Climate Change and Freedom

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“...He now acquires a little understanding of life, he learns to copy others, how they manage their lives - and he now proceeds to live the same way. In Christendom he is also a Christian, goes to church every Sunday, listens to and understands the pastor, indeed, they have the mutual understanding; he dies, the pastor ushers him into eternity for some dollars - but a self he was not, and a self he did not become. This form of despair is: in despair not to will to be oneself”

Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death

Abstract:
This paper examines the relation between climate change discourse and freedom which is held both as a self-evident value and a vital attribute for modern democracy. I argue that the discourse refutes individual freedom. It does so both through the goals and ends it promotes as well as the solutions it puts forward to achieve them, in other words through means, in the areas of economy, rights and political organization which reduce choices and diminish space of action for individuals. It opens the path to authoritarian regimes and the like by disempowering people in the name of natural order. This and other anomalies within the discourse make it the opposite of what it pretends to be - a revolutionary one; at least, unless it solves the question of freedom that resembles human nature.
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We are today living in a civilization of self-endangerment, self-injury and potential self-destruction.

Piet Strydom, Risk, environment and society

I. INTRODUCTION

Climate change discourse maintains that the complex and sensitive process of global warming is a product of, amid many other feedbacks, the ways modern societies are organized. Therefore, the discourse goes on, facing this challenge implies correcting the political system as well. The solutions it offers are at last generally egalitarian in aim, namely they seek more democracy, through establishing more participation, equality etc. However, this paper will argue that climate change discourse is problematic for freedom. The discourse fails to understand freedom as valuable in itself and the crucial role of freedom to modern democracy. By refuting freedom, it eventually establishes the pathway for traditionalizing political systems.

Research Question:
How do the solutions proposed by climate change discourse impact upon freedom?

Definitions

Before I elaborate the concept of freedom in the later stages, due to procedural relevance I state here that by freedom I mean principally “negative freedom” or “freedom from” as an area of freedoms of individuals or groups, starting from political ones, which limits the state and other similar intuitions as well as other individuals to interfere and coerce (see Berlin [1958] 2003).

With democracy, I indicate a political system that involves freedom as described above in addition to all these three other attributes: representation, equality and market economy. Let’s define them one by one more specifically. With representation I meant the idea of the ‘representative government’ elected by the majority of the people to implement its laws and will (see Prezrowski 2010; Mill [1859] 1952). Equality is understood as equality of opportunity, rights and capability (see Jencks and Tach 2005, Sen 2003, Rawls [1971] 1999). Finally, the market economy has democratic aspects in itself like offering choices to people etc. (see Sartori 1987 and Schumpeter 1947) but, in addition to that, I have in mind its conditional role to democracy for it is well argued that for a democracy to work, it needs a well-functioning economy (see Huntington 1993, Zakaria 2003). Despite some variations in the inclusion of all those four attributes, this is what prominent political philosophers understand with liberal democracy when they use this concept - itself a result of modern times, after a long tradition of trial and error. For consistency purposes, from now on, whenever democracy is used it means the above. When used differently, it will be made clear.

On the other hand, with climate change discourse or language, I mean a whole system of thought that tries to explain the multifaceted process of climate change. In doing so writers, who embrace this wave of thinking, criticize some values, beliefs and organizations etc., which were dominant during modernity and propose alternatives so that societies become able to deal with the challenge of climate change. There are of course differences and nuances between the authors. Nor is this thesis insisting that the climate change discourse is a coherent one worldview. Instead, its contribution should be looked at the endeavor to give meaning to the trends and bits of the climate change discourse texts. Every reading is normally also a creation. As such, in
terms of political organization, which is the key area of interest here, generally saying, the authors in the climate change discourse promote “communalism” meaning briefly equality in organization, leadership responsibility, distribution of production etc. I have decided to apply the term ‘climate change discourse’ because notions like ‘green ideology’ or ‘human ecology’ seemed to be less comprehensive or limited (see Naess 2008: 143-149). I use the following writers as a sample of those who share the principle arguments of this discourse: Ernest Schumacher, Daniel Quinn, Andri Snaer Magnason, Nico Stehr, David Korten, Garret Hardin, Arjun Makhijani, Neil Evernden, Alexander Gillespie, Wolfgang Sachs, Ernest Callenbach, Carl-Henric Grenholm, Normundus Kamergrauzis, Carolyn Merchant, J.C.Smuts, Fritjof Chapra, Robert D.Kaplan, Thomas-Homer Dixon, Anthony Giddens, Jared Diamond, James Lovelock, Piet Strydom, Arne Naess, Aldo Leopold as well as radical thinkers like Susan George, Naom Chomsky, David Harvey, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. The choice is arbitrary and of course the reading is eventually subjective. Very likely many of them would not agree with some of the arguments of each-other and they come from different fields. Occasionally, I use other texts as well, like UN and national governments policy documents, speeches, movies etc. These arguments will be discussed continually in the body of the paper.

**Argument**

This thesis argues that climate change language has negative implications for freedom. At a first level, its solutions for areas of rights, political organization and economy do indirectly rebut freedom by eliminating some basic rights that protect and ensure individual freedom, centralizing power and weakening the economy. This is extensively elaborated in chapter V and it is there where the crucial insight of this thesis lies. Secondly, the discourse is characterized by some important contradictions such as: [1] it criticizes rationality but then itself offers a ‘rational’ plan on how people can live in ‘harmony’ with nature; [2] it sees religious narratives as ignorantly refused by the people but itself takes the role of being godlike by interpreting the natural rule; [3] it aims for egalitarian and participatory democratic ideals but ultimately leads to inegalitarian and power concentrated results. Thirdly, by not acknowledging freedom and sometimes treating individual freedom even as a sickness (see Korten 2007), it downgrades people. By pretending to tell people what is the desired lifestyle and their ends, it takes a paternalistic role and crashes pluralism, spontaneity and other human capabilities. As such, it opens the way for traditionalizing political systems like totalitarianism, tyranny etc. To the contrary, freedom, according to many political philosophers, is basic for modern democracy and valuable in itself as well as a basic good (Berlin 1978; Rawls 1999). For example, Giovanni Sartori says that “by dismissing freedom, we are simply killing the chicken that lays the eggs” in democracy (Sartori 1987: 392). Many authors in the climate change discourse hold it to be revolutionary, but with its perspective on freedom one comes to see that, in fact, it is much more the contrary.

It would be a mistake to read this argument as a dismissal of the climate change adaptation. It rather is an effort to enrich the discourse so that, instead of destroying some of the fundamental political institutions like freedom, it will find ways to accommodate it turning consequent changes into steps ahead and not drawbacks.

**Organization**

Following the introduction, the method applied in this thesis is presented and there the form and the nature of this paper can be understood. The reader should be aware that this is meant to be a
philosophical normative paper and thus its arguments should be read having in mind its normative perspective. Then, a brief background of the climate change and its relation to democracy and freedom is sketched to give the reader a better position to follow the argument and why it is important. It is followed by a further discussion on freedom and climate change because it is relevant to the argument built in the paper. After that, there is first a discussion of the proposed solutions to issues like rights, economy, political organization etc. The work then discusses whether the change to political system that is promoted by climate change discourse is revolutionary. After it, a case for objections to the argument is discussed to try for neutrality in approach. It is closed with a conclusion.

“Is there life outside discourse...?”
V. Burr, Social Constructionism

II. Method
Texts are a broad notion. They include productions like reading articles, films, paintings, songs, speeches, television programs, interviews, webpages etc. (Burr 2003; Fairclough 2003). N.K. Denzin is quoted in Burr describing texts as having always an “indeterminate, open-ended and interactional” meaning (Burr 2003: 18). This work analyzes, from an external position, a variety of such texts that deal with the climate change.

Texts have effects on ideologies by “inculcating, sustaining or changing them” (Fairclough 2003: 3). Ideologies themselves are representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to “establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation” (Fairclough 2009: 9). Even Language is a sort of an ideology. It consists of ranges of accepted meanings of texts. Linguists and philosophers describe it as something created by the people and always living (Cobley et.al.2006). Thus, for example, what has been understood by Earth centuries ago changed during the modernity.

The extensive climate change adaptation and the vocabulary surrounding it, is shaping ideologies, or language, with which in particular the West is used to understanding democracy. Of course, Hegel says: “The highest point in the development of the people is this - to have gained a conception of its life and condition, to have reduced its laws, its ideas of justice and morality to a science; for in this unity lies the most intimate unity that spirit can attain to in and with itself” (Hegel [1837] 1952: 285). In the present case, this “science” is what we defined as climate change discourse or language. But, one should be careful to bear in mind this input by Friedrich Nietzsche, from On the Genealogy of Morals, where he writes: “Whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it” (Marino et.al. 2004 [Nietzsche 1887]: 166). Some discourse analysis by Michel Foucault dealt exactly with these Nietzsche advises. For example, he argued that “the way people talk about and think about sexuality and mental illness - in other words the way these things are widely represented in society - brings with it implications for the way we treat people” (Burr 2003: 18; See Foucault [1976] 1998). Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu analyzed ‘globalization’, ‘flexibility’, ‘governance’, ‘employability’, ‘exclusion’ etc. in order to see the political project of neoliberalism - which aimed at removing obstacles to the transformation of ‘New Capitalism’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 2001; Fairclough 2003).

So, discourses ‘make it possible for us to see the world in a certain way by producing our knowledge of the world’; ‘its processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, social world, dominations etc’. (Burr 2003: 79; Fairclough 2003: 144).
III. A Climate Change Background

Global warming is central in the Earth’s changing climate course. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, during the second half of the twentieth century temperatures were highest in the last 1300 years. The Panel stressed that the eleven recent years - 1995 to 2006 -- ranked among the twelve warmest years in the record of global surface temperature since 1850 (IPCC 2007: 2). Warming has already caused, and will continue to do so, loss of ice-sheets on polar areas, sea level rise, changes in coastlines in low-lying areas and river basins, frequency in precipitation as well as cold and warm nights and days, droughts etc. The planet’s climate system is highly sensitive and prone to feedbacks in many other ways. In Nagoya (Japan) Biodiversity Summit, held in October 2010, it was claimed that one in five of the 380,000 life forms on earth are close to extinction. IPCC projections suggested a 40-70 percent species extinction if temperature exceeds 3.5 grade Celsius relative to ‘80-’90s.

There are scientists who believe that warming already is in an unstoppable path with major environmental crises looming in no later than a decade from now, which would then quite possibly set an end to the current human civilization (Lovelock 2009). Some are skeptics about the causes. Showing temperature data correlations between ‘50s to early ‘90s, documentary The Great Global Warming Swindle maintained that global warming is caused by sun radiation and not people’s actions. However, IPCC says the warming is mainly increased due to anthropogenic activities, namely increased carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide percentage in the atmosphere chiefly by using fossil fuels for energy and land for agriculture. It further projects an increase of greenhouse gas emissions by 25-90 per cent between 2000 and 2030 ‘with fossil fuels maintaining dominant position in the global energy mix by 2030 and beyond’ (IPCC 2007: 7).

Nowadays fossil fuel based energy is essential to most societies. 80 per cent of the remaining reserves exists in the OPEC countries and is not renewable. There is a wide consensus that the peak oil is already reaching with a collapse threatening societies if there are no alternatives (Dixon 2009; Diamond 2005). On the other hand, climate change is causing basic resource scarcity, tension and even immigration (Giddens 2009; Dixon 1994 and 2006; Smith & Vivekananda 2008). Activists say that all leading economic ideologies during modernity were mistaken because they considered natural recourses infinite. And so was the Enlightenment, because it imagined nature to be in the service of human beings. As Susan George says, ‘the outcome of warfare between two worldviews, the ecological and the economic, will decide nothing less than the future of humanity and indeed whether or not humanity even has a future’ (George 2004: 29).

These issues require planetary measures and in turn they will implicate national egos, worldviews and power sharing. Of it all, according to UN projections, world population will reach 8.5 billion by 2025, with more than 7 billion in developing countries, whereas overall population exceeding 9 billion by 2050. By 2015, according to CITYNET, 23 cities will exceed the population of 10 million with 19 of those cities in the developing countries and 11 in Asia.

Climate Change today unites many fronts that have change as their goal. It is a strong point in the agendas of environmentalist, alter-globalist, local, feminist, conservationist, intellectual and cultural worker, aesthetic, farmer movements etc. No intervention in the warming process could be fatal to human destiny or at least this civilization; and interventions, on the other hand, will modify ways of life and its governance.

Despite all, many are optimists. Ronald D. Kaplan prophesized an incoming age of anarchy, but he also learned this truth in his journeys: ‘Force a challenge upon a human being and
he will rise to the occasion’ (Kaplan 1997). In this line, Hegel wrote centuries ago that ‘Napoleon, in a conversation which he once had with Goethe on the nature of tragedy, expressed the opinion that its modern phase differed from the ancient, through ours no longer recognizing a destiny to which men are absolutely subject and where policy occupies the place of the ancient fate’ (Hegel [1837] 1952: 285). But, is that so? The first danger for a present-day tragedy to civilization obviously appears by the workings of the global warming. Nevertheless, some of the solutions promoted by climate change discourse are themselves problematic for democracy and quality of human life because they take freedom away. Of course, several prominent figures in philosophy would say that rarely what is planned, in these terms (social changes), ends up being the final result, but rather the intention often at last turns to something new in the process (Marino et.al. 2004 [Beauvoir 1949]: 431). However, if a society without freedom (as defined in the introduction) will be the destination, it surely won’t be the ideal Hegel spoke about because this would still be a tragedy. Freedom is a great product of history, a fundamental institution, whose absence would be too costly for human beings and for democracy or for, eventually, a meaningless democracy. An age without freedom would be a return to the dark ages.

“The primary fact of man’s moral life is man’s creation of values”.

H. L. Parsons, Humanism and Marx’s Thought

IV. On Freedom and Climate Change

Few concepts have preoccupied philosophical thought as much as freedom. It is today held to be one of the basic human values. But, what is freedom? During the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes spoke about the freedom of the bodies in motion. “The freedom of man consists in this”, Hobbes said, “that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do” (Hobbes [1651] 1964: 148). Isaiah Berlin agreed with Hobbes, but he further maintained that there is negative and positive freedom. According to him, negative freedom was “freedom from” coercion by the state and similar institutions as well as other individuals, namely the ‘area within which a person or a group should be left to do what he is able to do or be, without others interference’. On the other hand, positive freedom or “freedom to”, which is associated with possibilities, identifies the ‘source of control or interference that can determine someone to do and be this rather than that’ (Berlin 2003: 392). He was chiefly preoccupied to show how the manipulation with the positive freedom in the name of some certain justification -- ‘freedom to lead one prescribed form of life’ -- takes freedom from the individuals, namely by forcing people to act against their explicit will or preference, thus at times turning to ‘a disguise for brutal tyranny’ (Ibid: 399). For Berlin freedom ultimately was only the first one, negative freedom, because only that allows people to be free as opposed to the second conception. As it will be shown here, climate change discourse resembles faithfully and through numerous features the danger for freedom that Berlin precisely warned us from.

Climate discourse is very much shaped by the holism theory. This theory maintains that in ‘nature everything is connected to everything else’, that the ‘whole is greater than the sum of the parts’, that ‘humans and nature are part of the same organic cosmological system’ etc. (see Merchant 1990: 292-293; Smuts 1926). In the famous essay “The Land Ethic”, Aldo Leopold suggested that therefore inherent value should be placed also into soils, waters, plants and animals - land (Leopold 1949:2). “The land ethic”, Leopold added, “changes the role of homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain members and citizens of it” (Ibid.2). To sum up the point, according to this view, things and life forms out there in land are not only important because they are and might prove useful to human beings but also valuable in themselves. According to Leopold, accepting this stand is an “ecological necessity”. It is argued
that recognizing land and its life forms as moral beings raises awareness on how humans treat nature. However, critics say that despite its stance on anthropocentrism -- that it is limited -- this view itself is anthropocentric, namely that it is out of the capabilities of the people to have other stands, that whatever people think about the nature it still is a people’s thought about the nature and not something that is like that in reality (see Grenholm & Kamergrauzis 2007). Especially contradictory are the claims of this discourse when it tries to fit the political organization of human societies within such an ethic. For example, when it promotes organizing ‘utopia’ communities, it encourages people to live “within the resources of local watershed and developing them to sustain the human and nonhuman community as an ecological whole” (Merchant 1990: 292). The first important thing to note is that climate change discourse pretends that there is an undeniable truth: that everything in nature is subordinated to a whole. As Capra says in this sentence: “the properties of the parts can be understood only from the dynamics of the whole” (Capra 2008: 366). Second, it tells people what lifestyles they should have as part of the ‘ecological whole’ to most incredible details like how much one should consume, why neighborhood is important, to aesthetic judgments as what is beautiful etc. It pretends that the end goal of humans is to live in nature, in harmony with it. Arne Naess calls it a “philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium” (Naess 2008: 146). People should be taught by this holistic approach to be able to understand this (see Gillespie 1997; Magnason 2008).

In regard to the individual freedom, contrary to those who acknowledge it as an inherent value and a crucial institution to democratic societies (see Przeworski 2010, Sartori 1987; Rawls 1999), climate change discourse treats it rather as a negative consequence of modernity, as a synonym of loneliness, of greediness etc. This, its argument continues, made people weak, purposeless and easily manipulated by domination powers (see Korten 2007; Quinn 1999; Gillespie 1997).

“The great Athenian philosophers - Socrates, Plato and Aristotle - began not with a concern for individual rights, but rather with a definition of the nature of the good society as one that nurtures the full development of the higher qualities of the mind of each person…” (Korten 2007: 154).

“The domestication of plants and animals, food production and storage, building construction and clothing production all were discoveries and innovations of great partnership societies…” (Korten 2007: 94).

Save for the fact that by letting people to do what they want with their lives, one upgrades, recognizes everybody’s value and their dignity. It allows for diversity of ideas, characters and forms. That’s what to be free supposedly means. And that’s why Berlin maintained that the decline of freedom ‘would mark the death of a civilization, of an entire outlook’ (Berlin 1958: 397). It is because climate change discourse pretends the opposite, namely showing the one ‘true’ road to the meaningful lifestyle and conformity, that it is paternalistic. It is due to such features, despite how ‘good’ its aims might be intended, that the discourse makes the cardinal mistake. Similarly, for example, communism has comparable features by promising the utopia of a classless freedom, but only that in the way people should be taught to live freely. According to philosophers like Berlin, this is reminiscent of Rousseau’s mistake when he implied that people should be even forced to become free if necessary. As Berlin suggested, such approaches open the path for tyrannical and totalitarian political systems. “To force people into the neat uniforms
demanded by dogmatically believed-in schemes is almost always the road to inhumanity” (Berlin 1988: 5).

Leopold’s and Hardin’s use of the term ‘necessity’ and Naess’s and the like ‘ecological harmony, equilibrium’ are emphasized here because they are similar to the grand idealistic claims in Hegel, Kant, Marx etc., in the sense that they subordinate everything else to a single goal and truth in addition to typically highlighting the emergency of the issue. To the contrary, value pluralism accepts many values at the same time and it sees it possible to reach social agreements taking into account that premise (see Berlin 1988). Values clash and they cannot be ranked or listed (Galston 2002:5). In other words, no value holds absolute truth in whose name others can be refuted. Galston says that “value pluralism is not relativism” (Ibid.5). Berlin formulates this notably: “the collisions of values are what they are and what we are” (Berlin 1988:5). It is for similar reasons, for emphasizing one value above everything else in reason, that Horkheimer and Adorno criticize the Enlightenment for being a ‘totalitarian system’ and the ‘domination itself’ (see Horkheimer & Adorno 2008: 63). And the thing is that likewise climate change discourse itself criticizes the Enlightenment as in the following paragraph.

The climate discourses criticizes rationality as a system that overemphasizes the role of the reason. Many authors go back to Descartes and other similar great names from the period of Enlightenment to ‘show’ how mistaken they were in their Cartesian approach (see Evernden 1985). They say look where rationality brought us: ‘close to self-destruction’; ‘we thought we were getting richer but we found ourselves in the fight with nature’; ‘we thought we were getting educated, but we found ourselves facing fear and crises for our existence’ etc. (see Merchant 2008; Marcuse 2008). In addition, they maintain, senses, traditions and experiences should never have been refuted since their role toward gaining knowledge is undeniable. The characteristics mentioned in the previous sentence were earlier elaborated in Romanticism which grew as an opposition to Enlightenment. However, in Two Concepts of Liberty and several other writings, Berlin showed how both ideas of ‘liberation by reason’ and ‘self-mastery’ (as the common denominator for romanticist features) ultimately might turn out to be enslaving, restricting etc. In the first case, he shows the weaknesses that characterize the process of arriving at ends and goals through application of strict reason in political arena; that there are inconsistencies between gaining knowledge and freedom because, for example, more knowledge reduces choices or increases power; that it is not the case that all rational results are compatible and, therefore, that rational laws can’t be justified as universally valid; that it is problematic to do what ‘we ought to will’ (see Berlin 2003; 1978). In regard to the second one, the first input is that freedom cannot mean withdrawal to some ‘internal or soul freedom’ because that is equal to enslavement. On the other hand it is also objectionable that someone takes the responsibility to teach others what the sole ‘truth’ is, that is to say what freedom is, or to manipulate with it which would be a deliberate hypocrisy etc (Ibid.). In sum, both versions restrict negative freedom which freedom is otherwise expected to allow everybody for action. But, then the climate discourse offers itself again the plan of living in “harmony” with nature. This is well summarized in the UN’s 1987 report “Our Common Future” which suggested “a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs”.

The discourse at times encourages the return to grand religious narratives. According to David Korten, if the mindset changes and becomes more god-centric, religion will be better interpreted and people will benefit from its true value. “Jesus, who taught a message for universal love, compassion and preference for the poor, was a prophet of the spirit model” (Korten 2007: 258).
Except that the discourse then takes the role of a godlike itself when it shows the life people should pursue, their goals, when it decides how many birds there should be in an ecosystem etc. It maintains that “human beings have a sacred duty to care for and be good stewards of nature” (Ball & Dagger 2008: 258). As such, it has itself monist features, because it creates hierarchies and priorities between values and goods (see Galston 2002: 5).

Then comes the paradox of the indirect return to the ‘political’, or the rising in relevance of the political institutions once again (see Schmitt [1927] 1966). For detailed explanation of this point the reader should go to Chapter V. However, here it will be briefly noted that the climate change discourse encourages more participation of the people into organizing their affairs and more central planning. Some speak about the need for the ‘earth communities’ where all the citizens will engage in running together and consensually their affairs, for partnerships (see Korten 2007) and for the ‘beautiful small’ where economies ‘can be organized locally, from local materials and for local use’ (see Schumacher 1973). Others say simply the alternative is to ‘put the power in the peoples’ hands (see Chomsky 1997) and a ‘global citizenship’ (see Hardt and Negri 2009). All those sorts of ‘utopias’ create powerful groups, institutions and centers bargaining the individual. This is another anomaly within this discourse, because ideally the more powerful ‘common’ or ‘central’ organizations and institutions are the more protected should the freedom be to establish an equilibrium that defends people from coercion and interference in their affairs (see Šartori 1987). And, for that matter, how can one community be both efficient in resource conservation and limit itself to the resources of the respective local ecosystem when a specific resource can be abundant somewhere else? Or should one community in China wait for the electric train till it is invented locally?

On the other hand, what about the fact that the natural resources are being depleted, about enormous differences between the rich and the poor, the fact the poverty is created by the way production is organized, the power concentrated in the hand of the big international companies that people have not elected? True, they are all problems and challenges to modern societies and modern democracy. Equality, justice, preservation of resources for future generations...all are egalitarian goals and important values. But, freedom cannot be refuted under the assumption that some people would choose something else if, for example, they knew how nature works etc. According to Berlin, limiting freedom in this manner is a “monstrous impersonation” (Berlin 2003: 410). Freedom is held to be not just any value and irreducible. For many, it is special because it offers to the people the space for respect, dignity, diversity. Indeed freedom is guaranteed by the principal propositions of every relevant theory of justice (see Rawls 1999, Dworkin 2011). Subsequently, a justice without freedom won’t be as egalitarian as climate discourse supposed. For example, Berlin says that the heart of the doctrine of equality is the formula: “every man (woman) to count for one and no one to count for more than one” (Berlin 1978: 81). Put freedom out of the equation and then there is no more “one”. This already leads to a radical ground.

To sum up, climate change discourse addresses and joins arguments of other movements to point to the problems of consequences of human actions to nature, especially in regard to natural resources depletion, negative impacts to ecosystems and warming process. But its jump to refute freedom and to tell people what is the desired lifestyle, how they should be organized, what institutions they should abolish -- is where it becomes paternalistic and dangerous, where it becomes a synonym of the ideologies of tyrannical domination. And, in a situation where such ‘communities’ or other institutions would be the norm of the modes of political organization, what will happen to freedom of speech, of protest and other political freedoms?
In other words, living in a society where the ideology tells one the desired lifestyle and the end goals in life, the person can’t really assume to have a freedom of speech or freedom to pursue or become what one likes to.

“We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be...”.
Slavoj Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom

V. Indirect Consequences on Freedom
The climate change discourse refutes freedom also when it does not deal with it explicitly. Its solutions in the policy level -- like adjustments on rights, political and economic organization -- indirectly limit or deny freedom and individuality. It has to be stressed that every political decision infringes on individual freedom (so that happens in the liberal democracies as well for example), but the solutions of the climate change discourse bring forward a systematic threat, that is, they invite for political centralization, economic shortcoming and growing authoritarianism. This argument is developed in this chapter.

V.1 Rights
Rights define the boundaries of the subjects of law in a society. However called and ranked, they are created by societies. Contrary to the ideal that a law-based society would eliminate state and other dominations (Habermas 1989: 82), thinkers, like in Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward’s article Rule Making, Rule Breaking and Power, say that reality and practice show often that “rule making is a strategy of domination” (Janoski et.al. 2005: 33). Private property, land use and human rights are discussed here because they are very relevant to climate change.

V.1.1 Private Property
The right of private property is important for market economy and democracy in general. To early liberal thinkers, private property was that piece of land that the man worked and improved and took the final product of, because at the end of the day, God had himself given him the authority to ‘command the earth’ and appropriate private possessions (Merchant 1990: 78). This line of thinking came to be widely accepted and remained long unquestioned. It was central to the success of capitalism because it impacted positively exchanges between people, opening unforeseen opportunities. And, as Fareed Zakaria recaps, nothing shaped modern world more than capitalism which effectively further eliminated obstacles to private property (Zakaria 2003: 46). Economists agree that it opened the way for exchanges, efficiency and productivity which in turn resulted with revolutionary social changes for which credit is given to economic growth etc.

The role of private property was early well understood by Karl Marx. In the Communist Manifesto and the Capital, among others, he explained private property as being the driving force towards ending the age of the bourgeois domination, but also to the creation of a capitalist class which again dominates by owning the capital and the means of production. He instead encouraged public ownership and control of major resources, means of production and distribution en route for establishing one utopic free society from exploitation, coercion etc. (Marx 1952). His followers claim nowadays that Marx maintained that man’s freedom cannot escape the natural order (Parsons 1971: 193). However, other authors say that both Marxist and Liberal views meant that property (especially nature) is near worthless on its own and, thus, nature being without inherent value remains only valuable for instrumental purposes (Gillespie 1997: 12).
In the contemporary era, one of the most influential stands on private property has been Robert Nozick’s theory of entitlement. Its essence emphasizes the need for the owner to invest his labor in the property and with the supplementary condition that, for the property to become private, no one is made worse off as a result (Nozick 1974). The later part makes the difference with early liberal thinking. But, through the process of the privatization of public property and other means, which are influential institutional change policies of neo-liberalism, there are massive differences created among people in terms of wealth, access to production, power etc. - clearly leaving many worse off (George 2004; Harvey 2005). Authors note paradoxes such as that millions die from malaria even though medicine exists to prevent and heal it (Makhijani 1992). In addition, the owners benefit themselves with profits but inflict massive costs to societies by devastating the environment. So, again based on the entitlement theory, if there is clear evidence that private property is mismanaged and that this mismanagement, by making humans and nature worse-off, contributed to bringing civilization on a brink, isn’t it that free market as its most established distributor loses credibility? Can it be allowed to manufacture such end products again and again? There is clearly a point against private property, namely its instrumental function to social differentiations and in particular its handy role to the domination purposes of the holders of the capital. Therefore, it is popular in the climate change discourse and among radical theorists the idea that there is only one right way out: abolishing private property. For example, in the American fiction state of Ernest Callenbach’s “Ectopia”, there is no more private property and stores and factories as well as the like are owned and run collectively by the people (Callenbach [1975] 2004). The following standpoint from Hardt and Negri is illustrative:

“Property, which is taken to be intrinsic to human thought and action, serves as the regulative idea of the constitutional state and the rule of law...Reforming or perfecting the republic of property will never lead to equality and freedom but only perpetuate its structures of inequality and unfreedom. It needs to be opposed, destroyed, and that is all’.

(Hardt and Negri 2009: 5-20)

Under the impact of this discourse, more and more the viewpoints are changing to hold that the private property is a domination shaping force within societies. Earlier in the twentieth century, T. H. Marshall rightly had observed that a property right is not the right to poses property, but a right to acquire it “if you can, and to protect it, if you can get it” (Marshall 1992). To do that, there is social justice needed, Marshall had suggested in Citizenship and Social Class, i.e. signifying that ‘market, contracts and statuses’ should be subordinated to social justice. That’s why Amartya Sen elaborates that, for example, “a person less able or gifted in using primary goods to secure freedoms (e.g. because of physical or mental disability, or varying proneness to illness, or biological or conventional constraints related to gender) is disadvantaged compared with another more favorably placed in that respect even if both have the same bundle of primary goods” (Sen 2003: 148). In addition to social justice claims, climate change discourse extends to nature condition. According to them, for example, individuals are no more utterly free to pollute a river, to produce whatever and however they want without taking responsibility for emissions and resource conservation, to build wherever despite owning a land area etc. New standards take place such as the protection of nature for its intrinsic value and a ‘common’ view on aesthetics of landscapes (Gillespie 1997). The point is that, as such, private property takes a new meaning i.e.
it is no more that private. Even further, with a large degree of consensus, the discourse simply suggests that private property should ultimately be abolished.

To summarize, climate change discourse is right when it maintains that private property functionally and indirectly favors often dominating social structures. It tries to work towards two goals: one, establishing more equality through social justice and, second, that private property should take into account natural value as self-evident. However, the first obvious problem that is raised from such a concept has to do with how will natural value be included: who will determine what is beautiful, what is worthy of what, how much can be used etc. In addition to it, removing private property means removing an institution that had a great role on motivating, protecting, easing and making possible exchanges and relations outside the reach of the state or similar institutions. Even economists who argued for socialism, like Joseph Schumpeter, accepted that “dematerialized, defunctionalized and absentee ownership does not impress and call for moral allegiance as the vital form of property does” (Schumpeter 1947: 128).

V.1.2 Land Use

Land use has also been very important to the success of capitalism and together with it to democracy (Zakaria 2003). Samuel Huntington maintains that land use reform is one of the biggest challenges to modern governments (Huntington 1968). However, as confirmed by IPCC’s report of 2007, methane release due to land use for agriculture and deforestation is the second main contributor to global warming. The latest policy directives for land use were released in a document titled “Land use, land use change and forestry” following the UN led conference in Mexico, November-December 2010. Measures range from emission limits, resources protection (like soil, minerals and water) to distribution, in order to persuade those who are poor not to destroy the environment for existential reasons. It also has to do with aesthetics. What is important, in organizational terms, is the fact that such solutions give to communities ‘common’ responsibility for forest management and even agriculture as a better thought measure to tackle emissions and similar consequences to the environment. Alexander Gillespie summarizes this trend well in this sentence: “The desire to protect the environment is not derived from the individual as such, but from the desire to protect the larger community on which the individual is dependent. In this sense, the individual is subservient to the environment ethic and the individual’s interests are secondary” (Gillespie 1997: 21). To sum up the point, these solutions regarding the land use take the rights from the individual and give them to the community. This point suffices for now because the aim here is first of all to show how the ‘space for action’ is being acquired by communities and similar institutions in place of individuals, through such solutions. In the subsequent sections it will be shown why such solutions are disempowering to the people and discourage economies.

V.1.3 Human Rights

Another important area of rights impacted by climate change discourse solutions includes ‘human rights’. According to some thinkers, since the Universal Declaration of 1948 was adopted, human rights have been lingua franca of global moral thought (Ignatieff 2003: 53). It is a language, they maintain, that makes possible empowerment of the individual in a world where it is continually seeking to avoid domination by those power hungry. It offers them a ‘means to resist injustices and provides them with agency for that’. Some even share the belief that moral progress could be considered the degree to which human rights define the actions of the states and other related social organizations (Ignatieff 2003: 53, 57, 3).
However, many of the specific rights mentioned in the Declaration are problematic according to the climate change discourse. Their finger first of all directed to the overpopulation of the Earth. According to United Nations estimations, the population will exceed 9 billion by 2050. Population is rapidly rising especially in the poor countries where, along the numbers, problematic is the fact that often families lack the sustenance resources (Kaplan 1997). On the organization level, it is argued that population rise has tendencies to impact negatively states which undermined by economic stresses, are not able to offer opportunities for people, face rising corruption and inability to maintain order (Kaplan 1997: 345, 350). For such reasons, thinkers in the climate change discourse support a coercive strategy of zero growth population (Hardin 1968) or similar measures, an argument that tends to gain more and more legitimacy in the policy level. Indeed, population control is a strong argument ever since Malthus claimed in 1798 that natural resources place limits on human populations causing eventually poverty and ‘social breakdowns’. But, as a matter of fact, it goes against what Universal Declaration maintains by ensuring that the size of the family and related belong solely to the families and what tradition, in particular dominant religions, have suggested (Hardin 1968; Merchant 1990).

From Bibile’s Genesis 1:26-8: ‘...and God said unto them, be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth’ (Merchant 1990: 77).

“There is no technical solution to the problem of the population. ‘Space’ is no escape…Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”.
(Hardin 1968: 1, 5, 13)

Another aspect has to do with Human Rights emphasis of individuals’ rights to pursue their happiness, as imagined mainly among liberal thinkers. For example, the need of the individuals to have choices (Sen 2003), to make the life one chooses to (Sartre 1985), to have ‘meaningful and satisfying work’ (Nozick 1974) etc. To avoid vagueness with the “meaningful and satisfying work”, it is important to show that Nozick defines it as: “(1) an opportunity to exercise one’s talents and capacities, to face challenges and situations that require independent initiative and self-direction (and which therefore is not boring and repetitive work); (2) in an activity thought to be of worth by the individual involved; (3) in which he understands the role his activity plays in the achievement of some overall goal; and (4) such that sometimes, in deciding upon his activity, he has to take into account something about the larger process in which he acts” (Nozick 1974: 247). For many authors in the climate change discourse who invite and argue for wider community responsibility, the space for such choices and satisfying work among individuals is limited in the changed climate and an age more populous than ever. According to them, such emphasis on the individual is leading to the collapse of the common. For more, according to numerous writers, ‘human rights’ serve also for legitimating capitalist ‘Empire’ (Schmitt 1996; Hardt and Negri 2009). Again, by using this terminology, the dominating structures implement their aims. Michael Ignatieff quotes Kenneth Anderson writing, “the claim to a universalism is a sham. Universalism is mere globalism and a globalism, moreover, whose key terms are established by capital” (Ignatieff 2003: 71).

“Conflict and consensus are not categories that remain untouched by the historical development of society”.
V.2 Centralization

The climate change discourse supports centralization in the political system, often explicitly and most importantly indirectly, through arguing for central planning and other forms of state interventionism (See Giddens 2009). First, the nature of these solutions are going to be described followed by an analysis from the perspective of freedom.

According to the discourse, some of the areas that require central planning include industry, transport, agriculture, building etc., in order to manage both resource conservation and emission control. Two of the most significant areas include alternative energy market and city planning in the western established democracies, where the discourse is rapidly being reflected into policies.

Fossil fuel oil is believed to be at its peak hence becoming a potential source of the civilization breakdown, because great fields of societal activities are depended in oil in a way or another (Dixon 2006). In such a light, the Independent Commission for Climate Change encouraged the Great Britain Government, in December 2010, to return to central planning of the energy market as the only way towards slashing goals for carbon dioxide emissions and energy security (The Independent, 2010). During the same year, US Government invested 28.4 billion on alternative energy programs with an eye to make them competitive in the future. In November 2010, US Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu, in a speech in The University of Tokyo, said that a large part of that budget went for research and development on energy with government offering also facilities. According to the documentary Fuel, US has only 2 per cent of the fossil fuel oil while it consumes 25 per cent of it. Some other states like Sweden - with the Government’s help through taxes and other means - are working to become petroleum free by 2020. Alternatives include bio-diesel, ethanol, biomass, solar, wind, hydropower etc. If not in all options, in some of the most relevant energy alternatives -- nuclear plants and geothermal energy -- it will be hard to imagine private business taking control because of the security implications even if ‘privatization’ is seen desirable (Dixon 2006; Lovelock 2009). The aftermath of the massive earthquake in Japan in mid-March 2011 where that natural disaster interlinked with the man-made nuclear power plant insecurities (power plants were owned by private companies) to extend the catastrophe, leave no room of doubts for risks that people face if other paths are taken. Nico Stehr, an author and ex-World Bank expert, says that central planning is inevitable in order to cope with emissions and related climate challenges (Stehr 2010).

Another very relevant sector towards centralization is city planning. According to UN projections, around 8 billion people will live in cities by 2020. Only in China, there are around 100 cities with a population between 1 and 5 million people. Under the impact of the climate change discourse, cities are taking actions to introduce public transport, more and more redistribution, environmental protection measures etc., with the return of ‘community’ at its top (Hall 2002). In the new ‘utopia’ villages and towns, inhabitants are asked to share managing responsibility from garbage to get-together festivities. Lots of such arrangements do have implications to the “freedoms from” such as, for a brief illustration, the lack of choice of individual transport (Giddens 2009: 47). In addition, according to Jose Puppim de Oliveira, director at the Institute of Advanced Studies in the UN University in Japan, such actions are requiring more bureaucracy (Oliveira 2011).

“In Britain 10 eco-towns are to be constructed, starting in 2012-13. They will be designed for between 5,000 and 20,000 people. The towns will be largely pedestrianized with only a few roads, where the speed limits will be 15 miles per hour. There will be no garages or parking places for the houses, and all the main
facilities will be within walking distance of every dwelling…” (Giddens 2009: 97).

Similar US, British and other western examples will likely serve as a model for other societies. That is reminiscent of what Samuel Huntington calls “snowballing effect” in the Third Wave. Meanwhile, the third direction of centralization takes place in international level as a necessity to deal with climate change as a shared planetary challenge. Not only are bodies created and legislation adopted, but the discourse speaks about the inevitability of tackling the environmental crises globally. For different observers, IPCC itself is an illustration of such centralization.

“There is no escape from the necessity of a centralized administration for our industrial world; it is the only means by which our threatened and dangerous civilization can make way for its successor” (Gillespie 1997: 169).

Characteristics like those will make the state and similar institutions even more, what Sartori names, “do-everything” ones (see Sartori 1987: 399). These ‘centrally planned’ societies are future oriented, working towards achieving a goal, a rational goal, i.e. what is often called as arriving to a solution where people live in harmony with nature as the discourse describes (see Naess 2008; Leopold 1949). This is the first anomaly here with the climate change discourse. First, as elaborated earlier, it refutes rationality but still brings a rational plan towards an end/ a goal in place of the free market which is widely accepted to function irrationally. The problem is that is highly problematic, and ideological, to speculate with utopias of ‘perfect harmony’. The authors of this rational plan cannot claim to know the claims and positions of every species in nature, there cannot be a law that incorporates the preferences and goals of ‘future generations’, for science itself rules out total determinism and even evolution theory gives lot of role to chances and conflict (see Merchant 2008; Ball and Dagger 2008). Meanwhile, administrative bureaucracy grows because it manages implementing the rational plan. Choice wise, it is the master that plays the role of the arbiter. It does everything instead of the individuals and free market is surpassed. The other anomaly is that discourse pretends to give power to the people and to increase participation, but it instead gives it into the hands of centralized bureaucracies. It is due to these and similar implications that the more there is planning the more the systems are undemocratic (see Sartori 1987: 426). Sartori says explicitly that “planning found its inevitable complement in the totalitarian dictatorship”. Especially Friedrich Hayek has been noisy for long maintaining that eventually planning leads to totalitarian regimes (see Hayek [1944] 2007). Why is it so? Two big points are the following. First comes the problem of ‘collective action’ namely the ‘free rider’ phenomenon that arises in big organizations where it is irrational to behave in accordance with the goals of the organization (See Ball and Dagger 2008: 263). Second, the ‘public choice theory’ also maintains that there is no such thing as working for ‘public good’ rather the truth is the people in the bureaucracy strategize permanently to work in their or their group benefit (Buchanan 1965). To summarize, the point is made here that first is impossible for people to make a rational plan of living in total harmony in nature. Furthermore, even if such a plan were taken for granted, there would be problems and mistakes in implementing it through centralization. On the other hand, due to both these cases, cost is placed at individual freedom.

The other significant point has to do with the argument of ‘conflict’ as a central aspect of politics (Montesquieu 1952; Schmitt 1992; Przeworski 2010). In the liberal thought pluralism is pushed forward particularly against the reality that the fewer the interests consisting a majority the easier
for the later to ‘execute its plans of oppression’ (Hamilton et.al. 1952: 50). Similarly Max Weber spoke about the ‘inescapability of politics as conflict’ (Webber 1994). However, the opposite is where climate change discourse leads. It often calls for unity, for cross-party agreements and policies to challenge climate change (Giddens 2009: 7-13). This and other forms of centralization and weakening pluralism, have its dangers for social organizations. For example, in economic terms, planning was accompanied with nationalization (Giddens 2009: 95) which paradoxically led to bigger collectivization of the burdens. In another direction, the followers of Max Weber recall his warnings that if capitalism were done away with, ruling will be concentrated in bureaucracy. At that point people will face problems of these features: first, it would be too hard to challenge the bureaucracy because it is usually well trained; second, based in its nature it will lead toward stagnation; third, if it does well economically, it could end up having tyrannical characteristics (Webber 1994; Sartori 1987).

“Islands of capitalism wealth are set in seas of poverty”.
A.Makhijani, From Global Capitalism to Economic Justice

V.3 Challenges to Economy
IPCC and a wide consensus among intellectuals and actors involved agree that the free market economy is the biggest factor behind global warming. There are calls to intervene on it both to ensure emission and waste control, resource conservation as well as to change the course of massive social differences created by global capitalism. At the same time, once again, such interventions have implications to freedom. How so?

It is important to elaborate the nature of the proposed interventions first. Accepting the side consequences of free market to environment -- emissions and waste parallel to resource depletion -- liberal thinkers like Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick maintain that the change could be simply put into practice through taxation (Friedman 1980; Nozick 1974). Indeed, examples of ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ and ‘Total Economic Value’ are popular taxation policies in this realm, encouraging ‘green’ options and reducing pollution. What is left to societies is to decide what pollution they will allow, what costs they want to pay etc. But, they expect a busy role by the legal (court) system not Governments (Nozick 1974: 79-84, 81). Other liberal philosophers closer to the center like Rawls, Sen and Habermas, consider it possible for liberal democracies to reach consensus towards a highly just distribution of goods, be they material or freedoms (Rawls 1990, 1999; Sen 2003, 2010; Habermas 1998). On the other hand, there is call for solutions outside of the market. Such writers express disbelief that market is able to put an accurate price or value in everything out there in nature (Gillespie 1997). For many, the least that should be done is the return of the regulated market since they consider deregulation a failure (Giddens 2009: 96). Generally, thinkers in the climate change discourse argue that in addition to conservation of the resources and control of emissions and waste production, the category of future generations should be taken into account in all economic activity. Others insist on a new culture of consumerism which would not exceed necessities and would encourage sharing among people. They criticize ‘efficiency’ and ‘productivity’, two dominant terms in past-economic thinking, as being wrongly fixated to results, which in turn had consequences for resource destruction and warming (Sachs 1999, Korten 2007, Stehr 2010). As Wolfgang Sachs put it cynically: “The departure of Columbus to America, after a long cycle, is followed by the return of menace” (Sachs 1999: 75).

“Market should not be allowed to make social and environmental choices in our stead. Through democratic debate, society has to set limits to the market,
determine what goods and services should or should not be bought and sold in marketplace and decide who pays the costs now externalized” (George 2004: 36).

And so, what is the point? These solutions bring forward a very relevant intrinsic value to be taken into account: nature. They are right in maintaining that natural resources are finite and that free market is cruel in this regard because it doesn’t consider this truth and, by not doing so, it devastates natural resources. They do have a strong moral point when they insist that our social organization should take into account future generations. Lastly, they are correct when they point that free market cannot stop power being concentrated in the hands of the few. So far so good, but then the story becomes dimmer.

In the previous section, the problems behind the construction of a ‘rational plan’ of a gigantic format as the one ‘living in harmony with nature’ were exposed as well as the problems arising from the ambitions to implement it through centralized structures. A second issue arises from what is called ‘time horizon’ (see Ball and Dagger 2008) in relation to the category of future generations, namely the impossibility to know what and how much of natural ecosystems should be saved for them and thus taken into account into every economic exchange in present situations. On the other hand, it is one of the values of the free market that it offers a “spontaneous order” (see Sartori 1987: 407) that works outside there, in itself, without anybody governing it, especially without one person or institution leading it. F.A. Hayek elaborates that “spontaneous collaboration of free men often creates things which are greater than the individual minds can ever fully comprehend” and that “through market people contribute to ends that were never their purpose” (Hayek 1948: 9, 15). Nobody has to pay for “managers” because it runs itself. Two crucial qualities that it offers are: choices for the people and fixing prices. In addition, it is an enormous “simplifier of information” and very adaptive to feedbacks automatically (See Sartori: 410). But it doesn’t care about equality, namely one is equal to chose something only in so far as it has the means as well as the concentration of the capital. Now, the climate discourse and other anti-market movements argue for an outside market system for egalitarian purposes. If this duty is given to ‘central’ authorities first of all there are managers that will do the job instead of the market. But to do it, like to fix the prices and to know what the consumption that people want to purchase is, they need perfect information (see Sartori 1987 and Schumpeter 1947). With what laws it is possible to describe every consumption choice? Since this is impossible, the alternative remains to tell people what they should buy, how much, to fix the prices centrally etc., with one word to establish an order that is no more spontaneous but centrally organized or similar; paternalistic. As such one is destroying an institution (free market) that has many democratic characteristics like the offer of choices and information for the people and even altruist features like fixing prices for free. The point is that, despite the obvious problems with the free market, it also is an institution dear to individuals’ life and with lots of democratic traits. It is especially cavalier conduct to decide to pull down off use an institution having clear evidence for the problems of the proposed solutions.

In addition, whatever policies, in particular in the developed countries, economies will face serious challenges for drawbacks. Even the UN document at the end of the Mexico Conference in December warned openly that climate change adaptations perhaps will see negative impacts in the economy. Taxation might not be very compatible with emission goals and resource protection, and certainly will be a burn to competitiveness and inaccuracies to redistribution (Giddens 2009; Krugman et.al. 2009). On the other hand centralization discouarges
entrepreneurship, work ethic and impacts negatively social cohesion (Giddens 2009; Webber 1994). The later one makes both Max Webber and Friedrich Hayek speaking about the danger of the return to ‘serfdom’, namely how establishing paternalistic economic institutions reduces choices and incentives for the individuals who, faced with strong and often in many ways corrupt institutions, are invited towards conformity (See Webber 1994, Kaplan 1997 and Sartori 1987: 399-439). The last thing is discouragement of international business which, whatever other truths are, in the modern day has made millions better-off in the world (Krugman & Obstfeld 2009).

This is important because from what is known today, economic well being is the single most important factor behind democracy (Zakaria 2003; Przeworski 2010). A study by Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, which covered the period between 1950 and 1990, found that ‘once rich democracies are immortal’, but 39 of 60 democracies that were poorer than 1,500 today’s dollars per capita income failed (Zakaria 2003: 69-70; Przewroski 2009). Even Voltaire is quoted to have said that the commerce makes countries free and in return liberty expands commerce (Zakaria 2003: 49). In the Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington summarized that economic well-being impacts positively on democracy by disrupting traditional social groupings -- family, class, caste --, producing new rich people who want political power and social status respectively as well as increasing geographical mobility, literacy, education, and exposure to media etc. (Huntington 1968: 49-50). And in no other political system freedom flourishes and is protected like in democracy.

“A power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will".

Hamilton, Federalist

V.4 Growing Authoritarianism

Facing climate change amounts to high probability of growing authoritarianism besides, as a political system characterized of hierarchies of power, order-obedience relations and external sources of authority etc. (See Arendt [1954] 2006), in other words an organization that clashes with democracy and the diversity of values it protects like individual freedom etc. Authoritarianism is here used to describe, like it is often done in the modern times for more ‘political correct’ language, a system that has attributes of totalitarianism and tyrannies too (See Arendt 2006: 103). In the worst case, it will appear as a consequence of climate deterioration causing resource scarcity which further will potentially cause armed conflicts, unifications behind political leaders at war, migrations etc. - all necessarily driving toward establishment of hierarchies of domination, strong rulers on top of weak individuals (Dixon 1994; 2006). But, policy adaptation impacted by the solutions of the climate discourse itself leads toward the same destination as well. How so?

One example is the romantic solution of the discourse which encourages people to go back to the utopia life of small localities, where the whole ecosystems, including humans, produce and organize locally. People are once again related to the local land. But the problem rises from the fact that it weakens the people. From an economic perspective, the scale now is small in addition to the general drawback tendency input that was deduced in the previous sections were economic solutions were analyzed. In addition to it, the individuals lose the know-how and the expertise that they (or some of them) “had” in previous modes of organization (see Adorno [1964] 2003 and Arendt 1968). It should be noted that, with those solutions, individuals are in addition short of private property, (material) capital, the work-place that they would rationally chose etc. Due to these reasons, people are more vulnerable to ideological and power manipulations. According
to Hanna Arendt, “an essential prerequisite for freedom is destroyed where there is no capacity for motion which cannot exist without space” (see Arendt 1968: 164).

Two additional things should be pointed in regard to the ideas for such utopia community proposals. First, even if democracy is aimed to be not as it is defined in the beginning of this paper but, like in the ancient version and similar, purely as equality i.e. participation of all in decision-making etc., it still cannot be understood as a liberation by equality. That’s why Berlin warns: “Democracy may disarm a given oligarchy, a given privileged individual or set of individuals, but it can still crash individuals as mercilessly as any previous ruler. An equal right to oppress or interfere is not equivalent to liberty” (Berlin 2003: 416). And secondly, ‘nor does a universal consent to loss of liberty’, Berlin argued, ‘somehow miraculously preserve it by merely being universal’ (Ibid: 417). To use Berlin’s metaphor, that is to say, if people consent to be oppressed by other people and institutions because of the environmental crises or for the sake of ‘natural harmony’, this will not make them less oppressed anyways.

The other argument towards authoritarianism is linked with the role of technology. There is wide consensus in the climate change discourse that only the most developed and complicated technology will help face climate change. Traditionally technology has helped centralization and hierarchy, with examples like radio, television, movies etc. confirming it (Zakaria 2003: 15). On the other hand the more complicated and dangerous the technology, the more work ethic it requires (Kaplan 1997). Kolakowski summarizes this well in this sentence: “the more the society depends on the technological network it created, the more problems have to be regulated by central powers, the more powerful the central bureaucracy is the more political democracy and more ‘formal’, ‘bourgeois’ freedom is needed to tame the ruling apparatus and to secure the individuals their shrinking rights to remain individuals” (Kolakowski 2005: 19). Not to mention that it is illogical to seek both “the most advanced technology” and “knowledge” and to seek it locally.

The third argument is almost ideological. The climate change discourse is very much impacted by “holism” theory as elaborated in earlier sections and the political system it seeks subordinates to this thinking. Its law is Natural law. Of course, the “natural law” as it understands it. It is arbitrary, it tells everybody what is the lifestyle one should purse, even what species should live and how much in an ecosystem. It has the answer, to use Kolakoswski’s word, “how the lamb and the lion can sleep in the similar bed”. Individual is powerless, only the whole is important, the mass (see Merchant 1990: 292 - 293; Smuts 1926; Chapra 1982). The important thing here is that the power that will dominate as a result of the new discourse will be legitimized by an authority that is external and speculative - this holistic understanding of the nature. In this aspect, it has similarities with religion narratives. It is also totalitarian, for totalitarian systems either purse historical or natural law (see Arendt 1968).

To sum up the point, what is thought in the beginning to work towards egalitarian democratic utopias ultimately establishes opposite ends. The bureaucracy and other centers of authority and domination are strong as opposed to the weak individuals whose means for actions are limited or destroyed. Like in the metaphor of authority at Arendt, hierarchies are stronger the upper one goes in the pyramid (Arendt 2006; Kolakowski 1974). As such there is an important anomaly in the climate change discourse. One of its biggest strengths lies at the critique of neo-liberalism namely its consequences on concentration of power in the hands of small multi-national companies and related, external costs that this power imply to the environment and massive differences between them as rich with the rest - the poor. As seen, in many ways, this neo-liberal structure that dominates is authoritarian in itself too. The anomaly of the climate change
discourse lies particularly at the fact that it doesn’t free people but it also leads to forms of authoritarianism: it will be the few that will show the way and lead toward the “harmonious life” through implementing the newly understood law of nature. Finally utopia is to be realized.

This input is very important especially in the light of the ‘successes’ of authoritarian regimes like Russia, China etc. (Gat 2007). Their ability to deal ‘easily’ with economic crises make them often popular in terms of chances to deal with issues like climate change etc. This is why influential thinkers like Zbigniew Brzezinski maintain that it might happen that China’s one party state system will compete to western ideas of democracy (Kornelius 2011: 4). But, it was often in the difficulty of the political processes, like consultation of a pluralism of interests and forces as required and enforced by laws and procedures, where the virtues of modern democracies lain.

**Feedbacks to Freedom**

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Figure 1. Chief features of the change, as derived from climate change discourse, through which the individual freedom will be affected.

“...If one does not know the terrors, one does not know the greatness, either”.  
Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling

VI. Between Reform and Revolution: A Discussion

Within the climate change discourse there is talk about a need for revolutionary changes in the political system to adapt to the new environmental circumstances as well as close the gap between the stratas of the people and even belief that the solutions it puts forward are a revolution in the making. This chapter will examine whether one can speak about such a revolution.

First of all, what is revolution? Scholars like Samuel Huntington and Hanna Arendt who have studied revolution define it as a “change in the form of governance occurring in a sense of a new beginning”, often through violent means, establishing institutions that have a high moral standing (Huntington 1968: 256, Arendt 1963). But let’s go step by step. In the Third Wave, Huntington says that “stability is a central dimension in the analysis of any political system” (Huntington 1993: 11). According to philosophers the stability of the democratic regime, as the most spread form of governance in the planet, is questioned by low trust and participation in its institutions as well as threats by environmental catastrophes leading to social frustration, with a range of diverse movements, united by climate change, pushing for justice and environmental protection (Putnam 2002; George 2003; Kaplan 1997). Climate change discourse solutions work toward a response ranging from resource conservation and distribution to institutional change in the sector of market and freedoms, and to shifting individual level-beliefs chiefly in the area of
consumption, a fact that has feedbacks to production itself (See Chapter IV). Similar suggestions are absorbed in United Nations and national policy documents, giving them the nature of a reform. Huntington, in the Political Order in Changing Societies, says that ‘changes limited in scope and moderate in seed in leadership, policy, and political institutions may be classed as reforms’ (Huntington 1968: 344). He further adds that ‘a reform is a change in which ‘the power of hitherto privileged groups is curbed and the economic position and social status of underprivileged groups is correspondingly improved’ (Ibid: 344). These climate solutions do fulfill most of those functions. Furthermore for thinkers as different as R.R. Palmer and Lenin, reform is a precondition and a preparation for a “revolutionary overthrow” (Ibid: 364) by rising expectations of the people and weakening existing regime. In addition, philosophers are attracted by revolution. Hegel, in The Philosophy of Right, says for example that “…just as the blowing of the winds preserve the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corruptions in nations would be the product of prolonged let alone ‘perpetual’ peace” (Hegel 1952: 107, 324). To sum up the point, the revolution is philosophically often seen as desirable. Reforms to existing regime can help lead towards later revolutions. And many of the solutions of the climate change discourse do fit with the ‘reform’ as defined here. For example, Hardt and Negri -- like Karl Marx long ago -- bluntly believe that “capitalist production by addressing its own needs is opening up the possibility of and creating the bases for a social and economic order grounded in the common” (Hardt and Negri 2009: vi).

Means are another important aspect to the revolution. In Huntington, city is seen as a powerful means and called a ‘lethal bomb’ especially when combined with the alienation of intellectuals, professionals, bourgeoisie and peasants (Huntington 1968). In Chapter VI, it was shown how central is ‘city planning’ to the solutions of climate change discourse. Meanwhile, cities are challenged by the population movement (Hall 2002). In addition, normally changes in the modes of organization (as climate change solution suggests) leave many professionals and do-gooders unsatisfied because they need to retrain and reposition themselves, parallel to general economic drawbacks (George 2003; Hardt and Negri 2009, Kaplan 1997, Arendt 1963). Even the concluding document of the Mexico Climate Conference in 2010 emphasized similar dangers from the “transformations to new market sectors”. This is why Hardt and Negri consider that metropolis is today what factory was to the industrial working class (Hardt and Negri 2009: 256).

Though the authors of the Commonwealth believe in an untraditional revolution, both in organization and the location where it can take place. Many supporters of the change do believe that a revolution should result with abolishing poverty parallel to private property and establishing some social justice that would allow for more equality and environmental protection (Hardt and Negri 2009; George 2003; Korten 2007). In the meantime, according to Huntington, it is typical for post-revolutionary institutions to see large participation and stand highly on the moral perspective (Huntington 1968). To sum up the point, city is considered handy to revolution. City planning is among the chief solutions of the climate discourse. Theory says that important reorganizations leave different parts of societies alienated or in need to readjust and retrain.

However, there is a crucial moment towards a revolution in the political system that climate change solutions do not fulfill - freedom. As Hanna Arendt maintains, in On Revolution, the end result of a true revolution should be freedom or its enforcement (Arendt 1963). To the contrary,
this paper shows that freedom as understood in modern liberal democracies is squeezed and even entirely refuted by the climate change discourse.

For long freedom has been maintained as a self-evident value. As such, it avoids the treatment of the people for instrumental purposes. Instead, by putting value to every individual it upgrades people. It creates room for spontaneity, pluralism, merits (Berlin 1958, Sartori 1987).

Similarly, according to Hannah Arendt, “freedom is the reason that men live together in political organization at all”. “Without it”, she adds, “political life as such would be meaningless” (Arendt 1968: 145). How is that so, namely why individuals engage in community and need institutions to preserve and cultivate freedom, was well explained by Hobbes in Leviathan and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. They endorsed the thinking that, in a natural situation, force will define relations among people. According to Locke, upon the existence of a certain limit of people, they will have to organize in groups in order to be able to protect their existence, which will suddenly in a later stage need the backing of a bigger agency that itself will compete with another agency which to a certain stage will have just to chose compromising with the rival agency rather than fight. This is the point where suddenly people realize that this job can be better done by a common more acceptable agency - like the state etc (Nozick 1974). It should be noted that here it is being talked for the freedom in the community, not some sort of “inner” freedom (See Sartori 1987). But despite that freedom needs such institutions to help maintain it, modern democracy was in the other hand limited as well to employ coercion and impediments to the individual freedom. Hannah Arendt ensembles this well in this sentence: “Is it not true that the smaller the space occupied by the political, the larger the domain left to freedom? Indeed, do we not rightly measure the extent of freedom in any given community by the free scope it grants to apparently non-political activities, free economic enterprise or freedom of teaching, of religion, of cultural and intellectual activities? Is it not true, as we all somehow believe, that politics is compatible with freedom only because and insofar as it guarantees a possible freedom from politics?” (Arendt 1968: 148).

The proposed solutions of the climate change do not acknowledge this reasoning. They instead rebut freedom. The discourse employs the argument that freedom serves ‘imperialism’ purposes. Carl Schmitt was among the earliest to draw powerfully this argument during the 1940’s. In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt called liberalism -- as a system to which freedom is its sine qua non -- a failure since it does not eliminate the political but only subordinates it to economic sphere. So, he continues, “the point of the political may be reached from the economic as well as from every other domain” (Schmitt [1927] 1996: 78). Schmitt warns that “the adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a distributer of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity. A war waged to protect or expand economic power must, with the aid of propaganda, turn into a crusade and into the lust war of humanity” (Ibid.79). In other words, we are only made to believe that we are free by not seeing political institutions intervening to coerce and place impediments, but in fact coercion happens through economic means etc. In addition to it, when ‘imperial’ powers engage in a war they manipulate the true purposes by saying that they are intervening for human reasons, to free the respective peoples from oppression of dictators, traditions etc. The argument came out into the surface again to challenge neo-liberalism. Authors say that “freedom of investment, freedom of capital movements, freedom to buy and sell goods and services across borders without hindrance” established a “Holy Trinity” that inflicted the
biggest ever differences between the rich and the poor, environmental devastation and Transnational Companies’ indirect domination (George 2004: 10, See also Korten 2007; George 2004; Hardin 2003; Makhijani 1992). Marxist critic David Harvey calls it accumulation of wealth by dispossession -- taking possession of existing wealth -- of the poor and the public sector by legal and other means (Harvey 2005). That’s why Slavoj Zizek says “the segregation of people is the reality of globalization” (Zizek 2008: 102). To sum up the point, the argument is that freedom serves indirectly established powers of domination and their imperialist goals. The capitalist class, especially in its neo-liberal form, accumulates for itself private property and capital by superior means, intrudes the free market to reach its ‘rational’ goals and violates a wide range of human rights as defined by the Universal Declaration (See Schumpeter 1948; Polanyi 2001). As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is for these reasons that it is itself authoritarian and characterized by its many centralizing features.

However, instead of establishing an alternative, the solutions that climate change discourse offers do lead towards centralization of the power and the restriction of freedom as well, only this time it takes stronger political color. It is for similar reasons why most of the ‘revolutions’ since the French Revolution in 1789 are considered to have been failures because, instead of promoting and establishing freedom, they helped place dictatorships, tyrannies etc. (See Arendt 1968: 141). In Huntington it is reiterated that centralization of power is a “prerequisite for revolution which replaces weak governments with strong and renovated governments” (Huntington 1968: 366). To the contrary, Sartori maintains that the more a state (and similar institutions) becomes involved, the more it needs to protect freedom (See Sartori 1987).

Freedom is one of the essential attributes of modern democracies. In addition to encouraging initiative and diversity, other attributes of democracy would not work without freedom. Sartori summarizes this issue well when he says: “From liberty we are free to go on to equality; from equality we are not free to get back to liberty. The itinerary is non-reversible - nobody has ever plausibly shown how to reverse it” (Sartori 1987: 389). For such reasons, the seemingly egalitarian goals of the climate change discourse would eventually become inegalitarian. For, as an illustration, the first principle of justice in John Rawls establishes exactly equal liberties (Rawls [1971] 1999). Therefore, Hannah Arendt maintains that “the raison d’etre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action” (Arendt 1968: 145). To reiterate what was defined earlier, there cannot exist action without space. Why would one participate in politics if he is not free? What meaning would election have if the person is not free to choose? What is the value of free expression, thought and opinion when the ideology tells one what is the lifestyle to be pursued and when its despot is the natural law?

Finally, it is in the nature of human beings to disagree in regard to values (Berlin 1988; Galston 2002). Moreover, according to Berlin, fields like ethics, aesthetics, critique of general ideas etc. remain “obstinately philosophical” exactly because they involve value judgments (Berlin 1978: 147). Perhaps this is what annoys, as for example Marx when he spoke about the ‘poverty of philosophy’ (Marx 1955: 47), those who embrace more determinist approaches.

It’s about time to summarize the argument. The climate change discourse is enriching in many aspects. It raises the awareness of the possible crisis resulting from the resource depletion and their feedbacks to warming processes, it is progressive in its attitude towards other life forms in
our ecosystems, it has produced massive new knowledge etc. In terms of the political system, it has helped raise some essential questions for modern democracy akin to: why there is so much difference between the rich and the poor; why it is unable to eliminate the few dominating indirectly, in economic ways, the rest; why it is unable to stop the global warming etc. But its problem is that it chooses to ignore rather than solve the issue of freedom in its solutions. Without doing it, these solutions are paternalistic, totalitarian etc. They tell the people how they should live and pretend to have absorbed the natural law of the ends of life in our planet. That is why Samuel Huntington states: "Paradoxically, the Green Uprising has either a traditionalizing impact on the political system or a profoundly revolutionary one" (Huntington 1968: 77). In other words, in order to become truly revolutionary, climate change discourse needs to absorb and resolve the problem of freedom.

"How much cruelty lies at the bottom of all 'good things'".
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals

VII. A case for objection: Capitalist Reproduction?
One may argue that the whole approach is mistaken. More precisely, is there room to suggest that ‘environmentalist’ language is perhaps before anything else used by the owners of the capital for their goals, that is to say something and aim its opposite or the like. Przeworski described a phenomenon of “protagonists wanting to do some things for other reasons and using philosophers to justify their positions” (Przeworski 2010: 9). Can it be that in this case climate discourse is used for capitalist reproduction goals, as Pierre Bourdieu uses the term in Political Interventions (Bourdieu 2008), meaning capitalists’ regrouping and keeping their domination power in the modern societies?

One first way towards this ‘reproduction’ could be by making sure that the money remains at the same place. Capitalists thus use the warnings of catastrophes to invest on greenery and thus, from being responsible for destruction, enter the other side of the medal and win some sort of ‘Mather Theresa image’ (Zizek 2008). Because it is important for this claim, this note of Friedrich Nietzsche from On the Genealogy of Morals recalls that there were a time when ‘good’ was equal to ‘noble’, ‘powerful’, ‘beautiful’, ‘happy’ and ‘beloved to God’ (Marino et.al. 2004: 121). Climate change discourse is full of a rhetoric reminiscent of these sentences: ‘creating new icons’, ‘open spaces’, ‘greenery’, ‘keeping signs of tradition’, ‘clean energy and energy maximization’, ‘attracting community’, ‘public-private partnerships’, ‘sharing same goals’, ‘trust and fairness’, ‘mixed use and not only business function’, ‘rediscovery and visualization’, ‘appealing entertainment’, ‘place making, value creation’, ‘sustainable community’... These approaches could be a good way to keep money around and, especially, to be competitive in the future.

“This paradox…a sad predicament of ours: today’s capitalism cannot reproduce itself on its own. It needs extra-economic charity to sustain the cycle of social reproduction” (Zizek 2008: 24).

The other way is technology. Those who hold the capital have the means to invest in the new ‘green’ economy as well as, often, in education. Michel Foucault had said that knowledge and power always go together as a pair (Burr 2003: 79). A good way, among others, to outcompete the new emerging economic giants and make sure the capital stays where it currently is. There are reasons to believe such versions. Susan George recalls that one US front group called the Global Climate Coalition was founded in 1989 with forty-six corporate members, including all
major oil companies. “This coalition worked tirelessly to prevent steps towards CO2 reduction in the states. As one congressman said, the group’s only goal was the ‘unimpeded production of oil, gas and coal’” (George 2004: 80). Just as Samuel Huntington, referring to Rousseau, warned: “The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty” (Huntington 1993: 46). In this case, the point is that by using this climate change rhetoric the owner of capital try to regain the trust of the rest of the people that what they do is right. In addition, since they have investment potential because they hold the capital, they become the model for the rest to follow.

As such, this ‘reproduction’ would be in conflict with one of the biggest goals within movements that support adaptations to climate change: social justice, or more precisely equality and abolishment of poverty etc. However, as it was said earlier, philosophers say that changes in the society level end up often becoming something else in the process respective to intentions or plans of the beginning. And Zizek suggests that “the very frame of the production (its totality) is always enframed by a part, a specific, of its content” (Zizek 2001: 16). In other words, it could have occurred that capitalist reproduction goals were behind climate change discourse at some point, but in the course of action the discourse has transformed itself so much potentially turning into the most relevant political movement of our time.
VIII. Conclusion
Climate change discourse undermines freedom which is both an essential institution to modern democracy and a self-evident value. Its solutions work toward a political system that refutes freedom and does not place adequate value at the individual. It has paternalistic and authoritarian character when it pretends to interpret natural order for the people, and to decide what their ends should be as well as their lifestyle. As such it downgrades people, it turns them to instruments, it hampers pluralism, spontaneity, the space for action etc. It is a discourse characterized of certain anomalies like: it pretends to work toward the ideals of participation of all in community affairs but ends up centralizing the power; it aims for egalitarian ends and finishes becoming inegalitarian without solving the problem of freedom; inside the discourse the critique of rationality is central but then eventually itself works a rational plan of the desired political organization and lifestyles etc. In other words, what is a discourse that brings lots of knowledge for the environment and ideas how to tackle global warming, opens the path to authoritarian or tyrannical political regimes. As such it is the opposite of the claim that this discourse is revolutionary. To turn into a true revolution, it needs to incorporate and solve the problem of freedom.

“A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right...”
Thomas Paine, Common Sense
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