Swedes in Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, 1924–1952
A study in early development co-operation

Viveca Halldin Norberg

Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala
Swedes in Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, 1924–1952
To my Father

In Memory of my Mother
Viveca Halldin Norberg

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A study in early development co-operation

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Acknowledgements

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Uppsala in April 1977

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<td>British Military Mission to Ethiopia</td>
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<td>BVMT</td>
<td>Bibeltrogna Vänners Missionstidning</td>
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<td>Dagens Nyheter</td>
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<td>IEAF</td>
<td>Imperial Ethiopian Air Force</td>
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<td>JAH</td>
<td>Journal of African History</td>
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<td>Journal of Ethiopian Studies</td>
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<td>Journal of Modern African Studies</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>United States Military Assistance Group</td>
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<td>Occupied Enemy Territory Administration</td>
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<td>SAE</td>
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<td>SECO</td>
<td>Swedish Ethiopian Company</td>
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<td>SEM</td>
<td>Swedish Evangelical Mission</td>
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<td>SFS</td>
<td>Svensk Författningssamling</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Authority</td>
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<td>SILA</td>
<td>Svenskt Internationellt Luft AB</td>
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<td>SMBV</td>
<td>Swedish Mission Bibeltrogna Vänner</td>
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<td>SMK</td>
<td>Svenska Män och Kvinnor</td>
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<td>SRK</td>
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<td>VS</td>
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Author's note

1. Transcription

There is no generally accepted form of Ethiopian transcription and most of the various systems belong to the realm of linguistics. The present author has used a transcription aiming at giving an English speaking person a version which could be assumed to follow the indigenous Ethiopian pronunciation. Personal names have created problems since they appear in many forms. For Ras Taffari and Haile Selassie the form used in official publications has been utilized. The names of the Ethiopian cadets enrolled in 1935 and 1946 have been transcribed in the same form as they were registered in the rolls. Persons who appear often, like Ato Abbebe Retta, have their names transcribed in the form they used themselves. In the foot notes the names and places have been presented in the same form as they appear on the document, with the exception that Addis Abeba is always spelt in that way.

2. Calendar

The Ethiopian Calendar (E.C.) lies seven years and eight months behind the Gregorian Calendar (G.C.). The Ethiopian year is divided into 12 months of 30 days and a thirteenth month of five days. During leap-years the thirteenth month has six days. The Ethiopian New Year, Maskerem 1, falls on September 11 according to the Gregorian Calendar. From September 11 to December 31, the Ethiopian year thus runs seven years in arrears to the Gregorian year whereas the difference is eight years from January 1 to September 10. All dates have been put into the Gregorian form or have Gregorian equivalents.

3. Ethiopian titles

Ethiopia is traditionally an extremely hierarchical society, indicated by the existence of numerous civilian as well as military titles. Some of the traditional Ethiopian titles are now about to disappear. Others like traditional military titles are only used as honorifics, but are still of social importance. In the present study the following titles will appear:

- Abun: Bishop, archbishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church
- Ato: Common title of respect (now simply Mr)
- Blatengeta: Administrator of the palace, prominent court official
- Dejazmatch: General, and normally governor, second only to Ras
- Itege: Queen, empress
4. Ethiopian names

An Ethiopian’s name consists of his own personal name followed by that of his father. Thus Abbebe Retta’s and Taffari Mekonnen’s personal names are Abbebe and Taffari and their fathers were called Retta and Mekonnen. The patronymic exists only to prevent confusion with namesakes. It is quite correct to refer to them simply as Abbebe or Taffari, without any hint of familiarity, whereas it is a mistake to call them Mr Retta or Mr Mekonnen as this confuses them with their fathers.

Many Ethiopian religious names consist of two words for example Haile Selassie which means Power of the Trinity. It is a mistake to use either part of such a name without the other.

5. Some definitions

In the present study the word missionary will be used for a person who, irrespective of his professional training, disseminates the faith of his denomination overseas in the service of a missionary society. The word expert will be used of a person employed in the service of the Ethiopian Government to fulfill a special duty, often as instructor. An adviser is a high-ranking expert employed for advisory duties to the Emperor or to an Ethiopian minister.

The term modernization will often be used in preference to development, partly because it was the term preferred by Haile Selassie during the period under review, and partly in order to avoid confusion with the state-organized undertakings of later date. References are, however, also made to co-operation for development in order to link the discussion with modern terminology. A detailed analysis of Swedish aid policy, definitions and terminology is given in a recent publication from the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), entitled 'Bistånd på mottagarens villkor' (Aid on the recipient’s conditions).¹

¹ Wohlgemuth (1976).
Chapter I
Introduction

At first sight it would appear strange that Ethiopia, an agricultural country in North East Africa, and Sweden, a highly industrialized country far in the north of Europe, should have developed close relations within various fields.

1. Aim of the study

The present study will deal with the problem of how the Ethio-Swedish relations first started, in which ways and why the first contacts via three missionaries sent out in 1865 expanded into large-scale co-operation for development initiated in 1924, and what this co-operation had achieved by 1952.

The study is thus intended to be a case study of a relationship between a non-industrialized and an industrialized country, represented by Ethiopia and Sweden. It will be an investigation into the relations between two independent Monarchies, where the Heads of States had entirely different functions. The countries are situated in different parts of the world, with different geographical and climatological conditions, ethnic composition, language structure, cultural and social settings and modes of production. It will, in other words, constitute a case study of early co-operation for development.

2. Angles of approach

The study will deal with the following main problems:

a. *The motives and beliefs behind the Ethio-Swedish co-operation.*

In the debate on foreign aid to developing countries, the issue regarding the donors' motives is often discussed; whether their actions are directed by moral and humanitarian motives or whether the donors use development assistance as a method of gaining influence in a certain sphere, i.e. as a part of their foreign policy. In the present study this question will also be reversed: Why does a developing country, in this particular case Ethiopia, choose certain countries, for example Sweden, as partners in the development process? In other words why just Sweden? Were there any alternatives? To what extent was the choice directed by political necessities? Did the Ethiopian and Swedish motives for co-operation undergo any change over time?
Why did the Swedish missionary societies Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission Bibeltrognas Vänner as well as the Scandinavian Union Conference of the Seventh Day Adventist Mission choose to take up missionary work in just Ethiopia? Why did the Swedish Government agree to send personnel to Ethiopia in the 1930s and the 1940s? Can any signs be traced that Sweden had any political or economic ambitions in Ethiopia?

Did Haile Selassie I want to use Sweden as a counterweight to Great Power influence in Ethiopia, and did the Swedish Government agree to supply him with personnel only when that could be done without risking Sweden’s own relations with the Great Powers?

It might be assumed that the official Swedish motives as well as the motives of the organizations sending personnel to Ethiopia differed from the motives of the individuals who accepted employment. An attempt to analyse the motives of the organization and that of the individual will be made regarding the SEM missionaries.

b. Which Swedes have been in Ethiopia? Under whose direction and within which occupational fields have they been active?
The study will be given a statistical base. All Swedes one way or another occupationally active in Ethiopia – either employed by the Ethiopian Government or by a private organization – as well as their family members staying with them in the country, will be included. This approach will enable us to find out whether any change can be noted regarding the professional orientation of the Swedes working in Ethiopia. For the missionaries the result of this purely quantitative study will be demonstrated in the form of tables as well as in 'Activity graphs' (Appendices 1-2).

c. The scope of the Swedish undertaking in relation to the undertakings in Ethiopia of other countries.
The presence of Swedes in Ethiopia has to be studied against Ethiopia’s position at the crossroads of power interests. Ethiopia wanted to resist foreign dominance but needed assistance from abroad to develop her resources. Was Sweden a suitable partner? A survey must also be made of the number, nationality and the occupational orientation of other foreigners in Ethiopia before 1952. In this context it becomes important to ascertain which other countries had missionary organizations active in Ethiopia.

d. The process of recruitment when employing Swedish personnel for Ethiopia.
The contact pattern in the recruitment process for the missionaries as well as for other categories of Swedes will be thoroughly investigated. We then have to distinguish between two levels, namely Haile Selassie’s contact pattern when approaching Sweden and the contact pattern used in Sweden to recruit the staff requested. Haile Selassie’s approaches will be analysed in detail and
placed into an international perspective. Can any connection be traced between the Christian missions and the recruitment of experts? The methods used when recruiting the experts will also be studied. To what extent were the experts 'hand-picked' on the basis of personal contacts with responsible persons or organizations involved in work in Ethiopia?

e. *The impact of the work performed by the Swedes* will be difficult to measure because of the lack of a suitable instrument. Some efforts will be made, however, by investigating the number of pupils in SEM's schools in Addis Abeba, Najo and Naqamte 1920–1935 and by making a small study of the Ethiopian cadets enrolled at the Cadet schools administered by the Swedes in 1935 and 1946.

3. Limitation of subject

The study will deal with the period 1924–1952, since it was during this period that Ethio-Swedish relations expanded to other fields than the Christian missions. The year 1924 was chosen because Ras Taffari – the future Emperor Haile Selassie I – that year visited Europe, a journey which also took him to Sweden. This visit initiated a period of expanded Ethio-Swedish contacts. The closing year, 1952, has been chosen because the 'Centralkommittén för svensk teknisk hjälp åt underutvecklade områden' (The Central committee for Swedish technical assistance to underdeveloped areas), decided in April 1953 to include Ethiopia in a Swedish Government aid programme. This decision initiated a new phase in the Ethio-Swedish relations.

Although Eritrea today is a province of Ethiopia, this area was not a part of the country during the period 1924–1952. Eritrea has therefore been excluded from the study except for the background parts dealing with the earliest Christian mission (Chapter IV:1.).

The study of Swedish missionary activities during 1865–1923 will be presented only as a background, because it has already been dealt with in several studies, the most comprehensive of which has been presented by Gustav Arén. The relations between the Swedish Christian missions and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church have recently been analysed by Olav Saeverås, and will therefore only be dealt with briefly when necessary for the general context of the present study. Since the mission as from 1924 will constitute

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2 Arén (1977). See also: Beskow (1884); Hammar (1901); Hylander (1917); Joseph (1972); Landgren (1871); Levander (1931); Rodén (1906); Tafvelin & Lundmark (1974).
an integrated part of the study it would have been an important task to investigate the effects of the cultural confrontation between the Swedish Protestant and the various Ethiopian cultures, in the same way as done by Sigbert Axelson regarding the Lower Congo. This could, however, lead too far into fields of mission history, social anthropology, ethnography etc. The problem of cultural confrontation will therefore not be discussed in the present study. The missionary work will, instead, be seen more as a part of the Ethio-Swedish co-operation for development.

The Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935–36 will be dealt with only insofar as it concerns the Swedish engagement i.e. the Swedish officers and the Red Cross Ambulance Brigade sent to Ethiopia.

The financing of the Swedish work in Ethiopia will be examined only with regard to the Swedish experts recruited in the 1940s. A brief examination will be made of how the Swedish activities were viewed by Great Britain and the United States – particularly in the 1940s – but French and Italian reactions to the Swedish engagement will be omitted completely.

The picture given of Ethiopia and the Emperor in Swedish mass media, as well as the reactions of the public opinion to the Swedish undertakings as viewed in the press have also been restricted to a minimum in the present study. When checking the Ethiopian press it was found that it contained very little on this issue, whereas the material from the Swedish national, local and organizational press is so rich that it could be made the topic of a complete research project. The press investigation will therefore be restricted to only one series of articles published in the Swedish daily newspaper Stockholms Tidningen in June 1947. This series has been chosen from many others because it caused strong reactions in Sweden as well as among the Swedes in Ethiopia.

4. Research method

The research behind the present study had been largely undertaken in official and organizational archives in Sweden, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States. Persons who in one way or another have been involved in the Ethio-Swedish relations, Ethiopians, Swedes as well as an American adviser – in all some 50 individuals – have been interviewed. These interviews have had two main purposes:


1 The sources surveyed cover the financing of the missionary work and also enable comparison of the salaries paid to the missionaries with those paid to the Swedes in Ethiopian Government service. This issue like the one regarding development of commercial relations between Ethiopia and Sweden in the late 1940s, however, will have to be left to a forthcoming study.
a) to trace private files with information of relevance to the study, which could not be obtained from official archives
b) to obtain factual information which could not be obtained from any written records, and which could be useful for the interpretation of events or conditions that otherwise could not be easily understood by a scholar living in a later generation.

These interviews led to valuable information in the form of diaries, correspondence, reports etc, becoming available and which, in all probability, could not have been traced otherwise. The interviews themselves have only very rarely been used other than together with other sources.

In order to study the working of the Ethiopian administration and to learn something about the Ethiopian way of life and thinking, the present author visited Ethiopia five times during the course of research. Extensive travelling in the country and visits to most places where Swedes have been working, including remote missionary stations, provided an insight into their working conditions which could not be learnt from living only in Addis Abeba.

Ethiopian files were not easily available for research during the period when the research in Ethiopia was conducted i.e. in 1971, 1973 and in 1974. However, by the courtesy of Ethiopian officials who had been involved in co-operation with Swedes before 1952 – among them the late Emperor Haile Selassie, the late Ato Abbebe Retta, former minister and the Emperor’s contact with the Swedes in the 1940s, and the late General Assefa Ayene, former Chief-of-Staff, trained by Swedes in the 1930s and liaison officer at the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force in the 1940s – files were placed at the present author's disposal regarding foreign immigration into Ethiopia in the 1940s as well as information about Swedes employed by the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force. It would appear that the fact that the author was a Swede made the files more easily available.

The present study is an attempt at a general survey of the Ethio-Swedish relations. A thorough background will therefore be needed in order to answer the questions raised above in Chapter 1:2. The study will therefore contain rather comprehensive descriptive sections, intended both as a contribution to our knowledge about what happened between Ethiopia and Sweden and as a base for an analysis of this relationship.

5. Comments on sources

The present study is mainly based on unpublished sources, most of which have not been used before in historical research. The biographical data on the Swedes in Ethiopia, which constitute the statistical base of the study, have been obtained from a variety of sources.
Missionary records of Swedish Evangelical Mission are housed at SEM’s main office in Stockholm, consisting of the following three unpublished sources:

1. _Förteckning över missionärer_ (Record of missionaries) is a handwritten booklet which appears to be most complete for the period 1900-1936. The earliest missionaries have not been registered in this booklet and the missionaries sent out after 1945 are recorded only occasionally. The first missionary recorded was sent out in 1884. The source provides detailed information about the missionaries and their families.

2. _Missionärernas personalier_ (Biographical data about the missionaries) is a card index started in accordance with a decision of the Board in early 1945. It contains the same type of information as the previous source, but is more detailed. The data provided in this register are probably sometimes taken from the previous source, but it supplements the earlier records by having been kept more up-to-date. The missionaries sent out before 1884 were not entriled in this register.

3. _Det nu aktuella kortregistret_ (The main card index) is a current register over active missionaries and their families. The personal data about the individuals are drawn from forms filled in by the missionaries themselves, and is then kept up-to-date by SEM’s office.

On checking these three sources it has been found that they together provide complete information about the missionaries sent by SEM during the 20th century.

For information about missionaries active during the 19th century two published sources can be consulted:

1. _Morgonljus. Femtioårigt missionsarbete på natthöljd jord 1865–1916_, by Nils Hylander. At the end of this book there is a list of the missionaries who were sent to East Africa. They are registered in the same order as they were sent out and each individual is given a running number, totalling 116 individuals. The list provides particulars about each missionary. It has not been possible to trace the origin of the information published in this register, but it would appear that the information originates from church records.

2. _Jubileumsalbum_ (Jubilee-album), ed. by Nils Hylander containing approximately 500 biographical notes and photos from SEM’s missionary fields in Eastern Africa and India, together with a short history. Biographical notes and photos of most missionaries sent out to Ethiopia 1865–1913 are included in this publication, providing the same kind of information as the previous publication, but slightly more detailed.

\[1\] Hylander (1917).
\[1\] Hylander (1916).
Information about missionaries who have studied at Johannelund's Theological Institute during the period 1863–1938 can be taken from a commemorative publication published when the Institute celebrated its 75th anniversary, called Johannelunds missionsinstitut genom 75 år. Jubileumsskrift 1863–1938 (Johannelunds Theological Institute through 75 years. Commemorative publication 1863–1938), ed. by Nils Rodén. Most of this book consists of very detailed biographical notes about the students at the Institute. Women were not admitted to Johannelund and therefore no information about female missionaries can be obtained from this book.

Biographical notes about ordained missionaries can be taken from Biografisk matrikel över svenska kyrkans prästerskap (Biographical roll of the Swedish clergy), which has appeared in several editions.

Biographical data have been collected on 186 missionaries who worked for SEM during the period under review.

Swedish Mission Bibeltroga Vänner have not kept records of their missionaries until lately. Biographical data on SMBV's missionaries have been taken from the following sources:

1. List called Svenska missionärer i Bibeltroga Vänner tjänst i Etiopien (Swedish missionaries in the service of Swedish Mission Bibeltroga Vänner in Ethiopia), prepared by the late Chairman of SMBV Sigurd Stark for the present author and handed over in May 1972. The list contains full name, year of birth and death and active period in Ethiopia and is, as far as can be ascertained, complete. Stark has taken the information from SMBV's archives.

2. Bibeltroga Vänner förteckning över missionärer (Bibeltroga Vänner's list of missionaries), contains full biographical information about SMBV's missionaries active in 1972, but does not include the earlier missionaries. The list is kept at SMBV's main office in Stockholm.

Biographical data have been collected on a total of 44 SMBV missionaries active during the period under review.

The Seventh Day Adventist Mission in Stockholm does not have any current index over their Swedish staff, due to their international organization. Information about their missionaries has, however, been supplied to the present author by Odd Jordal, SDA's director in Stockholm. In all, 14 Swedish SDA missionaries have been active during the period under review.

Missionaries sent to Ethiopia from all three societies during the period 1945–1952 have all been registered in Nationalitetsmatrikeln (the Swedish

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\* Rodén (1938).
\* The following editions have been used: 1901; 1914; 1934; 1970.
\* Stark (1972).
\* Jordal (1975).
Nationality Roll) kept by the Swedish Legation in Addis Abeba. Some of the missionaries sent to Ethiopia 1945–1949 have also been registered in the *Ethiopian Records of residence permits* kept at the Immigration Office in Addis Abeba. Current information about the missionaries can also be obtained from the annual reports and mission papers of the respective societies.

Biographical data about the Swedes involved in the Ethio-Swedish relations have also been taken from biographical publications like *Svenskar i utlandet, Vem är det, Svenska män och kvinnor* and *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*. Personal data about Swedes in Ethiopia 1945–1952 have mainly been obtained from the Nationality Roll.

By a decision of the King-in-Council taken in May 1972, the present author was admitted to the files of the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* covering the period up to 9 May 1945. These files are very comprehensive, containing documents which enable us to investigate the official Ethio-Swedish relations from various aspects, political as well as economic. Documents are available regarding employment of Swedish advisers and experts in Ethiopian Government service. The files on Christian missions enable us to investigate the conditions of the Swedish missionaries in Ethiopia, and to a certain extent also possible connections between the missionary societies and recruitment of experts. There is also a file covering the measures taken by the Swedish authorities with regard to Ras Taffari's visit to Sweden in 1924.

The *Ethiopian Records of residence permits* 1944–1949 kept at the Archives of the Immigration Office in Addis Abeba, were released by special permission of the Emperor granted to the present author during an audience in May 1973. These files constitute an important source for making a comparison between the number of Swedes and the number of other foreigners.

As far as can be ascertained there are no official Ethiopian records available about the foreigners in Ethiopia before 1944. The period before 1935 is, however, comparatively well covered in Adrien Zervos's book *L'Empire d'Ethiopie. Le miroire de l'Éthiopie moderne 1906–1935* containing a whole section about foreigners in Ethiopia. This section contains a country by country survey of foreign official representation in Ethiopia, treaties still in force by 1935, names of advisers, number of foreigners in Ethiopia indicating their nationality as well as their main professional orientation. Zervos states that the figures given for the different foreign groups are based on estimates.

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n The Swedish Nationality Roll and the Ethiopian Records of residence permits will be presented and evaluated in Ch. III:5. 1 and 5. 4.

* Zervos (1936), pp. 415–503. Zervos spent about 40 years in Ethiopia and served for some time as secretary to Minilik II. He was a Greek by nationality. 

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Unfortunately, he does not indicate which sources the estimates are based on. His position would indicate, however, that he had access to first hand information, and it might be assumed that his figures at least provide the correct proportions between the foreign groups. Despite the fact that Zervos's figures might contain errors they will be used in the present study. They will, however, mainly be used for comparison of the relative strength between different foreign groups.

Information about Ethiopia's relations with other states after 1941 as well as reactions from Great Britain and the United States on Swedish undertakings in Ethiopia has been obtained from the files of the Public Records Office in London and from the Decimal files at the National Archives in Washington. These collections are very comprehensive, and have been released for research up to 1945 and 1949 respectively.

The Italo-Ethiopian war is well covered by the files at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These files have only been used to a minor extent, mainly with regard to the Red Cross undertakings in Ethiopia. The investigation on the recruitment of staff for the Swedish Red Cross Ambulance Brigade sent to Ethiopia in 1935 is based on the archives of the Swedish Red Cross Central Committee deposited at the National Swedish Record Office, where the files with outgoing and incoming letters regarding the Brigade have been used. Some report about the Red Cross Ambulance Brigade's activities in Ethiopia, which could not be located in this collection, were traced to Fride Hylander, the Chief of the Brigade, who placed them at the present author's disposal. Additional information regarding the recruitment, which could not be found in the Red Cross archives, have been obtained from correspondence with Fride Hylander.

The recruitment of Swedish experts which did not pass via official channels, as well as unofficial enquiries from Emperor Haile Selassie to Sweden, and all relations between Ethiopia and Sweden after May 1945 have been investigated via private collections, the most important of which shall be introduced here.

Johannes Kolmodin's papers and Nathan Söderblom's papers, both collections deposited at the University Library of Uppsala, contain very complete documentation on Kolmodin's recruitment as Haile Selassie's adviser in foreign affairs.

The late Frank Hammar has placed all his papers on Ethiopia at the author's disposal. This collection contains documents regarding his recruitment as technical adviser at the radio station at Aqaqi in 1932 as well as his activities in Ethiopia. Frank Hammar was also one of the key contacts both during the first unofficial Ethiopian enquiries via London in 1943 and later regarding the further development of the Ethio-Swedish relations and the establishment of the Abyssinian committee in 1944/45. When Hammar in January 1974 handed over his papers to the author he wrote a summary on his
correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explaining the background of the different documents."

The late General Viking Tamm has via his wife Suzanne Tamm authorized the author to make use of his large 'Etiopienarkiv' (Ethiopia Collection), deposited at the Royal Swedish Military Record Office in Stockholm". Besides a comprehensive correspondence, Tamm’s collection contains material on the recruitment of officers to Ethiopia in 1935 and in 1945/46, reports and minutes from meetings, material from his activities as a member of the Abyssinian Committee, as well as from his periods in Ethiopia 1934–36 and in 1946. During the later period he was the representative of the whole Swedish expert group. After having left Ethiopia, Tamm kept in constant contact with the Swedish officers in Ethiopia as well as with his former cadets and Ethiopian military authorities.

Fride Hylander's collection kept at his home in Sörby Runtuna, contains a very rich material particularly on the years 1945–46 when he as Ethiopian Honorary Consul and member of the Abyssinian Committee was responsible for the recruitment of Swedish experts. The material includes his comprehensive correspondence with presumptive experts, as well as with Ethiopian and Swedish authorities, plans for the Ethio-Swedish co-operation etc. Also minutes from the meetings of the Working Committee of the Swedish expert group in Addis Abeba, which took place in January-September 1946 are kept among Hylander's papers. They were handed over by Tamm on his return to Sweden in September 1946. This Committee was the embryo of Föreningen Svenskar i Etiopien (The Association of Swedes in Ethiopia), which was established during the later part of 1946. This association has a rather comprehensive collection of documents kept at the Swedish Embassy in Addis Abeba containing minutes of their meetings as well as correspondence regarding the Swedes in Ethiopia.

Erik Leijonhufvud's collection kept at his home in Stockholm contains a variety of documents and correspondence with Ethiopian and Swedish authorities as well as with representatives of Swedish economic life regarding the negotiations about a Swedish Government credit in 1945 and 1946. In his capacity as legal adviser to the Emperor, Leijonhufvud was the Emperor's representative in the negotiations conducted in 1946.

The late Torsten Vinell's collection kept at the archives of the General Swedish Export Association, contains comprehensive files on the role of Swedish economic life with respect to the credit and plans for expanded Ethio-Swedish economic relations in the 1940s.

"Sammanfattning av skriftväxling mellan UD och F. Hammar 1944–45 i Etiopienfrågan, enclosed F. Hammar to V. Haldin, 11.1 1974, VHN.
" S. Tamm to V. Haldin, Kristianstad 7.10 1974, VHN.
The late Ato Abbebe Retta also placed papers regarding his activities as the Emperor's representative in his contacts with Sweden at the present author's disposal. It is not known, however, whether his collection still exists after his execution, but his papers have been microfilmed by the present author.

In order to investigate the activities of the missionary societies the archives of the respective organizations as well as private collections have been utilized. Swedish Evangelical Mission has deposited most of their files covering the period 1865–1945 at the City Archives of Stockholm, including minutes of Board meetings, correspondence, reports on their activities etc. It is a very comprehensive collection comprising several hundred volumes, of which only a few have been used for the present study. Minutes of the Board as well as of the Board's Executive Committee after 1945 are kept at SEM's main office in Stockholm and so are the files on recruitment of missionaries.

Reverend Nils Dahlberg has given the present author access to his unpublished diaries from journeys to Ethiopia 1924/25 and 1946/47, as well as to his correspondence with Ras Taffari from 1925, kept at his home in Stockholm. The diaries provide us with important information about the missionaries' situation as viewed by a responsible Board member.

Information about SMBV's activities in Ethiopia has been obtained from the Minutes of SMBV's Board meetings, which were made available for the whole period 1912–1952, by the late Chairman of the Board, Sigurd Stark. They are kept at SMBV's main office in Stockholm.

Axel B. Svensson's collection, covering SMBV's activities 1912–1952, is deposited at Lund's Provincial Archives. This very comprehensive collection of correspondence, manuscripts and various papers from Axel B. Svensson's varied activities as Secretary and Chairman of SMBV's Board has been made available to the present author by the courtesy of his son Sune Svensson. Axel B. Svensson's unpublished diaries from his journeys to Ethiopia in 1929/30, 1938/39 and 1947/48 have been used only to a limited extent, mainly to shed light upon his meetings with Haile Selassie and his efforts to clarify the situation between the missionaries and the Board in Stockholm. Like Dahlberg's diaries they are important sources of information regarding what kind of information the two representatives of missionary societies, who carried the main responsibility for the missionary work, took down to communicate to their respective Boards.

The many private collections kept by persons who in one way or other have been involved in the Ethio-Swedish relations, some of them having carried the main responsibility for developing these relations, constitute a very important complement to the official records. Taken together these official and private files provide us with a firm basis for an investigation of the Ethio-Swedish relations.
The annual reports and missionary papers of the respective societies also constitute important sources of information. Missionaries and experts have also written books on their impressions from Ethiopia, some of which could be characterized as memoirs. These books have been used only to a very limited extent, since unpublished sources have in most cases been available for investigating the problems raised in the present study. Haile Selassie's autobiography, which was originally published in Amharinya in 1973 has recently appeared in an English version. The book covers the period 1892–1937, and has been used as a complement to other sources.

6. Status of research

As late as 1955, Gerard De Geer, a well-known Swedish industrialist and traveller, stated in his book *Afrikansk rapsodi* (African Rhapsody) that Africa south of the Sahara lacked known history and culture. Today such a statement would be characterized as prejudiced and ignorant, but at the time his book was published systematic research in African history had just started.

The colonial rule had meant an underestimation of the African peoples. Africa's history was in the beginning regarded as a part of European history, limited to areas where Europeans had settled. During the interwar period only little research was undertaken on African initiatives and social changes. Slave trade was given a dominating position with emphasis on the European aspect. 'The scramble for Africa' constituted another important topic. Most historians undertook their research at European universities using European sources. There were, however, a few Europeans, mainly administrators, teachers and missionaries trained in historical method, who were stationed in Africa. They tried to research into the period before the white man arrived and thus became pioneers of the interwar generation of historians. African students trained abroad undertook a pioneering work by making use of oral traditions when writing the history of their people.

During the two decades following the Second World War, the research on African history developed rapidly. An increasing number of Africans attended European and American universities, and several universities were also established in Africa. In 1948 Roland Oliver was appointed the first professor...
of African history at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Oliver has greatly stimulated the research in African church history by his book *The missionary factor in East Africa*. The first conference on African history was held in London five years later. In 1960 the *Journal of African History* was established and became a forum for research in African history. Fruitful co-operation was established with archeologists, linguists, ethnographers and social anthropologists in the research into old African history. The African oral tradition has been systematized by Jan Vansina.

The reorientation of nineteenth- and twentieth century African history away from the traditional focus on European activities towards the study of the attitudes and activities of the Africans themselves has mainly taken place after 1960. Interest has been focused towards themes like African resistance against European conquest and colonial rule, which could be exemplified by the comprehensive volume *Protest and power in black Africa*. New explanations are also presented to African technical backwardness, as for example in Walter Rodney's book *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*, where the colonial system is blamed for many of the present problems on the continent. The European colonialism has been reduced to only an *episode in Africa's history* by professor J.F.A. Ajayi in the concluding chapter of volume one of the five volume work *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*.

National historical societies have been founded in several African countries, some of them publishing their own journals. Proceedings published from congresses of African historians have outlined methodologies and topics of relevance to modern Africans, for example in *Emerging themes of African history* ed. by Terence Ranger of Dar es Salaam and Manchester. In 1972 Joseph Ki-Zerbo published *Histoire de l'Afrique noire d'hier à demain*. This was the first comprehensive study on the history of the whole African continent south of the Sahara written by an African scholar.

African studies have a long tradition in Sweden dating back to the 18th century which has resulted in a comprehensive collection of Africana at the

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Rodney (1972).
Journal of the Historical society of Nigeria, publ. in Ibadan; Kenya historical review. The journal of the Historical association of Kenya, publ. in Nairobi; Rhodesian history. The journal of the Central Africa historical association, publ. in Salisbury; Tanzania zamani, issued by the History department of the University of Dar es Salaam and the Historical Association of Tanzania, publ. in Dar es Salaam. Journal of Ethiopian studies, publ. by the Institute of Ethiopian studies since 1963, covers a wide scope of subjects related to history and culture. Transafrican journal of history has been published in Nairobi since 1971 and is intended to cover the whole continent.
Ranger (1968).
Ki-Zerbo (1972).
University Library of Uppsala. In 1962 the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies was founded in Uppsala as an answer to the growing interest in African Affairs that had emerged in Sweden as a result of the Congo crisis and the emergence of independent states in Africa. This Institute was supposed to complement the University Library by concentrating on topics related to the economic, political and social development of modern Africa as well as its recent history. A comprehensive research on problems related to the development process have been undertaken in co-operation with this Institute to a great extent inspired by its Director Carl Gösta Widstrand. A thorough inventory of Swedish printed material on Africa entitled 'Africana Suecana, 1945–1965', has recently been presented as a Ph.D. thesis in ethnography, by Anna-Britta Wallenius, former librarian at the Institute. Among the many dissertations in ethnography could also be mentioned Lars Sundström's study 'The trade of Guinea' from 1965. Since the foundation of the Institute many Ph. D. dissertations have been presented particularly in the fields of political science, social anthropology and sociology among which could be mentioned 'Party and people' by Lars Rudebeck, which was one of the first."

Studies in African history undertaken in Sweden have to a great extent been related to the subject of Mission history and Church history, like Bengt Sundkler's studies 'The Christian Ministry in Africa' and 'Bantu prophets in South Africa' as well as studies by Sigbert Axelson on 'Culture confrontation in the Lower Congo', by Stiv Jakobsson 'Am I not a man and a brother?', by David Lagergren 'Mission and state in the Congo', and by Sigvard von Sicard, 'The Lutheran Church on the Coast of Tanzania, 1887–1914', just to mention some examples from Uppsala. From Lund could be mentioned a study by Carl-Johan Hellberg entitled 'Missions on a colonial frontier west of Lake Victoria.'

Åke Holmberg's study 'African tribes and European agencies' initiated a research project called Kolonialpolitiska brytningar i Afrika (Breakings in colonial politics in Africa), which was undertaken at the Department of History at the University of Gothenburg 1965–1973. This project has produced three Ph. D. dissertations, 'Two decades of Basotho development, 1830–1850', by Kerstin Keen, 'The Fanti confederation, 1868–1872', by Lennart Limberg, and 'Government in Abeokuta, 1830–1914', by Agneta Wallenius (1975); Sundström (1965). For publications issued by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies see Publications list (1976). Rudebeck (1967).

Sundkler (1960); Sundkler (1961); Axelson (1970); Jakobsson (1972); Lagergren (1970); von Sicard (1970); Hellberg (1965). See also Sundkler (1976), where his results from 1961 are slightly revised.

Holmberg (1966). For a presentation of the project see Holmberg (1976).
A programme is also planned in Gothenburg for the investigation of the role of the Chiefs in post-colonial Africa.\footnote{Keen (1975); Limberg (1973); Pallinder-Law (1973); Holmberg (1976), p. 459.}

A study entitled 'Ethnic minority problems in Nigerian politics, 1960–1965', by the Nigerian scholar Ugbana Okpu is the first Ph.D. thesis in African history presented at the Department of History at the University of Uppsala under the guidance of professor Sten Carlsson.\footnote{Okpu (1977).} Research on Swedish undertakings abroad has largely been focused on the Swedish emigration to the United States within the frame of a large research project 'Sweden and America after 1860' undertaken at the Department of History at the University of Uppsala. The present study on Swedes in Ethiopia, however, is presented within the frame of this project as also are studies on Swedish activities in Latin America and China. Swedish undertakings in Africa have, as already mentioned, mainly been investigated in Sweden within the framework of mission history. Examples can, however, be found where Swedish involvement in Africa has been the subject of historical research outside Sweden, as for example in France at the University of Provence, where a thesis has been presented called 'La Suède et Madagascar au début du 18me siècle', by Jacques Macau. An American of Swedish descent by the name of Alan Winquist has presented a Ph.D. thesis entitled 'The impact of Scandinavians on the cultural, social, and economic development of pre-1948 South Africa' at the New York University.\footnote{Rubenson (1976), pp. 2–5.}

After this introductory survey of research in African history in general and in Sweden in particular, we shall now turn to the study of Ethiopian history. To date Ethiopia's history has mainly been written by European and American scholars, a fact which has sometimes as emphasized by Rubenson resulted in a non-Ethiopian perspective on her history. A generation of Ethiopian historians represented by names like Sergew Hable Selassie, Zewde Gabre-Sellassie and Eleme Eshete have, however, come to the forefront. Rubenson has presented a survey of previous research in nineteenth century Ethiopian history, which will not be repeated here.\footnote{Rubenson (1966); Zewde (1975); Marcus (1975). Darkwah (1975) could also be regarded as a biography of Menilik, despite the fact that it ends in 1889.}

Political biographies of Ethiopian Emperors have been produced by Rubenson, 'King of Kings. Tewodros of Ethiopia', by Zewde Gabre-Sellassie 'Yohannes IV a political biography', and by Marcus 'The life and times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913'.\footnote{Rubenson (1976); Limberg (1973); Pallinder-Law (1973); Holmberg(1976), p. 459.} A biography on Haile Selassie I is at present (1977) under preparation by Harold G. Marcus. Rubenson's study entitled 'The
survival of Ethiopian independence’ which was presented at the University of Lund late 1976, constituted a thorough investigation of Ethiopian nineteenth century foreign relations.36 Ethiopian foreign relations prior to 1935 have been the subject of many studies, among which could be mentioned 'Ethiopia the study of a polity, 1540–1935' and a pro-Ethiopian diplomatic history presented by Ernest Work in 1935, called 'Ethiopia: a pawn in European diplomacy'.37 The prelude to the Italo-Ethiopian war, 1935–36, as well as the war itself has been analysed in several studies of which only a few can be mentioned here: 'The coming of the Italian-Ethiopian war', by Baer, 'The Ethiopian war', by Del Boca, and 'The civilizing mission', by Barker.38 Also the positions taken by single powers in the conflict as well as their actions in the League of Nations have been the subject of several studies among which could be mentioned 'The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis', by Harris Jr, 'France and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis 1935–36', by Laurens, and 'Sir Samuel Hoare och Etiopienkonflikten 1935' (Sir Samuel Hoare and the Ethiopian conflict 1935), by Åkerblom.39 Sweden’s position with regard to the conflict has recently been investigated by Carol Adamson in a study entitled ‘Sweden and the Ethiopian crisis, 1934–1938’. A similar study on Sweden and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis is at present under preparation by Kurt Strömberg at the University of Lund.

The role of foreigners in Ethiopia has been investigated by Richard Pankhurst and presented in two major articles entitled 'The role of foreigners in nineteenth-century Ethiopia, prior to the rise of Menelik', and 'Menelik and the utilisation of foreign skills in Ethiopia', as well as in a chapter of his 'Economic history of Ethiopia, 1800–1935', published in 1968.40 The role of the foreigners in Ethiopia during the nineteenth century has recently also been investigated by Rubenson.41 The role of single nationalities in Ethiopia has been the subject of studies for example by Jesman 'The Russians in Ethiopia', and by Natsoulas 'The Greeks in Ethiopia: economic, political and social life c. 1740–1936'.42 No total survey of the Swedish activities in Ethiopia has been presented. However, the role of the Swedish Christian missions has been the subject of several studies for example 'The origin and the early development of the Evangelical Church of Eritrea 1866–1917', by Joseph Gabrawold, 'On church-mission relations in Ethiopia 1944–1969', by Olav Saeverås.43 A very comprehensive

36 Rubenson (1976).
37 Mathew (1947); Work (1935).
38 Baer (1967); Del Boca (1969); Barker (1968).
39 Harris (1964); Laurens (1967); Åkerblom (1976).
40 Adamson (1976).
41 Pankhurst (1966); Pankhurst (1967); Pankhurst (1968), pp. 32–72.
42 Rubenson (1976), passim.
43 Jesman (1958); Natsoulas (1975).
44 Joseph (1972); Saeverås (1974).
study on the early Ethio-Swedish mission relations will be published in 1977 by Gustav Arén, entitled 'Evangelical outreach in Ethiopia. Origins of the Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus'. Arén's study has been given an Ethiopian approach by his use of Amharic sources and by his stressing the Ethiopian initiative in the process of evangelization. He covers the period from the 1860s to 1916, with a survey of early Protestant mission undertakings from the 1830s. Particular attention is given to the role of Evangelical Eritreans in the pre-history of the Mekane Yesus Church. In this study a survey is also presented on studies undertaken by Ethiopians as well as on the comprehensive memoir literature on Ethio-Swedish mission relations. The attitudes of international church workers in Ethiopia – persons who before the independent Evangelical Church emerged were called missionaries – have recently been investigated by Ingrid and Carol Winninge. Tore Tafvelin has investigated SEM from early times to the present.

Michael Ståhl's Ph.D. thesis in political science entitled 'Ethiopia: political contradictions in agricultural development', provides a historical and structural analysis of the land and agricultural policies of the Ethiopian Government until the early 1970s. By analysing the role of Swedish sponsored agricultural development projects, Ståhl's study might be regarded as an analysis of the continuation of the Swedish undertakings before 1952 that are investigated in the present study.

" Arén (1977). The role of Sudan Interior Mission for the emergence of the Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus has been the subject of a study by Cotterell (1973), covering the period 1927–1970.
Chapter II
Ethiopia. An introductory survey of the country, its people and recent history

The following survey will emphasize Ethiopia's foreign relations and will serve both as a background to, and as an integrated part of, the analysis of why Ethiopia chose to establish co-operation with Sweden in the mid 1920s.

1. The Ethiopian setting

Ethiopia is situated in northeastern Africa and is today divided into 14 administrative provinces with a total area of 1 221 900 sq.km. The country is thus almost three times the size of Sweden.¹ Large parts of the country are unaccessible because of their mountainous nature. Its heartland is the great Ethiopian plateau with an average altitude of 2 000 m, which stretches from Addis Abeba, north to the ancient cities of Aksum and Gonder. This plateau has been Ethiopian territory for over a thousand years, while the remaining parts of the country were mainly conquered by Ethiopia during the past century. Most of the great plateau is rich farmland and is also the most densely populated part of the country. Even today about 80% of Ethiopia's population work within agriculture.²

Ethiopia's population of roughly 28 million is composed of several ethnic groups with different religions, languages and cultures.³ The Amhara and the Tigreans, who speak Amharinya and Tigrinya respectively and who both live on the high plateau, are closely related. They are descended from the fusion of local Hamitic stock with immigrants from South Arabia in the centuries before Christ. The Tigreans occupy the northern part of the plateau in the

¹ Last (1976), p. 293. The figure is including the province of Eritrea (117 600 sq. km). According to the Ethioplan geographer Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Ethiopia and Abyssinia are synonymous and interchangeable for Ethiopians. The terms Ethiopia or Habesha (Abyssinia) are purely political that have no ethnic connotation. Anyone who is not Habesha is a Ferenj (foreigner) (Mesfin 1972), p. 21). In this study the terms Ethiopia and Ethiopian will be used, since they are becoming increasingly common.

² Last (1976), pp. 293–295.

³ All figures on Ethiopian population, its absolute size as well as its religious and ethnic composition, are based on estimates, since no full population census has ever been undertaken in the country and no civil records exist.
modern provinces of Tigrai and Eritrea, where the Ethiopian Empire had its origins some two thousand years ago in the kingdom of Aksum. The Amhara, who have dominated politically during the last centuries, cover most of the provinces of Begemder, Gojam, Shoa and large parts of Wollo. Since 1889 Ethiopia has been ruled from Shoa and the modern capital of Addis Abeba. The Amhara, especially those from Shoa have become the country’s politically dominating ethnic group, and they have more or less imposed their language and culture on other areas. Both the Amhara and the Tigreans have belonged to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church since early times.

The Oromo, whose origin is uncertain, immigrated from the south in the 16th and 17th centuries and settled in a semicircle around the Amhara areas from Wollaga in the west to Harerге in the east. They constitute the largest

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Clapham (1970), pp. 1–2. Regarding the ethnic and religious composition of the Ethiopian population see for example Tringham (1965) and Ullendorff (1973).
ethnic group, possibly about 50% of the population. They are divided among themselves into several regional groups with different customs and religions but they speak a common language, Oromo. It would appear, however, that most Oromo are Muslims or belong to local religions. The remaining peoples of Ethiopia mostly live in the peripheral lowlands, or in isolated pockets elsewhere.5

Before 1974, when Haile Selassie I was dethroned, the Monarchy and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, from the 330s until 1974 the state religion of Ethiopia, constituted the political centre of the Ethiopian state, and besides these no other national institutions of any significance existed. The religious and secular élites together formed the ruling class. Conversion to Christianity has been an essential condition for admission to important functions in the government. The Emperor, Niguse Negast (King of Kings), was by the Solomonian Legend brought into a blood relationship with Christ in the House of David, which gave him an enormous prestige.7 The economic power of the Emperor was based on the tradition that all land in the Empire belonged to the Emperor, who had the right to distribute areas of it in exchange for military or other services.8 Control of the trade routes across the Empire also played an important role. Minilik could purchase firearms in the 1880s by expanding his exports of ivory, civet, hides, coffee and gold.9 A great deal of Ras Taffari’s power, before he became Emperor, arose from his control of the trade routes that ran through Harer and Dire Dawa to Djibouti.10

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the State have long been linked in a close alliance in which the state, in practice the Emperor, has usually been the dominant partner. The Emperors, however, gained much of their legitimacy from the consecration of the archbishop, the Abun. The withdrawal of Church support from an Emperor has in some cases been a decisive factor in bringing about his downfall.11 The position of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was particularly strong in the northern provinces, where the population was mainly Christian.12

The Christian population in the highlands has traditionally despised manual work other than agriculture. Commerce tended to be left to the Muslims,
mainly because the Christian code of law, the *Fetha Negast*, forbade Christians from selling slaves, one of the most lucrative items of commerce, but imposed no such prohibition on non-Christians.\(^9\) According to Pankhurst the fact that a large part of the population was reluctant or unable to engage in occupations such as trade and handicraft work created a kind of vacuum which tended to be filled by foreigners as well as by minority groups. Occupations requiring technical skill were largely in the hands of foreigners. For the Ethiopian rulers it was often a question of survival that they obtained fire-arms as well as persons who were able to train their men how to use them.\(^{14}\) Both Teodros and Minilik realized that prejudice against manual labour would have to be overcome if the Empire was to be modernized. In 1908 Minilik even issued a proclamation against the insult of manual work, taking Europe as an example of how the encouragement of people who could make cannons, guns, trains, etc. contributed to development.\(^{15}\)

2. Towards a united Ethiopia, 1855–1896

In Ethiopian history the period between 1769 and 1855 has been called *Zemene Mesafint* or the era of the princes, because during that time Ethiopia was little more than a collection of independent principalities, the Emperor being a puppet in the hands of local war lords.\(^{14}\)

The recovery of the Ethiopian Empire started with the reign of Teodros II (1855–1868), who decided to unite and modernize the country. But even if he managed to conquer the different provinces and replace the feudal lords with his own administration, he lacked the economic resources to realize his plans. He contributed to his own downfall first by alienating the powerful Ethiopian Orthodox Church by claiming their land and later by a conflict with Great Britain caused by his imprisonment of the British envoy and other foreigners at his court. A British expeditionary force under the command of Sir Robert Napier was sent to rescue the captives in 1868 and was helped by Teodros' rivals. Teodros' subsequent suicide only put an end to a reign which was already in ruins.\(^7\)

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\(^{15}\) Pankhurst (1966), pp. 212–213; Pankhurst (1968), pp. 50–51.

\(^{16}\) Pankhurst (1968), p. 45.

\(^{16}\) There is a vast literature on Ethiopian history. Since it is not within the scope of the present study to present any detailed analysis of the Ethiopian historical development, but just to present a background, only a very limited part of the literature will be included in this survey. *Zemane Mesafint* has been thoroughly analysed in Abir (1968). Compare Ganshof (1964) on feudalism in Europe.

\(^{17}\) Rubenson (1966) passim; and Rubenson (1976), pp. 174–287, has thoroughly analysed Teodros' career.
The provincial rulers then fought each other for the throne. Yohannes IV (1872–1889) came out of this struggle as the successor. Minilik, king of Shoa since 1865, who had also claimed the Imperial throne, refused to recognize the suzerainty of Yohannes. He decided to co-operate with Egypt, but Egyptian attempts at conquest in co-operation with Minilik were repelled by Yohannes in 1875 and 1876. Minilik then embarked on systematic campaigns to conquer the Oromo Kingdoms southwest and southeast of Shoa. He increased his military strength by importing large quantities of fire-arms from Europe.

The opening of the Suez canal in 1869 had made the Red Sea an international waterway, its coast being viewed with keen interest by European powers. In the interior the sources of the Nile had begun to arouse European ambitions. Yohannes was threatened both by the Mahdists in the Sudan and by Italy. In 1885 Italian troops occupied the Red Sea port of Massawa and began to move inland.

When Yohannes in 1889 was killed in battle against the Mahdists, Minilik made good his claim to the Imperial throne. In the same year Minilik II (1889–1913) signed a treaty at Wuchale with Italy, which the Italians wrongly claimed gave them a protectorate over Ethiopia. The different interpretations of the Treaty finally led to war between Ethiopia and Italy. The Italians were defeated at the battle of Adwa on 1 March 1896, being the first time an indigenous African state had vanquished a European power. In the peace treaty signed in Addis Ababa in October, Italy recognized the full sovereignty and independence of Ethiopia, but Eritrea was left in Italian hands.

3. From Adwa to the Italian occupation in 1936

3.1 Minilik's and Haile Selassie's policy of modernization

After having secured Ethiopia's independence Minilik made efforts to modernize the country. In 1897 a French company started to construct a railway which was to link Addis Ababa with the important port of Djibouti.

Marcus (1969), pp. 421–422. See also Marcus (1975), pp. 28–110. Minilik as King of Shoa see also Darkwah (1975), passim. Import of firearms see Pankhurst (1962), passim; Caulk (1972), passim.


In the next few years French and Italian engineers constructed telegraph lines to Djibouti and Eritrea. A Russian Red Cross Hospital opened in 1898 and continued to operate until 1906. The Bank of Abyssinia was founded in 1905 as an affiliate of the National Bank of Egypt. The first Government school, the Minilik II School, was opened in 1908. Two years later the first Government hospital, the Minilik II Hospital, was established. The first state printing press started in 1911. Around the turn of the century Ethiopia had thus acquired its first modern institutions. This was achieved largely through the assistance of the French, the British and the Italians. According to Pankhurst, Emperor Minilik was careful not to fall unduly under the influence of any European power.\footnote{Pankhurst (1976), p. 297. See also Marcus (1975), pp. 199–202. See below Ch. III:1.}

When Minilik died in 1913, he was succeeded by his grandson Lij Iyasu, who after many intrigues had been appointed his heir. Lij Iyasu was, however, overthrown in 1916 by a group of Shoa noblemen and high Church officials in Addis Abeba because of his conversion to Islam. Minilik's daughter Zewditu was then crowned Empress, whereas Ras Taffari Mekonnen, the son of Minilik's cousin Ras Mekonnen, became Regent and Heir to the throne.\footnote{Clapham (1970), pp. 15–16. Marcus (1975) presents a detailed account of Minilik's last years and the political intrigues that preceeded Lij Iyasu's appointment as Heir, pp. 225–248, and of his reign pp. 262–281. See also Marcus (1970), passim. Taffari Mekonnen b. 1892 d. 1975, began his education in Amharyna and in the Ethiopian Orthodox faith, later taught by French Roman Catholic missionaries at Harer. Continued education in Addis Abeba. Appointed Governor of Sidamo province in 1908, Governor of Harerge province in 1910. In 1916 proclaimed Prince Regent and Heir Apparent to the throne. Nigus of Shoa in 1928. Proclaimed Emperor of Ethiopia under the name of Haile Selassie I in 1930. Lived in exile in England 1936–1940. Restored as Emperor of Ethiopia in 1941. Desposed in 1974. Died in detention (African biographies Ethiopia 2).}

Ras Taffari obviously aimed at continuing the policy of modernization initiated by Minilik. In 1922 he established a Ministry of Commerce and a Public Works Department. He was interested in improving the roads particularly in and around the capital. In 1924 he founded the Bethsaida Hospital in Addis Abeba and the following year he opened the second government school in Addis Abeba, the Taffari Mekonnen School. By 1924 Ras Taffari had also sent 25 students abroad for training in Europe and in America.\footnote{Pankhurst (1976), p. 298.}

Several times during the 1920s it had been far from certain whether Ras Taffari would succeed in taking over the supreme power of the country. Taffari's progressive views were actively resisted by the conservative elements that dominated court and clergy. After the Oromo supporters of Lij Iyasu had been defeated and a few plots against Ras Taffari had failed, Ethiopia was run by a coalition of conservative and reforming elements. In 1928, after an
attempted coup d'etat against him had failed Ras Taffari was strong enough to demand the title of Nigus (King) of Shoa and assume complete control of the central Government. When Empress Zewditu died in 1930, he succeeded her without difficulty and was crowned Emperor on November 2 the same year under the name of Haile Selassie I."

Haile Selassie continued the modernizing policies developed during his regency, coupled with an extreme centralization of power in himself. In July 1931 he promulgated Ethiopia's first written constitution, with a parliament of two houses. The same year, the Bank of Abyssinia was replaced by a national bank, the Bank of Ethiopia, and steps were also taken to reorganize the currency. In 1932 an anti-slavery bureau was created to accelerate the emancipation of the slaves. The same year in Ministry of Public Works was set up to assist in construction of roads and bridges. New schools and hospitals were also opened in these years, including the first girls school, the Itenge Menen School, which was established in 1931." Foreign advisers were also systematically brought into the government, where they were attached to the ministries. They were, however, without executive functions and were largely occupied with technicalities such as drafting legislation and contacts between the government and the foreign community." Fresh ideas were also introduced by the first generation of Ethiopian graduates, who had been sent to foreign universities during Ras Taffari's regency. By 1935, however, few of them had yet reached major positions. The only important politician among them was Lorenzo Taetas."

3.2 Ethiopia in international diplomacy 1896–1936

The General Act of Berlin, signed in 1885 between the United States and fourteen European countries, divided Africa into spheres of influence and was used as a pretext for a diplomatic partition on Africa among European powers." The Ethiopian victory at Adwa changed the balance of power in northeastern Africa in Ethiopia's favour. During the following years Britain, Russia, France and Italy all established legations in Addis Ababa. Surrounded on all sides by European dependencies, Ethiopia was the focus of British, Italian and French power interests. The Nile Valley was of vital importance both to Minilik and

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" See further Ch. III:1.
to Britain, France and Italy. Before Adwa, Britain had considered Ethiopia as an Italian sphere of influence. The British had relied on Italy as a watchdog against a possible French advance into the Nile Valley from the East. The French wanted to strengthen their position in Ethiopia in order to use it as a base from which to join hands with their West African possessions. They therefore encouraged Minilik's interests in the Nile frontier.35

It was obvious that the European colonial powers as well as the United States were interested in taking part in the economic exploitation of Ethiopia. The many treaties signed by Minilik between 1897 and 1908 can be interpreted as an effort to avoid coming too much under the influence of any particular power (see Table 2). Minilik's resistance to their pressure led to combined efforts from Great Britain, France and Italy. In December 1906 they signed a tripartite treaty, where they undertook to respect 'the political and territorial status quo' of Ethiopia and to intervene in her internal affairs only after consultation with the other parties. They also delimited economic spheres of influence in Ethiopia: for France the railway from Djibouti and for Britain and her Egyptian partner Lake Tana and the Blue Nile river. Italy was recognized as having an interest in linking her two colonies Eritrea and Italian Somaliland across Ethiopia.36 According to Marcus, Ethiopia gained considerable stability from this treaty, although not having participated in the negotiations. The treaty marked the end of active British and French imperialism in the region and eliminated, for a time, the likelihood of Italian expansion.37

During the period 1896–1906, Minilik completed Ethiopia's expansion so that Ethiopia, less Eritrea, obtained its present size. The independent Oromo kingdoms and Muslim sultanates adjacent to the Central plateau were thus conquered by Minilik. According to Marcus, Minilik's expansionary policy seemed to have been aided by a population movement southward, which caused a gradual shift in the Ethiopian policy from the north to the central and southern parts of the country. The surplus population could be settled in the conquered areas and Minilik benefited from the revenues obtained from these areas.38

An attempt to explain Ethiopia's survival as an independent state

Many theories have been developed to explain the European partition of Africa. Among the more general background theories could be mentioned the

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38 Ibid., p. 190.
technological gap between European and African societies, and the Marxist theories developed by Hobson and Lenin, which attribute the partition of Africa and imperialism in general to the alleged economic necessities generated by the development of capitalism. For Lenin the formal political institutions of capitalist states were mere facades behind which the real holders of power – bankers in control of monopolies – controlled the raw material of the world and by the export of capital, promoted and controlled the exploitation of its inhabitants. The competition between Britain, France and Italy in the Nile Valley, might fit into the Eurocentric strategic theory developed by R. Robinson and J. Gallagher. According to this model the process of partition began when a European power (Britain) reluctantly undertook new territorial responsibilities in Africa in order to defend the strategic security of older imperial possessions. But she threatened the interests of another power (France) which resorted to counter-annexations. Meanwhile other powers exploited the rivalry of France and Britain to make annexations of their own, some of which were also strategically dangerous to Britain. According to an Afrocentric model of explanation called the theory of local crisis, European territorial annexation was prompted by a crisis of local resistance by Africans to existing informal European control and unofficial empire. This model might be applicable to the situation in Ethiopia, where Menilik by means of diplomacy as well as by active military resistance challenged European attempts at conquest.

In an analysis of imperialism Galtung has used the key terms centre, periphery and bridgehead. A social collective, as for example a nation, is internally divided into a centre and a periphery i.e. rulers and ruled. One collectivity can dominate another by establishing a bridgehead in the centre of that collectivity. The centre in the central collectivity and the centre in the peripheral collectivity then jointly benefit from their dominance over the periphery in the peripheral collectivity. Galtung calls this relationship imperialism and it could be economic and political as well as military and cultural. Ståhl has elaborated Galtung’s model both to Menilik’s expansion southwards and to his internal reforms. Menilik, who together with his court, the high clergy and his military commanders, constituted the centre in Shoa, forcefully established relations of dominance over the earlier independent societies in the south.

Hobson (1902) and Lenin (1939) as analysed in Sanderson (1975), pp. 3–4.
Robinson & Gallager (1962) citéd in Sanderson (1975), pp. 4–6. For an analysis of 'The Scramble' see also Molander (1975) and literature cited by him.
Sanderson (1975), p. 15.
In his thesis ‘The survival of Ethiopian independence’ Rubenson concludes his investigations by stating that Ethiopia was saved from falling under colonial rule because of the determination with which the country’s heritage of national consciousness, international recognition and political/diplomatic skill was developed to meet the new challenges. This might be true in a way, but also alternative interpretations to Ethiopia’s survival might be contemplated. The ability of the Ethiopian leaders to attract foreigners with technical know-how and use them for tasks like manufacturing weapons, road construction etc. in the long run contributed to Ethiopia’s survival as an independent state (see Chapter III). This approach is supported by Pankhurst who maintains that the traditional Ethiopian attitude towards foreigners that they might ‘execute but not dictate policy’ made it easy for the Ethiopian rulers to use the foreigners rather than being used by them. It is also worth discussing whether Minilik’s establishment of a strong central government and military organization, which was used to conquer the non-Christian kingdoms and sultanates situated in a semicircle to the west, south and east of the old Christian Empire, after all meant that Ethiopia itself became an imperialistic state and in fact participated in the ‘Scramble for Africa’. Minilik’s expansionistic policy could well be compared with that pursued by his contemporary European colleagues. Minilik used the same military technology and the same diplomatic methods as the neighbouring colonial powers as well as economic exploitation of the conquered areas and therefore he had to be taken into account by the European powers.

Foreign relations during Haile Selassie’s first period of reign

As soon as the first World War was over the new Regent, Ras Taffari, made efforts to widen his foreign contacts. Already in 1919 Ethiopia applied for membership in the League of Nations, but was refused admittance, because of the existence of slavery in the country. In 1923 Ethiopia made a new application for admission to the League, this time with French and Italian support. The application was first resisted by countries like Britain, Switzerland, Australia and Norway on the grounds that Addis Abeba’s control of the country was uncertain and because of the slavery that still existed. On

Rubenson (1976), p. 409. Compare also review by first opponent Kerstin Keen which will be printed in HT in 1977, Keen (1977).


28 September 1923 the League Assembly, however, unanimously voted to admit Ethiopia. According to Mosley, France and Italy supported Ethiopia’s applications because they had ambitions to increase their trade and influence in Ethiopia. There is no indication that Sweden took any steps to prevent Ethiopia’s entry into the League.

In 1924 Ras Taffari undertook an extensive journey to Egypt, Palestine, Greece, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. He left Djibouti in April and stayed abroad until August 1924. According to his memoirs, Ras Taffari’s aim was to see European civilization with his own eyes and, on returning to Ethiopia, to initiate some aspects of it in his country. The journey did not give him what he had expected. From France he had hoped to obtain free port facilities at Djibouti, but got only vague promises. A draft treaty with Italy which would have given Ethiopia access to the port of Aseb never came into force, and from Mussolini he only obtained an oral promise of financial aid. There can be little doubt that the experiences gained during this tour confirmed Ras Taffari of Ethiopia’s need for innovation and development.

In 1925 Britain and Italy agreed to support each other’s demands for economic concessions in Ethiopia. The British-Italian agreement meant Britain’s formal recognition of Italy’s exclusive economic interests in western Ethiopia and virtually put the entire country in Italy’s sphere of influence. Ras Taffari sent notes of protest both to Italy and to Britain against what he considered as a violation of Ethiopia’s interests and a threat to its sovereignty. On appealing to the League of Nations, Ethiopia was supported by France.

Italy continued her efforts to gain influence in Ethiopia by supporting Ras Taffari’s modernizing policy. Italy aimed at replacing French political influence in Ethiopia with her own. In 1928 Italy and Ethiopia signed a twenty-year treaty of Friendship and Arbitration about conciliation and arbitration in case of dispute between the two countries. At the same time they signed a convention which offered Ethiopia a free trade zone in Aseb and permitted Italy to construct a road from Aseb to Desse. The road, however, was never built and neither did Ethiopia use the promised free trade zone.

"Nationernas Förbunds råds verksamhet under år 1923 samt fjärde förbundsförsamlingen i Genève 3–29 september 1923, p. 175.


" The journey is described in Haile Selassie (1976), pp. 81–123; see also Greenfield (1965), p. 157; Mosley (1964), p. 129. Regarding the visit to Sweden see below Ch. IV.2. 1.

" Haile Selassie (1976), p. 84.

" Ibid., pp. 93–94; see also Mosley (1964), p. 131.

" Ibid., pp. 100–103; see also Mosley (1964), p. 131.


During the years 1930–1933 official Italian interests in Ethiopia waned because Mussolini was preoccupied with European affairs, trying to build up a leading position for Fascist Italy. Ethiopia then turned to Britain and Japan for co-operation.

The world economic crisis of the early 1930s hit Italy badly. When Mussolini failed to work out a comprehensive programme of social and economic reform for Italy, he decided in 1934 that a campaign against Ethiopia would be the solution to avoid the consequences of his failure to resolve domestic problems. To conquer Ethiopia, Mussolini needed both an excuse for immediate invasion and an agreement with France similar to that received from Britain in 1925. Without the consent of all partners in the 1906 Treaty, any fullscale Italian expansion in East Africa ran the risk of leading to a conflict in Europe.

In face of the resurgent Germany after 1933, France and Italy drew closer together and negotiations for a French-Italian entente opened in 1 November 1934. On 7 January 1935 a French-Italian entente was signed. To Mussolini the essential political condition was that France would not resist his plans in Ethiopia. Once France had accepted Italian ambitions, Mussolini thought that the British government would not create any problems. The treaty of 1906, recognizing most of Ethiopia as Italy's sphere of influence was still in force, as was the bilateral British-Italian agreement of 1925, their implication being that Italy would be allowed to extend her influence throughout Ethiopia as long as no specifically British interest was endangered.

The pretext for an Italian invasion came when, on 5 December 1934, Italian and Ethiopian troops clashed at Wal Wal, a post with 359 wells about 100 km on the Ethiopian side of the border. The Italian government demanded a formal apology and a heavy compensation from the Ethiopian government, which the Ethiopian government refused. Ethiopia instead revoked the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928. Italy refused to submit to arbitration. Mussolini instead decided to make the Wal Wal incident a casus belli. According to a secret plan, October 1935 was set for the beginning of the operations.

In January 1935 Emperor Haile Selassie appealed to the League of Nations. Britain and France were hesitant to commit themselves too heavily to the Ethiopian case in the League, because they both were anxious to be on friendly terms with Italy, in face of a rearming Germany. After eleven months of fruitless negotiations at Geneva during which time Mussolini prepared for war,
the Italians started their invasion, without a declaration of war, on 3 October 1935. The League found Italy guilty of aggression, but failed to take any effective action. The Italians were vastly superior both on the ground and in the air. On 2 May 1936 Haile Selassie left Addis Abeba to lay the case of Ethiopia before the League of Nations in person. The Italian army under Marshal Badoglio entered Addis Abeba on 5 May 1936. Haile Selassie later went into exile in Great Britain with a small band of followers.

The position taken by Sweden in the League of Nations regarding sanctions against Italy as well as recognition of Italy's sovereignty has been discussed in detail by Adamson and will therefore not be dealt with here. As time went on, however, all states except the United States, the Soviet Union, China and New Zealand recognized Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. The Swedish government recognized Italy's sovereignty over Ethiopia in the spring of 1938.

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**Diplomatic representation in Ethiopia in 1935**

When the Italo-Ethiopian war broke out eleven countries had some kind of diplomatic representation in Ethiopia, which can be taken as an indication of Haile Selassie's efforts to keep in contact with the world outside Ethiopia. Six countries were represented in Addis Abeba by ministers i.e. Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, whereas the United States was represented by a Chargé d'Affaires. Table 1 presents a survey of foreign diplomatic representation in Ethiopia before 1935, giving information on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the respective countries as well as on the kind of diplomatic representation provided.

As demonstrated in Table 1, Sweden did not establish any kind of diplomatic representation in Ethiopia until 1929. Germany had been requested to look after Swedish interests in 1911, despite the application by the missionary Karl

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"Pankhurst (1976), p. 298; Britain's and France's positions taken in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict have been thoroughly investigated by Åkerblom (1976), passim; compare Tedebrand (1976). For the American position see Harris (1964), passim. Regarding France's position see Laurens (1967). For detailed investigations of the war see for example Barker (1968) and Del Boca (1969). Haile Selassie's version of the war see Negus anklagar (1936) and Haile Selassie (1976), pp. 212–312.


*Adamson (1976), pp. 77–147.

*Telegram Acheson to American Legation Addis Abeba, Washington 9.5 1946, NA, Decimal file 1945-49, 884.014/5-146.

*Adamson (1976), p. 143 and 147.

Table 1. Foreign diplomatic representation in Ethiopia before 1935.

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Legation</th>
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<th>Remark</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1897–</td>
<td>in Harer and</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dire Dawa</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1903–1920</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1928–</td>
<td>1906–1914</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1930–</td>
<td>1919–1930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1923–</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1928–</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protected by German Legation 1911–1919, by British Legation 1924–1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1929–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1933–</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legation planned for 1936</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Protected by French Legation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>Protected by Italian Legation</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Protected by French Legation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Protected by French and German Legations</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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Cederqvist via the Swedish Evangelical Mission, to receive protection from the British Legation in Addis Abeba. In October 1924 the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs obtained permission to receive help from the British Legation regarding Swedish nationals. The British were awarded diplomatic jurisdiction and in September 1928 a British subject, A.D. Bethell, employed at the Arabian Trade Company was appointed Swedish Honorary Consul in Ethiopia. When Bethell resigned in December 1929, because of ill health, he was immediately replaced by the Swedish physician Knut Hanner.

a VPM ang Sveriges representation i Abyssinien dated 7.1 1924; K. Cederqvist to Styrelsen för Evangeliska Fosterlandsstiftelsen, Addis Abeba 22.9 1911 (Copy); E. Trolle to Ministern för Utrikes Arendena, Berlin 31.10 1911. All documents in RA, KUD, vol. 2833.

b Adamson (1976), pp. 24–25. K. Hanner see Ch. IV n. 80.
4. The policy of Haile Selassie after the restoration

The Italian occupation, which had followed Ethiopia's military defeat, lasted for exactly five years. Ethiopia was liberated by a British expeditionary force supported by Ethiopian resistance. On 5 May 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie I made his official entry into Addis Abeba.

The fact that Ethiopia, while the world was still at war, had been liberated by the British, resulted in very close Anglo-Ethiopian relations, which became a decisive factor in Ethiopia's political life during 1941–1944. The Anglo-Ethiopian relations will therefore be discussed in some detail in this chapter, because not only the initial Ethiopian approaches to Sweden in 1943 and the Ethio-Swedish negotiations in 1944 but also the large-scale Ethio-Swedish co-operation which developed from 1945, can hardly be understood without this background.

4.1 Centralization of power

Emperor Haile Selassie immediately started to rebuild his administration and appointed the first seven ministers within a week of his return to Addis Abeba. The situation was, however, complicated by the fact that the British had liberated the country. It was therefore agreed that the Ministers should be regarded as advisers to the British Military Administration until Ethio-British relations had been defined.

According to Clapham the overall effects of the Italian occupation on the central government were surprisingly slight. There were, of course, many problems i.e. the raising of funds for the administration. A new currency was introduced in 1942. The educational system had to be reconstructed from the base up. But in many ways the Emperor more or less continued where he had left off in 1936. He had the same personal supremacy, a similar policy of gradual reform and much the same group of officials. Haile Selassie now consolidated his position by removing the nobility's administrative control over the provinces. Its military functions were removed by the training of a professional army under the Emperor's direct command, which replaced the feudal and private armies of pre-war days. The nobility's power to raise tribute was reduced by creating a centralized system of taxation administered by the Ministry of Finance. The school system was reorganized and included the reopening of the pre-war schools as well as the establishment of new ones.

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among them the Haile Selassie Secondary School, founded in Addis Abeba in 1943. The first institution of higher learning, the University college of Addis Abeba, came into existence in 1950."

Throughout the 1940s Haile Selassie extended his hold on the provinces and crushed revolts in Gojam and Tigrai, though he needed help from the British Royal Air Force to put down the Tigrean uprising in 1943. A Council of Ministers was formally established in 1943, which determined the fields of competence of the various ministries. The strong centralization of the administration by the Emperor did not pass without resistance. Some palace plots were unearthed in Addis Abeba, the most dangerous of which were attempts to depose Haile Selassie in 1947 and to assassinate him in 1951. In these plots the leaders of wartime resistance were involved."

The early 1950s brought changed political conditions. In 1952 Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia. This former Italian colony had been under provisional British administration since 1941. Much of Eritrea had belonged to the Ethiopian Empire before 1890, and the Ethiopian Government worked steadily to undermine the Eritrean Government. In 1962 they achieved their aim of completely absorbing Eritrea by including it as Ethiopia's fourteenth province. This development was resented by many Eritreans and separatist movements developed which are still (1977) fighting for an independent Eritrea."

The training of armed forces was expanded, both to maintain internal order and to supply a national defence. Besides the Holeta Military Academy, which had been founded by Swedes in 1934 (see Chapter IV:2. 4) a second military academy was set up in Harer in 1958, run by Indians. The size of the armed forces increased substantially. During the 1960s the territorial forces were reorganized and increased. The Police Force was also enlarged, improved and augmented by special emergency and commando units."

In the early 1950s the first generation of post-war Ethiopian graduates returned from abroad and took posts in the government. They have been a moving force behind many of the political changes in Ethiopia since 1950. A revised constitution was promulgated at the Emperor's Silver Jubilee in 1955 and the first general parliamentary elections followed in accordance with it in 1957. There were, however, too few places in the government for the first generation of post-war Ethiopian graduates who returned from abroad in the early 1950s, and they succeeded in remaining more independent of the

"Pankhurst (1976), pp. 300–301. Gilkes (1975), maintains that Haile Selassie in his educational policy was eager to develop an élite for his administration rather than working for mass alphabetization of the population, p. 89.


"Ibid., pp. 22–23.

"Gilkes (1975), pp. 85–86.
Emperor than the old nobility. According to Clapham their frustrations were partly responsible for the attempted coup d'État, initiated by the Imperial Guard in December 1960, when the Emperor was away on a state visit to Brazil. But the revolt only lasted for a few days and was crushed by the commanders of the army, a force quite separate from the Imperial Guard. Clapham notes that the failure of the revolt proved the success of Haile Selassie's divide-and-rule policy, because the armed forces as well as young graduates and conservative officials, refrained from committing themselves to either side until the outcome was clear.\footnote{Clapham (1970), pp. 24–25. Analyses of the attempted coup are presented by for example Clapham (1968), passim; Greenfield (1965), pp. 375–418. See also below Ch. V:6.3.}

The last fourteen years of Haile Selassie's reign saw growing opposition to both him and his regime. There were a number of plots and conspiracies against the Emperor, but none of them were successful. From the mid-1960s there were a number of student demonstrations as well as peasant disturbances, particularly in the southern provinces, against the land holding system. The failure of the Government and the administration to deal with the country's problems became evident when a disastrous famine in the provinces of Tigrai and Wollo became known in 1973 after having been kept secret for about two years. The revelations of the famine were accompanied by allegations of a widespread corruption which finally led to the Emperor's deposal on 12 September 1974, which was followed by a complete military take over. Haile Selassie I died in detention under slightly mysterious circumstances on 27 August 1975.\footnote{Gilkes (1976), p. 303. The 1974 revolution has been the subject of several investigations see for example Addis (1975); Gilkes (1975), pp. xi-xix; Legum (1975); Thomson (1975). Bondestam (1975) and Gilkes (1975), present analyses of the background factors to the revolution.}

The Monarchy was finally abolished in early 1975. In place of the former regime the armed forces set up a Provisional Military Government, while keeping civilian ministers to head the administration. The real power, however, was and still is (1977), within an anonymous military committee (the Dergue) composed of an unknown number of elected soldiers.\footnote{Gilkes (1976), p. 303.}

4. 2 Anglo-Ethiopian relations 1941–1945

In February 1941, only two weeks after Haile Selassie had entered Ethiopia to take part in its final liberation, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, read a statement in the House of Commons, where he undertook
to re-establish Ethiopia’s independence and to restore Emperor Haile Selassie I.

Some British commanders regarded Ethiopia as occupied ex-enemy territory, which should be administered by the conquerers until its status could be decided at a peace conference. The Emperor maintained that he had never renounced his sovereignty and therefore could resume all his powers."

Ethiopia was nevertheless put under the control of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA), whose representative in Addis Abeba declared that the King of Italy was the legal ruler of Ethiopia until a peace treaty had been signed with Italy." In Britain, two different conceptions were current. One party, called the Cromerites, believed in a temporary British protectorate or at least a period of tutelage. Another view, found particularly in the Foreign Office, was that Ethiopia could manage without tutelage." The Emperor was therefore anxious to have the Anglo-Ethiopian relations defined as soon as possible. In May 1941, Haile Selassie submitted five requests to the British Cabinet: 1. an Anglo-Ethiopian treaty as soon as possible; 2. financial aid; 3. advisers to his ministries; 4. assistance to establish an Ethiopian army; and 5. assistance to establish provincial administrations. The negotiations about the treaty took time and in the meanwhile the relations between Ethiopians and the British in Ethiopia became strained.

An Anglo-Ethiopian agreement was signed in Addis Abeba on 31 January 1942. It was to remain in force until replaced by another treaty. After two years the Agreement could be terminated at any time by either party giving three months notice (Art. 12). The British Government agreed to grant Ethiopia the sum of 1.5 million pounds sterling during the first year and the sum of one million pounds sterling during the second year (Art. 4). British advisers were also supplied (Art. 2). According to the attached Military Convention, Britain would, at her own expense, supply Ethiopia with a Military Mission, which was under British – not Ethiopian – command (Military Convention Art. 2). Britain was allowed to keep such military and police forces as they found necessary in Ethiopia (Military Convention Art. 4 & 6). Ethiopia was not allowed to take part in any military operations if the


12 Agreement and Military convention between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia. Addis Abeba 31.1 1942.
British considered them to be contrary to their common interests (Agreement Art. 10). Part of Ogaden was placed under British military administration, and the Franco-Ethiopian railway was brought under British control (Military Convention Art. 5 & 9).

Did the Emperor then get what he wanted? If we return to the Emperor's requests from May 1941, we find that they were all fulfilled. The treaty was there, financial aid and advisers were given and so was assistance to establish an army and a provincial administration. There were, however, certain articles in the Agreement, which in fact limited the Emperor's sovereignty: British troops and police, which were not under Ethiopian command; certain areas were under direct British military administration; the Emperor was not allowed to recruit his own advisers from any other foreign country without first consulting the British (Art. 2). Britain, by this article, certainly wanted guarantees that no foreign power would gain influence in Ethiopia beyond her control. They might have had in mind the Belgian and Swedish Military Missions and the Swedish political advisers during the 1930s. Four Swedish army officers had also fought on the Ethiopian side against the Italians. The Emperor certainly gained from the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942, but at the cost of having limited sovereignty. Emperor Haile Selassie's freedom of action being limited by the Agreement is also indicated by the very secret enquiries made on behalf of the Emperor via unofficial channels, as well as via official, regarding the possibilities of obtaining Swedes and Americans for employment in Ethiopian service. It would appear that Ethiopia's status during the Agreement of 1942 was more a British protectorate than a sovereign state.

In January 1944, when the minimum period of the Agreement had passed, Ethiopia initiated negotiations on a new Agreement with Great Britain, because Ethiopia was firmly determined not to let the Italian occupation be succeeded by a British protectorate. The Emperor was said to have particularly disliked both the British dominating position within the administration and those parts of the Military Convention that placed part of Ethiopia under British military administration and deprived the Ethiopian courts of jurisdiction over the British forces in Ethiopia. After having presented a preliminary proposal for a new Agreement, Ethiopia revoked the

" See below Ch. IV:2: 1 and V:1.
" This view was supported, in a discussion with John H. Spencer, American adviser on foreign affairs from 1943, in Madison, Connecticut USA 1.9 1975. Regarding Spencer see further below Ch. III. 4:2.
" S. Söderblom to Chr. Günther, Moscow 14.8 1944, KUD, HP 1, Yab I.
" B. Prytz to E. von Post, London 26.10 1944, KUD, HP 1, Yab I.
Agreement of 1942 on 26 May 1944, which accordingly ceased to be in existence three months later. The proposal differed from the 1942 Agreement on several points. It did not give the British envoy precedence over other foreign diplomatic representatives. Ethiopia should have the right to recruit advisers from Great Britain or from other countries according to her own choice. Financial assistance to Ethiopia should be examined by an expert appointed jointly by Ethiopia and Britain. The British Military Mission would be placed under the Ethiopian Minister of War. Areas under British military administration as well as the Franco-Ethiopian railway should be returned to Ethiopian administration. Both the proposal and an Ethiopian comment to it had been handed over to the Swedish Minister in Moscow in August 1944, obviously in order to emphasize Ethiopia's independence as a part of the contacts regarding experts from Sweden."

During the autumn of 1944, a British delegation chaired by Earl de la Warr, went to Ethiopia to negotiate a new Agreement." After complicated negotiations a new Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement was signed on 19 December 1944." Most of the Ethiopian demands expressed in the proposal were then agreed to. In particular those articles which limited the Emperor's sovereignty were revoked. Thus the Emperor was now free to recruit his advisers from any country without consulting the British (Art. 3). The British Military Mission would be placed under Ethiopian command (Art. 6). The British administration of the city of Dire Dawa was cancelled (Art. 5:4), although the British still kept part of the Ogaden and the border area to British Somaliland under their control (Art. 7). The Agreement would remain in force until replaced by another treaty, or if either of the two parties, after two years had given three months notice of termination of the Agreement (Art. 13).

Although the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944 had provided for greater freedom of action on the part of the Emperor, the presence of a British Military Mission and the continued occupation of the Ogaden area still made him dependent upon Great Britain. Ethiopia was also - apart from French Somaliland with the important city of Djibouti - surrounded by territories administered by Great Britain." Until the future of Italy's former colony Eritrea, administered since 1941 by Britain but claimed by Ethiopia, could be decided upon by the Great Powers, Ethiopia was anxious to have good

"Proposal for an agreement between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, enclosed S. Söderblom to Chr. Günther, Moscow 14.8 1944, KUD, HP 1, Yab I. See below Ch. V:1.

"B. Prytz to E. von Post, London 26.10 1944, KUD, HP 1, Yab I. Earl de la Warr was a member of the Privy Council, and had held position as Under-secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Privy Seal and Minister of Education.

"Agreement between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, Addis Abeba 19 December 1944.

relations with Great Britain. The continued British occupation of Ethiopian territory was, however, resented by Ethiopia, particularly after 1946, when the British proposed that the Ogaden area should be permanently ceded by Ethiopia. In July 1948, Britain agreed to withdraw from the Ogaden. They did not withdraw from the whole reserved area until after the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of November 1954, when Ethiopia thus assumed full sovereignty within her pre-war domains.  

Besides the Emperor's wish to free himself from British dominance, the British gradual withdrawal should also be seen against the background of her being weakened after 1947. Britain could for example no longer afford to maintain her undertakings in Greece and Turkey, which instead were taken over by the United States.

4. 3 Ethiopia's foreign contacts widen

When the Emperor loosened his ties with Great Britain after 1944, he turned to other countries, especially to the United States. Already in 1944 an American economic mission had been invited to Ethiopia. A concession to prospect for oil was granted to Sinclair Oil, an American company. In September 1945 an Ethio-American co-operation regarding civil flying started with a management contract between the Ethiopian Government and Transcontinental and Western Air (TWA). In 1946 Ethiopia was granted a loan of 3 million US dollars from the United States. In 1951 Ethiopia concluded a Treaty of amity and economic relations with the United States, which was ratified in October 1953. In May 1953 a treaty was signed according to which American arms and military advisers were to be supplied. Perham remarks that the United States was a suitable country to co-operate with, because besides being a Christian country it was rich, powerful and above all politically and physically distant. But the Emperor also avoided relying too heavily on the United States. He spread his contacts widely. The Emperor accepted help from the Soviet Union and had close relations with Yugoslavia and Israel. Sweden was, according to Perham, an old friend and helper but the Emperor also had contacts with Norway, Holland, Denmark, Western Germany, France, Britain, India, Czechoslovakia and Japan. The Ethiopian

9 Ibid., 394.
9 The United States in world affairs 1953, p. 490.

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relations with France, however, tended to decrease. English had also taken over from French as the second language of the growing educated class." Ethiopia had become a member of the United Nations already in November 1945 and Ethiopian armed forces took part in the United Nations operations in Korea (1951–1953) and in the Congo (1960–1964) where they distinguished themselves as tough fighters.

There seemed, however, to have been some competition for influence in Ethiopia going on behind the scenes, particularly between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. When the first Swedish experts arrived towards the end of 1945 and in the early 1946, they noted both a competition for influence among the foreign communities and a curiosity about the position the Swedes were supposed to have in Ethiopia. The important issue of why the Emperor decided to recruit Swedes to take part in the development of Ethiopia will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI, but already here the question should be raised whether Sweden was a suitable counterweight to possible Great Power domination of Ethiopia.

5. Ethiopia’s international position. Some concluding remarks

The survey given above of Ethiopian political history has, by its emphasis on foreign relations, aimed at determining Ethiopia’s international position in order to find a possible explanation as to why Ethiopia sought co-operation with Sweden in the 1920s.

The opening of the Suez canal had placed Ethiopia at the crossroads of European power interests. Even before Menilik became the Emperor of Ethiopia, he successfully played off different foreign interests against each other. He realized the importance of fire-arms, and by using the same technology as the European powers, he not only managed to conquer neighbouring African territories, but also to defeat Italy militarily. The immediate effect of the Ethiopian victory at Adwa was that the country managed to survive as an independent state. A policy of gradual administrative reform and centralization meant a consolidation of the Ethiopian Empire. As we have seen this did not mean that Ethiopia was left alone by her colonial neighbours, i.e. Britain, France and Italy, who all were interested in exploiting Ethiopia’s economic resources.

Table 2. Treaties concluded between Ethiopia and foreign countries, between foreign countries regarding Ethiopia and Ethiopia's membership in international organisations, 1896–1953.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Treaty for Trade &amp; Friendship</th>
<th>Trade Agreement</th>
<th>Border Treaty</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Treaties regarding Ethiopia/Membership in organisations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Britain (1896)</td>
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<td>France (1897)</td>
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<td>Italy concerning Eritrea (1900)</td>
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<td>USA (1903)</td>
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<td>Britain concerning colonies in East Africa (1907)</td>
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<td>Hungary (1905)</td>
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<td>Italy (1906)</td>
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<td>Tripartite Treaty Britain, Italy and France concerning Economic spheres of influence in Ethiopia (1906)</td>
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<td>France (1908)</td>
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<td>USA (1914)</td>
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<td>Treaty of London. Britain and France regarding Italy’s colonies in Africa (1915)</td>
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<td>Ras Taffari Regent</td>
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<td>Netherlands (1926)</td>
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</table>
USA (1929)
Egypt (1930)
Japan (1930)

Italy (1928, Friendship)

Haile Selassie I

Japan (1932, Friendship)

Greece (1933, Immigration)

Switzerland (1933)

Czechoslovakia (1934)

Sweden (1935, not ratified)*

Britain concerning Brit. Somaliland (1935)

French and Italy concerning Italy's interests in Ethiopia (1935)

Italian occupation 1936–1941

Haile Selassie I

Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (1942)
USA (1942, Lend Lease Agreement)
USA (1943, Lend Lease Agreement)
Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (1944)

Ethiopia into the United Nations (1945)
Peace Treaty after Second World War, Italy surrendered her colonies (1947)

USA (signed 1951, ratified 1953)

Eritrea federated with Ethiopia (1952)
USA (1953, Military Agreement)

Source: FO 371; KUD, HP 64; NA, Decimal file 1941–44; Hertslet 2 (1909); Perham (1969); The United States in world affairs 1953; Zervos (1936). See also Hamilton (1973).

* See further Chapter IV:3.3.
The survey of treaties between Ethiopia and other states or between other states regarding Ethiopia (Table 2), can serve as an illustration of Ethiopia’s foreign policy during Minilik II’s and Haile Selassie I’s reigns. Most treaties were trade agreements, which generally also contained declarations of friendship. Minilik II concluded treaties either with neighbouring European colonial powers (Great Britain, Italy, France, Belgium) or with other large powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, USA), while Haile Selassie tended to turn to countries which did not have any African colonies (Switzerland, Sweden, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Japan, USA). Haile Selassie’s treaties could be taken as an indication that by widening Ethiopia’s foreign contacts, he was aiming at making the country less dependent upon those European countries which had colonies in neighbouring territories, although he maintained relations with those countries. His application for membership in the League of Nations in 1923 and his journey to Europe in 1924 could be fitted into the same pattern – to widen his contacts and at the same time obtain international recognition as the representative of an independent African state. The fact that Ethiopia in the 1920s turned to Sweden and, as we shall see, in the 1930s expanded its relations with Sweden, can be fitted into this same pattern, because Sweden was a small, remote country without colonies in Africa. But Germany, France, Britain and Italy competed for influence in Ethiopia not only by concluding treaties with Ethiopia in order to gain favours but also among themselves in order to prevent any state among them from gaining more influence than another. When the central power in Ethiopia was strong and the balance of power among the European powers remained unchanged, the colonial ambitions of the European neighbours were resisted. However, due to the political situation in Europe in the 1930s, Italy was able to attack Ethiopia who lost her independence without the League of Nations having taken any effective measures against the aggressor.

There are similarities between Minilik’s reign and the first part of Haile Selassie’s, both regarding their foreign relations and their domestic policy of gradual reform to modernize Ethiopia. Haile Selassie, however, failed to resist Italy’s attempts at conquest, possibly because he relied on the League of Nations and because he had not yet managed to catch up with European technology of warfare.

The fact that Ethiopia was liberated in 1941 from the Italian occupation with British assistance, while the world was still at war, created a dependency upon Britain. The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 recognized Ethiopia’s independence but contained various provisions which in fact limited the Emperor’s sovereignty, to such an extent that Ethiopia’s position was similar to a British protectorate. With the signing in 1944 of a new Agreement with Britain from which the limitations on Ethiopia’s sovereignty had been omitted, the Emperor started to loosen his ties with Britain. Due to the war the number
of countries able to offer assistance in his reconstruction of Ethiopia was limited. The United States and Sweden were countries who both had the means to assist him and at the same time had no colonial past in Africa. Thus Ethiopia's contacts were widened and in 1945 she became a member of the United Nations. There was, however, competition for influence in Ethiopia particularly between Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The question is raised whether Haile Selassie wanted to use Sweden as a counterweight to this competition.
Chapter III
The influence of foreigners in the Ethiopian society, 1850–1950

This chapter deals with the origin of the foreigners in Ethiopian society and their professional and social structure. It will enable us to examine the Swedes in Ethiopia in terms of an international perspective. We shall also investigate whether or not any change over time can be noted in the composition of the foreign community during the century under review.

1. Foreigners in Ethiopia before 1924

In the mid-seventeenth century the Portuguese Jesuits were expelled from Ethiopia after having been in the country for about a century. Ethiopia then remained closed to Europeans until 1769 when it was visited by the explorer James Bruce. After sporadic Euro-Ethiopian contacts represented by the scientific and commercial activities of Sir George Annesley, Viscount Valentia in the Red Sea 1804–1805, and by his secretary and draughtsman Henry Salt’s efforts to establish contacts with the Ethiopian court in 1805 and 1809, Ethiopia’s isolation was definitely broken around 1830. During the next 25 years Ethiopia was visited by many different kinds of travellers and missions. In early 1830 two missionaries of the Church Missionary Society, Samuel Gobat and Christian Kugler, arrived in Ethiopia together with a German carpenter named Christian Aichinger. They were followed by C.W. Isenberg in 1835, and C.H. Blumhardt and J.L. Krapf in 1837 as well as by Roman Catholic missionaries. The missionary attempts ended in failure, owing in part to the hostility of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. In 1838 all Protestant missionaries were expelled.

The scientific and commercial interest in Ethiopia, however, increased. In 1841 an official British Mission under Captain W.C. Harris visited Shoa, and

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1 Crummey (1972), pp. 6–7; Jones (n.d.), p. 324.
3 Arén (1977), Ch. 2; Rubenson (1976), pp. 55–56.
4 Jones (n.d.), p. 325; Rubenson (1976), p. 76.
later the Belgian Consul in Egypt, Edouard Blondeel examined commercial opportunities in northern and western Ethiopia. Among unofficial British explorers to arrive in the early 1840s could be mentioned John Bell and Walter Plowden. The latter was later appointed the first British consul in Ethiopia. According to Rubenson, who has investigated Ethiopia’s foreign contacts during the 19th century in detail, almost all Europeans, of which only few have been mentioned here, became involved in Ethiopian politics, regardless of whether they were motivated by missionary, commercial or scientific interests, by a taste of adventure, or whether or not they were commissioned by European governments.

Considerable numbers of Europeans found their way to Ethiopia during the reign of Teodros II (1855–1868), who was fascinated by innovations, especially within the military field, and engaged European engineers and instructors. He appointed the Englishman John Bell as his principal adviser, and also entrusted to him the task of training soldiers. In the late 1850s representatives of the Basel Mission, mostly lay handicraftsmen trained at Chrischona Institute in Switzerland, were allowed to establish themselves in the country but only on condition that they confined their evangelistic activities to the distribution of the Scriptures.

Trade attracted many foreigners, especially Arabs, Greeks and Armenians. Foreigners with considerable capital and outside contacts were dominant in large scale business, while local Muslims handled most of the small retail trade. The Greeks and Armenians were largely occupied as silversmiths and goldsmiths. Some Greeks, Germans and Italians found employment in the construction of palaces and churches.

Rubenson emphasizes that Teodros II basically had a positive attitude towards Europeans, and wanted to make systematic use of them in the modernization of his country. Rubenson explains Teodros’s failure to maintain satisfactory relations with the Europeans in part by his erratic personality and growing tendency of violence, which finally resulted in the imprisonment of all Europeans at his court.

During the period of chaos that followed the death of Teodros, foreigners played a restricted role. Apart from the Armenians and the Greeks, who were more or less permanent settlers, there were few other foreigners in Ethiopia. Yohannes IV was somewhat less interested in foreigners than his predecessor, but he continued the tradition of employing them within the military field. A

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1 Rubenson (1976), pp. 56–57.
5 Rubenson (1976), pp. 174–175.
British sergeant by the name of J.D. Kirkham, who had participated in Napier's expedition, was more or less considered to be the Emperor's chief adviser on military matters. Yohannes was suspicious of foreign missions, and particularly of Roman Catholic missionaries. Thanks to the Swede P.E. Lager, who had been introduced to Yohannes by Kirkham, the Emperor was more favourably disposed towards the Swedish Protestant missionaries. However, they also had to be excluded from the country, since an exception for the Swedes would have made other nations ask for the same right. In addition to the foreigners in the Emperor's service there were also a number of foreign traders, craftsmen and entrepreneurs – mainly Greeks and Armenians. Pankhurst maintains that although foreigners often obtained economic privileges, they were treated as servants, and they had to execute orders given by Ethiopians. Only in rare cases would a foreigner rise to a position of trust, and still more rarely to one of influence.

Minilik II (1889–1913) was perhaps more interested in attracting foreigners to Ethiopia than any of his predecessors. Besides his interest in obtaining arms and munitions, Minilik sought to employ skilled European engineers and instructors. The first organized medical staff to come to Ethiopia consisted of Italian doctors who, at Minilik's request, were sent to Shoa towards the end of the 1870s. Shortly afterwards Minilik agreed to receive an Italian envoy, Count Pietro Antonelli, who was the first diplomat to be accredited to Minilik's court. A Swiss engineer by the name of Alfred Ilg became Minilik's principal adviser in European affairs and two Frenchmen, Leon Chefneux, an engineer and Léonce Lagarde, a legal adviser, were also employed. Besides these, there were many foreigners, including a number of French traders, who were attracted to Ethiopia by the high profits to be made in the arms trade.

The development of Addis Abeba and the innovations of the later part of Minilik's reign were accompanied by a significant growth of the foreign community. Building operations led to the immigration of Indian and Arab craftsmen. Increased Armenian immigration also took place in this period, largely as a result of the persecution of Armenians in Central Asia by the Turks in 1895–1896. Armenians soon gained prominence as small traders and skilled artisans. Despite the recent war with Italy, several Italians came to Ethiopia in the early twentieth century. Considerable Greek immigration followed a few years later, largely through the offices of G. Zervudachis, a Greek banker in
Egypt. Large numbers of Greeks were employed as housebuilders, while others entered the liquor trade or established flour mills, oil presses and bakeries.1

The pattern of foreigners engaged in commerce underwent a significant change in the years following the battle of Adwa. Until that time almost all the large traders had been French. The opening up of Anglo-Ethiopian relations in 1897 led to the immigration of Indian traders, the first of whom arrived in 1899. The competition from the Indians came at a time when French traders were encountering a slump in the arms trade. Menlik's diplomacy at that time enabled him to obtain arms from the French and the Russian governments without being obliged to rely exclusively on small private traders.2

Pankhurst maintains that the presence of foreigners of different nationalities made Ethiopia far more international than many other African territories, where development was largely dominated by one single colonial power.3 By the end of Menlik's reign the foreign population had reached a considerable number. The exact number of foreigners cannot be calculated, but contemporary estimates give us a rough idea of the size of different foreign communities. In 1905 the number of Europeans (Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, Russians, Swiss and Germans) was estimated to 66.4 In the following year the number of foreigners excluding Arabs and Indians, was estimated to 205. The Greeks constituted the largest group (65), followed by the Armenians (44) and the French (35).

According to an estimate by the Georgian physician Merab, the number of foreigners in Ethiopia had increased to 1,096 by 1910. The Greeks were still the largest foreign group (334), representing about one-third of the whole foreign community. Arabs, Indians and Armenians were next in number (227, 149, and 146 respectively). Besides the Greeks the European community comprised also the French, the British, the Swiss and the Russians (63, 14, 13 and 6 respectively). In 1910 there was only one Swede in Ethiopia.5 It should once more be emphasized that the figures given above are based on estimates, and may probably be regarded as minimum figures. An explanation to the comparatively large number of Armenians and Greeks might be that these foreign groups were communicants of Orthodox Churches. In a country like

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1 Pankhurst (1968), p. 60.
3 Pankhurst (1968), p. 61.
4 Pankhurst (1967), p. 79.
5 Pankhurst (1968), p. 62. The Swede was the missionary SEM, No. 58, Karl Cederqvist who arrived in Addis Abeba in 1904. He is not included in Henin's estimate of 1906. See further Ch. IV:1 and Ch. IV n. 9. Note: The abbreviation SEM + a number refers to the Activity graph for SEM missionaries in Appendix 1. The abbreviations SMBV and SDA + a number refers to the Activity graphs of SMBV- and SDA missionaries in Appendix 2.
Ethiopia, where the Orthodox Church plays a significant role in the society, the religious factor could well have been of significance.  

Provided the foreigners were Christians they were allowed to marry among the local Christian population and even from well reputed families, which would have been impossible for native craftsmen, who were despised as an inferior class. The inter-marriages resulted in increasing numbers of children of mixed origin, particularly of Italian and Greek parentage. The Armenians mostly had wives of their own nationality. The Indians hardly ever inter-married with Ethiopians, while the Arabs often took Ethiopian wives, and practising polygamy, had a great number of children by Ethiopian mothers.

Each foreign community tended to have its own occupational structure, which has been investigated from contemporary literature by Pankhurst. Most Asians were either businessmen or different kinds of artisans. The Greeks and the Italians had roughly the same occupational pattern as the Asians while the other Europeans, in addition to being merchants, held positions within the fields of health and the military.

The status of foreigners was for the first time officially defined in one of the articles of the Treaty of Trade and Friendship between France and Ethiopia, the so-called Klobukowsky Treaty, signed on 10 January 1908. Article 7 of this Treaty was given great importance, because the position it gave the French in Ethiopia was also considered to apply to other foreigners. Crimes or disputes in which a foreigner and an Ethiopian were involved were to be settled before an Ethiopian court, augmented by the Consul of the country in question. If the accused was an Ethiopian the person would be sentenced according to Ethiopian law, if a foreigner, according to the law of his country. When the judges were of different opinions the case was to be submitted to the Emperor.

In 1913 a decree was issued ordering all foreigners to register with their respective Consul. Those foreigners whose country was not represented by a Consul should choose a Consulate under whose protection they would stand. If a foreigner wished to become an Ethiopian subject, he had to apply to the Ethiopian authorities for permission and be registered as such. Failure to fulfill these rules would result in expulsion from Ethiopia.

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21 The significance of the religious factor was pointed out to me by SEM, No. 140, Gustav Arén see Ch. VI n. 56.
The fact that the position of foreigners in Ethiopia by the end of Minilik's reign was legally defined is a clear indication that both their number and influence had reached a point where they had to be taken into serious consideration by Ethiopian authorities.

2. The influence of foreigners during the period 1924–1936

The numerical strength of the foreign community in Ethiopia will now be studied, special attention being paid to the Christian missions and those foreigners employed in the Ethiopian administration. The economic activities of the foreigners will also be discussed briefly.

2. 1 Numerical strength of the foreign community in Ethiopia

By the mid-1920s the total European population of Ethiopia amounted to a few hundred, almost all of them living in Addis Abeba, Dire Dawa or Harer. They were mainly in the service of the railway company, the Bank of Abyssinia or the legations of the respective countries. According to contemporary observations, the foreign community in Addis Abeba consisted mainly of French subordinate employees of the Franco-Ethiopian railway company and a group of French, Greek, Italian, Armenian and Syrian small traders. A small 'upper-class' group of Europeans, about 30–35 persons, consisted of the French political director of the railway company and a French adviser to the Ethiopian government, senior British officials of the Bank of Abyssinia, a French and an Italian physician and representatives of European trading societies.

Zervos estimated the number of foreigners in Ethiopia in 1935 to be 14,580 representing 27 nationalities. Most foreigners lived in the three big cities, Addis Abeba (6,000), Harer (6,780) and Dire Dawa (800). Approximately 1,000 foreigners living outside these cities were mostly located in the provinces of Jimma, Illubabor, Wollaga, Sidamo, Arussi and Bale. The number of foreigners by origin is given in Table 3.

The majority of the foreigners were of Asian or Near Eastern origins, the Arabs being the largest foreign group in Ethiopia (4,000 or 27%). About 700 Arabs originated from Yemen. The Indians and the Armenians were next
Table 3. Estimated number of foreigners in Ethiopia 1935 by origin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>(4,446)</td>
<td>(30.5)</td>
<td>ASIA</td>
<td>(9,971)</td>
<td>(68.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Libanese/Syrian</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>NORTH AMERICA</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,580</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(3 000 or 21 % and 2 800 or 19 % respectively). The Greeks constituted the largest European group and the second largest group overall. These four national groups accounted for almost 90 % of the foreigners in Ethiopia. The European group was more diversified, including 18 nationalities. In addition to the Greeks only three nationalities exceeded one hundred, namely the French, the Italians and the Germans (350, 350 and 230 respectively). The others ranged from 75 to only one. The Swedes numbered 55, thus constituting one of the minor groups. Americans and Africans together only accounted for about 1 % of the foreigners. The figures given by Zervos are based on estimates from unknown sources, but their accuracy probably varies from nationality to nationality. However, despite possible errors they give us an idea of the foreign population in Ethiopia around 1935. The figure given by Zervos for the Swedes...
is identical with that given in Swedish sources. This is an indication that Zervos, at least regarding the Swedes, had access to first-hand information.

Zervos also provides us with information about the professional activities of the foreigners. Thus the Arabs, the Indians, the Armenians and the Greeks were mainly occupied within the fields of commerce and industry, many of them being small traders. Foreigners were also employed in different kinds of economic enterprises i.e. industries, banks, and commercial enterprises. The Swedes are said to have been working as missionaries, medical personnel and in Government service. This coincides well with the information given in Swedish sources.

The foreigners had always lived socially somewhat apart from the local population. As their number grew they tended to live more and more within their own national groupings. The largest groups started to form their own associations. The Greeks in Addis Ababa obtained their first bishop in 1910, founded a school in 1915, and built themselves a church in 1926. The Armenians established a school in 1918, a sports club in 1930, and a church in 1935. The West European communities were generally too small to have their own organizations. The Italians and Germans were exceptions in this respect by establishing Fascist and Nazi parties. Although the foreign communities tended to isolate themselves, measures were taken to fit them into the Ethiopian society. An Ethiopian Nationality law issued in 1930, dealt with issues such as mixed marriages, adoption of Ethiopian children by foreigners, naturalisation and loss of nationality. At this time a bureau of foreigners was directed by a man of mixed Ethiopian-German descent by the name of David Hall.

2.2 Foreign missionaries and their main activities

In 1924 the missionary organizations at work in Ethiopia in addition to Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission Bibeltrogna Vänner, were the British and Foreign Bible Society, the United Presbyterian Church of North America, the Seventh Day Adventists, and one or two French Roman

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a The 13 members of the Red Cross Ambulance Brigade are not included in these figures, since they did not arrive until the war. See further Ch. IV:4. 2.


c Ibid., pp. 144–148.

d Ibid., pp. 180–183.

e Ibid., pp. 127, 188–189.

f Ibid., p. 488.

g Pankhurst (1968), pp. 65–66.
Catholic agencies. In 1932 when the Sudan Interior Mission, and the German Hermannsburg Mission had also established themselves in Ethiopia there were 26 Protestant mission stations in the country staffed by approximately 130 missionaries. Two years later the number of mission stations had increased to 30 and the number of missionaries to more than 160.

In addition to their evangelistic work most of the missions also ran, and still run, schools and gave medical care. According to a report published by the African Education Commission, which in co-operation with the International Education Board in 1924 undertook a journey to investigate the educational facilities in East Africa, the foreign missions were responsible for most schools of any significance in Ethiopia at that time. The commission found that the government provision and interest in education in Ethiopia was inadequate. Besides the only government school, founded by Menilik in 1908, there were a number of formal and traditional types of church schools run by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The educational value of the church school system was, according the the Commission's report, exceedingly meagre in quantity and of indifferent quality. They expressed more appreciation of the Menilik school, where the programme of the Egyptian government school was followed for the most part, although the majority of the students preferred to learn French rather than English. All mission schools were primary schools. Besides the three Rs, they were sometimes also offered training in languages, sciences and handicraft. The Roman Catholic mission was the first organization to establish schools in Ethiopia, their boys' school in Alitena dating back to 1847. A girls' school was founded at the same place in 1898. Most schools were located to Addis Abeba and a few other towns. The Catholic Ecole des soeurs and the Swedish Evangelical Mission school, both founded in 1905, were the first schools to be established in Addis Abeba, besides the Orthodox Church schools.

The missionary societies expanded their work in Ethiopia during the 1920s. The Commission considered the activity of the missionary societies as the most certain basis of hope for education in Ethiopia, because it demonstrated an international interest in the development of the country. Ras Taffari's

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References:

" Jones (n.d.), p. 325.
" The African Education Commission, chaired by Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones was international, interdenominational and Interracial. It included both British and American citizens and members of various Christian communities. One of the members was a Ghanaian, James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey, M.A. Jones (n.d.), p. xxii.
" Jones (n.d.), p. 326.
" Ibid., pp. 327-330. See also Lass-Westphal (1972), p. 90.
" Ibid., p. 327.
" Ibid., pp. 327-328.
" Ibid., p. 335.
Table 4. Protestant missions working in Ethiopia with foreign staff in 1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>National-</th>
<th>Year of</th>
<th>Province Involved</th>
<th>Stations</th>
<th>Foreign staff</th>
<th>Hospitals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Evangelical Mission</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>(1866)*</td>
<td>Shoa (A-A), Wollaga</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>(1907)*</td>
<td>Begemder, Shoa (A-A), Gojam, Wolamo, Wollo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Mission BV</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>(1911)*</td>
<td>Harege, Shoa (A-A)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Presbyterian Church Mission to Jews</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Shoa, Wollaga</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Society</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Begemder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Interior</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Shoa (A-A)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermannsburg Mission</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Shoa (A-A), Wollaga</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc. for the Propagation of the Gospel</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Shoa (A-A)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Churchmen's Society</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Harege, Shoa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Lass-Westphal states that the figures of stations and missionaries are only approximate, due to difficulties in the sources (p. 90 note 3). The figures for Swedish Evangelical Mission and Seventh Day Adventists have been revised from Swedish sources. Eritrea has been excluded.

* year when work was initiated in Eritrea
interest in the education and the general development of the people, as demonstrated both by his plans to open a new government school of substantial size for which he planned to employ European teachers, and by his positive attitude towards the work of the missions from all Churches, was regarded by the Commission as a key factor for the development of Ethiopia."

Ras Taffari supported the educational and medical work of the missions by gifts of land and money for establishing schools and hospitals. "He had realized that the missionaries could make important contributions within these fields, but the Orthodox Church was suspicious of their work. The only way for Ras Taffari to justify the presence of the foreigners in the country was to open hospitals that were supported by him but run by the missionaries. Economic grants for new hospitals were given to the Swedish Evangelical Mission (Naqamte), the Swedish Mission BV (Harer), the Seventh Day Adventist Mission (Desse) and the United Presbyterian Mission (Addis Abeba). These hospitals were all called Taffari Mekonnen Hospital in order to remind the people of his generosity."

In 1935, according to Lass-Westphal’s investigations, there were ten Protestant societies at work, mainly in Shoa (particularly in Addis Abeba), Harer and Wollaga (Table 4). Four of the societies were British and the other two were American (the Seventh Day Adventists having Swedes among their staff), one American/British, two Swedish and one German. Most provinces were covered by their work, which besides evangelization in most cases also included educational and medical work. The missions were, however, most active in southern Shoa, and in the western and southern provinces. This was in accordance with the principle proclaimed by the authorities that the missions should only convert non-Christian peoples in order to avoid competition with the Orthodox Church, which had most followers in the northern provinces. "The Swedish societies ran 9 of the 34 mission schools (26 %) and 32 out of a total of 170 foreign missionaries (19 %) were Swedes, (Table 4).

As mentioned earlier, the African Education Commission found that the mission schools, although few in proportion to the population, were of great importance for the education of Ethiopians. This was also later emphasised by

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"Ibid., p. 332.
" Notes from meeting with Church officers of ECMY in Addis Abeba 28.9 1971, p. 1, GA. Statement made by Amanuel Abraham b. 1913, president of ECMY, Educated by SEM, pastor, Director General at Ministry of Education 1945–48, Ambassador to India and Italy. Among senior posts to be mentioned Minister of Communication and Minister of Post. Imprisoned by PMAC in 1974, but later released as innocent to charges of corruption raised against the former Akilulu Habte Wold cabinet.
Trimingham, who particularly mentions the schools run by the Swedish societies.\textsuperscript{a}

It thus seems as if Ras Taffari consciously used the foreign missionary societies for his development programme already before the war with Italy by supporting their educational and medical work, but confining their evangelization to non-Christian areas. The Swedish missionary societies at that time were already responsible for a substantial part of the educational and medical work in Ethiopia. Their situation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV:1.

2. 3 Foreigners in the Ethiopian administration

Top positions in the Ethiopian administration, especially in the Ministries, were held by Ethiopians, while on the sub-ministerial level many positions, particularly the technical ones, were often held by foreigners. Many foreigners were employed in schools and hospitals.\textsuperscript{b} The Bank of Ethiopia had a British Governor by the name of C.S. Colliers.\textsuperscript{c} Table 5 informs us about top positions held by foreigners in the Ministries. The adviser on foreign affairs was a Swede, first Dr Johannes Kolmodin (1931–1933), and after his death, General Eric Virgin (1934–1935). An American, Everett Colson, was the Emperor's adviser in financial matters (1930–1935). His legal adviser was a Swiss, J. Auberson (from about 1927). An Englishman, Frank de Halpert, who resigned in 1933 without being replaced, was the Emperor's adviser in issues regarding slavery. The advisers within the Ministry of Post, Telegraph & Telephone were French, first A. Bousson (1923–1932) and then Emile Sibilensky (1932–1935). Also recruited as technical adviser (1932–1935) within the same Ministry was a Swede, Frank Hammar.

The advisers thus originated from several different countries, among which small neutral countries like Sweden and Switzerland were represented. According to Perham the advisers were chosen directly by the Emperor generally through negotiations with ministers or consuls of the respective country. Perham finds it noticeable that the Emperor largely avoided the selection of advisers from neighbouring colonial powers. The exception in the case of Mr de Halpert was, according to Perham, due to the great importance given by the British government and public opinion to the question of slavery. Military missions were recruited from Belgium and Sweden, Belgium also

\textsuperscript{a} Trimingham (1950), p. 29.
\textsuperscript{b} Zervos (1936), pp. 255–257 (survey of hospitals); pp. 229–230 (survey of schools).
\textsuperscript{c} Pankhurst (1968), p. 64.

71
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry &amp; Department</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Start-End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>J. Kolmodin</td>
<td>Swede</td>
<td>1931-1933*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>E. Virgin</td>
<td>Swede</td>
<td>1934-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>J.H. Spencer</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Foreigners</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>D. Hall</td>
<td>German/Ethiopian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Laboratory of Chemical Analysis</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>K. Ewert</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of General Inspection</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>P. Yazeltjan</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Chemistry</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>K. Ewert</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>E. Colson</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>1930-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>F. Reaggli</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Ethiopia</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>A. Koeurhadjian</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of War</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>A. Taiininakis</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>1929-1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Army (Special Mission)</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>B. Dothee</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>1930-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>G. Polet</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>1929-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Lieutenants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>1934-1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet School at Holeta (Special Mission)</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>V. Tamm</td>
<td>Swede</td>
<td>1934-1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>A. Thorburn</td>
<td>Swede</td>
<td>1934-1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>N. Bouveng</td>
<td>Swede</td>
<td>1934-1936</td>
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<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>G. Heuman</td>
<td>Swede</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>A. Nyblom</td>
<td>Swede</td>
<td>1934-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>S. Papazian</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Fine Arts</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>E. Work</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>1932-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>F. de Halpert</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>-1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Public Health</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>K. Ewert</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td>J. Zervos</td>
<td>Greek</td>
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<td></td>
<td>K. Hanner</td>
<td>Swede</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>G. Argyrepolous</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Department</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>K. Mosshopolous</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>J. Auberson</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Post, Telegraph &amp; Telephone</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>A. Bousson</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>1923-1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Director</td>
<td>E. Sibilensky</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>1932-1935</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Adviser</td>
<td>F. Hammar</td>
<td>Swede</td>
<td>1932-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Works</td>
<td>Technical Adviser</td>
<td>A. Trahtenberg</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>-1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polytechnic</td>
<td>P. Pane</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>1929-1933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* died in service
supplying a police mission. The Belgian Military Mission had been invited in 1929 to train *Ras* Taffari's Bodyguard.

Swedes were thus recruited for top positions in the Ethiopian administration. The issue of why, how, and for which duties the Swedes were employed will be discussed in Chapter IV:2.

2.4 Foreign economic influence in Ethiopia before 1935

According to Zervos there was a small indigenous industry mainly producing articles for the local household on a handicraft basis, while the production of technical articles and goods requiring more advanced technology was in foreign hands. Even the foreign-owned plants were small in the 1930s, producing mainly consumption goods such as soap, vegetable oil, furniture and wine. Zervos prepared a directory of foreign economic enterprises, where the foreigners were classified by profession. Pankhurst has identified most of the foreign names given by Zervos by nationality. From Zervos's and Pankhurst's investigations the present author has calculated that the Greeks and Armenians each owned about one-third of the foreign enterprises. The Armenians were dominant among the handicraft firms, but they were also well represented among other branches and as owners of import-export firms. The Greeks were dominant both as owners of business firms and factories and within branches dealing with foodstuffs and beverages. Roughly 20 % of 341 foreign economic enterprises were import-export firms, run by Armenians, Indians, Greeks and Arabs. Although the information available is incomplete it might allow us to conclude that the foreigners had a considerable economic influence in Ethiopia in the 1930s.

The survey presented above of the foreigners in Ethiopia before 1936 has not only indicated that the Arabs, the Armenians, the Indians and the Greeks have always been the most numerous foreign groupings, but also that there was a pronounced difference in the occupational structure between the peoples...

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" Perham (1969), p. 92. For details on the Swedish Military Mission see Ch. IV:2, 4 and IV:4. 1. Belgium had Zaire (Congo) as a colony, but was not considered to have ambitions in northeastern Africa. J. Kolmodin see Ch. IV:2. 3, IV n. 85. E. Virgin see Ch. IV:2. 3, IV n. 120. F. Hammar see Ch. IV:2. 5, IV n. 169, V:1.

Ibid., p. 165. Military instructors had also been required from USA in the 1920s but had not been supplied (Shinn (1971), p. 301 & 307).

Zervos (1936), pp. 144–145.

Ibid., pp. 202–211.

Pankhurst (1967), pp. 75–79; Pankhurst (1968), pp. 64–66. Slave trade was an important economic factor in Ethiopian society, but it goes beyond the scope of the present book to analyse this issue. See for example Abir (1968), passim; Pankhurst (1968), pp. 82–128.
of Near Eastern and Asian origins on the one hand and the peoples of American and western European origins on the other hand. The former category were mainly active as businessmen and traders, while the latter were largely employed in Ethiopian government service or worked as missionaries. The Greeks had great similarities with the Near Eastern and Asian groups with regard to their professional structure."

3. Protestant missions during the Italian occupation, 1936–1941

It would appear that there were few other foreigners than Italians in Ethiopia during the years of the Italian occupation. The non-Italian missionary societies had taken a pro-Ethiopian stand during the Italo-Ethiopian war and in different ways taken part in emergency work. After the war most of the non-Italian missions were expelled. Schools, clinics etc. founded by the missionaries were taken over by the Italians. According to Lass-Westphal, Italian hostility was strongest against nations which had supported Ethiopia during the war. Swedish missionaries were therefore expelled first while measures concerning British and American citizens were taken more reluctantly. The only non-Italian missionaries allowed to stay in Ethiopia throughout the war belonged to the German Hermannsburg Mission and the two American missions, the Seventh Day Adventists and United Presbyterians. Lass-Westphal found that after the missionaries had left, some parishes disintegrated, while others experienced a rapid and wide expansion. After the attempted assassination of Graziani, the Italian viceroy, in early 1937, many Protestant parish members and leaders were placed in concentration camps or were executed along with other educated Ethiopians. Many Ethiopians left the country as exiles. Six SDA missionaries were allowed to stay in Addis Abeba throughout the occupation, among them the Swedish nurse Lisa Johansson. They were allowed to arrange meetings and services and to offer a little medical care in their homes, but the running of schools was forbidden."

" Dotson & Dotson (1975), pp. 567–568, have also pointed out this distinction between the different national groups.


" Missionären, Vol. 45:12, p. 197. Letter from H. Hanson to SDA's General Conference in Washington D.C., Addis Abeba 30.7 1941; Vol. 46: Special issue, pp. 10–11. The other five missionaries were Della & Herbert Hanson, N.B. Nielsen with wife, and Rosmine Hofstad, SDA, No. 9, Lisa Johansson see Ch. IV n. 46.
Having expelled the missionaries the Italian authorities followed up with pressing demands to purchase the missionary stations owned by Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission *Bibeltroga Vänner*. Axel B. Svensson, chairman of SMBV, and Anton Jönsson, a missionary therefore visited Ethiopia during the period October 1938–January 1939 to complete the negotiations regarding their stations in Ethiopia. Besides the economic claims they tried to get permission to keep at least one missionary couple in Ethiopia, a request which was turned down by the Italian authorities. SMBV, however, got full economic compensation for their stations in Addis Abeba, Dire Dawa and Harer (Lire 838,396 or Sw Cr 184,447). The sum included payment for the grounds and hospital building in Harer, which were a gift from the Emperor, valued at Lire 140,000 or Sw Cr 30,000.\(^4\) Svensson had originally intended to visit ex-emperor Haile Selassie in Bath to hand over his share of the money but the war in Europe made such a journey impossible. Instead Svensson secretly handed over the money via bankers according to Haile Selassie’s instruction.\(^4\)

SEM sent two representatives, Olle Hagner and Thérèse de Pertis, to Asmera in October 1939, to negotiate with Italian authorities regarding SEM’s property. Although the Board in Stockholm seemed to be anxious to reach agreement with the Italians, Hagner refused to sign, since he considered that the Italian offer did not give appropriate compensation for SEM’s property. He delayed the negotiations, hoping that the missionaries would be allowed to return. Hagner stayed in Asmera until 1945 without concluding any agreement for the sale of the property.\(^4\)


\(^4\) Haile Selassie I to A.B. Svensson, Bath 15.9 1939; Herouy to A.B. Svensson, Bath 16.10 1939; Herouy to A.B. Svensson, Bath 6.11 1939, LLA, ABS, C:22. Svensson received the Order of the Star of Ethiopia as a reward for his services to the Emperor. See also BV (1961), pp. 161–162.


75
SEM thus managed to avoid selling their property to the Italians. SMBV sold their stations, but on the other hand by selling them they were able to help the ex-emperor by handing over a substantial sum of money at a time when he needed it most. There are reasons to believe that this might have affected SMBV's situation positively when Haile Selassie started to reconstruct the country after his restoration.

4. Foreigners in the Ethiopian society, 1941–1944

4.1 The Ethiopian policy towards foreign missions

After the restoration the missionary societies which had formerly worked in Ethiopia approached the Emperor for permission to return. Those missionaries who had worked earlier in Ethiopia were allowed to return but no new missionaries were admitted until the Ethiopian Government had decided on what policy they were to adopt towards foreign missionary societies. The German Hermannsburg Mission, however, had to leave the country because they had co-operated with the Italians. They did not return until 1951. The missionaries were confined to Addis Abeba until Ethiopia's political situation had become clarified with the British. As soon as the Ethiopian independence was recognized in January 1942, the Ministry of the Interior issued some simple regulations allowing the resumption of missionary work also outside Addis Abeba.\(^4\)

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church had from its earliest history been under the supremacy of the Coptic Church in Egypt, the Alexandrian Patriarch being its supreme leader. In 1948, however, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church won autocephaly after a long and at times bitter struggle, which coincided with an Evangelical revival in southern Ethiopia and the efforts made by evangelical Christians to form an evangelical church in Ethiopia.\(^5\) It goes beyond the scope of the present book to examine the Church-Mission relations in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian policy towards the foreign Christian Missions, however, has to be seen against the background of a self-reliant Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

Some influential Ethiopians, especially the Orthodox church leaders and some of the members of the Ethiopian Council of Ministers, particularly Dejazmach Mekonnen Desta, the Minister of Education, were opposed to missionary work. They regarded the Orthodox Church as one of the most potent instruments in promoting a strong and united Ethiopian Empire.

\(^1\) Saeverås (1974), pp. 31-32; Tringham (1950), pp. 31-32.
Therefore they wanted to restrict the missionary work to the greatest possible extent, while Haile Selassie was considered to be sympathetic towards the work of the missions. However, a number of the members of the Council of Ministers were educated at mission schools and it is supposed that they realized the importance of the missions in the sphere of education. In December 1942 the Ministry of Education took over the control of foreign missions and proposed new regulations, according to which the missionaries would have to concentrate upon the non-Christian elements in the population. In areas where the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was established the missionaries were only allowed to engage themselves into purely philanthropic activities such as medical work. They had to refrain from engaging in evangelization or education. Missionaries were not allowed to admit to their schools or religious gatherings any children under the age of 15 and all mission schools should be open to inspection by representatives of the Ministry of Education.¹⁵

This memorandum caused universal protests from missionary organisations. The Emperor therefore instructed his Minister of Education to reach a modus vivendi with the missionaries. As a result of meetings held on 24 and 27 July 1943 between the Minister of Education, the British Educational Adviser, Mr E.H. Hussey and Mission Representatives, a more liberal policy towards the missionaries was outlined. It was now agreed that missionaries might teach the principles of Christianity from the Bible to both children and adults even in Ethiopian Church areas. In all areas 'great elasticity' with regard to the age of admission to schools would be allowed to missions 'co-operating whole-heartedly with the Government'. It was also stated that the whole country south of Addis Abeba was considered to be a non-Christian area. In a report to London by a British diplomatic representative it was suggested that the Ethiopian Government might use the missionaries as a minor instrument of Amhara imperialism in the Oromo and other colonial lands, because of the emphasis laid on the necessity for all missionaries to learn and teach Amharinya.¹⁶

Until the new regulations for the missions had been finally agreed upon and issued as an Imperial decree there were difficulties for new missionaries to obtain an entry visa. Six missionaries from England belonging to the British Church Mission Society and six members of the Seventh Day Adventist Mission from South Africa who were to teach in schools at Aqaqi, Desse and Debre Tabor had to wait several months for an answer.¹⁷ When the matter was

raised with the Emperor in April 1943, he answered that the whole question of missionary activity was still under consideration and that the question of the admission of further missionaries was dependent upon a decision as to a general policy. In August 1943 there were more than twenty Protestant missionaries in the country and four Roman Catholic priests."

It took another year until an Imperial decree on foreign missions was published in August 1944." The decree aimed at the closest co-operation between the Ethiopian Government and the missionary organizations. A Mission committee was established presided over by the Minister of Education and with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior as members (Art. 2). The Committee should divide the country for missionary activities into 'open areas', where the population was mostly non-Christian, and into 'Ethiopian Church areas', where the population mainly belonged to the Orthodox Church (Arts. 6 & 7). In Ethiopian Church areas the missions would be permitted to establish hospitals and nondenominational schools, but not to proselytize among the population (Art. 8).

Religious instruction in mission schools and hospitals situated in church areas should be confined to principles common to all Christian churches. The Minister of Education might appoint teachers qualified to teach Christianity according to the principles of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, when he found such teachers necessary (Art. 9), while in open areas they were allowed to teach and preach the Christian faith according to their own denomination (Art. 11). Addis Abeba was declared to be an open area (Art. 12). Amharinya was declared to be the general language of instruction and the missionaries were expected to learn that language (Art. 13), although in open areas they were allowed to use local languages orally at an early stage of instruction (Art. 14).

The new regulations can be regarded as a compromise between the restrictive and more liberal attitudes towards missionaries represented among leading Ethiopians. It is, however, quite clear that the Ethiopian Government by issuing this decree wanted to establish full control over the foreign missionaries, particularly over their evangelizational work, but also to make use of their resources for medical care and education throughout the country. Education was a crucial point, because of the possibilities offered for religious propaganda in the schools. This is certainly the reason why the Government sought to secure control of the missions' schools. The Emperor seems to have been opposed by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church leaders and the negative members of the Council of Ministers, represented by Mekonnen Desta, who was also one of the authors of the decree. This can be read from the reports

" Negarit Gazeta 1944:12, Decree No. 3 of 1944, August 27, 1944. Regulations on the establishment of missions.
sent from the British Embassy in Addis Abeba to the Government in London. Mekonnen Desta accused Amanuel Abraham, the Director General of the Ministry of Education of favouring the Oromo with regard to the establishment of schools and of favouring Protestant teachers. Ato Amanuel had to resign his position at the Ministry and later was appointed Ambassador to New Delhi.

Unlike Saeverås, who maintains that the Decree demonstrated a relative openness to missions, the present author considers that members of the Ethiopian establishment aimed at limiting the influence of the foreign missions to the greatest possible extent, particularly in Ethiopian Church areas, without making them loose their interest in supplying medical and educational staff. This restrictiveness against foreigners was further emphasized in a leading article in The Ethiopian Herald, published by the Ministry of Information, warning against foreign influence (Sweden mentioned by name) which might be exercised by foreign teachers in mission and government schools. The present author’s interpretation is supported by Heyer as well as by Tafvelin, who states that there can hardly be any doubt that the permission granted to the Protestant missions to evangelize depended on their possibilities to fill the demands for education and medical care from the Ethiopian Government.

Once the Ethiopian policy on missions had been defined by law, missionaries again started to arrive in Ethiopia not only from the societies that had been in the country before the war, but also from others. Among the new societies were Norsk Luthersk Misjonssamband (1948), and Den Danske Ethiopier Mission (1951). In 1952 there were eleven Protestant missions working in 12 provinces. All these societies offered education and most of them also medical care.

The Emperor seems to have been in a difficult position between Orthodox leaders and Ethiopians favouring the missions. His duty as Protector of the Orthodox Church as laid down in the constitution obliged him to protect the

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"FO 371, vol. 41485, passim.
"Oral information given by Gustav Arén 6.4 1976, based on his interview with Amanuel Abraham from 1971.
"The Ethiopian Herald 22.10 1945.
Orthodox interests. But Haile Selassie was personally positive to use the missions in his development programme and he was realistic enough to realize that too restrictive a policy towards the missionary societies might question his willingness to support religious freedom. He might then also lose their medical and educational resources. But on the other hand, the fact that he let Mekonnen Desta be one of the architects of the Decree and that Amanuel Abraham, who was an Evangelical Christian, was forced to resign his position, is an indication of his basic support for strong Government control over the missionaries. An analysis of how the new policy towards the missions affected the Swedish missionary societies will be given in Chapter V:2.1.

4.2 The supremacy of the British in the Ethiopian administration, 1942-44

As we have seen in Chapter II:4, Haile Selassie's need for assistance from abroad to reconstruct Ethiopia was recognized in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942. On the Emperor's request Britain supplied ten Principal Advisers and one Commissioner of Police to serve under the directorship of the Ethiopian Ministers concerned, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Foreign Office memorandum of 20 January 1942. The present chapter contains a survey of the British advisers in order to investigate British influence during this period and to reveal the foreign contacts made by the Emperor in other directions.

The question of how many British subjects were in Ethiopian service during the existence of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 was raised in the House of Commons in October 1944. From January 1942 to October 1944, a total of 30 British subjects had served as advisers in the Ministries of the Interior, Finance, Justice, Public Works, Commerce and Industry, Education, Communications, Customs, and Post and Telegraph, and as judges and police officers. The initial contract period was for two years. The adviser on Communications died during his term of service while the adviser to the Minister of Post and Telegraph resigned owing to illness. Neither of these advisers was replaced. Four other advisers resigned for various reasons before the expiry of their contracts, while eight had left Ethiopia on the expiry of their contracts. Advisers in the Ministries of the Interior, Finance, Commerce and Industry, a judge in the High Court and a number of police officers had renewed their contracts after two years. Others still had varying periods of their contracts to fulfill. The British Military Mission which the British Government provided at their own expense, comprised a comparatively large number of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry &amp; Department</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>J.H. Spencer</td>
<td>American</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>D.A. Sandford</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1941-44</td>
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<td>Dept of Public Health</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>G. Campbell</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>1943-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Dept</td>
<td>Commissioner of Police</td>
<td>P. Cullock</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1942-44</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Adviser of Police</td>
<td>P.N. Banks</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1944-</td>
</tr>
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<td>F.E. Stafford</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1942-44</td>
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<td>Ass Adviser</td>
<td>J. James</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ass Adviser</td>
<td>E.C.G. Fuller</td>
<td>British</td>
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<td>Adviser</td>
<td>C. Mathew</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1942-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ass Adviser</td>
<td>E. Law</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Court</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>H.C. Willan</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1942-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>P. Russell</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1943-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>A.N. Thavenot</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1944-46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>A.D. Bethell</td>
<td>British</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Customs</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>C.T. Underhill</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1945-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>E. H. Hussey</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1942-44</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Adviser</td>
<td>J. Hambrook</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>1945-</td>
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<td>British</td>
<td>1942-43</td>
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<td>Ministry of War</td>
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<td>Major-Gen.  A.E. Cottam</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1942-50</td>
</tr>
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<td>State Bank</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>C.S. Colliers</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>1941-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>G. Blowers</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>1943-</td>
</tr>
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Source: FO 371; NA, Decimal File 1940-44.

British officers and other ranks. In addition to these categories there were also provincial advisers in Harer, Jimma and Desse and British assistance was also used in the police force. Foreign advisers in the Ethiopian administration are surveyed in Table 6.

The influence of the British in the Ethiopian administration must have been considerable, particularly during the period 1942-44 when the British held key positions in most ministries. The Emperor was, moreover, bound by the Agreement of 1942 to consult with the British authorities before employing...

"Hansard, House of Commons 25.10 1944.
foreign advisers additional to the British. There is no doubt that they exercised a far-reaching control.

The co-operation between the advisers and their respective Ministers was not without friction. In June 1943 a series of major clashes between the advisers and their Ministers culminated. The advisers threatened to resign en bloc unless the Emperor and the British Government intervened to improve their conditions. The advisers felt that their advice was being ignored by the Ethiopian authorities. According to G. MacKereth at the Egyptian Department of the British Foreign Office, the difficulties were mainly because six of the first ten advisers had been seconded from the Colonial Service a fact making them most unsuitable for posts as advisers. They were unable to accept the Ethiopian mentality, and tended to administrate Ethiopia as if it were a British colony. Five of the first advisers had been selected by P. Mitchell, who favoured a strong British control of Ethiopia. From the start MacKereth had urged that Colonial servants should not be selected."

In December 1944, having just started a new contract period, A.D. Bethell, Commercial adviser, resigned owing to lack of confidence between himself and his Minister.\(^\text{1}\) In some cases, however, the co-operation between the Ethiopian Minister and his adviser went smoothly, as for example in the case of Mr C.T. Underhill, Customs adviser from 1943. He seems to have been on the best of terms with the Ethiopian authorities, because his contract was renewed both in 1945 and in 1948, at the later date for a period of four years.\(^\text{2}\)

The disagreements between the Ethiopian authorities and the advisers seem to have been largely on the economic policy of the country. When the advisers threatened to resign en bloc in 1943, MacKereth gave as his opinion that Britain would not supply any more advisers to the Emperor, but leave him to find men, as in the past, from the smaller countries and/or ask the Americans for help. He found that there might well be some advantages in having non-British advisers.\(^\text{3}\)

According to American diplomatic reports the Ethiopians were anxious to get rid of the British advisers provided under the Agreement of 1942.\(^\text{4}\) The Emperor’s feeling of embarrassment because of the high British representation

\(^{1}\) British Advisers to the Ethiopian Government, particularly Minutes signed by G. MacKereth 22.6 1943 and MacKereth to Mr Law, same date. His views supported by Riche in minutes written for Secretary of State 25.6 1943, FO 371, vol. 35638, J 2679.


\(^{5}\) Memorandum of conversation between J. Shaw and Mr Villard and Mr Lewis in Washington 2.9 1943, NA, Decimal file 1940–44, 884.00/548, Shaw had just returned to the US from a visit of several weeks in Ethiopia.
in his administration is further indicated by the fact that he, at least from the
beginning of 1943, took actions to diminish his dependence upon British
advisers. Secret enquiries about advisers and experts were conveyed to
American and to Swedish authorities. The possibility of having a household
physician, who could serve also as adviser had, for example, been conveyed
first to American and later to Swedish authorities in 1943. "The furnishing of
a medical officer preferably with a military background, who could serve both
as the Emperor's household physician and as his adviser and perhaps head a
medical mission, was considered by American authorities, not only as an
important contribution to Ethiopia but also advantageous to the United
States." However, it was difficult to recruit a qualified candidate for the
position unless also the directorship of Public Health was included in his
duties." After some hesitation the Ethiopian authorities agreed." Finally, in
September, Dr Guy Campbell was employed as personal physician to the
Emperor and Director of Public Health." Throughout 1943 and 1944 the
Emperor tended to turn to the United States for assistance within various
fields. In June 1943, Ato Yilma Deressa, vice Minister of Finance of Ethiopia,
who was then in the United States, in a formal communication dated 24 June
1943 asked for technical, agricultural, medical and minerals missions to be sent
to Ethiopia. American experts and technicians were also requested on a large
scale, among them 100 teachers, 25 doctors, 25 nurses, 8 agricultural experts,
60 technicians, 6 telephone experts etc., in all 365 persons. Another 54
individuals to train Ethiopia's youth in the trade school at Addis Abeba were
required, including 12 blacksmiths, 15 carpenters, 15 masons, 6 plumbers and
6 shoemakers."

E. Talbot Smith to Secretary of State, Asmera 18.2 1943. Enclosure No. 3 Report of statement
made by HIM Haile Selassie, on ... 11.2 1943, to General Maxwell, Col. E.N. Clark and E.T. Smith,
NA, Decimal file 1940-44. The enquiries to Sweden will be dealt with in Ch. V:1.

Memorandum of conversation between R.L. Maxwell and C.M. Ravndal, Washington 17.3

Telegram C. Hull to the Minister in Ethiopia, Washington 8.10 1943, NA, Decimal file
1940-44, 884.001 Selassie/390. Also printed in Foreign Relations of the US 1943, pp. 113-114.

J. K. Caldwell to Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 12.4 1944 with enclosure Copy of note from
Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 10.4 1944, NA, Decimal file 1940-44, 884.001
Selassie/410.

Memorandum of conversation (telephone) between Mr Tesemma and Mr Timberlake,
Washington 22.9 1944, NA, Decimal file 1940-44, 884.01A/9-2244.

Yilma Deressa to Secretary of State 24.6 1943, NA, Decimal file 1940-44, 884.24/119.

In Foreign Relations of the US 1943 p. 101 note 25 it is stated that this memorandum is missing in
the Department files. This note might be due to the fact that the date for the memorandum
referred to in the printed document is given as June 25 (Yilma Deressa to Secretary of State,
Washington 12.7 1943), instead of June 24. It is, however, beyond doubt that the memorandum
quoted here is the one referred to by Ato Yilma on July 12. The memorandum is also stated as
missing in note 52 on p. 122. Yilma Deressa b. 1907, Oromo from Wollaga. Educated in Great
Britain as economist. Major posts: Minister of Finance 1941-49, Minister of Commerce 1949-53,
Ambassador to Washington 1953-58, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1958-60 and Minister of Finance
The Emperor also wanted to employ an American legal adviser to assist him to draft a new Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement to replace that of 1942. These requests were reiterated by Ato Yilma in an aide mémoire left with President Roosevelt on 13 July 1943. The previous day Ato Yilma had applied for a loan of 50 million US dollars to develop Ethiopia's resources. Both the request for a loan and for advisers and experts were treated favourably by the American authorities. In connection with the economic issues, which were given to the Treasury and the Import-Export Bank for consideration, Ato Yilma appointed the American George Blowers as Governor of the State Bank of Ethiopia. In August 1943 Mr John H. Spencer, who had been in the Emperor's service in the 1930s, was appointed legal adviser to the Ethiopian Government.

When Blowers and Spencer arrived in Addis Ababa they found that the British had not been informed about their employment, a fact which caused embarrassment both to the newly arrived Americans and to the British. Mr C.S. Colliers, a Canadian with British citizenship, who held the position as Governor of the State Bank, had not even been informed about his being replaced. Instead of becoming legal adviser Spencer was appointed Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ato Yilma's failure to keep his promise to the American authorities to notify the British about the employment of the Americans, caused complaints and an oral protest to the Ethiopian Minister in Washington. The motivation was that the Ethiopians, according to the Agreement of 1942, were obliged to consult the British before employing advisers of other nationalities.

"Memorandum of Conversation between Yilma Deressa and Mr Lewis, Washington 29.6 1943, NA, Decimal file 1940-44, 884.01A/41-1/2.

"The Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance (Yilma Deressa) to President Roosevelt, Aide-Mémoire, Foreign Relations of the US 1943, pp. 103–106, 884.00/7-1443.

"The Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance (Yilma Deressa) to the Secretary of State, Washington 12.7 1943, Foreign Relations, pp. 101–103, 884.51/66.

"The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, Washington 2.8 1943, Foreign Relations, pp. 106–108, 884.014/7-2043.

"The Secretary of State to the President of the Export-Import Bank (Pierson), Washington, 4.8 1943, Foreign Relations, p. 109, 884.51/66; Memorandum of Conversation by Mr Charles W. Lewis of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington 5.8 1943, Foreign Relations, p. 110, 884.51/8-543; The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), Washington 6.8 1943, p. 111, 884.51/71.


The Ethiopian reluctance to notify the British about the arrival of the American advisers might be interpreted as a combination of a desire to present a *fait accompli* to the British in order to avoid a possible veto against the employments, and a desire to demonstrate their independence with regard to the British. The American authorities seem to have been willing to contribute to the development of Ethiopia, but only to such an extent that they did not disturb their own relations with the British.

In May and June 1944 several British advisers left Ethiopia upon the termination of their contracts. Only the President of the High Court and the Commissioner of Police were replaced by British subjects." It is fairly clear that the Emperor was trying to replace the British advisers by advisers of other nationalities, particularly after the Agreement of 1942 had been renounced by Ethiopia in May 1944. When Mr Bethell resigned his reason was that the Minister of Commerce had tended to lean more heavily upon Mr Spencer and Mr Blowers than on himself." In fact the Emperor during an audience in October 1944, had spoken of his desire for an American Commercial Adviser and an increase in the participation of American firms in Ethiopian commerce."

In March 1945, the British Foreign Office, having received reports about increasing American influence in Ethiopia, asked for information on all foreign advisers in Ethiopian service." The British Legation reported that in August 1945 there were only two British advisers remaining in Ethiopian service, namely to the Ministry of Commerce and to the Ministry of the Interior. There were also two American advisers – to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Ministry of Education. Moreover, the Governor of the State Bank and the Directors General of Medical Services and Radio Communications were Americans (Table 6). There were, however, still three British judges, four police officers and some other British people holding influential positions in Ethiopia." Thus, by 1945 British supremacy within the Ethiopian administration had been lost and was being replaced by increasing American representation.

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* J.K. Caldwell to Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 21.6 1944, NA, Decimal file 1940-44, 884.01 A/6-2144.
* J. K. Caldwell to Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 17.10 1944, enclosure Memorandum of Audience with Emperor 12.10 1944, participants: J.K. Caldwell and Hickman Price Jr, NA, Decimal file 1940-44, 884.001 Selassie Haile/10-1744.
4. 3 Ethiopian policy towards foreign immigration, 1941–1944

In 1941 there were about 70,000 Italian prisoners of war and 60,000 Italian civilians in Ethiopia. The British wanted to remove the Italians, while the Emperor and his ministers wanted at least some of them to stay, because of the great need for technicians of all kinds. The Italians were required to service and run the transport vehicles, to help in the hospitals and to perform many other services which no other Europeans were likely to do and for which there were no trained Ethiopians. A large number of Italians therefore remained in Ethiopia.

Many of the foreigners residing in Ethiopia in 1935 had left Ethiopia due to the war and the Italian occupation. When for example Indian merchants wanted to return after the liberation, they found that the policy was to restrict the entry of all non-Ethiopian businessmen irrespective of nationality. The import and export trade of Ethiopia was greatly restricted for the duration of the war.

In 1943 the Ethiopian Government issued regulations restricting the immigration of foreigners into Ethiopia. The control of immigration was seen by British authorities as the unquestionable determination of the Ethiopian administration to severely limit the entry of petty traders, shopkeepers and hawkers into the country. The regulations particularly affected those Indian merchants who had left Ethiopia because of the Italian invasion and now wanted to return after the liberation. The Indian Government accordingly petitioned for special treatment of Indian merchants who had owned well-established business in Ethiopia prior to 1935.

In April 1944 Haile Selassie proclaimed that registration should be compulsory as from Meskerem 1st 1937 E.C. (i.e. 12 September 1944 G.C.) of all foreigners above the age of 16 years. Every foreigner should within 30 days of the publication of this Proclamation or within 30 days of his arrival into Ethiopia or within 30 days of his attaining the age of 16 years report in person to the Registrar and complete a Foreigner’s registration form. In view of impressions reported by the American representative of the Middle East Supply Center and by representatives of the British Foreign Office and the Government of India, the proclamation on the registration of foreigners must be seen as an effort by the Ethiopian Government to establish control of foreign immigration into Ethiopia, particularly of Indian and Arab traders.

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111 Negarit Gazeta 1944:8, Proclamation No. 57 of 1944, 29.4 1944. A Proclamation to provide for the registration of foreigners.
5. Foreigners in Ethiopia, 1944–1949

We have seen how the Ethiopian Government was anxious to attract highly qualified advisers and experts to take part in the reconstruction of Ethiopia. It had, however, placed restrictions on foreign businessmen. Did the foreign community in Ethiopia comprise the same national groupings in the 1940s as in 1935 and did the foreigners have the same occupational activities?

5.1 Comments on the sources

The registration of foreigners took place at the Immigration Office in Addis Abeba, where also the residence permits were granted. The 'Records of residence permits' (RP) which do not appear to have been used earlier for historical research, are written in Amharinya, covering the period Meskerem 1, 1937–Tahasas 22, 1942 E.C., i.e. 12 September 1944 – 31 December 1949 G.C. However, despite many efforts it has not been possible to trace the records for the years 1950–1952. It must, therefore, be assumed that they have either disappeared or they have been so damaged that they cannot be identified. Research into the legal immigration of foreigners to Ethiopia thus has to be limited to the period 1944–1949. The Records are kept in the Archives of the Immigration Office in Addis Abeba. They consist of one bound volume, each page containing information about some 60 individuals. The following data have been taken from the Amharic original: date of registration, serial number of identity card, name (for Swedes only), origin, nationality, sex, occupation and size of family. Each person with an identity card, as the evidence that a residence permit had been granted, will hereinafter be designated as the 'head person'. Since the identity cards have been registered in numerical order it is possible to trace gaps, if any. Due to some pages being partly damaged, 449 (7 %) out of a total of 6 433 registered persons are missing in the records. The damage is such that half a page has occasionally been torn into pieces, the bottoms of some pages being destroyed and some persons thus being unidentifiable, etc. The gaps do not seem to be systematic, however. Of the remaining 5 984 persons the information is very incomplete concerning 128 (2 %) persons, with only the names given. None of these persons bears a Swedish name. The remaining 5 856 individuals can be investigated more or less in detail.

The size of family for the head persons is given only for the years 1944–1947 and includes a total of 2 729 persons (1 566 males and 1 163 females). The family members, however, constitute a problematic group, since only their number by sex is given. We therefore do not know whether only children were included or whether also husbands, wives, sisters and brothers etc. of the head
persons were counted. There is a comparatively large group of female head persons, whose occupation is given as 'family'. It is possible that wives were granted their own residence permits when they entered Ethiopia separately from their husbands. Since we can be sure neither of how accurately family members were reported nor which persons were included in the 'family', we will consequently concentrate on the head persons.

Probably due to the fact that during the 1940s there were still many European colonies in Asia and Africa, both origin and nationality are given for certain foreign residents, for example India/British, Armenia/French, Egypt/British. In all cases where origin and nationality differ, the origin has been counted, since it has been considered as more interesting to the present study to investigate the origins of the foreigners than the kind of passport they held.

Essential questions in this context are whether all foreigners were recorded on the basis of residence permits, whether there were any omissions, and if so, can they be estimated? The existence of a contemporary Swedish primary source, the Nationality Roll (NR), (Nationalitetsmatrikeln), kept at the Swedish Embassy in Addis Abeba, enables us to test the reliability of the Records of residence permits for the Swedes. All Swedes entering Ethiopia in other capacities than as tourists had to be registered on the Nationality Roll. Presumably, as with the Ethiopian records, this source has not been used earlier for historical research. The Roll in Addis Abeba consists of three handwritten volumes covering the period 1946–1960. It was started when the Swedish Legation first opened in Addis Abeba in early 1946. The first individual was registered on 24 March 1946. Information about Swedes already resident in Ethiopia was collected afterwards. The Roll is arranged familywise, each family or single person being given a Roll number. Family members arriving later and newly-born children were registered under the same number.

The Roll contains the following information: Roll number, date of registration, full name, profession, date and place of birth, civil status, date of departure from Sweden, last place of residence in Sweden and place of

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Sweden got a new Nationality Act in 1925. Nationality Rolls had to be kept by the Swedish Legations abroad concerning all Swedes residing in the respective country (FBK 1928 62 mom h). The ordinance was repealed in 1967 (SFS 1967:82).

That the persons already resident were registered afterwards has been confirmed by Gunnar Jarring, who was the first Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Addis Abeba and who started the Nationality Roll. Personal communication from Gunnar Jarring 13.9 1974. It is also indicated by the fact that at least the first 100 'numbers' left Sweden during the last part of 1945 or during the first three months of 1946, but got registered in the Roll much later. Sigurd Stark, the late Director of the Swedish Mission BV in Harer, reported to the Legation in Addis Abeba in May 1946 concerning the SMBVstaff and other Swedes living in Harer. Personal communication from Sigurd Stark 4.5 1972.
residence in Ethiopia. The information in the Roll is drawn from passports and certificates of change of address (flyttningsbetyg). The documents shown are noted in the column for remarks and so are marriages which had taken place in Ethiopia. The date of departure from the country was sometimes registered, but generally the only remark was 'returned home'. The Nationality Roll thus contains very complete information about the Swedes in Ethiopia. Since the registration of foreigners in Ethiopia by the Immigration Office as well as the registration of Swedes by the Swedish Legation was stated by law, the two sources presented are assumed to be reliable. However, we still do not know whether all Swedes really got registered on the Nationality Roll or whether there were omissions. A critical comparison of the registration of Swedes in the two sources will be presented person by person in part 5.4 of this chapter.

5.2 Ethiopian registration of foreigners

The total number of foreigners who obtained residence permits in Ethiopia 1944–1949 is listed by national groupings in Table 7.

Altogether 5 984 foreigners were registered as residents in Ethiopia during this period. As in 1935, the majority of the foreigners were of Asian or Near Eastern origin (3 374 or 56%), the Arabs being the largest foreign group (2 271 or 38%). In 1935 the Arabs numbered about 4 000 (27%). In the 1940s most Arabs originated from Yemen (1 809 or 80%), which is a pronounced increase in comparison with 1935, when they constituted about 18% of the Arab group. The Europeans amounted to 2 014 (34%) among whom the Greeks predominated (17%). In fact, the Greeks constituted the second largest foreign group, followed by Indians and Armenians (ca 8% each). Thus the relative order between the four largest foreign groups was the same for this period as

### Table 7. Residence permits granted to foreigners 1944–1949 G.C. Head persons by national groupings and sex given in absolute numbers and in percentage of total number of permits granted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>2 271</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arme-India</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspec.</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 295</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 2. Foreigners in Ethiopia in 1935 compared with foreigners who obtained residence permits during 1944–1949, by origin in percent of the total foreign population for the respective period.

(Source: Zervos (1936); Ethiopian Records of residence permits 1944–1949, IO.)
in 1935 (see Table 7). It is, however, worth noting that in the period 1944–1949 the Swedes constituted the fifth largest national group (5%), closely followed by Americans (4%), which was an increase for both groups in comparison with the situation before the war. See also Fig. 2.

Although the relative order between the four largest groups was the same in the 1940s as it had been in 1935, it should be emphasized that all four groups had decreased considerably in absolute numbers. Indians and Armenians represented the largest decrease from 21% to 8% and from 19% to 8% respectively. The decrease for the Indians might be a result of a deliberate Ethiopian policy to restrict the immigration of Indian merchants mentioned above. On the other hand, the Arabs had increased their relative strength by 12%, which seems to be mainly a result of increased immigration of Yemenite businessmen. The British, the Swedes and the Americans had also increased their relative strength from less than 1% in 1935 to 4–5% during the period 1944–1949. Although the figures from 1935 might not be quite comparable with the figures from the 1940s, which are based on primary sources which could be checked for reliability it is obvious that people from Western Europe and the United States constituted a more significant group in the 1940s than in 1935. It is also worth mentioning that the relative strength of the Greeks had decreased from 21% in 1935 to 17% in the 1940s. Only very few Italians obtained residence permits during the period 1944–1949, whereas there were quite a substantial number of Italians in Ethiopia in 1941.

The distribution by sex within the foreign groups is given in Table 7. The overwhelming majority of the persons who obtained residence permits 1944–1949 were men. The distribution between the sexes, however, differed very much between the foreign groups. Thus the Arab group only contained 24 (1%) women, while the Armenians included 187 (40%) women and the Indians 127 (26%). Among the Europeans and Americans we find a more even distribution between the sexes. But here the proportions also differed between the national groupings. The Swedes had the highest proportion of women 148 (52%). The Americans came next with 110 or 40% women. The Greeks had the lowest proportion of women, 380 or 37%.

5.3 Ethiopian registration of foreigners by occupational main groups and origin

The occupation is given for 5 127 foreigners (88%), leaving 729 persons (12%) with unknown profession. The omissions vary both between the years and between foreign groups because the occupation has been omitted from the Records of residence permits in a number of consecutive pages for the years 1944, 1948 and 1949. This yields a particularly large group of unknown
profession for these years (19 %, 17 % and 25 % respectively). For the other years the omissions are more moderate (1945 – 3 %, 1946 – 7 %, and 1947 – 8 %). The size of the group with unknown occupation has been calculated for each foreign group.

The lowest number of omissions, less than 10 %, is found among Arabs (6%) and Swedes (9%). The highest proportion of persons with occupation not given is found among the Armenians (22%). Among the Europeans the omissions are generally between 15 % and 20 %. They do not, however, seem to be systematic. Despite these substantial omissions the figures permit a rather thorough discussion of the occupational structure. The conclusions, however, have to be kept rather modest.

The occupational structure of the foreign residents is surveyed in Fig. 3. Asians predominated within Trade and Communications, while North Americans, Africans, Australians and Europeans were mainly occupied within the Administration and Public works. Roughly 10 % from each continent were occupied within Industry and Handicraft (including all technical positions). Domestic work, including a large group of housewives without employment, constituted a substantial group particularly among the Europeans. Among the Asians the domestic group contained a large number of servants who in many cases probably combined work as shop assistants with household tasks. Only a very small group (1–2%) was occupied in agriculture, mainly as commercial farmers.

The occupational structure differed between the respective nationalities. Arabs working as businessmen constituted the largest single occupational group (73%). Arab men also to a certain extent worked as drivers and servants (generally as shop assistants), but only a minor group served in administration (4%). Armenians and Indians had a more diversified occupational structure. A large group was active in Trade and Communications (36 % and 24 % respectively). Quite a significant proportion of these two groupings were domestic workers (31 % and 37 % respectively), and skilled artisans (13 % and 20 % respectively).

The Greeks worked within Trade and Communications (25%) and Industry and Handicraft (19%) at a larger extent than other European nationalities.

When classifying the occupations the same principle has been followed as in the Swedish population census of 1940. The occupations have been divided into the following groups: 1. Agriculture 2. Industry & Handicraft with the following subgroups: Building, Barber, Foodstuff, Leather, Metal, Technical, Textile and Unspecified 3. Trade & Communications with the following subgroups: Commodity, Hotel & bar, Driver, Porter, Air traffic, Misc. 4. Administration: Civil servant, Education, Health, Mission, Military, Police, Secretary, Student, Misc. 5. Domestic work: Family, Servant, Misc. 6. Not given 7. Students have been placed into a special category, because this group contains children above the age of 16 still at school, as well as professionally active adults.
Fig. 3. Residence permits 1944–1949. Head persons by occupational main groups and by origins in percent of the respective foreign group.

(Source: Ethiopian Records of residence permits 1944–1949, IO.)
Their occupational pattern was more similar to that of Armenians and Indians than to Europeans. Like these groups they had a high proportion of housewives without employment while also having a low proportion of employed women. There were fewer Greeks employed in the Ethiopian administration (23%) than Europeans in general. The British, Russians and Swedes had the highest proportion employed within Administration (60%, 58% and 54% respectively). The Swedes were represented in the Industry and Handicraft group (12%), mainly as technicians. The French and Swiss had a somewhat lower proportion within the Administration (41% and 36% respectively) and a somewhat higher rate in Trade and Communications (21% and 18% respectively) than other Europeans.

People from North America were almost exclusively employed in the Ethiopian administration (77% and 67% respectively for Americans and Canadians). The proportions of Sudanese and Egyptians in Administration were also high (65% and 54% respectively).

Fig. 3 illustrates that Administration and Trade and Communications had the greatest variations between different national groups. The higher proportion of individuals were employed in Administration while the lower proportion were active in Trade and Communications. The Americans and the Arabs can serve as examples of two foreign groups with completely different occupational structure. The Americans thus had 9% active in Trade & Communications and no less than 77% working in Administration, while the Arabs had 73% working with Trade and Communications and only 4% in Administration. It seems as if those national groups which took part in the economic life of Ethiopia as businessmen and artisans came to stay for a longer period, perhaps to settle there for good, while Western Europeans and people from North America, came to work in the Ethiopian administration for a limited period on a contract basis. The Swedes fit well into the latter category with a high proportion active in Administration and in Technical services.

In order to investigate the influence of foreigners in the Ethiopian society in the 1940s the occupational group 'Administration', including education, health, Christian mission, civil servants, has been broken down into subgroups as presented in Fig. 4. The question now to be examined is whether any particular group of occupations predominated among positions held by foreigners or whether there were differences between nationalities regarding fields of activity also within the Administration.

Education was the largest subgroup (30%), while Christian missionary activity, and Health were about equal, including administrative staff which amounted to 17% and 16% respectively. It should, however, be kept in mind that the Health and Education groups most probably included some missionaries, in the same way as missionary staff were probably found among teachers and health staff. The occupational structure differed between the
Fig. 4. Head persons employed in administration by occupational main groups and origins in percent of total employed in administration within each foreign group. Only foreign groups with more than 30 persons employed in administration included.

(Source: Ethiopian Records of residence permits 1944-1949, IO.)

nationalities (Fig. 4). Thus Canadians, French, Egyptians and Indians were mainly employed as teachers (60%, 52% and 48% respectively), while Russians and Swedes were mainly employed as medical staff (78% and 44% respectively). The Swedes supplied the largest group of medical staff. Arabs, Greeks, Indians and Armenians included a rather high proportion of clerks. Missionaries were mainly found among the Americans, Canadians and the British (34%, 31% and 30% respectively). Military and police staff were supplied only by Sweden and Great Britain. The figure given for British officers (2 persons) is, however, most probably too low, because the number of British officers in Ethiopia in 1946 was reported to be around 70.\textsuperscript{106} It is possible that some foreign officers were not registered as residents. This inference is supported by the fact that some Swedish officers, among them the head of the Swedish Military Mission General Viking Tamm, have not been identified in the Records of residence permits (see below Chapters III:5. 4 and V:4).

\textsuperscript{106} V. Tamm to G. Heuman and A. Thorburn, Addis Ababa 6.1 1946, KrA, VT, vol. 4.
From 1946 a major portion of the Americans came to work for the American company Sinclair Oil, which had obtained concessions to prospect for oil in Ethiopia, and for Ethiopian Airlines.

Because of the omissions in the source material, we cannot reach any detailed conclusions regarding the influence of foreigners in the Ethiopian administration. It can, however, be concluded that many nationalities, particularly small states, were represented and that there tended to be a certain specialization among the nationalities regarding professional activities. The Swedes seem to have constituted a substantial foreign group, which was well represented within different branches of the Ethiopian administration, particularly within Health and Education. A detailed study of the Swedes will be presented in Chapter V.

5.4 The registration of Swedes in Ethiopia by year, sex and main occupational groupings 1944–1949

Did all foreigners entering Ethiopia in capacities other than as tourists really get registered in the Ethiopian Records of residence permits (RP)? The Swedes offer the possibility of crosschecking the registration of residence permits, by comparing the Nationality Roll (NR) kept at the Swedish Legation in Addis Abeba with the Ethiopian Records of residence permits (RP).

Fig. 5 is intended to provide a survey of Swedish residents in Ethiopia 1944–1949 as given for each year in the two sources. The Nationality Roll has registered a total of 378 Swedes (180 men and 198 women) for the years 1944–1949, while the Records of residence permits has only registered 286 Swedes (138 men and 148 women) for the same period, a difference of 92 persons or 24%. Both sources have registered more women than men and they give exactly the same proportions between the sexes (52% women), which indicates that neither of the sexes has been systematically underregistered by the Ethiopian authorities. Did the registration differ between the two sources over a period of time? This can be studied in the year distribution given in Fig. 5. It can then be noted that there is a pronounced difference between the figures given for each year both in number and regarding over- and underregistration.¹⁰ The Nationality Roll has a higher number than the Records for residence permits for both sexes, not only for the whole period but also for the individual years 1944, 1945, 1946, and 1948. The RP, however, give a larger number than the Nationality Roll for both sexes in 1947 and 1949. The difference is most pronounced between the sources for 1946 (92 persons), i.e.

¹⁰ The difference between the sources has been calculated by taking the figure given in the NR minus the figure given in the RP.
Fig. 5. Registration of Swedes in Ethiopia 1944–1949. A comparison between the Swedish Nationality Roll and the Ethiopian Records of residence permits.

(Source: Swedish Nationality Roll 1946–1949, SE; Ethiopian Records of residence permits 1944–1949, IO.)
the year when the largest number of Swedes arrived in Ethiopia. As mentioned earlier, there were some defects in the Records of residence permits. The question then arises whether this affects the number of Swedes registered. An examination indicates that the discrepancies in RP are largest for the years 1944, 1945 and 1949, i.e. those years when only few Swedes arrived in Ethiopia, while for the years when the greatest number of Swedes arrived i.e. 1946 and 1948 there are no discrepancies and for 1947 there is only a minor one of 16 individuals. Thus the omissions due to the damaged Ethiopian records can be eliminated as an explanation of the underregistration of Swedes in this source. The difference in the registration between the years indicates instead that there was a time-lag in the Ethiopian registration. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the number of Swedes receiving residence permits in Ethiopia in 1947 was greater than the number of Swedes who were registered in the Nationality Roll as having left Sweden during that year. The same phenomenon can be noted for 1949. It is therefore possible that the number of foreigners who were never registered in the Ethiopian records was smaller than is indicated by Fig. 5.

The Nationality Roll seems to have provided a more detailed registration of occupations than the Ethiopian records. The group 'not given' is namely smaller in the Nationality Roll (3 persons or 1%) than in the Records of residence permits (39 persons or 14%). The largest difference between the two sources regarding the main occupational groupings is found within the group 'Domestic work' (51 persons or 43%) and 'Administration' (58 persons or 29%). The 'Domestic work' group includes a large number of housewives without employment. The registration of housewives was probably not taken seriously by Ethiopian authorities. The Swedish housewives have not been registered as 'family members' in the Records of residence permits, because only three female family members have been registered for the period 1944–1947. By taking into account Swedes who have been registered in the Swedish Nationality Roll but not in the Ethiopian Records of residence permits, it is possible to determine whether or not any particular groups have been systematically omitted from the Ethiopian registration of Swedes.

Table 8 is the result of an investigation made on a name comparison between those Swedes who had been registered both in the Ethiopian Records of residence permits and in the Swedish Nationality Roll and those Swedes who had been registered in the NR but not in the RP. The investigation, which has been made according to main occupational groupings, is given in absolute numbers. Those registered in the Nationality Roll but not in the Records of residence permits are also indicated as a percentage of the total of each occupational group. We then find that the underregistration in the Ethiopian source is particularly pronounced for the groups 'Military and Police', 'Christian Mission' and 'Domestic Work' (45%, 37% and 29% respectively).
Table 8. Comparison between the registration of Swedes in the Ethiopian Records of residence permits (RP) and in the Swedish Nationality Roll (NR) in absolute numbers, and the difference given in percent of total, by occupational main groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In RP</th>
<th>In NR</th>
<th>In NR but not in RP</th>
<th>Difference in percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Handicraft</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade &amp; Communications</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>(139)</td>
<td>(198)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Police</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Mission</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ethiopian Records of residence permits, 1944–1949 G.C., IO; Swedish Nationality Roll, SE.

The explanation might be that the Ethiopian authorities were reluctant to register all Swedish Military and Police officers in order not to embarrass the British who had, as we have already seen, a Military Mission in Ethiopia and certain other military interests in the country even after the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944. Regarding the missionaries and housewives the explanation might be that their registration was found less urgent by the Ethiopian authorities.

From what has been demonstrated above, it can be concluded that an underregistration amounting to about 25% can be noted for the Swedes in the Ethiopian Records of residence permits. The underregistration varied between different occupational groups. Research suggests that the numbers of foreigners indicated in the Ethiopian sources can be considered as minimum figures. The information available is, however, sufficient to provide a rough
idea of the number, origin and occupational activities of the foreigners entering Ethiopia during the period 1944–1949, and on the basis of these figures we have been able to study the Swedes and their activities from an international perspective.

6. Summary

In this chapter the presence of foreigners in Ethiopia 1850–1950 has been the subject of investigation in order to place the Swedish involvement in Ethiopia in an international perspective.

There is a long tradition of emigration to Ethiopia among Arabs, Armenians, Indians and Greeks, mainly to work as businessmen and skilled artisans. Ethiopian rulers have employed foreigners both as advisers and as craftsmen and technicians since the middle of the 19th century and perhaps earlier. The foreign community increased during the reign of Minilik II who, after the Ethiopian independence had been secured at the turn of the century, employed a comparatively large number of foreign technicians and advisers in the modernization of the country. The numbers of Armenian, Arab and Greek merchants increased. Next after the Greeks, the French were the largest European group, mainly active within the Franco-Ethiopian railway and as businessmen.

Haile Selassie – first as regent and from 1930 as Emperor – continued and even expanded Minilik’s practice of using foreigners in his administration at the same time that the number of foreign businessmen increased. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church had always been suspicious of foreign missionaries but Haile Selassie realized their value for educational and medical services. He therefore gave economic support to missionary societies of various nationalities, including the two Swedish societies Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission Bibeltroga Vänner, for the establishment of clinics and schools.

Particularly Armenians, Indians, Greeks and Arabs, who dominated the commercial sector, seem to have had considerable economic influence. Haile Selassie made great efforts to balance the different nationalities engaged in his administration. A survey of foreigners holding high positions in the Ethiopian administration indicates that all foreign advisers were of different nationalities, representing small states such as Greece, Sweden and Switzerland as well as Great Britain, France and the United States. The two military missions originated from two small countries, Belgium and Sweden. Thus already in the 1930s Sweden was represented at the top of the Ethiopian administration. The period 1942–1944 has been investigated in some detail in order to shed light upon Ethiopia’s situation during the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942.
This part of the investigation is based on primary sources in the National Archives in Washington and in the Public Records Office in London. As a result of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 the British dominated as advisers during 1942–1944. It is beyond doubt that the Emperor as well as his ministers felt the British dominance as an embarrassment. Some of the British advisers were recruited among colonial officers, who tended to act as if Ethiopia were a British colony. These circumstances encouraged Ethiopian nationalism and caused tensions between British advisers and their respective ministers, sometimes to the effect that the advisers resigned. Already before the Agreement was terminated Haile Selassie entered into secret contacts with the United States in order to obtain advisers, economic funds, experts and various supplies. After August 1944, when the Agreement of 1942 had expired the British advisers were increasingly replaced by Americans.

After the restoration there was a tendency to restrict the work of the missionary societies to the greatest possible extent, without making them lose their interest in Ethiopia. Ethiopian authorities, particularly in 1943, tended to restrict immigration of foreign, primarily Indian merchants, in order to avoid too much foreign economic influence. There can hardly be any doubt that the Decree on Foreign Missions and the Proclamation on Registration of Foreigners, both issued in 1944, represented efforts to control foreign immigration. The Emperor seems to have taken a more positive attitude towards the missionaries than some of his ministers. The missionaries were allowed to evangelize mainly to encourage them to supply educational and medical facilities, while the missionary societies sent more educational and medical staff in order to be allowed to evangelize.

The existence of two primary sources – the Ethiopian Records of Residence Permits and the Swedish Nationality Roll – enable us to investigate the presence of foreigners in Ethiopia 1944–1949. A comparison between the two sources has indicated that the number of foreigners given in the Ethiopian source could be regarded as minimum figures (Fig. 5). The Ethiopian Records, however, permit us to make rather detailed investigations of the number, origin and professional activities of the foreigners, thus placing the Swedes into an international perspective. From 1944 onward a great number of foreigners, particularly Arab businessmen, were registered as residents. From 1945, when the war was over, the number of Europeans and Americans increased. In comparing the total figures of foreigners registered as residents 1944–1949 (Table 7) with figures given for resident foreigners in 1935 (Table 3) it can be noted that Arabs, Greeks, Indians and Armenians were the largest groups both in 1935 and during the period 1944–1949 (Fig. 2.). The Arabs had increased in relative strength, Indians and Armenians had decreased substantially, while the Greeks had decreased to a minor extent. Differences could, however, be noted among the European community between 1935 and 1944–49. While the
French, the Italians and the Germans constituted the largest European groups after the Greeks in 1935, the order for 1944–1949 had changed to Swedish, British and French. Thus after the war the Swedes had taken position as the fifth ranking foreign group. The position of the Americans was stronger after the war than in 1935. The Americans increased in number particularly after 1946 and were the largest group of new residents in 1949.

Although information on professions is incomplete a rough idea of the occupational activities of the foreigners can be given. Both before and after the war two principal groups can be distinguished. The Arabs, Armenians, Indians and Greeks were mainly active as businessmen and skilled artisans, while the Western Europeans, Russians, Canadians, Americans, Africans and Australians were mainly employed in different branches of administration, i.e. health, education or as Christian missionaries (Fig. 4). In 1944–1949 the Swedes were mainly employed in medical services, where they constituted the largest foreign group, and in education. Britain and Sweden were the only countries to supply military personnel during this period. It can thus be concluded that the number of foreigners has successively increased and their economic influence has been considerable during the whole 20th century. Advisers and administrative staff have been recruited from many different countries, often from small countries, most probably in order to avoid domination by any particular country, especially by a Great Power.
In the previous chapter the Swedes in Ethiopia were placed in an international perspective. The present chapter will deal with the question of whether any connection can be traced between the work of the Swedish Protestant missions and Ras Taffari's efforts from 1924 to recruit Swedes for Ethiopian Government service as well as whether expanded Ethio-Swedish relations also included the economic field. A survey will therefore first be given of the work undertaken by Swedish missionaries from the very start i.e. 1865, in order to find out within which professions they were active and for how long they used to stay in the country. We shall also see to what extent and for which purposes Ras Taffari supported the Swedish Christian mission. By examining in more detail the activities of those Swedes working within education i.e. the missionaries and the army officers, an attempt is presented to illuminate possible effects of Swedish work in Ethiopia. Finally an investigation will be made of the measures taken by Sweden when the Italo-Ethiopian war broke out in 1935.

1. Swedish missionaries in Ethiopia 1865–1936

The missionaries were the first Swedish volunteers engaged in humanitarian and development work in Ethiopia. Three religious organizations have worked in Ethiopia with Swedish staff, two entirely Swedish societies, namely Swedish Evangelical Mission (SEM) and Swedish Mission Bibetroga Vänner (SMBV) and one international organization Seventh Day Adventist Mission (SDA).

1.1 Three missionary societies start work in Ethiopia

In the 18th century a pietistic revival started in Europe, resulting in the foundation of several organizations which took an active interest in preaching the Gospel in non-Christian areas outside Europe. Mainly as a result of contacts with British and German pietistic circles an interest in foreign mission awakened also in Sweden in the early 19th century. This interest was
channelled from 1834 through a paper called 'Missions-Tidning'. The following year the most active members of Mission-Tidning's editorial Board, among them the British Methodist pastor George Scott, founded 'Svenska Missionssällskapet'. In 1856 Swedish Evangelical Mission (Evangeliska Fosterlands-Stiftelsen) was founded in Stockholm as a result of a pietistic movement within the Church of Sweden. SEM's followers are mostly found in rural areas of the country, with some concentration in the coastal areas of Northern Sweden and in the northern part of the province of Skåne.

As editor of Mission-Tidning, Carl Olof Rosenius contributed to raising the interest in foreign mission within Swedish Evangelical Mission, who had originally focused their work on evangelization in Sweden. At SEM's annual meeting on 18 June 1861, it was decided to include foreign mission on the program. For the purpose of educating staff for domestic and foreign mission a school called Evangeliska Fosterlands-Stiftelsens Missions-Institut at Johannelund outside Stockholm (Johannelund Theological Institute) was founded on 1 October 1862. The Institute started with 14 students destined for foreign mission. The problem of where to send the missionaries after completion of their education was, however, not solved. Waldemar Rudin, the Director of the Mission Institute contacted various foreign missions regarding the choice of a missionary field. India, West Africa, Latin America and China were considered, but could for various reasons not be accepted. In the middle of 1863 Rudin was advised by Bishop Samuel Gobat to send Swedish missionaries to the non-Christian Oromo peoples in Ethiopia. After many discussions it was finally decided at SEM's annual meeting on 8 June 1865 to send missionaries to East Africa in order to reach the Oromo. East Africa was considered a suitable area, because the Suez canal was about to be opened, offering a direct sea route from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and Eastern Africa, thus making this area one of the nearest missionary and trade points.
for Europe. Because of the unsettled political conditions in Ethiopia the first three missionaries, who disembarked in Massawa on 15 March 1866, found it impossible to proceed towards the Oromo areas. A pioneering work was therefore started in the area which was later called Eritrea. At the price of great sufferings the Swedish missionaries first worked among the Kunama people in the lowland area and later also in the Eritrean highlands, where they founded small schools and primitive clinics. In the Eritrean highlands the Swedes came into contact with Orthodox Christian reformers at Tseazega. Although the goal of the mission was still to reach the Oromo peoples, a secondary goal developed during the years of waiting, namely to take part in the efforts to reform the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The work in Eritrea was, however, regarded only as a station on the way to the Oromo. Serious efforts were made to reach the Oromo areas and no less than six so-called Oromo expeditions were sent in different directions during the period 1877–1904. Pastor Nils Hylander and his wife Edla, both members of the fourth Oromo expedition 1893–1896, were the first Swedes to reach the Oromo and came to Harer in 1895. They were, however, expelled by Minilik for political reasons already in the following year. The first evangelical missionaries to reach the Oromo in Wollaga were not Swedes but Ethiopians who had been in the service of SEM in Eritrea. Wollaga was non-Christian until Orthodox Christianity was introduced as a result of Minilik’s conquest of the area in 1886. Oromo converted through Evangelical mission were baptized in the Orthodox Church and attended service there. In 1904 Karl Cederqvist was the


2 Hylander (1917), pp. 11–77; Saeverás (1974), pp. 17–18; Tafvelin & Lundmark (1974), pp. 73–77. Originally SEM also planned to establish a colonial trade agency in Massawa to prepare for the establishment of trade exchange between Sweden and East Africa. SEM, No. 16, Henrik Wilhelm Ahlborg, b. 1841 d. 1911, Engineer and Trade agent. Sent to Massawa in 1869 i.e. the same year as the Suez Canal was opened. The plans had to be abandoned due to the political unrest in Eritrea and Ahlborg returned to Sweden in 1873, (Tafvelin & Lundmark (1974), pp. 62–63). Where nothing else is stated the number before a missionary refers to SEM.


4 Arén (1977), Ch. 5.2; Hylander (1953), pp. 334–344; Tafvelin & Lundmark (1974), pp. 83–94. See also Hylander (1896), pp. 143–152. SEM, No. 56, Nils Hylander b. 1861 d. 1928, Pastor. In Eritrea 1890–1893. In 1893 married to No. 60, Edla Hedberg b. 1860 d. 1948, Midwife. They were in Lamu, Jubaland (nowadays Somalia) 1894–95 and reached the Oromo in Harer as the first Swedes in 1895. They were expelled by Minilik II in 1896 for political reasons.
first Swede to reach Addis Abeba, and his being there with Emperor Minilik's permission was considered as an important step forward towards SEM's goal to reach the Oromo.

Arén's investigations have shown that those expeditions led by Ethiopians were successful, while those directed by foreign missionaries all failed in the 19th century.\(^{10}\)

Swedish Mission Bibeltroagna Vänner (SMBV), was constituted as an independent missionary society on 17 June 1911 as a result of a conflict within SEM regarding the interpretation of the Bible. SMBV's teachings are still close to SEM, but from an organizational point of view SMBV is closer tied to the Church of Sweden. Like SEM, SMBV is mostly represented in rural areas.\(^{11}\) SMBV has always had most followers in the southernmost parts of Sweden, particularly in the province of Skåne and in neighbouring parts of Småland, Blekinge and Halland.\(^{12}\)

During the years of conflict within SEM, i.e. 1909–1911, some SEM missionaries expressed their sympathy with SMBV's view on the Bible. In 1911 the Board of SMBV in Stockholm called as their first missionaries Karl and Agnes Nyström, who at that time were working for SEM in Eritrea. By the end of 1912 six missionaries in Eritrea had resigned from SEM and agreed to work for SMBV. They founded their own stations in Eritrea in order to avoid conflict with SEM.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) Arén (1977), Ch. 4.3.

\(^{12}\) Andren (1971), pp. 110–111; BV (1961), p. 61; Nyhlén (1964), p. 117. The conflict was driven to its point, when Adolf Kolmodin in 1908 published a booklet called 'Kristendomen och den urkristna församlingens bibel'. Adolf Kolmodin b. 1855 d. 1928, Ph.D., Leading person within SEM's mission as teacher at Johannelund Theological Institute 1879–1903 and as editor of Evangeliska Fosterlandstjänstens Missionstidning 1893–1903. Undertook a journey of inspection to East Africa visiting Eritrea as well as Ethiopia 1908–09 (See Kolmodin (1909), passim). He was during this journey accompanied by his son Johannes Kolmodin (see further Ch. IV:2.3 and IV n. 85). Professor at the University of Uppsala, (B. Sundkler in SBL, vol. 21, pp. 477–479).

\(^{13}\) S. Stark to V. Haldin, Stockholm 5.10 1973, VHN.

In 1906 the Scandinavian Union Conference of the *Seventh Day Adventists* (SDA) decided to start missionary work in Ethiopia. The work in Ethiopia would be sponsored jointly by the Scandinavian countries and financed by so-called first day offerings."

SDA is an international movement organized in union conferences, introduced in Sweden in the 1880s. Adventism is an apocalyptic revivalist movement, which in the 1830s and 1840s developed in USA from Baptism. In Sweden Adventists are a tiny minority mainly to be found in urban areas, particularly in Stockholm and the districts of Västmanland and Örebro. The Adventists practice adult baptism and they celebrate Saturday as the sabbath. Concerned about health issues they offer an extensive health service. They do not use alcohol, coffee or tobacco. They are often vegetarians. Tithes from the members constitute the economic foundation of their work. "Ethiopia was chosen by the Scandinavian adventists because an opening had been made to protestant mission through the work of Swedish Evangelical Mission and because Ethiopia had been recommended by German and British Adventist missionaries in East Africa." In 1907, two Swedes, P.N. Lindegren and Julius Persson, were sent to Eritrea because that was the only possible way to reach the Ethiopian Empire."

It can thus be stated that Swedish Evangelical Mission decided to start missionary work among the non-Christian Oromo peoples by recommendation from persons with experience in that area. Ethiopia was also considered convenient from the view of transport. Seventh Day Adventist Mission and Swedish Mission BV, however, chose Ethiopia and Eritrea as their missionary fields because of SEM’s pioneer work in the area, but for different reasons. SMBV’s mission in Eritrea developed as a result of an internal conflict within SEM, when some missionaries already working in the area resigned from SEM and started as pioneers for their new society. SDA started their work as a result of a combination of SEM’s pioneering and recommendations from SDA missionaries in other parts of East Africa.

"*Missionären*, Vol. 10:13, p. 98. The Scandinavian Union conference was the last union to enter into work in Africa. For more information about SDA’s foreign mission see SDA (1961), passim.


"Ibld., Vol. 13:5, p. 33. SDA, No. 1, P.N. Lindegren b. 1878, Male nurse and teacher. SDA, No. 2, Julius Persson, b. ca 1882, Teacher and farmer. In 1909 they opened the first Adventist mission outside Asmera including a clinic, a school and a small farm."
1. 2 Active periods and main areas of activity of the Swedish missionaries

During the period 1865–1936 a total of 159 Swedish missionaries have worked in Ethiopia including Eritrea. The Swedish Evangelical Mission has sent 131 missionaries (63 men and 68 women), while Swedish Mission BV and the Seventh Day Adventist Mission have sent 25 (10 men and 15 women) and 9 (4 men and 5 women) missionaries respectively to the area.\(^6\) The average age of the missionaries on their arrival in Ethiopia was 29 years for men and 30 years for women among the SEM missionaries and 30 and 32 years respectively for men and women among the SMBV missionaries.\(^6\)

By consulting the records of missionaries kept by the societies it was possible to calculate the number of active years in Ethiopia for each individual. The result of this investigation will, in addition to the discussion in the text, also be demonstrated in a series of 'activity graphs' covering each individual missionary (Appendix 1–2). This part of the investigation will be divided into two sections: a. 1866–1904, when there were only SEM missionaries in the country, their work being almost exclusively located to Eritrea, and b. 1905–1936, when missionaries from SDA and SMBV joined the work, which now also extended into the Oromo areas within the Ethiopian Empire.

**Missionaries from Swedish Evangelical Mission on their way to the Oromo areas 1865–1904**

During this period SEM sent 85 missionaries (50 men and 35 women) to Ethiopia. With the exception of more or less sporadic visits to what at that time was Ethiopian territory, these missionaries worked in Eritrea. Only five persons sent out for the first time during this period spent part of their active period in the Ethiopian Empire.\(^6\) The number of missionaries and the active periods of the individual missionaries varied over the years (Appendix 1 and Table 9).\(^6\) Nothing has, however, been found in the sources that indicates that

\(^6\) Six missionaries (2 men and 4 women) resigned from SEM and joined SMBV, when that organization was constituted as an independent missionary society. Since these persons are counted only once the total for the period comes to 159 and not to 165 as would appear from the sum of the totals. For biographical notes on these persons see n. 13.

\(^7\) Hylander (1917); SEM missionary records; Stark (1972); Jordal (1975).


\(^9\) Each missionary has got a running number given to the left in the graphs in Appendix 1–2. The same number also appears in the respective person's biographical note.
Table 9. *Missionaries sent by SEM to Ethiopia 1865–1904 and their average period of service, by 10-year periods and by sex.*

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<td>No. of mission-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average no.</td>
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*Source: Hylander (1917); SEM, Missionary records.*

the missionaries had any fixed periods of service. It rather seems as though they were supposed to work as long as they possibly could.

The first years of Swedish mission in Ethiopia offer a dramatic picture. No less than eight of the first fifteen missionaries died during the years 1867–1870 (Appendix 1). Most of them died of tropical diseases while two were murdered. Some of the missionaries who arrived during the first decade returned to Sweden, mostly for health reasons, and never went back to Ethiopia. With regard to the missionaries who died in Ethiopia we find that eight died within the first two years of their arrival and another three died within four years (Appendix 1). Only three persons had a long active period of service before they died. However, it does not appear as though the high mortality and health problems discouraged the Board in Stockholm from sending more missionaries. On the contrary, it was necessary to replace the deceased missionaries if the work was to be continued. Although a number still died in service, the mortality decreased in due course (Appendix 1), most probably thanks to improved health services.

The average period of service gradually increased from about 5 years for missionaries sent out during the period 1865–1874 to 20 years for missionaries

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\[\text{Hylander (1917), p. 16. No. 2, P.E. Kjellberg b. 1837 d. 1869, Lay missionary. Arrived in Eritrea in 1866. In Febr. 1869 married to No. 15, Maria Karlsson d. 1869, Primary school teacher see also Ch. VI:1. No. 7, J.F. Elfblad b. 1839 d. 1869, Pastor, medical training in Edinburgh. Arrived in Eritrea in 1868. They were murdered during a journey in Kunama in April 1869.}\]

sent 1895–1904 (Tab. 9). During the three first decades the average period of service was lower for women than for men, while for the period 1895–1904 the average period of service was the same for both sexes. Among the missionaries arriving during the decade 1875–1884 two served more than 40 years. Three missionaries among those arriving during the period 1896–1904 had more than 33 active years in Ethiopia, while no less than 12 persons served between 17 and 32 years (Appendix 1).

During the period 1865–1904 more men than women were sent to Ethiopia. A certain change over time can, however, be noticed regarding the distribution between the sexes (Appendix 1 and Table 9). While the men were in strong predominance during the first decade, the proportion of women gradually increased. During the period 1895–1904 more women than men were for the first time found among the newly arrived missionaries, and from that time forward the female missionaries remained in a majority.

It can thus be concluded that both the number of missionaries and their active periods of service gradually increased toward the end of the 19th century, the increase of female missionaries being particularly pronounced. This tendency can most probably be explained by the decreased mortality among the missionaries and by expanded activities (see below 1.3 and 1.4).

The mission moves towards Oromo areas 1905–1936

The situation for the mission during the period 1905–1936 was affected by the First World War and the Italo-Ethiopian conflict 1935–1936. As we have seen, until 1904 the SEM-missionaries almost exclusively worked in Eritrea due to the political situation. But during the next 30 years the situation changed. The Oromo areas had always been the goal of the SEM mission, but during their long wait they had laid the foundation of an extensive work in Eritrea. When Karl Cederqvist in 1904 reached Addis Abeba this place was considered the new spearhead of the SEM mission.²⁶


Table 10. Placing of missionaries sent to Ethiopia and Eritrea 1905–1936, by region, organization and sex.

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<td>SEM  M F</td>
<td>SMBV' M F</td>
<td>SDA M F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>3 12 3 3 2</td>
<td>1 6 - - -</td>
<td>4 18 3 3 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea/Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>- - - - 6 9 6 8 2 5</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>6 9 6 8 2 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 13 4 7 2</td>
<td>9 20 6 8 2 5</td>
<td>13 33 10 15 4 5</td>
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Six missionaries (2 men and 4 women) had left SEM and joined SMBV (see note 13).

As demonstrated in Table 10, there was a pronounced shift in the placing of the missionaries from Eritrea towards Ethiopia after the First World War. Of a total of 70 Swedish missionaries sent to the area during the whole period 1905–1936, only 32 (46%) were placed in Eritrea during their entire active period (Table 10).

There is, however, a pronounced difference between the periods before and after the First World War. During the period 1905–1918 most missionaries were sent to Eritrea and stayed there during their entire active period. Some of SMBV's missionaries were first placed in Eritrea but later moved to Ethiopia. The period 1919–1936, however, offers another pattern because most missionaries were then sent to Ethiopia and stayed there during their whole active period. SMBV and SDA sent no missionaries at all to Eritrea. SEM kept sending new staff to the area but seven of these missionaries were later transferred to Ethiopia. This changed pattern was due to the altered political conditions in the area. The Italian authorities in Eritrea increasingly tightened their control over the Swedish missions by restricting their work. The Swedes then adopted the strategy of making the indigenous protestant congregations less dependent upon missionaries. In 1926 this strategy resulted in the establishment of an independent Evangelical Church in Eritrea. At the same time the Swedish missionaries were welcomed into the Ethiopian Empire as a result of Ras Taffari's positive attitude towards the mission. A period of
internal struggle for power, which had followed Minilik’s death, ended in 1921 when Ras Taffari finally defeated Lij Iyasu. If he was to modernize Ethiopia, Ras Taffari then badly needed assistance from abroad. In the 1920s the difficulties for Swedish mission in Eritrea thus coincided with efforts made by the Ethiopian Government in Addis Abeba to attract foreign staff.

This investigation will now concentrate on the missionaries working in Ethiopian territory and will demonstrate a possible connection between the work of the missionaries and Ras Taffari’s decision to recruit staff from Sweden to take part in the modernization of Ethiopia.

Before 1920 SEM and SMBV had only had very limited activities in Ethiopia. Nils and Edla Hylander had for political reasons been unable to stay in Harer for more than a year (1895–1896). Karl Cederqvist worked alone in Addis Abeba until his death in 1919. Karl Nyström and his family escaped expulsion from Eritrea in 1916, when all male SMBV missionaries were expelled by the Italians, by moving his work to Adwa on the Ethiopian side of the border. They stayed there till 1919, when they had to move because of the civil war in Ethiopia.

SEM’s work in the province of Wollaga had been started by Ethiopian evangelists already in 1898. The work among the Oromo in Wollaga was performed entirely by Ethiopians from 1904 under the supervision of Cederqvist until Erik Söderström, a physician in 1921 as the first Swede settled in the province and started medical work in Naqamte in the following year.

From October 1924 to May 1925 the Reverend Nils Dahlberg undertook a journey of inspection to Ethiopia and Eritrea. The journey was made at the invitation of the Swedish missionaries and Ras Taffari. The visit seems to have had the double purpose of investigating the situation for the missionaries in Eritrea and of planning an expansion of the programme in Wollaga, urged particularly by Dr Söderström in Naqamte. The prospects were good for an expanded Swedish engagement in Ethiopia, but the economic situation of SEM was still weak after a crisis in the early 1920s. The situation therefore required consultation on the spot between the missionaries and the Board in order not to exceed SEM’s economic resources. The financial situation was

**Ibid., p. 124.**

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<th>Author</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arén (1977), Ch. 5.2; Tafvelin &amp; Lundmark (1974), p. 84.</td>
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also discussed with Ras Taffari, resulting in substantial economic contributions to SEM's educational and medical work in Addis Abeba and in Wollaga. As a result of Dahlberg’s visit to Ethiopia, during which he undertook long journeys into Wollaga, SEM’s programme expanded considerably.

Both SMBV and SDA started their work in Addis Abeba in 1921. SMBV offered educational and medical services in Harer from 1924. Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission BV both received donations from Ras Taffari of about 50,000 Sw Crowns each for building their hospitals in Naqamte and Harer respectively. In 1926 he donated about 10,000 Sw Crowns to SEM for the purpose of purchasing a plot of land in Addis Abeba, where a boys’ school was established, and in 1929 he arranged that SMBV got a plot of land in Addis Abeba, where a girls’ school was to be established. In 1931 SDA obtained an economic grant of 25,000 dollars in cash and a plot of land from the Emperor for the purpose of building a hospital. In the same year SDA also received plots of land from the local governors in Debre Tabor and Gimbi in order to establish hospitals.

By investigating the placing of the missionaries it is possible to follow how the societies distributed their activities within Ethiopia (Table 10). Only in Addis Abeba were all three societies represented, which is natural since this was the capital of the Empire. SEM was working in Wollaga and Tigrai. SMBV had their work located to the Harerge Province. Dr Fride Hylander together with his wife Naemi in 1930–31, undertook a journey of investigation in Arussi, Bale, Harerge and Sidamo aiming at an expansion of SMBV’s work. SDA had programmes in Begemder, Wollaga and Wollo. The missionaries generally stayed in the province where they had originally been placed.


SEM, Annual report 1926, p. 265.


Missionären, Vol. 35:12, December 1931, p. 159.

Ibid., Vol. 36:7, July 1932, pp. 79–80; Vol. 36:11, November 1932, p. 120.


Although the Swedes only constituted a part of SDA’s staff in Ethiopia they still were represented at all places where SDA had work.
SEM sent most missionaries in the early 1920s and in the 1930s, while SDA sent Swedish staff to Ethiopia only during the 1930s (Appendix 1–2). SMBV continuously increased their staff throughout the period. Five of the SMBV missionaries sent to Ethiopia 1925–29 were obliged to resign in early 1932 because of a conflict with the Board in Stockholm regarding work in Ethiopia. One of the missionaries recruited before 1920 was also obliged to resign for the same reason. The situation of the SEM staff was characterized by a rather pronounced continuity. They tended to stay for about ten years before returning to Sweden for a period of rest (Appendix 1).

The work of the missions was, however, interrupted by the Italo-Ethiopian war. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm kept in close touch with the Missionary societies regarding the fate of the Swedish missionaries both during the summer of 1935, when it became clear that a war was to be expected, and during the war. When the war broke out SMBV had six missionaries in Addis Abeba and five in Harer. SDA had five Swedish missionaries in the country living in Debre Tabor and Desse in Northern Ethiopia and in Gimbi in Wollaga. When SDA’s hospital in Desse was bombed by the Italians in December 1935, Dr Ragnar Stadin and his wife Elfrida moved to the hospital in Addis Abeba but nurse Elfrida was killed by an Italian bullet when Addis Abeba was invaded in early May. The surviving missionaries later left the country, nurse Lisa Johansson, who had arrived at Addis Abeba on 29 April 1936, being the only exception. She stayed in Addis Abeba during the whole occupation.

When the Italian occupation was a fact in the summer of 1936, the remaining SEM missionaries in Addis Abeba were expelled by the Italians. Also the two remaining SMBV missionaries, Anna-Lena and Simon Röstin, were ordered to leave the country, while the missionaries in Harer were

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2 VPM, ang. de svenska missionärerna i Abessinien, Stockholm 5.8 1935, KUD, P 83 Yab I.


allowed to stay until September 1936. Also SEM’s missionaries in Wollaga left Ethiopia during the autumn of 1936."

We have seen how the missionary societies gradually expanded their work in Ethiopia, when the political conditions made missionary work there possible, and how resources were transferred from Eritrea to Ethiopia. From Appendix 1–2 we have also seen that both SEM’s and SMBV’s missionaries stayed in the country for comparatively long periods, often during their entire active life. Haile Selassie, both as Crown Prince and as Emperor, encouraged the work of the Swedish mission within those fields where he needed staff to develop Ethiopia. The missions were then able to expand their work to a greater extent than would have been possible without economic support from Ethiopia. Particularly SEM was dependent upon this support, because of their serious economic crisis in 1922/23. When the Italian occupation came, Swedish missionaries were working in six of Ethiopia’s twelve provinces. Investigations had also been made in three more provinces, namely in Arussi, Bale and Sidamo.

1. 3 The professional orientation of the missionary staff

The missionaries can be divided into five professional main groups: 1. Pastors 2. Unspecified laymen 3. Educational staff 4. Medical staff 5. Miscellaneous.

1. **Pastors:** All pastors, 32 in number, had received their theological education at the Johannelund Theological Institute and/or had university education. They had all been ordained within the Church of Sweden, although mostly specifically for missionary work abroad." It is worth noting that none of the SMBV- or SDA missionaries had been ordained on their departure for Ethiopia.

2. **Unspecified laymen** make up the largest group among the SEM-missionaries (46), almost half of whom were women. The men had often studied for some time at Johannelund, but had never been ordained." They were mostly sent to Ethiopia as so-called lay missionaries or as trained artisans mainly to deal with practical work." The women were often wives without


* Biografisk matrikel över svenska kyrkans prästerskap, 1901, 1914, 1934, 1970; Rodén (1938), passim.

* Rodén (1938), passim.

* Hylander (1916), passim for example p. 74. It seems as if some craftsmen are included in this group, see for example Beskow (1884); Hylander (1916), passim; Hofgren (1956), p. 127; Landgren (1871).
professional training. It should, however, be noted that they took an active part in the work of the missions. Only three of SMBV’s and one of SDA’s missionaries belonged to this category.

3. Educational staff: The SEM and SMBV teachers were mainly primary school instructors. The women generally taught in the first and second grades. Among SMBV missionaries the teachers constituted the largest professional group (12). Three of the SEM teachers (totalling 26) were ordained, and according to the annual reports they worked both as teachers and as pastors. From the composition of the educational group, it can be concluded that the missions offered mainly basic education. It is worth noting that the women were in the majority both within the SEM and within the SMBV. One of the SDA missionaries was a teacher.

4. Medical staff: This is the largest group among the SDA-staff (7) and the second largest group among the SMBV staff (10). In addition to those with only medical training there were also persons with other professions who had some sort of medical education, for example one pastor and one teacher. Also here we find mostly women i.e. nurses and midwives, but SDA also had some male nurses. The men were mostly physicians and one of them was ordained.

5. Miscellaneous: Among the SEM missionaries there were three persons who did not fit into any of the above categories, namely one trade agent and two book printers.

The most pronounced change over time can be noted for ‘unspecified laymen’ among SEM’s staff. This group decreased from having constituted about half of the missionary staff during the period 1865–1904 to only 7% during the period 1919–1936. This change seems partly due to the fact that more wives of missionaries had a profession during the 20th century than during the 19th century. The missionary staff sent out during the first pioneering decades included a substantial number of craftsmen. The proportion of educational and medical staff increased during the 20th century. For SMBV and SDA, who started their work in the area after 1904, the proportion of these categories is high. It seems reasonable to assume that the Boards of the societies became increasingly aware of the need for professional training within various fields among their missionary staff, which would explain this change over time.

From this survey it can be concluded that the missionaries represented a rather diversified group of people, most of whom had some kind of qualified professional training. Some of the missionaries even had more than one kind of training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Medical care</th>
<th>Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>Addis Abeba (clinic)</td>
<td>Addis Abeba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naqamte</td>
<td>Naqamte (hospital)</td>
<td>Naqamte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najo</td>
<td>Najo (clinic)</td>
<td>Najo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMBV</td>
<td>Addis Abeba (clinic)</td>
<td>Addis Abeba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harer</td>
<td>Harer (hospital)</td>
<td>Harer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Addis Abeba (hospital)</td>
<td>Addis Abeba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desse</td>
<td>Desse (hospital)</td>
<td>Desse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glmbl</td>
<td>Glmbl (hospital)</td>
<td>Glmbl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 SEM stations opened in Addis Abeba 1904, Naqamte 1923, Najo 1927.
2 SMBV stations opened in Addis Abeba 1921, Harer 1924
3 SDA stations opened in Addis Abeba 1921, Desse 1928, Debre Tabor and Gimbi 1932.

Note: The year given does not necessarily mean that all activities started that year.

Regarding the missionaries who worked in Ethiopia, we find that the difference in number of staff is not particularly pronounced between SEM and SMBV (29 and 19 respectively). The main difference between SEM and SMBV remains, namely that SEM had a substantial number of pastors ordained before leaving for Ethiopia, while SMBV had none of this category. Most pastors worked as teachers or had some kind of medical education. According to SEM’s and SMBV’s Missionary Records many male missionaries had obtained a basic medical training at Livingstone College in London or in Edinburgh, indicating co-operation between British missionaries and SEM and SMBV regarding missionary training. SDA’s Swedish staff had almost exclusively medical training. Two of SDA’s missionaries were ordained. Two of SMBV’s missionaries became ordained after some years in Ethiopia.


1.4 Main activities of Swedish missionaries in Ethiopia

The professional composition of the missionary staff would indicate a wholeistic view of the missionary work undertaken by the societies in question. The missionaries were not only sent to Ethiopia to preach but also to teach and to treat sick people (Table 11). The pastoral aspect of their work will not be examined here, since it has already been thoroughly analysed by Gustav Arén."

Medical care was particularly emphasized by SDA. Besides education and medical care the missionaries also performed important work by providing literature and by translating the Bible and other, mostly religious, books into Amharinya, Oromo and Tigrinya."

It is a difficult task to measure the effects of one country’s engagement in another country, due to the lack of a reliable instrument for such a measurement. Modern social scientists have met immense difficulties when trying to develop methods to evaluate the effects of, for example, economic and personal assistance to developing countries. The lack of sources makes it still more difficult to make measurements in the past. It is therefore far from easy to try to evaluate the impact of the work performed by Swedish missionaries in Ethiopia. Some light can, however, be shed upon the issue by investigating the number of students attending Swedish mission schools. Information about the number of students of the respective societies can be obtained from their annual reports. Only SEM published yearly statistical tables which enable us to follow their educational work. Therefore the SEM stations at Addis Abeba, Naqamte and Najo 1920–1936 will be used as examples. Although these statistics most probably contain errors, they give us a rough picture of the educational situation at these places (Table 12).

The number of members in the respective congregations established by the missionaries is given for comparison only". Karl Cederqvist founded a school for boys, which was called ‘the English school’, because he taught English." When Cederqvist died in 1919 he had 20 students at his school (Table 12). From 1924 SEM also offered education to girls in Addis Abeba. The number of students rose substantially that year, which can be regarded as a result of the number of SEM missionaries being increased in the city. The female students increased in number during the 1920s and 1930s, reaching a maximum in 1936, when there were more girls than boys at the SEM schools

" Arén (1977), passim.
" SEM, Annual reports, passim; SMBV, Annual reports, passim; BV (1961), p. 102.
" The issue on establishing Evangelical congregations has been thoroughly discussed by Arén (1977) and by Saeverás (1974). Hallencreutz (1975 & 1976) has discussed the issue in connection with Saeverás’ dissertation. It will therefore not be discussed in this context.
Table 12. Activities at SEM stations in Addis Abeba (1), Naqamte (2) and Najo (3), 1920–1936 with particular reference to education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Swedish Missionaries</th>
<th>Church Members</th>
<th>Mission-Schools</th>
<th>Ethiopian students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male (1)</td>
<td>Female (2)</td>
<td>Total (3)</td>
<td>Male (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1929</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1931</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Figure from 1.1 1919

in Addis Abeba (84 and 77 respectively). By the end of the period the number of students in Naqamte and in Najo, both situated in Wollaga, exceeded the number in Addis Abeba. Also at these places a large proportion of the students were girls. The fact that there were more students in the SEM schools in Wollaga than in Addis Abeba most certainly was due to the fact that the SEM schools were the only schools at these places in Wollaga while in Addis Abeba education was offered both by other foreign organizations and by the Ethiopian Government. The SEM-schools therefore played a relatively greater role in Wollaga than in the capital. We can also see that the number of students in the mission schools in Wollaga always exceeded the number of church members, while in Addis Abeba the situation was reversed. This is a clear indication that the population in the provinces, although they did not belong...
to the Evangelical church to any great extent, had confidence in the schools run by the Swedish mission.

Blatengeta Hiruy, Haile Selassie's closest confident and his Minister of Foreign Affairs during the 1920s and 1930s, could be mentioned as an example of an influential Ethiopian, who had obtained part of his training from a Swedish missionary. Blatengeta Hiruy studied English for Cederqvist around 1906. He accompanied Ras Taffari during his journey to Europe and most probably supported him when he turned to Sweden for advisers in the late 1920s. Ato Abbebe Retta, who in the 1940s played a decisive role in the Ethio-Swedish relations, offers another example of an Ethiopian who had obtained his training in English at the Swedish Evangelical mission in Addis Abeba.

In conclusion it can be stated that the Swedish missionaries sent by Swedish Evangelical Mission, Swedish Mission BV as well as Seventh Day Adventist Mission constituted the first group of Swedish volunteers engaged in development work in Ethiopia. They constituted a professionally rather diversified group in their 20s and 30s who went to Ethiopia to spread the Gospel by preaching, teaching and curing the sick. Many missionaries, particularly during the early decades gave their lives in the service of their organization. Others were able to continue their work for many years. The missionaries were sent to reach the Oromo peoples, but when this turned out to be impossible because of political unrest the societies started a pioneering mission in Italian Eritrea. As time went on they were able to reach the Oromo. In the 1920s and 1930s the activities were expanded in Ethiopian territory particularly into the Oromo areas. The Swedish missionaries offered education in areas where no Government schools existed. They therefore most certainly contributed to raising the level of education among the rural population in these areas. In 1924, when Ras Taffari made his European journey, the expansion of the missionary work in Ethiopian territory had just started. The work of the Swedish missionaries might well have made Ras Taffari consider Sweden as a source of educational and medical resources from which both Ethiopia and himself might benefit in the future. Ras Taffari's economic grants, particularly to the medical institutions, support this interpretation.

" H. Bildt to J. Kolmodin, Cairo 9.1 1931. UUB, J. Kolmodin's papers, Q 15:1.
" See further Chapter IV:2.
" Ato Abbebe Retta, see further Ch. V:1, Biographical data Ch. V n. 34.
2. Swedish experts in Ethiopia 1924–1936

As already stated in Chapters II and III, Ras Taffari in his efforts to continue Minilik’s modernization of Ethiopia, found it necessary to establish relations with European countries. We are now going to study Ras Taffari’s Swedish contacts, particularly the kind of Swedes employed in his service and how they were recruited.

2. 1 Ras Taffari’s visit to Sweden 1924 and his contacts with SEM and SMBV

In his memoirs Haile Selassie states that when undertaking his journey to Europe in 1924, he had a firm intention to visit Sweden. In an audience granted to the present author in May 1973, Haile Selassie answered the question about the reasons for his visit to Sweden in 1924 – using a polite phrase – that because of the good relations between the two countries he wanted to strengthen the friendship by visiting the country himself.

The visit took place in June 1924 and had been preceded by contacts with the Boards of SEM and SMBV both via their missionaries and by personal letters to Nils Dahlberg and Axel B. Svensson, the Secretaries of mission of the respective missionary societies. Via the Swedish missionaries and the Reverend Dahlberg, Ras Taffari had also exchanged portraits with the Swedish King Gustaf V, and to him communicated his plans to visit Sweden. He had informed Axel B. Svensson that he intended to travel incognito and that he wanted to meet the Swedish King and representatives of the Swedish missionary societies active in Ethiopia. However, nothing seems to have been communicated officially to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Ras Taffari on his way to Europe paid a week’s official visit to Egypt, he mentioned nothing to the Swedish Minister in Cairo about his plans to visit Sweden, although they met twice. No visa had been applied for either. The Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs made enquiries both to SEM in Stockholm and to the Swedish Legations in London and in the Hague about Ras Taffari’s plans in order to know how to receive him in case he appeared in Stockholm.

H. De Bildt to E Marks von Würtemberg, Cairo 15.5 1924, KUD, P 51 G I.

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The Swedish Minister in Paris reported that Ras Taffari was received in France like a European sovereign. From Brussels the Swedish Legation reported that Ras Taffari’s visit to Belgium was to be regarded as a study tour for becoming personally informed about European conditions.

Ras Taffari arrived in Stockholm on June 8. He had given the exact date of arrival to the Swedish Minister in Paris only four days before. He also requested to visit the Swedish King and the Archbishop. Ras Taffari was also very interested in visiting schools. He was to be accompanied by Blatengeta Hiruy, Minister of Foreign Affairs and president of the High Court, Ras Siyum and Ras Hailu. The programme was arranged according to the wishes expressed by Ras Taffari. He was received in Stockholm by the Marshal of the Realm on behalf of the King and by representatives of the Missionary societies SEM and SMBV.

Ras Taffari participated in an evening service in the Cathedral of Uppsala, during the course of which both Archbishop Nathan Söderblom and himself gave addresses. Ras Taffari expressed his appreciation of the work done by Swedish missionaries in Ethiopia. Nathan Söderblom invited the Ethiopian Orthodox Church to send ten delegates to the ecumenical conference in Stockholm, which was planned to take place in 1925. Ras Taffari also visited Johannelund Theological Institute, where he met representatives both for Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission Bibeltrogna Vänner. When invited to luncheon with King Gustaf V, the two rulers talked about extending the friendship between their countries.

In an interview published in the Stockholm daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter, Ras Taffari said that he had come to Sweden because of his love for the country, which had sent good missionaries to his people. The Swedes were the most appreciated missionaries, because they knew the Ethiopian language and had opened schools in his country. After the interview Ras Taffari asked the Reverend Dahlberg, who had been present during the interview, whether or
not it was possible for SEM to extend their work in Ethiopia by sending more missionaries and preferably one or two physicians. Sweden, he said, had no colonial ambitions in Ethiopia and he therefore preferred to take Swedes as his partners. On this occasion Dahlberg was also invited to visit Ethiopia."

As we have already seen in Chapter IV:1.2, the Reverend Dahlberg accepted the invitation. Only a few days after his arrival in Addis Abeba in October 1924, Dahlberg was called to an audience with Ras Taffari, during which the latter emphasized that he was prepared to support the Swedish mission because the missionaries as good Christians had made his people law-abiding and given them valuable knowledge." In his memoirs, Dahlberg says that he was surprised over the kindness shown by the Regent both towards himself, the Mission and to all Europeans and Americans working in the country. It was not difficult to get an audience, on the contrary, Ras Taffari seemed to be anxious that people should come directly to him with their wishes."

Also Axel B. Svensson was received by Ras Taffari when he made a journey of inspection to Ethiopia from October 1929 to March 1930. Like Dahlberg, Svensson made very detailed notes in his diary about the audience, apparently written down already the same day. Svensson conveyed greetings from the Swedish King, which was very much appreciated by Ras Taffari. According to Svensson's diary, Ras Taffari made very detailed enquiries about SMBV's activities both in Sweden and in Ethiopia. He expressed appreciation particularly over SMBV's programme in Harer."

Although both Dahlberg's and Svensson's diary notes well might give an exaggerated picture about Ras Taffari's interest in their respective societies they indicate together with other sources a positive attitude of the Ethiopian Regent towards the Swedish Christian mission and towards the goal of enlarged Ethio-Swedish co-operation. The measures taken to receive Ras Taffari during his visit to Sweden also indicate that the Swedish Government was not uninterested in encouraging Ethio-Swedish relations.

2. 2 Swedish medical staff in Ethiopia

In July 1925 Dahlberg received a letter from Ras Taffari asking for help in locating two good physicians to come to Ethiopia as soon as possible." This seems to be the direct reason for Dr Knut Hanner and the two nurses Vera

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"Dahlberg (1961), p. 75.
"Dahlberg (1924/25), p. 21, ND.
"Dahlberg (1961), p. 79.
"Ras Taffari to N. Dahlberg, Addis Abeba 28.7 1925, ND.
Boström and Verna Hagman going there in 1926, entering into Ras Taffari’s private service at the Bethsaida hospital in Addis Abeba. They all stayed in Ethiopia until 1936. As time went on Dr Hanner, who became Swedish Honorary Consul in Addis Abeba in 1929, seems to have gained quite an influential position at the palace. As newly appointed Consul, Hanner in a letter to Nathan Söderblom expressed the opinion that the Swedes had to make themselves heard if they wanted to compete with other foreigners in Ethiopia. He thought that the Swedes had the best chance of being successfully employed as advisers, organizers or as scholars.

In 1927 another physician, Harald Nyström, became employed in the private service of Ras Taffari. Nyström served as physician both to the Imperial Guard and at the Bethsaida hospital in Addis Abeba. He was born and brought up in Eritrea, as the eldest son of the missionaries Karl and Agnes Nyström, and entered into Ethiopian service after having completed his education.

In early 1932 the Ethiopian Government found that the troops in Ogaden were without a physician. When they learnt that Dr Gunnar Agge had resigned his services with the Swedish Mission BV in Harer, he was recruited by Blatengeta Hiruy as a physician for the troops in Ogaden. In March 1932 Agge signed a contract for three years with the Ethiopian Government.

We have seen that the first Swedish medical staff in Ethiopian Government service was recruited via the Swedish missionary societies. Dr Hanner and his two nurses Vera Boström and Verna Hagman had not had, so far as is known, any direct links with the missionary societies before, but they had been recruited by the Reverend Dahlberg of the Swedish Evangelical Mission as Ras Taffari’s intermediary. Both Dr Nyström and Dr Agge, however, had close connections with the missions. Because of their experience from the country it must have been convenient for the Ethiopian authorities to employ them.

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"K. Hanner to N. Söderblom, Addis Abeba 1.5 1930, UUB, N. Söderblom’s papers.


"Agge (1936), pp. 8–10."
2. 3 Swedish advisers in foreign affairs

Johannes Kolmodin

When Ras Taffari met Archbishop Nathan Söderblom in June 1924 in Uppsala, he mentioned his plans to open a new school in Addis Abeba. Söderblom then suggested that his friend Johannes Kolmodin might be interested in the project. On learning of Kolmodin’s interest in Ethiopian culture, knowledge of Ethiopian languages and diplomatic experience, Ras Taffari is said to have become very enthusiastic and had regarded it as a gift from God that Söderblom had mentioned Kolmodin’s name. He told Söderblom that he wanted Kolmodin as his 'Conseiller Politique'. Ras Taffari even wanted to see a photograph of Kolmodin, which was immediately sent for. He is said to have highly appreciated Söderblom’s remark that Kolmodin did not originate from any of the land-hungry colonial powers. They continued their talk in Stockholm on the following day at a meeting arranged on Ras Taffari’s own initiative. Söderblom wrote to Kolmodin about his talk with Ras Taffari and asked him to take into consideration the position offered. Kolmodin who was employed at the Swedish Legation in Constantinople was advised to send his decision either directly to Ras Taffari or via Söderblom. Attached to Söderblom’s letter was a personal letter of invitation from Ras Taffari to visit Ethiopia at his expense during the coming autumn to discuss the conditions for the position of political adviser. Kolmodin sent his answer to Ras Taffari via Söderblom, declaring that he was willing to visit Addis Abeba and to consider the position offered to him.

After having visited Sweden, Ras Taffari continued to Paris in July 1924 where he asked the Swedish envoy to inform the Swedish Government that he was interested in employing a Swedish adviser for a period of three years to organize Ethiopia’s finances. The Swedish Foreign Ministry immediately answered that they had no suitable candidate for such a position. The quick negative answer from the Swedish Government indicates that they were cautious about becoming involved in Ethiopia’s finances. It is not known whether Ras Taffari had mentioned the subject of a financial adviser while he was in Sweden.

**Johannes Axel Kolmodin** b. 1884 d. 1933 in Addis Abeba, Orientalist and diplomat, Ph.D. and lecturer in Semitic languages in 1914. Son of Adolf Kolmodin (see above n. 11), whom he accompanied to Ethiopia in 1908 and stayed to 1910. He then learnt Tigriinya thoroughly. Close friend of Nathan Söderblom. Attached to the Swedish Legation in Constantinople in 1917, where he was able to support Söderblom’s ecumenical efforts (G. Jarring in SBL, vol. 21, pp. 479-481).

**N. Söderblom to J. Kolmodin, Uppsala 12.6 1924, UUB, Q 15:6.**

**Ras Taffari Makonnen to J. Kolmodin, Stockholm 11.6 1924, UUB, Q 15:6.**

**J. Kolmodin to Ras Taffari Makonnen, Constantinople 29.6 1924, UUB, Q 15:8.**

**Telegram A. Ehrenswärd to Cabinet, Paris 5.7 1924 and 8.7 1924, KUD, P 71 Yab 1.**

**Telegram Cabinet to Swedish legation Paris, Stockholm 9.7 1924, KUD, P 71 Yab 1.**
Ras Taffari's answer to Kolmodin's and Söderblom's letters arrived in January 1925, i.e. after his request to the Swedish Government for a financial adviser had been turned down. Kolmodin was then invited to choose between two positions:

1. Auditor general and Adviser to the Minister of Finance.
2. Adviser to the Minister of Trade, with the special task of developing Ethiopia's trade.

Ras Taffari wanted a definite answer to his proposition from Kolmodin. A draft contract was enclosed with the letter. Nothing was now mentioned about any post as 'Conseiller politique'. Was Ras Taffari in fact more anxious to recruit a financial adviser than a political adviser? This might well have been the case, and therefore Ras Taffari, on getting a negative answer from the Swedish Government regarding a Financial Adviser, thought that Kolmodin who already had declared his interest in serving Ras Taffari, might instead accept a position as Financial Adviser. On the other hand, Kolmodin as a linguist, historian and diplomat was probably little interested in accepting a position where he would have to deal entirely with economic matters. Kolmodin's answer to Ras Taffari has been found neither among Söderblom's nor among his own papers. The answer was probably negative, since Kolmodin did not go to Ethiopia on that occasion. The sources available do not tell us what other contacts Ras Taffari made regarding a financial adviser. It was not, however, until 1930 that Everett A. Colson, an American, became employed as Financial Adviser.\(^\text{3}\)

The next time Sweden was contacted by Ethiopia regarding an adviser was in early 1929 when Taffari, now Nigus (king), via a personal letter to King Gustav V made enquiries about the possibility of obtaining a Swedish 'Conseiller'.\(^\text{4}\) When asking for supplementary information about the position, Swedish authorities were informed that the 'Conseiller politique auprès S.M. Impérial le Roi d'Ethiopie' was expected to advise Nigus Taffari on Ethiopia's relations with foreign countries and on issues regarding international law. Secondly, the adviser would be working on the adjustment of Ethiopia's internal law to European conditions and to a minor extent he would furnish opinions on lawmaking in general.\(^\text{5}\)


\(^{\text{4}}\) Zervos (1936), p. 212.

\(^{\text{5}}\) Negus Taffari to King Gustaf V, Addis Aheba 29.12 1928, KUD, P 71 Yab I.

\(^{\text{6}}\) A. Ehrenswård to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris 18.3 1929, KUD, P 71 Yab I.
In April 1929 the Swedish Government regretted that they had not been able to find a suitable candidate. According to Söderblom they made extensive efforts but had not been able to find a candidate competent enough for the position. According to Hanner, Nigus Taffari became rather ill-humoured upon receiving the negative answer from the Swedish Government, especially as he could not understand the reasons for such a reply.

In 1929 Hanner undertook a journey to Sweden, during which he passed Constantinople, where he had unofficial talks regarding Kolmodin with G.O. Wallenberg, the Swedish Minister. After he arrived in Sweden he had further talks about Kolmodin with Söderblom. On returning to Ethiopia in early 1930, as newly appointed Swedish Honorary Consul, Hanner advised Nigus Taffari to make an attempt at engaging Kolmodin without using the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as intermediary. In February 1930, most probably as a result of his talks with Hanner, Söderblom advised Kolmodin to apply for leave of absence from his post in Constantinople and accept the advisory position in Ethiopia for a period of one year on a trial basis. When Kolmodin visited Sweden during the summer of 1930 he discussed his employment with Söderblom and informed Hanner that he was interested in going to Ethiopia and asked for the conditions.

After further contacts between Söderblom and Haile Selassie, Kolmodin in December 1930 informed the latter that he was prepared to go to Ethiopia. In March 1931 Hanner told him that Haile Selassie had approved his conditions and asked him to come immediately. Kolmodin then replied that he would arrive in Djibouti on 14 April 1931.

It would appear that Kolmodin had the confidence of the Emperor from the start since his first major task was to organize the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Using the organization of the Swedish Ministry as a model he suggested that the Ministry should be divided into departments. When the Ethiopian constitution was written Kolmodin was the only foreign adviser to

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* E. Trygger to Wolde Mariam Ayeuleu, Stockholm 12.4 1929, KUD, P 71 Yab I.
* N. Söderblom to J. Kolmodin, Uppsala 5.2 1930, UUB, Q 15:6.
* K. Hanner to J. Kolmodin, Addis Abeba 26.5 1930, UUB, Q 15:2.
* N. Söderblom to J. Kolmodin, Uppsala 5.2 1930, UUB, Q 15:6.
* J. Kolmodin to K. Hanner, Uppsala 2.7 1930, UUB, Q 15:2.
* J. Kolmodin to Haile Selassie I, Istanbul 14.12 1930, UUB, Q 15:8. Nigus Taffari had on 2 November 1930 been crowned Emperor under the name of Haile Selassie I. It was convenient to Söderblom’s ecumenical interests to see his friend Kolmodin employed in Ethiopia, as mentioned also by Sundkler (1968), p. 385; Sundkler (1975), p. 108.
* Telegram K. Hanner to J. Kolmodin, Addis Abeba 3.3 1931, UUB, Q 15:2.
* J. Kolmodin to K. Hanner, Istanbul 12.3 1931, UUB, Q 15:2.
* J. Kolmodin to E. Boheman, Addis Abeba 9.5 1931, UUB, Q 15:1.
be consulted, although he had only been allowed to give his view on matters of principle. He was, however, asked to draft the speech given by the Emperor when proclaiming the constitution of 1931. He was also asked to deal with the reorganization of the Ethiopian legal system.\textsuperscript{10}

When the trial period came to an end it was agreed, when discussing the new contract, that Kolmodin should stay at least another three years and possibly five years. The Emperor is then said to have insisted upon a requirement in Kolmodin’s contract that he should give his opinion on the suggestions of the other European advisers before these suggestions were even submitted to the Emperor.\textsuperscript{11} No such paragraph was included in the new contract, which was to be valid for a period of three years as from 24 November 1931. Kolmodin was to be subordinate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom he was to give oral or written advice on all matters that the Minister might suggest. The Emperor also requested Kolmodin’s oral and written advice and that he should deal with problems within various parts of the administration on which the Emperor might choose to consult him.\textsuperscript{12}

Kolmodin’s relations with foreign diplomats in Addis Abeba, including the representatives of the so-called Tripartite countries i.e. Britain, France and Italy, appeared to have been good. Kolmodin regarded it as an advantage that even before his arrival foreign diplomats had become annoyed with the American adviser Everett Colson, and blamed him for everything they disliked.\textsuperscript{13} In September 1931, after Kolmodin had succeeded in arranging a compromise in respect of the rectification of the frontier between British Somaliland and Ethiopia, the foreign diplomats seemed to regard him as a mediator.\textsuperscript{14} Kolmodin received many enquiries from Swedes who wanted to obtain employment in Ethiopia, but his many responsibilities prevented him from becoming engaged in such matters.\textsuperscript{15}

Kolmodin was only able to complete two years of his term of contract since he died of a stroke in Addis Abeba on 9 October 1933, at the age of 49.\textsuperscript{16}

When analysing the recruitment of Kolmodin as political adviser to Emperor Haile Selassie, two main questions arise: why a Swedish political adviser and why Kolmodin?

\textsuperscript{10} J. Kolmodin to E. Boheman, Addis Abeba 19.7 1931, KUD, HP 12 Yab. See also UUB, Q 15:1.
\textsuperscript{11} J. Kolmodin to E. Boheman, Addis Abeba 10.10 1931, UUB, Q 15:1.
\textsuperscript{13} J. Kolmodin to E. Boheman, Addis Abeba 19.7 1931, KUD, HP 12 Yab.
\textsuperscript{14} J. Kolmodin to E. Boheman, Addis Abeba 10.10 1931, UUB, Q 15:1.
\textsuperscript{15} See for example J. Kolmodin to R. Gyllenram, Addis Abeba 20.3 1932, UUB, Q 15:2.
\textsuperscript{16} G. Jarring in SBL, vol. 21, p. 479.
It would appear that Ras Taffari's idea of employing Kolmodin as his 'Conseiller politique', came as a spontaneous reaction when Söderblom mentioned him. With his thorough knowledge of Ethiopian culture and some years of experience as a diplomat Kolmodin was certainly an attractive candidate for an advisory position to Ras Taffari. As the son of Adolf Kolmodin, the former Director of Mission within SEM, whom he had accompanied during a journey of inspection to Ethiopia in 1908–1910, Kolmodin was also familiar with the work of the Christian missions, something which Ras Taffari quite certainly appreciated.

Altogether it took seven years before Kolmodin finally became employed as political adviser to Haile Selassie I. The key person in the recruitment of Kolmodin was Nathan Söderblom, who from the outset acted as intermediary. As being the first to mention Kolmodin's name for a position as organizer of the school planned by Ras Taffari, he can be regarded as the initiator. On the other hand it was Ras Taffari who suggested the post as political adviser, and the initiative throughout remained with Ras Taffari. Direct contact between Haile Selassie I, who had then became Emperor, and Kolmodin was not established until very late i.e. in 1931 when the conditions had already been settled.

Söderblom was obviously interested in Kolmodin's employment in Ethiopia, and he also encouraged Kolmodin from the very beginning, although Kolmodin himself hesitated. It was Söderblom's suggestion that he should initially accept employment on a trial basis. Having Kolmodin as adviser to the Emperor would also have been advantageous to Söderblom's ecumenical interests.

The other key contact in this respect, Dr Hanner, was interested in recruiting Swedes for responsible positions in Ethiopia and supported the idea of employing Kolmodin. When the enquiries via official Swedish channels were turned down in 1929, Hanner made personal unofficial enquiries in order that the position as political adviser might still be open to a Swede.

Taffari also seems to have been interested in recruiting a Swede as his political adviser. Another important factor might be that Blatengeta Hiruy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was considered as the Emperor's closest confident, was regarded as a warm friend of Sweden.129 As already mentioned, he accompanied the Emperor during his journey to Europe. Taffari's personal contacts with the King and the Archbishop certainly also played a role. From their correspondence it appears that Ras Taffari had confidence in Söderblom and that they even became friends, treating each other with mutual respect. Their letters were written in a friendly and comparatively informal tone.

129 H. Bildt to J. Kolmodin, Cairo 9.1 1931, UUB, Q 15:1.
Despite the two negative replies he received from the Swedish Cabinet following his enquiries about advisers, *Ras* Taffari was still interested in 1930 in recruiting a Swede. He thus used his personal contacts with Hanner and Söderblom, and it was these personal contacts that finally yielded positive results.

Besides the difficulties in finding suitable candidates, the Swedish Government did not give any reasons for their turning down the Ethiopian requests for advisers in 1924 and 1929. In 1924 the Government might have had enough with its internal problems, including preparations for the elections in September 1924.\(^{11}\)

There might accordingly have been very little room for an engagement in Ethiopia at that time. Despite the fact that Sweden throughout the 1920s had been active in the League of Nations and had acted as a spokesman for small states, the Swedish Government in 1929 seems to have had little interest in Ethiopia.\(^{12}\) In view of the increasing competition between Italy, Britain and France, discussed in Chapter II, the Swedish Cabinet in April 1929 might have found it wise to turn down the Ethiopian request in order to avoid becoming involved in Great Power politics, apart from the fact that it had proved difficult to find a suitable candidate.

The recruitment of Johannes Kolmodin was thus the result of good personal relations between *Ras* Taffari, Nathan Söderblom, and Knut Hanner, all of whom had reasons for wanting to see him occupying an important position in Ethiopia.

The Emperor's confidence in Johannes Kolmodin is revealed in the fact that only ten days after Kolmodin's death he turned to Sweden for a successor in this position.

**General Eric Virgin**

In October 1933 Dr Hanner, on behalf of the Emperor, approached the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to find a Swedish General, who could serve both as political and as military adviser to replace Kolmodin. Before making an official application the Emperor had asked Hanner to enquire unofficially about the attitude of the Swedish Government to such an application so as to avoid an official negative answer as had been the case in 1929. As suitable candidate for the position Hanner mentioned General Ernst Linder, to whom

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he had already written." Hanner’s initiative in contacting a Swedish officer, before having consulted the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not appreciated in the Ministry. A handwritten remark on Hanner’s letter states that the Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted Hanner to be informed that he was most surprised over Hanner’s démarche to Linder.

Nothing more is mentioned about this matter in the records until 1934 when an unidentified person brought the matter up on behalf of the Emperor, who was said to be very anxious to obtain a positive answer from the Swedish authorities. The Swedish Cabinet answered that Major General Eric Virgin, could be placed at the Emperor’s disposal on certain conditions. The Emperor wanted ‘un conseiller politique competent, ancien militair apte de donner conseil’. The salary offered was £ 200 a month – twice that of the other advisers. Virgin was expected to serve as adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to reorganize the whole Ethiopian defence.

Before General Virgin became definitely employed there was some discussion about the length of contract. The Emperor wanted to employ Virgin for one year on a trial basis only, i.e. the same kind of arrangement as was made at the time of Kolmodin’s employment in 1931. After an exchange of telegrams General Virgin was finally employed for a period of two years. He left for Ethiopia on 5 May 1934.

Virgin was recruited by Swedish military authorities, with Hanner serving as the Emperor’s intermediary. Virgin apparently heard about the position for the first time in January 1934 when he was asked directly by Ernst af Klercker, the Head of the Military Office of the Swedish Ministry of Defence (Lantförsvarets Kommandoexpedition), whether or not he would be willing to accept a position as military and political adviser to the Emperor of Ethiopia. Virgin says in his memoirs that he immediately gave a positive answer.

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Handwritten remark by Hamilton on letter K. Hanner to C.F.H. Hamilton, Addis Abeba 18.10 1933, KUD, P 71 Yab I.

C.F.H. Hamilton to T. Friis, Stockholm 26.1 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I.

Telegram Cabinet to Consul Suède, Stockholm 3.2 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I.

K. Hanner to C.F.H. Hamilton, Addis Abeba 10.2 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I.


K. Hanner to C.F.H. Hamilton, Addis Abeba 9.3 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I.

Telegram Cabinet to Consul Suède, Stockholm 19.4 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I.


Virgin (1936), p. 6. No sources on Virgin’s recruitment have been found among his papers deposited at Krigsarkivet in Stockholm. Ernst af Klercker b. 1881 d. 1955, Lieutenant General. Chief of Lantförsvarets Kommandoexpedition 1934–36.
This case is also an illustration of how Haile Selassie executed his plans through personal contacts. Hanner was probably used as a buffer to avoid loss of prestige in case the Swedish authorities should be negative. The personal emissary, whoever it was, came with a direct request from the Emperor. The appointment was also confirmed by King Gustaf V, in such a way that Virgin brought a personal letter from him to the Emperor, where he expressed the wish that the friendly relations that already existed between the two states would become still better as a result of this appointment.\endnote{Gustaf V to Haile Selassie I, Stockholm 3.5 1934 (Copy), KUD, P 71 Yab I.}

The appointment of a Swedish general to a position in Ethiopia seems to have been in line with Hanner’s ambitions. In a letter to Archbishop Söderblom, Hanner expressed disappointment that while he had been in Sweden in 1929 the Emperor had employed a Belgian Military Mission for a task which Hanner had hoped would be offered to Swedish officers.\endnote{K. Hanner to N. Söderblom, Addis Abeba 1.5 1930, UUB, N. Söderblom’s papers.}

Virgin felt that one of his most important tasks as military adviser to the Emperor was to create an indigenous corps of officers. He therefore suggested that a cadet school should be established, staffed by Swedish officers. But since there was already a Belgian Military Mission in the country and since the Swedish army was said to lack wartime experience the Emperor suggested that the instructors should be recruited from Belgium. It was also said of the Swedes that they did not know French, which would be the language of instruction and that they were more expensive than the others. These objections to employing Swedish instructors were given to Virgin during an audience in August 1934. Virgin, however, assured the Emperor that should the Swedish Government agree to send officers to Ethiopia, those officers would also possess the appropriate qualifications. Virgin was then instructed to enquire of the Swedish authorities, whether they could place five officers at Ethiopia’s disposal for a period of three years.\endnote{Virgin (1936), pp. 152–153. Regarding the Swedish officers see below Ch. IV:2. 4.}

It was doubtless a gain in prestige for Virgin when he managed to convince the Emperor to recruit the staff for the planned Cadet school from Sweden. But it appears that during the first months of 1935 Virgin started to lose the confidence of the Ethiopian authorities. In the beginning of April 1935 Captain Viking Tamm, the head of the Cadet school (see below), informed Ernst af Klercker in a letter that by talking too much about the political situation Virgin had damaged not only his own position but also negatively affected the position of Hanner and other Swedes. Hanner and Tamm therefore wanted Virgin to return to Sweden before the end of his contract. They saw a possibility in the fact that Virgin had suffered from heart attacks, which could
be used as a pretext for terminating the contract. Tamm believed that due to considerations involving the Swedish King and Crown Prince, the Emperor would not release Virgin from his contract. Tamm therefore saw only two alternatives to solve the problem: either to convince Virgin to resign his position for health reasons or that Hanner, possibly via the Crown Prince, should ask the Swedish authorities to intervene.18

Tamm later wrote another letter to af Klercker, saying that the issue regarding Virgin’s return to Sweden had resolved itself, because Virgin had suffered new heart attacks and he had therefore decided to cancel his contract and return to Sweden, probably towards the end of May.19 In May 1935 the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed about Virgin’s heart attacks.20 However, when Virgin’s health improved he decided to stay on through the whole contract period.21 Due to lack of sources we do not know what actions were taken to convince Virgin to return home, apart from what he writes in his memoirs, namely that when the heart attacks came at shorter intervals, he decided to follow his physician’s advice to return to Sweden. The Emperor released Virgin from his contract and on 1 October 1935 he left Addis Abeba.22

When the relations between Italy and Ethiopia deteriorated, particularly after the Wal Wal incident on 5 December 1934, there was a strong campaign against Ethiopia in the Italian press, which also affected Virgin.23 Also in the files of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is evidence of Italy’s negative attitude towards Virgin.24 Nothing is mentioned either in Virgin’s or in Tamm’s book about difficulties in Virgin’s relations with Ethiopian authorities. On the contrary, Virgin expresses himself positively about his work in Ethiopia. He seems also to have had good relations with both Auberson, the Swiss legal adviser and with Colson the American financial adviser.25

When Virgin left Ethiopia rumours circulated in the international press that he had been recalled by the Swedish Government. These rumours were quoted for example in the Swedish newspaper *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* (NDA), where they were found to be sensational. NDA then expressed the opinion that the

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19 V. Tamm to E. af Klercker, Addis Abeba 21.4 1935, KrA, VT, vol. 1. Af Klercker sent an answer to Tamm’s letter dated 25.4 1935, but this letter has not been found among Tamm’s papers.
20 *VPM angående general Virgin’s hälsotillstånd och det militärpolitiska läget i Abessinien*, Stockholm 1.6 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
23 Tamm (1936), pp. 157–159.
24 KUD, P 71 Yab II, passim.
information given by Swedish authorities about Virgin’s bad health as such might be correct, but they did not exclude the possibility that the Government had intervened to speed up Virgin’s return to Sweden. Another Swedish newspaper, Svenska Morgonbladet checked the information with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it was denied that Virgin had resigned his position for any other reason than health.

Owing to the lack of sources we cannot be sure of what action, if any, was taken by the Swedish authorities in the Virgin case, and consequently we can only state that Virgin suffered from heart trouble, and that this was used as a pretext for Virgin to cancel his contract. The real reason for his departure might well, however, have been that due to inopportune statements on political issues he had lost the confidence of Ethiopian authorities, and had therefore to leave the country.

**Difficulty in finding a Swedish successor to General Virgin**

General Virgin left Ethiopia only a few days before the Italians attacked Ethiopia, at a time when the Emperor badly needed a political adviser. Within a week of Virgin’s departure Dr Hanner sent a telegram to the Swedish Cabinet asking on behalf of the Emperor for a new adviser in foreign affairs. This time the Emperor wanted a lawyer with diplomatic experience. The Government was asked to consult the Crown Prince regarding choice of person. Since the matter was urgent the Emperor wanted an answer by telegram. A separate telegram on the matter was sent also to the Crown Prince. Only a week later the Crown Prince communicated to the Emperor that under existing circumstances he was not able to assist in the recruitment of the adviser requested. The Cabinet gave the same reply.

There were probably two reasons why the Swedish Government turned down the Emperor’s application for a political adviser. On the one hand there was the fact that the Swedish officers had decided to stay in Ethiopia to fight for Ethiopia in the war with Italy. On the other hand there was the delicate

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136 Nya Dagligt Allehanda 3.11 1935.
137 Meddelande per telefon till Svenska Morgonbladet 4.11 1935 som gjort en förfrågan med anledning av NDA’s uttalande 3.11, KUD, P 71 Yab II. Svenska Morgonbladet had a small notice about the issue 5.11 1935.
138 Telegram Hanner to Cabinet, Addis Ababa 7.10 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
139 Hanner to Cabinet for Crown Prince, Addis Ababa 7.10 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
140 Telegram Cabinet to Consulat Suède from the Crown Prince, Stockholm 15.10 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
141 Telegram Cabinet to Consulat Suède, Stockholm 15.10 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
142 Regarding the Swedish officers in Ethiopia see below Ch. IV:2. 4 and IV:4. 1.
situation which had arisen when Virgin left Ethiopia. With regard to Ethiopia's position at that time in world affairs a move by the Swedish Government to provide another adviser in foreign affairs, would more than likely have encountered difficulties with Italy and possibly also with other European powers claiming interests in that part of Africa. The reasons for the Emperor again turning to Sweden were probably the same as before, namely that Sweden was a neutral state, which could be assumed to be without any particular self-interest in Ethiopia.

When the Emperor’s application via official Swedish channels was turned down he again resorted to personal contacts in order to obtain what he wanted. Hanner was apparently instructed by the Emperor to approach Colonel Sture Gadd and offer him the position as the Emperor’s military and political adviser. Tamm was also asked to give more information about the duties expected of him. He accordingly pointed out that the position of the advisers was unique in that they had always access directly to the Emperor. We do not know what Gadd replied, but since he never appeared in Ethiopia the answer was probably negative. Neither Hanner’s nor Tamm’s contacts with Gadd were recorded in the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2.4 Swedish Army Officers in Ethiopian Service 1934–1936

The application for officers was made to the Swedish authorities on the Emperor’s behalf by the Swedish consul Hanner and not by Virgin. The Emperor sought to recruit five Swedish officers as instructors at the proposed officer training school for the Ethiopian Army for a period of three years: one captain and four officers of lower rank, one of whom should be from the artillery and one from the engineers. They were expected to arrive in Addis Abeba on 1 December 1934. The Emperor had particularly stressed that he preferred Swedish officers despite repeated offers from other nations to establish a military academy for him and to supply it with instructors. Hanner therefore stressed the necessity of exercising great care in the selection of these particular officers. Hanner was sure that future recruitment of Swedes for leading positions in Ethiopia would depend upon how these officers performed their duties, particularly as the Emperor appeared to be discontented with some of the Belgian officers. A copy of Hanner’s letter was forwarded to the Military Office of the Swedish Minister of Defence.


2° K. Hanner to C.F.H. Hamilton Addis Abeba 16.8 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I. See also Adamson (1976), p. 25.

3° C.F.H. Hamilton to E. af Klercker, Stockholm 4.9 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I.
In the middle of September a message from the Military Office of the Swedish Minister of Defence informed the Swedish corps of officers of Emperor Haile Selassie's plans to recruit Swedes."

There were many applications for these positions." When Virgin learnt that Captain Viking Tamm had applied as Head of the Military Mission, he immediately recommended him for the position." Colonel af Klercker at the Military Office of the Swedish Minister of Defence then notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the following officers had been recommended by the Minister of Defence: Captain V.S.H. Tamm (Svea Life-Guards, Director of School); Lieutenants A.W. Thorburn (Bohus Regiment), N.E. Bouveng (Norrbottens Regiment), G.V. Heuman (Göta Artillery Regiment) and A. Nyblom (Engineers)."

A draft contract was sent to Stockholm, to be signed by the officers and returned to Addis Abeba. Due to shortage of time the contract signed on behalf of the Ethiopian authorities would be handed over to the officers on their arrival." The Swedish officers accepted the contract." They were granted leave of absence and accordingly maintained their positions as active officers in the Swedish army. They would therefore be obliged to return to their duties within the Swedish army when so ordered." According to their contract these officers were engaged for a period of three years as from the day of departure from Stockholm (10 November 1934) (Article 1). They were employed as instructors at a Cadet School and maintained their positions as officers in the Swedish army (Article 2). The Captain would be the Director of the School and receive his orders directly from the Emperor or from a person authorized by him (Article 3). The officers were obliged to put themselves at the Ethiopian Government's disposal for military and technical advice (Article 5). In case of war between Ethiopia and another country, or in case of mobilization of the Swedish army the contract would automatically be terminated. In such a case they might at the request

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18 K. Hanner to C.F.H. Hamilton, Addis Abeba HJO 1934, KUD, P 71 Yab I.
19 Telegram Cabinet to Consul Suede, Stockholm 7.11 1934, KUD, P. 71 Yab I.
20 PM angående de svenska officerarnas i Abessinien ställning m.m. undated. Enclosed to letter E. af Klercker to H. Beck-Freis, Stockholm 12.6 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
of the Ethiopian Government and with the permission of the Swedish Government remain in Ethiopian service (Article 6)."

The recruitment of the Swedish officers took place via the military authorities, who made the application from the Emperor known by means of a confidential message to the Swedish corps of officers.

This was the first time that information for a whole professional group was given about employment in Ethiopia. The response from the officers was obviously good, since a positive answer was given to the Ethiopian Emperor only two weeks after the message had been sent to the corps of officers. The whole process from the Emperor’s application via Hanner until the officers left Sweden took less than three months, which must be regarded as a very short time.

A possible explanation for the quick approval of the Swedish Government was that the Emperor had decided to open the Cadet School and to recruit instructors from Sweden on Virgin’s proposal. In that situation it must have been difficult for the Swedish Government to turn down the Emperor’s request. Hanner’s emphasis on the importance of these employments for future appointments of Swedes to important posts in Ethiopia might also have been of importance for the Government’s approval.

*Ethiopian cadets at 'Ecole de Guerre Haile Selassie I*° 1935–1936

It is a difficult task to evaluate the effects upon the society of a military mission like the Swedish one. One method, although not an ideal one, to illuminate possible effects of their work is to follow the careers of the cadets trained by the Swedish officers. General Tamm kept the roll of these cadets, including name, age when enrolled, and rank obtained while at school and on the basis of this roll an attempt to an evaluation of the Swedish Military Mission of 1935–1936 can now be presented. Tamm has also followed the careers of the cadets up to March 1970.°°

The main task of the Swedish Military Mission was to organize a cadet school and to train Ethiopian army officers within the shortest possible time. After having consulted the Emperor, General Virgin decided that the school should give 16 months training, French being the language of instruction.°°°

The school, located at Gennet in Holeta 40 km west of Addis Abeba, was


Table 13. *Ethiopian cadets enrolled in May 1936 by age, when enrolled and by rank reached at school.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16–18</th>
<th>19–21</th>
<th>22–27</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpromoted</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


placed under the Emperor’s direct command and was given the name of *Ecole de Guerre Haile Selassie I* er. As Director of the School, Tamm was expected to consult the Emperor’s private secretary on all matters concerning the school. The number of cadets was planned to be one hundred. The training was divided into three periods, the two first periods of four months each providing basic military training and training for non-commissioned officers respectively. The third period of eight months would constitute officers’ training. Tamm wanted to co-operate with the Belgian Military Mission, whose main task was to organize the troops for which the Swedes were to educate officers. But since no clear instructions had been given on that point no co-operation between the two military missions was established."

The first cadets arrived in January 1935. Altogether 148 cadets were enrolled at the school of whom 138 completed their training. The cadets with a roll number above 105, were, however, enrolled 3–7 months later than the others. All cadets were recruited from French schools, most of them coming from rather wealthy families. Following the Italian victory in May 1936 the school was disbanded."

The ages given for the cadets are based on information given by themselves on enrolling. Since many persons in Ethiopia do not know their exact age, due to lack of civil records, the data given in Table 13 cannot be regarded as exact. However, it gives a rough idea of the ages of the Ethiopian cadets. Most cadets

"Tamm (1936), pp. 72–75.
(66%) were between 16 and 18 years old when enrolled, while 25% were about 20 years old. The cadets were thus very young, some of them only 15 years of age. They attained different ranks during their training. About half the cadets left the school as lieutenants, while about one-fourth reached the rank of captain. On comparing rank and age when recruited we find that the older cadets reached ranks of captain or higher to a greater extent than their younger comrades. Three of the four cadets who were accorded the rank of lieutenant colonel, were liquidated by the Italians. "The fourth lieutenant colonel Negga Haile Selassie, later reached the rank of lieutenant general." Among the nine majors, four were either killed in battle or liquidated by the Italians. Three of the majors reached high military ranks namely Kebede Guebret, Issayas Guebre Selassie, and Moulougueta Bouly. "The fate of two of the majors is unknown. It thus appears that those cadets who were promoted during their education gave good accounts of themselves either in the resistance against the Italians or if they survived the war, by attaining the highest ranks.

Table 15. Comparison between the first Ethiopian course for army officers 1935–1936 and Tamm’s own officers course in Sweden 1915–1916, given in absolute and relative numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cadets</th>
<th>Tamm’s course 1915–1916</th>
<th>Ethiopian course 1935–1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1.3 1970:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>killed in battle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liquidated by enemy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other violent deaths</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(accident, murder etc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dead</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total dead or disappeared</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier or higher (and corresponding civilian rank)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other positions</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* In 1970 Tamm’s comrade officers had an average age of 75, while the average age of the Ethiopian officers was 53. 22 years earlier only 12 of Tamm’s comrades had died, of whom six because of accidents.

What then happened to the 65 cadets who left the school as lieutenants? More than one-fourth of the cadets who did not obtain high ranks at school later reached ranks above captain, four reaching as high a rank as brigadier (Table 14). Thus the lieutenants also gave a good account of themselves.

Tamm has compared the first course for Ethiopian army officers with his own course in Sweden 1915–1916 (Table 15).

Of the 138 cadets remaining at the school in May 1935, at least 75 had died by March 1970. At least 17 were killed in battle against the Italians and at least 24 were executed by the Italians after having been captured. Two officers were killed by the rebels in 1960, namely Moulougueta Bouly and Tadesse Negache. One of the officers, Mengistou Neowaye, initiated the coup in 1960.


No. 11, Tadesse Negache enrolled at 16, reached the rank of captain at the school, Collaborated with the Italians 1936–41, Pardoned by the Emperor, advanced rapidly and became Governor and Minister several times, Minister of Justice when killed in the coup 1960.
against the Emperor, and was hanged after the attempted coup had been crushed." Another officer, Assefa Ayene, took the Emperor's side in 1960 and helped him to crush the revolt." At least 24 of the cadets have reached the rank of brigadier or higher and corresponding civilian positions such as minister, governor general, governor, ambassador, member of the Supreme Court or senator. When looking into the careers of cadets, we find individuals who have opposed the Emperor during times of unrest as, for example, during the attempted coup in 1960, as well as individuals who have supported the Emperor on the same occasions. Many gave their lives in the war against the Italians and others became collaborators and were either killed or pardoned by the Emperor after the liberation. Five of the cadets who reached high positions in society were executed by the Dergue in November 1974."

It can thus be concluded that the cadets trained by the Swedish Military Mission 1935–1936 have in many cases played important roles in the Ethiopian society, both as civilians and as senior officers. They have not formed a particular group, but have been found on different sides with regard to the political development.

2. 5 Swedish staff at the radio station at Aqaqi

In 1928 there was only one telegraph link connecting Addis Abeba with foreign countries. Although this link was owned and maintained by the Ethiopian Government, it was staffed by Italians. Since the beginning of the 20th century book-keeping and international transactions were transacted through the Eritrean administration. Domestic telegraph traffic was also despatched in a similar way. Since Ras Taffari found this system unsatisfactory, he decided in

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10 No. 90, Mengistou Neowaye enrolled at 19, reached the rank of lieutenant at the school, fled to Djibouti during the occupation. Brigadier 1952 and Chief of the Imperial Bodyguard. Initiated the coup in December 1960, hanged in 1961. For information about the attempted coup 1960, see Clapham (1968), pp. 495–507; Greenfeld (1965), pp. 375–452.


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1928 to have a modern radio station built in the neighbourhood of Addis Abeba.\textsuperscript{166}

In 1931 the Ethiopian Government signed a contract with the Italian Ansaldo Company to build a radio station at Aqaqi, situated about seven kilometers outside Addis Abeba.\textsuperscript{167} In the following year it was decided that a European expert should be employed to run the station.\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{Recruitment of Frank Hammar}

In May 1932 Frank Hammar, a civil engineer, wrote to Dr Hanner in Addis Abeba asking for employment in Ethiopia. He had heard from his friend Thore Boström, that there might be a possibility of obtaining employment at the Ethiopian Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.\textsuperscript{169} Hanner assured Hammar of his keen interest in young Swedes being employed in Ethiopia. However, it appeared that the new radio station would be staffed by Italians unless the Ethiopian Government could buy the station and its equipment from Italy for cash. Hanner, however, kept Hammar's papers since a year earlier the Minister of Post and Telecommunications had secretly approached Hanner about the possibility of recruiting Swedish staff for the radio station. For this reason Hanner had asked Vera Boström to mention the possibility of employment for radio engineers to her brother, Thore Boström.\textsuperscript{170} In a second letter a month later Hanner wrote to Hammar on behalf of the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs offering him the post of technical director of the new radio station of Aqaqi. The Ethiopian Government was said to want a neutral person in this position. Hammar was expected to be in Ethiopia by November 1 in order to take over the radio station from the Italians on behalf of the Ethiopian Government. It was stressed that the Emperor did not want anyone to know about Hammar's employment until he had arrived in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{171}

Frank Hammar's contract was signed in Addis Abeba on 1 December 1932 for the position of technical director under the Director of the Radio station

\textsuperscript{166} Hammar (1936), pp. 1–2, FHa.
\textsuperscript{167} Zervos (1936), p. 284.
\textsuperscript{168} Hammar (1936), p. 3, FHa.
\textsuperscript{169} F. Hammar to K. Hanner, Stockholm 27.5 1932, FHa. Frank Hammar b. 1908 d. 1974, Civil engineer. In Ethiopia as technical Director at the radio station at Aqaqi 1932–35. Contact in Ethio-Swedish negotiations 1943–44. See below Ch. V:1. Thore Boström b. 1908 was the brother of Vera Boström. In Ethiopia at the radio station at Aqaqi early 1936.
\textsuperscript{170} K. Hanner to F. Hammar, Addis Abeba 5.8 1932, FHa.
\textsuperscript{171} K. Hanner to F. Hammar, Addis Abeba 6.9 1932, FHa.
in the service of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications for a period of three years."

When Hammar arrived in Ethiopia he found, however, that there was also a French engineer employed for exactly the same job. "How did this double recruitment of experts occur? Sources available do not allow us to reconstruct how the French engineer, Emile Sibilensky, had been recruited. One explanation might be that a Frenchman had held the position of 'conseiller' at the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications from 1923 to 1932." While the station was still under construction the Emperor had sent a French-speaking Ethiopian to France to be trained as a telegrapher." Contacts had therefore already been established in this particular field between France and Ethiopia. But why then was a Swede recruited for the position? As Hanner mentioned in his letter, it seems reasonable that both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Emperor wanted a person from a neutral country in a key position such as a director of the radio station. The Emperor already had a Swedish adviser in political matters working directly under the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this case it might have been important that Hanner could offer a candidate for the position, who could come to Ethiopia at any given notice. Hammar was thus recruited exclusively through personal contacts.

When the Italians learnt that the Ethiopian Government had recruited staff from other countries, they refused to hand over the station to Ethiopia. According to Hammar they particularly disliked the idea that a Frenchman should have something to do with the radio station, because of the existing rivalry between Italy and France over influence in Ethiopia." Hammar and Sibilensky then managed to convince the Emperor to allow them to buy a cheap transmitter from France. While waiting for it to be delivered, they trained Ethiopian telegraphers. A provisional station was inaugurated in October 1933 in the presence of the Emperor. On 31 January 1935 the Italians finally handed over the new station to Ethiopia."

According to his contract Hammar was supposed to leave Ethiopia in December 1935. However, due to accumulated annual leave he was authorized to go already in August 1935. He then sent his family home but agreed to stay until the Ethiopian Government had found someone to replace him. Since they did not manage to find anyone, Hammar himself arranged that Thore Boström should come to replace him. On the day of his departure, Hammar made an oral agreement to return to Ethiopia after four months. However, in

\[\text{"Contract Ministry of P.T.T. and Mr Hammar 1.12 1932 (French translation), FHa.}\]
\[\text{"Hammar (1936), p. 3, FHa.}\]
\[\text{"Zervos (1936), p. 286.}\]
\[\text{"Hammar (1936), p. 3, FHa.}\]
\[\text{"Hammar (1936), p. 6, FHa.}\]
\[\text{"Hammar (1936), pp. 6, 14-16, FHa; Zervos (1936), p. 284.}\]
consequence of the capitulation of Addis Abeba in May 1936 Hammar never returned. After the war he was offered another position at the Ministry of P.T.T., but at that time he was not able to accept the offer."

3. Ethio-Swedish economic relations

In the 1920s the Swedish Match Company (Svenska Tändsticksaktiebolaget, STAB), reached a dominating position on the world market as a result of the match monopolies it had obtained in many countries. Monopoly agreements with Governments were often combined with loan agreements, where STAB granted loans for a period of 25–30 years to Governments in exchange for concessions. STAB thus developed a dominating influence over about three-fifths of the world market in matches. In 1932 STAB had created monopoly concessions in fifteen countries."

The economic depression which originated in the United States in 1929 and affected the whole world also caused the collapse of STAB and wide sectors of Swedish business life. In 1933, the world had started to recover from the depression. Sweden had also partially recovered, mainly as a result of the devaluation of the Swedish Crown to 7 % below the nominal value of the British pound, thereby making Swedish export goods cheaper on international markets. Production in Sweden substantially increased, but without, however, exceeding imports. It was therefore natural for the Swedish export companies to look for new markets, as well as to strengthen their position on existing markets. This chapter will examine how the economic situation in the world affected the Ethio-Swedish economic relations. Did the expanding Swedish engagement in Ethiopia during the first part of the 1930s also affect the economic field?

3. 1 Hanner's and Kolmodin's contacts with Ivar Kreuger

In 1931 and possibly earlier, Hanner entered into contact with Ivar Kreuger at the Swedish Match Company. At present only two sources of information

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4 Ivar Kreuger b. 1880 d. 1932, Engineer. The Swedish Match Company (Svenska Tändsticksaktiebolaget, STAB) was founded in 1917 by merging several Swedish match factories. In 1923 Kreuger founded two companies in the United States, namely International Match Corporation (IMCO) and American Kreuger & Toll. The Kreuger Trust became an international credit institution in the 1920s. T. Dahl and A. Österlind in SMK, vol. 4, pp. 336–39; Runblom (1971), pp. 157–181.

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have become available with regard to this contact, namely a draft of a letter from Knut Hanner to Ivar Kreuger dated September 1931. Hanner’s contact with Kreuger and the Swedish Match Company was apparently for the purpose of obtaining both a loan from Kreuger and his personal contribution to the reorganisation of Ethiopian finances. At the time of writing his letter to Kreuger, Hanner had already received a negative answer from STAB regarding a loan to the Ethiopian Government. On receiving this reply, Hanner asked for an audience with the Emperor and told him that STAB had turned down the request for a loan because of the world economic crisis. The Emperor is said to have emphasized that Ethiopia was potentially rich and if only an efficient control of the financial administration could be established there would be plenty of money available. He therefore wanted to have Swedes in all leading positions in government-owned companies until those institutions had been put on their feet. The Emperor put the question directly to Hanner whether he could obtain people from Sweden to organize the Ethiopian financial administration. Hanner felt that the Emperor no longer regarded the loan as the main issue. The latter is said to have remarked that he wanted to put Ethiopian finances, even the coinage, into the hands of the great Swedish Trust. The most important thing was that a representative of the Trust could come to Ethiopia to discuss the matter with him. The Emperor told Hanner to take this up with Kreuger.

When Kolmodin wrote to Kreuger in order to explain the situation in more detail, he observed that Hanner was probably right in stating that the loan was no longer the main issue, but would rather be used as an excuse for assigning an important post such as organizer and controller within the Ethiopian economic administration to a well-known Swedish business concern. Kolmodin suggested that someone should be sent to Ethiopia to investigate the situation. The Emperor’s financial adviser, Mr Colson, had not been informed of the Emperor’s hopes of making a deal with Kreuger. The Emperor, Kolmodin said, knew that this letter had been written, but he had not asked for information as to its contents, which was an indication of his total confidence.

We do not know how far the contacts between Kreuger and Haile Selassie developed. We do not even know if Kreuger ever took any interest in becoming involved in Ethiopia’s economy. But it would appear that the loan to the Ethiopian Government never materialized and neither did Kreuger go to Ethiopia. One of the main reasons certainly being that Kreuger ran into

K. Hanner to I. Kreuger, Addis Abeba 25.8 1931, UUB, Q 15:11.
difficulties in late 1931, which led to his death in March 1932 and the crash of his financial empire.

Hanner's and Kolmodin's contacts with Kreuger indicate that they had planned to persuade Swedish companies to invest in Ethiopia and thus make Ethiopia a market for Swedish products. With growing commercial connections between Sweden and Ethiopia more opportunities might be created for the employment of Swedes in Ethiopia. This idea is supported by a passage in a letter from Hanner to Frank Hammar in 1932, telling him that he was very interested in having young Swedes employed in Ethiopia. Hanner used to have extensive plans in that direction, but Kreuger's economic collapse had completely altered his chances of success in that respect.185

3.2 Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf's journey to Ethiopia 1935

As part of their efforts to strengthen their position on existing markets and to establish new markets, the General Swedish Export Association arranged a four-and-a-half month public relations journey for Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf to the Mediterranean and the Near East. The journey took place from September 1934 to January 1935, the purpose being to strengthen the economic and cultural relations between Sweden and the countries visited.186

The Crown Prince was accompanied by Crown Princess Louise and his children Princess Ingrid and Prince Bertil. Other members of the Royal party were Björn Prytz, a Board member of the Swedish Export Association and Joen Lagerberg, a Swedish diplomat.187

The visit to Ethiopia, the last country visited during the long journey, took place on 7–15 January 1935. As far as can be ascertained no official communications were undertaken via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding this visit. It was prepared by authorizing General Virgin on his departure from Stockholm in May 1934 to enquire of the Ethiopian Emperor on behalf of the Crown Prince whether he could visit Addis Abeba during his tour. Virgin brought up this question during his first audience with the

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185 K. Hanner to F. Hammar, Addis Abeba 5.8 1932, FHå.
186 Kronprinsparets Orientresa (1935) Preface. The following countries were visited: Greece, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Egypt and Ethiopia.


The Crown Prince's journey is mentioned in Haile Selassie I (1976), pp. 209–210, as being a sign of the firm friendship between Ethiopia and Sweden.
Emperor in June 1934. The Emperor approved of the visit and in July 1934 Virgin was informed that the visit was to take place in January 1935."

During the stay a number of official events such as dinners given by the Emperor and visits to various institutions were included in the programme. One complete day (January 13) was devoted to the Swedish work in Addis Abeba, including visits to the Christian missions.""

Apart from the cultural and official visits, did the stay in Ethiopia offer opportunities to strengthen economic relations between the two countries? Björn Prytz was approached by Mekonnen Habte Wold, the Director General of the Ethiopian Ministry of Commerce, regarding the development of economic relations between Ethiopia and Sweden. Mekonnen acted on direct instructions from Haile Selassie, who wanted to sign a trade agreement with Sweden in order to create a framework for the direct exchange of goods between the two countries. At that time there was some exchange of goods between Sweden and Ethiopia arranged through foreign trade agents. Ethiopia imported matches and telephone equipment from Sweden and exported some coffee, hides and skins to Sweden. Prytz expressed the wish to station a Swedish commercial agent in Ethiopia and to establish a cement factory in the country. The Ethiopian Government accepted these suggestions in principle, but wanted more details about the projects before giving a definite answer."

The journey had established personal contacts between the Swedish Export Association and the Ethiopian Ministry of Commerce.

3. 3 An Ethio-Swedish Treaty for Trade and Friendship 1935

As a result of the journey in the Near East the Board of the Swedish Export Association in the middle of February 1935 approached the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding a Trade Agreement between Sweden and Ethiopia. At the same time a similar approach was made to Irak."

In his letter concerning Ethiopia, Prytz wrote that very intense efforts were being made to develop the country. This development should be taken into consideration by Sweden, especially with regard to the country's very good reputation in Ethiopia. Although the trade between the two countries at that time was not large enough to be recorded in the official trade statistics, some exchange of products had taken place. It was therefore of mutual interest that

" Virgin (1936), p. 163.
" Kronprinsparets Orientresa (1935), p. 211. See also Virgin (1936), pp. 163–189.
" Aide mémoire, Mekonnen Habte Wold to B. Prytz, Addis Abeba, January 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.
" Minutes of the Board 14.2 1935 § 13 and enclosure 6 (Ethiopia) and § 15 and enclosure 11 (Irak), SAE.
a development of direct economic relations took place. A trade treaty provided a suitable frame for these relations. The Export Association also handed over to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs a Memorandum given by Mekonnen Habte Wold to Prytz in Addis Abeba as well as the texts of trade treaties concluded by Ethiopia with Greece and Switzerland.

The matter was delegated to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, where a Treaty of trade and friendship was drafted, based on the trade arrangements which Ethiopia had with other countries. On 22 March 1935, the King-in-Council decided to take up negotiations with Ethiopia regarding a Treaty for trade and friendship according to the draft.

It was later agreed that the negotiations for the Treaty should be conducted in Addis Abeba. O.E.R. Carlander, the Swedish Commercial Attaché in Cairo, was to negotiate on behalf of Sweden. These arrangements were also approved by the Ethiopian Government.

Before starting the negotiations, however, the Swedish Government made enquiries to find out how Italy would react to an Ethio-Swedish trade treaty. Eric Sjöborg, the Swedish envoy in Rome, answered that in view of the deepening conflict between Ethiopia and Italy an Ethio-Swedish treaty would damage Swedish interests in Italy, especially the commercial ones. The mere fact that the Treaty was called a Treaty of Trade and Friendship would make the Italians believe that Sweden took Ethiopia's side against Italy. They would probably regard the commercial part of the treaty mainly as a way of supplying Ethiopia with armaments. Sjöborg therefore suggested that the negotiations for the Treaty should be postponed until a more convenient time.

The issue was probably discussed by the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (Utrikesnämnden) on 17 June 1935. Despite the views forwarded from Rome, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to complete the negotiations with Ethiopia. Apart from the interest in developing commercial relations with Ethiopia, the Ministry had reached the conclusion that it would be opportune to send Carlander to Ethiopia in order to obtain first hand information about

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"B. Prytz to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stthlm 14.2 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab. The issue was discussed by the Board of the Export Association on 14 February 1935, enclosure 6, SAE.

"B. Bolander to S. Sahlin, Stthlm 15.2 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.

"Utkast till vänskaps- och handelsfördrag mellan Sverige och Etiopien, dated 25.2 1935. List of those Ethioplan trade agreements taken into consideration enclosed KUD, HP 64 Yab.

"Copy of Statsrådsprotokoll 22.3 1935 § 7, KUD, HP 64 Yab.

"S. Sahlin to W. Bagge, Stthlm 30.3 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.

"E. Henning to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris 8.6 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.

"Telegram Cabinet to Legation Suede Rome, Stthlm 14.6 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.

"E. Sjöborg to R. Sandler, Rome 17.6 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.


"V.P.M. ang. handelsavtalsförhandlingar med Abessinien, dated 15.6 1935. Handwritten note on the Memo ‘Originalt till Exc för utrikesnämnd 17.6’, KUD, HP 64 Yab.
Carlander was therefore instructed to go to Ethiopia but that, before signing the Treaty, he should ask for authorization by telegram. In addition to the negotiations for the Treaty, Carlander was to hand over instructions for the Swedish officers as to their position with regard to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and to give some oral instructions to General Virgin. Carlander arrived in Addis Abeba on July 24 and met the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Blatengeta Hiruy on the following day. Since the Ethiopians had no major objections to the text the Treaty was signed on 1 August 1935.

The Ethio-Swedish Treaty of Trade and Friendship of 1935 was never ratified which was most probably due to the fact that Ethiopia was attacked by Italy only two months after the Treaty had been signed.

On his return to Cairo, Carlander sent a detailed report to Stockholm about his experiences in Ethiopia. When, he recounted, the rumour about an Ethio-Swedish Treaty started to circulate among the many foreign journalists in Addis Abeba because of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, nobody wanted to believe that it was just an ordinary Treaty for Trade and Friendship. It was generally believed that Carlander had been sent to Ethiopia to negotiate for the shipment of large quantities of arms to Ethiopia. Carlander felt that the conflict between Ethiopia and Italy had to be solved before any progress could be made within the economic field in Ethiopia. If the Ethiopians were left to themselves, he observed, the Europeans would have very little to do in Ethiopia. If, however, Ethiopia in one way or another should come under European influence, wide perspectives would open, because of its rich natural resources such as precious metals, fertile soil and large forests. According to Carlander the Ethiopians were neither interested in developing their resources themselves nor giving concessions to foreigners. No foreign company had at that time made any particular profit out of their activities in Ethiopia.

The rather pessimistic picture reported to Stockholm was most probably influenced by the general situation in Ethiopia during the summer of 1935, when no-one appeared to know what would happen next. Carlander seemed to believe that European pre-dominance would provide the most favourable conditions for development of Swedish commercial interests in Ethiopia.

The Ethio-Swedish Treaty of Trade and Friendship must be seen in the wider political perspective of Haile Selassie’s position in view of the conflict with Italy, and Sweden’s efforts to find new markets for Swedish products.

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23 Chr. Günther to E. Sjöborg, Sthlm 27.6 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.
24 S. Sahlin to O.E.R. Carlander, Sthlm 4.7 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.
25 Westrup to O.E.R. Carlander, Sthlm 4.7 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.
26 Telegram Carlander to Cabinet 1.8 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.
27 O.E.R. Carlander to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cairo 13.8 1935, KUD, HP 64 Yab.
canalized through the General Swedish Export Association. The trade agreement with Ethiopia was nothing unique at that time. Besides this treaty Sweden concluded no less than seven trade agreements during 1935 and another eight the following year. This indicates a pronounced interest in securing markets. On 24 June 1935 Sweden concluded a Trade Agreement with Italy. It is therefore understandable that Sjöborg in mid-June 1935 feared that an Ethio-Swedish Treaty might damage Swedish commercial interests in Italy. When signed the Treaty was interpreted as unfriendly to Italy. In fact the Ethio-Swedish negotiations did not start until July by which time the Italo-Swedish Agreement had been signed. It must, however, be regarded as an expression of considerable interest in securing Ethiopia as a new market that the Swedish Government approved the signing of a Treaty of Trade and Friendship with Ethiopia at a time when such an action would most certainly be interpreted in Italy as the adoption by Sweden of a position in favour of Ethiopia in the deepening Italo-Ethiopian conflict. The Treaty differed from other treaties concluded in 1935–36 because it was the only one called a Treaty of Trade and Friendship. Although it did not contain any obligations to support Ethiopia in case of war, it must still be regarded as a sign of sympathy with Ethiopia. The Treaty is at least an indication that the Swedish Government was hardly in favour of having the Italians gaining too much influence in the country. That attitude can, however, be interpreted as indicating that by signing the Treaty, Sweden would have improved the possibility of gaining a potentially rich country as a market for Swedish products. That was certainly also in line with Hanner’s ambitions, as expressed in his contacts with Kreuger in 1931 and with Hammar in 1932. For the Emperor it was certainly something useful to establish a formal relation with a friendly country in a time of crisis.

4. The Swedes and the Italo-Ethiopian conflict

As we have seen in Chapter IV:1, the Swedish missionaries were able to stay in Ethiopia during the war but were expelled when Ethiopia had been defeated. We are now going to look into the way the Swedish authorities handled the

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26 Sveriges överenskommelser med främmande makter 1935–1936, Passim. In 1935 and 1936 Sweden concluded various kinds of Trade agreements. In 1935: Greece (17.1), France (22.3), New Zealand (24.5), The United States (22.5), Italy (24.6), Spain (23.8), Irak (3.11). In 1936: Greece (11.1), France (18.1), Turkey (27.2), Guatemala (11.6), Salvador (23.6), Italy (5.9 and 1.12), Greece (30.12).

27 Sveriges överenskommelser med främmande makter 1935, p. 213.

28 See also Adamson (1976), P. 46 and p. 58.
issue of having Swedish officers in Ethiopian service when the latter country was at war, and what humanitarian actions were taken in Sweden to support Ethiopia.

As mentioned in the introduction Carol Adamson in her Ph.D. thesis *Sweden and the Ethiopian crisis 1934–38* has examined the Swedish officers' position during the war as well as the Swedish Red Cross Ambulance Brigade. Due to our using mainly the same sources, namely the records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those of the Swedish Red Cross, there will be some duplication of research, although our approach is not exactly the same. The present author has, however, obtained some additional sources from Viking Tamm's and Frde Hylander's archives. In this study the emphasis is placed on the contact pattern when taking action for Ethiopia before the war, as well as the result of this action, looked upon as one part of the Ethio-Swedish relations. Adamson's study emphasises the actions undertaken by the Swedish Government during the whole crisis, including Sweden's attitude in the League of Nations.

4.1 The position of the Swedish officers in case of war

In February 1935 the Italian diplomatic representative in Stockholm made cautious enquiries of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as to the duties of the Swedish officers in Ethiopia. When the Italo-Ethiopian relations became more critical during the winter and spring of 1935 and at times appeared to be insoluble except by recourse to war, the Italians became particularly interested in the position of the Swedish officers. They expressed to Henric Lagercrantz, the Swedish Military Attaché in Rome, certain complaints about the Belgians, but had none about the younger Swedish officers. That statement might, of course, be interpreted as an indirect complaint against General Virgin and Captain Tamm. On enquiring about the instructions of the Belgian officers, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs learnt that the Belgians had orders not to accept any political commissions. They would be ordered back to Belgium in case of war. It was then decided that the Swedish officers through General Virgin should be given the same


Chr. Günther to E. Sjöborg, Stockholm 12.2 1935; *Samtal med italiensk Chargé d'Affaires Stockholm 20.2 1935* signed RS (Richard Sandler), KUD, P 71 Yab I.


Telegram Cabinet to Legation Suède Bruxelles, Stockholm 20.2 1935; Telegram Dardel to Cabinet, Bruxelles 21.2 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab I.
instructions as the Belgians.” The Italian Chargé d’Affaires was informed to that effect.

In April 1935 a special memorandum was prepared by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding issues on employment of Swedish officers in foreign service. Any requests from a foreign country concerning employment of Swedish officers should first be considered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence. Thus if another authority in one way or another received an enquiry, it had to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately. Until that was done no military office was permitted to take any action in selection of personnel.” It thus appears that due to the strained Italo-Ethiopian relations the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was anxious to avoid involvement of Swedish officers in Ethiopia beyond their control. They might even have had in mind Hanner’s informal inquiries about a successor to Kolmodin in 1933. It was thus in accordance with these guidelines when an application to Swedish military authorities sent by Virgin in early July 1935 regarding two Swedish Air Force officers to serve as instructors at a planned Ethiopian Flying School, was turned down by the Swedish authorities. The reason given was that the Swedish Air Force could not do without any of its officers.” The real reason was probably that a positive answer might have been regarded by Italy as a provocation.

Already during the Spring of 1935 Tamm had apparently made plans about what to do in case of war. According to their contracts, the Swedish officers were supposed to return to Sweden unless otherwise agreed. Colonel E. af Klercker at the Army Command informed Tamm and Virgin in April 1935 that it was the practice in Sweden that officers serving in foreign armies in time of war would be allowed to resign, but by implication also might be allowed to resume their duties in the Swedish army after returning to Sweden. Colonel af Klercker wanted to postpone the question of whether or not this would be the case until the situation actually arose.” He also pointed out to Tamm that the Italians were following the activities of the Swedish officers with keen

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21 PM 21.2 1935, signed BF (Beck-Friis), KUD, P 71 Yab I.
22 PM 22.2 1935, signed BF (Beck-Friis), KUD, P 71 Yab I.
23 PM angående handläggning av ärende rörande anställningar i främmande staters tjänst av svenska officerare, Stockholm 5.4 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab I.
24 Presscuttings from Nya Dagligt Allehanda 9.7 1935 and Stockholm-tidningen Stockholms Dagblad 9.7 1935. NDA quotes an official communique from the Swedish Air Force, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
25 PM angående de svenska officerarnas i Abessinien ställning m.m. quotation from letter E. af Klercker to E. Virgin and V. Tamm, Stockholm 25.4 1935. The letter is missing among Tamm’s papers, but is referred to in other correspondence indicating that Tamm really received the letter, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
interest and reminded Tamm during the summer not to accept any duties which might arouse Italian suspicions."

The Italian pressure on Sjöborg in Rome appears to have been considerable. The continued presence of Swedish officers in Ethiopia was regarded by Italy as seriously detrimental to Swedish-Italian relations. However, by July, after the Emperor had accepted their conditions, all the Swedish officers had decided to remain in Ethiopian service even in case of war. The Swedes were supposed to stay on in the management and instruction at the Cadet school, where the training would continue. They would moreover be be at the Emperor's disposal to act as liaison officers to army divisions placed under his direct command. Although the situation was still very uncertain, the Emperor and most other people seemed to be convinced that war would break out. When it became known that the officers planned to stay even in case of war their families, via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram urging them not to sign new contracts. However, pressure from his family could not make Tamm change his mind. He explained to his parents that he would not alter his decision to stay, particularly since one of the officers, Nyblom, had changed his mind, and consequently the others felt themselves under heavier responsibility to stay. The new contract was signed on 15 September 1935.

When Italy attacked Ethiopia on October 3 the High Command of the Swedish Armed Forces withdrew permission for the Swedish officers to stay abroad as from October 4. Four of the five officers, Tamm, Thorburn, Bouveng and Heuman then applied for permission to resign their positions in the Swedish army and the Swedish Government consented on 8 October 1935. Nyblom returned home for family reasons. The Belgian Military Mission was recalled on the outbreak of the war and returned home.

Immediately after the outbreak of war the Italian Minister in Stockholm checked with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as to its attitude

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E. Sjöborg to H. Beck-Friis, Rome 23.7.1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II. See also Adamson (1976), p. 58.
V. Tamm to E. af Klercker 13.7.1935 (Copy), KrA, VT, vol. 2.
Telegram Cabinet to Tamm Stockholm 16.8.1935 (Code). The telegram was sent on behalf of Tamm, Lagercrantz, Kjellberg, Nyblom. Telegram decoded by Hanner, KrA, VT, vol. 2.
Conditions d'engagement de quatre anciens officiers de l'arme Royale Suédoise par le Gouvernement Impérial Ethiopien, KrA, VT, vol. 2.
Telegram Armékommando to Consulat suède, Addis Abeba, Stockholm 4.10.1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
Telegram Armékommando to Consulat suède Addis Abeba, Stockholm 9.10.1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
Telegram Dardel to Cabinet, Bruxelles 3.10.1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
regarding the Swedish officers in Ethiopia. He was informed that if the officers resigned their positions their action would be approved by Swedish authorities. The Italian Minister found this situation very remarkable and informed the Swedish Minister that Italian public opinion would probably consider the Swedish Government responsible for the officers staying in Ethiopia if their applications for resignation were approved. Since Lagercrantz, the Swedish Military Attaché in Rome, was related to Tamm, it was considered inconvenient for him to return to his position, unless Tamm could be convinced to return home. It was, however, deemed so important that Lagercrantz should return to Italy that the Swedish envoy in Rome recommended that Tamm, both officially and through his father and father-in-law, should be ordered to return home.

However, Tamm and three officers stayed in Ethiopia during the whole war. They remained at the Cadet school, where they trained a special brigade. They returned to Sweden in May 1936, after Ethiopia had been defeated.

The fact that the Swedish army officers with the consent of Swedish authorities continued their duties in Ethiopia during the whole war, despite strong pressures not to and the obvious risk of complications in Italo-Swedish relations, indicated that the Swedish political and military authorities supported Ethiopia’s case. Haile Selassie undoubtedly became strengthened in his positive view of Sweden, particularly as the Belgian Military Mission left the country on the outbreak of the war.

4.2 The Swedish Red Cross Ambulance Brigade and Field Hospital

We have seen how the Swedish officers in Ethiopia had decided to stay in Ethiopia in case of war and that all but one remained during the whole war. In this chapter we shall investigate the preparations undertaken in Sweden to support Ethiopia as well as the composition of the Red Cross Ambulance Brigade. A few observations will also be made about their work in Ethiopia. The original intention was to investigate the recruitment of the personnel by checking all incoming applications from interested candidates. There were namely so many applications that they were placed in a separate file. Despite an extensive search it has been impossible to find the file either in the Red Cross Deposition at Riksarkivet or at the Red Cross Head Office in Stockholm. It would appear that the file has been lost. Research into the number of

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225 PM angående samtal mellan italienske ministern och kabinettsskreteraren, signed Günther Stockholm 4.10 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
226 PM dated Stockholm 11.10 1935, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
227 The role of the Swedish officers during the war lies outside the scope of this book. Tamm (1936), pp. 192–327.
applicants and their possible motives in joining the Ambulance Brigade has therefore had to be abandoned.

_The preparations for the Ambulance Brigade and Field Hospital_

During the autumn of 1934 Erik Stiernstedt, Secretary General of the Swedish Red Cross Central Committee, contacted General Virgin in Addis Abeba about the conditions in Ethiopia. General Virgin answered in early January 1935, telling him about the political difficulties in Ethiopia and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis. During the summer of 1935 the Swedish Red Cross Central Committee under the personal leadership of its chairman Prince Carl made preparations for assisting Ethiopia in case of war.15

The initiative for an Ambulance Brigade seems to have originated from Fride Hylander and Gunnar Agge, who in July 1935 contacted Hans Key-Åberg, a physician wellknown to the Red Cross, because he had worked for them before. Key-Åberg contacted the Red Cross office in Stockholm placing himself at their disposal as Chief of an ambulance brigade for Ethiopia and mentioning Hylander and Agge as willing to participate.23 Enquiries were sent to General Virgin in Addis Abeba, regarding the need for medical assistance and regarding Ethiopian opinion about receiving a Swedish ambulance brigade in case of war.23 At the same time Prince Carl turned to Hylander enquiring whether he was willing to participate in a possible brigade. He was also asked to prepare a plan of organization for such a brigade.23 Hylander considered it very important for Sweden's future work in Ethiopia that in time of danger they support the Ethiopian people and within a week he sent a plan of organization for an ambulance brigade.23 After having received Hylander's positive reply Prince Carl contacted the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the secret preparations taken for equipping the brigade. However, according to the Geneva Convention the consent of the Swedish Government was necessary for sending an ambulance brigade of this kind. Prince Carl asked the Minister whether it would be possible to equip the Brigade with Government funds or with extensive support from the


23 Carl to E. Virgin 31.7 1935; E. Stjernstedt to E. Virgin 8.8 1935, RA, SRK, Överstyrelsen, B III e vol. 1.

23 Carl to F. Hylander, Sthlm 8.8 1935, RA, SRK, Överstyrelsen B III e vol. 1.

Government, and whether the brigade could be given dimensions that were sufficiently large to become a substitute for possible economic sanctions against Italy. Prince Carl maintained that an ambulance brigade supported by the Government would clearly demonstrate sympathy for Ethiopia from the Swedish Government and the Swedish people, without the Swedish Government abandoning its neutrality. The fact that the Red Cross of a country sends an ambulance brigade to only one side in a war had never before been looked upon as a hostile action.\textsuperscript{23}

We do not know what answer the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave to Prince Carl. The reply appears to have been positive towards the ambulance brigade but not with regard to financing by the Government. At its September meeting the Swedish Red Cross Central Committee decided to equip and send an ambulance brigade to Ethiopia in case of war. Hylander's plan would be used as a starting point and the financing would be arranged through a nationwide subscription.\textsuperscript{24} Hylander was confidentially informed of the decision and, at the same time, of the proposal to make him chief of the Ambulance Brigade.\textsuperscript{25} Dr Knut Hanner, the Swedish Consul in Addis Abeba also vice president of the Ethiopian Red Cross, and the executives of the other Scandinavian Red Cross Organizations were confidentially informed of the plans.\textsuperscript{26} Erling Eidem, the Archbishop, was contacted regarding an appeal on behalf of a subscription, a matter which he immediately approved.\textsuperscript{27}

The same day that Italy attacked Ethiopia, Prince Carl applied to the Swedish Government for permission to send an ambulance brigade to Ethiopia, in accordance with the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{28} The Prime Minister immediately orally informed Prince Carl that the Swedish Government would permit the Red Cross to send an ambulance brigade and field hospital.\textsuperscript{29} The formal decision was taken by the King-in-Council on 8 October 1935.\textsuperscript{30} On the same day the Swedish consulate in Addis Abeba was asked to discuss the Swedish plans with Ethiopian authorities. The consulate was also informed that the Brigade would be under the leadership of Dr Fride Hylander, Dr

\textsuperscript{23} Carl to Minister of Foreign Affairs 26.8 1935, KUD, HP 35D I.
\textsuperscript{24} Minutes of SRK 16.9 1935.
\textsuperscript{25} Carl to F. Hylander, Stockholm 17.9 1935, RA, SRK, Överstyrelsen, B III e vol. 1.
\textsuperscript{26} Carl to K. Hanner, Stockholm 19.9 1935; Carl to J. Meinich (Norwegian Red Cross), Stockholm 23.9 1935; Carl to Chairman of the Danish Red Cross, Stockholm 17.9 1935, RA, SRK, Överstyrelsen B III e vol. 1. The Ethiopian Red Cross, constituted in July 1935 (Ethiopian Red Cross, p. 59; Hylander (1936), p. 115; Haile Selassie I (1976), pp. 210–211.)
\textsuperscript{28} Carl to the King, Stockholm 3.10 1935, KUD, HP 35 D I.
\textsuperscript{29} VPM from E. Stiernstedt, Stockholm 4.10 1935, KUD, HP 35 D I.
Gunnar Agge and pastor Josef Svensson, all three being known to the Emperor.\(^4\) The Ethiopian Government agreed to receive them.\(^4\) The Italian representation in Stockholm was informed that the Ambulance Brigade would be sent and was given a list of the names of the participants.\(^4\)

Interest in the Ambulance Brigade was great among the Swedish population. An appeal was launched and lists for subscription were sent to all local Red Cross associations in Sweden. By a nation-wide campaign money was collected from all over the country. Between October 10 and November 20 about 678,000 Sw Crowns had been collected, almost twice as much as the estimated cost for the Ambulance Brigade.\(^4\) Contributions of substantial size were made by organizations like the Cooperative Union and the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions as well as from private persons. On October 22, only 12 days after the first orders had been placed, all equipment for the Ambulance Brigade and Field Hospital was sent to Ethiopia. Five specially constructed Volvo lorries, to transport the equipment and staff in Ethiopia were also sent by train and by boat during October. On 11 November 1935 the entire equipment, as well as the whole staff of the Brigade, arrived in Djibouti.\(^4\)

We have thus seen that already in August and September 1935 the Swedish Red Cross undertook preparations for sending an ambulance brigade to Ethiopia in case of war. The initiative to support the Ethiopian people by means of medical assistance most probably originated with Fride Hylander, Gunnar Agge and with Hans Key-Åberg, who were familiar with the poor medical conditions in the country. The present author is thus prepared to go a bit further than Adamson regarding the initiative to the Ambulance Brigade, but agrees with Adamson that its realization stemmed from several sources.\(^4\) Stiernstedt, who had been informed about the political conditions in Ethiopia by Virgin early in 1935, most probably easily accepted the idea, as did Prince Carl. The rapid actions taken, including preparations for a nation-wide appeal for a subscription, can also be regarded as a manifestation of positive feelings towards Ethiopia not only within the Red Cross organization, but also among the Swedish population in general. Due to the foresight of the Red Cross in having made plans for the organization as well as the manning and financing

\(^{16}\) Telegram Cabinet to Consulate in Addis Abeba 8.10 1935 KUD, HP 35 D I. Published in Akstycyen 1935–36, p. 9.


\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 10, Kabinettsssekreteraren i Utrikesdepartementet to italienske minister i Stockholm, Stockholm 29.10 1935.

\(^{16}\) Röda Korsets årsberättelse 1936, pp. 198–201.


\(^{16}\) Adamson (1976), p. 60, stating that it is unclear how this project was born.
of an ambulance brigade in co-operation with individuals well familiar with the conditions in Ethiopia, it was possible to equip and send it to Ethiopia within a month of the outbreak of war. The early support of the Swedish Government, which made possible the whole action is an indication of sympathy with Ethiopia also from them.

The staff of the Swedish Ambulance Brigade

Since the file with applications has been lost we can obtain information only about those persons recruited for the Brigade. The Emperor had given the Red Cross to understand that no female personnel would be allowed among the staff. A special subcommittee was responsible for recruitment. They received applications from more than 400 persons, Swedes as well as foreigners. Since no females were admitted, there were difficulties in finding competent male nurses, although there were many applicants. There were also several offers of aeroplanes with pilots. Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen’s offer to place himself and his aeroplane at the disposal of the Brigade was accepted.

A large number of applications was received during August and September i.e. long before it was certain that the Ambulance Brigade would really be needed.

The Ambulance Brigade was manned by 12 persons. The staff included four physicians, two assistant physicians, one superintendent, one mechanic and four male nurses, one of whom was also a mechanic. A

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298 RA, SRK, Överstyrelsen, Cla, vol. 18.
300 Fride Hylander (Chief physician), see Ch. IV n. 41; Gunnar Agge (Deputy Chief), see Ch. IV n. 43; Erik B:son Norup b. 1907 d. 1975, Bacteriologist, physician. Returned to Ethiopia as Director of Haile Selassie I Hospital 1945–1950; Eric Smith b. 1906, Physician, left the Brigade in April 1936.
301 Torgny Björk b. 1908, Graduate in medicine; Åke Holm b. 1912, Graduate in medicine. Returned to Ethiopia as chief of the hospital in Yirgalem 1946–47.
302 Josef Svensson, see Ch. IV n. 43.
303 Curt Allander b. 1907, Mechanic. Returned to Sweden in April 1936, due to illness.
thirteenth member, Carl Gustaf von Rosen was attached to the Brigade as pilot. When the files with applications could not be found, the present author contacted Fride Hylander regarding the recruitment of the Brigade members. He stated that he never attended the meetings during which the applications were scrutinized, although he was generally consulted regarding the choice of persons. When Hylander was appointed chief of the Brigade he suggested that Josef Svensson should be administrative officer, because of his experience from economic and administrative duties within missionary work in Ethiopia. He also suggested that an epidemiologist/bacteriologist and nurses should be recruited. He had nothing to do with the choice of the remaining members. The medical staff was selected by Dr Edén who, besides being Head of the Division of the National Swedish Board of Health, was also a member of the Red Cross Board. Since the Emperor did not accept female nurses this category was replaced by medical students. Swedish missionary societies had a dominating representation among the staff. The three leaders Dr Hylander, Dr Agge and Pastor Svensson all belonged to the group of SMBV missionaries who had been obliged to resign from that organization in early 1932. Two of the male nurses, Manfred Lundgren and Gunnar Lundström were students at SEM's mission-institute at Johannelund.

Dr Norup was the son of a Member of the Swedish Parliament, who was also lay chairman of the Mission Covenant Church. Anders Joelson was related to Petter Andersson, missionary for SEM, thus having a mission tradition in his family. According to Hylander the Red Cross had recruited somebody who shortly afterwards proved to be unsuitable for the job. One of the recruitment committee members had then stated that they had to be more careful when selecting the staff, adding that they had better keep to the mission societies who had people willing to engage in primitive field work and with training for such work. One of Norup's personal merits besides being a bacteriologist, was, according to Hylander, that he had been considering to enter into mission work. Johansson and von Rosen were both favoured by Prince Carl, the former being called 'the Prince's candidate'. Allander was recommended by Volvo as one of their best mechanics. He had experience from tough expeditions after having been a member of the Foreign Legion for several years.

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See above Ch. IV:1. 2 below Ch. VI:1. 2.

Rodén (1938), p. 185.


F. Hylander to V. Halldin, Runtuna 31.8 1972, VHN.


Josephson (1936), p. 73.
seven of the 13 members of the Brigade thus had some connection with mission societies, three of them having several years of experience from mission work in Ethiopia. The strong links with the mission societies, besides the fact that the initiative most probably originated from former missionaries, would indicate a deliberate policy by the Red Cross to recruit people with a Christian view of life.

Red Cross Brigades from other countries

The Swedish Red Cross Brigade was not the only one to be sent to Ethiopia, but it was the first one to arrive. When the war broke out the Ethiopian Red Cross appealed for help to the International Red Cross Organization in Geneva. By the end of 1935 twenty-five national Red Cross organizations had sent medical assistance to Ethiopia in the form of money, material and personnel. Ethiopia equipped six national brigades. All mission hospitals in Ethiopia were placed at the disposal of the Ethiopian Red Cross. Physicians from the Adventist mission, the Catholic and the Presbyterian missions were engaged by the Ethiopian Red Cross. Ambulance brigades were sent by the Red Cross organizations in Great Britain (20 people), Sweden (13 people), The Netherlands (9 people), Norway (5 people), Egypt (11 people) and Finland (5 people). In addition to their national staff these brigades employed a large number of Ethiopian sanitarians and other personnel. The Red Cross staff closely collaborated with the Ethiopian Government as well as with the foreign Christian Missions. To mention an example, the Finnish Red Cross Ambulance Brigade used the Swedish Mission BV hospital in Harer to treat wounded people.

The Swedish Ambulance Brigade and Field Hospital at work

According to his instructions Dr Hylander was to establish contact with the Ethiopian Red Cross as well as with other Red Cross Brigades. He should continuously report to the Red Cross in Stockholm about the work of the Ambulance Brigade. The economic situation did not allow the Brigade to stay longer than four months, unless the Ethiopian Government would guarantee to finance a prolonged stay in the country.

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26 Le Croix-Rouge dans le conflit italo-éthiopien. 332me circulaire, Geneve 27.12 1935, pp. 1–5. See also Haile Selassie I (1976), pp. 211–212.

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Upon its arrival at Addis Abeba the Swedish Ambulance Brigade was divided into two groups. The smaller group led by Dr Agge, consisting of Björk, Johansson and about ten Ethiopian members, proceeded towards south-eastern Ethiopia with one newly bought lorry. The main group, headed by Dr Hylander, went towards the south with the five Volvo lorries. Carl Gustaf von Rosen was stationed in Addis Abeba in order to supply the two groups with equipment and to take wounded persons to Addis Abeba. The Hylander group was machine-gunned from the air on December 22, but without any human or material losses. On December 30, the same group was bombed by Italian aircraft, although their camp was well marked with the Red Cross flag and the Swedish and Ethiopian flags. The whole camp was destroyed and 28 of 60 patients were killed and many were wounded. Lundström was so seriously wounded that he died on the following day. Hylander was seriously wounded and was taken by plane from Negelli to Addis Abeba, where he later recovered. Lundgren was also wounded, though not seriously. The bombing caused strong reactions both in Sweden and internationally. Dr Marcel Junod, Swiss by nationality and Sidney Brown the delegates in Ethiopia from the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva made an investigation on the spot into the circumstances involved in the attack. Sweden protested to the Italian authorities and demanded a thorough investigation of the event, which was considered as a serious violation of the League Convention. The matter was discussed in Geneva both within the International Red Cross and at the League of Nations. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give an account of all investigations conducted into the Italian bombing.

Although reduced in number after the bombing the Hylander group continued its work throughout January, but in February they returned to Addis Abeba. They had treated a total of 1 100 registered patients, of whom 915 received polyclinical treatment and the rest were hospitalized. There were 750 medical and 350 surgical cases.
When Hylander recovered, his group was reorganized (March 1936) and made more mobile by the acquisition of some 30 mules. Allander and Smith returned to Sweden, Allander for health and Smith for political reasons. Norup, Holm, Joelson and Lundgren were willing to prolong their contracts to the end of June, while Hylander and Svensson were prepared to stay longer. The reorganized group then went to Bale to establish contact with the Agge group. During March the Hylander-Norup group treated about 1,800 patients, of whom 27 suffered from injuries caused by mustard gas. The Agge group had treated altogether about 1,300 patients. By March 1936 von Rosen had made 55 flights and transported a total of 81 passengers. The Agge group remained at Elod in the province of Bale. Agge informed Hylander by letter that he and Björk were willing to prolong their contracts to the end of May but no longer. On April 11, the Hylander and Agge groups met at Elod.

When the Agge and Hylander groups met to return home in May via Addis Abeba, they found the way closed due to the war and were forced to go south where they joined the Norwegian Ambulance Brigade near Yirgalem in mid-July. After a very adventurous journey during which no messages about their fate reached Sweden, they arrived at Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, in early August. On 3 September 1936, the eight remaining members of the Ambulance Brigade arrived at Stockholm.

In conclusion it can be stated that the Swedish Government clearly demonstrated a positive attitude towards Ethiopia in the Italo-Ethiopian crisis by allowing four Swedish army officers to resign their positions in the Swedish army to stay in Ethiopia and to allow the Swedish Red Cross to send an Ambulance Brigade. These two decisions were taken on the same day by the King-in-Council, although the Swedish Government must have been aware of the risk of meeting difficulties in the Italo-Swedish relations. The wholehearted engagement of the Swedish Red Cross and the rapid and good result of the subscription demonstrated sympathy and deep engagement for Ethiopia’s case among the Swedish population. A close connection has been

276 Josephson (1936), pp. 15–17, 38–43.
162 IIbid., p. 18. For other more popularly written accounts of the Brigade’s experiences see for example Agge (1936), Hylander (1936), Johansson (1936).
found between the staff of the Ambulance Brigade and the missionary societies SEM and SMBV. It is beyond doubt that these two voluntary Swedish contributions to support Ethiopia with the consent of the Swedish Government, exerted a favourable influence on Haile Selassie’s view of Sweden.

5. Summary

Two different phases can be noted in the Ethio-Swedish relations up to 1936: the period 1866–1924, when there were only missionaries in the country, and the period 1924–1936 when, in addition to the missionaries, different categories of Swedish personnel found employment in Ethiopian Government service.

In 1865 the Swedish Evangelical Mission decided to work among the Oromo peoples in Ethiopia, because it had been recommended to them by representatives of foreign missionary societies with experience from the area. When the first SEM-missionaries arrived in Massawa in 1866, the political situation prevented them from proceeding to the Oromo areas. Instead of abandoning their goal, they started working in Eritrea. The work was successively expanded, despite the fact that many missionaries died or had to return to Sweden for health reasons, particularly during the early decades. The Oromo areas were opened to Swedish missions towards the end of the 19th century by Ethiopian evangelists working for SEM and by Karl Cederqvist who reached Addis Abeba in 1904.

After the First World War political difficulties for Swedish mission in Eritrea coincided with Ras Taffari’s efforts to attract foreign staff. Resources were then transferred from Eritrea to the Ethiopian Empire. Ras Taffari encouraged missionary societies of different nationalities to establish schools and clinics. In the 1920s the Swedish mission schools played an important role in the education of Ethiopians. A quantitative survey demonstrated that the missionaries had long active periods of service, often more than 20 years. The missionaries constituted a professionally diversified group of workers, most of them trained as teachers, medical staff or pastors. It appears that Ras Taffari consciously used the educational and medical resources offered by the missionary societies as part of his own development programme. It is beyond doubt that the work of the Swedish missionaries had laid the foundation of Ras Taffari’s positive view of Sweden and it was through the missionary societies SEM and SMBV that he first approached Sweden.

After 1924 Swedes were recruited for various duties in Ras Taffari’s personal service, certainly as a result of his experience of the missionaries’ work and from impressions gained during his visit to Sweden that year. Clear
connections can be traced between Ras Taffari's contacts with missionary societies and the recruitment of medical staff. There was also a strong connection between the missionary societies and the members of the Red Cross Ambulance Brigade.

Haile Selassie took the initiative in recruiting Swedes in all cases except the one concerning the Swedish Military Mission. Personal contacts appear to have played a considerable role and all employees other than the Army officers were selected on the basis of personal relationships. Nathan Söderblom played, for example, an important role for the recruitment of Kolmodin as the Emperor's adviser in foreign affairs. The understanding between Haile Selassie and the Swedish Royal Family most probably strengthened the former's positive view of Sweden. Members of the Royal Family on several occasions engaged themselves in activities aimed at creating good will for Sweden in Ethiopia. The fact that Sweden, like Ethiopia, was an old monarchy was certainly a factor to take into consideration when judging the reasons for Haile Selassie to expand his relations with Sweden. The importance of personal relationships is further indicated by the fact that official Ethiopian applications to Swedish authorities were turned down three times, most probably due to political considerations.

The Ethiopian cadets enrolled at the 'Ecole de Guerre de Haile Selassie 1ère', headed by Viking Tamm, were used as a small case study in an effort to measure the impact of the work of a particular group of Swedish professionals by following the careers of the cadets. It was then found that a substantial number of the cadets who survived the war, later reached influential positions in the Ethiopian administration. They were found to have taken different sides in Ethiopian affairs, and have thus never acted as a united group.

The Emperor appears to have been interested in establishing an economic contact with Sweden, eagerly supported in that direction by Hanner, who was a strong advocate in expanding the Ethio-Swedish relations within all fields possible. After the economic depression in the early 1930s the Swedish Export Association became interested in opening up Ethiopia as a market for Swedish products. The Swedish Royal Family, represented by Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf, was used to give publicity to Swedish business life. The Ethio-Swedish co-operation culminated when the Swedish Government concluded a Treaty of Trade and Friendship with Ethiopia in 1935. This Treaty must be seen in a wider political perspective, namely in the general rush for markets after the world depression in the early 1930s. Besides sympathy with Ethiopia, there were apparently also Swedish advocates of European control of Ethiopia. The possibility can therefore not be excluded that Swedish business life was interested in establishing a foothold in Ethiopia in case the country later under Italian dominance. Voices objecting to the Swedish officers' staying in Ethiopia because of the risk of deteriorating Sweden's relations with Italy
might be interpreted in that direction.

The Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935 interrupted a continuous expansion of the Ethio-Swedish relations which had taken place since 1924. Swedish authorities and the Swedish people demonstrated their solidarity with Ethiopia by allowing the Army officers to continue their training of Ethiopian cadets and by sending a Red Cross Ambulance Brigade. These acts, in addition to the work performed by the missionaries, the advisers and the experts, most certainly strengthened Haile Selassie in his view of Sweden as a suitable partner in his efforts to develop Ethiopia.
Chapter V
Ethio-Swedish relations 1943–1952

As stated earlier the contacts between Sweden and Ethiopia were interrupted in 1936. This chapter will deal with the resumption of Ethio-Swedish relations after the Italian occupation. Did the Swedes then become engaged within the same fields as before the war? Can any connection be traced between the Christian missions and the experts in Ethiopian Government service?

Special attention will be paid to the Emperor’s channels of communication when contacting Sweden. The investigation of Swedish experts will be given a statistical basis, including also their family members. The Swedish Military Mission will be used as a case study to exemplify Haile Selassie’s policy when recruiting foreign advisers as well as Swedish work in Ethiopia. Other categories of experts will only be dealt with briefly.

1. Ethiopian enquiries for Swedish experts 1943–1945

As far as can be ascertained, the first enquiries concerning employment of Swedes in Ethiopia after Haile Selassie’s restoration were communicated via the Ethiopian Legations in London, Cairo and Moscow during 1943 and 1944. These contacts were intensified in 1945. The contents of these enquiries and the channels of communication used by the Emperor will now be studied. We shall also examine whether the Emperor’s enquiries or the Swedish responses to these enquiries underwent any change between 1943 and 1945.

1.1 Comment on the sources

The investigation is entirely based on unpublished sources. Negotiations via official channels can be reconstructed more or less in detail from the Records of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The British and American reactions to the Swedish involvement in Ethiopian affairs can be investigated from documents kept at the Public Records Office in London and at the National Archives in Washington. The
Ethio-Swedish contacts that passed along unofficial channels have been reconstructed from private collections of persons who themselves took part in the events of 1943–1945. Private collections have been placed at my disposal by Frank Hammar, Frida Hylander, Erik Leijonhufvud, Per Stjärne and Viking Tamm.¹ The private collections of these persons together with the Records of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and documents at the Public Records Office and the National Archives, provide a set of contemporary primary sources offering a firm basis for an analysis of the Ethio-Swedish contacts in 1943–1945.

1. 2 Ethio-Swedish contacts via London, Cairo and Moscow, 1943–1944

Due to the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942, Ethiopia had limited possibilities of entering into contact with other European countries regarding expert aid.² We shall now examine how the Emperor combined the use of private contacts and official diplomatic channels to reestablish his pre-war relations with Sweden.

When Frank Hammar in August 1943 paid a private visit to the Ethiopian Legation in London, he was given a special commission to undertake preparatory investigations in Sweden to find a physician qualified to combine a position as personal physician to the Imperial family with unofficial functions as the Emperor’s adviser in European affairs. Hammar was authorized to contact General Eric Virgin and Colonel Viking Tamm in order to find a suitable candidate. Swedish businessmen and capital were also invited to take part in Ethiopia’s economic reconstruction.³

Since Hammar had been given the commission on a strictly confidential basis, he did not contact the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs until February 1944 when he needed help to transmit an answer to the Legation in London.⁴ It was agreed that Hammar should send the Ministry a memorandum on his talks with the Ethiopian Legation in August 1943.⁵ The Ministry was then informed of the actions taken. On his return to Sweden in September 1943, Hammar had turned over the mission to General Virgin, who

¹ Frank Hammar see Ch. IV n. 169; Frida Hylander see Ch. IV n. 41; Erik Leijonhufvud b. 1907, Lawyer, banker. In Ethiopia as Legal adviser and Acting attorney general to the Ethiopian Government 1945–48. Played an important role in the negotiations for a Swedish government credit to Ethiopia in 1945 and 1946 see below, Ch. V:4; Per Stjärne b. 1895, Primary school teacher, ordained. In Ethiopia as missionary for SEM 1921–1934, 1945–1952, emissary for the Emperor 1945; Viking Tamm see Ch. IV n. 149.

² See above, Ch. II:4. 2.


⁴ F. Hammar to V. Haldin, 11.1 1974, VHN.

⁵ F. Hammar to E. von Plomgren, Traneberg 29.2 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
undertook to approach some leading medical authorities. Because of the very vague and tentative conditions offered, Hammar and Virgin did not find a suitable candidate for the position. They therefore suggested that a physician should be offered leave-of-absence in order to facilitate the recruitment. The consent of the Swedish Government would in their opinion be justified by the possibilities for future trade connections with Ethiopia, which might develop if the right man could be recruited for the position. In March 1943 Hammar renewed his contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sven Graafström, Head of Division at the Ministry then told him that he had found the matter of great interest. Hammar was, however, asked not to mention anything about possible assistance from the Swedish Government but to express himself in such a way that the Ethiopian Legation would get the impression that there was a Swedish interest in the matter.

The Ethiopian Legation in London was informed by Hammar about the actions taken and that he had not been able to find a suitable candidate for the position as physician-in-ordinary to the Emperor. Hammar had found, however, that many Swedish companies would be willing to take part in the economic reconstruction of Ethiopia.

In October 1943 the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been approached on similar matters from Cairo. A telegram sent by the Swedish Chargé d’Affaires in Cairo on 3 October 1943 said that the Emperor wanted Swedish physicians and nurses to come to Ethiopia and resume the work formerly conducted by Dr Hanner at the Emperor’s hospital. By the end of October the Emperor wanted to discuss with a representative of The Swedish Match Company (Svenska Tändsticksaktiebolaget) the possibility of setting up factory in Ethiopia.

On receipt of the first telegram, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Swedish Red Cross and later also contacted the Swedish Evangelical Mission and the Swedish Mission Bibeltrognan Vänner regarding
their plans in Ethiopia. The Swedish Red Cross did not find it appropriate to send Swedish medical staff to Ethiopia under the existing circumstances. Axel B. Svensson, Chairman of SMBV, answered that they intended to send seven missionaries to Ethiopia as soon as possible, including one physician and two nurses. Previously the Emperor had informed Svensson through the Legation in London that he wanted two of them Dr Gunnar Agge and Sigurd Stark, a teacher, who was also capable of giving medical attendance, to leave for Ethiopia as soon as it could be arranged. Nils Dahlberg, Director of Mission at the Swedish Evangelical Mission, answered that Dr Erik Söderström, the only doctor at SEM’s disposal, was already in Addis Abeba, but five nurses and three pastors with medical training were prepared to leave for Ethiopia as soon as the journey could be arranged. According to files available, these were the only actions taken at that time by the Ministry in response to the Ethiopian enquiries about medical staff, and as far as can be ascertained the results of these investigations were not communicated to Cairo.

The message regarding a match factory in Ethiopia was forwarded to The Swedish Match Company in Jönköping. They answered that before sending anybody to Addis Abeba they wanted to consult their representative in Alexandria. It was then found that the demand for matches in Ethiopia was too small to justify setting up a factory there, but the Company wanted to leave the door open for future contacts.

The next Ethiopian approach came via the Legation in Moscow, when Blatengeta Lorenzo Taezaz, the Ethiopian Minister, conveyed a special message to the Swedish Government from the Emperor that he wanted the Swedes to take active part in the reconstruction of Ethiopia. When asked to

13. Telegram Chargé d’Affaires Cairo to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo 3.10 1943. Notes about actions taken on the telegram, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
14. Prince Carl to Kungliga Utrikesdepartementet, Sthlm 12.11 1943, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
15. A.B. Svensson to Kungliga Utrikesdepartementet, Sthlm 12.11 1943, KUD, P 71 Yab II; See also Ayele Guebre to A.B. Svensson, London 27.11 1942, SMBV. Axel B. Svensson see Ch. III n. 60. Gunnar Agge see Ch. IV n. 43. Sigurd Stark see Ch. IV n. 53.
16. PM signed KA, dated Sthlm 26.11 1943, KUD, P 71 Yab II. Erik Söderström see Ch. IV n. 32. Nils Dahlberg see Ch. IV n. 33.
17. Ljungberg to Grönwall, Jönköping 2.11 1943; Telegram Cabinet to Chargé d’Affaires Cairo, Sthlm 10.11 1943, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
18. Ljungberg to Grönwall, Jönköping 11.11 1943; Telegram Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Swedish Chargé d’Affaires Cairo, Sthlm 17.11 1943, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
20. I. Hägglöf to E. Boheman, Moscow 25.2 1944, For some unknown reason this letter was not registered as arrived in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 5.5 1944, KUD, HP 1 Yab I.

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give details about the Emperor's wishes, Blatengeta Lorenzo presented a list of doctors, nurses, engineers, administrative experts, agronomists and chemists.\textsuperscript{11} The Swedish Chargé d’Affaires was also given to understand that Ethiopia preferred to obtain help from Sweden rather than from Great Britain or the United States.\textsuperscript{12}

In early May, i.e. immediately after the letter from Moscow had reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, many steps were taken by Swedish authorities. Contacts were renewed with the missionary societies Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission BV. The Ministry also entered into contact with the Swedish Association of Engineers & Architects (Teknologföreningen) for engineers and with the Federation of Swedish Farmers’ Associations (Sveriges Lantbruksförbund) for agronomists.\textsuperscript{13}

SMBV answered that eight persons were prepared to go to Ethiopia and that in the near future they also intended to send out more nurses, one or two doctors, probably one or two engineers and one agronomist.\textsuperscript{14}

Swedish Evangelical Mission was also prepared to resume the missionary work interrupted by the Italians and to send out the number of missionaries required as soon as the journeys could be arranged. Dr Fride Hylander would be posted as chief physician at the Bethsaida hospital in Addis Ababa because he enjoyed the Emperor's special confidence. Dr Söderström and his nurses would then be transferred to Naqamte, where they had been working before the war.\textsuperscript{15}

The Association of Engineers & Architects did not want to release any statements until they received further details about the commission. Since it was expected that the demand in Sweden for engineers specialized in road-construction and water supply would increase, experts in those fields had good opportunities for employment in Sweden.\textsuperscript{16} The Federation of Swedish Farmers’ Associations did not show much interest in Ethiopia because of the good opportunities open to agronomists in Sweden.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{11} Techniciens dont l’Etiopie a besoin, dated Moscow 17.2 1944. Copy enclosed letter I. Hägglöf to E. Boheman, Moscow 25.2 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab I.

\textsuperscript{12} I. Hägglöf to E. Boheman, Moscow 25.2 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab I.

\textsuperscript{13} PM i anledning av etiopiske ministerens förfrågan om svenska läkare etc. för Abessinien, Stockholm 17.5 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II.

\textsuperscript{14} A.B. Svensson to Kungliga Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm 10.5 1944, KUD, P 83 Yab III.

\textsuperscript{15} PM ang Evangeliska Fosterlandsstiftelsens mission i Etiopien lämnad av missionsföreståndare Nils Dahlberg, 12.5 1944, KUD, P 83 Yab III. Fride Hylander see Ch. IV n. 41.

\textsuperscript{16} PM i anledning av etiopiske ministerens förfrågan om svenska läkare etc för Abessinien, Stockholm 17.5 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II.

\textsuperscript{17} PM ang anställning av svenska agronomer i Etiopien enclosed letter S. Landahl to H. Bagge, Stockholm 16.5 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II.
**Blatengeta** Lorenzo was informed about the various answers on 1 August 1944.\(^a\) Staffan Söderblom, the Swedish Minister in Moscow, met Lorenzo several times and during these meetings Lorenzo had confided in Söderblom about the difficulties facing his country, giving the impression that the Emperor appeared to regard Sweden as Ethiopia's only friend. The Emperor had given Lorenzo instructions to prepare the opening of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Sweden. Lorenzo did not think that the British would raise any objections to Swedish experts in Ethiopia, because an American had already been employed as adviser, thus breaking the British monopoly in this field.\(^a\)

In September 1944 Björn Prytz, the Swedish Minister in London, reported that he had received a visit from the Ethiopian Chargé d'Affaires, *Ato* Abbebe Retta\(^a\), who had been instructed by the Emperor to find out from Prytz whether the Swedish Government was in a position to suggest candidates for seven posts in Health, seven in the Military and eight in Education. In response to Prytz's direct question as to whether any objections would be raised from Great Britain or the United States, *Ato* Abbebe assured him that it was perfectly clear that no objections would be raised by any foreign power. The Emperor wanted to receive the Swedes as soon as possible. Prytz maintained that the former relations with Ethiopia should be resumed. Swedish missionaries and officers had a good name in Ethiopia and officers could gain valuable experience in Ethiopian service. Ethiopia might, after further development, offer certain possibilities for both export and import. Aware of Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf's interest in Ethiopia, Prytz had sent him a copy of the letter.\(^a\)

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\(^a\) Telegram Cabinet to Légasuède Moscow, Sthlm 24.5 1944, *Aide Memoire* enclosed letter S. Söderblom to E. Boheman, Moscow 1.8 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II. Staffan Söderblom b. 1900, Envoy, Minister in Moscow 1944–46. Son of Archbishop Nathan Söderblom see Ch. IV n. 71.

\(^a\) S. Söderblom to Chr. Günther, 14.8 1944, KUD, HP 1 Yab I.


\(^a\) B. Prytz to E. Boheman, London 15.9 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II. *Ato* Abbebe's commission from the Emperor to contact the Swedish Legation regarding experts was confirmed by himself during an interview in Addis Abeba 16.1 1973. Björn Prytz see Ch. IV n. 187.
1.3 Intensified Swedish response to Ethiopian enquiries regarding experts, 1944–1945

At the end of September 1944 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs renewed contact with Hammar and the documents relating to the Ethiopian enquiries and the Swedish responses were forwarded to him in the strictest confidence. In October a meeting was arranged at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm between Hammar and Grafström. The matter was of very great importance to Hammar and the notes he made in immediate connection with the meeting must be regarded as a good source for a reconstruction of the discussion. Hammar was, namely, very particular about the scope of his responsibilities.

The documents handed over to Hammar were consistent with information given during Hammar's visit to London in August 1943, thus indicating that the Emperor's intentions were serious. This did, however, not exclude the possibility that the Emperor might have made similar enquiries to other countries, i.e. Switzerland, the Soviet Union and the United States. Since Ethiopia's economic situation was probably very critical, any Swedish investments had to be made on a longterm basis and at considerable risk. Hammar also thought that the desire of the Missionary societies to resume their work in Ethiopia was most certainly very welcome to the Emperor. Some of the positions for physicians and teachers mentioned in Prytz's letter could be filled by missionaries. Possible Swedish interests would, however, gain tremendously in the event of top posts being reserved for first-class, wellpaid Swedes. Physicians, officers, and teachers were assumed to have the greatest opportunity of performing useful work. Hammar suggested that recruitment of engineers and agronomists be postponed until at least some guarantees were given that the country had economic resources to use their professional skill. He considered former 'Ethiopian-Swedes' as particularly well qualified to recruit candidates for positions and to negotiate conditions for employment. Hammar thought that the best way to resume direct contact with the Emperor would be a personal letter from the Crown Prince.

F. Hammar to V. Hallidin, Motala 11.1 1974, VHN. S. Grafström to F. Hammar, Sthlm 30.9 1944, FHa. The documents enclosed were returned to the Ministry, because they were confidential. From the contents of the letter and from other sources I have found that the enclosures were:

a. S. Söderblom to Chr. Günther, Moscow 14.8 1944, KUD, HP 1 Yab 1, enclosures regarding Ethiopia's relations with Sweden and Great Britain;
b. B. Prytz to E. Boheman, London 15.9 1944, KUD, P 71 YAB II.
c. Aide Memoire given to Blatengeta Lorenzo Taezaz 1.8 1944.

The exact date of the meeting is not given. Avskrift av minnesanteckningar October 1944, (Copy of memorandum) FHa; Summary of correspondence... 1944–45, VHN.
Grafström took up the suggestion of direct contact with the Emperor from the Swedish Crown Prince and Hammar drafted a letter expressing appreciation of the Emperor’s approaches via his Legations in Moscow and London. The former 'Ethiopian-Swedes' would be glad to give advice regarding choice of experts. Certain preparatory enquiries could already be undertaken according to information available about Ethiopia’s needs. The Crown Prince undertook to serve as an intermediary for contacts with suitable persons and institutions. Apart from some minor details, Hammar's draft was followed very closely in the final French version of the Crown Prince's letter, dated 14 November 1944. The letter was sent to Prytz in London, who handed it over to the Ethiopian Legation to be forwarded to the Emperor. A copy of the Crown Prince’s letter was also sent to Söderblom in Moscow, who handed over a copy to Blatengeta Lorenzo Taezaz.

There were obviously certain advantages in establishing that kind of contact on the matter of recruiting experts for service in Ethiopia. A personal approach to the Emperor by the Crown Prince whom the Emperor knew personally had the great psychological advantage of showing respect for the Emperor, which in the prevailing situation could produce generous political dividends. According to Swedish views a private letter from the Crown Prince could not be regarded as an official commitment by the Swedish Government. However, it was a way of emphasizing that the Emperor’s enquiries concerning experts from Sweden had been taken seriously.

The Abyssinian Committee

When the letter to the Emperor had been sent, the Crown Prince told Grafström that when the time was ripe for such an action, he was prepared to chair a small committee. Grafström in turn informed Hammar of the Crown Prince’s suggestion. Encouraged by Grafström’s information Hammar took the idea of a small committee a bit further. He noticed that the wording in the Crown Prince’s letter had been changed on one specific point, namely that he had written in the draft that certain preliminary enquiries for sending experts to Ethiopia could be made. The final version, however, stated that some


c S. Grafström to B. Prytz, Stlhm 15.11 1944; S. Grafström to S. Söderblom, Stlhm 15.11 1944; S. Söderblom to S. Grafström, Moscow 5.11 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II.

preliminary steps had already been taken. Hammar felt that this modification of the letter signified an intention to undertake certain activities even before the Emperor's answer was known. He suggested that some 'Ethiopian-Swedes' who had earlier been active in those professions from which the Emperor now wanted to recruit specialists, should be informed and be invited for a conference for the purpose of establishing a committee on the Ethiopian issue."

As far as can be ascertained no actions were taken to establish the proposed committee until early February 1945, when Grafström renewed contact with the Crown Prince."

On 23 February 1945 an informal meeting with former 'Ethiopian-Swedes' representatives of the SEM, the SMBV and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chaired by Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf, took place at the Royal Castle in Stockholm. The objective of the meeting was to appoint an informal committee whose task would be to check incoming applications from persons interested in employment in Ethiopia."

The Crown Prince opened the meeting by reminding those present of the work previously performed by Swedes in Ethiopia, particularly by the missionaries, the medical staff and the officers. The participants were informed of the enquiries from the Emperor and from his representatives in Europe and of actions taken in response to these enquiries. They were also confidentially informed that the possibility of establishing some form of official Swedish representation in Addis Abeba had been discussed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea of establishing a committee to examine both the applications and the conditions of employment had been raised in order to ensure that only highly qualified persons were sent to Ethiopia. This committee could serve both the public and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the discussion that followed, the participants supported the ideas outlined. Approaches had been made to the Swedish Mission BV by representatives of foreign trade regarding relations with Ethiopia. The Association of Overseas Swedes (Utlandssvenskarnas förening) had received applications from persons desirous of entering into Ethiopian Government service. According to Tamm there was also great interest among Swedish

"F. Hammar to S. Grafström, 20.11 1944, KUD, P 71 Yab II. The following persons were suggested: Dr Knut Hanner, Dr Fride Hylander, Colonel Viking Tamm and Reverend Per Stjärne. General Eric Virgin was also mentioned.

"S. Grafström to E. af Klint, Sthlm 11.2 1945, KUD, P 71 Yab III.

"PM dated Sthlm 14.2 1945, KUD, P 71 Yab III.

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officers in serving in Ethiopia. The meeting resulted in the appointment of a committee consisting of Grafström, Hylander and Tamm."

Thus by late February 1945 the Emperor’s enquiries about experts from Sweden, which had started in the summer of 1943, had resulted in the establishment of the above-mentioned committee which was intended to coordinate the employment of Swedish experts. It seems highly probable that the idea originated from Frank Hammar, who already in October 1944 had mentioned it as a possibility. Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf put the idea into reality by taking an active part in arranging the first organized contact between different categories of people with experience from Ethiopia, and by chairing an unofficial meeting according to Hammar’s suggestion. Since the Committee contained a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Grafström, it must be regarded as at least a semi-official body. It was no longer a question of whether Swedes were to be sent to Ethiopia but who and under what conditions.

1. 4 Emperor Haile Selassie’s emissaries in 1945

In March 1945 Ato Abbebe Retta arrived in Stockholm from London as Haile Selassie’s personal emissary to hand over an answer to Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf’s letter and to negotiate for the employment of Swedes for service in Ethiopia."In his letter the Emperor recalled the service given both by Swedish officers and the Christian missions and expressed a wish that these services be resumed as soon as the world situation would permit. Anxious to establish diplomatic relations with Sweden, he offered both land and a residence in Addis Abeba for a Swedish Legation."

Ato Abbebe also brought a letter from the Emperor to the Swedish Evangelical Mission, inviting them to continue their work with a widened programme."

* Protokoll över sammanträde hos H.K.H. Kronprinsen angående svenskar anställning i Abessinien 23.2 1945 (Minutes of meeting with H.R.H. the Crown Prince regarding the employment of Swedes in Ethiopia) signed by Gustaf Adolf. The following persons took part in that meeting: Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf (Chairman), F. Hammar (Engineer), C.G. von Rosen (Commercial Pilot), N. Dahlberg (Director SEM), F. Hylander (SEM), P. Stjärne (Missionary, SEM), A.B. Svensson (Director, SMBV), General E. Virgin, Colonel V. Tamm, E. Svedellius (Director, Association of Overseas Swedes, Utlandssvenskarnas Förening), S. Grafström (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Copies were distributed to all participants of the meeting 27.2 1945. S. Grafström circular letter to the participants, 27.1 1945, KUD, P 71 Yab III.

* S. Grafström to V. Tamm, Stlhlm 13.3 1945, KrA, VT, vol. 4.


* Minutes of the Board 12.3 1945, § 1, SEM. A rather detailed account of the Emperor’s letter was given.
On 15 March 1945 Ato Abbebe took part in a meeting with the Abyssinian Committee during which an *Aide Mémoire* brought from London by Ato Abbebe was discussed. The *Aide Mémoire* contained a 'minimum and initial list of Swedes' that the Emperor wanted to employ and a draft standard contract for Swedish employees. The list included staff for important posts in education, defence, police, justice, and health within the Ethiopian Government:

1. A Director responsible to the Director of the Ministry of Education.
2. A Military Mission like the one in 1934, but including a military engineering unit.
3. A unit to train police officers.
4. An Adviser to the Director of the Ministry of Justice.
5. A Director of a hospital, a surgeon and four nurses.

The meeting resulted in a standard contract, which was to be used for Swedish employees in Ethiopia. Ato Abbebe returned to London on March 17, after having met the Crown Prince, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of Mission for SEM. Per Stjärne had left for Ethiopia two days earlier together with seven other missionaries.

In early May Ato Abbebe was informed by the Swedish Government that Colonel Viking Tamm accompanied by a captain, was prepared to go to Ethiopia without delay as head of a forthcoming military delegation. Tamm was also prepared to place himself at the Emperor's disposal to organize the Swedish expert assistance as a whole. Tamm would be accompanied by Dr Erik Norup, a surgeon, and four nurses. County police superintendent Axel Blomer would become head of a police contingent and go to Ethiopia in September together with Sergeant Bengt Rehnström. Legal and educational advisers could probably be sent to Ethiopia in the course of 1945. Thus the Swedish Government had approved all points in Ato Abbebe's memorandum.

Stjärne arrived in Addis Abeba about 1 May 1945. He was received in audience by the Emperor, who discussed with him the possibility of enlarged Ethio-Swedish co-operation. Abbebe Retta also went to Ethiopia. When he

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* Ato Abbebe to S. Grafström, Sthlm 17.3 1945 (Copy), FHy.
* N. Dahlberg to P. Stjärne, Sthlm 20.3 1945 (Copy), SEM.
* P. Stjärne to N. Dahlberg, Addis Abeba 11.5 1945; P. Stjärne to J. Hagner, Addis Abeba 16.5 1945; Telegram P. Stjärne to N. Dahlberg, Addis Abeba 14.6 1945, SEM.
left London in the middle of May he took with him another letter from Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf to Emperor Haile Selassie."

In Addis Abeba the Emperor discussed the Ethiopian needs for Swedish personnel with Abbebe Retta and Per Stjärne. According to Abbebe Retta the Emperor was anxious to keep the discussions about the planned Ethio-Swedish co-operation secret in order not to disturb Ethio-British relations."

In late June 1945 the Emperor sent Stjärne back to Sweden as his personal emissary with a detailed memorandum on the subject of the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries, a government loan of 5 million pounds sterling, expanded economic relations and detailed requests for personnel in education, health, mining and police. Swedish missionary societies were invited to establish schools and clinics throughout the country."

The Abyssinian Committee met on 9 July 1945 to discuss the Emperor's wishes. Sven Grafström of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Committee that the question of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Sweden had been resolved in principle. Gunnar Jarring would leave for Addis Abeba as Chargé d'Affaires at the turn of the year. Insofar as requirements for an administrative staff were concerned Grafström stressed that it would not be possible to supply Swedes for all key positions suggested because of the risks of conflicts with the British and the Americans. The committee members presented candidates for several positions. The Ethiopian request of a Swedish Government loan of 5 million pounds sterling was discussed with economic experts outside the committee before the meeting. Jacob Wallenberg, Managing Director of Stockholms Enskilda Bank, had said that such a large loan was out of the question. Torsten Vinell, Director of the General Swedish Export Association had, however, shown some interest, saying that Ethiopia was one of the few states where Sweden might in the future gain a position as investor. The Swedish Minister of Finance had not yet given an answer. Sven Grafström maintained that financial and economic experts first had to make investigations regarding the preconditions for Government credit before giving a definite answer. The Abyssinian Committee finally gave as its opinion

"E. von Plomgren to V. Tamm, Sthlm 5.6 1945, KrA, VT, vol. 4.
"Oral information by Abbebe Retta given in Addis Abeba 16.1 1973. That the negotiations were very secret also confirmed by Per Stjärne during interview in Stockholm 21.6 1972.
"PM HM Kejsare Haile Selasses önskemål beträffande hjälp från och utbyte med Sverige. Copy enclosed letter H. Amler to T. Vinell, Stockholm 25.1 1946, SAE, R 62 TV. Swedes were requested for the following positions: One adviser to the Ministry of the Interior and two advisers to the Ministry of Justice, Chief and instructor for a police school and 12 policemen for the provinces, teachers both for primary schools and secondary schools, 2 physicians and 4 nurses for a hospital in Addis Abeba, instructors to educate Ethiopian physicians and nurses, and 24 physicians and 24 nurses for Addis Abeba and the 12 provinces, two engineers and one foreman to develop mining. Regarding the Missionary Societies see Ch. V:2.
that an initial small Government credit should be granted in order to finance
the work of Swedish experts in Ethiopia. Tamm estimated the need for the
next three years to be at least 5 million Swedish Crowns."

It would appear that Government credit of 5 million Sw. Crowns was
arranged with the Ministry of Finance in July 1945. The conditions were that
the credit should be made available in Swedish Crowns and be used for travel
expenses and salaries for Swedish experts as well as for equipment necessary
for their work in Ethiopia." The credit was formally approved by the Swedish
Government on 5 October 1945. The interest was to be 3.5 % annually to be
paid in semi-annual installments. By 31 December 1950 at the latest the credit
should be fully repaid."

Abbebe Retta returned to Sweden at the end of August 1945 to negotiate for
the employment of Swedish staff for Ethiopia, and stayed for about ten weeks." Before leaving Sweden he commissioned Dr Fride Hylander as Ethiopian
Honorary Consul in Stockholm until such a time as an Ethiopian Chargé
d'Affaires could be appointed." Hylander's main task would be to recruit
Swedes for service in Ethiopia." As Ethiopian Honorary Consul, he was
authorized to settle matters concerning payments from the credit with
promissory notes, sent to him from Addis Abeba. " It was arranged that Abbebe
Retta was to sign the promissory notes on behalf of the Imperial Ethiopian
Government against the Swedish Government credit."

Since the enquiry about a Swedish credit was a commission given direct to Ato Abbebe by the
Emperor, the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance was in no way involved until later."

In the course of 1945, by using as his personal agents – both an Ethiopian
and a Swede – the Emperor was able to persuade the Swedish Government
to participate in the reorganization of Ethiopia mainly on his own conditions.

" PM angående sammanträde med Abessinien-lItskottet 9.7 1945, FH \ y, EL, KrA, VT, vol. 4.
Wallenberg, b. 1892, Managing Director of Stockholms Enskilda Bank 1927–1946. Torsten Vinell
S. Åström to E. Leijonhufvud, Stlm 21.8 1945; Copy of memorandum signed Killander 4.8 1945 enclosed to the letter; See also handwritten comments by Leijonhufvud dated 22.8 1945 on
the letter, EL.
Extract from protocol of financial matters, held at King-in-Council, 5 October 1945 (Copy),
EL. The issue was not discussed in the Parliament.
Interview with Abbebe Retta, Addis Abeba 16.1 1973. See also PM Stockholm 14.8 1945, given
to E. Leijonhufvud by E. Posse, EL.
F. Hylander to Ministry of Finance, Addis Abeba, Stockholm & Addis Abeba
December/January 1946/47 (copy), EL.
Interview with F. Hylander, Runtuna 21.3 1972.
F. Hylander to the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance, Stlm Addis Abeba, Dec/Jan 1946/47
(copy), EL.
Copy of certificate for Abbebe Retta, EL.
E. Leijonhufvud to S. Grafström, Addis Abeba 21.11 1946, EL.
1. 5 British reactions to the Ethio-Swedish contacts

Despite the Ethiopian efforts to keep secret the Ethio-Swedish contacts on the possible recruitment of experts, details about the matter leaked out in Addis Ababa. Rumours circulated in the Ethiopian capital about a Swedish Military Mission, headed by Tamm, who would take over the duties of the British Military Mission to Ethiopia (BMME). These rumours were, however, categorically denied as groundless by the Ethiopian authorities, including the Emperor’s own secretary. The arrival of a Swedish expert unit, particularly a Military Mission, was denied by the Ethiopian authorities even after applications for transit visas for Sudan and Eritrea *en route* to Ethiopia had been sent from Stockholm to the British Foreign Office. Rather than to share the responsibility with a Swedish Military Mission, the British were prepared to withdraw the BMME, using article VI in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. When the Ethiopian authorities refused to relay any information about the Swedes’ duties in Ethiopia, the British Foreign Office retaliated by refusing to grant the transit visas. Even the entry visas to Ethiopia were delayed, because the whole matter was so secret that nobody except Abbebe Retta at the Legation in London knew about the Swedes’ future activities in Ethiopia. After Abbebe Retta’s departure in May the confusion was total. The departure of the first group of Swedish experts was therefore delayed. In mid-June 1945, eager to depart for Ethiopia, Tamm tried to arrange the journey via Per Stjärne in Addis Ababa. Stjärne answered by asking Tamm to wait for his return.

Due to the general confusion the entry visas to Ethiopia were not issued until the end of August. The transit visas were granted by the British authorities one month later. The issue of sending Swedish experts to Ethiopia was considered of such dignity that Sven Grafström went to London in early October to clarify the situation and explain what the Swedes were going to do in Ethiopia. Grafström told the British that Tamm’s mission was concerned with the Imperial Guard and would in no way encroach on the British Military Mission’s activities. The remaining Swedes were destined for educational and

"Telegram V. Tamm to P. Stjärne, Sthlm 13.6 1945, KrA, VT, vol. 4.
"Telegram P. Stjärne to V. Tamm, Addis Abeba 18.6 1945; V. Tamm to Gustaf Adolf Stockholm 20.6 1945, KrA, VT, vol. 4.
medical posts. The representative of the Foreign Office, explained on behalf of H.M. Government that the British had been very handicapped in their dealing with the visas because of the reluctance of the Ethiopian authorities to inform them about the aim of the Swedes' journey to Ethiopia. Grafström was assured that the British Government had no objections to the Swedish presence in Ethiopia once they knew the reason for it."

The Americans were also kept informed about the Ethiopian plans to recruit Swedes. Grafström had in strict confidence informed members of the American Legation in Stockholm about the meeting chaired by the Crown Prince in February." Also the Emperor's requests conveyed during the summer of 1945 were communicated in confidence to the American Legation." There is reason to believe that the British obtained their information from American sources, since a copy of at least this telegram sent from Stockholm in August 1945, was also sent to the American Legation in Addis Ababa.

That Britain still tried to control Ethiopia's foreign contacts is clearly indicated by the action of the British Foreign Office in delaying the visas of the Swedish experts, despite the fact that this action contravened the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944, whereby the Ethiopian Emperor was free to recruit advisers from any country without consulting the British.

1. 6 Concluding remarks

A common feature in the Ethio-Swedish contacts in 1943–45 was that they all appeared to have originated from Emperor Haile Selassie. We have also seen how the Ethiopian inquiries became more and more detailed as time went on. While the Ethiopian requests from 1943 only included medical staff and vague invitations for economic investments, the Emperor's requests forwarded in 1945 called for far-reaching economic and technical co-operation through the contributions of experts from Sweden. Apart from the enquiries addressed to the Swedish Government, the Mission societies were invited to make a significant expansion of their pre-war work. In both cases there was a continuation of a pre-war tradition. It is worth noting that all enquiries except the ones from 1943 via Cairo, were conveyed via Swedes and Ethiopians who

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" Telegram Johnson to Secretary of State, Washington, Sthlm 1.1 1945, 884.01A/3-145, NA, Decimal file 1945–1949.

" Telegram Johnson to Secretary of State, Washington, Sthlm 21.6 1945, 884.01A/6-2145; Telegram Johnson to Secretary of State, Washington, Sthlm 24.8 1945, 884.01A/8-2445, NA, Decimal file 1945–1949.
in one way or other had been involved in Ethio-Swedish contacts before the war. The Emperor wanted to arrange the financing of the experts by a Swedish Government credit. The Emperor’s conditions for expanded co-operation with Sweden seem to have been approved on all points except that the credit was smaller than that originally requested.

Why did the Emperor turn to Sweden and why the gradual change of the enquiries towards more intimate co-operation? Because of the war the number of states able to take part in Ethiopia’s reconstruction was limited. Britain was already present in Ethiopia to such an extent that the Emperor felt it as an embarrassment. Sweden and Switzerland were small states that had remained neutral throughout the war. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had been involved in colonial affairs in Africa. As we have seen in Chapter III, the Emperor was anxious to establish co-operation with the United States when he in 1943 secretly turned to them with far-reaching requests for financial support as well as experts, a great deal of which was supplied. When it became clear that the United States was not prepared to fulfill all the Emperor’s requests, at least not on his conditions, it was natural for him to turn to Sweden and ask for what he could not get from the United States.

Swedish advisers, missionaries and instructors had been in Ethiopia before the war. Swedes had even volunteered as officers and as staff of the Red Cross Ambulance Brigade during the war. The change in the form of the Ethiopian enquiries to Sweden over the years therefore has to be seen against the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 and the enquiries to the United States. If the Emperor wanted to engage advisers without consulting the British he had to make such enquiries secretly to avoid violating the 1942 Agreement and naturally to avoid straining Anglo-Ethiopian relations. The Ethiopian Legation in London might therefore have been waiting for a suitable channel of communication to Sweden. In the course of 1944, when the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 was nullified and replaced by the new Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 19 December 1944, Ethiopia seemed to have felt greater freedom of action, as indicated by the increasing emphasis placed by Ethiopian representatives on the subject of Ethiopian independence. The British reaction, however, when learning about a possible large-scale Swedish engagement in Ethiopia, particularly before they obtained information about what the Swedish officers were going to do, is a clear indication that the British still had a pronounced interest in controlling foreign involvement in Ethiopia. Grafström’s journey to London would indicate that the Swedish Foreign Ministry was eager to clarify the matter in order not to disturb Anglo-Swedish relations.

When looking at Swedish response to the Ethiopian approaches it can be noted how the Swedish interest gradually increased. When first approached from Cairo in October 1943, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs could
hardly have had any clear idea about how seriously the enquiries should be taken. Their initial actions also seemed to have been rather half-hearted.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to have become more interested upon learning of the unofficial enquiries made through Hammar in London. When the Ethiopian Legations in Moscow and London in February and September 1944 approached the Ministry it became obvious that such steps constituted serious requests for Ethio-Swedish co-operation, originating from the Emperor himself. It can also be noted from the Swedish response after the first letter from Moscow had reached Stockholm in May 1944 that serious inquiries into the possibility of sending Swedish experts to Ethiopia were undertaken. Particularly after the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 had been annulled, Sweden could respond to the Ethiopian enquiries without risking Anglo-Swedish relations. Although in October 1944 Hammar and Grafström did not know that the Emperor had sent similar enquiries to the USA and possibly also to Switzerland and the Soviet Union they discussed the Ethiopian issue in a sincere effort to fill the positions required. It was deemed essential that the Swedish Government should take some responsibility in the recruitment of highly qualified candidates. The Abyssinian Committee was intended to serve that purpose. The Swedish Crown Prince took an active interest in re-establishing the Ethio-Swedish relations and actively supported such relations both by personally contacting the Emperor and by taking part in the establishment of the Abyssinian Committee. The Missionary Societies were positive to the Ethiopian approaches from the very beginning and were prepared to send the staff required.

2. Swedish missionaries in Ethiopia, 1941–1952

As stated in Chapters III:3 and IV:1. 2 Swedish missionaries from SEM and SMBV were expelled during the Italian occupation. The only Swedish missionary to remain in the country was Lisa Johansson, who worked for the Seventh Day Adventist Mission in Addis Abeba. How did the Swedish missionary societies adapt to the new situation after the liberation?

2.1 Swedish responses to the Ethiopian policy on foreign missions

Since the Seventh Day Adventist Mission had been allowed to work in Ethiopia during the whole occupation, although to a limited extent, they expressed certain expectations about expanded activities after the liberation. In 1941 the SDA missionaries in Addis Abeba in a message to their General Conference in Washington said that teachers and medical staff were badly needed in the country. If SDA could only supply their former institutions with
staff they would be returned to them. The missionaries found the prospects for Christian mission good in Ethiopia." In 1942 the Swedish SDA nurse Valborg Larsson arrived from Jerusalem to work at SDA's hospital in Addis Abeba." While waiting for a physician to arrive, nurse Lisa Johansson had opened a clinic in Desse in early 1942."

Anton Jönsson, from Swedish Mission Bibeltrögna Vänner, had stayed behind after having accompanied Axel B. Svensson during his journey of inspection in Ethiopia in 1938/39, and went to Kenya to work among Ethiopian refugees there. When the Ethiopian refugees were repatriated in 1942, Anton Jönsson was allowed to accompany them. Besides being appointed headmaster of a school for refugees in Harer, Jönsson was also private tutor to the Emperor's son Prince Mekonnen. In January 1943 the Emperor told Jönsson that he wanted the Swedes to resume their work at the hospital in Harer as soon as possible, without, however, telling him how free the Swedes would be to work." The Ethiopian Government later offered to take full responsibility for expenses but to give SMBV the control of the hospital." From his attitude towards SMBV, the Emperor seems to have been divided between a feeling of gratitude and a wish not to find himself in a position that might influence his future policy towards the missions. This is clearly demonstrated in a letter written to Axel B. Svensson. He was full of appreciation for the work performed among the Ethiopian refugees both in Kenya and in Harer. In recognition of the services rendered by Jönsson, the Emperor restored to SMBV their former buildings in Harer. But on the other hand he made clear to the Board that the position of the foreign missions was to be regulated by a special proclamation. Any acceptable missionary would then have to apply through the proper channels for permission to work in Ethiopia. Only those who were prepared to abide these regulations would be admitted to the country."

In 1943 Dr Erik Söderström of SEM returned to Ethiopia together with his wife and sister, who were both nurses, after having spent the war working at a hospital run by the Church of Sweden in South Africa." They first spent some

14 Haile Selassie I to A.B. Svensson, Addis Abeba 6.7 1943, LLA, ABS C:22.
time at the Bethsaida hospital in Addis Abeba, but were later able to resume SEM's work at the hospital in Naqamte."

Educational and medical staff were badly needed in Ethiopia and the Emperor was prepared to receive such staff from Sweden." Swedish Mission BV and Swedish Evangelical Mission had both in 1943 and 1944 expressed willingness to send missionaries to Ethiopia without delay if only visas and transport could be arranged for them. Apart from the missionaries who came from other parts of Africa or from the Middle East, none was granted either visa or transport until the end of 1944. This situation must, however, be seen against the general political situation both in Ethiopia and in the rest of the world. The restrictions under the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 regarding employment in Ethiopia of foreigners other than British subjects might have also affected missionaries. The Ethiopian policy regarding foreign missions had not yet been settled. Finally, Europe was still at war which made the transport situation very crucial.

The situation for the missionary societies was characterized by some confusion until the Ethiopian policy had been outlined. Both SEM and SMBV wanted to send missionaries but did not know the conditions for their work. A certain difference between the SEM Board in Stockholm and Dr Söderström regarding the strategy in the field can be illustrated by a letter written in November 1944. Söderström complained that the Board in their letters had often emphasized that SEM should restrict themselves to pure evangelization. Söderström however, suggested that the mission should adapt themselves to the new conditions in the country and no longer demand the complete leadership. He told the Board that medical care and education were badly needed in Ethiopia and that Christ himself had used these means to reach people. Söderström regarded it as his duty as a Christian to give medical help. The Ethiopian Government, he said, was also anxious to give financial support to education and medical care. The Ministry of Education expected a lot from SEM with respect to the schools in Wollo. One of the most essential tasks of the mission was to start qualified education of the clergy, evangelists and teachers, work which might be arranged jointly by the evangelical missions. Rather than running their own primary schools the missions should supply teachers to Government schools." In September 1945 Söderström asked the

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* N. Dahlberg to H. Bagge, Stockholm 12.5 1944, KUD, P 83 Yab III; SEM, Annual report 1944, p. 109.
* A.B. Svensson to Kungliga Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm 12.11 1943, KUD, P 71 Yab II; PM signed KA Stockholm 26.11 1943; A.B. Svensson to H. Bagge, Stockholm 10.5 1944; N. Dahlberg to H. Bagge, Stockholm 12.5 1944, KUD, P 83 Yab III.
* E. Söderström to N. Dahlberg, Addis Abeba 24.11 1944, SEM.
SEM Board to send nurses to the hospital in Naqamte. If the SEM could not afford to pay their salaries he thought that the Ethiopian Government would be willing to pay for them. He wanted nurses who were devoted Christians, because they were free to evangelize despite the Government paying for the running costs of the hospital."

When Söderström wrote his letters, the Decree on foreign missions had been issued, aiming at the closest possible collaboration between the Ethiopian Government and the missions." Söderström had apparently fully accepted this principle and also tried to convince the SEM Board to accept it. He represented a wholistic view of mission work. The missionaries should serve the whole human-being by providing medical care and education in addition to pure evangelization. The Swedish mission should, according to Söderström, support the Ethiopian people on Ethiopian conditions and not only accept the leadership of the Emperor but also that of the emerging Ethiopian Evangelical Church.

Söderström's letter must be seen in the light of the development which had taken place within the evangelical congregations before the missionaries were allowed to return to Ethiopia. There had been an evangelical congregation in Addis Abeba since 1921. After the expulsion of the missionaries in 1936, the congregational work continued for some time under the leadership of Qes Badima Yalew and Ato Emmanuel Gebre Sillassie. When Ato Emmanuel was arrested and sent to Somalia in 1937, the congregation ran into difficulties. In early 1940 Ato Emmanuel returned to Addis Abeba and in June 1941 the congregation in Addis Abeba organized itself as a Church independent of Swedish Evangelical Mission, with a constitution of its own. Qes Badima was called to serve as pastor. There was no direct anti-mission feeling in Addis Abeba, but spokesmen of the congregation expressed disappointment at the absence of missionary support immediately after the liberation, and maintained that they now had to rely on their own resources." When the British Legation in Addis Abeba wanted to employ Ato Emmanuel in their service, he refused to leave SEM's compound in Addis Abeba for which he was responsible, until a Swedish missionary arrived to take over the compound. It was then arranged by the British Legation that Dr Söderström and his family could return to Addis Abeba in 1943. Already before the war, Söderström had

"E. Söderström to N. Dahlberg, Lakamte 10.9 1945, SEM.
"See Ch. III:4.1 for presentation and analysis of the Decree.
been disappointed at the Board's unwillingness to give him economic resources enough to run the hospital at Naqamte efficiently. In 1944 he wanted to enter into Ethiopian Government service at the hospital in Naqamte, which had been nationalised by the Government. He had a special agreement with the Government by which he was regarded as a missionary, but was paid by the Government."

How did the missionary societies react to the Decree? Axel B. Svensson wrote a rather pessimistic comment in SMBV's mission paper saying that Ethiopia was not a country open to evangelization. Although he expected much support from the Emperor, he was prepared to meet endless intrigues from the Ethiopian Orthodox priests. Svensson found it particularly hazardous since the Minister of Education had the authority to place teachers in mission schools. "However, in February 1945 Svensson expressed optimism regarding the situation for the mission in Ethiopia. If only the Emperor could be kept in a friendly attitude towards Sweden, SMBV's work might not be affected negatively by the Decree."

During his visit to Sweden in March 1945 Ato Abbebe Retta took part in a Board meeting at SEM where he presented an invitation from the Emperor to the Swedish mission to open clinics and schools in all twelve provinces. Ato Abbebe emphasized that the Emperor had turned to Sweden because of the great appreciation of the work done before the war. The Emperor had indicated that he personally was willing to support SEM's work. The Board was also confidentially informed about the Abyssinian Committee and the Ethiopian enquiries about experts from Sweden. Dr Hylander remarked that the mission might be able to perform important work with comparatively small economic means. The Emperor intended to employ staff for the key positions, while the mission was invited to work under more primitive conditions in the provinces. Stjärne was commissioned to work out a progressive plan for the continuation and expansion of work in Ethiopia. The Board decided to co-operate with SMBV regarding the mission. It would endeavour to work with the Abyssinian Committee in order to recruit persons with a Christian outlook for service in the Ethiopian Government." Direct contact was also arranged between Abbebe Retta and representatives of SMBV and SEM, where a co-ordination of SEM's and SMBV's resources in Ethiopia was discussed."

" Oral communication from Gustav Arén.
" BVMT, Vol. 34:1, p. 11. A Swedish translation of the whole Decree pp. 10-11. For a discussion on how the Decree affected SMBV's missionary goals in Ethiopia see Ch. VI:1.
" Minutes of the Board, 6.2 1945, § 16, SMBV.
" Minutes of the Board, 12.3 1945, passim, SEM.
Axel B. Svensson was not the only Swede to foresee difficulties in this field. Also Nils Dahlberg, the Director of Mission at SEM, worried about the possible consequences of the Decree for Swedish missionary work. Dahlberg had, however, been privately assured by Ato Abbebe that 'in view of the excellent results of former work' Swedish Evangelical Mission would be permitted to establish schools all over the provinces, if they could only supply staff for such an extensive programme. Ato Abbebe believed that such work should be considered by the Ethiopian Government as a help in the heavy work of reconstruction."

We have already seen that Per Stjärne was authorized by SEM's Board to give the Emperor a positive answer regarding expanded mission work in Ethiopia, and to offer his services in recruiting experts with a Christian outlook. Until he was sent back to Sweden as the Emperor's personal messenger in June 1945, Stjärne seems to have spent most of the time contacting Ethiopian authorities to prepare for future missionary work. On his arrival in Sweden he was authorized to contact both the Abyssinian Committee and the missionary societies. The Emperor suggested that the Swedish mission should co-operate with the Ethiopian Government in establishing a school, a hospital and two clinics in each of Ethiopia's twelve provinces." These issues were discussed on August 14 by the SEM's Executive Committee where Stjärne presented the Emperor's programme in detail. The Ethiopian Government would take responsibility for the buildings, the land and the running costs, while the Mission would be responsible for the travelling expenses and salaries of the missionaries. Missionaries from Britain and the United States were working in 3–4 provinces. If SMBV took responsibility for 3 provinces, SEM would sponsor the work in the five others. SEM would thus have to employ two missionaries, one doctor and two nurses for each of these five provinces." On the same day these issues were also discussed with representatives of SMBV in order to find a solution to how the Swedish mission could best use their resources in Ethiopia." The issue was further discussed by the SEM Board in September. SMBV did not intend to resume their work in Eritrea, but to transfer their resources in Eritrea to Ethiopia. After a long discussion the Board agreed to answer the Emperor that SEM would expand their work on his conditions, namely that the mission only took responsibility for travelling expenses and the salaries of the missionaries. SEM was prepared to send one pastor, one physician (both with

" Abbebe Retta to N. Dahlberg, Stockholm 13.3 1945, SEM.
" Minutes of the Executive Committee 14.8 1945, § 6, SEM.
" N. Dahlberg to F. Hylander, Stockholm 8.8 1945, SEM.
wives), three nurses, one primary school teacher and one missionary candidate, as soon as their journey could be arranged. They were also willing to extend the work further as soon as they found the staff and the economic means."

The Ethiopian enquiries meant high demands on both SEM’s and SMBV’s personnel and economic resources. Both societies had other areas than Ethiopia to supply with missionaries. When the Emperor’s enquiries were discussed by SEM’s Board, the need for staff in India and Tanganyika had also been mentioned. SEM’s supporters outside Stockholm might not accept that too many resources were devoted to Ethiopia at the expense of the work in India and Tanganyika." After Svensson’s and Jönsson’s journey to East Africa in 1938–39 SMBV had decided to start working in Kenya." But in 1945, due to the war, they had not yet been able to send any missionaries there, although staff for Kenya had been recruited." SMBV therefore found it difficult to meet the requirements from Ethiopia, due to the shortage of missionaries. When the new opportunities opened in Arussi, Axel B. Svensson, supported by the Board, decided to send all SMBV’s missionaries to Ethiopia."

Both SEM and SMBV seem to have found themselves in a difficult dilemma: on the one hand the whole of Ethiopia was open to their mission, after years of struggle. On the other hand they had to submit to Ethiopian rules, which restricted their work. One indication that the Government had ambitions to keep the foreign societies under control and not allow them to strengthen their position, is found in the fact that the Ethiopian Government never recognized the Inter-Mission Council, formed in 1942 for the purpose of bringing the foreign missions together. The Government preferred to deal with each mission separately."

The Emperor’s offer to SEM and SMBV of joint Ethio-Swedish financing of certain institutions, can be seen both as an effort to encourage them to extend their work, and as a method of making them more dependent upon the Government. The fact that the Emperor opened the whole country to the Swedish societies, while no such offer, as far as is known, was given to other nationalities must, however, be interpreted as an act of confidence by the Emperor towards Swedish mission. It would appear that the Swedish societies

" Minutes of the Board 13.9 1945, § 6, SEM.
" Minutes of the Board 12.3 and 13.9 1945, SEM.
" Minutes of the Board 1942–1945, passim, SMBV. Anton Jönsson, in Kenya 1939–42, was only working among Ethiopian refugees living in refugee camps.
" Trimmingham (1950), p. 32.
Table 16. Professional orientation of Swedish missionaries working for SEM and SMBV by occupational main groups, organization and active periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pastors (Ordained)</th>
<th>Laymen (Unspec.)</th>
<th>Education Staff</th>
<th>Medical Staff</th>
<th>Misc.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>SMBV SEM</td>
<td>SMBV SEM</td>
<td>SMBV SEM</td>
<td>SMBV SEM</td>
<td>SMBV SEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1905-36 only</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1905-36 and 1945-52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2⁴</td>
<td>5¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1945-52 only</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10²</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SEM, Missionary record; Stark (1972).

¹ Ordained after some years in Ethiopia
² One person ordained
³ Engineer
⁴ One agronomist and one instructor in physical training

interpreted it that way. SEM and SMBV were prepared to accept the Ethiopian invitation to the greatest possible extent and even co-ordinate their resources in order not to lose what they had once gained in good will. The Swedish mission in Ethiopia, however, was more than ever before a mission on Ethiopian conditions (see further Chapter VI:1).

2. 2 Numerical strength and professional orientation of SEM and SMBV missionaries, 1945–1952

We have already seen that when the Decree on foreign missions was issued both SEM and SMBV had Swedish staff prepared to go to Ethiopia. To what extent did SMBV and SEM meet the Ethiopian requirements, and which professions did the missionaries represent? Can any difference in the professional structure be noted between those missionaries working in Ethiopia before the war and those working after the war? In the following we shall concentrate on the two indigenous Swedish missionary societies SEM and SMBV. SDA's Swedish staff only constitute a small part of SDA's missionaries in Ethiopia and therefore they do not give a complete picture of SDA's professional orientation.

The missionaries in Table 16 have been divided into three categories: 1. active only in 1905–1936, 2. missionaries active before 1936, and who returned in 1945–52 and 3. newly recruited in 1945–52. This has been done in order to make comparisons between the missionaries active before and after the war.
According to Table 16 both SEM and SMBV sent more missionaries to Ethiopia during the seven years following 1945 than during the whole thirty year period of 1905–36.

According to Table 16 some missionaries, mostly with educational and medical training who had been working in Ethiopia before 1936, returned after the war. The missionaries with pre-war experience, however, constituted a relatively greater part of SMBV’s missionaries active in 1945–52, than SEM’s missionaries (one-third and one-sixth respectively). When checking the sources we find as expected that these persons, with some few exceptions, were the first to be sent to Ethiopia after the country had been re-opened to foreign mission. SEM had the largest number of new arrivals in 1945, 1946 and 1951 (Appendix 1), while SMBV had their largest number of new arrivals in 1946 and in 1952 (Appendix 2). From Appendices 1–2 can also be noted that the missionaries generally stayed for a period of 5–6 years, before returning to Sweden for a period of holiday. This explains the increased number of new arrivals in 1951 and 1952 for SEM and SMBV respectively. The number of missionaries thus increased rapidly in 1945 and 1946 and then remained relatively constant.

The question whether or not the missionary societies met the Emperor’s enquiries about educational and medical staff and whether this meant a change of the professional orientation of the missionaries is answered by Table 16. If we add group 2, i.e. those active both 1905–36 and 1945–52 to each of groups 1 and 3, we find that there was no change in the professional orientation of the missionaries active before 1936 and after 1945. Educational and medical staff, namely, constituted the largest categories for the two societies both before and after the war. For SEM there is a shift, however, from pastors towards medical staff during the period 1945–1952. Pastors were, however, often active as teachers and with literature work. The figures for SMBV in particular are too small to allow any deeper analysis. The most striking feature about the SMBV missionaries is that there were so few ordained missionaries among them. The educational and medical staff were about equal for both periods.

In conclusion it can be stated that educational and medical staff dominated among SEM’s and SMBV’s staff already before 1936. These organizations therefore possessed the experience within those fields which were most urgently needed in Ethiopia in 1945. The Emperor’s requests in 1945 to SEM and SMBV to send more missionaries with educational and medical training...
were obviously responded to by both societies, since the increase of staff was rapid, particularly within these fields. But that did not mean any change of the professional orientation of the missionaries other than that SEM strengthened the medical staff during 1945–52 at the expense of the pastors.


3.1 Comment on the sources

The Nationality Roll (NR), kept at the Swedish Legation in Addis Abeba is the main source for an examination of the Swedish experts in Ethiopia during the period 1945–1952. The Roll has been introduced in Chapter III:5.1. There are, however, four more sources available for an investigation of the Swedes resident in Ethiopia 1945–1952. They have all been prepared independently of each other and can therefore serve to check the accuracy of the Nationality Roll.

1. 'Account current of the Imperial Ethiopian Consulate in Stockholm' for the months of September and November 1946.\(^{101}\) The documents are carbon copies of the accounts of the Swedish Credit which the Ethiopian Honorary Consul in Stockholm, Dr Fride Hylander, sent to Ethiopian authorities in Addis Abeba. Altogether 134 Swedes are named under the respective Ministries.

2. A list titled ‘The Swedish expert group’, prepared for the Ethiopian State Bank by the Working Committee of Föreningen Svenskar i Etiopien (The Swedish Association in Ethiopia) in December 1946, containing 137 Swedes employed in Ethiopia.\(^{102}\)

3. In March 1947 the American Legation in Addis Abeba prepared a strictly confidential list of 'Swedes in Ethiopia' to inform the State Department of the United States in Washington.\(^{103}\) The Ministry is indicated for all Government employees, and for medical staff and teachers also the institution where they were employed. This source gives the names of 143 Swedish Government employees together with their spouses, if any.

4. 'Förteckning över svenskar i Etiopien (med Eritrea) den 1 jan 1953' prepared by Föreningen Svenskar i Etiopien in early 1953.\(^{104}\) The list gives the names of

\(^{101}\) Account Current of the Imperial Ethiopian Consulate in Stockholm for September 1946 is kept in Fride Hylander's Archives in Nyköping and for November in Abbebe Retta's Archives in Addis Abeba. It is, however, not known whether Abbebe Retta's Archives still exist after his execution in November 1974.

\(^{102}\) The Swedish expert group, dated 14.12 1946, FHy.


\(^{104}\) Förteckning över svenskar i Etiopien (med Eritrea) 1 jan 1953. SE, FSE.
96 Swedes in Ethiopian Government service, and offers an opportunity to check on the Swedes in Ethiopia at the very end of the period covered by this study.

According to the Nationality Roll the number of Swedes employed in Ethiopia for the period 1945–1952 totalled 298. A name by name comparison has been made between all five sources in order to find out whether any omissions can be traced in the sources. It was then found that all persons listed in the four other sources could be identified also in the Nationality Roll. This fact proves that the registration of Swedes by the Swedish Legation in Addis Abeba was very efficient. The Nationality Roll can therefore be considered as being reliable and, together with the other sources available, offers an opportunity to examine the Swedish experts in Ethiopia from a variety of aspects with a very high reliability.

3.2 General presentation of the Swedish experts

In addition to the Swedes who were in the service of the Missionary societies (see above Chapter V:2.2), a total of 700 Swedes were resident in Ethiopia in other capacities during the period 1945–1952. Of these individuals 298 were professionally active (229 men and 69 women). The remaining 402 persons constituted their family members (158 wives and 244 children, Table 17). Most of the professionally active Swedes were employed in Ethiopian Government service. They were generally called experts. Seven of the Government employees had been working in Ethiopia before or during the Italo-Ethiopian war.10

The experts had generally signed contracts for a basic period of two years with the possibility of staying a further year. The contracts were signed in Stockholm by the employee and a representative of the Ethiopian authorities. During 1946 Dr Fride Hylander was Ethiopian Honorary Consul in Stockholm and in this capacity he signed the contracts on behalf of Ethiopian authorities. The experts who were attached to an Ethiopian Ministry were subordinated to the respective Ethiopian Ministers, while those employed at special institutions like the Imperial Guard, the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force (IEAF) or Haile Selassie I Hospital were more directly subordinated to the Emperor.10

Some of the medical staff employed by the Ministry of Public Health were

10 V. Hagman see Ch. IV n. 80; Å. Holm see Ch. IV n. 255; F. Hylander see Ch. IV n. 41; E. Norup see Ch. IV n. 254; H. Nyström see Ch. IV n. 82; C. G. von Rosen see Ch. IV n. 251; V. Tamm see Ch. IV n. 149.

Table 17. Swedes (excluding missionaries) in Ethiopia 1945–1952 and their family members by occupational main groups, given in absolute numbers and in percent of the total of the respective category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Family members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. IEAF*</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Medical staff</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. School teachers</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Imperial Guard</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Police</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lawyers</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Agriculture</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hotel</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Geologists</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Garage unit</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Misc.²</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 IEAF Imperial Ethlopian Air Force
2 SECO Swedish Ethlopian Company staff included totalling 6 employees.
3 4 wives found temporary employment after arrival in Ethiopia
4 2 wives found temporary employment after arrival in Ethiopia
5 5 wives found temporary employment after arrival in Ethiopia
6 1 wife found temporary employment after arrival in Ethiopia

placed at different provincial hospitals in Desse, Yirgalem, Gonder, Adwa and Dire Dawa. The staff of IEAF was stationed at Bishoftu (nowadays called Debre Zeit), situated 50 km south of Addis Abeba. The geologists stayed in Adola and one of the members of the Agricultural unit stayed in Ambo. The remaining experts worked in Addis Abeba.¹⁰⁷

Experts active within related fields constituted special units, each with a Swedish unit leader.¹⁰⁸ According to this division the Swedish experts can be

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¹⁰⁷ The placing of the Swedes is given in the Nationality Roll and 'The Swedish Expert group'.
¹⁰⁸ Minutes of meeting with working Committee 1946, passim see for example 27.3 1946, 22.10 1946, § 5, and 30.10 1946, § 3, FHy.
divided into roughly 10 main groupings, each containing representatives of various professions. Some of the units were very small and contained only few experts (Table 17). It should, however, be emphasized here that these Swedes were never all resident in Ethiopia at the same time. They replaced each other on the expiry of their different terms of contract.

As demonstrated in Table 17, the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force constituted the largest expert group, containing a total of 98 Swedish employees. The Medical staff and the School teachers came next with 64 and 41 professionally active persons respectively. These three units constituted 68% of the total number of experts employed during the period 1945–1952. The Swedish officers in the Imperial Guard numbered 25. The remaining units had only between 5 and 12 professionally active members. These groups were given names indicating their professional orientation, without necessarily indicating their institutional affiliation in Ethiopian service. A member of the medical unit might thus have been employed at the IEAF, to mention an example. The overwhelming majority of the employees were men. There was, however, one exception from the male dominance, namely the medical staff, where the female employees constituted the majority. They were, with few exceptions, nurses.

Seen as a total, about 60% of the Swedish experts were married when they left Sweden. Out of the 229 male employees 172 were married, while only 6 of the female employees belonged to that category (Table 18). The married male experts were on average 3 years older than the single ones (34 and 31 years respectively). The difference was even more pronounced among the women with an average age of 36 and 31 years respectively for married and single employees.

Table 18 shows that the proportion of married experts varied considerably between the different units. In comparison with other units the IEAF group contained a larger proportion of single men. The School teacher unit also included a substantial number of bachelors. The single female experts were mostly found in the Medical unit. Although there was a substantial number of single Swedes in Ethiopia, no case is found where a Swede married an Ethiopian. In seven cases Swedes married another foreigner in Ethiopia. Three of the four female experts who married foreigners took Greek husbands. In five cases Swedish experts married colleagues. The Imperial Guard officers, except one who was engaged and married after his arrival, and the Police officers, were all married and all but one of the lawyers were married when they left Sweden. No case has been found where a female employee brought dependent family members to Ethiopia.

Considering the fact that most experts stayed in Ethiopia 2–3 years it is remarkable that so few of the totally 120 single experts married in Ethiopia. The fact that those who married either married a Swede or another foreigner,
Table 18. The Swedish experts 1945–1952. Civil status by occupational main groups given in absolute numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th></th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. IEAF</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Medical staff</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. School teachers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Imperial Guard</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Police and Lawyers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Misc.*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nationality Roll 1946–1953, SE.

* including Agricultural, Hotel, SECO, Geologist and Garage units.

would indicate that the Swedes like most other foreigners lived socially rather isolated from the Ethiopian population. There might also have been social barriers from both sides against mixed marriages.

The number of children varied between the expert units (Table 17). According to the Nationality Roll, the overwhelming majority of the children (196 or 80%), were born in Sweden before their parents went to Ethiopia. The children were, with few exceptions, below the age of 10, most of them below school age, when they left Sweden. Those 49 children who were born in Ethiopia mostly belonged to the IEAF and School teacher units. No children were registered by unmarried parents.

The fact that so many experts brought families to Ethiopia is a clear indication that even newly born babies were not considered as a major obstacle in recruiting Swedes for service in Ethiopia. This might be a consequence of the long tradition of Swedes in Ethiopia being represented by both the missionaries and by the Swedish experts who had been in the country before the war. The living conditions in Ethiopia were therefore relatively well known to Swedes.

3.3 Annual recruitment of Swedish experts, 1945–1952

Did the recruitment of Swedish experts take place continuously during the period 1945–1952, or can any change over time be noted? If so can any
Table 19. Annual recruitment of Swedish experts 1945–1952 in absolute numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of experts</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nationality Roll 1946–1953, SE.

difference be traced between the units regarding the intensity of the recruitment? In order to answer these questions a survey of the annual recruitment of experts by professional main groupings will now be presented.

Table 19 clearly demonstrates that the main recruitment of Swedish experts took place in 1946, when 131 persons accepted employment in Ethiopia. They constituted 44% of all Swedes recruited during the period 1945–1952. In the following year the recruitment drastically declined. A small increase can be noted in 1948, but in the two following years the recruitment declined again, reaching the lowest number in 1949. The last small peak in the recruitment was reached in 1951.

Why did the recruitment of Swedes decline so much after 1946? Was it because those experts who had gone to Ethiopia prolonged their contracts, or was it due to lack of interest from Ethiopia in employing more Swedes? If so, were there any particular groups that were not renewed? In order to answer this question we have to examine the annual recruitment by main professional groups. We then find that the recruitment in 1945 and 1946 mainly consisted of medical staff and teachers. The recruitment of school teachers stopped, however, after 1946, while the recruitment of medical staff continued until 1948, when the recruitment of this category also stopped. According to the Nationality Roll there were no new recruitments after 1946 to the Agricultural, Geologist and Garage units.

The recruitment of officers to the Imperial Guard took place at intervals in 1946, 1948 and in 1951, on the two later occasions to replace officers who had terminated their contracts. The main recruitment of police officers and legal staff, also took place in 1946, but there were constantly new recruits with the exception of 1949. The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force was the only unit where the recruitment increased. After a slight decline in 1947, the recruitment increased in 1948 and remained constant until 1950. In 1951 and 1952 it increased slightly.
Table 20. Year of arrival of Swedish experts resident in Ethiopia on 1.1 1953, by occupational main groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. IEAF</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Medical staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. School teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Imperial Guard</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Police and Lawyers</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Misc.*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including SECO staff

The changes become more pronounced when looking at the relative strength of the units. During 1945 and 1946 the medical staff and the school teachers dominated. The medical staff was still in dominance in the following year, but in 1949 the IEAP unit dominated. More than 50% of the new staff for the remaining years belonged to the IEAP unit.

When speaking of decreasing recruitment for all categories but the IEAF staff, it has to be taken into consideration whether or not this was due to the fact that experts already employed prolonged their contracts and stayed for more than 2–3 years. This can be examined in Table 20 which gives the year of arrival for the 96 Swedish experts resident in Ethiopia on 1 January 1953.

Among those Swedes resident in Ethiopia in early 1953 there was a small group of 20 persons who had stayed in the country for more than five years and another 14 who had stayed for more than three years i.e. they had arrived before 1948 and 1950 respectively (Table 20). Thus the IEAF staff not only dominated among the newly recruited, they were also in the majority among those experts who had prolonged their contracts (8 had stayed for more than five years and 12 had stayed for more than three years). The other experts who had arrived before 1948 mainly consisted of school teachers and medical staff (5 and 4 respectively). The proportion of experts who had stayed for more than three years was thus comparatively small (11%), the majority belonging to the
Table 21. Swedish experts resident in Ethiopia on 1.1 1953 compared with the total number of experts recruited 1945–1952 by occupational main groups given in absolute numbers and in percent of total resident 1953 and total recruited 1945–1952.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>IEAF</th>
<th>Medical staff</th>
<th>School teachers</th>
<th>Imperial Guard</th>
<th>Police &amp; Lawyers</th>
<th>Misc.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 1953</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–1953</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nationality Roll 1946–1953, SE; Förteckning över svenskar i Etiopien (med Eritrea) 1 Jan 1953, SE, FSE.

IEAF unit. The low recruitment, particularly of medical staff and school teachers after 1948, cannot thus be explained by their having prolonged their contracts to any great extent.

As demonstrated in Table 21, the IEAF was by far the largest unit, both regarding those resident in 1953 and the total number of experts recruited 1945–1952. Their proportion of the total, however, was higher in 1953 than for the whole period (63% and 33% respectively). The medical staff, the school teachers and the small units under the heading 'Misc.' had, however, experienced a pronounced decline both in absolute numbers and proportionally for 1953 in comparison with the whole period. The decline was particularly pronounced for the medical staff, which constituted 22% of the total number of experts for the whole period but only 7% of those resident in 1953. The Imperial Guard and the police and the legal staff units remained about the same in 1953 as for the whole period (Table 21).

How did the changed recruitment affect the institutional affiliation of the Swedes? Sources available allow an examination of where in the Ethiopian administration the Swedish experts were employed. Two occasions have been chosen for this investigation, namely December 1946, when the year of maximum recruitment was completed and 1 January 1953, representing the very end of the period. The examination of also a year in the middle of the period – preferably 1948 – would have been ideal but sources available do not permit such an investigation.

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In 1946 the Swedes were represented in almost the entire Ethiopian administration: Ministry of the Interior (11), Ministry of Public Health (14), Ministry of Education (34), Ministry of Finance (7), Ministry of Justice (4), Ministry of Agriculture (8), and Ministry of Pen (2). The Swedes were also well represented in three institutions subordinated directly under the Emperor, namely The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force (19), The Imperial Guard (12), and Haile Selassie I Hospital (28). The staff employed at the Ministry of Education were all teachers working at Haile Selassie I Secondary School (9), Technical School (9), Ittege Menen School (8) and Minilik School (4) in Addis Ababa and at Taffari Mekonnen School in Harer (4). In 1953, however, there were no Swedes employed at Haile Selassie I Hospital, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Pen. The number of employees had declined particularly within the Ministries of Public Health and Education. The Swedish staff employed at the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, however, had increased substantially from 19 in 1946 to 62 by early 1953.

In conclusion it can be stated that the recruitment of Swedish experts reached its maximum in 1946. After that there was a minor recruitment of Swedes, mainly for the IEAF unit. The officers for the Imperial Guard, the police officers and the legal staff remained about the same. The strongly decreased recruitment of Swedish medical staff and school teachers and some other categories was not a result of prolonged contracts, but rather that Ethiopia preferred to recruit such staff, if still needed, from other countries than Sweden. As could be expected from the changed pattern of recruitment, the institutional affiliation also changed between 1946 and 1952 towards a strong concentration to the IEAF, particularly at the expense of the Haile Selassie I Hospital, the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Education.

From having started with emphasis on medical and educational assistance from Sweden in 1946, the Emperor changed the emphasis to staff related to defence and maintenance of order at the end of the period under review. The reasons for this change will be discussed in Chapter V:5 and VI:2.3.

4. Financing of the Swedish engagement in Ethiopia

As stated in Chapter V:1.4, the Swedish Government granted a credit of 5 million Swedish Crowns, intended to cover travelling expenses and salaries for a large number of experts from Sweden as well as equipment necessary for their

7 Seven members of the IEAF unit had been transferred to Asmera, when the Federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea became effective from 12 September 1952.
work in Ethiopia. The Swedish Ministry of Finance prepared a scale of salaries for the experts, based on the salaries for the different vocational branches in Sweden. Part of the experts’ salary was paid in Swedish currency in Sweden. The Ethiopian Consulate in Stockholm was responsible for these transactions. The credit, however, diminished quickly due to expensive orders for equipment from the different expert units during the first months of 1946. By March 1946 Hylander found it necessary to convince the Swedish Government to extend the credit. The Ethiopian Ministry of Finance was in no way involved in this credit, which was negotiated by Abbebe Retta on behalf of the Emperor. It was therefore unable to coordinate the expenditure of the other Ethiopian ministries for equipment suggested. The authorities in Ethiopia and Sweden, however, had different views on how the credit should be used. The Ethiopians wanted to use as much as possible of the credit for purchases in Sweden, while the Swedes were most anxious to see that the salaries of the experts were paid in due order. By the end of May 1946 Hylander estimated that even without new orders for equipment the credit would be exhausted before the end of 1946. The Swedish Government in general but particularly Ernst Wigforss, the Minister of Finance, was definitely against an extended credit, and so were also Grafström and Dag Hammarskjöld, the special counsellor to the Government. The Swedes in Ethiopia, represented by Gunnar Jarring and Viking Tamm, and the Ethiopian representative in Stockholm, Fricle Hylander, apparently knew about the Government’s view and eager to convince the Swedish Government to extend the credit, they tried to push the matter by contacting key persons.

The issue of an extended Swedish Government credit cannot be looked upon as an isolated case, but has to be placed into the context of Ethio-Swedish economic relations in general. In the memorandum presented by Per Stjärne on behalf of the Emperor in July 1945, mention was made of a possible

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1 "PM angående lönereglering vid nyanställningar för att få rättvisast möjliga generella relation emellan alla befattningshavare," prep. by the Swedish Ministry of Finance, (Copy), EL.
2 "Account Current of the Imperial Ethiopian Consulate in Stockholm, September and November 1946, FH (September), AR (November).
3 F. Hylander to V. Tamm, Sthlm 31.3 1946, FH.
4 V. Tamm to F. Hylander, Addis Abeba 7.5 1946, FH.
5 F. Hylander to V. Tamm, Sthlm 31.5 1946, FH.
7 See for example V. Tamm to Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf 6.6 and 19.6 1946, KrA, VT, vol. 5; G. Jarring to S. Grafström, Addis Abeba 7.6 1946 (Copy), FH.
concession to an Ethiopian goldmine, besides the request of a loan from the Swedish Government. Swedish companies were also invited to establish themselves in Ethiopia and take part in the development of Ethiopia’s industry, forestry, agriculture and cattle breeding. During the early spring of 1946 the Emperor made soundings regarding the possibilities of expanded Ethio-Swedish economic co-operation. In May/June 1946 a delegation consisting of four persons representing Skandinaviska Banken, Boliden and Skånska Cement, headed by Erik Björkman, Director at Skandinaviska Banken, had undertaken a one month’s tour to Ethiopia. Their aim was to investigate the possibilities of obtaining a mineral concession and of constructing a railway from Addis Abeba to Sidamo and the gold mines in Adola. During their last meeting with representatives of the Ethiopian Government, on June 4, the Minister of the Interior, on behalf of the Emperor, stressed Ethiopia’s wish to co-operate with Sweden on a large scale. If Sweden was interested, practically all Ethiopia’s natural resources could be utilized by Swedes. The Björkman mission was so secret that not even Hylander and Tamm had been informed about the aim of their journey or about their activities in Ethiopia. In an exchange of letters, Tamm and Hylander complained to each other that they did not feel fully trusted. While the representatives secretly negotiated with Ethiopian authorities regarding expanded Ethio-Swedish economic relations without relaying information to anybody but Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Chargé d’Affaires, who had been present at the meeting on June 4, the Working Committee of the Swedish Association in Addis Abeba took action in the alarming economic situation. The Committee, consisting of all expert unit leaders plus Gunnar Jarring, with Viking Tamm as chairman, prepared a detailed survey of how the credit had been spent, together with requirements of an extended credit according to different alternatives. If the Ethiopian Government decided to fulfill an enlarged programme with Swedish experts and if the duties of the British Military Mission were to be transferred to Sweden, a minimum of 137 more experts would be needed at a total cost of 2.5 million Sw. Crowns. The Working Committee found it essential that the Government credit was extended or else the whole Swedish programme in Ethiopia would collapse. Tamm informed the Crown Prince about the economic situation emphasizing that the whole Swedish programme in

11 PM, Haile Selassies önskemål beträffande hjälp från och utbyte med Sverige. Copy enclosed letter H. Amler to T. Vinell, StHlm 25.1 1946, SAE, R 62 TV.
11 Rapport från resan till Abessinien (Etiopien) den 2/5–10/6 1946, SAE, R 62 TV. Erik Björkman b. 1895, Director at Skandinaviska Banken 1940–
11 F. Hylander to V. Tamm, StHlm 1.5 1946; V. Tamm to F. Hylander, Addis Abeba 7.5 1946; V. Tamm to F. Hylander, Addis Abeba 7.6 1946, FH.
11 PM angående den svenska statskrediten till Etiopien, Addis Abeba 4.6 1946, FH.
12 V. Tamm to F. Hylander, Addis Abeba 7.6 1946, FH.
Ethiopia would have to be cancelled already during the autumn of 1946, unless the Swedish Government approved an extended credit. The Ethiopian authorities did not appear to have funds to pay for the Swedish experts from their own means. If the Swedish Government credit would not be extended, the Swedish Military Mission would be unable to accept a possible offer to take over the duties of the British Military Mission in December 1946. The Swedish officers would then have nothing to do but return to Sweden. In a second letter to the Crown Prince, Tamm emphasized how small a risk Sweden would run by extending the credit, while Swedish prestige would suffer considerably if the whole Swedish programme collapsed just because of a refusal to grant a temporary credit.

Jarring had given his views regarding the Government credit in a long letter to Grafström. Seen against the background of Swedish companies negotiating for mineral concessions and expanded economic co-operation on a large scale Jarring found it unwise to refuse further credit intended to cover a difficult transitional period of about one year for the Ethiopian Government. Jarring found it beyond any doubt that the Björkman mission was positive towards expanded Ethio-Swedish economic co-operation. On receipt of this letter, Grafström informed Hylander that he intended to arrange a meeting to discuss the whole Ethiopian situation with representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Political and Commercial departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those representatives of Swedish economic life who had just returned from Ethiopia. Erik Leijonhufvud, legal adviser to the Emperor, was sent to Sweden as Ethiopian representative to negotiate with Swedish authorities. At his first meeting with Grafström he learnt about the negative attitude taken by the Swedish Government, shared by Grafström, towards an extended credit. The motive was that no promise had been given about an extension and that the credit had been used to an unforeseen extent for purchases of equipment in Sweden.

The meeting on the situation in Ethiopia took place on 27 June 1946. Leijonhufvud stated that an additional credit ought to be granted by Sweden in order to fulfill the work already started and to consolidate Sweden's good-will in Ethiopia. The Imperial policy was that Ethiopia would turn to some other country, notably the United States, if Sweden did not demonstrate any additional sign of willingness to contribute to Ethiopia's development. He presented a plan of how an additional 5 million Crowns was to be spent.

125 G. Jarring to S. Grafström, Addis Ababa 7.6 1946 (Copy), FHy.
126 S. Grafström to F. Hylander, Sthlm 13.6 1946, FH.
127 E. Leijonhufvud to Abbebe Retta, Sthlm 16.8 1946, EL.
Björkman maintained that the banks would hardly give credit to cover only the salaries for Swedish experts. The conditions would have to include some 'businesslike proposition' i.e. a concession. He did not find that the proposed credit meant any risks to the Swedish Government and therefore suggested that the Ministry of Finance should reconsider the matter and approve the credit. The possibilities of imports from Ethiopia were discussed, coffee being mentioned as the product most required. If Ethiopia could export to Sweden she would also get money to pay back the Swedish credits. The meeting ended with a recommendation that Leijonhufvud and Grafström should discuss the plan with Hammarskjöld and then present the whole Ethiopian matter to Wigforss for reconsideration.

On July 8 the Ethiopian credit was discussed at a preliminary Cabinet meeting chaired by Wigforss. Leijonhufvud explained that roughly 2.7 million Sw. Crowns of an additional credit of 5 million was needed to cover the costs of another 130 experts for a period of two years and the rest would cover their equipment. He proposed the following solution: 1. By granting a further credit of 2.5 million Crowns, the Government would pay for the personnel. 2. The exporters of equipment to the experts (roughly 2.5 million Crowns), would be granted export credit guarantees from the Government. 3. An 'exploring company' would be founded on a broad base to develop Ethiopia's economic life. Finally, the Swedish Government stated that it was willing to extend the credit with a sum of 2.5 million Crowns to cover the costs of the salaries. The supply of credit for the equipment was left to the banks and industries. The Minister of Trade decided that the exporters themselves must consider whether or not they were willing to take the risk of granting a credit to Ethiopia.

In the message to the Ethiopian Government the Swedish Government stressed that the granting of a further 2.5 million Sw. Crowns was a gesture of good-will, expressing the great interest in Sweden taken in the reconstruction of Ethiopia. The credit was estimated to cover the expenses for the Swedish experts until such a time that these costs could be covered by Ethiopian resources. The additional credit of 2.5 million Sw. Crowns was approved by the King-in-Council on 14 September 1946, on the same conditions as the original credit, only that it should be completely repaid by

12 PM angående sammanträde rörande frågan om ytterligare kredit till Etiopien, Sthlm 27.6 1946, EL.
13 PM ang. statskrediten till Etiopien, Sthlm 8.7 1946, FHy, EL.
14 E. Leijonhufvud to G. Myrdal, Sthlm 18.8 1946, EL.
15 E. Leijonhufvud to Abbebe Retta, Sthlm 16.8 1946, EL.
16 Copy of telegram Cabinet to Legation in Addis Abeba, Sthlm 15.7 1946, EL.
It is difficult if not impossible to determine any specific factor that convinced the Swedish Government, particularly Wigforss, to change their minds and approve the additional credit. Wigforss mentions nothing about the Ethiopian credit in his memoirs. After all, this must have been a minor issue for Wigforss, in view of the large undertakings of the Swedish Government to assist, for example, the other Scandinavian countries in their reconstruction after the war. The credit was not even discussed in the Swedish Parliament. There are good reasons, however, to believe that there was some pressure on the Swedish Government to approve the credit. Tamm’s good relations with the Swedish Crown Prince, who had taken an active interest in Ethiopian matters from the very beginning, is one factor to take into consideration. By writing his two letters to the Crown Prince, Tamm obviously wanted him to take action, although he did not express it clearly. He apparently obtained the effects he was aiming at. At the end of June, immediately upon receipt of the second letter, the Crown Prince contacted Grafström and discussed the credit with him. In early July 1946 the Crown Prince learnt that Wigforss seemed to be willing to grant Ethiopia a further credit. He then sent him a letter recapitulating the whole issue and presenting all the reasons favouring an approval.

The close co-operation between Tamm and Hylander must have been a strong factor in the matter, as well as Leijonhufvud’s good contacts in Government circles and his co-operation with Hylander. However, one of the most important factors was apparently that Björkman could assure the Swedish Government that there were no risks in granting further credit and that he also was in favour of accepting the Emperor’s offer of a large-scale economic co-operation. Jarring’s view that it would be unwise to refuse a credit at a time when Swedish economic life was about to gain a foothold in Ethiopia most probably also contributed to changing Grafström’s mind.

The fact that only 2.5 million Crowns were granted is, however, a clear indication that the Swedish Government was not interested in any deeper engagement in Ethiopia. It was apparently mainly in order not to damage the prospects for Swedish economic life to obtain concessions and trade exchange that made the Swedish Government change their mind. By granting a

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13 Extract from minutes on financial matters, held before HM the King-in-Council at the Castle of Stockholm 14.9 1946, EL.
14 S. Grafström to P. Anger, Sthlm 17.10 1946 (Copy), EL.
15 Wigforss (1954).
minimum additional credit the Government could also guarantee that the Swedish engagement would not collapse. The credits granted to Ethiopia was as far as can be ascertained the first credit for development work granted by the Swedish Government to an African country.

By September 1946 Wigforss had agreed, however, that also the additional credit could be used in Sweden to purchase equipment for existing expert units. Particularly the IEAF and the Agricultural units, who suffered from acute shortage of equipment could then cover their immediate needs. Wigforss had thus also become of the opinion that it was better to supply the existing experts units with sufficient equipment than to employ more experts.\(^{137}\)

The Emperor was eager to develop the Ethio-Swedish commercial relations first in the form of an 'exploring company' ('Studiebolag'), which could later be expanded.\(^{138}\) The plans for such a company materialized during the first half of 1947, mainly as a result of initiatives taken by Erik Björkman, Björn Prytz and Torsten Vinell. A company called *Etiopiska Kompaniet AB* (Ethiopian Company Ltd) was established 1 May 1947 and held its statutory meeting 20 June 1947. The purpose of the company was to develop the trade and the general economic relations between Sweden and Ethiopia.\(^{139}\)

One year later a subsidiary company by the name of Swedish Ethiopian Company was established in Addis Abeba.\(^{140}\) By founding *Etiopiska Kompaniet AB*, Swedish business life had taken the actions expected of it by the meeting in June 1946 about the extended credit. Moreover, it had fulfilled the Emperor's expectations of extended Ethio-Swedish economic relations. The expanded Ethio-Swedish economic relationship is, however, too comprehensive a problem to be penetrated within the scope of the present study. This will therefore be postponed to a forthcoming investigation.

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\(^{137}\) V. Tamm to G. Jarring, Sthlm 25.9 1946; V. Tamm to W. Bagge, Sthlm 26.9 1946, KrA, VT, vol. 5.


\(^{139}\) W. Kjellström to T. Vinell, Stockholm 4.6 1947 with enclosures, SAE, R 62 TV. The following persons and companies were founding shareholders: B. Bengtsson, E. Björkman, A. Johansson, B. Prytz, A. Sandberg, H. Wallenberg, A. Wettermark (1 share each). *Bolidens Gruv AB* and *Skånska Cementgiuteriet* (9 shares each), *AB Trustee* (8 shares), *AB Transfer* (4 shares), *Hellefors Bruks AB* and *Kooperativa Förbundet* (3 shares each). Each share had a nominal value of 2 500 Sw. Crowns.

\(^{140}\) The present author has collected a very complete material to research into the activities of the Swedish Ethiopian Company (SECO), but this will have to be postponed until a forthcoming study in order to keep the present study within reasonable limits.
5. The creation of an Ethiopian Air Force – a matter of first priority to the Emperor?

In Chapter V:3. 3 we have seen how the recruitment of Swedes declined after 1946. The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force unit was the only group to increase in number. We shall now look for an explanation to the change of emphasis in the Swedish expert recruitment that took place particularly after 1948 by examining whether the Emperor had any particular interest in emphasizing recruitment of staff for an Ethiopian Air Force.

The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force was intended to be a weapon in the hand of the Emperor to ‘defend the Ethiopian country against intruders and enemies of the Ethiopian Government’. The Emperor wanted the instructors and ground engineering crews to be Swedes. The Swedish Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Swedish Air Force had declared themselves willing to assist the Emperor in this matter.44 Nothing was, however, mentioned about a possible assistance from Sweden to establish an Ethiopian Air Force in the memoranda regarding Ethio-Swedish co-operation discussed in 1944–45. The memorandum brought by Stjärne in July 1945 had only included mention of a Swedish-Ethiopian company to establish a national Ethiopian civilian airline.45 How could that develop into an expert unit to build up an Ethiopian Air Force?

Experiences from the Italo-Ethiopian war 1935–36, when the Italian Air Force had played a decisive role to defeat Ethiopia, as well as experiences from September 1943, when he had obtained assistance from the British Air Force to crush a revolt in Tigrai, had taught the Emperor that an Air Force could be used for various purposes. During the negotiations for the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944, it had for a while been contemplated to add an air wing to the British Military Mission to assist in the development of an Ethiopian Air Force.46 This plan never materialized due to the reluctance of the British Foreign Office to build up an Air Force which could be used for punitive actions to maintain internal order beyond their control, the bombing of rebels in Tigrai mentioned as an example. The Emperor was therefore recommended to be left to build up his own Air Force, possibly with assistance from the United States.47

44 Proposition for the organization of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force by Ingvar Berg dated 20.6 1948, p.1, (Copy), IB.
45 HM Kejsare Haile Selassies önskemål beträffande hjälp från och utbyte med Sverige, SAE, R62 TV.
47 Secret telegram Howe to Foreign Office, with several minutes, Addis Abeba 13.10 1944, FO 371, vol. 41508, J 3609.
In his biography over Carl Gustaf von Rosen, Ralph Herrmanns mentions that Carl Florman, Director of Aerotransport AB (ABA), Per Norlin, Director of Svenskt Internationellt Luft AB (SILA) and Carl Gustaf von Rosen – at that time employed as pilot at ABA – had been in contact with the Emperor from late in 1944 through the whole of 1945 regarding a Swedish Ethiopian Airline.\footnote{Herrmanns (1975), p. 161. Carl Florman b. 1886 d. 1963, Captain Managing Director of ABA 1924–49. Per Norlin b. 1905, Managing Director of SILA 1943–49, 1955–, SAS 1946–49, 1951–54, ABA 1949–51. Carl Gustaf von Rosen see Ch. IV n. 251.}

During the meeting with the Abyssinian Committee on 9 July 1945, Per Stjärne mentioned that the Emperor had suggested von Rosen as the Director of an national Ethiopian civilian airline.\footnote{PM angående sammanträde med abessinienutskottet 9 July 1945, FH\textsc{y}, EL, Kr\textsc{a}, VT, vol. 5.}

Already in connection with the unrest in northern Ethiopia in the autumn of 1943, however, the Emperor had turned to the United States requesting aircraft and military equipment.\footnote{J.K. Caldwell to The Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 29.9 1943, 884.24/142; H.S. Villard to Department of State, Washington 24.1 1944 with enclosure Memorandum by P.H. Alling on Ethiopian request for transport aircraft dated 14.1 1944, NA, Decimal file 1940–44, F.W. 884.24/164.}

Throughout 1944 negotiations were undertaken on the Emperor’s behalf to obtain planes and pilots to improve the communications in Ethiopia, not least for security reasons. Some aircraft were delivered under the Lend-Lease Agreement of August 1943 and American staff was also supplied.\footnote{H.S. Villard to W.T. Stone, Washington 21.3 1944, 884.24/177A; J.W. Finger to C.W. Lewis, Washington 21.3 1944, 884.796/3-2144; H.S. Villard to W.T. Stone, Washington 24.4 1944, 884.24/178A; J.K. Caldwell to the Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 14.11 1944, 884.248/11-1444, NA, Decimal file 1940–44.}

In September 1944 an aviation school was started in Addis Abeba under the direction of an American pilot by the name of John Robinson together with four assistants, all of them Americans. In March 1945, since this staff did not prove efficient enough, Atö Tekle Roro, the Director General of Aviation, employed R.N. Thomson, a Canadian working at Halle Selassie I Secondary School, who had three years of experience from the Air Training Programme in Canada.\footnote{Tekle Rara to American Minister, Addis Abeba 12.6 1945, Copy enclosure no. 6 to J.K. Caldwell to The Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 25.6 1945, NA, Decimal file 1945–49, 884.24/6-2545.}

During the first half of 1945 requests for additional equipment and personnel to develop Ethiopian aviation were constantly communicated to the United States.\footnote{J.K. Caldwell to The Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 4.1 1945, 884.796A/1-445; Memoranda of conversations on the subject of aircraft and pilots for Ethiopia dated 6.3 1945, 884.796/3-645 884.796/5-345, NA, Decimal file 1945–49.} In order to get a clear idea of the needs within the field of aviation, members of the American Legation in Addis Abeba were invited to visit the
Ethiopian Aviation School. At the request of the American Legation Ato Tekle Roro presented a plan for the Ethiopian air service, stating that the immediate objectives were to establish an internal air service which would serve all the major centres of the country and also enable contacts with centres adjacent to Ethiopia. Aviation would greatly facilitate the administration of the country and would therefore be of great political importance. It would also be of great economic importance in the transport of government cargoes and mail, as well as cargo for commercial trading companies. The education of cadets was of utmost importance for the future of an Ethiopian air service. Tekle Roro’s plan, together with several memoranda containing requests for equipment and staff for the aviation school, were sent to Washington for consideration.

In September 1945 the Ethiopian Government signed a contract with the American aviation company Transcontinental and Western Air (TWA), regarding the establishment of an Ethiopian company called Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) serving Khartoum, Cairo, Jidda, Asmera, Djibouti, and Aden. TWA would also serve as government agent for construction and improvement of airports. The contract included purchase of aircraft and equipment. In the telegram reporting the event to the American Secretary of State, it was stated that the Emperor wanted the contract to be kept secret for the time being.

When von Rosen in mid-November 1945 landed in Addis Abeba on his way to Madagascar and, together with SILA’s chief economist Ture Bielkegård, discussed the project of an Ethiopian Airline with the Emperor, nothing was revealed about the contract with TWA. The American Legation, however, immediately reported to Washington about von Rosen’s and Bielkegård’s visit. Bielkegård was reported to carry a passport as a missionary, whereas the real purpose of his coming to Addis Abeba, was to investigate the possibilities of establishing an internal airline in Ethiopia.

According to Herrmanns, von Rosen was informed about the contract with TWA in early December 1945, when he again landed in Addis Abeba hoping...
to sign a contract for an Ethiopian Airline. The Emperor instead offered von Rosen a position as 'Principal Instructor and Director of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force' as from 1 December 1945, for a period of three years. He was to start with a flying school, mainly along the plans he had outlined together with Bielkegård. Herrmanns states that von Rosen believed that ABA/SILA had been outmanoeuvered from the project, because the news about a possible Ethio-Swedish airline had been leaked to TWA. This company had then sent representatives to Ethiopia and convinced the Emperor to allow them to organize civil aviation in Ethiopia with the motivation that the United States planned to give considerable assistance to Ethiopia.

Information about possible Ethio-Swedish co-operation within civil aviation might, of course, have contributed to speeding up a contract with TWA. The present author is, however, of the opinion that the Emperor was eager to obtain an Air Force as well as a civil air net. He therefore turned to Britain as well as to the United States, in order to see what he could obtain from them. At the same time he made enquiries about what could be obtained from Sweden. But he did not engage von Rosen until he knew what he could get from the United States. When they decided to support civil aviation, the Emperor offered the Air Force to von Rosen.

Before accepting the Emperor's offer, von Rosen consulted Bengt Nordenskiöld, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Swedish Air Force, to make sure that instructors could be recruited from Sweden to establish an Ethiopian Air Force. The first group of Swedes who had already been recruited to start civil aviation in Ethiopia, accepted to work for an Ethiopian Air Force instead. The Swedish Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Air Force gave permission for the recruitment of instructors and ground engineer crews for an Ethiopian Air Force and additional staff could therefore be recruited from the Swedish Air Force. Since the IEAF was to consist mainly of Ethiopians, the Swedes were to be released as soon as there were Ethiopians with sufficient training to take over their duties.

The Swedes started their work early in 1946 at the flying school started in Addis Ababa by the Americans. Since the Addis Ababa airport was needed for the Ethiopian Airlines, the Air Force was moved to Bishoftu, about 50 km south of Addis Ababa. According to Herrmanns there were about one hundred

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"Ibid., p. 163.
"Proposition for the organization of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, p. 1, (Copy), IB.
students aged between 17 and 20 years, with a basic education of a little less than nine years when the Swedes took over.\textsuperscript{16}

Besides von Rosen the initial group of Swedes belonging to the IEAF unit consisted of 19 persons, who left Sweden between January 9 and 16 July 1946. The group comprised three Air Force pilots, six mechanics, three wireless operators and one meteorologist, all but two of the mechanics being recruited from the F1 air base in Västerås. There were also three engineers, one of whom was a construction engineer to build airfields, one secretary, one hotel manager, and one accountant.\textsuperscript{16} Carl Gustaf von Rosen transported Swedish experts to Ethiopia every two weeks during most of 1946.\textsuperscript{16} This appears to have awakened the interest of the American Legation because in mid-January it reported in a secret letter to the American Secretary of State that enquiries had been made to the American Adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Swedish Chargé d’Affaires regarding Swedish plans in Ethiopia. The American adviser said that as far as he was aware no approach had ever been made to any Ethiopian official, unless perhaps informally and privately to the Emperor, regarding the establishment of a Swedish internal air service in Ethiopia. The Swedish Chargé d’Affaires said that a Swedish plane would make a number of trips to bring remaining Swedish doctors, teachers and nurses to Addis Abeba, but that these trips would not be on a commercial basis. The pilot of the plane, von Rosen, would eventually remain in Ethiopia as an aviation instructor.\textsuperscript{17} A detail worth noting in this context is that none of the three Air Force pilots arriving in 1946 became registered in the Ethiopian Records of residence permits, which might be an indication that the Ethiopian authorities were reluctant to demonstrate the presence of Swedish Air Force pilots during 1946.\textsuperscript{17}

The IEAF unit had a special position in that respect that the Emperor was its supreme commander and von Rosen was subordinated immediately below him, Assefa Ayene from the Imperial Guard serving as liaison officer. The Emperor considered it of vital importance to establish an efficient Air Force.

\textsuperscript{16} Herrmanns (1975), pp. 165–169. When inspected by the American Legation in June 1945 the aviation school was reported to have about 60 students divided into two groups—those who had some secondary education and those who had not. The second group of students were given courses in elementary subjects not required by the first. The ages of the students were said to vary between 16 and 26 years, the majority being between 18 and 23, (Copy of memorandum 8.6 1945 regarding visit to Ethiopian Aviation School, enclosure 4 to J.K. Caldwell to The Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 25.6 1945, NA, Decimal file 1945–49, 884.24/6-2525).

\textsuperscript{17} Nationality Roll 1946–53, SE.

\textsuperscript{17} Regarding von Rosen’s flights between Stockholm and Addis Abeba see correspondence F. Hylander–V. Tamm 1946, passim, FHy.

\textsuperscript{17} F. Cole to The Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 18.1 1946, NA, Decimal file 1945–49, 884.796/1-1846.

\textsuperscript{17} Records of residence permits 1944–1949, IO.
At the direct request of the Emperor, Nordenskiöld in 1948 agreed to send Colonel Ingvar Berg to Ethiopia to assist von Rosen in making an organizational plan over the expansion of the IEAF.\textsuperscript{165}

A plan covering the years 1948–1951 was presented to the Emperor by Berg in June 1948. After two years work the IEAF consisted of a headquarters, a flying school and a small workshop. The flying school had two courses. The first course had 17 pilot cadets and 10 radio operator cadets and the second course had 12 pilot trainees and 12 radio operator trainees. According to the plan an attack squadron was to be organized in October 1948. In addition to the Swedish instructors it would be manned also by the cadets of the first course of the flying school. In October 1949 a second attack squadron would be started, with students taken from the second course. At the same time the first course of an aviation transport school would start, with a duration of about four months. In November 1950 a fighter squadron would be organized and start its first training course, with students recruited from the third course of the flying school.\textsuperscript{166} In 1948 there were about 15 Saab 91 Safir trainer aircraft and 16 attack planes of model B 17, all purchased from Sweden.\textsuperscript{167}

According to Berg's plan the need for Swedish staff was calculated to be 22 for 1948, 39 for 1949, 42 for 1950 and 45 for 1951. The planned employment can be compared with the actual employment of Swedes as indicated by the list of Swedes employed at the IEAF, supplied to the present author by the IEAF headquarters on the command of the late General Assefa Ayene in January 1974.\textsuperscript{168} Besides the names of the employees the list indicates also the position held at the IEAF and the salary paid. A comparison of the list with the Nationality Roll indicated that there were no omissions. On comparing Berg's scheduled employments of Swedes with the actual employments it was found that Berg's plan was closely followed.

The increase of the IEAF unit after 1948 can thus be explained by an expansion of the IEAF which required increased employments. Despite the fact that the Emperor would have to pay for his Air Force by Ethiopian funds he obviously found it worth the price seen against the background of what had

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{165} Interview with Ingvar Berg, Lidingö 4.7 1973. Interview with Assefa Ayene in Addis Abeba 5.1 1974. See also Herrmanns (1975), pp. 192–193. Ingvar Berg b. 1905, Major-General. In Ethiopia for organizational duties 1947 and 1948. He was the leader of the group who flew 16 B 17s bought from Sweden in November 1947. Assefa Ayene see Ch. IV n. 164.
\item\textsuperscript{166} Proposition for the organization of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, p. 9 (Copy), IB.
\item\textsuperscript{167} Ufl 1948:7, p. 200. Regarding details how the planes were purchased and transported to Ethiopia see Herrmanns (1975), pp. 170–177, 181, 187–188. Regarding the transport of the B 17s see also Ufl 1948:7, pp. 165–199.
\item\textsuperscript{168} Proposition for the organization of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, enclosure no. 5, IB; List of Swedish personnel who served with the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force approximately as from 1945–60, VHN.
\end{footnotes}
already been accomplished by 1948. With this kind of arrangement the Emperor obtained an Air Force as well as a civil air net, thus enabling him to solve the problems of transportation within the country and also to obtain an effective weapon to be used against foreign aggression or in maintaining internal security, as was emphasized in the enquiries to the United States during 1944 and 1945. Haile Selassie had thus made recruitment of staff for the Air Force a priority when he had to pay for the Swedish experts from Ethiopian funds. Without having concluded any military agreement with Ethiopia, the Swedish Government gave its consent to this arrangement by granting leave-of-absence to staff from the Swedish Air Force for service in Ethiopia. The Emperor's priorities were thus accepted by the Swedish Government.

6. The Swedish Military Mission. A case study in Ethio-Swedish relations

6.1 The recruitment of the Swedish Military Mission

Already the first direct Ethiopian enquiries about Swedish experts communicated via the Swedish and Ethiopian Legations in Moscow in February 1944 mention that the Emperor had in mind the possibility of reorganizing the Ethiopian army with assistance from Sweden. The Emperor, however, wanted to postpone any actions to that effect until the war was over.\(^{16}\) A Swedish Military Mission similar to the one in 1934 was later included in the 'minimum and initial list of Swedes' brought to Stockholm by Ato Abbebe Retta in March 1945.\(^{17}\) The Swedish Government approved the sending of a Mission to Ethiopia, emphasizing, however, that the matter should be treated as strictly confidential, nothing being mentioned about it in official correspondence or in the press.\(^{18}\)

The Emperor's enquiry about a Swedish Military Mission was communicated to the Swedish body of officers via a confidential circular letter distributed to the heads of the Swedish armed forces. The Emperor wanted to employ 6–9 Swedish officers to serve as military advisers and as instructors to Ethiopian officers. At least 3–6 of the officers should have experience from either the Infantry or the Cavalry, and one should belong to the General Staff

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\(^{16}\) I. Hägglöf to E. Bohemen, Moscow 25.2 1944, KUD, HP 1 Yab I.


or be competent for such assignment. There would also probably be appointments for one officer from each of the Armoured corps, the Artillery, the Air Force, and the Engineers. The applications, which under no circumstances were to be registered in any diary, or mentioned in any official correspondence, were to reach the Chief of the Swedish Army Staff no later than 19 May 1945. The Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Army received more than 300 applications and after comments given by the various Regimental Commanders, the Commanding Generals and Inspectors of Service Branches, seven officers were recommended for service in Ethiopia on 6 June 1945. It was later found necessary to employ four more officers, two officers to serve as sport instructors and two officers qualified to give advanced education to Ethiopian officers.

As early as 20 March 1945, Viking Tamm had privately informed Captain Tage Olihn about a possible Swedish Military Mission to Ethiopia. At the end of April 1945, Tamm informed Olihn that he had decided to accept a position in Ethiopia if a Swedish Military Mission materialized. Tamm intended to recommend Olihn for a position if he applied for one. On 23 May 1945 Olihn was informed by Tamm that the Swedish officers were to establish a Cadet School in Ethiopia. Olihn would be appointed as chief of the School if he was accepted for service in Ethiopia by the military authorities and would be given an opportunity to select officers with whom he felt that he could collaborate. In mid-May these officers had been selected and given information about Ethiopia by Tamm.

Altogether 25 Swedish officers served in Ethiopia during the period 1945–1952. Of the officers 17 belonged to Infantry regiments, while four came from the Artillery, one each from the Engineers and Armoured corps and finally two officers belonged to the Cavalry. Their average age when leaving for Ethiopia was 35.2, all of them being married. All the officers took their families to Ethiopia, including 37 children. Four children were born in Ethiopia. The recruitment was arranged in such a way that there were always ten officers on active service in Ethiopia, with some overlapping in order to avoid gaps when someone returned to Sweden.
The officers who left in 1948 after two or three years of service were all replaced, while only one of those leaving in 1952 was replaced. The number of officers therefore decreased to six in early 1953. The decrease was mainly due to the fact that the Cadet school could be closed as more than sufficient numbers of young officers had now graduated to fill the cadres of the Imperial Guard. The decrease should probably also be seen in the light of the Military Agreement between Ethiopia and the United States concluded in May 1953, according to which a United States Military Assistance Group (MAAG) arrived in Ethiopia.

The majority of the officers employed between 1946 and 1952 stayed for more than two years, thus prolonging their contracts. The two sports instructors, Onni Niskanen and Gösta Isaksson stayed on in Ethiopia as civilian instructors after four years of service with the Imperial Guard. Only three officers stayed for only one year, one of them was Viking Tamm, the head of the Military Mission. This is an indication of a rather stable situation, the officers and their families having settled well in the country. Due to the delicate position of the Swedish officers in Ethiopia as long as the British Military Mission still remained in the country it was certainly of utmost importance that the Swedes did not have disagreements among themselves. This was probably the reason why Ollhn was given an opportunity to express his opinion about the officers he was going to collaborate with in 1946.

6.2 Viking Tamm’s role in Haile Selassie’s international relations

General Tamm arrived in Ethiopia in early December 1945. Besides the preparations for the work of the Swedish officers, Tamm had also to plan and organize the activities of the other Swedish experts. The British Military Mission consisted of about 70 officers, of whom 90% were temporary officers, with captain as the lowest rank. As long as the British Military Mission
remained in the country the Swedish officers were supposed to train the Imperial Guard under the Emperor's direct command. Besides advisory responsibilities, the Swedes were to organize a Cadet school for basic training of Ethiopian officers and an officers' course for advanced training of the officers of the Imperial Guard. Tamm's impression of the situation was that the Emperor wanted to transfer the responsibility for the training of the Ethiopian army to the Swedes as soon as possible. When Ato Abbebe Retta visited Stockholm he had given Tamm to understand that the Swedish Military Mission might be given greater responsibilities than training the Imperial Guard. In Addis Abeba Ato Abbebe had also told Jarring that the Emperor intended to replace the British Military Mission with Swedish officers as soon as possible. In early 1946 Tamm must thus have had reasons to believe that within a near future he would take over the duties of the British Military Mission.

The British were interested in the future activities of the Swedish Military Mission. The relations between the two military missions, however, were reported to be good. In the general competition for influence between nationalities – particularly between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union – which was reported to be in progress in Ethiopia the British were said to prefer that Swedes gained influence in Ethiopia instead of Americans or Russians. Tamm informed General Cottam, the Commanding Officer of the British Military Mission, about the tasks of the Swedish Military Mission and also gave details of the composition of the Swedish officers' group. He was invited to take part in exercises arranged by the British. This would indicate that there was no open friction between the two military missions.

Tamm's position in Ethiopia remained uncertain throughout the spring and summer of 1946. In mid-June 1946, however, Tamm received semi-official information that it seemed certain that the British Military Mission should leave Ethiopia when the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement expired in December. Tamm was even asked to give his opinion to the Emperor concerning the future organization and training of the Ethiopian armed forces as well as a plan for employment of Swedish officers if a Swedish Military Mission was to

\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\ V. Tamm to G. Heuman & A. Thorbourn, Addis Abeba 6.1 1946; V. Tamm to W.A. Douglas, Addis Abeba 11.1 1946; Svenska officerare i Ethiopiens. Rapport nr 1, Enclosed to letter V. Tamm to B. Steckzén, Addis Abeba 28.2 1946.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\ V. Tamm to T. Olh, Addis Abeba 15.12 1945, KrA, VT, vol. 5.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{12}}\ V. Tamm to Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf, Addis Abeba 20.4 1946, KrA, VT, vol. 5.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{13}}\ G. Jarring to V. Assarsson, Addis Abeba 15.1 1946, Copy sent to F. Hylander 1.2 1946, FHy.\]

succeed the British. According to Tamm’s plan the future Swedish Military Mission should comprise 57 Swedes, including 17 civilians (one physician, 3 language teachers, 2 athletics instructors, one engineer and 9 secretaries). Tamm’s memorandum is dated 25 June 1946 and was handed over to Abbebe Retta to be given to the Emperor. When by mid-July Tamm had heard no reactions from the Emperor he informed Moulougueta Bouly, the Chief of the Imperial Guard, who had just returned from a visit to England and Sweden, about his position. A few days later the Emperor told Tamm via Moulougueta that he intended to confide the responsibilities now held by the British Military Mission to Swedish officers. Because of the political situation abroad, he could not give any definite answer as to when this could be done. The Emperor therefore wanted Tamm to prolong his leave-of-absence in order to gain time. Tamm had, however, privately learnt that a termination of the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement could not be expected until the issue of the former Italian colonies had been settled, which would take at least a year. It was also increasingly obvious that the British wanted to retain their position in Ethiopia. Under these circumstances Tamm was not prepared to interrupt his career in Sweden, but intended to return to Sweden before 1 October 1946 unless the Emperor could give assurance within a week that Tamm could feel that his position was secure in Ethiopia.

Tamm was obviously disappointed over his unsettled position in Ethiopia. He felt that he had been used as a political counterweight to the British. Already in early June he made plans to return to Sweden and informed the Chief of the Swedish Army of his intention. Tamm wanted to keep his plans about leaving Ethiopia secret in order not to disturb the Ethio-Swedish negotiations about an extended Government credit. Tamm could not accept to stay in the shadow of another Military Mission with more important duties than his own. When he could not obtain clear information regarding his future, he handed in his preliminary resignation to the Emperor on 30 July 1946. His definite resignation was communicated to the Emperor a week later. Tamm returned to Sweden on 7 September 1946.

[References]

[2] V. Tamm to Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf, Addis Abeba 6.8 1946, KrA, VT, vol. 5. Tamm also mentioned that it had been clarified that the British police officers, whose departure had already been decided, should stay. That meant that the Swedish police group would have a much more modest position than what had been decided earlier.
Tamm's position has been discussed in some detail because it can serve as one of many examples of Emperor Haile Selassie's method of balancing his international relations in order to secure the greatest possible freedom of action for himself. This case reveals the complexity of Ethiopia's position in the mid-1940s. On the one hand Haile Selassie was anxious to retain Ethiopia's independence, as granted in the second Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944, but on the other hand he was still dependent upon British military presence in the country to maintain internal order. The British also seem to have been aware of their position in Ethiopia. Eritrea was under British occupation and the Emperor needed their support to unite Eritrea with Ethiopia. Their reactions to the rumours about the possible arrival of a Swedish Military Mission to Ethiopia, which might take over part of their duties, as well as the obvious reluctance to relay any information whatsoever about the possible Swedish presence in Ethiopia is a clear indication of the complexity of the situation.

Did then the Emperor ever have any intentions of replacing the BMME with a Swedish Military Mission on the expiry of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement in December 1946? The British did not seem to be very popular in Ethiopia in the early 1940s. It is therefore possible that the Emperor wanted to return to the situation in the early 1930s, i.e. to let a Swedish Military Mission resume their activities at the Cadet School in Holeta. The reaction from the British Military Mission that they would rather withdraw from Ethiopia than share the responsibility with another Military Mission was a clear sign to the Emperor not to give any such duties to the Swedes until the expiry of the 1944 Agreement. A small Swedish Military Mission, headed by Tamm could then serve as a stand-by mission in case the Emperor decided to replace the British with Swedes.

For Tamm the situation was different. He had accepted to go to Ethiopia to train the Imperial Guard only until such a time as the BMME would leave and their responsibilities would be taken over by him.

The Emperor managed to maintain a situation of uncertainty for almost a year, by refusing to give other than vague promises to anyone until he had the whole situation under control. He used Tamm as a pawn in his international game. When Tamm realized that he was being used as a political counterweight to the British he resigned from his post in Ethiopia.

6.3 Ethiopian cadets enrolled at the Imperial Guard Cadet School 1946

The difficulties in evaluating the effects of the work performed by Swedes in Ethiopia have been discussed above when the effects of the work performed by the SEM missionaries in 1920–35 and by the Swedish officers in 1934–36
Table 22. Age of Ethiopian cadets when enrolled. A comparison between cadets enrolled in 1935 and in 1946.

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<th>14</th>
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<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22—</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Förteckning över elever vid 'Ecole de Guerre Haile Selassie Ier' 1935–1936, KrA, VT, vol. 1; Roll of EthioPlan cadets 1946, TO.

were examined. An effort will, however, be made to illuminate the work of the Swedish officers also in the 1940s by following the careers of the cadets enrolled in 1946. These cadets can be examined in even more detail than the ones enrolled in 1935. The Roll kept by General Olihn in 1946 is, namely, more detailed than the one kept by General Tamm in 1935 and not only includes the age and name of the cadets, but also place of birth, home district, father's profession, religion, number of years at school and the name of the school attended before enrollment as well as the mark obtained at graduation. Each cadet was also given a rank number indicating his result in comparison with the rest of his course. Olihn's ranking of the cadets enables us to examine whether the élite, constituted by the 25 best cadets, differed from the rest of the course as regards their background as well as their future careers. Like Tamm, Olihn has followed the careers of his cadets, and he has been able to follow them up to March 1975.\(^\text{19}\) The source from the 1940s thus not only enables us to follow the cadets after their enrollment, but also to examine their background.

The main task of the Swedish officers was to train officers for the Imperial Guard, consisting of one division and a number of special units under the Emperor's direct command. Moulougueta Bouly, the Chief of the Guard and some fifteen of its officers, had received their training from Swedish officers at the Holeta Cadet School in the 1930s. These officers were now in their thirties. The training of Ethiopians was to be undertaken on three lines:

1. Basic training of new officers at a Cadet School situated east of Addis Abeba.
2. Advanced training of the present officers by courses in tactics, manoeuvres, staff service etc.
3. Advisory work by means of inspections, demonstrations and lectures, and by preparation of regulations for organization, training and service. English was to be the language of instruction.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^\text{19}\) Roll of Ethiopian cadets enrolled in 1946, TO.

\(^\text{19}\) Svenska officerare i Etiopien Rapport no 1, KrA, VT, vol 5. Moulougueta Bouly see Ch. IV n. 160.

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Age when enrolled is the only variable which is given both in Tamm’s and in Olihn’s rolls. It is therefore possible to compare the ages of the cadets enrolled in 1935 and in 1946.

It should be emphasized again that the information is based on the cadet’s own estimates of their age. The figures still give a rough picture of the age structure and, above all, enable comparison of the two courses. According to Table 22 the majority of the cadets in 1935 as well as those in 1946 were enrolled at the age of 16–18. Table 22 clearly demonstrates that the number of cadets below the age of 17 was higher in 1946 than in 1935. In conclusion we can note that the cadets enrolled in 1946 were very young and younger than the cadets enrolled in 1935.

Socio-economic background of the cadets

Olihn’s roll permits a rather thorough examination of the socio-economic background of the cadets. When the cadets underwent entrance examinations they had among other things, to give an oral and written description in English of their background. Olihn’s roll is based on the information given by the cadets on that occasion.

The place of birth is given for all but eight cadets. All provinces are represented, the highest representation being from Shoa with the capital Addis Abeba and the provinces Wollaga and Harerge. On comparing the birth place with the home district, which is given for all cadets, it was found that 69 cadets still regarded their places of birth also as their home district whereas the remaining 52 had moved. On enrollment 32 of the 42 cadets born in Addis Abeba also regarded it as their home district, while the rest had moved to various parts of the country. Of the 52 cadets who had migrated, 23 had moved from the provinces into Addis Abeba. It is still worth noting that as many as one-third of the cadets were born in rural areas, in some cases at very remote places like Wal Wal, and still counted these places as their home districts after enrollment. This would indicate a rather wide recruitment of the 1946 cadets. There was no difference between the course élite and the whole course regarding the geographical recruitment.

Tamm stated that his cadets from 1935 mostly originated from wealthy families and had obtained their basic education at French schools. Could the same be stated about the cadets enrolled in 1946 and can any difference be noted between the course in general and the élite constituted by the 25 best cadets? The father’s profession has been identified in 70 cases, whereas 49 of

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" T. Olihn to V. Halldin Norberg, Stockholm 18.1.1977, VHN.
Table 23. Profession of father of Ethiopian cadets enrolled in 1946.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Merchant</th>
<th>Clerk</th>
<th>Landlord</th>
<th>Soldier</th>
<th>Misc.</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 (5)*</td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>7 (4)</td>
<td>7 (1)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>16 (3)</td>
<td>2 (--)</td>
<td>49 (6)</td>
<td>121 (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures in brackets indicate the élite.

Source: Roll of Ethiopian cadets 1946, TO.

The remaining 51 cadets had stated that their father was dead, without giving his former profession (Table 23).

The best represented profession was that of farmer. Nothing is, however, stated in the Roll about what kind of farmers they were i.e. whether they were tenants or owned a plot of land. Only four cadets stated that their father was a soldier, three of them graduated within the élite group. None originated from an officer's family. It would be a reasonable assumption, however, that at least some of the deceased fathers had been soldiers or officers. It is difficult to determine how many of the cadets originated from wealthy families, since we do not know the families' incomes. In some cases the father's profession would indicate a good economic standard, namely seven landlords, two governors, one judge at High Court, one director and one treasurer, and probably some of the eight merchants. There are, however, reasons to believe that the majority of the cadets originated from rather humble though not poor conditions. The élite cadets originated from farmers to the same extent as the course in general, but they originated from merchants, clerks and soldiers to a greater extent than the others. The difference is most pronounced between the élite cadets and the whole group regarding the number of fathers who were dead on enrollment. For the whole group a total of 49 (40%) fathers had died, whereas only 6 (24%) of the élite cadets' fathers were dead. There was thus a certain difference between the élite cadets and the whole group regarding the father's profession.

The religion is given for all cadets. Only three cadets characterized themselves as Muslims, while the rest stated that they were Christians (97 Orthodox, 3 Catholics, 1 Protestant and 17 stated just 'Christian'). Of the élite cadets one was a Catholic while the rest were Orthodox or 'Christian'.

The overwhelming majority of the cadets had obtained their basic education in Addis Abeba, since the schools mentioned in Table 24 as well as most of the schools under the heading 'Miscellaneous' were situated in the capital. Most cadets had received their education in Taffari Mekonnen School and Minilik II School (37% and 24% respectively). It is worth noting that none of the cadets were recruited from mission schools. According to Olihn this was
Table 24. Educational background of Ethiopian cadets enrolled at the Imperial Guard Cadet School in 1946, by school and number of years in school.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of school years</th>
<th>Name of school</th>
<th>Taffari Mekonnen School</th>
<th>Minilik II School</th>
<th>Balabat School</th>
<th>Patriot School</th>
<th>Misc. schools</th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1 (-)*</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>8 (2)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>5 (-)</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>5 (-)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
<td>19 (1)</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>15 (3)</td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>9 (3)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>37 (11)</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>18 (3)</td>
<td>9 (-)</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
<td>5 (4)</td>
<td>43 (8)</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>5 (-)</td>
<td>14 (3)</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45 (9)</td>
<td>29 (6)</td>
<td>19 (4)</td>
<td>11 (1)</td>
<td>17 (5)</td>
<td>121 (25)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Roll of Ethiopian cadets 1946, TO.
* Figures in brackets indicate the élite.

due to the fact that the cadets had to be recruited from certain schools, among which no mission school was included. The Swedish officers were not allowed to recruit cadets from secondary schools.199

Only 14 cadets had attended school for more than four years before enrollment. The majority of the cadets had spent between two and four years at school, and no fewer than 27 cadets had spent less than two years at school. Only one cadet had attended secondary school. As demonstrated in Table 24, the élite cadets did not have any higher basic education on enrollment than the rest of the course i.e. mostly less than four years.

The poor educational background of the cadets must be seen against the background that a very small proportion of Ethiopian children had access to education during the years of Italian occupation. In 1946 there were, therefore, relatively few young Ethiopians who had attended school for more than five years. Young people with more advanced educational background tended to be recruited to the newly established secondary schools, and from these institutions recruitment of cadets was prohibited. In the beginning the low basic education created problems for the cadets as well as for their Swedish instructors, since the cadets had a poor knowledge of English and the Swedish instructors did not know Amharinya. In order to improve their knowledge of English, the cadets were given two hours language tuition daily immediately after enrollment. Initially, the cadets were taught English by Swedish teachers from Haile Selassie I Secondary School but in July 1946 the Cadet School received its own language instructor, Nils Malmgren.200 The senior Ethiopian

199 T. Olin to V. Hallin Norberg, Stockholm 18.1 1977, VHN.
Table 25. Positions reached in 1975 by Ethiopian cadets enrolled at the Imperial Guard Cadet School in 1946, by number of years at school before enrollment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position in 1975</th>
<th>Years at school when enrolled</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>1-2</th>
<th>2-3</th>
<th>3-4</th>
<th>4-</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. general</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
<td>6 (-)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>10 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td></td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>- (-)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civillian</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>7 (-)</td>
<td>13 (3)</td>
<td>19 (3)</td>
<td>5 (-)</td>
<td>49 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>8 (2)</td>
<td>9 (5)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>27 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 (3)</td>
<td>15 (-)</td>
<td>36 (11)</td>
<td>44 (8)</td>
<td>13 (3)</td>
<td>121 (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Roll of Ethiopian cadets 1946, TO.
* Figures in brackets indicate the positions of the élite cadets.

officers had moreover received training at Holeta in the 1930s, when French had been the language of instruction, which probably caused difficulties also for them.

The careers of the 1946 cadets

In view of the information given about the cadets' background, we are now going to examine their careers up to March 1975.

Table 25 demonstrates the positions held by the cadets some 25 years after completed training. The totals show that one-third of the cadets (39) had reached positions as majors or higher, of which ten had graduated among the 25 best. Among the high-ranking officers, three had been enrolled with less than one year at school and one of these officers had graduated among the 25 best. Five of the high-ranking officers had spent four years at school before

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enrolment, and two of them graduated among the 25 best. The fact that the cadets with very poor educational background had much the same result as those with better basic education would indicate that the educational background did not play any significant role for the future of the cadets.

No less than 49 of the cadets had become civilians by 1975, seven of whom had graduated among the 25 best. Why did so many of the cadets become civilians? When looking into the careers of the civilians, we find that no less than 34 of them had spent from 2 to 15 years in prison, in most cases after having participated in the coup against the Emperor in 1960. Six of them were élite cadets. The convicted officers had mostly reached the rank of major (17) and captain (9). In addition to them, one lieutenant colonel and three lieutenants were found among the convicted. The majority, or 23, of the convicted officers spent 3 years in prison. Two of them, a major and a lieutenant colonel were sentenced to five years imprisonment. The longest prison sentences, 8, 10 and 15 years, were given to three majors, all of them having graduated among the 25 best (ranked as nos. 10, 12 and 15 respectively).

After having been released from prison the former officers generally became civilians and obtained positions either in business life or as administrators in the provinces, where they had limited opportunities to maintain their contacts with the central administration. Four of the convicted officers retained their rank on release, two of them being police officers, but they were all placed outside Addis Abeba (3 in Asmera and 1 in Desse). It can thus be stated that a substantial number of the civilians in Table 25 had lost their military rank as a consequence of their involvement in the coup against the Emperor.

The remaining 15 civilians, who had not been imprisoned, had resigned from military service as lieutenants (7), captains (5) or as major (1), the fate of two is unknown. They mostly found positions as administrators in private business or in government administration. In 1975 the major in question was Director at the Ministry of Commerce. One of the captains had a top position

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No. 72, Assefa Mashasha, enrolled at 17. Born in Addis Abeba as the son of a farmer. Orthodox, spent 2 years at Taffari Mekonnen School before enrollment. Major, civilian, Director General at Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1975, Roll of 1946 cadets, TO.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During training</th>
<th>Accident</th>
<th>In Korea</th>
<th>Murder</th>
<th>Suicide</th>
<th>Killed in Coup 1960</th>
<th>Executed Illness 1974</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (-)*</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Roll of cadets 1946, TO.
* Figures in brackets indicate the élite cadets.

in the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of the lieutenants became a carpenter. According to Olihn some of the best cadets were recruited for civilian service at the direct request of the Emperor, among them No. 38 Workneh Gebaye, who was considered to be very close to the Emperor and in 1956 was appointed Chief of Security, and No. 8 Solomon Kadir, who was Minister of State and Chief of Security in 1974. They graduated as nos. 1 and 3 respectively from the 1946 cadet course, but had both died by 1975.

No less than 27 of the cadets enrolled in 1946 had died by 1975. This is a high figure in view of their age being around 45 years at that time. The causes of death can be examined from Olihn’s roll.

Table 26 clearly demonstrates that most cadets had met a violent death. Comparing the total figures with those of the 25 best cadets we find that they had a considerably higher mortality than the whole group (36% and 22% respectively).

Ethiopian troops, the so-called Kagnew Battalion, fought in the Korean war under United Nations command as part of the United States Seventh Division.

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* No. 104, Tarick Abekon enrolled at 16. Born in Naqamte. Father dead. Orthodox, spent one year at Minilik II School before enrollment. Ranked as no. 114 at graduation. Lieutenant, civilian carpenter, Roll of 1946 cadets, TO.

The first battalion was sent in 1951 but altogether three battalions were stationed in Korea before the ceasefire in 1953, totalling about 5,000 men. The officers and troops who went to Korea were almost exclusively drawn from the Imperial Bodyguard. No less than 89 of the cadets from the 1946 course participated in the Kagnew Battalion. By then they had reached the rank of lieutenant or captain. Three of the former cadets were killed in Korea.

Ethiopia also participated in the United Nations Forces in the Congo (1960–1964), where they constantly had a brigade consisting of about 3,000 soldiers, recruited from the Bodyguard as well as from the Army. Units from the Ethiopian Air Force also participated in the Congo. At least two officers who had graduated from the 1946 cadet course participated in the international staffs which organized the UN action.

As already stated, the coup against the Emperor in 1960 originated within the Bodyguard. Two of the members of the 1946 cadet course were killed in the Coup and one was later murdered in Asmera. All three were élite cadets from the course. A few officers from the 1946 cadet course briefly played a leading role at the beginning of the 1974 revolution. They were in opposition to the establishment and wanted a change of government but not to depose

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33 T. Ollih to V. Halldin Norberg, Stockholm 18.1 1977, VHN. No. 18, Nega Teghegn enrolled at 18. Born in Shemi as the son of a soldier. Orthodox, spent 2.5 years at Taffari Mekonnen School before enrollment. Ranked as no. 16 on graduation. Captain in the 1st Korea battalion. Participated in the Congo staff. Major General, Governor General in Gonder, escaped abroad in 1974. No. 121, Tereke Gebremeskel enrolled at 19. Born in Aksum as the son of a priest. Orthodox, had attended one year at secondary school before enrollment. Wanted to participate in the Korea battalions but was not allowed to, since he was needed in Harer as instructor. Participated in the Congo staff. Colonel, retired in 1975, Roll of 1946 cadets, TO.
34 No. 38, Workneh Gebaye see above n. 206. No. 55, Yohannes Mesker enrolled at 18. Born in Naqamte. Father dead. Orthodox spent 3 years at Taffari Mekonnen School before enrollment. Ranked as no. 2 on graduation. Major when killed in the coup. No. 106, Zaude Istifanos enrolled at 16. Born in Naqamte as the son of a soldier. Orthodox spent 2.5 years at Minilik II School before enrollment. Ranked as no. 20 on graduation. Lt Colonel when stabbed to death in Asmera, Roll of 1946 cadets, TO.
the Emperor." Three officers from this course were executed by the Dergue on 23 November 1974 for supporting the Emperor against the revolutionaries.14

The cadets and Ethiopian society: some concluding remarks

In his article 'The Military in Ethiopian politics', Donald N. Levine, an American social scientist, has analysed the role of the Ethiopian military from a more general point of view.15 Levine has based his research on literature and apparently also on interviews with Ethiopian officers, but he does not appear to have had access to any rolls listing officers.

Regarding the recruitment, Levine found that the older generation of Army officers enlisted voluntarily, whereas the postwar cadres of officers in the Bodyguard, Navy and Army had been hand-picked from the cream of secondary school seniors and first-year college students. The recruitment to the postwar security forces had, according to Levine, taken place on a voluntary basis from three sources:

1. Patriots who had fought in the underground during the Italian occupation.
2. Rural youths who were dissatisfied with their lot and interested in the opportunities, adventure and 'manly' life of the soldier and
3. The unemployed of the cities, including many school drop-outs.16

It would appear that the cadets recruited from the first postwar course to train officers for the Imperial Guard had great similarities with the Ethiopian security forces regarding their socio-economic background as presented by Levine. The low basic education of the cadets enrolled in 1946 must, of course, be seen in the light of the educational system at that time still not having recovered from the Italian occupation. Since recruitment of cadets from secondary schools was prohibited in 1946, they could not possibly comprise the

14 No. 109, Yilemy Teshome see above n. 201. Colonel of 4th Division when the revolution started. One of the leaders in the Movement February 1974, but was later not considered radical enough. Worked with General Aman Andom. No. 32, Yeagezou Yeamanl enrolled at 17. Born in Addis Abeba as the son of a farmer. Orthodox, spent 1.5 years at Taffari Mekonnen School before enrollment. Colonel, Chief of Army Aviation. Participated in the Movement February 1974, but warned Abij Abebe (Ch. IV n. 165), arrested and executed 23 November 1974, Roll of 1946 cadets, TO.
15 No. 8, Solomon Kadir, see above n. 206; No. 32, Yeagezou Yeamanl, see n. 213; No. 37, Tafesse Lema enrolled at 18, the son of a merchant. Orthodox, spent 2.5 years at Patriot School before enrollment. Ranked as no. 6 on graduation. Major-General and Chief of Bodyguard when arrested for having supported the Emperor and executed, Roll of 1946 cadets, TO.
cream of secondary school seniors. The 1946 cadets appear to have been hand-picked, however, from certain schools in Addis Abeba in order to fill the cadres but with a low motivation for becoming officers. This idea is supported by the answers given by the cadets when Tage Olihn, Director of the School, asked each cadet on enrollment why he wanted to become an officer. Not one of the cadets sought enrollment because he wanted to become an officer. The reason why they did not want to become officers was, according to Olihn, that they thought that they could get better and more well-paid jobs after completed civil education. Officers did not have a particularly high social status in Ethiopia at that time. This information about the 1946 cadets does not support Levine’s statement that success in military activity by tradition was the key root to social mobility and every able-bodied man in Ethiopia who did not belong to the clergy was willing to become a good soldier.

As stated above, the low basic education at enrollment did not affect the cadets future careers. According to Olihn, the cadets reached rather high standard of education during their three years at the Cadet School. In addition to the military training the cadets generally had 2 hours of civil education every day. After graduation the young officers got their housing in special quarters with lecture rooms, library etc., where they obtained additional education from Swedish officers. Many of the young officers attended evening courses at the University College. Many were also sent abroad for special training in the United States, Yugoslavia, and Israel. As we have already seen the majority of the cadets were sent to Korea, which gave them military experience and some of them also participated in the UN forces in the Congo. These officers must therefore be regarded as more or less an élite cadre.

According to Levine, Haile Selassie pursued a policy of checking, balancing, and dividing the armed forces internally. Levine also notes that the Army officers become envious of the privileged situation of the Bodyguard officers. It might thus have been in line with a deliberate policy by Haile Selassie to create a cadre of Bodyguard officers, who were supposed to constitute an élite with such good conditions of employment that they were inclined to remain loyal to him. The coup in 1960, however, proved that the Bodyguard officers instead became increasingly conscious of the inequalities in the Ethiopian society.

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217 Interview with General Tage Olihn in Uppsala 4.6 1976. Information based on his diary.
218 T. Olihn to V. Halldin Norberg, Stockholm 18.1 1977, VHN.
219 Levine (1968), pp. 8–9.
220 T. Olihn to V. Halldin Norberg, Stockholm 18.1 1977, VHN.
Despite the attempts by Haile Selassie to impose the idea on his professional military forces that they were to refrain from getting involved in political affairs, increasing numbers of officers were becoming alienated from his regime throughout the 1950s. Significant differences between salaries and allowances granted to higher-ranking officers on the one hand and to lower-ranking officers and enlisted men on the other, contributed, according to Levine, to create a growing political consciousness within the latter group. One former Bodyguard officer, who is not identified by Levine, is said to have stated that a number of officers in the Bodyguard began to discuss the political and social conditions in the country around the time of the Korean war and that these discussions resulted in growing opposition to the Emperor."

According to Olihn, the officers who graduated from the 1946 course were critical with few exceptions of the Ethiopian Government. Most of them supported the Emperor but they thought that he should delegate more of his personal power to an honest government. They were thus in opposition to a corrupt government and against the structure of the society. During the 1960 coup many of the former cadets did not know that it was a coup directed against the Emperor when they were given orders by the Chief of the Bodyguard to take control of certain strategical points in Addis Ababa and to arrest some leading officials. Those who knew what was going on thought that these actions had to be taken to support the Emperor who was then in Brazil on a state visit, against the corrupt government. In the general confusion the former cadets took different sides. Olihn bases his information on interviews with his former cadets. The fact that most of the officers of the 1946 course were sentenced to only 2–3 years of imprisonment for having participated in the coup would support Olihn’s information that most of them did not really know that the coup was directed against the Emperor.

The rivalry between the different branches of the armed forces is illustrated by the fact that one of the senior officers belonging to the 1935 cadet course, Mengistou Neowaye, the Chief of the Bodyguard, was the initiator of the coup, while another officer from the same course serving in the Army, General Kebede Guebret, took command of Army forces, and crushed the revolt. After some hesitation a third officer from the same course, General Assefa Ayene, the Chief of the Air Force, took position in support of the Emperor and contributed to crushing the revolt.

In conclusion we can note that the 1946 cadets were younger and apparently originated from a more humble background than Tamm’s course in 1935. The 1946 cadet course was recruited from all parts of the country, with a certain

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T. Olihn to V. Halldin Norberg, Stockholm 18.1 1977, VHN.
concentration to Addis Abeba and other urban areas. They were Christian by religion and had a low basic education. The 1946 élite had roughly the same socio-economic background as the cadets in general, but they appear to have reached higher ranks than the average cadet. The officers who belonged to the élite have had a higher mortality than the whole course, almost all having met a violent death. This study would suggest that the positions held by the officers rather than their personal political views will determine their stand-point in a situation of internal conflict or in a coup d'état.

7. Some Great Power reactions to the Swedish presence in Ethiopia

Some brief glimpses of British and American reactions to Ethio-Swedish contacts, particularly on the recruitment of experts in 1945–1946, have been presented earlier in this chapter. Detailed investigations on this subject cannot be undertaken until more documents are released from the official archives. Sources available do, however, permit a short presentation of some Great Power reactions to the Swedish presence in Ethiopia in the mid-1940s.

According to the first reports from Addis Abeba sent by Viking Tamm and Erik Leijonhufvud in December 1945 there was some competition for influence in Ethiopia between the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The British were then reported to prefer the Swedes gaining influence to the Americans or Russians. As soon as Gunnar Jarring arrived in Addis Abeba in January 1946 as Swedish Chargé d’Affaires, he made inquiries of Ato Abbebe Retta, as well as by visiting the various Legations, as to the reactions of the Great Powers to the presence of Swedes in Ethiopia. Ato Abbebe reported that the British were not very co-operative towards the Americans, who were trying to take the initiative in Ethiopia away from the British. The Emperor was said to follow this competition with keen interest, using it to recruit the greatest possible number of Swedes. The Russian, American and British diplomatic representatives all asked Jarring about the numbers of Swedes who had already arrived and those expected to arrive. The Russian and British representatives were particularly interested in the officers’ duties. The American envoy was reported to have been rather reserved and

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229 See above Ch. V:1. 5 and V:6. 1–2.
23 V. Tamm to Chefen för politiska avdelningen, Addis Abeba 19.12 1945 with enclosure PM I and II by E. Leijonhufvud, Copy sent to F. Hylander, FHy,
23 G. Jarring to V. Assarsson, Addis Abeba 15.1 1946, Copy sent to F. Hylander 1. 2 1946, FHy.
unwilling to become involved in any detailed discussions about their plans in the country. The British Chargé d'Affaires had been rather outspoken and expressed concern about the great number of American advisers, UNRRA representatives and businessmen, saying that the British preferred Swedes to Americans. He also asked what Jarring knew about the Russian plans. The French were mainly interested in the railway between Addis Abeba and Djibouti and the boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia. The French Minister only asked about the two Swedish members in the Ethiopian boundary commission."

Jarring's impressions are thus consistent with Ato Abbebe's information that Great Britain and the United States were mainly interested in keeping an eye on each other but also on the Swedes.

As already mentioned, British sources are only available up to 1945, but the American files are more readily available. The American Legation in Stockholm sent a stream of reports to Washington about the possible recruitment of experts for Ethiopia from Sweden in 1945. When plane after plane loaded with Swedish experts and missionaries started to arrive in Ethiopia it did not escape the notice of the American Legation in Addis Abeba. In early February the American Legation sent a list to Washington containing the names of 18 Swedes. The list had been compiled by John Spencer, the American adviser at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had obtained it from the police with great difficulty. Spencer himself considered that the difficulties he experienced might have been due to the normal procedure of Ethiopian authorities or might possibly have indicated the presence of instructions not to spread information concerning the Swedes to foreign officials. It was suggested by the Legation that the list should be sent to Army, Navy, FBI, and other security agencies in the United States for war security checks and also to the American Legation in Stockholm for a similar scrutiny. On February 9 a further list was supplied containing the names of 30 Swedish nationals who had applied for British visas in transit for Ethiopia. This list had been furnished by the British Legation. During the entire winter of 1946 the American Legation in Addis Abeba kept reporting 'recent Swedish

227 G. Jarring to V. Assarsson, Addis Abeba 30.1 1946, Copy sent for strictly confidential information to F. Hylander by S. Graafström 25.2 1946, FFHy.
228 Secret telegram Johnson to Secretary of State, Stockholm 1.3 1945, 884.01A/3-145; Airgram Johnson to Secretary of State, Stockholm 21.6 1945, 884.01A/6-2145; Airgram Johnson to Secretary of State, Stockholm 24.8 1945; 884.01A/8-2445; Airgram Johnson to Secretary of State, Stockholm 8.12 1945, 884.01A/12-845, NA, Decimal file 1945-49.
229 F. Cole to Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 5.2 1945 with enclosure 4 copies of list of Swedish nationals, NA, Decimal file 1945-49, 884.00/2-546.
230 F. Cole to Secretary of State, Addis Abeba 9.2 1945 with enclosure list of 30 Swedish nationals, NA, Decimal file 1945-49, 884.00/2-946.
arrivals'. The name lists were circulated to the various American authorities and sent back to the Department of State together with the result of the scrutiny. In June 1946 the American Legation in Addis Abeba sent a list of Swedes residing in Ethiopia classified in three categories: Swedes employed by the Ethiopian Government, Swedes not employed by government and not missionaries, and missionaries. The list would appear to be complete as far as can be ascertained by comparing it with Swedish sources.

The great efforts made by American authorities to obtain information about the Swedes in Ethiopia by researching into their activities as well as undertaking scrutiny of each individual, would indicate a pronounced interest in the Swedish activities in the country. In view of the Emperor's requests to America about the same kind of assistance that was supplied by Swedes, the American interest appears quite natural. They were, however, probably as much interested in finding out the Emperor's real intentions with regard to his foreign contacts, as to revealing the Swedish plans in Ethiopia. Since the Ethiopian authorities did not seem to be very helpful in supplying information about the Swedes, this certainly contributed to the American interest.

8. Summary

After the liberation from Italian occupation the Emperor turned to Sweden in order to resume the contacts interrupted by the war. Due to the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942, the first enquiries to Sweden took place via unofficial channels. As time went on and particularly after the Agreement had been renounced, the Ethiopian enquiries about experts from Sweden within the same fields as before the war became increasingly detailed. The enquiries all originated from the Emperor. The first Swedish responses were rather halfhearted but became increasingly effective and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the organisations which had been active in Ethiopia before the war. The missionary societies were eager to resume their work. After certain disillusionment about the consequence of the Decree on foreign missions for their possibilities to evangelize, SEM and SMBV found the whole...
of Ethiopia open to Swedish mission and they accepted the Emperor’s invitation to expand their work.

The Emperor’s offer to the Swedish missionary societies appears to have been unique in the respect that they were not geographically restricted in their activities. This would indicate confidence in their pre-war educational and medical work. The societies also followed the Emperor’s priorities, the most noticeable result being an increase in their medical staff at the expense of pastors. However, in the other fields (apart from army officers and police officers), the Emperor had always first turned to the United States asking for exactly the same services as he required from Sweden. He acted via personal emissaries as well as via his Legations.

The Emperor’s enquiries to Sweden during 1944 and early 1945 resulted in a large scale recruitment of experts, particularly medical staff, teachers and to a minor extent also army officers, policemen, lawyers, geologists, dairymen and technicians. A special Board, the so-called Abyssinian Committee, was established to recruit staff for Ethiopia. The recruitment of Swedes originated with persons who had been in Ethiopia before or during the war, missionaries as well as officers. A credit was granted by the Swedish Government to guarantee the salaries for the Swedes as well as equipment for their work. This would appear to be the first Government credit for development work granted by a Swedish Government to a 3rd World country.

A quantitative investigation of the Swedish experts and their family members by occupational main groups as well as over time indicated that The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force unit, the medical and the teachers’ units were the largest groups. The majority of the experts were married and brought their families to the country, even very small children. They also gave birth to children while in Ethiopia. The male experts were in majority in all units except in the medical unit, where single nurses constituted the majority. Some Swedes married in Ethiopia, but nobody married an Ethiopian. They either married a Swedish colleague or another foreigner. The experts stayed 2–3 years on a contract basis. The recruitment was largest during 1946. Thereafter it declined within all units except the IEAF unit. From having been concentrated on recruitment of medical staff and teachers in 1946 the emphasis changed towards staff for the IEAF.

On searching for an explanation for this change it was found that when the Emperor had to pay for the experts with Ethiopian funds he gave priority to the Air Force, which was of vital importance for external and internal security. The Swedish Government was also willing to grant leave-of-absence to Swedish Air Force staff for service in Ethiopia. This was also the case for Army officers. The increased recruitment of Air Force staff can be explained by the fact that a Swedish officer prepared a plan for the expansion of the Air Force according to which the foreign instructors were to be Swedes.
The Emperor seems to have tried to attract the largest possible number of experts at the lowest possible cost. He therefore applied for loans both to the Swedish and the American Governments. As indicated also in Chapter III, he apparently wanted to find out what could be obtained from the United States before he turned to Sweden. This is illustrated by an example taken from the establishment of an aviation net in Ethiopia, when the Emperor negotiated both with American and Swedish representatives of aviation. The Americans were then given civil aviation whereas the establishment of an Air Force was offered to a Swede.

Haile Selassie apparently turned to the United States and to Sweden in an effort to balance the high British representation within his administration. But he was also careful not to disturb his relations with Great Britain. The British authorities became very interested in duties expected from the Swedish officers and the other experts, but the Ethiopian authorities refused to relay any information. Also the United States followed the recruitment of Swedes with keen interest, but information was not furnished to them either, a fact which contributed to their special interest. Name lists of Swedes were sent by the American Legation in Addis Abeba for scrutiny in the United States.

The officers employed at the Cadet School at the Imperial Guard were used as a small case study in order to illustrate the Emperor's use of foreign instructors as well as to illuminate the duties of a Swedish expert unit. The officers were, moreover, a unit that aroused special attention abroad. General Viking Tamm, the head of the Swedish Military Mission was employed by the Emperor with the prospect of taking over the responsibilities of the British Military Mission. When Tamm realized that he was used mainly as a counterweight to the British, he resigned and returned to Sweden. A small Swedish Military Mission, however, continued to train officers for the Imperial Guard. The cadet course of 1946 was used as an example of Swedish activities in Ethiopia and as a follow-up study of the Swedish Military Mission in the 1930s. A detailed investigation was presented of the socio-economic background of the cadets as well as an examination of their careers up to 1975.

In conclusion it can be stated that Swedes were active within most parts of the Ethiopian administration in 1946. They were not only active within the same fields as before the war but also in many other fields. The missionary societies were able to resume and even to expand their activities. All kinds of Swedish activities during the 1940s were undertaken at the direct request of the Emperor.
Chapter VI
Motives and beliefs behind the Ethio-Swedish co-operation

Previous chapters have demonstrated how the Ethio-Swedish relations gradually expanded. After the war the Swedish Government became directly involved in the Swedish work in Ethiopia by granting a credit to be used for financing a large scale recruitment of Swedish experts, who worked parallel with the expanded missionary activity. Towards the end of the period under review the Emperor had to pay for the Swedes from his own funds, which led to a change of emphasis from medical care and education to Air Force staff and to a certain extent also military instructors.

In this chapter the following assumptions will be discussed: a) The SEM and SMBV missionaries were largely controlled by the Boards of the respective societies while the activities of these societies in Ethiopia were controlled by Haile Selassie to fit his political programme. b) Haile Selassie’s contacts with the missionary societies also contributed to the expansion of Ethio-Swedish relations in other fields. c) This expansion was made possible by an effective contact pattern also outside these missionary societies, whereby personal relations played a decisive role.

1. Missionaries, the tools of the Board in the service of God – or the Emperor?

In analysing the motives behind the mission in Ethiopia, two main distinctions have to be made, namely between the motives of the organization sending the missionaries and the personal motives of the individuals when they accepted being sent to a certain area. In this context a special analysis will be made of whether the SEM- and SMBV missionaries felt any particular desire to work in a specific area and if so, to what extent the respective Boards took the feelings of the individual into consideration when placing their missionaries.
I. 1 Missionaries for what purpose?

The aim of the missionary societies as well as the relations between them and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church have been the subject of investigations by Arén, Hallencreutz and Saeverås. It goes beyond the scope of the present study to examine these issues, but some comments will be given in order to place the missionaries in a wider context.

As stated in Chapter IV:1, evangelization among the Oromo was from the very beginning the main target of SEM's mission in Ethiopia. According to Hallencreutz, evangelical reform among the followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had developed in Eritrea as a sub-goal when the political situation in Ethiopia prevented the missionaries from reaching the Oromo areas. When Ethiopian evangelists reached Wollaga around the turn of the century the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had already been established in that area as a result of Minilik's expansion into Wollaga in the 1880s. Minilik pursued a sort of colonization mission using Orthodox priests from Gojam and Shoa. When the Swedish missionaries started to expand SEM's work in Wollaga in 1921, they had to work parallel with Orthodox priests. This development had, of course, not been anticipated by Waldemar Rudin, who in the 1860s planned SEM's work among the Oromo. Karl Cederqvist, who started work in Addis Abeba in 1904, did not establish evangelical congregations, but his successor Olle Eriksson, who had previously worked in Eritrea, established an evangelical congregation in the capital already in 1921. This congregation played an important role during the years of occupation.

The idea of evangelical reform among the followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was the guideline also for SMBV's work in Eritrea. The thought of evangelization among the Oromo was, however, still a living interest within SMBV, represented particularly by Fride Hylander who was supported in these ambitions by Axel B. Svensson when SMBV expanded their work in the Harerge province and in Addis Abeba in the 1920s. There was, however, a division of opinion between those favouring reform work among the Amhara and those favouring evangelization among the Oromo in Arussi and Sidamo. The goals of the missionary work were thoroughly discussed in 1930 during the missionary conference in Addis Abeba. SMBV did not establish congregations until the end of the 1940s. The years of isolation during the Italian occupation contributed to make the followers of SMBV more independent.

1 Arén (1977); Hallencreutz (1975); Saeverås (1974).
2 Hallencreutz (1975), pp. 51-53. O. Eriksson see Ch. IV n. 20. K. Cederqvist see Ch. IV n. 9.
3 F. Hylander to V. Haldin Norberg, Runtuna 28.12 1976, VHN.
4 Minutes of the Missionary Conference held in Addis Abeba 26–30.12 1930, § 14–21, FHy.
5 Oral communication from Sigurd Stark 4.5 1972 and from Gunnar Nilsson 2.2 1977.

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The work of reform among the Amhara as well as the efforts to evangelize among the Oromo could thus be fitted into Haile Selassie’s modernization programme, which started in the 1920s, because the evangelization work went hand in hand with educational work and medical care.

1.2 Recruitment of staff for SEM and SMBV

The missionary societies based their work on what is known as the Mission Command in the Gospel according to St. Matthew. As we have seen, the missionaries did not only preach, they also performed educational and medical work. Since the missionaries were the instruments of the respective societies for fulfilling their goals, the Boards must have considered the recruitment of their missionary staff as a serious matter. The candidates had not only to belong to what the Board considered to be the true faith, they should also preferably possess some kind of professional training. They should be courageous enough to meet an unknown fate far away from home and be prepared to fight against tropical diseases and death.

This chapter concerning the recruitment of the missionaries and their motives will be based mainly on the Missionary records, the Minutes of the Boards and the outgoing and incoming correspondence of the respective societies. The applications from persons willing to become SEM-missionaries are kept in a special file at SEM’s office in Stockholm.

Geographical and social recruitment of the missionaries

From the missionary records it has been possible to trace the geographical origin of all SMBV missionaries and for almost all of the SEM missionaries. For the two societies taken together during the whole period 1865–1952, the two districts of Kristianstad län and Malmöhus län in the the southernmost province of Skåne dominated (29 and 22 missionaries respectively), followed by Östergötlands län (21 missionaries), Västerbottens län and Örebro län (12 missionaries each) (Fig. 6). There is, however, a certain difference between the

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'The correspondence between the missionary candidates and the Board and the file containing applications from SEM candidates contain confidential information on personal matters unsuitable for publication. Names will therefore be avoided, particularly for the period 1945–52.

'As a unit, a Swedish län may be regarded as smaller than an American state, but larger than a county. A Swedish härad is, generally speaking, smaller than a county. Tingslag is the equivalent administrative unit in Northern Sweden to härad in southern Sweden, though geographically larger. A härad and a tingslag consists of one, two or even several parishes.
Fig. 6. Sweden. Administrative boundaries (län).
two societies regarding the areas of birth of the missionaries. SMBV recruited their missionaries only from Skåne and neighbouring län, Värmlands län and the area around Stockholm. SEM's recruitment was widely spread over the country, however, with a concentration in the five län in Northern Sweden, the two län in Skåne, Östergötlands län and to Örebro län. When comparing the SEM missionaries recruited in 1865–1904 with those recruited in 1905–1952, we find a certain difference between the two periods. While Örebro län, Jämtlands län and Skaraborgs län supplied a relatively high number of missionaries before 1905 this was not the case during the period 1905–1952. For Malmöhus län, Västerbottens län, Gävleborgs län and Norrbottens län it was the reverse. These län provided only few missionaries before 1905, while they supplied a relatively high number during the period 1905–1952. Östergötlands län and Kristianstads län had a pronounced representation before 1905 (9 and 5 missionaries respectively), which became stronger during the later period when they both supplied 12 of SEM's missionaries. Thus there appears to have existed a missionary tradition in Skåne and in Östergotland during the whole period under review while the interest grew stronger in Northern Sweden during the period 1905–1952.

SMBV recruited their missionaries from certain areas, which becomes apparent when investigating the recruitment on a härad level. SMBV recruited more than 60% of their missionaries from only four härad in southern Sweden, namely from Sunnerbo härad in Kronobergs län (6 missionaries), from Norra Åsbo härad and Villands härad in Kristianstad län (6 and 5 missionaries respectively), and finally from Luggude härad in Malmöhus län (6 missionaries).

A similar, though not so strong, concentration to Norra Åsbo härad and Luggude härad can be noted among SEM missionaries recruited in 1905–1952 (5 and 3 missionaries respectively). A similar local concentration can be found also in Northern Sweden for SEM missionaries recruited during that period, namely to Skellefteå tingslag in Västerbottens län and to Piteå tingslag in Norrbottens län (6 and 4 missionaries respectively). The SEM missionaries are thus not to the same extent as SMBV’s missionaries recruited only from limited areas. The strong concentration which has been noted for some härad and tingslag, however, proves a keen interest in mission in these particular areas and probably also good connections with the Boards in Stockholm, particularly between the SMBV Board and Skåne. Another difference in the geographical recruitment between the two societies is also worth noting, namely that 16 of SEM’s missionaries were born in small provincial towns, while none of SMBV’s missionaries originated from small towns. Neither society recruited any substantial number of missionaries from Stockholm (3 and 5 missionaries respectively). It can thus be stated that although both societies mainly recruited their missionaries from rural areas, the SMBV missionaries, except
for Stockholm were more exclusively linked with rural areas. Apart from the SEM missionaries in Östergötlands län, it can also be stated that the geographical recruitment of the missionaries roughly coincides with the areas where the respective societies had most followers.

For about 60% of the SEM- and SMBV missionaries the professions of their fathers have been identified. More than half of the identified fathers were peasants, i.e. freeholders or crofters. The remainder were craftsmen, teachers, local businessmen or employees of the respective organization. Four of the missionaries were the children of SEM missionaries, and one was the son of a Member of Parliament. It appears that most missionaries were recruited from lower middle class groups, with a certain representation of poor people such as crofters and upper middle class people like officers and businessmen. It is worth noting that unpossessed groups such as unskilled workers and farm labourers were not found among the identified fathers. The professional structure of the fathers thus confirms that the roots of mission tradition within SEM and SMBV could be found in rural areas and, as regards SEM, also in small provincial towns.

Contact pattern when recruiting missionaries for SEM and SMBV

Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission BV used somewhat different methods when recruiting their missionaries. The SEM members who felt it as a vocation to become a missionary generally on their own initiative applied to the Board to be accepted. Their applications were then discussed first by the Working Committee of the Board, and later at the general Board meeting, where it was decided whether or not the application should be approved. Sometimes a person who was considered as particularly well qualified to become a missionary was encouraged by a SEM representative to submit an application. The candidates appear to have been thoroughly scrutinized regarding their mode of life. It thus happened that a person who

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1 Hylander (1917); SEM, Missionary records; Stark (1972); Rodén (1938), passim. Riksdagsmannen Anders Olsson from Väsbys in Luggude härad in Malmöhus län was the father of SEM, No. 83, Petter Andersson b. 1868 d. 1947, Pastor. In Eritrea 1903–1929, see also Ch. IV n. 263.

2 'Avlidna missionärer'; 'Pensionerade missionärer'; 'Missionärer i aktiv tjänst', SEM, Box 42 I–III. Minutes of the Board 1945–1952, SEM. Minutes of the Board 1905–1935, SSA, SEM.

3 See for example 'Avlidna missionärer', SEM, 42 I. Johan Hagner see below n. 31, was asked by the Board to hand in an application to become a missionary. This application was dated 22.7 1912 and he was accepted by the Board 13.8 1912. See also: Minutes of the Board 13.9 1945, § 10; 12.12 1946, § 40, SEM.
was first accepted as a missionary candidate was later rejected because the Board did not find their way of life sufficiently respectable. Applications were sometimes turned down from the beginning but in some cases a rejected application was accepted later. Occasionally health or family reasons prevented a candidate from going abroad, despite the fact that he had been accepted. In such cases they were released from their contracts as missionaries for SEM. In most cases, however, the applicants seem to have been accepted by the Board and have also gone to the specific area for which they were intended.

A somewhat different pattern is found for SMBV. With few exceptions the initiative regarding recruitment of new missionaries originated from the Board. The Board decided whether or not a person should be offered the post of missionary. Sometimes enquiries were made beforehand to proposed candidates about their attitude to the prospect of becoming a missionary for SMBV.

Members of SMBV could, however, suggest suitable persons to the Board for consideration. When the Board had decided to approach a person about becoming their missionary, a member of the Board, usually Axel B. Svensson wrote a letter to the person in question informing him or her about the Board's offer. They were asked to consider whether they felt it was an act of God that they should become SMBV's missionary. They were also informed about economic conditions and about practical issues like living conditions in the area where they would probably be sent. The candidates were asked to give written answer about their attitude to the Board's offer.

Due to the different patterns of recruitment, applications to the Board are only available for SEM. In most cases the applications contained a *curriculum vitae* where the applicants themselves described their childhood, living conditions and also gave reasons why they wanted to be missionaries. Among the 130 applications investigated, 45 persons stated that they came from religious homes, 5 persons stated that their homes were worldly-minded and one person originated from an anti-Christian home, where the father was characterized as a socialist. In the remaining 79 applications nothing particular was mentioned about the religious situation in the home.

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*a Missionärsansökningar – ej antagna 1908, 1938, 1945, 1947–50, 1952* Box D27 1; Minutes of the Board 13.9 1945, § 22, SEM.

Minutes of the Board, tabled 29.8 1946, § 20, accepted 13.2 1947, § 11; tabled 29.8 1946, § 21, accepted 11.9 1947, § 27, SEM.

Ibid., accepted 13.9 1945, § 58 released 9.5 1946, § 18.

Minutes of the Board 1920–1952, passim, SMBV.

Ibid., 1941, p. 307, § 12; 1943, p. 37, § 20; 1944, p. 84, § 18; 7.9 1949, p. 204, § 15.

LLA, ABS, A: 12–16; C: 1–21, passim.
In 15 cases female applicants stated that they wanted to go out as missionaries together with their fiancés or husbands and they were usually accepted. In six cases impressions from the childhood seemed to have influenced the decision to become a missionary. One member of the Red Cross Ambulance Brigade had been against becoming a missionary when leaving for Ethiopia in 1935 but once in the country he felt a strong conviction to become a missionary. Seven persons stated that they became interested in mission because they had relatives who were missionaries. Four applicants said that their interest had been awakened in connection with lectures given by missionaries. Besides the religious motives personal motives, like relationship with somebody with a conviction to become a missionary, most probably played a decisive role for some candidates. This is indicated by the fact that such applications were attached to a formal request to the Board for permission to become engaged to, or to marry, a certain person. The Board seems to have accepted such motives as long as they were combined with religious belief. When the Board hesitated about the persons having the true faith, or their modes of life were not according to what the Board considered to be suitable for a missionary candidate, these persons were rejected despite their having been accepted earlier.

It thus appears that SMBV more or less 'hand-picked' their missionaries, while SEM was more open to personal initiatives from their members. For both societies, however, the recruitment seems to have been guided by the need for staff with a special kind of professional training, particularly during the 1940s, when they were invited to expand their activities in education and medical care. This appears clearly from the Minutes of both societies. Thus, one could probably say that the process of recruitment and the differences between the two societies regarding the geographical distribution of the missionary candidates indicate that SEM was more of a Popular Movement while SMBV had a more monolithic structure.

When examining the applications from SEM candidates a variety of motives were found behind their desire to become missionaries. Influence from active missionaries seems to have played a certain role and the atmosphere in their homes also appears to have influenced young people in their decision.

1. 3 How much could the Board control the life and work of the missionaries?

Before the missionaries were sent to their destination a Farewell ceremony (missionärsavskiljning) was arranged. During this ceremony the missionaries

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SEM, No. 137, Manfred Lundgren see Ch IV n. 258. 'Missionärer i aktiv tjänst' Box 42 III, SEM. Interview with M. Lundgren in Addis Abeba 10.2 1973.
had to promise to be faithful to their respective confession and not to take any important actions without consulting the Board and obtaining their approval. The missionaries also had to promise to obey to the decision taken by the Board. How did these promises then affect their private lives and their work? Regarding the placing of the SEM missionaries this issue will be examined by comparing preferred placing as expressed by the missionaries in their applications to the Board with their actual placing for the period 1905–1952. Did the Board then take into consideration wishes expressed by the missionaries when placing them? An investigation will also be made as to whether or not the Boards of SEM and SMBV tried to control the missionaries' private lives especially their marriages and whether or not their work in the field was directed from Stockholm.

Placing of the missionaries

Prior to 1945, SMBV only had Ethiopia (including Eritrea) as their missionary area, while SEM had India and Jubaland (Somalia) in addition to Ethiopia and Eritrea. After 1945 SMBV took on missionary work in Kenya and SEM worked in Tanganyilka instead of Jubaland.

By analysing applications from 130 missionary candidates sent to the SEM Board during the period 1905–1952 it is possible to get a rough idea of whether the applicants felt a conviction to go to a certain area, or whether they just placed themselves at the Board's disposal to be sent where the need for staff was most acute. Among these applicants, 70 mentioned an area where they wished to work. The remaining 60 persons either stated that they were prepared to go where their service was most needed or had expressed no particular wish. Forty-six of the 130 applicants were sent to Ethiopia (including Eritrea), while the others were sent to other SEM fields.

Although the material in this investigation does not extend over more than 130 applicants it still indicates that most missionary candidates in their vocation as missionaries had a fairly clear idea of where they wanted to work. Sometimes they even expressed very detailed preferences. Such detailed wishes were sometimes due to a woman wanting to be accepted as a missionary in order to join a fiancé who was already working abroad. The Board appears to have taken such wishes into consideration. Only in one case was a missionary sent to India although he had expressed a wish to be sent to

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Ethiopia, but two missionaries were sent to Ethiopia or Eritrea despite having given India as their preferred placing. However, in most cases the Board seems to have followed the preferences expressed by the candidates. No less than 46% of the applicants investigated had placed themselves at the service of the Board without specification. These persons were, of course, certainly sent where the staff was most urgently needed.

**Missionaries and marriage**

Following internationally accepted rules, the missionaries sent out by Swedish Evangelical Mission during the first decades were single. When the issue on missionaries' marriages was discussed by the Board in March 1867, they gave as their opinion that a missionary should not be allowed to become engaged or to marry before leaving Sweden. Although the Board did not intend to prevent their missionaries from getting married, they were of the opinion that the missionaries should stay 2–3 years in the field before discussing marriage. In each such case the Committee for Foreign Mission should approve the choice of partner. This statement of the Board might be interpreted in such a way that a missionary was expected to be male and if a woman were to be accepted she should primarily go as the proposed wife of a man who had proved that he could manage as a missionary. The prospective wife therefore had to be scrutinized and approved by the Board before being accepted. The first women were sent in October 1868 at the request of two missionaries. The issue had first been discussed both by the Board and by the Committee for Foreign Mission. Missionaries Englund and Kjellberg had written from Eritrea to ask the Board to send them wives, suggesting the two teachers Sofia Löwendahl and Maria Carlsson. The request was approved and the two prospective brides were sent to Ethiopia already the same autumn. The marriages took place according to the Swedish ceremonial. Before Gustava von Platen was allowed to go to Ethiopia as the fiancée of missionary Lundahl, she was asked to visit the Director of Johannelund's Theological Institute for

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"Another person, SEM, No. 151, Lydia Larsson, b. 1913, Nurse. In Ethiopia 1946–52, was intended for India, but was sent to Naqamte due to the need for staff there. Her papers are not among the applications, see SEM, Minutes of the Board approved 13.9 1945, § 20, her placing changed with her consent 24.10 1946, § 25. This change confirmed during interview in Boji 19.4 1973.

"Minutes of the Board 12.3 1867, § 8, SSA, SEM.

"Ibid., 22.9 1868, § 9 and 17.10 1868, § 4:b. SEM, No. 4, Petrus Englund b. 1836 d. 1916, Primary school teacher, ordained. In Eritrea (Kunama) 1866–1871. On 8.2 1869 married to No. 14, Sofia Löwendahl b. 1836, Primary school teacher. No. 2, P.E. Kjellberg and Maria Kjellberg née Carlsson see Ch. IV n. 22.

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an interview. "Miss von Platen was approved and both the Board and the Committee for Foreign Mission recommended that she should be sent as Lundahl's bride if Lundahl's formal request for marriage was received." Another example of control from the Board over the missionaries' private lives is that missionary Anders Lundholm was given a serious warning because he unexpectedly and without the Board's approval had become engaged to the widow of missionary Kjellberg. "In another example the Board refused to give missionary G.E. Arrhenius permission to marry his fiancée."

When examining the records dealing with the SEM missionaries we find that with only one exception, women who remained single during their entire active time in Ethiopia are not found until the period 1895–1904. During the first decades the women were mainly sent as 'Missionary Brides'.

Nothing has been found in the records that would indicate the existence of any rules that prevented the SMBV missionaries from getting married before leaving Sweden. There are, however, two examples from the 1930s when the prospective husband went to Ethiopia in advance, his fiancée coming later and the marriage taking place in Ethiopia.

The reason for the SEM Board being negative to the idea of the missionaries getting married before going to Ethiopia, might be found in the great risks connected with the work of a missionary during the 19th century. As we have seen, many of the first missionaries died after only a short time. The Board

"Ibld., 13.7 1869, § 1:b. SEM, No. 19, Gustava von Platen and No. 10, B.P. Lundahl see Ch. IV n. 23.

"Ibld., 12.10 1869, § 7.

"Ibld., 9.11 1869, § 4:1. SEM, No. 8, Anders Lundholm b. 1842 d. 1869 Pastor. In Eritrea 1867–1871. In 1869 engaged to No. 15, Maria Kjellberg née Carlsson, who became widowed after having been married only two months, because her husband was murdered 17.4 1869. On 26 October 1869 she gave birth to a son who died on November 1. Maria Kjellberg herself died on 6 November 1869 so she was already dead when the Board decided to give Lundholm a warning because of his engagement. Beskow (1884), p. 182; Rodén (1938), p. 116; Tafvelin & Lundmark (1974), pp. 60–61. See also Landgren (1871), pp. 217–218.


"SEM, No. 49, Hulda Lindström b. 1854 sent to Eritrea 1887, died in Asmera 21.8 1898. She was the first female missionary to remain single throughout her period in the country.

"Missionary Brides (Missionärösbrudar) is an expression rather often used, particularly in old literature on mission.

"SMBV, No. 21, Josef Oredsson, b. 1907 M.A. went to Ethiopia in February 1931, married to SMBV, No. 23, Phillippa Andersson b. 1906, M.A., on 16.12 1932 in Harer. They both left Ethiopia in 1936. Josef Oredsson returned 1945–1946, and served as teacher in Addis Ababa, (interview with Phillippa and Josef Oredsson in Asmera 31.3 1973). SMBV, No. 24, Sigurd Stark, see Ch. IV n. 53, was sent to Ethiopia in October 1933, while his fiancée SMBV, No. 25, Anna Persson left Sweden in September 1934. They married in Harer 8.12 1934, (Stark 1972).
might therefore have been anxious to avoid any tragedies that might occur. The policy regarding marriages indicates that the Board had a strong control over the missionaries. By having the possibility to control the missionary's choice of partner the Board could ensure that the missionary only married a person whom they could accept as a missionary.

Did then any change take place regarding the missionaries' marriages during the period 1945-1952? On checking the files we find that most missionaries were married when they left for Ethiopia in the 1940s. Neither SEM nor SMBV had any male missionary who remained single during the whole of his active period in Ethiopia, while both societies had a number of female missionaries who remained single throughout their active periods during the period 1945-1952. People who intended to marry appear to have done so before going to Ethiopia. There is a considerable difference between the pre-war and post-war period. The SEM missionaries, however, still had to get permission from their Board before becoming engaged. In 1945 the SEM Board discussed the missionary candidates' right to become engaged and to marry. The result was that a committee was appointed within the Board. The committee suggested the following rule, which was accepted by the Board in 1947: Candidates for foreign mission are not allowed to become engaged without the Board's permission. Each application from a missionary candidate to become engaged was discussed by the Board during the period under review. In most cases the application was approved, but cases are found where the Board decided that engagement or marriage should be postponed until they had completed their education. Nothing has been found in the minutes of the SMBV Board on the issue. Pastor Stark, however, in a letter from Harer asked Axel B. Svensson why the Board had abandoned the old principle to send the man to Ethiopia in advance and let his fiancée follow him later on. A single man could easily be transferred. This was considered as an advantage in the beginning of a missionary's term. Stark, however, did not want to persuade the Board to return to the old principle.

It can thus be stated that during the whole period under review the SEM Board have had a pronounced influence over their missionaries' private lives. The main difference between the pre-war and post-war period being that during the later period the Board to a greater extent allowed the missionaries

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"Minutes of the Board 14.6 1945, § 48, SEM. The committee had the following two members: SEM, No. 117, Isabella Stolpe b. 1885, Nurse. In Eritrea 1921–1929. SEM, No. 99, Johan Hagner b. 1888 d. 1963, married in 1917, Pastor. In Eritrea 1912–1914. The two committee members were thus between 55 and 60 years old and neither of them had been married when active in the field. No representative for the younger generation of missionaries was appointed.

"Ibid., 8.5 1947, § 37.

"S. Stark to A.B. Svensson, Harer 16.5 1946, LLA, ABS C:22.

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to marry before leaving for Ethiopia. SMBV's Board seems to have had the same main principle as SEM before the war, but they do not appear to have had any set rules in their minutes on the issue. The SMBV Board appears, however, to have also exercised a certain influence over their missionaries' private lives.

The marriage between Marqos Girmai and Regina Johansson, an issue with political complications

Only on one occasion during the whole period under review did a Swedish missionary marry an Ethiopian. On 6 December 1899 Regina Johansson married pastor Marqos Girmai from Eritrea. When Miss Johansson's plans to marry became known to the SEM Board in Stockholm they tried to convince her not to marry Marqos, although he was also in the sevice of SEM. But since they were unable to find anything in the Christian doctrine that opposed such a union, they could not prevent the marriage. The Italian authorities, however, reacted negatively and complained to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accusing the SEM Board for having shown a severe lack of tact by approving the marriage. The Italian authorities also wanted a guarantee that in the future the Swedish Evangelical Mission would dismiss anybody who entered into a so-called mixed marriage. The Swedish Government seems to have been willing to give such a guarantee, since they told the SEM Board to comply with the wishes of the Italian authorities in order to avoid loosing the good will they had always shown to the Mission in Eritrea. There seems to be no record of the SEM Board giving the guarantee wanted. The Girmais were allowed to continue their work in the SEM mission. This case offers an example of how the SEM Board reacted in a controversial situation. Although they tried to persuade their workers to act in a certain way, they found that they could not forbid them from doing what they wanted, especially when, as in this case, it could be regarded as being neither against

"Minutes of the Board 13.2 1900, SSA, SEM. Marqos Girmai b. 1862 d. 1924 had got his first education at B.P. Lundahl’s school at Imkullo. Educated at Johannelund 1884–1888, ordained in Uppsala 3.6 1889. In 1892 Marqos published a book in Swedish called 'Abessinska Kyrkan förr och nu'. SEM, No. 52; SMBV, No. 1 Regina Johansson b. 1857 d. 1943, sent to Eritrea as primary school teacher 1888 placed in Imkullo. The couple got a daughter Hulda Elisabeth b. in Köping 29.6 1901, died 23.7 1901. In 1911 they joined SMBV and founded the Koazén Station, where they stayed until 1922, when they retired and returned to Sweden. Marqos died 24.4 1924 and Regina 17.7 1943. See also Ch. IV n. 13.

"Ibld., 8.8 1899, § 9.
"Ibld., 14.11 1899, § 10; 13.2 1900, § 9.
"C. Bildt to A. Lagerheim, Rome 31.5 1901, RA, KUD, vol. 2833.
"C. Bildt to A. Lagerheim, Rome 3.7 1901, RA, KUD, vol. 2833.
Christian principles nor against the rules of the society. A statement by the Board that the situation would hardly re-occur is, however, an indication that they were prepared to use their influence to prevent mixed marriages in the future. This was the only occasion during the whole period under review that a Swedish missionary married an Ethiopian.

Marqos and Regina Girmai resigned from SEM in 1911 and joined SMBV. In SMBV's history it is mentioned that their period of service in SEM had proved that co-operation among the missionaries was not promoted by one of the missionaries being married to an Ethiopian. It is stated that this, as well as experience from other missions, had made the Board take a decision in principle that a missionary who married an African was to be considered as having resigned from SMBV. The fact that no mixed marriages took place within SMBV until the 1970s might, however, be regarded as an indication that this rule was considered to be in effect.

The marriage between Johansson and Girmai offers an example of how the Board, despite their control of their missionaries, also supported them and refused to submit even to demands from governments.

1.4 Missionary priorities

**SMBV in a changing position**

Besides corresponding with their missionaries, the respective Boards kept in contact with them by means of journeys of inspection undertaken either on the Board's own initiative or as a result of an invitation from the missionaries. Axel B. Svensson's journey in 1929 was undertaken on behalf of the Board to settle disagreements between the missionaries and the Board regarding the planning of the work and the distribution of economic resources, but also to settle discontent among the missionaries themselves, both in Addis Abeba and in Harer. In order to settle the difficulties it was decided that a conference should be arranged in Harer on 21–27 December 1929. This was the first

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" BV (1961), pp. 69–70.
" Ibid., p. 103. The issue regarding marriage between a missionary and an African was discussed by the SMBV Board on 6.10 1959, 4.2 1960 and 14.6 1960. At the latter meeting the Board approved a 'PM för Bibel troagna Vänner missionärer', according to which a missionary who married an African should be regarded as having applied for and been granted his resignation. Reference was then made to a decision made several years earlier. S. Stark to F. Hylander, Stockholm 29.10 1974, FHv. This PM was revised 11.2 1974. Regarding marriage it is stated that any missionary who marries a person who is not a SMBV missionary has thereby resigned as missionary in SMBV (§ 11).
" BV (1961), p. 102 and 103.
conference held by SMBV's missionaries. It had been carefully prepared by Axel B. Svensson, who had travelled around and had long discussions with the missionaries. Svensson mentions these talks in his diary but very little is said about their contents. It can only be understood that the missionaries expressed severe discontent with the Board and had serious disagreements between themselves. \(^a\)

The main issues discussed during the conference were the school activities, 'the direct mission work', medical work the budget and rules for future conferences. Other issues dealt with practical problems in the missionaries' everyday life and which persons and which official positions should be considered as being referred to in the Scripture's doctrine on authorities. The internal disagreements among the missionaries in Harer were discussed during a separate meeting, which ended with the reconciliation of the persons involved. \(^b\)

On his return to Sweden Axel B. Svensson summarized his impressions from Ethiopia, stating that he had found many bad conditions which might constitute a threat towards the future of the mission. But many issues he had recognized as being the consequence of his own activities as Secretary of Mission. Svensson also presented the minutes from the conference section by section and all of them seem to have been approved by the Board. The presentation ended with a statement that the Board wanted the missionaries to refrain from acting on their own in all issues of principal importance. In no case should the missionaries turn to private mission friends to raise economic subsidies without permission from the Board. \(^c\)

The disagreements between the missionaries and the Board and among the missionaries themselves continued after Svensson's return to Sweden. During the second Missionary Conference, which took place in Addis Abeba on 26–30 December 1930, one of SMBV's prominent missionaries Anton Jönsson did not participate, a fact that was regretted by the Conference. \(^d\) The main issues discussed during the Conference were the missionary priorities and the building of a girls' school on a plot of land in Addis Abeba granted to SMBV by the Emperor. According to the minutes from this conference the missionaries agreed that SMBV's mission work should be expanded in the Oromo areas in Arussi, where Hylander had already built a clinic and a small school. It would be much cheaper to undertake missionary work among the Oromo than to expand the work in Harer, which, moreover, was the headquarters in Ethiopia for the Catholic mission. \(^e\) The Emperor encouraged

\(^b\) Minutes of the Board 10.4 1930, § 25, SMBV.
\(^c\) Ibid., § 26.
\(^e\) Ibid., § 14–16.
an expansion of SMBV's activities into Arussi and Sidamo, and even offered them both land and money to establish a hospital in that area."

There was apparently a certain confusion about the girls' school project in Addis Abeba, which was caused by the fact that Axel B. Svensson had given three different instructions about which of the missionaries should carry the responsibility for the building work. This matter caused disagreements among the missionaries, and Axel B. Svensson's handling was criticized. Many letters were exchanged between the Board and some of the missionaries concerning this issue." During their February meeting the Board fully approved Svensson's instructions regarding the girls' school in Addis Abeba. The Board unanimously expressed their regret at the missionaries' self-will expressed in the minutes of the Missionary conference and in the letters attached thereto. The Board reminded the missionaries of their promises to obey the instructions given by the Board. These promises had been broken in the respect that the Conference had exceeded their powers and that individual missionaries had undertaken important steps without the Board's knowledge. The Missionary Conference was intended to be a useful instrument, but if it were to turn into a forum for arguments between the missionaries where the instructions of the Board were to be questioned, the Board intended to prohibit these conferences."

The situation in Ethiopia was thoroughly discussed in October 1931 on the basis of letters from the missionaries there. The discussion particularly concerned Dr Gunnar Agge's, Dr Fride Hylander's and Pastor Josef Svensson's positions as missionaries in SMBV's service." The Board wanted to keep all three in their service provided that they accepted the Board's decision regarding the work in Ethiopia. If they were not prepared to accept the Board's instructions they were to inform the Board of their dissatisfaction before the end of the year, whereupon they would be considered as having resigned from SMBV's service." All three missionaries expressed dissatisfaction with the Board's decision. The Board, however, found that the answers given by Agge and Hylander were slightly different from the one given by Josef Svensson. They therefore considered Agge and Hylander as having resigned from the society as from 1 January 1932." After a long

" Ibid., § 17–19.
" Ibid., § 44–52.
" Minutes of the Board 10–11.2 1931, § 17, SMBV.
" Ibid., § 21–22.
" Ibid., § 23.
" Ibid., 8–9.10 1931, § 26–27.
" Ibid., § 28.
discussion the Board decided to keep Josef Svensson in their service and to ask him to go to Arussi and take over Hylander's work among the Oromo peoples. "Josef Svensson, however, did not accept the Board's decision and sent a new letter which led the Board to consider him as having resigned from the society as from 31 March 1932."

It can thus be concluded that the Board was in a dilemma, because it had to take into consideration the different opinions of the missionaries, at the same time as it was anxious to keep the missionaries' activities under their immediate control. Axel B. Svensson apparently had a very strong position in SMBV. During his journey to Ethiopia in 1929–1930 he managed to make a temporary settlement of the disagreements among the missionaries. But on his return to Sweden the missionaries continued to oppose what they felt as too strong a direction from the Board. The missionaries who did not subordinate to the Board's instructions were obliged to resign.

The SEM missionaries in-between the Board, the Emperor and the emerging Evangelical Church, 1945–1952

To what extent did the Boards in Stockholm direct the work of the missionaries in the field? One way of investigating this issue is to compare the minutes of the Missionary Conference (missionärskonferens), constituted by the active missionaries in Ethiopia, with the minutes of the Boards in Stockholm. Such a comparison is possible for SEM since the original minutes of the meetings from Ethiopia and the minutes of the SEM Board and their Executive Committee have been placed at my disposal. The minutes of the Missionary Conference are very detailed in order to give the Board in Stockholm a clear picture of the situation in Ethiopia. The missionaries met in November each year, when the rainy season was over and the roads were passable again. The conference lasted for about a week and offered the only opportunity for the missionaries to meet and discuss their work and problems. The minutes were immediately sent to Stockholm. Both the Board's Executive Committee and the Board discussed them during their December or January meetings.

Ibid., § 23.
Ibid., 12.4 1932, § 11.
The SMBV missionaries also met for conferences, but minutes from these meetings are not available.
Originally, the chairman and the treasurer of the Missionary Conference were appointed by the Board in Stockholm. From 1947 this practice was changed in order to give the missionaries more influence. The missionaries' votes were thereafter sealed and sent to Stockholm to guide the Board in appointing the chairman of the missionary conference. This chairman also served as the Board's representative in Ethiopia. The first time the new rules were applied was when the Board appointed Manfred Lundgren as chairman, after he had been elected by the Conference. Gustav Arén was then appointed chairman of the Missionary Conference for 1948 on the proposal of Manfred Lundgren. During the years 1948–1952 the Board always followed the wish expressed by the majority of the missionaries when appointing the chairman.

The main issues discussed by the missionaries each year were the placing of the missionaries, the general activities and the economic planning, but in addition all kinds of practical problems were discussed. The Board always approved the proposed placing of the missionaries, sometimes with a minor adjustment caused by a change in the situation in Ethiopia. The expansion of the work in the country can be followed in detail from the minutes. The missionaries were more eager to expand the activities than the Board members, who were particularly sensitive to all steps that raised the costs. Already in 1945 the Board gave the Missionary Conference to know that they wanted the mission to become economically self-supporting. Although the Board was glad that the Emperor wanted the mission's work to expand to all provinces they emphasized that the Ethiopian Government would have to finance all new stations and schools, because SEM could only afford to pay for the missionaries' salaries and journeys. There seems to be a constant tug-of-war between the missionaries in the field and the Board in Stockholm. The missionaries had the practical experience of the needs in the areas they were working in, but they could not take any major steps without sanction from the Board, which controlled the finances. Each year the Missionary Conference presented to the Board a budget which the Board generally cut down by about 10%, although the Conference sometimes stated that they would have to cut down the activities accordingly if their budget was not approved.

* Minutes of the Board 15.111945, § 15; 12.121946, § 48, SEM.
* Minutes of the Missionary Conference 11–14.121945, § 4, SEM.
* Minutes of the Missionary Conference and Minutes of the Board 1945–1952. See for example 6–13.111947, § 10, SEM.

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The economic issues seem to have constituted an important part of Nils Dahlberg's programme during his second journey of inspection (October 1946 to January 1947). Dahlberg had instructions from the Board to try to reduce the cost of the work in Ethiopia. There was namely, competition for economic resources not only between the missionaries and the Board but also between the representatives of internal and foreign mission within the Board itself. Johannes Karlsson, secretary of internal mission, was in favour of strict economy. An important part of Dahlberg's programme in Ethiopia was therefore to ask the missionaries to reduce their demand for resources and to persuade those Ethiopians who had taken care of SEM's compound in Addis Abeba until the missionaries returned not to claim full salary for the years 1936–1945."

Dahlberg participated in the Missionary Conference held in Addis Abeba in November 1946. On the same day as the conference started Dahlberg noted in his diary that the most difficult issue was to keep the budget so low that it could be accepted by the Board. He found that Per Stjärne wanted to expand the work without considering from where the economic resources were to be taken. Dahlberg wanted to take a more cautious line in order to avoid a set-back in the future. He found his double task very difficult, for on the one hand he had to take care of the Board's interests and on the other he had to support the missionaries. "The conference suggested a budget of Sw. Cr. 109, 450, which was cut down by the Board to Sw. Cr. 95, 045." The missionaries disapproved of being, as they considered, too much under the influence of the Board. When Johan Hagner in early 1948 visited Ethiopia the missionaries very clearly informed him that they felt themselves to be directed from Stockholm to far too great an extent." Hagner reported his impression to the Board during their meeting in April."

When Dahlberg visited Ethiopia a third time, in 1952, he again participated in the missionaries' conference held in November as he had done in 1946. This seems to have been a very important conference, where the economic issues and the strategy of the work were vital points." A committee consisting of

" Oral information from Gustav Arén, who at that time was missionary for SEM in Addis Abeba.
" Dahlberg (1946/47), note 22.11 1946, p. 60, ND.
" Minutes of the Missionary Conference 23–25.11 1946, § 19; Minutes of the Board 12.12 1946, § 48, SEM. Dahlberg chaired the meeting.
" Oral communication from Gustav Arén. Arén was chairman of the Missionary Conference for 1948.
" Minutes of the Board 7.4 1948, SEM.
" Minutes of the Missionary Conference 12–22.11 1952, passim, SEM.
three missionaries was appointed to make a thorough analysis of the goals and
the guiding principles of the work in Ethiopia."

When the missionaries returned to Ethiopia after the years of occupation
they met a new situation. The leaders of the evangelical congregations had
now taken the responsibility for the administration as well as for the general
activities without any guidance of foreign missionaries. The evangelical
congregations had, moreover, increased in number due to a revival that had
taken place during the occupation, particularly in the southern and western
parts of the country. From 1944 meetings were held regularly with leaders for
evangelical Christians from different parts of the country. It was no longer
self-evident that the missionaries should have the complete leadership over
the congregations, but they were needed for many administrative and similar
duties in the expanding Church."

The situations described above can serve to illustrate the missionaries’
working conditions. At the same time as they were expected to work for the
main purpose of evangelizing among the Oromo peoples, they were tied by
their promise to obey instructions given by the Board, and not to take any
initiatives without the Board’s approval. The many needs and the limited
resources made priorities necessary. The Minutes of the Missionary
Conference in Ethiopia as well as the Minutes of the Board in Stockholm bear
witness to a detailed control of the missionaries and a constant competition for
economic and personal resources. The journeys of inspection seem to have
served the double purpose of emphasizing the guidelines given by the Board
for the missionaries work and to make the members of the Board more familiar
with the missionaries’ working conditions. Apart from the members who had
been to Ethiopia, the Board seemed to have found it difficult to fully
understand all the problems the missionaries had to face when fulfilling the
Board’s instructions. The Chairman of the Missionary Conference appears to
have had a difficult position not only between the Board and the missionaries
but also between the missionaries and the expectations and needs of the
emerging Evangelical Church.

"Ibid., § 10. The committee consisted of Manfred Lundgren, Stig Lundholm and Thorsten
Månsson. SEM, No. 175, Stig Lundholm b. 1917, Physician. In Naqamte 1951–1956. SEM, No. 168,
Thorsten Månsson b. 1924, Engineer. In Addis Ababa 1950–1954, where he worked as co-ordinator
of transport and as adviser in practical matters as had been demanded by the Missionary
Conference since 1947. Manfred Lundgren see Ch. IV n. 258.

also above Ch. V:2.
1.5 The Emperor's priorities

It has in previous chapters been emphasized that Haile Selassie's support of the missionaries medical and educational work during the 1920s and 1930s must be regarded as a strategy aimed at using the resources of the missionary societies for the benefit of Ethiopia’s development. Before the war there were no legal restrictions to hinder the evangelization work performed by the foreign missionary societies. After the Italian occupation, however, an increasing nationalism can be noted in the country, where Protestant evangelization began to be seen as increasingly dangerous in its competition with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and accordingly against the unity of the country. Due to lack of economic and personal resources to distribute educational and medical facilities all over the country, Haile Selassie had to look to foreign countries for support. The inaccessibility of Ethiopia and the difficulties caused by the variety of cultures and languages spoken, made it next to impossible to send inexperienced experts from foreign countries to the provinces. With few exceptions they could only be used in the central administration in Addis Abeba. Where would he then find experienced staff for the provinces? The answer, of course, lay among the missionaries who had been in the country before the war. They knew the languages, they were used to the climate and they were familiar with different Ethiopian cultures. The missionaries were accordingly the most suited participants in the reconstruction of Ethiopia. Haile Selassie’s invitation to SEM and SMBV to found schools and clinics in all provinces must of course be regarded as a sign of confidence for their missionaries. But above all, these missionaries offered an opportunity to recruit personnel for decentralized development work. Haile Selassie’s letters to the leaders of the missionary societies made it perfectly clear that the Swedes would have to adapt to Government policy if they were to be welcome in the country. However, it appears to have been an exception from the rule that Swedes were invited to work in all provinces and not only in the so-called open areas. The Boards of SEM and SMBV were, as we have seen, aware of the limitations laid on their evangelization work in favour of educational and medical work. The dilemma can be illustrated by a few examples taken from the 1940s.

The efforts to distribute medical care to those provinces that lacked such facilities can be illustrated by an example from SMBV. Dr Gunnar Agge, who arrived in Ethiopia in March 1945 to take over SMBV’s hospital in Harer, was instead offered medical work in Arussi province. The motive being that Harer was already well supplied with medical facilities, while Arussi completely lacked medical care, and it would take Ethiopian authorities far too long a time

"See above Ch. III:4.1, IV:1, V:2.

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to improve the situation there. SMBV was offered the whole province, being allowed also to found schools." The idea that SMBV should take the responsibility for educational and medical work in Arussi province and hand over their hospital in Harer to the Ethiopian Government was strongly recommended to the Board in Stockholm by Anton Jönsson. The Board decided according to Jönsson’s suggestions." By taking this decision the Board had resumed the ideas of missionary priorities discussed during the SMBV missionary conference in 1930, which had particularly been favoured by Frida Hylander, who had explored the area in 1929/30. His work had been interrupted by the conflict in SMBV." The Board’s decisions meant that they had changed their mind after earlier having recommended Anton Jönsson to concentrate on the hospital and school in Harer." Instead the Board had taken a line which meant hat they adapted themselves to the Emperor’s priorities. It is also worth noting that when Hylander returned to Ethiopia early in 1947 he was appointed Principal Medical Adviser to the Ministry of Public Health and later also Chairman of the Ethiopian Medical Board. Hylander’s principal idea was to distribute medical care to the remote areas and not only make it available to a minor part of the population living in urban areas. Preventive health services were of vital importance in improving the health conditions in Ethiopia. One of his first duties in Ethiopia in 1947 was to prepare a plan for preventive medical care in the provinces." These problems are still of vital importance in Ethiopia and have recently been discussed in the press." Another example could be taken from Swedish Evangelical Mission and Nils Dahlberg’s journey in 1946/47. One of Dahlberg’s main duties on this occasion was to convince the Ethiopian authorities to return the hospital in Naqamte to SEM. On 1 December 1946 an agreement was signed between Dahlberg and Abbebe Retta, where SEM undertook to run the hospital and pay the salaries for the staff. The Ethiopian Government undertook to contribute annually to the running costs of the hospital and place at SEM’s disposal all hospital buildings without cost." The Imperial policy to spread education throughout the country was not without problems for the Swedish missionary societies, which can be


" Minutes of the Board 26.5 1945, § 2-3, SMBV.

" See above, Ch. VI: 1.1 and 1.4.


" Inspektionsberättelse by Nils Dahlberg, pp. 8–11. Typewritten manuscript presented to the Board, 13.2 1947, § 2, SEM.

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illustrated with an example from SMBV. In 1950 one of the missionaries, Ruben Johansson, wrote to Axel B. Svensson that the mission schools no longer played the same role now that the Government school system had developed to such an extent that the small mission schools could no longer compete with them. The money used for schools would be better used for distribution of Bibles and religious literature. The Ministry of Education had, moreover, decided to demand a seventh and an eighth school year before allowing entry into secondary schools. Johansson found it meaningless to educate children for 6 years and then transfer them to Government schools in grades 7 and 8 i.e. at an age when they were most receptive to religious education. He therefore suggested an alternative plan for SMBV: Basic education for two years in village schools by Ethiopian teachers. The schedule would contain the three Rs and a lot of Bible instruction. The best pupils would then be offered the chance to attend a 6-year boarding school. Those who could afford it would pay and the rest would be supported by the Mission. The best students would then be recruited for a three-year seminar, with a curriculum approved by the Government. The candidates would then have the chance to enter into Government service after completed education if they could not be offered employment by the Mission.

Education was not only an important part of the development work, it also offered good opportunities for the missionaries to influence young people in their religious outlook. In the discussion about the future policy towards foreign missionaries the Ministry of Education had accordingly demanded that the mission schools should use Ethiopian Orthodox teachers for religious instruction, something, as we have already seen that was strongly questioned by the missionary societies. The educational system can thus be used as an example of how the Emperor's priorities could come into conflict with missionary priorities.

Per Stjärne's being utilized by the Emperor as his emissary in 1945, placed him in a position between the missionary societies and the Emperor, which was not without its problems. Stjärne's return home after less than two months in Ethiopia, seems to have placed the Board in a dilemma when SEM workers outside Stockholm made enquiries about the purpose of his journey. This dilemma is apparent from two letters written on consecutive days by Board members emphasizing different reasons for Stjärne's journey. Dahlberg declared that Stjärne's main task was to present to the Board in Stockholm the Emperor's wish to get the largest possible number of missionaries. Stjärne

"R. Johansson to Axel B. Svensson, Addis Abeba 30.5 1950, LLA, ABS, C:12. For an account of the time of transition see also Jönsson (1951), pp. 9–36.
should also try to get people with a Christian outlook to enter into the Emperor's service, something of great importance to the Christian mission." Johannes Karlsson, Secretary of the Board, said, however, that the main purpose of Stjärne's journey was to make official enquiries on behalf of the Emperor, although the mission duties might constitute a substantial part of his tasks." Both writers, however, emphasized that the Emperor paid for all expenses related to Stjärne's journey. These letters indicate that the Board could not expect full support from SEM's workers out in the country if they devoted too much of their resources to the Emperor's reconstruction work.

Stjärne was appointed Chairman of the Missionary Conference in Ethiopia. Due to his many responsibilities, among them to recruit staff according to the Emperor's directives, Stjärne was released from his ordinary responsibilities as a missionary in Addis Abeba. He was, however, supposed to assist the SEM missionaries both in Ethiopia and in Eritrea." Stjärne's position as intermediary between the Emperor's and the Mission's priorities was thus recognized by the Board in Stockholm.

In conclusion it can thus be stated that the Boards of SEM and SMBV both exercised a strong influence over their missionaries' private lives as well as over their work. The societies were able to work according to their main aim to evangelize particularly among the non-Christian Oromo. But the evangelization work was combined with education and medical care, mainly according to directives issued by the Emperor. The missionaries' work was of mutual benefit for the respective societies and the Emperor and the missionaries can thus, using a somewhat drastic formulation, be characterized as the tools of the Board in the service of both God and the Emperor.

2. Experts – the tools of the Emperor in the service of Ethiopia?

The large-scale recruitment of Swedes for Ethiopian government service appears to have awakened the curiosity not only of other nationalities but also of the Swedish press. The Ethiopian authorities were, however, anxious to avoid too much publicity around the Swedish experts. On 27 March 1946 the

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* N. Dahlberg to A. Akesson, Stockholm 26.9 1945 (Copy), SEM.
* J. Karlsson to C. Marcusson, Stockholm 27.9 1945 (Copy), SEM.
* Minutes of the Board's Executive Committee 22.10 1945, § 1–2; Minutes of the Board 15.11 1945, § 15–16; Minutes of the Missionary Conference Addis Abeba 11–14.12 1945, § 6.
Working Committee of the Swedish expert units arranged a meeting for representatives of the Swedish press. The journalists were recommended not to report about the duties of the Swedish experts and also to avoid political issues. They were asked not to publish more than one article a month per newspaper. Swedes who were about to leave for Ethiopia were recommended not to give interviews, but if it was unavoidable, not to give statements about their future duties in the country. These recommendations were appreciated by the Abyssinian Committee in Stockholm.

In June 1947, however, two articles were published in the Swedish newspaper *Stockholms-Tidningen*, one of which expressed strong criticism about the conditions in Ethiopia, particularly against the Ethiopian authorities, and the methods used when recruiting the Swedes; the recruitment being reported to be based on religious merits. In July 1947 there were no less than 137 Swedish experts in the country. These articles caused a strong reaction in the Swedish Association in Addis Abeba (*Föreningen Svenskar i Etiopien*). At a specially assembled general meeting a committee was elected to write a report about the articles to the Press Fair Practices Commission.

With these reactions as a starting point we shall, without going into details, examine the recruitment of experts in order to find out whether any connection can be traced between the missionary societies and the expert units and also what the relations were like between the expert units and the Ethiopian authorities.

Despite the fact that the material was collected to defend the Swedish experts – especially the group leaders – against what was found to be unfair criticism, the thorough manner in which the investigation was undertaken and the fact that it was presented by responsible persons to an official Commission,

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" Minutes from meeting arranged by the Working Committee in Addis Abeba for newspaper correspondents 27.3 1946, § 1–2, FHy.
G. Jarring to *Arbetsutskottet för de svenska expertgrupperna*, Addis Abeba 11.5 1946, encl. no. 6 to T. Torgersruud and E. Kullingsjö to *Pressens opinionsnämnd*, Addis Abeba 1.8 1947, FHy.
" StT 22.6, 23.6 and 27.6 1947.
" Minutes of General meeting for the Swedish colony 8.7 1947, FHy. The same day a retort was sent to *Stockholms-Tidningen*’s Chief editor as well as to Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå signed by Frida Hylander dated Addis Abeba 8.7 1947, FHy. Views opposing those expressed by Kumlien were also expressed in article by Per Stjärne published in *Stockholms-Tidningen* 10.7 1947. The articles had also been commented in critical editorials in *Stockholms-Tidningen* 28.6 1947 and in *Aftonbladet* 25.6 1947. The report was discussed by the Press Fair Practices Commission 1.10 1948. Since the retort sent from Addis Abeba had in all essential parts been published by *Stockholms-Tidningen* the Commission did not make any statements. Except from Minutes from the Press Fair Practices Commission 1.10 1947, § 5 (Copy), FHy.
would indicate that it could well be used as a source for research into these matters. The preparations for the report as well as the report itself offer a good possibility to research into the recruitment of experts.

2.1 Did the experts have to be devoted Christians?

It seems to be beyond doubt that when the Emperor engaged Per Stjärne as his emissary to recruit experts from Sweden he asked him to find qualified persons and preferably those with a Christian outlook. Stjärne and Hylander were, moreover, both connected with the missionary societies. But to what extent did the experts who went to Ethiopia have connections with the missionary societies SEM and SMBV?

**Geographical recruitment**

The place of birth has been identified in the Nationality Roll for all but five experts i.e. for 293 individuals. The geographical origins of the experts have been investigated unit-wise and then compared with the geographical origin of the SEM and SMBV missionaries.

Seem as a whole, the experts originated from all parts of Sweden, with 143 (49%) originating from rural areas, 100 (34%) from provincial towns and 50 (17%) from Stockholm. For the Teachers' and the Medical unit, a slight concentration can be noted for Kristianstads län and Malmöhus län in the southernmost province of Skåne (7 and 6 individuals respectively from the Medical unit, and 3 from each län for the Teachers' unit) (Fig. 6). The three teachers from Kristianstads län all originated from Norra Åsbo härad, while the medical staff originated from three härad in that län, Norra Åsbo, Östra Göinge and Villands härad. None of the other expert units had any members originating from these härad. But as demonstrated in Chapter VI:1, a number of missionaries from both SEM and SMBV originated from these areas. In Malmöhus län the härad of Luggude, which was a traditional stronghold for SEM and SMBV, was represented both in the Medical unit and in the Teachers' unit. Medical care and education are the traditional fields of missionary work and these two units together represent one-third of the experts. The figures are small, but they still indicate a certain connection between the geographical recruitment of missionaries and the educational and medical staff.

" See above Ch. V:2.1, VI:1.5.
Family relations between missionaries and experts

The detailed information given in the Nationality Roll offers a possibility to trace family ties between the experts. Ten members of the Teachers’ unit were either related to a missionary or were related to each other but with some sort of connection with the missionary societies. All these relationships were close, such as brother-sister. An eleventh member of the unit, Olof Emgård, was the brother of Gunnar Emgård, the head of the Agricultural unit.8 Fride Hylander’s brother was recruited as teacher.9 One sister and one niece of SEM missionaries went to Ethiopia as teachers.10 Another sister was married to an architect who was attached to the Technical School.11 His brother was also instructor at the Technical school.12 These cases can serve as examples from the Teachers’ unit.

A similar, though not so strong connection can be traced between the Christian missions and the Medical unit. Two of the nurses later married missionaries and returned to Ethiopia to continue their work in the service of the respective missionary society.100 Another two nurses later returned to Ethiopia as missionaries for SEM.101 Harald Nyström, the son of two SMBV missionaries, entered into SMBV’s service after many years of Ethiopian Government service, and the only dentist was a Board member of SMBV.102

Ties similar to the ones demonstrated above have not been identified within other units. These relationships, together with the geographical recruitment, would indicate a rather close connection between the missionary societies and the Teachers’ unit and the Medical staff, while no such relations have been identified with, for example, the officers and the IEAF units.

10 Birgit Arén b. 1912, Handicraft teacher at Itenge Menen School 1946–1957, sister to SEM, No. 140, Gustav Arén, see above n. 63. Tyra Sjöärne b. 1916, Primary school teacher, at Itenge Menen School 1945–48, niece of SEM, No. 115, Per Sjöärne, see Ch. V n. 3.
102 SMBV, No. 41, Harald Nyström see Ch. IV n. 82; Gunnar Thelander b. 1905, Dentist in Ethiopia 1947–48.
A possible explanation of the connection between the missionary societies and the medical staff and Teachers’ unit could be that besides possible personal acquaintance with Stjärne or Hylander, Ethiopia was a country well known to missionary circles. There were most probably many members of these societies who were not prepared to become missionaries, but who could think of entering into Ethiopian Government service within the traditional fields of mission work, thus indirectly serving the sake of the Christian mission.

The process of recruitment

In connection with the criticism against the recruitment of experts in the above-mentioned article in *Stockholms-Tidningen*, a very thorough investigation was made on the recruitment of experts by the special committee within the Swedish Association in order to find out the criteria for the recruitment. The result of the investigation was enclosed with the report to the Press Fair Practices Commission.113 According to the report, the Abyssinian Committee was primarily responsible for the recruitment of group leaders, who were authorized to recruit staff for their respective groups. Their choice of candidates was, however, to be approved by the Abyssinian Committee. The recruitment of group leaders fell into the following categories:

1. Persons considered obvious candidates because of previous experience in Ethiopia: Nurse Verna Hagman for the nurses, Dr Erik Norup for the Haile Sellassie I Hospital staff, Carl Gustaf von Rosen for the Air personnel and Viking Tamm for the officers.114 Per Stjärne, who was a schoolteacher besides being a missionary, was considered to have a special position since he had been personally instructed by the Emperor to recruit staff with a Christian outlook. He was therefore made responsible for the recruitment of teachers. The Committee, however, required that the qualifications of the teachers recruited by him should be checked by the National Swedish Board of Education. Once the teachers had arrived in Ethiopia three group leaders were selected for them, namely, David Törnblom for the teachers at Haile Selassie I Secondary School, Barbro Nordberg for *Itege* Menen School and Effe Runelid for Minilik School.115

2. Persons employed by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Axel Blomér

113 *PM angående urvalet av etiopien experter m.m. med anledning av Gunnar Kumliens artikel i Stockholms-tidningen 22.6 1947* written by Fride Hylander, enclosure no. 16 to T. Torgersruud and E. Kullingsjö to *Pressens Opinionsnämnd, Addis Abeba 1.8 1947, FH y.*

114 Verna Hagman see Ch. IV n. 80; Erik Norup see Ch. IV n. 254; Carl Gustaf von Rosen see Ch. IV n. 251; Viking Tamm see Ch. IV n. 149.

for the Police, Erik Leijonhufvud as Legal adviser and Sune Wetterlundh as adviser to the Ministry of the Interior."

3. Persons employed by the representative of the Ethiopian Government after discussions with the Abyssinian Committee: Elis Dahlström head of the Geologists, Gunnar Emgård head of the Agricultural unit, Erik Hägglund as head of the Garage group and Olof Emgård as Chief instructor at the Technical school." Fride Hylander became the group leader of the staff employed by the Ministry of Public Health when he arrived in Ethiopia early 1947.

According to the report, the Ethiopian authorities had requested that the recruitments as well as the departures of the experts should take part as secretly as possible due to the sensitive political situation. Abbebe Retta also wanted to sign as many contracts as possible during his stay in Sweden in the autumn of 1945." The recruitments undertaken during 1946 were to a far greater extent based on contacts with the respective professional organizations. The recruitment of physicians and qualified technical staff was reported to be particularly difficult." The different group leaders were also requested to give statements on how the experts had been recruited. The statements were collected in a special file called the confidential enclosure, which was not included in the report for the Press Fair Practices Commission." The statement on the recruitment of police officers is very detailed, giving the qualifications of each individual. Mention is also made of the lack of advertising to recruit staff, since it was considered that the political situation abroad made it inconvenient to publicly announce that Swedish policemen were going to be employed in Ethiopia." The statement for the medical staff was also detailed, and personal recommendations were said to have been of importance in addition to paper merits." Nothing is mentioned about the recruitment of teachers. Their

" Axel Blomér see Ch. V n. 49; Erik Leijonhufvud see Ch. V n. 3; Sune Wetterlundh b. 1904, Director, adviser to the Ministry of the Interior 1946–48.
" Elis Dahlström b. 1898, Ph.L. Geologist. In Ethiopia as head of the Geologist unit 1946–47; Gunnar Emgård see above n. 95; Erik Hägglund b. 1912, Factory owner, in Ethiopia June–October 1946, see below Ch. VI:2.2; Olof Emgård see above n. 95.
" This information confirmed by Abbebe Retta during interview in Addis Abeba 16.1 1973.
" T. Torgersruud and E. Kullingsjö to Pressens opinionsnämnd, Addis Abeba 1.8 1947, FHj.
" Den konfidentiella bilagan, enclosure no. 17 to T. Torgersruud and E. Kullingsjö to Pressens opinionsnämnd, Addis Abeba 1.8 1947, FHj.
" PM angående uttagningen av medlemmarna i svenska polisgruppen, Addis Abeba 25.7 1947 signed by Axel Blomér, in enclosure no. 17. Bengt Rehnström was an active member of SEM, nothing is mentioned about that in the memorandum by Blomér, but it is stated that all members except him had been selected by Blomér, but Rehnström had applied earlier to the Abyssinian Committee and been preliminary accepted, and Blomér found no reason not to accept him. See Ch. V n. 49.
" Tillvägagångssättet vid anställning av läkare och sköterskor för Etiopien, Addis Abeba 18.7 1947, signed E. Norup, in enclosure no. 17.
recruitment is however, commented in the report to the Press Fair Practice
Commission when discussing the religious factor in the recruitment. According to the report, religiousity was considered as a special qualification only for the teachers, and that about half of the teachers belonged to that category. The remaining statements were more general, emphasizing that only the professional qualifications had been the basis for recruitment. The only advertisements made in the press would appear to have concerned the Agricultural unit. However, Dr Norup wrote an article in Svenska Läkartidningen with the obvious purpose of making physicians interested in employment in Ethiopia.

Many people interested in employment in Ethiopia contacted on their own initiative the missionary societies SEM and SMBV as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but they were all referred to Dr Fride Hylander. The Association of Overseas Swedes (Utlandssvenskarnas förening) received many applications from interested candidates for employment, but these files have been sorted out from their archives, and are therefore no longer available for research.

In conclusion we can note that the recruitment of Swedish experts to Ethiopia in the mid-1940s was largely undertaken on a personal basis. The group leaders were obviously 'hand-picked' by the Abyssinian Committee. The group leaders in their turn seem to have used private contacts in finding suitable candidates, sometimes in co-operation with the different professional organizations. The recruitment of officers and Air Force personnel appears to have been based on a rather wide recruitment, while the teachers were apparently hand-picked. The religious factor was of importance, particularly in the teachers unit, and to a minor extent also among the medical staff, especially among the nurses. There were also some individual cases where the religious factor was of importance in other expert units.

T. Torgersruud and E. Kullingsjö to Pressens opinionsnämnd, Addis Abeba 1.8 1947, p. 12, FHy.

Memorandum angående rekryteringen av de svenska officerare som nu tjänstgörar i Etiopien, Addis Abeba 25.7 1947, signed by Tage Olihn; C.G. von Rosen to E. Leijonhufvud, Bishoftu 24.7 1947; Intyg about the recruitment of Geologists, Addis Abeba 3.7 1947, signed by Elis Dahlström, all in enclosure no. 17, FHy.

PM angående rekryteringen av personal inom jordbrukargruppen, Addis Abeba 30.7 1947, signed by Gunnar Engård, in enclosure no. 17, FHy.


Personal communication from the Archives of Utlandssvenskarnas Förening.
2.2 The experts and their relations with Ethiopian authorities

As demonstrated in Chapter V:5 and 6, the two Swedish military units were placed under the Emperor's direct command, with an Ethiopian liaison officer, and did not experience any severe difficulties in their work. But could the same be said for Swedish experts subordinated to Ethiopian Ministers?

A small Garage unit, consisting of Erik Hägglund, a Swedish industrialist, and four mechanics was employed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, their main task being to organize garages and if possible also to build buses. Hägglund had been offered a garage workshop that was large according to Ethiopian standards but he claimed that the facilities were insufficient for him to fulfill his duties. He therefore chose to return to Sweden in October 1946, after less than four months in Ethiopia. Since Hägglund was closely connected with mission circles, his failure to fulfill his duties in Ethiopia was regarded as a severe setback to the missionaries' reputation in the country.

Two of the mechanics who wanted to stay were later transferred to the Technical school, where they stayed until the expiry of their contracts.

The Agricultural unit was originally planned to take over and expand a farmers' school in Holeta situated about 30 km west of Addis Abeba. Carl Clason, an agronomist, was included among the Swedes who arrived in Ethiopia already in December 1945. In a plan outlined in a memorandum dated 29 January 1946, Clason asked for a Swedish staff consisting of three agronomists, one veterinary surgeon, one gardener and two foremen. This plan was approved by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Ato Mekonnen Habte Wold, the Minister of Agriculture and other ministers had told Clason that they wanted an advanced agricultural school at Holeta to train instructors for other basic agricultural schools which were to be established in various parts of the country. The best graduates from Holeta would be sent abroad for further training. The problem was that a sufficient number of students could not be recruited from secondary schools. They would therefore have to start with a basic course to train practical farmers, foremen and instructors. Clason wanted this basic programme to continue when the advanced programme with students with secondary education could be started. According to the plans, Holeta was to become not only a school but

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110 F. Hylander to E. Hägglund, n d copy answer to Hägglund's letter, FHy.
111 Minutes of the Working Committee of Föreningen Svenskar i Etiopien 11.10 1946, § 4, FHy.
also a centre for promotion of agriculture for all Ethiopia. By learning Amharinya, Clason hoped to establish contact with the local farmers and to give them suitable tools and teach them how to use them. He realized that he and the other instructors would have to make a thorough study of the farmers' customs before they would be of real use. The school was planned to start in September 1946.

When recruiting staff for the agricultural school, efforts were to be made to attract people with a Christian view of life. Instructors were to be recruited via personal contacts as well as by advertising. The instructors were employed by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Clason found advertising a good method since it gave more people to choose from but on the other hand it was then more difficult to recruit devoted Christians. Clason had a number of candidates to suggest. By the end of May, Hylander had received 50–70 applications.

The dairying was also planned to be organized by Swedes. A Swedish dairyman, Gunnar Emgård was employed as adviser to the Minister of Agriculture. He was also supposed to become the Head of the Agricultural unit, and his work was to be undertaken in close co-operation with Clason's agricultural school. Emgård arrived in Addis Abeba in May 1946. He took over a dairy which was administered by the Custodian of Enemy Property, because the existing dairies used to belong to the Italians. The Minister of Agriculture, however, wanted to take over the dairies. Emgård organized a dairy enterprise in Addis Abeba, which after two months' work seemed to offer good prospects for giving a good revenue to the Ethiopian Government in the future. Emgård's unit, however, experienced tremendous difficulties in their work. The fact that the dairy unit was not yet formally under the Ministry of Agriculture caused Emgård a lot of duplicate work, and his impression that the Ethiopian authorities did not share his view of agriculture as Ethiopia's primary source of revenue, made the work unnecessarily complicated.

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124 C. Clason to F. Hylander, Addis Abeba 5.3 1946; C. Clason to F. Hylander, Addis Abeba 20.3 1946, FHy.
125 F. Hylander to C. Clason, Sthlm 29.5 1946, FHy.
126 C. Clason to F. Hylander, Addis Abeba 20.3 1946; F. Hylander to C. Clason, Sthlm 15.5 1946, FHy. Gunnar Emgård see above n. 95.
127 G. Jarring to S. Graefström, Addis Abeba 21.9 1946, Copy sent to V. Tamm for his strictly confidential information by S. Graefström 27.9 1946, KrA, VT, vol. 5.
Emgård and his three assistants returned to Sweden on expiry of their contract without being replaced.\textsuperscript{19}

The recruitment of agronomists was delayed, however, by the reluctance of the Ministry of Agriculture to give confirmation that they approved the candidates submitted. Clason needed a gardener without delay, because the school was intended to be run by the income obtained from a small market garden.\textsuperscript{18} The Minister of Agriculture did his best to delay the employment of Swedish agronomists by neither definitely approving nor rejecting the candidates. The Minister planned to establish an agricultural college in Addis Abeba. He therefore wanted to recruit a highly qualified Swedish professor of agronomy to head such a college. He was in that respect supported by Abbebe Retta. Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Chargé d’Affaires, maintained that there was no point in establishing a college, until elementary training had been organized for farmers as a basis for recruitment of students. However, at the same time as the negotiations continued about agronomists from Sweden, the Minister of Agriculture negotiated with UNRRA about recruiting agricultural experts as well as equipment from the United States. Checking with the UNRRA representative in Addis Abeba, Jarring found that UNRRA was willing to supply agricultural machinery, but only if the Ethiopian Government was able to recruit a sufficient number of foreign experts to take care of it. The Minister had then informed the UNRRA representative that he could obtain agronomists from Sweden. The UNRRA representative therefore turned to Jarring in order to receive confirmation of this and Jarring could do nothing but confirm.\textsuperscript{20}

It would appear that the views differed between the Swedes and the Ethiopian authorities regarding how the agricultural training in Ethiopia should be organized. The Swedes, represented by Clason, Jarring, and Hylander seemed to have been in favour of a basic agricultural training at grassroot level, while the Ethiopian authorities represented by the Minister of Agriculture and Abbebe Retta were in favour of establishing advanced agricultural training. The Minister of Agriculture seemed to have been more in favour of obtaining American equipment and staff via UNRRA than obtaining them from Sweden. On learning that he could only receive equipment from UNRRA if he could guarantee the recruitment of agronomists from Sweden, he had to keep the door open for recruiting Swedish agronomists, thus delaying the issue by giving vague promises. Clason was the only agronomist recruited from Sweden during the period under review and he returned to Sweden on the expiry of his contract.

\textsuperscript{19} Nationality Roll 1946–53, SE.
\textsuperscript{18} C. Clason to F. Hylander, Holeta 2.7 1946, FHy.
\textsuperscript{20} PM signed by G. Jarring dated Addis Abeba 20.7 1946, FHy.
The Agricultural unit and the Garage unit thus offer examples of how lack of confidence between Swedish experts and Ethiopian authorities resulted in the termination of planned projects. The Agricultural unit can also be regarded as an example of how a certain category of Swedes could be used as a pawn in order to obtain facilities from another source than Sweden.

The situation of the Swedish expert units during the autumn of 1946 was surveyed by Gunnar Jarring in a strictly confidential letter to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The school teachers, particularly the primary school teachers and the instructors at the Technical School, were reported to have initially met with problems due to their insufficient knowledge of English. The Police Officers had an exceptionally difficult time since the police college, where they were supposed to serve as instructors was not even built when they arrived. The physicians had some early problems but their situation had improved by September 1946. Jarring mentioned the lack of communication between the Emperor and his Ministers regarding the recruitment of Swedes as a possible reason for some of the difficulties. The Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture was not, for example, informed about Emsgård's employment, until he arrived in Ethiopia.  

The legal staff, particularly those working as advisers in the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, did not meet any particular problems in their work and neither did the judges working in the High Court. The situation with regard to the difficulties encountered thus largely depended upon what duties the Swedes were recruited for.

2.3 The Emperor's priorities

As already stated, the large-scale recruitment of Swedes that took place during 1945-46 resulted in a high Swedish representation in many Ethiopian ministries as well as at educational and medical institutions. There was, however, a change of emphasis in the recruitment of Swedes from medical staff and teachers towards Air Force staff and military instructors.

G. Jarring to S. Grafström, Addis Abeba 21.9 1946, Copy sent for strictly confidential information to V. Tamm 27.9 1946, KrA, VT, vol 5.

Ibid., See also Nordström (1956), pp. 553–562. Erik Leijonhufvud see Ch. V n. 3; Sune Wetterlundh see above n. 106; Sigurd Lind b. 1908, Judge. Assistant Adviser Ministry of Justice and Judge at the Supreme Court in Ethiopia. Gunnar Linnander b. 1914, Judge. In Ethiopia as Presiding Judge High Court Commercial Div. 1947–49. Nils Mangård b. 1915, Judge. In Ethiopia as Acting Advocate General and Presiding Judge High Court Commercial Division, 1950–52; Torvald Hellquist b. 1910, Judge, In Ethiopia as Presiding Judge High Court Commercial Division 1950–53; Ivan Wallenberg b. 1917, Judge. In Ethiopia as Presiding Judge High Court Commercial Division.
According both to Jarring and the report to the Press Fair Practices Commission, the lack of communication between the Emperor and his representative Abbebe Retta on the one hand and the Ethiopian Ministers on the other was the main reason for some of the expert units meeting difficulties in their contacts with Ethiopian authorities. The initiative to the contacts with Sweden as well as the recruitment of Swedes was kept secret by the Emperor and Abbebe Retta for reasons relating to both foreign and domestic policy. In Sweden there was no reason to believe that the respective ministers had not been consulted regarding their recruitment. The Emperor’s view of Swedes was not necessarily shared by his ministers, particularly since they had not been given any opportunity to express their opinions on the qualifications of the experts. The Swedish experts were supplied according to the Emperor’s directives as communicated via Ato Abbebe Retta and Per Stjärne. The experts who worked under the direct command of the Emperor seemed to have had the greatest possibilities of succeeding in their work.

In May 1947 the additional credit was still sufficient to cover the salaries for experts who prolonged their contracts for a third year, but would not be sufficient to cover even the home salaries for newly recruited staff. In 1948 the Emperor thus had to start covering the cost of the Swedes from Ethiopian funds. It was also from 1948 that the change of emphasis in the recruitment became noticeable. The recruitment of medical staff and teachers almost stopped (see Chapter V:3, Table 18), while the Air Force staff increased. The Emperor’s priorities most probably included all these categories of staff. The salaries of the Swedish staff were calculated according to Swedish rules, which most probably made them more expensive than other nationalities. As stated in Chapter III:5.3 (see particularly Fig. 4), teachers were supplied from several countries during the period 1944–49, particularly from India, Canada and France. Medical staff was supplied by the Soviet Union, especially during 1946 and 1947.

In addition, teachers and medical staff were supplied by the Swedish missionary societies and certainly also by missionary societies of other nationalities, for example by the Seventh Day Adventist mission. The Emperor did not provide the missionaries’ salaries. Within these units there were some individuals who apparently enjoyed the special confidence of the

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"G. Jarring to S. Grafström, Addis Abeba 21.5 1947 (Copy), EL.

"Regarding medical staff from the Soviet Union see also Airgram Smith to Secretary of State, Moscow 18.5 1946, 884.1281/5-1946; Douglas to Secretary of State, London 1.12 1947, NA, Decimal file 1945–49, 884.01B/12–147.
Ethiopian authorities and therefore kept prolonging their contracts. The rest of the medical staff and teachers in Ethiopian Government service thus mainly consisted of persons who had stayed in Ethiopia for several years. However, the difficulties experienced by some of the expert units due to lack of understanding between them and their respective ministers, resulted in new recruitment for these units being hardly worthwhile. The officers, the Air Force staff, the police instructors and the legal staff appear to have been in a different situation. They all had special tasks to perform, which could not easily be taken over by experts of other nationalities. With regard to the unstable political situation in various parts of the country a strong defence as well as an efficient police organization must have been a matter of high priority to the Emperor. He was therefore certainly prepared to pay for these categories. The police officers were serving as instructors at Aba Dina Imperial Police Staff College, where they trained Ethiopian police cadets in courses that lasted for two years. One member of this unit stayed during the whole period under review. After 1948 the legal staff mainly served as judges in the High Court, where they also offered practical training to Ethiopian civil servants.

The Emperor most probably wanted to recruit Swedes in order to avoid becoming too dependent upon the Great Powers. It cannot be excluded, however, that the high representation of Swedish experts in the Ethiopian Administration raised suspicions in Ethiopia that the British dominance was going to be replaced by a Swedish one. When Swedish officers, policemen, pilots, engineers, lawyers, mechanics, physicians, nurses, administrators, teachers etc. kept arriving every two weeks during the first half of 1946, this must have lent support to many rumours. The secrecy which surrounded the recruitment of the Swedes, even for the ministers directly affected by their arrival, and the difficulty for foreign Legations to obtain any information whatsoever about the duties of the Swedes could hardly have contributed to eliminate these rumours. In view of Haile Selassie's ability to play off different interests against each other, it might be suggested that he tried to attract the greatest possible number of foreign staff, and then keep in his service those he considered be of most benefit to his own plans.

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3. It is the persons that matter

When analysing Ethio-Swedish relations during the period 1924–52 it is without exception Haile Selassie who is the active person, first as Regent and Heir to the throne and from 1930 as Emperor (Fig. 7).

The first Ethio-Swedish contacts, however, originated with the Swedish Evangelical Mission, and it was via the SEM and SMBV missionaries that Ras Taffari learnt about Sweden in the early 1920s. The medical and educational work they carried out was most probably the reason why Ras Taffari allowed them to expand their work in Addis Abeba and also to extend it into the provinces. It was via the missionaries that he made enquiries about visiting Sweden during his planned journey to Europe. The contact with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not established until just before his arrival in Sweden. Ras Taffari wanted to meet the Swedish King and the Archbishop, who in view of his background must have been considered the most important persons in Sweden. The meetings were arranged and particularly the contact between Nathan Söderblom and Ras Taffari was of importance. For Nathan Söderblom, Ras Taffari represented a contact with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, a matter of interest to him in view of the planned ecumenical meeting in Stockholm. For Ras Taffari it was important because it brought him into contact with Johannes Kolmodin, who many years later became employed as his Political Adviser. Kolmodin was the son of Adolf Kolmodin, the former Director of Mission at Swedish Evangelical Mission.

During his visit to Sweden Ras Taffari also met Nils Dahlberg and Axel B. Svensson, representatives of SEM and SMBV respectively (Fig. 7). It was via Dahlberg that Dr Knut Hanner and two nurses arrived in Ethiopia in 1926 as the first Swedes in Ethiopian Government service. They were followed by a second physician, Harald Nyström, the son of SMBV missionaries. Efforts made by Ras Taffari to recruit advisers via the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in failure both in 1924 and in 1928. However, when Kolmodin died in 1933 an official enquiry for a high-ranking officer to replace him was approved by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Swedish Military authorities. In early 1934 General Eric Virgin was sent to Ethiopia. Virgin arranged that Captain Viking Tamm and four officers were recruited to establish a cadet school. This first Swedish Military Mission to Ethiopia arrived late in 1934 and was recruited via a general enquiry to the Swedish Armed Forces. A Swedish engineer, Frank Hammar, was also recruited to establish a radio station outside Addis Abeba. He was recruited via Knut Hanner, who planned to establish Ethio-Swedish co-operation on a large scale.

The contact between Haile Selassie and the Swedish Royal Family was renewed when Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf and his family visited Ethiopia in
January 1935, formally as a return visit for Ras Taffari’s visit to Stockholm in 1924. But the journey was arranged by the General Swedish Export Association, and a member of its Board, Björn Prytz, took part in the journey, during which many countries in the Near East were visited.

Nils Dahlberg and Axel B. Svensson also visited Ethiopia and renewed contacts with the Ethiopian Regent, their visits being in 1924/25 and 1929/30 respectively. They were both granted audiences with Ras Taffari and discussed the mission work.

When the Italo-Ethiopian war broke out there were well-established relations between Ethiopia and Sweden both via the missionary societies and via the persons in Ethiopian Government service. A Red Cross Ambulance Brigade was recruited and sent to Ethiopia without delay. Its staff had strong links with both SEM and SMBV. Carl Gustaf von Rosen was employed as pilot. Harald Nyström remained in Ethiopian Government service and so did Viking Tamm and three of his officers. When Ethiopia was defeated the Swedes left the country, leaving behind only one Swede in SDA’s service.

Due to the war in Europe and elsewhere, it must have been difficult for Haile Selassie to find a country that could take part in the reconstruction of Ethiopia. Sweden was one of a few possibilities. Ethiopia was, moreover, tied by the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 and contacts with other countries had to be undertaken in secret.

The first contact that gave any response resulted from Frank Hammar’s visit to London when he was commissioned to find a physician for the Emperor and to expand the Ethio-Swedish economic relations. Official enquiries cabled via Cairo in 1943 had not given any result. Hammar contracted former ‘Ethiopian-Swedes’, but did not reach any immediate results. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with positive response from Dahlberg and Svensson when contacting them after the enquiries from Cairo. But the Red Cross was negative, possibly because of the difficulties they had experienced with the Ambulance Brigade during the war.

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not become interested until they were informed about the enquiries via Hammar. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was approached also from Moscow their efforts became more efficient. These enquiries were made first by Blatengeta Lorenzo Taezaz, who had been attendant to the Swedish Crown Prince during his visit to Ethiopia in 1935. The Swedish Minister in Moscow, Staffan Söderblom was the son of Nathan Söderblom. This might even have been one reason for Haile Selassie to use Moscow as a channel of contact with Sweden. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took action as soon as the enquiries became known to them and renewed the contacts with the missionary societies. They were still positive. Svenska Lantbruksförbundet (Swedish Farmers’ Association) and Teknologföreningen (Swedish Association of Engineers & Architects) did not
show any interest in sending out experts. They had apparently not had any earlier contacts with Ethiopia.

It was not until requests regarding experts had also arrived from London via Ato Abbebe Retta and Björn Prytz that actions were really taken in Sweden. Prytz added a strong recommendation to the Ethiopian request that the pre-war Ethio-Swedish relations should be resumed. Prytz even sent a copy of his letter to the Crown Prince, who he knew had a particular interest in Ethiopia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was now quite sure that the Ethiopian enquiries really originated from the Emperor. Sven Grafström at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a new contact with Hammar, who suggested that a letter be written from the Crown Prince to the Emperor.

When a meeting was arranged in February 1945 regarding experts from Sweden, all but two of the participants had visited Ethiopia. Besides knowing the Emperor they also knew each other. The meeting resulted in the establishment of a Committee consisting of two former 'Ethiopian-Swedes' and one representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the main task to recruit experts for Ethiopia, which they did. There was a certain connection between the experts recruited and the missionary societies. Per Stjärne was, moreover, utilized by the Emperor as his personal messenger to recruit experts with a Christian outlook. Both Nils Dahlberg and Axel B. Svensson visited Ethiopia again during the 1940s and then had direct contact with the Emperor.

In concluding we can thus state that it was the personal relations that played the decisive role in the development of the Ethio-Swedish co-operation. All the time it was the persons that mattered.
Chapter VII
Why Sweden and Ethiopia? Concluding remarks

Ethiopia’s position at the Horn of Africa had made the country an attractive
target for Great Powers who wanted to control the Red Sea Littoral. With the
exception of Eritrea, which became an Italian colony around 1890, Ethiopia
succeeded in preserving her independence throughout the European
‘Scramble for Africa’. Previous research has suggested that this was made
possible by a national consciousness and a capable leadership. However, it
would rather be suggested that Ethiopia was able to preserve her independence
by countering European attempts at conquest with military technology and
diplomatic methods imported from Europe, and also since Ethiopia herself
took part in the scramble by conquering the neighbouring Oromo states.

The present study on Ethio-Swedish relations during the period 1924–1952
is intended as a case study in the wider perspective of the relationship between
an industrialized and a non-industrialized country at a time when contacts
between such countries were generally those as between a mother country and
its colony. It represents an effort to examine the mechanisms behind the
establishment of co-operation between two countries which had reached
different levels of technical development at a time when the expression
‘development aid’ had not yet been coined. The Ethio-Swedish relations could
be regarded as one link in Haile Selassie’s efforts to keep the Great Powers at
a distance.

The present study has dealt with five main problems:

(a) Why Ethiopia chose Sweden as a partner in the development process and
why the Swedish Government during the 1930s and 1940s agreed to send
personnel to Ethiopia
(b) The scope of the Swedish undertakings in Ethiopia in relation to
undertakings of other countries
(c) The number of Swedes active in Ethiopia, as well as their professional
orientation and institutional affiliation when in Ethiopia
(d) The contact pattern and the process of recruitment when employing
Swedish staff and whether there was any connection between the
missionary societies and the experts
(e) and, finally, some efforts have been made to illuminate the impact of the
Swedish work in Ethiopia.
In order to answer these questions a rather detailed background was needed. In Chapter II the main features in Ethiopia’s history from about 1850 to the present were outlined, with emphasis on her foreign relations after 1896. Haile Selassie continued Minilik’s policy of internal centralization both as Regent and as Emperor. Even before becoming Emperor Haile Selassie established a wide net of international contacts, including membership in the League of Nations (Table 2). Haile Selassie’s attempts at balancing different foreign interests temporarily failed in 1935, when Italy attacked, defeated and occupied Ethiopia for a period of six years. After the Italian occupation when Haile Selassie wanted to widen his foreign contacts again, there were not many alternatives due to the Second World War. Sweden was one of the very few countries that stayed out of the war and accordingly might have had the economic resources to assist Ethiopia. The United States and Switzerland were other possible alternatives.

In Chapter III Haile Selassie’s foreign policy was examined through his use of foreigners. Recruiting foreigners for various duties had been practiced before both by Teodros II and Minilik II. But Haile Selassie managed to use the foreigners more systematically for his political purpose than his predecessors. His advisers were carefully selected and represented several countries, among which small countries like Sweden and Switzerland were included. Already in the 1930s there were a number of Swedes holding responsible positions in Haile Selassie’s administration (Table 5). In order to free himself of the heavy dependence on British advisers that had been a consequence of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942, Haile Selassie turned to the United States. He made detailed enquiries about different kinds of assistance for the reconstruction of Ethiopia. The United States was, however, reluctant to become too involved in Ethiopia in order not to disturb British interests.

When investigating the number of foreigners that were granted residence permits in Ethiopia for the period 1944–1949, it was found that the Swedes constituted the fifth largest foreign group closely followed by the Americans (Fig. 3), and constituted the largest foreign group employed in medical services (Fig. 4). In 1946 Swedes were employed in most Ethiopian ministries. In the 1940s the Swedes thus constituted a substantial element in the foreign population residing in Ethiopia.

Already in the early 1920s Haile Selassie realized that Ethiopia had to be modernized if the country was to survive as an independent state. He needed educational facilities in order to create an educated élite from which staff for a modern administration could be recruited. He needed medical facilities to improve the poor health conditions in the country. In the missionaries he found suitable instruments to overcome the shortages of educational and
medical staff. He therefore invited the missionary societies to expand their work, in what at that time was Ethiopian territory. Haile Selassie’s open policy towards foreign missionaries coincided with a very restrictive policy towards Protestant missions by the Italian administration in Eritrea, where Swedish missionaries had been working since the 1860s, while waiting for an opportunity to start large scale missionary work among the Oromo. The motives for the Swedish missionary societies to send missionaries abroad were directed by the Mission Command in the Gospel according to St. Matthew. The choice of the Oromo peoples as a Swedish missionary field came by coincidence as the result of many factors (Chapter IV:1). The wholistic view of missionary work meant that evangelization should include the whole human being. Thus education was necessary so that people could read the Bible and medical care essential to make them fit to receive the Gospel. The Swedish missionaries included a substantial number of medical and educational staff (Table 15). Haile Selassie’s motives for encouraging the missionary societies could thus be combined with SEM’s and SMBV’s main goal to evangelize among the Oromo. Their resources were now concentrated on the Ethiopian Empire.

The missionaries’ work as well as their private lives were to a great extent directed from Sweden by their respective Boards. The missionary organizations were controlled by the Emperor in such a way that their resources were located to areas where the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was not so well established (Chapter VI:1). In his Decree of Foreign Missions of 1944, the Emperor largely restricted the missionaries’ possibilities to evangelize, especially in so-called Church areas. After the liberation both the Emperor and the missionary societies had to take into account the emerging Evangelical Church, whose leaders no longer wanted to be under the direct control of the missionaries. The Swedish missionary societies were not so restricted as the Decree would indicate. Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission Bibel trogna Vänner were, in fact, invited to establish clinics and schools in all provinces. It would appear that Haile Selassie had reached his goal when he managed to mobilize the educational and medical resources of the missionary societies for the development of the provinces, whereas the missionary societies had reached their main goal when they were allowed to evangelize among the Oromo.

It is obvious that in Haile Selassie’s efforts to modernize Ethiopia he was directed by political considerations when recruiting foreign advisers. The Great Powers were competing for influence as indicated by their treaties not only with Ethiopia but also among themselves regarding their interests in Ethiopia (Table 2). Haile Selassie therefore needed a partner whom he did not have to fear as a threat to Ethiopia’s independence. Both Ethiopia and Sweden
were members of the League of Nations, where they acted as spokesmen for the small states. Ethiopia, however, had a more difficult international position than Sweden, being at the crossroads of European power interests. There are reasons to believe that Haile Selassie also wanted to use Sweden and Swedish personnel as a counterweight to any Great Power influence. This motive probably predominated in the 1920s and 1930s as well as in the 1940s, and did not undergo any fundamental changes.

It is beyond doubt that the work performed by Swedish missionaries contributed to giving Haile Selassie a positive view of Sweden, which affected his decision to visit the country in 1924. His contacts with Swedish authorities were of importance for his interest in establishing contacts with Sweden also outside the missionary societies. However, in the 1920s the Swedish Government was not prepared to supply Ethiopia with advisers, and twice rejected Haile Selassie's enquiries. The first Swedish political adviser, Johannes Kolmodin, was therefore not recruited via the Swedish Government, but via Archbishop Nathan Söderblom. In the 1930s, however, the attitude of the Swedish Government changed and a political and military adviser was supplied to succeed Kolmodin who died in 1933. The Swedish authorities later agreed to send a small military mission at the Emperor's own expense to train Ethiopian cadets. This change of attitude might have been due to Haile Selassie's position having become more legitimized after he had become the Emperor of Ethiopia. His position as head of State in an independent African state, the fact that he had visited Sweden as well as the increasing missionary undertakings and Kolmodin's work as his political adviser, were factors which contributed to making him known in Sweden and certainly also facilitated an official Swedish undertaking. Ethiopia's difficult position with regard to Italy might have influenced their decision. When the war with Italy became a fact, however, the Swedish Government refused to supply the Emperor with a political and military adviser. The Swedish Government was also reluctant to become involved in Ethiopia in the early 1940s before the relations between Ethiopia and Great Britain had been clarified.

Did Sweden have any economic or political ambitions in Ethiopia? The possibilities of developing the Ethio-Swedish commercial relations were contemplated by the Emperor as well as by the General Swedish Export Association in the early 1930s. The prospects of developing Ethiopia as a market for Swedish products, favoured by the Swedish Consul Knut Hanner, raised interest in Ethiopia within Swedish business life. The interest was manifested by the visit to Ethiopia by Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf together with a representative of the General Swedish Export Association in 1935 and the concluding of a Treaty of Trade and Friendship. The economic contacts were, however, interrupted by the war. The economic motives became rather obvious during the discussions about Swedish Government credit to Ethiopia.
in 1945 and 1946, when the trade prospects were mentioned as a motive in support of granting the credit. There are, however, no indications that Sweden had any political ambitions in Ethiopia.

One interpretation presented in this thesis is that Haile Selassie used his contacts with Sweden to counterbalance to Great Power influence in Ethiopia as well as to promote his domestic political programme. The Swedish Government, on the other hand, agreed to supply the personnel required only as long as this did not interfere with or endanger Sweden’s foreign relations.

What were the Emperor’s priorities when recruiting Swedish personnel? Missionaries were present in Ethiopia during the whole period under review, but their number increased substantially after the war. In accordance with the Emperor’s wishes the missionaries sent to Ethiopia during the 1940s included a greater proportion of educational and medical staff than before the war.

The first Swedes to be recruited in Ethiopian Government service were physicians and nurses and in the early 1930s they were followed by political advisers, civil engineers and military instructors. The number of Swedes in Ethiopian Government services was small, totalling only 14 before the Italo-Ethiopian war, but they carried important responsibilities. The work performed by persons like Hanner, Kolmodin, Hammar and Tamm before 1935 and by the Swedish Red Cross Ambulance Brigade and the Swedish officers during the war, obviously played an important role for Haile Selassie’s decision to renew his contacts with Sweden in the early 1940s. The recruitment of experts from Sweden in the mid-1940s took place entirely on Haile Selassie’s initiative and in accordance with his priorities. If he was unable to obtain personnel from Sweden within the exact field he wanted he turned to another state, notably the United States. When in 1946, Sweden was not prepared to give the Emperor enough military aid, he allowed the British Military Mission to stay, because it was supplied at British expense. Medical staff and teachers dominated in the first recruitment financed by Swedish Government Credit – the first credit granted by Sweden to a country in the Third World. In the late 1940s, when Haile Selassie had to pay for the Swedish experts from his own funds, he gave priority to staff for the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, police instructors and instructors for the Cadet school at the Imperial Guard. Teachers and medical staff could be obtained without cost from various missionary societies and at less cost from countries like India and the Soviet Union. The recruitment of Swedes within those fields was thus limited to a minimum. Towards the end of the period under review a shift from humanitarian and educational fields towards military duties and maintenance of internal order characterized the recruitment of experts from Sweden.

On arriving in Ethiopia the experts were generally attached to an Ethiopian Ministry, where they worked under the supervision of the minister
responsible. The lack of communication between, on the one hand, the Emperor and Abbebe Retta, his representative in the contacts with Sweden, and on the other the Ethiopian ministers affected by the recruitment of Swedes, created difficulties in the relations between the Swedish experts and the different ministers. It would appear that Swedes subordinated directly under the Emperor, i.e. the officers at the Imperial Guard and the staff of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, had better relations with the Ethiopian authorities. The missionaries were in the service of their respective organisation in Sweden, and they therefore sometimes found themselves in a difficult position between Ethiopian authorities, their Board in Stockholm and the emerging Evangelical Church.

Haile Selassie's contact pattern when recruiting staff from Sweden was investigated in detail. The recruitment was largely undertaken via personal contacts with individuals who had an interest in Ethiopia. The missionary societies were also well represented in the Red Cross Brigade that was sent to Ethiopia in 1935. The first contacts with Sweden after the war were undertaken via persons who had been in Ethiopia before the war, whereby Hammar, Tamm, Stjärne and Hylander in particular played important roles. Personal friendship and confidence between Haile Selassie and the Swedish Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf, Archbishop Nathan Söderblom as well as the leaders of Swedish Evangelical Mission and Swedish Mission Bibeltroga Vänner, played a significant role for expanding relations outside the missionary societies. The contacts with the missionary societies played an important role for the recruitment of experts after the war. Some experts within education, medical service, agriculture and certain technical positions were members of religious organizations and/or related to missionaries. The officers and the Air Force staff had, however, no connections with the missionary societies. All enquiries for Swedish personnel originated from the Emperor regardless of whether they were communicated via diplomatic channels or via personal contacts. The Emperor used as his representatives persons – Ethiopians as well as Swedes – who had been involved in Ethio-Swedish contacts before the war (Fig. 7).

It is not an easy task to research into the motives for hundreds of individuals to accept employment in a foreign country, for example Ethiopia. The missionaries' motives were based on a conviction to evangelize, and a large proportion of the missionary candidates did not give any statement about where they wanted to be placed (Chapter VI:1). Some persons who had a Christian outlook, might not have felt a conviction to become missionaries, but when positions as teachers and medical staff were offered in Ethiopian Government service, they might have felt that they could serve mission interests by accepting such employment. Missionaries as well as experts were certainly also influenced by the prospect of adventure and a wish to widen their
horizons. These were certainly important factors for going abroad after the years of isolation during the war. The fact that the living conditions in Ethiopia were wellknown to Swedes because of the pre-war undertakings, was most probably of importance when young families with small children did not hesitate to accept employment in the country.

The difficulties to measure the impact of another country's undertakings abroad have been emphasized in the present study. Despite the lack of a suitable instrument for evaluating the Swedish undertakings in Ethiopia, some efforts have been made to illumiate possible effects of their work. Before a unified Ethiopian Government school system had been developed, the schools run by the missionary societies, particularly in the provinces, seem to have played a relatively important role in the education of Ethiopians. The clinics run by missionaries, often in remote areas, as well as the mission hospitals in some of the big towns, contributed to improve the health situation for the poor population. The fact that these activities were encouraged by the Emperor and even supported economically would indicate that they were considered as essential.

The case study on the careers of two courses of cadets, one from 1935 and the other from 1946 (Chapter IV:2.4 and V:6.2), demonstrated that the Ethiopian officers trained by Swedish instructors have reached important positions in the Ethiopian society but they did not form a homogeneous cadre. Among their number were found examples of officers who revolted against the Emperor and those who remained loyal to the very end of his reign in 1974.

The preparedness of Swedish authorities to accept the Emperor's changed priorities towards military staff and personnel for the maintenance of internal order might also have contributed to maintain Haile Selassie's regime when it turned increasingly oppressive. When Haile Selassie started his reform programme in the 1920s he was considered as revolutionary by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as well as by part of the nobility because of his new ideas. The promulgation of a constitution in 1931 was considered a progressive act, as also was his recruitment of foreign advisers. When the Swedish Military Mission arrived in late 1934, Ethiopia's independence was threatened, which justified the establishment of an Ethiopian cadre of officers with modern training. After the liberation the establishment of an effective defence was motivated, but Haile Selassie's emphasis on defence and police coupled with a strong centralization of Government somehow also represented a step backwards, despite the advancement of his pre-war reform programme. He had to face new groups of oppositional elements and perhaps even his own reform programme, which aimed at an expansion of the educational system, created the very base for the protests and changes that have taken place after 1960.

When looking back on Ethio-Swedish relations during the period
In the period 1924–1952, we can recognize many of the ideas on development assistance that are practised today. Some of the ideas were put forward already in the 1870s. The distribution of basic education to the countryside at a low cost that was practised by the missionaries already in the 1920s and 1930s is the guiding principle for the mass literacy campaigns of today. Decentralized medical care and preventive health care in the provinces instead of expensive hospitals in the big cities were fundamental principles favoured and practiced by missionaries like Friis Hylander in the 1920s, who also worked along these lines when he was principal medical adviser to the Ethiopian Government in the 1940s and 1950s. It is interesting to note that the proposals by the Swedish agricultural unit in the mid-1940s for basic training of farmers and improvement of the traditional tools, proposals which were then renounced by the Ethiopian Government, have become leading principles for the Swedish development assistance in the 1960s and 1970s. Haile Selassie seems to have favoured elite education in the agricultural field as well as in the technical field, which created problems of such magnitude that the Swedes had to leave. It was the Emperor who directed the Ethio-Swedish co-operation. In cases where Sweden agreed to the Emperor's conditions a co-operation could be established, whereas the Swedes had to leave when their proposals diverged from those of the Ethiopian Government, as for example within dairying and agriculture.

When the Swedish Government decided to grant Ethiopia a credit in the mid-1940s, it was only after consultations with Swedish business life as to the stability of Ethiopian economy. The intention was that Ethiopia's future trade with Sweden would pay for Swedish assistance. This is, in fact, the same kind of commercial credit system that was developed by the World Bank in the 1960s and used by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) from the mid-1960s. More research is required in this field to shed light upon the original ideas on development assistance. The debate on these issues in the 1960s and 1970s seems to represent a change of terminology rather than a change of ideas.

The fact that Ethiopia had paid back the credits in due order by 1952 was of decisive importance when the Central committee for Swedish technical assistance to underdeveloped areas (Centralkommittén för svensk teknisk hjälp åt underutvecklade områden) in early 1953 recommended that Ethiopia should

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1 See for example Landgren (1871), pp. VII–VIII and p. 221. Landgren maintained that the missionaries should be well-trained within various fields in order to improve the living conditions, where they were sent.

2 See for example the analysis of principles on development assistance in Wohlgemuth (1976), pp. 1–4 and passim.
be included in the programme for Swedish technical assistance. It was then maintained that Sweden had already a long tradition of co-operation with Ethiopia and that the cost of the Swedish staff had been covered by Ethiopia, but with the help of a credit from Sweden only in the mid-1940s. A programme had already been presented by The Association of Swedes in Ethiopia (Föreningen Svenskar i Etiopien) and technical assistance to Ethiopia would then be a continuation of the work already started, the only difference being that the costs for Swedish teachers and technicians would in the future be covered by Sweden.¹

Ethiopia was the first country to receive from Sweden what is today called development assistance, mainly in the form of personnel assistance, but also military, humanitarian and financial assistance. During the period under review the missionary organizations spent millions of Crowns, collected from members and sympathisers of the societies, and sent personnel who together spent hundreds of years working in Ethiopia (Appendix 1–2). They might therefore be called Sweden’s first volunteers in co-operation for development, and the financing of their work might be called the first Swedish development aid. The Swedish Red Cross Ambulance Brigade sent to Ethiopia in 1935, was financed by a subscription among the Swedish population in a situation of Ethiopian national crisis. This would justify it being called catastrophe assistance probably the first supplied by Sweden to a country in the Third World. The fact that the Emperor directed in detail the Swedes’ work in Ethiopia, that of the missionaries as well as that of the experts, might motivate it being called an early Ethio-Swedish co-operation for development on the recipient’s conditions.

Appendices 1–2

Comment

The information regarding the missionaries' active periods in Ethiopia obtained from the sources mentioned in Chapter I:5 have been systematized in a series of 'Activity graphs' presented below. Appendix 1 contains the SEM missionaries, whereas the SMBV and SDA missionaries are surveyed in Appendix 2. The graphs have been prepared in order to illustrate how many missionaries were active at the same time and for how long they generally stayed in the country. By differentiating between male and female missionaries in the graph, the proportion between the sexes can also be seen. The placing of the individuals is marked to distinguish between those missionaries active only in Eritrea, both in Eritrea and in Ethiopia and in Ethiopia only. Each missionary has been given a running number roughly indicating in which order they were sent out. In the biographical notes presented about some of the missionaries, the number is always indicated together with the abbreviation for the respective society. For example SEM, No. 1, indicates the first missionary sent by Swedish Evangelical Mission in 1865, in the same way as SMBV, No. 40 indicates missionary number 40 sent by Swedish Mission Bibeltrogsna Vänner in 1952.
Appendix 1

Swedish missionaries working in Ethiopia including Eritrea for Swedish Evangelical Mission, 1865–1952.
Source: Hylander (1917); SEM, Missionary records.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Died in Service</th>
<th>Sweden Less Than a Year</th>
<th>Active Both in Ethiopia and Eritrea</th>
<th>Active Only in Eritrea</th>
<th>Over to SMIV</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Transferred to India</th>
<th>Transferred to India</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Over to SMIV</th>
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<td>1935</td>
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</table>

- Appendix 1
- Swedish missionaries working in Ethiopia including Eritrea for Swedish Evangelical Mission, 1865–1952.
- Source: Hylander (1917); SEM, Missionary records.
Appendix 2


Source: Stark (1972); Jordal (1975).
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