A Sustainable Concept of Freedom and its Complements
Abstract

This essay is a study in normative political theory with the purpose to find what the implications will be if we adopt a certain concept of freedom to the problem with climate change and future generations, and, based upon normative assumptions and available theories; complement the concept of freedom as non-domination on the global level. Thus, the theoretical and analytical parts of this essay examines the implications of the most used concepts of freedom in the contemporary debate, namely the negative concept of freedom, the positive concept of freedom, and freedom as non-domination, it also examines which theories could serve as a complement to freedom as non-domination on the global level. The chosen method is an argumentation analysis. This essay argues and concludes that freedom as non-domination is the most promising concept of freedom to deal with the aspects of climate change and future generations, since it can secure freedom for current generations and future generations in regard to the environment, by including both a negative and a positive aspect of freedom. Furthermore, complements to freedom as non-domination must stress the importance of having laws and institutions that corresponds to the ideas and interest of those affected by them.

Keywords: Climate change, freedom, non-domination, negative freedom, positive freedom, interference, global governance, institutions, republicanism
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1. Introduction

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."

This is article 1 of the United Nations (UN) Declaration of human rights.\(^1\) Merge this article with the current climate negotiations and climate change, with an emphasis on the question of equality between generations and it becomes evident that this article appears to be nothing more than a vague incompatible ideal, where individuals and states freedom are incompatible with freedom between the current generation and future generations.\(^2\)

Climate change, which has already led to changes in the conditions of human life, will also affect the conditions for future generations to live good lives, according to the UN: s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC argues that these changes raise questions about social and economic equality, regarding how climate change will affect the equality of a generation and between generations,\(^3\) since “humans are the dominant cause of global warming.”\(^4\) While economists and climate scientists can clarify many of these aspects, the question of the correct system of “climate burden” is primarily a normative problem, where the IPCC does not specify what "ethical ideas of equality and justice shall issue any effective action against climate change" means.\(^5\) Climate change affects all states and people in the world, but those who will suffer the most are those who already suffer in the world. Developing states with high levels of poverty and other severe problems are those who need development the most and are the ones most determined to claim their rights to emissions that for example poverty reduction will result in. These states claim to have the same right to the same emissions as the more industrialized and rich states have historically done, and that these richer states should pay for any potential climate change; and that they are the ones that have to reduce their emissions in order to secure a sustainable climate.\(^6\)

Previous studies in political theory with focus on "climate change and intergenerational policy", has mainly focused on the above mentioned problem, where focus has been on equity issues such as "who should pay for climate change", or in general about cosmopolitan-, or distributive justice.\(^7\) What has not been a regular subject of studies in this field are concepts of

\(^1\) Swedish UN-Federation. UN: s declaration on human rights
\(^2\) Turesson (2011), p 5-6. 11-12
\(^3\) Page (2006), p 7
\(^4\) McGrath (2013), BBC
\(^5\) Page (2006), p 3
\(^6\) Turesson (2011), p 11-12
freedom associated with climate issues, where normative questions about how we should view the earth and what our freedom allows us to do with the earth in relation to the freedom of future generations, are the most relevant.\(^8\)

Isaiah Berlin (re)introduced two revolutionary concepts of freedom, *negative-and positive freedom*, in his famous essay “Two concepts of Liberty”, which was fundamental for a large part of the contemporary debate.\(^9\) In short, the concept of negative freedom tries to answer “what is the area within which the subject, a person or a group, is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do without interference by other persons?” Thus, being free means to not being interfered with by others and the wider the area of non-interference the wider is freedom. The positive concept of freedom tries to answer “what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, one thing rather than another?” Thus, the concept of positive freedom derives from the wish of the individual to be her own master.\(^10\) What lately has become the leading view of freedom in the field of global political theory is what Quentin Skinner has referred to as a “neo-roman” view of liberty, which has been rebranded “republican” by most of its followers.\(^11\) Philip Pettit has however set the terms of the contemporary debate about this concept of freedom with his influential construal of it as absence of “domination”, which he refers to as *non-domination*. Thus labeled, this concept of freedom makes the absence of domination fundamental to our being free, and being dominated, in turn, “involves occupying a position where another can interfere on an arbitrary basis in your life”.\(^12\)

This paper will argue that *freedom as non-domination* is more suitable to incorporate a concern for the climate and future generations than the concepts of *negative-* and *positive* freedom, since freedom as non-domination has recently become a benchmark for the interaction between states in world politics, allowing states to “identify a domain of international basic liberties that they can each simultaneously enjoy”.\(^13\) It has also become a principle of global justice, giving us “strong reasons for lifting people out of poverty and for reducing large inequalities (curbing or neutralizing the power of dominant states)”.\(^14\) Further, it has been invoked to ground human rights globally in a fundamental “right to have rights”, understood as “something like the right to contest those relations of power acting on you”;\(^15\)

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\(^8\) Haddad (2003), p 20  
\(^9\) Spector (2010), p 780  
\(^10\) Berlin (1967), p 155-156  
\(^13\) Pettit (2010), p 85  
\(^14\) Laborde (2010), p 60  
\(^15\) Ivison (2010), p 42
and it has been used to frame a global “democratic minimum”, allowing “people to claim their freedom and equality effectively in the specific situation of potential domination from the democratic deficit of the global system”. However, the usage of this concept in global political theory has been significantly broadened as well as loosened during time. It has been broadened to the range of conditions covered by the labels of domination, while it has been loosened as to the political preconditions deemed necessary for the promotion of freedom as the absence of domination. This usage seems too ambitious. Thus, this paper will also argue that we need to complement the concept of freedom as non-domination with other theories in order to embrace the questions of the climate and future generations.

We need to find good normative arguments for how we should act on the principles of freedom; if we accept article 1 of the Declaration of human rights as true; if we have obligations towards nature and future generations; and to what extent we can accept restrictions of our freedom to prevent climate change. In order to accomplish this task, it becomes crucial to find the implications of the mentioned concepts of freedom. Thus, the overall question for this essay is: *what will the implications be if we adopt these different concepts of freedom in regard to the environment and future generations, and what will serve as necessary complements to freedom as non-domination?*

**1.1 Purpose**
The purpose of this essay is to find what the implications will be if we adopt a certain concept of freedom to the problem with climate change and future generations, and, based upon normative assumptions and available theories; complement the concept of freedom as non-domination. To ease the reading, I will conduct the purpose by specific research questions, which will be as follows:

1. **What will the implications be for the climate and future generations if we adopt the positive concept of freedom?**
2. **What will the implications be for the climate and future generations if we adopt the negative concept of freedom?**
3. **What will the implications be for the climate and future generations if we adopt the concept of freedom as non-domination?**

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16 Bohman (2005), p 102
17 Enroth (2014), p 4
4. What will the necessary complements be in order for freedom as non-domination to take effective action against climate change?

This is an ambitious task, but I do not claim to give answers to all theoretical implications or scenarios that these various concepts could raise.

1.2 Selection of case and outline

This essay will be carried out as a study in normative political theory. A normative study is based on different values about how things should be designed which covers everything from how we as individuals must behave, to how we should organize our society. The key for a normative study is to present good arguments and reasoning that describe how we individually and collectively should act in order to live a good life. To conduct normative studies is to think and argue, to clarify the relation and view on the potential. Language is our main tool; we must therefore be careful to clarify our concepts and assumptions and endeavour to conduct a logically consistent argumentation.

The essay is organized as follows. The second part will provide the reader with the normative assumptions, where a background of the reasoning is given. Method and material will be discussed in the third part, where a short explanation of its implementation will be given. The fourth part will provide the reader with the theoretical background of the concepts of freedom that represent the research questions. I will answer the research questions in the fifth part and in that answer discuss various implications and necessary complements. The last part of this essay will summarize and discuss conclusions and results.

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18 Marsh & Stoker (2010), p 156
19 Rothstein (2002), p 11
2. Normative assumptions

I will here clarify my normative assumptions in order to ease the reader’s review of my arguments. I embrace the principles of liberalism, that all humans should be able to decide for themselves regarding their own objectives in life, and that everyone should be treated with equal respect and care. This should be understood as that we have rights that comes with our attribute of being human, not with our attribute of being member of a community or citizen of a certain state; and that these rights go beyond what the collective may decide on. More specifically, liberal egalitarianism advocates that their objective is to ensure equal opportunities for individuals to live good and fulfilled lives, and that we all are equally entitled to the same rights and freedom; where social and economic inequalities should be designed to benefit the most disadvantaged. The egalitarian idea of redistribution of resources can be connected with socialism, due to their desire to increase the joint distribution of resources in the society. Socialists mean that resources in the society, primarily the material, should be distributed jointly. These ideas can be seen as perfectionistic, since egalitarians argue that solidarity is valuable and that society should maintain it. This could be attached to the perfectionistic sides of socialism’s, where each person’s good depends on the opportunity to share it with others. I agree with the argument that any socialist constitution must contain a “bill of rights”, in order for the majority to not exercise unacceptable tyranny over the individual and its choices.

Libertarians advocate neutrality, that the state’s policy should stay neutral to different understandings of what may be desirable or essential, to what could be described as “the good life”. Liberty is the most valuable and central value for libertarians, where the space for compromising with freedom is extremely small. Accordingly, the state should devote itself to the protection of individual ownership and freedom, where the individual has the right to procure of nature what it may have to offer. If the individual devote their energy and effort in the nature, the individual have then right to extract its resources since the individual makes nature a part of the individual when the individual puts its energy and work in it. I do not share the libertarian standpoint of giving freedom lexical superiority over all other values, or

20 Dworkin (1977), p 182-183
22 Rawls (1999), p 199-200
23 Kymlicka (2002), p 56
24 Kymlicka (2002), p 166
25 Kymlicka (2002), p 216
26 Cohen (1986), p 87
27 Schmandt (1967) p 247
28 Schmandt (1967), p 250
what is sometimes argued, autonomy understood as a combination of freedom of action and a
capacity of action. I believe that the right to “complete” autonomy has to be balanced against
other values, which in this case are the environment and freedom for future generations.
I embrace the republican theory of freedom, specifically the concept of freedom as non-
domination, which will be properly explained in later parts. However, I can acknowledge here
that my attraction is based on its emphasis of the importance of: democratic participation, rule
of law, institutions, non-arbitrary interference, and other important elements that combined
can establish a free state both for the individual and the collective.²⁹ I also agree with Steven
Slaughter’s arguments, which will later be discussed, that the promotion of liberty have to
consider ecological forms of domination and that “republican principles and institutions could
develop a strong rationale that enables the state and citizens to politically interface with global
governance to more consistently address global problems such as environmental
degradation.”³⁰

Freedom as non-domination is most likely best for the climate, but the concept has been
broadened and loosened over time, which makes it difficult to keep the terms and definitions
apart of its usages in the contemporary debate.³¹ In my understanding, Slaughter does not
fully explain the usage of his arguments. For the discussion, I agree with Berlin, that
“everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice, or culture, or
human happiness, or a quiet conscience.”³² Hence, we need to complement freedom as non-
domination with other theories. When it comes to the climate and future generations, I believe
that the claims made by the IPCC are true and important. Stephen M Gardiner also argues that
the problem regarding climate change is the human freedom to negatively affect for
themselves and for others.³³ If humanity would want to do something about the climate threat
and adapt itself to a more sustainable usage of the climate, it could be done with relatively
low costs. The reason for why this is not happening to a sufficient extent is mostly because
that the sacrifice for climate adaptation will have to be done by current generations, who
according to Gardiner, does not have anything to gain from it. The potential winners of a
climate adoption are future generations that does not exist.³⁴ This is however not a legitimate
reason to ignore a climate adaptation. Even if this would mean that current generations would
have to make some sacrifices, it can never be morally justified to risk the freedom of future
generations. It is thus legitimate to intervene where threats to future generations’ freedom

²⁹ Pettit (1997), p 5, p 8-9
³⁰ Slaughter (2008), p 25
³¹ Enroth (2014), p 4 & p 6-7
³² Talisse (2012), p 9
³³ Gardiner (2004), p 558-559
³⁴ Gardiner (2004), p 572
exists.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, I will not argue for why the question of climate changes and future generations is important in this essay, I will assume that they are.

I have now briefly clarified the theoretical positions that will serve as a base for the continued and more thorough discussion in this essay. This raises many difficult and comprehensive questions that I will not be able to give all the answers to. This is however not reason enough to not address these questions and embrace the importance of them, this is what this essay shall do. With these assumptions I shall take on the essay; I shall strive towards being objective when discussing the various implications, although I admit, that my “background” is biased. However, the point of normative studies is how something should be.\textsuperscript{36} To ease the reading, it is meritorious to briefly clarify some of the most central concepts of this essay, which will perhaps not be properly explained later. The concepts of freedom will be defined and fully explained in later parts of this essay.

- Implications refer to: which restrictions are acceptable, what does our freedom allow us to do with the climate, and how should we view freedom in regard to climate changes and future generations?
- To protect the earth refers to: preserving the environment so that the ability of future generations to have freedom and live good lives is preserved.
- Good lives refer to: possess the ability to design the individual’s own lives according to their own will.
- Equality between generations refers to: to ensure equal opportunities to freedom and thus live good lives.

\textsuperscript{35} Gardiner (2004), p 577-578
\textsuperscript{36} Marsh & Stoker (2010), p 156
3. Method and material

Since the essay’s purpose is of a normative character, the most suitable to call this study is thus a normative study. The key in a normative study is to contribute with sustainable arguments about how things should be constructed from individual action to collective organization, thus this essay will be based on an analysis of arguments. An analysis of arguments is well suited as a method of normative essays since one of this method’s research areas is the usage of the philosophical study of arguments and their validity claims. That is, that the arguments brought up are sound arguments that support a position.  

Argumentation analysis is well suited since it contributes to "going deep" of the arguments and to focus on the logic of the arguments that will be addressed in the essay. Thus, it is possible to review arguments in order to test if they stand. The purpose of an argument analysis can be said to be to systematize and organize a sort of hierarchy of the arguments addressed. The study of the “desirable” differs from the traditional empirical analysis in social science. When the empirical analysis tries to bring order among fact and observations of reality, the normative analysis tries to bring order among and organize values and principles. Thus, the normative analysis tries to find what is “desirable”, and what its characteristics and preconditions are. These are important elements since it is crucial to be able to go in depth of the arguments for understanding the meaning and logic of those which are needed if the essay is to establish and demonstrate sound reasons for a hierarchy of the arguments that will be addressed in the essay. This method is practical implemented by testing the "thesis", which in this essay are the normative concepts and theories. In order to try whether or not a normative argument is "valid and durable", meaning if the probatory of an argument can be valued as high or not, we use three different ways of testing this, where all of them concerns what the argument analysis call "logos". Logos refers to that it is the logic in an argument that is determent, which aims to persuade by focusing on the receiver’s intellect and rational ability to draw conclusions.

Normative durability testing:

1. To examine whether the arguments are consistent with one’s own and others’ moral intuitions.
2. Investigating whether step 1 can be subsumed under any widespread normative beliefs, such as equality and environmental concerns for example.

37 Bergström & Boréus (2012), p 91-92
38 Bergström & Boréus (2012), p 93
3. The final way is to relate the normative arguments in actual cases, hence what does the action that the normative arguments commend or condemn mean for real people. Thus, what are the implications of the normative arguments and principles?39

A normative durability testing of an argument is thus a judgment if the arguments that will be discussed are true, likely or reasonable. This is subjected in turn of a judgment that is based on one’s moral intuition, what you think and why, also what the logic is in one’s moral intuition, if there is any logic.40 The contestation of the normative study’s scientific aspects has largely been based upon the assumption that judgments concerning values cannot be true or false. These assumptions are reasonable but not reason enough to reject the opportunity to conduct normative studies based on scientific premises. It is simple not about finding truths, it is about finding ways of systematically organizing, comparing and developing our values and norms and showing that some values and norms are more reasonable than other.41 It is about finding good arguments, which are based upon some basic principles about which it can hopefully exist a comprehensive consensus.42

Finally, normative studies and its interpretations are subjective, in the sense that they take their point of departure in normative questions. However, this is the purpose with normative studies, thus it will be important to deliver good arguments and to motivate my positions.43 In order to achieve intersubjectivity (that is the demand of reproducibility, the possibility to criticize, and objectivity) is it fruitful in the selection of material to use material that both are for and against my reasoning. In this way, the selection of arguments becomes crucial since it is through the selection that it will show if I have thought about all complicated and relevant scenarios of the arguments that will be discussed.44

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39 Bergström & Boréus (2012), p 126-127
40 Bergström & Boréus (2012), p 128
41 Badersten (2003/2004), p 207-208
42 Rothstein (2002), p 11
43 Bergström & Boréus (2012), p 133
44 Esaiasson, et al. (2007), p 44
4. Theory

4.1 Negative freedom
The negative concept of freedom aims to answer the question of “what/which area where an individual or individuals can or should do or be, without interference from others.”  

Hence, negative freedom is about what kind of limitations of individuals’ freedom that are possible or desirable. The traditional usage of this concept consists of the defence of the individual’s inviolable freedom, where the “negative” objective for freedom is the fight against potential limitations of freedom. Thus, negative freedom means freedom from interference, more precisely the absence of humanly imposed external constraints, which is the only freedom that is worth calling freedom according to this concept. The aim is that individuals should with their freedom, unhindered try to achieve their life goals in their own way. If this concept would rule, then the questions would be whether or not a limitation of an individual’s freedom is ever legitimate?  

Hence, the wider the area of non-interference the more extensive freedom becomes.

Berlin argued that negative freedom is concerned exclusively with opportunities, thus “a matter of which doors lie open to you.” Accordingly, the individual may well be free, even if the individual do not have the corresponding power or ability of a certain opportunity because they perhaps do not have the necessary means or skills. Accordingly, I may still be free even if I for example do not have the ability to play piano or read a Japanese newspaper. Hence, the important thing here consists of not being prevented from choosing by others. Another example of this concept that demonstrates its usages is the so-called “lucky slave”. This example intends to demonstrate the difference between the negative freedom and freedom as non-domination (which will be discussed more in later parts). Pettit, and others, argues that based on the negative concept, a slave can still be free, as long the slave is “lucky” enough to not be interfered with by his master. The lucky slave belongs to the master, but without actually being interfered with in his choices, due to a “kind” master or that the slave is cunning and can get away with doing whatever, the slave is accordingly free. Republicans would however argue that even if the slave is not interfered by his master,

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45 Berlin (1967), p 155
46 Van Hees (1998), p 176
47 Berlin (1967), p 157
48 Berlin (1967), p 155
49 Van Hees (1998), p 177
50 Spector (2010), p 781
51 Pettit (1997), p 80
52 Pettit (1997), p 22
he is nonetheless dominated since he is subject to the whim of his master; hence the lucky slave is thereby unfree.\textsuperscript{53}

When it comes to freedom and politics, Berlin argued that an individual is lacking political freedom only if the individual is prevented from attaining a goal by human interference.\textsuperscript{54} What follows is that the defence of freedom consists of the “negative” goal of warding of interference.\textsuperscript{55} A very relevant question for this concept is “how far does the government interfere with me?” Accordingly, the area of freedom must be limited by law and a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and public authority. Negative proponents have argued that it is necessary to have recognizable frontiers when it comes to freedom as absence of interference, since there has to be some element of constrains or coercion involved in the safeguarding of freedom. Although, all forms of coercion is, as far as it frustrate or prevent human desires, bad as such. However, the proponents argue that some sort of coercion may have to be applied in order to prevent other greater evils that can interfere with you and your choices, such as war or criminality. Non-interference is good in itself, meaning the desire not to be impinged upon but be left to oneself and one’s own choices, but in order to achieve this, the state is allowed to “interfere” and protect the individual from greater evils.\textsuperscript{56} Freedom in this sense is not incompatible with some types of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government. Hence, the negative concept of freedom is principally concerned with the area of control, not with its source. Accordingly, this concept does not necessarily take action against inequalities and injustices, but it leaves the individual with a wide area of freedom.\textsuperscript{57} Once again, this represents the desire to be liberated from some measure of constraints, but without any further desire to act in any particular way.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{53} Talisse (2012), p 1
\textsuperscript{54} Berlin (1967), p 156
\textsuperscript{55} Berlin (1967), p 157
\textsuperscript{56} Berlin (1967), p 159
\textsuperscript{57} Berlin (1967), p 160
\textsuperscript{58} Skinner (2002), p 241
4.2 Positive freedom
The positive concept of freedom tries to answer “what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, one thing rather than another?” Thus, the concept of positive freedom derives from the wish of the individual to be her own master.\textsuperscript{59} Advocators of this concept argue that the individual’s life and decisions should depend on the individual itself, not on external forces of whatever kind. Accordingly, what guides this concept is a wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are the individuals own, not by causes which affect the individual, as it were from outside, and so on.

Positive freedom, according to Berlin, is more positive towards potential restrictions of the individual freedom than the negative concept of freedom is. Unlike the negative concept, the positive concept of freedom is focused on the freedom of one’s self-mastery; where the aim is to be one’s own master; where individuals can decide for and over themselves. The objective is thus that individuals should decide for themselves how they want to live their lives and what gives purpose to them without being dependent on any external impact.\textsuperscript{60} To ensure that the individual’s freedom and self-determination is not dependent on someone or something, it would be beneficial if the society, which the individual is a part of, could intervene and secure everyone’s freedom from ending up in dependence. The positive concept of freedom thus enables an interference and a limitation of individuals ”total” freedom with the purpose of securing certain objectives that is in the interest of their freedom, that could be considered to serve as a “higher freedom”, for example education or public health. This in turn leads to the possibility of coercing people in order to achieve these “higher goals”, which individuals would choose if they were enlightened enough or not ignorant or corrupt. Advocates of this concept argue that they know what people need, collectively and individually, better than themselves. Berlin argued that once this position is taken; there is a room for ignoring the wishes of individuals and societies and to take it to the extreme, torture and oppress people due to the achievement of this “higher freedom”, whatever that may be.\textsuperscript{61}

These doubtful sides of positive freedom thus demonstrate perfectionistic understandings of value according to John Christman, but Christman claims that the positive concept can indeed represent the ideal of autonomy. Christman acknowledges the arguments that this understanding of freedom can lead to various difficulties that can be dangerous, but he insists that the positive freedom can be motivated by various considerations. Crucial considerations

\textsuperscript{59} Berlin (1967), p 155-156
\textsuperscript{60} Berlin (1967), p 160-161
\textsuperscript{61} Berlin (1967), p 162-163
are that freedom concerns not only interference by others or by natural circumstances, but also the individuals “effectiveness as an agent”. Effective agency is manifested not only by the individuals internal (or psychological) capacities to govern oneself, but also when it comes to the individual’s ability to perform her wishes though action. Accordingly, even if a person is not interfered with, the person may still be unable to act in any meaningful way, for example due to lack of resources and are thus unfree.\textsuperscript{62} Hence, positive advocators view freedom as something more than just a set of opportunities due to the removal of constraints, the realization of self-government can only be achieved through just institutions and policies that protects and develop the autonomy of the individuals powers and abilities through various processes involving for example educational, social, and personal resources.\textsuperscript{63}

Freedom as personal self-mastery should be facilitated, if not actively promoted, in a state that assures freedom as non-domination, since it must be easier for people to achieve autonomy when they are assured of not being dominated by others, according to Pettit. The role of the state should according to the positive concept explicitly focus on embracing the better ideal of promoting people’s personal autonomy. Positive proponents would argue that a state that would promote non-domination, would be far too austere to be compelling, and that we would need to ascribe the state our better ideals if we are to justify the political expectations. To this, Pettit argues that people can be trusted to maintain their own autonomy as long as they do live under a dispensation where individuals are protected from domination by others. Accordingly, the positive opponents of the state of non-domination can be persuaded “that there is no need to give the state explicit responsibility for promoting people’s personal self-mastery”.\textsuperscript{64} Positive proponents deny that an action is free simply because it occurred or was not prevented by obstacles; a free action must be the right sort of action, expressive for example of the person’s true self.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{62} Christman (2005), p 80-81
\textsuperscript{63} Christman (2005), p 87
\textsuperscript{64} Pettit (1997), p 82
\textsuperscript{65} Christman (2005), p 84
4.3 Freedom as non-domination

Skinner, who is one of the most influential writers about republican liberty, argues that Berlin misuses and is wrong when it comes to the usage of the term freedom, and thus there is a substantial gap about this term that needs to be dealt with. However, as mentioned in the introduction, it is Pettit that have been in charge of this task, or as Skinner said, “I seem to have lost this part of the argument”. Freedom as non-domination is negative to the extent that it requires the absence of domination by others, not necessarily the presence of self-mastery, whatever that may be. The concept is positive in one respect, that it needs something more than just absence of interference; it requires security against interference on arbitrary basis. Pettits usage of “absence of domination” points out that our liberty, which is absence of domination, is essential to our being free. Domination occurs when someone has dominating power over another, someone dominates or subjugates another to the extent that:

1. they have the capacity to interfere
2. on an arbitrary basis
3. in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.

This kind of interference is always aiming to worsen the agent’s number of options available, by changing the number of options available or taking control over which outcomes will result from which options. Accordingly, it is vital to have the context in mind when determining if a given act worsens someone’s choice situation, since the context makes the baseline by which we determine whether or not the effect is a worsening one. However, the capacity to interfere must be a “real capacity”, a capacity that is more or less ready to be exercised, not a capacity that is not fully developed. For example, there is a difference if you know how to play piano, from the mere possibility that you perhaps have the capacity to play piano. An act perpetrated of arbitrary basis is referring to the “arbitrium”, the decision or judgment, of the agent; where the agent was in a position to choose it or not, at their pleasure. An act of arbitrary interference is chosen or rejected without reference to the interests or opinions of those affected. Thus, an act of arbitrary interference is referring to the aspects of control, specifically the lack of control under which the act can take place. An act of interference is non-arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and ideas of those affected by the interference. If the interference is not forced to track all the interests and ideas of the individuals involved, they should then have the right to make demands and have the right to question if the interference at least tracks their most relevant interest. The relevant

66 Skinner (2002), p 239
67 Skinner (2008), p 84
68 Pettit (1997), p 51
69 Pettit (2002), p 341
70 Pettit (1997), p 52-53
ideas and interests are those shared with others, since the state should serve others as well. In this way, freedom as non-domination shows both an equalitarian and a communitarian side. An equalitarian side due to its emphasis of polices that treats people as equals. However, treating people as equals does not necessarily mean equal treatment in for example, the share of a public provided good. A communitarian side due to its feature of what may serve as common goods, and that the state has a task through its laws and institutions, to promote these goods. Freedom as non-domination rejects however the communitarian assumption that a focus of common goods cannot be combined with a room for neutrality.

Domination can also come in the shape of the grievance of “having to live at the mercy of another, having to live in a manner that leaves you vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a position to arbitrarily impose.” For example, the grievance of a wife to an abusive husband, who dares not raise a complaint for fear of repercussions. This case is an example of unquestionable domination, even when “no arm is raised” as Pettit puts it, which indicates that domination also occurs when there is no actual interference made by the dominator over the choices of the dominated. In these kinds of situations is domination referring to the dominator’s capacity to interfere on arbitrary basis, not on the dominators actual interference.

These arguments comply with the lucky slave and the kind master, that it is possible to lose freedom even without actual interference, and that it is possible to have interference without any loss of freedom, as long as the interference is without domination. For example, a properly constituted law, the law that answers systematically to people's general interest and ideas, represent a form of interference. It does not however decrease people’s freedom; it constitutes a non-mastering interferer, and thus non arbitrary laws create freedom to be enjoyed by citizens. Hence, it is required for the state to exercise its powers in accordance with the welfare and world view of the affected public that is based upon their interest and ideas. To find if an act of interference is dominating or not is through politics, the role of the state is thus to promote non-domination through institutions that should be designed to maximize people’s enjoyment of non-domination. Accordingly, the state and its institutions must operate by law. Laws involving power sharing; a counter majoritarian condition; and

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71 Pettit (1997), p 54-55
73 Pettit (1997), p 120-121
74 Pettit (1997), p 4-5
75 Pettit (1997), p 5
76 Pettit (1997), p 52
77 Pettit (1997), p 35-36
78 Pettit (1997), p 56-57
need of discretion. To achieve this, freedom as non-domination requires contestation, which will be made possible through democratic processes and systems, meaning that it should be possible to contest what the state and its institution do. Hence, democratic preconditions for non-domination, is that the democracy is deliberative and inclusive.\(^{80}\)

5. Analysis

5.1 Negative freedom and its implications
We start from the assumptions that coercion and interference is bad per se, and that non-interference is always something good. However, the negative concept of freedom realizes that “we cannot remain absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest.”\(^{81}\) Berlin argued that simply the awareness of living in a state of social or political dependence is not enough to count as a restriction of our options and thereby a restriction of our freedom. If we are dealing with constraints of freedom, we must be able to point to some intruder, an identifiable act of hindrance, the aim or consequences of which was to impede or interfere with individual’s freedom.\(^{82}\) Negative proponents will argue that the will is autonomous so long as it is neither threatened nor coerced.\(^{83}\) The threat of climate change is mostly for future generations, can it thus legitimate interference by the state?

On the one hand, negative proponents would want to protect individuals from clear cases of interference such as an environmental catastrophe or from dangerous chemicals in meat. On the other hand, these proponents would most likely resist interference from “indirect” cases of climate interference. For example, the fact that you drive a car and you eat meat. Even if the effects from these actions contributes to a worsened climate, it would be difficult to argue that someone is interfering with others freedom if they would exercise any of these actions.

One thing negative proponents would have to deal with is whether or not we can “close some doors that are open”\(^{84}\) for us. Hence, close some opportunities due to polices that strive at saving the environment and thus can “open doors” for future generations. Negative proponents would be against interference from climate change made by humans, and they would most likely want the state to deal with this interference. For example, negative

\(^{80}\) Pettit (1997), p 276-277
\(^{81}\) Berlin (1967), p 158-159
\(^{82}\) Skinner (2002), p 256
\(^{83}\) Skinner (2002), p 263
\(^{84}\) Berlin (1967), p 155
proponents could accept paying taxes in order for the state to protect you from global warming, so the state can for example build water barriers that would protect you from an increased sea-level.

Even if negative advocators would desire to not being interfered with, they would not automatically accept restrictions of their freedom. They would argue that as long as their own actions do not interfere with someone else, they should be able to do what they want. Thus, I may use the environment as seems right to me, as long as I do not interfere with someone else. Accordingly, the state should deal with actual interference from climate change, not necessarily what causes it. If the individual’s resources are a part of the individual’s autonomy, interference in these resources would mean interference in the individual’s freedom. For example, if the state taxes my income to protect me from the threat of climate change, the negative I could accept it, since it protects me from this threat. This interference thus puts the individual in a situation where he can use his opportunities and choose “which door(s) he wants to open”. However, if the state would tax individuals from the basis of their choices, then the state would exercise unacceptable acts of perfectionistic interference in individuals’ freedom. For example, if the state would close some doors for you, or hinder you from choosing some doors, for the “noble cause” of promoting future generations’ freedom, the state would still exercise unacceptable interference. The implication could be that states refrain from imposing higher taxes on specific choices that contributes to a worsened environment, such as higher taxes on petrol or on meat. Negative proponents would not allow that their freedom of choice should be dictated by the state. Accordingly, states should refrain from controlling what people eat or how they travel.

The view of the environment would thus be that nature and its resources is something that individuals should not be refrained from since that would mean interference in the individual’s autonomy and thus freedom would lose its value. Accordingly, it would be difficult to legitimate interference for future threats that are hard for current generations to identify as “identifiable acts of hindrance”. Even if people know that this threat is real and dangerous, the state should not force people to choose “doors” that gains future generations. If people would want to choose these doors, they should do so because they want to, not because they are forced to. Thus, freedom for future generations is something we can choose or not choose. Global warming would be a problem if it interferes with you and your choices. If freedom of choice would be decreased by climate change, is it then possible to speak of interference once the “doors are closed” for future generations? Would it not be more accurate

85 Schmandt (1967), p 250-251
to speak of domination then? Where actual interference takes place, that changes the set of opportunities for the individual, freedom would have been decreased. When future generations will live, their set of choices would compared to current generations’ be less, but the reduction of choices came for current generations. Even if future generations would have fewer opportunities compared with current generations, the doors would already be closed for them. Hence, it would be more accurate to say that future generations would be dominated by a worsened climate rather than interfered. This reconnects with the example of the “lucky slave”. Accordingly, as long as the climate does not interfere with you and your choices, you are free to use the opportunities that you have. Thus, future generations would be free even if they would be subjected by an increased global temperature, they would only be unfree if they are interfered in their choices.

If the overall negative freedom depends on the opportunities an individual can choose without interference or without threat of interference, current generations should be free to choose things that can harm themselves and the environment, as long as they do not harm anyone else. If choices would be restricted or hindered to gain future generations “set of choices”, would mean that current generations would be unfree. If current generations would choose to refrain from certain “doors”, then it would be possible to combine freedom for current and future generations. Thus, the role of the state would be to protect living generations from interference in their “set of choices”.

On the global level, negative proponents would most likely not have anything against cooperation regarding climate change. However, negative proponents would most likely reject global forms of interference from global institutions and treaties that could interfere with states’ and thus its citizens’ choices. For example, the United States of America’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Treaty on emission. They saw a reason to deal with the climate on the global level, but failed to accept interference in their choices, since they could not accept the “perfectionistic idea” of having interference in their choices while having no interference in the developing countries choices. Thus, they did not accept the absence of neutral interferences.

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86 Van Hees (1998), p 194-195
87 Turesson (2011), p 11
5.2 Positive freedom and its implications
We take our point of departure from the individuals’ wish to be her own master, and that freedom refers to something, where the utopia is self-mastery. Thus, the state’s explicit responsibility is to promote personal self-mastery by securing certain objectives in the interest of individuals’ “higher freedom”. As mentioned earlier, in order to achieve these “higher goals”, which individuals would choose if they were enlightened enough or not ignorant or corrupt, it becomes possible to coerce people since positive proponents could argue that they know what people need, collectively and individually, better than themselves.\(^\text{88}\) This could produce various implications since states, according to Pettit, come in many different forms and editions in terms of territory and demography with various forms of powers and ways of organizing the state’s business.\(^\text{89}\) Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that these differences produce different conditions for freedom and different meanings of freedom, and thus, different views of climate change and its impacts.

Climate changes are primarily caused by fossil fuels, fuels that have different impacts and meaning for the conditions of living, both for current and future generations. Fossil fuels have mainly two consequences. Firstly, they mean great advantages through its energy production that is vital for many people. Secondly, fossil fuels are a threat against mankind due to its negative effects on the environment. Fossil fuels’ “pros and cons” will affect future generations differently compared with the current. The “pros” are especially for current generations that often only experience the short-term affects. While future generations will primarily experience the long-term disadvantages from previous generations’ actions. Accordingly, as long as a high usage of energy is associated with self-interest, current generations have strong selfish reasons to ignore the worst aspects of climate changes. This problem is heritable since every future generation will inherit the decision-making power over what to do with the environment or not. Hence, protect future generations’ freedom from climate changes or to maximize current generations’ freedom.\(^\text{90}\)

This indicates that to be free to something does not mean that you can be free to everything. Two main implications regarding the environment can be produced from the “higher values” of society that have various implications by themselves. Firstly, that nature should be viewed as something individuals and societies have the right to, and thus right to its resources to obtain other “higher values” for individuals to enjoy, whatever it may be, that gives individuals the means to self-mastery. For example, some developing or previous developing

\(^{88}\) Berlin (1967), p 162-163
\(^{89}\) Pettit (2010), p 71
\(^{90}\) Gardiner (2004), p 595
states, have prioritized values such as economic growth, better material standards of living, employment and so on, over values regarding the environment, that have been prioritized to enhance lives and thus to increase peoples self-mastery.\textsuperscript{91}

Accordingly, it would be difficult to allow restrictions which limit the usage of nature and its resources, since that would lead to a restriction of people’s ability to self-mastery. If above values are considered to be the higher values of the society’s total value, some choices would be dominated by these “higher values”. For example, choices for those who do not have higher material standers of living as their understanding of the good live, but have a usage of a healthy environment as their understanding of the good life. In the short run, this would lead to an increased freedom for current generations, but in the long run, the impacts looks grim for future generations’ freedom due to a worsened climate that would restrict their lives. It would be difficult for current generations to have a concern for future generations’ freedom, since restrictions of their freedom due to future generations’ freedom, would mean that future generations are the masters of their freedom.

The second “main” implication takes an opposite direction, where a sort of “radical environmentalism” could be implemented. In this scenario, the state’s polices would be guided by “higher values” that would correspond to a protection of the environment. These values would stress people’s right to a good environment. For example, to live in harmony with nature. In order to achieve this, choices that does not correspond to whatever “living in harmony with the environment” means, could be forbidden in order for the state to promote the greater good of living in harmony with the environment. Accordingly, protection of the climate would be achieved, but at the cost of the choices that are not in line with the dominating perception of self-mastery. For example, the usage of non-renewable fuels, such as fossil fuels and nuclear power, since they can damage the environment and thus hinders people’s freedom to a harmony with the environment. If it would be forbidden to eat meat or to travel, the protection of the environment would benefit from it, but at the cost of being left with choices that does not correspond to the perception of the good life for some. If people only have right to resources from sources that does not harm the environment, the freedom for future generations would probably be saved in the regard of having a good environment, and they would thus have self-mastery.

Thus, this implication would be achieved by extensive restrictions of freedom for some in the current generations, freedom to choose what makes a good life for them.\textsuperscript{92} However, even if

\textsuperscript{91} Turesson (2011), p 11-12
one state would live in complete harmony with the nature and would have no carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, that state could still be exposed to other states view of freedom in regard to the environment. For example, Bhutan, a state with few CO2 emissions compared to its neighbouring state China, and their very high levels of CO2 emissions, could still be dominated by China and the world’s total emission. Since freedom means self-mastery, the source of control over an individual would most likely not be given to a cosmopolitan institution that deals with the environment, since proponents of positive freedom resist to be controlled of some external force, which a cosmopolitan institution could be claimed to be. Hence, there would still be a risk of having for example a global warming and thus a risk for future generations’ freedom.

5.3 Freedom as non-domination and its implications

Pettit argues that freedom as non-domination “gives us salient reasons why we should be concerned about other species and about our ecosystem more generally.” Accordingly, caring about our shared environment and whatever harm is done to it can be translated as follows: “That any damage is done to the environment – the environment of subgroups, of the society as a whole, or of all societies on earth – means that there is an assault on at least the range of our non-dominated choice.” Furthermore, “even if the damage comes about inadvertently, or as the aggregate outcome of individually innocent actions, it counts as a loss in the ledger-book of republican freedom.”

Slaughter claims that certain restrictions and limitations in the society are necessary in order to ensure that individuals will not be placed under a form of domination. What Slaughter have in mind is a type of “governance” that neither (completely) embrace the free marked or an socialist form of governance, but rather a sort of “middle-position” between these two values, where the state have the right to interfere in order to protect individuals from domination due to an damaged environment. Thus, the state must protect individuals’ right to freedom from environmental problems that have potential to restrain and reduce individuals’ freedom.

The climate threat is potentially the biggest threat against individuals’ freedom a state can have, since the climate threat affects everyone in a state. With this in mind, it would be

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92 Pettit (1997), p 133-136
93 The World Bank (2010), CO2 emissions (kt)
94 Berlin (1967), p 160-161
96 Pettit (1997), p 138
97 Slaughter (2008), p 26
98 Slaughter (2008), p 27
motivated for individuals to work collectively toward this collective threat. This should be made through individuals’ actions as citizens, where citizens view environmental threats as threats against their individual freedom. This would legitimize interference and actions from the state. People that are not dominated can compensate for the interference through reprioritization or further efforts; in order for them to live the lives they want to if they have resources and choices available. For example, as long as my freedom to travel remains and I have enough resources through reprioritization or extra efforts by working harder or saving more money by decreasing other things that harm the environment, my possibility to live a life of my choosing have not been jeopardized. Hence, we can accept interference in peoples’ access to resources in order to finance a” perfectionistic” climate policy, if we collectively believe that the environment is worth saving. Thus, the state should promote these environmental concerns.

Non-interference has thus alone no” higher value by itself”. If there would be no options available to live good lives, or autonomy without a climate that brings no options of choice available, would not be of great help in our achievement of our purposes. Same with the positive concept, we are not against perfectionistic values in itself, but rather that it can arbitrary interfere and thus close opportunities for people. Accordingly, we are not defending people’s right to live under freedom as non-domination for non-domination’s own sake; it is because we believe that it is only under the circumstance of non-domination that we can live our lives the way we want to. Hence, autonomy is not an intrinsic value per se; it has a value to the extent it allows and helps us to achieve our goals that creates a good life. It is our understanding of what the good life consist of that gives purpose to our lives, not our resources our autonomy alone, and this is why we need to be free from domination in our lives.

Individuals and societies can have different understanding of the good life and which restrictions in regard to the environment that is necessary. Thus, we must safeguard everyone’s freedom from domination. Which restrictions and interferences in people’s lives we can accept dependents on whether or not they affects our choices negatively on arbitrary basis, and thus our possibilities to live good lives. We must therefore separate between arbitrary interference and interference that tracks our interests and ideas that we also share

99 Slaughter (2008), p 28
100 Slaughter (2008), p 30
101 Pettit (1997) p, 90-91 & 137
102 Pettit (2002), p 349-350
with others.\textsuperscript{104} If we individually and collectively believe that climate change is dangerous, we must dare to interfere accordingly. Freedom as non-domination needs the existence of several alternatives, thus our capacity to make choices. Accordingly, if we close opportunities to make choices we have closed what makes a good life for some. Alternatives are of course of different meaning for us, individually and collectively, and perhaps a proponent of positive perfectionism would suggest that we can allow that” less meaningful” alternatives should be erased from the equation. This would be arbitrary interference and hence domination of what perceptions of the good that should be available. For example, if we forbade people to eat meat or to drive their vehicles, we would have arbitrarily made their choice situation impossible. Thus, we cannot accept perfectionistic interference that would dominate which options are available for us. However, the state can promote environmentally friendly choices such as subsidizing organic food, and thus make choices that are bad for the environment harder, for example raising taxes on petrol and meat.

Interference with people’s resources is thus different from interference in people’s freedom. The interference of resources does not have to eliminate specific choices. The state that restricts people’s resources does not have to take an arbitrary side against different understandings of the good and can accordingly remain neutral to people’s understanding of the good life.\textsuperscript{105} When our access to resources is interfered, our opportunity to achieve our understanding of the good life becomes harder. We must thus remember that restrictions of resources should be done carefully.\textsuperscript{106} Where this line should be drawn, which interferences in our resources that should be made so that we can maintain our freedom and a sustainable climate, demands its own essay where economists and scientists are probably more suitable to give the answer. A precondition is that it takes place in a situation under non-domination, since it is not a goal in itself to make people’s lives harder. This does not mean that we can, as some negative proponents would claim,\textsuperscript{107} categorically resists from interfering with people’s resources, in the same way as freedom as non-domination would reject perfectionistic restrictions of people’s freedom. To summarize, freedom as non-domination offers a possibility to maintain freedom for current generations and for future generations. Thus, freedom as non-domination offers a more promising alternative to deal with climate change than the negative- and the positive concept of freedom.

\textsuperscript{104} Pettit (2010), p 74-75
\textsuperscript{105} Pettit (1997) p, 36, 60-61
\textsuperscript{106} Pettit (1997) p, 93 & p 111-112
\textsuperscript{107} Haddad (2003), p 20-21
5.4 Freedom as non-domination with its complements

We have identified that freedom as non-domination is the most promising concept to tackle climate change. So far so good, but who launches the assault regarding climate change; who are the “dominating parties”? And who are “we” in this case? Agent-oriented terms such as “assault” do not suit cases where “the range of our un-dominated choice” may well be affected, not necessarily or solely by identifiable agents acting on intent. In Pettit’s examples, domination is a relationship between specific agents where the dominator is in a position to arbitrarily interfere with the choices of the dominated. Furthermore, “a dominating party will always be an agent it cannot just be a system or a network of whatever, and interference always has to be more or less intentional in character.”109 What should we make of cases where no such agency in the global context can be identified, situations where we are dealing not only with willful domination but with unintended outcomes of individual and collective action? Take climate change, a problem, of historically unparalleled complexity in terms of “multiple driving forces, strong feedback loops, long time lags, and abrupt change behavior.”110

Pettit has acknowledged that “in the world as it is now every state is liable to be indirectly and adversely affected by what in an earlier period would have been innocent initiatives on the part of others.” Pettit leaves it however for states to establish, “by means of international debate, grounded in the acceptance of certain common reasons,” where “they may be harming one another and where the limits should naturally be set to the freedom as non-domination they may claim.”111 Other republican proponents suggest that if we want to analyze domination in the global context we need to drop the idea of agent’s. Cécile Laborde has argued that the term “domination” refer “not only to interpersonal relationships but to basic systemic power structures”.112 Accordingly, domination is not primarily described as a relationship between agents brought about by one agent’s will and ability to dominate; it is described as a general condition generated by the global economic order and its forces.113 This produces “more diffuse forms of social domination” that proliferate in the global domain.114 Even if “diffuse forms of domination” would be present, is it not enough to merely highlight its presence, there need to be solutions. Skinner stresses the importance of good and functional institutions that can “provide” freedom for all of the society’s members and uphold

108 Enroth (2014), p 10
109 Pettit (1997), p 52
110 Steffen (2011), p 22
111 Pettit (2010), p 85
112 Laborde (2010), p 54
113 Laborde (2010), p 58
114 Laborde (2010), p 50
a “free state” where all forms of discretionary or arbitrary powers are eliminated.\textsuperscript{115} Thus, complements to freedom as non-domination is needed since the primary focus is the state and its role towards its citizens.\textsuperscript{116} Or as James Bohman said, “the problem of domination can no longer be solved according to the old republican formula that to be free is to be a citizen of a free state.”\textsuperscript{117}

Climate change is a global problem and thus we need to extend our political ideas of democracy and community.\textsuperscript{118} If there was no global coordination of the efforts by states to reduce their GHG emissions, states can be undermined by a host of other states. Every state that has significant emissions, is developing a capacity for large scale emissions, or could develop such capacities, has the potential to undermine other nations’ mitigation efforts.\textsuperscript{119}

Thus, institutions on the global level are vital for ensuring that states do not dominate other states. The European Union (EU) can serve as an example. The “institution EU” consists of twenty-eight member states, where all states have agreed to (amongst other things) a mutually legal binding goal of reduction of GHG, due to their preconditions, thus their context. The EU is currently responsible for ten percent of the world’s total GHG emissions, and has the world’s most ambitious climate policy. However, the question is how to establish an institutional order without neglecting democratic processes, since the EU can hardly save the climate by itself.\textsuperscript{120} The “demos” that previous were taken for granted are now being questioned, often in regard to a cosmopolitan demos. David Held has argued that issues with a global range, such as climate issues, must, if democracy should not be eroded, be dealt with by a global demos.\textsuperscript{121} However, as previous climate negotiations have shown, not every question can be solved on the global level.\textsuperscript{122} Hence, it is still important with freedom as non-domination at the state level, but it needs to be complemented on the global level, especially since the existing system of universal rights, determined by the UN: s Declaration of human rights and that international legislation under the post –Westphalia era, is increasingly formulated in terms of individuals and their rights, not in terms of nations and their rights.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{115} Skinner (2002), p 258
\textsuperscript{116} Pettit (1997), p 5-6
\textsuperscript{117} Bohman (2004), p 352
\textsuperscript{118} Bohman (2004), p 352 & Slaughter (2008), p 26
\textsuperscript{119} Maltais (2008), p 16
\textsuperscript{120} Ek & Hatt, (2014), SvD & European Commission (2014), Climate Action
\textsuperscript{121} Held (2005), p 187-188
\textsuperscript{122} Turesson (2011), p 11-12
\textsuperscript{123} Held (2006), p 685-687
Since states and individuals are affected by each other’s freedom to treat the environment according to their own notion of freedom, a mutual understanding to a mutual problem is needed. If we reconnect the communitarian side of non-domination, and its focus on common goods, and extending it to the global level, it could be beneficial to complement non-domination with some of Gerald Cohen’s arguments for a joint ownership. Cohen tries to distinguish how abilities and inabilities are rewarded in a jointly-owned world, where self-ownership and the joint ownership of the external world is combined and how distribution affects the self-ownership. Cohen uses an example of a society consisting of two persons, Able and Infirm. Both own themselves and together they own everything else. Able can produce. Infirm cannot produce. We assume that both are rational and self-serving. We then ask them which sort of production and distribution they consider to be reasonable. Thus, we obtain the reward of the self-ownership in a society without private ownership. Able and Infirm are now not only dependent of each other, but also of how the world is materially. The point is that Able’s abilities do not affect how much he gets. This creates a situation where Infirm have a sort of veto over Able, due to his part of the ownership.

In regard to what Pettit describes about separate opportunities for individuals and states freedom, we can conclude that a joint ownership would also mean a joint concept of freedom that would be equal for all, regardless of power or population. However, I am not arguing for a global end of private ownership, I am merely stressing that there may be a need of combining freedom with a joint ownership if we are to find a common solution to a common problem and this can be a way of seeing the climate problem. This would in some ways give a “veto” against states that have a capacity to arbitrarily interfere with other states. It can also be argued that some states are more able and some more infirm, but that should not legitimate environmental policies that the other part is being dominated by. This idea is however far from simple to apply in reality and as Cohen claims, there are flaws in this somewhat perfectionistic world order, such as the lack of rights and laws that would correspond to the “global people”.

If we should “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” as the article that began this essay states, the discussion of necessary complements moves to the aspects of cosmopolitan justice. Contemporary cosmopolitanism is often focused on the following normative ideas:

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124 Pettit (1997), p 121
125 Cohen (1986), p 80-81
126 Pettit (2010), p 70-71
each individual has moral worth, this moral worth is equal regardless of the state or community one belongs to, and these facts generate some limited set of moral standards that are binding for everyone everywhere. Meaning in regard to the environment, that we are part of a global moral community where we have equal rights to a good climate. Thus, the demands of justice must be separated to some degree, from the territorial bounds of the state. Cosmopolitanism is thus a challenge to current practice where we are thought to have demanding duties of distributive justice within the state but not over state borders. Furthermore, a global government even if democratically controlled (assuming global democracy is possible) is nevertheless a form of political authority that is by design highly centralised and distant from individual subjects in terms of the weight of their influence on policy.\textsuperscript{128}

One of the most influential thinkers regarding cosmopolitan justice, Thomas Nagel, argues that the problem lies in how we can make rights and opportunities that are true and legitimate within the state, to be applicable globally.\textsuperscript{129} Hence, how can we make environmental policies in non-dominating states to work globally? The real world consists of more than two persons, compared to Cohen’s example with Able and Infirm, where the differences between states are vast. Nagel argues that this problem could be tackled from two positions.

The first position is cosmopolitanism that was stated above, where for example the arbitrariness of being born in a poor country versus a rich country should not affect individuals’ opportunities to live a good life.\textsuperscript{130} Hence, the freedom of swedes who enjoy their rich state are as important as the freedom for individuals born on the Maldives, a poor country facing an increased sea-level due to climate change.\textsuperscript{131} To take the argument to its extreme, theoretically it is not the sea-level that is a threat to the Maldives and its citizens, the threat is individuals and states freedom to use their freedom in a way that increases the sea-level.

Accordingly, we need to find a concept of freedom that satisfies the issues of the environment and intergenerational equity, or the Maldives would in the near future be under water.\textsuperscript{132} Perhaps you as a reader think “why is it needed to bring this problem to the global level if all states would just adopt environmentally friendly policies?” The answer is that we would still need an institution on the global level that overlooks aspect of the climate, and premises that

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{128}] Maltais (2008), p 24-25
  \item[\textsuperscript{129}] Nagel (2005), p 115
  \item[\textsuperscript{130}] Nagel (2005), p 119
  \item[\textsuperscript{131}] Härdmark (2009), Fokus
  \item[\textsuperscript{132}] Dagens Nyheter (2009-10-17)
\end{itemize}
are or are not universal, as Lena Halldenius have argued, “where there are no institutions, one is neither free nor unfree in the republican sense. The issue does not rise.”

The second position is the political conception of justice. Accordingly, sovereign states are not merely instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among people. Their existence is precisely what gives the value of justice its application. Thus, an institutional relation must be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that makes the content of justice. Nagel stresses that the problem of introducing a global justice is in the dilemma of choices and premises that may differ in different states, and to combine demands and obligations in a state to the global level, would be to allow some degree of arbitrarily coercion. It is this problem that has led to the resistance towards the erosion of sovereignty that for example resulted in the United States of America’s refusal to join the Kyoto Treaty on atmospheric emissions that have been widely criticized, and why some criticize the “illegitimatize” of the EU. Thus, republican proponents need to discuss how we can combine freedom with a global institution. It is here Slaughter fails to bring any answers, when he argues that republicans needs to extend the problem of global environmental degradation to the global level, while still holding on to the republican idea of the state to respond to its citizens.

If the prospects of having a cosmopolitan justice or a joint ownership looks less feasible, perhaps a republican law of the peoples is more feasible than a global institution, as Halldenius argues “where there is no law, one is neither free nor unfree in the republican sense.” However, the absent of an institutional order to enforce these laws would affect the credibility of a system of coordinated and effective climate policies. Hence, significant reductions of GHG emissions cannot be achieved through international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol, which are without strong systems for compliance.

133 Halldenius (2010), p 17
134 Nagel (2005), p 120
135 Nagel (2005), p 146-147
136 Nagel (2005), p 136 & 144
137 Slaughter (2008), p 30
138 Halldenius (2010), p 19
139 Maltais (2008), p 15-16
6. Conclusion

I have argued that freedom as non-domination is the most promising concept of freedom to deal with climate change since it takes advantage of both the positive and negative aspects of freedom by freedom from domination. People who are being dominated, and thus unfree, can regardless of their potential self-mastery and access to resources in the positive sense, and regardless of their absent of interference in the negative sense, not use the opportunities that have been closed to them. However, the one whose access to resources are interfered with due to environmental concerns, can as long as enough resources are maintained and the free choice remains, reprioritize and use further efforts to compensate for the interfered room to maneuver.\(^\text{140}\) The negative aspect of freedom remains since it is primarily people’s resources we interfere with, not their choices. Thus, we secure that people will not be dominated by the environment. Accordingly, we cannot allow the state to restrict people’s freedom based upon perfectionistic arguments, but we can accept that some of these choices are made harder due to our concern for the environment.

Hence, we respect peoples final freedom to choose what constitutes a “good life”, even if we would make some choices more difficult, choices that harm the environment, and ease environmentally friendly choices. We have accepted interference, but not on an arbitrary basis. Thus, we save the freedom to determine about one’s own life in a situation of non-domination.\(^\text{141}\) Who lives a” good life” and who does not, is of course not for the state to decide, but even if we cannot decide about the lives of others, we may have good reasons to assume that certain choices lead to better outcomes than others. In this essay, I assume that the protection of the environment leads to better lives than if we would not protect the environment. Accordingly, if states or institutions should refrain from promoting or offering choices and opportunities that our premises and values require, they would be apathetical towards the problems of climate change.\(^\text{142}\) Freedom should be viewed as a tool for humans to live good lives, since it is only when we are free we can be considered to realize our lives.\(^\text{143}\) Hence, we cannot allow current generations to destroy the earth and the environment, in regard to our- and future generations’ freedom. Therefore we must not hesitate to interfere, but not arbitrarily, in current generation’s freedom to complete self-mastery or their desire of complete absence of interference, when it comes to the usages of the resources and the wellbeing of the environment. Followers of the negative- and the positive concept of freedom

\(^{140}\) Rawls, (1999), p 61
\(^{141}\) Rawls (1999), p 203-204 & Pettit (1997), p 93
\(^{142}\) Raz (2001), p 124-125
\(^{143}\) Kymlicka (2002), p 222
would argue that I have grown silent on freedom and decreased its value. Interference will take place, but not on arbitrary basis, and in fact, the most valuable aspect of freedom has been protected, which is the final right to self-determination over a person’s life, both for current and future generations.

I have argued that freedom as non-domination needs to be complemented on the global level due to the global aspects of climate change. This argumentation shows that we have decisive reasons to secure institutional conditions at the global level where we could collectively respond to the threat of global warming. I have stressed the republican importance of institutions and the rule of law on the global level, but by doing so, I have acknowledged the difficulty of this regarding democratic deficit; deliberative democracy; ownership; cosmopolitan and distributive justice. I will stress the importance of initiating a discussion of how to combine several aspects for the mutual goal to protect the environment.

Normative ideas are of prime importance in politics. Since it is only possible for politicians and public officials to gain support for the policies they pursue to the extent that they can represent them as legitimate;” to the extent that they can represent them as policies that are motivated by this or that agreed, or more or less agreed, commitment.”144 As mentioned earlier, it is important for the sake of the discussion to take concepts and theories for what they are. However, it is vital that we find ways to combine freedom with other theories in order for us to deal with climate change on a global level. This could be described with a quote often used by the egalitarian philosopher Ronald Dworkin, “The fox knows many things, the Greeks said, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” Meaning that value in all its forms is one big thing where different things are mutually supporting.145 Thus, I believe we need one “big solution” to climate change, consisting of several aspects rather than several solutions with few aspects. I have tried to show that this is something that future studies needs to deal with, in one way or the other, with the goal of fighting climate change for our sake and for future generations’.

144 Pettit (1997), p 1
145 Dworkin (2011), p 1
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