Veröffentlichung der Arbeitsstelle Interkulturelle Konflikte und gesellschaftliche Integration, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung

AKI

Karen Schönwälder (Ed.)

Residential Segregation and the Integration of Immigrants: Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden

Discussion Paper Nr. SP IV 2007-602

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Social Science Research Center Berlin
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin

Telefon: +49/30/25491-0 E-Mail: wzb@wzb.eu
Telefax: +49/30/25491-684 Internet: http://www.wzb.eu

WZB

Abstract

Three country studies on Great Britain (C. Peach), the Netherlands (S. Musterd/W. Ostendorf), and Sweden (R. Andersson) outline key features of ethnic residential segregation and discuss their relevance for the integration of migrants. For all three countries the degree of settlement concentration is considered moderate. Empirical results are presented on links between neighbourhood and, e. g., labour market integration and inter-group relations. In a concluding chapter, Karen Schönwälder offers an assessment of the available evidence on neighbourhood effects and its relevance for the German situation. While it seems too early to draw firm conclusions, current knowledge suggests that the importance of socio-spatial structures for the integration of people with a migration background should not be overestimated. The evidence does not support a choice of political intervention strategies that focus on countering ethnic residential segregation.

Zusammenfassung

Drei Länderstudien zu Großbritannien (C. Peach), den Niederlanden (S. Musterd/W. Ostendorf) und Schweden (R. Andersson) skizzieren Grundmuster der ethnischen residenziellen Segregation und diskutieren deren Relevanz für die Integration von MigrantInnen. Übereinstimmend schätzen sie den Grad der Siedlungskonzentration als moderat ein. Zur Bedeutung des Wohnumfeldes für u. a. die Arbeitsmarktintegration oder Gruppenbeziehungen werden einige empirische Ergebnisse vorgestellt. Karen Schönwälder bilanziert deren Aussagekraft und Relevanz für Deutschland. Obwohl sichere Einschätzungen noch nicht möglich sind, spricht der heutige Kenntnisstand dafür, die Bedeutung sozialräumlicher Strukturen für Integrationsprozesse von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund nicht zu überschätzen und sie nicht in den Mittelpunkt politischer Steuerungsbestrebungen zu stellen.

Contributors

Ceri Peach is Professor of Social Geography at the University of Oxford and Fellow of St. Catherine's College.
cpeach(at)ouce.ox.ac.uk

Sako Musterd is Professor of Human Geography in the Department of Geogrpahy, Planning and International Development Studies of the Universiteit van Amsterdam.
S.Musterd(at)uva.nl

Wim Ostendorf is Associate Professor at the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies, Department of Geography and Planning of the University of Amsterdam.
W.J.M.Ostendorf(at)uva.nl

Roger Andersson is Professor of Social and Economic Geography at the Institute for Housing and Urban Research (IBF Institutet för bostads- och urbanforskning), Uppsala Universitet.
Roger.Andersson(at)ibf.uu.se

Karen Schönwälder is head of the Programme on Intercultural Conflicts and Societal Integration at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) and teaches at the Free University Berlin.
schoenwaelder(at)wzb.eu

Contents

Karen Schönwälder

Introduction

The spatial concentration of immigrants and members of ethnic minorities is a hotly debated issue. Both in academia as well as in the wider public debate this phenomenon has recently attracted increased attention. In the German media and among politicians, the assumption is widespread that immigrants increasingly tend to withdraw into secluded communities and that so-called "*Parallelgesellschaften*" are about to develop in German cities or have already come into existence. Typically, "parallel societies" are seen as formations that hinder the integration of individual immigrants, provide breeding grounds for fundamentalist and anti-democratic tendencies, and contribute to societal tensions. Similar debates have been conducted in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Positive views of the ethnic community as a support structure and a framework for stable identities seem much less influential at the moment.

It is highly controversial as to whether the above-mentioned worries are justified. Among academics, majority opinion tends to question the assumption that withdrawal into ethnic communities is a major tendency among immigrants, and emphasis is placed on socio-economic conditions of individual life chances rather than on identities and cultural preferences. At the same time, there is renewed interest among academics in the issue of residential segregation. It seems that, in the context of a revived debate about the development of immigrant integration in highly industrialized democratic societies and against the background of persisting inequalities, all potential determinants of the paths of integration are being reconsidered. Additionally, methodological advances allow for more sophisticated assessments of the multiple factors that influence individual development, including the residential environment.

The WZB's Programme on Intercultural Conflicts and Societal Integration[1] invited eminent scholars from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden to outline the existing knowledge, with respect to their countries, on the residential segregation of immigrants and ethnic minority members and its relevance for overall societal integration. To what extent do immigrants and members of ethnic minorities live in neighbourhoods largely populated by co-ethnics? And in what ways is this socially relevant? Or, more specifically, what empirical knowledge exists with regard to the impact of the residential environment (the neighbourhood) on, for example, opportunities in the labour market, identification with the polity, or social networks? Do primarily "ethnic" networks limit labour market opportunities, or does an ethnic economy provide employment to those excluded from other opportunities? Does growing up in an ethnic community present a barrier to equal opportunities by inhibiting children's

[1] As an external expert, Professor Hartmut Häußermann of Berlin's Humboldt University was also involved in this project. Thanks to him for the ideas and suggestions he contributed.

acquisition of the majority language and thus their educational performance? Are mutual hostilities and group conflicts more likely if people live apart from each other? These are only some of the commonly raised assumptions in this context.

Each of the following country studies first outlines major features of residential segregation in Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, respectively, and then moves on to discuss key findings on links between residential structures, individual opportunities and group relations. While the bulk of research in this field is on the United States, it seems more promising to look from Germany to other European countries whose urban structures, welfare state frameworks and, to some extent, similar immigration experience make them the more comparable cases.

As will be seen, European research does not yet provide conclusive answers to all questions raised above. The following contributions agree that, in all three countries, the levels of residential segregation are moderate, at least when compared with the US. The trends seem to be towards decreasing concentration, rather than towards consolidating ethnic enclaves. With regard to the consequences of residential environments shaped by the presence of large numbers of co-ethnics and/or by unemployment and poverty, there is less agreement. While Musterd and Ostendorf (for the Netherlands) retain optimistic views, Peach (for Britain) and Andersson (for Sweden) assume that, under certain conditions, individual educational and labour market opportunities may be negatively affected by living in specific environments. The findings on connections between residential patterns and processes of immigrant integration are summarized in a concluding chapter that also discusses their relevance for the German situation.

The situation in Germany is the main focus of two parallel publications by our Programme that explore settlement structures of immigrants in Germany and the relevance of neighbourhood effects (see details on back pages).

Ceri Peach

Sleepwalking into Ghettoisation? The British Debate over Segregation

Contents

1. Introduction

The claim that the race riots in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001 were the product of high levels of segregation (BBC 2001) provoked a debate in Britain about the level of ethnic residential segregation and its relationship to social integration. This linkage of ethnic clustering and social dysfunction came to a head in September 2005 with a speech by Trevor Phillips, then Director of the Government Commission for Racial Equality, in which he warned that Britain was sleepwalking into American-style ghettoisation. British political discourse has changed from 'Multiculturalism' to 'Social Cohesion'. While multiculturalism had a liberal attitude to the maintenance of identity and ethnic clustering, social cohesion sees ethnic enclaves as ghettos. The paper argues that ghettos are much more than simple percentage concentrations and that the dynamics of British ethnic enclaves are different from those of the American Black ghetto. It argues that criteria have been selected to create ghettos rather than revealing their existence.

The British debates centre around five main, but inter-related questions:

(1) Is Britain sleepwalking into American-style ghettoisation?

(2) Is segregation increasing or decreasing?

(3) Should measures of segregation concentrate on traditional a-spatial measures for the city as a whole (such as indices of dissimilarity, or isolation) or should they focus on categories of local concentrations?

(4) Is segregation voluntary or involuntary and does this differ between the black population and the South Asian groups? And is all segregation bad?

(5) Should religion (particularly Islam) replace race and ethnicity as the focus of segregation studies?

To place these questions in context this paper is divided into four sections: (1) an outline of the minority populations in the UK and their settlement patterns; (2) the debate about Britain sleepwalking into ghettoisation and the associated arguments about place specific and a-spatial measures of segregation; (3) a comparison of the differences between Caribbean and South Asian trajectories of assimilation; (4) a discussion about locations of social interaction and the relevance of segregation in some spheres for integration in others.

The discussion centres on Great Britain rather than the UK, because that would include the Northern Ireland sectarian divide, which requires separate treatment. Within Britain, the paper concentrates on England and Wales where 98 per cent of the British minority population is found (Table 1).

2. Growth and Settlement Patterns of British Minority Populations, 1951-2001

2.1 The Development of Britain's Ethnic Minority Population

In the 2001 census, the minority population numbered 4.6 million: 7.9 of the UK population; 8.1 per cent of the Great Britain population; 8.7 per cent of the population of England and Wales or 9.1 per cent of the population of England, where the overwhelming majority of the ethnic minority population lives (Table 1).

Table 1: Ethnic Composition of the Great Britain Population, 2001

	England	England & Wales	Scotland	Great Britain	E&W as % of GB
White	44679361	47520866	4960334	52481200	90.5
Mixed	643373	661034	12764	673798	98.1
Asian or Asian British	2248289	2273737	55007	2328744	97.6
Indian	1028546	1036807	15037	1051844	98.6
Pakistani	706539	714826	31793	746619	95.7
Bangladeshi	275394	280830	1981	282811	99.3
Other Asian	237810	241274	6196	247470	97.5
Black or Black British	1132508	1139577	8025	1147602	99.3
Black Caribbean	561246	563843	1778	565621	99.7
Black African	475938	479665	5118	484783	98.9
Black Other	95324	96069	1129	97198	98.8
Chinese or other ethnic group	435300	446702	25881	472583	94.5
Chinese	220681	226948	16310	243258	93.3
Other	214619	219754	9571	229325	95.8
All ethnic minority population	4459470	4521050	101677	4622727	97.8
Per cent of GB total minority	96.5	97.8	2.2	100.0	
Per cent of regional population	9.1	8.7	2.0	8.1	
All population	49138831	52041916	5062011	57103927	91.1

Source: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D6588.xls, based on data from Census 2001. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

The minority population of the UK has grown rapidly from about 80,000 in 1951 to 4.6 millions in 2001 (Figure 1). Between 1951 and 1981, the minority population grew from about 80,000 to 1.5 million. By 1991, the first census in which an ethnicity question had been included, it had doubled to 3 million. By 2001 it had grown by over 50 per cent to 4.6 millions. Between 1951 and 1981, ethnic identity was inferred from birthplace and parental birthplace, but this was an increasingly unreliable source (about half of the minority population is now British born). Between 1951 and 1981, the minority population had grown mainly by immigration, but since 1981 natural increase has been the main driver of growth.

Caribbean and South Asian immigration was largely a response to the post 1945 British labour shortage, which lasted until the 1973 oil crisis. There was a close relationship between the growth of immigration and the labour demands of the British economy in the period 1948 to 1974. Immigrants acted as a 'replacement population' (Peach 1968, 1991), occupationally and spatially, for the white British population which was moving up socio-economically, moving out of the large conurbations and emigrating to the white Commonwealth. However, labour shortage was not the only factor affecting non-European immigration. About 30 per cent of the Indian immigration was due to the expulsion of the highly successful Asian population from East Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Figure 1: Estimated Growth of the Minority Ethnic Population, Great Britain, 1951-2001



Source: Based on data from Censuses 1951- 2001.

The main ethnic components of the minority population are the 2.2 million in the South Asian groups: Indians (1 million) Pakistanis (747,000) Bangladeshis (280,000) and the 1.1 million in the Black groups: Caribbeans (565,000) and Africans (480,000). There has also been the emergence of a substantial (670,000) Mixed population. However, in the 1990s and the 2000s the migration flow has increased and has become hyperdiverse with refugees and worker streams from the EU's new accession states, China and even from Brazil. There are also many White immigrants and sojourners from the British Commonwealth, the EU, Japan and the USA, who have distinctive settlement patterns in London (White, 1988).

2.2 Regional Concentration

The minority population is concentrated in a small number of regions: Greater London, the West Midlands, East Midlands, North West and Yorkshire and Humber (Figure 2). The Caribbean population, which came as English-speaking individual workers, were principally

employed in service industries such as London Transport, British Rail and the National Health Service and concentrated in the prosperous London and Birmingham areas. The Indian Sikh and Pakistani workers were generally non-English speaking and were employed in gangs, often extended family-based, in the manufacturing areas of the Midlands and the struggling northern textiles towns around Manchester and the Leeds/Bradford conurbation. The further north in the country, the greater the dominance of the Pakistani population within the minority population. The Caribbean population was more gender–balanced from the start of the migration, but the South Asian groups were strongly male dominated until the immigration restriction of the 1960s and 1970s forced them to either bring their families to England or risk being barred if they left the country. The East African Asians expellees came as complete families and settled notably in Outer London and in the East Midland town of Leicester. The Bangladeshis, who were late arrivals and poor, were highly concentrated in London. A quarter of the whole Bangladeshi population settled in the depressed east London Borough of Tower Hamlets, where they remain concentrated.

Even at the regional scale, the contrast between the Pakistani and other groups is apparent. One third of the Pakistani population live in the North East, North West and Yorkshire regions compared with 13 per cent of Indians. Pakistanis were drawn to the Manchester and Leeds/Bradford conurbations in the 1950s and 1960s to prop up the failing textile mills. However, these industries fell to Third World competition and the poorly qualified Pakistani population has remained rooted in areas of high unemployment. The Indian and Caribbean populations, on the other hand, have a more southern and Midland distribution and are concentrated in more favourable areas for employment. The Pakistani male unemployment rate in 2001, partly reflecting its concentration in poorer regions and mainly its poor educational levels, was 13.8 per cent. This is more than double the Indian rate of 6.2 per cent (only marginally above the national rate of 5.8 per cent) though the Bangladeshi and Caribbean rates (both with low male educational levels) were 15.9 and 16.3 respectively.

The Indian population is more diverse and better educated than the Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Caribbeans. Those who came directly from the subcontinent ranged from highly skilled academics and medical professionals to peasant farmers, while those who were refugees from East Africa were often middle class, entrepreneurial and English-speaking. While the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were largely peasant in origin, the Indians had a higher proportion of professionals. While Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were over 90 per cent Muslim, the Indians were religiously diverse: 45 per cent Hindu, 30 per cent Sikh and 13 per cent Muslim, with Christians, Parsis, Jains and those with other or no religion making up the rest. The Indian population, with their higher educational levels, are concentrated in the more white-collared parts of Britain.

Figure 2: Regional Distribution of the Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Population of England and Wales, 2001



Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

2.3 Urban and Intra Urban Concentration

Within these regions the minority population is concentrated into the large urban areas in and around Greater London, Birmingham, Greater Manchester, the Leeds/Bradford conurbation and Leicester (Table 2).

Table 2: England and Wales 2001: Concentration of the Minority Population in Major Urban Areas

	Greater London	West Midlands Metropolitan County (Birmingham)	Greater Manchester	West Yorkshire Metropolitan County (Leed/Bradford)	Leicester (Unitary Authority)	Total	Major Urban areas as % of England and Wales
All people	7,172,091	2,482,331	2,482,331	2,079,210	279,921	14,495,884	28
White	5,103,203	2,260,507	2,260,507	1,842,813	178,739	11,645,769	25
Mixed	226,111	32,903	32,903	25,081	6,506	323,504	49
South Asian	866,693	140,019	140,019	180,173	83,751	1410,655	62
Indian	436,993	35,931	35,931	42,430	72,,033	623,318	60
Pakistani	142,749	75,187	75,187	122,210	4,276	419,609	59
Bangladeshi	153,893	20,065	20,065	8,213	1,926	204,162	73
Other Asian	133,058	8,836	8,836	7,320	5,516	163,566	68
Black	782,849	29,747	29,747	20,771	8,595	871,709	76
Black Caribbean	343,567	16,233	16,233	14,409	4,610	395,052	70
Black African	378,933	10,255	10,255	4,216	3,432	407,091	85
Other Black	60,349	3,259	3,259	2,146	553	69,566	72
Chinese or other ethnic group	193,235	19,155	19,155	10,372	2,330	244,247	55
Chinese	80,201	11,858	11,858	5,734	1,426	111,077	49
Other	113,034	7,297	7,297	4,639	904	133,171	61

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, tables for ethnicity for Local Authorities Table KS06.
Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

Because of the high degree of concentration into a small number of large urban areas, and because of the long standing decrease of the white population in many of the large urban areas, there has been concern about the possible development of ghettos on the American model. When the 1991 census produced, for the first time in Britain, data on ethnicity, a detailed investigation (Peach 1996a) concluded that Britain had much lower levels of black segregation and was far from having American style ghettos. However, while the Caribbean population had low and decreasing levels of segregation, there was a trend for the intensification of South Asian groups in their settlement in areas of high concentration. My conclusion from this was that South Asian groups were following a multicultural trajectory while the Caribbean population was following the melting pot route.

With the publication of the 2001 census, the debate has returned to claims that ghettos have emerged in British cities. The highest concentrations achieved by South Asians have in-

creased, while Caribbean concentrations have hollowed out. There has been a high-level argument over whether Britain is becoming increasingly segregated and whether Britain is seeing developments of ghettos on the American model or whether the South Asian concentrations are ethnic enclaves, like those of previous European groups in American cities (Peach 2005). The debate is partly related to methodological issues of the differences between place-specific and a-spatial measures. Thus, in the following section, methodological issues as well as the substance of the claim that ghettos are developing in British cities will be discussed.

3. Recent Public Debates: Ghettoisation in British Cities?

3.1 "Sleepwalking into Segregation"?

In the wake of the July 2005 bomb outrages in London, at the end of September 2005, Trevor Phillips, Director of the Commission for Racial Equality and himself an Afro-Caribbean, made a speech in which he warned that Britain was sleepwalking into segregation and that some British cities contained ghettos (Phillips 2005). The speech made headlines in the media and produced a great amount of activity among academics working on issues of segregation.

Trevor Phillips stated that

> Increasingly, we live with our own kind. The most concentrated areas, what the social scientists call "ghettos", aren't all poverty stricken and drug ridden. But they are places where more than two-thirds of the residents belong to a single ethnic group.
> Residential isolation is increasing for many minority groups, especially South Asians. Some minorities are moving into middle class, less ethnically concentrated areas, but what is left behind is hardening in its separateness.
> The number of people of Pakistani heritage in what are technically called "ghetto" communities trebled during 1991-2001; 13% in Leicester live in such communities (the figure 10.8% in 1991); 13.3% in Bradford (it was 4.3% in 1991).
> To get an idea of what this looks like, compare it with African Americans in Miami and Chicago, where 15% live in such communities.
> Even among those who don't live in the most concentrated areas, the ethnic separation is far too high for comfort.
> Social scientists now use what they call the index of dissimilarity to describe just how segregated a district is. The figure tells us what percentage of any given group would have to move house to achieve an even spread across the district. Below 30% is regarded as low or random (for which read tolerable, even if we don't like it); 30–60% is moderate (for which read cause for concern); and above 60% is high (for which read that if a black person is seen in a white area, it's time to call the police; and if a white person is seen in a black area, he's lost).
> Happily, we aren't yet in this range – mostly. But too many communities, especially those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage in some cities, are up around the 60s and the 70s, even in London.
> This is not primarily a class problem. Professor Ceri Peach of Oxford University suggests that less than 10% of ethnic segregation is explained by economic factors; much more is down to history and to choice.

There are four main points to note from the Phillips speech.

- The first is that he defined ghettos as: 'places where more than two-thirds of the residents belong to a single ethnic group.'
- Secondly he added to his definition of ghettos a comment on isolation: 'Residential isolation is increasing (…) what is left behind is hardening in its separateness.'
- Thirdly, ghettoisation was exemplified with the examples of Leicester and Bradford.
- Fourthly, unfavourable comparisons were drawn between Leicester and Bradford in England and Miami and Chicago in the US.

3.2 How to define a ghetto: Place-specific measures

Trevor Phillips' pronouncement about sleepwalking into segregation was inspired by the work of five geographers, Ron Johnston, Ray Forrest and Mike Poulsen, who have published several papers on segregation in differing combination of authorship (Poulsen et al 2001; Johnston et al 2003; 2004) and my own (Peach 2006a). The particular paper that was the basis of Trevor Phillips' speech was given by Mike Poulsen at the annual conference of the Institute of British Geographers and the Royal Geographical Society in London in September 2005 (Poulsen 2005). The paper was entitled "The 'new geography' of ethnicity in Britain?" Their work developed in part from a paper which I had published entitled 'Does Britain have ghettos?' (Peach 1996a). In this paper I had used the ideas of Thomas Philpott (1978) who had used threshold levels to make a sharp distinction between ethnic enclaves and racial ghettos.

The basis of the Johnston, Poulsen, Forrest approach is that traditional methods of measuring segregation, the Index of Dissimilarity (ID) and the Lieberson's P* Index of Isolation, give aspatial measurements for a whole city rather than representing the mosaic of concentrations and mixes on the ground. They therefore proposed a typology of places based on the percentage that the majority and/or the minorities formed of census units (wards, tracts etc) (Figure 1).

- Areas that were between 80 and 100 per cent white were termed 'Isolated host communities or citadels'.
- Areas with 50 to 80 per cent white or 'host' populations and 20 to 50 per cent minority populations were termed 'Non-isolated host populations'.
- Areas with 33 to 50 per cent white or 50 to 66 per cent minorities were termed 'assimilation/pluralism enclaves'.
- Areas that were between 0 and 33 per cent white or 67 per cent and 100 per cent minority were complicated. They were termed 'mixed enclaves', 'polarisation enclaves' or 'ghettos' depending on whether a mixture or a single group dominated the population. They were termed (a) mixed enclaves if less than 67 per cent of the minority population was from a single group or (b) 'polarisation enclaves' if less than 67 per cent of the population was made up of a single group or (c) 'ghettos' if the population of the census area was

composed of 67 per cent or more of a single group and 30 per cent of the city's group lived in such areas (figure 3).

Figure 3: Typology of Residential Areas



Source: Poulsen (2005).

The idea is helpful in principle. Knowing what proportion of the population resides in areas of particular concentrations conveys information that is not discernable from indices for a single group in a city as a whole. However, the formulation of the typologies should be seen as complementary rather than simply alternatives to the index approach. This is what the *hyper-segregation* formulation of Massey and Denton (1993) achieved. Recognising that no single index could capture all aspects of segregation, Massey and Denton proposed that achieving a high score on four out of five different measures of segregation would be a clear indication of extreme segregation.

There are, however, two problems with the Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest approach. The first is the terminology and the second the thresholds proposed for the individual types. The most contentious category is the 'ghetto'. Ghetto is a pejorative term. It applies to minorities and carries the implication of inferiority and enforced separation. The definition of the ghetto in the Poulsen paper is any areas in which a single minority constitutes over 67 per cent of the population and where 30 per cent or more of that minority in the city lives. Notice that in the

Poulsen diagram the areas of 80 to 100 per cent majority white population are termed not 'white ghettos', but 'citadels'. Deconstructing the term reveals that it carries the meaning of defensive strongholds (good) against the invading forces (bad). The bulk (91 per cent) of the white population is in the 'citadel' part of the distribution, but table 3 shows that nearly 40 per cent of the minority is there too. The 'ghetto' however, starts at a much lower level of concentration: 67 per cent. This seems to be because an 80 per cent threshold for the minority concentration, as given to the white citadel, would ghettoise only 2 per cent of the minority. A lower ethnic concentration has to be found to produce a respectably worrying figure for the ghetto. Thus, according to Poulsen, it is acceptable for the majority of whites to live in citadels of over 80 per cent of their own group, but threatens the stability of the country for 9 per cent of the minority population to live in a small number of wards where they form over 67 per cent of the population.

Table 3: England and Wales 2001, Minority and Total Population Living in Wards at Minority Population Threshold Concentration

Range	All Minority	Per cent	All People	Per cent
80-89	107983	2	129508	0
70-79	237537	5	321955	1
67-69	72712	2	105926	0
60-66	248025	5	392108	1
50-59	332843	7	608087	1
40-49	563603	12	1255203	2
30-39	578013	13	1649599	3
20-29	603390	13	2469761	5
10-19	698413	15	4832212	9
0-9	1078815	24	40277772	77
	4521334	100	52042131	100

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, Table S104 Ethnicity

The problem with taking a threshold of 67 per cent of a ward population and calling such areas ghettos is that it both trivialises the situation of Chicago and also exaggerates the situation of Bradford and Leicester. Table 4 shows that, taking all minorities together, in Leicester 46 per cent lived in areas where they formed 67 per cent of the population, but they did not exceed 83 per cent of the population of any ward. In Bradford 42 per cent of combined minorities lived in wards where they formed over 67 per cent, but the highest concentration was 74 per cent.

In Chicago, on the other hand, 3 per cent of blacks lived in tracts which were 99 to 100 per cent black. 60 per cent of the black population lived in tracts where they formed over 90 per cent of the population. Two-thirds lived in tracts that were 80 per cent or more black. Altogether 75 per cent of Chicago's black population lived in areas which were 67 per cent or more black. Comparisons of Leicester with Chicago seem exaggerated.

Table 4: Comparison of the Supposed Ghetto Populations of Leicester and Bradford (2001) with the True Ghetto Situation of Chicago (2000)

	Leicester		Bradford		Chicago/ Cook county	Miami/ Dade County
Threshold	Indian	All Minorities	Pakistani	All Minorities	Black	Black
99	0	0	0	0	3	0
90	0	0	0	0	57	14
80	0	27	0	0	7	15
70	12	8	0	30	7	14
67	0	11	0	12	2	6
subtotal 67+	12	46	0	42	75	49
60-66	9	17	17	0	2	9
50	29	0	32	0	4	7
40	18	9	0	15	2	6
30	4	0	16	16	3	7
20	4	15	10	11	5	7
10	16	11	19	9	3	6
0	7	3	6	8	5	9
N	72,033	101,184	67,994	101,617	1,405,361	457,214
Per cent	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables Table S104.
Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. Cook County 2000 figures from US Census 2000 Short Form.

Furthermore, taking the whole set of 880 wards in England and Wales (average size about 6,000) and combining all minorities, the highest concentration in a single ward is 88 per cent. There were only nine wards in the whole country having values above 80 per cent However, in Chicago alone, there were 3 tracts in which they formed 100 per cent of the population and 33 tracts where they formed 99 per cent or more. Over half of Chicago's Black population (54 per cent) lived in tracts where they formed 95 per cent or more of the population (US Census 2000 Short Form census data for Chicago, Cook County). On the other hand, taking the Phillips figure of 67 per cent of a ward population as the threshold for ghettos, only 9 per cent of the combined minority population of England and Wales lived at such densities (table 3). The problem with the Poulsen measure is that they do not reveal that there are ghettos; they are designed to statistically create them.

The question of interpretation is at the heart of the debate in British social science about the meaning of segregation. The meaning of ghettoisation and whether segregation in Britain is increasing or decreasing is in dispute. At the root of the issue is the definition of the ghetto. This is best demonstrated by showing how the definition in the *Dictionary of Human Geography* has changed between the first and second editions. The first edition (Johnston, 1985: 138) defines the ghetto as 'a residential district which is almost exclusively the preserve of one ethnic or cultural group.' The second edition of the *Dictionary of Human Geography* (Johnston 2000) changes the definition from a single dimension to a dual dimension. The ghetto is 'an extreme form of residential concentration; a cultural, religious, or ethnic group is ghettoized when (a) a high proportion of a group lives in a single area, *and* (b) when the group

accounts for most of the population of that area.' The definition has become dual: it is not only an area which is all black, but a situation in which nearly all or a very substantial proportion of Blacks live in such areas.

The distinction between ethnic enclaves and ghettos was forcefully demonstrated for Chicago in 1930 by the economic historian Thomas Philpott in his book *The Slum and the Ghetto* (1978). A table in the book (see Table 5 below) demonstrated that the black ghetto in Chicago in 1930 was different in kind, not simply different in degree, from the European ethnic enclaves. The table needs careful attention to understand its data. The first column of the table lists the main ethnic groups in Chicago. The second column gives the total population for each ethnic group in the city. The third column gives the number of people of each ethnic group living in the areas of the city which have been defined as their areas of the city (crudely, their 'ghettos'). The fourth column gives the total population of those so called 'ghetto' areas. The fifth column gives the percentage that the named ethnic group's 'ghetto' population forms of its total in the city. The final column shows the percentage that group's 'ghetto' population forms of the total population of its 'ghetto'.

Table 5: 'Ghettoization' of Ethnic Groups, Chicago, 1930

Group	Group's City Population	Group's 'Ghetto' Population	Total 'Ghetto' Population	Percentage of group 'Ghetto-ized'	Group's percentage of 'Ghetto' Population
Irish	169,568	4,993	14,595	2.9	33.8
German	377,975	53,821	169,649	14.2	31.7
Swedish	140,013	21,581	88,749	15.3	24.3
Russian	169,736	63,416	149,208	37.4	42.5
Czech	122,089	53,301	169,550	43.7	31.4
Italian	181,161	90,407	195,736	49.7	46.2
Polish	401,306	248,024	457,146	61.0	54.3
African American	233,903	216,846	266,051	92.7	81.5

Source: Philpott (1978: 141, Table 7).

Only 2.9 per cent of the Irish population lived in so-called Irish 'ghettos'. The Irish formed only 34 per cent of the population of the so-called Irish 'ghettos'. Between 15 and 49 per cent of the Germans, Czechs and Russians lived in the national areas associated with their group. In none of these areas did respective national groups form a majority of the population of those areas. The greatest concentration for an individual group was for the Poles: 61 per cent of Chicago's Poles lived in the Polish area and they formed 54 per cent of the population. The Poles were the only group to constitute the majority of the population of their ethnic enclave and the only group for whom a majority lived in such an area. Even so, 39 per cent of Poles lived outside the area and 46 per cent of the population living in the area were non-Polish. For the black population, the situation was different: 92 per cent of the black population lived in the black ghetto; blacks formed 80 per cent of the population of the black ghetto.

Repeating this exercise for ethnic minority populations in London in 1991 and 2001 (Table 6) shows that these racialised minorities showed patterns akin to the Chicago European groups, not the African American groups.

Table 6: Concentration of Minority Groups in Areas Above 30 Per Cent in London, 1991 and 2001

Group	Group's city population		Group's population in wards where they form 30% or more of total pop.		Column (2) as percentage of column (1)		Group's share of pop. in areas where group forms 30%+ of pop.	
	1991	2001	1991	2001	1991	2001	1991	2001
Non-white minorities	1,346,119	1,842,779	721,873	1,146,301	53.6	62.2	45.4	44.9
Black Caribbean	290,968	343,564	7,755	0	2.6	0	34.4	0
Black African	163,635	378,934	3,176	4,060	2.0	1.1	35.6	35.7
Black Other	80,613	60,353	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indian	347,091	436,992	88,887	95,851	25.6	21.9	44	39.4
Pakistani	87,816	142,748	1,182	0	1.4	0	35.2	0
Bangla-deshi	85,738	153,893	28,280	45,922	33	29.8	51	43.7
Chinese	56,579	80,204	38	0	0.0	0	34.2	0
Other Asian	112,807	133,058	176	0	0.2	0	30.8	0
Other Other	120,872	113,033	209	0	0.2	0	39.4	0
Irish born	256,470	220,488	1,023	0	0.4	0	39.8	0

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104.

3.3 Supporting Evidence for the Ghettoisation Hypothesis

In spite of the criticism of the usage of particular threshold values, evidence supports some of Trevor Phillips' claims for high concentration of the minority populations in Bradford and Leicester. In Leicester, where the Indian (rather than the Pakistani population, mentioned by Phillips) is the largest minority population, there were four wards where aggregated minorities formed over 67 per cent of their population: Latimer (83 per cent), Spinny Hills (83 per cent), Belgrave (74 per cent) and Stoneygate (67 per cent). Just over a third (34 per cent) of the minority population lived in these four wards. However, taking the Poulsen definition of a ghetto (a *single* ethnicity accounts for 67 per cent or more of the ward population and 30 per cent or more of the group lives there) none of the four wards would constitute a Poulsen 'Indian ghetto'. Latimer is the only ward in which Indians alone constitute over 67 per cent of the ward population, but less than 12 per cent of Leicester's Indians live there. In other words, while the Indian concentration is high by British standards, Leicester does not approach the Chicago figures in either the percentage of the group or the percentage of the tract population.

Table 7: Threshold Concentration of Selected and Total Minority Populations in Leicester and Bradford Wards, 2001, Showing Proportions in Concentrations of 66 per cent and Higher

	Leicester			Bradford		
Threshold	Indian	All South Asian	All Minori-ties	Pakistani	All South Asian	All Minori-ties
80	0	0	27	0	0	0
70	12	11	8	0	0	30
66	0	18	11	0	33	12
60	9	9	17	17	13	0
50	29	23	0	32	0	0
40	18	8	9	0	0	15
30	4	9	0	16	15	16
20	4	0	15	9	21	11
10	16	18	11	19	14	9
0	7	5	3	6	4	8
N	72,033	78,237	101,184	67,994	85,460	101,617
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

In Bradford, the other cited city, Pakistanis are the largest minority population. There were three wards, University, Toller and Bradford Moor (74, 73 and 69 per cent respectively) where the combined minority populations formed over 67 per cent of the population. Less than half (42 per cent) of the combined minority population lived in these three wards. In none of them did the Pakistanis alone constitute over 67 per cent of the population (Poulsen's threshold for a ghetto). The highest Pakistani concentration was 62 per cent in Toller. Less than half (49 per cent) of the Pakistanis, 46 per cent of South Asians and 42 per cent of the combined minority population lived in areas where they accounted for over half of the population.

However, even in the most concentrated Pakistani Bradford ward of one of the country's largest Pakistani populations, over a quarter of the population was white. In the most densely concentrated minority ward of Leicester, just under a fifth of the population was white.

3.4 P* Lieberson's Isolation Indexes Show Increases

Lieberson's P* index is an index which has been in popular usage since the 1980s (Lieberson 1980; 1981). Unlike ID, P* is an asymmetric index: what is true of one group of a pair is not true of its comparator. P* works on the principle that if in a city the majority population ('a') forms, say, 90 per cent of the population and the minority ('b') forms 10 per cent, then the 10 per cent is much more exposed to contact with the 90 per cent than the 90 per cent is exposed to the 10 per cent. P* has a literal meaning: the percentage probability of a member of group 'a' meeting a member of group 'b' in the areas where group 'a' lives. The percentage probability of a minority member living in the same area as other members of the same group (bP*b) is referred to as the group's *Isolation Index*. Another way of understanding the index is

that bP*b gives the percentage that its own group forms of the population of the average area in which a group b member lives.

The best way to assess a P* isolation value is to divide it by the per cent that the group forms of the city population (Sin 2002). If the group were randomly distributed, its percentage in every sub area would be the same as the percentage that it forms of the population of the city. If the distribution were random, P* divided by the group's city per cent would be 1. Thus any value above 1 would represent clustering or isolation.

While the ID is largely insensitive to the percentage size of the group in a city, P* is highly sensitive to the relative size of the minority. It follows that since the minority population grew by over 50 per cent between 1991 and 2001, the P* values of the minorities would be expected to increase. It also follows that P* values for the white majority population will all decrease if their percentage of the city population decreases. This can be seen by comparing the 1991 and 2001 values for London (Table 8). P* values support the argument of increasing isolation of minority groups, but only because they are highly correlated with the proportion that minorities form of the population. Since minority populations have increased by 50 per cent between 1991 and 2001, it is inevitable that P*s will increase.

However, comparison of the 1991 and 2001 rows for P* divided by the groups' percentage of the London population show, for the minorities, consistent decreases in the *degree* to which the isolation index exceeds its expectation, controlling for the increase in the percentage size of the minority population. The 2001 Bangladeshi P* of 19.6 which has increased from an already high of 16.2 in 1991 has, nevertheless, reduced its degree of over concentration relative to its percentage from 12.6 times to 9.1 times.

Table 8: London 1991 and 2001, Comparison of P* Values

	White	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Caribbean	African	Chinese
Group's % of 2001 London population	71.2	6.1	2.0	2.1	4.8	5.3	1.1
Group's P*/group's %	1.1	2.9	3.2	9.1	1.3	1.2	1.0
2001	75.6	17.7	6.4	19.6	6.2	6.2	1.1
1991	82.7	17.4	4.8	16.2	9.6	5.3	2.2
Group's P*/group's %	1.0	3.3	3.7	12.6	2.2	2.2	2.6
Group's % of 1991 London population	79.8	5.2	1.3	1.3	4.4	2.4	0.8

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104.

3.5 Intra Urban Indices of Dissimilarity

The dissimilarity index (ID) compares the residential distribution of pairs of population groups in cities. The index gives the percentage of either of the two groups which would have to move to replicate the distribution of the other. It has proved attractive because the theory underlying ethnic segregation studies is that there is an inverse relationship between the degree to which two populations are segregated from one another and the degree of assimilation or social interaction between the two. Values below 39 are taken as 'low'; 40-49 are taken as moderate, 50-59 as moderately high, 60-69 as 'high' and 70 and over as 'very high'. Table 10 shows that the Caribbean population has a 'low' average level of segregation (35) while the Indian mean is 'moderate' (43) the Pakistani mean is 'moderately high' and the Bangladeshi mean is 'high'.

Table 9 gives the IDs for the Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations in selected urban areas with substantial numbers. The index is scaled from 0: no segregation to 100: total segregation. The unweighted average for the Caribbean population (35) is in the 'low' category. The Indian (43) is 'moderate', the Pakistani (56) 'moderately high' and the Bangladeshi (60) 'high'.

Table 9: IDs for Urban Areas with 1,000 or More of the Specified Ethnic Groups, 2001

Urban Areas	Caribbean	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi
Birmingham	35	42	61	63
Blackburn		56	68	
Bolton	28	55	57	55
Bradford	32	43	51	60
Burnley		35	64	80
Kirklees	54	53	47	
Leeds	35	44	61	63
Leicester	39	61	47	61
London	39	47	47	62
Luton	15	18	51	47
Manchester	39	35	51	54
Oldham	24	42	69	66
Preston	28	46	49	54
Sandwell	27	31	49	59
Sheffield	37	37	60	64
Trafford	61	46	55	
Unweighted Average	35	43	56	60

Note: Empty cells represent minority population less than 1,000.
Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

There appears therefore to be a paradox. On the one hand, ID is showing decreases in minority segregation while P* is showing increases in minority isolation. The explanation is that P* is highly sensitive to a group's proportional size in a city population (Sin 2002). This is why the white majority population always has the highest isolation indexes. Since the minority

population has increased by over 50 per cent between 1991 and 2001, it is inevitable that their P* isolation measures will also increase. It is also inevitable that, as the minority proportion increases, the white proportion decreases and the white isolation levels will also decrease.

The percentage that minorities form of the areas of densest concentrations in British cities are increasing firstly, because their population size and their percentage is increasing in all areas whether low or high density; secondly because the white population is growing slowly and the minority population is increasing fast. There are four elements in local change: net migration, natural increase, mortality and family formation. These four forces work differentially on the white and minority populations. Taking net migration first, minority populations in Britain settled most heavily in inner city areas that had already lost population. The original immigrants came as a replacement population (Peach 1966) occupying areas and housing that the white population had been abandoning for some time before the arrival of the minorities in the 1950s and 1960s. Recent work by Simpson (2005), Deborah Phillips (2006), Stillwell and Phillips (2006) and Harrison and Phillips (2003) shows a net migration loss of both white and minority population from inner areas of northern towns. Minority population is following the suburbanizing path of their white predecessors. At the same time, there is reluctance by whites to settle in areas of minority concentration.

Taking mortality next, the remaining white population in many of the inner city areas is often old and has higher crude mortality rates than the younger minority population. Thus, as well as net outward movement by whites, there is higher white mortality. The effect of differential mortality will be to increase the percentage that the minority forms of the population even if their population remains static. Thus it is likely that the minority population percentage will increase in areas of concentration without conscious action by the minority.

Thirdly, the young minority population has higher fertility than the older white population in these areas. According to work by Simpson (2005) minority fertility rates outweigh the net migration loss or gain of minorities and, coupled with mortality in the white population and white reluctance to seek housing in areas of minority concentration, the net effect is to increase the percentage that minorities form of the population of inner areas. Thus, net migration, natural increase and fertility all point to increasing percentages of the South Asian minority population in existing areas of minority settlement.

Fourthly, because of their younger age and cultural expectations of early marriage among South Asian groups, new family formation is more rapid among the South Asian communities. At the same time, and particularly for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population, there are strong pressures to keep the new families close to the parental homes.

What is remarkable is that, despite these factors which seem to point in the negative direction suggested by Poulsen, there has been a net decrease in segregation measured by ID. The reasons seem clear. The minority population is not withdrawing into heartland ghettos. With upward mobility and new family formation, minorities are spreading out and mixing, albeit at different rates for different groups. The Indian population, and particularly its Hindu element, has been notable for its degree of suburbanization. Eighty per cent of London's Indians live in Outer London as do 82 per cent of Indian Hindus. Work in Leeds and Bradford (Phillips

2006; Stillwell and Phillips 2006; Harrison and Phillips 2003) points in the same direction. These movements are leading to a greater mixing of the minority and majority populations. These movements are leading to decreases in the IDs. Put differently, a higher proportion of both the white and minority populations are living in ethnically mixed wards.

The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that for South Asian groups, but particularly for the overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, clustering is high but does not amount to ghetto formation. Increasing densities in the areas of greatest concentration are due to fertility and family formation rather than net inward migrations. Net migration of both the South Asian and white populations is away from these areas. Not only is this the case, but the clusters are formed positively through strong kinship ties (Shaw 1994; 2001) not through negative racial discrimination. This point becomes clearer when we examine the very different patterns of the Caribbean population.

4. Caribbeans versus South Asians: Different Settlement Patterns, Different Trajectories of Accommodation

4.1 Differing Degrees of Segregation

The settlement patterns of the Caribbean and the South Asian populations in Britain differ markedly. One possible interpretation of these trends is that the groups are at different stages of the same settlement process. The Caribbeans, as the longest established group, have the lowest IDs while the Bangladeshis, as the most recent, have the highest values, with the Indians and Pakistanis in between. There is some truth in this view, but the Pakistani and Indian movements were largely contemporaneous, so timing alone would not account for a 13 point difference in their unweighted IDs. The Indian population has a much higher socio-economic position that any of the other groups, but this has not been translated into 'low' segregation although it has produced a significant suburbanisation of the Indian population.

Table 10 gives the IDs at ward level, for Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and the Caribbean population, in eight of the cities with the largest minority populations for which we have data in both 1991 and 2001. There was a universal decrease or stable position, for all of the ethnic groups in all of the cities. The only pair of values not to show a decrease was the Indian population of Leeds which recorded the same value (42) in both 1991 and 2001. Not only was this the case but the Caribbean unweighted average decreased from 'moderate' (45) to low (35) segregation between 1991 and 2001. The Indian average remained moderate, but decreased from 46 to 42, the Pakistani average remained moderately high, but decreased from 56 to 51 and the Bangladeshi average dropped from very high to high, from 70 to 61. Thus although Bangladeshi segregation is high, it has shown a significant decrease. Of the 32 pairs of values in Table 10 none show an increase. Thus the ID values give evidence for *decreasing not increasing segregation*. Even the segregation levels for Bangladeshis, which are high, show decreases in all eight cities.

Table 10: Comparison of 2001 and 1991 Indices of Dissimilarity for Selected English Cities with Significant Minority Populations

Urban Areas	Caribbean		Indian		Pakistani		Bangladeshi	
	2001	1991	2001	1991	2001	1991	2001	1991
Birmingham	35	40	42	48	55	62	61	67
Bradford	32	39	42	49	51	54	60	69
Kirklees	53	62	52	55	46	49	62	70
Leicester	20	29	38	42	40	47	63	73
Oldham	24	38	42	49	66	72	66	73
London	39	43	44	46	46	48	61	62
Manchester	38	49	35	39	48	52	53	63
Leeds	35	63	42	42	55	61	61	82
Unweighted average	35	45	42	46	51	56	61	70

Source: Based on Census of England and Wales, 2001 Table S 104; 1991 data from Peach 1996. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

It seems unlikely that differences can be explained by reference to different stages of the same settlement process. Differences between South Asian and Caribbean cultural practices, family structures and immersion in British customs offer a more credible explanation. The basic difference between the Caribbean and the South Asian settlement patterns is because they are on different trajectories of accommodation to British society. The two ways are *Assimilation* (the melting pot or Anglo conformism) and *Structural Pluralism* (multiculturalism) (Peach 1997). The two models have contrasting outcomes in terms of segregation and of intermarriage: assimilation produces low levels of segregation; pluralism produces high levels.

Assimilation is the process by which the minority becomes diffused throughout the social and spatial systems of a country so that its characteristics become indistinguishable from those of the population as a whole. In spatial terms assimilation means that in cities the group moves from having high levels of segregation from the indigenous population to having low levels and becoming residentially mixed. In the assimilation model the ID is expected to decrease over time from the 60s or higher to the 30s or lower (see the Caribbeans in Figure 4).

Structural Pluralism or Multiculturalism, on the other hand, envisages the group maintaining its identity *and its spatial concentrations*. Even if the group moves from the central city to the suburbs, it remains concentrated. Instead of the IDs reducing over time, they remain in the 50s or 60s or higher. This is the model for the Bangladeshis (in Figure 4).

Figure 4: Indices of Segregation



4.2 The Caribbeans: Trends Towards Assimilation

The Caribbean population shows the classic assimilation or melting pot model. The Caribbeans experienced an intensely anglicised cultural background: Christian, English-speaking and raised in a British educational system. They have followed an almost classic assimilatory trajectory in Britain, albeit a segmented assimilatory pattern into the white working class. The have low rates of residential segregation and have high rates of mixed marriage and unions with the white population. The Caribbean population, for which we have continuous measures for London from 1961 to 2001, shows continuous decreases at all available scales: Borough, Ward and Enumeration District/Output Area (Table 11). The ID has decreased monotonically census by census from 56 in 1961 to 39 in 2001.

Table 11: IDs for the Caribbean Population of London, 1961-2001

Year	Borough	Ward	ED/OA
1961	NA	56	NA
1971	38	49	65
1981	37	46	53
1991	34	43	50
2001	32	39	43

Source: 1961-1991, Peach, 1996; author's calculation for 2001 based on Census of England and Wales, Table S104. ED= Enumeration District (the smallest unit used by the census up to 1991). OA= Output Area (the smallest current census unit, (300 people); London wards in 2001 averaged 11,300 people. Boroughs averaged 217,000.
Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104.

Furthermore, the 1981-1991 map of Caribbean change in London shows the hollowing out of the central areas of concentration and increase in the outer areas with low densities (Figure 5). The areas of heaviest loss coincide with the areas of highest concentration.

Figure 5: London, 1981-1991, Change in Caribbean-born Population



Source: Peach (1996).

Over a third of Caribbean men living as part of a couple in the *Labour Force Survey* data 1997-2004 had a white partner - compared with 8 per cent for Indians, 7 per cent for Pakistanis and 2 per cent for Bangladeshis. Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi marriage patterns, unlike the Caribbean, are very homogamous (Coleman 2004).

Figure 6: Current Unions Outside Own Group, Great Britain 1991-96, 1997-02 (Per Cent)



Source: Coleman (2004).

It is important to emphasise the strength of Pakistani homogamy, since it is not confined to ethnic in-marriage. There is a preference for first cousins and beyond this to other cousin or kin for marriage. Shaw's data for her Oxford sample of 70 marriages in 1997/8 showed 76 per cent were between relatives, of whom 59 per cent were first cousins. Only 17 marriages, 24 per cent, were to people with whom there was no previously known or demonstrable kinship tie (Shaw 2001).

4.3 South Asians: the Plural (Mosaic) Model

The South Asian groups show a plural non-assimilationist structure. This is to say that their populations are economically integrated into British society but remain socially encapsulated within their own ethnic groups. Their patterns are more mosaic than melting pot (Peach 2005). Within the South Asian populations there are substantial differences between the more economically successful Indian population and the more economically marginalised Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

Parts of these differences are ascribable to the Muslim religion of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, part to the very strong *biraderi* (extended family) structure of these groups. The Muslim impact is manifested strongly through *Purdah*, the seclusion of women and their absence from economic activity. Only 29 per cent of Pakistani women aged 25 and over are economi-

cally active and only 23 per cent of Bangladeshi women. These rates are 50 per cent lower than those of most other ethnic groups and must make a big impact on family incomes. The tight family structures, extended families, arranged marriages and, for the Muslims and Sikhs (but not the Hindus), the importance of mosques and gurdwaras (Peach and Gale 2003) have helped to cement residential concentrations.

Unlike the Caribbean population, the South Asian groups, by keeping family close and having larger families, have tended to reinforce existing centres of settlement (Figure 7) rather than hollow them out, as the Caribbean population has done.

Figure 7: Percentage Change (1991-2001) in Pakistani Population, West Midlands Wards, Compared With Percentage Present 1991



r=0.9, p<.01

The result shows clearly that the greater the concentration of Pakistanis in the ward in 1991, the greater the degree of increase over the 10 year period to 2001.

In the debates which have developed over segregation and ghettoisation, the Caribbean/South Asian contrasts have been largely ignored in favour of concentrating on the consolidation of South Asian, particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi, populations in their core areas. This has been coupled with the recognition that these ethnic concentrations are also concentrations of Muslims.

4.4 Good Segregation/Bad Segregation?

The fact that South Asian groups seem to be following the Multicultural mosaic model of ethnic consolidation and that this pattern is particularly noticeable among the Pakistani and Bangladeshis Muslim components of that population, largely accounts for the suspicion with which ethnic concentrations have come to be regarded. This raises the question of whether all

concentration and all segregation is bad. The answer depends firstly on whether concentration is primarily associated with forced or voluntary conditions and secondly whether concentrations are associated with very poor living conditions.

To illustrate the argument I turn to new data on religion in London, available from the 2001 census. Table 12 shows high levels of segregation for the Sikh (61) and Jewish populations (60), but moderate levels for the Hindu (45) and low levels for the Muslim population (33).

Table 12: IDs at Ward Level for Major Religions in London, 2001

	ID	Jewish	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh	Christian
Jewish	60	0	64	62	77	63
Muslim	33		0	44	59	39
Hindu	45			0	53	50
Sikh	61				0	63
Christian	8					0

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

However, table 12 is misleading in some ways. The highest degree of concentration of the Sikh population in any London ward was 43 per cent; the highest Jewish concentration was 37 per cent Although ID values may be high, there is a difference between dominating an area and characterising an area. There is also a difference between nearly all of a group living in a particular district and nearly everyone in that district being a member of that group. The Jewish and Sikh populations do not form even a majority of the population of the most concentrated wards in which they live. Their high ID values are more the product of their absence from other areas. There may be issues about Sikh and Jewish concentrations, the north London *eruv*, for example (Vincent and Warf 2000), but such areas of concentration are more helpfully represented as areas of congregation rather than areas of segregation (Newman 1985, 1987; Waterman and Kosmin 1986).

Table 13: Ward Level Concentration of Major Religious Groups in London, 2001

Threshold percent concentration	Jewish	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh
70-79				
60-69		0.9		
50-59		3.3		
40-49		4.5	1.4	
30-37	12.8	7.5	8.2	13.3
20-29	12.4	9.4	9.2	15.4
10-19	26.3	34.9	30.5	14.9
0-9	48.5	39.7	50.7	56.4
highest individual ward value	37.1	61.9	42.7	39.5

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.

Similarly, although the Muslim level of segregation in London is low, it is low for a paradoxical reason. It is low because of the high degree of intra-Muslim ethnic segregation. There are Muslims from many different ethnic backgrounds in London, many of whom show high levels of segregation from other Muslims. Their distributions are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. When placed together, they form an even spread, taken individually they are distinct. Table 14 shows the intra-Muslim IDs for London. Values of 50 and above are highlighted.

Table 14: Intra Muslim Ethnic Segregation (Indices of Dissimilarity) London, Ward Level, 2001

	Total	White Muslim	Indian Muslim	Pakistani Muslim	Bangladeshi Muslim	Black Carib. Muslim	Black African Muslim	Other Ethnic Group Muslim	Other Mixed, Muslim	Other Asian Muslim
All Muslims	607,140									
White Muslim	116,338	0								
Indian Muslim	40,476	53	0							
Pakistani Muslim	130,656	57	27	0						
Bangladeshi Muslim	142,929	61	61	64	0					
Black Caribbean Muslim	2,735	44	52	53	70	0				
Black African Muslim	73,845	37	47	46	55	39	0			
Other Ethnic Group Muslim	28,761	41	45	47	64	48	36	0		
Other Mixed, Muslim	10,420	45	55	55	66	52	46	45	0	
Other Asian, Muslim	39,238	46	55	56	67	53	49	46	26	0

Source: Based on data from Census 2001, London ward tables for ethnicity by religion Table S104.

There are strong reasons for these concentrations. The basic structure of Pakistani Muslims in Britain is the biraderi, the extended family, which exercises strong influence over the behaviour of members of the groups. This manifests itself in tight spatial patterns of settlement, in adjacent or nearby houses. Such concentrations, although constrained by economic controls, are also predominantly voluntary (Dahya, 1974; Shaw, 1994, 2001). The desire of biraderi members to stay close to one another means that family values transmute into the appearance of high levels of ethnic segregation.

The negative aspect of these concentrations is that they coincide, to a high degree, with areas of multiple housing deprivations. The problem with high levels of Muslim segregation is that 55 per cent of Muslim households in England are found in the two worst deciles of multiple housing deprivation (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Percentage Concentration of Religious Groups in Deciles of Housing Conditions, Standardised on the Total Population, Ranked from Worst to Best, England 2001



Source: Beckford et al (2006).

5. Loci of Interaction

In the classical assimilation model there is an inverse relationship between ethnic residential segregation and social assimilation: the higher the segregation, the lower the assimilation (Duncan and Lieberson 1959; Massey 1985). Duncan and Lieberson demonstrated from their Chicago data in the 1950s that high levels of segregation were associated with low levels of out marriage and low percentages of the group able to speak English. Low levels of segregation were inversely correlated with high levels of out marriage and high levels of English language speaking.

A large number of institutional loci are influenced by residential patterns: the catchment areas of schools, places of worship, shops, workplaces as well as contact with neighbours. Assimilation in such studies is operationalised in terms such as language acquisition and outmarriage. The precise mechanism of the interaction brought about by residential mixing remains opaque, however.

However, looking at societies based on honour systems such as British South Asian societies (and possibly Turkish families in Germany) the conventions governing arranged marriage and the requirements of female chastity are so strong at caste and *biraderi* (patrilineal extended families) levels (Ballard 1990; Shaw 2001) that even if segregation levels were low, outmarriage would still be very unusual. Honour, rather than segregation and concentration is the primary means of social controlling social interaction in such groups, but close settlement does allow close observation and gossip to control the behaviour of girls. The stronger the honour system, the greater the wearing of traditional forms of dress and the higher the degree of concentration. These traits are more common among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who

have high levels of concentration than among Hindus. First generation women often speak little English and are inhibited from leaving the house alone by rules of *Purdah* (Shaw 1994). In Britain at least 55 per cent of Pakistani couples are married to their first cousins and even more, if more distant family members are included in the calculation (Shaw 2001). Prohibition of alcohol also removes a major social locus in white society for Muslims. We may note, however, that there may be toleration of Pakistani boys having white girl friends 'for experience' but not for marriage.

On the other hand, and this was shown above, Caribbean and Chinese groups in Britain, who have low and decreasing levels of segregation, also have high and increasing levels of outmarriage. The proportion of Caribbean men living with or married to a white partner in 1997-2002 was 37 per cent while for Caribbean women the figure was 29 per cent (Coleman 2004). As we have seen, the mean ID for Caribbeans in our sample of English cities in 2001 was 35, which is 'low'.

At the micro-scale, in choosing with whom to sit in canteens, ethnic choice has been shown to be strongly asserted (Clack et al 2004). The conclusion is that interaction and bridging contacts depend less on the residential patterns and more on group preference. Caribbean segregation levels are low and contacts with whites are high. Language is not a major barrier, religion is largely Christian – even if the preferred denominations are more pentecostal than is the pattern for whites. It is clear from the high rates of Caribbean/white intermarriage and cohabitation, that substantial social interaction takes place.

Social interaction with white society seems to be as much a question of whether the groups want it as of the opportunities for it to take place. The plural model is one of economic integration but social encapsulation within the ethnic community. It is a model which seems to work well for the Hindu, Sikh and Jewish communities.

Although conventional analyses of segregation have tended to rely on a-spatial measures such as ID, and P*, it is clear that absolute numbers and high levels of concentration play a significant role. In order to produce institutional completeness (halal shops, mosques, and madrassas, in the Muslim case, for example) critical threshold populations with a given distance of particular facilities are necessary. A dispersed population of a given size will be less able to maintain the ethnic identity of its children than one which is concentrated.

This becomes particularly important in relation to schools. The concentration of minority ethnic children in schools is higher than the degree of concentration of minority population in their catchment areas. A number of factors are responsible for this. If we take the case of Muslim children in Bradford, for example, the demographics of the whites and South Asians in the areas of minority concentration are inverse images. The Muslim population is young and fertile with large families and many children. The white population is aged and there are few white children. White parents, in any case, often avoid sending their children to Asian dominated schools. In the German system, there is evidence that Turkish children are channelled into the technical and artisan streams and schools. Thus, the schools in minority areas have a higher ethnic concentration than even the areas in which they are embedded. The reasons for this higher concentration are mainly demographic, but also related to white avoid-

ance. In Britain, the bulk of minority children go to state comprehensive schools. However, the number of faith schools is increasing. Thus while residential segregation gives a strong indication of the degree of mixing in an area, it is not necessarily the most important guide to the degree to which significant segments of the population experience segregation on the ground.

A number of papers have appeared which correlate the academic performance of students of different ethnicity in schools with different proportions of ethnic mix. These studies are based on PLASC (Pupil Level Annual School Census) data. These data are government collected and allow performance to be measured for individuals, schools, areas and for ethnic groups and different ethnic mixes in schools. PLASC therefore presents the opportunity of direct, rather than ecological, correlations, between ethnic composition of schools and academic performance of ethnic individuals. Work by Burgess and Wilson (2005a, 2005b) using PLASC data investigates whether white, Pakistani and Indian students perform better in schools where their ethnic group predominates or is in a minority. Leicester and Bradford secondary schools are chosen because they represent, respectively, high concentrations of Indians and Pakistanis. The main results are as follows: Indian students perform better than white students, who outperform Pakistani students. These findings hold true at all key stages and become more marked at GCSE. Within each ethnic group, there are differences between male and female students and between students from poor homes and others. Holding characteristics constant, single sex school students outperform those from mixed schools. Schools on religious foundations do better than non-denominational schools. Selective schools do better than comprehensives.

Ethnic composition of schools has little effect on the performance of Indian students in Leicester. They record higher test scores in all environments. There was some slight evidence that they did better in ethnically mixed rather than predominantly white or predominantly Indian schools. For Pakistani students in Bradford, there is clear evidence of different performance according to the ethnic mix of schools. Pakistani students achieve higher scores the larger the white majority. They achieve higher scores when they are in a small minority. The evidence for white students in Bradford was the opposite. The larger the Pakistani component, the lower the white test scores.

In further studies of segregation and schooling by Burgess and Wilson (2005a, b) indices of dissimilarity and isolation are employed to compare patterns of segregation across nine ethnic groups, and across Local Education Authorities in England. The main findings are that levels of ethnic segregation in England's schools are high. In many local areas, over half the minority pupils would have to switch schools to produce an even spread of ethnic groups. Second, there is considerable variation across groups – segregation is higher for pupils of Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin than for pupils with black Caribbean or black African heritage. Furthermore, in the former groups, segregation appears to be higher where they are (relatively) numerous, while for black pupils segregation is lower in areas where they are more numerous. Segregation is low (ID = 26.1) between African and Caribbean students. Intra South Asian segregation is higher (ID = 38.2) but Bangladeshi segregation is highest of all and from all other groups (ID = 66.2). They show that ethnic segregation in schools is only

very weakly related to income segregation. That is, there are areas with the same spatial spread of income, but very different levels of ethnic segregation.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is that graphing ID against P* they identify three areas of particular concern as scoring highly on both indices. For pupils of South Asian ethnic origin, they find that these areas include the locations of the severe riots in the summer of 2001 in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley. This is suggestive that either school segregation plays a direct role in the underlying causes of discontent (as suggested by the Cantle and Ouseley Reports on the riots), or is related through a correlation with housing segregation.

6. Conclusion

The conclusion to this survey of the debates between those believing that segregation is increasing and those that believe it is decreasing, is as follows.

- Caribbean segregation measured by ID is low. It has shown continuous decrease since 1961 in London where over 60 per cent of the Caribbean population lives. It has shown decreases in nearly all British cities with a substantial Caribbean population between 1991 and 2001.
- Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian IDs have all shown decreases between 1991 and 2001. Indian IDs are only moderate. Pakistani IDs are moderately high. Bangladeshi IDs are high and 25 per cent of British Bangladeshis live in the highly deprived east London Borough of Tower Hamlets.
- P* Isolation indices of isolation for minority groups have increased between 1991 and 2001. However, P* is highly sensitive to the percentage that a group forms of a city population. Minority populations in Britain have increased by over 50 per cent between 1991 and 2001. The test for changes in P* is to divide it by the percentage that the groups form of the city population. In London, for which we have the data, the number of times that the minority groups' P* exceed statistical expectation, has decreased.
- The maximum concentration which minorities form at the ward level has increased significantly in cities such as Bradford and Leicester. This has given rise to concerns of ghettoisation. However, just under 10 per cent of the minority population of England and Wales lived in wards in which they accounted for 67 per cent of the population. However, about a quarter of the population of these wards was white. The highest degree of concentration (taking all minorities together) found in any of the wards in the 2001 census, was 88.1 per cent. The highest percentage of a single minority in a ward was Latimer ward in Leicester where Indians accounted for 74 per cent of the population. The only other ward in England, where a single minority amounted to two-thirds of the population was Whitefield, in Pendle, north-east Lancashire, where Pakistanis form 67 per cent.
- The main drivers of the increasing percentage of South Asians in areas of high concentration seem to be minority natural increase (especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi) and white mortality as well as white reluctance to enter rather than minority in-movement and white flight.

- The rate of minority out-movement (spillover and spread) has been faster than the increase in the most concentrated areas. This explains the decreasing IDs at the same time as the concentrations have increased.
- Comparisons of Bradford and Leicester with Chicago misunderstand the intensity of the American ghetto: in 2000, 60 per cent of Chicago's black population lived in tracts which were 90 per cent or more black.
- This points to a caveat about cross-national comparisons of ID. Where a minority population, such as the black population of Chicago, is very large (26 per cent in 2000) it is important to use the Index of Segregation which measures the segregation of the minority from the rest of the population rather than the ID which measures the difference between the minority and the whole population (of which the minority is a significant element). The ID is 60 but the IS is 80. Comparing a Chicago ID with a Leicester ID is problematic.
- High IDs are also misleading for groups such as the Jews in London, where at ward level they do not constitute a majority anywhere. Jews have a high concentration in north London, but their high score is the product of absence from many parts of the city not dominance of a small area. Their highest ward percentage is 37.
- The high Jewish and Sikh IDs also indicate that high concentrations are not in themselves problematic. More problematic is the coincidence of high concentrations with bad living conditions. This is the case for the Muslim population in England and Wales where 55 per cent of Muslim households live in the areas containing 20 per cent of the worst housing conditions.

In terms of social interaction and promoting social cohesion, more seems to depend on group attitudes and cultural practice than simply spatial patterns. Schools seem to be the most universal loci for interaction, but schools themselves contain higher degrees of segregation than residential areas.

Measures of segregation have proved to be a good diagnostic tool for understanding intergroup relations, but they do not provide us with the tools for achieving good relations.

References

Ballard, R. (1990): Migration and kinship: the differential effect of marriage rules on the processes of Punjabi migration to Britain. In: C. Clarke, C. Peach and S. Vertovec (eds.), *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*, Cambridge: 219-249.

BBC (2001): 11 December 2001: Race 'segregation' caused riots says report. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1435958.stm (last accessed 4 January 2007).

Beckford, J. A., Gale, R., Owen, D., Peach C., Waller, P. (2006): Review of the Evidence Base on Faith Communities, ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) London http://www.communities.gov.uk/pub/321/ReviewoftheEvidenceBaseonFaithCommunities_id1165321.pdf (last accessed 30 November 2006).

Burgess S. and Wilson D. (2005a): Ethnic segregation in England's schools. In: *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers,* 30(1): 20-36.

Burgess S., Wilson D., Lupton R. (2005b): Parallel lives? Ethnic segregation in schools and neighbourhoods. In: *Urban Studies* 42(7): 1027-1056.

Clack B., Dixon J., Tredoux C. (2005): Eating together apart: Patterns of segregation in a multi-ethnic cafeteria. In: *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology,* 15(1): 1-16.

Coleman D. A. (2004): Partner choice and the growth of ethnic minority populations. In: *Bevolking en Gezin*, (33)2: 7-34.

Dahya, B. (1974): The Nature of Pakistani Ethnicity in Industrial Cities in Britain. In: A. Cohen (ed.) *Urban Ethnicity*, London: 77-118.

Dorling, D. and Rees, P. (2003): A nation still dividing: the British census and social polarisation 1971-2001. In: *Environment and Planning A,* 35(7): 1287-1313.

Duncan, O. D. and Lieberson, S. (1959): Ethnic segregation and assimilation. In: *American Journal of Sociology,* 64: 364-374.

Harrison, M. and Phillips, D. (2003): *Housing and Black and Minority Ethnic Communities: Review of the Evidence Base*. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London.

Johnston, R., Poulsen, M. and Forrest, J. (2003): Ethnic residential concentration and a 'new spatial order': Exploratory analyses of four United States Metropolitan areas: 1980-2000. In: *International Journal of Population Geography*, 9: 39-56.

Johnston, R., Poulsen, M. and Forrest, J. (2004): The comparative study of ethnic residential segregation in the U.S.A.: 1980-2000. In: Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie, 95(5): 550-569.

Johnston, R.J., Gregory, D., and Smith, D.M. (1984): *Dictionary of Human Geography*, Oxford.

Johnston, R.J., Gregory, D., Pratt, G., and Watts, D. (2004): *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 4th edition, Oxford.

Lieberson, S. (1980): *A piece of the pie*: *Blacks and white immigrants since 1880*, Berkeley.

Lieberson, S. (1981): An Asymmetrical Approach to Segregation. In: C. Peach, V. Robinson and S. J. Smith (eds.), *Ethnic Segregation in Cities*, London: 61-82.

Massey, D. (1985): Ethnic residential segregation: A theoretical synthesis and empirical review. In: *Sociology and Social Research*, 69: 315-350.

Massey, D. and Denton, N. (1993): *American Apartheid*, Cambridge.

Modood, T., R. Berthoud, J. Lakey, J. Nazroo, P. Smith, S. Virdee and S. Beishon (1997): *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage*, London.

Newman, D. (1985): Integration and Ethnic Spatial Concentration: The Changing Distribution of the Anglo-Jewish Community. In: *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,* NS 10: 380-376.

Newman, D. (1987): Data collection problems and the identification of Jewish ethnic community patterns: a reply. In: *Transactions, Institute of British Geographer*, NS 12: 113-115.

Park, R. E. (1926): The Urban Community as a Spacial (sic) Pattern and a Moral Order. In: E. W. Burgess (ed.): The Urban Community. Chicago. Reproduced in: C. Peach (ed.) (1975): *Urban Social Segregation*, London: 21-31.

Peach, C. (1968): *West Indian Migration to Britain: A Social Geography*, London.

Peach, C. (1974): Homogamy, propinquity and segregation: A re-evaluation. In: *American Sociological Review*, 39(6): 36-41.

Peach, C. (1980): Which triple melting pot? In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 31: 1-16.

Peach, C. (1991): The Caribbean in Europe: Contrasting Patterns of Migration and Settlement in Britain, France and the Netherlands. Research Paper in: *Ethnic Relations* 15, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations University of Warwick.

Peach, C. (1996): The ethnic minority populations of Britain. *Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Volume 2*, ONS, HSMO, London.
[see also volumes edited by D. Coleman and J. Salt (Vol. 1) P. Ratcliffe (Vol. 3) and V. Karn (Vol. 4)]

Peach, C. (1996a): Does Britain have Ghettos? In: *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, 21: 216-235.

Peach, C. (1997): Pluralist and Assimilationist Models of Ethnic Settlement in London 1991. In: *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geografie*, 88(2): 120-134.

Peach, C. (1998): South Asian and Caribbean Ethnic Minority Housing Choice in Britain. In: *Urban Studies*, 35(10): 1657-1680.

Peach, C. (1999): London and New York: Contrasts in British and American Models of Segregation with a comment by Nathan Glazer. In: *International Journal of Population Geography*, 5: 319-331.

Peach, C. (2005): The Ghetto and the Ethnic Enclave. In: D. P. Varady (ed.) *Desegregating the City: Ghettos, enclaves and inequalities*, Albany: 31-48.

Peach, C. and Gale, R. (2003): Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in the New Religious Geography of England. In: *Geographical Review*, 95(4): 469-490.

Peach C. and Rossiter D. (1996): Level and nature of spatial concentration of minority ethnic populations in Great Britain, 1991. In: P. Ratcliffe (ed.), *Ethnicity in the 1991 Census*, *Volume 3*. Social Geography and Ethnicity in Britain: spatial concentration and internal migration, London, Office for National Statistics, HMSO: 111-134.

Phillips, D. (2006): Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation. In: *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 24(1): 25-40.

Phillips, T. (2005): After 7/7: Sleepwalking to Segregation. Paper delivered to the Manchester Council for Community Relations, 22 September 2005. http://www.cre.gov.uk/Default.aspx.LocID-0hgnew07s.RefLocID-0hg00900c002.Lang-EN.htm (last accessed 13 March 2007).

Philpott, T. (1978): *The Slum and the Ghetto,* New York.

Poulsen, M. (2005): The 'new geography' of ethnicity in Britain? Institute of British Geographers Conference, September.

Poulsen, M., R. Johnston and J. Forrest (2001): Intraurban ethnic enclaves: introducing a knowledge-based classification method. In: *Environment and Planning A*, 33: 2071-2082.

Rex, J. and R. Moore (1967): *Race, Community and Conflict*, Oxford.

Robinson, V. (1986): *Settlers, Transients and Refugees*, Oxford.

Shaw, A. (1994): The Pakistani Community in Oxford. In: R. Ballard (ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*, London: 35-57.

Shaw, A. (2001): Kinship, Cultural Preference and Immigration: Consanguineous Marriage among British Pakistanis. In: *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, NS 7: 315-334.

Simpson, L. (2005): Survey of net migration, and natural increase in high minority concentration electoral wards in 83 Local Authorities with high minority populations. http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/research/migseg/index.html (last accessed 30 November 2006).

Sin, C. H. (2002): The interpretation of segregation indices in context: the case of P* in Singapore. In: *The Professional Geographer*, 54(3): 422-437.

Stillwell, J. and Phillips, D. (2006): Diversity and change: Understanding the ethnic geographies of Leeds. In: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 32(7): 1131-1152.

Van, K. R. and van Weesep, J. (1998): Ethnic segregation patterns in Dutch cities: Shifts and Consequences. In: *Urban Studies*, 35(10): 1813-1834.

Vincent, P. and B. Warf (2002): Eruvim: Talmudic places in a postmodern world. In: *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, NS 27(1): 30-51.

Waterman, S. and Kosmin, B. A. (1987): Residential change in a middle-class suburban ethnic population: a comment. In: *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, NS, 12: 107-112.

White, P. (1988): The Settlement Patterns of Developed World Migrants in London. In: *Urban Studies*, 35(10): 1725 -1744.

Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf

Spatial Segregation and Integration in the Netherlands

Contents

1. Introduction

Cities have traditionally accommodated different population categories. This was and is required because of the key functions of cities: to be centres of trade, culture, knowledge production and innovation. These functions require openness, diversity, and the willingness to learn from others. In this respect, cities have retained a position they have had since ancient times. Yet, currently, a substantial number of people seem to prefer a break with the past, expressing other views regarding the functions of the city and making active efforts to reduce diversity; they develop a fear of other cultures and therewith reduce the atmosphere of openness. According to their viewpoint, if something 'strange' comes to the city, this element should be assimilated as soon as possible. This is also expressed in debates regarding segregation, (i.e. the geography of diversity). Even living moderately segregated from other population categories in the city is regarded as a threat to the integration (or, in fact, the assimilation) process.

This paper will address this relationship between segregation and integration and discuss the existing knowledge on these phenomena in the Netherlands. We will start by briefly introducing two opposing views of the relationship between the city and immigrants and go on to discuss their implications for the segregation and integration debate. Then we will outline some empirical evidence regarding the development of the level of segregation (section 2), followed by a section on integration indicators (section 3). These sections are designed to give a more accurate view of the current state of integration as well as of the actual levels of segregation and the dynamics behind them. In section 4 we will focus on the relation between spatial segregation and integration, which includes a critical review of the different opinions on the association between the two central concepts. The final section draws some conclusions with regard to the relevance of ethnic segregation in the Netherlands.

In the international debate on integration and the city, there are at least two contrasting visions of the relationship between the city, the immigrants who settle in it, and integration. The first vision adopts the view that the integration of various categories of the population is closely and positively related to the aforementioned wider functioning of the city, in the sense that the influx of immigrants contributes to the functions of the city as a centre of innovation, knowledge production and cultural exchange. In this vision integration is not automatically addressed as a 'problem', but instead as a long-term process in which people find their way. It is assumed that ultimately this will have positive effects for urban society. The way various population groups integrate in the urban society, or become part of that society, can be considered a reflection of the opportunity structure or 'localised bundle' that impacts the innovation process the city may or may not experience. An open attitude towards immigrants may support the introduction of new ideas from outside. These outsiders may create new stimulating environments ('bundles of assets', see Robson et al. 2000), or create a dynamic and more innovative culture.

Hall (1998) and Simmie (2005) have suggested that several cities have reached their high levels of innovation through immigration and an open attitude towards 'outsiders' that entered the city. Several scholars point to the fact that the so-called "Golden Age of Amsterdam" was

clearly related to large-scale immigration of people from abroad with different lifestyles and new skills that complemented the knowledge and skills already available. Currently, it is suggested that the development of urban economies is characterised not just by expanding business quarters that accommodate large multinationals and their international employees, but also by newer and smaller firms in internationally-oriented cultural and creative industries. Moreover, it is said that this latter type of industry, especially, is attracted by open, tolerant and diverse urban cultures (Jacobs 1961; Florida 2002). These characteristics allow for the development and accumulation of creativity and stimulate the smooth integration of various population categories. We should notice that openness to and acceptance of outsiders is not confined to the immigrant population, but extends to attitudes toward a wide variety of lifestyles and socio-economic differentiation. An open attitude towards 'the other' is often regarded as an important factor for attracting young and highly educated people. Since these are required for filling vacant jobs in the knowledge economy, diversity may also contribute to the growth of the economy.

A second – and contrasting – vision, however, presumes a more negative relationship between the city, immigration and integration. Expressions of xenophobia with regard to recent immigrants from less well-off sections of the world predominate in this view. In the context of Dutch urban policy, the so-called Big Cities Policy, many politicians expressed fear of increased criminality, polarisation, spatial segregation, spatial concentration of problems, lack of integration and the growing risk of exclusion for parts of the population. Moreover, there appears to be a growing and strongly-held belief that people should be worried not only about the lack of integration in and of itself, but also about the high level of residential segregation, since segregation would have a negative impact on integration (Musterd 2005; Musterd/ Murie/Kesteloot 2006). These ideas are underpinned by a set of assumptions (see also Musterd 2003): The first assumption is that segregation is substantial enough and increasing in a way that we can indeed find significant spatial concentrations of specific vulnerable population categories that may result in negative effects. This assumption is based on the experiences in a number of American cities (Wilson 1987; Massey/Denton 1993). A second assumption is that current integration processes are unsatisfactory, and that some sections of the population lag far behind in areas such as education, the labour market and in social and cultural spheres. A third assumption, most crucial to the present study, is that a negative relationship exists between the levels of residential segregation of vulnerable population categories and the levels of societal integration. In other words, a high and increasing level of segregation and/or a strong spatial concentration of specific population categories are assumed to have a negative impact on integration and upward social mobility.

The idea that spatial segregation indicates a lack of participation and integration in society is not a new one. Beginning in the mid-1970s, as an increasing number of policy-makers in the Netherlands became aware of the fact that the guest workers they had welcomed during the heyday of the manufacturing industry would stay more permanently, they began developing dispersal programmes in major cities like Rotterdam and Amsterdam. These policies were aimed at rapid integration, in fact at assimilation, but were never implemented. This was because the Dutch constitution prohibited selective policies based on place of origin (cf. van Praag 1981). The segregation debate almost disappeared from the public sphere in the subse-

quent era in which the so-called multicultural model of cohabitation was adopted. Immigrants from various cultural backgrounds were 'allowed' to live together and (sub-)cultures were granted the right to develop their own (sub-) cultural norms, values and interests, insofar as these were compatible with the Constitution and with Dutch fundamental values (e.g. separation of church and state, equality of men and women). This multicultural attitude also allowed for the development of ethnically segregated cities.

The political climate changed again in the mid-1990s, when Dutch policies towards immigrants were reformulated. An increasing number of politicians started to express their worries about the ongoing influx of immigrants and – in their eyes – increasing segregation. As a result, Dutch policies towards immigrants again stressed rapid assimilation. Although some tried to develop spatial dispersal policies similar to those of the 1970s, most politicians opted for more subtle ways to reduce residential segregation. They used concepts such as 'urban restructuring' and started stimulating housing mixes and mixed neighbourhoods, while targeting homogeneous ethnic neighbourhoods in the hope of reducing segregation (see Musterd 2002; Botman/Van Kempen 2002). The Dutch government's June 2002 policy programme explicitly stated that the development of homogeneous ethnic neighbourhoods had to be countered by creating mixed-housing neighbourhoods.

2. Residential Segregation in Dutch Cities

What is the actual level of segregation? Is segregation increasing? Are the existing concentrations of ethnic minorities growing? For an answer to the first two questions we refer to the information in Table 1, which presents a comparison of residential segregation in 1980 and more recent years. We will focus our analysis on Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean immigrants. These groups are four to six times over-represented in the largest cities of the Netherlands and are also central in most of the political debates. Therefore, these groups are suitable examples for a discussion about integration in large Dutch cities. Taking into account that international comparison of levels of segregation is rather complicated due to differences in definitions, scales applied, years of measurement, etc. we can state the level of segregation in the large Dutch cities is moderate or average by European standards and certainly not generally increasing.

There was a slight increase in the level of segregation for the Turkish and Moroccan populations in Amsterdam. In The Hague, levels first dropped and then stabilised, whereas in Rotterdam the levels of segregation for these two population categories are steadily declining. Surinamese tend to show decreasing levels of segregation in all three cities, and Antilleans show a more stable level in Rotterdam and The Hague.

Table 1: Segregation Indices in the Largest Dutch Cities in 1980, 1998, 2000 and 2004

	Amsterdam				Rotterdam				The Hague			
	1980	1998	2000	2004	1980	1998	2000	2004	1980	1998	2000	2004
Turks	37.3	40.1	41.2	42.4	-	50.1	47.8	44.1	66.4	51.3	51.3	51.1
Moroccan	38.6	39.0	39.5	40.0	-	44.5	42.6	39.7	64.7	48.7	48.8	48.3
Surinamese	27.8	33.7	33.3	32.9	-	25.9	24.1	21.1	-	37.8	37.0	33.5
Antillean	26.2	36.6	37.1	33.3	-	27.8	30.2	29.7	-	26.2	27.3	28.1

Sources: Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands; Central Bureau of Statistics, the Netherlands.

Segregation and spatial concentration are strongly related but not identical concepts. Segregation is measured by statistical units, in which over- or under-representation of a population category relative to another category determine the level of segregation. These units, however, may be located adjacently or widely dispersed. This distance does not impact the value of the segregation index. Therefore, having a closer look at the concentrations through maps is useful. This perspective also provides information on the relative strength of the concentrations. Table 2 presents information for Amsterdam about the extent to which the four groups live in concentrations and about the share of these populations that live in such areas. In 2004 5.1 percent of the population of Amsterdam had a Turkish background (this figure includes both first and second generation migrants); in Turkish concentrations (areas with a percentage of Turkish inhabitants at least four standard deviations above the city-wide average) 23.8 per cent of the population had a Turkish background. Of all Turkish inhabitants in Amsterdam, 39.2 per cent lived in a Turkish concentration area. Moroccans tended to settle where large concentrations of other Moroccans were living (45.2% of all Moroccans lived in a Moroccan concentration), although their average share of the population in these concentrations did not exceed 33.3%.

Table 2: Concentrations of Ethnic Categories in Amsterdam, 2004

Ethnic group	N in city	% in the city	% of the total population in concentrations	% of the category that lives in a concentration
Turkish	37585	5.1	23.8	39.2
Moroccan	63078	8.5	33.3	45.4
Surinamese	71248	9.6	37.5	29.5
Antillean	11998	1.6	11.6	24.6

Source: City Monitor Amsterdam. Geography, University of Amsterdam and O+S Amsterdam.

Figure 1, below, shows the 2004 spatial concentrations of the four population categories shown in Table 2 for Amsterdam.[2] On the maps below, we can see that the Turkish and Moroccan residents are concentrated in the Western sections of the city, with some concentrations also present in the early-twentieth-century neighbourhoods in the Eastern sections. The Surinamese and Antillean concentrations are in very different areas, namely in the Southeastern sections of town. Especially over the past decade Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants have become more oriented to the Western parts of the city and to newer, often social housing. The maps show concentrations, but not extreme segregation.

Figure 1: Concentrations of Four Population Categories in Amsterdam, 2004

Turkish Moroccan





Surinamese Antillean

Source: City Monitor Amsterdam. Geography, University of Amsterdam and O+S Amsterdam.

[2] Concentration areas were constructed on the basis of very detailed spatial data, available at six-digit postcode level. When a certain level of the group was present, here at least four standard errors above the mean, that area was selected; when neighbouring areas were selected, these were taken together and presented as a larger area. For further details on the techniques used, see Deurloo/Musterd (1998).

The differences between the patterns can be explained by different factors, such as the year of immigration, type of migration (guest workers, colonial relation, family reunification, family formation), duration of stay, or access gained to social housing. However, rather than discussing these differences in this paper, we want to elaborate the dynamics with regard to these concentrations.

Figure 2, below, shows some changes that occurred in the period from 1994 to 2004: the share of Surinamese and Antilleans in their respective concentrations stabilised, while the share of Turkish and Moroccan residents in their respective concentrations increased. In a recent study, Musterd and De Vos (2006) showed that these developments in the four ethnic concentrations can be mainly ascribed to population dynamics in the city as a whole, which would lead us to expect higher shares of Turkish and Moroccan residents in their respective concentrations.

Figure 2: Percentage of the Population in an Ethnic Concentration Belonging to the Dominant Ethnic Category, Amsterdam, 1994-2004



Source: City Monitor Amsterdam. Geography, University of Amsterdam and O+S Amsterdam.

The differences between Turkish and Moroccan residents, on the one hand, and Surinamese and Antilleans, on the other, are also evident when we look at the share of a particular group's members living in "their own" ethnic concentration (Figure 3). Their development patterns almost mirror each other. Surinamese show the highest stability in terms of the proportion that lives in a Surinamese concentration. In recent years they, to a lesser extent than before, settled in 'their own' concentrations. Antilleans show a similar recent trend. These trends are most likely related to the fact that both population categories changed their housing behaviour and started to move into suburban areas since 2000.

The patterns with regard to the share of Moroccans and Turkish residents who live in concentrations are more complicated. Until 1998, the share of the different groups in their own ethnic concentrations increased substantially due to family reunification and increasingly to family formation. However, many tend to settle outside of such concentration areas. This is

indicated by the reduction of the share of each category in concentration areas between 1998 and 2000-01. Since 2001, however, unlike the Surinamese and Antillean patterns, there has been a stronger concentration of both Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants. This latter trend is unrelated to the total influx of Turkish residents and Moroccans in the city, which is characterised by very stable and regular increases over the entire period. However, there may be a relationship between the public debate regarding Muslims, which – at least partly – was more explicit and dynamic during the period 2001-2004 than before that period.

Figure 3: Percentage of Ethnic Group Living in an Ethnic Concentration of that Category, Amsterdam, 1994-2004



Source: City Monitor Amsterdam. Geography, University of Amsterdam and O+S Amsterdam

In short, the level of residential segregation in large Dutch cities is moderate and not generally increasing. Remarkably, in Rotterdam, where populist politicians make a lot of noise about increasing levels of segregation, segregation levels are steadily decreasing.

We also clarified that only a quarter of the population within areas of strong Turkish concentration (average + 4 standard deviations) is from a Turkish background (first or second generation), and approximately a third of the population in Moroccan and Surinamese concentrations turned out to be of Moroccan or Surinamese origin, respectively. The proportion of these population categories living in their own ethnic concentrations was highest for Moroccans (45 per cent) and for migrants from Turkey (39 per cent), with the percentage within these two population categories slightly increasing over the past few years. This could be a response to a more intense, open and tough discussion about fundamentalism and Islam. Yet, the quantitative position of the minority – the percentage of Turkish and Moroccan migrants living in areas of concentration as compared with the overall population – has not yet surpassed the level of increase we would expect, based on the developments in the city as a whole (Musterd/De Vos 2006).

3. Multi-dimensional Integration

The following paragraphs will outline key aspects of the situation of some immigrant groups in Dutch society before turning to the relevance of spatial segregation and ethnic concentrations for processes of integration. Integration has become a key word in current politics almost everywhere in Europe, and certainly in the Netherlands. "Integration" has different meanings to different people. For some, integration means assimilation ('disappearing' in society), for others integration could also occur in a multi-cultural setting. Again others have tried to define something in between these two positions, applying such concepts as 'diversity'. All of these meanings address the general host-foreigner relationship (see Alexander 2003). Integration is also discussed with reference to more specific domains, for example the extent to which immigrants are integrated or participate in socio-economic domains such as the labour market, education, or in the social-cultural domain. The socio-cultural domain refers to the ability to speak the language of the country or region of settlement, knowledge of basic characteristics of the country in which the immigrant is settled and the acceptance of basic norms and values, especially legally anchored norms. Integration also includes the level of interaction between immigrants and the longer-established population. Criminal behaviour is often part of the analysis, in that some view criminal behaviour as showing a lack of integration.

In the Netherlands, over a longer period of years it was widely accepted among politicians and academics that full integration in all spheres of life could best be reached through socio-economic participation in the labour market and in education. In other words, full participation in these domains was regarded as providing the basis for further integration into Dutch society. This position, however, has changed over the past decade. Currently, there is an increased focus on the socio-cultural dimension of integration (Brassé/Krijnen 2005; Van der Laan Bouma-Doff/Van der Laan Bouma 2005). Gijsberts and Dagevos (2005: 34) speak about 'segmented integration'; they believe that the socio-economic and the cultural dimensions of integration have become disconnected from each other; while integration has improved in the socio-economic domain, it has become worse in the social cultural domain. In the following section we will present some recent information on indicators of these different dimensions of integration.

3.1 Socio-economic integration: labour market participation

Economic cycles have a strong impact on the labour market position of immigrants. During periods of economic decline, unemployment rates of immigrants often rise much faster than the rates of non-migrants; during economic upswings the reverse occurs. In the economic revival between 1994 and 2001 unemployment rates for immigrants dropped significantly, far below 10 per cent. However, from 2001 onwards (the start of an economic slump), unemployment rates went up rapidly to 22 per cent for Moroccans in 2004, 14 per cent for Turkish residents, 12 per cent for Surinamese and 16 per cent for Antilleans. The (lower) figures for the Dutch population also declined, but much more moderately. Unemployment among young immigrants (15-24 years old), at a rate of 24 per cent in 2004, was twice as high as the unemployment of non-migrant youth. Unemployment figures are clearly related to educational

level, as is reflected in Table 3. But even after controlling for educational levels, clear differences remain between immigrants and the Dutch population.

Table 3: Unemployment per Population Category, by Level of Education, 2003-04

	Low	Medium	High
Turkish/Moroccans	18	14	7
Surinamese/Antillean	17	9	6
Non-migrants	6	4	3

Source : Jaarrapport Integratie 2005.

The net labour market participation rate[3] for 2003-04 for the four immigrant population categories is presented in Table 4. We also added an index for the development of the net participation between 1994 and 2004.[4]

Table 4: Net Labour Market Participation, Gender Ratio per Population Category, 2003-04 and the 1994-2004 Development

	Total	Male/female ratio	Index 2004 (1994=100)
Turkish	46	178	156
Moroccans	37	161	125
Surinamese	62	116	131
Antillean	52	124	121
Non-migrants	67	135	116

Source : Jaarrapport Integratie 2005.

The general picture is that the labour market participation of immigrants is still significantly lower than the participation level of non-immigrants. The Surinamese are doing quite well, while Moroccans show the lowest level. Male dominance in labour is still highest in the Turkish population. If we look at the development between 1994 and 2004, however, we can see a steep rise in net labour market participation for Turkish residents, and also to lesser extents for the Surinamese and Moroccans. All migrant categories succeeded in narrowing the gap. Some of the differences in unemployment (Table 3) and participation rates (Table 4) can be explained by age and education level differences, household category and gender. However, further factors play important roles, such as language competency in Dutch and whether the migrant was educated in the Netherlands or elsewhere (Jaarrapport Integratie 2005: 89).

[3] Net labour market participation is the share of the population between 15-65 years with a paid job for at least 12 hours per week.

[4] Own calculation based on Figure 6.1, Jaarrapport Integratie 2005.

3.2 Socio-economic integration: participation in education

The level of education of non-western immigrants is still lower than that of non-migrants. However, the gap between the two groups has decreased over the past fifteen years; the gap in language skills was reduced by one third. For 'black schools' (a Dutch expression for schools with a majority of pupils from ethnic minorities) this reduction was as high as fifty per cent (see also the section on social cultural integration). Between 1995 and 2003 the share of Turkish and Moroccan youth that started a higher education track (polytechnic) almost doubled from approximately 10 to 20 per cent. Although a 20 per cent enrolment level is still far below the rate for non-migrants (32 per cent), the non-migrant rate seems to be stagnant. Differences at the university level are still somewhat bigger, but Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese are closing the higher-education gap as well. In 2003, the share of second-generation immigrants in the age cohort of 30-34 years old with a high level of education was twice as high as for the same age cohort in the first generation (Jaarrapport Integratie 2005). Generally stated, the educational performance of the second-generation immigrants is much better compared to that of the first generation.

3.3 Social-cultural integration: contacts, language skills and role models

There is a widely shared belief that one of the most relevant indicators of social and cultural integration is the level of contact between immigrants and non-immigrants. To measure this, we use the proportion of immigrants who say that their contacts (outside of the workplace) are predominantly within their own ethnic group.

Table 5: Proportion of Immigrants (15 Years and Older) who Say that their Contacts (Outside of the Workplace) are Predominantly with Members of their own Group: by Age, Level of Education, Generation, and National Origin, 2002

	Turkish	Moroccan	Surinamese	Antillean
Age				
15-24 yr	52	48	36	33
25-34 yr	72	58	41	31
35-44 yr	74	67	38	31
> 44 yr	83	77	36	29
Education				
Basic	83	77	44	49
Low	63	52	38	31
Medium	59	49	37	32
High	50	35	33	19
Generation				
2nd generation	47	41	31	12
1st generation	81	73	46	46

Source: Gijsberts/Dagevos 2005: 24.

In Table 5 we summarise some findings of an ISEO/SCP research project as reported by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2005). We can see that there are clear differences between population categories in terms of the level of contact with other ethnic groups. The table also shows a clear age and generation cohort effect, and also an effect of the level of education, which refers to the socio-economic domain. Immigrants who are young, higher educated, and who are in the second-generation have more contacts with other ethnic groups than older, less educated and first-generation immigrants. Yet, differences among different categories of immigrants remain. Surinamese and Antilleans have more contact with people who do not belong to their own category than Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, who appear to be more own-group oriented. But even among the Turks and Moroccans, cohort and education effects can be seen.

What Gijsberts and Dagevos found striking was the fact that although second generation immigrants have more contacts with others, the share of those who have contacts with others decreased over the years (based on cross-sectional comparison). They interpreted this as evidence of declining levels of integration. However, it is in fact logical that the number of contacts with Dutch people decreases if the Dutch are part of a declining category. This same logic is reflected in another finding that non-immigrants had more contacts with immigrants in neighbourhoods with a higher percentage of immigrants. Nevertheless, existing differences in the level of inter-ethnic contacts should not be disregarded.

Differences in language skills reflect a similar difference between ethnic groups as for own- and other group contact. Turks and Moroccans have the worst language skills, whereas Surinamese and Antilleans have the best. These differences can be explained by taking the migrants' age and levels of education into account. Children whose parents are of non-western origin perform at lower levels in language courses. However, a cross-sectional comparison shows that their marks have risen and that most of them appear able to completely close the language-skills gap.[5] This development parallels a conclusion in the Jaarrapport Integratie 2005 (110) which states that "data over the period 1994-2002 point to a 'diminishing ethnic distance'".

The level of socio-cultural integration may also be derived from opinions on gender roles in the household. In Table 6 we present results from research carried out by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning agency (SCP). The opinions of Turkish respondents and Moroccans in particular, remind us of 'traditional family life' in the Netherlands before the 1960s.

[5] This statement is made on the basis of a longitudinal measurement in which pupils were individually followed through their basic education track.

Table 6: Opinions on Male and Female Roles by Population Category, 15-65 Year-Olds, 2004-05; Percentages for "Agree" and "Completely Agree"

	Turkish	Moroccan	Surinamese	Antillean	Non-migrants
If a husband does not want his wife to have a job, the wife should accept that	29	27	8	10	3
If the wife gives birth to a child she should quit her job	38	39	19	21	16
The wife should be responsible for housekeeping	72	63	47	48	31
The husband should be responsible for the money	48	38	19	27	10
Having one's own income is more important for boys than for girls	30	24	22	26	16

Source: Laan Bouma-Doff 2005: table 4.8.

As far as the social cultural dimension of integration is concerned, we do not share the rather pessimistic view that is expressed by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2005). Although much social interaction takes place within an immigrant's own group, younger, higher educated and second-generation immigrants clearly show more contacts with other groups. Moreover, differences in language skills rapidly decline. Large differences still exist between Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and non-migrants regarding gender roles. The attitudes of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants seem to be more comparable with the generation of Dutch who, in the 1950s, moved from rural to urban areas to find employment in the manufacturing industries.

In short, extensive analysis of the various dimensions of integration reveals that there still are substantial differences between population categories. There are, however, serious and promising positive developments. Even though economic cycles strongly impact the position of immigrants in the labour market, the gap between migrants and non-migrants has become narrower over time. With regard to the educational performance of younger and second-generation immigrants, we can also see improvement compared with the older immigrants and with first-generation immigrants.

4. Understanding the relation between segregation and integration

We concluded above that while there is residential segregation, levels are generally neither high nor increasing. We also concluded that integration in the socio-economic and social cultural domains is progressing slowly, but is not 'blocked'. This may still imply that there is a relation between segregation and integration as expected: it may be due to a reduction in residential segregation that integration is improving. This could indicate that the link between segregation and integration can be understood in terms of a neighbourhood effect of the social or ethnic environment of individuals on their integration – socio-economically or socio-culturally – in society.

4.1 Segregation and socio-economic integration

There are several studies that have found that the social and ethnic composition of an individual's direct residential environment affects their socio-economic performance.[6] The dominant tone in these studies is that there are neighbourhood effects on social mobility, but that these effects tend to be small, that they may partly be due to selection effects and that the longitudinal data to offer the real insight required are only sparsely available.

Figure 5: Neighbourhood Effects in the Three Largest Dutch Cities,
percentage of city residents in the potential labour force who were either on benefits in both 1989 and 1994, or who had a paid job in 1989 but received benefits in 1994, per environment type 1989 (types differ according to the share of people on benefits)



Source: Musterd et al. 2003.

We were able to carry out large-scale longitudinal research projects in both the Netherlands and in Sweden aimed at estimating the effects of the social and ethnic composition of individuals' immediate residential environments on their opportunities for social mobility (see also the contribution by Andersson in this volume). Regarding the socio-economic composition of the residential environment, our research in the Netherlands, based on data for taxpayers in 1989 and 1994 representing one third of the population, indicated only small effects on the social mobility of people with a weak social position (as indicated by the higher line in Figure 5). The share of people that remained on benefits hardly changed when the environ-

[6] See Ellen/Turner (1997) for a review of these studies; Atkinson/Kintrea (2001) for a cross-sectional survey in this area; Galster (2002) and Friedrichs et al. (2005) for a comparison between neighbourhood effect research in North America and Europe; Musterd/Andersson (2005 and 2006) for studies that apply large-scale longitudinal datasets in order to measure individual social opportunity in relation to housing mix, social make-up and other neighbourhood characteristics; and Musterd et al. (fc), specifically aimed at measuring the impact of ethnic compositions on social mobility.

ment contained a larger share of the disadvantaged (i.e. on benefits) population. People not on benefits in 1989 clearly showed more sensitivity to their residential environment: in more disadvantaged residential environments the share of people who, by 1994, had lost their jobs was higher (the lower line in Figure 5).

The fact that there were only weak effects might be ascribed to successful and direct intervention strategies by the state and other institutions to stimulate social integration (see also Van Amersfoort 1992). This argument is actually supported by analyses that focused on neighbourhood effects for people with somewhat stronger social positions, who therefore did not receive extra government attention. For those who started with a somewhat stronger social position, we found that environments had stronger negative effects (Musterd et al. 2003). Similarly, in the Dutch case studies that were part of the European Commission project URBEX[7], only marginal signs of neighbourhood impacts on integration were found (Musterd et al. 2006).

4.2 Segregation and socio-cultural integration

Many researchers believe that social mobility is the key variable for integration in a number of spheres. Thus, they focus on socio-economic performance, and studies of neighbourhood effects are limited to social careers. However, we have noticed that the socio-cultural domain of integration might have become separated or disconnected from the socio-economic domain. In this paper we used 'contact with others' as an important indicator of socio-cultural integration. Gijsberts and Dagevos (2005) argued that ethnic residential segregation might no longer be relevant for social mobility, but might still have serious impacts on social and cultural integration. Based on a sample of some 3,000 respondents, they tested their hypothesis by analysing the relationship between the share of non-western immigrants in the respondent's neighbourhood and the level of in-group contact (outside of the workplace). As shown in Table 7, there is a clear impact with a similar pattern to that discussed above. In comparison with Surinamese and Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans have fewer contacts with others. However, such contact is even less frequent when the respondent lives in an area of ethnic concentration.

[7] URBEX is the acronym for the project "The Spatial Dimensions of Urban Social Exclusion and Integration: A European Comparison".

Table 7: Proportion of Immigrants (15 Years and Older) who Say that Their Contacts (Outside of the Workplace) are Predominantly Within Their own Group, by share of non-western residents in the neighbourhood, per immigrant category, 2002

Share of non-western residents in the neighbourhood	Turkish	Moroccan	Surinamese	Antillean
< 10 %	52	49	20	23
10-25 %	65	55	32	24
25-50 %	71	60	40	35
> 50 %	77	67	56	47

Source: Gijsberts & Dagevos 2005: 24.

Van der Laan Bouma-Doff & Van der Laan Bouma (2005) arrived at a similar conclusion on the basis of an analysis that looked into the relation between ethnic concentration and the level of contact between migrants and non-migrants. Their analysis controlled for differences in age, gender, education, labour market participation and language skills. However, two comments must be made here. First, the definition of ethnic concentration used in Table 7 is problematic. Ethnic concentrations are defined as areas with a high share of residents of non-western origin, assuming that in such areas the individual has a higher probability of having more interaction with people of his or her own group. That is not necessarily true, due to the fact that areas with a high share of immigrants are often highly mixed in terms of countries of origin. However, this ethnic diversity may actually force individuals to rely more upon contacts with members of their own group because they are the only ones they understand. Second, there may be more contact with others in less segregated neighbourhoods, but we do not know what effects that may have.

4.3 School segregation and integration

In the aforementioned analyses, we pointed at the possibly crucial role of the state. State intervention in the spheres of education, labour market access, social support, etc. may have reduced the potentially negative effects of residential segregation on the integration of immigrants in the 'host' society. In this regard, but also in and of itself, it is also interesting to look more closely at another form of segregation i.e. school segregation and its effects on students. Free school choice has a long tradition in the Netherlands, rooted in the existence of religious and social democratic "pillars", which serve as a basis for organising Dutch social and political culture. This tradition also allowed for Islamic schools to be established, for example. Levels of school segregation are high, especially in large cities in the Netherlands. These high levels of segregation are based largely on the location of the child's residence and on traditional mechanisms for choosing a school, which are now based on social and ethnic factors (Karsten et al. 2006). In many Dutch cities, school segregation was also influenced by the location of elite schools, typically located in elite residential districts and dominated by white students from higher socio-economic strata. The current situation is one of relatively high levels of segregation, including the extremes in the form of the almost pure Islamic schools and the almost pure white elite schools. In regard to the integration debate, schools with very

high shares of Muslim students supposedly have a negative impact on integration, and many express their fear that separate worlds may develop.

However, Karsten et al (2006) argue that the basis for this fear is rather thin, and have the support of other scholars in the field, such as Gramberg and Ledoux (2005: 19-24). They argue that there is no conclusive evidence in the Netherlands that supports the assumed negative relation between school segregation and integration, neither in terms of educational achievements (the socio-economic dimension), nor in terms of attitudes and self-image of the pupils (the social cultural dimension). They also provide evidence against the assumption that school segregation has negative effects on educational achievement (Gijsberts/Dagevos 2005: 55). After controlling for individual child characteristics, "black schools" hardly had negative impacts on the scholastic performance of their pupils. Moreover, the school effects decrease over time, and immigrant children make more progress in primary school relative to their non-immigrant counterparts. Jungbluth (2005: 45-47) showed that school achievement differences are almost entirely explained by parental socio-economic differences.

Again, these findings may be due to fierce government intervention. The subsidies schools receive for pupils with a non-western background and pupils whose parents are in a weak social position are almost twice as high as those for other students. These types of policies may have had serious positive impacts on individual performance scores.

5. Conclusion

There are many reasons to develop policies aimed at changing the physical, social and economic characteristics of neighbourhoods, as Gijsberts and Dagevos concluded in their 2005 study on the relationship between ethnic concentrations and integration. They described the decreasing number of contacts between migrants and others as "alarming" and state that "mixed neighbourhoods are good for contact". We would like to question this assumption. Even in highly mixed neighbourhoods, specific immigrant categories may only have contact within their own group. Furthermore, it is unclear whether more contact between very different people does indeed result in higher levels of integration and increased individual opportunities. Van der Laan Bouma-Doff and Van der Laan Bouma (2005) found that in neighbourhoods with only a small share of immigrants, more contacts between migrants and non-migrants existed, but they did not measure its effects. In the political debate, these findings are quickly interpreted as 'more contact is good for social cohesion'. Because social cohesion is regarded as good for people, this is valued positively. Yet it is still unclear whether more inter-group mixing will result in more inter-group contact and subsequently enhanced social cohesion; social contact may remain superficial. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that not all social cohesion is positive. Very strong social bonds are usually regarded as negative because they prevent interaction with the rest of society (Granovetter 1973). In addition, there is not much information about the way social cohesion is related to other vehicles for integration. For example, does social cohesion result in higher levels of education? Or does social cohesion result in higher levels of labour market participation?

Regarding the political debate, inter-group mixing as a panacea for societal ills should be treated with scepticism. Too much mixing may actually result in the opposite of what politicians desire. If it is the case that individuals seek relatively small social distances between themselves and people in their environment – an important foundation of many sociological theories – then living together in a small space may actually increase residential segregation and perhaps also drive individual population categories further apart. This is not a black and white issue; most people accept certain levels of mixing, but large inequalities in terms of life styles may result in counter productive effects and bring a substantial number of households to search for more homogeneous, perhaps even gated, communities. This seems to be a tendency already, especially for households who are starting a family.

In regards to the relation between school segregation and integration, we think that fear is a bad counsellor. Although international literature and political views might suggest otherwise, in Dutch research there is no support for the view that school segregation along ethnic lines and integration are negatively related. This holds true both for the achievements of pupils and for their attitudes and self-image in society.

Altogether, the relationship between segregation and integration has attracted extraordinary political but very little scholarly attention. Large-scale research projects will be able to tell us more about the relations we discussed in this text, and such studies should precede large-scale spatial social engineering projects. If politicians do not want to wait, it seems safe in the meantime to continue with pre-existing policies for education, labour market access and social support. The policies in these fields may have had much more positive effects than is often assumed and seem more important for structural integration than interventions into settlement structures.

References

Alexander, M. (2003): Local policies towards migrants as an expression of Host-Stranger relations: a proposed typology. In: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(3): 411-430.

Amersfoort, H. van (1992): Ethnic residential patterns in a welfare state: lessons from Amsterdam, 1970–1990. In: *New Community*, 18(3): 439–456.

Atkinson, R. and K. Kintrea (2001): Disentangling area effects: evidence from deprived and non-deprived neighbourhoods. In: *Urban Studies*, 38(12): 2277-2298.

Botman, S. and R. van Kempen (2002): Improving Dutch neighbourhoods: Tarwewijk and Hoogvliet in Rotterdam. In: C. Kesteloot (ed.), *Urban Territorial Policies and their Effects at the Neighbourhood Level*, Amsterdam: AME, URBEX 21: 78-85.

Brassé, P. and H. Krijnen (eds.) (2005): *Gescheiden of Gemengd. Een verkenning van etnische concentratie op school en in de wijk.* Utrecht: Forum, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling.

Deurloo, M.C. and S. Musterd (1998): Ethnic Clusters in Amsterdam, 1994-1996: a Micro-Area Analysis. In: *Urban Studies*, 35(3): 385-396.

Ellen, I.G. and M.A. Turner (1997): Does Neighborhood Matter? Assessing Recent Evidence. In: *Housing Policy Debate,* 8(4): 833-866.

Florida, R. (2002): *The rise of the creative class and how it's transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life*. New York.

Friedrichs, J., G. Galster and S. Musterd (eds.) (2005): *Life in Poverty Neighbourhoods: European and American Perspectives*. London, New York.

Galster, G. (2002): Trans-Atlantic perspectives on opportunity, deprivation and the housing nexus. In: *Housing Studies*, 17(1): 5–12.

Gijsberts, M. and J. Dagevos (2005): *Uit Elkaars Buurt: de invloed van etnische concentratie op integratie en beeldvorming*. Den Haag: SCP.

Gramberg, P. and G. Ledoux (2005): Bestrijden van schoolsegregatie: dringend nodig, zinloos of onhaalbaar? In: P. Brassé and H. Krijnen (eds.), *Gescheiden of Gemengd. Een verkenning van etnische concentratie op school en in de wijk*. Utrecht: Forum, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling: 17-31.

Granovetter, M.S. (1973): The Strength of Weak Ties. In: *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6): 1360-1380.

Hall, P. (1998): *Cities in Civilization*. New York.

Jaarrapport Integratie (2005): Den Haag: SCP, WODC, CBS.

Jacobs, J. (1961): *The death and life of great American cities*. New York.

Jungbluth, P. (2005): Onderwijssegregatie en de (re)productie van ongelijkheid. In: P. Brassé and H. Krijnen (eds.), *Gescheiden of Gemengd. Een verkenning van etnische concentratie op school en in de wijk*. Utrecht: Forum, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling: 33-57.

Karsten, S., C. Felix, G. Ledoux, W. Meijnen, J. Roeleveld and E. van Schooten (2006): Choosing Segregation or Integration: the Extent and Effects of Ethnic Segregation in Dutch Cities. In: *Education and Urban Society*, 38(2): 228-247.

Laan Bouma-Doff, W. van der (2005): *De buurt als belemmering*. Assen.

Laan Bouma-Doff, W. van der and S. van der Laan Bouma (2005): Concentratie versus Integratie: vormt ruimtelijke concentratie van allochtonen een rem op de integratie in de Nederlandse samenleving? In: P. Brassé and H. Krijnen (eds.), *Gescheiden of Gemengd. Een verkenning van etnische concentratie op school en in de wijk*. Utrecht: Forum, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling: 59-75.

Massey, D.S. and N.A. Denton (1993): *American Apartheid*. Cambridge.

Musterd, S. (2002): Response: Mixed Housing Policy: a European (Dutch) Perspective. In: *Housing Studies*, 17(1): 139-143.

Musterd, S. (2003): Segregation and Integration: a Contested Relationship. In: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(4): 623-641.

Musterd, S. (2005): Social and Ethnic Segregation in Europe: Levels, Causes and Effects. In: *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 27(3): 331-348.

Musterd, S. and R. Andersson (2005): Housing Mix, Social Mix and Social Opportunities. In: *Urban Affairs Review*, 40(6): 761-790.

Musterd, S. and R. Andersson (2006): Employment, Social Mobility and Neighbourhood Effects. In: *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(1): 120-140.

Musterd, S. and S. de Vos (2006): Woondynamiek in Concentratiewijken. In: C. H. Mulder & F. Pinkster (eds.), *Onderscheid in Wonen: het sociale van binnen en van buiten*, Amsterdam: 123-138.

Musterd, S., A. Murie and C. Kesteloot (eds.) (2006): *Neighbourhoods of Poverty: Urban Social Exclusion and Integration in Europe.* Houndsmill, Basingstoke.

Musterd, S., W. Ostendorf and S. de Vos (2003): Environmental Effects and Social Mobility. In: *Housing Studies*, 18(6): 877-892.

Musterd, S., R. Andersson, G. Galster and T. Kauppinen (forthcoming): Are Immigrants' Earnings Influenced by the Characteristics of their Neighbors. In: Environment and Planning A.

Ostendorf, W. and S. Musterd (2005): Segregatie en integratie: feiten en visies. In: P. Brassé and H. Krijnen (eds.), *Gescheiden of Gemengd. Een verkenning van etnische concentratie op school en in de wijk*. Utrecht: Forum, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling: 77-93.

Praag, C. van (1981): *Allochtonen: huisvesting en spreiding*. SCP-Cahier no. 22. Rijswijk: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

Robson, B., M. Parkinson, M. Boddy and D. Maclennan (2000): *The State of English Cities*. London: DETR, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions.

Simmie, J. (2005): Innovation and space: a critical review of the literature. In: *Regional Studies*, 39(6): 789-804.

Wilson, W.J. (1987): *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago.

Roger Andersson

Ethnic Residential Segregation and Integration Processes in Sweden

Contents

1. Introduction

European cities face a number of similar, equally difficult problems including social and ethnic segregation, unequal access to the job market, unemployment, pollution, crime and deindustrialisation. This essay deals with one such urban problem, namely residential segregation in the specific European nation state of Sweden. Segregation, and especially ethnic segregation, has been a much discussed topic in Sweden over the last ten to fifteen years. Besides generating research projects and research output, the phenomenon has been addressed by several parliamentary commissions and state investigations, and anti-segregation policies have been launched by the Government and local authorities in major cities.

This contemporary Swedish interest in segregation might surprise those not following Swedish developments closely since the country has a reputation for having a progressive housing policy, good quality housing, well-planned cities and a costly, albeit effective and not much contested welfare state (Heidenheimer et al. 1990). For a considerable period after the Second World War, developing residential areas whose physical layout was designed to embody principles of community, co-operation, and egalitarianism was a dominating principle in Swedish modernist urban planning (see e.g. Franzén and Sandstedt 1993). However, the increasing geographical concentration of many immigrants in Sweden has triggered the contention that ethnic integration failure is linked to residential segregation. What was once seen as exemplary is now often linked with failure, and the so-called Million Homes Programme (MP, 1965-1974), the flagship of modernist state-led housing planning, is nowadays perceived as a measure that created residential segregation. The construction of one million new dwelling units in ten years time (20-25% of the current stock) was of course a major achievement – which for a long time did away with housing shortages and "inner city problems" – but the programme has been contested ever since the first large housing estates appeared in the late 1960s. The Million Homes Programme spurred the first wave of segregation research in Sweden.[1] With few exceptions these studies focused on the class dimension.[2] Most of the early studies consisted of descriptions of residential patterns, statistical analyses of these patterns and attempts to explain related social class mechanisms.[3] These early attempts also include a couple of interesting sociological dissertations focusing for example on the effects of school segregation (with regard to the class dimension).[4] Brännström (2006: 6) concludes that "although their empirical bases and research methods were limited, all [these early stud-

---

1 Early contributions by Dahlström (1951, 1957), Janson (1961), Lindberg (1968), and Swedner (1960) focused their attention on neighbourhoods and housing and did not engage much in the wider segregation issue. According to Brännström (2006: 9-10), these early sociological texts paid close attention to an individual's location within a social and spatial structure and how this may shape his or her behaviour, yielding an understanding of human conduct that is essentially ecological.

2 The 1970s witnessed a boom in studies related to housing and residential segregation (Olsson Hort 1992). Principally drawing on the massive U.S. literature on social and factorial ecology, Janson (1971, 1975), for example, mapped and analysed Swedish towns and cities according to their inner social differentiation.

3 See for example Danermark (1983).

4 Arnman and Jönsson (1985); Arnell-Gustavsson (1975).

ies] (more or less explicitly) hypothesise and principally confirm a negative effect of segregation on outcomes such as social participation and neighbourhood commitment." Although housing, neighbourhood and segregation research paid attention to patterns and effects of segregation, it was not until social class segregation was 'coloured' by the ethnic component during the later 1980s that segregation became a political issue and that questions concerning its effects became more pressing. Ethnic segregation research then stressed the importance of a more or less voluntary ethnic clustering (congregation). Later research moved away from these types of cultural explanations and towards a framework that stressed the importance of social exclusion, white flight, white avoidance, blocking strategies and racism (Molina 1997; Bråmå 2006a). The idea to link residential segregation to ethnic integration has increased interest in neighbourhood effects.

This paper aims to outline the current state of knowledge with regard to ethnic segregation and the effects of residential segregation on the overall integration of immigrants in Sweden.

The concept of integration was introduced into Swedish politics and policies in the 1970s and resulted from the turn from a taken-for-granted assimilation approach before the early 1970s to the multicultural approach introduced in the mid-1970s. Three general goals were formulated as the basis of immigrant policy, namely equality (1968), freedom of choice and cooperation (1975). The 1975 parliamentary decision recognized not only the existence of a linguistically and culturally diverse population, but also stated that diversity should in fact be promoted. One might say that Swedish integration policy aims at system integration, i.e. that immigrants have the right to live under equal conditions, have access to jobs and exercise political influence to the same extent as the native population. Social integration, understood as a characteristic of social networks and daily face-to-face social interaction, is however not part of the basic goals (freedom of choice). Social integration was not a part of the political debate until integration policy was reformulated twenty years later in 1997, when it was mentioned that the freedom of choice goal might potentially block integration ambitions. Altogether, it is rarely discussed whether social integration is related to system integration. This, however, seems to be the case: according to recent research findings, job recruitment practices are based on informal channels and social networks to quite a high extent (Rapport Integration 2005). Being disconnected from "Swedish" social networks would logically imply that an immigrant has to rely either on intra-ethnic networks or on the institutionalised formal support structure provided by state and municipal authorities. In that informal channels and social networks are to a large part determined by residential patterns, ethnic segregation could thus have implications for the overall integration processes.

The following text first provides some background information on immigration to Sweden (Section 2). Second, I describe key patterns of ethnic residential segregation and present the conceptual points of departure and the data used, and I also outline the most interesting findings (Section 3). Third, I summarize Swedish research on neighbourhood effects (Section 4). A look ahead finishes the paper.

2. Immigrants in Swedish Society

Similar to developments in many other European countries, post-war immigration to Sweden can be divided into three rather distinct phases. The first relates to the war itself, to the resultant refugee migration (Jews from the concentration camps, Finnish children, Danish and Norwegian refugees) and to the political developments occurring in some of Sweden's neighbouring countries (Estonia, Latvia). The second phase, during the 1950s and 1960s, is characterized by substantial labour immigration (primarily from Italy, Finland, Greece, and Yugoslavia). The third phase, commencing in the early 1970s and continuing throughout the rest of the century and into the present, is once again characterized by refugee and family reunion immigration. However, this third phase involves a rather large influx of non-European immigrants, especially from Western Asia (Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran), Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia) and from Latin America (Chile). Today, 41 per cent of immigrants have a non-European origin. 26 per cent of all immigrants living in Sweden were born in neighbouring Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark, and Norway). Another third of the foreign-born in Sweden come from a non-Nordic European background. While many of these have become Swedish citizens and are married to Swedes, others live more temporarily in the country, benefiting from the common Nordic labour market established already in the early 1950s.

Table 1: Population in 2003 According to Country of Birth

	Pop. 2003	%
Sweden	7,897,595	88,0
Nordic countries (except Sweden)	279,182	3,1
EU15 (except Nordic countries)	101,532	1,1
Europe (except EU15 and Nordic c.)	255,423	2,8
North America	26,041	0,3
South America	54,371	0,6
Africa	61,315	0,7
Asia	296,328	3,3
Oceania	3,405	0,0
Total foreign-born	1,077,596	12,0
Total	8,975,191	100,0

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Without immigration, the size of the Swedish population would have been the same today as 45 years ago. The country's net-population increase of some 1.5 million people is entirely due to a surplus of first and second generation immigrants. This has reshaped the demographic and ethnic structure of the population and affected many aspects of the country's social and economic development.

In the early post-war period, immigrants did very well in the labour market. Economists Ekberg and Gustavsson (1995) calculated that the average labour market participation rate (LMPR) for foreign citizens at that time was about 20 percent above the level for native Swedes (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Relative Labour Market Participation Rates for Immigrants in Sweden, 1950-2000



Source: Ekberg and Gustavsson (1995). Data for 2000 added by the author. See also Rapport Integration 2003. Values are standardized by age and gender.

However, from the 1950s onwards immigrants have performed less well decade by decade; average LMPR stood at .58 relative to the native workforce in the mid 1990s. This development – based on LMPR values standardised for gender and age differences between the native and the immigrant population – is worrisome in and of itself but even more so when the successive increase of the immigrant population is taken into account. Their numbers stood at about 200,000 in 1950 and have now increased to about 1,100,000. There is no consensus concerning the causes for the dramatic long-term reduction in labour market participation rates for the foreign-born. Explanations refer to the increased labour market participation of women, to the reduction of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, the changed backgrounds of the newly arrived immigrants (education, languages) and to discrimination.[5]

Since the 1980s, immigration has increasingly become characterized by refugee immigration from a broad range of countries and cultures. The shift from labour migration to refugee migration also brought about a change in the settlement pattern of immigrants. Although immigrants were already overrepresented in the capital city and other major urban areas such as Göteborg and Malmö, this trend was reinforced as refugees started to arrive in larger num-

[5] The three latest yearbooks produced by the Swedish Integration Board (Rapport Integration 2002, 2003 and 2005) scrutinize and discuss the existing and relevant Swedish labour market research regarding ethnic integration. These publications (in Swedish) offer a good overview of current research debates and describe current developments by using detailed statistical data.

bers at the beginning of the 1980s. Meanwhile, labour market participation rates for immigrants were decreasing, and the new refugee cohorts had great difficulties in finding jobs, despite the fact that Sweden had an unemployment rate between two and four per cent throughout the 1970s and 1980s (and less than 2 per cent in 1990). In the early 1990s, dramatic developments took place in many immigrant-dense estates. In Malmö's Herrgården housing estate, from 1990 to 1995, the percentage of foreign-born increased from 75 per cent to 95 per cent, the percentage employed among residents aged 20 to 64 decreased from 48 per cent to 8 per cent, and three out of four residents had to rely on social allowances in 1995. As indicated by data on disposable incomes, the welfare system managed to compensate for the dramatic decline in work-related incomes but that in itself was an important reason for the state to declare that this was neither sustainable nor acceptable. In this situation, many politicians in metropolitan municipalities argued for a reform of the way new refugees were received in Sweden. As a result, a new reception strategy was launched in 1985, whereby the responsibility for immigrant reception was shifted from a state authority (*Statens Invandrarverk*[6]) to the municipal level. Refugees were no longer allowed to settle where they wanted; rather, annual agreements were to be made between the state authority and the municipalities regulating the number and type of refugees (ethnic/linguistic origin, families/singles) that each municipality would take responsibility for. The strategy was labelled 'The All-of-Sweden strategy for refugee reception'. Sweden received close to 400000 immigrants from 1985 to 1 July 1994. The majority of these immigrants were dispersed throughout the country with the effectiveness that only a well organized public bureaucracy can achieve (Andersson and Solid 2003).

The All-of-Sweden strategy produced multicultural localities throughout Sweden, but was partly abandoned in 1994 due to increasing secondary migrations (which caused financial imbalances between the municipalities), to a decreasing number of new refugees and also due to criticism based on moral values. Since 1994, a refugee that can arrange for his or her own housing is entitled to choose where they want to live. Today, only some 30 per cent of the newcomers are received on the terms set up in the original Sweden-wide placement strategy.

Despite the dispersal programme, immigrant densities continued to increase during the 1980s and 1990s in the Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö regions. In the previously immigrant-dense housing estates on the urban periphery, the concentration of people with immigrant background approached 90-100 per cent. Even during the economic boom of the late 1980s, when unemployment levels were down to between one and two per cent, the new refugees had difficulties finding work. The magnitude of these problems increased severely during the

[6] This State agency, Board of Immigration (SIV), was closed down in the late 1990s and its duties were taken over by two new State boards: The Board of Migration (which handles the asylum procedure and the evaluation of each application) and the Swedish Integration Board (which takes care of the municipal placements and supervises the reception and integration process at the local level). The Swedish Integration Board will be closed down on 30 June 2007.

1990s, and "the immigrant issue" became one of the country's most discussed topics, always debated in the context of growing urban poverty, social marginalization and exclusion.[7]

3. Some Basic Features of Residential Segregation in Sweden

3.1 The Concept of Segregation

Segregation means separation, and thus, residential segregation is about spatial separation of certain social groups. The literature often identifies three social categorisation principles: demographic (household types, gender, age-groups), socioeconomic and ethnic/racial. It is rarely the case, however, that such spatial separation is absolute and that single households, economically poor or ethnic minority residents live concentrated in areas where no other household category lives. Segregation, therefore, is normally both understood and studied as a relative phenomenon. It is furthermore understood as a relational phenomenon, where the researcher stresses the fact that a city or an urban region shows certain degrees of segregation between poor and rich, ethnic groups, young and old etc. Politicians, however, tend to apply the term "segregated" to specific types of neighbourhoods, a view that tends to conceal the relational character of segregation. As convincingly shown by Massey and Denton (1993), there are both winners and losers in relation to the segregated city.

3.2 Data Sources

Swedish social scientists, especially segregation researchers, have access to internationally unique types of data. I will briefly describe the basic features of these data. Four characteristics are of key importance:

a) A personal ID code (*personnummer*) is used in all official registers. A similar code is used for firms. The individual-specific ID code comprises 10 digits and is given to everyone upon birth or immigration (permanent residents). This code is used by Statistics Sweden in all individual registers, such as the employment, income, population, education, and the event registers (birth, death, immigration, emigration).

b) There are constantly updated address registers (*Register över totalbefolkningen, RTB*), linked to the ID code mentioned in (a).

c) A geo-coded real estate and property register exists, linked to the address register (*fastighetsregistren*). The geo-coding of all real estates took several decades to finish, and this crucial part of the registers was not completed until about 1990.

d) The law grants researchers reasonably easy and inexpensive access to data on individuals.

[7] It is worth noting that, unlike Norway, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands, Sweden has not yet seen a breakthrough of an anti-immigration and anti-immigrant political party.

By merging (a), (b), and (c) all residents in Sweden can be localised both in terms of housing and work places. This allows for the study not only of static distributions at any point in time but also of longer-term developments. An individual's housing and employment careers can thus be studied both in their social and geographic contexts. Obviously, both migration and commuting can be studied using complete populations. If a person moves, this will show up in the address register and, due to the fact that all addresses refer to specific and geo-coded buildings, the exact location will be known.

It is not difficult to realise that these data are "sensitive", and the use is restricted in several ways. However, there is an important paragraph in the Swedish data security legislation saying that access to the registers should be generously provided to researchers. Applications from researchers are scrutinised by a special committee at Statistics Sweden, and also by regional research ethics committees who decide whether permission should be given and if certain restrictions should apply. Some restrictions are of a more general character, for instance that data on individuals or firms provided to researchers never contain the explicit ID code and that specific individuals should not be identifiable in publications. Furthermore, the most detailed geocodes (coordinates) are seldom provided, and researchers normally have to settle with 100m by 100m coordinates (which of course is still a very detailed level). There are often also restrictions on handing out specific codes for the country of birth information, and researchers may have to settle with aggregates (world regions). However, I have myself been allowed to access specific country codes for all nationalities having more than 1000 persons in the country (about 70 specific codes).

Sweden is divided into 21 counties, 289 municipalities, about 2,500 parishes and 9,200 *Sams* units (Small Area Market Statistics). The *Sams* division was constructed in 1993 but older information can be related to the existing division by using the more precise coordinates all real estate properties have. Local authorities in cooperation with Statistics Sweden delineate the Sams units. The delineation praxis is designed to construct fairly homogeneous neighbourhoods in terms of housing types, date of construction, and tenure form. However, the praxis varies somewhat between municipalities (for example spatial units are somewhat smaller in Göteborg and Malmö than in Stockholm) and areas comprising more than one tenure form are not by necessity divided into two or several units. The average population size of a Sams unit is about 1,000. The Sams units have been used frequently in recent Swedish residential segregation studies (Andersson 2000, Andersson and Bråmå 2004, Bråmå 2006b) with the argument that they constitute the most relevant formal division available.

The geocodes described above allow for researcher-specific divisions of urban space. It is possible, by using GIS or other techniques, to construct individual-specific environments (say contexts comprising everybody living within 200m or 500m from an individual). I will return to this later as some analyses of this kind have been carried out in the framework of the neighbourhood effects discourse.

3.3 Key Features of Ethnic Segregation

Understanding and explaining ethnic residential segregation is sometimes fairly easy, especially when residential patterns show distinct ethnic clusters. However, in the absence of such clusters, the relative spatial concentration of different immigrant categories could have complex demographic, socioeconomic and/or "ethnic" explanations. Thus, in countries experiencing fairly recent waves of immigration, immigrants tend to have a younger age profile than that of the native population. International migrants, like migrants in general, are often young adults. As in Sweden, where households comprising of young adults are overrepresented in rental housing, we can expect to find many immigrants in rental housing and also in less attractive rental housing since they will be over-represented in areas experiencing high turnover and vacancies. This is indeed the case in Sweden. Furthermore, as many immigrants face problems entering the labour market, they have substantially lower levels of income. Low income means difficulties accessing cooperative and especially home ownership housing. Demography as well as income could therefore be the factors explaining immigrants' positions in the housing market.

These factors are important but cannot fully account for the present level of either segmentation or segregation. It has been shown in many Swedish studies, most recently by Bråmå, Andersson and Solid (2006), that "the ethnic component" does play a significant role. The authors present an odds quota based on a multinominal regression analysis aimed at finding indications for what type of demographic, socioeconomic and origin-related attributes account for differences with respect to home ownership and cooperative housing in the Stockholm region, using rental housing as the comparison group. They find that after controlling for family type, employment status, disposable income, residence time in Sweden, and educational level, it is still five times more common for a native Swede to own his or her own home compared to an individual born in Western Asia or Northern Africa. The level of segmentation and segregation is similar in other Swedish cities.

The pronounced ethnic/racial hierarchy that exists both on the labour market and in housing is one striking feature of the Swedish case, which is furthermore characterised by the distinct multi-ethnic character of all immigrant-dense neighbourhoods.

As can be seen in Figure 2, with the noticeable exception of Greece, all west European nationalities show a fairly high labour market participation rate and low levels of residential segregation. The Greek case is a bit special as the group comprises predominantly older labour migrants with high levels of pre-retirement and unemployment. Otherwise, those facing labour market integration problems and high levels of residential segregation are exclusively of a non-European or of Muslim origin.

Figure 2: The Ethnic Hierarchy in the Housing and Labour Markets, Stockholm County, 2000



ID measures differences in residential distributions between people born in Sweden and different immigrant categories (based on the SAMS neighbourhood division). Value 1 = "apartheid".
LMP = Labour market participation rate for people aged 20-64 (Value 1 = 100%).
Source: GeoSweden 2002. Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University.

Although their housing location might be the result of preferences, their labour market position is certainly not. Research carried out by Swedish economists and sociologists shows that their position cannot be explained by their human capital (education, training, language skills; for an overview, see Rapport Integration 2002 and 2003). Also second-generation immigrants from these countries – having passed the entire Swedish school system and also those having good marks in the Swedish language – have substantially lower employment rates compared to their native counterparts (Rapport Integration 2002 and 2003; SOU 2005: 56). As decades of supply-oriented research (i.e. research focussing on the characteristics of the individual immigrants) have not provided satisfying explanations for this situation, researchers are now focusing more on demand-related aspects, such as discrimination in recruitment processes.

Neither ghettos nor enclaves exist in Sweden[8], albeit local pockets of the enclave type can be found in a few cases (such as the Assyrian-Syrian cluster in Södertälje, in the south-western part of the Stockholm region). Small colony-like clusters are quite common, and – as fore-

[8] According to Knox and Pinch (2000) three types of ethnic clusters can be distinguished, on the basis of longevity/permanence and the degree of free choice: colonies, enclaves, and ghettos. While the colony and the enclave are regarded as a type of congregation (voluntary clustering), the ghetto is not. The difference between the colony and the enclave is that the former is predominantly a first generation phenomenon (these clusters therefore decline and dissolve if immigration decreases or ends), while the latter reproduces over generations.

casted by sociological research – tend to depopulate when new immigration from the country of origin ends.

Table 2 presents data on ethnic clustering in Stockholm County for a rather short period of time (1995-1999). These data have been calculated as follows: for each individual living in the region in 1995 and in 1999, we have information concerning country of birth and each individual's exact place of residence (100m by 100m precision). This pair of coordinates was then used to construct individual-specific environments, where an environment comprises all residents within a distance of 250m from the individual (creating 500m by 500m individual-specific areas centred on each person). By calculating the number (and percentage) of own-group presence in these environments we obtained the value that provides the basis for Table 2. This operation was carried out for seven minority categories and for two points in time. By adding time we could get a sense of whether concentrations were increasing or decreasing. Due to the fact that the dataset is longitudinal (panel data) it is also possible to study individual mobility in relation to these clusters. Table 3 gives one such example by cross tabulating the position of all people born in Turkey who were residents of Stockholm in both 1995 and 1999.

Ethnic clusters exist but are mostly small and scattered across many housing estates. The percentage of each group who lives in own-group densities above 5 per cent is low for Ethiopians, Bosnians and Chileans (rapidly de-clustering), but high and increasing for Somalis and Iraqis and high but decreasing for Turks. People born in Iran are increasing in numbers but show no increase in geographical clustering. It is – with the noticeable exception of Bosnian immigrants – rather obvious that newly arrived immigrant categories tend to cluster during the expansion phase. This has to do not only with sheer mathematics (increasing numbers) but also with networks, i.e. family reunions, chain migration and institutional policies.

Table 2: Own-group Geographical Concentration in Stockholm County, 1995-1999

Country of birth	Year	Own-group concentration in 500m by 500m neighbourhood environments						
		< 1%	1-2%	2-3%	3-4%	4-5%	> 5%	N
Ethiopia	1995	33,1	17,9	15,9	9,4	8,1	15,6	4743
	1999	28,1	17,6	18,6	8,7	10,0	17,0	5742
Somalia	1995	31,2	18,2	12,2	5,2	6,5	26,6	2994
	1999	18,1	13,4	8,4	4,4	3,1	52,6	4718
Bosnia	1995	35,7	17,8	15,5	6,6	5,6	18,7	4018
	1999	34,3	21,9	13,9	8,1	4,8	17,1	4865
Turkey	1995	12,4	7,6	4,7	6,4	4,6	64,3	15438
	1999	12,3	7,5	6,4	6,9	5,9	61,0	16531
Iraq	1995	22,3	19,3	12,8	6,2	9,5	29,8	7989
	1999	11,0	12,1	11,5	8,0	6,6	50,9	14902
Iran	1995	16,8	19,4	17,2	9,2	7,7	29,6	13882
	1999	14,1	16,9	16,7	12,8	8,7	30,8	16705
Chile	1995	16,9	17,0	14,3	11,9	12,5	27,4	12665
	1999	19,0	18,4	15,7	16,8	11,3	18,7	12950

Source: GeoSweden database. Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University.

Table 3 shows that of all 14,323 individuals born in Turkey who remained in the Stockholm region from 1995 to 1999, 8,184 stayed in the plus 5% Turkish environments. These areas lost about 450 Turkish residents during the period (from 9,272 to 8,829), which means that more Turks are leaving than moving into the most Turkish-dense clusters. It is still the case that a majority of the Turkish-born (who are certainly not ethnically homogeneous, but rather have different ethnic and religious affiliations) live surrounded by a noticeable share of fellow countrymen and women.

Table 3: Own-group Geographical Concentration for Turks Resident in Stockholm County, 1995 and 1999, Crosstabulation

	1999						
1995	0-1%	1-2%	2-3%	3-4%	4-5%	> 5%	Total (1995)
0-1%	1184	261	59	33	45	137	1719
1-2%	184	469	251	72	16	102	1094
2-3%	48	93	282	174	21	57	675
3-4%	60	43	115	384	138	166	906
4-5%	21	22	22	112	297	183	657
More than 5	215	180	175	196	322	8184	9272
Total (1999)	1712	1068	904	971	839	8829	14323

Source: GeoSweden database. Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University.

The geographical patterns for Poles and Turks are displayed in Figure 3. The Polish score low on the Dissimilarity Index, whereas the Turks score high. This is easily visible in the two maps. The Turkish-born population lives fairly concentrated in large housing estates built as part of the aforementioned Million Homes Programme. These estates are found along the main highways stretching southwest and northwest from the central parts of the region. The Turks (including Kurds and Assyrian-Syrians) do however live rather dispersed over many of these estates and seldom exceed 10 per cent of the population of a single estate. They are most numerous in Rinkeby (10 km north-west of the city of Stockholm) where they constitute 8 per cent of the population with 1,300 residents, and their share is highest (15.5 per cent of the residents) in Fittja (20 km south-west of the city of Stockholm), where their numbers are just under one thousand. Both cases deal with about a few hundred households.

Figure 3: Geographical Distribution of Stockholm Residents Born in Poland and Turkey, 1998



Source: GeoSweden database. Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University.

Explanations of the origins and persistence of ethnic segregation have changed over time in Sweden. Dominant discourses have moved away from the initial propositions that the patterns were self-generated (the culturalist tradition[9]), via a structural understanding that socioeconomic subordination of minorities translates into housing segregation (the structuralist tradition), to a current discourse arguing that ethnic residential segregation has to be understood in the context of racism, discrimination, and the role played by Swedish institutions and the majority in blocking immigrants from accessing more attractive parts of the housing market (the "post-colonialist" tradition). None of the three interpretations can be easily dismissed, nor can any one of them sufficiently explain current patterns and processes without bringing in elements from the other two. It is however quite unusual today to find strong advocates of the culturalist interpretation.

If we distinguish between a majority and a minority group (see Knox and Pinch 2000: ch. 8), the literature offers a relevant conceptual framework to discuss segregation mechanisms relating to majority and minority behaviour. The majority can either react by accepting members of the minority or with reluctance to accept such residents. In the latter case, this may trigger flight reactions (when members of the majority leave neighbourhoods that have experienced the in-migration of minorities), avoidance (when members of the majority do not move into such neighbourhoods), and blocking strategies (when members of the majority act to keep the minority out of majority-dense neighbourhoods, or "isolated host communities" as they are labelled by Johnston, Forrest and Poulsen 2002). Partly related to the behavioural response of the majority, the minority itself may either attempt to achieve spatial assimilation or to cluster. In the latter case, the literature offers a set of reasons as to why a minority would cluster: for defence, for mutual support, for reproduction of cultural behaviour, and for (offensive) struggle.

Due in part to the existence of high quality data, Swedish segregation researchers have lately favoured dynamic approaches, focusing on gross migration flows in relation to patterns of segregation (see for instance Bråmå 2006a). It has thereby been possible to more fully understand both the emergence and the reproduction of immigrant-dense neighbourhoods. In one of her studies, Bråmå (2006b) tests the flight and avoidance hypotheses by investigating migration flows during the 1990s to and from a series of neighbourhoods that became immigrant-dense during this period. Although "white flight" could be confirmed, "white avoidance" is a much more appropriate label for what took place. Figure 4 shows the transition of the Husby housing estate (Stockholm) from a mixed Swedish-immigrant neighbourhood in 1990 to an

[9] Most studies arguing for the importance of self-segregation (congregation) are based on local case-studies. Andersson-Brolin (1984) studied Latin Americans in Tensta and Rinkeby, Pripp (1990) and Özukren and Magnusson (1997) Turks from the Kulu district in Fittja. These studies find that people have chosen to live close to relatives but they also report that immigrants complain about the lack of native Swedes in the neighbourhoods. These studies also recognise that living in ethnic clusters negatively affects integration opportunities (Urban 2005: 101). According to the Swedish Board of Social Affairs (Socialstyrelsen, 1999) a majority of immigrants (from Chile, Iran, Poland and Turkey) residing in immigrant-dense areas want to live in more "Swedish" environments.

immigrant-dense estate ten years later. Table 4 shows yearly gross migration flows to and from the estate by origin. The table clearly shows that differences in in-migration rates (avoidance) between Swedes and immigrants are much bigger than differences in out-migration rates (flight). Data for the year 2000 might indicate a shift but this is probably due to the construction of new student housing, which somewhat increased the number of Swedes.

Figure 4: Total Number of Residents and Number of Residents with Swedish and Immigrant Backgrounds in Husby, Stockholm, 1990-2000



Source: Bråmå 2006b.

Table 4: Annual Out- and In-migration Rates for Residents with Swedish and Immigrant Backgrounds in Husby, Stockholm, 1991-2000

	Out-migration rate			In-migration rate		
	Total	With Swedish background	With immigrant background	Total	With Swedish background	With immigrant background
1991	12,8	14,0	11,5	12,5	7,7	17,0
1992	12,9	13,6	12,3	12,3	7,8	16,0
1993	13,7	14,3	13,2	13,7	6,9	18,3
1994	15,0	15,4	14,7	15,0	7,0	19,6
1995	12,5	12,8	12,3	12,9	6,7	16,0
1996	12,1	13,4	11,4	12,1	7,0	14,3
1997	11,9	13,1	11,3	11,8	8,9	12,9
1998	12,0	14,8	10,9	12,2	8,1	13,6
1999	11,4	11,8	11,2	11,8	8,8	12,7
2000	9,2	9,5	9,1	8,0	9,9	7,4
Mean	12,3	13,3	11,8	12,2	7,9	14,8

Source: Bråmå 2006b.

Whether or not Swedish cities in general are more segregated than other European cities is difficult to say. The lack of comparable data for analysing residential patterns and especially the dynamics of segregation is a huge restriction for any attempt to generalize over and across different countries. In terms of ethnic residential segregation, Sweden shares many typical European features: a concentration of minorities in less attractive parts of the cities (primarily large housing estates), a general over-representation of immigrants in rental housing, and the multiethnic character of immigrant-dense neighbourhoods. I would also hypothesize that processes of white flight, white avoidance and of discrimination are present in all European countries.

4. Neighbourhood Effects

What is the relevance of residential patterns for integration into the labour market, education, and other dimensions of integration? Under the heading of "neighbourhood effects", I investigate whether and how the residential environment in which an individual lives determines or at least affects his or her life chances. This is also of political relevance: if spatial clustering of the unemployed leads to reduced opportunities for individuals in such a cluster, targeted assistance may be necessary and justified. If spatial clustering of minorities results in poor school performance, a poorer environment for language acquisition etc. then compensating such areas, relocating (dispersing) people or decreasing barriers for mobility, or restructuring neighbourhoods to achieve social mix might be considered – at least if clustering is not done voluntarily. In brief, the issue of neighbourhood effects is not only of academic interest, but is also a political and social policy issue. One of the most valid arguments for area-based interventions and anti-segregation policies is the presumed existence of negative effects of spatial concentrations of certain population categories (Andersson and Musterd 2005b).

One might think that Swedish researchers have made plenty of use of available longitudinal and geocoded data in order to attempt to measure neighbourhood effects on different aspects of social life. But even if the research interest has grown over the last years, there are still relatively few empirical studies aiming to measure such effects.

4.1 Neighbourhood and School Effects on Education

Helen Dryler (2001) studied effects of school segregation using a multilevel OLS approach. She had official data (Statistics Sweden) on 97,000 pupils leaving the 9th grade in 1990 and 125,000 leaving in 1997 (level 1: individual data) and data on the social and ethnic composition of all schools (level 2: school data). Her three outcome variables were average grades, transitions to upper secondary school (gymnasium) and leaving school with low marks or without certificate. For average grades she found small negative effects due to immigrant-density for the 1990 cohort and no effect for the 1997 cohort. For transitions to upper secondary school she finds positive effects related to immigrant density if the social composition of the schools was also controlled for; for the third outcome variable she finds higher risk if the immigrant density is also high. The higher risk exists both for the 1990 and the 1997 cohort but it was less strong in 1997. Overall, Dryler's findings suggest that the contextual effects

relating to the native-immigrant dimension are very modest. Although she contends that her study is methodologically more advanced than earlier attempts (SOU 1997: 61 and Lindmark 1998), she stresses the need for going deeper into the matter.

Szulkin and Jonsson (2006) ask whether ethnic segregation in Swedish comprehensive schools, exacerbated by increased residential segregation and increased immigration during the 1990s, is associated with decreased educational outcomes as measured either by teacher-assigned school grades in ninth grade (age 16) or eligibility to enter an academic study programme at the upper secondary level. Their data are based on two cohorts who graduated from comprehensive school in 1998 and 1999 (188,000 pupils and 1,043 schools; official records from Statistics Sweden), linking educational information from schools with census data on social background. Using multilevel analysis they find that increased ethnic density in schools depresses grade point averages in general, especially for immigrant pupils. For second-generation immigrants these lower grades are accounted for by socioeconomic characteristics of the family and by the composite socioeconomic status in schools. They argue that differences in school quality are unlikely to produce these results. Rather, a clustering of immigrant children is likely to create a more difficult learning environment, due in part to language problems and a relative lack of positive role models. Because ethnic density has strong negative effects in schools with 70 per cent or more immigrant students, they state that desegregation policies could be an efficient means toward increasing overall academic standards as well as decreasing educational inequality.

Recently, Martin Nordin (2005), a PhD student in economics in Lund, produced a paper studying neighbourhood effects on education. Based on official data from Statistics Sweden, he found small but significant effects. "…the neighbourhood effect primarily affects the probabilities to attain a comprehensive education, a vocational upper secondary education, and the highest academic education level. Thus, attending a school with an ethnic segregation ratio above 60% increases the probability of having a comprehensive education by 2.8%, the probability of having a vocational upper secondary education by 3.7%, and decreases the probability of having an academic exam or 80 academic points by 6.4%. (…) We have also found that second-generation immigrant youths, after controlling for family background, on average attain a higher education level than native youths. The group originating from the Nordic countries and the group originating from Latin America do however seem to attain a lower education level than natives." (Nordin 2005: 40)

The Swedish National Agency for Education recently published a report analysing compositional and contextual effects on grades, for the 1998 to 2004 age 16 cohorts. Using a multilevel regression analysis the agency found relatively high and increasing negative effects relating to the socioeconomic as well as the immigrant composition of schools. They could not fully separate compositional and contextual effects but argued that both prevail (Skolverket 2006: 32). It is for instance well known that schools having a high share of pupils with an immigrant background usually include many recently arrived immigrants. These pupils perform on average less well than other immigrants (a presumed language effect).

Further studies do not include effects of immigrant density but more generally investigate the effects of neighbourhood characteristics on educational and labour market careers. Thus

Brännström (2004) utilises Swedish longitudinal data (census and annual data from Statistics Sweden, plus repeated survey data) from the 'golden era' of Swedish welfare policy to evaluate the impact of neighbourhood poverty during adolescence on a wide range of social exclusion outcomes (including, but not limited to, educational and employment status) within a counterfactual approach based on matched sampling. "With certain caveats regarding /inter alia/ the lack of dynamism in the counterfactual methodology, the empirical analyses show that, when two groups of children who are identical according to observed factors before age 10 (including household income, family structure and welfare receipt) live in different types of neighbourhood in adolescence, the outcome for those who grow up in a poor neighbourhood is not more likely to be worse than for those who grow up in a more affluent neighbourhood" (Brännström 2004: abstract).

Eva Andersson (2001, 2004) analysed the significance of surroundings on an individual's socioeconomic career in the form of education, occupational status and income in three medium-sized Swedish cities. Using official data from Statistics Sweden, a multi-level regression analysis was carried out to measure the impact of the physical and the socio-demographic environment, respectively. Household and individual characteristics were also included in the analyses. The second set of empirical material was taken from an interview study carried out in the same three municipalities (Gävle, Västerås, Jönköping). Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted, in which the interviewees were asked to tell their life story with a focus on their residential history and their interpretation of possible contextual effects of neighbours and the built environment. The statistical survey cohort was made up of individuals born in 1970 who lived in the same area during their adolescence for at least five years. Their careers were analysed ten years later, in 1995. The most important finding was that the socio-demographic and physical context of the residential area during adolescence affected the subsequent socioeconomic career: "Of the three indicators of socioeconomic career, an individual's education was the most affected by the surroundings. Occupational status (employed or unemployed) and income were also affected, although contextual effects on income were the least distinct. The context provides different effects on socioeconomic careers for people living in different residential areas. There were 'hills of happiness' as well as 'valleys of sadness'; in other words, the place of adolescence matters for an individual's future. The analysis showed that socio-demographic characteristics of the neighbourhood were of greater importance to socioeconomic career than were physical characteristics" (E. Andersson 2004: 655).

Seen from a political standpoint, neighbourhood and school effects on educational outcomes trigger more interest than other types of potential outcomes (such as labour market careers of adults). The reasons are probably three, (a) children cannot at all choose where to live and normally not where to attend school, (b) since the early 1990s, school reforms have granted parents the right to both opt for private alternatives to public schools and to place their children in schools outside their residential district, and (c) the society sees it as a common and important responsibility to ensure that all children are given a good basic education.

4.2 Political Participation and Social Trust

Since the 1976 elections, non-Swedish residents have been entitled to vote in local elections (municipality and county councils). Many political scientists have analysed the downward participation trend occurring election by election since 1976. The lack of political participation has been viewed as an indicator showing that many immigrants feel excluded.

There has however been only one comprehensive study analysing neighbourhood effects on political participation so far. Using primary survey data supplemented with neighbourhood data (from Statistics Sweden), Strömblad (2003) shows that official concern regarding poor areas is justified. His analysis shows that area unemployment rates (as an indication of poverty) have negative effects for political engagement. Furthermore, potentially important differences between poor areas are analysed by examining contextual effects of immigrant density. Unexpectedly, the analysis based on data from nine poor areas of Stockholm reveals significant positive effects of immigrant density on political efficacy. Thus, residents of the more immigrant dense poor areas tend to be more optimistic as they assess their possibilities for political influence. "Further research suggests that this can be explained by local variations in government sponsored urban renewal programs, aimed – above all – at empowering residents of poor areas" (Strömblad 2003).

Another study investigates levels of social trust – but without referring to immigration. Based on data from the Swedish Longitudinal Survey among Unemployed (Statistics Sweden), which were collected during a period of mass unemployment and recession, extensive ordered logit regression analyses carried out by Brännström (2006) show that low levels of social trust are contingent upon perceived neighbourhood disorder, personal powerlessness, perceived fear of victimisation, and accumulated temporary employment. The results also indicate that neighbourhood disorder, powerlessness and fear of victimisation interact, thereby magnifying the negative impact on social trust. In order to rule out a potential reciprocal effect of social trust on perceived neighbourhood disorder, personal powerlessness, and perceived fear of victimisation, alternative models inspired by instrumental variables estimation were created. These estimates suggest that perceived neighbourhood disorder does indeed influence levels of social trust rather than the other way around. However, Brännström concludes that the empirical findings and theoretical explanations should be interpreted with some caution. "The analyses have been carried out on a sample of individuals that might be viewed as 'most likely cases', i.e. a sample which certainly ought to confirm theory. (….) Furthermore, the study essentially measures social psychological processes at the individual level, making it difficult to offer an assessment of which, if any, neighbourhood-level processes are of importance" (Brännström 2006: 45).

4.3 Health

There have been numerous studies focusing on health in relation to immigrant-dense areas, and I will only report a couple of interesting studies.

Hjern (1998) focuses on immigrant children in the Stockholm region; although the spatial level of resolution in his study is rather high (parishes), the results indicate substantial differences across different types of neighbourhoods.

Sundquist, Malmström and Johansson have produced several papers of relevance (Sundquist, Malmström, Johansson 1999, 2004, Malmström, Sundquist, Johansson 1999). They conducted a multilevel study in 1999 of 2.6 million women and men in Sweden studying the relation between neighbourhood deprivation and incidence of coronary heart disease (data from Statistics Sweden). The objective of the study was to examine whether neighbourhood deprivation predicts incidence rates of coronary heart disease, beyond age and individual income. The data material was taken from a follow-up study from 1995 to 1999. Women and men were analysed separately with respect to incidence rates of coronary heart disease. Multilevel logistic regression was used in the analysis with individual level characteristics (age, individual income) at the first level and level of neighbourhood deprivation at the second level. Neighbourhood deprivation was measured at small area market statistics level (SAMS) by the use of Care Need Index. They found a strong relation between the level of neighbourhood deprivation and the incidence rates of coronary heart disease for both women and men. In the full model, which took individual income into account, the risk of developing coronary heart disease was 87% higher for women and 42% higher for men in the most deprived neighbourhoods than in the most affluent neighbourhoods. For both women and men the variance at the neighbourhood level was over twice the standard error, indicating significant differences in coronary heart disease risk between neighbourhoods. The authors conclude: "High levels of neighbourhood deprivation independently predict coronary heart disease for both women and men. Both individual and neighbourhood level approaches are important in health care policies." (Sundquist, Malmström, Johansson 2004)

4.4 Labour Market Careers and Income Development

In a Swedish-Dutch collaboration, Roger Andersson and Sako Musterd produced a series of papers using the statistical database GeoSweden as the empirical foundation. GeoSweden contains yearly demographic, socioeconomic, educational and geographical information on all people residing in Sweden from 1990-2002 (recently updated with information for 2003 and 2004). Data was purchased from Statistics Sweden. The first two papers (Musterd and Andersson 2005 and 2006, respectively) are based on the 1991 to 1999 period and attempt to analyse the existence and magnitude of neighbourhood effects on (un)employment. The relevant area characteristic is in this case the extent of unemployment while the ethnic composition of the population is not included. Both papers confirm the existence of such effects. Figure 5 gives an overview of the relation between the percentage of unemployed in the 500m by 500m neighbourhoods (for the entire country) and the percentage of those who were unemployed in 1991 and remained unemployed in 1995 and 1999. The levels vary according to national origin, but all categories experience a clear impact of the residential context (horizontal axis). However, since this impact seems to vanish in areas having more than 15 per cent unemployment, one might hypothesize that state interventions in high-unemployment neighbourhoods are quite effective.

Figure 5: Percentage Unemployed Staying Unemployed in 1995 and 1999, per Environment Type, per Country of Birth



Source: Musterd and Andersson 2006.

In an enlarged collaboration, including George Galster and Timo Kauppinen, Swedish data are used to examine three important issues in the neighbourhood effects discourse. In Andersson, Musterd, Galster and Kauppinen (2005) the authors address the crucial question "What mix matters"? The paper explores the degree to which a wide variety of neighbourhood conditions in Sweden in 1995 are statistically related to earnings for all adult men and women during the 1996-1999 period (both metropolitan and non-metropolitan), controlling for a wide variety of personal characteristics. They find that the extremes of the neighbourhood income distribution, operationalised by the percentages of adult males with earnings in the lowest 30th and the highest 30th per centiles, hold greater explanatory power than variables related to education, ethnicity, or housing tenure. They also separated the effects of having a substantial share of low- and high-income neighbours and find that the presence of the former means most for metropolitan and non-metropolitan men and women, with the largest effects for metropolitan men. Another paper (Galster, Kauppinen, Musterd and Andersson 2005) contributes to the literature on obtaining unbiased estimates of neighbourhood effects. They employ the same massive longitudinal database (GeoSweden) comprised of all working age adults in metropolitan Sweden from 1991-1999 to estimate a preliminary earnings function for 1991-1995, then use the residual as a measure of time-invariant characteristics. Inclusion of these residuals in the 1996-1999 earnings model reduces the magnitude (but not the strong statistical significance) of the effect of the percentage of low-income and high-income males in any given neighbourhood. Nevertheless, simulations show that variations in neighbourhood income mix within sample ranges are economically significant, though sensitive to gender and activity in the labour force.

Musterd, Andersson, Galster and Kauppinen (2005) further address the role of ethnic clusters in relation to immigrants' income development. Differences in immigrant economic trajectories have been attributed to a wide variety of factors. One of these is the local spatial context where immigrants reside. This spatial context assumes special salience in light of expanding public exposure to and scholarly interest in "ethnic enclaves". Does concentrating immigrants aid or retard their chances for improving their economic standing? In this paper the authors contribute clear statistical evidence relevant to answering this vital question. They develop multiple measures of the spatial context in which immigrants reside and assess their contribution to average individual earnings of immigrants in three large Swedish metropolitan areas, controlling for individual and regional labour market characteristics. They use longitudinal information about Swedish immigrants during the 1995-2002 period. They find no evidence (with one exception) that own-group ethnic enclaves in Sweden typically enhance the income prospects of its residents, unless individuals use the enclave as a short-term place from which to quickly launch themselves into different milieus.

The results, derived from OLS regressions on longitudinal (1995-2002) data, are conclusive and show that people residing in own-group clusters in Sweden's three largest city regions pay a rather severe penalty in terms of income development – on condition that the unemployment level in the close environment exceeds a few percentage points (which it almost always does). This holds true for both male and female immigrants of all seven immigrant groups listed in Table 2 except for Somali females. Similar findings were reported by Andersson (1998b).

Let me speculate briefly as to why we find negative effects on income development for immigrants residing among co-ethnics. The issue needs further research but I can see at least three possible explanations: a) an external stigma is attached to neighbourhoods having clusters of non-European immigrants, b) in relation to the job market, informal networks are less functional in such clusters, c) self-selection of certain families having un-measured characteristics that correlate with low labour market participation is present. The self-selection issue is difficult to overcome, but I would like to stress that our studies do control for a wide set of personal characteristics. I would personally hypothesize that our findings are best explained by reference to the stigmatization and/or the network issues.

All of the aforementioned papers as well as earlier studies by Andersson (1998a, 2001) show clear neighbourhood effects on income and labour market performance. However, other papers do not confirm such effects, due in part to their use of larger spatial units and other time periods.

Based on the revitalised Project Metropolitan data bases, Brännström (2005) analyses neighbourhood effects on income and the receipt of social assistance. The empirical material (register data derived from the Stockholm Birth Cohort Study) provides a unique opportunity to obtain repeated information on both outcomes and place of residence for the cohort of Stockholmers born in 1953 over a 50-year period. With the use of longitudinal multilevel modelling, this study explores the inter-dependence of the observations by partitioning the total variance into different components using various hierarchical levels in the data. Extensive longitudinal multilevel analyses, which simultaneously work with two spatial levels of

differing territorial scope (i.e. census areas and parishes), show that prior place of residence accounts for a very modest proportion of the variation in cohort members' subsequent income and receipt of social assistance. Instead, the empirical analyses indicate that much of the variation is attributable to individual characteristics and/or to time of measurement. Since the variation in time between measurements accounted for a substantial part of the variability, this study may have demonstrated the benefits of including repeated information on the outcomes when evaluating the relative importance of neighbourhood context. "Thus, the major message of this study is that it is people and time point of measurement, rather than place of residence, that matter. Put simply, it matters more who you are than where you are. At least where the outcomes addressed in this study are concerned, this may indicate that it is primarily people and their households that should be the focus of policy efforts to alleviate disproportions in social and economic opportunities" (Brännström 2006: introduction).

In a second paper "Does Neighbourhood Origin Matter?", Brännström attempts to examine whether and to what extent neighbourhood exposure during childhood (age span 0-10), adolescence (age span 10-18), and/or early young adulthood (age span 18-22) has any influence on variations in income and receipt of social assistance in early adulthood (age span 25-30) and mid-adulthood (age span 38-47). Thus, this study indirectly evaluates the hypothesised effect of 'social geographical inheritance' (see Andersson 1998a) on later life outcomes. Accordingly, the observed non-effects of neighbourhood composition in this study do not contradict the idea of a welfare policy that aims at combating social and economic inequality wherever people may live, rather than a policy that uses small area-targeted interventions. But "(…) it needs to be remembered that the cohort of Stockholmers under study was born in 1953 and are relatively culturally and ethnically homogeneous. Since the mid-1980s, Sweden has gradually transformed into a multicultural society. Today, around 2 million out of a population of about 9 million in Sweden are considered first- or second-generation immigrants. As noted above, another change is that residential segregation in Sweden and Stockholm is now more advanced. This development escalated with the resurgence of mass unemployment during the economic recession of the early and mid-1990s, and 'immigrant-dense' areas have emerged in the largest cities (Andersson 2000). A cohort of Stockholmers born in the early 1980s and growing up in the Stockholm metropolitan area in times of a high unemployment regime, would thus have a different composition and would have faced a different context, presumably leading to different outcomes" (Brännström 2006: introduction).

5. Conclusions

In Sweden, as in most Western countries, the issue of social justice and equality has been revived in the light of the exclusion of the immigrant population (especially of the non-European migrants) from many spheres of society. It is something of a paradox that, since the country declared itself multicultural in 1975, integration into the labour market has become much more problematic, immigrants' political participation has dropped, and increasing proportions of especially newly arrived immigrants have concentrated in 'immigrant-dense' neighbourhoods. Many fear that negative socialisation processes will take place in poor and 'segregated neighbourhoods', that social exclusion will lead to crime and that social conflicts

will become more common in the future. Furthermore, segregation increases the risk of racism and discrimination. The multicultural model seems more out of reach now than it was at the time of its breakthrough 30 years ago.

Research does not yet provide satisfactory answers to these new problems. There is a need for more long-term research on the emergence and development of multicultural Western societies, and much of the Swedish research in this field has been short-sighted, commissioned as a response to acute integration problems (FAS 2003). The lack of basic funding is perhaps most obvious when it comes to studies on the relational nature of different social phenomena. It is a well known fact, for example, that processes of segregation are difficult to isolate; different social arenas in housing, work and politics condition each other in complex ways. Immigrants' position on the labour market or in the educational system can be negatively affected by discretion or discrimination on the housing market. Housing conditions, in turn, are clearly affected by the households' economic resources and thus depend to a considerable extent on positions in the labour market. Residential and work place integration are both central to the inclusion in social networks and the exercise of citizenship.

Political interventions have, since the 1990s, been characterized by selective measures aiming at particular housing estates, whereas earlier policies were aimed at residential areas (in particular, certain types of residential areas). Further, Sweden has now introduced specific policy initiatives for metropolitan areas. Among the motives for the policy change were increasing social polarisation and residential segregation in big cities as well as the influx of several hundred thousand refugees who settled in suburban housing estates and who faced severe social exclusion and integration problems.

The new Big City policy focuses not only on economic growth, but also aims to combat economic, social and ethnic discrimination and segregation. Several evaluations of the programme show that progress has been made on some of the goals, notably employment, benefit dependency, and education (Integrationsverket 2002, Bunar 2004, Hosseini-Khalidjari 2003, Bevelander et al. 2004, Törnquist 2004, Bak et al. 2004). However, most analyses show that the relative improvements in terms of employment and reduction of welfare dependency rates are not due to the programme as such but rather to improved macroeconomic conditions. Even more importantly, our own analyses show that progress for the targeted population might not rule out a policy failure vis-à-vis the targeted neighbourhoods. This is due to selective migration, i.e. people whose economic conditions improve move to other neighbourhoods (Andersson and Bråmå 2004, Bråmå and Andersson 2005). Thus, area-based policies have had positive effects in many of the large estates but have so far not seemed to reduce social as well as ethnic segregation or to have improved the relative position of targeted neighbourhoods vis-à-vis other residential areas. If the primary reason for the existence of immigrant-dense housing estates is structural subordination – i.e. little choice on the housing market rather than voluntary congregation along ethnic lines (Palander 2006) – then change can come about by raising the average income level in poor neighbourhoods relative to that in other areas. The main challenge seems to be to reduce the out-migration, and especially the 'middle-class leakage', since this is the driving force behind the production and reproduction of segregation (Andersson and Bråmå 2004).

Policy can influence both the level of residential segregation and the level of integration, but experiences so far tell us that too little action focuses on the role played by Swedish institutions and on the majority population; perhaps too much attention is paid to the immigrants themselves. Anti-segregation efforts concentrate on immigrant-dense neighbourhoods, but ethnic residential segregation is a result of decisions taken by the Swedish majority, who tend to cluster in Swedish-dense neighbourhoods and avoid immigrant-dense housing estates. Housing allocation practices carried out by financial institutions and gatekeepers (for instance people administrating waiting lists for public rental apartments or private rental housing companies) have to be scrutinised from the perspective of discrimination. Thus, while many questions regarding the consequences of residential segregation remain to be solved, policies aiming to reduce its extent need to be wide-ranging and encompass the revision of many institutional practices.

References

Andersson, E. (2001): Från Sorgedalen till Glädjehöjden – omgivningens betydelse för socioekonomisk karriär. [From Valley of Sadness to Hill of Happiness. The Significance of Surroundings for Socio-economic Careers] In: *Geografiska Regionstudier* 44, Dept. of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University.

Andersson, E. (2004): From Valley of Sadness to Hill of Happiness. The Significance of Surroundings for Socio-economic Career. In: *Urban Studies Journal*, 41(3): 641-659.

Andersson, R. (1998a): Socio-spatial dynamics: Ethnic divisions of mobility and housing in Post-Palme Sweden. In: *Urban Studies* 35: 397–428.

Andersson, R. (1998b): Segregering, segmentering och socio-ekonomisk polarisering. Stockholmsregionen och sysselsättningskrisen 1990-95. *Partnerskap för Multietnisk Integration, Rapport Nr. 2*. Sociologiska institutionen, Umeå universitet.

Andersson, R. (2000): Etnisk och socioekonomisk segregation i Sverige 1990–1998. In: SOU 2000, 37. *Arbetsmarknad, Demografi och Segregation*. Stockholm: 223–266.

Andersson, R. (2001): Spaces of Socialisation and Social Network Competition – a study of neighborhood effects in Stockholm, Sweden. In: Andersen, H. and T. van Kempen, R. (eds.), *Social Exclusion, Social Fragmentation and Urban Governance*. Aldershot: 149–188.

Andersson, R. (2006): Breaking Segregation - Rhetorical Construct or Effective Policy? The Case of the Metropolitan Development Initiative in Sweden'. In: *Urban Studies* 43(4): 787-799.

Andersson, R. and Bråmå, Å. (2004): Selective Migration in Swedish Distressed Neighbourhoods: Can Area-based Urban Policies Counteract Segregation Processes? In *Housing Studies*, 19: 517-539.

Andersson, R. and Musterd, S. (2005a): Social mix and social perspectives in post-war housing estates. In: R. van Kempen, Dekker, K., Hall, S., and Tosics, I. (eds.), *Restructuring large housing estates in Europe,* Bristol: 127-147.

Andersson, R. and Musterd, S. (2005b): Area-based Policies. A critical Appraisal. In: *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie,* 96(4): 377-389.

Andersson, R. and Solid, D. (2003): Dispersal Policies in Sweden. In: V. Robinson, R. Andersson and S. Musterd (eds.), *Spreading the 'burden?'A review of policies to disperse asylum seekers and refugees,* Bristol: 65-102.

Andersson, R., Musterd, S., Galster, G. and Kauppinen, T. (2005): What Mix Matters? Paper presented at the conference "Gaps in Neighbourhood Research", April 11-12 2005, University of Amsterdam.

Andersson-Brolin, L. (1984): *Etnisk bostadssegregation.* Stockholm.

Arnell-Gustafsson, U. (1975): *Om bostadssegregationens effekter*. Uppsala: Sociologiska institutionen, Uppsala University.

Arnman, G. and Jönsson, I. (1985): *Segregation och svensk skola. En studie av utbildning, klass och boende*, Lund.

Bak, M., Gunnarsson, L., Lassbo, G. and Ljungvall, B. (2004): *Samtal pågår. Språkutveckling och skolresultat*. http://www.goteborg.se/prod/storstad/dalis2.nsf/vyFilArkiv/samtal_pagar_sprakutv_skolresultat.pdf/$file/samtal_pagar_sprakutv_skolresultat.pdf (Last accessed on 13 March 2007).

Bevelander, P., Broomé, P., Carlson, B. and Lindberg, G. (2004): *Variationer på framtidsmelodi. Storstadssatsningen i Malmö. Utvärdering av lokala arbets- och utvecklingscentra*. Malmö.

Bråmå, Å. and Andersson, R. (2005): Who leaves Sweden's large housing estates? In: R. van Kempen, Dekker, K., Hall, S., and Tosics, I. (eds.), *Restructuring large housing estates in Europe,* Bristol: 169-192.

Bråmå, Å. (2006a): Studies in the Dynamics of Residential Segregation. In: *Geografiska regionstudier* 67. Uppsala: Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University.

Bråmå, Å. (2006b): White flight? The production and reproduction of immigrant concentration areas in Swedish cities, 1990-2000. In: *Urban Studies,* 43(7).

Bråmå, Å., Andersson, R. and Solid, D. (2006): Bostadsmarknadens institutioner och grindvakter i den etniskt segmenterade staten – exemplen Stockholm och Uppsala. In: *Rapport Integration 2005*, Norrköping: Integrationsverket.

Brännström, L. (2004): Poor Places, Poor Prospects? Counterfactual Models of Neighbourhood Effects on Social Exclusion in Stockholm, Sweden. In: *Urban Studies,* 41(13): 2515-2537.

Brännström, L. (2005): Does neighbourhood origin matter? A Longitudinal Multilevel Assessment of Neighbourhood Effects on Income and Receipt of Social Assistance in a Stockholm Birth Cohort. In: *Housing, Theory and Society*, 22(4): 169-195.

Brännström, L. (2006): *Phantom of the neighbourhood – Studies on area-based conditions and individual outcomes*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Research 67.

Bunar, N. (2004): Det går bra, men det ser fortsatt dåligt ut. Organisationen och tillämpningen av lokala utvecklingsavtal i Stockholms kommun. In: *Utvärderingar av den nya storstadspolitiken: Storstadsarbete/Storstadssatsningen 12*. Södertörns högskola.

Dahlström, E. (1951): *Trivsel i Söderort. Sociologisk undersökning i Hägerstensåsen och Hökmossen 1949-1950*, Stockholm.

Dahlström, E. (1957): *Barnfamiljer i höghus och trevånings låghus i Vällingby*. Stockholm: Statens nämnd för byggnadsforskning.

Danermark, B. (1983): *Klass, inkomst och boende. Om segregationen i några kommuner*, Stockholm.

Dryler, H. (2001): Etnisk segregation i skolan –effekter på ungdomars betyg och övergång till gymnasieskolan. In: J. Fritzell and J. Palme (eds.), *Välfärdens finansiering och fördelning*, SOU 2001, 57. Stockholm: 319-355.

Ekberg, J. and Gustavsson, B. (1995): *Invandrare på arbetsmarknaden*, Stockholm.

FAS (2003): *An Evaluation of Swedish International Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER) Research 1995-2002*. Stockholm: Forskningsrådet för arbetsliv och socialvetenskap http://www.fas.forskning.se/upload/dokument/publiaktioner/pdf/imerutvardering.pdf (last accessed 13 March 2007).

Franzén, M. and Sandstedt, E. (1993): *Välfärdsstat och byggande. Om efterkrigstidens nya stadsmönster*, Lund.

Galster, G., Kauppinen, T., Musterd, S. and Andersson, R. (forthcoming): Does Neighborhood Income Mix Affect Earnings of Adults? A New Approach using Evidence from Sweden.

Heidenheimer, A. J., Heclo, H. and Teich-Adams, C. (1990): *Comparative Public Policy*. New York.

Hjern, A. (1998): *Migration till Segregation -En folkhälsorapport om barn med utländskt ursprung*, Stockholm.

Hosseini-Kaladjahi, H. (2003): *Stora fiskar äter fortfarande små fiskar. Helhetsutvärdering av storstadssatsningen i Botkyrka kommun.* Botkyrka: Mångkulturellt centrum.

Integrationsverket (2002): *Everyday discrimination and racism in Sweden. An overview on the knowledge base*, Norrköping.

Janson, C-G. (1961): Socialekologiska metoder. In G. Karlsson (ed.), *Sociologiska metoder*, Stockholm: 353-392.

Janson, C-G. (1971): A Preliminary Report on Swedish Urban Spatial Structure. In: *Economic Geography*, 47: 249-257.

Janson, C-G. (1975): Kommunstudien. ERU:s underlagsmaterial, U4. Stockholm: Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet.

Janson, C-G. (1987): Working Class Segregation in Stockholm and Some Other Swedish Cities. In: U. Bergryd and C-G. Janson (eds.), *Sociological Miscellany. Essays in Honour of Gunnar Boalt*, Stockholm: Department of Sociology, Stockholm University: 161-195.

Janson, C-G. (1993): Ecological and Individual Approaches in the Study of Crime and Delinquency. In: D. P. Farrington, R. J. Sampson and P-O. H. Wikström (eds.), *Integrating Individual and Ecological Aspects of Crime*, Stockholm: National Council for Crime Prevention.

Johnston, R., Forrest, J. and Poulsen, M. (2002): The Ethnic Geography of EthniCities. The 'American model' and residential concentration in London. In: *Ethnicities*, 2(2): 209-235.

Knox, P. and Pinch, S. (2000): *Urban Social Geography: An Introduction* (4th edition). Harlow.

Lindberg, G. (1968): *Social omgivning: en socialekologisk undersökning av 20 bostadsområden i Malmö*. Lund: Sociologiska institutionen, Lunds universitet.

Lindmark, E. (1998): *Olika ursprung – skilda resultat? En analys av invandrarungdomars betyg i den svenska skolan, C-uppsats i sociologi*. Stockholm: Sociologiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet.

Malmström M, Sundquist J and Johansson S-E. (1999): Neighborhood environment and self-reported health status: a multilevel analysis. *American Journal of Public Health,* 89(8): 1181-1186.

Massey, D.S. and Denton, N.A. (1993): *American Apartheid.* Cambridge.

Molina, I. (1997): *Stadens rasifiering. Etnisk boendesegregation i folkhemmet.* Geografiska regionstudier Nr 32. Uppsala: Kulturgeografiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet.

Musterd, S. and Andersson, R. (2005): Housing Mix, Social Mix, and Social Opportunities. *Urban Affairs Review,* 40(6): 761-790.

Musterd, S. and Andersson, R. (2006): Employment, Social Mobility and Neighbourhood Effects. Accepted for publication by the *International Journal for Urban and Regional Research* (March 2006).

Musterd, S., Andersson, R., Galster, G. and Kauppinen, T. (2005): Are Ethnic Clusters good or bad? Exploring the relationship between individuals' incomes and the immigrant character of their neighbourhood. Paper presented at the conference 'Gaps in Neighbourhood Research', April 11-12, 2005, University of Amsterdam (accepted for publication in Environment and Planning A).

Nordin, M. (2005): *Ethnic segregation and educational attainment in Sweden.* Licentiate dissertation, Lund University Department of Economics.

Olsson Hort, S-E. (1992): *Segregation - ett svenskt dilemma? Socialpolitiska och sociologiska synpunkter*, Stockholm.

Özüekren, A. S. and Magnusson, L. (1997): Housing conditions of Turks in Sweden. In S. A. Özüekren and van R. Kempen (eds.), *Housing conditions of Turks in European Cities*, London.

Palander, C. (2006): Områdesbaserad politik för minskad segregation –En studie av den svenska storstadspolitiken. In: *Geografiska regionstudier,* 66. Uppsala: Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University.

Pripp, O. (1990): Kulturbundna attityder och anpassningar till bostadsmiljön. En boendeundersökning bland turkar och kurder i Fittja. In: *Byggforskningsrådet Rapport R5:1990*, Stockholm.

Rapport Integration 2002 (2003): Norrköping: Integrationsverket (Swedish Integration Board).

Rapport Integration 2003 (2004): Norrköping: Integrationsverket (Swedish Integration Board).

Rapport Integration 2005 (2006): Norrköping: Integrationsverket (Swedish Integration Board).

Skolverket (2006): Vad *händer med likvärdigheten i svensk skola? En kvantitativ analys av variation och likvärdighet över tid.* Rapport 275. Stockholm: Swedish National Agency for Education.

Socialstyrelsen (1999): *Social och ekonomisk förankring bland invandrare från Chile, Iran, Polen och Turkiet.* Stockholm: Board of Social Affairs.

SOU (1997) *Att växa bland betong och kojor*. Delbetänkande från Storstadskommittén. 1997(61), Stockholm.

SOU (2005) *Det blågula glashuset –strukturell diskriminering i Sverige.* 2005(56), Stockholm.

Strömblad, P. (2003): *Politik på stadens skuggsida* [Politics and Policy on the Dark Side of the Town]. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.

Sundquist, J., Malmström, M. and Johansson, S-E. (1999): Cardiovascular risk factors and the neighbourhood environment: a multilevel analysis. In: *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 28: 841-845.

Sundquist, J., Malmström, M. and Johansson, S-E. (2004): Neighbourhood deprivation and incidence of coronary heart disease: a multilevel study of 2.6 million women and men in Sweden. In: *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 58: 71-77.

Swedner, H. (1960): *Ecological Differentiation of Habits and Attitudes*, Lund.

Szulkin, R. and Jonsson, J. O. (2006): *Immigration, Ethnic Segregation and Educational Outcomes: A Multilevel Analysis of Swedish Comprehensive Schools*. Stockholm University Department of Sociology Working Papers Series, Number 4. Stockholm.

Törnquist, A. (2004): *Storstadssatsningen i ett områdesperspektiv*. Göteborg: Institute for Social Work, Göteborg University.

Turner, B. and Whitehead, C. (2002): Reducing Housing Subsidy: Swedish Housing Policy in an International Context. In: *Urban Studies*, 39(2): 201-217.

Urban, S. (2005): *Att ordna staden. Den nya storstadspolitiken växer fram*, Lund.

Annex

Table 5: Foreign-born persons by country of birth (selected nationalities)

Country	2003	2005	per cent of population 2005
Bosnia and Herzegovina	53949	54813	0,6
Chile	27528	27811	0,3
Greece	10853	10749	0,1
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	53241	54470	0,6
Iraq	67645	72553	0,8
Lebanon	20811	21441	0,2
Poland	41608	46203	0,5
Somalia	14809	16045	0,2
Syrian Arab Republic	15692	16772	0,2
Turkey	34083	35853	0,4
total foreign born	1.078.075	1.125.790	12,4
total population of Sweden	8.975.670	9.047.752	

Source: Statistics Sweden

Karen Schönwälder

Residential Concentrations and Integration: Preliminary Conclusions

In the preceding three country studies, the degree and basic patterns of residential concentrations of immigrant minority groups were discussed with special attention paid to the possible connections of these residential configurations with migrants' chances in the labour market, in education, and with their social networks, norms and attitudes. Which conclusions can be drawn from these analyses of the British, Dutch and Swedish situations for the German debate? How can the state of knowledge – with all the appropriate due caution given the state of research – be assessed?

First, it can be stated that a new empirical approach to an old controversy is taking place. In the US instigated by the "culture of poverty" thesis as put forward by W.J. Wilson, in Europe stimulated by concerns about social cohesion and the stagnant integration process of large immigrant groups, vivid debates are conducted once again about whether immigrant colonies and "ethnic enclaves" should be seen as a prevalent feature of ethnically plural societies, as a sheltered space for the newly immigrated, or whether they form a mobility trap and indicate dangerous societal divisions. Such alternatively formulated positions have long been irreconcilably opposed. Instead of repeating the by now well-known arguments and reactivating old lines of conflict, it is desirable to reach a more well-informed opinion on such controversial assumptions based on empirical tests. To what extent is research that would allow such insights currently available, and in what directions does the research reported in the country studies point?

Assumptions about the effects of socio-spatial structures on individuals, groups and social relationships play a role in both positive and negative perceptions of immigrant colonies and residential concentrations. Along with a number of other factors, a residential environment characterized by having a high percentage of migrants or members of a particular ethnic group is supposed to have its own influence on both individual opportunities and orientations as well as collective structures and orientations. Hypotheses on the effects of living in an ethnically concentrated environment overlap with the literature on the effects of living in highly concentrated areas of poverty or unemployment, and argumentation is not always clearly delineated when it comes to the related yet very different phenomena of social and ethnic segregation.

Empirical results are mainly available with regard to the effects that concentrated poverty and unemployment in the residential environment have on the individual; in the USA the focus is additionally often on the effects of levels of criminality in a particular neighbourhood. In Europe there are, however, very few empirical studies in this entire field. The number of studies that specifically analyse the significance of residential concentrations of members from a specific ethnic minority is even smaller. Even in Sweden, where data records are

practically optimal for such research, there have been hardly any studies that attempt to measure neighbourhood effects, or more specifically, the effects of ethnic concentration. In spite of these deficiencies, the patchy evidence and preliminary conclusions from the three studies commissioned by the AKI-programme and some additional studies will be summarily presented here. In addition to the three country studies printed together here, reference will be made to two further AKI-publications by Dietrich Oberwittler on neighbourhood effects and by Janina Söhn and Karen Schönwälder on the residential structures of migrants in Germany.

Although a number of hypotheses attempt to explain the connections between residential environments and individual opportunities, orientations and group structures, there exists no comprehensive and generally accepted model. As Douglas Massey explains, there are a number of speculations on the intermediary social mechanisms that concentrate on "peer influences, cultural diffusion, the imitation of role models, access to networks, and collective efficacy" (2004: 2; see also Oberwittler 2007; Friedrichs/Galster/Musterd 2003; Durlauf 2004 for methodological questions and primarily US literature). The assumptions[1] formulated in the literature can roughly be sorted into those that view the residential environment as an opportunity structure, as a structuring context of social interactions, or those that focus on interactions between neighbourhoods and their external environments. These levels overlap somewhat in that, for instance, the residential environment can also be seen as an opportunity structure for social contacts.

- The residential environment as opportunity structure: Residents are exposed to differing opportunity structures according to the degree to which their neighbourhoods differ along certain lines, such as the proportion of a particular group or infrastructural characteristics. For example, it is assumed that the available occupational opportunities in any given residential environment (sometimes viewed positively with reference to an ethnic economy) influence an individual's chance of getting a job. The demographic composition could be relevant insofar as it provides opportunities for interethnic contact and for communication with native speakers (acquisition of the host country's language). "Ethnic concentrations in the residential environment form conditions that structurally restrict everyday access to acculturating learning environments" (Esser 2006c: 352). The strong presence of a particular immigrant group can also be seen as an advantageous opportunity structure for the development of community structures (and also for the preservation of identities and for social control) and can be understood as a base for ethnic elites.
- The neighbourhood is seen as a context that serves to structure social processes in a number of respects. It is assumed that the composition of a population influences social contacts and networks, and also that mutual interactions between residents help shape individual norms and orientations through peer groups, role models and through the norms and behavioural patterns predominant in the neighbourhood. Here, social learning is

[1] The assumptions generally relate to these types of mechanisms in general, not specifically to ethnic concentrations. Relevant connections pertaining to the integration of migrants will be stressed throughout.

assumed to be the general mechanism through which an effect of a particular residential environment is transmitted, especially as regards the socialisation of children and adolescents. "In neighbourhoods which are predominantly inhabited by losers of modernisation, the socially conspicuous and discriminated, certain (deviant) norms and patterns of behaviour prevail, whereas other 'mainstream' norms do not or only decreasingly so. This leads to a strong dominance for the deviant behavioural patterns, from which a certain pressure to conform emanates" (ILS 2003: no page; similarly Häußermann 2005: 44). For migrants it could then be assumed that in an environment shaped by their own ethnic group, specific group norms are more effectively passed on and preserved. The marginal representation of long-established residents as role models could make the learning of patterns of behaviour and norms customary in the host society more difficult.[2]

Especially in American research and in research on criminality, special meaning is attached to the phenomenon of "neighbourhood 'collective efficacy'" (Morenoff/ Sampson/Raudenbusch 2001: 7). This term refers to the combination of trust, collective expectations and readiness to stand up for community affairs – in this case, neighbourhood affairs – and to exercise social control. This again may be dependent on the presence of integrated social groups, as is the case with social networks made through associations. Ethnic communities could internally strengthen such collective efficacy. On the other hand, sharp social distances between different population groups would work against this. Heitmeyer and Anhut further assume that the concentrated occurrence of a number of problems in a neighbourhood decreases the ability to muster "the degree of integrative efforts and conflict management necessary for a successful coexistence with other ethnic groups" (Anhut/Heitmeyer 2000: 29). As they argue, the coincidence in the same socio-spatial context of experiences of contact and the unfamiliar, on the one hand, and special social strain, on the other, is disadvantageous (ibid: 35, 44).[3]

- Third, neighbourhood effects are assumed to arise from interactions with external environments. Particularly, it is assumed that a stigmatization of a neighbourhood and its inhabitants decreases, for example, their chances in the labour market.[4] It is also assumed that migrants and those with weak positions in society are less able to effectively raise their interests in city politics and that the neighbourhoods in which they live may be poorly represented.[5]

Methodologically it is certainly not easy, and may well be impossible, to separate the aforementioned sets of interactions from one another and from other, individual factors. Nick Buck

---

2 It is implicit here that norms and patterns of behaviour typical of the middle class are acquired.

3 Such a correlation between potential for conflict and socio-spatial environment could not be empirically proven (Anhut/Heitmeyer 2000: 556-561).

4 See also Richard Florida's hypotheses (2002). He assumes that creative centres are also centres of tolerance and diversity. Under certain conditions, ethnic diversity can be a positive factor contributing to the attractiveness and economic potential of a city.

5 The results of a study done at Humboldt University qualify this thesis; marginalised neighbourhoods were not systematically disadvantaged in city politics (Häußermann 2006).

points out "that individuals interact with their neighbourhoods in complex ways which may in the end make it difficult to disentangle the individual from the area either conceptually or in terms of data" (Buck 2001: 2258). Indeed, existing studies generally point at insecurities in the interpretation of observed correlations, the causes of which are difficult to explicitly identify. In the following section some research evidence is presented on specific effects of the residential environment on individuals. This survey reflects the uneven state of research: the various existing hypotheses have not, so far, been empirically tested to a comparable extent; rather, studies primarily focus on interethnic contacts and social networks.

One plausible assumption is that neighbourhood encounters support **contact between various demographic groups**, whereas living separately decreases such contact. Indeed, the results of two studies in the Netherlands, summarized above by Musterd and Ostendorf, indicate that the degree of residential concentration influences the level of interethnic contact.[6] The 2005 Gijsberts and Davegos study also shows that long-established Dutch residents in particular primarily have contact to members of minorities if they live in a mixed residential environment. For a number of minority groups differences in the degree of interethnic contacts according to the demographic composition of the residential environment are shown. It is worthy to note that among people from Turkey, even when there are hardly any other Turks in their neighbourhood, over fifty per cent have contacts primarily with people from their own ethnic group (see page 56 above).

The results from Oberwittler's AKI study similarly indicate that interethnic friendships among adolescents (ages 13-16) in Germany are related to the composition of the population in the immediate environment. Fifty to sixty percent of all adolescents have predominately local groups of friends from within their own neighbourhood. The only group who do not follow this pattern are adolescents from immigrant backgrounds who live in neighbourhoods where there are few other migrant adolescents. They often look outside of their neighbourhood for friends, with ethnic preferences (and not just those opportunities provided by the residential environment) evidently playing a role.[7] The large majority of adolescents with immigrant background do, however, have at least one close German friend, even including those adolescents living in segregated areas. This may be due to the fact that, in Germany, areas considered as segregated contain a high percentage of long-established German residents. And it is Germans who live in areas with low numbers of migrants who most seldom have non-German friends. For migrant adolescents differences according to neighbourhood are less pronounced. In areas with low segregation, twenty-three per cent only have

---

[6] See also the English-language summary of the Gijsberts/Davegos 2005 study, which states the following: "high concentrations of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood have consequences mainly for the degree of contact between the indigenous and ethnic populations […] The same applies for the native population. Indigenous Dutch people come into contact with members of minorities more often if they live in a mixed neighbourhood. Where there is the opportunity for contact, as in mixed neighbourhoods, this is also more likely to take place."

[7] It may be that the distanced attitude of German youths toward youths with immigrant backgrounds forces migrant children to look for friends from their own ethnic group.

friends from their own ethnic group, whereas in highly segregated areas this number is not much higher (thirty-one per cent).

In the – altogether not very extensive – research on migrant social networks in Germany connections between social networks and neighbourhood characteristics have not been focused on as a central theme. In one study, Boos-Nünning and Karakaşoğlu (2005) analysed the relationship between young migrant women's choice of her three best friends and her "residential milieu".[8] Certain patterns are distinguished, but the authors highlight that "even among those who live in a German or in a mixed residential environment, a significant proportion has friends exclusively or primarily with their own ethnic background" (Boos-Nünning/Karakaşoğlu 2005: 158).[9] Other studies, like Oberwittler's, emphasize the frequency of migrants' *inter*ethnic relationships.[10] It remains unclear as to whether these different findings are due to differences in friendship patterns according to gender, country of origin, differences between close and extended groups of friends (some studies ask about the three closest friends, other studies ask about friends in general), or to other factors.

In general, there is no clear evidence to suggest that residential environment is the main determinant of social relationships for migrants or members of an ethnic minority.[11] Rather, this appears to influence whether members of the ethnic majority make friends with members of the ethnic minorities. For children and adolescents, the educational rather than the residential may be the important environment. The composition of the student body does not always reflect the demographic make-up of a particular neighbourhood. There may further be differences between specific groups. For those of Turkish origin, several social scientists suspect that familial relationships play an important role for their social networks, as does a common national origin. This does not, however, seem to be the result of an ethnic residential segregation, but rather an expression of preferences (on migrants from Turkey in Germany see Nauck/Kohlmann 1998; Gestring/Janssen/Polat 2006; Blasius/Friedrichs 2004). The signifi-

---

8 In this study, "residential milieu" refers to the subjective assessment of the residential area and apartment building by the women interviewed (527). The authors do not explain how exactly they constructed the category "ethnic environment", for example.

9 Anita Drever and William Clark (2006; unpublished) used GSOEP data to analyse the relationship between residential environment and the make-up of the respondent's three closest friends (outside of their own household). The study does not show relevant connections for Germans or for people from Turkey.

10 See Haug (2003), who, based on 3,685 responses to the 2000 BiB integration survey, came to the conclusion that interethnic contacts among migrants are "quite common". When asked about the citizenship of their friends, 55 to 80% named German friends, whereas this type of contact among Germans was much lower (722-723). Haug also reports findings from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), which however only asks about the three closest contacts outside of the respondent's own household.

11 Bernhard Nauck warned in 1988 "that it is an ethnocentric misunderstanding to decide that the frequent appearance of 'visible' foreigners in certain neighbourhoods also then implies that they have intensive contacts" (Nauck 1988: 326). He himself studied the influence of residential environments on the frequency and type of contact with friends and family.
A Swiss study conducted in three cities came to the following conclusion: "The socio-spatial and socio-demographic structures of cities and districts exert no significant influence on the dynamic of trans-ethnic relationships." The probability of such relationships does not depend on whether or not someone lives in a segregated or less-segregated district (Wimmer 2002: 22).

cance of the residential environment as the basis for social relationships is also questioned in the international research on ethnic communities. It is often argued that the significance of geographic proximity is decreasing. Andreas Wimmer, for instance, warns of a tendency of migration research to "define social fields of interaction geographically and to therewith overstate the spatial dimension of social structures" (2002: 16).[12]

With respect to the effects of socio-spatial contexts on the acquisition of **norms, attitudes and behaviour**, the AKI research reviews could only identify isolated evidence. Oberwittler (2007) shows that for girls from migrant families, attitudes toward gender roles vary considerably according to the residential environment in which she lives. Girls who live in neighbourhoods with a lower percentage of migrants have "more modern" attitudes, whereas those who live in neighbourhoods with higher percentages hold "more conservative" views. This supports the idea that the mediation of social norms and social control over compliance with such norms is made easier through the communal living of a group in a residential environment (see also Peach, above). But such an isolated finding cannot be treated as more than an index for the existence of such correlations in general.

The results of Anita Drever's analysis of SOEP data provide further reasons for caution. She focused on whether a correlation could be proven between the residential environment, on the one hand, and attitudes toward German society and the culture of origin, on the other. She came to the conclusion that the fact of whether someone lives in an "ethnic neighbourhood"[13] is not relevant for whether he or she is more or less alienated from Germans and German culture (2004: 1432). Also, the desire to preserve cultural heritage was not more widespread among those who live in residential areas with high percentages of foreigners (2004: 1435). Drever concludes by saying that the thesis "that the ethnic make-up of where one lives plays a determining role in one's social interaction – does not necessarily hold true in all contexts" (2004: 1436).

Oberwittler's analyses (2007) provide evidence relevant to the hypothesis that a deterioration of norms, and correspondingly, higher rates of criminality occur in residential environments marked by high levels of poverty. He found a possible neighbourhood effect, i.e. slightly higher rates of delinquency, primarily among German boys, for those living in areas of concentrated poverty, especially when their friends also came from the same neighbourhood. This relationship was less strong for girls. Rates of delinquency among adolescents with immigrant background were similar in different neighbourhoods. In fact, girls living in better-off neighbourhoods had even higher rates of delinquency. There is not yet a convincing explanation for such differences. It seems that socio-spatial conditions affect different groups in different ways, if at all.

---

[12] Alba and Denton argue that "Space is less determinative of strong ties today." And further, that "Ethnic infrastructures are therefore less dependent on proximity and spatial concentration." (2005: 257-8).

[13] These are districts (as determined by postal codes) with a population of at least 25% foreigners.

Hypotheses regarding the effects of the residential environment on the **employment opportunities** of its residents are based largely on assumptions on the significance of social networks. Additional hypotheses focus on the influence that role models have on attitudes toward employment and on patterns of behaviour relevant for the workplace, such as punctuality or discipline. Andersson (in this volume) points out results from recent Swedish studies that show the important role that informal channels and social networks play in recruiting employees. Migrants could be at a disadvantage if they lack a connection to such "Swedish" structures. In Germany, Manuela Brandt (2005; 2006) researched the relevance of social relationships for the exit from unemployment among the low-income population in general. She emphasised the importance of such networks, with size and heterogeneity as crucial factors.

There are, however, apparently few empirical studies that focus specifically on migrants and members of ethnic minorities.[14] In the three country studies printed here, only Andersson cites findings for Sweden. It could not be proven that minorities derive economic benefits from living in areas with high ethnic concentrations. Rather, Andersson argues that under certain conditions, residents of such areas suffer income disadvantages. He hypothesises that this could be due to stigmatisation of certain areas and their residents as well as to the marginal functionality of such local social networks.

Preliminary findings for Germany, from Drever and Spiess' (2006) GSOEP-data analysis, do not unequivocally support the Swedish results. Drever and Spiess show that personal networks are important during the job search, especially for younger and less-educated migrants; this effect does not, however, vary according to residential environment.[15] Peach (above) also warns against oversimplified conclusions, pointing to the example of British with Indian heritage, for whom professional success is compatible with relatively tight social bonds within their own ethnic community. The conditions under which this is the case versus the precise configurations that hinder professional careers must be further researched.

In addition to labour market integration, the educational careers of migrants have become the subject of an increasing number of studies. Residential environments may influence **educational opportunities** in that they serve as general environments for academic learning and also influence the composition of the student body in a particular school or classroom. The effects of residential structures on the educational opportunities for children and adolescents, and more generally on the migrants' acquisition of the host society language are discussed in two research reviews conducted for AKI. Both Schofield (2006b) and Esser (2006b) came to the conclusion that such correlations in all likelihood exist and, moreover, that they could be significant. This is mainly due to the fact that high percentages of migrants and social disadvantage generally overlap and to the interaction of different factors of disadvantage. Even if a high percentage of students from migrant families had no independent influence, Schofield

[14] The IAB published studies on the employment searches of migrants, but focused the effect of German language competency (see also Nivorozhkin 2006). For Great Britain, Clark and Drinkwater see ethnic concentrations an impediment for self-employment (2002: 20).

[15] For this additional information, I thank Anita Drever.

argues that "high concentrations of students from immigrant backgrounds are bound to increase the achievement gap. This is so because immigrant/minority status, achievement, and SES are so strongly correlated in many countries, and high concentrations of low SES and low ability/achievement peers (especially in its institutionalized form of *Hauptschulen* in the German case) clearly undercut individual students' achievement" (Schofield 2006b: 86).

The country studies published here report no clearly-defined results concerning the effects of ethnic concentrations. Thus, Musterd and Ostendorf find no evidence that high ethnic segregation in schools has a negative effect on educational achievement in the Netherlands. Possibly, as suggested by the authors, state interventions, specifically the considerable financial benefits that the Dutch government gives to schools with high shares of students from specific migrant groups and socially disadvantaged families, work to balance out disadvantages which can result from a particular student body make-up or from a limited knowledge of the language of the host country and its schools (see also Schofield 2006b: 85-86). This would point to the possible high efficacy of political interventions.

No clear picture results from research in Sweden, although there are some indications that very high percentages of migrant children in a given student body have moderate negative effects on educational achievement. The authors assume that this is due to adjustment problems and also to an unfavourable learning environment caused, for instance, by language problems.[16]

In Great Britain, detailed empirical studies on the relationship between neighbourhood environment and educational success are still rare. Peach refers to research done by a team at the University of Bristol. Using the examples of Leicester and Bradford, as centres of Indian and Pakistani settlement, Johnston, Wilson and Burgess (2007) studied the correlation between the ethnic composition of the student body and achievement test results. Their results are not uniform; whereas no significant correlation could be found for ethnically Indian students, for students of Pakistani origin test scores increased with the share of White students at their school. This effect may be due to the fact that higher-achieving Pakistani students choose to attend predominantly "White" schools, pointing to a selection effect rather than an effect of the student body's ethnic make-up.

The presence of a high share of students from ethnic minorities or from immigrant families only seems to have a negative effect on educational achievements under certain conditions. Presumably, this is primarily the case for situations in which a high share of students in a particular class have limited knowledge of the host society language, and thus slow down the overall pace of learning (on language, see Esser 2006b; esp. 32ff., 66ff., cf. also Esser 2006c: esp. 337-371). Schofield points out an additional effect high shares of minority or immigrant

[16] See also Brännström 2007 who studies school and neighbourhood effects on students' higher secondary school degrees. His focus is not on the effect of ethnic concentrations, but rather on areas of concentrated social disadvantage. Results are not clear-cut; effects exist only for male adolescents with a migrant background. However, the residential environment accounts for only 3 percent of the variance.

students may have, as teachers sometimes respond to this situation with lower expectations and by applying a less demanding curriculum (2006b: 86-88). In districts with a high share of migrants, school equipment und the qualification of teachers may also be poorer.

Esser also assumes that specifically in residential areas with high ethnic concentrations and institutionally well developed ethnic communities conditions exist that may work against the linguistic assimilation of foreign-language speaking immigrants. Such conditions would reduce the motivation and the opportunities for acquiring the host society language (2006b: 30, 33). While he finds strong evidence to support these effects internationally, they have not been shown to occur in Germany (2006b: 43; Esser 2006c: 144, 148ff.).[17] It may be the case in Germany and in some of its neighbouring European countries that residential segregation of ethnic groups is very low and the institutionalisation of ethnic communities so underdeveloped, that the anticipated effects do not occur (cf. Esser 2006c: 152, 154).

If the residential environment has the assumed effects on individual opportunities and on individual and collective norms and patterns of behaviour at all, the presence and relevance of such effects depend on the degree of residential concentration, i.e., the levels of concentration of certain population groups in particular districts and the extent to which a group actually lives in such ethnically concentrated settlements.[18] The country studies in this volume, as well as the recently published study on Germany (Schönwälder/Söhn 2007), indicate that the forms and extent of residential concentration among migrants and minorities are much lower in the major European countries of immigration than what is usual in many US cities. This may be the reason why European social scientists are altogether more sceptical than their American colleagues as to the influence of residential environments on individual opportunities, attitudes und patterns of behaviour. In addition to the drastically lower extent of ethnic residential segregation, the following factors also differentiate the European from the American context and may decrease the impact of living in a certain residential environment: lower levels of inequality in the living conditions between various quarters, greater mobility within a city through public transportation, and the impact of welfare-state policies (see also Friedrichs/Galster/Musterd 2003). However, these are all still hypotheses.

Overall, European research offers indications rather than a body of sound and reliable evidence regarding the effects of migrant and minority socio-spatial concentration on individual opportunities and individual and collective orientations. These indications do not, altogether, support the wide-spread concerns about an alleged seclusion of migrants in segregated spaces. It is, however, too early and would also be irresponsible to give the all-clear and then not pay attention to the concentration of problems in certain districts of German cities. Particularly in

---

[17] See also the results of a study in primary schools in Berlin, cited by Schofield (2006b: 85). Merkens (2005) comes to the conclusion that the school performance is impaired if a large group of pupils belong to one country of origin, and thus to one language group. Students are then tempted to communicate in their native language, which impairs the optimal development of their German-language skills.

[18] Other conditions are relevant as well, primarily the existence and the quality of ethnic-community structures.

schools, spatial segregation between the poor and the better-off, between natives and immigrants, creates homogeneous learning environments of disadvantaged students. Such configurations are presumably due in large part to the retreat of ethnic Germans and the better-off, rather than migrants' pursuit of their own community. Further, there is clear empirical evidence to show that an ethnically mixed residential environment has positive effects on the extent of interethnic contact in the majority population.[19]

We know very little about the spatial basis and the general workings of ethnic communities in Germany. Additionally, for example, the role that social contacts and networks play for migrants' integration into the labour market requires further research. It seems plausible, though it has not yet been proven, that migrants' social networks provide less support during the job search and in careers than do the social networks of natives. Identifying the factors of such disadvantages would help to design interventions aimed at creating equal opportunities.[20] In sum, the existing evidence, however, does not support that major research efforts or political interventions should focus on socio-spatial structures.

[19] However, the quality of such contacts and mutual attitudes depend on a number of conditions, see for instance Hewstone 2004.

[20] One might not only think of interventions aiming to change residential structures. Similarly, one could aim at a reduction of the influence of informal social networks on the award of jobs.

Karen Schönwälder

Siedlungskonzentrationen und Integration: eine Zwischenbilanz

In drei Länderstudien wurden vorstehend Ausmaß und Grundmuster der Siedlungskonzentration eingewanderter Minderheitengruppen sowie mögliche Zusammenhänge dieser Siedlungsstrukturen mit den Arbeitsmarkt- und Bildungschancen, sozialen Netzwerken und Orientierungen von Einwanderern diskutiert. Welche Erkenntnisse und Schlussfolgerungen ergeben sich aus diesen Analysen der britischen, niederländischen und schwedischen Situation für die deutsche Debatte? Wie kann – bei aller angesichts des Forschungsstandes notwendigen Vorsicht – der Kenntnisstand eingeschätzt werden?

Zunächst kann konstatiert werden, dass eine neue empirische Annäherung an eine alte Kontroverse stattfindet. In den USA angestoßen durch W.J. Wilson's Thesen zur ‚Kultur der Armut', in Europa durch aktuelle Sorgen über den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt und einen stagnierenden Integrationsprozess großer Einwanderergruppen, wird erneut lebhaft darüber diskutiert, ob Einwandererkolonien bzw. „ethnische Enklaven" vor allem ein gängiges Merkmal ethnisch pluraler Gesellschaften, ein Schutzraum für neu zugewanderte MigrantInnen oder aber eine Mobilitätsfalle und ein Ausdruck gefährlicher Spaltungslinien innerhalb der Gesellschaft sind. Lange standen sich als Alternativen formulierte Positionen hier relativ unversöhnlich gegenüber. Es wäre wünschenswert, heute über eine Wiederholung bekannter Argumente und die Reaktivierung alter Konfliktlinien hinaus zu gelangen und auf Basis einer empirischen Überprüfung kontroverser Annahmen besser begründete Urteile zu erzielen. Inwieweit liegen hierfür bereits aufschlussreiche Erkenntnisse vor bzw. in welche Richtung weisen die in den vorstehenden Länderstudien berichteten Forschungen?

Sowohl in positiven Sichtweisen der Einwandererkolonie als auch negativen Bewertungen der Siedlungskonzentration spielen Annahmen über eine Wirkung sozialräumlicher Strukturen auf Individuen, Gruppen und soziale Beziehungen eine Rolle. Neben etlichen anderen Faktoren, die auf individuelle Lebenschancen und Orientierungen ebenso wie auf kollektive Strukturen und Orientierungen Einfluss nehmen, wird einer Wohnumgebung, die von der Anwesenheit einer großen Anzahl von MigrantInnen bzw. Angehörigen einer bestimmten ethnischen Gruppe geprägt ist, ein eigenständiger Einfluss zugeschrieben. Die diesbezüglichen Hypothesen überschneiden sich in vieler Hinsicht mit Argumentationen zu angenommenen Wirkungen einer Konzentration von Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit („soziale Brennpunkte"), und nicht immer wird trennscharf zu den sich häufig überlagernden, aber doch sehr unterschiedlichen Phänomenen von ethnischer und sozialer Segregation argumentiert.

Forschungsergebnisse liegen vor allem zu den Auswirkungen einer Konzentration von Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit – in den USA häufig auch dem Niveau der Kriminalität – in der Wohnumgebung auf die Individuen vor. In Europa gibt es zu dem Gesamtkomplex allerdings noch recht wenige empirische Studien. Noch geringer ist die Zahl der Studien, die speziell die

Bedeutung einer Siedlungskonzentration von Angehörigen ethnischer Minderheiten untersuchen. Selbst in Schweden, wo die Datenlage fast optimal ist, liegen noch kaum Studien vor, die versucht haben, Wohnumfeldeffekte und hier insbesondere die Wirkungen ethnischer Konzentration zu messen. Dennoch sollen hier die Anhaltspunkte und ersten Erkenntnisse, die in den für die AKI angefertigten Expertisen und einigen weiteren Veröffentlichungen aufgewiesen wurden, zusammenfassend dargestellt werden. Dabei wird neben den hier abgedruckten Länderstudien auf die parallel erscheinenden AKI-Veröffentlichungen von Dietrich Oberwittler zu Neighbourhood Effects und von Janina Söhn und Karen Schönwälder zu den Siedlungsstrukturen von MigrantInnen in Deutschland Bezug genommen.

Zu den prinzipiellen Zusammenhängen zwischen Wohnumfeld einerseits und Lebenschancen, Orientierungen und Gruppenbeziehungen andererseits liegen etliche Hypothesen, allerdings kein umfassendes und allgemein akzeptiertes Modell vor. Wie etwa Douglas Massey erläutert, gibt es zu den vermittelnden sozialen Mechanismen Spekulationen, die sich konzentrieren auf „peer influences, cultural diffusion, the imitation of role models, access to networks, and collective efficacy (2004: 2; vgl. auch Oberwittler 2007; Friedrichs/Galster/Musterd 2003; Durlauf 2004 zu methodischen Fragen und vor allem der US-amerikanischen Literatur). Die in der Literatur formulierten Annahmen[1] lassen sich grob sortieren in solche, die sich beziehen auf erstens das Wohnumfeld als Gelegenheitsstruktur, zweitens das Wohnumfeld als strukturierenden Kontext sozialer Prozesse und drittens auf Interaktionen zwischen Vierteln und ihrer Umwelt. Zum Teil überschneiden sich diese Ebenen, indem etwa das Wohnumfeld auch als Gelegenheitsstruktur für soziale Kontakte angesehen werden kann.

- Das Wohnumfeld als Gelegenheitsstruktur: In dem Maß, in dem zwischen Stadtvierteln Merkmale, wie die Anteile bestimmter Gruppen an der Bevölkerung, aber auch Infrastrukturmerkmale differieren, sind deren BewohnerInnen unterschiedlichen Opportunitätsstrukturen ausgesetzt. Angenommen wird zum Beispiel, dass die im Wohnumfeld vorhandenen Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten (auch positiv: eine ethnische Ökonomie) die individuellen Erwerbschancen mit beeinflussen. Die Bevölkerungszusammensetzung könnte im Sinne der Gelegenheiten zum interethnischen Kontakt und zur Kommunikation mit Muttersprachlern (Erwerb der Landessprache) relevant sein. „Ethnische Konzentrationen im Wohnumfeld bilden Bedingungen, bei denen die alltäglichen Zugänge zu akkulturativen Lernumwelten schon strukturell schwieriger werden“ und zwar gerade für Kinder, argumentiert etwa Hartmut Esser (2006c: 352). Die Anwesenheit einer großen Zahl von Angehörigen einer Herkunftsgruppe kann darüber hinaus als günstige Gelegenheitsstruktur für die Ausbildung von Community-Strukturen (auch für die Bewahrung von Identitäten, für eine soziale Kontrolle) und als Basis für ethnische Eliten aufgefasst werden.
- Das Wohnviertel wird in mehrerlei Hinsicht als strukturierend für soziale Prozesse gesehen. Angenommen wird, dass seine Bevölkerungszusammensetzung die sozialen Kontakte

[1] In der Regel beziehen sich diese Annahmen auf derartige Mechanismen allgemein, nicht speziell auf ethnische Konzentrationen. Hier werden aber für die Integration von MigrantInnen relevante Zusammenhänge hervorgehoben.

und Netzwerke beeinflusst. Daneben wird den gegenseitigen Einflüssen der Viertelbewohner eine prägende Wirkung auf individuelle Normen und Orientierungen unterstellt und zwar durch Peer Groups, gelebte Vorbilder/Rollenmodelle und im Wohnviertel vorherrschende Normen und Verhaltensweisen. Die allgemeinen Mechanismen, über die eine Wirkung des Wohnumfeldes vermittelt würde, wären hier soziales Lernen allgemein und insbesondere die Sozialisation von Kindern und Jugendlichen. „In einer Nachbarschaft, in der vor allem Modernisierungsverlierer, sozial Auffällige und sozial Diskriminierte konzentriert wohnen, sind vor allem bestimmte (abweichende) Normen und Verhaltensweisen repräsentiert, andere „mainstream" hingegen nicht oder immer weniger. Dies führt zu einer stärkeren Dominanz der abweichenden Verhaltensmuster, von denen nun ein Anpassungsdruck ausgeht" (ILS 2003: o.S.; ganz ähnlich Häußermann 2005: 44). Auf MigrantInnen bezogen könnte vermutet werden, dass in einem von einer starken Präsenz der eigenen Gruppe geprägten Umfeld besondere Normen der ethnischen Gruppe effektiver weitergegeben und erhalten werden. Die geringe Repräsentanz von Alteingesessenen als „Rollenmodellen" könnte das Erlernen von im Einwanderungsland üblichen Verhaltensweisen und Normen erschweren.[2]

Insbesondere in der US-amerikanischen Forschung und Arbeiten zur Kriminalität wird darüber hinaus dem Phänomen der „neighborhood 'collective efficacy'" relevante Bedeutung zugemessen (vgl. Morenoff/Sampson/Raudenbusch 2001: 7). Gemeint ist hiermit eine Kombination von Vertrauen, gemeinsamen Erwartungen und der Bereitschaft, sich für die Angelegenheit der Gemeinschaft – in diesem Falle des Wohnviertels – einzusetzen und etwa soziale Kontrolle auszuüben. Dies wiederum könnte – ebenso wie soziale Vernetzungen durch Vereine etc. – von der Präsenz integrierter sozialer Gruppen abhängen. Ethnische Gemeinschaften könnten intern eine derartige *collective efficacy* stärken. Andererseits könnten scharfe soziale Distanzen zwischen unterschiedlichen Bevölkerungsgruppen ihr entgegenstehen. Heitmeyer und Anhut nehmen darüber hinaus an, dass die räumliche Konzentration einer Reihe von Problemlagen die Fähigkeiten, „das für ein gedeihliches Zusammenleben mit anderen ethnischen Gruppen erforderliche Maß an Integrationsleistung und Konfliktbewältigung" zu erbringen, vermindert (Anhut/Heitmeyer 2000: 29). Das Zusammenfallen von Fremdheits- und Kontakterfahrungen mit besonderen sozialen Belastungen in einem sozialräumlichen Kontext sei ungünstig (ebd.: 35, 44).[3]

- Drittens schließlich werden Wohnumfeldeffekte durch Interaktionen mit der Außenwelt vermutet. Angenommen wird hier, dass eine Stigmatisierung bestimmter Wohnviertel und ihrer BewohnerInnen etwa deren Arbeitsmarktchancen mindert.[4] Außerdem wird vermu-

---

[2] Implizit ist hier wohl die Vorstellung, dass Mittelschicht-typische Normen und Verhaltensweisen angenommen werden

[3] Empirisch konnte ein derartiger Zusammenhang von Konfliktpotenzial und sozialräumlichem Kontext allerdings nicht eindeutig nachgewiesen werden, vgl. Anhut/Heitmeyer 2000: 556-561.

[4] Vgl. auch die Hypothesen von Richard Florida (2002), für den kreative Zentren auch Zentren der Toleranz und Vielfalt sind; u. a. ethnische Pluralität also unter bestimmten Bedingungen eine positive

tet, dass MigrantInnen und sozial schwächer Gestellte weniger in der Lage sind, ihre Interessen wirksam innerhalb der Stadt vorzubringen. Vorrangig von ihnen bewohnte Stadtviertel könnten politisch nur schlecht repräsentiert sein.[5]

Methodologisch ist es nicht einfach, zum Teil vielleicht unmöglich, die oben skizzierten vermuteten Wirkungszusammenhänge voneinander und von anderen, individuellen Faktoren zu trennen. So verweist Nick Buck darauf, „that individuals interact with their neighbourhoods in complex ways which may in the end make it difficult to disentangle the individual from the area either conceptually or in terms of data" (Buck 2001: 2258). Tatsächlich verweisen vorliegende Studien durchweg auf Unsicherheiten in der Interpretation zumeist lediglich beobachteter Korrelationen, deren Ursachen schwer eindeutig zu fixieren sind. Im Folgenden werden einige Forschungsergebnisse zu einzelnen Wirkungen des Wohnumfeldes auf Individuen zusammengestellt. Dabei ist zu konstatieren, dass bislang die unterschiedlichen Hypothesen nicht in vergleichbarem Maß empirischen Überprüfungen unterzogen worden sind, sondern vorliegende Arbeiten sich vor allem auf interethnische Kontakte und soziale Netzwerke beziehen.

Zu den unmittelbar plausibel erscheinenden Annahmen gehört die Vermutung, dass **Kontakte zwischen unterschiedlichen Bevölkerungsgruppen** durch die Begegnung im Wohngebiet gefördert bzw. durch ein getrenntes Wohnen vermindert werden. Tatsächlich weisen die Ergebnisse von zwei vorn von Musterd/Ostendorf angeführten Untersuchungen in den Niederlanden darauf hin, dass der Grad der Siedlungskonzentration das Ausmaß interethnischer Kontakte beeinflusst.[6] Dabei zeigt die hier angeführte Studie von Gijsberts/Dagevos auch, dass gerade alteingesessene Niederländer vor allem dann Kontakte zu Minderheitenangehörigen haben, wenn sie in einer gemischten Wohngegend leben. Für eine Reihe Minderheitengruppen werden Unterschiede im Ausmaß interethnischer Kontakte je nach Bevölkerungszusammensetzung im Wohngebiet gezeigt. Bemerkenswert ist allerdings auch, dass etwa unter der türkeistämmigen Bevölkerung selbst dann, wenn es kaum andere Türken im Wohngebiet gibt, noch über 50% Kontakte vor allem in der eigenen ethnischen Gruppe haben (vgl. vorn S. 56).

Auch die von Oberwittler in seiner Studie für die AKI präsentierten Ergebnissen zeigen, dass in Deutschland interethnische Freundschaften unter Jugendlichen (13-16-Jährige) mit der Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung in deren unmittelbarer Umwelt zusammenhängen. Gene-

---

Ausstrahlungskraft entwickelt und mitentscheidend für die Anziehungskraft und Leistungsfähigkeit einer Stadt ist.

5 Die Ergebnisse eines an der Humboldt-Universität durchgeführten Projekts allerdings relativieren diese These; die marginalisierten Quartiere würden in der Stadtpolitik nicht systematisch benachteiligt, vgl. Häussermann 2006.

6 Vgl. auch die englischsprachige Zusammenfassung der Studie, in der konstatiert wird: "high concentrations of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood have consequences mainly for the degree of contact between the indigenous and ethnic populations" (Gijsberts/Dagevos 2005, English summary). "The same applies for the native population. Indigenous Dutch people come into contact with members of minorities more often if they live in a mixed neighbourhood. Where there is the opportunity for contact, as in mixed neighbourhoods, this is also more likely to take place."

rell haben 50 bis 60% aller Jugendlichen überwiegend lokale Freundschaftskreise innerhalb ihres Wohngebiets. Nur Migrantenjugendliche, die in Gegenden leben, wo es wenige andere Migrantenjugendliche gibt, suchen demnach häufig außerhalb des Wohngebiets ihre Freunde – offenbar spielen hier ethnische Präferenzen (und eben nicht nur die durch das Wohngebiet gegebenen Gelegenheiten) eine Rolle.[7] Dennoch hat die große Mehrheit unter den Jugendlichen mit Migrationshintergrund mindestens einen engen deutschen Freund/Freundin, und zwar auch in den segregierten Gebieten. Hierfür dürfte auch die Tatsache verantwortlich sein, dass in Deutschland selbst „segregierte Gebiete" noch Gebiete mit hohen Bevölkerungsanteilen alteingesessener Deutscher sind. Deutsche aber, die in Gebieten mit geringer MigrantInnenzahl leben, haben am seltensten nicht-deutsche Freunde. Bei Migrantenjugendlichen sind die Unterschiede nach Wohngebiet weniger deutlich. Während in Gebieten mit geringer Segregation 23% nur Freunde eigener Ethnizität haben, sind dies auch in als hoch segregiert eingeordneten Gebieten nicht mehr als 31%.

In der insgesamt in Deutschland nicht sehr umfangreichen Forschung über die sozialen Netzwerke von MigrantInnen werden nur selten deren Zusammenhänge mit Charakteristika des Wohngebiets thematisiert. So untersuchten Boos-Nünning und Karakaşoğlu (2005) in ihrer Studie über junge Frauen mit Migrationshintergrund Zusammenhänge zwischen der Wahl der drei engsten Freunde und Freundinnen und dem „Wohnmilieu".[8] Dabei wurden gewisse Unterschiede festgestellt, die Autorinnen heben aber hervor, dass „auch von denjenigen, die in einem deutschen oder in einem gemischten Wohnumfeld leben, [hat] ein erheblicher Teil Freundinnen und Freunde ausschließlich oder überwiegend mit eigenem ethnischen Hintergrund" hat (Boos-Nünning/Karakaşoğlu 2005: 158).[9] Andere Studien betonen allerdings, wie ja auch Oberwittlers oben zitierte Arbeit, die Häufigkeit *inter*ethnischer Beziehungen bei MigrantInnen.[10] Ob derartige Unterschiede auf Geschlechterdifferenzen, Unterschiede zwischen Herkunftsgruppen oder zwischen dem engeren und weiteren Netzwerk (gefragt wird mal nach den drei engsten Bezugspersonen, mal nach Freunden generell) oder andere Faktoren zurückgeführt werden müssen, ist noch ungeklärt.

Insgesamt gibt es keine deutlichen Hinweise darauf, dass das Wohnumfeld für die sozialen Beziehungen von MigrantInnen bzw. Angehörigen ethnischer Minderheiten eine determinie-

---

[7] Denkbar ist darüber hinaus, dass eine distanzierte Haltung der deutschen Jugendlichen die jungen MigrantInnen dazu zwingt, Freunde der eigenen Herkunftsgruppe zu suchen.

[8] Das Wohnmilieu wurde hier über die subjektive Einschätzung der eigenen Wohngegend und des eigenen Mehrfamilienhauses erfasst (527); es wird nicht erläutert, wie genau hieraus z. B. die Kategorie „ethnisches Umfeld" gebildet wird.

[9] In einem noch unveröffentlichten Paper untersuchen Anita Drever und William Clark (2006) anhand von Daten des SOEP Zusammenhänge zwischen Wohnumfeld und der Zusammensetzung des engsten Freundeskreises (im Rahmen des SOEP wird nach den drei engsten Bezugspersonen außerhalb des eigenen Haushalts gefragt). Sie stellt weder bei Deutschen noch bei Türken derartige Zusammenhänge fest.

[10] Vgl. Haug (2003), die basierend auf Daten des 2000 durchgeführten Integrationssurveys des BiB mit 3685 Befragten zu dem Ergebnis kommt, interethnische Kontakte seien bei Migranten „recht häufig". Gefragt nach der Staatsangehörigkeit der Freunde, nannten 55 bis 80% deutsche Freunde, während derartige Kontakte bei Deutschen viel seltener waren (722-23). Vgl. dort auch Hinweise auf Daten des Sozioökonomischen Panels (SOEP), wo allerdings nur nach den drei engsten Kontakten außerhalb des eigenen Haushalts gefragt wird.

rende Rolle spielt.[11] Eher noch scheint dies einen Einfluss darauf zu haben, ob Angehörige der Bevölkerungsmehrheit Freundschaften mit Minderheitenangehörigen schließen. Für Kinder und Jugendliche könnte eher die Schule als das Wohngebiet wichtig sein. Die Zusammensetzung der Schülerschaft der besuchten Schule spiegelt dabei nicht immer die Bevölkerungsstruktur im Wohngebiet wider. Vermutlich gibt es Unterschiede zwischen einzelnen Gruppen. Bezogen auf vor allem Türkeistämmige vermuten etliche WissenschaftlerInnen, dass für deren soziale Netzwerke vor allem familiäre Beziehungen, aber auch die gemeinsame Herkunft eine wichtige Rolle spielen, dies aber nicht Ergebnis einer ethnischen Siedlungskonzentration, sondern Ausdruck von Präferenzen ist (vgl. zu türkeistämmigen MigrantInnen in Deutschland Nauck/Kohlmann 1998; Gestring/Janssen/Polat 2006; Blasius/Friedrichs 2004). Die Bedeutung des Wohngebiets als Grundlage sozialer Beziehungen wird auch in der internationalen Forschung zu ethnischen Gemeinschaften infrage gestellt, wo häufig argumentiert wird, dass diese immer weniger auf räumlicher Nähe basierten. Andreas Wimmer etwa warnt vor einer Tendenz in der Migrationsforschung, „soziale Interaktionsfelder räumlich zu definieren und damit die Raumdimension sozialer Strukturbildung zu verabsolutieren" (2002: 6).[12]

Auch bezüglich der Prägung von **Normen, Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen** durch sozialräumliche Kontexte konnten die für die AKI angefertigten Expertisen nur vereinzelte Hinweise ausmachen. So zeigt Oberwittler (2007), dass bei Mädchen mit Migrationshintergrund die Einstellungen zu Geschlechterrollen deutlich je nach Wohnumfeld variieren. Sie sind „moderner" bei Mädchen, die in Wohngebieten mit einem geringen Migrantenanteil leben und „konservativer", wo die Migrantenanteile hoch sind. Dies spricht dafür, dass die Vermittlung sozialer Normen und die soziale Kontrolle über deren Einhaltung durch das Zusammenleben der Gruppe im Wohngebiet erleichtert wird (vgl. entsprechend vorn auch Peach). Allerdings kann ein solches Einzelergebnis allenfalls als Indiz für die Existenz derartiger Zusammenhänge gewertet werden.

Zur Vorsicht geben auch Ergebnisse einer Auswertung von SOEP-Daten durch Anita Drever Anlass. Hier ging es darum, ob Zusammenhänge zwischen dem Wohnumfeld und der Einstellung zur deutschen Gesellschaft bzw. der Herkunftskultur nachgewiesen werden könnten. Dabei kam Drever zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Tatbestand, ob jemand in einer „ethnic neigh-

---

[11] Bernhard Nauck warnte 1988, „dass es sich um ein ethnozentristisches Mißverständnis handelt, wenn von der Häufigkeit des Auftretens von ‚sichtbaren' Ausländern in bestimmten Wohnquartieren darauf geschlossen wird, dass diese dann auch untereinander intensive Beziehungen hätten" (Nauck 1988: 326). Er selbst untersuchte bei türkischen Familien den Einfluss des Wohnquartiers auf Häufigkeit und Art der Kontakte mit der Verwandtschaft und Freunden.
In der Schweiz kam eine Studie in drei Städten zu dem Ergebnis: „Die sozialräumlichen und –demographischen Strukturen der Städte und Quartiere üben also keinen determinierenden Einfluss auf die Dynamik transethnischer Beziehungen aus." Die Wahrscheinlichkeit solcher Beziehungen hänge nicht davon ab, ob jemand in einem segregierten oder weniger segregierten Stadtteil wohne (Wimmer 2002: 22).

[12] Alba und Denton argumentieren: „Space is less determinative of strong ties today." Und weiter: "Ethnic infrastructures are therefore less dependent on proximity and spatial concentration." (2004: 257-8).

bourhood“[13] lebt, nicht relevant dafür sei, ob er oder sie den Deutschen und der deutschen Kultur distanziert gegenüberstehe (2004: 1432). Auch das Streben danach, die Herkunftskultur zu erhalten, sei bei denjenigen, die in Wohngebieten mit hohen Ausländeranteilen lebten, nicht weiter verbreitet als anderswo (2004: 1435). Drever schlussfolgert, dass die These, “that the ethnic make-up of where one lives plays a determining role in one’s social interactions – does not necessarily hold true in all contexts” (2004: 1436).

Oberwittlers Analysen (2007) bieten auch Material zu der Hypothese, dass es in von Armut geprägten Wohngebieten zu einem Normenverfall und in diesem Zusammenhang auch zu höheren Kriminalitätsraten kommt. Einen möglichen Wohnumfeldeffekt, also eine leicht höhere Jugendkriminalität, wenn die Jugendlichen in Gebieten konzentrierter Armut wohnten und vor allem dann, wenn auch ihre Freunde aus dem Wohngebiet kamen, fand er vor allem für deutsche Jungen. Bei Mädchen war der Zusammenhang weniger stark. Jugendliche mit Migrationshintergrund neigten in unterschiedlichen Wohngebieten in ähnlichem Maß zur Delinquenz. Unter Mädchen waren sogar diejenigen aus besseren Wohngegenden häufiger delinquent. Eine schlüssige Erklärung für solche Unterschiede gibt es bislang nicht. Offenbar wirken sich sozialräumliche Bedingungen, wenn überhaupt, unterschiedlich auf unterschiedliche Bevölkerungsgruppen aus.

Hypothesen zu den Auswirkungen des Wohngebiets auf die **Erwerbschancen** seiner BewohnerInnen basieren – neben einem angenommenen Einfluss von Rollenmodellen auf Einstellungen zur Erwerbstätigkeit und zu mit Erwerbsarbeit verknüpften Verhaltensweisen wie Pünktlichkeit, Disziplin etc. – wesentlich auf Annahmen über die Bedeutung sozialer Netzwerke. So betont vorstehend Andersson, dass nach jüngeren schwedischen Forschungsergebnissen bei der Rekrutierung von Beschäftigten informelle Kanäle und soziale Netzwerke eine große Rolle spielten. Eine fehlende Anbindung an solche „schwedischen“ Strukturen könne eine Benachteiligung von Einwanderern bedeuten. In Deutschland hat Manuela Brandt (2005; 2006) für Niedrigeinkommensbezieher allgemein, also nicht speziell für MigrantInnen, die Relevanz sozialer Beziehungen für den Ausstieg aus der Erwerbslosigkeit untersucht und deren große Bedeutung hervorgehoben. Entscheidend seien Größe und Heterogenität der Netzwerke.

Allerdings gibt es offenbar kaum empirische Ergebnisse, die sich speziell auf MigrantInnen bzw. Angehörige ethnischer Minderheiten beziehen.[14] In unseren drei Länderstudien führt allein Andersson auf Schweden bezogene Ergebnisse an. Demnach konnte nicht nachgewiesen werden, dass Minderheitenangehörige aus dem Leben in ethnischen Konzentrationsgebieten ökonomische Vorteile ableiten können. Vielmehr argumentiert Andersson, dass unter bestimmten Bedingungen die Bewohner derartiger Gebiete Einkommensnachteile erlitten. Die Ursachen hierfür – so seine Hypothese – könnten einmal eine Stigmatisierung bestimmter

[13] Dies sind hier Gebiete (Postleitzahlbezirke) mit mindestens 25% AusländerInnen.

[14] Das IAB hat Erkenntnisse zur Arbeitssuche von MigrantInnen veröffentlicht, konzentriert sich aber hier auf den Einfluß der Deutschkenntnisse, vgl. Nivorozhkin u.a. 2006. Zu Großbritannien vgl. Clark/Drinkwater, die ethnische Konzentrationen als eher hinderlich für eine selbständige Erwerbstätigkeit sehen (2002: 20f.).

Wohngebiete und ihrer Bewohner sowie zweitens die geringere Funktionalität solcher lokal verorteter sozialer Netzwerke sein.

Erste Befunde, die Drever und Spieß (2006) für Deutschland auf Basis von Daten des SOEP vorlegten, bestätigen dies nicht eindeutig. Sie zeigen vor allem, dass persönliche Netzwerke wichtig sind für die Jobsuche, insbesondere bei jungen und weniger gebildeten MigrantInnen. Deren Bedeutung variiere aber nicht mit dem Wohnumfeld.[15] Vor zu einfachen Schlussfolgerungen warnt auch Peach in seiner vorstehenden Analyse, der unter Verweis auf das Beispiel der Briten indischer Herkunft argumentiert, dass beruflicher Erfolg und eine relativ enge soziale Einbindung innerhalb der eigenen ethnischen Gemeinschaft durchaus vereinbar sein könnten. Unter welchen Bedingungen dies der Fall ist und welche konkreten Konstellationen beruflichen Karrieren eher entgegenstehen, muss noch weiter erforscht werden.

Neben ihrer Arbeitsmarktintegration werden in den letzten Jahren auch die schulischen Bildungswege von MigrantInnen verstärkt untersucht. Das Wohnumfeld könnte deren **Bildungschancen** insofern beeinflussen, als es allgemeiner Kontext des schulischen Lernens ist und die Zusammensetzung der Schülerschaft einer Schule bzw. Schulklasse beeinflusst. In zwei AKI-Forschungsbilanzen wurden bereits Effekte der Wohngebietsstruktur auf Bildungschancen von Kindern und Jugendlichen sowie allgemeiner den Erwerb der Landessprache durch MigrantInnen erörtert. Sowohl Schofield (2006) als auch Esser (2006a) kamen dabei zu dem Ergebnis, dass wahrscheinlich derartige Zusammenhänge existieren und durchaus relevant sein könnten. Dies gilt vor allem, weil in der Regel hohe MigrantInnenanteile und soziale Benachteiligung zusammenfallen und unterschiedliche Benachteiligungen zusammenwirken. Selbst wenn es keinen eigenständigen Einfluss eines hohen Anteils von SchülerInnen aus Migrantenfamilien gäbe, argumentiert Schofield, „ist davon auszugehen, dass die Konzentration von SchülerInnen mit Migrationshintergrund aufgrund der engen empirischen Verflechtung mit dem niedrigen sozioökonomischem Status und schwächeren schulischen Leistungen mit größeren Leistungsdifferenzen einhergeht. Der negative Einfluss eines hohen Anteils von SchülerInnen aus einkommensschwachen Familien und von SchülerInnen mit geringeren Eingangsfähigkeiten (eine Zusammensetzung von Schulklassen, wie sie sich in Deutschland überwiegend in den Hauptschulen findet) ist [...] sehr gut belegt.“ (Schofield 2006: 100)

In den hier publizierten Länderstudien wurden über die Auswirkungen ethnischer Konzentrationen keine eindeutigen Ergebnisse berichtet. So finden Musterd und Ostendorf in den Niederlanden keine Evidenz für einen negativen Einfluss hoher schulischer (ethnischer) Segregation auf die Schulleistungen. Denkbar ist, wie von ihnen vermutet, dass staatliche Interventionen, vor allem die in den Niederlanden deutlich höheren finanziellen Zuwendungen an Schulen mit hohen Anteilen von SchülerInnen aus bestimmten Migrantengruppen und sozial benachteiligten Familien, Nachteile, die sich aus eingeschränkten Kenntnissen der Landes- und Unterrichtssprache, der sozialen Zusammensetzung der Schülerschaft u. a. ergeben können,

[15] Diese zusätzliche Information verdanke ich Anita Drever.

ausgleichen (vgl. auch Schofield 2006: 98-99). Dies würde eine große Wirkungsmöglichkeit politischer Interventionen zeigen.

Auch Forschungen in Schweden ergeben kein eindeutiges Bild, allerdings gibt es dort Hinweise auf moderate negative Effekte sehr hoher Anteile von Migrantenkindern in der Schülerschaft. Vermutet wird in den schwedischen Studien, dass dies auf Eingewöhnungsprobleme und eine u. a. durch Sprachprobleme ungünstigere Lernumgebung zurückgeführt werden kann.[16]

In Großbritannien sind detaillierte empirische Untersuchungen von Zusammenhängen zwischen Wohnumfeld und Bildungserfolg noch selten. Peach verweist vorstehend auf Arbeiten eines Teams an der Universität Bristol. Am Beispiel der indischen bzw. pakistanischen Siedlungsschwerpunkte Leicester und Bradford untersuchten Johnston, Wilson und Burgess (2007) Korrelationen zwischen der ethnischen Zusammensetzung der Schülerschaft von Schulen und den Ergebnissen in Leistungstests. Die Ergebnisse sind widersprüchlich: Während für indischstämmige SchülerInnen keine signifikanten Korrelationen gezeigt werden können, gilt für die SchülerInnen pakistanischer Ethnizität, dass deren Schulleistungen umso besser sind, je höher der Anteil „weißer" SchülerInnen an ihrer Schule ist. Nicht geklärt werden konnte, ob dies darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass leistungsstärkere SchülerInnen pakistanischer Ethnizität häufiger ‚weiße' Schulen besuchen, also eher ein Selektionseffekt als ein Effekt der ethnischen Zusammensetzung der Schülerschaft vorliegt.

Hohe Anteile von SchülerInnen aus ethnischen Minderheiten bzw. Migrantenfamilien beeinflussen offenbar nur unter bestimmten Umständen die Schulleistungen. Dies dürfte an erster Stelle der Fall sein, wenn hohe Anteile der SchülerInnen einzelner Klassen die Landessprache nicht gut beherrschen und sich dadurch etwa das Lerntempo insgesamt verringert (vgl. zur Sprache Esser 2006a: bes. 32ff., 68ff.; vgl. auch Esser 2006c: insbes. 337-371).[17] Daneben könnten sich, wie Schofield bemerkt, hohe Anteile von SchülerInnen aus Migrantenfamilien bzw. ethnischen Minderheiten insofern beeinträchtigend auswirken, als LehrerInnen unter Umständen mit niedrigeren Erwartungen und einem weniger anspruchsvollen Lehrprogramm reagieren (2006: 100-103). Unter Umständen sind in Wohnvierteln mit hohen Migrantenanteilen Schulausstattung und Qualifikation der LehrerInnen schlechter.

Darüber hinaus vermutet Esser, dass insbesondere bei hohen ethnischen Konzentrationen im Wohngebiet und dabei institutionell gut ausgebauten ethnischen Gemeinden auch außerhalb

---

[16] Vgl. auch Brännström 2007, der Schul- und Wohngebietseffekte auf die Abschlüsse von SchülerInnen in höheren Sekundarschulen untersucht, wobei er allerdings nicht den Effekt ethnischer Konzentrationen, sondern den konzentrierter sozialer Benachteiligung betrachtet. Die Resultate sind nicht eindeutig, Effekte werden allenfalls für männliche Jugendliche mit Migrationshintergrund festgestellt, wobei die Wohnumgebung für allenfalls ca. 3% der Varianz verantwortlich sei.

[17] Vgl. auch die bereits von Schofield (2006: 98) referierten Ergebnisse einer Studie in Berliner Grundschulen. Merkens (2005) kam hier zu dem Schluß, dass Schulleistungen dann beeinträchtigt würden, wenn innerhalb einer Klasse eine große Gruppe von SchülerInnen einer bestimmten Herkunfts- und damit Sprachgruppe angehöre. Dies verleite dazu, in der Herkunftssprache zu kommunizieren, wodurch die Deutschkenntnisse nicht optimal entwickelt würden.

der Schulen Bedingungen existieren, die einer sprachlichen Assimilation von fremdsprachigen Einwanderern entgegenwirken. Insbesondere würden die Motivation zum Erwerb der Landessprache und die Gelegenheiten hierzu vermindert (2006a: 31, 33). International seien derartige Effekte gut belegt; für Deutschland allerdings nicht nachgewiesen (2006a: 44; Esser 2006c: 144, 148ff.). Tatsächlich könnten in Deutschland – und einigen europäischen Nachbarländern – die Siedlungskonzentrationen einzelner ethnischer Gruppen so gering und die Institutionalisierung ethnischer Gemeinschaften so wenig entwickelt sein, dass die befürchteten Effekte nicht eintreten (vgl. ähnlich Esser 2006c: 152, 154).

Prinzipiell ist davon auszugehen, dass – sofern die angenommenen Wohnumfeldeffekte auf individuelle Lebenschancen sowie individuelle und kollektive Normen und Verhaltensweisen überhaupt existieren – ihre Existenz und Relevanz (unter anderem[18]) von dem Ausmaß der Siedlungskonzentration abhängen, also sowohl dem Grad der Konzentration bestimmter Bevölkerungsgruppen in einzelnen Stadtvierteln als auch dem Maß, in dem eine Gruppe in solchen Siedlungskonzentrationen lebt. Generell zeigen die hier vorgelegten Länderstudien und die parallel veröffentliche Untersuchung zu Deutschland (Schönwälder/Söhn 2007), dass in wichtigen europäischen Einwanderungsländern Formen und Ausmaße der Siedlungskonzentration von Einwanderern bzw. ethnischen Minderheiten vorliegen, die weit unterhalb des in vielen US-amerikanischen Städten Üblichen liegen. Dies könnte ein Grund dafür sein, dass europäische WissenschaftlerInnen insgesamt skeptischer als amerikanische Kollegen sind, ob das Wohnumfeld wesentlichen Einfluss auf individuelle Lebenschancen, Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen nimmt. Neben dem drastisch geringeren Ausmaß der residentiellen Segregation könnten auch die in europäischen Städten geringeren Unterschiede zwischen den Lebensbedingungen in unterschiedlichen Stadtvierteln, die größere Mobilität innerhalb einer Stadt (öffentlicher Nahverkehr) und der Einfluss wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Interventionen dafür verantwortlich sein, dass dem Wohnumfeld weniger Bedeutung zukommt (vgl. etwa Friedrichs/Galster/Musterd 2003). Dies sind bislang allerdings Hypothesen.

Insgesamt liegen in der europäischen Forschung eher Indizien als solide belegte und daher belastbare Erkenntnisse über die Auswirkungen einer sozialräumlichen Konzentration von Migranten- bzw. Minderheitengruppen auf individuelle Lebenschancen und individuelle wie kollektive Orientierungen vor. Diese Hinweise summieren sich nicht zu einer Bestätigung für verbreitete Sorgen über eine vermeintliche Abschottung von Migrantengruppen in segregierten Räumen. Es wäre aber auch voreilig und unverantwortlich, pauschal Entwarnung zu melden und Problemballungen in einzelnen Quartieren deutscher Städte keine Beachtung zu schenken. Vor allem in den Schulen wirkt sich eine räumliche Trennung von armen und besser gestellten bzw. alteingesessenen und zugewanderten Menschen negativ im Sinne eines zu homogenen Lernumfeldes bestehend aus auf unterschiedliche Weise benachteiligten Schülerinnen und Schüler aus. Dabei bringt diese Konstellationen zumindest auch – vermutlich vor allem – der Rückzug der ethnisch Deutschen und der sozial besser Gestellten, hervor – und

[18] Hinzu kommen andere Bedingungen, vor allem Existenz und Qualität ethnischer Gemeinschaftsstrukturen.

nicht das Streben der MigrantInnen nach Gemeinschaft. Deutliche Hinweise gibt es auch, dass für das Ausmaß der interethnischen Kontakte der Mehrheitsbevölkerung ein gemischtes Wohnumfeld positive Auswirkungen hat.[19]

Über die räumliche Grundlage ethnischer Gemeinschaften in Deutschland, wie ihre Funktionsweise insgesamt, wissen wir kaum etwas. Auch z. B. die Rolle sozialer Kontakte und engerer Netzwerke für die Arbeitsmarktintegration von Personen mit Migrationshintergrund sollte weiter erforscht werden. Denn es ist plausibel, wenn auch bislang nicht erwiesen, dass deren soziale Netzwerke weniger Unterstützung bei Arbeitsplatzsuche und Karrieren bieten als die alteingesessener Deutscher. Es ginge hier also um die Identifikation eines Faktors für Benachteiligungen, der Konsequenzen für Gleichberechtigung anstrebende Interventionen haben könnte.[20] Im Gesamtbild aber sprechen die bislang vorliegenden Indizien nicht dafür, Forschungsanstrengungen – ebenso wie politische Interventionen – auf die sozialräumlichen Strukturen zu konzentrieren.

[19] Allerdings hängen die Qualität der Kontakte und gegenseitige Einstellungen von einer Reihe von Bedingungen ab, vgl. dazu etwa Hewstone 2004.

[20] Dabei ist nicht nur an Interventionen zu denken, die es anstreben Siedlungsstrukturen zu verändern. Denkbar wäre es auch, den Einfluss informeller sozialer Netzwerke auf die Vergabe von Arbeitsplätzen zu reduzieren.

Literatur

Alba, Richard und Nancy Denton (2004): Landscapes of diversity: Residential patterns of immigrant minorities, in: Nancy Foner and George Frederickson (Hg.), Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States. New York: 237-261.

Alpheis, Hannes (1988): Das Wohnquartier und die Zufriedenheit seiner Bewohner. Kontextanalysen – Anwendung und Kritik, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 29: 328-356.

Anhut, Reimund und Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2000): Desintegration, Konflikt und Ethnisierung. Eine Problemanalyse und theoretische Rahmenkonzeption, in: Heitmeyer/Anhut (2000), 17-75.

Anhut, Reimund und Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2000): Bedrohte Stadtgesellschaft. Diskussion von Forschungsergebnissen, in: Heitmeyer/Anhut (2000), 551-569.

Blasius, Jörg und Jürgen Friedrichs (2004): Einstellungen zu devianten Verhaltensweisen von Deutschen und Türken in zwei benachteiligten Wohngebieten von Köln. Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung, in: Uwe-Jens Walther und Kirsten Mensch (Hg.), Armut und Ausgrenzung in der „Sozialen Stadt“. Konzepte und Rezepte auf dem Prüfstand, Darmstadt: 43-65.

Boos-Nünning, Ursula und Yasemin Karakaşoğlu (2005): Viele Welten leben. Zur Lebenssituation von Mädchen und jungen Frauen mit Migrationshintergrund. Münster.

Brännström, Lars (2007): Making their mark. Disentangling the effects of neighbourhood and school environment on educational achievement, working paper, Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm.

Brandt, Martina (2005): Soziale Kontakte als Weg aus der Erwerbslosigkeit. P.AGES 2 – Diskussions-Papier der Forschungsgruppe Arbeit, Generation, Sozialstruktur (AGES), Universität Zürich.

Brandt, Martina (2006): Soziale Kontakte als Weg aus der Erwerbslosigkeit, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 58(3), 468-488.

Buck, Nick (2001): Identifying Neighbourhood Effects on Social Exclusion, in: Urban Studies, 38(12): 2251-2275.

Clark, Kenneth und Stephen Drinkwater (2002): Enclaves, neighbourhood effects and employment outcomes: Ethnic minorities in England and Wales, in: Journal of Population Economics, 15(1), 5-29.

Drever, Anita I. (2004): Separate Spaces, Separate Outcomes? Neighbourhood Impacts on Minorities in Germany, in: Urban Studies, 41 (8): 1423-1439.

Drever, Anita I. und C. Katharina Spieß (2006): Netzwerke sind bei der Stellenfindung von Migranten bedeutend. In: DIW Wochenbericht 73 (21): 327-331.

Drever, Anita I. und William A.V. Clark (2006): Mixed neighbourhoods, parallel lives? Residential proximity and inter-ethnic group contact in German neighbourhoods, unveröff. Manuskript (www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/events/workshops/effects/main.htm).

Durlauf, Steven N. (2004): Neighbourhood Effects, in: Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Bd. 4: Cities and Geography, hg. von J. Vernon Henderson und Jacques-Francois Thisse, Elsevier: 2174-2242.

Esser, Hartmut (2006a): Migration, Sprache und Integration, AKI-Forschungsbilanz 4, Berlin.

Esser, Hartmut (2006b): Migration, Language and Integration. AKI Research Review 4, Berlin.

Esser, Hartmut (2006c): Sprache und Integration. Die sozialen Bedingungen und Folgen des Sprach-erwerbs von Migranten, Frankfurt/New York.

Florida, Richard (2002): The Rise of the Creative Class. Why cities without gays and rock bands are losing the economic development race, in: Washington Monthly, May.

Friedrichs, Jürgen, George Galster und Sako Musterd (2003): Editorial. Neighbourhood Effects on Social Opportunities. The European and American Research and Policy Context, in: Housing Studies, 18(6): 797-806.

Gestring, Norbert/Andrea Janßen/Ayca Polat (2006): Prozesse der Integration und Ausgrenzung. Türkische Migranten der zweiten Generation, Wiesbaden.

Gijsberts, Merove und Jaco Dagevos (2005): Uit Elkaars Buurt: de invloed van etnische concentratie op integratie en beeldvorming. Den Haag: SCP. [English summary auf www.scp.nl].

Haug, Sonja (2003): Interethnische Freundschaftsbeziehungen und soziale Integration. Unterschiede in der Ausstattung mit sozialem Kapital bei jungen Deutschen und Immigranten, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 55(4): 716-736.

Häußermann, Hartmut (2006): Desintegration durch Stadtpolitik? in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 56(40-41): 14-22.

Häußermann, Hartmut (2005): Integration und Urbanität – eine problematisch gewordene Beziehung, in: Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik (Hg.), Zukunft von Stadt und Region, Bd. 1, Wiesbaden: 19-51.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm und Reimund Anhut (Hg.) (2000): Bedrohte Stadtgesellschaft. Soziale Desintegrationsprozesse und ethnisch-kulturelle Konfliktkonstellationen. Weinheim & München.

Hewstone, Miles (2004): Neuere Forschungen über Intergruppenkonflikte: Konsequenzen für den Umgang mit Migration und Integration, WZB-discussion paper Nr. SP IV 2004-601, Berlin.

ILS [Institut für Landes- und Stadtentwicklungsforschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen] (2003): Sozialraumanalyse – Soziale, ethnische und demographische Segregation in den nordrhein-westfälischen Städten. Gutachten für die Enquetekommission „Zukunft der Städte in NRW“ des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen, Dortmund/Bochum.

Johnston, Ron, Deborah Wilson und Simon Burgess (2007): Ethnic segregation and educational performance at secondary school in Bradford and Leicester, Environment and Planning 39: 609-629.

Massey, Douglas S. (2004): Segregation and Stratification: a biosocial perspective, in: DuBois Review 1(1): 1-19.

Merkens, Hans (2005): Schulkarrieren von Kindern mit Migrationshintergrund in den ersten drei Jahren der Grundschule. Ergebnisse aus dem Projekt BeLesen: Berliner Längsschnittstudie zur Lesekompetenzentwicklung von Grundschulkindern. (Bericht aus der Arbeit des Arbeitsbereichs Empirische Erziehungswissenschaft Nr. 43). Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.

Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson und Stephen W. Raudenbush (2001): Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence. Population Studies Center at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Report No. 00-451 (revised).

Nauck, Bernhard (1988): Sozial-ökologischer Kontext und außerfamiliäre Beziehungen. Ein interkultureller und interkontextueller Vergleich am Beispiel von deutschen und türkischen Familien, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 29: 310-327.

Nauck, Bernhard/Kohlmann, Annette (1998): Verwandtschaft als soziales Kapital – Netzwerkbeziehungen in türkischen Migrantenfamilien, in: Michael Wagner/Yvonne Schütze (Hg.), Verwandtschaft. Sozialwissenschaftliche Beiträge zu einem vernachlässigten Thema. Stuttgart: 203-235.

Nivoroshkin, Anton, Laura Romeu Gordo, Christoph Schöll, Joachim Wolff (2006): Arbeitsuche von Migranten. Deutschkenntnisse beeinflussen Suchintensität und Suchwege, IAB Kurzbericht Nr. 25.

Oberwittler, Dietrich (2007): The Effects of Ethnic and Social Segregation on Children and Adolescents: recent research and results from a German multilevel study, WZB Discussion Paper SP IV 2007-603, Berlin.

Pott, Andreas (2004): Ethnizität und Lokalität als Aufstiegsressourcen. Theoretische Überlegungen und das Beispiel des Bildungsaufstiegs in der zweiten türkischen Migrantengeneration in Deutschland, in: Erdkunde, 58(1): 42-52.

Schönwälder, Karen und Janina Söhn (2007): Siedlungsstrukturen von Migrantengruppen in Deutschland: Schwerpunkte der Ansiedlung und innerstädtische Konzentrationen, WZB Discussion Paper SP IV 2007-601, Berlin.

Schofield, Janet Ward in Zusammenarbeit mit Kira Alexander, Ralph Bangs und Barbara Schauenburg (2006a): Migrationshintergrund, Minderheitenzugehörigkeit und Bildungserfolg. Forschungser-

gebnisse der pädagogischen, Entwicklungs- und Sozialpsychologie, AKI-Forschungsbilanz 5, Berlin.

Schofield, Janet Ward in cooperation with Kira Alexander, Ralph Bangs and Barbara Schauenburg (2006b): Migration Background, Minority-Group Membership and Academic Achievement. Research Evidence from Social, Educational, and Developmental Psychology. AKI Research Review 5, Berlin.

Wimmer, Andreas (2002): Multikulturalität oder Ethnisierung? Kategorienbildung und Netzwerkstrukturen in drei schweizerischen Immigrantenquartieren, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 31(1): 4-26.

Programme on Intercultural Conflicts and Societal Integration

The Programme (AKI) at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) focuses on reviewing and evaluating research results from different disciplines in the thematic field of immigrant integration and intercultural conflicts. It thus aims to contribute to discussions about future directions of academic research and to provide accessible and sound evaluations of existing knowledge and policy options.

The Programme starts from the assumption that a wealth of models and findings are available in academic scholarship that could help German society deal with challenges arising from migration and ethnic plurality. However, this potential is often not fully exploited. The Programme aims to address this deficit by helping to promote co-operation and communication between researchers, policy-makers and the wider public. It also aims to encourage interdisciplinary dialogue and to contribute to a higher profile within academia and German society of research into migration and intercultural conflicts.

The Programme began in 2003. It is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and affiliated with the WZB's research area Civil Society, Conflict and Democracy. AKI has a steering group as well as its own advisory committee comprising experts with a policy or media background and scholars from Germany and abroad.

Topics include

- migration and illegality
- language and integration
- educational participation
- urban segregation
- official data on the integration of individuals with an immigrant background and of members of ethnic minorities

Publications include a newsletter which is available in an electronic and a printed version.

AKI: Dr. habil. Karen Schönwälder (head), Dipl.-Soz. Janina Söhn (researcher), Dipl.-Soz. Helen Baykara-Krumme (researcher), Manuela Ludwig (secretariat).
Members of the steering group: Prof. Dr. Klaus J. Bade, Osnabrück, Prof. Dr. Hartmut Esser, Mannheim, Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Bielefeld, Prof. Dr. Amélie Mummendey, Jena, Prof. Dr. Friedhelm Neidhardt, Berlin.

Arbeitsstelle Interkulturelle Konflikte und gesellschaftliche Integration (AKI)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Tel.: 030-25491-352
aki@wzb.eu
www.aki.wzb.eu

Programme on Intercultural Conflicts and Societal Integration at the Social Science Research Center Berlin

Arbeitsstelle Interkulturelle Konflikte und gesellschaftliche Integration (AKI)
am Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Publications

Miles Hewstone, *Neuere Forschungen über Intergruppenkonflikte: Konsequenzen für den Umgang mit Migration und Integration*, WZB discussion paper Nr. SP IV 2004-601, Berlin 2004.

Karen Schönwälder, Dita Vogel, Giuseppe Sciortino, *Migration und Illegalität in Deutschland*. AKI-Forschungsbilanz 1, Berlin 2004.

Karen Schönwälder, Dita Vogel, Giuseppe Sciortino, *Migration and Illegality in Germany*. AKI Research Review 1, Berlin 2006.

AKI (Hrsg.), *The Effectiveness of Bilingual School Programs for Immigrant Children*, WZB discussion paper SP IV 2005-601, Berlin 2005; contributions at an AKI-Conference by R. Slavin/A. Cheung, Chr. Rossell/J. Kuder, G. Driessen, M. Axelsson, H. Reich and I. Gogolin.

Janina Söhn, *Zweisprachiger Schulunterricht für Migrantenkinder. Ergebnisse der Evaluationsforschung zu seinen Auswirkungen auf Zweitspracherwerb und Schulerfolg*, AKI-Forschungsbilanz 2, Berlin 2005. [Summary in English available online]

AKI, *Migrationshintergrund von Kindern und Jugendlichen: Wege zur Weiterentwicklung der amtlichen Statistik*, Band 14 der Reihe Bildungsreform des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, Berlin 2005.

Karen Schönwälder, Janina Söhn, Ines Michalowski (unter Mitwirkung von Katarina Löbel), *Sprach- und Integrationskurse für MigrantInnen: Erkenntnisse über ihre Wirkungen aus den Niederlanden, Schweden und Deutschland*, AKI-Forschungsbilanz 3, Berlin 2005.
[Summary in English available online]

Hartmut Esser, *Migration, Sprache und Integration*, AKI-Forschungsbilanz 4, Berlin 2006.

Hartmut Esser, *Migration, Language and Integration*, AKI-Research Review 4, Berlin 2006.

Janet Ward Schofield in Zusammenarbeit mit Kira Alexander, Ralph Bangs und Barbara Schauenburg, *Migrationshintergrund, Minderheitenzugehörigkeit und Bildungserfolg. Forschungsergebnisse der pädagogischen, Entwicklungs- und Sozialpsychologie*, AKI-Forschungsbilanz 5, Berlin 2006.

Janet Ward Schofield in cooperation with Kira Alexander, Ralph Bangs and Barbara Schauenburg, *Migration Background, Minority-Group Membership and Academic Achievement. Research Evidence from Social, Educational, and Developmental Psychology*, AKI Research Review 5, Berlin 2006.

Cornelia Kristen, *Ethnische Diskriminierung im deutschen Schulsystem? Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Ergebnisse*, WZB Discussion Paper, Berlin 2006.

Karen Schönwälder und Janina Söhn, *Siedlungsstrukturen von Migrantengruppen in Deutschland: Schwerpunkte der Ansiedlung und innerstädtische Konzentrationen,* WZB Discussion Paper SP IV 2007-601, Berlin 2007.

Karen Schönwälder (Ed.), *Residential Segregation and the Integration of Immigrants: Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden*, WZB Discussion Paper SP IV 2007-602, Berlin 2007.

Dietrich Oberwittler, *The Effects of Ethnic and Social Segregation on Children and Adolescents: recent research and results from a German multilevel study*, WZB Discussion Paper SP IV 2007-603, Berlin 2007.

All publications are available online: www.aki.wzb.eu