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Marknadens moraliska gränser
– en kritik av Satz och Sandel

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Det är gammal visdom att vissa saker inte kan köpas för pengar. Andra saker kan det, men väcker anstöt när de säljs och köps: droger, domstolsdomar, rösträtt, barn, sex, livsnödvändiga mediciner. Ibland upplevs själva handeln som moraliskt problematisk; ibland räcker det med att sätta en “prislapp” på något eller någon för att vår moraliska känslighet ska retas; ibland blir själva talet om ett fenomen i ekonomiska termer provocerande. Samtidigt som vår moraliska kompass protesterar inför handel med, eller ekonomifiering av, vissa fenomen, så förvandlas våra samhällen alltmer från samhällen med marknadsekonomier till marknadsamhällen. Detta väcker den intressanta frågan om var de moraliska gränserna går, om de nu överhuvudtaget finns: Vad får vi göra med pengar? Vad får vi handla med på marknaden? Vad får vi talan om, beskriva och jämföra med hjälp av marknadens termer och tankefigurer?


Satz (2010) hävdar att vissa marknader är ”noxious” ”[...] to the extent that their operation undermines or blocks the capacity of the parties to interact as equals [...]”(2010:65). Satz diskuterar dock aldrig på allvar de scenarier där handel med en vara leder till ökad social jämlikhet men där djupt liggande moraliska intuitioner samtidigt fäller utslaget att handeln icke desto mindre är moraliskt fel. Inte heller beskriver tydligt hur det jämlika samhälle hon anger som styrande ideal ska se ut, och det saknas en standard som låter oss väga olika former av ojämlikhet gentemot varandra eller konkurrerande värden.

Referenser
Speakers and Contexts

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According to the standard view of indexicals, the semantic content of utterances in which they occur depend partly on their meaning, and partly on features of the situations in which these utterances are made. In a Kaplanian semantics, these features are represented by contexts, i.e. n-tuples of contextual parameters. One central question in the recent debate on indexical reference concerns the criteria that a context must meet in order to adequately represent a certain utterance situation. There are various suggestions in the offering, but here the focus will be on a generic view—call it speaker-subjectivism—according to which the appropriate context is determined by features of the situation that are internal to the speaker’s mind. The details of this generic view can be filled out in various ways, e.g. depending on what kind of internal features are taken to determine the context. A couple of different options will be considered, and it will be shown that the choice between them has consequences for how some recent objections against speaker-subjectivism can be met.
A Puzzle about Proportionality

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It is generally believed that our permission to cause harm in self-defense, and as punishment, is limited by a proportionality requirement, though it is not obvious how that requirement is best formulated. This paper is concerned with two questions: why does this requirement exist, and when does it apply? Starting from some puzzle cases devised by L. Alexander, it argues (1) that the requirement holds because of our need to protect our rights from violation, and (2) that it applies to cases where the person defending his rights creates a new danger or threat to the offender, as opposed to exploiting an already existing one.
Perception of Shapes and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction

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In this talk an internalist view of perception of shapes is articulated and defended. A basic assumption in the talk is that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience has a certain structure. When perceiving an object of perception, there is one phenomenal property associated with presenting the colour of the object and another phenomenal property associated with presenting the shape of the object, viz. a phenomenal shape. Internalism about perceptions of shapes is defined as the claim that phenomenal shapes determine the intentional content presenting the shape of the object, viz. the intentional shape. Externalism is defined as the claim that the intentional shape is whatever shape in the environment which a phenomenal shape reliably tracks. The argument against externalism now proceeds in three steps. First, it is argued that phenomenal shapes are modality specific, such that a phenomenal shape which is a constituent of a visual perceptual experience cannot be a constituent of a haptic perceptual experience, and vice versa. Second, it is argued that intentional shapes are amodal, such that if an intentional shape is a constituent of a visual intentional content, a qualitatively identical intentional shape could have been a constituent of a haptic intentional content. Third, it is argued that externalism is incompatible with the fact that phenomenal shapes are modality specific and intentional shapes amodal.
Identity and Action in Theatrical Performance

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An attempt to establish an ontological status of a theatrical performance has been a subject of the various discussions in the area of ontology of art and analytical aesthetics. The following contemporary approaches emerged, among others, based on a dispute over the relation between a script/literary work and a theatrical performance (see Osipovich 2006, Saltz 2001, Carroll 2001):

(i) **interpretationism** – according to this dominant viewpoint, a literary work/script and a theatrical performance stand in a relation of interpretation. A theatrical performance is a kind of “addition” to a literary work: giving a theatrical performance amounts to getting an idea of what the work means (its interpretation) and expressing it on stage. For this reason a literary work is perceived as an ontological determinant of a theatrical performance.

(ii) **instructionism** – from this standpoint a literary work/script is a set of instructions and a given performance is a result of the carrying out of such instructions: it interprets a work in a strictly defined way because it follows certain “prescriptions” or “instructions”.

(iii) **productionism** – according to this conception a performance is not linked to literary work by a relation of interpretation but of production. Each time a certain performance is staged it is also produced: every performance is a unique, unrepeatable production because it is always put on in unrepeatable circumstances.

The aim of our presentation will be to critically reconstruct and analyse the above-mentioned standpoints and to propose a new approach to the relations between a theatrical performance and a literary work. The key elements of our proposal are the following:

(i) **anti-instructionism** – we will try to show that a literary work cannot be understood as a set of instructions to be carried out on stage. We reject instructionism based on the premise that imperatives, including instructions as their subset, are performative in character (Parsons 2012). We will present how the conditions of being effective and correct which are imposed on performative utterances come into conflict with common intuitions about the ontological status of a theatrical performance. Being an ordered sequence of states of affairs generated by performatives is not a sufficient condition for being a theatrical performance because it is also necessary that, for example, the audience and actors interact in a shared space at a given time. Moreover, although every literary work on which a theatrical performance is based contains some places of
indeterminacy filled in by the reader and the director on stage, such places are not filled in based on instructions or prescriptions (Ingarden 1973).

(ii) anti-productionism – although it is true that every performance is unrepeatable and unique (if only because they are relativised to a place and time), this does not automatically mean that a performance is not related to a literary work/script in a certain specific way. Let us note that the title of a performance is a key but often trivialised issue. Although it is not part of a performance, it effectively (based on the relation of qualification) refers us to its literary prototype (see Levinson 1985).

Our considerations lead us to state that the relation of “belonging” which occurs between a theatrical performance and a literary work is based on reproducing certain general dramatic relations and not on presenting strictly identical worlds on stage and in a literary work. Thus, we will support the conception that a theatrical performance is an implementation of a literary work (based on imitating its rudimentary structure) and we will also conclude that the possibility of filling in the places of indeterminacy in a theatrical performance (which are different from those in a literary work) makes it ontologically independent from a script.

References
The Dark Side of Numbers

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Here is the most fundamental difference between Hamlet and Napoleon: whereas there is no aspect of Hamlet’s nature that is not already contained in our conception of him, enquiry into the nature of Napoleon, while of course guided by our conception of him, is not a matter of unfolding or further articulating that conception, but rather it is a matter of genuinely adding to it – see Russell (1919), Schiffer (2003), and Yablo (2010). In this sense, I call objects like Hamlet transparent. The metaphor of transparency seems dangerously verificationistic, tempting us to say that all truths about transparent objects are knowable. But as I shall interpret it, the thesis just entails that if the truths about a transparent object are knowable at all, then they are knowable merely by unfolding the semantic articulation of our conception of it. Thus, if \textit{Hamlet} does not settle a question about Hamlet, then no extra-Hamletian fact will step in to settle it for us.

In my talk, the Hamlet–Napoleon case serves as a guiding analogy for dealing with this question: to what extent numbers could be regarded as transparent? Recent platonist philosophies of mathematics, i.e., structuralism and abstractionism, hold that numbers are transparent: all there is to them is already encoded in our initial assumptions about them – see Hale and Wright (2001, 2007, 2009) and Shapiro (1997 and 2006). This doctrine, as I shall argue, is needed for solving the notorious Caesar Problem (the problem as to how we know that numbers are not persons, ordinary physical objects, or even sets). However, this suggests a dilemma: if numbers are transparent (if they are on a par with fictional characters), then how can one be a platonist about them? On the other hand, if numbers are objects on a par with physical objects, then there must be truths about them that are not consequences of our initial assumptions about them. But this is a possibility that a proper solution to the Caesar Problem rejects.

Thus, the platonist suffers from a double-talk: she enjoys the benefits of the fictionality of numbers, when she wants to solve the Caesar-type problems, and at the same time, embraces the benefits of the reality of numbers, when the objectivity of mathematical truths is to be accounted for.

References
Cautiously Utopian Goals
and Environmental Goal-Setting

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Goals are desired future states of affairs. Furthermore, goals, as opposed to hopes or wishes, should be realistic and instruct agents on adequate actions for attaining the goal. A goal is rational if it pertains to actual abilities of agents, if the agents know what to do to attain or approach the goal, and if the goal is motivating (cf. Edvardsson & Hansson, 2005). Realistic or rational goals are distinguished from utopian goals, which merely portray a desired state of affairs, but has no explicit relation to achievability.

As goals relate to future states of affairs, they imply a temporal discrepancy, i.e. that the time points of goal formulation and goal attainment differ. This discrepancy does not often present an obstacle, but with a wide temporal discrepancy different uncertainties become more prevalent. First of all, there are uncertainties of values or preferences changing in the long run. Moreover, there are uncertainties of abilities, as means for what is attainable often changes due to for instance developed technology. Such uncertainties might make a goal utopian in the sense of not having any specific relation to actual abilities, and thus unsuitable for action-guidance and goal attainment. Two forms of uncertainties are considered in this presentation: I) changing preconditions for goal-attainment, and II) epistemic uncertainty of goal-setting.

Two examples of desired future state of affairs with wide temporal discrepancies are sustainable development and anticipatory climate change adaptation. In this presentation, it is suggested that a new form of long-term goals should be considered in environmental goal-setting that are not utopian (i.e. unrealistic), but which acknowledge changing means and ends, as well as consider the epistemic condition at the point in time of goal-setting.

The suggested form of goal, cautiously utopian goals, occurs at the intersection between what is believed to be possible (including possible development of means) and what is thought to be desirable to attain for future generations. Cautiously utopian goals are justifiably believed, but not certain, to be achievable, and are open to future adjustments due to changing values and/or in factual circumstances. Such goals can stimulate development of adequate means in long time frames, as well as adhere to changes in preferences or values by way of procedural assessment. This, however, requires the goal to be continuously assessed. It also requires that the goals are viewed
from multiple possible viewpoints, and takes into consideration possible developments of means as strategies for coping with the uncertainties of long time-frames between goal setting and goal attainment.

References
Double-prevention
and counterfactual dependence

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Double-prevention cases are amongst the most resilient troublemakers for accounts of causation (cf. Hall 2002, Schaffer 2000). In such cases, x prevents y from preventing c from causing e. Accordingly, there is (non-backtracking) counterfactual dependence of the effect on the double-preventer, due to the fact that had x not occurred, e would not have occurred either since in that case y would not have been prevented from preventing c from causing e. Given that counterfactual dependence is usually taken to be a sufficient condition for causation, it would seem that x should be classified as a cause of e. Yet, the double-preventer is disconnected from the effect. As a result, double-prevention cases threaten the locality as well as intrinsicality of causation.

A common response to these cases involves developing a disjunctive account of causation that integrates both counterfactual and non-counterfactual elements into the theory of causation. Most notably, Hall has argued that there are two concepts of causation, namely production and dependence, such that the relation between the cause c and the effect e is one of production, whereas that between the double-preventer and e is one of dependence (cf. Hall 2004). An analogous approach, concerned not with an analysis of causation but with the relation between causation and responsibility, has been developed by Moore who provides a disjunctive account of the bases of responsibility in order to deal with double-preventers (cf. Moore 2009).

These approaches run into difficulties when there is a back-up double-preventer, that is, when x* would prevent y from preventing c from causing e if x were to fail to do so. These modified cases no longer exhibit counterfactual dependence on the double-preventer, since the back-up would achieve the same result in the counterfactual scenario in which the double-preventer were to fail to occur. Yet, the double-preventer would still seem to be causally relevant to (and to share the responsibility for) the occurrence of the effect. This paper criticises Hall’s assimilation of such back-up cases to cases of preemptive prevention, showing that they exhibit substantively different causal structures and are not susceptible to the kind of context-sensitive exhibited by preemptive prevention cases. Moreover, this paper will identify a range of other variants of double-prevention cases involving overdetermination and joint prevention, all of which undermine the disjunctive approaches. These cases establish that double-preventers
need to accounted for in a way that does not rely on counterfactual dependence. The paper concludes with an outline of a unified account of causation that can deal with the various types of double-prevention problems by appealing to the difference between causes and conditions of causes.

References
Virtue epistemology and the musical octave

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The appeal of character or responsibilist (Code 1984, Axtell 1997) virtue accounts in epistemology is two-fold. Theoretically they suggest means of reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions about epistemic normativity (Zagzebski 1996). More peculiarly, in leaning upon thick (Axtell and Carter 2008) narrative methods of explication, such accounts present a model of epistemological theory with practical purport, easily communicable and potentially applicable outside of the field (see for example Fricker 2007).

The Achilles heel of such an approach, however, is that very thickness. By embracing narrative as fundamental to apprehending epistemic normativity, epistemologists open themselves to demands for further explication. Whether charged as too vague, incomplete, or imprecise, it is difficult to see how a thick narrative can ever satisfy all-comers in the manner in which a neat, thin, formal approach may (we may yet reject the substance of a thin, formal account even whilst acknowledging its clarity.) In itself this need not lead to an impasse, reminding us of the communicability of the narrative approach, the virtue responsibilist might suggest that though it be impossible to shore up all the gaps in her narrative, what is incomplete and susceptible to misinterpretation may nonetheless be richer and communicate far more of and about value than the flawless, formal framework.

A more troubling difficulty may arise, however, via conception of what that narrative should be, what it should be about, and how it should proceed.

Any attempt made to forward a narrative of discrete character traits as a definitive account of epistemic normativity, I suggest, displays misplaced ambition and is likely to contravene what I call the 'arbitrary division of normativity problem', in so doing undermining the very communicability that is the strength of the narrative approach. A significant portion of work in contemporary epistemology—harking back to treatments of ethical virtue in early Platonic dialogues and Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics—courts just this danger.

To illustrate this problem I compare the space of epistemic normativity to the musical octave. Just as 12 tone equal temperament is not the only possible division of the octave—and by necessity overlaps with alternative scales—so I argue we should be careful not to forward any particular division of epistemic normativity as the definitive one. To not exercise such caution is to risk theoretically and practically unproductive conflict with what may be equally valid alternative divisions.
With this metaphor in mind, it is suggested that the character trait based virtue approach should not be abandoned but rather reconceived, not as the project of describing definite, discrete virtues, but rather as a narrative method—capable of revealing and analysing areas of action and/or cognition with epistemic significance and corresponding aspects of normativity—fully realised only through communication between a plurality of narratives, divisions and apprehensions of the continuous domain of epistemic normativity.

References
Can the Amoralist be Your Friend?

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Aristotle would answer the question in the title of this abstract with a resounding “No.” His conception of the good life includes both moral and non-moral values, he regards both virtue and friendship as essential elements of eudaimoneia, and he argues that only virtuous men can truly be friends. Aristotle treats friendship itself as a moral good; and this view excludes the possibility that an amoralist, i.e., someone who does not care about moral goods, partakes in the good of friendship.

Contemporary philosophers of friendship, in contrast, see friendship as a good, even an important good, but not necessarily a moral good. Rather, they tend to emphasize the tension between the supposedly universal demands of morality and the partial demands of friendship. Some, like Michael Stocker or Bernard Williams, have seen this as an indication of a flaw in universal morality, especially of the consequentialist variety. Others, like Peter Railton or David Velleman, have recognized the tension, but argued that with some modifications in either our moral theory or our conception of friendship, we can address it.

In What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon resolves the tension between morality and friendship by arguing that caring about the demands of universal morality is a necessary condition for friendship. If we cannot appreciate the other as a human being worthy of respect, we cannot be friends with them. I argue in this paper that Scanlon’s proposed solution is neat but ultimately unsatisfying. It works only if we either adopt a conception of amoralism that is so narrow as to be indistinguishable from immorality, or if we adopt a concept of friendship that is so narrow as to exclude a great number of actual friendships. Scanlon does not acknowledge the extent to which people can have moral commitments and still fall short of any plausible universal standard of morality; he conflates amoralism and sociopathy; and he exaggerates the role moral commitments play in the lives of actual people.

Scanlon portrays the amoral person as a sort of sociopath, someone who is not moved by the needs and interests of other people at all. In contrast, I suggest that amoralism is much more common than he makes it seem. In practice, many of us disregard the interests of far-away people or animals; and many of us harbor racist, sexist, or queerphobic prejudices. All of these behaviors arguably violate the standards of universal morality, yet none of them would seem to be a real obstacle to forming genuine friendship. And if they were, only a vanishingly small number of friendships,
both present and historical, could count as genuine. Thus I suggest that if morality has universal standards, amoralists can be friends.

References
Exploiting giving

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It is commonly claimed that well-informed and voluntary giving of gifts cannot be exploited. This paper shows that this is not necessarily correct – on the contrary there seem to be good reasons why exploitation is indeed possible also in such situations. Firstly, it is shown how such exploitation would fit common descriptions of exploitation in general. Secondly, different conditions for when gift-giving may be considered to be exploited are investigated, three of which are determined to be necessary conditions for such exploitation. These conditions are that 1) the giver incurs a loss, 2) the recipient has aimed for the gift, and 3) the gift is undeserved. By identifying these conditions we come one step closer to a determination of when there is exploitation of gift-giving and when there is not.
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Although the polemic between Dummett and the neo-Fregeans has recently spawned considerable literature, there is still uncertainty about the coherence, plausibility, and philosophical significance of Dummett’s arguments. Here I want to offer a few comments on these arguments and to attempt to canvass the links between them and areas of the larger ontological debate.

Dummett based his critique of neo-Fregeanism on the limitations of the context principle. When questions of existence are filtered through the context principle, we face the task of explaining name-bearer relations. The methodology of the context principle for answering the question ‘Does a exist?’ is to ask the question ‘Does the name of a refer to a?’, where it is understood that the name of a is legitimately introduced into the language. So far as the latter question is settled by some extra-linguistic means, such as demonstrative identification, the question of existence will be settled too. In this case the name ‘a’ is ascribed realistic reference. When, however, the name-bearer relation is left unexplained, singular terms only possess ‘thin’ reference, a kind of reference insufficient for settling ontological questions.

After spelling out my interpretation of Dummett’s view in some detail, I argue that it has interesting contrasts with Carnap’s doctrine of linguistic frameworks. For Carnap, ontological questions can be asked either from within a framework (a regimented fragment of language), in which case they are trivial, or from without it, in which case they are meaningless. Traditional ontological questions tend to be asked outside the language (‘Numbers exist according to Peano arithmetic, yes, but do they really exist?’), and so they are denounced as those meaningless external questions. Dummett’s view is a mirror image of this idea. In the areas of mathematics and philosophical logic internal questions will receive the answers based on a top-down procedure. That would disqualify them from solving genuine ontological problems—not because such problems are meaningless, but because they should be resolved by stepping outside the given regimented discourse.

Another interesting connection is to Yablo’s figuralism. Consider Hume’s Principle: The number of Fs is equal to the number of Gs iff there are just as many Fs as there are Gs (‘LS ↔ RS’). If we deny realistic reference to the singular terms in LS, then there must be an explanation why we need sentences like LS. There must, in other words, be an
explanation as to why LS is useful to us and why we go into the trouble of constructing problematic sentences. Secondly, on Dummett’s view, if someone were to encounter LS in isolation, he would be misled into accepting ontic commitments it apparently forces. Now the figuralist reinterprets the procedure before us by treating LS as an instance of a metaphor. The literal content of LS, on this account, is about numbers. Thus to be committed to numbers means to read the metaphor literally. But the real content of a metaphor, and the only one that matters, is given through RS and involves no commitment to numbers. The result is compatible with the nominalist creed. Its significant advantage is in reaching the conclusion by observing the actual linguistic and mathematical practice, rather than by metaphysical stipulations.
This paper examines the relation between understanding and reconciliation in Hannah Arendt’s phenomenology of thinking. Reconciliation, Arendt claims in an essay that first appeared in 1954, is inherent in understanding. It is an unending activity by which we come to terms with and attempt to be at home in the world. Reconciliation as understanding “begins with birth and ends with death” (Arendt 1994:308). Arendt returns to the idea that thinking (in the form of understanding) has implications for how we form judgments and act in the world twenty years later in The Life of the Mind. Motivated by her report on the trial against Adolf Eichmann in 1961, she here considers the relation between the absence of thinking, lack of moral judgment, and political evil (Arendt 1978). In this later work, however, the concept of reconciliation is strikingly absent. The aim of my paper is to explore the meaning of Arendt’s early notion of understanding as reconciliation. I do this by comparing reconciliation with forgiveness, and by reflecting on tragic narrative’s capacity to effect reconciliation.

As “thought’s gift” reconciliation is to be distinguished from forgiving, which is a redemptive potentiality inherent in action (Arendt 1958; cf. Taminiaux 2000). Because of its power to redeem past wrongs, forgiving seems to have a more political significance than reconciliation (cf. Ricœur 2004). I question this ontological interpretation of reconciliation by turning to some of Arendt’s more fragmentary remarks on narrative and its reconciling possibilities, especially her references to the notion of catharsis in Aristotle’s Poetics (Arendt 1958, 1968; Aristotle 1995). Arendt’s stress on tragedy’s effect on the spectator when it comes to recognizing and accepting past events suggests a political conception of reconciliation, where the meaning of an action is revealed in public through the medium of a narrative. If reconciliation is inherent in understanding, her remarks on tragedy also point towards the political significance of her phenomenology of thinking.

References


Moral Obligation: Individual and Shared

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This talk explores a certain idea of a moral obligation, understood as a practically relevant moral demand for action. The purpose is to capture the precise way in which moral obligations presuppose that the obligatory action can be performed. Part of the problem is to reconcile (a) the sense in which the action in question should be performable as a response to the demand with (b) the possibility of obligations to do things that cannot be guided by the belief that the action is morally obligatory. Another problem is to understand assignments of obligations to groups of individuals that are neither assignments of obligations to individuals in that group, nor assignments to the group conceived of as an agent.

The rough shape of my proposal is as follows:

Moral obligation: P has a moral obligation to perform a certain action, if and only if, were P to have the sort of sensitivity that can be reasonably morally required, this would ensure, in normal ways, that P performs that action.

This account, I argue, handles the problems that I set out to solve and avoids problems faced by accounts of moral obligations in terms of what ideal agents would do, or ideal advisors advise the agent to do.
Common knowledge and genuine joint action

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According to most philosophical accounts of joint activity, for two or more agents to be acting together, they must have common knowledge (Lewis 1969) of each other’s goals or intentions concerning the activity (e.g. Tuomela & K. Miller 1988; Cohen & Levesque 1991; Bratman 1992, 1993; S. Miller 2001; Pettit & Schweikard 2006; Alonso 2009). But while this requirement is common, it is almost never explained or motivated. In this talk, I suggest that there are two reasons for thinking that common knowledge might be a constitutive element of genuine joint action. Common knowledge seems to be needed to (i) rule out certain class of cases—“concealment cases”—that would only counterintuitively be categorized as cases of genuine joint action, and (ii) to make sense of the idea that a genuine joint action ought to be non-accidentally coordinated in the right way. However, I argue that both (i) and (ii) can be achieved without common knowledge, and hence, common knowledge cannot be a constitutive element of genuine joint action. One reason why this conclusion may be important is that it allows us to make sense of the possibility of genuine joint action involving agents who lack the concept of belief (such as, perhaps, young children (see Wellman et al. 2000)).

References
Contemporary metaethical debate is characterized by a great variety of positions, ranging from realist and strong objectivist views—claiming that there are moral facts and their existence does not depend on the perspective from which we consider them—to anti-realist and non-objectivist approaches—claiming that what moral facts there are is a question about the attitudes of approval or disapproval toward states of affairs in a given society. In this essay I take on one of these metaethical theories—moral constructivism—, which seeks middle ground between the metaphysical commitments of moral realism and the pessimism about objectivity of anti-realist approaches in ethics. Notwithstanding the growing popularity of this approach, there is no consensus on what a constructivist theory in ethics could possibly be (Rawls 1980; Street 2010; Bagnoli 2011). On my view, moral constructivism is the claim that there are moral facts, and what counts as a moral fact depend on principles that can be accounted for as the outcome of a suitable specified procedure of practical reasoning. The label ‘constructivism’ derives from the idea that moral facts are ‘constructed’ out of more elementary things, like non-moral facts, human attitudes and so on, by a constructive procedure. A procedure is nothing mysterious: it is a formalization or description of a process of reasoning and inquiry about a given practical problem, a hypothetical process that takes place in ideal circumstances (for instance, behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ in the Rawlsian original position). A procedure represents the way agents ought to reason when they reason morally (Bagnoli 2011: §2.2 and §7.3).

The procedural account of justification exposes constructivists to a severe difficulty. Some realists (i.e. Shafer-Landau 2003) argue that the constructivist project of a metaphysically parsimonious and strong objectivist ethics is doomed: the priority assigned by constructivists to procedures of reasoning over the objectivity of moral principles makes constructivism either trafficking into the arbitrary or lapsing into moral realism. In the first case, constructivism does not produce objectively justified moral claims. In the second case, it does not represent a distinct position in the metaethical debate. In both cases, the constructivist project should be abandoned. In this paper I try to rescue moral constructivism and the accompanying notion of ethical objectivity from this objection. I argue that once clarified the role of procedures, the realist objection will turn out to be fundamentally misplaced.
The paper is divided in four parts. §1 illustrates the objection in its best possible form. §2 provides preliminary considerations to think that the objection is misplaced. §3 rebuts the objection elaborating on the constructivist understanding of objective justification. I claim that constructivism can achieve a robust notion of ethical objectivity—against the arbitrariness charge—without the commitments of a moral realist position, interpreting the question of objective justification in terms of attitudes invariance. Finally, §4 rebuts further objections that might affect my own version of constructivism.

References
Perfectly Natural Quantification

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Post-Quinean ontology (cf. Quine 1953, 1969) is done through existential quantification: what kinds of things there are is settled by what kinds of things are needed for values of the existentially bound variables in ones best theory of the world, i.e. needed in order for that theory to be true. Some recent work (e.g. Schaffer 2009; Sider 2009, 2011) has questioned this method as being too crude. The Quinean method, it is argued, fails to distinguish between what there is more derivatively speaking and what there is most fundamentally speaking, but what’s of interest to ontology (at least the realist branch of it) is the latter, not the former. In particular, Sider (2009, 2011) has argued that what is needed is a notion of perfectly natural, or fundamental existential quantification. Ontology is to be done not through existential quantification as such, but through perfectly natural, or fundamental existential quantification (see also Dorr 2005). But is there such a perfectly natural, or fundamental existential quantifier to be had? I argue that there is, but, contra Sider (and others such as Dorr 2005), it is not due to the existential quantifier as such, but rather due to some properties it can attach to. I end by briefly suggesting that contra the recent criticism mentioned above, the notion of a perfectly natural, or fundamental existential quantifier to be used in ontology is in fact built into Quine’s (1953, 1969) original idea. The overall upshot is a vindication of good-old Quinean ontology, but with a more clearly formulated notion of fundamentality at hand.

References
Coordination and Proper Names

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Coordination is the key notion of Kit Fine's semantic relationism. In my talk, I will argue that Fine's definition of coordination among proper names presupposes the notion of understanding. However, no characterization of this notion is offered by Fine; nor is it clear how such a notion could be characterized coherently with semantic relationism and with some pre-theoretical intuitions.

Two token names are positively coordinated if they represent their referent as the same; otherwise, they are negatively (i.e. not positively) coordinated. Fine proposes two characterizations of the relation of representing-as-the-same.

**Intuitive Characterization**: Two co-referential token names in a piece of discourse represent their referent as the same if and only if no (sincere, reflexive and non-reticent) hearer/speaker who understands the discourse can sensibly raise the question of whether their referent is the same.

**Technical Characterization**: Two co-referential token names represent their referent as the same if and only if they strictly co-refer, i.e. if and only if it is a semantic requirement that they co-refer. A semantic requirement is a semantic fact in a narrow sense. A fact, belonging to the semantics of a given language L, is semantic in a narrow sense if “any rational and reflective individual who understands L is [...] in a position to know that the fact obtains” [SR, p. 60 – italics mine].

**Example**: On the basis of the aforesaid characterizations, it is easy to determine that the two names of Cicero in the sentence “Cicero admires Tully” are negatively coordinated, whereas those in the sentence “Cicero admires Cicero” (uttered with the intention to co-refer) are positively coordinated.

Notice that both characterizations of coordination involve the notion of understanding.

**Question**: What is required for a listener of a piece of discourse containing two co-referential token names for understanding that piece of discourse?

**Proposal 1**: A listener understands a piece of discourse containing two co-referential token names only if s/he is able to detect the intention (if any) of the speaker to co-refer.

**Objection 1**: Suppose that I say “Clark Kent went into a phone booth and Superman came out”. For Fine, a listener who fails to detect my intention to co-refer does not (necessarily) fail to understand my statement, contra Proposal 1.

**Objection 2**: Suppose that, by addressing to myself, Mary says: “Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent and he also believes that Paderewski has no musical talent”. I know Kripke's 'Paderewski' case and I think to have perfectly understood Mary’s
message. I actually have no idea if Mary, like Peter, mistakes Paderewski for two different people or if, like me, knows that the pianist Paderewski is the politician Paderewski; at any rate, this missing information does not seem relevant for understanding her message. This, nonetheless, clashes with Proposal 1, according to which my failing to detect Mary’s referential intentions makes me unable to understand her message.

Other proposals for answering the above-mentioned Question will be examined and rebutted in my talk.
Konstruktiv klimaträttvisa

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Situationen som omgärder den politiska diskussionen kring klimatförändringarna är långt ifrån ideal. Prognoserna om framtida temperaturförändringar är djupt osäkra (atminstone med avseende till den övre gränsen) på grund av, å ena sidan, begränsad kunskap om återkopplingsmekanismer samt ett mycket komplext klimatsystem och, å andra sidan, liknande problem med att förutsäga social, teknisk och ekonomisk utveckling över långa tidsperioder. Traditionella riskanalyser och nyttokalkyler (e.g., Stern, 2006) är svåra att utföra med precision (Hultman et al., 2010; Spash, 2002). Vidare försvåras situationen av en politisk ovilja och långvarig oenighet (Hulme, 2009). Samtidigt finns det klara indikationer på att något måste göras snart om vi inte ska passera s.k. trösklar, i t.ex. klimatsystemet, som innebär stora risker och eventuelltohanterbara system (Lenton et al. 2008; Rockström et al. 2009). Det finns heller inget tvivel om att klimatförändringarna redan skördar offer och att detta kommer ytterligare förvärvas, med stora människor som skadas och dödas av torka, översvämningar, stormar, värmeboljor och ökad frekvens av dödliga virussjukdomar om ingenting görs. Trots problemen med att fullt ut specificera effekterna och omfattningen av klimatförändringarna är det inte svårt att se att dessa ger upphov till en etisk problematik. De senaste 20 åren (och i synnerhet de senaste 5–10 åren) har också ett antal moralfilosofier vaknat till uppgift att försöka specificera den etiska dimensionen av klimatförändringarna (e.g., Gardiner et al. 2010; Gardiner, 2011). Ett antal positioner kan börja utskiljas i det fält som vi kan kalla för "klimatetik" och som spänner över både en internationell och intergenerationell dimension. Ett generellt problem hittills har dock varit den distans som finns mellan vad dessa etiska teorier föreskriver och vad som diskuteras inom konkret klimatpolitik, t.ex. under de internationella klimatförhandlingarna under FN:s regi. Det är problematiskt på många sätt. Först och främst eftersom den faktiska klimatpolitiken verkar vara i stort behov av en etisk konfliktlösning som man hade kunnat föreställa sig moralfilosofin bidra med. Nu verkar dock den akademiska diskussionen kring klimatetik vara en avlägsen röst. För det andra skulle problematiken kunna vändas på: ett rimligt krav på en moralfilosofisk teori är att de maximer eller principer som rekommenderas är handlingsvägledande. Med tanke på hur situationen ser ut här verkar det finnas skäl att ifrågasätta i vilken mening klimatetik lyckas att tillfredsställa detta krav. I den här texten kommer jag försöka diagnosticera det etiska misslyckande som vår pågående passivitet i förhållande till de annalkande klimatförändringarna utgör och

Referenser
Moral Disunitarianism

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The basic tenet of moral disunitarianism is that moral generalities, to the extent that they exist, are domain-specific (where domains are understood as strongly interconnected complexes of practices and activities, such as “family life”, “business”, “friendship”, “war”, or “health care”). In contrast, there are two main forms of moral unitarianism, both of which the disunitarian will reject.

The first is rule-ethical unitarianism, according to which there is an ideal set of rules or principles that best captures morality as a whole (whether this is understood in terms of capturing a pre-existing moral reality or as being the best possible critical reconstruction of common-sense morality). Utilitarianism and Kantianism are the most prominent examples here: they aim to completely capture at least all non-derivative moral generalities. The second kind of unitarianism is virtue-ethical; according to it there is an ideal agent, the fully virtuous person, who is then taken to be morally competent across all domains. The Aristotelian idea of the phronimos can be understood as an example of this. Phronimoi might not be in possession of some set of moral general rules, but they are still moral generalists in that the virtues are not supposed to be domain-specific (e.g., you cannot truly be both a generous parent and a stingy friend – if you’re lacking in one domain, then you don’t have that virtue at all).

Like particularism, disunitarianism can be said to be a meta-normative position, *i.e.*, it neither implies any particular stand on any concrete normative issue or involves any particular brand of meta-ethics, instead it’s a position on the possibilities of doing normative theory. Like particularism, disunitarianism involves rejecting the project of formulating grand ethical theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism, but unlike particularism, disunitarianism leaves open the possibility that certain more specific areas of normative theorizing might still be viable – some examples could be biomedical ethics, business ethics or the ethics of war. These would then not be forms of “applied ethics”, but simply areas where it’s possibly meaningful to do a modest form of normative theory.

Now, there are certainly examples of moral rules that we can find in most, if not all, domains, *e.g.*, a prohibition against killing, but the bare fact that we can find a prohibition against killing in most, if not all, domains cannot straightforwardly be
taken to mean that it is a single prohibition against killing that we find in all of these domains rather than simply a set of different prohibitions against killing. This is an example of one of the main lines of argument for and against moral disunitarianism that will be discussed in this talk (in addition to also developing the characterization of disunitarianism that can be found above). Ultimately, the argument will however not so much be that you have to be a moral disunitarian, but rather that the unitarian stance cannot, as is so often the case, be taken for granted as setting the stage for what normative theorizing should look like.
Evolutionary theory and causation

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Evolutionary theory is a firmly established and seemingly straightforward theory. Yet, there are unresolved questions about its causal status. On the one hand there is the causal view (Sober 1984; Millstein 2002, 2006; Stephens 2004; Abrams 2012) according to which evolutionary theory describes the influence of various causes, most notably natural selection. On the other hand there is the statistical view according to which evolutionary theory describes statistical trends but not causes (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 2009; Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Walsh 2007).

The debate involves a set of relatively independent issues that haven’t been clearly disentangled. The primary point of this paper is to contribute to such disentangling. I focus on arguments that have been presented against the causal view. These are of at least four different kinds, coming with different commitments and scope: 1) Arguments from the transmission account of causation, 2) arguments from perspective dependence 3) arguments from “aboutness” and 4) arguments from arbitrariness.

Here is a brief characterisation of each:

Arguments from the transmission account: These arguments trade on the transmission account of causation and so target putative causal factors that are not transmission-causal relata. If statistical properties are not transmission-causal properties, and if the terms of evolutionary theory proper refer only to statistical properties, then the transmission account is a sufficient condition for refuting the causal view of evolutionary theory.

These arguments are not dialectically effective since causal theorists reject the transmission account and appeal to a manipulation account (e.g. Reisman and Forber 2005). The appeal to manipulability does not, however, resolve the issue in a non-question begging manner.

Perspective dependence: Walsh (2007) argues that the ascription of selection and drift to biological systems is sensitive to how samples are partitioned. Prima facie, perspective dependence is hard to reconcile with any account of causation that takes causation to be an observer-independent matter. However, several authors writing on causation in general propose accounts on which causation is relative to description (e.g. McDermott 1995) or model (e.g. Pearl 2000) so the force of the argument is not beyond dispute.

Aboutness: These arguments (e.g. Matthen and Ariew 2002) conclude that the terms of evolutionary theory are not about causal substrates. The idea seems to be that the
properties dealt with by the theory proper are formal, whereas all sentences concerning ecological interactions fall outside of the theory. A key question is if being formal precludes being about causal substrates.

Arbitrariness: These arguments target selection and drift specifically and focus on the distinction between the relations $x$ causes $y$ and $x$ is constituted by $y$. They claim that we can express all we need by saying that frequency changes constitute selection/drift and that there is no reason for saying that changes are caused by selection/drift. These arguments do not presuppose the transmission account and I find them persuasive. However, the arguments apply to selection and drift specifically and do not establish the general statistical view.

References
Offender Rehabilitation and Respect for Privacy: The Case of IDAP

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Whether criminal offenders have a right to privacy is a neglected topic in the philosophy of criminal law and punishment. On the one hand, intrusions of privacy, though not all of them, are arguably justified by the need of security and safety. Different forms of surveillance and control are important not only for the sake of correctional workers, but also in order to protect the offenders themselves and to create a good environment for offender rehabilitation. Besides the interferences just mentioned, there are additional interferences with privacy common in criminal justice systems. Since what can be referred to as a revival of rehabilitative optimism – starting in 1990s – rehabilitation programs have become common in prison and probation service (Scourfield and Dobash). Only in the Swedish prison and probation service (Kriminalvården) there are a large number of programs focusing on particular crimes and behaviors. Many of these programs are built around group sessions. One example is IDAP (Integrated Domestic Abuse Programme) which has been used since 2004 and aims at offenders who are sentenced for domestic abuse (Kriminalvården 2011). IDAP is based on cognitive behavior therapy and is based on group sessions where the participating offenders are encouraged to talk openly about their offences and experiences, including motivations and attitudes. One central starting point is that the offender accepts his responsibility for his conduct as the basis for his self-reformation.

My presentation address the question of how rehabilitation programs like IDAP should be made compatible with a respect for privacy. Following Antony Duffs communicative theory of punishment (Duff 2001) at least some rehabilitation programs are held to be appropriate responses to criminal offenses. Duff does however claim that rehabilitation programs similar to IDAP are compatible with respect for privacy. His main argument builds on a rejection of the harm-principle as an explanation for why certain actions and external conduct and not internal thoughts, motivations and attitudes are concerns for the criminal law. Duff argues that this view rests on an inadequate conception of harm and that offenders thus have no valid reason to claim that the intentions and attitudes manifested in the criminal offense are private. I will make two remarks to Duffs account. First, as Duffs argument rests on the claim that only intentions and motivations related to the criminal conduct are relevant for exercising rehabilitation
programs like IDAP as a form of communicative punishment, it is still very difficult to uphold such a distinction in practice. Second, Duff does not explicitly discuss further privacy issues beyond (non)discloser, such as sharing information to third parties, how the information is gathered and data aggregation. Based on these remarks I will argue that we should adopt an account where privacy is explicitly acknowledged as a prima facie right. I also argue that there are strong instrumental reasons why both correctional workers as well as the participants in rehabilitation programs should respect bounds of confidentiality.

References
First Order Expressivist Logic

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I provide finitary jointly necessary and sufficient acceptance and rejection conditions for the logical constants of a first order quantificational language. By introducing the notion of making an assignment as a distinct object level practice – something you do with a sentence – (as opposed to a meta-level semantic notion) and combining this with the practice of (hypothetical and categorical) acceptance and rejection and the practice of making suppositions it was shown that one gains a structure that is sufficiently rich to fully characterize the class of classical first order theories. The analysis thus provides a way of characterizing classical first order quantification by expressivist means.

The talk will mainly be structured around the conceptual (rather than technical) issues of quantification and expressivism.
Därför varken kunde eller borde Hume anta en begreppslig relation mellan känslan av stolthet och idén om jaget

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De flesta Humekännare är överens om att David Hume i A Treatise of Human Nature anser att de så kallade indirekta passionerna orsakar sina objekt, t.ex. orsakar passionen stolthet tanken på självet. De flesta är också överens om att Hume har fel: att vi är stolta över oss själva (eller något nära relaterat till oss själva) är en begreppslig sanning (Årdal 1966:23f, Baier 1978:29, Kenny 2003:16f, Penelhum 1978:90). Men enligt Humes beskrivning orsakas stoltheten av en positiv egenskap hos något objekt relaterat till självet och passionen orsakar alltså i sin tur att idén om självet aktualiseras (T 2.1.2.4; SBN 277). Eftersom kausalitet är en kontingent relation enligt Hume, är idén om självet kontingent relaterat till stoltheten och inte begreppsligt. Pål S. Årdal tycker att Hume missuppfattar relationen radikalt på grund av detta: ”it would be logically absurd to suggest that a man might have the passion of pride, and, at the same time, that the object of this pride is another and not the person himself” (Årdal 1966:23f). Det gör även Annette C. Baier: ”This may indeed be a muddle, a confusion between a conceptual connection and a causal one […] no pleasant emotion counts as pride unless its object is oneself. This [is a] conceptual requirement…” (Baier 1978:29). Flera kommentatorer anser att Hume borde ha antagit att idén om självet är ett nödvändigt kausalt villkor för stolthet, dvs. ett nödvändigt villkor för att en particulär passion ska identifieras som stolthet (Årdal 1966:23f, Cohon 2008:181, Penelhum 1978:90, Radcliff 2006:364). Detta är förenligt med Humes distinktion mellan intr Muk, bland annat passioner, och idéer, medan en hybrid perception bestående av ett intr Muk (stolthet) och en idé (självet) förstås inte är det.


Referenser
Keynote

The actuality of hermeneutics

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The aim of my presentation is to discuss the actuality of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics and hermeneutic philosophy represents a tradition in the so-called continental philosophy in which tradition itself is submitted to critical inquiry. In this sense, hermeneutic philosophy can be considered a hermeneutics of tradition precisely regarding its aim to give meaning to meaning. In my presentation, I will discuss the meaning of tradition in hermeneutic tradition and its role for seizing the meaning of the actual.

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Medvetande, information och representation

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Referenser
What has Happened to the ‘Human’ in Human Rights Discourse? — Perspectives from Comparative Philosophy

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At the drafting stage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Chinese representative P. C. Chang (張彭春) proposed the “humanization of man” as the foremost mission of the Declaration. For good reasons: for the Chinese who had suffered an estimated loss of 10,000,000–20,000,000 lives in World War II, crimes against humanity were committed not because of the absence of the concept of “rights” in the world, but because people have lost their humanity and humaneness, as well as their ability to recognize the victims of such crimes as human beings. Chang’s pleading fell on deaf ears.

World history since the adoption of the UDHR by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948 seems to render it time to reconsider Chang’s proposal. Rights discourse has become ever more elaborate and sophisticated over the past 65 years. Yet the long list of human rights violations simultaneous with the burgeoning of rights discourse should enjoin us to reexamine whether “rights” were not yet another abstract notion hypostatized into a monotheistic God, and whether it would not be more to the point to refocus on the human in “human rights,” and to reprioritize the flesh-and-blood human being before the intangible idea called “rights.”

It is not surprising that in calling for humanizing humanity, P. C. Chang drew extensively from Confucian philosophy whose humanism had inspired some philosophes in their formulations of rights discourse and their critiques of tyranny (including tyranny of the church and tyranny of absolutism). Chang’s “humanization of man” is an idea taken directly from Confucius’s “ren ren” — a core idea in Confucian ethics. This lecture will examine the contributions that could be made by Confucianism’s idea of “humanizing human being” in preventions of human rights violations. It will attempt to elucidate the many deep layers of the ethical, social, and political meanings of ren (仁) so far neglected in scholarship on Confucianism. The profound contributions that

1 The classical Chinese language is not gendered, and a literal translation of ren ren would be “humanizing humanbeing.” Chang used “man” to avoid the awkward repetition in favor of idiomatic English usage of the time.
could have been made by ren to the UDHR (an opportunity that had regretfully been missed) will be elaborated by engaging Confucius's ren in dialogue with Hegel's idea of love, Mauss's formulation of the gift, and Levinas's discussion of the suffering face of the other which holds me hostage and compels me to clothe the naked and feed the hungry.
Is ending lesser humanitarian wrongs a legitimate goal in war? The case of Afghan war and the goal of alleviating religious oppression

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Prior to 2001 most observers agreed that religious oppression in Afghanistan was insufficiently grave to constitute an independent just cause for humanitarian intervention. Yet today some consider alleviation of this wrong as part of the justification the war in Afghanistan above and beyond the purported just cause of self defense. Can the correction of wrongs insufficient for justifying going to war justify the continuation of an on-going war? Proponents of the view, typically attempt to do so by arguing that the good of preventing wrongs help counterbalancing the evils caused by war and thus help making the war proportionate.

Thomas Hurka (2005, 2007, 2008) defends this view by distinguishing between “conditional just causes” and “independent just causes” for war. On this view, the prevention or reversal of grievous injustice can constitute independent just cause in and of itself (paradigmatically self-defense), which can legitimately be pursued by means of war. Conditional just causes, however, can only be pursued by means of war given the separate presence of an independent just cause. Hurka suggests disarmament; deterrence and avoidance of lesser humanitarian injustices are conditional just causes. On Hurka’s view, all humanitarian evils (hereunder religious oppression) “above the threshold that determines when a humanitarian wrong can be another state’s legitimate business” (Hurka 2007:218) belong the category of contributing just cause – which if achieved, can contribute towards the wars justification by making it proportionate.

Against Hurka, I argue that his view leads to an overly permissive account of which goods can be pursued by means of war given the presence of an independent just cause and his view risks militarizing a humanitarian agenda which can only be pursued legitimately without military force – and that this view risks impermissibly justifying the extension of the scope and duration of what could otherwise be a just war. Instead I argue that the criteria must be whether the lesser evil itself is a wrong the prevention of which would independently justify defensive lethal harm.

I discuss whether wrongs suffered by victims of Taliban’s religious oppression, particularly women, constitute a wrong of this sort (the prevention of which justifies lethal harm). I argue that even if we think that the harm suffered by each victim of religious
oppression is insufficient to justify individual lethal self defense, these harms can under certain circumstances be aggregated to add to the Taliban's liability for lethal harm on grounds of victims' collective self defense. However, I raise serious concerns whether the prevention of this collective wrong can justify collateral casualties unless it can plausibly be assumed that such victims voluntarily would assume extra risk for the alleviation of religious oppression.

I conclude by pointing out that in spite of the limited way it can contribute justify the war by offsetting excessive casualties (especially collateral) otherwise out of proportion to the just cause, religious alleviation can contribute to the justification of the war by significantly offsetting non-lethal harm (e.g. economic harms) brought on by the war.

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Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony: A Virtuous-Contextualist Perspective

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The topic of this work is to illustrate the current debate between reductionism and non-reductionism according to a virtuous-contextualist perspective. The aim is to demonstrate that this dichotomy is misleading insofar as we demand to attest a criterion of testimonially-based knowledge apart from studying the epistemic subject. First of all, I will offer a case of testimony in two different epistemic contexts and I will show that the necessary conditions of testimonially-based knowledge are set by the level of the epistemic standards required by the context. Later, I will argue that just the epistemic agent can afford to set these standards, since he is able to compare each situation with his own purposes through those epistemic virtues he is provided with.

Suppose that Anna, Bruce and Chris work in a bank with offices in two buildings at the farthest ends of a square. Anna works in one office, whereas Bruce and Chris work in the other one. Anna is waiting for Chris in order to receive a pass for a concert that will take place the next week and she arranged to meet him at the company canteen. Unfortunately she meets only Bruce who says her: “Chris will be waiting for you at the usual café at 1/0 08 p.m. Now he is busy” (p). In this ordinary case, according to the Reidian principle of credulity, Anna is justified in believing that p is true if there are not evident defeaters of her belief. Therefore, according to non-reductionism we could consider testimony like a primary source of knowledge.

Consider now a “strong case”, where Anna has pressing and more relevant purposes, since she must meet Chris in order to receive a revolver and to kill Bruce by 19 p.m. The example continues as the previous one, but she needs stronger reasons in order to know that Chris will be waiting for her at 18 p.m., since Bruce could misunderstand the schedule or mistake him for another colleague. So Anna could not trust Bruce and could decide to do something (e.g. to phone Chris). She follows the Humean criterion of testimony (reductionism), according to which she is not justified in believing that p unless she has good epistemic reasons to trust the witness. Therefore testimony should be only a secondary source of knowledge.

The examples show that different epistemic standards lead to different criterions of testimony depending on the subject’s purposes. We are able to distinguish contexts and,
accordingly, the respective criterions through our epistemic dispositions or virtues: in
the former case, practical wisdom gets that the subject needs intellectual courage and
generosity in order to trust the witness. In the latter instead, it gets that she needs more
epistemic caution and self-confidence in order to warrant the succeeding of the date.

Therefore it seems necessary to go beyond the reductionism/non-reductionism
dichotomy and to focus on the epistemic subject and those traits of character that allow
him to have (or not-to have) justified beliefs.

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Vice Excluded from Virtue

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Issues that Elizabeth Anscombe addressed in her landmark essay protesting Oxford's decision to give President Truman an honorary degree are still very cogent and as puzzle-like as ever. Current questions surrounding the intention of and political justification in using vice in the pursuit of some perceived justice and the common good point to the miasma of consequentialist and Realpolitik policies that exist in the world today. How is it that one does not just give in to the impulse to accept what Mandeville proposed a few centuries ago, that human beings in their most egotistical and vice-filled ways actually provide unforeseen public benefits? Or perhaps we could go the sociological route and come to understand, by way of Durkheim and his common conscience thesis, that vice is helpful to a society in shaping its moral boundaries, even aiding it through time to “improve” in an evolutionary kind of way?

The relationship between virtues and vices understood within these non-normative points of view just has a structural, descriptive form. If viewed in this way, the content of that relationship is mostly overlooked, along with its true possibilities for change. Additionally, theories that pertain to moral relativism tend to be paired up with non-normative notions, in an effort to take a path of least resistance. Although these descriptive views of the relationship between virtues and vices are useful in outlining current moral conditions in a society, they do not provide any guidance as to which moral standards should be followed in the interests of both individuals and the society as a whole, and why.

In order to dispel the descriptive notion that a personal vice could ever amount to a public benefit/virtue, I apply Dworkin’s “double counting” objection, that he had to benefit in utilitarianism and used to undermine the concept of utilitarianism, to the concept of vice. One of Dworkin's examples of double counting is that of a swimmer benefiting from their preference of swimming, as well as those fans who receive benefit in the form of pleasure in the swimmer's success; those benefits adding up together in that instance would thus represent an unequal and prejudiced weighting not acceptable in utilitarianism. The objection, stemming out of fact that those fans would constitute a select group out of the general population of a society, could then be applied to situations of vice. An example here would be of a person who is prone to acts of vice that would have “fans” in the form of criminal associates who would also benefit from that person’s acts of vice. Unless the public at large was criminally associated with this person, there
would be an unequal parsing of “benefit” to the exclusionary criminal clique. Therefore, personal vice could not produce public benefit. In terms of a government who could potentially plead that political acts of vice were done to produce public benefit to a particular society, one would only need to show that other societies were excluded from benefit.
Two Leibnizian Theses
and the Plural Predication

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In his *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, Bertrand Russell, referring to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) states that “the difficulty is to prevent its proving that there cannot be two substances at all ... on the principles of Leibniz’ logic, the identity of indiscernibles does not go far enough. [Leibniz] should, like Spinoza, have admitted only one substance.” (pp. 58f) This is highly surprising given the fact that Leibniz embraces the indiscernibility of identicals (LL) as a complementary principle and maintains that differences in predicates provide a sufficient ground for the diversity between substances. Without discussing Russell’s remark in the context of Leibniz’ philosophy in particular, I argue that there is a tension between PII and LL and that once PII is endorsed Spinozistic monism follows.

Sketched in very rough terms, the tension is the following. According to PII, there can be no two distinct substances sharing all their predicates. That is: PII entails that there can be no brute facts of diversities between substances. But if, as PII states, differences in predicates are taken to be a necessary condition for diversity (and thus brute facts of diversities are denied), then such differences can no longer be taken to be a sufficient condition for diversity—LL will be of no help. Russell explains this in the following cryptic way: “the numerical diversity of the substances is logically prior to their differences in predicates ... until predicates have been assigned, the two substances remain indiscernible; but they cannot have predicates by which they cease to be indiscernible unless they are first distinguished as numerically distinct.” (ibid.) But if, as Russell argues, differences in predicates presuppose numerical diversities and therefore cannot account for diversities as such, then, once PII is endorsed, we are not better off in accounting the plurality at worlds that we pre-theoretically describe as containing two discernible substances than we are in accounting the plurality at worlds that we describe as containing two indiscernible substances. So, not only that there cannot be a numerical diversity between indiscernible substances but there cannot be a diversity between, say, a blue rectangular book and a red circular book. As Russell puts it, PII “proves that there cannot be two substances at all.” (ibid.)

In reconstructing Russell’s argument, I will appeal to a standard version of the bundle of universals theory (BT), which is a metaphysics similar to Leibniz’ in basic assumptions. BT allows nothing but universals in its metaphysical groundfloor and uses
only two primitives: “bundled-up” and “being distant from”. And “plural quantification”, as presented by McKay (2006), will be used in formulating bundle-theoretic claims, illustrating Russell’s point. The idea is to get the perspicuity of a first-order logic, quantifying over nothing but universals and then use plural quantification to eliminate commitments to bundles that can only be expressed by using second-order logic.
Is it possible to hear sound as well as the thing which made it? According to Berkeley (1703), we hear sound sources by virtue of hearing their sounds. The Berkeleyan view is based on two claims: (i) sounds are mind-dependent objects; (ii) sound sources are perceived by virtue of the perception of sounds, namely indirectly. In my talk I shall argue that it is possible to account for an indirect perception of sound sources even if sounds are construed as mind-independent objects. I shall motivate this claim on the basis of a two-stage argument. Moreover, I shall claim why Nudds’ account of indirect perception of sound sources – which is based on multimodal perception – differs from mine, according to which we can perceive sound sources not only multimodally but also by virtue of mere audition.

After having distinguished the two components of sound sources – the event source and the thing source – and argued for an identity between the event source and sound (Casati, Di Bona, Dokic, 2013), I shall clarify, in the first stage of my argument, why if sounds are construed as distally located spatio-temporal events (Casati and Dokic 1994; O’Callaghan 2007; Matthen 2010), they may be considered as mind-independent objects.

In the second stage, I shall sustain that we perceive the source of the sound (the thing source) by virtue of the perception of the audible qualities of sound, namely by virtue of timbre, pitch, loudness and duration. All such audible qualities are important for the perception of sound sources, but I shall focus only on the quality of timbre, which seems to be crucial in order to perceive both the material constitution of the source and the shape of the latter.

I shall conclude my talk sketching the main difference between my view of indirect perception of sound sources and Nudds’ view (2001). Nudds claims that we can experience the production of sound only multimodally. He affirms that: “When we see a dog bark and hear the sound it makes we don’t just hear a sound as coming from the same place we see the dog barking; we perceive the dog to be producing the sound we hear. When we see a hammer striking an anvil and hear the sound of the blow we perceive the hammer blow as producing the sound […] It is that kind of experience which is essentially bi-modal” (ibid.:218). Nudds’ statements are as follows:

(1) The experience of the production of sound is multimodal;
(2) It is not possible to auditorily perceive the production of sound. Whereas (1) can be true – since we can both see the cause of a sound (as when we see the shaking of Canadian quaking aspens) or “feel” the cause of a sound (as when we feel both the low frequencies of a double bass in the stomach or the vibrations of a tuning fork by touching it) – (2) is surely false. In order to demonstrate that (2) is false, I shall discuss empirical data which show that we can auditorily perceive relevant features of sound sources (Carello, Wagman & Turvey 2005).

References
Shaftesbury’s two reasons

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It is well known among Shaftesbury’s scholars that there is a certain tension in the role that reason and sentiment have in his philosophy. From Hume’s remarks concerning the confusion in the “elegant Lord Shaftesbury” to, more recently, Gill’s discussion on the relationship between reason and enthusiasm, it seems that Shaftesbury’s problematic, if not downright inconsistent, discussion is a major flaw in his philosophy.

This paper has two goals. The first is to solve the apparent tension by showing that Shaftesbury uses the term “reason” to refer to two different kinds of mental activity. In the narrower sense, reason is the faculty of demonstration, as praised by 17th century philosophers such as Descartes, who, according to Shaftesbury, had done much damage by turning philosophy into a discipline remote from the most urgent human concerns. In the wider sense, reason is what is most exquisitely human, in fact divine: it is an active faculty that allows for self-reflectivity and self-regulation. In this sense, reason is no longer opposed to sentiment, as Hume had thought: in fact, it acts through sentiment.

The second goal is to explore this broader concept of reason. I will offer textual evidence that, for Shaftesbury, such faculty is divine in nature: it is the faculty that, in the deity as well as in us, creates, restores, and maintains order. I will show how my interpretation solves several problems: among these the motivating role of reason in Inquiry, which puzzled Hume.

Finally, I will show the influence of Epictetus on both aspects of the issue. Like Shaftesbury, Epictetus seems prima facie ambivalent towards demonstrative reason. Epictetus also offers the model for Shaftesbury’s divine, active reason. While Epictetus’ influence is evident, however, I will also show that Shaftesbury moves beyond Epictetus. In his elaboration of what makes human reason the same in kind with divine reason, Shaftesbury focuses more on human activity than the Stoic philosopher.
Eudaimonic Love and the Charge of Egoism

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The connection between *eudaimonia* and egoism is often noted by scholars of ancient philosophy. Because of the strong focus on the agent’s own achievement of *eudaimonia* (happiness), one might suppose that all of the eudaimonic theories contain an essential egoistic line of thought, where concern for others only has an instrumental value to the agent’s own happiness. To my mind, the suspicion of egoism becomes particularly urgent when it comes to love and interpersonal relationships (i.e. that between friends, lovers, parent and child, husband and wife, etc.).

The charge of egoism against eudaimonic love urges the following questions: Is it correct to assume that the eudaimonic lover is essentially egoistical? Does he love his beloved only as a means and *per accidens*, i.e. only insofar as the beloved in some way is advantageous and beneficial to the lover *himself*—ultimately to the lover’s own happiness?

A central distinction in my argumentation is the opposition between A) *love for the lover’s own sake* and B) *love for the beloved’s sake alone*. Is the eudaimonic lover incapable of B, and moreover, is B the only proper kind of love? Consider these statements:

1) I love A, because loving A makes *me* happy, i.e. my life (more) valuable.
2) I love A, for A’s own sake.

Those who press the charge of egoism against eudaimonic theories of love tend to argue that the eudaimonic lover fails because he seems incapable of 2, and only capable of 1, which from their perspective is an expression of egoism. However, I do not think that the first should necessarily be characterized as an expression of egoism: The distinction between the lover’s and the beloved’s happiness is more problematic, and the expression “for the sake of” is more complex, than it is taken to be by scholars pressing the charge of egoism. Furthermore, I believe 2 is an improper demand as it is actually not love (at least not in terms of *eros*) but rather *care*. In proving this point, I’ll argue against the assumption that love has to be altruistic (*not* self-interested). But if 2 is an improper demand based on false conceptions, would the conclusion then be that the individual is simply a means in the eudaimonic lover’s pursuit of happiness – and if so, to what extent is this objectionable? I intend to show that insofar as eudaimonic theories of love are to be characterized as egoistic, this kind of egoism need not be objectionable.
From *Hausväterliteratur* to modern agricultural biotechnology: Present, past and future directions in environmental philosophy

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Environmental philosophy is a branch of philosophy that investigates man’s relation to the natural environment in a broad sense. According to the received view, the first steps toward the establishment of environmental philosophy as an academic discipline were taken in the 1970s. Among the first publications in the field were Arne Naess’ article “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement” (1973) and Holmes Rolston, III’s “Is There an Ecological Ethic?” (1975). In 1972, the first conference on environmental philosophy (ethics) was organized, and in the late 1970s the first academic journal dealing specifically with topics in environmental philosophy – *Environmental Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Journal Dedicated to the Philosophical Aspects of Environmental Problems* – was established, followed by *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* and *Environmental Values* a few years later.

Although environmental philosophy is a fairly young academic discipline by philosophical standards, systematic thinking about the natural environment and man’s place within it goes back much longer in time than 40 years. In this presentation, I give a brief overview of the history of Western environmental philosophy, from the early modern period to today, using the concept of agricultural sustainability as a departure point. I will show that systematic thinking about how to maintain the productivity of agricultural land goes back at least some three hundred years. As noted by Warde (2011), ideas about what we would refer to as “sustainable agriculture” were present already in the sixteenth century German *Hausväterliteratur*. In the late eighteenth century, the ideas presented in the *Hausväterliteratur* and elsewhere merged to become a “generalized theory of the management of agrarian resources” (Warde, 2011:165). Some hundred years later, the agricultural scientist Liberty Hyde Bailey defended so-called “permanent” agriculture, by which he meant “farming methods that maintain fertile soils and viable crops in perpetuity” (Thompson, 2010:207). Bailey’s ideas were further developed by scientists, such as Hugh Hammond Bennett in the United States and Sir Albert Howard in the...
UK. Whereas the German *Hausväterliteratur* is mainly written from an anthropocentric perspective (focusing on the maintenance of household income), Liberty Hyde Bailey’s works are interesting from a historical perspective, since they articulate a pluralistic ethical outlook that melds anthropocentric, biocentric and ecocentric commitments long before the terms “anthropocentrism”, “biocentrism” and “ecocentrism” began to be used in the literature of environmental philosophy (Minteer, 2008).

Using the pre-1970s Western history of the concept of agricultural sustainability as a backdrop I will explore some themes of current interest in the philosophical debate on agricultural sustainability. I will argue that modern agricultural biotechnology in particular raises questions that are interesting to look at from a sustainability perspective and that many of those questions will have to be addressed by philosophers and scholars working in other disciplines in the years to come.

References
Augustine on Second-Order Desires
and the Concept of a Person

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Several scholars have noted similarities between Frankfurt's account of second-order desires and Augustine's account of the human will. Almost exclusively these commentators have tried to clarify the relation between Frankfurt's and Augustine's respective accounts of human freedom, while little attention has been given to the notion of volitional hierarchy as an explication of the concept of a person. In this paper I examine Augustine's account of the will in the Confessions and in On the Trinity and argue that if we focus on Augustine's account of the will as a clarification of the concept of a person rather than as contribution to the debate about freedom and the will, a more consistent picture of Augustinian human moral psychology emerges. Furthermore, I argue that the parallels between Augustine's view of the will and Frankfurt's run much deeper than is usually assumed. Both Augustine and Frankfurt reject accounts of the will where the will is thought of as a power distinct from intellect and from emotion, and both think that being fully a person in no way precludes always acting weak-willedly, nor does it preclude partial or even full self-deception as to one's own real motives.
Döden och tidsproblemet

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Varför finns det så få kvinnor inom filosofi?

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Det är allmänt känt att andelen kvinnor inom svensk akademisk filosofi är betydligt lägre än andelen män. En snabb undersökning på åtta svenska filosofiinstitutioners personalsidor ger ett resultat på något under 23 % kvinnliga filosofer, varav sex institutioner har en lägre andel kvinnor och endast två institutioner har en högre andel (upp till 43 %). Om detta vore en beskrivning av svenska filosofiinstitutioner under, låt säga, 1943 skulle vi ha en förklaring till kvinnornas underrepresentation inom filosofi; proportionen kvinnor inom akademisk filosofi skulle endast avseglag proportionen kvinnliga studerande inom akademin överhuvudtaget. Men denna förklaring kan knappast ges år 2013. Proportionen kvinnliga studerande är över 60 %. Dessutom tycks det som om kvinnor, rent formellt, har lika goda chanser som män att fortsätta inom akademisk filosofi. Varför så få kvinnor faktiskt gör det kräver därför en förklaring.

Många olika typer av förklaringar har föreslagits, allt ifrån biologiska till sociologiska. I mitt föredrag ska jag presentera och klassificera olika typer av förklaringar och till viss del utvärdera deras rimlighet.
On dependence and logic

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A bound variable $x$ in a sentence is said to be determined by (or depending, in the strongest sense, on) the bound variables whose scope include the quantifier binding $x$. For example, $z$ is determined by $x$ in $\forall x \exists z R(x, z)$, but not in $\forall x \forall y \exists z R(x, y, z)$; it may be helpful to think about the Skolemization of the formula. In sentences of first-order logic only linear dependence structures can be expressed (the ordering in which the variables occur in the prenex form of the sentence, disregarding the fact that the prenex form is not unique).

In his paper on the infinite syntax of formulas Henkin (1961) introduced an explicit way of dealing with non-linearly ordered variable dependencies in logic with the partially ordered Henkin quantifier. Since then, several different formalisms has been studied to deal with similar phenomena. But not until recently, with the emergence of Dependence Logic (Väänänen, 2007), has there been an interest in investigating the very notion of dependence used, see for example Engström (2012).

In database theory (the branch of computer science studying relational databases), on the other hand, different notions of dependence have been well studied. These notions can be divided into three groups: equality generating dependencies, full tuple generating dependencies and embedded tuple generating dependencies.

I will give an overview of different logical aspects of dependence notions, both from an axiomatic and a semantic point of view.

References
On Responding to Nihilism

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What should we do with our moral practice if we came to believe that there are no moral facts, and therefore no true moral propositions? A shorter and (I stipulate) equivalent question is: What should we do with our moral practice if we came to believe that moral nihilism is true? Several philosophers have approached this question during the last few decades. Notable contributions are Mackie (1977, 1980), Hinckfuss (1987), Joyce (2001), Garner (2007), Cueno and Christy (2011) and Olson (forthcoming). These have all come up with strikingly different answers to the question above. This paper aims to approach that question again, and give a yet another constructive answer to it. I also hope to add to the discussion by providing more of an analysis of the very problem at hand than what previous discussions of this issue have produced.

The paper has three parts. First I describe what is involved in giving an answer to the question above, and thus which kinds of answers there are. I also note a highly relevant fact little attended to in previous discussions, namely that present moral practice seems to show considerable normative, metaethical and other relevant variation and that variation must be attended to in order to find a working solution to the question what to do with our moral practice if we think there are no moral facts. Secondly, I briefly discuss four attempted solutions to the problem: conservationism, fictionalism, abolitionism and propagandism. I note their different strong and weak spots. Finally, I piece together a fifth solution, negotiationism, from the strong spots of the previous attempts. It is not neat or tidy, but it might actually work in the moral environment were nihilists are likely to find themselves.

References
Metapsykologi och tillvaroanalys:
Heidegger och Freud om utläggning och agerande

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Heidegger hade inte mycket till övers för Freuds psykoanalys. Han menade att Freuds teorier representerade en vulgär form av naturalism där mänskliga uttryck, i vid mening, ytterst förstås och förklaras i termer av bakomliggande orsaker i form av omedvetna drifter. Enligt Heidegger fenomenologiska analys måste specifikt mänskliga uttryck snarare förstås i termer av ”utläggning”: då människan är en hermeneutisk varelse som alltid lever i vad Heidegger kallar för en ”värld”, så måste mänskliga uttryck ytterst förstås en respons på, och ett vidare utarbetande av, en mer eller mindre artikulerad och meningsmässigt strukturerad situation. Min ambition med detta föredrag är att iscensätta en dialog mellan Heidegger och Freud och på så vis försöka visa att Heideggers analys på vissa plan representerar en alltför snäv förståelse av mänskligt handlande: varje utläggning innehåller alltid ett moment av ”agerande” i Freuds mening.
Concentrated risk, Coventry Blitz, Chamberlain’s cancer

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Suppose that Churchill knew in advance about the German Blitz plan for Coventry and decided to do nothing to thwart it, simply in order to minimize overall British war casualties by a little. Would that decision be wrong? Norman Daniels has recently argued that abandoning individuals or groups (such as the inhabitants of Coventry) to concentrated risk is wrong, other things being equal. They alone face ‘concentrated risk,’ and so any such decision is unfair towards those who are worse off in terms of risk (Daniels 2012). Regarding Coventry, Daniels might claim that fairness towards Coventry inhabitants would have made their abandonment to concentrated risk of war death wrong. It would achieve a slightly better outcome, but through very unfair risk distribution.

I argue against treating risk as the currency of distributive fairness on grounds of the absurdities it generates. The historical case of Chamberlain’s cancer death nicely illustrates a familiar distinction between two possible interpretations of ‘risk,’ an epistemic one and an objective one (and a few subtypes); and, as I show, applying fairness considerations to risk distribution is absurd on either interpretation.

Starting with so-called epistemic risk, consider what would follow if it were obligatory to equalize epistemic risk as allocators assess it. That would mean that if electric power operators in a British town noticed, in the course of a Blitz attack on town, that one house’s lights had innocently been left on (putting its residents at concentrated risk of being targeted for aerial bombardment), the electric operators duty would be to cut the power to that house even at considerable financial cost, although that would only divert bombing to similar nearby houses. Otherwise, the operators would know that that house’s residents are at concentrated (epistemic) risk, and epistemic risk would be very unequal. Clearly however diverting bombing from one innocent resident to another is pointless. Therefore, ascribing such an obligation to power operators is absurd. While a fairer distribution of life and death matters would have easily justified—indeed, demanded—considerable financial sacrifice, such a futile ‘musical chairs’ game doesn’t.

Now consider what would follow if it were obligatory to equalize so-called objective risk. That would mean that any British cabinet decision likely to affect determinate German Blitz plans and ‘reshuffle’ which Britons are objectively at concentrated risk would
be wrong—even if it remained entirely unknown which Britons would be adversely affected. That judgement seems absurd as well.

On either interpretation of risk, then, treating concentrated risk as unfair turns out to be absurd. We often have pragmatic reasons to distribute risk in this or in that way, but such distribution has no intrinsic (dis)value. The only true currency of distributive justice is (access to) good and bad outcomes.

References
Knowledge and Extended Minds

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Knowledge of the external world requires an element of cooperation from the environment that is beyond our control. In this paper, I consider the proposal that when conditions are right, we may assign a greater share of labour to a cooperative environment in the shared project of acquiring knowledge. The kind of scenarios I have in mind are familiar from the so-called Extended Mind debate. I argue that we may have more reason to regard these cases as cases of knowledge than cases of belief.
Deflationism and the Value of Truth

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In this paper I discuss a familiar challenge for deflationism. The general tenor of such challenge is that deflating truth in the way deflationists wish to do is in tension with the normative role that truth plays in our cognitive economy. The plan is first to give a characterization of the kind of deflationism under discussion here. Secondly, to distinguish between three aspects of the normativity of truth and suggest a framework within which to conduct our investigation that has the advantage of clarifying what exactly is at stake in the normativity challenge. I will then argue that our deflationism has the resources for accounting for at least one aspect of the normativity of truth leaving the discussion of the other aspects for another occasion.

Talk of the normativity of beliefs requires some preliminary distinctions. Firstly, there is what we might call the evaluative issue, which concerns the correctness of our beliefs and assertions. According to one prominent proposal, which I am going to assume here, a belief that p is correct just in case p is true. Secondly there is the teleological aspect, which concerns the aim of beliefs (or, more properly, enquiry). A prominent suggestion is that truth is the aim of enquiry. What we primarily aim at in enquiry is to have true (and only true) beliefs. Thirdly, we have the axiological question concerning the value of enquiry vis-à-vis its primary aim – i.e. the value of having true beliefs. These aspects of the normativity of beliefs are importantly related but they shouldn’t be conflated.

In this paper I will focus exclusively on the axiological issue. I will argue that deflationists have the resources for accounting for it in a way compatible with their characteristic claim that truth denotes no substantive property (the insubstantiality thesis). The strategy will be to endorse Korsgaard’s framework for understanding value. According to Korsgaard, there is an important distinction between questions concerning the source of value, and so whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic, and question concerning the mode of value – i.e. whether the value is final or instrumental. Deflationists, especially Horwich and Field, maintain that their theory of truth can accommodate the fact that truth has final value. On the other hand, critics of deflationism, especially Lynch, have argued that any attempt to account for the fact that truth has final value is incompatible with the insubstantiality thesis. I shall argue that this criticism fails once the crucial distinction between final and intrinsic value is recognized. In fact, I will show that truth having final value is consistent with the insubstantiality thesis, insofar as final
does not entail intrinsic. Deflationist can thus account for the axiological aspect of the normativity of beliefs by defending the following thesis: having true beliefs has final but extrinsic value. I conclude by sketching one plausible way in which this proposal can be developed.

References
Implicit definitions and meaning-invariance

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A problem for logical pluralism is an adequate reply to Quine’s remark that change in logic is change in meaning. In this paper, we approach this problem by surveying the potential of various conceptions of implicit definitions in connection with different notions of meaning within inferentialist semantics.

I start by criticising two conceptions. According to the first conception, the implicit definition of a term is the introduction/elimination rules or the axiom(s) used to introduce the term into a context of deducibility. Historically, we can associate this conception with Hilbert and Gentzen. It is argued that the account is inadequate because it accounts for meaning-invariance only in the cases where the terms are introduced into a context of deducibility using the same introduction rules.

According to the second conception, the implicit definition of a term acts as a criterion for material adequacy in any context of deducibility in such a way that meaning is preserved if the material condition is satisfied in a context of deducibility. The historical origin of the account is Tarski’s convention T. The notion of meaning preserved across contexts of deducibility is naturally understood as something like Kaplan’s character but concerning contexts of deducibility and not contexts of utterance. However, just like Kaplan’s character for ‘I’ picks out different speakers in different contexts of utterance, we should except a similar notion for contexts of deducibility to pick out something in different contexts of deducibility because it plays the same role instead of picking out the same thing in different contexts of deducibility. Only in the latter case would an intuitive sense of subject-matter be preserved.

As an alternative, I propose to associate the latter account of implicit definition with a notion of reference we will call signification to distinguish it from denotation for singular terms and extensions for various classes of terms in possible world semantics. The idea is to consider distinct contexts of deducibility as different ways of theorizing about the same subject-matter as long as we have some background theory about the subject-matter of logical and metaphysical theories, for example that a logical theory is about various actions such as premise-combination if one prefers a use-theoretic picture, or perhaps some abstract objects if one adheres to a truth-theoretic conception. With a use-theoretic conception, ‘∧’ would signify a device for premise-combination, and each context of deducibility would be a way of theorizing about that device, so ‘∧’ signifies
the same in distinct contexts of deducibility despite differences in inferential role. We use Kripkean anti-descriptivist worries to argue that implicit definitions as conditions for material adequacy are neither necessary nor sufficient for preserving signification.

Finally, we suggest an account of implicit definitions analogous to Kripke’s reference-fixing definitions. With this account, the point of an implicit definition is not to preserve signification but rather to fix signification relative to some context of deducibility in which the term was first introduced while signification is preserved across contexts of deducibility through causal-historic connections between the contexts. The account avoids the problems pointed out with the above accounts.
Doxastic Attitudes Governed by a Principle of Coherence

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When we attempt to account for the entirety of human behavior, it has been proposed that we must look not only to belief, but also to something else. This need becomes evident when we think of cases in which we are disposed to act in ways that are discordant with our conscious beliefs. That is, we might believe that all races are equal (P), yet when we examine our automatic and implicit behaviors, they point to an attitude of inequality (not-P). How do we explain this phenomenon? Gendler (2008) argues that if we want to take seriously how human minds work, and we want to save belief, we must make conceptual room for the addition of unconscious beliefs – or aliefs. Under Gendler’s theory, alief is defined as arational, automatic, associative, and not at will, while belief is defined as rational and reality sensitive. According to Gendler, discord arises between P and not-P when the content of an alief conflicts with the content of a conscious belief.

But Schwitzgebel (2010) objects to the rigid division Gendler creates between alief and belief. He argues that belief cannot be so narrowly defined, claiming that Gendler’s view artificially separates rational and thoughtful responses from habitual, automatic, and associative responses. In his view, it is a mistake to claim that only the first qualify as beliefs. Instead Schwitzgebel argues that instances of P and not-P, or what he defines as the gap between dispositional belief and occurrent judgment, should be thought of as states of in-between belief. According to Schwitzgebel, in-between beliefs are only partly possessed and fail to penetrate the subject’s entire dispositional structure, and occur under circumstances when it is not quite right to claim that one believes, nor is it quite right to claim that one fails to believe.

But in making conceptual room for in-between belief and alief to function alongside belief, I argue that Schwitzgebel and Gendler both mischaracterize what it means to believe. That is, they both overlook another dimension to beliefs governed by different rules and principles. I advance the idea that this overlooked dimension is constituted by implicit beliefs formed according to a deeply rooted, inherent principle in the unconscious mind: coherence. This principle allows the subject to neglect ambiguity and suppress doubt so that a neat and more tidy picture of the world emerges. I propose several ways in which coherence is achieved in the acquisition of beliefs: (i) by filtering out inputs from the external environment that do not cohere with our existing belief.
set; (ii) by filling in gaps where evidence is incomplete, ambiguous, or contradictory; (iii) by selectively choosing evidence in the external environment that coheres with an occurrent belief, and (iv) by jumping to conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.

This principle dictates that while we may consciously, explicitly hold one belief, many of our automatic and implicit behaviors are formed according to these tenets of coherence. Finally, I claim that this new theory of beliefs provides a better explanation to the original problem presented by Gendler and Schwitzgebel: instances in which we profess to believe $P$, but act according to $\text{not-}P$. 
"The Curious Incident with the Dog in the Night Time"

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Selection of questions occurs, in inquiry, prior to management of answers. Accordingly, Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry (IM1) focuses on the strategic aspects of the interrogative phase (Hintikka, 1999, 2007). This contrasts with mainstream epistemology (both analytic and formal), which is dominated by issues of justification, reliability, and acceptance of answers. Moreover, the IM1 takes Pure Discovery (PD)—"inquiry in which all answers [...] can be treated as being true [and] all we need to do is to find out what the truth is" (Hintikka, 2007:98)—as a default position, to be adjusted if the context is known not to be one of PD, or revised if it reveals itself not to be so, after all.

The main strategic problem of PD is: "Given the list of the propositions one has reached in a line of inquiry, which question should one ask next?" (ibid), which in turn (because questions have presuppositions that must be reached first) is strategically equivalent to: "Which proposition should one use as the premise of the next logical inference?" (ibid)—and provably so (Hintikka, Halonen & Mutanen, 1999). This equivalence has been illustrated by literary examples of inquiry, esp. plot devices from the Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories—including "the curious incident with the dog in the night time" in Silver Blaze—studied by Hintikka & Halonen (2005) and Genot & Jacot (2012). More surprisingly, it also explains empirical response to the Selection Task of Wason (1968), despite its being usually thought of as experimental evidence for widespread deviation from deductive inference in human reasoning. However, only a generalized version of the IM1 can offers a better account of both types of reasoning than current epistemological and cognitive models (Genot, 2012, 2013). My main claim is that it does so at the expense of the parallelism between interrogation and deduction.

Indeed, Hintikka argues that the principal question under investigation is determined by abduction, which encompasses both the determination of its potential answers and the selection of one answer to test first (Hintikka, 2007:50 sq.). This selection constrains the inquirer's preferences to align with those of an ideal reasoner aiming at the shortest deductive derivation of the selected answer, from the information about the context possessed by the inquirer, supplemented by the answers she could obtain. In order to account for actual reasoning and empirical data, the IM1 must make room for strategies that investigate answers in parallel, or fail to fully track deduction, possibly in response...
to various contextual goals, and even in PD contexts. Deductive reasoning provides in general little guidance for this, because the best strategy typically hinges on the best introduction of a yes-or-no question, which by Hintikka’s own admission, is yet another type of abduction.

References
The “Death of God” in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*

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Reading Hegel’s discussion of the relation between humans and the divine in terms of the temporal, this paper sheds light upon the ways in which an experience of time itself is woven into the fabric of religion for Hegel, and thus one’s understanding of the divine. Traditionally, one can only know the divine as something that is either within the self, or outside of the self—a view that mandates that God can only be known as an inner power, or as something beyond human reach. Finding a new, third way for thinking of God, Hegel will claim that God is neither within us, nor beyond us; instead, God is Dead. Hegel claims this on the grounds that, if existence entails death—as the transition from nature to spirit in the *Encyclopaedia* renders explicit—then for God to exist requires that God too, like all other living beings, must die. Setting up God and death as absolute necessities, Hegel opens a new terrain of logic—the speculative—which paves the path for re-conceptualizing the relation between humans and the divine, and the temporal tag that this relation entails.

Picking up from the *Phenomenology* and the parallel, albeit condensed exposition that one finds in the *Encyclopedia* of “Revealed Religion,” the paper argues that the utterance of the death of God foregrounds a need for the new, and prompts a heretofore un-thought understanding of religion and philosophy. Offering an account of this famous phrase, we argue that it gives expression to a death/birth, to a fundamental shift in the self, and the self’s relation to the divine, to a disruption of the dichotomy of time—the finite and the infinite—which historically maps onto the division between humans and the divine. The proclamation of the death of God, as will be argued, thus serves as the springboard for a radically novel conception of time—that of the absolute present—which allows for the complete and reciprocal recognition between human beings and the Divine.
Interpretation and the Interpreter

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According to Donald Davidson, “what a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the speaker believes” (Davidson, 1983:148). This is a foundational claim about the nature of semantic properties: these are evidence-constituted properties. They are determined by the principle of charity on the basis of data about the behaviour of the speaker(s). But what exactly is the role of the interpreter in the Davidsonian account of meaning determination? Is he merely a dramatic device in a fully objective metaphysical picture? Or does the picture contain an irreducibly subjective element? In this talk, I investigate whether we can get help in answering these questions from David Lewis’s (1983) distinction between natural and unnatural properties.

References
Six conceptions of freedom of choice:  
A defence of All-options Probabilism

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CONCEPTIONS of freedom of choice can be specified along several dimensions according to what sort of obstacles count as limiting choice and so decreasing freedom. Bob Goodin and Frank Jackson (2007) have provided a helpful mapping of one such dimension: Obstacles can be actual, probable or possible. Goodin and Jackson argue for what they call probabilism as the most plausible alternative. However, they take probabilism to mean that we are more free the lower the probability of interference. This gives rise to the familiar problem of adaptive preferences, since one way of becoming more free on this account is to make it more likely that one will choose options which are less likely to entail interference. (The account also gives rise to similar and even more aggravating problems.)

Philip Pettit (2008) has argued against Goodin and Jackson and proposed that the republican conception of freedom is a form of bounded probabilism. On this account, Pettit says, some things are nonprobabilistically relevant, namely what the chooser prefers and how likely existing others are to interfere with her. Everything else is probabilistically relevant, including the possibility that some currently non-existing other will materialize and interfere. This distinction between obstacles created by different sorts of agents is, however, arguably untenable (see Lang 2012).

I propose that the part of Pettit’s bounded probabilism that concerns the chooser’s preferences is better captured by acknowledging another dimension of freedom: Freedom can be reduced by obstacles to the preferred option only, the infamous Hobbesian line, or it may be reduced by obstacles to any option (or possibly by obstacles to some in-between set of options). With this dimension in play, Goodin and Jackson’s mapping can be duplicated into a six-part mapping.

On this new mapping, one-option actualism is Hobbes’ conception of freedom, one-option probabilism is arguably an improvement on Goodin and Jackson’s account, all-options actualism is arguably Isaiah Berlin’s conception of freedom, and all-options probabilism is an attractive development of this conception. The republican conception of freedom, or a refined version of it, is all-options possibilism.

This mapping sheds new light on old controversies, and further exposes the problems with the republican commitment to freedom as the absence of the mere possibility of
interference. It also distinguishes all-options probabilism as a strong contender for a conception of freedom of choice as an important value.

References
Thought Experiments  
and Quantified Modal Logic

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Several proposals have recently been made regarding the form of judgements employed in philosophical thought experiments. According to Williamson (2005, 2007), they are counterfactuals. Ichikawa & Jarvis (2009) argue that they are strict conditionals. Malmgren (2011) suggests that they are possibility claims.

These authors also offer proposals concerning the logical form of arguments in which judgements about particular cases serve as premises. They all suggest that for a wide class of important cases – aiming to refute a general claim or theory – such arguments can be seen to be valid when formalized in quantified modal logic. And they all agree that while at least one premise is a judgement about the particular case, the conclusion is general.

Taking Gettier cases as paradigms, these philosophers seek to articulate both (i) the character of particular Gettier judgements, and (ii) the general form of (many important) philosophical thought experiments. They have attended in detail to the first of these aims. The second has received much less attention, perhaps because the presumed paradigmatic status of Gettier cases has been taken to warrant facile extension to other cases.

Their motivation, both for scrutinizing Gettier judgements and for proposing a general argument form, is largely epistemological. This is natural: if thought experiments may be modeled as valid arguments with interesting, general conclusions, two questions become pressing: what kind of premises may our judgements about particular cases deliver, and how may these be known? Here Williamson invokes “our general capacity for evaluating counterfactuals”, which he takes to be suited to armchair employment but not a priori. By contrast, Ichikawa, Jarvis and Malmgren take the premises to be contents of distinctly a priori intuitions. These epistemological agendas inform their respective proposals. Hence, a seemingly technical issue lies at the center of current debates over philosophical methodology.

I shall argue two theses.

The first is that the near-myopic focus on Gettier cases has skewed recent debate, to the detriment of its ostensible aims. The rationale for concentrating on these cases is that they are taken to be uncontroversial instances of successful thought experiments. But
most influential thought experiments are subject to controversy. It is therefore unlikely that proposals – such as those mentioned above – that are tailored to explain the (presumed) epistemic success of Gettier cases will generalize well. Moreover, there is strong reason to doubt the adequacy, even for Gettier cases, of these proposals (cf. Cappelen 2012:54f).

The second thesis is that there is a natural alternative proposal. Like its rivals, it takes many thought experiments to be representable as valid arguments in QML. But it is preferable because it better respects the particularity of judgements about cases, and generalizes well, partly because it isn't committed to the epistemic success of any particular case. Since it employs free logic, it does require that we have an ability to reason with empty names. This is defended briefly.

References
Moral requirements, Practical Clout and Divine Commands

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We have weighty reason to comply with moral norms even if we desire not to. Richard Joyce refers to this combination of rational authority and inescapability as “practical clout” (Joyce 2006:62). However, if what we have reason to do is ultimately bound by our desires it is hard to see how there could ever be norms whose rational authority is inescapable. The authority of any norm would be contingent on us possessing the relevant desires and would thus be escapable. Joyce concludes that moral norms cannot exist (Joyce 2001; 2006).

Resisting this conclusion would require either a) denying that practical clout is an essential feature of moral norms or b) showing that norms with the kind if practical clout characteristic of moral norms can exist. I take option b. Most of those who take this option challenge Joyce’s assumption that what we have reason to do is ultimately determined by our desires. I do not. I argue that there is a way in which norms possessing practical clout could exist even if what we have reason to do is desire-bound. I explain how the commands of a certain kind of god would have inescapable rational authority.

I consider some standard objections to identifying moral norms with the commands of a god and argue that they fail. I conclude that there is a good case for identifying moral norms with the commands of a god of the kind I have outlined.

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Ett kroniskt problem för informerat samtycke

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I motsats till standardfallet finns flertalet kroniska sjukdomar, t.ex. diabetes, där patienten tillsammans med en läkare kommer överens om en vårdplan som patienten i sin tur har det huvudsakliga ansvaret för att genomföra med stöd av läkaren och annan relevant expertis. Patienten fattar förutom beslut om vårdplanen också flera mindre beslut på egen hand rörande genomförandet av sin vård. Det förekommer regelbundet att patienter misslyckas med att sköta sin del av vårdplanen och att deras medicinska tillstånd till följd av detta påverkas negativt. En situation som frustrerar både inblandad vårdpersonal och anhöriga.


På grund av att egenvård av kroniska sjukdomar består av flera på varandra följande beslut där närvaron av skäl att respektera en patients självbestämmande kan variera verkar dessa utgöra en utmaning för tillämpningen av det etiska ramverk som vanligtvis används. Jag kommer under föredraget att argumentera att så inte är fallet och att vi inte saknar autonomibaserade skäl att respektera hur patienten genomför sin vård mellan besöken hos vården. Om patienten under mötet med läkaren kommer överens om
vilken vårdplan de ska följa och vilken typ av stöd att följa vårdplanen som patienten kan tänka sig att acceptera kan man se det som att patienten ger ett advance directive rörande sin vård och att denna typ av *advance directive* är mycket starkare än de typer som man vanligtvis diskuterar eftersom det inte drabbas av vanliga invändningar.

**References**


Functions in Biological Artifacts

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Scientific research and rapid advances in technology is accelerating our ability to manipulate biological systems. The core aim of the emerging field of synthetic biology is to enable the design of living systems with new functions that do not exist in nature and the redesign of already existing functions. One of the goals driving much research in synthetic biologist is to turn biology into an engineering discipline by applying engineering principles to biological systems and to do biology in a standardized, systematic way guided by rational design principles. Engineering biology means introducing abstraction levels, separation of production and design, knowledge-based design of a particular function, and in this way synthetic biology represents a significant development compared to genetic engineering understood as traditional trial-and-error recombinant DNA work. Still, the fundamental insights from molecular biology and advances in a range of other disciplines such as computer science, mathematical modelling, electronic engineering, are an essential part of current developments in synthetic biology.

While there has already been a lot of attention directed at ethical and societal issues that might arise in connection with synthetic biology research, little investigation has so far been focusing on the status of the products that synthetic biologists announce that they will construct. A recent book on synthetic biology and its promises and perils (Carlsson 2010) proclaims that biology is technology: Organisms and their constituent parts are engineerable components of larger systems, and the possible products of synthetic biology are commonly described as living machines. While these locutions are extremely effective when it comes to proclaiming and communicating the engineering aspirations of synthetic biology, they are also philosophically perplexing. In this paper I explore the ontological nature of synthetic biology products. The question concerns how to conceive of synthetic biology products and what to make of their status as technology or machines. In particular I examine the notion of a biological artifact in relation to theories of function in biology and technology.

The paper consists of two parts. In the first part I characterise synthetic biology products as Paley organisms – living systems originating in intelligent design. In the second part of the paper I discuss whether Paley organisms fit into the domain of paradigmatic technical artifacts such as watches and airplanes. In particular I investigate how to account for the biological functions of Paley organisms, and whether and, if so, how Paley organisms can be ascribed technical functions reviewing some of the main
theories of biological and technical function. I examine the role of intentional design for acquisition of technical functions, and I argue that the emphasis on designers’ intentions in accounts of functions in artifacts is problematic.

References
The modal/amodal distinction

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Since the earliest days of cognitive science, a distinction has been drawn between symbolic and analogous representations. Within this distinction, a central question was whether vision and, in particular, imagery can be conceived as symbolic or not (e.g., Minsky 1974; Tye 1991). In the more recent debate concerning the nature of concepts, a new distinction has been elaborated between modal and amodal symbols (Barsalou 1999; Prinz 2002). Modal accounts of concepts, however, have been criticized for either making too strong claims or for being indistinguishable in their predictions from amodal theories (Machery 2006; Weiskopf 2007). The critique is mainly directed at the methodology.

In my talk I aim to clarify some conceptual ambiguities in the distinction between modal and amodal symbols. I distinguish between an implementational, a functional and a representational account of modality.

The implementational account takes modal symbols to be representations in the brain’s sensory-motor-system or, in a weaker version, representations involving the sensory-motor-system. In support of this claim, neuroscientific evidence, found e.g. in MEG studies, is cited (such as Pulvermüller 1999). If, however, differences in the kind of information stored are stressed and, therefore, results in behavioural experiments such as mental rotation or image scanning are brought forth, the main focus lies on functional differences of modal and amodal representations (e.g., those discussed in Pylyshyn 2002). Both functional and implementational conceptions of modality are one-place predicates. In contrast, the representational account recognizes the relational characteristics of symbols and conceives the attribution of modality as a two-place predicate. A symbol is modal by virtue of having the same modality as what is represented.

In the first part of the talk, I introduce these three accounts of modality plus the types of evidence they cite and show them to be present in the seminal paper by Barsalou (1999) and beyond.

The second part concerns these three accounts on a conceptual level and discusses the relations between them and their implications for amodal symbols. If modality is an issue of implementation, then amodal symbols will be those symbols that do not involve the brains sensory-motor-system. Proponents of amodal symbols can argue that their theories are not about implementation and, therefore, the implementational account of modal symbols does not apply. The representational account proposes modal
symbols to be representations in the same format as perceptions; however, perception can be conceived as being at least partially symbolic. Therefore, proponents of amodal symbols could still claim that modal symbols in a representational account contain amodal symbols to the same extent to which perceptions do. The only account where there is a real clear-cut difference between proponents of modal and amodal theories is the older functional account.

In the third part, it is shown that the main reasons Barsalou gives for preferring modal over amodal symbols in explaining the conceptual system are tied to the implementational account. I conclude that the distinction between modal and amodal symbols is not clear-cut. Moreover, to have explanatory power, an account of modality has to be developed that does not contradict amodal symbols except in the strongest sense imaginable.

References
How do mind and body interact? Do they interact at all? In Kant’s philosophy, it is presupposed that they do, that affection of our sensibility by objects takes place. But famously, Kant’s transcendental idealism distinguishes the object of experience from the thing in itself, and this gives rise to a question: Which object, or which aspect of the object, is it that affects us? Three alternatives are traditionally considered:

1) Noumenal affection – the affecting object is the non-spatiotemporal thing in itself.
2) Empirical affection – the affecting object is the spatiotemporal object of experience.
3) Double affection – there is, and must be, both empirical and noumenal affection.

In this paper, I will explicate an overlooked problem that shows empirical affection, and thus options 2) and 3), to be impossible. Furthermore, I will show that Kant was aware of this problem, and for this reason indeed repeatedly claimed that empirical outer affection is impossible. Thus, noumenal affection, option 1), is the only plausible interpretation of Kant, assuming his position to be consistent.

The overlooked problem stems from Kant’s acceptance of the familiar early modern reaction to Descartes: that mind-body interaction is impossible, because of their difference in kind. In Kant, this problem is presented in terms of forces: Whereas empirical bodies have moving forces, empirical minds have representing forces. But how can a moving force be the cause of representations, and how can a representing force be the cause of motions? Motion is a change of spatial relations, so if something is not in space it cannot move. But representations (considered as vehicles), are according to Kant not in space. Therefore, moving forces cannot cause them or have any direct influence on them. Since the affecting object that causes us to have representations thus cannot be the spatiotemporal object and its moving forces, it can only be the object as it is in itself. And this is Kant’s solution to the problem: Although mind and body are different in kind when considered as objects of experience, they might not be different in kind, and might therefore interact, as things in themselves.
Economic Efficiency
and the Myth of the Pie

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In public policy debates efficiency is usually considered to be a non-controversial value. Efficiency is sometimes weighted against other concerns of distributive justice, but the intuitive idea seems to be that all else equal, it is better to have a larger pie to distribute. However, in practice is often unclear what we mean by efficiency. Efficiency of what? In this paper I will investigate the probably most common approach to measure efficiency in applied policy evaluation, namely economic efficiency.

According to mainstream economics, the economic efficiency of a policy or a project can at least in principle be calculated through a cost-benefit analysis. In a cost-benefit analysis all individuals’ valuation of the effects of the policy or project are measured and aggregated. If the net result is positive, then the policy or project is deemed ‘efficient’.

I argue that this is a mistaken methodology. Usually we think a project is more efficient than another only if there is more of some benefit, for the same or a smaller cost. But when costs and benefits are measured by individuals’ valuations, then a higher sum of net benefits does not mean that there is more of anything. Proponents of the mainstream approach, like Robert Frank, who claim that “[a]ny policy that passes the cost-benefit test makes the economic pie larger” (two.oldstyle/zero.oldstyle/zero.oldstyle/zero.oldstyle:/nine.oldstyle/one.oldstyle/seven.oldstyle) are simply wrong.

The reason they are wrong is that the mainstream approach to economic efficiency depends on all valuations being expressed in terms of some arbitrary good, which we call the numéraire (usually the numéraire is money). What the proponents of this approach have missed is that whether a project is deemed economically efficient according to the mainstream approach can vary with the choice of numéraire.

I show that under the plausible assumption that individuals have different preference-rankings, economic valuations cannot be aggregated over individuals in a unique, non-arbitrary way. For a given set of individual preferences, the aggregated group valuation can yield completely different rankings, depending on what good is being used as numéraire. This means that the choice of numéraire can determine whether a project is deemed economically efficient or not. But we have no reason to use one numéraire rather
than another. Hence, whether a project is deemed economically efficient or not on the mainstream approach is in an important sense arbitrary. This is a serious implication, since it means that the increasingly frequent use of cost-benefit analysis as a guide in public decision-making could be very misleading.

References
Coordinated Reasoning

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When trying to explain how humans reason, it is common to look for applications of inference patterns, such as deductive laws of logic. Logic being topic neutral, one thinks of reasoning as the application of universal rules that would yield the correct outcome whenever correctly applied. This conception of human reasoning as ‘mental logic’ has been widely spread in the literature, both in logic (Boole 1847; Gentzen 1934) and psychology of reasoning (Piaget 1957; Braine & Rumain 1983; Rips 1983). This is e.g. the view Wason had in mind when designing his Selection Task (Wason 1968). Johnson-Laird and his colleagues departed from this conception of a ‘mental logic’ to emphasize semantic processes, leading to the Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken 1992; Johnson-Laird 1999). Both the ‘mental logic’ and the Mental Models theory bear a common stance though: there is one single logic, classical logic.

Stenning & Van Lambalgen (2008:20–21) challenge this view and argue for a two-step reasoning process: first, reasoning to an interpretation, where one has to determine the kind of formal properties used in the domain in which one reasons (to which purpose reasoning is directed), then reasoning from an interpretation, where reasoning is guided by formal laws (the use of certain laws rather than others depending on the determination of the domain). It means that, in experimental reasoning tasks, experimenters should be careful about how subjects interpret the task before discarding some answers as incorrect or evidence of cognitive biases. In other words, if coordination on interpretation of the task between experimenters and subjects is not met at the first step, it is unlikely that subjects will perform well at the second step.

Although Stenning & Van Lambalgen (2008: chap. 3) explain the ratio of errors in some tasks by extensively studying how ambiguities of instructions affect the first step, we will argue in this presentation that their analysis misses two things, that both fall under a lack of coordination between experimenters and subjects. First they have given less attention to the second step, nor attempted to reconstruct the tasks and assess their logicality. This reconstruction has been done in Genot & Jacot (2012) for the Wason Selection Task. Secondly, Stenning & Van Lambalgen (2008:20–21) explanations rely mainly on semantic processes, forgetting the pragmatic aspects of reasoning tasks, especially when they are displayed in natural language. Those pragmatic aspects have been studied in Jacot (2012), where the author shows that solving the Double
Disjunction task is firstly a matter of coordination between experimenters and subjects under a Gricean principle of cooperation, provided that relevance constraints are fulfilled (Sperber, Cara & Girotto, 1995; Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber, & Van der Henst, 2001).

References
Normative and pluralist accounts of scientific explanation

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At first glance we see a great deal of explanatory diversity in the sciences and this is reflected in some recent accounts of scientific explanation, such as the one defended by Bokulich (2008, 2011), by challenges to tenets requiring explanations of phenomena to invoke entities that we take to exist and claims about them that we take to be true (or approximately so). If we take onboard such accounts then there seems to be not only a great variety of explanatory practices, but also a great variety of different explanatory relations in the sciences.

I will argue that in so far as we are interested in a normative account of scientific explanation—one that tells us what it is that we aim for in scientific explanations and that is capable of, in the words of Kitcher (1981:508), allowing us to “…comprehend and to arbitrate disputes in past and present science”—a simple kind of pluralism will fail. The worry is that many of the traditional problems raised for the deductive-nomological account are reawakened for simple pluralists accounts. The solutions to these problems suggested by accounts such as the causal account of explanation only work under a condition of exclusivity.

The problem arises for any account that is prescriptive and that is simply permissive about the nature of the explanatory relations in a particular way. This makes it a challenge for any account that tries to develop, for example, the ideas of structural explanation, such as those found in Hughes (1989/2003, 1993), into a prescriptive account.

Accounts such as those developed by Woodward (2003) and Strevens (2008) avoid this problem by having a fundamental causal explanatory relation and only allowing other types of explanatory relations when these are either derivative from the fundamental one in the right way or outside some class of cases that is delimited in a non ad hoc way. However, I argue that these accounts are unable to underwrite the seeming pluralism that we would like to account for since we find it even within the domain where causal explanations are available. Finally, I suggest a broader framework that can tackle these problems in a way that allows for a kind of explanatory pluralism within a normative account of explanation.
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In How To Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin studies how words and expressions are integrated parts of conventions and practices (Austin, 1975). In a similar vein, Stanley Cavell has argued that there is a sense in which we “must mean what we say” but that the roots of the meaning of our expressions are not to be found on the individual psychological but rather on the shared cultural level (Cavell, 1976).

Thus an analysis of what we do when we utter a certain expression will be an analysis of a part of our culture. This analysis can be extended to include all kinds of non-linguistic gestures; Ordinary Language Philosophy can help us understand the performativity of interaction more generally. While many thinkers (such as Peter Winch, Charles Taylor and Michel Foucault) have elucidated the linguistic nature of cultural phenomena in helpful ways, Ordinary Language Philosophy provides us with a specific method for actually investigating this linguistic nature.

Austin noted that “sophistication and development of social forms and procedures will necessitate clarification.” This development of our linguistic ability by way of clarification “is as much a matter of making clear distinctions as of making already existing distinctions clear” (Austin, 1975:72).

While Austin mainly examined what we do with certain ritualized expressions such as “I do” and their felicity conditions, a further task could be to provide a detailed analysis of what we do in situations where no clear or satisfying distinctions exist. We communicate and act with a great variety of expressions that are not strictly ritualized but more fluid. This is a path Austin’s work suggests, but one that I claim has yet to be tried (as for example feministic speech act theorists have not embarked upon this project in a proper way, see for example Butler (1997)).

A reconceptualization of social science, with the aid of the philosophy of Austin and Cavell, can help us better understand what we in fact do, can do and cannot do with certain expressions and gestures in social interaction by describing and analyzing performatively unclear action and interaction.

A clarification of what is actually done in situations where no obvious rituals are established as is proposed here would not be merely a detached description of already established cultural practices, but a creation of these cultural practices. Such a concep-
tion is thus normative in the sense that its aim is to edify, and thus contribute to the development of clearer and richer social interaction.

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Are the Neanderthals Extinct?

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This paper argues that modern technology requires that we adjust the definition of when a species is extinct. The paper will also explore, from the perspective of a deontological framework, a problem which is related to our moral obligations towards species of non-human animals. In the environmentalist community and among many philosophers, it is generally accepted that species of non-human animals have an intrinsic value in addition to whatever instrumental value (or disvalue) they have. Which obligations does this value entail? In general, it has been argued that if non-human animal species have value, this entails that we have an obligation to (a) protect these species from extinction or/and (b) abstain from exterminating these species. In light of the recent scientific progress in the field of genetic engineering, this paper will argue that we also have a prima facie obligation to (c) bring back life to species that currently lack living members.
Is there room for Cartesian externalism?

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In her book *The Subject's point of view* (2008) Katalin Farkas develops and defends an explicitly Cartesian and internalist view of the mind. The view is Cartesian because it defines a subject’s mental features as the features that are available to be known by the subject in a way that is accessible to her alone. It is internalist because it takes the content of a subject’s mental states to be fully determined by the features that are available to be known in a privileged way by the subject herself namely via introspection. I will discuss two examples that challenge Farkas’ claim that the Cartesian picture of the mind goes hand in hand with content internalism: Seeing something and intentionally doing something. If I see a canary it seems that I can know that I see a canary in a way that no one else can, exactly because I am the one seeing. If I intentionally wave at my friend it seems that I can know that I am waving in a way that is only accessible to me; in Anscombe’s phrasing I have non-observational practical knowledge of what I am intentionally doing. In both these cases what I have privileged, though not infallible access to seem to go beyond the Cartesian internalist’s sphere of facts about appearances. In so far as introspection is understood as a faculty that provides knowledge that is independent of any knowledge that goes beyond the sphere of appearances, such self-knowledge about seeings and intentional bodily actions is not introspective, nevertheless it seems to be gained in a way that is not accessible to anyone else. One might try to dismiss such examples by appealing to thought experiments that show how we could be provided illusions of seeing a canary or of waving our arm whenever someone else is seeing a canary or waving her arm: The normal asymmetry of access isn’t a principled asymmetry because it is dependent on a reliable but contingent causal connection between my body and the experiences in question. Under strange enough circumstances I could gain access to another person’s seeings or doings on the same evidence basis. Such an interpretation of the thought experiments however assumes a non-disjunctivist view of experiential reasons. If we adopt epistemological disjunctivism we can deny that the evidence base is the same in the two cases despite the fact that it seems to be the same. Farkas discusses and dismisses certain versions of disjunctivism. In the last section of my paper I argue that her arguments against Martin’s epistemic notion of indistinguishability are not effective against McDowell’s epistemological version of disjunctivism. I conclude that despite appearances the Cartesian idea of the mind as that which is known in a special way by the subject herself just might be perfectly compatible with certain versions of content externalism.
The interpretation of medical hierarchies of evidence

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A hierarchy of evidence is a list of study types, where a type found higher up in the list is claimed to produce stronger evidence than a type found further down. Hierarchies of evidence are regularly invoked in so-called evidence-based medicine. There are several basic questions that need to be answered concerning such hierarchies. I will here concentrate on one such question, viz. their interpretation. In what sense is a hierarchy of evidence hierarchical?

When comparing scientific methods, it is tempting to argue with reference to a ceteris paribus clause: all other things being equal, study type A produces stronger evidence than study type B (for example). This may be true, of course, but when we compare actual studies of different types, all other things are rarely equal. One might wonder, then, what it could mean to say that study type A provides stronger evidence than study type B in relation to the actual studies that belong to type A or B (rather than in relation to typical or idealized studies).

I delineate three interpretations of categoricity in a hierarchy of evidence. It is argued that the weakest of the three is the only tenable. According to this interpretation, when we put study type A above study type B in a hierarchy we mean two things, in relation to actual studies: (i) There are studies of type A that are able to produce stronger evidence than any study of type B could produce; and (ii) no study of type A could produce evidence that is weaker than the weakest evidence possible from a study of type B. I discuss implications and potential problems with this interpretation.
Triple Disjunctivism

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About a decade ago ‘disjunctivism’ was only a label for a theory within the philosophy of perception, i.e., it was short for ‘disjunctivism with respect to perception’ (Byrne & Logue, 2009; Soteriou, 2009). Nowadays, however, ‘disjunctivism with respect to action’ has become an established designation, too (Haddock & Macpherson, 2011). In both cases, a further distinction can be made between metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism, but I will deal only with the former.

Primarily, I will present and argue in favor of a third kind of disjunctivism, ‘disjunctivism with respect to assertions’, as well as make clear that taken together the three disjunctivisms are of a special interest. All three do each in their own specific respect come closer to our un-reflected everyday conceptions than the corresponding non-disjunctivisms do. Therefore, a defense of all three can be said also to be of some non-academic world-view interest.

According to perceptual disjunctivism, veridical perceptions (of a certain kind of object) and hallucinations (of the same kind of object) have radically different natures. They lack, as the phrase goes, ‘a highest common factor’. Despite the possibility to mistake a hallucinatory perception for a veridical one, the disjunctivists claim that these perceptions are not qualitatively identical. A perception is in itself – disjunctively – either of the one or the other kind. We do not, as non-disjunctivism has it, perceive something that, secondarily and independently of the nature of the act of perception, has or does not have a relation to a real object.

Action disjunctivism exists in some different forms. According to the one I am interested in, bodily actions and purely bodily patterns of movement lack a highest common factor. In other words, what makes an action into an action is not something that is external to the pattern of movement.

So far, assertion disjunctivism has not been afforded any significant place in the discussion of disjunctivism, but it has been mentioned (Johansson, 2010: sect. 5.III; Candlish & Damjanovic, 2011: sect. 3.3). How it ought to be defined depends on one’s assumptions within the philosophy of language. I will connect to the notion of intentionality. Moreover, I will take it for granted that all intentional states and acts have an intentional object, i.e., where there is a state that contains “aboutness,” there is always in some sense an object for this aboutness. On these assumptions, assertion disjunctivism is the view that true and false assertions have different kinds of intentional objects (cf.
real and hallucinatory objects in perceptual disjunctivism). In spite of the fact that we now and then mistakenly regard as true an assertion that is false, assertion disjunctivism claims that a true assertion never can be completely qualitatively identical to a false one. How this claim can be made reasonable will constitute the core of the talk.

The terms 'disjunctivism' and 'intentionalism' are often said to represent opposite positions (Crane 2011: sect. 3.3–4), but a possible designation of my position is 'intentionalist disjunctivism'.

References
Laws and natural necessity

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The concept of natural law has been debated by philosophers for a long time and a lot of different views have been proposed. The main alternatives are: i) Laws are relations between universals (Tooley 1977, Dretske 1977, Armstrong 1983, Bird 2007), ii) laws are axioms and theorems in a complete theory about the world (Lewis 1983, Lewis 1986), iii) laws are those universally generalised conditionals true in all possible worlds (Parfit 1984, McCall 1984, Vallentyne 1988), iv) there are no laws (Fraassen 1989), v) laws are grounded in invariances based on dispositional properties (Woodward 1992), vi) laws are relatively a priori principles for empirical knowledge (Friedman 2001), vii) laws are primitives (Maudlin 2007, Carroll 1994), and viii) laws are metatheoretic statements (Roberts 2008).

The debate has been characterised by Earman (2002) in the following way:

It is hard to imagine how there could be more disagreement about the fundamentals of the concept of law of nature – or any other concept so basic to the philosophy of science – than currently exists. A cursory survey of the recent literature reveal the following oppositions (among others): there are no laws of nature vs. there are/must be laws; laws express relations between universals vs. laws do not express such relations; laws are not/cannot be Humean supervenient vs. laws are/must be Humean supervenient; law do not/cannot contain ceteris paribus clauses vs. laws do/must contain ceteris paribus clauses.

One might shrug of this situation with the remark that in philosophy disagreement is par for the course. But the correct characterisation of this situation seems to me to be ‘disarray’ rather than ‘disagreement’.

Moreover, much of the philosophical discussion of laws seems disconnected from the practice and substance of science; scientists overhearing typical philosophical debates about laws would take away the impression of scholasticism – and they would be right!

In this talk I will present my own view, which may be characterised as broadly Humean, although I don’t agree with Hume in holding that the necessity of laws just is a projection of our expectations. I will argue that some fundamental physical laws are
necessary in the dicto sense and that our reasons for saying that they are necessary are epistemological. Some fundamental laws are necessary in the sense of being implicit definitions of quantities used in expressing these laws: it is impossible to continue to use these quantitative concepts while rejecting these laws.

The conservation laws are also necessary in the de dicto sense, but the motivation for their necessity is different. A well known theorem due to Emmy Noether says that if we require invariance under a continuous parameter transformation (in the Lagrangian formulation of a theory) the conjugate quantity to this parameter is conserved. So if we can give a reason for requiring invariance under certain parameter transformations, we have an argument for the necessity of some conservation laws. But that we have in some important cases; transformations of time, position, and angle parameters are transformations between different observer’s coordinate system, and it may be argued that our physical theories should be invariant under such changes of perspectives.

References
Wittgenstein, första person & intentionalitet

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Det finns flera anledningar till att den senare Wittgenstein börja undersöka språket ur dess användningsfunktion. En av dem är att han vill komma ifrån risken för psykologism. Om vi i undersökningar av språket ser på användningen istället för mentala processer behöver vi inte dra in det kognitiva i analyserna. Det kan då bli lättare att se hur språket fungerar utan att riskera psykologism. En annan anledning är att det vanliga sättet att se på språket är att beskriva det som ett system av uttryck i tredje person. Men vi som agenter använder inte språket i tredje person, vi använder det i första person. Om vi då istället för att analysera språket som ett system av uttryck, ser på språkanvändningen, så kan vi dels undersöka språket ur ett intersubjektivt första person Vi-perspektiv, vilket gör att vi kan undvika psykologism, och dels kan vi genom det komma åt språket ur just agentperspektivet istället för i tredje person. Jag skall i föredraget diskutera några problem i anslutning till dessa frågor.
Semantic tableaux for trial and error logic

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Trial and error classifiers – corresponding to concepts which change their extensions over time, but with a limit – are introduced and briefly motivated. Some technical and philosophical background and inspiration can be found in the papers Putnam (1965), Jeroslow (1975) and McCarthy & Shapiro (1987).

The language of classical first-order logic is given a new semantics, using $\omega$-sequences of classical models, in order to interpret the basic predicates as classifiers of this kind. In the paper Kaså (2013) a natural fragment of this language is given a sound and complete system of natural deduction.

In this talk, the method of semantic tableaux, as in e.g. Smullyan (1968), is adapted to this trial and error setting, and properties such as completeness and decidability are discussed.

References
The Problem of Reference in the Demonstrative Concept

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In this paper, I critically examine the non-conceptualists’ claim that demonstrative concepts cannot satisfy the re-identification condition. According to Kelly (Kelly, 2001:403), if a subject has a perceptual experience whose content is constituted in part by a demonstrative concept, then she must, at that time, have an ability to reliably identify a separate experience as having the same content if it occurs after some interval (perhaps extremely short) of no such experience. However, McDowell insists that “re-cognitional capacity is possibly quite short-lived, and it is set with the experience.” (McDowell, 1994:57)

I critically argue that Kelly is too ambiguous in explaining how many times subjects have to succeed in order to satisfy the re-identification condition. The term ‘reliably’ is very flexible. In addition, he has to give a case that subjects could discriminate perceptual experience without re-cognition capacity, because re-cognition ability has to be accompanied by discrimination ability. If we suppose that there is discrimination ability but no re-cognition ability, then the expressions ‘this green’ and ‘that green’ would be empty and meaningless-expressions.

Finally, I consider the problem of reference and the problem of fixing referents in the demonstrative concept that both conceptualists and non-conceptualists have overlooked in their arguments. I will then raise the issue that the non-fixability of referents that non-conceptualists claim does not harm the conceptuality of experience but it in fact confronts the main idea of conceptualism that a content of perceptual experience must be conceptual in order to be a reason for belief. This is what conceptualism has to overcome.

References
Is the conceptual defense
of the phenomenal unity of consciousness tenable?

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In this talk I present and evaluate the conceptual defense of the phenomenal unity of consciousness. I will argue that even if the conceptual defense is untenable, it might still illuminate interesting aspects of the notion of phenomenal unity.

The phenomenal unity of consciousness is usually framed with reference to phenomenal states. Phenomenal states are states that it is something that it is like to be in. The notion of phenomenal unity implies that when an individual is in two or more phenomenal states simultaneously these states have conjoint phenomenology. In its strongest form the idea of a phenomenal unity of consciousness can be posited as a thesis stating that 'Necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of subject at a time is phenomenally unified' (Bayne & Chalmers 2003:33). There are two common responses to this thesis. The upshot of the first response is that, with regard to the phenomenal unity of consciousness, what is important is not whether human consciousness is (in the normal case) phenomenally unified, but rather why it appears to us that our consciousness is phenomenally unified (see e.g. Rosenthal 2003). The upshot of the second response is that in the normal case our consciousness is not (or at best partially) phenomenally unified (see e.g. O’Brien & Opie 1998). From these two responses it seems prima facie possible to draw a distinction between the question of whether consciousness is in fact phenomenally unified and the fact that it appears to us, by way of experience, as if it is. There are two issues at stake here. The first issue is that if consciousness is in fact phenomenally unified could this possibly come apart from the experience of phenomenal unity, in the way presupposed by in the first response? The second issue is if consciousness is not phenomenally unified as held by proponents of the second response, how can it appear to us that it is?

The conceptual defense addresses both issues by claiming that if phenomenal unity exists then it is essentially experienced, since this follows from conceptually from the term 'phenomenal'. This means that an unexperienced phenomenal unity should be impossible. Thus the phenomenal unity and the experience of it cannot come apart, in the way necessary for the first issue. Next the conceptual defense states that the fact that it appears to me that my consciousness is phenomenally unified, is sufficient to conclude that it is phenomenally unified. It is sufficient because reasonably my phenomenal experience must be the authority on what my phenomenal experience is. Furthermore
since it was shown in response to the first issue that the experience of unity cannot come
apart from the actual unity, then it follows from my experience of phenomenal unity
that my consciousness is phenomenally unified.

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Autonoetic Consciousness and imagination into the future

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The fact that certain types of imagination activate the same brain zones as episodic memory provoked the hypothesis that there is a single neuro-cognitive system which enables human beings to engage in mental time travel (MTT). Mental time travel is, roughly, an individual’s capacity to project herself into the past or future by remembering or imagining first-person experiences respectively. As a neuro-cognitive phenomenon, MTT is presumed to have a distinct, though dispersed, neural correlate. The MTT hypothesis is consistent with a wide body of evidence from ontogenetics, neuroimaging and lesion studies.

My paper will open with a brief sketch of the leading account of mental time travel. I will then proceed to argue that this account is misconceived for two fundamental reasons: (1) Its genealogical debt to episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness as well as the shallow conception of imagination in play give rise to an ad hoc and unnecessarily constrained account of episodic states. (2) The necessary capacities for MTT as traditionally conceived are unfounded, their formulation is conceptually vague and uninformative. This will severely obstruct empirical research into the ontogenetic and neurological foundations of the phenomenon.

References

⁴The core references are Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving (1997) and Tulving (2002). An alternative, but similar account I might also mention is proposed by Suddendorf & Corballis (1997; 2007).


Oysters and Experience Machines: Thought Experiments about Value

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Many students of philosophy are introduced to Robert Nozick's "experience machine" at an early point in their exposure to the subject. Nozick's idea, put forward and discussed in just four paragraphs of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, is referred to again and again in the literature of moral philosophy. My lecture will try to look at this thought experiment in a fresh way.

My discussion will also refer to two other thought experiments that are related to Nozick's in ways that have not been generally recognized. The first is well-known to readers of Plato's *Philebus*: we are asked to compare two lives, one of which is rich in cognitive accomplishments but devoid of pleasure, and the other of which has the opposite imbalance. The second is known to only a handful; it was first described by the British idealist, J. M. E. McTaggart, in his 1921 work, *The Nature of Existence*. He asks us to imagine an oyster that experiences a very mild form and degree of agreeable consciousness; and then to compare that life with that of a well-lived human life, rich in the best that human existence has to offer (love, knowledge, virtue – whatever you think such a life ought to contain). McTaggart holds that if the human being in question has a normal life-span, but the oyster lives long enough, the oyster's life will be the better of the two, because the duration of its life will at some point be large enough to compensate for its impoverished quality at any given moment. McTaggart perhaps takes the principle in question to be self-evident, but I will assume that, on the contrary, it is false.

We can go a long way towards understanding the circumstances in which it would not be in one's interest to enter the experience machine if we learn the lessons of Plato's *Philebus* and McTaggart's error. The experience machine can make available to a detached brain many good things – that is part of its allure. But although it can give one the illusion that one has achieved an understanding of some subject or person, this has very little, if any, prudential value in comparison with real understanding. The unavailability of any such cognitive achievement is part of what makes the oyster's life so deficient.

My explanation of the limited value of the experience machine is different from the one that Nozick himself proposes. He claims that we would not plug ourselves into
the machine because we think it is better to live in the real world. That explanation is
difficult to reconcile with the plausible idea that creating and occupying fictional worlds
(as people do when they write or read novels) can be a great good. Any account of the
limitations of the experience machine ought to be compatible with the value of creative
fantasy, imagination, and fiction.
The Humean Thesis on Belief Explicated

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How do rational all-or-nothing belief and subjective probability relate to each other? I will propose an answer in terms of what I call the Humean thesis on belief: Rational belief corresponds to stably high subjective probability. I will make this formally precise, I will derive some substantial logical and philosophical consequences from it, I will show how the theory avoids the lottery paradox, and I will apply the resulting theory of belief and probability to a little case study in formal epistemology. The upshot is: epistemology can be done in terms of belief and subjective probability at the same time.
Can a creature which has grown up without any interaction with a similar creature possesses thoughts, i.e., mental status with propositional content? It may seem that it can, for the creature may appear to have sophisticated dispositions and highly discriminative sensory mechanisms just as human do. However, according to Donald Davidson's triangulation argument, the creature cannot (2001). He argues that a creature's interaction with another creature is a necessity for: 1) the determination of what objects or events its mental status is about; 2) the creature's acquisition of the concept of error. Without the concept of error, no mental status of the creature can be said to be true or false, or, in a more popular formulation, to have beliefs a creature must have the concept of belief. A concept which, in turn, requires the concept of error.

The triangulation argument is unintuitive and indeed very controversial. For example, K. Glüer (2006) argues that a potential, rather than actual, second person is sufficient to meet the requirements set by the triangulation argument, since in Davidson's account it is unclear how actual interaction could contribute to the determination of the content of thought (something that potential interaction could not). T. Burge (2010) challenges, as many others do, that the triangulation argument assumes a hyper-intellectualized conceptions of belief and of error, which an agent does not need to have in order to have thoughts. In this paper I try to respond to these two criticisms. With regard to the first, I argue that actual interaction is necessary for the emergence of thought. Specifically, I will argue that in the very beginning of concept acquisition what makes an error an error is its being recognized by the creature as such, and only actual interaction with another similar creature could provide it with the necessary cognitive background for the acquisition of the concept of error. As for the second criticism, I will turn to recent studies on joint attention to argue that the concept of error and of belief required in the triangulation argument need not be as demanding as it may seem. Preverbal infants as young as 12 months old show declarative gestures and communicative looks that have the topic-comment structure (Liszkowski et. al, 2007) and they will try to correct an adult if the adult misunderstood either the referent or the comment (Liszkowski et. al, 2004, see also Carpenter & Liebal, 2011 for an overview). This phenomena shows that 12-month-old infants can identify an object or event as the subject of another's response, and others can get their message wrong.
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The Moral Status of Fiat Money

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Since the present financial crisis started in 2007, no area of policy has played a more important role in political debate than monetary policy. Central banks’ decisions on interest rates have far-reaching implications for employment, investment, inflation and distributive justice. Some have argued for a return to the gold standard, whereas others have argued that this would risk deflation and would lead to higher unemployment. Having a gold standard would make it impossible for Central Banks to use inflation in order to combat deflation and lack of demand in the economy, thereby also making it harder to handle the problem of unemployment. This presentation discusses and criticizes an argument developed from the writings of Austrian libertarian economists such as Hayek and von Mises, to the effect that we should return to the gold standard for moral reason. This argument says that fiat money can only exist due to state coercion, and, hence, that a concern with freedom should lead us to reject fiat money and instead favor of gold standard currencies. I will show that the account of coercion involved in such arguments makes use of the idea that we have a fundamental right to as specific monetary system, and argue that it is implausible that we have such a right. Rights protect important interests and it seems doubtful whether there is any such important interest (comparable e.g. to interests in free speech or free choice of religion) at stake with regards to the decision of what system of currency to implement. The upshot of my argument is that the choice of monetary system can be made on efficiency grounds and that there are no moral reasons of this kind against Central Banks using inflation to fight unemployment.
Making Sense of Love
– a Critique of Kolodny

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Niko Kolodny has recently developed a distinctive theory of reasons for the special concern that love involves. According to this theory, love is a certain type of special concern for which a relationship is the normative source. In other words, the special concern we show for relatives, friends and other loved ones is justified by the special relationship we share with them. In “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” Kolodny argues for this theory by claiming that we are committed to it insofar as we love: “Special concern for a person is not love at all when there is no belief that a relationship renders it appropriate [since] love … partly consists in the belief that some relationship renders it appropriate” (2003:41, my emphasis). In this paper I try to refute this latter claim.

Kolodny’s claim that a loving agent believes that some relationship renders her special concern appropriate seems to entail that a loving agent has the following three sub-beliefs: (1) I have a relationship with my beloved, (2) my special concern for my beloved is appropriate, and (3) the relationship with my beloved renders my special concern for her appropriate. I distinguish between three interpretations of Kolodny’s claim, one psychological and two conceptual. On the psychological reading, the phenomenology of an agent’s special concern necessarily varies depending on whether the agent believes (1)–(3). On the first conceptual reading, love partly consists in the conglomerate of the state of special concern and the beliefs (1)–(3). On the second conceptual reading, love partly consists in special concern under the condition that the agent believes (1)–(3). By using counterexamples I argue that Kolodny’s claim is false on all these interpretations. Regardless of which interpretation we choose, none of (1)–(3) is necessarily believed by a loving agent.

I then proceed to argue that Kolodny neglects a crucial ambiguity when he uses “love seeming appropriate” or “justified” as interchangeable with “love making sense.” Although love need not make normative sense, I claim that a loving agent needs to identify herself with her special concern for it to be love; she must experience it as authentic or as her own. I argue that this constitutes a non-normative way in which love must make sense.

Once we distinguish between normative and non-normative ways for love to make sense, Kolodny’s account of love loses its plausibility. Instead of taking love to partly
consist in seeing reasons for one’s special concern, accounts of love should include that the agent is not alienated from her special concern, that she sees it as “authentic” in a sense that I explore in my paper.

I end by considering the following modification of Kolodny’s claim: almost all loving agents believe that a relationship renders their love appropriate, and almost all people are therefore implicitly committed to his theory. I argue that this is true only in a sense that fails to support Kolodny’s theory.

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Indefinite Extensibility and the Modal Metaphysics of Set Theory

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I explore two versions of the iterative conception of set, going back to Zermelo and Gödel, respectively. Both approaches start out from a conception of the transfinite hierarchy of sets as being built up in stages from an initial (possibly empty) set of urelements, taking power sets at successor stages and collecting everything that is previously obtained at limit stages. Zermelo and Gödel differ, however, concerning the subject matter of set theory.

For Zermelo, set theory is concerned with an unending expanding sequence of standard models of ZFC set theory. For any universe, there is a more comprehensive universe, in which all pluralities of the old universe are sets ("indefinite extensibility", in Dummett’s terminology). The Russell class in one universe becomes a non-paradoxical set in a larger universe, where of course it is no longer the collection of all non-self-membered sets. According to Zermelo, we can only quantify over one universe at a time.

Gödel allows us to quantify over absolutely everything. For Gödel, the subject matter of set theory is the entire cumulative hierarchy V, which can be thought of as the ideal limit of the construction process. There is a universe of absolutely everything that set theory seeks to explore. On this view, there is an absolute distinction between sets – that are elements of the universe – and proper classes, i.e., pluralities of objects that cannot, on pain of contradiction, form sets.

Both approaches are associated with serious difficulties. How can Gödel explain why his all-encompassing universe V cannot be viewed as part of a larger universe, in which classes in the old universe are sets of the new one? And how can Zermelo avoid seeing the different universes as parts of a single super-universe?

Here I will try to reconcile the two conceptions within a framework of modal metaphysics. Following Zermelo I assume that every universe can be extended to a more comprehensive one. But I take the modal talk seriously: the unending sequence of set-theoretic universes is thought of as having potential rather than actual existence.
We may think of these universes as possible worlds ordered by a linear accessibility relation \( \leq \). Any collection of sets that exist together at a given world will form a set at a later (i.e. accessible) world. We can quantify over absolutely everything in the sense that the quantifiers range over all the objects that actually exist. Although we do not quantify over Gödel’s \( V \) we can achieve some of the effect of doing so by means of the modal constructions \( \Box \forall \) and \( \Diamond \exists \). Unrestricted quantification over absolutely everything can be interpreted either as quantification over actual objects, or in terms of \( \Box \forall \) and \( \Diamond \exists \). The modal set theory developed here will be compared to alternative approaches in the literature, by among others, Charles Parsons, Geoffrey Hellman, and Øystein Linnebo. Finally, I discuss the intuitive interpretation of the modalities involved.

References
Keynote

Indirect Discrimination: Some Problems

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This paper explores the concept of indirect discrimination. The presentation takes its point of departure in a definition of indirect discrimination proposed by Andrew Altman and uses it as a springboard for a better one, which, among other things, does not involve the requirement that indirectly discriminatory acts have effects on discriminatees, i.e. those who are being discriminated against, that are in some sense disproportionate. I argue that indirect discrimination is asymmetrically parasitic on direct discrimination in that the former requires the (past) presence of the latter, but not the other way round. Finally, I show how the immorality of indirect discrimination is tied to a problematic relational view of group justice.
Why not rule-following?
Computation, cognition, and embodiment

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This contribution polemizes the long-standing tradition of conceiving of mind as a computational processor (Simon and Newell 1970). According to this tradition, cognition is the transformation of sensory stimuli into abstract symbols, in a language of thought (Fodor 1975), standing for something in the world; these symbols are then transformed into representations for memory storage or transformed into motor commands for action. Central for this conception of mind is the notion of rule-following: to model mind, we stipulate rules for computation governing, e.g., representation-category comparisons, and if–then rules governing processes from sensory input to appropriate action output. Furthermore, mind is demarcated by this central domain of rule-governed computation.

The last decades has seen opposition to the traditional conception of mind from various fields of research (Clark 2011; Shapiro 2011). From a hands-on perspective, research in robotics has revealed the possibility of constructing machines exhibiting complex real-world, real-time behavior without central representations (Brooks 1991). At the intersection of cognitive science and biology, it has been argued that mental states (perceptual states, conceptions, affective states) and cognitive processing (problem-solving, stimuli-to-action processes) are essentially embodied in the sense that bodily, biological constitution determines possibilities for sensation, action, and making sense of environments (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). Similarly, in cognitive linguistics, conceptualization has been argued to depend on bodily constitution; e.g., the common directionality of perceptual apparatuses and locomotive capacities is responsible for conceptualization of ‘time as an arrow’ or ‘life as a journey’, and forces exerted on one’s body, such as gravity and causation, are responsible for such conceptualizations as ‘feeling down’, or being a ‘patient’ or ‘agent’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 2010; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1999).

The debate on how to conceive of mind hinges on the question whether the mental domain is adequately accounted for in terms of representations and rule-following distinguished from peripheral sensory and motor systems (Hurley 2002).

I intend to assess this controversy against the desideratum that any conception of mind should be able to explain people’s interaction with each other and with the environment. I argue that reading rule-following into our conception of mind reflects
the human capacity for abstract reasoning which is grounded in her bodily constitution. People's reasoning about appropriateness and correctness can only be understood against the background of how they are embodied. Bodily constitution – mobility, respiration, perceptual apparatus, blood circulation, etc. – is responsible for the human conception of if-then relations, of responsibility as a causal force, of right and wrong, good and bad, and of categorization. Against this background the rules and representations paradigm for modeling mind is understood as a self-referential psychologist's fallacy: the fallacy of ascribing mental states or processes to a subject which are instrumental for explaining the subject's behavior (James 1890). This is not do deny that people follow rules, but to deny that some central representational domain, that is mind, follow rules. People can follow rules in social interaction, but this should not be confused with a conception of mind as following rules.
Remarks for a phenomenological metaphysics

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From the prevalent phenomenological point of view phenomenology must be considered as a discipline, or also a science, based on a different (sometimes opposed, according to certain authors) methodological investigative approach in comparison with the traditional metaphysical thinking. This distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics is pointed out especially by the French phenomenology after Heidegger and by the cognitive phenomenology respectively in the continental and in the analytic field. Nevertheless, such an opposition does not appear at the origin of phenomenology by Husserl, who instead not infrequently puts himself in continuity with some classical metaphysical positions up to the point of seeing himself as a Platonic or a Leibnizian. As is well known, at the end of Cartesian meditations he stresses the validity of the metaphysical instances despite his polemic against some assumptions in Kant’s transcendentalism.

My aim is not to show the historical continuity between metaphysical and phenomenological investigation, but rather to discuss (albeit briefly) the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics. It means firstly to consider the epistemic nature (and in this way the condition of possibility) of a certain metaphysics and of phenomenology. With the expression certain metaphysics I do not intend the metaphysical tradition tout court throughout its entire historical development, but I refer to the metaphysics which is established in the Aristotelian tradition (but actually in the Platonic too) and which still characterizes phenomenology in my opinion. According to this epistemic nature, both metaphysics and phenomenology reveal a deep eidetic essence which is common for both. It is exactly this essence that opens the possibility for a phenomenological metaphysics. Then, this kind of metaphysics is neither an abstract and therefore empty thought about reality nor a merely subjective representation of reality. Instead it constitutes an epistemic way to observe and understand reality in its manifold ontological stratification and its varied meaning dimension. At the same time such a nature determines thereby a hermeneutic task for a phenomenological metaphysics since this metaphysics must be a guarantor of the original equivocalness of being. The main basic points of this phenomenological (and hermeneutic) metaphysics are therefore the following:

- subjectivity plays a central role, but it is “dislocated” in front of phenomena because the subjective eidetic intuition of the essence of phenomena is possible only under the condition of a original givenness of them;
– in its approach to phenomena subjectivity catches the essence of them, but it can reduce neither the multifaceted ontological structure of phenomena (and of the entire world of phenomena) nor the mutual connection between necessity and contingency in the phenomenon under a single one aspect of phenomenon considered as fundamental. The identity of every phenomenon must be saved according to the otherness which every phenomenon implies in itself.

However such an approach to phenomena is still metaphysical insomuch as subjectivity confirms its discovering role in front of phenomena as well as its possibility to grasp the phenomenon in itself through the determination of its essence and in this way of its identity.
Contemporary metaphysics: A critical evaluation

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Analytic philosophy was originally very much against metaphysics. The logical positivists espoused a number of views, one being the importance of logical methods another the very negative attitude towards metaphysics. Nowadays the views of the logical positivists have fallen into disrepute. Within analytic philosophy the respect for logical methods and stringency is still very important, however many analytic philosophers have no qualms about working with metaphysics these days.

While I do not want to dismiss all metaphysics in the way that old school logical positivists did, I want to argue for the importance of taking scientific results seriously as a starting point for work in metaphysics.

Ladyman & Ross (2007), argues that much of modern metaphysics is too far removed modern science. They introduce two derogatory terms to describe their views on this kind of metaphysics, namely “Philosophy of A-level chemistry” and “Neo-scholastic metaphysics”. While I would not say that I agree with everything in their book, I do agree with their criticism of contemporary analytic metaphysics.

I will also argue that an assumption taken for granted by many contemporary metaphysicians is that they assume that reality consists of individual things or objects, in an objective way independent of our conceptual schemes or frameworks. This way of thinking leads in my view to a lot of pseudo-problems. I will argue for why this view on objects does not seem very reasonable from the point of view of modern physics. I will also explain why abandoning the view that there is a unique and correct answer to the question of what the objects making up reality are, does not have to lead to any form of radical relativism.

Finally I will argue for a more empiricist semantics that bear some similarities with earlier views of the logical positivists. An important point, that I would like to get across, is that when we try to talk about things far removed from everyday experience there is a sense in which we do not really know what we are talking about. This talk is more or less vague, ambiguous or even meaningless. However when this talk is performed
in closer connection with science, it fulfills an important pragmatic and heuristic role. When metaphysics is performed in a way that is guided by modern science, a slightly detached attitude towards scientific theories is the best way to go ahead. We should not interpret the theories too literally, but we should also not base our metaphysics on an incorrect and simplified version of our best scientific theories.

References
Troubles for interpretivism:
a case from educational research

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This paper provides a case study aimed at criticizing interpretivism in the social sciences. According to interpretivism, there is a sharp methodological divide between natural and social sciences. I criticize this view by adducing a case of interpretive social science and arguing that, despite containing explicit interpretivistic assumptions, it satisfies the methodological criteria usually assumed in the natural sciences.

I begin by presenting my case, described in Pettersson and Scheja's (2008). This research is framed in the context of contemporary approaches in educational psychology concerning science education. In this article, the researchers investigate the role of students’ misconceptions in the development of complex mathematical concepts among university students.

After introducing Pettersson and Scheja’s study, I identify and spell out the background interpretivistic assumptions of the paper: 1) reasons cannot be causes; 2) coherence is the only criteria for the assessment of an interpretation of action, and finally 3) action causal explanation cannot rationalize actions.

The next and most important step in my argument is to analyze the content of Pettersson and Scheja’s article and to identify several examples in the text that show that the researchers’ strategy in approaching human action entails a commitment in the possibility of providing sufficient evidence for the actual reasons for an action, and thus for the possibility of a correct interpretation of action.

In Pettersson and Scheja’s article, despite the supposed rejection of the causal role of reasons in action explanation, great effort is given to provide arguments that the explanation of students’ utterances provided in the study has more evidence than concurring explanations found in previous research on the issue. This claim is supported in the study by a series of comparisons between different sets of data. A close look at these comparisons shows that all three interpretivistic assumptions are violated by the researchers.

I also argue that the way in which the researchers move from the comparison between the data sets to the conclusion bears some interesting analogy with the concept of regression as understood in statistical analysis. My thesis is that Pettersson and Scheja perform a kind of regression on the data and thereby formulate an anomic prediction.
This latter term denotes a kind of estimate of the unknown value of a variable that does not imply a law like regularity. I argue that the data comparisons used in support of the researchers’ main hypothesis work as a support for the plausibility of the estimate.

Two disjointed possibilities arise at this point: either the conclusions drawn in the article are not valid (since the research is set out to achieve something that cannot be achieved, given the assumptions made), or the interpretivistic assumptions are false. I argue that the first possibility is not the case and that Pettersson and Scheja’s conclusion are valid.

I conclude that the article shows that Pettersson and Scheja’s approach is inconsistent with interpretivism, despite their interpretivistic assumptions and that interpretivism is undermined by actual social research committed to the interpretation of human action.

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Keynote

In Defense of Serious Metaphysics

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Metametaphysics is the study of metaphysics. It asks of the questions posed by metaphysicians how they (and their answers) ought to be characterized, if they make any sense, what answers to them can be taken to describe, whether answers to them can even be known, and how we can know them (if we can). According to proponents of one influential metametaphysical “school of thought” – the “Quineans” – the metaphysical question concerns the existence of Fs (for variable Fs), and should be answered (if it can be) by a close study of (logically regimented) language and, in particular, the semantics of the existential quantifier(s). According to the members of another, considerably less close-knit, metametaphysical tradition – the “Aristotelians” – however, the goal of metaphysical inquiry is not, or at least not primarily, the provision of a list of the world’s existents. Rather, the goal of metaphysical inquiry is to say what fundamentally exists, how what fundamentally exists is to be categorized, and how it can account for, ground, or (metaphysically) explain everything else there (derivatively) is. If asked “Are there Fs?” the “Aristotelian” will most likely answer “Of course there is!” and then quickly turn his or her attention to the more substantial question “Are there fundamentally Fs?”

In the relatively recently revived metametaphysical debate, much of the discussion has been focused on what is wrong with the “Quinean” way of seeing thing. Not in order to defend the “Aristotelian” approach, mind you. Rather, what the foremost critics of “Quineanism” – the deflationists – have argued is that, although the Quinean is right to insist that the metaphysician’s job if there is one is to be done through a close study of the semantics of the existential quantifier(s), the problem is that what such a close study reveals, is that the answers the metaphysician is able to provide are merely verbal or in some other way uninteresting and insubstantial.

The deflationists’ claim can be – and has been – contested. And in this talk, I (too) aim to contest it. Only, I aim to contest it, not by contesting the claim that existence questions have no interesting answers directly, but, rather, by critically investigating the assumption on which that claim (as well as the rival Quinean claim) for the most part rests: that the metaphysicians job, if there is one, is to seek answers to her questions through a close study of the semantics of the existential quantifiers. This assumption may be questioned for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it may be questioned
because of its reliance on logic and on logical form as a guide to conclusions about existence. Although the deflationist is most likely right in thinking that metaphysical reasoning, if it relies on logic as a guide to existence, can be deflated, I will argue, she is most likely wrong if she thinks that metaphysics is thereby deflated.
Att vara medveten om tyst kunskap

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Vid färdigheter där kroppsrörelser är involverade finner man att den som övar färdigheten, den handlande, ofta kan vara medveten på så sätt att han/hon observerar 1) att han/hon utför handlingen enligt vissa regler som oftast ger bra resultat 2) att handlingen verkligen ger avsett resultat.

Om man inte medvetet kan ange skäl på ett mer direkt sätt kan man kanske göra det mer indirekt.

Om man varken kan ange direkta eller indirekta empiriska skäl för sin uppfattning och endast kan ta fram att man har en intuitiv övertygelse, har man då rätt att se sin uppfattning som en syntetiskt apriori-berättigad uppfattning? Det gäller i så fall ett kontingent a priori. Det är en fråga som jag också ska ta upp.

Jag avser också att behandla korrigerbarheten hos olika fall av tyst kunskap. Det gäller både om den tysta kunskapen anses empiriskt och om den anses aprioriskt berättigad.

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Vad är moralisk realism?

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Det är relativt enkelt att ge en grov och metaforiskt laddad karakteristik av moralisk realism. Den intuitiva idén är att moralisk reflektion är en genuin och intellektuellt respektabel form av undersökning, åtminstone såtillvida att moraliska frågor är riktiga frågor med riktiga svar. Vi kan kanske aldrig veta om vi har hittat de riktiga svaren, men det finns riktiga svar. Vidare är det inte ”upp till oss” vilka de riktiga svaren är; de är inte våra ”konstruktioner”, utan de finns ”där ute”, redo att upptäckas (i den mån vi har förmågan att upptäcka dem). Det finns ”objektiva” eller ”medvetandeberoende” moraliska fakta ”inbyggda i världens struktur”.

Som vanligt uppstår svårigheter när vi försöker vara mer precisa. I mitt föredrag går jag igenom några av de vanligaste preciseringsförslagen, och argumenterar för att de misslyckas med att göra rättvisa åt den intuitiva bilden skisserad ovan. Avslutningsvis formulerar jag ett eget preciseringsförslag som tycks mig mer lovande.
Thick Concepts and the problem of variability

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Unlike thin evaluative concepts such as good, ought and right, thick concepts (TCs) such as bravery, integrity and kindness seem to say something specific about the object being evaluated, something about how the object is like. In the words of Bernard Williams, TCs seem to be both “world-guided” and “action-guiding.” So far, most theorists agree. But when it comes to analysing this dual service, disagreement begins. In the wake of John McDowell’s influential series of papers (McDowell 1979, 1981), the standard position holds that we cannot usefully separate the descriptive, world-guided aspect of a TC from the action-guiding evaluative aspect. Recently, this ‘non-disentanglement’ view has been challenged by theorists arguing that it is, after all, possible to ‘disentangle’ the thick evaluative aspects of TCs, namely in the sense that it may be reduced to thin evaluation (Payne 2005, Elstein & Hurka 2009).

In this paper, I argue that the strategy used in this recent trend, while promising at the outset and reflecting an important conceptual distinction, in the end fails to establish a viable account. The problem with the strategy is that it assumes that a feature picked out by a thick concept makes a constant evaluative (good-making or bad-making) contribution to a situation. This does not fit with our more complex intuitions concerning thick concepts, however, since the same thick concept can be used for both positive and negative evaluations, as first emphasized in the debate by Simon Blackburn. Two potential ways for disentangle accounts to handle this phenomena of contextual variability (suggested by Väyrynen 2011) are discussed, but both are deemed insufficient.

I conclude that the recent reductive accounts fail to supply a convincing analysis of TCs.

References
Mind and Body Relationship
in the Cartesian System of Knowledge
and its Possible Derivation into Monism

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Machamer and McGuire (2009) ended up their book titled Descartes' Changing Mind with these words: “Perhaps, at the end of his life, Descartes was not much a dualist after all.” This statement suggests that Descartes in his final works gave up somehow his dualist philosophy of the strict separation of mind and body to embrace monism. According to this hypothesis, Descartes would have gone from an irreducible distinction between mind and body to acknowledge common attribute between them. Even with the discovery of texts and letters where Descartes accepts a common attribute between mind and body, can we conclude that he abandoned dualism and embraced some kind of monism?

In this analysis, I will first present correspondence and passages in which Descartes accepts that mind and body have a common attribute (from his letters to Henry More, Chanut and Princess Elisabeth). Secondly, I will analyze what type of dualism Descartes posits in these sources and if Descartes could have developed at this stage the same kind of dualism established a few years later by Henry More in the Enchiridium Metaphysicum (Monnoyeur, 1999). Thirdly, I will demonstrate how the obstacle to any kind of monism or soft dualism, that is to say a dualism based on extension as common attribute between mind and body, comes from the Cartesian theory of substance.

The main issue of his theory of substance is the lack of proper distinction between substance and its modes, mind and body. We are forced to concede that this mutual interdependence of substance and its attributes does not replace a real definition of substance itself. What are the consequences then for the spiritual and material substances if they are not supported by a common definition of substance? In such a case, they would have nothing in common, and would only be defined by their different qualities, that is to say, thought and extension. This inadequate conception of substance makes the relationship between mind and body problematic. After having explored with Leibniz the limits of his definition of substance and the substances mind and body, I will finally explain why soft dualism or monism cannot explain the Cartesian union between mind and body, and also provide an answer to Peter Machamer and J.E McGuire's assumption.
References


Can Reasons Be Propositions?

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In this paper we discuss the view that normative practical reasons ('reasons') are propositions. In particular, we focus on the debate between what we call propositionalism (reasons are propositions) and statism (reasons are states of affairs). We first show that, contrary to common opinion, two arguments are discernable in Jonathan Dancy's (2000) contribution to the debate. We call them, respectively, the Thinness and the Representation Objection.

Concerning the former (which we abbreviate as TO), we distinguish four interpretations of the claim that propositions are too thin to serve as reasons for action: the argument from value (propositions cannot have valuable features; Everson 2009), the argument from affect (propositions cannot affect the properties of actions), the argument from powerlessness (propositions cannot explain the attitudes based on them; Turri 2012) and the argument from demands (propositions cannot make demands on us). We show that the first three versions of TO can be answered. The last interpretation invites the response that there is a difference between things in the world (states of affairs) and what we use to think about them (propositions). It is true that the it is states of affairs that prompt (demand) us to act, feel, or think; but what we consider in deciding whether to act, feel or think, are propositions. And reasons, we submit, are the latter, not the former: they are in our minds, not out in the world.

In other words, what we find out in our discussion of TO is that there is a clash of intuitions in the debate between propositionalists and statists. Our analysis of the Representation Objection (RO) produces the same result. Here we consider one interpretation. This says that propositions cannot be reasons because they are representational: they 'mediate' between agents and what constitutes a reason for them to act in specific ways. We consider two responses to this idea. The first invokes the concept of non-representational propositions, following, more recently, Skorupski (2010). However, we show that this response is inadequate to the task. The second response reiterates the intuitive idea mentioned above: that reasons are what we reason with; and inescapably so, since we have no direct connection to things out in the words, and we need propositions to gain access to them.

It seems then, that propositionalism, contrary to conceived opinion, is not an obviously indefensible position. All depends on which side one takes in the conflict of
intuitions detected above. Can there be anything more to be said? One idea would be to use Errol Lord’s (2008) recent argument against Dancy. However, we show that by taking seriously the distinction between content and object of beliefs (e.g. Crane 2001), a statist can avoid Lord’s objection. What we end up with is again the clash of intuitions: the statist now says that reasons are the objects of our thoughts, while the propositionalist maintains that they are the contents of our thoughts.

Nevertheless, in ending our paper, we point that there is one consideration that tilts the balance in favor of propositionalism: that it is less costly. To defend his position, Dancy – and all those statists who share his advocacy of the unity of reasons and of normative realism – must endorse several highly contested minority positions in the philosophy of mind and action as well as in metaphysics. In this way they incur significant theoretical burden and this makes their position, given that neither RO nor TO produces anything more but a clash of intuitions, much less attractive than it first appears to be.

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Hubris and the promethean sin in discussions on nature and technology

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For a long time in human history, the claim of things being natural or unnatural has carried normative force. Still, ‘all natural ingredients’ while predicated of a food product has a positive ring, while ‘unnatural’ is a strongly pejorative expression, whether it is applied to genetically modified plants, a particular sexual behavior, or something else.

Today, normative claims about naturalness and human beings’ proper relation to nature are frequently made with regard to the many possibilities and innovations technology offers. Some recent examples are Michael Sandel (2007), Eric Katz (2011), Paul Lauritzen (2011). These authors, and others, caution us of hubris and warn that a Promethean drive to master things that we should not master (for some reason) might be hurtful.

In this paper I explore the arguments about human hubris and the promethean sin, as those arguments appear in current debates about technology. I show that there are in fact several different arguments made. The argument from hubris is sometimes claimed to imply flaws of human character, for example a lacking appreciation of nature or an exaggerated belief in human capability of changing and controlling nature. Sometimes hubris is claimed to suggest that some people hold the false view that human beings are not a part of nature and regard themselves as outside or above nature and the natural world. Other times claims of hubris seem to be connected with cases of bad consequences resulting from technical innovation. I argue that these arguments are not convincing, particularly not as guides for public policy, and that the conclusions drawn from them cannot be supported. Finally, I will make the case that an argument can be made that hubris is actually what might be needed in this day and age. With the world facing a threat climate change and food crises technical ingenuity might be a key factor in a solution.

References


A Laugh is an Intellectual Thing:
How to do something for a Reason
without Doing it Intentionally

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It has been very commonly held in the philosophy of action, from Anscombe (1963) and Davidson (1963) to Smith (2003) and Davies (2005) that anything done for a reason is done intentionally. In other words, being done for reason is sufficient for some behavior to be intentional (whether or not it is also necessary, as held by Davidson and Smith, but not by Hursthouse (1991) and Anscombe). This sufficiency idea has lately been dubbed, by Knobe and Kelly (2009), 'Anscombe's Thesis' (AT).

I begin by distinguishing some variants of (AT), emphasising a distinction between variants that do, and do not, assume a prior notion of an action (notice the stressed use). I then present a putative counterexample to variants that do not assume such a prior notion: laughing spontaneously, and non-intentionally, yet for a reason, in a manifestation of an acute sense of humor and keen emotional intelligence. Other emotional expressions afford analogous examples, e.g. smiling, or crying, non-intentionally, yet for a reason. One defense of (AT), as against such cases, is that the emotional behavior is not strictly manifested for a reason but simply a non-rationalized sign, expression or manifestation of an underlying emotional state, where this underlying state may or may not be had for reason. I reply that, while this analysis may work for some cases, it is unlikely to work for all; in particular, it is unlikely to work for cases where the emotional behavior is so tightly interwoven with the emotional response as to be an aspect of its very character. For example, there may be certain ways in which I can find something funny – finding it 'hysterical', say – such that I cannot find things funny in that way without laughing out loud at them. My LOLing is an inherent aspect of the emotional response and partly constitutes it as the response it is.

I end by noting how these putative counterexamples to (AT) differ from (sometimes superficially reminiscent) examples of “deviant causal chains”, such as Davidson's unsettled climber. I also note how these problems for (AT) differ from, and go deeper than, Knobe and Kelly’s (2009) the objections to (AT), which trade on claims about unintended but foreseen side-effects.
References


Politisering av vetenskapen

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Syftet med detta projekt är att identifiera de olika mekanismer som bidragit. Man kan sammanfattningsvis peka på det växelspel som skett mellan vetenskapssamhället å ena sidan och politiska beslutsfattare och tjänstemän med stort inflytande å den andra, och som kanske bäst kan beskrivas som självsattstarka loopen. För FN har klimatfrågan blivit det dominerande verktyget för att i UNEPs regi samla miljöpolitiken under en hatt. Om människans utsläpp av koldioxid innebär att jorden kommer att värmas upp på ett katastrofalt sätt så krävs det en stor samordning och kontroll av världens naturresurser och industriproduktion för att pressa ned utsläppen mot noll inom några årtionden. Globala miljöproblem kräver globala lösningar. För vetenskapssamhället har "rätt sorts" klimatforskning blivit en karriärväg och en möjlighet till finansiering för sin forskning inom nästan alla områden, alltifrån humaniora till naturvetenskap och teknik.

Av särskilt intresse ur vetenskapsteoretisk synvinkel är att studera hur de interna vetenskapliga normerna om fri hypotesbildning, kritisk granskning och objektivitet klarat sig under denna period inom klimatforskningen. Begrepp som "konsensus", "underlättande forskning", "government review" samt kvantifierade sannolikhetsmått på teorier och prognoser har plötsligt blivit framträdande även inom grundforskningen. Till studiet av de interna normerna hör också att granska etablerade institutioner som successivt bygts upp under århundradena och som visat sig gynna forskningen: konferenser, peer review-systemet, publikationer i tidskrifter och tillgång till empiriska data. Allmänt sett har det skett ganska stora förändringar i och med elektronisk publicering och användningen av internet för datalagring. Möjligheterna för en snabb och öppen granskning har ökat dramatiskt. Inom klimatforskningen så har dessa förändringar spelat en särskild roll genom att de blivit ytterligare en källa till tvistefrågor. En del
skulle säga att de skapat mer av onödig split mellan forskarna, andra skulle säga att fler oegentligheter har kunnat avslöjas.

Sist, men inte minst, skall det förstås föras en diskussion om hur vetenskap och politik kan och bör interagera för att inte forskningen skall politiseras och för att den politiska sfären skall kunna dra nytta av den vetenskapliga grundforskningen utan att så sker.
Post-conflict property restitution and the problem of secondary occupants

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The end of an armed conflict is usually followed by the return by refugees and internally displaced persons. This creates a need for instruments to remedy forced displacement, and to generally establish conditions for “sustainable return”. Within the international community it is widely held that the restoration of property rights for people displaced by armed conflict is an effective and legitimate way to establish such conditions. In 2005, the Pinheiro Principles were formally endorsed by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and they are now used as practical guidance to governments and UN agencies on how to address legal and technical issues surrounding property restitution. This paper will consider a problematic aspect of the Pinheiro Principles, namely its treatment of the problem of secondary occupants, i.e. people who have taken up residence in a home or on land after the legitimate owners have fled. While the Pinheiro Principles acknowledge the importance of protecting secondary occupants against homelessness or human rights violations, they quite unequivocally prescribe unconditional restitution rights for original owners. Even though there might be cases where restitution is quite clearly justified, e.g. when the secondary occupants are the same people who forcibly evicted the original residents, there are also less obvious cases, e.g. where the secondary occupants are themselves displaced persons, or cases where occupants are innocent third parties who have bought seized property in good faith. The paper argues that we have to acknowledge such potential conflicts of rights between original and current occupants. Further, drawing on recent work on the supersession of historic injustice, the paper criticizes the historical entitlement account of property underlying the Pinheiro Principles, and instead defends an account based on the role property play in individual’s lives. The paper then discusses the implications of this account for the problem of secondary occupants.
Smith och Hume
om sympati och moralomdömen

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Referenser
On rain dances, mechanisms, and functional explanations

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Why did the Hopi perform their rain dance? Although the Hopi would probably have answered that they performed it in order to produce rain, some have argued that the real reason was to increase social cohesion. This explanation is often considered a paradigm of a functional explanation: the rain dance is performed because it serves the function of increasing social cohesion.

Many philosophers and social scientists have been suspicious of functional explanations. One reason has been that proponents of functional explanations in the social sciences fail to provide micro-mechanisms that connect the beneficial effect of an activity with the persistence of the activity. According to the critics, knowledge of the micro-mechanism is required in order for an explanation to be acceptable. Therefore, functional explanations are unaccepted.

This essay discusses one version of the no-mechanism objection and argues that it fails to rule out functional explanations in the social sciences.

Ann Cudd argues that either functional theories “can be shown to work through the production of a feedback mechanism or it must postulate an emergent social force” (2005:40). In the case of the Hopi’s rain dance, the dilemma requires either that we reduce the function to a feedback mechanism, or that we postulate the existence of some very strange entity that produces rain dances.

According to Cudd, the second horn of the dilemma is blocked by “the ontological criterion of causal fundamentalism” stating that “macro-level causes supervene on micro-level ones.” This leaves the proponent of the functional theory with the alternative of finding the feedback mechanism. The problem according to Cudd, is that if there is an identifiable feedback mechanism, then it is the mechanism rather than the function that should be pointed to as explanatory.

In this essay it is argued that Cudd’s ontological criterion does not successfully rule macro-level causation. Therefore, it fails to rule out functional explanations. After all, the concept of supervenience was originally used to show that a property, A, can depend on another property, B, without A being reduced to B. Fodor (1994) has, for example, argued that multiple realizability blocks reduction of the social properties to physical properties.
It is argued that a similar argument can be used to block the reduction from macro-level causation to micro-level causation. For example, in the case of the rain dances, it is easy to think of at least two feedback mechanisms that realize the relevant function, one purposive and one evolutionary.

The purposive elaboration works through pro-attitudes and beliefs, and the evolutionary elaboration works through mutations and selection of some kind. If these elaboration have anything interesting in common, it is that they produce similar results and realize the same function. Furthermore, it is argued that the micro-mechanical explanation fails to pick out what is interesting about the functional explanations, namely that the rain dance is performed in both cases because it increases social cohesion.
Identity, Worms, Stages and Personal Identity

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Suppose a person A divide herself like amoebas, splitting in two indiscernible halves. Call the persons produced by this operation B and C: they are both identical with A before the division for any classical criterion of identity we consider. In fact, they are psychologically connected and continuous to A, their bodies are half-made from her body and the half part remained is a faithful copy of the other part of her body. So, we can say that B is the same person as A, and that C is the same person as A. But how is it possible that B and C are the same person as A if they are not identical to each other? This case is puzzling because of Leibniz’ law and transitivity of identity.

Thought experiments like the amoeba’s one present puzzle cases very hard to be solved. My aim is to show that a four-dimensional approach allows us to shed new light on these problems. There are three classical answers to puzzle cases: The first is to claim that we need different kinds of identity. Gallois (1990, 2011) claims that there may be something which is identical at some time with something which is distinct from at another time: his move is to relativize to time the notion of identity – the logical form is the following:

\[(\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists t)(\exists t') [at t: x = y & at t': \neg(x = y)]\]

Following Bader (2012), I underline the ultimate problem of Gallois’ occasional identity, i.e. its lack of transitivity. The second is to claim, as Parfit (1984) does, that identity is not what matters in survival. I show the metaphysical problem of Parfit’s identity doesn’t matter view: if persons are three-dimensional objects, i.e. objects which persist as the same objects through time being wholly present at all time at which they exist, why shouldn’t we ask if they continue to exist as the same object? If we are three-dimensionalists we claim that objects endure, and continue to exist at different times. How can we justify the abandonment of identity? The answer highlights a problem which can be solved adopting a different metaphysics. Four-dimensionalism, the third way of dealing the puzzle cases, claims that personal identity concerns relations among four-dimensional stages. I underline that since we consider persons (as well as cups or robots) as four-dimensional stages (Sider 2001) we do not need identity when we ask how they persist over time: we need only a relation of causal similarity.

I don’t want to use here my argument as a reason to buy four-dimensionalism, or to ague in favor of it. My aim is to show how a theory like identity-doesn’t-matter view which
considers identity as a non-important fact in survival has to lie on a four-dimensional metaphysical base to deal the puzzle cases of identity.

References
Explicatures, speech-act pluralism, and the attitude of holding a sentence true

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Arguments for the existence of explicatures have the following paradigmatic form: first the linguist/philosopher describes a non-linguistic context C in which a dialogue occurs between two speakers (let us call them Peter and Mary) as well as a short linguistic interchange in which Peter asks Mary a question Q and Mary replies with a short utterance R. Then the linguist/philosopher describes how Peter interprets what Mary said (or asserted) by using R (cf. Hall & Carston 2012).

The use of locutions such that ‘said that’ in contextualist arguments has, however, been criticised. Cappelen & Lepore (2005) argue that there is not a single proposition that captures what a speaker said by an utterance of a sentence in a given context of utterance. The truth of an indirect report, where the verb ‘say’ is used, is dependent on facts about the context of the report, and there is an indefinite number of true reports of a given utterance of a sentence (in a given context).

In this talk, I will defend the paradigmatic form of arguments for explicatures. I will argue that such arguments are warranted, if we think of them as evaluations of counterfactuals, in the sense of Williamson (2007). The counterfactuals should not, however, express indirect reports, but they should contain statements concerning which sentences speakers would treat as semantically equivalent in a given context. The Davidsonian notions of ‘radical interpretation’ and ‘the attitude of holding a sentence true (at a time)’ (Davidson 1974) are appealed to, in order to shed light on both one of the problems identified by contextualists and the object of research that the notion of explication is relevant for. I will argue that arguments for explicatures may be thought of as attempts to clarify, from the perspective of the radical interpreter, why speakers have the attitude of holding true directed at literally false or trivially true sentences, and that the notion of explication is relevant for the observation that speakers treat sentences with different contents as semantically equivalent in some contexts.

References
Monadic Deontic Operators
Defined in Lewis-style Semantics

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In my dissertation (Pettersson, 2011), I defined some conditions of adequacy for an obligation operator suitable for analysis of normative reasoning in ordinary language, but I did not define an informative formal semantics.

In this talk, I will give a brief overview of my adequacy conditions, and their relation to the philosophical debate about deontic logic, and I will discuss different deontic operators definable in a semantics of the type used for conditional obligations in Lewis (2001), and their relation to these conditions.

References
Negative Images:
On Photography, Causation and Absences

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Many photographs seem to be images of privations, lacks and absences. Umbo’s *The Mystery of the Street*, for example, is primarily a photograph of shadows, and if shadows are absences of light, this image is a photograph of absences. In a different way, some photographs of Manhattan’s skyline, taken after 9/11, would seem to be photographs of the absence of the Twin Towers. But the very idea of photographs of absences is paradoxical, or at least puzzling. Photography is commonly held to be an essentially *causal medium*, and it is unclear how, or even if, absences can be causally efficacious. So can there really be photographs of absences? In this paper, I investigate various ways to unravel the puzzle.
A Theory of Persistence

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In this paper I shall present a novel theory of how to understand persistence through time. It is a theory on which object endure, i.e. object are wholly present at all times at which they exist. But it is also B-theoretic, i.e. all times are ontologically and metaphysically on a par. It is indebted to Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism (found in Fine, 2005), and draws on the philosophical notion of situations as used in situation semantics (e.g. Kratzer, 1989, and Elbourne, 2005). I shall claim that the theory, while it has costs, has significant benefits, especially in dealing with puzzles cases.

I begin by introducing situations, which are defined as parts of reality. As an aid to understanding they can be thought of as parts of possible worlds, though in fact possible worlds are simply a special type of situation. I then introduce the central metaphysical idea behind the theory: smaller situations are more fundamental than the larger situations of which they are a part. This metaphysical picture is controversial, and bears similarity to Fragmentalism. It crucially allows us, however, to deny a plausible sounding thesis, namely that what is true in a situation is true in any situation of which is a part. I claim, rather, that what is true in one situation may be true in larger situations containing it, but need not be.

This claim allows a neat and univocal solution to a number of longstanding philosophical puzzles about persistence. Among them are the problem of change, puzzles about fission and fusion and about detached and undetached parts, paradoxes of increase and decrease, and the problem of the many. I demonstrate these solutions in turn, and the central mechanism is the same in each case. As an example, consider a case of symmetric fission where an amoeba (A) splits into two perfectly similar halves (B and C). Let be the situation containing only the history of A and B. Let be the situation containing only the history of A and C. Let be the situation containing both and .

In the following proposition will be true: ‘’. In the following proposition will be true: ‘’. But in we need not assert that either proposition is true (in fact, I will prefer the view where both propositions lack truth-value). Thus, when considering solely the original amoeba and one of the halves, we can truly say they are identical. This vindicates the intuition that the original amoeba would be identical with either half if the other half didn’t exist. But when considering the combined situation, the identity of the original amoeba with either half is undetermined and so contradiction is avoided. There are analogous solutions for the other puzzles.
According to this picture each situation is internally consistent, and the metaphysics explains their unorthodox mereological properties. While there are certainly questions to be asked about such a theory, I suggest that it is worthy of further investigation.

References
Causal Influence and Woodward’s Manipulability Account

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Woodward’s (2003) account of causation as manipulability relies on the idea that causal claims in science are based on interventions and controlled experiments. At the same time, his theory has important applications in areas such as differential equations or causal reasoning. However, from a more metaphysically-driven perspective, this does not tell much about what causation amounts to. Also, in the book, Woodward does not make a clear commitment to a specific metaphysics of causation. As shown by Strevens (2007; 2008), there are some problems with turning the manipulability ideas into a metaphysics of causation, and there is some evidence suggesting that Woodward’s theory is taking this direction.

Drawing from this issue, I aim to explore a distinctive aspect of the metaphysics behind Woodward’s manipulability account. For my inquiry, I will first rely on a distinction made by Strevens (forthcoming) in his theory of singular causal claims, incorporating a relation of causal influence, an account of causal difference-making, and the framed-worked causal difference-making. While Woodward explicitly relies on interventionist counterfactuals to account for difference-making, what he takes to be the web of causal influence is open to interpretation. Starting from the assumption that the causal influence may be something like what Lewis (2004) or Strevens (forthcoming) propose, I will analyze to what extent these accounts could be accommodated with Woodward’s interventionist approach. This investigation could lead to the conclusion that Woodward’s theory may not be rivaling Lewis’s theory after all, capturing a different aspect of the inquiry into causation, namely adding an interventionist component to difference making, while being able to keep causal influence as described in Lewis (2004).

References

Scientific Representation, Denotation, and Explanatory Power

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It is widely admitted that to understand how scientific theories relate to the world three intertwined concepts must be understood: model, representation, idealization. That these concepts are intertwined is evident. A model is meant to represent something, whether a physical or an ideal system. For instance, a model of a building is a representation of an actual building. Moreover, a model represents a physical system in an abstract and idealized way. That is, a model of a building is not meant as an exact replica but as an idealized and abstract representation of an actual building. In science one encounters several kinds of models, such as iconic or scale models, analogical models, and mathematical models. In this paper, my discussion is restricted to mathematical models. Representation seems to be a primary function of such models, and idealization seems to be the steering thought process by which this function is achieved. I highlight this point to suggest that a better understanding of ‘scientific representation’ could be achieved if we examine it in relation to ‘scientific models’ and to ‘idealization’.

In science various means of representation are used. We say that a diagram of an electric circuit represents its target; that a graph of velocity plotted against time represents the acceleration of a body; that a material construction of double helical structure represents a DNA molecule; that a Feynman diagram represents a neutron decaying to a proton, an electron and an anti-neutrino; and that a mathematical model represents the behavior of a mass-spring system. Whether our scientific representations are diagrammatic, graphical, material, model-based, or other, they are important aspects of scientific inquiry; they enhance our understanding of the workings of physical systems and often enhance our understanding of abstract theoretical propositions. If one aims for a general theory of scientific representation then the latter must account for all these kinds of representational vehicles. I shall herein confine my analysis to how mathematical models represent physical systems.

One can categorize existing accounts of scientific representation into two types. Firstly there are accounts that attempt to reduce representation to other relations. The Semantic View of scientific theories, for instance, relies on the construal of the representation relation as mathematical mapping. The second category could be divided into two: denotative and non-denotative accounts of representation. The inferential account
is an example of a non-denotative account. Denotative accounts interpret the concept of representation as strongly linked to the function of denotation.

In this paper I focus exclusively on denotative accounts and attempt to develop a denotative account of scientific representation that ties the representational function of scientific models to their explanatory power. In the first part of the paper I argue that existing denotative accounts are plagued with some weaknesses that prevent them from accurately capturing important elements of scientific modeling. In the second part I argue that denotative accounts must make use of the notions of ‘mechanism’ and ‘explanatory power’ if they are to overcome those weaknesses and do justice to how scientific models represent their target systems.
A group is in a state of pluralistic ignorance (PI) when, roughly speaking, every member of the group thinks that his or her belief or desire is different from the beliefs or desires of (most of) the other members of the group. PI has been invoked to explain many otherwise puzzling phenomena in social psychology, such as the familiar situation where every student in a class refrains from asking for clarification, wrongly assuming that all the others have understood the lecture; or to explain why bystanders refrain from acting on behalf of victim of an emergence.

In a recent paper (Proietti and Olsson, forthcoming) we illustrated the nature of PI states – their structure, internal consistency and opacity and the role played by higher order beliefs of individuals (i.e. believing that others believe) – using the formal apparatus of Dynamic Doxastic Logic. There we also explained the sense in which such states are “fragile” by indentifying some plausible conditions under which a PI state dissolves into a state of shared belief as the result of a series of public announcements. Processes of this kind are often qualified as informational cascades or herding effects. Here, we will implement our analysis by studying also the role played by the network structure of communication within a group of agents and how it can explain the fragility or robustness of PI states.

References
Extended Frege’s Constraint

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This paper reconsiders a principle, employed in the foundations of mathematics, called Frege’s Constraint. According to this principle, various mathematical theories in order to benefit from successful foundation, must explicitly account, already at the most fundamental level, for applications of the entities forming the intended model of this theory (Wright, 2000).

I argue that a foundational approach, based on Frege’s Constraint, should be able to account not only for a one arbitrarily chosen application, but for all the important applications. In different words, the foundations of the theory should guarantee that the entities forming its intended model are applicable in every of the apparent contexts. I call this new principle the Extended Frege’s Constraint.

The paper discusses the case of natural numbers. Referring to (Benacerraf 1965, 1996), and indirectly to Quine and Russell, I enumerate three features that natural numbers should exhibit, counting as “the most important application of natural numbers”. Namely, they should be able:

(i) to state and to compare the sizes of finite sets,
(ii) to enumerate and to compute, and
(iii) to verify the structural property of forming an $\omega$-sequence.

I study the consequences of adopting either the neo-Fregean cardinality constraint or the computational structuralist’s (Halbach–Horsten, 2005 and Quinon–Zdanowski, 2007) computability constraint, and concludes that the latter is better justified when applications are to be taken into account.

This claim is supported by the theorem:

**Theorem** There exists a standard model $M_{HP_2} \models HP2$ such that there is $M_{PA2}$ defined by $M_{HP_2} \models PA2$, in which the successor function is interpreted, in a non-intended way, as a non-computable function.

This result shows that the usual neo-Fregean interpretation does not permit the conclusion that natural numbers are the entities that support computation. Standard models of Frege’s arithmetic exist that admit the intended interpretation of cardinality operator, but which admit also a non-computable successor function.
Instead of cardinality I propose to adopt a computability constraint. The definitional principle, in this case, is first-order Peano Arithmetic (consisting in recursive definitions of arithmetic functions and the induction schema), together with an additional metamathematical clause concerning computability of interpretations of functional symbols. Stating and comparing the sizes of finite sets consists in enumerating the elements of each set one by one by means of the successor function. Even if it is not possible to define cardinality in the first-order language, it is possible to define every finite cardinality by a single formula. The $\omega$-order feature is given by a version of Tennenbaum's theorem (for any $M \models PA\!\!\!\!,\,$ if the interpretation of addition and multiplication in $M$ is computable, then $M$ is a standard model (i.e., has an $\omega$-type ordering)).

References


Robust Epistemological Disjunctivism

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Epistemological Disjunctivism is the thesis that the kind of epistemic support available to one in good cases is not available to one in bad bases. One version of this view, which finds its core expression in the work of Duncan Pritchard (2011; 2012; forthcoming) and John McDowell (2008; 1995; 2011), maintains that the kind of epistemic support available to one in the good case is an epistemic reason which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. Call this Robust Epistemological Disjunctivism.

In this paper, I argue that Robust Epistemological Disjunctivism entails the denial of Naive Realism, and so turns out, surprisingly, to be incompatible with one version of Disjunctivism about the nature of perceptual experience. This version of Disjunctivism says that, the kind of experience I enjoy in the good case is different in kind from the experience I enjoy in the bad case because, in the good case, the sensory experience is a relation to mind-independent objects and properties that, when viewed, enter into sensory experience as constituents (cf. Martin 2006, Campbell 2009). As a result, the Robust Epistemological Disjunctivist cannot consistently maintain an interesting form of Disjunctivism about the nature of perceptual experience. I conclude with a short discussion on McDowell’s recent turn to a kind of Naive Realism, and how this consequence might bear on his wider epistemological views.

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Apology for pain

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What is the meaning of pain? Or is there any meaning of pain? Speaking of pain, we may ask if we are speaking the most senseless of things, or of the most vital of phenomena. Within secular science, we have seen an increasing tendency to consider pain as a phenomenon deprived of meaning, suggesting, with that, that the ethics of pain would be to renounce pain (Svenaeus, 2009:45). To the contrary, the present paper aims at a defense of the vitality and the meaning of this hostile phenomenon, here considered in terms of pain and suffering, by way of an inquiry into the ek-static temporality which structures a being in pain and sufferance.

The argument recalls the common understanding of pain as a symptom. As the present result of a source of injury that claims cure, a being in pain pictures a movement from something to something else, that is, it pictures the ek-static structure discovered by Aristotle. Furthermore, the argument recalls the Aristotelian apprehension of pain as responsible for the innermost secret of dynamics as such (Aristotle, 2005: 1046a 19–21). Pain cause unease, and unease demands change, hence it opens up a future dimension that marks a beginning – of motion and change in general and of time in particular. The argument concludes by considering the coincidence between chronic pain and incurable suffering, as the case when no positive change is to be hoped for, but time remains. The reference to witness-literature supports the guiding intuition of pain as a passion in service of things forgotten, in future light of a close or distant, yet new beginning. In summery the apology for pain refers to an affection that drives into activity, as such to be considered a creative force of vital importance. Notable references also include Heidegger (1994), Hirvonen (2009), Marschall (1894) and Schelling (2000).

References
Moral Testimony and Moral Expertise

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This paper defends MT, the view that we have not distinctively noninferential knowledge of some moral facts, such as that Hitler was evil by testimony. On some theories of testimony, it is a rich source of noninferential a posteriori knowledge. On these theories, I argue, we have some noninferential particular moral knowledge by testimony. On other theories of testimony, it is a rich source only of inferential a posteriori knowledge. On theories of the latter sort, I argue, we have some particular moral knowledge by testimony that is not inferential in any way distinctive to its moral content, but is inferential only in any way generic to most knowledge by testimony.

This paper makes a case for MT by arguing against those who reject it. Broadly three types of grounds have been highlighted in recent literature on moral epistemology for rejecting MT. On the first, testimony is at best a source of non-moral knowledge that the recipient may use to infer moral propositions. In response, I consider examples in which no non-moral knowledge is made available by testimony, but where it is still plausible that the recipient gets moral knowledge by testimony.

On the second, one ought not to form moral beliefs on moral testimony. This view has come to be known as Pessimism, and there are two accounts of it in contemporary literature, one by Robert Hopkins (2007) and the other by Alison Hills (2010). While neutral between MT and Pessimism, Hopkins considers that on the most plausible pessimist view, there is embedded in our culture a norm rendering it illegitimate to use testimony to form moral beliefs. This norm, “The Requirement”, requires that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. I argue that the appeal of The Requirement can be traced back to the Kantian valuing of autonomous thinking, but contrary to what Kantian views normally assume, autonomous thinking is not an all or nothing affair. There are different degrees and types of autonomous thinking, and in seeking moral testimony, one still employs at least a certain degree of autonomous thinking.

Alison Hills defends Pessimism by appealing to the importance of moral understanding. She argues that the primary aim of moral inquiry is whatever state is necessary for morally worthy action; this state is moral understanding; moral testimony does not deliver moral understanding; so moral testimony is irrelevant to the primary aim of moral inquiry. This gist of my response to Hills is that moral worth comes in degrees,
and in as far as moral testimony can achieve any of these, it is not irrelevant to the primary aim of moral inquiry.

On the third ground for rejecting MT, the notion of moral expertise which MT employs is extremely problematic. The key motivations for this are supposed to be the *Epistemological* and *Normative* problems: how does one identify moral experts given that it is not clear what counts as moral success, and should we give up our autonomy to putative experts in moral matters? In response, I identify three different types of moral experts: the local moral expert, someone who has localised moral expertise with respect to a particular situation relative to the recipient of one's testimony; the moral philosopher; and the *phronimos* or morally wise person. I then argue that for none of these kinds of moral experts are the Epistemological and Normative Problems as pressing as they have been thought to be. It is plausible that we do have some grasp of what makes someone a moral expert, and what counts as moral success, and these facts are manifested in the practice of identifying moral experts and relying on their advice in different cultures, a practice that is as yet not fully appreciated in moral epistemology.

References
Defining Endurance

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ENDURANCE is often defined as persisting by means of being wholly present at different instants of time. Nevertheless, it is also often objected to this account the rather obscure role that the clause “wholly present” has in it. One straightforward solution the endurantist might adopt is to dispense with the use of such clause in her definition and simply claim that enduring objects persist through time by means of existing at different times, but without being temporally extended. The contrast with perdurance then would not lie so much in the fact that enduring entities are wholly present at different times, as opposed to being present by means of a proper temporal part; but rather in the denial of temporal extension for enduring entities.

Although this intuition might be fundamentally correct—or so I shall argue, we would still need to say more about it, in order to fill in the details that a plausible account of endurance should offer. The strategy I will follow in this paper intends to provide these details, by engaging first with Parson’s Extended Simples account (2000, 2007) and secondly with both the criticism that Hofweber and Velleman (from now onwards HV) have recently directed to the account I favour and the account they themselves develop (2011). Unlike Parson’s account, I argue that ordinary enduring objects have proper spatial parts, some of which are gained, lost or replaced thought their existence, and therefore should not be treated as simples. Also, against Parsons, I claim that endurantists should accept that objects are extended through space—and only through space—by means of having proper spatial parts at different spatial regions.

On the other hand, HV’s novel criticism is motivated by a deep suspicion about the way in which the disagreement between endurantists and perduantists has usually been set up and particularly the aforementioned definition of endurance: the main point of their argument being that it is a conceptual truth that follows from the sheer fact of occupying an extended interval of time that objects have temporal parts. Now, the natural rejoinder that one might expect from the endurantist to HV’s objection is to question the assumption that to persist is just to be extended in time.

Notwithstanding this, the line of response I favour here is one that undercuts the very grounds of HV’s criticism. This response comprises a twofold argument. The first part of the argument, which I take from Hawley’s account of endurance and perdurance (2001), consist in introducing a second notion of parthood that would precisely do the work of differentiating these two different views on persistence. The second part of the
argument draws on Fine's distinction between existence and extension (1999, 2008) and in a sense contextualizes Hawley's proposal. What Fine's distinction attempts to do is to explain how enduring objects persist, from the contrast between these two modes of presence, without appealing to any notion of extension and parthood. If these proposals turn out to be plausible, the endurantist should be in a position to account for what it might be to persist without being temporally extended, thereby blocking HV’s criticism.

References
Grounding, Reduction and Explanation

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In recent times, analytic philosophy has seen a great deal of interest in the notion of (metaphysical or ontological) grounding. Grounding is thought to be a non-causal relation of determination underlying a certain kind of distinctly metaphysical explanation. For example, philosophers sometimes say that a certain set S exists in virtue of the existence of its members, or that the instantiation of a certain natural property by a certain action A makes A morally wrong, or that an object O instantiates a certain dispositional property because O instantiates a certain categorical property. All these explanations (and many more) have been construed as presupposing the notion of grounding.

Grounding has been put to work in clarifying the idea of ontological fundamentality (Bennett, 2011), in defining the notion of truthmaking (Schaffer, 2008), and in metametaphysics (Schaffer, 2009), to mention just a few applications. Additionally, some philosophers have apparently held that there is a connection between grounding and ontological reduction, such that (at least in some cases) what is grounded is, in some sense, not anything “over and above” its ground; such a view has been attributed to Rosen (2010), Fine (2001) and Schaffer (2009). This view accords central importance in ontology to grounding explanations, since such explanations could then help reduce the ontological commitments of the theories in which they figure.

The connection between grounding and reduction has, however, been questioned by Audi (2012; forthcoming), who argues from certain central characteristics of grounding to the conclusion that X’s grounding Y excludes Y’s ontologically reducing to X. In my talk, I will discuss Audi’s case against the alleged connection between grounding and reduction, and consider what the implications of his conclusion are for the wider questions about the value of a true grounding explanation. I will argue that Audi does not sufficiently distinguish between the thesis that grounding is a non-reductive relation that does not reduce ontological commitments and the thesis that what is grounded is never the existence of a thing, but always the instantiation of a property by a thing. When this distinction is upheld, we are in a position to maintain that even if grounding explanations are not reductive explanations in the sense that they help reduce the ontological commitments of the theories in which they figure, some grounding explanations are explanations of the existence of certain things. Such explanations can have the same kind of value that more mundane kinds of explanation often do. If
we recognize this, we can bolster the otherwise somewhat anemic case for studying questions about what grounds what on a non-reductivist conception of grounding such as Audi’s.

References
Om ”kan” och ”kunde”

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Vad ”kan” och ”kunde” betyder tycks på åtminstone två sätt vara viktigt för att förstå vår moraliska praxis:

(B) För att det ska vara korrekt att säga att en person, P, bör utföra en handling, H, så tycks det vara nödvändigt att P kan utföra H.

(M) För att det ska vara korrekt att säga att en person, P, är moraliskt ansvarig för att ha utfört en handling, H*, i stället för en annan handling, H, så tycks det vara nödvändigt att P kunde ha utfört H.

I föredraget, som bygger på Ryman (2012), kommer jag att argumentera för följande:

1. I både (B) och (M) uttrycker ”kan” och ”kunde” att en relation (förmågerelationen eller ”power-relationen”) råder mellan P och H. Detta ska noggrant skiljas från när ”kan” och ”kunde” uttrycker att ett visst sakförhållande, S, är möjligt i den meningen att S i konjunktion med ett epistemiskt, faktuellt eller normativt villkor är begreppsligt möjligt.

2. I (B) är innebörden av ”kan” konditional, dvs. innebörden av att ”P kan utföra H” är, grovt sett, att ”Om P beslutar sig för att utföra H, så utför han H”.

3. I (M) är innebörden av ”kunde” kategorisk, dvs. innebörden av att ”P kunde ha utfört H i stället för H*” är, givet att vi låter ”K” beteckna totaliteten av allt som var kausalt relevant för huruvida P utförde H eller H*, att P hade kontroll över huruvida K & H inträffade, eller K & H* inträffade.


5. Peter van Inwagens argument för att determinism och människors förmåga att handla annorlunda än de gör är oförenliga är sunt i kontexter av typ (M), men inte i kontexter av typ (B).
Referenser
The Constitution of Institutional Entities

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Institutional entities such as laws, governments and money are indispensable ingredients of our everyday world. We refer to, quantify over and interact with them. However, what ontological status do institutional entities have? Are they identical with material objects in the world? If they are – which material objects? Or are they psychological entities? If they are – how should one account for the objectivity of institutional entities?

John Searle (1995, 2010) has argued that all institutional entities can be analyzed from his formula for constitutive rules: X counts as Y in context C. The X-term stands for any material object in the world and the Y-term represents a status function which is imposed on a material object. A status function is a function which the material object could not have solely in virtue of its material constitution. The Swedish krona in my pocket can be analyzed thus: this piece of metal (X), counts as money (Y) in context C, Sweden.

Searle’s formula is important for our understanding of the social reality. Above all, it accounts for the relations between our minds, institutional entities and the mind-independent material world. The “count as” locution suggests that there is a collective intentional act involved in the creation of institutional entities – thereby the mind-dependence, characteristic for institutional entities, is accounted for. The relation to a material mind-independent object (X) further suggests that institutional entities are closely related to the material world.

Despite the benefits of Searle’s formula it has also been widely criticized. (See Thomasson 2003, McGinn 2010.) In this talk I would like to highlight the ontological uncleranness inherent in Searle’s formula and lift a more general discussion about the relations between our minds, institutional entities and material objects. Is the relation between X and Y a relation of constitution (with or without identity)? Or is the relation a relation of numerical identity? In the talk different views on the relations will be discussed. I will also suggest an alternative way to analyze the relations, based on ideas in Roman Ingarden’s ontology.

References
Resolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem

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The wrong kind of reason problem (WKRP) has been presented as a problem for T. M. Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing account of value’ (BPA) (e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004:393). According to this account, ‘being good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons’ (Scanlon 1998:97). Now, WKRP arises because some objects which clearly lack value yet seem to have properties that constitute such reasons. If there are such objects, BPA can be upheld only if it can be shown that in these cases the reasons are of the wrong kind, in the sense that the properties which constitute them do not give rise to corresponding values of the objects which possess them. Hence, the challenge that WKRP poses for buck-passers is commonly understood as the challenge of convincingly explaining the difference between reasons of the wrong kind and reasons of the right kind.

There have been several proposals for solution to WKRP, but all of them have been exposed to objections (see e.g. Lang, 2008; Olson, 2009; Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2011:33–45; Samuelsson, forthcoming). My suggestion for a solution to this problem is quite simple and straightforward, and it proceeds from recognizing an ambiguity in the expression ‘properties constituting (or providing) reasons’. The notion of a reason relevant to BPA is that of a normative reason, i.e. a fact that counts in favour of some response. Now, BPA is not formulated in terms of facts, but in terms of properties constituting reasons. However, properties are not themselves reasons, and there are different ways in which the property of an object can feature in a fact taken to provide a reason. My suggestion is that only one of these ways is relevant to whether the object in question possesses value. Thus, the solution to WKRP lies in understanding BPA in terms of facts, and getting the place of properties in these facts right. If BPA is adequately formulated in this way, it seems that WKRP does not arise in the first place – the problem will resolve. This solution that I propose bears similarities to a kind of solution to WKRP most thoroughly articulated by Stratton-Lake (2005), and can be seen as a further development and defence of that kind of solution.

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What Environmental Ethicists can Learn from Bioethics: Professions and ‘Killer Apps’

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Bioethics and environmental ethics are both sub-fields of applied ethics, even if there is remarkably little interaction between the fields (Dwyer 2009; Ehrlich 2009). Notably, at least in terms of output in the form of published work and attraction of resources, bioethics appears to be a more vibrant and prolific field than environmental ethics. In this presentation I reflect on some differences and similarities between the two fields. These concern, for instance, the relationship to history, the availability or non-availability of canonical texts and widely accepted normative theoretical frameworks, and publication practices. Some differences reflect ones commonly thought to hold between (natural) science and humanities/social sciences rather than between two arguably humanistic disciplines. I hypothesize that some of the differences might explain the apparent success of bioethics compared to environmental ethics, and I tentatively propose ways in which the fields may learn from each other. This applies in particular to two factors – bioethics’ strong connection to a profession (the medical profession), and its access to an intellectual ‘killer app’ in the form of principlism, i.e. the four principles approach to bioethics developed by Beauchamp and Childress (2001), both of which arguably are lacking in environmental ethics. It is tentatively concluded that environmental ethics might benefit from becoming more similar to bioethics in these respects. I also ask the question whether in the case of environmental ethics, what is usually thought to be humanistic discipline might need to be less humanistic in order to survive and thrive.

References
Powers & Kinds
– exemplified through a study of waves

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Recently there has been much written defending a power ontology in metaphysics (e.g. Mumford 1998). By powers (viz. dispositions, capacities, potentialities) I mean that it can do something, or be done something to (viz. that it is possible for A to X). What has been understated in this discussion is the role of (natural) kinds in this ontology. By (natural) kind I mean an integration of a cluster of powers, whereby these powers in a given context is singled out as epistemologically essential (cf. John Dupré’s concept of promiscuous realism). However, none of these relations are privileged. Briefly put, this excludes both the necessity that these various kinds together compose a taxonomical system of higher and higher kinds, as well as the necessity that one kind can be reduced to a more fundamental kind with no loss of information (both are basically types of reductionism). In this paper I argue that a power ontologist ought to include kinds in his ontology.

It is argued that kinds serve an essential role in scientific inquiry. 1) An explanatory role by kind-membership (viz. Aristotle’s cause formalis). This is an explanation where the fact that an entity has certain powers is explained through the entity belonging to a kind, and that this power belongs essentially to that kind. 2) As basis for inference from one kind-member to another (analogy). This conception of analogy is based on the two instances belonging to the same kind, and where the power inferred is an essential power belonging to that kind. It relies on Schlesinger’s principle of connectivity, which says that “two physical systems never differ in a single aspect only” (Schlesinger, 1963:73). Viz. this principle says that powers usually come in clusters and not separately. It also relies on the converse of Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility of identical, i.e. that two kind-members are identical qua members of the kind and therefore are indiscernible in terms of (kind)-powers.

This is defended through a case-study of the development of wave as a kind in physics. Following the development from the basic sea-wave, through the studies of Vitruvius, Newton, Hooke, Huygens, Young, Prevost, Maxwell, and lastly field and quantum theory, it is argued that both kind-explanation and analogical inference were essential and driving methods throughout these developments. Lastly, it is argued that Bohr’s principle of complementarity of particles and waves in no way is a rejection of waves as a kind, but rather the opposite (on the lines of Dorato 2011).
References


The debate on absolute generality has two main contenders. The generality absolutist claims that talking about absolutely everything is as unproblematic as uttering a sentence like 'Everything fits in the carry-on luggage,' before going a trip. Just as we can quantify over all the things necessary for a certain trip, we can quantify over absolutely all things once the range of quantification is assumed to be completely unrestricted. The generality relativist denies this claim, arguing that there is a substantive difference between the restricted and the unrestricted uses of ‘everything’.

The set theoretical paradoxes are sometimes taken to illustrate the structure of an argument for relativism. For instance, different relativists argue that given a completely determined collection allegedly corresponding to ‘absolutely everything’, one can always develop a generalized version of Russell’s paradox to show the existence of an object lying outside of the candidate collection (see Glanzberg 2004, Fine 2006, Hellman 2006). Consequently, on a possible interpretation of their views, the range of our completely unrestricted quantifiers should be understood as being indefinitely extensible. Following Fine (2006:37), let us call expansionist to someone arguing for the relativist position by way of indefinite extensibility.

This debate is however often described as being conclusively decided in favor of the absolutist position (see Lewis 1991, McGee 2000, Williamson 2003, Weir 2006). In an abbreviated format, the absolutist objection runs as follows. The expansionist is supposed to be committed to the existence of counter-examples to every possible collection. But in being committed to all those counter-examples, the expansionist is also supposed to be quantifying over objects that, in his own lights, lie outside of any collection. Therefore, in assuming that such objects belong to her domain of quantification, the expansionist contradicts her own scriptures.

The main goal of my paper is to defend the expansionist view against this criticism. I try do this by means of an analogy between the intuitionistic understanding of quantification over the natural numbers and the expansionist understanding of quantification over absolutely everything. Roughly, the idea is to show that just as the intuitionist can deny the existence of a completed collection of all numbers without leaving some number beyond his intended domain of quantification, the expansionist can deny the existence of a completed collection of absolutely everything without leaving some object beyond her intended domain of quantification. This analogy is therefore supposed
to offer the expansionist a reply to the challenge raised by the absolutist's objection described in the previous paragraph.

References
Definitioner katalogiserade i wiki
– en väg att skärpa slutledningar

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En skillnad mot traditionella wikier är att definitioner och deras indexering, införda i denna ”definitions-wiki”, inte skall kunna ändras – då kan ju slutledningar som refererar till definitioner i wikin bli ogiltiga. Däremot skall alltid nya definitioner kunna tilläggas (kunskap³ osv.).


Referenser
The standard peer-review system has come under extensive criticism in recent years. Critics complain that the system delays publication of scientific discoveries and that the level of disagreement between reviewers is high (see, e.g., Godlee et al. 1998). It has, however, yet a further problem that is at least as important as these yet is all too often neglected—namely, that it often effectively functions as a defensive bulwark of degenerative research programs. Papers are usually reviewed by disciplinary “insiders”, which means that systematic criticism from other disciplines does not get a fair hearing. Critics thus need to rely on unconventional methods such as those of Alan Sokal.¹

In this talk, I will propose a modification of the standard peer-review system that would make outside criticism of degenerative research programs more efficient. My idea is that it should be possible to appeal against the decision to accept a paper in a peer-reviewed journal. Such appeals could make use of all sorts of arguments—e.g., they could be directed against sub-standard methods, false assumptions of facts falling within the domain of another discipline, etc. In order to circumvent the problem of inside reviewers defending their discipline, the appeals would at least in part be judged by outsiders possessing the relevant expertise.² For instance, if this system had been in play in the 90s and Sokal had made use of it to appeal against the postmodernists’ articles, using his argument that they contain misconceptions of various physical and mathematical theories, his appeal would have been refereed at least in part by physicists and mathematicians (who presumably would have agreed with him).

Let me briefly mention two additional features of my proposal (details are omitted for lack of space). Firstly, successful appeals would be regarded as merits—as something that you could put on your CV—and hence people would have plenty of incentives to hunt down bad articles. Secondly, it is of course all too likely that journals catering to degenerative research programs would not want to join the system of courts of appeals that I am sketching, for fear of having their decisions overturned. The way to solve this problem goes through the major national and EU funding agencies, I believe: if they

¹Sokal submitted a fake article to a top postmodernist journal and then pointed out all its flaws once it had been accepted.
²One could think of a system which has several levels and a “Supreme Court” at the apex—just like the judicial system.
ruled that papers published in a journal that hadn’t joined this system wouldn’t count as a merit, such journals would presumably quickly lose influence.

Lastly, let me add that this proposal should be especially interesting to philosophers, who specialize in assessing the arguments and methods of the special sciences. Hence we should be especially effective at appealing against accepted articles.

References
Derrida och den elektroniska revolutionen

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Det finns inga händelser som är oberoende av de materiella stöd och de teknologier som är tillgängliga vid tiden för händelsen. Ett exempel på en sådan händelse är upptagningen av alla nya apparater för multimedia.


vara vaksamma, men samtidigt öppna mot framtiden och bejaka det som kan komma,

vilket detta än är. Att bejaka det som kan komma är inte en positiv tes, utan själva
grundförutsättningen för öppenhet inför framtiden. Att säga ”ja” till den elektroniska
revolutionen är alltså att ta ansvar för framtiden; det är enligt Derrida att handla etiskt

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Husserl and the postcolonial feminists

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Although the topic of ethics and responsibility of the embodied, coloured and gendered person in a communal, social setting is attracting a lot of attention at present, the perceptual aspects of this have not yet been sufficiently investigated. Several postcolonial antiracist philosophers and psychoanalytically inspired thinkers such as Fanon (2008), Gordon (1995) and Nissim-Sabat (2009) as well as important feminist philosophers and psychoanalysts including Beauvoir (2011), Kristeva (1997), Young (2005) and Butler (1990), rely on Husserlian phenomenology in their respective accounts of this. This development of transcendental aesthetics furthers our understanding of the relation between perception, embodiment and particularity well beyond the resources of Husserlian phenomenology. But at the same time, it is clear that Husserl has much more to offer to this discussion than has been recognized so far, precisely in terms of the analysis of passivity as that which precedes and guides perceptual life. I will show how this may provide essential clarification also for more recent attempts to work on the (un-)conscious mechanism which makes us immediately categorize the other person as this or that depending on an aesthetic category such as the colour of her skin (Alcoff 2006; Ahmed 2006; Ahmed & Stacey 2001).

References

Rush Rhees on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics

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Based on his letters to Georg Henrik von Wright, Rush Rhees’s conception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is presented. Rhees strongly emphasises that Wittgenstein was not concerned with creating new mathematics, but with ridding us of what Rhees calls ‘fantastic’ or ‘mythological’ interpretations of mathematical definitions and results. An important issue, which Rhees also calls attention to in his letters to von Wright, is the close connection that Wittgenstein saw between philosophical problems and Lebensprobleme. It is shown that this also has significant bearing on how one must understand Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics.
Modeling knowledge and justified belief

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In a recent exchange, Timothy Williamson has debated the proper way to interpret epistemic models with Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña. In his view, the modal account of epistemic concepts entails some anti-internalist conclusions which Cohen and Comesaña dispute.

I claim in this paper that by modeling knowledge modally, both sides to this debate commit themselves to a strong externalist premise that internalists cannot accept and that externalist need not accept: A proposition is known/justified by a subject if and only if the subject's evidence logically entails it. Interpreted in the model this premise makes knowledge and justified belief into local necessity operators, incompatible with internalism and with externalism that admits of fallibilism. After arguing that this premise is at the heart of the debate I will offer a different, non-modal way of modeling the phenomenon they aimed to capture: Knowledge and justified belief based on information gained by an imprecise measuring device.
Testimony and New Knowledge

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This paper argues for a view of testimony on which testimony is a generative source of knowledge even though testimony is not a basic source of knowledge. Testimony, on this view, can yield new knowledge – that is, knowledge not previously present in the relevant testimonial chain – but it does so only given a suitable non-testimonial basis.

This view of testimony rejects the orthodox view according to which testimony is solely a mechanism for transmitting knowledge from one agent to another. For the transmission theorist, testimonial knowledge must have a knowing source – typically, the testifier herself. By contrast, on the generative view, testimony is capable of producing knowledge from scratch. In this sense, testimony is like other generative sources such as perception, and unlike purely preservative (or transmissive) sources such as memory.

According to existing generative views, rather than a knowing source, testimonial knowledge merely requires that the testimony be reliable. By contrast, the I defend imposes a stricter condition on testimonial knowledge. I argue that testimony is a source of knowledge only if given on a reliable basis. We know things on the basis of testimony, but only when the testimony, in turn, is given on a reliable basis. I call this the Basis View of testimony.

Since, on the Basis View, testimony yields knowledge only if given on a reliable basis, testimony is not a basic source of knowledge. In this sense, testimony differs from both perception and memory. Both are basic in that they yield knowledge independently of the workings of other sources. By contrast, testimony is non-basic in that its ability to yield knowledge depends on a reliable non-testimonial source.

On the Basis View, testimony is a generative but non-basic source of knowledge. Yet, even though testimony is a non-basic source of knowledge, the Basis View maintains that testimonial knowledge is had on the basis of testimony itself. The special role of testimony is to allow us to know purely on the basis of other people's testimony. Yet it does so only if it is ultimately grounded in a suitable non-testimonial basis. Sloganizing, on the Basis View, testimony is a mechanism that absorbs bases for knowledge.

As such, the Basis View retains part of the central motivation for transmissive views of testimony, i.e., that testimonial knowledge is knowledge had solely on another's say-so and correspondingly that telling, in the relevant sense, is a form of letting-know. The Basis View demonstrates that this conception of testimony and testimonial knowledge is compatible with the generative view, and thereby honors the realization that testimonial knowledge may be new knowledge.
Does Aquinas have two arguments for the connections of the virtues?

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The thesis ‘the one who has one virtue, has them all’ was widely discussed in ancient and medieval moral philosophy and has recently gained traction in contemporary philosophy (Annas, 2011). Plato, Aristotle and their followers, as well as later Stoics, accepted some version of this thesis (Cooper, 1998). In medieval times, it became a disputed question. One can find both defenders (Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Buridan) and critics (Peter Olivi, Duns Scotus and Ockham). In this presentation, I am concerned with the relationship between the two arguments that we find in Aquinas’ writing on virtue. He sees one argument as Augustinian and one as Aristotelian.

The Augustinian argument focuses on how we cannot, for example, call someone brave if he is also unjust. According to this perspective, “discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude”. The virtues are connected because “strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth” (ST IaIIae.65.1c).

According to Aquinas, the Aristotelian argument connects “one with the other by prudence (per prudentia) (Com.EN. 1287) One cannot have a moral virtue without having prudence and one cannot have prudence without moral virtue. For Aquinas, every act of virtue requires prudence in order to find the mean (medium) within that virtue. Prudence is also equally dependent on moral virtue. Prudence requires an end and this end is set by the moral virtues.

This presentation is concerned with the structure of these two arguments and the relation between them. For Aquinas, the two arguments are based on two ways of dividing the virtues. The first sees different virtues as general conditions and second regards each virtue to have a distinct ‘matter’ that they are about. I will present arguments as to why the second way of regarding virtue is more fundamental in Aquinas’ virtue theory. If we take this into account, we can conclude that the two arguments, though presented together, in fact are not two arguments for the same thesis. I will argue that the Augustinian argument, in Aquinas’ rendering, instead only proves a more trivial thesis: in order to have one virtue fully one need all the conditions of that virtue. From this, I think we can conclude that Aquinas’ argument for why we should believe that ‘the one who has one virtue, has them all’ relies fully on the role of prudence in connecting the virtues.
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How physicalists can – and cannot – explain the seeming “absurdity” of physicalism

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According to physicalism, consciousness reduces to some physical phenomenon, just like water reduces to H₂O and liquidity to loose molecular bonding. However, the reduction of consciousness seems less satisfactory than the latter reductions. The reduction of consciousness gives rise to an “explanatory gap” that we do not find in the latter cases. According to many – even many physicalists – the reduction of consciousness even seems “absurd” (Papineau 2002) or “crazy” (Perry 2001). A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct reduction hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason to accept it, why does it seem “absurd”? One possibility is that this is explained (solely) by our having an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This kind of “error explanation” has been embraced by a small minority of physicalists (including Lewis 1995). It is rejected by, among others, proponents of the “phenomenal concept strategy”, which during the past 20 years have become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism (Loar 1990/1997; Papineau 1992, 2002, 2007; Tye 1995, 2000; Hill 1995; Balog 1999, 2012; McLaughlin 2001; Block 2007; Diaz-Leon 2010; and many others). I shall argue that the “error explanation” is the only plausible explanation that is available to physicalists.
Vilka skäl har vi?

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Jag skulle vilja presentera den forskning om så kallade praktiska skäl som jag just har inlett. De senaste åren har detta varit ett hett omdebatterat ämne bland filosofer. En sak jag skulle vilja göra i min forskning är att ta ett steg tillbaka, presentera en teori om skäl som förefaller mig rimlig, och sedan se hur olika klassiska problem med att förstå skäl framstår i ljuset av min egen teori.


Referenser
The Prospects for Backtracking Compatibilism

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One of the most powerful arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. It is supposed to show that if determinism is true, then no one was ever able to act otherwise than they actually did and a basic version of the argument runs as follows. If determinism is true, then our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and events that occurred in the remote past. But it is not up to us what the laws of nature are or what went on in the past before we were born. So, our present actions, that are the consequences of these things, are not up to us.

One way for compatibilists to evade the conclusion of the Consequence Argument is to argue that in a certain sense, it is up to us now what went on in the remote past. However, the claim is not that we are able to do something that would alter the past. Rather the claim is that we are now able to do something such that if we did it, then the past would have been different but we would not in any way have caused it to be different. This position has been labeled backtracking compatibilism and among its adherents we find Perry (2004, 2008) and Saunders (1968).

My aim here is to consider the prospects of backtracking compatibilism. I will discuss Fischer's (1994) efforts to illustrate why he believes that backtracking compatibilism is at odds with common sense. Then I will consider Holliday (2012), who presents an argument to show that it is unreasonable to think that we are able to perform an action such that if we did it, then the past would have been different. I will argue that these attempts to refute backtracking compatibilism are not as strong as they may seem prima facie.

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The Relevance of Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology for Biomedical Ethics

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Heidegger’s thoughts on modern technology have received much attention, but, with a few exceptions, the influence has been sparse in biomedical ethics. The reason for this might be that Heidegger’s position has been misinterpreted to equal a general hostility towards modern science and technology, and that Heidegger himself never subjected medical technologies to scrutiny but was concerned rather with industrial technology and information technology. In the paper, Heidegger’s philosophy of modern technology is introduced and then brought to bear on medical technology. The main relevance of it for biomedical ethics is found to be that the field needs to focus upon epistemological and ontological questions in the philosophy of medicine related to the structure and goal of medical practice. Heidegger’s philosophy can help us to see how the scientific attitude in medicine must always be balanced by and integrated into a phenomenological way of understanding the life-world concerns of patients. A critical development of Heidegger’s position can provide us with a criterion to distinguish the uses of medical technologies that are compatible with such an endeavor from the technological projects that are not.
Collective Responsibility and Group Control

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Collectives are more or less structured groups of human beings. The relevant types of collectives include formal organizations (e.g., corporations, intergovernmental bodies), associations of various kinds (e.g., clubs, teams), and random assemblages of people (e.g., witnesses of a traffic accident) (French 1979; May & Hoffman 1991). Responsibility-collectivism is the view that the moral responsibility of at least some such collectives is something over and above the combined moral responsibility of individual group members. This paper focuses on one of the key conditions of responsibility: the requirement of control. This requirement also applies to collective agents. Clearly, any agent will have to be able to have some control over whatever she is found responsible for. So collective agents too have to be able to exercise some control over whatever it is they are found collectively responsible for.

Responsibility-collectivists have often tried to unpack the idea of group control as non-causal control (Pettit 2007; List & Pettit 2011, etc.). I argue that even if non-causal control is a coherent notion (a big “if”!), it is not an admissible basis for attributing responsibility. Only causal group control is. This is because non-causal group control does not provide the right kind of information regarding the ancestry of a certain outcome. Specifically, it does not provide an explanation what role the collective is supposed to play in the actual causal history of an event, nor does it explain what role the collective would have played if not the actual causal story but an alternative causal story had been realized. Reference to the non-causal role of the group can at best amount to a prediction, not an explanation. Therefore, such non-causal group control is not a sufficient basis for attributing responsibility to the collective, not even when other conditions of “responsibility-fitness” (Pettit 2007) have been met. If we take seriously the responsibility-collectivist’s idea that collectives can be morally responsible agents in the same sense as individual agents (Pettit 2007; Shockley 2007, etc.), then the relevant collectives are to be able to exercise causal control.

In the second half of the paper, I will discuss the difficulties which would arise for responsibility-collectivism if one understood group control as causal group control. One of these difficulties is whether causal group control is consistent with ontological individualism, i.e., the view that collective properties supervene on properties of individuals. The second concerns the relationship of group control and individual control. I argue that the first difficulty is manageable, but only at the price of having
to accept a solution to the second difficulty which runs counter to the original aim of
the responsibility-collectivist of characterizing collective responsibility as something
compatible with individual responsibility. Worse still, responsibility-collectivists may
have to choose sides in other areas of social ontology as well raising the price of this
position even higher.

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Esse est percipi and the problem of percept identity in Berkeley and C. J. Boström

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Berkeley’s ontology and epistemology have been judged untenable on the grounds that the Esse est percipi principle absurdly does not permit two persons to observe the same thing. According to Dicker (2011), the absurdity follows from the privacy of ideas and cannot be evaded by invoking God’s omniscience.

Christopher Jacob Boström was early scorned because his Esse est percipi allegedly contradicted his simultaneous claim that two spirits (God and a human, or two humans) can perceive the same thing, albeit differently (Borelius 1859, 1860).

I shall argue that Boström (Anonymous 1860) successfully countered Borelius’s criticism by employing a dual concept of meaning (resembling Frege’s Sinn and Bedeutung some thirty years later): Boström’s “be” and “be perceived” have the same reference but not the same sense. Whether Boström is vulnerable to the arguments raised by Dicker against Berkeley will be discussed.

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Neutral monism is the view according to which the world is composed of one entity that stays neutral with respect to the physical as well as the mental and to which both are reducible to or constructible from. Standard neutral monism, in one form or another of Mach, Carnap, Russell, or Chalmers, takes the neutral entity to be the components of perceptual experience (Stubenberg 2010, chap 2). However, K. Sayre offers an alternative account and suggests structure as the neutral entity (Sayre 1996:312; Sayre 1976). In contrast to Sayre’s Platonist and information-theoretic take on structure, I allude to structure that can be conceptualized in group-theoretic terms. A group-theoretic conceptualization essentially draws upon the reduction of physical and mental objects to structure in terms of invariants under transformations. Physical objects are reducible to structure in terms of invariants under transformations according to Ontic Structural Realism (Ladyman/Ross, 2009:145). Mental objects, exemplified by percepts, are reducible to structure in terms of invariants under transformations according to Cassirer (Cassirer 1944:16) and Eddington (Eddington 1939:148). Also, I think that contemporary accounts that view perception as being essentially characterized by perceptual constancies (Burge 2010, chap 8/9 and Smith 2002:170) can be brought to bear upon such reduction.

Neutral Monism seems to be outdated. But in its alternative structural version and equipped with contemporary scientific structuralisms it might be prepared for a comeback.

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Beasts, Human Beings or Gods?
Human Subjectivity in Medieval Political Philosophy

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In a robust sense, human subjectivity includes not only the raw first personal experience and unique perspective to the world, but also experiences, history, values, personality and, in general, the path of life one chooses to follow. It is clear that social environment is significant for human subjectivity in this sense. People around us have a profound effect on our development, and the various communities to which we belong form the immediate context which makes us the kind of human subjects that we are.

The idea that human subjectivity is closely connected to the social setting receives a radical formulation with Aristotle, who depicts the connection between an individual human being and the political community as a relation between a part and the whole. He argues famously, in Politics 1.2, that a human being who is separated from the community is like a hand that is cut off from the body: unable to perform its proper function and therefore a human being only equivocally. A solitary person is either a beast or a god: a beast, if the deficiency of his nature makes him unable to live with others, and a god if he is self-sufficient without other people. Aristotle's idea is not that solitary people are lacking in a psychological sense but remain metaphysically human beings, because the metaphysical and psychological perspectives cannot be completely separated due to the central role that functionality plays in Aristotle's theory. Just like an axe is defined by its ability to cut wood, a human being is defined by the ability to think. If someone is utterly deprived of rationality, he is not truly a human being. One becomes a human only by living a human life within a political community.

In medieval discussions the metaphysical and psychological perspectives are separated from each other. One can be a human even when one fails to realise the proper function of man. This view stems from the commitment that every human being has a rational soul which is made by God, regardless of their actual ability to use the highest functions of the soul. Thus, when medievals wrote commentaries on Aristotle's Politics, they often repeated the idea of the essential connection between an individual human being and the political community but were less enthusiastic about Aristotle's stronger claim that it is not possible to be a human subject outside the community. The assimilation of the basic principles of Aristotle's political philosophy was not as straightforward as it seems at the outset.
My presentation examines how the social dimension of human subjectivity is treated in medieval political philosophy. Is communal life necessary for a human being? In what ways medieval philosophers conceptualise the Aristotelian distinction between three kinds of subjects, the beast, the human, and the god? Is political community a necessary condition for the realisation of human essence? My aim is to shed light on these questions by analysing medieval discussions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The historical approach will help us to understand the background for the modern idea of the non-natural relation between the individual and the political community, as well as the developments in the Western conception of subjectivity.
The Threat of Skepticism as an Argument for Relativism

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Pointing to skeptical implications of non- or anti-relativistic position has been used as an argument for relativism. This line of argument has two steps: first, showing that the non-relativist position leads to some unacceptable form of skepticism, secondly, showing that relativism, on the other hand, does not fall into the arms of that kind of skepticism.

Two forms of relativism are discussed, first (and briefly) epistemic relativism, i.e. relativism about epistemic justification. The non-relativistic, absolutist (view-from-nowhere) position on epistemic justification falls prey to Sextus Empiricus’ well-known Wheel argument (Diallelus). Relativism dodges this argument by admitting that ‘Yes, epistemic justification is, and must be, circular’ but denying that this has any skeptical implications if we just abandon the absolutist ideal.

The second form of relativism discussed is metaphysical/ontological relativism and the non-relativistic position here is metaphysical realism. What drives metaphysical realism into hopeless skepticism is that it has to admit the possibility that the Independent Reality (with its Eigenschaften-an-sich) actually is constituted in a way that is completely beyond our comprehension, and that all our theories about it are completely mistaken. The question is, can ontological relativism avoid this fate, either by not admitting the possibility that reality is completely incomprehensible, or by being able to handle that possibility.

And the answer is . . .
Environmental Pragmatism and the Objection from Impracticality

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Within the environmental ethical debate, there is the view that ethicists have traditionally focused too much on theoretical aspects of morality – such as on what makes acts right/wrong, and what makes things good/bad. On this view, ethicists have thus neglected the practical aim of morality – i.e. to help us determine which particular acts to perform in certain situations. They have also overlooked the fact that they could anyway contribute to the resolution of environmental problems when there is consensus on what should be done. Environmental Pragmatism (EP) is a reaction to this predominant theoretical focus in ethics – motivated by the urgent need of solutions to environmental problems. The chief aim of EP is to make environmental ethics more practically relevant for environmental policy making, and so in mainly two ways: (i) by offering a new substantive ethic that is more practically helpful than traditional ethical theories, and (ii) by supplementing existing ethical theories with a method that can be used to promote environmental friendly policies. In this presentation, I argue that both of these attempts of EP are themselves practically problematic, as they both fail to meet the practicality standard implicitly presumed in EP. Although EP is troublesome also for theoretical reasons, I claim that this practicality objection singly undermines the legitimacy of the position in the environmental ethical debate.

References
Concrete Impossible Worlds

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We all believe that things could have been otherwise. Leeds could have been closer to Manchester than it actually is, there could have been more cars, etc. Philosophers call the ‘ways things could have been’ possible worlds. By parity of reasoning, talk of impossible worlds – various ways the world could not have been – seems to be nothing but a regimentation of our pre-philosophical talk and opinions.

David Lewis’s theory of possible worlds is considered as unable to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. He argues against concrete impossible worlds on the basis that a contradiction in the scope of the modifier ‘at w’ amounts to an outright contradiction. His argument goes as follows:

1. Suppose that there exists an impossible world at which (P and ∼P).
2. At w ∼P iff ∼(at w, P).
3. At w (P and ∼P) iff at w P and ∼(at w P).

Therefore

At w P and ∼(at w P). (contradiction)

For Lewis, the operator ‘at w’ is a quantifier-restricting modifier, working in the similar way as the modifier ‘in Leeds’ does. Thus, unlike (hyper)intensional operators, which do not pass through the truth-functional connectives the restricting modifiers do. Therefore, supposing that there exist a world at which (P and ∼P), given the way how restricting modifiers work and given the opinion that the Lewisian modal space is classical, Lewis has no use for impossible worlds. However, Lewis does not object to impossible worlds in general. He does so as an extension of his own theory.

Firstly, that is because in his own conception of how modifiers interact with ‘at w’ the consequence of admitting an impossible world is an out and out contradiction (not just a contradiction within the scope of something). Secondly, Lewis does not accept that there are true contradictions, and to accept that there are would be a major violation of conservativeness. So the argument is not a demonstration of the non-existence of impossible worlds. It is a demonstration of the unacceptability of impossible worlds to anyone who has certain orthodox pre-theoretical opinions plus the Lewisian conception of analysis.

I will argue that even if that were so, there is an option to weaken the Lewisian argument. As it seems, there is no no-question-begging reason to think that reality is
classical. How can we know, after all, which logic appropriately describes reality? In particular, if there are worlds that instantiate plain contradictions then it is only to be expected that extended modal realism – modal realism + contradictory worlds – violates some of the main features of the Lewisian realism.

In my paper, I challenge the proclaimed universality of classical logic and motivate a paraconsistent approach to modal reality. Although the consequences are very hard to swallow, I argue that it is because of the fact that we are unsure of our pre-theoretical opinions concerning the impossible in the actual world. In other words, if reality is inconsistent, then the theory appropriate for it must not be classical.
Acknowledgment and Moral Motivation

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In my talk I will address the question what in general motivates a person to act and furthermore what in particular motivates her to follow moral rules.

There are different reasons for a person to follow moral rules: either the rule itself is motivating (internal motivation) or another reason like wanting to avoid punishment in case of disobeying the rules (external motivation).

But is there any Φ that motivates internally? My proposal for such a Φ is to be acknowledged (anerkannt sein) as a fellow human being.

Acknowledgement has two aspects, (a) being acknowledged as a subject by the others and (b) being acknowledged as having adopted a certain role within the community. Since (a) is as e.g. Sartre (1957) suggests an inalienable condition for the constitution of a subject I will focus on (b).

The social role a subject adopts within a community (b) depends on the others. This relation has fundamental consequences: By adopting a role one is at the same time acknowledged as a person as well as a fellow human being. Though, a person's – mostly unconscious – main motivation for acting which underlies all other possible motivations is to be acknowledged as that certain person and fellow human being. This works usually by adopting a social rule.

Michael Kober (2007) shows from a Wittgensteinian point of view how social roles are constituted. Since every role is defined by common rules and no one can follow a rule on its own, a person is incompossible as existing outside a community. The community consists of individual persons and each person depends on the community. Finding the way to oneself leads via the acknowledgement of the community.

Thus, acknowledgement is typically the basically internal motivating Φ. In this context, Siegwart Lindenberg observed “many indications that the human beings are predisposed to strive for improving their condition.” Which, in the light of my argument, means that humans indeed act to be acknowledged.

Lindenberg (2008) examined the ways how people try to be acknowledged and categorised three goals people aim at into three corresponding, motivating frames that influence the person's acting.

This shows that since a person's main aim is to be acknowledged, her actions, thus, are externally motivated. Consequently, there is no internal relation between moral rules and moral motivation.
Nonetheless, I will argue that there is a reasonable exception in the case that persons develop conscience or want to behave sincere in (cf. Sartre [1957]). I will try to show that this activates a moral frame such that being acknowledged equates to following moral rules. It follows that moral rules are than motivating internally, because wanting to be acknowledged is motivating internally.

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Traditionally, knowledge has been thought a necessary condition of expertise. How could one be an expert without knowing? This is a common sense and standard perspective. However, there is one particular implication which is problematic; the infallibility of the expert. If knowledge is understood to be justified true belief or even mere true belief, then the beliefs of the expert in order to be expert must be true. This has several further implications which are unacceptable:

1) The historical problem, which asks the question of how we’re to think about experts from previous eras in history. Was Aristotle, or Newton an expert? Given that Newtonian physics and Aristotelian science have been broadly discredited, their beliefs within these domains cannot have been true, and thus cannot have been known. Consequently, Aristotle and Newton cannot have had knowledge, and thus, cannot have been expert within these domains. How then are we to think of experts from the past?

2) The total denial problem. It is possible that the experts of today do not have knowledge, but merely justified belief. This is possibly what Newton had; something that Foley might call epistemically rational belief (Foley 1987). In fifty, or one hundred years’ time who’s to say that the alleged experts of then won’t look back at the alleged experts of now and mark it all down as incorrect (and thus not knowledge)? The problem becomes that if expertise requires knowledge, then it could be the case that there never has (and possibly never will) exist expertise. This problem is especially potent if we bear in mind that experts are usually thought to have a great deal of knowledge, rather than just one or two justified beliefs (Goldman 2001:91).

3) The problem of expert peer disagreement. It’s not just that rational peer disagreement is impossible (this is a separate issue), but that expert peer disagreement is an outright contradiction in terms. Expert peers literally cannot disagree on those matters about which both are experts, because for both be expert they both must know (have justified true belief).

The solution to these problems that I pose is to recast expertise away from knowledge, and towards Foley’s epistemic rationality. Expertise I argue requires epistemic rationality, and not knowledge. There are several features of Foley’s epistemic rationality which start to solve the problems outlined above:
1) The historical problem melts away once we understand expertise as the possession of epistemically rational beliefs and not truth. The ego-centricity of Foley’s epistemic rationality allows for Aristotle’s and Newton’s beliefs about their domain of expertise to be epistemically rational and thus expert qualifying despite it not being the case that Newton’s beliefs were true.

2) There is no total denial problem if our experts are required only to hold beliefs which are epistemically rational, but not necessarily true. Epistemic rationality is in a sense a much easier target to hit than truth, and is often sociocentric.

3) Expert peer disagreement, since the expert peers views need not be true is consequentlly no longer a contradiction in terms.

The major idea behind this understanding is that instead of expertise requiring a knowledge threshold instead we should understand as expertise requiring an epistemically rational belief threshold. By swapping our requirement from knowledge to epistemically rational belief, we solve at least the first two problems, and allow for the third.

References
Kant on the Analyticity of Hypothetical Imperatives

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Kant claims that the possibility of a rule of skill (a hypothetical imperative that guides the use of means to produce arbitrary ends as effects) can be shown by analyzing the concept of willing an end as an effect of one's action (Kant, 1785:417ff). The most natural interpretation of this view is that the concept of willing the use of means to my end is "contained in" the concept of willing the end as an effect of my action. However, scholars have noted that if the analyticity of the proposition is understood as "containment-in," then it is conceptually impossible for an agent to will an end and to fail to take the means to that end: who wills the end wills the means, but if I don't will the means, then I don't will the end (e.g., Hill 1973:430; Korsgaard 1997:229f; Schroeder 2005:363; Allison 2011:159). But this is absurd – it makes instrumental irrationality conceptually impossible.

This difficulty motivated an influential interpretation offered by Thomas Hill, Jr. (Hill 1973; cf. Korsgaard 1997 and Wood 1999:60ff). On Hill’s view, Kant is not arguing for the analyticity of a class of rules of skill, of which there can be “endlessly many.” Rather, Kant is discussing one general, sui generis norm of instrumental reasoning called "The Hypothetical Imperative": “Either take the means to your end or give up the end.” This principle functions as something like a transcendental condition of possibility for instrumental rationality as such. Mark Schroeder has argued that this interpretation is implausible, since it is both unmotivated by Kant’s texts, and leads to the un-Kantian conclusion that “The Hypothetical Imperative” itself is a categorical imperative, in that it would bind every finite rational will as such (Schroeder 2005:360; cf. Timmermann 2007:70; Allison 2011:165f).

I argue that the notion of analyticity that Kant uses here is not one of conceptual containment, but rather of conceptual reciprocity. The concept of willing a particular end as an effect of one’s action and the concept of willing oneself as acting as a cause with respect to that particular end are identical concepts, and hence analytically related on Kant’s view, because they are Wechselbegriffe, or reciprocal concepts (Hanna, 2001:138ff, for this kind of Kantian analyticity). This means that they have the selfsame object as Umfang or comprehension: the complex object of both concepts is this: myself acting in accordance with a causal law as means with respect to my particular end as effect of
that action. On this reading, it is possible to will an end as an effect of my acting in some way (de dicto), and yet fail to will to take the actual means to that end (de re) because of, for example, lack of knowledge of the causal law governing my activity in relation to the end (cf. Finlay 2009:163). This analysis sheds light on Kant's later claim that freedom and morality are Wechselbegriffe: the concepts of both freedom and the categorical imperative have the selfsame object as their comprehension: autonomy.

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The Authority Rule of Assertion

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Many think that the act of asserting is governed by a rule that states that one must: assert that \( p \) only if one knows that \( p \). Call this the knowledge rule. I would like to consider an alternative rule that receives relatively little attention (when it does receive attention, it is frequently dismissed out of hand, for example by Hawthorne (2004) and Williamson (2000)). This rule, I call the authority rule. I suggest that the authority rule can accommodate the traditional motivations supporting the knowledge rule and should thus be considered viable as a candidate rule of assertion. My claim is not that the authority rule is altogether superior to the knowledge rule. Rather, it is that the traditional case for the knowledge rule does not motivate the knowledge rule over the authority rule.

The authority rule states that one must: assert that \( p \) only if one is in a position of epistemic authority with respect to \( p \). Unlike the knowledge rule, which considers a speaker and a proposition and considers the relationship between the speaker and the proposition, the authority rule also considers the relationship between the speaker and the listener. One is not in a position of authority simply with respect to \( p \); one is in a position of authority relative to a listener with respect to \( p \). The basic idea is that I am in a position of authority relative to you with respect to \( p \) just in case my justification for \( p \) outstrips yours. I illustrate this idea further using the notion of justification transmission from the epistemology of testimony and the notion of epistemic peerage from the epistemology of disagreement.

Next, I examine how the authority rule can accommodate the traditional arguments Williamson (2000) and Unger (1975) use in support of the knowledge rule. I suggest that in the well-known lottery case, the authority rule returns the intuitive verdict that the assertion is improper. It does so since I am also not in a position of epistemic authority. Assertions of the form \( p \) and I do not know that \( p \) and the argument deriving from challenging how a speaker knows what she says are explained by the fact that ordinarily, admitting that one does not know that \( p \) implies that one lacks justification for \( p \) and this is incompatible of being in a position of authority with respect to \( p \).

Lastly, I consider a potential problem for the authority rule. It seems that there might be cases in which one might reasonably think that one is in a position of authority but in fact not be. Intuitively, we want to say that asserting in such a situation is permissible (contrary to the authority rule). The knowledge rule can be put under pressure by...
similar considerations—Gettier cases such as Russell’s (1948) stopped clock case. I end by arguing that the prospects for the authority rule in responding to these challenges are identical to the prospects for the knowledge rule in responding to the analogous challenges.

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