Security Challenges in Times of Change
Regional Options for Co-operation and Development

New Faces Conference 2005
Karlberg Palace in Stockholm, Sweden
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May-Britt Stumbaum, Magnus Christiansson (eds.)

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Preface

One of the most striking features of the political developments during the 1990s was the re-emergence of regional conflicts that seemed to be very forgotten during the Cold War. Indeed, something of regional identities were also created and reinforced in many parts of the world, making room for both promising developments (like the European Union) and more worrying tendencies. For many observers this development called for a deeper understanding of cultural and historical patterns, as well as a more hands-on need of knowledge of current regional dynamics. The importance of the MENA region, Central and Eastern Asia, and the former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, made it necessary for a broader access traditionally reserved for area experts.

This development also called for a framework for analysis and policy. Even if “regionalism” was a catchword already during the Cold War, its meaning was sometimes blurry or provided little help since it fell under the shadow of the super power confrontation. The new regional approach seemed to make more sense, even if people in the regions themselves were not surprised and often had deeply held memories of conflicts and cooperations on a regional basis. The flourishing of this perspective gave regional and sub-regional organizations like NATO, EU, ASEAN, the African Union and ECOWAS the opportunity to find expanded and
redefined roles. Furthermore, a strategic thinking on risks and challenges became more and more apparent.

The New Faces Conference 2005 “Security Challenges in Times of Change—Regional Options for Cooperation and Development” addressed these very issues. The yearly New Faces Conference gathers some twenty promising strategic scholars and practitioners—this year including participation from twenty different countries from all over Europe, the Middle East, Russia, North America and Asia. The idea is to provide an arena for dialogue as well as challenging debates while also giving opportunities to expand and extend the network between these young leaders.

The New Faces Conference concept is the second step in a three-pronged approach of the Forum on European Foreign and Security Policy of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). While promoting a European perspective on foreign and security policy, the Forum aims at bringing together future decision-makers in different stages of their career, and has been successful in establishing a lasting sustainable international network. Alumni of the Forum are found internationally and in an increasing degree in key positions in diplomacy, academia, business, as well as leading think tanks. The 2005 Conference also paved the way to the launch of the Forum’s consequent successor institution, the DGAP International Forum on Strategic Thinking, established in 2006.

The New Faces Conference 2005 took place on 30 September to 2 October in cooperation with the Swedish International Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), the Norwegian International Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and the Military Academy Karlberg. The event took place at the wonderful location of Karlberg Palace in Stockholm, Sweden. The conference had an ambition to cover both introductory discussions on the term security and the major players in regional security, as well as four panels on regional case studies. The first debates elaborated on the nature of threats in both soft and hard dimensions, the broader security agenda after the Cold War, regional patterns of conflict and cooperation, as well as regional and international organizations that aspire to handle different security challenges. The case studies provided an interesting insight into the intricate character of cooperation and conflict in a few of regions on the agenda in world politics. Participants from the regions in question gave an extra dimension to the discussions about Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and East Asia. The speakers showed great insight and knowledge on the topic, and the presentations assembled in this volume are indeed a substantial contribution. The contributions mirror the inspiring mixture of academics and
practitioners in their varying approaches and styles. This volume also includes an interesting contribution from Alyson Bailes of the Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), held at the opening dinner.

We would like to thank everyone without which the Forum or this report would not have been possible. The generous support of the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the keen supporter of the New Faces Conference since 1997, needs to be especially credited. Other supporting institutions that we extend our gratitude to include NATO, the Swedish Institute (SI), the German Federal Foreign Office, and The German Marshall Fund of the United States. The Swedish Armed Forces provided basic logistics as well as transportation during the event.

We hope that with this collection of views from emerging scholars and practitioners in the field of international security, we provide a timely contribution to the ongoing debate about the best ways to cope with security challenges in times of change.

Berlin and Stockholm, September 2007

_May-Britt Stumbaum_  
_Magnus Christiansson_
The only article I ever managed to publish in the “NATO Review” was called “Sub-Regional Organizations: the Cinderellas of European Security?” Even today, my own devotion to the study of regional security processes is driven partly by my feeling that they are still treated as Cinderellas by all too many other people: and I suspect that one of the reasons is a certain suspicion of intellectual fuzziness around the subject. For a start, in French and English and in Brussels-speak we have the confusion between a “region” within one country and a “region” made up of several countries. Traditional “regional studies” are something different; and we should be wary about the words “regionalization” and “regionalism”, which belong more in the field of economic and social analysis and can carry negative overtones. What I assume we want to talk about here are active and deliberate processes of multi-state regional cooperation, connected in some way with security, which are typically led by national governments but often most successful when they involve other layers of society. And here we come to the second part of the problem, which is that when such processes succeed, they tend to produce frankly boring results. Conflicts between states stop; other conflicts are contained and the impact of other threats reduced; the biggest fights that take place are word-fights between weary politicians after all-night meetings, and the most painful disputes are over how to share out the profits or over how many more members to let into the club. You do not have to be wildly macho or the old, military-obsessed kind of security analyst to feel that studying North Korea may be more interesting than Vietnam nowadays, or Ukraine more interesting than Slovenia, after the bland influences of ASEAN and the EU respectively have done their work.

As G. K. Chesterton once wrote, however, an arrow that hits its target is actually far more surprising and exciting, and should be more emotionally moving, than one that misses. I have argued throughout my time at SIPRI that we need to devote more effort to studying what works; and it’s in that spirit that I’d like to pick up two particular issues now—

1. whether and how the practice of regional security cooperation has adapted itself to the quickly changing constellation of security challenges; and
2. what is the significance of the European Union, the oldest of what I would call the “new generation” of regional organs, for the other (steadily multi-
plying) efforts at security-through-integration that are going on around the world.

I will also comment briefly at the end on issues raised by the apparently unstoppable spread of the regional security virus for the larger picture of world security governance.

“Old” and “New” Security, “Old” and “New” Regionalism

During the Cold War, two equally matched superpowers and two blocs who were each others’ military and ideological enemies dominated the security scene in Europe. This confrontation cast its shadow over most other parts of the world, with equally polarizing effects. The dominant security worries were about open war between states and groups of states, and there were four basic ways that regional cooperation could try to cope with this:

(i) by binding local states together so that at least they would not fight each other;
(ii) by binding them together to balance and deter the enemy—these first two functions of course combined by NATO, but also for a while by CENTO and SEATO in Western and South-East Asia;
(iii) by creating a structure around two opposing blocs that reduced the risks of their competition and allowed some cooperation as well: a role quite successfully played by the CSCE and then the OSCE in Europe;
(iv) to keep a group of states out of the main confrontation and shield them from its effects: this was the role of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Movement, but it is quite a rare variant and doesn’t require all the members to come from the same region.

Now, the major changes that have taken place in the security agenda during the last phases of the Cold War and since it finished will be well known to you all. There are three points I would particularly pick out:

– the shift from risks of inter-state conflict to intra-state conflicts, with their dangers both for security and humanity; this has gone together with a rise in positive and active military cooperation, even between former opponents, and with a demand that the more fortunate states of the world should not just look after their own security but help in exporting it to others;
– the growing prominence of worries about non-traditional threats ranging from terrorism, crime and WMD proliferation, through various kinds of
natural catastrophe and disease, to social and economic problems ranging from starvation to infrastructure collapse;

– new awareness of the interconnectedness of all these threats and risks, both in their causes and effects, and the multiple vulnerability it creates both for richer and poorer communities,

In the early 90s people used to wonder whether these changes would make old-style defensive alliances like NATO redundant. By now we have seen, not just that old alliances can learn new and more constructive tricks, but also that the new environment has offered new rationales for regional cooperation. To mention just two,

– states can get together to “export security” more effectively, in all its different forms just mentioned;
– and they can get together against all the new non-military varieties of challenge and threat: to protect their own lands and peoples against them, and to make a stronger input to the global policies and responses that they demand. (In the economic dimension, we may note the parallel issue of how far regional integration can help its participants to deal with the notorious challenges of economic globalization.)
Europe as Model, Laboratory or Warning?

The question of democracy, and of reform and transformation more generally, has also come into the picture in a big way. Even old-style groups like NATO created pressure on their members to be democratic and to behave democratically towards each other. With today’s wider security agendas it has become more obvious how security, good governance and democracy are related: apart from anything else, many new challenges need the willing and effective help of private actors right down to the individual level, which is problematic both in weak and oppressive states. So we find the enlargement of institutions like NATO, the EU and ASEAN—and even their less integrated “partnership” frameworks—being used consciously as way to promote democratization and reform in neighboring states and through key strategic dialogues like that with China. We find the new African Union, in its admirable basic documents, linking seamlessly together the ideas of conflict avoidance and control, of democratic governance, and of sustainable development. We find a new explicit recognition among both conflict management experts and development analysts that bringing a weak or wounded state into a stable framework of security cooperation with its neighbors is one of the best ways to boost its progress and ensure a lasting recovery.

New threats for the integrated regions cannot, however, be countered with old tools and I would highlight four new practical demands that they have brought to the fore:

– unlike military alliances, multilateral security approaches to the new agendas demand relatively high and constant inputs of money and other resources, and are pushing towards increasing centralization and collective use of these;
– challenges involving non-state actors and individual persons can only really be mastered with the help of individually applicable laws and norms, formulated within states as well as between them;
– the interconnectedness of many of the threats gives an advantage to groupings that can combine military competencies with other security ones, and both of these with political, economic and other functional capacities;
– respectable regional organizations, as much as nations, are increasingly called on to show their relevance to the whole world both by “exporting security” and by collaborating on the universal generic challenges.

The European Union

All these last four desiderata—resources, legislative capacity, multi-functional competence and global outreach—are all combined at least in theory in the European Union. No other European body has them all: NATO doesn’t have any significant collective budget or law-making capacity, and OSCE has only 1 of
the 4, i.e. multi-functional competence. I think people in other regions see just as well or even better than we do the importance both of having these tools and of combining them for the right security effect – even if for their own regional organizations, this is still much more of an aspiration than a viable program.

In this situation, the EU seems to be providing both a model and encouragement for other regions to move ahead and go deeper in integration, and a lot of food for thought on what not to do or on what could be done better.

In reality, though, how useful can the EU be as a source book for regional design in quite different regions of the world? Problems of widely different cultures, histories and economic levels might come to mind, but I’m not sure that this is the real point. Culturally similar and culturally diverse groups of states, and groups that are all poor or all rich or rather mixed, can achieve and have achieved workable forms of security community. If we need to offer warnings about the “exportability” of the EU model, I think they belong at a broader level of analysis. I have already hinted at one of them, i.e. that our Union has been working in the field of true integration longer than anyone else, and like any pioneer is bound to have run straight into all the traps that others should learn to avoid. Among other things, it created a single market and an almost single immigration space long before it realized how those arrangements would expose its citizens to transnational threats like terrorism, crime and disease, let alone set about developing collective responses to those challenges. It started off with a complicated set of institutions and was slow and often clumsy in redesigning them to deal better with new demands, notably including the demand for tight cross-functional coordination and for a single face and voice in dealing with the outside world. Here I would like to highlight, however, two other sets of issues that are very much alive in debate among Europeans themselves.

First is the question of how larger and smaller states can work together. The West Europeans in the 1940s decided to conduct their military cooperation with the USA, which indeed was the only way to keep the Soviet threat at bay, but they set up their deeper economic (and eventually political) cooperation only among themselves. The subsequent story of the EU suggests that progress in integration is relatively easy in a region that has no single dominant state but a balance among two, three, or more larger ones; and this same diagnosis could be supplied in broad terms to the relative success of the Latin American organizations, the African Union and ASEAN. But the EU as such doesn’t offer any answers—and NATO has never really found a permanent and satisfactory one—on how to build successful cooperation where there is one much larger state in the neigh-
borhood and it cannot simply be excluded from the exercise or treated in the older style as an enemy. That is the challenge with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with India in South Asia and with China in the East, and also in the former Soviet space where Russia’s attempts since 1990 to re-create a security community have never really delivered the goods either for itself or for others.

Secondly and last is the problem of popular consent and support. All regional structures dealing with security need to be led by national governments so long as the prime formal, and practical, responsibility for security lies at the governmental level. But it is all too easy for cooperation then to become the property of elites and to develop in a “club” atmosphere from which ordinary people in the region, as well as those outside, feel excluded. For the results, you need only look as far as the debacle over approval of the draft EU Constitution: but there is a broader point that organizations claiming to protect and promote democracy can risk their whole credibility when their own stake-holders find them undemocratic. The EU has plainly not solved this challenge and other regional groups should ponder hard on its lessons. Of course effective security work has its own disciplines, and it will rarely make sense to hand over operational control to parliaments, let alone to delegate further. But what the EU’s leaders, and all other regional leaders, do need to think about is a combination of informing and consulting ordinary people better about the security aspect (and all other aspects) of regional integration: and mobilizing and engaging them better especially in the newer areas of security creation and emergency control.

A “World of Regions”?

A last word on what all this means for the global security structure and security governance. Today we have one super-power and it is not in any real sense “regionalized”. Indeed many Americans see regional organizations as a challenge to themselves, a deliberate attempt to balance and limit US power or to make the world more “multi-polar”. As I see it, the EU and all the more successful regional groups exist first and foremost to meet their own people’s needs; and they often realize that those needs can best be met by constructive cooperation or complementarity with the USA. Any more defensive points in their thinking are likely to be about avoiding American bullying or divide-and-rule tactics on their own territory, or being able to make their case against the US when necessary in fora like the WTO—which is hardly unreasonable. In the big picture, however, it is clearly harder to find ways of running the world that are efficient and fair to everyone when we have such a messy combination of single (non-integrated or imperfectly integrated) big powers; a few successfully integrated or integrating regions; and
other regions like the greater Middle East, South Asia and East Asia where states of more modest size are creating dangers for themselves and the world precisely because they haven’t yet found or even sincerely tried to find a working regional formula. Shouldn’t those of us who believe in the regional method be trying a good deal harder, if nothing else, to tackle that last problem and to find some better way of talking to the US about it?
Europe as Model, Laboratory or Warning?
Russia’s “Energy Superpower”: Between Realpolitik and New State Idea

Andris Spruds

Russia has become one of the most significant global energy suppliers. Although the interpretations of motivation and guiding principles for Russia's energy strategy differ, Russia’s leadership obviously attempts to take advantage of the country’s important role in global energy markets and economy, in general. The questions, however, must be raised constantly what are the international and domestic interests of Russia and, especially, whether the perceptions abroad and at home of the nation’s elevated role are being shaped deliberately or inadvertently. In the context of the growing demand for energy resources and necessity to define parameters of energy security, it is imperative to identify the character, principles and driving force of Russia energy policy and prospective potential for “energy partnership” between Russia and Western democracies.

Russia’s “Gas and Oil Diplomacy”

Russia may be dubbed a “great energy power” or even “energy superpower”, if one takes into account the amount of its energy resources. Russia produces 12% of the world’s primary energy resources, possesses 13% of the known global oil reserves and around one third of known gas reserves. This makes Russia, if not the global, then the regional “swing state”, which may stabilize the volatile global and especially regional, namely European, energy markets. Despite a considerable depletion of the existing extraction sites and growing need for substantial financial investments and modernization of infrastructure, the natural resources give Russia attributes of a comparative advantage in global economic and political affairs. As the result, the Russian leadership has been inclined to utilize its energy resources to implement “gas and oil realpolitik” with the aim to maximize its political and economic influence on the global arena and especially in the neighbouring countries. Hence, a gradual and apparent shift is observable in Russian international orientation towards deliberately turning itself into a principal energy player in the global economy, which would allow gaining both economic and political dividends. It is also becoming increasingly apparent of what means and strategy is envisaged by Russia’s leadership in order to lead Russia to the status of the pre-eminent “energy superpower.”

1 Alexander Arbatov, Maria Belova, Vladimir Fyegov, Russian Hydrocarbons and World Markets, in: Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1/2006. Russia controls around 47 trillion cubic meters proven natural gas reserves. In comparison, the largest European gas producers Norway and the Netherlands own 4 and 1.5 trillion cubic meters, respectively.
The Kremlin, first of all, constructs the basis for its international realpolitik at the domestic level. Russian government has consequently pursued the domestic policy of turning the Russian state into a major player within the energy sector. The consolidation of state standing in and control over Russia’s energy sector has been especially advanced during Putin’s second presidential term. The state has strengthened its monopoly over the gas sector and considerably increased its presence in the oil industry. The Khodorkovski case was a clear manifestation of the determination on the Kremlin’s side to dominate the energy sector and to make energy companies instrumental in its aspirations for ensuring economic growth and international political potency. Russia’s government had made it clear that it would support the socially and politically “responsible” Russian companies on the domestic and international scene. And vice versa, those companies, which would pursue incompatible political, economic or energy agendas, would face a risk of “disapproval” by the state authorities. The re-structuring and activities of Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom exemplifies the Kremlin’s intentions to create “national industrial champions”, which could become a major instrument of Russia’s external energy policy and contribute to Russia’s national interests. Putin has clearly identified Gazprom’s linkage with the state: “The gas pipeline system is the creation of the Soviet Union. We intend to retain state control over the gas transportation system and over Gazprom. We will not divide Gazprom. And the European Commission should not have any illusions. In the gas sector, they will have to deal with the state.” This also pinpoints to the trend of Russia’s energy diplomacy, and especially gas diplomacy deliberately and increasingly being used as the central pillar of Russian foreign policy.

The Russian government possesses a number of means to maximize its bilateral and multilateral standing, bargaining powers and space for political and economic manoeuvres. The diversification of strategic transportation routes of Russian energy resources, signing long term bilateral supply as well as joint exploration and investment contracts with European and non-European state and private companies, obtaining industrial energy assets in foreign countries and controlling or influencing transportation of the energy resources by third parties apparently represents an important and integral part of Russia’s “gas and oil diplomacy”. Russia’s relative standing and its determination to utilize its advantages has been

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facilitated by the increasing global demand and rising prices on energy resources at the turn of the century.\(^5\)

A diversification strategy clearly may become one of the most effective tools of Russia’s energy realpolitik. Diversification was commenced in the oil sector by constructing the Baltic Pipeline System effectively allowing Russia to bypass the Baltic countries, above all, the Ventspils port in Latvia, which in the 1990s was crucial for stable Russia’s oil exports to European countries. Russia considerably decreased the transit costs and, more importantly, turned the previously existing asymmetric relations upside down. Prior to the construction of the Baltic Pipeline System, the Baltics were indispensable transit countries for export of Russian energy resources. From now on, in the context of the diversification of Russian energy export routes, instead of setting prices for transit, the Baltic countries primarily aspire, though mostly unsuccessfully, to retain some elements of the previously important role in the transit sector. However, it is clear that mutual interdependence in the energy sector has been transformed into obvious energy dependence of the Baltic countries on Russia. This contributes to the creation of circumstances, when Russia is increasingly in the position to demand that energy

\(^5\) During the period between 1992 and 1999, the average price for the barrel of Brent crude oil was $17.6, whereas in 2000–2005 it was $35.4. The high oil and gas prices contributed considerably to Russia’s ability to pay off foreign debts and, moreover, to increase its bank reserves and gradually approach a hundred billion dollar accumulation in Stabilization fund.
cooperation is preconditioned by certain political stances of the Baltic governments.⁶

In the gas sector, having implemented the Blue Stream project to Turkey, Russia actively promoted the implementation of the extensive North European Gas Pipeline, now, the Nord Stream project. It must be clearly viewed in the context of the transforming priorities of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. The construction of the Nord Stream obviously corresponds with the endeavours to turn Russia into a potential European and global “energy superpower.” Diversification may contribute to Russia’s reduced dependence on Ukrainian transit routes. Ukraine has been imperative for Russian gas exports to Europe. Although Ukraine will continue to serve as a dominant Russian gas export corridor after the new pipeline starts to operate, Russia’s dependence on the former would be lessened from almost 80% to approximately 65% of natural gas exports.⁷ As a result, political dividends are also obvious. Russia has effectively obtained additional instruments for both economic and political “carrot and stick” policies with respect to the transit countries, above all Ukraine, and extended its scope of political and economic manoeuvring and bargaining powers.

Apparently, the Russian leadership and Gazprom have calculated primarily the potential strategic economic and political benefits rather than pending costs and prospects of financial sustainability of the project. The pursued gains of the prospectively strengthened presence in West European energy sector and increased political manoeuvring in Central and East European countries outweighed considerations of the economic feasibility of the project itself. The Russian gas monopoly has already established itself as a major energy player in Central and East European countries and partly monopolized their gas markets. Gazprom increasingly dominates the whole industry from extraction to distribution to individual consumers there and it holds considerable shares in national gas companies in Central and East European countries. Although in the presence of established players similar influence would be impossible to achieve in West European energy sector, Gazprom seeks to intensify its connections with large European energy companies by signing long-term supply agreements, establishing joint extraction and transportation ventures, and implementing joint investment projects in other countries. If in Central and East European countries Russia aims to increase their


⁷ According to the Renaissance Capital Group estimates, the distribution of annual output capacity of export pipelines in 2010 (altogether 257 billion cubic meters as compared to 190 in 2004) will be the following: Ukrainian transit 170 (145 in 2004), Yamal-Europe (through Belarus) 33 (23), NEGP 30 (0), Blue Stream 16 (16) and Nordic (Finland’s) direction 8 (0); see: Situatsiya na evropeiskom gazovom rинke, in: Buletен instituta energetiki i finansov, No. 2/2006, p. 15.
dependence, then the objective in Western Europe is an increased mutual interdependence.8

Furthermore, trends in the foreign policy and energy establishment exist that facilitate a “geopolitical revolution.” Instead of regional “energy diplomacy”, the “geopolitical revolution” would be the major objective of a much more global in scope realpolitik. The proponents of this strategy advocate a close partnership with non-European powers such as China, India and others. In 2006, Russia actually signed a contract with China on the construction of a gas pipeline, whose first stage would be accomplished by 2010. Eventually, the implementation of the whole project may lead to the export of 60–80 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia to energy resources eager China. At the beginning of the 2007 similar considerable arrangements were made with India. The prospective natural gas pipeline alongside a crude oil route towards Asia and plans to develop liquefied natural gas (LNG) production would naturally extend Russia’s global economic presence and political clout, as well as strengthen its bargaining powers vis-à-vis Europe. In the optimistic scenario of Russia’s “geopolitical revolutions,” this may eventually lead to a certain energy dependence of the West on Russia and eventually challenge the Western political domination, thereby, contributing to the global shift of power.9

“Energy Superpower” and Identity Building

The “gas and oil diplomacy” under a more thorough scrutiny, however, does not represent an absolutely coherent, thought-out and effective strategy in the long term perspective. On occasions, quite the contrary is true. Most obviously, Russia’s pressure on Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus clearly was counterproductive in foreign policy terms as “price wars” and cutting supplies not only alienated those Russia’s neighbours but provided a stimulus for the European countries to reconsider their perceptions and policy regarding Russia and consolidate their attempts to ensure energy security. It would be difficult to imagine that the Russian leadership constantly failed to contemplate the reaction of other countries, which has actually complicated Russia’s ambition to maximize its external influence. This leads to the inference that Russia’s “energy diplomacy” has become a “double edge sword” strategy, and has been simultaneously and at least equally applied to both external and domestic environments and audiences, and intended to advance interests and shape perceptions.


After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leadership has been in a permanent search for the state’s ideology and nature of its mission. Tsarist Russia built its legitimacy on the principles of the autocracy, orthodoxy and pan-Slavism. The Soviet Union under the ideology of communism assumed the role of the guardian for the working class all around the world. Neither “liberal democracy” nor “liberal empire” had been considered for the consolidation of the post-Soviet elites and society. The “third” Russia inherited only the ever present threads of authoritarianism and imperialism accompanied in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR with national humiliation and economic and political turmoil.

Vladimir Putin had clearly grasped the importance of the lacking idea of the state, and as Fiona Hill has put it, “[h]e assumed the presidency in 2000 with a pledge to bring stability and order to Russia, and to begin a process of restoring the country to ‘greatness’ by unifying society, stabilizing the economy, and strengthening the state.” And what else in Russia’s case can restore more effectively the notion of Russia’s “greatness” and long sought exceptionalism among its society if not the country’s vast energy resources and repeated rhetorical and actual manifestations of the potential for Russia’s “gas and oil diplomacy”?

The Russian leadership increasingly perceives and underlines the nation’s “indispensability” in global economy and pinpoints to its role of the “great energy power.” The importance of the energy potency has been explicitly and vocally underlined on various occasions. According to Vladimir Putin, it is necessary to effectively exploit these Russia’s advantages both domestically and internationally in order to achieve the ambitious goal of becoming a “leader in the world energy market.” The president has stated that, “our country has certain competitive and natural advantages as well as the technical opportunities to occupy a more significant position in the energy market. We should use these advantages in the interests of the entire international community but also keep in mind our own national interests. Russia’s well-being in the present and the future directly depends on the place we occupy in the global energy market …” At the beginning of 2006, a leading Kremlin-backed opinion polling agency, the All Russian Public Opinion Research Center, carried out a survey assessing the public stances with respect to “Russia as an energy superpower.” A large part of the respondents indicated that energy provides Russia with the means to increase its “global weight.”

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tion to the necessity to increase Russia’s international importance. 34% of the respondents wanted Russia to aspire a superpower status similar to that of the USSR, 47% one of the world’s leading nation’s status and 9% leadership in the post-Soviet space.14 Thereby it was not surprising that in February 2006, a close associate and aid of the president Putin, Vladislav Surkov, referred to the term of “energy superpower” (“energeticheskaya sverkhderzhava”) in a speech to the Congress of the United Russia political party.15 Since then, the concept of “energy superpower” has been re-introduced into public discourse in an orchestrated manner by Russian leading politicians and reiterated on both international and domestic stage. This demonstrates that the identity building and formation of state image is a deliberate objective rather than a by-product of the “energy superpower” activities and parlance by the Kremlin. One “third” of Russia’s leadership has apparently searches for its way of “manifesting the destiny”, increasing domestic credibility and legitimacy and eventually consolidating the society.

In this context, it becomes easier to understand the mixed signals to the Western partners and investors and the “flexing of muscles” vis-à-vis Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and other post-Soviet countries, which had been rather counterproductive in long-term and pragmatic foreign policy terms. The principle of the “show must go on” in demonstrating Russia’s capacity to both international and, primarily, domestic audiences has apparently motivated the Kremlin to chose assertive as well as frequently inconsistent policy stances. The announcements regarding developing the giant Shtokman natural gas fields have been indicative of Russia behaviour with respect to Western partners. Although Russia needs massive financial investments and access to state-of-art technologies to develop this field, the Kremlin has suddenly and sharply changed its decisions on potential involvement of foreign companies and strategic direction of the fields exports during the second part of 2006. Concurrently, the pressure on Belarus at the turn of 2006/07 indicated that the Kremlin did not shy away from an easily predictable aggravation of relations with a close political and economic ally in the post-Soviet space. The case of Belarus also further allowed the EU new members, particularly Poland and the Baltics, to demonstrate its Transatlantic partners the validity of their interpretation of Russia as the country of assertive and confrontational behaviour, which willingly turns energy into a political tool. However, for the Russia’s leadership, paradoxically as it may seem, insecurity means security, or in other words, a certain confrontation on the international scene allows to position itself both abroad and at home. Hence, the effectiveness in real foreign policy terms notwithstanding, the Kremlin, above all, attempts to underline and form

the perception that it is Russia that retains the capacity and initiative to select partners, timing and terms of energy cooperation. This is apparently perceived as an important contributing element to the notion of the “energy superpower.”

Moreover, the “energy superpower” ideas and respective policies have become a popular and consolidating element not only because of its external application. “Gas and oil diplomacy” has not only pinpointed the constructed image of Russia’s role and status in the global affairs, it also has underlined Russia’s leadership to build a “politically and socially responsible” state. For instance, the diversification policy possesses a considerable domestic dimension, too. The Kremlin and Gazprom by launching, firstly, the Baltic Pipeline project and more recently, the Nord Stream project have demonstrated political, economic and social responsibility to the domestic audiences. Russians have enthusiastically supported an increased “economic and political security” from the countries, which in Russia have been perceived as “unreliable nations”. Economically, the project has provided opportunities to attract additional domestic and foreign investments to Russia, in general, and some of its regions, in particular. Not surprisingly, the authorities of Russia’s northern regions and especially of the Leningrad Oblast have been among the staunchest advocates of the diversification policy and infrastructure construction on their territory. In the case of the construction of the Nord Stream, the subcontractors participating in the project will have to establish local subsidiaries and pay taxes to the regional budget of Leningrad Oblast.16 Alongside the regional lobbies certain Russia’s economic interest groups are also interested in the development of the project.17 Apparently, the Kremlin’s endeavours to build, above all domestically, the image of an internationally powerful, respected and not infrequently feared “energy superpower”, which may ensure its “sovereign democracy” and implement socially and political “responsible” and popular policies at home and abroad, have achieved some success in contributing to the consolidation of the political elite, large economic grouping, regions and society at large.

Concluding Remarks

Russia’s leadership attempts to utilize comparative advantages of energy riches and simultaneously attempts to build a new state identity around the concept and behavior of an “energy superpower” frequently run into contradictions and raise questions about Russia’s foreign policy character. These contradictory trends in terms of seeking for energy partnership and advancing assertive announcements.


17 For instance, a major Russian producer of pipelines, which is a daughter enterprise of Gazprom, would participate in the project.
and confrontational policy decisions will clearly dominate Russia foreign policy in the near term perspective. This stems both from Russia’s strengths and weaknesses. Russia is a very vulnerable “energy superpower”. Moreover, it may appear even more vulnerable in real terms if in the longer perspective Russia’s rhetoric leads the mutual “danger of entrapment” as for both Russia and Western democracies Russia’s “energy muscle” may appear much larger than it is in reality. Then, not only Russia’s external mission will be consolidated around a rather feeble notion of being great energy power, but it will be entrapped into a frequently confrontational pattern of relationship with its most reliable and closely interlinked partners in the West. This will be counterproductive for the all parties involve, above all, Russia.

Putin has stated in a number of addresses that Russia must rebuild its power on a solid economic base. That merely building a big army is not viable in the long term, and it needs to be supported. This could be considered to be a manifestation of this stated policy.
Russia’s “Energy Superpower”
Ukraine: Europeans Beyond Europe

Ivan Poltavets

Foreword

While European Union has already expanded and pushed its borders to new geographical locations, a question of its relationship with the new neighbors increases in importance. What will be the model of the relationship chosen? What should be the intensity of cooperation? How will the demands of the EU in its “Europeanization” policy in the new neighborhood be matched with the use of incentives and leverages? These are the questions important not only for the security of the EU, but also for the neighbor’s internal development, as cooperation with the EU can become a strong incentive for the national neighbor’s elites to follow a quicker path of democratization and move towards a market economy.

Ukraine, a large European country outside of the expanding European Union, without a clear prospect of membership, currently faces a difficult period of transition. Are there incentives for further democratization of the country? Is the Ukrainian political elite up to the challenges of domestic and foreign policy? Will the EU play a role of an “attraction pole” for Ukraine in its transition process or will Ukraine remain a “front-line” in Russian-European relations or the “shared neighborhood”?

There are other potent geopolitical forces besides the EU active in Ukraine. The US and Russia, too, are competing for the influence in the country, sometimes running with contradictory agendas, further disorienting the country. Could there be a set of strategies of “less-than-superpower” states in Ukraine that would allow harmonized efforts, rather than nullify each other, creating friction in the region and making it even harder for Ukraine to move along the path of democratization and economic development?

Due to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has managed at least not to succumb to a more authoritarian regime, development of which we are witnessing in many of the other CIS countries. But the Orange revolution is not an achievement in itself, but rather a chance for the country to increase the pace of its transition, a chance that is still to be realized. Will the new relationship with EU foster this change? Or will the new mode of cooperation further isolate Ukraine, locking it in continuous oscillation between democracy and authoritarianism with which it borders in the West and in the East respectively?
Ukraine: (B)Locked among the Players

Up to now, Ukraine is bound to formulate its foreign policy rather as a reaction to the foreign policies of the major players in the region. The EU, Russia and the US are having more or less clear agendas for the country, which Ukraine is unable to influence. Therefore it is rather an object of other countries’ strategies. Frequently the strategies of the main international players compete with each other, splitting among them the weak Ukrainian elite, creating friction not only between the players, but also in the Ukrainian domestic political arena. Let us schematically evaluate the strategies of the major players, as they are perceived in Ukraine.

The Strategy of Russia

Russian strategy in Ukraine can be described as the wish to protect the status quo. Russia’s elite is unable to compete with the US or the EU in pushing its active policy measures through in Ukraine, thus it mainly creates friction and tries to block the initiatives that give Ukraine more political or economic independence from Russia. One of the recent examples of open intrusion into Ukraine’s domestic affairs was open support by the Russian president Vladimir Putin of Viktor Yanukovich, the presidential candidate who lost the elections and whose initial proclamations about election victory triggered the Orange Revolution.

While trying to secure its strongholds in the “near abroad” Russia continues its “colorful” retreat from the region. With this attitude Russia is perceived as a “brake” for modernization and democratization of the neighboring countries. Moreover, Moscow’s stance on Ukraine can divide member states of the EU, diminishing the coherence of the EU foreign policy towards Ukraine.

Russia’s perception of the countries of the CIS as its “near abroad” on which it has some “right of influence” for historical reasons is not backed by the physical ability to exert this influence, especially in competition with elites of the other strategic players. Unwillingness to review the strategy in the region led Russia to find itself supporting the losing political movements in its neighborhood and politicians in the neighborhood, further alienating itself not only from the winning elites, but also from the population of the countries.

This type of Russian foreign policy towards the “near abroad” cannot stimulate national elites to seek more cooperation with Russia, as long as there are no signals coming from Russia that an equal partnership is offered. On the contrary, authoritarianism being built in Russia, neo-imperial language used to describe the goals of its policies in “near abroad” nullifies the rhetoric of seemingly seeking cooperation with Ukraine, scaring off even pro-Russian part of the Ukrainian
elite. The recent intrusion of Russia in Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, the territorial skirmish between Russia and Ukraine over Tuzla island deteriorate perception of Russian policies towards Ukraine among the population, thus making it harder for politicians to lead a constructive and cooperative dialogue with Russia, since they can be easily accused of treason of national interests and of Ukrainian independence by their domestic political opponents.

The EU between Hope and Despair

The EU is failing to present a genuinely united vision of the foreign and security policy towards Ukraine so far. Without prospects for membership and only presented with a vague European Neighborhood Policy the Ukraine feels alienated from the EU. ENP for Ukraine cannot answer the expectations of the Ukrainians due to the asymmetry between tangible results for the Ukraine and obligations that the Ukraine is to fulfill. Lately EU was increasingly busy with expansion and constitutional processes devoting little attention to foreign policy in the region (except to the extensive, but rather pointless dialogue with Russia). Also, so far Ukraine was included into the extremely heterogeneous pool of countries, towards which EU tried to formulate a single strategy in foreign relations, which also lessened the opportunities for fruitful cooperation.

The EU institutional structure is way too complicated for the Ukrainian elite to deal with effectively, while the EU lacks not only the meaningful approach to
dealing with Ukraine, but also lacks the real instruments to support its political moves in the country. Comments and declarations cannot substitute for real projects involving Ukraine that would render tangible results for the partners.

The USA as a Strategic Player

The USA follows a more active approach in Ukraine, building strong bilateral relations and openly trying to fill the vacuum, which exists in the region after Russia’s retreat. The US is being less reserved than the EU in voicing its positions on developments in the country, since it is less afraid of friction with Russia. However, at times the US is perceived as being too pragmatic, caring only for the stability in the region and hence for the stability of the European market. Also, its support of Ukraine is frequently directed at the exclusion of Russia from regional politics, which increases friction in Russian-Ukrainian relations.

A lack of harmony in the US, the EU and Russia interactions in Ukraine, the inability of Ukraine to influence the strategies of these players, make the country locked in a reactive mode of an object of international relations. This leads not only to the inability of Ukraine to choose among the preferential “vectors” of its foreign policy, but also to its inability to benefit from participation in various regional blocks. Ukraine simultaneously pursued ideologically incompatible goals, such as membership in WTO and in the Common Economic Space, initiated by Russia; membership in NATO and the perspective of membership in the EU, while trying not to make this progress harm its relations with Russia; participating in the GUUAM and CIS clubs simultaneously, which lead to not receiving tangible benefits from either organization.

Interplay between Elites

It is also worthwhile to briefly mention the dominant attitudes of the elites of the major players, discussed above. The Russian elite psychologically feels uneasy about the EU and the US playing a more active role in Ukraine. It fears facing competition from other elites in the area that is considered to be within its sphere of influence historically. This fear creates friction in the relationship with other players as well as irritation with Ukraine, which constantly tries to stay out of from the Russian sphere of influence, while not being openly aggressive.

The European political elite, working with Ukraine, can best be described as fatigued with the partner. Again, Ukrainian oscillation, inability to honor its agreements with deeds, low performance of Ukraine in comparison with other Eastern European transition states, all of these factors contribute towards the image of Ukraine as the country of “vanished hopes”.
Ukraine's political elite is made to understand by the EU that the country definitely has less priority than the EU-Russia relationship. The inability of the EU to offer Ukrainians more than just a list of obligations, not supported with incentives, and the inability of Russia to formulate a positive offer of cooperation to Ukraine devoid of clear neo-imperial aspirations, contributes to increased skepticism in Ukraine towards both partners.

After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine did not receive any serious hint for the review of relationship with the EU or with the US. If this review is not happening in 2006 it can seriously harm the pro-reform part of the Ukrainian political elite. This in turn may deepen the unwillingness of the Ukrainian elite to continue the reforms “on their own”, thus making the country less stable in the long-term.

For years Ukraine under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma was using pro-reform, pro-European, pro-democratic rhetoric as a counter-balance to the Russian vector, while not supporting this rhetoric with real changes in policy. This tendency has some inertia and, multiplied by the greater skepticism on Ukrainian side, may slow down positive developments in the country for years, if not decades.

Orange Revolution: What has Revolved?

The 2004 Presidential elections in Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, uniting Ukrainians in mass protests against the falsification of the election results, proved that the Ukrainian people are ready to defend democratic values, such as freedom of choice, freedom of speech, freedom of political opposition. Ukraine received an image boost abroad and shattered its former image as the country of “vanished hopes” in terms of democratic developments. Also, one of the main political achievements of the revolution is the vastly extending public competition among political forces in the country, which now can be observed with and by the excessively transparent conflicts among the main leaders of the Orange Revolution.

A critical evaluation of the Orange Revolution is necessary to continue and strengthen its achievements both domestically and in relations with the foreign partners of the Ukraine. So, what has changed during the revolution and what are the tendencies set by the events of late 2004 that may influence Ukraine’s relationship with its major foreign partners? What seeds did the revolution plant concerning Ukraine’s domestic development?

First of all, it is necessary to note that the change of ruling elite was only partial. Most of the heroes of the revolution were part of the old team and could
not bring drastic changes to the modus operandi of the Ukrainian system. Second, the revolution as well as the previous presidential campaign of the current president Viktor Yushchenko were mostly directed against the Kuchma regime and did not contain a well-thought out positive program of economic and political reforms. Third, the proclaimed mottos of morality and honesty in power are superseding the ideal of the rule of law, which already creates conflict situations and suspicions of continuing corruption.

These traits are matched against extremely high expectations on behalf of the population, against the grown social consciousness of the Ukrainian people. Disillusionment that is bound to occur can put Ukrainian society in another round of apathy towards country’s fate, which was apparent during the years of the Kuchma’s rule. However, the mechanisms of society influencing the elite are not yet fully grown and the heroes of revolution are feeling safe from the need to advance reforms. On the contrary, the first government after the revolution showed itself as populist, postponing long-term concerns and catering to the short-term needs of the population with the clear goal to succeed in the parliamentary elections of 2006.

Although the first post-revolution government was swift in undertaking some long-awaited steps in cancellation of privileges, free economic zones, which were to the detriment of the equality of economic agents on the market; the government also succumbed to administrative price controls in gasoline and meat markets, unraveled the process of privatization review, which seriously harmed not only the investment climate in Ukraine, but also raised suspicion in adherence of the new elite to the market principles.

Ukraine’s business elite was paralyzed by the privatization process review, which was used not only with the goal to correct illegal privatization deals, but also with an aim to silence business from voicing critique against economic policies of the new government. Also, the so-called “re-privatization” was used by business groups to acquire their rivals’ property—hence the process, not controllable by the government, was highly destabilizing for the economy.

All these trends came into being under deafening silence of the international community, and if some concern was voiced at all it was easily ignored by the government, since there is no effective leverage, such as conditions on loans, to influence the policies within Ukraine. Thus, incentives to strive for long-term economic and administrative reforms were absent within the country and were not present in the form of external pressure either.
The revolution in Ukraine brought about a chance for the country to speed up its development, but there is no potent driving force in the country that would stimulate such developments. Therefore, although the vector of development points clearly into the direction of democratization and market economy, the question is the speed and stability of this process. In this regard, involvement of Ukraine into the international processes could serve as a boost to internal developments.

The EU was active during the Orange Revolution in settling the crises and leading to a peaceful resolution, while Russia was at best an observer in the process. This was one of the first showcases of true activism on behalf of the EU in Ukraine, but will that activism continue? It certainly depends on the performance of the new power in Ukraine, which, surprisingly, in its turn may depend on the activism of the EU. Thus a circle is created when performance depends on external incentives, and external incentives depend on performance. Will that circle become a vicious one or a virtuous one and who will lead this transformation?

Cooperation with Ukraine: How to Proceed

On the one hand, throughout previous years Ukraine proved to be an unreliable partner in international relations with a frequently changing mind and the rhetoric was not followed by real policy changes. On the other hand, Ukraine proved to preserve the resolve to develop democracy and a market economy, which other CIS countries failed to do. While political life in Belarus and Russia seem to be much less pluralistic and open in comparison to Ukrainian politics, it is possible to claim that in Ukraine there is still more short-term politics than long-term policy. As for the freedom of speech and media, freedom of choice and general course for democratization Ukraine also stands out among the leading CIS countries.

So, on the one hand, Ukraine's reputation as of a reliable partner in international relations is not satisfactory, which is partially explained by overblown expectations on behalf of the international community of the pace of reforms in Ukraine. On the other hand, after Orange Revolution and clear authoritarian tendencies in Russia and Belarus, Ukraine becomes the only country in the CIS with the potential to become the leader of democratization processes in the region.

However, as we have seen, without external incentives positive developments in the country are far from being stable. Involving Ukraine in international cooperation may serve as by far the most potent determinant of the speed of domestic transformations.
What should be the characteristics of such an international cooperation that simultaneously serves several goals, namely not only to improve the security in the region, but also to contribute to a faster democratization of Ukraine, bringing stability and predictability to the region?

Previously we have spoken of the attitudes of the elites of the major international players as well as of Ukrainian elite. First, in order to enable large scale-projects in the region it is vital that fatigue, fear, friction, skepticism are turned into basic trust. Without this transformation all serious multilateral cooperative efforts will be undermined from the start. Second, some coordination of efforts in the country on behalf of the EU, the US and Russia should be present, or at least between the EU and the US. Unilateral initiatives risk only bringing more friction into the region and might stimulate greater division among the partners.

Also, while working with Ukraine it is necessary to remember that due to the uncertainty of political processes within the country Ukrainian politicians are always looking to support those projects that besides long-term benefits are giving them short-term dividends. Such a lack of foresight is almost inbuilt into the political system of Ukraine and cannot be ignored. Therefore, for projects to succeed it would be best to take this characteristic into account in the course of their design.

Projects of mutually advantageous multilateral cooperation should be preferred in the first stage of building a relationship with Ukraine as opposed to projects bringing benefits to only several of the players and in the very long run. Also engagement in these projects should not raise concerns with the politicians domestically. Therefore, since values cannot be put at the top of the agenda in cooperation, it is more realistic to start with common projects in the fields of energy, transport and environment, slowly moving to higher levels of cooperation. A lot of projects have already been undertaken in these fields, but they have lacked the scope to serve as serious tokens to interdependence, and were of rather local nature.

Environmental cooperation could be best of all built around the Kyoto protocol implementation. Ukraine, according to evaluation of the EBRD, has the best potential for the Joint Implementation (JI) projects in Eastern Europe. JI is a Kyoto protocol mechanism where the firm, bound by the limit of the greenhouse gas emissions, finds it cheaper to undertake a joint implementation project with a firm from a different country. The project presupposes that the one firm invests in the other and achieves a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, while the host firm, receiving the investment, pays off with certificates that the investor can use to meet its limit of emissions.
Joint Implementation in Ukraine is cost-effective. However, as of now, the central government is lacking the institutional capacity to deal effectively with JI projects. Ukraine, due to economic decline through 1991 to 1999, is well below its country’s quota proscribed in Kyoto protocol. Therefore Ukraine is also able to sell its emission certificates as a country. Greatly positive for all sides would be the development of the separate dialogue with EU devoted to Kyoto protocol and emission trading schemes to engage Ukraine into flexible mechanisms of Kyoto protocol and also to see that Ukraine spends the money received for the emission certificates traded at the national level for the environmental projects.

In the energy field the opportunities for cooperation stem from several premises. Energy consumption in Europe is bound to grow throughout the next decade. Russia is interested in securing its place in the liberalizing European gas market. Ukraine is interested in securing its transit-country status. As of now, Ukraine transports about 80% of Russian gas exports to Europe and in the nearest future it will remain an important transit route despite the transit route diversification efforts by Russia. Ukrainian gas transit system not only requires investments to operate safely through the coming years, but also can relatively cheaply be upgraded to transport higher volumes of gas. However, the only precluding factor to the development of the Ukrainian gas transit capacity seems to be lack of trust between the players. In this regard, it is possible to run multilateral investment projects to increase energy efficiency of the gas transit system, which could also qualify under the Kyoto protocol flexible mechanisms.

Also Ukraine is the 6th largest consumer of natural gas in the world and one of the least energy-efficient countries in Europe. With the prices for energy resources growing, with the wish of Russia to adapt energy deliveries to the Ukraine to world market level prices, it is very likely that energy constraint will become a drag on the development of Ukrainian economy in the medium term future. If the pressure of the rising energy prices will not lead to a drastic shock for the Ukrainian economy it will play the role of an external stimulus for structural reforms in the country, for investment into lesser energy-intensive industry. These concerns will soon be high on the agenda of Ukrainian policy makers and will be easily catching their eye. This opens a window of opportunity not only for numerous cooperative efforts, but also for saving depleting natural resources, demand for which is steadily growing in Europe.

These are just a few examples of cooperative initiatives that could bring tangible results for all parties, improve the basic trust and spread common work standards to allow for upgrading the cooperation. These projects can pave the way towards
the talks on policies, values and other joint initiatives. Should the dialogue not include projects with tangible results it is likely that the dialogue between the EU and Ukraine will evolve into the sphere of rhetoric and will further isolate or even disillusion the pro-European part of the country.

Among other opportunities for motivating Ukraine to move forward with reforms could be simplification of EU visa requirements, which have always been highly bureaucratized and humiliating. Also the EU could grant access for Ukrainian youth to participate in European education and exchange programs.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, expansion of the EU, Ukraine and the EU are bound to look for the relationship of a new quality.

Ukraine is still locked in the reactive mode in its foreign policy due to its inability to effectively influence policies of the main players in the country. Heterogeneity in the region increases as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are following different tracks of development, with Ukraine choosing more democratic approach. Further development of Ukraine along the path of transition towards democracy and market economy currently depends on presence of external incentives or shocks.

In this regard, it would be beneficial for all major players in the region to look for multilateral initiatives that bring tangible benefits to the partners and de-emphasize value differences in order to break from the relationship of friction, skepticism and fatigue to one based on basic trust. Intensive cooperation in transport, environmental and energy domains looks like the best option towards this end.
NATO’s Support for the AU Mission in the Sudan: A Case Study of NATO’s Transformation

*Alexia Mikhos*

In April 1949, the Treaty of Washington brought into being a common security system based on a partnership among the member states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This decision marked the determination of NATO’s members to create an organization that would be based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. For Europe, the transatlantic link enabled protection from the Soviet Union as well as from one another. For the United States, it allowed it to have a say in Europe’s evolution.

To that end, the Alliance would perform a number of fundamental security tasks. First, it would aim to provide the foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Second, NATO would serve as a key transatlantic forum for consultations and coordination between its Allies on any matters that affect their vital interests. Third, the Alliance would seek to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state. Furthermore, in order to ensure the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO would be ready to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, as well as to promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Since the creation of the Alliance in 1949, the international security environment has been transformed in a major way. One such important change was the end of the Cold War era in 1989-91. It was at that time that many observers thought that NATO would dissolve. However, such expectations were based on a misunderstanding of NATO’s structure and objective. NATO was a permanent framework for transatlantic security cooperation that had proven its worth independently of the threat that it was originally meant to counter. Furthermore, NATO was needed as a framework to help manage the major transitions that Europe was undergoing after the end of the Cold War.

**Crisis on the Balkans**

With the break-up of Yugoslavia, NATO faced a further unparalleled challenge, which was to bring peace and stability to the Balkans. Throughout the Cold War,

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1 The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent those of NATO.
NATO had been focused on collective defense. Security was viewed as tantamount to protecting the national territories of Alliance members. Thus, the Allies did not acknowledge straight away the fact that the Balkan conflicts, albeit not directly threatening NATO territory, were nevertheless a security challenge that warranted a response from the Alliance.

Thus, with the Balkan crisis came the need for effective crisis management and peacekeeping. These represented new areas for NATO. However, NATO rose to the challenge, in part through the intensified consultation process, which allowed the Allies to be kept informed of the rapid changes on the ground and to provide continuous political guidance. NATO’s military structures similarly demonstrated an astonishing flexibility to adapt to new missions.

Soon after peace was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Kosovo exploded. If Belgrade were to be made to alter its policies and to allow for a NATO-led peacekeeping force to enter Kosovo, NATO would need to take action. To that end, NATO launched an air campaign against Belgrade.

Through its peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, NATO acquired great experience in crisis management; in particular it learnt that early diplomatic intervention, supported by credible military options, can prevent conflict. In early 2001, NATO applied this lesson with much success during the civil war in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Thus, the post-Cold War period of the 1990s saw NATO successfully adapt to the challenges of pan-European crisis management. In line with a changing security environment, NATO became Europe’s pre-eminent peacekeeper.

World Trade Center Attacked

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 brought about the end of the post-Cold war period and the dawn of an era of greater and globalized instability. Terrorism became more international and far more lethal than before. Maybe not more lethal but a new form of non-nationalistic terrorism that is an ideology based upon religion. Moreover, the spread of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons became another defining trait of the international environment. Rhetorically at least, but as Iraq proved …

Once again, NATO would need to transform in order to respond effectively to new and unprecedented dangers. Within 24 hours of the attacks on the United States, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—for the first time
in its history—indicating that this attack on the United States was perceived as an attack against all Allies. By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor should trigger NATO's collective self-defense obligation, the Alliance, in effect, mandated itself to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.

This broadening of the meaning of collective self-defense was complemented by a second precedent soon after. In Prague, in November 2002, Allies extended NATO's geographical reach to “out-of-area”, by mandating NATO forces to go wherever they are required, and to defend against threats from wherever they might come. Thus, in the face of global threats, NATO's defense was no longer artificially constrained by outdated geographic limits imposed during the Cold War.

In that context, in mid-April 2003, NATO decided to assume the lead role in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the international peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, by taking on the command, co-ordination and planning of the operation. NATO's enhanced role aimed to reinforce the international community's commitment to building a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan.

NATO's role in Iraq

Shortly after the ISAF decision, NATO's role was to be further transformed and widened following the start of consultations on a possible NATO role in
Iraq, which began in 2002. The campaign against Iraq in March 2003 was conducted by a coalition of forces from different countries, led by the USA. NATO as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or in its conduct. However, in response to a request by Turkey in February 2003 for assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance undertook a number of precautionary defensive measures to ensure Turkey’s security in the event of a potential threat to its territory or population. In June 2003, the Alliance also agreed to support Poland, a member of NATO, in its leadership of a sector in the multinational stabilization force in Iraq, including through force generation, communication, logistics and movements.

With NATO’s assistance to Turkey and its support to Poland, NATO did not require to have any permanent presence in Iraq; rather, NATO’s involvement in both aforementioned cases reflected the Alliance’s commitment to the security of its member states and policy of making its assets and experience available wherever and whenever they are needed.

NATO’s role in Iraq was to further evolve following the letter sent by the interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi to the NATO Secretary General on 22 June 2004, requesting NATO support to his government through training and other forms of technical assistance. In that context, on 28 June 2004, at their Summit meeting in Istanbul, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to help Iraq build the capability of its Government to address the security needs of the Iraqi people in line with the request by the aforementioned Iraqi Interim Government and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. A Training Implementation Mission was hence established on 30 July 2004. It was later re-named NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). The guiding principle of this NATO mission is that it is the Iraqis, who make the decisions and are in the driving seat. NATO is there only in their support.

On the Black Continent

NATO’s necessary evolution and transformation in the ever-changing security environment continued when on 8 June 2005, NATO took a landmark decision and agreed to undertake its first mission on the African continent, specifically to provide logistical support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). Indeed, when the African Union (AU) took the decision to expand significantly its peacekeeping mission in Darfur to about 7,700 troops in an attempt to halt the continuing violence in the region, it realized that AMIS could not succeed without substantial international effort.
Logistical support for the Darfur operation

As a result, on 26 April 2005, in a letter by AU Commission President, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré, asked NATO to consider the possibility of providing logistical support to its operation in Darfur. On 17 May, Mr. Konaré visited NATO, providing details on the kind of assistance that the AU would require in this regard. This was the first visit by an AU official to NATO. On 26 May, NATO Secretary-General attended the Major Donors’ Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where he expressed NATO’s readiness to help the AU mission in Darfur with logistics and to assist the AU with training. Based on further clarification and confirmation of the AU’s requirements, as well as consultations with the AU, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Council (NAC)—the Alliance's principal decision-making body—agreed on 8 June on the detailed modalities and extended Alliance support to the AMIS.

Thus, NATO agreed to support the AMIS first, by coordinating the airlift of AU troops into the region. At the beginning of August 2005, the AU requested that NATO also assist in the transportation of civilian police staff. Thus, on 5 August, NATO agreed to further extend its assistance to the AU in the area of strategic airlift to include the coordination of the transportation of civilian police personnel.

The EU was also to provide airlift assistance, and hence NATO would work in close coordination and constant consultation with the EU in this regard. The coordination of NATO’s airlift was to be done from Europe. A special AU air movement cell was also set up at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa to coordinate the movement of incoming troops and civilian police personnel on the ground in Africa with the presence of both NATO and EU staff.

During the first phase of NATO support to AMIS, which was completed at the end of October 2005, NATO coordinated the airlift of almost 5,000 African Union peacekeepers (seven battalions), significantly boosting the force on the ground. NATO also coordinated the airlift of 50 civilian police personnel.

As part of its assistance in Darfur and in addition to the coordination of airlift missions, NATO provided staff capacity building workshops for the AU’s officers at the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) Headquarters in Addis Ababa and at the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in El Fasher, Sudan. The first part of the training in Addis Ababa took place during the period 1–12 August 2005 with 10 participants. The training focused on strategic level planning to include staff tactics, techniques and procedures that the AU could employ to address the challenges presented by Darfur. The second part of the workshops, conducted in El Fasher
during the period 4–23 September 2005, involved 114 participants. They targeted
the AU Force Headquarters with three identical 5-day course packages covering
such topics as peace support operations, operational planning and media relations.

In a separate activity, NATO further helped organize an UN-led mapping exer-
cise, which ran between 18 and 27 August 2005. The key purpose of the exercise
was to assist AU personnel to understand and operate effectively in the theatre of
operations, as well as to build their capacity to manage strategic operations.

On 16 September 2005, NATO received a new AU request on further NATO
logistical support to AMIS. On 30 September 2005, NATO agreed to continue
to offer support to the African Union for staff capacity building, as well as in the
coordination of strategic airlift during further troop rotations of AMIS II forces,
in conjunction with the EU and other donors until 31 March 2006. On 9 No-
vember, the NAC agreed to extend NATO’s coordination of strategic airlift by
a further two months until the end of May 2006, in view of the schedule of the
AU’s troop rotation plan. The coordination of strategic airlift was implemented
together with the EU, using the same mechanisms as during the first phase of
NATO’s support to AMIS in this realm. During this second phase of NATO’s
assistance to AMIS, the Alliance coordinated the airlift of about 5,000 troops in
and out of Darfur (six battalions).

With respect to staff capacity building, NATO workshops for AU personnel took
place during the period of 5–16 February 2006 in El Fasher and 6–17 February
2006 in Addis Ababa. The detailed framework for the Staff Capacity Building in
El Fasher consisted of two courses over a two-week period with special emphasis
on the Joint Operational Centre, reporting procedures, operational planning and
current operations. Focus was placed on the “Train-the-trainer” concept with an
invitation to the Sector Headquarters trainers as well. Regarding the DITF Head-
quarters, the training covered topics regarding Strategic Planning over a two-week
period. 48 students from the Force and Sector Headquarters attended the training
in El Fasher. 12 students attended the workshops in Addis Ababa.

On 13 April 2006, the NAC took further important decisions regarding NATO’s
readiness to continue its current support mission to AMIS until 30 September
2006, covering the coordination of strategic airlift and capacity-building, subject
to consultations and agreement with the AU. Moreover, the Council agreed, sub-
ject to consultations and agreement with the AU, to provide further support to
AMIS to include Joint Operations Centre capacity building, unit pre-deployment
certification and lessons learned.
Following the Council decisions, on 2 June 2006, Mr. Konaré sent a letter to NATO Secretary General asking for further NATO support for the establishment of an AMIS Joint Operations Centre, as well as for training assistance in the fields of unit pre-deployment certification and lessons learned.

On 5 June 2006, the AU also asked all partners for international assistance in running a course in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. NATO is considering, in close coordination with all its partners, a possible contribution to partners’ training assistance in this field.

On 7 June 2006, the NAC decided to extend NATO’s logistical assistance to AMIS until the end of 2006. On 8 June 2006, NATO’s Defense Ministers expressed their willingness to extend the Alliance’s support to AMIS to assist with the establishment of an AMIS Joint Operations Centre, unit pre-deployment certification and lessons learned.

Following a Note Verbale by the AU on 25 August 2006, NATO responded positively to the request to deploy two personnel in Addis Ababa in order to provide temporarily staff capacity building assistance within the Information Assessment Cell of the DITF. The training started on 11 September 2006. Moreover, following an AU request on 19 September 2006, NATO is providing mentoring and training to the DITF for an AMIS Lessons Learned Exercise to cover military, civilian police and civilian support staff activities. In this area, NATO is working in full complementarity with the European Union, which will also be providing substantive input to the process.

In the latter phase of NATO support, NATO has coordinated the airlift of 3 AU battalions and about 450 civilian police personnel. Meanwhile, on 14 December 2006, the North Atlantic Council agreed to respond positively to the request of the Commission of the African Union, dated 7 December 2006 for a continuation of the existing assistance offered by NATO to AMIS until 30 June 2007. In this regard, NATO has agreed to continue to offer, within means and capabilities, support to the African Union for staff capacity building, as well as in the coordination of strategic air transport in support of troops and civilian police personnel induction and rotation, in conjunction with the European Union and other donors.

Key principles of the AU support
The key principles that the AU is in the driving seat guides NATO’s assistance to AMIS to solving the conflict in Darfur and the Alliance’s role is in support of the
AU to contribute to strengthen the AU’s capability to meet this challenge. Indeed, NATO is supportive of the view of having African solutions to African problems. NATO’s response is tailored to the appeals and expressed needs of the AU. NATO’s assistance is responsive to the AU’s requests. Moreover, it has been a common understanding from the outset that NATO will not send combat troops in Darfur; NATO’s assistance relates only to logistic support.

In all its efforts with respect to Darfur, NATO aims to work in full consultation, transparency and complementarity with the EU, the UN and all other relevant donors. To ensure the maximization of the involvement of all international organizations and actors involved in providing assistance to the AMIS, coordinating mechanisms and constant open dialogue at Headquarter, as well as theatre levels, have been established. Such structures enable to avoid duplication of efforts.

In conclusion, NATO’s transformation following the end of the Cold War has been undertaken with great success as demonstrated by the variety of operations and missions which it has undertaken successfully since then. NATO has demonstrated an astounding capacity to change and to manage change. NATO remains a security organization, which plays an essential part of world order.

With respect in particular to Darfur, NATO has proceeded successfully, driven by the requests and needs from the AU. NATO has received positive feedback from the AU on its contribution so far to AMIS, which has been perceived as very useful and as going some way towards increasing the effectiveness of AMIS. That said, ultimately, in Darfur, however important a peacekeeping operation is for the short term, a lasting peace will only come through a successful political process. To that end, all parties need to resolve their internal and external divisions and commit themselves earnestly to peace.
At their Summit in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government stated their intention to “put special focus on engaging with our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.”1 While the Allies have for some time discussed the need for greater engagement in these two regions, NATO’s programs prior to Istanbul remained fairly limited. Following the “Strategic Shift” at Istanbul, several major changes have taken place in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to make it more relevant to the needs and interests of NATO and these less-developed Partners. However, these new initiatives face many of the same challenges of past NATO programs in the two regions, including lack of democratization, lack of political will to undertake reforms, language and cultural barriers, and lack of resources. NATO must address these challenges or develop innovative ways to work around them if its programs are to achieve any measure of success.

This paper seeks to address why the “Strategic Shift” to the Caucasus and Central Asia was undertaken at Istanbul (with a specific focus on Central Asia), what tools NATO is using to address the security threats faced in these two regions, and what the prospects are for success in this endeavor. Finally, I will compare NATO’s programs in Central Asia with the many other competing interests of the Alliance, and will make the case that NATO’s strategic interests justify the increased expenditure of resources in the region.

Strategic challenges in Central Asia

A listing of the strategic challenges faced in Central Asia reads like a laundry list of post-9/11 security threats. Violent religious extremism, latent inter-state conflict, trafficking in weapons, narcotics, and persons, and weak and non-democratic state structures all contribute to a region in flux, oftentimes bordering on instability. The expansion of EU and NATO borders eastward only increases the likelihood that NATO Allies will have to deal with these challenges on their own doorsteps. Of more immediate concern, the states of Central Asia border on Afghanistan, a country in which NATO and its partners have deployed more than 35,000 peacekeepers. The security of the surrounding region has a direct impact on the success of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. While it would be nice to

1 The views expressed in this paper are the private views of the author, and do not represent an official position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
think that NATO’s assistance to Central Asia is a purely altruistic exercise, such a claim would be false. While NATO’s goals may be noble and lofty—promoting democratic reforms and enhancing security for the people in the region—its motives are more often grounded in realpolitik—heading off threats before they reach NATO’s borders.

NATO has a three-level approach to promoting security sector reform. At the level of individuals, NATO seeks to promote “intellectual interoperability”. That is, NATO seeks to prepare individuals to be able to participate alongside NATO military personnel in peacekeeping operations, and more generally, to be active participants in a democratically controlled security sector. At the national level, NATO seeks to promote democratic institutional reform. This means encouraging reform of security sector institutions to make them more transparent, efficient (interoperable with each other), and accountable to parliamentary authority. At the interstate level, NATO seeks to promote regional and international cooperation. In addition to preparing states for joint participation in international peacekeeping operations, this also means promoting joint approaches to regional security issues.

NATO has developed a continuum of programs to address its interests and those of its Central Asian Partners. NATO and individual NATO Allies run several thousand programs a year focusing on defense reform and military interoperability, ranging from language training, to international humanitarian law courses, to staff officer training for participation in a multinational peacekeeping headquarters. NATO has developed key sub-sets of programs to address specific security challenges. Two of the most important are the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T) and the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB—which is a specific set of programs dedicated to promoting democratic control of the security sector). NATO headquarters and the Central Asian partners engage in an ongoing discussion on which programs will best fit the interests of both NATO and the states concerned. For some states in the region, enhancing border security is a top priority. For others, updating Soviet-era defense budgeting and accounting systems is a key task. NATO seeks to provide advice and assistance on these critical reform processes, as well as help the states concerned find the resources necessary to conduct oftentimes expensive reforms.

The way in which NATO and a Partner country structure their cooperation is based on the needs, interests, and level of development of the country in question. All Partners develop an Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) with NATO yearly. This is a jointly agreed list of training activities and military exercises in which a
Partner will participate. Partners whose cooperation with NATO is slightly more advanced participate in the Planning and Review Process (PARP), in which some or all of their security forces undergo defense review procedures similar to those of NATO Allies themselves. More advanced still is the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), in which a Partner and NATO jointly agree on a detailed program of security sector reform. The benefit to a Partner of participating in more advanced programs is not only a more rapid rate of defense reform, but also greater access to NATO resources and expertise to help them conduct those reforms.

NATO faces many challenges in successfully achieving its defense reform goals in Central Asia. Chief among these is the lack of democracy and rule of law in most states in the region. While NATO can and does do much to promote these values in the states of the region, this is a long-term and often arduous battle that must be fought, as the continued lack of democratization slows the overall reform effort. Even in countries where lack of democracy is not as much of a concern, it is difficult to achieve the political will necessary to engage in complicated and oftentimes expensive security sector reforms. While some states in the region lack monetary resources (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic), all states in Central Asia region currently lack the human and institutional resources necessary to engage in substantive security sector reform.
Suspicious Russia

Another significant challenge to the success of NATO’s mission in Central Asia is Russian suspicions of NATO’s motives and methods. While the NATO-Russia relationship is growing in scope and substance, Russia remains quite wary of NATO activities in Central Asia, and often uses its influence in an attempt to limit cooperation between NATO and the states of Central Asia. If NATO is to achieve its goals in Central Asia, it must figure out ways to assure Russia that NATO programs are not a threat, but in fact enhance Russia’s security by increasing stability and security in a region on Russia’s borders.

Despite the significant challenges facing NATO in Central Asia, there are an equal number of factors working in NATO’s favor. Chief among these is the fact that NATO programs address the real security needs of its Partners. Whether it is enhancing border security capabilities or advising states on parliamentary oversight of the defense budget, NATO is attempting to address the most pressing security reform concerns of the states in the region. The fact that NATO programs are useful to the states in the region can be seen in the fact that all of these countries express a strong desire to increase their cooperation activities with NATO.

Another important factor that enhances NATO’s chances of success in the region is the experience gained in the reform processes of NATO’s ten newest members. Not only has NATO gained a great deal of experience in the field of post-Soviet defense reform, these states are themselves playing an active role in sharing their experiences with the states of Central Asia. Still another important factor working in favor of NATO’s success in the region is broader and deeper cooperation with the OSCE, EU, and UN. Each organization has significant assets and experience to bring to the region, and our increased cooperation is yielding benefits to the states of Central Asia.

Yearning for change

Finally, and most importantly, is the desire of the people in the region for change within their societies. While the human, political, and economic rights situation in Central Asia is still quite poor, the ordinary citizens of Central Asia are beginning to agitate for improvements in their government structures and their daily lives, including in the security sphere. As the events in Andijan in April 2005 and the continuing low-level violence during protests in The Kyrgyz Republic have showed, the political opening of Central Asia will be quite difficult and at times violent. But the people of Central Asia are showing unmistakable signs that they want greater accountability and transparency in their governments. NATO, and
other important international security actors like the EU, UN, and OSCE, can play an important role in encouraging, cajoling, and sometimes browbeating the governments of Central Asia into moving in the right direction.

NATO certainly does not have all of the answers to the complex and rapidly evolving security situation on the ground in Central Asia. True change, if it is to come, must be demanded by and led by the people of the region themselves. However, NATO has many useful tools for security reform that have proven themselves time and again over the past decade in Central and Eastern Europe. With further adaptation to the unique cultural and political circumstances of the region, they can be just as useful for promoting democratic security sector reform in Central Asia. The process of reform in Central Asia will not be easy, and significant setbacks can be expected along the way. But given the stakes involved, the West has little choice but to continue to promote reforms in this strategically important region.
NATO Cooperation with Central Asia
The five Republics in Central Asia are, as they appear today, largely creations of the Soviet Union. For over 70 years they were forgotten, closed territories to the outside world. This point cannot be underestimated, for it was the Soviet Union who put in place not only the states, but also the infrastructure on which they survive today.

In the last 15 years the people of the region have been pre-occupied in re-building their livelihoods in the harsh re-adjustment period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the closed world of Soviet Central Asia this collapse was neither anticipated nor embraced, and this partly accounts for why the post-Soviet era has been overseen by the former Communist Chairmen. Glasnost or Perestroika never found prevalence in Central Asia as it did in European Russia or the Baltic States. Today’s Presidents are manifestations of the late Brezhnev era of cadre politics, building large entourages and, if anything, accentuating the trends that caused the implosion of Communism in other regions in order to cement their reigns. In doing this they have mercilessly exploited the natural resources to be found in the region, including oil, gas, coal and gold.

It is these resources that have spurned a phenomenon amongst political scientists known as the “Great Game”, a twenty first century re-incarnation of the nineteenth century confrontation for imperial power and prestige between Russia and Britain. This “Great Game” though is markedly different. Prestige has been replaced by the want to exploit Central Asia’s natural resources. In addition to this, “new” security threats such as religious terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, human beings and weapons mean that global actors must engage in the region in order to protect their interests. The economic face to the new “Great Game” has raised the stakes to a higher level, and as such, significantly increased the number of actors. Russia, the incumbent politico-economic power in the region remains, but is now challenged by the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Turkey, Iran, India and China, to greater or lesser extents.

Political scientists and strategists tend to look upon the Great Game from the outside. Their focus is on which power can gain what, and ultimately, which outside power will establish a dominant political and economic position. Few people have looked inwards at the Great Game. The important issues for the man on the
street in Bishkek are not whether a unipolar or multipolar world order exists, but rather who offers the best opportunities for long term political, economic and social stability and development.

This article will attempt to take a look at the Great Game from a perspective of how the different actors are trying to achieve influence in the region, and which approaches offers the best prospects for the development and stability of Central Asia.

Objectives in the new “Great Game”

To understand the different approaches used by the various competitors in the Great Game it is necessary to first define their objective. The objective for all the competitors is to create an environment, which best serves, their economic and national security interests. Kazakhstan is said to have the estimated proven and probable oil reserves at approximately 26 billion barrels,¹ whilst Turkmenistan’s reserves in natural gas are said to be 30% of all world reserves.² Until the mid-1990s Central Asia remained less attractive for natural resource companies due to the lack of supply infrastructure and the high costs of exploration and exploitation. However, as the demand for oil and gas has dramatically increased, especially from China and Western Europe, and the desire of the USA to expand its oil supply options has increased, so Central Asia has become a prime natural resources market. By the late 1990’s oil companies from Russia, Europe, America and, lately, China have been both colluding and competing for a share of Central Asia’s natural resources.

National security concerns are also behind the “Great Game”. Even before the events of September 11th 2001 in America the region had become known as a breeding ground and outpost for religious extremists. The high birth rate, in Uzbekistan at 26.22 births per 1,000 population,³ coupled with the low socio-economic conditions provided a perfect breeding ground for disenfranchised young men who could be easily persuaded that they had been failed by both Communism and Capitalism. This manifested itself in some of the armed militia during the Tajik Civil War between 1993-1997 and later by the rise of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) based in the Ferghana Valley city of Naman-gan. The region’s proximity to Afghanistan, its porous borders and ineffective law enforcement structures also presented the possibility that religious terrorists, or the weapons they needed could both emanate and transit through the region.

and into Russia, China and Europe. Outside powers used the events of September 11th 2001 to add to their economic presence in the region by engaging with the Republics to clamp down on religious extremism and terrorism in the region. America, Russia, China and several European countries stepped up their security cooperation with Central Asian states after 2001. This included military assistance and law enforcement training. In addition to bilateral assistance, both Russia and China have created or enhanced existing security structures to fight the perceived threat of terrorism in the region. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure in early 2004.

The approaches of the competitors in the “Great Game” are, in many respects, molded to the characteristics of the five Central Asian Republics. The five Central Asian republics started their evolution as sovereign actors in international relations after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. They immediately and publicly allied themselves with developed democracies and firmly committed themselves to human rights. It was never going to be that easy though. At first they found themselves unknown, not exiting geopolitically on international maps. Meaningless lines on the Soviet maps now became firm borders, which was an alien concept in the minds of millions of Central Asians. These new Republics faced a multitude of problems that prior to 1991 were never considered, such as disputable borders, enclaves and divided nations.

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Moscow’s agenda, which had been dominating for 70 years, disappeared overnight and left a vacuum. Newly independent Russia, under Boris Yeltsin, was itself turning to the West for guidance. In the early days of independence, the Central Asian Republics still looked up to its “older brother” in Moscow for the lead. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan made similar commitments and joined the same organizations together with Russia and other former Soviet Republics. Their membership in the United Nations was just a procedural issue as was their simultaneous accession to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1992. The new Constitutions of all the Republics declared democracies and guaranteed human rights unconditionally. Furthermore, these states signed most of human rights treaties quickly and mainly without any reservations. The political process, at that time, was seen through the lenses democracy and human rights as paramount concepts. It helped to gain international recognition. In addition, democracy and human rights were quickly realized as productive in terms of aid and investments from the West.

Not too fond of democracy

As the Presidents’ of the Central Asian Republics became more comfortable and confident in their roles, the lack of genuine commitment to human rights and democracy revealed itself. Indeed, it is indicative that no election in any of the countries in the region has been recognized as free and fair in the last 15 years by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As we stand here today, in 2005, it is fair to say that neither civil society, political pluralism nor basic political liberties has really taken root in any of the countries, possibly with the exception of Kyrgyzstan.

Disappointing Kyrgyzstan

The greatest disappointment in the region was the regression of Kyrgyzstan. After gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan was termed the “island of democracy”, distinguished by rapid economic and political reforms in the spirit of free market and human rights. It acceded to the World Trade Organization in 1998 and still remains its only Central Asian member. President Askar Akaev was the most proactive and promising leader. Kyrgyzstan’s status as a relatively poor, landlocked country was the key impetus for this strategy. Despite some gold reserves, the country does not possess the natural energy reserves to be found in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. It has therefore had to rely on good will and foreign assistance in its development.

4 All the five Central Asian republics together with Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Ukraine joined the CSCE on 30/1/1992.
However, starting from 2000, actions of President Akaev shattered the illusion of Kyrgyzstan as an “island of democracy” in a repressive region. Political pluralism began to be infringed upon as oppositional leaders were prosecuted. Daniyar Usenov (then a leader of the People’s Party) was found guilty of criminal charges dating back to 1996. As a result, he was constitutionally ineligible to stand in the 2000 Presidential election. Felix Kulov (Chairman of Ar-Namys party, a former Mayor of Bishkek, former Governor of Chui Oblast and former Minister of National Security) was banned from the same Presidential election race and subsequently imprisoned on the grounds of fraud and embezzlement. During “Aksy Events” civil resistance in support of the opposition Member of Parliament, Azimbek Beknazarov, quickly escalated into civil unrest. During the clashes between the law enforcement bodies and supporters of Azimbek Beknazarov on 17-18 March 2003 in the Aksy district of the Jalalabat province six people were killed by police gunfire. This human rights’ reverse wave, which lasted until the end of 2004, could have been stopped by the “revolution” that took place in March 2005. However, the supporters of the revolution, a fragmented group of criminal/businessmen, opposition politicians and supporters of further democratic freedoms, hinted that despite the outward appearance of a popular revolution unseating an authoritarian leader, the post-revolution reality was going to be a lot different. And so it has turned out to be. The expectations of those hoping for further democracy have not materialized, and criminal elements that supported the revolution now control all key state functions and economic interests.

Rich Kazakhstan

In contrast, Kazakhstan was always in the most enviable situation in the region. A small population of 15 million occupies a territory of 2.7 million square metres rich in oil, gas and coal reserves. Kazakhstan has 29 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 1.8 trillion cubic metres of proven natural gas reserves. These have spurred per capita GDP to 7800 Dollar in 2004. Despite this, Kazakhstan remains somewhat of a kleptocracy. In 2003 it emerged that President Nazarbayev and a former Oil Minister had received more than 78 million Dollar in kickbacks from oil companies in exchange for lucrative oil contracts. In the same year, it was uncovered that a Swiss bank account held more than 10 billion Dollar in Kazakh state funds. These funds had never been disclosed to Parliament or in any budget documents, so it was with some incredulity that Nazarbayev announced shortly after the disclosure that the money was Kazakh oil revenues being held back in a “state development fund”. What happens to this fund should the Nazarbayev family someday stop ruling Kazakhstan will be interesting.
Given this relative economic wellbeing, Kazakhstan has never been a beacon for democracy or human rights in the region. Political pluralism has never fully taken root in the country. Prominent opposition figures such as Bolat Abilov, a prominent member of the opposition bloc “For a Just Kazakhstan” have consistently been barred from standing for election after sudden prosecutions. This practice went as far as to imprison the former Prime Minister, Galiymzhana Zhakiyanov, in 2002 after he had established the opposition party, “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan”. Persecution of independent media and journalists, especially through the use of criminal libel laws has decimated free press in the country. In the Central Asian context, freedoms are rather compromised than brutally violated if compared with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For instance, whilst the use of exhaustive legal and administrative obstacles has hindered the development of political pluralism, there have been no reported cases of torture in Kazakhstan recently.

Civil war in Tajikistan

The situation in Tajikistan stands out among all others, as it was the only country in the region to descend into civil war. Between 1992–1997 the Civil War in the country caused 100,000 casualties and displaced 500,000 people. The peace agreement, brokered in 1998, was designed to form the basis for democratic development. However, 2003–2005 have been characterized by a clamp down on opposition politicians, including those party to the peace accords, and a sustained attack by President Rakhmonov’s government on independent media sources. The backsliding on democratic development achieved in the late 1990s has once again led Tajikistan to the brink of instability. This threat has been accentuated by the lack of economic development and widespread poverty still afflicting the majority of the population. GDP per capita income was just 1,100.5 It remains the poorest region in Central Asia, despite some recent Russian, Pakistani and Iranian investment in hydroelectric projects in the country.

Personality cult in Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan stands out in the region as the most repressive regime in a region where democracy and human rights were already weak concepts. Already from 1993, Human Rights Watch started highlighting the oppression of all civil and political rights in the country, criminal persecution of political dissents and the widespread use of torture. Human Rights Watch reported that the continued widespread use of torture made “Turkmenistan the only Soviet successor state known to continue this barbaric practice”.6 To compare it to the closed, repres-

The sive regimes of North Korea and Burma would not be unrealistic. The final blow to political opposition in the country came in 2002, when President Saparmurad Niyazov alleged that he had been a target of an abortive assassination attempt. In the aftermath, prominent government ministers, former ministers and those in positions of power in the country were purged, put on trial and imprisoned. These included Boris Shikmuradov, the former Chairman of the Central Bank, Batyr Berdiyev, former Foreign Minister, and 58 others. In addition, 4 former officials, including the Minister of Agriculture and the former Turkmen Ambassador to Turkey were tried in absentia, whilst another 58 people (including 21 members of the same family) were held without charge. Of the 58 people imprisoned, it is not clear how many are still alive. It has been well documented that President Niyazov has build up a cult of personality. Posters of him adorn buildings in very town and village in the country. The book he wrote, the “Rukhnama”, has replaced academic texts and has been given an equal status to the Koran. The plentiful natural gas resources to be found in the country have fuelled this egotistical behavior. In 2004 Turkmenistan had 1.43 trillion cubic metres of natural gas reserves. Despite the potential for wealth, the population lives in abject poverty, with both education and health care cut back to a minimum in the last two years.

Stagnating Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan became a state of concern in the region some time later. Criticized for failing to reform its economy, the country has stagnated around an autocratic political system backed by ownership of the key economic resources by seven or eight of the most powerful families in the country. Since the mid-1990s, both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations have criticized Uzbekistan for its use of torture and poor prison facilities. Harsh government policies were adopted in the mid-1990s to curb the perceived threat of Islamic extremism in the country, particularly in the densely populated but economically depressed Ferghana Valley region. Non-state sponsored mosques were banned, as were beards. These policies, coupled with the strangulation at birth of moderate opposition parties such as “Erk” and “Birlik” have, if anything, led to genuine opposition to the Karimov regime being forced underground and becoming radicalized. The “fight against terrorism” has used to be justified by combating terrorism and religious extremism. The Uzbek population, seeing that the current regime offered no prospects or chances for economic development, have turned to other authorities for help. This is illustrated by the growth of Islamic extremist groups as an alternative to the governmental authority. The IMU, who in the late 1990s controlled large areas of the Uzbek city of Namangan, and according to residents introduced social welfare provision, education and law and order, is one such example. They gained certain public support due to repressions, deep-
ening economic crises, restrictions on trade in local markets (baazars), draconian measures in border security. Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir claimed some 4,000 of their co-religionists had been arrested since late 1998, the majority in 1999. Human Rights Watch and other rights groups documented the conviction of several hundred members of the group in 2000 for engaging in unsanctioned meetings, teaching religion and praying in private, and possession and distribution of literature not cleared by state censors.7 Worryingly, at Easter and in June 2004 Uzbekistan experienced a wave of suicide bombings, the first such attacks in the region.

“Cultural obstacles” for democracy

All the incumbent elites, to varying extents, refer to cultural obstacles while justifying their repression of human rights and democratic development. In fact, cultural factors are more articulated by the elites themselves than exist in reality. They foster the opinion that human rights and democracy are western values not appropriate to the local societies (at least) for the present historic moment. President Nazarbayev has stated this in two addresses to the nation in the year 2005 alone. Furthermore, the leadership in these countries keep the people unaware of the essence of human rights (for instance, the majority of Uzbek and Turkmen population lacks access to Internet and use of it is restricted). Based on the afore-mentioned it can be disclosed that the state policy on human rights, its failures and perspectives are mainly dependent on the ruling elites. Therefore, their democratization or replacement will have a direct impact on human rights and people’s lives in the region.

On May 13/14, 2005 the Uzbek authorities crushed an anti-government protest in the Ferghana Valley city of Andijon. The Uzbek government stated that 187 Islamic terrorists had been killed. Reports by some international organizations and NGOs, including the OSCE, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Human Rights Watch suggested that the figure could actually be between 500–1000, and include women and children.

Through this event two approaches were discernible, the “Realpolitik” approach, adopted by Russia and China, and the “Human rights”-based approach, used by the European states and the US. Generally, although all the states in the Great Game in Central Asia have their own objectives, whether based on national security considerations or economic desires, European states and the US appeal to certain standards, while Russia and China operate purely in a realpolitik manner.

A “Realpolitik” approach does not care about human rights and international law. From this perspective, their own interests, exercising power in pursuit of relative gains, drive states as the main actors. Military strength is the apparent principle. Russia’s and China’s reliance on their military might and resisting any external military presence in the region discloses this approach. They perceive the US military bases as a direct threat to their interests in the region and, therefore, actively lobby for the withdrawal of the American Forces from Central Asia. At the same time, they increase their military capabilities in order to alter the balance of power. There is a gradual activating of military capabilities of the region underway with joint military training being put in place.

Hard-nosed approach from China and Russia
Russia and China build up their relations in the region on a leader-to-leader contacts basis. These two big players recognize the incumbent presidents as individual decision-makers. They consider stability in the region as a stability of the ruling regimes and disregard populations and civic institutions. Therefore, Russia and China consider any potential for change of the regimes/elites as a security challenge and are interested in their status quo. Uzbekistan’s interpretation of Andijon events, for instance, was regarded as adequate and these two big players have accepted the Uzbek government’s reaction as rational. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman clearly stated that Beijing was “delighted” the situation was again under control.

Furthermore, being heavily criticized for alarming situations in human rights inland, the leadership of China and Russia find it comfortable to strengthen their presence in the region without such idealistic conditionalities as human right observance. They mainly view the spread of human rights norms in the region as a part of the enforcing strategy of the US and Europe to dominate. Therefore, any effort to improve their own or Central Asian records on human rights is judged as interference in domestic affairs. Moreover, they counterbalance such efforts. While, for instance, the European countries and the US repeatedly warn about fraud elections in the Central Asian republics, China and Russia recognize these elections fair and transparent.

Ambivalent USA and liberal EU
It should not be forgotten that the US position is ambivalent in Central Asia. Many human rights and democratization experts heavily criticize it for foreign policy towards Uzbekistan and previous support of President Karimov at the ex-

pense of human rights. Indeed, tension between morality and self-interest in US foreign policy is evident about consequences of giving up in human rights, too.

Human rights-based interpretations stem from liberal theory of International Relations and are diametrically opposite to realpolitik. It regards rights and freedoms of every human being rather than powers of governments. Nations, attaching themselves to this approach, are expected to respect certain international norms on human rights and to carry out their international policy through observance of human rights. The US and European countries tend to follow this path; they emphasize the rights of ordinary people. Consequently, in case of Andijon events, the US and especially European Union stood against Uzbek leadership’s closing the case and called for international investigation.

Security is differently viewed through the “human rights” and the “realpolitik” lens. The first one is more comprehensive and includes human dimension and human rights issues in particular. It reasonably concerns about deficit of democracy and poor situation in human rights as about security threats in general and roots of extremism in particular. Contrarily, in realpolitik perspective security is mainly achieved through stability of regimes and powers. There is no space for deeper understanding of social processes.

The bigger players’ approaches do not progress towards needs of peoples of Central Asia. China and Russia continue dealing with the Central Asian countries in the realpolitik manner. The US is closing down its human rights programs throughout the region, although still making general references to human rights (for instance, blocking the Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the OSCE). The EU seems to preserve its former policy and remains the most committed to its initial course toward human rights ideas. However, there are less and less demands which could have helped the republics to step up to a higher standards in human rights. Kyrgyzstan is fatigued by strikes and demonstrations and has got stuck in constitutional reform. President Rakhmanov is re-elected in Tajikistan and this is not promising for human rights development in the country. Turkmenistan is preparing to elect a new president after the death of President Niyazov, but it is most likely that the current elite will keep power. Uzbekistan remains self-isolated and closed to criticism from abroad. Although trying to improve its human rights image hastily in order to get chairmanship in the OSCE, Kazakhstan in fact remains a country where political system hampers human rights. The Central Asian ruling elites learn lessons how to manage internal protests of their populations and resort to realpolitik strategies while the populations are left with ever less solid international support and with less enthusiasm about human rights perspectives.
It would be naive to call for states to abandon their interests in the region. However, if realpolitik is viewed as rejecting human rights dimension, it will inevitably undermine stability in the region since it does not address the needs of the populations as roots of security and development challenges in Central Asia. Similarly, if “human rights” approach remains rhetoric or even gets withdrawn, conditions for instability and extremism are even more favored in Central Asia.

To be responsible, the international community has to rescue discredited human rights and democratic values in the region from external rivalry and for the sake of long-term comprehensive security. The big players should foresee the consequences of short-term zero-sum policies and re-approach current foreign policies towards taking into account security challenges and needs of Central Asian societies. In the context of lasting grievances within these societies, the latter is necessary but not sufficient given the detachment of human rights issues from international politics in the region. This also could help enlarge possibilities...
for constructive and “win-win” strategies for all the players in Central Asia and provide alternatives to the deepening social and security crises in this region of potentials and possibilities.
Strategic Ambiguity and Domestic Politics: 
US Policy over the Taiwan Issue

Guo Yongjun

A Powder Keg

In the post-Cold War era, there are still many potential powder kegs in different regions of the world. Among them is the Taiwan Strait that poses the biggest threat to regional and international security. The danger lies in the possibility of war between the existing superpower in the world, the US, and the rising power with the biggest population in the world, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In March 1996, PRC launched missiles into waters very close to Taiwan’s northern and southern tips. In response, President Clinton dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to that area. Peace and security in East Asia were at “the brink of the precipice.”

Strategic Ambiguity: Framework of US Policy

Taiwan issue is an internal problem for China. In the civil war right after World War II, the Kuomintang Party (KMT) was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and retreated to Taiwan island in 1949. However, in the Cold War context, the hostility across the Taiwan Strait was linked to international politics, and the US committed itself to defending Taiwan. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, President Truman deployed the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. Later, President Eisenhower administration signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1954.

US policy toward Taiwan could be divided into two phases. In 1950s and 1960s, US recognized Taiwan diplomatically and had no official relations with PRC. Since President Richard Nixon’s historical visit to PRC in 1972, US gradually altered its policy. Within one decade, four founding documents were released one after another and set up the framework of US policy over the Taiwan issue. They were the Shanghai Communique (February 1972); the Normalization Communique to establish diplomatic relations between US and PRC (December 1978); the

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Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, March 1979); the “8·17” Communiqué on arms sales (August 1982).2

The above documents adjusted US policy substantially. Politically, US shifted its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the Normalization Communiqué, US “recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China”. This was the turning point of US policy and US–PRC–Taiwan triangle.3 Militarily, US altered its security relationship with Taiwan significantly. The Mutual Defense Treaty was replaced by the newly passed TRA, which was only an unilateral act and had no binding force.4 US also withdrew all of its military personnel and facilities from Taiwan.

However, the US also decided to maintain “cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations” with Taiwan. The phrase “other unofficial” could cover a very broad field, including arms sales. Thus US tried to maintain a delicate balance between the rivals divided by the Taiwan Strait. Over a number of politically and substantively difficult issues that had to be tackled, the US used so many unclear words in the above founding documents. It made certain promises and compromises to both PRC and Taiwan, the majority of which were declared in passive, inactive tone. The word most often used was “not”. Thus US policy over Taiwan issue has been termed as a “strategic ambiguity”. With such dual ambiguity, Washington has gained advantage over the other two players in the US-PRC-Taiwan triangle.

The legal status of Taiwan is of critical importance. Does the island have its own sovereignty? If not, to whom does its sovereignty belong? What is the relationship between the island and PRC? From a legal perspective, this is the first question to answer when the Taiwan issue is under discussion. Beijing holds that PRC is the sole legal government of China, Taiwan is one part of China and its sovereignty belongs to the PRC. All US administrations since 1972 have stated “on China” as the cornerstone of their policy, but have refused to clearly recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communiqué, US “does not challenge

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2 For the original text of these documents, see CRS Report for Congress RL30341—China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, Updated September 7, 2006, p. 32, pp. 36–38, pp. 41–42.

3 Taiwan is one part of PRC, so it is not accurate to equal them and use the term “US-PRC-Taiwan triangle”. The more accurate term should be “US-China Mainland-Taiwan triangle”. In this paper, the author adopts the term “US-PRC-Taiwan triangle” just for convenience to discuss.

4 Richard Pious, who studied the constitution, read the TRA thoroughly and reached the conclusion that US “has no real commitment to the security of Taiwan … What it has … is a process by which the United States may recognize and act upon its own security interests. That is all the Taiwan Relations Act requires.” See: The Taiwan Relations Act: the Constitutional and Legal Context, in: Louis W Keoing (ed.), Congress, the Presidency, and the Taiwan Relations Act, New York, 1985, p. 161.
added] that position (of PRC)”. Such words have left a strong impression that US was very reluctant to make such statement. In the Normalization Communique, US “recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China”, but only “acknowledges the Chinese position [italics added] that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China”. Remember, “acknowledge” is different from “recognize”. After the “8·17” Communique, the Department of State answered questions submitted by the Senate and said clearly: US took no position [italics added] on Taiwan’s sovereignty; that was a matter to be resolved by the two sides of the Strait.\(^5\) Just as Allan Romberg pointed out, “beyond ‘acknowledging’ the Chinese position that there is ‘one China’ of which Taiwan is a part, it [US ‘One China’ policy] largely consists of things that the United States will not do.”\(^6\)

Another substantial issue is the US security relationship with Taiwan. This has been the most sensitive and most difficult part of the triangle. Taiwan hoped that the US could continue to be burdened with defense obligations: the more, the better; the longer, the better. This issue was defined mainly through the TRA and the “8·17” Communique, responding to Taiwan and PRC respectively. Both documents contained subtle words and left much room for US interpretation.

Firstly, to what extent would US commit itself to defend Taiwan after the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty? In the TRA, US considered that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, is a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States”, so it would “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan”. Once such a danger emerged, “the president and the Congress shall determine … appropriate action” [italics added] in response. Here at least three questions arose. (1) What did “grave concern” mean? Was this the kind of “concern” to famine in Africa, Middle East peace process, Central America conflict, or terrorism attack against US homeland? (2) Would US use the “capacity” maintained? If yes, then when? Under what kind of circumstances? (3) What kinds of actions would be covered by the term “appropriate action” in case of PRC attack against Taiwan? Did it include direct US military involvement? To all these questions, there was no answer in the founding documents.

Secondly, what was the future of US arms sales to Taiwan? PRC wished US set a deadline to terminate such transfers. In the “8·17” Communique, US stated “that

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\(^6\) Romberg (fn. 1), p. 225.
it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution [italics added]. Here again, we see too many “not”. The US again took a passive, inactive tone to response to PRC’s requirement. “Gradually”, “long time”, and “a period of time” were all indefinite. It could be months, decades, or even longer. Also what did “final resolution” mean? PRC interpreted it as the end of arms sales, while US referred to the resolution of the Taiwan issue.7

US strategy ambiguity was best reflected in the so-called “six assurances” promise to Taiwan. Right before the “8·17” Communique, the Reagan Administration pledged to Taiwan that it had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales; had not agreed to hold prior consultations with PRC on arms sales; had not agreed to revise the TRA; had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; would not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.8 Here we see that all substantive issues in the US-PRC-Taiwan triangle were included and fitted into Romberg’s statement on the US’s “one China”. Such strategic ambiguity unavoidably sowed seeds for future troubles in US-PRC-Taiwan relations. In the long run, US policy framework is still in dilemma and many factors could have an impact upon it.

Impacts from Domestic Politics

Domestic politics represents one of the most important factors, which impact US strategic ambiguity now and then and poses US policy and Strait security as being uncertain.

In the US, domestic politics has had a lasting impact on foreign policy. Congress, interest groups, and lobbyists play an important, sometime critical role in the president’s decision in foreign affairs. Sino-US relations are one of the most important bilateral relations in US foreign policy, and always rise as a subject of heated debate during election years. Taiwan, the well-known powder keg in East Asia, has always been the most sensitive issue, comparing to trade, human rights and other issues in Sino-US bilateral relations. Such a trend is intensified by Tai-

wan’s lobbying activities in Washington. Sales of F-16 fighter aircraft and former Taiwanese “president” Lee Teng-hui’s American trip were two typical cases.

In September 1992, President George H. W. Bush (Bush I) announced that his administration had decided to sell 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This was an obvious violation of the “8·17” Communique. Since the Communique was released, US had limited its arms sales to Taiwan. The value of arms sales was $525 million in 1982, $707 million in 1984, and $479 million in 1991. But the value of 150 F-16 fighter aircraft reached $5.8 billion, more than the total of the sales during 1980s. This decision went beyond the framework of “strategic ambiguity”, and the reason lay in electoral politics. President Bush I experienced the negotiation of the “8·17” Communique (as vice president that time) and understood the crucial significance of this sale. He was also a strong supporter of stable Sino-US relations. But at this moment, he was campaigning for re-election. The manufacturer of F-16, General Dynamics, is located in Texas, which has 32 electoral votes. To get a contract from Taiwan and save jobs for workers, the company pushed Congress to lift the restrictions in the “8·17” Communique. Led by two Congressmen from Texas, 100 Congressmen (almost one fourth of the total) wrote to Bush I and urged him to permit this deal. Senator Lloyd Bentsen from Texas argued that “hard-working Texas defense workers don’t deserve to be penalized just because the (Bush I Administration) insists on coddling Communist leaders in Beijing.” Under such pressure, Bush I finally made the decision. He won Texas, but Sino-US relations were harmed. In the White Paper on Taiwan issued in 1993, PRC declared: “This action of the US Government has added a new stumbling block in the way of the development of Sino-US relations and settlement of the Taiwan question.”

More serious and substantial harm was done to Sino-US relationship in the case of Lee Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. Here Congress again exerted strong pressure upon the executive branch. In the founding documents, the US promised that its relationship with Taiwan would be restricted within “unofficial” level. According to the 1994 review on Taiwan policy made by Clinton administration, Taiwan’s “president”, “vice president”, “premier”, “vice premier” would be allowed to make low-profile transit stops in US, but visits to the US were forbidden. Just as Richard Bush said, in the existing framework, “a public visit to the United States by Taiwan’s top official—even in a private capacity—ar-

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guably stretched the meaning of ‘official’ to the breaking point’.

When Lee’s case was raised, State officials had intended to decline Taiwan’s application. They considered that granting visa to Lee “would remove one of the most important elements which makes the relationship unofficial … reversing commitments at the highest level of the US government over many administrations.” However, the lobbying firm Cassidy & Associates, whose main customer was Taiwan, was successful in lobbying the Hill. In February 1995, the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of House Committee on International Relations held special hearing on the issue of Lee’s visa. All members attended and each wanted to speak on this subject and argue why Clinton administration should grant a visa to Lee. This hearing was “one of the most sophisticated operations to influence foreign policy in recent memory.”

Later both House and Senate passed resolutions urging the president to grant visa to Lee, and threatened to pass binding legislations to force the president to allow Lee’s entry. Under such Congressional pressure, Clinton administration shifted its policy and granted visa to Lee. This time, PRC’s response went far beyond protesting words. The ambassador to the US was recalled and the Defense Minister postponed his scheduled visit to Washington.

During the administration of George W. Bush (Bush II), a new element appeared. This time, it was Taiwan’s domestic politics that kept challenging US strategic ambiguity policy. The “presidential” election in 2000 was an earthquake in Taiwan. KMT, who ruled the island for decades without interruption, was defeated by pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and native Chen Shui-bian came to power. Chen opposed reunification strongly and longed for Taiwan’s de jure independence. He availed himself of every possible opportunity to push Taiwanese independence. Being a former lawyer, Chen was particularly skilful in linking his political goal with elections. Since the second half of 2002, as the new “presidential” election was approaching, Chen took more and more aggressive actions toward the existing triangle and US policy framework. Firstly he advanced a theory that there is “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait.” Then from the middle of 2003 on, he appealed to hold a referendum on cross strait relationship simultaneously with the “presidential” election. What’s more, he drafted a timetable for new “constitution”. US State officials, both in Washington and Taipei, at various level, expressed their concern, repeated Chen’s “five nos” word by word to remind him of his promise, stated that US oppose either side to change the status quo unilaterally.

On December 9, before visiting PRC Premier Wen

15 In his first inaugural address on May 20, 2000, Chen promised “five nos”: as long as PRC did not intend to use force, he would not declare independence, not change the national title, not insert the two-state theory into the constitu-
Jiaobao, President Bush II, who had stated to do “whatever it (American military) took to help Taiwan defend herself” in 2001, said he opposed “comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan” that indicate that Chen “may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo.” However, Chen insisted on his adventure and held the referendum on March 20, 2004 as scheduled. The situation during Chen's second term was very similar. When DPP lost the “Legislative Yuan” election in December 2005 and failed to gain majority, Chen decided to break his promises to US and abolish the National Unification Guidelines (NUG) and the National Unification Council (NUC). The Bush Administration strongly rejected such action and sent a special envoy to Taipei to express grave concern before Chen. But Chen announced his decision on February 27, and the only effect of American pressure was that Chen substituted the term “cease” for “abolish”, namely the NUG “ceases to apply” and the NUC “ceases to function”. Both the referendum in 2004 and the abolishment of NUG & NUC were highly sensitive topics relating to Taiwan's sovereignty, on which US has tried to keep ambiguous. Chen's provocative actions, which served his domestic political interest, have been challenging the US policy framework. Just as the report issued


by the Congress Research Service said: Chen Administration’s “pro-independence views conflict with the US policies that support the “status quo” in Taiwan Strait and are willing to support Taiwan’s independence”, Taiwan-US relations have been plagued by “mistrust between the Bush and Chen Administrations; mixed bilateral messages” etc. For the US, the “democratic” Taiwan is more and more difficult to rein in.

Future Trends

The so-called “strategic ambiguity” is meant to avoid definite US attitudes towards specific cases which may emerge in the US-PRC-Taiwan triangle. Such a framework for US policy was invented astutely by a couple of administrations to defend US national interests. However, both US and Taiwan’s domestic politics have impacted upon the policy framework significantly. In future, such trends will be enforced. In the US, Democrats won the mid-term election in November 2006, and since controlled both Senate and House. The 110th Congress, dominated by the Democrats for the first time since 1994, will exert more pressure on the Republican administration’s foreign policy. In Taiwan, the “Legislative Yuan” election will be held at the end of 2007, while the “presidential” election will be held in March 20, 2008. For the sake of his historical legacy, Chen Shui-bian will probably take new pro-independence actions. Domestic politics from the US and Taiwan will continue to exert an influence, sometimes unpredictable challenges, to the “strategy ambiguous” policy framework.

The Strategic Partnership of the European Union and the People’s Republic of China: Common Challenges—Common Actions?

May-Britt Stumbaum

In the framework of an ever-closer relationship—expressed in the “strategic partnership” as declared in 2003—between the European Union and the People’s Republic of China, cooperation in the field of security has repeatedly been part of the EU-China agenda. Yet, an implementation of this part of the strategic partnership is hampered by different interpretations of shared terminologies and rhetoric on the so-called “new security concepts,” and different views on the international system, the own desired role and, last but not least, the perceived role of the United States of America. Cooperation in the security field will hence remain fragmented and rather marginal in practice and will be most feasible in areas where no “hostile actor” is involved, such as (environmental) disaster management and coping with pandemics.

Since the declaration of the strategic partnership on occasion of the 6th EU–China summit three years ago, a lot of resources were invested in order to turn the declaration into deeds and to substantiate the demanded strategic partnership. Yet, the ambitious goals have not been met and a process of “sobering up” after the Sino-European “honeymoon” has been paving its way on both sides of the strategic partnership. The recently published communication of the European Commission1 sheds light on a not too harmonious marriage and on the manifold areas where the two partners still need to do a lot of work. Three years after the declaration of the strategic partnership, this paper aims to take a closer look on the underlying conditions for an ever closer cooperation in the field of security: Do we share the same paradigms? Do we share the same priorities? Do we share the same goals?

The paper critically assesses the possibilities, prospects and difficulties of Sino-European cooperation in the field of security. It discusses the signed EU-China Strategic Partnership and identifies commonalities and differences between the European Union and China in both their respective security concepts and in their general paradigms on the international system—and hence their perspectives on the role of the US. This chapter will conclude that although on paper there are numerous commonalities and common approaches to international issues and

problems, the EU and China differ too much in their interpretations of the defined security concepts, their preferred international system, and their positioning towards the US. Given these basic differences, cooperation is likely to be successful in fields such as the environment and pandemics, but will remain very limited in security areas such as non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, conflict prevention, and energy security.

The Strategic Partnership—Documents, Aims & Tools

In the business area, strategic partnerships are formed for a limited time period to achieve a goal by combining the differing strengths of the two companies, two companies that are based on the same market principles. The Sino-European strategic partnership aims at the cooperation between a block of democratic countries, the EU and a single, autocratic state, China. Yet it remains to be seen if the fundamental differences in the political systems per se exclude, limit or do not impact at all the implementation of a genuine strategic partnership. To what extent do the countries need to share the same paradigm and hence congruent connotations of key principles to establish and implement a sustainable and lasting strategic partnership?

Almost three years have passed since the EU called for the implementation of a “strategic partnership” with China in its December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), its first ever comprehensive security strategy paper. Following the first notion of China as a strategic partner in the June 2003 draft of the ESS, the European Union referred to China as a strategic partner already in September 2003, when the EU Council adopted the EU Commission’s paper on EU-China relations, entitled “A maturing partnership—shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations.”

During the following 6th EU-China summit on 30 October 2003, leaders from both sides “stressed their resolve to further expand and deepen China-EU relations, guided by the two policy papers, which promote the development of an
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For the first time, the summit was upgraded by a concurrent bilateral meeting with the Chinese president, Hu Jintao. Both sides expressed their intention to deepen cooperation on multilateral issues and global challenges, strengthen economic ties, launch numerous new sectorial dialogues and agreements and pursue their scientific, technical and development cooperation.

Over the following three years, great diplomatic resources were invested in the implementation of the EU-China “strategic partnership”, establishing respectively envisaging about 22 “sectorial dialogues”. In order to promote and implement “global”/”effective” multilateralism,” “democracy” and “global peace and stability”, the EU Commission co-hosted and co-sponsored a number of EU-China conferences, roundtables, workshops and seminars to create momentum in the aftermath of the ambitious declaration, discussing the envisioned EU-China “strategic partnership” with academics, analysts, journalists and the general public.

The Strategic Partnership and Cooperation in the Security Field

As this paper deals with the perspectives for a Sino-European strategic partnership in the realm of security cooperation, it is necessary to outline the different perceptions of the new security environment, the respective definition of security itself and the particular connotations of the used terminology. The EU’s foreign and security policies are still mainly decided and implemented by the individual EU Member States, not by EU institutions. Hence, in this context it becomes necessary to also take into account the security concepts and approaches to regional and international security of the Europe’s so-called “Big Three”: Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

Perception of the New Security Environment—Challenges, Opportunities and “Comprehensive Security” Concepts

Both papers, the “European Security Strategy” (ESS) as well as “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept” (CPP), start off by referring to the violence of the two world wars and the conviction that the use of force alone will not fundamentally resolve disputes in the long term. However, already the introductions

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7 These sectorial dialogues range from competition policy and education & culture to energy and space cooperation. For a list of the EU’s sectorial dialogue, please take a look at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/intro/sect.htm>.

8 Among other initiatives, the Commission conducted with the EU Member States a follow-up seminar to the 6th EU-China summit in February 2004 in Beijing in order to draft an Action Plan for implementing the summit declaration’s goals.

illustrate how differently the two parties perceive the situation today: According to the CPP, China, having become a power with global political and economic influence over the last decade, considers the current international security environment to be an opportunity to “discard the old way of thinking and replace it with new concepts and means to seek and safeguard security.”10 Europe, having been in a position of stability, peace and prosperity for the last 50 years, perceives the new challenges primarily as threats—hence the ESS emphasizes that “Europe still faces security threats and challenges.”11

After September 11th and in response to the spreading impact of globalization in the field of security, China as well as the European Union and its Member States have adjusted and extended their security concepts. During the Cold War, territorial defence against a conventional attack from a sovereign state perceived as the primary threat was paramount. This perception has changed to include an expanded security concept which appears to be similar in nature in both parts of the world. Terms for this new concept range from the “New Security Concept”12 to “comprehensive security”13 and an “extended security term” (“erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff”).14 All of these new concepts emphasise the changing nature of risks and threats in the 21st century, underlining the pre-eminence of international terrorism, the influence of non-governmental actors and the asymmetrical character of new confrontations. They also include challenges that go far beyond purely military concerns, such as demographic shifts, spreading pandemics and securing natural resources. Furthermore, they all agree that the challenges of today are global in nature and require concerted responses by the international community. In other words, they necessitate extensive international cooperation. The “New Security Concept” as laid out by the Chinese government even insists that in this “world of diversity […] security cooperation is not just something for countries with similar or identical views and mode of development, it also includes cooperation between countries whose views and mode of development differ.”15

In view of China’s historical memories of foreign invasion and occupation by foreign troops, defending against foreign invasions and safeguarding territorial

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11 ESS (fn. 9), p. 1.
12 See CPP (fn. 10).
13 This term was used for the first time already by the Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in the 1970s, see i.e. as quoted in Raymond Feddema, Akio Igarashi, Kurt Radtke (eds.), Comprehensive Security in Asia: Views from Asia and the West on a Changing Security Environment, Leiden 1998.
15 CPP (fn. 10), p. 2.
integrity still play the central roles in China’s security concept. Moreover, the emphasis on (a peaceful resolution of) territorial and border disputes reveals a worldview that is dominated by traditional security concerns. In Europe, which has seen half a century of integration and increasing economic, political and security interdependence, intra-European military conflicts are now considered highly unlikely if not altogether impossible. Threats are “more diverse, less visible and less predictable,” as outlined in the December 2003 ESS. All of the Big Three agree with this assessment, underlining that “the risks posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are starker [than before], as are the risks to wider security posed by failed or failing states.” In addition, for Germany traditional territorial defence has lost its significance, and international conflicts, asymmetrical threats, terrorism and WMD are now the focus of German security interests. France points out the increasing vulnerability of societies due to the “spectacular propagation of information technology” and other technologies as well as to the concentration of populations in vast urban societies. France hence adds to this list of security concerns non-military threats such as the possible neutralization of decision-making centres, possible action

16 CPP (fn. 10), p. 1.
17 ESS (fn. 9), p. 2.
against distribution and communication networks, and possible direct actions taken to influence public opinion via these new technologies.\(^{20}\)

While perceived challenges seem to be of the same nature in their respective security strategies, China and Europe do not necessarily share the same vision of what shape the international system should take. With the European Union being built on the ceding of sovereignty and China still suffering from a trauma of forced foreign influence, both sides differ fundamentally in their views on issues such as sovereignty, intervention, so-called “interference in internal affairs of other nations” and global governance. They also face differences in the approaches towards non-military threats: While the European Union is only slowly getting used to the idea of an “Energy Foreign Policy,”\(^{21}\) China’s rapid economic growth and steadily rising demand for energy (above all crude oil) has made China prioritize the hunt for energy and raw materials over a broader political agenda. Facing criticism for accommodating with dictatorships and autocratic regimes for the sake of securing their supply of crude oil and other commodities, the government typically refers to the principle of non-interference. Although criticism from the EU is still restrained in this context, this example nevertheless sheds light on the deviating approaches of Brussels and Beijing towards global governance.

China’s 2003 EU Strategy Paper called for “high-level military exchanges”, a “strategic security dialogue mechanism,” training and defence studies cooperation.\(^{22}\) Security issues such as non-proliferation, terrorism, international peacekeeping, conflict management, the prevention of people trafficking and illegal migration, etc., are now being discussed either within the framework of the EU’s so-called “political dialogue” or in the framework of the EU-China “sectorial dialogues.”

Besides the European Union, many EU Member States, in particular the “Big Three”, but also states like Sweden, undertake joint maneuvers, trainings and mutual visits of high-level military personnel on a bilateral basis. The UK and France are already holding joint military naval exercises with the Chinese navy on a regular basis and Germany has been conducting annual seminars on the level of generals since 2005. In regard to peacekeeping, the EU, being a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping operations with its member states’ activities


\(^{22}\) However, an implementation of these measures is hampered by the still existing EU arms embargo towards China.
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combined, has in recent years welcomed and encouraged China’s growing contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. Currently, China participates in ten UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is one of the areas where the EU and China could indeed expand their bilateral cooperation to make a visible and measurable joint contribution to international security.

The Strategic Partnership and the Limits in Security Cooperation

In order to identify areas for potential cooperation between China and the European Union in security affairs, it is necessary to identify common aims as well as to define what is understood by the used terminology on both sides of the partnership.

Terrorism

In all reviewed concepts terrorism is now at the top of the list of threats. September 11 was a world-wide signal that the end of the Cold War did not stand for the “end of history” as Francis Fukuyama predicted at the beginning of the 1990s, but instead released anger, hate and frustration that had been frozen by Cold War realities. This resulted in asymmetrical attacks from diverse, decentralised, well-ressourced terrorist groups that make efficient use of electronic networks and are aiming to cause mass casualties. Focusing on the fact that today’s most prominent form of terrorism is global in scope and linked to violent religious extremism, the EU argues that terrorism is a phenomenon arising out of complex causes, including the “pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.”

The uneven process of globalization, which still excludes the majority of the global population from the benefits of globalization, is aggravating this trend. The French prospectus points out that “as globalization progresses, the disparities in economic development and the unequal distribution of wealth could, if they become more pronounced, increase frustration.” An interpretation of the most influential countries’ actions in issues relating to business, the environment or pollution as hegemonic behavior may result in certain groups adopting a radical form of protest against market-based economies and globalization per se. As a result, “these interpretations of modernity may lead to violent acts and increase terrorism, especially if they are

23 In December 2006, China has been the 13th-largest contributor of U.N. peacekeepers, providing 1,648 soldiers, police officers and military observers to 10 nations, mostly in African countries, including Congo, Liberia and southern Sudan. But its activities reach well beyond Africa. Chinese riot police have been sent to Haiti to quell unrest. In November 2006, Beijing offered to send 1,000 peacekeepers to southern Lebanon to help enforce a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah. The United Nations accepted less than half. See Colum Lynch, ‘Beijing expands role as world peacekeeper’, in: Mercury News, 14 December 2006, <http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/16237116.htm>. See also the web site of the EU delegation in Beijing at: <http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/Solana170304>.


25 ESS (fn. 9), p. 3.
based on religious motives.”

The Europeans perceive this phenomenon as a part of European society, with Europe being both target and base for terrorism. They also see a need to consider and address the root causes of these threats, beyond the symptoms and the actual acts of terrorism.

The Chinese side shares, albeit to a lesser extent, the European perspective that terrorism is a problem caused by economic and social disparity. It hence originates in less developed parts of the world, and requires comprehensive policies including development aid and what Beijing refers to as the promotion of “cultural understanding.” Fighting terrorism is one of the prime goals of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO / “Shanghai 5”), a regional forum in which China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Kazakhstan discuss Central Asian security issues. The CPP points out that the “Shanghai 5” has taken the lead in making an unequivocal stand and proposition of combating “terrorism, separatism and extremism” by signing “The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” and “The Agreement on regional Counter-terrorism Agency.” However, the SCO’s international credibility is controversial since the SCO’s member states are mainly autocratic regimes with still questionable human rights records. The definitions of who is to be labelled a “terrorist” differ between Europe and the People’s Republic of China. Accordingly, despite both China and the EU having terrorism high on their agendas, joint declarations and action plans have not been followed-up with sustainable joint actions.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Along with the threat of terrorism, the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have gained importance for China and the EU. The ESS goes as far as to claim that the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat” to Europe’s security.

The dispersion of weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the increased military potential due to an arms race-like build-up of military forces, in particular in the Middle East and in East Asia, has not only spurred the prolifera-

26 The 30 Year Prospective Plan: A Summary, p. 6.
27 See Delivering Security in a Changing World (fn. 18), p. 4 for the need to address the underlying causes of these threats by working with other Government Departments.
28 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the follow-up organization to the „Shanghai 5“ process launched in 1996 and includes the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Kazakhstan.
29 CPP (fn. 10), p. 3.
30 A matter of discussion e.g. is the differing perception of separatist movements of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang province. However, the phenomenon that someone is labelled a terrorist to one actor and a freedom fighter to another actor is a general problem in international relations.
31 ESS (fn. 9), p. 3
tion of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic, tactical and cruise missiles and small arms. It has also increased the (legal and illegal) transfer of technical know-how in this area. Hence the French and the British concepts label the prevention of the potential passage of WMD knowledge or weapons from states to terrorist groups as a key part of the counter-proliferation challenge.  

In order to stress that the EU considers the prevention of the proliferation of WMDs to be a foreign and security policy priority, it published a strategy paper dealing with the proliferation of WMDs. China, too, considers the prevention of the proliferation of WMD to be one of the major threats to global peace and stability and has issued a specific policy paper on the topic. Beijing and Brussels signed a joint declaration on non-proliferation and arms control and an agreement on joint research into the peaceful use of nuclear energy at the EU-China Summit in The Hague in December 2004. However, even though Beijing now officially commits itself to actively (with and without the EU) promoting nuclear non-proliferation, its track record of nuclear proliferation, including assistance

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34 Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, EU-China Summit, December 2004.
for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme\textsuperscript{35} and missile technology exports to Iran, remain a cause for concern and call into question the probability of implementation of the recent joint declaration with the EU.\textsuperscript{36} In 2003, the US thrice imposed non-proliferation-related sanctions against China for missile-related sales. China’s missile technology-related sales to Pakistan and Iran in recent years also led the US to veto China’s application for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2004. Furthermore, Beijing has (unlike the majority of EU Member states) decided not to participate in the 2003 US-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) arguing that “proliferation issues should be resolved within the legal frameworks by political and diplomatic means.” China’s refusal to endorse the US-initiated PSI is understandable against the background that it was above all North Korea and its proliferation record which triggered the US initiative. China, North Korea’s solely remaining ally and the biggest foreign investor in North Korea, does neither favour a nuclear North Korea nor joining in a US-led confrontational course towards Pyongyang. Beijing has yet not signed the “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” which is up to date signed by more than 90 countries.

Even if China does no longer supply states\textsuperscript{37} with complete ballistic missiles, it still provides Pakistan with missile technology which is a “legitimate area for study and concern, the more insofar as they represent Chinese strategic support for Pakistan’s goals rather than purely commercial motives.”\textsuperscript{38}

The CPP outlines the desire to “conduct effective disarmament and arms control with broad participation in line with the principle of justice, comprehensiveness, rationality and balance” and to “uphold the current international arms control and disarmament regime.” The phrasing of this paragraph indicates that China remains sceptical about the feasibility of “fair” conduct of non-proliferation policies and regimes. Both sides, the European and the Chinese, lack credibility on nuclear disarmament with neither the European nuclear powers (UK and France) nor China currently striving to reduce their own nuclear weapons arsenals.

\textsuperscript{36} For an excellent analysis of the issue see e.g. Alyson Bailes, Anna Wetter, EU-China Security Relations: The “Softer Side”; Paper presented at International Politics of EU-China Relations, British Academy and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), London, April 20–21, 2006.
\textsuperscript{37} Including Pakistan, according to publicly available information.
\textsuperscript{38} Bailes/Wetter, ibid. (fn. 36).
Located in a region where arms expenditures have risen by an average of 22 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (compared to 3% world-wide),\textsuperscript{39} China emphasizes that it has no interest in getting involved in an arms race in East Asia and beyond.\textsuperscript{40} However, over the last 15 years China has increased its defence expenditures at a rate of between 15 and 17% per year,\textsuperscript{41} with the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces spurring the intensifying so-called “security dilemma” in Asia.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, there is a growing consensus amongst analysts, including scholars from London’s International Institute for strategic Studies (IISS), that China’s “real” or non-official defence budget could be up to two times higher than Beijing’s official one. China’s rising military expenditures are a concern in the region and beyond, although Beijing argues that more than 30% of the defence budget is being spent on rapidly growing personnel costs. Hence, the ever more increasing defence expenditures along with the visible modernisation of China’s armed forces will continue to be closely watched by the US, Japan and last but not least Taiwan.

Instabilities, Regional Conflicts and Failing States

The ethnically motivated war in the Balkans in the 1990s was a wake-up call for the Europeans. The Kosovo war triggered the formulation and implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Consequently, regional conflicts are at the very heart of European security concerns as they “destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights.”\textsuperscript{43} Furthermore, as pointed out in the British Defence White Paper, these conflicts can trigger mass population movements and consequently add to pressures on countries neighboring the European Union or “emerge as a surge in migration to Europe” itself.\textsuperscript{44} In the ESS’ view, regional instability can spur extremism, terrorism and state failure, provide favorable conditions for organized crime, and fuel demands for WMD. These trends can be observed today in the Middle East and on the conflict ridden continent of Africa. Focusing on the proximate areas first, European decision-makers are particularly concerned about those states located on NATO’s borders and in Africa that are characterized by political mismanagement, eth-

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40 CPP (fn. 10), p. 1.


43 ESS (fn. 9), p. 4.

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nic and religiously motivated tensions and economic breakdown. As the British white paper emphasizes, these states contain areas of ungoverned territory, which might draw neighboring states into competition for control and influence over these territories and their resources. They can also provide potential havens and resources for the support of terrorist groups and criminal networks involved in drug production and trafficking, illegal arms trading or the plundering of natural resources. The desire to stabilise these regions in order to avoid having to deal with the consequences of failing states and destabilization has become a cornerstone of European security policy. The shift from the priority of territorial defence to meeting challenges where they occur was famously depicted by the then German Defence Minister Peter Struck in his comment that “German interests are defended at the Hindukush.” Almost all operations in the framework of the European Defence and Security Policy can be viewed in this context.

The Chinese and the European side agree that they are primarily faced with intra-state conflicts which destroy infrastructure, encourage criminality, deter investment and make normal economic activity—the basis for our well-being—impossible. Coping with instability, failing states and regional conflicts seems therefore to be a field favorable for cooperation. Cooperation in this field would be particularly beneficial since operations such as stabilization efforts need long term, troop-intensive and costly commitments, as illustrated by past experiences. Having economic development as its top priority, China, too, depends on a stable environment around and within the People’s Republic as well as in the states from which it is retrieving its resources. However, considering the two countries’ different political systems, and their consequently differing interpretations of the sources of instability, and keeping in mind the fact that most of the countries rich in natural resources are also some of the most problematic areas in the world, it yet remains to be seen how meaningful and result-oriented EU-Chinese security cooperation in this context will be in the near future.

Organized Crime

Failing states, open borders and demographic pressures favour organized crime. For example, 90 percent of the heroin in Europe originates in poppy fields in Afghanistan, where the money is used to sustain private armies, thereby under-

45 A recent example being the military action in Somalia where the different parties are supported by Eritrea and Ethiopia, see Äthiopiens meldet Tod von bis zu tausend Islamisten in Somalia, 26/12/2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,456587,00.html>.
48 See, for example, Schwere Vorwürfe gegen die ISAF, in: Der Tagesspiegel, 03/12/2006, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/nachrichten/afghanistan/83175.asp>.
mining the democratization efforts and aims of the European states that operate ISAF in Afghanistan. Europe is also a prime target for cross-trafficking of not only drugs and weapons, but also illegal migrants and women: 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world-wide are smuggled through criminal networks in the Balkans. An additional concern is maritime piracy, which causes rising costs by intercepting trade flows. Maritime piracy—i.e. in the Strait of Malacca—presents an increasing problem, as does the spread of corruption due to criminal activities. European-Chinese cooperation could make a valuable contribution to combating cross-border criminal activities, in a bilateral framework as well as in international initiatives.

Environmental Issues & Pandemics

Apart from those military and policy related issues, the extended security concept also encompasses the dangers that arise from a deteriorating environment and reoccurring outbreaks of pandemics. Being less influenced by the differences in the political systems and the respective basic values, these areas offer the greatest potential for cooperation and have illustrated the most immediate need and also the most considerable successes so far. In recent years, pandemics with global repercussions such as SARS and the Avian Flu originated in China. Lacking a health system capable of sufficiently responding to these pandemics, China was dependent on external help to cope with the situation. Precious time was lost due to the PRC’s attempt to treat the disease as a domestic as opposed to an international issue. Considering far too long foreign assistance in tackling SARS as “interference” in China’s internal affairs, the Chinese authorities informed the international community too late about the extent and intensity of the SARS problem. SARS turned out to be a challenge where global cooperation and transparency was a necessity in order to stop the world-wide spread of the disease. Authorities did not want to admit failure or put at risk foreign investment, so downplayed SARS. Yet, the willingness of the Chinese government to learn was proven by the second outbreak in 2004 that was rapidly—with foreign assistance—brought under control. The system did prove effective when political will was present.

SARS and the Avian Flu demonstrated that challenges emerging in a distant country are nevertheless a security concern for Europe when they reached the

49 See ESS (fn. 9), p. 3
50 See e.g. Dana Robert Dillon, Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade (The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #1379), June 22, 2000.
51 According to the International Maritime Organization, at least 50,000 ships sail through this strait every year. They transport about 30 per cent of the world’s trade goods and 80 per cent of Japan’s oil needs. C.S. Kappaswamy, Straits of Malacca: Security Implications (South Asia Analysis Group), paper no. 1033, <http://www.saag.org/papers11/paper1033.html>.
Old Continent with serious consequences. Environmental concerns also have a global impact, as shown by the negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol—which neither the US nor China signed. With twenty of the world’s thirty most polluted cities located in China, there is a clear need for the Chinese to cope with environmental decline and pollution. Yet, these challenges are not outlined in the CPP. On the European side, the ESS points to the challenges ahead due to poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS, both of which can cause the breakdown of societies. It also emphasizes the increasing migration pressure that will emerge from a declining environment. “Competition for natural resources—notably water—which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.”

Although these issues are not mentioned in the Chinese paper, they might present the areas where the EU and China could indeed (given the political will on both sides) co-operate most promisingly in the future.

Securing resources

In order to put its rapidly growing economy on a sustainable path over the next few decades, China has made securing access to natural resources, including raw materials and primarily energy, its first priority. For China, access to natural resources as well as foreign markets is essential for its economic growth. The People’s Republic relies heavily on securing sea lanes as well as entertaining good relationships with states that are exporters of the desired resources. China has extended its economic and diplomatic presence in the most important sea lanes, such as the Suez and Panama Canals, and has built up a “string of pearls” of naval bases from South China up to Iran. Moreover, China is actively expanding its relations with countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America to ensure a supply of energy, primarily crude oil. Also the ESS states that “energy

54 Apart from the general reference that the new security concept’s contents extend „from military and political to economic, science and technology, environment, culture and many other areas”; CPP (fn. 10), p. 1.
55 ESS (fn. 9), p. 3.
56 The CPP therefore pays a great deal of attention on the fostering of economic exchange in „multi-channel, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted new economic cooperation“ and emphasizes the role of regional economic cooperation mechanisms such as the 10+3 cooperation in East Asia; CPP (fn. 10), p. 2. The ESS refers to the economic part of security cooperation by referring to the extension of member of “key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions”; ESS (fn. 9), p. 9.
58 From 3-5 November 2006, more than 40 heads of state and ministers of 45 African countries attended the China-Africa summit in Beijing. Even the leaders of the five countries that acknowledge Taiwan were invited as observers, but abstained. About 2,500 business deals where under discussion during the three-day-summit. See “Trade to top China-Africa summit”, BBC News, 03/11/2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6112360.stm>.
dependence is a special concern for Europe.” The European Union is the world’s largest importer of energy, with 80 percent of its energy based on coal, oil and gas, as well as the world’s second largest consumer of energy. Currently, the EU imports 50% of its energy needs. This share is expected to rise to 70% by the year 2030, with most energy imports coming from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.59

Yet, it remains questionable to what extent Europe and China will co-operate in this area, as they are not only competitors in the quest for energy but also have different approaches and policies towards dictatorships in energy-rich countries in Africa and the Middle East. Even if EU policies towards dictatorships in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere are not free from contradictions and hypocrisy, it has become obvious that China so far puts “business over principles” as far as its global energy security policies are concerned.

Finally, even leaving the issue of democracy aside, there are still fundamental differences with regard to the rule of law,60 the definition and functions of human rights, freedom of speech and other issues that have remained largely non-addressed during EU-China meetings and summits61 over the last three years,62 but are crucial in building up a genuine strategic partnership.

Different Mind Sets: Multilateralism, global governance and the principle of non-interference

In his speech on 6 May 2004, entitled “Vigorously developing comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the European Union,”63 prime minister Wen Jiabao pointed out that “[c]omprehensive” […] meant that cooperation between both sides is all-round, wide-ranging and multi-level” and that a “partnership” requires the cooperation to be based on “equality, mutual benefit and win-win result […] on the basis of mutual respect and mutual trust.” A “strategic” partnership hence means that the “bilateral cooperation is of an overall, long-term and stable nature, transcends the differences in ideology and social system and is free from the interference of a single event that occurs in a certain period

60 E.g. differences remain between the Chinese concept of “rule by law” and the Western concept of “rule of law”.
61 In the Commissions 2006 Communication, the lack of results from the human rights dialogue has been—for the first time—explicitly pointed out. COM (2006) 631 final, ‘EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities’, p. 4.
62 See e.g. Axel Berkofsky, EU-China Relations-Strategic Partners or Partners of Convenience?, in: Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch (ed.), German-Chinese Relations: Trade Promotion Plus Something Else? (German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Deutsche Aussenpolitik.de, Gateway to German Foreign Policy), No. 16, 23 June 2005, pp. 14–22; see also Stanley Crossick, Fraser Cameron, Axel Berkofsky, EU-China Relations : Towards a Strategic Partnership (European Policy Center, EPC Working Paper), July 2005.
of time.” While the last remark obviously refers to the Tiananmen Square massacre, it remains highly questionable to what extent differences in ideology and social systems can be “transcended” in order to implement a genuine EU-China “strategic partnership.” Ideology is a set of beliefs, values, and opinions that forms the paradigm through which the world and the own country’s situation is perceived. When speaking about cooperation in the realm of security, it is important that the actors identify the background against which security strategies have been developed, what ultimate goal shall be achieved through this strategy and hence to what extent and intensity cooperation could be realistically possible. The EU and China have not yet taken these steps.

The Chinese scholar Xinning Song argues that the “EU and China have more similar ideas and ways of thinking” [than compared to the US] as they both favour multilateralism and peaceful means of solving disputes and because they do not compete strategically with each other. However, the connotations of “multilateralism” differ and it remains an open question if the prioritization of multilateralism provides sufficient ground for a strategic partnership. “Favouring multilateralism” is a noble concept that on paper the EU has in common with many other countries and blocs of countries as well. It is true that the EU and China are not (unlike the US and China) so-called “strategic rivals” or “strategic competitors” as George W. Bush suggested at the beginning of 2001. But Brussels and Beijing do not have the same approaches, e.g. towards the use of military force. Whereas Brussels does (so far) exclude the use of military force to solve territorial issues, China does not exclude military means as a way of solving the so-called “Taiwan question.”

Unfortunately, EU policy makers fail to openly point out this fundamental difference even if it was outspoken in its stark criticism of last year’s “Anti-Secession Law”, through which Beijing authorizes itself to invade Taiwan militarily should it declare independence.65 Beijing’s preparedness in principle to “re-unify” Taiwan with the mainland using military force illustrates a stark contrast between the EU and China’s security policy approaches, at least so far.66


66 However, this difference in approach, and indeed the cross-strait relations themselves, hardly makes it onto the EU-China agenda. Apart from encouraging both Taiwan and China to solve the issue peacefully, the EU does not essentially get involved in cross-strait relations, leaving the impression that the so-called “Taiwan question” is none of Brussels’ business.
Both the European Union and China perceive themselves as emerging global actors that should naturally expand their reach and influence. The ESS speaks of the EU as a “more credible and effective actor” that should be ready to “share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”

With reference to its accumulating power and influence, China also makes its claim as an emerging global power. As the scholar Chen Bo puts it, “it is understandable that a big country or a big country bloc usually has [a] strong wish to influence the world when its comprehensive strength increases. Both the unified EU and [a] fast growing China now have new expectations in shaping a new world order. By doing so, they will undoubtedly contribute to the change of forces in the international system.”

However, in practice the paradigms shaping the international system seen from the EU and China are perceived and defined differently. The European and Chinese approaches towards and definitions of multilateralism, the so-called “principle of non-interference” and the so-called “preventive action” differ in their very essence.

Chinese Multilateralism vs. European Multilateralism?

The ESS as well as the CPP emphasise the priority of “effective multilateralism.” On the European side, the “fundamental framework of international relations

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67 ESS (fn. 9), p. 2.
68 Chen Bo, Contrast of the Security Concepts between China and the EU (fn. 47), passim.
is the United Nations Charter,” while the United Nations Security Council has been assigned the primary responsibility for keeping global peace and stability. The CPP also underlines that cooperation should be conducted on the basis of the UN charter while giving full play to the leading role of the United Nations. However, their interpretations of multilateralism differ: While the EU wants to become a major player in the current international system—including the acceptance and support of a “benign hegemon,” the US—and wants to strengthen multilateralism, China wants to “promote the democratization of international relations” and thus aims at reshaping the international system towards a multipolar world with the PRC as one of the major players and “poles” of power. Judging by Chinese political rhetoric of recent years, it seems that the terms “multilateralism” and “multipolarity” are quasi-synonyms rather than two distinct concepts.

After initial confusion created by French president Jacques Chirac, who seemed to have supported and embraced Chinese rhetoric on the need to create a “multipolar world,” the EU has repeatedly made it clear that it is “multilateralism” or “effective multilateralism” and not “multipolarity” it seeks to implement and promote.

Albeit using the same term, the EU and China obviously apply different interpretations to the term. Consequently, where and how the EU and China are planning to jointly implement multilateral policies has remained largely non-defined so far. However, China as a unitary state (like the US and unlike the EU) is an actor that naturally prefers bilateralism over multilateralism on a regional and global level, avoiding constraints to sovereign action that multilateral agreements bring about, while the European Union is a multilateral institution in itself.

Intervention vs. Non-Interference?

European integration is structurally built on the interference in each other’s affairs and the willingness to cede sovereignty to a supranational organization. China on the other hand emphasizes the principle of non-interference as one (if not the main) guiding principle of its regional and global foreign and security policies. Foreign advice (critical, “well-meant” or both) e.g. on how to deal with the so-called “Taiwan question” or recent criticism on China’s global and controversial policies to secure its energy supply is in Beijing typically being referred to and dismissed as “interference” in China’s internal affairs.

69 ESS (fn. 9), p. 9.


71 Also see in this aspect the Sino-French Joint Declaration, 16 May 1997, <http://www.uni.org/db/china/engdocs/chfr0597.htm>.
In line with determining the UN Charter as the main global reference for international security policies, the Chinese Position Paper also emphasizes the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” as the guiding lines for international cooperation. Co-crafted with India in 1954, the five principles encompass mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. These principles, in particular the first and the third, underscore the importance of national sovereignty and integrity to the Chinese. However, they are in clear contrast to the EU’s approach, adopted in 2003, of “preventive engagement” in order to counter threats such as instability, proliferation and “human emergencies” before they arise and would have direct consequences on the European Union. Following the US approach of “meeting challenges where they arise”, the EU has been aiming to set up more active policies to counter the new dynamic threats, to provide crisis management and conflict prevention and to develop “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”\(^7\)

The “robust mandates” apply to the EU Mission “EUFOR RD CONGO,” which supports the UN Mission MONUC in Congo under Resolution 1671, as well as to the French, Irish, Italian, and Polish troops and the German navy which are patrolling the Lebanese coasts as part of the UNIFIL mission. These missions are first, tentative steps towards this new, robust strategic culture.

The EU Arms Embargo—Setback for the Strategic Partnership

Ever since the declaration of an EU-China “strategic partnership” in 2003, Brussels has been facing difficulties in explaining to Beijing why the EU arms embargo imposed on China in 1989 was kept in place in an desired “ever closer relationship”. Objectively seen it is understandable that Beijing continuously stresses that a partnership can hardly be called “strategic” when such a key area of defence and technology is omitted from it by generally blocking the transfer of weapons technology. Hence, in 2004 and 2005, Chinese officials intensified their arguments towards the EU to lift the embargo, albeit not to open up the Chinese market to European weapons manufacturers.\(^7\)

Chinese officials claimed instead the need to create the political bilateral environment to get serious about the “strategic partnership”. Every single workshop, conference and or official EU-China encounter taking place featured the arms embargo on its agenda.

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\(^7\) Frank Umbach, East Asian Arms Races—and Cooperation; Growth of weapons heightens tensions, but can spur mutual aid, in: Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition), Summer 2005, p. 40.
However, the conditions for the lifting of the embargo are seen very differently from both parties: The PRC insists on Brussels to lift the embargo and in return Beijing agrees to expand its relations with the EU on all levels, including cooperation in the area of security. On the European side, however, the lifting of the embargo is linked to a number of EU demands such as the ratification of the UN Convention on Political and Civil Rights, the release of prisoners jailed during and after the Tiananmen Square massacre and last but not least verifiable evidence of the improvement of the human rights situation in China.

While the EU in 2005 announced in official statements “to promise to work towards the lifting of the embargo,” China understood that the EU “promised” to lift the embargo, overlooking the fact that the lift would be an intergovernmental decision by all Member States. Former EU Commission President Romano Prodi, the EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana but also the German and the French head of state have in their talks with their Chinese counterparts at times been less than clear about the fact that the lifting of the embargo is subject to a number of European (albeit non-official) pre-conditions to be met by the Chinese side and a common decision of all Member States. Furthermore, the embargo will not be lifted until the EU has adopted a new and improved EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The existing code was agreed on in 1998 and is only politically binding.

The controversy about the arms embargo did not only highlight the lack of unity within the Union and hence its lack of influence, but it also lightened the differences in perception—while the Chinese side continues to point out the (bilateral) logical reasons for lifting the embargo, the Europeans ask on a rather parallel than common track of dialogue for more understanding of the constraints applied on them by the structure of the EU’s system and by the necessity to find a solution within the broader context of the EU’s external relations: The debacle taught the Europeans the lesson that their decisions as an emerging global actor do have repercussions in their relations with third parties, first and foremost the United States.

The “US Factor” in EU-China Relations

As outlined above, an analysis of the envisioned EU-China strategic partnership is incomplete without taking the “US factor” into account as bilateral relations between Brussels and Beijing are influenced by their respective relations with Washington. During the very public transatlantic controversy over the lifting of

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74 Numerous conversations with Brussels-based Chinese diplomats, conducted by Axel Berkofsky, confirmed that Beijing was expecting to lift the embargo in accordance with the “promise” to do so.
non-lifting of the EU arms embargo imposed on China in 1989, it became clear that Washington is wary of the quantitative and qualitative expansion of EU-China relations, especially in the area of security. Even if Brussels is neither ready nor willing to expand its relations at the expense of its primal relationship with Washington, concerns amongst US policy makers remained.

The US, a vital supporter of European integration from the very start through the successful Marshall Plan, has over the last decades been perceived as Europe’s closest and most important ally. For China, the US as the only remaining superpower with a global sphere of interest is China’s number one foreign policy priority as well as a competitor—in terms of economic and political influence in the region and in the world as well as in terms of ideology. Consequently, Chinese policies aim at counterbalancing and diminishing US power and influence, thus establishing what has been coined as a “multipolar” world by Chinese authorities over recent years. In France, as mentioned before, China temporarily found an ally supporting this approach, even if the approach was never fleshed out and was not supported on the EU level. Until the EU’s demonstration of weakness when it was divided over the prospects of war on Iraq, the Chinese side set great hopes on the EU developing into a possible future alternative to the US and a way for hedging the only remaining superpower. Chinese scholars point out that there has been a “new thinking” on the EU in China suggesting that the EU is not only the most important trade partner for China, but that the EU is also “moving quite rapidly towards a political power, as it now begins to invest considerable energy in making a truly common foreign and security policy” and, first and foremost, that the EU has become an “independent strategic force’ which has increasingly shown its political willingness to challenge the American policies in the world.”

In reality, however, the EU recognizes that the EU has neither the capabilities nor the political will to challenge or counterbalance US global influence. The ESS calls the transatlantic relationship “irreplaceable”. “One of the core elements of the international system” the ESS reads, “is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole.” Also the security strategies of the “Big Three’, that is Germany, the United Kingdom and France, state the relationship with the US as a cornerstone in their respective foreign policy strategies. Although France seems rhetorically to be closer to the Chinese perspectives, there is no tendency for even this country to deviate too radically from the “US first” policy. However, the two entities have

75 See e.g. FENG Zhongping, China’s Policy towards Europe: Between the EU and the Big Three, paper presented at the conference International Politics of EU-China relations, London, 20–21 April 2006, p. 3.
76 ESS (fn. 9), p. 9.
in common that “both EU and China do not regard their counterparts as the most important partners,” but keep the US as the first foreign policy priority—a decisive factor that does weaken the prospects for a genuine “strategic partnership” in practice. Although Beijing does acknowledge the importance of the EU’s relations with Washington, it was and is concerned about the establishment of the EU-US “Strategic Dialogue on East Asia” in September 2004 and considered this dialogue hardly more than an US attempt to pressure the EU not to lift the weapons embargo. Indeed, it remains questionable whether the US would have dedicated resources and energy to discussing Asian security issues with Brussels without the controversies of the embargo.

The term “strategic” in the US view has above all a military connotation and led to the fear by some US-American analysts and policy makers that the EU and China were about to launch an inter-regional military alliance aimed at reducing US strategic military influence in Europe and above all in Asia. Yet, such fears did not resonate significantly as it remains difficult to envisage an EU-China hard security or military security cooperation resembling e.g. US-Japanese or US-South Korean security cooperation. Indeed, discussions (beyond joint declarations expressing concern about the volatile security situation on the Korean Peninsula) on Asian regional security issues have hardly taken place between the EU and China so far and were not followed up by action. This suggests two things: a) Beijing may not be seeing a necessity to involve its alleged strategic partners in Brussels in Asian strategic and geo-political issues; and b) Brussels for its part may indeed not be interested in getting involved with its emerging security identity being firstly targeted on the near abroad and secondly, is only slowly widening its horizon beyond the business realm concerning more distant regions.

Different Statehoods—Different Paradigms—Common Strategy?

Last but not least the different nature of the two players needs to be taken into account when discussing the opportunities and limits of a strategic partnership. The People’s Republic of China is a nation-state, governed by a central government and hence provided with the possibility to forge policies across different policy fields, ranging from security to economics and development. The European Union is a sui generis confederation of states, set on a stumbling path towards a supranational state that will most probably not become a comparable nation-state in the near future—the discussion about the “finalité” of European

77 Xinning Song (fn. 64), p. 6–7.
78 Concerns were repeatedly pointed out by Chinese scholars and officials, e.g. at the 3rd EU-China Roundtable at The European Policy Centre, 9–10 October 2006, Brussels.
79 For the official view on China’s relations with the EU see China’s October 2003 EU Policy Paper (fn. 5); see also Opening New Phases of China-EU Friendly Cooperation, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wenJiabao/czzhry/t174793.htm>. 
integration, that was once more triggered off by the then German foreign minister Joschka Fischer\(^8\) and mirrored in the debates about the constitutional treaty, has still not and probably will never be concluded. Consequently, the European Union is a global actor in the making, where decisions concerning security are made in the intergovernmental second pillar, between the Member States’ governments, excluding the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Decisions in the field of aid and trade are made in the first pillar, including all above mentioned supranational institutions and their competencies. Finally the national foreign policies of the individual Member States contribute to the complex picture of a European foreign and security policy. These divisions of competencies and power could, if applied skillfully, contribute to pursuing successfully European interests. Taking into account the diversity of interests between the EU Member States alone and the EU institutions, history has proven so far that the dispersion of competencies has rather led to a weakening of the European Union—and to a less predictable partner for China in an envisaged strategic partnership.

Conclusion: “Common Wording, Differing Meanings”—More Declarations than Deeds

The above analysis of the security concepts of China, the European Union and the “Big Three” has shown that despite a congruence in terminology, the underlying ideologies and paradigms in each group cause differing interpretations of these terms and undermine efforts to turn declarations into deeds, to apply theory to the practice of day-to-day international relations. When it comes to security—and hence to the core of states’ and the governing class’ interests: survival—a “strategic partnership” can only be of limited practical value precisely because it is not able to “transcend the difference in ideology and social system” as desired by the Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao.

For both sides, fighting terrorism is a foreign and security policy priority, but European and Chinese decision-makers differ in their perceptions of who is to be labelled a terrorist—Europeans feel uncomfortable with the SCO’s equation of “terrorism, separatism and extremism” and view the Uygurs in Xinjiang province differently than their Chinese counterparts do. They also differ in their perceptions of the root causes of terrorism, with the European side putting heavy emphasis on its intra-societal roots and the influence of a low level of development on its spread. Consequently, the targets as well as the strategies against these enemies differ.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of major concern for both sides and has even led to the signing of a joint paper on non-proliferation. However, with a closer look the interests of the two sides differ again too much to provide valid ground for any further activities: The Europeans follow to a great extent the US-American policies, including joining the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PRC for its part is determined to catch up in terms of military hardware and technology with the West, rapidly and significantly increasing its own defence spending. Being subject to an EU and US weapons embargo, Beijing imports more than 90% of its weapons and weapon technology from Russia, while pursuing sales to Pakistan and Iran.

There are also fundamental differences to how the EU and China view North Korea. While China remains North Korea’s most important ally, having in recent years turned into Pyongyang’s most important supplier of energy and significantly increased its investments on the peninsula, the Europeans are above all concerned about Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programmes. Even though the EU is—like China and despite the nuclear and missile crisis—committed to its economic engagement course towards North Korea, Brussels and Beijing mostly pursue different strategies regarding how to achieve this engagement with a regime that
has demonstrated its determination and desperation with its October nuclear test. The impression that China sees no real role for the EU in the field of security in Asia is supported by the fact that China—like the other participating countries—has not advocated EU participation in the Six-Party Talks seeking to negotiate a solution to North Korea's nuclear crisis. EU-China security cooperation on Asian security is hardly on the agenda of neither Beijing's nor Brussels' policy makers.

EU-China cooperation in coping with instabilities, regional conflicts and failing states will increase multilaterally due to the increasing number of UN operations in this area, but will remain nevertheless limited bilaterally by the two sides' fundamentally different perceptions of the causes of and cures for instabilities. Furthermore, cooperation will also be overridden by more important foreign policy priorities—as long as China is willing to co-operate with dictatorial regimes and failing states in Africa and the Middle East in order to secure its access to natural resources, a common approach in dealing with failing states is not a realistic issue on the agenda of EU-China relations.

The most realistic area for EU-China security cooperation could be in dealing with the so-called “new challenges” that deviate from the traditional notion of security and are part of what is commonly being referred to as “human security”: disaster management and disaster relief in the course of pandemics and environmental catastrophes offer promising common ground for cooperation. SARS and the Avian Flu were striking examples of epidemics breaking out in one country and having an impact beyond national borders, thus requiring joint efforts by the international community to deal with the crisis and its aftermath.

Why can ideology not be transcended in the other areas, as suggested by Chinese Premier Wen Jinbao? As mentioned above, security refers to the very core of states' interest: survival—not only survival of the state, but also survival of the ruling class and survival of the system of governance. Hence, security strategies are always a part of a comprehensive ideology which envisages a state of “finalité” in the undetermined future. Security cooperation needs to be based on trust that derives from a common world view. The Europeans have subscribed to a “Western view” of international society, with the end goal being democratically governed states with a high status for the rights of the individual, including human rights—as stated in the European Charter on Fundamental Rights and in every European state's constitution. Furthermore, despite all arguments about distance from and proximity to the only remaining superpower, Europe (“old” and “new”) has aligned itself with the United States and shares to a great extent its priorities and paradigms. With the US being the natural counterpart to China
as an emerging global power that perceives the world in a more traditional power politics system, this alignment prevents closer cooperation in the core area of security.

Even in the area where Europeans and Chinese seem to be much closer than US-Americans and Europeans—in their preference for multilateralism—their perceptions of multilateralism differ to the extent that the paradigms differ. For Europeans, being shaped by the multilateral EU policy-process, multilateralism means finding compromises between weaker and stronger states and backing these solutions with the legitimacy provided by an assembly of almost all nation states on the globe. For China, regionalism offers a chance to create a benign environment for its economic development, while multilateralism offers a chance to pursue power politics in the UN Security Council at eye level with the US without being as strong as the US. The differences in ideology also lead to the different connotation in each country’s terminology.

Putting all these factors together, Europe and China do share numerous security concerns on paper, but the differences in paradigms and ideology—and hence the connotations of these terms—will continue to stand in the way of closer comprehensive cooperation in the field of security. Most cooperation will be achieved in the “new security” challenges such as pandemics and environmental disasters. The differences, however, will de-facto exclude far-reaching security cooperation in most other areas from the envisioned EU-China strategic partnership.
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