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DRIVING FORCES INFLUENCING DEBATE ON INTENSIFIED FINNISH-SWEDISH DEFENCE COOPERATION

Summary:
This descriptive study focuses on analyzing the factors influencing public debate on intensified Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation, using qualitative abductive content analysis (a combination of Grounded theory analysis and text/content analysis) as the research method. The study was conducted using a model adapted from Tomas Valasek’s hypothesis on pooling and sharing (Surviving Austerity - The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration, 2011), inducted from a corpus collected from Finnish and Swedish public defence debates from 1.1.2013 to 31.3.2014. The main research question is: what are the driving forces influencing debate on intensified bilateral Finnish-Swedish defence. Secondary research questions were developed from the corpus in four categories: historical, political/military, economic and attitudinal factors. Using these as the analysis model, the corpus was deductively analyzed to increase understanding of the individual factors and to find driving forces.

The main result of this study is that the existence or lack of trust is seen as a key driving force influencing debate, either furthering or hindering cooperation. Other driving forces seen as influencing debate are the existence or lack of:
- understanding of the historical background of cooperation from both countries’ point of view
- commitment and clarity of political/military goals
- political commitment to the political/military purposes of cooperation instead of domestic economic gain
- a legally binding framework for cooperation.

Key words:
Finland, Sweden, military cooperation, defence alliance, driving forces, public debate
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1. Introduction


– Finnish & Swedish defence ministers, Svenska Dagbladet (13.1.2014)

1.1 Subject and purpose

The subject of this thesis is Finnish and Swedish public debate regarding intensified bilateral Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation, which has also included discussion of a potential defence alliance. Interestingly, it has included calls by leading defence politicians both for and against a potential defence alliance between Finland and Sweden. The choice of subject was based on the perceived importance of the subject for Finnish and Swedish defence politicians and defence forces, a lack of specific study on the subject, a sense of topicality seen in the significant intensification of public debate on defence in both Finland and Sweden in 2013, as well as personal interest as a Finnish officer studying in Sweden. The potential strategic importance of the subject and the somewhat fractured debate raise the need to study the underlying factors in order to increase understanding of what is being debated. This study thus focuses on finding and analyzing the factors and driving forces influencing debate.

The specific purpose of the study is to increase understanding of the debate and its practical aspects, ranging from being a general presentation of the debate to potentially enabling readers a more qualified understanding of the driving forces influencing debate. Increased understanding can be used either for participation in debate or as a tool for improved analysis of debate.

1.2 Research material

The primary research material used for this thesis was collected from the Finnish and Swedish public debates on defence from 1.1.2013 to 31.3.2014. The corpus is a large collection of public documents, articles, opinion and op-ed pieces, as well as public statements by participants.
including ministers, members of parliament, officers, researchers, defence bloggers and journalists. The main qualifying criteria used to select material for the corpus was relevance to the debate. There was no attempt in the selection to critique what was being said as either being correct or incorrect, as the idea in the collection of the corpus was to gather material reflecting what was being said. Relevance was thus only partially established in the selection process. Based on the corpus selected for use, the author acknowledges this study as one representation of debate and makes no claim to reflect the “reality” behind what was being said, but focuses on “what was said”.

Due to the author’s personal interest in using social media to support research, the corpus was collected into an online system, with hyperlinks to the individual articles stored individually in chronological order based on date of posting. This archival system, while simple to store and browse, also proved limiting, as material could not be easily quantified or arranged by themes or subjects, making what would later in the study become the evolving categorization of data more difficult. On the other hand this method of data collection was fast and did not require funding or database programs. The complete corpus is held by the author, and individual articles referred to is shown in the list of references. The articles referred to are seen as representative examples of lines of thinking seen within the corpus. Due to the amount of material (several thousand hyperlinks) the corpus is not listed in its entirety.

Secondary sources used in this thesis include earlier studies and literature specific to the categories and analysis developed during the study. The choice of literature was based on the author’s previous studies and developed during analysis in an iterative process. A specific focus was on literature adding to the understanding of the historical background of Finnish-Swedish military cooperation and potential defence alliance, as this was seen as lacking in debate.

1.3 Research questions

The main research question of this thesis, seen as a synthesis of secondary research questions, is:

- What are the driving forces influencing debate on intensified bilateral Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation, as seen in a corpus of Finnish and Swedish public debates on defence (from 1.1.2013 to 31.3.2014), using a model adapted from the theory of Thomas Valasek (2011)?

The four secondary research questions, seen as significant parts of the main research question are:

- Which 1) historical, 2) political/military, 3) economic and 4) attitudinal factors influence debate on intensified defence cooperation, and how do these differ between Finland and Sweden?

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4 Valasek, Tomas, Surviving Austerity - The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration
1.4 Assumptions and Exclusions

This study is based on the assumption that participants in the Finnish-Swedish debates reflected in the corpus are rational, and they are – critically to the methodology – also assumed to mean what they say, thus excluding study of rhetoric, “two-level games” and possible doublespeak/deception, which may be seen as common in defence/foreign policy debate. This assumption has the advantage of obviating the need to find hidden meanings behind statements or to interview participants on “what they meant”. The disadvantage is that the results of the analysis in this study cannot be treated as “reality”, but rather as reflecting debate and the underlying factors. Based on the primary assumption of “what is said is also meant”, the (assumed) influence of domestic political factors as well as bureaucratic/organizational factors in both Finland and Sweden has been excluded from this study. Outside powers are not looked at as active participants in debate, but some FIN/SWE reactions to their assessed security interests naturally becomes visible as influencing Finnish-Swedish cooperation (see chapter 3.2).

To enable a focused study of the subject within a thesis, this study is limited to a short presentation of the factors. The study focuses on sources from the selected time period, but bases this on a longer perspective of Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation. The historical study of Finnish-Swedish military cooperation is necessarily limited and conducted through literature study. It is however included in order to identify historical factors influencing debate. This decision was taken as the corpus showed a lack of awareness of the historical background of military cooperation.

Despite a clear influence by stimulating debate, recent events stemming from the Russian annexation of Crimea are seen as so current that reliable analysis cannot yet be conducted.

1.5 Terminology

“Intensified defence cooperation” is not a precise term, but is for this thesis defined as a level intensified from the already extensive military cooperation between Finland and Sweden. The term is not precise, as intensified defence cooperation potentially ranges from realized “pooling and sharing” of military equipment to operational consultation, creating joint units and possibly even coordinated defence planning. Intensified defence cooperation is, however, seen as a level below, but possibly leading towards, a defence alliance with security guarantees, based on a legally binding alliance treaty. Recent discussions of a Swedish-Finnish Navy unit (SFNTG) and potential cooperation in air policing are seen as examples of “intensified defence cooperation”. The term “cooperation” signifies bilateral Finnish-Swedish cooperation, except when other actors are specifically named.

”Finland” and ”Sweden”, the main actors in this thesis, are looked on as the nation state systems, their governments and militaries as whole, singular actors. Individual agencies, political parties or persons are meant only when specifically named in the text. Participants in debate

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5 Matlary, Janne, European Union security dynamics - In the new national interest, pp.70-71
under study are seen as individuals expressing their opinions, either privately or as representing the nation (as heads of state or responsible ministers).

“Driving forces” are defined as the main factors that influence debate on intensified military cooperation, either fostering or hindering cooperation. “Factors” are defined as their components.

The term “corpus” is used to describe the collection of public documents and public statements which was used as primary research material in this thesis. “Data” is used in this thesis to refer to the information contents of the corpus.

The abbreviated footnotes refer to full sources listed at the end of the thesis.

1.6 Previous research

Except for comparative studies of Finnish and Swedish policy documents, there has been surprisingly little recent research on the specific subject area of bilateral military cooperation between Finland and Sweden, and even less research appears to have focused specifically on intensified defence cooperation and potential defence alliance.

In an academic article published just before the beginning of the collection of material for this study, Rydell & Forss (2012) suggested how Nordic cooperation in security policy could be developed, focusing on coordinated strategic decisions, a “fleet in being”-strategy and the combination of Swedish capability for rapid action/deployment with Finnish capability for persistent defence. The authors also point out the need to continue to influence popular opinion in both countries, with the intention of increased cooperation on defence. The corpus used in this study can be seen as reflecting or even directly expressing many of these arguments.

Cohn (2013) used three of Thomas Valasek’s factors (strategic culture, trust and solidarity, and clarity of intentions) for an analysis of the Swedish and Finnish defence propositions of 2009 and 2012 respectively in order to find similarities and differences in defence and security policies and to find whether prerequisites exist for intensified defence cooperation. Cohn also analyzed three specific areas of cooperation: defence industry and materiel; training and education and regional maritime picture cooperation. Cohn finds that there is significant potential for intensified bilateral military cooperation. Reflecting the time of the study (before public political statements on intensified bilateral military cooperation), Cohn finds that both countries view NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) as the framework for intensified military cooperation.

Several recent theses on Nordic military cooperation were studied. For this study, the most relevant of these are two theses on Swedish-Norwegian cooperation, which are acknowledged as an inspiration for writing this thesis. The factors analyzed in these studies can by

6 Rydell, Stig & Forss, Stefan, “Vägen framåt i det nordiska samarbetet”, pp.99-105
7 For instance: Enström & Haglund, “Nu fördjupar vi samarbetet”
8 Cohn, Joel, Svensk och finsk försvars- och säkerhetspolitik, likheter och skillnader – Analys kring möjligheterna till fördjupat samarbete
extension potentially be assumed to also influence the current discussion of intensified military cooperation between Finland and Sweden.

Ottosson (2012) used Tomas Valasek’s hypothesis about factors required for defence cooperation to study conditions that can be successfully applied to NORDEFCO, and focused on Swedish-Norwegian cooperation. Ottosson examined the extent to which Valasek’s factors (strategic culture, solidarity and trust, similarity in military forces, similarity in the prevailing conditions in the defence industries and clarity of the intentions of cooperation) may prove to be significant in assessing the conditions for enhanced cooperation in NORDEFCO, and also raises the question of how to find expressions for the factors. Ottosson finds Nordic cooperation likely to emanate from strategic culture and similarities in the armed forces. Ottosson considers that the intentions of Swedish-Norwegian cooperation have been identified, although with more far-reaching intentions from the Swedish perspective. Ottosson sees trust as being built gradually and points out that solidarity has proven to be of minor importance to cooperation as both countries have their own security ties. Ottosson concludes that the single most important factor for future development is that of similar conditions for the defence industry, so setting common Nordic conditions for the defence industry would facilitate reaching a higher level of cooperation.9

Rasmussen (2012) used theories by Janne Haaland Matlary, Tomas Valasek and Håkon Lunde Saxi to identify four categories of driving forces for military cooperation between Sweden and Norway spanning from European CSPD (Common Security and Defence Policy) to NORDEFCO. Rasmussen argues that today’s security policy trends in Europe enable a much deeper and more extensive cooperation than has earlier been the case. Rasmussen points out certain similarities between the nations, as well as political and organizational will, as prerequisites for cooperation. If these are missing cooperation risks losing momentum.10

A far more extensive study by Doeser, Petersson & Westberg (2012) looked back over 200 years of history analyzing how the relations between the Nordic countries have been influenced by shifting constellations of great powers and degrees of international cooperation. The study focused on whether a basic Nordic security policy exists between the Nordic countries, and how national and international factors have driven or hindered cooperation in security policy. The study shows Nordic cooperation ongoing in parallel processes, albeit without dramatic developments. Interestingly, the study points out that EU membership and the end of neutrality have made Nordic cooperation redundant in some aspects. The study also suggests economic factors, and not a common threat, as the driving force for Nordic military cooperation today.11

Another related study, Roos (2012) used foreign policy analysis combined with John Kingdon’s policy window theory, focusing on a particular instance of foreign policy change in Sweden: the political take-off for enhanced defence and security cooperation in the beginning of the 21st century, which led to agreement on a Nordic declaration on solidarity. Roos analyzed why and when the policy change occurred by examining the factors and conditions influencing the

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9 Ottosson, Jonas, Nordiskt försvarssamarbete i åtstramningens tidevarv
10 Rasmussen, Espen, Svensk-norsk militært samarbeide, underliggende drivkraft
11 Doeser, Fredrik; Petersson, Magnus & Westberg, Jacob, Norden mellan stormakter och fredsförbund
policy change. Roos concluded that a number of factors came together at a critical time, opening up a policy window. Roos argues that strategic leadership seized this opportunity and advocated their proposal which led to a foreign policy change. Roos contributes to a more complete understanding of the policy process leading to the agreement on the Nordic declaration of solidarity.\footnote{Roos, Emelie, \textit{Nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete - Pragmatiskt men gränslös}}
2. Theory & Method

2.1 Theory

As seen in the presentation of different theories in Doeser, Petersson & Westberg, there were several possible starting points for an analysis of bilateral military cooperation. There are of course pros and cons to any theoretical model – as one example, the use of Graham Allison’s three models explaining decision making (Rational Actor, Organizational Behavior and Governmental Politics)\(^\text{13}\) were considered, but then rejected from this study due to a perceived risk that an analysis by answering the questions inherent to his models would have led away from the actual contents of the data in the corpus. The risk of purely deductive reasoning is further discussed in chapter 2.2.

Nonetheless, Valasek’s hypothesis on the characteristics historically seen as necessary for success in military pooling and sharing (a form of intensified military cooperation) was seen as a helpful entry point into a theorization of intensified military cooperation. Valasek’s theory was used in order to frame the problem, to act as a useable pre-basis for the model used in this study. Valasek was chosen as the theoretical starting point due to his applicability (see chapter

\(^{13}\) Allison, Graham & Zelikow, Philip, *Essence of Decision – Explaining the Cuban missile crisis*
1.6), relevance to the subject matter and use of several specific Nordic examples. Many of Valasek’s points were seen in the Grounded theory analysis of the corpus in the pre-study phase. Valasek discusses military pooling and sharing as a model of military cooperation. While Valasek does not connect his thinking to specific schools of thought, it can be seen to broadly reflect thinking stemming from a mixture of realist and liberalist schools of thought in international relations and economics. Valasek presents the theory that pooling and sharing has been successful when participating states had many or all of the following factors in common:

**Similarity of strategic cultures:** Valasek sees similarity of strategic cultures as more relevant in cases where countries pool capabilities meant to be deployed or directly support deployed forces, and less relevant in cases where countries pool training grounds or storage facilities to enable savings.¹⁴

**Trust and solidarity:** Valasek sees trust as important, especially when partners choose to combine forces responsible for defending their home territories, as governments want to be confident that their partners will not leave them without access to shared assets in times of crisis at home. Importantly, Valasek proposes committing to a treaty as a way for co-operating countries to build trust. The example of Nordic defence officials thinking of themselves as Nordics first and Europeans second is used to point out trust and shared sense of identity as primary factors making cooperation possible. Valasek also points out that Sweden has vowed unilaterally to defend its Nordic neighbours if they are attacked.¹⁵

**Forces of similar size and quality:** Valasek sees smaller countries desiring advanced systems as having no choice except partnering with a bigger country. However, he points out that in most other cases cooperation among countries of comparable size works better than the alternative. Valasek sees asymmetry in size as raising fears of one side dominating the other and ignoring the smaller one’s needs, which undermines trust.¹⁶

**Level playing field for defence companies:** Valasek sees pooling and sharing as saving money mainly by allowing nations to either reduce the amount of equipment they buy or close facilities. He points out that this means that industry in one nation will lose an order it would have received otherwise, so losses must be evenly spread for partnerships to work. This is undermined by some countries protecting their defence industry more than others, creating friction that can cause cooperation to break down. Valasek discusses differences in views on the role of the government in the economy, using the example of the Swedish-Norwegian relationship coming under strain in 2008, when Norway chose the US F-35 rather than Swedish Gripen as its future fighter aircraft. However, Valasek also points out that the absence of a level playing field for defence industries is not necessarily a “deal-breaker”.¹⁷

**Clarity of intentions:** Valasek makes the important point that if cooperation is to satisfy both partners, there has to be clarity and agreement on what purpose the initiative is to serve, as

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¹⁴ Valasek, pp.21-22
¹⁵ Ibid, p.22
¹⁶ Ibid, p.23
¹⁷ Ibid, pp.23-24
this will determine the scope, form and depth of the common project. Valasek sees pooling
and sharing or co-operative projects entered for different purposes; to save money, to en-
courage deeper (EU) integration, to bind countries closer or to build trust by establishing com-
mon units. Valasek uses the Nordic countries as an example of countries wanting to save
money by focusing on integrating relatively mundane but costly tasks such as training or lo-
gistics.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Seriousness of intent:} Valasek sees governments that take defence seriously, willing to nur-
ture and be ready to use their armed forces, as more inclined to co-operate than others. Vala-
sek sees such governments as feeling more urgency to mitigate the impact of decreasing budg-
ets on their capabilities and thus more willing to accept the political risks (partial loss of sov-
ereignty, industrial tensions) resulting from defence cooperation.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Low corruption:} Valasek points out that defence procurement may also suffer from corrup-
tion. Corrupt national procurement officials may see pooling and sharing as a constraint on
their ability to profit, which may lead them to actively thwart joint purchases. Valasek sees
this as primarily concerning countries with higher levels of corruption.\textsuperscript{20}

As Valasek focused on general principles for successful pooling and sharing, whereas this study
focuses on the specific debate on intensified Finnish-Swedish military cooperation, Vala-
sek’s theory was not used as the deductive lens for studying the corpus, and this thesis does not set
out to prove or disprove Valasek’s theory by applying it on Finnish-Swedish cooperation. This
study deals with only one specific “military island of cooperation”\textsuperscript{21} with its own specific cir-
cumstances, and these were assessed as being uncovered more reliably from “reality” as re-
flected in the data. The theoretic model used in this thesis was therefore inducted from the
corpus, resulting in a model which resembles Valasek’s theory. Some of Vala-
sek’s factors were discarded and some modified, as new categories were developed from the corpus and incor-
porated into a relatively simple four-category theoretical model described in chapter 2.3.

\section*{2.2 Method}

The study was conducted as a qualitative study, focusing on the contents and meanings of
empirical data, instead of quantitative information such as the frequencies of certain contents
in data. The method used in this study was qualitative abductive content analysis, a combina-
tion of Grounded theory and deductive reasoning.

Grounded theory is a method for the generation of theory, used to derive theory inductively
from the analysis of and reflection on the phenomena under scrutiny. It is a set of relationships
amongst data and categories that proposes a reasonable explanation of the phenomenon un-
der study. It does not look for the “correct answer” or representativeness, but rather as many
different viewpoints as possible in data. As it is iterative and close to the data that give rise to
it, Grounded theory starts with data rather than forcing data to fit a predetermined theory.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p.24
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p.26
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, pp.26-27
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, pp.29-30}
This means a process of theory generation rather than theory testing, using emergent categories rather than preconceived or received categories. Analysis begins with coding, where collected data is first scanned for meaning units. These are grouped into codes, which are grouped together into factors. By grouping factors, categories can be formed, allowing the generation of a model, which can be developed further into a theory. Analysis is continued until saturation, meaning that no new viewpoints are found.\(^{22}\)

Content analysis is a traditional method of qualitative study, focusing on finding systematic meanings in data. It is usually used in qualitative research of written or spoken data to create a concise and general description of the phenomenon being studied. Models enable the conceptualization and presentation of the phenomenon in structured and concise form. Analysis and synthesis are combined, and comparisons used throughout the analysis to enable the categorization of material. The choice and designation of categories for data from different sources is an important but seldom straightforward part of content analysis. The character of the study and research questions influence whether data is coded into pre-designated categories, or categories created during the analysis based on new meanings found in data. Categorization is specific to each study and data set, and typically develops during the analysis as data is analyzed as it is gathered. Categorized data is analyzed in order to draw conclusions on the phenomenon under scrutiny. There are several methods of content analysis, with the choice of method dependent upon the subject, data and sources being used and the researcher’s personal qualities. Content analysis can be conducted by inductive, deductive or abductive reasoning. In inductive reasoning, analysis is conducted purely on the findings made from data, while deductive reasoning uses a pre-created classification structure based on earlier knowledge to guide analysis. A particular combination of inductive and deductive reasoning is known as abductive reasoning.\(^{23}\)

Abductive reasoning is based on the idea that scientific discoveries are only possible when observations are guided by guiding principles ranging from vague intuitive understandings to highly developed hypotheses. This means that unlike inductive reasoning, new theory is not based on observations alone. Units for analysis are chosen from data, but earlier knowledge is used to focus and guide analysis. Earlier knowledge is not used to test theory, but to enable the researcher to shift and combine analysis based both on data and pre-created models. In order to ensure reliability, the data must be structured, and the analysis process must encompass the data systematically. Abductive analysis begins from the starting point of “what maybe is”, and “what must be” is systematically tested against “what is”. The categorization of data is in practice a process of exploration, comparison and juxtaposition, conducted as data is analyzed and filed into categories. Analysis of data is ended when new viewpoints are no longer found in it.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{23}\) Cohen, Manion & Morrison, pp.428,563-569,598-601; Grönfors, Martti & Vilkka, Hanna (editor), *Kvalitatiiviset kenttäyömenetelmät*, pp.17-20; Seitamaa-Hakkarainen

\(^{24}\) Grönfors & Vilkka, pp.17-20; Reichertz, Jo, *Abduction, Deduction and Induction in Qualitative Research*, p.300; Seitamaa-Hakkarainen
The choice of method was influenced by the data being studied and the personal background of the researcher. The choice of a qualitative study was seen as natural for an analysis of debate, and the use of a corpus of written and electronic sources further influenced the choice of research method. The use of Grounded theory analysis in pre-study analysis of material selected for the corpus was seen as an efficient method to pre-screen material and develop a deductive lens to filter data through, significantly simplifying the early research process. The use of abductive reasoning in content analysis was based on the researcher’s familiarity with the subject matter. The background of the researcher was seen as a basis, where the use of inductive, purely data-based reasoning would have been challenging and impractical due to significant pre-existing knowledge intruding in the process. On the other hand, use of pre-existing categories (e.g. Valasek’s factors) for purely deductive reasoning could have set unnecessarily rigid limits on categorization, possibly skewing the study of an evolving subject, which potentially goes far beyond the pooling and sharing discussed by Valasek. Purely deductive reasoning was also seen as potentially dismissing categories inherent in the data.

2.3 Operationalization

This study was conducted using a three-stage approach. Theoretical understanding of the subject was increased through literature study of the historical background of defence cooperation, as well as study of theory (Valasek) and methods of analysis (Grounded theory, abductive content analysis). Selection of data into a corpus of empirical evidence was also conducted in this stage, with data pre-screened during the collection.

The second stage was a pre-study for the construction of the specific model for this thesis. The corpus was analyzed using an inductive Grounded theory approach with the intention of finding factors, which may influence debate. The process is illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2: The Grounded theory pre-study process.](image-url)
The corpus was analyzed continually during collection and the results were used as the final categories for analysis in this thesis. These four categories are: historical, political/military, economic and attitudinal. Political and military factors were seen to be so interconnected that they were kept together in a common category, but there were also significant interlinks between other categories, as seen in chapter 3. Due to its simplicity and focus on Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation, this model is seen as both functional and relevant to the study. This stage resulted in the categorization of factors and a model to structure analysis, illustrated in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial hypothesis based on Grounded theory analysis for categorization</th>
<th>Research question based on abduction</th>
<th>Material (data) for analysis</th>
<th>Operationalization in analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical factors are a significant driving force, but are seen as incompletely reflected in the debate, requiring deeper study of literature to establish historical background to understand the current situation</td>
<td>Which historical factors influence intensified FIN-SWE defence cooperation, and are these different in Finland/Sweden?</td>
<td>Literature on historical FIN-SWE defence cooperation and corpus of FIN-SWE defence debate</td>
<td>Historical factors expected to become visible in analysis of the corpus when analysis is based on the perspective of a historical description of FIN-SWE defence cooperation including earlier discussions of potential defence alliance, in practice through the use of “code words” or specific historical references to the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and military factors are a significant driving force, and are clearly reflected in the debate, expected to differ between FIN &amp; SWE due to different geopolitical positions, “threat levels” and historical backgrounds</td>
<td>Which political/military factors influence intensified FIN-SWE defence cooperation, and are these different in Finland/Sweden?</td>
<td>Corpus of FIN-SWE defence debate, supported by literature discussing political and military factors</td>
<td>Political and military factors expected to become visible in analysis of the corpus, in practice through the use of “code words” or specific political/military references to the subject. These are limited by the assumption that “what is said is also meant” and by the fact that only public/open sources are used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic factors are a significant driving force, and are clearly reflected in the debate, expected to differ between FIN &amp; SWE due to different potentials of the national defence industries</td>
<td>Which economic factors influence intensified FIN-SWE defence cooperation, and are these different in Finland/Sweden?</td>
<td>Corpus of FIN-SWE defence debate, supported by literature discussing economic factors</td>
<td>Economic factors expected to become visible in analysis of the corpus, in practice through the use of “code words” or specific economic references to the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinal factors (such as trust, solidarity etc.) are a significant driving force, but are less easily isolated from the debate, expected to differ between FIN &amp; SWE due to different cultural backgrounds (biases)</td>
<td>Which attitudinal factors influence intensified FIN-SWE defence cooperation, and are these different in Finland/Sweden?</td>
<td>Corpus of FIN-SWE defence debate supported by literature discussing attitudinal factors</td>
<td>Attitudinal factors expected to become visible in analysis of the corpus, in practice through the use of “code words” or specific attitudinal references to the subject. These are expected to be culturally biased.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Analysis model.

The third stage, including the writing of this thesis, was a synthesis of the first two stages, conducted by abductive content analysis of the corpus and literature, using the result of the previous stage as the deductive analysis model in order to increase understanding of the individual factors. Initial hypotheses based on the Grounded theory analysis were used to support analysis. Conclusions were drawn from analyzed factors, and major differences between Finland and Sweden highlighted in order to answer the secondary research questions. Finally, these conclusions were synthesized in order to answer the primary research question.
3. Analysis

3.1 Historical factors

3.1.1 Analysis

Since Finnish independence 1917, defence issues have been an important part of Finnish-Swedish relations. Possibilities for military cooperation were initially very weak, as exemplified by a Swedish foreign ministry internal memo:

“Finnish foreign policy has once again displayed such ruthlessness, unpredictability, foolhardiness and dependence on certain great powers that close political cooperation seems anything else than attractive, at least to a nation which traditionally tries to stay outside of any arising confrontations”.25

Sweden was neutral in the Finnish Civil War, but helped the White side by approving participation of Swedish volunteers and allowing arms shipments including transports by German warships to pass via Swedish territorial waters. On the other hand, Sweden risked war with Finland by sending a naval expedition to the Åland islands to protect the population from the Russians. The expedition was dislodged by a superior German force supporting Finland. Relations were strained significantly by the Åland question until the League of Nations confirmed the demilitarized islands part of Finland in 1921. During 1920-21 the primary Swedish contingency plan was “Case F”, a war plan against Finland. Cooperation was further hindered by the inflamed situation between Finland’s Swedish- and Finnish-speaking populations.26

There were however significant soundings for military cooperation during the 1920s. While Finnish defence policy was directed against the Russian threat, Swedish neutral policy meant keeping a distance but also increasingly admitting that Swedish security interests were advanced by Finland’s viability and independence. The defence of Sweden was seen as beginning at the border between Russia and Finland, and military contacts established to plan Swedish army deployment to the Karelian Isthmus in case of war. In 1923 Swedish foreign minister Hederstierna even suggested a defence alliance with Finland, but was forced to resign. On the other hand, Swedish disarmament between 1925-1936 convinced Finland that Sweden would not be able to help in a crisis.27

During the 1930s cooperation on the military level was extensive, although politicians were reluctant to commit themselves. Both countries saw the Soviet Union as a threat, but Sweden also feared Nazi Germany and was concerned by the rise of right-wing nationalist extremism in Finland, including renewed attacks on the Swedish language. In 1935 Finland distanced itself from previous policy directed against the Soviet Union and announced a neutral policy with a Nordic focus, but cooperation showed its weakness in the lead-up to the Second World War.

27 Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi, p.168; Talvitie, pp.56 -57; Åselius, p.216; Westberg, pp.42-48
Sweden publicly rejected pleas from Finland’s government for military intervention in the Winter War to help defend Finland against the Soviets. The rejection, aimed to pressure Finland to accept harsh Soviet peace conditions and to quiet strong Swedish public opinion advocating participation in the war, produced substantial bitterness in Finland. As the Soviet Union attacked Finland, Swedish foreign minister Sandler succeeded in convincing his government to refrain from declaring Sweden as neutral. Sweden adopted a non-belligerent status, allowing extensive support to Finland without going to war. Sandler also suggested a defence alliance with Finland, but was forced to resign.28

The amount and significance of economic and military support in the Winter War is not fully understood in Finland. Swedish economic help was vitally important to the Finnish war effort, and included state credits of 230 million SEK (equal to half the 1938 Finnish state budget). Over 12600 Swedish volunteers were recruited, with over 4600 seeing frontline duty. Swedish support included air defence of Northern Finland by a reinforced fighter squadron with full logistic support, using Finnish nationality markings on its aircraft (a third of the Swedish Air Force fighter force). Overwhelming Swedish solidarity for Finland (“Finlands sak är vår!”) was made even more significant by the threat of a Nazi German invasion of Sweden. Sweden donated 131 000 rifles, 132 field guns, 100 anti-aircraft guns, 85 anti-tank guns, large amounts of ammunition and 8 aircraft to Finland, taking a significant risk by sending so much war materiel from Swedish depots.29

However, the Swedish refusal to allow an Allied military expedition to “help Finland” via Sweden led to Finnish accusations of Swedish disloyalty by foreign minister Tanner and commander-in-chief Mannerheim. Finnish politicians wanted to believe in the benign attitude of the Western Allies, as did the Swedish public. This misunderstanding is still seen in Finland. Swedish politicians calculated differently, and correctly saw the expedition as an Allied gambit to take over vital Swedish iron ore fields in order to deny these to the Germans instead of helping Finland, as historical research and Churchill’s memoirs have later confirmed.30

In a significant effort which is not well known today, Finnish and Swedish politicians hurriedly developed a very extensive plan for a state union during the Interim Peace between the Winter and Continuation Wars. In the union, Finland would have led defence, and Sweden foreign policy. The plan was however dependent on approval by both Moscow and Berlin, and became impossible. This has been seen as the only time Sweden has actually been ready to completely share the destiny of Finland.31 Swedish sympathy for Finland has not extended to security guarantees, and there are views of Sweden as historically averse to taking any risks.

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29 Wangel, Carl-Axel, et al, Sveriges militära beredskap 1939-1945, p.136; Suominen, Tapani, “Sveriges hjälp var betydande under vinterkriget”
30 Wahlbäck, Jättens andedräkt – Finlandsfrågan i svensk politik 1809-2009, pp.171-179; Suominen, ”Sveriges hjälp var betydande under vinterkriget”
31 Decemviri, Sverige-Finland, pp.1-66; Talvitie, pp.64-65; Manninen, Ohto, Toteutumaton valtioliitto – Suomi ja Ruotsi talvisodan jälkeen; Wahlbäck, Krister, Regeringen och kriget, p.133; Åström, Sverker, ”Realismi ei ole alistuvuutta”, p.94
observers have seen Sweden following a consequent policy since 1812 of refusing to give security guarantees to other nations (Finland, later the Baltic states) or to direct her policies against Russia. The policy has however been argued by others to have become irrelevant since Finnish independence, and such a view of Swedish caution has also been criticized by the current Swedish foreign minister Bildt, who was the first Swedish foreign minister to actually have promised (debatable) security guarantees to Sweden’s neighbors in the 2009 Swedish Declaration of Solidarity. A defence alliance has been discussed in Sweden several times – first in the beginning of the 1920s, then before the Winter War in 1939, and finally, and most ambitiously, between the Finnish Wars. A Nordic alliance was also discussed in 1948–1949, but without Finland. The Soviet Union opposed this type of cooperation consistently.\textsuperscript{32}

As hopes for a Swedish alliance died in 1941, Finland turned to Germany. Despite this, a total of 1694 Swedish volunteers fought in the Finnish forces during the Continuation War, participating in the fighting on the Hanko front in 1941 and in repelling the Soviet strategic offensive at Tali-Ihantala on the Karelian Isthmus in June 1944. Swedish volunteers also manned important support and maintenance roles. Historical Swedish sympathy to Finland is seen as a significant factor in both Finland and Sweden. A major significance of the Swedish volunteers was that their support created a feeling of unity, which has continued after the war. As Finnish veterans stated after the war: “The volunteers did their duty with honor and strengthened the bonds between our nations”\textsuperscript{33}

On the other hand, a historical underestimation of the significance of Swedish help to Finland during wartime can also be seen as major factor in Finland:


Connected to this lack of understanding, persistent historical myths are seen as being intentionally propagated in Finland:

“... de facto har det självständiga Finland faktiskt blivit hjälpt då en bistånds- eller militärpakt existerat. Utan tyska insatser hade Sovjetunionen sannolikt lyckats i sitt invaderingsförsök under sommaren 1944. Ofta hör man hävdas, att Sverige inte hjälpte Finland under vinterkriget 1939-40, som bevis på att man inte får hjälp i nödens dag från andra länder. Officiellt var Sverige neutralt och ingen pakt existerade, men i praktiken var hjälpen betydande. Det säger mycket om finsk inrikespolitik att landets närhistoria blivit så avsiktligt feltolkad.”\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{32} Suominen, ”Sveriges hjälp var betydande under vinterkriget”

\textsuperscript{33} Kadettikunta, Svenskspråkiga trupper under fortsättningskriget; Kadettikunta, Ulkomaalaiset vapaaehtoiset Suomessa; Wahlbäck, Jättens andedräkt – Finlandsfrågan i svensk politik 1809-2009, p.227

\textsuperscript{34} Suominen, ”Sveriges hjälp var betydande under vinterkriget”

\textsuperscript{35} Salonius-Pasternak, Charly, ”Alla talar om Nato, men inget händer - Debatten om Natomedlemskap i Finland”, p.10
The first of these myths, that “Finland has always fought alone for its independence, without any help”, is clearly not historically accurate. Swedish support and volunteers were crucial to Finland in the Winter War, and in the Continuation War German help in 1944 was instrumental in stopping Stalin from occupying Finland. A second myth, that “Finland cannot trust in help from others”, is thus also proven to be false. Researcher Charly Salonius-Pasternak sees these myths as impediments to increased military cooperation: “*When Finland has trusted in the help of others, it has also been received, even when official Sweden has turned her back.*”

It seems that post-war cooperation is also not well known, but seems marginally more acknowledged in Sweden. After the Continuation War, Finland avoided Soviet occupation, but there was no possibility for military cooperation with Sweden due to the risk of Soviet reactions. The pressed entry of Finland into a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in 1948 effectively defined security policy for Finland, blocking any public speculation of security policy or involving Sweden or other Western nations until the end of the Cold War. During the whole Cold War Sweden was, despite a public policy of neutrality and at times intensive rhetoric against the US, firmly part of the Western block. Sweden co-operated extensively with NATO in secret as “a non-voting member of NATO”, known by the Soviets, but unknown to the Swedish population. Swedish “neutrality” protected Finland, as the Soviets knew that pressing Finland too much could lead to Sweden openly nearing NATO. On the other hand, evidence of cooperation with Sweden could be dangerous to Finland. In 1950 the Swedish commander-in-chief was strongly rebuked by prime minister Erlander for publicly discussing the Soviet threat against the west (including Finland) and stating that Sweden could hardly stay neutral in such a situation: “*If something happens to Finland now, we can thank that blasted Jung and his idiotic speech*”. The beginning of the 1960s saw an increase in the regularity and informality of contacts between the Swedish and Finnish militaries. During the 1970s and 1980s Sweden and Finland co-operated covertly, primarily through frequent meetings of chiefs of defence and other high-ranking officers. The meetings were conducted during “fishing or hunting trips”, with the purpose of exchanging information and thoughts, but also informally coordinating concrete national war plans against a Soviet attack. The meetings were often conducted in the northern part of Sweden or Finland, allowing them to be used for terrain reconnaissance, and frequently included the Norwegians. Political leadership was aware of the meetings, but did not “officially” know of them. Cooperation also involved covert contacts between the ministries of defence and foreign affairs. Sweden was prepared to support the Finnish Air Force by storing significant numbers of “extra” fighters while Finland trained “extra” pilots. Covert exchange of information on (Soviet) submarine violations of Finnish and Swedish territorial waters and the situation of Warsaw Pact forces was conducted between Finland and Sweden.

After the Cold War, cooperation became more open, but the beginning of the Swedish EU accession process was seen as an unpleasant surprise in Finland, which then hurried its own accession. Finland joined the EU simultaneously with Sweden, avoiding a situation where Finland would have been alone between the EU and Russia. This can be seen as the background

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36 Toivonen, Hannu, “Liittoon Ruotsin kanssa”
37 Agrell, “Finis Finlandiae”, p.248 (translation by the author)
for the current Finnish suspicion of Sweden “sneaking to join NATO behind our back” (see chapter 3.2).\textsuperscript{39}

In a significant development, discussion has again included a potential defence alliance between Finland and Sweden. This began in early 2013, after a public statement by the Swedish foreign and defence ministers (Bildt & Enström) for increased ambitions for NORDEFCO, including shared ownership of weapons. The Finnish reply by the defence minister (Haglund) was, that while this was a positive proposal, it would require a defence agreement in the form of a state treaty between Finland and Sweden. Haglund was promptly rebuked by president Niinistö to “not answer a question which has not been asked”. Haglund then denied that an alliance had been proposed.\textsuperscript{40} Debate on an alliance has nonetheless continued actively in Finland. As an example, former foreign minister Kanerva stated:

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Svenskarna talar själva redan om ett arrangemang på statsfördragsnivå. Jag vill inte utesluta oss från förhandlingar på den nivån. Vi måste vara fördomsfria och modiga i det här fallet. Sverige kan ge oss mervärde, och vi kan ge mervärde åt Sverige.”}\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

\subsection*{3.1.2 Conclusions: Historical factors}

From the analysis above it can be concluded that several historical factors influence debate on intensified bilateral defence cooperation, and that many of these differ between Finland and Sweden.

Very significantly, a lack of understanding of history and the significance of Swedish help to Finland is an important factor influencing debate, with historical myths still propagated in Finland.

Defence cooperation has since the 1920s been consequent (as a general aspiration to cooperate), thus generating trust in both countries (see chapter 3.4), but also dependent on conjuncture. Cooperation has been accused of having unclear or unstated goals. In Finland, Sweden has been seen as generally unwilling to take risks, or even as “untrustworthy”. This may be a view based on realism, as fluctuating opportunities and threats have historically influenced cooperation, but may also explain Finnish distrust or hesitation to intensified military cooperation, especially when the question of an alliance is raised.

Based on the precedent of two foreign ministers being forced to retire, suggesting a defence alliance with Finland can be seen as politically suicidal in Sweden. This can be seen today, as ministers in both countries are often careful to note that intensified cooperation does not mean a defence alliance including security guarantees.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} YLE, “Soini: Ruotsi voi livetä Natoon”
\textsuperscript{40} Bildt, Carl & Enström, Karin, “Försvarsmateriel kan ägas gemensamt i Norden”; Gustafsson, Lars, “Försvarssamarbete svårt i praktiken”; Uusivaara, Terhi, “Niinistö puolustusliitto-puheista: Aina ei tarvitse vastata, kun ei kysytä”
\textsuperscript{41} Richt, Jyrki & Seppänen, Timo, “Ilkka Kanerva öppen för försvarsallians med Sverige”
\textsuperscript{42} See for example: Enström & Haglund, “Nu fördjupar vi samarbetet”
A dependency on outside powers’ approval has historically thwarted aspirations for Finnish-Swedish defence alliance, which have all been directed against the same threat: Russia/the Soviet Union. This is also a factor today, with politicians in both countries often careful to note that intensified cooperation is not directed against anybody.

3.2 Political/Military factors

3.2.1 Analysis

Finland and Sweden are currently engaged in extensive military cooperation. Since 1995 Finland and Sweden have been participants in extensive military cooperation within the frameworks of the EU and the NATO Partnership for Peace. In 2011 both countries agreed to the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity (based on the Stoltenberg report). In addition to NORDEFCO activities (see chapter 3.3), the countries also often participate in each other’s exercises, routinely integrating units together. Examples of this are the SWEFIN ATU (Amphibious Task Unit) cooperation, participation together in the EU NBG (Nordic Battle Group), naval exercises, air force Cross Border Training as well as staff exercises for the national defence colleges. Beside training and education, cooperation includes the exchange of national recognized maritime pictures (SUCFIS), as well as extensive cooperation in international crisis management. The Finnish and Swedish military are in practice highly interoperable due to this tradition of cooperation, as well as due to using NATO standards. Both countries have conducted NATO evaluations for many of their forces. Ease of cooperation and interoperability are significant.

“Det nordiska försvarssamarbetet har särskilt på flygvapenområdet redan lett till goda resultat. Nu vore det önskvärt att utvidga det markant även till de övriga vapengrenarna, särskilt armén. Man borde långsiktigt kunna skapa förnuftiga varaktiga strukturer, kanske någon gemensam utbildnings- och övningscentral uppe i norr.”

Geographic proximity to Russia (the Soviet Union) has historically influenced Finland’s foreign policy more than Sweden’s. In connection to this, debate on intensified military cooperation is also influenced by differences in how territorial defence is viewed in the two countries. It seems that defence has not been a high profile issue in Sweden until a significant increase of debate around the beginning of the period covered by the corpus, while history and geographic proximity to Russia have kept defence more of a major issue in Finland since the end of the Cold War. This may be connected to Finland continuing conscription while Sweden has changed to a professional military. On the other hand, defence issues can in general be seen as a more important issue in Finland, reflected in both proportional defence spending (1.5% of GDP in 2012) and a wider participation in debate, while defence has been seen as a less important issue in Sweden, reflected in both proportional defence spending (1.2% of GDP in 2012) and a narrower participation in debate mainly limited to experts, specialized journalists and designated defence spokesmen of political parties. The significance of defence in Sweden

43 Nordic foreign ministers, Nordic declaration of Solidarity
44 Stoltenberg, Thorvald, Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy
45 Haglund, Carl, speech to Defence Course Association
46 Forss, Stefan, “Finska synpunkter på försvarsdebatten”
has increased in the run-up to the Swedish parliamentary elections in 2014.\textsuperscript{47} Debate in both countries has recently increased due to current events (the Russian invasion and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in early 2014).

Finland and Sweden are politically allied as EU members, with some mechanisms of support in case of crisis, including the Lisbon treaty and the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity, but these are not seen as very significant in Finland. The Swedish Declaration of Solidarity of 2009 is seen as a factor, but its value is questionable – in Finland there are widespread doubts of Swedish capabilities to actually come to the help of a threatened neighbor. The military capabilities of both countries are significantly impacted by the ongoing defence transformation in both countries. In Finland a transformation process begun in 2012 includes a gradual downsizing of professional personnel and a significant cut of reserve forces to a full strength of 230 000, but mainly keeping existing capacities and continuing conscription as the defence solution. Sweden has since the Cold War seen significant defence cuts leading to what can even be called disarmament, including a transformation from 1996 onwards to a smaller expeditionary military, which accelerated decrease in capacities after the defence decision of 2009. This included the end of conscription, seen as the most dramatic change since the Second World War. In 2013, the Swedish defence forces had an approximate strength of 20 000 backed up by approximately 22 000 Hemvärnet volunteers.\textsuperscript{48}

Finnish views on decreased Swedish capabilities are a significant factor. Sweden is cast as one of the causes of Baltic Sea instability. This can be seen as an unexpected development: “Ett land som i århundraden har bidragit till regional stabilitet har på mindre än ett decennium gått till att vara en konsument av säkerhet”.\textsuperscript{49} According to Charly Salonius-Pasternak, a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs:

“During the Cold War, Sweden’s official neutrality and substantial and capable military provided a strong stabilizing influence in the region. Sweden’s open assistance to the newly sovereign Baltic states in the 1990s contributed to stability and eventually led to membership of either the European Union or NATO for all but one Baltic Sea littoral state. The primary reason why Sweden finds itself in an unusual position is the increasing gap between its stated security policy and its military capabilities. The ongoing process of radically altering its defence forces has been persistently underfunded. … Fundamentally, Sweden no longer has a military capable of defending itself or securing the Baltic Sea around it. This has prompted increasing talk of a security vacuum in the region, and has led to a lively public debate about defence policy. Baltic Sea littoral states are aware that while the Swedish ‘Solidarity Declaration’ is a strong sign of political commitment if a neighbour is threatened or attacked, Sweden has very little military capability to send abroad during an escalating regional crisis...”\textsuperscript{50}

Comparisons and calculations of military capabilities are also factors. Löfstedt (2013) analyzed the operational military capabilities of Poland, Sweden and Finland, and found that Swedish

\textsuperscript{47} Doeser, Petersson & Westberg, Norden mellan stormakter och freddsforbund, pp.200-201; Stenberg, Ewa, “Försvaret på väg bli en viktig fråga i valet”; Myyry, Liisa, Käsityksiä maanpuolustustahdosta ja siihen vaikutusta tekijöistä

\textsuperscript{48} Rydell & Forss, “Vägen framåt i det nordiska samarbetet”, p.101; Stenberg, “Försvaret på väg bli en viktig fråga i valet”

\textsuperscript{49} Bergqvist, Carl, Från Finsk kritik mot ett inkapabelt Svenskt försvar

\textsuperscript{50} Salonius-Pasternak, Charly, Will Sweden become a net consumer of security – or will Svea wake up and seek to assume its traditional role as a stabilizing power in the Baltic Sea?, p.1
capabilities – “on paper” superior to Finland’s – are actually inferior to those of Finland, when taking into account military geography and dynamics in four scenarios, which involved the defence of the capital, a sea and air blockade, an attack on an isolated island like Gotland, and an attack in an unexpected direction. This is a major change to the Cold War paradigm of Sweden as the “larger brother” to Finland militarily. Debate in Finland has also included discussion of the combined strengths of the Finnish and Swedish militaries, a part of the factor of deterrence potential against Russia, which is seen as one motivation for a potential alliance.  

Potential NATO membership is a significant factor, with the role of intensified Finnish-Swedish cooperation seen as either a complement to NATO, a better alternative to NATO, or as a more easily achievable predecessor to later NATO membership. Potential NATO membership is also reflected in Finnish views on potential changes in Swedish security policy:

“"The tornado-like debate in Sweden about the country’s armed forces and defence policy has led to the disintegration of the very cornerstones of Swedish defence policy. Finland should prepare for the possibility of Sweden making rapid changes to its security policy."

Finnish suspicions of Sweden seeking NATO membership without informing Finland have been alleviated by public commitment between the prime ministers of Finland and Sweden (Jyrki Katainen and Fredrik Reinfeldt) to inform each other regarding potential changes in security policy, if applying for NATO membership became actual. The Swedish government has effectively made a Swedish NATO membership conditional on Finland joining. Paradoxically (but potentially reflecting attitudinal factors, see chapter 3.4), surveyed Finnish opposition to a potential NATO membership increased, when opinion on membership was asked “if Sweden were a member”. Despite this, the general consensus in Finland seems to be that Swedish membership in NATO would significantly influence Finland, and might well lead to a rapid Finnish membership to avoid the situation of being alone between NATO and Russia. In Finland, the Swedish 2013 decision to contribute to NRF (NATO Response Force), as Finland has since 2008, was seen to open new potential to cooperation. Interestingly, the commitment to move “hand in hand” is also a factor blocking NATO membership. This means that the perceived/declared connection between potential Finnish and Swedish memberships is seen as both a driver and a hindrance to membership.

Popular opinion is naturally of major political importance in debate. Recent official opinion polls have found the Finnish popular opinion extremely favorable to Nordic military cooperation; 93% for, and only 4% against. The same is true for Finland’s military cooperation within

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52 Salonius-Pasternak, Charly, *Swedish defence illusions are crumbling: The changes in Swedish defence policy necessitate a debate about NATO prior to the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2015*, p.1
the EU; 84% for, and only 13% against. Swedish official opinion polls have found Swedish popular opinion split on intensified EU territorial defence cooperation; 29% for, and 26% against. The Swedish polls have not included a specific question on Nordic military cooperation.  

Several prominent Finnish defence politicians, including chairman of a parliamentary committee studying defence options Ilkka Kanerva and vice chairman of the foreign affairs committee Pertti Salolainen have specifically called for a defence alliance with Sweden. Possibilities for intensified cooperation are currently being investigated. Finnish defence minister Haglund has stated, that he is very favorable to cooperation with Sweden but for now regarding only peace-time cooperation, and that a treaty-based defence alliance would require “a broader debate”, just like NATO membership. Popular opinion in Finland is favorable to a specific defence alliance with Sweden. One poll found, that of 1000 respondents, 54% supported a bilateral defence alliance with Sweden while 36% opposed. Military cooperation with Sweden is seen as “natural” and can in the light of popular opinion also be said to be politically risk-free in Finland. Popular opinion in Sweden on an alliance with Finland is unclear.

The goals of intensified military cooperation are not yet clear, but according to the Finnish defence minister, they include long-term goals of further intensified peace-time cooperation in the development of defence forces, facilitating and simplifying practical cooperation between the defence forces, and coordinating the use of military capabilities in “certain questions”. Haglund also stated that Finland and Sweden are ready to open new areas for cooperation to enhance the defence forces’ readiness to develop, maintain and use military capabilities, increasing possibilities to invest in international crisis management and strengthening security and military capability in both countries. Decisions on use of military capabilities will remain subject to national control also in the future, “We walk hand in hand, but without security guarantees”. Haglund recently stated:


Beside the credibility and trust in a potential ally, which are seen as important factors, there are also several other issues that hinder alliances. These include the potential risk of being dragged into a war which could otherwise potentially have been avoided, as well as the possibility of a confrontational policy by one of the allies triggering conflicts involving all parties in the alliance. In a potential legally binding alliance treaty, the key issue can be seen to be the manner of automation - when and how defence guarantees are activated – and how much discretion (freedom of choice) is left to the individual allied nations. This means that the decision to surrender significant national power of decision to a treaty is not a light one. There is

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54 Haglund, speech to Defence Course Association; MSB, Opinioner 2013 - Allmänhetens syn på samhällsskydd, beredskap, säkerhetspolitik och försvar, p.20; MTS, The opinions of Finns about the foreign, security and defence policy of Finland (2013), p.6
56 Haglund, speech to Defence Course Association (translation by the author)
57 Sirén, ”Försvarsallians med Sverige gillas”
a clear resistance to binding security guarantees, which might be seen as a logical step resulting from (or demanded as a prerequisite for) deeper defence cooperation, and the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity may have awakened some historical fears in Finland. As an example of this:

“While pondering the mutual solidarity declaration, the different defence solutions of Finland, Sweden and the other Nordic countries have been an obstacle to finding a binding security guarantee between them. The Finnish position has been that separate Nordic security guarantees are not trustworthy as such. A very unfavourable situation for Finland would be one in which the Nordic countries would be left alone with their mutual solidarity commitments in a conflict between the great powers, as has sometimes happened in history.”

The issue of security guarantees is seen as a difficult one in Sweden:

“En försvarsallians innebär omfattande förpliktelser för ett annat land - inte i vackert väder utan i kuling och orkan. Redan en finsk-svensk gemensam incidentberedskap är ju som finske försvarsministern Carl Haglund sade "en otroligt stor politisk fråga". Frågan är väl också om Finland är intresserat av en försvarsallians med Sverige. De militära olikheterna är stora - de har ju uppåträtthållit ett territoriellt försvar medan Sverige avvecklat i stort sett allt detta för att satsa på fredsinsatser i koalitioner med andra långt borta.”

Debate in Finland has seen significant scepticism, including belittling of potential Swedish help to Finland in a crisis (which may reflect the historical myths discussed in chapter 3.1). The chairman of the defence committee Jussi Niinistö has stated that “Finland is a step-child in the Nordic Family.” His argument is that the Nordic countries will not make binding treaties on defence with Finland. With most Nordic countries being members of NATO only cooperation with Sweden is left. This cooperation is seen as natural and profitable only on a win-win basis. Niinistö sees that Sweden will not want to commit to a common defence, and despite its Declaration of Solidarity only thinks of its own interests as all nations, so “independent national defence should be improved, as Finland can only trust itself”. This is echoed by some views in Sweden, where the realism of a defence alliance has been questioned, as exemplified by retired Swedish colonel Pellnäs:

“Finland kan vara intresserat, men skall det leda till konkreta steg krävs att Sverige har något att erbjuda (vilket vi inte har) och att vi är beredda att komma till hjälp (vilket historien tycks bevisa att vi inte är!). Låt oss därför konstatera att svenska politiker som talar om ett nordiskt försvararbe, gör det utifrån tre förutsättningar: man är okunnig om de säkerhetspolitiska grunderna, man tror sig härigenom kunna undvika diskussioner om mer pengar till försvaret, man ser det som en väd att undvika politisk kamp om ett Nato-medlemskap.”

These views may be well-grounded, but also raise the question how well the significance of Swedish support, especially during the Winter War, is known. This question also has parallels to some attitudinal factors (see chapter 3.4).

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58 Forss, Stefan; Klianlinna, Lauri; Inkinen, Perti & Hult, Heikki, The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland
59 Holmström, Mikael, online chat
60 Verkkouutiset, “Jussi Niinistö: Pohjoismaista olisi tositilanteessa yhtä paljon apua kuin talvisodassa” (translation by the author)
61 Ibid.
62 Pellnäs, Bo, “Den nordiska illusionen”
A major obstacle seen in debates touching on alliances is of course the influence of Russia and its potential reactions to a Finnish-Swedish alliance. As General Makarov, then commander of the Russian armed forces, stated in 2012: “Joining [an] alliance would constitute a military threat to Russia.”63 Air exercises against Sweden have been seen as Russian efforts to re-establish great power status and increase its influence, and have significantly influenced debate in Sweden. Russia has also been seen to have made note of Finland’s defence and security policy decisions, and as becoming more open in attempts to influence those decisions. This also applies to cooperation with Sweden, as Makarov stated: “Continuing Nordic defense cooperation (is) an unnecessary distraction and a potential military threat to Russia.”64 Nordic reactions to this were clear: Swedish defense minister Enström commented: “In Sweden’s view, every country has the right to independently make its own security policy choices”65, and Finnish prime minister Katainen stated: “Finland will decide on the basis of its own consideration what is best for the Finns, and such decisions will not be left to Russian generals.”66 Makarov’s warning can be seen as demonstrating that in Russia’s view neighboring countries are part of its sphere of interest.67 This is not accepted:


3.2.2 Conclusions: Political/Military factors

From the analysis above it can be concluded that several political and military factors influence debate on intensified bilateral defence cooperation, and that some of these differ between Finland and Sweden.

Intensified military cooperation between Finland and Sweden is generally seen as a low-risk and desirable development, which is significantly facilitated by the existing close political and military ties and the “natural” military cooperation and interoperability between the countries. Very significantly, the political and military ambition levels of intensified military cooperation are not clear, and the goals of cooperation are not firmly established.

The defence transformation and significant cuts to defence strength in Sweden is seen as a very significant factor in Finland. This is connected to whether or not Sweden is seen as a credible partner in Finland, especially if a potential alliance is discussed. Potential NATO membership is also a significant factor, and seems to be an almost unavoidable subject, especially when a potential alliance between Finland and Sweden is discussed.

63 Helsingin Sanomat, “Russian general warns Finland about NATO”
64 O’Dwyer, Gerard, “Russian Military Chief Stirs Anti-NATO Pot”
65 Ibid.
66 Helsingin Sanomat, “Finland wants clarification of Russian general’s comments”, O’Dwyer, “Russian Military Chief Stirs Anti-NATO Pot”
67 Helsingin Sanomat: “Russian general warns Finland about NATO”
68 Forss, “Finska synpunkter på försvarsdebatten”
A defence alliance between Finland and Sweden is currently not seen as a realistic option, but due to popular opinion especially in Finland it can also in the longer term be seen to present a significant political possibility for entering an alliance. A Finnish-Swedish alliance is politically easier than joining NATO, which is opposed by popular opinion in both countries. However, debate shows significant military risks associated with an alliance. Even proposing an alliance has historically carried political risk in Sweden (as seen in chapter 3.1, it has been tried before and has failed every time).

The influence of an outside power, Russia, is a major factor in both Finland and Sweden. Deterring threat from Russia may be seen as a driver for cooperation. On the other hand, potential Russian reactions to intensified cooperation is also a major obstacle to a potential alliance.

### 3.3 Economic factors

#### 3.3.1 Analysis

The Swedish industry is seen as a very significant factor influencing debate. The Swedish defence industry is dominated by several large high-tech defence companies, including SAAB, one of the 25 largest defence companies in the world. These are complemented by a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, making a total of approximately 130 companies. The 65 largest companies employ a total workforce of over 33,500 directly and over 60,000 indirectly by subcontracting – far more than employed by the Swedish defence forces. During the last ten years the Swedish security and defence industry has been subject to extensive restructuring actions, resulting in substantial foreign ownership. In 2011 Sweden was the fourth largest defence material exporter in the world in proportion to its population, and exports quadrupled between 2002 and 2011. Despite a significant decrease in 2012, the Swedish defence industry generated more profit than those of all other Nordic countries combined. The 2013 Swedish exports of defence materiel totaled a worth of 11,942 billion SEK.\(^{69}\)

The Finnish defence industry can also be seen as a factor. It consists of some large companies, including Patria, as well as several smaller enterprises, with a total workforce of approximately 8,000. The majority of the high-tech defence industry of approximately 100 companies has mainly focused on the home market. The viability of the Finnish defence industry has been challenged by the decreasing economic means available for materiel investments by the Finnish Defence Forces during the defence transformation.\(^{70}\)

Pooling and sharing of military resources are part of the vision of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). Sweden and Finland both see NORDEFCO as a useful way of improving interoperability and operational effect, but above all to realize savings by increased cost-effectiveness in gaining added operational, economic, technical and industrial values. Cooperation can be driven by identifying needs together, or at least communicating these with each other. Despite economic constraints, there have been significant opportunities and developments in

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\(^{69}\) Regeringskansliet, *Strategisk exportkontroll 2013 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden*, pp.32,36; *Helsingin Sanomat*, ”Ruotsin puolustusteollisuus armeijaakin suurempi työlistajä”; SOFF, *Structure and Products*

\(^{70}\) Anteroinen, Jukka & Mikkola Harri, “Suomi tarvitsee omaa puolustusteollisuutta”
cooperation on defence materiel acquisition. This has developed in several steps, with current discussion focusing on potentially even owning and operating materiel together. Pooling and sharing is problematic, as it requires that the participants are willing to share profits and make several difficult choices, including which capabilities must/should be kept under national control, which can be shared, and which could be maintained by only one partner. Discussion of potential joint ownership and operation has also raised a significant military question of availability, which includes questions of trust and guarantees which make pooling and sharing harder. The availability of assets not controlled nationally needs to be ensured in time of crisis, as seen in statements by both defence ministers.  

Bilateral defence materiel cooperation includes several example of failed projects. These include AMOS (Advanced Mortar System), developed in cooperation between Finnish Patria and Swedish Hägglunds, but aborted by Sweden in favor of other projects due to the restructuring of the Swedish Defence Forces. The TMS (Torpedo-Mine-Sensor) is another example of a failed project. The costs of this project were to be divided evenly between Finland and Sweden, but were too high for the significantly decreased Swedish budget, so Sweden stopped the project. This received mixed reactions in Finland, where it was seen by some as a major disappointment since Sweden had been the lead nation for the project, while others saw aborting the project as understandable in the economic situation facing both countries.

Sales of defence materiel can also be seen as defence cooperation benefiting both countries. The export balance of defence material between the countries is heavily lopsided in Sweden’s favor. This is seen as an important factor, and is interesting to compare with Valasek’s “level playing field for defence companies”. During the years 2000-2012 Swedish major arms export to Finland included 102 infantry fighting vehicles (with 50% offsets), 147 armored personnel carriers (MT-LB), 56 anti-ship missiles, 450 surface-to-air missiles, 1500 anti-tank missiles, 16 air search radars, 6 fire control radars, 86 diesel engines and 4 naval guns, while Finnish major arms export to Sweden included 280 armored personnel carriers (with 100% offsets). In SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) trend indicator values (TIV), the Swedish export to Finland comprised 349 million TIV, while Finnish export to Sweden comprised 49 million TIV.

The interests of Swedish industry have been extensively discussed in both countries, in a positive light in Sweden, but often as a negative factor in Finland. Debate shows a sceptic Finnish view of Swedish proposals for closer defence cooperation as driven by the Swedish defence industry:

"The [Finnish] army has become more technological and its equipment more expensive. Maintaining independent, credible armed forces requires considerable investments. And cooperation or even an alliance is doubtless a sensible option for Finland. ... But at a time when Sweden is [name omitted], there is no political wish to pool and share capabilities. Sweden is driven by the need to use up the military equipment stocks remaining from the Cold War, and after the restructuring of the Swedish Defence Forces since 2001, Sweden’s military spending capacity has decreased. "

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71 Enström & Haglund, “Nu fördjupar vi samarbetet”; Försvarsministeriet, Det nordiska försvarsmaterielsamarbetet; NORDEFCO, Military Coordination Committee Annual Report 2012, p.7; Statsrådets kansli, Finlands säkerhets- och försvarspolitik 2012 – Statsrådets redogörelse, pp.13,73

72 Försvarsministeriet, Det nordiska försvarsmaterielsamarbetet; Regeringen, Regeringens skrivelse 2011/12:14: Riksrevisionens rapport om försvARETS internationella materielsamarbeten, p.81; Riksrevisionen, Besparingar i försvARETS materielförsörjning: Regeringens genomförandeuppdrif 2008, p.57

73 SIPRI data base Volume of arms exports, note on database: Figures cover deliveries of major conventional weapons, as defined by SIPRI. Deliveries of less than 0.5 million TIV are not included by SIPRI.
downsizing its army and using its neighbouring countries as a buffer against external threats, a Nordic defence alliance is just a remote possibility. And the other Nordic countries [Norway, Denmark and Iceland] aren’t interested either, because they are already members of NATO. So what does Sweden have to offer apart from its significant arms industry? Closer cooperation can’t simply mean that Finland commits to buying its defence equipment solely from Sweden without taking the competition into account”.

The future Finnish decision on its next fighter aircraft is a major economic factor. This decision is assumed to take place in 2015-2017 due to an out-of-service date of the current F/A-18 in 2020-2025. Gripen exports are seen as very important in Sweden, and the potential choice of the Swedish fighter as the next Finnish fighter aircraft is assumed to become increasingly important in debate. Discussion may be influenced by what has even been seen as Swedish meddling in other countries to influence their choice of fighter aircraft. The choice of fighter aircraft is not only an issue of military requirements or economic convenience, it is also a matter of security policy, and the US F-35 is already being tipped as a contender against the Gripen in Finland.

3.3.2 Conclusions: Economic factors

From the analysis above it can be concluded that several economic factors influence debate on intensified bilateral defence cooperation, and that some of these differ between Finland and Sweden.

Pooling and sharing is strived for, but is seen as problematic. Cooperation seeks to create cost-effectiveness through the sharing of costs for development, education et cetera, with a “win-win” situation seen as a significant driver for cooperation.

Sweden and Finland have collaborated on several projects. Some of these have included other Nordic countries, but collaboration has primarily been bilateral. Several bilateral projects have failed, primarily due to economic reasons.

The role of the defence industry is significant, especially in Sweden. Reflecting the size of the industry, the export balance is significantly in Sweden’s favor, and high-profile projects, such as the Gripen, are seen to significantly influence debate, raising Finnish suspicions of a “win-lose” situation in cooperation, and of cooperation being driven by the interests of the Swedish industry.

3.4 Attitudinal factors

3.4.1 Analysis

Several issues touching attitudinal factors have already been discussed in the previous chapters. As seen in chapter 3.1, solidarity between Finland and Sweden is evident, and as dis-

74 Karjalainen, “Nordic defence alliance implausible”
cussed in chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, trust is also generally seen to be high. These may be explained by a long tradition of cooperation, sharing similar values and belonging to the same communities (Nordic countries, members of the EU and advanced partners of NATO), as well as due to sharing common history as part of the same nation until 1809.

This is not the complete picture however, as Finnish debate also reveals a very significant factor acting as an obstacle to intensified cooperation or alliance – distrust. A significant sense of this distrust is seen when it comes to “homeland defence”, reinforced by national myths:

“En orsak till detta är starka nationella myter som är starkt knutna till finsk säkerhetspolitisk identitet. Den starkaste av dessa är att det finska folket (speciellt efter självständigheten 1917) inte kan lita på support från andra länder. Redan den under mitten av 1700-talet byggda befästningen Sveaborg utanför Helsingfors har vid Kungsporten låtit införa inskriptionen ”Eftervärd stå här på egen botn och lita icke på främmande hielp”. Detta budord har det finska folket tagit till sitt hjärta, och ser man på historieböckerna när Finland varit en del av det svenska eller ryska riket, är det rimligt förståeligt”.

As seen in chapter 3.1, distrust between Finland and Sweden marked the first 20 years of Finnish independence. It could also be claimed as a simplification, that Sweden often exhibits significant sympathy towards Finland, while Finland more often perceives Sweden as the “luckier big brother”, even displaying antipathy at times. Stemming from the misunderstanding of Swedish motivations in rejecting allied help to Finland during the Winter War, a view of Sweden as cold and disloyal to Finland has been perpetuated in Finland. This Finnish perception of a lack of solidarity between Sweden and Finland, possible caused by ignorance of historical facts, may also be connected to language politics. The status of the Swedish language in Finland as the second official language has been challenged repeatedly, and even xenophobic sentiments have at times been seen in Finland, causing concern in Sweden.

An attitude of scepticism or realism also significantly influences debate. As an example of this from a Finnish view:

“Även i Norden och närområdet är problemen stora och tyvärr behandlas de ofta på ren nationell basis. Insikten om att det också finns betydande möjligheter om man ser till helhetsbilden, verkar saknas. Det behövs både ledarskap och visioner som sträcker sig långt utöver snäva nationella intressen. I slutändan måste det även till fasta politiska utfaselser. Utan sådana anser man åtminstone i Finland att hela det nordiska samarbetsupplägget är oseriöst”.

On the other hand, politicians on both sides have in debate made it clear that the nations share a deep connection, and a general sense of optimism can be seen, also reflecting popular opinion (see chapter 3.2). Cooperation is facilitated by the nations in general having similar Nordic values and policies.

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76 Salonius-Pasternak, ”Alla talar om Nato, men inget händer - Debatten om Natomedlemskap i Finland”
77 Chrispinsson, John, “Svenskan allt mer osynlig i Finland”; YLE, “Utan Sverige inget Finland”; Huvudstadsbladet, ”Svenskan i Finland bör också diskuteras i Sverige”
78 Forss, ”Finska synpunkter på försvarsdebatten”
79 Enström & Haglund, ”Nu fördjupar vi samarbetet”
3.4.2 Conclusions: Attitudinal factors

From the analysis above it can be concluded that several attitudinal factors influence debate on intensified bilateral defence cooperation, with significant differences between Finland and Sweden.

Finland and Sweden are seen as sharing common values and history, which facilitates cooperation significantly. As seen in debate, significant trust and solidarity exist between Finland and Sweden.

These are however to some degree undermined in Finland by distrust and continuing promulgation of myths, seeking to belittle Swedish solidarity and to cast Finland as “always having been left alone”, which can even be seen as a sort of counterproductive national paranoia. Such views can also be seen to be based on realism or scepticism.

Even though national language politics might at first seem irrelevant, attacks on the Swedish language in Finland can also be seen to have influenced debate on military cooperation significantly.
4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Driving forces

The driving forces influencing debate on intensified military cooperation are a very complex mixture of the factors analyzed “categorically” above. This is natural, as the evolving and fluctuating debate can be seen as influenced by different factors, depending on the point of view. Multiple cross-influences between categories are highlighted in the analysis, and it is not certain whether a significant change in one category would change debate on cooperation, or whether the interlinkage means, that several changes in the factors in different categories would be required to change debate significantly. As an example: if better historical understanding of the significance of Swedish support to Finland in times of war became widespread, would this change attitudes in Finland on Sweden as a trustworthy partner in a potential defence alliance, or would significant change in Swedish military capabilities and political commitment beyond a Solidarity Declaration also be required?

Significantly, many of the factors are perceived very differently in Finland and Sweden. Intensified defence cooperation would be facilitated by increased awareness of this difference of perspectives. Finnish suspicion or distrust of Sweden was seen in all four categories of factors. On this basis, trust can be seen as a key driving force influencing debate on cooperation. Trust could potentially be improved by increased Finnish public awareness of the historical significance of Swedish help to Finland, improved credibility of Swedish military capabilities, a strictly enforced “win-win” perspective in military exports and procurement, clarifying the goals of cooperation and proposing a legally binding framework for cooperation, as well as countering xenophobic sentiments in Finland.

As the result of this study, debate on intensified military cooperation between Finland and Sweden can be seen as influenced by either the existence or lack of trust, furthering or hindering cooperation. Debate is also influenced by four other specific driving forces, which are also presented as polar opposites (as furthering or hindering cooperation);

- A good understanding of the historical background of cooperation from both countries’ point of view, increasing trust and furthering cooperation – or a lack of understanding of history, which increases distrust and allows myths to be perpetuated, hindering cooperation either through distrust (unwarranted pessimism) or by making expectations on cooperation unrealistic (unwarranted optimism)

- Clarity of the political/military goals (visions) of intensified cooperation, including its limitations, and political/military commitment to cooperation in both countries, dependent on both trust and military capability, furthering cooperation – or a lack of clarity, which decreases willingness to take risk, hindering cooperation

- Political commitment to subordinate domestic economic gain and independence to the political/military purposes of cooperation and pooling and sharing (a “win-win”-mindset), furthering cooperation – or a lack of such commitment, which decreases
trust as cooperation is seen as a mask for economic self-interest ("win-lose"), hindering cooperation

- A legally binding bilateral framework for cooperation (beyond NORDEFCO and the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity) including guarantees that capabilities will be available in crisis, increasing trust and enforcing commitment, starting with a formal agreement on intensified military cooperation (which could if such a goal becomes actual later be developed towards a defence pact treaty), furthering cooperation – or cooperation based on good faith without legal guarantees, which decreases willingness to take risk, hindering cooperation

These driving forces influence debate on intensified defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden, but may also be seen as one evolution of Valasek’s theory. They could potentially be applied to other nations and other debates on intensified defence cooperation as an alternative analysis model to Valasek’s factors.

This study points out the existence or lack of trust as the key driving force influencing debate on intensified defence cooperation. This can be seen as confirming the need seen by Rydell & Forss (2012) to continue to influence popular opinion in both countries if increased cooperation on defence is intended. The results can also be seen as complementing Doeser, Petersson & Westberg (2012), which pointed to economic factors as the key driving force for actual Nordic cooperation. For debate on intensified defence cooperation, trust is even more than “important” (as seen by Valasek (2011) for pooling and sharing) – it is critical.

4.2 Reflections

As a reflection on this study, some comments are necessary. What was supposed to be studied was studied, and the research questions were answered. The results are seen as fulfilling the purpose of the study. However, the attempt to provide a practical approach through analysis of a limited corpus can be questioned, and the results might have been different if another sample of debate, a broad round of interviews or a survey had been used instead.

The reliability of this thesis is seen as improved by the method used, which in terms of Grounded theory evaluation means that the “theory” generated (the categorization of factors and results of this study) are seen to fit the data. The chosen methodology facilitated the research process, allowing time for critical evaluation of the study as it was conducted. Nonetheless, the analysis and results of this study are open to other interpretations. The use of Grounded theory is also a methodological choice that may be questioned. Prior knowledge on the subject influenced results, and the corpus consists of articles reflecting personal choice as “relevant” during continuous monitoring of the debate – instead of a “database search” using only a set of specific key words, which could be listed. This means, that testing of the reliability of the results by reproduction by another researcher given the same questions and data is not optimal. However, the sources used and the public nature of the subject facilitate this kind of testing. On the other hand, the use of public surveys as sources carries some risk, as the exact wording of questions in polls is known to influence answers, with minor variation in questions producing very different results, especially in reaction to certain “loaded words” repeated by
the mass media. Results may also be interpreted to mean more than what is answered. These effects can skew survey results significantly.\footnote{Suhonen, Pertti, "Ulkopoliittiset gallupit presidentinvaaaleissa 2006"}

New information has been produced as a contribution to the field of study. The study increases understanding of debate, which may be of interest for students, researchers and even decision makers. Some of the sources used are assessed to have had a role in shaping debate and influencing experts and decision makers in Finland and Sweden. As this study aimed to identify and analyze driving forces influencing debate on intensified defence cooperation, and not find “what actually causes cooperation“, variable analysis on the differing weights of the factors against each other was intentionally not conducted. As a debate is by nature an evolving subject, the results of this study are seen as relevant for the chosen period and debate itself, but not necessarily generalizable for other time periods or as fully reflecting what is debated. The results of this study cannot be treated as “absolute truth” reflecting “reality”. However, they can be seen as useful tools for understanding the ongoing debate and “what lies under it”. The questions raised above may be answered in later research.

4.3 Suggestions for further studies

The results of this study portray one view of the subject, and are thus open to critique. This thesis is not in itself a basis to make predictions or formulate policy for future military cooperation, and a powerful argument for further research on the subject area remains. Some further areas of study are suggested:

- A continuation on this study using quantitative methods and the categories and factors developed in this study to find internal dependencies and priorities in debate to find which factors are more important than others

- Using the driving forces seen in this study as an analysis model for studying other cases of intensified defence cooperation

- Study of the aspects excluded from this study, including the influences of other actors (e.g. Russia, NATO, EU), domestic political factors (including political rhetoric) as well as organizational factors in both Finland and Sweden.
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