Swearing and the Expression of the Emotions

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Chapter from the book *Perspectives on Swearing*
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Series: Swearing Reports, 2
ISSN: 0282-4302

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1. Introduction

Swearing is often defined as an expression of feelings and emotions. It is, however, not fully clear why we swear to express our feelings and emotions. This paper will try to cast some light on some aspects of this question. The first part of the paper will deal with the problem of what emotions there are and how they can be characterized.

The characterization will be presented in terms of a conceptual model. This conceptual model gives us an insight into the various dimensions of an emotion as a psycho-social phenomenon. The latter part of the paper will be devoted to a discussion of how the emotions are related to swearing.

2. What emotions there are.

In this paper I will take it as given that emotions are phenomena that exist in their own right. They cannot be reduced to bodily sensations or neuro-physiological events. They are instead very complex psycho-social conceptual phenomena. Our interest in this paper will therefore be primarily aimed at looking at the emotions in this sense and only secondarily in viewing the emotions as some sort of somatic states.

Throughout the history of western culture there have been literally hundreds of attempts at listing and characterizing the emotions. Among the most early attempts is that of the stoic Zeno who reckoned with four classes of 'irrational and unnatural movements in the soul' - namely, 1) Grief, 2) Fear, 3) Desire or craving, and 4) Pleasure. (Diogenes Laertius, Book 11:217)

Each of these classes contained a number of species.

Grief or pain, defined as an irrational mental contraction had as species - pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction.

Fear, defined as the expectation of evil had as species - terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony.
Desire or craving, defined as irrational appetency, had as species - want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment.

Pleasure, defined as an irrational elation at the acquiring of what seems to be choiceworthy, had as species - ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport.

Zeno also reckoned with a number of emotional states that were good, i.e., rational and natural.

Joy, defined as rational elation with the species - delight, mirth, cheerfulness.

Caution, defined as rational avoidance with the species - reverence, modesty.

Wishing, defined as rational desire with the species - wellwishing, benevolence, friendliness, respect, and affection.

We see here that Zeno takes a rather negative view of what we today normally call the emotions. This is probably a result of his aims of disciplining the soul in order to gain the status of 'a wise man'. However, the case may be, one important point of interest to us is evident in this very early attempt at saying what emotions are and how many and of what kinds.

We notice that Zeno lists a number of species under the different class concepts. These are related in some sense to the general class concept. In what ways the species are related to the general concept is, however, not specified. There are probably many points of criticism that can be addressed at this classification, for instance, whether Shame really belongs under Fear or constitutes a general class concept on a par with Fear. The main point to be made here, however, is that there seem to be large groups of related concepts that pertain to the emotions. Specifying which groups there are and how the concepts in the groups are related to each other has been the major goal of the many proposals for classifications of the emotions.

In the more modern discussion, these general groups are usually spoken of in terms of family resemblances (W. P. Alston, 1968) or in terms of semantic fields (Hirsch, 1980). In this paper I will refer to such groups as
conceptual complexes. Such a conceptual complex is not always given a simple label, for instance, Zeno's grief or pain, and desire or craving. Just how we should best label these complexes so as to avoid confusion but at the same time being economical and effective is a problem we will address when we come to the more modern classifications.

Another problem that arises upon an inspection of Zeno's classification is the fact that the terms that are used for labeling the emotion concepts are not strictly scientific. Rather, they are everyday terms that are used in a wide range of contexts and senses. They are part of what might be called a common sense folk theory of the emotions. Many of the treatises on the emotions consist of attempts at regimenting this terminology to make it serviceable for philosophy and psychology.

Aristotle in his 'Art of Rhetoric' gives the following definition of emotions.

'The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain. Each of them must be divided under three heads; for instance, in regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom they are angry and occasions which give rise to anger.' (Aristotle, 1975:73)

In his 'Nicomachean Ethics' he makes an attempt to define 'how and with whom and for what reasons and how long one ought to be angry, or within what limits a person does this rightly or wrongly.' (Aristotle, 1976:162)

In the 'Art of Rhetoric' his purpose is to instruct the would-be orator in the art of manipulating the listeners' emotions. There he deals with twelve different emotions:

Anger, Mildness, Love, Hate, Fear, Confidence, Shame, Benevolence, Pity, Indignation, Envy and Emulation.

Describing, as he says in the definition, the dispositions of the mind, the objects and the occasions which give rise to the respective emotions. Although there is some attempt to relate the emotions to the more basic states of pleasure and pain, it is not systematically carried out.

The systematic attempt at reducing the emotions to pleasure and pain was left to Spinoza. In his 'Ethics' Spinoza gives an account of the emotions where they are placed in relation to nature (or being) according to his geometrical method.
Spinoza is interested in showing that the emotions can be reduced to some combination of Pleasure, Pain and Desire in contrast to the Cartesian doctrine that there are five primary passions: Gladness, Sadness, Love, Hatred and Desire. Spinoza's catalogue of emotions in the 'Ethics' is probably the most inclusive one to be found in the philosophical accounts. There he defines and characterizes at least thirty-nine different emotions which fall under the heading human servitude and eight more that fall under the heading human freedom. However, because the emotions are object oriented there is in principle no limit to the number of emotions according to Spinoza.

'There are as many species of pleasure, pain, desire and consequently any emotion which is composed of these, such as wavering of the mind, or which is derived from these, such as love, fear, hope, hate etc, as there are species of objects by which we are affected.' (Prop. LVI, Part 3)

'The emotions can be compounded one with another in so many ways, and so many variations can arise from these combinations, that it were impossible to express them by any number.' (Spinoza, 1979:127)

This is surely the most extreme position to be found anywhere as to the number of emotions. Spinoza himself retreats from this position to deal with those forty-seven emotions which he deems to be of primary interest. His account is aimed at giving a conceptual analysis of the emotions. He therefore neglects 'the external modifications of the body which are observable in emotions such as tremor, pallor, sobbing, and laughter, because they refer to the body without any relation to the mind'. (p.127)

Although such a strict dichotomy between mind and body is most likely unfruitful, a very interesting point in Spinoza's account of the emotions which was already present in some degree in Aristotle's account is the implicational relationships between the emotion concepts. For instance, Hope implies Fear and Fear implies Hope, Bashfulness implies Fear, Derision implies Hate, Anger implies Hate, etc. Such implicational relations between the emotion concepts are very important for the construction of the conceptual complexes that we will discuss later. There seems to be a kind of implicational core in the complex which is implied by the other concepts but which does not necessarily imply the others. The next comprehensive account of the 'passions of the soul' and which has exercised great influence on most philosophical and psychological accounts of the emotions is found in David Hume's 'Treatise on Human Nature, Part II':

The emotions for Hume are a type of impression. He distinguishes between
original and secondary impressions, original impressions or impressions of sensations being those that 'without any antecedent perception, arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs.' Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately, or by the interposition of its idea.' (Hume, 1952:3)

The passions are secondary impressions. These can be further divided into two kinds - the calm and the violent. The calm consist of 'the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external object' - something like 'good taste' in an aesthetic sense. This is usually confused with reasoning, says Hume. The violent passions are 'the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility', (Hume, 1952:4)

Hume is concerned to explain the 'violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects'. These he divides further into direct and indirect passions. The direct passions are derived 'immediately from good or evil'. The indirect passions 'proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities'. To the direct passions he reckons desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security. To the indirect passions he reckons pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, 'with their dependents'. (Hume, 1952:4)

Hume seems to be clear that there is a distinction to be made between the cause of a passion and the object of a passion. For instance, a suit of clothes which I own can be the cause of my pride but the object of my pride is myself. Hume is, however, not convinced of the intensionality of the emotions to the degree that Spinoza was. The emotion does not necessarily depend on its object for its quality. 'When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more reference to any object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high'. (Treatise II, 3.3)

The intensionality of the emotions is a central point in Sartre's phenomenological study of the emotions - 'Sketch for a theory of the emotions' which is one of the latest philosophical treatments of the emotions. There he argues against William James' thesis that 'the states of consciousness called joy, anger and so forth are nothing but the consciousness of physiological manifestations - or if you will, their projection.
intD consciousness'. (Sartre, 1962:33) Rather, Sartre claims that emotions are something else - namely, 'a certain relation between our psychic being and the world'. This relation is not chaotic but has 'an organized and describable structure.' (Sartre, 1962:34) The emotions that are dealt with in Sartre's treatise are those which Hume refers to as the violent passions. Sartre's account of the emotions will play a major role in our attempt to explain why we swear to express our emotions.

Although certain psychologists have held that there are only three basic emotions - namely, fear, rage, and love (J B Watson), the latest attempt in the psychological literature at classifying the emotions reckons with ten emotions. This is the so-called Differential Emotions Theory of Carroll B. Izard (Izard, 1977)

The ten fundamental emotions are the following:
1. Interest-excitement
2. Enjoyment-joy
3. Surprise-startle
4. Distress-anguish
5. Anger-rage
6. Disgust-revulsion
7. Contempt-scorn
8. Fear-terror
9. Shame/shyness-humiliation
10. Guilt-remorse

We see that Izard has difficulty putting a one-term label on the emotions, two terms are given for each fundamental emotion. This is to represent the fact that each emotion varies in intensity, the first term being the lower level of intensity and the second term the higher. We see that Zeno and Izard are both wrestling with the problem of placing discrete names on something that is in reality a continuum. As usual our everyday words have a tendency to fail us when it comes to a direct confrontation with reality. Although the emotional spectrum seems to fall into rather distinct centers of focus, there are lots of problems of drawing the lines between them. Where, for instance, does excitement end and enjoyment take over? These problems of distinguishing the various conceptual complexes from each other are mirrored by the problems that we have in trying to identify which emotion a subject is expressing. Putting a label on a specific expression
We have then the following dimensions in our conceptual model of the emotions
1) Object, 2) Cause, 3) Goal, 4) Disposition to Action, 5) Bodily Manifestation,
6) Reasons, 7) Beliefs and 8) Implications. We must give values for all of
these components for a complete characterization of any of the emotions.

For the purposes of this study we will reckon with the following primary
emotional complexes.

1. Anger
2. Joy
3. Surprise
4. Fear
5. Disgust
6. Grief

For the sake of economy these complexes will be referred to by their most
genral category label.

These complexes seem to constitute a set of emotions found in all of the
characterizations and listings of the emotions looked at earlier. They also
have the least amount of overlap conceptually, although there could be a
number of implication relations between them. By this it is meant that Joy
and Anger can be implicationally related given the proper circumstances, but
they are not strictly conceptually related to each other in the way that
mirth and joy or hatred and anger are. (see Hirsch 1980a+1980b)

We now turn to a general characterization of the relationship between the
emotions and swearing.

5. Why do we swear to express our emotions?

Ashley Montague (Montague, 1942) claims that swearing arises from a feeling
of frustration. Swearing is for him as innate as the expression of anger.
As we will see below, there are more emotions than anger that can be related
to swearing. There are also many types of swearing that are not directly
expressions of emotions but based on social norms and values. These types
of swearing will be dealt with elsewhere.

Several authors have pointed to a connection between emotions and magic.
Sartre defines emotion as a slip of the consciousness into a magical attitude
(Sartre, 1962:91). Malinowski describes in detail the affinity that magic
has with an emotional outburst (Malinowski, 1954:79ff). Building on what
these authors say about magic and the emotions, one version of the relationship between the emotions and swearing will be proposed.

Emotions arise in the confrontation of the human will with a problematic world. A healthy human will aims at maintaining a state of well-being and security. However, the world often endangers this aim, our loved ones become ill, our houses and possessions are destroyed by natural catastrophes. In such situations the will acts to become a cause. In many situations our knowledge of the causal-deterministic nature of the world help us to act on the world and rescue our well-being and security.

In certain situations, however, the world presents itself to us as too overwhelmingly dangerous or as suddenly lacking all causal-deterministic texture. In such situations, the human will still acts to become a cause. This time, however, not by taking appropriate action based on knowledge of causal-deterministic relationships, but rather by the utterance of words and the making of gestures, i.e., symbolic action. In this symbolic action powers that lie outside this world of causality and determinism are called upon or invoked to assist or stand by the will.

This is what might be called the most prototypical or primordial case of swearing. Crying out "Oh, God!" upon seeing your wife's clothes catch fire from a candle, is an attempt to invoke the divine as an aid and comfort in our crisis. The same applies to shouting "God damn it!" upon witnessing the visiting team make the winning goal in the last seconds of play.

This invoking or petitioning of the divine will to intervene in the world on behalf of the human will is not to be taken lightly. For this reason swearing and the uttering of oaths and curses are subject to heavy restrictions and serious sanctions in nearly all social communities.

Other types of swearing, i.e., those where we cast abuse on others or make pronouncements upon them, such as, "You son-of-a-bitch", or "Go to hell!", also find their origin here. In our impotent rage we make these utterances as a sort of plain-clothes sorcerer in an act of black magic where the object of our rage is to become that which we call it or be projected into abomination. Crying "Shit!" in reaction to a repulsive or repugnant situation is following the principle of 'fighting fire with fire'. This sympathetic principle where one evil force is combated with another is a dominant element in magic.
Swearing in relation to the expression of joy is a bit more complicated. Joy might, at first thought, be seen as an exception to this way of viewing the emotions. Joy might be thought to be the emotion which we experience when the world is unproblematic. We would like to claim that a being that possessed a will which never was in conflict with the world would experience no emotion at all. The contradiction then, of emotions where the will is thwarted, such as anger, fear, grief, disgust, is not joy but no emotion at all. Joy can be seen as a contrary to these emotions. The emotion of joy presupposes a problematic world and is the reaction of the person whose will has succeeded in the face of dangers and disappointments. Swearing in relation to an expression of joy is not invoked to assist the will but is similar to an act of reverent praise to powers that have presumably been of assistance.

In the case of surprise, goals are achieved as if by magic against the subject's worst expectations. Here the world appears magical to the subject and prompts him to respond magically.

The thesis here then, is that when the human will is confronted with a world which is impossible to deal with in normal ways, we approach the world in a magical attitude where we take symbolic action uttering curses, oaths, etc. and making gestures that are aimed at introducing the will as a cause in the world.

Under the influence of the strong emotions, those Hume called the violent passions, the subject attempts to achieve his goal not by ordinary means of cause and effect, but by extraordinary means of magical spells, incantations, and curses.

6. Types of consciousness and types of swearing

The preceding discussion presumes a certain view on the relationship between what might be called mind or consciousness and language. This section will be devoted to presenting a rough sketch of this view. Because practically nothing has been written in the psycholinguistic literature about the relationship between language and emotion since Wundt, the discussion will of necessity be more suggestive than definitive.

There appear to be very few basic general classes of types of conscious-
ness (forms of consciousness, modes of consciousness, or states of mind). These have been characterized by different authors in terms of such general distinctions as Fühlen (feeling), Vorstellen (imagining, conceptualizing) and Denken (thinking) (Wundt 1900) or Feelings and Thought where feelings include emotions and sensations and thoughts include conceptions and judgments (James 1950: 221-223), or more recently Affect, Imagery, and Consciousness (Tomkins, 1963). Most modern introductory textbooks to psychology still seem to follow these broad distinctions (see Lindsay & Norman, 1977).

For the purposes of this study these will be labeled in the following manner.

Class I types of consciousness characterized as primarily concerned with sensations, drives, emotions and attitudes.

Class II types of consciousness characterized as primarily concerned with imagining, remembering, conceiving, conceptualizing.

Class III types of consciousness primarily concerned with drawing conclusions, deliberating, reasoning.

These classes are not disjunctive but rather elements of the different classes are found in all classes. This means that there is probably no pure type of consciousness belonging to any of the classes. All types of consciousness contain an admixture of other types. We have, therefore, for instance, attitudes to conceptualizations and emotions involved in reasoning to some degree and vice versa. There is, however, from a developmental point of view, an assumption that the Class I types of consciousness appear in primarily concrete specific situations where there is some immediate "knowledge-of-acquaintance" of the object (or objects) that comprise the content of the consciousness. This is the type of consciousness we adapt when confronted with a real ripe juicy apple on a warm summer day, as opposed to the type that we adopt when asked to tell the difference between apples and pears.

Phylogenetically, the development from lower to higher stages of brain development, from what MacLean (1980) refers to as a development from reptilian to neomammalian, has presumably been positively correlated with the various classes of consciousness. This means that the lower stages of brain development, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, are characterized by predominately Class I types of consciousness. The higher stages of brain development are characterized by predominately Class II and III types of con-
sciousness. Predominately, is perhaps saying too much, rather, higher levels of brain development give rise to the possibility of predominately class II and III types of consciousness.

Moving from Class I to Classes II and III means that the degree of cognition involved is becoming greater. This does not mean, however, that there is no cognition in Class I or that there is no emotive element in Class III.

The whole brain is most likely involved in all of the different types of consciousness at least above any very rudimentary level of arousal - "it appears that for the brain to 'understand' the surrounding world, to perceive its meaning and to take action in difficult tasks the cerebral cortex must be activated not only locally but also totally." (Lassen, Ingvar & Skinhoj 1978:59)

As concerns language, there seems to be a correlation between Class I types of consciousness and highly expressive and/or evocative language. This means that psychic experiences such as pain, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, sexual deprivation, etc are positively correlated with highly expressive and/or evocative language. At the most inarticulate levels of language (Linguistic expressions), we find these types of consciousness related to screams, cries, groans, moans, etc together with certain reflex body movements. At a slightly higher level of articulation we find such cries and screams accompanied by gestures which together with gestures function as vocatives and imperatives and some sort of indicatives. (Lamendella, 1977:196)

Later we find expressions that in some way are intimately related with that which they signify. Some of these could be strictly onomatopoetic, while others are more generally sound-symbolic identifications of a synesthetic nature where an experience of the thing signified is transferred from a visual, olfactual, oral, or tactile sensory impression to an acoustic image. Because, for instance, something is stinking or repulsive to the taste, the words that refer to this thing are also taken to be stinking or repulsive themselves. They are, as it were, guilty by association of the same sins as the things they refer to.

Some of our basic so-called figures of speech are also involved in this primitive type of symbolism, e.g. metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. A case in point would be that because the sexual act has certain aggressive aspects the word that refers to the sexual act can also be used metaphori-
cally to describe an act of aggression.

Whatever the explanation might be in the final analysis, the main point to be noted is that the relationship between the symbol and its signification is not conceived of as contingent but rather as of a causal, necessary or essential nature.

At the highest levels of linguistic articulation within the Class I types of consciousness we find oaths, curses, and spells. In their most primitive state these are probably highly sound-symbolic, at least to the speaker. It is here that swearing expressions as expressions of the emotions start their career.

Within this class I types of consciousness the symbol is intimately related with an expression of the will and the emotion of the speaker. The symbol is also identified with what it stands for. The expressions related to this class will, therefore, have a much greater world-creating or world-changing power than expressions related to the Class II and Class III types of consciousness.

This identification of the word with the thing symbolized is typical for a low degree of linguistic awareness. There are many examples of this phenomenon. Particularly fine is a passage from the novel "Things falling apart" by Chinua Achebe. "A snake was never called by its name at night, because it would hear. It was called a string." (Achebe, 1958:9) "Snake" here is understood to be a sort of proper name for the animal which when mentioned functions as a vocative. For this reason its "true" name is not used, instead it is given a nickname or pseudonym.

The developmental perspective being proposed here gives rise to an interesting hypothesis concerning the most powerful swearing expressions. These will be historically quite old and are connected with primarily class I types of consciousness. They belong to a phylogenetically and ontogenetically primordial level of language development. At this stage of development there is no clear distinction between symbol and thing signified. Which means that the expressions are taken for the things themselves. The referents are themselves basic body functions such as defecation, excreting, and copulation, which are biologically primary, and related to very primitive levels of brain development. This would explain why these expressions are so powerful. It would also explain why they are so easy to learn and hard to forget.
(or resistant to damage in brain injuries). (See Lammel 1977)

These linguistic symbols are intimately related with a type of consciousness which is principally non-reflective. They enter the mind of the individual at a level where there is, in a sense, no healthy critical perspective or distance between the self and the world. When used against us they strike where our defenses are the weakest. To defend ourselves we have to counter with the same and hopefully more. In reply to an expletive or abusive swearing expression it just will not be appropriate to say it isn't true. If called, for instance, "Asshole!" by someone one could counter with "Takes one to call one" or maybe even better "Shithead!".

The reasoning above leads to the following hypothesis concerning types of swearing behaviour. Whereas stated before swearing expressions with high emotional value are less likely to be affected by aphasia, swearing as a way of speaking, i.e. swear words used as adjectives, verbs, nouns, adverbs, in other words, as normal parts-of-speech, will, according to this hypothesis, suffer the same fate as other expressions within these classes, or at least not have any privileged survival status in relation to other words or expressions affected by the aphasia.

Continuing in the presentation of the relationship between classes of consciousness and language, we find Class II types of consciousness (those concerned primarily with imagining, conceiving, etc) related with descriptions of scenes, events, chains of events, etc in sentences, texts, and discourses. These do not necessarily have to be factual accounts, but can be of a metaphorical, allegorical or mythological nature.

The class III types of consciousness are related in turn to language expressions such as debates, theories, and proofs.

It should perhaps be reiterated that this view on the relationship between types of consciousness and language does not claim that certain speech events are purely expressive and/or evocative and that others are purely cognitive. Everything is a matter of degree. Class I types of consciousness are correlated with predominately expressive and/or evocative language, while Class II and III are correlated with more cognitive language, Class III being related with the highest degree of cognitive language.

This view does, however, claim that the predominately Class III types of
consciousness are rather late developments in the history of the species and the individual. Also, judging from experience in everyday life, it seems that even after the species or individual has developed Class III types of consciousness, that they are something which are employed only rather infrequently.

It seems that a subject's type of consciousness is relative to a situation and the subject's social circumstances. For instance, when a subject experiences a situation as frustrating to his vital needs and interests he will tend to assume a Class I type of consciousness. In a state of strong emotion, such as anger, the subject takes recourse to his strongest symbols. Given the identity of a symbol and referent within this type of consciousness, he will call upon the most odious and horrible symbols to, in a sense, throw in the face of whomever or whatever provoked his anger.

Therefore, in answer to the question in the heading of section five, we swear to express our emotions because there is an inherent relationship between emotional experiences, Class I types of consciousness, and powerfully expressive and evocative language, the most powerful of these being our swearing expressions. These expressions are more powerful than say inarticulate screams or shouts, because they make reference to taboo objects and actions. They engage, as it were, more of the social and psychological dimensions of the speaker and listener by containing a referential element - especially a reference to objects or actions associated with power and danger within their shared culture.

By way of summary, therefore under the sway of one of the primary emotions the speaker adopts a Class I type of consciousness in which the swearing is meant to be magical. In other circumstances and in other classes of consciousness the swearing could be meant as serious but non-magical or even as non-serious, non-literal, and non-magical.

It can therefore be claimed that when we encounter a speaker or group under the sway of a predominately Class I type of consciousness, that in a case of name-calling such as "You, Shithead!", if the speaker can, in a sense, make the name stick (perhaps by the threat of brute force), then the person who the name-calling is directed toward in a very literal sense suffers a loss of prestige or self-respect. The words have the power of changing the world rather than describing it, at least that part of the world comprised of by human relations.
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