Strategic decision-making, negotiation ability and beliefs about malleability

Maria Gabrielsson

Mentor: Per Henrik Hedberg
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STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING, NEGOTIATION ABILITY AND BELIEFS ABOUT MALLEABILITY

Maria Gabrielsson

The “2/3 Beauty-contest” game is widely used to measure peoples strategic ability, but are quite abstract and numerical (Camerer, 2003). Based on research from Sternberg one may believe that people’s strategic ability will show better in a less abstract situation (Sternberg, 2004). A new game is invented to represent a more intuitive situation that will be compared to the beauty-contest game. We examined the correlation between the participant’s strategic ability and their negotiation ability and in experiments we tried to manipulate the participant’s beliefs about negotiation ability. As predicted, the participant’s strategic ability showed better off in the new and more intuitive decision-situation. The manipulating element in the experiment seems to have had an effect on the participant’s beliefs about negotiation. The two decision situations were together able to predict compatible negotiation ability. The results are discussed in relation to other similar research (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007).

All people have to make decisions, every day. The choices we make will have an impact on all aspects of our lives. We can lose or win contracts worth millions, or do good or bad investments when buying a house or apartment to live in. So whether we stand in front of a work related problem or a problem regarding our family or personal life, we better make the right decision. Bad decision-making can have great consequences for us, why it is relevant to identify what characteristics that are important when we make decisions. What then, defines a good decision-maker? For one thing we can imagine this person to have a good strategic ability. A strategic person is one how can predict other people’s behavior, in a quite accurate way (McMillan, 1992). For example, if you are going to sell your stocks you want to do it right before everyone else does so, not at the same time as most people sells, because then you will lose more money. So it is important to be able to predict how others will behave in the future, and make your decision based on your beliefs about what others will do. In what kind of situations does a strategic ability show? One situation where a strategic person has an advantage is in a negotiation. As decision-making, negotiations take part in all kinds of levels in our lives. We negotiate about contracts of employment, how much we are willing to pay for a car, and even what to have for dinner (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 2008). And for the past decade negotiation as a field has grown larger and larger, and almost all universities now have departments or classes focusing on negotiation (Fisher et al., 2008).

Theories of decision-making did for long have a normative point of view, suggesting how people should behave to make the most optimal decision (Plous, 1993
As many of the classical decision-making theories, the expected utility theory has its background in mathematics and economy (Slovic, 1995). This theory suggests a number of principles that a rational decision-maker would follow and that would lead to a good decision. The problem was that researchers saw examples where people acted against the principles suggested in the expected utility theory. One of the principles was Transitivity. According to this principle a rational decision-maker who prefers outcome A, over outcome B, and outcome B over outcome C, would never choose outcome C over outcome A (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Psychological researchers found evidence of people acting against the transitivity principle (Slovic, 1995). It seems that people were not that rational after all. Due to that kind of evidence, researchers came up with more descriptive theories of decision-making, wanting to explain how people actually made decisions (Slovic, 1995). The prospect theory, by Tversky and Kahneman, is one example (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). One important difference between the utility and the prospect theory was that the prospect theory replaced the notion of utility with value. Value can be seen as both gains and losses, which deviates from a reference point. Utility is usually seen as a net wealth (Plous, 1993). The prospect theory also suggested that decision-makers weren’t always rational, but affected by heuristics and biases. There is evidence for the distinction of the two theories, in favor of the prospect theory (Bazerman, MaglioZZi & Neal, 1985).

Strategic reasoning and Dominance-solvable games

According to some researchers the prospect theory represents a great improvement of the expected utility theory (Plous, 1993) but the principles suggested in the latter can still be very useful to detect strategic ability in decision-making. The principle of dominance suggests that rational decision-makers would never choose strategies that are dominated by another one, even if the dominant strategy is dominant in only one aspect (Plous, 1993). To measure strategic abilities researchers often use dominance-solvable games (Camerer, 2003). If you assume that other players will obey the rule of dominance, you can make a guess of what other players would choose. According to Camerer (2003) dominance can be applied iteratively which means that a player first eliminates a dominated strategy for all other players and then see if the first round of elimination makes some strategies dominated, and if so eliminate them and repeat (Camerer, 2003). The dominant-solvable game “2/3 Beauty-Contest” can be used to illustrate this further. In this game the participants gets to choose a number between 0-100. The person who chooses a number that is closest to 2/3 of the average number of all the participants wins (Camerer, Ho & Chong, 2004). 2/3 of the average number will than never be above 67, so no matter what you will have a larger chance of winning if you chose a number below 67, than a number above 67. If you are a player in this game and you think the other players will obey the principle of dominance you should chose a number that is 2/3 of 67, which is no more than 44 (Camerer et al., 2004). This way of describing the Beauty Contest game can be seen as a quite economic view. A more psychological way of reasoning in a Beauty contest game can be to start with an average of all chosen numbers, instead of starting with 100. The average of all other numbers between 0-100 would be 50. If the participant is reasoning one step further according to the dominance principle he would chose 2/3 of 50 which would be 33 and so on. The latter way of reasoning about the game will be used in the present study when analyzing the games. This will be described in detail later in this paper. How many steps of iterated reasoning’s would you do? According to Camerer (2003) most people (nearly 100%) use one step of iterated reasoning and the median number is two steps.
The “2/3 Beauty-Contest” game has been implemented with a various number of participants. In one study data from several thousand people was collected via news papers in Germany, Spain and The UK (Nagel, Bosch-Domènech, Satorra & García-Montalvo, 2002). A lot of researchers also studied this method in lab experiments with usually 20-35 contestants (Camerer et al., 2004). It has also been done with only two contestants in a study by Nagel and Grosskopf (2008). When there is only two contestants the person with the lowest number always wins, which makes it rational to choose number 0. Nagel and Grosskopf (2008) found that it was quite rare that participants chose 0. Even experienced game theorists failed so that the rational thing in a situation with two persons would be to choose number 0 and instead reasoned as if there were more than two persons participating in the game (Grosskopf & Nagel, 2008).

Research has shown that people perform better in a strategic situation when they get a more intuitive variant of "2/3 beauty-contest" (Chou, McConnell, Nagel, Plott, 2007). In some cases the participants got a hint of how they should reason in games like beauty-contest, for example they were asked to think strategically and they also got to see a picture so they could visualize the numbers on a staple with marks over the highest and lowest numbers. There were also marks of where 2/3 of the average was. They also presented a variant of beauty-contest called Battle, where the participant were asked to place troops on a hill in relation to one other contestant and a number between 0-100 represented a place on the hill. The person who ends up highest on the hill wins (Chou et al., 2007). This way to use beauty-contest can be seen as a bit too easy, and one may think that the structure in the strategic game is gone. But the results clearly showed that the participants were better to reason strategically in the variant that were less abstract (Chou et al., 2007).

Many researchers’ calls for more research on how to improve decision-making, and what strategies we can use to commit less error when we make decisions (Bazerman, Chugh & Milkman, 2009). This can be of importance, but we also might need to evaluate the ways in which we traditionally measure the abilities used in decision-making processes. For many people games like the beauty-contest might seem a bit abstract. For someone who is not familiar with mathematics it might even seem hard to solve. As mentioned earlier studies have shown that even game theorist can have problem solving beauty-contest games in a rational manner (Grosskopf & Nagel, 2008). And the question is whether beauty-contest game measure mathematic skills better then strategic skills? There is evidence that people’s abilities to solve a problem can show off better if they get to solve the problem in a familiar setting (Sternberg, 2004). In Brazil researchers have shown examples of young children who supported themselves by selling things on the street. These children were able to do relatively advanced mathematical calculations when bargaining on the streets. But when the researchers sat them in a classroom and asked them to solve math problems which were of the same difficulty that the children had solved on the street they couldn’t perform as well (Sternberg, 2004). This results shows that problem solving is very context dependent. There might be a possibility that strategic ability works in the same way. If we try to identify strategic ability by using a measurement that is too mathematical we might be misled. These results are in line with research that has shown that people have fewer problems solving issues that are presented in frequencies rather than percentage (Gigerenzer, 2000). Gigerenzer asked the participants in his study to rate the probability of someone having breast cancer, due to a positive mammogram. The results showed that they were better at rating the probability if the problem were presented in
frequencies, rather than percentage. These results were also significant for professionals such as doctors (Gigerenzer, 2000).

Negotiation

One situation where a person’s strategic ability can show is in a negotiation. A negotiation can be defined as a decision-making process in which two or more people are trying to allocate scarce resources (Thompson, 1990). There is a communication in which you and your counterpart must agree on issues where you have both common and conflicting interests (Fisher et al., 2008). The negotiation literature was for long influenced by economic research as early theories of decision making (Malhota & Bazerman, 2008). But psychological influence on negotiation is large. Research with behavioral decision theory as framework has shown that people are not always rational when making decisions. For example people can be overconfident, affected by irrelevant anchors, assume that the negotiation pie is fixed and that the opponent has diametrically preferences, and devalue concessions made by the opponent (Malhota & Bazerman, 2008). Negotiation can be of great importance to all peoples work and personal life, therefore it can be of interest to explore what a negotiation process can be like and identify aspects that can help us predict negotiation skills. What then, identifies a good negotiator? Game theorists often define the word strategy as a game-plan, a set of actions covering all possible outcomes (McMillan, 1992). A negotiation is sometimes about more than just one question, for example a contract of employment. The negotiator has to make a plan for what he or she wants to do in all issues, salary, insurance policy, vacation time and so on. So a good negotiator might be someone who can make a decision about what issues are more important and on what issues he or she can make a trade off.

A negotiation can contain a lot of different possible outcomes. There can be issues that are completely distributive, which means that the negotiators require diametrically opposite things and have to find a way to distribute the resources (Olekalns, Smith & Walsh, 1996). There also can be issues where the negotiators require going in opposite directions but it is of greater importance for one of them to make a good deal, so called integrative issues. There can also be issues where the negotiators want the exact same thing, so called compatible issues (Olekalns et al., 1996). What can be seen as interesting is that people sometimes fail to detect the issues that are integrative in nature, which leads to a worse outcome than possible for both parts (Bazerman, 1983; Thompson, Wang & Gunia, 2009). This can be due to our culture and society which often is very competitive, and makes people see negotiations as a win or lose situation (Bazerman, 1983). It might be easier to detect the integrative issues for people who tend to share information rather than hold on to information about what they want. If both sides just focuses on keeping information, in fear of the losses that might come when giving information, the negotiation can come to a dead end (Olekalns et al., 1996). Studies have also showed that integrative issues can be easier to fulfill when the negotiators are more experienced (Bazerman et al., 1985).

As mentioned earlier, people are not always rational when making their decisions (Plous, 1993). This also has been discussed regarding the negotiation process (Bazerman, 1983). Tversky and Kahneman have found evidence that people respond differently to questions that are asking the same things but framed differently (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). A question that is framed in matter of what a person will gain can make us more risk seeking, than if the question is framed in a matter of what
he or she might lose (Bazerman, 1983). Due to this kind of evidence Bazerman suggests that a negotiator always should try to create a situation where the opposite part is framed positively and negotiate in terms of what the other side has to gain. The negotiator should also make it clear to the opposite part that it is a risky situation where he or she still can make a sure gain (Bazerman, 1983).

One way to measure negotiation skills is to have participants in a study to perform a negotiation task. A widely used method is to let the participants negotiate in dyads about a contract of employment, where one part will act as employee and the other as employer (Curhan & Pentland, 2007; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Thompson, 1990). Other similar examples can be a bargaining between a buyer and a seller, who will try to settle a selling price (Bazerman et al, 1985). As mentioned earlier, a negotiation can contain several different issues. They can be integrative, distributive or compatible, and negotiation tasks like the ones described can have several advantages. Such data may enable researchers to investigate a person’s negotiation skills in all types of scenarios. And these kinds of tasks can also give the researcher and opportunity to look at the overall score in a negotiation, for example the total of points collected from one negotiator. One can also see how well the negotiators as a dyad did by measuring the points they have collected together. The present study will examine five different negotiation outcomes, the integrative, distributive and compatible issues but also the participants own collected points and the points the negotiation dyad got together. And collectively these negotiation outcomes can be a measure of strategic ability and therefore negotiation ability. This may enable the researcher to see if the participants were better in the overall issues in the negotiation but also give us information about the different parts of the negotiation. A good negotiator can be assumed to be a strategic person. But it has also been suggested that people’s beliefs can be correlated with their judgment and decision making (Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995).

**Beliefs about the malleability of personality and negotiation**

According to Dweck (2008), self theories can be defined as “mental representations of the nature and workings of the self, of their relationships, and of their world”. People’s beliefs about their ability to perform can be important to understand their choices and actions. Some people have a fixed theory of the self (entity theorists), and believe that their personality, and qualities, for example their intelligence is a fixed trait that is hard to develop. Other people have a malleable belief or theory (incremental theorists) believing that their basic traits, such as intelligence, can be changed and developed (Dweck, 2008). Studies have shown that people with an incremental theory often will explain failures to specific actions in the situation, for example a bad strategy. But people with an entity theory will often explain failure with lack of ability or low intelligence to a larger extent than incremental theorists (Dweck et al., 1995). People’s beliefs about their ability to perform can be helpful when explaining people’s reactions and goals (Elliot & Dweck, 1988).

People with an incremental viewpoint of their abilities tend to be more open to learning challenging tasks and better able to overcome failures (Dweck, 2008). These people have also shown to perform better in challenges in business, for example negotiations (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007) and sorting out relationship problems (Dweck, 2008). There is evidence that an incremental theory of one’s abilities can be developed or learned (Dweck, 2008). In one experiment students got to view a film that explained the human brain to be capable of developing through life and how connections between brain cells
grew in response to academic challenge. The students in the experiment also got to write a letter explaining this to another student who they were told had difficulties in school (Dweck, 2008). At the end of the semester the student in the experimental condition (who were thought the incremental viewpoint) expressed greater joy of their academic work and got better grades than the students in the control group (Dweck, 2008).

Researchers have successfully manipulated people’s belief theories when it comes to intelligence (Burns & Isbell, 2007; Dweck et al., 1995) and in more recent studies people’s beliefs about their negotiation ability (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). This has been done by giving the participants one of two short articles about the malleability of their intelligence. One half of the participants read an article that stated that intelligence was malleable and could be developed and the other half of the participants read an article that stated that intelligence is a fixed trait that is almost impossible to develop (Dweck et al., 1995). Kray and Haselhuhn (2007) used the same kind of method but the article was about negotiation skills. Their study showed that the participant’s with an incremental theory of negotiation skills outperformed the entity theorists. Their study also showed that incremental theorists were more integrative than their entity theorist’s counterpart (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007).

The purpose and expectations of this study

To summarize so far this paper has been about strategies, negotiation and belief theories. These topics are closely connected with each other. People use strategies to cope with issues in their work as well as private life’s. We use strategies for choosing the best way investing our money and for getting what we want to eat for dinner when several interests are involved (Fisher et al., 2008). We can use these strategies to negotiate with people in our surroundings to get the best possible outcome. Our beliefs about our self’s and our ability to change can be essential for how we react and cope with different tasks in life, like negotiations (Dweck, 2008). Exploring these issues can be important, because they give us information of how people make decisions, which can be very different from how they should make decisions. These issues can tell us something about why a negotiation does not always get to an end, which can be essential in both our private and work life. This study take Sternberg’s results from studying street kids in Brazil into account (Sternberg, 2004) and Gigerenzers research of people who did better judgments when a problem was presented in frequencies rather than in percentage (Gigerenzer, 2000). The present study examine if people’s strategic abilities will show more easily when presented with a decision situation that is more intuitive and less numerical than the beauty-contest game that traditionally have been used to measure strategic ability (Camerer, 2003). We will also examine the participant’s strategic ability and their negotiation ability and if their beliefs about negotiation malleability can be manipulated. The following hypotheses are stated.

1. Intuitive decision situation (Theater game) will be easier to solve than the Abstract decision situation (Beauty-contest game).

The participants will choose a significant lower number in the Theater game then in the Beauty Contest game.

2. People with a malleable view of their surroundings will be more strategic then people with a fixed view.
There will be a significant negative correlation between how high the participants score on the survey “what can be changed” and how low number they choose in the Theater game and the Beauty Contest game.

3. Intuitive decision situation (Theater game) will be a better predictor of negotiation outcome then the abstract decision situation (Beauty-contest game).

The Theater game will be a better predictor of how high the participants will score in the distributive, compatible and integrative negotiation issues, and they will also get a higher own collected score and they will do better as a dyad in the negotiations.

4. People who are strategic will have better negotiation ability.

People who chose a low number in the Theater game and the Beauty Contest game will score higher points in the distributive, compatible and integrative negotiation issues, and they will also get a higher own collected score and they will do better as a dyad in the negotiations.

5. People with a malleable view of their surroundings will be better negotiators then people with a more fixed view.

There will be a positive significant correlation between the participants score on the survey “What can be changed” and there score on the distributive, integrative and compatible issues.

6. Incremental theorists (participants who get to read the incremental article) will be better negotiators then entity theorists.

Incremental theorists will get better scores in the distributive, compatible and integrative negotiation issues, and they will also get a higher own collected score and they will do better as a dyad in the negotiations.

7. Incremental theorists (participants who get to read the incremental article) will report the negation ability to be more malleable then entity theorists.

The participants in the incremental condition will score higher on the manipulation check (the survey presented right after the articles).

Method

Participants

The participants in the experiment consisted of 48 students, 31 women, and 17 men from the department of psychology at Stockholm University. The mean age was 24. The participants were recruited by lists at the department at which the students themselves signed on to participate. When the students signed on they were informed that they
would participate in a study on decision-making and that it contained four different elements. They were all rewarded with 1.5 h of study-participant-time which students on basic level need to finish a semester at the department of psychology.

**Material**

The study consisted of four different elements. At start the participants got to make decision in two different scenarios, one intuitive and one abstract decision-making scenario. The purpose of these two elements was to examine the participant’s strategic ability and see if it differed in situations that were more intuitive than in situations that were more abstract and numerical. One of the two scenarios was a variant off the Beauty-contest game that was described earlier in this paper (Camerer, 2003). The participants were informed that they would take part in a competition and they were all asked to choose a number between 0-100, any number they wanted. The person whose number was 1/2 of the average number of all the numbers collected from each participant were the winner in the competition. This situation represented the abstract decision-making scenario in the experiment, and will from now on be referred to as the Beauty-contest game. In the other scenario the participants were asked to choose a row in a theatre saloon, where the sound from the scene was dependent on where they sat in relation to the other participants. The sound was as best if they sat one row in front of the row that the other participants opted to be seated in at this particular time. This scenario was also presented as a competition and the winner would be the person who chooses the row where the sound was as most optimal at this particular time. This decision situation represents the intuitive decision situation and is from now on referred to as the Theater game. When the participant had made their choices in both the beauty-contest and the Theater game they were asked to answer three questions about the decisions they just made. The purpose of these questions was to get a better understanding of how the participants reasoned when they made their choice.

The second element of the experiment was a survey named “What can be changed” (based on Hedberg, Tong, Iyengar & Dweck, 2002). The survey consisted of 33 questions where the participants could estimate to what extent themselves, their parents, their close friends, people in their environment, their country, their organizations, and the world they live in were changeable. The participants could estimate on a scale of one to nine the extent to which they thought the different subjects could change. Where one was “not at all changeable” and nine was “extremely changeable”.

The third element of the experiment was a short article about negotiating ability that has been used in earlier experiments (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). The article was the manipulative element of the experiment, and half of the participants got to read an article with an incremental viewpoint of negotiation ability, named “Negotiating ability is changeable and can be developed”. The participants in this condition will be called incremental theorists. In this article the author claimed that scientist found evidence that negotiation ability, which is essential to all of us in our daily life’s, can be developed to a great extent and that “only 2% of a person’s negotiating ability can be traced to stable personality characteristics”. The other half of the participants got to read an article with an entity viewpoint, named “Negotiating ability, like plaster, is pretty stable over time”. The participants in this condition will from now on be called the entity theorists. Here the author claimed that scientists found evidence that negotiation ability is hard to develop and that “negotiation ability may be increased or decreased by only about 2% during most of a person’s adult life”. Both of the articles were fictional and they were
translated into Swedish by a professional translator in Cambridge, UK. When the participants finished reading the article they filled out a short survey about what they thought of negotiating ability and to what extent this ability can change (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). This was a manipulation check and done in order to see if the participants were affected by the article and to see if they read and understood the article. The survey contained seven questions with the same scale used in the survey in the second element in the experiment.

The fourth and last element of the experiment was a negotiation task named The New Recruit (Neal, 1997. One person plays the role of an employer and the other the employee. Together they would then try to reach a consensus of a contract of employment. The contract contained eight different issues; location, vacation, salary, insurance, division, start date and moving expenses. This task will enable the researcher to examine several kinds of negotiation outcomes, both how the person did in the overall issues, which can be measures with the participants own collected points. One can also examine how the participants did as a negotiation dyad, which is done by examine how many points the participants collected together as a dyad. This task also enable the researcher to examine how the person did in the distributive, integrative and the compatible negotiation issues.

Procedure

All the experiments were carried out in groups of 5-10 participants at a time in one of the classrooms at the department of psychology at Stockholm University. When the participants arrived to the experiment they were asked to pick a small note from a jar with a written number on it. This number randomly assigned the participant in a dyad for the negotiation task in the fourth element in the experiment. The participants also got to write this number on a small plastic map where they collected all the material when finished an element of the experiment.

The participants were informed that the experiment contained four different elements which would be presented as the experiment was in progress. The experimenter then informed the participants about the debriefing of the experiment that would not be carried out right after the experiment was finished. The debriefing would take place via email right after the data collection was finished. The reason for this was that several of the participants were in the same course at the university and information about the experiment could spread even among students who had not participated and whose participation would then become contaminated and be able to give biased results. They were than informed that it was voluntary to participate in the experiment and questions would be answered as the experiment was in progress.

The first element of the experiment, the Theater game and the Beauty-contest game, were presented separately to the participants. One answer was collected before the other scenario was presented to the students. This was done to inhibit the participants to go back and change his or her answer. Half of the participants got the Theater game first, then the Beauty-contest. The other half got the Beauty-contest game first than the Theater game. This was done to prevent any learning effect from one scenario to the next. One of the elements was presented to the participants, and then the experimenter read the instructions loud to the participants. After that they were asked if they had any questions about the scenario. The participants then got 2 minutes to make their
decisions. The three questions about the two scenarios were presented separately after the two first decision-making scenarios.

The participants got 12 minutes to finish the second element of the experiment, the survey named “What can be changed” (based on Hedberg, Tong, Iyengar & Dweck, 2002). They were told when there were 5 minutes left to finish filling out the survey.

One of the two articles was presented to the participants and they were asked to read and understand the content of the article. They got three minutes to finish reading it. They also got 3 minutes to fill out the survey presented after the article which was presented separately from the article. All the participants in a group got to read the same article. The experimenter had decided in advanced which article each group would get to read.

To the fourth and last element of the experiment the participants were told that they would take part in a negotiation task, which would be carried out in dyads. The experimenter told them that one part would take the act of an employee and the other part would be the employer. They would then try to reach a consensus on a contract of employment. Written instructions about the task were presented to the participants. They got 10 minutes to read, understand and ask questions about the instructions and then they would negotiate for 30 minutes. After the ten minutes of reading the instructions the experimenter placed the participants next to their negotiation partner and they were told that they had 30 minutes to try to reach a consensus. As soon as the dyads reaches a consensus they were parted and told to answer a survey about the negotiation they just finished. After that they got to count the points from the negotiation if they wanted. At last the participants were thanked for participating in the experiment.

As mentioned above the numbers the participant picked when arriving to the experiment decided who they would negotiate with. In the jar there were numbers from 1-11. The reason for this was that there were a maximum of 11 participants that could sign on to one moment of an experiment. The lowest number was paired with the lowest next number. So, if there were nine participants that showed up to the time of the experiment and the numbers the participant’s picked was 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, than 1 would negotiate with 3. Nr 5 would negotiate with nr 6. Nr 7 would negotiate with nr 8, and nr 9 would negotiate with nr 10. If, as in this case, the number of the people participated were of odd number then there would be one participant who would not get to negotiate. The person who had picked the highest odd number, in this case 11, got to answer questions about the survey they had answered earlier named “What can be changed”. The questions were about which situations the person had in mind when answering the questions in the survey.

Results

The Beauty-Contest game and the Theater game

To analyze the Theater game the rows were translated into numbers so that it would be comparable to as large extent as possible with the Beauty-contest game. The rows were translated as follows. Row 1 = 3.125, row 2 = 6.25, row 3= 12.5, row 4 = 25, row 5 = 50, row 6 = 61.718, row 7 = 73.436, row 8 = 85.154 and row 9 = 96.875. The rows were
translated like this due to the following reasoning. One may think that the participants who choose the line in the middle, row nr 5, are picking the average of all chosen rows. Compared with the Beauty-contest game, this would mean picking the average number between 0-100, which would be 50. If the participant is reasoning one step further according to the dominance principle, this would mean picking row nr 4 which would be the same as picking 25 in the Beauty-contest game, and so on. When it comes to the rows above the fifth row it is unlikely that the participants are reasoning as described above. It is therefore not reasonable to count backwards, because choice of row is not related to one another. Thus, choice of row would appear random which would mean that the choice is somewhere between 50-100. But since the participants cannot choose 0 in the Theater game, they should not be able to choose 100. Row nr 9 deviates from 100 as much as row nr 1 deviates from 0.

The average estimate of the selected row in the Theater game was 15.99 (s=20.80). The average estimate of the selected number in the Beauty-contest game was 23.76 (s=19.90). A paired t-test showed that the difference between the two situations was significant (t = -1.968, df = 47, p < 0.05, two tailed). This result is consistent with hypothesis nr 1 which stated that the participants will go further in their reasoning in the Theater game then in the Beauty Contest game.

*Malleability → Strategic decision making (Beauty contest and Theater game)*

To analyze the results from the survey “What can be changed” correlations analysis was carried out. Two of the participants failed to fill out the whole survey. The minimum points a participant could get on this survey was 33 indicating that the participant had fixed view of themselves and their surroundings. The maximum score the participant could get on the survey was 297, indicating that the person had a malleable view of themselves and their surroundings. The mean score on the survey in this study was 161 points. The correlation between the participants score on the survey and their choice of row in the Theater game was not significant (r =-.186 N = 46, p > 0.05). The correlation between the score on the survey and the Beauty-contest was not significant (r =.131, N = 46, p > 0.05). The results are not consistent with hypothesis nr 2 which stated that people with a more malleable view of themselves and their surroundings would choose a lower number in the Theater game and the Beauty contest game.

*Negotiation outcome*

The maximum point a participant was able to get in the negotiation task was 6600, and the minimum point was -4200. The participants own negotiation points ranged from -50 to 4450 points, with a mean of 2323.91 points. In total five different negotiation outcomes were analyzed, the integrative, distributive, compatible negotiation issues, the participants own collected points, and the points the negotiation dyad collected together. Two of the six groups examined in the present study were of odd number. Therefore two of the participants were not involved in the negotiation task. A total of 23 dyads participated in the negotiation task, and all the dyads reached a consensus.

*Predictive value of the Theater game and the Beauty Contest game → Negotiation outcome*

A regression analysis was conducted to examine whether the Theater game better could predict negotiation ability than the Beauty-context game. The results showed that the Theater game as predictor for integrative negotiation issues was not statistically
significant (t = -0.894, β = -0.041, p > 0.05). The predictive value for the Beauty-contest game on the integrative negotiation variable was not significant (t = -0.724, β = -0.392, p > 0.05). The result for the Theater game as predictor for compatible negotiation issues was not statistically significant (t = -1.605, β = -0.238, p > 0.05). The predictive value for the Beauty-contest game on the compatible negotiation variable was not significant (t = -1.177, β = -0.026, p > 0.05). The result for the Theater game as predictor for distributive negotiation outcome was not significant (t = 1.388, β = -0.207, p > 0.05). The result for the Theater game as predictor for the participants own total points was not statistically significant (t = 1.271, β = -0.191, p > 0.05). The predictive value for the Beauty-contest game on the points the negotiation dyad collected together was not significant (t = -0.071, β = -0.010, p > 0.05).

This is not consistent with hypothesis nr 3 that stated that the Theater game would be a significant better predictor for negotiation outcome.

*Strategic ability and negotiation outcomes*

Both the Theater and the Beauty Contest game intend to measure strategic ability. And to measure strategic ability the mean from both of the two games were included into one variable. This variable was a significant predictor for how well the participants did in compatible negotiation issues (t = -2.112, β = -0.293, p < 0.05). A significant model emerged F (4,39) = 3.349, p < 0.05. The model explained 17.9 % of the variance (Adjusted R2 = 0.179). Table 1 gives information about the predictor variables that are included in the model. As stated in the introduction to this paper, all the issues investigated in the present study are related to each other. The variables included in the model are all factors that might have an effect on the outcome and therefore relevant to take into account.

Table 1. Dependent variable; Compatible negotiation issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean from both games</td>
<td>-4.751</td>
<td>2.249</td>
<td>-0.293*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation check</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score on “What can be changed”</td>
<td>-2.175</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article</td>
<td>-85.868</td>
<td>74.94</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = <0.05

No significant results were found for the Mean of both games as a predictor for distributive negotiation outcome (t = -1.136, β = -0.178, p > 0.05) the integrative negotiation outcome (t = -0.517, β = -0.074, p > 0.05) the points the negotiation dyad collected together (t = -1.859, β = -0.280, p > 0.05) or the participants own collected points (t = -1.030, β = -0.154, p > 0.05). This is partly consistent with hypothesis nr 4 that stated that people who are strategic will be better in all negotiation outcomes.
**Malleability → Negotiation outcome**

No significant results were found in the correlation analysis between the scores on the survey “What can be changed” and the integrative negotiation issues \( r = .124, \ N = 46, p > 0.05 \) the distributive negotiation issues \( r = -.079, \ N = 46, p > 0.05 \) or the compatible negotiation issues \( r = -.267, \ N = 46, p > 0.05 \). This is not consistent with hypothesis nr 5 which stated that people with a malleable view of themselves and their surroundings would be better negotiators then people with a fixed view.

**Incremental theorists, Entity theorist’s → negotiation ability**

A comparison between means, like a t-test would usually be a suitable analysis to test the results of the conditions in an experiment like the one conducted in the present study. In this case a regression analysis will be carried out, since we later intend to control for other relevant variables in a multiple regression. A regression analysis with the article as a predictor for all of the negotiation outcomes was conducted. The results with the compatible negotiation outcome as a dependent variable showed that the incremental theorists outperformed the entity theorist. The result was significant \( t = -2.317, \beta = -3.300, p < 0.05 \). No significant results were found for the integrative \( t = 1.225, \beta = .182, p > 0.05 \) the distributive \( t = -.063, \beta = -.010, p > 0.05 \) the points the dyad got together \( t = -.257, \beta = -.039, p > 0.05 \) or the participants own collected points \( t = -.109, \beta = -.016, p > 0.05 \). The results are partly consistent with hypothesis nr 6 which stated that the incremental theorists would outperform the entity theorists in all of the negotiation outcomes.

As mentioned earlier, the subjects examined in this paper are expected to be closely related to one another why we decided to conduct a multiple regression with predictors that can have a significant effect on the negotiation outcomes. In a multiple regression with the integrative negotiation ability as the dependent variable, a significant model emerged \( F (4,39) = 2.568, p < 0.05 \). The model explained 10.5% of the variance \( (Adjusted \ R^2 = .12) \). The manipulation check, the short survey after the article could predict integrative negotiation ability significantly \( t = 2.685, \beta = .413, p < 0.05 \). The results also showed that the participants who read the entity article outperformed the participants who read the incremental article in the integrative negotiation issue \( t = 2.275, \beta = .364, p < 0.05 \). This is not consistent with hypothesis nr 6 that stated that incremental theorists would outperform entity theorists in all negotiation issues. Table 2 gives information about the predictor variables that are included in the model.

Table 2. Dependent variable: Integrative negotiation issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean from both games</td>
<td>-3.424</td>
<td>6.628</td>
<td>-.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation check</td>
<td>30.123</td>
<td>11.22</td>
<td>.413*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score on “What can be changed”</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>3.614</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article</td>
<td>514.118</td>
<td>220.8</td>
<td>.364*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*= <0.05
In a multiple regression the articles were not able to predict compatible negotiation outcome significantly (t = -.174, β = -1.146, p > 0.05). No significant results were found for the manipulation check (the negotiation malleability questionnaire) as a predictor for compatible negotiation outcome (t = 1.607, β = .240, p > 0.05). Table 1 gives information about the predictor variables that are included in the model.

The manipulation check was a significant predictor for the participants own collected points (t = 2.147, β = .344, p < 0.05). But the regression model was not statistically significant (F (4,39) = 1.606, p > 0.05).

No significant model emerged with the distributive negotiation outcome (F (4,39) = .517, p > 0.05) or the points the participants got together as a dyad (F (4,39) = 1.387, p > 0.05). For every negotiation outcome, the same variables were included in the models as in table 1 and 2.

*Incremental theorists, Entity theorists → view of negotiation ability*

The manipulation check (the negotiation malleability questionnaire) showed that the participants in the incremental theory condition rated the negotiation ability as more malleable (M = 48.03, SD = 6.32) than participants in the entity theory condition (M = 41, SD = 10.98). An independent t-test showed that the difference between the conditions was significant (t = 2.772, df = 46, p < 0.05). This is consistent with hypothesis nr 7 that stated that the participants in the incremental condition would rate the negotiation ability to be more malleable.

**Discussion**

The purpose of this study was to examine if people`s strategic ability would show more easily in a situation that is more intuitive and less numerical than the widely used Beauty-contest game. We were also interested in examine which one of the two decision situations that could best predict negotiation outcomes. We also wanted to see if people`s beliefs about their malleability would affect their strategic ability and ability to negotiate, and if people`s beliefs could be manipulated. The results showed that the participants in this study did better in the more intuitive decision situation, the Theater game as predicted in hypothesis nr 1. No significant correlations were found between the participant`s performance in the Theater game and the Beauty Contest game, and their score on the survey “what can be changed”. This is inconsistent with hypothesis nr 2 which stated that people with a malleable view of themselves and their surroundings would be more strategic than people with a fixed view. None of the two games could significantly predict negotiation outcomes by themselves, which were not consistent with hypothesis nr 3 which stated that the Theater game would be a better predictor of negotiation outcome then the Beauty-contest game. Taken together in one variable the mean from the two games were a significant predictor for compatible negotiation outcomes which is partly consistent with hypothesis nr 4. Hypothesis nr 4 stated that who are strategic will be better negotiators. No significant correlations were found between the survey “what can be changed” and the participant`s negotiation skills. This is not consistent with hypothesis nr 5 which stated that people with a malleable view of themselves and their surroundings would be better negotiators then people with a fixed view. The manipulative element in this experiment, the short article showed that the entity theorists outperformed the incremental theorist in the integrative negotiation
issues. The results also showed that the incremental theorists were better in compatible negotiation outcomes, but when controlling for other variables this relation were no longer significant. This is not consistent with hypothesis nr 6 which stated that the incremental theorists would outperform the entity theorists in all of the negotiation outcomes. When filling out the manipulation check, the negotiation malleability questionnaire the incremental theorist expressed that negotiation ability was malleable to a larger extent than the entity theorist. This is consistent with hypothesis nr 7 which stated that participants in the incremental condition would report negotiation ability to be malleable to a larger extent then the participants in the entity condition. It appears that the manipulative element in the experiment did have an impact, since the participants in the incremental condition did report the negotiation ability to be more malleable then the participants in the entity condition. Still, the manipulative element did not have the expected impact on the participants in all of the negotiation outcomes. This issue will be discussed later in this paper.

Strategic decision-making

The results from the Theater and the Beauty-contest game are consistent with results from other studies. In general people use in average 1.5 or 2 steps if iterated reasoning when making decisions in the Beauty-contest game (Camerer, 2003; Camerer et al., 2004). That seems to be the case in this study as well. Sternberg has shown that people are better at problem-solving in situations that they are more familiar with (Sternberg, 2004). It might be easier for people to understand the underlying structure of the problem if it is integrated in a more familiar context, like in the Theater game. The results are also consistent with results where the researchers have made easier versions of Beauty-contests (Chou et al., 2007). The participants in these experiments had fewer problems when solving the new versions of the Beauty-contest game called Battle. The contribution with the present study is that the structure in the Beauty-contest game, is still present in the Theater game to a larger extent than one may think is the case in the Battle game. Off course people will have lesser problems solving a much easier problem than a harder one. In this study, the Theater game is not necessarily easier, but more intuitive. According to Gigerenzer, both lay persons and experts can have difficulties solving problems presented in probability. But they can solve the same problem if it is presented in natural frequencies (Gigerenzer, 2000). What Gigerenzers findings show us is that people can be very sensitive to the presentation of the problem and to the use of numeric data. And this can be important to take into account when examine strategic ability. According to the results from the present study people seem to have lesser problem thinking strategically in more intuitive and less numerical situations, like the Theater game. This is in line with that proposed by Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer, 2000). One may so reason that the participants were better in the Theater game due to the fact that is was less numerical, and people are in general more familiar dealing with situations that are not containing numbers and calculations.

Hypothesis nr 3 stated that the Theater game would be a better predictor of negotiation outcomes then the Beauty Contest game, but no significant results were found to support this hypothesis. Both of the games intent to measure strategic ability but the main question is how well they can detect this ability. Therefore it can be of interest to measure the results from both games taken together. The mean from both the Theater game and the Beauty-contest game were added together to form one variable. And as the results showed, the mean from both games turned out to be a significant predictor for compatible negotiation ability. This is partly consistent with hypothesis nr 4 which
stated that people who are more strategic will have better negotiation outcomes. This indicates that we need more than one way to measure strategic ability in order to predict negotiation ability.

After the Theater and the Beauty contest game were presented for the participants they filled out three questions about the choices they just made. The participant’s answers from the two games were important in order to understand how they actually reasoned when they made their decision and what led them to pick a certain number or row. The answers are also important in order to improve and develop the new Theater game. One drawback with survey methods is that the researcher are left with a number on a scale, that are representing the participants answer but is tells us little about what led the person to make the particular choice. When asking the participants how they reasoned we get a more information about how people are thinking in situations like this.

**Malleability and negotiation**

The participant’s view of the malleability of themselves and their surroundings in general did not correlate significantly with their negotiation ability in the distributive, integrative and compatible issues. This is not consistent with the predictions in hypothesis nr 5 which stated that people with a malleable view of their surroundings would be better negotiators then people with a more fixed view. Studies have shown that our malleability belief can affect our judgment over several different construct, such as intelligence and negotiation skills (Dweck et al., 1995; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). One may therefore believe that our belief theories about malleability will affect us in several aspects of our lives. In a negotiation situation a person with a more malleable view of themselves and their surroundings would be able to see several kinds of different solutions in a negotiation. The mean of the score on the survey “what can be changed” was quite high which indicates that the participants in this study find their surroundings were malleable to a large extent. It can be of interest to examine this issue with a wider range of participants. The contribution of the survey “What can be changed” in this study was that it gave us information about the participant’s general beliefs about malleability before it was manipulated.

**Incremental theorists, entity theorists and negotiation outcomes**

Kray and Haselhuhn found statistically significant differences in the negotiation skills between incremental and entity theorists, where the incremental theorists outperformed the entity theorists (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). In the present study the results appear inconsistent with the ones reported by Kray & Haselhuhn. The results indicated support for the hypothesis nr 6 when the analysis showed that the incremental theorists were better in the compatible negotiation outcomes. When other variables were included in the analysis the article was no longer a significant predictor for compatible negotiation outcomes. Instead the mean from both games, (strategic ability) were a significant predictor for compatible negotiation outcomes. Which one of the two articles the participants were going to read during the experiment were decided in advanced, so the difference between the participants in the two conditions should have been random. Still, there is a possibility that the people in the incremental condition happened to be more strategic than the ones in the entity condition why the results indicate that mean from both games is a significant predictor for compatible negotiation outcomes.

The results showed that the entity theorists outperformed the incremental theorist in the integrative negotiation issues. This is not consistent with the predictions in hypothesis
nr 6. The integrative issues in a negotiation are important because by communication
the negotiators can increase the overall outcome of the negotiation. One explanation for
this result might be that the participants had an idea of the researcher’s hypotheses in
this study. Based on earlier studies, our prediction was that the participants would do
worse if they read an article that expressed an entity viewpoint of negotiation (Burns &
Isbell, 2007; Dweck et al., 1995; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). But many psychology
students are used to participate in experiments, which can make them more aware of
manipulative elements and react to them in ways that other people would not. It can be
worth mentioning that the students participating in Kray and Haselhuhns study also
were ground course university students and MBA students (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007).
Maybe those who participated in their studies didn’t have the same experience with
manipulative elements in experiments. This can be one of the draw backs with using
psychology students in psychological research. Some of them might also have a
personal interest in the particular field. The participants knew that the experiment was
about decision making, and they signed up themselves to participate. This might help us
to explain why the results sometimes appear contradictive. The result tells us that the
article did have an impact on the participant’s belief about negotiation skills, because
the incremental theorists rated the negotiation ability to be more malleable. Yet, the
incremental theorists were outperformed by the entity theorists in some of the
negotiation outcomes. If the participants were trying to figure out the research question
they might have tried to act against it, which could help us explain why the results
sometimes were quite contradictive. One may also take into account that the participants
might have tried to act against what was purposed in the article they got to read even if
they didn’t figured out the research question. The choice of method in this study is
based on earlier research and was conducted in similar ways that the method has been
used before (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007).

Consistent with our predictions in hypothesis nr 7 the participants who read the article
with the incremental viewpoint did report the negotiation ability to be more malleable
than the participants who read the article with the entity viewpoint. This is also
consistent with results from earlier studies where the belief theories of the participants
have been manipulated successfully (Burns & Isbell, 2007; Dweck et al., 1995; Kray &
Haselhuhn, 2007). However, contrary to our predictions in hypothesis nr 6 we were not
able to manipulate the participant’s core negotiation skills in all negotiation outcomes.
This is inconsistent with results from other similar studies were the incremental theorists
outperformed the entity theorists in negotiation tasks (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). The
results in this study are indicating the opposite to that of earlier studies. Can it be that
the Swedish context is somehow different than the American one? If the Swedish
students are reacting differently it might be an explanation to the results. Bazerman has
suggested that culture can be an explanation of how people often fail to reach a
consensus in negotiations (Bazerman, 1983). It can be of interest to compare how the
cultural context affects people and their belief theories as well. The non significant
results can also be discussed in terms of statistical power. If the effect is small it might
be difficult to show the effect with a sample as small as the one used in this study.
Therefore it can be of interest to examine this issue with a larger sample.

Reliability and validity

One important aspect of psychological research is to use the right measuring
instruments to detect a psychological construct (Shadish, Cook, Campbell, 2002). If we
want to say something about a person’s strategic ability, we want to be shore that the
method used to detect that particular construct, is really measuring what we want it to measure, and not some other construct. In the case of the Beauty-contest game there might be a risk that we measure a person’s mathematical or numerical skills, instead of his or her strategic ability. The Theater game was invented to serve as a new form of measurement of strategic ability. But since it is a new form of strategic game, only used in pilot studies before, one may question the validity of the measurement. How do we know that this scenario really measure strategic ability? For one thing, it is based on the widely used Beauty-contest game, which has been tested over several studies, by several researchers, and with a wide range of participants (Camerer, 2003; Grosskopf & Nagel, 2008; Nagel et al., 2002). The Beauty-contest game can therefore be said to be a relatively reliable and valid measure for strategic ability. The people who participate in the new Theater game will need to reason the same way as they need to do in the Beauty-contest game. The Beauty-contest game can be a valid measure of strategic ability. But one may also believe that there are better ways of measuring it. And according to the results from this study the new Theater game did capture the participant’s strategic ability better than the Beauty-contest game. None of the games were able to significantly predict negotiation outcomes, which is a situation where strategic ability often shows of. This study and other similar research shows that peoples strategic ability show of more easily in less abstract situations (Chou et al., 2007). And the result from both game turned out to be a significant predictor for compatible negotiation outcomes. Based on the results from research on strategic decision-making it might be an idea to measure strategic ability with several different kinds of tasks, both numerical and intuitive.

The survey “what can be changed” was important to measure the participant’s core malleability view before it was manipulated by the short article. The drawback of using a survey method can be that the researcher is left only with a point on a scale. To draw inference from results like that can be difficult. Like any method, a survey has its difficulties but sometimes the only way to get information from a large group of people is to ask them what they think. The purpose of the survey in this study was to get information about the participant’s view of how malleable they believed themselves and their surroundings were. In the survey the participants were asked about the malleability of themselves, their parents, their close friends, people in their environment, their country, their organizations, and the world they live in were changeable. One important issue of validity is that the method used should cover a large extent of the construct. If we want to know how good a person’s mathematical skills are we don’t get the full picture if we only ask questions about addition. Mathematic skills are more than just addition. One can therefore say that the survey “what can be changed” is a measurement that is trying to detect people’s view of malleability over a wide range of settings.

The negotiation task the New recruit (Neal, 1997) used in this study is a method used in several studies before (Curhan & Pentland, 2007; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Thompson, 1990). A negotiation of a contract of employment is something that most people have experience of but one drawback with this kind of method is that the participants only gets 30 minutes to reach a consensus. In real life it can take time to reach an agreement about a contract of employment. One may even have time to think about an offer and then get back to the other part with an answer in real negotiations. So one might question if this method really can give us information about how people would behave in a real negotiation. Even though it is not perfectly comparable to a negotiation in real life it can still give us information about a person’s negotiation ability in several different kinds of negotiation issues.
To make the manipulative element in this study, the short fictional article as valid as possible in this experiment, it was translated into Swedish by a professional translator. The point of this element was to manipulate the participant’s beliefs about negotiations. It can still be important to think about how comparable it is to earlier studies were it has been used. We have not found any Swedish studies were the same method has been used and one can, as mentioned earlier question if this article has the same effect on the Swedish participants as on the Americans.

**Future research**

In the stock market, we need to recruit people with a high strategic ability. And recruiting people can often be expensive and time consuming. One may think that if there was a fast and easy way to detect strategic ability, it can be of great use for the recruiting business. The field of psychological testing is a growing market and often used when recruiting people for different kind of assignments (Larsen & Buss, 2008). But there are sometimes problems with the validity and reliability of those tests (Larsen & Buss, 2008). More research is needed to establish the validity of tests used to measure strategic ability. One suggestion for future research is to test if people in fields where strategic thinking is used, like in the stock market or estate market, are better on the kinds of strategic tasks used in this study.

As mentioned above, the participants in this study contained of psychology students at Stockholm University. One can therefore question the external validity in this study. It can be difficult to generalize the results to other groups of people in other situations (Shadish et al., 2002). It can be of interest to conduct similar studies with a wider range of participants and under different conditions. Replication is one of the oldest and most trusted methods to make inference about cause and effect (Cohen, 1994).

One of the main issues of this study was to find out if one of the decision situations, the Beauty-Contest game and the Theater game, was a better predictor for negotiation ability. Even though none of the games could significantly predict that ability given the data in this study it is of interest to examine this question further. The negotiation task used in this study, The New Recruit, is a task with quite a lot of numbers (Neal, 1997). One way to improve the design and make it more coherent can be to use a negotiation task that is more intuitive and less numerical. A negotiation situation is not always about setting a selling price, but about communication with the other part. It is not necessary that a person is good with numbers to detect the issues that are important for the opponent and try to find a way to settle the deal so that both parts can be satisfied.

This paper started with an explanation of the importance of understanding decision-making. We are confronted with commercials and sales options everyday and whether we like it or not we are affected by it. Research like the one conducted in this study can be used when making commercials for insurances, in the estate market or stock market. The contribution with this study is that it helps us understand how people can be affected when making judgments, and how much presentation of a problem affects us in strategic decision-making. And we have moved one step closer to understand strategic ability.
References


Hedberg, Tong, Iyengar, & Dweck (2002) and unpublished manuscript, Columbia University


