HILDUR KALMAN

THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWING
Existential Trust as an Epistemological Category

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THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWING
Existential Trust As an Epistemological Category

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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the structure of knowing, and it argues that existential trust is an epistemological category.

The aim of the dissertation is to develop a view according to which all human activity is seen as an activity of a lived body, and in which the understanding of the structure of such activity is regarded as central for the solution even of epistemological problems. This view is not rooted in any one philosophical tradition, but circles around activity of the lived body. It connects thinkers who in other respects belong to different "isms" in philosophy. Central to the dissertation are Aristotle, Dewey, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Anscombe, Polanyi, and Grene.

Michael Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge, and connected concepts like attend to, attend from, and subsidiary awareness, are presented. Different kinds of subsidiary awareness, not noted by Polanyi, are distinguished. It is also argued that Polanyi has not seen all the implications of his view that instruments can be interiorized and be part of the lived body. Conversely, parts of the normally lived body can be exteriorized. Nor has Polanyi seen that one has subsidiary awareness of oneself as a certain kind of person. This fact, in turn, is shown to have implications for the way we constitute ourselves as agents. Since we are engendered agents, we always attend from gender.

In the last decade, the concept of trust has definitely entered epistemology. Mostly, it has been in terms of trusting testimony and/or testifier. This thesis wants to deepen that account. There is a more fundamental kind of trust, namely trust in oneself and trust in the world. It is called existential trust, and it is of epistemological importance, too. Existential trust, it is claimed, is necessary in all acts of knowing. Probably, this fact is hard to discover without having recourse to a distinction like that between attending from and attending to. Existential trust is shown in the way we attend from something. Observation and thinking are central epistemological categories, of course, but they should be supplemented by trust. Without trust they cannot perform any epistemological work.

Linguistically, 'to know' is a state verb. Superficially, it describes only a state, not an activity. This fact, however, does not contradict the view of knowledge put forward in the dissertation. To know is to have a disposition to perform successfully either some kind of action (= knowing how), or to perform some kind of true assertive speech act (= knowing that). Basically, knowing is an activity.

Keywords: lived body, knowing, existential trust, tacit knowing, Polanyi, subsidiary awareness, experience, gender, epistemology, from-to structure, agency.
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HILDUR KALMAN
This is the war of the words, the worst war ever
This is the war over who names what
    and who listens to whom
    and who says what in which voice
who is heeded and who is ignored
who interrupts and who listens.

Aristotle says that slaves talk indirectly;
    they circle around the question,
    and take a long time to come to the point.
That's how slaves talk;
But you know, you have a servant problem these days:
    we're insolent and poorly trained
    in matters of deference and genuflection,
    and all too likely to talk back.

In the Great War of Words for Control of the Naming of Reality
we have a bad attitude
we're reckless and we're rude,
we name things better left unsaid
we show things you see in your mind's eye but
    think we don't know you see
we show you things you shut out of your mind's eye as nonexistent,
    like us, for example.

From The Great War for Control of Reality: (Her Voice)
by Adrian Piper

To my children Teitur and Thor, without whom not
Hildur Kalman
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Some years ago I stumbled upon the painting “Schack matt” by Birthe Wesselhöft—a painting that I find to be a supreme illustration of the
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Last but not least I wish to thank my husband Olof Ahlgren for his emotional support. Contrary to a myth upheld by some, no one writes a thesis twenty-four hours a day, and were it so: the worse for the results I would say. A large part of my life has not been concerned with the writing of this thesis at all, but with cherishing life in a number of other ways together with him. I am deeply grateful for Olle’s sharing those valuable parts of life with me.

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Introduction

What if epistemology takes the experience of the human lived body seriously? What is characteristic of knowing when it is investigated as being an activity of the lived body? What is fundamental to such activity?

To find answers to these questions, one should take one's point of departure in the activity of an agent that acts knowingly, without hesitation. In this way questions about knowledge become questions about knowing, the activity of knowing. This thesis in philosophy of science belongs within a strain of philosophy that stresses activity, man as agent, and where activity is bound to the lived body in this world.

Lived bodies have seldom been the concern of epistemologists; the main focus has been on knowledge as abstracted from its origin in, and continued existence in, lived bodies. To direct sustained epistemological attention to human bodies as they are lived, and to knowing as an activity of these lived bodies, is therefore a project that in my opinion is long overdue. Philosophy of science, which is mostly concerned with questions concerning sources and justifications of scientific knowledge, has focused on doubt rather than trust. Trust in testimony or the testifier has sometimes been dealt with, but existential trust, that is, trust in oneself, one's lived body, and in the world, is rather new to the epistemological arena. Existential trust is shown in the way we act and react, and characterizes the relation between our acting and what we act from.

The results of my philosophical reflections are mainly descriptive in character, as I aim to give an account of the way in which we do things knowingly. That the activity of knowing is fundamental to the possibility of human agency is in itself reason enough to engage in this descriptive project, but my interest is also furthered by its implicit normative potential. There are lessons to be drawn from Polanyi's claims that all knowledge is personal and that all attention is an attention from something. If these theses are given due attention, we can see how knowing can be enhanced as well as restrained in, e.g., education, training, and rehabilitation. We can also see how experiences are constitutive of further action such as, e.g., gendered experience being constitutive of gendered action.
Epistemological questions

A general definition of epistemology, given by D.W. Hamlyn in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (s.v. "epistemology, history of") informs us that epistemology is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions and basis, and the general reliability of claims to knowledge.

Inherent in the very term 'epistemology' there is an evaluation of what knowledge is, as the Greek word *episteme* refers to infallible knowledge.\(^1\) This infallible knowledge is contrasted to *doxa* which is fallible as it is mere opinion, assumption, view, or belief. Thus *epistemology* is concerned with knowledge of a certain kind, and that kind of knowledge is supposedly certain. The prevailing view within traditional epistemology is that it does not only concern infallible knowledge, such as mathematics according to the ancient Greeks. The demarcation is drawn somewhere around what is referred to as theoretical or propositional knowledge in general.

If, as often is the case, epistemology instead is referred to as a *theory of knowledge*, one might ask if it only concerns, and whether it should only concern, a special kind of knowledge. If epistemology only concerns what is referred to as theoretical knowledge, in what areas should then questions concerning the corporeality of knowledge, practical knowledge (whether referring to skills or to the wisdom of dealing with ethically salient situations, politics, etc.), be dealt with?

---

\(^1\) When I am specifically referring to a term or a word itself and it is not being used functionally, the term or the word will be enclosed in single quotation marks such as in the case of ‘epistemology’. When I refer to a concept or to key terms they will be italicized such as, e.g., in the cases of *existential trust* and *attend to*, respectively. Foreign words are set in italics, as are the titles of books. At times italics are used to signal emphasis, and quotation marks as in the case of “worlds” are there to signal special, nonstandard, use.
I will sketch a background of epistemology below that adheres to epistemology as only concerning *episteme*. After that I will make another starting point from an Aristotelian account of *praxis*, and sketch another possibility. What I suggest, as many have before me, is that epistemology as a theorizing of knowledge can address questions about knowledge understood in a broader sense. Making a move like this is in some respects to disregard the etymological roots of the term ‘epistemology’ and the roots of the concept in philosophical tradition.

**Epistemology as explanation of episteme**

The pre-Socratic philosophers, the first philosophers in the Western tradition, were primarily concerned with change, its nature and possibility. That we can obtain knowledge of nature was not doubted, but questions were raised about what sources of knowledge are best fit to afford us with knowledge of the structure of reality. During the fifth century B.C. human practices and institutions came under critical examination, and the Sophists asked how much of what we think we know about nature is really an objective part of it and how much is contributed by the human mind, and whether we have any knowledge of nature as it really is. As a result of this general scepticism, epistemology, as it has been traditionally known, developed. It has been concerned with attempts to justify claims that knowledge is possible, and to assess the part played by the senses and reason in the acquisition of knowledge.

Plato is often seen as the real originator of epistemology. He identifies *episteme* as being knowledge of the unchangeable and imperishable. In his dialogues *Meno*² and *Theaetetus*³ he attempts to deal with questions such as:

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² In the *Meno* Plato makes us aware of the paradox inherent in discovery or in the finding of a solution to a problem. The paradox rests on the assumption often stated by Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues that “of that which we know, we can also say what it is”. In the dialogue Socrates has a slave-boy solve some geometrical problems, though the boy claims not to know the answer from the beginning. So the problem is: how can we seek and find a solution to a problem? Either we know and can say what we are looking for, and thus do not need to look for it, or we do not know and cannot say what we are looking for and therefore will not be able to recognize the solution. Plato solves the paradox through the theory of *Anamnesis*; that knowledge is acquired, not as information
"What is knowledge?" and how much of what we ordinarily think we know is really knowledge? Do the senses provide knowledge? Can reason supply knowledge? What is the relation between knowledge and true belief?

In the Republic, Plato uses a metaphor for how he conceives of knowledge in light of his theory of ideas. He uses the picture of a line, consisting of four parts, that taken together will be used to depict the cosmos (1987, 509d-511). The first part of the line represents objects that are unreal, like shadows and reflections, and the second part represents objects that can be sensed. Together, these two parts constitute the phenomenal world, that we can reach through the use of our senses.

The third part of the line represents objects that are studied within science, which on Plato’s view is in large part mathematics, as the mathematical truths are unalterable. The fourth part represents the ideas, to Plato the most objective and real of all, (and not something subjective as we talk of ideas in a modern sense). Together, the third and fourth part of the line constitute the world that we can reach through our thinking.

The parts, from the first to the fourth, represent a rising degree of truth or reality. Each one of the four forms of reality match different forms of knowledge. To reflections and shadows correspond imagination, and to conveyed from one mind to another by teaching, nor through the senses, but by recollection of realities and truths seen and known by the soul before its incarnation to this life (Plato 1956).

Alexander Sesonske suggests an interpretation to the effect that the whole Socratic enterprise assumes that “saying without knowing can lead to knowledge, and suggests this, indeed, as the path to knowledge.” Awareness of ignorance is then the beginning of knowledge. Sesonske thinks that the problem of how saying without knowing can lead to knowledge may be resolved by seeing that quite a different kind of knowledge, a knowing without saying, underlies the dialectic (Sesonske 1963, 3).

A similar solution is proposed by Michael Polanyi who thinks that what the Meno clearly shows is that if all knowledge is explicit, i.e. capable of being clearly stated, then we cannot know a problem or look for its solution. Furthermore he thinks that the Meno shows that if problems nevertheless exist, and discoveries can be made by solving them, then we can know things, and important things at that, that we cannot tell. For this he introduces the concept of tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1967).

3 In the Theaetetus Plato deals with the question of what true knowledge is. In the line of argument Socrates suggests metaphors for memory, first as a Wax Tablet (190E-195B), and then as an Aviary (196D-199C). Different attempts to define knowledge are seen to fail, such as ‘knowledge is perception’, and ‘knowledge is true belief’ (Cornford 1960 [1935]).
objects known to our senses correspond beliefs and convictions. Taken as a whole the phenomenal world corresponds to opinion, or doxa in Greek.

Corresponding to the object of science is discursive knowledge, where the premises are known, and to the ideas corresponds philosophical knowledge. Knowledge, as episteme, is of the world since it can be reached through thinking.

Man, as consisting of body and soul, is to Plato a dual being that has access to both the world of ideas, through thinking, and to the phenomenal world through the senses. Knowledge as episteme is contrasted to doxa. Episteme is the knowledge of reason, while doxa stems from experience through the senses.

In a continuation of this line of thought, epistemology has throughout the history of philosophy, to a large extent been concerned with what is generally referred to as theoretical knowledge or propositional knowledge (that something is so).

Aristotelian praxis

The idea of man as active is originally explicated by Aristotle. Our senses are on Aristotle's account further not seen as being merely passive receptors of stimulation. This can be seen, for example, in his account of tactility in De Anima (1986) where it is a question of touch, and not mere cutaneous stimulation (Sheets-Johnstone 1990, 310). Through our agency we come to know the world.

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4 The role of perception in the epistemology of Aristotle is examined by Deborah Modrak in her book Aristotle: The Power of Perception. In short she concludes that

Knowledge (episteme) consists of the apprehension and manipulation of universals; nevertheless, basic (indemonstrable) universals are not arrived at through episteme. Universals are derived from particulars; particulars are apprehended through perception; thus episteme is ultimately dependent upon perception (1987, 160).

5 Michael O'Donovan-Andersson (1997) argues for embodied knowers as being in epistemic contact with the structured physical world in virtue of their agency, where intervention is a kind of knowing.
The concept of *praxis* is intimately connected to the philosophy of Aristotle. *Praxis* refers to the sphere of thought and action concerning the political and ethical life of man that Aristotle contrasts to *theoria*, the theoretical designs of logic, epistemology and metaphysics.

This contrastive comparison between theory and practice has been general in the history of philosophy from Aristotle on, and does not question the making of a difference between theory and practice, as in the Platonic roots of epistemology. Neither does Aristotle question the upholding of a division between episteme and other kinds of knowledge, albeit that his main concern is with what forms of activities that are supposed to lead to the highest good in life, where ‘praxis’ is a keyword.

There have been several philosophical approaches that have used the concept of *praxis* so that traditional demarcations between what is regarded to be the problems of epistemology, or theoretical philosophy, and what is considered to be problems of moral philosophy have been crossed. Karl Marx, at least once, linked *praxis* with a production paradigm in the interests of historical explanation, a thought that has influenced several marxist thinkers.

What Aristotle aims for, according to Sherman (1989, 3, note 2), is to “distinguish practical reason both from the top-down, deductive methods of *episteme* and from the procedural methods of *techne*.” Scientific understanding, with a subject-matter of unqualified and unchanging truths, the procedural methods of making handicraft products, and furthermore the bottom-up method of *epagoge*, when thinking from the particular to the universal, are all models that will not work for ethical theory, as there are always contingent circumstances for human action.

Ulla M. Holm has given accounts of the ecology of the philosophical concept of *praxis* as developed by Aristotle, where *praxis* is being specified according to the context (1990, 68-70; 1991; 1993, 179-194). My account given below is a short summary of Holm’s more elaborate accounts, as I am providing the pertinent points for my discussion.

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6 ‘Praxis’ stems from the Greek word *prasso* referring to ‘doing’ or ‘acting’ (*The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 1995).

7 See Marx’ so-called Feuerbach theses in (Engels 1946 [1888]).

8 For a schematic illustration of the Aristotelian concept of *praxis*, and its specifications with regard to differing context, see *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, s.v. “praxis, praktisch”.

‘Praxis’ means movements or that which causes movements. In a broad sense, in cosmological context, it means only this. Then in a biological context the term ‘praxis’ is used for movement that is a realization or a manifestation of life, in contrast to any movement. Manifestations of life are, for example, when living beings reproduce, rear offspring or gather food.

In aesthetic context praxis is one of the basic concepts closely related to ways of life, and in this context it acquires new dimensions of meaning through its being connected to whole courses of life, to characters they manifest, and further to their passions and sufferings (Holm 1991, 54). So from a cosmological and biological category, the concept of praxis of Aristotle is now condensed into an anthropological category where man is “origin and principle of certain actions”, as “[o]nly human beings can choose to start” or “refrain from starting courses of events” (54), and where the choices made are motivated by desire. The anthropological category of praxis can then be contrasted to non-human movements of living organisms that are realizations of life in general.

In the anthropological category of praxis, contrast is further made between theoria and praxis. Aristotle thus makes theorizing a sort of praxis too, that makes possible human welfare and meaning of life (Holm 1993, 184). I will return to this idea of theoria as a form of praxis below.

A further specification of praxis is in a metaphysical context where Aristotle distinguishes between potentiality and possibility on the one hand, and on the other actuality or perfection (gr. energeia). Potentiality and possibility are with human beings either “inborn capacities of the mind, or dispositions acquired through practices or studies” (Holm 1991, 55). Actuality or perfection are the actualized capacities or dispositions in use. Aristotle stipulates a distinction between two forms of actualization, that is motions in general (kinesis) and species-realizing motions in particular, that is to say energeia in narrow sense. These forms of actualization represent for humans two different forms of praxis, whereby the one corresponding to energeia in [a] narrow sense will be defined as praxis in [a] proper sense (Holm 1991, 55).

Praxis in the narrow sense of energeia are activities that are purposeful in themselves, and that are complete at any moment. An example of this would be that when it is true to say ‘I am seeing’, it is also true to say ‘I have
seen'. Activities of this narrow sense of *energeia* can be contrasted to those human activities that correspond to *kinesis*, and that can be separated from and subordinated to their goals, such as the acts of building a house. In the case of building a house, when it will be true to say that 'I am building a house', it will not at the same time be true to say 'I have built a house', as the process and its completion are mutually exclusive besides implying one another. This distinction is made for the benefit of the ethical-political context so that the acts of doing, producing or creating, *poiesis*, can be separated from acting in a narrower sense, that is *praxis* in a proper sense (Holm 1991, 55).

Still another role for the concept of *praxis* is given when Aristotle discusses what forms of activities are supposed to lead to the highest good in life. He borrows from Plato a conceptual distinction between the theoretical-philosophical and the civil-political, as two different forms of life, but replaces the concepts with the pair *theoretical-practical* through a strategic, semantic act. Through this “a unique form of human existence for a free human being, i.e. the *political* is reinterpreted and revalued.” Even using “the combination *political and practical* living”, he argues for *good acting* (*eu prattein*) as part of the most valuable life. “Flourishing in *prosperous acting* is exercising *praxis*” (Holm 1991, 56-7).

The three dimensions of *theoria*, *poiesis*, and *praxis* in [a] proper sense also frame the Aristotelian categorization of the sciences, human excellences, states of the world, forms of reason and parts of the rational soul. Theoretical science, ‘*episteme*’, distinguishes a logos actualized as firm knowledge through attending towards unchangeable and necessary entities. The logos actualized as a productive capacity he calls ‘*art*’ in the sense of artfulness. The Greek term is ‘*techne*’. The logos guiding *praxis* in human affairs and welfare is practical wisdom, prudence or moral insight. The Greek word is ‘*phronesis*’ (Holm 1991, 57).

To conclude there is within the concept of *praxis*, as a manifestation or realization of human life, first a distinction between *praxis* and *theoria*. In the exercise of *theoria* we obtain *episteme*, true knowledge of that which cannot be otherwise. In the exercise of *praxis* there is a further distinction to be made, the one between *poiesis* and *praxis* proper. Through the exercise of *poiesis* we obtain *techne*, a kind practical knowledge that is referred to as
artfulness. Lastly in the exercise of praxis proper we may gain practical wisdom, that is phronesis.

Philosophical questions concerning the ethical and political life of man, as the praxis of Aristotle, are dealt with within the branch of philosophy referred to as moral philosophy.

Theoria as a form of praxis

When Aristotle makes a blanket term of praxis so as to include both theoria and praxis Holm sees this as a move to legitimate philosophizing, one that makes it possible for him to claim that theoretical praxis is even the highest form or praxis. Holm, in accordance with Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation, sees this as a fall back into a Platonism at odds with the rest of Aristotle’s practical-philosophical writings, as he explicitly argues that happiness cannot be reached through mere contemplation (Holm 1991, 56; 1993, 184; Nussbaum 1986, 375-77).

Whether this inclusion of theoria in praxis must be seen as opposed to Aristotle’s other writings on the matter of praxis is questioned by Nancy Sherman. In her reading of Aristotle she finds that, “[c]ontrary to the popular interpretation according to which ethical habituation is non-rational, . . . it includes early on the engagement of cognitive capacities” (1989, 7). She argues that there is in the Aristotelian account of habituation a cognitive shaping of desires through perception, belief, and intention. A process of moral education will cultivate the perceptual and deliberative capacities that are requisite for mature character, and this cannot be accounted for in a mechanical theory of habituation (158). So “[i]f excellence of character is inseparable from practical intellect, then an account of moral education must recognize this fact” (7).

There is on Sherman’s reading of Aristotle’s practical ethical theory no opposition between theory and practice. Instead “the exercise of practical reason in its various aspects (i.e. perceptual, deliberative, and collaborative) will be ways in which the virtuous agent proceeds, at a determinate level, to construct a conception of good living” (1989, 10). Moving between particular deliberations and the reflective mode is continuous and part of the same complex process of determining what is good in life.
The practically wise individual is thus in a certain way a theoretician, capable of a reasoned conception of happiness achieved through the dialectical skills of the ethicist. . . . And, conversely, the Aristotelian ethicist must be practically wise. For the theory ultimately requires familiarity with the particular circumstances of human life; it is based upon experience, and it is about individuatetable particulars, even if the account it gives is not detailed or precise enough to determine choice. As theory, it remains inexact, awaiting the more determinate operations of practical reason in its perceptual and decision-making roles (Sherman 1989, 11).

Theorizing, as Sherman points out, is not a way to lay bare an implicit method. What theorizing gives us is not a “general rule we apply or a procedure we bring to bear for constructing principles” (1989, 25). The orthos logos of Aristotle’s phronimos, the reasoning by which one hits the mean in action and feeling, is “always much closer to the particulars: a way of ‘improvising’ and ‘conjecturing’ given experience and what is now at hand” (25). The process of formulating intentions depends upon what we perceive as relevant in the case. Prior to an agent’s decision to act in a situation that she finds ethically urgent, there is a perception of the circumstances. Perceiving what is ethically salient in a situation requires a “reading” of those circumstances. The agent is responsible for her “reading” of the situation, as it is informed by ethical considerations expressive of her virtue (29).

Character is the acquisition of states (hexeis) through habituation, a process involving practice and repetition. A virtuous character then has acquired good hexeis through the practice and repetition of virtuous acts, where the acquired capacity becomes second nature, or almost natural. “Character states thus arise through the sorts of activities that are involved in their exercise” (Sherman 1989, 177).

The virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts (Aristotle 1980, 1103a10-1103b25).

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9 A similar reading is given by (Holm 1993, 185).
Holm discusses the problem of how our development of good *hexeis* is supposed to come through acting *as if* one already is virtuous. This seems paradoxical as only the agent who in praxis realizes what is good will be able to act accordingly. Does the agent then already possess the knowledge, or the practical wisdom, she is trying to achieve? Does a *knowing why* a situation is ethically salient, or the *knowing that* certain features are relevant in perception and action, precede a *knowing how* or an *ability* to act. This Holm finds to be inconsistent with Aristotle’s claim that theoretical knowing, *episteme*, in itself can not move an agent to action. To be susceptible for theory as a guide for practice, one already has to possess some basic proficiencies according to Aristotle. So Holm (1993, 189) resolves the seeming paradox by seeing theoretical and practical knowledge as being co-constituted. Some concepts demanded by one form of knowledge presuppose concepts from the other form and vice versa. An agent must have exercised the practice in question to be able to theorize about it in a meaningful way.

The stress on the practice and repetition of virtuous acts is not to be understood as implying that we simply become just by doing just actions. Presupposed in action is, as was stated above, a perception of a situation as requiring a response. In the impulse to act that is included in the perception there are “reactive emotions that mark that response, and desires and beliefs about how and for the sake of what ends one should act” (Sherman 1989, 178). So the notion of repetition in Aristotelian habituation is not to be doing the same action over and over again, as any

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10 In her theorizing of mothering as praxis Holm (1993, 190-2) develops a critique of Aristotle’s concept of *hexeis* as patriarchal, aristocratic, imbued with teleological ends, and even inconsistent in its own terms. On Aristotle’s account the patriarch guides his wife and slaves (as women have an undeveloped faculty of reason, and slaves completely lack one) so that they can carry out the training of *hexeis* with the children (sons). But as Holm points out this is inconsistent with Aristotle’s own account of how praxis is developed. As the patriarch has not exercised the practice in question, he is not able to theorize about it in a meaningful way, and thus will not be able to guide those involved in it. Aristotle would on his own theory be bound to admit that women and slaves apparently possess practical proficiencies that the patriarch as theoretician cannot even grasp as he has not exercised those activities at all.

In (Holm 1999) she states that recent rereadings of Aristotle with regard to gender and reason does suggest that women, on Aristotle’s account, do not lack in their capacity for intellectual deliberation, but rather in authoritative agency as a sequel to such deliberation. Whether this lack in authoritative agency is due to conventional or constitutional reasons is unclear though.
just action will be contextually defined and will vary considerably from other just actions.

Whilst noticing that habituation is not brought about by mere repetition, Sherman makes us wary of the rejection of simplified analogies to the practice of skills, where presumably there would be some isolatable sequence of steps. The point is that even in the cases of the repetition of such a sequence (of seemingly isolatable steps), the repetition cannot involve doing the same action, if by that is meant doing just what one did before. Such a repetition would make one do the same thing over and over again, including making mistakes, instead of improving or progressing.

Staying with the simplified analogy with a skill, Sherman claims that a more plausible conception of repeating the same action would involve trying to approximate some ideal action type that has been set as one's goal. So instead of mere mechanical repetition, learning through repetition will be successive trials where an awareness of the goal is present. The successive trials will then vary from one another as they approach the ideal way of acting. Not only awareness of the goal is important, but so are measures of how nearly one has reached it or by how much one has failed to reach it. The practice is not merely “sheer mechanical repetition of any one action”, but rather a refinement of actions through successive trials (Sherman 1989, 179). This is a feature in the acquisition of skill that is also pointed out by Polanyi: “[t]he skilful performer is seen to be setting standards to himself and judging himself by them” (1958, 64). On Aristotle’s account this is what a phronimos, the practically wise and excellent in virtue, would do.

In further development of this line of thought Sherman suggests that practice achieves progress to the extent that repetition is critical. Then

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11 It is interesting to note that Sherman’s philosophical account of skills or skilful action as not being acquired through mere mechanical repetition is on par with empirical findings of movement science. When studying the nature of repetition and its contribution to the acquisition of motor skills, it has been shown that cognitive processing is a key component of practice, that is even undermined by repetitive performance. This is taken to mean that the physical act of repetition is only part of the process undertaken during a repetition of an action (Lee, Swanson, and Hall 1991). See also (Emmerik and Newell 1987; Higgins 1991; Maring 1990; Weinstein 1991).

12 The necessity for repetition to be critical is also a prerequisite in the acquisition of motor skills. In the acquisition of motor skills each trial is a process, in which there is a construction of an action plan. Comparing a blocked-order practice, (such as hitting a ball that is coming from the same angle, with the same speed over and over again), and a random order practice, (such as hitting a ball that comes from a variation of angles and
whether the states to be acquired are primarily physical, intellectual, or emotional, and whether they concern *techne* or character she concludes that the acquisition of these “must involve the employment of critical capacities, such as attending to a goal, recognizing mistakes and learning from them, understanding instructions, following tips and cues, [and] working out how to adapt a model’s example to one’s own behaviour” (Sherman 1989, 179). Obviously the practice of actions will be more complex in the case of virtue than when concerned with skill, as virtuous action combines “a judgement of circumstances, reactive emotions, and some level of decision of how to act” (179).

Holm makes some points to counter interpretations of praxis in simple analogy with skills, rule-following or theoretical principles. The first point is that theoretical reflection gives us opportunity to “think away” all that is culturally relative and susceptible to historical change, and even to discover in, or ascribe to, reality a skeleton of facts regulated by natural laws. The second point is that living in and dealing with reality affords us with an abundance of more things to consider, such as slowly changing interpersonal “facts” such as language, culture, social relations, practices and artefacts. In action Holm claims these conventional facts to acquire almost the same epistemological status as natural laws. Even if it would be the case that one is breaking the laws, one is still acting on them in some sense. To neglect them is not always possible and furthermore there may be times at which neglect may lead to one to feel ill at ease somehow. Such a feeling may even be worse when there is a clash between cultures and one does not

with different speed) in the acquisition of motor skill, shows how the critical process of problem solving is circumvented with a blocked-order practice. “Repeated practice on the same variation of a task, as defined by blocked-order practice schedules, serves to circumvent the process of action-plan construction” (Lee, Swanson, and Hall 1991, 152). Blocked-order practice schedules take a short cut by relying on a previously generated action plan, and the repetition can evolve as a simple modification. Following this performance can be good, although skill is not learned or retained. Random-order practice on the other hand makes subjects practice on all task variations throughout motor skill acquisition, requiring them to better learn the process of action-plan construction. So if our goal is to teach someone skill, as a process of problem-solving, it would be unwise to create a practice situation in which the process of problem-solving would be circumvented (Winstein 1991). This can be compared to the learning of classical philosophical texts by heart, without understanding what problems are addressed in the text. The distinction between learning and performance is as relevant with regard to motor skill as it is in theoretical learning.
know what “facts” one is up against. Holm concludes that the knowledge required as guidance for praxis concerning human affairs and well-being is phronesis, the practical wisdom described by Aristotle (Holm 1993, 185-6).

I do not think, though, that to assess the complexity of human life and to celebrate the phronesis required to live and deal with it, must necessarily be done by way of making skills simplistic, such as when Holm refers to the skills of walking and riding a bicycle, as acting in automatic ways. I would claim that in the exercise of these skills, in similarity with the virtuous person exercising virtues described by Holm, one can see how the skilful pedestrian or cyclist “has acquired a sort of ‘intuition’ to find the best alternative of actions considering all relevant details in the specific, concrete situation” (Holm 1991, 59). Considering the complexity of many situations in walking and cycling, it is obvious that the skill is not automatic, but that we are habituated to act skilfully, and that this habituation facilitates the judgement of the moment. If one has had an opportunity to witness bike couriers making their way in heavy New York traffic, or the bounding strides of reindeer breeding Sami in mountain terrain one will know how to admire those kinds of skill. There is no more automaticity there than in virtuous action, not even in the cases of those of us who are not as skilful in the art of walking or biking.

Nor does recognition of the complexity of phronesis have to be done by way of regarding theoretical reflection as either mere contemplation in a Platonic sense or as scientistic attempts to simplify questions concerning the ethical and political domain. Skill and skilfulness are furthermore as much a part of science as of other domains of human praxis.

My point of interest in Sherman’s interpretation of Aristotle’s writings, where the learning of virtue is neither a mindless nor a purely intellectual matter, is that it questions a conception of practical knowledge as being fundamentally different from theoretical knowledge. Not only can practice be enhanced through reflection and reasoning, but also is theory only developed successfully in interplay with the exercise of the practice that is the object of the theorizing in question.

Being neither an Aristotelian scholar, nor a moral philosopher, I am in no position to argue for Sherman’s reading of Aristotle as being true to his

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13 What is referred to as scientism is the belief that the natural sciences offer the unique model for discovering what there is.
writing. Her interpretation of his remarks on *theoria* as part of *praxis* though, does at least show that it is not inconceivable to read Aristotle's remarks on *theoria* as consistent with his overall conception of *praxis*.

To conclude: philosophical questions concerning knowledge in a broad sense may be excluded from the confines of epistemology narrowly defined. Instead, such questions can be posed as a starting point, where practical knowledge is the paradigm, and where theoretical knowledge is conceived of as a subset of practical knowledge.

Practical knowledge pertains to human activity, and this activity is an activity of a *lived body*. Different thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition have attended to practical knowledge, and thus developed this informal tradition, albeit theirs belonging to different "isms" in philosophy in other respects. Central to my work, with respect to epistemological questions concerning the knowing of the lived body, besides Aristotle, are John Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, G.E.M. Anscombe, Michael Polanyi and Marjorie Grene.

A starting point like this can be considered Aristotelian. Whether my continued investigation can be that as well, might be questioned as this

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14 There are other approaches than the purely Aristotelian that have approached questions of knowledge in a wider sense, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Its task was to illuminate the interpretative and linguistic context in which all understanding occurs, and he criticized epistemology’s project since Descartes as a fundamentally mistaken pursuit of a method of inquiry. His hermeneutics has then mostly been understood as an alternative to epistemology. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1980, 357) Richard Rorty writes of hermeneutics as a setting aside of the classic picture of human beings so that epistemologically centered philosophy can be set aside. On his reading hermeneutics is a philosophy without epistemology. Linda Alcoff counters Rorty’s interpretation in *Real Knowing*. She argues for Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as a theory of knowledge, as it sets out the conditions necessary for understanding to occur. Understanding this to be an epistemological project Alcoff shows how Gadamer is concerned with how knowledge is possible, instead of trying to secure a method as a means to epistemic certainty, which he criticizes Descartes for having done (Alcoff 1996, 18-24).

15 Besides the philosophers mentioned above, some others ought to be mentioned here in spite of their not being central to this dissertation. Donald Schöns (1983; 1987) develops an epistemology of practice which is based on reflection-in-action. Bengt Molander (1996a) also develops this informal tradition, stressing knowing or “knowledge-in-action” (*kunskap-i-handling*). See also (Molander 1997). Linguist Ingela Josefson (1991) has been one of the main proponents in Sweden for recognizing the importance of knowledge-by-acquaintance. Allan Janik (1996) discusses the concept of knowledge from the point of view of praxis.
thesis is concerned with similarities in the nature of instances of knowing, rather than with differences. I suggest that in recognizing the anthropological category of praxis, as including both theoria and praxis, my investigation should be recognized as an endeavour Aristotelian in spirit.

Even while making use of terms that are commonly used to distinguish instances of knowing from each other (such as for example ‘knowing-that’, ‘knowing-how’, and ‘knowing-what’), I invoke a perspective on knowing that I hope will highlight a similarity in the structure and nature of knowing in general.

Practical knowledge as paradigm knowledge

Practical knowledge starts from the position of agents. Agents need a starting point from which to direct their actions, or points from which to redirect their actions. Such a starting point, or rather such an axis, to direct one’s actions from I claim to be something that we trustingly act from. We must trust ourselves and the world, in some sense, to be able to carry out any action. This kind of trust may be conceived of as a certainty from which we act. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work On Certainty (1979 [1969]) revolves around the question of certainty. He is concerned with certainty as being at once empirical and at the same time being seemingly immune to doubt.16

Mats Furberg (1994) describes how Wittgenstein turns certainty from being a problem for observers who aim at propositional knowledge to being a problem for humans in action. Knowledge in the Platonic-Cartesian tradition is concerned with finding “truths”, truths that are taken to be amenable to propositional formulation. Certainty, if addressed, is often construed as evidence that is manifested as a truth. With such an approach certainty is a problem for observers who aim at propositional knowledge, as there arises a need for justification.

If one approaches certainty as a problem for humans in action the need for justification does not arise, at least not in that form, as the certainty is a prerequisite for even engaging in a project of justification. Agents, Furberg

16 Many of Wittgenstein’s remarks are aimed at truisms expressed by G.E. Moore in his papers “Proof of the External World” and “Defence of Common Sense” (Moore 1959).
claims, need some knowing-that to be able to act wisely. They do not need only that though, but diverse kinds of knowing; knowing-that, knowing-what, knowing-how; abilities and a sound judgement to be able to carry out their actions. Most of all they need something to start from. Whatever an agent thinks or believes about her/his starting point is not without importance, but Furberg does not think that this is as decisive as tradition would have it, though. The important thing is that the agent takes some things for granted, and that reasons to regret having taken those things for granted will not arise. This is the certainty that forms the starting point of the agent. Furberg points out that this “taking some things for granted” is not an outcome of a decision, but rather a thing of “body and limbs”. He takes care to discourage a reading of this description as being one of a stimulus/response-mechanism, as what happens before and after is important even in moments seemingly devoid of deliberation (1994, 150-1).

Furberg claims that for Descartes, Georg Edward Moore and their tradition well-founded certainty is a lack of doubt, whereas for Wittgenstein certainty is lack of hesitation. For Wittgenstein certainty is to act, without hesitation and without being at loss about what to do. Of course this entails that we may at times be ill-informed, and therefore do wrong, but that we are still acting with confidence. It is a mistake to think that all our actions are or should be well-founded, for example in terms of propositional knowledge. Some of the ways we react to a situation, Furberg in his reading of Wittgenstein claims, are on the contrary the foundation and basis for the elements of propositional knowledge: the conditions for our validation of truth or falsehood, and so forth. Validating and making judgements are actions, thus in need of an axis or a starting point (Furberg 1994, 151, 154).

The axis or starting point for validating or making judgements is the certainty that is lack of hesitation. Lacking hesitation we trust in the way that we reach the conclusion of a statement, accept it, and in how we use and understand its content. This kind of trust is consequently not in a propositional statement, nor in its content. My focus in this thesis is not directed at propositional content, but at the directing with which, for example, we reach and use propositional statements. The certainty which

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17 The passage of On Certainty discussed here is § 231-2.
we attend from when concerned with propositional knowledge I claim to be an *existential trust*. Certainty as *existential trust*, forming a starting point or axis for our actions, is a topic that will be further developed in chapter four: "Trust".

**A pragmatic approach to epistemology**

In fact there is only one process: that is ourselves trying to make sense of things, trying to find significance in what would else be chaos (Grene 1966, 34).

In science, just as in art and in life, only that which is true to culture is true to nature (Fleck 1979 [1935], 35).

Whether acknowledged or not, an Aristotelian heritage is maintained in pragmatism as it works with a wide conception of knowledge, connected to man in action. Pragmatism is primarily an American school initiated by Charles Sanders Peirce and further developed by William James and John Dewey. The pragmatist paradigm of knowledge is one of interaction. In the root meaning of *pragma*, deed or affair, significations of ‘praxis’ are also discernible. Insisting on a connection of knowledge with action, it repudiates the requirement of absolute certainty in knowledge. As knowledge is equated with successful practice, propositional statements are but instruments which may take us to the goal towards which our experimental endeavours are directed. That which has been shown to work, the trustworthy, is truth on a pragmatic account. Peirce introduced the term ‘fallibilism’, to denote the tentative character of the conclusions of science. We can only say if something has worked so far. What has worked in our experimental investigations is what we judge to be true. We will work from that which we judge to be true and truth is in this sense future-directed. But it is not until after these future experimental engagements that we will know if it also worked in those instances. A pragmatic judgement of truth is therefore a value-judgement. Truth is adverbial, it is a modifier of action.

Dewey was one to be most suspicious of traditional philosophical dualisms that he saw as inherent in the philosophical tradition from Plato
to Descartes and onward. This is reflected in his epistemological writings which are critical of the tradition's dependence on the dichotomies of subject/object, fact/value, nature/culture and theory/practice, and proposing a conception of *experience* that is much richer and thicker than a mere "sensation" as it has often been described in empiricist philosophy.

According to Dewey, any significant experience is a unity of practical, emotional, and intellectual qualities. The emotional phase pervades and unifies the others. Experiences are intellectual simply because they have meaning, and they are practical in the sense that organisms interact with surrounding objects and events. On reflection, these aspects can be distinguished. Since one aspect may dominate the others, an experience can be accurately described as primarily intellectual or aesthetic, but to substantialize these distinctions distorts the original unity of the experience and ignores the influence of the subordinate aspects (Seigfried 1997, 164-5).

Dewey suggests thought, science and philosophy to be tools or instruments. This suggestion should not be read as an attempt to reduce the complexity of human activity to mere manipulation or to mere calculation. It should be read in light of his view of knowing as a way of doing. His metaphor of 'tools' is not meant to be a reduction of knowledge. It is not a question of artefacts lying in a tool-box, albeit there being some versions of pragmatism where an instrumentalism is stressed that does not give the practical reasoning of *phronesis* its due. It should be obvious to my readers that the pragmatist approach of Dewey that I am suggesting is not one that reduces knowledge to "mere" instrumentality. It is the other way around: his pointing to the use of tools is the way they are part of our acting, *as parts of ourselves in action*. Dewey sees the acquisition of skill and possession of knowledge as marks of growth and as means to its continuing.

The question of instrumentalism in pragmatism is closely related to a discussion of *means* versus *ends*. A division John Dewey argues against is the one between means and ends, where ends are seen as "higher", "pure", "final", "given", and existing for its own sake, and means are seen as "mere", "lower", and existing only for the sake of something else. Against this he proposes an idea of the thoroughly reciprocal character of ends and means, where one has to have an idea of the means to have a clear, well-worked out and thorough idea about the end.
Connected to this is the critique that Dewey offers of the division between *instrumental* and *constitutive* means. An example of *instrumental means* I suggest would be, for example, of having sex not as part and parcel of the good life, but as a means to getting the good life in other respects. The relation between the sexual act and the good life is then seen as being mechanical and external, for example, if one engages in the sexual act to get peace and quiet within a relationship, or to get money to spend in the making of that good life. *Constitutive means*, on the still criticized view, would be modelled in contrast to such instrumental means where, for example, the showing of sympathy is shown in constitutive acts of sympathy. What Dewey aims at is an integration of means and ends, where the means are constitutive of the end. If adhering to his proposed alternative, the sexual act as instrumental should not be seen as instrumental in the external-model sense, where the good life is set apart from the means by which it is supposed to be acquired. The means would be totally integrated in the *end* of getting the good life. The sexual act would be part of that good life, and constitutive of it. The *instrumental* on Dewey’s account is to be an organic constituent (and thus constitutive) of the end.

As man, according to Dewey, is basically in activity, it is not a question of getting some work done and deciding on an appropriate tool for the work to be done—that would be an instrumentalist view of the matter that he would oppose. Instead, our acting affords us with experiences, thoughts, emotions, and so forth, and in the process we act with respect to the situations that arise. In this process different capacities and abilities of ours are called for, including such things as the capacity to “read” a situation. But whatever is called for and that we utilize in the situations as we are redirecting our activity is an organic constituent of us, is something that is part of us in that action. This is the case whether we are speaking of the know-how of mathematical operations, the ability to “read” signs of fatigue in a person and the know-how to then abstain from making unnecessary demands on her/him, the capacity to ponder how to understand such things as genocide, or whether we are speaking of the blind person finding her/his way with the help of a stick, which is an instrument in a more obvious sense of the word.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{18}\) The blind man with his stick is an example discussed by Merleau-Ponty as well as Polanyi.
Modelling the idea of man as being in a continuous process or activity precludes ideas such as passive reception of knowledge, or stimuli as provoking response in agents otherwise passive. As a critique of a contemplative or spectator-view of knowledge, Dewey gives us the image of a man walking by a painter at the end of the day. The painter has just finished painting the picture. The man walking by looks at the picture, in a moment taking in the picture just finished, "grasping" it in a second. Dewey offers us another image of knowledge instead, where knowledge is conceptualized in terms of the painter engaging to paint. Using his brushes and colours, he experiences facilitation and resistance alike as they are given by his working material and by the landscape that he wishes to make a picture of. At the end of the day the painter can take a step back and estimate the result of his undertakings. In the image of the spectator viewing a finished picture we see the assumption of a merely beholding mind on one side, and a foreign and remote object to be noted and viewed on the other. This gives rise to a number of questions like "how a mind and world, subject and object, so separate and independent can by any possibility come into such relationship to each other as to make true knowledge possible" (Dewey 1950, 107). The assumption here is that to know is to seize upon what is already in existence. The image offered in contrast presents knowing conceived of as active and operative, in analogy with "experiment guided by hypothesis, or of invention guided by the imagination of some possibility" (107).

I will now turn back to a point made earlier, the one Ulla M. Holm (1993, 189) makes about theoretical and practical knowledge as being co-constituted, where concepts from one form of knowledge presuppose concepts from the other form and vice versa. This is close to a deflationary move of Dewey's, where his way of deflating dichotomies often was to argue for the one thing in the other, and vice versa. So a pragmatic standpoint is of course to see the theory in practice, and the practice in theory, facts in values, and values in facts.

I have discussed how practice is inherent in theoretical thinking, and the how theory and correct judgement are part of practical knowledge and reasoning above.19

19 Or 'reflection-in-action' as Donald Schön (1983) would put it. Cf. also what Wittgenstein writes on learning correct judgement through the tips of a teacher, and through experience (Wittgenstein 1967 [1953], 227e).
For an illustration of facts in values and the values inherent in facts, let us look at the example of the blade of a knife cutting through skin.

The cutting of the knife into skin is to begin with a practical thing. Someone is cutting through another person’s skin; someone is undergoing this cutting and someone else is doing it. Now let us add some context to this practical situation. One is the context of surgical procedure in a hospital, the other context is of a stabbing in the street.

In the medical world we will have factual descriptions of how to cut through skin in a surgical procedure, in order to reach the relevant tissues. The clean cut of the surgical procedure is there in order to prevent bleeding and excessive scar formation, and to enhance and ensure growth. Already in using the words ‘relevant’, ‘unnecessary’, and ‘enhance’ I have suggested some values and norms that are part and parcel of surgical procedure. Not only as a background to, but inherent in the material practice of surgical procedure, and inherent in the experience of doing or undergoing surgical procedure, there is a “world” of values and norms. As these norms are shared by most participants, they are often taken as “natural”, and the value-laden nature of medical science disappears into a mere description of “facts”. The “world” of values are, for example, that cancer and disease are seen as “foreign” to the body, that a loss of blood is regarded as negative (in contrast to the medical blood-letting of earlier times), that lives should be spared through medical procedure on a planet where there is an acute problem of overpopulation, that accidents and diseases are not punishments sent by some god—a punishment one has good reasons to suffer, instead of being relieved from, and so forth. The “goods” of our culture are celebrated, but these “goods” are so commonly agreed upon so that one can easily miss that there are any value judgements in the description of a surgical procedure. As Ludwik Fleck comments on the idea of emotionless thinking:

The concept of absolutely emotionless thinking is meaningless. There is no emotionless state as such nor pure rationality as such. How could these states be

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20 The clash between the values and norms of the culture of medical science and the culture of Seventh-Day Adventists, make the questions of values and norms visible though, when members of the latter group wish for help by way of surgical procedure (as in cases of hip arthroplasty e.g.) but are not prepared to accept blood from donors, should complications arise.
established? There is only agreement or difference between feelings, and the uniform agreement in the emotions of a society is, in its context, called freedom from emotions. This permits a type of thinking that is formal and schematic, and that can be couched in words and sentences and hence communicated without major deformation (1979 [1935], 49).

Now let us turn to the stabbing in the street. Here the clean cut is done in order to injure the counterpart as much as possible, maybe even to kill. The stabbing we do not primarily think about as a fact but as something evil, that is morally wrong. Now let us complicate the picture a little. What if the cutting is done in self-defence? Now we have another moral problem—is it all right to injure somebody else in self-defence? What will be regarded as necessary, sufficient, or excessive violence? What will be regarded as the “facts” of the situation? Depending on such “facts” as distance, temporality of events, height, age, sex, and so forth, the situation will be described differently. Facts like that will “determine” whether we interpret the situation as one of attack, self-defence, or prompt acting with regard to a dangerous situation. The facts will influence our moral judgement of the act, so that we either hear a poor excuse of “threat” as a reason for subsequent “self-defence”, or whether we hear the happy outcome of a situation of a poor victim who managed to defend her/himself.

In the experience of a blade cutting through skin, for the one doing the cutting and the one undergoing the cutting alike, there is the unity of experience described by Dewey. The experience is a unity of practical, emotional, and intellectual qualities, with the emotional phase pervading and unifying the others. The experience is intellectual because it has a certain meaning, and it is practical in the sense that the two persons are interacting with each other.

For us who regard the situation from “outside” there is the same unity of fact and value in what things mean to us and what values are inherent in these meanings and in our practical doings and undergoings. Marjorie Grene argues against the existence of purely factual statements, that is, statements which do not even presuppose evaluation. Her argument is that there could be no intelligible discourse except on the ground of an evaluation or appraisal. In short: there are “no descriptions wholly independent of prescriptions.” In a critique of the fact/value dichotomy she
argues that our judgements of facts depend on constitutive judgements of value.

Only by an evaluation do we call the Eroica 'music', not noise, and so assimilate the 'fact' of its composition to the history of music rather than acoustics. Only by an evaluation do we call the story of Ausschwitz or Belsen mass murder and so assimilate it to human history rather than to chemistry or population genetics (1966, 160).

The dichotomy of nature/culture is of special interest with respect to gender.\textsuperscript{21} Several authors have pointed to the social construction not only of gender, but also of sex.\textsuperscript{22} Where there was formerly an understanding of 'sex' as referring to a "natural" biological body, 'gender' was correspondingly, to use a metaphor, understood as referring to a social and cultural "frosting" of a biological cake. But even the biological bodies of what is perceived as male and female are conventionally divided into two categories. This is not to claim that humans are arbitrarily being assigned a sex as male or female, but that the dividing line between the sexes is conventional, as we have states of affairs which cannot categorically be seen clearly as one or the other. One of the reasons that our knowledge of the relations between, for example, different "outer" and "inner" bodily features can only reach truthlikeness is that whatever theory we embrace, the chosen theory has its given explanatory limitations.\textsuperscript{23} So if science investigates, for instance, sex using the concept of genetic codes, the limitations of the results obtained is inherent in the concept of genetic codes itself. The understanding of today is rather that we are as infants given a sex, which is an assignment heavily laden with gender, and what takes place is the beginning of a life-long attribution of gender.\textsuperscript{24} The gender attribution is being \textit{made by} and \textit{made to} humans, and \textit{experienced by}

\textsuperscript{21} See Fink (1993) for an interesting discussion on different concepts of nature. He identifies five different conceptions: i) nature as "the wild", ii) nature as the rural and green, iii) nature as what is universal in our life on earth, iv) nature as that which is governed by natural laws, and v) nature as "the whole".


\textsuperscript{23} This is a feature of scientific investigation well illustrated by Fleck (1979 [1935]).

\textsuperscript{24} The writings of Susan Kessler and Wendy MacKenna, delving into the problems of case management of intersexed infants, have shown how the important part of sex assignment is really gender assignment (Kessler and McKenna 1985).
This experience of being gendered has a unity of practical, emotional, and intellectual qualities. The intellectual "fact" of the sex we are assigned, is surrounded by a whole praxis of social interaction. The experience of this interaction is much pervaded by the emotional quality of experience, where evaluations of how "well" we perform with respect to gender is an important part.

It has been argued then that the sex/gender distinction has an inherent social construct of sex just as much as it has of gender. Following this the distinction has been left by some and replaced by the use of the sole term 'gender', or kön, in Swedish, where the understanding is that there can not be any simple demarcations made between what is supposed to be "mere" nature and what "mere" culture. Nature is moulded according to some culture, and our nature is that we are cultural beings.

The knower and the known

Knowing bears an obvious relation to the (particular) subject of knowledge, and is thereby seemingly concerned with particular facts/truths in particular places, as opposed to more general concerns of epistemologists with whether we are justified in claiming knowledge of some whole class of facts/truths or whether knowledge is possible at all. Thus my choice to focus on knowing might lead one to think that I am leaving the domain of epistemology for the one of psychology, but I am not. Attending to the question of trust in knowing is not to bring attention to a basic psychological question, but to ask about the nature of knowing. The claim put forth that trust is necessary to the process of knowing also implies that there are not only questions about the knower, but also questions about the relation between knower and known that need to be attended to.

Practical knowledge, whether a "mere" skill or practical wisdom, has never been characterized as something apart from the human possessing that knowledge. It is always personal in some sense, even though it may partly be communicated. For practical knowledge to be communicated it

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25 For a discussion of ontological aspects of sex and gender assignments, see (Kalman 1994b).
26 Iris Marion Young (1990), e.g., writes on female body experience.
27 For a more thorough discussion of the contemporary debate on the concepts of sex and gender, see (Fridlizius 1998, 140-8).
does not necessarily have to be defined in procedural rules, or propositional statements. To communicate a skill, that is to teach someone a skill, might require "a looser set of critical cues and hints as to how to proceed at each stage" writes Sherman (1989, 181), or at least an awareness of what one is doing and how one achieves certain ends. Neither in the case of ethical education does its teachability go through a set of rules or procedures. Still there is the possibility for a tutor to pass on "ways of reacting, seeing, and understanding which will aim at establishing enduring patterns of action" (181).

Theoretical knowledge on the other hand is often seen as being impersonal, and that is also seen as one explanation of why knowledge can be communicated, or commoned. But this does not rule out the possibility of an imprint of the knowing subject on what is known. Some philosophers arguing for imprints of the knowing subject on what is known. Some philosophers arguing for imprints of contextual components such as culture, gender and class, have also pointed to the contributions of Immanuel Kant as having afforded us with an understanding of what the knower adds to experience. His contribution helped us give up "the idea that any description of the world can be simply a copy of the world" (Putnam 1995, 30).

Kant (1929 [1781]) claimed that there are both a priori percepts (the structure of space and time) and a priori concepts which are produced by us and which form our experiences. Thus there is always an imprint of the knower on experience, even though it must be remembered that this knower on a Kantian account basically refers to the transcendental ego.

The imprint of the knower on the known is, on a pragmatic account, necessarily an oscillation between the knower as individual and the knower as part of a community, a form of life, and a species. There is need to recognize that there are ways that we can experience the world that is formed by the human body as a specimen of a species, with certain innate faculties (such as the faculty to hear within certain frequencies of sound, or the faculty to see within certain wave-lengths of light), without denying the importance of cultural and historical context.

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28 The term 'commed' is chosen by Michael Welbourne (1993) for the way knowledge may be conveyed from one person to another.
Admitting an imprint of the knower on the known might be seen as a step towards psychology, or worse to psychologism, but that is not necessarily the case.

Epistemology or psychology?

Even when broadly defined epistemology is concerned with questions about the nature of knowledge, and whether or how knowledge is possible. The questions are general in the sense that one is not concerned with the knowledge of some particular truth, and whether that particular truth is possible, and how we can be said to know that particular truth. Instead the epistemologist is concerned with questions about knowledge in a more general sense.

When discussing the possibility or occurrence of knowledge it is common to make a difference between epistemology and psychology precisely to the extent that latter is concerned with particular truths and the former is not. Psychology is then described as being concerned with giving explanations of why individuals hold the beliefs that they do, and with the ways in which they come to hold them, whereas epistemology is concerned with general questions about the nature of knowledge that cannot be answered within some one branch of knowledge. So questions concerning the agent of knowledge, the motives for knowledge-making, the relation between the knower and the known and so forth, have often been referred to as only being a concern for the domain of psychology.

Still questions have been raised within epistemology and philosophy of science concerning questions that traditionally might have been referred to as being questions for psychologists.

Where questions concerning only “knowledge proper” have been seen as failing to illuminate certain aspects of both the nature and the possibility of knowledge, an account of the knower and her/his relation to the known has been seen as being required. Without such accounts the knower and

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29 Psychologism refers to the view that psychology is the foundation of all philosophy, a view that reduces epistemology to being a special case of psychology.

30 Telling titles of some of these works are Personal Knowledge (Polanyi 1958), The Knower and the Known (Grene 1966), "Knowers, knowing, known" (Hawkesworth 1989), Who knows? (Nelson 1990), What Can She Know? (Code 1991).
that relation will be implicitly defined, and the importance of it not scrutinized.

**Focus on knowing**

From a pragmatist point of view, the knower is an actor, and man is basically in activity. As Dewey sees everything as being in process, without ever any fixed forms, he proposes process as such as a primary focus in the study of man. Consequently, Dewey suggests what he conceives of as a radical reconstruction of the theory of knowledge. The radical change he suggests will concern the subject-matter on which it is based. "[T]he new theory will consider how knowing (that is, inquiry that is competent) is carried on . . ." (Dewey 1950, 11, emphasis mine).

My choice to focus on the act, the knowing, is influenced by the thinking of the sociological school called symbolic interactionism, that names pragmatist philosophers John Dewey and George Herbert Mead among its founding fathers. The unit of study within symbolic interactionism is the act, a process of social interaction. The act of knowing is then to be seen as a process of social interaction, and interaction with nature. This implies that the individual who knows, the institutions that produce knowledge, the norms and rules governing the knowledge-seeking process, are all products of a process of social interaction in interaction with nature, and this process must be understood. These processes of social interaction, and their outcomes, obviously include scientists and philosophers studying or contemplating social interaction. The situation thus demands moral and intellectual responsibility, trying to take account of this.

When I have chosen to focus on the concept of knowing instead of knowledge, an ontological commitment is already made. A grammar of knowledge enters as a frame. My idea of referring to a "grammar of knowledge" including the terms 'act', 'agent', 'agency', 'purpose', 'scene', has been inspired by Kenneth Burke's *A Grammar of Motives* (1969). When Burke writes of a grammar of motives, he is fighting reductionist thinking about human motivation. He attempts to show that it is wrong to deflect

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31 See e.g. (Dewey 1950, 10-1, 106-7)
32 Cf. this to Kathryn Pyne Addelson's outline for investigating how we pose and answer moral questions in a collective process of *moral passages*, passages in which we create answers to how we should live (Addelson 1994, 22-3, chap. 6-7).
attention from scenic matters by situating the motives of an act in the agent, as much as it is wrong to deflect attention from the criticism "of personal motives by deriving an act or attitude not from traits of the agent but from the nature of the situation" (17). In answering the question "[w]hat is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?" Burke gives us five key terms: act, scene, agent, agency and purpose. He writes:

"[i]n a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose (Burke 1969, xv)."

His pentad of key terms I borrow to highlight what I take to be key terms in any complete statement about human knowing. His mode of treating thought and language primarily as modes of action fits well with my approach, and just like with his statements about motives, in any statement about knowing these five key terms are inseparably associated with each other. Paraphrasing Burke I claim that any complete statement about knowing “will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose)” (Burke 1969, xv).

When Johan Asplund (1980) writes on Burke he makes several references to the way we can understand these five key terms with the help of crime stories (which is in line with Burke’s dramatism of course, even though we normally do not refer to Hamlet as a crime story). In a crime story, you want to know who (agent) did what (act), how (agency), where and when (scene), and why (the motive). Without the motive we do not even know whether a crime has been committed or whether there simply was an accident. In line with this is Naomi Scheman’s point that the gangster movie staple question “who wants to know”, signifies “the value of knowledge, the ways

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33 The claim “any complete statement” should not be read too literally, of course. The pentad used as a generating principle for an investigation ideally provides a kind of simplicity, that can still be developed into considerable complexity. Take the term ‘agent’, e.g., that Burke claims to be a general heading that might require further subdivision to co-agents and counter-agents (Burke 1969, xix-xx).
in which having or withholding it are forms of power, and the dangers of its falling into the wrong hands” (1993b, 205). More important, she claims, is that the values that constitute communities of knowers and motivates the pursuit of knowledge shape that knowledge, and consequently that knowledge is never value free.

Even so apparently simple and objective a question as length depends on the purposes for which we are measuring, and those purposes reflect the values of those who are asking the question, even if such values are only a preference for coastal sailing over plying the open sea. Even if we grant the realist’s contention that the true answer is the one that conforms to the world, we need to have some idea of how closely we are to conform, which of the irregularities of whatever we are examining are of significance, and which are to be smoothed out in our representation (Scheman 1993b, 206).³⁴

With the help of these crime story, or gangster movie, questions we can see how even if just one of these five aspects of knowledge claims are under discussion, the other four will always “branch out” as Burke writes.

Knowledge, as concept, rests on the term ‘knowledge’, that is a noun. As such it refers to a finished product, that seemingly can be reflected upon without heeding the process by which it came into existence. Considered as a finished product, it is remarkably invisible (intangible, odourless, inaudible, not sensible to our taste-buds). Furthermore, the only way we can see/feel/smell/hear/taste knowledge is where it has left its mark in other processes: such as when somebody has used her/his knowledge to solve a mathematical or a scientific problem, alleviate a pain, compose a perfume, compose and/or play a tune, make a delicious meal, comfort a child, or mediate a peace. Those “outcomes” though are not knowledge—they are marks of the exercise of knowing. The point I wish to make is that knowledge never exists for and by itself, apart from the people that know this or the other. I think that focus on the noun, as if knowledge ever existed on its own, can obscure important questions about the act, the agent, the agency, the purpose, and the scene or circumstances of knowledge-making, or of the use intended as being a purpose of knowledge.

In the course of my argumentation for existential trust as an epistemological category I will present and discuss some examples. The

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³⁴ Cf. with the discussion on fact/value page 22.
examples are meant to throw light on the way we conceptualize, or might conceptualize, knowing, through a description of the nature and structure of experiences of knowing. This is to bring forth similarities between such instances of knowing that are often described in terms of dissimilarities. The examples are used as measuring rods, not as preconceived ideas to which our talk about knowing must correspond. It is important here to point out that I will not so much consider how we talk about knowing, but rather to invoke a perspective on our experiences of knowing.

Being concerned with the act of knowing and existential trust it seems self-evident that I should not address some epistemologically ideal situations for obtaining infallible knowledge. In the cases where I do use fictional examples I still aim at investigating our actual cognitive procedures. With a focus on actual cognitive procedures, how we go about our knowing generally, the situation still demands some caution. There is a risk of conflating the cognitive with the epistemological. ‘Cognitive’ is the term that I will use to refer to the actual processes of knowing. When I am referring to how these processes are to be understood I will use ‘epistemological’.

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35 This description of a possible strategy for investigation is derived from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1967 [1953]).

130. Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language—as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.

131. For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison—as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)

36 In the use of the terms ‘cognitive’ and ‘epistemological’ there is sometimes a confusion that is due to views expressed in the genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget, where he conflated these two concepts (see e.g. Kitchener 1996). As both the confusion and Piaget’s epistemology fall outside of the aims of my thesis, I will not elaborate these themes further.
Philosophy and the body

By stressing a connection between knowing, reasoning, experience and the lived body, I feel a need to make some points on the history of philosophy and views on the body. Prevalent in the history of philosophy has been a downgrading of the body. A polarization between the body and a supposedly immortal soul figured in religious rites associated with Orphism and Pythagorean cults, where they conceived the soul as a fallen ‘daimon’ trapped in a disdained body. A Pythagorean table of opposites displays pairs of contraries, where one of the terms of the polarity is privileged over the other. There were ten principles enunciated in a series of corresponding pairs. These were limit—the unlimited, odd—even, unity—plurality, right—left, male—female, rest—motion, straight—crooked, light—darkness, good—evil, square—oblong (Aristotle 1933, 986 a 23-30).

With Plato the bearer of immortality became the rational soul that would attain freedom from the body through the cultivation of rational thought. The god-like rational soul should rule over the slave-like mortal body. In his later thought this simple picture of the subjection of body to mind gives way to a more complex, and the non-rational comes to be seen as located within the soul as a source of inner conflict (Lloyd 1993, 6-7).

The body in its turn is associated with femaleness, whereas reason is associated with maleness. This metaphor of maleness is deeply embedded in philosophical articulations of ideas and ideals of reason. It is important though to note that

the maleness of reason belongs properly neither with sex nor with gender. Its proper subjects are not men and women but concepts and principles. . . .

[T]he symbolic content of maleness and femaleness cannot be equated with socially produced masculinity and femininity. This symbolic content interacts with socially constructed gender (Lloyd 1993, ix).

The body and the senses were to be rightfully dominated by the mind, so that the knower could be brought into the required correspondence relations with the forms, that are superior to matter. “[T]he dominance
relation is seen as holding within the knower” (Lloyd 1993, 7). This symbolism of domination and subordination is in the process by which the knowledge is acquired, but knowledge itself is not seen as a domination, but as enraptured contemplation of its objects. Later thinkers in Judaic and Christian traditions connected the Platonic theme of a struggle, between a rational part of the soul and other non-rational parts that should be dominated, explicitly with a theme of man's rightful domination of woman. Within the continued history of philosophy there is this mingled theme of contempt for woman as body, body as feminine, traits perceived as feminine as being of lesser value, etc. (Tuana 1992; 1993).

This thesis starts from a feminist viewpoint, where gender and power are seen to have a large explanatory potential as an analytical tool in research. My approach stresses a sensitivity to questions of gender, whether concerned with matters of scientific research or of philosophical investigation. Given the burden of earlier connections between femaleness and the disdained body within the history of philosophy one might think that I would be hesitant to make any connections between knowing and bodies, especially personal and gendered lived bodies. But I am not. To speak of gendered lived bodies, is not to subscribe to the above-mentioned tradition where the body is seen as being a burden, or a problem. Furthermore gender assignment is an experience no one escapes, so that is common to both women and men, even though what traits and merits are assigned differs, and where the male is generally coded superior.

I think that the important point for my work is to stress gender as an experience of the lived body, an experience that is constitutive to knowing, as knowing is actualized from a perception of gender.
The tool of my continued investigation is the concept of *tacit knowing* put forth by Michael Polanyi. Knowing on his account is modelled on practical knowledge, where the humanities and the knowing of man is the paradigm case, and where *indwelling* is a central feature. *Indwelling*, or empathy, was postulated as the proper means of knowing man and the humanities by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and Theodor Lipps (1851-1914). They taught that the mind of another person can only be understood by reliving its workings. Lipps suggested that an entering into a work of art and thereby dwelling in the mind of its creator is what represents aesthetic appreciation. Dilthey and Lipps asserted that indwelling sharply distinguished the humanities from the natural sciences (Polanyi 1967, 17).

Polanyi adopts the term *indwelling*, seeing this as a key function of all knowing. On his account indwelling underlies all observations. He claims, for example, that when we identify ourselves with certain moral teachings, that is, when we interiorize them through indwelling, they become established as a tacit framework for our moral acts and judgements. In the practice of science we interiorize a theory if we rely on it for understanding nature.

Attending to knowing as a way of doing, highlights the contingent nature of human action and thereby all our acts of knowing. He claims

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37 Bertil Rolf (1995, chap. 4) discusses the concept of *tacit knowing* and how it has sometimes been erroneously conflated with that of which we cannot speak, or that which cannot be put in words (*det outsägliga* in Swedish) as it is addressed by Wittgenstein in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Wittgenstein 1961 [1921]).

38 Kathryn Pyne Addelson’s claim that “knowledge is embodied in sensitized people” seems very apt here. She continues: “Knowledge (even knowledge in the natural sciences) is something that people have and act upon” (1994, 170).
that: "[t]he affirmation of a probable statement includes a judgment no less personal than an affirmation of its certainty would do. Any conclusion, be it given as a surmise or claimed as a certainty, represents a commitment of the person who arrives at it" (Polanyi 1967, 77). Polanyi's view of knowledge is not a mere giving up to the whims of the observer, as he recognizes the universal intent of, for example, a scientific endeavour, in trying to give account of an essentially indeterminate reality. Instead of affirming science to establish unchanging and unqualified truths, he sees the affirmation of a scientific truth as being of an "obligatory character which it shares with other valuations, declared universal by our own respect for them" (78).

Many of the remarks of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of Perception* foreshadow the analysis of Polanyi as to the phenomenological aspect of tacit knowing, as Polanyi himself points out (1965, 808). When writing of all the movements involved in his reaching towards the telephone, leaning forward or standing up, Merleau-Ponty claims that "[a]ll these movements are available to us in virtue of their common meaning", and that "the various parts of the body are known to us through their functional value" (1962 [1945], 149).

Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his discussion on intelligence gives several examples to illustrate that intelligence is not due to the presence of some "ghost in the machine", but that there are many activities which directly display qualities of mind, yet are neither themselves intellectual operations nor yet effects of intellectual operations. Intelligent practice is not a step-child of theory. On the contrary theorising is one practice amongst others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted (1949, 26).

He is attacking what he calls an "intellectualist legend" that would have any intelligently executed operation rest on a prior intelligently performed theoretical operation: first "to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice" (1949, 29-30). Instead he points to efficient practice as preceding the theory of it, and gives the examples of skilful arguing, and the "knowing how to make and appreciate jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish" (28).

This rejection of Cartesian dualism in the writings of Ryle is also found in the work of Merleau-Ponty. But as Polanyi points out many subtle
phenomenological descriptions of Ryle's used in critique of Cartesian dualism fail to take account of the existential experience that Merleau-Ponty puts forth as an alternative to intellectual interpretation.

As an example Polanyi compares the claim of Merleau-Ponty: “I do not understand the gestures of others by an act of intellectual interpretation” (1962 [1945], 185) with Ryle’s affirmation: “I am not inferring to the workings of your mind, I am following them” (1949, 61). If it were not for the existential perspective of Merleau-Ponty’s remark, it might be equated with the claim of Ryle. The alternative of intellectual interpretation for Merleau-Ponty is existential experience. Ryle on the other hand has no alternative and makes the following claim: “most intelligent performances are not clues to the mind; they are those workings” (1949, 58), a claim that Polanyi finds absurd. He thinks that what disposes of the Cartesian dilemma is the acknowledgement of two mutually exclusive ways of being aware of one’s body (Polanyi 1965, 809).

The structure of tacit knowing

Polanyi in his writings attends to the act of knowing. He describes knowing as having a from-to structure, between what we attend from, and that which we attend to.

One might think that tacit knowing would refer to all our background knowledge and knowledge in general, in an undifferentiated manner. I do not think that this is the case. All our background knowledge does not constitute a part of the act of knowing all the time—rather it is the case that mutually inconsistent parts of our background knowledge are what we attend from in different situations, such as having different conceptions of ourselves as agents in different situations.

Even while emphasizing “the personal participation of the knower, and on knowing as a form of living process” (Greene 1966, 25), Polanyi’s theory does not entail an absolute subjectivity. His description is of a from-to structure, not with “pure inwardness”. Knowledge is always personal, even though there is an explicit, formable core of knowledge that can be transferred from person to person. Philosopher Marjorie Greene has suggested that the implicit base of this formable core of knowledge, since
it is not verbalized and cannot be formulated and so impersonalized, is
always the groping of someone (1966, 25). Furthermore, given the from-to
structure of knowing described by Polanyi, she claims that all knowing can
be said to be orientation. The tacit knowing, as in perception and skills, and
the explicit knowing (though never totally so), as in the mastery of an
intellectual discipline—both share the dual structure of the from-to
relation. “I attend from a proximal pole, which is an aspect of my being, to a
distal pole, which, by attending to it, I place at a distance from myself”
(Grene 1969, x-xi).

In Polanyi’s view knowing covers both theoretical and practical
knowledge, since he sees these two aspects of knowing as having a similar
structure and neither ever being present without the other. What is
referred to as “wissen” and “können” in German, that is, knowing of a more
intellectual and a more practical kind is dealt with in the same way by
Polanyi where, as an example, he compares the denotative use of language
as verbal pointing with our use of more “ordinary” tools. Polanyi works
with a wide range of examples, from the interiorization of moral teachings
that we accept, by which they come to function as a proximal term of tacit
moral knowledge that we apply in practice, to the way we rely on a theory
for understanding nature in the practice of science (1967, 7, 17).

Knowing that and knowing what
In his discussion of knowing as covering both the more intellectual and the
more practical kind of knowledge, the “wissen” and the “können”, Polanyi
refers to the “knowing what” and the “knowing how” of Gilbert Ryle. Ryle
(1949) writes of “knowing that” and “knowing how”, though. Polanyi’s
exchange of “that” to “what” I take to be significant to the approach of
knowing that Polanyi chooses. Even though he does not comment on it
himself—thereby making it possible to assume that the exchange is the
result of a “simple” mistake—I am sure that the “what” represents
Polanyi’s more corporeal approach to knowledge. “Knowing what” this or
that is, recognizing something as “a case of” this or that, is not necessarily

39 Steen Wackerhausen (1997) suggests this dwelling in, or interiorization of, tools while
using them to be a kind of “settlement” (bosættelse in Danish) or living in the tool.
propositional as the “knowing that” implies with its “knowing that it is the case that . . .”.

I think that the choice of “knowing what” mirrors Polanyi’s conception of knowing as a form of living process, as orientation. A concept of knowing what points us to the lived experience, where we recognize things, events, and processes, as cases of this or that. It is a kind of recognition that does not have to be propositional or verbalized and it is possible, for example, to assign this kind of knowing to infants also. Knowing what is therefore a much wider concept than knowing that, and thus knowing that can be seen as a subset of knowing what. The knowing that of Ryle on the other hand mostly concerns propositional knowledge, what narrowly defined is the subject-matter of epistemology: “s knows that p”. It should be remembered though that Ryle is aiming to show that we are more concerned with people’s capacity to find out truths for themselves than with stocks of truths that they acquire and retain, and how skilfulness is shown in how one “applies criteria in performing critically, that is, in trying to get things right” (Ryle 1949, 29).

Tacit knowing
Polanyi’s idea of human knowledge starts from “the fact that we can know more than we can tell (Polanyi 1967, 4). He introduces the term ‘tacit knowing’ for the tacit power “by which all knowledge is discovered and, once discovered, is held to be true” (6). This tacit power he sees as manifested in scientific and artistic genius, as well as in skill, be it artistic, athletic or technical.

Tacit knowing involves two terms. Polanyi illustrated this with a psychological experiment where persons were exposed to a shock whenever they happened to utter associations to certain “shock words”. The persons learned to forestall the shock by avoiding the utterance of such associations, but on questioning it appeared that they did not know they were doing this. Polanyi describes this as the subject getting to know a practical operation, without being able to tell how he worked it.40

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40 Polanyi (1967, 8) suggests that these experiments show most clearly what is meant by saying that one can know more than one can tell. The experimental arrangement wards off the suspicion of self-contradiction for anyone to be speaking of things he knows and cannot tell, as there is a division of the roles between the subject and the observer; where
The first (the proximal) term is what we attend from, whereas the second term (the distal) is what we attend to. There is a functional relation between the first and the second term: "we know the first term only by relying on our awareness of it for attending to the second" (Polanyi 1967, 10). This means that we can know clearly, but only indirectly by attending to ourselves from a third-person perspective, what we attend from. So in the example of the shock words the participants attended from the shock words to the electric shock. As the participants attended from the shock words they knew them without being able to identify them whereas the electric shock was specifiably known.

As I read Polanyi it is not only the first (proximal) term of the relation that is tacit since not only that which we attend from, but also the relation between the first (proximal) and the second (distal) term, is tacit. In the case of the relation it is not possible to pick out only one of the terms, namely the first, as then the relation between the two terms is lost. Nor is it possible to pick out the relation only, as the relation does not exist without the parts that it is relating. As I understand Polanyi there is in every act of knowing (of which the ability to use abstract linguistic symbols is one) a remainder that is "tacit", namely that which we attend from, including the relation between that which we attend from and that which we attend to.

Polanyi discusses the different kinds of awareness involved in tacit knowing when using tools. He uses the example of driving in a nail with a hammer, where we attend to both hammer and nail. In a sense we are aware of the feelings in our palm and the fingers that hold the hammer. Bringing the hammer down we do not feel that its handle has struck our palm, instead we feel that its head has struck the nail. Still we are alert to the feeling in our hand, as we are attending from it, while attending to the nail, and to driving the nail in. Polanyi labels the feeling in the hand subsidiary awareness. This subsidiary awareness is merged into a focal awareness that is directed to the nail, and to driving the nail in. The feeling in the hand and the hammer he suggests to be called instruments of attention—what we attend from—whereas our driving the nail in is an object of attention—that is what we attend to (Polanyi 1958, 55).

The experimenter observes that another person has a certain knowledge that he cannot tell.
Polanyi’s concept of awareness encompasses much more than is commonly understood by the use of the term ‘awareness’. I will return to the topic of subsidiary awareness later in this chapter, with the aim of modifying and extending Polanyi’s analysis.

The structure and shaping of experience
The two kinds of awareness described above are not only part of tacit knowing, it is also a description of the way we experience the world, attending from particulars, to a coherent entity. While we cannot be said to be attending to the particulars in themselves, we can be said to interiorize them, when we achieve the integration of them to this coherent entity. It is by dwelling in details that we understand their joint meaning, and can be said to be aware of them in their bearing on the comprehensive entity which they constitute (Polanyi 1967, 18).

An example of attending to the whole, is when we recognize a face among a million others. Recognizing the face is an observational experience that is made possible by tacit knowing, by attending to the whole, while interiorizing and attending from the details; the nose, the eyes and the chin. The subsidiary awareness of the particulars is merged into a focal awareness of the whole, the face.

In his analysis of knowledge Polanyi further discusses how we may know a physiognomy by integrating our awareness of its particulars, without being able to identify them. He sees this as the outcome of an active shaping, or integrating of experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge. In the recognition of a face, the whole—as the meaning of the features—is the outcome of an active shaping of experience. This aspect of tacit knowing Polanyi labels the semantic aspect. The active shaping of experience is due to earlier experience and the efforts we make in attending to the meaning of the world and its particulars, while attending from, and relying on, our body and our awareness of contacts of our body with things.

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41 Polanyi’s term ‘awareness’ might be medvetenhet as well as varselivning, i.e. perception, if translated to Swedish. But it is important to remember that his use of the concept of awareness entails more than what is usually referred to, as what we are unaware of is not included generally. Bertil Rolf (1995) uses the term varselivning.

42 Polanyi chooses the term particulars for the parts of the whole that we are attending to. Obviously his choice of term has nothing to do with the common philosophical distinction between particulars and universals.
outside for *attending to* these things. In learning to perceive for example, we transpose meaning away from us. Our learning to perceive and to form a coherent experience of ourselves and the world goes all the way from the infant's turning of its head to see where a sound is coming from, through the interpretative effort we make when transposing meaningless feelings into meaningful ones while using a probe or a stick to investigate a cavity, and further to the act of comprehending moods of another person.

We may say that when we learn to use language, or a probe, or a tool, and thus make ourselves aware of these things as we are of our body, we *interiorize* these things and *make ourselves dwell in them*. Such extensions of ourselves develop new faculties in us; our whole education operates in this way; as each of us interiorizes our cultural heritage, he grows into a person seeing the world and experiencing life in terms of this outlook (Polanyi 1969, 148).

Some experiences are new, some are familiar. The experiences may be dull, interesting, fascinating, frightening or whatever, but they are always experienced through an indwelling in our bodies and indwelling in our interiorized\textsuperscript{43} theories of the world. In this respect I think we can be said to *live our experiences in experiencing anew.*

### Boundaries of the self

In Polanyi's work on tacit knowledge we can find an interesting tool to understand the way the boundaries of our lived bodies are developed and maintained. In his discussion of how we make tools and probes a part of our own body, he points out that we do not handle them as external objects. Instead we shift outwards the points at which we make contact with things that we observe as objects outside ourselves, making the tools remain on our side of it to form a part of ourselves. "We pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them" (Polanyi 1958, 59).\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{43} It appears that the *interiorization* Polanyi wrote about, could in some cases be referred to as *internalization* in current psychological theory, but internalization seems to be a more specific phenomenon.
I would like to focus on another aspect of knowing that would be consistent with Polanyi's descriptions, except that instead of a growing self with extensions to one's lived body, it is acquired in shrinking the self, with restraining the boundaries of the (embodied) self, e.g. by making oneself numb in some sense. Just like a tree in its growth is shaped by conditions of climate, wind, nourishment, closeness to other trees, and so forth, we are formed by society, forms of life, and praxis. And in the way the roots of a tree may rot some time after the bark has been severely damaged, so we may wither through a lack of connections between different forms of life that we partake in.

The necessity of restraining the boundaries of the self is mostly connected to situations of extreme duress, such as torture or sexual violence, but also in situations with less negative connotations, such as getting dental treatment. In fact we have all the scale from neglecting some minor discomfort to physical or psychic impairment.

What happens in these situations is that we do not dwell in parts of our bodies, or our selves, but instead exteriorize them. The lived body may be felt not to be one's own. To the extent that one can fully dwell in one's body, one will have the concomitant capacity to conduct and experience the conscious operations of one's body. Not being able to dwell in a part or aspect of one's lived body will delimit one's experience of that part, and affect future experiences.

Knowing our own bodies is the paradigm case of tacit knowing, according to Polanyi, and in a sense "all subsidiary elements are interior to the body in which we live" (Polanyi 1969, 183). We dwell in all subsidiarily experienced things, and if we do not dwell in our body or a part or aspect of it, I would claim that we are not subsidiarily experiencing from it either. It is not interior to the body in which we live, the lived body. Polanyi makes the point that it is important not to make the mistake of distinguishing indwelling from observation as it is practised in the natural sciences, as for him it is only a matter of degree:

indwelling is less deep when observing a star than when understanding men or works of art. The theory of tacit knowing establishes a continuous transition from the natural

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44 I have chosen the terms 'exteriorize' and 'exteriorization', in symmetry to the terms 'interiorize' and 'interiorization', to label the converse phenomena of interiorization.
The 'I–Me' awareness depends on our dwelling in our bodies, and to the extent that this dwelling is impaired, the dependant awareness from the body is impaired, too.\(^{45}\)

Polanyi described our own body as the only thing in the world that we normally never experience as an object. Instead we experience the body always in terms of the world to which we are attending from our body, and by making this use of our body we feel it to be our own, and not a thing outside (Polanyi 1967, 16, emphasis mine). But Polanyi is attending to the normal, one might even claim, ideal case. Less ideal cases can though be described by the use of his concept.

As a consequence of this I claim that when we exteriorize a part of our body, our self, it is in terms of the world. Making oneself numb, for example, is not a thing of non-experience, it is an experience where the focus is bent on survival which may be the maintenance of a coherent understanding of the world. The knowing acquired must therefore be sought in terms of survival, maintenance of self or the world, and the like, as that is what has been focused on in these experiences.

"Normally" our knowledge is thought of as applying to external things and the external world, whereas tacit knowing concerns the way we use our body and our intellect to attend to the world. In cases where one has to exteriorize parts of oneself, this division is more unclear. The focus may be outside of the situation, to survive, not to dwell in one’s body, fighting the ability to feel, or even attending from the experiences to a part of the self by an extreme awareness of a boundary within it. In these cases the tacit knowledge accumulated is more about “the world”, and the terms in which it can be experienced, for one who—in order to be able to experience it—is partly “shut down”.

\(^{45}\) Merleau-Ponty discusses what could be labelled exteriorization, or inability to dwell in parts of one’s body, mostly with examples from various pathological cases (1962 [1945], 138-42).
The self in growth

Now I want to connect this partly growing and extended, partly numbed, self that we can conceive of with the help of Polanyi, to the thinking of John Dewey. In all his philosophy Dewey stresses growth, and sees the acquisition of skill and possession of knowledge as marks of growth and as means to its continuing (Dewey 1950, 146). There is a similarity here between the way Dewey and Polanyi regard education as growth, and how what we learn becomes a part of us, that we “use”—if that can be a correct word for describing a part of us that partakes in our experiencing—in further education and experiences.

A consequence that I infer from this is that one can imagine a “negative” education, as one lacking in encouragement, or worse; the forced “shutting out” of experience, that would then not only forestall growth, but also diminish the potential self that may partake in future action.

In the growth of our selves, and with the acquisition of theories about the world, we get tacit knowledge of ourselves through our experiences of the world, or rather as I want to stress: in terms of the world.

Problematizing the structural relation of tacit knowing

The direction of tacit knowing is in Polanyi’s description one from proximal to distal, from the first term to the second, where we transpose meaning away from us. The proximal term is supposed to be the one closest to us, where the distal is placed somewhere at a distance. This echoes a medical language of anatomy, where the proximal is located towards the center of the body, to the head, and to what is next to or nearest the point of attachment or origin (of a limb e.g.), whereas the distal is further off from the center, further off from the head, and far from the point of attachment or origin. In my use of Polanyi’s thesis I will, when possible, avoid the use of the terms ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ but will use ‘first’ and ‘second’ instead, when referring to the terms of tacit knowing. This choice of terms is not arbitrary but reflects my interpretation of what the
structural relation implies. A use of the terms ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ I think obscures, or fails to bring attention to, the importance of what we come to know, tacitly, of the first term, a term that includes a part or a perception of ourselves.

When we are focally aware of situations or things outside of our lived body we acquire a tacit knowing that pertains to ourselves. As I wrote earlier of the structure of tacit knowing, the term refers not only to what we attend from, but also to the relation between the first and the second term. Working from that description I wish to make two points.

The first point is then that the first, the proximal, term is often constituted by different parts and aspects of ourselves that pertain to different actions and circumstances. These parts and aspects may be of our body, of our way of seeing the world, of ourselves as different agents (mother/father, daughter/son, teacher, pupil, customer, somebody skilled or trained in a profession, and so forth).

The second point is that the relation between the two terms of tacit knowing implies a conception of how, as agents, we are able to engage knowingly in different actions and situations.

These two points will be further elaborated in the next chapter: “The epistemic conditions”.

Problematising subsidiary awareness
Starting from Polanyi’s distinction between focal and subsidiary awareness I will, with the help of examples (shooting and impaired hearing), discuss and expand the analysis of subsidiary awareness. With regard to the role of subsidiary awareness in learning I think it may be of use to distinguish what different kinds of subsidiary awareness there are. In situations of learning we can let that which we attend from in the activity, that is the “tools” of awareness, become what we attend to, i.e. become the object of attention.46 When focally attending to that which we were formerly only subsidiarily aware of, something else has become the tools of attention.

I will argue for some kinds of subsidiary awareness to be such that we can become focally aware of them in situations of learning and training and

46 My bracketing of the term ‘tools’ is there in order to signal that the choice of the term is metaphorical.
work with them consciously, and that there are other kinds that we can only reach indirectly by way of mental training and the like. The awareness one has of the latter kinds of subsidiary awareness one could claim to be an awareness on a third-person account—you can be aware of the successful mechanisms of mental training in general, but you cannot be focally aware of those mechanisms in yourself.

According to Polanyi what is characteristic of subsidiary awareness is the function it has for what we are attending to. Subsidiary awareness is not equivalent to the subconscious or preconscious, neither is it the same thing as being unconscious, nor is it connected to psychoanalytic interpretations of the unconscious. On the contrary Polanyi addresses such mistaken identifications and describes the *functional* relation between subsidiary awareness and focal awareness as a logical relation, similar to that which a premise has to the inferences drawn from it. Similar, but with an important difference. The tacit inferences drawn from clues are not explicit, but informal and tacit. To exemplify this he describes the way we get stereoscopic vision through the merging of two separate pictures. The tacit inference we make when attending from the two separate pictures, to one stereo-image, is not the result of a deduction. That this is not the case becomes clear if we think of how even if the result, the stereo-image, is illusory the result does not change by any argument. The merging of the two pictures is an integration, not an inference. The difference between the integration and an inference becomes clear if one thinks about the way we can go back and forth between premises and inference in a deduction, whereas most of the time we cannot go back in the same way when it comes to integration. Once we have seen the solution to a puzzle we cannot go back to a state where we are yet again unaware of the final picture that was the solution. There are times though where we can go back to the "premises" (Polanyi 1965, 800-1). An example of such a going back, in the case of playing the piano, will be addressed later.

To Polanyi tacit knowing encompasses every proficiency we have, including perception and even neural processes. So when he writes of subsidiary awareness he is referring to all that contributes in the subsidiary function, regardless of level of awareness. As long as something contributes in the merging of a focal awareness, this is part of the subsidiary awareness in question (Polanyi 1967, 95, n. 1).
Do the different kinds of awareness that I aim to argue for only differ with regard to the possibility one has in directing one’s focal awareness on it as contributing in a subsidiary role or not?

Polanyi discusses some examples where we let that which we attend to in an activity, that is the “tools” of attention, become what we attend to, that is the object of attention. Polanyi mostly addresses how such interplay may have negative consequences for our actions, as the tacit knowing in question is not brought to bear on that which we are trying to do. This he exemplifies by describing the famous tight-rope walker Blondin who in his memoirs wrote that he would instantly lose his balance if he thought directly of keeping it, and of stage-fright as the consequence of becoming self-conscious through a focal awareness of particulars of which one has previously been aware only in their subsidiary role, such as the next word, note or gesture (Polanyi 1958, 56; 1965, 801).

He does though give some examples of how a temporary focusing on that which constitutes a subsidiary awareness in an action may help to develop our proficiency. It is important to remember though that as focal and subsidiary awareness are mutually exclusive, an attention to some aspects of my body, for example, will make those aspects become the object of attention, whereas other aspects will become what I am subsidiarily aware of.

A pianist who attends to her/his fingers may temporarily become clumsy and stiff-fingered when using them, but may recover her/his full ability when s/he has her/his mind on the music again, as the particulars are interiorized and recover their comprehensive relationship. Important to note though, the recovery never brings back the original meaning, but may improve on it. A study of motion may tend to paralyse a skill but will improve it when followed by practice. Both examples where such an interplay between focal and subsidiary awareness may enhance an ability with subsequent training, and examples where an interplay may through the focus on the particulars of the subsidiary function utterly destroy the possibility of recovery of meaning, are given (Polanyi 1967, 18-9).

The example of the pianist illustrates how s/he moves from attending to the result, that is the integration of the particular details that playing the piano is a result of, to attending to one of the details that contributes to the piano-playing instead. So this is an example of how we can go back to the “premises” and then back to an integration, that is playing the piano. But
as Polanyi takes care to point out: it is not the same integration that the pianist goes back to, but a changed one and hopefully one that is changed to the better. In this way it also differs from the deduction, where the result will presumably be the same, even though we may at times come to the conclusion that the result of a former deduction was wrong.

Different kinds of subsidiary awareness
What different kinds of subsidiary awareness are there in tacit knowing then? I distinguish three kinds:

i) (actual) subsidiary awareness. This kind of subsidiary awareness is the type that one, from a third-person perspective, is aware of attending from, and can also be focally aware of from a first-person perspective.

ii) potential subsidiary awareness. This kind of subsidiary awareness is the type that one may potentially become focally aware of. It is part of one’s subsidiary awareness, but a part that one is, from a third-person perspective, as yet unaware of attending from. If one, from a third-person perspective, becomes aware of attending from these parts, one may eventually become focally aware of them from a first-person perspective also.

iii) (necessarily) subliminal (subsidiary) awareness. This kind of subsidiary awareness is the type that one is necessarily unaware of from a first-person perspective, but that we may well be aware of in reflection. If one has subliminal subsidiary awareness of x, then x is a bodily causal part of one’s focal awareness, but a part that one can know of only from a third-person perspective, but not turn one’s focal awareness to from a first-person perspective. (I can, e.g., be focally aware of, and affect, the rhythm of my breathing from a first-person perspective, but I cannot be focally aware of neuron firings in my brain from a first-person perspective—only know of them from a third-person perspective.)

In making these distinctions I am developing the account of subsidiary awareness beyond Polanyi’s account.

In order to argue for these distinctions I will use two examples. The first example is of a skill that one consciously strives to attain, the second example is of something we could call tacit knowing by the same standard,

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47 This going back and forth between the whole and some particular details, between proximity and distance, as a part of the process of learning, illustrates what Bengt Molander labels the dialogical structure of learning (1996a, chap. 4).
except that the tacit knowing acquired has not been consciously striven for. The first example is of shooting, and the second is of the ability to hear.

**Shooting**

The first example is of shooting with a rifle, and scoring a bull’s eye. When practising to shoot you attend to focusing the bull’s eye, and scoring. The attention is focused on the bull’s eye while having subsidiary awareness of keeping the body still, and a calm pulling of the trigger. One is certainly alert to the stillness of the body, and the finger’s pulling the trigger, but this is a subsidiary awareness that one is from a third-person perspective aware to be attending from, and that one can turn one’s focal attention to.

My claim is that it is easy to turn one’s focused attention to the body or to the finger, for a while. Polanyi claims that our attention can hold only one focus at a time. So if I turn my attention to my body as what I am being focally aware of, something else or certain other aspects of myself, will be what I am subsidiarily aware of in turn.

Aiming for higher skill, perhaps getting instructions, I may become aware of particulars in accomplishing keeping the body still, such as taking a deep inhalation before pulling the trigger, since an inhalation may cause a movement of my body to the effect that the rifle moves. A holding of my breath may also result in a sudden exhalation resulting in a subsequent movement. How to co-ordinate my breathing with shooting, so that the pulling of the trigger is done while exhaling, is something I am merely potentially aware of before analyzing particulars in the skill of shooting. Once having become aware of how my breathing effects my chances to score a bull’s eye, this subsidiary awareness of my breathing that I was formerly potentially aware of, has become a part of my (actual) subsidiary awareness that I now have when shooting. I am aware of my breathing, from a third-person perspective, and can be focally aware of it from a first-person perspective, when preparing to shoot, then letting it be part of my subsidiary awareness while shooting. I may also enhance my skill by using different techniques to elongate my exhalation.

Not all parts of our tacit knowing are as easily observed by ourselves and people around us as breathing is. Other particulars that make up our

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48 I have benefitted from discussions with Olof Ahlgren on the topics of shooting, and of enhancing this skill.
subsidiary awareness are such that we are either necessarily unaware of them and cannot become aware of them, from a first-person perspective, or we have a potential subsidiary awareness that we may become aware of. In the case of shooting I rely on visual perception, which I certainly cannot make myself change in any substantial way while seeing the bull's eye. The things we may change are conditions for our visual perception. This may be done through the use of glasses, a peaked cap, telescopic sight, and so forth. The way my visual perception makes me see objects I may be said to “know” as according to Polanyi

Polanyi discusses the process by which we become aware of subliminal processes inside our body in the perception of objects outside our body that are hardly noticeable in themselves, and compares this process with the use of tools and probes. The difference he claims is just one of distance. So even if we are quite incapable of controlling or even feeling the internal action in itself, we can see that tacit knowing is operating as we are attending from these internal processes to the qualities of things outside. “These qualities are what those internal processes mean to us.” The bodily experience is thereby transposed into the perception of things outside, and can be said to be an instance of transposition of meaning away from us. This transposition of meaning away from us is the reason for Polanyi to label the first term of tacit knowing, the part we attend from, the proximal term, and the second term of tacit knowing, the part we attend to, the distal. The distal, as the part being furthest away from us is what we attend to the meaning of (Polanyi 1967, 13-4).

The internal processes in my body that I attend from in order to visually perceive may form a part of my tacit knowing, but I claim that this part of my tacit knowing is something that I am not even potentially subsidiarily aware of in the doing, i.e., from a first-person perspective, even while relying on this subliminal awareness. It is part of my tacit knowing but a
subliminal (subsidiary) awareness that I am necessarily unaware of, and cannot become aware of in the doing. But I can speak of these processes, and be aware of them if attending to myself from a third-person perspective. From this perspective I can become aware of these processes and sometimes enhance the conditions for these processes. I may, for example, change the conditions for my ability to see, with the help of things that I know will enhance my possibilities for a successful seeing, but I am attending to my visual perception only indirectly. This can be seen in analogy with mental training as enhancing the conditions for a successful performance, where you attend, for example, to a physical performance indirectly by attending to your thinking about it.

To hear with impaired hearing

My second example is of a man with impaired hearing on his right side. The way that he starts to make use of his body would normally not be described as a know-how or skill that he strives for. Still my claim is that this is an example of tacit knowing.

When we try to hear what people say and when we listen to the radio for example, we are attending to what is said or the music played. To hear what is said; to be able to catch the difference made by different phonemes is something we learn. Audial perception is a part of our tacit knowing.

What happens then when the man who formerly had a normal hearing gets an impaired hearing? The man will as always focus his attention, his focal attention to use Polanyi’s terminology, to what is said by attending to the meaning of the sounds he is able to catch on to, hearing and discriminating between different sounds. In his attempts to hear what is said it is likely that he will develop a habit of keeping his head slightly tilted so that the ear, that is his best ear, the left, will be directed towards the source of the sound, so that his eardrum will more easily be reached by the

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49 I am indebted to Anna-Lena Grönling for helpful discussions on this example.
50 I am here referring to the ability to catch on to what sounds make a difference in meaning in a certain language. These phonemes form morphemes, entities that carry meaning in a language—these are entities that we also learn to discriminate. I choose to focus on the role played by phonemes, as it is often the difficulty in catching particular sounds in words that turns out to be a problem for those suffering from impaired hearing, such as hearing the difference between the words pappa (daddy) and kappa (coat) in Swedish. Furthermore the ability to distinguish between phonemes is more basic, as these can be distinguished before one has learned the differences of meaning.
waves of sound. His way of flexing his neck/directing his best ear is thereby a part of his subsidiary awareness, what he is attending from, in attending to what is said.

With time the man's habit of holding the neck slightly flexed to the side may lead to tense muscles and the man may develop an ache in his neck. We can here imagine that the man seeks help because of his pain and then, if not before, he will become aware, from a third-person perspective, of his holding his neck slightly flexed in the interpretative effort he makes in order to hear. With training he might become aware, also from a first-person perspective, of how he tends to flex his neck, while straining to hear, and if he is lucky he can learn not to flex his neck that way. Probably, as hearing is of such importance when communicating with other people, this habit will be very hard to break as the flexing of the neck is something the man attends from to be able to hear; it is a part of his audial perception, and thus of him.

In the subsequent development I see two possibilities. One is that he not only becomes aware, from a third-person perspective, of his way of flexing the neck, but that he is also successful in training and that he manages to obtain a subsidiary awareness of a painless position of his neck while listening and attending to what is said. In this case we may in hindsight come to the conclusion that a painless position of his neck was something that he was first potentially subsidiarily aware of in hearing, and then it became part of the subsidiary awareness that he was aware of attending from when hearing. A better (from the aspect of pain) position of his neck is then a part of his tacit knowing when hearing.

The other possibility is that the man, albeit becoming aware of his habit from a third-person perspective, will not be able to break the habit, in spite of training such things as body awareness. Then his tacit knowing of how to hear has the flexing of the neck as part of his subliminal (subsidiary) awareness that he is necessarily unaware of.

Furthermore a better (from the aspect of pain) position of the neck is then not even something that he has as a subsidiary awareness of, as it is not part of what he is attending from when listening, and therefore it does not constitute any part of his tacit knowing how to hear.

The awareness that he obtained of his flexing the neck, when attending to himself from a third-person perspective, could not that be counted as (actual) subsidiary awareness, even if he would never be able to break this
habit? No, as this knowledge did not alter or influence his performance, and subsequently is not part of his knowing how to hear which has been the subject of my discussion.

Conclusions on subsidiary awareness

I have distinguished different kinds of subsidiary awareness in what Michael Polanyi labels tacit knowing. These kinds are i) (actual) subsidiary awareness, that we are aware of attending from and can be focally aware of from a first-person perspective, ii) potential subsidiary awareness, that we may become aware of attending from and eventually be focally aware of from a first-person perspective (thus turning it to a subsidiary awareness of the first kind), and iii) necessarily subliminal (subsidiary) awareness that we can only be(come) aware of when attending to ourselves from a third-person perspective. The distinction should be of help when theorizing about, and practise teaching, training, and rehabilitation. This line of thought has not been developed fully, but with my examples I see a possibility to do that, as they point to two important and hitherto neglected aspects of tacit knowledge.

The first aspect is the possibility of distinguishing between that which we have (actual) subsidiary awareness of, and that which we have potential subsidiary awareness of. In the example of shooting I show some of the possibilities this gives us when training.

The second aspect is that the same ability may differ in important respects in what we attend from. In the example of the man with impaired hearing we saw that the subsidiary awareness of his ability to hear may consist of different flexings of the neck in his tacit knowing (how to listen successfully). Consequently that which we attend from may, in the same proficiency or activity, differ with the same individual on different occasions, and even more so between different individuals. In what we attend from, or learn to attend from, I think there is as part of our subsidiary awareness a perception of ourselves as acting agents. Through my elaboration of Polanyi’s thesis, the importance of making it clear what we aim pupils/patients/ourselves, to attend from—to obtain an optimal result in teaching, training or rehabilitation—is highlighted.
Attention

Polanyi’s account of attention may seem overly simplified. The emphasis he places on how our attention can hold only one focus at a time, might be taken too literally. The reason for his emphasis is to alert the reader to the impossibility of being focally aware of that which we are attending from at the same time as we are focally aware of that which we attend to, that is, to highlight the directionality. This does not mean however that our attention can hold only one thing, literally implying one object, at a time.

Attention may be directed to minute details or on a comprehensive whole. The comprehensive whole may be everything from watching a football match to an attempt to understanding the conflicts of former Yugoslavia, with the full complexity of history, political interests and human suffering. We can be more or less attentive, and we can develop our ability to let our attention be open to other people, situations, and so forth. Attention may be so wide that one can rather be said to be open to the world, and “empty” as with regard to focus. Such wide attention can entail an alertness without specificity to what the attention is alert to. An open alertness may be seen in discovery for example.

Polanyi claims that “to see a problem is to see something that is hidden” (1967, 21). In seeing the problem we still are unaware of the solution. With an open frame of mind discovery may dawn on us, when least expected, but this discovery is due to the indeterminate commitment shown in the emptied, but alert focal awareness. In this more or less emptied awareness, we are still attending from, are subsidiarily aware of, particulars that we rely from, the constitutive meaning of which we discover when finding a solution. Terms like ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ may trigger a philosophical reading of Polanyi as being concerned only with causal explanations such as are given

51 Cf. with what Gustaf Östberg (1995) writes of different degrees of attention and of the possibility of developing an ability to be attentive.
52 Such an indeterminate commitment may be seen in serendipity, the ability to make “accidental” discoveries. This ability is an openness to see how something observed bears on something else. What is observed appears in terms of the problems we are attending from. One’s attention is an attention from the old problem, even though one is not consciously attending to these problems. See also (Roberts 1989).
in natural science or the like. This would not be a reading that does him justice, though, since he explicitly attends to the full existential range of the human condition.

The attention cannot be directed towards being alert, though. Take the example of my writing of this thesis. In reading a draft my attention will be open to whatever my attention recognizes as a problem, even though I do not know in advance what errors I will find. Reading in an open frame of mind, emptied from specified expectation I may find many different kinds of problems in the text. But if I read attending to a perception of myself as an attentive and clever reader, instead of to the text itself, I will surely miss what is problematic in the text. This can be understood in parallel to what I wrote earlier of stage fright or tight-robe walking.

**Summing up**

In my investigation of our epistemic situation I will use the tool of tacit knowing. Important features of this tool are:

a) knowing as having a *from-to* structure, between that which we attend from and that which we attend to, also described as

b) a distinction between focal and subsidiary awareness,

c) the different kinds of subsidiary awareness,

d) the *semantic* aspect of tacit knowing,

e) the indeterminate border of our lived bodies, and

f) a conception of ourselves as being in growth, enhanced or restrained.

The structure of the relation is between a first term, that which we *attend from*, and a second term, that which we *attend to*. That which we attend to we are focally aware of, whereas that which we attend from is what we are subsidiarily aware of. *Tacit knowing* refers to the tacit nature of all knowing, that is, that in all kinds of knowing there is always a remainder that is tacit. This tacit remainder is what we attend from, and the relation between that which we attend from and that which we attend to. We can be said to *dwell* in what we attend from, relying on our awareness of it, for attending to something else. Our subsidiary awareness is merged into a
focal awareness, where what we are focally aware of is what the subsidiary awareness means to us—which is the semantic aspect of tacit knowing. That which constitutes the subsidiary awareness in an act of knowing, the tools or instruments of attention, may differ between different knowers and between different instances of similar knowing with the same knower. I suggest that part of what constitutes tacit knowing is a perception of ourselves as agents, the way we come to know ourselves indirectly when engaging with the world. In the functional relation between the (proximal) first term and the (distal) second term of tacit knowing, my claim is that we are not—contrary to Polanyi’s account of the matter—always transposing meaning away from us, but may transpose it onto ourselves—either as what we become focally aware of, or how we come to know ourselves in the tacit knowing.
The epistemic conditions

Within traditional epistemology when questions about knowledge are raised, and confined to questions about theoretical knowledge, an initial move has been made, even though it seems as nothing has been done. This can be compared to what Wittgenstein points out as the invisible move, or conjuring trick, in saying that there are mental processes. There is with Descartes an initializing move that goes un-noticed; that there are mental events, thus they are ontologized and then taken under examination. There is a picking out of a “they”—these events to be talked about—and then to be investigated.\footnote{This interpretation of Wittgenstein was given by Naomi Scheman at the Inter-Nordic Graduate Course on Wittgenstein and Feminist Philosophy, Göteborg University, Fall 1997. Wittgenstein (1967 [1953]) writes:}

§ 308. How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise?—The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)—And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.
this follows the presumption that all knowers are the same, and that they
are seen as inter-changeable in principle. Commitment to such an idea of
generic knowers is possible if one, for example, does not think there is any
reason to question whether we can trust, or understand each other. Starting
there, with the initializing invisible move already made, it proves difficult
to turn the questions back and discuss how knowledge is in some sense
always personal knowledge, how even abstract concepts are derived from an
existential experience of lived bodies, and how these concepts have meaning
and refer to others within forms of lives.

John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Polanyi, among others,
in their work bring attention to such aspects as have been lost in the first
invisible move of epistemology. In their rejection of Cartesian dualism and
setting the quest for certainty aside, they attend to questions of knowledge
as tied to praxis, the way we live and the life we are part of.

A pragmatic approach has man as active agent in the world. Knowledge,
as was stated in chapter one, is seen as fallible and primarily connected to
the possibility of agency in the world. Agents exercising practical knowledge
are human beings in action. A recognition of our epistemic conditions
entails a recognition of context and circumstances. Our situation as agents
is one of being in a natural and social order of which we are part. The
epistemic situation is that we are placed within the world—not outside of
it—within language, within a form of life, or forms of life. The world of
natural order contains the world of social order that we are born into and
are in continuous process with; in interaction the world (and we as part of
it) is apprehended and remade, and where language is a way in which we
"have the world". Knowledge on this account I claim to be a modifier of
action. The aspects of our epistemic situation, our being in this world and
having this world, that I will touch upon are our social being, language, and
our lived bodies.

Knowers in epistemological communities

Not only is the very biological nature of human beings fundamentally
social, but also our social being affects the way our bodies are lived. Being
born into a form of life we catch on to that form of life, to a larger or lesser
extent, important parts of which are the inherent praxis and language. Essential categories of the natural and social order together with values imbued, or the values that pertain to ontologizing those categories, are accompanied with norms of how to act in this form of life. The knower is "in the middle" of a form of life, more or less sharing the knowledge of that form of life. Also, as Lars Hertzberg (1988, 308) points out, a reader who is familiar with Philosophical Investigations will on reading Wittgenstein's On Certainty see that the issues discussed "are to be taken as arising among speakers who share a language and who use this language in telling one another things, asking questions, conducting investigations, etc." Furthermore, Hertzberg claims, Wittgenstein gives us reminders such as: "In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind" (Wittgenstein 1979 [1969], § 156). It is obvious then that the one who is engaged in the language-game of a form of life, is not a solitary knower but one who partakes in a community of knowers.

The question may then be raised of how the social aspect of sharing a form of life should be recognized in terms of epistemological agency. The primary epistemological agent of the Cartesian tradition has been the individual. A solitary knower of a Cartesian kind is not in the setting of a form of life, where there are things to catch on to, and where the world, and we as part of it, is apprehended and remade. I will give a brief account of criticism aimed at Cartesianism below, and then outline an alternative of communal knowing as it has been proposed by Ludwik Fleck. As there is a tension between what we may recognize as communal and as individual epistemological efforts I will then pay some attention to this tension through a distinction between community and society, or Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.

Communal knowing
The Cartesian view has been contested by several philosophers.54 Lynn Hankinson Nelson as one argues for "the recognition of communities as

54 See e.g. (Addelson and Potter 1991; Code 1991; Johansson 1989; Nelson 1990, 1993). Addelson and Potter criticize what they label 'epistemological individualism' (1991, 263). Johansson writes that "(t)raditionally the epistemological subject is a single person thinking about and/or observing the world. But the real epistemological subject is certainly a macroagent" (1989, 333). Similarly Code writes that "[k]nowledge is an
the primary agents of epistemology” (1993, 151), where science communities serve as obvious examples. Claiming that communities are the agents of epistemology, she suggests that it is communities that construct and acquire knowledge. An epistemological community “is a group or community that constructs and shares knowledge and standards of evidence” (1990, 123-4). She suggests it to be clear “that in the current state of science and science criticism, group membership is an epistemological variable” (265).

An alternative to Cartesian individualism was given early by Ludwik Fleck in his promotion of a comparative epistemology. He identifies thinking as “a supremely social activity which cannot by any means be completely localized within the confines of the individual”, and sees observation as being “conditioned by thought style and . . . thus tied to a community of thought” (1979 [1935], 98). Opposing the view of cognition as an individual process of any theoretical “particular consciousness”, Fleck describes cognition as a result of a social activity, as the existing stock of intersubjective product constructed within communal practices of acknowledgment, correction, and critique” and that “near-exclusive epistemological concentration on individual, putatively autonomous knowledge claims, caused by ‘direct’ contact with the world, obscures the constitutive role of communal, dialogic credibility-discerning and -establishing activities” (1991, 224).

Such a critique of ‘epistemological individualism’ as given by Nelson might e.g. be connected a to critique of ‘methodological individualism’ as it has been promoted by Roy Bhaskar, as they both argue for naturalistic accounts of science. He offers a critique of methodological individualism as “the doctrine that facts about societies, and social phenomena generally, are to be explained solely in terms of facts about individuals” (Bhaskar 1979, 34). He claims that this conception of the social is radically misconceived, and that it is concerned “with the persistent relations between individuals (and groups), and with the relations between these relations (and between such relations and nature and the products of such relations)” (36).

Nelson adopts the naturalized epistemology of Quine, where epistemology is itself within science, viewing epistemology as radically interdependent with other things we know (Nelson 1993, 125). Bhaskar thinks that “it is possible to give an account of science under which the proper and more or less specific methods of both the natural and social sciences can fall.” But he does not deny that “there are significant differences in these methods, grounded in real differences in their subject matters and in the relationships in which their sciences stand to them” (Bhaskar 1979, 3). In discussing the possibility for a philosophy of science Bhaskar is critical of Quine, whom he thinks undermines the results of philosophy, to differ insignificantly in epistemological status from scientific theories. Bhaskar finds philosophy both possible and indispensable, but he remarks that philosophy must recognize the conditional nature of all its results, and rejects any idealist and individualist cast (6).
knowledge exceeds the range of any one individual. He concludes that

cognition is a relation of interaction between three factors; not only the
knowing subject and the object to be known, but also the existing fund of
knowledge. “What is already known influences the particular method of
cognition; and cognition, in turn, enlarges, renews, and gives fresh
meaning to what is already known” (38).

Fleck likens the operation of cognition to the physiology of movement,
where motion and inhibition are the two active processes of which every
movement consists. The moving of a limb, for example, rests on the
immobilization of an entire so-called myostatic system to provide a basis of
fixation for the movement. In the operation of cognition the features
corresponding to motion and inhibition are, suggests Fleck, directed
determination and co-operative abstraction, which complement one
another (1979 [1935], 30).

Elaborating what he names a comparative epistemology Fleck introduces
us to his concepts, thought style (Denkstil) and thought collective
(Denkkollektiv).

If we define “thought collective” as a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or
maintaining intellectual interaction, we will find by implication that it also provides the
special “carrier” for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as for the
given stock of knowledge and level of culture. This we have designated thought style. The
thought collective thus supplies the missing component (Fleck 1979 [1935], 39).

The act of cognition (in science) he describes as ascertaining those results
which must follow, given certain preconditions. The portion of the act of
cognition that belongs to the collective are the preconditions, that he

56 ‘Myostatic’ is derived from the Greek myo, (mouse, muscle), and stasis, (standing,
stopping), and refers to the immobilization of, or the keeping of a co-ordinating
equilibrium between different groups of muscles.

57 On account of his development of a theory of a thought collective as a bearer of a
thought style, and their importance for the development of a fact, Fleck has principally
been seen as a forerunner to the theories of Thomas Kuhn regarding the attachment
between knowledge and the social. The concepts thought style and thought collective have
been seen as corresponding to Kuhn’s concepts paradigm and scientific community. The
concepts developed by Fleck have aspects reaching further than the paradigm of Kuhn,
though. In spite of this the concepts of Fleck are more precise and better demarcated
than paradigm, that can be given a large number of interpretations (Liliequist 1997, 12).
names active linkages. That which is experienced as objective reality are the constrained results, that he names passive linkages. The contribution of the individual takes part in the act of cognition by the act of ascertaining (Fleck 1979 [1935], 40).

In his case study of the Wasserman reaction the history of the modern concept of syphilis, Fleck shows us how discovery is inextricably interwoven with what we call error, as in recognizing a certain relation, many other relations must be misunderstood, denied or overlooked (Fleck 1979 [1935], 29-30).

In all of this Fleck points us to the very processual character of knowledge-making. “Knowledge, after all, does not repose upon some substratum. Only through continual movement and interaction can that drive be maintained which yields ideas and truths” (1979 [1935], 51). He claims that the statement “[s]omeone recognizes something” is incomplete, whether it be a relation, a fact, or an object. The statement demands some supplement as “on the basis of a certain fund of knowledge,’ or, better, ‘as a member of a certain kind cultural environment,’ and, best, ‘in a particular thought style, in a particular thought collective’” (38-9).

**Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft**

A key concept in this discussion of knowers and knowing is community. The concept has a relation to the concept society, to which it may be compared or contrasted. The contrast, and likeness, between community and society can be mirrored in, although not directly translated into, the concepts Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. It is generally acknowledged that the translation of the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to the English words ‘community’ and ‘society’, will not catch the full meaning of the concepts. These sociological concepts, were established by Ferdinand Tönnies in 1887, in his classic *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Abhandlungen des Communismus und des Socialismus als empirische Kulturformen*.

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58 This indeterminacy of translation is mirrored in different translations given. Cecilie Høigaard in her interpretation of Tönnies’ work describe the two types of acts in a society, acts which are unfolding and acts which are calculating, as giving rise to two different forms of interaction and relationships among people. These forms of relationships and interaction she chooses to call ‘community’ and ‘company’. This might be compared to the first English translation of Tönnies’ work that was titled *Community and Association*. Later translations have been titled *Community and Society*. 
The paradigm of *Gesellschaft* can be described as a “voluntary association, such as a chess club, whose activities are the coordinated actions of a number of people who intentionally join that group in order to pursue the purposes that identify it”, whereas the paradigm of *Gemeinschaft* can be described as an association “whose members find their identities in that group” (*The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, s.v. “social philosophy”, op.cit.).

Johan Asplund discusses the concepts of Tönnies’ illuminatingly in his book *Essä om Gemeinschaft och Gesellschaft*, and my brief sketch of these concepts is derived from his book. Life in *Gemeinschaft* is intimate and private. The idea of *Gemeinschaft* is tightly knit together with rural life as being “natural” and organic, and is often referred to as the true and lasting form of social life. The art of social engineering cannot bring forward a *Gemeinschaft*, as it is a natural and unplanned social unit. You are born into *Gemeinschaft* and live with your own people.\(^{59}\) In *Gemeinschaft* everybody is a “brother” or “sister” albeit their not being related. People in *Gemeinschaft* work, and their work is viewed in this sociological understanding as an end in itself. The work is creative and produces values. The work may increase people’s property, the kind of property that is an expansion of the self; property that you cannot imagine being parted from (Asplund 1991, 63-6). This kind of work may be seen in the production of food that meets your own needs, and where a surplus is just saved for later consumption, or lavishly spent.

*Gesellschaft* on the other hand is the public life, where you can keep a person company part of the road. It is related to urban life, business, travelling and science. *Gesellschaft* is artificial and constructed, a mechanism. In *Gesellschaft* every man is a “stranger” or “foreigner”, even when he is related to others. Work in *Gesellschaft* produces profit and increases wealth or capital, but without furthering intrinsic values (Asplund 1991, 63-6). Calculation as in a company has a “dominant role in the relations between people”, and the relationships between people are “characterized by mutual indifference”. Parties are prepared to exploit each other, and “see each other as a means through which to achieve their own individual ends” (Høigaard 1993, 60). A production of food surplus is in *Gesellschaft* produced for selling and to be made a profit from.

\(^{59}\) Being “born” should here be interpreted in a very broad sense, as should be obvious from the continued discussion.
The concepts *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are theoretical constructs, and have been criticized for being dichotomously constructed. Critics of Tönnies have complained that as given social circumstances always are a mixture of both, the concepts should not have been constructed as exclusives. Different attempts to make a continuum of the concepts have been made. As a complaint about Tönnies' concepts this goes back a long way, according to Asplund. I am not going to discuss the attempts of making the concepts into a continuum. Instead I will outline an alternative view of the concepts, where they are still exclusive, but as the prerequisites of each other. This alternative is put forth by Asplund.

Opposing earlier critique of the dichotomous construction of the concepts Asplund suggests that "the figure of thought" represented by the concepts *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* should instead be seen as a puzzle picture. When looking at a puzzle picture one can first see a certain figure, for example, an old man, but after a while you can see another figure, for example, a young man. The elements of the picture can be organized in two separate or opposite ways. A puzzle picture done with eloquence will have the same elements included in the two different figures. However one can only see one figure at a time; both figures cannot be seen at the same time. According to the analogy presented by Asplund there would in every picture of a *Gemeinschaft* be hidden a picture of a *Gesellschaft*, and vice versa. But you cannot see the one at the same time as the other. When you have first seen a Gemeinschaft, the picture has to be reorganized so that the picture of the Gesellschaft will appear. How well this puzzle picture of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* will be done varies from case to case. One can

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*A frequent example, when not a duck/rabbit, is that of an old woman versus a young woman, which is the example Asplund uses too. While writing I decided to change the gender of the persons in the picture of the example. The changing of gender in examples often reveals other aspects of gender than meets the eye, when one reuses standard examples. This was also the case with this example. Thinking of a picture of an old man, turning to be a picture of a young man, does not have the same effect; somehow the change between young and old does not seem as total, as is the case with the women. Age, youth and external appearance has much more significance in the gendering of women than it has in the case of men. For women age is generally constructed as negative; for men it can be constructed as having positive aspects. My example seems overly constructed, and furthermore I cannot remember having seen it done this way either. Still I use it, as I think that the hesitation one feels when confronted with the example is important for becoming aware of how gender is constructed in hundreds of ways all the time.*
imagine that in rare cases the puzzle picture would be so well done that exactly the same elements would be part of the picture of Gemeinschaft as of the Gesellschaft. In other cases the one picture would dominate over the other. Anyhow the character of puzzle picture would never be erased. Some little shade of a Gemeinschaft will always be able to be discerned in a Gesellschaft, and vice versa. This interpretation makes it possible to see Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft both as the prerequisite for and the exclusion of each other. Thus every attempt to replace Tönnies' dichotomy with continuums will be seen as peculiar, as it would be an attempt to go from a sort of dialectical thinking to a sort of quantitative thinking (Asplund 1991, 42-3).

Communication or language itself has distinctively different characteristics in Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. In Gemeinschaft language is no invention, and is not the result of agreements or conventions. It is connected to people sharing each other's lives, and to their intimate knowledge of each other. It is the organ of intersubjective understanding. It is important though not to think the understanding and the organ of understanding (that is language) as separate. Language is no instrument that men have agreed to use to make themselves understood. Language is to form and content a living intersubjective understanding. It is the voice of community.61

In Gesellschaft on the other hand language is instrumental, a tool to be used for specific purposes. As intersubjective understanding cannot be constructed or brought forward through agreements or conventions, the acts of language in Gesellschaft presuppose that the parties understand each other. The contract as the typical act of Gesellschaft presupposes that the parties involved already understand each other, and have a common language. Gesellschaft in this fundamental sense builds on Gemeinschaft. The language of merchants is the pure form of the language of Gesellschaft. The merchant chooses his words by their effect, striving for benefits or gain. If true words will not lead to the desired effect, a lie is not far away. Albeit fraud is not officially condoned, the well considered and instrumental words of merchant language are untruthful as they have lost

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61 This represents Asplund's reading of Tönnies' writing (Asplund 1991, 68).
their original qualities and have been reduced to adapt to quantitative purposes.62

Neither in Gemeinschaft nor in Gesellschaft is life without conflict. In Gemeinschaft man is by nature kind towards his friends and unkind towards his enemies. This situation is characteristic of Gemeinschaft. All men are basically connected in Gemeinschaft in spite of all dividing factors. In Gesellschaft man is abstract or artificial. As such he has friends and enemies only in relation to his aims. In Gesellschaft men are basically divided in spite of all connecting factors. Friendship and enmity, love and hate are on the other hand almost constitutive of Gemeinschaft. Conflict in Gemeinschaft cannot be avoided but is seen as something negative. In Gesellschaft on the other hand, conflict is the very principle on which it is based. Here all values are convertible; the parties in conflict do not what they have to do, but what they choose to do. They know what they are doing and can in principle always undo what they have done. The conflicts are not violent in character but have an economic nature. One can say that the opposition between enmity and friendship is cancelled in Gesellschaft and replaced by economic competition. As enmity this economic competition is as thin and impersonal as it is omnipresent. Man in Gesellschaft has no friends or enemies, only contracted collaborators and competitors. The competitors meet in the market, not as concrete persons, but rather as abstractions or masks (Asplund 1991, 70-6).

The description given above is not a plea for Gemeinschaft. It is nothing more than an elaboration, and one of its conclusions is that the dialectic between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is necessary to the extent that you cannot talk of the one without, implicitly at least, contrasting it to the other.

Figures of thought”
A “figure of thought”63 is a way of seeing something (Asplund 1991, 38-9). As an idea it is not necessarily verbalized. To understand a figure of thought one needs more than access to what is “in” a text or a discourse.

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62 This represents Asplund’s reading of Tönnies’ writing (Asplund 1991, 68-9).
63 As I am not sure whether this word can be directly translated from Swedish to English I have put it in scare quotes. From this point in the text I will however not use the scare quotes, as I hope my reader by now will have accepted the term.
One needs access to what lies “under” the text or discourse. In relation to discourses figures of thought are undeveloped or mere embryos of discourses. In a discourse the underlying figure of thought is often not directly visible according to Asplund.

Not only does one have to read the discourse within which the figure of thought is developed into a text, one also has to pay attention to what Kenneth Burke would have labelled the *material situation*, that is the scene in which the figure of thought is enacted (Burke 1969, 13).

We can also refer to *praxis*, writes Asplund. He points to the concept of praxis as having the advantage of referring not to something static, but to human activity. Discourses are about, or refer to, praxis or changes of praxis, but do not do so unmediated. The task to mediate between praxis and discourse is given to figures of thought. When writing or talking, we never do so about a directly perceived reality. We write and talk about a reality that is already worked on, formed or shaped. This working on, forming and shaping is done by way of figures of thought. All seeing is seeing something *as* something. The figures of thought and their task are related to this *as*. Asplund claims that the level of figures of thought is the level where reality is on its way to become language, text or speech, but in relation to the developed texts the figures of thought are “mute”. They are ways of seeing (Asplund 1991, 38-9).

Distinguishing between figures of thought and discourses the way Asplund does show a certain parallelism with a general distinction between thinking and language. The concept of figure of thought may serve as an auxiliary concept when discussing the relation between translatability and understanding. If a speaker of language A develops a discourse in his language, and a speaker of language B develops one in his, and their languages are not translatable into each other, they may still be able to understand each other if their discourses are developed starting from figures of thought that they both have at their disposal. However, if the two different discourses are being started from figures of thought that only one of them has at his disposal, they will not be able to understand each other, even if their languages are translatable. Thus one can see that two speakers of the *same* language can at times be unable to understand each other, if they do not share the same figures of thought (Asplund 1991, 15-6).
The concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* describe a way of seeing human societies or communities, whether these be Early Christian communities, urban society, or the shift from the pre-Modern to Modern society. I want to give an example of the figure of thought that *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* represents, an example that also shows how this figure of thought is shared by many of us without having been shared in a common discourse.⁶⁴ Thus the figure of thought represented by *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* is not exclusive to sociological quarters, it is public property.

My example is that of seeing Laurel and Hardy in a silent movie furnishing a room. This is just one example of many with Laurel and Hardy, that I think points towards a shared figure of thought that we have of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. What makes us laugh or smile when watching them furnishing a room, is seeing the individualistic, the action of the *Gesellschaft*, moved into the idea of the *Gemeinschaft*. They both furnish and move furniture about in their own individual projects, but they do so in their common room. It gets wrong and funny and amusing. Somehow there is a clash between two different projects, the communal and the individual. The two individual projects are not possible to get in accordance with one another. There is nothing communal in their actions but they act within a frame, the room, of an implicit communal project and action. The minute they would start building a wall in between them, the amusement would be gone, as the amusement thrives on the clash between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*.

To be able to laugh at Laurel and Hardy, one does not need to have taken part in any discourse on *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. But one needs to have been a member of a society where this figure of thought is a way one has of seeing things. It is a figure of thought that lies under some of our discourses on human action, and that is a background to shared practices.

A figure of thought does not come from nowhere, it is a way of seeing things. In this way of seeing things we are given a frame to which we can relate our actions as rational or irrational, valid or invalid, and so forth.

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⁶⁴ In this case I let “us” refer generally to people in Western society, as far as they are able to appreciate an old silent movie with Laurel and Hardy.
Figures of thought are inevitable. It does not matter how we see reality, we always see it as something. Uncovering a figure of thought is at the same time to relativize it, and open other possibilities of seeing (Asplund 1991, 40).

Conclusions on knowers in epistemological communities

I have let the terms ‘community’ and ‘society’ bear the full meaning of the figure of thought that Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft represents. Choosing the term ‘community’ for what I see as the epistemological agent, I have aimed at making it clear to the reader that every reference to a community in this respect, should be read as implicitly contrasted to a conception of a society. The community stands for our common efforts of trying to understand ourselves and the world, in circumstances where we are basically connected to each other; as family, as colleagues and so forth. In the section discussing Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, I pointed out that there is always a shade of society (Gesellschaft) in every community (Gemeinschaft), and vice versa. In every epistemological community there are shades of a society, where each individual is striving to reach her/his own goal, be it economic or scientific, and where as individuals we are, at least seemingly, replaceable. Thus the figure of thought represented by Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is to be called forth when I use the term ‘epistemological community’. As an elaboration of what a notion of an epistemological community might entail, I have sketched Ludwik Fleck’s account of the efforts of medical scientific communities to understand and explain the origin of syphilis. His term ‘thought collective’ (Denkkollektiv) is well captured by the figure of

This seeing something as something may be compared to what Norwood Russell Hanson writes of science and observation:

seeing as and seeing that must be active elements in what we call seeing in science. Not only do scientists see things as being things of a certain sort, which is just to see that were certain operations performed other actions would follow, but, . . . , we see that the situation could not be otherwise. It is a matter of logic, not merely a matter of fact, that seeing as and seeing that are indispensable to what is called, in science, seeing or observing (1969, 147).
thought represented by *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, as the *Denkkollektiv* embraces both kinds of efforts, the individual and the common.

**Language, meaning and making sense**

In this section I aim at what could be an understanding of the foundations of language, as it might be conceived of with reference to the experiences of our lived bodies in different forms of life. In this I tend towards a Wittgensteinian understanding of language, stressing a pragmatic viewpoint of language in use.

Language as connected to, and even being, a form of life is a theme developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later philosophy. Language on this account can be said to be both a way of doing something, and connected to ways of doing something. The use of language and meaning are connected to forms of life. In language, as a form of life, we are applying standards to situations and organizing experience according to implicit rules.\(^6\) Connected to this is the way language is developed and changes with praxis inherent in our forms of life, but also how praxis is formed by language (as a form of life).\(^7\) Through interaction within a form of life language is formed and informed, along with the inherent praxis of that form of life. Language also informs and takes part in the constitution of the form of life and its inherent praxis.

Meaning on this account is not only a linguistic event. Meaning is deeply embedded within a corporeal structure and experience—not only in analogy with but also grounded in corporeal structure and experience.\(^8\) Cognition of the lived body is inherently corporeal and experiential—and meanings emerge, and change, in individuals in the interaction between

\(^6\) This interpretation of Wittgenstein's thesis of language as a form of life is found in (Grene 1966, 165).

\(^7\) See e.g. the works of Helen Watson Verran and David Turnbull where knowledge and belief systems of different cultures are compared, such as e.g. between Western and Aboriginal, and between scientific and other indigenous knowledge systems (Turnbull, Watson, and Yirrkala 1989; Verran 1995; Watson 1990; Watson, Yirrkala, and Chambers 1989; Watson-Verran and Turnbull 1995).

\(^8\) These themes are developed in e.g. (Johnson 1987; Sheets-Johnstone 1990).
individuals, and between individuals and communities in interaction with, and as part of, reality.  

Furthermore meaning is not always a linguistic event. A lot of the time when we refer to meaning we do refer to linguistic meaning, but that is not all there is to it. Many things and events are for us imbued with meaning, meaning that we apprehend with our lived bodies, but meanings some of which could never even be linguistically mediated. I am here thinking of the meaning that for example faces, body postures, and many rituals have for us. The meaning imbued in such cases are often characterized by its salient emotional quality. Some meanings might be difficult to mediate successfully, or fully, through words, and these are areas in which the arts often work.

Meaningfulness in the sense here proposed is given the two following features by Mark Johnson. First, meaning can be attributed to human events and for words and sentences, and therefore is always meaning for some person or community. On this view words have meaning only for people who use them to mean something, i.e. they do not have meaning in themselves. Still we can say that a word or a sentence has a certain meaning, as a “shorthand for the statement that a word or phrase or sentence is used by a linguistic community to mean something.” To sum up: “linguistic meaning consists of the use of words by a person or community to mean something for that community” (Johnson 1987, 177).

Second, “[t]he meaning of the symbol stems from the imposition upon it of a certain intentionality”. Human understanding is rooted in our intentionality, in the way we can direct our attention to some dimension or

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69 An interesting example is given by what in industrial design is called the semantics of products. The design of the product is in itself supposed to give a description of the purpose and/or mode of operation of the product, express it’s properties, exhort reactions, and function as identification of the product as to origin, kinship, nature or category. The lines, the surfaces, and the colours of the product are all examples of such functions. Through a certain design an armchair can e.g. look really inviting. Of more interest to this thesis is the way our lived body through other senses than sight can apprehend the semantics of a product, such as when the handle of a tool may be “self-instructing” so that you intuitively feel how the grip should be held, or how the handle should be pressed in the use of the tool. See Monó (1997).

70 Compare with Wittgenstein (1967 [1953]) writing about “meaning is use”:

§ 43. For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
aspect of our experience. Thus meaning is a matter of relatedness as the event or symbol "has meaning" by virtue of its relation to something beyond itself. The relatedness depends upon the understanding in which it is embedded (Johnson 1987, 177).

Language

Language is the means by which we express propositional knowledge. How should a knowing that is defined by "that-clauses" then be accounted for? My thesis is that the knowing expressed in language are abstractions that are grounded in experience given by our activity in the world. Without such activity there could be no such abstraction. Agents express these abstractions in speech-acts. Abstractions expressed in propositional knowledge do not only point backwards, to former activities and experiences in the world. If the abstractions expressed did not aim at some connection to future activity in the world, it would be without meaning. Thus the knowing that is abstracted in these speech-acts should not be viewed as Platonic ideas, but should be understood as it is connected to activity. The knowing expressed in concepts and propositions should thus

71 This second feature is also illustrated in Wittgenstein's (1967 [1953]) writing:

§ 454. "Everything is already there in . . ." How does it come about that this arrow $\rightarrow$ points? Doesn't it seem to carry in it something besides itself?—"No, not the dead line on paper; only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that."—That is both true and false. The arrow points only in the application that a living thing makes of it.

This pointing is not a hocus-pocus which can be performed only by the soul.

72 The concept of speech acts relates to John L. Austin, who regarded language as primarily a way of acting, doing something with words. He distinguished between locutionary speech acts, the saying of something imbued with meaning, and illocutionary speech acts, that is what is done in uttering the words such as claiming, asserting, asking, ordering, or baptizing. His concept of perlocutionary speech acts refers to the effect the utterance has on the one addressed, such as when somebody becomes cautious from being warned (Furberg 1997, 359-69).

73 I am not denying that we can theorize about brains and thinking as is done in cognitive science, nor that this kind of theorizing may be useful for many purposes. However I think that we cannot get a complete understanding of language without seeing it, basically, as an activity of the lived body. I think that to do basic philosophy of language one cannot start from, for instance, the models of cognitive semantics (see e.g. (Gårdensfors 1996, 1997) but should start from language in use, in something like the way proposed by Wittgenstein. I think that this remark of mine is in conformity with
not be regarded as thing-phenomena, but as interdependent with a web of other concepts and propositions, as well as with an overall praxis within a form of life.

If one is to give an account of meaning as it is apprehended by our lived bodies, it is a meaning that is deeply embedded within a corporeal structure and experience, within a communal human experience of the lived body, where our thinking is rooted in doing. If it is the case that something has a meaning (whether this something be a word, a sentence, a gesture, a task, an experience, or a theory), this necessarily implies that someone can understand it as something.

In this thesis I am stressing the processual character of experiencing, understanding, and knowing, thus giving priority to a focus on human beings in action and interaction. Meaning as it is apprehended or given by us in action is connected to our human understanding of things, of course. This connection between understanding and meaning is outlined by Mark Johnson in what he labels a “semantics of understanding”:

... meaning is always a matter of human understanding, which constitutes our experience of a common world that we can make some sense of. A theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. And understanding involves image schemata and their metaphorical projections, as well as propositions. These embodied and imaginative structures of meaning have been shown to be shared, public, and “objective,” in an appropriate sense of objectivity (Johnson 1987, 174).

The view put forth by Johnson, in line with phenomenological approaches, obviously entails a broad conception of understanding. It is our way of “being in”, “being situated in” or “having a world”. Through intentionality we orient ourselves and direct our intentional actions in this world. “Understanding exists both as reflective activity and experiential orientation or situatedness, in this sense” (Johnson 1987, 221, n.23). It is only through our understanding, our experience, of this world that we

Georg H. von Wright’s view in Explanation and Understanding (1971) that the concept of activity is logically prior to the concept of causality. I have merely applied it to philosophy of language. A defence of von Wright’s view, but with other arguments, is to be found in Bengt Molander’s The Order There Is and the Order We Make (1982). In my opinion, both cognitive science and cognitive semantics seem to regard the concept of causality as logically prior to the concept of activity.

“have” and understand ourselves to “be in”, that we can act intentionally. Our being able to act with intention is built on a fundamental intentionality.

The concept of intentionality refers to our ‘being directed’ in a very broad sense, and applies to both consciousness and to a being conscious of something.\(^7\) Intentionality is the directedness of an intentional subject directed towards an intentional object. The intentional object may be a state of affairs, another subject, an object in the usual sense, or a fictional object. When the intentional object is another intentional subject, who is simultaneously directing her/his intentionality towards the former subject, the intentionality becomes nested. For example, when “I see you seeing me”, our intentionality is nested. A society then consists of individuals who are in relation to each other in nested intentionality (Johansson 1989, 270 ff.).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty has motility and a relation of the lived body to the world as basic intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 1962 [1945], 110-2). He states that “[m]ovement is not thought about movement, and bodily space is not space thought of or represented” (137). The centrality of motility of the lived body is also stressed by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone who writes:

Turning toward and away are not acts of pure spirit or Being. Short of a body, there is no turning—of anything—to begin with. In effect, the concept of directionality, like the concepts of right and left, are corporeally spawned concepts (1990, 289).\(^7\)

Understanding will on this account be an understanding of meaning in the very broad sense earlier described. Our being in this world is of our lived bodies, and to this being meanings are present, some of which are abstracted

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\(^7\) Franz Brentano saw intentionality as the essence of the psychical, as opposed to the physical, where the psychical (mental) is characterized by being directed towards a content, as it is directed towards an object (whether real or imagined). The late Edmund Husserl elaborated the notion of intentionality and finds beneath the intentionality of representations, a deeper intentionality; existence or the life-world (Merleau-Ponty 1962 [1945], 121, n.4). Merleau-Ponty in his turn elaborated this notion of intentionality and, in line with his claim that the world has meaning to us before we consciously choose to afford it with meaning, sees conscious or explicit intentionality as founded in previous, implicit intentionality. Seeing motility as basic intentionality he claims that “[c]onsciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’” (Merleau-Ponty 1962 [1945], 137).

\(^7\) See also (Sheets-Johnstone 1998).
in the form of propositions. Linguistic meaning on this view is only an instance or specification of meaning(fulness) in general.

Mark Johnson focuses on “the human body, and especially those structures of imagination and understanding that emerge from our embodied experience” (Johnson 1987, xiv). Following his and linguist George Lakoff’s accounts of embodied, imaginative understanding, I will give special attention to different types of imaginative structures: image-schemata and metaphorical projection through embodied structures of experience, from the concrete to the abstract, and to more “linguistic” uses of metaphor and metonymy.

The use of the term ‘embodied’ unfortunately echoes a dualistic, Cartesian, view of body and mind where the “self is conceived as packaged in the flesh”, “[w]here the original conceptual separation between the mental and the physical is mended by a grammatical union” (Sheets-Johnstone 1990, 303). A similar claim might be made for the term ‘incarnate’. My preference therefore lies with the terms ‘the lived body’ and ‘corporeal’. My overall aim in this thesis is to adhere to a centrality of the lived body, even though there will be instances where I use terms like ‘embodied’, or ‘incarnate’ also, as such terms are what often is at hand in a cultural linguistic practice that is informed by a dualistic view in these matters.

**Image-schemata**

Image-schemata not only connect, but also permeate our networks or webs of meaning (Johnson 1987, 188-9). They arise from our imaginative structuring of experience, and are recurring, dynamic patterns of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that give coherence and structure to our experience. The VERTICALITY schema, is one example given by Johnson. The VERTICALITY schema is a recurring dynamic pattern that emerges “from our tendency to employ an UP-DOWN orientation in picking out meaningful structures of our experience.” This structure of verticality is grasped repeatedly in thousands of perceptions and activities we experience every day; such as perceiving a tree, our felt sense of standing upright, . . . , and experiencing the level of water rising in the bathtub. The VERTICALITY schema is the abstract structure of these VERTICALITY experiences, images, and perceptions (Johnson 1987, xiv).
Metaphor and metonymy

Metaphor can be conceived of "as a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different kind" (Johnson 1987, xiv-xv). So principally it is "a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 36). Metaphor, thus conceived, is not merely a linguistic mode of expression. It is "one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, ordered experiences" (Johnson 1987, xv) to make sense of, and reason about. The patterns we obtain in our physical experiences are used to organize our more abstract understanding. Through the use of metaphorical projection we make use of our physical experience in two ways.\footnote{I am aware of the vast existing literature dealing with metaphor and metonymy as phenomena and the understanding of their role and function, see e.g. (Black 1962; Kittay 1987). My own reference to these matters is only done with respect to the way metaphor and metonymy can be seen as cognitive structures, by which we organize our understanding.}

First, our embodied experiences from various physical domains are structured (as e.g. image-schemata), and that structure can be projected through metaphorical projection onto abstract domains.

Secondly, concrete bodily experiences also constrain "the kinds of mappings that can occur across domains" (Johnson 1987, xv), just as they constrain the input to the metaphorical projections. This does not mean that anything projects onto anything. As an example of this constraint on meaning and reasoning, Johnson gives us the simple, but pervasive metaphorical understanding of MORE IS UP. He points us to the propositional "more is up" as a misleading shorthand way of "naming a complex experiential web of connections that is not itself primarily propositional" (xv). We understand MORE (increase) as being oriented UP (involving the VERTICALITY schema), due to our most common everyday bodily experiences and the image schemata they involve. If one adds liquid to a container, the level goes up, and when one adds objects to a pile, the level goes up. "MORE and UP are therefore correlated in our experience in a way that provides a physical basis for our abstract understanding of quantity." (xv).
Physical experience as designating a way we come to know the world, hence we change accordingly, is caught hold of in some Icelandic metaphors. Social anthropologist Gísli Pálsson (1995, 10) relates the experience of nausea as representing above all a temporary, transitional and possibly beneficial phase for Icelandic fishermen, where the metaphor of nausea combines emotional and cognitive aspects. Being seasick (sjöveikur), he writes, is to be unfamiliar with the rocking movements of the world. A leap in learning is supposed to take place as one recovers from seasickness, when “getting one’s sea legs” (sjóast). Those returning from experiences of rough seas are said to have found their sea legs (vera sjóaðir). The nautical metaphor of having sailed (being sigldur or sigld) used when referring to a person who has been abroad, “suggests some kind of othering” (Pálsson 1995, 10). The geographical location of Iceland, together with the historical importance of maritime transport, forms the background of this, presently and past, common metaphor of people “having sailed” if they have had first-hand experience of foreign customs. The metaphor links bodily involvement with a critical stage in learning where you are changed with what you experience of the world.

Metaphorical structurings of experience have systematically related entailments, i.e. metaphors are never merely metaphors as isolated beliefs. In the investigation of a historical example Johnson shows how the BOY AS A MACHINE metaphor in medical research worked as a massive experiential structuring that involved values, interests, goals, practices, and theorizing. Someone whose understanding is structured by that metaphor, will grasp the medical situation at hand accordingly. One might see the underlying metaphor as an implicit theory from which the understanding is done. The entailments of the “body as a machine”-metaphor, such as the body being constituted of parts, that are distinct, albeit connected, will affect patterns of discernment, and make that person “see” some things and miss others (Johnson 1987, 127-38).78

78 The historical example Johnson uses is Hans Selye’s research into the nature of stress reactions. Selye was the first researcher to define stress as a biological syndrome, a general reaction to some shock to an organism’s system. When he was educated he was taught to look for specific causes for specific or unique symptoms, but he was intrigued by the fact that there were so many symptoms common to so many diseases. With time, and research, he began to see the possibility of a general, non-specific, and non unique reaction pattern. Johnson interprets Selye’s research as moving from one metaphorical grasp of the situation with an understanding of the BODY AS A MACHINE to another, with
In the case of metonymy, a different kind of process is being used as "one entity is being used to refer to another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 36). In contrast then to metaphors that promote the understanding of one thing in terms of another, metonymy promotes understanding through the letting of one entity stand for another." In cases such as "The ham sandwich is waiting for his check." the expression "the ham sandwich" is being used to refer to an actual person who is waiting for his check. One entity, the ham sandwich, is used to refer to another entity that is related to it, i.e. the person. In the case of the metonymy THE PART FOR THE WHOLE there can be many different parts that can stand for the whole, and the one part picked out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on. To say that we need good heads on the project, is to use “good heads” to refer to “intelligent people”, where the part chosen refers to a particular characteristic that is associated with the head. To say that we need strong arms in this work, is to use “strong arms” to refer to strong people that probably will be of good help when lifting heavy things (35-6).

I suggest that it can also be the case that several stages of abstraction may be needed between the projection of patterns from the original domain and its mapping onto the target domain. It seems to be the case that the coupling of a metaphorical in terms of and a metonymical letting one entity stand for another, can be a combined mode of conveying meaning. Let us look at a recent example of new meaning conferred to a word, actually a name, in Swedish.

The example might be mistaken for a personification. Personification is an ontological metaphor where a physical object is being specified as a person, which gives us a wide array of possibilities of seeing something non-human as human.79 The non-human entities can then be experienced in an understanding of the BODY AS HOMEOSTATIC ORGANISM. (‘Homeostatic’—compare to the noun ‘homeostasis’ that refers to a relatively stable state of equilibrium or a tendency toward such a state between the different but interdependent elements or groups of elements of an organism or group.)

79 Ontological metaphors function by letting us relate to parts of our experiences by way of understanding them in terms of objects and substances, as if they were discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Even those things that are not clearly discrete or bounded are still categorized as such, e.g. mountains and street corners. There is a wide array of ontological metaphors that serve various purposes by viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances. A lot of the time we do not even recognize the metaphor underlying the way we ordinarily refer to certain phenomena. It is often the case that we do not catch on to the underlying metaphor, until the metaphor
terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities. In cases such as
diseases and inflation for example we impute human qualities to things
that are not human. In the case described below the non-human entity, the
register, is not experienced in human terms, however (Lakoff and Johnson
1980, 33-5).

Whilst an investigation of alleged scientific fraud in the medical sciences
was being conducted, the following sentence was delivered in defence of the
accused researchers—as some of their original data, patients that had
undergone surgery, could not be identified in the surgical record, the state
of the record was focused on instead—:

Denna op-liggare ser i det närmaste ut som en Marjasin.[This register of surgical
operations almost looks like a Marjasin.] (Bengtsson, Hjerpe, and Holmgren 1997)

The name Marjasin refers to a Swedish county governor, who was
prosecuted and acquitted for the alleged crime of getting double
compensation for his official entertaining, through the cutting and
pasting of receipts. What is obvious in this example is that referring to “a
Marjasin” does not refer to a person cutting and pasting receipts or
documents. Instead his cutting and pasting is the relevant feature passed on.
With this the projection from one domain to a target domain is not yet
completed, though. The cutting and pasting have then been projected on
to (in this case) a register, as having been cut and pasted upon. In this
example it is the features of cutting and pasting that have gone through
two stages in the projection from a person doing this, to something
undergoing this treatment.\footnote{The example can be regarded in contrast to the example of conferred meaning from
the name Paparazzo, the photographer in Federico Fellini’s film La Dolce Vita, to
paparazzi, referring to photographers working for the gutter press. In this case just one
is further elaborated. The example THE MIND IS A MACHINE -metaphor e.g. “gives us a
conception of the mind as having an on-off state, a level of efficiency, a productive
capacity, an internal mechanism, a source of energy, and an operating condition.” This}
comes through in sentences like “My mind just isn’t operating today.”, “I’m a little rusty
today.”, or “He broke down” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980. 25-9).

The difference between an ontological metaphor and a linguistic metaphor is that it is
not necessarily the case that we say that “the car is a kind of human being” even though
some people regard their cars as their “friends” or give them proper names. However we
might say that “the car gave up” as if it was human, thereby making an ontological
metaphor.

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In the example above, one can discern such systematically related entailments as Johnson describes. As the cutting and pasting of Marjasin seems highly dubious, that feature of distrust is entailed when the register is concerned. The meaning conveyed is that the register is not to be relied on.

Interaction
Social power can be exercised in the arena of spoken or written language alone. More often than not, though, it is exercised between language users that are mutually interacting not only with each other, but with reality, of which they themselves are a part. An important part of the “social” is how we, in interaction, handle and designate this “reality”. That is what we learn from the story of “the egg of Columbus”, a story that I was told in school.

Having come back to Europe, after his having “discovered” America, Columbus is said to have been taunted once at a dinner. The taunting consisted of the claim that there was nothing remarkable about his discovery; it was no feat as “anyone can sail to America”.\(^8\) Columbus then asked if anyone at the table could make an egg stand on its end. Several tried but without success. Columbus then put his egg down forcefully on its end with his hand, thus slightly cracking it and making the egg stand on its end. At this someone said: “but that is no feat; anyone can do that!”, at which Columbus responded: “yes, now you might do it, but not before I had shown you how to!”

This story has an interesting feature with relation to the way Johnson describes metaphor “as a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different kind” (Johnson 1987, xiv-xv). In order to understand one thing, we conceive of it in terms of another. The metaphors can therefore be seen as cognitive operations, where their linguistic expression is only a secondary phenomenon. On this view we can

\(^*\) stage is involved in the projection. The name Paparazzo, designating a special person, confers meaning to other persons similar to the person Paparazzo, who is a photographer working for the gutter press.

\(^8\) I am by no means unaware of how the concept of discovery, whether applied to the discovery of other people or the discovery of inhabited land, is deeply problematic in its obvious Eurocentric and imperialistic connotations, but still the story of the egg of Columbus has other features that come handy to my account.
describe the metaphors as transformations of image schemata (Gärdenfors 1996, 164). “The core hypothesis is that a metaphor expresses a similarity in topological or metrical structure between different quality dimensions. A word that represents a particular structure in one quality dimension can be used as a metaphor to express a similar structure about another dimension. In this way one can account for how a metaphor can transfer knowledge about one conceptual dimension to another” (Gärdenfors 1996, 171).

My claim is that what Columbus supposedly demonstrated was first a contest of what was to fall under the concept of “egg standing on its end”, and in light of this he made a non-linguistic metaphorical mapping from one sociophysical domain, that of handling eggs, to another, that of sailing to continents yet unknown.  

My interpretation can be seen in light of the work of linguist Eve Sweetser on the pervasive, coherently structured system of metaphors that underly and relate three dimensions of experience; the sociophysical realm, the epistemic realm, and the structure of speech acts. In this system of metaphors the physical or the sociophysical become a metaphor for the non-physical. The mental, the epistemic (rational argument, theorizing, activities of reasoning), and the structure of a speech act is understood in terms of the physical in a BODY FOR MIND metaphorical structure, when we “use the language of the external world to apply to the internal mental world, which is metaphorically structured as parallel to that external world” (Sweetser 1990, 50).

In the case of different senses of modal verbs Sweetser identifies the sociophysical as a metaphor for the nonphysical. She

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82 There are of course two major problems with this story as an example, one is that it probably is not true, and the other is that we know that Columbus surely did not know that he was sailing to America when he did. Even though the story may not be true though, it has a point as a story being told often enough to be known under the heading “Colombi ägg” in Sweden—obviously it is seen as conveying an important feature about how an argument over a contested concept can be dealt with.

The use of an egg standing on its end is afforded to another historical figure, architect Filippo Brunelleschi, who when asked how he was going to support his giant dome for the cathedral of Florence puts down a broken egg on its bottom. See (Barolsky 1991; Vasari 1967 [1568]).

As for Columbus’ surely not knowing what he did, I might have done better with an example like Alexander undoing the Gordian knot—where the task of *untying* the knot was solved in a previously unforeseen manner.

83 Sweetser works from an understanding of speech acts that is derived from Austin.

84 See also (Johnson 1987).
distinguishes between root and epistemic senses of modals, where the root sense of modals denote ability (can), permission (may), or obligation (must) in our sociophysical world, whereas the epistemic sense denotes probability, possibility or necessity in reasoning. The ability, permission and obligation of the root sense either originates from “natural causes” like physical constraints and forces, or from “social forces” like social restrictions or commitments (Sweetser 1990, chapter 3).

Our concern in the case of Columbus will be with the root senses of can and may, i.e., their connections to ability and permission. As Sweetser points out “[c]an denotes positive ability on the part of the doer; may denotes lack of restriction on the part of someone else” (1990, 53). The differing senses of can and may have been described in terms of experiential (image-schematic) gestalts for force by Johnson (Johnson 1987, 48). These gestalts are actual repeatable structures of experience that exist for us prelinguistically, although they can be refined and elaborated in language, and are part of meaning and understanding. The image-schematic force gestalt of may is understood as ABSENCE OR REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT to the occurrence or performance of some action, whereas the image-schematic force gestalt of can is ENABLEMENT.

Columbus altered the understanding of the meaning of his feat. Through his putting the egg down forcefully on its end he altered the understanding of his feat from a metaphorical understanding of it in terms of the force gestalt of ENABLEMENT, to an understanding of it in terms of the gestalt ABSENCE OR REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT. Columbus succeeded to affect not only the understanding of his feat, but also the linguistic meaning of ‘feat’ in that party. His success cannot be reduced to an explanation concerning linguistic power alone. In using a corporeal or non-linguistic metaphorical mapping between two differing sociophysical domains, Columbus’ dealings with these domains have to be taken into consideration.

Observations as theory-laden
Not only does our interaction within this world have to be recognized. There is also an interdependence between experiences, conceptualization and linguistic representation. In the philosophy of science this interdependence is known as the theory-ladenedness of observations. Karl
Popper writing about observation and interpretation of observations thus states:

[m]y point of view is, briefly, that our ordinary language is full of theories; that observation is always **observation in the light of theories**; that it is only the inductivist prejudice which leads people to think that there could be a phenomenal language, free of theories, and distinguishable from a 'theoretical language'; . . . (Popper 1968 [1934], 59,n. *1).

and further:

[O]bservations, and even more so observation statements and statements of experimental results, are always **interpretations** of the facts observed; . . . they are **interpretations in the light of theories** (Popper 1968 [1934], 107, n.*3).

There is an abundant literature revealing how observations in scientific inquiry are formed by the theories guiding the investigation in question; a priority of theory to observation; that has been produced in critique of really naive positivistic accounts of science, where observations have largely been regarded as unproblematic accounts of "reality".85

Even though the "discovery" of theory-ladeness of observations often is ascribed to Karl Popper, and sometimes to Thomas Kuhn, the ideas corresponding to that concept were not unknown to proponents of logical positivism such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, and was discussed at length by Pierre Duhem in 1906 (Melander 1999). What one can claim in a critique of positivism though, is that there is a belief that it would be possible to "de-theorize" some observations, and thus create some neutral starting point for investigations. This is an idea that can be traced back to Francis Bacon, who wrote that one had to free oneself from the *idola menti*, the idols or illusions of the mind, as prejudices preventing us to find the truth in our inductive investigations (Bacon 1991 [1620]).

With reference to how discoveries can change language and our ways of thinking and seeing, Norwood Russel Hanson, writes that “at any given time it is our language and our ways of thinking and seeing that control what kinds of things we would be capable of appreciating as discoveries, the possible range of things discovered” (Hanson 1969, 184-5). The intelligible world is in part the world as we see it, a world of objects, events and situations and relations as we can make statements about it.

Part of how the world is intelligibly seen is in terms of symbolic gender, where the old Pythagorean table of opposites is still profoundly actual since it, and related thoughts, has informed metaphorical understanding and subsequently language within Western culture. Even within science such symbolic understanding and language has had a constitutive role in directing scientific interest, and guiding interpretation and understanding. Later years have seen an increasing number of theorists who have shown how philosophy and science have been informed by gender, to the effect that the male has been the norm, whether investigated as biological body, socio-cultural being, or symbolically.

An important aspect of the pragmatic approach is a rejection of such dichotomies as fact/value, theory/practice and nature/culture, where, for example, so-called “facts” always include or presuppose evaluative judgements. Marjorie Grene, in a rejection of the separation of statements of facts from statements of value, discusses a seemingly value-neutral statement as ‘this is red’.

86 See e.g. (Keller 1985, 1992).
87 See e.g. Women, Feminism and Biology (Birke 1986), The Science Question in Feminism (Harding 1986), The Everyday World As Problematic (Smith 1987), Feminism and Science (Tuana 1989), The Conceptual Practices of Power (Smith 1990), Science As Social Knowledge (Longino 1990), What Can She Know? (Code 1991), Myths of Gender (Fausto-Sterling 1992), Biology and Feminism (Rosser 1993), The Less Noble Sex (Tuana 1993), Feminism, Animals and Science (Birke 1994), Beyond the Natural Body (Oudshoorn 1994), Women, Madness & Medicine (Russell 1995).
88 Within the philosophy of science there are discussions of the theory-practice relationship as questions are raised as to whether there is, could be and ought to be a value-free science. There is recognition of the human endeavours antedating theory construction, and there is rejection of the construal of practice as mere application of theory. See also the section “A pragmatic approach to epistemology”, chapter 1.
89 She is refuting such basic propositions as Bertrand Russell (1940) claims to be ‘statements of facts’ as opposed to ‘statements of value’. His example is “That is red though, but as he treats ‘this’ and ‘that’ as logical equivalents, Grene states that the difference between ‘that is red’ and ‘this is red’ can be ignored (Grene 1966, 161, n.5).
First of all, if one is able to claim ‘this’ or ‘this is’ about something, one has already “learned to discriminate object from background, and object from object, and so has already acquired in some measure a spatial orientation” in one’s immediate environment. Being able to use ‘this’ in a consistent way one is not simply “pointing to particulars, but applying intellectual concepts to particulars distinguishable within” one’s “organized world”. ‘This’ is in this sense already “implicitly conceptual” (Greene 1966, 161-2).

Secondly, Greene continues, to call something ‘red’ puts it into a class of things, all of them red, but in varying degrees or sorts. In the immediate act of perception Greene claims that when she calls something ‘red’, her percept fits into the range of colours which are part of her organized world: she already *dwell* in a world where ‘this’ can fall into its place as ‘red’ or ‘just-not-red’ (Greene 1966, 162). Seeing a particular as red, we must be able to discriminate or isolate that particular from its context and judge it by a general standard of redness. Referring to Kant, Greene claims that “concepts are rules for organizing experience”—not “formally stateable rules, but norms to which judgment is implicitly referred” and “by which it is tacitly governed” (163).

The value judgements we make in making factual statements are not just whims, or nothing but statements of preference though. They pertain to our forms of life, where the theories we form are about a uniformity that pertains to our acting in the world. Through our acting in the world we may discover a uniformity, one aspect of which pertains to the natural and social order, and another aspect of which is our relation to the natural and social order, and our ability to act in uniform ways. What we report (fact/value e.g.) is part of our perception in activity, in a form of life. The values cherished in that form of life will make us see some things, and of course miss others, and that which is cherished will be part of what is developed in *hexeis* and regarded as excellence in character. Character is “expressed in what one sees as much as what one does”, according to Aristotle, and where the “[k]nowing how to discern the particulars is a mark of virtue” (Sherman 1989, 4).

There are so to speak differences in the world, as a possibility for us to make distinctions, but as John Dewey claims, these differences are endless. The question is what differences we will let count. Differences that we do not notice are uninteresting, whereas what we let make a difference is
another thing. That which we are in relation to, letting differences make a difference, is also changed in this process.

The corporeal in forms of life
The theme of embodied and imaginative structures of meaning and their roots in our human bodies has been elaborated by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone in *The Roots of Thinking* (1990). They are shared as most features are shared by us as a species; most of us can hear, sense, feel, see, balance, grope, rub, grasp, crawl, walk, run, and so forth. The commonalities in human experience, the successive series of “I can’s” and “if/then’s” experienced by infants, are to a great extent shared by human beings, and is a base on which other ways of making meaning depend (Sheets-Johnstone 1996). Such corporeal experiences, together with corporeal orientation or situatedness, is what we share and that makes it possible to talk of “objective” meaning to a certain albeit somewhat limited extent.

A mere “given” of unproblematically common corporeal experiences is not what we have though, as we are born into linguistic communities sharing forms of life, where praxis moulds meaning into even basic corporeal experiences.

Experience
In his article on experience in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, P.L. Heath notes that an ancient philosophical meaning of the word ‘experience’ denotes experience as the capacity to do something, learned in the habit of doing it, and guided rather by rule-of-the-thumb precept than by theoretical understanding. As such it is not far from the plain man’s understanding of this term, as meaning no more than familiarity with some matter of

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80 Cf. to what Wittgenstein (1967 [1953]) writes:

§ 114. (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.5): “The general form of propositions is: This is how things are.” — That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.

81 Cf. with Sheets-Johnstone (1998, 285) writing of how we have a “species-specific range of movement possibilities, a repertoire of what might be termed ‘I cans’, and — by way of proprioception, and more particularly, of kinesthesia a sense of agency”.
practical concern, based on repeated past acquaintance or performance. Experience, Heath claims, as retention of individual memories and their gradual hardening into principle, was at best seen as only a stage on the way to real understanding in terms of universals by most ancient writers, and subsequently seen as a makeshift and uncertain form of knowledge.92

In this thesis I address experience largely in the ancient philosophical meaning, that corresponds rather well to the plain man’s understanding of the term. This does not mean that I am unaware of the problems of the “given” and the manner in which this “given” is elaborated into the fullness of ordinary experience. I will touch upon these questions below. Experience, on my view, is always embodied and it is necessary for those features of experience that can be expressed in language, to have a bodily basis. Mark Johnson is one to oppose views that regard the structure of rationality as transcending structures of bodily experience. Following him I claim not only that the body is ‘in’ the mind, so that these “imaginative structures of understanding are crucial to meaning and reason”, but also that it is necessary for abstract meanings, as for reason and imagination, to have a bodily basis (Johnson 1987, op. cit. x-xvi). This claim can easily be transferred to experience.

One has to be wary when approaching the concept of experience as it refers to individual momentary experiences as well as experience gained over time. As Ullaliina Lehtinen points out the English noun ‘experience’ designates both momentary “inner experiences” and a wider notion of “life or general (empirical) experiences” (Lehtinen 1993, 42). In Swedish and

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92 Heath is referring to Aristotle’s (1960) *Posterior Analytics*, II, 19, 100 a 3-14:

Thus sense-perception gives rise to memory, as we hold; and repeated memories of the same thing give rise to experience; because the memories, though numerically many, constitute a single experience. And experience, that is the universal when established as a whole in the soul—the One that corresponds to the Many, the unity that is identically present in them all—provides the starting-point of art and science: art in the world of process and science in the world of facts. Thus these faculties are neither innate as determinate and fully developed, nor derived from other developed faculties on a higher plane of knowledge; they arise from sense-perception, just as, when a retreat has occurred in battle, if one man halts so does another, and then another, until the original position is restored.

It would be wrong to assume that the ancient philosophers, e.g. Aristotle, thought of principles in the way we do now. When reading about the “gradual hardening into principle” it is important to bear that in mind.
German there are two distinct terms for this: Erlebnis/upplevelse and Erfahrung/erfarenhet.93

With regard to Swedish linguistic use I still wish to claim that we might call the individual experience erfarenhet also, as when we experience or make/have an experience, similar to the way it is expressed through the English verb ‘experience’. Does such a claim not impoverish the distinction we otherwise might make between Erlebnis/upplevelse and Erfahrung/erfarenhet? No, I would rather say that it opens a possibility to get away from a discussion within philosophy that works with distinctions between the limited experience as an “inner” state (as sensation or perception), and our collected experience and knowledge as something else. Not that I wish to claim that the two fall together, but if one first makes a distinction between limited experiences as momentary mental states on the one hand and knowledge as a persistent intersubjectively acknowledged state of affairs on the other, and then apply these created concepts in a discussion we are facing a collapse. The collapse occurs between an “inner” world where we supposedly all are separate as individuals and where any experience is a “private” event in a delimited autonomous individual, and an “external” world where things seemingly are going on and where we in some miraculous way can agree intersubjectively on what is supposed to count as a piece of knowledge. In such a setting we will either be questioning the existence of an external world, or we will be debating the reality of our inner worlds.

So when I choose to call both the individual experience ‘experience’, and the sum and product of our experiences ‘experience’ also, it is to direct focus to two things. The first is how the individual experience is not only the presupposition of, but also is what constitutes and reshapes the collected experience. The second is how collected experience in its turn is a

93 Lehtinen here argues against a distinction made in the way described above, and describes the risk some feminist philosophers run in founding epistemological claims on such a frail ground as atomistic “inner” emotions given by a feminine experience, as the distinction does not recognize the social construction of feelings or emotions. It is easy to agree with this critique, but Lehtinen does not here approach the problem of how these feelings or emotions, that she describes as a “weave of our life” gives rise to, or can be acknowledged as, a collected experience (Lehtinen 1993, 48).

Later, in (Lehtinen 1998a) she argues that our understanding of piecemeal episodes springs from the Erfahrung, the general experiences, brought to the situation, as this forms the basis of our interpretation of the incident.
presupposition of the individual experience and how it is constituted and shaped. In such a way individual experiences and the collected experience are two aspects of the same process where our “inner” reality—our “private” experiences—are maintained by our acting in the world, and at the same time it is a presupposition for our acting in this world.

My position is somewhat Kantian: regarding experience as a synthesis part given and part made, but I still feel impatient with a two-level-theory of experience, where the distinction between sensation and perception is emphasized. I do not think that we only have some sort of categories of understanding, that brings together the “manifold” of sensory intuition under a priori rules. Sensations, the “given” would then be “active” merely as something given, and then activity would be solely on the part of the understanding. Instead I see perception and sensation as intertwined in a complicated process, where both are different aspects of the same process. Crossing the street I turn my head to be able to have the optical sensations that perception might interpret as a car moving towards me. My perception is dependent on what I have learned to allocate value to.

Consider the following citation from Merleau-Ponty: “Already the mere presence of a living being transforms the physical world, bringing to view here ‘food’, there a ‘hiding place’, and giving to ‘stimuli’ a sense which they have not hitherto possessed” (1962 [1945], 189). To perceive something as ‘food’ or ‘hiding place’ implies to begin with that I have at some time or other have had reason to experience some things as ‘food’ and other as ‘hiding places’, in short my lived body has had some meaningful interaction with the environment, albeit this meaning has not necessarily been verbalized, but “merely” corporeally recognized. To see something “as” something or other requires that either there exists some a priori percepts or concepts in us, or that earlier experiences have made us susceptible to seeing things that way.\(^{94}\) An example of the latter would be the difficulty of finding mushrooms like chanterelles, but once you have been shown what to look for, and what they actually look like, it becomes much easier to distinguish them.

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\(^{94}\) In his discussion of Kant’s writings, Charlie D. Broad (1978, 11) claims that “Kant, unlike almost all other philosophers, held that there are \textit{a priori} percepts as well as \textit{a priori} concepts. He asserts that space and time are \textit{a priori} and that they are perceptual and not conceptual”.
Our being-in-the-world is an embodied or corporeal being-in-the-world, any experience we might have is corporeal, even though it might even be the experience of sitting absolutely still, thinking about an abstract problem, such as playing blindchess. Experience as embodied does not need to be verbalized, though. That is, I do not need language to acquire, or keep, experiences. We see this for example in small children who learn to avoid things that have hurt them. The well-known effect of mental practice in the acquisition of skill or athletic excellence is another case that shows us how our “mental” capacities are basically integrated in our embodied knowledge.95

Let us turn to the question of a difference between experience, as embodied, and verbalized experience. In verbalizing experience we can abstract aspects of the experience. The abstraction of these aspects can then be focused on, analyzed, drawn schemas of, or whatever, and most of all they can be communicated to others. That I see as the main feature of a verbalized experience. But communication is not only given in words or in drawings as we have, for example, gestures, posture, tone of voice as means of communication. More often than not we are unaware of what we are communicating in terms of posture and movement, although our tone of voice is more apparent to us.96

Cases where there is ambiguity in what is communicated are of special interest here. Such ambiguity may be the case when our performance contradicts our verbal commitment, such as if I told somebody that I was angry at him, while laughing, or claiming to “feel fine!” while crouching and smiling tensely. A common interpretation of this would be that the body was “the one to be speaking the truth”, but that is not my claim. The contradiction between what “is told” by the body in general and what is propositionally verbalized can be explained by giving context and circumstances. That does not necessarily make the one more true than the other, but I will grant that we are by no means always clear and obvious unto ourselves.

95 See e.g. (Maring 1990).
96 “What” we are communicating is here to be understood as ‘the meaning’. It is ‘the meaning’ that has cognitive content. Our posture e.g. is not a medium, as our bodies are not the media of our minds. Our bodies are lived. Still we can decide to act or pretend with purpose, and body builders may be seen as aiming towards a future communication of a certain meaning through their body appearance.
Gendered experience

Women and men are assigned a biological sex when born. Ethnomethodological studies have shown these assignments of sex to be in fact cases of gender assignment. Feminist research and philosophy has dealt with the construction of gender in society for some decades now, and it is more than clear that the construction of gender is not only an aspect of the individual person but of the societal structure and symbolic meaning as well. The fact of being gendered, gives women and men in our society a qualitatively gendered embodied experience, and thus a gendered knowledge of the world. Meaning as inherent in praxis and the world as we apprehend and remake it is thus also engraved in our bodies, influencing thoughts and language. Although it is conceptually possible to distinguish body, thought and language, they are co-constituted. Thus we cannot simply erase the gendered experience of our being-in-the-world as women and men.

As an example we may take the gendered experience of sexual violence as a threat to women, especially in public places, that makes women wary of being "provocative" or "challenging". It is dangerous for a woman to be singled out, as women are not expected to be able to defend themselves. This wariness is not only of the body. It is an embodied knowledge of the world, that may be present in thought as well as in posture, in language as well as in movement. It may be seen in the language of the lived body, and as part of a being-in-the-world. I will give some examples below of how former experience is part of an enactment of the world, and how we as part of the world through action, spoken or otherwise, afford meaning to it.

In a sentence, uttered or thought, we enact the world as it has meaning for us. My first example is of telling you that there is an enemy in the next room. With this statement I have rendered visible a world with at least two rooms, one harbouring emotions of fear, the other emotions of hostility.

In a movement or action we may likewise predicate what there is and what the meaning of it is. My second example is of how by a tender, soothing voice I might be predicating a child that needs comfort. Finally, my third example is of a crouched, anxious posture and hurried walk by which I am predicating a hostile world.

\footnote{Cf. pp. 24-5, and footnote 24.}

\footnote{I find it important to stress that I do not regard the body as a permanent product of our experiences. Our being-in-the-world is a process.}
When women grow up in a Western society where sexual violence is inherent as a threat, especially to girls, it gives them a gendered experience that is enacted in their lives. Sexual violence as a threat, or reality, is just one albeit significant aspect of this gendered experience, of course. Another important aspect of the gendered experience of women is the shame connected to their bodies, where more areas of women's bodies are shamed, and are earlier shamed, as compared to men's bodies. My claim is that these gendered experiences are intrinsic in one's furthered experience.

Conclusions on language, meaning and making sense
There is an interdependence between experiences, conceptualization and linguistic representation. What we as a species share is corporeal experiences, corporeal orientation and situatedness, and this is what makes it possible to talk of "objective" meaning to a certain, albeit somewhat limited, extent. Not all of us can walk, hear, see, carry or nurse children, neither do all of us menstruate, shave or have nightly pollutions, just to mention a few of many possible differences in corporeal experience. Such differences are sometimes given a disproportionate weight in the making of differences. The overall common corporeal experiences of our species are sometimes habitually disregarded, as the point from which we could aim for equality. There is no "given" of any unproblematically common corporeal experience, though. We are born into linguistic communities, sharing forms of life, where praxis moulds meaning into even basic corporeal experiences.

Value judgements and factual statements that we make pertain to our forms of life, where the theories we form are about a uniformity that pertains to our acting in the world. Through our acting in the world we may discover a uniformity, one aspect of which pertains to the natural and social order, and another aspect of which is our relation to the natural and social order, and our ability to act in uniform ways. What we report (fact/value e.g.) is part of our perception in activity, in a form of life.

99 For illuminating descriptions of this feature of our society, see Transforming a Rape Culture (Buchwald, Fletcher, and Roth 1993).
100 See e.g. (Bartky 1990; Haug 1987 [1983]; Lehtinen 1998b).
There are so to speak differences in the world, as a possibility for us to make distinctions, but these differences are endless. The question is what differences we will let count, what differences we will let make a difference.

The lived body

Relying on our (lived) body and our awareness we not only come to know the world but also ourselves as part of it. The significant experiences we have of ourselves and the world are unities of emotional, practical and intellectual qualities. In Seigfried's (1997) interpretation of Dewey, the intellectual quality is the meaning these experiences have for us, whereas the practical quality is the way we act, react and interact. Unifying and pervading these qualities is the emotional quality.101

In this part of the chapter I aim to discuss some aspects of our lived bodies, with the help of the tool of tacit knowing. Attention will be given to the way we come to know ourselves in action, to the indeterminate border of our lived bodies, to a semantic aspect of our lived bodies, and to a conception of ourselves in growth enhanced or restrained. That the way we come to know ourselves and the world is in experiences having emotional, intellectual and practical qualities should not be forgotten.

Knowing ourselves in action

Knowing oneself is knowing oneself as agent in action. In differing action we may know ourselves as different kinds of agents. Knowledge, on a pragmatist account, is what guides us in further practice. In this sense a knowledge of oneself may work as a guide (that one is not aware of) in action. Such a guide, that one is not aware of, is something we trust without question, or rely on in Polanyi's terms. This makes the first term of tacit knowing crucial. The first term of tacit knowing encompasses a subsidiary awareness of oneself as agent, and this may enhance or restrain possibilities of agency. A perception of oneself as agent is thus tied to—

101 Cf. with the quote of Seigfried on page 19.
through the relation between the first and second term of tacit knowing—one’s knowing something.\footnote{In qualitative research methodology we can see an awareness of this tie between the agent of knowing, and the acts of knowing, in the stress put on the central role of the researcher, and on the importance of the researcher’s self-awareness. An awareness of this may help in a development of the self as an instrument in research, by training to utilize one’s subjectivity in a constructive way. See e.g. Brown (1996).}

Our knowledge of the world and of ourselves stems from the dual experience of experiencing the world in terms of our bodies, and experiencing our bodies in terms of the world. These experiences are subsequently incarnated, and the meaning that we make of them is built into our theories of the world and of ourselves. As we dwell in our experiences and our theories, they become parts of our lived bodies, of ourselves, in our continued interpretative efforts. As knowers we then know our way about in a world, enacting it as it has meaning for us. We know our actions under certain descriptions, and these actions relate to the world that we conceive of. If one is living in a gendered society, the experiencing one has of oneself in terms of the world, necessarily implies a gendered experience.

Interiorizing the heritage of a gendered culture necessarily implies a gendered interiorization. Not only does this imply knowing the importance of being able to apply and recognize gender in our culture, but also an indwelling in a gendered self. This self is not necessarily a self that is apprehended as ideally gendered, rather it is a self that knows how close s/he meets cultural expectations and presumptions of gender. Women and men in our culture have engendered experiences. The experiences may be more or less constituted by aspects of gender, and this is also true of the descriptions we may give of our own actions.\footnote{Sociologist Carin Holmberg (1993) has e.g. shown how young couples, without children and in their own eyes being equal partners, refer to the way that the woman subordinates herself as “love”. That such acts of subordination would not be labelled similarly if performed by the man is implicit, as his “love” is expressed in other ways.} These gendered experiences are interiorized, and thereby active when we shape new ones. This does not imply that there are any experiences that are essential to being a woman, except for being gendered woman.\footnote{I am here referring to an understanding of gender that encloses a social construction of sex (Scott 1988).}
Polanyi’s description of tacit knowledge gives us a means to a deeper understanding of what it is to be gendered. To be gendered is knowing how to act in a gendered way, and this requires a special kind of tacit knowledge. It is neither a question of automatic, reflex-like behaviour, nor transparent conscious acts.

In gendered actions we attend from our bodies by dwelling in them and in our perceptions of ourselves. This attending from is what we rely on for attending to the outcome of the action. What we attend from forms a vital and necessary part of our tacit knowing in gendered action.

In contemporary Western society the public/private divide makes it possible for our actions to be known as relating to two different “worlds”, the public and the private. This means that if for example married women are primarily acting with reference to problems and decisions of a private sphere, their actions may not be recognized, nor known, under those same descriptions if dealt with in a public sphere.\textsuperscript{105} In such a case the divide between the public and the private sphere poses obstacles for the woman to become a public knower, that is, being someone who knows her way about in the (public) world, enacting the world as it has meaning to her. In light of the tool of tacit knowing I will address the kind of problems we may encounter when moving between the two spheres.

**Intentional action**

Our knowing of the world is always in terms of our bodies, albeit bodies with indeterminate borders. Our experiences and our interiorized theories of the world become parts of ourselves by our dwelling in them, and this affects our ability as knowers to act in the world. I aim to describe below a “knowing one’s way about” in the world one conceives of, as a presupposition for the performance of intentional action. The example deals with women experiencing the clash between a “private” and a “public” description of their presupposedly intentional action.

Being knowers, we act with respect to a world that we conceive of, in the enactment of intentional action. This can be called “knowing one’s way about”. Knowledge exercised in action is practical knowledge, according to

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\textsuperscript{105} Cf. with the research of Elisabeth Sundin (1989) who has illuminated how the agency of women as ‘economical agents’ is judged to be “incorrect” according to public theoretical and political norms of economical agency.
philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe (1963, 89). Practical knowledge, as she describes it, is in itself a guide towards the action. The ability to know why one does what one does intentionally is a part of the (continued) intentional action.\textsuperscript{106} To know what one is doing, one has to know in what “world” one is doing it. So to be able to perform intentional action, this “knowing one’s way about” is presupposed.

The description of practical knowledge given above encompasses what is often referred to as theoretical knowledge (knowing-that), besides the more trivial connection to what is referred to as skills. To have theoretical knowledge, knowing-that something, is to have a special kind of practical knowledge; “knowing one’s way about” within a “world” constituted of a theoretical system; within a “language” of words or other symbols carrying meanings.

Our understanding of ourselves and the world is due to earlier efforts to master ourselves and the world. In this respect the knowledge determines in what “world” we can act, and what actions that are intelligible in this world of ours. Acting intentionally thus always presupposes a “knowing one’s way about” in the world (Anscombe 1963).

Anscombe defines action as being intentional under a certain description if the person doing the action knows the action under the same description. “So to say that a man knows he is doing X is to give a description of what he is doing under which he knows it” (Anscombe 1963, 12). There is a clear difference here between Anscombe’s writings and Polanyi’s. What is described under the heading ‘tacit knowledge’ by Polanyi, encompasses every skill we have down to perceiving, and internal processes down to neural traces.\textsuperscript{107} Furthermore tacit knowing is part of theoretical as well as practical knowledge. According to Anscombe on the other hand, we have to be able to give a reason for what we are doing, in order for us to be regarded as knowing what we are doing. Anscombe discusses the example of someone observing that he did something, for example, stumbled, and subsequently claiming to have done it. This she refuses to call intentional action, since the observation that I stumbled is not a reason why I stumbled. Polanyi

\textsuperscript{106} This interpretation of Anscombe’s writing can be found with Molander (1996b, 3).

\textsuperscript{107} As I have shown in the section on “Problematicizing subsidiary awareness”, chapter 2, I think that Polanyi’s all-encompassing description of tacit knowledge, benefits from making a distinction between such subsidiary awareness as we can become focally aware of, and such as we can only attend to from a third-person perspective.
would agree with Anscombe in this. They would neither of them label the stumbling intentional, other than if it was done on purpose, as a clown would as part of his performance. There are instances of the performance that would pass as tacit knowledge according to Polanyi, but that would not pass as intentional according to Anscombe. Take the earlier mentioned psychological experiment where subjects had been exposed to a shock whenever they happened to utter associations to certain “shock words”. The subjects had learnt to forestall the shock by avoiding the utterance of such associations, but when questioned it appeared that they did not know they were doing this. Somehow the subjects partaking in that experiment knew how to forestall shock words, without knowing how they did this. They could not then have claimed that they did this, to them unknown, performance in order to forestall shock words. The tacit knowledge displayed, showed no overt intentionality imbued with purpose on the other hand. The acts were not known to the agents as having been undertaken in order to accomplish the forestalment of the electric shocks. The acts displayed intentionality in a phenomenological sense on the other hand, as a directedness towards the forestalling of shock words, attending from the avoidance of shock words, and attending to the forestalment of electrical shocks.

I find the way Anscombe defines intentional action, that is, action as purposive, somewhat problematic. I think that an action that is not known to us under one description, may well be known to us under another. If the first of these descriptions is called forth we may well claim that “I did not know I was doing that”, but with hindsight accepting this as a true description under which we subsequently know it. This might be the case when, for example, someone is informed of how the “innocent” jokes made by her/him, in their flippancy not only have had a silencing effect, but might even have been undertaken in order to silence some people. Then “the joking” is recognized as an act of silencing, instead of as an act of simply joking.

In order to be able to describe why we are doing what we are doing, we need to have a coherent view of ourselves and the world, and to have a socially accepted and functionally relevant knowledge of ourselves and the world.

I have found an interesting illustration to the problem for some women to know under which description they can without problem know their actions, in a work by Kevät Nousiainen, professor in Comparative Law and
Legal Theory. She followed certain women seeking legal aid in Helsinki, Finland. When doing this she observed that there were repeated clashes between a “family” interpretation of these women’s actions, and a legal interpretation of the same actions (Nousiainen 1995).

In her research Nousiainen was a listening participant while family-oriented, married or divorced, women sought legal aid for economic problems that were an effect of their private lives. It was often a question of how the means of the family should be divided following a divorce, and how the care of the children and their support should be arranged. Often it was also a question of how much responsibility the wife had for the husband’s business and debts. She often had legal responsibility for the debts. In these cases the lawyer would explain to the woman the legal nature of agreements on debts and personal guarantees and the like. A conflict between the woman’s everyday understanding and a legal understanding of these matters became apparent. The women would try to make their motives and their moral understood. They explained their actions—how they became guarantors or signed promissory notes—with reference to the bonds of dependence between husband and wife, and how a husband and wife must trust each other. When a woman had been reluctant to shoulder economic responsibility for the husband’s business, she had been “forced” to do it anyhow. The “forcing” had not been of the kind that is illegal, but the kind that is based on the relation of dependence that exists between husband and wife. The women described the reasons for partaking in their husbands business with words referring to the absence of freedom in acting. They stressed the moral nature of their actions, viewed from a family perspective, where trust and sharing of interest is presupposed. Emphasizing the moral import of dependency between people, the women claimed that they had acted rightly (Nousiainen 1995, 332).

108 I have used this example earlier in a paper presented at the enGendering Rationalities conference, at the University of Oregon (Kalman 1997).
109 Whether these women were heterosexual is not stated. Marriage, divorce, and family-orientation are not markers of sexual orientation or sexual choice, as Tuula Juvonen (1996) points out in her research dealing with the prevalence, or rather with the outward seeming lack of prevalence, of lesbians in Tampere in the 50’s. A definition of lesbianism built on visibility and public expression does not catch the possibility of assumed heterosexual status and simultaneous sexual relationships with women.
110 One might say that they were stressing the perspective of Gemeinschaft.
The common understanding eventually reached by the lawyer and the woman was often expressed as a collision between the woman’s understanding and the legal interpretation. The “private-sphere”-interpretation of the woman’s action had to give way, as there is no room for negotiable meaning when a client’s problem is legally analyzed. At the end of the consultation several women said that they understood the interpretation given by the lawyer, and that they would act accordingly in the future. With some variation they all talked of having had to pay dearly for their experiences (Nousiainen 1995, 331-2).

This example illustrates the difficulty of giving a description of one’s action, that is relevant to what one is doing. Of course Anscombe points to an important feature in knowing, a crucial feature for becoming a knower, that is the ability to know our actions under a “relevant” description. What is considered relevant in a situation is socially constructed, but that does not make it less important to be able to define one’s actions in a way that fits the life we live. The ability to name our actions thus, should enhance our understanding of our lives, and facilitate well-informed intentional action.

I find it important to stress that I am not arguing for the moral and the “knowing” of the public sphere as being correct and desirable! I am referring to a problem. The figure of thought represented by Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft illuminates an understanding of social relations in our society that may cause problems. The symbolically feminine has often been that which falls under the Gemeinschaft. Women in our society are often expected to and habituated to celebrating values of the Gemeinschaft, a habituation that is deeply problematic as it is at the same time connected to asymmetrical gender relations. So as long as women are marginalized within a social order, it is important for them to have knowledge of that social order, for the ability to take action, on a personal as well as a political level.

In the case of these women I can imagine a range of new definitions of their actions, from a claim that they still had done the right thing as they had acted out of love or trust, to a claim that they had “acted like a fool”, or to a questioning of the frame in which their actions might be understood by claiming that the dependency between husband and wife should be legally recognized. This variance in how our own definitions of our own actions can change over time, not only shows aspects of social construction,
but also points to the impossibility of once and for all knowing under which description we can and will know our actions.111

Gendered knowing

Polanyi’s description of tacit knowledge deepens, I think, our understanding of gendered experience and what gendered knowledge implies. It gives us some explanation of the tardiness of change in our gendered society; the strong inertial forces in the gender system. To be gendered is to be able to act in a gendered way, or perform gendered action, which implies a special kind of tacit knowledge.

There are several feminist descriptions of how women may become aware of patterns in their lives, for example by insights won in consciousness-raising groups.112 These insights can make women see the world and themselves in completely new ways, and accordingly enhance new kinds of actions.113 The almost revolutionary insights described can be understood with the help of Polanyi, by seeing how we integrate the details, features of separate events in our lives, to a coherent entity, the meaning of which gives us a new understanding.

My claim, though, is not only that these events are rare, but also that a new understanding does not automatically include new ways of acting. “Knowing-that” is not enough. The “instant-revelation” that this picture of knowing gives us, leans too much on metaphors of vision connected to knowledge, in which knowledge is like a mental picture that you can grasp in a second.

Still the new or changed “knowing-that” may be the sudden seeing of a new aspect, becoming aware of a new aspect of oneself or of the situation that is grasped in a second’s revelatory insight. The ability to see other aspects, highlights how seeing depends on seeing as and seeing that. This difference is usually illustrated with the picture of a duck-rabbit.114 Either

111 Cf. (Scheman 1993a).
112 See e.g. (Haug 1987 [1983]; Holm 1990).
113 Cf. (Bartky 1975).
114 Using the duck/rabbit picture as an illustration to the seeing of aspects is common in philosophical literature. Often (if at all) the duck/rabbit is only referred to as a well-known figure from experimental psychology (see e.g. (Hanson 1969, 89). In (Wittgenstein 1967 [1953]) though there is a reference to Jastrow’s Fact and Fable in Psychology (1900), albeit no further bibliographical references are given there. Joseph
one sees it as a duck or as a rabbit, but not as both at the same time. Still we are able to go back and forth between a seeing the picture as being a picture of a duck and a seeing the picture as being of a rabbit. It is this changed perception or new apprehension of an aspect of oneself and/or the state of affairs that one has to get used to, in further action. That it is a new way of "seeing" the situation should not be taken too literally—the new awareness may be ways of perceiving, that is sensing, grasping, or apprehending oneself and the situations at hand.\textsuperscript{115}

What is needed for our actions to really change is then a new "knowing-how" \textit{in} the changed "knowing-that", not as parallel processes but as co-constitutive.\textsuperscript{116} A theoretical understanding needs to be accomplished also in action several times before we even come to think in the new way with ease. Acting in completely new ways, trustingly attending from a changed perception of ourselves as agents demands even further training. In this training we have to attend from the new perception of ourselves as agents as well as of the world we act in. This means, in relation to the women earlier described, that they have to act and be responded to as agents, autonomous in accordance with the standard of the public sphere, before this can become part of their existential trust as tacit knowing in action and thinking.\textsuperscript{117} A woman who gets married for the second or third time will

\begin{itemize}
  \item Jastrow, holding a PhD in psychology, has intimate connections to early American pragmatism. He published an early paper with C.S. Peirce, and in 1892 Jastrow was appointed to the first council of the APA (American Psychological Association) together with William James among others. Jastrow, like James, and John Dewey were all each at some time elected to the APA presidency. The early annual meetings were held jointly with the philosophers, who did not establish the American Philosophical Association until 1900 (\textit{Encyclopedia of Psychology} 1994).
  \item When talking or writing about perception philosophers often privilege sight, while all the senses are involved in perceiving.
  \item Cf. with what Ulla M. Holm (1993, 189) writes about practical and theoretical knowledge as being co-constituted.
  \item The being of an 'autonomous agent' does not in itself imply anything about a public/private divide. An autonomous agent is one to act according to the law given by her/his own reason. S/he is not governed by external authorities, such as her/his father, spouse, or religious authorities e.g. But as the concept of autonomy is deeply entangled with a discourse imbued with metaphors of maleness (Lloyd 1993, 66-7), it furthers a distinction between a private and a public realm. Autonomy is a trait Immanuel Kant perceives of as a fundamental feature of moral persons. The autonomous agent acts independently of any influence, whether internal as based on his (rather than 'her', in the case of Kant) inclinations, or external as based on the will of another. The autonomous moral agent of Kant acts solely on the basis of reason (Tuana 1992, 61). Dependency,
\end{itemize}
act more “adequately”, that is in accordance with a public description, in legal matters of this kind.

So revelatory insight can be a starting point for changing our actions, but for real change to occur we need to know ourselves in new actions.

I am sure that many of “Nousiainen’s women” had knowledge of what, for example, promissory notes are, theoretically. But their gendered experiences were not the experiences of being the publicly recognized autonomous agents acting in a public sphere, instead their experiences of themselves as agents were of women acting in a private sphere. While writing promissory notes, they were not relying on a perception of themselves as that of an autonomous business partner acting in a public sphere. They attended from a perception of themselves as wives and mothers, and they attended to the needs and morals of a private realm.\(^\text{118}\)

The indeterminate borders of the lived body

I stated earlier that I had found in Polanyi’s work on tacit knowledge an interesting tool for furthering an understanding of the way the boundaries of our lived bodies are developed and maintained. I claimed that an aspect of knowing that would be consistent with Polanyi’s descriptions would be of a shrinking self, restraining the boundaries of the lived body, by not dwelling in parts of it.

An aspect of knowing ourselves is a knowing of our bodies, a dwelling in it. This knowing is necessarily a knowing imbued with meaning and value, or the lack thereof, of the body or its parts. To illuminate the indeterminacy of the borders of our lived bodies and how this is connected to the way we know ourselves I will discuss the example of street prostitution.

*Prostitution as a knowing passage*

When we are speaking of knowledge, we usually do this in terms that are positive; for example, there are a lot of sayings that speak of the lightness of the burden of knowledge. Most of the time knowledge is regarded as care, responsibility, love and trust—all prominent features of a private realm—are not to influence the autonomous agent.

\(^\text{118}\) Cf. to what Eva Mark (1998, 134) writes of self-images as being an aspect of our activities, something we attend from in the activity when adjusting actions to the world.
something positive, something worth having. It is seen as having some value when it increases our understanding of the world or when it has social marketability. We sometimes speak of useless/worthless or trivial knowledge, as when speaking of non-interesting statistics, but even in these cases it is seen as somehow increasing a person’s information about the world. I think that when the knowledge is seen as useless, it is not seen as increasing the person’s understanding of herself or the world, but simply as some numbers that one can choose to repeat or to keep silent about.

When a person’s understanding of herself or of the world is increased, her ability to make sense of, live or cope in the world increases. It might be the case of a scientist’s understanding of the world; or the having of a theoretical understanding of the world and the creatures inhabiting it, or a practical knowledge of how to make certain things happen for you or other people, or the wisdom acquired in the complex relations of human affairs; a knowing one’s way about in a complex world. In between these examples we would have the acrobat’s mastery of his/her body, and nurses and surgeons knowing how to comport themselves when exposed to the sight and smell of wounds, intestines and the like, and having the know-how to facilitate the healing of wounds, the knowing-that what causes and prevents infection, the knowing-how of how to make the patient calm and trusting, and the wisdom to listen attentively to the patient, and so forth.

In the examples given above knowledge is seen as something positive; something worth striving for. The example of prostitution problematizes the concept of knowledge as inherently positive. But imagine that I went down to the cafeteria in the humanities building at my campus, with a charged machine-gun, shooting some people and subsequently keeping the rest in terror lest I shoot them. Could not that be labelled a knowing-how to scare people, the knowing-that of how a machine-gun works, the knowing-how of handling it? The skilled torturer, in his mastery of the

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119 Of course this can also be the case with what is normally referred to as “useless” knowledge; once I saw a cut from an old television show, with a man who was able to (had the know-how to) smoke 14 cigars at the same time, while whistling “Smoke gets in your eyes”. This obviously increased that man’s ability to live in this world (at least in a short perspective) as he could get paid to entertain by showing this trick.

120 When I write about a “scientist” or “science” it refers to an understanding of “science” that in Swedish is referred to as “vetenskap”, and in German as “Wissenschaft”, both of which include not only the natural sciences, but the social sciences as well as the arts and humanities.
world in terms of how to inflict pain on others, should he not be seen as enacting knowledge? I do not think that we would call that knowledge normally, although we could, as when Annette Baier claims “criminals, not moral philosophers,” to be experts at discerning different forms of trust (Baier 1997 [1986], 607). She is here referring to skills inherent in criminal professions. It might be for instance the skill of a robber to discern, and provide, what is needed to make you trust her/him enough to let her/him into your home, when s/he has the intention to rob you.

Imagine a woman in prostitution who masters her own body to be able to have customers; in spite of feelings of disgust for the customer, and for the act of prostitution. Her ability to prostitute herself might be described as an ultimate act of both mastery of the self and mastery of the world (customer), in short a knowing-how.

The examples given above might be seen as proving my description of knowledge as being misconceived, but I do not think so. I think that we might well label all these instances of knowledge, and that we will do so given the “right” circumstances. The point is that we seldom think or speak of knowledge in these negative cases, which is one part of how knowledge is socially constructed.

A prostitute and people in general have a negative view of her(self) and her actions. The knowledge acquired in prostitution, the knowing enacted

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121 My choice of referring to the torturer as a “he” and the prostitute as a “she” may seem sexist, and perhaps it is. My belief though, is that statistically this division and representation with relation to the sex of the subject would fit well. Of course this does not mean that I may go from a statistic “is” to a normative “ought to be”. But choosing a term neutral to gender I think would be worse than to make explicit the images that come to my mind, as long as I am willing to problematize them, and acknowledge well-known facts of female torturers and male prostitutes.

122 Cecilie Hoigaard, Professor of Criminology at the University of Oslo, uses the term “expert” in her description of survival strategies within prostitution. The survival strategies—aiming to avoid prostituting your self whilst being involved in acts of prostitution—are the ingenious, complex systems that women in prostitution have worked out to protect “the real me”, the self, the personality from being invaded and destroyed by customers (Hoigaard 1993). As should be obvious to my readers, according to my view of agents and of the way experiences moulds us, a “real me” cannot fully hide and completely stay “outside” of these experiences.

123 I find it important to point out that strictly speaking no one is a prostitute, but there are women and men who are in prostitution. Behind the “role” of prostitute there is a person, a subject. Cf. (Borg et al. 1981, 300-1).
while “turning tricks”\textsuperscript{124}, is seldom considered as such. Do I want to change this by choosing the example of prostitution, and make us all begin calling every kind of mastery knowledge? Not necessarily, but I wish to move our view of knowledge, knowing and knower, by showing how they are created in “passages”.\textsuperscript{125} In the passage knowledge and knowing is constructed and achieved, and the knowing subject(s) constitute herself/themselves as knower(s).\textsuperscript{126} Along with the knowing our actions are modified, and we as agents are changed.

My choice of giving attention to a case of “negative” knowledge here is made as it is often difficult to get sight of a hitherto unattended aspect in the “normal” or rather the normatively taken-for-granted case. Attending to what we perceive of as an exception to the normal—not necessarily what we are right in perceiving as an exception—may highlight features that we usually do not see because of their familiarity. So when I use the example of prostitution this is done in order to highlight a feature of knowing, that I claim to have universal application.

\textsuperscript{124} I borrow the term ‘turn tricks’ for the acts of prostitution from Høigaard (1993).

\textsuperscript{125} I have borrowed the concept of passage from Kathryn Pyne Addelson. In her book Moral Passages, one main philosophical question is “How should we live?” Her claim is that “[w]e pose and answer the question in the moral passages of our lives” (1994, 1).

To capture the asymmetry and the essential creativity of both doers and judges, I will talk about moral passages. These are processes that include judges and actors and their interactions. . . .

. . . Or to use more everyday language, I look at human group life as a collective process of moral passages in which people interpret each other’s meanings and interpret the past in the process of creating their present institutions. These are passages in which people create their answers to how we should live. . . . That people enter into collective action together does not at all mean that they agree on official definitions of what they are doing, or that they share the meanings of their “rules” and language (Addelson 1994, 23).

\textsuperscript{126} By pointing to the way we do use our words, one is not claiming that there is a correct way that words must be used. But it is a way of pointing away from an idea of a true Platonic home for words. I aspire to use a diasporic view of words that has been suggested by Naomi Scheman through her reading of Wittgenstein. Scheman suggests that in order to be able “to reject both the idea that words have true, Platonic, homes and the idea that the homes afforded by current practice are in order just as they are” we need to address the question of how such critiques can be made intelligible, by whom and to whom (Scheman 1996, 403).
Prostitution and the borders of the lived body
What I will pay attention to in the example of prostitution are the experiences of suffering from delayed damage as these are reported by some women involved in street-prostitution.\textsuperscript{127}

To preserve integrity of the self, women in street-prostitution try to maintain clear boundaries between what is for sale and what is not. A clearly defined split is upheld between the “public” and “private” self, where everything that has personal meaning for the woman is denied the customer. The women develop a set of survival mechanisms that serve this purpose: non-participation, maintenance of distance, protection against the invasion of the self—in fact everything that can rob prostitution of their own presence. Thus they attempt to preserve what is most important—the ability to feel. Turning off feelings, blanking out, reserving certain parts of the body for uses other than prostitution (like the mouth, the hair, everything above the neck), hiding one’s private self (by wearing wigs, “whore clothes”, working name, by not bringing customers to the home) are some of these survival strategies (Borg et al. 1981, 301-4; Høigaard 1993, 57-8).

Now do the survival strategies of the women work? Trying to hide oneself and turning off one’s feelings, each act of prostitution adding to a cumulative effect, often makes the destructive effects of prostitution appear later, as a long-term consequence. Women learn to switch themselves off after a while, but eventually it becomes difficult to turn the feelings on again, and they tell about how the “public” self grows like a

\textsuperscript{127} I limit my discussion here to what is usually referred to as “street-prostitution”, and will not address other domains of prostitution such as are practised in disguise of massage parlours and night clubs. I also restrict my discussion to female heterosexual prostitution as the space is too limited to address male heterosexual, homosexual and lesbian prostitution as well. Political scientist Sheila Jeffreys notes that some theoreticians who see prostituted women and men as a sexual minority make no distinction between the experience of women and men in prostitution. She claims that “lumping them all into one category can be seen as a profoundly problematic homogenising of women’s experience into that of men” (Jeffreys 1997, 102). But she also points to:

a variety of male prostitution which clearly shares characteristics with the experience of women. This is the prostitution of young men who have experienced sexual abuse and/or are homeless and living on the streets. Their situation seems to share much of the powerlessness and vulnerability to abuse of women involved in street prostitution (Jeffreys 1997, 108).
tumour, steadily craving more space and displacing the “private” self. Thereby the boundaries are wiped out, and strategies and tricks from prostitution begin to take root in the women’s lives outside and after prostitution (Høigaard 1993, 58). This long-term consequence is what is referred to as delayed damage.

One woman, Ida, sums up her reactions like this:

I was wrong. . . . It’s not easy money. . . . The feelings I had, I’ve left behind on the street. . . . Sometimes I dream of being like I was before prostitution. Of feeling something. It’s like I’ve burned up a hundred crowns bill and am trying to make a new one out of the ashes. It’s gone. Only my head belongs to me now. I’ve left my body on the street (Halvorsen et al. 1987, 206. Quoted in Høigaard 1993, 59, emphasis mine).

How does this harmful effect come about, if prostitution is an autonomous choice, as some of the debate on prostitution makes it out to be? In what way is more at stake than was intended in the sale?128 Why is it not “easy money” for, at least, some of the women? I think that the way that the cumulative experience leads to consequences not intended, can be understood in terms of the indeterminate borders of our lived bodies, as these are highlighted in Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge.

Delayed damage on this account may be understood as a shrinking of the self, restraining the boundaries of the (embodied) self, the lived body, for example, by making oneself numb in some sense. Then one can see how to survive in prostitution with as much of the self intact as possible, exteriorizing parts of oneself is a means. The focus of the woman may be outside of the situation. This is done by blanking out, thinking of something else or getting high. Focus may further be directed to retaining boundaries of the physical and personal self, by the exteriorization of certain body parts, and of parts of her life that she does not want to have

128 Prostitution cannot be about selling sex only, as it is so obviously marked by several categories of oppression. That the uneven distribution of power coincides with who does buy and who does sell, and with who sells what, cannot be sheer coincidence. The majority of those “working” in prostitution are women, and the majority of customers are men whether it is male or female prostitution. It also seems that racially oppressed young men are more likely to be severely victimised than those who are not so, as the sexual practices involved with their prostitution put them at greater risk (Jeffreys 1997, 109).
"inhabited" in the act. The prostitute's exteriorizing parts of herself to keep as much of the self intact as possible, and the way clothes, and other things, create a public self would be an example of a shrinking of the lived body.\footnote{129}

*Not dwelling in* parts of one's body, but instead exteriorizing it may lead to the body being felt as not being one's own. Thus *exteriorizing a part of her body, her self*, is *in terms of the world*. Making herself numb is not a thing of non-experience, it is an experience where the focus is bent on survival with as much as possible of the self intact. The knowing acquired must therefore be sought in terms of survival, maintenance of self or the world, and the like, as that is what has been focused on in these experiences.

"Normally" our knowledge is thought of as applying to external things and the external world, whereas tacit knowing concerns the way we use our body and our intellect to attend to the world. In cases where one has to exteriorize parts of oneself, this division is more unclear. The focus may be outside of the situation, to survive, not to dwell in one's body, fighting the ability to feel, or even *attending from the experiences* to a part of the self by an extreme awareness of a boundary within it. In these cases the tacit knowledge accumulated is more about "the world", and the *terms in which it can be experienced*, for one who—in order to be able to experience it—is partly "shut down".

Compare the situation of the prostitute with a tight-rope walker. The tight-rope walker is attending *from* her body *to* the rope and keeping her balance. The prostitute on the other hand is attending *from* the act of prostitution *to* retaining her inner boundary of the self, in her attempt not to participate. A woman in prostitution experiences parts of her body *in terms of the world*. The repetition of such experiences, where intimate bodily experiences are stripped of their *meaning*, accumulate and make the "public" self grow like a tumour. The experience cannot be completely shut out, as it is forced on her every minute. She tries to keep the time down for "turning the trick", and avoids customers she might start caring about. So every reminder of the situation she is experiencing reinforces the need to

\footnote{129 I cannot claim that this *must* be the way prostitution is experienced. For the women, and men, for whom "sex work" is a free choice, the "accessories" may be like Polanyi's tools—extensions of the agential self. (I thank Naomi Scheman for this remark.) Still I think that one has to be wary of a discourse that makes references to "free choice", as this is so obviously a discourse of the privileged.}
not focus on the experience but in keeping her “public” self shut out from her “private” self.

The focus is on turning off feelings, and this is subsequently the part of prostitution easily told by women when interviewed. The many apparently bizarre or peripheral details of prostitution can then be seen to have a deeper meaning in the striving to keep a wholly necessary distance during every act of prostitution (Høigaard 1993, 58).

The destructive effect of prostitution can then be analyzed in a long-term perspective. A woman while prostituting herself attends to retaining the self in terms of the world which means trying to shut out experience and by dividing the self into the “private” self and the “public” self. Eventually the retaining of the self is done in these terms, that is by shutting out experience and shutting down a part of herself. That is why the “public” self can be described as a malignant cancer growing. That is the part of the body that has been exteriorized, whereby the boundaries of the lived body have become restrained.

**Semantic aspects of the lived body**

Staying with the example of prostitution I aim to highlight the semantic aspect of tacit knowing, that is the way in which our subsidiary awareness is merged into a focal awareness, where what we are focally aware of is what the subsidiary awareness means to us.

I will analyze the actions of prostitution in light of the puzzle picture of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft earlier discussed (p. 64). Connected to these two aspects of society the nature of actions can be related (Tönnies 1988 [1887]). Actions related to Gemeinschaft are seen as “unfolding”, where the act is an end in itself, such as acts of friendship and love are seen to be. The value of the act lies in the act itself. Friendship is not supposed to be for sale—because then it is not true friendship.

Gesellschaft on the other hand is related to urban life, business, travelling and science. Gesellschaft is artificial and constructed, a mechanism (Asplund 1991, 63-6). “Friendship” in Gesellschaft would be, for example, therapy, something you pay for, and where the relation is “professional” and for a limited time. Calculation has a dominant role, and parties are prepared to exploit each other, and “see each other as a means through which to achieve their own individual ends.” Acts of prostitution are acts of calculation,
where the woman’s body is a commodity she can market. “She performs an extremely unpleasant act in order to achieve a goal. The goal is to acquire money. The customer interests her only insofar as he possesses money. Otherwise she is indifferent to him” (Hoigaard 1993, 60). Money is not the ultimate goal, of course. The ultimate goal may be a to have a tolerable life; without disabling symptoms of abstinence, without hunger, or just to pay for a reasonable living.

Hoigaard considers the effects of prostitution together with theories of actions as either unfolding or calculating, and there she sees some clues as to the end result of using one’s sexuality as a commodity in the marketplace.

We have seen that the woman attempts to protect her private self by simulating and hiding her true self. This is typical of the calculated act. She fights prostitution’s content from within by struggling to keep the goods that the customer seeks — her sexuality, her closeness and intimacy — outside of the transaction. Her real love is not for sale. But in the long run, this is a battle that cannot be won (Hoigaard 1993, 60).

Looking more closely at friendship, though, I think that one can see that at times it is completely without calculation, and at other times, within the same relation of friendship, calculation might be a part—“I really must listen to her/his problems even though I am deadly tired, as s/he has done the same for me”. The choice to listen may sometimes come without reflection, just out of a felt “need”—a demand not questioned, and at other times one has to coax oneself to act as the good friend one aims at being or wishes to be.

Now remember the two different terms in tacit knowing, the first from which we attend, and the second to which we attend. The first term might be the particulars in a face or the particular notes in a melody from which we attend. The second term is then the face as a whole or the melody. We are attending from the particulars to a meaning of them. I would like to suggest that the different kinds of acts described as unfolding and calculating, differ in the way they are carried out and with respect to particulars and meaning.

An act that is unfolding requires that I focus on particulars, the acts of love or friendship, being only subsidiarily aware of the meaning of the sum of the acts. My attention must be given to the particular act, and the feeling of friendship or love may result as the meaning of my act—this is
the unfolding. If my attention should be focused on the result, the unfolding fades away, as friendship and love are not entities of calculation.

As I stated earlier it has to be kept in mind that this description is a highly polarized fixation picture. The “true” love of marriage can and has been described in terms of prostitution also.\textsuperscript{130} The institution of marriage with it’s “freely given”—and taken or accepted—love is suggested by political scientist Anna Jónasdóttir to be what has to be centered in an analysis of the sociosexual authority structure.\textsuperscript{131} Her point is that women let themselves be exploited, much in the same way that workers sell their labour. Such exploitation and such selling of labour is not so much “free” as it is a necessity, being the only available means by which one can acquire a reasonably good life, but where the exploitation outnumbers the gains. This exploitation might well be described in terms of prostitution also.

The calculating act has it the other way around as compared with the unfolding act—here the focus is on the sum of my particular actions, where the accumulated result is in focus as the meaning of the action. The means, the particulars, of reaching this result are disregarded.

Acts of prostitution are then seen as being to the greater part calculating, where the meaning of the act lies in getting the money (which is a means to the ultimate goal of leading a reasonable life). The particulars of reaching this goal are however acts of unfolding, even though the prostitute tries to keep the “true” unfolding outside of the transaction. The “true” unfolding would here imply acting out sexual feelings and

\textsuperscript{130} I am aware that my simplified representation of Gemeinschaft may seem overly positive, if not romantic, even though my aim is to make it simple for the sake of illustration. Ideals connected to ideas of Gemeinschaft are and have been problematic especially for women and also for those who are perceived as Other. In the “good” society of Gemeinschaft many women use “survival strategies” just like the ones described in prostitution, in what is commonly perceived as “good” relations.

\textsuperscript{131} She writes:

It is the ‘freely contracted’ empowering care and ecstatic experiences in intimate love relations; and it is the ‘free exchange’ of socioexistential, i.e. personal, genderic confirmation, at work and in other public contexts, that now are ‘central to the social realities which are reflected in and partly constituted by our use of the term “individual”’. It is in these ‘free’ affairs of transactions of existential power, power that creates and recreates individual identity and strength for agency, that men tend to exploit women. And women, we let ourselves be exploited, because we love; that is, not only ‘in the name of love’ as if this process was only a question of a ‘false consciousness’, or a lack of (the right kind of) ‘desire’. We know we are doing good to others and that does good to us (Jónasdóttir 1991, 195).
being attracted to the customer, where this actually is kept outside of the situation. The truth is that she does not have, or strives not to have, any sexual feelings at all. The problem is, as I stated earlier, that strictly speaking no one is a prostitute, but there are prostituted women and prostituted men, who perform acts that are extremely unpleasant to them. Meanwhile they are women and men with a need for human relations, and relations of friendship, love and intimacy. This is where the splitting of the self in a "private" self and a "public" self is an act of survival, which can result in the body being "left on the street".

What Høigaard claims that women in prostitution have in common, is the struggle against the blurring of two different types of social relationships. On her account the women do this by fighting to keep the two distinct types of acts separate, acts which are unfolding and acts which are calculating; where the body must take part in acts which belong to intimate unfolding. The harm of this is, in part, the resulting delayed damage that is found in reports on prostitution (Høigaard 1993, 63).

I think that Høigaard is right in this respect, except for the differing views we have on the acts corresponding to aspects of society in terms of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Where she has them as two distinct, differing kinds of acts, I see them as aspects forming a fixation picture. The two aspects are always present, but where one can dominate more than the other.

Investigating the example of prostitution with regard to the semantic aspect of tacit knowing has shown how meaning is not only what we find in what we perceive of things "out there" in the world, when we attend from particulars to a coherent entity. Meaning, tacitly formed, also pertains to an awareness of our lived bodies. This meaning is part of our lived bodies.

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132 I am aware that there are women and men in prostitution who report otherwise, but as I have stated earlier my focus here is on those claiming that they are doing it for the money, and not for the pleasure.

133 Again I feel the need to stress that this kind of experience of prostitution is not necessarily the case. There is not necessarily a splitting of the person into a public and a private self, or a fight against a blurring of two different types of social relationships. There may be those who see this as a job and who do not find it especially unpleasant, and that find satisfaction with being skilful in their work, if not sexual pleasure. (I thank Naomi Scheman for this remark). Still my belief is that experiences of this more positive kind are rare in street prostitution.
The actions we undertake as agents are subsequently enhanced or restrained, as are their outcomes.

Selves in growth: enhanced or restrained
I will now take the example of prostitution further to highlight the conception of our lived bodies as being in growth, enhanced or restrained. Growth in the qualified existential sense suggested by Dewey and Polanyi is connected to knowing, where the acquisition of skills and the possession of knowledge are marks of growth and means to its continuing. What I suggest is an understanding of this existential growth in light of a proposed phenomenological conception of self and bodily ownership. My proposed phenomenological conception is connected to owning as suggested in owning/disowning persons, where the owning includes a responsibility to, as well as responsibility for that person. Such a relationship is based on a way of knowing people, and in the case of our bodies as a way of knowing, and thus dwelling in our bodies. The knowing of our bodies is necessarily a knowing imbued with meaning and value, or the lack thereof, of the body or its parts. For the self to disown the body is not to dwell in it, and thereby not fully integrate it into a self. The self is further an agential self in a world, a world in which we make more or less sense to ourselves and others.

Knowing ourselves, knowing our lived bodies, is crucial for existential growth as this forms the pole from which we trust when coming to know the world. Knowing of the lived body is accumulated in actions where the lived body comes to have meaning for us, and where we interiorize our perception of ourselves, that is part, as subsidiary awareness, of our continued acting. Part of this knowledge is of ourselves in interaction with others, knowing who may and who can do what to whom, and what this means. In the example of prostitution this is illustrated in an ‘idea of prostitution’.

An “idea of prostitution” needs to exist in the heads of individual men to enable them to conceive of buying women for sex. This is the idea that woman exists to be so used, that it is a possible and appropriate way to use her. A necessary component of this idea is that it will be sexually exciting to so use a woman (Jeffreys 1997, 3, emphasis mine).
Owning and knowing body and self

Ownership of the body is central in contemporary debates on abortion rights and the legalization of prostitution, and connects to liberal theories of property rights. The underlying assumption is that one owns one's body, and in virtue of this fact one has certain rights over it, as when claiming "my body belongs to me, and I can do what I want with it". Jennifer Church urges us to go further and analyse the question of ownership in light of contemporary discussions of personhood and selfhood, and also connects her ideas to prostitution. The alternative she suggests is:

A body belongs to a person when and if the psychological states of that body are integrated through reflection in such a way as to constitute a person or a self. When and if the mental states of a body are not so integrated, no ownership (of this fundamental kind) is possible because there is simply no person or self to be the owner; nothing can be your body if there is no you. Thus, coming to be a person or a self and coming to own one's body are not two different processes (first the creation of a will and then its application) but, rather, two faces of the same process—a process whereby the psychological states of a body are simultaneously integrated by and integrated into an overall conception of the self (Church 1997, 92).

She argues that this view of the relationship between self and body, as one of ownership, can accommodate two aspects of ownership that has been put forth in debates over ownership and the body. The first of these aspects is ownership of parts by the whole, to the extent that “[t]he self, through reflection, combines psychological states of the body into a whole of which individual states belong as a part”. The second aspect is ownership of the used by the user, as the self-conception that arises from reflection has a significant role in directing the body’s actions (Church 1997, 92).

Her proposed alternative additionally construes ownership as “owning up to”, that is taking responsibility for something. She claims that “in the shaping of bodily desires into the relevant sort of whole, one must consciously acknowledge one’s various desires—owning them insofar as one accepts them as part of who one is” (Church 1997, 92). Her proposal should not be read as a claim that one can be whatever one conceives oneself to be, or that the self is always integrated, as for instance there is self-deception.

Church suggests that we think of what might be called the phenomenology of bodily ownership, and gives various examples of
experiences of when a body or a body part is no longer experienced as one’s own, “when it either has become lifeless or takes on a life of its own—that is, when it resists integration into one’s life, or acts independently on the basis of beliefs and desires that are not part of one’s self-conception”. The examples she gives are various pathological cases, such as loss of bodily sensation or loss of memory (Church 1997, 93).

Connecting her ideas to prostitution Church endorses the view that prostitution involves something like the temporary selling of oneself, or selling a temporal phase of oneself. Her suggestion is then to “legalize prostitution in order to strengthen the prostitute’s control over the situation by enforcing her restrictions on the scope of the sale” (Church 1997, 97).

Owning/disowning
Starting from Church’s proposed view of the relationship between self and body I propose a different view on the owning of bodily ownership though. I also wish to stress the phenomenology of bodily ownership more. The aspect of ownership that I want to stress is not so much concerned with pathological cases, as it is with the development of phenomenal “bodily ownership”, and the maintenance of this. Ownership on this account is concerned with experiences that develop and maintain a phenomenal ownership of one’s body. Likewise it is concerned with experiences threatening the development or maintenance of a phenomenal ownership of one’s own body, experiences that may lead to a disowning. Ownership on the account I want to stress is connected to the “owning up to” suggested by Church, as owning or disowning is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for “owning up to”. Where her concern is with owning up to something, thus taking responsibility for, my proposed view stresses owning as having responsibility to someone or something.

Owning and knowing
My understanding of “bodily ownership” is connected to knowing.¹⁳⁴ I suggest that it be read in the light of the way that a man can (I wish I could

¹³⁴ Problematizing ownership of the body like this, should neither be understood as advocating the ways in which we can imagine a new and fuller bodily ownership, where a fully integrated self could be seen as selling her/himself with more right, nor should it be understood as an attempt to eradicate the possibilities of individual choice. Rather it is
have written “could”, as if this had been a historical example) own or disown a child. Owning the child means caring about and taking responsibility for it, for example, including the child as an heir. Furthermore it includes a mutual relationship. Included in this paternalistic example lingers the *caring about* as restricted to a domain of *caring* that lacks what has traditionally been defined as female domains of *caring*, namely *caring for*. These aspects of *caring*, traditionally labelled female, should of course have to be included in the owning that I am suggesting.

An alternative account of ownership that includes a mutual relationship between owner and owned has been exemplified in the negotiations over land in Australia between pastoralists and the Wik people. Helen Verran, consultant philosopher of the Wik people, identifies in these negotiations two different systems of knowing and owning land—where the ways in which you can *know* the land is connected to the way ownership is conceived.

Both systems have an identifiable logic through which land can be publically known and since known, owned. In each case these logics translate meaning invested in the land. But the forms of meaningfulness, and explanations of its origins are quite different (Verran 1995, 105).

There are different ways of *knowing* and thus *owning* the land. In the Wik sense the clan can be claimed to belong to the land rather than the land be claimed to belong to them. Included in this is the notion of ‘owners’ as being responsible to the land. She contrasts this to the western epistemic idiom of representationalism, where the knowing of land is a one-sided

an attempt to make way for another *imaginary* of what a self is and how it is created and maintained, and in virtue of that, what our society could imagine as being possible to have for sale.

My proposal should be seen as an attempt to counter an imaginary given in the debate by the use of such terms as “sex workers” and their “clients”. In between my proposed view on bodily ownership and the view I am opposing, is the dominant discourse in which the *idea* of prostitution is seldom problematized as such, but only the practice and its social consequences. In a way my investigation can be said to problematize the practice and its social consequences, but from another conception of what the self and the self in relation to body is, so that in the process the very idea of whether this should be conceivable to have for sale is raised.
interrogation where Nature can only be known about. Connected to the western one-sided way of knowing is the owning of land. “Area and length, . . . are the qualities conventionally used as the basis for quantifying land—publicly knowing land, that is,—and the basis for owning particular sections of land”. In the conceptual system inherent in the reasoning amongst members of Aboriginal communities, land exists primarily as sets of sites where inherent focii in the land are connected in particular ways, and through this land is meaningful. The logic takes its pattern from the material pattern of kinship relations (Verran 1995, 105-6).

We do not have to live in Aboriginal communities to be able to understand that one can imagine different ways of knowing and owning. These other possibilities are also inherent in English linguistic usage. The meaning of ‘knowing’ glides between, for example, ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing somebody’, and ‘knowing’ in the Biblical sense. The meaning of ‘owning’ glides between ‘owning’ a car, ‘owning’/’disowning’ a child, ‘owning’ one’s faults and ‘owning up’. Between these senses of ‘knowing’ and ‘owning’ we have such uses as when the disciple Peter claimed not to know Jesus, he was disowning him.

In my proposed account of bodily ownership there are similarities to the way land exists as meaningful in Aboriginal reasoning, through the connections between different focii. The way the body comes to be known to us is constitutive to the way we subsequently own or disown it, or parts of it.135 Our lived body and parts of our body have meaning to us, and inherent in this meaning is the value we experience our selves and our lived bodies to have. The meaning is constituted through experiences that make connections, thereby owning, or disconnections, thereby disowning. In the ongoing development of bodily ownership we make connections between sites of experience and the self. Susan Brison, when problematizing trauma and the undoing of the self, gives us an example of a loss commonly experienced by rape survivors; “I will always miss myself as I was” (Migael Scherer as quoted in (Brison 1997)). This I think is a telling example of how disconnection to our lived bodies/our selves can be expressed.

In her approach to bodily ownership Church points out that the problematization of ownership is most often concerned with the right to

135 Cf. with Maurice Merleau-Ponty who writes: “. . . our body is comparable to a work of art. It is a nexus of living meanings, . . .” (1962 [1945], 151).
decide over other bodies, where the underlying assumptions of what ownership is is not questioned, namely, to own is to decide over and to control. In contrast to such debates my view here on ownership is a way of being in relation to or rather being related to. This kind of relation concerns the ways in which one's body and one's self matters, (and can matter!—as opposed to cases where one's body has become estranged), the ways in which it has meaning and value to one, but also to the extent that one is capable to dwell in it and do this trustingly, not having to fear that such dwelling will mean the risk of being overwhelmed by feelings or memories that threaten to undo the self. In the case of street prostitution feelings that are reported as being very disturbing, albeit not threatening to undo the self, are experiences of sexual feelings in the encounter with a customer.

Knowing ourselves in relation to others
In the growth of our selves, and with the acquisition of theories about the world, we get tacit knowledge of ourselves through our experiences of the world, or rather as I wish to stress: in terms of the world. An immensely important part of this "world" consists of other human beings, and our acts of self-creation are made in interaction with others. That acts of self-creation exist does not imply that we in every aspect "know" ourselves. In her criticism of the thesis of privileged access, Naomi Scheman puts it thus:

Something needs to be there to make one's articulations of identity more than meaningless babble, even in one's own ears—a "something" that the privileged tend to take for granted.

Part of that "something" is provided by the discursive resources of our cultural surround; but we also need more particularly focused uptake from those with whom we interact—we need acknowledgment and, beyond that, critical engagement with our on-going projects of self-creation. Simply being left alone, as the ultimate authorities on ourselves, will too often leave us without the resources to figure out just what it is that we are supposed to know. We are neither as opaque to (all) others nor as transparent to ourselves as the thesis of privileged access would have it: To a great extent we are what others take us to be, and if we think that is not so, that is likely to

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136 See e.g. (Brison 1997).
be because the "others" are sufficiently culturally ubiquitous and basically on our side for us to be oblivious to their contributions (Scheman 1997, 12).

Some philosophers have, when they have been dealing with the basic knowledge we acquire from birth and onward, tended to focus on knowledge of things and physical phenomena. As Willard Van Orman Quine puts it; "[e]ntification begins at arm's length" (1960, 1), and "[o]ur conceptual firsts are middle-sized, middle-distanced objects" (4-5). The possibility of a person at arm's length does not seem to exist except as someone mouthing words for the child to catch on to. Even when Quine discusses the correct use of the one-word sentence "Ouch", it is as something that "is inculcated in the individual by training on the part of society" (5). The method that society uses to achieve this is by rewarding the utterance of "Ouch", when it is accompanied by further evidence of physical discomfort. Visible blows and slashes may be seen as stimuli evocative of "Ouch", but even in these examples what is learned is a word that is correct to use when one has certain physical sensations, according to Quine. That an important part of the world consists of oneself—not only as a bundle of physical sensations—and oneself in interaction with others is not in focus. That the self, as knowing subject, should be a person experiencing slashes and blows, and through these experiences be learning something other than that certain words refer to physical discomfort is not considered. My point is that what slashes and blows teach the self that suffers them is also something about the self, and the terms in which this self can experience the world.

That experiences from the sociophysical level of intentional action can in some respects be more basic than the purely physical level of causally interacting objects has been suggested in linguist Eve Sweetser's work (1990) on epistemic modals. The may(s) and may not'(s), the can(s) and cannot(s), and the must(s) of the sociophysical domain and their correspondence to experiences of possibility, force, rules, demands, duties and remorse is a large part of the experience we get of the "world" that is forgotten in the talk of middle-sized physical objects. One of the important features of our experiences of the sociophysical domain is how we come to know our bodies and selves as what we learn ourselves to be.

I think that one of the reasons that some philosophers have tended to be—in the cases when they have cared about knowledge from birth and
onward at all—more interested in medium-sized physical objects than in the way we act and respond to each other, is that these philosophers have been mainly interested in knowledge-making within the natural sciences.\footnote{Cf. with what Lorraine Code (1991, 36-7) writes of the paradigmatic status of such knowledge as is concerned with medium-sized physical objects but not with the knowing of other people.} On the one hand we have had within the natural sciences the ideal that the scientist as a person should, at least in principle, be inter-changeable.\footnote{In contrast to this ideal there is a co-existent idealization and adoration of genius.} So whatever this person would get to know about himself (and it was more often than not a "he") was unimportant. Within the sociophysical domain of interaction on the other hand we find "structures of intelligibility", structures that correspond to the culturally available discursive resources we have to make sense of our selves and our lives. These structures make some lives more intelligible than others, and in some cases utterly fail to let some people make sense of theirs. As the lives of these male philosophers have to a large extent been unproblematically intelligible in the sociophysical domain of interaction, I think that it has to the same extent been "invisible" to them, as part of what we come to know about the world.

**Self and agency**

If we connect possibilities of sense-making to features of health, we see another aspect of the self that can be connected to the "numbing" of the self as a feature of delayed damage in prostitution. Let us look at Lennart Nordenfelt’s proposal of what it is to be a healthy person:

\[ A \text{ is healthy, if and only if } A \text{ is in a bodily or mental state which is such that } A \text{ has the second-order ability to realize his or her vital goals given a set of standard or otherwise reasonable circumstances (Nordenfelt 1996, 102).} \]

Remember now the pentad of key terms chosen by Burke: act, agent, agency, scene and purpose. Nordenfelt’s proposal shows that all these five aspects are taken into consideration in his account of what it is to be healthy. The act of realizing one’s vital goals, rests on the agent’s ability (available agency), in a set of standard or otherwise reasonable circumstances (scene), given that one knows and aims to realize such vital goals (purpose).
To be a healthy person one presumably ought to know oneself, what one’s vital goals are (a matter that clearly depends on the former), and what one’s circumstances are. The agency available to one who neither feels sure about who and what she is—how to make sense of herself—, nor can state her goals clearly, and does not see her circumstances in their totality, is not a healthy individual according to this theory of health. The ability to realize vital goals depends on knowing what these goals might be, and knowing what possibilities and obstacles there are.

Agents that are oppressed and the agencies of resistance might be seen to be difficult to fit into this picture of the healthy individual. María Lugones has problematized the concepts of agency and strategy from a streetwalker perspective. Successful agency includes intentional action. But as Lugones points out: an oppressed person may intend to do what she does, but still her act may not be autonomous, in the modern sense of successful agency—the sense that Lugones wants to question. One example she uses is Dorotea, a fifty-five year old Chicana who has been washing dishes in posh southwestern restaurants for minimum wage since she was thirteen and who intends washing the dishes when she washes them. Lugones lets us imagine Dorotea placing all the dishes in the large ovens of the restaurant and cooking them till the breaking point. Depending on what framework of meaning we apply, this act of Dorotea’s can be seen as crazy, stupid, or incompetent. Given the framework of her boss the “act” cannot be understood as resistant, but Lugones constructs this act of resistance as active subjectivity (Lugones 1997, 4).

The successful agent reasons practically in a world of meaning and within social, political and economic institutions that back him up and form the framework for his forming intentions that are not subservient to the plans of others and which he is able to carry into action unimpeded and as intended (Lugones 1997, 5).

As Dorotea’s cooking the dishes past breaking point is not a meaningful act within the social, political and economic institutions that backs up her boss’s world, he will think her crazy. Dorotea, though, is not forming her intentions within the same world of sense that her boss recognizes, and in which most people would understand his acts. He would be able to, as the autonomous agent, take “all the social backing of his sense for granted, as well as the social efficacy of his agency.” Her act of sabotage, and “ability to
form resistant intentions marks her both as an agent and as a participant in a world of sense different from—though cognizant of—the official world of sense” (Lugones 1997, 7-8). Dorotea is a participant in both “worlds”; the official world of sense, and in the world in which her act can be recognized as resistance.

Here is the problematics of the strategies possible for agents and active subjectivity. Working from a distinction between strategies and tactics drawn by Michel de Certeau (1984), Lugones shows us the impossibility of strategies being devised from positions of the oppressed. Strategies are devised by subjects of will and power, from a position “high above the street”, and with a possibility to predict and plan for the future. The tactic on the other hand, involves always turning alien forces to one’s own ends whilst not being able to count on a place ‘proper’. The tactician rather “subverts systems by using them to ends and references foreign to them”, as the total rejection or alteration of these systems is not an option for the weak and oppressed. The circumstances are located at street level, without a “sense of “the whole” except as an imposing, intruding, deceitful, and powerful fiction” (Lugones 1997, 1-2).

The streetwalker, and Dorotea doing the dishes, are not agents in the dominant sense with the ability to plan, and cannot make deliberations according to their “map” of the world.139 Their projects of self-creation are going on in a world that is not theirs, but that they know. They are left with situations in which they can elaborate the meanings of who they are, and what they may do, in interaction with plans made by others. But the subjectivity of the oppressed can also be conceptualized in terms of health and agency. I think that a notion of health and agency as presented by Nordenfelt may, with the help of Lugones’ account, offer us a possible conceptualization of the subjectivity of the oppressed. The healthy person as an autonomous individual, knows her/himself and her/his world, can predict, foresee and project her/his plans into the future and into the space of the world that s/he inhabits through strategies. The oppressed may lack the resources to make sense of their life in terms of the world of the dominant discourse living in a world that is not articulating the possibilities of their conditions, and where they are met with situations and other

139 I think that this might be the case for most of us, but with differing degree in different circumstances. I am not sure that Lugones would agree, as I am stretching this beyond the point she makes in her paper.
people’s plans to which they can respond only in terms of tactics. The sense-making of the oppressed is limited insofar as the sense-making is made within the dominant discourse. But the sense-making of the oppressed—as in the recognition of Dorotea’s breaking the dishes as being an act of resistance—can make their agency, through reflection, take on new senses.

Recognizing that the culturally available discourses fail as “sense-making resources” can make us see that there is need to take political responsibility for “our complicity in setting or refusing the conditions of each other’s possibility” (Scheman 1997, 14). Sometimes there are structures of intelligibility available to make sense, but in another “world” to which we must travel.

The self in healthy “world”-travelling
Not only do people of the Western industrial world and people of the Third world live “worlds apart”, but also individual people do sometimes live in different “worlds” that they travel between. Lugones suggests that those “who are outside of the mainstream of, for example, the U.S. dominant construction or organization of life, are ‘world travellers’ as a matter of necessity and survival.” She gives the example of being in a “world” that constructs one as stereotypically Latin, and at the same time being in another “world” that constructs one as simply Latin. These two, being stereotypically Latin and being simply Latin, are different but simultaneous constructions of persons that are part of different “worlds”.

“One animates one or the other or both at the same time without necessarily confusing them, though simultaneous enactment can be confusing if one is not on one’s guard.” One can inhabit different “worlds” at the same time, and/or one can travel between them. The experience of being a different person in these differing “worlds” and having the capacity to remember oneself in other “worlds” does not mean that one experiences any underlying “I”. The travel between these “worlds” is the shift from being one person to being a different person. The shift can be, but may as well not be, wilful or even conscious—it is not a matter of acting, as pretence or posing is not being done—one is not trying to be someone of a different personality or who uses language differently. One is someone who has this personality and who uses language this way (Lugones 1996, 426-7).
In the different “worlds” we inhabit we can be more or less at ease, Lugones claims. One way of being at ease is by being a fluent speaker in that “world”, knowing all the norms to be followed, all the words to be spoken, knowing all the moves. Another way of being at ease is by being happy in that “world”, agreeing with and loving the norms, being “asked to do just what I want to do or what I think I should do.” Furthermore I can be humanly bonded, and by being with those I love and with those that love me too, I can feel at ease in that world. Being at ease in this third sense does not mean that the “world” I am in could not be hostile towards me otherwise, but still it can be the “world” in which I feel at ease when I am together with those whom I love and who love me. One can be at ease in all these senses, or just in one. The claim “this is my world”, can even be done in respect to a “world” in which one is not at ease, or is at ease in, in only some respect, but not in others. The evaluation of a “world” as being one’s own can be made for a variety of reasons, one of which is that one may “experience oneself as an agent in a fuller sense than one experiences ‘oneself’ in other ‘worlds.’” (Lugones 1996, 427-8).

In different “worlds”, with our being different persons in them, or enacting different aspects of ourselves, our health may differ. Lugones, who starts her paper with the question of whether she is playful or not, states that she is not a healthy being in “worlds” that construct her as being unplayful (Lugones 1996, 429). This is not just a personal attribute that she finds important, but an attitude in activity, that includes uncertainty into the meaning of the activity, as an openness to surprise. This metaphysical attitude makes us open to self-construction, as we then in our activity are not self-important and not fixed in particular constructions of ourselves. If we are playful “we have not abandoned ourselves to, nor are we stuck in, any particular ‘world’. We are there creatively” (431).140

By connecting health to the “worlds” we inhabit, and to the persons we animate in these different “worlds”, we are being pointed back to the self in process and the agent in action. Dewey, in his discussion of “the self and its interests”, sees the talk of interests as being damned beyond recovery when they are being identified with the things of petty selfishness. “They can be employed as vital terms only when the self is seen to be in process, and

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140 Lugones also offers us another, opposed, notion of play as competitive, but as this notion is not of importance for my discussion here, I will not elaborate on it.
interest to be a name for whatever is concerned in furthering its movement" (Dewey 1950, 153, emphasis mine). In a Deweyan sense we can see that a “world” in which one can be healthy is a “world” in which one’s self can be in process. Health, like truth, to Dewey is adverbial; it is a modifier of action. Someone who seeks health, is someone who seeks to live healthily. “Healthy living is not something to be attained by itself apart from other ways of living. A man needs to be healthy in his life, not apart from it, and what does life mean except the aggregate of his pursuits and activities” (Dewey 1950, 135)?

Dewey, in his social philosophy, is concerned with making society a place in which it is possible for individuals to be created.

The real difficulty is that the individual is regarded as something given, something already there... When the individual is taken as something given already, anything that can be done to him or for him it can only be by way of external impressions and belongings: sensations of pleasure or pain, comforts, securities. Now it is true that social arrangements, laws, institutions are made for man, rather than that man is made for them; that they are means and agencies of human welfare and progress. But they are not means for obtaining something for individuals, not even happiness. They are means of creating individuals (Dewey 1950, 152).

Dewey is concerned with society, which is placed on the other end of the construction of selves that Lugones pictures. But their projects are in no opposition to each other, as I see them. A “world”, or “worlds” in which one can be playful and where openness to self-construction is possible, where one can be creatively there, without being stuck in any particular “world”, is the good society that Dewey aims at. But where Dewey is concerned with the making of this “world” or the “worlds” we live in, to “worlds” in which we can grow better, Lugones is concerned with opening up possibilities for travelling between the different, and already existing, “worlds”. In both their cases though, there is a quest for the possibilities of persons to grow in self-creation, a large part of which is done in interaction with others with whom we are humanly bonded.
Selves in problematic “world”-travelling
One can be in a particular “world” and have a double image of oneself. As an outsider to the mainstream one can, for example, animate that “world’s” caricature of a person one is in another “world”. To the extent that one can animate both images of oneself at the same time, one becomes an ambiguous being. Latins are often constructed as stereotypically intense in Anglo “worlds”. A Latin person, being genuinely intense, can then take hold of the double meaning of being Latin and being intense, by animating the Latin and the stereotypically Latin simultaneously. People of the Anglo “world” will not know if the person is animating the stereotypically Latin person or the Latin person, or both. The Latin person “may or may not intentionally animate the stereotype or the real thing” knowing that the others “may not see it in anything other than the stereotypical construction” (Lugones 1996, 429).

If the travelling between “worlds” is forced upon one, it is difficult to animate both positions, and succeed in being ambiguous by choice. To be forced to inhabit the stereotypical can harm the self in considerable ways. If one has been the instrument of another’s agency, as a prostitute, as a porn actress, or as the victim of sexual harassment, it may prove difficult not to be reset in that position if one tries to fight it or question it. Even in the case of a lawsuit concerning sexual harassment, one may be seen as the stereotypical person one has been made into and which one is trying to fight. If the lawsuit becomes public, the woman fighting it, may publicly be reset in the position she is trying to fight. This problematic feature of trying to fight the sexualization of pornography is shown in the case of Anita Hill when she was heard in the U.S. senate hearings. Judith Butler analyzes it thus:

The resistance to sexuality is . . . refigured as the peculiar venue for its affirmation and recirculation.

This very sexualization takes place in and as the act of speech. In speaking, Hill displays her agency; in speaking of sexuality, she displays her sexual agency; hence, any claim made against the sexualization of discourse from that position of the active sexualization of discourse is rhetorically refuted by the act of speech itself or, rather, by the act-like character of speech and the fictive “agency” presumed at work in the act of speaking (Butler 1997, 83-4).
Through the fictive "agency" displayed when one states as porn actress, or as prostitute, or as unintending (as to the display of sexual agency) testifier of sexual harassment in courts, one is animating a position with which one is at odds. By being forced to inhabit the stereotypical position one is robbed of one's possibility to the agency of another position.

**Summing up**

Investigating the indeterminate borders or our bodies and the semantic aspect of how we come to know ourselves in action and interaction through the example of prostitution makes it possible not only to sum up philosophical points, but also to sum up some points pertinent for a discussion on delayed damage in prostitution. The latter summing up, may seem to fall outside of the aims of this thesis, but I would find it immoral, since I subscribe to a promotion of an edifying discussion as proposed by Richard Rorty (1980), to use the example without feeding back into the example what I have highlighted through the use of the tool of tacit knowing.

The harm that the self may suffer in prostitution is of several kinds, and a philosophical investigation must take this into account. A philosophical investigation must therefore attend to different aspects of the self: as it is connected to bodily ownership, as it can be seen in connection to the possibility of agency, and to the "worlds" that the self inhabits. Investigating harm from all these aspects, I have furthermore questioned the possibility of a person's living healthily in the position of a prostitute.

Prostitution may work through a negative development of, and the forestalled maintenance of bodily ownership. Parts of the body and one's self can come to be known and take on new meanings that lead to a disowning of the body and to the lack of being able to dwell trustingly in the body and the feelings this might entail. The selling of a "temporal phase of oneself" can lead to a diminished bodily ownership; a "numbing" of aspects or parts of the body and the self. Research on prostitution gives us a picture of a means-end relationship. A person prostitutes herself as a stereotypical agent in one "world" in order to have the means to live as an agent in another "world". Animating a position in one "world" is the means towards animating and inhabiting a self in the other "world". In the "world" of prostitution the prostitute cannot decide what happens next.
She is left to wait for a customer to intrude in her “world” of streetwalking, and make her part of his plans. Plans that she can tactically modify but not alter. One of the major problems, besides the physical harm she might suffer, is that the “world” of prostitution is a “world” in which she does not want to be. She does not want to travel between “worlds”, instead she tries to sever her private self from her “public” self when travelling to the “world” of prostitution, trying to leave the self outside of it (by blanking out, getting high, hiding behind working names, wigs and so on).

If we focus on the self, the subject who prostitutes herself, she is likely to experience physical harm. Furthermore she will get to know herself in terms of a “world” that she does not want to inhabit, and through the subsequent lack of growth thereby will also be creating a diminished self. The possibility of having the metaphysical attitude of playfulness, and openness to surprise is something that she has to deny herself, in her attempts to control the situation of prostitution. (This fit the reports of experiences of sexual feelings in the encounter with a customer as something very disturbing.) Her acts of positive self-creation may be denied, as she may get to be just one type of self in one “world”.

A capacity for “world”-travelling is one of the prerequisites if the survival “strategies” of prostitution are to work; animating the stereotypical prostitute in order to get a “salary” to inhabit and animate a private life. I think that one of the reasons for the failure of this survival strategy in the long run is that it is supposed to work exactly through not travelling between “worlds”. The blanking out and getting high is there in order not to remember the self of the “private” “world”. If the self from the “private” “world” is remembered in the “world” of prostitution, the division between the public self and the private self fails.

I think that discourses that try to compare street prostitution to monotonous work in industries and the like fail to see an important difference between the two. Doing dishes or monotonous work does not rely on one’s blanking out the self of the private “world”, or a diminished capacity for “world”-travelling.\footnote{As I am here trying to highlight features that to a high degree may pertain to street prostitution, my description of heavy/dirty/monotonous work is superficial. It is important though to see that a numbing of the self may well be part of the accumulated experience of such labour, also. Such claims are not opposed to the claims put forth in this thesis. On the contrary, the example of prostitution is chosen to highlight features of}
long-term delayed damage; the different “worlds”, the private and the public are forged into one, so that one has difficulties in inhabiting the private as a total self, a self of both body and mind, and with a capacity for “world”-travelling. What prostitution should rather be compared to is having to be a soldier or a torturer or a guard of prisoners that you would not want to have imprisoned. In these cases one will have to “shut down” the self of the private “world”, that would repudiate these acts and find them abominable. I think that if we want to compare the experiences of prostitution to something else, this is the direction that we should be looking in, even though soldiers do not have to make acts of unfolding into acts of calculation, as shooting other people is not usually seen as rewarding in the private “world”. Rather it is the evaluation of life, and the inviolability of life that is usually cherished in the private “world” that one has to forego as a soldier.

What has been named “the survival strategies of prostitution” then, should rather be described as the tactics of resistance in a situation the prostitute cannot control. The tactics are held on to in situations of denied agency. The sense-making of acts of the “world” of prostitution, are of the “world” she does not want to inhabit. As the acts of “unfolding” are done in the “world” of prostitution they get connected to the blanking out of the self in the private “world”. With time the women feel that the public self is growing like a tumour, and that they have difficulties in turning on their emotions again.

To live healthily we have to be able to grow through the interiorization and integration of our experiences and to have as many of our faculties intact as possible, whether we are thinking of seeing, hearing or having the capacity to experience emotions and sexual feelings. These latter faculties may be harmed in prostitution.

By way of using the example of prostitution, I think that the philosophical salience of Burke’s pentad has been proved. For any rounded numbing of the lived body, a numbing that I think to a certain degree is part of any human life.

My point, though, is that to my knowledge it is not common for factory workers or manual labourers in restaurants to claim that they have found strategies to blank out, or actively forget about their private lives, during work. Rather it seems to be the case that some engage in the work, thus simply not thinking so much about their private lives during work, whereas some “flee” from the work by specifically thinking about that private life, holidays, a career, etc.. See e.g. (Westlander 1976).
statement on human agency we have to heed all five key terms, as in this example. The act of prostitution and subsequent harm cannot be fully explained without recourse to the agent of prostitution. The self as lived body, may phenomenally (dis)own the body, by different means as to the available agency, that is through the tricks as well as the tactics. Furthermore her agency depends on the scene; that consists of the street, the customer, the possibility of "world"-travelling, and on the purpose. In a close-up perspective this depends on whether the purpose is concerned with turning tricks or with ways to cope with the act of prostitution. A more distant perspective will reveal aspects that are constitutive of the purpose as in what circumstances, and to what ends the act of prostitution is taking place.

Conclusions on the lived body

Through the example of prostitution I have illustrated the borders of our lived bodies as being indeterminate, not only so that we can existentially grow, but also in the sense that we may existentially restrain the boundaries of our lived bodies. I have investigated several dimensions of knowing oneself: knowing oneself as agent in action, as agent in relation to a "world" or travelling between "worlds". Tied to the way we know ourselves as agents we form strategies or tactics, and the meaning of our actions may pertain to the different "worlds" we inhabit.

The pole from which we trust when coming to know the world are our lived bodies. As being the pole from which we trust it is crucial for a possibility of existential growth. The knowing of our lived bodies is knowing the lived body as it has meaning to us. From this I have suggested a view of how we come to dwell in our bodies, know and "own" it.
Trust

The philosophical discussion on the concept of trust is fairly new. According to Annette Baier trust was for long something mostly discussed by psychologists, sociologists, and lawyers, and the philosophers who addressed it were to a large extent political philosophers who discussed trust in government, trust as social glue, or addressing the assurance problem in Prisoner's Dilemma contexts. From the start being mostly a concern for moral philosophy, the concept of trust has in the last decade definitely entered epistemology, mostly in terms of trusting testimony and testifier.

In this chapter a concept of existential trust will be developed. I will either be drawing on, or contrasting it to other philosophical accounts of trust. Existential trust will then be discussed with reference to self-trust, trust in a perceived uniformity in the world, and trust in testimony and testifier as it can be discerned in some examples of knowing. The role of trust in science, as an example of institutionalized knowing, will also be addressed.

142 On Baier's (1997 [1986]) account, a general account of the morality of trust relationships has been lacking. Recent years have seen an increasing number of philosophers interested in trust, though, see e.g. (Adler 1994; Coady 1992; Code 1987a; Govier 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c; Hardwig 1991; Hertzberg 1988; Hollis 1998; Lagerspetz 1996; Løgstrup 1997 [1956]). There are sociological accounts such as (Gambetta 1988a; Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1979, 1988). In political science Francis Fukuyama (1995) has suggested the level of trust inherent in a society to be what conditions the economic and political well-being of a nation, and Robert Putnam (Putnam and Nanetti 1993) has suggested social trust as part of the social capital that makes democracy work.

143 It is interesting to note that in an introductory book to epistemology published 1998, testimony is being dealt with as one out of five sources of justification, knowledge and truth. The other four are perception, memory, consciousness and reason (Audi 1998).
Existential trust

With the concept *existential trust* I am suggesting a perspective on the relation between what we act from, and what we do, where doing is a way of knowing. I will not try to give some definite characteristic of what trust is, as trust is not here defined as any specific ‘mental state’. Rather it is to see a quality in the relation between that from which we act, and to that which we do. Existential trust is what may be conceived of as trust, from a third-person perspective, against a background of what may fail us; against a background of vulnerability.\(^\text{144}\) It is expressive of the way we trustingly act on, or from, what we trust-as-true, and/or rely on without questioning. To see this one has to have recourse to the distinction Polanyi makes between subsidiary and focal awareness.\(^\text{145}\) We trust from something to be able to act, where thinking and perceiving also are ways of doing. Existential trust is tacit, and can from a first-person perspective become conscious in retrospect, most often after a loss of it. It is something that we seldom are conscious of until something or someone has failed us. Since it is tacit it will only emerge in the way that we act and react (with surprise if that which, or whom, we trust fails us). In a present situation, it characterizes a relation between our acting and what we act from. In this situation it is unreflected and not the exercise of conscious judgement.

Existential trust may well survive our becoming aware of it, but may be both unwanted and unaccepted, as in interpersonal trust. An example of existential trust that one might become aware of, without wanting or accepting it, would be, e.g., if one realized that part of one’s judgement about a person’s performance was formed by a sexist or racist framework of thinking. This framework would not be consciously chosen but such as might have been formed by one’s socio-cultural background. To discover

\(^\text{144}\) Code writes:

basic trust is a tenuous and fragile construct, tacit and implicit though it may be. It is always open to violation by the very things that create and sustain it: belief in other people, confidence that much of what they tell us can be taken at face value, reliance upon our ability to assess their credibility. People are fallible, credulous, and deceitful (Code 1987b, 173).

\(^\text{145}\) See chapter 2.
that one's judgement was influenced by sexism or racism might be shocking, but as I concluded earlier (p. 101): an insight does not necessarily produce an instantly altered type of action. To really change the tacit framework of one's thinking, one would probably be in need of many "re-discoveries" of the framework, and conscious working on it.

Existential trust can in some respects be likened to certainty as a form of life, as certainty was tentatively described by Wittgenstein. What we trust existentially in is ourselves (self-trust), in others, and in the uniformity of the world as we come to know it through our actions.

**Drawing on Løgstrup and Lagerspetz**

The concept of *existential trust* that I propose as an epistemological category borrows much of its character from *basic* or *natural trust* as it is described by Knud Løgstrup (1997 [1956]). His concern is with interpersonal trust, so some points that he makes do not pertain straightforwardly to self-trust, to trust in things or to the uniformity of the world. Most of the aspects of trust that he brings forward pertain to existential trust, though, as it captures trust as a given in human life, and where our actions are always a daring forward to be met, a "leaving oneself out".

He writes of trust as something that in an elementary sense belongs to human existence, and from which there arises a tacit demand, an ethical demand for trust. According to his account it is part of our human life that we meet each other with natural trust, not only in the case when we meet someone we know well, but also when we meet a complete stranger. If we meet a stranger with distrust, there must first have been certain circumstances in which our natural trust has been betrayed, thereby leaving us anxious and unfree. Normally, though, we believe the words of a stranger and start to distrust only when we are given due cause. According

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146 See the earlier section "Practical knowledge as paradigm knowledge", chapter 1.

147 Lars Hertzberg makes similar claims. He thinks that what stands in need of explanation, normally, is not the fact that someone trusts another person, but the fact that he distrusts him.

The distrustful person is someone who has been damaged by other people. No matter that this, to an extent, is what happens normally in the process of growing up: the destruction of our trust in others is a tragedy of life, a fall from grace (Hertzberg 1988, 320).
to Løgstrup we believe in each other’s words beforehand; we have trust in each other initially. He sees this as a part of being human, as any other way of living would be hostile to life itself. Without trust we would not be able to live, our lives would be impaired and wither away if we were in advance to distrust one another, and thinking the other person to be a thief, a liar, and a fraud (Løgstrup 1997 [1956], 8-9).

To trust, is according to Løgstrup, to “lay oneself open”, “step out of oneself”, to “surrender oneself to the other person”, or to place something of her/his own life into the hands of the other. These expressions are metaphorical and may easily be subject to misunderstanding. They should not be taken as the exposing of oneself, a turning inside out of oneself, or a giving away of oneself. One surrenders oneself in the trust of the other person, whereby a requirement is imposed upon her/him, to the extent that there is an expectation to be met. In expectation one does something, and this is what the “laying oneself open” consists of. But it does not necessarily entail an explicit expectation, and the trusting is not to confide in someone (even though this might also be case). The trust may consist in a number of things such as the trust that the other will be speaking the truth, or simply that the note struck by the speaker’s address is accepted.

No matter what form our communication takes on, it always consists of a daring forward to be met. In every encounter there is this unspoken demand, no matter under what circumstances the meeting takes place or what characterizes it. Neither an insight, nor an agreement is needed for us to be aware of this. As Løgstrup takes care to show this unspoken demand is not something that depends on our good will, so that we without losing something could ignore it. On the contrary it does not for its existence depend on us, but is a given, to the extent that our lives could not be lived without a laying oneself open in trust shown or demanded, thus more or less giving one’s life into the hands of the other. In this attitude we not only contribute to each other’s worlds, but also constitute it (Løgstrup 1997 [1956], 16). Notwithstanding this description is the fact that most of the time we show each other a highly reserved trust. The trust albeit being basic, is not total (19-20).

If it is the case that every human encounter can be seen as tacitly demanding trust, this requires an acknowledgement of the situation and that we assume due responsibility. This is exactly the point that Løgstrup is making.
If one mistakenly reads Løgstrup’s normative account (of the ethical demand that there is in being a fellow human being) as a description of life (which it is not in any simple way), he might seem overly positive or even naive. First of all it is the case that we ought not to trust blindly in a number of situations such as, for example, not taking it for granted that one can leave one’s wallet unguarded on café-tables or on the beach while taking a swim. Second, there are a lot of people that are not met with trust, except maybe by those who are close to them in some way. Often when people are perceived as Other, due to their ethnicity, gender, race, class, or in a variety of ways used to sort people into different categories, they are met with distrust in a number of situations. It takes a position of the privileged to be able to address the question of trust, as something that is normally afforded to a stranger. It is part of the “invisible package of unearned assets” that the privileged can count on cashing in, and still be oblivious of. Even while relying on, and using Løgstrup’s account of trust, I am not denying that trust is unevenly distributed, and neither is he. To give an account of trust without heeding its uneven distribution may well work to make sense for those who can afford to be trusting and who are socially recognized and entrusted, but may equally fail to make sense to those in less fortunate positions. In my account of the role of existential trust in knowing I will direct attention to this political dimension of the importance of existential trust as it may be unevenly distributed not only in the case of interpersonal trust, but also as regards self-trust.

Adopting the expression ‘a tacit demand’ from Løgstrup, Olli Lagerspetz claims trust to be necessarily tacit. To speak of trust is, for Lagerspetz, to invoke a perspective on human action, a perspective that calls for moral responses. To see an action as an expression of trust is to see it as involving a tacit demand not to betray the expectations of those who trust us (Lagerspetz 1996, 10).

148 A similar point is made by Govier: “Perhaps the sense that the most reasonable standing attitude is one of slight trust reflects no more than one’s location as relatively privileged person in an affluent and smoothly functioning society” (1993b, 172-3).

149 I have borrowed the phrase “invisible package of unearned assets” from Peggy McIntosh’s account of male, white, and heterosexual privilege that is not recognized. Even though the advantages associated with racism, sexism, and heterosexism are not the same, and that “it is hard to disentangle aspects of unearned advantage which rest more on social class, economic class, race, religion, sex and ethnic identity than on other factors”, all these kinds of oppression are interlocking (McIntosh 1988, 17).
He thinks that trust can only be explicit from a third-person perspective. The trusting party does not often recognize her/his own attitude as trust, as s/he has not thought about the possibility of risk at all. By the use of the word ‘trust’ Lagerspetz suggests that we are inviting others to see a person’s behaviour in a certain light.\textsuperscript{150} When we further characterize a relation as trustful, it is done against a background of risk: the risk of betrayal.

This underlies the appeal of the idea that trust always means ‘leaving oneself in someone else’s power’. The idea of risk does come in after all. That is - from an observer’s perspective. In typical cases, the agent simply will not recognise his own present attitude as one of trust. To speak of trust is to take the possibility of betrayal into account; but our own trust lies precisely in the fact that we do not recognise betrayal as a genuine possibility (Lagerspetz 1996, 38).

If one from a first-person perspective asks oneself whether trust is possible, that is, if one engages in thinking about “acceptable” reasons for trust, then one cannot be said to be trusting.\textsuperscript{151} Rather it is the case that one is doubting. Annette Baier describes us as, for example, sometimes letting ourselves fall asleep on trains, “with scarcely any sense of recklessness”, “trusting neighboring strangers not to take advantage of our defenselessness” (Baier 1997 [1986], 607). Lagerspetz in opposition to her description claims that many of us often fall asleep quite naturally, without thinking about our fellow passengers. Trust is here shown in the fact that we do no think about them! To the extent that we would think about them, and be very conscious of our behaviour as displaying trust, one might rightly ask with Lagerspetz whether there is really trust at all (Lagerspetz 1996, 28).

\textsuperscript{150} The choice of a third-person perspective I suggest to be read in the light of Wittgenstein’s remark: “Ask not: “What goes on in us when we are certain that . . . ?” — but: How is ‘the certainty that this is the case’ manifested in human action” (1967 [1953], 225e)

\textsuperscript{151} For discussions on trust as presupposing a situation of risk, where one engages in risk-taking, see e.g. (Gambetta 1988b; Luhmann 1988).
Existential and tacit, summing up pertinent points

Løgstrup and Lagerspetz both address interpersonal trust, where we trust others and they trust us. The concept of existential trust that I aim at developing cannot be a straightforward adoption of their views as some of the points they make cannot be brought to work for self-trust, or a trust in a perceived uniformity that pertains to our actions in the world.

Our existential trust is not something that we think about in terms of trust, from the perspective of the agent in action. From an observer’s perspective though, we can perceive of a quality in the relation between what one acts trustingly from to what one does. When engaging in inquiry for example, one may trust in testimony, in one’s grasp of the language spoken (that the meaning of the words have not changed overnight), in one’s ability to proceed by inspecting, investigating, trying out, reading further, et cetera. Trust as being such lack of hesitation is pointed out by Bengt Molander. He gives examples of trust in language, trust in one’s agency, and trust in knowing what one is doing (Molander 1996a, 259-61). Existential trust I claim to be a given, as it is part of our daring forward in our actions in the world.\(^{152}\)

My use of the term ‘daring’, in line with Løgstrup’s account of trust, may seem to be a term that denotes an action that must be deliberate and must have been reflected upon, as in cases when one chooses to dare to trust somebody. It should be noted however that the full term is a ‘daring forward[to be met]’ which to me is something that does not necessarily have to have been reflected upon in advance. Approaching the counter at the railway station to buy a ticket, I do not normally heed the possibility of getting a smack in the face, but my approach and my request opens up the possibility of a smack as well as a rejection of my buying a ticket—it is this open-ended approach of mine that is labelled a ‘daring forward’.

In existential trusting there is always a trust from something (as e.g. my limbs) to something (efficient motion). To elucidate this I am bringing in the functional relation of tacit knowing as described by Michael Polanyi, as an attention from something to something. The role of trust in epistemic

\(^{152}\) Luhmann (1988, 97-8) would probably label this confidence. He suggests that the difference between confidence and trust is that in the case of confidence we do not (even) consider alternatives, whereas with trust there is an engagement on one’s part, where a disappointment may depend on one’s own previous behaviour: one chose to trust in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others.
matters is exactly this: as long as we trust we are attending from whatever we trust, and whatever that is, that is not what we are attending to or doubting. Therefore it is also very fitting, from the point of view of tacit knowing, to label trust ‘the tacit demand’, because when broken, once we have started to doubt it, we do not attend from it anymore, but to it. Lagerspetz rightly concludes that even speaking of trust as trust is to do it from an observer’s perspective. That way we can also perceive of ourselves as having had trust, or lost it, as we are in hindsight attending to ourselves in a third-person perspective.

This existential trust should therefore be distinguished from trust that is ‘explicit’. With the term ‘explicit’ I am referring to interpersonal trust, where one makes decisions to trust someone, or thinks that one has good reasons to trust. Existential trust, as being tacit, is as I concluded above not the outcome of decisions made presently or through a weighing of reasons.

Existential trust on the part of the agent is to rest, to existentially dwell in something, acting from it. That is one of the reasons why I label this kind of trust existential trust, as it refers to an existential indwelling.

Existential trust further developed

Existential trust is not restricted to interpersonal trust, but includes the way we have self-trust and expect ourselves, the “world”, and others to display some continuous uniformity in a natural and social order, as opposed to chaos. Without an experienced uniformity we would, for example, have no reason to engage in inquiry at all. This is not to claim that there must be a uniformity, as we are still open to surprise, but rather that the expectation of uniformity is shown in the way we deal with surprise. So the idea of uniformity in a natural and social order is also a description of our relation to nature, and thus our own ability to act in uniform ways.

My expectation of uniformity shows in what I do to cope with unexpected situations - for instance, when an object (say, a book) is missing. I will look for it rather than just

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153 Cf. (Luhmann 1979).
154 This Kantian point is argued by Lagerspetz (1996, 124-5).
assume that it has disintegrated; and I will do this in particular ways depending on the kind of object it is. I dismiss certain methods by an appeal to earlier experience. The character of the 'uniformity' shows in what kinds of earlier experience I see as relevant: which ones I refer to shows what I mean by uniformity in this particular case (Lagerspetz 1996, 124).

In the case of other human beings, for example, there is a complexity on which trust is focused, namely: freedom of action. Trust in the other human being can then, according to Niklas Luhmann, be to assume him to possess a personality, to constitute an ordered, not arbitrary, centre of a system of action, with which one can come to terms. Trust, then, is the generalized expectation that the other will handle his freedom, his disturbing potential for diverse action, in keeping with his personality—or, rather, in keeping with the personality which he has presented and made socially visible (Luhmann 1979).

This highlights a difference from accounts of more 'explicit' trust. It is that the "expectation" inherent in existential trust is not a reliance on someone's good will towards one. On Annette Baier's account trust is a reliance on someone's good will, in contrast to a mere reliance on their dependable habits. If one takes this as a distinction regarding only explicit trust, her description might work. But with existential trust as being "implicit" it does not. The infant does not rely on its parent's good will, from the point of view of the infant the parent just is. In the case of Lagerspetz looking for his book, I do not think that he is relying on a uniformity in a natural order apprehended as a manifestation of any good will (on the part of Nature, God, or whatever), to him this uniformity just is. This is yet another reason for my choice of labelling this trust existential, as it is an aspect of the way we have and know the world.

One may ask why I did not choose to label existential trust 'unreflected' instead. The reason is that 'unreflected' as opposed to 'reflected' seemingly refers to one kind of trust as being the result of not-thinking, and the other kind as being the result of thinking, and where thinking is taken to be

155 Compare this to Løgstrup's account of trust as a given. As such it is not dependent on someone's good will, as he claims that our lives could not be lived without a laying oneself open in trust shown or demanded, thus giving one's life in the hands of the other to a larger or lesser extent.
propositional. This is wrong in an account of both kinds of trust. Existential trust may well be a result of earlier thinking, as an apprehension of propositionally expressed interpretations or states of affairs. If these interpretations or states of affairs become part of how one sees the world, they may be part of one’s existential trust. On the other hand there are a lot of ways in which we make sense of the world that are not propositional, albeit some of these may be expressed propositionally. Now Løgstrup makes a point about trust versus distrust:

[trust and distrust are not two parallel ways of life. Trust is basic; distrust is the absence of trust. This is why we do not normally advance arguments and justifications for trust as we do for distrust” (Løgstrup 1997 [1956], 18, n. 5).

If we follow his account on basic, natural trust, this supposedly is our initial attitude in life. With time we lose trust in those who fail or that which fails us. One of the early things we catch on to is how smell and taste “go together”. What we come to know as tasting well, we learn to apprehend as having a positive smell. What smells good usually tastes well. With the infant this is not propositionally expressed, except maybe with a smacking sound which seemingly implies that s/he wants it. With time distinctions will be learned and made, but building on this basic trust of what smells nice will taste well. Absent yet is a trust for those things that smell putrid, which is really a distrust then. To distrust meat that smells or tastes putrid is something we not only do after having apprehended propositional statements about it, but is a sign of the absence of trust.

I think that existential trust, in contrast to the explicit trust discussed by Baier, may well be unconscious or unwanted, and may also survive consciousness of it. But existential trust will not be something either easily rejected or accepted, as in Baier’s account of more explicit trust. As little as existential trust can be had for the asking, as difficult can it be to exchange it for a trust in others or in other things, even if need should arise, when someone or something has failed us.

This kind of existential trust, a trust that at least for a time being knows of no alternative, may be the trust children have to their caretakers, when there is no one else to turn to. As Lars Hertzberg states:
Nothing can force a person to give up his trust in another; in order to do so he must change.

This also means that, in so far as I trust someone, there will be no limits, given in advance, of how far or in what respects I shall trust him (Hertzberg 1988, 314).

For children to have only one person to turn to is to be in a situation of utmost vulnerability. Referring to Adrienne Rich who claimed that the isolation of mother and child in a symbiotic relation is a misanthropic wrong of the same dignity as maltreatment and rape, Ulla M. Holm gives us a story of a mother. The mother who had a little child said: “The worst part is that when I have been really horrible towards him, so horrible that I hate myself, he stretches his arms up and wants to cuddle. Then I think in despair: poor devil, you are completely at the mercy of your executioner!”

Does the existential trust then grow from infancy on? Do we get better at it, do we get more trustful? Lagerspetz discusses an analogy between balance and trust. Where we can say that a child’s sense of balance is better than it is with new-borns, we cannot say that a child at three is better at trusting than the infant, or that it’s trust is bigger. “What takes place is, instead, a steady increase of situations where the notions of trust and distrust are applicable” (Lagerspetz 1996, 78). This seems to be a reasonable account also in the case of existential trust. Still I would like to make a further qualification. In one sense one can speak of trust as growing, and that is to the extent that some of what we existentially trust can come to be integrated as parts of ourselves as, for example, in the case of our “theories” about the world, when these become parts of the way we “see” the world.

Why did I not choose the term ‘implicit trust’ then or ‘confidence’ as Luhmann suggests? The reason is that ‘existential’ suggests more of a life in process, and man as active, and where the existential trust is something we act in attention from. It refers to existential indwelling, a meaning that is not conferred by the term ‘implicit’. Furthermore it is fundamental to our being-in-the-world and our acting without hesitation, and encompasses more than the way we depend on others, as it is also concerned with trust in ourselves and “the world”. These last points are not conveyed in the term ‘confidence’, nor in the term ‘implicit’.

156 In (Holm 1993, 215-6, translation mine).
Existential trust or mere reliance?

While acknowledging the implicit trust of many human encounters and affairs, Baier still attempts to make a difference between trusting others and merely relying on them. Trust seems to her to be a reliance on their good will towards one. The "merely relying" on the other hand would be to rely on their dependable habits or on other motives compatible with ill will toward one, or on motives not directed at one at all. In this she would include a relying "on our fellows' fear of the newly appointed security guards in shops to deter them from injecting poison into the food on the shelves, once we have ceased to trust them" (Baier 1997 [1986], 607).

Baier is here addressing an explicit form of trust. Her way of distinguishing trust from other species of reliance on persons, is a claim that when one trusts another, one is depending on the good will of the other. To be depending on another person’s good will is not necessarily a reliance that either one of the parties involved has acknowledged. “[T]here is such a thing as unconscious trust, as unwanted trust, as forced receipt of trust, and as trust that the trusted is unaware of.” To exclude such forms of trust that are unwanted or would not be acknowledged, she thinks that plausible conditions for what she labels proper trust “will be that it survives consciousness, by both parties, and that the trusted has had some opportunity to signify acceptance or rejection toward the trusting if their trust is unacceptable” (Baier 1997 [1986], 608).

Even while mostly addressing questions about explicit forms of trust, several philosophers compare or contrast these to other more ‘implicit’ forms of trust. It is sometimes done with reference to the trust exhibited in infants or children, and sometimes to a general “background unreflective trust” as opposed to “the discrete self-conscious trust we place [in] a specific person in a concrete situation, trust based on judgment made after reflective deliberation about the other’s character and the situation” (Govier 1993b, 156).

Baier refers to infant trust and how this is not an act of choice but probably innate to some degree. Innate or not, I would, in line with Lagerspetz, emphasize that the reason we may call infants trustful is one of perspective (Lagerspetz 1996, 76-81). It is a way of seeing the infant as being
capable, or potentially capable, of participating in relationships where from a third-person perspective we can characterize the relation as being one of trust.

Strangely enough Baier writes about the maintenance of trust on part of the child as a matter of deliberation, as if "acceptable" reasons were there for an implicit choice, and thus an act of decision.\(^\text{157}\)

Why, once the child becomes at all self-conscious about trusting parents to look after such goods [nutrition, shelter, clothing, health, education, privacy, and loving attachment to others] for her, should she have confidence that parents are dependable custodians of such goods? Presumably because many of them are also goods to the parent, through their being goods to the child, especially if the parent loves the child. They will be common goods, so that for the trusted to harm them would be self-harm as well as harm to the child. The best reason for confidence in another's good care of what one cares about is that it is a common good, and the best reason for thinking that one's own good is also a common good is being loved (Baier 1997 [1986], 613).

Still when modelling her account of trust on entrusting, she takes care to point out that "trusting is rarely begun by making up one's mind to trust, and often it has no definite initiation of any sort but grows up slowly and imperceptibly." The "acceptable" reasons for trust that there are, is something that we can become conscious of, in those cases where we have been unaware of the trust we have placed in someone else (Baier 1997 [1986], 611). That way she is actually modelling implicit trust in terms of explicit trust. But implicit trust is not something that can be described in terms of "implicit" and, on later inspection, acceptable reasons. Implicit trust is to not even engage in thinking about reasons.

I have argued that it is not possible to distinguish existential trust from mere reliance by way of some (in the present or in hindsight) perception of good will. But Baier offers us another possibility and that is her notion of 'accepted vulnerability'. On her account the accepted vulnerability is tied to a dependence on another's good will. This implicitly places an emphasis "on trusting's vulnerability, on the risks rather than the benefits of trust", but that is because "we come to realize what trust involves retrospectively and

\(^\text{157}\) Lagerspetz (1996, 30, n. 40) makes a related objection to Baier's account of trust.
posthumously, once our vulnerability is brought home to us by actual wounds” (Baier 1997 [1986], 608).

As I stated earlier existential trust may well survive awareness of it, just like more explicit forms of trust, but it does not rest on any (with hindsight) “accepted” vulnerability any more than it rests on any (with hindsight) “acceptable” reasons. This is what distinguishes it from explicit trust. But there is dependence, and there is vulnerability.

A mere reliance to Baier would be when we depend on another’s psychology in countless ways, but not yet trusting them. For the dependence to be trust there must be the risk of betrayal or of being let down. Mere disappointment in another’s psychology will not do as a mark of former trust. She gives us the example of Kant’s neighbours, who counted on his regular habits as a clock for their own less automatically regular ones, as possibly being disappointed if he slept in one day, but not as being let down.

How would this distinction between mere reliance and trust function in the case of existential trust? To begin with it would not be possible to use the term ‘let down’ in the case of existential trust, as it implies that “the trusted has had some opportunity to signify acceptance or rejection toward the trusting if their trust is unacceptable” (Baier 1997 [1986], 608), and that does not have to be the case with existential trust.

Counting on Kant’s regular habits may be seen both as a case of a mere reliance, and as a case of trust, explicit or existential. This depends on whether this was just an unreflected taken-for-granted without any import for the neighbours own actions, or whether the neighbour counted on Kant’s appearance to make it possible for him (the neighbour) to do something at the right time. In the first case it would have been a mere reliance. In the second case, where Kant’s regularity becomes a starting point of the other’s action, there are two possibilities. Had the neighbour been deliberating the risk of Kant’s sleeping in, but decided to count on his regularity rather than the possibility of risk, it would not be a case of existential trust, but might rather be considered to be some kind of explicit

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158 Bok gives some examples of how detrimental deceptive practices can be to the trust that functions as a foundation of relations among human beings (1978, 30-1, 119, 233).

159 Hertzberg makes claims about the allocation of responsibility in the grammar of trust (as opposed to reliance) that are similar to Baier’s. He writes: “[T]rust can only concern that which one person can rightfully demand of another” (Hertzberg 1988, 319).
trust. Lastly, had the neighbour not been deliberating the risk of Kant’s sleeping in, but had unreflectively counted on Kant’s appearance as the starting point for his own (the neighbour’s that is) action, it may be seen as existential trust. If Kant slept in when the neighbour’s action had to be brought off timely, the existential trust would be broken. This highlights an important feature of existential trust: if the trust is broken, if what we trust fails us, there is not always a reason for blame. Kant could not be blamed for his neighbour counting on his appearance. In some situations we may be aware that people unthinkingly trust us for a lot of things (like not taking advantage of them while they are sleeping in the train), and in those situations there would be due cause for blame if we were to let them down, whereas the trusting party would be without blame. But if I leave my purse unguarded on the table in a cafe where I know that thefts have occurred, the unreflected trust I have put in my neighbours may well be seen as imprudent and worthy of blame. Whether there is cause for blame when what we existentially trust fails us, is a matter of context and circumstances.¹⁶⁰

One might then ask if there is any distinction between trusting and simply living. Lagerspetz argues against such a conflation of trust and simply living, where the distinction would only amount to assigning different degrees of probability to events. “By saying that I trust a friend I vouch for her against a suspicion which I do not share but which I can recognise as intelligible.” In a similar way existential trust may be characterized as something that we can intelligibly conceive of as trust from a third-person perspective. I think that what can intelligibly be conceived of as existential trust is in the relation between us and that from which we act, without present deliberation, as from an axis that constitutes the stable point of our movements. The characteristic feature of existential trust is that it has a function, the function of bearing on our actions, as something we act from. In the case of knowing existential trust is that from which our knowing is done.

¹⁶⁰ Things may fail us, too, but can of course not be blamed. Let us imagine that on driving my new car homewards I found myself with a steering-wheel that had come loose in my hands. Not being able to steer the car I would probably have an accident. One can say that I had existential trust in the car, or the steering-wheel, and the car failed me. The blame could not be put on the car however, but would have to be put on the manufacturer.
Self-trust and trust in the other

When philosophers have explicitly dealt with questions of trust it has mostly been concerned with what I label explicit trust in others. More fundamental than this explicit trust in others I think is the existential trust one has in oneself, in others and in the world. Epistemologists have shown little interest for this trust that we have in our lived bodies, such as in our ability to perceive.

In Descartes quest for certainty, accompanied by the belief that such a quest would yield truth, perception was one of the things possible to doubt. In his universal doubting he was also doubting himself from an observer’s perspective, doubting the “me” from the “I”, I would say. For him what was left as being impossible to doubt was his own thinking, the “I” that acts (in thinking). That which was impossible to doubt should not be equated with trust on the part of Descartes though. He did not trust that which he could not doubt. On my interpretation, though, Descartes was trusting, existentially trusting, from his ability to form propositional thoughts of doubt, to the doubting. Even more so; he was existentially trusting in his reason to be functioning.

Bertrand Russell also attended to perception in his promotion of knowledge-by-acquaintance as a perceptual infallible source of knowledge. This lack of doubt of Russell’s is still not the same thing as trust for him either, of course.

Trust in ourselves is co-constituted with trust in others as “we are one another’s world” (Løgstrup 1997 [1956], 26). I think that it may be the case—even more so than in the case of interpersonal trust—that it is only after having lost trust or certainty in the embodied aspects of the self, that one becomes aware of the trust one had before.

In philosophical accounts of infants and their trusting, or their coming to trust, or developing a trustful attitude, the aspect of embodiment has

\[161\] I am here thinking of the aspects of the self as subject and as object to itself, the “I” and the “me”, suggested by George Herbert Mead. The “I” acts, whereas the “me” is continually in process in our self-conscious apprehension of ourselves in our continued experiences of ourselves as agents in a world (Mead 1934, 173- pp).
not yet been heeded. Giving more or less detailed accounts of how the infant "learns to turn to the mother for nourishment and comfort" (Lagerspetz 1996, 77), or shows trust "enough to accept offered nourishment" (Baier 1997 [1986], 612), the trust seemingly is concerned with interpersonal trust. The story not told is how the infant comes to trust herself/himself and her/his abilities. The crying that makes nourishment or comfort appear, will be a crying that the child with time comes to trust as a way of expressing a need and getting it fulfilled. Hearing and coming to listen to the comforting voice, the infant will turn it's head in the direction of the sound. This will have the effect of making the child trust in her/his ability to let sound and sight come together through her/his turning of the head. In conjunction with her/his sense of self-agency, s/he will learn that certain things go together. The experiences of self-agency are linked to a concept of invariance "rooted in the infant's awarenesses of regularities with respect to its own body and body movement and with respect to the world and 'the way it works'" (Sheets-Johnstone 1996, 3). As Maxine Sheets-Johnstone suggests:

Were I to verbalize for an infant its invariant if/then experiences, I might begin by saying, not only does it get dark if I close my eyes, but if I cry, someone comes; if I turn my head so, the mobile out there in the room comes into view; . . . . I might continue by remarking that perhaps the most primitive consequential invariant I discovered was in the act of nursing. Making certain buccal movements in relation to the thing in my mouth, I came to expect certain tactile happenings to occur in consequence; namely, a rush of warm fluid in my mouth (Sheets-Johnstone 1996, 4).

So what the child comes to trust then is a certain uniformity that pertains to the world as it comes to be known through her/his actions. Becoming aware of oneself as the author of one's actions (turning my head when I want to), and as a subject that expects certain consequences (it gets dark when I shut my eyes), is interpreted by Sheets-Johnstone in terms of "I can's" and "if/then relationships". What the infant comes to trust then is not only the person that appears when s/he cries, but also the capacity of her/his own body to produce sound that makes that person appear.

In this interaction between the child and her/his environment there is a co-constitution of trust in others and of self-trust. Not only is it the case
that s/he comes to trust others, her/his trust in herself is developed at the same time—not in a parallel and distinct process, but co-constitutively.

Self-trust may be characterized from several perspectives. First of all it concerns a trust in one's ability to act, and one's ability to be. Abilities to act are such as the ability to move, feel, deliberate, speak, make sense of the world, and make sense to others, and so forth. Connected to these abilities are what we can be. We may for example strive to be good, virtuous, and trustful, that is, through habituation develop a character we wish for. Self-trust can be that we trust ourselves to be trustful, or that we think that we can develop such qualities of character that we regard as desirable. Self-trust pertains to the living body acting in, and as part of, the world.

The “self of self-trust”, “the empirical self that runs, walks and swims, reads and writes, cooks and eats, laughs, worries, and loves” (Govier 1993a) may be the self that has not yet had any reason to lose a basic trust in her/himself. Illness, accident, disease or worse violence, rape and torture will shatter the trust that one has as a given.

A person suffering from, for example, multiple sclerosis may lose her/his confidence in whether her/his legs will carry her/him. Someone suffering from a chronic disease such as rheumatoid arthritis, with its unpredictable short- and long-term disease course, will not only have her/his functional capacity affected but also her/his judgements of how well s/he can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations, that is, her/his self-efficacy\(^1\) will be affected. Furthermore s/he will become uncertain with regard to her/his social role and social capacity, as her/his need of support from significant others is felt to be increased as a consequence of the rheumatic disease, and where s/he at the same time may worry about losing this important support.\(^2\) A trust that was formerly there has been altered, brought along by a change of the self and how one conceives of oneself.

An experience of violence inflicted by another person will shatter the existential self-trust, and make visible how the embodied and social aspects of this self-trust is co-constituted. One’s body and one’s perception of it are

\(^1\) Perceived self-efficacy is concerned with judgements of how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations, and influences thought patterns, actions and emotional arousal (Bandura 1977, 1982).

\(^2\) For a phenomenographic study of the everyday life with rheumatoid arthritis, see (Stenström 1993).
essential to how one conceives of oneself, and so is the perception of oneself in relation to others. By way of discussing the nature of trauma and how trauma affects the self, Susan Brison elaborates an account of the relational the self as both “autonomous and socially dependent, vulnerable enough to be undone by violence and yet resilient enough to be reconstructed with the help of empathetic others” (Brison 1997, 12). She claims that “one’s ability to feel at home in the world is as much a physical as an epistemological accomplishment” (18). Drawing on feminist accounts of the self as being formed in relation to others and sustained in a social context, she argues that the study of trauma reveals that “accounts of the embodied self, the self as narrative, and the autonomous self are compatible and complementary” and that each of these aspects of the self is fundamentally relational.

Intentionally inflicted violence that one suffers from another human being destroys not only the trust one has in oneself, but also the trust that one has in the possibility of being oneself in relation to others. It shatters “one’s fundamental assumptions about the world and one’s safety in it”, and “severs the sustaining connection between the self and the rest of humanity” (Brison 1997, 14). Jean Améry writing of his experiences of torture in a Gestapo prison states that: “[w]hoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home in the world. . . . Trust in the world, which already collapsed in part at the first blow, but in the end, under torture, fully, will not be regained” (Améry 1995, 136). Trust in the world, he writes, includes the certainty that

the other person will spare me—more precisely stated, that he will respect my physical, and with it also my metaphysical, being. The boundaries of my body are also the boundaries of my self. My skin surface shields me against the external world. If I am to trust, I must feel on it only what I want to feel.

At the first blow, however, this trust in the world breaks down. The other person, opposite whom I exist physically in the world and with whom I can exist only as long

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164 Brison refers to the works of feminist philosophers such as Annette Baier, Virginia Held, Diana T. Meyers, Sara Ruddick and Naomi Scheman.

165 Studying the relationship between self-images and the constitution of the self, Eva Mark (1998) investigates aspects of the bodily self, the self as narrative and the autonomous self.
as he does not touch my skin surface as border, forces his own corporeality on me with the first blow (Améry 1995, 126).

Améry aptly likens the torture to rape, a sexual act without the consent of one of the two partners. The trust that was there, before the torture, in the other person’s respect of one’s physical and metaphysical being is on a par with Løgstrup’s account of elementary trust. The trust in one’s embodied self and one’s being oneself in relation to others is destroyed with the violence inflicted. In retrospect the trust one had and now has lost is revealed. Annette Baier’s use of the term ‘posthumously’ in connection with trust that is revealed in hindsight, after traumatic events such as rape and torture, is uncannily apt. In the aftermath of trauma survivors may experience a separation from themselves. Susan Brison gives examples of survivors of Nazi death camps who claims to have “died” or “not survived” the camps in spite of their still being alive in some other sense. Through the effects of trauma we see the existential trust that was there and that was lost.

Trust, distrust and authority

Annette Baier does not think that a trustful attitude should always be the case, as there are immoral as well as moral trust relationships. She distinguishes between different forms of trust, and the morally relevant

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166 Sometimes when rape is being discussed, one hears the claim that rape is not (about) sex but (about) violence. This might be seen to be running counter to the reference of Améry’s that rape is a sexual act. I think that the claim, that rape is not about sex but about violence, is true as long as the about is stressed, and one does not deny that, as an act, it is sexual. Sexual should here not be conflated with love or eroticism, as pertaining to sexual love or an amorous temperament. As an act of violence, rape takes the form of a sexual act, which is why it is the worse; sexuality being one of the most intimate parts of life. The sexual act ought to be an act where there is a mutual respect, a respect for one’s physical and metaphysical being, where one knows the other through oneself, and oneself through the other.

I think that one might apply the distinction between form and content in this discussion. Rape is sexual in its form, having violence as its content. A sexual act between mutually consenting and respecting partners would be erotic in its form, being sexual in content.
features they may possess, as to when it would be right to expect or meet trust. Similar to Knud Løgstrup and Sissela Bok, Baier describes us as inhabiting a climate of trust,167 but warns us that exploitation and conspiracy, as much as justice and fellowship may thrive in an atmosphere of trust.

Trust is always an invitation not only to confidence tricksters but also to terrorists, who discern its most easily destroyed and vital forms. Criminals, not moral philosophers, have been the experts at discerning different forms of trust. Most of us notice a given form of trust most easily after its sudden demise or severe injury. We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and notice it as we notice air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted (Baier 1997 [1986], 607).

The relationship between child and parent provides a good example of the asymmetry that there often is in relations that demand trust, albeit implicitly. What should be a mutual knowledge-seeking or -gaining enterprise may prove to be far too authoritarian—a danger most parents have felt when not giving enough room for the acknowledgement of the experiences of the young.

I will give an example of an event that took place when my children were very young.168 As you can easily see our relation was asymmetrical. But even in an asymmetrical relationship the wish to perceive what the other one perceives can be reciprocal.

I was helping my son who had been sitting on the toilet. By the age of three he had learned a lot of our common language, and we shared a lot of experiences, but of course not all.

I began lifting him off the toilet and he said: “Ouch!” So I said: “Why do you say ouch? Were you pinched?” Asking these questions, I was trying to understand what could have happened, and what he could have experienced. Had he been pinched somehow between the toilet seat and the toilet?

“No”, he said after having in thought tried my suggestion to fit his experience with our common conceptual scheme.

167 Baier cites Sissela Bok who states that: “Whatever matters to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives” (Bok 1978, 31).

168 I have used this example earlier in a paper dealing with the relation between the epistemological community and the individual knower (Kalman 1994a).
Then I thought further and remembered that he had been sitting there for a while, so the toilet seat might have clung stickily to the skin of his thighs—something which can produce a tearing sensation when you are getting up. I then asked: “Was there a tearing of the skin of your thighs?”

After having tried this new suggestion to our common conceptual scheme he obviously felt that it fit, as his answer was: “Yes!”

In this example some important features of a mutual knowledge-gaining enterprise are highlighted. First I want to point to the fact that I alone could not have given meaning to, nor have been sure of being accurate about what had happened. Finding the right word was a joint operation. This joint operation will not have to take place in every situation since given common epistemological ground, we can make singular observations.

A second point I would like to make is that both my son and I were directed towards reality. We trusted each other to aim at a mutual understanding of the situation. The general claim that I wish to make here is that not only do we want to compare our perceptions with those that other people have, but also do we want to share, even perceive what the other one perceives.

A third feature of the situation described, is that without reflection we reproduced a lot of our hitherto common body of concepts whilst slightly expanding the body of concepts with what can happen when you sit for a long period of time in the bathroom. Without deliberating to do so, we trusted on that common body to work as an axis, or a point of reference, for our investigation at hand.

A fourth point to be made is that this example shows the amount of responsibility that is being demanded in our, more often than not, asymmetrical relationships. Our being is necessarily social and it is our social nature that makes us, as individuals, possible knowers. Taking care of children, especially infants, often involves the very situation described in the example given above: trying to perceive what a child perceives, you give the child words and concepts. The child on the other hand tries to perceive what you perceive and assimilate the words and concepts, learning what distinctions (in words and perception) matters. The child is socialized into

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169 This can be compared to the *implicit* replication done in a lot of scientific research. That replication in research is done explicitly in some cases, but more often implicitly, as new research is building upon old, is a point made by Adler (1994, 267).
our way of perceiving the world. From the fact of this situation there arises an ethical demand, to assume responsibility for each child’s daring forward to be met.

As was further shown in my example given above, even whilst we are directed towards reality, we are dependent on others in order for us to know something. As Lynn Hankinson Nelson puts it:

My claim is that the knowing we do as individuals is derivative, that your knowing or mine depends on our knowing, for some “we.” More to the point, I will argue that you or I can only know what we know (or could know), for some “we” (1993, 124).

If our perceptions do not fit in with the rest of our body of experience and is not acknowledged by others we may then even loose our mental health, as basic existential trust is thereby shattered. A good example here is the film “Gaslight”, starring Ingrid Bergman and Charles Boyer as a married couple where the husband is trying to drive his wife insane. This is done by making her distrust her perceptions and her memory. When these loose their social and inter-subjective foundation, the wife falls apart mentally.\textsuperscript{170}

To place one’s trust wisely in situations of unequal power requires that one can “differentiate authoritative manifestations of epistemic authority from merely authoritarian ones” writes Code (1991, 185). As none of us can become experts in every area of specialization, we have to place our trust in others, which includes the risk of disempowerment. To minimize that risk one has to try to be well enough informed to know whether and when it is reasonable to place one’s trust in experts. Code claims that that distinction turns upon the competence, the informed and hence justified position of an authoritative expert, contrasted with the power of an authoritarian knower to claim

\textsuperscript{170} Adrienne Rich makes a reference to the film “Gaslight” in her notes concerned with relationships between and among women. She is concerned with the need for a new ethics among women, as part of a feminist politics, where the problem of speech and language are primary.

Women have been driven mad, “gaslighted,” for centuries by the refutation of our experience and our instincts in a culture that validates only male experience. The truth of our bodies and our minds has been mystified to us. We therefore have a primary obligation to each other: not to undermine each other’s sense of reality for the sake of expediency; not to gaslight each other (Rich 1986, note 45).
credibility on the basis of privilege alone or of ideological orthodoxy, rather than on a basis of responsible epistemic practice (1991, 185).

Responsible epistemic practice often includes being fallibilist, being prepared to reconsider and even to reserve judgement. As a vision of how things ought to be improved, I agree with Code, but the problem remains that in situations of unequal power it is often the case that we are not well enough informed, and the choice of reasonably placing our trust in experts is not a choice available to us.171

**Jokes, magic and roller coasters; trusting enough to afford distrust**

Comfortable trust, or ontological security,172 in the world even makes room for distrust as entertainment. Jokes, magic, roller coasters and similar amusements, all depend on our being comfortably trusting and certain enough to have our trust confidently rocked. Confidently, yes, as we do trust these amusements to stay within “comfortable” limits.

In a comfortable certainty of having caught on to some relevant categories of their world, children will early on make jokes by demonstratively putting the “wrong” thing in the “wrong” place, such as putting trousers over the head, mittens on their feet, or the like. On the heels of children’s catching on to words, they will be able to make jokes by consciously using the wrong one. Also will they laugh at verbal jokes made by others. Early jokes of this kind will be for example “misunderstandings”

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171 Patients seeking emergency treatment are often without the choice to choose what person to place their trust in, while at the same time placing their trust in the medical care system. In the case of patients reporting chest pain when admitted to emergency wards an unequal placing of trust manifested as neglect to the disadvantage of female patients, on the part of the medical staff, has been reported in several studies in Western countries. See e.g. (Becker 1990; Schenk-Gustafsson and Orth-Gomér 1992; Wenger, Spero, and Packard 1993). I have discussed this phenomena from an epistemological point of view in (Kalman 1996).

172 I have taken the term ‘ontological security’ from Anthony Giddens, who uses it to refer to a way of “being” or “being-in-the-world”. To him this is an emotional rather than a cognitive phenomenon, rooted in the unconscious. In ontological security there is a confidence in one’s continuity of self-identity, and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action. A sense of the reliability of persons and things is basic to ontological security. As this is also central to a notion of trust, Giddens (1990, 92) sees trust and ontological security to be psychologically closely related.
that older children or grown-ups pretend to have when they hear the "wrong" word, for example if the child asks the other to 'find' something, the other will emphatically say 'grind' or 'bind', and act accordingly. These jokes show an existential trust as they are displayed against a background of vulnerability—that is, there is room for being "wrong", of not having caught on to essential categories of the world.

As in my discussion above on distrust and authority, examples concerning children highlight trust against a background of vulnerability, as their trust in the world is more easily shattered. In her discussion of the horror of survivors of trauma not to be heard, Brison gives us an example of a scene in Ettore Scola's film *La famiglia* (1987). A little boy's uncle pretends not to see him. Beginning as a bit of fun, the game quickly turns into a kind of torture when the man persists long beyond the boy's tolerance for invisibility. "For the child, not to be seen is not to exist, to be annihilated", and similarly in the case of survivors of trauma: "not to be heard means that the self the survivor has become does not exist." As the earlier self has died, "the surviving self needs to be known and acknowledged in order to exist" (Brison 1997, 29).

Jokes among adults are often told and listened to in an attitude of trust. Trust affects the way we listen to and interpret what others do and say. If a person one knows (and trusts in an open-ended way) makes a joke we apprehend as being in "bad taste" we are likely to make allowances.\(^\text{173}\)

The skill of a magician is shown in her/his capacity to make us unthinkingly accept what goes on in front of our eyes. We trust that what we know will still be true: that nothing can come out of nothing, that out of an empty box nothing can appear, and that what disappears must be somewhere near. Still we are there confident that we will be fooled, but not more than a little. That last assumption is one that many magicians take advantage of too, of course. If a magician asks one of the persons in the audience to assist them on the scene the trick on the scene may be followed by a later surprise, such as the magician waving with the wrist-watch of the assistant after the assistant has descended from the scene.

Taking rides in roller coasters and doing bungy jumps is done when we trust that the seeming life-threatening experience will stay within certain limits, in both senses of the word. A choice of these activities is not done by

\(^{173}\) Cf. (Govier 1992, 17).
someone who has lost trust in the living body and the world, but is done by someone who trusts.

Certainty and action

For an account of existential trust, we apparently need to look more closely at the certainty with which the “self of self-trust” acts, the everyday self that runs, walks, and so forth. In her discussion of Wittgenstein’s work on certainty, Elizabeth Wolgast describes the kind of certainty that we show in the complete confidence of our actions, as ‘not-doubting’.\(^{174}\) When we step out, we do not examine the ground first to check that it has not become soft as oatmeal. We simply do not doubt, and this certainty belongs to our form of life, and not to a conclusion based on reasoning (Wolgast 1987, 154-5).

We are here concerned with a kind of knowing one’s way about. When we do not doubt the ground before our door, we might reply to a sceptic that we do know that the ground will hold, thereby implying that we would be bewildered if what we claimed was not confirmed.\(^{175}\) If we were to be bewildered, this would be shown in our behaviour. Wittgenstein makes several remarks on certainty to the effect that actions, rather than words, are its expression.

The emphasis on certainty with Wittgenstein is on something that pertains to human beings in action as Mats Furberg points out. In a Platonic-Cartesian tradition (well-founded) certainty is the lack of doubt. For Wittgenstein certainty is a lack of hesitation. Certainty is to act without hesitation, and without being at loss about what to do (Furberg 1994, 151). This is the reason for Wittgenstein referring to comfortable certainty as “a form of life” or as “something animal”, and beyond being justified or unjustified (Wittgenstein 1979 [1969], § 358-9). These remarks on certainty in a way point back to earlier remarks of Wittgenstein on justification, as some requests for justification can be answered, whereas

\(^{174}\) Wolgast’s article deals mostly with Wittgenstein’s book On Certainty, but addresses other of his writings as well.

\(^{175}\) Cf. (Wittgenstein 1979 [1969], § 355).
others can not, and where justifications have to come to an end somewhere.\footnote{Wol gast (1987, 152) remarks on this connection between Wittgenstein's writing on justification and certainty, in Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, respectively.}

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (Wittgenstein 1979 [1969], § 217)

Language and practice are not independent of one another. When we are born into a form of life, we do not only come to be part of, and appropriate, this form of life but also the language-game(s) that is/are tied to this/these form(s) of life. So to refer to some things as what we "simply do" is not to recede to a domain outside of language, as what we do is connected with language. Rather the reference is made as this kind of certainty is independent of the language-game of justification.\footnote{This is a point also made by Wol gast (1987, 153).}

The lack of need of justification shown in references to things we simply do, as the basis for the phenomenon of certainty, is not to give up on the possibility of politically challenging such certainties. According to Naomi Schem an we can, in Wittgenstein's later writing, find alternatives to the unreflected acceptance of our practices, through an attendance "to those aspects of our practices that are critical and transformative, that are, as much as the unreflective following of a rule, part of what 'we do'" (Schem an 1996, 403). The existential trust, the certainty of our actions, the lack of hesitation, does not automatically make these actions all right as they are. The certainty pertains to how they make sense or are conceivable within a form of life.

Wol gast brings forth the contrast Wittgenstein makes between 'comfortable certainty' and a certainty that is still 'struggling'.

§357 One might say: "'I know' expresses \textit{comfortable} certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling." (Wittgenstein 1979 [1969])

The certainty that is 'still struggling' is one that is a part of our language game of certainty and then (at least implicitly) of doubting, such as when we reason about why or how we can know or trust something, that is when
we start to think about justification. The 'comfortable certainty' is a feature of existential trust, a comfortable certainty from which we act.

I think this contrast between struggling and comfortable certainty elucidates a difference between an "explicit" and an existential trust in knowing. Once we start making assertions about that which we have comfortable certainty of, we transform it, endow it with a different status. Wolgast argues that to assert certainty, comfortable or not, is to bring it into the arena of the certainty language-game. She illustrates this with one of Wittgenstein's remarks:

When one hears Moore say "I know that that's a tree", one suddenly understands those who think that that has by no means been settled . . .

It is as if "I know" did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis (Wittgenstein 1979 [1969], § 481-2).

In the course of being asserted the proposition changes from comfortable to struggling certainty, and the issue is in "restless condition". A characteristic of the comfortable certainty is it's "lack of evidence", and this is precisely what makes it indefensible in the struggling certainty. "'I know' doesn't tolerate being taken out of its ordinary language game, you might say; yet this is precisely what Wittgenstein, like Moore, attempted to do" (Wolgast 1987, 157).

I would like to point here to the functional relation of tacit knowing again. Acting from comfortable certainty, is the attending to something, from this comfortable certainty. Expressing a comfortable certainty verbally, even talking about such certainties without the aim of bringing them into the working discourse, has the effect of bringing them into the language game of struggling certainty. We begin to attend to them instead of from them. When we act in comfortable certainty, we are acting trustingly from something. To assert it verbally turns out to be another kind of act, it is a

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178 Still an existential trust may well have been of the 'struggling' kind earlier, as when we are learning something new, not yet relying on (or rather in!) this new knowledge in further action (which might of course be the action of thinking from a new theory that one has apprehended).

179 Cf. with Wittgenstein's remark following his reference to "This is simply what I do," in Philosophical Investigations, § 217: "Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing".
speech-act that is directed to what is being asserted, and is "expected" in our language-game of asserting to be asserted from some kind of evidence. The "evidence" from which we are supposed to assert then is nothing more than the comfortable certainty that we were about to assert! And in this indirect way of questioning it, it becomes a certainty that is still (and certainly!) struggling.

**Trust and fallible knowledge**

That our epistemic situation cannot be adequately described if divorced from our relations to other people is a point made by several philosophers.\(^{180}\) I would even claim that our individual epistemic situation is not even conceivable without an acknowledgement of the way we know as derivative of what a larger community knows. Existential trust is fundamental to knowing, and for making deliberations that are part of rational judgement. We do not judge it rational to trust implicitly, instead our capacity for making rational judgement about, for example, trust is contingent on existential trust in ourselves and others.\(^{181}\)

My suggestion that trust is an epistemological category is to a certain extent Wittgensteinian in spirit, as he promoted a certainty that was lack of hesitation as a reasonable replacement to the certainty that was equated with lack of doubt, and that was supposed to lead to truth. To trust is to take something as being certain and thus to be able to act, but this does not entail that this trust is regarded as an infallible source for gaining knowledge. Certainty, in the case of trusting, is expressive of lack of hesitation for agents, whereas the quest for certainty was aimed at finding foundations for, or sources of, knowledge that cannot be doubted, which is quite a different thing.

In the quest for infallible sources to knowledge within epistemology, observation and reason have been the major options discussed. Empiricism has opted for the former and rationalism for the latter. Bertrand Russell

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\(^{180}\) Such as Wittgenstein (1979 [1969]) and Dewey (1950), and stressing the importance of trust are e.g. Hertzberg (1988) and Lagerspetz (1996).

\(^{181}\) Lagerspetz (1996, 3) criticizes philosophers whom he thinks have put the cart before the horse, through their writing of the rationality of trust.
invoked observation as an infallible source, when he promoted knowledge by acquaintance as the source of knowledge that all else falls back on.\textsuperscript{182} Descartes' epistemological project had reason as the infallible source. As trust is so obviously fallible, no one in either tradition (empiricist or rationalist) has claimed it to be a source of knowledge, nor has it been seen as a concept for epistemological considerations.

With a focus on man in action, and practical knowledge as paradigm knowledge, it is possible to speak of trust though. With a focus on knowing as an activity and promoting the role of trust, one does not aim for guaranteed certainty and eternal truths, but rather admits to the fallible nature of knowledge.

What we often trust, or rely on without questioning, is our background knowledge. This reliance has often been acknowledged by philosophers, but there is not much agreement on whether this is something positive, negative, or merely something unproblematic. Nor is there any agreement on the extent to which we do it.

There is, for example, a divide between those who regard our reliance on our background knowledge as something problematic, and between those who regard it as something that we have to accept, if only for the time being. Karl Popper is of the latter opinion and he states that

\[\text{[t]he fact that, as a rule, we are at any given moment taking a vast amount of traditional knowledge for granted (for almost all our knowledge is traditional) creates no difficulty for the falsificationist or fallibilist. For he does not accept this background knowledge; neither as established nor as fairly certain, nor yet as probable. He knows that even its tentative acceptance is risky, and stresses that every bit of it is open to criticism, even though only in a piecemeal way (Popper 1965, 238).}\]

Background knowledge, with Popper, is not to be relied upon. It is something that has to be tested and questioned. Our problem is to question the right bit as we cannot test all of our background knowledge at the same time. All criticism of background knowledge must be piecemeal as it would be impossible to challenge all of our assumptions at the same time. That is, on Popper's account we can test them distributively, one at a time, but not

\textsuperscript{182} "All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation" (Russell 1912 [1951], 48).
collectively, all at the same time. He would on the other hand not want us to start from scratch every time; “Were we to start the race from where Adam started, I know of no reason why we should get any further than Adam did” (Popper 1965, 238). He recognizes that fruitful discussions of a problem have to rely on the acceptance of a considerable amount of common background knowledge. Still Popper recognizes how the uncritical acceptance of some shared background knowledge can be responsible for some of the difficulties a party has in the solving of a problem. Those shared background assumptions are namely that which can give rise to some of the very problems one has set out to solve.

On Popper’s account our investigations would proceed better in methodological aspects if we were not always testing our hypotheses together with the sum of, or large chunks of, our theoretical system. Testing hypotheses together with chunks of our theoretical system makes it difficult for us to know which one of the ingredients we should blame for a falsification. Stressing the importance of letting “every bit of our traditional knowledge (and even our inborn knowledge)” be open to critical examination and run the risk of being overthrown, he nevertheless admits that “without tradition, knowledge would be impossible” (Popper 1965, 28).

Hans-Georg Gadamer gives a more positive view of background knowledge and tradition. He claims that not only is it the case that we are always located within a situation and harbouring a body of assumptions when we engage in inquiry, but also that it is only in a situation like this that we can use reason, and engage in the act, or participate in the event, of understanding. Linda Martín Alcoff, in her reading of Gadamer’s Truth and Method, states that “[o]n Gadamer’s view, the maintenance of prejudice, which is simply a form of prejudgment or judgment prior to the process of inquiry that informs that process, is an act consistent with reason” (Alcoff 1996, 26).

My position with regard to an existential trust in background knowledge will be as a pragmatist crammed between Popper and Gadamer. Every time we doubt some part of our background knowledge, we always have to trust some other part of it. Gadamer highlights our need for trust in some background knowledge, and the impossibility of global doubt. Popper on the other hand highlights the need for doubt, not the least for doubt of those things we often take for granted as global trust is impossible, even
madness. The way we do trust our background knowledge, acting from it as what we trust as true, is not only the way we happen to do it, but it is rational as our epistemic endeavours would otherwise start from zero every time.\textsuperscript{183} Still it is the case that even those things we most trust as true can, and should at times, be scrutinized.\textsuperscript{184}

One of the insights of pragmatism is that one can be both fallibilistic and anti-sceptical. Doubt, for a pragmatist, requires as much justification as belief, and at the same time s/he holds that "there are no metaphysical guarantees to be had that even our most firmly-held beliefs will never need revision" (Putnam 1995, 20-1). As Wittgenstein reminds us: "One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need" (Wittgenstein 1967 [1953], § 108). Sometimes the need is to scrutinize the most basic of our assumptions, such as, for example, those assumptions hidden in the concepts of our language, or in the praxis of our everyday lives.

**Trusting testimony and testifier**

Closely connected to the concept of trust is the concept of testimony. The concept of testimony has recently been put into epistemological focus by C.A.J. Coady.\textsuperscript{185} Starting from the view that most of our knowledge

\textsuperscript{183} That global doubt is not a question of mere impossibility, but rather the way we judge our not-doubting as being rational, and how this judgement is connected to our agency in this world is pointed out by Wittgenstein (1979 [1969]).

\textsuperscript{184} Dewey moves back and forth between labelling earlier interpretations of experiences, that continue to influence our understanding of present events, as being sources of enrichment, or as being causes of distortion. This may seem ambiguous. The ambiguity is deliberate though, as he, according to Seigfried, thinks that "we ought to reflect, continually and critically, on these inheritances" (Seigfried 1997, 157).

\textsuperscript{185} See also (Welbourne 1993).

\begin{align*}
\text{§ 231.} \quad & \text{If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I} \\
& \quad \text{should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person} \\
& \quad \text{would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{§ 232.} \quad & \text{"We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt} \\
& \quad \text{them all."}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
& \text{Wouldn't it be more correct to say: "we do not doubt them all".}
& \text{Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.}
\end{align*}

See also (Furberg 1994, 154-5).
ultimately rests on the testimony of others, Coady questions whether what we have on the testimony of others should be judged epistemically less certain than what we have from our own reason, observation and memory. Were we to cleanse our memory of what we have from the testimony of others to retain what is independent of testimony and accessible to each individual's powers of reason, memory and observation, there would be close to nothing left. He points out that much of what passes for observation is already enriched by the testimony of other people (Coady 1992).

This is the case whether we are concerned with what we usually take to be unproblematically known in our everyday practices, or concerned with scientific knowing. We always rely on other people to a certain extent. A large part of our knowing we have from others, on trust. But this knowing does not only concern the data from which our reasoning proceeds, when engaged in scientific research or in our everyday life. Science is obviously a communal achievement and the underlying interpretation inherent in the concepts used when reporting data cannot be neatly separated from the verification of these reported observations. We do not learn a language first and then start testing the truth of each and every claim we hear. Learning the language encompasses a large body of assertions about the world that we take on trust. It would be impossible to take the language apart from those assertions. Inherent in the language learning we even get to know how to assess other people's statements as true or false. "[A]n attitude of trust on the part of the child precedes and makes possible the acquisition of language and . . . it is this attitude of trust which should figure prominently in a causal account of our present attitude towards testimony" (Coady 1992, 115).

Would it in principle be possible to justify testimony? Were it possible to show that we are wrong to make a practice of trusting people, at least in principle, a justification of testimony might succeed, according to Coady. But he thinks that to show that we are wrong in trusting people is a goal that is unattainable, not merely in practice, but also in principle. If knowledge is seen as a building with foundations then testimony is part of

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186 See also what Bertil Rolf, concerned with the development of professional competence and the possibility of professional discourse, writes of the importance of trust and confidence for the possibility of a hand over of tradition (Rolf 1995, chap. 9).

187 Compare with Wittgenstein's remark: "If I don't trust this evidence why should I trust any evidence" (1979 [1969], § 672)?
the foundations, he thinks. Working in the tradition of the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, Coady’s claim is that human knowledge is built on trust, and learning from others is epistemologically as basic an operation of the human mind as observing, remembering and reasoning. This is a claim similar to Wittgenstein’s stress on how we first have to trust our parents (or whoever might be the caretaker) in order for us to later be able to doubt things, and to take part in the language-game of doubting.188

Another thing often trusted in, besides background knowledge and testimony, is vicarious experience. The question is: should we from an epistemological point of view be judged to be less certain in trusting background knowledge, vicarious experience and testimony, than in trusting what we have from our own perception and memory? I will discuss an example of knowing below to argue for trust as an important epistemological concept that makes it possible to have knowledge that is trusted-as-true as a third part, apart from perception and memory, of a larger epistemological schema.

Vicarious experience and extended testimony
Let us imagine that I know that there are steep stairs behind a door. Knowing this, from earlier experience, would make me open the door more cautiously than I would have had it been a “regular” door leading to another room. My earlier experience would have initiated a state of knowing—where my altered state would make me open the door more cautiously than I would have done otherwise. My knowing that there are steep stairs behind the door affects my knowing how to move about that room and that door.

My knowing that there are steep stairs behind the door is not necessarily connected to any of my own earlier experiences, though. It might be a case of vicarious experience or understanding. As Russell Keat and John Urry write, humans “have the capacity to extend the range of their own experiences as a result, for example, of the perceptive and sensitive presentation to them of other people’s experiences.” This may be the case when we, for example, read novels, poetry and drama, or for that matter see

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188 One of Wittgenstein’s remarks to this effect: “I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say “can trust something”)” (1979 [1969], § 509).
films and plays. From this they distinguish a sense of ‘understanding’ that they label ‘vicarious experiential understanding’, as it is closely related to experiential understanding. By this they claim that we “not only know other people’s subjective states, but are somehow able to understand them in the sort of way that we would if we had previously had similar experiences ourselves” (Keat and Urry 1975, 169).

Let us then imagine that I just heard a terrible story from someone who, whilst visiting the same room, once happened to open that very door behind which there are steep stairs and who fell down those stairs and hurt himself terribly. I would be on edge from having heard that story. I might imagine that I could fall down those stairs, too. This would make me open that door more cautiously than I would have, had I not heard the story.

Let us continue on the line that this is the first time ever that I open that door. My knowing that there are steep stairs behind it could also stem from the reading of a warning sign. Through my reading of the warning sign I got some ‘orientation information’, that was provided by others. Coady claims that the kind of testimony that we get from the reading of warning signs, destination markers on buses, and author attribution on the title-page of a book, and so forth, are institutional testimonies that can be likened to frozen speech acts. They are all instances of extended testimony (Coady 1992, 48-51).

The first example given above (hearing about the one falling) involves a knowing that stems from vicarious experience. The second involves a knowing that stems from one kind of extended testimony. These examples could be challenged as to whether they could pass as justified, true beliefs—the common definition of propositional knowledge. But adhering only to a severe “justified-true-belief”-scheme would actually leave us not knowing anything in the present, as we would never be able to agree on the truth of any of our present beliefs but afterwards. This is where a knowledge that is “trusted-as-true” enters the scene.

If we again consider the case where my knowing rested on my own earlier experiences, then that kind of knowing would not necessarily be true either. In this case the house might have been rebuilt, and there could be a wall behind the door, or a cupboard. What I learn from others is generally considered less certain than the claims that I can accept on the testimony of my perception and reason. Olli Lagerspetz, when investigating the tacit demand for trust and respect in human encounters, connects to the ideas of
Coady. He claims that the testimonies of others are on the post-Cartesian account, something “whose veracity I can only assume, and only to the extent that they are compatible with my own perception. If then, my perception is fallible, what I learn from others is one more remove away from absolute certainty” (Lagerspetz 1996, 75). But the traditional view actually distorts what is usually meant by rationality. Often it is the case that it is “rational to believe in the testimony of others rather than one’s own perception”, and a “standard way of establishing the accuracy of our perceptions and memories is by comparing them with the testimonies of others” (Lagerspetz 1996, 75). Coady gives the example of Jones ‘seeing’ an old friend at the end of a corridor, and later telling others that she saw him, only to be told that the friend could not have been in the building, because he had left for foreign parts two days earlier. When she first ‘saw’ her friend she may have been utterly persuaded that she saw him, but as Coady claims, “there are surely circumstances in which such conviction is rationally undermined by the testimony of others” (Coady 1992, 148). This way of establishing the accuracy of our memory and perceptions is actually an important part of how we learn.

Trust in science—knowing institutionalized
Trust in connection with scientific activity has been dealt with from two differing approaches. The first approach deals with trust as explicit, and the second with trust as existential.

Explicit trust is most often discussed in connection with testimony, where the trust or trustworthiness is or can be more or less questioned. The debate on explicit trust in epistemic matters may also be led in terms of strategic trust, where scientific co-operation is an example. The co-operation would on such an account not require trust in the moral sense, but trusting each other will be prudent as it “pays” in the long run.189 Ideas of trust as prudent, as paying-off, are criticized by Annette Baier who sees the ‘male fixation on contract’, and the “domination of contemporary moral philosophy by the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma problem” as displaying an

189 A critical account of arguments that deal with trust as ‘strategic’, with reference to scientific co-operation, is given by Hardwig (1991, 702-6).
obsession with moral relations between minimally trusting, minimally trustworthy adults who are equally powerful” (Baier 1997 [1986], 620).

What I label existential trust, as it is a trust that is not spelled out or questioned, is a concern of several authors. John Hardwig, similarly with Knud Løgstrup and Annette Baier, likens the role of trust in knowledge to the air we breathe (Baier 1997 [1986]; Hardwig 1991; Løgstrup 1997 [1956]). Jonathan Adler (1994) in his criticism of Hardwig thinks that this is to overstate the significance of trust, as we can still doubt and reason about the amount of trust we put into something. Adler seems to fail to notice that there are two different types of trust being discussed. When he introduces doubt and reasoning about trust he is not discussing the same kind of trust that Hardwig is concerned with. What is at issue is trust as described by Olli Lagerspetz where trust from the perspective of the agent actually entails that the risk of betrayal is not an issue (as it may be from an observer’s perspective). Once the risk of betrayal is invoked, that kind of trust is not there.

Interestingly though, Adler proves his point by introducing a distinction between foreground and background. The foreground, as the focus of attention, he claims to highlight “the information seeker who must rely upon the word of his informant”. The background, which is often out of focus when the role of trust is being discussed in connection with testimony, Adler claims to supply “an enormous, if hardly noticed, critical foundation for the seeker” (1994, 265). His point is that even though there are a lot of things that we come to know through the testimony of others, this does not entail that most of our knowledge is sustained by testimony in the long run. There are a lot of other sources which come into play and that supply additional grounds, once testimony is accepted. Thus Adler in a way does support Hardwig’s claim, as to what concerns the background, as he grants that we do not investigate the credibility of testimony first, and as he acknowledges that we have “an enormous warrant for an act of accepting testimony.”

In chains of communication sensitive to failures of past claims to truth, the present ease of communication and reliance upon the words of others reveals the workings of a far-reaching, epistemic division of labor. This vast knowledge, which we freely borrow, is obscured by the focus on a single act of testimony. Instead, we should view any act of testimony diachronically, as a moment in an ongoing process which has
shaped and guided our own participation in it, providing resources for critical judgment (Adler 1994, 268).

In the discussion of trust within philosophy of science there is often a gliding between a focus on trust as being explicit, where we reason about whether we can trust or not, and a focus on existential trust, where we without thought rely on something or someone.

Conclusions on testimony and trust

In the discussion above I have addressed questions about testimony and trust. This was done to show that my knowing that there are steep stairs behind that door can be taken to be “good-enough” knowing, whether it is on the “testimony” of my own experience, or on the testimony of others, as there is no difference in kind between my knowing in this case and what we otherwise refer to as knowing. My knowing this is fallible, but so is all our knowledge. So to continue with Lagerspetz:

rational judgment involves, in some sense, the acceptance of various beliefs that one takes on trust. This taking on trust will not in its turn be based on reasoning since it is itself the background of reasoning. Putting it temporally: before we can learn the use of our rational faculties we must start by not questioning what our parents and educators tell us (Lagerspetz 1996, 76).

Knowing on this account is a readiness to believe certain things, and does not fit a “justified-true-belief”-scheme. That scheme would have to be supplemented by a scheme of knowing labelled “trusted-as-true”.

Stressing what we trust as true is not a way of doing away with justification. As M.F. Burnyeat comments on Coady’s claim:

[j]ustification has to come to an end somewhere. There have to be reasons for which no further reasons need be given. In the appropriate circumstances ‘I saw it with my own eyes’ can serve as such a reason. So can ‘I remember,’ or ‘It follows from what we already know.’ Coady’s claim, . . ., is that the ultimate reason is often: ‘That’s what I
was told.’ Without such expressions of trust human life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and ignorant (Burnyeat 1993, 31).

Seeing “trusted-as-true” as part of what knowing is, changes the previously given picture of background knowledge as almost a necessary evil. Background knowledge on a “trusted-as-true” account of knowing is something else and more important than what is usually recognized.

If we take someone to be a source of knowledge, then a warrant of hers/his will be taken as an imparting of knowledge. In such a case our focus is not on weighing evidence or on reasoning to the effect that we believe her/his testimony. Rather it is taken to be a question of whether we believe the testifier. We are not treating the warrant as if it were nothing but reliable evidence. In the background knowledge that we have on trust, we have relations to other people, and this is something positive and it is rational. It is part of our existential trust.

If I claim that “I know that there are steep stairs behind that door”, basing this claim on what I have seen, what I remember, or what I take on trust from somebody, my knowing this is fallible. The truth of what I say might be contested—whether I really think that I am justified in claiming to know this—or whether I am just kidding you; about the stairs or about my trusting their existence to be true. But when I claim to know this, truthfully, I do so because I feel justified to trust my claim to be true. So it is not only a question of whether the states of affairs described are true or not, but whether I am justified in trusting them as true. Then other people’s testimony can be seen as justifiable as a ground for a claim to know, and sometimes even more than what I have observed on my “own”.

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190 This is a point argued by Michael Welbourne (1979).
I have argued that existential trust is an epistemological category. It does not have to be the case that one trusts knowingly, in the case of existential trust. Existential trust is what we habitually disregard in acts of knowing. What we have come to trust in earlier situations may be part of our knowing, or coming to know later. For this reason I will elaborate on knowing in relation to time below. This elaboration connects to the way we can conceive of knowing as a state, with dispositions to act with respect to relevant circumstances, modifying our actions through the acquired state. I distinguish The linguistic recognition of ‘know’ as being a state verb, is distinguished from the activity of knowing as being logically prior to such descriptions.

Knowing in time

Coming to know in the process of living is an effort that may be approached from different perspectives, depending on whether stress is put on intrinsic values or on extrinsic, namely instrumental ends. Depending on the perspective we get different accounts of how knowing is regarded with respect to time, and what a discrimination between present, past and future implies. The two possibilities, extrinsic and intrinsic values, do not exclude each other, though. The joy of a child who learns the alphabet by heart, show us the intrinsic value of learning to recite from memory, and we also know instrumental ends to which this knowledge is a means, such as
when we trustingly attend from the alphabet to finding books in libraries, reference lists, and so forth.191

Dewey, in line with his deflationary practice with regard to dichotomies, criticizes a view of education where the acquisition of knowledge is seen as being acquired only for future use and future enjoyment (Dewey 1950, 146). Such a view of education fails to signify the present as the important thing in education—instead it signifies the future, he claims. In this "future-signifying" account there is a certain kind of discrimination between present, past and future.

A more subtle suggestion of what might be presupposed and involved with regard to time is put forth in the alternative view Dewey suggests where "growing, or the continuous reconstruction of experience," is the only end. Thus the acquisition of skill, and the possession of knowledge are not ends, but marks of growth and means to its continuing (Dewey 1950, 146).

In this Deweyan version of knowing I see the notion of time as imbedded in the processual character of knowledge-attainment. It is also discernible in the relation between a present coming-to-know or knowing now, and the future. Knowledge attained now is not only something to be had for later use, instead there is a continuous moving forward. With the attainment of knowledge the subject of knowing is changed. Therefore a coming-to-know can be described as a mark of growth. At the same time the coming-to-know is a means to the continuation of growth, as the knowledge attained now is part of the process of knowing or coming to know later.

Knowing on such an account is a highly determinable state, ranging from dispositions such as skills. Ryle warns against a conflation of single-track, that is determinate, dispositions of things such as the brittleness of a glass or such as the human habit of smoking, with higher-grade, or determinable, dispositions such as knowing and believing (Ryle 1949, 43-4).

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191 Whether all knowledge should (continue to) be seen as having intrinsic value is a question raised by Nelson (1994).
Knowing as a state

. . . states, that puzzling category in which the role of verb melts into that of a predicate, and actions fade into qualities and relations (Vendler 1967, 109).

Focus on knowing, is a focus on the verb ‘to know’ in a specific tense. Zeno Vendler in “Verbs and Times” points out that the very fact that verbs have tenses indicate “that considerations involving the concept of time are relevant to their use.” Not only does this entail the obvious discrimination between present, past and future, but “the use of a verb may also suggest the particular way in which that verb presupposes and involves the notion of time” (Vendler 1967, 97).

In the discussion of verbs and their tenses, Vendler compares ‘knowing’ to other verbs like running, writing, and working. These other verbs possess continuous tenses, whereas ‘knowing’ does not. So the question “What are you doing?” might be answered by “I am running” (or writing, or working, etc.), but not by “I am knowing”. On the other hand we can ask “Do you know . . .?”, to which an appropriate answer would be “Yes, I do.” But to the question “Do you run?” the answer “Yes, I do.” could not be given unless a very different meaning of running was involved. The question might, e.g. be asked to determine whether one was the kind of person to include running in one’s general program of becoming fit. The difference between verbs that possess and verbs that lack continuous tenses, “suggests that running, writing, and the like are processes going on in time, that is, roughly, that they consist of successive phases following one another in time”, whereas knowing and its kin do not consist of successive phases following one another in time.

Let us begin with the group of verbs that admit continuous tenses. First we have activity verbs, such as running, where if it is the case that the activity stops the next moment it will still be true that the person did run before. A man who is running, lifts up his right leg one moment, drops it the next, then lifts his other leg, drops it, and so on. Whether he stops now or later on we still would be able to claim that he has been running. Within the group of verbs that admit continuous tenses there are also accomplishment
verbs that involve something that has to be finished. Drawing a circle for example necessarily involves the finishing of the circle for the precedent drawing to be called “drawing a circle”.

So concepts of activities such as running, calls for periods of time, not unique nor defined. Accomplishments on the other hand, such as drawing a circle, imply the notion of unique and definite time periods (Vendler 1967, 99-100).

Let us now turn to the group of verbs that do not admit continuous tenses, such as knowing. In the case that I know geography now, Vendler claims that it does not mean “that a process of knowing geography is going on at present consisting of phases succeeding one another in time.” Even though ‘knowing’ lacks continuous tenses, that is, it does not indicate processes going on in time, ‘knowing’ can still be predicated of a subject for a given time. We can know something for a long or a short period of time. This Vendler contrasts to verbs that can be predicated only for single moments of time, such as ‘reach’ in “At what time did you reach the top? At noon sharp.” The latter he calls ‘achievement terms’, whereas ‘knowing’ is a ‘state term’. Achievements occur at a single moment, whereas states last for a period of time. At a quick glance achievements might sound very similar to accomplishments, but the ‘reaching’ of the top is not something going on all the way through the climb, such as the drawing of the circle goes on through the full circle. The top is reached at a single moment (Vendler 1967, 102-3). The circle is closed, though, at a single moment.

One might ask whether dispositions are tied to that which we achieve, or that which we accomplish? If we tie dispositions to achievements, then they are infinitely varied. Think, e.g., of all the ways in which we may save a person’s life. We may then refer to the disposition to save lives as to an achievement-oriented disposition. Swimming on the other hand cannot be done in so many ways. The disposition to swim might rather be referred to as an accomplishment-oriented disposition.

Vendler suggests that a comparison between achievement concepts and state concepts according to time schemata can be made from another angle. Such a comparison will reveal whether the time periods implied by the verbs are unique and definite time instants or instants in an indefinite and nonunique sense.

An illustration of an achievement shows us how unique and definite time instants are involved. It could be the referral to a known person like
Gun de Svan winning an Olympic gold medal somewhere between two and two-thirty p.m. today, where the time instant at which Gun de Svan won that race is between two and two-thirty.

With regard to states Vendler gives us an example of somebody loving somebody else. One could say “Humphrey loved Laureen from the spring they met until he died”. In this case the meaning is that at any instant between “the spring they met” and the time at which he died Humphrey loved Laureen. Thus achievements (e.g. winning a race) involve unique and definite time instants, whereas “states [e.g. loving somebody] involve time instants in an indefinite and nonunique sense” (Vendler 1967, 106-7).

Let me now compare what Vendler has written about loving as a state, with knowing as a state. Does “knowing something” also involve time instants in an indefinite and nonunique sense, meaning that at any instant in a given time period (that might last a lifetime) the person in question knew that something? Consider the example “From the summer she attended the swimming school she knew how to swim.” In this case the girl obviously is not indefinitely in the water swimming, but instead the meaning of it is that from that summer she had the know-how to swim, she could apply this know-how at a number of instances, not defined or unique. She will have the disposition to apply her know-how at a number of instances, where the circumstances are that she is in water. These considerations are in my opinion clear aspects of the state sense of knowing as described by Vendler, that is knowing of this kind involves time instants in an indefinite and nonunique sense.

I would claim that there is more to the question of what a state-sense of knowing is though, than this disposition to apply her know-how to swim. Her knowing also changes the way she perceives water, in those instances where she is not applying her know-how. It means that from that summer on, having learned to swim, her way of seeing, sensing and thinking about the water element has changed. Walking by the sea, or on a river bank will be another walking than before, as her ability to swim in that element affects her way of seeing the water, that is, her experience of the water element is changed. We can also expect metaphorical projections from the sociophysical domain of dealings with water, to similar domains constituted
by other liquids, or "almost-liquids." Thus her ability to swim in water may affect the way she acts if she is thrown into jelly, or at least the way she thinks about this possibility. In the state sense of knowing, the way the girl orients herself towards the water, in any instance of encountering it, has changed. Obviously the knowing here is not "only" to have a disposition to apply the know-how of swimming when in water. So in the state sense of knowing there is a change in her perception. The change in her perception is present in a lot of other situations than when she is applying her know-how to swim. This feature of knowing I describe as *orientation*.

In the example above I used an instance of *knowing how*. A case of *knowing that* should also be tried. The knowing in "I know that my father is dead" shows that *knowing that* also involves time instants in an indefinite and nonunique sense, as a knowing of this kind clearly involves a different way of orienting oneself. Coming to know that one's father is dead begins a state of knowing, that also connects to the notion of knowing as *orientation* mentioned above. One orients oneself differently than before—from another conception of oneself as a daughter/son, towards a dead father instead of a living one, and so forth.

**The initiation of a state sense of knowing**

Vendler further discerns the difference between the insight sense of knowing like in "And then I suddenly knew" or "Now I know it!" and the state sense of knowing. The insight sense sounds like an achievement, and Vendler fits the insight sense into that category.

Yet it would be a mistake to think that this kind of knowing is related to the state sense in the way that catching dogs is related to the specific state of dogcatchers. A

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192 Compare this with what is written on metaphorical projections, on pp. 76-7 and how a metaphor can be said to function like a theory.
193 Observant (probably female) readers may already have recognized the origin of this example of connecting swimming in water with swimming in jelly. It is taken from a high school dinner conversation in *Daddy-Long-Legs* (Webster 1966 [1912]).
194 See e.g. Martha Nussbaum (1997, 204) writing on herself travelling towards the death-bed of her mother, and how the about-ness of her emotions of fear and grief encompassed a perception of herself and her own life: as threatened in the one case and as bereft in the other.
little reflection shows that they are related rather as getting married (achievement) is
to being married (generic state). This is best shown in an example. Suppose someone
is trying to solve a problem in mathematics. Suddenly he cries out “Now I know it!”
After ten minutes he explains the solution to me. Obviously he still knows it, which
means that no flashes of understanding are necessary for him to explain it. Indeed, so
long as he knows it (in a state sense), it is logically impossible that he will “know” it (in
an achievement sense). *Now I know it!* indicates that he did not know before (Vendler
1967, 112).

Thus “knowing” cannot, according to Vendler, be taken as meaning “to
start knowing”. That would be a mistake, as it would make us think that
“just as to start running begins the activity of running, to start knowing
begins the activity of knowing.” It does not make sense to say “to start
knowing”, as it is “not the beginning of an activity but the beginning of a
state” (Vendler 1967, 112). To come to know something then is an
achievement that initiates the state of knowing.

I do not think that all states of knowing are such that they are initiated
by achievements such as insights, though. An achievement such as the one
described by Vendler is like a terminal point. A sudden insight to how a
mathematical problem can be solved might resemble that, of course. But all
insights are not as conclusive in character as the insight described above.
Sometimes we have to find things out a couple of times, achieving them
over and over again, before we could claim it to be an overall state of
knowing something. Even the knowing of two plus two equalling four, is
an insight children have to achieve over and over again before knowing it
by heart. It is also the case that when one realizes something one can still
turn out to be wrong, also in one’s own terms, as one thinks the solution
over again. One does not even have to be wrong as insights may be modified
and altered, as is the case with hermeneutical work. Still the “first” insight
may be taken to start a state sense of knowing, a state that is subsequently
altered.

Can states be qualified as actions then? As to this question Vendler
answers in the negative. He states that “one cannot know, . . . deliberately or
carefully, and none of us can be accused of, or held responsible for having
‘done’ so either.” Knowing is simply not “done” or “performed” (Vendler
1967, 106). I aim to address and refute this claim of Vendler’s, that
knowing does not qualify as an action, below.
States and dispositions

Identifying knowing as a state, as does Vendler, is not enough. His example of knowing geography, and mine of knowing how to swim, should they not rather be described as dispositions? Yes and no. To describe something as a state is to describe it as if it were from the perspective of an “I”, whereas to describe something as a disposition is to describe it as it were from the perspective of a “me”.

As the “I” acts, any apprehension of the “I” will necessarily be from a third-person perspective, whether the apprehending is done by the agent her/himself, or by another person. In the case of self-conscious apprehension that is done by the agent her/himself the result is an apprehension of a “me”. When I suggest that knowing as a state should be seen as a description from the perspective of an “I” I am not inviting the regular third-person perspective. The perspective I am suggesting is to be understood as a constructed perspective as it could be theoretically conceived from the perspective of an “I”.

Describing the knowing of geography as a state, that is considered from the perspective of an “I” that acts, is to describe someone as having a general ability that may come of use in a number of situations not specified and yet unknown. To describe an altered state in the way the girl would orient herself differently towards the water after having learned to swim is to describe a change in her and a change in her relation to water, as considered from the perspective of an “I”, an agent in a continuous process facing a yet unknown future.

The knowing of geography and the knowing how to swim may on the other hand be described from the perspective of a “me” also, as a certain disposition to act, react, remember, behave, and so forth, in certain ways given certain circumstances, and where these circumstances are at least implicitly more specified and less open-ended than in the case of descriptions of state-senses.

To describe a disposition is to pick out a certain feature (more or less observable) of someone’s agency, or certain delimited actions from a process. Such descriptions will not catch the full meaning that parallel descriptions of states will, though. Coming to know something new makes us perceive differently than before, not only in situations where an observable disposition to act or react will arise. The way that the girl (and later the woman) orients herself towards water is part of the state-sense of knowing.
Her (altered) state is a change in the relation between her and the water and a change of the girl/woman herself.

So to return to the question of whether knowing geography or knowing how to swim should be described as states or as dispositions I think we need to recognize the existence and the need for both kinds of descriptions, as long as it is remembered that knowing is considered from the perspective of the agent as an “I” in the one case and a perspective of the agent as a “me” in the other.

States and perception

Relations must be considered from more than one aspect in the state sense of knowing. What we perceive, what we come to know through perception, may bring about a change of our state and with that follows what is usually referred to as dispositions to act and react.

Imagine water in a water-bottle that is placed on a shelf close to a stove where water is being brought to the boil in a pot. The boiling of water close-by does not affect the water in the water-bottle at all, even though the water of the water-bottle shares the disposition of the water in the pot to come to the boil given that it is heated to a certain degree. The water in the water-bottle is not heated, and that is all there is to that.

Now imagine that I am standing close to the stove and that I see a child aiming to pull the handle of the pot containing the boiling water. I would then perceive someone with the same disposition as I have, a human disposition to be burned by boiling water, and that would certainly affect me. As a child I suffered a burn injury from boiling water. Consequently I would be generally upset by seeing a child in similar situation of danger and precipitate forward to hinder the child. Probably I would call out something like “No!” also. These are examples of how the awareness of what is happening to the child would alter my general state. It would make me tense and alert several of my dispositions to act in different ways. Several kinds of knowing would be present, some of which are: a knowing that the water is boiling, a knowing that boiling water may cause burn injuries, a knowing what it is like to be burned by boiling water, a knowing how to catch the child’s attention by calling out, a sense of responsibility for the young and vulnerable, and so forth. There is also a good chance that I would almost feel the child’s body being burnt, even before the handle was
pulled, and the pot tipping over! My focused awareness would be an **indwelling** in what I perceived.

The difference that perception makes between the dispositions of things and the dispositions of humans can be explained in terms of Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing. In our tacit knowing, and perception, there is a *from-to* structure between what we *attend from* to what we *attend to*. In the case of the child I am attending *from the body of the child* to the heat of the boiling water, almost to the effect that I could even claim to have felt it. The way we interiorize what we attend from is a feature of the indeterminate border that our lived bodies have due to our intentionality. Directing my attention to the child, *dwelling in* the body that I think will be hurt, makes me be “out there”. This is the crucial difference between the dispositions of the water and myself—that I, through intentionality, am in some kind of contact with what I perceive, and can through this be literally stirred out of inertia, whereas the water to be heated has to be in direct contact with something hot, and to the water in question it does not matter whether what is hot is of the same kind (water) or something completely different (e.g. iron).

Knowing as a state has often been described as a bunker-state of a human being. My example above refutes such a thing-like description by pointing to the importance of perception and indwelling.

**The exercise of a disposition as heterogeneous**

Knowing can be referred to as a higher-grade disposition, a disposition the exercise of which is indefinitely heterogeneous, as compared to single-track dispositions, the actualisation of which are nearly uniform. Ryle complains about epistemologists who expect dispositions to have uniform exercises. From the recognition that the verbs ‘know’ and ‘believe’ are ordinarily used dispositionally, he states that there are no one-pattern intellectual processes in which these cognitive dispositions are actualized. He takes the example of a man that believes that the earth is round. This man is not “from time to time going through some unique proceeding of cognizing, ‘judging’, or internally re-asserting, with a feeling of confidence.” On the contrary, Ryle asserts

people do not harp on statements in this way, and even if they did do so and even if we knew that they did, we still should not be satisfied that they believed that the
earth was round, unless we also found them inferring, imagining, saying and doing a great number of other things as well. If we found them inferring, imagining, saying and doing these other things, we should be satisfied that they believed the earth to be round, even if we had the best reasons for thinking that they never internally harped on the original statement at all (Ryle 1949, 44-5).

The mistake of those epistemologists criticized by Ryle, I would claim to be that they have conflated what are delimited dispositions from an observer’s perspective with the state-sense of knowing of lived bodies, knowing from a first-person perspective.

The comments of Ryle cited above lead back to what I earlier wrote about the know-how of scoring a bull’s eye (p. 49). In judging whether a performance is the execution of a certain know-how we have to go beyond the performance itself. Looking beyond the performance is to consider the abilities and propensities of which a certain performance is an actualization. Ryle discusses the problem of how we are to know whether a soldier scoring a bull’s eye is an execution of luck or skill. If it is an execution of skill the soldier will be able to get near the bull’s eye again, even with an altered wind, altered range, or with the target moving, and so forth. We need to take into account more than this one success, as

[there is no one signal of a man’s knowing how to shoot, but a modest assemblage of heterogeneous performances generally suffices to establish beyond reasonable doubt whether he knows how to shoot or not. Only then, if at all, can it be decided whether he hit the bull’s eye because he was lucky, or whether he hit it because he was a marksman enough to succeed when he tried (Ryle 1949, 46).

So knowing-how, recognized as a higher-grade disposition is not only a case of, for example, having a skill, but also if one has it, whether one uses it, at different occasions. An important factor in determining whether a skill is put to use is the perceptual part of a disposition, where we perceive of a situation as requiring, or not requiring, response. With respect to knowing this can be labelled epistemological perception, ranging from the perception implicit in Kuhnian paradigms, to the perception inherent in skilful performance, whether this is the playing of chess, making points in arguments, or giving the right tips at the right times in teaching.
Knowing as a capacity

In *The Concept of Mind* Ryle finds that there are important differences between the dispositional verbs 'knowing' and 'believing'. He identifies 'know' as a capacity verb, whereas 'believe' is a tendency verb. ‘Know’, according to Ryle, is a capacity verb used for signifying that the person described can bring things off, or get things right. He explicitly states that ‘to know’ is “not to tend to act or react in certain manners.”

'Believe' is on the other hand a tendency verb that “does not connote that anything is brought off or got right” (Ryle 1949, 134). He places 'believe' in the same family as motive words, and 'know' in the same family as skill words. Our beliefs will bring on questions like “Why do you believe (this or that)?”, whereas our claims to know will bring on questions like “How do you know?”.

So we ask how a person knows this, but only why a person believes that, as we ask how a person ties a clove-hitch, but why he wants to tie a clove-hitch or why he always ties granny-knots. Skills have methods, where habits and inclinations have sources. Similarly, we ask what makes people believe or dread things but not what makes them know or achieve things (Ryle 1949, 134).

Belief and knowledge, at least when it is knowledge that Ryle asserts, can be said to operate in the same field, but acting on belief is not the same thing as acting on knowledge. Ryle uses the example of somebody skating. If this person believes that the ice is thin, he will skate warily, warn other skaters and so on, *because* he believes the ice to be thin. If the person knows that the ice is thin he will be apt to act and react in these same ways, *because* he knows it. But the two ‘because’ are two different explanations with respect to the skater’s behaviour.

Lurking behind Ryle’s distinction between motive words and skill words is a distinction between fact and value, I think. Behind what makes us know or achieve things, or prevent us from knowing and achieving them, are motives, beliefs, dread and trust, existential trust being not the least. When aiming at acquiring a certain knowledge we have motives for doing so. If
aiming at higher skill in shooting, we may do so because we believe that such skill will result in fame, or hope that such skill will make us better marksmen when hunting, which will shorten the suffering of the animal, and damage meat and fur less. So the “how” and the “why” are both constitutive of the skill of shooting. We may ask how one acquires marksmanship, but this marksmanship is defined by what is better and worse according to the motivational why’s of preventing the suffering of an animal, of taking care of meat, or of fur-making. Asking how a scientist can make claims to know something from empirical results, is connected to standards, values and ideals of scientific society. Overwhelming dread of failure may prevent the acquisition of knowledge, and once we have learned such achievements the fear of failure may prevent our exercising them, for example in cases such as stage fright.

The skater of Ryle’s then who knows that the ice is thin, will know so according to a certain standard—a standard defined by a mixture of “how” and “why”. He may claim to know so, because he checked by drilling a hole, or because he knows that there is an outlet of a sewer close to that certain beach. But still his knowing so must be according to a standard defined by what is to count as thin, and what is to count is defined by why’s—such as why five centimetres of ice of “that kind of quality” does not count as thick enough, whereas three centimetres of another kind will do so. Existential trust is common to all these examples of knowing how to know whether the ice is to be counted as thin, and why some ice will do and other ice will not. Not engaging in doubting what we have learned, not engaging in doubting our sight when inspecting the drill-hole, not engaging in doubting our memory, is to existentially trust all these things.

But does Ryle’s description of knowing as a capacity, and not as a tendency, contradict what Vendler refers to as the ‘state sense of knowing’? Is not a disposition a tendency to act and react in some ways? It might sometimes be referred to as such tendencies, but that would have to be done against a background where human behaviour is not reduced to mere reflexes or automaticity. I do not think that the two, Ryle and Vendler, are in opposite quarters but that a large part of their seeming difference is to be found in their different contextual backgrounds, as Ryle is arguing against a conflation of mere habits and intelligent capacities in a discussion of what dispositions are, whereas Vendler is putting linguistics to use in philosophical argumentation.
Ryle's stress on knowing as a capacity to bring things off, or get things right, is there in order to highlight knowing as a verb of success, in contradistinction to such things as jump reactions or mannerisms. When we claim that someone knows something we mean that this person can be relied on to succeed reasonably often in normal situations without the aid of luck. A capacity to bring things off is necessarily tied to an acquired ability to adequately perceive a context and what problems or possibilities a situation seem to offer. Knowing that “2+2=4” cannot be separated from a sense of when it is correct to apply this adding ritual. Having learned basic mathematics does not make us go about adding all the time. Given that we see four oranges and that we want to share them equally between two parties, though, it might be adequate to know about two and two equalling four. But given that I want to make as much orange juice as possible out of the four oranges, the calculation of adding oranges just does not come about. Our way of perceiving changes with what we come to know, and with this follows what might be labelled tendencies to act and react. I agree with Ryle in his rejection of simplistic models of human agency, but I might well accept such words as he rejects given that the frame of understanding was such that knowing is conceived of as a state.

In the state sense of knowing there is a relation to the world; that is the woman earlier mentioned, she who from the summer she attended swimming-school knew how to swim (p. 174), orients herself otherwise to the water than before. In this state sense she has a disposition to “bring the swimming off” or “get the swimming right”, as Ryle puts it, given the circumstances that she finds herself in water. It might still be the case that she just chooses to float or even stand still if it is shallow enough. Ryle stresses the difference between mere tendencies and capacities, as a difference between statements that might involve “would if . . .” as opposed to “could”, and “regularly does . . . when . . .” as opposed to “can”. Tendencies imply ‘can’, but are not implied by it. When we use ‘can’ or ‘could’ it is not a certainty that something will not be or was not the case, whereas when we use ‘tends to’ there is a high probability that something will be or was the case (Ryle 1949, 131).

So if we consider knowing as a state, we see that this state does not imply that any acts of knowing will necessarily take place, but that the possibility of such acts are not excluded. The state of knowing encompasses a possible perception of circumstances and possibilities in a situation though, albeit
often in the form of tacit knowing as something we attend from in a situation. From this it follows that a state of knowing will often give rise to a tendency to perceive of a situation in a certain way, and act accordingly, in short we become habituated. This connects to what I earlier wrote of knowledge being on my account a modifier of action. What we have come to know from earlier experience, is actualized in later action, as what we come to perceive, and whether we perceive of a situation to require a response or not, is part of that action.

Trust as an epistemological category

There is a similarity between the verbs believing and knowing. My claim is that a specific believing, or a specific knowing, rests on, or is tied to, a web of observations, reasonings, memories and trust. Such a web is actually being hinted at when Ryle asserts that we would not be satisfied with someone believing that the earth was round, unless we also found her/him inferring, imagining, saying and doing a great number of other things as well. In a web there are strings attached so to speak, so when one of the threads is pulled we expect adjoining threads to be stretched also.

Wittgenstein states in his treatise on certainty: “Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it” (Wittgenstein 1979 [1969], § 410). A claim to know something is a belief that one finds reasonable, where one thinks one is justified in one’s claim to know. In everyday uses of the phrase “I know that p”, these are such that, according to Mats Furberg’s reading of Wittgenstein, they give the listener the right to trust that p; and/or such that the use of the phrase is intimately connected to the speakers readiness to act as if p was true, without questioning p, and/or be oriented with respect to, agree with and acknowledge the form or forms of life that p is a partial description of (Furberg 1994, 220, emphasis mine).

This description of Wittgenstein’s claim is similar to the way Coady describes a readiness to believe certain things and to trust them as true. We
do not question our trust,\textsuperscript{195} as it is part of the background; the web of observations, reasonings, memories, and trust, where for instance we seldom separate trust in a person from trusting what they say. Agreeing with and acknowledging a form or forms of life as Wittgenstein describes it, is furthermore necessarily tied to beliefs that are formed within this form of life. Some of the beliefs we would, on questioning them, find reasonably justified, others less so. But as long as they are in the background, in the web, they are what we reason from.

The main part of what we regard as knowledge with respect to ourselves, we have heard or read. This is not enough though, as we also have to trust those things heard or read. If we do not trust them, they will not qualify as knowledge. We have three faculties—observation, thinking, and trusting—whereof two are generally recognized as epistemological categories, that is observation and thinking. The question is then: does trust have a function beyond the function of social glue? My answer is that it does. The two classical epistemological categories of observation and thinking, as psychophysical faculties, should be supplemented by at least a third, namely existential trust. Without existential trust neither of the other two could do any epistemological work. My conclusion is that existential trust is an epistemological concept basic enough to qualify as an epistemological category.

\textbf{Knowing and agency}

Now I will turn back to the earlier mentioned question of Vendler’s. Does knowing qualify as an action? Is it, to use the words of Ryle, only a capacity to bring things off? I suggest that here is a relation between the actions we perform and the states of knowing. A certain kind of action can be undertaken due to the state or disposition of an agent in a certain situation. The undertaking of an action may likewise change the state or the disposition of the agent. “Bringing things off” in action, we might label acts of knowing.

\textsuperscript{195} Except in those cases when we find reason to do that, as in the example with the film “Gaslight”. But then that which we trusted is no longer part of the background from which we trust.
Let us go back to the example of the girl/woman who after attending the swimming-school knew how to swim. Our assertion about her “knowing-how to swim” conveys an “ideal” understanding of knowledge, that is, we talk as if there is a question of either-or. But everybody knows that it is still an open question whether this means that she from that summer on knew how to swim in deep water in a pool, in deep water in a lake with dark water and unknown depth, or whether it means that she also knew how to swim when the sea runs high. In labelling this “knowing-how to swim” we give priority to a general state sense of knowing, thereby giving less attention to specific acts of knowing, the capacity to bring it off in a small or a large number of situations. Everybody “knows” that there is a difference even when they are not familiar with a distinction between the state sense, and the acts of knowing in which this capacity is exercised. Still I find it important to point to the difference between the way we talk about knowing, as if it was a case of either-or, simply having knowledge of something, and the understanding we get when looking at acts of knowing in comparison. Let me illustrate this with an example from Tove Jansson’s novel Sommarboken.

The story of the novel is set on an island in the Finnish archipelago, where a young girl, her grandmother and her father live together in a summer-house. One day the grandmother and the young girl go off along a ravine to some cliffs by the sea, whilst the father is sleeping. The child shouts to her grandmother: “That is forbidden!”

“I know. Neither you nor I may go to the ravine, but now we do it anyway since your daddy is sleeping and doesn’t know it.”, the old woman answers contemptuously.

When they have reached the sea the child says that she wants to go into the water, expecting resistance that does not occur. She undresses slowly and anxiously, as she feels that one cannot trust someone who just lets things happen. She puts her feet into the water and states that it is cold. “Of course it is cold”, the old woman replies with her thoughts elsewhere, “what did you expect?”

The child gets into the water waist-high, waiting in suspense.
“Swim.” her grandmother says, “You know how to swim.”

“It is deep”, Sophia, the child, thinks. “She has forgotten that I have never swum in deep water without having somebody with me.” She gets up from the water, sits down on the cliffs and comments on the weather. After a while the conversation turns to diving.

“I know how to dive” says Sophia. “Do you know what it is like to dive?”

“Of course I do. You let go of everything, take a run and just dives.”, her grandmother replies, and goes on telling her about how it feels to be deep down in the water, and then how it is to get up floating.

“And all the time with your eyes open.”, says Sophia.

“Of course. Nobody dives without having their eyes open.”

“Do you believe me if I tell you that I can do it without my showing it to you”, asks the child.

“Yes, yes.”, the grandmother replies. “Now get dressed so we can get home before he wakes up.”

Whilst walking home the old woman says to herself: “And I must remember to tell him that this child is still scared of deep water.”

In this interaction between the child and the old woman we see that the speaking of, or referring to, knowing how to swim and dive is with both parties implicitly understood as not telling the whole story there is to tell about knowing. The child and the woman alike both know that there is more to it than that. The story also illustrates that they do not know this about one another’s speech.

More important though, the story highlights another feature in knowing—that knowing rests on a web of observations, reasonings, memories, and trust. The young girl has a know-how to swim, but probably not so when the sea runs high—there her knowing would be lacking, or rather the trust from which she could attend to the act of swimming would

196 From Jansson (1972, 7-9, translation and reduction mine).
be lacking. As knowing has a character of from-to, we must be able to dwell trustingly in something we can act from, where different senses of the know-how to swim, for example, demand different degrees of trust in others. So some of the multiple senses of knowing how to swim (in shallow water, in deep water) are there as knowing in her web of observations, reasonings, memories, and trust. Sophia also, rightly, believes that she will be able to exercise her capacity to swim, even in deep water given the right circumstances, that is together with somebody. This belief is also part of the aforementioned web. As the novel tells us, she does not trust her grandmother fully though, as the grandmother does not behave in the right "forbidding-adult" way. The trust she does have or does not have in her grandmother sitting on the cliffs is not the trust that is a part of the web that is tied to her knowing how to swim generally. Sophia does not dare to swim because she lacks trust in herself and in her capacity to bring the swimming off when left on her own in deep water. Was her grandmother in the water beside her the lack of trust Sophia has in herself could be "replaced" with a trust in her grandmother, from which she could exercise her capacity to swim. Trust as I describe it here has the same from-to structure that has been mentioned before in connection to Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing. Sophia will in swimming on her own in shallow water, trust from a perception of herself as knowing to the knowing how to swim. When swimming in deep water, with somebody accompanying her, she will be able to dwell in that person trustingly, and through this indwelling she will trust from that person to herself as being able to exercise the capacity to swim.

An existential trust in somebody else being part of a knowing how to swim in deep water is not a necessity for everyone, of course. As for Sophia her trust in (some) adults will with time and training probably be replaced with a trust in herself and her own capacity. What we are subsidiarily aware of, that is, what we attend trustingly from, may in the same proficiency or activity, differ with the same individual at different occasions, and even more so between different individuals.197

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197 This is connected to the point made earlier on page 53.
Knowing as activity

'Knowing' has been identified as a state verb, that is closely connected to dispositions. Phrases like "I can swim" (implying "I have the know-how to swim") are from a linguistic point of view the description of a state. This state cannot be adequately understood though, if it is separated from its emergence and its actualization(s). Being in a state, a state of knowing something, implies that at times I am in a certain activity. Knowing—that "Stockholm is a larger city than Umeå" may be regarded as a propositional statement only. My point is that such propositional knowing is founded in trust. To see this, focus must be put on the emergence of this knowing, and the actualization thereof in a number of instances such as proposed by Ryle.

What gives rise to the state, and its inherent dispositions, is logically prior to the linguistic description, that circumscribes it as a state. From a linguistic point of view knowing is a state verb. Logically prior to the linguistic description, though, is knowing as an activity, being a modifier of action.

Conclusions on knowing

In this chapter I have investigated the concept of knowing further through the use of the tool of tacit knowing earlier discussed and I have argued for the importance of existential trust.

With the help of Zeno Vendler's analysis of verbs and their tenses, knowing is linguistically identified as a state term. Knowing conceived of as a state is highly determinable and ranges from dispositions such as skills to states as relations or orientation. I have discussed this range of descriptions of knowing by distinguishing between 'disposition' as being a third-person perspective on knowing, and 'state' as being a first-person perspective.

States as orientation or relation have been analysed in terms of a changed way of perceiving, of oneself and features of the world relevant to the knowing at hand.
With the help of Gilbert Ryle I have argued against simplistic understandings of knowing as capacity and habituation, as we have to go beyond the performance of a skill, for example, to be able to say whether this is a case of knowing. Marksmanship is not judged by one single performance, and we do not judge someone to know something unless s/he does not in a number of other instances act as if this knowing formed part of her/his web of observations, reasonings, memories, and trust.

Logically prior to the linguistic description of knowing as a state, is the emergence and actualization of knowing in and as activity.
Summary

This thesis investigates the structure of knowing, and it argues that existential trust is an epistemological category. This claim is made within an epistemology that takes activity of the lived body to be the fundamental explanatory unit. In such an epistemology trust is an aspect of the way we knowingly engage with the world, an aspect that can be discerned in our acts of knowing. The role of trust is argued for as being common to the activity of knowing whether we are concerned with theoretical or practical knowledge. The role of existential trust is investigated from aspects that are claimed to be co-constituted; that is aspects of the living body, language and the epistemological community. The reader is invited to share a perspective on knowing, through the discussion of some examples, by which the role of existential trust is highlighted.

The aim of the dissertation is to develop a view according to which all human activity is seen as an activity of a lived body, and according to which the understanding of the structure of such activity is regarded as central for the solution even of epistemological problems. This view is not rooted in any one philosophical tradition. Circling around activity of the lived body this work connects thinkers who in other respects belong to different "isms" in philosophy. Central to the dissertation are Aristotle, John Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, G. Elizabeth M. Anscombe, Michael Polanyi, and Marjorie Grene.

In chapter one the epistemological stage for this work is set. An investigation of such a thing as the role of trust in knowing is inevitably a work that crosses intra-philosophical boundaries, emanating from within the domains of epistemology and stretching towards the practical and political domain. Taking practical knowing as the paradigm, the pragmatic-philosophical starting point of this work in epistemology is clarified. Not
only is one species of knowing addressed, but those that are usually distinguished from one another, like the knowing-how exhibited in skills as distinguished from propositional knowledge claims of knowing-that. The claim that they are similar in a fundamental respect regarding the structure of knowing is put forth.

An analysis of trust in knowing is in need of a tool that makes it possible to approach knowing as a process, where knowing is a kind of doing. The tool should admit of a structural analysis of the knowing process, and further allow for aspects of change and temporality. The tool brought forth is derived from Michael Polanyi's concept of tacit knowing. This concept highlights the from-to character of knowing. In chapter two this concept is outlined and elaborated as a tool for the investigation of knowing. The concept of tacit knowledge, and connected concepts like attend to, attend from, and subsidiary awareness, are presented. Different kinds of subsidiary awareness, not noted by Polanyi, are distinguished.

In chapter three our epistemic conditions are sketched. The constitutive aspects of the living body, language, and the epistemological community are given their dues, and the analytical tool is applied, and further developed, in that task. It is argued that Polanyi has not seen all the implications of his view that instruments can be interiorized and be part of the lived body. Conversely, parts of the normally lived body can be exteriorized. Nor has Polanyi seen that one has subsidiary awareness of oneself as a certain kind of person. This fact, in turn, is shown to have implications for the way we constitute ourselves as agents. Since we are engendered agents, we always attend from gender.

In the last decade, the concept of trust has definitely entered epistemology, mostly in terms of trusting testimony and/or testifier. This thesis deepens that account, and drawing on the writings of Knud E. Løgstrup and Olli Lagerspetz, it identifies a more fundamental kind of trust, namely trust in oneself and trust in the world. It is called 'existential trust', and claimed to be of epistemological importance. In chapter four this concept of existential trust is developed, and claimed to be an epistemological category. Probably, this fact is hard would be hard to discover without having recourse to a distinction like that between attending from and attending to. Existential trust is something we attend from. Observation and thinking are of course two basic epistemological categories but the suggestion is that they have to be supplemented by testimony and trust.
Without trust testimony cannot perform any epistemological work obviously, but nor can observation and thinking.

In chapter five the nature of knowing is further elaborated. Knowing as being an activity, is discussed in connection to the verb ‘knowing’. Linguistically, ‘to know’ is a state verb. Superficially, it describes only a state, not an activity. This fact, however, does not contradict the view of knowledge put forward in the dissertation. To know is to have a disposition to successfully perform either some kind of action (= knowing how) or to perform some kind of true, assertive speech act (= knowing that). Basically, knowing is an activity. The main results of the investigation along with the central claim of the thesis; that existential trust should be recognized as an epistemological category; are brought forward.
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Starting from a view according to which all human activity is seen as an activity of a *lived body*, this thesis investigates the structure of *knowing*, and argues that *existential trust* has epistemological implications. In epistemology, trust has mostly been investigated in terms of trusting testimony and/or testifier. The thesis deepens that account by identifying a more fundamental kind of trust, namely trust in oneself and trust in the lived world. It is claimed that such existential trust is of epistemological importance, as it is necessary in all acts of knowing. The claim is put forth with recourse to the distinction between *attending from* and *attending to*, well known from the discussion about tacit knowledge. Existential trust is shown in the way we attend from something. It is argued that such basic epistemological categories as observation and reason should be supplemented by the category of trust. Without trust neither observation nor reason make a positive contribution to knowing.