Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century

ROBBEN ISLAND
11-14 FEBRUARY 1999

CONFERENCE REPORT

Organised by The Robben Island Museum, The Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape and The Nordic Africa Institute
Report of the conference

Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century

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SOLIDARITY

If only you could take my hand,
If only you could do it today,
I will use your right hand
And you mine,
For understanding,
Equality,
And solidarity.

We would be ourselves
The two of us.
We would struggle together
You and me.
The gap between us is temporal
That's when solidarity counts.

My shortage is the mirror
Of life of in-equality.
It reflects you in yesterdays
You might not have,
But your mother did
Sacrificing for your security,
For you to render solidarity.

I should not shiver,
I should not cry
When we are in solidarity.
The nights should be bright
And the future wide,
When you render solidarity.

We would be firm in our undertakings,
We would eliminate the cause
That grieves your people and mine
The causes which pain you and me.
We would do it the two of us
We would do it all the way.

We would destroy the seeds of oppression
We would destroy the roots of exploitation.
Their existence is disastrous
Too painful for you and me.

Solidarity is not a myth,
It is a living philosophy.
It transcends the bars of colour
A language for deaf and blind
SOLIDARITY,
A language international.

Ben Amathila
Stockholm, 9 January 1975
Foreword

This is a report on the conference *Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century*, jointly organized by The Robben Island Museum and The Mayibuye Centre in Cape Town, and The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.

Rather than presenting a longer text on the detailed proceedings, we have chosen to write a short summary and to reproduce the main papers and presentations that guided the discussions at the conference.

We are grateful to all those involved in making this conference possible. We thank the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden for their generous support. We also wish to thank all the participants who, in so many ways, contributed to making this conference a successful event.

Professor André Odendaal
Chief Director
Robben Island Museum

Barry Feinberg
Director
Mayibuye Centre

Lennart Wohlgemuth
Director
Nordic Africa Institute
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Background
On the evening of 11 February 1999 the conference *Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century* was officially opened by Thabo Mbeki, Deputy President of South Africa, under the chairmanship of the Speaker of Parliament, Dr. Frene Ginwala. In his address, Mbeki set the tone for the seminar discussions on past and future relations between Southern Africa and the Nordic countries by underlining the need for “a common strategic perspective on human development from people to people.”

Speaking on behalf of the Nordic researchers, Tor Sellström from the Nordic Africa Institute made a brief presentation of the studies carried out in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In his address—included in this report—he emphasized that “the history of interaction between the Nordic countries and the Southern African liberation movements is so rich that our studies only scratch the surface. With the ambition of avoiding the pitfalls of superficial *Festschriften* or dull catalogues, they attempt an intelligible presentation of the relationships, largely based on unresearched primary sources”. The Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh also spoke during the opening ceremony.

The opening session was held in the Old Assembly Chamber of Parliament in Cape Town. Some 250 guests were invited, including leading government representatives, policy and opinion makers, academics and NGO representatives.

The seminar itself was held on Robben Island. Of the 100 participants, about 40 were from Southern Africa and 50 from the Nordic countries, representing almost in equal numbers Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. To obtain international perspectives on the heritage of past North–South relations, some representatives also took part from England, the Netherlands, Iceland, Russia and Germany.

Before and during the conference, accompanying cultural activities with both Southern African and Nordic musicians were arranged.

The Nordic studies: book launch
The aim of the conference was twofold. Firstly, it presented the opportunity to discuss the findings of the research project *National Liberation in Southern Africa: The Role of the Nordic Countries*, implemented by the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden.
Studies on Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the liberation struggles in Southern Africa were distributed and discussed. The Finnish study, the first of a two-volume study on Sweden, as well as a separate volume containing interviews—published by the Nordic Africa Institute at the beginning of this year—were submitted in book form, while the Danish and Norwegian studies and the second volume on Sweden were presented as manuscripts.

The second objective was to address the issue of future challenges for solidarity and co-operation between Southern Africa and the Nordic countries. During the first part of the conference—discussing past relations between the two regions—the following key questions were addressed:

- What characterized the Nordic involvement with the struggles for majority rule and national independence in Southern Africa?
- What explains the broad involvement by the Nordic societies?

Following introductions by the Nordic authors, a brief overview on ‘Reflections on the Nordic research project in the wider context of Southern African studies’, was given by Alberto Ribeiro-Kabulu, Ambassador of Angola to Zimbabwe (appendix I). In his presentation, the role of the Southern Africa Regional Institute for Policy Studies in Harare as initiator of the project was underlined. Comments by each of the five Southern African countries—Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe—were then made in response to the Nordic research project. The response papers appear as appendices.

The Nordic studies were well received. They were widely viewed as valuable contributions to the history of solidarity between the Nordic and the Southern African countries. As such, it was suggested that they should be translated into Portuguese and French. Illustrating the significance of historic relations, it was said by one of the conference participants that “it is important to see how the Nordic countries overcame the challenges and constraints imposed by Cold War aspects to assist liberation movements. This will provide us with lessons of how to face and overcome current constraints to our future”.

The importance of initiating research on the history of the national liberation struggles in the Southern African countries themselves—in line with the research project initiated by Dr. Ibbo Mandaza and the Southern Africa Regional Institute for Policy Studies, Harare in 1992—was also underlined. Many participants felt that comprehensive histories of each of the liberation struggles have to be made available for future generations.

Future challenges

Professor Jonathan Moyo from Zimbabwe, at present attached to the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, made a presentation in which he identified three major challenges for the future (chapter 3):
— the challenge to rise above personalities,
— the challenge of generational change, and
— the challenge posed by a changing world order with new norms and a new international situation.

According to Moyo, solidarity was relatively uncomplicated in the old days, when national liberation was the core issue. It is more difficult today, when common values are not as clear. The challenge is therefore to introduce and work with shared core values in the North and the South, even in the face of government opposition.

Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa, not only brought up the issue of generational change and the need for new generations to be able to identify new causes to believe in, she also focused on the importance of gender awareness, stating that “if it doesn’t work for women, it doesn’t work” (appendix VIII).

Especially invited to discuss the question of future challenges on behalf of the Nordic countries was the Danish Minister of Development Co-operation, Poul Nielson, who addressed the themes of globalization and the need for new types of partnerships and values (chapter 4). Reflecting on the concept of partnership, he gave it the following definition:

To me partnership is a long-term relationship between people who are committed to the same common goal. And who share basic dreams and ideas. Real partnership must build on some kind of common ground. [...] The notion of democratic partnership raises the level of ambition even higher.

The presentations and discussions under the heading ‘future challenges’—both in group discussions and in plenary sessions—showed that real partnership is not easily defined, nor constructed. The challenge is first and foremost to be met by the younger generations. The past will not be the only guide to what is right or wrong. True partnerships require equal acceptance, mutual understanding and constructive criticism.

Conclusions: future Nordic–Southern African partnerships

The conference discussions were summarized by Mats Karlsson, State Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden (chapter 5) and Dr. Amélia Sumbana, Secretary for External Relations, FRELIMO, Mozambique (chapter 6). Taking account of these summaries and the discussions, both in the groups and in the plenary sessions, the following concrete proposals were made:
Facing the process of globalization, we should reject the concept of globalization as a steam-roller process, and instead take on the attitude that it is possible to win, i.e. that we can change things even if they seem impossible.

Threatening global peace and stability, immediate action has to be taken to eliminate underdevelopment and poverty. Social issues must not be treated as something extra, but as integrated parts in the development debate.

There should be political campaigns for the democratization of international institutions, for example UN, IMF and the World Bank. Internationally, we need to enter into new alliances, based on the concept of solidarity.

To strive to democratize systems of governance and improve the socio-economic well-being of the majority of the populations, there is a need for the development of popular initiatives and for the development of human resources as a whole.

To establish a 'Charter of Common Values', on which to base future co-operation. The liberation struggle was based on values which we need to regain and jointly consolidate as partners.

To continue the involvement of non-government organizations and people-centred and people-driven co-operation.

The Nordic countries should join forces within the EU to use their influence to strengthen the co-operation links between EU and SADCC. The peace-keeping process initiated by SADCC must also continue and be consolidated.

Striving for real partnerships, we need to move from traditional aid relations to relations for the promotion of growth based on common values. If we a) agree on strategic objectives, b) are ready to agree on a broad cohesive agenda, and c) develop mechanisms for trust and dialogue, we can develop something new.

To support research, there should be technical and financial assistance to the Southern African countries to collect and process written and oral material to produce liberation struggle histories accessible to young generations.

To establish a Nordic–Southern African Institute, mandated to further co-operation in the fields of research, information and policy issues.
Angola—a special issue of concern

Permeating the discussions was the concern felt by most participants over the tragic developments taking place in Angola, the continuation and intensification of the war and the human suffering involved.

It was emphasized that ways of solving the problems of Angola would be for governments and business communities in Europe and Southern Africa to:

— strengthen the sanction policies against Savimbi/UNITA, especially regarding the illegal trade in rough diamonds and weapons;
— increase humanitarian aid to the victims of the war;
— support the presence of the UN in Angola to monitor the situation in the country as well as to co-ordinate humanitarian efforts.
Your Excellency, President of ANC and Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki,

Madame Chairperson, Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr. Frene Ginwala,

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In a tribute to the Swedish premier Olof Palme, the late ANC President Oliver Tambo stated in 1988 that

*there has [...] emerged a natural system of relations between Southern Africa and Sweden, from people to people. It is a system of international relations which is not based on the policies of any party that might be in power at any particular time, but on the fundamental reality that the peoples of our region and those of Palme’s land of birth share a common outlook and impulse, which dictates that they should all strive for the same objective.*

Tambo was talking about Sweden and Southern Africa, but he could just as well have been talking about Denmark, Finland or Norway.

During the Thirty Years’ War in Southern Africa, special relations developed between the Nordic and the Southern African peoples. Between the two there was a real *partnership* for self-determination and universal political rights. Although ‘poles apart’, the peoples in the North and the South came to share fundamental values and establish strong bonds in pursuit of these ideals.

Led by broadly based liberation movements, the struggles for majority rule and national independence in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa were eventually crowned with success. Yesterday’s liberation movements assumed state power, with MPLA, FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU and ANC steering their countries towards national development and full international participation.

The Nordic governments extended humanitarian assistance to the region’s ‘governments-to-be’ from around 1970 until the historic ANC victory in 1994. Exceptional in the Western world, the co-operation was preceded by close and frequent contacts, where modest contributions in the form of legal assistance and scholarships paved the way for political openings. The beginnings were sluggish and encumbered with bureaucratic obstacles, setbacks and frustrations.
Nevertheless, assisted by committed solidarity movements, the visiting nationalist leaders and their resident representatives managed through principled efforts to build a firm and broad relationship.

Madame Chairperson,

working closely with Oliver Tambo, you recall that only a month after going into exile after the Sharpeville shootings he was invited to the Labour Day celebrations in Denmark in 1960. Received by Prime Minister Viggo Kampmann, Tambo addressed 3,000 workers at the Burmeister & Wain shipyard—Denmark’s largest employer—appealing for support and a boycott of the apartheid regime.

The century-old missionary links with Namibia later facilitated direct relations between SWAPO and the Finnish government. A significant number of Namibian students received their education in Finland from the mid-1970s.

In Norway, the Nobel Peace Prize to the ANC President Albert Luthuli in December 1961 and the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in August 1962 were early landmarks. The youth congress assembled no fewer than 225 participants from Africa and the Nordic countries, who for three weeks exchanged ideas and experiences. They were also treated to a reception by King Olav. Among the Southern African students who established contacts with their Nordic colleagues were the future President of FRELIMO and Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano; the President of Säo Tomé and Príncipe, Manuel Pinto da Costa; and the MPLA leader Henrique ‘Iko’ Carreira.

ANC’s Billy Modise—who is with us tonight—was then studying in Sweden, where he actively contributed to the building of a strong solidarity movement. He was present when Luthuli received the Nobel Prize and took part in the Oslo youth congress.

In Sweden, there were many contacts from the early 1960s. In 1961, the liberal newspaper Expressen staged, together with MPLA, a campaign for the Angolan refugees in Congo. Together with his wife Janet—the Director of the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam—the FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane regularly visited from 1964. After Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, ZANU and ZAPU—similarly—informed about the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The ZANU Chairman Herbert Chitepo’s frank diplomacy was particularly significant.

The emergence of active solidarity movements and the Nordic governments’ stand against colonialism and white minority rule did not go unnoticed. The Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African regimes reacted strongly as boycott demands were raised and the nationalist leaders were received at government level in the Nordic capitals. In June 1963, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Eric Louw stated in this very building that
the public of South Africa will refuse to buy [...] goods [from the Nordic] countries. When my wife buys sardines, she wants to know whether they come from Norway. She buys Portuguese sardines. And as far as I am concerned, I would not have a Volvo car even if it was given to me as a present.

There was a proliferation of anti-Nordic articles in the Portuguese and South African media. A particularly ‘ingenious’ example is a travesty of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* in the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s radio programme *Current Affairs* from October 1967:

Through these ten years past, in the temper of their indignation,
Denmark and her Nordic neighbours have led Europe’s crusade
against our country.
Norway’s Parliament lends succour to refugees from our land.
Sweden’s men-of-letters break down the pales and forts of reason.
In their censure, they find general corruption in each of our
particular faults and they assail our policies with blasts from hell.
The Danish government sets funds aside to counter race discrimination.
Nordic navvies, in the ports of Scandinavia, withdraw their hand
and our cargoes remain within their holds.

Twenty years later, there was no literary paraphrase. When Sweden in March 1987 banned trade with South Africa and Namibia, an editorial in *The Citizen* simply told Sweden “to go to hell!”, adding that

the Swedes should stop mucking about in a sub-continent in which they have no real stake. [...] One day, when Sweden’s hostility becomes too dangerous—and its direct interference in our internal affairs too much to bear—it should not be surprised if ‘Swedes go home!’ becomes a popular slogan.

Nordic support to the Southern African liberation movements started in 1969, when the Swedish parliament—based on resolutions by the UN General Assembly—declared it compatible with international law. Elsewhere in the West, this was far from a foregone conclusion. Reviewing the United States’ policies towards Southern Africa, the Nixon administration concluded at the same time that “the whites are [there] to stay” and that “the only way that constructive change can come about is through them”. That would, basically, remain the Western position.

While the Danish government chose to assist the liberation movements via established NGOs, in 1973 Finland and Norway followed Sweden and extended direct support. Between 1969 and 1994, the Nordic governments granted—in constant, 1998 figures—a total of some 1.5 billion US Dollars as official humanitarian assistance to Southern Africa. Of this amount, 600 million—around
40%—went as direct support to the liberation movements. In several cases, the Nordic contributions represented over half of their non-military expenditure.

Characterized by Western Cold Warriors as ‘Communist’ or ‘terrorist’, the nationalist organizations’ relations with the Nordic countries were largely seen as an anomaly. Treated as a ‘collective secret’ in the Nordic countries themselves, the scope of the assistance was kept confidential. As a result, little documentation is available on this unusual North-South co-operation internationally, as well as in the Nordic countries.

To document and analyse the Nordic involvement, in August 1994 the Nordic Africa Institute initiated a project on National Liberation in Southern Africa: The Role of the Nordic Countries. It was inspired by an initiative taken in 1992 by our friend Dr. Ibbo Mandaza at the Southern Africa Regional Institute for Policy Studies in Harare. The aim of the SAPES project is to research into The History of the National Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa. We hope that the Nordic studies may assist by shedding some light on the liberation movements’ lesser known international policies and relations. In a way, they thus provide a footnote to the main text.

Introducing our project to Professor Odendaal—then Director of the Mayibuye Centre—the idea was raised to present its findings to a wider public. As the Centre was preparing similar studies—notably the work by Dr. Shubin on the Soviet Union and South Africa—the intention was to arrange a book launch. However, the plans grew, and in 1997 it was agreed with the Robben Island Museum to hold a conference around the theme of Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century. The aim is to reflect on past relations and address future challenges of solidarity and co-operation.

Speaking on behalf of the Nordic authors, it is with trepidation that we submit our studies to scrutiny by academics and, in particular, political actors from the North and the South who played prominent parts in the very relationship that we try to describe. We will—as the saying goes—have to face that music over the coming days.

Studies have been made on Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. The Finnish study and the first of a two-volume study on Sweden are now launched in book form, while the Danish and Norwegian studies—as well as the second volume on Sweden—are submitted as draft manuscripts. In addition, a volume containing interviews with around 80 politicians and activists from Southern Africa and Sweden is presented.

Many of those who appear in the interview volume are present here. Despite important responsibilities and busy working schedules, you found the time to share your experiences and opinions for the benefit of the project. I want to thank you all for your invaluable contributions.
The history of interaction between the Nordic countries and the Southern African liberation movements is so rich that our studies only scratch the surface. With the ambition of avoiding the pitfalls of superficial *Festschriften* or dull catalogues, they attempt an intelligible presentation of the relationships, largely based on unresearched primary sources.

A considerable amount of Nordic material has been collected. Over the next few days, we will have the opportunity to discuss future research cooperation between the Nordic and the Southern African countries. A number of subjects come to mind, such as the diplomacy of the liberation movements; the organization of the settlements in the Frontline States; and, more generally, the conditions in exile.

The Nordic material can also shed light on regional events, as well as complement biographies of nationalist politicians, such as Oliver Tambo, Eduardo Mondlane, Herbert Chitepo, Robert Mugabe, Sam Nujoma and many others who frequently visited the Nordic countries. Joint research ventures require financial resources. We hope that the Nordic governments will consider possible proposals in a positive spirit.

Madame Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen,

our conference will also be forward-looking, addressing issues in the post-colonial and post-apartheid era. Although a solid foundation for inter-regional partnership was laid during the liberation struggles, this constitutes a major challenge indeed. On a global scale, the gaps between the North and the South are increasingly widening, with a crisis of wealth on the one hand and economic and political marginalization on the other. Perhaps more than any other actors, the NGO movements are here faced with difficult considerations. In the case of Sweden and South Africa, a representative of ISAK—the Swedish Isolate South Africa Committee—recently asked if it should keep the acronym, but interpret it as 'Invest in South Africa Committee'.

There are no easy answers to the enormous challenges on the eve of the new millennium. As in the past, however, where there is the will there is hope. I therefore end by quoting the veteran ANC leader Walter Sisulu. Reflecting on the relations with the Nordic countries, he said in 1995:

> In the same way that we have worked together [in the past], I have no doubt that we will be able to take [the relationship] a step further. [...] We need each other. We have a greater job to do, and this time not for a particular country, but on a global basis. [...] It involves, by and large, the question of non-racialism. We now have to lead other countries in this direction. [...] It is the greatest task that we must work for. The first stage without the second is not worth it.

Thank you.
Future challenges

Jonathan N. Moyo

Introduction

If we are to critically and positively review the history of Nordic solidarity with liberation struggles in Southern Africa and the future challenges of that solidarity for democratic partnerships into the 21st century, it seems to me essential that we should begin by appreciating the present configuration of national and international relations. In this connection, it is significant to note, as a starting point, that many important actors in the former Nordic solidarity movement—who were activists during the height of the struggles for liberation in Southern Africa—are now part of the ruling elite in the Nordic countries.

Thus, they face new challenges shaped by new priorities within their own countries. In the same vein, many of the important actors within the liberation movements in Southern Africa are now the ruling elite: the liberation movements have become ruling political parties facing new problems as the peoples of Southern Africa press on with demands for political liberalization and democratization.

Against this backdrop, we need to take cognizance of three ‘conditioning challenges’ that simultaneously explain the present relations between the Nordic solidarity movement and critical elements of the liberation movement while also serving as sign posts for possible relations in the future. I use the term ‘conditioning’ to underscore the consideration that the three challenges I outline below are so central to a view of the relationship between Nordic countries and former liberation movements that any prospects for a meaningful democratic partnership in the 21st century are necessarily ‘conditioned’ by the three challenges.

For this reason, we need to carefully, critically and objectively examine the three challenges before making a projection about the likely future of the new Nordic–Southern Africa partnership in the 21st century. The three ‘conditioning challenges’ are:

—the challenge of personalities
—the challenge of generational change
—the challenge of shifting or competing geopolitical interests at the global level.
The challenge of personalities

Even though the issue is often ignored or relegated to a level of insignificance, personalities are important to any movement. Sometimes, personalities in a movement become so important and dominant that they overshadow the movement and become synonymous with the movement itself. Both the Nordic solidarity movement and the national liberation movement in Southern Africa were dominated by personalities. It is much better to chart a new future path from the position of a clean slate. Yet this is not possible in a situation where personalities who were intimately involved with both the Nordic solidarity movement and the national liberation movement are still on the scene.

Personalities tend to have vested interests. Other personalities tend to favour some truths while covering up other truths seen as unpalatable. The work of the national liberation movements put a number of leading figures in the movement on the spot with respect to issues such as human rights. It is not easy to raise these issues now either with respect to the past or the future. This is because a number of the personalities are still on the scene and they do not take kindly to any open discussion of the past if this touches negatively on their personal involvement. Since some of the personalities in question are sitting presidents, revered former or late presidents or leading government ministers, this very fact alone 'conditions' how we can explore the future and what we should focus on about that future.

Notwithstanding this fact, it is my considered view that we should be willing to set personalities aside and to examine the future challenges of continued solidarity between the peoples of the Nordic countries and the peoples of Southern Africa. In other words, we should not allow ourselves to be conditioned by personalities in our search for a better and more democratic future in this region.

The challenge of generational change

When one critically reviews the relationship between the Nordic solidarity movement and the national liberation movements in Southern Africa, there is a notable tendency to debate and discuss that relationship as if it were frozen in the past. Indeed, the past seems to haunt the national liberation movements in this region: the battle cry is often about 'what we did then'; 'our heroic achievements in defeating apartheid, colonialism and UDI', etc. It is rare to hear battle cries that speak of new challenges, new circumstances let alone future prospects. In many ways, this is a region of the past. In my view, it would be unfortunate, and certainly a historical mistake, to use the past to justify the present.

Fundamental generational transitions have been taking place in both the Nordic countries and in Southern Africa, and the transitions are continuing. There is a generational shift that is taking place. New generations are emerging in terms
of new leadership, new social movements, new institutions, and new problems requiring new processes, new approaches and new solutions. Those belonging to the generation of the erstwhile Nordic solidarity movement and national liberation movements in Southern Africa are not the only ones on the scene.

The younger generations in the Nordic countries do not understand the national liberation movements in Southern Africa in the same way as did the earlier generations in the solidarity movement. Indeed, it would appear that the younger generations in the Nordic countries either do not fully appreciate the contribution of the earlier generations of the solidarity movement to the struggles for liberation in Southern Africa or that they question the contribution and find it to have been a waste of their national resources.

Many young people in the Nordic countries today have negative, dark and hopeless images of Africa. By the same token, the younger generations in Southern Africa do not readily appreciate the contribution of the solidarity movement in the Nordic countries to the national liberation movements in Southern Africa.

Even more serious, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that the younger generations in this region are not altogether clear as to the value significance of the liberation movements, especially in terms of the future. Rather remarkably, the gap between the younger generations in the Nordic countries and their counterparts in Southern Africa is deep and wide. There is mutual ignorance of one another reinforced by television images. In my view, this situation more than anything else, stands to condition whether and how the Nordic countries will forge new partnerships with the peoples of Southern Africa in the 21st century. Generations that are ignorant of one another’s destiny cannot easily foster mutual rewarding collaborations and partnerships.

The challenge of shifting or competing geopolitical interests

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has been used by many observers and analysts in international relations as a benchmark for a new international order in the post-Cold War era. While a lot can be said about this, the long and short of it is that a fundamental change has taken place in the configuration of the geopolitics of the world. Power relations among nations have changed and continue to do so.

The realignment of NATO and the rise of the European Union with the Euro as the new global currency of the future attest to this point. As these changes are taking place against the background of a political environment in Southern Africa where apartheid is seen as a thing of the past and where, generally, the original objectives of the national liberation movements are believed to have been achieved, it is reasonable to assume that the Nordic countries are unlikely to readily see Southern Africa through the lenses of the past. As the former national liberation movements have now become ruling parties, it goes without saying that, in their view, future partnerships with the Nordic countries
should mean a continuation of development assistance at increased levels. Yet the Nordic countries have new priorities within the European Union and in the former socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

There is also new thinking reconsidering the viability of development assistance. Political conditionality in favour of, among other issues, democracy, good governance, human rights and economic austerity has also become a major international issue. Therefore, the expectation for increased aid from the Nordic countries by former national liberation movements in Southern Africa is unrealistic. The expectation of aid from the Nordic countries by the former liberation movements and the fact that such aid will not be forthcoming is a ‘conditioning challenge’ for the future of Nordic–South African partnership. For these and related reasons, it is my view that the Nordic countries should be frank about their limitations as well as priorities; and should not use the language of conditionalities to hide those limitations and/or priorities. Conversely, Southern African countries now ruled by former national liberation movements should also be realistic in their expectations of increased aid from the Nordic countries based on previous solidarity. Solidarity and partnerships are good things but they are not always possible.

The above conditioning challenges should be taken together in order to get a better assessment of the real possibilities that exist for Nordic–Southern Africa partnership in the future. The conditioning challenges become even more daunting when they are seen against the background of the transitions that are under way in Southern Africa.

Transitions in Southern Africa
An unprecedented drama of social ferment is currently shaping political events and social processes in Southern Africa. The region is precariously straddling the boundaries between order and chaos, the old and the new. At the fore of this ferment are the dialectical symbiosis and conflict between and among issues of economic growth, equity, democracy, political stability and national and regional autonomy.

These five issue areas have defined the development and research contexts in the region. Four years ago, following decades of widespread destabilization and regional conflict largely spawned by apartheid and liberation struggles against it, spirited optimism defined Southern Africa. A new democratic and non-racial South Africa was on the horizon with the formal end of apartheid, prospects of democratization were high in Zimbabwe and Lesotho while peace was in sight in Mozambique and Angola after decades of crippling civil war, population displacements and economic destabilization.

Against this background, Southern Africa is a region in transition from a long and sustained period of colonialism, racism and post-independence national and regional conflicts. Specifically, there are five transitions that have far-reaching implications for likely collaborations and partnerships between new
solidarity movements in the Nordic countries and new liberation (democracy) movements in Southern Africa. These transitions are as follows:

- The transition from authoritarian systems of governance to as yet undefined forms of multiparty democracies [in pursuit of the development goal of democracy].
- The transition from regional destabilization, conflict and environmental insecurity to peace, environmental security and reconciliation [in pursuit of the development goal of political stability and order].
- The transition from underdevelopment and poverty to development and sustainable forms of wealth [in pursuit of the development goal of economic growth].
- The transition from income gaps, gender disparities and regional imbalances to social justice and even human development [in pursuit of the development goal of distribution and equity].
- The transition from dependency and foreign domination to national and regional self-determination within a globalized economic environment [in pursuit of the development goal of national and regional autonomy].

The above transitions have important implications for the research project we are examining at this conference. The big question that emerges from the five transitions in Southern Africa seen against the background of the three ‘conditioning challenges’ outlined above is this: How does the research project help us deal with the conditioning challenges given the region’s transitions?

**Implications for the research project**

In the research project we are examining, personalities are at best presented as if they embodied and represented either the Nordic solidarity movement or the national liberation movements in Southern Africa, as the case may be. There is thus, an impression that, for example, ZANU, ZAPU, ANC, SWAPO were and are synonymous with the national liberation movements. In other words, these movements and their leaders are treated as if they personified the national liberation movements. But surely, the national liberation movement was, within the Southern African countries under study, broad and diverse. None of the organizations just named represented the ‘nations’ in their countries. Virtually all of these organizations had serious ethnic problems and, to some extent, class problems as well. Treating them as national liberation movements was problematic in the first place and that continues to be a problem today because personalities and specific ethnic groups dominate many of these organizations (now as ruling parties). The national question remains unresolved. In effect, this means that the research study relies, in my view, on a rather narrow definition of ‘movement’.

Three questions are thus left open by the research project and they are the following: (a) What values really guided the relationship between the Nordic solidarity movement and the national liberation movements in Southern Africa?
(b) What values really guided the Nordic solidarity movement itself? and (c) What values really guided the national liberation movements in Southern Africa themselves?

It seems to me that these questions should be answered with reference to empirical evidence. The study would be much richer were it to include interviews that specifically aim at unearthing evidence to respond to the question of values beyond the rhetoric of ideological declarations. There is no doubt that racial minority rule in Southern Africa was abominable but it would be a mistake to justify the struggles for national liberation purely on the basis of the need to remove the white minority regimes from power and to replace them with black majority regimes that did not respect or subscribe to fundamental principles of democracy and human rights.

Did the Nordic solidarity movement and the national liberation movements engage in meaningful dialogue on questions of democracy and human rights during the struggles for national liberation? Were these issues assumed and thus taken for granted or were they discussed and debated with a view to formulating shared values with an enduring impact beyond the struggles themselves? Why is it that the Nordic countries today seem to be speaking a language that is different from that spoken by their former partners in the struggle with respect to human rights and democracy? What went wrong?

I think that it is rather unfortunate that the findings of the research project we are examining at this conference do not help us better appreciate these important questions of values. But I also think that it is still possible for the research to look at these issues before the conclusion of the whole project.

It also seems to me that the omission of the fundamental value questions is found not only in the study but also in the history of the Nordic solidarity movement and the national liberation movements in Southern Africa. That is why ruling personalities have hijacked the movement and are doing totally unacceptable things in the name of national liberation. Being here at Robben Island for the first time, I am immensely pained by the fact that some people who suffered here left this place only to turn their whole countries into Robben Islands. This has been possible, in my view, because the liberation movements did not have democratic cultures and the Nordic solidarity movement did not, as a matter of practice in their support for the liberation movements, promote a democratic culture as a critical component of the assistance they gave.

As a result of this failure to foster a democratic culture within the liberation movement we now have in this region the following unfortunate developments:
- Social breakdown in Zimbabwe
- Growing xenophobia in South Africa
- Namibia's amendment of its constitution to suit the interests of an individual who happens to be the country's sitting president who wants to continue in power beyond the period originally stipulated by the constitution prior to the amendment.
- ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe fighting a senseless war in the Congo.

These developments are only mentioned here as illustrative examples of things that would not be happening had the national liberation movements in Southern Africa promoted democratic values as part of the struggle, with support from the Nordic solidarity movement. In view of the foregoing, the real challenge for the future that I see is to ensure that the emerging new democracies do not lose their way, as did the liberation struggles. Throughout Southern Africa, civil society groups are calling for transparency, good governance, democracy and human rights. These groups must succeed and everything should be done to support them to create better societies in the region in the 21st century.

In conclusion, I wish to end by observing that this research project is of immense importance not only for the Nordic countries but also for this region. Everything possible should be done to ensure that the publications before us are made available beyond this conference to wider policy, research and ordinary audiences in the region and elsewhere.

While I appreciate the reasons why this study has been descriptive, I would encourage the researchers to work on a final volume that would be more rigorous from a theoretical and methodological point of view. This is necessary if the project is to avoid being seen as a "self-congratulatory" exercise about Nordic contribution to the liberation of Southern Africa. The study should contribute not only information but also new knowledge and new methodologies.

Organizationally, since this project was originated in Southern Africa by SAPES in Harare, I think it is still possible for the coordinators of the research project to return to SAPES with a view to fostering better collaboration. The time is now ripe for a Southern Africa research response, and the opportunity should not be squandered given the excellent start by the Nordic Africa Institute.

Another weakness of the present study that still can be rectified is the apparently poor coordination of the research within Nordic countries. The quality of the work on Sweden is manifestly better than that of the studies from the other Nordic countries, notably Denmark. This could have been avoided.
Challenges for democratic partnerships into the 21st century

Poul Nielson

Honourable Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am happy to be here in such good company and in such a fantastic setting.

To be true to the ideals we fought for yesterday, we must have the courage to face the challenges of today. Otherwise our discussions become self-congratulatory and empty of visions. It calls for an honest and a realistic analysis of what the challenges are confronting us now and in the future. We also have to discuss our methods of co-operation in order to make sure that the quality of our relationships corresponds to the level of ambition expressed politically.

Solidarity was a fundamental part of the struggle. It was a valuable and highly meaningful experience for our general public to line up with the freedom movements in a common struggle for democracy and against racism. The world has never seen as broad and universal a political mobilization as the campaign against apartheid.

There are several factors in this; in the U.S., the popular support to the human rights movements such as the NAACP and the freedom buses in the early sixties formed the background. In Europe the ghosts of racism and nazi-philosophy were in our minds when we were confronted with the systematic formalization of apartheid. This resulted—not only in strong awareness and solidarity with the oppressed in South Africa and in the region—but also to a broader strengthening of the universal principles of human rights. For millions of people in the world the struggle against apartheid became a test case. Not only solidarity, but also democracy and human rights were the ideals we fought for.

The popular mobilization behind this was probably the most important factor, but also Parliaments and governments were involved. In Denmark for example we imported a lot of coal, more than 10 million tons every year. Denmark was the second biggest buyer of coal in the world and much of it was imported from South Africa. Although the utilities using the coal were publicly owned, the import from Richards Bay in South Africa continued during the seventies. The argument being that it was impossible to buy the same quantity and quality at the same price anywhere else in the world. In 1979 this was discussed in Parliament and a resolution against continuing the purchase of coal from South Africa was adopted. I was my party's spokesman and I wrote the resolution. Only a few months later I became the first Danish Minister for Energy (and not only that, but the coal purchasing agency had its headquarters in my
constituency). By travelling to places like Australia and Canada to prove there were other providers, but mainly by using the argument that it was unwise in relation to the security of supplies to rely on South Africa it was possible to drastically change the import pattern away from South Africa.

The Nordic—and Dutch—experience of the struggle, I think, fed back into our societies and created the foundation for a more global solidarity. Therefore I don’t think it is a coincidence that while the level of ODA is only 0.22% on a global level, it is in these countries higher than 0.7%. The general solidarity has been strengthened by our co-operation.

Our co-operation took place against the global background of the bipolar system, the East-West confrontation. This competition often blurred the principles of democracy and human rights. Now we have a much clearer but also more demanding background for these discussions.

Based on this brief review of the changes in our regional and global environment, allow me to introduce the notion of democratic partnership, the foundation upon which it rests and the challenges levelled at it.

**Introducing the concept of democratic partnership in the 21st century**

We call each other partners. And we see development co-operation as a partnership. But we rarely discuss what we mean when we say ‘partners’ or ‘partnership’. To me partnership is a long-term relationship between people who are committed to the same common goal. And who share basic dreams and ideas. Real partnership must build on some kind of common ground. To be partners is more demanding than to be business associates.

The notion of democratic partnership raises the level of ambition even higher. The aspiration should be to bring about increased equality and mutual respect in the relationship. Consequently, democratic partnership is also aimed at strengthening the weaker party. This aim includes an idea of solidarity, as well as a realization that an endeavour to bring about a more equal world is also in the long-term interest of the stronger party.

The notion of democratic partnership applied to development co-operation means that the traditional relationship between donor and recipient must change if development co-operation is to succeed in achieving the goals set out. The question is: How do we ensure partnership? How do we manage to move beyond the stereotypes and traditions in the roles of the donor and recipient? Notwithstanding the fundamental inequality represented by the donor’s upper hand in terms of resources, the aspiration should be to bring about increased equality and mutual respect in the relationship. Old friendships are to be used not just celebrated.
The building blocks of democratic partnership

Local ownership

How do we go about building democratic partnership in development cooperation? Local ownership is what we must be aiming at. As partners. But local ownership can be as tricky as partnership. It is not automatically achieved. Local partners must be willing to assume ownership. And Nordic partners must be willing to let go of control. This accentuates the dilemma between the goal of national ownership and the priorities of the donors. National or local politicians in the recipient countries may not always wish to continue along the lines originally agreed upon with the donors. There may have been a change in government or the government may have changed its policies for other reasons. The question is: Do we, as donors, insist on the continuation along the agreed lines or do we support the changes in policy of the local owners – even if they are not consistent with our perception of the needs in a certain sector? Or more broadly? Values and principles on our side are more than common conditionalities. Basic values reflect legitimate views of our own people. Democratization, gender, human rights, poverty eradication. All are core values that must be taken serious.

Transparency and accountability

A prerequisite for effective local ownership is obviously local capacity. However, to this should be added the need for transparency and accountability. While ranking high on the agenda of the donors, I have been surprised to find almost a habitual resistance from local partners towards changing procedures or simplifying structures in pursuit of transparency and effectiveness. When we as donors argue for transparency it is often done with reference to our parliaments and taxpayers whom we must be accountable to. But transparency and accountability—politically as well as financially—are not to be achieved for the sake of donors. They are—to my mind—severely needed for the sake of the populations of recipient countries. Corruption does not take money away from us—we stick to 1% for ODA—it takes money away from the poor beneficiaries in the recipient countries.

Popular participation and democratization

Closely connected to the ideas of partnership and local ownership are the ideas of popular participation and democratization. If development isn’t broadly based and doesn’t actively involve the people of the country, it will not be sustainable. Development must be achieved for the entire population and not just for the few. Governments’ performance on distribution measures is calling the bluff on their declared policies on poverty eradication. The new situation has opened new possibilities for co-operation. One example is our business-to-business programme in South Africa. We are stimulating and partly financing the creation of joint ventures between Danish and South African small businesses. What is
special, however, is that it was clearly spelled out to the Danish Parliament that this should benefit non-white partners in South Africa. Here in South Africa you have since used the more politically correct language of “previously disadvantaged groups”. We prefer the more clear language. But running an affirmative action business development programme is exciting and meaningful.

The Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the year 2000 emphasizes the need for supporting popular participation and democratization. It focuses on improving the opportunities and capacities of vulnerable groups. Most of the Danish support to democratization is directed to NGOs. Some—or most—of them are in opposition to national government. At the same time, Denmark co-operates closely with the government on Sector Programmes, and we work at capacity-building in central institutions like the judiciary, state auditor etc. To some it may seem contradictory. How can we support opposition and government alike? To me this is both logical and unavoidable. All levels and all actors must be included in the process if long-term sustainable development is to be achieved. We cannot focus on one side of the coin only. A number of issues must be addressed at government level. Other issues are better approached through NGOs.

Many of our (Southern) African partner countries have come a long way in the process of democratization. We also know that sustainable democratic systems and cultures must come from within a society. The donor community can assist and encourage the process – but we cannot prevent if from failing if the local will is not there. There are many dilemmas in this. NGOs or opposition parties often ask us to do things they would not want us to do if they were in government. Our response is to insist on a demanding and transparent dialogue with all sides in society. Governments as well as NGOs. We did that with President Moi in 1995, where we also explained to him that in our opinion NGO also meant non-governable organizations.

Let me provide you with an example that demonstrates this point. Since 1993 the Nordic countries have supported the Nordic–SADC Journalism Centre in Maputo with a view to strengthening the development of a professional and free media in the SADC region. From the beginning it was envisaged—and agreed—that SADC gradually should take on an increased share of the financial and managerial responsibility of the Journalism Centre. Meanwhile, it has become clear to us that SADC is not prepared to shoulder this responsibility. This leaves us as donors with no other choice than to close down the project. Our task is now to consult with our local partners in the media themselves and NGOs to agree on new avenues for supporting the media in the SADC region.

This is just one small example of a situation where the authorities in Southern Africa do not seem to continue to pursue objectives which they fought for in the past and for which they received broad-based Nordic support. When journalists are imprisoned and tortured by the military or demonstrators are being beaten by police, the Danish and, I think, Nordic population wonders if
freedom has become meaningless. Or when poverty is on the increase and governments decide to increase military spending or buy presidential aeroplanes, they wonder what has happened to equality. Or when it is revealed that an election process has been rigged or a president openly questions and threatens the independence of the courts, they wonder about democracy. We all know that democracy, equality and freedom are concepts which one has to fight for daily. I know that many of you have fought hard for these ideals and many victories were won at the beginning of this decade. But recently there seems to have been more rhetoric than action. I can only appeal to you all to ensure that there will be progress concerning these values in Southern Africa for otherwise I am sincerely worried that the popular support of the Nordic countries will also dwindle.

**Solidarity**

Finally, let me point to the issue of promoting sustainable economic development in (Southern) Africa in an environment increasingly characterized by globalization and liberalization. Globalization and liberalization are facts of life. The challenge is not to say yes or no. Globalization enhances mutual dependency and, consequently, requires global *solidarity*. Globalization without solidarity benefits the powerful and the affluent, but marginalizes the weak and the poor. We must make sure that the challenges of globalization are turned into benefits for the many, not just for the few. This perspective was clearly spelled out in the Programme for Action adopted in 1995 by the Copenhagen Social Summit. It is our shared responsibility to turn this into reality. The Danish government seeks to make a contribution through a continued elaboration and discussion at the ongoing series of Copenhagen Seminars for Social Progress.

As donors we should be supportive of efforts aiming at securing access to the world trade market for the African countries. But it is an illusion to believe that formal market access alone will bring about the integration of developing countries into the global trading system. Trade not aid is a false formula. The right one is trade and aid. We are doing our best in the EU to give Africa a fair deal. But it is also necessary for Africa to come out more clearly in supporting a stronger differentiation between ACP-countries if the poverty issue is to be kept in focus in the future Lomé-convention. Don’t let the Carribbeans run the show.

Everybody talks about ‘the International Society’. But we don’t have one. We are trying to create one. And in view of the globalization and especially the enormous power of multinational co-operations, we are far behind in the struggle for global governance. The Nordic countries have as small countries an obvious interest in strengthening international structures, such as the UN, in order not to be left to ‘the law of the jungle’ and in order to pursue the values we believe in. I strongly believe that if we wish to enhance global solidarity there is no other way than creating an international society built on international treaties and proper structures to implement them. I am looking forward—based on our solidarity—to an increased co-operation between the Nordic countries and Southern Africa in
creating the foundation and structures for a true international society in the UN. We need a more active participation from African countries in this endeavour.

Having introduced some of the major building blocks of democratic partnership let me in conclusion single out a potential stumbling block on the road to democratic partnership: The issue of violent conflicts. In light of the recent conflicts in the Southern African region, this seems indeed to be an issue deserving special attention.

The issue of violent conflicts

I am concerned to see how easily political disagreements in and between African countries are transformed into violent conflicts. Violence and the use of military means in many cases still seems to be the first choice of African leaders. This culture of violence is deeply troubling. The violent conflicts of Africa have devastating effects on the possibilities of the continent to achieve sustainable development. Not just because of the destruction of physical and human capital. But also due to lost opportunities for the countries involved as well as for the entire continent. I must also emphasize that the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the event in recent years which in my country has most seriously triggered questions concerning the usefulness of continuing development co-operation with African countries.

The region must be seen to be attempting to deal with conflicts in a constructive way. This brings me to the potential role of regional structures in dealing with conflicts. Regional structures need to play a much more prominent role in preventing, managing and solving conflicts. This need is evident not only in Southern Africa, but also in other regions of the world, including Europe. The nature of present-day conflicts often transcends national borders and involves several stakeholders at one time. Concerted efforts at preventing and solving conflicts must be based on regional solutions. In this regard, the institutions established by SADC for co-operation in the field of peace and security deserve to be granted higher priority.

Thus, speaking from a donor’s point of view, we should work to support the promotion of mechanisms, processes and institutions that enable societies to manage conflict through peaceful negotiation and mediation. Bearing in mind that the establishment of these structures must be rooted in the societies in question—based on the actual needs and realities of these societies—rather than the demands of the international community.

The Nordic countries are all firm supporters of efforts to promote regional co-operation in the field of peace and security. Let me share with you an important regional initiative that Denmark is currently supporting within the field of conflict prevention and management in Southern Africa. The SADC-countries have initiated a multifaceted regional peacekeeping programme aiming at increasing co-operation in the field of peace and security, and in particular in peacekeeping training. It was initiated in July 1997 following intensive
consultations within the region. It is a three-year project. Peacekeeping instructors from all the Nordic countries are involved. It is a positive sign that in spite of all the present differences on the issue of Congo, the co-operation in this project is actually continuing.

African leaders wish for support to their efforts to build a regional peacekeeping capacity. And the donors are in general willing to do so. However, external assistance to regional initiatives is only meaningful when African leaders themselves opt for regional solutions instead of choosing the old approach of each country for its own. The latter is not a viable solution to the problem of violent conflicts, neither in Africa nor elsewhere.

Conclusion

The primary responsibility for the development of the countries of Southern Africa rests with the governments and the people in these societies. But it is in our interest as much as theirs that development takes place. We are therefore eager to engage in a democratic partnership with a view to supporting this process.

Our partnership is a very valuable asset which we all must take pride in, while at the same time we must continue to foster and develop it on the basis of solidarity. Our partnership—and friendship—is a very solid foundation for the continued development co-operation between Southern Africa and the Nordic countries. Let us strive to ensure that democratic partnership is turned from an abstract notion into an instrument for change.

The values and ideals that were the core of what we fought for in the past are still alive—and they still present themselves as challenges for us. We remain committed to a long-term partnership in the development of Southern Africa. We take it for granted that democratization, human rights and the dream of a solidaric society are still shared values. And we look forward to bringing the experience we have gained in our partnership to bear on the global political processes. The world deserves and needs exactly the kind of input and inspiration that we can provide together as partners.

Thank you for your attention.
Six lessons from the past – and six for the future
Reflections on Nordic solidarity with the liberation struggle in Southern Africa

Mats Karlsson

Friends, Comrades,

I got up early this morning to reflect on what I might say. I stepped outside of the wardens’ houses in which we have been living. I looked out over the grass and out to the sea when something struck me: this looks just like the nature around the summer house where I spend my holidays in the south of Sweden, Öland. The sun, the strong wind, the dry grass, the sea – too cold to swim in. It was very much as if I had been sitting resting in our summer landscape – and yet I have been living in a warden’s house. I turn my head and I see the walls and the barbed wire.

It struck me then that much of what we have been doing here is to help link our own image with what has really been happening, with what is happening – in short, reality. That linkage is at the absolute centre.

We have been challenged a few times: did all those years of work give us in the Nordic countries anything? And of course the answer is, it gave us—I can’t say as much as it gave you, that would be a rhetorical lie—but it gave us an immense sense of self-respect, of understanding where we are in our own situations at home.

When one listens to Ahmed Kathrada as he explains what things were like here at Robben Island during his 25 years, what I take in is not only the account of what happened but his amazing attitude to his present and to the future and the past. That attitude is as close as I have ever got to anything that I can understand as wisdom. This is what should be inspiring us when we face our challenges at home.

These remarks were made as a summary of a three-day discussion on the preliminary results of a Nordic research project led by Tor Sellström at the Nordic Africa Institute. Participants were government representatives, academics, NGOs from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe as well as the Nordic countries. The transcript has been slightly edited for clarity.
This reflection is not new at this meeting. We have been carrying it with us during all these years. I'll never forget when some of the inmates, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, came to Stockholm nine years ago to meet Oliver Tambo. And just a few years earlier—13 years almost exactly to the day—we had what was a very important event in our domestic context, the People's Parliament against Apartheid, with Olof Palme and Oliver Tambo present. That was Olof Palme's last political appearance.

Myself, I had just another few years earlier started my first job in international affairs by taking on, at Lennart Wohlgemuth's initiative, our support to Somafco in Tanzania, the school for political exiles from South Africa in this front line state. Of course, that experience has been part of the shaping of my personal view of the world.

I learned six lessons from the studies on the Nordic contribution to the liberation movement (studies on nothing else, that was the focus).

The first lesson might seem a simple thing to say. It is possible to win, and to win against seemingly impossible odds. To hear that from me might seem stupid but we were all of us looking at a long, long period. Nobody could spell out when the end game might come, and what it might look like. But we kept on working. I am deeply impressed by this fundamental lesson that it is possible to win against impossible odds. Such courage and determination should be one of our biggest inspirations today.

The second lesson is that it matters what everyone does. I think it was Raymond Suttner who pointed the finger at us and nicely called us "middle powers" and in that sense I take it in. It matters what everyone does, and it matters what countries do.

The third lesson is that solidaric support wasn't a self-evident thing. Perhaps in some of the self-congratulatory moments it might have seemed as if the support was always there, perhaps even since the 1950s, in a nice consensus. But it wasn't like that, it was an uphill battle in our home countries. Many were against it, many were afraid and many thought it was not possible. Abdul Minty reminded us nicely just a few moments ago of the formidable opposition to trade and investment sanctions that existed even in the Nordic countries.

Support was dependent on determined political leadership by a few enlightened leaders. In particular I would refer to Olof Palme whose role it seems cannot be overestimated in mobilizing solidarity and overcoming systemic inertia.

The counterpart of that emphasis on leadership, and the lesson that we need, is that solidaric support would not have been possible if we hadn't been pushed by public opinion. The solidarity movement, the trade unions, churches, all organizations which put pressure on and moved the top were absolutely essential. The shift to solidaric support would not have happened otherwise. The
dialectic between the two, the broad-based solidarity movement and political
leadership, is the decisive factor behind enlightened political action.

The fourth lesson is that it is possible to devise good and effective co-operation. Everybody knows, of course, that we didn’t do it. The fighters did it, the liberation strugglers did it, but, however big our part was, it was part of it. When I’m asked at home to defend development co-operation – “What kind of success stories do you have to tell? Isn’t it all wasted?” – well, here’s the biggest success story of them all: the liberation and the freedom from apartheid. And, we were there.

The fifth lesson is that real partnerships are possible. Raymond Suttner put it nicely but it’s to be read all over this wonderful interview volume. He said that the Nordic countries did not seek strategic influence. Yes, we agreed on the strategic objective, we trusted each other, and knew each other’s limitations as well as strengths. It was a real partnership. It is nice to know such a thing is possible.

The sixth lesson is inspired by Billy Modise and is that the solidarity did reward both parties. We stand with greater strength at home as a result of it.

The books that have come out of this conference have, I believe, borne out those perhaps simple conclusions by going directly to participants and partners and first-hand witnesses. I also believe that these books and draft studies and our discussions show the extreme importance of meeting each other at policy level and research level. That is how you can get an explosive mix at times, a challenge, something that spells out new directions. I think this is a wonderful example of how we have begun to treat living history in another way.

At home we are in the midst of reflecting on the holocaust and what it meant and what it means to us and where we were in that period of history. I believe more can come from that kind of reflection on the recent past, to make sure we have a direction for where we’re going. We all know that history is in the making every day. Angola is still waiting to make its final liberation history.

At this point I want to express my thanks and my appreciation to all those who have contributed, without mentioning any institution or any name. You know who you are. Perhaps this spirit that we experience here at Robben Island can enlighten a kind of process of continuous consultation, as it was put in one of the group reports.

I’m not finished here. That was the introduction. I have six other points on what this future might hold in store for all of us, six areas for action. Maybe we can develop such a process to deliver on them – a Robben Island initiative.

The first point here is about values. I think it was Jonathan Moyo who challenged us, and others did too, by asking: What values really did infuse us? I think the answer is very simple and I got it right there at Somafco. On the walls I saw the Freedom Charter, the Freedom Charter from Kliptown way back in 1955,
which, I wish to tell you, had a great impact on me. Here was a small piece of A4 which in such tiny print, in so many words, contained a summary of what it's all about. I needed no other English, certainly no more beautiful English, to tell me what the values were. The possibility of immediate identification was there. So, we need look no further.

I think today in the world we have developed quite a substantial body of agreed norms and common values. Last year we celebrated one of history’s most important documents—if not the most important one, together with United Nations Charter—the Declaration on Universal Human Rights. Since 1948 we have developed an enormous body of norms and rights, right up till the Convention of the Rights of the Child, and we took another major step last year in creating the International Criminal Court. There must be an end to impunity for crimes against humanity.

We have, each nation, to respect these rights at home. We have quite an intense debate in Sweden: Are we fulfilling these norms? National implications are important, we develop them in the constitutions and in the respect for the constitutions, in the rule of law, the independent judiciary, the respect for human rights and the dignity of man and, of course, in how we develop our democratic governance at all levels, and beyond just the structure of democracy the culture of democracy.

I am happy to say that we are carrying on one aspect of a Nordic–Southern African co-operation within one of the most interesting institutes: The International Institute on Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Stockholm, which I think is state-of-the-art when it comes to the understanding of the development of democracy.

For the second pointer for the future, I take the word liberation. That was a focus of so much of our debate, the liberation from subservience to the European colonial powers, to whites. Basic, yes. An era is over. No one can doubt it.

I took notice of somebody who said that Olof Palme would never accept the Cold War mode, and I think that’s a key aspect on how the Nordic countries wanted to relate to the liberation. Of course, liberation isn’t through yet worldwide, the Palestinian situation, the Kurds, the East Timorese and many other peoples around the world have yet to be given their rights to self-determination.

To many of us Olof Palme was not just a North–South politician, he was also a European politician and he acted in a period when our continent was divided. We had neighbouring us the Soviet oppression of its peoples and I want to mention that because several times here the strong appreciation, which I respect, for the support that was given from Eastern Europe to your armed struggle came out. That in itself is an extremely interesting subject that is coming forth for our reflection in the Nordic countries. What I want to take out from this
period is my clear memory of Olof Palme as he faced the Cold War in Europe. He said: “our values will win, pursue dialogue and disarmament and the values of human dignity will prevail. The rest will follow”. And – it did.

We now have another era, an era after national liberation and after the Cold War. So, what now? I still think, like many of you, that ‘liberation’ remains a key word. Personally, I am inspired by the philosophy of Karl Marx as he saw the word liberation, the liberation of each individual to fulfil his or her human potential. If we put it in international terms, in relation to the international debate on where we stand on subservience today, I think what it is about is making sure that each one becomes the subject of his or her own destiny and not the object of somebody else’s design.

Whether as individuals or nations, that is what we must strive for. That has been a key message as we, at least in our country, have been reviewing our overall co-operation policy, our Africa policy, the way to eradicate poverty and shape democracy, in short to win the rights of the poor. The objective is to maximize people’s power over their future.

And that brings me to the third area: How should we achieve it? I think Thabo Mbeki said the key words in Parliament in Cape Town as he staked out the challenge in these times. He said: human development. And I think Sérgio Vieira pointed it out here: How to move from the solidarity of a liberation struggle to the solidarity of economic growth?

Again, we have come far, we have behind us the Copenhagen Summit, all of the other global summits, we know a lot on how to act and work together. Poul Nielson correctly said: “The Washington consensus ain’t what it used to be”. In Europe we have a very different debate now. Neo-liberalism is out, what is in, we don’t quite know. Some call it a third way, others are looking for other language, but it is clearly another attitude. We know well that the market economy can deliver increased growth, increased wealth. We must work with the market economy but, what we must not do is to treat social policy as an add-on, as something extra. We must make sure that the development policies we pursue take the social and human development issues from the very beginning as an intrinsic part or else we will fail. That is what we in Europe call the social market economy. Maybe human development is a better term when we talk about it internationally.

There is choice in how we shape things. If we miss this one we will still of course have the market economies. They will be there, but they will be captured by elites of various kinds. Captured markets can function for a while, but they will serve only limited interests. Unsustainable and corrupt yes, but tenacious enough to stunt the development of generations. The weaker countries are in terms of growth, the more susceptible they will be to having their market economy captured by elites. To counter this we need an ethos of public responsibility and we need a commitment to poverty eradication in all its dimensions.
We have touched on many, many issues that would go a long way to help change this and I’ll just go along with Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, South African Deputy Minister for Industry and Trade, who said: “If it does not work for women, it doesn’t work.” Yes, that is part of the very definition.

And, Rector Laurinda Hoygaard of the University of Angola, called for “a renewed emphasis on education”. This lesson we bring with us from home, from history in my own country as we took the step to a higher degree of human development. I believe we did three things right:

- one person, one vote, the culture and organization of democracy,
- the social market economy, and
- individual empowerment through an education revolution.

We should live by what we know works. We should focus on young people’s knowledge and capacity as we develop our new strategic partnership.

The fourth area to focus on is globalization. I would like to define globalization in active terms. Globalization means that because interdependencies are becoming so much more intense anyone who wants to have power over his or her future has to act together with others, not only on the local and the national level, but globally as well. It is a message about power.

I totally reject the concept of globalization as a steam-roller process. Left on its own, that is what’s going to happen, but we can change things even if they seem impossible – the first lesson I mentioned. That’s the kind of attitude we should adopt towards globalization. We should not be defeatists, we can change it.

In fact, in judging where global governance stands, the glass should be seen not only as half empty. It is also, well, half full is maybe an exaggeration, but there is something going on which is steadily filling the glass. The global governance agenda is enormous and we were challenged here by many to really see how serious the gaps are. There is no time to go into the depths of this, but I do see many processes going on with some promise.

There is one thing here that I would like to say – and I was provoked by the quote “We in the South are very weak”. I don’t think so! This is not my reading of where the world stands at the turn of the century. Yes, there are power differences, but yes, there is also much greater strength in the South today than ever before. I think that if you and we can get our act together—again take it as the middle power lesson from above—I feel sure that the enlightened forces of this world can have an impact on globalization.

What we need is the willingness to enter into new alliances worldwide, new alliances based on the concept of solidarity.

There are many things that can be done and which are impossible to comment on at this late stage in our discussion. But let me bring out the
continuing scandalous debt crisis. Making sure that each country knows what it has to do and what it can count on in terms of debt reduction by the year 2000, to see a real exit from unsustainable debt dependence, that is important.

On trade issues, they require a new focus as so much is going on in the WTO, in the post-Lomé Convention, and regionally. We need to look at the real trade engagement interests of the South, we need to know what we are talking about and we need to address the overall issues of financing for development. But I think it is possible to address many of these issues in new partnerships.

That, in fact, is my fifth point: partnership. Again, Sérgio Vieira said it nicely “to move from traditional aid relations to partnership relations for the promotion of growth based on common values”. Partnership is a key word everywhere and, of course, it leaves scope for a lot of hypocrisy, the horse-and-rider syndrome that many reminded us of. If we

—agree on strategic objectives,
—agree to agree on a broad cohesive agenda, and
—develop mechanisms for trust and dialogue,

I think we can develop something that is quite new.

Let me here say one word on the African renaissance. This is a concept that has promised a lot. If we look at the African debate at home, many concerned persons are saying: ‘What was it?’ ‘Was it nothing?’ ‘Is it not going to happen?’ ‘What’s going on?’. And, of course, the conflicts all around rightly demand our attention. But what about the renaissance: Was it a failed rebirth or is it a real birth?

I think, there is no doubt that a new generation of people in societies all around, at all levels, leaderships, opposition, civil societies, civil service, the media, private business, academics, are creating something new to build on.

We haven’t everywhere yet seen a full democratic transformation, but almost everywhere we have seen an openness revolution. As more and more interests are articulated the strengths of political institutions in the broadest sense are tested. Where weak, intolerance and corruption can play around, with devastating consequences. Democracy is the ultimate form of non-violent conflict management. And human development is the best way to get there. All over demands are being raised for nations to meet these aspirations.

It is possible to create a broad partnership for something new. Poul Nielson used the concept “to make ends meet”. I like that very much in terms of what it implies. The poor always have had to make ends meet.

Lastly, then, the sixth area, the obvious one of people-to-people contacts. Many have talked of the importance of personal contacts, the strong reactions, relations between people. It kept on coming up in the group reports. Definitely,
this is one of the most important aspects we bring with us from thirty-forty years of common history as we reflect on the future. We must do what we can to see to it that our contacts are developed on the broadest possible front.

Let me just take up Annika Lysén’s metaphor to round off. She said that “a marriage will fail if there is no communication”. Similarly our relations will falter if we are not open, if we do not meet, if we don’t see things as they are, and do not discuss them. I think that this conference took us a long way towards doing that. That is staying true to our tradition.

Perhaps it would be taking Annika’s metaphor too far to say that we maybe can hope for a second falling-in-love in our long-standing marriage.

In any case I hope that the spirit of our discussions here at Robben Island will infuse the partnerships we engage in in the years to come.

Thank you.
Summary

Amélia Sumbana

Dear Comrades and Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to start by thanking all the organizers of this conference, for the opportunity they have given us to be on this historic island where, inspired by the suffering of our comrades and leaders we have reviewed what the co-operation between the Southern African and the Nordic countries has been, and at the same time, drawn the strategies for future collaboration.

Before I start my presentation I would also like to make a brief reference to the wise and guiding speeches made by His Excellency the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, the Honorable Speaker Dr. Frene Ginwala and the Minister for Foreign Affairs from Sweden. In my point of view, those were very important keynote speeches which enlightened our work throughout the four days and I believe that we have easily reached common points of view because our interests are also common and we have received the green light to go ahead.

Comrades and Friends, I am going to follow the methodology used during the discussions, referring first to the research presented before us and afterwards summarizing the ideas for future strategies and co-operation vis-à-vis the role of the Nordic and the African countries and the new meaning of solidarity.

The research and the comments

There was a general consensus in the positive appreciation of the studies and it was stressed that it is a step forward to fill the gap and put together all available information concerning the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

It was pointed out that although the researchers in a humble way have said that all the work done was a footnote it is clear that this is part and parcel of all research and guides us to the analyses of the region's transition from the liberation movements period to fully independent countries. In order to improve the content some points of concern were raised:

The need to look into all aspects of the liberation movements taking into account not only the Nordic countries' perspectives but the African reality and information as well. The researchers have to work closer with the African researchers and use the available archives and human sources, for instance by doing direct interviews of the participants.

The human dimension has to be emphasized, and the impact of the Nordic co-operation in the African communities has to be analysed as well as the
impact of the liberation movement on public awareness and the development of a solidarity spirit among the Nordic peoples.

The studies do not go beyond the armed struggles in the sense that the launching of the war was not only to reach political independence but to pave the way for economic independence.

Attention was drawn to the impact of the sanctions applied against the apartheid regime and the racist Rhodesia: To what extent have they contributed to the success of the armed struggles and the price paid by the neighboring countries as a consequence? The reasons for the huge African debt make sense if analysed within those parameters. The role of the Nordic countries was recognized particularly when they stood full of authority on different occasions to advocate with confidence the legitimacy of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. It is essential to consider the liberation movements within the context of the Cold War, the underdevelopment, social and economic backwardness of the region.

The research could be more comprehensive so as to include gender relations during the struggle as well as mentioning the contribution to women's emancipation and empowerment. The capacity of the Nordic countries to mobilize their civil society for solidarity was a good base for the support of the movement, and a recommendation was made to continue.

**Future perspectives for co-operation and strategies**

The researchers are recommended to continue their work and to study numerous other aspects such as relations between liberation movements and frontline countries, neighbouring countries, liberation committees, OAU, Eastern Europe and China, the West, and of course the very history of liberation struggles in each country.

These historical researches need a broad partnership of both Nordic and Southern Africa researchers, as well as others. It was suggested that results of research should also be translated into Portuguese and French.

The future co-operation should also focus on the supply of means for collection and dissemination of the past history to contribute to a valuable transmission of positive values to the future generations. The Southern African region deserves a capacity to better organize the existing archives and to create new ones where these do not exist.

About the meaning of solidarity, it was stressed on many occasions that it has to gain a new dimension where the donor-recipient relationships have to be transformed in real partnership, based not only in interstate relations but also in direct relations from people to people with very clear instructions to the executor on how to make sure that all that is agreed reaches the targeted beneficiaries.
The solidarity concept had a different shape in the past but now it has to be redefined to fit the actual context.

The relations between the Nordic and the independent countries have to be different from those with the clandestine liberation movements of the past.

Humanitarian, moral and political support has to be transformed into real economic, social, cultural co-operation in the framework of a win-win philosophy.

It is important to redefine the sense of international co-operation and solidarity for a sustainable development in the region.

The new content of solidarity has to be based on the consolidation of peace and democracy to eliminate the huge gap between the developed and developing countries, the joint fight against crime, poverty and the elimination of the social exclusion of parts of the population in our countries.

The external debt is a threat to Southern African development. Concrete steps have to be taken for its total cancellation, thus allowing our countries to use the national income for development as well as social programmes to improve the living conditions of the disadvantaged people.

The continuation of co-operation with SADC is crucial. The development of management skills will enable the consolidation of the economies and make possible good governance and guarantee the awareness and accountability of the countries involved.

This conference should make concrete statements of its commitment to contribute to a smooth transition of power from the older to the younger generations and thus make sure that the future will be in good hands, avoiding clashes between generations.

Youth was also considered important and their problems have to be addressed. The ideas and needs of the new generations for change have to be considered with sufficient care so as not to jeopardize the positive achievements.

The new partnership should reinforce the efforts being made in Southern Africa for economic empowerment of the disadvantaged groups. Globalization is a phenomenon to be dealt with by the follow-up of the conference, and recommendations have to be made on strategies to be followed by all partners to prevent the further impoverishment of these countries in favour of the rich ones.

We all agree that the new relations should be based on the terms of market economy and not market society. It is also recommended that efforts have to be made by both partners in the economic arena. The increase of African participation can facilitate the intervention of the Nordic partners and an efficient advocacy in the negotiations with the European Union.
The conflict proliferation in Southern Africa is cause for concern. The peace-keeping process initiated by SADC must continue and be consolidated with the commitment of all Southern African countries.

Finally, referring to the Angola conflict it was emphasized that the supply of any means to UNITA must come to an end. UNITA is a continuous threat to all Southern African countries.

This conference recommended that all public opinion and governments should commit themselves to stop the genocide and killing of innocent people. Angolan people deserve peace to start the reconstruction of its economy and take care of the social needs of its citizens.

Last but not least, the need for a statement from the Nordic countries, committing themselves to continue the support of the Southern African ones, in their endeavour for the elimination of the burden of the external debt and to introduce the changes of the European Union and Bretton Woods policies was recommended, because sometimes those policies put in jeopardy national sovereignty and introduce serious factors of social destabilization. Economic measures and action have to be human-oriented and not only and solely profit driven.

Thank you.
APPENDICES
Reflections on the Nordic research project in the wider context of Southern African studies

Alberto Ribeiro-Kabulu

Southern Africa: A common struggle, a shared heritage

1. The demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, four years ago, evinced the total liberation of the continent. The decolonization of Africa and self-determination for its peoples was the major objective set out by Africa's Founding Fathers, when they established the Organization of African Unity. In 1975, most of Africa was already liberated, and the last bastions of colonialism were set up in Southern Africa. That noble aspiration was finally attained, but only as a result of long and bloody liberation wars, which raged across the borders and throughout the countries of Southern Africa. In fact, in that part of the continent, three colonial rulers: Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa had established powerful settler regimes and in very close co-operation among themselves formed an 'unholy alliance', determined to perpetuate colonialism and the supremacy of the white settlers, to the detriment of the African majority. To achieve this, they also manoeuvred to gain the connivance of most Western countries, which elsewhere in the world had defended the self-determination of the peoples and the end of colonialism.

2. The response of the African peoples in their quest for freedom and self-determination was correspondingly determined. They also strove to co-operate and fight together against the enemy and, on the other hand, searched for alliances abroad to support their struggle. There is some geographical uniformity in Southern Africa and its peoples have the sense of belonging to the same fatherland. We share common resources in our vast savannas and shores and have the same culture and ethnicity across boundaries. Besides, migration of labour moved from the rural areas large groups of the population across the borders, to work in the mines, plantations and fisheries. They could easily return home, after each contract, through railways and roads which criss-cross the region. These workers from different countries experienced together the same exploitation and humiliation by a rapacious capitalist system, which was unrestrained with impunity, because it had the protection of the colonial governments. The first protests, marches and strikes were organized together and then appeared the trade unions and political parties, which could only work underground and had no opportunity to vent their grievances. The organizations
they have created still maintain in our countries to the present day, the indelible imprint of these common origins. It was soon understood the close relationship among the rulers throughout the region and the need to take up arms in the last resort to survive and fight for human dignity.

3. Long before the outset of the armed struggle in the region, there were thus objective conditions for unity in the fight for liberation. Soon after the beginning of the national liberation struggle of Angola against the Portuguese colonialism in 1961, other peoples in different countries of the region successively took up arms against the oppressive regimes until the final demise of the apartheid regime in 1994. During that period i.e. for more than three decades, two generations of freedom fighters across the region have shared refugee camps and prisons, camps for military training and the ramparts and trenches in the combat for freedom. In 1990, when all other countries in the region had achieved independence, only the apartheid regime in South Africa persisted in the oppression of the African majority and destabilization of the newly independent countries through sabotage and acts of war.

4. In this long journey many sacrifices have been accepted by the freedom fighters and many heroes lost their lives for the cause of liberty, sometimes in exile, far from their homes and families. Particularly this place, Robben Island, which has been a prison where freedom fighters from all countries of the region have been detained and tortured, inspires a profound sentiment of respect and appreciation for their sacrifices for the noble cause of liberty. Their solidarity in the common struggle was a condition for the final victory against the oppressor. Today we feel the need and obligation to work together to research the history of the national liberation struggles in Southern Africa, which have been so closely intertwined. Several individuals, organizations and institutions have already started research projects to that effect and a few publications have been produced. Nevertheless, the scholarly work will always be imperfect without the broader view conferred by a common approach and contributions from the different countries in the region and abroad. The liberation struggle in Southern Africa was a highly profiled process with vast international implications, which affected international relations from the Second World War until the end of the Cold War. Its study is relevant not only for its academic interest, but also because it has consequences on the present diplomatic and political context of the Southern African countries.

Geopolitical interests and Nordic neutrality

5. One unfortunately remarkable aspect of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa was the undisclosed but effective support given by NATO to Portugal and South Africa, in contradiction to the accepted policy of decolonization and self-determination which was professed and practised elsewhere by the members of the organization. After the Second World War, Portugal, which was ruled by a
fascist regime led by Salazar, had difficulties to join the United Nations for those reasons. Nevertheless, it was invited in 1949 by the United States to join NATO, as one of its founding members. The reason for that apparently contradictory decision was the fact that the United States had signed an agreement with Portugal, before the end of the Second World War, to build a large military base in the Azores, a strategic Portuguese archipelago situated between Europe and the United States. The strategic importance of this military base is still relevant in the present day, despite the existence of satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles. This event gave Portugal a unique opportunity to avoid complete isolation among the Western countries, as was the case of its neighbour, Spain. So, Portugal had a decisive leverage to impose its colonial policies. Furthermore, it also gave the Portuguese colonial regime access to most needed weapons and military training to wage the colonial wars in Africa. The colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau were carried out with NATO weapons.

6. The case of South Africa was different. After the Suez crisis, it was important for the Western countries bordering the Northern Atlantic to have an alternative route to the Suez Canal, which had been nationalized by Nasser. The possibility was the use of Cape route, along the southern tip of the African continent. It was vital for the Atlantic alliance to have a safe route for the supertankers carrying oil from the Middle East to their member countries and to secure the maritime traffic with Japan and the Far East. The apartheid regime was aware of these strategic considerations and offered unrestricted co-operation, in exchange for Western support against the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. The vast and important natural resources of the region were added to those strategic interests, compounding an opportunistic alliance between NATO, Portugal and South Africa, in contradiction to universally accepted principles.

7. Sweden, the most important of the Nordic countries, maintained its neutrality during the Second World War, and is not a member of NATO. During the liberation struggles in Southern Africa it could therefore consistently pursue a policy based in the principles of self-determination and democratic rule, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, without submitting to the constraints imposed by Portugal and South Africa on the NATO countries. This fact gave Sweden a unique position among the Western countries, which was reflected in the support it rendered to the liberation struggle to end colonial rule and apartheid. After independence and the end of the Cold War, the region is at present in search of peace and stability. To achieve this purpose, the countries in the region need a correct evaluation of its new security threats and geopolitical constraints. At present scholars, military and politicians are studying this problem. In the search for partners for those purposes, the neutrality of the Nordic countries in relation to the constraints imposed on other NATO members during the liberation struggle is valuable capital of trust and mutual confidence which might be used now. These are important requisites to co-operate with the region in its present search for peace and stability.
The Non-Aligned Movement, decolonization and the United Nations

8. The ideology of non-alignment was chosen by the Third World countries to confront the polarization caused by the Cold War. This ideology was embraced by the liberation movements, which have been accepted as part of the Non-Aligned Movement. With their active participation the Non-Aligned Movement gave an invaluable contribution to the liberation of Southern Africa. Since its inception the Non-Aligned Movement used the United Nations as a privileged platform for the decolonization efforts, based on the Charter principle of 'equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. The approval in 1960 by the General Assembly of the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' was an important contribution to bringing colonialism and racial discrimination to a speedy end. The imposition of sanctions against Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa was another important step to support the liberation struggle. Nevertheless, the Non-Aligned Movement could exercise its influence only at the level of the General Assembly, on account of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, thus rendering the sanctions less effective.

9. With the end of colonialism and the Cold War the debate in the Non-Aligned Movement shifted to new issues, such as globalization and the increasing economic marginalization of the developing countries. In relation to the United Nations the current efforts of the non-aligned countries are aimed at democratic reforms, particularly the reform of the Security Council. The Non-Aligned Movement also remains an important forum to discuss issues of economic development and the new economic order, which is regulated by institutions outside the United Nations system, such as the World Trade Organization. Human development in the region, gender issues and the impact of structural adjustment programmes are other matters that are currently being studied in the region, within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Pan-Africanism and the role of the OAU

10. In the very early days of the decolonization of Africa, Pan-Africanism was the ideology presented by Kwame Nkrumah to unite the continent in the struggle for political independence and self-determination. These principles of unity for the total liberation of colonialism and oppression, were enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and have been the most inspiring guidelines for the national liberation struggle. After trying to use diplomatic and political means, the OAU recognized that the liberation of Southern Africa was only possible through an armed struggle. To that effect it established the Liberation Committee, based in Dar-es-Salaam, to organize the military support to the liberation movements. Until the independence of Angola and Mozambique, all military support for the armed struggle was channelled through the Committee,
which successfully accomplished its glorious task with the total liberation of the continent.

11. It is very remarkable that the Liberation Committee of the OAU could defend its activities against the sabotage attempts and attacks by the apartheid regime and colonialists, which have victimized freedom fighters throughout the region and undermined the liberation movements. Its records and reports are an invaluable source of documentation for the history of the liberation struggle.

Regional unity: The Frontline States and SADC

12. After the independence of Zimbabwe, in 1980, the countries in the region decided to create a structure to confront the economic and security threats represented by the apartheid regime in Namibia and South Africa. In the economic sphere, they created the Southern African Development Conference – SADC. This was later on transformed into a Community with the aim of economic integration, maintaining the same acronym and the same philosophy of promoting economic development through the implementation of concrete projects, grouped by main areas of responsibility, each under the co-ordination of a different country. The establishment of an economic community is a much more ambitious objective, which was complicated by the fact that South Africa had already created, during the apartheid regime, monetary and customs unions with some of the countries of the region. At present some studies are being undertaken to investigate the best ways to move the countries of the region towards regional economic integration.

13. In relation to defence and security matters, the Heads of State of the region decided to create a separate structure, grouping fewer countries than SADC, to consult among themselves on an ad-hoc basis, whenever it was necessary. These were called the Frontline States. To complement the summit meetings and coordinate matters at ministerial level, the Interstatal Committee on Defence and Security was established. SADC and the Frontline States had different chairmen. A complete separation between the economic and security spheres was therefore established. After the end of the apartheid regime the membership of the Frontline States was extended to all SADC countries and several studies were undertaken to reorganize the defence and security sector. This debate is still continuing.

Major regional projects and the role of the transnational corporations

14. During the liberation struggle all major projects undertaken in the region have been seen in a very critical manner and the intervening transnational companies condemned, because they infringed the sanctions imposed against colonialism and apartheid. This was the case, e.g. for the Cabora Bassa and Kunene River hydro-electric schemes. The impact of these and other projects in the outcome of the liberation struggle is still to be completely evaluated, as well as the role of the
transnational corporations, particularly during the period of the policy of constructive engagement of the American administration towards the apartheid regime. At present all projects involving several countries in the region are favoured, in order to promote economic integration. The economic, social and ecological impact of these projects is evaluated jointly with the participation of the involved transnational companies. Examples of this are the Epupa Hydroelectric and the Maputo Corridor projects.

The History of the National Liberation Struggles

15. This project was launched by the Southern Africa Political and Economic Serie, SAPES-Trust in 1991, to investigate the history of the liberation movements in the countries of the region in their own perspective, i.e. with a major contribution of the historic actors and direct reference to original documents and sources. It was intended to provide a critical analysis of the liberation processes in each Southern African country, in all their components, from the origins until independence, compiling the history of each organization, party, or entity contributing to the liberation movement, presenting biographies and case studies about participants, and highlighting the links and connections among themselves and with external organizations. Some methodological problems have been jointly addressed by all participating countries, related with the research on the origins of the liberation movement in the ethnic, cultural and class perspectives and its periodization, as well as the inter-relations of the national liberation movements during the struggle.

16. One very important aspect of this project is the investigation of the interactions and inter-relations among the liberation movements of the region, their personal, ethnic, ideological and religious affinities, which led eventually to common actions at social, political and military level. The history of the Liberation Committee of the OAU and its relations with the liberation movements is one focal point of the project, which also covered their relations with the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. The influence of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet conflict on the liberation movements are other external factors to be analyzed. Finally, the relations with the liberation support movement in the Western countries and the contribution of the youth, workers, students and church for decolonization and the end of apartheid. The actions of the civil society and grassroot movements have been a decisive factor in the victorious outcome of the liberation struggle.
Response, Angola

Maria da Conceição Neto

It's an honour and it's a great pleasure to be in South Africa, listening and discussing about solidarity with liberation struggles. My warmest thanks to all who have made this conference possible at such a special place as Robben Island. As far as Angola is concerned, special thanks go to Sweden's Ambassador, Lena Sundh, for her persistence in getting a significant presence from Angola to this conference, despite the serious situation of our country.

Rationale and limits of this contribution

A brief introduction is necessary, regarding the rationale and limits of my contribution, in relation to what was proposed. We were asked to give our personal point of view regarding the Nordic countries support of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, in reference to the work carried out over a number of years by the research team, that is now submitting its work for our appreciation.

This part of Angola's response was entrusted to an Angolan historian, not a specialist on the topic of the armed struggle, nor on international relations, and, apart from this, one who did not participate directly in the events referred to here, and who, as such, is unable to give personal testimony of the events concerned. I hope that others will have the opportunity to do so. However, throughout the post-independence years I have been able to interview some men and women directly involved in our liberation struggle, and my comments result largely and indirectly from their opinions, for which I must pay a debt of gratitude to these persons, some of whom are present.

Given the amount of work carried out and the number of pages to be read in a very short time span, some drastic measures were adopted.

First: Centre attention exclusively on relations between Nordic countries and Angola – even though we acknowledge that to understand some aspects of solidarity we must with no doubt take into account the regional dimension of the struggle, and 'three party' and 'multi-party' relations.

Second: Only analyse the period until the proclamation of Angolan independence, even though we acknowledge the importance of post-independence relations, whether at the State to State level, or between Nordic non-governmental organizations, churches and other associations, and Angolan partners. We also acknowledge the important relations that representatives of Nordic countries maintained within Angolan territory with SWAPO and ANC during the fighting years.
Third: It was out of the question to begin a parallel piece of research, collecting some more Angolan eye-witness accounts on past and present relations with Nordic countries. Neither was this the objective, and in any case, there was no time to carry out such a complementary study. However, we can state that the impressive research work carried out will be an additional incentive to the development of the oral history in Angola, concerning the national liberation struggle, in a more systematic form than it has been done previously – and this was, as such, a positive effect of this work by Nordic researchers.

So, the decision was to focus only on certain aspects of this study and in a very succinct way. But before going on, I’ll make a short digression on a related question which, on this occasion, I could not overlook.

As I stressed previously, this research work can be considered as impressive, as it manages to pull together analysis of documents and interviews. In relation to Angola, however, it is clear that documentation which exists in Angolan archives has not been consulted. I am not saying this in order to criticize or pinpoint a failure in the research work – on the contrary, I’d like to draw the attention of those concerned to the fact that, in Angola, the main historical archives relating to the liberation struggle and the first years of independence are not sufficiently organized, or not yet available, which has created serious limitations to the (few) national and foreign researchers interested in the subject. Possibly, a large amount of documents that were still existing at the end of our liberation struggle have been lost afterwards, which yet again highlights the importance of the oral and written testimony of those who participated directly in these events.

I do not wish to be pessimistic and I should emphasize that the situation is at last changing: the official MPLA archives are from some months back now trying to reorganize documentation, with the collaboration of the National Historical Archive; and also some documentation has been published – the most remarkable example of this being the publication by Lúcio Lara and Ruth Lara of documents in their possession (the already published Volume I covers the period up to February, 1961). But this in itself, still represents very little.

Given the serious economic and military crisis in Angola it is normal that attention and support concentrates on the more vital questions of the survival of the Angolan people. But this kind of research shows that also in the field of history (ancient, modern and recent history) there is work to be done, and scope for international co-operation.

It is important for Angolans, but also for their counterparts or partners in various places in the world, to recover knowledge of the past which is uncharted or not well-known. I won’t emphasize this point too much, but I could not omit reference to it at this meeting, given the seriousness of the situation as regards history and other social sciences in my country. We are without adequate research institutes. Although we do have a Higher Institute for Educational
Sciences, our University doesn't even have specific graduation in history, anthropology or sociology and the newly established private universities don't seem to be interested in those subjects. Almost no research is being carried out and Angola only has a few researchers in this area, most if not all of whom have a number of jobs, fighting for their economic survival. To be more direct: if the situation of the social sciences does not change in Angola, research institutes, whether they be from Nordic countries, such as the Nordic Africa Institute, or from other countries in Southern Africa, more advanced than us in this field, will continue to be unable to find much sought-after partnership in Angola. Now, it's time to go to the main theme of this meeting.

Some main points raised by this research

As proven by documentary research and confirmed in interviews, Nordic solidarity with the Southern African Liberation Movements was, above all, the result of opinion formed and conveyed through organizations within civil society – student associations, unions and political parties, groups linked to Missionary Churches or to political leftist organizations. These organizations gave practical and multifarious support – food aid, money, scholarships, publication in newspapers and 'propagandist' support. But their contribution was greater than this. When we analyse the individual careers of leaders who, once in power, influenced their governments in the sense of providing official aid for the liberation movements in Southern Africa, and more globally for the development of African countries, it becomes evident that they first made contact with these issues in their youth, through the aforementioned organizations.

This is to say, that everything indicates that the solidarity movements were born in society and made their way into governments, exercising pressure on the decision-making process, some strong, some less so, depending on the country and given moments in time. In such a way that even when there were internal political changes—for instance, when in Sweden the Social Democratic Party lost power—this did not substantially alter the rationale or the forms of aid. Another interesting confirmation of this research is that in the 1960s and 1970s political and ideological issues played a more complex role than usually admitted.

On the one hand, there is no doubt that activism in favour of the liberation movements (and, above all, the solidarity with those who, from the beginning of the sixties, were in open war against Portuguese colonialism), was an activism ideologically committed; it was against colonialism and imperialism, but also in favour of the struggle for socialism, interpreted in more or less radical forms. In my opinion the options chosen, in the case of Angola, in which there were a number of organizations asking for support, clearly reveal this political side of support to liberation movements.

But, on the other hand, we are not dealing with sectarian alignment—for instance, aid was directed at various groups, in the case of Angola—and above all, the donors did not demand any kind of political or ideological conditions
from the liberation movements in order to provide support. In this they distinguish themselves in relation to other major groups of supporters of these struggles, i.e. the so-called Soviet bloc. Even the most 'difficult' condition imposed by the Swedes—that material and financial support should be strictly used for humanitarian aid—was quite 'elastic', given that in no war can we expect that means of transport have an exclusively 'civilian' function. On more than one occasion, the MPLA movement received means of transport as part of Swedish aid.

This problem of humanitarian aid versus support for the armed struggle deserves a bit more reflection. The idea I've got is that 'everyone knew', (even when they did not admit it) that the Nordic countries were also contributing, even though indirectly, towards our anti-colonial fight, and that the society in these countries—or at least the activist groups in those societies—accepted this because it had been defined as a 'good cause.' And this was enough, perhaps, to legitimate the support given.

It seems to me very difficult to sustain the opinion that the majority of those who supported our organizations were 'naïve', and that they only wanted to give humanitarian aid, expecting that 'others' would help in a more active way in order to ensure victory for independence fighters. However, this is perhaps a question that can be cleared up more easily with the researchers from the Nordic Africa Institute.

Let's now see how was the political/ideological question set out, on the Angolan side? Without doubt, with great pragmatism. The friends—and the enemies—came from various tendencies, in spite of the undoubted influence of the Cold War in the main alliances already established. Examples are easy to find: as we know, the FNLA also received scholarships from Eastern European countries, even when Holden was accused of being 'a CIA agent', the MPLA received diverse support from religious organizations even when accused of being 'communist', and these two, as well as UNITA were, at different moments, able to count on China for support...

We should also not forget that the Angolan nationalist organizations were not politically monolithic, neither did their members share the same ideas on the future of the country. The main beneficiary of Nordic aid, the MPLA, was the result of the union of various groups, existing at the end of the fifties, whose ranks were then filled after 1961 with thousands of refugees fleeing from Portuguese repression to neighbouring countries. Amongst MPLA militants and fighters, those who avowedly saw themselves as communists always represented a minority, albeit an influential one. Communists or not, the cadres and leaders of the MPLA, came out clearly in favour of a policy of non-alignment, and this probably contributed and facilitated the relationship with parties and organizations in the Nordic countries.
The position of Angolan leaders in relation to these countries seems to have been one of openness and interest in closer relations, certainly for practical reasons—as a result of the fact that more support could be obtained from them than from any other Western country—but also as a result of the genuine interest in what was then called the ‘Swedish model’, whether you consider it ‘socialist’ or ‘social-democratic’. Apart from this, even when material support was scarce, the MPLA valued the support of the Nordic countries in itself, as it constituted an important opening to the Western world.

Another interesting problem—above all in relation to the future, our future—comes out from this piece of research. It’s the question of economic interests in relation to foreign policies and politics. It seems evident that part of the relative facility with which Scandinavian governments gave their support to the liberation movements and the struggle against apartheid can be put down to the fact that such aid did not put economic interests of any significance at risk in their countries (and when this happened, as in Cabora Bassa, the reaction was quite different...).

In the case of Angola, economic links were virtually non-existent and such questions were not contentious. In a general way, apart from a few exceptions, which have been analysed in the Nordic project, the ‘civil society’ of the Nordic countries did not have to oppose the state, in order to give support to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

Nowadays, as economic links become stronger for all of us (something which can certainly be considered desirable), state to state co-operation is strengthened and... the following question becomes inevitable: How do we, how can we avoid those economic interests preventing support for the development of social sectors or pressure groups which may be seen as ‘undesirable’ or ‘useless’ by political powers in our African countries?

Let us put it in another way: At the beginning of the 21st century are societies in developed countries prepared to lose economic advantages in exchange for solidarity for good causes, should it be necessary?

The last (but not least) question which has impressed me globally has to do with the importance of personal contacts and interpersonal relations throughout this process. Perhaps we could, reading the study, criticize the fact that authors placed too much value on these relations, as if almost everything depended on the persistence of a limited number of people, in each of these countries, to plead the cause of ‘freedom fighters’, refugees, and so on. In the analyses that have been done, it seems that at decisive moments, what counts is the form in which A or B manages to make his opinion prevail, influencing many others. Having a friend in the right place at the right time....

In my opinion, the research work exactly reflects reality. Personalities count a lot in this history of relations between worlds which are geographically and culturally so distant. The contacts were established at student meetings, in
solidarity committees, at party congresses, in meetings held by international organizations.... Decisions were taken influenced by conversations held with leaders and cadres of these organizations although, above all in the 1970s, people were also influenced by detailed reports and feature articles which emphasized the necessity of aid for those fighting for their freedom and their dignity. Bureaucracy also played its part (there were decisions which dragged on and there were funds which took more than a year to get to their destinations...) but, in general, those problems were overcome through personal relations, and influenced by the good or bad impression left by the representatives of peoples in struggle.

On the Angolan side, it is gratifying to see the recognition given to Agostinho Neto and, in the group of Portuguese colonies, the fundamental role of Amílcar Cabral.

However, the most paradigmatic and impressive example, in accordance with many testimonies quoted in this work, is a personality to whom we owe so much of the support to our struggles – I mean, of course, Olof Palme. His opinions and his actions, before and after being in power, will have been decisive in the official Swedish aid given to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. If, as recently claimed, and as the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa made public, the apartheid regime seems to have been implicated in his assassination, this is indirectly a tragic tribute to this remarkable man. At last, apartheid has fallen forever, Olof Palme has not been forgotten, and one proof that he was on the side of right is that today we are here, in this special place, together and free.

Are there any lessons from the past?

Finally, a few comments in order to contribute to reflections on future co-operation and solidarity.

First, about fragility and strength of so-called 'public opinion' and of the pressure groups. It became evident that sometimes the support of solidarity groups for a certain cause comes before the institutional and governmental support – and at times 'forces' it, by its persistence and its echo in other sectors. This is the strength of civil society in countries where the 'civic conscience' is not only an ideal to be achieved, but actually a reality.

However, we also saw that 'public opinion' (press, student groups, party committees) can in fact be dependent on the opinion of one or two people, activists and opinion-makers bent on gaining that support. That is to say that there is always the risk that 'public opinion' can be manipulated with a certain ease and the cause can change from being supported to being forgotten or being condemned and vice versa. I believe that this risk has increased with the proliferation of 'causes' which today are appealing for solidarity, with the increase in the number of non-governmental organizations in African countries,
and with the spread of a kind of journalism seeking strong emotional response and which indulges in scandal-mongering.

The second comment is about international solidarity and the ideological questions, and other disagreements with a philosophical, political, or religious basis. As has been seen, these differences are not sufficient reason to prevent solidarity and even strategic alliances, given common problems or important common objectives, namely the fight against oppression. In the case of Nordic support for the liberation of Southern Africa, it was exemplary, even when nationalistic organizations were considered to belong to the 'other camp' in the bipolar division engendered by the Cold War. We are impressed by their refusal to align their external politics in accordance with the decisions of the great powers, managing to make 'questions of principle' prevail, in this specific case the people's right to independence and the rejection of any racial discrimination. Today, when to make 'questions of principle' prevail in international relations is as difficult or more difficult than in the past, we must reflect on this.

Lastly, it seems important to stress the persistence of solidarity in hard moments or when results are difficult to see. We could, through this study, observe cases of backtracking and cases of persistence – these are the cases that today can make some of you proud. We know how sometimes it is difficult to believe in the future.

Yesterday's future is our present now. This research has done great work on the past common history of Nordic Europe and Southern Africa. This research also stressed some of the ties amongst Southern Africa countries and peoples. Let us hope this work on recent past history will help our future common history.

Thank you.
The Nordic countries and Mozambique
From national liberation to economic liberation

Sérgio Vieira

Introduction
About four decades ago the most southerly point where one could perhaps discuss liberation was Tanganyika. The River Ruvuma marked the border separating the Africa that considered political power belonged to Africans and the Africa condemned to colonial and racist domination.

In the early seventies the Kissinger report on Southern Africa predicted that nothing would change in the colonial universe of Angola and Mozambique, or in the empire of racism, before the end of the millennium.

Yet here we are today, seated in what was the most secure prison of apartheid, witnesses to the triumph of the strength of peoples and their solidarity over the technocracies of oppression.

In mid-November our friend Tor Sellström sent me some 500 pages, the outcome of your collective work. I was intimidated by the volume until I started reading eagerly, reviewing what had been lived by me and my generation, retrieving the thread that leads us to the present.

I am of course familiar with the Mozambican universe, but to some extent I have also shared the experiences of the other liberation struggles in this sub-continent such as those in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and S. Tomé e Príncipe.

I shall follow the advice of the organizers and limit this text to some dozen pages and to the Mozambican vision.

At the present time it is hard to come across an analysis as vast, well documented and complete as that offered by your collective. Since many among us are from the academic world you will not be surprised if I propose that the work be approved summa cum laude.

Here and there I found small and occasional flaws in the information that can be easily corrected if those of us with a little spare time could revise the text before final publication. Just a few light touches.

Given the time constraints my presentation will concentrate on two main aspects, one looking to the past and the other to the future.

In the first part, on legitimacy and solidarity, on the basis of your text and concerns I shall touch on three main aspects: the clash between bureaucracy and the national interest and that of humanity, the distortion introduced by
Here we should emphasize the role played by Sweden, by the Swedish Agency for International Development, by the Swedish social democratic forces and by Swedish youth.

As it was not a member of NATO and to some extent removed from the Cold War and not suspected of compromise with the USSR, Sweden could act and speak with really decisive authority and effect.

**Bureaucracies and national interest**

Small and medium powers obtain their information from reports by their embassies and consulates, including their military attachés. In addition to these sources the great powers frequently have autonomous intelligence networks.

Experience has often shown that the quality of the information obtained in this way, particularly in totalitarian countries like Portugal, tends to be poor and even wrong.

Various factors contribute to this. The diplomatic corps lives in a closed circle, its contacts are limited to government circles and elites close to the centres of power. At that time they worked with them, went to receptions, lunches, dinners, on hunting trips and spent weekends with them. The information obtained in this way seldom differed from what the government wanted to be known. In Mozambique, the various consulates knew virtually nothing about the ‘natives’, who were relegated to the functions of domestic servants and little more. The consular corps only socialized and talked with the colonial authorities and economic circles, made up exclusively of the colonial elite.

Since they were being watched by the political police, the embryonic Mozambican intelligentsia within the country or in Portugal did not even attempt to approach diplomats, and indeed had little or no trust in them.

Those who were abroad only had access to the student movement and the leftwing groups, all with little credibility in decision-making circles.

It should also be recalled that economic interests favoured relations with colonial fascist Portugal and the apartheid block, as did commitments arising from Portuguese membership of NATO.

FRELIMO and the liberation movement in general could not but fail to criticize the pernicious role of NATO and economic interests in preserving Portuguese colonialism and racism. This position did not facilitate approaches to and dialogue with decision-making centres. It is thus not surprising that Mondlane and FRELIMO leaders encountered obstacles to dialogue with Western leaders. Even in their embassies in Dar-es-Salaam or Lusaka access was frequently limited to minor officials and it was virtually impossible to obtain a meeting with the ambassador.

At best, states sought refuge in platonic declarations condemning violence or massacres, insisting on ‘assistance for refugees’ in ways that did not
compromise their governments, while at the same time Portugal was receiving military assistance under Atlantic alliance obligations. This essentially came down to supplying weapons to the murderers and bandages to the victims.

This absence of communication and impediment to dialogue deprived Western leaders of important and direct information and determined their negative political options. Since they had no real information base, their perception of the way the situation was evolving led to errors of analysis.

The dominant discourse today still considers that the fall of the Portuguese regime was the determining factor in decolonization. Nothing could be further from the truth. The underlying cause of the fall of the Lisbon regime, the April captains' revolt, was essentially the desire to avoid the military collapse of the Armed Forces in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau and hence, 14 years after the surrender of the army in Goa, once again becoming a scapegoat for government policy. Such is the tenor of the opening words of the 25 April manifesto. Preventing the surrender of the army in Mozambique, foreseen by the chief of the general staff General Costa Gomes, or in Guinea-Bissau, foreseen by Spinola, united the conservative elements among operational generals with the more junior officers who were in command in the field. The national liberation struggle was the vital factor in the Portuguese liberation of 25 April, and its continuation after the fall of the regime blocked manoeuvres in quarters that still hankered after colonialism, headed by Antonio Spinola.

American surprise at the fall of the regime and colonies, the cheque hurriedly signed by the Finnish government described in your texts, are yet other consequences of the lack of information and hence erroneous perceptions.

However, not only the West suffered from this problem. The Soviet bureaucratic machine, including its intelligence organizations also suffered from the imperative of only transmitting what corresponded to the official and hierarchically desirable truth.

In August 1974 a Soviet delegation came to Dar-es-Salaam to "reprimand" FRELIMO for not accepting the cease-fire, and thereby endangering democracy in Portugal and the participation of the Portuguese Communist Party in the new government. Samora Machel and some of his colleagues, including myself, met with the Soviets one hour after having concluded the texts of the Lusaka Agreements in a secret meeting with a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government delegation, that included Ministers Mario Soares, Almeida Santos and Melo Antunes. Soviet arrogance and their desire to "reprimand" deprived them of this information.

Both the West and the USSR were surprised at the overwhelming victory of ZANU in the 1980 elections, even though Mozambique and others had foreseen it and informed them in advance that this would happen.
And what about Western and Zairean underestimation of Angolan capacity to hold back invasions from the north and south on the eve of independence or the unimaginable Carlota operation?

The immediate visions and interests of bureaucracies tend to blur the truth and prejudice the national interest.

**The force of reason**

A combination of various factors gradually forced acceptance of the legitimacy of both the armed national liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies and solidarity with liberation movements.

The unitary character of the liberation movements in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau was certainly an important factor. The exemplary struggle led by FRELIMO and PAIGC, their respect for civilians, observation of norms on the treatment of prisoners of war, their social programmes in the liberated areas, the frequent visits by journalists, cameramen, and delegations of all kinds dissipated the curtain of silence and eroded the pre-conceived ideas imposed by ignorance and the Cold War.

Denunciation of massacres of the population, such as those in Mecumbura or Wirayamu, because publicized by Catholic priests—the Spanish Burgos Fathers and the British Father Adrian Hastings—made the West aware of the hateful nature of the Portuguese colonial war.

Christian churches, Protestants and essentially non-Portuguese sectors of the Catholic clergy became an important vehicle for denouncing the colonial system.

In 1970 the Rome Conference, that anticipated the Oslo conference, was attended by important sectors involved in solidarity action. In particular, Christian Democracy and Aldo Moro played an important role at this level. And the audience granted to FRELIMO, PAIGC and MPLA leaders by Paul VI marked a major turning point in the West’s perception of our struggle.

In this overall context, the solidarity battle hitherto waged by youth movements, students, intellectuals and forces on the left was able to open the doors of parliaments, to get governments to take positions, including in NATO fora. The Norwegian intervention in Lisbon in the NATO ministerial meeting was exemplary.

The battles won by the Portuguese colony solidarity movement in the early seventies opened the way for subsequent actions in the second half of the decade and the eighties, on behalf of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. We should also note that the anti-apartheid movement in the fifties and sixties created favourable conditions for solidarity with FRELIMO, PAIGC and MPLA.

There were many exemplary actions that stimulated your enthusiasm and touched our hearts. It is impossible to list them all. However given the text by our
colleagues Lina Soiri and Pekka Peltola I must say how we were moved by Taksvarkki and its effect, indeed its revolutionary effect, on the production of teaching materials for schools, health services, education policy, information. The small printing press that solidarity offered us became a vital instrument of progress and almost, I might add, the darling of our comrade Jorge Rebelo.

The combination of the justice of the cause and its means, and efficiency in the use of solidarity was an effective and indispensable response to the desires of solidarity and enabled the solidarity cause to spread and win over the essence of society.

The solidarity movement was also important in the strategy to make our struggle autonomous in the Cold War context, to some extent to distance it from the confrontation, because it had the sympathy of all.

It must be said that erroneous and immoral commitments to Portuguese colonial fascism, to the Salisbury and Pretoria regimes, prolonged the wars, contributed to the vast enterprise of devastation in Angola and Mozambique by apartheid, and meant that the USSR and the East appeared to be virtually the only consistent champions of the liberation cause in Southern Africa, when in fact the West also repudiated colonialism and racism.

II. The search for future paths

Until the end of apartheid the priority of our peoples was to overthrow colonialism and racism, to neutralize armed aggression and racist destabilization. Consequently, these were the tasks of international solidarity.

Of course, the consolidation of peace and democracy is always an essential imperative and basic condition for progress.

We are aware that peace is as yet barely visible on the Angolan horizon. We note that democratic institutions do not prevail in Lesotho and Swaziland, and that they are fragile in Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, we also know that a great deal has been achieved over the last two decades.

The search for a solidarity that looks to the future means identifying the main tasks, common interests and partners in this process.

The main task

The legitimization of armed action and the solidarity and support for the liberation movement was the essence of the solidarity cause.

Today the concerns of our peoples and of mankind lie at another level. We have mentioned the consolidation of peace and democracy as an imperative and basic condition for progress.

What threatens peace and democracy in Southern Africa today? Underlying the ethnic and other conflicts that have arisen in various places we always find the common denominator of misery. Unequal development,
polarization between the sea of poor people and a wealthy few, the social foundations for the proliferation of crime, organized or not, receptivity to religious, ethnic, political and other forms of fundamentalism are all different branches of the tree of misery in our countries.

Hunger riots, the disorderly influx of people to urban areas, the proliferation of crime are the main destabilizing factors in society, the most immediate threat to peace and democracy in our states.

These social cancers create a favourable environment for the triumph of various kinds of fundamentalism and demagogy, legitimize appeals for dictatorial governments and internal and regional belligerent adventures.

Humankind is distressed by the deterioration of the environment, the advance of desertification, the degradation of soils and the pollution of waters. Here again we find in our countries a strong correlation between poverty and the destruction of the planet. How can we tell a peasant not to cut down a tree for firewood, not to kill the elephant that destroys his crops, not to cultivate on river banks during years of drought or on slopes when floods are expected? What alternatives do we offer?

The fight against misery is also a requirement of humankind, including in developed countries, and is in everyone's interest.

Among the international community Mozambique is considered a success story in the achievement of peace, national reconciliation and economic and social development. In four years not only has our GDP grown more than 50%, but according to UNDP there has been almost similar progress in the Human Development Index.

While taking note of this success and being pleased with it, in reality and realistically we must also recognize the growing frustration at social exclusion.

Without ambiguity I must stress that the weight of the country's foreign debt is today the greatest threat to national stability. Adjustment measures, directed as they are towards financial aspects in particular and satisfying creditors, tend to bring about the downfall of the governments which apply them and weaken states.

We are currently spending almost 60% of the value of our exports to pay for debt and debt service. If we fulfill the 47 conditions imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions, from June 1999 one quarter of our export revenue will be spent on paying for debt and debt service.

Every year, for every inhabitant we spend one dollar on education, one dollar on health and 4 dollars on debt and debt service – double what is spent on education and health combined.

It seems unnecessary to say that this is not sustainable. In 1953 Germany informed the allies that it could not allocate 10% of its exports to pay its
creditors. The 1953 London protocol reduced the maximum ceiling for debt payments to 5% of the annual value of German exports.

A large part of the Mozambican debt results from Mozambique having complied with United Nations Security Council decisions on Rhodesia and South Africa.

We owe 5.6 billion dollars but the Rhodesian and South African wars destroyed equipment and infrastructure valued at 20 billion dollars, left us with one million dead and one quarter of the population displaced within the country and abroad.

I would thus say that the campaign for the immediate elimination of Mozambique's debt or its conversion into investments in agriculture, education, health, communication infrastructure, the rehabilitation of degraded soils and reforestation, is the main and decisive task for the solidarity movement. In doing this we will consolidate peace, expand democracy, fight effectively against misery and save the environment.

The mass movement, the social pressure that led the Nordic parliaments and governments to solidarity with Mozambique’s liberation struggle should today be directed at this objective.

Community of interests

In the past, the anti-colonial, anti-racist and anti-fascist ideological basis, and an awareness of belonging to a humankind that is diminished by the effect of oppression, were clear points of departure and points for the convergence of interests for the solidarity movements.

The focus today is the objective of economic and social development, the desire and the need to reduce the wide domestic gap between the privileged few and the excluded masses, and the international gap between the countries at the centre and those on the periphery. This context also includes concern about the need to halt the destruction of the planet.

Development and the rehabilitation of the environment generate little emotional echo compared to the previous causes in which we were involved, although they are no less imperative.

Involvement in development actions requires the active participation of financial capital, investors, commercial interests. We shall have to show that development investment in Mozambique can generate rewarding returns, explain to the investor the favourable economic environment, seek complementary interests and mutual advantages in the relationship.

Without wishing to reduce solidarity to a mere chamber of commerce, we must recognize that the commercial and economic relationship is one of the tasks to be included on the agenda.
In the colonial context we opposed Swedish participation in the construction of Cabora Bassa and the import of citrus fruit from Southern Africa to the Nordic countries.

In the development context the exploration of Mozambique hydro-energy sources, the control of water so that it does not become scarce and kill during years of drought, does not destroy through floods, are requirements with mutual advantage.

Providing an unpolluted space in nature for non-polluting tourism, the discovery of the value to be found in cultural difference and exchange, help development and help bring peoples together. The simple fact that your winter, a major consumer of energy for heating, coincides with our summer and even autumn, opens up the prospect of a flow of tourists, in particular young and retired people.

We know that in order to prevent the uncontrolled growth of cattle herds, every year the European Union has to buy, kill and incinerate a million calves. We could conceive a solidarity movement that avoids killing calves by transporting them to where they can grow, put an end to misery and develop. We shall thus exchange the civilization of waste for a culture that gives value to goods and life.

Transporting calves, their adaptation, their transformation from animals fed by rations to free animals growing on pasture, benefits your cattle breeders, the transporters, scientific institutes, it benefits us and provides gains for everyone.

In order to control fishing, every year the European Union acquires hundreds of fishing vessels and dismantles them. This benefits shipyards and the renovation of the fleets. It would still serve this objective if, instead of being dismantled, the boats were given or even sold to us, who need them to feed ourselves and for our development.

Saving the planet’s resources means the rational use of what we create and produce in order to avoid waste.

Just as in the past, the solidarity movements can raise the awareness and interest of financial and business circles, showing the advantage of the new partnership prospects, that are profitable and serve the common cause of the well-being of humankind.

Freedom from misery is today a cause as noble as was the national liberation struggle in the past and is its indispensable compliment.

Identifying partners
Samora Machel used to tell us that we should win new friends, but without ever abandoning our old companions, those who have always stood by us.
The solidarity movement of the Nordic countries grew out of nuclei of young people and students, forces of the left, in universities, in churches, and little by little won over the media, the political parties including those of the centre and right, entered parliaments and states and led to action by governments.

In the process it had to overcome bureaucratic inertia, incorrect perceptions of strategic interests and question the activities of certain companies.

The nucleus of the solidarity movement expanded. Today in the Nordic countries there is undoubtedly consensus in parliaments and states on policy towards Mozambique.

We must now expand into new partnerships. Find them in banking—there is no Nordic bank in Mozambique—in industries, in trade, in agriculture, in forestry, in the business world.

The diversification of our relationship, the transformation of the aid exercise into economic and financial partnership for development would seem to be the immediate and main challenge that on the one hand stabilizes, consolidates and expands relations between peoples and states, and on the other hand helps overcome donor fatigue.

The recent visit of His Majesty the King of Sweden was marked by a major presence of economic agents, a positive indication of the dawn of qualitative and quantitative progress in our relations. Why not establish ship repair yards along the Mozambican coast? The area is in dire need of them and Nordic capital, technology and experience could collaborate to the benefit of everyone. Why not use the enormous capital of the abundant electrical and thermal energy in Mozambique for your benefit and ours? Would this not improve your competitiveness, would it not lower costs and generate employment and development in our country?

New avenues are opening up, new paths must be found.

Conclusion

We face the challenge of winning new friends and reality indicates where we should concentrate our main action in order to expand your support.

Many of your citizens know Mozambique, have worked or work there, have visited us, experienced and lived with us the excitement of liberation, the dark hours of apartheid aggression, the apprehension that came with the achievement of peace, the anguish and disillusionment, the setbacks imposed by economic adjustment and the sometimes tyrannical and absurd rules dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions. These friends, those who have since returned home and those who still live with us, want to be used as spokespersons and ambassadors for the cause of friendship, solidarity and co-operation.
What we have already achieved is enormous and marvellous. But there are still new mountains to be climbed.

I would like to end with a personal note. This is the first time I have visited this island. In January 1983 I came to Cape Town with some colleagues on a mission in search of peace, an exercise to prevent more military escalation in the conflict between us and apartheid.

At one point I was invited to see Cape Town by helicopter, accompanied by the apartheid ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Law and Order.

The helicopter flew over an island. The then Commissioner of Police asked me if I knew the name of the island, I said no and he replied: Robben Island. I asked if he visited the island and met with the prisoners. He said yes.

I stood up and asked if the next time he went to the island he would transmit my respect and solidarity to President Mandela.

Despite their icy stares the fact is, and this represents our victory, we are here today and Nelson Mandela is the President.

Thank you very much.
Zimbabwe: Nordic solidarity, national liberation and post-independence problems and prospects in Southern Africa

A. M. Kambudzi

Introduction

Although the principle of self-determination for colonial territories was articulated at the time of the post-World War I settlement in the 1919 Versailles Treaty, the application of this principle to colonial territories and populations was delayed until two and a half decades later. In the inter-war (1919-1938) League of Nations order, colonies became “Trust Territories” under the administration of appointed powers. But from 1945 onwards, under the aegis of the United Nations, which succeeded the League of Nations, colonies became “mandated territories, with a provision for differential, gradual progress towards a self-determination status”. In reality, all this translated into sluggish, gradual transition to self-rule. Various countries were given the mandatory functions of steering colonial territories towards independence. In the colonies, gradual decolonization became more and more unacceptable. Violent measures were adopted, giving birth to the armed struggle in many situations. On the African continent, Southern Africa took the largest share of these violent anti-colonial struggles from 1950 to 1994. But once the racist colonial systems were over, not all went well in some of the liberated colonies. New forms of authoritarian rule mushroomed as military and one-party rule spread.

Of course, the resort to violent measures, the problem of this kind of phase-by-phase decolonization was that it could not treat the evils of oppression, exploitation and humiliation of the colonized population quickly and effectively. This view of the colonial situation found its expression in the ‘National Liberation Movement’. Violent anti-colonial struggles raged in Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In South Africa, the national liberation movement was dominated by internal mass action, with significant elements of violence against the apartheid system. In the words of one political theorist, because “the colonial system is based on brute force, it can only be resisted with force”. Mao Tse Tung even put it precisely, that “political power grows out of

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1 National Liberation Movement: An African political organization to mobilize support and remove the colonial system.

2 Fanon, F., The Wretched of the Earth, p. 87.
the barrel of the gun". Hence the recipe was drawn up and applied in the national liberation struggle. Whilst most of these struggles are over, much is left for researchers and the struggles' participants to do to establish the facts of these historic movements. To document these facts will be a pioneering activity. Some Nordic scholars and researchers have already embarked on this kind of work.

An intellectual tribute

We all owe a big debt to the Nordic researchers and scholars in our search to understand the intricacies of the nature of attention and support that was rendered by the Nordic communities and governments to the cause of anti-colonial liberation in Africa. Southern Africa drew the largest share of all this obvious support activity. It is not so much the originality of the Nordic research project on the subject of the 'Support to National Liberation in Southern Africa' which is special, but it is the intellectual dexterity with which these scholars and researchers accessed, analysed, discussed and presented things that were totally official secrets. They have successfully desecretised some of the official statements and communications between the key players, namely, the leaders and representatives of national liberation movements (NLM) and Nordic governments and civic activists.

Yet specifically, some of us in Southern Africa remain indebted to these Nordic researchers and scholars for another reason. Through this Nordic research project on National Liberation in Southern Africa, we begin to come to grips with both the inside and outside characteristics and dynamics of the Southern African liberation movements. The results of the study, and more are to come up, are so stimulating that one cannot avoid contemplating research undertakings in Southern Africa to deal with a number of issues:

- What motivated Nordic support, given the Cold War situation of the time?
- To what extent did Nordic support encourage a centralist outlook or democratic orientation within those national liberation movements which they chose to recognize and support; how much did these movements exploit this recognition and support to starve other nationalist formations of energy to organize against the colonial system? Presumably, selective recognition and support reinforced the ego in dominant nationalist movements to take all power for themselves once the colonial regime ceased.
- To what extent does the legacy of NLMs, in addition to the legacy of the colonial system, contribute to the contagion of internal conflicts in the post-independence era?
- And what could be done to restore political stability, trust and hope in some of the liberated countries today immersed in war or internal crisis (Angola, Zimbabwe, Lesotho)?

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3 Mao Tse Tung, *Selected Works*, p. 213.
Certainly to chart the way forward for the renewal of solidarity between Nordic and Southern African countries, we have to clear these issues. The implication of ignoring them being that we risk ending up with the wrong recipe for a new, post-liberation partnership between all of us. Thus, we must start from the background now provided for us in the Nordic research project.

Notably, Tor Sellström has been, and remains a frontal actor in this research. His present draft research work *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Volume II: A Concerned Partnership (1970-1994)* is very revealing. The author follows the track of his first volume that focused on the formative stage of Nordic "active political opinion" as the preliminary stage to active support to NLMs in Africa. Yet the second volume labours articulately on the links between Swedish politicians and activists on one hand, and national liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. One imagines that there should be a third volume focused solely on South Africa and Namibia, since these two problems were closely linked. Tor Sellström's study is definitely built around solid detailed facts.

So is Christopher Morgenstierne's study on Denmark's role in the anti-colonial liberation process in Southern Africa. His perspective in *Denmark: A Flexible Response - humanitarian and political* shows us clearly the evolution of a Danish position relative to national liberation movements. Though he does not use a case-by-case approach, as Sellström does, one gets to see Danish support links to a number of liberation movements: ANC, MPLA, FNLA, ZANU, SWAPO and FRELIMO.

Equally illuminating is the study on *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, edited by Tore Linné Eriksen. The Norwegian support to the ANC, FRELIMO, SWAPO, MPLA, PAIGC, ZANU and ZAPU is properly put into perspective. The civic dimension of this support is clearly illustrated.

Finally, the work on *Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa* by Lina Soiri and Pekka Peltola, stands as a very outstanding endeavour. The pattern is common with other research works, with a pre-occupation to show explicitly when, what and how support was mobilized and given; and the recipient national liberation movements are clearly described.

As informative, interesting and stimulating as these segments of the Nordic research project are, each of them has been able to deal with the evolution of pro-liberation opinion in the Nordic countries as well as the internal attitudinal contradictions that flowed from this evolution. Though not every official section was pro-liberation in the Nordic countries, the preponderant

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official, activistic and civic actors understood the moral imperative of supporting the national liberation movements in Southern Africa. The studies underscore the point that Nordic support was motivated and founded on moral principles, with a specific humanitarian focus.

Indeed, after the reading, one is left inspired to investigate more both the historical stage of national liberation and post-independence stage of the contradictions and problems of national liberation in Southern Africa. Let me move on to deal with some of these issues.

Resistance to entrenched colonial system

The colonial empire was a real fountain of wealth and prestige for colonial powers which hardly ever accepted the total liberation of colonial possessions. Portugal, for example, hung on to its African colonies into the 1970s, but only to face stiff and overwhelming military opposition from national liberation movements. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Portugal enjoyed considerable diplomatic and military support from some of its NATO partners. The latter viewed Portugal as an ally against the spread of communism in Africa.

In the mid-1970s, Portugal, apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia entered into the so-called “Holy Alliance” with the goal of confronting and halting the southward advance of the process of national liberation. The plan was only self-deceptive as the momentum for liberation continued to gather. Even when South Africa adopted its “Total Strategy Policy”, in the late 1970s, this did not neutralize the process of liberation.

As a result of somewhat different circumstances and considerations, two groups of countries emerged which were sympathetic to the cause of national liberation. On the one hand, there were socialist (communist) countries that sought to reduce the world edifice of capitalism by solidarising with, and backing, anti-colonial national liberation movements. But this military, moral and diplomatic support as it were, had overriding ideological motivations. There was a vision of remaking the world in a communist style whereupon the liberated colonies would add on their number and membership. Southern Africa, throughout the Cold War era, became an intense field for US-Soviet ideological conflicts.

On the other hand, there were countries which espoused and supported the principles of justice, human dignity, freedom and equality in so far as these basic principles should be enjoyed by all people. No doubt, the espousal of these

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5 The 1972 Security Co-operation between South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal to jointly halt the southward advance of communism and national liberation.

principles was inspired by a firm commitment to the respect of human rights. The humanitarian and Christian element was very strong in this current of international opinion. Notably, the Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden) occupied a central position in this group. Social movements and governments in these four countries assumed what was a counter-current within the mainstream thinking of the ‘West’ prior to the height of national liberation politics in the 1970s. Thus, Nordic civic groups and governments opposed colonial injustice and elected to support anti-colonial national liberation movements, especially in Southern Africa.

Yet today, one is faced with the task of reviewing both the character and impact of national liberation, together with the historical role of Nordic countries in the process. Simultaneously, one has to project the direction of further Nordic support to Southern Africa on a long-term basis. In this context, the question of who benefited from national liberation should be addressed in order to deal with the future challenges of international co-operation in the Southern Africa–Nordic context.

**Nordic countries and national liberation**

In the mainstream national liberation movements in Southern Africa, the Nordic countries played a role that becomes clearly significant in view of the circumstances that:

- the major Western powers gave no sympathetic hearing to the call for national liberation in Africa, especially in the last colonies in Southern Africa;
- the Nordic countries broke out from a no-historical-ties position to become the international spokespersons on national liberation in the world, mobilizing diplomatic, moral and material support to liberation movements; a very important humanitarian contribution was made in that process;
- although the socialist countries most actively supported national liberation, from a military point of view, they had ulterior ideological motives, which created burdens for liberation movements;
- the prevalent view within the Western bloc was that liberation movements were communist agents to be neutralized.

In these conditions, Nordic countries did play an essential supportive role to the national liberation struggles in Southern Africa, the last part of the African continent to be liberated from direct colonial rule; though it is, again, in this area that the first winds of anti-colonial African nationalism began to blow. The African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa for instance, stands as one of the oldest nationalist parties in Africa dating back to 1912.

The region faced the spectre of late decolonization on account of:
— a widespread white settler population as a result of favourable climatic and economic conditions;
— abundant natural resources which gave promises of wealth accumulation to colonial powers and the settlers;
— the pro-colonial regime support that some of the Western powers provided in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, to Portugal and South Africa;
— the geo-strategic value of the Cape route, and abundant strategic mineral reserves.

At one time, in cases such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, colonial political developments seemed to parallel the evolutions of colonial Australia and New Zealand in the last century where white settlers became as resident and nationalized as the indigenous population. Nonetheless, none of the colonies in Southern Africa ever reached dominion status as the indigenous population remained predominant.

Nordic support in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe Nationalist Movement shares the same characteristics with its contemporaries in Southern Africa. Two political forces remained preponderant during the period of the national liberation movement namely, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). The movement began in the 1950s, using peaceful methods of struggle (strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, calls for talks and prayers). Owing to the intransigence of the white settler regime, the movement became militant in the course of the 1960s. The first guerrilla attack on Rhodesian positions, today referred to as the “First Chimurenga”, was the Battle of Sinoia on 28 April 1966. But this is the version of ZANU, since ZAPU claims that its own military units crossed from Zambia in 1965 to engage Rhodesian forces. In both cases, the fact is that both the element of deployment and actual fighting marked the beginning of the liberation war.

From the beginning, the nationalist movement was vulnerable to both “internal struggles” and enemy manipulation. The Rhodesian government used the “penetrate, manipulate and divide approach”. As a result, the movement split into moderate, internally based political parties (African National Council,

7 Historical reference by the Zimbabwe African National Union to the initial phase of the armed struggle against the white settler regime.

8 Sithole, M., Struggles Within the Struggle, p. 5.
Zimbabwe United Federal Party, etc) and externally-based militant parties which opted for the armed struggle.

ZANU established key bases in Mozambique and ZAPU did the same in Zambia. This explained personality connections; for instance ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, was a favourite of Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda. Whilst R. G. Mugabe had close relations with the Mozambican nationalist leader, and later president Samora Machel.

In common for ZANU and ZAPU was that they obtained the recognition of both the Frontline States and the OAU’s Liberation Committee, set specifically on completing decolonization. Of course, by 1976, ZANU and ZAPU were pressurized into one formation to speak with a single voice: Patriotic Front (PF). ZANU and ZAPU fought under the PF banner till the 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, but finally separated in the first independence elections in April 1980. After bitter antagonism between 1981 and 1986, the two parties came together again under the “Unity Accord” of October 1987. During this period, there was a quasi-civil war in the south-west Matebeleland area and a considerable number of civilian lives were lost and property damaged.

It is significant to note that, regardless of the internal contradictions within the Zimbabwean national liberation movement, the Nordic countries unhesitantly funnelled support to both ZANU and ZAPU. The fact that Nkomo and Mugabe were closer to Moscow and Peking, respectively, did not really discourage Nordic recognition and support. Notably this demonstrated that Nordic support motives were not ideological but were purely a case of resistance to forces of injustice, indignity, oppression and racial discrimination, then prevalent in Rhodesia and other colonies. One is persuaded to think that, since Nordic support was basically ‘humanitarian’, this fact made Nordic countries as good as the socialist countries which provided military hardware to liberation movements.

National liberation: Who really benefited?

This is one major question that we should consider in assessing the Nordic role and when setting new postures for co-operation in future. Perhaps, one should identify four elements, namely the nationalist elite, the nationalist party (liberation and post-liberation) the people and interested investors.

The experience of the past two decades in Southern Africa shows that the achievement of national liberation goals unleashed vast opportunities for the following two groups:

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— The nationalist elite, who took over mainly the political, and some of the economic posts of the former colonial regimes. These have gained enormously from national liberation. They have accumulated power, money and property, leaving the rest of the people in dire poverty.

— The nationalist party, which simply converted itself into a dominant party after independence, thus enjoying unchallenged but rather immoral power. Under its rule, from Mozambique to Angola, Guinea-Bissau to Zimbabwe, none of the countries have prospered, except to descend into poverty – increasing repression. The nationalist dominant party has shown more undemocratic tendencies.

On the other hand there are the people, who lost much (property, sons, daughters) during liberation wars, and then gained the least benefit in the post-independence era. These are the ordinary people who remain poor. Their social, economic and political rights are ignored or violated without recourse. Today, under austere economic reforms, as driven by the International Monetary Fund, these ordinary people are in a very insecure position. Even when foreign aid comes, it is often diverted away by corruption before reaching them.

Whilst Nordic and Socialist support for national liberation helped to removed colonial repression, the victorious nationalist parties seem to have eroded the gains of that support by developing new authoritarian systems following independence. This is a point that we should seriously take into account today.

Transformation of liberation movements

Is the transformation of victorious national liberation movements to become ruling parties a democratic process? We must find out. Definitely, the main function of national liberation movements in Southern Africa was to uproot the colonial system. And indeed, this defined the immediate goal, that of replacing the oppressive colonial system with a better humane system. This appeal of a better socio-political and economic system, is what motivated many outside communities, organizations and governments to support the national liberation movements in various ways.

But apparently, the long-term political evolution of national liberation movements in the post-colonial landscape was not an issue at the time of the liberation struggles. Neither did the national liberation movements give a firm promise of democracy, human rights and decent human existence to the then oppressed people in Southern Africa; nor did the outside Nordic and Socialist supporters of the struggles insist on a condition that the post-colonial order must necessarily be set up according to irreversible democratic measures. In Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe, one-party and authoritarian systems were introduced just after independence.

Perhaps, it is only in ANC’s ‘Freedom Charter’ that some democratic feelers were integrated. Otherwise the majority, including those of MPLA,
FRELIMO, UNITA, ZANU, ZAPU, SWAPO, AZAPO were so ill-defined, apart from their single identification with the cause of liberation. The real self-definition and self-identification of most of these movements followed soon after the attainment of independence, since each of them started translating its own ideas into practice. For example, rather than turn to assaulting the poverty of the poor peasants in, e.g. Mozambique, FRELIMO began to build a strong Marxist-Leninist party.

Liberation movements: The ruling parties

Over a period of nineteen years from 1975, most of the national liberation movements which the Nordic governments and people's supported, successively became ruling parties in their own countries:

— MPLA in Angola, 1975;
— FRELIMO in Mozambique, 1975;
— PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau (in civil strife today) in 1975;
— ZANU in Zimbabwe in 1980 (and jointly with ZAPU after the 1987 Unity Accord);
— SWAPO in Namibia, and
— ANC in South Africa.

Some of the NLMs that forced out colonial regimes, such as UNITA and FNLA in Angola and PAC in South Africa, have either vanished from the political scene or embarked on opposition, including military resistance against the dominance of a single party. I.W. Zartman has observed that “the absence of a common enemy”\textsuperscript{10} after the collapse of the colonial regime incites divergences and struggle among the former national liberation political parties. Zartman is again correct to have observed that they are always “leftover liberation movements”\textsuperscript{11}, meaning those old political forces which may start attacking the newly independent state. Just think of UNITA and FNLA in Angola, which were legitimate NLMs prior to independence in 1975, but started fresh campaigns against the MPLA which had seized all the power from 1975. Or again, in Mozambique, where political and ideological differences soon after independence plunged the country into civil war for the next seventeen years. The building of a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party, faced long-lasting resistance from the Mozambique Resistance Army (MNR) formerly led by A. Matsangaise, and later on by A. Dhlakama.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid p. 20.
Post-liberation political insecurity

Inherited legacies, of both the colonial system and national liberation; the pattern of personalized, centralized power, as well as the suppression of civil and democratic forces and economic mismanagement, constitute the sources of internal political insecurity and economic instability in the liberated territories. There do not seem to be any success stories among these territories; one can only hope that South Africa will be one such story. The high period of anti-colonial liberation is over; and the conclusion was marked by the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa which brought an end to the formal system of apartheid, though in its cultural and economic forms, it will linger on for some years to come. That Zimbabwe today, long independent since April 1980, is still grappling with the colonial problems of unequal land ownership and lopsided economic distribution is evidence enough to inform us of the longevity of the colonial legacy.

But what is alarming in the liberated countries is the emerging spectre of neo-nationalist liberation. This has been known by various terms: uprising, separatist movement, resistance movement and rebellion. But up to now, and because of the initial euphoria caused by the completion of anti-colonial liberation, the outbreak of violent conflicts after independence was regarded as "foreign manipulation,"12 or "power hungry campaigns"13 led by misguided individuals. But now, as internal political crises rock countries as far apart as Angola and Lesotho, Namibia and Mozambique; the current war is being waged in the Democratic Republic of Congo; the current internal political and constitutional disputes rage in Zambia and Mozambique, we can only review our view of the situation. Inevitably, one has to note the following:

- Anti-colonial liberation was not the end of national liberation; rather, national liberation goes beyond the end of the anti-colonial campaign;
- The legacy of the colonial system, especially "arbitrary boundaries"14 and "uneven economic development"15 breeds fresh internal conflicts, even some years after independence.
- The legacy of national liberation, particularly personalized power, lack of institutionalisation of good governance, centralized command and control, does not augur well for internal political stability, peace and security in the post-independence period;

12 Term to express the official interpretation of resistance movements or rebellions after independence. Many African governments have blamed outside interference in their own internal affairs.
13 Ibid.
Because the new political terrain after independence is not accommodating enough, with the ruling party closing off space for itself, a variety of contesting forces tend to express themselves violently; thus, the relations between the opposition and the government tend to be clouded with violence.

These rather unstable conditions in the liberated territories attract the return of big power influence hitherto characteristic of the Cold War.

Causal factors of insecurity

The menace of political insecurity in Southern Africa stems from a number of factors. And unless these factors are neutralized, the anticipation that the end of apartheid would signal lasting peace, stability, democracy and development in Southern Africa will slowly give way to the fear of internal violent confrontations:

Firstly, the former NLMs, today’s Ruling Parties (RM), brought into the post-independence era all the aspects of organization once necessary to fight the colonial enemy. The military organization of the NLM was centralist and no dissent or frank debate was tolerated by the top leadership. Whilst this is the main tendency in war situations, the problem is that the NLMs continued with this approach beyond the conquest of the colonial enemy. It was this rigid political organization, as a legacy of anti-colonial national liberation, that stifled the growth of democratic practices and institutions after independence. This set up has been ferociously challenged in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe by both the opposition and rebel groups. It is taking considerable violence to remedy the situation in some of these cases.

Secondly, those NLMs that assumed power at independence subsequently installed a system of party supremacy and dictatorship. Rather than honour the universal principles of democracy, human rights, sound governance and human-centred development, the new ruling parties went on to take measures to consolidate their own power in the long-term. This was achieved by harassing and liquidating opposition personalities and parties. At the climax, the one-party state was installed in some of the countries. Mozambique, war-torn Angola, Zimbabwe and Zambia had various forms of this one-party system at different times.

Thirdly, there are incessant constitutional disputes: Zambia 1997-98, Lesotho 1998-99, Namibia 1997 and Zimbabwe 1999. These disputes often revolve around two opposed positions. On one hand, the ruling parties seek to maintain or introduce any constitutional provisions that protect their position in power regardless of dismal economic performance; on the other, there are emergent civic groups and opposition parties that call for the writing of a new constitution. At the end of March 1999, the Government of Zimbabwe and the National Constitutional Assembly were already deadlocked over the subject of the new constitution. As one editor of a daily said “Constitutional crisis as talks
References


Response, Namibia

Ben Amathila

The Namibian delegation would like to express its sincere thanks and gratitude to the researchers who have done so much in recording the history of our struggle and highlighting the co-operation between ourselves and the Nordic countries until Independence had been achieved. The significance of this co-operation lies in the solidarity rendered and recognition given to us when the rest of the Western world was shying away from us, even calling us by the name of terrorists. We would like to thank the Nordic Governments for making the resources available for us to meet here and to chart our way forward.

To put the Namibian situation in its historic perspectives, as a basis to understand why certain things have been done the way they are reflected in the documents to which I am to respond to, I would like to mention two factors: 1) Political stability in a liberation movement; 2) The Tanga Consultative Conference of SWAPO.

When the OAU adopted the policy of supporting African liberation movements to break the political colonial chains, none of them was a producer of arms of war to carry out this objective. At least they knew that the West was not going to be the source of supplying arms to topple a fellow NATO member from its colonies in Africa. Nor was it expected that the West would supply weapons of war to end apartheid which had guaranteed them a steady supply of cheap raw materials. The only countries (as manufacturers of arms) to fill the vacuum that none of the OAU member states could fill were the Soviet bloc of countries and China. Not only did they supply the weapons by their own transport but at no charges to the liberation movements. The criticism from the West that we were using communist weapons forced President Julius Nyerere to retort that time that you could not expect us to fight with bows and arrows when you were arming our adversary with the most deadly and modern weapons.

Because of Portugal's membership in NATO and NATO weapons entering the theatre of war through Portugal, some of the liberation movements met in Lusaka in 1970 during the Non-Aligned Conference and agreed upon a strategy of sharing military information, training facilities and sharing experiences to counter the co-operation between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

The intensification of the war of liberation in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and South Africa, resulted in sabotage and bombing activities against the neighbouring countries. The strategy was to stir up the emotions of the citizens in those countries against liberation movements and the governments
supporting them. This did not happen. The death of Eduardo Mondlane of FRELIMO and the Kavadane affair almost shook the confidence of the host governments in liberation movements. Eduardo was respected as a model of a statesman emerging from a liberation movement. After his death the element of trust and confidence in the remaining liberation movements were affected.

The Tanga Consultative Congress

The mid-1960s became a very critical period for Namibia and SWAPO. In the eyes of the Namibians the World Court had failed on July 18, 1966 in the case of Liberia and Ethiopia vs South Africa on Namibia. On August 26, 1966 the armed struggle was launched with very little supply of arms. Those arrested after the battle were brought here to Robben Island. In 1968 we requested the UN Council for SWA to rename our country Namibia. In 1968, SWAPO decided to call a National Conference to decide on the future of the struggle. This Conference was held as the Tanga Consultative Congress at the Tanzanian port town of Tanga in December 1969. The Congress had to answer one main question: After Liberation What? At the end of the meeting an administrative structure was agreed upon, which looked like a government in waiting. We had to prepare ourselves to take over the administration after Independence. We agreed on some principles for a new Constitution. The Consultative Congress also agreed that political, military and diplomatic activities were not in contradiction and that they should be intensified.

When I arrived in the Nordic countries (Sweden) in 1971, military assistance was not on my priority list. I had to ask what Sweden for instance was comfortable with. The rest of the Nordic countries were very much aware that our military hardware was coming from the Soviet Union. I did not come across anyone who tried to discourage us from receiving military hardware from the Soviets. Occasionally there was a time when SWAPO needed vehicles to transport refugees and the terrain required four wheel drive vehicles. Then we were questioned whether the vehicles would not be put to military use, but our word was accepted.

During the time of Torsten Nilsson as Foreign Minister of Sweden, increased attention was given to the struggle of the people of North Vietnam straining the relationship between the USA and Sweden. A national consensus was reached in support of Vietnam which left individual liberation movements to their support groups for support. While the Foreign Office had an open policy to receive those who might seek audience with the political office bearers and higher bureaucrats there, it was during the time of Krister Wickman as Foreign Minister in 1973 after the Oslo Conference that leaders of liberation movements were officially received and a reception given in their honour. This improved the standing of the liberation movements in Sweden.

We have gathered here to see how together we can shape our future and our future co-operation. Most of the Nordic countries have become members of
the European Union and all of us have become members of our regional organization SADC. SADC is a dynamic region with all the economic pull factors to make it a regional giant. We therefore have a choice to narrow this co-operation amongst us or to widen it to promote greater regional growth.

Namibia believes in regional co-operation and has invested a lot in providing regional links: the Trans-Kalahari highway, the Trans-Caprivi highway, the expansion of the port of Walvis Bay to serve as a regional port. We are currently seeking funding to build a bridge over the Zambezi river into Zambia. Can we together look at some of the regional projects planned to enhance trade and co-operation and see whether firms in our countries will be interested in this project and what assistance can be provided to them? Can we work towards exchanging industrialists’ visits to our Trade Fairs with some support to them to create jobs to promote trade?

Everything that we want to happen, we can make it happen. We should demonstrate that practical will and entrepreneurial risk taking will make things happen.
Response, South Africa

Raymond Suttner

Many of the comments of participants indicate an anxiety that something should come out of this conference and I share the desire that our meeting should help us understand the Nordic involvement in our national liberation, as a continuing process, continuing solidarity and deepening of our national and democratic tasks.

I want to begin by asking what may seem a rude question: Do we need this conference? South Africa has thanked the Nordic countries for their support. There are also processes under way for developing our relations at a diplomatic level. What further purpose is served by a conference? I ask as someone who is professionally concerned with relations between South Africa and one of the Nordic countries, Sweden. I would prefer these relations to be based on more than the courtesies and politeness of protocol. For that reason I would resist a conference which is going to repeat what we already know.

In answer to this question, I think the research raises the following important issues about the character of Nordic support and I will try to link some of these to the future:

1. The quantity of humanitarian support was massive. However, humanitarian aid was political in that it helped tilt the balance in favour of the democratic forces.

South Africans do not realize the quantities involved. They need to know this. They need to know that when we develop our diplomatic relations with the Nordic countries it is with peoples and governments who have shown through their deeds how greatly they want our national democratic project to succeed.

I want to mention one aspect of humanitarian assistance which concerned me personally. I spent two periods in prison, totalling ten years in the 1970s and 1980s. In the course of these periods I needed legal counsel to defend me and either on my own or with others made a variety of other (unsuccessful) legal applications – to end prison censorship, for release and other causes. None of us had the resources to bring these cases ourselves.

Author's note: I am the serving ambassador of South Africa to Sweden. This paper does not represent an official position of the government of South Africa but is my own understanding as a person who was involved as a UDF and ANC activist in the struggle for liberation in South Africa.
This money came from somewhere. I did not know where and I did not ask for fear that it was an illegal source, about which I did not ‘need to know’. I suspected that it was the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), banned in South Africa from 1966, but I had the mistaken impression that because IDAF was in the UK, the funding came overwhelmingly from there. The research makes clear that this was far from the case, apart from a few pence here and there and that the overwhelming majority of the funds came from the Nordic countries, especially Sweden.

This was very important support, sometimes enabling us to exploit the limited legal space that was allowed to detainees under apartheid law, helping to curb some of the most gross attacks on people’s rights, sometimes reducing time spent in jail, sometimes saving people from the gallows.

But also when we were in jail we had expenses. If we were allowed to study, which was not always the case, we needed funds for fees and textbooks. When we were allowed to purchase music and sports equipment (which was not always the case), we needed funds. I do not know precisely where this money came from, but it seems that a sizeable proportion came from the Nordic countries.

These were some of the resources that made it possible to deal constructively with prison life and also provided us with some of the facilities that we used to improve our education and our capacity to contribute further to the struggle on our release. The support nourished our moral, political and personal beliefs in a just cause and came to be part of the alternative fabric of our lives in the hostile and often brutal and inhumane circumstances in which we were held.

This support made it possible for us to survive to fight further battles. Our prison yards and cells became rooms where we argued over political issues, discussed what we managed to glean from the books that were allowed through the censors and learnt from one another. We used our time in jail to improve our understanding of a variety of issues, holding our own seminars and discussions and in general readying ourselves for the moment when we would again be able to play a direct political role.

But the humanitarian support to the ANC, as such, was massive. I was never in exile myself, but as I understand it, Nordic countries literally provided the clothes that people wore, the food that they ate, the funds for their basic sustenance, the educational infrastructure and volunteers in the ANC school, scholarships and support for the ANC Women’s League, as part of their commitment to ensuring gender equality in our democratic development. These things we will never forget. The decades in exile were very traumatic, but the Nordic contribution went some way towards making reasonable living conditions possible. And in a wider sense, the solidarity movement, from letters of support
to the concerts held to advance our cause, all strengthened our resolve to win our freedom.

2. What emerges from the research is that Nordic support did not arise from a ‘top/down’ process. One of its distinguishing features is that it had a popular base. Ordinary people made the representatives of the apartheid regime feel unwelcome on their soil. I know that the noise of angry protesters used to drown out conversations in the South African embassy in the apartheid era. Ordinary people implemented consumer boycotts and made contributions towards funds that supported South African solidarity. The trade unions were key and youth and church people were also. Some outstanding people in advancing our cause in Sweden were the editor Herbert Tingsten, the legendary priest, Rev. Gunnar Helander, who today still writes a weekly newspaper column on South Africa in Västerås and the writer Per Wästberg.

Having this popular base meant that changes of government made little impact on the level and degree of support. It was grounded in Nordic popular consciousness. The compact forged between civil society and state/government was a unique feature of Nordic support for Southern African peoples and movements. This relates to both the strategic significance of Nordic support in the past and also raises questions about possible re-engagement of civil society in the changing ‘global’ order.

3. There is no doubt that Olof Palme as an individual was a major influencing factor in escalating Swedish, Nordic and broader social democratic support for our struggle. Palme represented a broader rejection of the Cold War paradigm being transposed onto liberation struggles. Not only our own, but also that in Vietnam and Nicaragua. There is no doubt that his energy and stature was crucial in mobilizing support for our cause.

We need to remember how powerful his anti-imperialism was, that his attacks on the Vietnam war led to the recall of the United States ambassador from Sweden.

4. This brings me to the conjuncture within which Nordic support was provided, which made their contribution have a particular significance. Why did it make a difference? What were the conditions?

i. In the first place, one of the characteristics of the post World War II world was the Cold War, with former allies against fascism lining up in opposite camps. These contending forces ranged themselves in support of and against struggles for self-determination. In particular, the former Socialist countries gave massive support to our struggle, educating thousands of people, providing diplomatic support and military training and equipment In the case of the Cubans we know that they gave their lives in defeating the apartheid forces in Angola.
On the other side the West was in the main unwilling to support our struggle and in the case of the United States, according to documentation quoted by Tor Sellström, saw future developments primarily in terms of the white regimes of Southern Africa.

ii. Another characteristic of this period was the almost universal decolonization of Africa and Asia. This was a factor that weakened the ground on which the apartheid regime stood and created diplomatic allies for our struggle and in the long run countries in the front line who sacrificed massively in providing shelter to our cadres and refugees.

iii. Of major significance in Nordic support was that it broke the Cold War mould, that Nordic countries were prepared to recognize liberation struggles as having merit in their own right. It was vital for us to not have our aspirations reduced to a battlefield between contending Cold War powers and the Nordic countries, as countries of the West, were vital in breaking this paradigm.

iv. The apartheid regime emerged from the war as a founder member of the United Nations, but it soon found this status under attack as India and emerging independent states launched attacks on apartheid. The regime responded with legalistic arguments, relying on Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter preventing discussion of matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, an argument that at first won the support of many Western countries including Nordic countries.

v. Over time this conjuncture altered and indeed the efforts of ourselves and our allies, including the Nordic countries, was important in changing the balance of forces. The Sharpeville massacre was a watershed in creating outrage and removing the legalistic fig leaf that the regime used to protect its human rights violations from scrutiny. Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter could no longer be used to prevent enquiry.

At the same time, the Sharpeville period opened a phase of massive crackdown on the ANC and its allies and the PAC. It was a period of great difficulty for our movement as it set about rebuilding under new and difficult conditions of illegality.

One of the issues that concerned us then was whether we would be able to rebuild without the regime first re-establishing or recasting its own alliances. In particular, one thing that worried us was that in the event of escalation of our armed struggle and the regime being threatened, it might have been able to rely on countries with heavy investment intervening in its support.

This was not paranoia. It must be remembered that at this time there was evidence of NATO weaponry being used in the Portuguese territories against liberation forces.
Here again, the impact of the Nordic countries was significant. Steps against investment that they initiated acted as a deterrent on the part of others. But also the involvement of NATO members, Norway and Denmark and Iceland in Nordic anti-apartheid solidarity, meant that any attempt to abuse NATO in support of apartheid became more difficult. Norway in fact declared that NATO could not be used in the Portuguese territories, which was a victory for the liberation movements there as well as for us.

vi. We may sometimes forget how difficult the periods were, before we had rebuilt our structures within the country. I was a student in the 1960s and by 1969 there appeared to be no presence whatsoever of the ANC within the country. Censorship laws at any rate ensured that we heard nothing of the liberation movement and I left the country to study in that year, but also with a view to seeing what I could do on my return – not being sure whether there was still an ANC with which I could link up.

vii. The difficult period prior to 1976 was one where the regime boldly tried to create new allies. Vorster had the temerity, we now think, to try and reach out to Africa. But we must remember that there were ‘takers’. In 1971 Banda of Malawi visited SA amidst much praise for his act as a statesperson. Later in the 1970s Vorster reached out to Ivory Coast, and Ghana then under Busia indicated interest in a ‘dialogue’. As underground propaganda workers in Durban at the time we brought out a pamphlet called Vukanif/Awake!, attacking these attempts to have dialogue abroad, while suppressing the black population within South Africa. The diplomatic efforts of the liberation movement in the OAU managed to foil Vorster’s efforts.

viii. It was precisely in these difficult years that the Nordic involvement, particularly in Sweden was stepped up and we started to count on their backing in our diplomatic efforts against the regime.

ix. After 1976 a whole new phase of struggle opened up with the regime no longer able to contain resistance in the ways to which it was accustomed. The question then became whether it could establish a new way of ruling, while maintaining apartheid or whether we would be able to defeat any attempts to hold their ground or shift gears.

In this period, thousands of people left the country and returned as armed militants of Umkhonto we Sizwe and to a lesser extent PAC.

x. The late 1970s and 1980s saw the opening of yet another new phase, with the reclaiming of legal space in South Africa, democratic forces starting to build organization and challenge the regime on a new front. This was difficult. We lacked resources. The primary base of the democratic forces, the oppressed black masses, had little funds and to challenge national oppression meant we had to organize nationally – in the factories, in the townships, in the rural areas,
amongst women and students. To do this meant having transport and that cost money. To reach people required printing presses and other media. To provide the T-shirts with popular slogans which was so characteristic a feature of this period also required funds that the support base did not have.

Here again, the Nordic countries were vital. Their funding was directed towards organizations based in communities. By providing funding they contributed towards long-term democratic governance in South Africa. By providing funding for democratic structures they helped root democratic practices, the practices that will be essential if we are to have long-term accountable government, popular participation and continued respect for human rights.

At a strategic level they threw in their lot with those forces who wanted to 'make apartheid unworkable and South Africa ungovernable'. These, the Nordic countries recognized, were not anarchists but people who in fact wanted peace, which could only be established and sustained in a democratic South Africa.

5. But there is a paradox here. When one reads the literature of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s it is clear that the former socialist countries and Cuba had some strategic influence on our liberation movement. This is particularly clear in some of the perspectives of the 1969 Morogoro Strategy and Tactics document and even later with the influence of the Vietnam War on ANC military thinking. The Nordic countries on the other hand do not appear to have had or tried to have a major strategic influence on our movement.

In addition, the former socialist countries and Cuba, Vietnam and Nicaragua also provided fruit for ideological and theoretical advances, whatever one may think now of the weaknesses of the socialist project and even its failures. It was for many people in South Africa a source for inspiration, for debate, for vision of the new era, examples that showed that it was possible to defeat imperialist and oppressive forces. The Nordic countries did not offer the vision of revolutionary transformation which was vital to the moral and political energies of the liberation movement for much of its existence. (This is well illustrated in some of the remarks of Trevor Manuel recorded in his interview with Tor Sellipse. Perhaps at the level of inter-trade union co-operation in the 1980s, some of what I say here ought to be qualified.)

But this is not necessarily something we should criticize. I think it is worthy of credit that they accepted that it was we who had to develop our strategy and they made their contribution within that framework. They were partisans of our cause, though in different ways. And in a context where democratic values, popular participation, peaceful relations and partnerships between peoples and governments are vital for economic development and environmental sustainability, to fight the war against poverty, discrimination, xenophobia, homophobia and prevention of HIV/AIDS and to build gender
equality – there is much that we can learn from the Nordic countries. There are things that we can learn from the social democratic project in the Nordic countries in terms of concrete solutions to some of the problems that face post-apartheid South Africa.

6. But is there nevertheless basis for suggesting that Nordic support was precisely to avert our liberation movement from falling under Soviet sway externally and Communist hegemony within the country? In the research this issue is raised occasionally, but mainly in the context of avoiding the solidarity movement falling under left-wing dominance. The implications of this theme are not really elaborated.

In regard to the South African liberation movement there seems to have been an understanding in the Nordic countries that ANC alliance with the Communist Party did not impede ANC independence.

The global context in which Nordic support started to become substantial was one where the dominant Western powers were reluctant to offer substantial support to our liberation movement. The Soviet Union and its allies offered unreserved diplomatic support as well as military hardware and training. Clearly the Nordic involvement did have the advantage of demonstrating that some Western powers recognized the legitimacy of struggles for national liberation. Particularly striking was that the Nordic Prime Ministers met the leaders of our liberation movement in 1962, 25 years before any major Western country or leader of the Soviet Union.

7. My response is related to South Africa, but we would not be here, holding a meeting in a democratic South Africa, were it not for the sacrifices of the states of the Southern African region. People shared their countries with our cadres and they paid heavily for this generosity, losing loved ones and almost losing their hard won independence. The emergence of independent neighbouring states was a great strategic boon for us, just as snuffing them out or turning them into something ineffectual was strategically important to the regime.

The Nordic countries gave substantial support to these countries and to SADCC – rightly recognizing that the future of the region was intertwined, that one could not just focus on the future ‘miracle’ South Africa. This holds equally true for today, where the advancing of the concept of an African renaissance is part of the battle for survival of the region, its interdependence on questions of economic development, democracy and peace. In this way the type of regional support provided by Nordic countries in the anti-apartheid period is equally crucial for survival of the region today.

The research also throws light on general strategic questions regarding factors contributing to the success or failure of national liberation projects. It clearly shows how Nordic support empowered liberation movements and organizations on the ground to realize their strategic goals of democratizing South
Africa. Their support made a difference – it helped shorten the life of the apartheid regime.

8. At the level of the discipline of international theory, the Nordic role made a contribution, in particular in its emphasis on the role of non-state actors in international relations. This applies both to their according recognition to liberation movements but also in the role of solidarity movements in the formation of their foreign policy. It also shows the significant role that middle level powers can play in international relations, particularly when they act within the type of consensus that developed amongst the Nordic countries. This is something on which we hope to rely in the future.

Conclusion

9. It has been difficult to respond to the volumes of research that have been presented to us. As everyone knows, these are massive tomes and we have not had them for very long. Furthermore, some research is closer to completion than other. Consequently it has not been possible to do adequate justice to all the countries and because there is more on Sweden than the others there is more attention given to Sweden.

The research indicates that Nordic support did not happen overnight, that it required a lot of hard work over many, many years, experiencing resistance from sections of Nordic society. In the first place, the missions within South Africa were more attuned to white South Africa than the liberation movement and business interests were very resistant to anything that affected their perceived interests.

10. Although the research is uneven, it nevertheless does show clearly that the process of involvement in anti-apartheid solidarity was uneven. Sweden took the lead and it may have been that its not being a member of NATO gave it more independence—as a state—to do this.

The Nordic support helped swing things: the Nordic countries direct support to the ANC and the democratic formations within the country contributed to our capacity, our ability to take on a very powerful enemy, by helping us with resources for our organization. We did not have the normal freedom to raise funds for printing presses, transport or hire of venues. Outside funding was crucial. Diplomatic support was essential to isolate the regime and build our own legitimacy.

Now that we have political freedom the future of our relationship has been determined partly by government to government relations, which is close in the case of all the Nordic countries. But that is not the only reason why we look forward to deepening relations. We also rely on continuing people to people relations. The store of goodwill that we have built over the last few decades must be built on in order to develop our friendship in the period that lies ahead.
It must be sustained not only in regard to South Africa, but in relation to the region as a whole. South Africa cannot be developed in isolation from the region. It is essential that Nordic support continues for the region as a whole.

The research presented to this conference helps us understand that our present relationship was built patiently over a long time, not always smoothly. It is with an awareness of this complexity that we better equip ourselves to move on and build still stronger ties between our peoples.

Finally, I want to pay tribute to the late President Oliver Tambo who did so much to build the international pillar of our struggle and in particular relationships between ANC and the Nordic peoples.
Nordic solidarity with ANC

Lindiwe Mabuza

I must begin by expressing our most profound gratitude to the Nordic Africa Institute for having come up with this project in the first place. Having gone through most of the manuscripts and interviews, this documentation of our history is a monumental contribution to the African Renaissance. Whoever came up with the idea of the project is a genius. A special word of gratitude must go to the Nordic authors – Tor Sellström, Tore Linné Eriksen, Eva Helene Østbye, Pekka Peltola, Tina Soiri and Christopher Morgenstierne, amongst others.

Yet amongst friends some criticism is in order and is meant only to help strengthen this compelling body of work. There is a glaring unevenness in the representation of the different countries. In our discussions with our High Commissioner to Canada, Billy Modise, one of our energetic pioneers in the mobilization of Nordic public opinions, for example, we agreed that one of the dynamics not touched upon in the study was the conflicts or contradictions between the different Communist Parties on the one hand and those between these parties and the Social Democratic Parties in some cases. Although this only represents a footnote, it nonetheless was part of the unfolding history.

Another example would be lack of support by the majority Labour Organization (LO) for the South African Congress of Trade (SACTU). The reason was SACTU’s affiliation to the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) while most of LO’s member organizations belonged to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) based in Geneva and therefore preferred giving support (and this was generous, critical and important) to black trade unions based in South Africa. But not supporting SACTU would naturally put strains of ANC’s limited resources.

I believe the exercise we are all engaged in of recalling our individual experiences also serves the purpose of expressing our sense of gratitude to all those who were part of this effort of putting an end to apartheid, the crime against humanity. Olof Palme, the Prime Minister of Sweden and Oliver Tambo established such an unbreakable brotherhood that they singly and/or together gave much inspiration and direction and built a cadre of leadership to champion the cause. This unique camaraderie and that of their generals like Pierre Schori, Thabo Mbeki, Thomas Nkobi, Alfred Nzo gave impetus to the fullest and deepest sense and magnitude of Nordic contributions to our liberation. The consolidation of democracy in South Africa continues to be the first beneficiary of that history.
When one looks at the totality of Nordic involvement with the ANC and South Africa during the years of the struggle, one can make the mistake of understanding but never, never the mistake of overstating the facts.

My tour of duty in the Nordic countries lasted from 1979 to 1987. The mandate from the ANC was lucid and unambiguous. The following objectives had to be achieved:

- The mobilization of the entire political spectrum.
- To engage all segments and formations of the population.
- Solidarity was to translate into concrete material support.
- To build partnerships that would help the ANC to build and/or strengthen its structures or departments.
- To look into the question of establishing ANC offices in the Nordic countries.

As you can see from the above the question of persuading Nordic governments to give military assistance was never part of the agenda. But this does not mean we did not get it from organizations and people who wished to do that. All the Amandla concerts, the ANC Gala initiated by Mikael Wiehe, the proceeds from ANC Bazaars, meant that ANC got some millions “with no strings attached”. But it would be the height of naivety and ignorance in the extreme if we concluded that Nordic governments did not contribute to our military efforts. Transportation, medical supplies, food for Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana meant support to soldiers and those involved in underground operations of the ANC. Soldiers without basic necessities are a mutiny in the making. SIDA in particular ensured we bought supplies from the international market. Our endeavours of nine years can be summarized as follows:

**The mobilization of the entire political spectrum**

As I was getting ready to leave Lusaka for Stockholm, the late Oliver Tambo, as President of the ANC, advised that we should steer away from irresponsibly and indiscriminately hurling slogans and labels like ‘imperialist’ that might alienate some of the very people we needed to win over. We were to enter the bloodstream of the region in a manner that would irreversibly bond people from all political parties to our just cause by flying the ANC flag and explaining the principles of the Freedom Charter.

The fact that in 1979 Sweden was ruled by a coalition of the Centre Party and the Liberal Party immediately put us on a fast learning curve to discover a deep reservoir of support from the government of the day as well as the opposition. Therefore, our immediate task had to be getting closer to the women’s and youth sections of these two parties while relating at the highest possible levels with government. A mechanism already existed in Sweden for pursuing this in the Isolate South Africa Committee (ISAK). Working closely with both ISAK and the Africa Groups in Sweden (AGIS), we influenced party structures and
many organs of civic society to join ISAK. Whilst commitment to support sanctions would be a prerequisite to ISAK membership, the other side of the same coin was material, financial and general but concrete support to the ANC and SWAPO, for example, for our school in Mazimbu, Tanzania, the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (Somafco).

In Finland, the Afrika Komite, an offspring of the Finnish Peace Committee was our first contact point. Since the perception was that this organization was too closely identified with the Communist Party it became urgent that we soon began to interact directly with the Social Democrats, Centre Party, the Swedish People’s Party and the Liberals. Since ‘UNITY in ACTION’ was one of the ANC themes, it helped to facilitate co-operation amongst erstwhile opponents and resulted in a common loyalty to the ANC which worked in all countries.

In Norway there already existed the Norwegian Council on Southern Africa, with a rich tradition of co-operation across the political spectrum. While in the beginning our visits were hosted by them we soon found partners to work closely with in LO (Vestla Vetlesen, Laila Nokolaisen), Rädda Barnen and Operation Day’s Work, to name but a few.

Denmark seemed a bit more difficult in the beginning. In the first place the Danish government did not give direct support to the ANC for fear that this would be directed to military use. Significantly, they were the only Nordic government that did not support our ANC office which opened in 1985. But when we suspended the armed struggle in 1990 in preparation for negotiations, the Danish Parliament voted for direct assistance to the ANC, including support for our Copenhagen office. The daily organization of support was in the Danish Committee for Southern Africa. There were insufficient funds available for daily operations but a young woman, Janne Felumb, was retained to coordinate much of the work. The fact that she belonged to the Communist Party which gave solid support especially through their newspaper meant we had to work extra hard to allay fears and win confidence and generate active support from all political parties.

To have durability and a multiplying effect, we consciously aimed at turning nationals of all countries into our representatives by making them appreciate and propagate the principles of the Freedom Charter as our definitive policy document which also armed them with the defence of ANC. This engagement did not derive from some wishy-washy altruism. These parties had a vested interest in the overthrow of apartheid, a new brand of National Socialism, and in the furtherance of democracy and peace in the world. Naturally, the representatives of the regime spared neither money nor effort to paint the ANC as a blood-thirsty terrorist organization.

In Sweden, the fact that we were in the end guaranteed the support of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Left Communist Party (VPK), the Workers’
(APK), the Centre Party (CP), Liberal Party (LP) and the Marxist Leninist Revolutionary (KPLMR) meant we had a political support. Yet we could not afford to be complacent for granted. Every ANC member posted or visiting there, to consolidate and expand the support. Especially in the first ade sure that there were ANC speakers at party congresses, conferences and festivals. The dictum ‘make new friends and is silver the other gold’ was applicable in the culture of political support base.

ents of the population

was to engage all segments of civil society: the trade unions, professional bodies, cultural workers (individuals and structures).

describing the ugliness of apartheid to especially young one was pained by what seemed to be a violation of the, almost an intrusion into their otherwise peaceful world. ected in their families, institutions, and, their nations, where 1 economic fabric ensured that there would be no avoidable, apartheid seemed to be the harshest and most brutal, nt to introduce into their lives.

these countries had made a political commitment, shared our ld had entered into a contract with their consciences and be participants in the destruction of what the United crime against humanity”, we had to teach about the evil in the final outcome spirited young and old to our ranks. evoted converts they stopped at nothing to ensure the igns, the young sometimes at the expense of their school was simply that they did not believe in white supremacy. They had to actually distance themselves from a system of white skin to brutalize even children. Their integrity and their acceptance of the leadership role of the ANC ways moving together.

ete material support

over the years, it became an accepted norm that political concrete material support. It was important to us that arity’, and was not to be confused with ‘charity’. Our VC had a common interest in the overthrow of the herefore, financial, material support towards attaining n imperative. The unity of feeling and action invariably mutual inter-dependence. Each party depended on the ss of the co-operation and therefore, absolute integrity
and accountability on the part of all involved for continuity and increase in support, underpinned the relationship.

DANIDA, FINNIDA, NORAD and SIDA poured millions into the ANC. This assistance often meant more than the maintenance of ANC offices and dependants all over Africa, Scandinavia, and, as a one time shot, the operations of the ANC mission to the USA in Washington which SIDA funded from 1989-1990. This last case was contrary to accepted practice yet when the urgency and need were understood in Stockholm nothing stood in the way of the necessary flexibility.

It is quite inconceivable to me to understand how Somafo and Dakawa would have been built and maintained without a huge infusion of resources by these governments and the Nordic peoples.

Infrastructure projects, sewerage and electrification, housing and dormitory construction, purchase of farms, agricultural equipment and last but not least feeding and housing thousands of ANC members decently is still mind-boggling.

As important as official government support was for the ANC it would never be as dynamic in its mobilizing effect in the Nordic countries as assistance and co-operation from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Even the governments recognized and greatly encouraged this kind of help. If an NGO raised a third of the total amount required for a given project, then the development agencies would provide the rest.

The Nordic countries recognized that 'an injury to one is an injury to all' and therefore acted together with us, in unison, in defence of justice and a common human decency because the Danes, the Finns and Norwegians experienced to differing degrees, the same injustices and oppression, for some, during Nazi occupation.

In our work with trade unions, we encouraged direct contact and co-operation with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in the beginning and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) later. After initial stumbling blocks, the Nordic trade unions vigorously found SA partners they were happy to directly cooperate with and supported the work of the ANC in various ways.

The symbiotic relationship between solidarity and culture reached a climax when in 1985 Mikael Wiehe came up with a brilliant idea, a two-day ANC Gala in Göteborg. Having already mobilized all his friends in the music world in Denmark and Sweden, Mikael and Tomas Ledin presented the public with an idea whose time had come and one that would reach out into all corners of Nordic society in its impact. In addition to the two star-studded concerts in Göteborg (30,000 people) and the double-record album, the concept included having other local arrangements in different parts of Sweden.
The "Sold out" event brought together under one roof individuals and representatives of organizations, including churches, that for years had laboured for love of justice and freedom to this manifestation of the gigantic heart of solidarity, thousands of hearts pulsating with conviction and commitment to the same music! So important was the event, the ANC was represented by the Head of International Affairs, the late Johnny Makatini and the Head of our Cultural Department based in Lusaka, Ms Barbara Masekela.

If the ANC Gala in Göteborg marked the ultimate or pinnacle in cultural expression of solidarity, then the political climax would have to have been the Swedish People’s Parliament against Apartheid organized by ISAK, AGIS, SWAPO and ANC. Taking many months of arduous work to organize, it brought to Stockholm the entire spectrum of those organizations opposed to apartheid and in support of sanctions. The ANC delegations led by President Oliver Tambo consisted of Comrades Thabo Mbeki and Steve Tehwete, amongst others. The SWAPO delegation was led by Hidipo Hamutenya, today’s Minister of Trade and Industry in Namibia.

This event was the last political public appearance by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme. Though the Prime Minister never lived long enough to see the fruit of his leadership, the people and government of South Africa are much indebted to his unwavering support and mobilization of others to support us.

Throughout the Nordic region, our relations with the people developed to such an extent that there was a constant flow of ANC members to the region. We missed no opportunity in attempting to get their freshest message through to the media. In this regard, whenever President Oliver Tambo was in town, the ANC office would be flooded with requests for an exclusive interview. Initially, some of us had had a view of the media as part of a hostile enemy camp. Gradually we had to appreciate that every question from the media or public was an opportunity to inform and to educate. By the time I left Sweden, the relations between the ANC and the media had matured beyond anything we could have imagined. Per Wästberg, Ewonne and Lennart Winblad to this day, remain close friends because, like many Nordic journalists, they turned their excellent professionalism into a powerful weapon of struggle.

Assistance to build ANC departments

Because of the general understanding in the Nordic countries that the ANC was a government of the future, the logical consequence of this belief was support for all programmes associated with governance. Again Mazimbu served as a place where many programmes in need of support could be initiated. The construction of Mazimbu, in general, and Somafo, in particular, served as the most dynamic process to engage not only the Nordic development aid and agencies, (DANIDA, FINNIDA, NORAD, SIDA) but also drew relevant non-governmental organizations in reinforcing whatever nascent structures we had.
Within the ANC, there had always been recognition of culture as a potent weapon of struggle. One of our aims was to ensure that ANC would be regarded by all as a popular and serious people's organization. In Scandinavia, culture certainly became the centrepiece of all our work. We found that political ideas packaged and presented through a universally appealing medium of culture struck a resonant chord even amongst those not politically involved. It also showed a dimension of the ANC as an organization concerned with diverse aspects of life contrary to the image of heartless 'terrorists'.

When we managed to have a world famous Swedish actress, Bibi Anderson, to say in introducing Amandla, "The struggle for liberation is ultimately a struggle for peace", we had made significant gains. This is not to imply that Nordic artists were never involved with us. On the contrary, the enthusiastic reception of Miriam Makeba in the early sixties had underscored this point. But there had been a lull since then which made Bibi Anderson and later Mikael Wiehe extra special. The ANC Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) grew in stature and volume and its diverse responsibilities warranted its inclusion during the annual talks between Nordic countries and ANC. The Woman's Section, Agriculture, Health and Legal Departments would not have grown significantly without their help. The Post-Apartheid South Africa project (PASA) engineered anticipating a change to prepare South Africans for governance was heavily funded by Sweden.

**Opening new ANC offices in Nordic countries/cadre training**

The idea of opening ANC offices in other Nordic countries besides the one in Sweden came from Comrade Josiah Jele, then our International Secretary. Both the Danish and Finnish Solidarity organizations had discussed it with him. Once we were in the region, it became clear that the need was great. The volume of work generated by many successful campaigns, especially Operation Day's Work by school pupils' organizations (1980 in Sweden for the Somafco Laboratory, 1983 by Norwegian People's Aid, 1985 by all the Scandinavian countries again for ANC's Somafco and Dakawa) underlined this. Thus offices were opened in Denmark (1985), Norway (1986) and Finland (1987).

For all of us who had the privilege of working for the ANC, our work became a training opportunity for future responsibilities in a free and democratic South Africa. When we had to open an ANC mission in Copenhagen, for example,Themba Kubeka (Aaron Mnisi) was moved from the Stockholm offices to become our new Chief Representative in Denmark in 1985. Today, he is democratic South Africa's Ambassador to that country.

Jerry Matsila had only come to a Youth Conference in Finland when we requested ANC Headquarters to extend his stay for another two months to help organize youth and trade union work in the area. He only went to Lusaka to collect his belongings and vigorously pursued our common objectives until his
transfer in 1987 to Tokyo as ANC’s first Chief Representative to the entire Asian Pacific region. Today, he is South Africa’s Ambassador to India.

Our Minister of Housing, Mrs Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, (Rebecca Matlou) had come to Sweden for health reasons. After leaving Sweden, she became our second Chief Representative to the Federal Republic of Germany.

All the ANC members who served or were in some or other way attached to the Nordic countries during the struggle consider their years there and at the ANC office as having been most crucial in equipping them with skills which now serve our new democracy.

Finally, dear friends, I would like to pay special tribute to a fine lady present in our midst today. When I arrived in Sweden, the Ambassador of Angola, María Jesús de Haller immediately took me by my hand and walked me across the tightrope of diplomatic and representational work since she knew so much having been MPLA’s representative before her ambassadorial appointment. She literally became a sister, my ‘little’ mother, and a great friend. For example when we got our telex machine, she came to our office to teach me how to operate it and keep files. When my security was threatened she invited me to stay with her in her residence until she found a ‘safe’ second place for me. When we last saw each other in Portugal after she finished her tour of duty, her parting words were “next time we meet will be in a free South Africa”. How significant that we should actually meet on Robben Island. Please help me to thank that very special lady, María Jesús de Haller.
Key points of the address ‘future challenges’

Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka

1. This gathering is about the past, present and future relations between our two regions, and the principled stand you took, especially in the 1950, 60s and 70s and we salute you for those efforts.

2. Unique solidarity developed out of the political, humanitarian and strategic support of Nordic countries.

3. The articulation of gender equality of the Nordic countries contributed significantly to our own definition of a non-racial and non-sexist society.

4. The co-ordinated support by the Nordic countries also contributed towards giving us space to develop our solidarity as liberation movements.

5. As we meet at the end of a millennium the current climate is influenced by various phenomena such as globalization; the syndication of crime; possibilities for people, public and private sector partnerships; multilateralism and regionalism and the evolution of the concept of African Renaissance.

6. The 1990s in both SADC and Nordic countries represent a shrinkage of activists with the history we present here, a collective history which we seek to build on.

Defining features of this shared history

1. The struggle was based on a shared strategic objective, namely liberation of the peoples of this region.

2. The origin of this solidarity was broader than just institutions, it was people to people.

3. You defined your own brand of international solidarity and your own brand of Ubuntu.

4. NGOs; governments; learning institutions were all involved on your side.

Aspects defining the present and the future

1. The attainment of political freedom took away a unifying challenge, i.e. the need to liberate.

2. Yet in all our countries, we still have a long and difficult road to travel because a ‘better life for all’ which our liberty should have ushered in has not yet been realized. Improved and sustainable quality of life is an ongoing
challenge yet to be achieved. A human society which is people-centred has not yet been realized.

3. The new relations have to be about broad partnerships with benefits for all our peoples. The unique people to people features must not be lost.

4. Our world has new issues which include: crime prevention, Aids, economic empowerment and the gender and racial struggle that continue in a new form.

5. The years of isolation and economic sanctions need to be turned around to achieve economic integration and co-operation where the Nordic investor gets returns from the creation of rural infrastructure, from turning the African wood into jobs and timber-based export products.

6. I will not pretend that the new agenda is as clear as that of solidarity for liberation.

The new agenda
1. I would therefore define the new agenda and strategic goal that should guide our relations as that of building a humane society.

2. Our new thrust has to be consistent with what is possible between peoples who are poles apart.

3. It has to be part of a broader agenda of our nations and building a better world. It must make sense to the new generations.

4. It must be something that ordinary people on both sides can contribute to, give meaning to and benefit from.

5. It has to be something that can draw from the collective experience of the solidarity movement as a definite contribution.

6. We must replace ‘foreign-relations’ with ‘people to people’ relations and evolve people centred foreign policy, within our regions and between our regions.

Who should be the focal point of this new agenda and why?
1. Youth stands out.

2. To ensure a succession plan and institutionalization of memories.

3. To give content to the idealism of youth, a course to believe in and share.

4. To give new meaning and content to North–South relations by defining our SADC–Nordic relations and capturing that in the content of our policies and relations.

5. Whatever we want the distinguishing features to be, it must be a targeted approach which has a multiplier effect. It must appeal to our peoples.
6. We have to re-capture and recast the people to people notion and use it to build the new partnerships with civil society, public and private sectors, because this is something unique we hold dear from this history.

7. As countries and governments we sign agreements. They often do not take into account the people to people aspects, the sister city value and purpose.

8. These seemingly peripheral issues are actually fundamental in the context of building bridges across continents and countries.

9. Within SADC we have a lot of challenges and space to sustain and re-build the solidarity as it threatens to slip away.

10. There is a need to re-define international solidarity once again as the support for national liberation did, in a new North-South context through:

   —Regional co-operation and multilateralism
   —People to people solidarity
   —Civil society, public and private sector partnerships.

11. The youth and entrepreneurs from all SADC and Nordic countries must become a new and added force of the partnership.

12. Our concept of African Renaissance is instructive in the articulation of the new agenda.

13. A key political imperative of the African Renaissance is to seek and promote peaceful resolution of conflicts on the continent and to build durable institutional and other capacities for post-conflict resolution in afflicted societies.

14. This enjoins our region to define for ourselves, and in partnership with others on the continent and beyond, a role in peace-making and peace-keeping initiatives to ensure that Africans themselves are in the forefront of guaranteeing African peace and stability and security.

15. Over and above this, the African Renaissance is a call for co-operation in restoring the social and moral fibre of African societies.

16. It is also an inspiration for moral rectitude in the public and private spheres, a commitment to fight crime and corruption, a covenant to eliminate violence against women, children and the elderly.

17. While we would not want to burden our Nordic-SADC agenda with our still unfolding regional agenda, it does serve as a backdrop. It weaves the new geography from ex-national liberation movements to SADC.

18. The new agenda has to bring in players who can give sustainability and succession, hence 'youth', but also bring in some critical players that were not a clear part of the solidarity movement i.e. the private sector. It must also give great value to culture which did in the past and will in the future bring warmth and fellowship to the fore, and re-define protocol.
Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century

OPENING PROGRAMME

11 FEBRUARY 1999

OLD ASSEMBLY CHAMBER & OLD ASSEMBLY DINING ROOM, PARLIAMENT, CAPE TOWN

Organised by The Robben Island Museum, The Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape and The Nordic Africa Institute
CHAIRPERSON
Dr. Frene Ginwala, Madam Speaker, South Africa

17.00 Arrivals
18.00 Zolani Mkiva, Praise Poet
Welcome: Dr. Frene Ginwala
18.10 Presentation: Tor Sellström,
Coordinator of the Research Project,
National Liberation in Southern Africa:
The Role of the Nordic Countries
18.30 Comment: Anna Lindh, Foreign Minister, Sweden
18.35 Keynote Address:
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa
18.55 Closing: Dr. Frene Ginwala
19.00 Zolani Mkiva, Praise Poet
19.10 Reception
Music and refreshments
in the Old Assembly Dining Room
21.00 Departures

MUSICIANS
Arja Saijonmaa, Tomas Ledin, Mikael Wiehe
Inkululeko (Norwegian Choir)
Members of the UCT Choir for Africa
Amampondo

Subject to alterations
Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century

SEMINAR PROGRAMME
12-14 FEBRUARY 1999
ROBBEN ISLAND

Organised by The Robben Island Museum, The Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape and The Nordic Africa Institute
FRIDAY 12 FEBRUARY
Transport to Robben Island, Registration and Tour of Prison

0800  Boat to Robben Island from the Waterfront for seminar participants and their luggage. Transport to Craig Hall for Registration
Transfer with luggage to places of accommodation
Transport to Prison Dining Hall
Tea/coffee/juices

0900  Boat to Robben Island from the Waterfront for guests and musicians.
Transport to Prison Dining Hall.
Tea/coffee/juices

11.30  Address: Ahmed M. Kathrada MP, Chairperson Robben Island Council
Introduction to and Tour of Prison

13.00  Lunch and Welcome by Conference Partners
Music

SESSION 1: THE NORDIC RESEARCH PROJECT
Venue: Prison Dining Hall
Chairperson: Prof. André Odendaal, Chief Director, Robben Island Museum

15.00  Seminar Opening: Prof. André Odendaal,

15.15  Reflections on the Nordic Research Project in the wider context of Southern African Studies:
Alberto Ribeiro Kabulu, Ambassador to Zimbabwe (Angola)

15.30  Brief presentations by the Nordic Writers (4 x 15 minutes):
Ass. Prof. Tore Linné Eriksen & Eva Østbye (Norway), Christopher Morgenstierne (Denmark),
Dr. Pekka Peltola & Iina Soiri (Finland) & Tor Sellström (Sweden)

16.45  Tea/coffee/juices

17.15  Plenary

18.30  Summary by Lennart Wohlgemuth, Director, The Nordic Africa Institute (Sweden)

19.00  Dinner & music

21.00  Departure of boat for Waterfront for guests and musicians invited for the day

SATURDAY 13 FEBRUARY
07.45  Transport from places of accommodation to Prison Dining Hall for Breakfast

SESSION 2: SOUTHERN AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE NORDIC STUDIES
Venue: Prison Dining Hall
Chairperson: Kirsti Lintonen, Under-Secretary of State (Finland)

09.00  Response from Dr. Concelção Neto (Angola), followed by Plenary
(20 + 15 min.)

09.35  Response from Prof. Sérgio Vieira, MP (Mozambique), followed by Plenary
(20 + 15 min.)

10.10  Response from Dr. Addmore Kambudzi (Zimbabwe), followed by Plenary
(20 + 15 min.)

10.45  Tea/coffee/juices

11.15  Response from Ben Amathila, Minister of Information and Broadcasting (Namibia), followed by Plenary
(20 + 15 min.)
11.50 Responses from Raymond Suttner, Ambassador to Sweden (South Africa) & Lindiwe Mahuza, Ambassador to Germany (South Africa), followed by Plenary (15+15+10min.)

12.30 Summary by Chairperson

12.45 Lunch

SESSION 3: FUTURE CHALLENGES
Venue: Prison Dining Hall
Chairperson: Nahas Angula, Minister of Higher Education (Namibia)

14.00 Presentation by Prof. Jonathan Moyo (Zimbabwe)
14.20 Presentation by Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Dep. Minister of Trade and Industry (South Africa)
14.40 Presentation by Poul Nielsen, Minister for Development Cooperation (Denmark)
15.00 Tea/coffee/ juices
15.30 Plenary
16.30 Summary by Chairperson
16.45-19.00 Working group sessions (6 groups)
(Venues & guidelines to be announced)

20.00 Barbecue at the Guest House

SUNDAY 14 FEBRUARY
07.45 Transport with luggage from places of accommodation to the Prison Dining Hall for Breakfast

SESSION 4: GROUP REPORTS AND SUMMARIES
Venue: Prison Dining Hall
Chairperson: Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, MP Head, ANC International Affairs (South Africa)

09.00 Reports by group rapporteurs (6 x 10 min.)
10.15 Plenary
11.00 Tea/coffee/ juices
11.30 Plenary continued
12.15 Summary:
Mats Karlsson, State Secretary for International Development and Cooperation (Sweden)

12.30 Summary:
Dr. Amelia Sumbana, MP, Secretary for External Relations, Frelimo (Mozambique)
12.45 Closing comments by Chairperson
13.00 Lunch & a bid of farewell: Prof. André Odendaal, Chief Director of the Robben Island Museum
14.15 Transport from Prison to harbour
15.00 Departure of boat to Waterfront. (Time to be confirmed)

The Seminar Programme is subject to changes
MESSAGE BY MARTTI AHTISAARI,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND

It gives me great pleasure to greet the distinguished participants of the conference 'Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century' to be held in the Republic of South Africa.

Robben Island was part of the oppressive system of the pre-democracy times in South Africa, and it still reminds all of us, and especially its former inmates of the Apartheid regime in this country. But besides these sinister memories, it has also come to symbolize national unity, which has overcome oppression and undemocratic rule and led to a successful transition to majority rule.

The countries of Southern Africa had to come to this transition through difficult periods of colonization, power struggles, conflicts and apartheid. Enduring and consequent efforts to freedom of the oppressed have led to a successful struggle, which has rightly gained the support of the United Nations, the Nordic countries and the international community.

These experiences have set an important example to the international community, that crucial changes can be brought about with peaceful means. It is worthwhile to consider this now as many African nations are engaged in military operations in countries already crippled by poverty. Democracy and the universality of human rights can and have to be applied everywhere. These changes are important and necessary, because democratic change provides for the political stability which is conducive to economic growth and equal opportunities.

The countries of Southern Africa are committed to reduce poverty and to develop their civil societies and their economies. The Nordic countries give their full support to these efforts. It is in the interest of both the Southern African and industrialized countries to see the political dialogue between the North and the South develop as well as the promotion of regional integration. The challenges and opportunities of globalization can be managed best with cooperation on the national, regional and global levels.

During my own years in Africa I learned to appreciate the rich diversity of this continent and the warmth of its people. I also had the opportunity to be personally involved in the independence process of Namibia and to be present to witness the peaceful transfer of power in South Africa. The unanimous commitment to democracy and freedom left a lasting impression on me.

MESSAGE FROM AHMED M. KATHRADA
CHAIRPERSON, ROBBEN ISLAND MUSEUM COUNCIL

This Conference provides the opportunity for the presentation of and response to The Nordic Africa Institute's research project on the role of the Nordic societies in the national liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa during the period 1950-1994.

The Conference aims to reflect on the heritage of Nordic solidarity as well as to address future challenges of democratic partnerships in the context of a complex and changing arena of global governance on the eve of the 21st Century.

We commend the discussion by this Conference and thank all those involved in making it possible.

May the deliberations be inspired by Robben Island as a symbol of the triumph of human dignity and freedom over repression and humiliation.

A.M. KATHRADA MP
# List of participants

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<th>Journalist</th>
<th>Sida</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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<td>Mr.</td>
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<td>National Chairman</td>
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<td>Rukudzo Murapa</td>
<td>Professor, Vice Chancellor</td>
<td>Africa University</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Mrs.</td>
<td>Helen Murapa</td>
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