



# Exploring the post-Gaddafi Repercussions in the Sahel

Mustapha Abdallah  
Jenna Sapiano  
Frank Okyere  
Doreen Ivy Bentum

*Report from an experts' workshop organised by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Nordic Africa Institute with the support of the Australian Government, 28-29 June 2012.*

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## INTRODUCTION

The 'Arab Spring' that greeted North Africa and resulted in the fall of the Gaddafi regime has brought in its wake consequences that transcend national boundaries. One region in Africa that is grappling with the post-Gaddafi repercussions is the Sahel, which also faces enormous challenges relating to environment, food insecurity, terrorism and Islamic radicalization, among many others. Besides the core Sahelian states, namely Mali, Niger and Mauritania, many others such as Nigeria, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad and the Central African Republic and the Darfur region of Sudan continue to face the multiple socioeconomic and security repercussions of the 'Arab Spring.' Returnee migrants, Tuareg mercenaries and the flow of arms from Gaddafi's weapon caches have contributed to the deteriorating security situation in Mali and the wider Sahelian states. Against this background, the Kofi Annan International Peace-keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), Sweden, in collaboration with the Australian Government, organised a two-day **Experts' Workshop on Exploring the Post-Gaddafi Repercussions in the Sahel** aimed at addressing the emerging security challenges.

The workshop, which took place at KAIPTC, Accra, on 28 and 29 June 2012, brought together from across Africa, Europe and America academics, diplomats, security practitioners, researchers and representatives of various organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Among the key speakers and representatives were Brigadier Gen. Benjamin F. Kusi, Deputy Commandant, KAIPTC, Accra, Ghana; H.E. Ambassador Chris Kpodor, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ghana; H.E. William (Billy) Williams, Australian High Commissioner to Ghana; Dr Kwesi Aning, Dean and Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR), KAIPTC; and Dr Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director, FAAR.

The purpose of the workshop included:

- Identifying the security threats posed to the Sahel region after the fall of Gaddafi;
- Providing a platform for sharing ongoing initiatives to mitigate security challenges in the Sahel region; and
- Mapping the threats to possible solutions.

## OFFICIAL REMARKS

The workshop commenced with an opening ceremony, during which official remarks were made by Brig. General Benjamin F. Kusi, H.E. William (Billy) Williams and H.E. Ambassador Chris Kpodor.

In his opening remarks, **Benjamin F. Kusi**, on behalf of the KAIPTC Commandant, C.E.K. Dovlo, welcomed all participants to the two-day workshop on post-Gaddafi repercussions in the Sahel. He commended the Nordic Africa Institute and the Australian Government for their collaboration and support in organising the workshop. Indeed, the appropriateness of this workshop is underlined by the fact that the crisis in the Sahel, and particularly in Mali, is still unfolding. Consequently, the objective of the workshop included providing a platform for sharing ongoing initiatives to mitigate security challenges in the region.

The Deputy Commandant noted that the North African Spring that succeeded in removing three North African heads of state, namely Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Mu'ammar Gaddafi of Libya, has had several consequences reaching far beyond North Africa into the Sahelian region. Principally, he mentioned the threat of Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and the Tuareg mercenaries, who are believed to have access to thousands of arms originating in Gaddafi's weapons caches.

Despite the challenges outlined, the Deputy Commandant expressed optimism that given the array of people assembled, the outcome of the workshop would be fruitful and shape policy decisions for states and sub-regional and regional organisations.

He ended by wishing all participants a warm welcome to KAIPTC as they engage in ground-breaking deliberations.

For his part, **H.E. William (Billy) Williams**, the Australian High Commissioner to Ghana, expressed satisfaction at the broad representation from across Africa and around the world, noting that effective regional collaboration is important to finding lasting solutions to security challenges in Africa.

He stated that recent events in the Sahel and North Africa have highlighted the emerging security challenges the continent is grappling with. Of critical concern to the Australian Government was the ensuing security and humanitarian crisis in Mali after the coup of 22 March 2012. The High Commissioner acknowledged that the Malian crisis had again demonstrated the links between political instability, poverty and extremism, links that have prompted Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Bob Carr, to call for the restoration of democracy and constitutional order to Mali. As a consequence, he expressed the determination of the Australian Government to foster discussions on and work to-

wards solutions for the serious security challenges in Mali and other parts of the Sahel. Further, he underscored the Government of Australia's support for counter-terrorism in Africa, mentioning the existing collaboration with the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODOC) in combating terrorism in Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia, and partnerships with Indonesia, Thailand and Turkey.

As a response mechanism, the High Commissioner referred to the financial support so far made available to mitigate the Sahel crisis, namely AU\$ 30 million (GHS 55 million), making Australia the sixth largest donor, according to the UN. He reiterated the Australian Government's commitment to a continuing partnership with Africa, noting that international cooperation is essential to effective counter-terrorism activities. As a result, Australia will continue to work collaboratively with the countries of Africa to promote security and address the root causes of terrorism.

He concluded by expressing optimism that the workshop would provide an important opportunity for all participants to share experiences and expertise and also looked forward to the outcomes of the workshop.

Delivering the keynote address, **Ambassador Chris Kpodo**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, recalled the security situation in Africa after the Cold War. These challenges initially proved difficult for the continent to address effectively, particularly intra-state conflicts, with their unimaginable humanitarian consequences, in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. He noted, however, that many African countries subsequently began to embrace democracy and good governance and hence there was a reduction of the intra-state conflicts characteristic of the immediate post-Cold War era.

As democracy and good governance began to take root in certain countries, the unfortunate development in North Africa dubbed the 'Arab Spring' erupted. After outlining some emerging security threats such as arms trafficking, terrorism and mercenaries, he recognised the opportuneness of the workshop in addressing not only these threats but also existing socioeconomic and environmental challenges. The Deputy Minister made particular reference to the coup d'état in Mali as a consequence of the Sahel crisis and described it as an unfortunate episode in Africa's quest to consolidate democracy and good governance as enshrined in African Union and ECOWAS protocols.

To restore peace and stability in Mali and to forestall further repercussions in other Sahelian states, the Deputy Foreign Minister called on workshop participants to deliberate and proffer appropriate strategies and mechanisms. Echoing the Deputy Commandant's earlier remarks, he expressed the hope that, given the calibre of the invitees, the two-day workshop would come up with concrete, practical and solution-oriented recommendations to inform policy deci-

sions by states and sub-regional and regional organisations, including non-state actors and civil society.

In conclusion, Ambassador Kpodor commended KAIPTC and its collaborating partners on the initiative, reaffirmed the government of Ghana's continuing commitment to support such laudable initiatives and wished participants successful deliberations and a wonderful stay in Ghana.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

To address the post-Gaddafi repercussions and the Sahel's security dilemmas, participants and presenters made the following recommendations.

- ECOWAS needs to stop issuing empty threats. Rather, it should mobilise an international force for transformation instead of peace enforcement in Mali.
- ECOWAS needs to collaborate and seek assistance from advanced countries and larger and more powerful international bodies to speed up the process of addressing emerging security challenges in the Sahel.
- In order to address or counter terrorism in the Sahel, there needs to be a shift from national to human security. This requires ensuring that basic material needs and conditions of existence are met and that human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised.
- It is also important to engage with people of the Sahel and provide support to African states so they can take charge of their own security, while the UN provides an effective counter-terrorism strategy.
- ECOWAS and the AU need to link up as a unit to work with the UN in order for the African voice to be afforded a high degree of respect while the challenges are addressed.
- The US and other powerful countries should contribute to maintaining peace in insecure and conflict-ridden countries.
- There is a need for inter-agency collaboration in the sub-region for intelligence-gathering and the creation of a network of informants to penetrate trafficking rings, camps and syndicates.
- Besides embarking on serious inspection of goods at borders, the control of people and commodities should be undertaken within countries rather than at the borders.
- There is a need to enforce the ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy.
- Public awareness campaigns against drug and arms trafficking should be increased.
- There is a need to establish a social watch on drug traffickers' investments and activities.
- The EU and US need to tighten control on the demand side to minimise the supply side of trafficking.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS ON PAPER PRESENTATIONS

### SESSION ONE

#### **The State of Security in West Africa: An Overview**

**Dr Thomas Jaye** of KAIPTC provided an overview of the security situation in West Africa, and briefly highlighted the most immediate security concerns in each country. He also spoke about regional security issues, such as urbanisation, Islamic radicalism, maritime insecurity, recurrence of unconstitutional changes of government and secessionist tendencies in northern Mali. It was observed that international bodies provide a good forum for African discussion and efforts to address these challenges. However, a question was raised as to whether there was enough trust in these bodies to effect the needed changes in the state of affairs. It was noted that the UN was arguably being manipulated by powerful nations, which had big stakes in the organisation. The presentation concluded with a recommendation that ECOWAS and the AU link up as a unit to work with the UN in order for a higher level of respect to be given the African voice. This 'hybrid formation' would probably be a good way to address emerging African security challenges. In pursuit of this, help could be sought from the US as well as other powerful countries in maintaining peace in insecure and conflict-ridden countries so that they are able to protect their own interests in those countries.

In his contribution on the topic, **Issac C. Armstrong** from the ECOWAS Regional Security Division spoke on behalf of General C.A. Okae, the Director of Peacekeeping and Regional Security of the ECOWAS Commission. He spoke about ECOWAS's principal security challenges in Guinea-Bissau and Mali, noting that the mission in Guinea-Bissau is proceeding despite logistical problems. With respect to Mali, the presenter attempted to address questions about ECOWAS's possible intervention in that country. Although it has the mandate, ECOWAS requires consent from the host country unless the crisis is deemed detrimental to regional stability. However, it was acknowledged that the situation in Mali was becoming increasingly complex and that there is division in Mali as to whether ECOWAS should intervene. In an overview, the vulnerabilities of the region and the current security risks, including human and drug trafficking (and trafficking routes), civil war and ethnic violence, natural resource extraction, piracy (especially in the Gulf of Guinea) and terrorism were highlighted. In conclusion, the speaker expanded on the risk of terrorism, going into further detail about AQIM, its origins and operating procedures.



## **Towards Mitigating Security Challenges in the Sahel Region: The Role of International, Regional, National and Civil Society Organisations**

In his presentation, **Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso** of the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana, mentioned that Africa was experiencing excessive financial losses on account of protracted and severe instability. He gave brief background information on the Sahel, including some of the reasons for its volatility and the futility of efforts to improve the security situation. Delving into history, he noted that Gaddafi had a strong following before his death and that most likely this persisted. Again, the weapons of the former leader were still in circulation and were compounding the problem of proliferation. Libya's weapons of war are also very advanced and powerful (e.g., MANPADS, man-portable air defence systems). The presence of oil in the region could also aggravate the security problems due to lax maritime law enforcement in the West African Region.

Consequently, it was recommended that ECOWAS needs to stop issuing empty threats and mobilise an international force for transformation instead of peace enforcement; and it needs to seek assistance from advanced countries and larger and more powerful international bodies.

## SESSION TWO

### Leaving West Africa – The Trans-Saharan Escape and Other Routes

**Professor Morten Bøås** centred his presentation on the concepts of hubs, nodes and organisation without organisations. He identified the hubs, each serving different needs, as Liberia, Accra in Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Kidal in Northern Mali. The nodes, he explained, are big men – points in complex networks of informal governance. These operate inside a loosely connected network, hence his ‘organisation without organisations’ terminology. Discussion ensued on the importance of the route, which has ever-increasing geopolitical significance because of the War on Terror and the after effects of the Libyan revolution. This route is a site of increased criminalisation for terrorists, bandits and rebels (Tuareg). The journey itself is uncertain, but utilises these networks and resources. Gao and Kidal in Mali were identified as the hubs on this route and therefore are of increased geopolitical significance. However, emphasis was placed on how little is actually confirmed about northern Mali. Prof. Boas touched on the question of whether northern Mali should become an independent state, concluding this is not a political reality. It was noted that very little definite can be said about this region, including on the issue of AQIM and the supposed unification of regional terrorist networks under al-Qaeda.

In conclusion, he focused on the topic of the conference, confirming that weapons were looted from Libya when the Gaddafi state fell. The rumours are that Tuareg rebels have access to sophisticated weapons, and this may explain why the Malian army attempted to remilitarise the north in violation of the Algiers agreement. However, a note of caution was sounded not to put too much faith in rumours from the region, as very little can be corroborated.

### Containing Insecurity in Post-Gaddafi Sahel: Lessons from the Past

Contributing to the session’s proceedings, **Andrews Atta-Asamoah**, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, began by establishing three facts – first, that the crisis in the Sahel is the result of the region’s burden of being a double haven (of threats and opportunities); second, that actors responding to the crisis have over-secritised the issues; and third, as a consequence, the response has been over-militarised.

Stressing the first point, Mr Atta-Asamoah went into more detail about the natural resources available in the region, focusing on uranium, oil and gas. He then spoke about the threats (real, imagined and crafted) in the region. These include the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, climate change and

refugees, radicalisation and political Islam, lack of state presence, insurgency towards secession and domestic/international terrorism.

The above argument is underpinned by a theory that poor governance and state crisis, coupled with a Sahel-wide security crisis, is exacerbated by external responses based on external threat perception. Emphasis was placed on the need for a Sahel-wide security response to the crisis, which to date has not reflected the extent of the conflict in the region.

Consequent upon this, it was argued that there could be no solution in the Sahel as the situation was overly complicated and a viable functioning state would be impossible to achieve. In reference to the issue of 'branding and branching' raised by Prof. Bøås, it was noted that although some insurgent or terrorist groups in the Sahel had inspiration from, and were loosely networking with major terrorist organisations, one could still not conclude that these smaller groups are actual branches of major organisations. As a result, smaller groups attempt to create the impression they are connected to Al-Qaeda in order to portray themselves as important and potent. To further buttress this point, it was argued that, for example, although Al-Shabab is touted as having connections with Al-Qaeda, there was information to the effect that Osama Bin-Laden did not approve of the organisation of Al-Shabab.

## SESSION THREE

### **The Storm Rages On: Security Challenges in the Sahel in the Post-Gaddafi Era**

The first presentation in this session was delivered by **Omotola Shola**. He listed some issues that are of immediate concern in the region, including food insecurity as a result of displacement following the 'Arab Spring' and the fall of Gaddafi. The problem of migration based on the magnitude of displacement likewise has serious security implications. Quite clearly Gaddafi was the only leader to be extra-judicially executed of the many leaders experiencing the 'Arab Spring.' The removal of Gaddafi has left a vacuum in the region and this will continue to pose severe challenges for some time to come.

### **Northern Mali 2012: The Triumph of Irredentism after Decades of Struggle or the Temporary Collapse of the State**

**Dr Ole Martin Gaasholt** delivered this paper focusing on northern Mali. He provided a historical background to the situation in Mali and examined in detail the previous rebellions, including those in 1963 and 1990, and also mentioned the problematic relationship among Arabs, Tuaregs and black people in northern Mali as an issue of great concern. The creation of a state involving members of the various factions would not be a solution. Instead, this would only cause those put in authority to forget their backgrounds and perpetrate the injustice of neglect. He also mentioned the continuing human rights violations in northern Mali that are undermining the fragile security situation.

### **Mali: A Collateral Victim of the Security Challenges in the Sahel**

Session three commenced with a presentation by **Dr David Zounmenou** of the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa. Dr Zounmenou started by noting that there was a problem concerning the interpretation of the security challenges in the Sahel. The problem consists of the conceptualisation of terrorism; the response to the issue of development; and the poor understanding and handling of social economy and political issues. Foreign intervention may not be the key to stability in the Sahel. Instead, adopting dynamic approaches was crucial to changing the situation in the Sahel, and there needs to be a move away from the absolute security approach. In shedding light on the issue of forced migration in the region, he stated that between 70,000 and 80,000 Libyans had been displaced, and this has given rise to many other prob-

lems, such as competition for resources in the host country as well as holding back development in the country of origin.

In the follow-up discussions, some experts remarked that there was insufficient action from organisations and regional actors in dealing with the Sahel crises and spoke about the 'big man' concept. It was further argued there must be increased concern about the activities of these 'big men,' because their exits from society were likely to have unprecedented effects on the entire population. The late Mu'ammarr Gaddafi was one such, and lessons from his death and its ripple effects needed to be analysed and learnt.

Others believed that the UN's handling of the crisis in Libya only compounded the situation and thus blew the problem out of proportion. They stated that Libya's extensive influence in the region could not be underestimated and that Mu'ammarr Gaddafi was a 'sceptre for democracy.'

## SESSION FOUR

### **Militarisation in the Central African Buffer Zone**

The presentation was delivered by **Louisa Lombard**, beginning with a brief political overview of the country. Ms Lombard considered the impact of Libya on the Central African Republic (CAR). It was observed that although Gaddafi's actual support for armed groups in CAR may have been substantial, he was perhaps equally important as a spectre – armed groups with mysteriously sophisticated weaponry were described as 'likely armed by Libya.' In some cases this was true, in others not, but in all cases it was a way to make the amorphous, flexible groups that work in the Central African buffer zone (the area between CAR, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and the DR Congo) appear more unified and coherently fearsome than is actually the case. Her conclusion was that Gaddafi had little influence or involvement in the CAR, and that his fall will have no significant impact on the country.

### **The Libya Connection: Libya and the Regional Politics of War in Darfur**

According to the presenter, **Dr Lee Seymour**, Darfur, by virtue of its geography, has become a political space in postcolonial politics, especially after Gaddafi became president of Libya. This has played out in the context of the Sudan/Libya/Chad rivalry over the Chad Basin. Libya's relations with Sudan have generally been cordial over past decade. However, this changed in the last months of Gaddafi's regime as Sudan lent support to the Libyan uprising.

Gaddafi increasingly favoured peace in the region only as this was likely to prevent an international presence on the Sudan/Chad border and in order to curry favour with the Americans and Europeans. Dr Seymour concluded by speaking about Sudan's potential to experience an 'Arab Spring.' Although Sudan appeared to have the structural requirements to prevent an uprising, recent changes, such as the loss of oil revenue, the secession of the south, urban/student protests, defeat in the war with the 'New South' and sustained opposition in Darfur, have brought that into question.

### **Returnee Migrants and the Impact of the 'Arab Spring' in the Sahel Region**

**Dr Rasheed Olaniyi** noted that migration to Libya began in the 1950s and 1960s, driven by Libya's oil. However, by the 1970s this trend changed because of the new Gaddafi regime. In the 1970s and 1980s, this policy changed again, as Gaddafi considered himself a Pan-Africanist. His policy changed yet again in the 1990s. It was observed that anti-African riots in Tripoli in 2000

resulted in the deaths of 120 African migrants. Immigration policy under Gaddafi oscillated between open-door policies and mass expulsions. Migrants returning to home states from Libya need to consider a disarmament programme so as to reduce the effects and consequences of arms proliferation after the fall of Gaddafi.

## SESSION FIVE

### **The Death of Mu'ammarr Gaddafi and the Intensification of Boko Haram Terrorist Activities in Nigeria**

**Dr Nathaniel Dominic Danjibo** from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria views the Boko Haram as the most serious challenge confronting the government since its return to civilian rule in 1999. He cautioned against the simplistic interpretation of Boko Haram, which reduces it to the literal 'Western education is a sin,' and attempts to expand it to the whole of Western civilisation. Since the beginning of the 'Arab Spring' and the fall of Mu'ammarr Gaddafi, Boko Haram has intensified its attacks as a consequence of a spread of arms in the region. Of the 82 documented attacks, only seven were carried out before 2011. However, the group's attacks have now shifted to other institutions such as churches, the media, government and international institutions. Many reports suggest links with the AQIM and Al-Shabab as well as funding support from other terrorist networks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Nigerian government to counter the Boko Haram threat. The government would require the collaboration of fellow Sahelian states and the international community to counter these threats as well as address other issues such as corruption, unemployment and social security.

### **The Phantom Menace: Convergent Catastrophe and the Ghost of AQIM in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania**

The presentation was given by **Christian Vium**, PhD Fellow at the University of Copenhagen. His argument was that AQIM is a threat to the country and causes anxiety by hampering the way people can move. The current Mauritanian head of state, who came to power through a coup, is using the rhetoric of combating terrorist groups to justify his position and to get external funding (particularly from US and EU). The convergence of water scarcity and food insecurity, soaring food prices, escalating regional conflict and the ideology of fear have exacerbated an already perplexed Sahelian country.

### **Counter-terrorism in the Sahel: Protecting whom and against what?**

In her contribution to the session, **Sarah Molaiepour** examined US counter-terrorism efforts in the region, which have been criticised for being too focused on the military. The justification for spending more is that this region has been identified as the new front in the War on Terror. This heavy-handed approach



to terrorism is out of step with the more immediate concerns of people on the ground. The US approach to terrorism may also make the Sahel less secure because of a backlash against the US efforts. Furthermore, the US approach has left no room for dialogue with local populations or negotiation with groups. In order to address counter-terrorism in the Sahel, there is a need to shift from national to human security by ensuring basic material needs and conditions of existence are met and human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised. It is also important to engage with people of the Sahel and provide support for African states to take charge of their own security while the UN provides an effective counter-terrorism strategy.

## SESSION SIX

### Post-Gaddafi repercussions in the 'Republic of Azawad' (Northern Mali)

In this session, **Prof. George Klute** argued that recent events in northern Mali can be partly linked to events in Libya. He gave an historical interpretation of the current events linking the two political claims in the north – Islam and independence – which he argued have been interdependent since independence.

There is no other African region where the repercussions of the defeat of Gaddafi's regime in Libya seem to be more visible than in northern Mali. After two-and-a-half months of fighting between Tuareg rebels and the Malian army, the 'National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad' (MNLA) declared the independence of a new state 'Azawad,' comprising two-thirds of Malian territory, on 6 April 2012. Despite the fact that former Libyan soldiers of Tuareg origin fought on the rebel as well as on the Malian side, it would be too simple to reduce this year's fighting and the following declaration of a new state to the breakdown of Gaddafi's regime alone. There are indeed specific reasons not linked to Libyan events for the recent developments linked to state-Tuareg relationships in general and the situation of the Tuareg in Mali in particular.

### The sociopolitical turmoil in Mali: Report on media debates following the coup d'état of March 2012

The final paper was given by **Gabriella Körling**. Beginning with a background to the Malian crisis, she demonstrated how Mali, once portrayed and cheered on as a democratic example for Africa, has been caught up in unresolved conflicts and tensions over the past decade. Describing the crisis in Mali as both political and military, Ms Körling presented an analysis based on media reporting. Since the beginning of the crisis, different positions have been taken by media practitioners, focusing on specific aspects of public debate, such as the origins of the crisis (the fall of Gaddafi; the anti-globalisation discourses especially in light of Malian intellectuals' petition against Western involvement; the legacy of the Tuareg rebellion; and the very strong cleavages in Malian public opinion regarding the coup d'état and subsequent crisis). To conclude the presentation, pertinent questions regarding the prospects for peace and the rule of law were put forward to stimulate further debate so as to generate solutions to the Malian crisis.

## CLOSING SUMMARY

The closing remarks were delivered by Issac Armstrong, ECOWAS, Prof. Mats Utas, Nordic Africa Institute and Dr Nicholas Okai, KAIPTC.

**Issac Armstrong** thanked the Nordic Africa Institute, KAIPTC and the Australian Government for organising and sponsoring the conference. It had indeed been useful to hear outside perspectives on what was happening in the Sahel and, in particular, Mali. There was, therefore, a need for the recommendations of the conference to be made available to ECOWAS headquarters. Mr Armstrong repeated his assertion that ECOWAS uses the military option as a last resort. Peacekeeping, he said, is very expensive and requires considerable resources, which could be put to better use.

**Prof. Utas** then gave his closing remarks, saying that he had learned much from the experts convened at the conference. Clearly, different questions and answers had emerged over the last two days and events on the ground were changing rapidly and it was difficult to confirm what was happening. Commenting on the outcome of the conference, he noted that considerations of Chad, Niger and Algeria were missing as an addition to the Libyan perspective.

What had emerged is an undertone in conversations about Islamist threats. He cautioned against such wording, which is extremely unfortunate and dangerous and plays into the rhetoric of the 'War on Terror.' He stressed the importance of undertaking an historical reading of terrorist/separatist movements and understanding how local movements are linked to regional/international conflicts. Arguably, rumours of global terrorism are a greater threat than actual terrorism.

He ended by saying that given the rich and scholarly nature of the presentations, partners and participants should collaborate to produce an academic journal.

**Dr Okai** concluded the conference by thanking participants on behalf of the Dean, Dr Kwesi Aning, and the Commandant of the Centre, C.E.K. Dovlo. He also gave his thanks to the Australian Government and to the Nordic African Institute for co-sponsoring the workshop.

## TWO-DAY WORKSHOP: EXPLORING THE POST-GADDAFI REPERCUSSIONS IN THE SAHEL

*Joint Collaboration between the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the Nordic Africa Institute and the Australian Government, 28-29 June 2012*

### PROGRAMME

#### 28 JUNE 2012

0830 – 0845 Arrival and Registration of Participants

#### 0845– 0930 OPENING SESSION

Moderator: Dr Thomas Jaye

Opening Address: Benjamin F. Kusi, Deputy Commandant, KAIPTC

Welcome Address: H.E. William (Billy) Williams, Australian High Commissioner

Keynote Address: Ambassador Chris Kpodo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

0930 – 0945 Group Pictures and Media Interaction

0945 – 1000 Coffee Break

#### 1000 – 1100 SESSION ONE

*The State of Security in West Africa: An Overview*

Moderator/Discussant: Associate Professor, Mats Utas, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden

Keynote Speakers:

Dr Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director, Research, KAIPTC

Chima Isaac Armstrong, Representative, ECOWAS Commission

Dr Vladimir Antwi Danso

*Towards Mitigating Security Challenges in the Sahel Region: The Role of International, Regional, National and Civil Society Organizations*

#### 1100 – 1200 SESSION TWO

Moderator/Discussant: Dr Nathaniel Dominic Danjibo

Speakers:

Professor Morten Bøås

*Leaving West Africa – The trans-Saharan escape and other routes*

Andrews Atta-Asamoah

*Containing Insecurity in Post-Gaddafi Sahel: Lessons from the Past*

Ferdaous Bouhleh  
*Percolation des mécontentements, inaudibilité de l'État avant l'heure des armes et agencement des mouvements insurrectionnels : une revue des causes endogènes du conflit au Nord Mali*

1200 – 1230 General Discussions

1230 – 1330 Lunch Break

### 1330 – 1445 SESSION THREE

Moderator/Discussant: Professor Morten Bøås

Speakers:

Dr Omotola Shola

*The Storm Rages On: Security Challenges in the Sahel in the Post-Gaddafi Era*

Dr Ole Marin Gaasholt

*Northern Mali 2012: The triumph of irredentism after decades of struggle or the temporary collapse of the state*

Dr David Zounmenou

*Mali: A Collateral Victim of the Security Challenges in the Sahel*

1445 – 1515 General Discussions

1515 – 1530 Coffee Break

### 1530 – 1630 SESSION FOUR

Moderator/Discussant: Dr Vladimir Antwi Danso

Speakers:

Louisa Lombard

*Militarisation in the Central African Buffer Zone*

Dr Lee Seymour

*The Libya Connection: Libya and the Regional Politics of War in Darfur*

Dr Rasheed Olaniyi

*Returnee Migrants and the Impact of the 'Arab Spring' in the Sahel Region*

1630 – 1700 General Discussions

## DAY TWO, 29 JUNE 2012

### 0900 – 1000 SESSION FIVE

Moderator/Discussant: Dr Nicholas Okai

Speakers:

Dr Nathaniel Dominic Danjibo

*The Death of Mu'ammarr Gaddafi and the Intensification of Boko Haram Terrorist Activities in Nigeria*

Christian Vium

*The Phantom Menace: Convergent Catastrophe and the Ghost of AQIM in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania*

Sarah Molaiepour

*Counterterrorism in the Sahel: Protecting whom and against what?*

1000 – 1030 General Discussion

1030 – 1045 Coffee Break

#### 1045- 1200 SESSION SIX

Moderator/Discussant: Dr Ole Marin Gaasholt

Speakers:

Prof George Klute

*Post-Gaddafi repercussions in the 'Republic of Azawad' (Northern Mali)*

Gabriella Körling

*The socio-political turmoil in Mali: Report on media debates following the coup d'état of March 2012*

1200 – 1230 General Discussions

1230 – 1330 Lunch

#### 1330 – 1500 SESSION SEVEN – SYNDICATE SESSIONS

Moderator: Prof. George Klute

Group 1

*Terrorism, Militarisation and Insurgency: What strategies should be adopted to counter these threats in the Sahel?*

Group 2

*Arms and Drug Trafficking: Recent and or emerging trends within the Sahel.*

*-Coordination between regional and national institutions in combating the menace.*

Group 3

*Addressing the Sahelian crisis: The role of international and regional organisations.*

1500– 1515 Coffee Break

#### 1515– 1645 PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

Moderator: Prof. George Klute

Group 1: Terrorism, Militarisation and Insurgency

Group 2: Arms and Drug Trafficking

Group 3: Role of international and regional organisations

#### 1645-1700 CLOSING SESSION

Remarks, Representative, ECOWAS Commission

Remarks, Dr Mats Utas, Nordic Africa Institute

Remarks, Dr Nicholas Okai, KAIPTC

**2-DAY WORKSHOP ON  
POST-GADDAFI REPERCUSSIONS IN THE SAHEL KAIPTC-NAI  
VENUE: KAIPTC ACCRA, GHANA, 28-29 June 2012**

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

Mustapha Abdallah, Research Associate, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana; Mustapha.abdallah@kaiptc.org

Alphonse Adu-Amankwa, Superintendent, Ghana Police Service

Kwesi Aning, Dean and Director of Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra, Ghana; kwesi.aning@kaiptc.org

Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa; andyasamoah@yahoo.com

Doreen Ivy Bentum, Intern, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana

Morten Bøås, Professor and Head of Research, Norway Institute for Labour and Social Research (FAFO), Oslo, Norway; morten.boas@fafo.no

Ferdaous Bouhleb, PhD Fellow, Nouakchott, Mauritania; ferdaous.bouhleb@gmail.com  
Nathaniel Danjibo, Senior Lecturer, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; danjib@yahoo.com

Vladimir Antwi Danso, Senior Lecturer, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), Accra, Ghana; vladanso@yahoo.com

Obed Dzikunu, Asst Commissioner of Police, Ghana Police Service

Ole Martin Gaasholt, Associate Professor, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, UK; omgaasholt@hotmail.com

Chima Armstrong Isaac, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, Nigeria

Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director, Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra, Ghana

Georg Klute, Professor, University of Bayreuth, Germany; georg.klute@univ-bayreuth.de

Gabriella Körling, Senior Researcher, Uppsala University, Sweden; gabriella.korling@antro.uu.se

Louisa Lombard, PhD Fellow, Duke University, Durham NC, USA; louisa.lombard@gmail.com

Sarah Molaiepour, MSc, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden; sarah.molaiepour@gmail.com

Frank Okyere, Research Associate, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana; Frank.okyere@kaiptc.org

Rasheed Olaniyi, Senior Lecturer, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; rasolaniyi@yahoo.com; rasheed\_olaniyi@hotmail.com

J. Shola Omotola, Senior Lecturer, Redeemer's University, Redemption City, Nigeria; sholaomotola@yahoo.com

Jenna Sapiiano, Intern, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana; jenasapiiano@gmail.com

Lee Seymour, Associate Professor, Leiden University, The Netherlands; ljmseymour@gmail.com

Mats Utas, Associate Professor, Senior Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden; mats.utas@nai.uu.se

Christian Vium, PhD Fellow, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; christian.vium@anthro.ku.dk

David Zounmenou, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa; dzounmenou@issafrika.org /zounme@yahoo.com