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**Inspection effects through the eyes of the inspectors: Swedish notions**
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Inspection effects through the eyes of the inspectors: 
Swedish notions

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Abstract

A cadre of school inspectors with different backgrounds visit around a thousands schools annually in Sweden. Do they believe that they ‘make a difference?’ This paper analyses the ‘assumptive worlds’ (Marshall et.al. 1885) of inspectors and inspection managers at the Swedish Schools Inspectorate as expressed in interviews. The inspectors’ notions about what is affected and in what ways are brought forward, illuminating the relation between the national, the municipal and school, and the inspection process. The effects through the eyes of the inspectors, their assumptive worlds, are discussed in terms of constitutive effects (Dahler-Larsen 2011a, b) and ‘doing governing’ (Ozga & Segerholm 2011).

School inspection has gained ground in Europe in recent years and a number of nations and regions have set up Inspectorates (The Standing International Conference of Inspectorates, SICI, n. d.). As all other evaluative activities, (like tests, program evaluation, quality assurance and assessment, etc) school inspection governs education in one way or another. The concept “constitutive effects” (Dahler-Larsen 2012) directs attention to the governing potential of such activities through their effects on the very meaning of education. In this paper we analyse notions of inspection effects as they are expressed in interviews with inspectors and inspection managers at the Swedish School Inspectorate (SI) as a way to discuss education governance.

The questions to be addressed are:

- What are the inspectors’ and inspection managers’ notions, their assumptive worlds, regarding inspection effects on different arenas?

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2 This paper draws on data from three projects. The authors acknowledge support from The Swedish Research Council, financing the two projects Governing by Inspection (no 2009-5770, Segerholm, Forsberg, Lindgren, Rönnberg) also financed by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in the UK, and Swedish national school inspections: Introducing centralized instrumets for governing in a decentralised context (no 2007-3579, Rönnberg). The authors further acknowledges Umeå University for financing the project Inspecting the ‘Market’: Education at the Intersection of Marketisation and Central State Control (no 223-514-09, Rönnberg, Lindgren).
• Departing in their notions what could be said about constitutive effects of school inspection?

The paper starts with a description of the SI and its inspections, moving over to a short presentation of our understanding of education governance, the assumptive worlds of policymakers, and evaluation influence and effects. We give an account of the methods used, the empirical material, as well as of how the material was analysed. Thereafter the results are presented, and the paper ends with a discussion of how the relation between inspection and education governance may be understood, based on the statements from those responsible for inspection.

School inspection in Sweden

Since autumn 2008 when the new inspection agency, the Swedish Schools Inspectorate started to operate inspection activities have increased dramatically, the SI now visiting thousands of schools annually (Skolinspektionen n.d. a). In 2011 the Inspectorate assessed 2,400 comprehensive schools, 550 secondary schools and 660 other publicly funded educational enterprises. In their annual report to the government they stress the increase in productivity of around 1,000 visits compared to the previous year, (or a 41% increase in productivity, our calculation) (Skolinspektionen n.d. a, p. 8).

The Inspectorate is commissioned by the government to carry out: a) regular supervision of all schools and principal organizers (municipalities and operators of independent schools), and b) quality audits where a sample of schools are audited thematically, e.g. one school subject, or a particular area of interest like assessment in the lower grades (Regeringen Utbildningsdepartementet 2010, 2011, Skolinspektionen n.d. b). The SI also handles c) complaints from individuals (e.g. concerning bullying) and d) licences for independent schools. The basis for all activities are the agency’s interpretations of the Education Act and Ordinance, and other national formal documents that have to be adhered to by all schools. Examples of the latter are: the national curriculum and course plans, the national grading system, regulations concerning individual development plans for all pupils, plans for equal treatment, and the National Agency for Education’s general advice (could for example be about how to carry out quality assurance).

These laws, rules and regulations are particularly important in regular supervisions (Regeringen Utbildningsdepartementet 2010, 2011, Skolinspektionen n.d. b). Decisions and reports in regular supervision are made for individual schools and principal organizers focusing deviances from what is required. A response from the principal organizer with a plan of how to comply with the SI decisions has to be sent to the Inspectorate. The SI assess if they can accept the response and planned actions and inform the organizer of their decision. A follow-up is conducted approximately three months later. From the first of July 2011 the SI may make use of penalties according to the new Education Act. Fines can be imposed, or for independent schools the license to operate may be withdrawn if the principal organizer does not correct what is wrong. In quality audits external
The concept “proven practice” is central in the opening paragraphs in the Higher Education Act prescribing the basis for higher education (SFS 1992:1434, 1 Ch. 2§). It is said that all higher education should be based on scientific knowledge and proven practice. The meaning of the concept originally implied an acknowledgement of professional experience as a form of knowledge.

The Inspectorate is organized in five regional departments and the head management group is composed of the Director general, the Director of Inspections, the five department head managers, and the managers from central functions like communication, internal support, personnel, etc., and law. Persons with a background in education (teachers, headmasters and local administrators), persons with a general competence to investigate, and persons with a background in law have been recruited as inspectors in order to get an inspectorate with mixed competences and knowledge (Skolinspektionen n.d. a, p. 51). Many of the inspectors with an educational background also worked as inspectors during the period when the inspections were part of the National Agency for Education 2003-autumn 2008 (Johansson 2012, p. 20). This year (2012), SI’s grant from the government is 351 million SEK, a small increase from previous years (e.g. 2011: 338.5 million SEK). More than half of the economical resources is now used for regular supervision - a steady increase over the years (Skolinspektionen n.d. a, p. 43). Considering the very comprehensive activities undertaken by the SI it is interesting to ask if the inspectors and inspection managers believe that these activities ‘make a difference’, and if so, in what ways.

Theoretical approach

We do not aspire to study causal links between inspection and effects. Drawing on the extensive evaluation literature on evaluation use, impact and effects (e.g. Dahler-Larsen 2012, Kirkhart 2000, Power 1997, Sahlin-Andersson 1995, Segerholm 2001, Segerholm & Åström 2007, Vedung & Svärd 2008), and on research on education governance in a global and European context (e.g. Ball 1998, Ozga, Dahler-Larsen, Segerholm & Simola 2011), we do however argue that school inspection is part of education governance and of transnational as well as national policy processes in education. In a European perspective SICI and its workshops and other projects and activities are examples of instances where inspection ideas and education policies flow and travel between nations without the involvement of governments (Lawn & Grek 2012, p. 135-149, Grek, Lawn, Ozga & Segerholm). Inspection ideas are brokered and methods are learned and
carried back and forth between national/regional inspectorates by inspectors and inspection managers attending these events. National/regional inspectorates and inspectors do however operate in national contexts that differ so our understanding is that inspection policies and practices are not copied straight off, but have to be translated and adapted to these different contexts. This mediation of inspection policies and practices through networks and organizations like SICI are what Jacobsson calls meditative activities (Jacobsson 2006, 2010). In addition to meditative activities Jakobsson proposes that regulative activities and inquisitive activities, are central to governance in a European context. Regulative governing activities are those that require compliance like laws and explicit rules. Inquisitive activities operate through activities like comparisons, indicators and opening up for examination. We find these concepts useful also in relation to inspection in national contexts. Central to our understanding of education governance is that it concerns balancing “tensions between centralised and decentralised levels of governance, deregulation and existing or new (re-) regulatory instruments of governance within nation-states where relationships are multidimensional, overlapping and fluid.” (Ozga & Segerholm 2011, p. 5).

School inspection activities and the inspectors’ notions of those activities then become of interest to study. Their notions likely “limit the range of options and focus debate within certain understood priorities.” (Marshall, Mitchell & Wirt 1985, p. 110), and in so doing affects the course of action and how governing is done. Marshall et al identifies with reference to Young (1977) the ‘assumptive worlds’ of policy makers as the “policymakers’ subjective understanding of the environment in which they operate” (Young, p. 2). Following their argument about policy makers’ assumptive world we assume that inspectors are socialized in a certain culture that affect their notions of expected behaviours, judgements and understandings and reflects “a shared sense of what is appropriate in action, interaction and choice.” (Marshall et al, p. 90). Assumptive worlds glues together other elements of policy making like informal processes and formal structure (p. 113) and “reflects the taken-for-granted framework within which policy making occurs.” (p.91). Simply put this means that we believe that the assumptive worlds of inspectors and inspection managers, their notions of school inspection, their work and what it leads to, matter in understanding how inspection policy and practice is constructed and governs education.

Another useful concept is brought forward by Dahler-Larsen (2011, 2012), is the concept ‘constitutive effects’:

> By constitutive effects I refer to how QAE (quality assurance and evaluation, author’s clarification) redefines the meaning of education and the practices of education by means of installing new discursive and cultural markers defining standards, targets and criteria. (Dahler-Larsen 2011, p. 153)

Constitutive effects “seeks to capture the way tests, measurements and indicators help define the social realities of which they are a part” (Dahler-Larsen 2012, p.173). The concept acknowledges the profound influence evaluative activities may have on what education means and should mean, including notions of what is a good teacher, a good student, good teaching, and good outcomes.
From a general overview of theories of evaluation use Mark and Henry (2004) develop a model of mechanisms that may mediate evaluation influence (Mark & Henry 2004, p. 41). Their interest here is to try to classify different ways that evaluative activities influence at individual, interpersonal and collective levels. Their model is both a classification system and an expanded and elaborated theory of evaluation influence, recognising that influence may occur in different ways and at different levels in organizations.

**Methods**

Marshall emphasize the importance of using interviews as a way of entering into the assumptive worlds of the interviewees:

> Using their utterances as a key to understanding their assumptive worlds will provide insights into policymakers' worldviews, their ways of understanding and wending their way through their own world to achieve their own ends (Marshall 1985, p. 9-10).

Following her advice we have performed rather extensive interviews with a sample of inspectors and the head management group. In the three projects from which our data is derived, we have been taken part of and observed several schools inspection processes and afterwards interviewed the inspectors. The interview data that we analyse in this paper consists of these interviews (15 inspectors) and additional interviews with the head management group (4 national managers and 5 department managers). The interviews with the inspectors were carried out at their offices and with the managers they were mostly made by phone. The duration was about 45-90 minutes. The interviews were all recorded and transcribed and the total amount of transcribed interviews consists of about 300 pages.

The projects aims at examining the ways in which Inspection regimes may be understood as governing education and the interviews deals with how the interviewees conceive of school inspection, its intentions, means, effects and problems. In this paper we analyse their views on inspection effects on three different levels, from national and municipal/responsible authority to local school level. The data is compiled according to which level the interviewee refers the effect to and the effects are in turn put together in different categories. The result is reported according to the different levels and to possible differences between inspectors and inspector managers.

The effects reported by inspectors and inspection managers are then analysed and discussed according to possible assumptive worlds of inspectors and inspection managers. Following the methodological argument of Marshall et al. (1985, p. 94) we “examine how the dominant story emerges in the assumptive worlds” of inspectors and managers.

The resulting effects in the eyes of inspectors and inspector managers are also discussed in relation to constitutive effects. Dahler-Larsen refers to Schwandt (2001) when he points to the concept as an “open, broad, sensitising concept without a full operational definition” (Dahler- Larsen 2012, p181). In our use of the concept as an analytic tool the following question has been put forward: Based
on the reported effects how might/would they discipline actors in different arenas?

The resulting notions of inspection effects will also be discussed in relation to the activities Jacobsson (2006, 2010) argue as central to educational governance. We use the concepts meditative, regulative and inquisitive activities to link the inspectors’ notions of inspection effects to how governing is “done”.

**Inspection effects through the eyes of inspectors**

When asked about the effects of their work both inspectors and inspection managers had some difficulties to offer distinct and substantial examples of the effects at different levels. The inspectors’ experiences of effects foremost referred to the municipal and school arena while the inspection managers referred to all levels.

**National level**

Not surprisingly the inspection managers were more initiated and offered more examples of inspection effect on the national level. Most of them were rather confident that SI had an effect on the governments’ decisions in the educational area:

*The Ministry of Education and Science want to know: Is there something that doesn’t work all right?… so we should emphasize that, we must always be prepared to, not just go to meeting, but rather bring proposals with us. So on the national level, I feel that we are rather strong at the moment.* (Department manager 2)

However one inspector, when asked for inspection effects on a national level, expressed the opposite view; it is rather the Inspectorate that is influenced by politics on the national level.

The examples mentioned that concerned the national level could be categorised in four different types of effects from school inspection:

- Changes in education policy
- Appointment of investigations/commissions/quality audits
- Interpretation and standardising of regulations
- Implementation of the Educational Act and other regulations

The inspection managers offered different examples of occasions when they perceived that their work, annual reports, quality audits and contacts with the Ministry of Education and Research have made an impact and changed for example the new national curriculum for the pre school, or when documenting the assessment of each student was made mandatory:

*I do actually believe that all the critique we reported during the 6-year commitment (before the new inspection agency was formed, author’s clarification) had effects on the governmental decisions, IUP for example (Individual Developmental Plans) and the requirement to do written reports… this later brought on the reassessment of the national tests.* (Head management 3)

One inspector mentioned, in general terms, that the body of knowledge that the Inspectorate gathers in the long run could generate changes in the Educational
Act. Another inspector thought that the annual reports from the Inspectorate has contributed to the strong emphasis on academic school performances on the national level.

Through the eyes of inspection managers the regular supervision also lead to new investigations and extended fields of responsibility for administrative authorities, for example has the Government appointed an investigation to establish rules and conditions for independent schools corporate groups and the National Agency for Education now are responsible for head teacher training as a result from regular supervision and quality audits. One inspector had noted that when inspectors after the regular supervision write their reports they also highlight deficiencies that sometimes lead to a special theme for a quality audit.

One effect that the inspection managers pointed to and that no inspector mentioned was the interpretation and standardisation of parts of the Education Act and new regulations. Examples mentioned were that schools now are obliged to have a school library and the Inspectorate then had to define what could count as a library and they also had to decide, since school fees not are allowed, if and how much would be reasonable per student if schools were going for an excursion or a picnic.

Finally on the national level, also only reported by the inspection managers was that the regular supervisions contributed to the implementation and appreciation of new parts of the Educational Act or new regulations in the school area. When inspectors start asking questions on how the schools or municipalities are handling a specific regulation, they also make the head teachers and local politicians aware of these changes. One example is a new obligation for the municipalities to make it possible for parents and students to file a complaint, so accordingly this is part of the questions the municipality has to give an account of.

Municipality/ responsible authority level
Both inspectors and inspection managers offered examples of effects on the municipal level, however no examples concerning the independent schools’ authorities were given.

The effects on municipal level were categorised in three categories and both inspectors and inspection manager contributed with examples in each of them:
- Organisational changes of, or administered by, the city councils’ school board
- City councils’ increased awareness of its responsibility for the school
- Improved work with the development of education in the municipal schools

While the inspection managers had noticed that the regular inspections may result in redistribution of resources among schools and a raise in the number of teachers with a teaching degree, the inspectors had observed effects that might cause problems for individuals or schools. When a specific school is reported as very deficient the city council rather often remove the head teacher to another post in the municipality.
Sometimes it can result in very far-reaching consequences for head teachers. It is of course tragic on a personal level, but we can’t quite take that into consideration, it isn’t our task... We discovers disproportions, yes, that is what we are supposed to do. (Inspector 10)

Another example is when critique of small village schools results in a decision from the city council to close schools or merge them.

Both inspectors and inspection managers had noticed an increased awareness on the municipality level that what’s going on in schools actually is part of the city councils responsibility. They were agreed on that the quality work has improved. Examples given by the managers were: more thorough statistics of school results and better acquaintance with laws and regulations on the school area. The inspectors had noticed that the local politicians were more aware of the state of the schools in the municipality and of certain obligations, e.g. school bussing. Already the information that SI will be visiting soon starts activities and overlooking required plans and documents.

Inspectors and managers did both offer different examples of improved developmental and quality work with educational issues in municipalities. For instance creating forums for different school subjects where teachers from different schools and municipalities cooperate. Mostly it was the quality audits and not the regular inspections that generated these kinds of substantial examples, according to the inspectors and managers.

Local school level

In the answers from most of the inspectors and inspection managers concerning the school arena we find a commitment for the well-being of the individual child that in many respects seems to serve as a justification for their work. This engagement appears especially among inspectors describing experiences of students contacting them during inspection. Also two other categories of effects were apparent.

- Individual student’s rights
- Attitudinal change
- Increased awareness among head teachers of laws and regulations

The protection of individual students rights is an effect of regular inspection that both inspectors and managers talked about. Earlier and better systems for identification of students with special needs and also better ways of documenting and supporting them are reported. Among the inspectors, quite a few of them related experiences where they had discovered abuses of individual students when visiting their school, or when young students personally have contacted them for help on these occasions. The increase of parents and students that fail a complaint to SI also was regarded as a positive effect of school inspection; it means that parents and students are aware of their rights and that these problems aren’t allowed to go on unattended.
I think that’s a proof that we have been successful and that we have been visible, that the complaints have increased, quite clear. You can see that it is effective, not least have we been very visible in media with these issues. (Inspector 4)

Attitudinal changes are also an effect noticed by both inspectors and managers. Inspectors have experienced a more recipient attitude towards them and the inspection procedures from the head teachers. Managers conclude that there is an increased awareness among head teachers and teachers, of the schools’ responsibility to educate in a way that all students pass their grade. Another change in attitudes reported is that the head teachers now have realised that a favourable report from SI can be used in the rivalry between schools.

As well as on the municipal level inspectors and managers report an increased awareness of laws and regulations on the local school level. The documentation and development plans for individual students are in better order and so are plans against bullying and prevention of offending manners. One inspector though, expressed some concern that if documentation demands gets out of proportion it can take the teachers focus off education.

No effects

There were also some examples of default effects from both inspectors and managers. Sometimes the same deficiencies remain from one inspection to another, but with the new Inspectorate it is decided that they should not let go of municipalities and schools until they can show how they are going to improve. There can also be only temporary changes that soon are back to ‘normal’.

One of the head management also reflects upon whether investment and positive changes in one area in a school maybe creates deterioration in another.

…and there they had developed a fantastic programme for teaching engineering and they engaged wholehearted in that, but at the same time, it can of course be other parts that they didn’t develop. So it’s very hard to say if it’s a zero sum game. (Head management 2)

Discussion

The question of effects from evaluations in general and school inspection in this case is constantly up-to-date and crucial:

In short, the link between evaluation and the betterment of social conditions is absolutely crucial as a collective raison d’être of evaluation. (Mark & Henry 2004, p.36)

It also seems to be a delicate question for the inspection mangers and the inspectors. Like Mark and Henry (2004) we could identify effects on different levels in our interview data. On the one hand examples of inspection effects were presented on these level but managers and inspectors also admitted that it is hard to prove effects on the students’ school performances, which was one of the main motives to create the SI and strengthen school inspection (Rönnberg 2011). They had observed changes in the educational policy, in the organisation of school
boards and in the schools’ quality and developmental work, but if this also have improved the students’ academic school performances they were not convinced of.

The Inspectorates’ overall and everywhere stated objective is to help engender good education in a safe environment (Skolinspektionen n.d. c). In the interviews the inspection managers in particular refers to this objective at the same time as they recognize the difficulty to engender good education as long as they don’t inspect education in the classroom. The opportunity to protect individual students safety and rights appeared especially when talking to the inspectors who regularly visit schools, to be a key part of their professional honour. This concern for the individual student seems to be an important part of the inspectors’ and inspector managers’ assumptive worlds. It is something that all of them in one way or another acknowledged.

Another possible part of the assumptive world of the inspection managers and inspectors is the positive notion of constant change and improvement. Of course reported effects from school inspection imply improvement and changes in for example organisation of school board/schools, quality work, attitudes and so on. There were also recurring and often indignant comments on experiences where nothing did happen or introduced changes after extensive critique of different aspects/sectors of municipalities and schools, soon went back to ‘normal’. In an earlier analysis of documents published by both the National Agency of Education and the Swedish Schools Inspectorate we found ‘improvement’ to be an important keyword (Lindgren et al. 2012). Also in England Baxter and Clark (2012), when analysing Ofsted documents and the changes in classification system for school grading, concludes that ‘improvement’ is one of the keywords of the Ofsted discourse. The school’s ‘capacity for improvement’ is an important part of their judgement, which could be compared to the Swedish Inspectorate judging schools’ and municipalities’ quality work. As Baxter and Clarke puts it:

“... performance by itself is no longer enough: the promise of better performance is also required.” (Baxter & Clarke, 2012)

So, what might be constitutive effects of school inspection in Sweden if we depart from the effects reported by inspectors and inspection managers? According to them has the awareness of and compliance to laws and regulations among local politicians, civil servants and head teachers increased. They had noticed that municipalities and schools have improved in keeping documents and statistics in order and also that the quality work has improved. In order to get good judgements from the Inspectorate and after words be able to advertise this publicly, municipalities and schools seems to conform to this image of a good school. The principle of transparency of the Swedish Inspectorate becomes part of the soft governance (Lawn, 2006) in that municipalities and schools even before inspection can, and according to the interviews do, look at the Inspectorates’ website to check for and try to live up to the judgement points. Will this mean that the image of a good school gradually will (at least partly) turn to an image of a
school that on their website can link to all required documents, statistics and plans and also are capable of giving a convincing picture of their work?

An important part of what schools in Sweden are supposed to accomplish has been the fostering of democratic values in active and responsible citizens. When the conservative-liberal-centre parties’ coalition won the election 2006 the main motive to the decided new agency, the Schools Inspectorate, was Swedish students poor results on the national and international tests. So, this has been on the agenda for the Inspectorate along with the individual students’ rights and schools work on preventing offending behaviour. One of the inspection managers talks about this and states that it also means that they have lost the democracy commitment:

“...however we have lost, almost totally, the democracy commitment /.../ that is I am thinking of how the school works with socializing students and young people into the society, so to say. How do schools support that /.../ that they understand how the society works?” (Inspection manager 3)

Constitutive effects “redefine the meaning of education” (Dahler- Larsen, 2011, p. 53) and the above quote can implicate a loss and a change in the former meaning of education in Swedish schools.

Returning to the inspectors’ notion of the importance to protect individual students’ rights and their statements of inspection effect in that respect, this may not only be part of their assumptive worlds, but may also be interpreted as a process where their conception of the student is about to change. The individual students’ right can be viewed as part of the marketisation of education where each student and their parents are regarded as consumers. This is something different from a view where the right of all students are central. If such an interpretation is plausible, a shift in the conception of the student and parents is yet another constitutive effect where there is an ideological shift from “public good” to “private good” that also includes a shift in the meaning of the hallmark concept “principle for equivalence” so central in Swedish education policy (Englund 1993, 2005).

In terms of meditative, regulative and inquisitive governing activities school inspection as performed in Sweden is a mix (see earlier description). The inspectorate use laws and regulations as a basis for much of their inspections and demand compliance, and can also use legal force like fines to make municipalities and other organizers adhere to the rules. But information on their website, oral information, written reports, follow-up meetings, etc. are also used to direct schools, as is their questioning about the schools operations and results. From the results of our analysis inspection managers seem more inclined to believe in effects at the national level, like new regulations for independent schools. This is achieved through meditative activities like meetings with and reports to the Education Ministry. If such perceived effects are indeed occurring, the SI quite strongly influences the national education policy, and governing.
The common features of inspection effects in the eyes of the inspectors’ and inspection managers’, their assumptive worlds, are that there are indeed effects, and at all levels, something we interpret as their belief in the governing potential of inspection. They also signalled no effects, but that mainly refers to the inspection round performed by the National Agency for Education (the former inspection agency). Clearly the strong belief in the governing power and effects of inspection legitimise their work.

References


