Protectionist leftists and right wing capitalists?

The role of labor and capital as determinants for labor immigration policy preferences in Scandinavian parliamentary debates

Carina Gisela Therése Portin
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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to investigate to what extent political parties in the Scandinavian parliaments express opinions on labor immigration in line with the policy preferences predicted by the Stolper-Samuleson theorem. A hypothesis derived from the theorem suggests that left wing parties traditionally connected to labor interests should favor restrictions on labor immigration to a greater extent than right wing parties traditionally connected to businesses and market interests. To establish any such trend, parties are placed on a left-right axis according to their given Rile scores. The findings indicate that there is some evidence for a left-right divide regarding parties' assumed factor interests labor and capital, but the basis for these findings are limited and inferences should be made with care.

Keywords

Labor immigration arguments, policy preferences, Scandinavian parliaments, political parties, the Stolper-Samuleson theorem, content analysis, Rile score
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Introduction

Here is a statement most would agree on: everyone wants what is best for them and their families, and when that part is covered, they want what is best for their close surroundings, and possibly for their country. Most would also agree that in a globalized world, the chances of improving one’s standard of living are better than ever before. Trade and movements of both production and labor has reached new heights and even though globalization is not new phenomena, the flow of both goods, capital and people across national borders have increased immensely during the latter part of the 20th century (Spero & Hart 2010, pp. 28-31, 135-138, Oatley 2008, pp. 174).

Just as migration from Europe to America in the 19th and 20th centuries came about in the search for work, wealth and a better future, labor migration in Europe today happen for very much the same reasons. Migration increase the possibilities of reaching a higher personal wealth, and for countries as a whole, national growth may very well be dependent on being able to supply enough labor.

For workers in countries with relatively high unemployment and low wages or other unattractive labor standards, labor migration represents the possibility of finding a job and providing for the family where conditions are better. For companies in the receiving countries, labor migration means a larger supply on the labor market and a possibility of finding the labor and the qualifications you need at a better price. However, for workers in the receiving countries, a larger supply on the labor market naturally means greater competition and possibly lower wages, and for the sending countries, the so called brain drain might affect the country negatively in the long run, as highly qualified labor leave in search for better terms.

Clearly, globalization goes hand in hand with some distributional effects. Production factors such as capital and labor are players in the international trading arena, and particular interests give birth to particular preferences on economic and social policies. In representative democracies, aggregated individual opinions are transformed into policies, and opinions on labor immigration is no exception.

The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and the EU Services Directive (2006/123/EG) has opened up for more extensive labor migration. Some countries implemented transitional restrictions in 2004, among other Denmark and Norway (although not a member of the EU, participating in the EEA). Sweden was one of few EU-countries not to adopt transitional restrictions. These three countries, classified by Esping-Andersen as social democratic welfare regimes and very similar in their economic and welfare structures, state intervention, political institutions and labor unions (Johansson 2008, pp. 147-153; Sapi, 2006) have received a varying number of labor immigrants in the past decade. Denmark is at the bottom, accepting some 73 000 and Sweden just above with 110 000.
Norway by far exceeds the other two, receiving approximately 313,000 labor immigrants in recent years (OECD, 2000-2009). The difference between the three cases is notable, and policy decisions are likely to be part of the explanation.

From having focused on receiving refugees and asylum seekers, labor immigration is again on the agenda. In the Scandinavian parliaments, the topic has been discussed, and some of the arguments nearly qualify as entertaining in their bluntness, like statements such as “Labor immigrants ... are less costly to use than the national workforce since we haven't paid for their daycare or education.” For sure, Abir Al-Sahlani (The Swedish Agrarian Party, C) has a point, but even with the best intentions, it is without a doubt expressed in an awkward (and not very politically correct) manner. Then there are the more substantial arguments, where labor immigration is discussed as a threat or a necessity to economic growth and to the welfare state and the services it provides. On the one hand, with an impending growing and aging population, claims are being made that labor immigration is crucial if we are to sustain the welfare state and economic growth. On the other hand, labor immigration without limitations will increase competition on the labor market with possible wage and social dumping as a consequence.

An understanding of where certain arguments originate from and why they are being defended is of great importance to the general political debate and to reaching agreements and unity in political decisions. Such an understanding may also explain the fact that the Scandinavian countries differ in the number of received labor immigrants. So why do some political parties oppose labor immigration and why are some in favor? Are there national differences in the Scandinavian countries? A comparison between parliamentary debates in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark might provide some insights and might suggest further research or possible angels on why (if so) arguments differ between these countries.

**Aim**

The purpose of this paper is to identify claims and arguments regarding labor immigration in the Scandinavian parliaments. A content analysis will be applied for this purpose.

Depending on whether an actor's interests lie within a scarce or an abundant factor of production, opinions on trade and labor migration are likely to differ as the impact of trade and migration affects scarce and abundant factors of production differently. This will in turn cause certain preferences on economic and social policies. The aim is to try to establish if there is a connection between party affiliation and opinions in accordance with the assumed implications on policy preferences as implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (discussed below in the Theory section). Furthermore, it is to investigate if there are national differences within the Scandinavian parliaments. Policy preferences will not be studied as such, but will be indirectly expected as a consequence of certain parliamentary attitudes toward labor immigration.

Finally, the paper aims to see if a trend in opinions on a political left-right axis can be discerned, under the assumption that labor interests are represented on the left side and capital represented on the right side of the axis.
Research question

To fulfill the purpose of the paper, the following research question directs the route for the remainder of the study (the question builds upon a hypothesis derived from the mentioned theorem, further discussed in the section Theoretical framework and previous research):

To what extent do political parties in the Scandinavian parliaments express opinions on labor immigration in line with the policy preferences predicted by the Stolper-Samuleson theorem?

Disposition

The paper will in the following section define terms and concepts used, and then go on to discuss its theoretical framework. A relatively extensive and essential section on methodological considerations will follow, along with an account of material selection and delimitations. Next in line is the section Construction of coding scheme, in which a coding scheme and coding instructions are enclosed. An account of the empirical findings for each country then follows, along with a comparison between the Scandinavian countries to see whether they exhibit the same pattern. The parties included in the study will finally be positioned on a left-right axis to establish if there seems to be a trend in policy preferences on labor immigration. Some final remarks will conclude the paper.

Definitions of terms and concepts

To avoid possible confusion, definitions of some occurring key terms and concepts used are accounted for below.

Political parties

“[A]ny political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office” (Sartori 1976, cited in Hague 2010, p. 203). In addition, only political parties elected into office and present in the studied material will be considered in the paper.

Labor migration (in the paper mainly immigration is discussed)

Permanent or temporary and voluntary migration for finding and engaging in employment (ILO 2002).

Dependency ratio

A comparison between the dependent population (usually aged 0-15 and 64-) and the working, i.e. the productive, population (McKenzie et al 2012, pp. 248-249).
**Social dumping**

Refers to an erosion of social protection or environmental standards that occurs due to economic competition with countries of lesser standards (Alber & Standing, 2000).

**Wage dumping**

“The exploitation of differences in wages, working conditions and wage related fringe benefits that make up employers' labour costs in order to create an unfair competitive advantage.” (Dictionary on the Interuniversity Research Centre on Globalization and Work website, 2011).

**Human capital**

Training and skills accumulated by workers which increase their productivity and normally the wages they receive. Human capital is subject to changes such as investments in education or skills no longer needed by the market, and thus can vary over time (Hubbard & O’Brien 2010, p. 526; Åslund, 2006).

**Skilled/unskilled labor**

Labor (individuals/workers) in possession of a large amount of human capital/a limited or very small amount of human capital.

**Sending and receiving countries**

Sending countries refers to the nations from which people emigrate and receiving countries to the nations in which they arrive.

**Brain drain**

The loss of human capital in a country when skilled labor moves abroad, possibly causing a loss of general welfare in the sending country (Lundborg, 2006).
Theoretical framework and previous research

Theoretical approaches

To understand where certain arguments originate from and why they are being defended, is essential for keeping a healthy political climate and invaluable in the quest for reaching agreements and unity in political decision-making. This paper takes off in a society centered approach, meaning that it emphasizes “the interaction between societal interests and political institutions” (Oatley 2008, p. 12).

In the international economy, actors such as individuals, companies or governments have certain interests based on assumptions and beliefs about the state of things; they act in accordance with their ideas about the economic or ideological state of the world. Political institutions such as parties and national parliaments act on the interests and ideas of the different groups when making policy decisions and creating rules and regulations that set the terms for the political and economic system, whether it is nationally or internationally (Oatley 2008, pp. 12-13, 72-73).

Under the assumption that actors are rational and that trade in the international economy means the whole world is a market place where you trade one or more production factors (money for land, money for labor or money for capital) where you make the best deal, companies will try to maximize profits by producing at the lowest cost (which includes wages for labor) and selling products to the highest bidder. Likewise, individual workers (or labor) will have an interest in earning a larger wage rather than a smaller one. It should be noted that labor in general is not nearly as mobile as capital due to language barriers, citizenship, moving costs, family bonds etc. (Åslund, 2006), but it can be stated that trade and labor movements will have different implications in different parts of the world and for different factors of production. Consequently, if actors (in representative democracies) want to maximize their welfare gains, it seems reasonable to expect them to vote for the political parties that seem to attend to those interests in the best way possible.

Economic models and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

With the previous section in mind, one can begin to approach how individual preferences on economic policies differ with the help of neo-classical economic models such as the Hecksher-Ohlin model, which explains how two or more countries can all gain in trade through the comparative advantage that emerges due to differences in factor endowments. The model states that a country should produce and export in areas where its endowment factors are abundant (since this will be less costly), and import products that requires a country’s scarce endowment factors in production (Oatley 2008, pp. 59-60).

The Stolper-Samuelson theorem (or factor-price equalization) develops the model and claims that free trade will lead to an increase in the price for the intensive factors of

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1 To what extent political representatives actually do present arguments in accordance with the interests of their voters have been studied and discussed (see for instance the Public Choice vol. 130 pp. 137-162 article by Ågren, Dahlberg & Mörk), but it is not the main concern of this paper to establish political representation of opinions, and in short, representative democracy would quickly lose its legitimacy if political representatives did not live up to expectations and fulfill at least some of their obligations.
production in a country; the income of the abundant factor will rise and the income of the scarce factor will fall. Through competition prices for capital and labor will converge over time between countries engaged in trade. Applied on labor (when divided into skilled and unskilled) and the international labor market, this means that un- or semiskilled labor in many developing countries will see their wages rise, whereas un- or semiskilled labor in the developed countries will face decreased wages (as skilled labor constitutes the intensive production factor in most of these countries) as a consequence of trade. For capital, likewise, in capital intensive countries, capital owners will get increasing returns on their investments when they can place them abroad rather than within the country. The implications of the model, then, would mean a difference in attitudes towards free trade between groups that control or possess abundant factors of production (they will be in favor of trade), and groups in possession of scarce factors (they will oppose trade and be in favor of protectionism to a greater extent due to falling incomes as a result of trade). All together, the theorem points toward a convergence that will create a fairer distribution of income across the globe (Oatley 2008, pp. 74-78).

**Previous research**

Although the connection between trade with goods or capital and the “trade” with labor requires one to ignore and adjust some parts of the theorem, as for labor migration, it seems reasonable to expect the same logic to apply. In his summary of the article “Trade, Immigration, and Cross-Border Investment”, Rogowski (2008) also clearly states that:

Gains and losses from trade, and hence preferences over trade, will divide along factoral lines in the HO and in the SJ specific-factors models, abundant factors normally favoring, and scarce factors normally opposing, free movement of products and factors. ... Perhaps more importantly, however, factor owners' preferences on trade will correlate almost perfectly with their preferences on migration and foreign investment: free traders will favor free migration (again, abstracting away from any fiscal or cultural impact) and free movement of capital, and protectionists will also oppose migration and foreign investment. The difference, as indicated earlier, is that under free trade the winners' gains will outweigh the losers' losses; under migration this need not be the case.

(Rogowski 2008, pp.823-824)

With open borders for migration (and ignoring the fact that labor is not mobile to the same extent as for instance financial capital), the intensive factors should see their income rise, whereas the scarce factor will face a decrease. These effects are likely to affect labor migration preferences. As for the Scandinavian countries, (relatively) abundant in both capital and skilled labor, individuals with such factor interests should be in favor of rather liberal labor immigration policies, whereas unskilled labor (such as traditional industrial or manufacturing workers) on the other hand would oppose such measures to a greater extent. The connection between trade and migration preferences are confirmed in Mayda (2006), but furthermore she concludes that individuals on average are more pro-trade than pro-migration, which suggests that opinions on labor immigration should be rather
apparent in the selected material, as the implications of free migration would affect individuals' everyday (professional) life to a larger extent than the implications of free trade (Mayda, 2006).

The Stolper-Samuelson theorem builds on a number of economic assumptions, among other perfect competition in markets and countries having an equal number of production factors, which seems to have few resemblances with reality (Appleyard, Field & Cobb 2005, pp. 134-135), and thus the accuracy of the economic implications of the theorem has been rightly contested. Albeit a large number of conducted studies on economic implications of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and of effects on wages and (see for instance Leamer 1996), to my knowing the research on (labor migration) policy preferences as a result of the theorem are somewhat less extensive, in particular with regard to the Scandinavian countries. This being said, the Mayda-Rodrik paper (2001) analyzes trade preferences with (among other) the factor endowments model as a starting point and finds a strong correlation between an individual’s level of human capital and pro-trade opinions (and thus strong support for the model, which justifies using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem as a theoretical backdrop for this paper). It also states that non-economic determinants such as values or identities strongly affect trade preferences. For instance, a strong regional or national attachment is likely to cause individuals to be less pro-trade (Mayda & Rodrik, 2001). However, the Mayda-Rodrik paper does not further discuss (labor) migration preferences as such, but with the Rogowski quote above in mind and the findings from Mayda (2006), this should be a feasible task for the present study, in which I hope to contribute to some new knowledge on the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish policy preferences on labor immigration.

As previously mentioned, to see if there is any evidence for a trend between production factor interests such as labor and capital, and the party opinions on labor immigration present in the studied material, the intention is to place the empirical findings of this study on a left-right axis. As for the political concepts left and right, they are wide and display differences in both space and time, and should thus be used with care. Even so, the left-right axis serves a purpose when it comes to showing trends. For instance, Budge (2006) has identified themes in election programs from 50 democracies between 1945-1998, listing among other trade protection, social security and trade unions as left wing issues, whereas free trade and a free market stands as typical right wing issues (compiled briefly in Hague 2010, pp. 21-22).

To establish the parties' positions on a left-right axis, the Manifesto Project (where Budge also participates) and its measures will provide the basis. The Rile score, ranging from an extreme left of -100 to an extreme right of 100, is established by considering a number of societal, political and economic aspects and using the values in a specific formula. The formula and the project will not be further discussed as the main purpose of the paper lies elsewhere (see The Manifesto Project Database, 2011).
Delimitations

A possible angel for this paper could have been to also approach the problem with a sector specific trade and migration preferences analysis, but due to the limited space and the difficulty of establishing voters occupations and party affiliation, such an endeavor will have to be postponed and the emphasize will instead be put on capital and labor. Furthermore, in the debate on labor migration, there is a considerable emphasis on the effects of skilled versus unskilled labor immigration which also applies to the Scandinavian countries to a very large extent. Even if such an approach most certainly would have been both relevant and valuable, I have chosen not to approach labor migration from this angle to limit the task and to be able to go deeper in one area.

Hypothesis

From this theoretical backdrop, the following hypothesis can be derived regarding opinions on labor immigration in the advanced Scandinavian countries:

- Parties and representatives connected to labor movements and interests (such as social democratic and left wing parties connected to labor unions) should express a more conservative view on labor immigration, as this, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, poses a threat to those voters.\(^2\)

- Parties and representatives connected to industry and business (such as liberals and right wing parties connected to business federations and organizations) should rather be in favor of labor immigration, as this, in accordance with the model, will lower the price of labor and thereby lower the cost of production.\(^3\)

For the remainder of the paper, the study will make the following three assumptions, briefly discussed above, in order to be able to go through with the analysis: 1) political representatives do represent their voters, 2) class and occupational voting still occurs to the extent that the factor endowments model will constitute a valid approach and 3) there is sufficient evidence for the correctness of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in terms of implications on policy preferences to apply it to the parliamentary debates (the Mayda-Rodrik paper supports the last two assumptions to some extent).

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\(^2\) This assumes that the majority of these voters can be categorized as unskilled labor. Naturally, party affiliation depends on more than identification with skilled or unskilled labor (see for instance http://www.scb.se/statistik/_publikationer/ME0201_1956I02_BR_ME09ST0402.pdf p.15), but to due to the limited space of this paper and for the sake of being able to investigate the hypothesis, some (rather far-reaching) simplifications and assumptions will have to be made.

\(^3\) For both parts of the hypothesis, the connection between voter interests and political parliamentary representation will be somewhat arbitrary as voters are not a homogenous crowd; for instance, business owners might very well vote for social democratic parties and workers might affiliate themselves with conservatives. Some generalizations will therefore be made when placing the parties on a political left-right axis.
Methodological considerations

General considerations

In order to arrive at possible conclusions to the posed research question and to investigate the hypothesis, a content analysis has been found best suited with respect to the topic and the aim at hand, i.e. identifying, coding, categorizing and counting arguments regarding labor immigration in the Scandinavian parliaments. Krippendorff's definition of the method is applicable to the study: "Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context." (Krippendorff 1980, p. 21). For the purpose parliamentary debates will be used as primary sources, and the arguments will be coded to make a comparison between the countries possible. Both quantitative and qualitative features will be used: the former to demonstrate the distribution and frequency of different types of arguments, and the latter for the necessary task of interpreting which of the three main categories (discussed in further detail below) each argument belong to. Thus, definitions of content analysis that focus strictly on manifest content are rejected (Wilkinson, 2011; Boréus & Bergström, 2005; Krippendorff 1980, pp. 21-24).

All in all, the primary sources amounts to around 70 000 words and the study is rather limited, which means a detailed analysis (as to particular words and sentences) of the content will be left out. The emphasis will instead be put on identifying full arguments in the debates, which means that a simple word count will not be satisfactory. Furthermore, a plain search for words such as "labor immigration" might cause distortions to the result, as the theme can be referred to without using particular terms, and thus an amount of interpretation is both justified and useful to the analysis. Not only explicit arguments will be included, but in some cases also the absence of arguments (accounted for in the Coding scheme and the Empirical findings and analysis sections), which means that rather a great deal of interpretation needs to be made.

Methodological approach

According to Bergström and Boréus (2005), it should be assessed whether analytical frameworks such as a coding scheme is in fact a preconstructed model, or if it rather should be seen as a result of the study, in which case it is not an analytical tool (Bergström & Boréus, 2005).

For this particular investigation, initially an inductive approach has been used. By briefing the primary sources before trying to establish categories and codes, the chances of missing out on nuances are somewhat diminished. This first reading gives a general impression of the content and allows for a lose initial labeling of the arguments. A coding scheme is then derived and constructed from both the theory discussed in the previous section, and in accordance with the notes from the initial briefing of the material. Clearly, refining the categories further is always a possibility when working with a diverse primary material, and to ensure that the criteria for exclusive and exhaustive categories has been met to the greatest extent possible, the process has been repeated several times (Boréus & Bergström, 2005; Rapley, 2011; Stemler, 2001; Patton 2002, pp. 453-454).
Possible credibility problems with the methodological choices

The act of interpreting naturally comes with some reliability problems. Clearly, every researcher has some knowledge and ideas about the state of things and in this case of politics; views are influenced by upbringing and surroundings, by interests, by media etc. When interpretation occurs, I have tried at my best ability to be thorough in my reading and to provide some examples for the way in which the interpretation has been made. In an attempt to counterbalance reliability problems, the analytical tool used (i.e. the coding scheme) has been equipped with three main categories and several sub-codes, some of them with extensive examples of arguments, to provide for both better inter-subjectivity and to try to eliminate some of my own preconceptions when coding (Boréus & Bergström, 2005; Patton 2002, p. 93). Examples of how codes have been derived and coding has been made/arguments have been interpreted are found in the section General coding instructions below.

With regard to the research question posed, assumptions discussed in the theory section and the chosen primary sources, validity should not present a pressing issue; it seems reasonable to expect rather straightforward party opinions on labor immigration in debates held on the matter. However, since there is an element of interpretation in the study, the use of triangulation would effectively increase its validity. By employing for instance an ideology analysis, as the paper assumes that certain parties have certain factor interests, or using another coder or some other material like actual policy outcomes or votings, results could be cross examined. Again, due to the limitations of the paper, such measures will not be taken, but they may be future prospects (della Porta 2008; Patton 2003, pp. 247-248; Boréus & Bergström, 2005).

Material selection and delimitations

Parliamentary debates have been chosen as primary sources to try to establish party opinions on labor immigration. Apart from the posed question and the prepared answer, most of the discussants contributions are not prepared or adjusted, the speaker controls the amount of time each discussant is given and the researcher has not been able to interfere in or influence the production of the material. The debating situation may also put pressure on discussants to reveal or acknowledge more than their usual arguments. Thus, using debates rather than for instance party platforms seems a more straightforward approach if one is trying to access a wide spectrum of arguments. However, because the debates are governmental official documents, one might give them more weight and credibility than they deserve, if one forgets that the discussants (even if they express a presumed opinion of their party) are also private individuals with views of their own. Furthermore, the material is produced in a political setting (the parliament) with certain social structures, and one could expect there to be an amount of not just rhetorical twists but also attempts to portray a certain image to the public of both the party and the private individual (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011). With this in mind, the material should still provide a sufficient basis for some initial research with regard to trends in opinions.

Obviously, parliamentary debates across countries naturally do not occur at the same point of time, with the same number of participants or parties, or on the same topics. Hence, the difficulty of finding accurately matching primary sources is pressing. Due to these facts,
and to varying lengths in the parliamentary debates, an uneven number of debates has been chosen (three Swedish, three Norwegian and one Danish) to, in terms of the number of words, provide a somewhat more equal basis for a cross country analysis. However, there are significant differences in party appearances, both in terms of presence in each debate and in number of contributions to each debate. This fact will be considered in the analysis to avoid faulty inferences.

The selection of the material has been made by searching for transcripted debates between the years 2000 – 2011 on the respective parliaments' websites, using the keywords "labor immigration". Each document has then been searched for key words before use, to make sure the topic occurs to some relevant extent. The following debates are analyzed (themes have been freely derived from the debates by the author):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpellation 2004/04:426 Scarc resources on the Swedish labor market. Socialdemokraterna (S), Moderaterna (M) and Centerpartiet (C).</td>
<td>Stortinget 29.04.2002 Sak nr. 9 The labor reserve and companies facing recruiting difficulties. Arbeiderpartiet (Ap), Høyre (H), Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) and Senterpartiet (Sp).</td>
<td>F 32 Folketinget 28.03.2006 The international competition for highly qualified labor. Venstre (V), Dansk Folkeparti (DF), Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF), Socialdemokratiet (S), Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF), Radikale Venstre (RV) and Enhedslisten (EL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpellation 2010/11:52 Regulations and controls regarding labor immigration. Moderaterna (M), Sverigedemokraterna (SD) and Centerpartiet (C).</td>
<td>Stortinget 19.12.2005 Sak nr. 13 Scarc labor resources and increasing competition for skilled labor. Arbeiderpartiet (Ap), Fremskrittpartiet (FrP), Høyre (H), Socialistisk Venstreparti (SV), Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF), Senterpartiet (Sp) and Venstre (V).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpellation 2010/11:111 Measures for a well-functioning labor immigration. Moderaterna (M) and Socialdemokraterna (S). Question posed by (S) to (M).</td>
<td>Stortinget 08.05.2007 Sak nr. 4 Tax reliefs as means for increasing the incentives to engage in work. Arbeiderpartiet (Ap), Fremskrittpartiet (FrP), Høyre (H), Socialistisk Venstreparti (SV), Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) and Venstre (V).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from two debates (Stortinget 2002 and 2007), all of them covers labor immigration directly. Finding sufficient material has proven more difficult than expected, which justifies including these exceptions as they express several views on labor immigration and thus extend the material. As for the other countries, not all parties are present in the Swedish debates (Folkpartiet, Miljöpartiet, Kristdemokraterna and Vänsterpartiet are absent), and the Danish debate contains a much larger number of sampling units, and thus a larger number of arguments. In comparison to the other countries' debates, it may then be easier to draw inferences upon this material. However, as the purpose of the paper is to
try to identify patterns in opinions on a right-left axis, this should hopefully not be of any major concern.

Ideally, enough material to provide a larger and equal number of arguments regarding labor immigration from each party, and during a shorter period of time, would have been preferred, however, this has proved rather difficult. This being said, the primary sources should still give some indications on trends in relation to the theory discussed.

Construction of coding scheme

The following section is inspired by the coding scheme on content analysis partly described in Bergström & Boréus (2005, pp. 58-65). The coding is done manually to try and capture full arguments (as discussed under Methodological considerations).

With respect to the hypothesis of this paper and for a more fruitful final comparison, three main categories are used: **Pro** (Pro labor immigration), **Res** (Pro restrictions on labor immigration) and **Ag** (Against labor immigration/refutations of pro arguments).

However, I will give account for a larger number of arguments to show the nuances in the debates and to give an idea on how interpretations on final categories have been made. Furthermore, a larger number of arguments should make the coding more feasible in terms of trying to eliminate possible preconceptions on party opinions, and they can also provide information on how and in what areas the countries' opinions differ, if they do. Of course, choosing to divide the three main categories into several separate codes will produce a larger number of hits for each document, but the benefits discussed above should justify this. To ensure greater replicability, I have found it necessary to include a large number of varieties of the argument in codes Pro 2 and Ag 2.

Derived from the theoretical discussion, some general themes on labor immigration can be expected:

- Labor immigration is wanted and needed to secure enough labor supply for companies
- Labor immigration should not occur or occur under restriction, as it might lower native workers' wages and their possibility of finding work
- Labor immigration is desirable in terms of increasing poor peoples' and developing countries' chances of income and welfare

As mentioned, these themes and the findings from the initial briefing of the primary sources have been combined to construct codes and coding instructions. The origin of the arguments is not accounted for per country as a final comparison of the analysis will show the distribution.

Varieties of arguments belonging to the same code (expressing the same intent) but with slightly different wordings are separated by a "/". This interpretation has been made with care to avoid skewness in the result. The distinction between Pro, Res and Ag categories should be apparent when coding and keywords are emphasized in italic to mark main
themes. When it comes to the separate codes, admittedly there may be some overlapping regarding the criteria for exclusive and exhaustive categories. For instance, Pro 1, 2 and 3 all have to do with scarce labor affecting the economy negatively, but their reasons for increasing labor immigration differ somewhat, hence the decision to create separate codes. Again, the initial arguments (separate codes) should be viewed as complementary information, and as for finding trends in political party opinions (such as for or against labor immigration), these possible errors might be overlooked without any great impact on the final result. One unclear case has called for specific coding instructions/interpretations, created by repeatedly testing the constructed categories/codes against the primary sources (Boréus & Bergström, 2005). The instructions/interpretations are labeled “Note by author:” in the coding scheme.

**General coding instructions**

Each single contribution (i.e. every time a discussant speaks/is given the floor) is counted as one sampling unit (Krippendorff 1980, pp. 57-60). To eliminate some reliability problems as in regard to interpreting the arguments and number of occurrences, and furthermore which words, sentences or paragraphs that should be counted, the following procedure should be taken. If one and the same argument (i.e. the same code) occurs several times within the sampling unit, it is marked down only once. If different arguments (i.e. different codes) occurs within the same sampling unit, all of them should be marked down, but each of them only once. This means that a main category (Pro, Res or Ag) may be counted several times in each sampling unit, however, as the initial arguments differ, I have chosen to include them as the frequency might give an idea of how important a particular standpoint is to the party in question.

Arguments claimed by one party to be the opinion of another party are not to be counted, as this will bring systematic measurement errors to the result (Pollock 2009, p. 15). Where discussants are interrupted and the sampling unit has been broken up in two parts, this is still counted as only one sampling unit.

The following examples should provide some insights on how interpretations have been conducted and codes have been applied (translations by author and allotted code in bold at the end of each paragraph):

”(---) strategically, it is a mistake to refer to a set of rather complicated rules and agreements and claim that we mustn't allow for social dumping and shouldn't accept companies and labor on other terms than the traditional ones we've had in Sweden the past decades.” - Anders G Högmark (M), Anf. 65, Interpellation 2004/05:426 **PRO 2**

“(---) the Globalization Committee suggests (---) a green card, which I also support, but we need to establish the framework for this possibility. We need to discuss how to create a sensible balance to avoid such a possibility from being exploited.” - Henriette Kjær (KF), Nr. 91, F 32 Folketinget 28.03.2006 **RES 2**

”To access more workers than we do today, we need to a greater extent use the labor we have, and we need to employ the spare resources that undoubtedly exist.” - Ivar Østberg (KrF), 29.04.2002 Sak nr. 9 **AG 2**
The debate questions in the Swedish debates are included in the analyzed material, however not the short introduction in the Norwegian and Danish debates, as these are summaries of the debate topic. In some cases, discussants use quotations from reports and investigations. When apparent, these have been interpreted (and thus coded) as the discussants’ view as they are being brought up to make a case.

Coding scheme

General themes of the arguments serve as headlines for easier coding.

PRO LABOR IMMIGRATION

Economy, growth, welfare.

**Pro 1** Increasing *dependency ratio* and sustainable future welfare services require labor immigration

**Pro 2** *Labor is scarce* (competition for labor is increasing) / *labor immigration is necessary for economic growth* / labor immigration will contribute to *higher employment* and *economic development* / labor immigrants have contributed to the present *welfare* / labor immigration contributes to a *flexible workforce* / *protectionism* and regulations will *cause economic slowdown* and higher unemployment (regulations must adapt to European standards) / *selective labor immigration* is positive for the economy, growth and welfare (efforts should be made to attract skilled labor and objective criteria for attracting the right people should be set up) / highly qualified labor will increase general employment rates

**Pro 3** *Bottlenecks* on the labor market can be adjusted through labor immigration / *scarce labor supply* might cause companies to move abroad if they cannot hire enough people

**Pro 4** Labor immigration will *increase trade with the sending countries*

**Pro 5** From a socio-economic view, labor *immigrants are cheaper to employ* than natives because their education has already been paid for

**Pro 6** *Exchange of labor* between countries *creates useful networks* and a vital workforce

**Humanitarian reasons.**

**Pro 7** *Labor sending countries also benefit* when labor migrants transfer money to their home countries

**Pro 8** *Labor migration is a matter of basic human freedom* / anyone, skilled or unskilled, who wishes to move to improve their welfare should be allowed
PRO RESTRICTIONS ON LABOR IMMIGRATION

Regulations, social and wage dumping.

Res 1 Social and wage dumping must be addressed / workers are concerned about labor immigration as a threat to collective bargaining agreements

Res 2 Poor regulations leads to exploitation of immigrant workers and employers cheating the system / poor regulations on labor immigration are abused and serious businesses are being pushed out of the market / lack of governmental controls and reviews on labor immigration encourage scoundrels to take advantage of both labor and the system

AGAINST LABOR IMMIGRATION (REFUTATIONS OF PRO ARGUMENTS)

Economy, growth, welfare, employment/unemployment.

Ag 1 Labor immigration as means for securing the future welfare state is futile, since the amount of people depending on those services will increase / immigrants cost money

Ag 2 Labor is not scarce / employers identify the need for labor, which leads to exaggerations of shortage and wage dumping / the need for labor (immigration) is not pressing, as a deficit of labor in some areas will be covered by a surplus in others (health care, authors remark) / initially, unused labor resources should be employed / labor scarcity can be adjusted through other measures, such as active labor market programs, education, changes in laws and regulations to keep workers from burning out, raising the pension age etc. / the need for future labor immigration depends on how well the current labor resources are used / jobs needed by natives are consumed by (unskilled) labor immigrants / labor immigration will cause unemployment / efforts should be made to find employment for regular immigrants already living in the country.

Note by author: The posed debate question in “Stortinget Sak nr. 13” suggests labor immigration as one of five solutions to labor scarcity. However, since reflections on labor immigration are absent in several of the other debating parties' statements and other types of solutions are suggested, these particular arguments have been interpreted as being against labor immigration. As a code for absent arguments, Ag 2 has been used with care in other cases, i.e. only applied when it appears to stand in direct opposition to labor immigration.

Humanitarian reasons.

Ag 3 Brain draining developing or poorer countries of their skilled labor to improve our welfare is not acceptable
Empirical findings and analysis

Even if the primary sources amounts to some 70 000 words, the results from the analysis displays a total of only 217 coded arguments on labor immigration, distributed unevenly between both the countries and the parties. Summed up, the Swedish debates have a total of 66 arguments, the Norwegian a total of 29 and the Danish 122 arguments. This means that inferences must be made with care, in particular in the Norwegian and Swedish case, but patterns appearing in the material could give some hints for further research.

For greater clarity, I will account for each country in turn (however not the separate debates) and then come back to a comparison. Parties in all figures below are arranged according to the Rile score (-100 expressing the extreme left and 100 the extreme right), with the most left wing parties on the left side and the most right wing parties on the right side of the x-axis.

As for the Rile scores, it is likely that the numbers would correspond more or less accurately with the parties actual positions depending on the issue at hand (in this case labor immigration), as the score is derived from a formula considering a diverse set of factors, but they still provide some basic information on parties' positions (The Manifesto Project Database, 2011). For this reason, the scores are not included in the figures but only mentioned in the text, where they are written in whole numbers. Descriptions and/or labels on parties have been adapted from the European Election Database (2011).

Please see Appendix for tables of complete empirical findings.

Sweden

As for the Swedish findings, it should first of all be noted that Moderaterna (M) are present in all three debates, whereas Socialdemokraterna (S) and Centerpartiet (C) appears in two respectively, and Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in only one. This is reflected in the total number of coded arguments: (M) contributes with a total of 33, (S) with 14, (C) 10 and (SD) with 9. For Sweden as a whole, a percentaged distribution of the total findings (arguments) will thus give misleading impressions of the country trend, and will therefore not be considered in the Norwegian and Danish cases either. However, looking at the separate parties with regard to the main categories gives the following percentages: (S) Pro 29% and Res 71%, (C) Pro 80% and Res 20%, (M) Pro 64% and Res 36%, (SD) Res 44% and Ag 56% (figure 1).
As for the distribution of Pro arguments, there is a clear dominance in the two center most parties, social liberal (C) and right wing (M), scoring -3 and 3 respectively on the Rile score, whereas (S), a traditional labor party at -28 on the Rile score, displays a considerable majority of Res arguments, findings in line with the predictions of the hypothesis. As for the nationalist (SD), scoring 16 on the Rile score, there is almost a 50/50 distribution of Res and Ag arguments. Being the most right wing party but not expressing pro-views on labor immigration, a plausible explanation to these findings could be nationalistic values and identities causing a more protectionist view on the matter (as the Mayda-Rodrik paper shows). Notably, in more than 1/3 of the arguments (M) also expresses restrictive opinions on labor immigration, which may be an example of political unity in the Swedish parliament.

Looking at the individual arguments (codes) in the total Swedish findings, Pro 2 occurs 18 times, suggesting that scarce labor resources, growth and economic development are core issues. Res 1 occurs 17 times, indicating that wage and social dumping, alongside with collective bargaining agreements, also are a main concern. Res 2 appears 11 times, expressing some concern for poor regulations and exploitation of labor. Note that for all of the above mentioned individual codes, (M) contributes with the majority and the result may therefore not be representative for the parliament as a whole. As for the rest of the individual codes, the findings are too small to be of any substantial use in the analysis.

All Rile scores for the Swedish parties is an average between the 2006 and 2010 scores, except for (SD) which only made it into parliament in 2010 (The Manifesto Project Database, 2011).
Norway

In the Norwegian debates the number of coded arguments is even smaller and adds up to a total of 29. Once more, not all parties are present in all of the debates. Arbeiderpartiet (Ap), Høyre (H) and Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) occur in all of them, whereas Socialistisk Venstreparti (SV), Senterpartiet (Sp), Venstre (V) and Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) participate in two each. (Ap) and (H) dominate the number of contributions with 10 respectively 7 arguments each, (SV), (KrF) and (V) contribute with 3 each, FrP with 2 and (Sp) with only one. Rather than to draw incorrect inferences upon a limited material, I will only discuss the main findings from (Ap) and (H), possibly justified by the fact that the two parties represent opposite sides of the left-right axis. However, I will account for all of them: (SV) Pro 34%, Res 33% and Ag 33%, (Ap) Pro 30%, Res 20% and Ag 50%, (Sp) Ag 100%, (KrF) Pro 33% and Ag 67%, (V) Pro 100%, (H) Pro 86% and Res 14%, (FrP) Ag 100% (figure 2).

Again, the Pro arguments clearly dominate the right wing party (H), positioned at 10 on the Rile score, which corresponds with the hypothesis. As for the labor party (Ap) at -38 on the rile score, the Ag arguments make up half of the total number. Together with the Res arguments, these findings are also in line with the hypothesis, suggesting that traditional labor parties are likely to express more restrictive opinions on labor immigration.

As for individual codes, Ag 2 amounts to a total of 12, indicating that parties find labor scarcity to be exaggerated or that it can be adjusted through other means. However, as noted in the Coding scheme, the debate question in “Stortinget Sak nr. 13” suggests labor immigration as one of five solutions to labor scarcity, and when reflections on labor immigration have been absent in the other parties responses, this has been interpreted as being against labor immigration, possibly resulting in an excess of those codes.

![Figure 2: Norway Political parties on a left-right axis](image)
Pro 2 occurs a total of 10 times, again indicating concerns for failing growth and economic development due to scarce labor resources.

Only one of the debates deals with labor immigration directly, which might explain the very limited findings. That being said, the findings would have been even smaller without including the two other debates. Another possible explanation for the lack of arguments (considering that the Norwegian material in number of words is nearly twice as large as the Swedish and that all debates to some extent still do deal with the topic) could be that out of the three, Norway is the country with the most labor immigration in the past decade. Although admittedly there are other forms of official parliamentary documents regarding the topic, perhaps the difficulty of finding whole debates on the matter, and the fact that arguments are scarce, reflect that the issue is not quite as pressing as in the other countries, possibly because Norway has grown accustomed to labor immigration.

Rile scores have been adapted from The European Election Database (year -01), 2011, since figures for Norway are missing on the Manifesto Project Database website.

**Denmark**

As for the Danish case, the findings amount to a somewhat larger number, a total of 122. Furthermore, the coded arguments are all drawn from the same debate which means that the parties have participated on even terms. However, it should be noted that the Danish debate (The international competition for highly qualified labor) have a strong focus on skilled/highly qualified labor and not many parties object to this type of labor immigration. Consequently, many of the arguments have been coded Pro 2, which skews the result towards an ostensible liberal labor immigration policy. To what extent these findings actually correspond with reality may be discussed.

An initial account with both total amount and distribution for each party in turn gives the following numbers: Enhedslisten (EL) Tot 12, Pro 58%, Res 17% and Ag 25%, Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) Tot 16, Pro 81%, Res 6% and Ag 13%, Socialdemokratiet (S) Tot 10, Pro 60%, Res 30% and Ag 10%, Venstre (V) Tot 21, Pro 71%, Res 19% and Ag 10%, Radikale Venstre (RV) Tot 32, Pro 91%, Res 6% and Ag 3%, Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF) Tot 20, Pro 50%, Res 20% and Ag 30%, Dansk Folkeparti (DF) Tot 11, Pro 18% and Ag 82% (figure 3).
As mentioned, there is an excess of Pro arguments, and all parties except (DF) display an absolute majority of Pro arguments. The Pro arguments amount to a total of 82 (of which 66 are Pro 2) and thus constitute approximately 67% of the total arguments. To further discuss these findings as a whole will be rather futile with regard to the hypothesis, and I will instead look at Res and Ag arguments to try to establish any connection. Of course, a larger percentage of pro arguments will decrease the other arguments' percentage with the same amount, but the two remaining categories may give some indications on labor immigration policy preferences.

At the most right hand side of the axis, the populist and nationalistic right wing party (DF), placed at 39 on the Rile score, displays a notable majority of Ag arguments. Again, positioned at the very right, these findings are likely to be explained by strong nationalistic values rather than as an anomaly in a factor interest analysis. Next in line is the traditional conservative party (KF), at 13 on the Rile score, surprisingly expressing a total of 50% Res and Ag arguments, which contradicts the hypothesis to some extent. Partly, these findings may have to do with the coalition between (DF), (KF) and (V). On the opposite side at the very left, the communist party (EL) with a Rile score of -43 presents a notable percentage of combined Res and Ag arguments, which seems to be in line with the predictions of the hypothesis, but it should be noted that the total amount of (EL) Res and Ag arguments are only 5, and that the main part of these express opinions against brain draining and selective skilled labor import, rather than concerns for social and wage dumping. Thus, (EL) deviates from the predictions.

As for the three parties in the middle, the popular socialist (SF), the social democrats (S), the liberal (V) and the social liberal (RV) parties positioned on the Rile score at -40, -37, -2 and 0 respectively, they display rather insignificant differences. Most notably, the (SF) arguments against labor immigration come down to an opposition against brain draining in line with the (EL) arguments, and thus also deviate from the predictions of the hypothesis as protection of national labor is not their main concern. On the other hand, the (S) Res arguments express concerns for wage and social dumping which then corresponds with the predictions. (RV) displays almost only Pro arguments, which seems to correlate to its position on the Rile score, even if the label of the party reads social liberal.
Admittedly, the possibility of making inferences from the Danish material are somewhat diminished because of the focus on skilled labor in the debate, but it can be stated that most parties in the Danish parliament in the studied material are in favor of skilled labor immigration.


Summary and comparison of the empirical findings

As discussed in the previous sections, the primary sources have produced an uneven number of coded arguments, making a comparison between countries somewhat difficult. However, some similarities can be discerned. For instance, the Swedish most right wing party (SD) and its Danish counterpart (DF) both display a majority of Ag arguments, which in both cases are likely to express nationalist protectionist values rather than anomalies to a general pattern predicted by the hypothesis.

Out of the more thoroughly discussed parties under each country's findings, the Swedish and the Norwegian labor parties (S) and (Ap) show similar patterns when Res and Ag are combined, with some 70% of the arguments being against labor immigration/refuting pro arguments or in favor of restricted labor immigration. This seems to be in line with the policy predictions of both the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the hypothesis of this paper, but again, such inferences could be misleading due to the limited material. There are also similarities between the countries' right wing parties (M) and (H) displaying a majority of Pro labor immigration arguments, but even more so between (H) and the Swedish social liberal party (C), which doesn't perfectly correspond with the Swedish parties' positions on the Rile score and with the predicted pattern. The Norwegian findings also display a wider polarization between the largest labor and conservative/right parties (excluding the second largest party Fremskrittspartiet, only accounted for in the initial findings section due to the limited number of arguments) than what is found in the Swedish parliament.

As for a comparison between all three countries, the excess of Pro 2 arguments due to the debate topic in the Danish material will produce an inadequate impression. However, the total Res and Ag arguments expressed by the Danish social democrats (S) indicate a resemblance to the Swedish and Norwegian labor parties, suggesting that factor interests do play a part in party opinions on labor immigration.

Finally, to see if a trend in opinions on a political left-right axis can be discerned, the parties have been placed on the same axis according to their given Rile score. The Norwegian parties (SV), (Sp), (KrF), (V) and (FrP) have been excluded since those very limited findings will distort the result and thus produce an incorrect trend. This being said, the remaining results are also limited and should be read with some reservations (figure 4).
Starting with the most striking observation, the pro arguments dominate the figure, which to a large part can be explained by the Danish findings and the code Pro 2 (as previously discussed). Even so, three out of five parties ranging from (C) to (H) and between -3 to 10 on the Rile score (and thus mainly alleged right wing parties) are not Danish, and display a clear pattern: the number of hits on Res and Ag arguments are significantly lower than the Pro arguments. Thus, there seems to be some evidence for a connection between pro labor immigration arguments and parties traditionally related to capital factor interests.

As for the three traditional labor parties (Ap), the Danish (S) and the Swedish (S) between -38 and -28 on the Rile score, the trend is somewhat more blurry, but displaying a larger amount of Res and Ag arguments than their right wing neighbors. Regarding Pro arguments for these parties, the Pro curve peaks at the Danish (S) which again seems to be explained by the Pro 2 code. These findings indicate some support for the hypothesis, but should be interpreted with care.

The sharp Ag curve at the right most part of the figure displays the nationalistic parties’ distribution of arguments, (SD) and (DF) at Rile score 16 and 39 respectively. Again, these findings are likely to be the result of strong national values and identities rather than an anomaly to the expected pattern. With this in mind, the connection with the Rile score seems to be accurate as well, as (SD) at a much lower score than (DF) not only express pure Ag arguments, but also almost an equal number of Res arguments.

Finally, the two parties at the most left hand side of the axis, (EL) and (SF) at -43 and -40 respectively on the Rile score, display a result almost in line with the five right wing parties initially discussed. This clearly contradicts the hypothesis. In the (SF) case, it seems to be the result of the Pro 2 code, whereas in the (EL) case, free exchanges of labor and general humanitarian/freedom reasons seem to be decisive for the large amount of Pro arguments.
As for the number of individual codes, a comparison is of little use since the parties appear on such uneven terms, but some of the main findings have been accounted for under each country's section.

Concluding remarks

In most countries, not many political parties are likely to be in favor of a completely unrestricted labor immigration (except perhaps libertarian ones, which in any case are not represented in the primary sources), and in western/northern democracies few are likely to completely oppose labor immigration because of its great impact on economic development and growth, both in the present and past. The findings of the study reflect this, and where a certain type of argument (Pro, Res or Ag) amounts a full 100% within one party, this is the result of limited material rather than extreme opinions.

So to what extent do political parties in the Scandinavian parliaments express opinions on labor immigration in line with the policy preferences predicted by the Stolper-Samuleson theorem? The study indicates some support for the hypothesis derived from the theorem, suggesting that Scandinavian parties traditionally connected to labor interests and unions are more likely to express concerns for wage and social dumping and opinions on a more restrictive labor immigration, than parties further to the right. Conversely, Scandinavian parties (except perhaps the Danish Det Konsevative Folkeparti) traditionally connected to businesses and market interests are in general more likely to express less restrictive opinions on labor immigration. However, there are some deviations at the very left, and at the most right end of the political left-right axis, nationalistic parties tend to oppose or express restrictive views on labor immigration (perhaps for rather obvious reasons), which can be explained by strong national values and identities. In general though, perfectly clear trends are absent, which may be explained by some amount of unity on the matter in the Scandinavian parliaments. All in all, there seems to be some evidence for the actual occurrence of labor immigration policy preferences as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, the material is too small to draw any conclusions from, but the findings do set out some suggestions for future research.

Admittedly, a larger (and more condensed) material would have been preferred, as well as a more refined method (in combination with the chosen one) for identifying the arguments, such as an argumentation analysis. This being said, the content analysis has served its purpose, although preferably, it should have been applied to a more extensive material. As for the coding scheme and the Danish debate on skilled labor, an option would have been to create a separate code for support of skilled/highly qualified labor. However, to label this code Pro would have produced the same final result, and to label it Res would have caused the same distortions to the findings but in a different category. Furthermore, being in favor of skilled labor immigration is not equivalent to being in favor of restrictive labor immigration, thus making the Pro label a more obvious choice.

As for a cross country comparison, it is difficult to make inferences about opinions on general labor immigration in the Scandinavian parliaments as the Danish debate concerns skilled labor, however, it seems relatively clear that most Scandinavian parties at least are in favor of skilled labor immigration. Whether the varying number of labor immigrants entering the countries in the past decade has to do with policy preferences, is difficult to
say on the basis of these findings. The higher wages in Norway may attract more labor immigrants (Lundborg, 2010), and an alleged bad Danish reputation as a xenophobic nation, as some of the representatives in the debate repeatedly bring up, may discourage labor immigrants to choose Denmark.

In advanced countries such as the Scandinavian ones, it is clear that the theme attracts a central position in the debate on labor market issues and scarce labor resources, which makes the topic even more important with regard to both the social, economic and political climate. Unsubstantiated arguments may have undesirable implications on both economy and social attitudes as they settle in public opinion. Making political decisions on the belief that labor immigration is harmful to the existing work force and to regulations regarding lower limit for acceptable pay, working conditions, safety regulations etc., when in fact it is essential to increase aggregated demand, public finances and general welfare, will have negative effects on the economy as a whole. Furthermore, the argument itself could affect attitudes towards immigrants in a negative way, and its practical implications (i.e. causing negative effects on the economy) might increase these attitudes in times of hardship.

However, making political decisions on the belief that labor immigration is crucial to economic growth when it is in fact superfluous or could be dealt with through other strategies, might lead to strains on public finances and possibly to expenditures rather than revenues, which in turn might create even more xenophobia. Thus, to foster an understanding of the origin of opinions on labor immigration might prove essential to both the future economic conditions of the country as well as the social attitudes towards immigrants.
References


26


Primary sources


Appendix

Provided below are the complete findings from the analysis.

Sweden

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