A Holistic Understanding of Domestic Democratic Peace

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Abstract

In this study the notion of domestic democratic peace will be examined by using a holistic understanding of internal conflicts. Domestic democratic peace has most commonly been studied by using quantitative methods. This study will be qualitative using an abductive approach when understanding why mature democracies are more stable than other types of regimes. The holistic understanding of internal conflicts used in this study is based on the concepts of relative deprivation, instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity. Burton’s sources of conflict are used to show how relative deprivation can be experienced. The questions to be answered in this essay are as follow:

- How can the proposed holistic understanding explain why mature democracies are more stable than newly established democracies and autocratic states?
  - In what ways do mature democracies decrease experience of relative deprivation and thereby safeguarding Burton’s sources of conflict?
  - In what ways do mature democracies cater to a more peaceful process of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics?

Keywords: domestic democratic peace, holistic understanding of internal conflicts, mature democracies
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1. Introduction

First Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace:

The civil constitution of every state shall be Republican.

The republican constitution is a constitution that is established, first, according to the principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as human beings), second, according to principles of the dependence of all on a single, common legislation (as subjects), and third, according to the law of the equality of the latter (as citizens of the state).\(^1\) (Italics in original text)

- Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, 1795

Kant was one of the first to advocate the need for democracy in order to establish, in his words, perpetual peace. He wrote this in the context of interstate wars. Although Kant dismisses democracy as good way of ruling a state (as most of his contemporaries), this quote can also be applied to the study at hand. His definition of a republic is what can be seen to characterize mature democracies. Schumpeter and later Dahl further develops the peace enhancing capacities of democracy.\(^2\)

Nevertheless, in all political entities known as states political violence seems to erupt from time to time, some evolve in to civil wars while others stop at riots and then ends. What are the reasons why some instances of political violence turn into civil wars and some do not? This is almost an impossible question to answer. However, it seems that democracies are less likely to suffer from civil wars. Over the past two decades there has been an increased interest in the fact that democracies seem to be more stable domestically than non-democracies.

The focus of academic studies on the subject has been mainly statistical, researchers has tried to establish a numerical connection with the type of government and proneness to civil war and domestic political violence (for example Krain & Edson Myers, 1997; Stockemer, 2010; Hegre et al, 2001) There is some research that has tried to establish why democracies are more stable than non-democracies. Rummel (1995) focuses on political regimes and the possibilities for political leaders to act violently on their citizens. Regan and Henderson (2001) also look at political repression. Goldstone et al (2010) uses a simple model based on type of government, child mortality and closeness to conflict areas. Nevertheless,

\(^1\) Kant (1795), p 99

\(^2\) Schumpeter 1975 (1942) and Dahl 1971
these three articles also use statistical data to support their claims to why democracies are more stable. Yet so far there has been little attempt to understand domestic democratic peace using a theory of internal conflict.

This essay attempts to do just that, I will use a holistic understanding of internal conflicts to explore why democracies are more stable than other types of government. In order to establish why democracies are more stable we need to understand why civil wars and political violence erupts. In my essay I will use an holistic understanding comprising of Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1973), Burton’s sources of conflict (Burton, 1990) and Nilsson’s concepts of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics (Nilsson, 1999) in order to understand civil wars and domestic political violence. Anders Nilsson put this holistic understanding together in order to understand the civil war in Mozambique, a war and peace process he was closely involved with. The framework looks at the tension between value capabilities and value expectations (relative deprivation) by using Burton’s sources of conflict (basic human needs, values and interests) as tools. Politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics examines the relation between mass mobilization and elite aspirations for power.

### 1.1 Definitions of democracy and civil war

Democracy is probably one of the most contested concepts in political theory, Hidalgo writes: ‘[…] that democracy – like justice or arts – is yet another one among those “essentially contested concepts” which lack standards of definition.’\(^3\) Rosanvallon ads: ‘[…] democracy is always at one and the same time the clear solution to the modern problem of the institutions of society as well as the question forever left unanswered, in the sense that no conclusive and perfectly adequate response can be provided to it.’\(^4\) Hidalgo continues: ‘Furthermore (and fortunately) the contest seems to concern first and foremost the interpretation of the concept, not the concept of democracy itself.’\(^5\) Democracy is almost unanimously today seen as the best way to rule a state.

I will loosely follow Powell’s definition of contemporary democracy.

1. The legitimacy of the government rests on a claim to represent the desires of its citizens.

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\(^1\) Hidalgo 2008, p 177  
\(^2\) Rosanvallon 2006, p 68  
\(^3\) Hidalgo 2008, p 177
2. The organized arrangement that regulates this bargain of legitimacy is the competitive political election.

3. Most adults can participate in the electoral process, both as voters and as candidates for important political office.

4. Citizens’ votes are secret and not coerced.

5. Citizens and leaders enjoy basic freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization. Both established parties and new ones can work to gain members and voters.6

The democracies I claim to be more stable than others are states where democracy is a natural part of the political life. Citizens and politicians alike respect the institutions of democracy where rule of law is implemented and there is freedom of expression and association. The democracies that live up to these standards are the mature democracies of the West. Nevertheless, these democracies are not flawless and have their own democratic deficit. I will not present an extensive discussion on the pros and cons of certain kinds of democracies; I will rather focus on the lowest common denominators, such as the things I listed above.

Democracy is used, for now, primarily to mean a set of political procedures in which the holders of power are responsible to electorates, either directly (by virtue of being elected) or indirectly (by virtue of being appointed by the elected); in which almost all adult citizens can vote ([…]); and in which people can form parties to contest elections, campaigns provide some opportunity for oppositions to address the electorate, and official vote counts are not profoundly fraudulent.7

‘Democracy can therefore only be understood as historical in all its dimensions, subject at once to institutional change and to changes in ideological perspectives.’8 The history of the democratic evolution shows that the concept of democracy is by no means settled and we will see changes in how democracy is experienced and what it must entail.

The notion of democracy I will use in my analysis is rather simplistic as I will argue that it is the basic features of democracy rather than the different setups of democracy that make a democracy more stable than any other form of government. I will label this type

6 Powell 1982, p 3
7 Markoff 1999, pp 662-663
8 Bourke 2008, p 13
of democracy as mature democracy in order to highlight the fact that semi-democracies can be seen as evolving into mature democracies.

Civil war will be used interchangeably with rebellion/revolution/internal conflicts. I do not separate these words in any way, although in conflict literature these concepts tend to denote different levels of armed conflict. I will use the words the authors I present use. Political violence on the other hand denotes riots and other civil disturbances that have note escalated into an armed conflict.

1.1 Aim

The aim of this study is to conduct a qualitative excursion into the notion of domestic democratic peace. It is an attempt to go beyond the statistics and establish a deeper understanding of why democracies seem to be more stable than other types of regimes. I will follow the recommendation of Krain & Edson Meyer (1997):

> Our preliminary test confirms the proposition that different regime types have different consequences for internal conflict. Specifically, we find that non-democracies are more civil war prone than democracies, even when controlling for period effects. In addition, this study demonstrates the value of applying the democratic peace proposition to the study of conflict other than interstate wars or disputes. Our project has proved to be a valuable testing ground for a proposition which has been examined all too often with the same data. Future work should continue this research strategy, refocusing its efforts on civil wars, as well as other types of intrastate conflict, in testing theories of conflict and conflict resolution.9

In order to establish this deeper understanding I have chosen to examine democracy through the lens of a holistic understanding of internal conflicts. This understanding consists of the notion of relative deprivation, where Burton’s sources of conflicts are used to highlight what can cause the experience of relative deprivation; instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity.

1.1.1 Research questions

- How can the proposed holistic understanding explain why mature democracies are more stable than newly established democracies and autocratic states?

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9 Krain & Edson Myer 1997, p 115
- In what ways do mature democracies decrease experience of relative deprivation and thereby safeguarding Burton’s sources of conflict?
- In what ways do mature democracies cater to a more peaceful process of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics?

### 1.2 Why a holistic understanding of internal conflicts?

The main advantage of this particular understanding of internal conflicts is that it is rooted in the personal experience of the author/creator Anders Nilsson. He was part of the peace process after the civil war in Mozambique. Since the peace process in 1992 there has been no more civil wars in Mozambique and has today one of the highest rates when it comes to economic growth. The peace process was undertaken through extensive discussions in all levels of society, not just on the top levels. Nilsson was also present in Mozambique during the civil war as documentary filmmaker and an aid worker. He still has close contact with the country and follows his master students from LUI on minor field studies.

Grievance theories have also made its way into just war theories. Jeff McMahan develops the notion of liability in his article ‘Just Cause of War’ (2005). Under the notion of liability a state/group may have just cause to attack another state if that state inflict harm, or cause that state/group some kind of deprivation or grievance. McMahan writes: ‘the just causes for war are limited to the prevention or correction of wrongs that are serious enough to make the perpetrators liable to be killed or maimed’. (2005, p 11) This notion is not wholly embraced as a just cause of war, as the grave implications of wars, i.e. maiming and killing, are so severe that the conditionality of the wrongs according to McMahan is strict. Nevertheless, relative deprivation theory is not interested in just causes of war; the focus is on why civil wars erupt.

I have myself applied this holistic understanding on two different kinds of conflicts: the Israel/Palestine conflict (master’s thesis 1-year) and the Holy Spirit Movement in Uganda. The framework manages to explain why peace between Israel and Palestine is so hard to reach as relative deprivation is experienced on both sides, but on different levels and there is an ongoing process of instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity.

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10 [http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/75548 2012-12-12]

11 Nilsson 1999
1.3 Delimitations

Due to the limited scope of this essay I have decided to conduct a theoretical study on the concept of mature democracies using a holistic understanding of internal conflicts. The study would have benefitted from a discussion on why semi-democracies are less stable, but this question is wider in scope than that of the stability of mature democracies as semi-democracies differ more amongst them and some are more stable than others. Such a study needs more space and would benefit from having the stabilizing effects of democracy more thoroughly examined.

Furthermore, the study would have benefitted greatly for a set of case studies on mature democracies, semi-democracies and autocracies to compare the different results, but again the limited space prevents this.

1.4 Outline

I will start this essay with a discussion of the method and material I have chosen to use in this study. In the third chapter I will discuss the previous research done on domestic democratic peace. The fourth chapter presents the holistic understanding of internal conflicts that I will use. First I will present a short discussion of conflict theories in general and how an acceptance for the notions of my chosen understanding of conflict has developed over the years. I then proceed to give an account of the holistic understanding. The fifth chapter analyzes mature democracy through the lens of the holistic understanding of internal conflicts. This chapter is divided into two sections: the first dealing with relative deprivation and Burton’s sources of conflict. The second deals with the processes of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics. I will end the essay with a discussion of the results of the study.

Chapters 3 and 4 may seem unnecessarily extensive, but they are central in order to understand chapter 5. Without the extensive presentation of the current understandings of domestic democratic peace and the in-depth presentation of the holistic understanding of internal conflicts the study falls flat.
2. Method and Material

2.1 Qualitative Method

One of the characteristics of qualitative research is the focus and in-depth study of one or a few cases. It provides a deeper knowledge of the problem and grounding in reality. The major problem with qualitative research is the researcher as it is based on interpretation of facts and data by the researcher. When doing a qualitative study the researcher has to be aware of his/her own preconceptions and bias in relation to the material used. Biased research can be avoided if the researcher stays grounded in the material and argues his/her case in a coherent manner. Another important part of doing qualitative research is the quality of the material and data used, it should, as far as possible, be varied and from as many sources as possible, preferably primary sources, but if primary sources are scarce, secondary sources can be used. If the bulk of material is secondary sources the demand for variety and accountability in the writers are of utmost importance to avoid biased information.  

This study is mainly theoretical. I will apply the holistic understanding of internal conflicts on the research of domestic democratic peace. The study will help to enhance the domestic democratic peace theory as it will add a deeper understanding of what aspects of democracy works to create more peaceful states. This study will show the importance of using a conflict theory to understand why mature democracies are more stable. It will illustrate how concepts such as relative deprivation and basic human needs, values and interests are useful in understanding the dynamics of both democracy and peace and how these concepts are catered for within the democratic setting. Furthermore, democracy seems to ease the processes of mass mobilization (politicisation of identity) and elite aspirations for power (instrumentalisation of politics). I will do so by examining the notions of rule of law, repression, equality, elections (participation and parties), right to vote and civil society. The first three deal with relative deprivation and Burton’s sources of conflict and the last three deals with instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity.

2.2 Abductive approach

The explanatory model of abduction can be said to be a combination of induction and deduction. Abduction works from the empirical material connected to theory. The theory is used to guide the researcher through the empirical material. Another way of

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12 Denscombe, 1998, pp 259-261
explaining abduction is that it can be used as a pattern for understanding certain events. The advantage of abduction lies in the combination of induction and deduction as it allows for alternate use of the two and is more flexible. Instead of testing a specific theory, the theory can evolve throughout the study based on the empirical material used. Abduction leads to a deeper understanding of both the theory and the case being researched. It is also probably the most common explanatory model when conducting a case study.  

The advantages of using an holistic understanding in an abductive way are that it allows for a combination of theories to be used at the same time and that the theories are not fixed, but rather fluid in the sense that they can be adapted to the material at hand.

### 2.3 Material

In this study I will mainly use theoretical material. I will analyze previous studies conducted on domestic democratic peace. These studies will be used in both chapter 3 and 5. Furthermore I will use different studies and philosophical texts on the concept of democracy. I will not use any literature on democratic peace dealing with interstate wars as I have enough literature dealing with domestic democratic peace.

### 3. The current understanding of domestic democratic peace

I have decided to divide the existing literature on domestic democratic peace in to two different parts. The first part deals with the statistical research that aims to find and explore the correlation between civil wars and regime type. The second presents the literature more focused on finding a specific cause why democracies are more stable than others. This kind of literature is mainly focused on one or a few variables when explaining why civil wars tend not to occur in democracies. Yet they all use statistics to prove their point in all the studies presented.

Most of the current understanding of domestic democratic peace is based on statistical measurements and mathematical methods. By using different sources of data, such as the Polity Project (Polity III, Polity IV denotes the same thing and are used interchangeably)\(^{14}\), Correlates of War\(^{15}\), Freedom House Index\(^{16}\) and Penn World Table\(^{17}\),

\(^{13}\)Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994, pp 42-43

\(^{14}\) http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 2012-12-27
different outcomes are reached, as detailed below. To measure income equality and level of development GDP (Gross National Product) and the Gini coefficient for income distribution is used. In part three of this chapter I will develop why these types of measurements are problematic explaining why civil wars occur and how it can blur the connection between civil wars and democracy. I end the chapter with a summary.

3.1 The statistical field of Domestic Democratic Peace

The interest in the stability of governments took off with Eckstein and his article ‘Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry’ (1973). His article tries to establish a structural analysis for authority patterns. He defines authority patterns as ‘a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit.’18 The advantage of studying polities from a perspective of authority patterns is that it can be applied to many different kind of societies and types of governments.19

In 1974 Gurr elaborates on Eckstein’s definition of authority patterns. He establishes the connection between ‘highly coherent polities’20 and stability of regime type. There is no difference in this assumption between autocracies or democracies, both are equally as stable as regime type. Anocracies, more commonly known today as semi-democracies, are the most unstable type of regime.21 Gurr uses five categories in order to establish this connection: openness of executive recruitment, decision constraints on the chief executive, extent of political participation, directivness: scope of governmental control, complexities of governmental structures. These categories are further divided into different levels on which a state can score points from 4-1. Depending on the score a state gets Gurr classifies them on the scale democracy-anocracy-autocracy.22

In 2006 Gates et al published an article reconstructing the model used by Gurr in his 1974 article; confirming Gurr’s conclusions: coherent regime types are more consistent

18 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 2012-12-27
16 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world 2012-12-27
17 https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 2012-12-27
13 Eckstein 1973, p 1153
19 Eckstein 1973, pp 1154-1156
20 Gurr 1974, p 1500
21 Gurr 1974
22 Gurr 1974, pp 1485-1486
than less coherent regime types, i.e. semi-democracies.\textsuperscript{23} Eckstein and Gurr later developed their findings into the Polity Project classifying states on a scale democracy-autocracy. Many of the studies conducted on domestic democratic peace use the numbers presented in these indexes.\textsuperscript{24}

Krain and Edson Myers (1997) use a simple model that correlates statistics on civil war based on Singer and Smalls \textit{Correlates of War} (1994), ‘which codes all civil wars from 1816 to 1992’\textsuperscript{25}, with the data over regime types collected by Jagger and Gurr in their Polity III (1996) index. They end up with 10 203 years of civil wars between 1816 and 1992. The result of their study shows a significantly lower occurrence of civil wars in democracies than in non-democracies, the relationship is 20\% civil wars in democracy versus 80\% civil war years in non-democracies. This study shows that there is a notable correlation between regime type and civil war, yet the study does not separate between mature democracies and emerging democracies.\textsuperscript{26}

Hegre et al (2001) try to rectify this by posing the hypothesis that semi-democracies (sometimes labeled anocracies, regimes with mixed types of authority levels) are more prone to civil wars than both mature democracies and autocracies. Instead of looking at merely regime type and civil war correlations they link regime change and civil war outbreaks. This makes their statistical data sheets more complex using different types of models in order to prove their hypothesis. However they continue to use the data provided by Singer and Smalls as well as the Polity Index project. They also add control variables such as

\begin{quote}
‘[…] Development, Ethnic Heterogeneity, Proximity of Independence, and International War in Country - whose omission might bias the results for the regime change variable. The remaining control variables-Proximity of Civil War and Neighboring Civil War - are included to model how the hazard of civil war depends on earlier events in the country and the neighborhood.’\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

This elaborate statistical analysis point to the fact that semi-democracies tend to be more unstable than mature democracies and autocracies.\textsuperscript{28} Fein first pointed this out in her essay

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{23} Gates et al 2006  \\
\textsuperscript{24} http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 2012-11-13  \\
\textsuperscript{25} Krain & Edson Myers, 1997, p 111  \\
\textsuperscript{26} Krain & Edson Myer, 1997, pp 112-114  \\
\textsuperscript{27} Hegre et al, 2001 p 37  \\
\textsuperscript{28} Hegre et al, 2001, p 44
\end{flushright}
'More Murder in the Middle’ (1995) where she established the relationship between life-integrity violations and democracy.

Goldstone et al (2010) use a model based on only four variables: regime type, infant mortality, conflict-ridden neighborhood and state-led discrimination. In this model they further complicate the picture on the scale democracy-autocracy. They divide the scale even more and fine-tune the understanding of the importance of regime type in understanding outbreaks of civil war. Their study includes full democracy, full autocracy, partial autocracy, partial democracy with factionalism and partial democracy without factionalism. Their result show that both full democracies and full autocracies faced the same incidence of civil wars, they proved to be more or less stable. Partial autocracy and partial democracy without factionalism faced the same threat from civil wars and regime change. However the most unstable type of government proved to be partial democracy with factionalism. They reach the conclusion that the most important aspect of understanding why civil wars erupt is the political regime of a given state.

While most of the above studies analyze conflicts over several decades, even centuries, Stockemer chose to focus on the time span after the end of the Cold War, 1990-2007. He also use a different index, instead of the more commonly used Polity Index, the Freedom House Index is used in his analysis. The reason for choosing this index is that it 'includes a scale of civil liberties alongside political rights in its assessment of democracy.' Stockemer reaches the conclusion that semi-democracies and autocracies are equally prone for civil wars; there was even a slightly higher incidence of civil wars in autocracies compared to semi-democracies. Nevertheless, the analysis confirmed that democracies are less likely to experience civil wars than the other two types of regime.

Given the different answers of the above cited articles Hegre and Sambanis (2006) made a sensitivity analysis of the scholarly work on domestic democratic peace. A sensitivity analysis is aimed to establish the robustness of a given theory. Most robustness test carried out in political science are generally ad hoc, as ‘they identify a set of competing explanations and see if their empirical results hold once they control for some variables that

29 Goldstone et al 2010, p 194
30 Goldstone et al 2010, p 196
31 Goldstone et al 2010, pp 197, 205-206
32 Stockemer 2010, p 267
33 Stockemer 2010, pp 273-274
might be consistent with those explanations.\textsuperscript{34} Hegre and Sambanis use Leamers theory of global sensitivity analysis defined as

"a framework for 'global sensitivity analysis' in which a neighborhood of alternative assumptions is selected and the corresponding interval of inferences is identified. Conclusions [would be] judged sturdy only if the neighborhood of assumptions is wide enough to be credible and the corresponding interval of inferences is narrow enough to be useful."\textsuperscript{35}

They based their sensitivity analysis on different concepts used in at least one study on the onset of civil wars. To each of these concepts they added a number of competing variables in explaining the concept in order to enlarge the ‘neighborhood of alternative assumptions’. The result of their analysis point to the importance of governance and regime type. The most robust variable was that of regime change or regimes in transition. The second most robust was the level of democracy, measured as how political participation is regulated. However not all variables concerning the level of democracy could be labeled robust. Variables concerning inconsistency of political institutions on the other hand proved to have a high level of robustness.\textsuperscript{36} There are a number of different variables that are robust in explaining civil wars, but regime type and level of democracy cannot be ruled out as Collier and Hoeffler\textsuperscript{37} argue.

\section*{3.2 Democratic Theory and Peace}

Przerworski et al (1997) argue that economic development is the most important factor to explain democratic domestic peace. They establish a correlation between GDP and the probability for democratic demise. According to their results, a democracy that has reached the level of $6000 per-capita income will not experience a change in regime type. Furthermore, there seems to be a connection between a growing economy and democratic stability, ‘democracy is more likely to survive in a growing economy with less than $1000 per-capita income than in a country where per-capita income is between $ 1000 and $ 4000, but which is declining economically.’\textsuperscript{38} Nevertheless, poor democratic countries can survive

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}
\bibitem{} Hegre & Sambanis 2006, p 509
\bibitem{} Leamer quoted in Hegre & Sambanis 2006, p 509
\bibitem{} Hegre & Sambanis 2006, p 527
\bibitem{} Collier & Hoeffler 2000
\bibitem{} Przerworski 1997, p. 305
\end{thebibliography}
given that they work to ‘generate development, if they reduce inequality, if the international climate is propitious and if they have parliamentary institutions.’

A problem with the results of Przeworski et al (1997 and 2000) is that their definition is very minimalistic, their definition of democracy, and thereby the variable of democracy they check for, is whether or not the rulers are elected and if there has been a change of leaders following an election. They do not take into account political liberties and how elections are held. A further problem with the results of Przeworski et al (2000) is the time span they have chosen. By starting at 1950 they leave out the democratic transition taking place prior to this year. These democratic transitions created the mature democracies that are the most stable today. Bois and Stokes (2003) show that by stretching the time span of Przeworski’s study and starting at 1850, economic development is proven to have a larger impact on the development of democracy than on the stability of democracy. By 1950 the most affluent countries were already democratic.

However, in the theoretical field of domestic democratic peace theory the general starting point is democracy and how democracy can act as a stabilizer in social/political conflicts. Reynal-Querol main argument is that the most stabilizing factor within democracy is the system of representation. She develops the theory that a majoritarian system is more likely to suffer from social conflicts than a proportional systems of representation. The reasons for this are mainly two: the opportunity cost of social conflict is higher in a proportional system than in a majoritarian and that a proportional system is more effective to promote different ethnic groups within an ethnically divided society. A proportional system that creates coalitions politics, as she labels it a consociational system, has the lowest probability of experiencing civil wars. The findings of Przeworski et al (1997) support Reynal-Querol's assumptions. In her article ‘Does Democracy preempt civil wars?’ she argues that the level of inclusiveness is the most important aspect of a political system and that the proportional system of representation serves this end the best.

There are however some problems in her analysis: she does not distinguish between democracies and semi-democracies. She argues that the level of democracy is not of any importance, that inclusiveness is what matters. Nevertheless, inclusiveness can be seen as

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39 Przeworski 1997, p. 305
40 Przeworski 2000, pp 28-29
41 Bois & Stokes 2003, pp. 529-531
42 Reynal-Querol 2001, p 4
43 Reynal-Querol, 2004
part of mature democracies and can be problematic with concern to semi-democracies. As the preceding chapter showed, there is a significant difference between mature democracies and semi-democracies. It can be argued that her studies are flawed in the same way as the study by Przerworski et al (1997 and 2000). By not taking in account the difference between the different structures and historical facts concerning mature democracies and semi-democracies the result can be regarded as problematic. Doing a sketchy account of mature democracies, it can be easily confirmed that neither the proportional system nor the majoritarian system are more prone for civil wars. This point to the fact that it might be something else that makes mature democracies more stable than semi-democracies other than what kind of system of representation is in place.

Sanhueza (1998) focuses on the hazard rates of political regimes. He wants to establish a connection between time and the probability of survival of the regime. He distinguishes regimes as autocracies, almost democracies and democracies. To establish this connection he looks primarily at the level of development and popular discontent. His study shows that economic development has a positive effect on the stability of regimes with democratic institutions whereas on autocratic regimes the effect is of almost of no importance. However, the relationship between the level of popular discontent and probability for regime change is higher in autocracies and of lesser importance in democracies. The hazard rate in the aspect of durability shows that regimes are the most vulnerable in their first years of existence and that this vulnerability decreases from approximately three years for autocracies and four years of existence for democracies.\textsuperscript{44} In this study there is a discussion and distinction between, as Sanhueza labels them, almost democracies and democracies. Nevertheless there are some problems with the samples that he uses in his study. Generally they date back to the early eighties and late seventies.\textsuperscript{45} As the study by Stockemer showed, with a different sample, the outcome is slightly different: autocracies and semi-democracies have the same likelihood for civil war.

Taydas et al (2010) argue for the importance of institutional quality. According to their results it is important to examine the rule of law, level of corruption and the quality of the bureaucratic system in order to understand the probability of civil war. Central to this argument is that the understanding needs to go beyond what is “on paper”. Many states can on paper have the correct political institutions in place without them functioning in a proper way.

\textsuperscript{44} Sanhueza 1998, pp 354-355
\textsuperscript{45} Sanhueza 1998, p 343 & pp 360-367
They end their article by advising further studies to conduct case studies of countries suffering from civil wars and how their institutions function and the quality of these institutions.\textsuperscript{46}

Hendrix (2010) also focuses on state capacity, but unlike Taydas et al, he expands the variables to three: military capacity, bureaucratic/administrative capacity and political institutional coherence and quality. These are in themselves divided into different ways of operationalization, 15 in all as identified by Hendrix. These in turn can be boiled down to three different categories: rational legality (can be equated with democratic societies), rentier-autocraticness (states rich in natural resources where incentive for tax collection is low) and neopatrimonality (monarchies where revenues from natural resources benefit the ruling family).

Furthermore, Rummel (1993) argues that the rules of democracy, such as ‘voting, negotiation, compromise and mediation.’\textsuperscript{47}, facilitate the peaceful resolution of potential social conflicts. The main reason for this peaceful resolution of social conflicts is that democracy through these rules constrains the possibilities for democratically elected leaders to use violence against their own people. In opposite to autocratic states where rule by force and coercion are used to suppress opposition. Rummel uses the concept of democide to establish the relationship of occurrence of civil wars in both democracies and autocracies. Democide is defined as ‘the intentional killing of people by government.’\textsuperscript{48} First he establishes the connection between democide and regime type, where autocracies have an overwhelming correlation to democide whereas in democracies have virtually no incidences of democide. Rummel then turns to the relationship between civil wars and regime type by correlating incidences of war-dead and rebellion-dead with democide. This relationship clearly shows that autocracies are more prone to experience civil wars/rebellions than democracies.\textsuperscript{49} The final conclusion of Rummels essay states: ‘democracy is a general method of nonviolence.’\textsuperscript{50}

Davenport (2004) follows in the line of Rummel where he asserts that the constraint put on the executive by democratic rules of election severely diminish the level of repression of the citizenry. However, he also finds that democratization does not lead to lower levels of repression; rather ‘the path towards this end (democratization) is covered in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Taydas 2010, p. 211
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Rummel 1993, p. 4
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Rummel 1993, p. 4
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Rummel 1993, pp. 7-25
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Rummel 1993, p. 25
\end{itemize}
This study is also based on statistical measurements. The main focus is on the executive constraint measure of the Polity data. Davenport slightly differs from other researchers in this field as he extensively reviews the measurements he uses and discusses the pros and cons of using them.

### 3.3 The problem with statistics

The studies conducted on domestic democratic peace theory are mainly quantitative in nature. Different types of statistical models and indexes are used to establish connections between different dependent and control variables (see for example Reynal-Querol 2001, 2002 a+b, 2005; Hegre et al 2001). Some use chi-square test (Krain & Edson Meyer 1997), others use a case-control method (Goldstone et al, 2010), there are a number of different statistical tools used to find what variables are the most important when correlating stability and regime type. Regardless of what type of statistical tool is used in a given study, the data used in most of the studies above come from the same kind of sources: the Polity Project, Correlates of War, Freedom House Index and Penn World Table. Despite the good intentions of the creators of these datasets, they are all inherently problematic as the following paragraphs will show.

Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) examine the theories concerning political opportunity structures and the problems identifying them. Political opportunity structure theories hold that social conflicts erupt when certain circumstances arise that create the possibilities for collective action to take place. In civil war theory this is usually connected to a weakened state capacity. As the authors themselves acknowledge, this is problematic as it is difficult to determine how to measure weakened state capacity. The problem rests in the material at hand and how to operationalize the studies. Most studies on regime stability rests on the numbers and estimations produced by the Polity Project by Gurr et al. Gleditsch and Ruggeri identify a number of problems with the Polity data, ‘which provide a 21-point scale indicating a country’s degree of democracy based on institutional characteristics.’ Using this data tend to produce an inverted U-curve argument that points to the fact that democracies and autocracies are more stable than semi-democracies. The main problem with the data lays in the observations made, the value of the observations produced and the explanation of the signification of the observations done.

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51 Davenport 2004, p. 555
52 Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010 p 301
Polity contains a large number of observations where we do not see regular values on the subcomponents that make up the overall Polity scale, since institutional characteristics could not be classified according to the coding protocol. More precisely, observations are given a special code during periods of ‘foreign interruption’ (~66), cases of ‘interregnum’ (~77), defined by Gurr, Jaggers & Moore (1989: 6) as periods ‘in which there is a complete collapse of central political authority’, or periods of ‘transition’ (~88) where institutional characteristics presumably are unclear or undergoing significant changes.\textsuperscript{53}

Given this way of coding states can be defined as being in interregnum by either experiencing civil war already or by being in transition from one type of regime to another. As this confusion exists it is hard to draw any conclusions on whether or not the state is actually weakened by being in transition or by suffering from civil war. ‘Moreover, although linear interpolation may be a reasonable strategy for dealing with missing data on slowly moving features, existing research shows that that political transitions rarely follow such a smooth pattern of change over time.’\textsuperscript{54}

Vreeland (2008) finds more problems with the Polity data. By using the data collected by Gurr et al in a slightly different way he reaches the conclusion that the inverted U-shape arguments are not present when the variables connected to political violence and civil war are left out of the equation. Apart from the problems of coding identified by Gleditsch and Ruggeri, Vreeland points to problems in the coding of political participation.

For these variables, however, observations are coded in the middle when political participation is factional, a situation where political competition between groups is “intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival governments and in civil war” (Gurr 1989, 12).\textsuperscript{55}

This can mean two things, according to Vreeland, either civil war is likely to occur when there is a civil war or that there is some connection between civil war and groups engaged in political violence.\textsuperscript{56} Most researchers using the Polity Project caution that the project has its problems (see Hegre et al 2001 and Fearon and Laitin 2003).

\textsuperscript{53}Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010, p 301
\textsuperscript{54}Gleditsch & Ruggeri, p 301
\textsuperscript{55}Vreeland 2008, p 402
\textsuperscript{56}Vreeland 2008, pp. 402-403
Studies using GDP or the Gini coefficient have similar problems with the data collected. In the Penn World Table almost one quarter of the annual observations for African countries in the period 1950-1988 lack GDP data.\(^{57}\) Furthermore the numbers submitted by the poor countries in the world suffers from being imprecise with an error margin of 20-40%. ‘This can have a substantial deleterious effect on the empirical results of a cross-country study.’\(^{58}\) As many of the states suffering from unstable political regimes can be found among the states with this track record in the data bases used for statistical studies on civil wars and regime stability, the correlation and results in studies like the ones presented in the two preceding parts of this chapter are problematic and non-conclusive. At most these types of studies point to the probability that their results are true, yet they present their results to be the primary reason for regime stability or civil war. Often studies reach different conclusions using the same type of material.

While every researcher might make legitimate decisions and strive for precision and rigor, the overall picture is one of multiple choices and discrepancies, conveying a strong sense of subjectivity, arbitrariness and imprecision.\(^{59}\)

The problem with statistics is depending on the choice of variables in use. The outcome will differ. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) reaches the conclusion that democracy do not matter when it comes to the outbreak of civil wars, whereas Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) reaches a slightly different conclusion by merely altering the statistical data presented by Collier and Hoeffler. The main difference between these two studies is the questions they want to answer. Collier and Hoeffler are interested in settling the dispute between greed and grievances theories in the understanding of civil wars whereas Elbadawi and Sambanis are mainly interested in is to ‘explore the impact of democracy and ethnic divisions on civil war prevalence.’\(^{60}\)

Another aspect that is problematic with using statistics is that it is blunt in the sense that it cannot take into account the unique difference in every case of civil war. The underlying assumption in statistical analysis is that all instances of civil war are insulated occurrences and that the past history of a given country plagued by civil war is somehow irrelevant. There is always an exemption to any attempt to generalize. Furthermore, the need

\(^{57}\) Laurie 2005, p. 13
\(^{58}\) Laurie 2005, p. 13
\(^{59}\) Laurie 2005, p. 16
\(^{60}\) Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, p. 308
for statistical analysis can be put into question. There are but approximately 200 sovereign states in the world, arguably all of them unique in form of government and experience of civil war. Furthermore, many of them are no longer plagued by civil wars. To do case studies on the states experiencing civil wars and trying to understand why they are is not that difficult. As Lipset writes:

> Clearly then, we cannot generalize by a formula. The various factors I have reviewed here do shape the probabilities for democracy, but they do not determine the outcomes. The record of social scientists as futurologists is not good. [...] Whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend significantly on the choices, behaviors, and decisions of political leaders and groups.\(^{61}\)

### 3.4 Why the need for yet another study on domestic democratic peace?

> ‘Political scientists of all inclinations are aware of the dictum “correlation does not prove causation.”’

Hadenius and Teorell (2009:62)

As the, far from comprehensive, account of the current understanding of domestic democratic peace shows, most of the studies done so far use some kind of statistical model to correlate democracy and civil war incidence. These studies can be roughly divided into two subfields: those establishing the relationship between democracy and civil war (see 3.1) and those trying to find ‘the’ variable that has the highest probability of explaining domestic democratic peace (see 3.2). The former prove the correlation without adding a theoretical understanding to why this is the case. The latter try to establish a theoretical understanding, yet they only use a limited set of variables as explanations. This combined with the problems of using statistical analysis in this particular case point to the need for a qualitative study of domestic democratic peace.

Furthermore, none of these studies use a conflict theory to test why democracies seem to be more stable. At the most some studies (see for example Reynal-Querol 2002(b)) look at some popular causes of conflicts such as ethnicity. If they do incorporate conflict theory, they again focus on a limited number of variables (usually one). Conflicts are inherently complex, many variables interact and these variables are not always the same (see ch. 4).

\(^{61}\) Lipset 1994, pp. 17-18

\(^{62}\) Hadenius & Teorell 2009, p 93
These two facts point for the need for a qualitative study on democracy using a holistic understanding of internal conflict to further explain why democracies are more stable. In the coming chapter I will present a holistic framework that I use to conduct a qualitative study on democracy.

4. Conflict theory and a Holistic understanding of internal conflict

In this chapter I will develop the holistic understanding that in chapter 5 will be used to explain why democracies are more stable. I will begin by briefly looking into the wider debate of understanding conflicts before I proceed to present the holistic understanding in more detail.

4.1 Understanding sources of conflict

The debate on understanding conflicts can roughly be divided into theories of ‘modernization’ and the Marxist understanding of conflicts. The modernization theories focuses mainly on transitions from one level of development into the next, as Goodwin writes: ‘[…] links revolutions to the transition from traditional to modern societies, […]’ In this process some people are left behind and do not benefit from change. Modernization theorists focus on the gaps that develop between different groups in society. Example of modernization theorists is Ted Robert Gurr and his book ‘Why Men Rebel’ (1970).

In the Marxist perspective the focus lies on group interests. It is the classical Marxist understanding of how certain groups in society exploit other groups. Conflicts can arise when: ‘[…] when the existing mode of production has exhausted its potential for further growth and development and has entered a period of crisis.’

This is a very simplistic sketch of these two different perspectives; nevertheless it shows the main traits of different understandings of sources of conflicts. I will now turn to a brief presentation of some recent work on understanding conflicts before I will present my holistic understanding.

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63 Goodwin 2001, p. 17
64 Goodwin, 2001, pp. 16-19
65 Goodwin, 2001, p. 20
In his book ‘Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World’ Goldstone conducts a thorough analysis of revolutions and rebellions in the early modern world. His analysis ranges from the European revolutions (England and France) to the crisis of the Ottoman and Ming empires in Asia. He writes:

But as we shall see, there are remarkable similarities in the originating pattern of state breakdown in Eastern and Western absolutisms: state fiscal crises linked to inflation; intra-elite divisions over social mobility; and popular uprisings, partly autonomous and partly elite orchestrated, that pressed basic economic demands so fiercely as to lead to changes in political, social and economic organization.66

Despite these findings he chooses to look for other explanations of why revolutions and rebellions erupt. He continues in the tradition of trying to find one variable that will explain why conflicts erupt67. In his case that one particular variable is demography. He finds the source of conflict lie in the tension between rising populations and the scarce resources of the any given state.68 He further develops this argument in the book ‘Political Demography’ (2012).

Goodwin uses a state-centered perspective when analyzing revolutionary movements. The state-centered approaches ‘[…] emphasize or ‘center’ a particular set of casual mechanisms – namely those processes whereby states (foreign as well as domestic) shape, enable or constrain economic associational, cultural and even social-psychological phenomena.’69 Yet the state-centered approach cannot in itself explain why revolutions erupt. Goodwin develops five state practices that can be seen to ‘engender or “construct” hegemonic revolutionary movements’.70 These are: unjust living conditions experienced by a particular group in society; exclusion of groups in society; discrimination of oppositional groups or elites; weakness in possibility of coercion; autocratic regimes.71 These five state practices can easily be fit inside the holistic understanding that I have chosen to work with. Goodwin’s analysis is useful in understanding the relationship between democracies and civil war/rebellion/revolutions as it focuses on the state. Nevertheless, he is not mainly concerned

66 Goldstone 1991, p 3
67 Goldstone 1991, p 22
68 Goldstone 1991, p 24
69 Goodwin 2001, p 36
70 Goodwin 2001, p 44
71 Goodwin 2001, p 44-50
with understanding why democracies are more stable, his focus is rather on pointing to the importance of the state when it comes to revolutions.

These short discussions on understanding sources of conflict shows three trends: the first that conflicts can either be understood as results of grievances or group/class tensions; second that there is a growing importance of the grievance theory; third that there is a desire to find that one, unique particular variable that explains why civil wars erupt. The holistic understanding I have chosen combine these three trends, as it is a holistic understanding of internal conflicts. This means that no particular importance is put on any one variable. Rather it allows for many different variables to interact in explaining civil wars. This holistic understanding is best used in an abductive manner; this means that the researcher combines induction and deduction in the work with the material. Instead of testing a specific theory, the theory can evolve throughout the study based on the empirical material used. Abduction leads to a deeper understanding of both the theory and the case being researched.  

4.2 Holistic understanding of internal conflicts

To understand how the theory of relative depravation leads to political violence I have divided the theory into three parts, relative deprivation, politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics, in order to make the different aspects of the theory more accessible. All three of these different aspects are necessary for relative deprivation to lead to political violence. Burton’s sources of conflicts are used as a blueprint to establish occurrence of relative deprivation.

4.2.1 Relative Deprivation and Political Violence

Gurr’s theory of Relative Deprivation as a tool to understand conflicts in the international community is based on the relationship between relative deprivation, collective/political violence (CV/PV) and the magnitude of political violence (PV).

Relative Deprivation → Potential for CV → Potential for PV → Magnitude of PV

Political violence is understood by Gurr as all acts of collective violence on political targets such as actors or policies. The goal of political violence is change in the socio-political arrangements of a political community or state. It includes coup d’états, riots and rebellion. However, the use of actual violence is not necessary; the threat of violence in order to force
the socio-political change to occur is enough. Furthermore, political violence is not automatically undesirable, it can be perceived to be the only way for change to come about in society due to highly coercive and discriminatory regimes.⁷³

**Chart 1. Relative deprivation**⁷⁴

The concept of relative deprivation (RD) is defined by Gurr as: ‘[…] actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities.’⁷⁵ RD simply put is the difference between what one feels to be entitled to and what one actually has or has the capability to achieve; expectations versus capabilities. One of the most important aspects of RD is that it is highly psychological and it can be experienced by all classes in society, not only by the lower classes but also by the upper classes. It is, as noted in the name, a relative concept: everyone can experience the frustration born in the sense of deprivation. It is not directly connected to poverty or low income, even the rich with an abundance of material goods and personal freedom can experience deprivation.⁷⁶ Chart 1 illustrates the concept.

RD can be experienced if there is discrimination in a state based on ethnicity, religion or other kinds of systemic discrimination. Usually RD is perceived in such situations when there is a discrepancy between the norms in society and what is actually felt to be ones

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⁷³ Gurr, 1970, pp 3-4
⁷⁴ Nilsson, 1999, p 160
⁷⁵ Gurr, 1970, p 24
⁷⁶ Nilsson, 1999, pp 159-160
capabilities to express oneself in terms of for example ethnicity and religion. There is a number of ways this kind of systemic discrimination is manifested.

First, there may be freedom of religion, but there are few possibilities to practice one’s beliefs in a proper way. Second, equality before the law can be a part of the constitution, but because of one’s identity, skin color or ethnicity one is treated differently. Third, oppositional parties can be banned and excluded from the political arena for certain reasons. This kind of action from the government or governing elites caters directly to politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics discussed below. Fourth, one’s life can be circumscribed by prohibitions regarding mobility, habitation and what kind of work one is allowed to perform.

Fifth, RD can also be based on group memory, the discrimination or source of frustration may have happened in the past but can still fuel feelings of deprivation. These five examples of possible RD does not necessarily lead to political violence, but serves as a growing ground for discontent that can under the right circumstances lead to collective violence and potentially to political violence.

RD is enhanced if one lives in close proximity to people who have more than you. Living close to or having an awareness of groups which are wealthier, have more freedom and can voice their frustration without repercussions will enhance RD and the potential for political violence.

4.2.1.1 Critique of RD

In his book ‘Why Muslims Rebel’ (2003) Mohammed M. Hafez offers some critique against Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation as a source to conflict especially in concern to why Muslims rebel. He cites three reasons why this theory does not explain why Muslims rebel. The first is that it is not enough to be frustrated for a group to engage in political struggle. For frustration to turn into political violence there is a need for some sort of organization around the frustration, there needs to be a leadership to guide the masses. There are a lot of frustrated groups around the world that do not express or fight their oppression. Hafez argues that this is due to a number of reasons such as heavy oppression from the

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77 Gurr, 1970, p 87
78 Gurr, 1970, p 89
79 Gurr, 1970, p 83
80 Gurr, 1970, p 223
opponent/state, lack of outside allies to support their cause, lack of resources and material etc.\textsuperscript{81}

The second reason deals with the fact that even if frustrated groups manage to assemble enough support and power to actually fight they do not necessarily have to turn to violence. They can channel their frustration in more established ways such as forming a party to voice their frustration or lobby the government/leaders of the state or whatever is causing the oppression and frustration. For violence to erupt there needs to be a feeling that it is the only way to voice ones grievances. The third reason deals with the kind of militancy that breaks out, with scope, scale, intensity and duration. In certain instances a group may change society by mass demonstrations, in other cases political violence breaks out. Some conflicts last for only a few months whereas others turn into protracted conflicts without a foreseeable end.\textsuperscript{82} Hafez does not deny the importance of relative deprivation as a source of political violence; however one needs to look at so much more to establish why certain cases of deprivation and frustration turn in to political violence.\textsuperscript{83}

Collier and Hoeffler offer the same kind of critique against relative deprivation theory in their article ‘Greed and Grievances in Civil Wars’ (2000). They argue that grievances alone cannot explain the occurrence of civil war as there are many cases where severe grievances can be found but no civil wars. Nevertheless, they argue that grievance can have some importance in explaining civil wars.

In this essay this critique is met by adding the concepts of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics. These concepts deal with how relative deprivation is channeled into political violence. Instead of offering one simple explanation to why civil wars occur, this holistic framework offers a wider explanation to civil war occurrence.

\textbf{4.2.2 Burton’s Sources of Conflict}

Burton’s sources of conflict are three: basic human needs, values and interests. In this holistic understanding they are important as they are the concepts used for establishing the occurrence of relative deprivation. They also help in understanding how identity is politicised and politics instrumentalised.

\textsuperscript{81} Hafez, 2003, p 17
\textsuperscript{82} Hafez, 2003, p 18
\textsuperscript{83} Hafez, 2003, pp 18-19
**Basic Human Needs**

Burton defines human needs as universal to all human beings, they are not merely about food and shelter, and rather they deal with human autonomy and the need of humans to be respected for who they are and where they come from. The most important aspect of human needs, contrary to values and interests, is that it is extremely difficult, not to say impossible to change them. They cannot be altered over time, neither by socialization nor coercion and sanctions. If these needs are not satisfied they generate RD and can turn into political violence worst case scenario. 84

**Values**

Values can be defined as habits, ideas, beliefs and customs. They are closely linked to the expression of one’s identity, both culturally and socially. For some values and needs seem to be the same thing, but that is not so. Values are usually specific to a certain culture or ethnic identity and they vary between different cultures and ethnic groups. Needs are more basic and deals with the inherent need of respect, development and personal growth. Values can change over time. Two cultures living in close proximity and with close contact over time will assimilate and have features of both cultures. Moving into a different cultural area also alters values through education for example. The time span we are talking about is a generation or two. However, if the values of one culture are suppressed, denied or harassed it can lead to RD and political violence. 85

**Interests**

Interests are the third category of Burton’s sources of conflict. This category is more transitional than the other two, it can change if circumstances in society change or if ones personal circumstance change. Interests can be defined as ‘[…] the occupational, social, political and economic aspirations of the individual […]’ 86 they are personal hopes and aspirations of all human beings. There is a need for these interests, not necessarily to be fulfilled, but there needs to be a sense that they could be fulfilled. However, there is a darker aspect to interests and that is that the pursuit of group interests in society does not necessarily cater for the common good. The relationship between interests and needs is that prohibition

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84 Burton, 1990, 36-37
85 Burton, 1990, pp 37-38
86 Burton, 1990, p 38
and circumcision of interests has a negative impact on needs, as it infringes on basic human needs.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{4.2.2.1 Critique of Burton’s Sources of Conflict}

Burton’s sources of conflict have been criticized on different levels, mainly concerned with his theories around basic human needs. In this section I will discuss two authors who criticize basic human needs in general and Burton’s basic human needs in particular. The two authors are Vivienne Jabri and Tarja Väyrynen, they criticize basic human needs from two different perspectives.

In her book ‘Discourses on Violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered’ Jabri uses Gidden’s theory of structuration to argue the need to put conflicts in the right social structure and analyze how the social structure affects actors to resort to violence. At centre of the theory of structuration lies the age old dualism of agency and structure. However, while individualism and structuralism sees one of them as the most important ontological concept, in structuration theory the relationship between agency and structure is problematized and put into a context. Agency and structure are both essential in understanding the social world.\textsuperscript{88} The theory of structuration is, according to Gidden’s, ‘\textit{social practice ordered across time’}.\textsuperscript{89} According to Jabri basic human needs theory lacks the structural aspect of social theory. Basic human needs theory is based firmly in the individualist camp of agency. The theory fails to put identity and the creation of identities in its right context and structure.\textsuperscript{90} In failing to do so it becomes ‘[…] ahistorical and acontextual […]’.\textsuperscript{91}

In ‘Culture and international conflict resolution’ Väyrynen specifically analyses and criticizes Burton’s sources of conflict. As indicated in the title of the book, she identifies the problem with Burton’s theory to be the rejection of culture in the analysis of conflicts.\textsuperscript{92} Both these objections are valid and should be noted. However, Burton does allow for both the study of structure and culture under the heading of values in his sources of conflict. Burton does not deny the importance of culture and the structural surrounding of the individual.\textsuperscript{93} As argued in the theory of structuration, it is of utmost importance to understand the interaction

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\textsuperscript{87} Burton, 1990, pp 38-40  \\
\textsuperscript{88} Jabri, 1996, pp 75-77  \\
\textsuperscript{89} Quoted in Jabri, 1996, p 77  \\
\textsuperscript{90} Jabri, 1996, pp 121-124  \\
\textsuperscript{91} Jabri, 1996, p 123  \\
\textsuperscript{92} Väyrynen, 2001  \\
\textsuperscript{93} Burton, 1990, pp 37-38
\end{flushright}
between structure and agency. According to Burton’s sources of conflicts this is allowed, under basic human needs the individual actor is examined and under values the relationship between the individual and the surrounding structure is examined. He adds an extra twist by adding interests into the mix, something that is highly subjective and ever changing over time.

If the criticism of the lacking structural argument in Burton’s theory can be fairly easy to refute, the second criticism is harder. Both authors question the universalist and biological claims of human needs theory. Väyrynen argues that such claims decontextualises human needs and it is implied that it is part of the Western universality tradition which is based on the assumptions that whatever is true in the Western, white, male hemisphere is true all over the world. Jabri offers the same kind of critique of this aspect of human needs theory. Both dismiss the claim on the lack of evidence to support the assumption. However, powerful evidence has been presented in the World Bank report ‘Voices of the Poor: Can anyone hear us’ (2000). In this report the following quote can be found:

As we moved more deeply into analyses of poor people’s experiences with poverty, we were struck repeatedly by the paradox of the location and social group specificity of poverty, and yet the commonality of the human experience of poverty across countries. From Georgia to Brazil, from Nigeria to the Philippines, similar underlying themes emerged: hunger, deprivation, powerlessness, violation of dignity, social isolation, resilience, resourcefulness, solidarity, state corruption, rudeness of service providers, and gender inequity.

This quote points to the fact that if we strip away the layers of culture, values and interests we all have the same needs that we want to fulfill. It does not matter whether or not one is poor or rich or live in the West or in Malawi, human dignity is important. Humans want to live their lives on their own terms with respect of and for each other. This claim is not a Western biased one; it is in fact so that despite the color of our skin we all want our basic human needs fulfilled and respected.

\[94\text{ Väyrynen, 2001, pp 46-47}\]
\[95\text{ Jabri, 1996, p 122}\]
\[96\text{ Narayan, 2000. p 3.}\]
4.2.3 Politicisation of Identity

For RD to be turned into political violence there has to be a level of politicisation of identity, something that can channel the feeling of frustration and deprivation into collective and political violence. However, identity in conflict situation should not to be narrowly understood as being ethnic. Nilsson argues that there are a number of different identities that can be politicised: class, gender, age, religion, local/territorial, political, linguistic, kinship and supra-ethnic national identity to name but a few. As one of his interviewees commented it is ‘...about politicisation of anything it was possible to politicise.’\(^97\)

As I wrote above, the banning and prohibition of political parties in a community is one way for identity to be politicised. The party leadership can use the feelings of frustration in society to promote their own agenda. In order to do that they need to answer to what the discontented are experiencing and feeling. However, such an elite organization is not necessary in order to channel the frustration of the discontented.\(^98\) Identity can be politicised by local leaders in the affected community, one example of this is Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirit Movement who without any political power managed to channel the frustration felt by the Acholi in Uganda to a rebellion that experienced a fair amount of success before it was defeated.\(^99\)

Table 1 shows possible outcomes of RD in a society. If RD is only felt by the masses turmoil or riots may occur, usually easily for the political leadership to crush. However, if RD is experienced both by the masses and segments of the elites the risk for violence increases. When RD is experienced by only elites, there is a risk of conspiracy or coup d’êtats, political violence is in no need of large amounts of support or soldiers. If there are low levels of RD in society, there is minimal violence. There is no discontent for neither the elite nor the masses to alleviate.\(^100\)

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\(^97\) Nilsson, 1999, p 214  
\(^98\) Gurr 1970, pp 179-180  
\(^99\) Allen, 1991, pp 370-399  
\(^100\) Nilsson, p 164
Intensity and Scope of mass RD

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity and Scope of elite RD</th>
<th>Low</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Minimal violence</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>Conspiracy</td>
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Table 1. Outcome of relative deprivation in mass and elite groups

Politicisation of identity is an essentially bottom-up process. There is a necessity for discontent of a large group that in some sense or another identify with each other in order for an identity to be politicised. It does not suffice to experience the same kind frustration or RD for politicisation of identity to occur, it is not enough to unite around being poor. However, if the poor belong to a group that perceives to have a certain identity, be it soldiers, women or an ethnic group, there is an identity to politicise.

4.2.4 Instrumentalisation of Politics

If politicisation of identity is a bottom-up process, instrumentalisation of politics is a top-down process. This process answers to the perceived RD of the elites. It deals with the aspiration of elite groups to broaden their social base, to ground their politics with the masses. In a political system that is not centered on multi-party democracy this kind of instrumentalisation takes place when the elite feels that their political or economical interests are being denied or hampered. In a multi-party democracy this kind of RD is usually channeled through different political parties or the creation of new parties that cater to these specific sources of RD. For elites to become powerful or successful in their aspirations they usually have to join forces with the masses. It is in this joining of forces is where the instrumentalisation of politics meets the process of politicisation of identity.

4.3 Framework put together

For relative deprivation to lead to political violence Burton’s sources of conflicts, instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity needs to be present in one form or other. They interact and together they can throw a country or region into violent conflicts. However it is important to bear in mind that the occurrence of all three in a society does not mean that the society is on the verge of civil war. There are a number of different circumstances in a society that needs to be present for collective/political violence to erupt.

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101 Nilsson, 1999, p 164
102 Nilsson, pp 215-217
103 Nilsson, 1999, p 218
The outbreak of political violence is dependent on the reaction of the leaders in the country to the demands made by the groups experiencing RD. There is a correlation between coercion/sanctions from the government and collective/political violence in a society. The correlation between punishment and lower levels of violence is weak; rather it could be argued that high levels of punishment can lead to a more violent society. Coercion and sanctions against people who are associated to dissident groups usually leads to support for protests rather than condemning the actions of the dissidents.\textsuperscript{104}

There is also a dependency between the support of the masses, terrain and the dissidents and political violence. If the dissident group enjoys popular support it can sustain small-scale attacks on the opponent. However, if popular support is falling the surrounding terrain becomes highly important in order to maintain a long-term opposition against a powerful opponent. Popular support for dissidents is dependent on the level of satisfaction of RD or the prospect of RD satisfaction. If the dissident group fails to satisfy RD popular support will eventually decrease and if the dissidents turn against their own group or the group where they gained popular support, popular support will shift and be given to the government/official leaders of the country.\textsuperscript{105}

By combining Burton’s sources of conflict with Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation the understanding of conflicts are enhanced. Burton concepts of basic human needs, values and interests offer the tools of establishing the sources of relative deprivation. In Gurr’s theory the concept of relative deprivation can be perceived as a bit vague, however Burton argues that human needs theory can implicitly be found in Gurr’s theory.\textsuperscript{106}

5. Democracy and a holistic understanding of world society conflict

It is inherent in the concept that basic human needs, values and interest will be safeguarded in a democratic government. The multi-party system channels the possible negative energies that can emerge in perceived relative deprivation among both elites and the

\textsuperscript{104} Gurr, pp 242-255
\textsuperscript{105} Gurr,1970,  pp 264, 297
\textsuperscript{106} Burton, 1990, p 94
masses. In this section I will further develop the arguments of why democracy decreases the risk for internal conflicts using the proposed holistic understanding. I have chosen to analyze relative deprivation and Burton’s sources of conflict in the same section as the latter is used to establish the existence of the former. Instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity will be analyzed in the second section as they interact with each other.

5.1 Relative Deprivation and Burton’s sources of conflict

This section is divided into three parts: rule of law, repression and equality. The reason for the choosing these three notions are that they are reoccurring themes when trying to explain domestic democratic peace. In these notions we can identify sources of relative deprivation as basic human needs, values and interest fall under this notion.

5.1.1 Rule of Law

The notion of liberty is under democracy defined by the rule of law. Przeworski defines liberty as ‘freedom through law and freedom from law’.107 This means that law guarantees the citizens a certain level of freedom, given that the law of the state has been agreed upon through democratic elections of representatives. It also means that the law should regulate the level of interference from the rulers of the state. Game-theory can be used to visualize this concept: if all cooperate, we all benefit the most.108

Weingast (1997) argue that democracies are stable because of the respect for the rule of law by masses and elites alike. He advances an approach that identifies democracy as a limited form of government. It is limited in the respect that the government is bound by the set of values of the citizens concerning what the government may or may not do. Weingast labels these phenomena as a coordination dilemma. This dilemma is resolved when the political institutions, elites and masses have reached a consensus on the boundaries of state power and the respect for democratic rights.

A society that has resolved this dilemma is a society that exhibit the following complementary phenomena: ‘stable democracy, a set of political institutions and rights of citizens that define limits on the state, and a shared set of beliefs among the citizenry that those limits are appropriate and worth defending.’109 These phenomena can be seen to characterize mature democracies. This indicates that in a mature democracy the values and

107 Przeworski 2010, p 150
108 Przeworski 2010, pp 150-151
109 Weingast 1997, p 253
interests of the citizens are safeguarded by the rule of law, a rule of law that is respected by elites and masses alike. Weingast stress the importance of examining the values and interests of both elites and masses.\textsuperscript{110} This argument follows the logic of the holistic understanding of internal conflicts in which the interaction between the masses and elites are central for political violence and civil wars to erupt.

### 5.1.2 Repression

State repression is a source for relative deprivation. State repression generally means the possibilities and acts of a coercion and limitation of the political influence from a state directed on its citizenry or parts of citizenry. Davenport argues that a popular account for the connection between democracy and repression are as follows:

When authorities are accountable to those within their territorial jurisdiction, they are less inclined to use coercion against them because they could lose mass support, be removed from office, or face increased difficulty getting legislation passed/implemented because of delays, negotiations, or some form of investigation. Political authorities therefore resort to repressive behavior in order to avoid the costs normally associated with coercion and to maintain the position, status, and resources that accompany public office.\textsuperscript{111}

This connection is only valid at the highest level of democratization, i.e. in the mature democracies of the West. Davenport challenges this account of the domestic democratic peace theory on three accounts. The first deals with the fact that it seems that although democracy has a positive effect on the level of repression, it is necessarily not the case with the level of respect for social liberties. Second that some aspects of democracy seems to be better at counteracting repression. These aspects deal with the participation of the masses in their electoral power combined with the need for political elites to stay in power. The third account is concerned with the possibility of democracy to decrease the possibility of repression in the light of political conflicts.

There are competing notions on whether or not this is true, some argue that political conflict has no impact on the level of repression whereas others argue that it does.\textsuperscript{112} These challenges are mostly valid when dealing with emerging democracies and not with mature democracies. In most mature democracies these challenges are of little concern.

\textsuperscript{110} Weingast 1997, p 261
\textsuperscript{111} Davenport 2007, p 176
\textsuperscript{112} Davenport 2007, pp 177-178
Davenport (2004) further finds that executive constraint lowers the levels of repression in a state.

Regan and Henderson (2002) argue that democracies are less prone to use repression on their citizens. The reason for this is the close connection between level of threat to the leadership of a state and the level of repression in a state. In a democracy the threat against the leadership is low as oppositions have legal ways of voicing their views through political institutions. This is somehow the opposite in semi-democracies, as the political institutions are not as well developed as they are in mature democracies. There seems to be a tendency that leaders of semi-democracies meet the demands of the opposition with repression rather than to seek less violent means of meeting these demands.

However, the most important variable identified by Regan and Henderson is that it is not the regime type that is important to understand repression, it is the threat experienced by the leaders of a state. Somehow this seems to be a discussion of the chicken and the egg, what causes what. It can be argued that, as Regan and Henderson concede, that the level of democracy actually decreases the level of perceived threat by the leaders. In a democracy the opposition is a central and integrated part of the political system, it does not pose a threat that needs to be met by repression of any form. Pierskalla (2010) argues that “Murder” happens in the “middle” because in semidemocracies and transitioning regimes, there is higher uncertainty about the rules of the game, behavioral norms, and the capabilities of actors.\(^{113}\)

In mature democracies the rules of the games are set on how the state is best rule and how opposition is to operate. There is no place for the kind of repression that can be seen in semi-democracies and autocracies where opposition is limited or forbidden, and those offering critique can face repression in full scale.

5.1.3 Equality

Basic human needs, values and interests understood as the respect for both individual and collective freedoms are inherent in what we perceive democracy to be. Christiano argues that democracy is grounded in public equality, that we all as citizens in a democracy have the possibility to advance our different interests.\(^{114}\) In the notion of public equality Christiano puts basic liberal rights, such as ‘Rights to freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of private pursuits[…]’\(^{115}\) These rights are part of the package when individuals are treated publically as equals. Their basic

\(^{113}\) Pierskalla 2010, p 135

\(^{114}\) Christiano 2006, p 83

\(^{115}\) Ibid., p 90
human needs, values and interests are being respected. As early as in the time of the Greek city states we find the same thoughts on equality and the pursuit of freedom:

[...], the first principles of democracy were freedom and equality – all citizens being free by birth each one would accept the other as an equal, and henceforth by ruling they accepted to be ruled in return. [...] democracy also meant that officials were to be controlled by fixed laws and by the people’s vote – [...] – that citizens would be ensured the right to live on their own behalf without being educated and guarded by the state and its public norms.\textsuperscript{116}

Nevertheless, Przeworski argues that equality is not necessarily inherent to the concept of democracy. Equality within a democracy can only be under the label of participation: everyone should have equal opportunity to participate and there must be equal weight put on each vote. For Przeworski the concept of anonymity is more valid to use in this context, a citizen needs not be distinguishable from the rest. The rulers need not know who s/he is, only what s/he indicates by casting their vote.\textsuperscript{117}

Another form of equality connected with democracy is that of social and economic equality. This form of equality is often assumed to have a close and positive connection to mature democracies. As Przeworski established before, this is not inherent in democracy. Nevertheless, in a democratic system the rulers and the parties cannot ignore this aspect as “the poor” in most countries outnumber the rich and a party merely focused on issues for the rich have less chance of ruling in a democratic system. In the newly established democracies of Eastern Europe and the emerging democracies of Latin America a large part of the people expect that the inequalities in the social and economic realm will decrease with the advent of democracy.\textsuperscript{118}

Most studies on how socio-economic groups use their right to vote point to the fact that there is only a slight difference in voter turnout between the rich and the poor, where the rich tend to vote more. In most Western countries this is the case, only the United States and France diverge from this trend with a smaller proportion of the poor vote. In the developing world this relationship is reversed. The poor tend to use their vote more than the

\textsuperscript{116} Hidalgo 2008, p 179
\textsuperscript{117} Przeworski 2010, pp 66-67
\textsuperscript{118} Przeworski 2010, p 85
rich. These facts point to the need for political parties in democracies to be more sensitive to socio-economic inequalities. Equality is perhaps not inherent in the concept of democracy, but demands for equality follows in the wake of democracy as most people in states live in the lower end of the socio-economic scale and want to see their situation improved. The gap between value capabilities and value expectations can become less under democracy.

Taydas and Peksen (2012) point to the fact that there seems to be a certain degree of correlation between welfare spending and a lower risk for civil wars to erupt. In order to prove this correlation they look to the level of governmental spending on education, health and social service spending. They give two probable reasons for this correlation. First, welfare spending increases the masses level of satisfaction with the political leaders. It shows that they “care” about the well being of their citizens. This leads to less desire to change the political leadership. Second, welfare spending decreases the effects of poverty and weakens the opportunity structure for rebellion. Furthermore, welfare spending decrease perceived relative deprivation as it caters to the basic human needs of the population. **Walters (2004)** finds the same relationship between higher levels of economic well being and a decreased risk for reoccurring civil wars. Rebel groups need to find soldiers to fight their wars and they do recruit them among the poor where perceived relative deprivation is high.

These two studies support the notion that it is important for states to focus on social and economic equality as it seems to play a part when it comes to decreasing relative deprivation. In many states citizens suffer from social and economic inequalities. In democracies these circumstances turns in to political parties focusing on these types of issues. Today a political party can find it hard to win an election if they do not tend to the questions of social and economic inequalities. It can be argued that the Republicans lost the presidential race 2012 in the US to the Democrats due to a lack of focus on social and economical inequalities. **Also the change by the Swedish Moderaterna into the new “Labor Party” can be seen as an example of the need for political parties to focus on social and economic inequalities.**

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119 Przerworski 2010, pp 93-94, the circumstances surrounding the vote of the poor in the developing world need to be understood in the light that there are some studies pointing to clientilistic relationships.

120 Taydas & Peksen 2012, p 276

121 Walter 2004, p 372


123 [http://www.moderat.se/politik](http://www.moderat.se/politik) 2013-01-08
5.2 Instrumentalisation of Politics and Politicisation of Identity

This section is also divided into three parts: elections: participation and parties; right to vote and civil society. These notions are chosen to illustrate how the processes of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics can work in a peaceful manner.

5.2.1 Elections: Participation and Parties

The concept of democracy is based on the assumption of the rule of the people. This assumption is problematic to say the least as it is impossible for all people to rule at the same time or even once. This problem has been solved in different ways throughout the history of democracy, commonly with limiting who can be considered the people. Today this problem has been solved with the use of elections and multi-party systems. ‘What can be realized is a mechanism through which people who never govern themselves select their rulers and at different times can select different rulers if they so wish.’

Fearon (2006) argues that an election ‘is a natural and indeed ingenious way of solving this coordination problem.’ The coordination problem being Weingast coordination dilemma (see section 5.1.1). Through the processes of elections the electorate threatens the leaders of potential rebellion if they do not conform to the rules of the systems that have been worked out when the coordination dilemma was solved. Elections provides the masses and opposing elites with the opportunity to keep the leaders following the agreed upon rules. If the rules are not followed there is a possibility for rebellion as masses and elites potentially can join forces against the leaders of a state. Londregan and Vindigni (2006) follow the same logic as Fearon when they argue that voting can be seen as way of the masses to threat the leaders of the state to keep to the rules. According to them voting for a particular party means that one is prepared to fight for that party, ‘the way in which fair elections, by revealing the relative fighting strength of the factions, create a shared set of expectations about the consequences of a potential civil war.’

The people of England regards itself as free, but it is gravely mistaken. It is free only during the election of members of Parliament. As soon they are elected, slavery overtakes

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\(^{124}\) Przerworski 2010, p 18

\(^{125}\) Fearon 2006, p 28

\(^{126}\) Fearon 2006, p 28

\(^{127}\) Londregan & Vindigni 2006, p
it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short moment of liberty it enjoys merits losing them. - Rousseau

This quote points to the problematic relationship between democracy and representation. Nevertheless, the masses are not as powerless as Rousseau indicates. In mature democracies where there are regular elections with the possibility for a ruling party to be exchanged for other party, parties are very weary of the politics they pursue and do not tend to diverge greatly from the platform on which they were elected. Today this relationship is not considered problematic by the masses, it is taken for granted as a part of democracy, Rosanvallon writes:

Representation, in other words, is not understood as a mechanical principle, like that authorizing the delegation of elected authority. It has a creative and instituting capacity unto itself. It is the means to unity and identity. If the fact of voting is a personal right, the subject of representation is not the individual considered in isolation, but the nation as a whole, that is to say the collectivity in its irreducible totality.

Instrumentalisation of politics deals with how elites organize themselves when it comes to expressing their perceived relative deprivation in the state they live in. The quest for democracy throughout the centuries has been driven by elite, mainly academics of non-noble decent, dissatisfied with the rule of monarchy. Many of the political parties in the developed world have evolved from this centennial quest for democracy. The multi-party system acts as a catalyst for the elite. Przerworski writes:

The magic of elections is that they enable intertemporal horizons. A party that loses in any conflict may be prone to revert to force if it expects the defeat to be permanent or just indefinite, yet it may respect the result if it believes that in some fixed time it will have a chance to win. This is what elections enable: the prospects of alternation of power.

In a democracy the elites have the possibility to enjoy power or expect to enjoy power through the concept of fair elections. This alleviates their possible sense of relative deprivation.

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128 Quoted in Markoff 1999, p 671
129 Przerworski 2010, pp 112-113
130 Rosanvallon 2004, p 89
131 Przerworski 2010, p 122
deprivation that could lead them into a perceived need for change of regime by force. Przerworski et al (2000) defines democracies along the lines of the change of political leadership in a country. Four criteria need to be fulfilled for a country to be labeled a democracy:

1) Are the head of state elected,
2) Is the parliament elected
3) There is more than one party to elect
4) Is election followed by a change of head of state

This is a fairly limited account of democracy as it eliminates the notions of the different freedoms attached to democracy. Yet it proves its value when we turn to look how authoritarian regimes use the multi-party system to manipulate the elites.

Gandhi and Przerworski point to the fact that authoritarian regimes employing a certain degree of freedom for elites to organize themselves and have a limited influence over the state tend to last longer than authoritarian regimes excluding other elites. Fjelde (2010) supports this notion. A multi-party authoritarian regime has a higher survival rate than a military-ruled authoritarian regime, despite the fact that the latter controls the means of coercion and thereby would make the costs higher for a potential civil war. Even a single-party authoritarian regime is more stable than the military lead one.

These findings point to the fact that elite mobilization is something that leaders of authoritarian regimes need to be aware of and try to channel if they do not want to be turned out of office. By using the multi-party system of democracy but without fulfilling Przerworski et al (2000) criteria for democracy authoritarian regimes can stay alive for a longer period of time. This assumption is further supported by Gandhi and Przerworski (2006) where they show that in times of possible rebellion dictators tend to try to appease elites in their countries in order to deter the rebellion.

The party system enables different kinds of groups in society to express their interests and what is important to them. The existence of a multi-party system decreases the possibilities for violations of values and interests according to Burton’s sources of conflict as the opportunity to create a party of one’s own is not limited, given that the freedom of association is granted in the constitution. Furthermore, the party system in itself follows

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Przerworski 2000, pp 28-29
Gandhi & Przerworski 2007
Fjelde, 2010
Gandhi & Przerworski 2006
democratic rules, that is representatives are elected within a party structure and their possibilities to act on their own is severely limited by the rules and regulations of the party.\textsuperscript{136}

\textbf{5.2.2 The right to vote}

The right to vote has always been and still is an act of inclusion and exclusion. Rosanvallon writes: ‘The demand for universal suffrage, which emerged at the beginning of the July monarchy, was linked to the demand for social inclusion.’\textsuperscript{137} Some have the right to vote, some do not. This is not an issue that some see as problematic, certain groups are excluded and no reason is given nor is this situation problematized to any great extent. Today non-citizens, nonadults and certain groups of adult criminals do not have the right to vote.\textsuperscript{138} Rosanvallon again: ‘Those excluded from political rights would in future be identified as a social group.’\textsuperscript{139}

In the beginning of democracy, in ancient Greece, only adult, free men were granted the right to vote, as they were the only ones who had citizenship in the city-states.\textsuperscript{140} By the time of the French Revolution the claim for universal suffrage was raised. Initially universal suffrage was to be granted to those that had a certain income, in the constitution of 1791 a certain level of tax payment was set as a minimum but by the constitution of 1793 the propertyless were granted the right to vote. However, as these constitutions were exchanged by a number of other constitutions they can merely be seen as an introduction to the idea of universal suffrage.\textsuperscript{141}

The right to vote for racial and ethnic groups is still today problematic. It was not until 1965 that the Afro-Americans were granted the right to vote, the same fate faced the aboriginal people in Australia and the non-white population in South Africa. A notable exception is the Maori in New Zealand who were granted suffrage in 1867.\textsuperscript{142} However, the most problematic situation is of those who are termed non-citizens. ‘In the 1990s as well, there are millions of temporary, semi-permanent and permanent residents with limited rights in Western Europe and the United States.’\textsuperscript{143}

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\textsuperscript{136} Przerworski 2010, p 26  \\
\textsuperscript{137} Rosanvallon 2004, p 98  \\
\textsuperscript{138} Markoff 1999, pp 662-663  \\
\textsuperscript{139} Rosanvallon 2004, p 99  \\
\textsuperscript{140} Beckman 2009, p 11  \\
\textsuperscript{141} Markoff 1999, p 677  \\
\textsuperscript{142} Markoff 1999, p 681-682  \\
\textsuperscript{143} Markoff 1999, 681
\end{flushleft}
However, the most problematic question of the right to vote is the question of inclusion/exclusion. Beckman points at two problems with the question of exclusion concerning democracy. The first problem deals with the fact that democracy is understood as the “rule by the people”. If this is democracy than any form of exclusion from that notion means that the state is compromising its status as a democracy. The second problem deals with how to justify the exclusion of certain individuals in a democracy that is built on the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. Beckman argues that these problems can only be resolved:

[…] by considering both the criteria of the democratic people and the principles of equal treatment. A just and democratic distribution of suffrages should (i) be congruent with a democratic understanding of who belongs to the people and (ii) only be restricted on the basis of distinctions that are reasonable.

The peace in Liberia in 2003 can serve as an example on how inclusion strategies can decrease the risk of reoccurring civil wars. Call (2010) argues that it was the exclusionary strategies of President Charles Taylor that mainly triggered the renewed civil war in Liberia after the peace of 1997, as many of the opposing elites were repressed or forced to leave the country. The variables such as poverty, state weakness or natural resource dependence were very much at the same levels when peace was reached once again in 2003 as it had been in 1997. However, the transitional government and the later elected president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf chose a more inclusive strategy towards the opposition. By allowing opposing elites and masses to be involved in the political process the possible dangers of elite and mass mobilization is curtailed in to a more peaceful process. Reynal-Querol identified inclusiveness as one of the most important aspect for a regime to promote in order to achieve or maintain stability.

The right to vote can be seen as central in politicisation of identity. It is essentially through our possibility to vote that we can influence decision-making in the state we live in. It is the way that we mainly participate in the political forum. If a group is denied that possibility and excluded from the right to vote, the possibilities to influence society is

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144 Beckman 2009, pp 10-11
145 Beckman 2009, p 12
146 Call 2010, pp 362-363
147 Reynal-Querol, 2004
severely limited. Groups excluded from the right to vote can be placed under Christianos notion of persistent minorities. And it is in these persistent minorities that riots and political violence may erupt given certain circumstances.

The democracy so far presented points to the fact that politicisation of identity should not be reasons for riots and political violence in mature democracies. However, the past decades have seen a rise in the number of suburban riots in mature democracies such as the United States, France, United Kingdom and Sweden. How is that so? Christiano offers an explanation to this under the umbrella of democratic theory. He introduces the concept of persistent minorities. ‘A persistent minority is a group of persons within a society that always or almost always fails to get its way in decision making’\(^\text{148}\) Persistent minorities are most commonly indigenous people but can also be immigrants, either with or without citizenship. These groups are stuck in what is commonly known as structural discrimination. They may have all the same rights as the rest of the citizens of a state (apart from non-citizens who usually do not have any political rights in the land they reside), but the issues closest to them rarely or even never get recognized in the democratic assembly and they are not part of the decision-making procedure.\(^\text{149}\)

\[\ldots\] all individuals have fundamental interests in being able to correct for cognitive bias, make the world a home for themselves, and be recognized and affirmed as equals. But the first two interests cannot be advanced by a persistent minority since they never actually determine any outcome. Nothing they do can help correct for the cognitive biases of the majority nor can anything they do help to make a home for themselves. As a consequence their fundamental interests are being set back.\(^\text{150}\)

However, it should be noted that this is not necessarily a conscious act, it is part of the idea of democracy, and the majority wins. Nevertheless, according to Christiano, a democracy that produces persistent minorities loses its democratic authority over more groups than just the persistent minorities. As Table 1(see page 32) showed, a high level of perceived relative deprivation among masses can lead to riots and turmoil as have been experienced in many mature democracies over the past decades.

\(^{148}\) Christiano 2006, p 90  
\(^{149}\) Christiano 2006, pp 90-91  
\(^{150}\) Christiano 2006, pp 90-91
5.2.3 Civil Society

A flourishing civil society is an important arena where both politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics can work in a peaceful manner. A civil society adds many democratic functions to a state and enhances democracy. Diamond argues that there are ten functions of civil society. The first deals with the possibility of civil society to restrain power in democratic states and push for democracy in authoritarian states. Secondly, it encourages political participation and democratic skills of citizens through the associational aspect of civil society outside of the political arena. Third, it fosters other aspects important to democracy,

such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints. These values and norms become most stable when they emerge through experience, and organizational participation in civil society provides important practice in political advocacy and contestation.\textsuperscript{151}

Fourth, civil society offers other channels through which citizens can voice and articulate their particular interests outside of the political parties. Fifth, it provides an arena where citizens of different cultural, economical, religious and ethnical groups can meet around interests that unite them. Sixth, it enhances and trains the skills of future political leaders. Seventh, civil society enables the founding of democracy fostering organizations such as think tanks and democracy institutes that monitor and develop democracy in given states. Eight, it enhance the spread of information and knowledge across society. Ninth, for long-term economical reforms to achieve legitimacy they need the support of a vibrant civil society that can spread the information surrounding these reforms and help to implement them. Lastly, ‘by enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the political system, a vigorous civil society gives citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it.’\textsuperscript{152}

Civil society is the arena where interest can be formed and transformed into politics. It enables the masses to voice their potential grievances that can be experienced on different levels, as have been developed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. It is also in the civil society that the masses and the elites can meet across cultural and class borders and unite in particular interests. These functions of the civil society facilitate to decrease the possibilities

\textsuperscript{151} Diamond 1994, p 8
\textsuperscript{152} Diamond 1994, p 11
for the processes of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics to turn into political violence and civil war.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this study has been to conduct a qualitative excursion into the notion of domestic democratic peace. It is an attempt to go beyond the statistics and establish a deeper understanding of why democracies seem to be more stable than other types of regimes. In order to establish this deeper understanding I have chosen to examine democracy through the lens of a holistic understanding of internal conflicts. This understanding consists of the notion of relative deprivation, where Burton’s sources of conflicts are used to highlight what can cause the experience of relative deprivation; instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity.

Throughout this study I have been guided by one overarching research question and two questions that have helped me operationalize the study:

- How can the proposed holistic understanding explain why mature democracies are more stable than newly established democracies and autocratic states?
- In what ways do mature democracies decrease experience of relative deprivation and thereby safeguarding Burton’s sources of conflict?
- In what ways do mature democracies cater to a more peaceful process of politicisation of identity and instrumentalisation of politics?

In this chapter I will answer first the two sub-questions and then turn to the main question. I will also try to answer the question of reversed causality, in this case: have only relatively peaceful state the possibilities of developing stable democracies?

In this study I have used three different concepts to illustrate how relative deprivation can be experienced in a state. These three are rule of law, repression and equality. The rule of law is important in decreasing the experience of relative deprivation as it safeguards the citizens against the government with concern of expressing their values and interests. Weingast labels the process under which the respect for the rule of law comes in to place as the coordination dilemma. The dilemma at hand here is the seemingly opposing notions of elites strive for power and the masses need to express their values and interests. A state that has resolved this dilemma is generally more stable, with the rule of law as a guiding principle respected by elites and masses alike. A state characterized by these features will
have lower probabilities of experiencing political violence to turn into civil wars. This type of state is most certainly a mature democracy.

Repression is closely connected to the rule of law. A state that has not resolved the coordination dilemma is more likely to experience more repression from the government targeted at the citizens. When the rule of law is not respected, primarily by the elite in this context, there tends to be uncertainty about the role and place of opposition against the ruling party. This situation generally leads to repression against oppositional parties and citizens alike. This situation increases perceived relative deprivation as the ability to express one's values and interests are severely limited. Also basic human needs are violated by the means of repression as it limits autonomy and the expression of the citizen. In a mature democracy there is generally no need for repression as the role and place of the opposition is clearly defined and, furthermore, the opposition is seen as an important part in the democratic process.

If these two notions mainly deal with the rules of democracy and political institutions, equality is according to Przerworski not even inherent in the concept of democracy, especially not when it comes to social and economic equality. Despite this, mature democracies seem to have fewer problems with social and economic inequalities. This fact is generally connected to the desire for political parties to attain power or stay in power. As argued in section 5.1.3 the part of the citizenry that suffer from social and economic inequalities in one way or another are generally larger than those more affluent. It is therefore important for political parties to target this section of the citizenry in order to stay in power or move into power. These processes make equality a central notion in a democracy, even if it is not inherent in the concept.

As this short review of the arguments of the study show, the principles of democracy cater to the basic human needs theory presented by Burton. Basic human needs, value and interests are best safeguarded in a democracy as the rule of law and lack of repression means that human autonomy is guaranteed and not a source for relative deprivation. Relative deprivation can still be experienced in a mature democracy. Nevertheless, in a democracy the processes of instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation seem to proceed in a more peaceful manner.

In this study I have used three notions in order to establish how these processes become more peaceful in mature democracies. These three notions are: elections: participation and parties; the right to vote and civil society. Through the procedures concerning elections the masses can control the elite by the means of voting. By their vote
they force the elite to focus on issues important to the masses, or as both Fearon (2006) and Londregan and Vindigni (2006) argue that in elections the voters threaten the elite with revolt if they do not follow the rules and processes of democracy. This argument may seem a little harsh, yet it has a certain truth in it, if we compare with the instability of semi-democracies where the rules and procedures concerning elections are not in place and post-election violence is common.

A party-system allows for different kinds of values and interests to be turned into politics. Parties are generally the means of elites to attract the vote of the masses. As Reynal-Querol (2001) argue, the proportional system of representation tend to be more stable as it allows for a wider range of parties to fight for power and enhances the sense of inclusion in a state. This process decreases the perceived relative deprivation to turn into civil wars, as there is a legal way of expressing ones values and interests as well as a legal way of trying to take the power in a state.

The right to vote is closely connected to the process of politicisation of identity as it allows the masses to express their values and interests in the political process. For the right to vote to have a positive effect on the politicisation of identity it needs to be inclusive. Exclusion tends to lead to less stability and increases the potential for civil war, as the case with Liberia showed. Nevertheless, the most inclusive mature democracies with proportional systems of representation are not immune from the plight of political violence as Christianos notion of persistent minorities show. A persistent minority is a group of citizens within a state whose values and interests are consistently underrepresented in the government. However, as this group tends to be represented by the masses and they rarely have any support from elites; their experienced relative deprivation is generally expressed as riots.

It is in the arena of the civil society that the processes of instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity met and develop into politics. A vibrant civil society can indicate the respect for the civil liberties from the elites in a state. In a civil society many of the civil liberties are needed for the processes of instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity to be peaceful, such as the freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly to name but a few. In mature democracies these types of freedoms are generally granted by the constitution. This fact allows for vibrant civil societies in any given mature democracy and the peaceful process of instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity.

These three notions seem to cater towards peaceful processes of instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity. It can be argued that these
processes can turn experienced relative deprivation into civil wars. This study has shown that regimes that cater to citizens possibilities to express their values and interests enjoy greater stability than other types of regimes. The rules and procedures of democracy are dependent on this types of processes as it is through those parties are formed, parties that are supposed to represent the will of the people inherent to democracy.

As this brief qualitative study of the notion of domestic democratic peace through the lens of the holistic understanding of conflict has shown, there is some merit in using this kind of holistic understanding to explain more thoroughly why mature democracies are more stable. Nevertheless, this study does not answer the question of why semi-democracies are less stable. For that question to be answered one need to conduct extensive case studies on different types of semi-democracies using the holistic understanding of internal conflict. Nonetheless this study can act as a theoretical background when conducting the study on semi-democracies as it identifies what makes mature democracies more stable beyond mere numbers.

Yet, despite the merits of using a holistic understanding of internal conflicts to further explain domestic democratic peace, the question concerning if a more peaceful condition is a prerequisite for democracy to develop is not answered. For that question to be answered, as with the question of semi-democracies, more thorough case studies of different kinds of transitions into democracy is needed. Even so, the states mentioned in this study, the transitions form war to peace in Mozambique and Liberia, point to the fact that a country devastated by years of internal wars can start the transition towards peace by employing democratic strategies.

By establishing democratic institutions that aim to turn, the potentially destructive, processes of instrumentalisation of politics and politicisation of identity into peaceful processes in the name of democracy previously war-torn states can become more stable. These two states are hardly mature democracies; rather their regimes can be seen as evolving democracies. Both Mozambique and Liberia are plagued by corruption and their democracies are yet to experience the change of head of state (in Liberia Johnson-Sirleaf has won both elections since 2005, and in Mozambique FRELIMO continues to dominate the political scene). Nevertheless, both countries have not experienced civil war since the establishment of democracy. As Sanhueza’s (1998) study on the hazard rates of regime
types has shown, the longer a state remains democratic the lesser the risk of civil war becomes.

As this concluding discussion has shows, the holistic understanding of internal conflict has added a deeper understanding of why mature democracies are more stable. Nonetheless, there are still a number of questions left unanswered; such as why semi-democracies are less stable. There remains also the question of causation: does democracy breed peace or is peace a prerequisite for democracy. These questions can be addressed using the holistic understanding of internal conflict as it targets the causes of conflict that seems to be decreased within a democratic setting. A series of case-studies would address these issues the best, as the statistical approach has established the correlation between regime type and stability/instability but has failed to explain why some states are more peaceful than others.

The study also served a second purpose, though unintended. As the holistic understanding adds a deeper understanding on why mature democracies, the notion of domestic democratic peace serves to strengthen the analytical value of the holistic understanding of internal peace. The research done on domestic democratic peace has established that mature democracies are more stable than other types of regimes. This study shows that mature democracies cater to the notions of the holistic understanding and are therefore unlikely to suffer from civil wars.
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