Guarding the gates

Reassessing the concept of borders in Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

Using discourse analysis, this study will apply a critical theoretical framework and discuss how perceptions of the Tanzanian national borders compares to problematized understandings of the socially constructed concepts of borders, sovereignty, and power. For example, the Tanzanian borders will be reassessed into something creating a safe ‘inside’ opposing an unsafe ‘outside, and into something dividing territories, thus, giving birth to the identities of ‘nationality’. Furthermore, the presence of biopolitical interventions will be discussed in order to see how biopower can help increase security in Tanzania. More substantially, the phenomena of roadblocks will be analysed as something potentially functioning as ‘extended arms’ of the national border. The analysis showed how the so called ‘geopolitical imaginary’, where borders are defined as the outer reaches of a sovereign state, is a well-established idea in Tanzania; the national borders were perceived as important and worthy of protection. However, they can also be seen as something ultimately creating non-coherent ‘insides’ and an ‘outsides’, where outside ‘threats’, often perceived as illegal immigrants, are dependent on the existence of territories. The analysis further showed that biopower in Tanzania is something which can create ‘social’ borders wherever there is authority. This form of exercised power does although suffer severely from corruption, and this leads to a conclusion that Tanzanian ‘security’, to a great extent, is being evaluated in terms of money.

Keywords: sovereign power • biopolitics • security • discourse • Tanzania
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1. INTRODUCTION

When we travel today and approach the security theatres of modern border controls, a part of our privacy is suddenly wiped out. While standing in line for passport controls and metal detectors, we are forced to answer questions not asked anywhere else; for example, who are you? And where are you going? In most other situations, we can keep the answers to ourselves, but when encountering borders we are required to clearly expose both our identity and the purpose of our travelling. This is due to the fact that borders are dressed in the clothes of authority, a form of clothing accepted by the public as legitimate power, and embraced by politicians as a legitimate instrument. It is also what connects borders to security, because the authority exists only due to the idea of ‘securing’, that something or someone inside the borders is worthy of protection (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 2-4).

However, and as we will see, borders can be more than parts of a national security theatre. Borders, as well as security itself, can be seen as mere social ideas or concepts, and with this change of perception we can also open the floodgates of criticism (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 8-10). A rethinking can be made, and instead of answering to ‘who are you, and where are you going?’ we can start asking the questions ourselves. Who decided borders were something exclusive to states? Why are borders only thought of as something spatially fixed at the outer reaches of these states? How can borders and security be so intimately connected to each other? Can the extensive authority surrounding the borders be legitimatised?

These kinds of questions will be asked throughout this study. And, these kinds of questions also open up for discussions on relations of power, on the relations of politics and biological life, on the relations between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and much more. The developed view on the concept of borders can thus be connected to the ideas of ‘biopolitics’, a term also having close ties to the idea of security, and it is often thought of as the state’s legal ability to govern and control its people (Epstein 2007, pp. 151-152). In the context of this study, biopolitics will be analysed as a potential extended arm of the national border, as something established in order to comply with the authoritative security practices of the state.

The idea of the sovereign state, territorially defined by its national borders, is indeed something well cemented in the traditions of the western world. But how does this idea prevail in the developing country of Tanzania? Is the perspective on the national borders the same as in the West? Furthermore, how does Tanzanians perceive state power? Is this form of power seen as legitimate and necessary attempts of increasing Tanzanian security? This study does not aim to fully answer these questions, nor does it aim to ‘measure’ the phenomenon of
borders. Rather, it seeks to illustrate useful discursive examples by analysing qualitative empirical material collected in Tanzania.

1.1 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF THE STUDY

Using discourse analysis, contemporary theories of borders and biopolitics will be applied on this study with the purpose of providing the field of critical security studies\(^1\) perceptions from Tanzania. Firstly, perspectives seeing borders as socially constructed *concepts* will be offered. The study will then examine how the current perceptions of the Tanzanian national borders compare to these problematized understandings of borders and sovereignty. Secondly, the study will offer discussions on the presence of biopolitics in Tanzania, in other words, how the institution of the state is able to control its citizens *within* the given territory provided by the national borders. Can biopolitical power be an instrument for legitimately resolving threats to national security, and therefore, be seen as an ‘extended arm’ of the national border?

In summary, the purpose of the study boils down to the following research questions:

- *How does current perceptions of the Tanzanian national borders compare to problematized understandings of borders and sovereign power?*

- *How can biopolitical interventions in Tanzania be connected to attempts of increasing national security?*

1.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIELD

The main literature used regarding the concept of borders as ‘limits of sovereign power’ is written by Nick Vaughan-Williams (2009). Although his work provides a splendid overview of the field, the theory section in chapter two is complemented with texts by Jef Huysmans (2007), Didier Bigo (2002), Etienne Balibar (2002), among others. These writers commonly use poststructuralist theory when reconceptualising and criticising the traditional views on borders and security.

For an overview of the idea of biopolitics the works of Vaughan-Williams (2009) is once again used, but so is also a number of contemporary academic articles including writers like Charlotte Epstein (2007), Lousie Amoore (2006), Trevor Parfitt (2009) and Bülent Diken (2010), among others, all of them echoing and developing the initial and influential words of thinkers like Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben.

1.3 Mapping out the study

This introduction will be followed by a twin-headed section in accounting for the theoretical framework of the study. Firstly, a discussion will be held regarding new perspectives on the phenomena of ‘borders’. Starting off with questioning the ‘geopolitical imaginary’, and the traditional realist ways of defining borders as the outer reaches of a state, the discussion will then present contemporary schools of theory. The critical perspectives are, as we will see, often discursively deconstructing borders and suggesting them to be socially constructed ideas found not in a realist world of states, but rather in a social reality. These arguments will lead into the second part of the section discussing biopolitics; a term having distinct connections to the ideas of authority often found in, and made legitimate by, states. Biopolitics (or foundationally, biopower) is often summarized as the state’s ability to control the physical bodies of its citizens, and it is a topic which can provide useful input to discussions developing the concept of security.

When the notions of borders and biopolitics are sufficiently discussed, the study will move on to the chapter of research methodology where an introduction to discourse analysis will be provided. This will be followed by a section explaining how the interviews during the field trip were conducted in order to best capture the ‘spoken discourses’ of the topic. Following this is a brief presentation of the empirical material collected in Tanzania.

Chapter four is constituted of an analysis of the empirical material, and this too shall be done in two separate parts. The first part of the analysis will reconnect to the first research question regarding the perception of Tanzania’s national borders. The second part will reconnect to the second research question regarding the function of Tanzanian biopolitical interventions.

The fifth and ending chapter will discuss selected details of the topic and apply the theory of the ‘gatekeeper state’ in order to show how the concept of borders can be problematized even further. Following this is an attempt of answering the research questions and summarizing the study.
2. Theory: Questioning the ‘Imaginary’

Security practice can be likened to a form of gardening that concentrates on protecting the beautiful and harmonious life in the garden against contamination, parasites and weeds, which are perpetually trying to destroy it. Once the gardener let’s nature play its game, they will emerge and the cultivated garden will quickly ‘die’.

– Jef Huysmans (2007, p. 52)

2.1 New Perspectives on Borders

First of all, an introduction is due of the ‘modern geopolitical imaginary’; the conceptual order which is to be analysed and questioned in this study. This ‘imaginary’ is a system structured and organised by the outer geographical reaches of states, reaches also known and defined as the ‘national borders’. This is reminiscent to the traditions of realist theory within the field of international relations, where states are seen as the central actors and where their sovereign power is given clear territorial delimitations in the form of national borders. However, borders of states are foundational to much more than a realist ‘imaginary’. Without borders and limitations of state sovereignty many aspects of the globalised world would not exist; for example, international law, interstate cooperation, international migration, and many other phenomena are all dependent on a demarcation of what is ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 1-4). So, needless to say, Vaughan-Williams rightly states that ‘the border of the state, has had, and indeed continues to have, significant political and ethical influence on the practice and theory of global politics’ (Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 2).

However great the impact of the borders of a geopolitical imaginary may be, many writers now call for alternative ways of assessing the borders (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 8-10). Even within the field of geopolitics itself, the perspective is starting to change from seeing borders as ‘real’ material fences or walls to seeing them as mere social ideas (Williams 2003, p. 25). Important today, though, is to carry out a change of rhetoric. We must no longer ask ourselves what the concept of borders is or should be, but rather acknowledge the diverse understandings of borders and the consequences they have for people in contemporary political life (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 9).

The idea of the border, or possibly the ‘boundary’, can be analysed firstly as something creating an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’. For example, by setting up national borders one has demarcated the limit of sovereign power, defined sovereign territory, and thus, defined the state itself. The state is dependent on borders since it, in order to be regarded sovereign, must
be given a specific territory over which to control (Williams 2003, p. 29). But, more importantly, the demarcation of power gives birth to something ‘outside of’ and ‘other than’ the state; something on the other side of the border which the sovereign state cannot control (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 51-56). However, developing this notion, boundaries can distinguish not only ‘inside’ from ‘outside’ but also ‘us’ from ‘them’, consequently involving peoples into the equation. Surely, the relationship between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ is complex since they, with this poststructuralist mind-set, are both essentially and textually creating each other and requiring each other to exist, perpetually divided and delimited.

Now, after demarcating sovereign power and by that defining the territory of the state, the subject of an ‘outsider’ is created, and, here is also were matters of fear and security starts to enter the picture. Rather than seeing borders as fences between friendly neighbours, Huysmans rhetorically asks in the context of the geopolitical imaginary, ‘who is going to protect me from an aggressive neighbour who wants to kill me, if not a sovereign authority?’ (Huysmans 2007, p. 53). Here, he refers to the monopoly on violence and the responsibility to protect that state has over its citizens on the basis of being a ‘sovereign authority’. But can sovereignty rightly legitimise violence and protection? Jacques Derrida (1992 cited in Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 68) discusses the idea of ‘law’, as a state attempt of thwarting violence, and comes to the conclusion that authority comes from ‘pure performative act[s] that does not have to answer to or before anyone’, and, that ‘authorisations of authority’ cannot be done since authority, or state law itself, ‘[…] cannot rest upon anything but itself’.

The perspective of seeing the concept of borders as ‘creators’ and ‘approvers’ of state sovereignty can although be altered to an understanding with different abstraction levels. Huysmans argues that borders, in a cultural context, can be seen as ‘distributers of fear and trust’. He is referring to the border as something dividing ‘life worlds into the cultural similar […] who can be trusted and the cultural dissimilar […] who have the capacity to corrupt cultural identity’, in other words, as a cultural boundary directly acknowledging the ‘differences’ of people (Huysmans 2007, p. 51). However, the content of the ‘inside’ cultural identity is never made explicit, rather, a pointing out of dissimilar ‘outside’ fears is done. According to Huysmans, the latter stems from ‘the insecure state of nature’, thus, leading to ‘the fear of not knowing who is dangerous’ in the outside world (Huysmans 2007, p. 53).

Huysmans intermittently applies the concept of borders as distributors of fear and trust to a notion of securitization of immigration, but this is also done extensively by Bigo (2002). The state sovereignty, justified by ‘a territorialisation of its order, by a cutting up of borders’, ultimately justifies the existence of a ‘national identity’ (Bigo 2002, p. 67). National identity,
in turn, creates the constructed identity of a ‘citizen’, which although is understood solely when opposed to the outside ‘foreigners’. Any ‘foreigner’ crossing the border and penetrating the nation therefore poses a threat to the homogeneity of the national identity. This can be connected to the phenomena of immigration which is now being increasingly securitized in contemporary politics. Since bodies migrating through a mapped space has become a delicate question for the politicians struggling to ‘enforce the integrity of the national body’, the migrating body is now seen as both ‘a public enemy breaking the law and a private enemy mocking the will of the politician’ (Bigo 2002, p. 70). As Huysmans exemplifies, this perspective of seeing migration as a political issue can lead to practical implications such as increased border control, making it more demanding for migrants to cross the border legitimately. All in all, border control aims to sustain the distance of the identity within the borders and the fears from outside (Huysmans 2007, p. 55). While political attempts are made to unify that which is inside the borders to something homogenous, this effectively produces an outside threat also perceived as a single entity. Empirically, though, we can see that a great diversity of peoples exists outside the state and that they all approach the borders with different intent. States cannot rightly ‘unify the individual immigrants and refugees into a collective dangerous force’ (Huysmans 2007, p. 56).

Furthermore, Steffen Mau (2010) can show us how immigrants actually are treated unequally even though they, as discussed, can be seen as approaching a unified, liberal state. In the case of visa policies, citizens from rich democracies are favoured in front of immigrants from poor states and this indicates that a prejudice exists regarding where outside threats are most likely to derive from. Mau calls it a ‘transnational inequality’ born in the ‘stratification’ between accepted cultural identities and those being denied equal ‘rights, capacities, and resources to transcend or cross borders’ (Mau 2010, p. 339).

Leaving the discussion of institutional visa aspects, Balibar can point us to a new direction within the topic of the concept of the border. When stating that ‘some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all’ he disregards the geopolitical imaginary and makes a philosophical turn (Balibar 2002, p. 84). Here, the concept of borders is not limited to lines on maps but could rather be found everywhere in the social world. A ‘border’ is constructed as soon as specific societal functions or situations require people to be or act ‘legitimate’, for example, when people are controlled at security checks, health checks, ticket controls, roadblocks, etcetera. The examples are many, but all situations include a passing of a ‘border’. Balibar’s all-embracing conclusion of this is that borders exists ‘wherever selective controls are to be found’ (Balibar 2002, p. 84).
This perspective introduces a mobile border which has later been referred to as ‘biometric’. Epstein (2007) argues that biometrics hails from when governments realised that populations was more than just people inside a demarcated territory. Rather, the populations became regarded as ‘a huge productive force’ required to be controlled by the counterforce of ‘governmentality’ (Epstein 2007, p. 151). So, governmentality became a form of authority inside the sovereignty, targeting the population and attempting to measure and assess bodies. Amoore (2006) develops this notion and sees how human attributes are used in more substantial attempts to measure bodies and to categorize them within binary slots of, say, secure/insecure or legal/illega. In practice, this categorization is done with modern technology at airports, in harbours and at train stations. Bodies are required to legitimately cross borders after being assessed by the ‘legitimate’ authority of, say, immigration workers and border police. Based on humanly attached attributes, bodies are given a constructed identity being either ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’. In this way, biometric borders are constantly drawn and re-drawn among legal and illegal bodies, and the concept of borders are once again re-shaped; here, from being the outer reaches of sovereignty to something instead being cemented merely in the attributes of people. The concept of the border is therefore no longer ‘national’ but more of a social sorting process having major consequences for the movement of people (Amoore 2006, pp. 337-339).

The idea of a border as a sorting process conveniently leads us into the next part of the section which will discuss the idea of biopolitics. Biopolitics, or biopower, is something having a history within Foucauldian social sciences, but as we will see, it is now being increasingly connected with critical studies of security. The following part will continue on the notions introduced above and show how biopolitics can be connected to new perspectives on the concept of borders and sovereignty.

2.2 Biopolitics and Security

Starting off with biopower, it can be seen as a form of power preceding the ‘politics’ of biopolitics, and furthermore, as something foundational for the ‘governmentality’ and ‘biometrics’ discussed above. Biopower can be summarized as an authority’s ability to rightly control bodies, and as a force being able to legitimately subjugate the physical aspects of life. Although it can be seen as a force hindering the ‘freedom’ of citizens, it is commonly meant to improve the many aspects of life, for example its ‘mental and physical well-being, its longevity, its environment, its productivity, its efficiency, etc.’ (De Larringa and Doucet 2008, p. 520). Agamben (1998 cited in De Larringa and Doucet 2008), one of the most
influential writers within the field, further argues that biopower and sovereign power are constitutive of each other, that they ultimately require each other to exist. For example, today’s sovereign state would mean nothing without the existence and presence of living people over which the state can exercise biopower (De Larrinaga and Doucet 2008, p. 521).

A continued discussion on biopower requires an account for some of the consequences born in the relation between politics and life. As hinted, it is a relation that creates two separate perspectives on life: zoë which is the ‘biological fact of life’ and bios which is the ‘political or qualified life’. And, biological life is today, without hesitation, forced to subjugate to the practices of political life, thereby putting the ‘bio’ into biopolitics (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 96-98). The political life can also be understood as the life of a community and the life lived under the rules and demands of law, politics, economy, and of course, borders (Schinkel 2010, p. 161). So in conclusion, we are here acknowledging the transformation where a living physical body is made into a legitimate political subject and given a political identity.

However, if we think of these forms of life in a reversed order we can deduce something which Agamben refers to as bare life (or homo sacer in Latin) (Schinkel 2010, p. 161; Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 99). This is, briefly put, a form of life stripped from political identity, a naked bios separated from the legal procedures of law and order which, in turn, is upheld by sovereign power. Bare life, separated from law and put in a ‘state of exception’, can be illustrated with the examples of prisons like, for example, Guantanamo Bay where prisoners are being legitimately and ruthlessly reduced to nothing but ‘bodies’. The prison, as a representation of a ‘sovereign’ authority, is in these situations authorised to control, encage and, with legal rights of death penalties, even take a life (Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 103; Parfitt 2009, pp. 42-46). Less grave, bare life can also be exemplified as illegal immigrants, moving through a mapped space, but without the legitimate rights of staying as a ‘citizen’ of the sovereign state (Schinkel 2010, pp. 161-166).

The relevance of the bare life to the security practices of sovereign states is explained well by Vaughan-Williams (2009, p. 116):

Instead of viewing the limits of sovereign power as somehow spatially fixed at the outer edge of the state, Agamben reconceptualises these limits in terms of a decision or speech act about whether certain life is life worth of living or life that is expendable. Such a decision performatively produces and secures the borders of political community as the politically qualified life of the citizen is defined against the bare life of homo sacer.
Thus, we return to the problematized concept of a biopolitical border since sovereign power can be seen as exercised when drawing lines between different forms of life. Sovereign power is here not about upholding the geopolitical imaginary but about deciding which people are ‘legal’, ‘illegal’, or even ‘worthy’ or ‘unworthy’ of living.

Parfitt shows how Agamben’s thoughts on *homo sacer* can be applied to much more than Guantanamo-like prison examples and that situations creating bare life can be found also in the context of development interventions. Refugees, for example, are often found in situations where the state cannot sufficiently protect them and where they are reduced to bare life when being placed helplessly in refugee camps (Parfitt 2009, p. 42). And in a larger scale, the ‘billion or so people who subsist on less than a dollar a day’ can also be seen as bare life. According to Parfitt, the population of the ‘third world’ is reduced to ‘poor *hominès sacris*’ (*homo sacer* in plural) as a result of the failed capitalist economy project, and, they can therefore be seen as one of the many ‘marginalized groups who have been deprived of legal recourse[s] […] and reduced to a state analogous to that of bare life’ (Parfitt 2009, p. 43). However, by arguing for a preferable ‘good life’, as an opposition to bare life, we can presume that this ‘good life’ is the aim for any intervention in the developing world. This also leads us to the main point raised by Parfitt, that the ‘third world’ may be mere ‘poor *hominès sacris*’, but that development interventions ultimately are ‘biopolitical enterprises’ aiming to eliminate bare life itself (Parfitt 2009, p. 47).

‘Having left behind his origin and been stripped of his former identities, the refugee is socially a “zombie” […]’, states Diken (2010, p. 87) when discussing the asylum seeker as an example of bare life, stripped from identity, when confronting the power of the sovereign state. Moreover, Diken points out how the asylum seeker in many aspects is being criminalized and portrayed as a ‘bandit’. ‘Clinging to trains, attempting to cross the channel in boats, hiding among the refrigerated vegetables in long-distance lorries’, the refugee becomes the bandit with bad intentions which ‘citizens’ of the sovereign state fears (Diken 2010, p. 88). The refugee can therefore be seen as an ‘outsider inside’, an outlaw who can be legitimately exposed to authoritarian control, surveillance, and even violence.

This section, too, will conclude with a notion of biometrics, but here it will be connected to risk assessment rather than its metaphorical value as a social sorting border. As previously discussed, biometric borders exists wherever selective controls of authority are to be found, for example, at airports, train stations, harbours, or essentially, at all locations where extensive security practices are perceived as required. A pattern of movement can be glimpsed, that this form of security is present in order to assess travellers as either ‘trusted’ or
‘suspicious’ (Amoore 2006; Muller 2010, pp. 16-23). As biopolitics in practice, an evaluation of moving bodies is done, letting trusted bodies pass controls, or roadblocks, freely while hindering and questioning suspicious ones. These acts include an indispensable element of ‘risk thinking’ or ‘governing through risk’, an ‘attempt at prevention, taming the limit, monitoring, managing, and governing the ungovernable and the uncertain’ (Muller 2010, p. 14). Indeed, risk is in its essence ungovernable, it is highly dependent on settings, and it is something in need of constant evaluation. For example, how is it possible that some people are evaluated as threats while some are not? Who decides, and based on what? Later on, we shall ask these kinds of questions and try to illustrate possible answers in a Tanzanian context.
3. METHODOLOGY: INTRODUCING A SOCIAL REALITY

This section presents the methodology of discourse analysis that is used in this study. Discussions are held both on the term ‘discourse’ itself, and on the ontological stances required when analysing and thinking in terms of a social reality. Techniques for handling and using ‘spoken discourse’, in this case interview material, are then reviewed. Finally, the collected empirical material is presented briefly to provide an overview prior to the analysis. The literature used for a presentation of discourse analysis is primarily Diskurs (2007) [Swedish translation] by David Howarth, and the article entitled The study of discourse in international relations: a critique of research and methods (1999) by Jennifer Milliken. The section was also complemented with texts by David Campbell (1998) and Michael Shapiro (1989). The literature regarding ‘spoken discourse’ that has been used is Working with spoken discourse (2001) by Deborah Cameron.

3.1 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Today, discourse analysis is an established research method within the field of critical security studies. Analysing and discussing in terms of discourse is often done aiming to challenge the traditional aspects of the positivism and measurability often found in social science, political science, and sociology (Howarth 2007, p. 9). Hailing from the world of linguistics and semiotics, discourse analyses are often executed within poststructuralist, constructivist and feminist studies. Several different stances exists within the methodology, it has been thoroughly developed through the years, so discourse analysis should therefore be seen as a method being constantly processed, criticised and developed, rather than a solid framework (Howarth 2007, pp. 10-13). However, despite the diversity of thinkers and alignments within discourse analysis, Milliken (1999, p. 229) concludes that researchers within the field nevertheless can agree on three general commitments. These three commitments of discourse analysis will be accounted for in this section.

The first of the commitments suggests that researchers, briefly put, see ‘discourse’ as a collection of meaningful socially created ‘structures’, together turning our world to a mere social reality. Our world, including every single person, thing and phenomenon we acknowledge, cannot exist independently from our understanding of it. Things exist only through the meaning we give them through ideas and beliefs, we create representations of something or someone through language, and these representations then constitute our ‘reality’. Even if our world would exist outside the world of language, we cannot know that –
the existence of a reality is impossible to see or interpret without our tradition of representing through language (Campbell 1998, pp. 6-7). The notion that the reality is constituted of discourses, and with this becomes a social rather than an ‘objective’ reality, is although not the central question of debate. Instead, this concept functions as a starting point when researchers analyse the consequences of when people interpret the reality. Interpretations of the world create discursive representations, and these representations can in turn create binary oppositions, conditions described and categorized as, say, inside/outside, legitimate/illegitimate, safe/unsafe (Milliken 1999, p. 229, pp. 231-235). This inevitably has consequences on social interplay, often leading to a certain kind of implementation of politics, and this is commonly what is of interest to discourse analysts. For example, Shapiro (1989, p. 319) argues that political processes, stemming from discursive representations, should be seen merely as contests of having an interpretative prerogative. If an interpretation is ‘winning’ over another it can lead to political implications of course having major impact on areas like economy, education, welfare, security, and movement. This also exemplifies how creating and interpreting representations ultimately can affect how we live our lives and how we interact with others, separating us from them, inside from outside, etcetera.

This leads us to the second commitment for discourse analysts which is suggesting that an underlying concept of a social reality is insufficient. A perspective on the productivity of discourses is also needed, ergo, how identities are born and how actors and relationships between actors are created. For example, Milliken (1999, pp. 236-240) stresses how discourses of knowledge and power can produce certain ‘legitimate’ actors (say, ‘experts’ and ‘authorities’) who, with their position in the social reality, possesses the ‘legitimate’ right to tell other actors what is right or wrong, good or bad, safe or unsafe. Some actors, or institutions for that matter, are allowed to produce approaches, policies and rules which directly affect other actors or institutions.

The productivity of discourses does in other words highlight how different capacities and legitimacies are drawing lines, dividing power and creating boundaries within the social reality. However, it is those standing on the ‘other’ side of the boundaries that the third and last commitment accounts for. Namely, when discourses produce authority, expertise and legitimate ‘speakers’, they simultaneously produce their ‘listeners’. Or, as argued by poststructuralist Derrida (1976 cited in Howarth 2007, p. 47), there is a ‘we’, privileged by discourses of knowledge and power, standing before a secondary or excluded ‘other’. The relation between these two is although highly fragile and changeable and the ‘orders’ of the social reality are therefore being constantly produced and reproduced. This reproduction is of
interest to the discourse analyst, who should analyse both current relations between discursive representations, as well as undertake the important task of questioning these relations. The analyst must not take hegemonic notions for granted, but always question what ‘reality’ is and who is to tell the ‘truth’ about it (Milliken 1999, pp. 242-244).

This act of ‘questioning’ can be compared to a well-discussed Derridian concept within discourse analysis called ‘deconstruction’. This method is ambiguous but often means that texts are undergoing deep analyses, being interpreted, reinterpreted and put into several different contexts in order to show contradictions and concealed meanings. Ultimately, it is also done in order to show the central role, and constant changeability, of language (Howarth 2007, pp. 52-58). The term itself was although never clearly defined by Derrida, and this goes hand in hand with his will to not let discourse analysis become fixated or complete. He often emphasizes the limitations for discourses to describe our world, stressing how words, ideas, and beliefs can be repeated endlessly in different contexts. Therefore, neither can discourse analysis, and nor does it want to, be able to describe our world perfectly, and by that becoming a ‘complete’ research method (Howarth 2007, p. 53). Rather, a constant deconstructing of language should be done, developing ‘the discourse about discourse’, and improving the ways it could make us understand and question the social reality further (Howarth 2007, p. 10).

3.2 ‘SPoken DISCOURSE’

Since a great deal of the material in this study was gathered through interviews it is important to present how these were conducted and transcribed into field notes in order to later function as text material in the discourse analysis, because as discourse analyst Cameron (2001, p. 19) states: ‘[…] whereas most written materials […] are relatively straightforward to collect, collecting talk and getting it into an analysable form presents more of a challenge’.

First of all, a point should be made regarding the functions of collected data for discourse analyses. Cameron (2001, pp. 19-22) argues that there is no ‘prototype’ of preferable data, nor should any parts of the collected data from a ‘spoken discourse’ be seen as more reliable than others parts. Although, while making a distinction of material from ‘ordinary’ talk (from casual contexts) and ‘institutional’ talk (from professional contexts), she stresses that discourse analysts should be cautious of privileging any of the two since they both are equally legitimate parts of the ‘talk’ of language.

It is also important to acknowledge the fact that interview talks, ‘however “conversational” the tone’, are direct results of two (or more) people entering the roles of interviewer and
The speech acts are essentially and inevitably characterised by the particular purposes of people playing particular ‘roles’ during the interview situation, and this should of course be taken into consideration.

A point of research ethics should be made when using ‘private’ interview or conversation material for ‘public’ analyses, especially in the case of this study where the topics discussed, as we will see, are of a susceptible kind, often hidden behind secrecy. Therefore, this study applies the well-used solution of giving respondents, and people respondents talk about, pseudonyms both in the transcript and in the analytical section (Cameron 2001, p. 23).

Conclusively, regarding the transcription of material, Cameron (2001, p. 31) boldly states that ‘without a transcript […] talk is impossible to analyse systematically’. This could be seen as a reference to the deconstruction of language discussed above, and the fact that the act of deconstructing cannot be done in real-time; ‘speech cannot be processed in the same way as writing, hearing and reading are different’ (Cameron 2001, p. 31). Thus, detailed notes were written during (and complemented directly following) the interviews in order to lay the grounds for a thorough deconstructive discourse analysis.

### 3.3 Empirical Material

The empirical material, consisting of observation notes and notes from six semi-structured interviews, were collected during a three week field trip in Tanzania in early 2012. Every interview was conducted in Babati town, Manyara region. The observations, although of a more spontaneous kind, were done in and around Babati and Arusha, and often when travelling on the roads by bus.

The first interview respondent, Mussa, figured as a representative of the ‘politically engaged elderly citizens’ and provided his perception of borders and the current national security issues (Interview 1). The second respondent, who was answering anonymously and given the pseudonym Jean-Pierre, works at an immigration office and provided information about the institution of immigration, what common issues they face and how they work and cooperate with other border institutions to solve these problems (Interview 2). The third respondent, Majuto, is currently a member of Driver’s Association of Manyara Region and worked as head of transportation during the field trip. Having several years of experience when it comes to driving buses, trucks and cars, he provided information about the traffic security from a ‘driver’s perspective’ (Interview 3). The fourth respondent was answering anonymously and given the pseudonym Mr X. Working as a traffic police officer, he provided information from a ‘government perspective’ about how they work with security along the roads (Interview 4).
The fifth respondent, anonymous and given the pseudonym David, also works as a bus driver and provided further opinions on the traffic security and roadblocks in and around Babati (Interview 5). Lastly, the sixth respondent, Ally, provided information based partly on his working experience in the Tanzania Revenue Authority, and partly on his experience as an ‘ordinary driver’. He shared his opinions both on how the institutions cooperate at the national borders and on the role of traffic security in Tanzania (Interview 6).

The observations during the field trip were done mostly while travelling by bus, and when encountering the quite frequent security checkpoints in and around the cities. This showed how the police worked at the stops, and how they practiced their authority towards the drivers. Moreover, the observations at the Kilimanjaro International Airport showed how the border institutions and its personnel worked on representing, serving and securing the border. The security practices surrounding the border could of course also be analysed, for example, routines for immigration, visas, vaccine requirements etcetera (Observation notes).

In sum, the empirical material can illustrate several qualitative examples within topics such as borders, state sovereignty, power, and authority. This study does although not in any way intend to ‘measure’ or ‘prove’ anything within these topics. Rather, it aims to provide interpretations and analyses of the given material in order to present unique perceptions of Tanzanian contemporary political life.
4. REASSESSING THE CONCEPT OF BORDERS IN TANZANIA

This analysis will follow a structure similar to that of the theory section in chapter two. In section 4.1, the Tanzanian national borders will be analysed, problematized, and compared with the critical perspectives introduced earlier. In section 4.2, biopower in Tanzania will be discussed, and substantial biopolitical interventions such as security checkpoints, as well as the presence of refugees within Tanzania, will be analysed. In both sections, the empirical material (both the interview material and the observations) will be implemented in running text.

4.1 THE NATIONAL BORDERS

When arriving at the Kilimanjaro International Airport and entering the terminal building from the landing runway, passengers instantly notice the extensive machinery of bordering practices. Although it is a rather tiny terminal, the work force is large and visible. During the time of observation, around seven to eight security employees wandered around, seemingly without any current tasks, and the size of the personnel therefore seemed to exceed the demand, due to the low frequency of arriving airplanes. Moreover, a scanning of fingerprints was executed together with the passport control, supervised by authoritative guards with straight faces. This example of modern security technology was a somewhat peculiar addition to the otherwise rough and simple interior of the terminal. Restless employees, clever passport controls, and complicated visa application forms could all be interpreted as abstract representations of the national border. Still, the abstraction level of the border was at its lowest in the representation of a yellow line running through the room (Figure 1). This can be seen as a demarcation of where no-man’s-land ends and where Tanzania begins. It can also be an attempt of visualising something otherwise invisible, since it indeed is as close as one can come to the ‘actual’ border. Adding this to the overall impressions during the observation at the airport, the notion is that a geopolitical imaginary is highly present at the airport. The national borders are stressed as important and valuable, and there is a need for clearly demarcating what is ‘domestic’ and what is ‘international’ space, where sovereign power begins and ends (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 1-4; Williams 2003, p. 25).
When arriving at many other airports, welcoming signs or billboards with lush advertisements are often found, perhaps with the purpose of creating a ‘pleasant’ first impression of the country. Though, what one actually sees at first glance when entering the Kilimanjaro International Airport are signs proclaiming fees and charges for visas and vaccines. Interestingly enough, the ‘yellow card’\(^2\) is checked by border security before passports or visas; hence, vaccination can be seen as prioritized over identification. Those approaching the borders are evaluated as ‘secure’ and ‘welcome’ by health status instead of nationality, and, the ‘outsiders’ who are ‘not welcome’ are those not having their health papers in order (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 51-56). In sum, there is an aspect of money which is highly present at Kilimanjaro International Airport. One can observe the passport controls with its technical solutions, the large amount of employees, the signs with visa fees, and sense a general feeling of expense. There might be an official will to create a Tanzanian border which is more than a regular airport. Rather, the terminal is to be regarded as ‘safe’ as possible, and its personnel should be functioning as ‘worthy’ representatives of the border. This can be added to the previous notions of the sovereign state’s responsibility of protecting the territory it is provided by the national borders (Huysmans 2007, p. 53-54). In this example, though, officials have both the responsibility to protect, but also an aspiration of

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\(^2\) A booklet containing stamps and doctor’s signatures insuring that the holder has taken the yellow fever vaccine, a requirement for anyone seeking to enter Tanzania.
generating a feeling of expense, as if institutional or infrastructural investments were to be seen as equal to investments in ‘security’.

Further analysing the ‘outsiders’ of the state, interviewee Mussa shows great knowledge about national security issues when discussing the conflicts in neighbouring countries. He argues that without borders, the situation in Tanzania would be ‘hectic’, referring to current or historical conflicts north and west of the country (Interview 1), demarcated as ‘outside’ Tanzania by the national borders. Furthermore, Mussa is well aware of foreign ‘threats’ posed by Al-Qaeda and Somali based Al-Shabaab. Interesting though, is how he never defines the ‘inside’ which is to be protected from these foreign threats. Why? As discussed by Huysmans, it is easier and more accessible to point out the ‘insecure state’ of the world outside of the borders, rather than defining who ‘we’ as ‘insiders’ are, and, the fear consequently lies in ‘not knowing who is dangerous’, (Huysmans 2007, p. 53).

Immigration worker Jean-Pierre can be described as one of the ‘representatives’ of the borders, and he discusses the work carried out by immigration offices, police, military, the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), among others (Interview 2). All of these institutions could in themselves be seen both as representations of the borders, and also as representations of the sovereign state, thus, that which is ‘inside’ the borders. And as noted by Huysmans, if threats from the ‘outside’ are constituted of something culturally ‘dissimilar’, that which is ‘inside’ must be a ‘similar’ entity (Huysmans 2007, p. 51). However, Jean-Pierre describes a situation currently being opposite to this, where the personnel working at airports or border crossings ‘might look like a solid team’ in spite of the fact that they are actually competing, and even if the officials aim to portray the border as unified, apparently ‘no real friendship exists’ (Interview 2). Further describing the dissension at the borders, respondent Ally argues that the different border institutions often act as ‘their own bosses’, and that this can lead to rivalry and a corrupt competition, outplaying the initial and ultimate goal which should be to achieve national security (Interview 6).

When analysing Tanzanian perceptions of national borders, it is rather common to see how the borders are creating and sustaining the ‘Tanzanian’ identity. Jean-Pierre, for example, stresses the significance of national identity when arguing that there is a security aspect of knowing who is from what country and who is travelling legally or illegally. Interestingly, he also states that ‘there is no place where you don’t belong’ (Interview 2). It must be emphasized, however, that this is a point made only with reference to his idea of the collective identities of ‘nationality’. Hence, nationality stems from the ‘place’ where we ‘belong’, but it exists merely thanks to the existence of national borders. The nationality of the ‘state’ is also
central to several respondents, and it is often used metaphorically to describe the overarching situation in East Africa. For instance, Jean-Pierre paints the picture of Tanzania being the ‘heart’ in the conflict ridden ‘body’ of East Africa, referring to current aspects of insecurity in Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya, and drawing a line between the ‘safe’ Tanzania opposing the ‘unsafe outside’ (Interview 2). These bodily related metaphors can be applicably connected to the discussions by Bigo (2002, pp. 67-70) on nationality and how it is ‘threatened’ by immigrants. In this context, the national ‘body’ of Tanzania can be seen as penetrated by the ‘threat’ of immigrants, transforming the supposedly homogenous nation to a heterogeneous collection of identities.

In fact, illegal immigration is frequently seen as one of the ‘main issues’ for the Tanzanian state (Interview 1; Interview 2). Rather than discussing the on-going Kenyan military operations against Al-Shabaab, or the lengthy conflict in neighbouring Congo, discussions on illegally migrating foreigners are more common among the respondents. This can show something reminiscent to a feeling of attachment towards the own national body, that the Tanzanian identity is seen as something fundamental and indeed worthy of protection. Furthermore, the immigrants are often judged alike, as if they were an ‘outside’ entity consisting solely of Somali migrants. Jean-Pierre (Interview 2) claims the trend to be that ‘people are nowadays talking about the Somalis’, that some even speak of it as a ‘crisis’, while Mussa (Interview 1) goes so far as to blame the collective Somali immigrants for having ‘bad intentions’. However, as previously noted by Huysmans (2007, p. 56), attempts of posing immigrants as a collective force requires a national body which is being equally lumped together. So, if Somalis are to be seen as a united ‘threat’ in this context, it requires a ‘Tanzania’ which is just as united. And by specifically pointing out the ‘Somalis’, it also shows the previously discussed ‘stratification’ between accepted cultural identities and those being perceived as suspicious, or even dangerous, ‘outsiders’ (Mau 2010, p. 339).

At several occasions, respondents refer to Tanzania as a ‘transit-country’. Briefly put, this means that migrants moving within the Tanzanian borders will not stay and settle. Instead, migrants will attempt to cross the country, commonly with the aim of seeking refuge in South Africa (Interview 2). To some, this idea might be of negligible relevance to the national borders, but as Balibar can remind us, borders are no longer at the borders (Balibar 2002, p. 84). As previously noted, they have instead expanded into being everywhere in the social world, and therefore, they are present within Tanzania as well as at its outer reaches. When applying this view on the current situation in Tanzania, we can suggest that migrants ‘in transit’ frequently encounter these ‘mobile’ forms of borders. As soon people face ID
controls, security checks, roadblocks, or any form of authority, a boundary is set up by ‘legitimate’ authority which in turn has to be crossed in a ‘legitimate’ way (Amoore 2006). Or as Balibar (2002, p. 84) has argued, borders are ultimately to be found ‘wherever selective controls are to be found’. Hence, these forms of borders are likely to be purposively set up by officials as a method of resolving the transit-country issue. In theory, the moving borders of authority can function as an effective security practice for the sovereign state of Tanzania. But does serve its purpose in practice? The next section will provide a potential answer to this.

4.2 BIOPOLITICS IN TANZANIA

Security checkpoints set up by traffic police are, to say the least, common in Tanzania. These are sites along the roads where one or several police officers are patrolling and stopping vehicles, and the officers are distinguishable by their brightly yellow vests, their upscale uniforms, and their accessories of walkie-talkies and batons (Figure 2). When operating at the security checkpoints, they become an embodied form of biopower; an intrusive representation of this abstract form of power. The official purposes for these checkpoints are, according to the police, to monitor speed limits and to control driver’s licenses, that insurances are active, and that the vehicle is in a statutory condition (Interview 4). They also check that larger vehicles are not carrying more passengers than allowed, since overcrowded buses are a very common problem (Interview 1). Regarding the amount of security checkpoints, traffic police officer Mr. X argues that Tanzania should have ‘as many as possible’ (Interview 4). This statement can be likened to De Larringa and Doucet’s indication that biopower commonly is meant to improve life within states, that the authority strives to help, not to hinder (De Larringa and Doucet 2008, p. 520). So, the fact that Mr X calls for an increased amount of checkpoints might derive from a will to ‘help’. But, it can also be a seen as an effect of the previously discussed ‘governmentality': the authorities of the state might inherently have a mere need to target and to control the force of a population (Epstein 2007, p. 151).

Alas, not everyone agrees with the ‘official’ picture of security checkpoints. First of all, the interviewed drivers does not even address them as ‘checkpoints’, but instead as ‘roadblocks’. Emphasising ‘block’, it reflects the phenomenon’s restrictive nature. Interviewee Majuto also stresses their frequency, exemplifying how drivers at times can encounter up to 25 roadblocks during the three hour drive between the cities of Babati and Arusha (Interview 3). The stops are concentrated in urban areas, but can also be found in more rural areas where there is less traffic (Interview 6). Due to the frequency of the roadblocks, certain etiquette has been established in order to make the stops as ‘smooth’ as possible. In practice, biopower is then
exercised with great impact as the drivers supposedly are required to subjugate themselves, obey and politely answer questions (Interview 3; Interview 5). As noted, they encounter a form of border where they have to act in a certain ‘legitimate’ way, where the biopolitical power has an extensive control over the movement of bodies, and where people are evaluated by authority as either ‘trusted’ or ‘suspicious’ (Amoore 2006; Muller 2010, pp. 16-23). The drivers clearly bear a grudge against the roadblocks, and respondent Ally further blames them for having a severely negative effect on free movement in Tanzania (Interview 6).

From the traffic security’s point of view, there is an evaluation of ‘risk’ present in their work where they have to determine whether drivers should be stopped or allowed to pass the checkpoints. But how exactly do they determine this ‘risk’? According to the drivers, there is a severe corruption and hunt for money at the roadblocks. Majuto states that collecting money is the ‘hidden purpose’ of roadblocks and that they have no ‘real’ use (Interview 3). Therefore, the police are actively searching for reasons to stop vehicles, and even brand new Land Cruisers are being stopped and thoroughly searched for faults (Interview 6). Whatever the cause for being pulled over, the ‘standard’ fee for car drivers is said to be around 3000
Tanzanian shillings\(^3\) per roadblock, however, if you are ‘known in town’ you might be excused of paying (Interview 3). Moreover, the fact that they function as a potential source of income for police officers obviously also regulate the amount and frequency of the stops (Interview 6). The interviewed drivers’ trust towards the traffic security is understandably low. Some even experience how travelling in Tanzanian is being reduced because of the corrupt traffic security since many, due to the required bribing, cannot afford the trips (Interview 6). Public transport is also involved in the ‘business of roadblocks’. According to Majuto, a pre-paid ‘permit’ for around 10,000 shillings is usually arranged, allowing buses to pass the roadblocks comparatively unhindered (Interview 3). Connected to the context of borders, this permit can interestingly be seen as a ‘bus visa’ for travelling the roads of Tanzania, therefore resembling the passport visas required when entering the country. Still, as we can see, this is not a spontaneous form of corruption where bribes flow aimlessly. Rather, it is a systematic procedure and a well-rooted tradition shaping biopower into a matter of economy rather than security. So in conclusion, we can see in these examples that the aspects of money ultimately determine notions of safety. Money is the main variable separating ‘secure’ from ‘insecure’, and it is the main instrument used when authorities assess moving bodies and govern through risk at the roadblocks (Muller 2010, pp. 14-15).

However, not all people travelling in Tanzania can pay their way to ‘security’. Refugees, for example, are regarded ‘insecure’ due to other reasons than not having enough money. According to the idea of law, they are initially ‘lawless’, whether they can bribe someone or not. They are, as previously put, moving through the transit-country of Tanzania, but without the legitimate rights of staying (Schinkel 2010, pp. 161-166). Because of this, they can be seen as bare life when encountering the roadblocks. Refugees are lacking the ability of legitimately living under the current country’s rules of law, they cannot obtain a political identity, and they are indeed ‘on the run’ as lawless bodies in a legal system. For example, according to Jean-Pierre, a group of 17 Somalis had recently been caught ‘on the run’, crammed into a regular sized car, showing how ‘eager’ they are to move (Interview 2). But without aspects of the political life, the bios, people are turned to marginalised groups of homo sacer when fleeing their country, entering another, and desperately trying to avoid the powers of authority (Parfitt 2009, p. 43).

Another recent incident, discussed by several respondents, is the lorry found abandoned in the Morogoro province, near the border Tanzania shares with Zambia. The lorry, found in

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\(^3\) In May 2012, 3000 Tanzanian shillings is equivalent to around 2 U.S. dollars.
January 2012, carried a container in which Somali refugees were found, 20 of them already dead, the rest of them alive but exhausted and in a critical state (Interview 1; Interview 2). When stopped, the lorry had travelled the entire distance from the Kenyan border, presumably with South Africa as a final destination. The unworthy and even lethal way of travelling, in concealment and lacking oxygen, inside a container, exemplifies how the refugee is stripped of a dignified identity, thus, becoming bare life on the run. The refugee is forced to play the role of a fearful ‘bandit’ when taking illegal measures of cheating and hiding from the power of the sovereign state (Diken 2010, p. 88).

But if refugees are to be seen as bandits, what is the Tanzanian counterforce? Observations early in the morning in central Babati showed a gathering of police officers on an open field next to the police station. Seemingly the entire police force, including the traffic security with their yellow vests, were lined up in three long rows, all of them standing in attention, uptight and disciplined. In front of them strolled another officer, holding and pointing with a stick, shouting orders. It all resembled a military drilling exercise, as if the police were briefed before an important mission, as if they were an ‘army’. Is this militarised police force that which is to protect Tanzanians from ‘threats’ like refugees? Let us leave this notion for a while and return to the previous discussion on the ‘good life’, as an opposition to bare life. If we equalise the state of being a refugee to bare life, refugees are in this sense functioning as an opposition to the ‘good life’ of having a political and legal identity. And if a ‘good life’ is the preferable form of life, the homines sacri are societal ‘oddities’ that must be eliminated through biopolitical interventions (Parfitt 2009, p. 47). It can be suggested, then, that the bare lives of refugees are facing a Tanzanian counterforce of biopower, an ‘army’ of traffic police aiming to eliminate the homines sacri. Thus, the police can hypothetically be seen as engaging in ‘warfare’ against the ‘threat’ of Somali migrants, and therefore participating in a process of militarising Tanzanian biopolitics.

As discussed, substantial Tanzanian biopower, in the form of authoritative roadblocks, is often assessing security in terms of money. However, even refugees have successfully taken advantage of the money aspect, even though it was suggested initially that they resemble the ‘helpless’ state of bare life. Ally exemplifies with a story of how a group of Somalis recently had travelled through Tanzania with vast amounts of money in their luggage. Tens of millions of shillings had been used for payment at the roadblocks along the way, and at one occasion a handful police officers had also been bribed individually. This lead to that the refugees got escorted the remaining stretch to the border (Interview 6). Jean-Pierre complements this story when pointing out the severe but rather unbeknownst problem of police being extensively
bribed in order to move refugees in the night from district to district (Interview 2). These stories can show how refugees, with the help of money, enable a transformation from being the ‘threat’ to becoming regarded as ‘secure’. And more importantly, refugees are in this sense also buying their way to the transformation from being *hominæ sacræ* to temporarily becoming *bios*, a politically qualified life, getting both escorts and helping hands (Vaughan-Williams 2009, pp. 96-98).

So in conclusion, can biopolitical interventions increase Tanzanian security? In fact, all interviewees could agree on that biopolitical interventions like roadblocks, in theory, are effective *instruments* for increasing security. However, most of the interviewees could also agree on that the current biopolitical security instruments are not working well at all. Some blamed ‘the system’ (Interview 6), some blamed ‘the corrupt personnel’ (Interview 3), and some even blamed the Tanzanian citizens for being poorly educated about law and corruption (Interview 4). However, as a last remark, the debate should not be about whether one should believe in or support the biopolitical security instruments or not; it should rather be about how security ultimately is dependent on the linguistic rules of *assessment*. Terms like security clearly have different meanings to different subjects, since it can be assessed both with reference to the value of money and the ethnicity of people.

This discussion will be continued in the following section, where attempts also will be made to answer the initial research questions. First, though, is a text concluding the study where results of the analysis will be compared to the theory of the so called ‘gatekeeper state’, hopefully showing that the concepts of borders and security can be discussed and problematized in many different ways.
5. CONCLUSION: GUARDING THE GATES

The theory of the gatekeeper state originates from historian Frederick Cooper’s *Africa since 1940: the past of the present* where he discusses, among other things, the role of state power after the decolonisation of African countries. States did at the time of independence ‘inherit’ several political institutions, originally created and established by the colonial powers. This greatly affected the ability to govern, and many new African states had ‘great difficulty getting beyond the limitations of a gatekeeper state’ (Cooper 2002, p. 156). The state is here given the name ‘gatekeeper’ due to its trouble of achieving loyalty from the citizens of the ‘inside’. As described by Cooper (2002, p. 156):

> Like colonial regimes, [the African states] had trouble extending their power and their command of people’s respect, if not support, inward. They had trouble collecting taxes, except on imports and exports; they had trouble setting economic priorities and policies, except for the distribution of resources like oil revenues and customs receipts; they had trouble making the nation-state into a symbol that inspired loyalty.

Hence, the only way for the newly independent state to ‘survive’ was to guard the gates of the given territory by assuring a steady income from taxes, visas, customs etcetera. Therefore, the ‘guardians’ had nothing more than the gates to protect and fight for, since the ‘inside’ constituted of no more than a disloyal mass of bodies (Cooper 2002, p. 157).

In the context of this study, the idea of the *gates* could of course be applicably likened to the many border crossings at the outer reaches of Tanzanian territory. Moreover, gates can also (metaphorically and literally) be found at the border sites of international airports. The *guardians*, on the other hand, could be likened to the representatives of the borders; those working at the airports, patrolling the border crossings, sitting in the offices of the border institutions, and so on.

These illustrations could help explain the already observed presence of money at the sites of the Tanzanian national borders, for example, the importance of visas and vaccines, and the high rate of employees. Seeing border representatives as guardians could also help explain the transformation when matters of ‘security’ are reassessed into matters of ‘economy’. For example, immigration workers are sometimes bribed by migrants so that they can be ‘allowed’ to enter the country (Interview 6). As a result, immigration institutions, essentially holding a purpose of controlling flows of migration, are transformed to profitable gates that can function as a source of income for the guardians. And the geopolitical order is
consequently upheld and reinforced by the ‘guardians’, since the national borders, in this sense, still are of great importance.

On a related note, the questionable role of Tanzanian traffic security can be compared to the assumption that gatekeeper states have a hard time receiving support and respect when reaching ‘inwards’. Hence, the difficulties of controlling the ‘insiders’ of the state does in this sense lead to an establishment of security checkpoints along the roads, functioning as attempts of enforcing state authority over people. And moreover, the difficulty of taxing citizens can be suggested to lead to corrupt roadblocks where the guardians desperately and illegitimately attempt to collect unofficial ‘taxes’ from citizens. It is as if the guardians, with these particular examples, are trying to overcome the problem of disloyalty by shortening the distance between the gates and the ‘insiders’ of the state with exercising of biopower and establishing of biopolitical measures.

However, if connected further to the problematized concept of borders, there is an even greater presence of guardians. In sum, guardians and gates can, once again, be found wherever selective controls are to be found, but they do in this sense require an involvement of money (Balibar 2002, p. 84). The theory of the gatekeeper state may therefore not be able to completely explain notions of either biopolitics or national security, but it can however unite with the critical border studies in the sense that they both are able to reassess concepts of borders, sovereignty and power. When introducing the perspective of the ‘guardians of the gates’ we see that the concept of borders can, and indeed should, be problematized and discussed further. Discussions on socially constructed ideas of borders, security, and other phenomena having political impact, should never come to a halt and be considered ‘done’, but should rather lead to a constant reassessment.

5.1 Answering the Research Questions

How does current perceptions of the Tanzanian national borders compare to problematized understandings of borders and sovereign power?

The ‘modern geopolitical imaginary’ seemed to dominate the Tanzanian perceptions of borders. Borders were often discussed in terms of being the outer reaches of states, and the international system was therefore perceived as a mapped space having clear demarcations of what is ‘domestic’ and ‘international’. This demarcation of Tanzanian territory could be observed at the Kilimanjaro International Airport where a yellow line, surrounded by a large and visible work force, functioned as a divider of political space. Seemingly, the demarcation of territory also held major significance for the geopolitical order in the way the airport
generated a feeling of expense. For example, the notable investments in terminal security measures could be seen as mere attempts of portraying the airport as a worthy representative of the national borders.

Several respondents did also, during interviews, stress the national borders as foundational for Tanzanian national security. However, notions of what is ‘secure’ and what is ‘insecure’ were based solely on national origin which, in turn, is dependent on the border as a ‘tool’ that divides nationalities. So, the national border is once again dominant in the perceptions, but here as something drawing a line between the safe ‘inside’ and the unsafe ‘outside’, between Tanzania and the dangers of the outside world.

Perspectives on the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ could although be deconstructed and dismissed as non-coherent. As discussed, an outside ‘threat’ creates an inside subject which also is required to be ‘one’. For example, if Al-Shabaab ‘terrorists’ are to be seen as a coherent threat to ‘Tanzania’, then, this subject of security must also be defined as united. But as stated by several respondents, this was not case; the representatives of the borders, and thus representatives of the state itself, were not in any way united, but rather competitive and shattered. Still, it was argued initially that identities of neither treats nor subjects can be taken for granted. The ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ create each other and require each other to continue existing, but they can never be fixated or cemented. Identities are, instead, constantly moving and changing since they eventually are dependent on context, and in extension, language.

For the same reasons, the issue of illegal immigration, which is perceived by several respondents as the most crucial, could also be dismissed as non-coherent. In this sense, the identity of a Somali ‘immigrant’ is dependent on the existence of the ‘transit-country’ of Tanzania. Tanzania can although only be defined by the territory it is provided by concept of national borders. Without them, immigrants would not exist; they would have no demarcated territory of origin, and no demarcated territory to immigrate into. In conclusion, we can therefore see that all perceived ‘outside’ threats to Tanzania are dependent on the concept of borders.

- How can biopolitical interventions in Tanzania be connected to attempts of increasing national security?

By observing the roadblocks, as substantial forms of biopolitical interventions, they could be seen as an intrusive representation of the abstract form of state power. The phenomena of roadblocks became concrete examples of Tanzanian instruments of ‘governmentality’, where the active and mobile authority essentially created a form ‘border’ wherever selective controls
were to be found. Roadblocks could also be clearly connected to the idea of the biometric border, where moving bodies were measured and evaluated by authority as ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’, and where the border itself functions as more of an authoritative social sorting process. Actually, according to Tanzanian drivers, the biopolitical interventions should be seen as a mere exercising of authority, rather than something motivated by notions of increasing national security. The roadblocks were seen as sites hindering free movement, and as sites creating a social power-play between the police and the drivers where the latter is required to obey and subjugate to authority.

Ultimately, though, the roadblocks were also seen as highly expensive elements along the roads. The corruption within traffic security was regarded severe, and the collecting of bribes was even argued to be one of the ‘hidden purposes’ of the roadblocks. This aspect of money does not only affect the Tanzanians private economy, but it does also affect how notions of security are assessed. With the standard fee of around 3000 Tanzanian shillings, anyone could be evaluated as ‘safe’ and allowed to pass the checkpoint. Money, or the ability to bribe, could therefore be seen as the main variable in assessments of security.

Moreover, attempts were made of deducing homo sacer in Tanzania. Refugees were argued to approach authority at the biopolitical interventions as bare life, as ‘outlaws’ without a political identity, thus, without legal rights of staying in the country. Instead, the bare life ‘on the run’ had to take the roles of ‘bandits’; hiding in lorries and avoiding traffic security when travelling through the transit-country of Tanzania. However, even bodies stripped of legal rights and political identities managed to find ways of being assessed as ‘safe’. Examples were told of how refugees at several recent occasions had bribed traffic security in order to pass as ‘safe’ and get an escort. Hence, when refugees could buy their way from being bare life to becoming qualified bios, they also showed how biopolitical interventions like roadblocks essentially are non-functioning instruments for increasing national security. Once again, money turned out to be the main variable in assessments of security.

Still, there is some belief in biopolitical interventions as instruments of increasing national security, potentially efficient for protecting Tanzanians from the refugee ‘threat’ of ‘outsiders inside’, but the optimism is at the same time clouded by the issues of corruption. As previously put, ‘security’ clearly has differing meanings, it can be determined by both the value of money and by matters of life and death, and this shows how it all ultimately is about assessment.
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