Making Borders

Engaging the threat of Chinese textiles in Ghana

Linn Axelsson
The borders of the twenty-first century come in many forms and are performed by an increasing number of actors in a broad variety of places, both within and beyond the territories of nation-states. This thesis sets out a detailed political geography of how borders operate to reconcile the often conflicting demands of open markets and security. Focusing on Ghana, where there is a widespread fear that the inflow of Chinese versions of African prints will lead to the collapse of the local textile industry, the study explores where and when borders are enforced, who performs them and what kinds of borders are enacted in order to maintain and protect the Ghanaian nation and market without compromising the country’s status as a liberal economy. It combines interviews and documentary sources with analysis drawn from border, security and migration studies to explore three sets of spatial strategies that have defined the Ghanaian approach to the perceived threat of Chinese African prints. They are the institution of a single corridor for African print imports, the anti-counterfeiting raids carried out in Ghana’s marketplaces, and the promotion of garments made from locally produced textiles as office wear through the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. These strategies stretch, disperse and embody the borders of the state or nation to control trade in ways that resolve the fears of both open flows and closed borders. This thesis thus seeks to show how a geographical analysis can clarify the specificities of how borders now work to control mobility. In doing so, it not only unsettles conventional assumptions about what borders are and where they are supposed to be located, but also the idea that borders primarily are used to constrain the mobility of certain people while facilitating economic flows. Furthermore, this thesis adds to the understanding of the variety of responses to the inflow of Chinese consumer products to the African continent.

**Keywords:** borders, political geography, smuggling, intellectual property, national dress, Ghana, textiles, China-in-Africa.
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In November 2006, Ghanaian newspapers carried the announcement of a boycott of something that had become an increasingly common sight in Ghana’s marketplaces: Chinese copies of the African print.¹ This boycott – which was called for by Ghanaian traders’ associations from across the country at a public forum on the impact of services liberalisations on traders organised in Ghana’s capital, Accra – was in response to the recent increase in Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian market. According to the traders, these prints were “smuggled through Togo into the country” (Adadevoh 2006, 27th November:9) and carried “the designs of Ghanaian cloths […] to let them appear like Made in Ghana cloth” (Orhin 2006, 27th November:n.p.) and they, it was claimed, had subsequently pushed the traders’ businesses to “the verge of collapse” (ibid.). A textile dealer from Takoradi in Western Ghana, who appeared before the audience in a well-designed dress made from locally produced African prints in order to emphasise the importance of supporting Ghana’s textile industry, rallied other traders to join the association leaders in their boycott (Adadevoh 2006, 27th November:9). This intervention would not only protect the traders’ jobs in the commercial sector, but also “the jobs of our brothers, sisters and children who work with the local textile factories”, the trader stated (Orhin 2006, 27th November:n.p.).

The traders’ call for a boycott is significant to this study because it is symptomatic of a widespread fear that the influx of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market will lead to the collapse of the local African prints industry and, the loss, not only of employment opportunities in the industry and in the textile trade and distribution, but also of the values and aspirations vested, so to speak, in this symbolically charged object. More pointedly, in Ghana, the threat that the Chinese African print represents extends beyond the pure economic as it goes right to the heart of the symbolic significance of this object. Thus, it was not only in the interests of Ghana’s textile workers and traders that the local textile industry stayed in production. Rather, as a

¹ The African print – the object at the centre of the Ghanaian protest against the inflow of Chinese textile products to the Ghanaian market – has deeply rooted economic and symbolic values. Originally produced by European companies for West African markets, over the course of decades, the African print was incorporated into West African patterns of consumption and is now considered an “‘authentically African’ object” (Sylvanus 2007:204).
representative of one Ghana’s textile companies asserted, “the whole nation stands to gain if we are able to flush out the fake garment from the country” (as quoted in Opare 2006, 31st August:n.p.). Nor was the threat simply felt by Ghana’s textile traders. The presence of the Chinese African print also mobilised textile companies, trade unions and textile workers, the Ghanaian press and even leading politicians. In 2009, for instance, Ghana’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Hannah Tetteh, announced that “[w]e in the Ministry believe that the Ghanaian textile companies concerns are legitimate and need to be addressed. We think it important to give opportunities to Ghanaian cotton farmers, create more opportunities for Ghanaian textile manufacturers and designers to create beautiful Ghanaian products and protect Ghanaian jobs” (Tetteh 2009a:n.p.).

The traders’ boycott was thus the latest move in a wider set of issues that involved the Chinese African print, and which would have consequences far beyond the traders’ immediate concerns. Indeed, the perceived threat of the Chinese African print, as noted above, engaged a broad range of actors in Ghana and would translate into a number of strategies that, in different ways, sought to intervene against the presence of the ‘alien’ print in Ghana. This thesis is about the construction of the threat that the Chinese African print represents to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation, and how political geography can help us understand how Ghanaian actors have engaged that threat.

At the same time, I should stress that I do not wish to imply that all responses to various forms of Chinese presence in Africa are best understood in terms of discontent and resistance. In fact, some Ghanaian traders, as well as traders from other West African countries, actively engage in, rather than work against, the trade in Chinese products in Africa (see e.g. Axelsson and Sylvanus 2010; Haugen 2011; Li, Ma and Desheng 2009; Lyons and Brown 2010; Lyons, Brown and Li 2008; Mathews and Yang 2012; Mohan and Lampert, forthcoming; Sylvanus 2008a, 2008b). The presence of the Chinese

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Footnote: For an overview of African responses to the increasing Chinese presence on the continent that explores some of the complexity and diversity of these responses, see Alden (2007:59-92) and Mohan and Lampert (forthcoming). It should also be noted that the responses to the presence of the Chinese African prints in Ghana are complex. While certain state actors, textile company representatives, business organisations, trade unions and segments of Ghana’s textile traders, as discussed above, express concern about the presence of the Chinese African print in Ghana, the intentions of other actors are more difficult to gauge. For one thing, there are the traders who actively engage in the Chinese African prints trade in different ways, and Ghana’s low-income earners for whom the cheaper Chinese African print may represent an opportunity to consume a product they could otherwise not afford. Further, in early 2007, the then-Minister of Presidential Affairs, Kwadwo Mpiani, who was the chairman of the Ghana@50 Planning Committee, admitted to having engaged a Chinese textile manufacturer to print the jubilee cloth, which was to mark the celebrations of Ghana’s 50 years of independence (Safo 2007, 26th February:a:1-2; 2007, 26th February:b:2). This demonstrates that even the responses of Ghanaian state actors to the availability of cheap Chinese textile products are contradictory.
African print on the West African market, for instance, is thus partly the outcome of local traders’ ‘go out’ policy, rather than China’s (cf. Sylvanus 2008a).

Rather, my point is that it is important to engage critically with the strategic responses of the critical voices of African governments, civil society and private sector actors. For while fragmented evidence suggests that discontent has arisen among segments of African populations across the continent who see themselves as negatively impacted by various forms of Chinese presence, the case of South Africa’s quotas on Chinese textile products aside (see e.g. Naudé and Rossouw 2008), it has generally not been explored whether and, if so, how these concerns are turned into strategic acts intended to deal with a situation that has been identified as harmful.

The approach to the Ghanaian response to the inflow of Chinese products that I adopt in this thesis is one that focuses on the construction of a Chinese threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation. For me, this implies the need to take an interest in not whether the presence of the Chinese African print actually has caused the decline of the Ghanaian textile industry, but rather in how Ghanaian textile or state actors, for instance, perceive that the inflow of Chinese African prints impacts on the Ghanaian textile economy. Within the context of this study, it also requires us to try to understand what Ghanaian textile or state actors do, provided that they believe that this impact is, in fact, harmful. Thus, my point is this: if we wish to understand Ghanaian responses to the inflow of Chinese products, it is not necessary to know what the ‘real’ impacts of these trade flows on the Ghanaian textile economy are so long as we recognise that the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and that the responses to the inflow of Chinese African prints to the market are consequential. Indeed, this thesis will show that

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Ghanaian actors, such as trade unions that organise textile workers, do not wait for the economists’ ‘objective’ assessment of the real impacts of Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian textile economy to act. If they perceive that the inflow of Chinese products impacts negatively on the Ghanaian textile economy, they respond, with force, in ways they think will save the local industry.

This is not to deny that textile and clothing industries have declined in a host of sub-Saharan African countries, including Ghana, and that jobs have been lost. I merely wish to propose that there is room for alternative approaches to contemporary academic debates about the role of Chinese textile products in Africa that move beyond what may be captured by econometric models or political economy analyses to focus on how a Chinese product is constructed as a threat and on the consequences thereof in terms of the strategies enforced to deal with its presence. Thus, in contrast to earlier work on the import quotas on Chinese textile products in South Africa, for example, my aim is not to assess the impacts of Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian textile industry or the efficiency of the strategies adopted in Ghana. Instead, this thesis does something different: it uses insights from critical border, security and migration studies to take a close look at the responses to the Chinese African print in Ghana as political strategies in their own right.

More to the point, the responses to the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print that I wish to foreground in this thesis, and which are engineered in close relationship with the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in certain ways, are what I call spatial strategies that work through borders to protect the Ghanaian market from the threat that the Chinese African print represents. This means that they re-shape borders (see e.g. Popescu 2012; Weber 2006) to make them appear not only along the outer edges of state territory, but also in locations prior to and beyond the territorial border (e.g. Amoore and de Goede 2008; Coleman 2007; Vaughan-Williams 2010), while engaging an array of state and non-state actors in “borderwork” (Rumford 2008). The central thesis of my argument is, thus, that our understanding of the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print and the spatial responses to its presence on the Ghanaian market may be furthered by a geographical analysis of borders.

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A question of borders

The line that separates one state territory from the next has long been a key field of enquiry in political geography. However, the border concept is currently being reworked in light of the increasing mobility associated with developments such as neoliberalism, globalisation and transnationalism, and, especially now, with the perceived new border security needs after the attacks of 11th September 2001. Recent developments in border studies, and related work in migration and security studies, demonstrate that the continued conceptualisation of borders as lines enclosing state territories may obscure, rather than clarify, our understanding of the mechanisms through which contemporary borders operate to control mobility. Thus, the outlook on borders as empirical-physical phenomena located at the edges of state territory is increasingly replaced by a focus on the border-making processes that construct certain people (or things) as ‘risk’ or ‘threat’, and others as ‘safe’ or ‘desirable’ (e.g. Amoore 2011; Squire 2011) and enact borders in locations other than at the territorial border.7

Regarding the latter, recent work on the border concept suggests, first, that borders are folded outwards, for example through the enforcement of immigration laws in international waters (e.g. Carrera 2007), or in the territories of other nation-states (Coleman 2007:620-625). This is a projection of border control outwards in space, which often implies an extension of border control in time (e.g. Amoore 2011; Amoore and de Goede 2008:175). In turn, this means that travellers are increasingly scrutinised before they reach the territorial border they hope to cross (e.g. Vaughan-Williams 2010:1073-1074, 1075-1077). At the same time, borders are folded inwards, and are dispersed across state territory, through the enforcement of immigration and anti-terrorist laws in a network of sites inside the territories of nation-states (e.g. Amoore 2007, 2009b; Rumford 2006). More than that, it is suggested that the increasing use of ‘smart-border’ technologies may result in embodied and “fully portable” borders (Weber 2006:35), which are carried inside the human body (Amoore 2006:341-344). These borders completely dissolve the preconceived relationship between state, territory and border.

Second, the enactment of borders in locations other than at the edges of territory often depends upon the engagement of an increasing number of actors in borderwork, including private economic actors and civil society representatives, as well as the state agents traditionally associated with the enforcement of the borders of the nation-state (e.g. Amoore 2007; Coleman 2009; Lahav and Guiraudon 2000; Rumford 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2008).

7 My placing of ‘risk’, ‘threat’, and similar terms in quotation marks is to mark that they are constructed conditions rather than natural categories. For the sake of the readability of the text, I will not put these and similar terms in quotation marks throughout. This is in no way intended to naturalise the sorting of people into these categories.
Combined, the above means, in Lahav and Guiraudon’s terms (2000), that borders are doubly displaced: from the border and outside the state.

Finally, a number of border scholars stress the need to explore not only the enforcement of state borders, but also the adoption of a more inclusive border concept (see e.g. Newman 2003; Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009). Indeed, political borders not only produce state territories. They also function as identity markers and are involved in the construction of nations (e.g. Donnan and Wilson 1999; Paasi 1996). Importantly, these identity borders and the mobilising force that the territorial ideology of nationalism offers (Storey 2001:72, 74), I argue, may be used in ways that resemble how state borders are used to protect certain spaces.

As pointed out above, these spatial and temporal shifts in the enforcement of border controls are closely related to the construction of certain people or objects as safe, or desirable, and others as threats, or undesirable (e.g. Amoore 2006). This thesis is thus concerned both with the constitution of the Chinese African print as a threat and the spatial strategies used to intervene against its presence on the Ghanaian market. From this, it follows that the first research question explored in this thesis may be phrased as:

**How is the Chinese African print constructed as a threat in Ghana?**

By construction, I here mean that the forms that the perceived threat of the Chinese African print take are not static or forever fixed. Rather, the Chinese African print is produced as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation in specific ways by Ghanaian textile and state actors. Equally, it is linked to the activities, movements and relations of the Chinese African print itself. To give an example, ‘smuggled’ is one of the forms that the perceived threat of the Chinese African print takes. This is a condition that the Chinese African print moves into when it enters Ghana without payment of the tariffs, taxes and fees that represent the costs of access to the Ghanaian market. The Chinese African print becomes smuggled at this moment because this is where and when it comes into contact with the trade and taxation laws drawn up by the Ghanaian state.

Smuggled is one of three variations of the perceived threat of the Chinese African print that I consider in this thesis, the other two being ‘counterfeit’ and ‘morally unjust’. Importantly, one or more of these three threat variations may be present in one and the same Chinese African print. More to the point, in a given situation, the Chinese African print may, for example, pre-

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8 Cf. Squire (2011), and also see Amoore (2006, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) and Amoore and de Goede (2005, 2008), on the sorting and encoding of people as risk based on their activities and associations.
sent itself as smuggled and in another situation as counterfeit and morally unjust.9

Further, the three variations of threat that Chinese African prints represent, I suggest, are linked to a set of circumstances, which come together in the Ghanaian context, and they involve certain places and activities. To explore this question empirically thus requires a focus on the activities, movements and relations that produce these distinct threats and on the agents involved in this process. Additionally, this means taking an interest in how the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust is in part informed by a combination of circumstances, including, for example, a long-term outlook on Ghana’s borders as porous, certain particularities of the Ghanaian African prints market and the historically rooted values of the African print and the textile industry in Ghana.

Importantly, the production of the Chinese African print as a threat in specific ways is relevant to the case explored in this thesis in that it transforms it into an object available to intervention. The interventions that I am interested in here, as pointed out earlier, are spatial strategies that enact borders to impose sanctions on the Chinese African print. Thus, the second question explored in this thesis is:

**How do Ghanaian actors enact borders to engage the perceived threat of the Chinese African print to the textile economy and nation?**

This question concerns the spatial responses to the perceived threat posed by the smuggled, counterfeit or morally unjust Chinese African print. They are: the establishment of a single corridor for African print imports; the anti-counterfeiting raids carried out in Ghana’s marketplaces; and the promotion of Ghanaian African prints as office wear through the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. These responses should be understood in the context of recent work on the border concept, which contends that the enactment of borders in locations away from the edges of territory by a broadened base of actors, as noted above, are linked to new security needs. Indeed, the purpose of these enforcement practices is often to facilitate the mobility of some, while imposing restrictions on others, such that products, capital and trusted travellers may move freely without compromising the

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9 I should point out that while this implies that we must understand the different variations of the object that is being ‘bordered’, this thesis does not seek to present an object-centred analysis of the Chinese African print as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation. Rather, it is the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in specific ways, and how these constructions are related to the spatial responses used to intervene against this threat that are the objects of study here. However, in political geography, it is widely recognised that to understand political interventions requires that we first look at how a problem is produced as a political object that may be intervened against (see e.g. Falah and Newman 1999; Larsen 2008; also see de Goede, 2012, on securitisation as a process that produces societal problems as objects of security).
security for those on the inside. Put another way, our fear of certain forms of mobility – in particular the mobility of the global poor and potential terrorists – and of restrictions on mobility produce a desire for a certain kind of border. This is a border that is “semi-permeable” (Wonders 2006); that is, a border that sorts between people and imposes sanctions selectively. Thus, sanctions are only imposed against those categorised as a threat or risk. In this thesis, I extend this discussion to include not only people on the move, but also moving objects. I will argue that, in the Ghanaian case, the fear of a foreign product – the Chinese African print – which is in conflict with the assertion that it is necessary to facilitate international trade, results in a desire for borders that control trade flows selectively.

Importantly, these shifts in border control do not necessarily imply that borders are everywhere (Balibar 1998) – although they sometimes seek to make the impression that they are ubiquitous – but rather, that they appear in very strategic locations (e.g. Mountz 2011a:65), where they are enacted by a variety of state and non-state actors. Put another way, and to draw upon Popescu, the practices documented by contemporary scholarship on border securitisation represent “non-linear” forms of control (2012:69, 82-83). Indeed, borders may take on a range of shapes; they may, for example, be embodied, or networked and dispersed. What is relevant is that they remain deeply territorial and often have as their aim to maintain the same old state territories (Popescu 2012:82-84; also see Walters 2006b).

This, in turn, means that border controls may appear in unexpected locations because they are strategically moved there. Equally, they may take on a range of shapes because they are made to do so. Thus, I should stress, my interest is not mainly in whether borders themselves are becoming increasingly mobile or appear in new shapes, but, rather, in how Ghanaian actors re-shape the borders of the state and nation and make them appear in various locations in their attempts to spatially respond to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print to the textile economy and nation. To elaborate, the construction of such mobile borders and the manipulation of their shapes may be looked upon as purposeful acts that perform borders strategically in a geographical sense or, in other words, as spatial strategies. To explore this question empirically thus means focusing on where, when and by whom the borders of the Ghanaian state or nation are enacted to engage the threat of Chinese African prints in Ghana.

10 See e.g. Johnson and Jones (2011) for a critical intervention on how a broadened border concept may result in the loss of analytical clarity. While this is a valid concern, taking my inspiration from Popescu (2012), I would argue that a broader border concept, which encompasses a range of non-linear forms of control, might bring new insights concerning the specificities of how contemporary borders are enacted. This is as long as we do not end up calling everything a border and instead keep the focus on how border-making practices are strategically enacted in a geographical sense.
Further, and in a similar vein to the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat, to understand how these spatial strategies unfold, we must consider them in their historical context. For me, this involves a need to explore how the current moment of crisis of the Ghanaian textile industry is mediated, for example, through Ghanaian discourses on smuggling, border porosity and profiteering by manipulation or circumvention of the Ghanaian state or through the combined effect of de-regulation of the global textile trade and liberal economic policies that swept across Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. These are events that, in the first instance, had nothing to do with the Chinese African print. Rather, these discourses become intertwined with and contribute to the particular forms taken by Ghanaian strategies to deal with the perceived threat of the Chinese African print.

Aims of the thesis

This thesis seeks to intervene in political geography and the growing body of research on the border concept by presenting an in-depth empirical illustration of the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and how the borders of the Ghanaian state and nation are mobilised in multiple ways to engage this threat. In so doing, it also adds to the understanding of the variety of responses to the flows of Chinese consumer goods to the African continent. I press the claim that our understanding of the perceived threat that the Chinese African print represents and the spatial responses to its presence on the Ghanaian market may be furthered by a geographical analysis of border-making through three related lines of argument.

First, I advance the argument that the Ghanaian response places the threat of the Chinese African print in certain ways. This means that the smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust variations of the perceived threat of the Chinese African print are at once the outcome of a set of circumstances, which come together in the Ghanaian context, and are produced both by Ghanaian textile and state actors as well as through the activities, movements and relations of the Chinese African print itself. Further, the three forms of the perceived threat of the Chinese African print that I consider in this thesis translate into certain interventions. That is, the construction the Chinese African print as smuggled justifies the single import corridor. The construction of the Chinese African print as counterfeit results in the anti-counterfeiting raids in Ghana’s marketplaces. And, finally, the construction of the Chinese African print as morally unjust provides the motivation for the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes.

Second, my aim is to provide new empirical and analytical insights about how borders are enacted in response to threats that come from (the ‘wrong’ kinds of) mobility. Indeed, while considerable advancements have been made in geography and related disciplines towards furthering the under-
standing of how contemporary borders increasingly are about movement rather than fixity, Mountz has argued that there still is the need to “understand with precision where and how borders are moving” (2011a:65). This thesis, thus, seeks to draw out the specificities of the mechanisms through which contemporary borders operate to engage the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print. To draw upon Lahav and Guiraudon (2000), I will show how borders in the Ghanaian case are three times displaced – first, from the edges of territory; second, from central state actors; and, third, from state borders – to allow non-smuggled and non-counterfeit Chinese African prints to be traded on the Ghanaian market, while, at the same time, imposing restrictions on the trade in those African prints identified as a threat. These displacements are both enabled by and make the border take on non-linear shapes. That is, the spatial strategies used in Ghana to respond to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print not only displace borders three-fold, but also enact the borders of the state and nation such that they are stretched into the shape of an import corridor; are dispersed across state territory to form a networked border that tries to make itself appear ubiquitous; or become embedded in the African print to construct an embodied and fully mobile border. What is more, these interventions, which displace and re-shape borders, activate the three distinct threats of the Chinese African print. From this, it follows that, if we are to understand the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print in Ghana and the spatial strategies used to respond to its presence on the Ghanaian market, we must explore not only these processes individually, but also consider how they work in conjunction.

Combined, the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in certain ways and the spatial strategies used to intervene against its presence represent the critical Ghanaian voices that oppose the influx of smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust African prints to the Ghanaian market. Thus, finally, I want to reaffirm the importance of making African agency central to on-going academic debates about Chinese presence in Africa. Indeed, as pointed out by Mohan and Power, “[t]here is an urgent need to listen to what Africans themselves are saying about China’s influence in Africa” (2008:26; also see Mohan and Lampert, forthcoming, for a comprehensive account of African agency in relation to various Chinese partners). The agency that is the focus in this thesis, as noted above, is of a particular kind. To clarify, this thesis is concerned with the policy and non-policy responses to a form of Chinese presence that has been constructed as a threat in Ghana. Specifically, I want to suggest that, while there has been a tendency to label the concerns raised by African populations about increasing Chinese presence as anti-Chinese (see e.g. Dobler 2008b, 2009:717-724; Harris 2010:216-217; Marfaing and Thiel 2011; Park 2009:11-12), if we take a closer look at these critical voices from across the African continent, such as through the lens of the border concept, we might discover that the complexities of these re-
sponses are better framed as contextually mediated constructions and strategies that are rooted in the places where they emerge. As such, this thesis extends the argument, implied in the work of a handful of scholars, that the way the ‘China-question’ unfolds, in one way or other, is deeply embedded in the local historical context. For example, Bourdarias’s study from Mali has suggested that local encounters with Chinese entrepreneurs may result in the reassessment of one’s own society (2010:273-274); the Zambian case has illuminated that ‘China’ may be constructed as a threat and used to serve internal political purposes (Larmer and Fraser 2007:613, 627-629); Giese and Thiel’s work in Ghana has suggested that diverging culturally grounded expectations may explain conflicts arising between Ghanaian employees and their Chinese employers (2012); studies of Chinese traders in Dakar, Senegal, have shown that the Chinese presence may bring to the surface underlying conflicts between societal groups within an African country (Dittgen 2010:9-10; Scheld 2010:162-167); and, finally, Liu’s study from Accra, Ghana, has suggested that if the Chinese traders that retail in the trading areas in central Accra appear threatening this is because of the low-quality products that they sell, and the fact that they do business in a space of great historical, cultural and economic significance in Ghanaian society: the marketplaces (2010:192-193).

Thus, contemporary events, including the organised protests against Chinese traders in Dakar (Dittgen 2010:8-9; Scheld 2010:162-167), Lomé (Sylvanus 2008:17-18), Kampala (Lee 2007:33-37), Lagos (Mohan and Lampert, forthcoming) and Accra (e.g. Ghana News Agency 2007, 14th November),

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11 It is relevant to note that the Ghanaian case differs from the cases presented in these studies in at least one key respect. If the responses that are labelled as anti-Chinese predominantly are directed against Chinese people, the Ghanaian responses place the perceived threat of a Chinese product, which is a copy of a highly significant object in Ghanaian society, at the centre. Overall, what has disconcerted some of Africa’s traders are the business practices of Chinese entrepreneurs in the commercial sector, including violations of local laws, the poor quality of the products that they sell, and their entry into a sector of the economy, commerce, and place, the markets, which are of considerable historical, cultural and economic significance in a host of West African societies (e.g. Carling and Haugen 2008:334; Dittgen 2010:6, 9; Dobler 2009:717-718, 721-722; Gadzala and Hanusch 2010:15; Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2007:18-19; Liu 2010:192-194; Lyons and Brown 2010:779; Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009:596; Park 2010:462-464). Also see Esteban (2010) for a further example of the role played by the local context. Based on interviews in Equatorial Guinea, Esteban suggests that perceptions of the Chinese presence hinges upon former relations between China and the African country in question (the longer the contacts, the more positive the attitude toward the Chinese presence). Equally, Esteban’s study illustrates the role that the local economic context plays in shaping African populations’ perceptions of the Chinese presence. In Equatorial Guinea, the commercial sector is dominated by foreigners. Consequently, the entry of Chinese migrants into the commercial sector has generated little response. Instead, it is the entry of Chinese workers into the highly significant agricultural sector that has been the focus of public debate in Equatorial Guinea (Esteban 2010).

12 The 2007 protest in Accra did not specifically target Chinese traders. Based on section 18 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act 1994, which states that retail trading in marketplaces is an economic activity and space reserved for Ghanaian nationals, the Ghana Union
for example, could perhaps partly be read as continuations of earlier contestations over the foreign presence in the commercial sector, rather than simply as a reaction to the particular origin of these traders.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, just as China-Africa relations are not new (see e.g. Large 2008; Mawdsley 2007; Snow 1988), nor are contestations over the commercial sector on the African continent. At independence, the new notion of national citizenship was used to exclude foreigners from access to certain economic and political spheres in several countries across the continent (e.g. Akyeampong 2006; Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2008; Peil 1971, 1974; Young 2008). At the time, access to the mercantile sector was frequently the focus of recurring confrontations between citizens and non-citizens in both East Africa and West Africa (see e.g. Garlick 1971; Gates 1998; Gregory 2003; Jamal 1976; Mangat 1969).\textsuperscript{15}

In a similar way, I would argue that certain historically significant events in Ghana, including old fears about border porosity, for instance, and more recent fears concerning the westernisation of Ghanaian dress, are active in shaping both contemporary constructions of the Chinese African print as a threat and the spatial strategies used to respond to the threat that this cloth represents. Moreover, the strategies explored in this thesis are not primarily directed at the Chinese African print. Rather they seek to address three forms of threat – the smuggled, the counterfeit and the morally unjust. Chinese African prints becomes subject to border-asserting responses because they are perceived to carry these three variations of threat more often than other (foreign) African prints.

This is not to deny that preconceived ideas about Chinese actors engaged in the manufacture or trade and distribution of Chinese copies of the African print exist in Ghana. In terms of the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and the spatial strategies enacted in response to its presence, however, other factors may be of greater significance. Put differently, it is not so much the presence of the ‘stranger’ itself – the Chinese African print – that appears threatening to Ghanaian state and textile actors, but rather what the stranger represents as a threat in this particular setting.

That said, I should stress that several of the circumstances that place the Chinese African print in a position to threaten the textile economy and nation are beyond the immediate influence of both Ghanaian and Chinese actors. They include, for instance, certain global regulatory regimes and the

\textsuperscript{14} This question has also been raised by Park (see 2009:10). Also see Giese and Thiel (2012) on how the conflicts between Chinese employers and Ghanaian employees are not best understood in racial terms but as based in diverging culturally grounded expectations regarding the employment relationship.

\textsuperscript{15} Also see Aluko (1985), for an account of Nigeria’s expulsion of 3 million aliens in 1983, and Tangri (1993), for an account of the targeting of trading enterprises owned by foreign nationals, Chinese among them, in riots in Lesotho in the early 1990s.
structure of the global textile industry itself (see e.g. Kaplinsky and Morris 2008). It can be concluded from this that the responses to the inflow of Chinese African prints in Ghana are at once locally mediated and globally connected, and that the specific forms that these responses take, in part, may be explained by the combination of these circumstances rather than simply by the ‘Chineseness’ of the Chinese African print.

Structure of the thesis

Thus far I have introduced the research topic and presented the research questions that I seek to answer. In terms of structure, the thesis is in two parts. The first part situates the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print in the Ghanaian context (Chapter 2) and the Ghanaian case in the geographical debate on borders (Chapter 3). It then goes on to discuss the research process and the materials generated (Chapter 4). The second part of the thesis comprises three chapters and presents the empirical findings of the study. Each of the three chapters foregrounds a different process that constructs the Chinese African print as a threat in a certain way and produces a spatial strategy that responds to its presence on the Ghanaian market.

In Chapter 2, the focus is on the production of the African print and the textile industry as symbolically charged objects in Ghana, and by extension as something worth protecting against the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print. Moreover, I make the case that the combination of a range of factors – including changes to the regulation of the global textile market, the dismantling of protectionist trade policy regimes across Africa following the implementation of donor-driven structural adjustment programmes, and in-built problems associated with import substitution industrialisation – have enabled Chinese textile products to reach previously protected markets and threaten local textile industries. This allows me to argue that the perceived threat of the Chinese African print in Ghana is at once locally mediated and globally connected, and that, in light of the continued liberalisation of African markets, there is the need to respond to the perceived threat of uncontrolled trade flows in new ways.

In Chapter 3, I set out the geographical debate on borders to explore in detail the construction of certain people and things as a risk or threat, and others as safe or desirable, and the enactment of borders in new ways to deal with those that have been identified as a threat. The chapter foregrounds the recent shift in border studies which has opened up a new interpretation of what borders are and where, when and by whom they are enacted. This shift in border studies, in turn, allows for the border concept to be used to explore practices quite different from those that have previously preoccupied political geographers, including the construction of objects as threats and the strategic use of semi-permeable borders to intervene against the inflow of Chi-
nese African prints to Ghana. The chapter argues that we need to approach the responses that have emerged in Ghana as spatial strategies if we are to understand how geography is integral to the Ghanaian engagement with the perceived threat of the Chinese African print. This means looking at the increasing plurality of borders in terms of their shapes and locations and the actors they engage as purposeful acts that unfold spatially in different ways to maintain and protect an inside space from something that has been identified as harmful.

The final chapter in the first part of the thesis, Chapter 4, sets out the methodological strategy I adopted and discusses the process of undertaking research on African prints in Ghana. The chapter seeks to give a sense of how the materials upon which this study is based were constructed and how I interpreted them. In this chapter, I also make a few reflections concerning ethics, power and positionality in this research project.

The second part of the thesis comprises three chapters and presents the voices of the Ghanaian protest against the inflow of Chinese products to the Ghanaian market in terms of the borders through which they work.

In Chapter 5, the focus is on the constitution of the Chinese African print as smuggled and the establishment of a single import corridor for African prints in response to this perceived threat. Through an exploration of the moments of contact (or lack thereof) between the Chinese African print and the places, procedures, institutions and actors associated with the extraction of tariffs and taxes in Ghana, the chapter shows how some Chinese African prints become ‘legal’, while others are constituted as ‘smuggled’. The construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled, in turn, motivated a spatial strategy – the single import corridor – that stretched from the Ghanaian border outwards, to China, and inwards, into the south-eastern border zone, while it, at the same time, intensified the monitoring of African print imports along the outer edges of territory. Taken together, this allows me to argue that we may look upon the single import corridor as a spatial strategy that sought to intensify the line along the outer edges of state territory by stretching it to multiple locations both at and away from the territorial border to allow the trade in legal (Chinese) African prints while imposing sanctions against illegal (Chinese) African prints. The chapter also seeks to illuminate how both the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled and the single import corridor were mediated through a long-term Ghanaian debate about contraband trade, corruption in the Customs Service and a particularly contested boundary shared with Togo to the east, along with the liberalisations of the Ghanaian market.

In Chapter 6, I turn the attention to a different spatial response that was motivated by the same debate about the porous Ghana-Togo border. This response abandoned all attempts at enforcing the line along the outer edges. Instead, the focus is on the construction of the Chinese African print as counterfeit and how Ghana’s textile companies and one of its trade unions,
with the assistance of regional police services, took charge of border control in a way that folded the border inwards to a locale that has figured prominently in Ghana’s political history: the marketplace. As in the previous chapter, the focus is on the constitution of the Chinese African print as a threat in legal terms. In this instance, however, it is Ghana’s intellectual property laws – rather than trade and tax laws – that are used to construct the Chinese African print as inside or outside the law. The anti-counterfeiting operations in Ghana’s marketplaces, which sought to deal with the perceived threat posed by the counterfeit Chinese African print, not only moved the enactment of the Ghanaian border away from the actors traditionally associated with border control: the Customs Service. They also dispersed the border of the Ghanaian state to form a networked border that tried to present itself as ubiquitous as it struck against the counterfeit (Chinese) African print deep inside Ghanaian territory.

In Chapter 7, the focus shifts to the construction of the Chinese African print as morally unjust and how the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes are used to intervene indirectly against the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print. The chapter shows how the construction of the Chinese African print as morally unjust emerges from a specific lack in the Chinese African print – that is, it does not represent the values and meanings and the complex relations that the Ghanaian African print represents – rather than from its activities and movements. The National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes seek to resolve this perceived threat by expressing it in national identity terms and by imposing moral, rather than legal, sanctions against the Chinese African print. Understanding how this second policy of the Ghanaian state operates as a spatial strategy thus requires an analytical move away from the legal borders of state. While this response is similar to those explored in the previous two chapters in that it displaces and re-shapes borders, in contrast to the previous two chapters, it draws upon the identity border on the Ghanaian nation to resolve the problem of the Chinese African prints. It does so by embodying the border; that is, this strategy embeds the border in the foreign object – the Chinese African print (cf. Sassen 2006) – such that the cloth itself becomes a “mobile regulatory site” (Amoore 2006:337; also see Walters 2006b:197; Weber 2006). This, in turn, enables the Ministry of Trade and Industry to distribute and display the morally just consumer behaviour on the bodies of citizens who play strategic roles in Ghanaian society.

Finally, in Chapter 8, I summarise and discuss the main arguments of this thesis.
In the previous chapter, I proposed that the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana and the desire to intervene against its presence are locally mediated and globally connected processes. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to unpack some of the economic, geographical and historical circumstances that come together in the Ghanaian context and which, first, produce the African print and, by extension, the textile industry as symbolically charged objects, and, second, serve to place the Chinese African print as a threat. It begins by exploring the global relations involved in the construction of the African print – which originally was a foreign product on the West African market – as an “‘authentically African’ object” (Sylvanus 2007:204). Next, I look at how new values, which are both economic and symbolic in nature, were embedded in the African print around the time of Ghana’s independence in 1957. If these two first sections put us in a better position to appreciate what is at stake if the Ghanaian textile industry were to succumb to competition from Chinese textile products, in the final section of the chapter, I shift the focus to the combination of factors that have enabled Chinese textile products to outcompete African prints produced by Ghana’s textile companies in their own market. Here, my focus is on two concomitant trends: namely, the rise of China as the world’s largest exporter of textiles and clothing and the liberalisations that swept across Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, and which, in turn, have enabled Chinese textile products to access previously protected markets. Moreover, I link the current crisis of the Ghanaian textile industry to in-built problems associated with import substitution industrialisation and Ghana’s overall economic decline, which began shortly after independence.

**Becoming African prints**

[O]f all the cloths that have gone into West Africa, none has caused greater excitement in the markets, and none has earned larger profits for the merchants and the market traders, than the Dutch wax block. (Pedler 1974:240)

The African print – originally a European imitation of the Javanese batik and the object at the centre of the on-going Ghanaian protest against the inflow
of Chinese textile products to the Ghanaian market – is something far more than a piece of fabric or a colourful mode of dress. It is an object that embodies layers of meaning, meaning that has been constructed over the course of more than a century’s consumption and, later, production of African prints in West Africa, and which has been fostered by the complex global relations reflected in the African print (Clarke 1997:122; Sylvanus 2007:205). Thus, in order to understand what this object represents in Ghana and, by extension, why the Chinese African print appears so controversial in this context, a short introduction to the relations that turned the African print into a symbolically charged object in West Africa and Ghana in the first place is necessary.

First, however, I want to point out that while wax prints is the preferred term in Ghana’s marketplaces, in this thesis, I have chosen to use the term African prints. This is because the term African prints alludes to how this product originally was manufactured elsewhere but for an African market; because it may be used as an umbrella term to refer wax prints, as well as to the lower quality and cheaper alternatives, the fancy and java prints (Gott 2009:171, endnote 24), which were introduced to the West African market during the depression in the 1930s; and because African printed textiles is the official term used in documents produced by the Ghanaian government.

As alluded to above, the introduction of African prints to the West African market is not only a story about Ghana, but is in fact one that is deeply embedded in the history of global trade. According to Parthasarathi and

16 While commonly referred to as wax prints, resin had replaced wax long before the African print was born (Kroese 1976:12). Thus, wax prints are produced by the application of hot resin on both sides of a plain weave cotton fabric through the use of two identical engraved metal rollers. Next, the cloth is passed through an indigo bath, after which the design appears, in indigo, on the cloth. Next, the resin is removed from the cloth before additional colours are added, either through the use of machines or through hand-blocking with stamps onto the fabric (van Koert 2007:140-141; Luke-Boone 2001:65; Nielsen 1979:468, 476-477; Picton 1995:24; also see figures 5 and 6). The cracked lines and white spots typical of handmade Javanese batik are mimicked to make the finished product appear handmade (e.g. Robinson 1969:77). Since the amount of work put into the production of a wax print is one of the factors that determine its rank and price on the market, the wax block print – on which two additional layers have been added using the hand-blocking technique – ranks highest on the market, while the wax print – the cloth which has been passed once through an indigo bath – represents the simplest, and least expensive, of the wax printed cloths (see for instance Gerlich 2004:37; Gott 2009:158; Picton 1995:24).

17 The production of fancy and java prints is entirely mechanised; designs are applied on one side of the cloth using engraved metal rollers (Luke-Boone 2001:65; Nielsen 1979:468, 476-477; Picton 1995:24; Vlisco 2008-2012). The less demanding process associated with the production of fancy and java prints has served to position them below wax prints on the West African textile hierarchy (see Gerlich 2004:35-37; Picton 1995:24; and Nielsen 1979:481-482, for further accounts of production techniques used and the hierarchy of African prints on the Ghanaian market).

18 For an introduction to the global trade in cottons, see e.g. Inikori (2002) and Reillo and Parthasarathi (2009). For an introduction to the history of West African textile production and trade, see e.g. Kriger (2005).
Reillo, the scale of the production, consumption and trade in cotton textiles after 1500 suggests that cottons were “‘the first global commodity’” (2009:2). Up until the end of the eighteenth century, the bulk of the cotton textiles that were traded on the global market were of Indian origin, and Indian merchants controlled the trade in the Indian Ocean and the overland trade to central Asia and the Middle East (Parthasarathi and Reillo 2009:5-6). Only in the 17th century did European merchants enter the global trade in cotton textiles on a larger scale, primarily through the English and Dutch East Indian Companies. While the Dutch company specialised in intra-Asian trade, the English East India Company (EIC) soon dominated the Euro-Asian trade in cotton textiles (Prakash 2009:145). Yet the cottons brought to Europe by the EIC were not only destined for the domestic market, but were also intended for re-exportation (see e.g. Gupta 2009:281; Inikori 2002:430-431; Reillo 2009:281).

While the first European merchants to arrive in West Africa during the 15th century entered into existing regional cotton trade networks where they served as carriers (Inikori 2009:98-101), two centuries later, the large-scale seaborne trade would link West Africa to the global market in new ways. For one thing, it connected the trade in cotton textiles to the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Hodder 1980:205; Inikori 2002; Inikori and Engerman 1992; Klein 1990:290-291; Kriger 2009:106, 123). Moreover, it transformed West Africa, where cotton had been produced for centuries, into an important market, first, for Indian cottons, and then, beginning in the 18th century, for cottons produced in Europe (e.g. Reillo 2009:281-283). Indeed, Kriger (e.g. 2005, 2009:105-106), an authoritative source on the history of cotton textiles in West Africa, has suggested that Europeans could trade textiles, especially cottons, in exchange for gold, slaves, ivory and other commodities, because cottons were already in demand among West African consumers. They were so, Kriger continues, because they had been produced and traded in West Africa long before the arrival of Europeans (2009:107-125; also see Hodder 1980:204; Inikori 2009:89; Klein 1992:290-291).19 The gateway to the all-important West African market, as suggested in several works, was the Gold Coast (now Ghana), partly because of its position as a regional trade hub prior to the arrival of Europeans (e.g. Inikori 2009:93-95), and partly because of its rocky coastline, which enabled the construction of the fortifications needed to conquer the gold trade of the West African interior (Kroese 1976:22-34).

19 Although it is not known exactly when people in West Africa first began to cultivate and transform cotton into textiles, archaeological evidence suggests that at least two centres of cotton textile production existed in West Africa before the 15th century (Kriger 2009:107). After 1500, additional textile production centres arose around the Volta River, covering parts of present-day Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Burkina Faso, and present-day Benin and Nigeria (Kriger 2009:112-113).
If we are to understand the meanings and values that much later were to be embedded in the African print, we must also know that cotton cloth was a coveted product in West Africa long before the European textile trade; it indicated wealth, status and prestige and was used in rituals and ceremonies (Hodder 1980:205). Records also suggest that cotton cloth was used as currency in West Africa from around the 11th century (Kriger 2009:109; also see Johnson 1980). Equally, and this is highly pertinent to the argument pursued here, West Africa’s consumers were no passive recipients of European products. Rather, to trade cotton textiles in West Africa required Europe’s trading companies to study the market and adjust their products to suit the advanced tastes of West Africa’s consumers of cotton textiles (e.g. Robinson 1969:40, 76). This meant not only learning about West African aesthetics but improving on quality as well (Clarke 1997:112; Steiner 1985:93-95, 97-100). Indeed, it took the Manchester manufacturers until 1750 to reach the level of refinement needed to produce the high quality cottons that allowed them to compete with, and eventually displace, Indian cottons on the West African market (Clarke 1997:112-113; Robinson 1969:76; Steiner 1985:96).

The African print is the outcome of a similar European endeavour to capture another market: the Javanese (Clarke 1997:114; Nielsen 1979:474). Batiks from Java first appeared in Europe during the 17th century, when present-day Indonesia was under Dutch rule. Eager to develop new products to capture additional segments of the global textile market, Dutch, English and Swiss textile producers intently studied the Javanese designs and the techniques used to produce batiks (e.g. Robinson 1969:40; Steiner 1985). However, the industrialised version of handmade Javanese batiks that they presented to the Dutch East Indian (now Indonesian) market was rejected by local consumers (Clarke 1997:114). Thus, the Dutch firm Prévinaire & Co., which was the leading producer of machine-printed versions of the Javanese batik, refined its production techniques further (e.g. Clarke 1997:114; Kroese 1976:14-21; Nielsen 1979:474; Pedler 1974:242; Vlisco 2008-2012) before introducing the product to the West African market towards the end of the 19th century (e.g. Pedler 1974:242). The combination of the long-standing trade relationship between Europe and (certain parts of) West Africa that could be used to introduce new products and the popularisation of Javanese batiks on the West African market with the return of West African soldiers who served in the Dutch East-India Army between 1831 and 1872 (Kroese 1976:35-46) made this region the perfect market for Prévinaire’s product (Kroese 1976:21), where it, as noted by Frederick Pedler, became exceedingly popular (1974:240).

The literature suggests that the African print was successful on the West African market for a number of reasons. Its Javanese origins made it exotic (Picton 2001:159, as cited in Gerlich 2004:34; Spencer 1982:8); it was lighter than indigenous woven cloth and allowed for elaborate dress-making; and it was easier to wash than hand-woven cloth, an important quality in a tropi-
cal climate (Cordwell 1979:495). Yet, as noted above, West Africa’s consumers were not easily convinced by new products. Thus, the African print appealed to West Africa’s consumers ultimately because it was “reframed” (Sylvanus 2007:204). That is, it was reinterpreted and integrated into its new context, a process in which local actors played an active and creative role (e.g. Cordwell 1979:496; Nielsen 1979:465, 470; Picton 1995:25; Steiner 1985:93-95; Sylvanus 2007:208-210).

The European textile manufacturers’ first strategy when they entered the West African market was to simply copy patterns and indigenous cloth (Robinson 1969:77; Steiner 1985:98-99). In the long term, however, several adjustments were made to suit West African tastes. As noted above, these adjustments included improvements on the quality of the cotton base, since quality was one of the main attributes with which to compete on the West African market (Cordwell 1979:495; Johnson 1974:181-182; Steiner 1985:93-94). Colours, patterns and the size of a piece of cloth were also modified to reflect the local market (Cordwell 1979:495; Nielsen 1979:469; Spencer 1982:8; Sylvanus 2007:207-208).

Moreover, exchanges between the sites of production in Europe and the sites of consumption in West Africa enabled European producers to draw upon elements of indigenous cultural traditions, which they combined with Asian-inspired designs (Pedler 1974:241; Spencer 1982:14), in order to popularise their products. For the sake of brevity, the Asante, whose textile traditions are widely acknowledged, may be used to illustrate this. Indeed, what contributed to the eventual popularity of African prints on the Gold Coast market was the incorporation of West African objects and symbols, such as the Asante stool into African print designs (Nielsen 1979:481-482), and the integration of indigenous textile designs, specifically those associated with the kente and the adrinkra cloths (see e.g. Picton 1995:29; Sylvanus 2007:208; Gott 2009:150-151). Kente – probably the most widely known African cloth in the world – is made from hand-woven strips with intricate geometric designs, sewn together selvedge to selvedge (Aronson 2007:9-10; Luke-Boone 2001:86-87). Kente cloth is woven by the Asante (Ghana) and the Ewe (Ghana and Togo) peoples (see figures 1 and 2). In adinkra production, motifs are hand-blocked on plain cloth. Adinkra is commonly used for funerals and mourning (printed on a black, brown, red or purple background) or festive occasions/post-burial celebrations (printed on a white background) (Gillow 2001:18; Picton 1995:21-22). Each motif is associated with a proverb or axiom (Aronson 2007:12). It has been noted that adinkra motifs appeared on African prints around 1910-11 (Picton 1995:29).

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20 The Asante may be counted among the Akan peoples who occupy most of south-central Ghana (Yankah 1989:19).

Figure 1. Kente weaving in Ghana’s Volta Region. Photo: Ari Peskoe.

Figure 2. Kente-inspired African print by Akosombo Textiles Ltd. Photo: Michael Meinild Nielsen.
Further, in Asante society, colours are visual codes, which, combined with the quality, patterns, style of dress and the context in which the attire is worn, signal the bearer’s position in society or membership in a particular group (Gerlich 2004:73-78; Gott 2009; Spencer 1982:4). Thus, the ability to present to West Africa’s consumers the right colour combinations and designs that incorporated a range of visuals codes was crucial for the success of the African print in West Africa. Additionally, the practice of naming everyday objects using proverbs, idioms, maxims, legends or historical events (Gerlich 2004:57; Yankah 1989) was transferred to the African print and used to market this product in West Africa (e.g. Sylvanus 2007:209-210).

In Ghana, the African print has also become associated with (female) wealth in at least three ways. First, African prints have been accumulated by both men and women to indicate wealth and bank capital (Gerlich 2004:65-67; Gott 2009:157; Nielsen 1979:481; Spencer 1982:5). Second, since cloth traditionally was considered female property, and hence was not claimed by relatives when a husband died, an accumulation of wax prints became a means for women to become economically independent (Gott 2009:157). Finally, the African prints trade in itself was a source of female status and wealth, in particular among the costal Ga traders, who had controlled the trade and distribution of imported items, particularly of African prints, since the late 19th century (Sylvanus 2007:209). The large amounts of capital needed to enter the African prints trade and the sums that the traders in top positions earned placed the African prints trade at the top of a complex trading hierarchy (Gott 2009:157; Robertson 1984:99).

What is so significant about the transference of indigenous cultural traditions to the African print is that this implies that the African print could serve as a communicative medium (see e.g. Gerlich 2004; Gott 2009; Hodder 1980:205; Spencer 1982) and a way of accumulating wealth, much as cloth had done in West Africa for a long time. When the struggle for Gold Coast independence commenced, African prints had been part of West African society for at least six decades. Thus, it is probably fair to suggest that the African print, at this stage, had developed into a symbolic object in West Africa, and that it had been incorporated into West African textile traditions.

Up until now, the position of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in the global history of cotton textiles had been one of trade and of distribution throughout the West African sub-region. This was about to change on 6th March 1957, when Kwame Nkrumah – Ghana’s Prime Minister between 1952 and 1960, and President between 1960 and 1966 – dressed in garments from locally produced textiles, declared: “At long last, the battle has ended. And Ghana, your Beloved country is free Forever” (see e.g. Ghana@50 n.d.:n.p.). The birth of the new nation-state, I propose, would place the African print in new con-

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22 In this thesis, I have adopted Gott’s definition of cloth (ntoma) as a term that refers to kente, adinkra and African prints (2009:152).
texts, which, in turn, served to embed additional meanings and values in this object. Indeed, symbols, and the construction of shared meanings and memories are all crucial for the building of nation-states (Penrose and Mole 2008:275-276). Thus, in the next section, the focus is on the role of cloth, a category in which African prints may be counted, in the struggles for independence and in the construction of the Ghanaian nation-state that followed.

Symbols of Ghanaian independence

With growing nationalism in the Gold Coast during the 1940s and 1950s, the kaba – a three-piece outfit developed in the coastal areas during the 19th century by adding a European-inspired sewn blouse to the wrapped ensemble worn by many West African women at the time – regained its popularity among the Gold Coast elite, who commonly had dressed in Western attire during the colonial era. The kaba’s association with nationality meant that only cloth – namely, hand-woven kente, adinkra or African prints – was used for the kaba (Gott 2009:152-155). The importance of cloth as a symbol of the struggles for independence is further illustrated by Ghanaian and Nigerian ambassadors’ choice to dress in kente cloth when appearing amidst the international community in the late 1950s, to mark the transition from colonial to independent states (Akou 2004:51; Hess 2006:18; Ross and Adedze 1998:171).

Once independence had been won, ‘traditional’ arts, including textiles, became an important tool in nation-building processes. In Ghana, Hess (2006:16-17) proposes, Nkrumah actively worked to subsume regional cultural expressions and to redefine them as national. That is, kente was no longer to be seen as a symbol of the Asante or the Ewe, but of a shared, Ghanaian history. Moreover, Mohan writes, “[b]y wearing kente cloth, Nkrumah was projecting the idea that post-colonial Ghana had long-standing traditions based on complex and robust political institutions and, therefore, was fit to determine its own destiny free from the divisive paternalism of empire” (2008:285) This is perhaps the context in which we may understand Nkrumah’s presentation of four spectacular kente cloths as political gifts to the United Nations from the “‘government and people of Ghana’” (Ross and Adedze 1998:172).

Yet a degree of difference remained central to Nkrumah’s construction of the Ghanaian nation and state. Thus, Nkrumah, Mohan continues, not only wore kente, but textiles from different parts of Ghana, including the northern smock, so as to embody the multi-ethnic Ghanaian nation; that is, a nation that allowed for Ghanaians to hold multiple attachments. Thus, cloth (together with other forms of cultural expression) provided the means for the construction of a collective Ghanaian sense of attachment to the new territo-
ry, while still acknowledging the differences within the new nation-state (2008:285).

The African print, as just noted, had become associated with the kaba, the garment through which “national pride” (Gott 2009:155) increasingly was expressed in the years leading up to Ghana’s independence. At the 1957 Independence Ball, Gott writes, the kaba was frequently worn (ibid.), which, in turn, further accentuated the role of the African print as a symbol of Ghanaian independence. Equally, the printing of commemorative cloths – African prints that record special events and which often carry the message of the state – became an important tool in the hands of recently independent governments across the African continent. To construct a sense of national consciousness, belonging and loyalty towards the new state and territory, the colours of the national flag were frequently incorporated into the design of these cloths, as were the flag itself and the coat of arms, along with a map of the country. Photographs of the heads of state were other common motifs, as were the initials or slogan of the ruling party or the motto of the country (see figure 3). The use of commemorative cloths continues today. Independence anniversaries, the President’s birthday, significant accomplishments of the government, visits of foreign dignitaries, and single political issues have all been recorded on cloth (see figure 4). The printing of a cloth to celebrate the golden jubilee of Achimota secondary school, Ghana’s leading secondary school, which had educated most of the country’s leaders, is one example of an event which has been immortalised through the printing of a commemorative African print (see Spencer 1982:6-7, 16, 24-32). Equally, a commemorative African print was an essential part of the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of Ghana’s independence in 2007. Thus, while cloth is not the only symbolic object around which the Ghanaian nation and state were and are constructed, the foregoing analysis was intended to highlight some of the significant roles played by cloth in this process.

According to the Ghanaian government, however, political independence and a sense of identity and belonging were not enough to consolidate the new nation-state. Indeed, to become truly independent, the economic foundations for Ghana to become self-reliant must be laid. When Nkrumah declared Ghana independent on 6th March 1957, the Ghanaian economy had “a typical open economy structure” (Jebuni, Oduro and Tutu 1994:1163). At the time, import substitution industrialisation schemes, which sought to attract private investments by providing protected markets, were the preferred model for economic development across the developing world (Traub-Merz

23 The use of traditional arts to build new nations was certainly not limited to Ghana. National liberation leaders across the continent, as well as the new political administrations of independent African states, actively suppressed the ethnic identities previously used by colonial administrations to differentiate between African populations in favour of new territorial identities based on national citizenship in independent nation-states (e.g. Akyeampong 2006; Dorman et al. 2008).
Figure 3. Cloth commemorating Malian independence. The cloth shows President Modibo Keita and Malian territory. Photo: Tommy Miller.

Figure 4. Cloth commemorating President Obama’s 2009 visit to Ghana. The cloth shows Ghana’s late President John Atta Mills, Ghana’s first lady Naarou Mills, President Obama and the US’s first lady Michelle Obama. Photo: Tommy Miller.
Thus, Ghana’s first Five Year Development Plan as an independent state, launched in 1959, stated that industrialisation through foreign investment was the desired developmental path for Ghana (Hutchful 2002:9-10; Jebuni et al. 1994:1163; Steel 1972:213). Surveys concluded that textile and clothing industries were among the industries that the Ghanaian government wished to see established in Ghana.

Given the symbolic significance of the African print, it is hardly surprising that a range of West African governments saw the production of African prints as an important expression of self-reliance. The steep increases in import tariffs on printed textiles in 1956, while tariffs on other textile products were removed, are illustrative of the Gold Coast administration’s desire to have wax prints produced in Ghana (van Koert 2007:13-19; also see Spencer 1982:8). Once independent, the Ghanaian government’s ambition to develop Ghana through foreign investment was to motivate the introduction of additional barriers to trade. In 1961, for instance, the Ghanaian government introduced quantitative restrictive measures on imports, exchange control and import licensing (e.g. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1992:9; Jebuni et al. 1994:1163; Steel 1972:221-222). Additional increases in import tariffs in the early 1960s resulted in a drop in exports of European African prints to Ghana (van Koert 2007:18; also see Steel 1972:219).

Importantly, these trade barriers would convince several European actors on the West African market – including the United Africa Company (UAC), the leading importer of printed cottons to West Africa at the time; Unilever, which had taken control of the Dutch companies that produced African prints in the early 1960s; and the Calico Printers Association Ltd. – that relocation to or investment in textile industries in Ghana was a necessary move in order to escape escalating tariffs and to maintain control over the African prints market (van Koert 2007:12-30). Thus, African prints, which until now exclusively had been produced in Europe, were soon to be produced in a range of West African countries, Ghana included (Picton 1995:29). The producer of the most prestigious of all African prints at the time – P.F. van Vlissingen & Co (Vlisco), which had purchased Prévinaire & Co’s machinery when the company closed in 1917 (Kroese 1976:21; Nielsen 1979:474) – was to be involved in the set-up of textile factories in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Nielsen 1979:474). On 16th July 1964, the UAC (on behalf of the Anglo-Dutch-African Textile Investigation Group) and Unilever signed an agreement with the Government of Ghana for the first factory to produce African prints outside Europe: Ghana Textile Printing Company Ltd. (GTP). Two years later, the production of fancy and java prints commenced in the brand-new Ghanaian industrial town of Tema. It would be another two years before the knowledge about how to produce wax prints was disseminated to the factory in Tema (van Koert 2007:10, 13-20, 45-47, 50-51, 107; also see figures 5 and 6).
Figure 5. Production of wax prints in TexStyles’ factory in Tema. Courtesy of TexStyles Ghana Ltd.

Figure 6. Additional layers being added to the wax print using the hand-blocking technique. Courtesy of TexStyles Ghana Ltd.
Other main players on the West African textile market at the time included the Cha Textiles Group, established by Cha Chi Ming in Hong Kong in 1949, and the Basel Trading Company, which had long traded on the West African coast (Nielsen 1979:471, 6; also see Picton 1995:25-27). Beginning in 1964, the Cha Textiles Group established a host of textile factories in Nigeria (CHA Textiles Ltd. 2004). Likewise, the Basel Trading Company, which was linked to the Swiss textile manufacturer Hohlenstein, established textile companies in Ghana and Nigeria in the 1960s (Nielsen 1979:475-476). In Ghana, the Cha Textiles Group took over Hohlenstein’s shares in Akosombo Textiles Ltd (ATL) when the Swiss firm collapsed (Gerlich 2004:48, footnote 11).

As African print factories were established in Ghana and West Africa, the production of African prints in Europe decreased significantly. Most factories in Europe closed shop, eventually leaving only Vlisco in the Netherlands and A. Brunnschweiler & Company Ltd. (ABC Wax), which had produced wax prints in Hyde, outside Manchester, England, since 1908 (ABC Wax n.d.; also see Picton 1995:29; Steiner 1985:92).

For Ghana’s part, the government’s ambition to assist foreign investors who wished to establish new industries in Ghana, and its introduction of policies that favoured domestic trade over international, transformed Ghana into a major West African centre for the production of African prints. Additional policy changes, including General Acheampong’s self-reliance programme (Rothchild 1980:467-472) and the prohibition of textile imports in the mid-1970s (Fosu n.d.:22), were to steer Ghana further away from the international market. Indeed, a study of the Ghanaian market during the mid-1970s concluded that nearly all African prints sold were produced by companies located in Ghana (Littrell 1977, in Gerlich 2004:49). These inward-oriented economic policies thus meant that Ghana’s position as the main hub for trade with Europe was lost. Instead Lomé, where the Togolese leadership had established a free port in the 1960s, and later Cotonou in Benin, took over as privileged entry points for European African prints to the West African market (Sylvanus 2008a:178).

For Ghana’s budding textile industry, on the other hand, the absence of competition on the Ghanaian market was initially positive. Subsequently, the textile industry came to play a significant role in terms of the employment opportunities provided as well as its contribution to the government’s budget. According to a report by a sub-technical committee on measures to save the textile industry in Ghana, appointed by the National Tripartite Commit-

24 ABC Wax was acquired by the Cha Textiles Group in 1992 (CHA Textiles Ltd. 2004). In 2005, the Cha Textiles Group re-located the production of ABC Wax’s standard wax prints to the ATL factory in Ghana, while keeping the production of Superwax and hand-blocked prints (wax prints at the top end of the African prints hierarchy) in Hyde (ABC Wax n.d.; also see Ghana News Agency 2005, 21st December).
the Ghanaian textile industry contributed 15 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 1970s (National Tripartite Committee 2005). At its peak, in the late 1970s, Ghana’s textile industry employed 25,000 workers in sixteen large-scale textile companies and 138 garment factories, which, at the time, represented 27 per cent of manufacturing employment in Ghana (Ampofo 2002; Kwami 1995:43; Quartey 2006:136). The textile industry not only provided a livelihood for the individual textile worker and his family, but also textile factories located in rural areas played additional roles in local communities. Juapong Textiles Ltd., for instance, established in 1968 to produce grey cloth for GTP, among others (interviews with representatives for GTMC, March 2010; ICU, October 2007), provided residents in the area with a school and a water system. By-products from the factory provided local women, who made pillows to sell from leftover cotton, with a livelihood (Joy Online 2005, 12th April; also see Accra Mail 2002, 25th September). Additionally, the cotton-based textile industries provided a large number of employment opportunities in the cotton industry (interview with ATL representative, March 2010).

Yet, the production of African prints was important, I argue, not only because of the employment opportunities it provided, and its contribution to the GDP, but also because it allowed Ghana to define itself as a truly independent nation-state. As I see it, the African print provides a focal point that links symbolic and economic values in a way that non-industrial textile products, including hand-woven kente or tie-dye, cannot (cf. Chalfin 2010a:134-135). Indeed, the African print allows for the construction of Ghana as a multi-ethnic yet unified nation and an industrialising nation-state on its way up the development ladder. From this, it follows that it is not only the casualties in terms of employment opportunities lost that the potential collapse of these industries represents, but it is also a threat to Ghana’s identity as a textile-producing nation-state and the dream of a future industrialised economy. Thus, the point I want to make is that, in the Ghanaian context, the African print embodies all the complex economic, geographical and historical relations discussed hitherto, and that it represents an array of eco-

25 According to Obeng-Fosu, tripartism in industrial relations was common practice in Ghana even prior to the first Industrial Relations Act, passed in 1968 (2007:139). The foundation for the formalisation of tripartism was laid in 1972, when the National Tripartite Committee (NTC) was established by the National Redemption Council and charged with setting the national daily minimum wage. Tripartism in industrial relations became even more pronounced under the presidency of Hilla Limann (1979-81). At present, the Labour Act of 2003 assigns the NTC statutory backing and broadens its responsibilities to include advising the minister responsible for employment on all labour-related issues, consulting with partners in the labour market on matters of social and economic importance, and implementing requests by the minister that will promote employment and further peace in the labour market. The Labour Act prescribes 16 members of the NTC, five representatives each from the government, employers’ organisations, and organised labour. The Minister of Manpower, Youth and Employment (MMYE) acts as its chairperson (Labour Act 2003, section 112-113; also see Obeng-Fosu 2007:107-108, 139; Hodges and Baah 2006).
nomic values and symbolic meanings that, combined, transform it into something worth protecting against the Chinese African print. For the individual who carries it on her (or his) body, it represents status and wealth (e.g. Gott 2009:157), or belonging and a means of expressing sympathy and solidarity at a funeral with those who have lost a family member (Gerlich 2004:73-75). Kept in her (or his) coffers, it represents capital (Gerlich 2004:65-67; Gott 2009:156). For the textile worker, it represents a regular income, and, at least before the industry declined, it earned the worker respect and a certain position in society (van Koert 2007:64). Likewise, for the trader who sells it, it represents economic independence and a means of providing for one’s family. Once it also represented a coveted position at the apex of a complex trading hierarchy (Clark 1994:316-318; Gott 2009:157; Robertson 1984:99). For the shareholders of Dutch, British and Ghanaian trading and textile companies, and the Hong Kong-based Cha Textiles Group, the African print represents profit (in good times at least), and for the Ghanaian state, it represents revenues that may be used to develop Ghana. Finally, and as noted above, the African prints and the textile industry were symbolically and economically important for the construction of the Ghanaian nation-state.

For the Chinese African print to threaten these symbolic meanings and economic values, however, it must be placed in the position to do so. This is the focus of the next, and final, section of the chapter.

The rise of China and the fall of the Ghanaian textile industry

In the 1950s and 1960s, textile and clothing production, which had propelled European industrialisation, began to shift from Europe and North America to Asia. This trend began with the displacement of North American and European products by Japanese exports. The rise of Japan, in turn, was followed by the re-location of textile and clothing industries to Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, which dominated global textile and clothing production in the 1970s and the early 1980s. In the 1990s, textile and clothing production migrated yet again, this time to China and South East Asia. These sequential shifts in the production of textiles and clothing are explained by the continuous search for countries with low labour costs (Gereffi 1999:4; Gereffi and Memedovic 2003:8-9).

The Western response to these developments was to establish a global regulatory regime – the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) – that would enable Europe and the US to restructure their industrial bases away from textile and clothing production before opening up their markets to textile products from low income countries (e.g. Kaplinsky and Morris 2006:7-8, 2008:259-261; McCormick et al. 2006; Morris 2006b:37). The MFA, which was
signed in 1974, served to diversify global textile production as Asian textile producers, who had exhausted their export quantities, established factories in other low-income countries, including a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Kaplinsky and Morris 2008:260; Morris 2006b:37; Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:20). This kind of foreign direct investment – “quota hopping” (Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:20) – was further intensified by the preferential market access granted to African countries under the EU’s Everything but Arms initiative, the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement and the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to include textiles and clothing in 2000 (Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:21-24; also see Gibbon 2003, for an account of the AGOA). The AGOA, for instance, resulted in the relocation of Asian textile and clothing factories to southern and eastern Africa in an attempt to gain preferential access to the US market (Brooks 2010:116; Zafar 2007:122). It could be argued, therefore, that these global regulatory regimes increased many sub-Saharan African economies’ dependency on textiles and clothing exports (cf. Ancharaz 2009:632).

While the MFA kept the textile and clothing sector outside the general rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, later, the World Trade Organization (WTO), it could not halt the rise of the Asian economies as the world’s leading exporters of textiles and clothing. The quotas on textile and clothing products it allowed Europe and the US to impose, however, succeeded in delaying these effects (Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:20). On the other hand, they also served to increase the competitiveness of Asian textile and clothing manufacturers as the MFA forced them to be innovative (Gereffi 1999:51). Thus, when the Uruguay round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1994 concluded that the MFA should be phased out during a ten-year period, China and other Asian producers stood to gain. Moreover, China was advantaged by the structure of the global textile industry itself. Without getting into too much detail, it can be said that price and volume are the main factors with which to compete on the global textile market and that China has a comparative advantage in both (e.g. Kaplinsky and Morris 2008:260). Thus, between 1990 and 2004, the value of China’s textile and clothing exports increased by 540 per cent, making China the world’s leading exporter of textiles and clothing (Kaplinsky and Morris 2006:4). This, development economists argue, has been consequential for both domestically-oriented and export-oriented textiles and clothing producers across the African continent, as noted in the introductory chapter.

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26 In 2004, the Ghana News Agency reported that a Chinese business delegation visited Ghana to explore the business opportunities that followed the country’s AGOA certification (2004, 4th June).

While these developments are relevant to the Ghanaian case – because they explain why Chinese exports appeared in great numbers on the global market at this particular time – if we are to understand the perceived threat of the Chinese African print to the Ghanaian textile industry, we must go back to the Ghana of the 1960s and the era of import substitution industrialisation. This is because the decline of the Ghanaian textile industry began long before the late 1990s, when Chinese African prints first appeared on the Ghanaian market.

At independence in 1957, Ghana’s economic future looked promising; the new nation-state’s per capita income was one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, its natural resources substantial, its physical, economic and social infrastructure in good condition, and its population well educated (Price 1984:164-166). As noted above, the Nkrumah administration’s approach to development was one that favoured import substitution industrialisation. This, Hutchful (2002) argues, should be understood in the context of the previous experiences of a number of economic distortions associated with the colonial-type trade economy, which the Gold Coast Colony effectively was. Thus, rather than remaining dependent upon the production of agricultural and primary commodities for exports to the volatile global market, Nkrumah’s vision for Ghana was that of a modern, industrialised society that provided its citizens with social welfare benefits. Substantial investments over a few years were to provide the “Big Push” (Hutchful 2002:9) needed to transform Ghana from an agrarian and primary commodity-based economy into the modern welfare state that Nkrumah had envisioned (Hutchful 2002:6-14). As discussed above, protective barriers to trade, including tariffs, import licensing, quantitative restrictions and foreign exchange control, were implemented to create the protected market that would attract foreign investment (e.g. Oduro 2000:170-172). When world market prices in Ghana’s main export commodities dropped, and the fiscal basis for Nkrumah’s

Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:17, 25). Most of the Chinese firms that had established textile factories in sub-Saharan Africa to circumvent the MFA, or to take advantage of the AGOA, either relocated back to China or succumbed to competition from competitors producing in China (e.g. Kaplinsky 2008:12; Tull 2006:471-472). As a consequence, sub-Saharan African clothing exports to the US fell by 26 per cent in the first two years after the MFA quota removal (Kaplinsky 2008:13-14). Textile and clothing exports from Lesotho and Madagascar fell by 14 per cent in 2005, while South African exports declined by 45 per cent. Employment in the textile and clothing industry declined accordingly: in Lesotho by 28.9 per cent, in Swaziland by 56.2 per cent and in South Africa by 12.2 per cent (Alden, Large and Soares de Oliveira 2008:12). The loss of sub-Saharan Africa’s export-oriented textile and clothing industries is seen as particularly destructive given the importance attributed to the textile and clothing sector, not only in theories of development, but also given the role the textile and clothing industry played in the rise of the Asian drivers (e.g. Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:10). The economic literature therefore warns that, in the medium- to long-term, Chinese products may threaten African development, leaving African countries locked in as primary commodity suppliers. Competition from Chinese products also impacts on Africa’s long-term inclusion into global commodity chains (Kaplinsky 2008:16-19).
reforms subsequently was eroded, deficit spending and foreign borrowing continued to finance the Big Push.

In 1966, when Nkrumah was deposed in a military coup, the model of development through import substitution industrialisation came to a halt. Decades of political and economic turmoil followed in Ghana, and subsequent governments, military as well as civilian, liberal as well as protectionist, all failed to restore the Ghanaian economy (Hutchful 2002:6-14; Tsikata 2007). By the latter half of the 1970s, Ghana was in deep crisis. The per capita income, which had been among the highest in Africa less than two decades before, had declined significantly; productivity had dropped in all sectors; inflation reached a staggering 116 per cent in 1977; the fiscal imbalances were, in Hutchful’s words, breath-taking; and the fixed exchange rate meant that the Ghanaian cedi was the most overvalued currency in Africa (Hutchful 2002:6-14; also see Aryeetey and Harrigan 2000:8-11). Additionally, a number of exogenous shocks to the economy, including severe drought; the return of more than a million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983; and a significant decline to the international terms of trade in the 1970s and 1980s, following the drop in prices of Ghana’s main export, cocoa; and the steep increases of the oil prices on the world market pushed Ghana further into recession (Fosu and Aryeetey 2008:55-56; Huq 1989:5, 24; and see Aluko 1985, for an account of the Nigerian expulsion of foreign nationals in 1983). Indeed, Ghana’s lowest growth rate of minus 12 per cent coincided with the oil price shock in 1975, and the inward orientation of the economy following the 1972 military coup (Fosu and Aryeetey 2008:38) led by Colonel I.K. Acheampong.

By the early 1980s, Ghana’s overall economic situation was so desperate that Ghana’s head of state, Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings, who had seized power twice through the use of force (in 1979 and 1981), signed a structural adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It is widely noted that Ghana was touted a model of structural adjustment after the implementation of the first two Economic Recovery Programmes (1983-1986, 1987-1990), which were followed by a brief but impressive recovery of the Ghanaian economy. The late 1980s and the 1990s, however, were characterised by large deficits, which were financed by internal and external borrowing, as well as money printing. The result was considerable depreciation, which eventually compelled the newly elected government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) to seek relief under the IMF and World Bank-sponsored Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in March 2001 (e.g. Hutchful 2002:57-66; Tsikata 2007:79; Youngblood and Franklin 2008:78; also see International Monetary Fund 2004).

It follows from this that if we are to understand the threat of Chinese clothing and textile products to the domestically oriented industries that were established across Africa during the first decades of independence, such as in Ghana, we must also take into account the 1970s oil price shocks, the adjoin-
ing foreign debt crisis and the subsequent implementation of structural adjustment programmes in Africa. To clarify, for African textile industries across the continent, the agreements signed with the IMF and the World Bank meant, among other things, that government subsidies were cut and that the trade barriers that had provided the incentives for the establishment of textile industries in a host of African countries gradually were phased out (Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:16). This, in turn, meant that the textile and clothing industries that up until now had been the sole operators on protected markets were to face global competition from textile giants such as China. Indeed, research on Sino-African economic relations shows that trade between China and Africa has increased significantly, in particular from 2000 onwards (e.g. African Center for Economic Transformation 2009; Broadman 2007, 2008; Haugen 2011; Oyejide, Bankole and Adewuyi 2009). According to Broadman, cotton fabrics represent the main Chinese export to Africa (2007:75, based on figures from UN COMTRADE, 2004). A host of West African countries, Ghana among them, along with Kenya and Tanzania in East Africa, have emerged as the main destinations for Chinese cotton fabrics (Broadman 2008:100). Thus, it is argued that, in countries with domestically-oriented textile and clothing industries, it is first and foremost the combination of the in-built problems associated with import substitution industrialisation (Traub-Merz and Jauch 2006:14-15) and the removal of trade barriers that has allowed China to access previously protected domestic markets and to outcompete domestic industries (Kaplinsky 2008:11-13). The Ghanaian case exemplifies this point.

As noted earlier, the textile industry in Ghana initially thrived on the monopolistic market that was created during the 1950s and 1960s to attract foreign investors. At same time, this lack of competition resulted in highly uncompetitive industries and Ghana’s economic crisis was to further reduce the Ghanaian textile industry’s competitiveness. The imported inputs needed for African prints production, including, for example, chemicals and dye-stuffs, were scarce, and the machinery outdated (van Koert 2007:66-68, 103, 105). Capacity utilisation went down to between ten and twenty per cent (Ampofo 2002) and all efforts went into getting products out to the market, while buildings and machinery were left to decay (interviews with representatives for GTMC, March 2010; TGLEU, November 2007).

For the Ghanaian textile industry’s part, the implementation of Economic Recovery Programmes in three stages meant that the protection of the domestic market from foreign competition, which Ghana’s textile companies had enjoyed for more than a decade, was phased out. Instead, import tariffs became the main policy instrument used to protect domestic industries (Oduro 2000:176-177; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1992:9). Even though tariff concessions were granted on inputs used by domestic industries, and import tariffs on textile products remained steep (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1992:9; World Trade Organization 2001:34-35),
during the 1990s, the Ghanaian market had been opened to foreign competition to a degree that the textile industry never before had experienced. Importantly, the quantitative restrictions and import licenses that had protected Ghana’s industries from foreign competition were removed at the same time as tariffs were lowered. The result was a flood of cheap imports, which many of Ghana’s industries, the textile industry in particular – weakened as it was by decades of political instability and economic crisis – were unequipped to handle (Hutchful 2002:82). Furthermore, this shift in economic policies in Ghana, as suggested earlier, coincided with the remarkable growth of Chinese exports of textiles and clothing, noted above.

Thus, by 1995, the once proud textile industry that had accounted for 27 per cent of manufacturing employment in the country during the 1970s employed a mere 7,000 workers, it operated at 10 per cent of its capacity and its annual output had been reduced by 65 per cent (Ampofo 2002; Quartey 2006:136-137). In the new competitive environment, producers of non-printed textile products were the first to succumb. African print producers proved somewhat more resilient, at least during a transitory period. One of the strategies adopted by several of Ghana’s textile industries was subsequently to close their labour-intensive spinning and weaving departments and to shift to the production of African prints using imported grey cloth (interviews with representatives for ATL; GTMC; Printex, March 2010; TGLEU, November 2007, March 2010). In other words, Chinese competition increased Ghana’s textile industries’ dependency on African prints production. Thus, when cheap Chinese versions of the African print began to appear on the Ghanaian market towards the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, the Ghanaian textile industry declined even further. At this stage, the remaining companies began to sound warnings about industrial collapse and by 2005, the workers employed by the Ghanaian textile industry had fallen to a mere 2,961 (Quartey 2006:136).

28 See e.g. Anon (1997, 29th April), Ghana News Agency (2004, 17th November), Ghanaian Chronicle (2003, 18th August), Ghanaian Times (2003, 22nd September), The Independent (2003, 21st November). The warnings about industrial collapse intensified as the situation for the Ghanaian textile industry deteriorated further during the second half of the 2000s (see e.g. Adadevoh 2006, 12th April; Boateng and Bonney 2010, 2nd February; Daily Graphic 2010, 3rd February; Dartey 2007, 16th January; Ghana News Agency 2006, 1st February; 2009, 24th March; Ghanaian Times 2005, 20th June; Joy Online 2005, 17th June; Okine, Sah and Lamptey 2005, 12th April:25; Public Agenda 2005, 24th September; 2006, 24th January). Overall industrial decline was the topic most frequently discussed in Ghanaian newspapers; industrial decline/collapse was the main topic in approximately 50 per cent of the articles included in the sample.

29 At the time of my final fieldwork in Ghana in 2010, four companies were still in operation: Akosombo Textiles Ltd. (ATL), TexStyles Ghana Ltd., Printex Ltd. and Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd. (GTMC). ATL is the largest of the companies with around 1,500 workers. TexStyles (former GTP), as discussed earlier, was the first company to take up the production of African prints in Ghana. To date, its hand-blocked wax prints are only out-ranked by those of Dutch wax print producer Vlisco. In the mid-2000s, the company reported
na’s textile companies, then, the rapidly increasing inflow of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market from 2005 onward represented the final blow to an already deeply distressed industry, which at this stage was highly dependent upon the African prints market for its survival.

These developments, which place the Chinese African print in the position to threaten the economic and symbolic values of the Ghanaian African print, together with the complex economic, geographical and historical relations which are embedded in the Ghanaian African print, I would argue, set the scene for the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to unpack some of the circumstances that serve to place the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana. Indeed, I have sought to illustrate that the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print partly emerged from the complex values and relations that are embedded in the African print, which make it so significant in Ghanaian society. Thus, the point of the first sections of the chapter was to illuminate that the Chinese African print not only represents a threat in strict economic terms. Instead, it is the combination of the symbolic threat to the Ghanaian nation and the economic threat to the textile economy that makes the Chinese African print so controversial in Ghana. These symbolic meanings and economic values of the African print, in part, explain the Ghanaian government’s use of quantitative restrictions and high tariffs, first, to attract textile industries, and, second, to protect those industries from foreign competition. Moreover, my intention in this chapter was to suggest that, on the one hand, the structure of the global textile industry and a de-regulated global textile market and, on the other hand, in-built problems associated with import substitution industrialisation and the African debt crisis – which compelled political administrations across the African continent to open their markets to foreign competition – have placed the Chinese African print in a position to threaten the Ghanaian African print. The inflow of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market became all the more detrimental because the Ghanaian

that it employed around 690 workers (National Tripartite Committee 2005). While both ATL and TexStyles have produced African prints since the very beginning, Printex and GTMC only entered the field of African prints during the second half of the 1990s. In 1997, the textile companies Spintex and Millet Textile Corporation merged into Printex and ventured into African prints production to escape Chinese competition in other textile products. In the mid-2000s, Printex employed around 300 workers (National Tripartite Committee 2005). Around the same time, GTMC closed its spinning and weaving departments and merged with its sister company and African prints producer, Tema Textiles Ltd. At the time of my fieldwork in 2010, GTMC employed a mere 130 workers and printed African prints only on commission.
textile industry had responded to these global economic changes by shifting its production to African prints.

These unique circumstances puts us in a better position to understand the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana and, in particular, the desire to intervene against its presence by imposing borders to protect the Ghanaian market. At the same time, the liberalisations of the Ghanaian market imply that quantitative restrictions on international trade or steep increases in import tariffs no longer represent viable options. Instead, interventions that can control trade flows in new ways are required. As noted in the previous chapter, the focus in border studies is increasingly on the spatial consequences of the competing demands associated with open borders and mobility, and, to the contrary, with security. Contemporary border scholarship thus suggests that new forms of border-making are emerging, which enact borders in a variety of locations and engage an increasingly broader base of actors to impose control on mobility selectively. This shift in border studies is the focus of my analysis in the next chapter.
3 Making borders to manage threatening mobilities

In this chapter, I return to the discussion from the introductory chapter about spatial strategies that seek to produce “semi-permeable borders” (Wonders 2006), and how these strategies are engineered in close relationship with the construction of certain people or objects as threats. The purpose of the chapter is to set out and critically engage with the geographical debate on borders by bringing it into conversation with the Ghanaian case. Equally, it is to outline how recent insights into the border concept may be drawn upon to explore the constitution of threats and the spatial strategies used to intervene against them. The chapter begins with a short overview of how borders have been studied in political geography and illuminates how contemporary border scholarship has rethought the border concept in ways that allow for it to be usefully extended to thinking about the case of Chinese African prints in Ghana. The chapter then discusses the role that the tensions between open borders and security, which are at the heart of the neoliberal economy, have played for the emergence of bordering processes that discriminate between categories of flows and selectively impose restrictions on mobility. Next, the focus is on how we may approach the construction of certain bodies and objects as threats, as well as how these constructions both translate into and are activated by the spatial strategies that perform borders in order to intervene against mobilities that have been defined as harmful. The final section of the chapter discusses how borders are enacted in locations at and away from the edges of state territory, and by a broadened based of actors, in order to produce the semi-permeable borders needed to resolve the conflicting fears of free flows and of fixity and stasis.

From lines at the edges to processes of bordering

As stated in the introduction to the thesis, borders have long been a key field of enquiry in political geography, and the origins and development of border/boundary studies have subsequently received a fair amount of attention (see e.g. Brunet-Jailly 2005:634-636; Diener and Hagen 2009; Donaldson and Williams 2008, Grundy-Warr and Schofield 2005; Häkli 2008; Kolossov 2005:607-613; Minghi 1963; Newman 2003, 2006a:174-176, 2006b:
For political geographers of the first half of the twentieth century, the boundary represented a line enclosing a specific territory: that of the modern nation-state. The focus of early boundary studies was on describing and mapping the establishment, evolution and morphology of these lines and on constructing typologies of different categories of boundaries. Hartshorne’s (1936) “Suggestions on the terminology of political boundaries”, in which he distinguished between political boundaries that were *anteecedent* (preceded human settlement), *subsequent* (adjusted to existing natural or cultural divisions), or *superimposed* (imposed by an external power), for example, has been frequently referenced (Hartshorne 1936; see e.g. Boggs 1940; Jones 1943, 1945, for alternative classifications of political boundaries). Insights such as these were converted into practical handbooks on how and where to define and mark out international boundaries (e.g. Jones 1943, 1945), in part with the purpose of avoiding future conflicts between nation-states over the boundaries that separated them (Minghi 1963:408).

Another generation of boundary scholars directed the attention towards the functional aspects of political boundaries; that is, they took an interest in trans-boundary flows and placed the interactions that took place across state boundaries at the centre of their work. The focus remained on the line encompassing state territory, but the boundary was no longer seen only as a line but as a space in its own right. That is to say, this shift in boundary studies extended the boundary in space to encompass a frontier zone (presently more commonly referred to as a borderland) that stretched several kilometres into the territories of each nation-state (cf. House 1980:458-459; Minghi 1991). More than that, the boundary was now seen as something that not only divided, but also connected peoples and economies on each side of the boundary. House, for instance, proposed a model for the exploration of economic and social flows within frontier zones, characterised by asymmetric power relations (1980).

Thus, while the boundaries of the nation-state remained at the centre of boundary scholarship, the deepening of the line and the shift of focus towards the interactions within borderlands may be read as

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30 Van Houtum (2005) has proposed that border and boundary studies have grown apart as a consequence of the recent radical shift in border studies. If the focus in boundary studies remains on the evolution of and changes to the territorial line of the nation-state, borders scholars are more interested in the social construction of differences and distances in space and the practices that discontinue the mobility of some subjects and objects (van Houtum 2005).

31 For reviews of the functional shift in border studies, see e.g. Minghi (1963), Newman (2001:142-144), Rumley and Minghi (1991).

32 The interest in economic and social exchanges within borderlands and across state boundaries, and the particular border cultures or border identities that they give rise to, extends well beyond the discipline of geography (see e.g. Chalfin 2001; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Flynn 1997; Martinez 1994; Migdal 2004).
a move towards a more inclusive border concept than the one that had been the focus in earlier boundary scholarship.

However, a number a geopolitical shifts – including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, and the integration and the expansion of the European Union – and developments on the financial markets – for instance, major de-regulations following the triumph of neoliberalism in the UK and the US during the 1970s and 1980s, and the rise of new electronic information technologies – meant that boundary studies partly lost its appeal. These developments appeared to herald the prospect of a future borderless world (for discussions of these developments, see e.g. Diener and Hagen 2009; Ó Tuathail 1999) and inspired theoretical advancements, in geography and social sciences more broadly, on globalisation and relational networks, theories which gave prominence to flows and mobilities, rather than barriers and fixes (e.g. Castells 1996; Strange 1996; Taylor 2004). At the same time, the borderless world thesis (Ohmae 1980) “served as a primary catalyst for the rejuvenation of border studies” (Diener and Hagen 2009:1199; also see Johnson and Jones 2011:61). The events of 11th September 2001 and the subsequent ‘global war on terror’, among other things, have further triggered an interest in borders and border securitisation in political geography and related disciplines. Thus, a new field of enquiry has emerged, which draws from a variety of approaches – critical geopolitics, social constructionism, psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, to name but a few – to critically rethink the border concept.

It is not my intention to review contemporary debates concerning the border concept in full (for a recent overview, see Popescu 2012). Instead, I focus on three interrelated themes that run through contemporary border scholarship and which I find to be of relevance if we are to understand the strategies used by Ghanaian actors to resolve the problem of the Chinese African prints. First, observations suggest that borders increasingly are enforced in ways that defy taken-for-granted assumptions about the relationship between state, territory and border. That is, unlike what previously was assumed, state borders do not only appear along the lines at the edge of state territory but rather are multiplied in their locations (e.g. Amoore 2011; Coleman 2007; Vaughan-Williams 2010). Some scholars argue that a consequence of this is that contemporary borders no longer are necessarily shaped like lines (e.g. Popescu 2012:82; Salter 2004:80; Walters 2006b). Instead, as this study will show, they may take on the shape of an import corridor or a network of marketplaces across the country, or they may be embedded in a foreign object: in this case, in the Chinese African print. Yet borders, whether enacted in locations away from the edges of state territory and whether shaped as lines, corridors, networks, or cloth, I argue, remain located in space and time and involve the claiming of space. They are not, as Walters has suggested, non-geographical (2006b).
Next, contemporary border scholarship has demonstrated that actors other than those commonly associated with border control – the Customs and Immigration Services – increasingly perform borders. At present, a range of private economic actors, civil society representatives and citizens are engaged in “borderwork” (Rumford 2008; also see Amoore 2007; Coleman 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2008).

As noted in the introduction, these two trends have impelled Lahav and Guiraudon (2000) to suggest that borders presently are doubly displaced: from the lines at the edges of state territory and from the state agents generally associated with border control. What I want to add to this is a third displacement of the border. Thus, finally, while the borders of the nation-state certainly have remained at the centre of contemporary debates about the securitisation of borders, several scholars have sought to bring border studies into closer conversation with research on relational identity formation. The implication is the need for a more inclusive border concept. This is a concept that encompasses the multitude of dividing practices that construct differences and distances in space, based not only on the nation-state, but also on social and political principles of inclusion and exclusion on several scales (e.g. Ackleson 1999; Balibar 2002:84-85; Berg and van Houtum 2003:2; Newman 2001:145-147; Paasi 1996, 1999; Rumford 2011:68; van Houtum 2005:678; van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002:126). The relevance of this development of the border concept for the case explored in this thesis is first and foremost the claim that not all borders are manifestations of the state or work for the state (Rumford 2011:68). Indeed, borders are equally involved in the construction of nations, for example (see e.g. Ackleson 1999; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Paasi 1996). The latter is highly pertinent to the analysis of one of the spatial strategies explored in this thesis, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. Rather than relying only on the state border, this spatial strategy draws upon an identity border – specifically, the border of the Ghanaian nation – in an attempt to intervene indirectly against the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print.

These insights on the nature of borders have resulted in new questions being asked about borders, including: How and where are borders enacted? Who are the actors that perform borders? Whose interests does border-making serve? Moreover, this shift in thinking about borders has had consequences for how borders are approached empirically and analytically. An agency-oriented approach to the study of borders that focuses on border-making practices has increasingly gained ground in political geography and related disciplines. This is because borders, in Soguk’s terms, become “consequential only where and when border practices are at work” (2007:284; also see van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005:3; Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009). Thus, if the focus were only on the edges of state terri-

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33 For more on this, see Johnson and Jones (2011:61-62) and Popescu (2012:22).
tory and on the actors traditionally associated with the enforcement of border controls, we would miss the borders that presently are being enacted by a broad base of actors in a wide variety of locations. From this, it follows that the focus of analysis is increasingly directed towards the multiple sites at and away from the line at the edge of state territory where a range of state and non-state actors perform border-making practices; that is, the acts of inclusion and exclusion that construct divisions and distances in space and that discontinue the mobility of (some) people and, I argue, the flows of certain objects (see e.g. van Houtum 2005; Mountz 2011a:65; Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009:586).

In the remainder of the chapter, I discuss these insights further and draw upon them to outline a geographical approach to the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and the interventions by Ghanaian actors to engage that threat. First, however, I want to say something about the relationship between mobility and ‘risk’, or ‘threat’, in the neoliberal economy. I stress this because this particular outlook on risk and threat informs the emergent forms of border-making that that contemporary research on the securitisation of borders has brought to our attention.

The fear of free flows and closed borders

In their seminal paper on the new mobilities paradigm, Sheller and Urry noted that “[a]ll the world seems to be on the move” (2006:207). People travel and capital and goods circulate at an unprecedented rate (ibid.). However, unless the right amount of movement of the right kind occurs at the right time and in the right place (cf. Sheller and Urry 2006:208), mobilities may indeed appear undesired or threatening. The fear of certain forms of mobility, several border scholars argue, produces a desire for borders (see Newman 2006a:177; Papastergiadis 2006; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007; van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002). In several instances, these fears have translated into the creation of new borders or the tightening of already existing borders intended to discontinue the mobility of threatening mobilities in one way or other.

Yet, under the prevalent neoliberal paradigm, across-the-board restrictions on mobility are seen as equally threatening (e.g. Coleman 2007:611-615; Salter 2004:72). This is because neoliberalism asserts that economies need flows and mobility of the right kind to grow. Coleman’s (2007) work on security practices along the US-Mexico border, for instance, illuminates the tensions inherent to the neoliberal economy between free trade and security. The US Commission on National Security is, on the one hand, increasingly concerned about the fact that the removal of barriers to induce free flows not only facilitates the mobility of desired subjects and products, but also is exploited by terrorists, illegal migrants, traffickers and
smugglers. At the same time, Coleman argues, to restrict mobility is not an option because this would discontinue the flows of commerce and capital upon which the neoliberal economy depends (2007:611-615). Thus, new forms of border-making practices that “seek to reconcile security with mobility and sovereignty with economy” (Amoore 2011:64) have subsequently emerged to resolve this “geopolitical ‘catch 22’” (Coleman 2007:613). More specifically, contemporary fears of mobility have resulted in a desire for a certain type of border: the semi-permeable border.

This desire for a semi-permeable border, in turn, is increasingly manifested in a technology-driven security doctrine that discriminates between desirable and undesirable mobilities to control their movement selectively. That is, an array of risk management programmes have developed which have as their objective to facilitate legal economic flows and the mobility of “trusted liberal subjects” (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1077), while restricting that of ‘undesirables’ or ‘illegitimates’: presumed terrorists, refugees, asylum seekers and the global poor.34 One consequence of these emergent forms of border-making is that borders are “multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function”, and are “thinned out and doubled” (Balibar 1998:220; emphasis added), depending on who attempts to cross them. That is to say that the very border that one – the trusted traveller – crosses with ease, may prove an insurmountable obstacle to another – the migrant from the global South (e.g. Balibar 2002:81-83; van Houtum 2010:962-964).

More than anything, it is the fear of people on the move that has been placed at the core of debates about contemporary bordering practices. It is the fear of the (moving) terrorist body (e.g. Amoore 2006, 2007, 2009b; Amoore and de Goede 2005, 2008; Amoore and Hall 2009; Bigo 2001b; Epstein 2008), and the fear of the refugee, asylum seeker or economic migrant – whose presence is seen as a threat to security, material wealth and (national) identity (e.g. Coleman 2005, 2007; Khosravi 2009, 2010b; Papastergiadis 2006, van Houtum 2010; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007; van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002) – that have resulted in a wide array of new security practices. The fear that the expansion of the European Union would result in ‘social tourists’ (populations of new Eastern and Central European member states, who were expected to flood Western member state to reap the social benefits of welfare systems), for instance, initially prompted Sweden’s Prime Minister at the time, Göran Persson, to call for transitional mo-

bility restrictions for citizens of the new member states (e.g. Galgóczi et al. 2009:88).\(^{35}\)

The outlook on mobility as something that we fear, but which we cannot live without, is central to the argument I want to make in this thesis. For it to be of relevance to this study, however, we need to qualify the claim that emerging border-making practices intend to restrict the mobility of certain threatening people, while they, at the same time, seek to facilitate legal economic flows (see e.g. Coleman 2005:194-197).\(^{36}\) Indeed, this study will demonstrate that in certain instances, foreign products may be constituted as threats to the survival of domestic industries, long-standing trading hierarchies and national identity. Subsequently, they may also be placed at the centre of the processes that discriminate between legitimate and threatening flows and seek to impose restrictions on the latter. Yet, as just noted, in the neoliberal context, barriers to trade appear equally threatening. Thus, it is not free trade that concerns Ghana’s textile actors and representatives of the state – Ghana is a liberal economy and importation is allowed or even encouraged – but rather the unfair trade practices associated with Chinese African prints and the threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation that they accordingly represent. The solution to this “geoeconomic contradiction” (Popescu 2012:68) is in part a selective control of foreign African prints that seek access to the Ghanaian market.

Just to be clear, I am not arguing that borders treat people and products in exactly the same way. Specifically, I do not wish to imply that the moral implications of exclusionary interventions directed at a piece of cloth are the same as those associated with people being illegalised and immobilised. Nor that the consequences of exile, deportation or detention for the cloth in any way compares to the consequences experienced by a person in a similar situation.\(^{37}\) In my view, however, borders may in certain instances treat bodies and objects in similar ways. This line of thought is inspired by Epstein’s (2007, 2008) work on biometric systems: that is, systems of surveillance that de-humanise people

\(^{35}\) Sweden later withdrew its request to become one of three EU member states not to impose transitional mobility restrictions on new member states. Also see Pijpers (2006), for a discussion about EU enlargement and the fear of migrants from a Dutch perspective.

\(^{36}\) As it is commonly asserted that borders do not treat people and products in the same way (e.g. Balibar 2002:91), the imposition of selective control of the mobility of products has received little attention. However, Ackleson (2005a:145) and Chalfin (2004), for instance, have illustrated how sophisticated technologies, including X-ray scans, have been developed, not only to detect migrants hidden inside cargo loads, but also to sort out illegal goods and to speed up the process of border crossing for legal economic flows. Further, de Goede’s study of terrorist monies in the war on terror suggests that selective control is imposed on flows of capital as well (2012:1-26).

\(^{37}\) See e.g. Cunningham (2001), Heimstra (2012), Khosravi (2010a, 2010b), Martin (2012), for accounts of the experiences and impacts of border-making that enforces selective control on the people who are categorised as undesired or illegal.
and reduce them to bare life, to thing-ness. Indeed, Epstein writes, echoing Agamben, that “in the logic of biometrics, ‘life’ is nothing more than a functional attribute of the object” (2008:185). Thus, in many ways, the “foreign, de-humanized, bare body” (Epstein 2008:187) at the centre of contemporary security practices is treated more as an object than as a person; it is scanned, profiled and encoded, and, at times, it is seized, expelled or detained.\footnote{On bodies and border control, also see Donnan and Wilson (1999), who have suggested that many of the practices associated with the crossing of international borders “animalise” the human body. That is, they re-classify undocumented migrants as other than human. ‘Illegal’ border crossers, for example, are referred to as “chickens”, “sheep” and “killer bees” (Donnan and Wilson 1999:130-137; also see Epstein 2008:185; Khosravi 2010b:27-29).} Additionally, within the context of this thesis, the focus is not primarily on the consequences of border-making practices on those whose mobility is constrained, but rather in how geography is integral to the Ghanaian response to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print.

The construction of certain human beings as security threats, and the reduction of them to thing-ness, is relevant to this study, not only because they bridge the gap between the person and the object analytically, but also because this suggests that the presumed terrorist or the undocumented migrant are not threats in themselves. Rather, they are constituted as “problem objects” (Inda 2006:7): namely, as threats to security, employment, or the welfare state. This, in turn, is what renders them governable. Thus, if we wish to understand the security practices that presently are emerging or the Ghanaian response to the inflow of Chinese African prints, we must consider not only how borders are performed to resolve the two conflicting fears of free flows and of closed borders, but also how the presumed terrorist, economic migrant or Chinese African print are constituted as threats, and it is to this that I now turn.

Constructing the illegitimate

A number of critical border, migration and security scholars have sought to show how political elites produce undocumented migrants as threats or risk, and how this allows for actions to be taken against them (see e.g. Ackleson 1999, 2005b; Andreas 2000; Bigo 2001a; Inda 2006; Kuus 2003; Martin 2012; Nevins 2002/2010; Papastergiadis 2006). Rather than focusing on “elite speech acts” (Ackleson 2005b:174), and how these constitute certain people as objects of government, the approach to the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat that I want to adopt, as stated in the introductory chapter, begins from the tensions between the activities, movements and relations of the Chinese African print, on the one hand, and the Ghanaian institutions and actors charged with imposing restrictions on flows in different ways, on the other.
My inspiration for thinking about the constitution of the Chinese African print as a threat in this way comes from Louise Amoore’s work on risk assessment practices associated with the war on terror. The risk assessment models at focus in Amoore’s work, I find, may be read as systems that construct individuals as trusted travellers/potential terrorists based on transgressions of norms concerning ‘normal’ or ‘safe’ behaviour. To be more specific, Amoore illuminates how data-mining programmes are used in the war on terror to calculate the degree of riskiness of an individual through its associations. These programmes are designed to find combinations that signal risk in transactions data – that is, credit card purchases, travel data, telephone records, library records and so on – derived from an array of sources, so that an individual’s purchase of an ‘unusual’ number of mobile phones, repeated phone calls or transference of money to Afghanistan, combined with choice of in-flight meal, for example, are transformed into an alert of risky behaviour (Amoore e.g. 2006, 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Amoore and de Goede 2005, 2008). Thus, these systems, Amoore writes, divide the subject “into calculable risk factors, both within herself (such as, for example, ‘student’ and ‘muslim’ and ‘woman’), and necessarily also in relation to others (as, for example, ‘alien’, ‘immigrant’ or ‘illegal’)” (Amoore 2006:339). This kind of profiling – that is, sorting and encoding of people as high-risk bodies – Amoore argues, is based upon the assumption that the identity of an individual may be derived from assemblages of information and that the degree of deviance and risk may be arrived at by checking transactions against norms about safe behaviour (Amoore e.g. 2007:220-222, 2009a:51-57; Amoore and de Goede 2005:162).

While the constitution of the Chinese African print as a threat certainly deviates from the technology-driven security doctrine at focus in Amoore’s work in several respects, the notion of transgressions that divide the subject, or in this case the object, into risk factors within itself and in relation to ‘Others’ (Amoore 2006:339) based on deviations from normal behaviour, which are derived from the subject’s (or object’s) activities, are relevant to the Ghanaian case. As noted in the introductory chapter, I take this to imply that to understand the constitution of the Chinese African print as a threat requires an exploration of how certain activities and movements of the Chinese African print itself represent deviations from what is considered legitimate trade in Ghana. To clarify, while Amoore’s interest primarily is in the systems that transform transactions data into degrees of risk, at the same time her work also draws the reader’s attention not only to the elite speech acts that constitute the individual as a security risk, but also to (the activities of) the human beings whose transactions become subject to scrutiny. That is, through Amoore’s work, part of which she has undertaken together with de Goede, we are made acutely aware of how our purchases of seemingly mundane things – a public transport travel card, for instance – and our journeys
using that card, are used to attach information to us and to sort us into degrees of risk (see e.g. Amoore and de Goede 2008:176).

Thus, in this thesis, I focus on the objects – Chinese African prints – and how they are inscribed with information, not in terms of transactions data, but about their movements, activities and relations, and how those Chinese African prints that transgress Ghanaian laws that regulate trade (here trade, tax and intellectual property laws) or moral norms about legitimate trade are constituted as problem objects. To exemplify, to understand how the Chinese African print is constituted as ‘smuggled’, we need to focus on how it moves and where it enters the Ghanaian market. More precisely, it is the Chinese African print that has entered Ghanaian territory away from designated ports of entry or without paying the costs for access to the Ghanaian market which becomes smuggled.

The other two transgressions associated with the Chinese African print explored in this thesis are, as noted in the introductory chapter, ‘counterfeit’ and ‘morally unjust’. To understand these transgressions, we need to consider not only how the object moves across the Ghanaian border, but also other activities and relations that have become embedded in the Chinese African print before it enters Ghanaian territory. Indeed, a consequence of the historically rooted values and relations of the Ghanaian African print, which were the focus of the previous chapter, for instance, is the need to consider not only how the Chinese African print is constructed as a threat because of its activities and movements, but also because of the different values and relations already reflected in the Ghanaian African prints and the Chinese African prints respectively. Similarly, the very act of producing a copy of a Ghanaian design or trademark, and which transforms the Chinese African into counterfeit, takes place long before the cloth reaches the Ghanaian market.

What this implies is that Chinese African prints are not threats in and of themselves. Rather, they come to be ‘wrongly priced’ (smuggled), the bearers of the ‘wrong visual markers’ (counterfeit) and produced in the ‘wrong place’ (morally unjust), and thereby a threat, when they violate certain legal or moral frameworks. By contrast, this means that the Chinese African print that enters the Ghanaian market in the ‘right way’ becomes legal, as does the Chinese African print that displays the ‘right modes of visual communication’.

At the same time, Amoore’s work implies that the individual’s activities and associations are not risk factors in themselves, but rather are constituted as such as they are run through data-mining programmes. In other words, these technologies of control combine and transform an array of individually mundane activities (a phone call, a credit card purchase) into “‘actionable intelligence’” (Amoore 2007:221, also 2009a:52; and de Goede 2012:xxvi). In other words, and to draw upon Squire (2011:7), the irregularity of the migrant is not purely the outcome of the migrant’s activities and movements. That is, irregularity is not only produced because the migrant enters another
state’s territory ‘illegally’ or commits illegal actions once inside (nor would irregularity only be the outcome of the activity’s or association’s deviation from normality, as Amoore might put it). Rather, as Squire writes: “irregularity can be seen as a product of political struggles that emerge where the movements and activities of national, international and/or transnational agencies come into contact with the movements and activities of migrants and citizens.” (2011:7, emphasis added). In other words, only where and when the migrant becomes a target to control is its irregularity activated (ibid.). While these moments of contact, to use Squire’s term, between the presumed terrorist and the actors, technologies and institutions of control may not have been Amoore’s immediate concern, I find this to be a useful point of departure for thinking about the constitution of problem objects, be they undocumented migrants, potential terrorists or foreign products. Indeed, the implication of this claim is the need to focus not only on the activities and movements of the migrant, presumed terrorist or foreign product, but also on where and when these moments of contact between the body or object and the agencies that seek to control its mobility emerge.

Thus, I would propose that it is where and when the Chinese African print comes into contact with the places and procedures associated with tariff extraction and the registration of textile designs and trademarks in Ghana that these transgressions take place and its illegal condition is constituted. Equally, it is once the Chinese African print has entered Ghanaian territory that it comes into contact with the moral frameworks that constitute it as morally unjust.

The construction of the Chinese African print as a threat is important because, as pointed out above, it renders it an object available to intervention. Indeed, Squire’s claim that it is the moments where and when the migrant becomes a target to control that activate its irregularity (2011:7) produces a link between the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and the interventions against its presence in Ghana (also see Ackleson 2005b:171-174; van Houtum 2010:959). To clarify, each of the three forms that the perceived threat of the Chinese African print takes – smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust – translates into and justifies certain interventions. At the same time, the three interventions explored in this thesis – the single import corridor, the anti-counterfeiting operations and the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes – activate these distinct threats of the Chinese African print. This means that, while the Chinese African print becomes smuggled once it has entered the Ghanaian market the wrong way, its status as smuggled does not become consequential, or in Squire’s terms, fully activated (2011:7), until it becomes subject to intervention. Thus, while the identity of a subject, or, in this case, a foreign product, may be temporarily fixed as legitimate or threat and, as Amoore suggests, be perceived as infallibly verifiable (2006:341-344), the above implies that the subject may move in and out of this condition depending upon whether it is in fact in contact
with actors or institutions that impose control on it or not (cf. Squire 2011; also see Khosravi 2010a:99). Importantly, these two processes – the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and the interventions imposed against it – do not necessarily engage the same places, procedures, institutions, relations or actors. This is why we need to consider them both separately, as well as explore how they work in conjunction.

In the next section, I return to the above discussion about the two conflicting fears of free flows and fixity – which have resulted in a desire for semi-permeable borders that can control mobility selectively – to engage with the contemporary debate on border-making through the example of the Ghanaian case and to set out a geographical approach to the interventions taken against the perceived threat of the Chinese African print in Ghana.

**Border-making as a spatial strategy**

In response to the claim that borders are everywhere (Balibar 1998), political geographers and others with an interest in borders have become increasingly concerned with questions pertaining to the locations where contemporary borders are enforced. As discussed earlier, recent insights on the border concept suggest that practices associated with the selective control of mobility increasingly take place in multiple and shifting locations away from the lines, or frontiers, at the edges of state territory. Borders are folded outwards: that is, border controls increasingly take place outside state territory (spatial extension) and before the border (temporal extension) in ways that project state borders outwards, beyond their territories (e.g. Amoore 2011:63-64; Salter 2004:81). The extension of borders outwards is manifested, for example, in the immigration officers who are outsourced to points of embarkation at airports, bus and train stations in the territories of other nation-states (Salter 2004:80-81; Walters 2002:569, 575). Passengers destined for the UK, for instance, are screened in Calais, Lille and Paris, and at the Eurostar terminal in Brussels long before they reach the UK border. In fact, they may never reach the UK border at all if they are found to be illegitimate travellers (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1072-1077). Likewise, the US enforces its immigration laws in Mexico and other countries in Central America and the Caribbean (Coleman 2007:620-625). Border patrols also operate in international waters to prevent undesired migrants from reaching the shores of Italy, Spain, Australia and the US (Popescu 2012:101).

All of the above practices are driven by a spatial logic that suggests that territorial security is best maintained if “‘spontaneous arrivals’” (Mountz 2011b:119) at the territorial border are prevented through “remote rule” (Wilson 2006:92) and the construction of “‘buffer zones’” (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:58). Moreover, borders are projected outwards in space and time through a range of smart-border programmes that seek to fast-track
goods and trusted travellers, while they, at the same time, sort out high-risk travellers for further scrutiny. Thus, in this case, the ‘smart’ border is the one that enforces selective control of mobility in ways that appear to reconcile economy with security (Amoore 2011:64; also see Ackleson 2005a; Amoore 2006; Salter 2004; Sparke 2006). At its most extreme, these practices construct zones of exception in remote locations where the people who are categorised as high-risk or ‘illegal’ travellers are kept separate from the populations on the inside (see e.g. Martin 2012; Mountz 2011b, 2011c).

Furthermore, the surveillance and profiling, detention and deportation of illegitimate bodies increasingly take place inside, and are dispersed across, state territory. To be more precise, motorways, hotels, internet cafes, street corners, supermarkets, neighbourhoods, workplaces, warehouses, hospitals and schools have all emerged as sites for the enforcement of immigration or anti-terrorist laws (e.g. Popescu 2012:83; Rumford 2006:158). Interventions against potential future criminals – that is, presumed terrorists – and ‘already criminals’ – undocumented migrants, for example – carried out in these locations are underpinned by particular modes of governing, including the use of task force arrangements (see e.g. Coleman 2009) and increasingly more sophisticated risk management techniques (Amoore 2007, 2009a; Amoore and de Goede 2005, 2008). The former represents governing through uncertainty (Coleman 2009:910-911; also see Inda 2011), and an attempt to construct a border that presents itself as ubiquitous (see Amoore 2006; Balibar 2002:84). Thus, in a way, these practices appear to mimic the very subjects they seek to control by remaining hidden until the strike.

Risk management techniques, by contrast, epitomise governing through probability and “locatability” (Amoore 2009a:57-64). That is, these systems are designed to detect irregularities in masses of transactions data and to track and position moving targets through the radio frequency identification (RFID) tags embedded in passports and travel cards (Amoore 2009a). Because the bodies at the centre of contemporary practices of border securitisation – those of potential terrorists and the global poor – are hidden from sight, producing a sense of security on the inside requires particular “ways of seeing” (Amoore 2007:223-226) that can visualise the criminal and foresee the crime before it has happened (e.g. Amoore 2007, 2009b; Amoore and de Goede 2008). That is to say, the border that is enforced to pre-empt the terrorist attack, for example, also produces new temporalities as it draws on past events to produce risk profiles in the present, which are, in turn, used to prevent an attack from taking place in the future (Amoore and de Goede 2008:175; also see Amoore e.g. 2007, 2009a, 2009b; de Goede 2012).

Observations such as these have inspired border scholars to suggest that borders not only appear in locations other than at the outer edges of territory but that they increasingly appear in new shapes and forms (e.g. Popescu 2012; Walters 2006b). Indeed, it has been noted that contemporary borders appear in the shape of networks (Popescu 2012:81-85, 98-104; Rumford
filters or firewalls (Walters 2006a:197, 2006b:151-154), mobile regulatory sites (Amoore 2006:337; Walters 2006a:195-197), or security continuums (Vaughan-Williams 2010). To be clear, this is not to say that borders are no longer enforced at the territorial border, but rather that the pre-emptive and post-emptive logics of contemporary security practices, in both space and time, produce a wide array of additional sites and times where and when borders are enforced. Nor does it mean that the border no longer appears in the shape of the line, but rather that it appears in other shapes as well.

This way of thinking about borders, I find, may be usefully extended to analyse the strategies used by Ghanaian actors to intervene against one or more of the three forms that the perceived threat of the Chinese African takes. However, while critical border and security studies scholars have highlighted that borders are re-spatialised and, to some extent, re-shaped, their work never really outlines the outward and inward folding of borders as anything beyond the consequences of perceived new security needs. As a result, we are offered documentation of the spatial outcomes of the off-shoring of borders into the territories of other states, of decentralisation, privatisation and regionalisation strategies, and of the use of ever more sophisticated technologies in the war on terror, rather than an examination of how borders are strategically enacted in a geographical sense. To clarify, and as pointed out earlier, borders take on new shapes and are displaced from the edges of state territory to serve the purposes of certain actors. That is to say that borders, the way I understand them, are not becoming increasingly mobile in space and time ‘by themselves’. Rather, actors with an interest in protecting certain spaces or territories from illegitimates make them spatially and temporally mobile or make them take on new shapes to engage threats that come from (the ‘wrong’ kinds of) mobility. Accordingly, we may look upon the construction of such mobile borders, and the manipulation of their shapes, as spatial strategies. What I hope to show is how a shift in emphasis from the documentation of the spatial outcomes of perceived new security needs to an examination of how geography is integral to the strategic enactment of borders has much to offer in terms of understanding the specificities of how borders presently operate to control mobility selectively.

As pointed out earlier, contemporary border scholarship has provided important clues regarding how we may unpack these spatial strategies empirically and analytically: that is, by focusing on the multiple sites at and away from the lines at the edge of state territory where borders appear. An exploration of the spatial strategies through which borders operate also necessi-

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39 Indeed, at the same time as border enforcement is moved from the edges of territory and is made to appear in network-like arrangements, new walls and fences are erected at territorial borders across the globe (see e.g. Andreas 2000; Diener and Hagen 2009; Jones 2009; Nevins 2002/2010).
tates that attention is directed towards the different shapes that borders may be manipulated into.

Thus, the intervention examined in Chapter 5 – the institution of a single import corridor for African prints between 2005 and 2008 – is, I will argue, an example of a spatial strategy that stretches the line into an import corridor, which, in turn, performs the border in multiple locations both at and away from the edges of state territory in ways that fold borders both outwards and inwards. The anti-counterfeiting operations, which are the focus of Chapter 6, by contrast, represent a spatial strategy that abandons the line as it folds the border inwards and disperses it across territory. In this instance, interventions against Chinese African prints take place in a network of marketplaces across Ghanaian territory, which are turned into sites for the enforcement of intellectual property laws. For me, these two chapters illuminate how one spatial way of dealing with the perceived threat of the Chinese African print is to re-shape the borders of the Ghanaian state and enact disruptive interventions in multiple locations – prior to, at and beyond the territorial border – interventions that are designed to keep the alien outside Ghanaian territory, as well as to expel the illegal inside.

However, to account for the spatial strategy focused on in Chapter 7 – the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, designed to restrict the consumption of Chinese African prints by promoting locally produced African prints – the perspectives outlined above need some qualification. To this end, I return to the foregoing discussion about the scrutiny of travellers prior to departure through visa application procedures and the increasing use of smart border technologies to enforce selective control on mobility. Concerning the latter, Amoore has suggested that the data-mining systems used to discriminate between, on the one hand, legitimate and desired mobilities, and, on the other, mobilities that are perceived as a risk rest upon the assumption that information about who is desired and who is to be considered a risk may be anchored in the human body (2006:341-344). This, in turn, Amoore (2006) proposes, may be extended to suggest that borders now are carried inside human bodies. Weber (2006, based on Guild 2000) has made a similar claim regarding UK immigration law, which considers non-British visa holders “legally present” (2006:35) in the UK, even when they are physically outside British territory. The location of the UK border, Weber thus suggests, is not primarily determined by the enforcement practices of the nation-state. Rather, this is a “fragmented and fully portable” border that is geographically defined by the whereabouts of the visa holder (Weber 2006:35).

One way to think about the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes is to extend these claims about the human body as the carrier of borders to view the border as something that may be embedded in objects, in this case the African print, and carried on bodies when worn. Indeed, borders, Sassen argues, may not only be anchored in people. They may also be
embedded in products (Sassen 2006:416). Thus, in Chapter 7, I argue that the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes intervene against the perceived threat of Chinese African prints by *embod[ying]* the border: that is, by displaying the embedded border – the ‘right’, or morally just, African print – on the bodies of citizens. These bodies, in turn, distribute the message that Ghanaian identity may be reinforced and the textile industry rescued if Ghanaians consume and dress in garments made from locally produced textiles across Ghanaian territory. It follows from this that to explore these programmes as a spatial strategy requires an analytical move away from state borders to think more broadly about what borders may be. That said, I want to emphasise that it remains relevant to retain the empirical and analytical focus on the spaces where and when borders are performed, and the shapes that borders take on, even when a spatial strategy that works through identity borders is the focus.

Recent insights on the border concept also suggest that an increasingly broader base of actors enable the increasing mobility of borders in space and time, and the various shapes they take on. That is, if we are to fully understand these spatial strategies there is also the need to focus on the actors who perform them.

The workers of the border

Contemporary border scholarship has illustrated that the agents involved in border-making processes presently extend far beyond the national governments traditionally associated with management of state borders (e.g. Amoore 2006, 2007; Brunet-Jailly 2011; Coleman 2009; Lahav and Guiraudon 2000; Rumford 2006, 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2008). In fact, the inclusion of additional borderworkers is a pre-requisite for some of the practices of bordering discussed above. Below, I discuss four key trends as far as the engagement of additional borderworkers is concerned.

For one thing, it is suggested that the extension of borders outwards into territories of other states is in part enabled through transnational cooperation. The Schengen Agreement, for instance, has relocated some aspects of border control not only outwards to the outer edges of the Schengen block, but also upwards, to the EU level (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:59-61; Rumford 2006:156). Additionally, there are agreements between source and recipient countries with the intent of preventing departure, a move that off-shores borders of one state (the recipient country) into the territory of the other state (the source country) and delegates border control to officers in the source country (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:61-63; Popescu 2012:102-104). In certain instances, these operations have gone supranational. This may be exemplified by FRONTEX – EU’s agency for border security – which, since 2004, operates off the African coast in an attempt to keep undocumented

Border management functions are also delegated to regional and local governments (Coleman 2007:627, 2009:907-910; Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:68-70). For instance, in the US, Coleman (2009) suggests, non-federal officers are increasingly authorised to enforce immigration laws. It is often local police officers that raid city streets, supermarkets and neighbourhoods in search of undocumented migrants (Coleman 2009:907-910).

Further, the engagement of private actors is central to the enforcement of immigration and anti-terrorist laws inside state territories. Carrier liability laws, for instance, which shift the responsibility for border-monitoring onto private carrier companies, and whose staff is turned into borderworkers, extend borders outwards (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:63-64; Walters 2006a:194). Equally, private security agencies are contracted to run detention centres where illegal migrants or asylum seekers whose applications have been denied await deportation (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:65; Martin 2012:322) and the smart-border technologies used to screen, profile and encode bodies as ‘legals’ and ‘desirables’ or ‘illegals’ and ‘undesirables’ have been enabled by the development of new risk profiling technologies by private companies (e.g. Amoore 2006:344-347; Vaughan-Williams 2010:1074-1075).

Finally, a great deal of attention has also been directed towards the involvement of citizens in borderwork (e.g. Amoore 2006, 2007; Rumford 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2008). Increasingly state institutions rely on the observations of citizens, or in Vaughan-Williams’ terms, “citizen-detectives” (2008), of the unusual or suspicious behaviour of ‘Others’. Thus, state institutions increasingly encourage on-looking citizens to record and report unusual purchases, financial transactions, unidentified luggage and even suspicious neighbours (Rumford 2008:1; Vaughan-Williams 2008:70-76). Sophisticated computer software programmes, which combine the observations of citizen detectives with the electronic traces of a range of other transactions (Amoore and de Goede 2005, 2008), as suggested above, transform this information into actionable intelligence. At the same time, Rumford (2006, 2008) suggests, citizen vigilantism may originate from discontent with the level of security that governments deliver. Subsequently, citizens engage in border patrol (as has been the case in the US along the border with Mexico) or resort to gated community living to construct their own sense of security (Rumford 2006:165, 2008:6-7).40

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40 Also see Doty (2007), for an account of civilian border patrols along the US-Mexico border, and Walters (2006b:149-151), van Houtum (2010), van Houtum and Pijpers (2007), for discussions concerning the EU as a gated community.
Within the context of the Ghanaian case, the combined efforts of a broad range of private, civil society and state actors as well as citizens manipulate the borders of the Ghanaian state and nation in response to the perceived threat posed by the smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust African print (from China). They include representatives for the Ghanaian state: national and local politicians, officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Registrar General’s Department, and the judges who rule intellectual property cases, as well as customs officers and standards board officers, who operate the border posts along the frontiers, and the Customs Service’s and Police Service’s patrol units. They also include Ghana’s textile companies, which help the Ministry of Trade and Industry to identify counterfeit Chinese African prints; raid marketplaces in a vigilante-style intervention to enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property, with the assistance of trade union representatives and the police; and supply the cloth for the launches of the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. Finally, they include the Ghanaian citizens who display the border of the Ghanaian nation on their bodies by dressing in garments made from locally produced African prints.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss how the border concept may be used to explore the construction of certain mobile bodies and objects as threats and the strategies used to intervene against them. The chapter has explored three arguments. First, it argued that attempts to restrict mobility selectively – to facilitate the mobility of some, while restricting the mobility of others – are not limited to certain people (asylum seekers, economic migrants, potential terrorists) on the move. Rather, the Ghanaian case suggests that the fear of a foreign product, which is in conflict with the assertion that it is necessary to facilitate international trade, may also result in a desire for borders that control trade flows selectively. The second point of the chapter was that in order to understand emerging security practices or the spatial responses to the inflow of Chinese African prints in Ghana, it is necessary to consider how the presumed terrorist, the economic migrant or the Chinese African print are constituted as threats. This was because the presence of both motivates and justifies one another. The approach to the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat that I draw upon in this thesis took the tensions between the activities, movements and relations of the Chinese African print, on the one hand, and the Ghanaian institutions and actors charged with imposing restrictions on flows in different ways, on the other, as its point of departure.
The final point of the chapter was that if borders are increasingly plural in terms of their shapes, locations and the actors involved in enforcing them, this is not just the (spatial) consequences of new security needs. Rather, we may look upon the increasing plurality of borders as purposeful acts; that is, as spatial strategies that, in the Ghanaian case, seek to protect the textile industry, the domestic market and the Ghanaian nation from the three variations of threat that Chinese African prints represent by twisting the shape of the borders of the state and nation into corridors, networks and cloth, by making them appear along the outer edges as well as inside Ghanaian territory, while engaging a broadened base of actors in borderwork.

In Chapters 5 to 7, I will explore in detail the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana and the spatial strategies used to engage that threat strategically. First, however, I will discuss my methodological strategies and the materials upon which the arguments presented in this thesis are based.
4 Doing research on African prints in Ghana

In previous chapters, I have sought to situate the research topic within academic debates about the border concept, and, to some extent, within research on the increasing Chinese presence in Africa. Equally, I have attempted to unpack some of the circumstances that produce the African print as a symbolically charged object and serve to place the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana. In this chapter, I shift the focus to methodology and the process of undertaking research on African prints. The purpose of the chapter is to set out the methodological strategy I adopted and to give a sense of the materials upon which this study is based: in other words, how they were constructed and how I interpreted them. The chapter is divided into three parts. It begins by discussing why I chose to combine semi-structured interviews with official and non-official documentary sources, what materials these methods generated and how they worked together to answer the research questions. Next, I outline how these materials were generated and then discuss how I arrived at my interpretations of them. Importantly, I seek to emphasise that materials are something generated (Whatmore 2003); that is, they are the outcome of encounters between the researcher and ‘the researched’, as well as a range of decisions made in the field. Moreover, I attempt to account for my interpretations of these materials through three moments in a non-linear research process: namely, the generation of materials, analysis and writing (cf. Pryke, Rose and Whatmore 2003). Finally, I offer a number of reflections concerning ethics, power and positionality in this research project.

Methods and materials

Earlier, I have shown how I drew upon insights from border studies to produce two research questions and how I operationalised these questions. To clarify, in relation to the first research question – how the Chinese African print is constructed as a threat in Ghana – I argued that the status of the Chinese African print as a threat is something that it acquires through a number of transgressions linked to its activities and movements, as well as the relations inscribed in and on it, and because Ghanaian state and textile actors draw upon these transgressions in order to constitute the Chinese African print as a threat. Exploring this question empirically thus requires methods
that generate materials that can capture, first, how the Chinese African print is transformed based on its activities, movements and relations and, second, how an array of Ghanaian textile and state actors construct the Chinese African print as a threat. This involves seeking answers to a range of related questions, including: Who are the textile and state actors involved in the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat? How does the Chinese African print move to get to the Ghanaian market? What are the activities that the Chinese African print is involved in that appear threatening in the Ghanaian context? What and who decides when a transgression takes place that transforms the Chinese African print into a threat?

Likewise, recent insights in border studies led me to conclude that to explore the second research question – that is, how Ghanaian actors enact borders to engage the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print – materials are required that can shed light on where and when the borders of the Ghanaian state or nation become consequential and who the state and non-state actors involved in borderwork are.

As I see it, two methodologies are particularly well-suited to addressing these questions. First, it is relevant to ask the actors themselves what their perceptions are of the presence of the Chinese African print on the Ghanaian market and what strategies they have adopted in response to this; in other words, to use qualitative interviews as a research methodology. This is a methodology that basic textbooks on qualitative research methods in human geography describe as particularly suited to gaining an in-depth understanding of the construction of meanings and identities in the interviewees’ own terms, as well as of why people act the way they do within specific settings (e.g. Cloke et al. 2004:150; Dunn 2005:80; McDowell 2010:157-158; Valentine 2005:110-112). Equally, my decision to rely on interviews was partly pragmatic (cf. Cloke et al. 2004:151). Operating in a setting and working with a research problem that I initially knew very little about required an explorative approach and a flexible method that would generate information quickly and that allowed me to return to questions I did not understand and to adjust and follow up on new issues that emerged. Interviewing allows the researcher to do precisely this (e.g. Valentine 2001:44, 2005:111). Further, my motivation for choosing interviews as a methodological strategy comes from my interest in exploring the voices of the Ghanaian protest, which, as I have argued, many scholars within the emerging field on Sino-African relations tend to overlook. Interviewing offers the opportunity to explore and account for a range of neglected voices (Cloke et al. 2004:151). At the same time, it is important to note that the voices presented in this thesis should not be taken to represent the ‘true’ Ghanaian voices, extracted by me as a researcher, but rather that these accounts have been “subject to the editorial and authorial concerns of the researcher, as well as to the interpersonal drama of the interview itself” (ibid.), an argument I shall return to.
The 55 interviews I conducted with a range of actors in Ghana – including representatives from Ghana’s textile companies, trade unions that organise textile workers, textile distribution companies, business organisations, state officials at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ghana Standards Board, the Ghanaian Customs Service, the Registrar General’s Department and textile traders in central Accra, six of whom held leadership positions in four traders’ associations – gave me an in-depth and contextual understanding of the construction of the Chinese African print as ‘smuggled’, ‘counterfeit’ and ‘morally unjust’. Furthermore, these interviews gave me a certain degree of insight about the spatial strategies used to intervene against the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print; in particular, how they were contextually mediated and how each spatial strategy was linked to the next.

What these materials did not provide me with was a full understanding of the transformation of the Chinese African print into these three threat variations, or detailed accounts of how the single import corridor, the anti-counterfeiting operations and the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes worked through borders to engage with this perceived threat. For this purpose, I used a different method: namely, the generation of official and unofficial documentary sources.

This way of generating materials is little discussed in geography and development studies literatures on methodology (Clark 2005; Cloke et al. 2004; Mawdsley 2006 and Rigg 2006 are among the exceptions). Textbooks, thus, offer little advice in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of this method and what it provides in terms of answers to specific types of research questions. Clark, however, implies that the main uses of “preconstructed” materials (Cloke et al. 2004:36) – that is, materials that have not been constructed by the researcher – are to identify topics for research and to contextualise primary data (Clark 2005:59). What I want to argue is that documentary sources have many more uses than that and that the right documents may give the researcher an in-depth understanding of the research problem in ways that in certain instances make them more suitable than interviews or other possible methods.

The documents I have generated include a range of official and non-official documentary sources, including the Ghanaian government’s budget statements between 1999 and 2010; acts that regulate international trade, intellectual property and labour rights; brochures and information from Ghanaian authorities’ websites concerning the regulation of international trade, intellectual property and labour issues; Ghana’s trade and industry policies;

41 When materials that come in the form of texts are discussed, this often occurs with a focus on materials that are generated in archives (DeLyser, Herbert, Aitken, Crang and McDowell 2010; Hay 2005; Jennings 2006). Others discuss imaginative sources (Cloke et al. 2004; Aitken 2005; McEwan 2006), which, for instance, include literary texts, photographs and maps. Yet others discuss only on the generation of primary materials (e.g. Corbridge and Mawdsley 2003; Limb and Dwyer 2001; Scheyvens and Storey 2003).
press statements by Ministers of Trade and Industry; the administrative directive that established the single import corridor; the court proceedings from a case that tried intellectual property infringement; keynote addresses held at the inaugurations of the National Friday Wear programme; reports on the state of Ghana’s textile industry; international conventions for the protection of intellectual property and World Intellectual Property Organization reports; and a number of unofficial documentary sources, including minutes, internal reports and public announcements by Akosombo Textiles Ltd.’s anti-copying team and around 200 newspaper articles published between the years 1998 and 2011.42

What these materials offered in terms of answers to the research questions were, first, a better understanding of the transformation of the Chinese African print into smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust. To be clear, these materials include the laws and procedures that determine which Chinese African print becomes smuggled and which becomes the price that Ghana’s trade and taxation laws stipulate, as well as which Chinese African print becomes counterfeit and which print displays modes of visual communication that are not in violation of Ghana’s intellectual property laws; that is, they make clear the processes that transform the Chinese African print into smuggled and counterfeit (or non-smuggled and non-counterfeit). Moreover, other documentary sources – namely, the Ghanaian government’s budget statements, trade policy and keynote addresses, as well as a range of newspaper cuttings, especially when combined with interviews and literature on the history and significance of the African print and the Ghanaian textile industry – illuminated how the Chinese African print becomes morally unjust.

Second, the documentary materials spelled out in a more precise way where, when and by whom the borders of the Ghanaian state and nation were enacted. To give an example, if an interview generated rather unspecific answers concerning the where and when of the anti-counterfeiting operations, the internal reports of ATL’s anti-copying team provided the exact dates and number of times that the team’s taskforce raided a particular marketplace.

42 Once I began to engage with the branch of border studies that I have been most inspired by when thinking through the Ghanaian case – namely, studies with a focus on the security function of borders – I found that the generation of documentary sources was the most frequently used method within this research field. These studies are based on a range of documentary sources generated by national governments or supra-governmental institutions, including acts, policy briefs, strategy papers, reports, parliamentary hearings, fact sheets, statements, press releases and the websites of governmental authorities, as well as unofficial sources, which include, for example, newspaper cuttings and the websites of the private companies that provide the services used by governments to ensure the security for those on the inside.
Third, these documentary sources deepened my understanding of how the Ghanaian state, textile companies, trade unions and the printed press communicated the perceived threat of the Chinese African print internally as well as to the Ghanaian public. Clark (2005:58, Box 5.1) and Cloke et al. (2004:36) identify the fact that documentary materials are produced for purposes other than those of the research project as a potential caveat associated with basing research on these kinds of sources. Within the context of the Ghanaian case, however, the fact that these materials had been constructed for purposes other than those of my research project was precisely what I found to be the strength of this methodology. Indeed, these official and unofficial documentary sources gave me a more detailed understanding of how Ghanaian actors construct the Chinese African print as a threat and how they enacted borders to intervene against this perceived threat because these sources were not adjusted to suit the ears of a foreign researcher (cf. Ley and Mountz 2001:237).

That said, I do not wish to imply that these accounts represent ‘true’ or ‘objective’ versions of how Ghanaian actors construct the Chinese African print as a threat and how these actors engineer spatial strategies in response to this perceived threat. In my view, all materials are constructed. Rather, these documents represented different accounts of the same events that I had addressed through interviews: namely, accounts of how the Ghanaian state, textile companies and the printed press present their views internally or to the Ghanaian public.

Lastly, I want to emphasise that these two methods worked together to generate the materials needed to answer the two research questions in this thesis. The documentary sources and the interviews both shed light on the actors involved in the transformation of the Chinese African print into a threat. Moreover, they both provided the necessary context that enabled me to make sense of the other set of materials. That is, I needed the interviews to place the documents in context, and vice versa. What is more, both methods drew my attention to a set of circumstances which come together in Ghana and they thus allowed me to consider the problem of the Chinese African print and the spatial strategies used to engage with its presence on the Ghanaian market in their local historical context.

In the next section, my focus is, first, on how I used these methods, which combine personal interaction with desktop research, to generate the materials needed to answer the two research questions and, second, on the process of constructing interpretations based on these materials.
Generating materials, constructing interpretations

The mechanisms and logistics of interviewing have received considerable attention in textbooks on methods in human geography. The decisions involved in the process of generating materials through interviews include choices about who to interview and how to recruit interviewees as well as a variety of issues pertaining to the interview situation itself: what questions to ask and how to ask them, where and when to conduct interviews and how to dress in different interview situations (e.g. Cloke et al. 2004:152-159; Elwood and Martin 2000; Kvale 1997; McDowell 2010; Valentine 2005). How to generate official and non-official documentary sources, however, is less frequently discussed. Thus, in the first part of this section, I want to outline some of the key choices I made concerning how I constructed materials both through interviews and official and non-official documentary sources. I here use the terms ‘construct’ and ‘generate’ to indicate that my approach to fieldwork and the materials it produces is not one that attempts to ‘discover reality’, but rather is one that looks upon ‘the field’ as something constructed and the materials generated as something that reflects not only the unique perceptions of the people who inhabit the field, but as something that is the outcome of the encounters between myself as a researcher and the respondents that I have chosen to include in this study. This is a move that, in Whatmore’s terms, entails a shift “from a rodent activity of ‘collecting’ bits of the world and bringing them home, to one of generating materials in and through the research event” (2003:104).

In this, it means that interpretation begins to shape materials long before the researcher sits down with the materials to conduct analysis; indeed, interpretation is embedded in each moment of the research process (Crang 2003:129; MacKian 2010:360). Pre-emption of the materials is part of the production of research questions (Allen 2003:13). Further, interpretation is embedded in the choices about what to include and what to disregard when materials are generated in the field (MacKian 2010:360; Massey 2003:83). And interpretation is certainly present when we engage in the creative process of producing meaning through analysis and when we write up our reports (cf. Crang 2003:128, 130). Yet, interpretation is rarely discussed in final publications (Crang 2001:215, 2003:134; Jackson 2001:199; MacKian...
Therefore, in this section my aim is to present at least one account (for I cannot possibly account for all the twists and turns of this research project) of the processes of interpreting materials through three moments of the research process: these are the generation of materials, analysis and writing up. The purpose is also to account for how I generated the materials upon which this thesis is based. Specifically, I will argue that it is equally relevant to consider the generation of documentary sources as it is to account for how materials are constructed through interviews.

The choices I have made insofar as the generation of materials is concerned are best understood in the context of the explorative and iterative approach to the research topic that I have adopted. This means that when I first set out to generate materials in the field, I had not yet settled on the two research questions I presented above and I was not yet familiar with the border concept. Instead, my inquiries were informed by a general interest in how Ghanaian actors understood the Chinese African print and in how they had responded to its presence in Ghana. Thus, at the time, my selection of interviewees and documents was based upon my understanding of who the key actors were and on how they related to other actors within the Ghanaian context, and this was an understanding that expanded gradually. What is more, to some extent, it was based on who was willing to disclose their opinions about the topics of my study (cf. Cloke et al. 2004:156, 290; also see Valentine 2005:112).45

Taking the traders’ boycott as my point of departure, my inquiries began in the marketplace. To recruit interviewees I relied on gatekeepers and the concept of snowballing;46 that is, I sought access to this particular field locale through certain key figures who, in turn, introduced me to other textile traders (Cloke et al. 2004:156; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:63-67; Valentine

45 Had I been clear that the focus of this thesis would be on the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and the spatial strategies that work through borders to protect the Ghanaian market, my fieldwork would have included additional field locales – the overland entry point at Aflao, the seaports of Tema and Takoradi and private companies and public institutions that have implemented the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes – and it would have focused more on the Customs Service and Ghana Standards Board, two of the key implementing bodies of the single import corridor.

46 During the early stages of research, two Ghanaian academics, one of whom had the experience of doing fieldwork in Accra central (albeit with traders in other commodities), and one whose sister traded in African prints in central Accra, along with a representative for a Ghanaian Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) that works with women’s rights, played a crucial role as gatekeepers. The representative of the NGO introduced me to the leaders of one of central Accra’s traders’ associations that had called the boycott of Chinese African prints in 2006. During my second period of fieldwork in 2007, I also spent time hanging around central Accra’s textile trading areas. In the course of these excursions, I approached several traders, and was able to gain the trust of two of them. These traders later introduced me to other textile traders. Additionally, representatives of one of Ghana’s textile distribution companies, one of the trade unions that organise Ghana’s textile workers and the Ghana Standards Board helped me identify and get into contact with textile traders in key positions.
2005:116-118; Scheyvens, Nowak, Scheyvens 2003:153-154). Through these textile traders’ accounts I soon learned that there were other actors I needed to include in the study, such as representatives of textile companies and trade unions, as well as state officials. This was because these actors all had a stake in the issue and were involved in crafting strategies that sought to intervene against the presence of the Chinese African print in Ghana, some of which the traders approved of (the single import corridor) and others which they objected to (the anti-counterfeiting operations in the marketplace). My next move, thus, was to snowball from the marketplace to explore the views of other state and non-state actors.

The style of interviewing I most commonly used was the semi-structured; that is, I had a set number of themes and questions I wanted to discuss with each interviewee, but I adjusted the questions and the order in which I posed them depending on the circumstances and the course the conversation took (see e.g. Valentine 2005). The themes and questions included how each interviewee would explain the decline of the Ghanaian textile industry and what her or his thoughts were about the inflow of Chinese African prints to Ghana. Moreover, I enquired about the strategies that each category of respondents had adopted in response to the challenge posed by the Chinese African print and what they viewed as the roles of other actors. As my understanding of these issues deepened, my questions became increasingly precise (and my interview schedules longer).

47 I chose to work in the trading areas in central Accra because of Accra’s location and position. Located near the centres of production of African prints in Ghana and two major seaports in the sub-region – the Ghanaian port of Tema and the port at Lomé in neighbouring Togo, which has emerged as the main point of entry for Chinese African prints to the West African market (Sylvanus 2008:178) – central Accra is undeniably one of the main, if not the main, nodes in the African prints trade in Ghana.

48 A chain of interviews could be established in the following way. A professor at a Ghanaian university introduced me to her sister, who traded in African prints. After having interviewed the professor’s sister, I asked her if she in turn could introduce me to another trader. The next trader was one of the main customers of CTD Ghana’s Accra outlet (CTD Ghana distributes Akosombo Textiles Ltd.’s (ATL) products). This trader, in turn, introduced me to the manager of the Accra outlet. Next, the manager contacted the Operations Manager at CTD Ghana’s head office on my behalf. After having met with the Operation’s Manager of CTD Ghana on several occasions, I, in turn, asked him to introduce me to representatives for ATL. Other interviewees were recruited through the Coalition Against Counterfeit and Illicit Trade (CACIT Ghana), a multi-stakeholder body advocating for the enforcement of Ghana’s intellectual property and licensing laws (see CACIT Ghana:n.d.). Newspaper cuttings provided me with further key information about who the vocal actors were and the positions they represented. Also, they provided crucial information about events that had taken place and policies that had been implemented by the Ghanaian government to support its textile industry. This information not only allowed me to focus the interviews on relevant issues, but it also enabled me to seek out actors in key positions.

49 All interviews were carried out by me in the interviewee’s place of work (a market stall, shop or an office). The language used was English. The majority of the interviews with state officials and representatives from textile companies, trade unions and business organisations were recorded. However, three respondents refused to be recorded, and circumstances surrounding the interviews with Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd. and the Customs
The process of ‘recruiting’ documentary sources was in many ways similar to and closely intertwined with interviewing. To clarify, the interviews I conducted not only provided me with the opportunity to ask a range of Ghanaian actors about their views on the presence of the Chinese African print on the Ghanaian market, but they also helped me to identify the existence of documentary sources and, more importantly, to build the relationships needed to access documentary sources otherwise unavailable. Let me give an example to clarify what I mean by this.

When I embarked upon what turned out to be the final period of fieldwork in February 2010, I had set out to explore the different interventions implemented by the Ghanaian government to support its textile industry and to protect it against competition from certain foreign African prints, in particular the single import corridor, which I had picked up on during earlier periods of fieldwork. My initial and, perhaps in retrospect, naïve, intention was to begin by collecting the relevant documents and to thereafter conduct follow-up interviews with relevant state officials. Instead, as it turned out, I was required to build relationships through interviews with a range of state actors (at the Import/Export, Trade Facilitation, Legal Affairs and Small, Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Technology Divisions of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Destination Inspection Division of Ghana Standards Board) and non-state actors (textile company and trade union representatives) to identify and access the right document: an administrative directive issued by the then-Minister of Trade and Industry. I employed similar tactics to generate the majority of the documentary sources used in this thesis. Thus, contrary to what is sometimes assumed about the collection of preconstructed sources, this was not an easy, cost-efficient method through which to generate materials (e.g. Clark 2005:58). In fact, it took me the greater part of the six weeks I had to spend in the field on this occasion to identify and access the documentary sources upon which several of the arguments of this thesis are based.

Finally, other documentary sources, as noted above, were generated through the use of the web, in particular the Ghanaian government’s Budget Statements between 1999 and 2010, which I downloaded from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning’s website; Ghana’s Industrial Policy and

Service’s official resulted in my not asking to record the interview. In these instances I considered the situation and due to the position of the actors in question, I felt it would negatively impact upon the interview if I had asked to record it. Interviews with state agents lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. Textile company and trade union representatives were more than willing to share their views with me and these interviews lasted about an hour and a half. The interviews in the marketplace were quite different. For one thing, except in two cases, none of the interviews were recorded due to the noise levels. These interviews often lasted for several hours due to constant interruptions. In several instances, an interview continued over two days or more, simply because both the interviewee and I became tired from our attempts to have a discussion in very noisy surroundings and our efforts to understand the different versions of English we spoke. In other cases, the interview was cut short for the same reason.
Industrial Sector Support Programme from the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s website; and large number of articles from Ghanaian newspapers. These were copied during periods of fieldwork in Accra or generated on GhanaWeb, a website directed at Ghanaians living abroad that covers Ghana’s state-owned news agency, Ghana News Agency, and several of Ghana’s major newspapers from 1995 onwards, including the state-owned Daily Graphic and the Ghanaian Times; as well as a range of private newspapers and online news portals including the Ghanaian Chronicle, The Independent, the Accra Mail, the Daily Guide, Public Agenda, The Statesman, the Crusading Guide, Joy Online, Gye Nyame Concord, The Enquirer, the Ghanaian Times and The Informer. Further, the World Intellectual Property Organization’s website became my main source of information about international intellectual property legislation.

Equally, what it is relevant to note is that this approach to generating documentary sources means that my understanding of which documents were relevant was expanded gradually and that this, in turn, impacted on my decisions about what documents to include in this study (and this, of course, is similar to the process of selecting and recruiting interviewees discussed above). What this means is that, while I believe I accessed enough key documents to support my arguments, the process of generating them is best understood as the construction of an archive of sorts, rather than the exploration of an already defined set of documents. To clarify, while I have not con-

50 I searched GhanaWeb’s news archive using the terms cloth, textile* and wax. I also searched articles using the terms smuggling and CEPS (the popular name for the Customs Service in Ghana). I thereafter went through all the hits and excluded articles that did not focus mainly on African prints and/or the textile industry. While GhanaWeb’s news archive does not include all articles published in Ghana, especially during the 1990s and the early 2000s, I do think that it provides a reasonably good overview of how the Ghanaian press presented the state of Ghana’s textile industry during that period. To make up for any shortfall in GhanaWeb, I also searched the webpage of Ghana’s most widely read newspaper, the state-owned Daily Graphic, using the same search terms. 172 of the 230 newspaper cuttings I generated are referenced in this thesis. The most common theme in the 58 articles that are not directly cited was worker-textile company conflicts.

51 Prior to 1992, when Ghana began its transition to democracy, the freedom of the press was limited. In 1962, Nkrumah had banned all newspapers but the state-owned Daily Graphic and the Ghanaian Times. Subsequent military regimes – in particular the National Liberation Council, 1966-1969; the National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council, 1972-1979; and the Provisional National Defence Committee, 1981-1992 – controlled the press through repressive decrees (Hasty 2005a:34-35). Following the approval of the new constitution in 1992, which transformed Ghana into a democratic state, over 40 private newspapers appeared more or less overnight (Hasty 2005b:349-350). According to Hasty, the state-owned and private press play distinctly different roles in Ghanaian news discourse. The state-owned press serves as the ‘mouthpiece of the government’, its news stories usually reproducing statements of politicians and state officials, which were delivered at meetings to which the private press is not invited, and meanwhile the private press primarily represents the opposition (Hasty 2005a:32, 2005b:344-345). The privately owned The Independent and the Ghanaian Chronicle in particular are widely known for their devotion to exposing corruption among state officials (Hasty 2005b:350).
structured the contents of these documents, I have generated them in the sense that I have brought them together for the purposes of this study.

Next, I want to give a few examples of how I sifted and sorted while still generating materials; in other words, how I was already making interpretations as I was generating materials in the field and how these interpretations steered the research project in the direction of the two main research questions.

As pointed out above, my exploration of Ghanaian traders’ views on the presence of the Chinese African print soon took me to different field locales and other actors. Thus, when generating materials in Ghana, the voices of the textile traders, whose call for a boycott had been my initial focal point, and the complexities of the marketplace gradually became more peripheral to this study. Moreover, my interest in the traders’ boycott – that is, in an intervention that sought to protect the Ghanaian market against the Chinese African print – resulted in my placing the actors who construct borders, rather than those who (seek to) transgress them (smugglers of African prints or Chinese manufacturers and Ghanaian traders engaged in the practice of counterfeiting, for example) at the centre of my inquiries in the field. The decision to focus on strategies used to intervene against the Chinese African prints also meant that I excluded the Ghanaian government’s (specifically the Ghana@50 Planning Committee’s) outsourcing of the printing of the cloth designed to commemorate Ghana’s first fifty years of independence to China (see Safo 2007, 27th November:a:1-2; 2007, 27th November:b:2) and partnership with a Chinese textile manufacturer to revitalise a collapsed textile factory (Amankwah 2007, 4th May; Ghana News Agency 2007, 11th May) from my inquiries.52 Further, my decision to focus on (the perceived threat of) the Chinese African print to the Ghanaian textile economy meant that the role of Ghana’s industrial (including labour market legislation, taxation policy, environmental, health and safety regulations and national product standards), monetary (interest rates) and energy (costs of oil and electricity) policies were downplayed in terms of an overall explanation for the decline of Ghana’s textile industry. I justified this focus by the fact that the Ghanaian actors I interviewed commonly related these factors to an overall Chinese threat to the Ghanaian textile economy. High prices for oil and electricity and insufficient power supply, for instance, were said to threaten Ghana’s textile industry because the Chinese government gives its companies steam for textile production for free. Had Chinese products not entered the market, many respondents suggested, the high costs of production in

52 My decision to exclude these events – as well as smugglers and counterfeitors of African prints – from the study was not only informed but my research interests but was also pragmatic as I did not have the contacts needed to gain access to smugglers, the resources to travel to China, or the capacity to convince state officials to discuss the outsourcing of the printing of anniversary cloth to Chinese manufacturers or the partnership with the Chinese textile manufacturer.
Ghana would not have been an issue in the first place (interviews with representatives for ATL; TexStyles; Printex; TGLEU, March 2010).

If I am to describe the main period of analysis, which began after my final fieldwork in early 2010, and the process of writing up this thesis that followed, I would turn to Mike Crang’s depiction of analysis as developing plausible explanations through data (2003:131-133) (albeit in a less structured way than the grounded theory inspired approach to analysis that, according to Crang (2001:215, 2005:219), is so common in geography), “disciplining material” (2003:133) and “making narratives and coherent stories” (2003:138). To clarify, what Crang discusses is a process where the researcher picks out themes and constructs categories through a close reading of interview transcripts, makes connections between categories and, finally, seeks to construct a plausible and persuasive argument by focusing on some parts while leaving others out, and by attempting to bridge the gaps and holes that necessarily are always present in any set of materials (e.g. 2001:219-226, 2003:131-134, 138-142, 2005:220-225).

For my part, analysis did not begin with a one line at a time reading (Crang 2001:221) of all the materials I had generated. Instead, I partly drew upon my interpretations of the Ghanaian situation, which had taken place throughout the whole research process, particularly when I generated materials and engaged with various academic literatures, to construct my initial categories and the questions which I posed to the materials. Based on field experiences, I had already developed a sense of why the Chinese African print was considered threatening: namely, because of the practices of smuggling and counterfeiting. Further, I had learned what these terms meant in the Ghanaian context and how they were intertwined with issues of price, brand names and quality. More than that, through the interviews I had developed a distinct feeling that there was something less tangible than intellectual property infringements at stake when Ghanaian textile actors and state officials described the Ghanaian African print as ‘original’, ‘genuine’ and ‘authentic’ and the Chinese African print as ‘fake’, ‘stolen’ and ‘pirated’. Indeed, it seemed to me that ‘being original’ was not just about bearing an original design (by which I mean a design that is not counterfeit) but of being part of West African textile heritage, a property that the Chinese African print can never acquire. During the first periods of fieldwork, I did not yet think of these properties as being part of the perceived threat of the Chinese African print in Ghana. Rather, the notion of a relational construction of the Chinese African print as a threat was something I began to develop when I wrote a paper for a conference (Axelsson 2009). During periods of fieldwork, I also learned about Ghana’s textile companies’ anti-counterfeiting operations in Ghana’s marketplaces as well as a range of policy responses from the Ghanaian government, including the single import corridor and the
National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. These attempts at coming up with solutions to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print thus became a further theme of my analysis. However, I had yet to make the connection that these strategies were the spatial responses to the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana. Finally, and based on the fact that I was working with a range of different actors, my analysis focused on unpacking their different views, roles and relations.

While my initial analysis and first attempts at transforming the materials I had generated into an academic text certainly involved a degree of disciplining of the materials, it was as I began to think about writing up the thesis in earnest and when I finally sat down in front of the computer to construct a plausible argument that the notion of analysis as an act of violence (see e.g. Crang 2003:141-142) started to make sense to me. It was at this stage in the research process that I engaged closely with the border studies literature, and in particular with scholarship on contemporary security practices, in order to transform my initial thoughts concerning the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat, and of the policy responses of the Ghanaian state and Ghana’s textile companies’ use of existing legislation to pursue the counterfeit Chinese African print as border-making strategies, into an argument based in an academic debate.

From this point onwards, my analysis and writing processes worked closely together to (re-)shape my interpretations of the Ghanaian case. Thus, I went back to re-order my materials; this time, my sorting was organised, as discussed in earlier chapters, around three variations of threat – smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust – and three spatial strategies used by Ghanaian actors in response to these threats – the single import corridor, the anti-counterfeiting operations and the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. Next, I re-read the materials while focusing on the processes that constructed the Chinese African print as a threat and on where and when borders were enacted to intervene against their presence on the Ghanaian market, as well as on the actors involved in these processes. Thus, if during the initial stages of analysis I drew upon interpretations based on field experiences and the materials I had generated, during the later stages of the

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53 I also looked at other, less frequently discussed solutions to the inflow of Chinese African prints to Ghana: the anti-smuggling of textiles taskforce set up in 2003; the 2006 decision to auction seized African prints to deter people from smuggling; the additional five per cent levy on textile imports, introduced in 2010, to reduce importation; and, to some extent, the memorandum of understanding, signed in 2010, which established that seized smuggled or counterfeit African prints were to be publicly burnt but which I decided to downplay once I had chosen to focus on the single import corridor, the anti-counterfeiting operations and the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes.

54 I took a few first steps in that direction in a paper I presented at the Nordic Africa Days in 2010, which I titled ‘Our borders are porous’: Ghanaian responses to the Chinese textile challenge.’ In this paper, I explored the link between the Ghanaian discourse on border porosity, on the one hand, and the single import corridor and the anti-counterfeiting operations, on the other.
research process I revisited the same materials, parallel to writing the thesis, with a set of refined and distinct questions with which to conduct analysis and construct interpretations anew.

In the final section of this chapter, I would like to make a number of reflections about a range of issues pertaining to ethics, power and positionality, which, in their own way, shaped this research project.

**Ethics, power and positionality**

The value, and, at times, the necessity, of reflecting critically about one’s positionality – that is, to explore and render visible the class, gender and racial, differences between the researcher and the researched in terms of distances in a landscape of power (Rose 1997:312) – has been emphasised by many geographers, in particular feminist geographers and/or geographers writing about research in post-colonial settings (see e.g. Dowling 2005; England 1994; Ley and Mountz 2001; Skelton 2001; Thrift 2003). At the same time, Rose (1997) has argued that to do so is an exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, task. How can I tell, for example, what my being a white, female, Swedish researcher means in each unique research situation? Thus, rather than aspiring to communicate the distances between ourselves and the researched in this landscape of power, a position that in the first place is underpinned by assumptions about the identities of the researcher and the researched as being complete and fixed, Rose suggests, we may consider the positions of the researcher and the researched as relational; that is, as something that is constituted through the research process itself, which, in turn, makes these positions complex, unstable and incomplete (ibid.). This move does not necessarily mean that Rose has made the issues of positionality and power any less complicated or easier to address. Rather, she has illuminated how a (necessarily incomplete) attempt to account, for example, for how my ‘whiteness’ positions me in relation to the researched is intrinsically flawed and that we must seek alternative way of addressing the issues of power and positionality in qualitative research (Rose 1997).

On that note, I want to end this chapter with a few reflections on the unstable nature of power and positionality in my own research. Importantly (and self-evidently?), this account reflects my experiences of power and positionality. The experiences of those who participated in this study are altogether different, to be sure. Although power was certainly involved when I defined this research project, here my account is organised around two moments of the research process where the issues of power and positionality became particularly pronounced for me and where my experiences of power were fundamentally different: these moments were when interacting with respondents in the field and when sitting down at my desk to construct an argument out of the materials that I ‘brought back’.
Consider the following. I had arranged to meet with a textile trader in central Accra. After we have exchanged the usual greetings, I introduced myself and explained that I was conducting a PhD research project on the challenges that textile traders in Accra presently are facing and that my main interest was in what the traders think about the presence of ‘foreign cloth’ in the marketplace. I was just about to explain in more detail what the research project was about and what it would mean to take part in the study, when the trader interrupted to deliver her thoughts on the research topic. The question of foreign cloth in the marketplace clearly engaged the trader; her voice was animated, her gestures vivid. While I found her story truly fascinating, I also found myself looking for an opportunity to disrupt the stream of words to place this conversation within the framework of the interview. After some time, the trader asked in an accusing tone, “Are you not writing this down?” “I’m sorry; of course”, I responded, and pulled out my notebook. “Please continue”. Once the trader had finished, I looked down at my sheet of themes and questions and tried to make out what we had not yet covered. I asked the trader one of my questions. The trader hesitated, then said, suspicion in her voice this time, “Why do you want to know? Is it because you want to trade?” My attempts at re-assuring the trader that this was not the case were futile and the trader’s shrug dismissive. She said, “I’ve already told you what I have to tell you”.

To me, this event represents one example of how the researched and myself as researcher negotiated power and positions in a specific interview situation. In this case, the trader chose to participate in the research project on her own terms. For her, this meant delivering her opinions about foreign cloth in the marketplace and the challenges that the local textile industry was facing in the form of a ‘speech’. Once she had been given the opportunity to express those views, the interview was, as she saw it, over, and there was no convincing her otherwise. I, on the other hand, attempted to assert my position as interviewer, first, by waiting for the trader to pause long enough for me to transform the conversation into a clearly defined research situation that would meet the requirements spelled out in the ethical guidelines of research councils, and, then, by pulling the conversation back into the semi-structured format specified in my interview schedule once the trader had finished telling her story. I clearly failed at both attempts in this instance.

55 ‘Foreign cloth’ and at times ‘China cloth’ were the terms I used when conducting interviews in the marketplace. Foreign cloth turned out to be the more useful of the two, in particular when discussing each trader’s own stock. Many small-scale traders were unaware of the specific origins of the African prints they sold (I could tell, however, that they were of Chinese origin due to the brand names). Additionally, while the traders had no problem telling me that the African prints they sold were foreign, some traders would prefer not to admit to selling African prints from China.

56 This is a reconstruction of the conversation.
Other actors asserted power in different ways. One state official, for example, expressed his wish not to participate in the study in a number of ways. First, he claimed to need authorisation from the minister’s secretariat, and then, once my letter had been approved, he did not turn up to our scheduled meetings or, if he did come, he suddenly interrupted the interview by leaving for another meeting, or he asked not to be recorded or he simply directed the conversation away from the topic of my research. In this instance, I was obliged to accept his wishes and the interview was never completed. In other situations, I was the one who asserted my position through the use of business cards, interview schedules, notebooks and, at times, recording devices. Additionally, it happened more than once that I insisted the respondent answer all my questions, even when I could sense that I had overstayed my welcome.

The point I want to make is that while I certainly acknowledge my privileged position as a Western researcher and the implications of conducting research in a post-colonial setting, as well as the power that always comes with posing research questions, deciding who is to be included in the study and who is not and asking interview questions, my experiences of doing fieldwork in Ghana is probably better described as a two-way encounter where positions constantly were negotiated. Indeed, this field was certainly not passive, but rather spoke back in a number of ways (cf. Massey 2003:86).

In this context, I would also like to draw attention to what Nigel Thrift calls “a new kind of ‘audit culture’” (2003:108), which includes requirements for researchers to obtain informed consent (see e.g. Brydon 2006; Dowling 2005:21; Kvale 1997:104-116; Scheyvens, Nowak and Scheyvens 2003) and to guarantee the confidentiality of the participants. In my view, these principles are related to the question of power. Indeed, in their emphasis on informed consent, the right of the participants to withdraw from the study at any time and the confidentiality of participants (Vetenskapsrådet 2002:7-13) these guidelines are, to some extent, designed to empower the researched. Yet, when put into practice in a specific research situation, these principles are not always easy to comply with (Thrift 2003:117-118), as illustrated by my meeting with the textile trader, as described above. In other similar situations, I also chose not to interrupt the respondent, but instead asked her/him at the end of our conversation if she/he would like to withdraw any statements. In no case did the respondents express that they wished to do so. Some expressed, however, that they preferred to remain anonymous. Thus, I have chosen to conceal the identities of all the respondents who participated in this study. As I see it, the identities of the people who contributed to this study are not essential to the arguments that I wish to make, nor do I find that concealing them significantly impacts upon the credibility of the study. While the reader who is well informed about Ghanaian circumstances may be able to identify some of the respondents, I am confi-
dent that the identities of the respondents who specifically asked to be anonymous cannot be revealed.

Equally, the choices I made in order to construct a coherent argument based on the materials led me to reflect upon further ethical considerations involved in undertaking research. Indeed, while I at times experienced my power as limited when conducting fieldwork, when I constructed an argument out of the materials I had brought back, I certainly felt the power that comes with sorting out what is relevant and what should be left out, pulling out sentences from a long conversation and placing them in new contexts, and transforming other people’s accounts into academic writing. For me, this feeling of power was far from intoxicating. Rather, as noted above, the process of transforming materials into this thesis made me appreciate the notion of analysis and academic writing as acts of violence. Indeed, many times my efforts at producing a seemingly seamless argument based upon materials that were full of gaps and holes reminded me of childhood attempts at pushing a square-shaped block through a circular hole. Moreover, constructing interpretations based on these materials evoked anxieties about misrepresentation (cf. Ley and Mountz 2001:239) in ways that brought all the people I had interacted with in the field right into my office at Stockholm University. What would the reactions of the Ghanaian actors – who willingly (or indeed unwillingly) had provided me with information while in the field – be to the narrative about the Ghanaian situation that I had constructed? Was I exploiting my power as a researcher at the expense of those who participated in the study? Thus, while interpretation through analysis and writing up, as Crang has suggested, based on de Certeau, divides us from the materials (2003:140-142), at the same time the field remains forever present (cf. Massey 2003:83).

These are obviously complex issues that are related not only to the ethical considerations of the researcher, but also to philosophical discussions about whether it is in fact possible to represent the ‘Other’ (Ley and Mountz 2001:235). I will not attempt to provide any glib answers to such a fundamental issue. Rather, I will refer to my point of departure, which has been that the one thing I have access to are my interpretations of the Ghanaian case, and that these interpretations are based upon materials that have been generated in the context of interactions between me and a range of Ghanaian actors who participated in this study (see e.g. Cloke et al. 2004:326-330). Thus, more than anything, the contribution of this thesis is a reading of Ghanaian textile actors do not overlook the fact that their capacity to compete with Chinese products on the domestic market also has to do with internal factors; Ghana’s industrial (including labour market legislation, taxation policy, environmental, health and safety regulations, national product standards), monetary (interest rates), energy (cost of oil and electricity) and trade (tariffs imposed on raw materials) policies were all pointed out as factors contributing to the decline of the textile industry. The decision to exclude these issues from the thesis is mine alone.

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57 I would thus like to acknowledge that Ghanaian textile actors do not overlook the fact that their capacity to compete with Chinese products on the domestic market also has to do with internal factors; Ghana’s industrial (including labour market legislation, taxation policy, environmental, health and safety regulations, national product standards), monetary (interest rates), energy (cost of oil and electricity) and trade (tariffs imposed on raw materials) policies were all pointed out as factors contributing to the decline of the textile industry. The decision to exclude these issues from the thesis is mine alone.
naian responses to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print through the lens of the border concept, and less an account of the ‘true’ Ghanaian voices, if such an aspiration were indeed possible.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to account for my choice of methods and the process of undertaking research on African prints in Ghana. One of the main points put forward in the chapter was that it is equally relevant to consider how both primary (here, materials generated through semi-structured interviews) and preconstructed materials (here, official and non-official documentary sources) are the outcome of a range of decisions and are constructed through encounters between the researcher and the researched. Furthermore, while I stressed that interpretation begins to shape materials from the very outset of a research project, my focus was specifically on the practice of interpretation through the generation of materials, analysis and writing up. Here, the emphasis was on how field experiences, materials and academic debates work together to structure the final product at each of these moments of the research process. Finally, I reflected upon how issues of power and positionality played out in this research project.

Based upon my interpretations of the materials outlined in this chapter, the next three chapters present the voices of the Ghanaian response to the inflow of Chinese African prints to the marketplace, principally in terms of the borders that they work through. I begin, in Chapter 5, by exploring the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled and the institution of a single import corridor. In the chapter following that, I look at the construction of the Chinese African print as counterfeit and the operations carried out in Ghana’s marketplaces. Finally, in Chapter 7, the focus is on the construction of the Chinese African print as morally unjust and the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. Each of these three chapters seeks to add a new element to our understanding of the processes that transform the Chinese African print into a threat, and, by extension, into an object available to intervention. Equally, and just as importantly, each chapter demonstrates a different way that the borders of the Ghanaian state and nation are re-shaped and displaced in response to the presence of the Chinese African print in Ghana.
5 Stretching the border: Chinese African prints as smuggled

In May 2005, the then-Minister of Trade and Industry, Alan Kyerematen, called a press conference. Before the Ghanaian press he announced that, beginning on 1st July, all entry points, except the seaport at Takoradi in western Ghana (see figures 7 and 12), would be closed for African print imports. The designation of Takoradi as the single import corridor for African prints meant, the Minister concluded, that “all commercial imports of African prints through unauthorised routes, particularly the land borders, shall be confiscated on sight and the importers prosecuted” (Ghanaian Chronicle 2005, 19th May:n.p.). This intervention was necessary, the Minister continued, to deal with the “illegal trade practices” (Kyerematen 2005:16) associated with the importation of African prints to Ghana, including the complete evasion of the payment of duties, fees and other taxes, or under-declaration and under-invoicing to reduce the costs of bringing African prints onto the Ghanaian market (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005a). These practices, classified as smuggling in the Ghanaian context, Kyerematen declared, had been enabled by a “well-organised smuggling syndicate including importers, clearing and forwarding agents, officials of the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, the Police, [and] Port Security personnel [...] that had flooded the market with smuggled products mainly from China” (Ghana News Agency 2005, 18th May:n.p.).

The purpose of this chapter is, first, to explore how the Chinese African print is constructed as smuggled, and, second, how the single import corridor worked through the borders of the Ghanaian state to intervene against this perceived threat. I argue that the single import corridor sought to intensify the line at the outer edges of state territory by stretching the border to a number of locales prior to, at and beyond the territorial border.

The chapter is organised as follows. First, I explore how the Chinese African print is constituted as either ‘legal’ or ‘smuggled’. Here, the focus is on the moments of contact (or the lack thereof) between the Chinese African print and the places, procedures, institutions and actors associated with tariff

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58 It is important to note that the single import corridor also was designed to deal with the perceived threat of counterfeit Chinese African prints. I will mention counterfeiting and intellectual property rights briefly when appropriate, but will leave the majority of this discussion for the next chapter.
extraction in Ghana. The Chinese African print for which the appropriate costs – tariffs, fees and taxes – of access to the Ghanaian market are paid is constituted as legal. The Chinese African print that evades some of these costs, by contrast, becomes smuggled. Next, I seek to situate both the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled – and the establishment of the single import corridor – in a long-term Ghanaian debate about smuggling, corruption and border porosity, and in the liberalisation of the Ghanaian market. In other words, I propose that the single import corridor was not only justified by the smuggled status of the Chinese African print. Rather, both the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled and the intervention against this threat – the single import corridor – are informed by certain events of the Ghanaian past and by the liberalisation of the Ghanaian market that continues to date. Finally, I shift the focus to the single import corridor as a spatial response to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print in Ghana. This spatial strategy, I contend, worked with the line along the edges of Ghanaian territory in a variety of ways. It twisted the border into the shape of a corridor; it folded the border both outwards and inwards and enacted the border along the line at the outer edges of territory, while engaging a wide array of actors in borderwork. These moves were to enforce selective control on the African prints trade; that is, the objective of the single import corridor was to allow trade in non-smuggled (Chinese) African prints, while imposing restrictions only against the illegal trade. The chapter thus shows that even a spatial strategy that displaces certain functions associated with border control from the line at the outer edges may have as its objective the intensification of that very line.
Before I explore in detail the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled and how the single import corridor sought to intervene against the presence of this threat on the Ghanaian market, however, I want to clarify how price, revenue generation and import tariffs are associated with smuggling as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy.

The threat of the smuggled Chinese African print

[T]he major one [challenge] that we are facing is the smuggling. Apart from them copying our designs and what not, [...] they [Chinese African prints] don’t even come in through the right channel to be taxed as we are being taxed. They go to our neighbours, Togo – it’s a free port – they offload there and then they try and smuggle it in. And the volumes that come in, that is the problem. And they come in at about half the price of what we are selling. Even if we all go to the same market to buy the grey cloth, when you look at the price at which they are selling, it’s as if the grey cloth is cheap, or is free, which is not so. So when you do the calculations you find out that they have smuggled these things. That is the main problem that is clambering the textile industry. (General Manager for Administration, Printex Ltd., March 2010)

As noted in the previous chapter, it was through interviews with textile and state actors in Ghana that I came to understand that the practice of smuggling Chinese African prints onto the Ghanaian market was central to the constitution of them as a threat. In the Ghanaian context, smuggling has historically been a symbolic and political issue, just as much as an economic concern. I will return to the former below, but in this section, I want to focus on two, interrelated, economic aspects of smuggling as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy. The first has to do with price, the second with revenue generation. They both have to do with import tariffs, a trade policy measure used to inflate prices of imports to create incentives for industrialisation, to protect domestic industries from foreign competition and to generate revenue for the state. Import tariffs have been Ghana’s main trade policy instrument since 1989.

However, the taxation of mobile products or people at the outer edges of territory has long been central to the Ghanaian economy, and the Gold Coast Colony before it. Indeed, several scholars have argued that the control of cross-border trade was a key incentive behind the British colonial project in West Africa (cf. Chalfin 2010a:22, 62; Clark 1994:108; Nugent 1996:52, 2002:224-225). Once independent, Ghana continued to derive the bulk of its income at specific points – customs stations – located along the outer edges of its territory (Chalfin 2010a:23, 107, 140; Ghana News Agency 2005, 19th November). As discussed in Chapter 2, a combination of import licensing, prohibitions and foreign exchange control were used to protect Ghana’s
budding industries from foreign competition. By contrast, Ghana’s signature on a structural adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1983 signalled the country’s gradual return to import tariffs as its main trade policy instrument (e.g. Oduro 2000:176-177; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1992:9). In addition to import tariffs, Ghana imposes a number of fees and taxes on imports that are extracted at the port of entry on Ghanaian territory.

Now, returning to the issue of price, it is widely recognised that the costs of production for textile products are considerably lower in China than in countries such as Ghana. The purpose of import tariffs and fees, and, to some extent, taxes that are imposed on African print imports, thus, is to decrease the price gap between Chinese and Ghanaian African prints on the market. In Ghana, the trade policy prescribes the highest tariff for African print imports: 20 per cent. Together with other fees and taxes, the 20 per cent import tariff seeks to inflate the price at which the Chinese African print sells on the Ghanaian market to a level where it no longer can outcompete locally produced African prints.

In a way, smuggling thus de-regulates the Ghanaian market; that is, it undermines the protective element of the import tariff (and fees and taxes) as it significantly reduces the price at which the Chinese African print may be sold. Based on figures from the Makola Cloth Sellers Association, an association that organises African print traders in central Accra, in 2003, the Ghanaian government introduced an additional 5 per cent tariff on textiles to protect the local industries against cheaper imports (see Ghana Revenue Authority, Customs Division 2010; Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2010, section 877). This measure goes against the argument that liberalisations of the Ghanaian market imply that increases of import tariffs do not represent a viable option, and that new forms of border-making are emerging that seek to impose control on international trade selectively in that they raise the barriers to trade in all textile products.

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59 Yet, Jebuni et al. (1994) have described the years between 1957 and 1961, as well as those between 1966 and 1972, as relatively liberal. When Ghana became independent, a colonial development plan, which prescribed a relatively liberal regime, was in place. The military government, the National Liberation Council, which seized control of Ghana in 1966, accepted an International Monetary Fund/World Bank stabilisation package, after which Ghana entered into a phase of a liberalised import regime, which was to last until the Busia civilian government, which led the country between 1969-71, was ousted in 1972. Following the 1972 coup, Ghana entered into a protectionist phase that more or less was to last through three successive changes of government until a structural adjustment agreement was signed in 1983 (Jebuni et al. 1994:1162-1165).

60 A uniform tariff of 30 per cent was introduced in 1983. This was adjusted downwards in 1986 when a four-tier tariff structure ranging from zero to 25 per cent was adopted. Yet, these were long supplemented by special import taxes of between 10 and 40 per cent (but up to 100 per cent on luxury goods in 1991, adjusted down from between 75 to 500 per cent) (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1992:9). Import licensing was ultimately abolished in 1989. When the World Trade Organization last reviewed Ghana’s trade policy in 2007, Ghana’s four-tariff band structure (zero, 5, 10 and 20 per cent) was applied to 99.8 per cent of all imports. The average tariff was 12.7 per cent, down from 14.7 per cent in 2000 (World Trade Organization 2008:viii).

61 In 2010, just over a year after the single import corridor was revoked, the Ghanaian government introduced an additional 5 per cent tariff on textiles to protect the local industries against cheaper imports (see Ghana Revenue Authority, Customs Division 2010; Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2010, section 877). This measure goes against the argument that liberalisations of the Ghanaian market imply that increases of import tariffs do not represent a viable option, and that new forms of border-making are emerging that seek to impose control on international trade selectively in that they raise the barriers to trade in all textile products.
*naian Chronicle* reported that Chinese wax prints sold at around one-third of the price of those produced in Ghana (2003, 29th November). In 2010, textile company representatives stated that the price for a Chinese African print was around half of that for an African print produced in Ghana, as illustrated by the quote above.

If we assume that price is an important factor when Ghanaian consumers decide which African print to purchase, the lower prices of Chinese African prints, compared to those produced in Ghana, indeed threaten the Ghanaian textile economy. This, in turn, means that if Ghana’s textile companies are unable to compete on their main market, the domestic (van Koert 2007:135), then, ultimately, more than four decades of African prints production in Ghana may come to an end. In Ghana, the threat that the smuggled (Chinese) African print represents is primarily discussed in economic terms. To clarify, unemployment and the loss of revenue to the Ghanaian state are pointed out as two of the main consequences if the textile industry succumbs to the competition created by smuggled African prints. In 2003, the Deputy Minister of Finance, for instance, claimed that smuggling was “killing the local industries, especially textile companies” and that this “trend needs to be checked because when the companies fold up, people become unemployed” (Ghanaian Times 2003, 13th November:n.p.). The fear that the inflow of smuggled Chinese African prints would result in the loss of employment opportunities and revenues was also expressed by the representatives of textile companies, trade unions and a consumer association, and the state officials and textile traders I interviewed in Ghana.

As pointed out above, the construction of the Chinese African print as either legal or a threat, in this instance is closely interlinked with its price on the Ghanaian market. To clarify, the Chinese African print that is displayed at the ‘right’ price – that is, the price stipulated by Ghana’s trade and tax laws – is legal, while the Chinese African print that is marketed at the ‘wrong’ price – a price significantly lower than that at which Ghanaian African prints sell – is constituted as smuggled. These processes are the focus of the next section.

### Constructing Chinese African prints as smuggled

As noted above, import tariffs replaced the quantitative restrictions on imports as the Ghanaian government’s main trade policy instrument from the mid-1980s onwards. Thus, in this section, the focus is on the moments where and when the Chinese African print comes into contact with, or completely

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62 This is not to say that price is the only factor with which to compete on the Ghanaian market. In the next two chapters, I examine the roles of brand names, designs, quality and ‘authenticity’.
avoids, the places, procedures, institutions and actors involved in the extraction of import tariffs and on how this transforms the Chinese African print into either the right price or smuggled.

However, if we are to understand the transgression of the Chinese African print, and what constitutes it as smuggled, we must first know something about the trade routes on which this product travels as well as the intersecting histories of Ghana and Togo in the African prints economy. Indeed, while all of Ghana’s official border posts were open to African print imports prior to the establishment of the single import corridor in July 2005 (and after its revocation in 2008), there are two privileged routes for Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market: namely, on a ship from China, crossing Ghana’s maritime border at Tema port, or via the seaport at Lomé in neighbouring Togo, entering Ghana at the overland border post at Aflao (figure 8).

Tema, located just over 30 kilometres east of the capital, Accra, hosts Ghana’s primary seaport (see figure 9). While first initiated by the British colonial administration in 1951, the construction of a modern deep water seaport at Tema in close vicinity of the capital was part of Nkrumah’s modernist vision for Ghana. Thus, in addition to the seaport, the former fishing village of Tema became host to an extensive industrial and residential area (Chalfin 2010b:575-576; Hilling 1969:376-377) where several of Ghana’s textile companies – including Ghana Textile Printing Company Ltd. (now TexStyles Ghana Ltd.), Tema Textiles Ltd. and Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd. – set up. Once full operations commenced in 1962, Tema port quickly became Ghana’s leading port for imports and replaced the roadstead port in Accra, as well as a number of piers and surf ports along the coast (Hilling 1969:375). In present-day Ghana, Tema port is the hub of the large-scale seaborne trade in Chinese African prints.

The other privileged route for Chinese African prints destined for the Ghanaian market goes through the free port at Lomé (see figure 8). As discussed earlier, the Gold Coast was the initial trade hub for African prints produced in Europe, and its textile mammies attained a highly influential position due to the fact that they established control over trade and distribution of African prints throughout West Africa (Robertson 1984:99-101). In the years leading up to Ghanaian independence in 1957, however, the economic policies of the Gold Coast changed radically. As noted in Chapter 2, the steep increases of tariffs on printed textiles, which began in August 1956 (van Koert 2007:14-15), would re-position Ghana in the African prints economy. Thus, towards the end of the 1950s, the distribution of European African prints had shifted to Togo, whose Nana-Benzes monopolised the European trade from the capital of Lomé (Axelsson and Sylvanus 2010:132; Sylvanus 2007:209). The Ghanaian market, on the other hand, was increasingly dominated by locally produced African prints. More recently, the free port in Lomé has emerged as a major, if not the main, gateway for Chinese African prints into West Africa (Sylvanus 2008a:178).
Ghana, by contrast, has become a major recipient of overseas imports, African prints included, which are redistributed from a number of entrepôt economies in the region (see e.g. Bach 1999; Meagher 2003), Togo included. The Chinese African prints that enter the West African market at Lomé continue their journey towards the Ghanaian market by crossing the border at Aflao, a dusty border town on the southern end of the Ghana-Togo border, roughly 200 kilometres from Accra (see figure 10). This border post is one of West Africa’s busiest. For Ghanaians, it represents the gateway, not only to Togo, but also to the markets in Benin and Nigeria (Chalfin 2010a:59-62). Employing nearly 300 customs officers and operating six substations in strategic locations further inland and a number of checkpoints and control zones along the southern stretch of the eastern boundary, along the Ghanaian coast, as well as inland, Aflao is the largest of Ghana’s frontier posts (Chalfin 2010a:62). In the Chinese African prints trade, the Aflao border post represents the gateway to the textile market in Lomé. As such, it plays a key role in the smaller scale overland import trade in Chinese African prints to Ghana.
Figure 9. View over the seaport in Tema. Photo: Doug Herbert.

Figure 10. The ceremonial arch at the Aflao border-crossing. Photo: Bruce Thompson.
Therefore, prior to the establishment of the single import corridor, Tema port and the border post at Aflao were the two main places where African print imports were inspected and valued, and where the cost of access to the Ghanaian market was extracted. Subsequently, they represented the places where the Chinese African print could be transformed into the right price, the subject to which I now turn.

**Becoming the right price**

I begin the exploration of the procedures, institutions and actors that are involved in tariff and tax extraction and hold the potential to transform the Chinese African print into the right price at Tema port, which, as noted above, is the centre of the large-scale seaborne trade in Chinese African prints. Here, the Chinese African print comes into contact with a wide range of actors, including government agencies and private logistics service providers, that have to be approached in a certain order. Moreover, these procedures take the importer, or rather the importer’s licensed Custom House Agent, to a number of places inside as well as outside Tema port, and they produce substantial amounts of artefacts along the way, including Attested Invoices, Import Declaration Forms, Bills of Lading, Packing Lists, Final Classification and Valuation Reports (FCVR), Tax Clearance Certificates, Taxpayers Identification Numbers, Delivery Orders, bank receipts, waybills and so on (Customs Excise and Preventive Service n.d.; Ghana Shippers Authority n.d.; Ghana Shippers Authority n.d.;a, n.d.;b). Combined, these artefacts represent the ‘visa’ of the Chinese African print, so to speak, which allows it to enter the Ghanaian market.

The process of gaining access to the Ghanaian market begins with the valuation of the consignment. The valuation and calculation of duties to be paid is one of several key functions of the Ghanaian duty collection procedure, which, according to Chalfin, have been subjected to neoliberal reform (e.g. 2004, 2006, 2010a). Indeed, prior to Ghana’s World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in 1995, valuation was the complete purview of the Ghanaian Customs Service, who used a list of standard values to determine values and import duties. This list, according to Chalfin, was in fact “a generalized and largely outdated list containing rough estimations of the going price with select markups and markdowns serving as de facto system of im-

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63 The laws that are used to control mobility in this instance are trade and tax laws; specifically, they are the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law 1993, The Export and Import Act 1995, Value Added Tax Act 1998, and the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (Management) (Rates, Duties and Other Taxes) Act 1994 (also see World Trade Organization 2008:11).

64 Legislative Instrument 1178 (Customs House Agent Licensing Regulation) of 1978 prescribes that importers engage a licensed Customs House Agent to clear goods (Ghana Shippers’ Authority n.d.;b).
port control” (2010a:107). After a five-year grace period, Ghana was expected to abandon this practice of commissioner’s value, to replace it with the WTO’s preferred transaction value, which bases import duties on “the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to the country of importation” (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994:171). The relevant point here is that the transition to transaction value, which took place in 2000, moved valuation from customs officers operating the border posts along the outer edges of territory to Accra, where it was to be overseen by destination inspection companies (Chalfin 2010a:107-108; World Trade Organization 2001:28).

Around the same time, in April 2000, Ghana overturned its dual inspection scheme. Since the 1970s, inspections – another key function of customs officers’ work (see figure 11) – of overseas imports destined for the Ghanaian market had been carried out at the port of embarkation, as well as at the port on entry, which is within Ghanaian territory. While pre-shipment inspections were carried out by private actors, inspections in Ghanaian territory were carried out by the Ghanaian Customs Service (Chalfin 2010a:171). Since 2000, Ghana applies destination inspection: that is, inspections at the port of entry alone (Chalfin 2004:400-402, 2006:157, 2010a:169-175; Darkwah 2002:190-193; also see Tetteh 2009b). This reform was part of a trade facilitation and export promotion scheme known as the Gateway Project (Ghana Trade and Investment Gateway Project 2009; also see Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 1999, section...
Similar to the transition to transaction value, the shift to destination inspection involved partial privatisation of inspections (Chalfin 2010a:107-108).

The agent of our importer of African prints subsequently begins his/her work at a designated destination inspection company in Accra to have the importer’s consignment valued. Based on documents provided by the importer’s agent, the destination inspection company establishes the FCVR, which specifies the dutiable value, import duty and value added tax to be paid on the consignment. The agent thereafter pays the duty and taxes, before presenting the FCVR and a range of other documents to a designated customs officer in the long room at Tema port for verification. If given approval in the long room, the agent approaches the shipping agent to have the consignment released for inspection. Before inspections begin, the agent must deposit a number of documents at the offices of Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority for assessment and the payment of handling charges. Once these procedures are completed, the consignment is either physically examined by customs officers or passed through Ghana’s state-of-the-art x-ray scanner to determine its contents before proceeding to the exit for final clearance. Here documents are scrutinised one final time before the consignment is allowed to enter the Ghanaian market.

Border-crossing procedures at Aflao, by contrast, begin in the arrival hall and the customs yard, where initial valuation takes place to determine which consignments should be sent to the long room for clearance (consignments valued USD 5,000 or above), and which should be cleared in the baggage hall (consignments valued to less than USD 5,000) (Chalfin 2010a:71-84, 104-114). Since procedures associated with bringing larger consignments into Ghana through Aflao differ little from those in Tema (except that shipping agents and the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority are not involved), I here will focus on the practices in the baggage hall. Unlike in the long room, customs officers operating the baggage hall are authorised to determine the value of the importers’ consignments and the duties, taxes and fees to be paid. The valuation of each consignment is based on receipts brought by the importer, or, more commonly, as the majority of small-scale importers lack invoices, on the Ghana Custom’s list of standard values. Thus, in the baggage hall at Aflao, the practice of commissioner’s value has, as I understand it, not yet given way for the WTO’s preferred transaction value.

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65 All destination inspection companies listed by Ghana Shippers’ Authority have addresses in Accra (Ghana Shippers’ Authority n.d:b). In 2009, a press statement by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Hannah Tetteh, suggested that the Customs Service may be charged with handling destination inspection (2009b).


67 See Chalfin (2010a:104-108) for a discussion about the long room at the Aflao border post.
Once valuation is complete, the importer pays the duties and fees to the cashier, before proceeding to the last gate for final scrutiny. While the procedures in the baggage hall at Aflao result in a relatively limited volume of documents compared to those produced at Tema port, the valuation and payment of duties, fees and taxes for the smaller consignments that pass through in the baggage hall produces a number of receipts which “signal the official release” (Chalfin 2010a:80) of the consignment onto the Ghanaian market.68

The point I want to make is that these practices of valuation and inspection at Tema or Aflao should result in the payment of the costs of bringing African print imports onto the Ghanaian market, including the 20 per cent customs duties set for African print imports, the 1 per cent destination inspection fee (which is based on the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) value of the consignment), the export development and investment fund (EDIF) levy of 0.5 per cent, and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) levy of 0.5 per cent. Additionally, both domestic and imported goods are subject to 2.5 per cent national health insurance levy (NHIL), 12.5 per cent value added tax (VAT), and excise duties (e.g. World Trade Organization 2008:viii). If these are paid, the price gap between Chinese and Ghanaian African prints is reduced to a level that enables Ghanaian textile industries, and the traders who sell them, to compete on the Ghanaian market. That is, it is these practices of valuation, inspection and revenue extraction, which bring the Chinese African print into contact with a number of places, institutions and actors who enforce Ghana’s trade and tax laws, that transform the Chinese African print into the right price. The Chinese African print that avoids paying some or all of the costs of access to the Ghanaian market, by contrast, becomes smuggled.

Becoming smuggled

Let us begin the exploration of the transgression that constitutes the Chinese African print as smuggled by accompanying X, an Accra-based wholesale dealer on one of her bi-weekly across-the-border trade endeavours to the textile market in the Togolese capital of Lomé. Having made the four-hour journey from Accra to the Togolese border, X crosses the border at Aflao and heads straight for Lomé’s Grand Marché. X browses the wholesale shops for a while, looking for Chinese African prints she thinks will appeal to her customers back in Accra. Togolese as well as Chinese traders run these shops, for in Lomé, unlike in Accra, Chinese textile dealers are a common sight in the marketplace. On this visit, she finds a good selection of a higher quality brand of Chinese imitations of wax prints. Once her purchases are

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68 See Chalfin (2010a:108-114) for a discussion about the clearance of goods in the baggage hall at Aflao.
completed, packed into four bags – each containing 50 twelve-yard pieces\(^{69}\) of Chinese imitation wax prints – and loaded into her car, X returns to the border post at Aflao. Importing around 200 twelve-yard pieces of African prints on each occasion, the value of X’s consignment does not exceed the USD 5,000 mark, and she is subsequently directed to the baggage hall for inspection and valuation. Since she has not brought any receipts from her purchases in Lomé, the customs officers who operate the baggage hall rely on the Custom’s list of standard values to determine the duties, taxes and fees X must pay to take her goods into Ghana. Having travelled this route many times before, X knows very well that the lack of documentation opens up the possibility of negotiation regarding the value of her consignment, and by extension, her costs for bringing it into the Ghanaian market. In fact, this is how X makes her profit, as paying the full price for access to the Ghanaian market would eat her entire profit margin. When X exits the baggage hall this time, she has successfully convinced the customs officers to classify her consignment as fancy, rather than wax, prints (which attract a lower valuation and subsequently reduces the duties, taxes and fees for X to pay), and to note on the landing account that she brings 140 pieces of African prints onto the Ghanaian market, instead of the 200 she actually has in her car. In so doing, X has, in Andreas’s terms, purchased “a key service monopolized by the state: the nonenforcement of the law” (2000:23). The bribes, or “informal tax” (Andreas 2000:24), which X has paid for this service is not only for the discretion of the customs officers in the baggage hall but is shared with officers operating the last gate to ensure that X is at no risk of having her goods confiscated here.

Now that X has entered Ghana at the ‘right place’ – namely, at a designated port of entry – and has paid part of the costs of bringing African prints onto the Ghanaian market, to her mind, they are legitimate to trade. Yet, Ghana’s regulatory framework states that all (rather than some) of the above mentioned costs (20 per cent customs duties, 1 per cent destination inspection fee, 0.5 per cent EDIF levy, 0.5 per cent ECOWAS levy, 2.5 per cent NHIL levy, 12.5 per cent VAT and excise duties) should be paid. The misclassification (the classification of X’s consignment as fancy rather than wax prints) and under-declaration (the note on the landing account that X’s consignment comprises 140 rather than 200 pieces of African prints) of goods, which X and the customs officers at Aflao are guilty of, are, together with under-invoicing, among the “illegal trade practices” (Kyerematen 2005:16) which are identified as smuggling in Ghana, as illustrated by the Minister of Trade and Industry’s statement, with which I began this chapter.\(^{70}\)

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\(^{69}\) A yard is just under a metre.

\(^{70}\) X is a fictional figure inspired by people I interviewed in Accra. The above is also inspired by Chalfin’s description of border-crossing procedures at Aflao (see 2010a:68-85, 104-115).
Other small-scale trade endeavours that fall under the broad definition of smuggling of African prints in Ghana are those people who cross the border on small bush paths away from the designated ports of entry (that is, who enter the market at the wrong place), as well as those who hide small quantities of African prints on their bodies before passing through the official border post (cf. Chalfin 2001:212). Smugglers of larger consignments of African prints that cannot be carried on a person, bicycle or motorbike, and who consequently must travel on the major roads, by contrast, rely upon bribing customs officers at the Customs stations. Some, like X, will bribe customs officers at Aflao in an ad hoc manner; others, textile company and trade union representatives and textile traders suggested when interviewed, collaborate closely with customs officers, who take them across the border at night time. A number of newspaper cuttings support this claim (see e.g. Aklorbor- tu 2011, 15th September; Ghana News Agency 2001, 20th November; 2001, 21st November; Ghanaian Times 2007, 27th January; also see Nugent 2002:248-249). Another option that large-scale smugglers of African prints may opt for is declaring their consignment as transit goods, which are exempted from duties (World Trade Organization 2008:23), and then offloading them inside Ghanaian territory.

While in Ghana smuggling commonly is associated with the boundary shared with Togo to the east and the Aflao border post,71 the practices of under-invoicing, misclassification and under-declaration are not limited to over-land ports of entry. In her study of transnational traders who travel to far-off destinations in Europe and Asia to purchase consumer items for the Ghanaian market, Darkwah suggests that the negotiation of the trade policy framework is an equally necessary practice for the large-scale traders who enter their goods at Tema port (2002:193). The point is, thus, that, whether at Tema or Aflao, it is the importer’s failure to fulfil tax obligations that transforms the Chinese African print into smuggled. Smuggling, in turn, allows for the Chinese African print to sell at a price that is considerably lower than that of the Ghanaian African print. This, as suggested earlier, is how the Chinese African print becomes a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy.

This is not to suggest that the Chinese African print is the only African print on the Ghanaian market that has avoided some or all of the costs of entry. According to the representatives of Ghana’s textile companies, business organisations and trade unions and the state officials that I interviewed, however, the Chinese African print carries the smuggled transgression more frequently than other African prints on the market.

Important, these moments where and when the costs of entry are negotiated, or are completely avoided, not only transform the Chinese African print into smuggled; they also convert it into an object available to certain

71 African prints are also smuggled across the northern borders (see Chalfin 2001; Daily Graphic 2000, 6th July; Ghana News Agency 2007, 19th February).
interventions. Before I turn to discuss the single import corridor as a spatial response to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print in Ghana, however, I want to explore in more detail how the construction of the Chinese African print and the single import corridor motivate and justify one another, and how the two are mediated through a long-term debate about smuggling, corruption and the contested Ghana-Togo border.

Contraband, corruption and a contested border

If in Chapter 2 the focus was on how the Ghanaian African print became something worth protecting from the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print as well as on the circumstances that have allowed Chinese textile products to reach previously protected markets, here I want to add yet another piece to our understanding of how the processes that construct the Chinese African print as a threat and the spatial strategies explored in this thesis are embedded in and emerge from a range of circumstances that come together in Ghana. As suggested above, this story begins with the contested Ghana-Togo border. Indeed, this politically defined line, which was the outcome of competing European interests in the region, is one of the more contested in Africa (Nugent 2002:199). A first line, between the British Gold Coast Colony to the west and German Togoland to the east, was defined in the Heligoland Treaty of 1890. Once the painstaking process of marking that boundary out on the ground was completed, British and German administrations alike enforced strict control of trade and high duties along the boundary to attract the region’s trade to their respective territories (Nugent 2002:22-23). The outburst of the First World War in 1914 effectively ended the existence of German Togoland. Within a month, Gold Coast (British) and Dahomean (French) forces had defeated Togoland. This marked the beginning of decades of controversy over this narrow stretch of land, first between the British and French colonial administrations, and later between Ghana and Togo, controversies that had to do with both territorial aspirations and diverging regimes of taxation applied on each side of this boundary.

As discussed above, the imposition of duties on cross-border trade was a key incentive behind the British colonisation of the Gold Coast. Thus, in 1920, the British administration sent out its customs officers to set up border posts and collect duties along the new boundary, which had been drawn in an area within which trade hitherto had been unrestricted (Nugent 2002:39-40). The French colonial administration, by contrast, derived the bulk of its taxes from fixed units inside its territory, such as consumers, property and income (Nugent 2002:149; also see Chalfin 2010a:246, footnote 5). According to Nugent, these disparities in tariffs and taxes on each side of the boundary served as incentives for an escalating contraband trade in the region (2002:102-107). From the French point of view, the British imposition
of customs duties indicated the ambition to “strangle the economy of French Togoland” and induce French withdrawal from the eastern part of Togoland (Nugent 2002:42). For the British colonial administration, on the other hand, dependent as it was upon these duties, increasing contraband trade in the region was cause for concern. These different views on taxation soon became a major disruptive element in British-French relations in West Africa. Yet, Nugent suggests, the British authorities, somewhat contradictory, considered contraband trade to be part of rational economic behaviour and adopted a fairly pragmatic approach to smugglers (Nugent 2002:81, 106-113).

With Ghanaian independence in 1957, to be followed by French retreat from eastern Togoland a few years later, conflicts over the boundary between the two Togolands arose yet again (Nugent 2002:202-208, 247). The different developmental paths chosen by Ghana and Togo at independence further exacerbated the division between the two countries. While Accra, as discussed earlier, opted for import substitution industrialisation, the Togolese leadership established a free port in Lomé, close to the Ghana-Togo border, and became dependent upon importation and re-exportation throughout the region. Differences in tariffs and taxes on each side of the Ghana-Togo boundary continuously served as incentives for smuggling according to a distinct pattern; agricultural produce, in particular cocoa, as well as light industrial items flowed from Ghana to Togo, and imported consumer items, including luxury textiles, specialty foods, second-hand clothes and so on flowed in the opposite direction (Chalfin 2010a:60; Nugent 2002:247). These trade flows caused serious distress in Ghana-Togo relations. Indeed, the first decades of independence were characterised by allegations and counter-accusations between Accra and Lomé (see e.g. Austin 1963:143; Nugent 2002:223-224, 251, 2004:33-34; Packer 1986:266). To provoke the Togolese leadership and reduce smuggling, the Ghanaian government repeatedly closed its eastern border, and when it was open, it enforced strict controls on trade (Nugent 2002:247-248). These tactics continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Importantly from the point of view of the argument pursued in this thesis, the pragmatic approach of the British administration to smuggling was abandoned after Ghanaian independence, and smuggling, once integrated into a larger moral debate concerning all forms of profiteering by manipulation or circumvention of the state, was to play a decisive role in Ghanaian politics in the 1970s and 1980s. To elaborate, Nugent has demonstrated that tariff and tax disparities between the Gold Coast and Dahomey were particularly large when Nkrumah was elected Prime Minister in 1952, and that contraband trade subsequently was rife. Ghana’s introduction of import licensing and price controls during the early 1960s further increased the incentives for smuggling in the region. More than that, Nugent has argued that the British colonial administration had not informed Nkrumah about its pragmatic ap-
proach to contraband trade and incapacity to fully enforce customs duties along the eastern frontier. Thus, when Nkrumah came to power, he firmly believed that the state machinery he inherited held the capacity to enforce border control. These factors, combined with the limited resources set aside for preventive work along the frontiers, meant that duty collection along the Ghana-Togo boundary proved an immense challenge from the onset (Nugent 2002:247; also see 1991:70). In response, the Nkrumah administration, not yet ready to accept the difficulties associated with imposing duties along the frontier, initiated a series of restructurings of the Ghanaian Customs Service. These efforts, however, proved futile. Instead, the engagement of additional personnel, who partly were sourced from outside the Customs Service, further undermined the morale of the officers operating the frontier stations, and, Nugent claims, reports of misconduct soon surfaced, rumours which the Ghanaian Customs Service to date has not been able to escape, despite extensive efforts to re-organise the Customs Service (see e.g. Chalfin 2010a:91-103, 116-125; Nugent 1991:73, 2002:249-254).

As noted in Chapter 2, the Ghanaian economy began to decline shortly after independence, which resulted in the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 and two decades of economic and political turmoil in Ghana. By the 1970s, the economic situation was desperate. In the cities, food shortages had become chronic, and the costs of living and inflation spiralled. Import licensing, price and exchange controls had created the foundations for a flourishing parallel market. General Acheampong and the National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC), which seized power in a military coup in 1972 and by the mid-1970s, they had become heavily dependent on the parallel market in order to supply the population with essential commodities (Clark 1994:377-378). Smuggling, hoarding and corruption were all part of this parallel market. Moreover, the lack of foreign exchange meant that the economic consequences of increasing smuggling of timber, foodstuffs, minerals and cocoa were particularly dire (Nugent 1991:70).

The relevant point here is that as the Ghanaian economy continued to spiral downwards, doubt about all forms of accumulation in Ghana arose, as did the distrust of anyone associated with wealth, including wealthy farmers, traders or other entrepreneurs. Along with politicians and state officials, these groups were held responsible for the desperate Ghanaian situation (Chazan 1983:197; Nugent 1995:79-80). Furthermore, customs officers stationed in the borderlands were increasingly made responsible for the ‘porous nature’ of the Ghana-Togo border and the loss of revenue that the contraband trade resulted in. Thus, restructurings of the Customs Service continued. To discipline customs officers and reduce malpractice, the military

72 According to Nugent, small-scale smuggling for sustenance was generally considered morally acceptable, whereas larger-scale smuggling was associated with corruption in the state machinery and nation-wrecking (2002:259-264).
regime in Accra proposed that each officer was to be supervised by an army officer. Moreover, the increasingly exaggerated tone of the debate was reflected in the introduction of harsh punishments for smuggling and inflammatory rhetoric, which depicted smugglers as nation-wreckers (Nugent 1991:73, 2002:250-251). Thus, at this stage – and this is important – smuggling had developed into something more than a ‘simple’ violation of the law. Nugent writes, “Ghanaians were informed that there was a greater moral issue, namely, whether individuals should be permitted to sacrifice the interests of the nation to their own selfish greed. Smuggling came to be depicted in almost pathological terms, especially in the government press.” (2002:251).

By the mid-1970s, a specific term, kalabule, had come into use to denote all forms of profiteering by manipulation or circumvention of the state. The invention of a specific term for these activities was, according to Jeffries, “indicative of the fact that, in popular perceptions at least, they started to assume a quite unprecedented scale and to exert an especially deleterious effect on many people’s living standards” (Jeffries 1982:307, footnote 1; for a discussion of kalabule practices in the Ghanaian context also see Chazan 1983:194-197). Kalabule was to play a key role in two decisive moments in Ghana’s political history: J.J. Rawlings’ two military coups in 1979 and 1981. Indeed, accusations of kalabule motivated Rawlings, a flight lieutenant in the Air Force, to overthrow General Akuffo in 1979, who just one year earlier had deposed General Acheampong and the SMC II. Despite the military coup, Rawlings and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) decided that presidential elections would be held as planned on 18th June 1979. The AFRC, however, would remain in power until 1st October that year. During those three months, the AFRC set out to undertake a “house-cleaning” exercise (Chazan 1983:281) to clear up corruption and the kalabule system. During these months, the AFRC executed three former heads of state and five other senior officers without trial (Chazan 1983:279-284).

Kalabule accusations also played a key role in Rawlings’ second military coup only two years later (Oquaye 2004:97-113). This time, however, Rawlings’ seizure of power was not a ‘regular’ military coup, but rather, in Rawlings’ own words, “nothing less than a Revolution” (Rawlings, First Broadcast to the Nation, 31st December 1981, as quoted in Oquaye 2004:97), with the intent of encouraging Ghanaians to govern themselves rather than allowing corruptive, exploitative and unrepresentative forms of government to determine their future (Oquaye 2004:97). These accusations were specifically directed at the Limann government, the winners of the 1979 elections, and which, in Rawlings’s view, quickly had resorted to kalabule practices (see Nugent 1995; Oquaye 2004:97-113, on the political situation in Ghana and Rawlings’ revolution).

According to Nugent, smuggling had now dominated the Ghanaian press for more than a decade. Thus, by this time smuggling was considered “the

smugglers were not simply branded as cynical nation-wreckers, but stood accused of being counter-revolutionaries to boot. The regime insisted that those who profited from smuggling were primarily members of the dominant class who lived parasitically off various forms of kalabule rather than engaging in productive activity. (2002:252, emphasis original)

More than that, the monitoring of the Ghanaian borderlands changed radically under the PDNC. The revolutionary approach to anti-smuggling operations took on the form of vigilantism as border communities were engaged in border monitoring through the establishment of People’s Defence Committees, People’s Tribunals and the People’s Militia (Nugent 2002:253-255), alongside the Customs Preventive wing, which by now had been completely militarised (Chalfin 2010a:117-118).

While certain elements in the Ghanaian moral discourse on smuggling were transformed when the revolution came to an end and Ghana’s transition towards democracy began in 1992, there are few indications that the smuggling debates died down. Instead, I would argue that the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled is mediated through these events of the past. This may be illustrated, for instance, by looking at how the smuggling of Chinese African prints presently is described in the Ghanaian press and by state and non-state actors. Indeed, the smuggling of African prints is depicted as “fraudulent” (Ghana News Agency 2005, 18th May:n.p.; also see National Tripartite Committee 2005:n.p.), “nefarious” (Ghana News Agency 2006, 11th October:n.p.; 2010, 4th November:n.p.) or “clandestine” activities (Keelson and Arthur 2003, 17th November:1), and as “abuse” and “fraud” (Ghana News Agency 2005, 19th November:n.p.), as well as “criminal” behaviour (Okine, Sah and Lamptey 2005, 12th April:25; Ghana News Agency 2006, 25th April:n.p.). A representative of one of Ghana’s textile companies calls smuggling “stealing from the nation’s coffers” (interview with representative for ATL’s anti-copying team, March 2010), and, in a letter to the Minister of Trade and Industry, one of Ghana’s textile workers’ unions describes smuggling as an “unpatriotic” activity (Textile Garment and Leather Employees Union 2009:n.p.). Smugglers, on the other hand, are depicted as “economic saboteurs” who should be “weeded out” (Ghana News Agency 2005, 18th May:n.p.; 2005, 19th November:n.p.), or indeed as “nation wreckers” (Boadu 2006, 1st August:n.p.; Ghana News Agency, 2005, 28th September:n.p.) or “enemies of the nation” (Anon 2011, 7th February:n.p.). For me, these accounts indicate that the smuggling and kalabule rhetoric that emerged during the escalating economic hardships of the 1970s, and eventually motivated a revolution, continues to play a role in contemporary debates
about smuggled Chinese African prints as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy.

Further, the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled and the institution of the single import corridor are mediated through debates about corruption in the Customs Service, which continue to date. Indeed, the poor performance of officers employed by the Ghanaian Customs Service was subject to political debate prior to the 2000 elections (Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2000, sections 160-174; also see Chalfin 2010a:91-93). These debates were to continue (Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2001, section 360; 2002, section 410) after the momentous elections of December 2000, when Ghana for the first time changed government through use of the ballot box. Thus, the winner of the elections, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), continued to restructure the Customs Service. As already discussed, several of the key functions of customs work have been partially outsourced to private actors. Chalfin’s account of these reforms suggests that they in part may be seen as a means of disciplining customs officers operating the stations along the frontier (2010a:88-130). Additionally, in 2001, the Revenue Agencies Governing Board (RAGB) Secretariat was installed to supervise and monitor the revenue agencies (Ghana Revenue Authority n.d.; also see Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2001, section 369). Around the same time, Ghanaian news media reported that a rigorous code of ethics that prescribed the dismissal of corrupt officers was to be adopted (Anon 1999, 20th May; Ghana News Agency 2003, 23rd September). The Ghanaian Customs Service underwent yet further reform in December 2009, when it became a division of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). GRA replaced all of Ghana’s revenue agencies, including the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Value Added Tax Service (VATS) and the RAGB. This, according to the new authority, represented the “culmination of years of plans to streamline the administration of tax collection in Ghana” (Ghana Revenue Authority n.d:n.p.). Among the objectives of the new authority is to “promote efficient collection of revenue and the equitable distribution of tax burden and ensure greater transparency and integrity” (Ghana Revenue Authority Act 2009, section 2(c)).

Despite these extensive efforts to improve the integrity of the Ghanaian Customs Service, reports about malpractices are abundant in the Ghanaian press (see e.g. Anon 2008, 8th May; 2011, 7th February; Crusading Guide 2002, 10th December; 2009, 5th May; Daily Graphic 2002, 1st April; Ghana News Agency 2003, 23rd September; 2008, 24th May:b; Kofoya-Tetteh 2011, 12th December). To give a few examples, in 2002, the Customs Commissioner, who had adopted a particularly strict approach to misconduct, was himself dismissed for withholding duties from the state (Crusading Guide 2002, 10th December), and, in 2009, an investigative journalist from the Cru-
sading Guide, a Ghanaian online newspaper, went undercover to reveal extensive corruption in the Customs Service. The newspaper wrote:

Behind these broad smiles on the faces of some of these CEPS men, exists a complex web of rot and fraud under their happy supervision. The New Crusading Guide undercover reporter’s hidden camera has caught the ‘men in blue’ ... neck deep busily helping the smuggling mafia to deprive mother Ghana of her needed revenue [...] [These officials] are mainly concerned with enriching themselves and see their work post as ‘gold mines’. (2009, 5th May:n.p.)

The way I have interpreted contemporary events in Ghana, the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled and the establishment of a single import corridor for African prints may in part be read as a continuation of these debates. Put differently, the single import corridor, I would argue, activated, and was activated by, both the smuggled status of the Chinese African print and a long-term debate about smuggling, corruption and border porosity in Ghana. To elaborate, calls for actions to be instituted against smuggled African prints on the Ghanaian market intensified in the years leading up to the establishment of the single corridor for African print imports in July 2005. Following years of lobbying by Ghana’s textile companies and trade unions, the issue formally entered onto the government’s agenda in the early 2000s (interviews with textile company representatives, March 2010). The 2002 Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana stated that:

The single most important obstacle to the management of this economy is inefficiency in our revenue collection especially at the points of entry into Ghana through smuggling [...] Smuggling undermines local production, national revenue targets and consequently contributes to unemployment. Currently, textile companies in Ghana, are cutting production because of unfair competition with smuggled textile products. (Sections 434-435)

From this point onwards, a series of meetings – which engaged different constellations of government agencies, the private sector (including the textile companies and representatives of some of the textile traders) and the trade unions – were to discuss the threats to the Ghanaian textile economy. Three and a half years later, these discussions resulted in the establishment of the single import corridor for African prints.

Following upon the 2002 Budget Statement, in August 2003, the Revenue Agencies Governing Board (RAGB) Secretariat summoned officials from the Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning and Trade and Industry,

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73 Equally, a survey by the Center for Democratic Development concluded that the Customs Service is considered Ghana’s second-most corrupt state agency after the Motor Traffic Transport Unit of the Ghana Police Service (2000).
the revenue collection agencies (including the CEPS, the IRS and the RAGB), the textile companies, business organisations and worker representatives to discuss “[p]ractical measures to combat the menace of ‘under-invoicing’ and smuggling by importers of goods into Ghana” (Revenue Agencies Governing Board 2003). The RAGB’s report from the meeting was to set the agenda for the Ghanaian debate about the textile economy for years to come. When I did fieldwork in 2010, the analysis of the impacts of smuggling on revenue generation and the textile industry presented in the RAGB report was still the common point of reference among state officials, textile company and trade union representatives alike.

Within a month of the workshop, Ghana News Agency reported, the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning called an emergency meeting with the Frontier and Deputy Commanders of the Customs Service and the Executive Secretary of the RAGB. The meeting concluded that a special task-force, including military personnel, was to be instituted to enforce customs regulations, increase the Customs Service’s capacity to generate revenue and address the issue of increasing smuggling rates (Ghana News Agency 2003, 11th September; also see Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2002, section 436). These measures, however, failed to reduce the smuggling of African prints onto the Ghanaian market and the following year the General Secretary of the Textile, Garment and Leather Employees’ Union (TGLEU) publicly questioned the Minister of Trade and Industry’s genuine interest in rescuing Ghana’s textile industry on several occasions (Arthur 2004, 19th January:1; Ghana News Agency 2004, 17th November; Gye Nyame Concord 2004, 30th November; Obeng 2004, 30th October:1). A few months later, on 30th March 2005, the National Tripartite Committee (NTC) appointed a “Sub-technical Committee on measures to save the textile industry in Ghana” (National Tripartite Committee 2005). The Committee was commissioned to identify causes for the decline of the textile industry and to recommend measures for consideration by the NTC. Two textile industry and labour representatives respectively were appointed to the Sub-technical Committee, along with the Chief Director of the Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment, who was the government’s representative on the Committee. Also, an official from the Ministry of Trade and Industry was co-opted, along with two additional industry representatives. The draft report that summarised the committee’s meetings took a broad approach to the problems that Ghana’s textile industry faces. Among the problems identified was the issue of illegally imported African prints, said to amount to 48 per cent of all African prints on the Ghanaian market.74 Thus, the Sub-technical Committee’s report concluded that addressing the issue of smuggling of African prints into Ghana was one of the short-term interven-

74 In 2010, Ghana’s textile companies claimed that between 80 and 90 per cent of all African prints on the Ghanaian market were smuggled.
tions needed to restore Ghanaian textile industries’ “rightful place in the economy” (National Tripartite Committee 2005:n.p.).

There are two things about these debates that I would like to draw attention to. First, they emphasise the need to intervene quickly and with force against the smuggled Chinese African print. In 2003, the RAGB report concluded that smuggling “gives cause for concern by government and all patriotic Ghanaians. There is, therefore, the compelling need for all stakeholders to come together to deliberate on the problem and agree on the necessary corrective measures to stamp out this menace” (Revenue Agencies Governing Board 2003:4). Second, that the restriction of African print imports to a limited number of entry points was repeatedly put forth as the preferred strategy to intervene against the inflow of smuggled Chinese African prints onto the Ghanaian market. Specifically, the RAGB report concluded that restriction of African print imports to the seaports at Tema and Takoradi as well as Ghana’s main airport, Kotoka International Airport, represented the most efficient way of dealing with the perceived threat posed by smuggled Chinese African prints. This was because “high import duties, [and] laxity in the performance of the valuation and monitoring functions of the destination inspection agencies as well as ineffective Customs Excise and Preventive Service activities at the frontiers” had contributed to the high rate of ‘uncustomed’ African prints on the Ghanaian market (Revenue Agencies Governing Board 2003:5). In 2004, the Deputy Minister for Trade and Industry proposed that Aflao and Elubo, the main overland ports of entry on the borders between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire respectively, together with the above-mentioned ports of entry should be allowed for African print imports. “‘Apart from these approved routes, textiles that find their way into the country through any other route would be considered smuggled, and those involved would be dealt with according to the law’”, the Deputy Minister declared in the government press (as quoted in Obeng 2004, 30th November:1, 3). Similarly to the 2003 meeting, the Sub-technical Committee’s draft report concluded that African print imports must be restricted to the seaports at Tema and Takoradi, and to Kotoka International Airport to efficiently deal with smuggling of African prints. This was because “textile smuggling has been heavy along our land borders, especially the Eastern and Northern frontier of the country” (National Tripartite Committee 2005:n.p.). Indeed, there was the need to find a new way of managing the line at the outer edges of Ghanaian territory, which would ensure that tariffs and taxes were paid on African print imports, while, at the same time, not compromising Ghana’s status as a liberal economy. An official at the Import-Export Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry put it the following way: “The textile companies are not asking for any special protection. All that they are saying is that government must make sure that [for] all the textiles imported, people pay duties on them” (interview, March 2010). As we already know, the Minister of Trade and Industry decided to restrict all African print imports to one
port of entry: Takoradi port in Ghana’s Western Region. How the single import corridor unfolded as a spatial response to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print in Ghana is the focus of my deliberations in the next, and final, section of the chapter.

The single import corridor: Stretching the border

A person who imports African Prints through any port or land route other than the Takoradi Harbour commits an offence and shall be prosecuted and have such imports also confiscated. (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005a, section 6.1)

Earlier, I discussed how the procedures associated with tariff and tax extraction, which take place at Ghana’s ports of entry, held the potential to transform the Chinese African print into either legal or smuggled. Specifically, I showed how the Chinese African print became legal if subjected to the practices of valuation, inspection and revenue extraction. By contrast, Chinese African prints that evaded some or all of the costs of access to the Ghanaian market fell into the smuggled category. As noted above, in May 2005, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Alan Kyerematen, appointed Takoradi port in the Western Region as the single corridor for African print imports. The measure was to take effect on 1st July (Ghana News Agency 2005, 7th June).

The seaport at Takoradi, completed in 1928, was the first deep-water seaport on the West African coast. Situated in what is now Ghana’s Western Region (see figure 12), 230 kilometres from Accra, it was originally built to export cocoa and minerals, extracted at Tarkwa and transported via railway to the coast, and support the economic growth of the Gold Coast Colony (Hilling 1969:370). Together with the roadstead port in Accra, Takoradi port handled the lion’s share – 92 per cent in 1938 – of the Gold Coast’s international trade (Hilling 1969:371). As noted earlier, once Tema port was completed in 1962, it quickly became the privileged entry point for imports due to its vicinity to the Accra market. The deposits of manganese and bauxite, as well as timber, in the western part of the country, however, kept Takoradi port ahead in terms of exports (Hilling 1969:375). Between July 2005 and November 2008, Takoradi was temporarily redefined as the single port of entry for African print imports.

In other words, during a certain time span – June 2005 to November 2008 – the single import corridor redefined where several key functions associated with the control of trade – including classification, valuation, inspection and revenue collection – should be carried out (see figure 12). By so doing, it altered some of the procedures that held the potential to transform the Chinese African print into legal.
That is, if all of Ghana’s ports of entry usually represent spaces where Chinese African prints could be constituted as legal, between July 2005 and November 2008, Takoradi became the only port of entry where Chinese African prints could be cleared to enter the Ghanaian market legitimately (see e.g. Ghana News Agency 2005, 18th May; 2005 7th June; 2005, 9th November; Ghanaian Chronicle 2005, 19th May; Ghanaian Times 2005, 25th June).

In this section, I set out the single import corridor as a spatial strategy used to intervene against the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print. I look, first, at how the single corridor altered several key procedures associated with control of international trade in order to make the border take on the shape of an import corridor. After that, I explore how the single import corridor sought to intensify the line at the outer edges by stretching the border to multiple spaces prior to, at and beyond the territorial border. Finally, I elucidate the different roles of the actors engaged in staging this spatial response to the inflow of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market. The section is based on the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s “Notice to importers of African textile prints: Guidelines for importation of African
textile prints” (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005a); Ghana Standards Board’s “Handbook for inspection of High Risk Goods” (Destination Inspection Department of Ghana Standards Board n.d.); Ghana Standards Board’s General Labelling Rules (Ghana Standards Board (Food, Drugs and Other Goods) General Labelling Rules 1992); an analysis of around one hundred newspaper articles on the issue of smuggling of African prints into Ghana; and interviews with the director at the Small, Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Technology Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry who chaired the committee responsible for vetting African print imports, the official in charge of Destination Inspection Division of Ghana Standards Board, textile company and trade union representatives, and textile traders.

Twisting the border into an import corridor

To bring African prints onto the Ghana market between 1st July 2005 and December 2008, importers had to meet a number of requirements in addition to those I described earlier in this chapter. First of all, only registered import companies could qualify as African print importers. These importers had to register at and report their monthly returns to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. They also had to register at the Ghana Standards Board – Ghana’s governmental agency for national standards – as importers of High Risk Goods. Moreover, a vetting committee was charged with the responsibility of determining which of the registered and approved African print importers’ Chinese African prints were allowed onto the Ghanaian market and which were to be denied entry. For each application the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s guidelines for African print imports prescribed a GHS 95,000 fee (the equivalent of approximately USD 10).75 African print importers were also obliged to submit a 2-yard sample of each African print they wished to bring onto the Ghanaian market (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005a; interviews with representatives for CTD Ghana; Ghana Standards Board; the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s SMEs and Technology Division, March 2010). The vetting committee’s assessment, or ‘profiling’, of the Chinese African print, was based on Ghana’s intellectual property laws (further discussed in Chapter 6), as well as on national standards set for African prints and the labelling requirements laid out in the Ghana Standards Board General Labelling Rules. In practice, this meant that only applicants whose African prints were considered safe for consumption, that were properly labelled and whose samples met the requirements concerning originality of designs and trademarks were granted permission to import, while Chinese African prints that violated any of these regulations were supposed to be denied entry.

75 Due to inflation, the Ghanaian cedi was re-denominated in 2007. After the re-denomination, GHS 95,000 would be the equivalent of GHS 9.50.
Next, a list of approved samples was forwarded to the Executive Director of Ghana Standards Board, who officially signed the Permit to Import High Risk Goods (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005a). At the same time, the sample and adjoining documentation, the so-called “biometric data” (Amoore 2006:339) of the African print, so to speak, was forwarded to Takoradi port, which by now was the only port of entry where Chinese African prints could be legitimately brought onto the Ghanaian market, where it was used in the process of inspection upon arrival and to enforce the vetting committee’s ruling.

Further, and as indicated above, between 1st July 2005 and December 2008, African prints were entered onto Ghana’s list of High Risk Goods, together with food products, pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances, LPG cylinders, toys, chemicals, building materials, second hand clothing, petroleum and pyrotechnic products, motor vehicle batteries, alcoholic products, arms and ammunition, machetes, vehicle spare parts and industrial machinery. For these products, special inspection procedures apply, which, for the foreign African print’s part, included 100 per cent physical inspection of each consignment to ensure that it was in keeping with the vetting committee’s approved samples. They also included the authentication of Certificates of Analysis and Conformance: documents that specify the results of tests carried out on the product to ensure that the product complies with Ghana’s national standards and is safe for consumption (Destination Inspection Department of Ghana Standards Board n.d.; Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005b). Finally, the inspections at Takoradi would ensure that each Chinese African print was clearly marked in Ghana’s official language, English, with code marks indicating the batches of production to which the product belongs, the country of origin, and the name and address of the manufacturer, importer or distributor of the product (Ghana Standards Board (Food, Drugs and Other Goods) General Labelling Rules 1992, section 3).

The outcome of the combination of these measures, I would contend, was a border that appeared in the shape of an import corridor. To better understand this, however, requires that we know more about how this spatial strategy constructed multiple spaces of governing. Before exploring these in detail, I want to point out that the purpose of these measures was to impose selective control on the African prints trade. That is, the additional requirements imposed on African print importers was to allow (Chinese) African prints that comply with Ghana’s intellectual property laws, national standards and labelling requirements to be traded freely on the Ghanaian market, while restrictions were imposed only on (Chinese) African prints that violated these regulations. This, in turn, implies that the vetting committee’s work and the inspections carried out at Takoradi port were not intended to impose restrictions on the smuggled African print directly. Rather, as explained, the work carried out in Accra and Takoradi was governed by different principles. Yet, and as discussed in the previous section, the perceived need for a
spatial strategy that reduced the number of entry points was, in fact, embedded in and activated both by the smuggled Chinese African print and a long-term debate about smuggling, corruption and border porosity. Thus, while this may not be evident in the first instance, the single import corridor, I would argue, was actually intended to intervene against the smuggled African print (as well as the counterfeit, sub-standard and improperly labelled foreign African print). This becomes clear if we examine the multiple space of governing, which the single import corridor constructed.

Constructing multiple spaces of governing

As I see it, the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s attempt to impose selective restrictions on the international African prints trade by altering the procedures that transformed foreign African prints into either legal or smuggled stretched the border to several spaces. First, to the centre, the capital of Accra, where the vetting committee operated. This arrangement, in theory at least, allowed the possibility of turning (Chinese) African prints that violate intellectual property legislation, standards or labelling requirements away en route; that is, before they ever reached the outer edges of Ghanaian territory. Thus, the vetting committee’s work projected Ghana’s borders outwards in space and time (cf. Amoore 2011:64; Amoore and de Goede 2008:175; Coleman 2007:620-625; Vaughan-Williams 2010:1073-1074) to inhibit “‘spontaneous arrivals’” (Mountz 2011b:119) of future illegal Chinese African prints at the territorial border. This move, I would argue, was partly motivated by the long history of contraband trade across the Ghana-Togo border, which necessitated the construction of a buffer zone (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:58) through the extension of the border outwards. It follows from this that had all the importers of African prints respected the Ministry’s guidelines for the importation of African prints to the Ghanaian market, then no Chinese African print that violated Ghana’s intellectual property laws, national standards and labelling requirements would have arrived at Ghana’s ports of entry.

That said, unlike the border-making practices that were discussed in Chapter 3, which enforced those laws and regulations of the state that control the mobility of people in the territories of other states by outsourcing some of its immigration officers to points of embarkation, the single import corridor did not project the Ghanaian border outwards by sending some of its customs officers to China. Rather, it extended the border outwards in the sense that it made its presence felt even in China through some of the additional requirements it imposed on African print importers. Indeed, as pointed out above, the single import corridor initiative required that the importer sent samples of each Chinese African print s/he wished to bring onto the Ghanaian market from the factory in China before the consignment reached Takoradi port. In this way, the single import corridor followed one of the key
principles of governing that is increasingly used to project border control outwards: namely, that of remote rule. This is the practice of granting or denying access to a market or territory from a distance (Wilson 2006:92; also see Lahav and Guiraudon 2000:56-59; Walters 2006a:194-195).

Now, as suggested above, the second move of the single import corridor was to stretch the territorial border to Takoradi port, where it enforced the vetting committee’s ruling. What I have not yet discussed, however, is that the successful institution of the single import corridor for African prints relied on denial of entry at all ports of entry except for Takoradi. This essential function of the single import corridor became particularly pronounced at Aflao, which, as we know, was the preferred trade route for the bulk of importers who source Chinese African prints from Lomé’s textile market. The second objective of the single import corridor was, thus, to intensify the monitoring of African print imports not only at Takoradi port, but at all designated ports of entry along the outer edges of state territory. This suggests that even interventions that move the practices associated with the enforcement of borders away from the lines at edges of territory may have as their objective to intensify that very line.

What is interesting about the Minister of Trade and Industry’s choice of Takoradi port as the single import corridor for African prints is that it not only engaged Accra in borderwork and routed African print imports to the seaport at Takoradi, but that it also directed African print imports away from the main import corridors for African prints, including the land borders, and particularly from the south-eastern stretch of the Ghana-Togo border and Aflao, which are “notorious for such fraudulent [smuggling] activities” (National Tripartite Committee 2005:n.p.). Indeed, the re-direction of African print imports to Takoradi effectively closed the most important trade routes for Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market, the seaport at Tema and overland entry point at Aflao.

One of the main implications hereof was the folding of the border inwards and the construction of a fourth space where the perceived threat of the smuggled Chinese African print could be dealt with: the south-eastern frontier zone.

Picture a dark road somewhere in the southern parts of Ghana’s Volta Region. Earlier that day, customs officers, stationed at Aflao, had been tipped off about a load of African prints, which was loaded on to a lorry in a local village after being smuggled across the Ghana-Togo border. It is now 1.30 a.m., and a customs patrol vehicle is waiting in the dark for the lorry to pass its stakeout along the Keta-Dabala road. Before long, a vehicle that matches the description appears on the road. The customs patrol signals to the driver to stop the vehicle. The lorry, however, diverts onto a rough road.

76 In Ghana, this is called a ‘pick-up truck’. The term ‘lorry’ is often used to refer to a *tro-tro*; that is, the minibuses that represent the Ghanaian version of public transport.
Figure 13. Ghana’s south-eastern border zone. Map by Pontus Hennerdal.

Figure 14. The Ghana-Togo border as it slides into the sea near Aflao. Photo: Doug Murray.
along the Volta River towards Sogakope. The customs vehicle follows closely behind and a number of warning shots are fired in the night. The chase continues until the lorry suddenly stops and all its passengers escape into the bush, leaving the truck and its load behind. The customs officers intercept 1,008 pieces of African prints, hidden among bags of crabs and baskets full of discarded fishing nets, and take them to the customs station at Aflao. On their way back, the customs officers stop another vehicle, a Togolese registered motorbike, carrying 35 pieces of African prints (Ghana News Agency 2007, 24th July:b; also see figures 13, 14 and 15).

What this event is intended to illustrate is that the single import corridor never managed to disrupt the flow of Chinese African prints on the Lomé-Aflao-Accra trade route. This may in part be explained by the fact that the designation of Takoradi as the single import corridor for African prints, as I understand it, excluded all small-scale importers who source their Chinese African prints in Togo and take them across the border at Aflao from legal African prints importation. Indeed, generally the scale of the seaborne trade in African prints by far exceeds the small amounts of capital that smaller-scale importers can raise. Thus, I think it is fair to claim that Kyerematen, the Minister of Trade and Industry, by diverting African print imports away from the land borders, (possibly inadvertently) restricted legitimate importation of African prints to a handful of large-scale African print importers.77

Yet, what the single corridor succeeded in doing was to illegalise the (Chinese) African prints that continued to travel on the Lomé-Aflao-Accra trade route and justify interventions against them. In other words, if the single import corridor, in the first instance, was designed to intervene against the smuggled (Chinese) African print (by re-routing the import trade away from the trade route known for contraband trade), in so doing it also activated the status of the Chinese African print as smuggled and enabled further actions to be taken against it. That is, this spatial strategy redefined the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways of entering the Ghanaian market, so that only Chinese African prints that passed through the import corridor (that is, Chinese African prints that were subjected to the vetting committee’s scrutiny, and which entered at Takoradi) could become legal on the Ghanaian market.

77 These included a handful of African print traders who up until now had imported container loads of Chinese African prints, primarily through Tema port, and Ghana’s textile companies who import African prints from the Netherlands, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. This is because TexStyles Ghana Ltd. is part of the Dutch Vlisco-group, which, in turn, is owned by a holding company, Gamma Holding. In addition to TexStyles, Gamma Holding owns Uni wax in Côte d’Ivoire and Vlisco in the Netherlands. Thus, TexStyles imports Uni wax and Vlisco African prints to Ghana. Likewise, Akosombo Textiles Ltd. (ATL) is owned by the Cha Textiles Group, a Hong Kong-based holding company, which also owns textile factories in Nigeria. CTD Ghana, a textile distribution company engaged by ATL to distribute its products, imports African prints manufactured by other textile companies within the Cha Textiles Group.
Figure 15. Smuggled African prints intercepted by the Customs Service. Photo: Eunice Edith Saka. Courtesy of the Ghana Revenue Authority.

For the small-scale African print importers, such as X above, whose livelihoods depended upon Lomé’s textile market, and who subsequently kept going on their bi-weekly journeys to Lomé, the single import corridor implied increasing economic risk as the probability of having goods seized on the way from the border to the market in Accra increased considerably between July 2005 and November 2008, as suggested by the numerous reports by Ghana News Agency about unsuccessful smuggling endeavours in the Volta and Eastern Regions (that is, the stretch of land that links the eastern boundary with the markets in Accra; see figure 13). Whether these African prints entered Ghana at the official border post at Aflao or were taken across the border on bush paths, the majority of these newspaper cuttings do not state. However, a Chinese African print importer who I interviewed in Accra in 2010 testified that the single import corridor was never fully instituted at

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the Aflao border post. According to the importer, the customs officers at Aflao rather used the restriction on the Chinese African prints trade to increase their fee – that is, bribe – for misclassifying and under-declaring African print imports (interview with importer 1, March 2010).

Another move by the Customs Service and the Revenue Agencies Governing Board around the same time further added to the risks of the Lomé-Aflao-Accra importers. Before September 2006, intercepted African prints were returned to their owners after the appropriate duties, fees, taxes and penalty fees had been paid. Now, smuggled African prints were forfeited by the state and re-sold at heavily discounted prices to District Assembly officials and the Ghanaian public (Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law 1993, section 118; also see Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006f; Ghana News Agency 2006, 1st September; 2006, 11th October; Ghanaian Times 2006, 29th September). This move was to discipline importers/smugglers and deter them from future engagement in smuggling. The policy, however, was strongly criticised not only by African print importers, but also by Ghana’s textile companies and worker representatives, because it effectively reinserted smuggled African prints into the Ghanaian market (interviews with representatives for ATL; TexStyles, March 2010; TGLEU, November 2007).

This particular design of the single import corridor was enabled by the engagement of a broader base of actors in borderwork, and to which I now turn.

The borderworkers of the single import corridor

There are a number of things about the borderworkers of the single import corridor that I find particularly striking, first, in terms of how they enabled the implementation of the single import corridor, and, second, in terms of how their different roles were rooted in the debate about corruption in the Customs Service, which motivated the single import corridor in the first place. For one thing, the single import corridor constructed a hierarchal organisation that placed a new institution, the vetting committee, at the apex. This multi-stakeholder arrangement, which, as we have seen above, was charged with making the final decisions about which Chinese African prints were eligible for entry onto the Ghanaian market, was placed under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, while at the same time it also involved officers from the Customs Service and Ghana Standards Board, and representatives from Ghana’s textile companies and the association of the African print importers in borderwork (interviews with Director of the SMEs and Technology Division of the Ministry of Trade and representatives for Ghana Standards Board, March 2010).
Further, the single corridor initiative placed all key functions associated with control over international trade – classification, valuation, inspection, and revenue collection – with experts. To clarify, the vetting committee positioned private-sector experts at the centre of the very process that profiled and classified Chinese African prints as eligible or illegible for entry onto the Ghanaian market. That is, the vetting committee authorised Ghana’s textile companies to determine whether or not an importer violated their rights as intellectual property owners, and by extension, whether an application to import African prints should be denied.

Additionally, as Takoradi was designated as the only location along Ghana’s territorial borders where the procedures associated with determining the value of a consignment of African prints and the subsequent collection of due revenues were to take place, the single import corridor positioned the Standards Board and Customs Service officers operating the Takoradi port of entry as experts. That is, by gathering all the functions associated with clearing African prints into Ghana to one point, Takoradi port, it was assumed that Standards Board and Customs Service officers could be trained to manage this ‘delicate’ product. Thus, between 2005 and 2008, Customs and Standards Board officers in Takoradi carried out both regular border-monitoring functions (valuation, inspection and revenue collection), the additional practices associated with the classification of African prints as High Risk Goods. Most importantly, they enforced the vetting committee’s ruling. Thus, both the establishment of the vetting committee and the nomination of Takoradi port as the only eligible port of entry for African print imports represent a positioning of experts at the centre of interventions against the Chinese African print. Only these actors, it was asserted, held the expertise required to detect the Chinese African print that violated Ghana’s intellectual property laws, national standards or labelling requirements.

Finally, the single import corridor displaced key functions associated with clearing goods from customs officers operating the two main entry points for African print imports: Aflao and Tema. Indeed, the single import corridor can be read as an attempt to curb “ineffective Customs Excise and Preventive Service activities at the frontiers” (Revenue Agencies Governing Board 2003:5), which, according to Kyerematen, was to be held responsible for the flooding, so to speak, of the Ghanaian market with smuggled Chinese African prints (Ghana News Agency 2005, 18th May; also see Aklorbortu 2011, 15th September; Dartey 2007, 16th January; Ghanaian Chronicle 2003, 24th October). As such, the organisation of the single import corridor is similar to the disciplining of customs officers at Aflao described by Chalfin. As discussed above, around the year 2000, both valuation and inspection were partially outsourced from Aflao to private actors and to the Customs Service’s headquarters (Chalfin 2010a:104-108). The way I look at it, the decision to deprive customs officers at Ghana’s the land borders, particularly Aflao, of key functions associated with customs work may be linked to the
discourse on border porosity and lack of morals among customs officers operating the stations at the outer edges of Ghanaian territory. Indeed, as suggested above, this particular design of the single import corridor was partly motivated by the perceived need to re-route African print imports away from customs officers who, it was asserted, not only lacked the capacity to carry out the appropriate classification of African prints, but who were more susceptible to corruption than officers in central locations due to the nature of their work and the conditions under which they operate (cf. Nugent 1991:73, 77, 2002:253-254). At the same time, and this is both important and quite contradictory, these customs officers were entrusted with one of the most essential tasks of the single import corridor: namely, denying Chinese African prints access to the Ghanaian market.

Through the measures discussed in the foregoing sections, it was asserted, legal, that is, non-counterfeit and non-smuggled, Chinese African prints could be traded freely on the Ghanaian market, while counterfeit or smuggled (Chinese) African prints could be turned away prior to, at and beyond the territorial border. However, these measures, which, as alluded to above, made the Ghanaian border take on the shape of an import corridor for African prints, were to be terminated towards the end of 2008.

The single corridor revoked

Just before the elections in December 2008 and after fewer than four years, the single corridor was revoked. From this date onwards, African print imports could enter at any of Ghana’s ports of entry where they would be subjected to the procedures described in the second section of this chapter. The vetting committee was dissolved and all additional procedures, including registration at the Ministry of Trade and Industry and at the Ghana Standards Board, and the sending of samples for approval were cancelled. African prints were also removed from Ghana’s list of High Risk Goods.79 None of the state officials I met in Accra had a clear understanding of why the guidelines were revoked. Nor did they know how Kyerematen, the Minister of Trade and Industry, arrived at the decision to allow African print imports only via Takoradi port. In fact, Kyerematen called the press conference where he announced his decision to re-route all commercial quantities of African print imports through Takoradi port before the Sub-technical Com-

79 On 21st March 2011, however, the majority of the restrictions associated with the single import corridor were re-instituted, including the obligatory registration of African print importers with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and Ghana Standards Board. Moreover, African prints were re-entered onto Ghana’s list of High Risk Goods and the vetting committee was yet again to meet every last Tuesday of each month at Ghana Standards Board to vet samples of African prints for importation. This time, however, the vetting committee’s ruling was to be enforced at all official ports of entry (Ghana News Agency 2009, 23rd April; 2010, 15th November; 2011, 16th February; 2011, 14th April; Tetteh 2009a).
mittee of the National Tripartite Committee had presented its final report (interview with TGLEU representative, March 2010). An official at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, however, suggested that Takoradi may have been preferred to Tema due to the fact that the volumes of goods handled at Takoradi are smaller. This, in turn, would enable the personnel operating the port of entry to adequately deal with African print imports (interview with representative for the SMEs and Technology Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, March 2010). Concerning its revocation, a couple of interviewees suggested that the decision to revoke the guidelines was ‘political’, because the single import corridor was withdrawn during election times (interviews with representatives for Ghana Standards Board; the SMEs and Technology Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, March 2010; also see Public Agenda 2008, 22nd December).

Additionally, the increasing distance to the market, which the single corridor implied, meant that several of the actors involved in the discussions about the future of the Ghanaian textile industry during the first half of the 2000s, expressed surprise at the Minister’s choice of Takoradi port as the single import corridor for African prints into the Ghanaian market. The distance from Takoradi to the major African print markets in Accra (and Kumasi), textile actors said, would slow down consignments and increase the costs of those importers “in genuine business” (interview with TGLEU representative, March 2010), that is, importers who bring their consignments to the designated entry points and pay the costs of access to the Ghanaian market (interviews with Printex; TexStyles; TGLEU; importer 2; CTD Ghana Ltd., March 2010).

Two years after the single import corridor was abolished, many actors agreed with the Customs Service’s claim (see e.g. Ghana News Agency 2006, 25th April) that the single import corridor actually served to increase smuggling from the Togolese market into Ghana (interviews with representatives for the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s SMEs and Technology and Import/Export Divisions; ATL; TexStyles; TGLEU, March 2010). Rather than selectively controlling the movement of illegals, which was the intention, the single import corridor slowed down the movement of all Chinese African prints, including those eligible for sale on the Ghanaian market. Yet, whether or not this intervention successfully curbed smuggling is not my main interest. Rather, what is interesting from my point of view is that the single import corridor indeed was revoked and left Ghana’s textile companies to find alternative ways of dealing with the perceived threat of Chinese African prints. This was expressed in the following way by the officer responsible for Destination Inspection at the Ghana Standards Board:
We stopped last December when government said they can pass through everywhere. So now that vetting committee is no more sitting and nobody is actually checking the designs and things anymore. So it now shifted to the producers. You can go and then when somebody is pirating your designs you can take him to court, or use the legal system to address it. So that is all. So we are not doing anything… (Head of Destination Inspections, Ghana Standards Board, March 2010)

What Ghana’s textile companies did when the responsibility to intervene against the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print was shifted onto them, as suggested by the state official, is the focus of the next chapter.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore how the Chinese African print is constructed as smuggled and how the single import corridor sought to intensify the line at the outer edges of state territory by stretching the border to a number of locales prior to, at and beyond the territorial border. I have sought to demonstrate that one reading of the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print is as an economic issue that revolves around the issue of price. That is, smuggled Chinese African prints are constituted as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy ultimately because they sell at lower prices on the Ghanaian market. Drawing on this discussion about price, the next point of the chapter was that to understand the constitution of the Chinese African print as a “problem object” (Inda 2006:7) required that we explore the movements of the Chinese African print itself, and the moments of contact (or the lack thereof) between it and the places, procedures, institutions and actors associated with tariff and tax extraction in Ghana. That is, it was how the Chinese African print moved to enter the Ghanaian market that determined its status as legal or as a threat to the textile economy.

As a spatial response to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print to the Ghanaian textile economy, the single import corridor re-shaped the border of the Ghanaian state and enacted disruptive interventions in multiple locations prior to, at and beyond the territorial border. Thus, in line with what has been argued by a broad range of border scholars, there is a need to shift the empirical and analytical focus from the line at the edges of state territory to the multiple and shifting locales where and when borders are performed by a range of state and non-state actors in order to make sense of contemporary border-asserting processes. What I have sought to add to this discussion through this chapter, and those that follow, is a stronger emphasis on the need to understand the enactment of borders in increasingly diverging locations and by a broader base of actors as purposeful acts; that is, as spatial strategies, rather than primarily as the consequences of new security needs. The specific contribution of the single import corridor to these debates is an
illustration not only of how borders are extended outwards and inwards in space and time in an attempt to control mobility selectively. Rather, the objective of this spatial strategy, even as it displaced the border from the outer edges, was the intensification of the very line along Ghanaian territory. This tells us that contemporary border-making practices may be *intensive*, rather than just extensive in their reach.

Finally, I have sought to demonstrate that to understand the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled and the single import corridor as Ghanaian responses to the inflow of Chinese textile products to the domestic market requires that we turn our attention not only to contemporary events, but also look at how the two are rooted in deeper historical and global processes. Within the context of this chapter, this implied an exploration of a long-term fear of the porous border in Ghana.

In the next chapter, I shift the attention to the constitution of the Chinese African print as counterfeit and the anti-counterfeiting operations, which represent a spatial strategy that disperses and forms a networked border that strikes against the counterfeit Chinese African print deep inside Ghanaian territory. In so doing, it abandons any attempt to enforce the line at edges of territory. Equally, and as alluded to above, these operations displace border management from the actors of the central state.
At around 11.30 a.m. on 27th July 2006, the anti-copying team of Akosombo Textiles Limited (ATL), Ghana’s largest textile company, and personnel of the Striking Force of the Ghana Police Service arrested 12 traders at the Kumasi Central Market for selling counterfeit Chinese African prints. 83 pieces of ATL duplicates were seized in the operation, and 10 of the traders were later tried for infringement of industrial design before the Circuit Court in Kumasi (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2007; Boadu 2006, 1st August; The Republic v. Arko and 9 others 2006-2008). This, and similar operations in Sunyani, Berekum and Accra, were the result of ATL’s growing frustration with “Asian Manufacturers, Importers and Traders who are systematically copying our Brands, our Company Name and our Designs” (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006c:n.p.). Thus, earlier that year, ATL established an anti-copying team and embarked on a publicity campaign to warn textile traders against selling counterfeit products and to urge the Ghanaian public to notify ATL about any counterfeit African prints in the market (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2007). By now, ATL had come to the conclusion that the single import corridor, instituted in July the year before, would not stem the inflow of counterfeit and smuggled Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market. Hence, they had decided to raid marketplaces and to institute “zero tolerance” against counterfeit African prints in Ghana’s marketplaces themselves (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a:n.p.).

The purpose of this chapter, is, first, to explore how the Chinese African print is constructed as ‘counterfeit’, and, second, how the anti-counterfeiting operations disperse the borders of the Ghanaian state in response to this perceived threat. I argue that the construction of Chinese African prints as counterfeit translates into a strategy that moves border management from the lines at the edges of state territory to certain locales inside Ghanaian territory and after the cloth has crossed the territorial border, as well as from the actors generally associated with border control to private economic and civil society actors.

80 These events are noted in the Ghanaian press (Akpey 2006, n.d. May; Asare Boadu 2006, 1st August; Ghana News Agency 2006, 18th May), in ATL’s internal documents (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2007), and were discussed in interviews with the head of ATL’s anti-copying team in March 2010 and November 2011.
The chapter begins by looking at the multiple places, procedures and actors in Ghana and China that are involved in the constitution of certain Chinese African prints as counterfeit. It also discusses how the counterfeit Chinese African print is rendered governable where and when it comes into contact with Ghana’s intellectual property legislation. Next, it explores the anti-counterfeiting operations as a spatial strategy used to engage the perceived threat posed by the counterfeit (Chinese) African print in Ghana. Unlike the two interventions explored in Chapters 5 and 7, in this instance, Ghana’s textile companies and one of its trade unions are the leading actors. As these actors enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property, they move the enforcement of the borders of the Ghanaian state inside the territory and after the territorial border. That is, this spatial response to the inflow of counterfeit African prints to the Ghanaian market abandons all attempts at enforcing the border at the outer edges of state territory. Instead, it constructs a network-shaped border that disperses border control across Ghanaian territory. Specifically, it makes the border appear in certain locations – marketplaces and warehouses – where counterfeit Chinese African prints are traded and distributed. In my view, the choice of these spaces as the preferred site of enforcement of the border may, in part, be linked to the debates about border porosity and corruption in the Customs Service, which were discussed in the previous chapter. Equally, a long-term outlook on traders as “exploitative parasites” (Robertson 1983:472) partly serves to construct the marketplace as an appropriate space of intervention against the counterfeit (Chinese) African print.

Before proceeding to explore in more detail how the Chinese African print is constructed as counterfeit and how the anti-counterfeiting operations work through the borders of the Ghanaian state in response to the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print, however, it is important to be clear about why counterfeit African prints appear threatening to the Ghanaian textile economy.

The threat of the counterfeit Chinese African print

[T]he issue of counterfeit affect our very existence, because we spend a lot resources to build our brands to whatever level people perceive it as what it is. And then somebody want to exploit that, it is not fair and secondly, […] if the product turns out to be bad, an unsuspecting consumer who bought it perhaps may not know that what he or she bought was not the original product. He uses the product, it doesn’t perform to his or her expectation and the conclusion is that the brand GTP is not good. […] so it goes to affect the perception of consumers about the products, and we thought that is a very serious criminal offence that affects our very existence so we need to fight that... (sic) (Marketing Director, TexStyles Ghana Ltd., March 2010)
In Ghana, the rise of China as an African prints producer has been followed by accusations about counterfeiting; that is, the intentional making of copies so that they appear to have the same attributes as the original product. The copying of Ghanaian African prints is seen as particularly adverse because the economic values of African prints to a high degree are vested in brand names and designs. That is, competitiveness on the Ghanaian market depends not only upon price,\(^8\) as discussed in the previous chapter, but on the ability to build brand names and to present appealing designs to the market, designs that evoke tradition by combining the right colours with symbols and proverbs, which are important in Ghanaian society. This, van Koert suggests, is of particular significance on the conservative Ghanaian market (2007:130; also see Spencer 1982:16). Thus, the African prints producer whose company name became associated with coveted wax print designs, which are worn to display wealth and rank (Gott 2009) or kept as capital, was indeed successful on the Gold Coast, and later Ghanaian, markets. In a study carried out in the 1970s, Nielsen noted that some European wax print designs for sale in Ghana’s marketplaces dated back at least 85 years (1979:481).

As discussed earlier, an agreement to establish Ghana Textile Printing Company Ltd. (GTP, now TexStyles Ghana Ltd.) in Tema was signed in 1964 (van Koert 2007:20). From the onset, van Koert argues, the Dutch African print producers were most reluctant to produce wax prints in the Ghanaian factory. The chairman of Texoprint NV – a holding company established in 1964 after the merger between Vlisco, Ankersmit and a third textile company, Stoomweverij – underlined that “we should never sacrifice this most valuable asset of Van Vlissingen and Ankersmit, except when absolutely no other options are available to us and even then only in return for full compensation by means of a fee for technical assistance” (as quoted in van Koert 2007:22). In 1968, four years after production commenced in Tema, Texoprint was, most reluctantly, forced to disseminate the necessary expertise to produce wax prints to the GTP factory in Tema, including knowledge about colour compositions, the technological knowhow about how to transfer designs onto cotton cloth, and so on (van Koert 2007:20, 46). It did so, however, only under the condition that the design department remained in

\(^8\) Counterfeiting is, however, partially linked to the discussion about the price of Ghanaian and Chinese African prints in the sense that counterfeiting reduces the prices at which Chinese African prints may be sold on the Ghanaian market. It does so because counterfeiting allows Chinese manufacturers to engage in African prints production without investing in costly design departments. Furthermore, counterfeiting reduces risk and increases profit margins because it enables Chinese manufacturers to only put on the West African market what already has proven to sell. Ghanaian textile companies and textile designers, on the other hand, must take the risk that comes with introducing new designs and they must bear the costs of those designs that do not appeal to the market. Equally, price plays a role when the consumer decides what African print to purchase in the market. If the consumer is presented with the opportunity to buy a copy of the design that s/he wants at a fraction of the price of the original, s/he may very well do so.
the Netherlands and that wax print production remained under the complete control of Dutch experts (van Koert 2007:10, 13-20, 45-47, 50-51, 107). The many efforts of the Dutch manufacturers to keep knowledge about colour compositions and the technology used to produce wax prints in the Netherlands amply illustrate, I find, just how important design is to market success.

To understand the perceived threat of the counterfeit Chinese African print to the Ghanaian textile economy, we must also consider the importance of quality on the Ghanaian market. Several scholars on the history of wax prints have claimed that quality and durability were two of the main attributes with which Europeans competed on the West African market (Cordwell 1979:495; Johnson 1974:181-182; Steiner 1985:93-94). The high quality and durability of wax prints meant that they could serve as indicators of wealth, status and prestige and be used to bank capital, much as cloth had done in West Africa for a long time, as discussed in Chapter 2.

Counterfeiting, as illuminated by the industry representative quoted above, appears threatening to the Ghanaian textile economy because it obscures the differences between original and copy. This ambiguity that counterfeiting creates is highly relevant because it means that the values of one easily can be transferred to the other. Indeed, the objective of counterfeiting is commonly to take advantage of the superior value of the original product. A worker representative explained it to me in the following way: “if you are introducing a new design, it may not catch up with the people. [...] [T]hey have their taste or choice of designs that are traditional and that our culture recognises and that is the problem that the Chinese printers have because they do not know what our people will appreciate. [...] So the origin of this faking is about the anxiety of these Chinese people [that their designs will not appeal to Ghanaian customers]” (TGLEU representative, March 2010). In a report, ATL’s anti-copying team draws a similar conclusion (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a; also see Ocloo 2011, 25th August).

To be precise, the production of exact copies of Ghanaian African prints may result in positive values associated with Ghanaian African prints being carried over onto Chinese African prints, at least once they reach a market (the Ghanaian or West African) where the consumers understand these values. This, in turn, means that manufacturers, importers and traders of Chinese African prints may exploit the hard work that TexStyles, for instance, has put into building its brand name to gain advantages on the market. Conversely – and indeed adversely from the point of view of the textile companies, workers and traders who work with locally produced African prints in Ghana – counterfeiting implies that the negative characteristics of Chinese copies may be transferred to the Ghanaian original. When Chinese African prints first entered the Ghanaian market, they were of considerably lower quality than the original products they attempted to mimic. The cotton-base, the grey-cloth, on which the print was applied, was of low quality and colours would fade or run when the cloth was used and washed. Thus, when the
product, which appeared to be the original, but was not, did not perform as expected, the negative experience of that product, the copy, was transferred to the original. As a result, the brand names, which Ghanaian companies so carefully had built, could be ruined, as illustrated by the textile industry representative quoted above. The company that loses its competitive edge in the market – that is, an esteemed brand – may, in turn, see its sales drop, which, ultimately, may lead to its collapse. Thus, similar to what was proposed in the previous chapter, the loss of Ghana’s textile industries would not only threaten the workers they employ and the jobs of the traders who distribute them, but also the revenues these companies generate for the Ghanaian state. This is the threat that the counterfeit African print represents, and which the anti-counterfeiting operations seek to resolve by manipulating the shape of the border and multiplying the locations where the border may appear. At this point, however, I wish to consider how the Chinese African print is constituted as counterfeit.

Constructing the Chinese African print as counterfeit

In the previous chapter, I proposed that the transgression that transformed some Chinese African prints into smuggled took place at the lines at the edge of Ghanaian territory where and when the cloth came into contact with, or completely avoided, the places, procedures, institutions and actors involved in the extraction of import tariffs. By contrast, the transgression that transforms some Chinese African prints into counterfeit involves and intertwines multiple places and actors in China and Ghana. I begin this section by taking a closer look at what the counterfeiting of African prints means in the Ghanaian context and how the transgression that transforms some Chinese African prints into counterfeit is enacted through networks that span places in both Ghana and China. I also illustrate how the intangible assets associated with African prints production, as discussed above, are transformed into something that can be owned and protected from unauthorised use. Finally, I suggest that the counterfeit Chinese African print is rendered governable when the cloth enters into Ghanaian territory.

Becoming counterfeit

Counterfeiting, the way I see it, may obscure the difference between original and copy in a number of ways so that the object – the counterfeit – comes to incorporate one or several layers of visual deception. First of all, the design – that is, the combination of patterns, colours and proverbs – may be subject to duplication to make the copy visually appear to be the same as the original.
Secondly, the production of a counterfeit may be extended to include the imitation of additional visual markers used to distinguish the product on the market. To be more specific, information about the manufacturer and the product is printed on the selvedge of each Ghanaian African print. Moreover, the trademarks that Ghana’s textile companies have developed are commonly expressed as logotypes on product labels affixed to the product (see figure 16). These labels provide the consumer with information about the type of African print s/he has purchased, and where it has been produced (see Gерlich 2004:39-42). Finally, the Ghana Standards Board’s logotype on the label tells the consumer that the product complies with national standards set for African prints and that it is safe for consumption. Additionally, as a representative of one of Ghana’s textile companies explained to me, some years ago the company came out with a new strategy to market its products. They decided to display some of its products in plastic covers imprinted with the company’s trademark and to print carrier bags with the trademark and company’s slogan. Before long, Chinese copies of these marketing devices had reached the Ghanaian market (interview with Printex representative, March 2010).82

82 According to interviews conducted in Accra in 2010, some copies reach the Ghanaian market less than a month after the original initially is introduced (interview with ATL representative, March 2010). Others stated that copies appear for sale in the marketplace between
All of the above represent visual means of communication between producer and consumer, and all may be subject to duplication in order to present the perfect copy to the market. Put differently, each African print carries several layers of visual communication: the design (which in itself is multi-layered), the trademark used to market it and the product label attached to it. The more of these layers that are incorporated into the copy, the more difficult it becomes for the consumer to tell copy and original apart.

The second point that I want to make in this section is that the act of counterfeiting involves and ties together multiple places. As I see it, the process that transforms Chinese African prints into counterfeit begins in the Ghanaian marketplace. According to textile traders I interviewed in central Accra, it may also begin in the Togolese marketplace or in other West African countries where Ghanaian African prints are sold. In these marketplaces, West African and Chinese businessmen shop around for locally manufactured and European African prints with particularly appealing sales figures. Only these are subjected to counterfeiting to ensure that profits are maximised. Traders I met in central Accra testified that they had sold samples of popular African prints designs to Ghanaians and other West Africans who they suspected would be brought to China for duplication (interviews with printer 2, March 2010; importer 3, March 2010). Whilst I was interviewing the leader of a traders’ association in Accra, for instance, her employees sold a quantity of 6-yard pieces of African prints to three women. When they were about to leave the shop, the association leader called out to the women from the back of the shop where she and I sat to ask them where they came from. The women replied that they had come to Accra from Togo and then quickly left the shop. The interviewee appeared convinced that the women’s intention was to send the samples to China for reproduction. “Did you see these women’s reaction when I asked where they come from, and how quickly they run?” she asked me (importer 3, March 2010). Other traders talked about Chinese businessmen who came into their shop to take photographs of the Ghanaian African prints on display (interviews with distributor 1, November 2007; distributor 2, December 2007). Ghanaian newspapers provide similar accounts. In late 2003 and early 2004, for instance, the involvement of a Ghanaian pastor and a Chinese businessman, the latter a former employee of one of Ghana’s textile companies, Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd., in counterfeiting some of ATL’s products made front-page news in the Ghanaian newspaper The Independent (see Arthur 2004, 10th February; Arthur and Keelson 2003, 27th November; Keelson 2003, 2nd December; Keelson and Arthur 2003, 17th November).

Samples and photographs collected in the Ghanaian marketplace are then transferred to manufacturers in China, where they are copied before being

two to six months after the original product is introduced to the Ghanaian market (interviews with representatives for Printex and TexStyles, March 2010).
sent back to the West African market. As long as they are on the outside – that is, outside markets where the original is sold – the counterfeit African print remains distinguishable from the Ghanaian original. Counterfeiting, however, implies that once it enters the market where the original is sold, the ‘outsider’ disappears from sight. This is because, as mentioned above, counterfeiting makes the copy appear to be the same as the original.

I will shortly return to the significance of the entry of the copy into Ghanaian territory for the anti-counterfeiting operations examined in this chapter, but before that it is important to be clear about how some Ghanaian African prints are transformed into intellectual property, and, by extension, into something that may be infringed upon. For it is only the copy that mimics an African print which is protected by intellectual property laws that may be defined as counterfeit in the legal sense. And, importantly, it is only these Chinese African prints that the anti-counterfeiting operations may intervene against.

Becoming intellectual property

The intangible assets that knowledge about design composition, for instance, represents, and which the Dutch wax print producers developed and later transmitted to the Ghanaian market, and the brand names that European and Ghanaian textile companies have built around the products they present to the market, are commonly referred to as intellectual property. To be clear, it is not the tangible object, in this case, the African print, which is encoded as intellectual property, but rather the information or knowledge reflected in it. These types of intangible assets, which may be incorporated into material objects, may be owned and protected from unauthorised use. The system for the protection of intellectual property, as described in a number of international agreements and in national legislations of the majority of the world’s countries, transforms assets such as these into something that may be owned, disseminated and traded; in other words, into something that the

83 The need to protect innovation and creativity was first recognised towards the end of the 19th century, when the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) were adopted. In 1967, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialised agency of the United Nations, was mandated to initiate collaboration between states to promote intellectual property protection globally (Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization 1967, articles 3 and 4). Accordingly, systems that facilitate the protection of intellectual property in multiple jurisdictions have been introduced. The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks enables intellectual property owners to seek protection in the territories of all signatory states by a single registration. The Hague System for the International Registration of Industrial Designs provides a similar service to owners of industrial designs (World Intellectual Property Organization 2010:24). Ghana became a WIPO member state in 1976 (World Intellectual Property Organization n.d. a.).
creator may reap the benefits from (World Intellectual Property Organization n.d. b:3-4).

Soon after the production of African prints commenced in Ghana in the mid-1960s, the United Africa Company (UAC), which had major interests in the GTP factory in Tema, realised the need to protect its textile designs in order to prevent its main competitor at the time, Akosombo Textiles Ltd., from copying its designs. Consequently, the UAC approached Ghana’s legislators about the importance of establishing a textile design registry to clarify what protection textile designs enjoyed under Ghanaian legislation. Although the Ghanaian government’s initial response was to reject any external interference, before long the parliament had passed the Textile Designs (Registration) Act, which established Ghana’s first registry for textile designs (Textile Designs (Registration) Act 1965; van Koert 2007:27). Later that same year, a law that made possible the registration of trademarks was passed (Trade Marks Act 1965). These laws were later revised, in particular after the turn of the millennium, when Ghana was required to implement the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.84 While this is not the place to review Ghana intellectual property legislation or the international system for its protection in full, I want to make two points that are of particular relevance if we are to understand the construction of some Ghanaian African prints as intellectual property, and by extension the construction of some Chinese African prints as counterfeit and others as appropriate for sale on the Ghanaian market.

First, intellectual property takes a range of forms. Commonly, it is divided into copyright and industrial property. While copyright refers to literary and artistic creations (such as books, films, music, architecture, art) and performances, recordings, and radio and television broadcasts (Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, article 2), industrial property includes patents, marks, industrial designs, trade names and geographical indications (Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883). Trademarks are one of the two forms of intellectual property relevant in the Ghanaian case. The other is textile designs, which may be

84 The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement), which came into force in 1995, represented a new era in intellectual property protection. The TRIPS agreement stipulates that WTO member states must comply with the Paris and Berne Conventions. More than that, it adds obligations in areas that are either not covered or are inadequately addressed by these conventions. The TRIPS agreement particularly emphasises the enforcement of intellectual property legislation (see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement) 1995, articles 41-61). Penalties for infringements should be tough enough to deter traders and manufacturers from future violations; however, and along with the WTO’s neoliberal agenda, they must not create barriers to legitimate trade (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement) 1995, article 41.1). Ghana’s intellectual property legislation underwent substantial revision in the early 2000s when Ghana, after a five-year grace period following its WTO membership in 1995, was required to implement the TRIPS agreement.
protected either through design – that is, industrial property – or copyright law (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement) 1995, article 25.2). Ghana has chosen the former (first, in the Textile Designs (Registration) Act 1965, and then, in the Textile Designs (Registration) Decree 1973, and, finally, in the Industrial Designs Act 2003.). In this case, industrial design refers to combinations of patterns, colours, and proverbs – that is, the aesthetic aspect that makes a particular African print design distinguishable from others on the market – whereas trademark refers to the combination of words, shapes and colours that makes up product logos and brand names such as ATL, Da Viva, Treasure, GTP, Diva, Printex, GTMC and so on.

Second, to enjoy protection by Ghana’s intellectual property legislation, textile designs and trademarks must be subjected to certain procedures that result in the design or trademark being entered into Ghana’s registries, which are located at the Registrar General’s Department, a department of the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General. To register a textile design, the applicant fills out a form at the Registrar General’s Department, submits four identical representations of the design, and pays an application fee as well as a fee for the registration certificate (Registrar General’s Department 2010a; also see Industrial Designs Act 2003, section 5). The registrar records the application and examines it to ensure that the design is original – that is, that the design “significantly differs from known designs or combinations of known design features” already on the Ghanaian market (Industrial Designs Act 2003, section 2.2). If not opposed by anyone within a prescribed time period and the application is indeed approved, the applicant may collect the registration certificate within three to five months of the application (Registrar General’s Department 2010a; also see Industrial Designs Act 2003, sections 7 and 8). This registration protects the design against the “making, selling, importing or otherwise distributing for commercial purposes [of] articles bearing or embodying a design which is a copy or substantially a copy of the industrial design” (Industrial Designs Act 2003, section 9.2) for an initial period of five years (section 10.1).

To register a trademark for protection, applicants fill out another form, which they may collect from the in-house bank at the Registrar General’s Department. The application should be accompanied by five representations of the trademark and a list of the products that the trademark is to represent. Once the prescribed fee of USD 150, or the GHS equivalent, has been paid, the application is examined. Applications may be refused if the trademark is identical to, or confusingly similar to, a trademark already registered (Trade Marks Act 2004, sections 5 and 6). If approved, the trademark is published in the Ghanaian government’s industrial and commercial bulletin. Within three months to a year of the application, the applicant may pay a fee of USD 100 to collect the registration certificate (Registrar General’s Department 2010b; Trade Marks Act 2004, section 7). The registration protects the
trademark against the “use [of] the mark in relation to any goods or services for which the trade mark was registered without the agreement of the owner” (Trade Marks Act 2004, section 9.1) for an initial period of ten years (sections 10 and 11). In section 9.4, the Trade Marks Act clarifies that “[t]he right of the registered owner under this section shall, in addition to any other remedies, extend to the use of a sign similar to the registered trade mark and use in relation to goods or services similar to those for which the mark has been registered where confusion may arise in the public” (Trade Marks Act 2004, section 9.4). In sum, the registration of textile designs and trademarks is a legal agreement between the proprietor and the state, which protects the design or trademark against unauthorised use for a set time period.

There are two things about the process of registration that I wish to emphasise. The first is that a textile design or trademark, for which there is no valid registration, is open to public use, because its originality has not been recognised by the law. Thus, anyone may reproduce an unregistered design and sell it in the market. This is what many of Ghana’s importers of Chinese African prints do (interviews with importers 2 and 3, March 2010). The second is that, unlike trademarks, which may be protected indefinitely if the owner chooses to apply for an extension and pay the additional fees, all textile designs fall into the public domain after a maximum registration period of fifteen years (Industrial Designs Act 2003, section 10). In much the same way that unregistered textile designs (or trademarks) are open to public use, so are textile designs for which the registration period has passed. Thus, under Ghanaian legislation, the rights of the owner of a textile design can only be infringed upon during a certain period of time. This limitation of protection in time is particularly relevant for TexStyles, a company whose market success largely depends upon its established designs. Today, Texstyles has to simply watch as copies of many of its classic designs – that is, textile designs for which the registration period has expired – are legally sold on the Ghanaian market. The relevant point is, however, that it is the procedures associated with registration, which indefinitely (trademarks), or for a limited period of time (textile designs), construct some Ghanaian African prints as intellectual property – that is, as something that may be owned and, by extension, be infringed upon.

Earlier, I defined counterfeiting as the intentional act of copying in an attempt to transfer positive values from the original to the copy. Drawing on the discussion above, I would like to qualify that definition. Thus, within the Ghanaian legislative context, counterfeiting is the act of copying registered textile designs and/or trademarks without the authorisation of the owner of those properties. From this, it follows, as suggested above, that a Chinese African print that bears an unregistered design, a new design that significantly differs from textile designs already registered at the Registrar General’s Department, or what is referred to as a classic design in Ghana – that is, a design for which the period of protection has expired – is legitimate to trade.
on the Ghanaian market. The Chinese African print that bears an original design is only legitimate, however, as long as it does not have a trademark registered in Ghana affixed to it. For the Chinese copy to become an object available to intervention, however, it must come into contact with the laws that constitute it as counterfeit in the legal sense.

**Becoming governable**

According to Dinwoodie, the laws that protect intellectual property are laws of the place (2004:892); that is, they offer the creator protection against the unauthorised use of his/her property within a certain territory (see Dinwoodie 2004, for a discussion about territoriality and trademarks). Thus, when registered, the Industrial Designs Act and the Trade Marks Act protect the intangible assets reflected in the African print within the Ghanaian jurisdiction. In other territories, other legislations apply. From this, it follows that the Ghanaian African print that is brought across the border into the territory of another state no longer is protected by Ghanaian legislation. It also follows that a Chinese African print that bears a design and/or trademark registered in Ghana, but is sold on the Nigerian market, for instance, is not a counterfeit in the legal sense, unless the Nigerian legislation states that it is. While the international system for intellectual property has sought to facilitate the protection of intellectual property in multiple jurisdictions, ultimately protection remains dependent upon national legislations. Thus, while a textile design, for example, in one country may fall under industrial property law, making registration necessary for it to enjoy protection, it may fall under copyright law in another. Copyright law offers a different kind of protection to the proprietor whose work does not have to be registered to enjoy protection (World Intellectual Property Organization 2004:40-65; Copyright Act 2005).

To account for the protection that Ghanaian textile designs or trademarks may or may not enjoy in other markets is beyond the scope of this thesis. More than that, it is the domestic market that is of primary importance for Ghana’s textile companies (van Koert 2007:135) and this is subsequently where they attempt to enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property. Thus, from my point of view, the relevant issue here is that the territorial border, similarly to what was the case in the previous chapter, plays a key role for the transformation of the Chinese African prints into either ‘legal’ or a ‘threat’ on the Ghanaian market. If, in the previous chapter, the way that the border was crossed (the ‘right’ or the ‘wrong’ way) was crucial for the transformation of Chinese African prints into legal or threat, I here propose

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85 The Paris Convention states that the nationals of a signatory state shall enjoy the same protection of industrial property in all other signatory states as the laws of each state provide for its nationals (Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, article 2).
that we need to focus on the combination of acts that takes place in the Ghanaian marketplace and in the Chinese factory, as well as in the networks through which information is exchanged about what designs (or trademarks) are most profitable to copy, as this exchange connects the two. When the Chinese African print, which is the outcome of the act of counterfeiting, enters the Ghanaian market (regardless of whether it has crossed the right or wrong way), it is transformed into counterfeit, and illegal. To be specific, the crossing of the border does something to the counterfeit Chinese African print: it makes it governable, or, in other words, it brings the Chinese African print into contact with Ghana’s intellectual property laws and transforms it into something that may be dealt with, within the parameters of these laws. Ghana’s intellectual property legislation may thus be utilised to stop the movement of these illegal objects once they fall under Ghanaian legislation – that is, at the border and inside Ghanaian territory. Importantly, Ghana’s intellectual property legislation enables certain types of sanctions to be imposed on the illegal African print by owners of intellectual property, and it is this topic to which I now turn.

The anti-counterfeiting operations: Dispersing the border

Whilst we know something about their [the counterfeiters’] nefarious activities we are rarely in a position to stop the goods from entering into Ghana. […] The only effective action that we can take is to stop these goods from being exhibited for sale. (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a:n.p.)

I now return to the time before the operation in the Kumasi Central Market, with which I opened this chapter. By early 2006, Akosombo Textiles Ltd. (ATL) had experienced the competition from cheaper Chinese versions of African prints for a number of years (interview with ATL representative, March 2010). Recently, however, the situation had gone from bad to worse and, in the last two years, ATL’s share of the Ghanaian wax print market had plummeted (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a). An investigation of African print imports suggested that counterfeiters specifically targeted ATL’s designs and trademarks (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2007). The measures so far implemented by the Ghanaian government – including the single import corridor instituted in 2005, as well as any attempt ATL had made to collaborate with the Ghanaian Customs Service to stop smuggled and counterfeit Chinese African prints at the territorial border – had left ATL disillusioned. In spite of ATL’s efforts to actively engage in government-sponsored interventions, ATL’s position on the Ghanaian market was continually undermined by cheap, counterfeit Chinese African prints. Reluctantly, ATL decid-
ed, as a last resort, to take matters into their own hands (interview with a representative for ATL’s anti-copying team, March 2010). Thus, on 15th March 2006, ATL’s newly established anti-copying team held its first meeting, where it drew up a strategy to fight “the war” (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a:n.p.) against Chinese African prints. The anti-copying team knew that the producers, smugglers and distributors of counterfeit African prints were well organised. Therefore, the team could not mobilise enough resources to stop counterfeit African prints when they first appeared at the border. “The only chance that we have to combat this menace”, the meeting concluded, was thus to target counterfeit Chinese African prints when they “appear for sale in the market place” (ibid.).

In the previous section, I discussed how entry onto the Ghanaian market transformed Chinese copies of designs and/or trademarks registered in Ghana into something that may be dealt with under Ghana’s intellectual property legislation. More to the point, this legislation gives owners of intellectual property, in this case Ghana’s textile companies, the right to institute court proceedings against any person who infringes on the rights conferred by registration (Industrial Designs Act 2003; Trade Marks Act 2004). In this section, I analyse how the anti-counterfeiting operations, as a spatial strategy, deal with a threat, such as a counterfeit, which is partly hidden from sight. In what follows, I discuss, first, how the anti-counterfeiting operations abandon the line at the outer edges of territory in order to construct a networked border that strikes against the counterfeit Chinese African print after the border and inside Ghanaian territory. Next, I explore why the marketplace has emerged as the main space for the governing of intellectual property rights, and, then, how the anti-counterfeiting operations sought to deal with the perceived threat of the counterfeit Chinese African print through a particular mode of governing that instilled uncertainty about when and where the border would be enforced next. Finally, I look at the different roles of the private economic, civil society and state actors involved in staging this spatial strategy. The section is based on ATL’s anti-copying team’s minutes, internal reports and public announcements; the court proceedings from the Kumasi case; interviews with representatives for Ghana’s textile companies and trade unions, as well as with textile traders; and a number of newspaper articles about the anti-counterfeiting operations.

Abandoning the line

The African prints trade in central Accra is organised around two nodes: the area around Rawlings Park, central Accra’s car park, and the 31st December Women’s Movement Market, also known as the two Makola Markets (see figure 17). Currently, the western end of Rawlings Park area hosts the upper end of the African prints market.
Here TexStyles’s wholesale distributors, whose shops are easily recognisable by the GTP trademark above each door, attract traders from markets across southern Ghana as well as from several of its West African neighbours. The majority of ATL and Printex distributors, though fewer in numbers, are also located to this area. Additionally, the area around Rawlings Park is host to the printers: a group of economically powerful traders who commission ATL and Printex to print designs they themselves have developed. Relatively new to this area are the Ghanaian wholesale dealers who specialise in Chinese African prints. Several of these traders occupy a number of shops in the Ghana Chinese Commodities Wholesales Town (see figure 18). This is a former warehouse, now converted into a business hotel for traders who sell Chinese goods, and adjacent buildings at the southwest side of Rawlings Park. Moving a couple of hundred metres northeast of Rawlings Park, through crowded streets where Ghanaian consumers and traders from Accra
and beyond share the limited space with cars, *tro-tros* – the minibuses that represent the Ghanaian version of public transport – taxis, garbage skips, porta-potties and the thousands upon thousands street hawkers who operate in the area, is the plot where the 31st December Women’s Movement Market was built in 1986. The main African prints section is located deep inside the market. Here, rows upon rows of corrugated iron stalls are used to display the traders’ goods during opening hours and to store the goods at the end of the working day. The prints on display bear names such as Shiny, Obama, Sosso, Velvet, Auden and Hitarget. Increasingly rare are the traders who sell GTP, ATL, Printex and GTMC prints. The GTP signs hanging from the corrugated iron roof at the end of each row, however, testify to Makola’s once prominent position as a key distribution centre for locally produced prints in Ghana. Today, however, Makola has instead positioned itself as a hub for the trade in Chinese African prints (interviews with distributor 2, November 2008; distributor 3, December 2007; printer 1, March 2010). Thus, to be close to their market, several wholesale dealers in imported Chinese African prints have opened shops inside the market. Being a major, if not the main, hub for the African prints trade in Ghana, the trading areas in central Accra have frequently attracted the attention of ATL’s anti-copying team.

ATL’s anti-copying team began its operations in central Accra in April 2006, when Makola and the African prints market around Rawlings Park, including China-Town, were targeted. In Accra, the Madina market, one of the main suburban markets, also received a visit from the team. These operations resulted in 25 arrests and the seizure of 200 counterfeit African prints.
The next operation took place on 19th May in the Brong Ahafo Region. This operation resulted in the arrest of 12 traders, including the leader of the Sunyani Cloth Sellers Association. A second operation was carried out in the Brong Ahafo Region two months later in marketplaces in Sunyani and Berekum. In this operation, eight traders were arrested and around 200 pieces of counterfeit African prints were seized. In July 2006, the anti-copying team took its operations to Ghana’s Ashanti Region where they, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, targeted the Kumasi Central Market, one of the most important markets in the regional web of the African prints trade. In this operation, 12 traders were arrested and 184 pieces of African prints bearing designs and/or trademarks registered by ATL were seized (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2007; also see figure 19).

Ten of the 12 traders arrested in the Kumasi operation were later charged with industrial design infringement under sections 9 (1) and (2) and 22 (1) of the Industrial Designs Act. The case was tried before the Circuit Court of Ghana in Kumasi. After nearly two years of court proceedings, the Circuit Court acquitted and discharged the traders on the basis that the prosecution...
had failed to prove intent; that is, the prosecution could not provide sufficient evidence that the accused traders knew that the African prints in their possession indeed were counterfeit. The judge’s ruling quoted the counsel of the accused: “The accused persons are not the manufacturers, they are ordinary market women. They also buy from other people to sell. They are not even importers of the product. They had always said they did not know they were selling fake ATL products. It is not the intention of the law to punish ordinary people who had no way of knowing that the exhibits are imitated of [or] fake” (The Republic v. Arko and 9 others, 2006-2008:n.p.).

Following the Kumasi operation, ATL took its anti-counterfeiting operations back to Accra, where they successfully arrested one trader and seized 15 pieces of counterfeit prints of the brand ABC Prestige (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2007). These operations continued throughout 2008 and 2009, when three raids were conducted in Kumasi, another three in Sunyani and four in Accra (telephone interview with a representative for ATL’s anti-copying team, November 2011).

The strategy that was used by ATL’s anti-copying team was the raid. In these particular raids, the team entered marketplaces in three key regional centres in the African prints trade – Accra, Kumasi or Sunyani – without prior warning, and with the assistance of the regional Police Service they seized counterfeit Chinese African prints and arrested the traders selling them. After having broadcasted their intentions of using Ghana’s intellectual property rights legislation to prosecute anyone caught selling African prints bearing ATL’s registered designs or trademarks (e.g. Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006c, 2006d, 2006e), the locations and times when the anti-copying team intended to strike were kept secret.86

This was not, however, the first time that the market raid was used to deal with the perceived threat of Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian market. Following the 2003 meeting regarding the smuggling of African prints onto the Ghanaian market, organised by the Revenue Agencies Governing Board Secretariat on the behalf of the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning

86 As mentioned earlier, the anti-copying team’s first move was to embark on an awareness-raising campaign. On three occasions during 2006, a group of ATL managers appeared on television shows – including Mmaa Nkommo (Women’s Digest), a popular talk show for women (The Mmaa Nkommo Talk Show 2002), which is aired on GTV, a channel with national coverage – to inform the public about the presence of counterfeit ATL products on the market and to demonstrate the difference between counterfeit and original African prints. ATL also published several notices in the Daily Graphic, Ghana’s most widely read newspaper, in March 2006, and held a press conference announcing its intentions to clamp down on traders selling products that infringed on ATL’s rights as owners of registered trademarks and industrial designs (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2007). Additionally, ATL surveyed Ghana’s regional market centres to become clear about what products were being copied, at which prices they sold, where the marketing of counterfeit products was most pronounced and so on. These investigations revealed, among other things, that trade in counterfeit ATL products was rife in Accra, Kumasi and Techiman, somewhat lower in Sunyani, Takoradi and Tamale, and insignificant in Cape Coast (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006b).
(see Chapter 5), a special taskforce was established to arrest and prosecute traders who sold smuggled African prints on Ghana’s marketplaces (Ghana News Agency 2003, 11th September). Equally, ATL is not the only rights owner to establish a taskforce to disrupt the trade in counterfeit Chinese African prints. Between 2008 and August 2010, another taskforce, coordinated by the Textile Garment and Leather Employees Union (TGLEU), for instance, organised raids to seize African prints bearing the trademarks and/or designs registered by any of Ghana’s three main African prints producers, ATL, TexStyles and Printex (telephone interview with the operations manager of the joint taskforce, March 2010).

This taskforce chose a somewhat different strategy than ATL’s anticopying team did. Instead of concentrating all its efforts on the marketplace, the taskforce also targeted warehouses in central Accra where counterfeit textiles were brought before being distributed to market traders. This way, their operations would have a greater impact on the trade in counterfeit African prints; according to the operations manager of the joint taskforce, and as reported by the Daily Graphic, in one swoop the taskforce was able to seize two cargo-loads of counterfeit African prints (Azu 2009, 30th November; also see Azu 2009, 9th December). These types of operations, however, relied on extensive investigations and required a lot of resources, since the time when counterfeit Chinese African prints were kept in warehouses was significantly shorter than the time they appeared in the marketplace. A successful strike against counterfeit in the warehouse thus equalled striking at exactly the right time. According to one of the interviewees, the substantial economic losses that the multi-stakeholder taskforce had caused traders meant that warehouses in central Accra now were used less often as transit points for counterfeit African prints between the territorial border and the marketplace. Instead, counterfeit Chinese African prints were moved elsewhere, to locations more difficult for the multi-stakeholder taskforce to identify (interview with representative for Printex, March 2010).

The above was intended to illustrate that, unlike the single import corridor, examined in the previous chapter, which first and foremost was designed to turn certain foreign African prints away before they reached Ghana’s territorial border, the objective of the anti-counterfeiting operations is to expel counterfeit (Chinese) African prints that have made their way into Ghanaian territory. In so doing, this spatial strategy abandoned the line,
which no longer was seen as a suitable locale for the enforcement of the border of the Ghanaian state. Instead, it enforced this border in particular locales – marketplaces – inside Ghanaian territory and after the territorial border (see figures 20 and 21).

Constructing the marketplace as a space of governing

If the single import corridor dealt with the perceived threat of the Chinese African print by folding the border outwards and inwards, and by intensifying the control along the outer edges of Ghanaian territory, the anti-counterfeiting operations construct the marketplace as the main space of governing. One implication of this choice is that ‘illegals’ may move as ‘legals’ across the line at the outer edges and, in part, inside Ghanaian territory. Only when they surface in the marketplace are they at risk of becoming subject to anti-counterfeiting interventions. That is, although the Chinese African print falls under Ghanaian legislation the moment it enters Ghanaian territory, it is only in the moment of the strike that its status as illegal is fully activated (cf. Squire 2011:7). Thus, the selective control of mobility here results in the emergence of certain nodes, dispersed across Ghanaian territory, as spaces where the borders of the Ghanaian state are enforced, and as the moments where and when the status of the Chinese African print as counterfeit is activated. The use of force – that is, seizure and arrest – in this particular location is, in my view, partly justified by the discourse on border porosity and corruption in the Customs Service, discussed in Chapter 5, as well as the role that the trader and the marketplace has played in Ghanaian politics.

As we know, the single import corridor arose from the conclusion that there was a need to intensify Ghana’s territorial borders by moving them outwards, engaging experts in border monitoring, and constructing the eastern frontier zone as an additional space of enforcement of Ghana’s trade and tax laws. ATL’s anti-copying team and the multi-stakeholder taskforce, by contrast, conclude that “the war” (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a:n.p.) against counterfeit Chinese African prints at the outer edges of Ghanaian territory already was lost. Indeed, in interviews with textile company and worker representatives, state officials, business organisations and textile traders, customs officers operating in the frontier zone were frequently portrayed as responsible for the porous nature of the Ghana-Togo border and the incidence of smuggled and counterfeit Chinese African prints in Ghana. This conclusion was partly based upon several failed attempts to collaborate with the Ghanaian Customs Service to enforce intellectual property legislation at the territorial border, as well as inside Ghanaian territory. Throughout the many meetings I had with industrialists, worker representatives and traders in Accra between 2007 and 2010, there was no mistaking the frustration that many of them felt over what they described as inadequate performance of the Ghanaian Customs Service.
Figure 20. Anti-counterfeiting operations in Accra, May 2012. Courtesy of the Textile, Garment and Leather Employees Union.

Figure 21. Anti-counterfeiting operations in Accra, May 2012. Courtesy of the Textile, Garment and Leather Employees Union.
In June 2003, for instance, ATL had initiated collaboration with the Customs Service to deal with counterfeit Chinese African prints. According to one textile company representative, at first the Customs Service regularly summoned representatives of the textile company to identify if African prints, seized on the suspicion of smuggling, violated the company’s rights as registered owners of textile designs and trademarks. Initially, the interviewee suggested, the collaboration worked well. Soon enough, however, customs officers began demanding compensation for their services. When the management of the textile company refused to comply with these demands, the Customs Service terminated the arrangement (interview with representative for ATL’s anti-copying team, March 2010). In fact, several interviewees who attempted to collaborate with the Ghanaian Customs Service to deal with illegal African prints testified to similar experiences. More often than not, according to these interviewees, customs officers asked for ‘compensation’ to fulfil what the textile company and trade union representatives perceive to be regular customs work. In 2010, the relationship between the Customs Service, on the one hand, and Ghana’s textile companies and TGLEU, on the other, had deteriorated to the point where some actors simply refused to deal directly with customs officers. Thus, Ghana’s textile companies came to the conclusion that the line at the edges of territory was no longer a viable locale for the enforcement of Ghana’s intellectual property laws.

The solution they agreed on, as discussed above, was to enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property in the marketplace with the assistance of regional police services. This was because, without the support of Ghana’s security agencies that operate the ports of entry, the counterfeit, as pointed out, remained hidden from sight until it reached the marketplace (interviews with representatives for ATL’s anti-copying team; Printex; TGLEU, March 2010). Put differently, while a textile company does not have the resources required to patrol a space as vast as the border and the border zone, it may be able to monitor a marketplace. A representative of TGLEU explained the situation to me in the following way:

“[W]e cannot fence all the place. But if we want to check whether things [counterfeit African prints] have come, then we will go to the market where eventually these shots will land. [...] We will not even bother ourselves with the borders [...] the point of sale is easier to deal with than to go to the point of arrival. It wastes time and money. [---] [I]f you [the customs officers operating the stations at the outer edges of territory] like to allow the goods to come; we will chase the people in the market.” (interview, March 2010)

This is, however, not the first time that the marketplace has emerged as a site of contestation in Ghana. That is, just as contraband trade, corruption in the Customs Service and the Ghana-Togo border have long played central roles in Ghanaian politics, as discussed in Chapter 5, so have debates about
the profiteering trader and the marketplace (see e.g. Clark 1994:372-401; Robertson 1983:472-478). In fact, Ghana’s traders were at the centre of the kalabule debates of the 1970s and 1980s, which were discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, it was traders who were accused of hoarding, profiteering and creating food shortages in Ghana (Clark 1994; Robertson 1983), and traders were used to divert the attention away from the kalabule activities of men in leading positions (Nugent 1995:79). More than that, Clark claims, during this period, textile traders were forbidden to trade in African prints, the product that had placed them at the top of the trading hierarchy (1994:377). Thus, not only leading politicians, but also Ghana’s traders became target of Flight Lieutenant Rawlings’ Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’s (AFRC) housecleaning exercise following the 1979 coup (see chapter 5). On the day of the coup, Makola no. 1, Ghana’s main wholesale market for imported and manufactured products, especially African prints, was looted and closed down.

Within days, similar operations took place in all the central markets of Ghana’s regional capitals and once the soldiers were finished, angry mobs continued the looting (Clark 1994:381). Many traders were arrested or beaten, and in Kumasi a textile trader was shot dead for profiteering (Robertson 1983:469). The hostility directed towards traders and the marketplace culminated in August 1979, just over two months after the coup, with the demolition of Makola no. 1. The state-owned Ghanaian press declared the destruction of Makola a “‘happy tragedy’”, which represented the victory of the common man over ruthless female profiteers (as quoted in Robertson 1983:469). The AFRC symbolically earmarked the site of Makola no. 1 for a car park (Oquaye 2004:106), now known as Rawlings Park. Within a few days after the “death of Makola” (Robertson 1983), markets in several of the regional capitals were demolished (Clark 1994:388).

According to Clark, the ultimate goal of the AFRC was to remove traders from the food trade (1994:387-388). Without the assistance of traders, however, food distribution proved difficult. Thus, once a civilian government under Hilla Limann had been installed in October 1979, it did not take long before the dual distributive system, with a significant proportion of essential commodities being traded on a parallel market, and upon which the National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council had been dependent throughout the 1970s, was re-instated (Clark 1994:380-390). As we know, kalabule accusations directed towards the Limann government were to motivate another military coup only two years later (see e.g. Oquaye 2004:97-113). What I have not yet touched upon, however, is that Rawlings’ second coup was to be followed by another series of attacks on urban marketplaces.

More adversely, from the point of view of Ghana’s traders, Clark claims, these attacks were followed by an extended period of aggressive enforcement of controlled prices, which caused far more economic damage than had earlier confrontations between traders and the state (1994:390-391). A textile
trader I met in 2008 told me about her experiences of these years. Once Makola no. 1 had been demolished, textile traders were no longer allowed to sell African prints. This trader thus stayed at home until she returned to Rawlings Park the following year to hawk African prints illegally in the street, because there no longer was a marketplace. Following the second coup in 1981, the textile traders were forced to leave the area yet again. “These were Rawlings years”, the trader said, “and everybody was afraid” (interview with market trader 3, December 2008). The African prints that the textile traders sold were smuggled in from Côte d’Ivoire and Togo, which now had become the best places to purchase Ghanaian African prints (Robertson 1983:475). The conflict between the regime and the textile traders originated in the traders’ refusal to adhere to the price controls instituted by the government, because “that was no price that would allow you to pay school fees or to even live from”, the trader explained (market trader 3, December 2008). The trader continued: “The government itself would take the textiles to the villages and sell it there at their controlled price. They thought that we put too big profit. That was the whole problem” (ibid.).

Rawlings was, however, far from the first head of state to turn traders into scapegoats to divert the attention away from his government’s inability to run the country’s finances and to ensure that the basic needs of the people were taken care of (Robertson 1983:472). Rather, these events represented the culmination of many decades of contestation over the position of the market trader in Ghanaian society (Clark 1994:372-401; Robertson 1983). Illusions of economic and political power, Robertson claims, were constructed around the success of a few traders at the top of the trading hierarchy, when in fact the profits of the majority of Ghana’s traders were decisively limited (Robertson 1983:472-474).

Yet, it is relevant to note that Ghana’s textile companies regret having to target traders and the marketplaces. While my impression from the many meetings I have had with representatives of Ghana’s textile companies and trade unions is that their views on Ghana’s traders are influenced by Ghanaian discourse on market traders as an economically and politically powerful group in Ghanaian society, they still recognise that they are dependent upon traders to distribute and market their goods in the marketplace and are therefore careful to maintain good relationships with textile traders. They also recognise that not all traders who deal in Chinese African prints trade in counterfeit; as a trade union leader explained: “Those who do genuine imports, they don’t import these counterfeit ones. There are some people who import […] they import maybe Holland [Vlisco], ABC, or even some from China with their own [non-counterfeit] designs. That one, nobody will stop you” (interview with TGLEU representative, March 2010). In fact, Ghana’s

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88 African prints from A. Brunnschweiler & Company Ltd. (A.B.C.), located in Hyde, outside Manchester.
textile companies claim that certain categories of traders – including the printers, the textile companies’ distributors, and traders further down the textile trading hierarchy, who primarily deal in locally produced African prints – are just as adversely affected by the presence of Chinese African prints as are the textile companies (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a; interviews with representatives for ATL; CTD Ghana; Printex, March 2010). But, as ATL’s anti-copying team points out, unless they take action, there will soon be no relationship with traders to consider, because ATL will have to close down its factory (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a; interview with a representative for CTD Ghana Ltd., December 2008). Additionally, market raids have generated opportunities to communicate with segments of traders beyond the printers and distributors with whom the companies have longstanding relationships. The anti-counterfeiting operations have intensified the interactions between textile companies and traders and they have given textile companies the opportunity to educate traders on the impact of counterfeit goods on their businesses (interview with a Printex representative, March 2010).

On the other hand, in September 2011, around 100 workers from ATL, TexStyles and Printex marched from the Trade Union Congress’s headquarters to the trading areas in central Accra in protest against the counterfeits trade. According to the Daily Graphic, placards directed at the textile traders in the area read: “Cloth dealers: Stop importing fake materials” and “Textile companies are collapsing because of you” (Anon 2011, 14th September:n.p.). Other messages were directed at the government, which was asked to come to the textile industry’s aid (ibid.)

Accra central’s Chinese African print traders, on the other hand, have developed their own counter-tactics to cope with market raids. Based on interviews with textile traders in central Accra and representatives for the two taskforces that raid Ghana’s marketplaces, these tactics, as alluded to above, include warning all traders about any taskforce approaching the market, abandoning their shops, and if caught, fighting taskforce members and police officers, pleading to and/or bribing police officers to let them go, neglecting to appear before the court if indeed charged with any offence, attempting to influence the Minister of Trade and Industry to stop operations in the marketplaces, and appealing to customs officers at the frontier to stop the influx of counterfeit Chinese African prints. The strategies employed by Ghana’s textile traders have also been noted by the Ghanaian news media (see Adadevoh 2006, 27th November; Akpey 2006, n.d. May; Azu 2009, 30th November; CitiFM Online 2011, 21st July; Ghana News Agency 2011, 17th May; Ghanaian Chronicle 2003, 14th April).

More than that, and this is perhaps more relevant to the argument I pursue here, leaders of several traders’ associations in central Accra question whether the marketplace is an appropriate location for the enforcement of legislation that comes into play as soon as the counterfeit (Chinese) African
print enters Ghanaian territory (e.g. interviews with market trader 5, December 2008; market trader 10, March 2010; also see Ghanaian Chronicle 2003, 29th November; Ghana News Agency 2011, 17th May). Indeed, association leaders in central Accra claim that clampdowns in marketplaces represent border management in the wrong place. One trader, who operates a shop in Makola market’s textile section, explained to me: “[T]hat’s why the Customs are there [at the territorial border]. […] [T]he government should ask Customs why it is still coming. It’s their duty to stop it. It’s up to security to stop this” (interview with market trader 10, March 2010). It is, however, not only the choice of locale, the marketplace, for the anti-counterfeiting operations that concerns some of Ghana’s traders, but also the mode of operation these taskforces employ: that is, the raid.

The ubiquitous border

To exercise their rights as owner of intellectual property, Ghana’s textile companies must locate, recognise and seize counterfeits, as well as identify a person to be held responsible and charged with infringement. Earlier, I pointed out that counterfeiting enables the Chinese African print to partially disappear from sight as it obscures the visual means of communication between producer and consumer. Dealt with at the territorial border, the identification of counterfeit Chinese African prints is a fairly straightforward, albeit resource intensive, procedure; it is about matching what comes from the outside to industrial design and trademark registries and intercepting those African prints that infringe on the rights of Ghana’s owners of intellectual property. Once inside Ghanaian territory, however, the visual deception that counterfeiting represents makes it more difficult to recognise the ‘illegal’. Interventions against it thus require a certain “way of seeing” (cf. Amoore 2007:221), which can disentangle that which has been deliberately obscured. This becomes particularly pronounced when the illegal, at the same time, infringes on both industrial design and trademark legislation and thus completely blurs the markers available to the consumer to differentiate between original and copy. This way of seeing thus draws upon additional knowledge about African prints, including the knowledge about differences in the quality of the print, the quality of the grey cloth, the exact composition of colours

89 The introduction of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market has also created conflicts between different categories of traders. All groups accuse other traders of being responsible for or profiteering from the Chinese textiles trade. More often than not, it is the market women – that is, the traders in Makola’s textile section, earlier identified as the hub of the Chinese textiles trade in central Accra – who are turned into scapegoats. These traders, however, claim to make very limited profits from Chinese African prints and instead identify the importers as the category of traders that stand to benefit the most from the trade in Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian market (interviews with textile traders in central Accra, November-December 2007, December 2008, March 2010).
and so on, knowledge that only the textile company representative may have. In other words, at this stage, identifying counterfeit requires an expert gaze.

As just noted, to exercise their rights as owners of intellectual property, Ghana’s textile companies must not only identify the cloth that infringes on their rights, but also a person to be held responsible for the act of counterfeiting. To do so, Ghana’s textile company representatives explain, is difficult, because the person responsible for selling counterfeit Chinese African prints in the Ghanaian market; that is, the person who can be charged with industrial design or trademark infringement, often hides. The head of ATL’s anti-counterfeiting operations, for instance, explained to me that if he so much as passes by the Makola markets the word quickly gets around and traders, knowing who he is, will abandon their shops to escape arrest. When confronted with empty shops there is little that the taskforce can do because there is nobody they can charge with design or trademark infringement (interview, March 2010). The raid – the unannounced strike against the counterfeit Chinese African print – is thus particularly well suited to deal with a threat that is elusive in more than one way. That is, the uncertainty about where and when Ghana’s intellectual property legislation will be enforced, which the market raid creates, may, if successful, deter traders, importers and manufacturers from future engagement in the counterfeit trade.

This, I find, is the context in which we may best understand the choice of the market raid as a strategy to deal with the perceived threat of counterfeit Chinese African prints. That is, to protect yourself from something and someone who is hidden from you, you may have to hide your intentions. Thus, it is the element of surprise, combined with the choice of locale – the place where the threat re-surfaces – and a particular way of seeing that only the expert has, which enables Ghana’s right holders to enforce these rights. As such, this spatial strategy, which seeks to govern through uncertainty (cf. Coleman 2009:910-911) and which constructs a border that presents itself as ubiquitous (e.g. Amoore 2006; Balibar 2002:84), in the sense that it may appear at any time, in any marketplace, has something in common with the strikes against smuggled Chinese African prints in the southeastern frontier zone, as discussed in Chapter 5. The anti-counterfeiting operations, however, engage different borderworkers from those of the other two spatial strategies explored in this thesis.

The borderworkers of the anti-counterfeiting operations

As should be clear from the foregoing, Ghana’s intellectual property legislation gives registered owners of industrial designs and trademarks the right to institute court proceedings against any person who infringes on the rights conferred by registration (see Industrial Designs Act 2003, section 9.4; Trade Marks Act 2004, section 9.2). In so doing, this spatial strategy, like the single import corridor, partly displaced border enforcement from the
state actors traditionally associated with border control, namely the Customs Service. As we have seen, this was the outcome of the Ghanaian discourse on corruption in the Customs Service and failed attempts to collaborate with customs officers around the issue of counterfeiting, on the one hand, and the legislation, which places the responsibility for monitoring intellectual property infringement with right-holders, on the other.

Unlike the spatial strategies explored in Chapters 5 and 7, however, which were coordinated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, in this case Ghana’s textile companies and one of the two trade unions that organise Ghana’s textile workers, the Textile, Garment and Leather Employees Union (TGLEU), were the leading actors, who, in the words of a Ministry of Trade and Industry official operated as “a neighbourhood watch dog type of group, like [a] vigilante to look at the interest of the textile industry” (interview with a representative for the Domestic Trade Division, March 2010). Yet, and as mentioned above, this is a responsibility that Ghana’s textile companies only reluctantly accepted and they accepted it only because the Ghanaian government, in their opinion, had failed to do so. They were reluctant to accept a role as implementers of Ghana’s intellectual property legislation, I think, first of all because they saw the state as chiefly responsible for instituting protective measure to save Ghana’s textile industry, and second, because the state on several occasions in the past had taken upon itself the enforcement of intellectual property legislation. The vetting committee of the single import corridor, examined in the previous chapter, for instance, and the establishment of a 16-member taskforce under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, charged with the task of seizing and disposing of smuggled and/or counterfeit African prints, in August 2010 (Ghana News Agency 2010, 11th August), are among the more pronounced examples of the blurring of responsibilities for the enforcement of intellectual property legislation in Ghana.

Further, the way that ATL’s anti-copying team operated illustrates particularly well, I find, how Ghana’s textile companies were dependent upon other actors to enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property. While the anti-copying team carried out investigations about where and when to strike against the trade in counterfeit Chinese African prints, they were also highly dependent upon tip-offs from informers. Thus, before embarking on its anti-counterfeiting operations, ATL, as noted above, appealed to the Ghanaian public to be vigilant and to report to the company about any counterfeit products in the marketplaces (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006d, 2006e). For the most part, according to the leader of ATL’s anti-copying team, it was traders who were prepared to blow the whistle on other traders who provided the anti-copying team, as well as the multi-stakeholder taskforce coordinated by TGLEU, with information about counterfeit Chinese African prints in the market. Once the location and the time to strike had been established, the anti-copying team depended upon regional police commands to seize coun-
terfeit Chinese African prints and to arrest traders who sold them. This was necessary in order to have evidence (the counterfeit African print) to present to the court as well as suspects to charge with infringement on their rights. Once the seizure and arrest had been made, the head of ATL’s anti-copying team explained, the textile company was completely in the hands of the Regional Police Service, which was in possession of the evidence and had the authority to prosecute criminal cases. Finally, they also depended upon trained judges to rule on the cases in court. Thus, while Ghana’s textile companies and TGLEU frequently questioned the Ghanaian government’s commitment to its textile industry, these anti-counterfeiting operations did not, as I see it, represent governance beyond the state.  

They did, however, seek to circumvent some state actors by engaging others. That is, one reason why an earlier attempt to operate as a taskforce in collaboration with the Customs Service and under the Ministry of Trade and Industry failed, the trade union representative explained, was that the taskforce could not act independently and that information about planned raids was leaked to the marketplace. Operating independently, but with the assistance of another agent of the state, the Police Service, at least initially, proved a more viable way forward.

Additionally, the multi-stakeholder taskforce headed by TGLEU illuminates how a number of divisions in industrial relations and in business were transgressed to create a unified front against a common enemy: the counterfeit African print. While the trade union leader stressed that the interests of workers and employers are fundamentally incompatible, in this instance the union found itself in the same position as the textile companies and had therefore chosen to engage in an intervention it hoped would save the textile industry and its members’ employment. This became all the more evident when one looked at the composition of the multi-stakeholder taskforce. The leader of TGLEU was the convenor of the taskforce, while an employee of Printex headed its operations, and it acted on behalf of three of Ghana’s textile companies: ATL, Printex and TexStyles. Thus, while TGLEU only organises ATL and Printex workers, the union, and the taskforce it coordinated, also acted on behalf of TexStyles, whose workers are organised by the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union. TGLEU also collaborated closely with the Local Textile Printers Association (LTPA), an association that represents textile printers, a category of traders that is particularly adversely affected by the counterfeit trade. In 2010, TGLEU and LTPA organised a

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90 This is in contrast to Africanist scholarship, which suggests that the inadequate performance of many African states has left African populations with little option but to disengage from the state (see Azarya 1988; Azarya and Chazan 1987; Chazan 1988; de Soto 1989; Hydén 1983 among others; also see e.g. Ferguson 2006; Mbembe 2001:9; Roitman 1990, Söderbaum and Taylor 2008:15, for discussions on the development of regulatory strategies beyond the African state).

91 Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd. (GTMC) does not participate in these operations for reasons that were told to me in confidence, so I accordingly cannot account for them in this thesis.
meeting to educate traders from Kumasi who had been caught selling counterfeit African prints on the negative effects of the counterfeit trade on traders, textile workers and companies alike (Bonney 2010, 2nd March).

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to briefly discuss the next move initiated by Ghanaian textile companies and trade unions: advocating for counterfeit (and smuggled) Chinese African prints to be burnt in public. This move not only displaced corrupt and ‘unreliable’ state agents from border management, but it also represented the most dramatic expulsion of the perceived threat of Chinese African prints from the Ghanaian market.

The problematic state revisited and new ways forward

By the time I finished my final fieldwork in March 2010, Ghana’s textile companies had grown increasingly disillusioned about whether their anti-counterfeiting operations indeed would have the desired effect. As illustrated by the Kumasi case above, it had proven difficult to win court cases. In fact, any further action beyond the interception of counterfeit African prints in the marketplace had proven difficult. The head of ATL’s anti-copying team explained to me that the police service, while being very supportive when counterfeit African prints were to be located and seized, would “start dragging their feet” as soon as court action was mentioned (interview, March 2010). Every time the anti-copying team’s representative went to the Accra Regional Police to discuss further action,

“they will be giving you all sorts of excuses and they will even sometimes end up telling them [the traders] that: go and talk to them [the textile company], they will understand it, go … apologise that you won’t do that again. […] We want them [the Police] to do the right thing, but they don’t want to do the right thing so that is it. That is why up till now we have not been able to take anybody to court in Accra.” (interview, March 2010)

More than that, the Customs Service’s new way of dealing with seized African prints, as discussed in Chapter 5 – which meant that smuggled and counterfeit African were re-sold at heavily discounted prices to District Assembly officials and the Ghanaian public – not only reinserted counterfeit into the market but in a way legitimised the counterfeiting of African prints (interview with TGLEU representative, March 2010). The best solution to these dilemmas, according to Ghana’s textile companies and TGLEU, would be to follow the route that several neighbouring states had taken: to publicly burn counterfeit African prints to deter people – specifically, Ghanaian, other West African and Chinese traders, importers and exporters and Chinese textile manufacturers – from future engagement in the counterfeit trade. That way, the textile companies would no longer be dependent upon the police to pursue court cases or upon judges whose expertise in the field of intellectual
property legislation had proved limited. Additionally, it would keep counterfeit Chinese African prints from being reinserted into the market (interviews with textile company and trade union representatives, March 2010; also see Boateng and Bonney 2010, 2nd February).

While it initially was difficult to gain government support for the public destruction of counterfeit African prints, Ghana’s textile companies and TGLEU eventually succeed in getting their position across. The day I left Accra at the end of my final fieldwork, 31st March 2010, a multi-stakeholder meeting at the Ministry of Trade and Industry decided that counterfeit African prints brought onto the Ghanaian henceforth would be destroyed when seized (Bonney 2010, 22nd April). Shortly thereafter, on 6th July 2010, the four local textile industries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Customs Service to “ensure co-operation and support from the parties and protect intellectual property of manufacturers” (Ghana News Agency 2010, 6th July:n.p.). This authorised the Customs Service, Ghana Standards Board and the Police to destroy African prints bearing “pirated” designs and/or trademarks (ibid.; also see Ocloo 2011, 25th August). In August of that year, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Hannah Tetteh, inaugurated a 16-member taskforce headed by the Acting Director of the Import/Export Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry to be responsible for the effective implementation of the MOU (Ghana News Agency 2010, 11th August). Three months later, 391 pieces of counterfeit African prints were burnt by the Customs Service, Standards Board and police officers, in the presence of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Ghana Revenue Authority, the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Ghana Textiles Manufacturers and Importers Association and TGLEU as well as the Ghanaian press. A journalist for the Daily Graphic reported:

The members of the taskforce were: the Acting Director of Communications and an Assistant Commercial Officer, Ministry of Trade and Industry, a representative for Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), the Deputy Commissioner of operations and the Legal Chief Collector, Customs and Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Head of Ghana Standards Board at Tema port office, an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) of the Police Headquarters’ Criminal Investigation Department and a Police Chief Inspector of Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), representing the national and local government. A representative for Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industries, one representative each for Ghana’s four textile companies, one representative for the workers (TGLEU) and one for the textile importers (Textiles and Distribution Association) represented the private sector on the taskforce. At the inauguration of the taskforce, Hannah Tetteh, the Minister of Trade and Industry, “urged members of the committee not to connive with illegal importers to undermine their work but rather appreciate the duty entrusted on them to meet their objectives”, a statement that gives some indication about how several state agencies are looked upon in Ghana (Ghana News Agency 2010, 11th August:n.p.).
The Ministry of Trade and Industries (sic) (MoTI) has sent its strongest warning yet to dealers in illegal textiles, by publicly destroying 391 pieces of counterfeit wax prints smuggled into the country. [---] It was the first such public wax print destruction to be undertaken by the task force, which was established earlier this year with a mandate to monitor the movement of smuggled fabrics, target relevant warehouses and seize for destruction pirated and smuggled textile prints to deter the dealers and others who may be tempted to deal in such goods. A representative of the ministry who briefed newsmen at the site said the action was a warning to all dealers that the ministry was determined to destroy the illicit trade and salvage the local textile industry. (Ocloo 2010, 4th October:n.p.)

The way I see it, the single import corridor, the anti-counterfeiting operations and the advocacy for the public destruction of illegal African prints all have in common the desire to “purify” and dominate Ghanaian territory (cf. Falah and Newman 1995:698-699; Sibley 1988) by ridding it of the smuggled and/or counterfeit (Chinese) African print. At the same time, the existence of corrupt state officials threatens to undermine all attempts to exclude the threatening Chinese African print. Engaging other state agents to circumvent those encoded as problematic thus becomes part of the spatial strategies used to deal with the perceived threat of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian textile economy. To be more precise, the single import corridor displaced customs officers operating the frontier stations and moved certain key functions associated with international trade away from the outer edges of state territory. The anti-counterfeiting operations, by contrast, engaged Regional Police Commands to avoid dependence on the Customs Service, which in Ghana is notorious for corruption. Thus, for me, the effort to have all counterfeit African prints publicly destroyed represents the most recent of a series of attempts to displace ‘unreliable’ state agents: in this instance, police officers and the courts.

At the same time, when one takes into account the composition of the most recent taskforce, the public destruction of smuggled and counterfeit (Chinese) African prints may just as well be read as Ghanaian textile actors’ re-engagement with state actors whom they, during a time period, had turned away from: that is, the Customs Service and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Put another way, the role of the Ghanaian state in terms of the protection of territory and economy has re-surfaced as a key issue in the Ghanaian debate about the threat of Chinese African prints. That is, while the inflow of illegal African prints, on the one hand, brings the role of the Ghanaian state as a regulator into question, at the same it re-enforces the imagination of the state as the ultimate source of social order (cf. Hansen and Stepputat 2001:2). Regardless of how we choose to read the relationship between state, private and civil society actors, however, the public destruction of the illegal Chinese African print represents the most dramatic expulsion of the threat of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian textile economy.
Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore how Chinese African prints are constructed as counterfeit, and how the anti-counterfeiting operations dispersed the borders of the Ghanaian state to intervene against this perceived threat. While similar to Chapter 5 in several respects – this threat is described as economic in nature; the transgression of the Chinese African print is a legal transgression; and the anti-counterfeiting operations work through the borders of the Ghanaian state – this chapter has sought to add a new element to our understanding of the processes that constitute the Chinese African print as a threat and to demonstrate a different way that the borders of the Ghanaian state are re-shaped and displaced in response to its presence in Ghana. That is, to understand the perceived threat posed by the counterfeit Chinese African print, the focus was shifted from price to the visual deception that comes with the production of a counterfeit, and to what this meant in economic terms. Furthermore, to analyse how the Chinese African print became counterfeit, there was the need to focus not only on the movement of the Chinese African print, but also on its prior activities, and what it subsequently already carried with it when it arrived on Ghanaian territory.

Finally, while the counterfeit Chinese African print became governable the moment it entered Ghanaian territory, the spatial strategy explored in this chapter dealt with the perceived threat of the counterfeit (Chinese) African print after the border, deep inside Ghanaian territory. Thus, unlike the single import corridor, which partly attempted to turn counterfeit and sub-standard (Chinese) African prints away before they reached the territorial border, the anti-counterfeiting operations abandoned the line at the outer edges to expel ‘illegals’ that already had made their way inside Ghana. It did so by constructing a border that was quite different from the one explored in the previous chapter. This was a network-shaped border that dispersed border control across Ghanaian territory and tried to make itself appear ubiquitous to deter from future engagement in the counterfeits trade. Equally, one of the more striking things about the anti-counterfeiting operations, when compared to the spatial strategies explored in Chapters 5 and 7, was the border-workers that they engaged. While the Ministry of Trade and Industry coordinated the single import corridor as well as the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, Ghana’s textile companies were the leading actors of the spatial strategy explored in this chapter. Yet, to enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property, Ghana’s textile companies remained dependent upon other actors, including the police, the courts and the vigilant Ghanaian.

If the anti-counterfeiting operations represented a spatial strategy that broadened the actors involved in the enactment of borders, in the final empirical chapter, the focus is yet again on the Ghanaian state’s response to the
inflow of Chinese African prints. To understand this spatial strategy, I will argue, requires an analytical move away from the borders of the state to a focus on how the construction of the Chinese African print as morally unjust translates into a spatial strategy that draws upon the borders of the Ghanaian 

*nation* to protect the domestic market from the perceived threat of the Chinese African print.
On Friday 12th November 2004, in the capital of Accra, the Ghanaian government launched the National Friday Wear programme – an initiative that sought to encourage white-collar workers to dress in locally produced textiles, rather than formal dress, on Fridays. This initiative was part of a comprehensive programme under the Ghana Trade Policy with the objective of creating demand for Ghanaian products in order to create jobs and development in Ghana and to “encourage national pride in producers and consumers” (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2004:30). This was a necessary measure to protect the Ghanaian culture, which, Nana Akomea, the Minister of Information, stated, was “under siege” by globalisation (Ghana News Agency 2004, 12th November:n.p.), and to save Ghana’s textile industry, which was threatened by cheap imports from China. Indeed, by linking Ghana’s textile products, African prints among them, and the textile industry to Ghanaian identity, the Friday Wear programme was intended to increase the consumption of locally produced textile products and to revitalise the textile and garment industry (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2004:30; Budget Statement and Economic Policy for the Government of Ghana 2006, section 419; 2007, section 425; 2009, section 374). For the programme to work to this effect, however, the attitudes of Ghanaians towards locally produced textile products would have to change, Alan Kyerematen, the Minister of Trade and Industry, stated at the national launch of the programme. Akomea, the Minister of Information, joined Kyerematen in his appeal as he urged all Ghanaians to embrace the programme (Ghana News Agency 2004, 12th November:n.p.).

93 The reader should take note that the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes not only seek to intervene against the threat posed by Chinese African prints. They also address the threat of the westernisation of Ghanaian dress through the extensive use of obroni wawu, second-hand clothes, which have become the preferred dress among the Ghanaian youth. At the launch of the National Friday Wear programme at Wa, the capital of the Upper West region, for instance, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry expressed that he found it “ironical that while tourists from all parts of the world admire our traditional wears and culture by patronizing made in Ghana products, Ghanaians shy away from them and use their scarce resources to patronize imported second hand clothes” (Ghana News Agency 2006, 21st October:n.p.). Thus, the objective of these programmes is to change the attitudes towards all locally produced textiles, including African prints, kente, batik and tie-dye.
The purpose of this chapter is, first, to explore how all Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian market are constructed as ‘morally unjust’, and, second, how the National Friday Wear programme, and the National Everyday Wear programme that replaced it in 2009, work through the borders of the Ghanaian nation to intervene against the perceived threat of the Chinese African print. The argument of the chapter is that the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes seek to resolve the economic issue – the potential collapse of the textile industry – by transforming it into a question of identity, of rights to a certain cultural heritage, and of the moral obligations of the citizens towards the Ghanaian nation. They do so by embodying the borders of the Ghanaian nation; that is, this spatial strategy displays the embedded border on the bodies of citizens in strategic positions in order to encourage the consumption of local textile products and to intervene indirectly against the presence of the Chinese African print in Ghana.

In what follows, I explore, first, how the Chinese African print is constructed as morally unjust. Contrary to what was the case in the previous two chapters, this variation of the Chinese African print as a threat is not something that the Chinese African print acquires through its activities and movements. Rather, this form that the threat takes comes from the relations already embedded in the Chinese African print and the Ghanaian African print. Next, I explore how the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes unfold spatially and temporally and the actors they engage. Just as the single import corridor and the anti-counterfeiting operations do, these programmes, I propose, represent a spatial response to the influx of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market, albeit in a slightly different way. Indeed, similar to the strategies explored in the two previous chapters, these programmes displace borders from the edges of territory and manipulate their shape (here, into cloth) to protect the Ghanaian market and nation from the perceived threat that the Chinese African print represents. This spatial strategy, however, does not stretch or disperse the legal borders of the Ghanaian state. Instead, it works through distribution and display of the identity border of the Ghanaian nation. That is, it seeks to distribute the ‘right’, or morally just, way of dressing by displaying the embedded border on what I have called strategic bodies. Thus, the intent is to unsettle some of the assumptions about borders from the previous chapters and to show what a broader conceptualisation of borders may add to the understanding of border-making as a spatial strategy used to resolve the conflicting fears of unrestricted mobility and of fixity and stasis.

First, however, I want to return to the discussion from Chapter 2 regarding the construction of the African print as a symbolically charged object in order to clarify why the African print from China appears threatening not only in an economic sense, but also in identity terms.
The threat of the Chinese African print to the Ghanaian nation

The Asian manufacturers have a massive advantage in terms of price to the consumer and margin to the trade. We know that it is impossible for us to compete on price. [---] [Our competitors, however,] are not satisfied to take our share from the lower end of the market where price is the more critical factor, they also want the rest of our business and are prepared to steal our ideas, our cultural heritage and even our identity in order to achieve this. (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a:n.p.)

[As a] local company we are doing a lot to the country. [---] [Y]ou are offering to the community be genuine, from your own sweat, from your own source so that at the end of the day you also add up. Then we develop. Because we cannot depend on foreign, foreign, foreign, foreign, foreign. We cannot develop, if we say: okay, let all the local industry collapse and then we import everything we use, clothing and... we are not helping our country to develop. (Copyright Officer, Akosombo Textiles Ltd., March 2010)

In the previous two chapters, I explored two variations of the perceived threat of the Chinese African print, which made it appear threatening in economic terms. First, in Chapter 5, I described smuggling as a practice that undermined the protection that import tariffs provide, as it reduced the price at which the Chinese African print sold on the Ghanaian market. The cheaply priced Chinese African print represented a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy because it appealed to the Ghanaian consumer, who might purchase it rather than a Ghanaian African print. Likewise, in Chapter 6, I focused on the economic functions of brand names and designs and how they were used to gain advantages in the marketplace. I described counterfeiting as a practice that undermined these economic values, because it obscured the difference between original and copy. This, in turn, meant that the negative values associated with the copy (the Chinese African print) could be transferred onto the original (the Ghanaian African print). Thus, counterfeiting was described as a practice that undermined the consumer’s trust in the original product. Both smuggling and counterfeiting represented a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy because they reduced the consumption of locally produced African prints. This, in turn, would result in the dismissal of textile workers and, ultimately, in the collapse of Ghana’s textile industry.

In Ghana, the Chinese African print is not only associated with smuggling and with the counterfeiting of Ghanaian brand names and designs. Indeed, it is also associated with the exploitation of Ghana’s cultural heritage, as illustrated by the first quote above. While this is an economic issue in part – the competitiveness of the Chinese African print on the Ghanaian market may increase as the result of the ‘theft’ of Ghanaian identity – in this chapter, I emphasise the entanglement of symbolic meanings and economic values that
African prints and the textile industry represent in Ghanaian society, and which the Chinese African print threatens to erode. From this, it also follows that it is not primarily the loss of employment opportunities or the revenues lost to the state if Ghana’s textile industry collapses that are the focus. Rather, the point I wish to make in this chapter is that the threat of the collapse of Ghana’s textile industry goes beyond what may be expressed in economic terms. Indeed, the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print to the African print and to Ghana’s textile industry goes right to the heart of what Ghana represents as a nation.

My use of the term nation to discuss the perceived threat of the Chinese African print and, later, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, is to be understood in the context of how the state and state borders were used in the previous two chapters. To clarify, in these chapters, the focus was on the state as a legal and regulatory organisation, and, more specifically, on how those laws and regulations of the state that are associated with the control of mobility increasingly are enforced away from the edges of state territory. Thus, in Chapter 5, the focus was on how the Ghanaian laws and regulations that control international trade were used to construct the Chinese African print as inside (non-smuggled) or outside the law (smuggled). In Chapter 6, Ghana’s intellectual property legislation served a similar purpose.

The concept of the nation, by contrast, may, for the purposes of this thesis, be used to refer to “a collection of people bound together by some sense of solidarity, common culture and shared history” (Storey 2001:21). Additionally, and to follow Anthony D. Smith, a prominent writer on nations and nationalism, nations commonly claim a particular territory and have “a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (1991:14, emphasis original). While I will return to the claims to territory in the name of the nation and the obligations of citizens towards it below, it is primarily the nation as an imagined community (cf. Anderson 1991) who share a culture, a past and a sense of territorial attachment that is of interest in this section of the chapter.

Following the social constructionist approach of this thesis, a nation is not something pre-given, but rather is an entity that is socially constructed to serve certain purposes. The Ghanaian nation (and state), as noted earlier, was first built in opposition to British colonial rule. Once independence was won, the ruling elite used the ideology of nationalism to construct a sense of attachment to the new territory. Thus, if we are to understand how the Chinese African print is constructed as a threat to the Ghanaian nation, it is useful to return to some of the main points put forward in Chapter 2 concerning the role played by cloth and the textile industry during the period of nation-

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building in Ghana. This is by no means intended as a comprehensive account of the construction of the Ghanaian nation, but instead is simply the recapitulation of a few key points relevant to our understanding of how the Chinese African print has come to be represented as a threat to Ghanaian identity.

Thus, in Chapter 2, the focus was on the role of traditional arts, including the rich textile traditions of the West African sub-region, in the Gold Coast Colony’s struggle for independence as well as how these later were used to construct a sense of attachment to the Ghanaian nation. That is, the process that transformed the former British colony into the independent Republic of Ghana also re-defined the textile traditions of various ‘ethnic’ groups as Ghanaian textile heritage. The objective of the leadership in Accra was to provide the new nation with a shared history that pre-dated colonialism (e.g. Hess 2006:16-18; Mohan 2008:285). To give an example, the kente cloth, which had long been associated with authority and leadership among the Asante (e.g. Aronson 2007:16-18), was now used to construct Ghana as a nation-state with political institutions with pre-colonial roots. Furthermore, cultural artefacts, such as cloth, represented signifiers that enabled the Ghanaian leadership to unify diverse peoples and to construct a multi-ethnic Ghanaian nation. Thus, while the kente cloth was transformed into Ghanaian cultural heritage, at the same time it remained a symbol of the Asante (Mohan 2008:285).

The European origin of the African print, by contrast, implied that it could not be used to invoke a pre-colonial past. After at least six decades of consumption of African prints in the West African region, however, it was well integrated with the region’s textile traditions. Thus, by the time of Ghana’s independence, it had taken on symbolic values similar to those associated with kente or adinkra and it was used in similar ways as cotton cloth in the West African region had been for centuries (e.g. Gott 2009; Hodder 1980; Johnson 1980).

As suggested by the second quote above, the Ghanaian state and nation were not only built around the notion of a shared cultural past, but also around a future as an industrialised, developed economy. As discussed earlier, at independence, the Ghanaian government identified import substitution industrialisation as the preferred development path for the Ghanaian economy. Textile industries, considered an important first step towards industrialisation in theories of development due to the favourable ratio between technological investment and employment generation, were high up on the Ghanaian government’s wish list. The result in terms of a protectionist trade policy regime – designed to attract foreign investment in textile industries in Ghana – has already been accounted for. What I want to add to this is one example of the continued importance attributed to the textile industry in Ghana in economic and symbolic terms, in particular under President Kufuor’s eight years in seat (2001-2008).
In the Kufuor government’s Development Plan for Ghana – called the Golden Age of Business – the textile and garment sector played a leading role, as it was expected to attract foreign investors, mainly in the garment sector, who wished to access the US market through Ghana. This was because Ghana had received a certificate to export duty-free and quota-free textile products under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2002 (Ghana News Agency 2002, 12th April; Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2004, section 394; 2005, section 857; 2006, section 506; 2007, section 426). Thus, in 2001, the Ghanaian government launched the President’s Special Initiative on Garments and Textiles (PSI-GT) to facilitate the establishment of garment and textile factories in Ghana that would produce for the export market. The government’s expectations of the programme were high; at the inauguration of the first garment factory under the programme in July 2004, which was a Ghanaian-Mauritian partnership, the Ghana News Agency reported that the President had announced that Ghana would now “leap-frog into the mainstream of development” (2004, 2nd July:n.p.). Indeed, according to the Ghanaian press, the PSI-GT was expected to generate at least 70,000 employment opportunities in 120 new companies (Ghana News Agency 2004, 22nd May; Ghanaian Times 2004, 19th July). In its efforts to rescue and develop the textile industry, the Ministry also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the liquidators to take over the assets of Juapong Textiles Ltd. (Daily Graphic 2006, 6th April), which they planned to revitalise with the assistance of a Chinese textile company (Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2007, section 414; 2008, section 216; also see Amankwah 2007, 4th May:1; Ghana News Agency 2007, 11th May; Ghanaian Times 2007, 12th April). The reactivation of the collapsed textile factory in May 2007 under a new name, Volta Star Textiles Ltd., “would send a strong signal about the Government’s commitment to revive collapsed indus-

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95 The PSI-GT involved a range of activities aimed, in part, at marketing Ghana as “a hub for textile manufacturing” (Budget Statement and Economic Policy for the Government of Ghana 2005, section 901). Activities under the PSI-GT included, among others, the establishment of textile and garment clusters in Accra and Tema, as well as training centres in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi to educate machine operators; the release of land by the government that was to be used for a garment village in Tema export processing zone and the construction of an industrial park in that garment village, which would be rented out to local entrepreneurs; the establishment of eight garment factories in the Accra textile and garment cluster; the purchase of a dilapidated warehouse from Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd. in Tema, which was to be refurbished and turned into garment factories; and the setup of a credit scheme for Ghanaian companies participating in the PSI-GT (see Budget Statement and Economic Policy for the Government of Ghana 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; Quartey 2006:141; Accra Mail 2001, 29th October; Anon 2001, 29th November; Anon 2002, 8th October; Anon 2002, 28th October; Anon 2003, 31st January; Anon 2005, 24th June; Daily Graphic 2002, 5th November; 2003, 18th June; Ghana News Agency 2003, 7th July; 2004, 22nd May; 2004, 2nd July; 2008, 30th April; Ghanaian Chronicle 2006, 24th January; Ghanaian Times 2003, 4th March; 2004, 19th July; Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research 2005:148, 2008:156).
tries that have the potential to give jobs to the people”, Kyerematen, the Minister of Trade and Industry declared (Ghana News Agency 2007, 11th May:n.p.). Though these expectations were never realised, they illustrate just how important the textile and garment sector has remained in Ghana, especially in terms of fostering the idea of Ghana as an industrialising nation-state.

Having recapitulated what Ghanaian identity here is taken to mean and what is at stake if the Ghanaian textile industry indeed was to close shop, I want to turn the attention to why the African print from China represents a threat to this identity. To understand this, we need to return to the discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 about the price and quality of the Chinese African print, and the practice of counterfeiting, while retaining the focus on the symbolic aspects of both the cloth and the textile industry, and how the two are interlinked. That is, in Chapter 5, I pointed out that the lower price of the Chinese African print, when compared with the Ghanaian, meant that its presence on the Ghanaian market threatened to collapse Ghana’s textile industry. The key point within the context of this chapter is that the consequences of such a collapse are not only economic in nature (in terms of revenue and job opportunities lost). They also represent a threat to the symbolic values of the textile industry. That is, in symbolic terms, the textile industry represents Ghana’s potential future as an industrialised, modern welfare state, as illustrated by the second quote at the beginning of this section.

Equally, while in Chapter 6, I discussed the economic consequences of the practice of counterfeiting and the poor quality of the Chinese African print, here, the presentation of poor quality and counterfeit Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market devalues not only the economic values of the Ghanaian African print, but also its symbolic roles. To clarify, it was precisely the high quality (and price) of European, and later Ghanaian, African prints that turned them into an asset that increased in value over time, and which, in turn, placed them at the centre of wealth accumulation strategies, turned them into a mode of high-status display, and placed African prints traders at the top of the trading hierarchy. This is a role that an African print whose economic and symbolic values have been eroded by the presence of cheaply priced and low quality copies, but which appear to be exactly the same as the original, cannot play.

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While the African print and the textile industry, I should stress, are not the only symbolic objects around which Ghanaian identity was constructed, I do mean to suggest that they carry symbolic values that are significant for Ghana as a nation. Thus, what currently is at risk is the idea of Ghana as a multi-ethnic, yet unified, nation with a rich cultural and political heritage, and a modern, industrialised future ahead. The National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, as we shall see later, seek to reinforce this link between Ghana’s textile traditions and its textile industry, on the one hand, and Ghanaian identity, on the other, in order to produce a spatial response to the presence of Chinese African prints on the local market. First, however, I want to explore how the African print from China is constituted as morally unjust.

Constructing the morally unjust Chinese African print

If the transgressions that transformed some Chinese African prints into ‘smuggled’ and others into ‘legal’ took place at the territorial border, and the transgressions that placed some Chinese African prints into the ‘counterfeit’ category involved and intertwined a number of places in both Ghana and China, the construction of the Chinese African print as ‘morally unjust’ is tied up in the places where the Ghanaian African print and the Chinese African print are produced. By this, I mean that both the Ghanaian African print and the Chinese African print are the products of the places where they are manufactured: respectively, Ghana and China. These places are made up of an array of temporally layered relations, which are transferred onto the object that is the product of these places at the moment of production. It follows from this that the construction of the Chinese African print as morally unjust and the translation of this construction into a spatial strategy – the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes – that seeks to govern through moral sanctions, must be understood in the context of what being the product from China means.

Being the product from the wrong place

As noted earlier, when conducting fieldwork in Ghana, I developed a distinct feeling that it was not only the Chinese African print’s legal status that positioned it as a threat in Ghana. Thus, intellectual property right infringements alone did not fully explain Ghanaian textile actors’ and state officials’ de-

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97 When I use Ghana and China to denote the places that produce two distinctly different African prints – the Ghanaian and the Chinese – I do not mean Ghana and China in their entirety. Rather, in this context, I am referring to the layers of meaning that make up these countries as places of textile production.
scription of the Chinese African print as ‘fake’, ‘stolen’ and ‘pirated’. As I see it, this way of narrating the Chinese African print thusly relates to what is considered a ‘real’, or ‘authentic’, African print in Ghana, and how this works together with place to produce the African print from China as the product from the ‘wrong’ place. What I have discussed in the above section are subsequently some of the layers of relations reflected in Ghana as a place. These layers make Ghana the ‘right’ place for the production of the authentic African print. In addition to what I have already described in this chapter, they include, among other things, the ancient textile traditions that preceded the European presence and which tied together different regions in West Africa, and the role of cotton textiles in the global history of trade that came to link these textile traditions to South East Asia and Europe and connected the Gold Coast Colony to European trading houses and textile producers; these links helped position the area into a textile trading hub in the West African region during the early 1900s. They also include new textile relations between the independent nation-state of Ghana and Europe’s African prints producers and trading houses; between Ghana and her West African neighbours; and between Ghana and textile actors from Hong Kong, once Ghana was established as a centre for African prints production in the 1960s. As pointed out before, Unilever, the owner of Dutch African print producers PF van Vlissingen & Co. (Vlisco) and Ankersmit, established a number of factories in West Africa – including, for instance, Uniwax in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana Textile Printing Co. Ltd. in the Ghanaian industrial town of Tema – to ensure that they would not lose control over the West African market when the former colonies in West Africa became independent (van Koert 2007). Around the same time, a Hong Kong-based textile conglomerate, the Cha Textiles Group, established textile factories in both Ghana and Nigeria.

These relations between different African print producers are important because they mean that not only are European, Ghanaian, Ivorian and Nigerian textile companies, and their products, representatives of the same textile legacy, but also that these textile companies are economically entangled. It follows from this that African prints produced in Europe, where the African print was ‘invented’ in the first place, as well as in Côte d’Ivoire or Nigeria, while indeed foreign, are not seen as threats to the Ghanaian textile economy or nation. Rather, the shared history and economic links between these textile producers serve to construct the African prints that they produce as ‘real’ African prints.

The Chinese African print, on the other hand, is not. This is because, from the point of view of Ghana’s textile and state actors, China produces an African print that is fundamentally different from the Ghanaian, the Dutch, the Ivorian or the Nigerian African print. This is an African print that does not reflect the ‘right’ relations and values associated with the real African print. To elaborate, if the variations of the perceived threat posed by the Chinese
African print so far explored in this thesis have been defined as positives in the sense that the focus was on identities that the Chinese African print acquired through its activities and movements, as well as where and when it came into contact with Ghanaian institutions, the construction the Chinese African print as morally unjust is characterised by the absence, or lack, of that which makes a real African print. Thus, drawing from the above discussion, what the Chinese African print lacks is the appropriate pedigree. That is, the Chinese African print is not the product of the proud West African textile heritage. Nor is it a reflection of the object around which Ghanaian identity was constructed during the struggles for independence in the 1940s and 1950s. Further, it is not the product of a company located in Ghana that employs Ghanaian workers in the present, that reflects the Ghanaian textile heritage, or that represents a potential future for Ghana as a developed, industrialised economy. Thus – and this is the key point here – because the Chinese African print is not produced by a Ghanaian textile company, but by a Chinese company, it represents a threat to the employment of workers in the Ghanaian textile industry in the present, as well as to past and future values and aspirations vested in the Ghanaian African print. This is partly because the Chinese African print is produced in China and, thus, will never provide employment for Ghana’s workers. More than that, the production of African prints in China will never sustain Ghana’s identity as a textile-producing nation or become part of West African or Ghanaian textile traditions. It follows from this that, while a print produced in China can bear an original design (in the sense of a design that is not counterfeit) the product itself can never be authentic or ‘the real thing’. Rather, the Chinese African print is seen as an exclusively economic product that represents altogether different relations and values.

One implication of this definition of what constitutes an authentic African print is that the Chinese African print must always fall outside. Put differently, it is impossible for the Chinese African print to be from the right place. This means that the perceived threat that comes from being the product from the wrong place stays the same as the Chinese African print moves across space. That is, the Chinese African print becomes the product from the wrong place at the moment of production in China and this is not something that the movement from China to the Ghanaian market changes. This is in contrast to the smuggled Chinese African print, for instance, which, I have argued, did not become smuggled until it had crossed Ghana’s territorial border the wrong way. This is because a line has been drawn in time – at the establishment of textile industries in Ghana – so that no foreign African print may become the real thing from this time onwards, as well as in space, such that only African prints from certain places (Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, the Netherlands and Nigeria) may be authentic African prints. It also follows from
this that China is not the only wrong place for the production of African prints. Any foreign African print that carries a textile legacy other than the European or West African and that it is not part of the same economic networks represents a product in which the wrong relations are embedded. This may be illustrated by the arrival of Indian copies of the African print to the Ghanaian market. Preliminary inquiries in the trading areas in central Accra in March 2010 suggested that Indian African prints displayed the same perceived threats as Chinese African prints, although Indian African prints did not exist in Ghana to the same extent at this time (interviews with importers 4 and 5, March 2010).

While an African print that is produced in China (or India, for that matter) may be considered wrong by definition, unlike the smuggled and the counterfeit Chinese African print, it is not outside the law. To sell it on the Ghanaian market, however, may be regarded as morally unjust.

Becoming morally unjust

By using the term morally unjust to account for how the Chinese African print is perceived as a threat to the Ghanaian nation, I am trying to capture two things. First, I am attempting to cover the less clear-cut aspects of the position of the Chinese African print as a threat. This draws from the above section in that, to my mind, there appears to be something in Ghana’s textile and state actors’ descriptions of the Chinese African print that suggests that there is something just not right, or even morally wrong, about the production of the symbolically charged African print in places other than in Europe or West Africa. Second, the term morally unjust is employed to emphasise how this transgression of the Chinese African print is different from the legal transgressions that were the focus in the previous two chapters.

Indeed, the transgression that is the focus of this chapter comes from the way that the Chinese African print tries to represent itself as a real African print, when in fact it is not. To elaborate, this transgression emerges from the symbolic values that are inscribed in the Ghanaian African print at the moment of production, values that the Chinese African print lacks: namely, the right origin or pedigree. Thus, when the Chinese African print, in a second move, tries to present itself as part of West African or Ghanaian textile heritage to gain advantages in the market, it is constructed as morally unjust and as a threat to Ghanaian identity. The latter is enabled through the practice of counterfeiting, which, as noted earlier, obscures the difference between copy and original. However, it is not the legal transgression that counterfeiting represents that is the focus here. Rather, from the point of view of some of Ghana’s textile actors, it is the deeply immoral transgression that the attempt to capitalise on the West African textile heritage to tap into the Ghanaian textile market represents.
Here, I draw upon Amoore, who has suggested that an outsider (in Amoore’s paper, a “black character” in a US context) may be accepted on the inside as long as they agree to remain clearly recognisable as ‘Other’. Thus, the presence of the “black character” in Amoore’s paper (2007:219-220) is questioned only when he mimics ‘whiteness’. The relevance of Amoore’s intervention for the Ghanaian case is that it tells us something about why the Chinese African print that presents itself as ‘original’, when it is not, is so controversial in the Ghanaian context. Indeed, the production of African prints in China, as a representative for one of Ghana’s textile companies put it, when interviewed by a reporter for the Daily Graphic, represents “an attack on the Ghanaian folklore” (Obeng 2004, 30th October:3).

In turn, this also explains why the other two strategies explored in this thesis are able to separate between threatening and non-threatening Chinese African prints, when the strategy that is the focus here cannot. Instead, and as noted above, it places all Chinese African prints into the undesirable category by default. This means that the counterpart of the threatening Chinese African print is not another (non-threatening) African print from China, but rather the authentic African print. This is not to say that the spatial strategy examined in the next section of this chapter does not attempt to selectively control the mobility of African prints on the Ghanaian market. While the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes intend to reduce the mobility of Chinese African prints on the market (from producer via trader to consumer), they actively encourage the mobility (and consumption) of the desired Ghanaian African print on the same market.
Further, and in line with what I have argued earlier, while the Chinese African print is the product from the wrong place from the moment it is produced, the Chinese African print’s status as morally unjust is not activated until it is subjected to control; that is, when it comes into contact with the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes (cf. Squire 2011:7). In Chapter 6, I proposed that the movement of the Chinese African print across Ghana’s borders rendered it governable. This was because, once inside Ghanaian territory, the Chinese African print fell under Ghanaian jurisdiction, which enabled interventions against it by instituting court action. In a similar way, the African print from China that enters Ghanaian territory is placed within reach of the Ghanaian government’s National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. It is to these programmes that I now turn.

The National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes: Embodying the border

[W]hat we are doing here today is a perpetuation of the noble tradition of practising our culture. (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006a: Keynote address held at the regional launch of the National Friday Wear programme in Ghana’s Ashanti region, 19th September: n.p.)

One early Friday morning in Kumasi, the capital of Ghana’s Ashanti region, home to the renowned kente and adinkra cloths, and a key node in the Ghanaian African prints trade, the invited guests started to arrive. Everyone in the region who mattered had been invited to attend the event, including Members of Parliament from the region, heads of the regional branches of departments of the Ghanaian government – including the Customs Service and the Ministries – representatives of the educational institutions and the private sector. In his welcome address, Emmanuel Asamoah Owusu-Ansah, the Ashanti Regional Minister, noted that Ghana’s textile industry was at risk of collapse as the result of the smuggling of cheap textile products from China and the importation of second-hand clothes from the USA and Europe. Solidarity messages from the Ghana National Tailors and Dressmakers Association and the textile industry followed before Kwadwo Afram-Asiedu, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, took to the stage to give the keynote address.

In his speech, Afram-Asiedu emphasised the importance of the textile industry if Ghana was to break with its dependence on primary commodity exportation. Other developing countries, such as Malaysia and South Korea, the Deputy Minister pointed out, had transformed their economies from agrarian to industrial. Now the time had come for Ghana to do the same. Indeed, “[t]he launching of our ‘National Friday Wear’ in the Regional Capi-
tals could not have come at a more opportune time. Ghana abounds in world acclaimed textiles clothing designers and also a wealth of exquisite designs and traditional techniques [...]. These attributes put Ghana in a unique position to develop a vibrant local textile and garment industry and also build significant inroads into the international markets” (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006a:n.p.), Afram-Asiedu said. For the National Friday Wear programme to have its desired effect, however, it was essential that all Ghanaians identify with the programme and patronise textile products made in Ghana. Therefore, the programme was also, Afram-Asiedu stated, “aimed at rekindling the national psyche and giving the Ghanaian a unique national identity and a sense of pride” (ibid.). Given the rich textile traditions of the region, it seemed self-evident, Afram-Asiedu continued, that “the good people of Ashanti Region” (ibid.) would take the Friday Wear concept to their hearts. “As my Minister, Hon. Alan Kyerematen is wont to say ‘we are talking to the converted’” (ibid.). Finally, the Deputy Minister designated a number of local shops as official Friday Wear shops.

Following Afram-Asiedu’s speech, a local band played as students from schools in the region displayed garments made from locally produced textiles. Local cultural groups performed and a variety of local products were exhibited.98

In this section, I set out the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes as a spatial strategy used to engage with the perceived threat posed by the morally unjust Chinese African print. While the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes have a fundamentally different way of dealing with the presence of the Chinese African print, the objective of the programmes, I would argue, is partly the same as that of the single import corridor and the anti-counterfeiting operations: namely, to claim a certain economic space, the Ghanaian market, and to keep Ghana’s textile industry from collapsing (Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2005, section 860; 2007, section 425; 2009, section 374; Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005b:25-26). However, the objective of the two programmes also extends beyond the economic. As noted by the Ghanaian press and in the Ghanaian government’s official documents, through the two programmes, the Ministry of Trade and Industry strives to construct a sense of “national pride” and “unique Ghanaian identity” (Ghana News Agency 2004, 12th November; 2006, 3rd July; 2006, 27th September; Ghanaian Chronicle 2004, 15th November; Ministry of Trade and Industry 2004:30).

Below, I begin by exploring how the festive launches of the programmes are used to display and distribute the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s message across the country. Next, the focus is shifted to the borderworkers of the

98 The above is also based on Ghana News Agency (2006, 30th September) and interviews with the Ministry of Trade and Industry official in charge of the programmes in March 2010 and November 2011.
Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. After that, I explore the use of what I have termed strategic bodies to extend the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes beyond the day of the launch. Finally, I discuss how the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes seek to govern the perceived threat of the African print from China through the exercise of moral sanctions. The section is based on keynote addresses held at two of the launches of the National Friday Wear programme, Ghana Trade Policy 2004 and Trade Sector Support Programme 2006-2010, the Government of Ghana’s budget statements for the years 2004-2009, newspaper cuttings, and interviews with the Ministry official in charge of the two programmes.

Distributing Ghanaian identity

To dress, according to Entwistle, is about “preparing the body for the social world, making it appropriate, acceptable, indeed respectable” (2000:7). Simply put, there are right and wrong ways to dress in each situation (e.g. Entwistle 2000:8; Wilson 2003:9-10). One way to read the launch of the National Friday Wear programme in Kumasi is thus as an attempt by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to invent a right way of dressing – indeed, a dress code for Ghana’s white-collar workers, for whom western wear long has been the norm. In an attempt to increase the consumption of Ghanaian textile products, and to save its textile industry from collapse, the programme seeks to reinforce the links between dress and Ghanaian identity, as well as between Ghanaian identity and the West African textile legacy and Ghana’s position as a textile producing nation-state.

The launch of the National Friday Wear programme in Kumasi was but one of several events designed to carry the message that Ghanaian identity may be reinforced and the textile industry rescued if Ghanaians consume and dress in garments made from locally produced textiles across the country. Thus, after the programme had been launched in Accra, during the second half of 2006, it was gradually expanded outwards to all of Ghana’s ten regions with festive launches organised at the centre of each region: that is, the regional capital. In June and July, events similar to the one described above were organised in Koforidua, Takoradi and Cape Coast, the capitals of the Eastern, Western and Central regions respectively.


In September, the programme reached Ho, the capital of the Volta region, as well as the capitals of the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions, respectively Kumasi and Sunyani. Finally, in October, the programme was extended to the northern part of the country, with launches taking place in the regional capitals of the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions: Tamale, Bolgatanga and Wa (see figure 23).

As indicated by the name, the National Friday Wear programme was a twist on the Casual Friday concept. As such, it encouraged white-collar

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101 Casual Friday, the day of the business week when white-collar workers across the globe abandon formal dress for casual outfits, has its origin in the Hawaiian ‘Aloha Friday’. Debates about what should be counted as appropriate business attire began in Hawaii in the 1940s, when the Honolulu city-country attorney attempted to introduce the Hawaiian shirt as business attire for the island’s government employees. Additional attempts to have aloha attire accepted as business wear followed after the end of the Second World War (Hope and Tozian 2000:42-45). In 1962, the Hawaiian Fashion Guild, a manufacturing association, launched “Operation Liberation”, a campaign aimed at promoting the use of aloha attire as business wear (Arthur 2006:27). That year, Hawaiian legislators passed a resolution recommending that aloha attire be worn throughout the summer, beginning on Lei Day (1st May). The word-
workers to dress in locally produced textiles, rather than formal dress, at particular times: on Fridays. The objective of the Ghanaian government, however, was to extend the use of locally produced textiles as widely as possible. Thus, it did not wish to limit the use of garments made of locally produced textiles to Fridays alone. Indeed, at the launch of the National Friday Wear programme in Kumasi, for instance, Afram-Asiedu, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, stated that

[a]s a Government, we are setting aside Fridays, and in future, extend it to cover all working days, for all public officers and the private sector, as much as practicable, to wear locally designed garments produced from locally manufactured fabrics. I urge all of us to identify with this programme and patronise the garments. (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006a:n.p)

To reflect this ambition, the Friday Wear programme was transformed into and replaced by the National Everyday Wear programme in 2009. In contrast to the Friday Wear programme, which was implemented on the regional scale, the National Everyday Wear programme, which continues to date, seeks to extend the message of the programme across the territory through launches in two district capitals in each region. The decision to implement the National Everyday programme on the district scale, rather than the regional scale, according to the Ministry official in charge of the programmes, was based on the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s observation that it had become necessary to take the programme closer to grassroots if it was to engage with every Ghanaian (interview, March 2010; also see Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana 2009, section 374). Indeed, the Everyday Wear programme addresses all Ghanaians, not only its office workers. In August 2009, for instance, the Ghana News Agency reported that the Director of His Grace Preparatory and Junior High School in Kasoa in the Central Region had announced that the pupils of his school would join the programme (2009, 10th August).

To understand how the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes work as a spatial strategy, it is necessary to begin from the notion of the embedded border. As discussed earlier, recent research on the increasing use of ‘smart-border’ technologies has suggested that the location of borders increasingly is determined by the whereabouts of the human bodies in which they are embedded (e.g. Amoore 2006; Popescu 2012; Weber 2006). It is argued that these security systems, which seek to resolve the

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conflict between the economy’s need for free movement, on the one hand, and the fear of unrestricted mobility, on the other, attach the information needed to perform the borders of the state to the individual such that it may be acted upon anywhere and at any time. This is enabled by changes to legal and regulatory frameworks and the re-organisation of border control to encompass an increasingly broader base of actors. Based on Sassen (2006:416), I have suggested that we may extend this notion of state borders that are embedded in human bodies to look at the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes in Ghana as an example of a spatial strategy that embeds the borders of the Ghanaian nation in the African print such that the cloth itself becomes a “mobile regulatory site” (Amoore 2006:337; also see Walters 2006a:197; and see Paasi 1996, on the manifestation of borders in symbolic objects). The communicative element of dress and adornment in general (see e.g. Cordwell and Schwarz 1979; Entwistle 2000; Wilson 2003), and of the African print in particular (see e.g. Gott 2009; Hess 2006; Spencer 1982), puts this cloth in a unique position to communicate the message of the two programmes.

What I want to suggest here is thus that the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes distribute the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s message through festive events at certain strategic nodes across the country. They do so on the days when the two programmes are launched in regional and district capitals. Through these events, the border of the Ghanaian nation, which is embedded in the cloth, is repeatedly displayed (see figures 23-27). The use of the most central point of the region or district – the capital – in turn, means that the message of the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes is gradually distributed across the country. These are, however, not the only spaces where and when these programmes seek to enforce the borders of the Ghanaian nation. To explore these other spaces, however, we must first know who the borderworkers of the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes are.

The borderworkers of the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes

Similar to the single import corridor and the anti-counterfeiting operations, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes engage an array of state and non-state actors in borderwork. As I understand the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, based on interviews with the Ministry official in charge of the programmes and the available government documents, there are two main categories of borderworkers who together attempt to enforce the border of the Ghanaian nation to protect the domestic market and Ghanaian identity from the perceived threat of the Chinese African print.
The first category includes the ‘architect’ of the two programmes, the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Indeed, it is the officials of the Domestic Trade and Distribution Division and the Regional Trade Officers at the Ministry’s local branches who organise the events that seek to extend the message that Ghanaian citizens must patronise locally produced textile products if Ghana is to develop and if the country’s cultural heritage is to be protected from exploitation by Chinese textile manufacturers (cf. Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a). In addition to the officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Accra, a range of actors are involved in the execution of the events that extend the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes across Ghanaian territory. These include the Regional Ministers or Deputy Regional Ministers who gave the keynote addresses at each launch of the Friday Wear programme. District or Municipal Chief Executives play a similar role at the launches of the Everyday Wear programme. Moreover, Ghana’s African print, batik and tie-dye producers donate cloth for each event. Local tailors and dressmakers turn the cloth into garments, which are then displayed by local students. Together, these state and non-state actors present to the audience at each event the morally just African print; that is, the African print that represents Ghana’s future as an industrialised, developed economy, and that represents Ghana as a nation that has maintained a unique identity derived from its past.

The idea to support the local industry by promoting Made-in-Ghana goods, however, initially came from the private sector. According to the responsible official at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Association of Ghana Industries – a business organisation established in 1958 to protect the interests of Ghana’s manufacturing companies – first presented the idea towards the end of the 1990s. More than that, several private companies, including banks and insurance companies, as well as political institutions had already adopted the practice of wearing locally produced textiles as business attire prior to the launch of the National Friday Wear programme in 2004. In 2001, on Tuesday the 4th of December, for instance, it was decided that Members of the Ghanaian Parliament would attend the remaining sittings of the week dressed in garments made from textiles produced in Ghana. According to the First Deputy Speaker, textile designers had appealed to the House to help boost the local textile industry by dressing in locally produced textiles. Thus, the Ghanaian press reported, “for the first time in living memory”, Ghanaians were about to see its Speaker of Parliament in “traditional wear” (Anon 2001, 5th December:n.p.). The importance of the commitment of the private sector to the programmes was also emphasised by Ghana’s politicians. At the launch of the National Friday Wear programme in Kumasi in September 2006, for instance, Afram-Asiedu, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, expressed that it was his “fervent hope that our entrepreneurs, designers, textiles and garment manufacturers and exporters will take full advantage of this great opportunity for the benefit of their re-
pective businesses and our dear nation, Ghana” (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006a:n.p.).

The second category of borderworkers involved in the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes include the actors who project the values associated with the Ghanaian African print beyond the one-day event that each launch of the programmes represents. These actors include members of the media – who cover the event itself, advertise it on the radio, television and in the printed press – and, more importantly, the Ghanaian citizens who wear them. The support of the Ghanaian citizen, as suggested above, is the key to the success of the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. Indeed, if the Ghanaian African print is not patronised, the sales of the textile industry will not increase, and if the garment made from local textile products is not worn and displayed, Ghanaian identity is not projected. Thus, the real borderworkers of the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes are the citizens who spend their hard-earned money on purchasing Ghanaian African prints and whose bodies the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, I would argue, turn into spaces of governing.

Constructing the body as a space of governing

In his keynote address at the launch of the National Friday Wear programme in Wa, the capital of the Upper West region, Afram-Asiedu, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, spoke about how Ghanaian culture was perpetuated through the use of garments made from locally produced textile products. He said, “[a]s a nation, we must safeguard our cultural heritage and traditional values which have been bequeathed to us by our forefathers. These are expressed through local and national clothes we wear” (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006b:n.p.). In this section, I return to the foregoing discussion about the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes as a spatial strategy that works through distribution and display. As illustrated above, the first move of the Ministry of Trade and Industry was to organise festive events to distribute its message. For these programmes to succeed, however, the borders of the Ghanaian nation need to be enforced beyond the day when and the venue where the regional or district capital programme was launched. To be precise, for this border to become truly mobile and, in turn, widely displayed and distributed, it needs the human body.

As alluded to above, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes seek to achieve this effect through the use of strategic bodies. In the audience at the launches of the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes are a range of people who have been strategically invited because of the roles they play in the local community. These, as noted earlier, include the district’s Member of Parliament, the heads of the regional branches of the departments of the Ghanaian government – for instance the Customs Service and the Ministries – and the Directors of private sector companies in
Figure 24. Traditional leaders and VIP guests at the launch of the Everyday Wear programme in the Shama District. Courtesy of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Figure 25. Hon. Hannah Tetteh, the Minister of Trade and Industry, admiring locally designed batiks at the Jomoro District launch of the Everyday Wear programme. Courtesy of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Figure 26. Hon. Betty Bosomtwi-Sam, the Deputy Western Regional Minister, cuts the tape to declare the exhibition open at the Shama District launch of the Everyday Wear programme. Courtesy of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Figure 27. Some of the models who displayed garments made from locally produced textiles at the Jomoro District launch of the Everyday Wear programme in Half Assini. Courtesy of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
the region, along with representatives of the educational institutions. These guests are key people in the region or district who, if they are convinced by the message that the Ministry of Trade and Industry seeks to send, may sway many more to support Ghanaian textile producers by dressing in garments made from locally produced textiles. They may do so, first, by instigating a Friday or Everyday Wear scheme at the workplace or in the school they represent. That is, in much the same way as some directors of public institutions and private companies have done, they may approach one of Ghana’s textile companies to have a design printed that represents the company, the public institution or the school, and they may then encourage their employees or pupils to wear it. More important for the argument pursued here, they may decide to dress in locally produced textile products themselves. The following comment, which was published on the editorial page of the Ghanaian Chronicle after the launch of the Friday Wear programme in November 2004, illustrates this point: whether “the National Friday Wear idea will catch on, a lot will depend on the type of leadership given by members of the government and policy makers. Their example will spur others on to patronize it so that it will not be just a one-day symbolic wear, but something that will be part of our way of life” (2004, 15th November:n.p.). As dignitaries in their local communities, these people serve as role models both for their employees and for the local community, and should they embrace the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, then so would large segments of the population. Thus, the speakers at the launches of the programme appeal to these people to acknowledge their responsibilities as role models and to display the morally just African print on their strategic bodies.

In that way, the border of the Ghanaian nation is performed in a wide range of locales when it appears on the bodies of national and local politicians, public servants, private sector employees and school children. Indeed, the border is embodied in their homes as they choose their outfits for the day, in the buildings where they go to work and study and in all the locales they pass through when they move between home and workplace or school. In these spaces, the embedded border is put to work to construct a sense of unity, belonging and national pride in the bearer, indeed “a unique Ghanaian identity” (e.g. Ghana News Agency 2004, 12th November:n.p.). It also visually projects these values to the onlooker. When the President, for instance, attends a function dressed in textiles produced in Ghana, when the bank manager greets his customer in his Everyday Wear, when the civil servant dressed in kaba stops at the market on her way home, and when the school children, dressed in school uniforms made from locally produced African prints, play in the school yard, they all project the Ghanaian nation; that is, to the president of a foreign country and to the Ghanaian in front of the television watching the function, to the bank customer, to the trader in the market and to the Ghanaian who passes by the school yard.
To draw on a point made above, within the framework of the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, to consume (the economic aspect) and to dress in (the identity aspect) locally produced African prints becomes interlinked. That is, when one identifies with the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes and dresses in African prints made in Ghana, one creates incentives for others to wear Ghanaian African prints, thereby increasing the overall consumption of local textile products. Ultimately, this is how the National Friday Wear and the Everyday Wear programmes work to intervene against the perceived threat of Chinese African prints. Put differently, the (strategic) bodies that display the border of the Ghanaian nation become the main borderworkers of the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. With the help of these bodies, the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes seek to govern through moral sanctions, and it is to this topic that I now turn.

**Governing through moral sanctions**

In contrast to the interventions examined in Chapters 5 and 6, which, in different ways, governed through legal sanctions and either attempted to turn the Chinese African print away prior to, at and/or beyond the territorial border, or removed the illegal Chinese African print from Ghana’s marketplaces, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes work in a different way to deal with the perceived threat of the Chinese African print. This is because, as pointed out above, the movement across the Ghanaian border does not produce an illegal Chinese African print. Hence, it cannot provide the grounds for legal sanctions to be imposed against it. Instead, these programmes may be described as a form of moral policing that intervenes against the Chinese African print *indirectly* by displaying its opposite – the ‘right’ African print – on the bodies of morally responsible citizens.

To ensure that the right cloth is worn, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes seek to turn dress into a question of people’s sense of attachment to Ghana and the citizen’s obligations towards the nation (cf. Smith 1991:14). That is, and again in contrast to the interventions examined in Chapters 5 and 6, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes focus more on how the borders of the Ghanaian nation work through inclusion, rather than exclusion. These programmes seek to rescue Ghana’s textile industry by encouraging the consumption of locally produced African prints by the marketing of the positive values inscribed in the Ghanaian African print. This way, they appeal to the Ghanaian citizen to make the morally just decision when deciding what to wear. Thus, while not directly aimed at the morally unjust Chinese African print, if successful, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes will result in the reduced consumption of African prints from China.
The Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes attempt to reach the Ghanaian citizen in two ways. First, they address the citizen directly at the launches of the programmes, as well as through the media. In these public addresses, national and local politicians, as well as state officials, as illustrated at the beginning of this section, link the consumption of and adornment of Ghanaian African prints to employment for Ghana’s workers and livelihoods for their families; to a potential future for Ghana as a developed, industrialised nation-state; and to a unique Ghanaian identity with pre-colonial roots. These addresses, thus, are intended to teach the Ghanaian citizen to consume the right, or morally just, African print. Politicians and state officials suggest that there is a need to educate average Ghanaian citizens because they have forgotten about their past and neglected their responsibilities “of keeping the local textiles industry in operation by patronizing their products”, as the Asante-Mampong Municipal Chief Executive, Daniel Appau-Ohyeamang, stated at the launch of the Everyday Wear programme in Asante-Mampong (Ghana News Agency 2010, 16th June:n.p.).102 Indeed, “the taste of Ghanaians for foreign products”, the Deputy Upper West Regional Minister, George Hikah Benson, said when he launched the National Friday Wear programme in Wa, the regional capital of the Upper West Region, had “done a lot of damage to their confidence as a people” (Ghana News Agency 2006, 21st Octobera:n.p.). For this reason, when Ghanaian citizens fail to remember this obligation, they may be reprimanded. At the inauguration of the National Salt Producers Association of Ghana in 2007, for instance, Affram-Aseidu, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, reprimanded the participants for “failing” to dress in locally produced textiles at the event (Ghana News Agency 2007, 23rd March:n.p.). Since it was covered by the press, the reprimand was extended to include every Ghanaian who did not dress in locally produced textiles.

Second, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes, as just discussed, use the launches and strategic bodies to convey to the Ghanaian consumer the morally just way to dress (and, by extension, the right way to consume textile products). In so doing, they, in part, place the responsibility for the survival of the Ghanaian textile industry and Ghana’s cultural heritage upon the ‘good citizen’.

This responsibility, however, is one that the average Ghanaian citizen may find difficult to fulfil. When I met the leader of one of Ghana’s textile workers’ unions in 2007, he explained to me that the majority of the African prints worn as Friday Wear were in fact produced in China. The difficulty for the Ghanaian consumer who wishes to make the right choice in the marketplace lies in the widespread practice of counterfeiting. As discussed earli-

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102 Also see the Ghana News Agency (2007, 19th March; 2009, 8th August; 2009, 18th September), for additional calls by Ghanaian politicians that Ghanaians adhere to the programmes by dressing in garments made from locally produced textiles.
er, the counterfeit Chinese African print obscures the difference between original and copy. Thus, the Ghanaian consumer who goes to the marketplace, or indeed to the officially designated Friday/Everyday Wear shop, to purchase an African print to wear on Fridays (or indeed every day) may not be able to verify that the African print s/he purchases is in fact the product of a Ghanaian company. For this reason, a trade union leader concluded that, in reality “the Friday Wear [programme] wasn’t reflecting on anything Ghanaian” (interview with TGLEU representative, November 2007). Indeed, the strategic bodies sent out to project Ghanaian culture and to support Ghana’s textile industry may instead be displaying the threatening Chinese African print. Equally, in June 2010, the Daily Graphic – a government-owned newspaper which is the most widely read newspaper in Ghana – published a critical account of the National Friday Wear programme, which, according to the newspaper, was “an attempt to go round the problem” (Anon 2010, 23rd June:n.p.) and would not be enough to keep the textile industry from collapsing. This was because the Ghanaian government, through its National Friday Wear programme, “in a way, [was] saying that we should use imported clothing for four days and devote Fridays for local wear” (ibid.).

The practice of counterfeiting also means that the Chinese African print, from the point of view of the Ghanaian who wears it, may be used to display the very values that s/he wishes to project. Thus, the Ghanaian consumer may not see the need to purchase a Ghanaian product to project Ghanaian culture if the Chinese African print does it just as well, but at a lower cost. As such, the consumer may support one part of the National Friday Wear and Everyday programmes – the projection of a unique Ghanaian identity through what s/he carries on her/his body – while at the same time delinking Ghana’s cultural heritage and identity from its position as a textile-producing nation-state. In this instance, thus, “[w]hat defines authenticity […] lies in the observer’s gaze and not in the object itself”, as noted by Sylvanus (2007:205).

However, it is not only the Ghanaian citizen who gets it wrong. As pointed out earlier, in February 2007, Ghana’s textile worker representatives were outraged when they learned that the Ghana@50 Planning Committee had engaged a Chinese textile manufacturer to print the jubilee cloth, which was to mark the celebrations of Ghana’s 50-year anniversary as an independent nation-state. Thus, they joined forces with Public Agenda – a newspaper published by the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC), a Ghanaian non-governmental organisation focused on social and economic rights – to make the Ghanaian government’s “endorsement of cheap imports” publicly known (Safo 2007, 26th February:a:1-2.; also see Safo 2007, 26th February:b:2). Only a couple of years later, the Ghanaian press carried the news that the Ministry of Education had awarded Chinese companies the contract to produce the school uniforms of newly elected President Mills’ free school uniform programme (Essuman 2009, 5th October; Ghanaian Times 2009, 29th
September; PeaceFM 2009, 11th August; Public Agenda 2009, 11th August; 2009, 27th September). Approached from a different angle, these incidents could be taken to represent additional examples of the contradictory responses of various government actors in Ghana, whose objectives do not always support those of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, to the availability of cheap Chinese textile products on the global market.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore how the Chinese African print is constructed as morally unjust, and how the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes embody the border of the Ghanaian nation in order to deal with the perceived threat of the Chinese African print. In so doing, the chapter has qualified some of the assumptions from the previous chapters. Specifically, it has shifted the focus from the borders of the state to those of the nation. This analytical move also involved a shift from the economic to the symbolic and from the legal to the moral.

The first point of the chapter, thus, was that the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print extended beyond the economic and that the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes not only sought to rescue Ghana’s textile industry, but also intended to construct, in the citizen, a sense of attachment to the Ghanaian nation. Moreover, the constitution of the Chinese African print as a threat, which was the focus of this chapter, entwined economic and symbolic values and included a moral, rather than a legal, transgression of the Chinese African print when it represented itself as an authentic African print as a way of tapping into the Ghanaian market. It followed from this that the programmes designed to intervene against the morally unjust Chinese African print sought to govern through moral, rather than legal, sanctions. That is, they attempted to reach into the hearts and minds of the Ghanaian citizen and to instil in the Ghanaian consumer morally appropriate consumer behaviour: namely, to purchase and dress in textile products made in Ghana rather than in China. This way, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes activated the morally unjust status of the Chinese African.

Finally, the borders transgressed by the Chinese African print were not those of the state but rather those of the nation. Equally, the spatial strategy explored in this chapter did not work through the borders of the state, but instead those of nation, in an attempt to intervene against the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print. It did so through a number of events held in strategic locations across the country and through the use of strategic bodies, which were used to distribute and display the message that Ghanaian identity may be reinforced and the textile industry rescued if Ghanaians consume and dress in garments made from locally produced textiles.
If indeed successful, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes would indirectly help to reduce the consumption of Chinese African prints in the country and rescue an industry that is constructed as central to Ghana’s identity as a textile-producing nation-state. Importantly, the chapter made these analytical moves while retaining the focus on how the border was re-shaped and displaced in response to the presence of the Chinese African print in Ghana.

This was the last of three chapters that combined have sought to illustrate how the Chinese African print is constructed as a threat in Ghana and how Ghanaian actors draw upon these constructions when they intervene against the perceived threat posed by this product by enforcing borders in diverging ways. These spatial strategies, I have demonstrated, stretch and disperse the border of the Ghanaian state, as well as embody the border of the Ghanaian nation. In the next, and final, chapter, I summarise and discuss the findings of the thesis.
8 Conclusion: Making Ghanaian borders to engage the threat of the Chinese African print

In this thesis, I have sought to shed light on the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation and on how geography is integral to the Ghanaian engagement with that threat. Specifically, I have claimed that recent insights into the border concept may further the understanding of the perceived threat of the Chinese African print and the spatial responses to its presence on the Ghanaian market. Taking my inspiration from critical border, migration and security studies scholarship, I have attempted to answer two interrelated research questions. In response to the first question – *How is the Chinese African print constructed as a threat in Ghana?* – I have argued that the forms that the perceived threat of the Chinese African print take are constructed. This means that I have approached the threat of the Chinese African print to the Ghanaian textile economy as something that the Chinese African print acquires through a number of transgressions linked to its activities, movements and relations, and because Ghanaian state and textile actors draw upon these transgressions to construct three distinct variations of the Chinese African print as a threat: namely, as smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust.

To take an interest in how the Chinese African print is constructed as a threat in the Ghanaian context does not mean, however, that the threat of the Chinese African print is not real. Indeed, this thesis has demonstrated that the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat is consequential. More to the point, the three variations of threat translate into certain spatial strategies that seek to intervene against the presence of the Chinese African print on the Ghanaian market. These spatial strategies were the focus of the second question explored in the thesis: *How do Ghanaian actors enact borders to engage the perceived threat of the Chinese African print to the textile economy and nation?*

This question drew attention to how political-economic interventions worked through borders to intervene against the perceived threat of the Chinese African print. Based on recent developments in critical border and security studies, I suggested that to explore this question empirically required both a focus on the spaces where and when excluding and including practices become consequential and also on the state and non-state actors who enforce border controls (e.g. van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005:3; van
Houtum 2005; Mountz 2011a; Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009; Soguk 2007:284). Indeed, if the focus was only on the edges of state territory and on the actors traditionally associated with the enforcement of border controls, we would miss the borders that presently are being enacted by a broad base of actors in a variety of locations at and away from the lines that enclose state territories.

Through the Ghanaian case, I have sought to intervene in political geography – more precisely, in the growing body of work on the border concept – and, to some extent, in the emerging academic field on African responses to the increasing Chinese presence on the continent. I have done so through a detailed account of how the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat plays out on the ground and how this works together with certain spatial strategies to form a particular Ghanaian response to the influx of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market.

In doing so, I have advanced my argument along three lines. First, I have shown how the Ghanaian response places the threat of the Chinese African print in specific ways. Second, I have demonstrated how the spatial strategies used to resolve the problem of Chinese African prints displace the borders of the Ghanaian state and nation. And, third, I have argued that these two processes combined represent the critical Ghanaian voices that oppose the influx of smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust (Chinese) African prints to the Ghanaian market. In the remainder of this conclusion, I will expand on each of these three interventions in turn.

Placing the threat

In this thesis, I have furthered the border studies claim that the status of certain people as ‘irregular’ (Squire 2011) or ‘risk’ (e.g. Amoore 2006) is a produced condition by arguing that the construction of the three discrete variations of the Chinese African print as a threat that have been considered in this thesis is a placed process. As pointed out above, this means that the activities, movement and relations of the Chinese African print itself, and Ghanaian actors’ construction of the Chinese African print as a threat, are mediated through a set of circumstances that come together in Ghana.

The three transgressions of the Chinese African print explored in this thesis involve a variety of actors and they have been shown to transform the Chinese African print into a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation in economic and legal as well as symbolic and moral terms. First, the transformation of the Chinese African print into ‘smuggled’, I have demonstrated, takes place at the territorial border. It involves an array of actors, including the importer of Chinese African prints to Ghana, the importer’s licensed Custom House Agent, the employee of the Destination Inspection Company, the official at the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority and the
customs officers at the Ghanaian seaport, airport or land border where the Chinese African print enters. This means that the Chinese African print that enters the Ghanaian market in the ‘wrong place’ (away from designated entry points) or in the ‘wrong way’ (without paying some or all of the costs of entry for access to the Ghanaian market) and, thus, becomes the ‘wrong price’ (that is, a price significantly lower than that of the Ghanaian African print) is constituted as smuggled. The smuggled (Chinese) African print represents a threat in two ways. In the first place, it undermines revenue generation at the points where the Ghanaian state has derived the bulk of its income ever since independence: namely, at customs stations along the outer edges of territory. And, secondly, the low prices at which those Chinese African print sell have undercut import tariffs at the territorial border which, in turn, means that Chinese African prints outcompete locally produced African prints on the Ghanaian market.

Additionally, the (Chinese) African print that bears the ‘wrong trademarks’ or designs – namely, trademarks and designs that are registered under Ghana’s intellectual property legislation – are placed into the ‘counterfeit’ category. The counterfeit Chinese African print is seen as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy because the practice of counterfeiting obscures the difference between copy and original. It is in this way that counterfeiting undermines the Ghanaian consumer’s opportunity to make informed choices in the marketplace.

Third, the Chinese African print that seeks to present itself as part of West Africa’s textile heritage when it is, in fact, the product of altogether different relations, becomes ‘morally unjust’. This is because this transgression is not a legal transgression, but rather a move that is considered deeply immoral in Ghana. The Chinese African print is constructed as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation because its presence on the Ghanaian market in a way dissolves historical and geographical relations, as well as undermines economic and symbolic values, which are embedded in the Ghanaian African print.

The transgressions that transform the Chinese African print into counterfeit and morally unjust, I have argued, intertwine multiple places and actors. Both of these processes engage Ghanaian and other West African textile traders and importers and Chinese manufacturers of African prints and traders. More than that, they both involve representatives of the Ghanaian state – in the former case, legislators and authorities in charge of intellectual property protection and, in the latter case, the representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, who, indirectly, seek to control the mobility of African prints on the domestic market by presenting the morally just African print to the Ghanaian public. Additionally, these two forms taken by the perceived threat of the Chinese African print imply that the Chinese African print becomes governable when the cloth enters Ghanaian territory. That is, the movement across the territorial border places the Chinese African print un-
der Ghanaian jurisdiction and within reach of the Ghanaian Ministry of Trade and Industry’s National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes. Both are in contrast to the smuggled Chinese African print. While this transformation takes place at the territorial border, it is not that the Chinese African print enters into Ghanaian territory that transforms it into smuggled, but rather where and how it crosses that border, as explained above.

Throughout this thesis, I have sought to argue that if we wish to understand in depth the construction of these three variations of threat, we must remain sensitive to the specific context in which they emerge. Thus, I have tried to show how the combination of a wide variety of factors has served to constitute the Chinese African print as a threat in Ghana. I have illuminated how the African print developed into a symbolically charged object that embodied complex economic, geographical and historical relations, and suggested that this makes the African print representative of certain values, which the Chinese African print may undermine. Additionally, I have sought to demonstrate that we must consider the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in the context of certain particularities of the African prints market in Ghana. One of these is to recognise that the economic values of the African print to a large degree are vested in well-established brand names and designs. On the conservative Ghanaian market, competitiveness is not only determined by price, but also by the ability to build brand names and to create designs that evoke tradition. Further, I have proposed that the combined effect of the de-regulation of the global textile trade and the liberalisation policies in Ghana has facilitated the entry of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market. To this must be added the historical significance of revenue extraction along the outer edges of territory for the Gold Coast, and later Ghanaian, economy; the complex geography of the Chinese African prints trade; and the long-term outlook on Ghana’s borders as porous. These are factors that, from the Ghanaian perspective, all appear to contribute to the rapid inflow of Chinese African prints to the domestic market. Finally, I have suggested that, beginning in the latter part of the 1990s, the Ghanaian textile industry – which, at the time, was weakened by problems associated with import substitution industrialisation and Ghana’s economic crisis and was unable to compete with Chinese textile and clothing products – shifted its production to African prints when competition on the global textile market increased. This, in turn, made Chinese manufacturers’ entry into African prints production a few years later all the more detrimental to the Ghanaian textile industry.

From the above, it follows that it is as important to explore the locations and actors involved in the constitution of the Chinese African print as a threat, as is to focus on where, when and by whom borders are enacted to intervene against the presence of Chinese African prints in Ghana. In part, this is because the actors, activities, movements and relations that transform
the Chinese African print into a threat are not necessarily the same as those involved in staging interventions against the threatening Chinese African print on the Ghanaian market. Equally, this is because the same economic, geographical and historical circumstances may play out differently depending upon whether it is the construction or the spatial strategy that is the focus.

More important, however, is that the processes that transform the Chinese African print into a threat also transform the Chinese African print into an object available to specific interventions. Thus, in this thesis, I have argued that the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat in certain ways is closely related to the spatial strategies engineered to engage the threat of the Chinese African print in Ghana. This means that the distinct variations of the Chinese African print as a threat translate into specific spatial strategies. That is, the construction of the Chinese African print as smuggled motivates and justifies a spatial response – the single import corridor – that stretches the border in an attempt to intensify it. Likewise, the construction of the Chinese African print as counterfeit translates into a spatial strategy – the anti-counterfeiting operations – that disperses the border and enforces it inside Ghanaian territory. Finally, the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes draw upon the construction of the Chinese African print as ‘not a real’ African print and as morally unjust in order to propose a spatial strategy that embodies the border of the Ghanaian nation and, indirectly, imposes moral sanctions against it. Put another way, certain sanctions will appear more relevant depending on which variation, or combination of variations, of the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print is, or are, addressed in any given situation.

Conversely, this means that, while all three forms of threat may be present in one and the same Chinese African print, it is the three interventions that activate the smuggled, counterfeit or morally unjust variations of the perceived threat of the Chinese African print respectively. What this also means is that in situations when these interventions are not enforced, threatening Chinese African prints remain indistinguishable from non-threatening Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian market (cf. Squire 2011).

The interventions that are of interest here, as pointed out, are spatial strategies that work through borders to protect the Ghanaian market and nation from the perceived threat of the Chinese African print. Indeed, if these constructions placed the threat of the Chinese African print in the Ghanaian context, the spatial strategies that I have explored in this thesis displace and re-shape the borders of the Ghanaian state and nation in order to intervene against the three variations of threat that Chinese African prints represent.
Displacing borders

The notion of mobility as something that we fear, but which we cannot live without, can, as I have shown, be used to think about trade in a symbolically charged object: the African print. While Ghanaian actors mostly concur with the free trade agenda – they emphasise the open nature of the Ghanaian economy and are careful to point out that Ghana does not oppose free trade, or impose unnecessary restrictions on trade – their responses to the influx of Chinese African prints to the Ghanaian market suggest that they seek to impose selective control on the trade in African prints. That is, they attempt to construct “semi-permeable” borders (Wonders 2006) to enforce control on Chinese African prints encoded as smuggled, counterfeit or morally unjust, while allowing non-threatening African prints to move freely on the Ghanaian market.

Taking my cue from Lahav and Guiraudon (2000), in the light of contemporary security practices, borders are doubly displaced: from the border and outside the state. In this thesis, I have sought to demonstrate that Ghanaian attempts to control the international African prints trade selectively mean that borders are three times displaced: first, away from the edges of territory; then, away from central state actors; and, finally, away from state borders.

Away from the edges of territory

One key insight of contemporary border scholarship that I have stressed throughout this thesis is that the practices associated with the selective control of mobility increasingly take place away from the lines at the outer edges of state territory. It has been noted that state borders are extended, or folded outwards, in space and time to prevent spontaneous arrivals at the territorial border (e.g. Amoore 2011; Mountz 2011b). Moreover, borders are folded inwards to address the threat posed by future criminals (would-be terrorists) and already criminals (undocumented migrants) inside state territory (e.g. Amoore and de Goede 2005; Coleman 2009).

As a spatial response to the perceived threat of the Chinese African print, the first of the two policy interventions of the Ghanaian state – the single import corridor – did not seek to stop the trade in Chinese African prints. Instead, it attempted to intervene selectively against the Chinese African print that was encoded as a threat: namely, the smuggled (and the counterfeit and improperly labelled) African print. This required that African print imports were sorted into either ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’, and that sanctions were imposed only against the latter; that is, the future illegal (the counterfeit that fell under Ghanaian jurisdiction once it had crossed Ghana’s borders) and the already illegal (the smuggled that was transformed into illegal once it had crossed the territorial border in the wrong place or in the wrong way) (Chinese) African print.
In their first move, the Ghanaian state – through the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ghana Standards Board and the Customs Service – folded the border outwards by instituting an expert committee in the capital, Accra, that profiled African print imports and decided which were eligible for entry onto the Ghanaian market and which were to be turned away. This move sought to enforce the border before the Chinese African print reached Ghanaian territory. In the second move, the Ghanaian state intensified its monitoring of African print imports at the official ports of entry along the outer edges of state territory, specifically at Takoradi port, where specially trained Standards Board and Customs officers were charged with the duty of clearing African print imports. And, in the third move, it folded the border inwards to hunt down (Chinese) African prints that had entered the Ghanaian market illegally. In this way, it was asserted, legal (here, non-smuggled and non-counterfeit) Chinese African prints could be traded freely on the Ghanaian market, while counterfeit or smuggled (Chinese) African prints were turned away prior to, at or beyond the territorial border.

This need to extend the border outwards in space and time, and to intensify monitoring at designated entry points and inside Ghanaian territory, I have argued, was linked to the view of this very border as porous and to the liberalisation of the Ghanaian market. That is, the long-term Ghanaian discourse on contraband trade, corruption in the Customs Service, controversies around the Ghana-Togo border, and the fear of being left unprotected on a global market had resulted in an emphasis on the territorial border and on resolving the threat posed by the Chinese African print by stretching it to four spaces: to Accra, where the vetting committee operated; to Takoradi port, where specially trained Standards Board and Customs officers cleared African print imports; to the remaining entry points along the Ghanaian border, where customs officers (should have) denied African print imports entry; and, finally, to the south-eastern border zone, where the Customs Service’s preventive wing and the Police Service hunted down and intercepted African prints arriving from the free port and textile market in Lomé, Togo.

What is more, while this spatial strategy partly enforced the territorial border in locations away from the line at the outer edges of territory, at the same time, it sought to intensify this very line. This tells us that borders, even when they are enacted in locations away from the edges of territory, may be intensive, rather than just extensive, in their reach.

However, the single import corridor was not the only intervention explored here that displaced the border from the edges of state territory. Both the anti-counterfeiting operations – the intervention of the private and civil society sectors – and the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes – the second policy response of the Ghanaian state – imposed sanctions against the Chinese African print inside Ghanaian territory. The anti-counterfeiting operations did so while relying on the combination of the expert gaze to separate ‘real’ from ‘fake’ African prints and the unan-
nounced strike, a form of governing that worked through uncertainty (Coleman 2009:910-911) and which moved border management away from the outer edges of state territory to marketplaces deep inside Ghanaian territory. Likewise, the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes sought to enforce the border of the Ghanaian nation at certain strategic nodes, regional and district capitals, and on the bodies of strategic citizens inside Ghanaian territory.

What also has been noted about contemporary bordering processes is that they tend to broaden the actors involved in border-making beyond the state and/or to shift the responsibility for some functions of border management to state actors other than those traditionally associated with border control. Indeed, many policy solutions adopted to meet border security needs after the attacks of 11th September 2001 rely upon agreements of transnational cooperation, the delegation of border management functions to regional and local governments, and the engagement of private actors and citizens in borderwork (e.g. Coleman 2009; Lahav and Guiraudon 2000; Rumford 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2008).

Away from central state actors

In line with this, I have argued that border-making in the Ghanaian case engages an increasing number of private and civil society sector actors and citizens in borderwork, as well as the transference of border-asserting functions from certain state actors to others. They do so, however, in a slightly different way than contemporary border scholarship suggests. For one thing, the Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes engage citizens in borderwork. In this case, their role is not to act as “citizen-detectives” (Vaughan-Williams 2008) and to report the suspicious behaviour of ‘Others’ (see e.g. Amoore 2007). Rather, their bodies are used to display the morally just consumer behaviour: namely, to consume and dress in locally produced, rather than Chinese, African prints.

Furthermore, the single import corridor partly relied on a multi-stakeholder arrangement – a vetting committee – to control the trade in Chinese African prints selectively. This spatial strategy involved the centralisation of a key function associated with the clearance of goods: namely, the classification – or in the language of the border literature, the profiling – of goods for importation to the vetting committee in Accra. This arrangement gave private sector experts – in this case, Ghana’s textile companies – the deciding vote on which African prints would be allowed into the Ghanaian market and which were to be turned away. Moreover, this intervention displaced other key functions associated with clearing goods, including valuation, inspection and revenue collection, from certain state actors at specific ports of entry (Aflao and Tema) to specifically trained Customs and Stand-
ard Board officers at the single entry point at Takoradi port in western Ghana.

Of the three spatial strategies explored, the anti-counterfeiting operations best illustrate how the Ghanaian response to the inflow of Chinese African prints extends to actors beyond the state. Here private sector and civil society actors, with the assistance of Regional Police Services, took charge of the enforcement of the laws of the state to intervene against ‘the already criminal’ (in this case, the counterfeiting Chinese African print). This involved the selective intervention against the Chinese African print that violated intellectual property law, while letting the legal (here, non-counterfeit) Chinese African print be traded freely in the marketplaces.

Ghana’s textile companies and trade unions made this move, I have asserted, because they saw the performance of a particular state actor – the Customs Service – as inadequate. Indeed, Ghana’s textile companies and trade union concluded that “the war” (Akosombo Textiles Ltd. 2006a:n.p.) against counterfeit (Chinese) African prints along the outer edges of Ghanaian territory had been lost because of widespread corruption among customs officers that operate the stations along the porous Ghana-Togo border. Instead, they turned their attention to the marketplace: an economic space that long has been contested in Ghana (see Clark 1994; Nugent 1995; Robertson 1983). While it may not be the intention of Ghana’s textile companies and textile trade unions to specifically target the trader, at least not across the board, Ghanaian discourses on border porosity and the profiteering trader, I would argue, worked together to construct the marketplace as a space where it was appropriate to intervene against illicit trade. Yet the construction of the marketplace as a space of governing is also pragmatic. Indeed, Ghana’s textile companies may not have the resources required to patrol a space as vast as the Ghanaian territory. They may, however, be able to monitor a number of marketplaces.

The relevant point is that Ghana’s textile companies, at the time when they embarked on these anti-counterfeiting operations, had concluded that they could no longer rely on the state to protect them from the inflow of counterfeit African prints, and that they had to take matters into their own hands by setting out to enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property. They did so in a way that displaced border enforcement from the state actors commonly associated with border control: the Customs and Immigration Services. More than that, they linked the anti-counterfeiting operations both to earlier attempts to intervene against illegal African prints in Ghana – notably the single import corridor, which they saw as a failure due to the continued flows of counterfeit (Chinese) African prints across the Ghana-Togo border – as well as to Ghanaian discourses on border porosity and to debates in the 1970s and 1980s concerning the role of the trader in wider discussions about Ghana’s economic crisis.
Equally, what is important to note is that while the anti-counterfeiting operations represent an example of border-making being displaced from the central actors of the state, Ghana’s textile companies and textile trade remained dependent upon the assistance of other actors to enforce their rights as owners of intellectual property. These included citizen-detectives – for the most part, traders who were willing to blow the whistle on other traders – and also, more importantly, upon Regional Police Services and judges trained to rule in intellectual property cases. Phrased another way, while Ghana’s textile companies and trade unions frequently questioned the commitment of the Ghanaian state to its textile industry, these anti-counterfeiting operations did not, as I see it, represent governance beyond the state. They did, however, seek to circumvent certain state actors identified as problematic (the Customs Service) by engaging other state actors (the Police Service and the Courts of Justice).

To understand the second spatial strategy of the Ghanaian state and, in part, the response of the Ghanaian citizen – the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes – requires a third analytical move away from the political borders of the nation-state in order for us to think more broadly about what forms borders may take. That is, rather than focusing on state borders, I have shown that we need to explore an identity border, or the border of the Ghanaian nation, and the mobilising force that the territorial ideology of nationalism offers (see Storey 2001:72, 74) in order to make sense of these programmes as a spatial strategy used to deal with the perceived threat of the Chinese African print.

Away from state borders
The Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes illustrate how the borders of the nation at times are used by state actors to protect the same economic spaces which the single import corridor and anti-counterfeiting operations sought to protect through the legal borders of the state. In other words, what I have sought to show is that, while this spatial strategy attempts to resolve the economic threat of illegal (Chinese) African prints to Ghana’s textile industry by expressing it in national identity terms and by imposing moral, rather than legal, sanctions against this threat, it still seeks to protect the same textile industry and domestic market for printed textiles from the threat that the Chinese African print represents.

However, unlike the two spatial strategies that drew upon state borders to intervene against the Chinese African print, these programmes worked through identity borders and, in so doing, placed all Chinese African prints into the undesirable category by default. This policy response, thus, did not attempt to selectively control the mobility of certain Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian market. Instead, it sought to reduce the mobility of all Chinese African prints. At the same time, it actively encouraged the mobility
(and consumption) of the desired Ghanaian African print on the same market. The unique economic, historical and geographical relations embedded in West African and European African prints imply, however, that, even though these African prints may be foreign, the objective of these programmes was not to reduce the consumption of African prints of West African or European origin. These programmes, thus, resulted in a selective control of mobility of sorts, which did not draw on barriers to trade.

Although the literature on borders and contemporary security practices tends to remain focused on state borders, I would argue that certain insights generated from this literature help us to make the analytical move necessary to understand the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes as a spatial strategy that works through borders in order to protect the Ghanaian market from the perceived threat of the Chinese African print. This insight is that the increasing use of ‘smart-border’ technologies has resulted in embodied borders: that is, borders that are carried inside the human body and which fully dissolve any preconceived relationship between state, territory and border (see Amoore 2006; Weber 2006). Drawing upon Saskia Sassen, who argues that borders may be embedded in products (2006:416), I have extended the notion of embodied and “fully portable” borders (Weber 2006:35) to think about the Ghanaian case. Thus, I have argued that the National Friday Wear and Everyday Wear programmes embed the border of the Ghanaian nation in the African print produced in Ghana, such that the cloth itself becomes a portable border. This, in turn, enables the Ministry of Trade and Industry to distribute the message that Ghanaian identity may be reinforced and the textile industry rescued if Ghanaians consume and dress in garments made from locally produced textiles through festive events organised across the country. The purpose of these events is to encourage citizens in key positions to wear locally produced textile products such that the Ministry’s message is extended, and the borders of the Ghanaian nation are repeatedly displayed, far beyond the days when and the venue where the regional or district capital programmes were launched. By displaying the embedded border, or the ‘right’ or morally just African print, on these strategic bodies, others arguably are encouraged to dress in Ghanaian African prints, and the overall consumption of local textile products is increased.

From this, it follows that even when we shift the focus to identity borders, it remains highly pertinent to bring certain insights from research on contemporary security practices into the analysis. Specifically, this requires an empirical focus on the spaces where and when the border of the Ghanaian nation is enacted and on the actors involved in borderwork.

More significantly, and as pointed out earlier, the processes that construct the Chinese African print as a threat and the three displacements of the borders of the Ghanaian state and nation actually represent the critical Ghanaian voices that oppose the presence of the smuggled, counterfeit and morally unjust Chinese African print in Ghana and it is to this that I now turn.
Ghanaian voices

What this thesis has sought to add to the rapidly growing body of work on the increasing Chinese presence in Africa is a geographical analysis of a trend that hitherto has received limited attention: the critical African voices against the inflow of Chinese products to African markets and the spatial strategies that they have produced. Specifically, I have attempted to demonstrate how the border concept may help to further the understanding of how African agency is played out in a situation where the Chinese presence is itself identified as harmful. This necessitates, as I have illustrated in the foregoing two sections, that an exploration of the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and the spatial responses to this threat remains sensitive to the particular historical context in which these processes unfold.

Importantly, my emphasis on the constructed nature and contextual mediation of these processes does not suggest that the threat of the Chinese African print to the Ghanaian textile economy is not real. What it means is that Ghanaian textile companies, trade unions, segments of textile traders, policy-makers and journalists do not oppose the Chinese African print only because it is from China. At the same time, there is something distinctly different about the Chinese African print when compared to other foreign African prints on the Ghanaian market. To clarify, Ghanaian state and non-state actors oppose the Chinese African print because of the perceived threats it carries – smuggled and counterfeit – which transform it into a significantly cheaper and deceptive product on the Ghanaian market. Further, they oppose the Chinese African print because it does not agree to remain clearly recognisable as ‘Other’, but rather tries to present itself as part of West Africa’s textile heritage to gain advantages in the market. These are threats that Dutch, English, Ivorian or Nigerian African prints do not carry.

From this, it follows that Ghanaian actors have responded to these three perceived threats of the Chinese African print, rather than to its ‘Chinese-ness’.103 For me, this means that the critical African voices regarding the inflow of Chinese products to African markets and the spatial responses they have resulted in are not best understood as anti-Chinese sentiments, or Sinophobia. Instead, I have argued that, in the Ghanaian case, we may perhaps understand these voices and responses as contextually mediated and globally connected constructions and spatial strategies that seek to protect certain economic sectors without compromising Ghana’s status as a liberal economy.

103 When I conducted fieldwork in early 2010, other foreign African prints had started to arrive in the trading areas in central Accra. It would appear that, as Chinese manufacturers were improving on quality, Indian manufacturers captured the gap at the lower end of the market. Preliminary inquiries suggested that Indian-made African prints displayed the same perceived threats as did Chinese African prints (interviews with importers 4 and 5, March 2010).
What this in effect means is, first, that the Ghanaian responses to the inflow of Chinese African prints to the local market do not lash out indiscriminately against all Chinese African prints, but rather engage this perceived threat selectively. What can also been noted is that while these strategic responses foreground the Chinese object, in the Ghanaian context it is rarely a Chinese person who is subjected to sanction. Rather, it is the Ghanaian importer, whose design is rejected by the vetting committee; the Ghanaian or Togolese smuggler, whose goods are seized by the Ghanaian Customs Service; or the Ghanaian market trader, whose Chinese African prints are confiscated by the anti-copying team and the Striking Force of the Ghana Police Service that bear the economic costs of these strategic interventions.

Second, this entails that the preference for one spatial strategy over another not only depends upon what sanction is better suited to deal with the Chinese African print, but also upon what is considered feasible or most appropriate in the Ghanaian context. These circumstances partly explain why the perceived threat of the Chinese African print appears in these particular forms and the specific shapes that these responses take. As such, this thesis partly extends the argument, implied in the work of a handful of scholars, that the ‘China-question’, in one way or other, is deeply embedded in the local historical context (e.g. Bourdarias 2010; Dittgen 2010; Esteban 2010; Larmer and Fraser 2007; Liu 2010; Scheld 2010). Yet, at the same time, I have pointed out that several of the circumstances that place the Chinese African print in a position to pose a threat to the textile economy and nation emerge from wider set of concerns that are beyond the immediate influence of both Ghanaian and Chinese actors.

Moving forward

Through this account of Ghanaian voices and their spatial responses to the inflow of Chinese African prints, in turn, I have sought to bring some nuance to the growing body of work on the border concept. I have attempted to do this first by arguing that the Ghanaian case tells us something important about border-making as a spatial response to a threat that comes from (the ‘wrong’ kinds of) mobility: namely, that semi-permeable borders may not only be constructed to constrain the mobility of certain people while facilitating economic flows and the mobility of trusted liberal subjects. Rather, a desire for borders that control mobility selectively may emerge around certain symbolically charged products as well. I have also sought to add to the discussion by bringing the spatial strategies that re-shape and displace borders into closer conversation with the construction of certain people and objects as a threat, and by emphasising the need to place these processes in their historical context in order to understand why they unfold in particular ways. Indeed, we cannot understand the spatial responses to the inflow of
Chinese African prints without considering the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat to the Ghanaian textile economy and nation, as the presence of the two in the Ghanaian market motivates and justifies one another. Equally, the Ghanaian case has demonstrated how a range of fears that extend beyond the immediate concerns raised by the presence of the Chinese African print come together to construct this object as a threat and to shape the spatial responses to its presence in very specific ways. Also, I am adding to the understanding of borders by including a third displacement of the border in the analysis, a move that takes us away from state borders to think more broadly about what a border may be, while retaining the focus on how this identity border unfolds spatially.

Indeed, the development of a broader border concept and the three borders displacements discussed here do not necessarily imply that borders are becoming non-geographical (cf. Walters 2006b), or that the border concept is losing its analytical clarity (cf. Johnson and Jones 2011:61-62) but rather that they are territorial in non-linear ways (Popescu 2012:69, 82-83). Thus, finally, in this thesis, I have not only applied the border concept in a new context, but also provided new insights about the specificities of how spatial strategies operate through borders to engage the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print in Ghana. To clarify, I have demonstrated how the borders of the Ghanaian state were stretched into the shape of a corridor. This spatial strategy, in Vaughan-Williams’s terms, made the Ghanaian border appear as a (spatial-temporal) continuum (2010:1077-1078) that stretched from China, via the African print’s arrival on Ghanaian territory, to the in-country swoops in Ghana’s south-eastern border zone. I have shown how Ghana’s textile companies and trade unions dispersed the borders of the Ghanaian state to form a networked border that struck against the Chinese African print unannounced. This way of imposing sanctions, if successful, would construct a border that appeared to be ubiquitous (e.g. Amoore 2006; Balibar 2002:84-85). I have also demonstrated how the border of the Ghanaian nation was embodied, a move that embedded the border in the foreign object – the Chinese African print – and turned the border into a “mobile regulatory site” (Amoore 2006:337; also see Walters 2006a:195-197; Weber 2006).

Above all, I have attempted to show that, while the bordering practices explored in this thesis may displace borders and alter the shape that borders take, both the construction of the Chinese African print as a threat and the sanctions imposed against it take place spatially and temporally, and that such practices are used strategically in a geographical sense to maintain and protect Ghanaian territory and its market from the perceived threat posed by the Chinese African print. In other words, my main interest has not been in whether or how borders themselves are becoming increasingly mobile in space and time, or whether they take on new shapes. Instead, my interest has been in how Ghanaian actors re-shape the borders of the state and nation to
make them appear in a range of locales prior to, at and beyond the territorial border in response to the inflow of Chinese African prints. In so doing, I have shifted the focus from the spatial outcomes of contemporary border making practices to explore a number of spatial strategies that represent both state and non-state interventions against the perceived threat of the Chinese African print in order to clarify how borders operate to control mobility in ways that resolve the fears of both open flows and closed borders.


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Appendix 1: A chronology of significant events, starting in 1000 CE

- **c. 1000**: Archaeological evidence suggests that cotton textile production centres exist in West Africa. Cotton cloth circulates as currency in cotton-producing areas.

- **c. 1000-1450**: Extensive intra-regional cotton textiles trade networks develop in West Africa. The Gold Coast emerges as a trade hub in the region.

- **1471**: Portuguese merchants arrive in the Gold Coast.

- **15th-16th century**: European merchants serve as carriers in West African cotton trade networks.

- **17th century**: A number of trading forts are constructed along the coast by Portuguese, Dutch, Danish, English, French and Swedish trading companies.

- **17th century**: European merchants enter the global trade in cotton, primarily through the English and Dutch East India Companies. The English company dominates the Euro-Asian trade in cottons.

- **17th century**: Javanese batiks arrive in Europe from Dutch East India (Indonesia). Using a converted banknote-printing machine, the Haarlem-based firm Prévinaire & Co. develop and partially mechanise the production of imitation batik in an attempt to enter the Indonesian market by undercutting local production.

- **1828**: The Basel Evangelical Missionary Society is established with Christiansborg (now Osu Castle, Accra) as its headquarters. The Basel Mission is to play a key role in the African prints trade.

- **1839**: The British government authorises its merchants to collect duties on all merchandise coming into the Gold Coast settlement.

- **1831-72**: West African soldiers who serve in the Dutch East-India Army bring Javanese batiks to the West African market.
Britain declares the Gold Coast its colony and Cape Coast becomes the capital. The Colony comprises present-day Ghana’s coastal areas. North of its frequently contested boundary is the Asante Empire, one of a series of kingdoms along the West African coast, which was known for its military might. Throughout the 19th century, its forces repeatedly fought the British for control of the coastal areas. During the colonial era, the Customs Service generates the bulk of the Colony’s revenue.

The capital of the Gold Coast Colony is moved to Accra.

The long-standing trade relations with the Gold Coast are used to introduce the African print to the West African market. The designs are continually developed in collaboration with local actors.

Germany establishes the protectorate of Togoland to the east of the Gold Coast Colony. Its territory encompasses present-day Togo and most of Ghana’s Volta Region. The French colony of Dahomey is its eastern neighbour.

The Heligoland Treaty establishes the boundary between the Gold Coast and German Togoland.

The Asante protectorate and the Northern territories are proclaimed to be part of the Gold Coast Colony.

A. Brunnschweiler & Company Ltd. begins African print production in Hyde, outside Manchester.

Within a month of the outbreak of the First World War, Gold Coast (British) and Dahomean (French) forces defeat German Togoland. Togoland territory is temporarily divided between Britain and France.

Togoland territory is divided along new lines, giving France 60 per cent of Togoland and Britain a far smaller sector west of the Togoland hills, which is called the British Togoland Trust Territory.

The British administration sends out its customs officers to set up border posts and collect duties on main roads between the two Togolands. Britain’s and France’s different views on taxation become a major disruptive element in British-French relations in West Africa.

Kwame Nkrumah is appointed General Secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), a political party formed to bring about Gold Coast independence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Nkrumah and other party leaders are arrested following riots in several cities across the Gold Coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Nkrumah breaks from the UGCC and forms the Convention People’s Party (CPP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>The CPP wins the majority of seats of the newly instituted legislative council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Nkrumah is elected Prime Minister following an amendment of the constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Following a referendum, British Togoland Trust Territory merges with the Gold Coast Colony. The borders and shape of Ghanaian territory as we now know them are realised. The Ghanaian territory amounts to 238,535 square kilometres. Its land borders, which are shared with Côte d'Ivoire to the west, Burkina Faso to the north and Togo to the east, are 2,093 kilometres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Steep increases in import tariffs on printed textiles are introduced to attract production to the Gold Coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>On 6th March, Nkrumah declares Ghana independent. Textiles play important symbolic roles in the struggles for independence and the period of nation-state building that followed. At independence, the Customs Service is among Ghana’s largest and longest-lived authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Ghana’s first Five Year Development Plan as an independent state is launched. The plan states that industrialisation through foreign investment is the desired development path for Ghana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1950s, Early 1960s</td>
<td>Conflicts over the Ghana-Togo boundary arise yet again. Different views on taxation continue to put a strain on Ghana-Togo relations. Differences in tariffs and taxes on each side of the Ghana-Togo boundary result in a distinct smuggling pattern; agricultural produce flows from Ghana to Togo and imported consumer items flow in the opposite direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Ghana attains republic status with Nkrumah as the first President. Ghana’s first post-independence population census counts about 6.7 million inhabitants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Quantitative restrictions on imports, exchange control and import licensing is introduced to attract foreign investment to the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Additional increases in import tariffs are introduced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1964 Nkrumah proposes a constitutional amendment to make the CPP the only legal party and himself President for life.

1964 The United Africa Company and Unilever sign an agreement with the Government of Ghana to establish an African prints-producing factory in Ghana, the Ghana Textile Printing Company Ltd. (GTP).

1965 Ghana’s first textile design and trademark registry is established.

1966 The production of African prints commence in the GTP factory in the industrial town of Tema. Throughout the 1960s, several African print-producing factories are established in Ghana.

1950s-60s Textile and clothing production, which had propelled European industrialisation, begins to shift towards Asia.

1966 Nkrumah is deposed in a coup. The army and the police establish the National Liberation Council (NLC). The NLC accepts an IMF/World Bank stabilisation package and Ghana liberalises its import regime.

1969 Kofi Abrefa Busia’s Progress Party (PP) wins the elections in August. Busia is associated with Ghana’s political right and liberalisations thus continue.

1972 The PP devalues the Ghanaian currency, after which Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong seizes power in a military coup. The National Redemption Council (NRC) is established with Acheampong as chairman.

1972 The NRC launches Operation Feed Yourself and Ghana turns away from the international market. Import licensing and price controls are re-instated. By now, Ghana has lost its position as a regional trade hub for African prints. The African prints consumed in Ghana are almost exclusively locally produced. The locally textile industry is booming.

1974 The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) is signed to keep the textile and clothing sector outside the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and, later, the World Trade Organization (WTO), for thirty years.

1975 The Supreme Military Council (SMC) replaces the NRC in Ghana. Acheampong is promoted to General.

1977 The Ghanaian textile industry reaches its peak. The industry employs 25,000 workers in sixteen large-scale textile companies and 138 garment factories.
1978  SMC officers force Acheampong to resign. Acheampong is replaced by General Akuffo, who is appointed chairman of the SMC II. Akuffo states that he will hand over political power to a new government to be elected by 1st July 1979.

1979  Before the elections are held, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings leads a coup against the SMC II. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) takes over the country’s government.

1979  The Makola Market in central Accra is looted and closed down on the day of the coup. Similar events take place in all central markets in Ghana’s regional capitals.

1979  Presidential elections are held. Hilla Limann and the People’s National Party (PNP) assumes office in October after the AFRC have completed a ‘housecleaning’ exercise, during which Acheampong and seven other NLC and NRC/SMC military leaders are publicly executed by firing squad. Some attempts at liberalising the trade regime are made to correct the strict import control system, which was contributing to the manufacturing sector’s problems. Renewed negotiations with the IMF and World Bank are held.

Late 1970s, Early 1980s  The Ghanaian economy is in deep crisis. The per capita income, which had been among the highest in Africa less than two decades ago, has declined significantly, productivity has dropped in all sectors, inflation reaches a staggering 116 per cent in 1977, and the fixed exchange rate means that the Ghanaian cedi is the most overvalued currency in Africa. Food shortages in the towns are chronic. The drop in prices on Ghana’s main export, cocoa, and the steep increases of the oil prices on the world market push Ghana further into recession.

Late 1970s  The term kalabule is introduced to refer to all forms of profiteering by manipulation of the state machinery. Customs officers stationed in the borderlands are increasingly made responsible for the porous nature of the Ghana-Togo border and the loss of revenue that the contraband trade results in. The Limann government is also accused of resorting to kalabule activities.

1981  Rawlings stages a second coup, which he calls a revolution. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) takes control of the country, with Rawlings as chairman. The monitoring of the Ghanaian borderlands changes radically. The revolutionary approach to anti-smuggling operations
takes on the form of vigilantism as border communities are engaged in border monitoring through the establishment of People’s Defence Committees, People’s Tribunals and the People’s Militia.

Early 1980s Further attacks by the PNDC on Ghana’s marketplaces.
1982 Wage and price controls are introduced to decrease inflation. These controls are to cause far more economic damage on the businesses of traders than had earlier confrontations.
1983 Over a million Ghanaians are forcibly repatriated from Nigeria, thereby deepening Ghana’s economic distress.
1983 Ghana signs a structural adjustment agreement with the IMF and World Bank.
1984-86, 1987-89, 1993 The implementation of Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) in three stages means that the quantitative restrictions on trade that have protected Ghana’s textile industry are phased out. Import licensing is abolished in 1989. The textile industry struggles on the new competitive market.
1992 A referendum approves a new democratic constitution and multiparty system. Rawlings transforms the PNDC into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and wins the elections.
1994 The Uruguay round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations concludes that the MFA should be phased out over a 10 year period.
1995 Ghana becomes a member of the WTO.
1996 Rawlings and the NDC win a second term.
1998 Value Added Tax (VAT) is introduced. The VAT is part of broader tax reforms under the ERPs.
1990s-00s China and South East Asia emerge as the world’s leading textile and clothing producers.
Late 1990s, 2000s Chinese textile products, including copies of African prints, appear in great numbers on the Ghanaian market. Ghana’s textile industries begin to sound warnings about industrial collapse.
The New Patriotic Party (NPP) wins the elections. For the first time, Ghana changes government through the use of the ballot box. Alleged corruption in the Customs Service is a key question of the political debate leading up to the elections.

The Customs Service is continuously restructured in response to the allegations about corruption that have troubled the service for decades.

John Agyekum Kufour of the NPP is installed as President of Ghana.

Kufour launches the President’s Special Initiative on Garments and Textiles to facilitate the establishment of new factories that would produce for the export market.

The Revenue Agencies Governing Board (RAGB) Secretariat is installed to supervise and monitor the revenue agencies.

Ghana joins the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

Ghana’s intellectual property laws are revised to meet the requirements of the WTO.

Ghana qualifies for duty-free and quota-free export of textile products to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

The RAGB summons a meeting to discuss the crisis in the textile industry.

The Ghanaian population is estimated to be 20 million.

Kufour and the NPP win a second term.

The National Friday Wear programme is launched in Accra.

The National Tripartite Committee appoints a sub-technical committee to discuss measures to save the textile industry.

The single import corridor is enforced in an attempt to support the textile industry. The initiative alters the requirements imports must meet to access the Ghanaian market.

The National Friday Wear programme is rolled out across the country.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry takes over a collapsed textile factory, Juapong Textiles Ltd. (JTL), which they plan to revitalise with the assistance of a Chinese textile company.
2006 The Customs Service and the RAGB decide to re-sell African prints that have been smuggled into the country at highly discounted prices to the Ghanaian public in a bid to deter smuggling.

2006 Akosombo Textiles Ltd. begins its anti-counterfeiting operations in marketplaces in Accra, Kumasi, Sunyani and Berekum. Ten traders in the Kumasi Central Market are arrested and tried at court for intellectual property infringement.

2007 On 6th March, Ghana celebrates the 50th anniversary of her independence. The Ghana@50 planning committee admits to having imported the cloth printed to commemorate the event from China.

2007 JTL is reactivated under a new name: Volta Star Textiles Ltd.

2007 Ghanaian traders’ associations from across the country call for a boycott of Chinese African prints.

2008 The single import corridor is revoked.

2008 In the December elections, the NDC returns to power.

2009 John Atta Mills is installed as President of Ghana.

2009 Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) replaces all of Ghana’s revenue agencies, including the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Value Added Tax Service and the RAGB.

2009 The Friday Wear programme is transformed into the National Everyday Wear programme. Launches are held in two district capitals in each of Ghana’s ten regions.

2010 The Mills government introduces an additional 5 per cent import tariff on textile products to protect the local industry.

2010 The textile companies and trade unions join forces with a range of government agencies to remove smuggled and counterfeit African prints from the marketplaces and they burn these before the public to deter people from trade in illegal items.

2011 Ghana attains middle-income status and is expected to be one of the world’s fastest growing economies. The textile industry, however, continues downwards.

2011 JTL faces imminent collapse and angry local youth take over the factory in protest.
2011 Restrictions on the import trade in African prints similar to those under the single import corridor are introduced. This time, however, all of Ghana’s ports of entry are to handle African print imports.

2011 African prints traders in central Accra express concern about the raids being carried out in the marketplace.

2011 Around 100 textile workers march from the Trade Union Congress to the trading areas in central Accra in protest against the trade in counterfeit African prints.

2012 Traders in locally produced African prints appeal to the government to enforce the restrictions on African print imports.
Appendix 2: Interviews

Accra central textile traders
Distributor\textsuperscript{104} 1, 21\textsuperscript{st} November 2007.
Distributor 2, 11\textsuperscript{th} December 2007, 8\textsuperscript{th} November 2008.
Distributor 3, 12\textsuperscript{th} December 2007.
Distributor 4, 12\textsuperscript{th} December 2007.
Distributor 5, 11\textsuperscript{th} October 2008.
Printer\textsuperscript{105} 1/Association leader, 17\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Printer 2/Association leader, 26\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Printer 3, 30\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Printer 4, 25\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader\textsuperscript{106} 1/Association leader, 11\textsuperscript{th} November 2008.
Market trader 2, 4\textsuperscript{th} December 2008.
Market trader 3, 4\textsuperscript{th} December 2008.
Market trader 4/Association leader, 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 2008.
Market trader 5/Association leader, 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 2008, 13\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader 6, 13\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader 7, 17\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader 8, 17\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader 9, 20\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader 10, 20\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader 11, 27\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Market trader 12, 27\textsuperscript{th} March 2010.
Importer\textsuperscript{107} 1, 4\textsuperscript{th} March, 2010.
Importer 2, 23\textsuperscript{rd} March, 2010.

\textsuperscript{104} Each trader’s relationship with the textile companies, the scale of her/his business in terms of turnover and the location of her shop were the key factors used to categorise traders. ‘Distributors’ get their supplies directly from distribution companies. Together with the printers, this group of traders function as distributors of Ghanaian and European African prints to traders further down the textile trading hierarchy.

\textsuperscript{105} The ‘printers’ are a group of economically powerful traders who commission Ghana’s textile companies to print designs they themselves have developed.

\textsuperscript{106} The ‘market women’ operate stalls in the textile section inside the 31\textsuperscript{st} December Women’s Movement Market/the Makola Markets. The scale of these traders’ businesses in terms of turnover is generally far below the two above categories.

\textsuperscript{107} The ‘importers’ are the traders who import Chinese African prints to Ghana, either directly from China or via the textile market in Lomé in neighbouring Togo. All importers included in the study were former traders in Ghanaian African prints. Some of them still held positions as distributors for one of the local textile companies.
Importer 3/Association leader, 26th March 2010.
Importer 4, 30th March 2010.
Importer 5, 30th March 2010.
Newcomer108 1, 16th November 2007.
Newcomer 2, 27th March 2010.

Business organisations
Director, IR and Administration, Ghana Employers Association, 7th November 2007.
Coordinator, Institute of Packaging Ghana, 9th March 2010.
Head of Marketing, Trade and Investment Promotion, Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 16th March 2010.
Director of Finance and Administration, Association of Ghana Industries, 19th March 2010.
Senior Policy Officer, Association of Ghana Industries, 19th March 2010.

Consumer representatives

Customs Division of Ghana Revenue Authority
WCO National contact point, 29th March 2010.

Ghana Standards Board
Head of Quality Insurance, 18th March 2010.
Head of Destination Inspection, 18th March 2010.

Ministry of Trade and Industry
Deputy Chief Commercial Officer, Import-Export Division, 3rd March 2010.
Director, Domestic Trade and Distribution Division, 5th March 2010, 23rd November 2011 (telephone).
Director, Small, Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Technology Division, 23rd March 2010, March 26th, 2010.

108 The ‘newcomers’ are the traders whose engagement in the textile trade is a direct result of the entry of Chinese African prints on the Ghanaian market. This category proved difficult to identify. Although traders I met often spoke of these “new” textile traders who, in their opinion, eroded the exclusivity of the textile trade, few knew them in person and could subsequently not introduce me to them.
Senior Commercial Officer, Small, Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Technology Division, 29th March 2010.

Registrar General’s Department
Principal State Attorney, 9th March 2010.

Textile industry representatives
Head of Administration and Human Resources, Akosombo Textiles Limited (ATL), 29th March 2010.
Copyright Officer, Akosombo Textiles Limited (ATL), 15th March 2010, 15th November 2011 (telephone).
Director, Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Limited (GTMC), 24th March 2010.
General Manager for Administration, Printex Limited, 18th March 2010.
Operations Manager of the joint taskforce, Printex Limited, 31st March 2010 (telephone).
Marketing Director, TexStyles Ghana Limited, 24th March 2010.
Director of the Accra shop, CTD Ghana Limited, 10th November 2008.

Trade union representatives
Regional Officer, Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), Tema branch, 11th October 2007.
General Secretary, Textile, Garment and Leather Employees Union (TGLEU), 11th October 2007, 16th November 2007, 16th March 2010.


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