The Bush Doctrine: Continuation or Revolution of American Foreign Policy?

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Panel: Obama v. Bush: Continuity or Change in US Foreign Policy?
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Introduction
In January 2009, Barack Obama replaced George W. Bush as president. The expectations on the new president to present something new, especially regarding how the U.S. should engage the world, were high, inside as well as outside the U.S. After eight years of neo-conservatively founded unilateralism and extensive use of force, expectations that the only remaining super power of the world would start to act responsible regarding urgent questions, such as the war on terror and global heating, were tremendous. Put briefly, the expectations were that the “Bush parenthesis” would be left behind. But, will this really happen? Differently put, was the Bush Doctrine as unique as stressed by many journalists and academics in the early twenty-first century? Or, was the Bush Doctrine, in fact, rather yet another expression of the same activities – surveilling countries’ domestic politics and economic policies, providing development assistance, coordinating with allies, selling weapons, running covert operations, carrying out covert acts of warfare – that the U.S. has resorted to for over a hundred years?

Early in the twenty-first century, US’s foreign policy began to be talked about as having undergone major changes. Academics and journalists alike started to argue that with the advents of the Bush administration and its reaction to the events of 9/11 2001, the U.S. was now engaging the world in a way that was fundamentally different than before. The differences included a more frequent resort to military force, a concomitant downgrading of diplomacy and a repudiation of international law; a penchant for acting unilateral rather than multilateral, i.e. trough legitimate institutions in international society; and an ideological classification of other countries into friends and foes, with the latter being combated even if they did not pose a military threat to others. Put shortly, the U.S., it was said, had shifted to a fundamentally imperial policy. The shift was so dramatic that it was, by some scholars, even described as a revolution (see e.g. Daalder and Lindsay 2003, Jhally and Earp 2004).

Statements like these has, however, over the last few years been claimed to be misleading. On the one hand, they greatly exaggerate to the extent U.S. foreign policy was militarized, or unilateralised, or ideologised under President Bush; on the other hand, they present past U.S. policy in a considerably more multilateral, modest and legalistic light that was in fact the case. U.S. foreign policy, it is argued, has been fundamentally continuous, with the same type of routines and interventionary policies being opted for in similar situations (see e.g. Lynch and Singh 2008, Sylvan and Majeski 2009).

The objective of our paper is to scrutinize the two accounts – the “revolutionary” one (being methodologically agent oriented) and the “continuity” one (being methodologically structure oriented) – respectively and, based upon this analysis, to argue in favour of a more coherent account, instead emphasising revolution (or perhaps differences) and continuity, simultaneously. Put in a different way, to argue in favour of an approach being more sensitive to agency, structures and “structuration” as well as the room to manoeuvre, all at the same time.

Briefly speaking, we are theoretically influenced but not strictly ruled by social constructivism (SC), neo-classical social constructivist to be more precise (see e.g. Baaz 1999, 2002, 2009, Cox and Stokes 2008: 16f. Cf. Deudny and Meiser 2009, Sylvan and Majeski 2009). This statement will become clearer infra (see p. 14ff).

Given our objective, the outline of the rest of the paper is quite straightforward. Next follows a short historical exposé of how the U.S. has engaged the world since the birth of the nation in general and since 1898 in particular, in one subsection the case of difference between different administration are highlighted, while in another, the case of continuity is put forward. After this presentation of the U.S. grand strategy, necessary in order to establish what we are talking about, follows a discussion and analysis of the revolutionary account and the continuity account, respectively. Then follows a longer
section arguing in favour of a more sensitive – agent-structure oriented – approach that will help us to better understand American grand strategy in general and the Bush Doctrine in particular, emphasising elements of revolution or change as well as elements of continuity. The argument in the section is rather foundational than substantial. The paper is ended by a presentation of some concluding remarks.

American foreign policy: From past to present
The debate regarding how the U.S. should engage the world is an old one in American history, so is the analysis of what actually has come to characterize American foreign policy. On one hand, there are several scholars who describe U.S. history as full of differences and struggles between diverse perspectives on how to act, on the other hand, there are several other scholars who would prefer to describe the history of U.S. foreign policy as a continuum.

The case of differences and struggles
The founding fathers of the nation confronted the question already six years after the ratification of the new Constitution when France declared war on England (1793). President Washington opted for neutrality and articulated a vision of an America trading happily with Europe but otherwise standing apart from the power politics of the old continent. The policy of American non-involvement, i.e. isolationism, in European affairs became further strengthened by the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine. The authors of the doctrine conceived it as a proclamation by the U.S. of moral opposition to colonialism (Jentleson 2004: 75ff, Keylor 2006: 18f). But the Monroe Doctrine has subsequently been re-interpreted in a wide variety of ways. President Roosevelt turned the original intentions on its head and in fact used the Monroe Doctrine as a license for the U.S. to practice its own form of colonialism (Holmes, 2006).

The U.S. become involved in imperialist activities for the first time in 1898, when it engaged the Spanish-American War. With this war and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, internationalists for the first time triumphed over isolationists in the debate of how the U.S. national interest should be defined (Holmes, 2006; Smith, 2004). But it did not take long before the imperialist internationalists were again challenged. This time, however, the challenge did not come from the isolationists, but from within the internationalist camp itself.

In 1913 Woodrow Wilson took office. Wilson, like his predecessors, shared a belief in American exceptionalism, i.e. a belief that the U.S. was different from (read superior to) other nations and it was widely believed that if America went abroad, it would lose its soul. But Wilson turned the exceptionalist argument on its head and argued the reverse (Hunt 1987: Ch. 2, Lipset 1996). The liberal internationalism of Wilson set forth a moral argument for broad American engagement in international relations (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 6). It was, Wilson argued, when he requested a declaration of war from the Congress against Germany necessary for the U.S. to engage in WW I, not because American interests were endangered. Rather, he continued, America, thanks to its exceptionalism, must fight because “the world must be made safe for democracy” (Wilson, 2nd April 1917). This opinion was revolutionary. So was the second component of Wilson’s international vision, namely a firm belief that the key to creating a world in which democracy could flourish lay in extending the reach of international law and the creation of international regimes and international organisations (Boyle 1999: 8ff). The Treaty of Versailles, regulating the Peace terms after WW I, established inter alia a League of Nations.

In America, the debate about the Treaty of Versailles was, however, more factious than Wilson’s strong determination presented on the world stage. The U.S.
Senate’s opinion on the Treaty was divided into three distinct views: (i) Internationalists, Democrats loyal to President Wilson who wanted the Treaty to be ratified in its original form without any amendments or reservations; (ii) Reservationists, a group – lead by Senator Henry C. Lodge – who claimed to be in favour of the Treaty, but only after the insertion of a series of reservations prior to ratification; and (iii) Isolationists, a group of senators, who opposed the treaty and U.S. entry into the League under any circumstances. They had counselled against entering the war in the first place and now opposed further participation in affairs on the old continent. The Reservationists were the largest of the three factions (Jentleson 2004: 75ff).

Finally, the Senate voted twice to reject the Treaty, thus keeping the U.S. out of the League. The reason for the Congress to reject the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations was not that Wilson wanted to involve the U.S. in world affairs, but an objection towards Wilson’s chosen method of doing so. Many Reservationists are in fact best described as anti-League internationalists, arguing that the U.S. should preserve a free hand for its overseas activities and not tie its fate to the interests of others. This unilateral internationalist approach prevailed during the 1920s, but by the beginning of the 1930s it began to give way to rising isolationism (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 7f).

In the wake of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, U.S. isolationism was replaced by an active internationalism. The foreign policy questions facing the U.S. after the end of the war was not about what the country could do abroad, but about what it should do abroad. The answer was the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO, casting off America’s traditional aversion to entangling alliances and formally declaring that the U.S. saw its security interests inextricably linked with those of Western Europe. The approach of Truman was characterised by its blend of power and cooperation (Jentleson 2004: 116f). During Truman’s presidency much of the infrastructure of current international society, like the UN, the IMF, the IBRD and the GATT, was introduced. By accepting and promoting these as well as other international regimes and organisations, the U.S. accepted that the country’s right to act should be constrained by international law, even though it had the power to act as it saw fit. In essence Truman stayed loyal to the intellectual heritage of Wilson. So too did his successors during the greater part of the Cold War. The Wilson School was, however, not unchallenged during this period. Advocates for the Lodge School longed for a policy of the free hand. As the Cold War proceeded and the U.S. allies became less and less willing to follow Washington’s lead uncritically, the debate between those emphasising co-operation and international law and those who emphasised the free exercise of American power was intensified. The differences between the two camps eventually flared into the open in the 1990s with the demise of the USSR (McCormick 2005: 223ff).

The U.S. foreign policy debate that followed was initially mistakenly seen as a replay of the debate between isolationists and internationalists of the interwar era. But, the real debate in the 1990s was not whether, but (again) how the U.S. should engage the world. George H. W. Bush’s presidency in most ways represented a continuation of Wilsonianism (Melanson 2005). So did the presidency of Bill Clinton, at least during the first of his two tenures.

But from the mid-1990s it became more and more obvious that the U.S. (once again) had the freedom to act as it saw fit. Simultaneously, the demands of a more aggressive American foreign policy increased. It was argued that since the U.S. could, it should act unbound. Behind these demands were a number of neo-Conservative intellectuals and practitioners, several of whom were connected to think tanks like e.g. the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) (Mann 2004). Put briefly, the approach was anti-UN internationalist.
The neo-Conservative moment finally came with the presidency of George W. Bush. Even though Bush outlined his main ideas during the presidential campaign and started to implement parts of his foreign policy agenda as soon as he took the oath of office, it was not until after the terror attacks of 11th September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) that he carried out what has been labelled a foreign policy “revolution” (Gurtov 2006, Skillen 2005).

In the U.S. elections of 2000, George W. Bush contrasted his foreign policy approach to that of the Clinton administration by launching the idea of the U.S. as a humble nation. Bush implied that his opponent, Al Gore, was associated with what he presented as the “arrogant nation” approach of the second Clinton administration, which, he argued, saw America as the indispensable nation. Yet short after his inauguration, President Bush, due to a revolutionary change in American foreign policy, it was argued, roused international resentment against the U.S. on a scale inconceivable during the Clinton years.

The case of continuity

Ever since Washington DC was attacked for the first time on 24th August 1814, three principals have guided America: pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony (Gaddis 2004:16). The humiliation the attack meant to the new country cannot be overestimated, nor its effects. This gave rise to an extended mission for the Americans to provide for their own security. The concept “enlarge/extend” is important because the example this almost forgotten attack created was something that lasted from that day and onwards. Since the attack “U.S. safety comes from enlarging, rather than form contracting, its sphere of responsibilities.

Americans [...] have generally responded to threats – and particularly to surprise attacks - by taking the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security. (Gaddis 2004:13)

This was nothing new though, even in 1814. James Madison said in Federalist Paper no. 10 that growth would guarantee republicanism. Thomas Jefferson definitely had security through expansion in mind when he abandoned his strict “constructionist” approach and took the opportunity to buy Louisiana 1803. Under his second period he also changed his rhetoric. From speaking of America as an “exemplar of liberty”, he soon described it as “an empire of liberty”. The goal was set – to spread freedom to others (Selden 2004: 2). The idea of exporting freedom or “teach people how to elect good men” as Woodrow Wilson phrased it a century later, has characterized American foreign policy ever since. Through McKinley interventionism and actions of war was connected with the idea of “a cause for humanity”. It also was connected to the Monroe doctrine by claiming that the doctrine had implied America’s duty to assist all people who wanted to escape European oppression. Part of the so called Manifest Destiny was to dedicate power to other people to achieve freedom and republicanism (Weinberg 1958: 421). To find a way to masquerade the real power ambitions, it became necessary to call the politics for example: “imperialism for freedom”. Wilson later refined this idea and argued that it was vital for American security to rule the Pacific, which also meant the beginning for a vision to dominate the future global economy (Stephenson 1995: 94). Already in 1905, Wilson had established a mindset about America’s greatness and he had no doubt about America’s destiny; “I suppose that in our hearts we know that we shall rule the world” (Ninkovich 1994: 43). During the post World War II period these ideas have been redefined and entrenched by every administration. With the self-image of exceptionalism and the idea about spreading freedom to others, every war becomes, not
an immoral action against equals, but help towards the less exceptional peoples. Exceptionalism implies subordination. And if you are exceptional you can never be wrong. The Iraq war can be understood in accordance to this grounded American identity and notion of a mission.

The tradition to act unilaterally is also a well established. The fact that the U.S. constitutes an exceptional entity in the world implicates that they should not cooperate with others. However, this does not mean isolationism, but an aspiration for territorial integrity and independence from others. The idea of isolation has indeed served as a rhetorical symbol for exceptionalism and created early a sense of distance to the old world, but in practice, isolation has never existed (Bemis 1956, Kagan 2006, McDougall 1997). America has interfered in other nation’s interests, expanded economically and politically and tried to remake the world into its own mirror image. Therefore, the U.S. has frequently been compromising with the idea of isolation (Hietala 1985: viii). Nevertheless, regarding national security America has under no circumstances accepted interference from others. This unilateral approach implicates that America does not tolerate foreign influence and that they have to answer military to every perceived threat (Chase and Carr 1988). As a consequence America has at the same time always sought hegemony; first, in their own hemisphere and thereafter, on a global level (Gaddis 2004). During the twentieth century this has been illustrated by the open door policy and the attempts to create a world order resting on the premise that other nations are open for American economic interference. The open door policy rests on two principals: (i) “The Economic Open Door”, maintaining and open international economic system; and (ii) “The Political Open Door”, spreading democracy and liberalism abroad (Layne 2006: 30). The open door policy, postulate that the economic power, should be used in ways that reorganize the international political system in accordance with the American ideology; a kind of “imperialism of idealism”. Hence, the open door policy combines very well the two dominating themes in American history, i.e. expansionism and mission.

U.S. policymakers believe that Open Door U.S. expansion requires an international political system conducive to trade and investment and that war and instability is bad for business. Consequently, the United States has sought to create an international political environment that is hospitable to openness. To preserve this needed political stability, the United States has taken on the role of hegemonic stabilizer in regions where it has important economic interests. By the same token, for the Open Door to remain open, other countries need to be stable internally, so that trade will not be disrupted and U.S. foreign direct investments will not be jeopardized by political upheaval or expropriation. The United States has vested interest in having other countries by run by the ‘right’ kind of governments, that is, those that eschew mercantilistic or autarkic economic policies and embrace the nation’s incorporation, or integration, in to an open –American dominated –international economy. (Layne 2006: 33f)

Throughout American history other entities than states have been threatening American security interests and expansion. From the very beginning there were pirates and radical groupings and more important the originals (Indians) who were ready to defend their positions against American expansion (Zinn 1995).

One of the first problems to solve was therefore to make sure that the expansion itself did not cause further insecurity. This, in turn, created an endless spiral of active and reactive actions and the necessity to act pre-emptively/preventively. Soon after the foundation of the country founding, the U.S. also began to see enemies and threats everywhere and this is a tradition still going strong. We saw it during the Cold War (NSC 68 and Team B report) and in the PNAC. The very latest contribution to this body of thought is “An American Strategy for Asia”, a policy document written by Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg at AEI. Argument for pre-emptive use of force was
nourished through this sense of threat and in the idea of the necessity of an expansion of the “civilisation”, which meant and legitimized dispossession and massacres of Indians for more than a century (Gaddis 2004: 18). It also justified actions against country’s that otherwise would fall apart and risk to be occupied by France or England. President Polk’s arguments to expand America’s territory were, that hostile Europeans eventually could invade an independent Texas or California and thereby jeopardize America’s safety. McKinley followed this idea when he invaded the Philippines 1898 with the excuse that a weakened Spain would open up for other powerful nations to take the islands and thereby threaten American interests. Subsequent administrations like Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson used the same kind of arguments to legitimize a series of pre-emptive interventions in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and Mexico. In several cases it was not about averting imminent threats but rather eventual future threats. It is important to recognise that America sometimes has had adequate reasons to invade or use military force against others, but as many times there has not been any reasons (Chase and Carr 1988:15).

Large part of American foreign policy after World War II has also been about preventing possible future threats. In fact, it serves as a core of its policy. Washington has never allowed strategically essential countries to develop politically independently. This has been true for many different kinds of regimes, not just communist ones (for example Syria 1948, Iran 1954, Guatemala 1954, Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, Angola 1975 and Argentine 1975). The Carter doctrine later underlined the notion when it stated that the Persian Gulf was a vital interest for the United States and that an attack in this area would be regarded as an attack on America. This is in many ways similar to Bush pre-emptive war declaration (Kolko 2006: 12).

The Bush Doctrine: A revolution in foreign policy?
As the Cold War ground on, America’s allies became less and less willing to follow the lead of Washington. By consequence, it became harder and harder to paper over the differences between those who emphasised multilateral cooperation and those who exercised the free exercise of power. While the former, the Wilson school, saw new possibilities for regime development, the latter, and the Lodge school, decried the ineffectiveness of many international organisations and despaired at the constraints placed on the U.S.’s freedom to act. These differences, for obvious reasons flared into the open in the 1990s with the demise of the USSR – suddenly those who had emphasised international institutions and law lost the trump card they had long held (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 12). Hence, the real debate during the 1990s was not whether, but how the U.S. should engage the world. Clinton’s first tenure in most ways represented a continuation of the traditional Wilsonian approach. Clinton’s opponents criticised the approach, especially that he had failed to recognise that with the demise of the USSR, the U.S. now had the freedom to act as it saw fit (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 12). During his second tenure, Clinton complied more to his opponents than during the first. But it was George W. Bush, not Bill Clinton who profoundly changed the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The revolution started after the terror attacks on 11th September 2001.

The Bush revolution is foreign policy at its broadest level, rested on two basic beliefs. Pro primo, in the world post-9/11, a dangerous world, the best, not to say only, way to ensure U.S. security was abandon multilateralism, i.e. to shed the constraints imposed by friends, allies and institutions. Maximising the freedom to act was essential. Pro secundo, an unbound U.S. should use its strengths to change the status quo in the world. By extension, the U.S. should aggressively go abroad searching for monsters to destroy.
The practical consequences of these basic beliefs were a decided preference for unilateral action, that pre-emptive, and by extension preventive, war was no longer a last resort of American foreign policy and that the U.S. should use its unprecedented power to produce regime change in rogue states.

If George W. Bush in fact presided over a revolution in foreign policy, was he responsible for it? Most analysts and journalists arguing that the foreign policy of the Bush administration indeed was revolutionary argued that he was not. They rather blamed neo-Conservatives within the Bush administration, led by Deputy Secretary General of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. It was argued that President Bush was “the callow instrument of neoconservative ideologues” (Epstein 2003: 13) and that they had “captured the heart and mind of the President, and that they’re controlling the foreign policy agenda” (Biden, 2003).

Daalder and Lindsay (2003: 15) question the description given supra and argues that neither Bush nor the bulk of his adviser was neo-Conservatives but rather assertive nationalists, willing to use American power to defeat threats to U.S. security, but rather unwilling to use American primacy to change status quo in the world. Nevertheless, after 9/1, assertive nationalists started to listen to neo-Conservatives and eventually the two formed a marriage of convenience. Hence, neo-Conservatism became a very, not to say the most, important source of influence for U.S. foreign policy post-9/11.

Neo-Conservatives argued that the moment had come, with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, to create an American-dominated world order. Some debaters called in “the unipolarist imperative”. Instead of reducing military spending, they argued, the U.S. needed to expand its military reach to every region of the world, using its tremendous military, technological and economic power to create a new Pax Americana. Against the liberal internationalism of the Clinton administration and the (neo)isolationism of the Republican Congress, the neo-Conservatives had a forceful vision of a world reshaped by U.S. power. Based on this vision they forged alliances with inter alia hard-line Conservatives such as Cheney and Rumsfeld, but also the President himself (Dorien 2004: 1).

According to Francis Fukuyama (2006: 15), a former prominent advocate for the neo-Conservative movement, the roots of the –ism lie in a group of largely Jewish intellectuals who attended the City College of New York (CCNY) in the mid- to late 1930s. The group included e.g. Irving Kristol, Seymour Martin Lipset and Nathan Glazer. The group was totally politicized and committed to left-wing politics. Kristol for example started as a Trotskyite.

The most important inheritance, however, from the CCNY group was an intense anti-communism and an outspoken distaste for liberals who sympathised with communism, being unable to see the evil it represented. Trotsky was, needless to say, himself a communist, but the Trotskyites understood better than most people the utter cynicism and brutality of Stalin. Important to note is that the anti-communism of the disillusioned Left is rather different from the anti-communism of the traditional American right. The anti-communist Left sympathised with the social and economic aims of communism but was very critical towards “real existing socialism” as it had been developed in the USSR. The American Right opposed communism because it was atheistic, linked to a foreign hostile power and anti-free market. Virtually all of the CCNY group had ceased being Marxists by the time of WW II (Fukuyama 2006: 15f).

Between the anticommunism of the CCNY group and the second important stream of neo-Conservatism that grew out of the journal The Public Interest, founded by Kristol and Glazer in 1965, there is considerable continuity. American politics had changed profoundly by the late 1960s. In the wake of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, a New Left had replaced the old communists of the 1930s. The old guard
now found itself in opposition to a new generation of radical students attacking the university itself. In short, the first formative battle shaping neo-Conservatism was the fight with Stalinists in the thirties and forties; the second was with the New Left and the counterculture it spawned in the 1960s (Fukuyama 2006: 17f).

Given the origins of neo-Conservatism in left-wing communism, it is hardly surprising that advocates for the ideology for the most part ended up opposing the realist foreign policy of Henry Kissinger during the 1970s (assuming that all nations are equal in their struggle for power and that morality has no place in the conduct of foreign policy). But, consequently, they were broadly supportive of Ronald Reagan’s effort to (re)moralise U.S. foreign policy.

The expansive, interventionist, democracy-promoting position currently identified with neo-Conservatism is, however, very much the product of younger intellectuals, like William Kristol and Robert Kagan, who started to argue for this kind of foreign policy in the magazine The Weekly Standard during the mid- to late-1990s. The approach has also been labelled “neo-Reaganite”. In essence, the approach can be described as Wilsonianism minus international institutions or anti-UN internationalist. In place of international regimes, current neo-Conservatism, emphasise three tools for projecting U.S. influence, namely: overwhelming military superiority, a renewed dedication to U.S. alliances and missile defence as a means to protect the American homeland security from counter-attack. Kristol and Kagan also argued explicitly for governmental change as a central component for their foreign policy.

There is a great deal of diversity in the views held by different neo-Conservatives and nothing approaching a party line. In spite of this, it is possible to boil down the foreign policy of neo-Conservatism into three principles, which logically explain the policy positions that advocate for this –ism has taken and hereby distinguish it from other schools of thought about foreign policy. These principles are: (i) a belief that the internal character of governments matters and that foreign policy must be a mirror of the deepest values of liberal democratic societies; (ii) a belief that U.S. power has been and should be used for moral purposes and that America needs to remain engaged in international affairs; and (iii) scepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law, regimes and organisations (Singh 2006). These means and ends catch the essence of neo-Conservatism.

One way to understand neo-Conservatism is to think of it as reversed Trotskyism. While Trotsky believed in permanent revolution and wished to export socialism to as many countries as possible, the neo-Conservatives wish to export democracy to as many countries as possible. Early neo-Conservatives understood foreign policy as a “crusade”, first aiming to reach global socialism, then social democracy and finally democratic capitalism. They drew no sharp line between theory and practice, but regarded theory as a sort of political struggle and politics as something that should be dictated by theory (or ideology).

Dwelling on crisis, but also thriving on it, neo-Conservatism had a ready-made worldview when President Bush (unexpectedly) needed one in the wake of 9/11 (Singh 2006). Initially President Bush was not a neo-Conservative, neither was Cheney nor Rumsfeld. However, post-9/11 they became neo-Conservatives, or at least relied upon the agenda put forward by neo-Conservative thinkers and practitioners.

Although neo-Conservative and assertive nationalists (like Rumsfeld and Cheney) differed on several issues, e.g. that the U.S. should actively spread its values abroad, they shared a deep scepticism towards traditional Wilsonian commitment to international law and a belief in the relevance of international regimes and organisations. They placed their faith not in diplomacy, compromises and treaties, but in power and resolve (Døalder and Lindsay 2003: 13ff).
To conclude, during at least the first tenure of the Bush presidency it became considered conventional wisdom that the Bush Doctrine differed fundamentally from the foreign policy of his predecessors, that the marriage of convenience between assertive neo-Conservatives and assertive nationalists truly constituted a revolution in American foreign policy, that the foreign policy pursued was highly unrepresentative for the U.S., not to say un-American.

But is this really true? How revolutionary was the revolution really? Does the Bush Doctrine really differs from earlier American foreign policy doctrines, if yes to what extent? Can really one individual human make such a policy impact as it has been argued that George W. Bush did during his presidency? Put in a different way, is the Bush doctrine rather nothing else than yet another expression of the traditional American values.

**The Bush Doctrine: A case of continuity in American foreign policy?**

Contrary to those who argue that the Bush presidency should be seen as an anomaly, there are many scholars who argue that the American foreign policy is more about continuity and historically persistent structures that limit the room of manoeuvre. Bush’s invasion of Iraq and the “war on terror” therefore has to be understood as grounded in the American foreign policy tradition. It should at best, be recognized as an extension of previous doctrines and engagements abroad, not as a revolution or even an anomaly. One can also interpret it as a rational evolution where America’s development consists of different historical phases which logically have followed upon each other. Some core ideas about America and the nation’s unparalleled development have constituted a kind of mutually strengthening elements, which has resulted in a logical progression of interests and an expansion of America's political position in world politics. 9/11 also gave America its opportunity to become the absolute supremacy of the international system or more accurate to establish and deepening Pax Americana.

Those who have been arguing that the Bush presidency is an anomaly has not (according the continuity paradigm) take into consideration for example (i) that the so-called neoconservatives have been influential in Washington in different ways for decades (ii) that previous highly influential policy documents (compared to the neoconservative agenda formulated in PNAC 1998) have many similarities and have demanded pre-emptive actions to eliminate different threats to the U.S. (for example NSC-68 and Team B report 1976). Or that these demands for pre-emptive actions and substantial increases in military budgets has been met by various administrations (iii) every administrations has emphasized a clear and manifest idea about America as an exception in the world, a provident country with a special mission (from God) to spread democracy throughout the world. Every administration also has used military force from that standpoint. (iv) a self-image of exception implicitly include a superiority towards others which set a standard of “helping” others to implement “universal” superior values and institutions. In practice this has sometimes meant leading by example, but more often, by imposing these ideas on those who do not understand their own best.

There are many aspects/things that run through the American history that creates continuity’s in policymaking and constricts the room of manoeuvre. The idea of a Manifest Destiny or a sense of exceptionalism has been a part of the American self-image since its founding (Greabner 1968, Johanssen 1997, Stephanson 1995, Merk 1963), so has the strive for absolute security through expansion (Gaddis 2004, Kagan 2006, McDougall 1997). With the notion of exceptionalism followed very early a hierarchy both within the nation (against Indians and afro-Americans) and towards other cultures outside the nation. Exceptionalism also developed a rational of legitimizing violence against others due to the superiority (Hietala 1997, Hunt 1987, Weinberg 1958). Ever
since America entered the world scene as a successful industrial nation it has also regarded its security as dependent on an “open door policy” and a surrounding world that develop in accordance to American interests (Bacevich 2005, 2009, Layne 2006, Rosenberg 1982). Furthermore, oil and military interest have shaped the real politics and served as an incentive to extend American interests abroad and sometimes led the U.S to undertake unclear violent actions (Johnson 2005, Kolko 2006).

Through the foundation of Americas identity – or core ideas about what America is and what mission the nation has in the world – some aspects has appeared as salient and in different ways established a structure that set bounds to the political administrations; America has as a consequence: (i) preferred to act unilaterally – though never isolated itself from the world (Kagan 2006, Mc Dougall 1997) (ii) given itself the right to act pre-emptively which in reality from time to time has meant preventively (Kolko 2006) (iii) been searching for global hegemony and a system confined by Americas interest (or as a mirror image of America) (Gaddis 2004). At the same time the U.S. has been acting secretly in a way contrary to its own basic values and principles. Such times have been morally complicated but interpreted as necessary for the higher good (Cohen 2010). (iv) The American policy has constantly also been portrayed as a fight between good and evil – right or wrong where (v) the conflict always been elucidated and exaggerated to motivate and legitimate various wars (Appelman Williams 1972, Weinberg 1958). Nearly every President has also been driven by a religious belief that in different ways have affected the politics and been used rhetorically (Holl 2007, Spalding 2007, Tocqueville 1831, Wood 1990).

Above this there has been a tradition for the President to go to war without a resolution from the Congress; Presidents have ordered hundreds of military actions without it. There was for example not an official declaration of war towards Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Bosnia or Afghanistan (Watson, Gleek and Grillo 2003:8). Previous security policy doctrines have also from time to time expanded the Presidents power when it comes to national security issues, changed formal structures and developed new organizational principles to achieve security goals (Schmitt 2007). As was the case with his predecessors, the Bush doctrine reflected the Presidents world view and identified the enemy and legitimized certain actions against defined threats. The world view may have changed according to the context, but the ideas to which the surrounding world has been evaluated have been surprisingly constant. The Bush doctrine should according to this be understood as an extension and a progress of the previous doctrines. It confirms in many ways the values and policy’s that were articulated through the Wilson, Truman, Carter and Reagan doctrines which focused on open door, right of self-determination, democracy promotion as a guarantee for Americas security (Watson, Gleek and Grillo 2003 :118). The fact that the Bush doctrine was formulated in a new historic age, enforced by new threats against America was more central to what might differ from previous doctrines. 9/11 gave the Americans, with their self-image of exceptionalism, altruistic goals and search for absolute security further excuse/reasons to strengthen their position and act against the new danger. Those who argue that the Bush administration was an anomaly or even a revolution, has not taken these facts into consideration.

Understanding change and continuity: Agents, structure(s) and institutions
Our conclusion is that the revolutionary account over-estimates agents, agency and the room for manoeuvre and does not recognize some very important aspects about traditions in American foreign policy that has narrowed the room of manoeuvre. On the other hand – the continuity account over-estimates structures, structural impact and under-estimates the room for manoeuvre. This leads to a deterministic standpoint that
leaves scant options to search for possible openings in the political system. Both perspectives are in some way problematic.

One of the most essential dividing lines within the Social Science is the one between:

On the one hand, all those who are concerned to study social actors, their modes of symbolic interaction, their definitions of situations, their modes of constructing and negotiating social reality, and on the other hand those whose focus is upon systems and objective co-ordinates, on what Durkheim called ‘social facts’ and Marx ‘definite relations that are indispensable and independent of [men’s] will (Lukes 1977:3 quoted in Rothstein 1988:37).

The distinction is evident in International Relations (IR), not at least in foreign policy analysis (FPA). Those who work with agent-based explanations have not found any adequate way to treat the importance of social structure(s), and vice versa (cf. Giddens 1979). This state-of-the-art is absurd, since societies consists of both agents with some consciousness and therefore with the ability to choose, but whose actions are impressed by, but also are impressing, structural patterns (cf. Rothstein 1988: 27). The conclusion is obvious: both perspectives are necessary. Trying to work out how this can be done is what the agent—structure problem really is about. There are several dimensions of the agent—structure problem – e.g. an ontological and an epistemological one. The ontological dimension, which is the only one considered in this essay, is concerned with the very basic characteristics of the social, trying to answer questions such as: What is an agent and a structure, respectively? What does the relation between agents and structure(s) looks like? These questions will, in turn, be addressed infra.

The existence of a great variety of agents in contemporary IR/FPA (individuals and different type of organisations, states and bureaucracies included) causes problems for scholars who want to make sense of international relations research. It is hard to find a concept of “agent” that is general enough to cover the whole range of different agents, at the same time that it is still analytically meaningful. The solution to the problem chosen in this paper is one of simplification. Hence, the point of departure here will be the individual agent. One reason for this choice is that the face-to-face relation between two individuals can be considered the most elementary case of human interaction.

Agents act in society to achieve goals (which they need not to be fully aware of), reflecting their needs and wishes. They do there very best to achieve their goals with means that the nature and societal structure(s) make available to them (cf. Lundquist 1984). The act that the agent is carrying out could be considered as a function of its “capacity” and “motivation” – of its properties: “understand” (defined as the agents perception of itself as well as the surrounding environment, which of course can be incomplete or even false), “can” (i.e. the ability to make decisions and more or less effective influence the surrounding environment), and “will” (which means that the agent have more or less conscious and explicit preferences). These properties affect the “choice” of the agent, which lead to intended as well as unintended outcomes (cf. Lundquist 1984: 42f, 1984: 5ff).

Then, what about using agents as the point of departure for explaining different policy phenomena (methodological individualism)? The problem with an analysis that emanates strictly from the acts of individual agents is that they must start with a postulate of the basis for these acts. Goals are supposed to be endogenous given and considered as point of departure for the analysis (like e.g. within “Realism”, where it is supposed that the only interest of the state is “power”). Furthermore, the interests of the agents are often defined as constant over time (Morgenthau, 1948[1993]: cf. Rothstein 1988: 29). An assumption, which in extension leads to, as shown by e.g. Mayhew (1980), a value of the explanations produced equal to zero. Agents do what they do because they do it, i.e.
a reiterate of data. The very same agent acts in the same way over time and different agents act equally in the same, or in similar, situations, et cetera. What is not accounted for is that agents are affected by (social) structure(s) (with certain duration). The study of American grand strategy cannot take its point departure from (strictly) agent-based models of explanation.

The opposite, i.e. explanations that (strictly) emanates from structures (methodological structuralism), is just as impossible. The problem is actually even bigger than in the case of agent-based explanations, since when it is quite unproblematic to define the concept of agent, the concept of structure is notoriously elusive. A short excursion of the history of the concept could be illuminating.

When Durkheim introduced Sociology as an academic discipline of its own right in the end of the nineteenth century, he was “forced” to show that it represented something new in relation to already established disciplines, such as Political Science and Economics. Typical for Sociology, Durkheim argued, was the study of the synchrone and collective aspects of society. The aim of Sociology was to study the “structure”, understood as some kind of patter with certain duration, of the society. Societies should be studied as whole, irreducible to its containing parts. After Durkheim, the “structural” tradition has developed into two different directions – “North American” structural-functionalism and “French” structuralism (cf. Borglind 1993: 36ff).

In the former tradition, developed especially by Talcot Parsons (see e.g. his 1951), structure normally appears in conjunction with function (drawing on a metaphor from biology). The study of societal structure(s) is like studying the anatomy of an organism, to study its function is like studying the physiology of its organism – i.e. it is to illustrate how the structure works (Giddens, 1979:60). “Structure is understood as referring to a pattern of social relationships, function to how such patterns actually operate as systems” (ibid.). In IR this use of structure is evident in the writings of e.g. Immanuel Wallerstein, who use the global capitalist process of accumulation as the overall descriptive character of the world-system, explaining all social phenomena, like e.g. why the U.S. attacked Iraq on 16th January 1991 during Operation Desert Storm and why the U.S. attacked Iraq again on 18th March 2003 (see e.g. his 1996). The two wars, however, as we know were radically different (Battistella 2008).

In “French” structuralism – heavily inspired by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand Sassur – the concept appears in a more explanatory role, linked to the role of transformation, aiming to penetrate below the level of surface appearances. A division between code and message replaces the division between structure and function found in structural-functionalism (Giddens 1979:60). This use of structure in IR is to be found in, inter alia, the theorising of Kenneth Waltz (1979). He makes a sharp distinction between phenomena of international politics on the system and the unit level respectively. To be brief: by structure, very different things can be meant. The use of the concept in this paper is closer to the French tradition than the North American. To this we will return infra.

The problem with analysis such as Waltz’ is that they are deterministic. The structure is only regarded as an imperative on the acts carried out by already existing agents (i.e. states). In spite of his ambition to present a(n) (uncompromising) structural approach to IR, Waltz ends up being agent-oriented. The structure is considered as given however originally created by the agents. It is seen as an external force, which agents simply have to adapt to. Simply put: agents are treated as ontological primitive units-of-analysis (Waltz 1979).

The problem with the analysis of Wallerstein is that he eliminates the conscious (and the unconscious) acts of different agents. This is not so good, since no societal structure(s) can exist if they are not supported by the act of agents. In structural-
functionalist approaches the structure per se is equipped with consciousness and own needs. If e.g. the capitalists in the world-society should quit to invest for accumulation of capital, or this process should be made impossible by other reasons, then the global structure of capitalism should be brought to an end. This does not mean that it is the structure of capitalism as such that creates the accumulation of capital but agents aware of that they have interests to see that the progress goes on. In the approach of Wallerstein, the structure of the system is made ontological primitive, i.e. it is treated as given which the agents passively implement. This in extension makes it impossible to explain change from one system to another (Rothstein 1988: 34, Wendt 1987: 348).

The point of departure for understanding American foreign policy cannot be strictly methodological individualistic (nor methodological structuralistic). The approaches need to be combined. This conclusion is the base for the so-called structuration-theory introduced by Anthony Giddens.

Giddens criticism against the two structural perspectives discussed above is far-reaching. Nevertheless, it could be condensed into two points: he blames structuralists on the one hand for lacking insight about the importance of context, and on the other hand for being deterministic. Consequently, inspired by Bourdieu, he presents an alternative conceptualisation for the agent—structure (Giddens, 1979, 1984). The hard core of the structuration-theory could be condensed as follows:

1) In opposition to individualists, they accept the reality and explanatory importance of irreducible and potentially unobservable social structures that generate agents. 2) In opposition to structuralists, they oppose functionalism and stress the 'need for a theory of practical reason and consciousness that can account for human intentionally and motivation'. 3) These oppositions are reconciled by joining subordination of one to the other, which is characteristic of both individualism and structuralism. 4) Finally, they argue that social structures are inseparable from spatial and temporal structures, and that time space must therefore be incorporated directly and explicitly into theoretical and concrete social research (Thrift, quoted in Wendt 1987: 356).

Giddens has, however, been criticised – by e.g. Thompson (1989), Archer (1990) and Layder (1985) – for over-emphasising agents on the expense of what is limiting agency, namely structural frames (i.e. the opposite criticism put forward against Wendt and Dessler). The critics do not believe that Giddens specifies to which extent the structures are limiting and enabling respectively on the acts carried out by the agents. Another criticism delivered against Giddens concerns the application of the theory in empirical research. The theory is considered as too abstract (see e.g. Gregson, 1989).

The latter criticism is quite easy to deal with. We agree with the critics that the structuration-theory is more to be regarded as meta-theoretical frame than a substantial theory. But this is not a problem. Structuration-theory does not claim to be a substantial theory. It needs to be, on the one hand operationalised before it is used on the operative levels, and, on the other hand, contextualised in view of the actual problem taken into consideration – i.e. the “research-question” – e.g. to understand the Bush Doctrine.

Regarding the first criticism the situation is a bit more problematic, but by no means impossible to deal with in a constructive manner. It is regarding this latter criticism that SC becomes important (see supra, p. 2). At a first sight, it seems like SC advances very little beyond the structuration-theory. This is natural since SC very much in indebted to the works of Giddens. But, looking a bit closer, differences between the approaches are to be found. The most important one is how the concept of “institution” is used. In the theorising of Giddens (1979, 1984) institutions are considered as properties of structures. In the work of some SC, e.g. Onuf (1989), institutions are seen as the rules of the game in a society, i.e. the rule (formal as well as informal) for
interactions between different agents. By this, institutions are given an ontological status appropriate to their dual function. They are given properties of their own. Institutions are considered to constitute themselves in regular patterns. They may or may not be observed, but are always observable in principle for the agents (cf. Gould 1999: 80ff). Structure(s) are what observers “see”, while institutions are what agents act in (Onuf, 1998:62).

The ontological status(es) of structure(s) is still a bit problematic; they are phenomena that cannot be directly observed. From my point of view, the concept is best understood by the use of a metaphor and related to the concept of institution(s). Most scientists take the unobservable phenomenon of “gravitation” for granted. It exists as some sort of virtual phenomenon, present only as a possibility. Isaac Newton was the first to formulate the phenomenon in terms of a (physical) law – Newton (the agent) saw some sort of phenomenon in the world (the structure) upon which he used his mind to impose some sort of order, the law of gravity (in this case a formal institution). The law constituted our world-view until Einstein in the early twentieth century institutionalised the structure in another way and formulated his theories of relativity. In the same manner, we ought to consider the societal structure(s) – as virtual phenomena, present only as a possibility.

The structure (of international society) then becomes the sum of all institutions (identified as well as unidentified) taken together and their internal relations. The agents affect the structure via institutions. By this, institution(s) can be considered as the third element that links the two other elements together – they make the process by which agents and society constitute each other in a continuous and reciprocal way.

The societal structure comprises patterns of activities and ideas in the form of institutions. They are mainly the result of the (inter)actions of past generations. Each generation changes the old institutions, creates new ones, and thereby changing the societal structure. At the same time as institutions and the societal structure(s) display some sort of continuity they are continually (re)produces by thinking and acting agents (cf. Lundquist 1987:40).

The structure enable or limit the agent’s execution of certain acts and thought and thereby its possibilities of achieving certain outcomes (whether the agent is conscious or not) – it affects the agents “can” (cf. Lundquist 1987: 43). It thereby defines who is an agent, i.e. who can participate in a particular situation – “no one is agent for all… situations” (Onuf, 1998: 59). Some agents are excluded, others are not. The structure therefore works constraining, at least in the short run, for a number of agents. But the structure is not static. It can be changes – though reconstruction of old, or the creation of new, institutions (which necessarily must be the products of other agents than the ones excluded) (cf. North 1993:17).

If the structure “enables” the agent to act, this action is not carries out in a vacuum. When an agent interact with other agents it encounters a body of institutions, which more or less implicitly sets out not only the way the world is, but who they are, what they are doing, and what they should be doing (cf. Schon 1971: 34). Through “socialisation” the institution(s) furnish the agent with incentives for action. It forms the “understand” as well as the “will” of the agent, and through these it affect its “can”. “Information” consists of real and qualitative messages about the institution. These are interpreted and treated by the agents “understand” and thus given meaning and coherence. Information, in contrast to socialisation, requires that the agent is more active and conscious. Information affects the “can” of the agent, which in turn can change its “understand” and “will”. All this taken together affect the “choice” made by the agent, which in turn is confronted with the choice of other agents in some sort of interaction. This interaction (which can be symmetric as well as asymmetric) creates some sort of
outcome(s), which reproduces or recreates already existing institutions or create new ones, which in turn affects the structure, and so forth (cf. Lundquist 1984, 1987). The process is going on continuously.

**Some concluding remarks**

In order to understand American foreign policy in general and the Bush Doctrine in particular we need to take into account the multiple independent variables, agent-based as well as structure based ones, framing this policy. Moreover, we need to have a foundational understanding of how different independent variables interacts, i.e. a theory about structuration. If this is done, it becomes obvious that we can identify both differences/variations, and continuity in American foreign policy simultaneously; the one does not preclude the other.

With an overall actor-oriented way of analyzing American foreign policy there is a risk that one might overlook the opportunity for important critique of the American system as a whole. This is problematic because there is a need for a better understanding why certain foreign policy decisions seem to be repeated from time to time (for example Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq). Obviously, there are many situations where America has used its military power in a way not in tune with international law. Lots of prominent research has shown that there exists some core interests in America that have had an impact on the policy making process over the years. It seems like these interests and some core idea about what America is and what role it has in the world limits the room of manoeuvre for the administrations. What these limitations consist of and what effects they produce in policymaking are of course invaluable to define adequately. Here we find, for example the concept of exceptionalism as one of the most interesting terms that influences, both explicitly and implicitly, the political room of manoeuvre. With a notion of exception follows many important things.

Obamas election campaign for presidency and his first year in the White House constitute an excellent example of this assertion. During his campaign and perhaps foremost in his speech in Cairo in June 2009, he showed Americans and the world that it is possible to talk and act beyond traditions. He asked for support for an (in an American perspective) unusual political approach and got legitimacy to stretch the borders. But, ever since June the tone has changed and come into terms with previous Presidents way of acting and rhetorically addressing things. His Oslo, Peace Prize speech as well as his increasing number of combatants in Afghanistan teaches us the need to better understand. The speech was also cheered by many neoconservative thinkers such as for example William Kristol who a week later wrote in Weekly Standard that:

> There was a fair amount for Bush Doctrine-supporters, American-exceptionalist patriots, and neocon warmongers to like in Obama's Oslo speech. He sounded hardheaded and pro-American, certainly by contrast with his previous rhetorical forays abroad—his utopian world-without-nuclear-weapons remarks in Prague in April or his apologetic speech to the Muslim world in Cairo two months later --- The instruments of war may even have a preemptive role to play. For, Obama explained, an American president “cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people.” Indeed, Obama repeated the "standing idle" image later in the speech: “Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselves for nuclear war.” Threats matter, and we can't wait to be attacked (Kristol, 21st December 2009).1

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1 [www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/324jeods.asp](http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/324jeods.asp).
Two days into his presidency, Obama signed three executive orders to change the direction of U.S. strategy in reducing Al-Qaida’s capability to threaten America. Among them was to close Guantanamo Bay within a year and to ban the use of torture.

This morning, I signed three executive orders. First, I can say without exception or equivocation that the United States will not torture. Second, we will close the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and determine how to deal with those who have been held there. And third, we will immediately undertake a comprehensive review to determine how to hold and try terrorism suspects to best protect our nation and the rule of law. The orders I signed today will send another unmistakable message – our actions in defence of liberty will be just as our cause. Once again, America’s moral example must be the bedrock and the beacon of our global leadership (Obama, 22nd January 2009).

President Obama engaged Greg Craig to work with strengthening the principles of legal security. In the transition period Craig had been tasked with rolling back what Obama and his campaign believed were extra legal measures that President Bush had instituted with his war on terror (Calabresi 2009). During his campaign, Obama had frequently talked about that America should use righteous means in its battle with Al-Qaida. He avoided the phrase “war on terror” and said that the fight could only be won if America changed its approach and promoted democracy with democratic means. It was Craig’s stead fasted work during the transition that made it possible for the new President to draft the Executive Orders which also included the aim to end CIA’s enhanced interrogation.

When Greg Craig eleven month later resigned from his job and was replaced by Fred F. Fielding it was definitely a sign that this more “soft” approach, in less than a year, had reached a dead end. Something had happened during Obamas first year in office. A huge public outcry about the release of two Uighur prisoners, and an offensive campaign from parts of the CIA that questioned the ban of some extraordinary methods for interrogation, with the excuse that it jeopardized America’s security – resulted in a U-turn. The Obama administration decided to reverse the Greg Craig Guantanamo Bay Plan and to continue its use of military tribunals and indefinite detention without charge (Calabresi 2009). The Guantanamo Bay is not yet closed (February, 2010).

The Bush Doctrine is a case of change and continuity, simultaneously and in order to understand it (as well as the foreign policy of other American presidents, or maybe more correct administrations, agents structure(s), institutions, structuration and, by extension, room to manoeuvre should be taken seriously.

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5 www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1940537-3,00.html.
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