Freight transport, policy instruments and climate

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Abstract: The impact of policy instruments supposed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from road freight transports may seem smaller than expected. Using insights from economics and contract theory, the paper sorts out the (possible) instances of market failure in the freight transport market; operator market power, asymmetric information split incentives, and public goods. The primary limitations of standard policy instruments are demonstrated to be linked to unobservable information. Some of these may be reduced but not eliminated as information technologies develop, making it possible to observe, verify and provide contract-relevant information to the uninformed parties. There is little reason to believe that possible market failures present major limitations to the efficiency of economic instruments geared toward protecting the climate, other than possibly in the short run.

Key words: Freight transport, climate, greenhouse gas, policy instruments, asymmetric information, split incentives

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1 Introduction

The freight-transportation market, i.e., the purchase and sale of transport services, is growing rapidly, in Sweden – which serves as a backdrop for this paper – the rest of Europe and the wider world. This applies to all modes of transport. In addition to general economic growth, this is also related to the increase of international trade. Production specialization, combined with scale economies in the production of goods, adds to the growth. Increased transport volumes will lead, ceteris paribus, to increased demand for energy in the form of fossil fuels, biofuels, and electricity, and to more greenhouse gas emissions. To counter this, more stringent policy measures for lowering energy use and greenhouse gas emissions have been implemented.

Against this background, this paper addresses whether shippers, intermediaries and buyers of freight transport services adapt their fuel usage – in terms of both volume and type – to these policy instruments in a way consistent with economic efficiency. That is, will they respond to fuel price changes, possibly influenced by changes in policy, in a predicted way, and if not, why? Understanding this is of crucial importance when designing future policy, and even more so given the fact that freight transport is responsible for a large share of greenhouse gas emissions.

Two observations highlight the relevance of these questions. First, freight markets, at least in Europe, are to a large extent deregulated. In efficient markets, buyers and sellers are informed about the costs and the scarcity of goods and services through the price system. They will react to changes in costs of various inputs in the production chain in a way which establishes a socially optimal resource allocation, without any public intervention being required. In the transport sector, this would imply, for instance, that fuel price changes influence the demand for transportation per se, as well as the demand for vehicles in terms of their specific fuel consumption. Second, the rather substantial economic policy instruments, aimed at the transport sector – in particular in the form of taxes on fuel – and implemented in Sweden and other countries over several years, have arguably had limited visible impact on the volume and growth of transportation.

Thus, we observe something of a puzzle: Markets have been deregulated and should be expected to respond to increasing fuel prices by way of buying less transport. But, quite to the contrary, we observe a rather dramatic increase in transportation. Perhaps even more puzzling,
a major share of the increase is in road transport, which is highly dependent on fossil fuel, the most heavily taxed fuel type. An immediate suspicion given this observation is (i) that there are some market failures at work hindering the market from responding as suggested by theory, or (ii) the market has actually responded in the anticipated way, but the result is not observable since other things are occurring on the market simultaneously, or (iii) a combination of these two. This paper is mainly focused on (i), trying to isolate a series of market failures that may exist in the freight transport market. The primary candidates include information asymmetries among agents in the market, market power at least in some segments of the transport sector, knowledge, e.g., regarding how to enhance transportation’s energy efficiency as a public good, and externalities other than those related to greenhouse gas emissions. Focus is on the roads and railways, ignoring both the maritime and the aviation sectors. Most of the discussion applies to freight transportation in general, although the Swedish market is used as a backdrop. In particular, the freight transport market exhibits the following characteristics:

- Transportation costs’ share of trade value varies: In particular, the transport of high value goods has a different cost structure compared to shipments of low value and bulk goods, (SIKA, 2007).
- There are structural differences among goods that must be delivered within a specified time (e.g. fruit and vegetables), or at a specific time (c.f. just in time delivery strategies), and goods where the time of delivery is less important.
- Shipments may be made on the shipper’s own behalf or by using carriers. Carrier logistics, which is a black box from an outside perspective, may be of great importance in many cases.
- The contracts for (privately) purchased or (publicly) procured transportation may be designed in various ways. For instance, some contain environmental standards (EURO classes, etc.), while others do not. Contract arrangements and compensation models also differ among shippers, forwarders and carriers.
- Some parts of the transport sector are highly competitive while others are highly concentrated. In Sweden, there are about 14,000 trucking companies in the market for road haulage (SIKA, 2009), while there are only some 15 operators in the market for rail freight, of which the largest operator has a market share of 70% (Vierth, 2012).
Similarly, the degree of competition varies also on the freight forwarder and carrier-level.

- In contrast to the long-distance transport market, short-distance (local and regional) transports are dominated by trucks and modal competition is virtually non-existent.
- The proportion of foreign operators varies in the sub-markets and increases over time. This means that competition aspects must be taken into account when considering measures that only impact companies registered within the country.

Thus, the freight transportation market exhibits a series of specific characteristics and is also highly heterogeneous. The characteristics of the market most likely influence the market’s responses to policy instruments. This is also the starting point for the analysis: While markets typically respond to policy instruments, the freight market’s idiosyncrasies may mean that it reacts to policy changes differently from other types of markets.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the land freight sector’s energy use and greenhouse gas emissions together with policies geared towards these. Section 3 addresses other market failures which might exist on the freight transport market, and hinder CO2-policies from working as intended. Section 4 concludes the paper.

2. Energy use, CO2 emissions and policy in the land freight sector

Table 1 illustrates freight transport levels, energy use, and emissions of CO2e\(^2\) in Sweden over the period 2003 to 2010. With the exception of the recession year 2009, total freight transportation increases continuously. However, the market shares of the different modes remain relatively constant over the period.

It is difficult to correctly calculate the energy use and emissions by freight transport, in particular since it involves determining the share of total transportation that relates to goods. Thus, some care should be taken when interpreting the figures in Table 1. Even so, the values point towards stable energy use by freight transports, i.e. 20 - 21 TWh per year for the period 2005-2010. Most of it, around 19 TWh, is used for road haulage purposes. Overall, energy consumption for freight is about one third of the energy used for passenger transport. This relationship too is relatively constant during the period in question.

\(^2\) CO2e refers to CO2 equivalents. However, in the case of freight transports, the greenhouse gas emitted is almost exclusively CO2. Thus, we only refer to CO2 hereafter.
The pattern of greenhouse gas emissions is similar to that of energy use. Again, care must be taken when interpreting the numbers. For instance, the entry for road includes heavy trucks, light trucks and buses. At least the latter should not be defined as freight transport. For rail, no distinction is made between freight and passenger transport, meaning that this statistic comprises both types of services. The broader picture probably remains correct. This shows that there is a steady growth up to 2009 and the financial crisis resulting in a reduction of emissions. The increase between 2009 and 2010 may indicate that it indeed is a business cycle effect that causes the 2009 drop. Also, CO2e emission for rail is far lower than for roads.

Table 1: Transport volumes (billion ton-km), energy (TWh) and CO2e emissions (million ton) for land based freight transport (CO2e Rail refers to all rail transport, not only freight) between 2003 and 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
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<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport volume</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road (billion ton-km)</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36.3</td>
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<td>Market share (%)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rail (billion ton-km)</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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<td>Market share (%)</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Energy use</td>
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<td>Road (TWh)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rail (TWh)</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>1.026</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>1.142</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.887</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO2e</td>
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<td>Road (million Ton)</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>6.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail (total, million Ton)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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Both the EU and Sweden have a quantitative target for CO2 emissions. The main policy task is therefore to design policy instruments such that this target is met at lowest possible cost. This could in principle be accomplished by implementing a set of administrative instruments. As always with administrative means, this would require access to vast amounts of information in order to appropriately balance emission costs against other types of costs for implementing a policy which minimizes costs.

3 These targets are not only to be met within the borders of the EU or Sweden. There are mechanisms, e.g., the clean development mechanism (CDM), designed to allow some of the emission reductions to occur in other places, e.g., in developing countries where reductions are cheaper.
Two observations suggest that a fairly simple pricing system is an appropriate regulation approach for greenhouse gas emissions. First, there is currently no economically viable way to "clean" CO2 emissions. Thus, it is straightforward to calculate emission volumes from information about the type and amount of fossil fuel consumed. Second, the impact on global warming is independent of the source from which emissions occur. This simplifies the design of cost effective policy instruments significantly.

A tax on fuels based on their carbon content is therefore fit for internalizing the social costs associated with CO2 emissions. Such a tax is also desirable from a cost perspective. A condition for cost-effectiveness is that the marginal cost of abatement is equal for all emitters. A general and uniform tax per unit of emissions implies that all emitters will reduce emissions up to the level where their marginal abatement cost equals the tax. An (uniform) emissions tax will therefore lead to a cost-effective allocation of burdens to reach the given emissions targets. Similarly, a system of emissions trading will result in a price on emissions, and each emitter will reduce its emissions so that its marginal abatement cost equals this price. Again, a cost-effective outcome.

Economic instruments are particularly useful in the presence of information asymmetries regarding the available technology between the regulated (e.g. firms) and regulators (e.g. the government). This follows from their ability to decentralize decision-making, such as using agents, who are best equipped to make such decisions, to adapt the production process to new relative prices. Economic instruments are therefore superior, in most instances, to administrative rules in curbing CO2 emissions.

Since damage is caused by the emission, a tax should, as far as possible, be linked to the extent of harmful emissions. As CO2 emissions directly follow from the use of fossil fuel, it is straightforward to calculate the emission volumes via the amount of fuel used, for instance knowing that the use of one liter of diesel emits approximately 2.5 kg of CO2. Managing CO2 emissions through a tax on fuel is better than using a kilometer or vehicle tax, since neither of these links directly to the source of the externality.

Consequently, it is difficult to justify the use of more instruments than a CO2 tax equal for all emitters, or a system of emissions trading where all emitters participate. With this in mind, it is interesting to study the instruments in use. Mandell (2009), for instance, demonstrates that Sweden has neither a comprehensive emissions tax nor a comprehensive system for emissions trading, but rather a bit of both. An emissions trading scheme handles emissions from the
energy-intensive industry, while CO2-taxes cover the rest of the economy, including fossil fuel based transports. On top of these, the policy basket comprises a large number of additional instruments motivated by climate concerns. Examples of instruments (partly) aimed at the transport sector include programs to subsidize bike paths and biogas plants, a green car premium that subsidizes certain cars, differentiated vehicle taxes that are lower for cars with lower CO2 emissions, etc.

Since total emissions are set by international agreements, these additional instruments do not contribute to a reduced carbon footprint. It is also obvious that they will not reduce the costs associated with reaching target levels, but rather the opposite. Instruments which are complementary to the carbon tax/the trading scheme, and which target a specific sector such as transport, rather create differences in the marginal cost of emission reductions between sectors. As a result, the total costs for emission reduction increase, while total emissions remain unaffected. Instruments like those described here can either be attributed to a poor understanding of how markets react to policy instruments, or to “warm glow” related to taking action, supposedly in order to reduce CO2 emissions.

3. The combination of externalities, market power and asymmetric information

We have established that a tax on fuel in relation to its carbon content is an easy way to internalize the social costs associated with CO2 emissions. An obvious concern is to determine the appropriate tax level. While this is not a trivial task, it is not further addressed here; see Mandell (2011), Angelov et.al. (2010) or Carlén and Mandell (2012). To highlight the consequences of other (potential) market imperfections, e.g., market power and asymmetric information, we rather adopt a bold assumption: The correct value of the social costs associated with an additional unit of CO2 emitted by freight transport is known and is correctly handled through a fuel tax.

This makes it possible to address the following question: If fuel prices reflect all social costs, including costs associated with CO2 emissions, are there reasons to believe that freight transport would be used to an extent which is compatible with social welfare maximization? If the answer is in the affirmative, energy use and greenhouse gas emissions would be at levels which are optimal from a social standpoint. If not, there must be some other market failure(s) involved. Here, the main attention is on market failures due to information asymmetries (section 3.2 to 3.5). We also address the implications of market power (section 3.6), and
public goods (3.7). We start, however, by addressing a situation where externalities other than CO2 are not correctly reflected in the prices.

3.1 Other externalities

The presence of negative externalities typically results in a market not being able to establish an allocation of resources which is optimal from a societal point of view. The general idea is to use policy instruments to ‘internalize’ the externalities, so that the market – given the instruments – will adapt behavior so that (an outcome at least closer to) an efficient outcome will emerge. The ratio between the level of the policy instrument and the event's marginal social cost, the internalization rate, provides a measure of the degree of internalization. A ratio less than one indicates that the level of the tax or fee is not high enough to fully internalize the societal costs of the effect in question. The opposite applies for ratios greater than one.

Calculations of the rate of internalization require a series of steps. For instance, the vehicles’ fuel consumption has to be known in order to convert externalities per fuel unit to distance unit. As some of these steps by necessity rely on simplifications and assumptions, the outcome is associated with some uncertainty.

Typical values for Sweden indicate that externalities from cars are not far from being fully internalized. For traffic on major roads, both rural and urban, passenger cars exhibit an internalization rate of 0.86. The corresponding values for trucks are far less, typically ranging from 0.4 to 0.6. Thus, the present policy instruments in Sweden do not account for the fact that heavy vehicles cause larger negative externalities than cars. Rather, the charges levied on heavy road traffic should increase by a factor of two, Trafikanalys (2012a).

The corresponding exercise for railways reveals that passenger trains exhibit a larger degree of internalization than freight trains. But there seems to be a need to increase all track user charges, since passenger and freight trains show internalization rates of 0.64 and 0.29, respectively, Trafikanalys (2012b). The precise numbers are of less interest as they rely on less than perfect data. However, that they are both below one, and much more so for freight trains, is an interesting observation. The main driver behind the large difference seems to be that, even though the charges are differentiated with respect to weight, they do not fully account for the substantial difference in infrastructure wear.

The main message from this is that heavy traffic on both road and rail, on average, are subject to policy instruments that are too weak. Consequently, the freight volumes are higher than
would be the case if these costs were fully internalized. Even if greenhouse gas emissions in isolation were handled by correctly calibrated policy instruments, energy consumption and CO2 emissions would be inefficiently large.

These observations apply to average values that can vary greatly according to road type, urban environment, etc. For instance, the internalization rate for heavy road transport may be much higher for long distance journeys than for local transport in the cities (Kågeson, 2011). The impact from increasing the internalization rate of energy consumption or greenhouse gases depends on, e.g., how price sensitive the final customers are, and on what opportunities are available to change behavior. The overall conclusion, however, is clear: Efficient use of the infrastructure requires significantly higher charges for freight transports, and further differentiation of charges with respect to distance, weight and geography.

3.2 Asymmetric information and contracts
Freight transport typically involves several parties contracting with each other. The simplest situation involves a transport buyer (sender) who wants to send goods to a customer (receiver) and signs a contract with a service provider, i.e. a trucking company, a train operator or a shipping company.

To address the consequence of this chain of relationships, consider for simplicity a situation where the service provider is an owner-driver firm. This hauler can affect his fuel consumption, and thus the greenhouse gas emissions, e.g., by adjusting his driving style. There are also other factors affecting fuel consumption, but which are beyond the hauler’s control, e.g., weather, congestion, etc. Even if the hauler is doing his best to keep down fuel consumption, it may be (inefficiently) high due to external circumstances. The hauler has knowledge of both his driving technique and the external conditions, but the client does not. A contract between the parties must account for this information asymmetry.

This can be illustrated with a simple hidden action model. Let \( z \) denote fuel consumption, which is assumed to be observable to all parties. There is a ‘start value’ of fuel consumption, \( F \), for a given transport. The actual consumption is affected by two variables the effort of the hauler \( e \) and exogenous random events \( x \), such that \( z = F - e + x \). The expected value of \( x \) is zero. Thus, \( E[z] = F - e \) and \( \text{var}(z) = \text{var}(x) \). Both \( e \) and \( x \) are unobservable for the transport buyer, and cannot be contracted upon. Rather, the contract must be based on \( z \). Restricting attention to contracts where the payment \( (w) \) is linear in outcome means that \( w = \alpha + \beta z = \alpha + \beta (F - e + x) \). The contract thus specifies \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), where \( \alpha \) is a fixed payment (independent
of z) and $\beta$ is a variable part. The value of the transport service to the transport buyer is denoted $V(e)$. Thus, we allow for the influence of the hauler’s efforts to reduce fuel consumption on the value of the transport service. However, our base case assumes this not to be the case, i.e., that $V'(e)$ equals zero which would seem to be the typical case in real life.

The expected pay-off, $\pi_B$, to the transport buyer becomes:

$$E\{\pi_B\} = E\{V(e) - w\} = V(e) - \alpha - \beta (F - e)$$

(1)

The hauler faces a cost of effort, $C(e)$, where both $C'(e)$ and $C''(e)$ are strictly positive, i.e., the costs of effort increases at an increasing rate. The hauler may be risk averse, which then is captured by a strictly positive risk coefficient, $r$. There is a strictly positive fuel price, denoted $p$. The hauler is responsible for purchasing the fuel. The hauler’s expected pay-off, $\pi_H$, is given by:

$$E\{\pi_H\} = E\{w\} - .5r \text{var}(w) - C(e) - p (F - e) =$$

$$\alpha + \beta (F - e) - .5 r (\beta - p) \text{var}(x) - C(e) - p (F - e)$$

(2)

The transport buyer’s problem is to design a contract that maximizes her expected pay-off and is acceptable to the hauler. To examine this, we start by deriving the hauler’s optimal response to a given contract by differentiating $\pi_H$ with respect to $e$. From this, it can be concluded that the hauler’s optimal effort level must fulfill $\beta = p - C'(e)$. As $C''(e)$ is assumed strictly positive, the hauler’s effort will decrease in $\beta$. This effort is not influenced by the fixed payment, $\alpha$, so $\beta$ may be used to maximize the total expected value of the contract, and $\alpha$ to distribute this value between the buyer and the hauler. The expected total value of the contract, $E\{\pi_{TOT}\}$, is given by

$$E\{\pi_{TOT}\} = E\{\pi_B\} + E\{\pi_H\} = V(e) - .5 r (\beta - p)^2 \text{var}(x) - C(e) - p (F - e)$$

(3)

In (3), the transfer between the parties cancels out. Substituting for the hauler’s optimal effort, and maximizing $E\{\pi_{TOT}\}$ with respect to $e$ yields the following first order condition:

$$V'(e) - r C'(e) \text{var}(x) C''(e) - C'(e) + p = 0$$

(4)

Finally, substituting for $\beta = p - C'(e)$ and solving for $\beta$ yields an expression for the optimal level of the variable part of the contract:

$$\beta^* = \frac{-V'(e) + p \text{var}(x)C''(e)}{1 + r \text{var}(x)C'(e)}$$

(5)
Equation (5) is akin to a standard result in contract theory, often referred to as the incentive intensity principle. It shows the strength of the optimal incentive to put on an agent – the hauler in this case. As noted, in the base case the value of the transport service as such is independent of the fuel consumption. That is $V'(e)$ equals zero. In a situation where there are no exogenous circumstances, equation (5) shows that it may influence the fuel consumption, i.e., $\text{var}(x) = 0$, and/or the hauler is risk neutral, i.e., $r = 0$, and the optimal value of $\beta$ is zero. That is, the optimal contract specifies a fixed payment only – the payment should not depend on the fuel consumption at all. This seems intuitively correct. A fixed payment implies that all gains from reducing fuel consumption remain with the hauler, thus providing the strongest possible incentive for the hauler to keep fuel consumption at an efficient level. In other words, the hauler is balancing fuel costs against the costs associated with reducing fuel consumption.

However, if there are risks involved, $\text{var}(x) > 0$, and the hauler is risk averse, $r > 0$, and the optimal $\beta$ is strictly positive. This follows from a fixed price contract that puts all risk on the hauler. As the hauler is risk averse, she will demand compensation for this. There is thus a trade-off between providing incentives and limiting risk exposure – the optimal trade-off will be the result of applying (5).

It is also worth noting that $\beta^*$ increases in the fuel price, $p$. A higher fuel price will magnify the risk exposure of the hauler. Consequently, it will be optimal to reduce risk-exposure on the expense of providing incentives when fuel prices increase. Furthermore, $\beta^*$ increases in $C''(e)$, which measures how rapidly the marginal costs are growing in effort. If $C''(e)$ is large, further effort by the hauler will be very costly, meaning that it is costly to provide strong incentives. To some extent $C''(e)$ captures the hauler’s ability to influence the outcome. When $C''(e)$ is large, this ability is less (or costly). It is then reasonable that $\beta^*$ increases, thus providing less incentive.

Finally, let us relax the assumption of $V'(e) = 0$. Even though it seems reasonable that in most situations the value of the transport service per se does not depend on the fuel consumption, there may exist situations where it might. For instance, consider a setting where the hauler reduces fuel consumption by reducing speed. In such a case, lower fuel consumption may result in a reduced transport value if delivery is time sensitive, i.e., $V'(e) < 0$. From (5) we may conclude that this, ceteris paribus, will increase $\beta^*$. This makes sense as it will provide less incentive for the hauler to make the effort and, thus, the fuel reduction will be less.
In this case there is thus a trade-off among three things; incentive for fuel reduction, risk-exposure and the impact on transport service value. The optimal way to handle this trade-off depends on certain characteristics, including the fuel price. To make matters worse, fuel prices may fluctuate over time, which is often handled through including fuel clauses in the contracts. There is reason, therefore, to consider the consequences of these paragraphs from a welfare perspective.

3.3 Impacts of a fuel clause

To recap, we are considering a situation where a transport buyer wants to send goods to a customer (receiver) and therefore signs a contract with a service provider. This hauler can affect fuel consumption, but there are also other factors affecting fuel consumption beyond the hauler’s control. Still, the hauler is aware of both his driving technique and the external conditions, but the client is not. A contract must therefore trade off activities that may reduce fuel consumption against other activities that may affect profit.

Reducing fuel use has low priority if it is associated with small potential gains. Higher fuel prices will, all things being equal, result in a relative shift of focus to fuel consumption. A counteracting effect is that contracts often contain a fuel clause allowing increased fuel costs to be directly passed on to the customer. This allows long contracts to be written even if fuel prices fluctuate over time, as the hauler does not need to guard himself against the uncertainty regarding future fuel prices. There is an obvious parallel here to the problem discussed above. Fluctuating fuel prices expose the hauler to risk. The hauler may accept this but will require compensation, at least when she is risk averse. Risk exposure is thus costly and, consequently, if a fuel clause reduces risk, it may also reduce total costs associated with the contract.

However, depending on its formulation, the clause may also hamper the incentives to reduce fuel consumption that otherwise would result from an increase in prices. That is, the profit maximizing trade-off between activities will not be affected by a fuel price change as long as this change is shifted to other agents through the fuel clause.

Figure 1 illustrates the point in the form of a simple isocost/isoquant-diagram. The figure includes two inputs: fuel and other, where other may be wages that depend on the time it takes to fulfill the transport assignment. The isoquant (the convex line) denotes a given amount of transportation to be carried out by a hauler. The straight lines (A, B and C) are isocosts each linking all combinations of inputs that yield the same total cost for the hauler. Let isocost A be
given by the initial prices per unit of fuel and other inputs. The cost minimizing combinations, given these prices, are given by $Q_F^1$ and $Q_O^1$ for fuel and other inputs, respectively. At this combination the isocost is a tangent to the isoquant.

Figure 1. Consequences of a fuel price change

Now, assume that an increased fuel tax raises the fuel price. This implies that a less steep isocost emerges, denoted B in Figure 1. A parallel shift of B, up to a point where it is a tangent to the isoquant, results in a new isocost, denoted C. Given the new prices, C is thus the lowest isocost at which it is possible to produce the given amount of transportation. The new optimal combination of inputs is now given by $Q_F^2$ and $Q_O^2$. From Figure 1 it is obvious that a higher price of fuel makes the hauler substitute away from fuel and towards more of other inputs, e.g., time. The hauler chooses to drive slower, thus consuming less fuel but more time to carry out the transport assignment. However, if the fuel clause is written so that the hauler is fully shielded from fuel price changes, the slope of the isocost will remain unchanged after the tax increase, and the optimal combination will still be $Q_F^1$ and $Q_O^1$. The entire extra fuel cost will be shifted to the transport buyer.

In this way any contract with indexation clauses creates a ‘filter’ between policy instruments, e.g., fuel taxes, and agents that otherwise would react to the instruments. As a result, the haulers’ response to policy changes may be lower than anticipated or desired. Thus, a higher fuel tax may increase the cost of agents whose behavior is not intended or even possible to change. However, when the contract is renegotiated, it seems reasonable to assume that it will be rewritten in accordance with the new cost structure. That is, the possible ‘filtering’ process inherent in the contracts may cause the transport market to react slower than otherwise would be the case, but it seems likely that this is only a short-run effect.
There are several different ways to formulate a fuel clause. One that is often used in Sweden is not based on actual fuel consumption – probably due to it being unobservable for the transport buyer and, thus, not feasible to contract upon. Rather, it relies on typical consumption for a given type of transportation. The contract specifies a total cost for the transport service, and a specific share of this that is (said to be) due to fuel. This share is then tied to an index. This seemingly minor adjustment relative to using actual fuel consumption has a major impact on the outcome. As the actual fuel consumption is paid for by the hauler, he still faces incentives to adapt to fuel tax increases. Returning to Figure 1, the hauler will reduce his fuel consumption from $Q_F^1$ to $Q_F^2$ as a consequence of a tax increase. The fuel clause will compensate for the higher fuel price. As the fuel share given by the contract remains intact, while the actual fuel consumption has decreased, the compensation may even exceed the increased fuel costs.

3.4 Split incentives

In a situation where both the transport buyer and the hauler are able to take actions that influence the fuel consumption, a contract may be a blunt instrument for establishing an efficient outcome. The reason is that (i) some of the benefits from actions taken by one party will accrue to the other and (ii) asymmetric information renders it infeasible to contract on actions directly. This is a situation with split incentives, often illustrated by the relationship between a landlord and tenant in a rental property. Both are able to affect energy use in an apartment. The landlord is responsible for insulation, windows, etc. The tenant chooses which devices to purchase - TVs, lamps, etc. - and if she turns off the lights when leaving the room. The question is how incentives can be created so that both make efficient choices when constructing, running and using the property.

A similar case may arise in a freight transport setting, which may be illustrated with a simplified version of the above model. We still consider a given transport service that yields a fixed value to the buyer of $V$, and assume that the fuel consumption is known by both parties. To simplify, the possibility of external risk is ignored so that fuel consumption is only affected by the actions of the transport buyer and the hauler. This allows a more general specification in which the fuel consumption is given by $z(e,b)$, where $e$ denotes efforts taken by the hauler and $b$ by the buyer. More effort by either party results in lower fuel consumption, i.e., $\frac{\partial z(e,b)}{\partial e} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial z(e,b)}{\partial b} < 0$. But effort is costly. The hauler’s generalized cost is still $C(e)$, where $C(0) = 0$ and both $C'(e)$ and $C''(e)$ are strictly positive.
Similarly, the buyer’s cost of action is denoted $K(b)$, where $K(0) = 0$, $K'(b) > 0$ and $K''(b) > 0$.

To establish the efficient outcome, consider an integrated case where the buyer and the hauler act as one agent. The pay-off for the integrated agent, $\pi_I$, is given by

$$\pi_I = V - C(e) - K(b) - p z(e,b)$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

From this we may derive the following first order conditions:

$$C'(e) = -p \frac{\partial z(e,b)}{\partial e}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

$$K'(b) = -p \frac{\partial z(e,b)}{\partial b}$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Neither of these is surprising. Each action, $e$ and $b$, should be taken up to a level where the marginal cost of the action equals the value of the resulting decrease in fuel consumption.

In the actual industrial situation, the transport buyer and the hauler are separate entities and their relationship is regulated through a contract. As above, the payment is assumed to be linear in outcome, $w = \alpha + \beta z(e,b)$, and the hauler is the party who pays for the fuel. The hauler’s pay-off, $\pi_H$, is

$$\pi_H = \alpha + \beta z(e,b) - C(e) - p z(e,b)$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

The transport buyer’s pay-off, $\pi_B$, becomes

$$\pi_B = V - K(b) - \alpha - \beta z(e,b)$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

This results in a first order condition for the hauler and the transport buyer, respectively:

$$C'(e) = -(p - \beta) \frac{\partial z(e,b)}{\partial e}$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

$$K'(b) = -\beta \frac{\partial z(e,b)}{\partial b}$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Comparing (11) to (6) and (12) to (8) it is obvious that, given the assumptions made, the efficient outcome achieved in the integrated case, i.e., through (7) and (8), is not established in the contract case. Setting the variable part of the contract, $\beta$, to zero, such that the hauler receives a lump sum for carrying out the transport service, results in the hauler taking optimal actions (since then the hauler’s first order condition under the contract coincides with that in
the integrated first best case). Still, when $\beta$ equals zero, the transport buyer has no incentive to take action, as seen from (12). Rather, to induce the efficient action level of the transport buyer would require a $\beta$ equal to the fuel price. As $\beta$ obviously cannot equal zero and a strictly positive $p$ simultaneously, the efficient outcome will not be achievable under the contract.

The best the parties can do is to write a contract that divides the cost of fuel, so that both will have sufficient incentive to take action. But this means that at least one of them will be faced with weaker incentives than if she was responsible for the entire fuel cost. Nonetheless, the case is not as clear-cut as the tenant/landlord-case. For instance, consider a contract under which the hauler bears the full fuel cost. The seller still has incentives to streamline packaging etc. since this reduces transportation costs. This incentive is weaker though than when the seller also bears (parts of) the fuel cost. Thus, there seem to be situations which, at least in part, are characterized by a split incentive problem.

3.5 Impacts from information technology

Many of the problems discussed above stem from the fact that information is asymmetrically distributed, making it difficult or impossible to write efficient contracts. The rapid development of information technology may partly reduce the problems as some information, which formerly was unobservable and/or unverifiable, becomes available and possible to contract upon.

Baker and Hubbard (2003) study how the introduction of on-board computers in trucks affected the freight transport market in the USA during the 90s. They formulate two hypotheses. First, if technology makes it easier to observe the driver's actual behavior, this should lead to more companies managing their shipments by hiring their own drivers. The reason is that the improved information makes it easier to monitor their driving. Second, if technology also makes it easier to coordinate shipments so that the trucks are used more efficiently, it should lead to hiring transport to a greater extent because it increases the possibility of utilizing the better coordination.

The two hypotheses obviously work in different directions – the first argues for a larger degree of in-house transportation while the second argues for less. However, the authors use the fact that two technologies were implemented at the time: one that only recorded behavior (thus solving the first problem), and another that communicated in real-time (thus solving the second problem). By empirically studying how the market behaved when these different
technologies were introduced, the authors find empirical support for both hypotheses. Thus, there is clear evidence that the market structure is changing as technology develops. This, in turn, suggests that asymmetric information may cause fewer problems the more advanced the information technology that is adopted in the transport sector.

3.6 Market power

We now turn briefly to the consequences of implementing emission-regulating policies when there is market power. To illustrate this, we employ a simple textbook example. To maximize profits, the quantity should be such that the revenue from an additional unit equals the cost of producing that unit, i.e., marginal revenue \((MI)\) equals marginal cost \((MC)\). For a monopolist, this corresponds to producing quantity \(q_m\) and charging a price per unit \(P_m\), as illustrated in Figure 2. However, the efficient quantity from a welfare perspective would be \(q^*\), where demand equals supply. Thus, market power causes an efficiency loss.

If production creates a negative externality, the firm’s marginal cost \((MC)\) will be lower than the social marginal cost \((SMC)\). The socially optimal quantity is then \(q_s^*\) (where \(SMC\) equals demand). The policy maker may impose a tax equal to the monetary damage, which will mean that the monopolist's cost will also include the costs that emissions incur for society, i.e. the effects are internalized. As seen from the figure, the profit-maximizing quantity is then given by \(q'_m\), where \(MI\) is equal to the \(SMC\).

![Figure 3](image)

*Figure 3*, the monopolistic solution given a tax equal to the negative externality.
An emissions tax equal to the damage caused thus makes the monopolist take the (formerly) external effect into account. The tax establishes what seems to be a desirable result, i.e., to reduce output and thus the damaging externality. But since the monopolist is already holding back its production, the tax makes the outcome even worse as the quantity produced \((q_m')\) is smaller than the optimal one \((q_S^*)\). This is a classic example of the fact that a situation with more than one market failure does not necessarily result in a more efficient outcome than if only one failure is handled. To the extent that (parts of) the freight market is characterized by market power, the above situation may occur.

A more general observation is related to the monopolist’s response to a policy instrument. Assume temporarily that \(MC\) in Figures 2 and 3 represents the aggregate supply function of a transport market under perfect competition. Introducing a tax which shifts the firms’ aggregate supply function to \(SMC\) would reduce the total quantity from \(q^*\) to \(q_s^*\). This is a larger reduction than in the monopolistic case (from \(q_m\) to \(q'_m\)). As Figure 3 is drawn, the monopolist’s response is only half of what it would be in a perfectly competitive market. Therefore, other things being equal, a low response to a CO2 tax from the transport sector may be a consequence of inadequate competition in the sector.

A factor that may further enhance these effects is if the industry involves a chain of actors, where each has market power. As noted, the efficiency loss follows from the price being set above marginal cost. To the extent that goods and services are inputs into the production of other goods and services, this may result in a chain where players downstream impose a price mark-up on marginal cost, which already contains additional cost from upstream players in the production chain. In the transport sector, such a situation may occur if there is a lack of competition on both the freight forwarder and transporter levels.

A paradoxical conclusion is that there may be reason to question the use of taxes to address externalities in a market where a commercial company has market power. The more practical question is how large the problem of market power really is. As noted, the freight transport market is highly heterogeneous in respect to market concentration in different sectors. Thus, the problems discussed here may exist in some parts of the market, but in general they are probably less prominent.
3.7 Public goods

Freight transport is in itself not a public good, unlike knowledge about how the parties in the freight transportation market may reduce greenhouse gases and energy consumption. That is, this knowledge is essentially a good where one agent’s consumption does not exclude other parties’ simultaneous consumption. When individual agents assess how much they should invest in acquiring new knowledge, they weigh the cost of the investment against its potential gains. The benefits to others from this knowledge is not (automatically) taken into account, and thus the chosen investment will be too low from a social welfare perspective.

Increasing the cost of CO2-emissions, e.g., through higher fuel taxes, will strengthen the incentives for investing in better knowledge of how one may reduce these emissions. Still, it will not solve problems related to the public-good characteristics of knowledge. This requires other kinds of policy instruments, in particular measures turning the public good into private and/or increasing the responsibility of the public sector. The typical example of the former would be patents which establish a property right of the knowledge. Consequently, it may be sold and profits may be made. This will handle the underinvestment problem and remedy the freight transport market’s underinvestment problem. To the extent that knowledge is of less tangible nature, e.g., new ways to improve eco-driving, it may be hard to patent. The latter measure involves research at universities etc. Research is typically financed by governments and the results are free for all.

Information campaigns will also play a role here. They will not solve the underinvestment problem, but they may spread information among market participants in a way that the market would not do by itself.

4. Concluding remarks

Greenhouse gas emissions and other externalities from freight transportation are increasing even though policies on issues concerning the transport sector’s emissions have gradually been made more stringent. One explanation for this could be that something hinders the policy instruments from operating properly. We argue that if this is the case, it must be due to some other market failure(s) being present in the freight transportation market.
Market power may have implications for how the freight transport market responds to economic incentives. However, it is difficult to characterize competition in the transport market in general terms, as it varies among submarkets. We can conclude that if there were a significant element of market power, this would influence the market’s response to changes in economic policy instruments, e.g., fuel taxes. It may even be the case that such a tax will result in the transport volume being even less than is socially optimal.

Likewise, asymmetric information has an impact on how the market responds to (changes in) economic instruments. The design of contracts in the market is crucial for the response in the short run. The contract may work as a ‘filter’ such that agents, who have the ability to change their behavior in order to reduce emissions, are shielded from (parts of) changes of prices and taxes. Over time, as contracts are renegotiated, changes in policy will influence the design of the new contracts. A plausible conclusion is thus that information asymmetries in connection with long-term contracts create rigidities in the system, but they do not constitute absolute obstacles.

The consequences of so-called split incentives for how the market adapts to economic policy instruments are less obvious. The basic observation is that economic instruments induce companies to save money by reducing their energy consumption and / or emissions, or otherwise limit the externalities of traffic. When there are split incentives, several parties may affect the volume of the emissions, but it is difficult to provide incentives for all parties to do this in an efficient way. The consequence is that the overall reduction in emissions will be less than optimal.

The rapid development of information technology may directly or indirectly influence the situation by facilitating access to information that formerly was unavailable. Thus, it becomes possible to contract on measures that formerly were unobservable and/or unverifiable. This relaxes the problem of asymmetric information and thus reduces – but will probably never entirely eliminate – the negative consequences following from it.

It has also been established that the market, in trying to find new ways to reduce emissions and energy consumption, will underinvest due to the public-good characteristics of knowledge. This problem is difficult to solve using policy instruments such as fuel taxes. Rather, the call is for patents and/or publicly funded research. Information campaigns will not solve the underinvestment problem, but is a remedy for the related problem of there being too little incentive for individual agents to spread the knowledge they have.
To sum up: We have identified a series of market failures that may hinder otherwise correctly set economic policy instruments from leading to an efficient outcome. These market failures certainly exist in the freight transport market. Some, such as asymmetric information issues, are general in nature, while others, such as problems related to market power, probably only occur in segments of the market. However, it is arguably the case that neither type of problem is large enough to have any major disturbing effect on the operation of the economic policy instruments, at least not in the longer run.

Finally, let us return to the initial question stated in this paper: why are the sector’s emissions increasing at the same time as the policy instruments targeting these emissions have gradually become stricter? This study provides three important insights. First, there is little reason to believe that there are any major inherent problems in regulating the freight transport market’s greenhouse gas emissions through economic policy instruments. Second, this suggests that, without the instruments being in place, we would have seen a potentially much larger increase in the sector’s emissions. Third, the levels of the existing instruments as a whole, i.e., not only those targeting CO2-emissions, seem to be currently set below – and in some cases far below – what would be efficient. Thus, even if the climate motivated policies work and are set at reasonable levels, the policy package as a whole is not strict enough to keep transportation at an efficient level. Consequently, energy consumption and CO2 emissions will also be inefficiently high, albeit for other reasons than commonly believed.
References


