Integration and Politics Among African States
Limitations and horizons of mid-term theorizing

CHIMELU CHIME
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Dedicated to the memory of my father,

REUBEN NWOBODO CHIME
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAPC</td>
<td>All-African People’s Conference</td>
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<td>AATUF</td>
<td>All-African Trade Union Federation</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>African Liberation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATUC</td>
<td>African Trade Union Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTA</td>
<td>Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa (South of the Sahara)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAS</td>
<td>Conference of Independent African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa (United Nations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Commission (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Mocambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPRA</td>
<td>Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAE</td>
<td>Govêrno Revolucionário da Angola em Exilo</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAMO</td>
<td>Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization (also known as Monrovia Powers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFCTU</td>
<td>International Federation of Christian Trade Unions</td>
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</table>
ILO  International Labour Organization (United Nations)
LPAI  African Popular League for Independence (Djibouti)
MPLA  Movimento Popular para Libertaçao da Angola
OAU  Organization of African Unity
PAFMEC(S)A  Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central (and Southern Africa)
PLEC  Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
POLISARIO  The People's Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro
SWANU  South-West Africa National Union
SJ APO  South-West Africa Peoples' Organization
UAM  Union Africaine et Malgache (also known as Brazzaville Group)
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNI  National Independence Union (Djibouti)
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UPC  Union des Populations du Cameroun
WASU  West African Students Union
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People's Union
Preface

The Organization of African Unity is identified, in our day, chiefly with the chaotic conditions which have often prevailed in the relations between African states. It is remembered in popular image as an organ of indifferent record and many vicissitudes. And yet, ever since the Pan-Africanist ideology fired the imagination of the early Caribbean, Afro-American and African freedom fighters, a steady effort has been going on to unite the African states mentally, socially and economically - the ups and downs of national politics notwithstanding. The sorry record of this effort in certain major aspects has provided abundant excuse for analysis in international theory to leave this experiment largely by the wayside. This study is intended to introduce the reader to a theoretical way of looking at that experiment. It sets out to examine the major concepts and impulses behind the African unity movement in the light of contemporary theories on integration, and, in the process, to throw those same theories into critical relief.

I first became intrigued by the subject ten years ago in Geneva while, as a fresh graduate, I was carrying out a project on the ILO and the African trade unions. In 1966, the OAU was barely three years old. Our imaginations were still distended - despite the fact that certain events had dented them - by the high hopes that the Organization would quickly bring Africa's problems to heel. 1966 was also the year of the historic ILO conference when the Presidency, for the first time in the fifty years of that Organization, fell into the hands of an East European country, despite spirited efforts, from certain quarters, to prevent that outcome. As the historic votings drew nearer, it soon became apparent that they would be close. The votes of the various African delegations quickly assumed, for obvious reasons, the attraction of the proverbial hot cakes. Judging from the intrigues that followed, some of the delegations were presumably inclined to think that they were just as marketable. Circumstances, which need not be recounted here, having enabled me to become closely involved in the proceedings (including caucuses disguised as luncheons and dinners), I was able to witness, for the first time at close quarters, the workings of the Godfather syndrome.

Most of these delegations were led by men who were in the first rank of their countries' leadership - able men, many of them, with the exalted probity beffiting their high offices. Others were not so impeccable. One was merely left wondering at their dexterity. One was also left wondering how correct was the myth that it was only the Pan-Africanist ideology which fired the OAU and the new breed of Africans at the international level...
The search for the answer has taken me to extensive journeys through fourteen African countries, covering a total period of two years, a considerable portion of which I spent in Addis Ababa at the headquarters of the OAU and ECA. I am naturally indebted to a lot of people many of whom, by their own wishes, I cannot name. The rest are too numerous to be mentioned individually. But I am particularly bound by gratitude to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies not only for an earlier Fellowship grant, but also for the excellent facilities which I was afforded at its seat and library in Uppsala. Likewise, I am grateful to SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority) for an early travel grant without which my first research trip would have been more difficult. I should like to thank M. Diallo Telli, the former Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, who was kind enough to grant me interviews and arrange invaluable facilities for me at the OAU headquarters. I am grateful to Dr. Robert Gardiner, formerly the Secretary-General of the United Nations Economic Commission in Addis Ababa, and the staff of the ECA library, for all their assistance especially for assistance and guidance by Dr. Gardiner who read the manuscript. I should like to thank Dr. Göran Hydén, formerly of the University in Nairobi, who provided me with assistance and hospitality while I was in Kenya. The foreign ministries of Sierra Leone and Liberia helped me with documents on the earlier African groupings and the Swedish foreign office helped me to ease procedural questions in Addis Ababa, for which I thank them all.

I am indebted to Prof. Hans Ruin, Prof. Gunnar Wallin, and Prof. Per Sundberg, all of the University of Stockholm, for reading the manuscript and for guidance; also to Dr. Gunnar Sjöstedt, of the Foreign Affairs Institute in Stockholm, who provided valuable criticism, and Prof. Hans Meijer, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Linköping, who read the original manuscript. Dr. Zdeneck Cervenka was kind enough to allow me use of his up-to-date collection of OAU papers.

The latter part of this work was completed during a prolonged stay in Copenhagen, Denmark. I am grateful to Prof. Kjeld Philip for comments on the East African Community, to Carl and Sine Hansen for their longsuffering hospitality, to Gideon Alozie for manifold assistance, to the Directorship of Dansk VVS and particularly to Leif Holmgaard, Peter Hemcker and Connie Hansen for their labours which saw the final proof through, but, above all, to my wife, who not only typed the entire manuscript but did valuable work in the final editing. For what appears in these pages, of course, I alone am responsible.

August 1977

S.C.C.
Introduction

This work is my attempt to critically relate contemporary theorizing on integration to the realities of the politics of unity on the African continent. In our time the concept of the nation-state, after holding sway for centuries, is gradually being overlaid by a new outgrowth, a relatively dynamic process - the movement beyond the nation-state. Even to the layman, the pressures leading to this development are readily discernible; for they stretch practically over the whole gamut of economic, social, political and strategic affairs. Increased interaction between countries and the advent everywhere of the penetrated society have released in their wake economic and social needs whose satisfaction lies increasingly in cooperation across state boundaries. Seen from this viewpoint the contemporary trend in all parts of the world towards regional cooperation in economic, technical and political matters is not in itself remarkable. What, on the other hand, is enormously fascinating is the widely varying degrees of success and failure which have met these ventures in different regions of the globe.

One example - and in many ways by far the most successful - of the institutional expression of this new process has been the European Economic Community. Together with the American experience it has until now served both as an inspiration and a living laboratory for contemporary theories on integration with which we are concerned here.

The broad sweep of the pursuit of these theories has, without doubt, provided us with some potent analytical foundations for understanding the phenomenon we call integration. They have addressed themselves with not inconsiderable success to fashioning tools more rigorous, more 'scientific' if you like, for accumulating and ordering our data on the subject. In a relatively short number of years theorizing on integration has acquired a myriad of valuable new dimensions and brought ever-increasing clarity to its definitions. In short it has become probably as sophisticated as most other fields of theorizing in political science.

Nonetheless it may well be argued whether the increasing confidence of theorizing in this field has not overly encouraged the unconscious attitude that its findings command universal validity. If this were true the problems of the political theorist on integration would be greatly lightened. One would need merely dissect and study minutely the efforts towards integration of the Western industrialized society and thereafter superimpose the findings on other systems - be they in Africa, Asia, or South America - and calmly...
read out the answers. And yet one of the basic premises of the scientist must be that "there is no universal scientific method, no compass or ruler for routine scientific work valid for all times and places, there are partial methods, valid for limited periods, and enabling the progress of... scientific inquiry."\(^1\)

To point this out is by no means to level a general charge against all the theorists on integration although even the most eminent among them are sometimes subject to it. Happily, precisely the spatial limits imposed on these theories and models by their considerable fixation on the European and American experiences are gradually becoming apparent. And this realisation is imbuing the field with increasing modesty. Consequently some of the postulators of these theories have begun to refer to them as "pre-theories." In so doing they recognize no more than John Stuart Mill did more than a century ago when he launched the term mid-term theories.\(^2\) These, according to Mill, are theories which while they command validity in a given time and place lose some of their relevance when applied to other places and conditions.

Ultimately a full-fledged insight on the phenomenon of integration can only be built up after painstaking study of the widely differing efforts at unification in the different regions of the world. And as one specific example of a conscious ongoing attempt at unification the African experience is an integral part on the chequerboard of the study of this phenomenon.

The examination, therefore, of the conditions which govern the unification process in Africa is the object of this study. In doing this we shall enlist, as much as is feasible, the aid of the contemporary conclusions of integration theory. All the same it is well worth noting that, in spite of all, a good deal of the central problems of integration theory are still a far cry from final resolution. Therefore our recourse to the present theories and models must be marked by criticism and caution instead of credulity. Further, bearing in mind the present disparate conclusions of theorists in the field, our adoption of their findings will often be tentative instead of total. And always with a keen eye on the peculiar historical or other circumstantial attributes of the African area.

Specifically we shall be examining the perennial question of the nature of the end-product itself in the process of unification. Although we shall not presume to provide final answers, a rigorous approach to this question, it is believed, is a sine qua non to a meaningful discussion of the alternative processes available for achieving whatever we choose to define as integration. What forces are responsible for initiating integration and what forces have been responsible for initiating integration in the African context? Once these forces are generated, what, in theory and in the African case, is the connection between them and the maintenance of integration?
In what respects does the African example differ from the models distilled from the industrialized Western societies and how valid are these models for the African case? Among the possible alternative processes, in which direction or directions is the present unification process in Africa tending?

In attacking these problems we hope to provide at the same time a rounded account of Africa's strivings to date towards unification. But hopefully we can achieve somewhat more than that: to the extent that a critical application of our present theories to a specific case, usually assumed to be deviant, can illuminate the limitations of our mid-term theories, we shall hope to have illuminated as well new horizons in our search for more encompassing theory-building on the subject.

In many ways the African students of politics and of integration in particular may understandably be bewildered by the real world picture which they contemplate in the Africa in which they live today. Often the gap between their textbook models and the objective situation on their continent is quite harrowing. To take but a few glaring examples: The idea that the new trend beyond the nation-state is gradually seizing hold of the world may appear convincing as a general proposition. Even on the continent of Africa the multitude of international and intergovernmental agencies and conferences on technical, economic and political matters, purporting to encourage closer ties between the different African states would seem to support this general picture. Just the same there is another picture, even more vivid, which seems to belie this idea. It is the spectacle of dozens of states making belaboured efforts to whip up the very rudiments of nationalism and often achieving it on chauvinistic levels. It is also a picture of a multiplicity in contiguous countries of Five Year National Plans whose authors often, despite the laudable efforts of the ECA, demonstrate a touching but frustrating innocence of the import of the term regional co-operation.

Similarly, while some text-book models have succeeded in establishing the potency of communication and transaction flows as harbingers of integration, the African students will look in vain for more than a well-nigh negligible amount of trade between African countries. Communication networks between African states are conspicuous by their absence. Rather, what emerges is the ubiquity of border disputes, the high incidence of the expulsion of African alien citizens, en masse, from neighbouring African states in the name of indigenisation, the unsavoury habit of some African Heads of States of closing their borders with their neighbouring countries at the slightest sign of political unrest and the fact that the African usually needs more visas to travel on his own continent than he needs to travel in other continents.

Finally the text-book models uniformly discount the feasibility
in this day and age of integration by conquest or imposed hegemony - the so-called Bismarckian model. But it is a fact of life that many an African goes around dreaming of a conqueror in the image of the national Redeemer Messiah - a strong man endowed with atavistic qualities, who would will-nilly unite African countries.

Naturally it is not only to Africans that these facts are known. Indeed the question is whether they are not fast becoming part of the popular image of African countries. And yet, considered purely as phenomena, they cannot be said to be peculiar to that troubled continent. It is not only in Africa that the reality falls short of the model, neither is Africa unique in having nationalism marching side by side with integration. One of the core questions in integration is, after all, the relationship between conflicting and competing state and supranational institution as well as conflicting national and supranational loyalties. The germane issue is of course that of degree. And without a sympathetic and diligent attention to unique historical circumstances it becomes problematic to place this difference in degree in the right perspective in our attempts to formulate theories. It is consequently one of the underlying themes of this work that the ahistorical nature of some of the contemporary theories on integration inhibits the possibilities for such a perspective.

Also the unwary African student of integration is liable to be subject to this inhibition. Versed as he may well be in the prevalent theories of integration and singularly conscious as he is of the popular picture of African cooperation he could easily develop an unconscious but reprehensible attitude. This is the attitude that looks askance at the African example placing it at the periphery of substantive studies and theories of integration since there is a mental reservation and hesitance about the desirability of studying in depth, examples which, when all is said, are reputed to be so highly deviant that they might not stand up to such studies. In short, he might begin to indulge in some species of unconscious ostracism.

Mazrui has directed attention to the pervasive Eurocentrism in African academic culture. In a sense this is part and parcel of a global fact of life - namely that to the extent that we can speak of an evolving world culture today it is basically saturated by Western ideas precepts and language. But if there are certain ways in which one might look positively at this development one of the effects has nevertheless been to inhibit communication between other cultures and historical experiences which are thus placed in a twilight world of quasi-illegitimacy. Again Mazrui with graphic simplicity: "No one is surprised on seeing a Japanese man in Western dress or an Arab, an Indian, or a Chinese man in Western attire. But there is something incongruous about a Japanese in Arab dress or an Indian in Yoruba attire, or a Zulu in an Indian doti. The elites of the non-Western world imitate the West - but they seldom emulate
each other." Practically all the theories we are about to consider here represent the result of break-throughs made in the study of integration in Europe and the United States. And yet if we accept the thesis that the relevant historical circumstances are crucial in formulating our theories, then there is much to be said for a more diligent attention to the study of such phenomena in other areas of the world whose historical developments are more akin. To open up this vista of communication is to open up exciting new horizons that might lead to more profitable comparative analysis and which will more meaningfully complement our present state of knowledge on integration which is based on largely ethnocentric data.

There are therefore strong reasons for studies consecrated to the African effort at unification taking account of its own terms but at the same time with a critical attention to the general findings of contemporary theories on integration. And even if one does not look as far ahead as the formation of a World Community, the course of amity and cooperation between the different regions of the world must eventually depend on how well we can understand and unite the lessons learned from the different guises in which global processes like integration manifest themselves in different regions.

At least in the sense that it is always the study of ideas, the study of politics, it can be said, is always theoretical. The so-called facts of the world of practical politics on which the realist as well as the behavioralist places so much premium are not independent or objective but are determined by their intellectual antecedents, some manner of thinking and its formulation - in a word, theory. Theory elicits the basic principles of practice and in time influences practice in its turn. The range of the history of politics of African unity will illustrate this truism: Kwame Nkrumah with his federalist plans owed much, on his own admission, to the American federalist ideas; functionalism has found an echo in the debates on African unity in the recommendations of those who, unlike Nkrumah, would seek first, not the political but the economic kingdom. Recently the neo-functionalist ideas which fire the European integration experiment have also inspired certain African prescriptions for unity. In many ways the Charter of the Organization of African unity looks like the Pluralist dream come true. All this is hardly surprising considering, as we have pointed out, the Western intellectual heritage in which many African leaders have been schooled and to which they continue to be highly subject. There are of course other influences and in the course of the following analysis we shall attempt to trace the ways in which the prevalent theories on integration have left their print on the African scene.

Our research methodology is deliberately eclectic. A methodology must needs relate to the problems it sets out to solve, and by the nature of the problems we have posed no single technique could eli-
cit all the data we require. To begin with, in asking questions about existing theories on integration we have had to resort to what we may call the conceptual method of examining them. We can distinguish, like Pentland, three distinctive critical methods of analysing theory, namely: the 'genealogical', criticism of the internal development of the concepts themselves, and the analysis of the real world efficacy of the concepts. Each of these techniques constitutes an aspect of the conceptual method which itself is, generally speaking, a sort of 'second-order or parasitical' exercise that sets out to cull out flaws and limitations in the content, context and procedures of given theoretical approaches.

The 'genealogical' method pertains to the intellectual environment of a given theory. The method of tracing the intellectual antecedents, patterns or assumptions of a given idea can provide uniquely profitable angles from which to clarify, as has been said, the novelty or otherwise and the intellectual debts of the idea as well as analogies pointing to interdisciplinary foci. It can afford other benefits. Thus in our case it has provided a good vantage point for gaining insight into the charge of ethnocentrism which has been levelled against some of the content of integration theories.

The second technique sets out to elicit disabilities in the internal development of the theory itself, logical inconsistencies as well as linguistic obscurities, lacunae and contradictions. This is a technique which has found favour in other disciplines like economic theory or sociology where it has been employed with considerable success. In the field of International Organization Inis Claude has used it with remarkable effectiveness in his classic study of the United Nations.

The last technique seeks to juxtapose to observable real world situations the postulates of theory in order to justify or falsify them. This includes reference to cases where the prescriptions of theory may already have been put into practice. It is generally agreed, for example, that the functionalist and neofunctionalist theories of the past two decades have been the motive force behind much of the efforts at unification in Europe in recent times. A keen eye on the success or failures of these efforts can serve to elucidate theory.

Beyond this, data has been obtained through evidence as varied as official archives, textual analysis of accounts of previous writers on the subject, newspaper articles and reports, journals, observations and interviews. Our criterion in the use of this evidence goes beyond that of pure historical assessment which, generally speaking, usually rests on the internal coherence of the account itself craving 'the most credible arrangement of what the evidence implies.' Our own approach to the evidence is rather a scientific exercise seeking to derive and illustrate generalizations about human behaviour - in this case the process of integration. This last point is worth going
into, raising as it does a number of crucial problems in a work of this kind since existing literature on African integration has left this theoretical aspect of the study largely untouched.

After thirteen years of the life of the OAU - the formal institutional expression of African strivings toward unity - the study of African integration has by and large been carried out on three distinct levels, and literature on the subject, consisting in the main of articles in journals and pamphlets, has proliferated in accordance with those demarcations. The first appertains to the historical studies. This accounts for by far the largest part of literature on the subject. It is easy perhaps to understand the strong interest in this area. The most readily discernible characteristic of African regionalism is the complexity of its forms and development. We are faced with a bewildering array of organizations, conflicts, personalities and ideas in the study of the quest for African unity. Little wonder then that many a writer on the subject has devoted energy primarily to reconstructing events and clarifying the line of development in this seeming conundrum. The ideas and personalities which have played a part in these developments have formed part of the target in this historical approach. Thompson has published an excellent background work on the historical and cultural bases as well as the personalities of Pan-Africanism. The best known works are however Legum’s book on Pan-Africanism which appeared in 1962 and another welcome addition to literature on the subject - Geiss’s work, originally in German, which appeared in English in 1974. Thompson’s work, though it came out in 1971, devotes no more than a cursory attention to events after 1963, the year that the OAU was formed, and this from a purely historical viewpoint. Other works which are typical of the pure chronicle in this area are the Chronologie politiques africaine published by a French foundation and the summaries provided by the journal of International Organization. Included in this genre are works that attempt to collect available documents on African integration. Two notable examples are the works edited by Sohn.

The next group of literature generally tends to subject African regionalism to a legalistic and institutional scrutiny. Pioneering works by Boutros-Ghali and by the Nigerian legal scholar Elias are typical of subsequent studies of the OAU and its organs. The interest here is usually to clarify the structure of the Organization and to describe the workings of its organs in detail. The Commission of Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration has been singled out for particular interest. Thus Elias’s article on that body was followed up by Degan, Legum and more recently by Queneudec. The seminal work by Cervenka falls largely into this category.

Finally the euphoria generated in 1963 by the formation of the OAU has predictably led to a tendency to make periodic assessment
of the Organization with a view to establishing whether the Organization is living up to its fame. Such works have generally concentrated on reviewing the functions and effectiveness of the Organization at work, the many conflicts which have beset it and on passing judgement over its relative success and failure. Such are the articles by Markakis, Wallerstein, Hoskyns and more recently by Bonzon.

Thus the study of African regionalism has hitherto centred largely on static and descriptive methods rather than on a dynamic approach relying on theoretical appraisal. Constantin has been led to the observation: "Contrairement aux apparences liées à l'abondance des articles ou ouvrages, le régionalisme africain est loin d'être un thème de recherche épuisé du point de vue de la science politique."

No one can deny the immense value of these historical reconstructions in the attempt to put together into a coherent whole the jigsaw that is the development of African regionalism. Nor can anyone gainsay the indispensable contribution of descriptive and institutional appraisal of the subject as a necessary stage in the direction of theoretical assessment. But the researcher who would embark on such a theoretical venture finds that he treads a largely unbeaten track as far as African regionalism is concerned. The breakthroughs made by the communication theories of Deutsch based partially on the quantification of crucial variables in the European example have failed to inspire similar theoretical effort in the African case given the fact that the conditions in that continent favouring the collection of reliable data and exact measurement are still at a deplorably low level. A different kind of disability attends, for example, the application of the federalist theories of Etzioni. Granted that the raison d'être of federalism is the diminishing of the powers at the national centre it would seem to militate as a matter of course against the cardinal preoccupation of African leaders, namely, the entrenchment of powers at the centre.

Nevertheless a few notable efforts have been made to give a theoretical dimension to the study of African regionalism. Following the article by Haas and Schmitter, Nye published a critique of their projections in an article based on the East African case. The groupings in both the anglophone and francophone West Africa have inspired a work by Welch. Similarly Zartman using Deutsch's model has attempted a delimitation of the ideal political groupings as well as their effectiveness using his experience mainly in the West African area. These articles and works

***Contrary to appearances connected with the abundance of articles and works on the subject, the theme of African regionalism is far from being exhausted from the point of view of political science.***
notwithstanding, there is indeed a dearth of sustained application to the African case (especially on a continental basis) of contemporary advances made in the study of regional integration. The more recent attempts by Lindberg and Scheingold, in the light of developments in Europe, to refine the concepts around the process of integration have hardly found an echo in the African case.

There still remains the crying need for African journals devoted to the review and analysis of the different trends in the process of African regionalism both on the economic and the political levels. Until such sources have established themselves the researcher has to take recourse to newspaper articles and reviews in journals which generally appear in random fashion often leaving unnoticed many a vital development on the subject. The ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) has published and continues to churn out a fairly constant stream of valuable and well organized information and analyses in the economic field. On the contrary the OAU has yet to produce on the political side anything equalling the efforts of the ECA.

The history of cooperation between African states on a continental level is just slightly older than a decade. The writer of this kind of analysis of contemporary history relies on the willingness of people directly involved to speak frankly of what they know. And yet there is a certain veil of secrecy that enshrouds the activities of the African organs of cooperation both at the continental and sub-regional levels and this is reflected in the attitude of their officials to interviews and private conversations. The interviews from which this work has drawn information were conducted during two long sojourns in Addis Ababa among officials at the headquarters of the OAU and ECA. Further interviews were carried out among numerous officials at the headquarters of the East African Community in Kampala, at Arusha in Tanzania, and finally at the foreign ministries of twelve African states.

With respect to official documents, with the possible exception of the ECA, the African regional Organizations do not compare favourably with some other Organizations like the United Nations or the Nordic Council both regarding the amount of material compiled and access to them. An astonishing percentage of documents on OAU proceedings are classified. In a continent where neocolonialism is a byword with all its attendant menaces - real or putative - it is understandable why officials of such organizations tend to be fretful about close interest in their archives often going to very involved lengths to try to satisfy themselves that the student is a bona fide researcher. Nevertheless this attitude constitutes a more than usually serious obstacle to research. Not least of all on account of the tenuous nature of the information received in the face of such resistant attitude, I have found it hardly worth while to attempt at this stage to reach quantifiable results based on such data. Source notes
have been provided, wherever published material has been used.

At the governmental level and in the foreign ministeries the same diffidence in the face of interviews was evident perhaps to an even greater extent. Although several of the persons interviewed had participated prominently in the moments of history under study, their continuing position in public service or politics tended to make them wary about expressing views. In virtually every instance anonymity was stipulated as a condition for granting interviews. Anonymity or not, interviewing public officials in many African countries can be a complicated process requiring permission from high and numerous instances since such interviews may be prohibited as a general rule as illustrated by the document reproduced in Appendix 1. The involvements of so many officials and ministeries in the decision to grant interviews tended to reduce the forthrightness of those interviewed - since their participation was an open secret - even when they were reasonably certain that they would not be identified by the interviewer.
Footnotes to Introduction


PART ONE
Four Approaches to Integration
1. **Four Approaches to Integration**

Like most hackneyed words 'integration' has no single nuclear meaning. In common parlance the term is not without its emotive overtones being now generally accepted in some quarters as an intrinsic goal of the modern world and posited as part of the desideratum of international society. Two sides of international society poised on the brink of a widening gap, partake in these sentiments. In one vast area of the world the word integration is interwoven with the dream that closer cooperation between economies, peoples and policies will eradicate the disparities between the rich and poor countries of our globe. Sometimes integration assumes the nature of an article of faith implying that the hand of history is slowly but inexorably moulding the world into larger and more rational entities. In the other half of the world integration is looked upon as the solution to a wide array of problems ranging from power to pollution posed by the terrors and the lopsided advance of modern science and technology. Here again the obsolescence of the nation-state is frequently taken as a foregone conclusion. In spite of this - or perhaps thanks to it - the concept of integration remains ill-defined in the science of politics. Numerous theorists have analyzed the term by means of numerous methods only to arrive at numerous contradictory results. The only definite certainty, it would seem, is that there is no certain definition of integration.

The proliferation of definitions is only one aspect of the somewhat general state of flux that is the hallmark of this field of study. The others concern divergencies in the analysis of the end-product to which integration is expected to lead and the salient conditions conducive to the achievement of this end-product. Basically one can distinguish between theorists who regard integration as a process and those who define it as a condition. Even in this respect the positions of the theorists are often not very clear. Deutsch, for instance, uses the concept to refer to both a process and a condition. Haas, although he has previously defined integration as a process, seems to have been converted to Etzioni's more restrictive use of the term to denote the terminal condition.

Some theorists do not define integration at all. In such cases they appear to be more concerned to delineate different factors which characterize integration than to construct overarching definitions that purport to be applicable in all cases. But such authors are exceptions. In general theorists on integration have in common that
they aspire towards definitions that claim universal applicability far beyond the confines of the European or American cases from which they were distilled. In some cases this concern for polyvalidity at all levels leads to such wide definitions that what is gained in all-inclusiveness is lost in vagueness. To this category belongs Galtung's definition of integration as "...a process whereby two or more actors form a new actor. When the process is completed, the actors, are said to be integrated."

Another characteristic common to theorists on integration is that they are studying a relatively new phenomenon which moreover is in a process of rapid growth. Pentland sees reason to jubilate over this 'happy exception' in political science. One will certainly agree that this phenomenon runs somewhat counter to the abiding quality of the study of international politics namely the seeming inertia that underlie the political structure of the world order giving scant opportunity for testing the empirical validity of theories aspiring to change. By contrast the dynamic scenario of unification processes in Europe and other parts of the world decidedly afford this opportunity in our time, and during the two decades or so of systematic theorizing on integration there has been an abundance of cases in contemporary history to which theorists can apply their hypotheses and prescriptions. This point is well worth bearing in mind not least of all because it is responsible for the fact that an intertwining of scholarly and policy-making goals characterizes most important theoretical efforts on integration today. In other words the fusion of the normative and the prescriptive uses of theory is very much in evidence. In his celebrated work *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch was as much pursuing the understanding of the process of integration as attempting to provide formulations - if not justifications - about its relevance to a particular foreign policy namely American support of a United Europe as part of an Atlantic Community. The functional constructions of Mitrany had as their motive force an unflinching belief in a whole new strategy for building a new world order. Likewise Haas and Etzioni look towards the development of the EEC in the direction of a political union. All this indicates that, in fact, it can reasonably be argued that in so far as these differences in the goals of the theorists influence their premise and approaches it is hardly possible to arrive at a common definition of integration until agreement is reached on what sort of end-product is envisaged at the end of the integrating process. "Integration studies," asserts one observer faced with this fragmentation, "thus proceeds along a number of parallel tracks, and passengers rarely transfer from one train to another."

It is generally agreed among the theorists that integration will proceed along co-operative as opposed to coercive lines. This conclusion emanating mainly from studies of contemporary efforts at
unification in Europe, appears to be more a wishful conviction than a self-evident fact. One writer claims that the reason is that the present era is well suited to negotiation and the use of reason pointing to economic considerations such as the need for wider markets, the harnessing of investment potential and the desirable mobility of labour and capital as pressures towards this state of affairs. However one cannot dispel the suspicion that such felicitous projections merely belong to the optimism that is part and parcel of the European feeling in our time. This optimism may well turn out to be ephemeral. The history of Europe from the Romans through Charlemagne to Napoleon is replete with instances of attempts to realize the concept of a unified Europe by force of arms. In a way one can see Hitler's epoch as representing the latest attempt to impose a new order on Europe. In the three decades that have transpired since that cataclysm faint echoes of the same phenomenon have been heard on occasion as witness the vauntings during the French Algerian army rising that "the Paratroops will create the real Europe!" or the recent fulminations of the Falangists in Spain in their self-ascribed role as "the spiritual reserve of the West." However that may be, the significant point to note here is that this conviction of the co-operative character of integration typifies the influence on theory of the objective state of affairs from which it is distilled. Certainly, applied as a general proposition to other more turbulent regions than Europe, it is liable to lead to some rude awakening. We shall have cause to return to this point later.

In the four chapters that follow we shall attempt to outline and criticize the central elements of four different approaches in the field of theorizing on integration. In order the better to know what actually we are looking for it might be profitable at this stage to begin with a somewhat crude working definition of integration. Such a definition, if it can take account of the major theorists in the field, must be wide enough to include the important elements common to them. Needless to say there is no attempt at this stage or level of conceptualization to include all the important elements. We hope as we go along to distil other elements which we can include into a more refined working definition for final application to the African scene. We can thus tentatively define integration as a process of cohesion between two or more social units whereby these units come to constitute a political whole which can in some cases be described as a community.

At this stage it is possible to say that two major concrete questions exercise the minds of theorists alike. The first is the question of the end-product. Theorists have generally attempted to envisage the terminal state that can be expected at the end of integration (the dependent variable). They have usually attempted to define them more or less clearly as ideal types. The next question concerns the
kind of conditions which not only initiate the process but bear it forward (the independent variables). The independent variables thus divide into static and dynamic conditions as on Fig. 1.1

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**Fig. 1.1**

**The common structure of integration theories**

For the purposes of our analysis we have tried to line up the major theories on integration under *four* approaches namely: Pluralism, Functionalism, Federalism, and Neo-Functionalism. It may be in place, however, before we proceed any further to clarify what we mean by an approach. We take an approach to mean an intellectual outlook, representing not simply one man's image of the world but an intellectual outlook shared by a community of scholars who both co-operate and compete in developing it into a more systematic theory.\(^\text{a}\)
An intellectual outlook to which we refer here is identifiable by three distinctive intellectual functions which it can be said to perform. According to Young, the first two functions make up its psychological dimension, its cognitive structure, a broad intellectual orientation making for the image or the tint of the glass through which a particular scholar sees the world around him. It is generally to be associated with certain models, metaphors or analogies as well as conceptual frameworks and methodological tendencies. In the first function an approach acts as "a rather systematic and consciously developed set of criteria and procedures to help with the problems of perception." It directs the scholar's choice of data deciding what he sees - or does not see - as problems. There is an unmistakable difference between Deutsch's interest in transactions and communication processes and Mitrany's fascination by a social network of functional entities.

An approach also generates a framework for the 'intellectual organization' of perceptions, linking up the variables according to previous judgements about their roles. Finally, an approach can usually be associated with a common framework of communication among those of the same intellectual persuasion to the point of providing a common language. Concepts, meanings and categories are standardized. Russett's study of Britain and America in the twentieth century bears obviously closer affinity to Deutsch than to Haas orienting itself with the same system of symbols and language.

To return to the question of the end-product and the process, we have pointed out that theory-building on integration has generally been predicated in terms of independent variables or conditions contributing to a process which, in turn, leads to a more or less specific final product or dependent variable. How a particular author envisages the end-product naturally tends to be in keeping with his purposes and fundamental assumptions. It can be said, however, that basically all the theorists share misgivings if not disenchantment over the present international system and that their projections of an end-state represent attempts to produce a modified or ideal future state. Recently a tendency has emerged to stipulate less and less rigid models of the end-state. Nevertheless we can isolate two broad streams, namely, a 'state-model' and a 'community-model.'

Federalism represents the most vivid example of the state-model, being formulated on very specific terms and couched in the legalistic language of constitutional law. The classic solution is a federal blueprint. It entails the immediate creation of a central political authority, a territorial dispersion of power and a binding commitment to irrevocable union. There can be varieties of course which
need not correspond neatly with the constitutional blueprint as is aptly suggested by Pentland who argues that Etzioni’s paradigm ‘may well be regarded as a federal beast in sociological clothing.’ Neo-functionalism, focusing on decision-making as well as behaviour and attitude changes, does not possess the leading features of federalism which are detailed power arrangements and a final idea of the political system. Nevertheless, by being projected on the idea of assimilation of loyalties to a new center, the idea of supranationality - ‘a specified institutional structure,’ to cite Haas’ phrase - is one of its decisive attributes. Haas, the main representative of this school states however that ‘the ideal type may be that of a unitary, a federal, or even a confederal arrangement.’

The pluralists and the functionalists embrace the community-model. The basic idea in this model is harmonization. For the pluralists the component parts of the community-model are the nation-states who, although they retain their sovereignty, have modified the way in which they deal with each other by means of harmonization of values, perceptions and habits. The functional approach differs from this in that it seeks to do away with the nation-states. Still it seeks to achieve this by a steady aggregation of harmonization of particular activities in a variety of economic and social sectors. Thus in the community-model the harmonization of activities and values takes precedence over the emergence of political structure.

Equally, regarding the conditions leading to the process of integration we can distinguish between theorists who put their trust in direct political variables and those who rely on indirect socio-economic variables. The functionalists and neo-functionalists underline the importance of ‘an incremental process of political change based on the need to resolve social and economic problems.’ The pluralists and federalists by contrast, concentrate on purely political variables based on ‘problems concerning the power, responsiveness and control of political elites, and on the political habits of the general public.’

Having disposed of these demarcations of a more general nature we can now proceed to a more detailed and critical analysis of each of the four theoretical approaches which we have sketched. Each of the following four chapters will take up one approach. The object of the exercise is a critical appreciation of the approaches leading to
COMMUNITY

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Functionalism

INDIRECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES

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\[\text{Fig.1-2} \]

End-product and process conditions

STATE

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DIRECT POLITICAL VARIABLES

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some specific conclusions concerning the nature and definition of both the end-product and process conditions of integration; conclusions which we shall attempt to employ as tools in the next section of this work where we embark on a more rigorous theoretical examination of the story of the African politics of unity.

In each chapter we shall base our examination of the approach to the end-product and the process conditions on an appraisal of both the intellectual traditions and assumptions behind each approach and also on the identification and criticism of the concept embedded in the approach itself. Following a venerable tradition in international relations theory we shall undertake this critical appreciation on three levels, namely: the system, the state, and the individual. There appears indeed to be ample justification to employ this mode of analysis in studying political integration. For just as international relations theorists explain war by examining it as either (1) a manifestation of the attributes (or the defects) of a system - in this case the chaotic and highly decentralized international system, or (2) a manifestation of the nature of the states which make up the system i.e. capitalist, communist, industrial, fascist, liberal e.t.c. or (3) a manifestation of the nature of the minds of men, so the theorists on integration as we shall see, seem to take their cue from the level - of - analysis framework by characterising integration as either a response to the needs of a system, or as being in consonance with particular types of societies e.g. industrial-pluralistic, or as turning on 'social learning' - a term reminiscent of the 'minds of men' concept. Finally, in criticising each of the approaches we shall keep an eye on the African situation, for it is the adequacy, or otherwise, of these approaches in explaining the African situation that is our primary concern in this work. Naturally, since these theories are distilled from the Western European situation it behoves us to criticise them also on that basis. A disclaimer is perhaps timely here. Our references to the African situation in the following section of the work will be entirely random and no attempt will be made to impose a genealogical consistency on the issues of African continental politics which we shall take up.
Footnotes to Chapter one

1. On this point see Etzioni, A., op. cit. p.6 notes.
11. We have relied in this and the following passage on Pentlands' discussion of the subject see Pentland, C., op. cit. p.17.
16. Haas, E.: The Uniting of Europe p.5.
17. Pentland, C. op. cit. p.22.
2. The Pluralist Thesis: 
International transactions and 
the concept of Community

Those whom we range here under the heading pluralists are known by other names as well. Indeed fashion in contemporary theorizing speaks of the communications approach theory which, as we shall presently show, affirms the cardinal importance of communications between states in the process of integration. Others, still in the same vein, speak of transactionalists. For both groups the measurement and assessment of patterns and flows of transactions between states is a central element in theorizing on integration. Apart from Karl Deutsch this group includes Donald Puchala, Bruce Russett et al. But there is another group which has acquired the name traditionalists. It includes Liska, Max Beloff, Raymond Aron, and Elmer Plischke. One of its foremost exponents is Stanley Hoffmann and in all probability it is he who has earned the name for the group. "As long," he asserts, "as the process is not completed, we must analyze the building of the political community as an incipient instance of 'interest group politics,' of 'domestic politics of the community' and as a continuing example of traditional interstate politics."

There is not much to choose between these groups. Essentially the traditionalists and transactionalists envisage the same dependent variable i.e. a 'security-community' or something akin to it. Furthermore the traditionalists would agree more or less with the seminal role of transactions between states in so far as their relations are susceptible to modifications. However, the traditionalists maintain the decisive importance of direct governmental action in promoting or retarding the process of integration. For them self-interest in pursuing express objectives, not transactions, is the final arbiter of the direction of the integration process. The difference thus turns on a question of emphasis. The transactionalist's belief in the potency of communication flows, leading via a learning process to common values, makes him somewhat more optimistic than the traditionalists who would argue like Hoffmann that "...common values have not in the past always prevented the mutual slaughter of people that were divided into separate political units; intense transaction have not always been an effective deterrent to political disputes and wars."

Two further points; both the transactionalists and traditionalists have identical perceptions of the present state of
the EEC. Finally, with varying degree of emphasis on the role of self-interest and socio-political attitudes, they both place the possibility of the emergence of a supranational state at a heavy discount.

For these reasons we have deemed it fit to include all these influences under the heading of pluralists. Uniting the central ideas common to these strands of thought, this nomenclature nevertheless does not subtract from the nuances which exist between them. For, nuances notwithstanding, it is the ramifications and intertwining of these two strand which form their most crucial and interesting aspects. Even De Gaulle's supposedly extreme traditionalist stance which has been labelled 'confederation' resembles the transactionalist view in some important sense seen in the light of his favourite dictum that "what makes a (nation) is not simply to speak the same language... but to have undertaken great things in the past and to aspire to do so in the further." 5

The pluralist thesis, therefore, considers the nation-states as the basic units in the process of integration. If this belief can be traced to time-honoured concepts of political philosophy it is nevertheless also largely commonsensical. The modern nation-state presides over enormous resources. It employs, services, and guards over the lives and limbs of great numbers of people. It possesses the means of mobilizing vast amounts of coercive resources which it employs in producing certain effects conducive to what it may consider to be its self-interest - on occasion with devastating results. Contrary to prognostications about its imminent demise or obsolescence, it appears to cling tenaciously to life, its area of control ever-widening, and its military resources ever more terrifying.

An old tradition of international thought stands behind these empirical observations. The 'realist' school of thought takes as given the irreducibility of the nation-state as a unit of international life. The concept of national interest, conflict and the struggle for power - these things according to this school comprise the stock-in-trade of international politics. Such ideas can be traced through the writings of Morgenthau, Claude and Aron. For them the international system is chaotic precisely because it lacks those pristine and sterling qualities which make the nation-states relatively so much more stable.

The 'realist' concept of the composition and nature of the basic units of the international system leads to several important consequences. In the first place, attempts to uphold the viability of supranationalism are seen as illusory given the premise that the basis of international life is the struggle for power between national units.

Again, for the realist, the struggle for power and the furtherance of the national interest is limited only by the general interest in peace and security. The pursuit of plans to perpetuate peace is as old as
the practice of war itself. The traditional approach to this end has
been diplomatic - the attempt to regulate the relations of sovereign
states. This is envinced by the long list of diplomatic systems
throughout history constructed to maintain some sort of equili-
brum or balance of power.

The pluralist thesis is akin to these traditions in several respects.
Besides the belief that the nation-state is the basic unit of interna-
tional life, there is the same emphasis on peace and security. As
Karl Deutsch states: "Since our study deals with the problem of en-
suring peace, we shall say that any political community... was even-
tually successful if it became a security-community - that is, if it
achieved integration - and that it was unsuccessful if it ended even-
tually in secession or civil war." Thus integration for the pluralist is
synonymous with the attainment of peace and security in the
international system. This primary concern with peace and security
as opposed to the construction of formal insitutions is amply illu-
strated by Deutsch's chain of basic definitions: (1) a 'security-com-
munity is a group of people which has become 'integrated,' (2) 'inte-
gration' means the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of
community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and
widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expecta-
tions of peaceful change among its populations; (3) 'sense of com-
munity means a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they
have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common
social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful
change'; (4) 'peaceful change' means the resolution of social prob-
lems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to
large-scale physical force. (5) 'Amalgamation' means the formal
merger of two or more previously independent units into a single
larger unit with some type of common government after amalgama-
tion.+

The pluralists', and in particular, Deutsch's concept of politics
as having to do with 'compliance with authoritative allocations of
values,' matches the central theme in the political realist's view of
politics. If for Deutsch politics is 'the area of enforceable decisions
or, more accurately, of all decisions backed by some combinations
of a significant probability of voluntary compliance with a signifi-
cant probability of enforcement', it is readily evident that the inter-
national system does not envince these qualities. Relations between
states are rather marked by a low degree of probability of both com-
pliance and enforcement; hence the recourse to diplomatic accom-
modation.

If the nation-states thus represent the closest answer to the plura-
lists ideal of politics, there is little wonder that according the plural-
list thesis it is not the abolition of the nation-states but their
development which is most likely to produce a peaceful world. For
although some pluralists do not discount entirely the possibility that
some form of loose institutional - probably federalist - form might
emerge in the unforeseeable future, they are generally averse to
replacing the nation-state. Hallowed by European diplomatic tradi-
tion this view was recently clearly demonstrated by the politics of
de Gaulle. Even though he sometimes professed himself to envisage
a three-tier development from 'equilibrium' through 'cooperation',
to 'union', he could not bring himself to support moves beyond the
second stage.\textsuperscript{3}

The pluralist goes beyond the mere desire to develop the
nation-states as the means of achieving peace. The reasoning goes
somewhat like the following: Diplomacy has failed time and time
again to assure lasting peace and the worst conflagrations have
occurred precisely between those regions of the world which are
often said to have the strongest claim to development. Therefore
one of the cornerstones of the pluralists thesis is the belief that
nation-states can best accommodate and regulate their interactions
by developing the social communication between them and improv-
ing their capacities to assess and use information about their politi-
cal environment.

Here again the pluralist thesis ranges itself on the side of yet ano-
other time-honoured concept. Peace theory has often begun with the
same assumptions about the nation-state as the basic entity of inter-
national politics. Moreover the idea that decision-making in the ser-
cvice of peace can be made more rational both by improved commu-
nications and by resort to the lessons of information theory, is a
strong element in that tradition.

The essence of the pluralist thesis is then, to conclude, the image
of the sovereign nation-state as the basis of international politics.
Integration is defined as a process leading to an end-state envisaged
as a 'community.' The attributes of such a community are, namely,
that the nation-states exercise their sovereignty in choosing their
own policies and are regulated in these choices by diplomatic and
strategic accommodations, by a resolve to solve their conflicts within
a peaceful framework without resort to war, and by a cohesive net-
work of transactions inducing social learning and a feeling of affini-
ty - the so-called 'we' feeling.

**Pluralism and the process conditions**

Together with the definition of the end-product the pluralist the-
sis offers certain explanations about the process which leads to inte-
gration. At the systemic level it affirms the covariance between pat-
terns of relationships among the units comprising the subsystem and
the level of integration of the system as a whole. Applying the sys-
tems approach to international relations Kaplan sees the role of in-
tegration as that of regulating the relations between independent
subsystems as a means of satisfying 'system needs' - including both
the needs of the system as a whole and the needs of the separate sub-
systems.

According to this conception it is understood that the basic units
being considered are nation-states and not individuals or groups in
the first place. There is a modicum of willingness to envisage a
transformation of the system by the process of integration in the di-
rection of more centralization. However, this view contends that
there is no objective basis in the real international system for more
than a slight development in this direction. The probability of an
emergence of a new centralized system in lieu of the regulatory func-
tions of integration between independent units is considered remote.
For Lasswell, the international system rests on conflict between
nation-states and the inertial forces of system maintenance preclude
the formation of a new centralized system. Kaplan has suggested
five systems in which the 'integrative role' may be evident - the 'unit
veto,' the 'balance-of-power,' the 'bipolar,' the 'universal' and the
'hierarchical' systems. A system may evolve, by means of integra-
tional forces, into the last two categories. But here again the possi-
bility is suggested as a negation of the trend in historical internatio-
nal systems and consequently as being minimal.

Different theorists have suggested various ways of resolving this
situation. In a more pessimistic view, Lasswell, convinced of the im-
practicability of evolving a new centralized system, speaks of the
'trapped elites' who, will-nilly, must follow the inexorable forces of
system maintenance. ''I suggest,' he affirms, 'that even if they
wanted to agree with their opposite numbers to establish a new sys-
tem of effective public order, they would refrain from taking cru-
cial steps for fear of loosing support in the arena of internal poli-
tics.' In this view, even the grounds gained by communications
technology give cause for further pessimism since the nation-states
in practice use these advances to improve their capabilities, e.g. by
indoctrination, and thereby enhance their authority. For Lasswell
therefore the only possibility is 'the parallel and simultaneous seizu-
re of power in the principal sovereign states by national political
movements committed to the establishment of a worldwide political
system based on unity... and the erosion of the state system,' a pos-
sibility which begs imagination.

The pluralist thesis is generally not so pessimistic. It chooses to
rely on communications and interactions between independent com-
ponents of the system leading to 'mutual trust and tissues of com-

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community' are theoretically quantifiable. This kind of thinking is by no means novel. Quincy Wright has suggested several facets which can be reduced to measurable terms in the interaction between states namely, technological, strategic, intellectual, legal, social, political, psychic and 'expectancy'. His preoccupation - in the same tradition as peace theory and pluralist theory - was with how to ascertain the likelihood of war between any two states.

The pluralist thesis also attempts to go beyond the traditional geopolitical criteria used in determining the possibility of integration between states. It is of course easy to see why considerations such as contiguity and the existence of 'core areas' are held to be important in the formation of bonds between national entities. But pluralists lay emphasis on other criteria. In his study of the relations between Britain and the United States, Russett has listed several variables for determining the existence of a region. These include: the number of common membership in international organizations, trade patterns, geography, major social and cultural characteristics, and the political attitudes of governments.

Both Deutsch and Russett have used the Relative Acceptance model (the RA-index) to assess the effect of transactions. Deutsch's conditions include: a core area around which the union can crystallize, common values and expectations i.e. compatible self-images, mobility of persons, unbroken links of communication between political units concerned as well as between politically relevant strata within them (both horizontal and vertical communication), multiplicity and balance of transactions, mutual predictability of main values, and a "distinctive way of life." From these conditions one proceeds to ascertain facts about the flow of goods and services, information and symbols between the states concerned and thus the likelihood of integration. Russett has also utilized similar factor analyses.

Not only do the pluralists hold that these conditions are indicators of the probability of integration they assert that the conditions themselves sustain integration. Increased transactions between states are said to condition positively their mutual trust and responsiveness as well as the disposition to embrace peaceful solutions to their problems. It is this circular process, as we shall see, which has exposed the pluralist position on the process conditions to the charge of tautology. However that may be, it is evident that instead of emphasizing economic integration or the growth of central institutions, the pluralists rely on the interdependence and informal structures which grow out of intense transactions. Economic integration is potent only to the extent that it leads to more intense or accelerated communication flows which in their turn issue into more compatibility of values and images. International institutions 'are
If on the systemic level the pluralists thesis is based on a belief in the overriding importance of patterns of communications and interactions between the basic units of the international system (i.e. states) its position on the level of analysis of states is decisively oriented by its assumptions about the nature of those units. The idea that world peace is related to the nature and forms of governments which make up the international society is an old one. While the Marxists opt for the establishment of socialist states as the harbinger of peace, others, like enlightenment theorists, advocated different forms of liberal nationalism, self-determination or populist democracies as was once preached by Woodrow Wilson.

Contemporary theory of political development holds forth the prospect of nation-states which have become peaceful by virtue of the development of their administrative, political and economic resources. In the same way the pluralists thesis affirms that political development and integration are mutually supporting. Nation-states which have managed to achieve a high-level of political development will by the same token command the requisite resources and attitudes that favour intensive interaction. In short, political development is conducive to integration.

In order to understand the assumptions behind this viewpoint it may be worthwhile to take a brief look at some of the definitions of political development and the characteristics which are usually associated with development. One writer has summed up the many definitions of political development under three salient variables - rationalization, national integration and democratization. In terms of political development rationalization involves "movement from particularism to universalism, from diffuseness to specificity, from ascription to achievement, and from affectivity to affective neutrality." The cornerstones of rationalization are held to reside in functional differentiation and achievement.

The second criterium, national integration, recognizes nation-building as the essence of political development. "A developed polity, it is usually assumed, must, with rare exception, be a nation-state." Sometimes this thinking extols the virtues of a distinct ethnic basis as an important aspect of nation-building the aim being to achieve a firmly entrenched political community.

Finally, in focusing on democratization political development insists on the virtues of pluralism, competitiveness, equalization of power and similar qualities. "Competitiveness," says Coleman, "is
an essential aspect of political modernity.” Hence, "the Anglo-American polities most closely approximate the model of a modern political system..."21

One can readily see the affinities between these assumptions and the pluralist thesis. When, therefore, the pluralists correlate political development with integration it is quite evident that their image of the kind of nation-state most likely to benefit from the integration process is the industrialized-democratic model. Deutsch himself belongs to the political development theorists who focus on such an image of the nation-state as the hallmark of political development.22 As we shall attempt to demonstrate further on, it is not only the pluralists who nurture these assumptions which have laid theorists on integration, to the extent that they hold them, open to the charge of ethnocentrism.

The final level of analysis, the individual, brings us to a concept which leads directly from the idea of political development - at any rate according to the pluralist thesis. It will be recalled that the pluralists put a heavy premium on political development as the forerunner of integration. The socio-causal paradigm argues that political development can only come into being through a process of social learning. The prospect is that of individuals who have been conditioned to develop a "we" feeling, whose aspirations and self-images have become compatible, who have come to possess a common sense of their destiny. It is the familiar picture of peace gathering in "the hearts and minds" of men. It is reminiscent of contemporary psychoanalytic, social psychological and anthropological theories which see in the foreign policies of nation-states the influences and consequences of "broader cultural patterns which in turn are the result of family structure and childhood socialization patterns."

The socio-causal paradigm, then, is about social assimilation. It holds that a process of social assimilation must precede political development.24 Social assimilation is described as a process in which the populations of different nation-states develop feelings of mutual trust and mutual responsiveness for each other through transactions which are mutually perceived as mutually rewarding. Social assimilation is likewise said to lead to such a level of mutual confidence among the populations that they develop a disposition to co-operate in solving problems which they increasingly perceive in the same ways and this attitude in turn is said to make way for more transactions. Thus the socio-causal paradigm constitutes the social-psychological dimension of the pluralist thesis.

Here again Deutsch has transferred to the international scene ideas from his studies of political development on the national level. In his attempt to explain how nation-states are formed he advanced
the hypothesis "that both society and community are developed by social learning, and that a community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and services... Experience and complementarity may... continue to reproduce each other, like the proverbial chicken and the egg, in a syndrome of ethnic learning, that is, a historical process of social learning in which individuals, usually over several generations, learn to become a people." Likewise on the international scene. Sauce for goose is sauce for gander.

Footnotes to Chapter two


16. Ibid.

17. Pentland, C. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


20. Pentland, C. Ibid.


23. For references on literature on this subject see Almond and Verba: The Civic Culture, Princeton New York 1963, chs. 1 and 12.


3. Harnessing Power: The Federalist Blueprint

According to some writers the federalist approach to integration is moribund. As Haas states it: "this approach, in its pure form, is probably discredited." Others are more inclined towards faith in its longevity. The tribulations of federalism may be real and deep but they do not 'mean the demise of federalism, but merely require different kinds of analysis.' As a concept federalism has its roots in much the same influences which we noted have inspired pluralism; equally it has been inspired by the momentous historical experiences both in the United States and Switzerland. For our purposes, as a theory of action it is one of those few concepts whose progress have been crucially affected by experience of their application in Africa among other places. The potency it has commanded on the national level is no less than its significance as an impetus on the international level where it has fired and coalesced the forces of the European Movement in post-war Europe. The leading champion of African unity - Kwame Nkrumah - was nothing if not a federalist fascinated as well by the American experience. "Seek ye first the political kingdom," he urged in his heyday with Biblical fervour," and all the rest will be added unto you." For many adherents of Pan-Africanism, which in its pristine form has flowered and has been thwarted, the dream of a federal Africa was sacrificed on the altar of pluralism. What, then, is the federalist approach?

Let us first spell out in skeletal form an important distinction albeit far from clear cut. We refer to the contemporary distinction between the so-called classical and sociological forms of federalism. Classical federalism is said to adhere, to the point of rigidity, to the basic question of the contrivance of a blueprint, a 'contract' among states for the creation of a supranational state complete with checks and balances and cut-and-dried arrangements for the distribution of powers between the system and its units. By contrast the sociological perspective of federalism minimizes the role of the institutional and constitutional criteria relying instead on the political and social forces for assessing the degree of federalism in any system. From the viewpoint of the sociological federalist, federalism becomes a process.

Classical federalism concerns itself primarily with power. According to K.C. Wheare, "By the federal principle I mean the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional government are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent."
its conventional model a strong federal system requires three important characteristics: (a) a clear-cut allocation of powers between the states and the federation, in which the powers of the states should be significant. (b) a range of supportive institutions (such as a constitutional court) to guard over the demarcations of federal and state powers. (c) a distribution and division of powers within the federal state so that according to Wheare '...the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent.' As a theory on the national level federalism is constructed as pursuing a dual aim. First, it is regarded as a framework within which unity and centralization can be imposed on disparate units leading to order, security, authority and administrative rationality. On the other hand federalism is associated equally with the protection of certain values seen as concomitant with decentralization. By allocating clearly demarcated powers to units in a national system federalism seeks to preserve what is seen as the virtues of local autonomy, diversity and freedom.

Even so on the international plane. Here federalism takes its place in the tradition of attempts at finding solutions to international conflict. Instead of stressing the importance of techniques to improve transactions between nation-states, federalism focuses on the question of power, seeking to erect a supranational authority which, by virtue of its constitutional powers, can bring to bear on the relations between otherwise autonomous units, order, security and peace. As an approach in integration theory federalism upholds the outright securing of political union by a dramatic and immediate subscription to a blueprint allocating powers to the system and the units. In this federalism differs fundamentally from pluralism. As we have seen, the pluralist thesis embodies faith in techniques of international accommodation as well as the network of transactions between the nation-states as a means of obtaining peace and as the highroad to a 'security-community.' In federalist thinking, on the other hand, there is a deep awareness of the failings of a system of unregulated interactions between states. The federalist hope for peace and security resides therefore in harnessing the power of autonomous states by regulating this power through a super-ordinate authority. This consideration apart, federalism has a number of attributes in common with pluralism. Like the pluralist thesis federalism accepts the nation-state as the basic unit in international systems. Furthermore the question of integration, for both the pluralists and the federalists, is not in the first instance an economic question but rather a question of politics, of power, and of responsiveness and control. In short, integration, for both approaches, has to do with 'high politics.'

It has been suggested on occasion that the neo-functionalist ap-
proach and federalism are not dissimilar. Doubtless the two approaches subscribe to a supranational state as the end-state of integration. But as we shall show, neo-functionalism is more concerned with the process of integration than with a stipulated dependent variable. Haas, arguing that there is a basic difference between activist/actor and theorist/observer, has put it succinctly. "Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein are 'federalists' in the sense that they hope to create a united Europe with more or less federal institutions; they are 'functionalists' in the sense that they do not believe in constitutional conventions and elaborate institutional schemes because they prefer to initiate common policies and arouse new client groups which will eventually result in a federal regime. Federalist theorists believe in the federal end but may be willing to use functional means; federalist activists despise recourse to functional means. Neofunctionalists theorists are concerned with the end postulated by the actors only to the extent that they are preoccupied with understanding why and how actual integrative outcomes occur. Neo-functional theory and federal theory, therefore, are by no means similar.'"

As for the functionalists, whereas they aim at eliminating the state by letting it wither away in the face of the usurpation of its functions by a welfare-oriented myriad of functional entities, federalists aim at creating yet another state - albeit larger and more powerful - to regulate the nation-states.

We have dwelt on the rigid demarcations of classical federalism. However not all federalist theorists will underwrite such legalistic or dramatic constitutional perspectives. Indeed an influential group among federalist theorists tend to see federalism more in terms of a process. For Freidrich federalism is "the process of federalizing a political community." Another writer is of the view that 'the essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces - economic, social, political, cultural - that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary.' It is this perspective - the readiness to take account of those socio-economic forces that underpin the process of integration - which distinguishes sociological from classical federalism. When that is said, the two forms of federalism retain much in common: they both share the basic belief in the efficacy of federalism both on the one hand for engendering unity and administrative efficiency between previously disparate units and on the other for imposing 'the democratic postulate of local control and local autonomy through decentralization.' They both subscribe to the need for erecting super-ordinate institutions and are both prone to relying on the writing of constitutions as an avenue to stability. Both forms of federalism are preoccupied with power, its distribution and the harnessing of it through checks and balances. Finally both attach
much importance to the study of historical examples of federalism. The line separating classical and sociological federalism has become blurred in recent federalist literature. This has been mainly due to the realization that the rigid positions of classical federalism have often proved untenable. The classic federalist’s ideal is something like the United States model. But historical federal systems have differed vastly from one another. Classical federalists contemplating the ‘deviant’ characteristics of the Swiss or the Canadian models have often felt obliged to coin phrases like ‘real’ or ‘weak’ or ‘genuine’ federal systems. Wheare, for example, was led by this problem to categorize the Canadian case as being ‘quasi-federal.’ Sociological federalism comes to the aid of this dilemma by pointing to other relevant social and economic criteria than those of institutions and the rigid allocation of power by which integration might be assessed. A few writers have argued that certain phenomena generated by the twentieth century conditions have frizzled away the classic federalist distinction of powers between the centre and the units. According to Corry, "...under the heat and pressure generated by social and economic change in the twentieth century, the distinctive strata of the older federalism have begun to melt and flow into one another." Therefore between classic federalism of the pure type and sociological federalism, there are varieties of federalist theory depending on the extent to which they recognize first, that different kinds of relationships can exist between the units of a federal system, secondly the extent to which they accept federalism as a process and not simply as a question of writing a constitution and finally the degree of saliency which they attach to socio-economic forces in the federalising process.

One result of this shift from the clear-cut distinction of classic federalism is that certain other concepts which follow from the federalist approach are rendered more or less ambiguous. The confederal idea is one of these. The idea of confederation, like federalism, lays down a final political form in which the units are distinct entities, retaining their sovereignty side by side with a purely instrumental authority at the centre - where it exists at all. Those federalists who discern the process of federalism in different systems 'from a hierarchical structure to a decentralized administrative system to a loose pattern of intergovernmental co-operation' run the risk of making meaningless the classic distinction between federation and confederation.

Like the classic federalists the sociological federalists regard power as the central question in defining integration. The end-product of integration is a political community and political community is defined in terms of power. Etzioni’s sociological writings on integration have been classified as federalist on the basis of these terms.
For Etzioni a political community is a community that possesses three kinds of integration: "(a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence (though it may "delegate" some of this control to member-units); (b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens." A political community, he concludes, is thus 'a state, an administrative-economic unit, and a focal point of identification.' Pentland argues that since Etzioni not only uses the single-state analogy but emphasizes the element of supranationality in a system in which the units continue to play a more or less prominent role Etzioni’s paradigm really represents a sociological statement of federalism. In Pentland’s words Etzioni’s paradigm is a "leading candidate for a systematic sociological model of federalism as it applies to international relations."

Etzioni’s analysis of integration is dissimilar from the classic federalist approach in that he does not show the same penchant for erecting checks and balances and all the mechanistic paraphernalia of the classic federalist for apportioning power between the units of a federal system. But he too has devoted his main attention to the power of central institutions to units and to integrating elites. Granted that his approach is decidely constructed on more functional terms with a strong element of cybernetics, he is nevertheless convinced that the attempt to draw up "balance sheets" and power inventories is an essential part of the study of unification. "Like the classic federalists," one writer has been led to conclude, "he tends to see power as a quantity - based on assets and capacities to perform certain tasks and influence other actors."

Just as in pluralist and classic federalist writings, the achievement of peace is cited as a major concern in Etzioni’s work on integration. He writes "...the most compelling appeal of regionalism is that the rise of regional communities may provide a stepping-stone on the way from a world of a hundred-odd states to a world of stable and just peace. Such an achievement seems to require the establishment of a world political community."

In summation, the federalist approach posits the building of a supranational body - a political community - as the end-state of integration. In this thinking power is the heart of the matter; and the main characteristic of federalism has been the concern to harness power by direct political acts enunced in constitutions. The main elements in the federalist blueprint are the clear cut allocations of power to units of a federal system, and checks and balances between the power of the centre and the units. Like pluralism, federalism takes the nation-state as the basic unit in the international system. It is not the abolition of the nation-state that is the major concern but
the creation of a supranational body to regulate the relations between the states. Sociological federalism has brought a new dimension to federalism in which socio-economic forces are given greater prominence in the march towards integration. In that perspective federalism is a process. But for all the modifying influence of the sociological perspective, federalism continues to have as its major concerns power and the supranational state.

Federalism and the process conditions

On the systemic level the federalist approach to integration focuses on the mutation from an 'international' to a 'domestic' political system. This mutation is seen by the classical federalist as sudden and dramatic. One reason for this is the central position in federalist thinking of the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is one of the crucial attributes of the basic units (the nation-states) of the international system which the federalist seeks to transform. Sovereignty, furthermore according to the federalist, is a legal status. In order to entrench a superordinate body with powers over these units sovereignty must be wrested from the nation-states. To the classical federalist this act is of necessity revolutionary. The classical arena in which it is played out is customarily a constitutional conference where the units face themselves squarely with the question of the abrogation of their sovereignty and yield a substantial part of their utilitarian, coercive and identitive power to a new political system judiciously designed in a constructive bargain. Institutions are created to safeguard this bargain and to carry out its stipulations. Often the constitutional bargain is followed by system-wide elections. Thus the change from the international to the domestic system is swift and clear-cut.

A corollary to this thinking is that the classical federalist links the end of the change with the extent to which stable federal institutions can be seen to have emerged. In other words, political integration is made more or less synonymous with the existence of viable federal institutions. This is reminiscent of early theorizing on political development which used to affirm the same connection between political development and the existence of certain kinds of institutions.

For the classical federalist, as well as his sociological counterpart, system-change in integration is a matter of high politics. The undeniable impact of economic and technological evolution notwithstanding, the change from the international to the domestic system is perceived as primarily dependent on the capacity of elites in
the given system, 'to amass, control and employ the assets of power.' Far from accepting a continuity between economic and political integration, the classical federalist regards the commitment to system-change as subject to the will and whims of political elites. It will be recalled that the 'balance-of-power' theory of international relations accepts the same basic assumption about the crucial role of the elites in a political system as the arbiters of the direction of events by reason of their freedom, in their capacity as decision-makers, to choose whom and whom not to ally themselves with.

Although it can generally be said that classical federalists embrace these inflexible images of system-change, many of them recognize that in practice other criteria are brought into play in the mutation from the international to the domestic society. For one thing the history of federations has demonstrated forcefully the inadequacy of institutional constructs built on a fragile social foundation. Therefore even classical federalists recognize the value of certain background conditions in instigating integration. They list among these, threats posed by external forces or systems, a similar cultural background and economic motivations. However in the classical federalist scheme of things these background conditions always yield first importance to the direct solution of the constitutional question. Also gradualism as an alternative to the direct and dramatic broaching of the constitutional issue has often proved a rewarding tactic and therefore finds favour even among federalists of the classical persuasion.\(^3\)

But the sociological federalists go much further. Indeed for writers like Friedrich and Etzioni the 'constitutional threshold' is accorded virtually no decisive role in the process of integration. Where, for the classical federalists, the appearance of viable federal institutions puts paid to the question of integration, the sociological federalists see such institutions as merely contributing factors in a much more gradual and much wider process of integration. The crucial criteria in this process are seen as communication-patterns, the location of power-assets, social differentiation, or cross-cutting lines of cleavage in the system.\(^4\)

The sociological federalist's insistence on the gradualness and indeterminacy of the process of integration has its roots in the works of Friedrich, Deutsch and others who have advocated the point of view that integration should be seen as a process rather than as a sudden and dramatic change. Friedrich's definition of federalism as the process of federalizing a political community was a break with the classical definition of that concept. Deutsch whose list of background conditions for integration resembles the federalist's in many respects, has stated that the transition from background to process is fluid. The essential background conditions do not come into existence all at once; they are not established in any particular fixed
sequence; nor do they all grow together like one organism from a seed. Rather, it appears to us from our cases that they may be assembled in almost any sequence, so long only as all of them come into being and take effect.16

In his paradigm on integration Etzioni takes up the issue of integration as a process focusing especially on its dynamic aspects. He specifies the dimensions as follows:17

THE PREUNIFICATION STATE

Unit Properties
- Individual Properties
- Analytical Properties

Environmental Properties
- Nonsocial (Ecological) Properties
- Social Properties

System Properties
- Shared Properties (Other Than Integration)
- Preunification Integration.

THE UNIFICATION PROCESS:
A. INTEGRATING POWER

Effective Compositions
- Differences in Kind
- Differences in Quantities
- The communication Factor

Effective Distributions
- Degree of Elitism
- Degree of Internalization.

THE UNIFICATION PROCESS:
B. INTEGRATED SECTORS

The First Stage: Take-Off
- Determinants of Take-Off
- The Take-Off Sector

Expansion of Union's Scope
- A Stable Scope
- Sequences of Unification

THE TERMINATION STATE

Level and Scope
- The Dominant Function.

The premise for these demarcations is heavily sociological otherwise they are not dissimilar to the background conditions of the classical federalists, pluralists and neo-functionalist. Under 'the preunification state' Etzioni examines first the nature of each societal unit prior to unification, the state of the aggregate of these units, then the environmental factors within which these units operate and finally the degree of interdependence between the units (i.e. system properties) prior to unification.
Etzioni’s discussion of the unification process is centered in good federalist fashion on power and its distribution. But here again it is a thorough-going sociological approach and, according to Etzioni, exhaustively so since it is intended to represent the three major sociological schools variously concerned with force (the Italian school of Pareto and Mosca), economics (the economic-Marxist school) and psychology - sentiments and ideas (the Weber-Durkheim tradition). Accordingly, power is classified as either coercive, utilitarian or identitive or a combination of any two or all of these three. The nature and relative importance of the communication factor to other factors is also taken up as well as which kinds of power in which combinations and at which point are most conducive to unification.

Under the unification process Etzioni also discusses both the take-off concept - emphasized by Deutsch - and the expansion of the scope of unification. The take-off concept runs counter to the classical federalist belief of acceptance of the constitutional blueprint as representing the achievement of integration. For Etzioni the take-off point i.e. where the process can continue on its own momentum, is far more important than the formal inauguration of a treaty, convention or constitution. The institutions created by such constitutions are not in themselves of cardinal value and must be seen together with other more important societal forces. Elsewhere Etzioni has said of these structures that ‘...while in general they have only a limited independent effect, when conditions are favourable the ”right” institutional structure might provide the marginal difference between success and failure, ...’ The section on scope is also central to Etzioni’s paradigm. Scope in this context has to do with how far the process has penetrated the societal sectors. Again this is established in terms of the level of the three kinds of power classified on sociological lines. Altogether the effect of the sociological perspective has been to imbue the federalist approach to system-change in integration with a keen awareness of gradual societal changes as opposed to revolution by constitutional charter.

According to federalist thinking, the system-change from international to a domestic society is carried out by the states themselves. As we have seen the pluralists do not believe that such sudden and revolutionary changes in the system are feasible if at all desirable. The neo-functionalists and functionalists are yet of other persuasions. The former believe that a complex of political interests and issue areas overflowing across national boundaries will come to eliminate the state system while the functionalists put their faith in
common activities across the borders directed towards meeting welfare needs thereby rendering the state system superfluous. With the federalists the onus of eliminating themselves rests with the nation-states. "Of all approaches to integration theory, "says Pentland "federalism is the only one which attempts directly to face the Hobbesian paradox posed by states' willing abrogation of their own sovereign power." It is the elites in the nation-states who according to the federalists are responsible for effecting the changes leading to integration: for the classical federalists this would mean the foreign policy elites. However Etzioni's definition is slightly broader. For him the term elite "refers to a unit that devotes a comparatively high proportion of its assets to guiding a process and leading other units to support it. It might be a person...a group of persons...or a state..." In practice it means that, according to the federalists, the pressures generated by economics or interest groups are not enough to effect integration. It is the elites who make or mar the prospects for integration. Spinelli, a federalist himself, speaking of European integration has said: "In the long run, trade follows politics rather than vice-versa, and all the emerging European economic enterprise could be destroyed just as it has been created... Contrary to the theories of those who regard the great anonymous forces of popular sentiment and economic interest as the mainsprings of the political undertakings of peoples, the European unification adventure began with tepid popular support and no popular pressure, over economic questions but without pressure from economic forces." Since, for the federalists, the basic units of the international system are nation-states, it follows that the elites to which they refer belong exclusively to the states. It has been suggested that the federalist characterization of the elites of the nation-states as the sole arbiters of integration unfettered by economics or public opinion would suggest that integration is more easily achieved in authoritarian regimes. We shall return to this point. Suffice it here to recall that we found that federalists, like pluralists, favour the so-called developed states, meaning, in the parlance of development theory, democratic-industrialized societies as being most rank for integration. Besides, sociological federalists, like Etzioni, tend to lay stress on the communication factor. The elites of a nation-state are not merely denizens of an ivory tower and their relevance and success depend in part on how much "the pipelines of political representation" are open. Therefore the influence of the elite is not taken as absolute as it may seem at first blush. Just the same, the position of the federalist approach as regarding individuals is far from clear and on occasion may even seem contradictory. On the one hand federalists extol the virtues of democracy, popular support, individual freedom and responsiveness of the
elites. On the other, they, especially the activists, believe in propaganda campaigns to whip up public support for the federalist standpoint. Since the burden of perception of needs - as well as the translating of these needs into action - rests with the elites, it is not clear what would be the position of the individuals should they harbour a different opinion from the elites.

Etzioni's definitions of identitive power bring out the subsidiary role of the individual in the federalist approach to integration since for him, identitive power "is based on the identification of the subject with norms, values, symbols over which the holder of power has control ... or on an identification with his personality that makes his approvals and disapprovals powerful." Clearly, if the individuals to such a great extent are subject to the manipulation of the identitive power of the elite, one can rightly conclude that the federalist approach to integration is dominated by the role of the elite as opposed to that of the individual. One final point about the role ascribed to the individual by federalist approach to integration: Federalism, structured as it is by the allocation of varying powers to the units and the system, accepts by the same token that the loyalty of the individual towards the centre in the integrated system need not be total. We shall return to this idea of multiple loyalties.

Footnotes to Chapter three


22. Etzioni, A. op. cit.
4. Functionalism: Dissolving the nation-state in universal welfare functions

Functionalists are first and foremost the protagonists of the administration of things instead of the government of men. 'Society', maintains Mitrany, 'will develop by our living it, and not by policing it.' In the face of technological revolution the nation-state, according to the functionalists, stands out as increasingly inadequate as the supreme and exclusive unit for organizing human needs. Implicit in this reasoning is a basic functionalist paradox: Technology is progressing by leaps and bounds while politics is running amock. 'La poussée de la technique,' write Armand and Drancourt, 'a pour conséquence de tisser entre les peuples des liens de plus en plus nombreux, de plus en plus complexes.'* But while technology is making the world smaller and drawing people nearer, politics has persisted in canalizing irrational divisiveness such as in the nation-state. Mitrany again: "...after centuries... we find ourselves with little sense of ...unity left in our outlook and actions. That is all the more strange as in material life the world has moved far towards a common unity." The functionalist prescription for resolving this paradox is to forsake the constitutional approach for the functional, to capitalize on welfare, on economic and social organization to the detriment of politics. If people recognizing their 'felt needs' organized piecemeal on the basis of those non-political needs, the nation-state system would sooner or later be dissolved in a swelling pool of welfare-functions.

The notion of 'needs' is central to the functionalist approach to integration. The same is true of the use of the term 'function' in functional sociology to which functionalism in integration has affinities. In functional sociology, however, the idea of needs of the system has as its essence the maintenance of the system whereas in the thinking of integration functionalists like Mitrany, functions are expected to lead to a new system. In social science theorizing we can further distinguish between two approaches of functionalism namely the approach which posits 'needs' as appertaining to the system as a whole and the approach in which 'needs' are seen to as belonging

*"The advance of technology has, as a consequence, the creation between peoples of bonds more and more numerous and more and more complex."
to individuals rather than the system. We find in the former approach the organicisms of Spencer and the metaphorical variety of it of Radcliffe-Brown and Durkheim joined more recently by Parsons, Almond and Apter. Malinowski and Merton perhaps best represent the latter school. The functionalist principle in integration is much more pragmatic than that of the system-oriented sociological functionalists who by their insistence on the claim that 'all social systems have the same functional requisites...run the risk of making teleological explanations of change.' The integration functionalists merely argue that in response to needs and the univeralizing effect of technology functional cooperation can be stimulated in specific areas which will, in time, create a global network of such organizations transcending the traditional bounds of the nation-states.

The functionalists join therefore the age-old concern of theorists to determine whether social, economic and technological change determine political change or whether the 'non-political' factors follow in the wake of political change. It has been suggested that functionalism is not dissimilar to Marxism in several respects. One, it envisages, like Marxism, the withering away of the state. Two, it looks to the influence of economics to produce a more rational order capable of satisfying the needs of a modern society. Three, like Marxism, the effects of its postulates are envisaged as being global. It must be said, however, that what the functionalist is concerned with is the growing gap between technological advance with its unifying effects and the tardiness of politics to produce equivalent answers. There is no attempt in the first instance to produce a theory on the relationship between political and non-political change; rather for them it is a question of urgent practical choice whether to opt for developing society by following in the tracks of rational technological advance or to increase the sources of conflict by letting politics lag behind. In the words of the Englishman, Mitrany, the father of functionalism: 'The number of problems which take on a world character is growing apace, partly because we have a better understanding of them... but also because of their technical peculiarities... These new contacts which crowd upon us from all directions can be as much a source of conflict as of cooperation.'

All the same, the functionalist cannot escape the conclusions attendant on the contrast between 'le rapprochement "physique" des individus sous l'effet des progrès techniques... et l'écart qui sépare les mentalités de nos contemporains devenus proches sans être, toutefois, devenus des prochains.'* Technological advance

*the "physical" drawing-together of individuals under the influence of technological progress... and the distance between the mentalities of our contemporaries who have become near without, however, becoming close.
seems to be generally ahead of political progress. According to Quincy Wright, 'there appears to be a general tendency for change in the procedures of political and legal adjustment to lag behind economic and cultural changes arising from technological progress. The violent consequences of this lag can be observed in primitive and historic societies, but its importance has increased in modern times.' But the functionalists do not go as far as Herz who has argued that the form of the political unit turns on the state of weapons technology since it is the security of the political unit which decides its form. Nor would they generally go along with Weber's theory that technological change is 'unilinear and progressive' while cultural and sociopolitical change are 'cyclical or indeterminate.' All that can be said is that certain technological changes are conducive to, and clear the way for, political integration. Since they are only environmental factors, their effects on integration depend on to what extent they are percieved and put into effect by individuals.

The functionalist emphasis is on welfare. But at the same time there is a clear feeling that in opting for functionalism and avoiding or playing down politics they are opting for a most effective way of side-stepping conflict. Claude has observed that in spite of the stress on welfare the functionalist principle is, when all is said'..., an assertion and defense of the proposition that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and the elimination of war...'

The end-product conceived by the functionalists is therefore a net-work of functional agencies stretching over the globe, sidetracking politics, eliminating war and rendering the nation-state superfluous. Furthermore, these functional entities are created by the recognition of felt needs and become defunct when those needs subside. For this reason functionalism has been described as 'fédéralisme à la carte', because of its piecemeal flexibility. Armand and Drancourt put it thus: 'le fédéralisme à la carte repose sur la nécessité de nouer organiquement les relations entre les hommes à partir de la base au lieu de les imposer du sommet.'* In short, these functional organs form a global tissue composed of cells which wither away when they no longer serve their purpose and grow up where they are needed.

But it is quite clear that the functionalists do not by any means envisage a federation even though they recognize that in theory it might serve their aim. Mitrany asserts: ''In theory it could be done through a world state or federation, but even if desirable such a

*"Federalism à la carte is based on the need to tie up the relations between men organically, working upwards from the base rather than imposing them from the top."
monstrous construction could hardly come about except through conquest... The key we have to find is... by making use of the present social and scientific opportunities to link together particular activities and interests, one at a time, according to need and acceptability, giving each a joint authority and policy limited to that activity alone. That is the functional way.” In this manner Mitrany envisages co-ordinating organs which themselves spring up, ad hoc, to organize liaison between these functional units. Finally some forms of international planning agencies would take up co-ordination and planning on a global basis.

The functionalists are not very clear on the issue of regionalism. But there seems to be a tendency to look with suspicion on regional arrangements if they appear to hinder a global development. For Mitrany, if the new regional units aim at political unity the more the chances that they will hinder global unity.”...if they are to be closed and exclusive unions, the more fully and effectively they are integrated the deeper must in fact be the division they cause in the emergent unity of the world.” The essential is that such regional organizations should remain open in order to leave a leeway to progress for the global ”'rationalist administrative and economic 'Gesellschaft'.” The functionalist end-state to the process of integration is a world community whose functional range is coterminous, in toto, with the relations between nation-states.

Some functionalists argue that the establishment of a political authority, even in a regional organization, is inevitable. Paul-Henri Spaak has said of the European Community that 'it is difficult to believe that six countries can combine their resources, opportunities and capabilities to a greater and greater degree, can integrate and dovetail their interests more and more, without one day setting up a political authority to crown this economic organization.' Mitranyn’s answer would be that these political aspects can and ought to be isolated from the welfare aspects and treated just like any other functional area ‘... not (like) something that stands in stern isolation, overriding all the others.’

In recapitulation, functionalism draws a clear distinction between the rational, utilitarian, welfare aspects of interstate relations and the political aspects dealing with law and order, security and sovereignty. The backbone of the functionalist thesis is the belief that these rational areas can be developed and co-ordinated on a worldwide basis. The more the net-work of such organisations expands the farther into oblivion is pushed the nation-state system which functionalism regards not merely as a residue of obsolescence but a hinderance to progress and unity.
The system-change envisaged by the functionalists consists of a transition from a politico-legal system of relations between nation-states based on conflict to a system made up of a web of functional organizations based on utilitarian computations. Unlike the actors in, for example, Kaplan’s systems theory, the actors in the functionalist thinking nation-states are the bane of global unity. functionalists thinking nation-states are the bane of global unity. Criticising federalism which he called a case of "political marriage by sentence of court" Mitrany observed that such solutions merely created new political units. Furthermore, 'federalism would change the dimensions of nationalism but not its nature.'

Consequently the new system prescribed by functionalism is not regional groupings like Africa or Europe but areas defined by their functions like aviation or malaria control. The process which leads to the transition is that of the gradual strengthening of international functional organizations, which prove their merit by successfully undertaking functional tasks on a global basis. At first the establishment and the continuance of these organizations depend on the nation-states. But the ultimate aim is to render the nation-states redundant in the face of the established competence of the functional organizations.

A parallel has been drawn between the functionalist’s line of reasoning and that of political development theory. In political development the nation-state is assumed as the unit in which development takes place. In the same way functionalism takes the global entity as given. Moreover in political development theory the successful performance of certain structures is taken as an indication of development - success in this case being measured against 'implicit norms of rationality.' Functionalism measures the success of integration by the ability of global functional structures to solve problems and their degree of responsiveness to functional needs. Political development further envisages the gradual victory of the forces of national bureaucracy over provincial or regional forces. In the same way functionalism assumes that the international organizations would, in time, take over the functions of the organs of the nation-state.

Functionalists see the areas of economics and security as particularly suitable for initiating a successful challenge against the functions of the nation-state. They speak of areas of rational cooperation that are 'always prescribed by geography, always prevented by history.' The modern world has overwhelmingly recognized the be
nefits of economics of scale at the same time as such problems as pollution and interdependence in the monetary field have demonstrated the growing incapacity of the nation-state to serve all the needs of the individuals in an adequate manner. Technological advances in the field of armaments have further reduced the viability of the nation-states making cooperation not only desirable but inevitable. Therefore functionalist tradition has promoted the idea of such organizations as the European Coal and Steel Community. Similarly advances in electronics and transport support the idea of a 'shrinking world.' 'Les hommes, les marchandises, les idées, les structures industrielles et commerciales franchissent de plus en plus, et de plus en plus vite, les frontières. Les monnaies sont solidaires. L’interdépendence des collectivités s’accentue, mais la politique n’évolue pas en conséquence.'*

The process of integration, according to the functionalists, possesses its own dynamic - what Sewell refers to as 'technical self-determination.' Says Mitrany, 'the functional dimensions... determine themselves. In a like manner the function determines its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice the nature of the action required under given conditions, and in that way the powers needed by the respective authority.' Extolling the New Deal launched by Roosevelt as an example of technical self-determination, Mitrany draws attention to how 'every function was left to generate others gradually, like the functional subdivision of organic cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow and develop out of actual performance.' Of course some of these ideas are open to question and we shall return to them later. Suffice it to add finally here that the success of these functional organs depend, according to the functionalists, in part on the extent to which individuals perceive their 'felt common need' thereby letting a 'new conscience' of co-operative habits lead the way to further functional cooperation.

It should be evident by now that to the functionalist, as far as process conditions are concerned, the nation-state is a liability which must be shed by hook or crook. The problem is that until now the state has served as the main focus of the individual's aspirations and loyalty, however irrational this may seem. Therefore the nation-state must be lured into the functional system where it is fated to loose its identity.

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*Men, goods, ideas, industrial and commercial structures are increasingly and even more rapidly overcoming frontiers. Currencies are solidary. The interdependence of collectivities is being accentuated, but politics is not evolving accordingly.*
We have already pointed to certain purported similarities between functionalism and Marxism. Here again in attributing war and totalitarianism to the very nature of the nation-state, functionalism demonstrates other kinds of kinship with socialist doctrines which place their bet on "the people, the proletariat, human needs or technology (not) the bellicose and parochial tendencies of such state-dominating minorities as the capitalist classes or the munition-makers." The insistence of the nation-state system on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs is also a prime hindrance that must be sidestepped.

The functionalists depend on the national elites to lead the way towards functional cooperation having perceived the felt needs. They also count on the supportive influence of public opinion once the individuals begin to reap the benefits of cooperation. Consequently this approach also favours the kind of states in which there is reasonable or high responsiveness to political opinion. Furthermore like the pluralists and federalists, functionalists would also favour societies with a high enough level of economic and technological development to benefit from the blessings of cooperation. There is a general tendency to assume that (purely) functional problems will arise more frequently among such societies. The more the state goes in for such cooperation - granted their success - the nearer for it comes the day of reckoning. "Functionalist theory," says one writer, "sees the state in international cooperation as the insect in a carnivorous plant. Attracted ever inward by the benefits, it finds that behind it the avenues of retreat are progressively blocked."

On the individual level the point to note is that the functional institutions to which the functionalists attach such prime importance are borne up, according to this approach, on an undercurrent of a psycho-social community. It is the political attitudes of individuals, invoked and weaned by the success of international cooperation, which ensure a continuing trend towards functional collaboration. As we have seen, even the idea of technical self-determination is not so self-determined insofar as it is a function of the people's attitude towards integration.

This is by no means to detract from functionalist emphasis on institutions. "Seules les institutions deviennent plus sages, elles accumulent l'expérience collective et, de cette expérience et de cette sagesse, les hommes soumis aux mêmes règles verront non pas leur nature changer, mais leur comportement graduellement se transformer."* But this wisdom accumulated by the institutions can

*"Only institutions become wiser; they accumulate collective experience and, through this experience and wisdom, men subjected to the same rules will experience, not a change, but a gradual transformation of their behaviour."
only be transmitted to the individuals when a new conscience has been created and bred in them making them favourable to further functional enterprise.

Two stages are envisaged in this learning process. In the first stage the individuals may be still unaware or lukewarm towards their felt needs owing to centuries of conditioning to the dysfunctional political approach of the nation-state. It is then left for those who perceive these needs most, that is to say, the elites of the embryonic functional system, to carry forth this conscience by making a success of the few areas where functionalism operates. In the next stage the individuals in the society have begun to reap the benefits of functionalism and the area of functional cooperation has begun to expand aided by the efforts of these agencies to diffuse contact with the functional organs among all and sundry. "Underpinning this process," Pentland points out, "is the emergence of what has been called 'mondiovision' - an ecumenical sharing of images, emotions and information through the pervasive immediacy of electronic communications."

We conclude by pointing out two major assumptions which back up these functionalists approaches to a learning situation among individuals. Firstly there is an assumption that if men's attention and aspirations were riveted on utilitarian things their loyalties would be captured in its entirety. In other words "political attitudes, then, are almost entirely cognitive; the emotional components are taken to be small, secondary and atavistic." More, the functionalists assume, like the federalists that political loyalty can be 'fractionated.' Therefore political loyalty can be built up area by area function by function and, as we pointed out earlier, none 'stands in stern isolation, overriding all the others.' These are farreaching assumptions and invite closer examination further on.

Footnotes to Chapter four


20. Ibid.

21. See Pentland, C. op. cit. p.82.


24. Ibid., p.85.
5. Dynamics of a melting-pot of roles and interest-politics: The Neo-functionalist Approach

The neo-functionalist paradigm employs the metaphor of politics at the national level. According to this approach, integration - at least the so-called Western democratic industrialized model - between states emerges from the pluralistic bargaining process among salient political forces consisting of interest groups, parties, governments and international organizations. As in the functionalist approach the bargaining is welfare-issue oriented and incremental. But self-interest is assumed. Actors involved in non-violent conflicts and seeking to maximize their common interest, delegate more and more powers to common organizations. In pursuit of short-sighted self-interests, as it were, elites do not foresee the systemic consequences of their actions. This process of incremental and myopic pursuit of self-interest constitutes cumulatively a learning process which is transferred to the masses.

Historically neo-functionalism has evolved from three different strands. Firstly it emanates from a critique and attempted reformulation of the functionalist thesis. Secondly the progress of the European Economic Community has served as a power-house for the fashioning of this approach and the vagaries of the history of that Community have been reflected, as we shall see, in the twists and turns of the approach. Thirdly it is crucially linked with the tools of analysis developed from the so-called behavioural revolution which has taken place within the fold of American political science in the past two decades.

Neo-functionalists are the first to admit that their assumptions and hypotheses are not always coherent. Writing of this limitation, Haas adds: "Neo-functionalist practitioners have difficulty achieving closure on a given case of regional integration because the terminal condition being observed is uncertain: Neo-functionalists do not agree on a dependent variable and therefore differ with each other on the point in time at which a judgement of 'how much successful integration' is to be made." Theorists of this approach are generally agreed however that political integration is a process and not a condition as we found in Etzioni's writings. Again, instead of relying like the pluralists mainly on transactions or communication for
measuring integration, neo-functionalists capitalize on bargaining styles, organizational growth or relapse, and the adaptability of elites in their specialized roles.

If we take a look at the broad trend of the definitions of political integration we find that the theorists have modified their definitions following largely the experiences of the European Economic Community from which the theories are distilled in the main. In the early years of the EEC there was much optimism concerning the sort of body into which the Community would eventually issue. At first the enterprise seemed very successful and many a European activist looked forward to the formation of a specie of federal Europe - albeit by functional means. Theory followed suit. But as the career of the Community has become more and more chequered both theorists and activists have become obliged to lower their sights and this is reflected in the present largely undefined state of the concept of political integration in neo-functionalist writings.

Haas, for example, defined political integration in a study of the Coal and Steel Community written in 1958, soon after the formation of the EEC. "Political integration," he wrote, "is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones." Consequently he defined a political community as "a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space." Needless to say, this definition was influenced by Deutsch's approach of the pluralist school. Haas himself made no secret of it, pointing out however that..."Deutsch's concept... does not insist on the presence of a specified institutional structure. The scheme here used, by contrast, makes the existence of political institutions capable of translating ideologies into law the cornerstone of the definition." He, however, leaves the nature of the structure open: "...the ideal type may be that of a unitary, a federal or even a confederal arrangement."

Between this exacting definition of a political community and his present position, Haas has been hard put to it to escape from the restrictive definition of the institutional type. For instance he has defined political community in such a way that..."a variety of constitutional and structural factors are compatible with this notion (of political community); political community exists when there is likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually antagonistic aims." According to this definition, Deutsch's definition of a pluralistic community, since it insists on
peaceful resolution of conflict, would appear to meet also the neo­
functionalist criteria for a political community.

In yet another article Haas states that political union "implies
any arrangement under which existing nation-states cease to act as
autonomous decision-making units with respect to an important
range of policies," where 'the actors have transcended their earlier
exclusive identification with the pre-existing national state,' and
where 'the politicized decision-making process has acquired legiti­
macy and authority.'

Meanwhile Leon Lindberg, although reasoning on the same neo­
functionalist lines as Haas came to a different conclusion: "My own
investigations," he writes," have led me to adapt a more cautions
conception of political integration, one limited to the development
of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means
other than autonomous action by national governments. It seems to
me that it is logically and empirically possible that collective
decision-making procedures involving a significant amount of poli­
tical integration can be achieved without moving toward a 'political
community' as defined by Haas."

In an attempt to move away from the "ideal types" of the
nation-state or international community, Haas has criticized the di­
chotomy that characterizes "the nation-state as a warm and
self-contained community" in contrast to "the colder and more cal­
culating world of nation-states labelled "international society." The
two systems are more akin than the popular myth will allow. The
Gemeinschaft of the national society has, in the modern world
become a "multi-group competitive... society" in which there is
"agreement on the means of resolving internal conflicts by peaceful
method ...a Gemeinschaft that looks and acts like the Gesellschaft
we associate with our modern international system." In this com­
promise between the ideal types it is then possible to speak of supra­
nationality as a "unique style of making international decisions,
unique because of the nature of the participants, the context in
which decisions are made, and the quality of the decisions
produced... Supranationality, not federation, confederation or in­
tergovernmental organization, seems to be the appropriate regional
counterpart to the national state which no longer feels capable of
realizing welfare aims within its own narrow borders, which has
made its peace with the fact of interdependence in an industrial and
egalitarian age."

In a more recent article Haas argues that the terminal condition
of the process of integration should be visualized not as "ideal types
reconstructed from our historical experience at the national level...
(which are) inadequate because they foreclose real-life developmen­
tal possibilities." He then launches the concept of "authority-legiti­
macy transfer" between national and international organization in
order to be able to look at integration with the minimum of a preconception based on ideal types. As such the terminal state could be visualized, among other possibilities, as a 'regional state,' a 'regional commune' or as "asymmetrical overlapping." In a regional state the system is hierarchical with a single legitimate decision-making authority at the centre. The regional commune has no decision centre but there is a high level of interdependence between the component parts: "It is an anarchoid image of a myriad of units which are so highly differentiated in function as to be forced into interdependence." In the case of asymmetrical overlapping, although the units have lost some of their authority no new centre has taken over the authority as yet. "...instead it is distributed asymetrically among several centres, among which no dominant one may emerge, though one might imagine subtypes of this dependent variable involving various degrees of centralized authority."

We can dwell briefly on two other attempts by neofunctionalists to grapple with the question of the elusive dependent variable in integration. In a study of comparative regional integration Joseph Nye has advanced the suggestion that instead of having a single all-inclusive image of the end-product it might be disaggregated into: a transnational economy, a transnational society, and a network of political interdependence. His reasons were both to sharpen terminology and to facilitate operationalization. However Haas has taken issues with him on this score. "To avoid making causal assumptions and positing hypotheses..." argues Haas, "merely sidesteps once more the difficulty of finding a dependent variable. Political integration, if that is what we are concerned about, is more important than economic and social trends; these are important because we think they are causally connected with political integration... In short, the quantitative definition of progressive integrative development is best seen as a methodological help in making accurate observations and at limiting recourse to overly restrictive verbal definitions; but it cannot alone provide the dependent variable. Scales of separate dimensions of integration are useful descriptively because they capture a process; but without hypothetically linked variables they are not explanatory of an outcome which itself remains unspecified. When used in lieu of descriptive or schematic images of end states they substitute premature operationalization for theory and vision."

Lindberg has also attempted to get away from the teleological quality implicit in neofunctionalist espousal, as the end-product of political integration, of supranationality. Earlier he attempted to capitalize on the process variables and policy-content of integration in lieu of concentrating on the nature of the end-structure. Thus he defined political community as 'a legitimate system for the resolution of conflict, for the making of authoritative decisions for the
group as a whole.' He then advanced ten different properties capable of being operationalized, also by quantification, by which to assess the amount of decision-making assumed at the supranational level. These include the shape and capacity of the decision-making system, the nature of the societal and other forces which activate or support the decision-making system, the nature of the decision-making activities, including bargaining style and the like, and finally, the effects which the operation of the decision-making system has on its surroundings. In addition he has turned to systems-theory (notably Easton's), to extract categories for assessing integration. Opting for the functionally interrelated set of categories of systems-theory he insists that they offer a valuable tool to be applied to the study of the process of integration since they are '...free from many of the kinds of assumptions involved when the nation-state is the sole empirical example from which a model of the political process in general or the integrative process in particular is derived.' He has remained more or less faithful to the decision-making definition. More recently he has put the matter as follows: "The essence of political integration is the emergence or creation over time of collective decision-making processes, i.e. political institutions to which governments delegate decision-making authority and/or through which they decide jointly via more familiar intergovernmental negotiation." Such an idea of the terminal state, by its generality, enables theory to visualize decision-making systems which are higher or lower than the quasi-federal state to which it has been said the neo-functionalists adhere at heart. Lindberg says himself to be open to the image of a Western Europe in which the national and governments produce a mixed system together with the institutions of the Community and growing step by step into 'a symbiotic relationship.'

It has been suggested that the difference between neo-functionalists and the other theorists on integration reduces to their divergent views of what 'politics' implies. In short whether politics is a substance, as the other integration theorists maintain, or a process as the neo-functionalists seem to imply. To cite Uwe Kitzinger: "A question is political not because of what it is about; the word 'political' tells us something not about the subject that is being dealt with, but about the manner in which it is being treated." The neo-functionalist view of 'politics' is very much in this abstract sense. Where the other approaches identify concrete areas like foreign affairs, defence or the struggle for power as the essence of politics, the neo-functionalists regards everything as involving politics 'wherever values are scarce.' According to Haas '"all political action is purposively linked with individual or group perception of interest.' In this view politics is not inherent in certain areas and activities (e.g. defence) and absent in others by their nature (e.g. health). Lindberg
also joins Easton when he defines a political system as "that system of interactions in any society (including prenational or multinational societies) through which binding or authoritative allocations are made and implemented." This behavioural view of politics makes it possible for the neo-functionalists to project integration as a process which is capable of spilling over from virtually any area to another without much regard for what the pluralist will maintain is "high politics." Both Lindberg and Haas have declared themselves aware of this difficulty. According to the former they "have tended to treat reassertions of *purely political goals* (emphasis added) such as national grandeur or independence either as atavisms or at best as residual categories."

The neo-functionalist view of politics, then, makes the approach see integration from a point of view very different from most of the other theorists. The functionalists see integration mainly as a question of economics and welfare and seek to eliminate the nation-state. The pluralists seek to preserve the nation-state in a system of diplomatic bargaining and accommodation. For the federalists conflict leads to the abrogation of nation-state sovereignty to a certain extent. The essence of neo-functionalism is the attempt to reconcile economics and politics, welfare and conflict in a concept which builds ostensibly on the resolution of political conflict among elites and interest groups - politics in this sense representing the totality of the activities of the contemporary nation-state. As we shall seek to demonstrate further on, such a concept is borne up on a smug assumption of a consensus over basic ideology leaving for the state or supranational authority, in the main, the task of allocating scarce resources.

It sometimes seems that the image of the end-state projected by the neo-functionalists is a cloaked federal state. Both Haas' original definition of a political community and Lindberg's "legitimate system for the resolution of conflict for the making of authoritative decisions for the group as a whole" can quite readily be seen as federal states. Certainly the stipulation by Lindberg that "nations" forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs' invokes reflections of a federal blueprint even though it is nebulous enough to include other possibilities.

There is reason to conclude that the question of the neo-functionalist definition of the end-state in the process of political integration is unresolved. This is true despite the enormous assiduity and rigour which this approach, as an heir of the recent behavioural revolution in American political science, has brought to bear on the study of political integration. Traditional historical and legal ap-
approaches have been largely abandoned for the sociological; concern for statics gives way to emphasis on the dynamics of a process. And all the time a determined and consistent effort is being invested in the incessant search for new variables both independent and dependent, through identification, classification, quantification and operationalization of data. We shall have cause to return to this point later and in particular to the charge of 'quantomania' which has been brought against this approach.

**Neo-functionalism and the process conditions.**

On the systemic level the neo-functionalists assume the existence of an international political interdependence - even if rudimentary. In this respect the neo-functionalist perspective is markedly different from that of the other theorists of political integration. As we have already seen the functionalists, federalists and pluralists all affirm a basic dichotomy between the national and the international systems. For the federalists and pluralists the difference between the two systems turns on power and sovereignty. The functionalist recognize the same basic demarcation between the two systems arguing however that technology, economics and welfare matters have combined to weave an ever-widening network of functional interdependence in the international system. For the neo-functionalists this demarcation is virtually absent. For them the 'primitive' interdependence which exists in any international system may be weak in comparative terms but is nevertheless so tangible that for analytic purposes the international system may very well be viewed as a going concern in the same way as the national systems.

The neofunctionalist definition of politics facilitates this image of the state of interdependence in the international system. Clearly if the criteria for ascertaining the existence of a political system are patterns of conflict and decision-making apparatus for allocating values authoritatively to the units, then it follows that the bargainings, accommodations on the international level and indeed all the paraphernalia of traditional diplomacy can be seen as the equivalent of the bargaining, competition, interest-group conflict and resolution, party, legislative and judicial processes at the national level even if these latter can be considered more stable, since they are surrounded by a greater consensus.

Often the neo-functionalists point to "the incipient breakdown of the differentiation between foreign affairs and domestic affairs" to support their view of the interdependence in the international sy-
Also the conflicts in the individual national systems often tend, in our times, to have repercussions far beyond the borders of the nation-states concerned. This is evidenced in such different fields as pollution, defence, labour, economics and education. Partly as a result of this, interest-group and other political forces tend to operate more and more in other national systems than their own and political actors, according to Lindberg, move more and more "beyond the nation-state as a basic framework for action."

The neo-functionalists also maintain that public opinion has begun to follow this trend so that international system has begun to look more and more akin to the national system.

The systems analysis employed by the neo-functionalists is also partly responsible for this view of the international system. It makes it, after all, of little import to insist on the traditional distinction between the national and international systems. For the neo-functionalist the important questions consist in identifying the functional scope and institutional capacities of the international system—the selfsame criteria which are employed by systems-theory on the national level.

But the neo-functionalists recognize that the interdependence on the international level is, more often than not, embryonic—very much like some fledgeling central institutions in the so-called emergent communities on the national-level. For this reason neo-functionalism, more than most other theories in integration, takes after political development theory since the basic question for it is how authority accrues to the rudimentary institutions of the international system in the process of development towards a full-fledged decisionmaking authority for the allocation of scarce value and resources. As applied to national systems political development theory concentrates on the attempt of the central institutions of a national system to gain ascendancy over the traditional and parochial units of the system. According to Pye, a set of six crises must be overcome for the central institutions to gain overriding authority. The crises are (1) attracting allegiances from older political institutions or subsystems; (2) establishing the legitimacy of its activities; (3) penetrating popular awareness at all social levels; (4) becoming a centre of political activity and expectation for groups, parties and individuals; (5) developing a capacity to allocate values efficiently and authoritatively; and (6) drawing the whole system together in a web of interactions. There is also the question of a more horizontal growth—that of developing a distinctive style for decision-making throughout the system.

In the neo-functionalist perspective it is the central institutions which bear up and advance this systemic development. In this sense the institutions are seen not merely as the diplomatic mediating or conciliatory organs of the pluralist school but as organs of a budd-
ing supranational state. By means of such functions as 'goal articula-
tion, coalition building, recruitment and organization, expansion
of scope, and brokerage on the creation of package deals,' these
organs develop a regular bureaucratic as well as political elite who,
both by information and other means, lead the way in socializing the
participants to 'new norms and loyalties.' Thus the central insti-
tutions are the harbingers of the political community in the same
way as the state, in the national systems, is said to create the nation.
Like development theory, the neo-functionalist model regards the
bureaucracy as active rather than passive, relying on its initiative to
carry forward the progress of the central institutions towards greater
authority.

A concept which is given a central position in the neo-functiona-
list process towards supranationality is the 'spill-over' launched by
Haas. Its original claim that the functionalist socio-economic vari-
ables spill over almost inevitably into political variables has now
been largely abandoned for a more nuanced concept which takes
account of the 'socio-economic and political conditions producing
varying probabilities of spill-over.' The suggestion of determinism,
linearity or inevitability of spill-over, has been largely exponed
from neo-functionalist literature. Rather, Lindberg and Scheingold
have suggested other dynamic processes which can be isolated in
conjunction with 'spill-over.' These are the process models of 'for-
ward linkage,' 'output failure,' 'equilibrium,' 'spill-back' and 'sys-
tems transformation.' The main neo-functionalists concern re-
 mains however ''spill-over'' or forward linkage - the developmental
process from a fledgeling international interdependence via com-
mon institutions to a supranational system with the attributes of
an authoritative decision-making unit. Scheingold defines 'spill-
over' as 'the process whereby members of an integration scheme,
agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but une-
qually satisfied with their attainment of these goals, attempt to resol-
ve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration in
another, related sector (expanding the scope of the mutual commit-
ment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (in-
creasing the level of mutual commitment) or both.' For Lindberg
what constitutes 'spill-over' is that ''the ability of any of the Six to
achieve major policy goals is dependent upon the attainment by the
others of their policy goals. In such a situation, the role of the cen-
tral institutions in helping to define the terms of the final agreement
is crucial... the initial task and grant of powers to the central institu-
tions creates a situation or series of situations that can be dealt with
only by further expanding the task and the grant of power.''

Finally the notion of spill-over assumes as a precondition in the
integrating international system the existence of considerable eco-
omic and political interdependence. The neo-functionalists stress
severally the importance of prior bureaucratic interpenetration (elite complementarity) and the existence of interest-groups and political parties who are used to operating freely throughout the system. The capacities and adaptability of both the national governments and the supranational elites are also presupposed. In the economic sector, neo-functionalists tend to take it for granted that the modern industrialized society of the Western European model is virtually the only one in which the functional tactics of "tie-ins" and "package deals" can operate successfully at the same time as neo-functionalists see the purely economic fields, as opposed to the cultural and social ones, as being more conducive to the effects of "spill-over."

Neo-functionalist analyses of integration treat the nation-states, in the form of political leaders and bureaucratic officials, as just one more group among the constellation of interest-groups, coalitions and parties which operate at the international level. The neo-functionalist image of integration as "an institutionalized pattern of interest politics, played out within existing international organizations" means that although the nation-states are recognized as decision-making centres on the national level and also as the spearhead of certain group interest and political demands, it is their role as one of the many actors on the international level - within existing institutions - which is relevant for the process of integration. Even the nation-states themselves become in the neo-functionalist scheme, not the monolithic power centres of the pluralist, functional and federalist perspectives, but fragmentations of political actors and parochial groupings of the subnational and crossnational varieties. The shifting coalitions between these groups are carried on, according to the neo-functionalists, not merely on the basis of national demarcations but of perceived group interest.

Behind this view of interest politics lies intellectual traditions of classical and pluralist liberalism as well as group theory which in turn derive from liberalist theory. The classic liberal calculus results in the service of the common good by means of a criss-cross of individual and group interest pursued under the watchful eye and supervised by the "hidden hand" of the state. Modern pluralist liberalism while continuing to adhere to the basic calculus of conflicting individual and group interest, sees the role of the central institutions as far more than that of a referee since these institutions are expected to entrench and expand their power by their successful management of the conflict situations. Modern pluralist liberalism also emphasizes the role a normative consensus within which these conflicts of interests are played out and resolved.

Neo-functionalist perspective of integration as resulting from the resolution of conflict within the decision-making ambit of international institutions derives from these liberal concepts. Where functionalists see the organization of the objective individual inte-
rests - expressed in socio-economic and welfare terms - as the road to integration, the neo-functionalists regard these welfare, economic and technological matters as essential only in so far as they are perceived by groups and elites and translated into political demands based on self-interest. These demands are channelled into issue-areas which form the determinants of the functions performed in a community.

Neo-functionalists have generally not devoted nearly as much attention to analysis of political integration on the level of individuals as they have devoted to the systemic level. In one of the few neo-functionalists analysis focused on this level Inglehart has stated the problems thus: 'To what extent do public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set of national decision-makers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase (or diminish) regional integration?' The factors which Inglehart has singled out for examination include the openness and responsiveness of national decision-making structures. As we have pointed out neo-functionalists have generally assumed an undercurrent of normative consensus as one of the requisites for political integration. The idea of a 'permissive consensus' connotes, if not a patently favourable attitude among the general public towards the other members of the community, the institutions, and the acts of the elites, then at least a passive absence of antipathies towards these objects, organs and acts. According to Inglehart's delimitation, it should be possible to research into the effect on the elites of this consensus. The other factors discussed by Inglehart are the distribution of political skills in society ('cognitive mobilization' producing public attitudes more favourable to integration) and the relation of decisions to deep-seated values among the public (internalization of integrative values, and the relative effects of short and long-term feedback.)

The cognitive and affective components of individual attitudes in the process of integration are usually separated in neo-functionalist theorizing, with more emphasis placed on the cognitive aspects. The cognitive aspects are very much like the utilitarian perceptions of the individuals stressed in functionalist writings or, as Haas puts it: 'expectations concerning sources of interest-fulfillment.' The affective aspect includes 'loyalties, values and the sense of community.' Although the neo-functionalists differ from the functionalists in reckoning to some extent with the affective aspects of individual attitude, they regard this aspect as dependent in the final analysis on the cognitive components. Lindberg and Scheingold distinguish between 'utilitarian' and 'affective' attitudes as well as 'identitive' and 'systemic' supports finding the utilitarian and systemic supports more conducive to integration in the Community than the affective and identitive support.
Neo-functionalist discussion of attitudes usually revolves around the elites. As Lindberg maintains about the "perceptions and resulting behaviour" of elites, "the relationship between this set of indicators and those referring to governmental decision-making is very close." It is therefore the political attitude change among the elites which counts most in the neo-functionalist analysis of integration and the 'social learning' which the pluralists and functionalists capitalize on among the individuals is confined in neo-functionalist literature largely to the national political, administrative and economic elites and the representatives of international organizations.

The attitude change, being based ostensibly on utilitarian perceptions, are incremental and take place piecemeal. It is the successes of the common institutions in satisfying utilitarian expectations and allocating values which trigger off loyalties in new areas. There are difficulties of course, which we shall tackle further on, about situations in which changes in affective attitudes do not remain at par with changes in the cognitive attitudes. At any rate neo-functionalist analysis on the whole tends to rely on the elites to direct the affective attitudes of the public through education and propaganda.

Group dynamics theory has provided the neo-functionalist approach with a perspective for analyzing attitude change in which "contextual pressures toward attitude change (communications, interactions, cognitive dissonance, time-perception)" all militate in favour of attitude change just as within the context of Synder's decision-making process. In short, it is not so much the objective self-interest of individuals that counts as how they perceive these interests. Experience in decision-making is pointed out by neo-functionalists as a powerful agent in socializing elites towards 'creative adaptation' of their norms as well as more uniform perception of their self-interest. Hence the value which the neo-functionalists place on the contacts between elites at the headquarters in Brussels of the European Community. As for individuals, neo-functionalists, to varying extents, accept the position of the pluralists in reposing trust on transactions and communications, that of the functionalists who stress the incremental effects of the satisfaction of individual needs and Russett's point about the internationalization of values among youths, making them receptive to new norms later in life.
Footnotes to Chapter five


2. Ibid, p.5.


4. Ibid.


11. Ibid.


13. Lindberg ibid.


15. See Pentland, C. on this point op. cit. p.108.


17. Lindberg, L.: The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, p.80.


24. Haas, E.B.: Beyond the Nation-State, p.35.


27. On discussions of this point see Pentland, C. op. cit. p.129.

28. Ibid.


Our task in the two following chapters is to throw into critical relief the theories on integration which we surveyed in the four preceding chapters. During our review of those theories we drew attention to several aspects of both the assumptions and postulates of their concepts which we hinted were discussable. We propose now take up those points. It is however of the utmost importance to bear in mind the crux of the problem we posed for ourselves. We set out to analyze the conditions which govern the unification venture on the continent of Africa. Our strategy is worth repeating. We expect to draw critically from the findings of the four mid-term theories we have surveyed, conscious of the special aspects of the object of our study. Specifically we shall examine to what extent the process variables put forward by contemporary theories on integration are sufficient in explaining integration attempts in Africa, whether the definitions of the end-product need reformulation in view of any contextual idiosyncracies and finally we shall attempt, at the end of the section, to put forth a framework within which we shall examine in more detail the progress since 1963 of efforts at unification in Africa.

Several objections to the above statement could be raised. To begin with, there is a palpable tendency among certain theorists on integration to look with suspicion at efforts to project the special traits - not to say 'uniqueness' - of certain areas in the examination of the flood of variables thrown out by our mid-term theories. Like Haas, these theorists brand such efforts as representing a withdrawal "into the safe shell of geographical uniqueness and complacently noting that 'things are different in Pago Pago.'" If I may stretch the freedom of interpretation, this is to say that for the political scientist, problems, properly speaking, ought not be designated as African or Asian or Latin American but should be investigated on the basis of the isolation of a myriad variable which, when adequately linked together conceptually as verifiable hypotheses, ought to endow theory with more than geographically limited validity. So far so good. The correctness of this point of view can be readily granted. Indeed, although it is possible to multiply examples of problems which occur fortitously in certain geographical areas it is equally true that a great many of such problems are experienced by other geographical areas if not contemporaneously then at different mo-
ments of history. As such, to the political scientist they are not problems to be designated by geographical momenclatures, but phenomena, human phenomena at that, to be investigated in terms of the relevant variables.

A rather similar objection has been raised by Etzioni against a not infrequent stance of historians, namely, that which regards "each context (as) unique, hence what needs explanation is not diversity but uniformity - if ever found." Affirmations about differences in the historical context are of scant value since, for the political scientist just as for the sociologist, "the 'historical context' is a shorthand phrase referring to the values of a myriad variable; unless these are specified, little is explained by the statement that 'the context is different'."

As general precepts for scientific thinking little can be said to negate these objections. In practice, however, the path of political science, in this respect has been beset by age-old and 'venerable' stumbling blocks. For despite the universality implied in the Aristotelian dictum that 'Man is, by nature, a political animal,' political science has come, among other sterling qualities, to be dominated by assumptions about the so-called 'Graeco-Roman-Christian' tradition. The form of state organization implicit in this tradition, the political and economic principles as well as the image of society that emanate from it have often been assumed to approximate to what Lipset has called the best that man can hope for. As for the conditions related to this image of the utmost in state organization they are "essentially located in countries of northwest Europe and their English-speaking offspring in America and Australasia."

This line of assumption thus often falls into the selfsame geographical pitfalls which some theorists castigate. Lipset continues: "...the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia and Africa is bleak. The nations (my italics) which have the best prospects, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, the Philippines and Turkey, tend to resemble Europe in one or more major factors..."

Lest it be thought that the above is some specie of aberration of the old school it will be instructive to peruse some of the contents of political development theory which can be said to subsume some of these assumptions in a modern guise - now usually termed Western-democratic-industrialized. Focusing, for instance, on competitiveness as an essential aspect of political modernity, Coleman has said that "the Anglo-American polities most closely approximate the model of a modern political system." We have pointed out in our foregoing review of political integration theories, how all these approaches take their cue in one way or another from political development theory and other influences about assumptions concerning the so-called Western democratic model as the be-all and end-all of political development. Seen in this light, political science can be said
to have encapsulated itself to an unacceptable degree in a shell of
ethnocentric presumption. The besetting sin in political science of
claiming that "things are different in Pago Pago" has an equally se­
rious counterpart, namely the bland assumption that "Pago Pago is
the world writ small."

Before we run the risk of overstating this point let us hasten to
add that one of the refreshing aspects of political science, in our
day, is the emergence - under the influence of developments in
other parts of the world outside the Western-democratic orbit, as
well as growing doubts about some of the outputs of the capitalist-
industrialized-democratic system - of a fledgeling cohort of political
scientists who increasingly question some of the assumptions we ha­
ve stated.

Moreover, if these assumptions are hardly excusable they are
understandable. One writer has stated it thus: "Political science
had become 'established' as a discipline before there was any general
awareness that countries outside the 'Graeco-Roman-Christian orbit
had anything which might be dignified by the name of 'politics' at
all. Systems which did not conform to this norm tended to be dis­
missed as 'deviants' ...most of our everyday synonyms (reference to
such words as 'civilization', politeness', 'civility') imply that the
person being praised is a fit member of a 'Graeco-Roman-Christian
state.'" Regarding the African scene specifically, a history of pur­
ported European mission civilisatrice has served to further reinforce
the force of habit.

It should now be easier to state our point simply. Those who
employ the geographical terms African, or Asian or Latin American
in political science to categorize certain phenomena, do so for want
of better terms and ostensibly in order to break out of the shell of
presumption which we have just described. (This is an issue that is
commonly brushed aside but which is becoming too grave to be ig­
ored since it is proving increasingly to be a liability for theory). It
is not the 'Africanness', 'Asianness' or'Latin Americanness' that is
the germane point. The geographical term can be likened to a meta­
phor serving notice that the confines of the traditional assumptions
in political science are too narrow and must give. Robert Ward has,
for instance, pointed out the illogicality in American political scien­
ce of regarding specialization in systems in America and Europe as
standard parts of the discipline whereas specialization outside these
areas are termed 'Area Approach'.

There is another sense in which these assumptions are doing dis­
service to the pursuit of understanding in the science of politics.
Gunnar Myrdal has said: "Our knowledge, as well as our ignoran­
ce, at any time and on every issue, tends to be opportunistically con­
ditioned, and thus brought to deviate from full truth. In every
epoch and every problem, this opportunistic tendency operates also
in our scientific work, if not critically scrutinized.” We noted in our survey of theories on political integration how the choice of variables of the different theorists - what they see or do not see as problems - are conditioned by their perspectives. Similarly, the fact that all these theorists subscribe largely to the Western-industrialized-democratic political system would tend, to the extent that Myrdal’s observation has validity, to imbue their theories with an opportunistic aspect geared towards the refinement of the system which they are familiar with and believe in, to the exclusion, consciously or otherwise, of other systems. Perhaps this is why contemporary theories on integration have mainly served to predict failures when they have been turned on the African system. To arrive closer to the ’full truth’, or at least expand our horizon, data derived from conscious emphasis on other systems need to be employed - together with their baggage of opportunism.

This having been stated it remains incumbent on us to delineate the specific variables on which our claim for the difference of the African situation is postulated. It goes without saying that one of the cardinal sources of the special traits of the African political system can be found in her colonial experience. Much analysis - and lamentation - has been directed at this considerable period of history and we have scant reason to dwell on it here, except to categorize some of its abiding repercussions on African countries in the political, economic and social spheres. On few evidence is there so much consensus among observers of widely differing persuasions as the uniqueness of the political boundaries which were superimposed by alien powers in the nineteenth century on the cultural and ethnic reality of the African continent. What this has meant in terms of political reality in contemporary times is that any process towards unification in Africa has to reckon with the existence of some fifty odd states. Many of these states are miniscule in terms of geographical area, population and political power. Their economic characteristics are governed by a concatenation of factors most of which can plausibly be traced to the said colonial era. In the main, these countries have remained almost exclusively producers of primary products. Not only does this make them competitors to the extent that they produce the same primary products but it hampers the potential of their economies for complementing themselves.

A further point follows from the above. The African countries are generally non-industrialized or at a low level of industrialization. In part this is dependent on the smallness of the spatial area of these countries, or the smallness of their populations or both,* although

*The average size of a country in Africa is put at 271,000 sq. miles compared with 448,000 sq. miles for Asia and 528,000 sq. miles for South America. The corresponding average figures for populations are 6 million for Africa, 11 million for South America and 43 million for Asia. See Hazelwood A. (ed) African Integration. London 1967, p.9.
other factors come into play. The disadvantages of this state of affairs include the barriers to integrative policies aimed at utilizing the redistributive effects of industrialization, namely substitution of domestic high-cost production with low-cost supplies from other units of the African system. At all events, the fact that the economies of the African countries still suffer from their colonial attachment to alien economies as mere appendages, has produced a situation in which intra-African trade is much less important than trade between African states and foreign countries making it even more problematic to realize effective economic harmonization. Of course this is only one side of the ledger. The practice until now has been to characterize these factors as being unmitigatedly negative. It is possible however to argue that they possess their positive consequences, depending on what sort of theoretical perspective is utilized. A single illustration will suffice here. Conventional customs union theory, derived from experiences in so-called economically developed areas, holds that the primary importance of customs union resides in the efficient allocation and utilization of resources. Now, considering the aforementioned facts regarding the economies of African states, coupled with the effects of the general low-income levels which typify the majority of African states, the marginal effect of customs union on the African economies may appear minimal since the resources involved are not considerable. But if the question is attacked from the perspective of the influence of customs union on growth - a perspective which does not suggest itself readily in cases involving developed countries - then it is possible to see the benefit of customs union as residing primarily in its role as a stimulus for growth by giving rise to new productive capacities.

The purely economic issues dovetail with the political, social and psychological. In our day, especially in the period following the second world war and the independence of African states, the issues involved in the economic situation of African countries have stood out more vividly. In contrast to the view in which specialization in particular primary products is seen as an advantage in the international economic system, African countries are discovering how much they are prey to the whimsical fluctuations of world demand, supply and price conditions. In the short run these fluctuations produce bottlenecks in development processes which are predicated on export earnings from primary products - an item which in such economies usually constitutes a disproportionately large part of the national income. In the longer term the effects of the low income-elasticity of demand of certain products - such as foodstuffs - set in. By means of improved agricultural protection and methods of production leading to productivity gains, and also through the effects of growing replacement of certain raw products by synthetic material, the developed countries cut down severely on
the growth of demand for primary commodities.

Attempts by African countries to face this situation with the aid of industrialization are becoming more widespread although they have met with mixed success. The small size of the domestic markets constitutes a major impediment as well as the fact that industrialization is producing, in many cases, the self-same enclave economy which typified the colonial period. Last but not least, tariff protection in Europe and the United States against precisely those industrial products from the infant industries of the developing areas, presents another effective barrier. The political, social, and psychological impact of these consequences are subsumed in the growing tendency among African countries to embrace integration in one form or another as a solution to their problems, and also in the fact that elites in these countries now tend to perceive modernization as synonymous with industrialization and industrialization as dependent on integration, represented in the economic sense by the search for wider markets.

In the political sphere, one of the major distinguishing traits of the African situation is the degree of nationalism. It is perhaps to be expected that this is one of the guiding features of systems which have just emerged from colonial tutelage and in which attempts at modernization and national cohesion must call national feeling to their aid. What, however, is often not taken into sufficient consideration is the bifurcate nature of nationalism in Africa. At one end of the scale is the nationalism of the states, supported by the feeling that present political authority ought to be entrenched in order at all to have a going political concern. But since, from rational economic and political perspectives, as we have seen, the very idea of such a conglomeration of small weak states is taken to merit criticism, we have at the other end of the scale the nationalism which is broader and more continental. Again, the usual practice until now has been to assume that these two nationalisms are quite contradictory if not mutually exclusive. But even a superficial attention to events in Africa in the past fifty years will reveal that in reality these two forms of nationalism are capable of being subsumed in one article of faith so that instead of being contradictory, one can plausibly be regarded as a function of the other.

Pan-Africanism has served as a framework within which this apparent contradiction could be resolved. "In ideology," it has been said, "there is a strong tendency to merge fact and value, to superimpose upon things as they are the things that are desired." In this sense the function of Pan-Africanism has been to unite the fact of state nationalism with the desire for a more exclusively continental nationalism. It is well nigh impossible to find among the leadership, elite, or masses in Africa any considerable opinion that is consistently negative towards the ideology of Pan-Africanism.
The familiar fact is rather the consistency with which Africans at all levels subscribe to the desire for continental unity in principle. Yet this common ideological commitment to Pan-Africanism should not obscure another equally salient fact. It has been claimed that the political scientist analyzing post-industrial societies with a considerable history of national unity can plausibly make the assumption about what has been termed the 'end of ideology'. This assumption, found frequently in American political science, holds that 'liberal, pluralistic interest-group politics (is) played out against a backdrop of ideological consensus.' No such claim has been made about the African situation either on the national or continental level. Indeed contemporary African politics on the national level, marked by violent oscillations between civilian and military rule, reveals a lack of this consensus as one of its chief features. On the continental level, African leaders have made no secret of the absence of this basic consensus. A close look at the speeches of African heads of state at the Conference in 1963 establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU), will clearly show that these leaders were all too aware of this fact and were willing to temper their politics of unity with that perspective. One of the basic theses of this work is that this lack of consensus expressed in a multiplicity of conflicts between 1957 and 1963, was a prime impetus, in line with Coser's analysis of conflict, in the movement of African states towards some form of unification.

Although as a general claim pertaining to all sectors of political life the assumption about the 'end of ideology' can often appear questionable even in a post-industrial society with entrenched national unity, it is possible to envisage situations in which 'certain areas of political life are imbued with a basic ideological consensus.' One can further suppose that to the extent that such areas are considered of key importance, their promotive effect as a background to such processes as integration is likely to be enhanced. In our brief discussion on the typical economic condition of African states, we traced many of its origins to the colonial era and pointed out that particularly elites in Africa see these issues more and more in those terms and formulate their solutions to the problems from that perspective. Now, the history of both Pan-Africanism and politics between independent African states will reveal that one issue on which there is a basic ideological consensus among Africans has been the political liberation of African states from colonial rule. If we reason further that the African states perceive their economic and hence their political problems as part and parcel of the colonial system, it is possible to suppose that the basic issue commanding consensus - that of liberation - is perceived as a key issue. Therefore we can expect to find that its input in political processes requiring consensus will be considerable. As a matter of fact, in this work we shall
content that its effect on integration is decisive.

We now turn to a final point of demarcation, namely, the effects of the fact of Africa's economic dependence and the implications of the attendant political dependence. Hitherto, political integration theorists have laid stress severally on the beneficial effects of core areas as a stimulus in the process of integration. One writer, in a variation of this point, laments the adverse effects on the process of integration in Africa, of the absence of an uncontested leadership in the form of one man or a state, in the same way that the United States of America is considered to have stimulated the integrative process in Europe or to lead the same process within the Organization of American States (OAS). This idea of a *deus ex machina* has heretofore been seen largely from its supposed positive effects as a catalyst in the integration process. No doubt much can be said for this point of view. In fact we have drawn attention to another aspect of that point, namely, how the threat posed by the increasing domination of the international economic system by industrialized countries can act as an impetus towards integration on the part of the producers of primary products. But these possibilities notwithstanding, the powerful tendencies that propell African countries towards economic stagnation and dependency have as their principal effect the encroachment upon their liberty of action. The reliance of many African national budgets on aid, the dependence of these countries on external know-how for setting up some form of superstructure, the attachment of the African countries *en bloc* to external economic systems - an act which, despite seemingly favourable bargains, constitutes, according to some, the pinning of a sluggish economy to the chariot wheels of a dynamic system in the name of association - the accumulation of enormous debts which not all the will in UNCTAD can make fade into thin air, the compounding of all these things by a more subtle yet more penetrating cultural attachment - these factors point, in political terms, to dependency. The effect on the African process of unification manifests itself in the considerable role which external elites play in conflicts among African states, both in exacerbating them and as powerful factors influencing the success of mediation. It also manifests itself in the character of regional groupings some of which lean heavily on the side of their respective *catalyseur*. The *deus ex machina* has become, in contemporary jargon, a *Godfather*.

"Dans cette situation," concludes Constantin, "le «catalyseur» extérieur peut détourner le processus intégrateur de ses objectifs théoriques, c'est-à-dire la primauté des intérêts des peuples africains." For the spheres of economic and political influence pur-
sued and created by such external forces among the African states can hardly be expected, in complete negation of other vested interests, to be uniformly benign and to proceed unflinchingly in the direction of African integration. In any case they open the possibility for a multiplicity of more or less closed sub-regional groupings - a functionalist’s nightmare.

We can now pause to summarize our categories. There is no attempt, in presenting them, to claim exhaustiveness for them. They are essentially broad categories intended as an aid in clarifying how it may be meaningful to speak of distinctive attributes of the African situation in the light of which we can scrutinize the contemporary theoretical findings on the process and end-product of integration. We have noted among the African states a common colonial experience. What makes it distinctive more than other traumatic experiences like the world wars** or the great plague, is first, that all the countries within the African system were directly involved in it in one form or another; that this experience is continuing within that system; and that their physical structure as well as the economic and political structure appear to be dictated predominantly by that experience. We also noted that these states were non-industrialized. This is a characteristic which the African system can be said to share with some other systems although certain authors would maintain otherwise. But here again the distinctive quality is how the elites perceive their non-industrialized status and their efforts at the rudiments of industrialization as being intertwined with the colonial system. We noted the twofold character of nationalism in Africa. Etzioni** has differentiated between three degrees of nationalisms in the study of unions; the prenationalist (e.g. the Roman Empire); postnationalist (e.g. the EEC); and unions that are themselves an expression of rising nationalism (e.g. the unification of Italy). However, these categories appear inadequate for our purposes since they clearly do not take account of the distinctive attributes of the African situation. The African unification process does not fall into the first two categories and although it has been claimed that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is an expression of rising African nationalism, it seems more justified to view the efforts at nation-building on the level of the individual African state as the salient expression of nationalism, whereas the formation of the Organization of African Unity can plausibly be held to have stemmed essentially

**Even then Stanley Hoffmann maintains that a ‘pressing background of memories and worries’ from a common wartime experience sets the universe of the Six apart from the universe of British and American politics. This argument, in our view, applies a fortiori in the case of African states and neocolonialism. See Hoffmann A. Discod in Community op. cit. p.528.
out of the conflict between different groupings of nationalisms. The other level of nationalism on a continental level was strongest prior to the national liberation of African states and finds expression nowadays as a residue of Pan-Africanist ideology the most potent content of which is the liberation of African territories on a national basis structured on the colonial boundary demarcations. Finally we noted the highly penetrated structure of African states, economically, politically and culturally leading to a considerable circumscription of their freedom of action in the unification process. There is also a propensity on the part of the exogenous forces to maintain or resurrect spheres of economic and political influence based not on alliance but on dependence—a phenomenon we categorize under the Godfather syndrome.

To return to the end-product defined by theorists on political integration, we encounter a term, political community, which has already entailed a certain problem for conceptualization among contemporary integration theorists but which for our purposes threatens to befog the relevance of these theories for the African case. The reason for this lies chiefly in two factors: (1) the tendency to employ this term as a synonym for what in systems analysis is usually termed political system and (2) the bias implied in this use of the term by reason of the specific geographical region with reference to which it was first developed. Deutsch advances two separate definitions. In the first one, since he focuses on communication, he differentiates between community and society in largely the same way as the classic sociological and anthropological distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft laying emphasis on the cultural aspect of integration i.e. "those symbols, ideas and artifacts transmitted from generation to generation." Thus a society is "a group of individuals connected by an intense division of labor and separated from other societies by a marked drop in this intensity" whereas community refers to "people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and services." The second definition advanced by Deutsch concerns more specifically political cohesion at the international level and deals with political community. Political community for him is "a community of social interaction supplemented by both enforcement and compliance." In such a community "coordinated facilities for the making of decisions and the enforcement of commands are supplemented by habits of compliance which are sufficiently widespread and predictable to make enforcement in the remaining cases of non-compliance probable at an economically and culturally feasible cost." Clearly, the meaning of this concept resembles very much the definition of a political system in systems analysis. Rather than limit its scope to the cultural aspect as in the first definition, it appears to embrace the totality of interac-
tions concerned with the authoritative allocation of values.

As we have already pointed out, Haas has described political community as a condition in which "specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographical space." Here again it is the totality of political relationships which is the main concern of the concept.

Most of the end-products of the process of integration advanced by theorists are predicated on the kinds of end-states to which the observable developments in the European or Atlantic models are expected to lead. Integration is thus seen in the terms of the observable variables in a specific geographical setting. Particularly the pluralists and the neo-functionalists set much store by the observable condition of the European setting regarding transactions and institutions respectively. Now, there seems to be no controversy about the fact that the pattern of integration which is going on in the European setting is operating at higher levels than in almost all other regions. Therefore the fact that the variables observed in that setting would show a bias towards the attributes of an advanced stage of the process of integration ought to be self-evident. In short, variables such as an advanced level of a "we" feeling and a set of rather stable and functioning institutions can be expect to be the order of the day. But if we regard the process of integration as a continuum ranging conceptually from a powerful unitary end-state to a low point on the line where things fall apart and the centre cannot hold, then it is relevant to put the questions: What about the lower ranges of continuum? Are we to isolate the partial attributes of the upper ranges and formulate them in a term that claims to represent the whole?

For this is precisely what the concept of political community purports to do. "The peculiar value of the concept," asserts Easton, is that it conveys the latent notion that, underlying the functioning of all systems, there must be some cohesive cement - a sense or feeling of community amongst the members. Unless such sentiments emerge, the political system itself may never take shape or if it does, it may not survive." This is (ought to be?) the central meaning of political community - the capitalization on the affective aspect of a political system. We shall presently try to show that a political system may begin with or without this affective aspect. The point to note here is that if it is agreed that such affective aspect including loyalty to institutions, can reasonably be expected to be higher at an advanced point on the continuum of the process of integration, and if in isolating these variables we make them appear to represent the whole of the political system, or if we tend to see the end-state predominantly in terms of those variables, we run the risk of begging the question of integration for the lower ranges of the
continuum. Our partial variables, by appearing to represent, or inordinately dominate, the whole, would sap the meaning out of the study of the lower ranges on the process. One writer impressed by the absence of these variables pointing to a political community in the Nordic area, was led to assert: "If the assumption concerning the character of Nordic integration is correct, it is probable that they (the integration theories) are not sufficient to provide the theoretical basis for an approach founded on the assumption that Nordic cooperation can be regarded as an instance of integration." What in this case is true of the Nordic area is even more true for the African setting. What would seem to suggest itself in the face of this fact is that any definition of integration, if it can claim to take account of both the higher and lower levels of the process must be formulated in a sufficiently broad manner to significantly accommodate variables that are not merely the hallmarks of more advanced levels of integration.

A pertinent issue in this connection is the not infrequent practice of posing a distinction between regional cooperation (or transactions or organizations) and integration, and arguing on the basis of this that those systems which exhibit ostensibly the qualities of regional cooperation cannot be entered in the process of integration. As Haas puts it, "Regional cooperation is a vague term covering any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly experienced need... But judgements as to whether cooperation is "successful" must be based on criteria very different from those appropriate to the study of integration."

There is more than a little risk of confusion of issues in this line of argument once we have opted to see integration as a process and not as a particular terminal condition. What the continuum of the process of integration actually registers is, according to our definition,* the different degrees of cohesion - not expressed in terms of regional cooperation or regional organization, but in terms of some requisite elements which we have included in our definition. If we recognize this, there is then conceptually no reason why it should be the same continuum which must account for both integration and cooperation even though at certain stages the former might exhibit qualities reproduces in the latter. Thus, continuum AB (for integration) might register at a locum x

A ----  x ---- B

A,--------------~It--------B

A,  x

*See definition further on.

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Conceptualizing rigorously, it would be wrong to assume that only a high degree of cohesion can account for the existence of a process of integration. There is, for example, in Haas' elaboration of his distinction between cooperation and integration, a seemingly unwitting assumption of this high degree of cohesion: "Integration studies," he states, "must rely on the study of comparative politics and economics because the regional organizations through which integrative/disintegrative activity is carried on are properly considered intervening variables which help explain our real concern, the attainment of the possible later conditions in which the region may find itself." (my italics). Even though Haas seems to renege on his earlier definition of integration as a terminal condition and now opts for seeing it as a process, at the same time, for him, it is the perception of a "new deal" - judged by the standards of the institutional and attitudinal criteria of an organization with which he is familiar (the EEC) - which decides whether a given case concerns integration or 'mere' cooperation. Haas again: "The study of regional integration is concerned with the outcomes or consequences of (the) activities (involved in regional cooperation or regional organizations) in terms of a "new deal" for the region in question even though these activities could of course be analyzed for other purposes as well."

We submit that it is not only the degree of cohesion but, just as importantly, the goal to which the actors are aspiring, expressed in statements by the relevant elites or in a pervasive ideology, which actually accounts for much of the general sense de la marche of the process. The degree of cohesion, once there is a prima facie case that the process has been embarked on, serves more to determine the position of the particular experiment on the continuum.

It may seem, at first blush, that this prima facie evidence is hard to determine. In reality, however, it is not a major problem. Within Western Europe, with a background of more or less vague commitment to supranationality, it is customary to speak of integration. On the contrary, it normally seems absurd to place the changing levels of rapprochement between e.g. the United States and the Soviet Union on the same basis seeing the complete absence of even remotely defined goals and ideologies for unity between the two actors. It comes naturally to speak of detente between the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc. But, again, it would seem absurd, within the Western world, to employ that terminology to describe the same tendency, of improvements in relations, between the component states within that system. Likewise for the relations between the African states. But African states, on the other hand, en bloc, can theoretically envisage a situation of detente between the rest of the continent and South Africa - two actors between whom there is no love lost. In order words, it is normally possible to determine the
existence or absence of this prior commitment which is the hallmark of the extended scope of the integration continuum as opposed to cooperation.

In brief, Haas’ statement on the distinction between cooperation and integration leaves something to be desired. Without the qualifications which we have advanced above, it seems to imply that once, in a given case, we detect ostensibly the rudimentary process of cohesion which we normally associate with cooperation, we cannot speak of integration i.e. it denies by inference that the under ends of the process of integration might quite simply resemble cooperation. Its implication that it is the greater cohesiveness eninced in the institutions and attitudes in more advanced experiments which is the overriding criterium for establishing the existence of the process of integration, appears narrow-sighted and, arguably, conceptually of doubtful validity - to put it charitably.

We said that a political system may begin with or without the affective aspect of integration. Indeed if the central elements among a group of persons in a political system consist of their participation in a common division of political labour and a sense of feeling of community among them, the existence of the former need not under all circumstances imply the existence of the latter. The minimal linkage in a political system between otherwise isolated and independent political activities resides in the participation in a common division of labour. The affective aspect may or, may not develop to strengthen the functional aspect. The example of the Hapsburg Empire has often been cited. That system was able to survive for centuries despite the fact that the affective aspect of the political system never developed to any appreciable degree.

Etzioni has further drawn attention to the way in which, in the epigenesis of social units, countries can begin to engage in collective activity long before control is internalized by the budding supranational system, how, in short, collective performances expand more rapidly than collective control. In the same manner, in the unification process, the adaptive aspect could precede the normative or vice versa depending on the nature of the unions concerned - determined by initial needs (e.g. industrialization) and the ’period’ (e.g. advent of nationalism).

The idea that community-like sentiments constitute an essential ingredient in a political system is mainly commonsensical. But it has also been shown in historical cases that without such sentiments political systems have largely been unable to continue in the long run. However, it would be a useful strategy in the analysis of budding unions to separate the affective aspect of a system from the purely instrumental or associitative. This would go a long way towards facilitating an openness of mind which does not see the end-
product mainly in terms of variables such as are to be found only in advanced unions. Moreover if other variables, even those which do not distinguish only advanced stages of unification, are taken into serious account, it would widen the scope of the continuum of the process of integration in such a way as to cover even those "processes of which," according to Andrén, "the significance and aims are hardly clear to its actors or possible to observe by the student."23

A useful way of doing this has been suggested by Easton's definitions.24 In this, the term political community is reserved for "that aspect of the political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor." There is no emphasis in this definition on how loose or tight these bonds may be. For the affective aspect, Easton uses the term sense or feelings of community to distinguish the strength of feelings associated with the instrumental attachment. It must be contended vigorously that this is not merely a question of semantics. The problem with the definitions of integration by Haas and Deutsch is that they tend to confine the criteria for assessing integration to such a high level that it might just as well be taken for granted that they refer to the EEC or the Atlantic system which, as we have pointed out, have no counterpart, as regarding the level of integration. We find that at least one important reason for this is the insistence on isolating the affective aspect of the system, judged by transactions and loyalty to institutions, and defining them as if they represented the totality of political interactions. We therefore propose a modified definition, for the purposes of this study, which, hopefully, will enable us fit in for analyses even the modest and problematic attempts at unification of the African type. For us, then, integration is a process of cohesion between specific and previously independent groups and individuals, in terms of values, institutions, and communication, which facilitate escalating sequences of social contact, cooperation and consensus. For us, the foremost recommendation of the above definition is its utility for our purposes in the present study. It is neutral in the sense that it contains no criteria which could be seen as favouring either a specific geographical setting or a particular perspective. It does not, for example, place the exacting demand on loyalty to central institutions found in Haas' definition. Although we speak of escalating sequences of cooperation and consensus we do not presuppose the rigid demand that the units involved would have renounced the use of force in settling their disputes. We shall presently tackle that point. Furthermore, our "sequences of social contact" affords in our view, a wide enough scope to analyze the economic, political, ideological and, if need be, the military aspects, without prejudging the issues with prior emphasis. It is also "low key" if, as we hope, it enables us conduct our investigation even "in the absence of significant data which otherwise

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might reduce or even eliminate the chances of conducting meaningful research. Finally, from the point of view of parsimony we have avoided cloudy concepts such as "sense of community," "loyalty to central institutions," "mutual obligations," "collective capacity," which by being controversial hamper operationalization.

Of course it might well be argued that to water down a definition also amounts to diluting its relevance as a tool of analysis. This is the kind of vagueness inherent in Galtung's definition which we have already cited or Korbonski's which speaks of "a process by which separate systems develop a common framework which allows for the common pursuit of some goals and common implementation of some policies." We have attempted to avoid much of this vagueness by including in our definition instead of "a common framework," which is decidedly vague, the idea of cohesion being judged in terms of values, institutions and communication although we claim no specific levels. Also, for "common implementation" which suffers the same limitation as "common framework," we include social contact, cooperation and the idea of consensus. Naturally, since we are operating in the present analysis on much lower levels of unification than those from which the familiar pretheories on integration are drawn, we are conscious of the fact that it is a question of a more or less judicious balance between specificity of criteria and universal applicability of definition.

Footnotes to Chapter six


8. See Pentland, C. on this point op. cit. p.110.


10. See Deutsch, K. et.al. op. cit.


13. See Segal, G.


15. For the following discussion on political community see Easton, D.: A system Analysis of Political Life, New York 1967, pp.171 ff.

16. Ibid.


23. Andrén, N. op. cit. p.3.


25. Korbonski, Andrzej on this point op. cit. p.947.

7. Limitations of theory: A framework for analysis

In the last chapter we tried to make a case for, and also categorize, the distinctive nature of the African setting in the study of integration. We also put forward certain criticisms of some basic concepts about the end-product. Our criticism led us at the close of the chapter to a suggested definition of integration to meet our purposes. We shall continue in this chapter our scrutiny of the contemporary theories on integration and build up our suggested framework. Once again it is worth stating that the subject we are faced with concerns attempts at unification at considerably lower levels than theories on integration are normally exercised by. Theory-building or conceptual analysis on such a level carries with it more than the normal share of anguish. For one thing, we will have to discard a lot of the paraphernalia for microstudies which have proved invaluable in studying settings in which reliable data abound and statements of intentions, ideologies, and general directions of planning have been stipulated repeatedly over a long period. Instead we shall have to content ourselves with broad analyses, sometimes in the broadest of outlines, in a setting in which the actors have not debated their priorities for more than a few short years, where the general outlines of the direction of development often have yet to emerge. But the effort is not thankless. We shall be posing a number of questions some of which, though by no means novel, have been obscured in the search for variables on integration at other levels. What part does ideology play in the lower ranges of the process of integration? How far has conflict been a positive factor on this level? Which of the approaches that we surveyed describes most adequately the process as well as its different stages in the setting that concerns us here? How relevant are some of their assumptions (e.g. on political development, pluralist politics and industrialization?) What are the implications for integration at such a level of concepts like spill-over, the debate over automaticity, high and low politics and threshold conditions? How considerable are these theories as an aid in predicting developments in the African setting?

First about ideology. What role does ideology play in the early stages of the integration process? We have two extremeties to grapple with: Neo-functionalists affirm the irrelevance of 'operative myths' such as is found in the long tradition of European unity going back in history. It has been repeated ad nauseam that the ideology of Pan-Africanism was the principal moving force behind the
Organization of African Unity. The basic explanation for these two opposite assertions lies, in our view, in the difference between the two settings about which the assertion are made. There seems to be a consensus among the theorists on integration that the kind of societies they have studied within the Western-democratic-industrialized models are more prone to integration either through functional means, through transactions or through developing the sinews of fledgeling supranational institutions or yet again, as the federalists would prescribe, through the willing abrogation of their sovereignty. By the same token, it is assumed that the role of ideology - which is directed at the sentiment or belief in unity - plays a lesser role in the upper levels of integration compared with the role of functional or utilitarian aspects. By contrast, in less developed social units the affective aspect is supposed to play a larger role since the basis for integration by functional means may be small or non-existent. Thus Deutsch and his associates found in their study of political community in Europe that although the conditions of integration "may be assembled in almost any sequence... consent has to come before compliance if amalgamation is to have lasting success." Etzioni, on the other hand, expects that in newly independent states the normative aspect of integration will be stressed more than the instrumental as in the Nordic Union.

Ideology plays an important role in the promotion of a 'we-feeling.' There are normally two ways in which a we-feeling might emerge. It can result from a common history, through past religious, literary and mythical traditions of the system. It can also emerge from current events whatever the past history might have been. Through ideology these factors are 'interpreted and codified in a form that makes them readily visible, accessible, and transmissible over the generations.' We shall expect therefore at the inception of a process of unification that ideology performs the function of creating a sense of community by codifying an image of a common past, a common destiny and a common fate.

Ideology can however be seen in two ways. In reality of course the two aspects need not be mutually exclusive and do co-exist as the content of most ideologies. But since one aspect may predominate, depending on the particular circumstances, thus producing crucial results for the system concerned, it is well worth looking into these two aspects. Ideology can exist as a set of beliefs helping to orient members of a society towards the image of the kind of society they want to have. This kind of ideology while seeking to indicate a way of looking at the past and the future organization of the society, is not immediately concerned with a militant pursuit of policies to put into effect their image of the society. Easton cites the example of economic liberalism whose content is largely 'demands' of a negative character in the sense that what their image of the society envisa-
ges is that government should refrain from interference in a range of activities in the social and political spheres. Naturally, since it would still require authoritative action even to effect these 'negative' requirements they could be said to represent demands - albeit of a non-militant character.

The other aspect of ideology is more militant. Besides, although part of its content may include, and usually includes, an image of a projected society, it is generally concerned with demands stated as a general programme and setting goals for immediate action or action in the not so far future. Such an ideology is usually propagandist. It is also usually the product of historical circumstances which the proponents (elites) of the ideology seek to change. It is possible to view the Pan-Africanist movement in this light. As we shall see, it represented a set of concrete demands emanating from historical circumstances under which its promoters (elites) were chafing. It was militant in the sense that the programme set up by the ideology posited concrete goals and demanded immediate action by means of more or less frequent and intense protests and representations. Depending on the historical circumstances, the ideology may cover a system which may be a tribe, village, nation or region. To raise support it would find its potency in setting up a belief structure e.g. about a common culture, or a common destiny enunciated in such statements as 'we are all Africans.'

What interests us mainly here is what happens to this kind of ideology in the face of any of a set of two circumstances or both (1) when the demands of the ideology are met either formally, in toto, or partially and (2) if new overriding or more urgent loyalties fractionate the proponents (elites) of the ideology. As we have pointed out, it is not so much the social ideals seen as ideal images of a future society which set off this type of ideology. Rather it is the demands, the goals set up as a response to particular circumstances - a militant programme for action. Therefore we can expect that if the demands of the ideology are met or if the peculiar circumstances from which the ideology has emerged are positively and formally altered a large part of the impetus for the ideology is likely to evaporate.

What happens if a new set of loyalties or commitments fractionate the elite who direct the ideology? If we take the simple situation where an ideology grows from a conscious ad hoc attempt among separate groups to fight a common enemy, the termination of the conflict with a common enemy is likely to see the groups revert to their different loyalties even if new bonds between them are created in the process of cooperation. We see this sort of response among allies in a war and among liberation movements, parties and trade unions in countries under foreign tutelage. In other cases the cooperation between the different groups and among their elites in
fashioning an ideology may not have been intended as *ad hoc* but we
can expect that if historical circumstances fractionate them into enti-
tities that have more prospects of rallying immediate loyalties the
force of the common ideology is likely to be weakened and the elites
behind it may resort at best to being vaguely guided by it or at worst
to paying only lip service to it. One such historical circumstance is
the advent of nationalism defined as *organizationally heightened
and articulated group demands directed towards securing control of
the distributive system in a society.*

The upshot of all this is that ideology as a variable, in the circum-
stances we have just described, is only a catalyst. Where a common
history exists or there is a common involvement in current circum-
stances, ideology can serve as a unifying factor by directing percep-
tion towards a sense of community. But as a catalyst it can be frail
and stands to loose its potency if the other main ingredients change
their character radically. We must conclude therefore on the one
hand, that the assumption of contemporary integration theories that
ideology plays an overriding role in the integration process of less
developed areas is premature and must be subjected to the scrutiny
of empirical test. We shall go into this more concretely when we re-
view the Organization of African Unity in the next part of this
work. On the other hand, the neo-functionalist tendency to under-
state the influence of ideology in higher level processes of inte-
gration, has more recently been marked by an increase in the
willingness of certain of the theorists to place more importance on
the ideological variable. As Haas has said, "Pragmatic interests,
simply because they are pragmatic and not reinforced with deep
ideological or philosophical commitment, are ephemeral. Just be-
because they are weakly held they can be readily scrapped. And a poli-
tical process which is built and projected from pragmatic interests, is
bound to be a frail process, susceptible to reversal."*6

Both the pluralists and the functionalists in integration theory have
been accused of neglecting the role of conflict. The neo-functiona-
lists on the other hand base part of their analysis on the role of
conflict resolution in the advanced stages of integration. The plura-
list emphasis on communications and mutual responsiveness in the
process conditions tends to envisage a 'semi-autonomous, cumulati-
ve, and determined process' thereby overlooking the integrative ef-
fects that the resolution of conflict may bring. Similarly, the func-
tionalists lay emphasis on the objective, material and utilitarian
factors in the process of integration. It is the succesful accumula-
tion of these factors that dissolves the obstacles placed in the way of
integration by national divisions. Again like the pluralists they 'find
it difficult - indeed paradoxical - to conceive of integration proceeding through conflict. The neo-functionalists, on the contrary, attribute the accumulation of authority in the central institutions to the successful resolution of conflict. It has been pointed out, however, that in advanced levels of integration, such as the EEC, the increase in powers of the central institutions produces a negative effect by increasing the politicization of issues thus offsetting the benefits of conflict resolution. It has therefore been suggested that integration through conflict may be relevant only in the early phases of the process. Certainly the requirements of the two different settings - the high-level integrating unit and the lower-level integrating unit - appear to be quite different. In the higher-level integrating unit, since the level or scope of integration is already considerable, extensive negative results from conflict coupled with low gains from its positive effects may only serve to reduce the level of integration whereas in the early stages, assuming that integration either is non-existent or at a negligible level, any positive effect is comparably significant - if only by establishing the possibility for joining the process of integration.

In examining how conflict issues in an integrative process - in short the unifying dimensions of conflict - we are reminded of Coser’s words: “When one refers to conflict theory or integration theory one does not, or should not, consider them rival explanatory systems like, say Ptolemaic astronomy versus Copernican. They are partial theories sensitizing the student to one or another set of data relevant to full theoretical explanation. ’’The two concepts need not be diametrically opposed under all circumstances. We define conflict as normative behaviour that seeks to preserve or change the structure of a system through direct representation of demands by adversaries. Individuals and groups in a world where status, power, resources and values are scarce are apt to lay incompatible claims to these factors. However the mere existence of these claims, even if they constitute predispositions to engage in conflict, do not in themselves constitute conflict. Only when individuals or groups act in favour of their claims towards incompatible goals can conflict be said to ensue. ’’Conflict... is always a trans-action.’’ By functional impact of conflict we envisage the non-disruptive effects of conflict as opposed to its dysfunctional impact.

In their extensive sociological analysis of conflict both Simmel and Coser have examined many different aspects of the functions of conflict - ranging from its manifold effects on the internal structure of the group to its effects on the out-group. If we single out three of these propositions useful for our present purposes we can presume that: 1. conflict binds antagonists; 2. conflict establishes and maintains balance of power; 3. conflict creates associations and coalitions.
Conflict binds antagonists:

Contradictory as this statement would seem its meaning is quite trite. The implication is that conflict itself is an engagement in relationship. A common example is offered by child psychologists who point out that children who were previously strangers proceed to cooperate after they have quarrelled over a toy. Adults are however not immune to the same predilection. An extreme example is the cross-fertilization of alien cultures induced by war. Once relationship has been established by conflict, antagonists are apt to indulge in other forms of interaction by reason of the fact that they have acquired more knowledge about themselves.

Another way in which conflict can bind antagonists is by socializing them. It must be born in mind that the very engagement in a conflict frequently indicates that the antagonists have a common interest in some object. Or they may profess common interest in a goal while having incompatible ideas as to the means of attaining it - as in the case of African unity. All the same, frequently the existence of the common interest, or profession of it, paves the way for agreement over basic rules about 'what is done' and 'what is not done', on which the conflict is acted out. More than that, this inception of socialization may lead to the establishment of new rules and norms for conducting the conflict. Quite often it is on a quid pro quo basis. For example a certain head of state may want a neighbouring country to cease to lay claims either on his territory or on an ethnic group within it, and in return would agree to cease to support a breakaway opposition group or government-in-exile (an all too common phenomenon in Africa only a decade ago!) from the neighbouring territory. In time they may come to agree that in future it is not "a fair game" within a conflict to harbour political dissidents or to act to seize neighbouring territory. In short they are well on their way to establishing a new modus vivendi where it did not exist explicitly before. The salutary effect of conflict in this sense is then to focus conscious attention on ideas and concepts about latently disruptive issues.

Conflict establishes and maintains balance of power.

We defined conflict earlier as normative behaviour that seeks to preserve or change the structure of a system through direct representation of demands by adversaries. In a conflict situation, therefore, what the adversaries are doing, regardless of their substantive goals, is to try to influence the behaviour of others in accordance with their own wishes. They exercise power. However a conflict is not the same as a contest. In a contest prior criteria are already available by which it is determined who has the upper hand - as in sporting contests. Also, if it is possible to isolate financial power, we would generally be able to ascertain by means of money value who has the upper hand in this respect. But it is in the clash of adversaries that
knowledge of their relative strength is established. In the absence of prior legal and ethical precepts such as might exist in already socialized groups, it is partly this knowledge that helps to determine the respective allocation of the objects and factors to which they lay disparate claims. Another way of putting it is to say that it is engaging in conflict which ensures that the demands and desires of a given group are accorded the attention that they merit in the absence of other established precepts. "No doctrine that a true adjustment of interests follows from the free play of interest can be construed to mean that an interest which is neglected will get its right." 10

Once the adversaries have gauged their relative strength it is usually easier to recognize an equilibrium. Consider the case of a mediator in a conflict. Not infrequently, the mediator finds it impossible to embark on fruitful negotiation before conflict is actually engaged. But when adversaries have clashed "each estimates the limits of his resources as compared with those or his opponent and gauges his own inevitable losses against possible gains." 11 It becomes then more feasible for the mediator to gain a footing. Similarly between labour and management, the strike or lock-out serves to soften up the adversaries. It is a process of attrition which forces the adversaries to think in terms of an equilibrium. Conflict, therefore, by modifying the basis and perceptions of power relations, serves to maintain equilibrium.

**Conflict creates associations and coalitions.**

In their analysis of this proposition Simmel and Coser take up the phenomenon of the so-called "antagonistic cooperation." In essence it consists of "the combination of two persons or groups to satisfy a great common interest while minor antagonisms of interest which exist between them are suppressed." A familiar example is the banding together of entrepreneurs who normally compete among themselves in order to defend a common interest - say, against a trade union - while continuing to maintain competition in other respects.

There are two ways in which antagonisms against a common enemy may create bonds. It can give rise to new ideologies, loyalties and common values thus leading to formation of a new and distinct group. Or it can result in temporary or loose associations designed to meet a single threat or limited number of common threats. This latter effect usually issues in coalition - something that has been described as the minimum form of unification.

Conflicts arise over different kinds of issues and where a number of individuals or groups coalesce in multiple configurations to attain differing ends on different occasions, it means that the system will gradually take on the nature of a crisscross of associations and coalitions - a not inconsiderable factor in giving form and cohesion to
what Elton Mayo has termed a "dust of individuals." The same effect is evident as between groups.

Conflict can result in coalition between customary antagonists with a common interest in order to fight a common enemy. In this sense there is a tendency to create coalitions between antagonists in order to limit or attenuate the privations of excessive conflict for all parties concerned. This is not as astonishing as it may seem. Individuals and groups often react to conflict by creating new and less in-commodious basis for conducting conflict while not abandoning the conflict itself. The example of the trade unions and employers organizations has often been cited. While, for instance, it may seem that trade unions in principle would seek the disarray of their adversaries, it seems that labour unions prefer to deal with organized employers in order to facilitate negotiations. In some cases the employers have been known to organize at the suggestion and with the help of the trade unions. They then establish an organizational basis for conducting and if possible settling their conflicts. The defunct League of Nations affords another example. We can conclude then that groups in conflict are sometimes bound together and socialized by the conflict. By engaging themselves in struggle they may come to recognize a point of equilibrium. Sometimes they may coalesce in order to fight another group. But sometimes they may coalesce in order to achieve another common interest which is the attenuation of excessive and uncontrolled strife. In other words they create new and institutionalized basis for carrying out their future conflict. The degree of cohesion to which this act of socialization will lead will depend on a number of other factors, among them the size of the group and how long they can maintain the smallest common denominator of the group while other forces lead to further socialization. We shall examine in the next chapter how these propositions have applied to the African states at the inception of their efforts towards unification.

We shall devote this last section to considering the various implications for our study of some of the controversial assumptions of the major theories on integration. Lively debate has gone on for some time between those who, like the neo-functionalists, believe in automaticity and those who do not. Briefly, Haas has stated that "...the progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union and finally to a political union among states, is automatic." Central to this claim is the idea of gradual politicization. Again Haas and Schmitter: "Integration can be conceived as involving the gradual politicization of the actors' purposes which were ini-
tially considered 'technical' or 'noncontroversial.' Politicization implies that the actors, in response to the initial purposes, agree to widen the spectrum of means considered appropriate to attain them. This tends to increase the controversial component i.e., those additional fields of action which require political choices concerning how much national autonomy to delegate to the union. Politicization implies that the actors seek to resolve their problems so as to upgrade common interests and, in the process, delegate more authority to the center. It constitutes one of the properties of integration—the intervening variable between economic and political union—along with the development of new expectations and loyalties on the part of organized interests in the member nations.13

As can be seen from the above, the other important element in this statement of "the logic of integration" is the element of crises. "Crises, says Haas, "is the creative opportunity of realizing (the) potential to redefine aims at a higher level of consensus." Furthermore the propensity to engender such crises is an exclusive attribute encountered in systems of industrialism, pluralism and democracy. "Industrial society is the setting in which supranationality and a lively spill-over process are able to flourish..."15

The pluralists emphasize the distinction between "high politics" and 'low politics.' Low politics concern welfare and are calculable. However they constitute only a minor fraction of the total interests of a nation. High politics concern "the vital interests of national diplomacy and strategy" and in this area, rather than rely on supranational institutions" nations prefer the certainty or the self-controlled uncertainty of national self-reliance...

Pluralist criticism of the neo-functionalist argument is based on an insistence that in the final analysis the potency of the national interest will render meaningless any claims of automaticity. Hoffmann argues about the Europe of the Six "...the failure (so far) of an experiment tried in apparently ideal conditions tells us a great deal about contemporary world politics, about the chances of unification movements elsewhere, and about the functional approach to unification. For it shows that the movement can fail not only when there is a surge of nationalism in one important part, but also when there are differences in assessments of the national interest that rule out agreement on the shape and on the world role of the new supranational whole." While it might be conceivable that economic integration can ensure the preponderance of gains over losses political integration cannot be relied on to provide that assurance at least regarding "high politics."17

What the argument really boils down to is how far national decision-makers command a freedom of choice. The pluralists maintain that national elites are generally not willing to relinquish their opportunities for planning towards calculable goals; the neo-functio-
nalists argue that they are often not able to avoid doing just that since the development of affairs propel them in directions that they were not able to foresee. The pluralists point to certain aspects of the international system which it would indeed be rash to ignore. To the neofunctionalist logic of integration Hoffmann counters the logic of diversity. Diversity is a universal attribute of the international system - "the diversity of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims among its units; any international system based on fragmentation tends, through the dynamic of unevenness... to reproduce diversity."\(^{16}\) Not only this, but since, in our day, the international system has become more global reducing thereby the capacity of the regional subsystems to remain autonomous, it means that the relations of units in the systems are more often than not subject to their "divergencies about the outside world." Finally under the influence of the nuclear age in which bipolarity has created an umbrella of security under which national diversity is able to flourish, national decision-makers are encouraged to rest on their sovereign interests.

One interesting argument in support of the pluralist logic is that the very success of attempts at integration produces results which serve to postpone the demise of national sovereignty. It has been affirmed that the economic growth and welfare improvements following a relatively successful term of integration effort in the EEC have enhanced the authority of the nation-states who reap the benefits of these successes in the form of increased capability to muster popular support.\(^{19}\) Another variation on this point is the view that national cohesiveness has tended to increase among these countries as a response to increased international interdependence in a growing number of fields. It is argued that governments are placed on their guard by this growing interdependence and seek to shore up their powers of control by involving themselves in an ever increasing number of areas in national economic and social life. Cooper remarks that "the two track system" of the world economy is growing defunct. By two track system Cooper refers to the unwritten code in the Western economic sphere which places a distinction between fundamental rules of the game and the competitive interaction of states and various other actors on the basis of respect for those fundamental rules. This unwritten code is being disregarded or flouted more and more and the result in the absence of respected rules of the game is that economic questions become increasingly charged with politics.\(^{20}\)

Neo-functionalists have not remained impervious to the cogency of some of these arguments. Lindberg has partly concurred. "Grosspolitik," he asserts, "has not lost its relevance, the nation-state has not begun to wither away and politics has not been emptied of its emotional, symbolic and dramatic content" ... (the) integra-
tion process is discontinuous and subject to intrusions of Grosspoli­
tik and ... spill-over depends as much on political choices as on eco­
nomic dynamics.” But generally neo-functionalists have remained
wary of the concept of the overriding potency of political will in the
process of integration. Some among them, like Nye, tend to regard
the posited discontinuity between high and low politics as mainly
theoretical and liable to be proved irrelevant in practice, since it
might be adequately compensated by “intense and durable (gemeins­
chaft) loyalties (which) tend to follow and coexist with associatio­
nal or instrumental (gesellschaft) attitudes after a period of time...

It will take us too far afield to dwell on the deficiencies of the
neo-functionalist logic of integration when it has been applied to the
workings of the integration process in Western Europe from where
the concept was distilled in the first place. We shall content
ourselves with two points briefly. In practice - supported in fact by
economic theory - it has been shown that the units in the Western
European integration system have been able to achieve major
economic gains within the framework of customs union without ha­
ving to resort to political union. Furthermore the series of crises
projected by the neo-functionalists as the engine which pushes deci­sion-makers into deeper involvement in integration have not mate­
rialized in practice. Equitable distribution of the benefits of integra­
tion among the units has been largely attended to by the ”hidden
hand” of market mechanism thus sidestepping crisis through the
avoidance of the agglomerative tendencies or backwash effects po­
sited by economic theory.

What is the relevance of this debate for our area of study? The
distinction between high and low politics has mainly been support­
ed, on the part of the pluralists, by pointing to studies of the African
and Central American areas. To the extent that neo-functionalists
accept the pluralist criticism of their logic of integration it is to con­
cur that the effects of the so-called instant politicization may well be
evident in those areas outside Europe but that in the Western Euro­
pean context the distinction may turn out to be largely academic.
We shall not cavil at these findings. Nye’s rigorous study of the East
African common market has distilled other valuable findings and we
shall examine in the next section the integration process on the Afri­
can setting in the light of those findings - including the hypothesis
about high and low politics and instant politicization. Our
approach will therefore be exploratory: How far is it correct to con­
ceptualize economic integration in the African setting in terms of
high politics rather than in welfare terms? (ref. Hansen op.cit. ”The
evidence from the East African and Central American cases clearly
suggests that, for less developed countries, economic integration is
better conceptualized in terms of high politics than its welfare equi­
valent in Western Europe.”)
Almost all the theorists we have considered place a premium on political development enshrined, as we have seen, in assumptions about pluralism, industrialization, and democracy, as a *sine qua non* for integration. Very few writers would demur on this point. Nevertheless Hazelwood has suggested that "Integration between African countries is at present facilitated by the absence of too many vested interests in existing industries, and in this respect the low level of industrial development in Africa makes integration easier." A related argument has to do with the point we raised earlier about governments in the Western European setting reacting to the gains of increasing functional integration by increasing the scope of national sovereignty. Another writer has thus concluded: "Functionalism as a strategy for integration should be related to the specific conditions of the phase of integration... It may be that Functionalism as a strategy for integration is less useful in the later phases of regional integration because governments have become increasingly sensitized to the political implications of integrative ventures." We shall approach this question also in an exploratory manner inquiring: *How far do the dissimilarities between the actors in the process of integration in the African setting and the "industrial-political actor" of the neofunctionalist projection justify conclusions as to the inevitability of national exclusiveness in that setting?* (ref. Haas "...because the modern "industrial-political" actor fears that his way of life cannot be safeguarded without structural adaptation, he turns to integration; by the same token, political actors who are neither industrial, nor urban, nor modern in their outlook... seek refuge in national exclusiveness. Thus, countries dominated by a non-pluralistic social structure are poor candidates for participation in the integration process. Even if their governments do partake at the official level, the consequences of their participation are unlikely to be felt elsewhere in the social structure.")) These are indeed farreaching assumptions some of whose basic flaws moreover strike even a most fleeting perusal. It is after all difficult to sympathize with the view that if the African governments, having 'partaken at the official level,' should by diplomatic support and material means (however meagre they may be) influence the liberation of a territory on their continent, this would be "unlikely to be felt elsewhere in the social structure," particularly if this is seen as one of the principal aims underlying the system the success of which may carry farreaching - and even (seen from the neo-functionalist viewpoint) unforseen - consequences! Still less is it possible to maintain that the limited success of their *continuing* efforts at integration (defined in our terms) can *only* be seen in terms of 'refuge in national exclusiveness.' The very fact that the system continues to drive, ponderously though it may appear, towards some form of integration would belie this claim. To point out these flaws is not by any means an attempt
to detract from the formidable nature of some of the problems that beset systems, such as the African, burdened with serious economic and political problems of development. But in our view, rather than begin with such question-begging assumptions about candidacy in the integration process based on a priori reasoning about the compatibility of other settings to parochially distilled concepts such as 'the industrial political actor,' it is perhaps more meaningful to rely on empirical studies geared towards inquiring about what kinds of interactions do exist in other settings.

The question of threshold conditions is germane to the above issue. It has been marked by attempts by different theorists to put up a list of conditions which establish the threshold of integration at the end of the process. Deutsch's security-community presupposes a set of carefully delineated conditions (1) those necessary for 'amalgamated' and 'pluralistic' security-communities, (2) those that are essential for the 'amalgamated' but helpful for a 'pluralistic' community and (3) those considered to be helpful for security-communities of both varieties. They include:

1. (a) compatibility of major values; (b) mutual responsiveness.

2. (a) a distinctive way of life; (b) core areas with high capabilities; (c) superior economic growth; (d) widespread expectations of joint economic reward for the participating units; (e) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transactions between the units involved; (f) a broadening of the political, social or economic elites; (g) the presence of unbroken links of social communication between the political units concerned; (h) greater mobility of persons.

3. (a) reluctance to wage fratricidal wars; (b) outside military threat; (c) strong economic ties; (d) ethnic linguistic assimilation.

There is a marked similarity between the conditions listed by most of the theories regardless of their particular approach, even if the terminology may differ somewhat. Thus Nye classifies the conditions under structural conditions including: symmetry of units, capacity of member states to adapt and respond, pluralism, and elite value complementarity; whereas the perceptual conditions include: perceived visible costs, perceived external cogency, and perceived equity of distribution of benefits. Finally in works by Haas and Schmitter and also Haas and Barrera this school of neo-functionalists has categorized the conditions thus:
BACKGROUND CONDITIONS
1. Size of units
2. Rate of transactions
3. Pluralism (modern)
4. Elite complementarity

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF ECONOMIC UNION
5. Governmental purposes
6. Powers of union

PROCESS CONDITIONS
7. Decision-making style
8. Rate of transactions

Despite the apparent similarities, the lists of threshold conditions developed by the different theories are hard to handle for comparative purposes. Apart from the different terminology the terms themselves are general and vague. They are descriptive functional and structural categories too nebulous sometimes for operationalization. (What are the specific contents of terms like "mutual responsiveness" or "compatibility of major values"?) As one writer has remarked "...it is evident that the possibility of political unification is maximized by "common values and expectations" or by a "sense of community." But the isolation of a "structure" or a "function" common to all examples is very different from discussing particular values, expectations or senses of community and analyzing how they have evolved, been accepted and contributed to political unification and the legitimacy of authority." 29

Furthermore it is sometimes hard to make a clear distinction between "threshold" conditions and "process" conditions, between "threshold" conditions and the dependent variable. By what criterion does one regard "mobility of person as an attribute of an integration" process and not of a threshold condition?

In our view although some of these categorizes are valuable as general indicators of trends in the process of integration, particularly in the Western European setting, it is not for nothing that they have been described as ahistorical, pragmatic and utilitarian as perspectives, thus carrying with them the deficiencies inherent in the normative judgements that flow from such perspectives. Consequently we shall not attempt to view the African setting systematically in the terms of those conditions. Rather we shall bear them in mind in our analysis, being on the look-out for what the neo-functionalists have termed "functional equivalent" but more importantly, delineating any variables which seem salient in the integration process in our setting even if they do not fit these familiar categories. One final point on this issue. The lists of conditions which we have been
examining are expected to cover the conditions which lead the process of integration to completion. In other words when all these conditions are fully satisfied the threshold of integration can be said to have been crossed. But we remarked before that we were dealing with a setting in which there is at least agreement that integration is at a low level. Consequently in our view the theoretical significance of these conditions for our setting is at least questionable. These conditions, while they may be meaningful for higher levels of integration, may prove of little value in settings where "the process is still in doubt."

Footnotes to Chapter seven

3. See Easton, D. op. cit.
4. Easton, D. op. cit. pp.43-44.
7. See Pentland, C. op. cit. p.86.
10. See Coser, L. op. cit. 9.134.

14. See Haas, E.


17. Ibid p.882.


24. Hazelwood, A. op. cit. p.43.


PART TWO
The politics of unity among African States
PART TWO  Introduction

There is a manifest movement towards unity among the states on the African continent. Its historical genesis is not generally in question. Likewise, that its ideological roots are embedded in the idea we know as Pan Africanism, enjoys a consensus among political analysts. The need for African unity has moreover emerged as self-evident, arguments in its favour are legion and the specie of *homo africanus* is rare that does not at the very least pay lipservice to its ideals. The two decades that have elapsed since the emergence of independent states in Africa have seen Africans engage themselves in earnest in the politics of unity. If nothing else the chequered history of this period has thrown up momentous questions about the rationale of African unity, the conditions which govern its process and the end towards which it aspires. It is to this short but complex history that we address ourselves in this section in the light of the foregoing analysis of contemporary theories on integration.

Quite aside from certain disabilities, some of which we are yet to expose, the existing theories on integration offer a useful springboard from which to essay on an analytical survey of the African politics of unity. These theories represent, when all is said, the accumulated wisdom of years of diligent application of available techniques of scientific analysis to a phenomenon which is reproducing itself in different corners of the globe. And it is one thing to question assumptions which tend to encourage an ethnocentric bias in analysis; but quite another to overlook those conceptually consistent aspects of analysis which appertain to those human behaviour and predilections which are not necessarily or primarily subject to geographical uniqueness or historical circumstance.

To be sure, this section of the work addresses itself to a reality - the reality of the African politics of unity. But bearing in mind our remarks about the intertwining of theory and the "facts" of political life, we expect our attention to this reality to aid us in our continuation of the conceptual analysis which we began in the last section, just as our evaluation of concepts can be expected to assist us in indicating which parts of reality can be of use in a systematic study of the phenomenon of integration. Depending on the standpoint from which it is observed, the movement towards African unity has been marked severally by its troubled nature and by its ineffectual aspects. Most of all, however, it has impressed, heretofore, by its vague and amorphous characteristics and no doubt this accounts for the claim that it is "a matter of hazy, vague emotions - a vision or a
dream.” Posterity has certainly tended to view the ideology of Pan-Africanism predominantly in this light. Furthermore, the limited and - perhaps more importantly - badly publicized achievements of thirteen years of African efforts at unity, have generally not inspired much confidence either in the consciousness of the drive towards integration or in the prospects for future successes. This is especially true outside Africa.

But these impressions are as much the results of an unimpressive reality as the consequences of a myth - that magnificent but largely undefined myth, in this era, emanating from the troubled nature of the African continent, the recurring state of flux of its institutions on the national level, and the low level of its impact in international affairs in terms of power. And yet a closer look at Africa in search of continental unity will reveal that she is not a mere colossus filled with smoke. For all its vagueness, the ideology on which this search has been based has at times attained such a point of articulation that its impact on the movement must be seriously reckoned with - how much we shall leave to our empirical study to illuminate. The conflicts and debates through which the movement has proceeded, have exhibited on occasion such a remarkable closeness to many of the concepts involved in our theories of integration that an analysis on that basis can be well and truly rewarding. The readers who wend their way through these complex but deceptively vague political convulsions may discern a familiar macrocosm peopled by African federalists - both of the classical and sociological varieties - functionalists, and powerful contingents of pluralists. The record and achievements of thirteen years of African attempts at integration may indeed prove less than satisfactory in many ways but they are sufficiently tangible, in our view, to provide a basis for a critical assessment of the merits and demerits of contemporary theories on integration applied to another setting.
8. Ideology of a movement: The Pan-Africanist Perspective

Diallo Telli, the former Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU has suggested that Pan-Africanism was born out of 'complete alienation, physical exploitation and spiritual torment.' The implication of this is of course that the Pan-African movement is charged heavily with emotion and we may well find that it shows a tendency to vagueness. Still it is probably in the nature of movements to be amorphous, certainly at their inception. Our primary purpose in this chapter is not to trace an exhaustive history of the origins and course of the Pan-Africanist idea but rather to determine, as far as is possible, its content and its many facets to aid our perspective in examining how contemporary theorizing has viewed this aspect of integration.

Despite the later and decisive influence of Africans - especially African students abroad - it is no exaggeration to say that the Pan-African movement received most of its earlier incentive from the activities of the Negro in the Western Hemisphere. It is perhaps not surprising either, for in a century when the African stood discredited, an object of slavery and contempt, and his history underrated and ridiculed, the position of the Negro in the Western Hemisphere represented the bitterest accentuation of this state of affairs. Physically he was alienated from his homeland; socially he was a kind of pariah placed on the fringe of a society which both used him and discriminated against him. Culturally he saw his background scoffed at and yet could not integrate himself into his new surroundings. He was between and betwixt. In order to appreciate the logic of Pan-Africanism, its origins in the throes of the Negro populations in America must be placed in the proper context. It is in these remote recesses of Negro history that we can already begin to find some of the aspirations and goals which later found clearer expression in the Pan-African movement. For the Negro's situation was a summary of the position of the African in the global context. The same physical, social and spiritual alienation of the Negro could also be found among the African who, side by side with these events, found himself enmeshed in the webs of a shattering colonial system. More than that, the position of the Negro dictated to a considerable extent the way in which the African was regarded in the eyes of the world. His secondary position in a sub-culture contributed in no mean way to
the mass of ideology about the inferiority of the Negro which became rampant at this time. Such an unhappy and impossible situation was bound to produce a reaction.

This reaction found expression in various ways. It was seen, for instance, in the advent of the Negro Church, religious syncretism and fraternal co-operative associations, or in the emigration movements of the early eighteenth century. All these were attempts by the Negroes to insulate themselves, or escape totally, from their alienation. The reaction, however, which is most relevant to our brief survey, was Negro nationalism defined here as "the belief of a group that it possesses, or ought to possess a country; that it shares or ought to share, a common heritage of language, culture and religion, and that its heritage, way of life, and ethnic identity are distinct from those of other groups." In addition, there is a belief among such a group that it ought to create and control its own social economic and political institutions. The strands of this thought which form part of the content of Pan-Africanism emerge later as the African belief in their distinctive way of life as well as strivings for the appropriate economic and political institutions.

In fostering this nationalism three men played very important roles from three different aspects. The first two were Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois. The first of these men favoured a kind of withdrawal into economic and social self-sufficiency. We can detect here some faint connection with later Pan-Africanist belief in non-alignment. For DuBois, Negro nationalism meant first and foremost a cultural revival and solidarity among the Negro race. Here again we may detect the beginnings of the emphasis on the racial concept in Pan-Africanism which was not to disappear until the emergence of independent African states. DuBois believed in a unique and important role in the world assigned to the Negro race. His starting point was in a conviction in something common in the culture and background of the Negro people and different from other cultures. To him the American Negro constituted the vanguard in the forward march of the Negro race to their appointed role in history. Originally he called this Negro-Americanism but in 1897 he described it as Pan-Negroism. It was this that led somewhat later in 1900 to a more developed form of this nationalism which sought as its aim not only cultural but also political unification of the Negroes and the Africans. In 1900 the first Pan-African Congress was held in London.

But it was Garvey who instilled into this movement the most fiery brand of nationalism. Without any doubt his influence has been decisive. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana said that of all the influences he imbibed from America, Garvey was the strongest. Marcus Aurelius Garvey was a Jamaican born on the 17th August 1887. With his bitter experiences at home over the position of the Negro, he travell-
ed widely in Latin America and later to London in 1912 and there he began to associate with one Egyptian author named Duse Mohammed Ali. This association was to prove momentous in his career. He not only came to learn much about the colonial system through his strong connection with Mohammed Ali Duse's periodical "Africa Times and Orient Review", he was able to observe at first hand the situation of the Negro in England. It was this that led him, more than any of the previous Negro nationalist leaders, to identify the Negro's position definitely with colonialism in Africa. Later on, after reading Booker T. Washington's book "Up from Slavery," he began to strive actively for the breakdown of colonial power and the establishment of African government in its stead. This immediately put him in line with the African nationalist leaders and united the two trends from Africa and the New World. He declared:

"I read 'Up from Slavery' by Booker T. Washington, and then my doom - if I may so call it - of being a race leader dawned upon me... I asked: 'Where is the black man's Government? Where is his kingdom? Where is his President, his country, and his ambassador, his army, his navy, his men of big affairs? I could not find them, and then I declared, 'I will help to make them.'"

It is interesting here to note that Garvey not only assembled a large International Convention which he called the first Black Parliament, but he proclaimed himself 'Provisional President of a Racial Empire in Africa.' Garvey accentuated the racial content of the movement. He tried to advocate a pure Negro Race: 'I believe in a pure Black race just as how all self-respecting whites believe in a pure white race, as far as that can be.' It has been suggested that in this he was misguided and that it contributed quite considerably to his failure. Incensed by his own experience in Jamaica where there was a marked difference between the social standing of light-skinned mulattoes and their darker skinned brothers, Garvey turned automatically against light-coloured Negroes in America, even though in that case there was no appreciable similarity in the social strata occupied by these Negroes and those occupied by their counterparts in Jamaica. Certainly this attitude exacerbated the conflict between him and DuBois who took the liberty of describing Garvey as a 'little, fat, black man; ugly but with intelligent eyes and a big head' - after, of course, Garvey had characteristically enough referred to him as a 'hybrid.' He was also led by this attitude to certain excesses one of which was finding common cause for a time with the extremist racist organizations - the Ku Klux-Klan and the Anglo-Saxon Clubs. It can be said that his attempts at racialism failed.

What did succeed in capturing the imagination of the Negroes was his 'Back to Africa' movement. In 1914 he established the 'Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities
League. His motto was "One God, One Aim, One Destiny." In doing this he was only giving expression to the longings which years of alienation had welled up in the Negro. The literature of the Negro in the Western Hemisphere is replete with evidence of this longing, this nostalgia for a home. It was eloquently expressed in the Negro Spirituals in America and also in various forms in other Negro communities in the Western Hemisphere, as witness this poem by a Haitian bard:

It's the long road to Guinea
No bright welcome will be made for you
In the dark land of dark men:
Under a smoky sky pierced by the cry of birds,
Around the eye of the river
The eyelashes of the trees open on a decaying light
There, there awaits you beside the water a quiet village,
And the hut of your fathers, and the hard ancestral stone where your head will rest at last.

Garvey organized the 'Black Star Line,' a shipping service whose name the Ghana shipping service later adopted and whose aim was to transport Negroes back to Africa. It was in connection with this venture and the financial mess that followed in its wake that Garvey was hounded and imprisoned for many years and finally expelled from the USA. He travelled to London where, after several abortive attempts to revive both his journalistic and leadership roles, he died in indigence and obscurity. But he had inspired the movement with a messianic hope. He had linked it up decisively with the strivings of the Africans under colonialism. He made his Negro followers, numbered at about 6,000,000, believe that their destiny was linked with that of their African counterparts. He endowed the movement with a mystique. He was not able to avoid racialism but he was among the first to tie up the economic and political aspirations of the Africans with their colonial destitution. Indeed in his messianic faith he seemed to hold out inspiration for all those fighting for their liberty. From his prison cell his last message to his followers was:

"Look for me in the whirlwind or storm, look for me all around you, for with God's grace, I shall come and bring with me countless millions of black slaves who have died in America and the West Indies and the millions in Africa to aid you in the fight for Liberty, Freedom and Life."

At this point we see the outlines of a movement, based on moral and cultural deprivation, vague, amorphous, emotional, almost religious, and stamped with a mystique. Nevertheless some clear patterns are appearing. For instance, belief in a common heritage, determin-
nation to escape from the yoke and frustrations of foreign bondage - political or economic - a desire to institute and run its own government and affairs. In political terms two systems have already come under fire - namely Imperialism and Colonialism. Pan-Africanism has inherited these things.

While these developments went on in the Americas, Africa was experiencing her own convulsions. It is a matter of history that the slave trade which brought the Negroes to America was accompanied by a systematic conquest of the African continent - what has been somewhat euphemistically termed the "scramble for Africa." It proved to be a disorienting experience for the Africans. They underwent in varying degrees the same breakdown of their tradition, the same degradation, the same alienation which their counterparts were suffering on the other side of the ocean. By 1900, African nationalist-intellectuals were also chafing under the effects of the colonial system. It was under these circumstances that the first Pan-African Congress was held in 1900 in London. The moving spirit was a Trinidadian, a lawyer by name Henry Sylvester-Williams. As a legal practitioner at the English Bar he had come into contact with many Africans, especially visiting chiefs and kings, who came on political missions or to settle colonial questions. Indeed he had on some occasions acted as legal adviser to several of them. By 1900, Africa was experiencing particularly serious paroxysms. The Boer War was already taking its toll not only on African lives but on African land. Cecil Rhodes was expanding into Central Africa. In West Africa, Gold Coast (Ghana) was passing through difficult times. Its governor Sir William Maxwell, had decided to seize large tracts of land, belonging to the Fanti tribe and turn them into so-called Crown land. In Sierra Leone, "The Hut Tax War" - a civil insurrection - had broken out. Similar incidents in Bechuanaland and the famous Matabele uprising were being put down with considerable blood shed. At Adowa, the Abyssinian army engaged and defeated an invading Italian army. In America, it was the era of Jim Crow laws.

Under the sponsorship of Henry Sylvester-Williams the first Conference was held in London. Dr DuBois was present at this meeting. It was a very modest assembly but it received much attention. It sent a protest to the British government over the treatment of Africans in South Africa and Rhodesia, and directed an appeal to missionaries and abolitionists to help safeguard the interests of the Africans from the aggression of the colonizers. The Queen of England, through the British government, declared in a reply that they would not "overlook the interests and welfare of the native races."
Between 1900 and 1945, five other Pan-African Congresses were held. The two world wars helped immensely in accelerating the movement through the impetus it gave to African nationalism. The war affected African nationalists in two basic ways. There were those like Mohammed Ali Duse, who hoped that the European countries would emerge from the costly wars too weakened to maintain the imperialist hold on African territories with their accustomed rigour. Others saw it differently. By 1914, the first Senegalese Deputy was elected to the French Parliament. Blaise Diagne was the man; and during the war between 1917 and 1918 he was a commissioner for recruiting. On December 1918, he was awarded the cross of the Legion of Honour in recognition of his services during the war when in the teeth of the German offensive he had helped to recruit large numbers of African troops to the Western front. By the end of the war he had supplied the French with about 680,000 African soldiers and 238,000 labourers. He represented the opinion of many African nationalists when, at one of the sessions in Paris of the Second Pan-African Congress he declared

"On a fait l'appel à notre solidarité pendant la guerre, et elle n'a jamais fait défaut. N'avons-nous pas le droit de la demander à notre tour pendant la paix?"**

Some of these nationalists visiting the tomb of the unknown soldier in Paris were reported to have remarked as to how the unknown soldier "may be a black man because the death which struck the defenders of France made no distinction between soldiers according to the colour of their skin."***

The war brought together ordinary Africans with their European counterparts through service in the army, exposed them to the realities of modern technology involved in soldiering as well as to the propaganda of the allies such as the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination. The net effect was the politicization of ordinary Africans to whom a new vista of their possibilities was opened. Added to all this was the profound impression left by the Russian revolutions of 1917. These events presented to the Pan-Africanists a new way of looking at their plights. To protest based on race they now added protest based on class. To be sure, it is easy to exaggerate the influence of communism on Pan-Africanism at this juncture. Garvey, a moving spirit in the Pan-African movement, categorically rejected communism. DuBois himself did not embrace that ideology until much later in his old age. Furthermore, there was much reluc-

**"An appeal was made to our solidarity during the war and we never refused it. Have we now not also the right to demand it for ourselves in peacetime?"

***"...qui est peut-être un noir, a dit l'un d'entre eux, puisque la mort qui a frappé les défenseurs de la France ne distinguait pas entre les couleurs des combattants."
tance generally among the early Pan-Africanist leaders to espouse the communist cause as can be seen from the numerous conflicts that ensued between communism and Pan-Africanism dramatized in 1934 by George Padmore’s break with Communism and in 1956 by Aimé Cesaire’s letter of resignation from the Communist Party. Nevertheless it must be accepted that the revolutions in Russia, bursting on a consternated world and entrenching itself as one of the momentous landmarks in history, must have encouraged young Pan-Africanist intellectuals who were actively engaged in the struggle for their own liberties.

Certainly a new tone was to be detected in the demands voiced in the 1923 Pan-Africanist Congress held in London and in subsequent Congresses. Two new items in the list of demands deserve particular attention as signs of incipient radicalism and militancy, self-evident though they may seem in today’s circumstances:

1. World disarmament and the abolition of war; but failing this, and as long as white folk bear arms against black folk, the right of blacks to bear arms in their own defence.

2. The organization of commerce and industry so as to make the main objects of capital and labour the welfare of the many rather than the enriching of the few.

After the second world war the centre of gravity of the Pan-Africanist movement shifted from the Western Hemisphere. It was first the African students in Europe, notably in England, who gradually took over the initiative but by the middle of the fifties many of these students returned to Africa to spearhead continued action based on the movement's precepts, and by 1957 when Nkrumah’s Ghana gained independence the movement could justifiably be said to have come home to roost in Africa.

The impact of the second world war was ostensibly responsible for this dramatic change. True enough, the war had a galvanizing effect politically, even in the West Indies and in the USA, among the Afro-Americans. In America, heavy investments in arms towards the war effort brought the Great Depression to a halt, jobs were created for the Afro-Americans whose umitigated sufferings were among the worst during the slump. Active service in the armed forces also helped to widen their political horizons. Similarly, in the West Indies, the arms boom, symbolized by the creation of American bases, provided increased employment. As the number of wage earners rose, trade union activity was dramatically stimulated and social conflicts became acute.

But it was in Africa that the impact of the war produced truly startling results and gave a foretaste of the political convulsion that was to come. It has been estimated that from the British territories alone 372,000 Africans saw active service during World War II. So-
mething like 166,000 of these were stationed outside their own countries or outside Africa. They fought in North Africa alongside the allied forces and in Burma where they were in combat on their own in divisional strength against Japanese forces. Another estimated 141,000 African soldiers from French African territories are reported to have fought outside their own countries.

Inside Africa, Africans participated actively in the economic war effort and the number of wage and salary earners rose dramatically. In Nigeria alone the increase was from 183,000 to about 300,000 between 1939 and 1946, feeding the resurgence of trade union activity. Following the defeat of France, both Britain and France relied increasingly on the economic and strategic resources of the colonies. The same impact which the first world war had on the political consciousness of Africans was reproduced with redoubled effect. After all, was not the war proclaimed from the start to be a fight for democracy? African veterans returned from the war to find administrations which had become increasingly Africanized by reason of the depletion of the European apparatus during the war effort. The names of many of these ex-servicemen are to be found in the annals of the trade union and incipient political activity which marked this period. The Manifestos published by the Pan-African League at the close of the war in 1945 preparatory to the fifth Pan-African Congress took note of these developments: "...the African peoples by their contribution in manpower and material resources in the war against Fascism; by their services in Ethiopia, East Africa, the Western Desert, Italy, in the battle of Germany; their labor in factory, field, mine and on the high seas; and by their present service in Burma in the eastern war against Japan, have earned the right to expect that they shall benefit as a result of the new concept of international cooperation which has been achieved in the course of the grim ordeal of the war of liberation against Fascism."

The formation of a concrete ideological content in the Pan-African movement can be seen from the objectives of the International Service Bureau which were translated into the Pan-African Federation in 1944. They included:

1. To promote the well-being and unity of African peoples and people of African descent throughout the world.

2. To demand self-determination and independence of African peoples and other subject races from the domination of powers claiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them.

3. To secure equality of civil rights for African peoples and the total abolition of all forms of racial discrimination.
4. To strive to co-operate between African peoples and others who share our aspirations.

The students who stood behind these objectives had had occasions to put their words into action. The latest was the crisis in Ethiopia. Indeed both the Pan-African Federation and International Service Bureau descended from the I.A.F.A. (International Friends of Abyssinia group) which had been formed when Mussolini declared war on Ethiopia. They organized extensive campaigns "to assist by all means in their power in the maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of Abyssinia." Within one year the Pan-African Federation was to organize the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester which is generally regarded as the highwater mark of the Pan-Africanist movement outside the African continent.

The story of the epoch-making fifth Pan-African Congress which began in Manchester on 15th October, 1945, need not detain us here. Suffice it to observe that for the first time in the chain of Pan-African Congresses since 1900, African delegates from West, East, Central and Southern Africa predominated, even though the francophone states were not represented at all. Moreover the list of African delegates at this Congress reads like the political 'Who is Who' of African leadership in the following decade. For our purposes, this has a great import since it was largely the same actors who engaged themselves in the African politics of unity under review in this section. The West Indian delegation, large though it was, played a subsidiary role. The Afro-Americans were not at all represented. DuBois, present and the permanent chairman at all the sessions, attended in a private capacity.

The resolutions passed at this Congress followed the pattern of radicalization since 1923. Instead of watered-down demands, as in the early Congresses, on limited African political participation, proposals for Dominion status and subdued criticisms of European dominated land-tenure systems in East and South Africa, or of the unsatisfactory systems of education, we see bolder proposals aimed at total emancipation and independence for Africans and the total control of African land by Africans. A sample from a 10 point appeal directed to East Africa will illustrate the point. The appeal demanded:

1. The principles of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter be put into practice at once.

2. The abolition of land laws which allow Europeans to take land from Africans. Immediate cessation of any further settlement by Europeans in Kenya or in any other territory in
East Africa. All available land to be distributed to the landless Africans.

3. The right of Africans to develop the economic resources of their country without hindrance.

4. The immediate abolition of all racial and other discriminatory laws... and the system of equal citizenship to be introduced forthwith.


6. Revision of the system of taxation and of the civil and criminal codes.

7. Compulsory free and uniform education for all children up to the age of 16, with free meals, free books and school equipment.

8. Granting of franchise i.e. the right of every man and woman over the age of 21 to elect and be elected to the Legislative Council, Provincial Council and all other Divisional and Municipal Councils.

9. A state medical, health and welfare service to be made available to all.

10. Abolition of forced labour, and the introduction of equal pay for equal work.

These events were played out on the eve of the era of African nationalist politics. For 1946 saw the return of Kenyatta to Kenya. In 1947 Nkrumah went back to Ghana. The chain of developments foreshadowed by these happenings had their first culmination in the Independence of Ghana in 1957. But before we proceed further, it will be useful to dwell briefly on another development around this period which successfully reflects a few of the important elements in the ideology and movement of Pan-Africanism - namely Negritude. It is beyond the scope of this work to add to the already numerous aesthetic and literary appreciation of this movement. We intend simply to set out some of its important points of contact with the Pan-African ideology.

The Negritude movement has been castigated and rejected time and time again in certain African quarters. Its lyrical excesses, its pathos, its supposedly false exuberance, have been severely
condemned or described as Fascist. Many a critic has found reason to draw a parallel between some of its content and the racial ideology behind German national socialism. The debate goes on. However, in estimating the political importance of the negritude movement it should not be forgotten that its roots lay in the same morass of suffering and alienation which had prompted the proto-Pan-Africanists. Geiss has said of Negritude: "Neither in subject matter nor in content was it original. It was merely a reaction by Francophone West Africans and West Indians to the universal problem of confrontation between new and old." The truth of this assertion must be qualified. To a certain extent the movement had no claims to originality. It takes its place in the historical line of nostalgic revolts against an uncongenial historical present. In this sense and this alone it is akin to European romanticism, the 'back to nature' movement, the revindication of the 'noble savage', the extolling of ancient Teutonic values, the reversion to the ideals of Christian Middle ages, Primitivism, Exotism and Expressionism. But then again, few of these movements could claim absolute originality. The many influences behind negritude included surrealism, the egalitarianism of the Christian teaching, and also the ideas from the French Revolution which helped to build up a ferment among Afro-American intellectuals. Out of the anti-intellectual trends of the twentieth century was born the surrealist movement which was at once aggressive and iconoclast. The movement found many adherents among Afro-American and Caribbean intellectuals the most notable of whom was perhaps Aimé Césaire. It fostered the spirit of criticism towards the old established order and the well-nigh sacrosanct institutions of the Western world. This was an attitude which was to feature prominently in the Negritude movement.

Marxism also played a most important role in these developments. For it could be said that it was the social and political soul brother of surrealism which was mainly literary and individualist. The Marxist idea offered the African a new way of analysing colonialism, by introducing the class concept.

The literary mode in Europe at this time was also conducive to the emergence of Negritude. If one thinks of the era of the Spanish Civil war and after, when the so-called literature of "causes" was a vogue, or the littérature engagée developed by Jean-Paul Sartre followed by such writers as Louis Aragon or Albert Camus, one can understand what ferment and opportunities this literary climate must have produced for a bunch of African intellectuals in Paris and the Francophone states who were already chafing under a double alienation. Double, since they were not only alienated from the society into which it was hoped they would be "assimilated" but also from the bulk of their own people. Herein lies the originality of the reaction symbolized by the Negritude movement.
Around this time the science of anthropology began to devise new methods of inquiry which it turned towards a revaluation of African cultures. Leo Frobenius' *Histoire de la civilisation Africaine*, was published in 1936. He and others like the American, Melville Herskovits, and a host of other French writers, embraced the cause of challenging the scientific authority of the current downgrading of African culture and prejudice against the capabilities of the African.

The upshot of all this was a negation of Western civilisation and values. This had been foreshadowed by the works Jean Price-Mars of Haiti, characterized politically by his opposition to the American occupation of Haiti in 1915, and reinforced by the New Negro movement through which Claude McKay, Langston Hughes, Countee Cullen and others, sought the revalorisation of the African cultural heritage. René Maran's novel *Batouala* appeared in 1921. "The poets of negritude (sought to) construct a dream image of the African past, of a negro "golden age." They began to question very aggressively the Western ideas which had been imposed on the African way of life and to challenge the current situation in the colonies where African culture was relegated to the background and possible oblivion. Moreover, a new consciousness about African culture became evident among the African intellectuals notably in Paris where this ferment was most active. They began to inquire into and to extol, the remote and mysterious inner workings of African culture with something of an atavistic nostalgia. They explored and admired the taboos and superstitions of the African way of life as can be seen in the following lines by Birago Diop:

Listen more often
To things than to beings;
The fire's voice is heard,
Hear the voice of water.
Hear in the wind
The bush sob
It is ancestors breath.
Those who died have never left,
They are in the woman's breast,
They are in the wailing child.
And in the kindling fire brand
The dead are not under earth,
They are in the forest, they are in the home,
The dead are not dead.  

Sometimes this reaction attained, depending on how one looks at it, its most bizarre form, or its most truculent rebelliousness in lines like the following from Césaire's *Cahier*:
"Because we hate you, you and your Reason,  
We demand for ourselves the precocious dementia  
of the flaming folly of tenacious cannibalism."\(^{16}\)

Leopold Senghor has said that Negritude "denotes a certain quality which is common to the thoughts and behaviour of Negroes. It stands for the new consciousness of the Negro, for his newly-gained self-confidence, and for his *distinctive outlook on life*, (my italics) with which he distinguishes himself from non-Negroes."\(^{17}\) As in Pan-Africanism there is a rather strong racial strand involved in the idea of Negritude but it appears to be the kind that a writer has described as "an anti-racist racism... the moment of negativity as a reaction to the thesis of white supremacy."\(^{18}\) See also Aimé Césaire's poem:

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You know my world-wide love
know it is not naíred against other races
that turns me into the cultivator of this one race
for what I want
arises from infinite hunger
finally to demand them to be free
freely in their secluded soul
to create the ripening fruit.
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It is partly from this strand that the idea of "African Personality" has developed. Alioun Diop has described the idea of "African Personality" thus: "The African Personality which is the basis and foundation of our humanism, aspires... to being freed from the Western grip. It requires that our people should speak through us...Our peoples only mean to give expression to what they alone can show forth: how they see themselves, how they identify themselves in the context of the world situation and of the great problems of mankind..."\(^{19}\)

One of the most positive contributions of Negritude is the idea that there is a fundamental unity of African culture, expressed in language, music, art, thought and religion. The quintessence of the Negritude movement can therefore be seen as the promotion of a consciousness of a distinctive African way of life. This is also, despite its aberrations, its most abiding contribution to the Pan-Africanist ideology and which, as much as any other positive influence, has helped to build up a "we feeling" among Africans of far-flung regions, languages and customs.

At an earlier point we distinguished between two types of ideolo-
gies, namely those which are highly infused with political and often militant demands and those which are ostensibly belief systems for facilitating orientation to the future and for assessment of the past - although both aspects are usually present in most ideologies. An example of the former is furnished by socialist ideology in whose broad spectrum is included a range of demands which crave authoritative decisions for the attainment of the ideals invoked. In assessing the role of the Pan-Africanist ideology in the integration process in Africa, we might do well first to confront the question: "What kind of ideology did Pan-Africanism represent?" Only when we have satisfactorily resolved that issue can we find our way to estimating the role of the Pan-Africanist ideology both at the inception of the unification movement and its fate further on in the process in the face of other influences.

Easton has provided us with three categories by which we may usefully examine this question. In his analysis of ideology he has suggested three types, namely, partisan ideology, legitimating ideology and communal ideology. Just as in the earlier categories we demarcated, these three categories are analytical rather than concrete typologies. Using Easton's terms, these three aspects of ideology will often be present in a general or omnibus ideology, even though the sum total will lean so heavily towards one of the aspects that it might become meaningful to characterize the ideology by that aspect alone.

The three categories can be summarized briefly: Partisan ideology refers to those belief systems in a regime which while not challenging the legitimacy of the existing political order, serve as vehicles for competition among political leaders within the existing regime. Examples of this are to be found within dominant parties and groups under the demarcations of 'hawks' and 'doves' - those who take a hard line or a soft line within the same omnibus ideological framework. Such partisan ideology will usually traverse the gamut of e.g. possible foreign policy alternatives, creating a distinction between those who favour, as in the United States, a so-called 'hard foreign policy posture' or a soft one. In the area of economy the same distinction, within the same omnibus ideological fold of free enterprise or social welfare, can be detected between ranging commitments to state-intervention in the economy.

Legitimating ideology is directed towards the building up of a fund of support. The impact of such ideologies provide legitimacy for the authorities and the political structure. They also provide a vehicle for challenging the regime. "They consist," according to Easton, "of those principles and values validating a structure, its norms, and occupants in terms of images of the future, interpretations of the present, and conceptions of the past."

Communal ideology serves on the other hand to promote a sense
of political unity among a group of persons and to instil a sense of sharing regarding norms and values for political purposes. It tries to create and cement the "we" feeling which consists in the belief in a common history, shared traditions and expectations and a common political fate and destiny. The function of a communal ideology is to codify these beliefs "in a form that makes them readily visible, accessible, and transmissible over the generations."

Which of these categories is most closely represented by the Pan-Africanist ideology? First, our fleeting review of the history of that movement has revealed that the ideology stemmed from a particular historical experience - a shared history between Africa and communities in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, it was disenchantment with a shared historical experience which provoked the proto-Pan-Africanists in their first endeavours. The Pan-Africanist ideology is characterized ostensibly by demands. These demands, examined closely, reveal many facets but can be summarized in a word, FREEDOM - a fact which, as we shall argue, is crucial in understanding the subsequent fate of the Pan-Africanist ideology. A tentative summary of the demands and principal ideas of the Pan-Africanist movement can be stated thus:

The first is the idea of Africa for the Africans. We traced the roots of this idea to the feeling of alienation of the Africans and Afro-Americans. We saw how it found expression in the 'Back to Africa' movements of Garvey. The series of resolutions passed by the Pan-African Congresses between 1900 and 1945 never missed an oppurtunity to defend the African's right to use his land or to castigate its exploitation by the colonisers. This is the strand of thought which has found expression in the OAU in the form of declarations to liberate the lands in Africa still under foreign domination. Judging from the repeated declarations by the Pan-African movement of this idea, it is safe to conclude that it is one of the principal ideas in Pan-Africanist thought.

Second is the idea of a United States of Africa. Again we trace its origins to the feeling of a common cause and common destiny among Afro-American peoples. We found that after the advent of Garvey it amounted almost to a mystique. At the 1919 Pan-African Congress, the delegates who presented a petition to the Versailles Peace Conference believed themselves to speak for the whole of the African continent even though their nationalities were multifarious. Questions of boundaries did not inhibit them from discussing in subsequent Congresses problems emanating from all corners of the African world. The regional association of West African students formed at the instance of Kwame Nkrumah had as its final aim a United States of Africa. For better or for worse, this idea has developed into an important strand in Pan-Africanist thought.
There has been a consistent demand among Pan-Africanists for a reversal of the economic and political systems of the colonial era. An acute consciousness of the poverty of the African world led the early Pan-Africanists to advocate large integrated economic complexes based on continental unity.

An ancillary demand is the advocacy of democracy and socialism. We traced the ideological influences which contributed to this aspect of Pan-Africanist ideology. Although Garvey embraced and extolled capitalism, the dominant influences in Pan-Africanism from DuBois to Nkrumah favoured democratic socialism as the requisite system to combat the colonial economic system.

Finally, there is the demand for every available means to be employed in the fight for independence. These include not only political and economic methods but the resort to the use of force if peaceful means fail to produce the required results. Pan-Africanist ideology does not of course consist only of such demands. As we have seen, its advocacy of socialism and democracy belonged also to the category of ideology which we noted was ostensibly relevant as an orientation to an ideal image of society. But, when all is said, the Pan-Africanist ideology was dominated by demands aiming first and foremost at the liberation of African peoples.

If we proceed to our three remaining categories of ideology, we find that although the Pan-Africanist movement itself could hardly be described as a system vying for power with the colonial regime, as a movement it employed its ideology partially in the legitimating sense in so far as it set forth norms by which it challenged the validity and legitimacy of the incumbent system. Partisan ideology was also very much an aspect of Pan-African thought. From Garvey to Nkrumah, between DuBois and Padmore, Maran and Tollou-Houenou there were always groups within the Pan-Africanist fold who embraced the different ranges of radical and more conservative aspect of the ideology which is the mark of partisan ideology.

However, what is characteristic of Pan-African ideology is, in our view, its communal aspect. Pan-African thought arose above all from an overriding need to project and assert the conclusions drawn from a belief in the shared history and common destiny of peoples of African origin. Pan-Africanism sought to instil in the minds of all Africans, or at least the politically relevant, this community feeling of a common political fate and destiny. The significance of these strivings linked up the different African cultures. It culminated into at least two important ideas - Negritude and the idea of African Personality. We saw how earlier in Pan-African history, it expressed itself in syncretic religious movements, cultural fraternities and a new appreciation of African cultural background - a regeneration.

But the significance of these strivings was not always merely cul-
The feeling of African nationalism, fostered by this ideology, also belongs to the dominant communal aspect of the omnibus Pan-Africanist thought. The feeling of a common bond and destiny embodied in the Pan-Africanist idea is at once opposed to territorial as well as parochial differences like tribalism. The value in political terms of the mystique generated by this aspect of the ideology is that it seeks to unite the different fragments of Africans who have been alienated from one another.

It has been suggested that the reactions of Pan-Africanism to the racism practiced against it has imparted to it a high racial content. Such an assertion does not bear the light of careful study. Even the over-zealous aberrations of Negritude poets have been proved to be hopelessly unrepresentative. Time and time again these advocates of Negritude have sought to define the racial content of their posture in terms that were clearly not inimical or antipathetic to other races. Moreover, the fact that, right from the start, Pan-Africanists enthusiastically found and continue to find common cause with Asians and peoples of the so-called "third world" would indicate that the "racist" assessment does not adequately explain the ideology.

Seen in this light, the frequent assertion that the common cause of Pan-Africanists was simply negative and therefore could not endure, appears quite misleading.

What tentative conclusions can we draw from our foregoing analysis of ideology and the early history of Pan-African ideology? To begin from the beginning, we noted that Pan-Africanism was highly infused with feeling and that it was vague. Our short review of its history has, if anything, confirmed this view. Although the development of its content owes much to many philosophical, literary and political influences, it was never committed to a clear-cut ideological stand. Despite the fact that its demands touched on many varied problems on the African continent, it hardly essayed on a detailed analysis of them. It hardly ever produced an uncontested and consistent leadership over any considerable period. In the half-century of its active life, organizations came and went, Congresses were organized a bâton rompu and on an almost ad hoc basis with the intervals punctuated either by inactivity or sporadic advocacy by mushroom related organizations of ephemeral questions like the Abyssinian-Italian crisis. In short, its content leaned on the side of vagueness, its influences were weakly eclectic, and its leadership diffuse and inconsistent. Vague demands do not make for ideals neither do feelings amount to a doctrine. For all its pains to watch over many
aspects of the African colonial condition, the most relevant summary of the Pan-Africanist strivings is LIBERATION. For all its advocacy of a United Africa no consistent effort was made to canalize the demands into plans for organizing this unity on a broad front when power devolved to Africans. Therefore the attainment of formal and fragmented independence was liable to take the wind from the sails of the movement and it would be some time before other influences, which we shall examine in the next chapter, put the strivings for unity back on its course, albeit within a redefined framework.

We can now clarify our rejection of the "racist" and "negative-common-cause" explanation of the decline of Pan-Africanism after 1957. Africans and Afro-Americans in the nineteenth century found indeed a common cause in their common suffering under historical circumstances. However, there was nothing particularly negative about this feeling or the common cause engendered by it. The feeling was accompanied by a rejection of the status they were confined in and a resolve to create other modus vivendi. Most positive resurgence in history have always been accompanied by this redefinition, this realization, and the same resolve to regenerate. Furthermore, we have sought to show that even though the Pan-Africanists defined their stance in racial terms, it was because the rationale of the problem was, whether they wanted it or not, racial. Pan-Africanism dwindled, in our view, not because the sufferings disappeared, thereby wiping out the common basis for agreement, but because having organized their movement in the sole terms of freedom for Africans, the sudden attainment of freedom in 1957, even in a fragmented form, removed the main concrete ideal on which the movement was built. If the demands of the Pan-Africanist ideology amounted to freedom it meant that henceforth a new impetus must be found to carry forward the Pan-Africanist dreams. Meanwhile the leaders of Pan-Africanism, turned their attention from the unwieldy Pan-Africanist Armada to steer their individual ships of state into nationalist waters.

But Pan-Africanism, as we noted, was also a communal ideology. It sought, and to a large extent successfully created, a "we" feeling among the African elite. Whatever the ups and downs of the politics of unity in the years following 1957, this feeling survived. We shall reserve our verdict for our final conclusions. But as we carry forward our analysis in the next chapter of the rationale of the continuing politics of African unity we shall continue to trace at the same time the persisting role of ideology, in the light of our foregoing analysis, in the integration process.
Footnotes to Chapter nine

10. Ibid.
17. See Legum, C., op. cit., p.95.
9. From Conflict to Organizational Compromise

Taken all in all, the rationale for the politics of African unity between 1957 and 1963 was conflict. This might appear as a paradoxical statement especially as the period closed with the formation, for the first time, of an all-embracing organization for the African states - the OAU (Organization of African Unity). But in line with our previous theoretical examination of how conflict issues into unity, we shall attempt an empirical examination in this chapter of the role played by conflict during this period in the integration process in Africa.

The period after the Sixth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945 was not a dormant one for the movement. It was in 1946 that the West African National Secretariat was established in London under Nkrumah. Discussions, which nevertheless proved abortive, were initiated between Nkrumah and other Pan-Africanists on ways and means of creating a "Union of African Socialist Republics." At the same time the cultural ferment of the Paris group reached its apogee. It organized itself around the journal Présence africaine with a Comité de Patronage comprising such figures as Satre, Gide, Camus and Mounier. Richard Wright remained one of the important links between this movement and Afro-American literary circles. It was around this time that the drama was played out between the Negritude movement and the Communists resulting, in 1954, in the resignation of Aimé Césaire from the Communist party. In 1956, the first World Congress of Black Writers and Artists met in Paris, uniting for the first time the English-speaking and French speaking literary groups.

In the political sphere, as far back as 1946, Nkrumah had increased his contacts with such African figures as Houphouët-Boigny, Apithy and Senghor, and a number of discussion were held between them on at least two occasions in Paris and subsequently in West Africa. In 1953, after the attainment of internal self-government in the Gold Coast, a West African Nationalist Conference was held in Kumasi and delegates from several West African countries attended including Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Liberia. In 1952, the Revolution took place in Egypt releasing Arab nationalism which came to a head in the 1956 showdown between Egypt and Great Britain over the Suez Canal - a remarkable and successful assertion of independence by an African country. The year before, 1955, marked the Bandung Conference. Gold Coast sent observers to this Conferen-
ce. Ethiopia was the only non-Arab independent African state at the Conference. But it marked the beginning of the cooperation between Asian and African states in colonial questions and it not only gave added impetus to the political struggles of African nationalists, it emphasized a new angle of the Pan-African tradition - that of solidarity with the struggle for independence in other parts of the world. In 1956, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia attained their independence.

But we have chosen 1957 as a watershed in our analysis to mark the beginning of some important changes. It may be objected that the choice is somewhat arbitrary since it does not neatly separate the passing of an old epoch from the commencement of a new one. The leaders of Pan-Africanism had begun to return to Africa long before 1957. We should be much mistaken if we pictured to ourselves that the nationalist politics which led the precipitous way to independence in Africa began at this date. Even in the Belgian Congo, regarded at this time as the symbol par excellence of intransigent and incorrigible colonialism, had not a group of intellectuals around the journal Conscience Africaine demanded independence within thirty years!? It was moderate, it was audacious; it was a sign of the times. In 1956, three countries in North Africa had attained independence. There were also stirrings in French-speaking Africa. In 1957, at the Third Congress of the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine), this major organization for the first time asserted the right to independence. In short, before 1957 the times were already taking their trend. But it is in the nature of history to embalm the spirit of the times at a stroke in one momentous event, and the independence of Ghana in 1957 was such an event. Posternity, minimizing illogically the importance of the earlier attainment of independence by North African countries, has commemorated the event as the first in dependence of a "black" African country. More importantly however, Nkrumah was known to be committed to the Pan-African goals and the independence of Ghana marked, and was seen to mark, the beginning of sustained activities on the diplomatic level to secure closer cooperation between African states. One writer has described the event thus: "Excluding India, none of the successor states in the post-colonial era aroused so many hopes as Ghana... On attaining independence Ghana’s leaders pledged to work toward the liberation of the rest of the continent, accumulating immense political capital in making their state the Mecca of African nationalism, Thus Pan-Africanism, an historical movement championing the cause of black people, was brought to African soil for the first time."

However, a new phenomenon appeared on the scene. After 1957, no longer were the activities of the Pan-Africanists confined to Conferences, congresses and consultations between isolated and scattered African nationalists in Europe; Pan-Africanism became the tool of leaders and heads of state, who, at the beginning at least,
seemed to have the support of the majority of their people and who stood behind conscious foreign policies. On the other hand a new problem was introduced. The more Africa became divided into numerous sovereign states the more the question of African international politics began to dominate the scene. One sign of this was that after 1957, the nationalist parties which had not attained independence were placed on a different footing from the independent states. Meetings and conferences were organized separately for the two groups. More than that, the question of the merging of the different colonial units became an imperious one. Also the partisan ideologies within the fold of Pan-Africanism which were ineffectual—lacking a regime as they did—became more important as their proponents acquired territorial power bases with all the formidable apparatus of national governments. The radicals became separated from the conservative, the core from the periphery. Finally, where there were governments, there were opposition groups. And in a situation in which everyone, especially the opposition, professed Pan-Africanist goals, but in which active dealings with the opposition was regarded as subversion, stalemates were quickly reached in African politics. In our view, these considerations set the scene for the conflict which dominated African international politics in the years following 1957 until the OAU was formed in 1963. In other words, the movement towards unity which was set afoot by the Pan-African ideology was carried forward in the next phase by conflict. How did this come about?

Ghana takes the lead.

On March 6, 1957, the whole of Ghana was agog with independence celebrations. Representatives came from all over the world to mark the occasion. Nationalist leaders from all over Africa were invited. The United States was represented by none other than Richard Nixon. The event brought together the largest gathering of African leaders heretofore. Tunisia sent her head of state, Habib Bourgiba. It was at this time that the idea of a Conference of Independent African States was first mooted in discussions between Bourgiba and Nkrumah. The latter announced the proposed Conference at the celebrations.

At the same time Nkrumah seemed to have taken over the role of the spearhead of the Pan-African movement in Africa. If it was not already clear, a public letter written on the eve of the celebrations by the aging Dr. Du Bois, universally regarded as the "father" of the Pan-African movement, left the question in no doubt. He wrote: "I hereby put in your hands, Mr. Prime Minister, my empty but still significant title of President of the Pan-African Congress to be bestowed on my duly-elected successor who will preside over a Pan-African
Congress due, I trust, to meet soon and for the first time on African soil, at the call of the independent state of Ghana." This call was more romantic than realistic; but it was a further sign that the old order had given place to new. It was also to contribute to some of the disagreement that appeared subsequently over personalities in the process of unity.

The Conference of Independent African States.

The Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) took place in Accra from April 15th to 22nd, 1958. Delegates from independent states in Northern and Western Africa attended including Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. The final preparations for the Conference were made by the African ambassadors in London who had created a joint secretariat for this purpose. The Union of South Africa received an invitation to this conference but they declined unless, as they claimed, other "responsible powers" on the African continent were invited also. By this they no doubt meant that the colonial powers should also be invited - a proposal which could only be regarded as a red herring. South Africa by her reaction to this invitation forfeited further consideration on the part of the African states to have her participate in any other African conferences at any level. Indeed, henceforth there has been, as we shall see, spirited effort to dislodge South Africa from such meetings.

The aims of the Conference were fourfold:

1. to discuss problems of common interest.
2. to formulate and co-ordinate methods aimed at accelerating mutual understanding.
3. to consider means of safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of participating countries and of assisting dependent African territories in their efforts toward the attainment of self-government.
4. to plan cultural exchanges and mutual assistance schemes.

Kwame Nkrumah presided over the conference which was attended by African delegations headed for the most by their foreign ministers. In his opening speech he outlined some of the purposes of the conference. He expressed alarm at the politics of the Great Powers and proposed to the Conference to ask these Powers to resolve their differences and to let the African states work out their own destinies. He reaffirmed the principle of non-alignment for the African states based on the protection of their national interest and the promotion of peace.

He urged greater efforts at cooperation in economic matters between the African countries, including exchange of trade missions.
He went on to advocate closer cooperation with the UN as well as acceptance of aid from bodies outside the UN provided such acceptance did not compromise the independence of the African state concerned. There was a general consensus among all the speakers at the Conference that African states should step up cooperation between one another and impress their mark on world affairs by the weight of their unity.

The Conference passed a number of resolutions dealing with political, economic, and cultural matters. Out of 11 resolutions passed, 8 dealt with political matters, 1 with economic matters, 1 with cultural exchange, and 1 with administrative machinery. The political resolutions dealt with:

1. foreign policy objectives
2. dependent African territories
3. the Algerian question
4. International peace.

The Conference affirmed the fundamental principles of the UN as well as the peaceful settlement of international disputes and abstention from the use of collective defence arrangements to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. They reaffirmed the principle of non-alignment and expressed the hope that an "African personality" in foreign affairs would be evolved.

A call was made by the Conference for specified dates to be declared for the independence of the colonial territories. They called on the administering powers:

1. to take rapid steps to implement the provisions of the UN Charter and the aspirations of the people for independence.
2. to refrain from repression and arbitrary rule in territories under their control and
3. to end immediately all discrimination.

The participating governments at the Conference were called upon to give all possible assistance to the dependent peoples in their struggle for independence and to offer facilities for training and educating the peoples of the dependent territories.

An important political decision at this Conference was the recognition of the FLN (Algerian Liberation Front) as the legitimate representative of Algeria. Algeria was engaged at this time in a total war against France on the question of Algerian independence. The Conference called on France to enter into immediate negotiations for peace with the FLN. The resolution recognized the right of the
Algerian people to independence and self-determination. It appealed to France's allies to refrain from helping France in its military operations in Algeria. It appealed to the UN to try to effect a just and peaceful settlement of the problem.

On the question of international peace the Conference urged the Great Powers to put an end to the production of nuclear weapons and all other such devices and to halt the nuclear tests. It advocated increased and equitable representation of African countries on international bodies dealing with the question of disarmament. It condemned the failure of certain member states to comply with UN decisions, notably the resolutions on Palestine and South West Africa.

There were other resolutions against racial discrimination and segregation, outside interference directed against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states and a special resolution urging France to co-operate fully with the UN commissioner to ensure fair and democratic elections in Togoland. The use of military force against unarmed people in the Trust territory of the Cameroons under French administration was also condemned and the UN was urged to help the people of that territory to achieve their legitimate political aspirations.

On economic matters a wide range of proposals were made. They included:
1. establishment of a joint economic research commission among the participating states.

2. formulation of common policies on foreign investment.

3. utilization of Africa's mineral resources in ways more advantageous to Africa's peoples.

4. eventual establishment of an African common market.

In the cultural sphere a number of proposals were made to foster the exchange of peoples and materials and cultural cooperation was generally approved.

The only administrative resolution at the Conference dealt with the constitution of African ambassadors to the UN into an "informal permanent machinery" to be known as the 'African Group' with its own by-laws and a Secretariat. The aims were, to coordinate all matters of common concern, to examine and make recommendation on concrete practical steps for the implementation of the decisions of the Conference and to prepare the ground for future conferences. This was to prove to be an epoch making decision for it marked the beginning of an era of increased activity by the African governments as a somewhat homogeneous and influential group.
at the UN. A joint declaration was issued by the Conference at the end of its deliberations.

The CIAS was a Conference between governments. Although it was Nkrumah, the new uncrowned head of the Pan-African movement, who convened the meeting, it was evident that other considerations than the Pan-African ideology were beginning to seize the delegates. The African nationalists from non-independent territories were not admitted to the Conference on an equal footing with the governments. The representatives of the Juvento of Togo, the UPC (Union des Population du Cameroun) and the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) of Algeria were admitted, in UN fashion, as petitioners and observers. Thus the African states began to put sovereignty even above ideological considerations of Pan-Africanism. Moreover, the resolutions passed at the Conference made no mention either of the creation of a United States of Africa or the eradication of the colonial boundaries - two of the constant and principal aims of the Pan-African movement until the Manchester conference in 1945. It was left to the All-African People’s Congress - a non-governmental gathering held a few months after the CIAS - to take up those Pan-African issues again.

The first All-African People’s Conference.

Twenty-eight independent and dependent African countries participated at the first AAPC conference in Accra, Ghana, from December 8 to 13, 1958. These were: Angola, Basutoland, Belgian Congo, Cameroons, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Afrique Occidentale, Senegal, Togoland, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zanzibar. The independent African states were: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. More than 300 political and trade union leaders attended representing over 200 million Africans. Observers came from Denmark, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The head of the Congolese delegation was Patrice Lumumba.

The organizers of the Conference listed two main purposes for the Conference, namely:

1. to give encouragement to nationalist leaders in their efforts to organize political independence movements.

2. to plan strategy for non-violent revolution in Africa. As Nkrumah put it to the Conference, there were four stages of political development to be sought by Africa’s political leaders.
These were:

1. the attainment of independence
2. the consolidation of independence
3. the creation of unity and community among free African States.
4. economic and social reconstruction of Africa.

There was considerable talk at the Conference about the preservation of the "African personality." For example, Tom Mboya the Kenyan Trade Union leader, declared that Africans would tolerate neither interference with the development of an African personality nor any attempts to undermine the independence for which the African countries were fighting.³

The atmosphere at the Conference was highly political as can be seen from the fact that economic, educational and social questions did not in themselves constitute the subject of deliberations. There was much preoccupation with the question of the acquisition of political power by Africans throughout the continent and the avoidance of "balkanization."

The Conference appointed five committees to take charge of five different areas of deliberations and to work out resolutions under those headings, namely:

1. imperialism and colonialism
2. racialism
3. frontiers and federations
4. tribalism and traditional institutions
5. establishment of a permanent organization.

On the first question the Conference condemned racialism and discriminatory laws, especially in the Union of South Africa, the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia, where the Conference found that racialism existed "in its extreme and most brutal forms" and called for a stop to the acquisition of the best African lands by the European colonizers. A number of recommendations followed.

First, African states were called upon to impose economic sanctions against South Africa and not to encourage migrant labour
drifting into that country from their territories. Secondly, diplomatic relations were not to be taken up by the participating African countries with any country on the continent of Africa which practiced racial discrimination. Thirdly, immediate independence was demanded for all African states in order to put an end to racial discrimination. Fourthly and specifically, the Conference demanded that South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa be revoked and steps taken to grant independence to that territory.

In another resolution the Conference rejected the Portuguese claims that her colonies were part of her metropolitan territory. Immediate independence was demanded for the Portuguese colonies. Discriminatory practices were condemned in the Central African Federation and the British government was called upon to end the state of emergency in Kenya, following the Mau Mau affair, to release political prisoners, to end all discriminatory laws, establish a common electoral roll based on adult "one man one vote" suffrage and to enact laws for the transfer of lands and rights to the African people.

In a special resolution on Imperialism and Colonialism the Conference declared:

1. That the All-African Peoples’ Conference vehemently denounces colonialism and imperialism in whatever shape or form these evils are perpetuated.

2. That the political and economic exploitation of Africans by Imperialist Europeans should cease forthwith.

In article 10 of this resolution the Conference declared.

"That the All-African People’s Conference in Accra declares its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa, to all those who resort to peaceful means of violence and civil disobedience as well as to all who are compelled to retaliate against violence to attain national independence and freedom for all people. Where such retaliation becomes necessary, the Conference condemns all legislations which consider those who fight for their independence and freedom as ordinary criminals."

There was a special resolution condemning tribalism as an impediment to the rapid liberation of Africa. African governments were urged to pass laws modifying their traditional institutions in order to suppress the evil effects of tribalism.

The resolutions on "frontiers, boundaries and federation" was most important for its endorsement of Pan-African unity. It read thus:

"Be it resolved hereby by the All-African Peoples’ Conference that
the Conference
a. endorses Pan-Africanism and the desire for unity among African peoples.

b. declares that its ultimate objective is the evolution of a Commonwealth of free African States.

c. calls upon the Independent States of Africa to lead the peoples of Africa towards the attainment of this objective and
d. expresses the hope that the day will dawn when the first loyalty of African states will be to an African Commonwealth.

This resolution expressed support for the desire of various parts of Africa for regional groupings of states, but advocated that such groupings be based on the following three principles:

1. only independent states and countries governed by Africans should join together.

2. the establishment of regional groupings should not be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of a Pan-African Commonwealth.

3. adherence to any groups should depend on the wishes of the people ascertained by referendum on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

The Conference resolution on this item denounced the artificial frontiers drawn by the imperialist powers, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and called for the abolition or adjustment of such artificial boundaries at an early date.

The delegates decided to establish a permanent, professionally staffed secretariat in Accra. The aims of the proposed Organization were to be as follows:

a. to promote understanding and unity among the peoples of Africa.

b. to accelerate the liberation of Africa from imperialism and colonialism.

c. to mobilize world opinion against the denial of political rights and fundamental human rights to Africans.

d. to develop the feeling of one community among the peoples of Africa with the object of the emergence of a United States
We may pause here to note in passing a few points on which we shall elaborate later. We have dwelt in some detail on the two conferences - the CIAS and the AAPC - in order to illustrate what kind of cleavages were already appearing on the African scene after 1957. First we find the government groups who consciously drew a line between themselves and the non-governmental group. We also note among these government groups an ascendancy of traditional interstate politics - reminiscent of the pluralist contention - over considerations of Pan-Africanist ideology. This posture, so far, has been marked by caution and moderation in their resolutions. On the other hand we find the non-governmental groups aggressively carrying forward the pristine principles of Pan-Africanism unrestrained by the responsibility of power. In resolving to foster a feeling of one community - a "we" feeling - among Africans, their ultimate goal was - no matter what name they attached to it, a Commonwealth, a United States of Africa - a kind of federation. Thus we mark the beginnings of ideological differences. Soon other cleavages would emerge. Even at this juncture the government group was on the verge of split. Soon the trade unions would organize and split on ideological lines. Even the non-governmental group would begin to show the same stress and divergencies as in the government group. It is significant that the governing parties in the newly autonomous French-speaking Community states did not attend the AAPC Conference - except for Senegal.

Developments occurred in other areas. On the first of May 1959, Ghana and Guinea announced that the two countries had formed a Union, with a common national flag and anthem, common citizenship and an open invitation to other African states to join. 29 days later the Conseil de l'Entente was formed by the governments of four French-speaking African territories - Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey. The association appeared to be looser than the Ghana-Guinea Union but it was to prove more longlived. However that may be, this marked the beginning of a cleavage at the governmental plane and was the prelude to the giant divisions between the Brazzaville and Casablanca groups and to the well-nigh total dominance of African problems of international politics in contradistinction to Pan-Africanism. Let us take a closer look at these organizations.

The Ghana-Guinea Union.

Guinea's radicalism had burst upon the world on October 28, 1958 when, as the only country, it voted "no" to De Gaulle's consti
tutional referendum which provided for association with France for
her former African colonies. Guinea found herself in immediate
isolation although her example quickened the pace of decoloniza-
tion in the other French-speaking territories. Sekou Touré of Gui-
nea became overnight the darling of African intellectuals, radicals
and commonalty. It was not surprising that he found common cau-
se with Nkrumah. What was astonishing was the sweep of their de-
cision. Their joint communiqué read:
"Inspired by the example of the thirteen American colonies, the
tendencies of countries of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to or-
ganize in a rational manner, we have agreed to constitute our two
states as a nucleus of a Union of West African States." (The May
Charter revised this last phrase and provided that it was to be the
nucleus of a Union of Independent African States.)
The following are some of the salient features of the subsequent
declaration on the 1st of May.
1. The declaration left membership open to all independent
African States or Federations adhering to the principles on
which the Union is based.

2. Each state was to preserve its own individuality and structure.
But the member states would decide in common what portion
of their sovereignty shall be surrendered to the Union in the
interest of the African community.

3. A flag and a national anthem were devised for the Union al-
though each member state was to retain her own national an-
them and flag.

4. The policy of the Union was declared to be the building up of
a free and prosperous African community in the interest of its
people and world peace. It would maintain diplomatic eco-
nomic and cultural relations on the basis of equality with all
States which adopt a position not contrary to African dignity
and personality. The declaration also declared support and
help for our African brothers subjected to domination with a
view to ending their state of dependence and widening and
consolidating with them the Union of Independent African
States.

5. Although each member state was to maintain her own foreign
representatives, every member of the Union could entrust any
other member state with its representation in certain coun-
tries.

6. A common Union citizenship was declared. There were to be
no visa requirements for travel from one State to another within the Union.

7. Heads of member states would determine common policy on matters of defence, although each State or Federation will have its own army.

8. An economic Council of the Union was established composed of equal number of members designated by each member State and was to have the task of determining common economic policy. A common bank of issue known as the Union Bank would be set up.

9. The declaration planned to set up measures to co-ordinate historical research, the teaching of languages and cultural activities designed to promote the harmonious development of African civilisations.

The Conseil de l'Entente and the Federation of Mali.

It was on the 30th of May, 1959 that four French-speaking states - Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey - set up the Conseil de l'Entente (sometimes known as the Union du Bénin-Sahel.) The Conseil comprised the Prime Ministers of the four countries, legislative assembly Presidents and Vice Presidents, and Ministers responsible for common affairs between the four countries. A customs union and solidarity fund, to be financed by ten per cent of the customs revenues of the member states, was instituted. Because of the favourable financial position of Ivory Coast this meant in effect that Ivory Coast was agreeing to aid the poorer members. The Entente was a loose flexible organization. There were a number of bilateral agreements between the members which provided for economic harmonization and political consultations. These included the joint management of the Abidjan harbour and the Abidjan - Niger railway; co-ordinated road transport; a common court of appeal, and a customs union.

The Conseil de l'Entente must be seen both as a counterpoise to the Federation of Mali which was created on the 17th of January, 1959, and as a reaction to the Ghana-Guinea Union. It had its roots in the 1958 Referendum by De Gaulle among the French-speaking African states. The Referendum represented in effect a choice between immediate independence and ostracism from the French community. On an ideological basis it posed a dilemma for the Pan-African idea. For the Pan-Africanist goal was Unity and Independence. De Gaulle’s offer meant in Pan-Africanist terms Unity or
Independence. As Sékou Touré himself put it: "Between voting 'yes' to a constitution which infringes the dignity, the unity and freedom of African, and accepting, as General De Gaulle says, immediate independence, Guinea will choose that independence without hesitating. We do not have to be blackmailed by France. We cannot yield on behalf of our countries to those who threaten and put pressure on us to make us choose, against our heart and reason, the conditions of a marriage which would keep us within the complex of the colonial regime... We say 'no', unanimously and categorically to any project which does not cater for our aspirations."56 M. Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast had been one of the foremost advocates of close identity with France. Sékou Touré of Guinea on the other hand demanded both independence and unity. As it was, Guinea voted "non" to the referendum and joined Ghana in the Union. Meanwhile Senegal and Soudan which had been among the so-called radical French-speaking states but which had voted "yes" to the referendum for fear of isolation, continued their quest for independence encouraged by Guinea's example. It was out of this that the Federation of Mali was formed in 1958. Originally the Federation was to embrace about sixty per cent of the population of the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Francaise) including Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Soudan and Upper Volta. M.M. Senghor, Modibo Keita, and d'Arboussier fought on behalf of the Federation under the PRA (Parti du regroupement Africain). Houphouët-Boigny and his supporters fought against the Federation under the ROA (Rassemblement Democratique Africain.) After a referendum, Upper Volta dropped out of the Federation having succumbed to Houphouët-Boigny's campaign. France was of course actively in support of the ROA on this question. Later, as France promised to construct a deep-water port for Dahomey, that country withdrew in the grip of a government crisis.

Thus the Federation which had been formed with only Senegal, Dahomey, Soudan and Upper Volta, was left with Senegal and Soudan. A federal government was instituted consisting of a Prime Minister (M.Modibo Keita) a Deputy Prime Minister (M.Mamadou Dia) and Ministers of finance, economic affairs and planning, justice, public works, transport and communications, education and health, labour and civil service and information. The six ministries were equally shared between the two parts of the Federation. There was a forty-member assembly, with twenty members from each of the territorial assemblies, elected for five years. The President was M.Leopold Senghor, the doyen of Negritude and the Pan-African movement.

The Mali Federation broke apart on June 20th, 1960, after barely eighteen months. The reasons were:
1. The conflict between the economic liberalism of Senegal and the economic radicalism of Soudan. Also while Senegal maintained a political system with several parties, Soudan was building up a Marxist inspired monolithic one-party state.

2. On foreign policy questions Senegal favoured France while Soudan was openly hostile.

3. Hostilities between personalities developed, notably between Mamadou Dia of Senegal (who was Defence Minister) and Modibo Keita of Soudan (who was Prime Minister).

When the Prime Minister dismissed the Defence Minister on August 19th, 1960 and declared a state of emergency, the Federation broke apart into Senegal and the Republic of Mali (Soudan).

The problems of the francophone states was Africa’s problems writ small. It would not be long before substantive controversies like border disputes and subversion were added to the questions of incompatible political systems and personalities so that even the radical groups became emasculated. Conflict was in the air. As we follow these developments, it is striking how the question shifts more and more from the positive goal of further unity to the negative goal of, at best, how to keep the different sovereign groups from each other's throats or, at worst, how to counterbalance alliances.

The Sanniquellie Agreement.

Things were moving on the Ghana-Guinea front. Liberia took the initiative to call a meeting between Nkrumah, Sékou Touré and President Tubman. Liberia, a country which, under Tubman, opposed supranationality, was alarmed at the new Union between Ghana and Guinea. The meeting at Sanniquellie on the 19th of July, 1959, formulated six principle for the formation of the Community of Independent African States. But no mention was made of a Union. On the contrary a major principle was enunciated:

"Each state and federation, which is a member of the Community shall maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure. The Community is being formed with a view to achieving unity among independent African states. It is not designed to prejudice the present or future international policies, relations and obligations of the States involved." (my italics).

The last sentence of the principle was astonishing. It need not surprise us that Liberia desired it. What was remarkable was that radical states like Guinea and Ghana, who were bent on achieving a
The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union.

Five months after the break-up of the Mali federation the new Republic of Mali (Soudan) joined forces with its ideological brothers. At a meeting in Conakry on the 24th of December, 1960, Presidents Nkrumah, Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita issued a communiqué creating the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. Ghana offered a loan of $11.2 million to Mali. A significant aspect of this Union was the decision to create a co-ordinating committee for mass organizations (parties, women’s groups, trade union, and youth organizations) to develop "a common ideological orientation which is absolutely necessary for the development of the Union." The three leaders also took a common stand on the Congo issue which had broken out in June of the same year and which finally exposed the growing split among the African governments in all its stark reality.

The Congo crisis marks an important landmark in the developments which we follow and try to analyse in this chapter. For it brought together in one explosive problem all the different elements which constituted the conflict we are tracing. More importantly, it occurred in a year, 1960, when the number of sovereign African States multiplied enormously (Nigeria and thirteen French-speaking territories became independent that year) thus multiplying and intensifying in turn the elements we analyse. Soon mammoth groups were to appear on the scene. But before we plunge into that phase let us take a brief look at how far the divergencies had advanced by 1960 between the two major groups - the government group represented by the CIAS (Conference of Independent African States) and the AAPC (All African People’s Congress).

The Second AAPC Conference.

The Second AAPC Conference in Tunis from 25th to 30th Ja-
uary, 1960 demonstrated in a heightened form some of the differences outlined here. Radicals and Moderates began to appear in their true colours. First the Ghanaian proposals for political union were vigorously opposed, notably by Nigerian delegates, although the Conference recommended the setting up of an organization to co-ordinate "the aid and solidarity of all the independent countries with regard to helping African peoples engaged in the colonial struggle and in particular the sending, at the request of the GPRA (of Algeria), of African volunteers to Algeria and the collection of funds..." A fact which subsequent events would underline was already evident here - namely that the one common point of agreement between groups of different shades was once again LIBERATION.

In foreign policy a split was created over the affiliations of trade unions. Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Algeria (GPRA) and the UPC of Cameroons, pressed for the severance of all trade union ties with international bodies. The Tunisians, the East Africans and the Nigerians wanted to maintain existing ties.

Even the question of legitimacy arose over the attendance UPC of Cameroons. Although both the AAPC and the CIAS had supported the UPC at their first conference, the fact that the Ahidjo group in close partnership with France had come to power after an election had been refused to test the degree of support commanded by Ahidjo or the exiled UPC leader, Felix Moumie, caused some problems. The Nigerian delegate at the AAPC Conference criticized the continued support of the UPC by the Conference. The same question was to arise at the Second Conference of the CIAS. There was evidently a growing pressure from different groups that a tacit principle be enunciated by which governments in power would be recognized whatever their ideologies.

The Second CIAS Conference.

At the Second Conference of the CIAS in June 1960 at Addis Ababa, the UPC was denied audience, notwithstanding that all the governments at the meeting had previously questioned the legitimacy of Ahidjo and his group before the government fell into their hands. The Cameroon UPC issued a pregnant analysis in its journal:

"The situation is thus perfectly clear: in the months and years to come, we shall see the birth of governments which are called independent but are clearly directed by the imperialists. From then on, African solidarity will be more and more sentiment in the service of imperialism, if as at Addis Ababa the truly independent governments seek unity at any price."
But it was at this meeting that the first violent open split occurred over the question of political union and personalities. The drama was played out between the Ghanaian and the Nigerian delegates. Their exchanges are a study in themselves of the essence of the incipient ideological cleavage. Nigeria, along with Congo Leopoldville, the Malagasy Republic, the federation of Mali and Somalia had been invited to the meeting since the dates of their independence were already announced for that year. The Ghanaian delegate, Foreign Minister Ako Adjei, in an interpretation at the Conference of the Sanniquellie Declaration said:

"It is clear from this declaration of principle that the Union of African States which the three leaders discussed and agreed upon is intended to be a political Union. Such a political Union in their view, will provide the framework within which any plans for economic, social and cultural cooperation can, in fact, operate to the best advantage of all. To us in Ghana the concept of African Unity is an article of faith. It is a cardinal objective of our policy. We sincerely believe that the Independent African States can, and may some day, form real political Union - the Union of African States... It does not matter whether you start with an Association of African States or whether with economic or cultural cooperation... we must start from somewhere, but certainly the Union can be achieved in the end."

The Nigerian delegate not only opposed this view but brought out glaringly the undercurrent of a clash of personalities. He began typically enough with a homage to Pan-Africanism:

"Pan-Africanism is the only solution to our problems in Africa... No one in Africa doubts the need to promote Pan-Africanism..." But then he continued with a lengthy argument leading up to a rejection of the idea of giving up State-sovereignty:

"But we must not be sentimental; we must be realistic. It is for this reason that we would like to point out that at this moment the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature. On the other hand, we do not dispute the sincerity and indeed the good intentions of those people who advocate it. But we feel such a move is too radical (my italics) - perhaps too ambitious- to be of lasting benefit. Gradual development of ideas and thoughts is more lasting... It is essential to remember that whatever ideas we may have about Pan-Africanism it will not materialise, or at least it will not materialise as quickly as we would like it to if we start building from the top downwards. We must first prepare the minds of the different countries - we must start from the known to the unknown. At the moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form a union government with any African States by surrendering our sovereignty..."
President Tubman’s idea of the association of states is therefore more acceptable for it is as yet premature to form a Union of States under one sovereignty...”

And then he fired his broadsides. He warned:

"If anybody makes the mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got the mission to lead Africa, the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will, I fear, be defeated."

It must have been abundantly clear to his audience that he was referring to none other than Kwame Nkrumah whom the Ghanaian press were busily adulating at this time with titles like Osagyefo (the Messiah) and 'Nkrumah of Africa.' Be that as it may, the theme of this repartee was to become a recurrent one in the coming struggle between the groupings. Sections of the Nigerian Press were in fact acrimoniously developing it further. Again, the Nigerian rejection of Ghana’s radical proposal marked the beginning of concrete divisions between the radicals and the gradualists; and its espousal of the Liberian idea was the cue for a mammoth alliance based on Nigerian and Liberian diplomacy. The leaders of African politics - from all corners of the continent, from the anglophone to the francophone, were now well and truly ranged against one another.

"Madness in the head; paralysis in the members." The disorder among the leaders produced a rash of problems so that in the next two years the business of African international politics all but came to a standstill or else threatened to explode into a conflagration. In the West, President Ahidjo’s government of Cameroons mounted a bitter attack against Guinea for giving refuge to the rebel headquarters of the UPC under Dr. Félix Moumié - the rival to the Cameroonian leader. In the North, following the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate M. Habib Bourgiba, Tunisia and Egypt moved apart. It was implied that Egypt was behind the attempt. The trade union leaders continued to be at daggers drawn over the question of international affiliation and for the rest they followed the lead of their governments. In the East, trouble developed between Ethiopia and Somalia over disputed territory. All these were the beginnings that later converged into the giant Brazzaville, Monrovia and Casablanca groups. At the root of all these evils was of course not only ideological differences but considerations of Realpolitik. The Congo crisis, in one fell swoop, brought matters to a head.

The Congo Crisis.

Two weeks after the Congolese independence was declared on the 30th of June 1960, the Congolese government found itself in a
deep crisis. There were mutinies by the army partly due to poor service conditions and low pay. Europeans became involved in the general state of panic. Belgian troops intervened seizing Matadi and the Leopoldville airport. As if this was not already crisis enough, Katanga announced her secession under Moise Tshombe. On the 12th of July, Lumumba's government asked the UN for military assistance against Belgian aggression. By mid-August the Congolese government began to show signs of stress. The break came on the 5th of September when President Kasavubu announced that Lumumba's appointment as Prime Minister had been revoked and that a new government under Joseph Ileo had been set up. The same evening Lumumba made a broadcast in which he in his turn revoked the appointment of Kasavubu as President. Anarchy reigned in Leopoldville.

In fact, Kasavubu held de facto power in the capital. He was not only supported by the UN command but by a section of the army under Colonel Mobutu. In the midst of this political mêlée Lumumba was captured and murdered by his enemies. However, some of his men under Antoine Gizenga had established control over the northeastern part of the country and proclaimed a Gizenga government. Until now the African Group at the United Nations had worked at the Congo Crisis in apparent unison. They had sponsored a series of action designed mainly to keep the 'cold war' politics out of the crisis. But the Lumumba-Kasavubu split forced a showdown. A ballot was cast and a deep rift was revealed. Some governments supported Lumumba while others supported Kasavubu or Tshombe.

So far as diplomacy could go, the African Group had exhausted its resources. At the height of the conflict Lumumba had toured several African countries in an attempt to arrange a summit conference. A preparatory conference was in fact held in Leopoldville, in August, at ministerial level between the governments of Cameroon, Congo (L), Ethiopia, Ghana, GPRA, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and the U.A.R. But this meeting further revealed the fissures underneath the relations between the different African countries and struck the death-knell of the African Group in its original composition. Lumumba's idea of an African military presence did not get off the ground even though the meeting not only expressed support for the unity of the Congo but called for an early meeting of the African heads of state.

The Brazzaville Group.

It was under these circumstances that President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast summoned a meeting in Abidjan in October
1960. Only the members of the former French West African territories were invited. The agenda included:

1. The Algerian question
2. The Congo crisis
3. The admission of Mauritania to the UN.

The Algerian question had assumed a new urgency because these states were shortly to be admitted to the UN and they wanted as much as possible to have a common policy. They decided to mediate between Algeria and France. For this purpose they sent Mamadou Dia and Diori to Tunis to meet the Algerian leaders while Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny went to Paris.

On the Congo question the group backed Kasavubu against Lumumba but urged mediation in the crisis. The United Nations Assembly was at this time considering the problem of the seating of two rival Congolese delegations and the support of Kasavubu by this group was calculated to strengthen Kasavubu’s hand. As for Mauritania, the group supported her application to the UN. Morocco was claiming at this time that Mauritania was part of the state of Morocco and was therefore not entitled to apply to the UN for membership. An important indication of the group’s pro-French attitude was the fact that it decided not to protest the French atomic tests in the Sahara - an event which was causing a furore in Africa and which subsequently led to the severance of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and France.

Of course Morocco did not attend the group’s meeting since Mauritania was on the agenda. Togo refused to attend unless Morocco and Tunisia were present. The presence of those two Maghreb countries, Togo maintained, was essential if Algeria was to be discussed. On the other hand, the Malagasy Republic declined to attend since the Algerian issue was on the agenda at all. The Malagasy Republic considered Algeria an internal concern for France! Mali only sent an observer; Guinea did not attend.

At a subsequent meeting in Brazzaville in December (from which it got its name) the group decided to form a more permanent association. Its final communique stated:

"The undersigned States and Madagascar met at Brazzaville from 15th to 19th December with the aim of realising new progress on the road to their inter-African cooperation, founded on neighbourhood, culture and community of interests, and to work effectively towards the maintenance of peace in Africa and the world. In
the face of the grave situation which is today that of Africa, they are fully conscious of their responsibilities. However, the method that they have chosen is not to take sides - but to reconcile the sides, not to propose any particular compromise but to invite sides to a dialogue from which can only emerge a solution which constitutes a positive progress for international peace and cooperation."

They reiterated their support for Mauritania and commended the UN's efforts in the Congo. But one of the most important outcomes of the meeting was the decision to set up a Commission to investigate the possibilities of economic cooperation. From this decision grew the new organization which was declared in September 1961. The new name for the Organization was UAM (Union Africaine et Malagache).

The aim of the UAM was declared to be the cooperation of members in the negotiation of a common foreign policy. Meetings of Heads of State and Government were to be held twice a year. Members agreed to harmonize their policies at the UN. A secretariat was to be set up at Cotonou (Dahomey). The following subsidiary institutions were set up:

- **OAMCE** (Organization africaine et malagache de coopération - already approved in Yaoundé the previous year.)
- **UMAPT** (Union africaine et malagache des postes et télécommunication - with headquarters in Brazzaville.)
- **UAMD** (Union africaine et malagache de défense - with headquarters in Ouagadougou.)

**The Casablanca Group.**

The formation of the Brazzaville group had evoked immediate reaction from the other camp. In a declaration on December 24th, 1960, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali in their capacity as members of the UAS (Union of African States), issued a statement as follows:

"The three heads of state deplored the attitude taken by certain African Heads of State whose recent stand is likely to jeopardize the unity of Africa and strengthen neo-colonialism. They condemn all forms of African regroupement based on languages of the colonial Powers. They therefore appeal to these Heads of State to follow a higher and more healthy conception of African unity."

Nonetheless the forces supporting Kasavubu won the day at the UN when the Kasavubu delegation was accorded Congo's seat in that Organization. Morocco took the initiative in calling the next Conference. As we have seen, the UAM had supported Mauritania
in preference to Morocco over the question of Mauritania’s admission to the United Nations. This was added reason for King Mohammed V of Morocco to rally his group. But the direct reason offered was consultations between Heads of State “directly interested” in the Congo. Ghana, Guinea, Libya and the United Arab Republic all had troops stationed in the Congo under the UN and they had all voted against the Kasavubu delegation at the UN. These states met in Casablanca from the 4th to 7th of January 1961.

The Conference passed a number of resolutions. On the question of the Congo it supported Lumumba. On African unity it recommended the creation of an African Consultative Assembly “as soon as conditions permit, composed of the representatives of every African State, having a permanent seat and holding periodical sessions.”

It called for the creation of four committees:

1. The African Political Committee, comprising Heads of State or their duly accredited representatives to meet periodically with a view to co-ordinating and unifying the general policy of the various African States.

2. The African Economic Committee, comprising the Ministers of Economic Affairs of the Independent African States, to meet periodically with a view to taking decisions with regard to African economic cooperation. One of the most urgent tasks of this Committee was to be the establishing of postal and telecommunication links among the various African capitals.

3. The African Cultural Committee, comprising the Ministers of education of the Independent African States, to meet periodically with a view to preserving and developing African culture and civilisation and intensifying African cultural cooperation and assistance.

4. A joint African High Command, comprising the Chiefs of Staff of the Independent African States, to meet periodically with a view to ensuring the common defence of Africa in case of aggression against any part of the continent, and with a view to safeguarding the independence of African States.

Agreements were registered for the setting up of a secretariat at Bamako at a subsequent foreign minister’s meeting in Cairo from 30th April to 5th May, 1961. An Economic Committee also met and agreed on proposals for an African common market, payments union, development bank, planning council, joint air and shipping lines and a telegraph union. The cultural and defence committees
met in Tangier and Cairo respectively in August 1961.

When the political committee met in Cairo from 15th to 17th of June 1962 it appointed sites for the various institutions.

- Joint African High Command (Accra)
- African Development Bank (Conakry)
- African Cultural Institute (Tangier)
- African Payments Union (Cairo)
- African Economic Union Council (Bamako)

The divisions among the government groups continued to be reproduced in the non-governmental bodies. Just at about the time when the Brazzaville and Casablanca groupings were redressing themselves, the recently formed PAFMECA (Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa) was meeting in Uganda. Significantly the secretary of the AAPC - the non-governmental body - attended the meeting. Their meeting declared their support for the Lumumbist forces in the Congo and reaffirmed Nyerere’s idea for a federation of East African States.

As for the AAPC, their third Conference in Cairo in March 1961, took an even more extremist position - if it was possible. They declared their support for the Lumumbist forces in the Congo and even demanded the dismissal of Dag Hammarskjöld from his post of secretary-general of the UN for responsibility for Lumumba’s death. More than ever the Conference was dominated by the influence of opposition parties and movements such as the Sawaba of Niger, Mehdi Ben Barka’s Moroccan *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* (UNFP) and the UPC of the Cameroon. This factor is important in explaining the subsequent disappearance of the AAPC. As the problem of subversion and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states became rife so did the African leaders become disposed to let that grouping - the symbol of the encouragement of subversion - lapse.

Between May 25 and 30, the African trade unions met in Casablanca to set up an All-African trade union. Here again, divisions arose over the question of international affiliation. AATUF (All-African Trade Union) was created, but those unions who believed in affiliation refused to join and a rival organization was subsequently set up in Dakar in January 1962 under the name African Trade Unions Confederation (ATUC).

**The Monrovia Conference.**

On the joint initiative of President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, President Tubman of Liberia and President Senghor of Sene-
gal, negotiations were put underway for a conference that was "truly Pan-African." At first it looked as if the venture would succeed. Guinea as well as Mali showed interest. At the same time the Nige- rian Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa joined in the efforts to convene a Conference. At last seven sponsoring states - Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Togo and Liberia, sent out the invitations. But Morocco refused to attend if Mauritania was invited. At the same time, the UAM states were determined not to include Algeria on the agenda. For that reason all the Casablanca states decided not to attend. At last the meeting became a kind of enlarged Brazzaville group - that is to say, all the UAM countries plus the states outside the Casablanca group. And indeed it took a distinctly different stand on African unity from the Casablanca group. For it declared:

"The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not political integration of sovereign states, (my italics) but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity."

It issued a declaration of non-interference except for territories under colonial rule. It entrusted to a commission due to meet in Dakar the drafting of measures for economic, technical, scientific and educational cooperation. When the commission met in July 1961 it approved recommendations for promotion of trade between African countries, regional customs union, harmonization of external tariffs, a development fund, a payments union, a primary commodity price stabilization fund, and a health and social affairs organization to combine national efforts to fight diseases.

At the next meeting in Lagos of the Monrovia group from January 25th - 30th 1962 (which the Casablanca group again boycotted because the GPRA was not invited) Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the then Governor-General of Nigeria compared the Monrovia and Casablanca groups thus:

"From a general observation, it would appear that there is not much to choose between the respective accords reached by the member-states of the Casablanca Conference and those of the Monrovia Conference... But there is one basic difference... It is the conspicuous absence of a specific declaration on the part of the Casablanca States of their inflexible belief in the fundamental principles enunciated at Monrovia regarding the inalienable rights of African States, as at present constituted, to legal equality... to self-determination... to safety from interference in their internal affairs through subversive activities by supposedly friendly states..."
Within a little more than a year the Organization of African Unity was to be formed.

We may now return to our original question: What was the role of conflict in the process that led to the Organizational compromise of 1963? Earlier on, we defined conflict as *normative behaviour that seeks to preserve or change the structure of a system through direct representation of demands by adversaries*. Beginning from 1957 there were a host of reasons for conflict among Africans. But it is part of a popular myth that it was solely Pan-Africanism that exercised the minds of African leaders when they entered into that compromise. Therefore it might be useful to take a glance at the milieu in which these leaders had to operate in 1957 and the years following. Contrary to popular belief, the years following 1957 were not years of Pan-African continental politics but years of *national* politics. Of the thirty-two African states who signed the Addis Ababa Charter in 1963, more than twenty-two attained independence first in 1960 or after. Therefore by 1957 it was to national independence - whether imminent or on the balance - that the national leaders turned their attention in the main; those who had gained it were engaged in consolidating it. At the Summit Conference of 1963, Kwame Nkrumah stood out as the sole leader who seemed willing to put Pan-African unity before all else. That was the meaning of his isolation.

The revolution which took place in Egypt in 1952 released Arab nationalism bringing it to its peak by 1956, the year of the Suez Crisis. In April 1957, the North African states of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia met to build federal unity. It has been contended that when they decided to participate in intra-African activities in 1957 it was due ostensibly, not to commitment to African unity, but in order to gather support for the Algerian situation in her conflict with France. Ethiopia, which played such a decisive role in the era under survey here, was hardly geared towards Africa. Many travellers to that country witnessed as to how the ordinary Ethiopian scarcely considered himself an African. In 1954 only the American refusal to consider Ethiopia a Middle-Eastern country seems to have stopped the Ethiopian move to join the Baghdad pact. Even Nkrumah was still thinking in terms of only a West African Union as is seen by the formation of a National Congress of West Africa in 1953 and the first announcement in November 1958 (changed soon after) that the Ghana-Guinea Union was a nucleus of a Union of West African states.

The trouble was that although the Africans have endeavoured to foster the idea of a common culture, in fact the continent was teem-
ing with cultural differences. Apart from the evident demarcations between the peoples of Northern Africa and Africa South of the Sahara, there was a formidable hiatus separating the French-speaking and English-speaking African states. These two foreign languages relegated their own cultures and languages - however latently potent they might have been - to a subordinate role. President Bourgiba of Tunisia was to say at the Summit Conference in 1963, "We hardly know ourselves and we have hardly had time to draw up an inventory of the things which bring us together." Ethnic groups found themselves separated by borders created with any other end in mind but national self-determination and this vitiated, and continues to vitiate, relationships between African states.

Communications between African states were at their poorest or non-existent. A rather interesting example is the case of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali "Union of African States" of 1958. Although these countries purported themselves to merge into one they did not even enjoy the benefit of a direct telephone or telegraphic line between their countries. But this was a normalcy between African states in those days.

It is also often forgotten that African countries economically, as producers by and large of the same range of raw materials and primary products, actually constitute competitors among themselves. This state of affairs has traditionally been blamed exclusively on foreign gnomes but the fact remains that trade between African countries, although on the increase, has been minimal and until this situation is improved Africans must look on themselves partly as competitors with all it implies in divergent interests and discord. Finally, the African states and territories were more than ever in the grips of foreign influence. Even in Nkrumah's Ghana the general commanding Ghana's forces in the Congo was an Englishman. When the Ghana delegation went to Guinea to discuss the details of aid to Guinea, some of the members of the delegation were expatriates - leading at least one African observer to explain the Ghana-Guinea enstrangement thereby.12 Many of the French-speaking territories were under the direct influence of France (Guinea demurred on the pain of instant ostracism). Such then, in brief, was the context in which Africans found themselves between 1957 and 1963.

We have tried to trace in this chapter the substantive reasons for conflict between the African countries during this period. But conflict was not the only motive force in these developments. As we have seen, each of the groupings found it necessary to pay homage to Pan-Africanism in their resolutions and recommendations. In any case there is a complete absence of any organized or systematic opposition to the general ideas of Pan-Africanism. It is true that some groups used the Pan-African idea sometimes as an honorific
term to cloak other intentions. True also, there was a great differ-
ence in how far each of the states was prepared to go on the Pan-Afri-
can path. But we must conclude that, over and above any consid-
erations of Realpolitik a genuine "we" feeling persisted throughout
this period. But for this feeling, the compromise of 1963 might not
have taken a continental form. Instead Africa would have became
polarized into major blocs or riddled with bilateral and antagonistic
alliances. But we must also conclude that this feeling was very
much subordinated to other factors.

In assessing the relative influence of Pan-Africanism during this
period it must not be forgotten that we are dealing largely with the
same leaders who little more than a decade before were behind the
radical demands of the Pan-African or Negritude movements. It is
the same Senghors, the same Nkrumahs, the same Kenyattas and a
host of others, who still dominated the African political scene.
George Padmore until his death was living in Ghana as the chief po-
litical adviser to the government. So that if it is found that Pan-
Africanist fervour was not very much in evidence among these lea-
ders is it well to look for the reason surely not in lack of belief in
what Pan-Africanism implied but in the emergence of other factors
which were able to take precedence over the Pan-African idea. In
our view, there were two ostensible reasons. Firstly, the primary de-
mand of the Pan-African movement was largely and formally sati-
sified between 1957 and 1963. The majority of African countries
attained their independence. This, as we foresaw in our analysis,
took the steam off the Pan-African movement although it left a resi-
due of a "we" feeling - which was the other aspect of Pan-Africa-
nism. Secondly, the attainment of the status of nation states swung
the emphasis from continental unity to considerations of national
interest, justifying the pluralist belief in the ascendancy of tradition-
al politics. In our view, it is in this context that the compromise at
the end of the period of conflict can be meaningfully analysed.

Our first conclusion in our theoretical analysis of conflict was
that conflict binds antagonists. We saw in the course of this chapter
how conflict itself meant the onset of the rudiments of a relation-
ship. For instance, the French-speaking and English-speaking states
in Africa were thrown into a period of accelerated interaction first
when conflict had given them cause to engage in a relationship. In
this context, the Ghana-Guinea Union between an English-speaking
and French-speaking state broke the ice on the Franco-Anglophone
scene in West Africa. We also suggested that conflict socializes the
antagonists. Throughout the conflict that ensued between the diffe-
rent groupings each of them professed interest in unity in one form
or another. This paved the way for an agreement over the "do" and "don'ts" of their relationship. Over and over again, states refused to join conferences or groups, because of unacceptable support of opposition parties or irredentist groups, or because claims were made on their territories or the territories of their friends. On Nkrumah's first state visit to Ethiopia in 1958, the Emperor insisted on including in their communique that they "affirmed anew... the principle of refraining from interference... in the internal affairs of any country." On the other hand other states boycotted conferences because enough attention was not given to what they considered important, Pan-Africanist principles, such as the support or discussion of the Algerian cause in that country's struggle against the French colonizers. By these various means the African states were well on their way to, if not a resolution of their integration problems, the discovery of a modus vivendi.

We further advanced the view that conflict establishes and maintains balance of power. At the end of the process of regroupement which we have just surveyed, Africa was divided into two giant groups - the Monrovia and Casablanca states. Any edge which the one group had in numerical strength the other group made up for in the fervour and attraction of its radical stance. For the Casablanca powers were able to attract and use as a pressure the support of a large part of the trade unions and non-governmental parties. At least it made them feel a moral advantage by giving the appearance of broad popular support. We pointed out that adversaries in a conflict come nearer a solution when each has had the opportunity to "estimate the limits of his resources as compared with those of his opponent and (to gauge) his own inevitable losses against possible gains." Although it was the Monrovia powers that consistently demanded guarantees for the respect of national sovereignty and against subversion, they were not the only vulnerable ones. As we shall show, the other group was just as subject to subversion and military coups and, in our view, the growing realization of their vulnerability contributed to their willingness to subscribe to the demands of the Monrovia group.

We need not dwell much on our assertion that conflict creates associations and coalitions. The mammoth groupings on the African political scene by 1962, were only the largest in a series of alliances that crisscrossed the continent on the governmental or trade union level. This factor helped to create new loyalties and common values-evanescent though they often were - making the period, to adapt a phrase, an apprenticeship for greater continental cooperation.

Finally, we said that conflict can result in coalition between antagonists in order to limit or attenuate the privations of excessive con-
licts for all parties concerned. We pointed out that individuals and groups often react to conflict by creating new and less incommo-
dious bases for conducting conflict or, to facilitate the settlement or limiting of conflict. This aspect of our analysis cannot be fully re-
solved until we have looked in the next chapter at the nature of the compromise struck by the African leaders in 1963.

It must not however be thought that in pointing out the unifying effects of conflict, there is a claim here that the effect of conflict during this period among African countries was nothing but a bless-
ing. As should be evident from the foregoing account, Kwame Nkrumah’s influence was the driving force behind the major contro-
versy between the so-called radical and moderate states. His contro-
versial image alone suffices to indicate that his influence cannot be seen as unqualifiedly positive. There are two schools of thought. Some maintain that if Nkrumah had not pursued continental unity so frenetically or had not denounced those who did not see eye to eye with him so shrilly, African leaders would have progressed towards unity without the distracting influence of acrimony. More than that, some analysts have claimed that Nkrumah’s fervour was egoism run riot. He had one single thought in mind - to assume hegemony over the rest of the continent. Another variation of this as-
sessment was that Nkrumah was a monomaniac who, in his illusion that a Union Government of Africa was possible, failed to see the advantages and realism of a “useful minimum” cooperation and thereby plunged the continent into an era of fruitless acrimony. Nkrumah, in short, was chasing the whirlwind.

Another school of thought holds that Nkrumah’s influence was an indispensable catalyst during this period. But for his zeal, many African leaders would have been content to rest on their oars on the achievement of independence and left Pan-Africanism to lapse into abeyance. They point out that he was ahead of his time and that the truth of his ideas are appearing in their true light long after he has left the scene.

We shall leave our final assessment until our analysis comes to a close. It would be in place, however, to point out that many of the sources of conflict we have analyzed here existed with or without Nkrumah. He did not invent the frontier problems between African countries and, long after he has gone, they have continued to plague the continent. He gave voice to radical Pan-Africanism but he did not create it. Many of his opponents in the government group were his erstwhile comrade-in-arms speaking the same explosive Pan-
African language. The petty clashes of personalities which character-
ized much of the conflict during this time would have been carried on with or without Nkrumah. Looking at the history of pettyfogg-
ing squabbling among the top echelons of African freedom fighters,
trade unions, the political parties and abortive federations of the French-speaking and English-speaking world, one cannot avoid the conclusion that if Nkrumah had not existed the African leaders would have invented another scapegoat.

Conflict is not played out in a vacuum. Apart from the influences we have analyzed here, there was a noticeable change in the historical circumstances on the African scene at the close of this era of conflict such as was conducive to compromise. We shall now turn to that period and examine the nature and content of the Addis Ababa compromise.

Footnotes to Chapter nine


4. For details of all these resolution see the All African People's Conference in the appendix of Legum, C., op. cit., p.341ff.


8. See Legum, C., op. cit., p.46.


12. Thompson, W. Scott, op. cit., p.70.
As of today, the political leaders of Africa are also Africa’s political theorists and philosophers. To the extent that this is true, our task in this chapter is made more problematic: How to separate substance from chaff, rhetoric from policy, and how to pinpoint the essential elements of approaches whose protagonists are at the same time theorists and bargainers. Happily, we have at our disposal a unique body of utterances delivered in Addis Ababa by the African Heads of State who, after their foreign ministers had defined the problems, were obliged to make their views as explicit as possible in order to arrive at a working compromise. There is no reason to doubt that the speeches preceding the signing of the Addis Ababa Charter represent the most exhaustive expose on the different approaches to African integration uttered in one gathering at the highest level of leadership. There is therefore good reason to analyze them closely. However, before we embark on that it might be in place to make a fleeting survey of the African political scene in 1963 from which the Addis Ababa Summit emerged.

Wallerstein has given an excellent account of the various influences which led to the rapprochement between the African groupings in the two years or so preceding the Addis Ababa Summit and the following survey will be based largely on his analysis. Perhaps the most important agent in the reconciliation between the two African factions was the fact that from 1961, the great bone of contention - the Congo Crisis - began to approach a solution. Gizenga, the Lumumbist, was chosen Vice-Premier in the Cyril Adoula’s central government voted on August 2, 1961, by an almost unanimous Congolese Parliament. The immediate effect was to pacify the Casablanca powers who had until now been getting, it seemed, the short end of the stick in the diplomacy of the Congolese question.

Other crises erupted on the continent at this juncture but this time almost opportunistically as if calculated to underline the things that united the two groups. In July, Tunisia fell out with France over the evacuation of the Bizerte base. A violent episode ensued when Tunisia blockaded the base in response to France’s refusal to evacuate
it. Subsequently the two countries severed their diplomatic relations. Both the Casablanca and Brazzaville states, including Nigeria from the Monrovia group, found common cause in supporting this dogged show of militancy by a small African state against a former colonial power.

It was the same admiration for militancy, this time by one of the so-called moderates, against a former colonial power in defence of national freedom of action which united the two groups in the following month. The Nigerian public, following the lead of students and certain trade unions, had become incensed by the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact. At a meeting in August, an All-Nigerian People's Conference convened by the government, took a decidedly militant line on foreign affairs singling out particularly the Anglo-Nigerian Pact which was later abrogated in January 1962.

Similarly Guinea, one of the so-called radicals, expelled the Soviet Ambassador to Conakry in November, 1961. The background was a plot to overthrow the Guinean government allegedly led by France and an unspecified East European country. This event put Guinea's foreign policy in a new light - at least in the eyes of the Brazzaville states.

A number of African leaders also began at this time to call for reconciliation. At the Lagos meeting of the Monrovia group in January 1962, Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia called for the end of the blocs. The Emperor declared, "Ethiopia considers herself a member of one group only - the African group." The leaders of PAFMECA meeting in Addis Ababa in February, put a rein on their criticism of the Monrovia group. Later in August, the Annual Conference of the Uganda People's Congress refrained from joining the Casablanca group in the interest of unity. Even Guinea and Mali dropped their plans to sponsor a meeting of AAPC due to be held in Mali early that year.

Early in 1962, the African countries had joined together to have South Africa expelled from both the CCTA and the ECA (Economic Commission for Africa). In the latter organization they also recommended that Portugal and Spain be expelled while Britain and France should remain as associate members. This was the more significant since the Brazzaville states had blocked the same move only a year before. At the same meeting of the ECA the idea of an African Development Bank, which, it will be recalled, was first mooted at the Casablanca meeting, was adopted and a group comprising of all the shades of opinion and the two main languages was appointed to draw up the plans (They were Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanganyika and Tunisia.)

The move towards reconciliation continued throughout 1962. Tunisia did not insist on the projected third CIAS Conference in Tu-
nis in deference to objections by the Monrovia group, particularly Nigeria, and also due to the fear that the Algerian issue still remained divisive. President Hamani Diori visited Ghana in April and extracted assurances that the offices in Accra of the Niger opposition party - Djibo Bakary's Sawaba party - would be closed down. He also visited Guinea. A meeting of the Pan-African Youth Movement held in Conakry, Guinea, in April, was attended for the first time by a broad representation of both the Casablanca and Monrovia persuasions.

The African countries also jointly sponsored action that year at the UN where Mauritania, notably, agreed not to insist, together with the UAM states, on its candidacy on the Security Council (since it was opposed by Morocco.) The joint action resulted later in the first amendment to the UN Charter which increased the number of seats in the Security Council and ECOSOC thus ameliorating what the African countries had attacked as an unjust system of distribution of seats.

Foreign influence played a considerable part too in these developments. In March, African liberation achieved a spectacular triumph in the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland after talks in London. France gave way over Algeria and also in March, the Evian accord paved the way for the Algerian independence in July. But it was perhaps the American influence that proved the most decisive. The United States, a somewhat passive bystander in African politics, had entered the scene in 1960 in the Congo, largely to counteract the influence of the Soviet Union by setting its face against Lumumbist radical forces. Following the death of Lumumba and the inauguration of President Kennedy which took place a few days later, the United States policy took a new course geared towards reconciliation between the factions in the Congo. As 1962 drew to a close, the United Nations forces occupied Katanga. One further exogenous factor is relevant here. In 1963, the French government began its policy of a progressive reduction of military aid and budget subsidies to their former colonies thereby whittling down for the UAM states their biggest aid and succour. It has been suggested that this contributed considerably to their increased perception of the need for a continental structure. A further influence was the decline of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement began in Bandung in 1955. The Sino-Indian conflict, by reducing this solidarity, seemed to make an African Organization necessary.

Rapprochement was therefore continuing apace and sometimes to the alarm of the radical groups - mostly opposition parties - in African continental politics who made futile attempts to arrest its pro-
gress. The UPC of Cameroon declared:

"There is an Africa of the peoples and one of servants... The road to true African unity is not that of the fusion of the groups of Brazzaville, Monrovia, Lagos, and Casablanca. That would be a confusion which would profit only neo-colonialism and imperialism and which would induce African leaders to relegate to the background the fundamental problem of the struggle against neo-colonialism in order to amuse themselves with economic and social hocus-pocus." 3

Their assessment of this tendency was ominous and prophetic; Djibo Bakary of the Niger Sawaba party put it thus:

"Finally, in no way must African unity become a sort of trade-union of men in power who will seek to support one another to resist popular currents." 4

Two events, which in hindsight stand out in all their portentous significance, set the seal on these developments. On August 2, 1962, at Kulungugu in Ghana, an attempt was made to assassinate President Nkrumah. He escaped narrowly. Although one Tawia Adamafio was accused to be the principal culprit, suspicion was also cast on some of the revolutionary groups which at this time were finding refuge in Ghana. The spell was broken and henceforth, it has been suggested, Nkrumah became more amenable to compromise solution on the African scene based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

On January 13, 1963, the head of state of Togo, Sylvanus Opympio was killed in a coup staged by a group of soldiers. As the first assassination of an incumbent head of state in modern Africa's history, the event sent shockwaves throughout the continent. The revolution which it caused cut across the divisions of the different blocs. Guinea joined the hue and cry to ferret out the culprits. The Monrovia powers convened and sent a commission of inquiry to Togo. Wallerstein has advanced the opinion that the Summit All-Africa meeting in Addis Ababa in May was convened in spite of the events in Togo.5 In our view, the assassination in Togo was an added incentive to attend a meeting for the large numbers of African leaders, whether radical or moderate, for whom such events seemed to strike at the root of their efforts at national consolidation. One indication of this fact is that the African states were able, on this occasion, to agree not to invite the new Togolese government to the Addis Ababa meeting. Thus it was that out of the clash and fusion of ideas and interests a new political climate had emerged in Africa by 1963, making it possible to put through the Addis Ababa com-
Two important conferences preceded the signing of the Addis Ababa Charter. They were:

1. The Preparatory Conference of Foreign Ministers, which opened on the 15th May and ended on the 23rd May, and

2. The Summit Conference of Heads of States, which opened on 23rd May and concluded its proceedings on 25th May with the formal signing of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

Both Conferences are of vital importance in the attempt to find out the motivations for the contents of the Charter. It was at the Preparatory Conference of the Foreign Ministers that many of the different problems were isolated and argued, albeit inconclusively. It was this Conference that produced the compromise, however that might be, which enabled the Summit Conference to take place. However, one of the important facts that emerged at this first Conference was that many of the foreign Ministers had no mandate from their governments to discuss or make suggestions about some of the major problems which faced the Organization. It was left therefore to the Heads of States to bring up and elaborate some of these problems. But the Summit Conference did not have the businesslike atmosphere of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference. Rather, it was a highly formal but open occasion with formal speeches by practically every representative of the African governments. Consequently, it is difficult to isolate platitudes from policies on such an occasion. Furthermore, the Conference was held while the whole of Africa stood on tiptoes in eager anticipation. Indeed, in his opening speech the Emperor of Ethiopia had gone out his way to encourage this awareness of an atmosphere of heightened expectancy among Africans and the outside world: "We are meeting here today to lay the basis for African unity... Let us not put off, to later consideration and study, the single act, the one decision, which must emerge from this gathering if it is to have real meaning. This Conference cannot close without adopting a single African Charter... If we fail in this, we will have shirked our responsibility to Africa and to the peoples we lead." Under such a pressure, one could almost certainly expect a certain amount of playing to the gallery among the African States. This must be borne in mind in analysing the speeches at this Conference.
More importantly, we must recognise the things that were glossed over or left out completely in the general atmosphere of expectancy and euphoria. For some of these problems were to raise their heads again and with them raise doubts about the Charter and structure which were created on that day.

The Foreign Ministers' Preparatory Conference.

Ten countries submitted agenda proposals to the Foreign Ministers Conference. These Countries were: Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Sudan, Somali Republic, Tunisia, Cameroons, Uganda, Nigeria, Algeria. These agenda proposals are revealing for their order of choice and priorities among the problems facing the African countries at this time. The Nigerian entry also put forward for adoption the Charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organization. It suggested that this be used as a foundation of African Unity. Thus right from the start Nigeria took a definite stand on the question of African Unity. Item 15 of the Nigerian proposal read:

"Tabling the resolutions of the Lagos Conference on Economic and Fiscal cooperation."

This item was referring to the Lagos Conference of the Monrovia group. As no mention was made either of the Casablanca Charter or of Ghana's stand on the creation of the Union of African States, the Nigerian agenda proposal can be regarded as an open challenge to Ghana's position on this question.

The Algerian entry also put heavy emphasis on the question of Unity. Its agenda contained 5 items. Items II. and V. read as follows:

II. African Unity, its basic principles and structures.

1. The political structures. (a) regional groupings. (b) continental groupings.
3. Economic structures and Social structures.
4. The Cultural and Scientific structure.

V. Setting up of the Union of African States. (a) Charter. (b) Permanent Secretariat.

The Ethiopian delegation put forward an agenda proposal which avoided the issue of the definition of African Unity but which none-theless included the formation of an Organization and which also embodied most of the other items in the other entries. But it will be
remembered that Ethiopia had been a member of the Monrovia group of powers but had never joined the Casablanca group. Naturally its proposals had more in common with the Monrovian standpoint than with the Casablanca. In spite of this, its agenda proposals can rightly be regarded, in so far as it took cognizance of the two standpoints, as a compromise agenda. It read:


II. Cooperation on agreed areas of African Endeavour. (a) Economic and social. (b) Educational and cultural. (c) Collective defence system.

III. De-colonization.

IV. Apartheid and Racial Discrimination.

V. Effect of Regional Economic groupings on African Economic Development.

VI. Disarmament.

As might have been expected, the question of which form African Unity should take became the cardinal issue at the Foreign Ministers Conference. The problem was summarized aptly by Cyrille Aduola, the Congolese Premier:

"There is much talk about African Unity, but, up till now, we have not had the same concept of this unity. We must first find a common denominator."

Three approaches to African Unity emerged distinctly at this Conference. The first was the Ghanaian approach which sought the immediate creation of a Union government of African States. As the Ghanaian foreign minister, Kojo Botsio, declared:

"My delegation is of the opinion that the establishment of a continental government is the only antidote to combat the entrenched forces dividing our continent."

The second can be called the Nigerian approach. It was gradualist and was supported by most of the so-called Monrovia States. As has been mentioned, the Nigerian proposal envisaged the Monrovian Charter as the basis for unity.

The last approach had the support of most East African countri-
es, although Ethiopia and many of the Monrovia powers were not averse to it. The Tanganyikan Prime Minister, Julius Nyerere, has expressed this view thus:

"Most East Africa believes that the way to unity is through regional associations. At least Kenya, Uganda, Tangayika, already have a common market, and run many services through the Common Services Organization. This is the nucleus from which a federation is the natural growth."

The different approaches to unity were not, however, the only cause for disagreement; many of the states were afraid of being overshadowed by their more powerful neighbours. They therefore tended to feel, like the Malagasy Foreign Minister, that the Conference could be fruitful only "if territorial claims and aggressive policies are renounced."

Many of these states were fearful of Ghana's dynamism on the question of African Unity and harboured considerable suspicions about the intentions of Nkrumah. We have seen how this became an open fight between Nigeria and Ghana. Nkrumah kept up his campaign for a Union Government of African States. His book 'Africa Must Unite' was published just in time for the Addis Ababa meetings. Some of the African states saw Nkrumah's activities not merely as a genuine commitment to a goal of Pan-Africanism but as a bid for leadership in Africa. The Congolese (Brazzaville) foreign Minister, Stephane Tchitchelle, said:

"Personally, I think all idea of leadership should be brushed aside... We want to keep our personality within the framework of African Unity. We have... come to lay down the foundations of an overall African democratic union."

This preoccupation with the sovereign rights and equality of member states was partly the direct result of all the previous clashes of national interests before 1963, when some small countries as well as politically unstable ones were in danger of losing control over their own affairs, actively challenged, or so they sometimes imagined, by neighbouring African states. The preoccupation persisted and is reflected in the Charter which was subsequently drawn up. Far from talking of the 'African Personality,' some members were now inclined to talk about their personality (meaning in this context, one may well presume, their national personality, within African Unity.) Far from seeking ways and means to eradicate what the first Pan-Africanists and the mass Pan-African organizations had called artificial colonial boundaries, the governments were more disposed
to ensure that the boundaries remained as they were.

In the debates at the Foreign Ministers Conference several countries denied that there was any incompatibility between an African Common Market and association with the European Common Market. It is significant in this regard that in the following year, the East African countries declined to associate with the European Common Market precisely because they considered it incompatible with Pan-Africanism. Suffice it to state here that the premium which many countries placed at the Foreign Ministers Conference in 1963, on what they saw as their national interest, played a great part in determining their own notions of Pan-Africanism.

The foreign ministers' Conference was unable to decide the question of the definition of African Unity. It had set up two Committees to deal with certain items of the agenda. Committee I had on its agenda:


II. Cooperation in specific areas of African Endeavour. (a) Economic Social and Technical. (b) Educational Cultural and Scientific. (c) Collective Defence and High Command.


IV. Africa and the United Nations. (a) Effect of Regional Economic Development.

In its report, this Committee stated that in its debates on the basic principles of African Unity it took into consideration a draft Charter submitted by Ethiopia, embodying the principles in the Monrovia and Casablanca Charters. Immediately a controversy arose whether the text of the draft Charter should form the basis of a new document or whether they should revert to the ideas expressed by Dr. Nkrumah in his proposed agenda. It became impossible to reach agreement on this point. A suggestion was made that a Committee of experts be appointed to draw up a new draft Charter. Finally the Committee decided to appoint a sub-Committee of nine members to seek an agreeable formula. This sub-Committee comprised: Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Tunisia. The sub-Committee ran into the same difficulties and failed to reach agreement. The matter was again referred back to the full Committee where it was finally decided to entrust the Algerian delegate with the task of drawing up a draft recommendation to be submitted to the Conference of Heads of State. According to the report, "the recommendation adopted on
the basis of this draft recalls the principle of African Unity, stresses its advantages for the people and nations of Africa and recommends consideration of the preliminary draft Charter submitted by Ethiopia. Responsibility for the provisional Secretariat was entrusted to Ethiopia. This organ will have the task of submitting the Ethiopian document to all the African governments, and of receiving their comments and amendments before a new Conference of foreign Ministers. The Charters of Casablanca and Lagos, and the draft submitted by Dr. Nkrumah are among the texts that are likewise to be taken into consideration."

The Committee also discussed the question of African representation in various organs of the United Nations, especially the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. They found their present representation inequitable and recommended the coordination of their efforts, especially under the aegis of the African Group at the UN, as well as by maintaining closer links with the Asian countries through the Afro-Asian Group, particularly as regards the question of decolonization. A further sub-Committee of six was appointed comprising: Congo (Brazzaville), United Arab Republic, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and the two African members of the Security Council at the time, Ghana and Morocco. This sub-Committee submitted a resolution on Africa and the United Nations embodying the above points.

Long discussions were held under the Committee on African economic problems. As in the discussions on the content of African Unity, discordant voices were raised over economic cooperation. Although there seemed to be a general consensus that greater economic cooperation was needed among African countries, some of the delegations seemed to be sceptical about the irreversible trends which might be created if the continent was split up into little economic groups. Here the idea of regionalism came under strong attack. Furthermore, certain delegations were not so averse as others to economic cooperation (even if it meant economic dependence with former European Colonial powers for the time being). They pointed to certain real facts of history and their own economic situation which rendered a close association almost a necessity in certain cases. More than that, as the report states, "...one or two delegations affirmed that the establishment of the African common market was not incompatible with links with the European Common Market."15

Much support was expressed for the work of the United Nations agency - the Economic Commission for Africa - which had been functioning since 1958. There was a proposal to hold an African Economic Conference before the end of 1964 and attention was drawn to the International Conference on trade and Development due to take place at the beginning of 1964. African countries were
asked to take active part in the preparatory work of that Conference and to lend it full support. Finally a sub-Committee of five was appointed. It comprised: Congo (Leopoldville), Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda. They submitted a general report on African economic problems, which recommended the appointment of a preparatory economic Committee to undertake studies on African economic problems in collaboration with governments and in consultation with the Economic Commission for Africa. Later, the full Committee considered and adopted recommendations by Libya for cooperation in social matters and public health as well as scientific education and cultural cooperation. It also considered a draft resolution by Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal for the signing of a new Convention on Technical Cooperation in Africa (CCTA).

Committee II of the Foreign Minister’s Conference had on its agenda:

1. De-colonization
2. Apartheid and Racial Discrimination
3. Disarmament.

Three sub-Committees were created for each of these items. Sub-Committee I dealt with de-colonization. Six countries were members: Mali, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Algeria. This Committee listened to representations from Angola, Kenya, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese Guinea, Gambia and other dependent territories. A recommendation consisting of 15 items was submitted by the Committee. It called on the Colonial powers to take necessary measures to grant independence to their colonial territories and to consider the maintainence of colonies or semi-colonies a menace to peace on the continent. It referred to the United Nations resolution 1514 on Independence and called on the colonial powers, particularly the United Kingdom with regard to Southern Rhodesia, not to transfer sovereignty to foreign minority governments imposed on African peoples by the use of force and racial legislation. With regard to Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, the recommendation re-affirmed support for African nationalists in their fight for freedom and stated that it would regard any assistance of the oppressor powers by any government as an act of aggression against African countries. It called on African governments to break off consular and diplomatic relations with Portugal and South Africa “so long as they persisted in their present attitude towards de-colonization.” African countries were also called upon to observe trade boycott against South Africa.

Other recommendations included an invitation to the liberation movements to co-ordinate their efforts in establishing common fronts, the establishment of a permanent secretariat to harmonize assistance from African States to freedom fighters, the establish-
ment of a special fund to supply aid. African governments were encouraged to receive nationalists from liberation movements "in order to give them training in all sectors, and afford young people all the assistance they need for their education and vocational training." They were also asked to provide volunteers to assist the freedom movements in their fight. They recommended that a deadline be fixed for the accession of all African territories to independence. Finally, the Committee recommended that a special day of each year be set aside as African Liberation day "to organize popular demonstrations...to disseminate the recommendations of the Heads of State Conference and to collect sums, over and above the national contributions, for a special fund." 17

Sub-Committee II took up Apartheid and Racial Discrimination with the following countries participating: Somalia, Morocco, Liberia, Congo (Leopoldville) and Guinea. In its recommendation it called for "the creation of a fund for concerted financial assistance to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa." Like the Committee I recommendation, it called for sanctions against the Government of South Africa and for diplomatic consular and economic boycott of that government. Apart from recommending the granting of scholarships, educational facilities and possibilities of employment in African government service to refugees from South Africa, it called for the appointment of a delegation of Foreign Ministers to inform the Security Council of the situation in South Africa.

Sub-Committee III on General Disarmament submitted the following recommendations:

1. Declaring and accepting Africa as a denuclearized zone.
2. Removal of military bases from Africa and disentanglement of African countries from military pacts with foreign powers.
3. Banning of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests.
4. Banning the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
5. Destruction of existing nuclear weapons.
6. Appeal to the great powers to: (a) reduce conventional weapons; (b) put an end to the arms race; and (c) sign a general and complete disarmament agreement under strict and effective international control.
7. Appeal to the great powers, in particular to the Soviet Union and the United States of America, to use their best endeavours to secure the objectives stated above.
Despite the long list of recommendations on colonialism and racial discrimination, the foreign Ministers Conference of May 1963, was not a success. It failed in its major task - agreement on African Unity and a Charter. No settlement was reached on the mutual suspicion among the member states. The proponents of a federation of African states and those who preferred a loose organization remained poles apart. These matters were shelved, and it was left to the Conference of Heads of State to produce the new organization. One thing emerged at any rate: It was seen that on the question of colonization of Africa and its concomitant of apartheid and racial discrimination, there was a general consensus. This had long been one of the preoccupations of Pan-Africanism. Yet on another question of economic cooperation with non-African countries there were deep divisions. Taken all in all as one writer has said:

"The ministerial Conference defined more clearly the problems at hand; it was up to the Heads of States to determine action."

The Conference of Heads of State and Government.

If the Foreign Ministers Conference defined the problems, it can be said that the Conference of Heads of State and Government stipulated the approaches and produced a quick compromise - with perhaps a touch of haste. All the observers at this Conference are at one in reporting it as marked by heightened feelings and general euphoria. Some of the delegates even began to feel that the general air of goodwill could serve as an example to the United Nations. "...if the nations of the world assembled at the United Nations," opined Nyerere, "will approach the problems of the world in the same spirit of goodwill and cooperation as the Nations of Africa assembled have approached their African problems here, the human race, like the African people, shall have taken an immense step towards universal brotherhood." Indeed, the atmosphere in which the sittings were conducted, was remarkably cordial. It was in marked contrast to the businesslike atmosphere of the Foreign Ministers' Conference which was characterized by altercations and open disagreement. There was none of that at the Summit Conference. Only on one occasion was the placidity of the proceedings disturbed when Ethiopia and Somalia entered into an exchange over frontier issues. and even this was conducted with the utmost decorum and well within the limits allowed by such a debate.

As a token of their determination to arrive at an agreement the Conference began by appointing a Special Committee of Foreign Ministers to prepare a draft for an African Charter and to submit the result within two days. While this was going on behind closed doors, the plenary sessions of the Summit were held in the glare of
publicity before representatives of the world press and observers from all parts of Africa, including countries which had not yet attained their independence.

The Conference was held at the Africa Hall in Addis Ababa - a large ultramodern building which the Ethiopian government had erected and donated for this purpose and which housed the Headquarters of the UN agency - the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Each Head of State made at least one speech. The proceedings were opened by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and it was he, more than any one else, who set the high tone of expectancy which sustained the delegates' resolve to arrive at a Charter, come what may:

"Let our meetings henceforth proceed from solid accomplishments. Let us not put off, to later consideration and study, the single act, the one decision, which must emerge from this gathering if it is to have real meaning. This Conference cannot close without adopting a single African Charter. We cannot leave here without having created a single African organization possessed of the attributes we have described. If we fail in this we will have shirked our responsibility to Africa and to the peoples we lead. If we succeed, then, and only then, will we have justified our presence here."

It is obvious that this speech made a great impact judging from the many references made to it by numerous speakers in support of the idea that a Charter must be found at the Conference. One result of this general consensus was that most of the speeches were couched in such terms as not in any way to detract from the overwhelming importance of unity as a goal. Any other attitude would have been unthinkable for any of the delegations in the atmosphere prevailing at the Conference. It makes it, however, all the more difficult to sift out precisely the differences in the approaches of the speakers.

But of course it was not all a question of peace on earth and goodwill to all men. This would have been too much to expect from a gathering composed of men and groups who had become committed to, nay, who had been running crusades in favour of, approaches which had left a considerable residue of acerbity. Many of them had come to the Conference for different ostensible reasons: to defend their sovereignty, to condemn subversion, to speak out for a union, and above all to win converts. We can therefore, count on a high degree of articulation in their speeches coupled with a willingness to define positions in despite of the feelings of euphoria. And although the debates were not carried out in the jargon of our analysis of the different approaches to integration, we are able to observe the broad outlines separating the federalists, pluralists and functionalists - including the adherents of regionalism.
All the world knew where Ghana stood. If Nkrumah's assiduous campaigns were not enough, his latest book was published just in time for the Conference and was being distributed among the delegates. Its title was loud and insistent: "Africa must Unite." At the Conference his position was equally unequivocal.

But it might be useful to resume, briefly, before we proceed further, the cardinal traits of federalism which we traced in our earlier theoretical analysis. These are power and the supranational state. We noted the basic federalist belief, whether in its classical or sociological form, of the efficacy of federalism in engendering unity, its deep awareness of the failings of a system of unregulated interactions between states, its belief in the primacy of politics, its focus on power. Nkrumah's position reproduced all these traits. He asserted his belief in the primacy of political union over economic cooperation.

"African Unity is above all a political kingdom which can be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round. The United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, were the political decisions of revolutionary peoples before they became mighty realities of social power and material wealth."

Power, indeed, was at the centre of Nkrumah's analysis. He dwelt at length on colonialism, pointing out that it still persisted in Africa, in many cases in a new guise - neo-colonialism. He saw this as a design on the part of the imperial powers against the sovereignty of African states. The only way to combat it was to unite. That was also the only way to free the rest of Africa.

"Do we have any other weapon against this design but our unity? Is not our unity essential to guard our own freedom as well as to win freedom for our oppressed brothers, the freedom fighters."

He surveyed in much details the material resources of the African continent recalling that it is probably the richest in the world in minerals, industrial and agricultural primary materials. He urged for a unified economic planning for Africa with great industrial complexes. He insisted that Africans do away with their customs and currency barriers. He predicted that unless the African governments could unite so as to improve the well-being of their peoples they stood to suffer from the discontent which resulted from dependence.

"Unless we can establish great industrial complexes in Africa - which we can only do in a United Africa - we must leave our pea-
santry to the mercy of foreign cash crop markets, and face the same unrest which overthrew the colonialists."

Similarly, only unity in a Union Government would cure the financial ills and frustration of the small African countries.

"No sporadic act nor pious resolution can resolve our present problems. Nothing will be of avail, except the united act of a United Kingdom... Is it not unity alone that can weld us into an effective force, capable of creating our own progress and making our valuable contribution to world peace?"

His call for the creation of an "all-embracing African High Command" was aimed at maintaining non-alignment by ending the system of military pacts with former colonial powers and at maximizing the power of the African states, according to him, in the service of peace.

"We do not want nor do we visualise an African High Command in the terms of the power politics that now rule a great part of the world, but as an essential and indispensable instrument for ensuring stability and security in Africa."

He called attention to some of the problems that dissipated the energies and attention of African states. The ubiquitous frontier problem was one of these and he suggested that the only effective remedy for this problem, a relic of colonialism, was to be found in unity.

"Unless we succeed in arresting the danger (of war through boundary disputes) through mutual understanding on fundamental issues and through African unity, which will render existing boundaries obsolete and superfluous, we shall have fought in vain for independence. Only African unity can heal this festering sore of boundary disputes between our various states."

True to his federalist convictions, he advocated an immediate blueprint. In a key passage he attacked the gradualist approach. He pointed to the determined call by the ordinary Africans for independence and unity.

"It is this popular determination that must move us to a Union of independent African states. In delay lies danger to our well-being, to our very existence as free states. It has been suggested that our approach to unity should be gradual, that it should go piecemeal. This point of view conceives Africa as a static entity with
"frozen" problems which can be eliminated one by one and when all have been cleared then we can come together and say: "Now all is well. Let us now unite." This view takes no account of the impact of external pressures. Nor does it take cognizance of the danger that delay can deepen our isolations and exclusiveness; that it can enlarge our differences and set us drifting further and further apart into the net of neo-colonialism, so that our union will become nothing but a fading hope, and the great design of Africa's full redemption will be lost, perhaps, forever."

He rejected the idea of an organization "conceived in the light of the United Nation's example" whose resolutions have sometimes been ignored by member states. Similarly he rejected the Organization of American States as a model since he found that such an organization put the weaker states at the mercy of the more powerful ones politically and economically. He seemed to prefer the United States of America as a model for the Union he envisaged.

"When the first Congress of the United States met many years ago at Philadelphia one of the delegates sounded the first chore of unity by declaring that they had met in "a state of nature." In other words, they were not in Philadelphia as Virginians or Pennsylvanians, but simply as Americans..."

He ended with a number of proposals. First, he urged the delegates to make a declaration of principle on unity and to agree to the establishment of a Union of African States. Secondly, he advocated the formation of an All-African Committee of Foreign Ministers and urged that a date for their meeting be appointed before the Conference rose. This Committee was to appoint a permanent body to draft a Constitution for a Union Government of Africa. The Summit Conference was to decide on a location for the new capital. For this, President Nkrumah put forward two proposals - Bangui in the Central African Republic or Leopoldville in the Congo. The Committee of Foreign Ministers was to be empowered to establish:


2. A Commission to work out a continent-wide plan for a united and common economic and industrial programme for Africa; this plan should include proposals for setting up:

   (1) A Common Market for Africa.
   (2) An African Currency.
3. A Commission to draw up details for a Common Foreign Policy and diplomacy.


The two groups who opposed their approaches to Nkrumah's federalism, we term pluralists and functionalists. It is not always possible to separate the two neatly since the same state sometimes seemed to embody the two approaches. This need not surprise us either. We are dealing with theorists/actors not theorists/observers of the neo-functionalist type and also, with the general willingness to work towards a modicum of unity, functionalism was at hand to temper even the most diehard pluralism. But there was no mistaking the front-line pluralists.

"Nous enten­ dons conserver nos Etats dans leur totale souveraineté... Je dois mettre en relief que notre adhésion écarte "ipso facto" la formule de la Fédération des Etats Africains, puisque le fédéralisme suppose l'abandon d'une grosse partie de la souveraineté nationale.

"De meme, nous rejeterons la formule confederaliste parce que l'autorité que nous placerions au-dessus des Etats pourrait imposer des directions inacceptables pour certains d'entre nous..."

(President Tsiranana of Malagasy Republic).

President Bourgiba of Tunisia was just as blunt. It was, here again, the realist school personified:

*"We intend to conserve the total sovereignty of our states... I should underline that our adhesion means by the same token a rejection of a formula for a Federation of African States because federalism presupposes the surrender of a large part of a national sovereignty. Similarly, we would reject a confederal formula seeing that the authority we superimpose on the states might impose demands which would be unacceptable for certain of us."
"Speaking for ourselves we prefer to see things as they are. We hardly know each other and we have barely had time to draw up an inventory of the things which bring us together and those which divide us."

He hastened to add however:

"It is not out of some vague feeling of scepticism that we, for our part, wish to proceed gradually. On the contrary, it is because we have faith in African unity..."

We noted in our theoretical analysis how the pluralist approach to integration is grounded on the tenets of the realist school, namely, the irreducibility of the nation state as the unit of international life, the conception of national interest, conflict and the struggle for power as the stock-in-trade of international politics making the pursuit of supranationality an illusion, and finally the idea that the pursuit of peace and security is the primary limit on national interest and that the road to their achievement lies in diplomatic accommodation. All these strands of thought found their way into the debates of African pluralists at the Conference.

"Paix sur le continent d'abord," Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, was to declare. "Nous souhaiterons, par ailleurs, que la solution des différends qui peuvent opposer certains États frères fut recherché par la voie des négociations pacifiques."

For the President of Niger Republic Hamani Diori it there could be no ignoring the national interest:

"Une vision réaliste de la conjoncture africaine nous permet de percevoir cette première évidence criante: ... ce fait nouveau qu'est le fait national..."

Again President Tsiranana:

***"L'Afrique des États doit être l'Afrique de Coopération. "Even that old protagonist of Negritude, Senghor, was to play on the same

**"Peace on the continent, in the first place, and besides we would wish that the solution of the differences which are liable to divide our brother states should be undertaken through peaceful negotiations."

***"A realistic appreciation of the African situation would lead us to a realization of this supreme and glaring evidence... The novel fact of national reality."

***"The Africa of States ought to be an Africa of cooperation."
theme of l’Afrique des Etats. On his return from the Conference he declared in Paris, literally taking a leaf out of De Gaulle’s famous book:

"Je me fais de l’unité Africaine la même idée que le général De Gaulle se fait de l’Europe, il faut faire l’Afrique des patries. Nous sommes en effet trop différents les uns des autres, aussi bien du point de vue de la race que de la culture et de la langue."

It was rather difficult, to say the least, to reconcile this with the paean to African culture which he delivered at the Summit Conference:

"I am convinced that what binds us lies deeper; and my conviction is based on scientifically demonstrable facts. What binds us is beyond history: it is rooted in pre-history. It arises from geography, ethnology, and hence culture. It existed before Christianity and Islam; it is older than all colonization. It is that community of culture which I call African-ness. I would define it as 'the sum total of African values.' Whether it appears in its Arab-Berber aspect or its African-Negro aspect, African-ness always shows the same characteristics of passion in feelings and vigour in expression. I recognize an African carpet among those of other continents. It is no mere chance that some mosaic in the Bardo Museum resembles some Mali 'pagne'."

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, on this occasion the rhapsody over African culture was intended, in view of the general feeling of optimism, to cushion his pluralistic views, for he declared:

"If we do not wish to meet with disaster, we should consider the European and American examples. We must be cautious, moving forward step by step and stage by stage. I fear that we should be heading rapidly for disaster if we tried to construct a federation - or even a confederation with its own parliament and military command at the first attempt."

Of course this was Europe of 1963. Nevertheless it is significant that Nkrumah the federalist and Senghor the pluralist drew diametrically opposite conclusions from the European and American models. The pluralists, therefore, had a clear answer to Nkrumah’s call for an immediate blueprint. President Tsiranana:

* "My idea of African unity is the same as general De Gaulle’s idea of Europe. We must create an Africa of fatherlands. We are indeed too different from one another from the point of view of race, culture and language."
President Bourgiba:

"Poser l'unité comme une chose imminente, facile, qui se fera par l'adoption d'une motion, d'un manifique ou l'élaboration d'une constitution risque d'aboutir à des déceptions."

President William Tubman of Liberia joined those who wanted to create "a body which will allow us to live and work in peace." For the pluralists, the maximum that the African could strive for in 1963 was peace and cooperation. Houphouët-Boigny tried to formulate it into a slogan:

"Liberté, paix et bonheur, n'est-ce pas la finalité de notre politique commune?"

The pluralists did not share Nkrumah's analysis of colonialism, frontier problems, and the African economy. For Bourgiba...

"... the paralyzing fear of neo-colonialism might well keep newly liberated countries in a state of chronic weakness and therefore of prolonged dependence... Cooperation with the industrialized countries, rich in capital, cadres and technical experience, is not only desirable but inevitable for developing countries. There is no alternative. The refusal of such cooperation through fear of a revival of colonialism is a position which can be justified from a sentimental point of view or that of pure logic. But all the same, the attitude is unrealistic. Accepting the assistance of former colonial powers does sometimes mean running a real risk, I admit. But refusing it means isolating oneself and condemning oneself to stagnation."

Senghor rejected the emphasis on under-development which featured largely in Nkrumah's approach:

"Most of us feel that what brings us close to one another - and must unite us - is our position as under-developed countries. Nor is that wrong. But we are not the only countries in that position. If

*"My answer is still that an African community is an illusion."
**"The projection of unity as something imminent, easy and which can be achieved through the adoption of a motion a manifesto or an elaborate constitution, is liable to end in disappointment."
***"Liberty, peace and happiness, are these not the end of our political community?"
that could be said objectively to be the whole truth, then African unity ought one day to dissolve with the disappearance of under-development. I am convinced that what binds us lies deeper…”

But it was on the question of frontiers and its corollary of subversion that the pluralists led the most vicious attack on Nkrumah’s position. Houphouët-Boigny:

”It has been said that frontiers are the scars of history. The magicians of plastic surgery, which certain persons would like to claim they are, will employ their supposed extraordinary talents in vain; they will not succeed so soon in effacing these scars from the face of the earth. That operation is not indispensable to the achievement of the unity with which we are concerned.”

Even normally radical states like Modibo Keita’s Mali joined energetically in the defence of existing frontiers.

Modibo Keita:

”The colonial system divided Africa, but it permitted nations to be born. Present frontiers must be respected and the sovereignty of each state must be consecrated by a multilateral non-aggression pact.”

Several states denounced subversion. Indeed, for some it seemed to be the main reason for attending the Conference. We may recall that in the statement of the difference between the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups made by Azikiwe, President of Nigeria, he had declared that while the two groups agreed on many things, the cardinal difference between them was that the Casablanca group had not denounced subversion. At the Summit Conference members of the Casablanca group joined the pluralists in this denunciation with a will.

The Prime Minister of Nigeria Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared:

”If we want this unity in Africa we must first agree to certain essential things: The first is that African States must respect one another. There must be acceptance of equality of all the states. No matter whether they are big or small, they are all sovereign and their sovereignty is sovereignty.” He continued:

”Mr. President, I want to be frank. I want to tell the bitter truth. To my mind we cannot achieve this unity as long as some African countries continue to carry on subversive activities in other African countries.
Houphouët-Boigny:

"This is the place for us to condemn energetically and in unison political assassination as a means of government or of assuming power."

Echoing Abubakar, President Ahidjo of the Cameroun declared:

"We have to agree upon certain basic principles. We must accept each other for what we are. We must recognize the equality of all our states, whatever they be and whatever their size or population, we must accept the sovereignty of each and everyone, its absolute right to exist as a sovereign state in accordance with the will of its people. This implies respect for one's neighbours, abstaining from intervention, in its internal affairs, from encouraging or trying to maintain covert or overt subversion."

Modibo Keita of Mali:

"If indeed each and everyone of us is animated by the ardent wish to create African unity, we should take Africa as she is..."

The Chad delegation was emphatic:

"We think that the unity we seek will be founded on the policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries."

In the midst of all these solemn declarations in favour of the status quo regarding frontiers, Somalia declared that it wanted a change in her frontiers. The delegate President Aden Abdulla Osman demanded the adjusting of the boundaries which he said divided the Somalis along the entire length of the existing borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. He accused Ethiopia of "taking possession of a large portion of Somali territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants." He advocated the principle of self-determination as the UN expounded it. The placidity of the Summit Conference was ruffled. The Ethiopian host Prime Minister made an unscheduled speech in a dramatic intervention refuting the Somali charges. For a time it was touch and go but the Chairman was able to restore calm. In the end however it was the principle of uti possidetis which won the day. One may usefully compare on this question Houphouët-Boigny's policy of "quietus non movere" with Somalia's advocacy of national self-determination and Nkrumah's idea of an all-embracing unity rendering the question of boundaries irrelevant.
Our theoretical analysis revealed that functionalists believe that social, economic and technological change determine political change. This approach found many adherents in the debates at the Summit Conference and was echoed in Bourgiba’s phrase:

"Faisons ensemble l'apprentissage de l'unité!" *

Again, ’...Il faut habituer les esprits à l'idée de l’unité et à ses implications matérielles et morales. Une sérieuse préparation psychologique est nécessaire, sans laquelle rien de valable ne pourrait être fait."

Although, as we have pointed out, there were those whose advocacy of gradualism was just an expression of their hidebound attachment to their sovereignty, there must have been several heads of state who felt genuinely concerned about the prospects of unity if the process was rushed.

"At this stage’ asked Abdulla Osman of Somalia, ’...I wonder whether the African States could be prepared to surrender their recently acquired sovereignty to a central government. In our view, such a momentous decision should be reached only at the end of a process of evolution. We should begin with less binding forms of association."

The problem was doubtless real. Whether or not it was justified, some delegates saw real and formidable differences in their background and experiences and did not feel that any farreaching arrangement for unity would gain the support of their people. President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic pointed out for example, that Malagasy has no borders with any African country and has been spared the colonial experience of boundaries that played havoc with ethnic and linguistic homogenity. This fact probably made Malagasy’s attitude more insular. In any case, that was Tsiranana’s view—

"The Malagasy being deeply attached to their independence, which they attained recently and with difficulty, I would not have the support of my fellow countrymen, were I to approve any project of association, federal or even merely confederal in character."

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*"Let us do the apprenticeship for unity!"

**"...we must habituate the mind to unity and its material and moral implications. A serious psychological preparation is necessary without which writing nothing worthy can be done."
President Bourgiba also hinted at the same thing. He declared that unity could only come from the consent of the people - a suggestion perhaps that he did not think his people would consent. More importantly, as a follow-up on his "we hardly know ourselves" declaration, he suggested that they planned meanwhile to advance their effort in a Maghreb unity - countries with which they had greater affinity.

"For all these reasons, and for others arising from the many affinities existing between our peoples, we long ago planned to set up in North Africa the great Arab Maghreb."

The advocacy of regionalism seemed to offer an attractive alternative to those who genuinely believed in a "step by step" advance towards integration at the same time as it suited the books of those who, fearing encroachment on their sovereignty, merely wanted to temporize. Besides, as our surveys of the preceding era of conflict demonstrated, some of the foremost pluralists already figured prominently in regional groupings and hoped to continue in those activities. We have already noted Nkrumah's misgivings about the danger that regionalism might ossify particular interests. Tsiranana of Malagasy disagreed.

"It is difficult for me to believe that regionalism can develop particularities; on the contrary, I think that it will favour cooperation and contribute to the flowering of African universalism. Each member state of a regional grouping can become an efficient intermediary for the new relations between that grouping and other member states of the Convention..."

He went further, stating a trenchant functionalist case:

"I sincerely hope that in all the fields of our cooperation, the same procedure will be adopted, that the rapprochement of regional groupings will ensure our unity. I even believe that it will be necessary to create new regional groupings to cover the continent with a machinery for harmonious cooperation."

For still other reasons Bourgiba favoured regionalism:

"Whatever the case, regional agreements have an important part to play in the development of Africa. We know that the industrial countries, which provide technical assistance and capital, would rather deal with groups than with separate countries. Moreover, it is easier for countries combined in a unit to harmonize their economic and social politics within the framework of joint programmes. Thus regional agreements further both the planning of external assistance and that of their own development."
Senghor had a still different nuance, always cultural.

"Let us at last dare to say it; the ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences will not be wiped out...we should recognize these complimentary differences. We should even help to organize them into regional unions. I can envisage three: North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, until such a time as South Africa is liberated. Each of these unions could in its turn be divided into smaller unions."

But Haile Selassie thought that regional associations were only "temporary expedients designed to serve only until we have established the conditions which will bring total African unity within our reach."

Thus the proponents of functionalism tended also to embrace regionalism as a solution to the dilemma of what they saw as excessive defence of national sovereignty (pluralism) or precipitous move to supranationality (federalism), or else as a half-way house in a dynamic process between the two through economic and social cooperation. President Nyerere of Tanzania quickly assumed the role of a spokesman for functionalism through regionalism and in the next year the controversy between him and Nkrumah would culminate in the showdown in Cairo. Meanwhile he advanced his "step by step" thesis in his customary didactic fashion.

"No good mason would complain that his first brick did not go far enough. He knows that a first brick will go as far as it can go and will go no farther."

On one matter there seemed to be a general consensus - with differing degrees of enthusiasm. This was the liberation of the rest of dependent Africa. Nearly every delegation spoke of it in approving terms. Everyone agreed it was an urgent necessity. Haile Selassie thought it was the first task. Some even declared that the independent African countries could not contemplate a Union without first liberating their brothers who were still colonized. President Milton Obote of Uganda offered his territory as a training-ground for freedom fighters and a springboard for action against the settler minority regimes in Southern Africa. It was in this connection that President Ben Bella of Algeria made his memorable declaration. After amplifying Nkrumah's phrase to the effect that freedom meant nothing to the independent African countries unless all Africa was free, he reviewed the Algerian situation before independence and found that it was because other African states had agreed to help and to die a little, that Algeria had been able to win her independence. He revealed that 15,000 Algerian volunteers were under arms ready to join a liberation force if called upon. He concluded:

"So let us agree to die a little, or even completely, so that the peoples still under colonial domination may be freed and African..."
This seemed very aptly to summarize the general feeling and it was generally agreed to set up funds and facilities for training for the liberation movements. It was in its way a remarkable development. Some members of the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups had not always been so enthusiastic towards the liberation movements. At the Summit Conference it seems they caught, this far, the general Pan-African "we" feeling. What, then, was the conclusion of this meeting? On the most important point, unity, the Conference without a doubt declared for gradualism. Apart from the marked concern for national sovereignty which we have sought to demonstrate there were other fundamental differences between Nkrumah and his opponents. His differences with Senghor is an index to these factors. While Nkrumah's political view of African unity led him to see Union Government as the solution of Africa's problems, Senghor's highly cultural approach - or sociological if you like - led him almost inevitably to a more gradualist approach. Take the debate over the American example. It was characteristic of the two men that while Nkrumah saw in his example mainly the emergence of a powerful political force and was filled with optimism, Senghor looking at the same phenomenon in humanist terms gravitated towards pessimism. To a mind not attuned to this humanist bent, Senghor's arguments must have appeared contrived to a degree:

"The aim we must assign, which we do assign, to our action, can obviously only be the very aim which other nations and continents have set themselves: development through economic growth. I say development. By that I mean bringing each and every African to full worth. It is a question of man."

In effect, it was a tragic opposition of belief in a dramatic political act and trust in the potency of a sociological process. Tragic because the two need not have been mutually exclusive. As it was, only Obote of Uganda said anything amounting to a support of Nkrumah's stand.

"The time for high sounding words, slogans, clichés and good intentions has come to an end; this is the time for concrete proposals and for action. I hold the view that however nice one may feel as complete master in one's own house the time has come, indeed is almost overdue, for African Independent States to surrender some of their sovereignty in favour of an African Central Legislature and Executive body with specific powers over those subjects where divided control and action be undesirable..."
Otherwise the Conference declared for "Unity in Diversity" - Bourgiba's phrase. This was at one with the general inclination to preserve national sovereignty, interest and culture. Many questioned, directly or indirectly, the Pan-African idea of an African Personality. President Diori Hamani of the Niger Republic asked:

"Must we, in the name of African Unity, abolish our differences, make uniform the elements of (those) differences, and tend to produce an average, standardized, de-personalized "homo africanus"?" That would be pure fantasy."

For Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria:

"The African is a human being and, therefore, we have to see to the development of human personality in Africa. I think any talk of African personality is based on inferiority complex."

According to Houphouët-Boigny:

"The unity we seek should not be confused with uniformity, which implies first of all that every country must have the opportunity of adopting the political and economic system which appears to it to correspond with a precise phase of its development, and which likewise implies that every country has the imperative duty to respect the different paths that brother-countries may choose."

There were numerous other examples. President Maurice Yameogo of the Republic of Upper Volta:

"Africa is not monolithic in thought, it obviously cannot be so in politics; and this affirmation becomes a fortiori even more obvious from the moment when we leave the geographical area of Black Africa and enter the realities of the modern Arab world."

President Youlou of Congo (Brazzaville):

"L'unité de l'Afrique ne doit pas cependant faire oublier sa diversité, d'autant plus qu'il s'agit d'un immense continent..."*

**"African unity should not make us forget its diversity especially considering the immense size of the continent."**
The verdict was overwhelming. Pluralism had won the day at the Addis Ababa Summit. True, it was tempered by a commitment to functionalism evinced in the advocacy of regional cooperation. There was also a consensus of feeling on the liberation of the continent. It was, all the same, national sovereignty which carried away the trophy. These facts were enshrined in the ensuing Charter.

Footnotes to Chapter ten

2. See Wallerstein, I., op. cit., p. 44 and p. 49.
3. Ibid p. 63.
4. Ibid.
5. See Wallerstein, I., op. cit., p. 64.
10. In fact it was being distributed among the delegates at the Conference.
11. SCIAS, Plen 3, p. 4.
14. SCIAS, Plen 3: Proceedings, p. 3.
18. Nyerere in his closing speech remarked: "...If the nations of the world reassembled at the United Nations, will approach the problems of the world in the same spirit of goodwill and cooperation as the nations of African assembled have approached their African problems here, the human race, like the African people, shall have taken an immense step towards universal brotherhood." CIAS, GEN, INF. 34, p. 4, Proceedings, Vol. 2.
11. The Charter

"What are we looking for in Africa? Are we looking for Charters conceived in the light of the United Nations example? A type of United Nations Organization whose decisions are framed on the basis of resolutions that in our experience have sometimes been ignored by member States... Or is it intended that Africa should be turned into loose Organization of States on the model of the Organization of American States... Is this the kind of association we want for ourselves in the United Africa we speak of with such feeling and emotion?"

(KWAME NKRUMAH at the Addis Ababa Summit, May 1963.)

There was no gainsaying the fact that Pluralism and the so-called moderates had gained the upper hand at the Addis Ababa Summit. Nkrumah’s total commitment to Pan-Africanism, including his analysis of Africa’s position, seemed to have been rejected. As we have seen, some of the tenets of Pan-Africanism were questioned and rejected by some delegations. The overwhelming preference was evidently for a loose organization. The predominant inclination seemed to be the preservation of national sovereignties, national interests and to insulate them from interference from other African countries. It was only on this basis that the moderates could contemplate unity. The boundaries created by the colonial powers constituted no longer an anathema that was to be effaced from the continent but an imperfection that had to be maintained, or as some delegations asserted, defensible lines of demarcation. The halcyon days of Garvey and DuBois or the first Pan-African Congresses seemed very far off indeed when African unity was conceived of in an all-embracing sense. The fulminations of the All-African People’s Congress against small sovereignties behind artificial boundaries, seemed to have been left by the wayside. This was the prevailing mood of the Conference. Yet, we noted also a compromise on the issue of liberating the dependent African territories. Again, there was an undefined acceptance that unity was a goal. Furthermore, a more acceptable common denominator was found in functionalism - in economic and social cooperation. The Charter of the Organization consecrated these things.
Article III of the Charter of the Organization lists seven principles, namely:

1. The sovereign equality of all Member States.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for the inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation of arbitration.
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state.
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

The first fact to be noted is that of these seven items four were clearly in defence of the sovereign rights of the member states and these were insisted on by the Monrovia powers. A declaration against subversion, political assassination, and interference in internal affairs, was included in the Lagos Charter of the Monrovia powers and it was its absence in the Charter of the Casablanca powers that was regarded by the Monrovia States as the main difference between the two groups! The first item on the sovereign equality of member states was a rejection of the Pan-Africanist contention that there were too many unjustifiably small sovereign states in Africa. Two of the items seem to be concessions to the Nkrumaist school. These were the declaration to liberate the dependent territories and the last item subscribing to non-alignment. The so-called Casablanca group had been the most assiduous sponsor of these principles.

The sovereign equality of member states is solidly entrenched in the Charter. It is mentioned in the Preamble where the founding fathers registered their determination "to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States..." Apart from Paragraph I Article III under Principles, it also appears in Article V which stated that Member States shall enjoy equal rights and duties. Article IV makes sovereign independence the criterion for membership. It is significant that the word Pan-Africanism does not appear even once in the Charter or its Preamble.

The solicitude of the founding fathers to protect both sovereignty and equality reflects the arguments expressed during the debates...
on African unity at the Summit Conference. Many States had expressed their fears and rejection of any leadership. In the words of President Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia:

"Le désir d'hégémonie ou le complexe de superiorité c'est le ver dans le fruit... L'expérience des dernières années est là pour en témoigner."

He was of course alluding to the years immediately preceding the Summit Conference when certain African countries felt that their very existence was threatened by their neighbours. This assertion received overwhelming support even from large states like Nigeria which stated bluntly that unity was impossible without acceptance of equality by all the states.

Article III Paragraph 2 speaks of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It is significant that the founders of the OAU should insist on this clause. The most important problem which had faced the African countries by 1963 had been the Congo question. It was by definition an internal problem. But no African country could fail to see its implications or its repercussion on the other African countries. For one thing it represented the tip of the glacier that would bring the cold war into Africa. As most African countries professed non-alignment it was a matter that concerned them urgently. To others it represented the thin end of the wedge of neo-colonialism. As such the Africans at the United Nation lost no time in co-ordinating their actions to find a solution to that problem. Many of the problems that faced the Organization later were to come in that guise. The founding fathers could not have been unaware of this. It can only speak for the concern of most states to protect their national rights that despite this consideration they insisted on including this paragraph in the Principles.

Article III paragraph 3 consecrates "respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence." This alludes no doubt to frontier disputes, latent or open, which exist between many African States. It is also in consonance with the general feeling at the Summit Conference, summed up by President Tsiranana of Malagasy:

"It is no longer possible, nor desirable, to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the pretext of racial, religious or linguistic criteria...

*"The desire for hegemony is the worm in the bud. The experience of recent years stands as a witness to this fact."
Should we take (these) criteria for setting our boundaries, a few States in Africa would be blotted from the map.\textsuperscript{3}

The fourth principle of peaceful settlement of disputes was made necessary because the member states, mindful of the frictions between the African states, especially border disputes, realized that they needed peace in order to consolidate their states. They had a vested interest therefore in peaceful settlement of disputes. The solution found for this was typically Pluralistic. Article 19 of the Charter is an attempt to institutionalize peaceful cooperation in a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

A few months before the Addis Ababa Summit, President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo had been assassinated in a coup d'état. At least one Head of State was under suspicion, whether justifiably or not, for having a hand in the affair. It will also be recalled that there were several disputes over the harbouring of exile governments in neighbouring states. It was not surprising therefore that Article III paragraph 5 should seek specifically to make member states refrain from political assassination or subversive activities.

It has been suggested that there is a contradiction between the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and paragraph 6 of Article III which pledges the members to eradicate all forms of colonialism.\textsuperscript{2} But it is more likely that the founding fathers had in mind only the unliberated African territories which under Article IV are not eligible to become members of the Organization.

Although the last principle under paragraph 7, that of non-alignment, can be seen as a concession to the Nkrumaist line, it was not much of a concession, seeing that most African countries already embraced that principle as best serving their national interests. Hedged in between the two super-powers with their political doctrines, the African states saw non-alignment probably as the only course to afford them room for manoeuvre.

According to Article IV membership is open to all independent sovereign African States. Membership is not binding. Under Article XXXII any State may withdraw from the Organization and its withdrawal takes effect one year after a written notification has been sent to the Administrative Secretary-General. Likewise under Article 23 member states are admonished to pay their contributions to the budget regularly but there is no sanction to ensure this.

The Charter has also tried to deal with some of the major problems that faced the Addis Ababa Conference. On some of these problems it is silent. Apart from paragraph 4 of Article II which calls for the eradication of "all forms of colonialism from Africa," a special resolution of the Conference appointed a co-ordinating Committee - the so-called Committee of nine - later eleven - (consi-
sting of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Congo (Leopoldville), Nigeria, Senegal, Tanganyika, United Arab Republic, and Uganda, with headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam,) to harmonize assistance from African States to the liberation movements.

The Charter is silent on regional Organizations. But paragraph (e) of Article II proposes to "promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human rights." And according to Article 52 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." It might be supposed that by implication regional organizations are well within the limits set by the Charter of the OAU.

Similarly, there is nothing in the Charter that forbids African States to participate in non-African Organizations. Indeed the Charter does not mention any possible incompatibility that might arise between it and treaties prior to it and after it. The founding fathers were aware that many members were either in the Commonwealth or were associated with the European Common Market but there is nothing in the Charter to indicate a criticism of such association.

Neocolonialism is specifically referred to only in the preamble to the Charter, although the drafters of the Charter were conscious of the debate that had been going on about it. Neocolonialism has been defined by Alex Quaison-Sackey as "the practice of granting a sort of independence with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client-state, and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones..." According to Nkrumah it is "economic penetration, cultural assimilation, ideological domination, psychological infiltration and subversive activities..." President Nasser saw it thus:

"There exists that insistence on the making of the continent a mere warehouse for raw materials at prices which fail to satisfy the hunger of its people while the total benefit goes to the importing countries which try to make of their industrial and scientific progress a quasi-colonialism of a new form, that of unjust exploitation of the wealth of others without a fair share."

The only other allusion to neocolonialism might be assumed under Article II where one of the purposes was stated as the eradication of all forms of colonialism. But in the debates at the Summit
Conference, many delegates insisted on the necessity and in some cases on the desirability of carrying on economic association with former colonial powers. One writer concluded that the reference to neocolonialism in the Charter is "merely an empty phrase included to placate those nostalgic for direct action, or as a convenient slogan for those faced with intricate domestic difficulties." The Charter does not provide for any sanctions against States which do not abide by its provisions. Indeed nowhere in the Charter is there an express call for an obligation on the part of the members to abide by the resolutions of the organization. No organ has disciplinary powers, neither is there an international force to pursue action against a recalcitrant State. The keyword is cooperation and there is a complete absence of coercion - except perhaps indirectly in the force of opinion of the other member States.

Cooperation is indeed the subject of Article II paragraph 2 which goes on to list the fields in which member States had agreed to harmonize their general policies:

1. Political and diplomatic cooperation.
2. Economic cooperation, including transport and communications.
3. Educational and cultural cooperation.
4. Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation.
5. Scientific and technical cooperation, and
6. Cooperation for defence and security.

Reference to political union in any form is avoided entirely in consonance with the rejection of the Nkrumaist proposal.

Four main organs were erected under the Charter, namely:

1. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
2. The Council of Foreign Ministers.
3. The Secretariat.
4. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

The Charter describes the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as "the supreme organ of the Organization." It is entrusted with the task of discussing "matters of common concern to Africa with a view to co-ordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the Organization." It has also been empowered to review the
structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies which the Charter may create. Nevertheless it is clear that this organ is intended to be essentially deliberative.

Article XX entrusts to the Assembly the task of setting up the specialized agencies:
- the Economic and Social Commission
- the Educational and Cultural Commission
- the Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission
- the Defence Commission
- the Scientific Technical and Research Commission.

Similarly, the Assembly is empowered to amend the Charter by a two-thirds majority provided a written request has been sent to the Administrative Secretary-General and all the member States have been notified one year beforehand.

An attempt has been made to leave the Assembly as flexible as possible. Membership includes Heads of State or Heads of Governments. Originally this was to avoid the difficulty in the case of a country like Tanganyika where the head of Government was an African but the Head of State was the Queen of England. Article IX of the Charter also provides for "a duly accredited representative" to take the place of the Head of State or Government should the occasion arise. Under the rules of procedure the Charter states that "All resolutions and decisions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the Organization." This provision together with the lack of sanctions imposes, in true pluralist fashion, a necessity to rally a broad base before the organization can issue resolutions.

The Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers, according to Article XII of the Charter consists of the foreign Ministers of member States, although other Ministers designated by their governments are allowed to take the place of the foreign minister. The Council meets twice a year in ordinary session and in extraordinary session when two-thirds of the member States approve.

Under Article XIII, the Council is responsible to the Assembly. It prepares the conferences of the Assembly and deals with any matters referred to it by the Assembly. It is entrusted with the task of implementing the decisions of the Assembly. And it co-ordinates inter-African cooperation. Its own resolutions, determined by a simply majority, are submitted as a rule to the Assembly for approval.
The General Secretariat.

The Charter provides for the Appointment of an Administrative Secretary-General. The use of the word 'Administrative' indicates a preference on the part of Member States that the Secretary-General should play a purely administrative role as opposed to a political or diplomatic role. Whether they have been able to effect this inclination is another matter. But the use of the word 'Administrative' to designate the Secretary-General was quite intentional and later events have shown that the fears of some Member States about the secretariat acquiring powers of initiative, have not by any means disappeared.

Article XVIII following a similar provision by the UN Charter, stresses that Member States may not try to influence the Secretary-General and his staff in the discharge of their duties. Among the major functions of the Administrative Secretary-General are:

1. To communicate a copy of the notification of adhesion by any state to all the Member States, in accordance with Article 28 of the Charter.

2. To receive a written notification from any state desiring to renounce its membership, in accordance with Article 32.

3. To receive a written request for the amendment or revision of the Charter and to notify all the Member States, in accordance with Article 33.

4. To accept on behalf of the Organization gifts, requests and other donations after due approval by the Council of Ministers, in accordance with Article 33.

5. To call ordinary as well as extraordinary sessions of the Council of ministers and of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in accordance with the rules of Procedure of the Council.

6. To draw up the provisional agenda and to communicate it to Member States, in the manner laid down in Rule 14 of the rules of procedure, and

7. To prepare and submit for approval of the Council of Ministers the annual Budget of the Organization.
The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

Under Article XIX Member States pledge themselves to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and for this purpose a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration is set up. The same Article further provides that a separate Protocol should define the composition and conditions of service of the Commission and that this Protocol should become an integral part of the Charter.

The Commission is not a judicial organ neither does it have any powers of sanction. It operates in the spirit of the Charter by encouraging cooperation. In fact, as we shall discover later it has never yet undertaken successfully a definitive settlement of a dispute.

Under Article XX some other Specialized Commissions were established namely:

1. The Economic and Social Commission.
2. The Educational and Cultural Commission.
4. The Defence Commission.
5. The Scientific Technical and Research Commission.

But in November 1966 these Commissions were incorporated into three Commissions as follows:

1. The Economic and Social Commission also in charge of Transport and Communications.
2. The Educational, Cultural, Scientific and Health Commission.
3. The Defence Commission.

It will be observed from the above brief survey that the Charter of the OAU has consecrated a loose Organization. The draft on which the Charter was drawn was prepared by Ethiopia. As a member of the Monrovia group she had drawn largely from the Lagos Charter of that group. However we have seen that the Charter owes much both to the UN Charter and to the Charter of the Organization of American States. As has been pointed out, the Chilian ambassador to the OAS was employed by the Ethiopian government to help draw up the Ethiopian draft. The result is therefore an amalgam of three documents.
As regards the UN, the preamble specifically mentions the principles of the UN as the foundation of the OAU Charter. Furthermore, the assessment of the members for the budget of the OAU is in accordance with the assessment of the United Nations. Article XVIII dealing with the duties of the Administrative Secretary-General closely follows not only Article 100 of the United Nations Charter, but Articles 89 and 90 of the Organization of American States. Finally, the text of the privileges and immunities of the officials of the OAU closely follows the UN provisions on the same subject.

As regards the OAS, Article 6 of the OAS Charter reads "States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise these rights, and have equal duties. The rights of each State depend not upon its power to ensure the exercise thereof, but upon the mere fact of its existence as a person under international Law." The same principle will be found embodied in Article 5 of the OAU. Secondly, the form of the organs of the OAU follows that of the OAS in some important respects although the latter is somewhat more complicated. In comparison with the OAU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of foreign Ministers, General Secretariat, and Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the OAS has the following organs:

1. The Inter-American Conference (which is almost the equivalent of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.)

2. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (here as in the OAU a Minister may be replaced by a special delegate.)

3. The Pan-American Union (which resembles the General Secretariat.) However, the OAS Secretary-General elected by the Council is empowered by Article 80 of the OAS Charter "to direct the Pan-American Union and be the legal representative thereof."

The OAU Charter has consecrated largely the principles advocated by the so-called Monrovia states. With its strong emphasis on the sovereign rights and equality of Member States and immunity from interference by other countries it also consecrates a loose organization. There is no power of sanction. What power that exists in the Organization is concentrated in the Assembly of Heads of State and Government leading one writer to conclude that "there does seem to be a trend toward an Africa of Heads of State."
Footnotes to Chapter eleven

1. One African commentator who took part in the Conference has claimed that the Charter is "substantially the same as the Lagos Charter." See Elias, T.O., in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 59, 1964, p.244. In fact the new Charter owed a debt to the United Nations Charter and probably more to the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). It was the Ethiopian draft which formed the basis of the new Charter, but then the Ethiopians had employed Mr Truco, Chile's ambassador to the OAS as the consultant for the drawing up of this draft. He was later invited by the Ethiopian government as an observer to the Summit Conference.

2. Elias, T.O., op. cit.


4. Although resolutions to settle this point were subsequently adopted at the Foreign Minister's Conference in Dakar.

5. Ibid p.34.


7. See UN Document A 64, July 1, 1946, p.25.

8. See Boutros-Ghale, Boutros, op. cit., p.45.
The events of 1963 belied the hopes of those who were deceived into thinking that Africa was palpitating on the threshold of supranationality. The OAU took on the archetypal pluralist mould - an international organization with no real will of its own 'designed primarily to facilitate communications and cooperation between states over certain problems without jeopardizing their political independence.' Nonetheless, Nkrumah did not abandon his federalist schemes at the Addis Ababa Summit. The next twelve months saw repeated and indefatigable attempts by Ghana to steer the new organization into more federalist paths and to bend the Charter in the direction of supranationality. Also, where the framework of the new Organization had signally failed to define the role of regionalism, the African states now entered a period of lively debate over regional cooperation and its position vis-à-vis the new organization and mainly as a more acceptable alternative to the highroad of federalism. The showdown at Cairo, in 1964, marks the end of this pe-
period. Two years afterwards, Nkrumah had left the international political scene in Africa. But it was in Cairo that the idea of a continental Union was put aside for the nonce and regionalism was endorsed.

The remarkable aspect of this debate was that, in the final analysis, it was two protagonists of federalism who faced each other - Nyerere of Tanzania and Nkrumah of Ghana. For Nyerere was no less attached to the Pan-African ideal than Nkrumah and, in his own words, was not so enamoured by the position of those 'who wished to get nearer it by functional cooperation.' Nevertheless, it was he who subjected Nkrumah's proposal to the most scathing criticism and both the pluralists and functionalists were content to line up behind him. Thus, although in substance the debate between Nkrumah and Nyerere could be said to represent a choice between classical and sociological federalism, in effect it represented at worst the entrenchment of pluralism and at best a vague subscription to functionalism.

Nkrumah went to work immediately after the Summit Conference. The Special Resolution passed at the Conference had called for the setting up of a "Provisional General Secretariat that will operate until the Charter of the Organization of African Unity is applied." An expert committee consisting of Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda and the UAR was appointed to assist the Secretariat. A similar proposal had been put forward by Ghana and Uganda. The main difference between the two documents lay in the fact that where the Special Resolution had provided for a Provisional Secretariat the Ghanaian proposal had called for a Provisional Commission. The distinction was however important. The Ghanaians apparently aimed at using the commission to direct the organization towards the idea of a union government instead of a secretariat. However, the Ethiopians refused to budge and had in fact not only set up a provisional secretariat but were interpreting the Special Resolution in such a way as to give the assisting countries a minimal role.

On August 8, 1963 the first Regular Conference of OAU Foreign Ministers was held in Dakar and there Ghana continued to press its case vigorously. A Ghanaian sponsored proposal asked the Council "to instruct the Provisional Secretariat to work out as a matter of urgency, for the consideration of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a machinery for a more effective central direction in order to give full meaning to the burning desire of achieving one organic and dynamic unity composed of vigorous sovereign States working harmoniously within the framework of the Addis Ababa Charter." Although this proposal was to come up in different variations no less than three times, the general attitude of the Council to it was unfavourable.
As the year drew to a close, rumblings of the second Congo crisis could already be heard. On 29th September Kasavubu dissolved the Congolese Parliament upsetting thereby the delicate compromise between him and the Lumumbists. The latter reacted by forming a Conseil National de Libération (CNL) which began insurrections in Kwilu province. By October it had moved its headquarters to Brazzaville and begun guerilla activities across the border under its leader Pierre Mulele. It was under these circumstances that the OAU Defence Commission met in Accra for the first time in October 1963. Naturally, the Ghanaians found added reason to press for an integrated African high command especially in order to replace the UN command in the Congo now that the need for an African military presence in that country seemed more justified than ever. The proposal put forward by the Ghanaian defence minister called for (a) supreme command headquarters "responsible for the Defence of union," (b) regional headquarters (c) a "Joint Services Strategic Reserve Command" and (d) a joint intelligence organization. As was only to be expected, states which showed no keenness for a union government were little disposed to contemplate a union army.

Not even the East African mutinies of January 1964 proved to be of any avail for Ghana's case. Between January 20 and 23, army mutinies took place in East Africa first in Tanganyika but also in Uganda and Kenya. On the 24th, all the three East African governments invited British troops to assist in restoring order. Four days later Nyerere of Tanganyika called for an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU to consider "the grave situation arising from many revolts... in East Africa." Although the other two governments did not join him in the request, the meeting took place nevertheless between the 12th and 15th of February in Dar es Salaam. The Ghanaians made no secret of their view of the situation: "...the concept of regional federation as a substitute for continental unity," declared the Ghanaian Times, "has been largely destroyed by the sequence of events in East Africa." Nyerere charged that there was even glee in the Ghanaian reaction: "We experienced army mutiny in East Africa and had to go through the humiliation of asking for assistance from a former colonial power. But in my country... the Ambassador of a brotherly African State celebrated and rejoiced, and I am forced to request that he be removed... And what was the reason for this rejoicing at the humiliation of a fellow African country? Union government." This event foreshadowed the altercation between Nkrumah and Nyerere later in that year in Cairo. As it was, neither the Ghanaian attempt to put up the issue of a high command for discussion at this Conference nor her request for its inclusion on the agenda of the imminent ordinary session of the Council of Ministers met with support.*

*A Nigerian battalion replaced the British troops soon after the meeting.
The controversy continued and the debates at the Lagos session on February 24-29, 1964 quickly grew very heated. The Sudanese delegate described the Ghanaian proposal as "the most difficult proposal that has ever been discussed in this Council." The Ghanaian proposal in fact seemed innocuous enough on the face of it. It called for the setting up of a Committee by the Council of Ministers to draw up possible political action which would "further promote the Unity and solidarity of African States" and which was "not only in line with the revolutionary speed of world events but... was also in line with the uncompromising mood of the African masses for more effective political and diplomatic action on all African issues." In substance it was purely and simply an attempt to create a venue for the discussion of the proposal for a Union Government of Africa. The Ghanaian argument ran thus:

"According to the Charter the Council of Ministers meets twice a year, and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government meets one a year. Yet every single issue affecting the destiny of Africa must be discussed by the Council of Ministers, who shall then submit their recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for their approval.

In the periods between the meetings, many issues affecting the destiny of Africa may arise which call for immediate solution and prompt action. As things stand now, our only approach is to summon an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers to deal with the specific problem. This means that if, for example, six emergency situations arise in a year, requiring immediate consideration by the Council of Ministers, the Council will have to meet six times in addition to its two normal meetings. This is definitely going to be an expensive exercise and a heavy burden on the financial resources of Member States. Its only prevention is for the Council of Ministers to recommend the establishment of some sort of machinery by which political direction can be given with the sole aim of strengthening unity and solidarity of the African cause in the supreme interest of mother Africa."

Although this time the Ghanaian proposal was supported by no less than five states, many of the delegates were vehemently opposed to it mainly on the grounds that such a machinery if set up would detract from the powers of the Heads of State and Governments to whom the Charter, as we have seen, had given supreme powers. However other delegates opposed the proposal on extreme pluralist premises. The representative of the Malagasy Republic declared for example:

"Furthermore, what is the point of a permanent Committee which will have to work constantly outside its sessions in order to find political measures to be applied to the African continent? If it is
not a Government, it would at least have a supranational authority which the Malagasy delegation would not approve. Therefore, we do not agree that such a permanent Commission should be set up.”

At a certain point, a Committee of eleven was appointed to meet the Ghanaian proposal. But the UAM states kept up the most vicious attacks on both the proposal and the Committee. The Senegalese delegate resorted to sarcasm:

"However, since there has been some hesitation in calling the proposal by its proper name, we will turn to the question of a Federal Government, of this famous Continental Government. We do not deny that the realisation of this aim would be beneficial for Africa. However, do the necessary conditions for the achievement of this aim exist? I say without any hesitation that they do not. That is why, as far as we are concerned, the idea of a Federal Government must be regarded as a utopia. The term utopia is not pejorative to us; we mean that perhaps it will be possible to achieve this in the future but that we must consider the possibility in the light of present conditions.

We do not have the right to be other than realistic. This is why my delegation cannot support this idea. OAU is the first link in the Unity of our Continent... We have no wish that the OAU should be a subject for regret. We do not have the right to fail and this is why we must be realistic."

It all sounded so ominous. The Chairman declared that "the situation was changing into a crisis." At the eleventh hour a Liberian proposal saved the day. It proposed the dissolution of the Committee of eleven and called for all proposals for the enhancement of unity and solidarity of the African continent to be submitted to the Provisional Secretariat and for the Secretariat in turn to circulate the proposal among the Member States. Some journalist was to record that "the OAU showed masterly diplomacy in shelving (my italics) a point of discord!"

The issue of regionalism also came up in connection with the UAM of the French-speaking states and the proposed federation in East Africa. Soon after the Addis Ababa Summit the UAM states announced that their regular twice yearly meeting of heads of state was to take place in Cotonou on July 27-30, 1963. Nkrumah immediately denounced the plans for the continued existence of that organization. This time he received support from several African states, notably Guinea and Nigeria. Sekou Touré, the Guinean leader, described the proposed UAM plans as an "insolent recrudescence." It must be noted that the support of Nkrumah's criticism of this regional organization by other African states did not by any means imply that Nkrumah's views on regionalism as a principle was gaining ground. In fact, these states had other reasons for opposing the UAM. That organization was known to be highly political (it was
not even strictly regional since Malagasy was a member) and, as we saw, constituted one of the virile forces in the period of groupings between 1958 and 1963. As a token of their recognition of the Addis Ababa compromise, the other main groupings - the Monrovia and Casablanca - had been dissolved, tacitly or openly, and it was naturally unacceptable to a great many of the African states who had belonged to one or the other of these groups, that the UAM should attempt to march on. Guinea was especially incensed because although it belonged to the frontline of radical forces, it had been one of the main architects of the Addis Ababa Summit. Reasons of national interest were not lacking either. Nigeria did not see eye to eye with the UAM on a couple of important questions and later the UAM states was to oppose Nigeria's move to negotiate an association with the European Economic Community. In 1961, at the UN, UAM had challenged the plebiscite in northern Cameroons whose verdict was to incorporate that territory into Nigeria. In any case as a result of the concerted criticism of the African states the UAM relented and dissolved its group at the UN although it admitted Togo the same year as the fourteenth member. Nkrumah did not have reason to be content.

On June 5, 1963, Nyerere of Tanganyika, Obote of Uganda and Kenyatta of Kenya met in Nairobi and signed a declaration stating that "The three Governments having agreed to establish a federation this year expect the British Government to grant Kenya independence immediately." It has later been suggested that the latter part of that declaration was the real intent and that the plan for a federation was merely a red herring designed to divert attention from the main concern - the independence of Kenya. Although it must be granted that the declaration hastened the independence of Kenya which came soon after, genuine pan-africanist sentiments stemming from PAFMESCA organization was also a potent force. Nkrumah had not ceased to attack the PAFMESCA and now he joined battle with the propounders of the plan for an East African Federation. He regarded it, in line with his theory on Imperialism and Neo-colonialism, as just another form of balkanization. Naturally this did not appeal to Nyerere one of the foremost pan-Africanists, at the time, for an East African federation, who considered himself at the same time to be a genuine pan-Africanist. According to Joseph Nye, Nkrumah's opposition, although it was not the decisive factor, was an important cause for the subsequent breakdown of the federation idea, by providing ideological legitimacy for those whose opposed the federation for other reasons.

On July 10, 1964 Africans were stunned by the news that Tshombe had been installed as Prime Minister. The Congolese nightmare had begun in earnest. The revulsion caused by this stu-
pendous act of Realpolitik on the part of Kasavubu can be gauged by the outburst of king Hasan of Morocco:

"...How can you imagine that as a representative of our national conscience, I can be seated at a conference table or at a banquet at the same time as a representative of this state of rebellion and secession?"

He was referring to the possibility of Tshombe appearing at the approaching Heads of States Conference in Cairo on July 20. But Congo, at the heart of Africa, was already demonstrating that when it was cloven the continental body politic sickened as well. There were those who were prepared to defend Tshombe:

"We all deplored the death of Patrice Lumumba, "intoned Tsiranana," but that doesn't give us the right to interfere in Congolese affair. While we are about it, search your hearts. Have we not all signed an execution warrant against one of our compatriots? We are not all angels and if Mr. Tshombe goes to hell, there shall be others among us who shall go with him."

The Cairo Conference was notable for many things. Tshombe was excluded from the meeting. This was the first time African Heads of state had undertaken concerted action to boycott another African Head of State. Other decisions included 'the choice of the headquarters site at Addis Ababa; the choice of the Secretary-General, Diallo Telli of Guinea; establishment of two new permanent commissions; reinforcement of various decisions concerning action on Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese territories.' But it was the battle royal between Nyerere and Nkrumah over regionalism which has gone down in history as the essence of this first Regular OAU conference of Heads of State. But its significance has been exaggerated. Scott Thompson, in our view, woefully misreads the result of that Conference when, in reporting the decision of the Conference to refer the principle of Union Government to a Committee, he alleges: "With that union government expired." For although the Cairo Conference demonstrated once again that the African leaders continued to believe in regionalism, it did not decide definitively on Union government. Instead it shelved it, once again by referring it to a Committee. In fact, in the next year, in Accra, as we shall show, Nkrumah, undeterred, brought it up once again, more diplomatically, and scored a notable result. From our interviews we did not get the same impression of Nkrumah at this meeting of a sorry, blustering, incoherent loser that Scott Thompson seems so intent

*Of course it is evident that Scott Thompson was out to demonstrate a particular case - namely, the failure of Nkrumah's foreign policy and his 'facts' assume that tendency but not without surprising by their virulence which assumes sometimes the proportions of a verbal vendetta.
on making him out for. Furthermore, our account so far has demonstrated how there was a progressive worsening of relations between Tanzania and Ghana reaching the point of a request for the withdrawal of an ambassador. Added to these were the differences in opinion about the principle and organization of the activities of the Liberation Committee (Ghana for example opposed the recognition of Holden Roberto's group in Angola - a judgement vindicated only eleven years afterwards.) Nkrumah's attacks on the Committee which had its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam was construed by the Tanzanians, among others, as partly a sign of resentment on the part of the Ghanaians who had not been included in the Committee - an understandable conclusion since, from the first, the Ghanaians had showed no inclinations to make donations to the Committee.

The irritations caused by these developments were not without their side effects on the relations between the two personalities involved. Such a conclusion is further borne out by a report to Nkrumah by the Ghanaian ambassador to the UN after an interview with President Nyerere. Therefore far from being a simple case of a day of reckoning for regionalism and union government, the Cairo debates were an egregious example of the distortions in debate caused by personality clashes. Far from philosophies blossoming or principles expiring, it was dirty linen that was washed in public that day. As it turned out, it was Nkrumah who expired not long afterwards and that event has meant infinitely more for the apparent demise of the idea of supranationality in Africa than the cascades of obloquy and sarcasm that flowed in Cairo.

At the foreign Ministers meeting which preceded the Conference, the Ghanaians pressed their case. However, certain apparent inconsistencies in their statement on Union Government caused the few supporters they might have had to balk. Their foreign Minister arrived with a draft constitution and argued:

"Some people also maintain that a union government of Africa is not practicable. It is difficult to see what is meant by such a statement... The Ghanaian proposals... are easier, cheaper, and more effective to implement than the numerous commissions, meeting often and only issuing reports... Our draft constitution emphasises that under a Union Government, the sovereignty of individual states will be preserved and in fact strengthened. There is therefore no purpose in any Member State hesitating, regarding the establishment of a Union Government."9

The Ghanaian proposal was not only greeted with hesitation but was submerged in criticism. How could a Union Government bring increase in sovereignty? Several UAM states harped on this question. Senegal and Dahomey joined the Cameroonians in demand-
ing regional planning and cooperation instead of 'fictitious solida-

rity.' All the meeting could achieve was the appointment of a Com-

mittee to draft a report for the Heads of State. The Committee con-

sisted of Ghana, Liberia, Togo and Tunisia. Thus the venue was

shifted to the Summit.

Nkrumah's speech at Cairo was intended to galvanize the Afri-

can leaders into action towards a form of Union Government. He

again attacked the 'step-by-step' approach to unity:

"The neo-colonialists and their agents have become, (after the

Addis Ababa Summit), particularly active and vocal in preaching a

'step-by-step' course towards unity. If we take one step at a time

together, they are in a position to take six steps for every single one of

ours, our weakness will, of course, be emphasized and exaggerated

for their benefit. One step now, two steps later then all will be fine

in Africa for imperialism and neo-colonialism. To say that a Union

Government for Africa is premature is to sacrifice Africa on the

altar of neo-colonialism."

He criticized the running of the Liberation Committee and sug-

gested in veiled language that those African states 'who are ready to

do so' might go ahead and establish a Union Government.

When Nyerere's turn to speak came, he deliberately took a postu-

re that suggested that he saw the whole matter as a duel between him

and Nkrumah. He dismissed Nkrumah's admonitions as mere pro-

paganda.

"Nothing could be more calculated to bring ridicule to the whole

concept of a continental Government in Africa than this incessant

and oft-repeated propaganda."

More than that, he refused to believe that Nkrumah was motivat-

ed by any other reasons than self-aggrandisement:

"Some people are willing to use their very great talent to wreck

any chance of unity on our continent as long as some stupid histori-

an could record that they wanted African unity when nobody else

did."

He had the same argument for his explanation of Nkrumah's cri-

ticism of the Liberation Committee. Nkrumah was critical only be-

cause the Addis Ababa Summit "had committed the unforgivable

crime of not including Ghana on the Committee."

Then he resorted to mocking:

"...to cap this whole series of absurdities, after all the wonderful

arguments against unity in East Africa, we are now told again, at
this very rostrum, that those who are ready should go ahead and unite. Those who are ready should now go ahead and unite. Now we have permission to go ahead... If I were a cynic, I would say: "We of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar are ready." I would ask Ghana to join our United Republic. But I am not a cynic."

Sticking to his guns on the 'step-by-step' approach, Nyerere finally declared:

"To rule out step-by-step progress in a march to unity is to rule out unity itself."

Even to the most biased observer, the result of Nyerere's asperity was clear. Scott Thompson records: "What Nyerere stopped by his speech was the politeness about union Government." It was as if he had opened the floodgates. In the ensuing debates the Heads of State essayed on an unprecedented degree of invective against Union government. The Nigerian Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa called the idea a "nightmare." Union government might come, he said, so might world government.

In the aftermath, only the acerbity of the exchanges is remembered. But on a deeper analysis it is its tragic nature that impresses. If Nkrumah was the proponent of classic federalism; Nyerere was the protagonist of its sociological form. Logically Nyerere and Nkrumah had much more in common regarding the principles of African unity than the bitterness of the debate shows. As it was, while Nkrumah stood alone as the sole African federalist, Nyerere's stance seemed to represent, at a blow, the interest of both the pluralists whose main aim was to stop supranationalism, and the proponents of some form of functionalism represented in regional cooperation. But it must be remembered that regional cooperation in Africa had hitherto been undertaken in line with the colonial demarcations (French, English, West, East, and Central Africa) a system which is the bane of the Pan-Africanist ideology. Thus it was not surprising that Nyerere was to turn gradually from his stance to a more federalist position. But notwithstanding his subsequent apology, his role in Cairo must be seen as difficult to reconcile with the spirit of Pan-Africanism judged by the standards of the ideology we reviewed earlier. The most that could be said on its behalf was that it was an aberration. As for Nkrumah, as we shall see, he continued to press his demands for some form of supranationality.
Footnotes to Chapter twelve


2. Algeria, Guinea, Nigeria, Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

3. CN/Res. 4 (S); AHG/Res. 18/1.


5. See Wallerstein, I, op. cit., p.118.


8. See Thompson, W. Scott, op. cit., p.355 and 356, for quotations of disjointed sentences which, on a careful examination of the report, appear to depend more on interruptions than on the psychological disintegration of the speaker, which is strongly insinuated by the writer.

9. CM (III) (L)/SR. 2; First Committee (Political), 14 July, 1964, pp.2-3.

So far in our sketch of the sociopolitical history of both the Pan-Africanist movement and the Organization of African unity, we have attempted to outline the forces which were the prime movers of the unity movement - history, myth, ideology, conflict and the play between different approaches to integration discernible among the African leaders. The formation of the OAU was a landmark in these developments; and that Organization has become the nucleus around which the unity movement has grown and politics among African states has revolved. Our task in this section is to trace the process of evolution - or otherwise - of that Organization by focusing attention on the highlights of the problems that have beset it in the first thirteen years. A diligent study of this evolution and an analysis of how the African states have attempted to solve their common problems should be a sound basis from which to assess the relevance of the major concepts and assumptions of integration theory applied to the African continent. Naturally, it will be foolhardy, in a short space, to attempt to tell an exhaustive story of complicated events that span thirteen odd years and fifty states. Nonetheless it should be possible, by directing attention to salient stages in the development of that Organization and the major crises which have faced it, to distill relevant conclusions about its rationale, scope, and direction.

The Algeria-Morocco Border Crisis.

For a long time trouble had been brewing between Algeria and Morocco about Moroccan claims on Algerian-controlled territory near their underfined border in the Sahara. By September 1963 the OAU was faced with its first full-scale armed hostilities on the African continent.

The origins of the Algeria-Morocco dispute lay of course in colonial history; its immediate causes were however a clash of the national interests of the two countries - on the one side Moroccan irredentism and on the other the attractions of the mineral resources in the disputed territory. Ideological differences between the two regimes compounded the problem. It was a classic example of the dan-
ger which had haunted the drafters of the OAU Charter.

Throughout September the conflict expanded. Russia and Egypt supplied Algeria with more arms while France, Spain and United States, although known to be assisting the Moroccans, were reported to be withholding supplies in an attempt to isolate the conflict. Several ceasefire agreements by the parties concerned and attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution proved abortive.

It was under these circumstances that the OAU stepped in. Other attempts at mediation prior to this had proved of no avail for several reasons. President Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia, the third party in the Maghreb, had tried to mediate and failed. None of the belligerents had found his good offices acceptable. There was still a residue of coldness between Tunisia and Morocco over the former's early recognition of Mauritania at the time when Morocco was claiming Mauritania. As for Algeria, President Bourgiba had accused the Algerians of harbouring those who plotted to assassinate him. President Nasser of Egypt, the prominent Arab, had also failed in an attempt to arrange a Summit meeting of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, having already committed himself by deploring what he called the "aggression committed against Algeria." Similarly the Arab League was thought to be sympathetic towards Algeria from the onset. The Moroccans wished to table the matter before the United Nations (It will be recalled that Morocco had boycotted the Addis Ababa Summit of the OAU - because of Mauritanian participation - although she eventually signed the Charter in September 1963.). Algeria however favoured the convening of an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU to consider "an African settlement of the dispute."

Emperor Haile Selassie was visiting North Africa at this time. Together with President Modibo Keita of Mali, he offered to mediate. The offer was accepted and the four leaders met in Bamako, capital of Mali, on October 29, 1963. That this meeting was held at all constituted a considerable achievement in itself since Morocco felt herself at a disadvantage in any OAU mediation following her seeming isolation in African politics on account of the combined effect of her challenging Mauritanian sovereignty, her espousal of the Casablanca cause, and her boycotting of the OAU Summit. The Algerians, on the contrary, were riding on the crest of the sympathy evoked among the African countries by their recent anti-colonial struggles. The recent consecration by the OAU of the principle of respect of existing boundaries seemed moreover to favour the Algerians.

The communique issued after Bamako stipulated the following:

1. The immediate ending of hostilities on 2nd November at zero hours;
2. The creation of a Committee composed of Algerian, Moroccan, Ethiopian and Malian military officers, which would define a demilitarized zone.

3. The supervision of security and military neutrality in the demilitarized zone by Ethiopian and Malian observers.

4. The request for an extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, for the purpose of creating a committee of arbitration to effect a definite solution of the Algerian-Morocco border dispute.

5. The cessation of hostile propaganda as of 1st November.

How much the meeting was successful would depend on how far the parties were willing to abide by the decisions of the mediators. But violations of the cease-fire continued throughout the first weeks of November. Morocco continued to attempt to put the case before the United Nations and it has been suggested that it was mainly the determination of Paris and Washington to isolate the matter and leave it to the African statesmen, which finally stopped the Moroccans.

The much awaited extra-ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers took place in Addis Ababa from November 15th-18th, 1963. Although the Moroccans seemed to have feared that the meeting would be biased against them, their confidence was quickly restored when the foreign ministers accepted the Moroccan insistence that the Bamako agreement be made the basis of the talk instead of the Algerian note of October 23rd summoning the Council.

The Moroccans based their case on the non-existence of a border in certain areas between Morocco and Algeria and also on the ill-defined form of the boundaries which existed. Moreover they insisted that they had legitimate territorial claims based on certain treaties including an agreement made with the then provisional government of the Algerian Republic. Finally they alleged that Algeria had involved the continent in the cold war by accepting arms from the Soviet Union and allowing another country to intervene.

Algeria defended its right to purchase arms with countries with whom she had long-standing agreements to that effect. She blamed Morocco for the border incidents and accused her of expansionist policies in contravention of the principles of international law accepted by the OAU. Her foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika said:

"To wish to impose unilaterally the least revision of the Algeria-Morocco border is without doubt to create a precedent or an unfor-
tunate jurisprudence for the future of many African states... Just as there is a dynamic of war or peace, there is a dynamic of territorial claims. The Algerian people and their Government believe it to be their duty to call your attention to... this danger. The only remedy which will preserve security and ensure political stability in our Continent is the...destruction at the outset of the seeds of division.”

The resolution issued at the end of the meeting recalled the principles enumerated under Article 3 of the Charter of the OAU and reaffirmed ”the unwavering determination of the African States always to seek peaceful and fraternal solution to all differences that may arise among them by negotiation and within the framework of the principles and the institutions prescribed by the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.” It also referred to ”the imperative need of settling all differences between African States by peaceful means and within a strictly African framework.” It appointed an ad hoc Commission to effect a definitive settlement of the dispute. The ad hoc Commission was made necessary because the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the OAU had not yet been set up. The ad hoc Commission consisted of Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanganyika.

They met for the first time in Abidjan, Ivory Coast from December 2nd-5th, 1963, without disclosing in their communiqué at the end of the meeting what progress they had made. They met again from January 23rd-28th, 1964, and presided over some exchange of documents by the parties to the dispute. By February an agreement had been signed by the disputants, in the presence of the Bamako cease-fire committee, by which Morocco agreed to withdraw from the positions she had occupied before October 1st, 1963. A no-man’s land was created along the border and the strategic highlands were demilitarized.

On May 29th, an ambassadorial committee of the two countries which had been meeting since May 25th, announced a number of agreements:

1. free passage of persons and property between the two countries would be resumed;

2. as of June 8th, nationals of the two countries who had been expelled from either country during the hostilities of Autumn 1963 could return to their previous domiciles;

3. the victims of the events of Autumn 1963 would be compensated;

4. the property of the victims would be returned;
5. all necessary assistance would be granted to the victims so
that they might resume their normal activities;

6. all restrictions placed by the governments of either country on
the liberty of nationals of the other country would be lifted.

By the end of May, the two countries had exchanged ambassa-
dors. However the ad hoc Committee continued to meet - in Bama-
ko from April 24th - May 7th, 1964 and again in Algiers and Rabat
from 20th-30th October. It reported to the Council of Ministers
which met in November in Addis Ababa. The Council asked the ad
hoc Commission to continue its work and the Heads of State later
approved the Council’s decision.

At this point - although the Organization continued to discuss
the issue - it was evident that the conflict had been contained. And
without a doubt it was a feather in the cap of the new Organization.
That it was able to gain the confidence of the parties to the dispute
was an achievement in itself especially considering the fact that the
disputants belong not only to the Maghreb but are Arab countries.
It is true that there were certain circumstances which threw the ac-
ceptability of major Arab states and the other member of Maghreb
into question, but even in the OAU one of the parties had reason to
have qualms about its popularity. Therefore the fact that the OAU
succeeded where others failed must be ascribed to the extent of the
identitive power wielded by that organization with regard to con-
licts between African countries.

Also, the organization was quick to seize the oppurtunity of this
conflict not only to consolidate its authority but also its claim to
settle African problems within an African context.

But a number of other points are salient here. On this occasion
the Great Powers had reason to desist from involving themselves in
the dispute at least openly. In our theoretical section we drew atten-
tion to the omnipresent and marked influence of outside powers in
African affairs to such an extent as very often to be the arbiter of
crucial trends and developments in phenomena like integration. The
Godfather in popular literature is depicted, and in common parlance
is typified, as a grey eminence hovering in the background, whose
influence is ubiquitous, patronizing, monopolistic - sometimes for
good but frequently for ill. We shall enlarge on this point later; for
the nonce it may suffice to state that the Godfather syndrome in in-
ternational relations, represents, in our view, precisely the political
counterpart of such an ubiquitous and patronizing influence with
monopolistic tendencies. These tendencies are at their most glaring
or obvious, seen from an economic point of view. But the political
aspect of it is equally evident in those situations in which the policies
of the different powers are projected not on cooperation - or even
conflict - in the first place, but on assumptions about spheres of influence. Such assumptions may be based on purported claims or expectations arising from past colonial influence, language spheres, or the universal crusade against capitalism or communism. In one sense it can be seen as no more than Realpolitik - the perennial fate hanging over small powers. However it is in its most patronizing form - enshrined in the concept of *deux ex machina* - that it takes on its attributes of a *Godfather syndrome*.

However that may be, it was opportune for the new Organization that the Great powers opted to isolate the Algeria-Morocco conflict. What would happen in a case where these Powers chose to be deeply committed? We have already noted some of the international aspects of the first Congo Crisis in 1960 and how it split the African states. It was to happen again and it is a useful angle to explore seeing that it may illuminate the limits of the actual authority which an Organization like the OAU wields on the continent, based as it is on pluralism.

Furthermore, unlike the Congo Crisis and many of the major crises that were to face the OAU, the Algeria-Morocco conflict was a dispute between two sovereign states. As such there could be no question about the competence of the OAU, within the limits of the Charter, to mediate. What would happen when the conflict could plausibly be classified as "internal," despite strong international aspects?

Finally, in opting for the principle of *uti possidetis* the OAU was being true to the spirit and letter of its Charter which, as we saw, had prescribed the respect of the existing boundaries whatever their shortcomings.

**A spate of military coups - the Tanganyikan case.**

We have already touched on the mutinies that took place in January 1964. Earlier, on the 12th of the same month the Sultan of the ruling Arab minority in the newly independent state of Zanzibar had been overthrown. Throughout the latter half of 1963, tension was rife in Africa. In August 1963, there had been a revolution in Congo (Brazzaville) in which the Prime Minister, Fulbert Youlou, a close associate of Tshombe, was removed from power. In October of the same year Dahomey underwent a coup in which the government was overthrown. Unsuccessful coups were also reported in the Ivory Coast and Senegal in late August and December respectively. It was hardly surprising under such conditions, that the East African governments took the worst view of the mutinies and called on Britain to supply troops to help restore order.
What was interesting was the reasons that Nyerere outlined for asking for the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers between the 12th and 15th of February. Firstly he felt that he was open to the charge of having let in neo-colonialism into Africa by inviting the British troops, and that this might cause suspicion among African states. Secondly, he thought that as a "border state" to the minority settler regimes in the south and as the host to the headquarters of the Liberation Committee the position in which Tanganyika was now placed was not conducive either to the effectiveness of the Liberation movement or to its morale. He was therefore requesting for the British troops to be replaced by Africans.

It was a quite clever stroke and seemed to save an awkward situation. The Council endorsed the proposal and in its turn proposed that:

1. The British troops should be replaced by, at the most, three battalions of African troops and an air wing;

2. The Government of Tanganyika should have the right to choose from which African State/States to ask for such troops and an air wing;

3. The African troops asked for by the Government of Tanganyika should be in Tanganyika for a duration of six months, as it is hoped that by the end of six months the Government of Tanganyika will have trained its own national troops, subject, however, to the review of this proposal by the Government of Tanganyika;

4. The African troops asked for by the Government of Tanganyika from the African State/States concerned should be under the direction and control of the Government of Tanganyika.

5. Decides that all the other details pertaining to costs, operations and replacements, etc. should be the subject of further discussions and agreement between the Government of Tanganyika and the State/States concerned.²

In accordance with this proposal the Nigerian government dispatched a battalion to Tanganyika to replace the British troops. On April 27th Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged into the United Republic which later assumed the name Tanzania.

The OAU had taken a hand in this matter at the instance of a government that felt its position endangered. Although the mutiny was an internal matter, following the terms of the OAU Charter, the continental repercussions of the situation were sufficiently obvious.
for the Tanganyikan government to request the intervention of the African International Organization. Neo-colonialism was the danger that was pinpointed on this occasion. Other such occasions were to arise.

The special position of Tanganyika as the seat of the Liberation Committee may have been an important consideration in Nyerere’s actions. But the decision, (whether to a lesser or greater extent is immaterial), is also an index of the extent of the identitive power of the organization. In short, one could not, it would seem, with impunity invite a colonialist power to keep law and order in Africa without legitimizing the action by involving the OAU. Yet, it must be remembered that the other East African governments also invited British troops. But it was only Nyerere who called in the OAU. In a pluralist organization without powers of sanction the importance of the identitive power depends on the particular idiosyncracies of the individual leaders and their degree of commitment to the continental goal. And Nyerere, as we have shown, was an ardent federalist - if of the sociological persuasion.

The Tanganyikans had not turned to the OAU in the first instance. That would have been a futile gesture. The OAU was without the means or a standing force to help out in situations like this. Still, the situation was urgent and dispatch was of the essence. One inadequacy of the OAU as a peace keeping organ was thus revealed. On this occasion it was an extra-continental power that held the boat. The role of the OAU was supporting.

All the same the question arises: Who was the OAU supporting? In the debate at the extraordinary meeting at Dar-es-Salaam, there were suggestions for a permanent force to deal with similar matters in future. One of those who opposed the idea was Congo (Brazzaville) a country which had recently undergone a revolution. And the argument of her Foreign Minister was relevant and interesting:

"We Congolese are especially unfavourable to it since if this force had existed last August, Fulbert Youlou could have appealed for it and thus have entrenched his dictatorship." 3

Two points emerge here: First, no one, it is true, questioned the legitimacy of Nyerere’s government. But what would be the case if opinions were divided on that score? The second Congo Crisis was soon to illuminate that problem. Second, this situation illustrated the classic dilemma that is posed for an African International Organization which on the one hand purports to eradicate neo-colonialism - a task which, by definition, transcends the limit of national boundaries - and on the other hand purports to eschew interference in "internal affairs."

Ghana, as we saw, had been the only country, to seriously re-
approach Tanganyika for inviting the British troops. Since her arguments were linked with her proposal for the setting up of a Union Government they had received little hearing. Thus it seemed that a precedent had been set. When a few weeks later, the French intervened in Gabon, the OAU managed to ignore the incident entirely. And yet it was quite a remarkable affair. It was on February 17th, 1964 that the President of Gabon, Mba, was removed after a brief coup. Upon that the vice-president requested French help and a few hours later French paratroopers stormed the capital and restored the ousted President to power. The OAU Council of Ministers meeting held in Lagos one week after the incident did not mention it at all. It was the more surprising because it could plausibly be seen as constituting a direct military intervention by a former colonial power.

A somewhat similar incident under different and more pathetic circumstances was to occur a few months later in the Congo (Leopoldville). Once again the Godfather syndrome would set the limits on the effectiveness of the African unity movement.

Finally, true to its pluralist order, the OAU was content to leave the substance of the arrangements for an African force to be settled bilaterally by the Nigerians and the Tanzanians. There was to be no question of a supranational authority.

The Somalia-Ethiopia, Somalia-Kenya border clashes.

It was only at the eleventh hour that the Ethiopia-Somalia border clash was put on the agenda of the Council of Ministers meeting in Extraordinary session in Dar-es-Salaam. The meeting had already been scheduled for the 12th of February, 1964, when the Ethiopian and Somali governments, on the 9th and 10th respectively, requested that their dispute be discussed also after Somalia had failed to get the UN to take up the matter. As the Council meeting was assembling, Kenya also tendered her dispute with Somalia which, like the Ethiopia-Somalia case had already developed into active hostilities at the border. Although several delegations objected to having the issues on the agenda on the grounds that they carried no instructions from their government, the meeting finally accepted to discuss them. In the case of Kenya and Somalia the Council accepted the case with a vote of 9 to 1, with 9 abstentions.

Somalia continued to try to bring the matter before the UN, feeling that she stood at a disadvantage if the matter was discussed in the OAU which backed the principle of territorial status quo. Somalia was claiming the right of self-determination for the Somali population living within the borders of Ethiopia and in the Northern part of Kenya - the former Northern Frontier District which the British government had refused to separate from Kenya on Kenya's ac-
cession to independence. The Ethiopian and Kenyan governments maintained however that the principle of self-determination did not apply to territories within independent states and was therefore against the principles of the OAU Charter.

At the discussions in Dar-es-Salaam, the Somali delegate called on the Council to arrange a cease-fire but the Ethiopians and the Kenyans preferred that the political roots of the dispute be taken up instead. Finally, the Council agreed on a resolution which proclaimed that "the unity of Africa requires that the solution to all disputes between member states be sought first within the Organization of African unity." It called on the parties to the dispute (Ethiopia and Somalia) to observe a cease-fire, to put an end to hostile propaganda and to commence negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The resolution also called on "all African States with diplomatic or consular missions in Ethiopia and Somalia to do their best to assist in the implementation of the cease-fire." A similar resolution was passed for the Kenya-Somalia dispute. Later, a cease-fire was arranged between Ethiopia and Somalia through the instrumentalities of the Sudanese President, Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud.

At the Council’s Second Ordinary Session in Lagos from the 24th-29th February, 1964, the matter came up once more. Somalia requested that observers be sent to supervise the cease-fire. Although several countries including Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia and the Congo (Brazzaville) were in favour of the idea, Ethiopia successfully blocked its implementation. It maintained that rather than appoint observers the Council should try to prevail on Somalia to renounce her claims and to agree to respect existing borders. Both the Kenyan and Ethiopian delegates stuck to their argument that the principle of self-determination did not apply to people living in independent states.

The resolution which the Council passed on this occasion was unlike the Dar-es-Salaam resolution in that it referred to paragraph 3 of Article III of the Charter of the OAU. As this article regards the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity it may rightly be supposed that the Council felt more sympathetic to the Ethiopian and Kenyan points of view.

Although relations between Ethiopia and Somalia improved considerably after this, the matter came up at the Council of Ministers meeting in Cairo on July 14th in preparation for the Summit Conference on the 15th of the same month. The Somali delegate protested against the defence agreement signed not long before the meeting between Kenya and Ethiopia. He urged the Council to denounce it arguing that it threatened the balance of power in Africa and constituted "a threat to the concept of African unity." This matter was the subject of a heated debate which revealed deep divi-
sion among the delegates and the Council decided to drop it from the agenda.

Although further border incidents took place in March 1965, by October of the same year it was obvious that here again the conflict had been contained and the Somalian and Ethiopian governments had made further attempts to improve relations between them with limited success. That the dispute has by no means been definitively settled does not significantly detract from this fact. A request by Somalia in 1965 for the OAU Commission to investigate the situation of Somali refugees who fled from Ethiopia and Kenya was not taken up by the Organization and a meeting arranged between Kenya and Somalia under the good offices of President Nyerere of Tanzania, came to nothing since neither side was willing to compromise. But President Kaunda of Zambia met with more success in his attempt to mediate between the parties at the OAU Summit meeting in Kinshasa in 1967. In October of the same year they signed a "memorandum of understanding" at Arusha and decided to re-establish diplomatic relations.

The territory of Afars and Issas.

The border problems between Somalia and her neighbours has yet another complication. The five stars on the Somalian national flag is the symbol of Somali irredentism. Two stars represent the former Italian and British Somalia both of which make up the present Republic of Somalia, two represent the areas in the Northern border of Kenya and the Ogaden valleys of Ethiopia both of them the subject of the conflict reviewed above, and the last star represents the territory of Afars and Issas known as French Somaliland. It was the prospect of independence for that territory which raised the conflict of claims between Ethiopia and Somalia. The inhabitants of Afars and Issas are divided between Issas who are Somalis and the Afars who although they speak a language akin to Somalian have closer affinity with Ethiopia. The Committee on Liberation, in whose province the question falls, tried in 1965 to ascertain the political situation in the country. A subcommittee was appointed to prepare a report. Since the French authorities refused them permission to enter the territory they resorted to interviewing nationalist leaders whom they met in Ethiopia and Somalia. It proved a vain exercise since naturally the nationalist leaders in Ethiopia claimed that the country wanted unification with Ethiopia while those in Somalia were sure the country would opt for Somalia. The stand of the Liberation Committee has consistently been to maintain that the people of that territory will decide when the time comes.

But an interesting episode developed in 1966 when, after General
De Gaulle visited the territory, in the midst of widespread riots, a referendum was promised by France to decide the country’s future. There were fears, encouraged by statements by Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian Emperor, that if France withdrew, Ethiopia might occupy the territory. It was even believed in certain quarters that this would happen as a result of a collusion between the Ethiopian and French governments. The Somalis campaigned for a UN or OAU administration to take over the territory for a time to ensure a fair plebiscite. It was under these circumstances that the matter came up at the OAU Summit Conference in Addis Ababa in November 1966.

But before this the Liberation Committee had discussed the question on October 31st and adopted by a majority vote a resolution calling on the population of the territory to vote for independence in the referendum and accusing the French of intimidating the people to make them vote to remain under French rule. But when the resolution came up to the Council of Minister’s meeting it ran aground. A heated debate ensued. Somalia proposed a resolution calling on the population of Afars and Issas to choose independence. The resolution also criticized France albeit in more veiled terms. But the Council could not agree. An Ivory Coast counter proposal merely noted the French promise to hold a referendum. It, in turn, was rejected. The compromise solution on which the Council agreed “expressed the hope that the referendum would be free and impartial and pledged the member states to accord the population all necessary assistance in case of need.”

The Assembly of Heads of State next took up the matter. The resolution which it formulated merely took note of France’s decision “to grant the people self-determination in a referendum,” expressed the “fervent desire that the voting would be free, democratic, and impartial,” appealed to the “people of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti)... to unite in confronting their destiny” and assured them of “active solidarity designed to bring about and consolidate the independence of that people.”

A few important conclusions can be drawn from the above account. The OAU was unable by itself to solve the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia or Somalia and Kenya. The success in arranging a cease-fire was due to the good offices of a neighbouring state rather than the direct intervention of the OAU. Indeed the OAU did not succeed in persuading one of the states involved (Ethiopia) to allow the OAU committee to supervise a cease-fire when that state considered it contrary to her national interest - even though a large number of states were in favour of this.

Furthermore, at least on two occasions the OAU shied away from discussing the problem because it was too divisive. This occurred when the Somalis protested against the military pact between Ethiopia and Kenya and also when they requested the Commission
to inspect the refugee situation.

The agreements between the parties to the disputes were agreed in bilateral discussions and depended on the good offices of a friendly Head of State rather than the efforts of the OAU. Although a resolution was passed at the Kinshasa and other Summit meetings, the actual credit for the success of the talks must go to President Kaunda.

The Liberation Committee found itself at variance with both the Council of Ministers and the Heads of State and Government over the Djibouti referendum. There were several reasons for this. While the so-called radical states wanted an unequivocal declaration condemning France and encouraging the population of Djibouti to vote for independence, the so-called moderates, which included states which were very friendly with France or under her thumb, did not wish to issue a resolution which was harshly critical of France’s policies. This is a further illustration of the sort of circumstances in which the interest of an extra-continental power can intervene importantly in deliberations on the basis of African unity. Furthermore some states advanced, in our interviews, the explanation that they feared a bitter confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia if they sided with the Somali proposal. And they feared furthermore that the Organization as it is constituted could not cope with such a confrontation.

Doubtless, the OAU has played a significant role as a forum for discussions on the conflict and for bringing the parties together at all. There can be little question about the fact that the Organization commands a considerable measure of importance in the eyes of the parties concerned as an area for legitimizing their claims. At present the Somalis continue to affirm that they are awaiting the result of the OAU Commission. But some observers attribute their quiescence on this issue to other factors. The recent adverse and prolonged effects of the Sahelian droughts have taken their toll on Somali and Ethiopian resources and diverted their energies to the main concern of alleviating the situation. And although it would seem that Ethiopia is particularly vulnerable now when it is faced not only by constitutional problems but by the Eritrean question, the Somalis fear that any attempt to take advantage of the situation will merely stiffen the adamancy of the Ethiopians by culling out a surge of national feelings of solidarity. Whatever may be the merits of this reasoning, the fact that Somalia continues to try to bring the case before the UN shows that the parties do not completely bank on the OAU.

Finally, the increasing cooperation between the government of Somalia and the Soviet Union at a time when Ethiopia continued to receive massive military aid from the United States of America, injected into the conflict a large measure of big power politics the
mere knowledge of which greatly limits the efficacy of African integration politics. More recently the decisive influence of the exogenous factor has become more conspicuous. War has indeed broken out between Ethiopia and Somalia. The big powers have switched sides. Russia now backs Ethiopia and the US has promised arms for Somalia. The Alice in Wonderland logic of it all becomes more understandable when it is remembered that, quite apart from the grievances nursed by Ethiopia and Somalia, the race is now on between Russia and America to secure control of the strategic horn of Africa.

The Second Congo Crisis.

We have previously followed the events in the Congo after Kasavubu broke his compromise with the Lumumbists and appointed Tshombe as Prime minister. Throughout the rest of 1964 war was in the air in the Congo. The Lumumbist forces were on the increase and the government forces faced repeated military setbacks. Meanwhile Tshombe was reacting with alacrity. With strong support from outside powers, notably Belgium and the United States, he organized an offensive on the rebels against a background of massive recruitment of mercenaries, many of them South Africans - and this much to the alarm and annoyance of many African states. An extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers, convened on September 5, sat for five days with Tshombe participating this time in his capacity as foreign minister, and ended with a resolution which read as follows: (The Council).

"Deeply conscious of the responsibilities and of the competence of the Organization of African Unity to find a peaceful solution to all the problems and differences which affect peace and security in the African continent;

1. Appeals to the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop immediately the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible all mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo so as to facilitate an African solution."

In addition, it appointed, under the chairmanship of Jomo Kenyatta the President of Kenya, an ad hoc Commission composed of: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Upper Volta. Their terms of reference were: (a) to help and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation... (b) to seek by all possible means to bring about normal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours especially the kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of
The Congo (Brazzaville). The last two named were accused of helping the Congolese rebels. The resolution further appealed to all foreign powers to desist from intervening in the Congolese crisis.

The ad hoc Commission made strenuous efforts to resolve the crisis without notable success. Indeed by late September it stood disappointed and virtually ineffective. After a meeting in Nairobi on the 18th September, it decided to appoint a five-man delegation to meet President Johnson, having declared that:

"It is the feeling of the ad hoc Commission that without the withdrawal of all foreign military intervention in the Congo the ad hoc Commission cannot find the right atmosphere which fits the high mission of reconciliation entrusted to its members."

The Congolese government protested and President Johnson refused even to meet the delegation. Thus the group was left kicking in a vacuum. A State Department spokesman declared that:

"...We could not agree to discuss our aid to the Congo without the participation of the Congo government, at whose request our aid is given." The situation was most significant. In effect the US was letting the African delegation know that the Organization of African Unity was interfering in the internal affairs of an African state! As a matter of fact the Charter of the OAU might have vindicated the American position.

Matters went from bad to worse. On October 5 the Conference of non-aligned Nations opened in Cairo. All the OAU countries were of course invited. But a day before the conference the foreign ministers indicated that Tshombe was not welcome. He arrived all the same and was quickly placed in gilded confinement. In Leopoldville the government retaliated by surrounding the embassies of the UAR and Algeria, forbidding the staff to leave. Africa held her breath. This game of nerves was the nearest the OAU had indirectly come to sanctioning of one of its members. It proved to be very brief. It ended in the release of Tshombe after the siege on the embassies in Leopoldville was lifted.

By the end of October the military situation in the Congo was reversed. The rebels were under seemingly overwhelming pressure. They retreated to Stanleyville, holding as hostages a number of foreigners - mostly Belgians and Americans - with a standing threat to do them in if the Congolese government and her allies did not call a halt to hostilities. Not all the determined attempts at mediation by Kenyatta could open up the impasse. On November 24, the very worst happened. Negotiations were still going on when the Americans landed Belgian paratroopers in Stanleyville. The city fell in the midst of ugly fighting in which some foreigners and many more Congolese were killed followed by even uglier scenes in the world press.
Many African states were horrified. A great debate took place in the Security Council of the UN following a resolution introduced by the African states condemning the joint Belgian-American intervention. M. Spaak, the Belgian Minister, was hard put to it to defend his country's action. But a further split appeared in the African ranks. Only eighteen African countries signed the resolution:

- Algeria
- Burundi
- Central African Republic
- Dahomey
- Ethiopia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Kenya
- Congo (Brazzaville)
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- U.A.R.
- Uganda
- Zambia

An extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers was called to resolve the split. It met in New York from the 16th to the 21st of December, 1964. Many of the delegates were furious. The delegate from Congo (Brazzaville) introduced a delicate moment:

"If in the name of African unity one seeks hereafter to hold back African revolutionary movement, and if, to assure a so-called respectable facade for the OAU, we must silence all differences of view when vital interests are at stake, then I say as do others: let the OAU split up."

Only 20 countries - the original 18 plus Chad and Sierra Leone - supported the final resolution "to condemn the recent foreign interventions" and "to recommend an African solution to the Congo problem." The ad hoc Commission had achieved next to nothing. Although it survived a Congolese (Leopoldville) attempt to dissolve it, it fell virtually into disuse.

The inability of the OAU to deal with the Congo crisis was finally and dramatically revealed when the Council of Ministers met in Nairobi from 26th February to 9th March, 1965, for its fourth ordinary session. A report by the ad hoc Committee was before the Council. This report recommended that negotiations be opened between the warring parties. Tshombe who was again at this meeting in his capacity as foreign Minister, objected strenuously. The Council rejected the recommendation in a vote in which as many as fourteen states abstained. Two other resolutions failed to win a majority: (1) a Sudanese proposal that the rebels be given a hearing. (Tshombe would not hear of it.) (2) A Ghanaian proposal that the white mercenaries be replaced by African troops. At the end of its
resources, the Council shelved the matter and passed it on to the Heads of State. A writer has commented:

"This abdication on the part of the Council perpetuated an open sore in inter-African relations and left the OAU open to the accusations of impuissance."  

Meanwhile Tshombe consolidated his power. As it turned out, his ascendancy proved very brief. On 13th October, 1965, Kasavubu forced him to resign. On the 23rd November Kasavubu in his turn was removed by General Mobutu after a military coup, and events in the Congo began to take a different turn. In the meantime the OAU underwent further divisions arising from the Congo crisis.

The reappearance of the old groupings and the imbroglio over the Accra Summit.

Perhaps the most important result of the Congo crisis was that it marked the re-emergence of the groupings which the 1963 Charter seemed to have cancelled out. It illustrated vividly how much the Addis Ababa compromise was based on national interest and how reluctant some of the states were to consider unity as soon as these interests were threatened. In all the crisis that ensued, no one mentioned Pan-Africanism. The initial developments in the Congo between 1964 and 1965 had revealed a rift in the African ranks. When neither the ad hoc Commission nor the Council of Ministers proved equal to the task of closing the rift, the individual states began to take matters into their own hands.

First, Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast reactivated the Conseil de l’Entente. It will be recalled that this union had been formed in 1959 by Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey and Upper Volta, and that it stood for close collaboration with the Western countries as well as for the maintenance of the status quo on the African continent. It now began to protest against the threat of what it called "the siege of Africa by Chinese communism." In fact it turned out that its real target was Ghana which it suspected of aiding the Sawa party (of Niger in exile) to attack Niger with allegedly Chinese-trained African troops. The Conseil intensified its efforts to recruit Togo - which had a common frontier with Ghana - into its fold, the idea being to set up a cordon sanitaire of entente States around Ghana. Bearing in mind that border frictions already existed between Togo and Ghana, it was not surprising that in January 1965, Togo joined the group.

Furthermore, Houphouët-Boigny continued his campaign by advocating that the Union Africaine et Malagache (UAM) be reincarnated. After the formation of the OAU that union had disbanded in
1964, it will be recalled, transforming itself into a purely economic and cultural group - Union Africaine et Malagache de Cooperation Economique (UAMCE). At that time, the four members of the Entente had refused to join the new Organization because they disapproved the disbanding of the UAM. Now they seemed to find common cause once again. Only two of them, Congo (Brazzaville) and Dahomey, were hostile to Tshombe. Most of them were against Ghana.

At a conference in Nouakchott, Mauritania, from February 10 to 12, 1965 a new Organization was formed - Organization Communale Africaine et Malagache (OCAM). It was a new name but the old group. They attacked Ghana which they accused of subversion. In a reference to the Congo problem they spoke of "the malaise which the OAU is suffering...essentially from the non-respect of its Charter." Specifically they "strongly condemned the action of certain states, notably Ghana, which offer a welcome to the agents of subversion and organize training camps on their territory." In a spate of spirited diplomatic activity they supported Tshombe at the Nairobi Council of Ministers conference, blocking a hearing of the Congolese rebels and a proposal for an African force. At Freetown February 2 to 5, the Defence Commission met to consider the creation of an African peace force. The OCAM members killed the proposal. They further attacked the Administrative Secretary-General for, as they put it, playing too forward a role in the attempt to reconcile the factions in the Congo. They pledged their support for the 'legal' government of the Congo. It was apparent that they meant Tshombe. In a few months they were to admit him as a member of their organization.

Ghana, Mali, Guinea and Algeria reacted. On the Congo issue they were certainly not in support of Tshombe. On the 14th of March they met at Bamako. After the meeting the Algerian President is said to have spoken in terms of a union of these states. Another writer claims that they refrained from it because of "the strong sentiment on behalf of the OAU." The next day Guinea, Mali and Algeria met in Conakry.

The members of the OCAM continued their activities. On April 13 an attempt to assassinate President Hamani Diori of the Niger Republic failed. The OCAM members accused Ghana of being involved. It was alleged that the would-be assassin had been trained in Ghana and China. Stringent denials by the Ghana government were of no avail. When on the 27th April the Presidents of Niger and Upper Volta visited the Nigerian Prime Minister, the ghost of the Monrovia group seemed to appear also on the scene.

One alarming development was the threat by the members of the OCAM not to attend the approaching Heads of State Summit at Accra. Nigeria, seconded by Liberia and Ethiopia, set out to media-
te. An extra-ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers was called in Lagos from June 10th to 13th. The necessary two-thirds majority consent for the meeting had only been achieved in the nick of time. At the debates the accusations against Ghana were repeated. Again Ghana denied them. Finally a compromise resolution was agreed in which member states were urged to attend the Accra Summit and to do everything possible to make it a success. Ghana agreed "to send away from its territory before the next conference all those persons whose presence is considered undesirable" and to "forbid the formation of political groups whose aims are to oppose any member state of the OAU." Ghana further invited the Administrative Secretary-General as well as the current chairman of the Council of Ministers to make sure that Ghana would abide by the decision. It was then hoped that all would attend the Accra Summit.

That was not to be. Despite a meeting, eight days before the Summit, between Nkrumah and the entente Presidents at which Nkrumah made further concessions, agreeing to deport all political refugees and their families opposed to any of the three governments, the Entente states, together with Togo, Chad, Gabon and Malagasy, boycotted the meeting. Nine other heads of state were represented only by ministers. The Accra meeting did not achieve much. Apart from a resolution condemning subversion and Press and radio campaigns against other African states, the Administrative Secretary-General's report showed that as many as twenty-four member states had not completed their dues and the Organization was 2.5 million dollars in the red. The meeting did not discuss the Congo question; the condition on which Kasavubu attended the meeting was that the question would be removed from the agenda.

There was however one interesting development. Nkrumah had continued at this Conference, his campaign for a Union Government. But taking to a more diplomatic approach he proposed the formation of an Executive Committee "charged with the responsibility of taking political initiatives and making recommendations to the Conference as well as to the Governments on question affecting the aims and objectives of the OAU..." The proposal needed a two-thirds majority to be passed. To everyone's surprise eighteen votes were cast for the resolution - only six less than the necessary two-thirds. More than that, the Conference adopted a resolution which "took note of the proposal of the Government of Ghana regarding the creation of an executive organ of the OAU as well as the debates which followed the proposal and urged the governments of the member states to study this problem with a view to making known their opinion at the next session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government."

It seemed at last that Nkrumah's doggedness was producing results - albeit not quite sufficiently. It would have been interesting to
see how that proposal would fare at the next Conference. But that question must remain forever unanswered, for, by that date, Nkrumah had been overthrown from power in Ghana and with it the centre of the pressure for Union Government in Africa fell apart. At the next Conference it was left to Sierra Leone to propose a watered-down version of Nkrumah’s proposal - and that without the compelling - if controversial - figure of Nkrumah behind it.

The Rhodesian fiasco.

The Accra Summit found the OAU at its nadir, it was left to the Rhodesian crisis to advertise the fact. On November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian government declared independence (UDI). The OAU had repeatedly in numerous resolutions, urged the British government not to allow the minority regime in Rhodesia to seize independence. At the London Conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in June 1963, the British government had promised "unimpeded progress to majority rule for the Rhodesian Africans." Consequently the extra-ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers which was convened in Addis Ababa on December 3, 1965, called on the United Kingdom to put down the Rhodesian rebellion. It resolved that "...if the United Kingdom does not crush the rebellion and restore law and order, and thereby prepare the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by December 15, 1965, the Member States of the OAU shall sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom."

When on the 15th of December the Rhodesian independence was still maintained, only ten African States followed the Addis Ababa decision. They were: Guinea, Tanzania, Ghana, U.A.R., Mali, Mauritania, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Algeria, and Somalia. There were proposals to have another extra-ordinary meeting of the Council to discuss the problem once more, but several states protested - among them the President of the Congo (Brazzaville) whose telegram to the Administrative Secretary-General perhaps best explained the sentiments of his group. He argued:

"The Rhodesian problem has been studied sufficiently and was the object of unanimous decisions at Accra and Addis Ababa. By calling a new 'Summit', Africa would show that it does not know what it wants. Before seeking new decisions, it would be best to apply courageously those that have already been pronounced." 8

It is difficult to ascertain why this embarrassing episode occurred. It was suggested at the time that the resolution was not a resol-
tion but a mere recommendation. But the General Secretariat issued a statement denying this suggestion. Certainly the unanimity of the members in arriving at the decision was strong enough grounds to expect that they would abide by it. Some delegates tried to excuse themselves by claiming that Council decisions are not binding on the states unless approved by the Heads of State. Of course this raises an important question of the interpretation of the Charter. Certainly it would suggest that some of the delegations did not regard the resolution seriously enough. At least that would seem to be the implication of the rather innocent remarks attributed later to the President of the Malagasy Republic, Tsiranana:

"We subscribed to the resolution presented during this important meeting in a sincere spirit of unity, even though we were not convinced at the time of the possibility of finding practical resources to implement the ultimatum."

At the Addis Ababa Council meeting of February 28th, 1966, a resolution was proposed which would have virtually cancelled the previous ultimatum, but Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, U.A.R., Algeria, Kenya, Somalia and Congo (Brazzaville) walked out of the meeting. All the same, the subsequent resolution passed at the seventh ordinary session of the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa (October to November 1966) and adopted at the Heads of State Summit in November, appeared to disregard the 1965 resolution. By that time the Rhodesian UDI was nearly one year old and seemed as strong as ever. The half-hearted British sanctions were not working and the British government had even begun talks with the settler regime. The resolution criticised the sanctions, condemned the talks and called on member states of OAU to continue not to recognize the Rhodesian regime or any other government that may issue from the talks, if it was not based on majority rule. But there was no more mention of an ultimatum. At this point the OAU policy on the Rhodesian question could with justification be described as a fiasco.

Before we pass on to the final conflict in this section, a few remarks about the preceding account of the Congo and Rhodesia questions are in order. It will be remarked that the African states continued to hold to the pluralist line in the politics of integration. They continued to rely mainly on orthodox diplomacy to settle their differences. Questions which were found divisive could always be conveniently shelved so that at times it looked like a 'fairweather' cooperation.
Furthermore, the influence of extracontinental powers continued to place the limits of African politics of integration. Notably in the Congo crisis, the intervention of Belgium and the United States appeared to dictate the course of events more than the collective efforts of the African states. The Commission of Reconciliation appointed by the OAU came to grief. One of the main reasons was the attitude of the United States. It chose to stiffen the position of the Tshombe government. Although the OAU was able to alleviate the situation by means of periodic meetings, it could not prevent a head-on clash between some member states of the OAU and the Tshombe regime.

Some member states of the OAU were prepared to defend their pluralist right to further their national interest even at the cost of letting the OAU break apart. That this did not happen, again depended on the ability of the OAU to shelve inconvenient issues. This pattern of approach to conflicts conforms with what we have previously observed.

In the case of the Accra Summit we noted how member states used their very participation in the Summit meetings as a bargaining point in their opposition to subversion and generally to mark their opposition of the politics of their peers. This, in our view, is a ploy more in tune with orthodox diplomatic tactics than to a strong commitment to the ideal of continental unity. Together with the scant loyalty which some member states show towards the resolutions of the Organization (a tendency dramatized by the Rhodesian crisis) this fact gives ground for the opinion among many that the OAU is mainly a debating arena. We shall have reasons to elaborate on this point later.

The Nigerian Civil war.

On May 30, 1967, the former Eastern Region of Nigeria declared itself independent under the name Biafra. This followed repeated and extensive breakdown of law and order in the Federation, two military coups, the disintegration of the army and police and mass killings in northern Nigeria of civilians of eastern Nigerian origin creating an unprecedented refugee problem as thousands of these civilians escaped back to the Eastern Region. As a result, what began on the part of the Nigerian Government as a police action against a breakaway region had developed into a full-scale civil war by July 1967.

From the very beginning the Federal Military Government of Nigeria stood firmly by its decision to treat the whole affair as an internal Nigerian concern. This attitude made it easier in turn for the
OAU as a body, to maintain a consistent stand, throughout the conflict, against the secession, not without, of course, major disruptive effects on its solidarity as an organization. Several factors were responsible for facilitating this consistency of the OAU. Apart from the strong Nigerian stand made even more considerable because of the diplomatic weight carried by Nigeria as one of the foremost countries on the continent, it was known that throughout the war that country also had the diplomatic weight of no less than three powers, including two super powers behind it (The United Kingdom, USSR, and USA). More than that, these powers kept Nigeria amply supplied with the military resources to conduct its campaigns on the field. These prodigious amounts of weapons made sure that the Nigerians kept the military initiative (except for one or two lulls) throughout the war. With such diplomatic and military upper hand the Nigerian stand could not but command the subordination of the OAU, bearing in mind that the OAU Charter formally endorses such a stand. In this respect the affair differed importantly from the Congo Crisis where the involvement of the two superpowers was on opposite sides of the conflict and for that matter not nearly as deeply as in the Nigerian civil war.

Nonetheless, the deep commitment of outside support, by the same token, made the matter a serious international concern. At one point in the conflict it was known that as many as seven countries - USSR, United Kingdom, United Arab Republic, Czechoslovakia, France, even purportedly South Africa and Portugal - were to a greater or lesser extent involved in the war. Furthermore the heavy toll in lives, the brutality of the conflict, especially the widely canvassed factors of mass starvation, acute refugee situation and the emaciation of children, including the atrocities that preceeded the war, dramatized the humanitarian aspects of the conflict and the imperious necessity for external interest if only on those grounds. This last factor was largely responsible for the recognition of the breakaway state by several African countries, - a turn in events which dramatized the fact that, notwithstanding its Charter and the Nigerian stand, the OAU could not afford to keep aloof.

The early Tanzanian decision to accord recognition is an interesting case in point. Nyerere justified the move on several grounds. "Unity," he declared, "can only be based on the general consent of the people. There is no other jurisdiction for state and government except man." Although he professed himself, in principle, to be against secession, he qualified that conviction:

"I would certainly be one of those working hard to prevent secession or to reduce its disintegrative effects but I could not support a war on the people whom I have sworn to serve, especially not if the secession is preceeded by a rejection of the Zanzibaris by the Tanganyikans."
Even the question of African unity did not seem to be enough to debarr him from his stand:

"It seemed to us that by refusing to recognize the existence of Biafra, we were tacitly supporting a war against the people of Eastern Nigeria and a war conducted in the name of unity. We could not continue doing that any longer."

The Council of Ministers meeting which preceeded the OAU Summit did not put the Nigerian crisis on the agenda of the Summit Conference. The Heads of State took the matter up nevertheless. Their stand was clear from the start as can be seen from their resolution "recognizing the situation as an internal affair, the resolution of which is primarily the responsibility of Nigerians themselves," and "reposing their trust and confidence in the Federal Government of Nigeria..." A consultative mission, consisting of Cameroon, Congo Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Niger, was appoint­ed to meet the Nigerian Head of State "...to assure him of the Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria." The communiqué issued in Lagos at the end of the mission's deliberations with the Nigerian Head of State remained true to this line "...any solution of the Nigerian crisis," the communiqué set forth, "must be in the context of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria."

As was only to be expected, the Biafran reaction to the OAU initiative was entirely negative and this too vitiated further chances of OAU mediation. The Commonwealth office now captured the initiative. In the wake of the Tanzanian recognition of the breakaway state on April 13, 1968, peace talks were arranged between the parties. After preliminary talks in London, separately between the two sides beginning on May 6, the main talks were held in Kampala on May 23. The Nigerian side was represented by the Commissioner for Information, Anthony Enahoro, while the Biafran side was led by Sir Louis Mbanefo. Their positions proved unreconcilable, the Biafrans seeing the Nigerian proposals for ending hostilities as an "unconditional demand for surrender," while the Nigerians thought the Biafran refusal to renounce secession as "utterly unrealistic." More importantly the meeting took place against a background of extensive military successes for the Nigerian Army rendering the bargaining positions of the parties singularly unequal. The talks broke down on May 31st. Sir Louis Mbanefo announced that "...the Biafran delegation does not see that any useful purpose can be served in Kampala while more lives are daily lost in this gruesome war, and the Biafran delegation is going home."

Throughout the ensuing months the initiative remained with the British who, among other things, dispatched their Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs to Lagos for talks which in the end turned out not only to be centred around relief and rehabilitation que-
stions, but also to be fruitless. Some non-governmental British initiative led to a Christmas truce between the warring parties.

Meanwhile, the OAU Consultative Mission again resumed attempts to mediate between the parties. Meetings arranged in Niamey from the 15th-26th July, 1968 laid the ground for the subsequent peace talks in Addis Ababa. Limited successes were also achieved in bringing the parties to agree on the principle of a demilitarized corridor supervised by representatives of the countries which composed the Consultative Committee for the purpose of sending relief to starving civilians. The Nigerian Government, in addition, agreed to the idea of the introduction of an observer team composed of outsiders to report on the charges of massacre and genocide which had constantly been laid against the invading Nigerian army. The agenda for the Addis Ababa peace talks, published at the end of the Niamey meetings, included:

1. arrangements for a permanent settlement;
2. terms for the cessation of hostilities;
3. concrete proposals for the transport of relief supplies in food and medicine to the civilian victims of the war.

The Addis Ababa peace negotiations begun on the 5th of August 1968 under the aegis of the OAU Consultative Committee achieved next to nothing. Despite the hopes raised by the Niamey talks the positions of both side remained virtually locked. The leader of the Nigerian delegation departed from Addis Ababa prematurely on the 12th and agreements could not even be reached on the proposed "mercy corridor."

The next OAU Summit met on September 4th in Algiers. The host country, Algeria, was known to be a rabid supporter of the federal Nigerian side in the crisis and their President Boumedienne set the tone of the OAU approach at this Conference in his opening speech. He called on the Assembly to put up a united face against "plots from all sides directed against Nigeria, aiming to disintegrate and shake to its foundations this great African State, the unity and cohesion of which we were and are proud."

The Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, present at this Summit, added his voice to those who believed that the crisis could only be solved on the basis of a united Nigeria. All this is despite of the fact that those African countries which had recognized the secessionist state put up a spirited fight in defence of their actions. Houphouët-Boigny declared:

"Unity is the fruit of the common will to live together; it should not be imposed by force by one group upon another. If we are all in agreement in the OAU in recognising the imperious necessity of unity, unity as the ideal framework for the full development of the
African man, we also admit that it should not become his grave. We say yes to unity in peace, unity in love and through brotherhood. Unity is for the living and not for the dead.”

However, this was scant logic for states which, by and large unstable themselves, lived in constant fear of the same kind of fissures and centrifugal tendencies that were afflicting the Nigerian body politic. More than that, on the field of battle the situation appeared well-nigh hopeless for the Biafrans and many an African state was anxious not to run foul of the winning side.

The Resolution adopted by the Conference read as follows:
1. appeals to the secession leaders to co-operate with the Federal authorities in order to restore peace and unity in Nigeria;
2. appeals for the cessation of hostilities;
3. recommends that, the above being accomplished, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria declare a general amnesty and co-operate with the OAU in ensuring the physical security of all people of Nigeria alike until mutual confidence is restored;
4. appeals further to all concerned to co-operate in the speedy delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the needy;
5. calls upon all Member States of the United Nations and the OAU to refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria; and
6. invites the Consultative Committee, in which it reiterates its confidence, to continue its efforts with a view to putting into effect the Kinshasa and Algiers resolutions.10

As many as thirty-three States voted for the resolution.

Other meetings were held in Monrovia on the 17th of April, 1969, in which, Liberia, Ethiopia, Ghana Cameroon and the Secretary-General of the OAU participated without notable success. The Addis Ababa Summit of 6th September urged "the two parts of the Civil war to accept, in the supreme interest of Africa, a united Nigeria, which ensures all forms of security to all citizens." Talks scheduled in Addis Ababa between the parties, never in fact took place. The Biafran delegate Dr. Pius Okigbo suddenly left Addis Ababa before the talks began. On January 10, 1970 the Biafran secession finally collapsed.
We have followed the major conflicts of the first six years of the OAU. The results of the OAU’s attempts to handle these conflicts have been exceedingly varied, ranging from downright impuissance to partial success. On several occasions the very continuation of the Organization seemed to be at stake. But it must be borne in mind that these were the formative years of that Organization - a time when positions are hardly consolidated, fears tend to be exaggerated, and every teething problem tends to assume unrealistic dimensions. Furthermore, the crises we have reviewed have been among the most gigantic involving invariably armed conflicts. Such conflicts, for any international Organization, are normally among the most intractable. During the period we have surveyed such crises were interspersed by minor diplomatic ones in which the OAU registered a relatively more impressive record and we shall conclude by touching on a few of these.

On the 29th October, 1966, an aircraft carrying a Guinean delegation led by their foreign minister Dr. L.L. Beavogui, was detained at the Accra airport where it was on transit. The Ghanaian authorities declared that the delegates would be liberated only if Guinea liberated 85 Ghanaians illegally detained in Guinea. Despite the excuse it was apparent that the Ghanaian action was prompted by the Guinean announcement that ex-President Nkrumah who had been overthrown in March was now granted asylum in Guinea in his capacity as co-President of the Ghana-Guinea Union. Many of the Ghanaians citizens alleged to be kept illegally by the Guineans were in fact supporters of Nkrumah who had fled the country after the downfall of their leader and who were now on the 'wanted' list prepared by the new regime. Furthermore, the Ghanaian authorities wished to demonstrate their displeasure at the incessant propaganda by radio of the Guinean "Voice of Revolution" directed against the Ankrah regime.

The Council of Ministers assembled in Addis Ababa to prepare for the 1966 Summit, appointed delegates from Congo Kinshasa, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, to obtain the liberation of the Guineans. After a few days of negotiations the Ghanaians agreed to release the hostages while Guinea agreed to announce that Ghanaians who wished to leave her territory could do so. The hostages were duly released on the same day, 5th November, that the Summit Conference began in Addis Ababa. It would have been a complete success for the OAU had not the Guinean President refused to attend the Summit on the grounds that he could not sit in the same hall as the Head of the new Ghanaian regime!

A similar dispute, on the death of President Nkrumah, over the transfer of his mortal remains to Ghana, was settled in the end, mainly through the instrumentalities of Nigeria, but in the name of
African unity.

In August 1967 foreign mercenary soldiers who had rebelled against the Congolese government seized Bukavu. That year's OAU Summit in Kinshasa in September was in fact held under the mercenary menace. The OAU appointed a Committee to deal with the problem even though it appeared to be an internal affair. The Organization also issued an ultimatum to the mercenaries to leave the Congolese territory - an ultimatum which they blandly ignored. Backed diplomatically by the OAU, Mobutu attacked and apparently cornered the mercenaries, who nevertheless succeeded in fleeing to neighbouring Rwanda. In the ensuing disagreement between Rwanda and the Congo over the repatriation of the mercenaries the OAU resolutely stood behind the Congolese demands. It also tried to mediate but could not prevent the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries, although the mercenaries were repatriated in the end.

Between 1966 and 1967 the OAU also successfully prevailed on Rwanda and Burundi to settle their differences over Rwanda's accusations that Burundi terrorists were harassing her borders. A resolution passed on the 9th of November, 1966, urged the two parties to refrain from any hostile or military action. During the breathing space which this afforded, the good offices of the President of the Congo Republic helped the two disputing states to arrive at a rapprochement.

A final area of conflict in which the OAU has been operating with somewhat questionable effectiveness is in the conflicts among the liberation movements. It has been quite common for rival liberation movements to crop up in the same territory and the OAU success to date in uniting them has been very scant. Here again, the conflict has a military aspect. Besides, the stakes - the responsibility for forming the first government of an independent state - are so high that reconciliation is often an unattainable ideal. When it is considered that deep ideological differences often divide the rival groups, backed moreover by African countries with the same ideological stand, then it is not surprising that the OAU has met with only limited success in its efforts in this area. As we shall see, often the Organization has merely resorted, at best, to recognizing the major rival groups. At worst, the principles for the recognition have not been consistent.
Footnotes to Chapter thirteen


2. See OAU, ECM/Res. 2 (II).

3. See Wallerstein, I., op. cit., p.75 f.


5. See Makeon, Nora; The African states and the OAU, in International Affairs, July 1966, p.398.


8. Telegram to the Administrative Secretary-General from President Massemba, Debat of Congo (Brazzaville).


10. See AHG/Res. 54, p.2.

11. See AHG/Res. 49 (IV).
The crisis in Nigeria, between 1967 and 1970, was gigantic by any standards. It had quickly developed into an all-out war fought with some of the most lethal weapons than modern conventional military technology has at its disposal. The toll in lives was astronomical. Despite the hopes that it would be short-lived, it became protracted over three long years and the privations it created for the civilian populations involved bordered on the macabre. It became tangibly internationalized what with the huge amount of armaments built up on both sides from the arsenals of the world’s major military powers. As a diplomatic crisis, it posed in a heightened form for the OAU, all the elements of the perennial post-colonial African problems of the right to self-determination, boundary, refugees, state sovereignty and extra-continental involvement. Yet when it ended in 1970, the solidarity of the OAU was demonstrably intact. The show of reconciliation between Nigeria and Tanzania at the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa in September of the same year was so ready that it seemed superfluous.

Doubtless, the factors we outlined earlier contributed to a considerable extent in reducing the threat to the Organization which the conflict inevitably posed. Nevertheless, the fact that the OAU emerged from it unscathed was a testimony to the fact that the sentiments of that Organization were toughening apace thanks to the seven odd years of crisis which exercised its early life. It is significant that between 1963 and 1967 no less than six extra-ordinary sessions of the Council of Ministers conference were called. But it was not until 1970 that the seventh extra-ordinary session was convened and significantly it was to discuss the attempted invasion of Guinea by Portugal.

For it can be said that from 1970 onwards it was by problems of decolonization that the Organization was seized in the main. And, as we saw, it was precisely in these questions that the African states have had a basic consensus. It was therefore only natural that the period which produced the liberation of Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Angola and other former colonies and saw the intensification of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Namibia and South Africa should create a changing mode in the strivings of African states to achieve diplomatic consensus.

In the early years of the OAU most of the problems that faced
the Organization could hardly be divorced from the effects of the heady years of nationalism following the independence of the member states. After the Organization had gradually evolved its stand over these questions it had developed enough experience and respect from its members for every such question not to put its existence at stake. Also, for better or for worse, the disappearance of Nkrumah from the continental political scene meant that the divisive question of creating a strong supranational body - with all its corollary of fears of subversion or loss of national sovereignty - disappeared as well.

Throughout the sixties, despite early misplaced reputation for stability after independence, Nigeria had remained the sick man of Africa. At the time of the Nigerian civil war, it was freely speculated that some of the African states who supported the break-away region did so ostensibly out of a desire to see the threatening size of Nigeria considerably reduced. It seems more likely, however, that many African states saw as a negative factor for the continent the disabilities which faced that country, keeping her from the dynamic role in African affairs, which her size and stature gave so much promise of. After 1970, Nigeria gradually assumed that role as witness her unequivocal support of Angola which undoubtedly influenced other states, her initiative in the formation of the West African Economic Community, her increasing commitment in the struggle in Southern Africa and her beginnings of economic assistance to parts of the continent. However these events are looked upon, it meant in practical terms that, provided such a leadership does not turn out to be dysfunctionally controversial like Nkrumah’s, Africa may well be on the way to acquiring the sort of internal elite which certain theorists regard as a necessary catalyst for integration.

It has also been suggested that the rampant military coups in Africa in the last decade have not been without their salutary effect in producing a fresh new temper in African cooperation. To the extent that the soldiers succeeded in ”abolishing politics” they have preoccupied themselves increasingly with economic matters. Even the mere concentration on domestic rather than international matters has been rewarded with a keener awareness of the real problems facing African states and the need for more efficient planning, including integration. It is no accident that the member States of the OAU are gradually leaving the days of emotive polemics behind them and that their deliberations are becoming increasingly businesslike. The African States, in short, are set to embark in earnest on the beginnings of the vaunted functional cooperation, pending the liberation of Southern Africa.

But the incubus of Southern Africa continues to haunt the OAU. Despite a newlyfound maturity, that Organization is hard put to it
to find a formula for action in the face of that problem. The question of ideology also lurks around the corner. The liberation movements whose struggles have engaged the resourcefulness of the OAU in the phase which we take up here, are fired and split increasingly on ideological grounds and they have thereby sharpened the relevance of external involvement. It is impossible nowadays to see the struggle in Southern Africa in the right perspective without taking due note of the ideological goals and thereby the power considerations of the USA, the USSR and China, among others.

The wrangle over dialogue with South Africa and detente.

Despite the fact that the liberation of Southern Africa has been the common denominator on which African unity has been based, the member states have not always agreed on the right strategy and formulae for combating the racist regimes. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is a marked significance in the objective situations of those African states who share borders with South Africa and Rhodesia or those whose proximity to these regimes render their situation vulnerable, compared with other member states of the OAU whose territories are not contiguous to the problem. The Zambian foreign minister, Vernon Mwaanga, was led to remark to his fellow ministers:

"It is easy for those of us in distant places to feel strongly about Southern Africa. We feel strongly too. But strong feelings are not always the right feelings. We have a strategy..."

The most extreme examples of this situation are Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland whose economies are so closely interwoven with that of South Africa as to render them virtually hostage territories. They earn a great part of their national incomes from the contract labour system by which large numbers of their citizens migrate to South Africa to work in the Rand mines. In 1974, the income for Lesotho from this migrant labour amounted to $4.5 million compared with an income of only $1 million from export. They are similarly dependent on the customs union with South Africa from which Lesotho receives well upon 60 per cent of her revenues. Out of a population of little over 1 million, upwards of 200,000 are usually employed in South Africa. The GDP of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland put together amount to a mere 1 per cent of South Africa's.

The economies of South Africa's other African neighbours may not be so extremely dependent on South Africa but they are all relatively vulnerable. Malawi, for example, sends large numbers of migrant labour to South Africa. Until the "Uhuru Railway" was opened between Zambia and Tanzania on 22nd October 1922, Zam-
bia depended on Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) for the transportation of her exports to the sea.

South Africa has not failed to exploit the situation by trying to entice her neighbours into a state of even greater dependency. It has flaunted the idea of a "prosperity sphere" which is supposed to include South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Namibia (South West Africa), Mozambique, Rhodesia, Malawi and Zambia. The South Africans have tried, as part of this campaign, to preach the advantages of a common labour pool, integrated monetary and fiscal policies as well as mounting investment, trade and general integration of infrastructure. As of now, South African investment, at 2 billion dollars, doubles that of the United States and 10 million dollars is devoted annually to the promotion of cooperation.

Tempting as these economic arguments might seem, the Africans are at the same time acutely aware of the nature of the regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia which have revulsed the conscience of a whole world. As for the other African states who are geographically far removed from the problem some of them, on the other hand, are none too impressed by the logic of economics preferring, on the basis of ideology and principles, to give full vent to their revulsion. Others, for the same reasons, place less importance on the burden of the racist systems, choosing to put their trust on a more pragmatic approach aimed at the gradual erosion of racism by the logic and pressure of economic contact. These opposed formulae have constantly occasioned strife among the African States.

On the 10th of September 1967, Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi announced the setting up of diplomatic relations with South Africa, contrary to the avowed principles of the OAU. Ironically enough it was on the same day at the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government, meeting in Kinshasa, passed the Resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination urging the African States once again to boycott South African goods and refrain from setting up diplomatic relations with that regime. Although the OAU Charter does not provide for the expulsion of its recalcitrant members, Zambia proposed that Malawi be expelled from the organization. When the matter came up for discussion, Africa found itself divided. Ivory Coast, for one, expressed sympathy with the Malawian move. Others were clearly not prepared to criticize Malawi. These included Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana (under Busia), Lesotho, Malagasy (under Tsiranana), Rwanda, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, and Mauritius.

But, in fact, Zambia herself had at one time made overtures to South Africa. This was in 1964 at her accession to independence. President Kaunda had offered the setting up of relations between the two countries provided it was done on a scrupulously equal foot-
ing - a suggestion which the South African Prime Minister, Verwoerd, treated with condescension bordering on scorn.* Naturally Zambian attitudes hardened. But at the death of Verwoerd, Kaunda sent a letter to his successor this time outlining the factors which hindered contact between the two states. These included South Africa’s military and economic support of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, South Africa’s truculent and even aggressive attitude towards Zambia. (South Africa’s policy was reputed to be ”to hit Zambia so hard they will not forget it,”) and also the disregard of human rights in South Africa by that regime. Vorster’s tone was even more supercilious, if anything, than his predecessor’s. He described Kaunda’s letter as ”presumptous and uninformed.”

There the matter rested. But in April 1969, at the Conference of East African states in Lusaka, a momentous Manifesto was passed by the participating African states. They were: Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. The Lusaka Manifesto was a declaration of principle on the situation in Southern Africa. The burden of it was a total rejection of the racist principles on which the regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (Zambabwe) were based, an adherence to the principle of ‘one man one vote,’ and a commitment to work towards the eradication of the racist systems in that part of the continent by peaceful means, but failing that, by armed struggle. The Manifesto pursued the point thus:

”We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to violence against human dignity which is perpetrated now by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of the struggle, even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change…”

Some of the liberation movements felt that the Manifesto did not go far enough. They feared that it had endorsed a preference of peaceful methods in the liberation struggle to the exclusion of active armed struggle. This illusion was to disappear in the Mogadishu Declaration of 1971. Meanwhile at the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government Conference in Addis Ababa in 1969, the Lusaka Manifesto was adopted by the OAU. Similarly, at

*Compare with reactions by South Africa to an invitation by Nkrumah to the CIAS conference in Ghana.
the UN, the Manifesto was debated at the General Assembly. Significantly 113 countries voted in favour of it, 2 (South Africa and Portugal) voted against, and there were 2 abstentions (Malawi and Cuba). The latter found the Manifesto too mild.

In the course of all these developments, Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast proposed contact with South Africa. There was a spate of activities in the exchange of trade missions and delegations. Eyebrows were raised but more was to come. Ivory Coast was not alone. Indeed Houphouët-Boigny insisted that he made his moves after consulting the OAU and the OCAM states. He was reported in Paris as saying:

"I believe the dialogue with the white citizens of South Africa is feasible if it is carried out in a perspective of peace through neutrality which is of concern to all Africans, to the white population of South Africa as well as ourselves."

In fact Houphouët-Boigny, made no secret of the fact that he was also troubled by the fear of Communism in Africa. His initiative was backed by his colleagues in the Conseil de l'Entente (Dahomey, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta. Other countries joined in his defence (Gabon, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Malagasy, Swaziland and Malawi.) Their arguments were based severally on the fact that Africa possessed neither the economic nor the military capabilities to pose an effective, let alone decisive, challenge to South Africa, and that the sanctions and embargo prescribed against South Africa were not proving effective since they were being increasingly flouted by Britain, France, Germany and Japan among others - including even a few African states. Finally they believed that dialogue with South Africa and the consequent increase in business dealings would create pressures which would make South Africa more amenable to change.

A serious confrontation seemed to be imminent. Some African states began to feel that it was high time the principles surrounding the idea of 'dialogue' were defined. Gowon of Nigeria met with Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in May 1971 and they proposed that the OAU should define the African position for dealings with South Africa. Their joint communique of 8th May, 1971 stated their support for the Lusaka Manifesto as the basis for any dialogue with South Africa. The Nigerians went even further. In his banquet speech Gowon declared:

"...it will be a great betrayal if we only pay lip service to the cause of liberation of the people of South Africa or if we assume that we can restore their dignity by bargaining on economic or other selfish grounds with their oppressors... Nigeria will not be a party to any dialogue with those whose only aim is to divide our ranks and
subjugate our brothers forever in servitude and degradation..."

Houphouët-Boigny was adamant. At a Press Conference on the 28th April, 1971, he declared himself to subscribe to the Lusaka Manifesto but added: "After due consideration I think it is possible to have a dialogue with South Africa." The wrangle over dialogue had begun in earnest. Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenyatta of Kenya met on the 12th of May and issued a joint communiqué which declared that there could be no meaningful dialogue which was not based on human equality and dignity as envisaged by the Lusaka Manifesto.

Meanwhile, in January 1971, the Commonwealth Conference was held in Singapore. The atmosphere was charged in the face of reports that the British were about to resume arms supply to South Africa. Nyerere and Kaunda led the African onslaught against the policy. Probably in order to discredit Kaunda and take the steam off the joint Tanzanian and Zambian attack, Vorster published parts of Kaunda’s letter to him making sure to create the worst impression by publishing them out of context. Kaunda proceeded to publish the entire correspondence and in the end it was Vorster’s motives that emerged discredited. But this incident further exacerbated the already confused situation on the continent on the question of dialogue.

The showdown came in Addis Ababa at the Summit Conference of the OAU from 21-23 June, 1971. This meeting was held in the shadow of a recent coup in Uganda which overthrew President Obote and brought Idi Amin to power. The Council of Ministers had put the 'dialogue' issue on the agenda under the heading "Peace through neutrality." But Tanzania, wishing to charge directly into the issue, moved that the item be amended to read "The principles of the OAU and the Lusaka Manifesto: Dialogue and the future of strategy of Africa." When this was adopted, Ivory Coast and Gabon walked out in protest. The other members of the Entente (Dahomey, Togo and Upper Volta) followed suit, more in solidarity, since it was suggested that they had nothing against the proposal. A committee (consisting of Cameroons, Burundi, Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania) was appointed to formulate a Declaration on the Question of Dialogue. Report CM/st.5.XVII records the rejection by the OAU of the idea of dialogue as a manoeuvre by South Africa and her allies to confuse world opinion, relieve South Africa from international ostracism, and to obtain acceptance of the status quo in South Africa. It recommended that dialogue should properly take place in the first instance between the South African minority regime and the oppressed South Africans. The report further records that Member States of the OAU are forbidden to initiate or engage in any action that would undermine or abrogate the solemn obligations and undertakings to the commit-
ment of the OAU Charter. Any approaches made by Member States to South Africa shall be with the approval and under the guidance of the OAU.

This Declaration was endorsed by only 28 states. The following voted against it: Ivory Coast, Gabon, Lesotho, Malagasy, Malawi and Mauritius. Dahomey, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta abstained. In August 1971 Banda of Malawi visited South Africa in defiance of the Declaration.

This turn in events prompted another meeting of the signatories to the Lusaka Manifesto. It took place in October 1971 in Mogadishu. They declared:

"There is no way left to the liberation of Southern Africa except through armed struggle to which we already give and will increasingly continue to give our fullest support."

This seemed to mollify the liberation movements who were increasingly questioning the Lusaka Manifesto. In 1972, the strikes in Ovamboland in Namibia and the rejection by the African of the British - Rhodesian agreement for a settlement of the Rhodesian issue, underscored the growing impatience of the Africans in Southern Africa. It tarnished the appeal of the idea of dialogue. Furthermore, Amin, in Uganda, began to take an extremely aggressive stance towards South Africa, Busia was overthrown in Ghana in June 1972, and similarly Tsiranana was removed from power in the fall of the same year. It seemed, for the nonce, that the question of dialogue had lost out in African continental politics.

But on October 23, 1974, Vorster addressed the South African Senate in these words:

"I think that South Africa has to make a choice between peace on the one hand and escalation of strife on the other. The toll of a major confrontation will be high, too high for South Africa to pay."

The following day the Rand Daily Mail emblazoned 'detente' on its reports. The idea of detente in South Africa is thus a South African creation - a figment deliberately coined to give backing to a specific policy. What was this policy? In order to understand it, it is necessary to examine South Africa's position at this time. Her support for Rhodesia was proving increasingly to be an embarrassment. The liberation movements were becoming more insistent and aggressive. FRELIMO in Mozambique posed added danger. That territory was soon to attain independence. Even at the UN, pressure was mounting on South Africa. When she was brought to the verge of expulsion it was only the triple veto cast by the Western powers which saved her. But even these powers were demanding that she should withdraw her forces from Rhodesia, that she should appease the Africans by modifying the worst aspects of the racist domestic legisla-
tion, and that she should concede the right of self determination to Namibia (South West Africa.)

By engaging the Africans in talks about an apparent rapprochement the South Africans hoped above all to gain time. Their Bantustan policy was proceeding apace under the unlikely motto of "vrede, vooruitgang en ontwikkeling" (peace, progress and development.) The Namibian independence, on South African terms, was also being planned. If South Africa could convince the Africans to accept the illusion of a detente, Mozambique, along with others, would cease to be a threat. Mozambique's quiescence meant peace along South Africa's Eastern border. Furthermore, South Africa could thereby ease the appreciable burden of aiding Rhodesia as well as divert the opprobrium of world opinion which the continued fomenting of the Rhodesian crisis in the news was attracting on South Africa. Besides, the Portuguese empire was coming rapidly apart removing the buffer which Mozambique and Angola provided. If South Africa could induce Mozambique to guarantee as well the railroads links and the harbours of Nacala, Beira, and Laurenço Marques she would not only enjoy the access they afford but would retain the goodwill of Rhodesia for dislocating the strategy of the liberation movements. In return she could guarantee a Labour agreement with Zambia, Malawi, Rhodesia and Mozambique to the benefit of the tens of thousands of workers from these countries who earn their living from the South African gold mines.

Such, it could be presumed, was the strategy of South Africa. Whatever their actual reasons, the South Africans pursued the policy of detente with gusto. Their foreign minister Muller declared not long afterwards: "It is possible that we are on the threshold of peace and cooperation and development in Southern Africa." South African Prime Minister Vorster claimed that given six month's "truce" he would produce great changes in South Africa.

"Give South Africa six months' chance - I ask no more than that - give South Africa six months' chance and do not make the road more difficult than it is, and if you give South Africa that chance, you will be astonished where South Africa will stand. Even if you refuse to give South Africa that chance you will still be astonished where South Africa will stand in six or twelve month's time."

As part of the general campaign Vorster visited West Africa where he met Houphouët-Boigny, and reportedly President Senghor, at Yamoussoukuro in the Ivory Coast and spent a couple of days in Liberia conferring with President Tolbert. Gabon decided to send a delegation to South Africa. It seemed indeed that the South Africans had made a breakthrough.

Kaunda had reacted favourably to Vorster's speech to the senate. The Zambian President called it "...the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting." Toge-
ther four Presidents - Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Seretse Khama (Botswana) and Samora Machel (Mozambique) - responded to these moves by putting out feelers to explore the chances of agreement on the Rhodesia problem. A period of secret diplomacy followed.

What was the policy of the Africans? There seems to be every reason to put credence on the explanation of the four Presidents to the effect that they based their move on the Lusaka Manifesto. President Kaunda put it thus:

"This Manifesto...is very specific on what should be done. It states clearly that when the minority regimes appear to change, they should be given an opportunity to say what they are prepared to do; that Africa must not close its doors until it has proved what their objective is. And for us there can only be one objective..."

The same tactics had been employed in 1974 when talks were held in Lusaka between FRELIMO of Mozambique and the Portuguese. The initiative of the four presidents on the basis of a manifesto sanctioned by both the OAU and the UN must therefore be seen as a legitimate pursuit of peace in Southern Africa quite different from the earlier misguided and discredited attempts at 'dialogue' by some. No doubt Zambian proximity to Rhodesia and her dependence on the Rhodesian economy was an added incentive for Kaunda to lead the initiative on the African side in seeking a solution. Be that as it may, the secret diplomacy soon yielded results. Ian Smith agreed to release, temporarily, certain detained African leaders - notably Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU - to attend meetings in Lusaka. These meetings were designed to unify the liberation movements in Rhodesia and to produce a common programme for action. They were attended - apart from Kaunda, Nyerere, and Seretse Khama - by ZANU, ZAPU, front for the liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi) and ANC (Bishop Mozorewa's party.) Two Rhodesian top civil servants were reported to have joined the talks in the later stages. The most notable result of these meetings was the Declaration of Zimbabwe Unity by which the liberation movements agreed to form a common front under the ANC and "recognized the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe."

Notwithstanding these achievements, the action of the four Presidents was criticized by certain African States - especially Guinea, Uganda and Lesotho. This led to the convening of an extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Dar-es-Salaam from 7-10 April, 1975, to discuss the whole question of detente. From this meeting emerged the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration.

The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration was a landmark in the history of the OAU and the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. It vindicat-
ed the initiatives of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique, in seeking a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian question. It was attended by a newly united Rhodesian liberation front. It set forth the principles as well as the general strategy for action in the liberation of Southern Africa. It set forth these declarations of principles and action taking full account of the different conditions in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It stipulated the roles of the liberation movements viz-à-viz the African governments and the OAU, and laid down a code of behaviour for the individual African states in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The Kampala Summit of July, 1975, endorsed the Declaration. The Summit rejected detente as an attempt by South Africa "to legitimize the oppression and exploitation of the South African people" and the South African regime itself as "a product of colonial conquest now operating as a fully-fledged fascist power bent on perpetrating the ruthless domination of the indigenous people..." Thus the OAU put paid to the policy of detente.

Following on the efforts of the four Presidents, a rather bizarre meeting took place on August 25, 1975, between representatives of the ANC and the Smith regime in the Presidential carriage of a South African train straddled across the Zambezi river on Victoria falls bridge, between Rhodesia and Zambia, with Kaunda of Zambia and Vorster of South Africa present as 'witnesses'. The Conference was doomed from the start - so diametrically opposed were the positions of the parties before the opening day. The whole exercise finally collapsed on the question of procedure. On the 3rd of March 1976, one of the four Presidents, Samora Machel of Mozambique, suddenly announced the closure of the border between his country and Rhodesia. Mozambique further decided to observe in full the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia. All Rhodesian assets in the country were confiscated. A ban was put on all communication between Rhodesia and Mozambique "including land and air traffic of goods and persons." The President also announced that he was placing his agricultural and industrial sectors on a "war footing" as an added safeguard. The reaction of the UN was swift and favourable. The Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, promised United Nations aid to Mozambique and the Security Council soon afterwards voted to provide economic aid.

A few points command attention here regarding the debate over dialogue and detente. It is significant that the OAU on these two occasions, claimed the authority to place the limits and conditions for bilateral relations between sovereign African states and another
sovereign state. Still more striking is the fact that the African states concerned were content to concede the OAU this right and that none of them questioned it. The recalcitrance of Malawi and Gabon in continuing with their diplomatic intercourse with South Africa, even when the OAU had condemned it, was not accompanied by any rejection of the jurisdiction of the OAU. Rather, it should be seen as the stiff-necked reaction of states who, for their own reasons, believe they are doing right, that the OAU decision was misguided in substance, and that somehow they were saving the OAU from itself. It should be noted also that the South African government’s attempts at détente, even if they were rhetorically directed at Africa as a bloc, were pursued in practice between individual African states.

Nothing but an overwhelming sense of community - at least as far as the liberation of the continent is concerned - can explain the absence of arguments based on national sovereignty on the part of the states who embarked on détente with Africa. Each of them explained her actions by relating them to the general good of the continent.

Unlike the practice in most of the other issues facing the OAU which we have reviewed in our analysis, the OAU this time stuck resolutely to the principle of "no-dialogue." When the matter threatened seriously to split the Organization, the OAU nevertheless put it to the vote. There was no shelving of an uncomfortable issue this time. Evidently, on the question of liberation, it is possible for the OAU to act confidently and decisively.

The OAU has, as in many other earlier cases, been content to let certain states take the initiative in devising policies and strategies of action and the Organization has remained in the background ready to criticize and endorse. On this occasion it was the proximity to the problem of the four Presidents that accorded them legitimacy. In principle, however, it is possible to argue that it was the OAU that endorsed both their legitimacy and the actual strategies that they evolved. If this is accepted, the role of the four Presidents in this matter must be seen as being next door to supranationality.

The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration constitutes an authoritative setting out of principles, policy, and future strategy concerning the Southern African problem. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that as in previous cases, the OAU possessed no powers of sanction, the Defence Commission is only a paper resolution and it is left to the weight of the continental "we" feeling to wean away the recalcitrant states from their deviant lines of action.
The military coup in April, 1974, in Portugal, sounded the keynote to the final phase of the rapid collapse of the Portuguese empire. Within a period of one odd year Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, and finally Angola, all achieved independence. It was, however, Angola which provided the acid test for OAU effectiveness in 1976. The divisions in the Angolan liberation movements were not unlike those of the other movements in unliberated African territories. But several factors gathered to a head and produced a serious international situation in the Angolan case. The history of OAU approach to the divisions in Angola, marked at first by indecision and, at the later stages, by a resolute determination to achieve a viable solution, is not only an index to the growing maturity of the African integration movement but also a pointer to the growing sinews of the OAU as an organization - at least where it concerns the fight for liberation. We shall attempt to sketch the highlights of this history, quite briefly.

The two liberation movements in Angola were both activated in 1961. On February 6, of that year, the radical MPLA (Movimento Popular para Libertação da Angola) under Agostinho Neto instigated an uprising in Luanda. On March 1, the moderate UPA (União de Populações da Angola) under Holden Roberto, started a rural guerilla warfare. The MPLA uprising was ill-fated. It was brutally put down and the leaders were imprisoned. But the UPA went from strength to strength and on April 5, 1962, proclaimed a government in exile, GRAE (Governo Revolucionario de Angola em exílio) - following the Algerian example. The MPLA was based in Conakry, Guinea, while the UPA had its own base in the Congo (Leopoldville). While the newly formed ALC (African Liberation Committee) of the OAU was having its first meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in June, 1963, the Congolese government announced, as the first African state to do so, that it was formally recognizing GRAE. The Committee found itself in an awkward situation since it was now forced to take a stand on the issue of the split. However, it was decided to send a special delegation to conciliate between GRAE and the MPLA. At this time the GRAE seemed to be in a stronger military position than the MPLA. It had not always been so, since the MPLA had constituted a quite considerable force. But there were ideological differences in the movement following the Peking-Moscow split and, more importantly, the movement was still recovering from the setbacks arising from the first Congo crisis. Consequently the conciliation Committee recommended unanimously that Holden Roberto’s movement be recognized. Even Guinea and Algeria, which had been traditional supporters of the MPLA, voted in fa-
vour. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Dakar in August 1963, it was decided to "request all Member States to accord recognition to the Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile." Only Ghana and Congo (Brazzaville) denied the movement recognition.

The decision of the ALC to recognize only the GRAE was epoch making - and especially so since it had been the declared policy of the ALC regarding the liberation movements to attempt to create united fronts. It now abandoned this policy, as we shall see, not only in Angola, but in Mozambique, Rhodesia and Guinea Bissau. Worse still, the ALC did not maintain a consistent policy. As one writer put it "...the ALC did not abandon altogether the principle of common action fronts. It merely applied it selectively, according to its political preferences." Sometimes, it shared its aid between two groups and the proportion of aid each received would depend on the degree of support it had within the membership of the Committee, and it was a well-known fact that the Committee itself was divided between moderates and radicals. At other times, it chose to support one group only to have its decision overturned by the Council of Ministers Conference where other powerful supporters had the upperhand. Furthermore, the ALC could not stop other countries funnelling support in the form of arms and money to organizations which were not sanctioned by the Committee. Soon, even Nyerere, one of the staunchest defenders of the Liberation Committee against the criticism of leaders like Nkrumah, was prompted to characterize the Committee as follows:

"(The ALC)... was supposed to be, at its origin, an instrument of liberation and not a political committee having the power to pass resolutions... What do we see at the present time? A Committee, here in Dar-es-Salaam, which votes resolutions and more resolutions..."

In at least two cases, the ALC seemed to have been unduly pressured by the influence of "neighbouring" states to the dependent area concerned. These were in Angola where the Congolese government was able to force the Committee's hand at a time which was signally unpropitious for one group and, as we shall see, also in Guinea Bissau, where Senegal was able to block the considered decision of the Committee.

The fortunes of the two liberation groups in Angola slowly changed. For the MPLA, the support of Congo (Brazzaville), a neighbouring state, was a shot in the arm. The government of Youlou in Congo (Brazzaville) had been overthrown barely one week after the Dakar Council of Ministers Conference which accorded exclusive recognition to GRAE. The new radical government in Congo (Brazzaville) welcomed the MPLA with open arms and that movement found a convenient base from which to recuperate its forces and even entrench its influence in the enclave of Cabinda which, to all intent and purposes, was henceforth considered a part of Angola.
As for GRAE, despite the continued support of the OAU (at the OAU Summit in Cairo in July 1964, its leader, Holden Roberto, was accorded the full rights of a delegate), and its new found friendship with China, its fortune waned. The fall of the Aduola government saw the ascendancy of Tshombe between whom and Holden Roberto there was no love lost. Also, internal troubles took their toll on the effectiveness of the movement. While Holden Roberto was enjoying the unprecedented honour accorded by the OAU at the Cairo Summit, his foreign minister Jonas Savimbi resigned from GRAE. It was he who formed the third faction in the Angolan crisis - the UNITA.

The Cairo Summit seemed to turn the tables on the earlier decision of the OAU. Where the Organization had exclusively recognized GRAE, it now asked the ALC to try to effect a reconciliation between GRAE and the MPLA. As if to ensure that the MPLA would gain ascendancy, it appointed a Committee of three to this effect - Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, and the UAR. All three could be considered radical. At least two of them were rabidly against the former decision of the OAU! Naturally, at the special session of the ALC in Dar-es-Salaam on November 24-25, 1964, where the report of the special committee was presented, the MPLA received a more favourable hearing and it was now decided to put an end to the exclusive recognition of GRAE and to share aid between GRAE and MPLA. The Nairobi Council of Ministers Conference in March 1965 overturned this decision and reverted to the Cairo formula for reconciliation. Thus the OAU was vacillating over Angola.

The OAU's favourable attitude to GRAE/UPA was not matched by the attitude of the non-governmental African body - the AAPSC. In May, 1965, the AAPSC expelled Holden Roberto's party, the UPA, from its ranks. More internal problems further reduced even the military effectiveness of GRAE. In June, 1965, the Minister of Defense of that government-in-exile, Alexander Taty, attempted a coup. It failed but it further diminished the standing of that group in Africa.

When the Portuguese empire came crashing down in 1974, Angola posed a very special and difficult problem. In the other former Portuguese controlled territories of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tomé Principe, and Cape Verde, the transition to African government had been more or less well-organized and had been executed in a relatively orderly manner. In Angola, on the contrary, there were three rival groups. The MPLA, (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), still under the leadership of Agostinho Neto, was reputed to be one of the major forces together with the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola,) the new name for Holden Roberto's group. This latter enjoyed the support of Zaire, USA, and China while the MPLA was known to have the back-
ing of the Soviet Union. The last group, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), was led by Jonas Savimbi the former colleague of Holden Roberto. There were deep ideologi­cal and ethnic cleavages between these groups and it was feared from the beginning that reconciliation between them would be impossible to achieve.

Another aspect of the problem was the involvement of outside powers. Apart from the ideological differences, Angola’s immense potential resources were a powerful attraction for these powers. Angola’s natural resources include oil, diamonds, copper, gold, alu­minium and ore. The country possesses huge agricultural potential and is already the world’s third largest producer of coffee, despite the fact that only two per cent of its arable land is under cultivation. The United States, Portugal, Canada, Japan, West Germany and France, controlled vast interests in the oil resources of Angola from the Cabinda enclave. South Africa’s economic interests regarded the hydro-electric complex on the Cuene river but it also had strategic reasons for interesting itself in the Angolan situation since Angola borders on Namibia (South West Africa).

The stage was therefore set in Angola for an internecine struggle. Various attempts were made in the name of African unity to recon­cile these three groups. One of the most notable was an agreement signed in Mombasa on January 5, 1975, between the leaders of MPLA, UNITA and FNLA. The meeting itself was arranged with the good offices of President Kenyatta of Kenya who prevailed upon the three leaders to form, as their communiqué put it, “...a common political platform for the negotiations which will lead Angola to inde­pendence.”

These negotiations took place barely one week after the Momba­sa agreement and on January 15, 1975, a Concordat was signed in Penina, in the south of Portugal, between Portugal and the three li­beration movements. The Concordat was an elaborate attempt to balance the power of the three liberation movements in a transitio­nal government. It set up a Council of Ministers composed of Portuguese officials and representatives of the three liberation mo­vements among whom the twelve portfolios were equally shared. The government itself was to be directed by a Presidential Council manned by representatives from the three groups, and by a rotating system of chairmanship. A Portuguese High Commissioner would work with this Council, but government decisions would be subject to a two-thirds majority of the Council. The transitional govern­ment was charged with the responsibility of drafting electoral laws and setting up electors list and register in preparation for elections before formal independence.

The Concordat failed on the tenuous military situation between the rival groups. The National Council of Defence which the Con-
cordat created, with representatives from the three liberation groups and the three services of the Portuguese army, merely presided over four unintegrated armies. No sooner was the coalition government set up on the 30th January, 1975, than the MPLA and FNLA renewed their armed conflict with redoubled intensity. By June, the UNITA was also drawn into the struggle. The prospects for even an early independence, according to plan, began to recede. In the same month, through the auspices of President Kenyatta and the Liberation Committee of the OAU, another meeting was held between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA at Nakuru in Kenya. Among a long list of items on which the parties signed agreement was the following:

"Searching for solutions to problems which make the Transitional Government inoperative in this crucial phase of the process of decolonising, the liberation movement of Angola, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, have decided: ...To collaborate positively with the Government in the application of measures taken in all sectors of the national life, political economic and military..."

But it was clear by the beginning of the 12th Summit of the OAU in Kampala in July that neither the Mombasa agreement, nor a similar document signed in Alvor, nor the Nakuru arrangement were proving workable. The Summit itself demonstrated the growing polarization between the supporters of MPLA and FNLA. Zaire, already suspect on account of her support for the Cabinda secessionist group and for her close connection with the FNLA, made a great issue out of Portugal's alleged support of the MPLA, while Algeria and Congo, known to be MPLA supporters, put the blame on the FNLA for the collapse of the Mombasa, Alvor, and Nakuru agreements. Zaire gave her critics even more reason for apprehension when she tabled a proposal on the self-determination of Cabinda and demanded at the Council of Ministers meeting that the OAU should "demand that Portugal must recognize the necessity of associating the people of Cabinda in the determination of their destiny and ...should respect their right to self-determination." This stand on the part of Zaire only confirmed her opponents in their fears that she had "expansionist designs" on Cabinda. To add to the complication, while the Conference was still taking place, Luis Franque the leader of PLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda), - the secessionist Cabinda movement - unilaterally declared the independence of Cabinda in the "Déclaration Solonelle à l'occasion de la proclamation de l'indépendance du Cabinda" on August 1.

All the same, the Summit called on the warring parties in Angola to lay down their arms. More importantly, a fact-finding and Reconciliation Commission was appointed - composed of Somalia,
Algeria, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Morocco, Niger, Upper Volta, and the OAU Secretariat - who would report to the current Chairman, Idi Amin - through the Secretary-General. The OAU defence Commission was charged with the responsibility of considering further action including the possibility of sending an African peace keeping force. Meanwhile, the Summit appealed to the Portuguese to resume their responsibility for law and order until 11th November, 1975, the appointed date for Angolan Independence. The Summit also agreed on a strongly worded resolution condemning South African aggression in Angola. It will be recalled that South African troops had entered Angola on the excuse that they had to defend their interest around the Cunene hydro-electric scheme near the Namibian border. As the weeks wore on, however, the South African incursion was extended and the MPLA was accusing South Africa of invasion. Partly to meet this situation, the Summit Conference set up an ad hoc advisory Military Committee composed of representatives from Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Uganda, and the OAU Secretary General. This Committee was charged with the task of maintaining constant contact with the Angolan Government of National Unity. They were to determine whether there was any necessity to dispatch an OAU peace keeping force to Angola, whether the African states needed to contribute to the maintenance of Angolan administrative structure, and to report on the immediate needs of the Independent State of Angola.

The military situation in Angola continued to escalate after the Summit. The French, after President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Zaire in August 1975, were now reported to have joined the United States, Zaire and China in the active support of the FNLA from the north. The South Africans continued their incursion in the South where UNITA forces were soon to ally with them. The Portuguese, racked by internal convulsions at home, and a well-nigh disloyal army in Angola, could hardly alleviate the situation. Despite laudable victories over its enemies and its control of the capital, Luanda, the MPLA's position became increasingly threatened.

Two rival governments were proclaimed on Angola's independence day on November 11, 1975. The first was in Luanda where Agostinho Neto of the MPLA proclaimed the new regime; the other in Huambo, where Jonas Savimbi of UNITA set up a coalition administration with the FNLA under his presidency. From then on the events raced on to their denouement. Shortly after independence, FNLA and UNITA forces, aided by massive supplies of arms from their foreign supporters and units of regular South African army, were making a sanguinary but sure progress to the capital. Under these circumstances the MPLA government undertook two measures. First, it arranged a massive increase in its supply of Soviet arms. Secondly, it invited Cuba to send in an estimated force of 10,000
men to assist the MPLA forces. These measures not only stopped the advance of the opposing forces but laid the foundation for a total victory.

The massive involvement of foreign influence now began to create serious fissures in the OAU. Not only that, the recruitment of large numbers of European and American mercenaries on the side of the FNLA forces, offended African sensibilities. Together with the brazen campaign of the South African army, these developments now forced many an African state to take a definite stand. Nigeria, which had just emerged from another change of government with a regime which had proclaimed a new dynamic order, reacted with alacrity. The occasion was the action of the American President, Gerald Ford, in sending a circular letter to African states, insinuating the dangers of Communist involvement in Angola and trying to persuade them to condemn the involvement of the Russians and the Cubans. The Nigerians published Ford's circular letter and in a publicized reply characterized the American note as an attempt at "arm-twisting," an "insult to the intelligence of African nations, and scorn to the dignity of black men." From now on the Nigerians led the so-called progressive group on the Angolan issue. Their stand, hostile to the Western Powers, was characterized by the statement in the Ethiopian Herald of 24th January, 1976. "The manœuvres of the Western Powers," the article declared, "by their biased news communication media and through others in Africa, for the withdrawal of socialist countries from Angola, is for their benefit, so that they will have an opportunity to slip through the back door." Soon after, the Nigerians backed up their stand by recognizing the MPLA Government as the legitimate government of Angola and as "truly representing the interest of the Angolan people." It rejected the policy of reconciliation between the different Angolan groups noting that "divisive international forces have made deep in-roads in the fighting... There is now abundant evidence of racist South Africa's troops in the conflict. The factions fighting against MPLA are backed not only by South Africa but by other interests which are clearly against Angolan independence and freedom in Africa. And for this reason, Nigeria has to take the stand to recognize MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola."

But there were other countries which did not share Nigeria's views. Zaire, for one, was evidently apprehensive about the prospect of the emergence at her borders of another socialist/radical state under the MPLA, to join the Congo with whom Zaire already had problems. The fear of Communism for a regime such as Mobutu's was doubtless a real one. Furthermore, Zaire's close collaboration with the United States rendered it in Zaire's interest to ward off the influence of the USSR and Cuba in her neighbouring territories. (Substantial military aid was being given to Ethiopia, Kenya and
Zaire by the United States ostensibly to contain Communism in Africa.) Finally, for reasons of power politics and economics, it was in Zaire’s interest to prevent the addition of the resources of Cabinda to the already potentially threatening size of the new Angolan state. Thus, in any event, did Zaire’s critics assess her attitude. For the same reasons of apprehension over growing Communist influence, the Entente States did not see eye to eye with the Nigerians. But on one subject did African states find common ground in their common revulsion. This was the influx of mercenaries in the Angolan war. On this one issue, beginning from the 1964 Congo crisis, the Africans had learned to share a common viewpoint.

It was under these circumstances that the Extra-ordinary Summit of the OAU, the first of its kind, was called in Addis Ababa on 10th January, 1976, to discuss the Angolan issue. Two resolutions lay before the assembled delegates. The first was sponsored by Nigeria with the backing of twenty-one other states. The other resolution presented by Senegal was also co-sponsored by twenty-one states. Ethiopia and Uganda remained neutral. The formal reasons were that Ethiopia was hosting the meeting while Idi Amin from Uganda was the current Chairman of the organization and in this capacity had to maintain a discreet neutrality. But it was suggested that Ethiopia, a recipient of heavy American military aid in a situation of civil strife in Eritrea was little disposed to displease the Americans—a suggestion belied by the swift Ethiopian recognition of the MPLA government directly after the Summit Conference. Similarly, there is good reason to put credence on Amin’s explanation of his neutrality, and not to attribute it, like his critics, to a newfound friendship with Mobutu of Zaire, since Uganda also accorded recognition to the MPLA regime shortly after the Summit. However that may be, the Organization had never been so equally divided. The Nigerian resolution linked the Angolan issue with the whole of the South African problem, consistent with her earlier statement that “the current event in Angola must be seen in its right perspective not just as fighting between factions in Angola but as fighting between fascist South Africa with their backers and MPLA...” The resolution asked the Organization to reaffirm its “unconditional commitment to the total liberation of the continent and to increase its aid to the liberation movement in Namibia, Zambabwe and South Africa.” As for Angola, it condemned the armed aggression “against Africa by troops of the fascist and racist regime of South Africa in collusion with FNLA, UNITA and mercenary bands” and resolved “to oppose by all means, political diplomatic and military, South African and imperialist aggression in Angola.” The last part of the resolution was the most controversial. The Organization was called upon to “express confidence in the ability of the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola to continue to create an atmosphere of
reconciliation of all Angolans willing to work for the consolidation of national unity, territorial integrity and to rebuff the South African invasion and imperialist machinations designed to compromise the independence and sovereignty of Angola." Behind the resolution were Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial-Guinea, Libya, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome, Somalia, Sudan, Chad and Tanzania.

The Senegalese-sponsored resolution "unequivocally condemned the intervention of South African troops in Angola" but it also decried "all other forms of foreign intervention and intrusion in the internal affairs of Angola whatever their motivations and origins." It maintained that "...the Angolan problem being an African problem must be resolved within the framework of the OAU." It condemned "all recourse to mercenaries and any supply of arms to the parties of the conflict in Angola." It not only demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the area but called for an end to the supply of arms to the combatants by non-African states. The resolution further urged the three liberation movements to arrange a cease-fire and work towards reconciliation and proposed the setting up of a Committee of the Heads of State of the OAU to assist in the observance of such a cease-fire. Finally, it proposed that the parties to the conflict in Angola set up a national union government. The sponsors of this resolution were: Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Gambia, Gabon, Upper Volta, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Mauritania, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Zaire and Zambia.

The basic problem was of course that while the OAU had recognized the three liberation movements, some member states now recognized only the MPLA government. More, despite the formal legitimacy of the FNLA and UNITA, there was no overlooking their collusion with the continental pariah - South Africa. As one observer put it "...the OAU could not very well ask the Angolan people (under the MPLA) to stop fighting the South African troops who had invaded their country." This was the main strength of the Nigerian proposal. For the Cubans might equally well have been regarded as interlopers were it not for the moral legitimacy involved in their fighting against the South African side - a legitimacy which fortified the formal one of the legality of the MPLA government for those who recognized that regime.

The deadlock for the Organization had been complete but it was the unlikely temperance of Chairman Idi Amin that helped the Organization over the crisis. For the deadlock was not without its tendentious aspects. President Bokassa of the Central African Republic was reputed to have gone off the deep end and declared that
South Africa had given him aid when not one African country had responded when he travelled around seeking economic support. Therefore, while he rejected apartheid as much as the next man he refused to vote for any resolution that unilaterally condemned South Africa!

The communiqué issued on the 13th of January was moderation itself, the epitome of a 'wait-and-see' policy. It simply read:

"After seriously considering the Angolan problem from January 10-13, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government decided to adjourn and request the OAU Bureau (this is the office of the incumbent Chairman of the OAU) to follow closely the Angolan problem."

Within a month of the Extra-ordinary Summit the MPLA had been recognized by a majority of the OAU members and the OAU Secretariat was able to admit Angola on the 11th of February, 1976, as the 47th member of the OAU. An early South African withdrawal from Angolan territory after suffering serious military setbacks and disagreeing openly with its UNITA allies, coupled with the declaration of Zairian neutrality and a meeting in Kinshasa between Mobutu and Neto on 27th February to discuss peace and friendship, helped the MPLA government to rout its enemies and entrench its power.

In the aftermath of the first Extra-ordinary Summit in Addis Ababa it has been said that Angola marked the beginning of a new era in African continental politics - the era of ideological cleavages and indigenous continental power politics. Paul Bernetel, writing in Jeune Afrique, has said:

"Le conflit angolais marque la fin d'une époque dans l'histoire des relations interafricaines. Celle où le continent, à l'abri des pulsations et des rivalités extérieures, pouvait, dans la tolérance, dégager un consensus sur les grands problèmes africains. Le retour aux clivages idéologiques et politiques traditionnels est consommé."

But our study has shown that ideological cleavages have never been lacking in the heterogenous politics of the African continent. And considerations of power politics have often lurked behind the most banal conflicts between African states. None of these tendencies can be said to be new to the continent. Still less can it be plausibly claimed that in the period we have reviewed, Africa was sheltered from the great ideological and power political cleavages of the

*"The Angolan conflict marks the end of an era in the history of inter-African relations. An era in which, under the shelter of external rivalries and pulsations, the continent could work out a consensus on the major African problems. The return of the political and ideological cleavages is consummated."
world. The very first great conflict on the African continent - the Congo crisis, immediately after the formation of the OAU, was marked by the deep and decisive involvement of cold-war politics. This tendency continued through the Nigerian civil war and the Angolan crisis and promises to be an abiding feature of the Godfather syndrome in African continental politics for sometime to come. The Angolan crisis signalled the resilience of the Organization of African unity. Deep as the ideological cleavages might have been and in despite of the strong motivations of power politics and national interest among the parties concerned, all the African states subjected the issue to an African settlement. The solution itself, though a fait accompli projected on a deliberate act of procrastination, was respected by all and sundry. This achievement is all the more remarkable if it is remembered that the deadlock between the states was complete in a year of the chairmanship of Idi Amin - one of the most controversial figures the continent has ever produced and the prospect of whose term of office inspired less than solidarity among the African states (Several states, for instance, boycotted the Kampala Summit on account of Amin.)

It is worth recalling that only ten years earlier, a group of OAU Heads of States, appointed as members of a Conciliation Commission over the second Congo crisis, was left cooling their heels in Washington where President Johnson, by refusing them even the courtesy of an audience, stultified the modest African strivings to hedge unsanctioned external involvement in the affairs of the continent. In Angola, though still divided, African states were able, led by a determined and influential African state, to offer a convincing resistance to unacceptable foreign intervention on the side of South African interest. Although it was this last factor - South African involvement - which was decisive for the effectiveness of the resistance, it had offered a potent formula, for the first time, for the assertion of strong African interests. The point must however not be overstated. Many African states did not consent but acquiesced in the fait accompli. On the infinite gamut of political history silence is not always consent, but may await ominously for propitious circumstances to negate apparent consent with contention. On the other hand, the situation in which the continent was divided equally on both sides of an important issue is probably unique. It remains to be seen what the future holds for similar issues in which the OAU is divided between a determined majority and an equally insistent minority.

We shall end this section by touching briefly on other lesser African continental problems in which the OAU is demonstrating a
new found maturity and growing authority. We followed the problem of Djibouti or the territory of Afars and Issas, noting the setting up of an OAU Fact-finding Mission. At the OAU Summit in Kampala in 1975, Ethiopia and Somalia were still locked in controversy over the fate of that territory in the face of imminent independence. Somalia's concern caused, in the main, by Somalian irredentism is matched by Ethiopian economic interest in the area which handles more than 80% of Ethiopia's import and export. At a meeting held in June, in Rabat, by the Liberation Committee, Somalia had proposed that a sub-regional bureau of the Liberation Committee be set up in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, to devote attention exclusively to the liberation of Afars and Issars. Ethiopia, fearing that Somalia, wanted the bureau in Mogadishu, mainly to facilitate the realization of her territorial claims on the area, opposed the proposal. By the time the OAU met in Mauritius from the 24th June to 3rd July, 1976, for the 27th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers Conference preceeding the Summit, the fact-finding Mission on Djibouti had made considerable progress in settling the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over that territory. The Commission registered the solemn declaration of the leaders of the Ethiopian and Somali delegations before the Council affirming on behalf of their respective Governments, to recognize, respect and honour the independence and sovereignty of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) and its territorial integrity after its accession to independence;..."10

The Ethiopian delegation went even further and introduced an amendment which would make both parties affirm "their commitment to renounce any and all claims they may have on the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti)." Although all parties professed themselves to subscribe to the spirit of the proposal, when it came to the brunt at the Summit, Somalia and three of the Djibouti parties refused to comply to the Ethiopian and the ruling party's insistence that they hallow their assurances in a signed document. The resolution also laid claims to OAU jurisdiction in the attempt to find a common political basis for an independent Djibouti. It urged "all political parties and groups and the two Liberation Movements recognized by OAU (FLCS and LMD) to accept a round-table conference on neutral grounds under the auspices of the OAU and to agree on a common political platform before the referendum." It further designated "the OAU fact-finding Mission to observe the referendum and the subsequent elections and to assist in the determination of the status of refugees on the basis of the recommendations made by the fact-finding Mission." Criticising the French Government for policies aimed at hindering independence in the territory it nevertheless requested the Administrative Secretary-General
"to transmit to the French Government the contents of this resolu-
tion and to take all the necessary measures for its implementation."

The strategy employed by the OAU on this issue clearly re-
sembles that employed with regard to the Angola issue and it is a
measure of the growing confidence of the Organization as well as
the respect it commands among the liberation movements and poli-
tical parties of unliberated territories that it can speak as authoriti-
vously for the areas regarding the general aim of liberation and the po-
licies of the movements as well as make representation on their be-
half to the colonial power. This latter claim to jurisdiction was con-
firmed when the (LPAI) African Popular League for Independence,
demanded independence from the French basing its claim on the
fact that "its representativeness was recognized by the OAU and
the Arab League" - a stand which the French Secretary for Overseas
Territories appeared to find it difficult to understand. Said he,
"Perhaps we do not have the same concept of democracy since this
is the first time that I have seen the opinion of foreign organizations
rather than the votes of the citizens involved to support a claim of
representativeness." He omitted to add that the citizens of
Djiboutti
we re hardly allowed to vote. On June 8, 1976, the main political
parties agreed in Paris, at the French Department of Overseas Terri-
itories, on an early independence pending the completing of a pro-
cess which will include farreaching electoral reforms of the limited
franchise system as well as a referendum which the OAU will be
asked to help supervise. With the new coalition government of all
parties, with the exception of the former ruling UNI (national Inde-
pendence Union,) formed after political disturbances in July, the
territory has come several steps nearer the OAU-approved goal of a
national government of unity. The new government has also ex-
pressly declared its determination to follow the OAU stand by main-
taining its independence viz-à-viz both Ethiopia and Somalia.

However, here again, certain strategic elements in the problem as
well as ideological factors, give cause for apprehension and a situ-
ation akin to the Angola issue may yet ensue. Somalia has now close
ideological affinities to Russia, whereas Ethiopia continues to be
armed by, and maintain close relationship with, the United States
inspite of the socialist stance of the Dergue (the new military regi-
me.)* The strategic position of the Territory of Afars and Issas pro-
vide strong military interests not only for the United States and the
Western powers but also USSR, Israel, and by the same token, the
Arabs. Djibouti, at the end of the Red Sea, is a vantage point for

*Recently the positions seem to have altered, with Russia now supplying Ethiopia with arms
and the US promising weapons to Somalia.
the control of the entrances to the Indian Ocean - a significant element which is of interest not least of all for the members of NATO. It is also of vital importance to Israel since it bears on the approaches to her southern port of Eliat and since the Arab States have a considerable interest in Djibouti as witness the role the Arab League has played in the issue to date. It will require all the latent resources of the OAU to avert the impending international conflict in the area.

The Western Sahara has provided a thorny problem for the OAU in recent years. Briefly, the conflict began over King Hasan of Morocco’s intensified claim of the arid Saharan territory, rich in mineral deposits, and which had been a Spanish colony. Ironically Morocco and Mauritania are now making the strangest bedfellows on the issue considering that in the early sixties it was Morocco’s claim over Mauritania which exercised the OAU for a few anxious years. Now both countries are presiding over the dismemberment of the territory and sharing the potential spoils of annexation. Earlier in 1969, Spain had transferred Ifni, an enclave on the northern part of the Saharan territory, to Morocco. But Morocco, egged on by the knowledge that Spanish colonization of the territory was drawing to a close, intensified its claims. Moroccan pressure on the Spanish authorities reached its climax late in 1974 when King Hassan set afoot a stupendous picnic of about 350,000 unarmed Moroccan marchers in a peaceful invasion of the territory in what came to be known as the "green march." The main attraction of the territory lies in its vast reserves of phosphates in the area estimated at about 1.7 billion tons. There are known to be iron deposits too in the south eastern part of the territory. Phosphate, used in the manufacture of fertilizers, has become a big money-earner in recent times and Morocco is the world’s third largest producer of the mineral after the United States and Soviet Union. But she is also the largest exporter of phosphates from which she earns up to fifty-five per cent of her foreign exchange. It can readily be seen why Morocco is tempted to boost her reserves of this mineral thereby acquiring a possible stranglehold on the world price by controlling the territory.

But the territory has its strategic importance as well. Together with Spain it controls the strait of Gibraltar. One of the important aspects of the strategy of the NATO alliance is the accessibility of the United States 6th fleet to the Mediterranean in which free passage through the Suez or the strait of Gibraltar holds the key. The strait assumes a greater importance in a situation where the unimpeded use of the Suez Canal is by no means assured. Spain and Morocco flank the strait of Gibraltar and the continued existence of a
favourable regime in Morocco is an important pillar of the strategy of securing the strait. Much of the United States support for King Hasan’s regime can only be understood from these motivations. But also the mining of the phosphate deposits in Western Sahara controlled by Morocco has been contracted to a Spanish subsidiary of a US company.

Algeria, as a socialist state which has also had boundary conflicts with Morocco, has its problems with the Hasan kingdom. And it opposed Morocco claims from the start, insisting that the inhabitants of the Western Shara should decide for themselves in a referendum. This is also the view of POLISARIO (The People’s Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro) launched in 1973 and dedicated to the independence of the territory from Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco has opposed the idea of a referendum in the territory claiming as its chief reason that the nomadic population is hard to count since they do not remain for long in any one particular place at any time of the year. No sooner had the Spanish government commenced the vacation of their position in the territory than Morocco and Mauritania attacked from two fronts. At the time of writing, they have virtually overrun the entire territory and the liberation movement is based in the desert in Algeria together with thousands of refugees from the territory. Algeria has sustained the POLISARIO throughout the conflict. The Moroccan and Mauritanian action was taken in despite of the ruling of the International Court of Justice at the Hague in April, 1975, to the effect that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had any territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara. The Algerian stand is therefore similar to the decision of the ICJ as well as the United Nations General Assembly.

The OAU has taken a similar stand. At the Kampala Summit of 1975, Algeria demanded that POLISARIO should be given a hearing but the Moroccans took strong exception to this proposal. They threatened to leave the Conference if the POLISARIO were admitted and the matter was dropped. The Moroccans have since repeated a similar threat, this time at the Summit Conference in 1976, in Mauritius. On February 27, 1976, the POLISARIO proclaimed the Sahraoui Republic. Although it has the backing of Algeria and many other sympathetic states, Morocco has described it as a 'pseudo-state’ and this time threatened to leave the OAU altogether if the Organization accepted the new republic as a member. The problem is of course that the OAU Liberation Committee had recognized POLISARIO as a legitimate liberation movement. It would have been merely logical also for the Organization to recognize the republic declared by the movement. But the Member States would like, at the same time, to avoid a head-on collision with Morocco. When
in January, 1976, the Liberation Committee decided to recognize
POLISARIO, Morocco and Mauritania had left the Committee. There was now every reason to take their threat seriously. In March,
at the Council of Ministers Conference in Addis Ababa, seven states
voted in favour of recognizing the new government while nine were
against and twenty-one abstained. The necessary two-thirds major-
ity required for the decision was therefore not attained. The Addis
Ababa meeting therefore left it to individual countries to decide
whether to recognize or not. The number of African countries
which have accorded the new state recognition is too small to effect
an automatic membership in the OAU. But there is no doubt, judg-
ing by the resolutions at the last OAU Summit, that the new Republic
has a reservoir of goodwill in Africa at the same time as many states
disapprove of the blatant power politics pursued by Morocco and
Mauritania in what many regard as an unholy alliance. The Resolu-
tion CM/Res. 491 (XXVII) of the OAU Council of Ministers from
24 June-3 July, 1976 in Mauritius is worth quoting in full. After the
recalling the principles of the OAU and the UN and especially the
UN resolution of the Western Sahara issue the meeting resolved as
follows: "The Council of Ministers...

1. REAFFIRMS the inalienable right of the people of Spanish
Sahara to self-determination and to national independence in
conformity with the Charter of the OAU and the UN Char-
ter;

2. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the United Nations Or-
ganization to pursue his mission with a view to enabling the
Saharaoui people to freely exercise their right to self-determi-
nation;

3. GIVES its unconditional support to the just struggle of the
Saharaoui people for the regaining of its national rights; (my
italics)

4. DEMANDS the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces
of occupation and the respect of the territorial integrity of
Westerns Sahara and of the national sovereignty of the Saha-
raoui people;

5. CALLS on all parties to the conflict in Western Sahara to
take urgent steps to effect a settlement acceptable to all par-
ties, including the people of Western Sahara, within the con-
text of African Unity and in the interest of peace, friendship
and good neighbourliness in the region;
6. REQUESTS the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU to report to the next session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU on the implementation of the present resolution.

Although Morocco and Mauritania had threatened to sever diplomatic relations with any country which recognizes the Saharaoui Republic, they carried out their threat only in the case of Algeria. This may suggest the possibility that they will hesitate to actually break with the OAU. If they should carry out the threat they would be the first state ever to leave the Organization. But in this issue where the OAU insists for the first time on the right of self-determination against two of its own members, one can discern a growing tenacity in the Organization which was very much lacking only a decade ago.

The OAU has taken to providing for the welfare of its politically weak members who after a long period of independence struggle find themselves struggling to produce a viable state. The Organization has, for example, given considerable financial assistance to the new state of Guinea-Bissau, at one time at the cost of cutting down on the budget of the Office of the Administrative Secretary-General in order to eke out the available funds. Similarly, at the 1976 Conference of Foreign Ministers in Mauritius, the Organization set out to provide both diplomatic and financial support for the new states of Angola and Mozambique. The resolution on the question denounces what it calls "the continuation of the campaign of defamation and acts of hostility against the People's Republic of Angola," and calls on Member States to provide all the necessary "political, diplomatic, financial material and military resources" for the new state to live up to its responsibilities.1

In the case of Mozambique the Organization voted a grant of 20 million dollars from the Special Arab fund "to reinforce her capacity to apply sanctions and support the Liberation struggle of Zimbabwe." It also promises practical help and invites all the Member States of the Organization to do the same.

A particularly significant resolution at the 1976 Summit also demonstrates the growing self-confidence of the Organization at least in matters concerning liberation. This was over the question of Bantustanisation in South Africa which the OAU described as "the cornerstone of apartheid designed to ensure balkanisation, tribal fragmentation and fratricidal conflict in South Africa to the benefit of white supremacy."

The resolution "urges all member states to refrain from establishing contact with the emissaries of the so-called Bantu Homelands" it also urges the member states of the Organization "not to accord recognition to any Bantustan, in particular, the Transkei whose so-called independence is scheduled for 26th Oc-
October, 1976.' But the resolution includes a powerful declaration namely "that violation of this collective commitment by any member state will be seen as a betrayal of not only the fighting people of South Africa but the entire continent." At the end of October the Transkei was declared independent as threatened, and so far no African state has accorded it recognition. More than that, the United Nations General Assembly has backed the OAU resolution. We shall return to these questions to discuss their import in assessing the future of the Organization. But altogether it would seem that the OAU is acquiring more resolve, direction, and tenacity.

Footnotes to Chapter fourteen

4. The so-called independence of the first of these, Transkei, in October 1976, was rejected by the General assembly of the UN.
5. See Dar-es-Salaam Declaration.
7. In this latter case the Council of Ministers overthrew the Committee's decision.
10. See Document CM/Res. 480 (XXVII) for this and following quotation.
15. The ECA, Regional cooperation and the functionalist foundation of African integration

The rate and direction of African integration depend, in the final analysis, not only on the evolution of the pluralist continental politics but also on the relative success of the functionalist economic and social endeavours to which the African states overwhelmingly committed themselves in 1963. This commitment was intended, at the time, as a more promising alternative to the hortatory notion of automaticity implicit in Nkrumah's quasi-Biblical dictum: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all the rest will be added unto it." How has this commitment been put into practice? What is its rationale and scope? With what manner of problems is it fraught? Are the changes that have evolved in its wake sufficiently significant to render pertinent that other concept of automaticity - of progress from economic to political union - advanced by certain theorists on political integration? To these and other related questions we must now address ourselves.

The fundamental and vexing economic problem confronting all African countries is the paucity of their per capita output. This in turn depends on a number of other factors which by now have become familiar. All the same they are worth restating here. To begin with, it is typical of developing economies like Africa's that they are dependent to an overwhelming extent on agriculture. Another ancillary feature of this condition is the fact that a considerable proportion of agriculture consists of subsistence farming while the rest of the economy is dominated by the production of certain raw materials like coffee, cotton, cocoa and different varieties of minerals. Consequently another basic economic problem for Africa is the high dependence on trade. To be sure, there are a great many developed economies which are at the same time dependent on trade. What renders the African situation singularly precarious is the relation between production and foreign trade the nature of which is always liable to cause grievous economic harm. African production patterns are typified by the near absence of the capacity to produce capital goods locally, therefore imported goods and equipment assume a central role in production and development. Furthermore, these imported capital goods are paid for ostensibly from the proceeds of
the export of primary products. However, the state of the world economy is such that, partly due to the low income elasticity of demand for Africa's exports coupled with a high income elasticity of demand for manufactured products, the prices of primary products have been steadily falling in relation to the prices of manufactured goods. To make matters worse, African economies produce the same relatively limited range of primary products and external trade means trade with the rest of the world since intra-African trade continues to be on a low level. Therefore, there is almost a total absence, within the African context, of the sort of sectoral specialization which might have contributed towards alleviating the condition we have described.

We have already touched on the relationship between this peculiar economic condition and the phenomenon of colonialism in Africa as well as African perception, among elites, of that relationship. But even after independence, certain economic approaches and concepts have tended to perpetuate this condition by inhibiting a rapid and clear appreciation of the problem on the part of the Africans. One of these is the laissez-faire doctrine of specialization which posits the "comparative advantage" in the international economic system of specialization in particular primary products coupled with the free play of market forces. Similarly, orthodox economic thinking has it that there exists an automatic tendency towards equilibrium in the international economic system. It was in 1950 that Prebisch first advanced his observation about the dwindling prices of primary products in relation to manufactured goods. Less than a decade later Gunnar Myrdal was pointing to the tendencies towards stagnation on the part of the poorer countries inherent in the prevailing international economic system. Far from a tendency towards an automatic self-stabilization, the trend was towards a widening gap between the rich and poor:

"The advice - and assistance - which the poorer countries receive from the richer is, even nowadays, often directed towards increasing their production of primary goods for export. The advice is certainly given in good faith, and it may even be rational from the short-term point of view of one underdeveloped country seen in isolation. In a broader perspective and from a long-term point of view, what would be rational is above all to increase productivity, incomes and living standards in the larger agricultural subsistence sectors, so as to raise the supply price of labour, and in manufacturing industry. (Italics added). This would engender economic development and raise incomes."

More recently improved agricultural protection on the part of the industrialized countries, better methods of production leading to productivity gains and the increasing use of synthetic materials to replace raw products, have led to the diminishing of the volume of
the sales of primary products compared with the volume of manufactured goods exported to African countries. Despite the severe criticisms to which both Prebisch’s and Myrdal’s theses have been subjected it has become increasingly clear to African leaders and elites that in their strivings for economic development, diversification of exports as well as import substitution must be given first place. In fine, the need for industrialization has become accepted and respectable in Africa. Also the need for mechanisms for improved commodity price arrangements, compensatory financing and other schemes leading to a more equitable international economic system, have become widely appreciated among Africans and other affected states and both UNCTAD, OPEC, and the North-South dialogue are predicated ostensibly on those doctrines. The alternative is the present chaotic and invidious system creating a vicious circle in which these inequalities produce serious balance of payments problems for African countries causing more and more resources to be consumed by the cost of servicing hard loans and leading to more borrowing and so on and so forth.

Industrialization aimed at rapid economic development presupposes not only the production of simple consumer goods and intermediate products but also capital goods which are the essential agents for propelling the economy in the direction of accelerated growth. And while small-scale and medium-scale industries may primarily produce for national markets, large-scale industry, owing to the nature of the minimum economic sizes of plants in such sectors, require large markets. Now the continent of Africa is unique in the number of mini-states that it harbours. There are eight states with a population of less than one million, thirteen with less than two million and as many as twenty-seven with populations of four million or less. The low income levels among the populations in these states further underline the inadequacy of African national markets for industrialization leading to economic growth. Africans have increasingly realized that in order to reap the benefits of large-scale production as well as the positive effects of international specialization within Africa, external economies, and linkage effects essential to the industrialization process, they can do no better than effect the grouping of their markets.

The realization of these needs among the African leaders constituted the rationale of their commitment in 1963 to a process of economic cooperation. We have already examined the transactionalist and functionalist strands in the different points of view. The fact remains that the African states have set for themselves the goal of economic integration as an essential aspect of their varying degrees of commitment to political integration.
The role of the ECA.

The Economic Commission for Africa was the last of the United Nations organs established as arms of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In 1947, both the ECE (Economic Commission for Europe) and the ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) had been set up as part of a general attempt by the UN to combat the problems of post-war reconstruction. In 1948, a similar Commission - (ECLA) Economic Commission for Latin America was formed for the Latin American countries. Although they could hardly show that the war had dislocated their economies, they were able to substantiate a claim that the seriousness of their economic condition warranted the attention of the UN on a regional basis. The Africans, at that time, were not strongly represented at the UN, unlike the Latin Americans who controlled twenty votes out of a total of fifty-seven. By 1957, however, Ghana and a number of African countries had attained independence and they began to exert pressure on the UN for the formation of a similar Commission for Africa. This demand was vigorously opposed by the colonial powers who not only had their own organ the CCTA (Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa - composed of Belgium, France, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom) but feared that any new Commission for Africa under the aegis of the UN might be used by the Africans as a forum for attacking colonialism and its effects just as the UN's Trusteeship Council and Fourth Committee were demonstrating. But with the support of the Latin American countries and certain Asian countries, the Africans prevailed on UN General Assembly to pass the resolution of the 25th November, 1957, asking the ECOSOC to set up the new Commission. On the 29th April, 1958, this was done. At the same time, beginning with Ghana and Liberia in 1958, African states joined the CCTA and came to dominate it before long as is shown by the fact that in 1960 its headquarters was moved from London to Lagos. Two years later South Africa and Rhodesia were expelled from the Commission and Britain, France, and Belgium lost the right to vote at the meetings. An African, Dr. Mhammadou Tourre became the Secretary-General. Finally in 1963, the CCTA was incorporated into the OAU under the Scientific, Technical and Research Commission.

Similarly in the ECA, although the colonial powers - Britain, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain - together with the independent African states had constituted the membership, in 1962 Portugal and South Africa were expelled because of their policies and Britain, France, and Spain became associate members. Thus at the formation of the OAU in 1963 the OAU and the ECA respectively constituted the effective organs on the continent for carrying forward
African aspirations politically and economically. In June, 1963, the first Secretary-General of the ECA, Mekki Abbas of Sudan was replaced by Dr. Robert Gardiner - a Ghanaian who led the Organization during the crucial thirteen years that followed.

In 1958 only nine African states (Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic) were members of the ECA. Today the Organization is strictly African and its membership includes all the independent African states. The aims adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution setting up the ECA enjoins the Organization to promote concerted action aimed at the economic and social development of the African continent, to maintain and reinforce economic relations between African territories as well as between them and other countries, and to work towards the formulation and application of a co-ordinated policy aimed at the promotion of the economic and technical development of Africa.

From the beginning ECA’s institutional machinery consisted of a Plenary Assembly representing all the member states and which met biennially, an executive secretariat, working parties (together with their subsidiary committees) which dealt with concrete projects, and regional bureaux. But in 1969 an extensive reform programme was carried out in the administrative structure to adapt the Organization to the new role assigned to it by the series of ”commemorative resolutions” adopted at the 9th session of the Organization. The burden of these resolutions was the expansion of the responsibilities of the Organization by assigning to it significant operational functions in the areas of planning and technical assistance. Moreover, these resolutions represented a realization of the wish of the vast majority of the member states to exercise what they regarded as their ”sovereign” right to political supervision of the activities of the Organization. This move was opposed by the representatives of the United Nations from a legal point of view but they were passed nevertheless. The new programme provided for:

1. Conference of Ministers. This was composed of ministers from the member states responsible for economic, financial, planning and development matters. They were charged with examining (a) the general political problems, in particular inter-African and international questions; (b) co-ordination between the Executive Committee and the Technical Committee of Experts; and (c) questions concerning the representation of Africans in the international economic and social Organization.

2. Executive Committee. This was to consist of two African representatives (one English- and one French-speaking) of the Governing Council of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), two African members of ECOSOC (again one English- and one French-speaking), two representatives from each subregion (each officer of
the Conference counted as a representative of his region), an elected Chairman, the two vice-Chairmen, and the Rapporteur of the session of the Conference of Ministers. There was a provision that no country would have more than one member. The Executive Committee whose chairman is also the Chairman of the Conference of Ministers convenes at least two times a year and if necessary in extra-ordinary session. Its principal task is to assist the Executive Secretary in implementing the programme and the resolutions of the Commission and to "reinforce by means of regular consultations, with the secretariat of the OAU the cordial relations existing between that Organization and the Commission."

3. Technical Committee of Experts. The task of the Technical Committee is not only to provide technical advice to the Conference but also to "ensure active contact" between the ECA secretariat and the "working level of competent officials" among the member states, and to present reports on such matters to the Conference of Ministers. It meets once a year, and always just before the biennial Conference of Ministers.

The Secretariat itself, with its 400 odd personnel among whom about 120 are professionals, takes charge of the overall administration of the Commission and the concrete organization of the conferences. It is responsible for the diffusion of information to the delegates between the sessions and for keeping them on tap about the activities of the Commission. It translates the speeches, sends out reports, keeps the archives and the accounts. French and English are the two official languages of the Commission and all speeches and publications appear in those two languages.

The resolutions of the 9th session called for more powers for the Commission by means of decentralization and delegation of the UN administrative authority, assigning to the Executive Secretary the responsibility to participate in all international meetings which touch on African problems. It also "affirmed the political and policy-making supremacy of the OAU:"

The special Committees and working groups which operate between sessions have a more specialized function according to a resolution adopted at the 7th session of the Commission. Their members, appointed by the Chairman, are assigned to tasks which to date include inter-African Commerce; inter-African monetary and payments affairs; industry and natural resources; transport and telecommunication; agriculture; economic integration; labour and training.

Although the ECA is committed to the pursuit of African integration on a broad front in which small- and medium-scale industry producing in the first instance for national market, as well as agriculture, would play a major part for some time to come, it has en-
dorsed, by and large, the arguments that lay stress on the development of large-scale industry in Africa as the main avenue to rapid economic development. There are of course good reasons for the continuing emphasis on the modernisation of the rural sector and the area of small- and medium-scale industry. Given the high figures in Africa of import of manufactured goods and the extremely low level of domestic output of such goods and also given the fact that these manufactured goods usually include consumer goods such as processed food, tobacco, textiles and beverages, it seems to be a reasonable strategy for the purposes of creating employment, substituting the imports, and expanding the market, to concentrate in the first place on such small- and middle-scale industries by which these goods are produced. This also requires the expansion of the agricultural sector as a further impetus to industrialization. Moreover the substitution of these imports by domestic products releases considerable amount of foreign exchange which may be invested in essential capital goods thereby further promoting industrialization. However there is a limit to the rate of expansion of this process. Textiles, for example, no longer command a rapidly expanding market in Africa. This follows the common tendency for the elasticities of demand for the new products of the small- and medium-scale industry to start off very high and taper off rapidly. By contrast the elasticities of demand for the products of large-scale industry tend to remain high over a longer period. Furthermore, higher productivity in agriculture requires heavy input in machinery and capital goods. Finally, the full benefits of external economies - which arise when the operation of one industry cheapens or facilitates the establishment or operation of another - do not come readily to small- and medium-scale industries. In order to attain these important "growing points", investment in large-scale industry is of the essence.  

As the ECA report points out:

"Real industrial growth depends primarily on stimulating activity at a number of growth points. This means the installing now of modern industries strategic for economic development, with their growth effects. It has been shown that such industries are mainly large-scale with a minimum size which, although smaller than is the case in the industrialized countries, is still considerable and beyond the scope of existing or foreseeable national markets."

For these reasons, the ECA, since 1962, has undertaken a number of studies on the feasibility of large-scale industries based on a sub-regional approach. (The ECA, being a UN organ, regards Africa as a global region, other subsidiary demarcations in Africa are therefore designated as sub-regions.) Two important considerations are responsible for this approach. Firstly, it was considered that the continent was too large and heterogenous to offer any chances of
success for an attempt at a continental approach at a blow. This seemed also to be the general inclination of African states based on political consideration. Secondly the very small size of many African countries makes it necessary, for the creation of large markets, to combine efforts based as much as possible on contiguity and economic, human and historical homogeneity. The four sub-regions demarcated by the ECA for the carrying out of schemes of multinational cooperation are as follows: (See Map, Fig. 15.1)

1. North Africa (with headquarters in Tangier (Morocco).)
2. West Africa (with headquarters in Niamey (Niger).)
3. Central Africa (with headquarters in Kinshasa (Zaire).)
4. East Africa (with headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia).)

Fig. 15.1 The ECA sub-regions
The reports given by the ECA Industrial Co-ordination Missions in 1964 showed that there existed an immense industrial potential on which the scheme of multinational cooperation could be based. But at the same time there was evidence of extensive duplication in the industrial efforts of the African countries and a good deal of waste regarding investment. A few examples will illustrate the position in 1964. Algeria was constructing a 500,000 ton integrated iron and steel works while Tunisia, close by, was building a smaller integrated works of 70,000 tons at considerably higher costs. Morocco had plans for another complex of a similar capacity. In East and Central Africa, Uganda and Zambia were planning electric steelworks with capacities of between 80,000 and 100,000 tons. But Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was already producing 350,000 tons of pig iron with a steel capacity of 150,000 tons. And both the pig iron and steel production were due for expansion. It was estimated that in the case of East and Central Africa, by proper co-ordination, the three countries could meet the needs of the whole sub-region. On the basis of such findings the Missions came forward with various recommendations aimed at effecting rational international specialization. For instance, in the North African sub-region the abundant supplies of natural gas in Algeria would be a base for a single ammonia plant located in Algeria which would supply Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Also, the vast amounts of petroleum in Algeria could provide for a petro-chemical industry as well as for a wide range of plastics and synthetic rubber which could cover the needs of the continent and overseas markets. Similarly, phosphates from Morocco, could supply the needs of the continent for phosphatic fertilisers as well as compete effectively in the world market.

Steel industry was thought to be most promising in the West African sub-region. A large plant in either Nigeria or Liberia, both of which possess the necessary natural resources would provide for the needs of the sub-region, supplemented by smaller additional plants in Mali for example. It could also supply semi-finished steel to smaller rolling mills situated in different countries of the sub-region. Abundance of natural gas and cheap electric power could provide the basis in this sub-region for the development of basic chemicals and fertilizers:

"In West Africa the main elements are: a nitrogen complex in Nigeria, the principal end-products being ammonium sulphate fertiliser and industrial explosives; single super-phosphate in Togo, and triple super-phosphate in Senegal; a salt electrolysis complex in Ghana; polyvinyl chloride in the Ivory Coast; and calcium carbide in Dahomey and Guinea."

These examples can be multiplied: Ghana's cheap and abundant power could effectively be combined with bauxite from Guinea to
yield considerable returns in the manufacture of aluminium from transforming alumina into metal. More rational planning, standardization and co-ordination in the assembly of motor vehicles, both private and commercial, would make for substantial cost reduction. By 1964, there was already considerable wastage of resources in this area notably in the Maghreb. The same goes for the textile industries which have been sprouting up in different parts of the sub-regions.

Of course, despite their cogent rational basis, many of these recommendation were not heeded in the coming years. What, then, were the salient problems in the way of African economic cooperation even on a modest sub-regional basis? It can be said right at the outset that although many of the problems which militate against a smooth and rational pursuit of economic cooperation are economic, the basic and overriding problem concerns the political context in which these strivings are carried on. To take industrialization first, it is evident from experiences in other parts of the world that the rational planning of industrial production in regional areas is always liable to produce inequalities given the marked differences in the competitive power of the component states. This leads the weaker states to resist any attempt at economic integration in which the long-term benefits for them are offset by relative short-term stagnation. In Africa, this point becomes more crucial since industry, largely in foreign hands, tends to be located in proven and established parts thereby increasing the relative threat of such projects to the poorer areas. This means that in building up economic cooperation in developing areas like Africa the political problem of an equitable share-out becomes more intractable than in advanced industrial areas. Under these circumstances, new industries are located to such proven areas even if other places might be preferable on purely rational grounds. Very often this presents a hard political nut to crack.

Conventional theory endorses the efficacy, in advanced industrialized regions, of meeting this problem by the simple measure of customs union the effect of a customs union being either trade creation or trade diversion. Trade creation ensues when a member of the union is forced to replace its high cost production of particular commodities with imports of such goods from other members of the union at lower costs. If, however, a member is forced by a customs union to replace low-cost external purchases of a particular commodity with high-cost purchases from other members, trade diversion is said to have taken place. It is evident from the above that a customs union will normally favour regions in which there is already a considerable amount of trade between the members and in which the products are competitive but potentially complementary and where only a small proportion of total expenditure is on external trade.
The African area does not meet these requirements. Industrial products are few and are mostly purchased externally. A customs union more often than not means the replacement of low-cost external purchases by high-cost products of infant industries. Although it is true that customs union is nonetheless potentially beneficial to African states by causing the creation of new industries leading to economic development, the fact of the effects of the switch from low-cost imports to high-cost domestic or regional products gives rise to a certain inertia.

This tendency is demonstrated in the area of transportation. Even though the long-term effects of development of transport facilities between African countries are beneficial, the short-term effect is to impose vast additional costs far in excess sometimes of the cost of importing from abroad.

As far as agriculture is concerned the problem in the EEC (also recognized by the EFTA countries by their shelving of it) shows that even advanced industrialized countries are loath to leave their agricultural interest to the mercy of market forces. Even more so in African countries their high dependence on agriculture makes it unattractive to expose that sector to the vagaries of competition especially when the standards of living are so low that any further falls would plunge them to catastrophic levels.

For these reasons measures such as a free trade area, falling short of economic union, although they may be beneficial in advanced industrialized areas, may well constitute only half measures in the African context. For a preferential access to the regional market, in other words a market forged behind the walls of an economic union, is a *sine qua non* if the newly allocated industries can be operated without the alternative recourse of importing from cheaper areas. African states wishing to attain economic integration must therefore, it seems, go the whole hog or retain the status quo which implies the attachment to overseas industries and markets. A decade ago, it was customary for economic analysts to affirm that African countries, by reason of the paucity of their industrialized sector, have a great scope for integrating new small-scale and medium-scale industries. However, today the industrial landscape is substantially altered. After nearly two decades of duplicated 'national' plans all over the continent, there is now a considerable number of such small- and medium-scale industries, aimed at *national* import substitution and which increase the resistance to multinational cooperation.

The difficulties in operating a customs union or even a common tariff system have been repeated very often especially in respect of landlocked areas and commodities which are reconsigned from the countries into which they were originally imported, causing difficulties in the estimation of the value of the transfers of such imported
goods and in the payment of customs revenue to the country of final consumption. "These arrangements are liable always to be a matter of controversy, with the inland country believing that it does not receive its fair share of revenue from customs duties."

Again, there is a perennial hazard that attends all so-called laissez-faire unions. Open to the free-play of market forces it has been pointed out that the poorer members tend to lose, at least in the short run. By contrast, in the so-called 'regulated' unions it is possible to introduce measures and mechanisms to rectify these inequities. But this would presuppose a far-reaching surrender of sovereignties. Says one writer: "As it turns out, therefore, the difficulties of economic and of political integration are fundamentally the same. They both require a surrender of political autonomy."

And this, as we demonstrated in our foregoing political analysis, is what most African countries are loath to do. And as we shall see in the case of East Africa, differences in the forms of government and their political philosophies tend to accentuate this problem.

Another factor which sharpens the political problem is the large number of states concerned with the attempts at economic integration in Africa. It has been argued sometimes that economic integration is easier between many than between few states since the strains and stresses in such a union tend to be more widely distributed thus lessening the possibilities for confrontation. By contrast, a union composed of few states is conducive, it is believed, to the concentration of discontent leading to uncontrollable fissures. It may well be that integration once achieved is easier to regulate when it is between many states. It is not as evident however that integration, for that reason, is easier to establish among so many states. Experience has rather shown that political affinity is more readily found among few states. For the same reason, such states are usually able to strike a swift bargain. The bargaining process between many states, jealous of their sovereignty, usually tends to be protracted, the unions they achieve are often only on loose platforms, and their regulation progresses usually on the basis of a low profile and slow rather than rapid onward march. Perhaps this is why such unions can linger on in a moribund state in which smaller unions would long have disintegrated. These reasonings will however remain speculations until they are finally substantiated or disproved empirically. Still it is difficult to believe that the fact of the large number of African states is not a stumbling block on the path of integration if only because it offers a wider scope for the operation of the theory of n-person games - the theory of coalitions!

In fact, there is evidence of powerful varieties of such coalitions in the combinations among English-speaking and French-speaking African countries which cut across the neat demarcations on which
the ECA's subregional programme is based. We have followed the impact of these combinations on the history of political cooperation. Their effect is no less in the economic field. Equally they stem from the colonial system. The Common Services which linked the English-speaking states in West and East Africa had their counterparts in the economic unions under the tutelage of France in the AEF (Afrique Equatoriale Francaise) and the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Francaise.) After independence the deep impact of French culture on the habits, methods and ways of thinking of the elites of French-speaking African countries has been manifested in the close attachment to France of post-independent political and economic institutions, aimed at multinational cooperation in those areas. Only Guinea, in 1958, after her negative vote in the referendum was kept out of this Community. France concluded multilateral agreements like the defence treaty with Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Niger in 1961; the Convention of Cooperation with twelve French-speaking states for the control of business and insurance activities in 1962; and the agreement with the members of the West African monetary union. There were also a great many bilateral agreements aimed at harmonization of policies and common procedure. The system of technical assistance by France extended to providing a large force of French civil servants to man the administration and educational systems of these countries. The "transactions accounts" system obviated the necessity for these countries to put their balance of payments in equilibrium. "France," one writer has said, "provided the method, the common fund of ideas, the experts, and the finance."  

We have seen how the political developments in Africa, among other reasons, led to the formation of the Entente and Brazzaville groups together with their extensions in the economic sphere - the OAMCE and later the UAMCE and others. Others include the UDEAC (Union Dutariere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale) and UDE (Union Dutariere Equatoriale) of Equatorial Africa. But the kernel of the problem of division between the francophone and anglophone African states has been, until recently, in their relationships with the EEC. Originally the French-speaking African states were linked to the European Organization under the special provisions of the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957. These included a sharing of preferential customs policy, a privileged market and financial aid for the African states concerned. No doubt France, which at the time retained direct control of the colonies concerned, saw in these provisions a means of sharing the costs of running her dependent territories at the same time as they conserved her influence. For the same reason many of her EEC partners were not so enarmed with this arrangement despite the fact that it opened the market of French-speaking Africa to them. Apart from a 581 million dollar fund set up for a period of five years for purposes of in-
vestment aid, there was a provision for the principle of non-discrimination in the establishment of nationals and companies of the six EEC countries in the associated territories. Of the eighteen African countries which associated themselves with this treaty, fourteen were former French colonies. The others were the dependent territories of Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.

True it is that the Treaty of Rome affirmed the right of the associated states to 'levy such custom duties as are necessitated by their need of development and industrialism or are of a special nature and are intended to contribute to their budget.' Furthermore, the Convention provided for the possibility of the formation of unions or free trade areas between the associated states and third countries 'insofar as they neither are nor prove incompatible with the principle and provisions of the said Convention.' But of what avail were these provisions in view of the fact of the basic inequalities both in the political power of the parties and their economic influence. Besides, a special most-favoured-nation clause in the Treaty seriously curtailed the effect of these provisions. Finally, how was incompatibility to be defined? For these reasons the association of the African states to the Treaty of Rome came in for severe criticism. It was contended that the Treaty's provisions on trade were inimical to African interest by its negative impact on the access of other non-associated African states to the EEC market bearing in mind that the African states produced virtually the same range of commodities. The EEC Secretariat put the position in a nutshell:

"Unlikely as it may be that (the EEC partners) would regard a general rising of protective tariffs in the associated states as being in harmony with the spirit of the Rome Treaty, it is even less likely that they would tolerate discrimination against them in favour of African countries. The preferential arrangements of the Rome Treaty will tend to preserve and even strengthen the traditional features of African trade, namely the concentration on industrialized markets to the exclusion of any significant trade flows between the various monetary zones of the continent... There is therefore a danger that the Rome Treaty may tempt (the Associated States) to prefer the short-run advantage of tariff concessions (in the EEC markets) to the long-run gains of industrial development."

That these objections were justified was partly demonstrated when the Associated French-speaking states initially opposed the association of other English-speaking territories - a factor which, as we saw, occasioned diplomatic problems between Nigeria and the Brazzaville states. More than that, the EEC inevitably became drawn into the issue and for a time became an arena for contention on this and other issues, between the francophone and anglophone African states. During this time, for example, the French-speaking
countries made much of what they considered the domination of the ECA secretariat by English-speaking Africans - a charge which was justified to a certain extent.

The Community had decided that the initial period of association would continue for five years 'jusqu'à nouvel ordre.' In July, 1963, a new Convention was signed in Yaoundé. In general the Yaoundé Convention did not differ radically from the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. However, five institutions of note were created: (1) the Association Council and (2) the Association Committee in which the European and Associate states were each represented, (3) a Secretariat staffed equally from the Associated and original EEC signatories (4) a Parliamentary Conference composed of equal numbers of members of the EEC Assembly and members of parliament of the Associated States and (5) a Court of Arbitration composed of a President and four judges two appointed by the Associated states and two from the Council of Ministers of the EEC. Like the Treaty of Rome the Yaoundé Convention included provision for unions between the Associated states and also for the protection of the infant industries in these states even within a regional grouping. But, with the exception of border trade, preferences given by any Associated State to a third country could not be denied the members of the Community. Like the Rome Treaty, the Yaoundé Convention stated that the establishment of a customs union or a free-trade area between Associated states was allowed only as far as they were not incompatible with the principles of the Convention.

A certain measure of benefits accrued to the Associated States during the duration of this Convention. For example, the Development Fund projects, financed very often by grants instead of loans, have stimulated the economies of these states to a certain extent. But the method of administration of this fund by a central EEC organ under the direct surveillance of the European states has been subjected to hard criticism. But the strongest objections were voiced regarding the tendency of the Convention to perpetuate the difference between French-speaking and English-speaking Africa. Of the 18 Associated Members to the Yaoundé Convention 17 were French-speaking.14 "Yaoundé," it was said, "bore the mark of Paris." Other African states felt likewise. In September 1962 the Premier of Tanganyika Rashidi Kawawa had said:

"It is obvious that if we join the Community we should cement ourselves to the Western bloc. Further, we believe that our association with the Community will be against the possibility of the promotion of African unity, which we highly value."

Much has been made about the difficulties, especially at the early stages between the EEC and the OAU. Only the general aspects of it need detain us here. It must be borne in mind, however, in consi-
dering this question that while the OAU is an African political Organization which claims jurisdiction over all aspects, including economic, of cooperation on the continent, the ECA is a United Nations organ and is financed from the funds of the UN. Besides, many of the early controversies between the ECA and OAU relate to the teething problems of the OAU - the tussle with the jealous jingoistic attitudes of some African states at the beginning, the groupings on the political scene, border disputes, political reconciliation between African states, but above all the attempts to entrench the OAU as an Organization, at a time when the Organization, despite the creation of the Economic and Technical Commission relied almost entirely on the ECA for action and information in the economic sphere. As we saw, the OAU went out for Organizational supremacy over all other influences on the continent. Such tendencies coupled with weakness always make for administrative difficulties. The ECA has also enjoyed great, although by no means affluent, resources in contrast with the OAU which has had to operate on relatively tight budgets and salary-scales for its staff. It is probably misguided, therefore, to lay the blame for the problems between the two Organizations primarily at the door of their respective Secretary-Generals in the crucial years, as some authors have strongly insinuated. Indeed the contrary might be true. Two international officers of the first calibre at the head of both of these Organizations, fully alive to the problems facing their respective spheres albeit with varying emphasis - and commanding an unflattering loyalty to the well-being of the continent, these were essentially the reasons why the rapport between the two Organizations grew from problematic to effective and even cordial, instead of the other way round. It is significant that the conclusions about the personality clashes of these two illustrious figures are based largely on surmises and deductions and not on any statements they have ever made about themselves. It must be remembered also that it is the same states which constitute the memberships of the two Organizations. What could be more natural than that their political and economic problems would be carried into each others affairs. One example of how these two spheres were always liable to dovetail is the fact that the regional demarcations of the ECA based on economic logic, cut across the political and economic combinations of e.g. the UAM/OCAM states by placing them into three separate ECA subregions! As long as there remains an ambivalence, among the African states, between political goals and the economic goals of unity, these problems will no doubt abide. Meanwhile attempts have been made to strengthen the ties between the two Organizations and to clarify their relationship. Apart from the ECA reforms of 1969 which we have mentioned the resolution setting up the Executive Committee of the ECA states that "the African ministers
assembled under the ECA should constantly inspire the directives of the Conference of Heads of state and government of the OAU." It adds "The reports on the activities of the ECA shall regularly be submitted for examination by the Conference of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU in order that the Commission may benefit from their necessary political support."

The ECA and OAU have a strong legacy of cooperation on important African issues. Two momentous occasions will suffice here to illustrate this. The meeting of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) from March 23 to June 16, 1964, in Geneva, and the subsequent emergence of the so-called Group 77, constituted a landmark in the history of international affairs. To adapt the comment in *Jeune Afrique*, the Group 77 is "...to the Third World what trade unionists are to the workers: an avant-garde force which organizes the solidarity of the underprivileged class and poses the demands of this class to the haves." The report of the new Secretary-General of UNCTAD Raúl Prebisch - of the ECLA fame - foreshadowed the attitude of the ECA. Prebisch remarked, not for the first time, the "persistent tendency towards external imbalance associated with the development process." He recommended that "for the technical discussion to be profitable, it must be preceeded by a political decision of the first importance, namely, a decision to transfer one way or another, to the countries exporting primary commodities the extra income accruing to the industrial countries as a result of the deterioration in the terms of trade... In other words, compensatory operations must be an integral part of a more rational policy for financing development." The ambitious, and optimistic demands, in view of subsequent developments, advanced in this report included "easy access to the markets of the developed world of both the primary products and the manufactured goods... of the underdeveloped nations; the maintenance of commodity prices, low priority on research for substitutes for primary products, compensatory schemes for over-all financial fluctuations, expansion of aid and easier terms of payment, and development of trade within the underdeveloped world and between it and Communist nations."

Both the OAU and ECA adopted by and large the same stance. The ECA Addis Ababa meeting of February 28, 1964, in which a coordinating committee was set up for the UNCTAD Conference also invited the OAU to service this Committee of African States. Almost at the same time, the OAU Council of Ministers, gathered in Lagos between February 24 to 29, recommended the formation of a working party of African states for the UNCTAD conference. The result of this cooperation between the OAU and ECA in the marked influence of the African states among the so-called Group 77, is now history and, at the time of writing, is still wending its tortuous revo-

The original association to the EEC by the French-speaking African states had met with serious criticism not least of all from the ECA. The expiration of the Yaounde Convention in 1972 coincided with the enlargement of the EEC in the same year by the admission of Britain into the Community. This brought to the forefront the question of the fate of Commonwealth countries who had operated under special arrangements that included the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and the Commonwealth preference. A new arrangement with the EEC seemed to be indicated. The negotiations on these matters which began in October 1973, proved to be long-drawn. It was not until February 28, 1975, that the Lomé Convention was signed. Meanwhile, the oil crisis coupled with the growing consciousness of the merits of collective bargaining among the producers of raw materials provided the shifting background which the negotiators were obliged to take into account. More importantly, two factors came to assume a crucial role in these events. Firstly, in May 1973, the OAU set out eight principles to guide these negotiations and despite the fact that the OAU Secretariat ran into the compact opposition of the European EEC states as well as the francophone African states, the principles formulated by the OAU became the accepted basis for the negotiations and the principle of collective bargaining for all African states won the day. Secondly, with the joining of the Commonwealth Caribbean and Pacific states in the talks on the side of the Africans the bargaining power of the ACP (African Caribbean and Pacific) states was immensely increased. Where the Yaounde Convention included 18, mostly francophone African countries, the Lomé Convention was signed by 46 ACP countries as follows:

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<th>Bahamas</th>
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<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Congo</td>
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<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Niger</td>
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The European countries were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.
A few aspects of the new Convention are worthy of note. Perhaps the most revolutionary idea in the Lomé treaty is that implicit in the new system for compensating fluctuations in the earnings of export commodities from the ACP members. It is a commonplace that raw materials are particularly susceptible to such fluctuations caused either by bad harvest or slump in world market prices. The Lomé Convention singles out 12 such commodities: Cocoa, palm oil, groundnuts, tea, cotton, coffee, wood, bananas, hides and skins, coconuts, sisal and iron ore. By the provisions of the so-called STABEX system those ACP countries whose export earning depend up to 7.5 per cent or more (in the case of the poorer signatories the figure is 2.5 per cent) on any one of these 12 commodities are entitled to compensation if their earnings fall below a certain agreed level. Like the Yaoundé Convention before it, the Lomé agreement encloses a "non-reciprocity" clause by which the ACP states may withhold trading preferences from the EEC while the EEC members bind themselves to provide such advantages to the ACP countries. Furthermore, the new Convention creates considerable scope for industrial cooperation between the two parties with promises from the EEC states for the transfer of technological know-how, programmes for industrial training as well as help in the promotion of ACP products in the EEC markets. Finally, the ACP countries have access to the EDF (European Development Fund) to the tune of 460 million dollars.

It may appear from the above that the odds in the Convention are heavily loaded on the side of the ACP states. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the compact and longstanding advantages on the part of the EEC countries, residing in their control, in the present economic set-up, of not only the financial and commodity markets but the vital area of the export of industrial and capital goods, far outweigh the incipient advantages implied in the treaty and which have yet to be proven in practice. A glaring example of this was the oil crisis in which the recycling of the petroleum money seemed in the end to operate in favour of the same industrialized states whose position had been thought precarious. The UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi proved if anything that the Lomé Convention was not a watertight guarantee that the EEC countries would be amenable to demands by the developing countries for equitability in international economic dealings. At that Conference, Western Germany and Britain blocked the attempts to set up a Common Fund for the stabilization of commodity prices. In 1976, the percentage of EEC budget earmarked for development aid fell from 4 to 0.8. Some controversy seems also to have arisen over the practical application of the STABEX scheme. It appears that when some ACP countries have been seen to increase their home demand of their raw material products in order to meet the demands of industrialization or
when they process such raw materials (such as groundnuts into oil-cake) in order to increase the value of their exports, the EEC countries have shown an unwillingness to put the STABEX scheme into operation to compensate for falling earnings. To be sure, this situation offers a tough juridical and economic problem. Nevertheless the development is tendentious in the sense that its logical conclusion might well turn out to be a disincentive to industrialization.

The most salient aspect of the Lomé Convention from the point of view of the ACP states is the fact that their assiduous and laudable pursuit of the advantages of collective bargaining among raw material producers has produced one of the most remarkable changes in thinking which promises to take the world beyond the threshold of the new economic order. That fact might well turn out in the end to be eminently more advantageous for these states than all the hopes that reside in the Development Fund scraped out, none too cordially, from the affluence of an unamenable economic system. The bitter tug-of-war that preceded the Sugar Agreement under the Lomé Convention, demonstrated that there is still a long way to go and that the Lomé Convention must remain simply an earnest of the beginnings of a new willingness to buy and sell on a fair basis. By the terms of the Convention the EEC states had bound themselves to import 1.3 metric tons of sugar from the ACP states at a guaranteed minimum price subject to negotiations to be concluded before May 1 each year. The 1976 negotiations were broken off owing to failure to agree. It was not until June 5 that the Agreement was finally signed. The ACP countries were demanding 27.5 units of account per ton (1 unit US = 1.15) whereas the EEC countries were offering 25.53 units of account per ton. The 26.7 units per ton at which it was finally fixed represented 4.6 per cent increase on the 1975 price and compares unfavourably with 8 per cent increase achieved by the European sugar beet producers or the 25.2 per cent increase received by refiners. It also compares most unfavourably with the estimated average increase of 26 per cent in the price of manufactured goods imported from the EEC by the ACP countries. The irritation caused by this state of affairs can be gauged from the remarks of Wills, the Guyanese Minister at the negotiations, who characterized the EEC policy as "indistinguishable from the callous colonialism that preceded the Lomé Convention." The search for equity continues. "We are all committed to working out a dynamic relationship," declared the Jamaican Minister of Trade P.J. Patterson, "that marks a fresh landmark in a new international order. To succeed, it must be firmly based on principles of partnership and mutual respect. It cannot be based on charity and mendicancy..."
How is this new-found unity among the African Caribbean and Pacific states going to affect African cooperation? The question might justifiably be put differently in these days of enhanced awareness of the so-called "producer power" among the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. How, indeed, might the increasing cohesion among the countries of these continents in UNCTAD, OPEC, and North-South dialogue be expected to influence African integration? There is good reason, in principle, to envisage a situation in which continued cohesion and success of these inter-continental organs of cooperation might detract from the commitment of the Africans to their own Organizations. As Wallerstein suggests, "The more such alliances any one state is meaningfully involved in, the less total must be its commitment to any one given alliance." However, in practice, this has not become the case. And it need not surprise us either. African problems, as we saw, have at the same time preoccupied the African countries. If anything, the developments in Southern Africa promise to engage the overriding loyalty of the African states in the years to come. In such a situation the manifestations in Africa, the Caribbean, Pacific, Asia and Latin America must be seen for what they are - a renascence among the peoples of those continents, which may merely reinforce instead of detract from their particular commitments.

Robert Gardiner once said that the ECA has become a sort of "brain center" in economic matters for the whole of the African continent. That is indeed the impression conveyed by the wide scope of activities that the ECA has undertaken since 1962. These cover the fields of industry, energy, commerce finance, transport and telecommunication and development of human resources. The ECA also co-operates widely with several United Nations Organizations such as WHO (World Health Organisation) FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation) and ILO (International Labour Organization) whose activities stretch over the African continent. One of the most epoch-making institutions created at the instance of the ECA is the ADB (African Development Bank). Following a decision taken in 1962 at the fourth session of the ECA (the OAU also approved the idea subsequently), the bank was set up on the 10th of September 1964. The board of governors is composed of one representative from each member state and the President has been the Tunisian M. Abdewahab Labidi. The aim of the bank is to promote public and private investments in Africa according priority to multinational projects of economic development. The bank is situated in Abidjan Ivory Coast. Its authorized capital in 1976 is 500 million dollars.
contributed by the member states according to a system based on their national income and population. In 1975, the loans granted by the bank stood at 103 million dollars towards 28 development projects in various African states. Since 1964, when it was instituted its cumulative loans commitment have amounted to 316 million dollars excluding 8 million in equity investments. 99 projects spread over 34 states have benefited from these loans. The 1975 loans were distributed as in Fig. 15.2.

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<td>Transport infrastructure</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 15.2 ADB LOANS 1975: Distribution

An associated body to the ADB is the ADF (African Development Fund) opened in 1974. This body issues loans mainly towards agricultural projects (making up for the low percentage in Fig. 15.2). Its loans in 1974 totalled 60 million dollars granted to 17 African countries. The bank has received funds through bilateral aid agencies, governments, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) which made a grant of 1.5 million dollars in 1974, and voluntary contributions by African states. The ADB has also issued bonds worth 20 million dollars of which the Nigerian government has bought a quarter (5 million dollars). An African Solidarity Fund set up in 1975 by the Nigerian Government together with the ADB, has provided additional funds, so have contributions by two European governments - Sweden and Austria. The Austrian government has given a loan of 2 million dollars. The Swedish loan is to the tune of 6 million dollars repayable over a period of 50 years with 0.75 per cent service charge. On June 26, 1975, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia, mobilized 375 million dollars to finance development projects during a three-year period on concessional terms. The Algerian government has also set up a 20 million dollar oil trust fund - which the ADB administers - to meet part of the increased oil
expenditures of African states.* Finally the Nigerian Federal Government set up in 1976, a Nigeria Trust Fund. This 80 million dollar fund is to be administered by the ADB according to the general aims of that bank but with an eye to "especially those member countries of the bank which are relatively less developed or most seriously affected by unpredictable catastrophies, including adverse international economic events."

The ADB has every prospect of becoming a vitalizing influence on the continent in the attempt to hasten economic development. The recent institution of the ARC (African Reinsurance Corporation) by the ADB and 32 African governments (signed in Yaoundé on February 24, 1976), is worthy of note. The Corporation, with an authorized capital of 15 million dollars, aims at transacting reinsurance business in Africa and abroad, investment geared towards the promotion of continental economic development, and providing technical assistance to African insurance institutions. In view of the fact that there is an estimated annual revenue outflow from Africa of 350 million dollars to pay for the services of the international insurance industry, this is a wholesome development.

The ECA has also played a prominent role in the development of an African telecommunication network. From its early days that organ had stressed the importance of the development of such a network. In 1962 the ITU (International Telecommunications Union) had sponsored a meeting of the African Plan Sub-Committee attended by twenty-six African countries. The Committee itself had been drawn up in 1960 by the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee and the International Radio Consultative Committee. It proceeded to map out a plan for linking African countries by telephone and telegraph. The basic problem, inherited from colonial times, was of course that the networks which existed in Africa were linked directly with the countries in Europe which happened to have control over the colonial territory concerned. It was common for neighbouring African countries not to have any telecommunications links at all and when such links existed, they passed through one or even two European cities before coming to the African neighbours. The ECA resolution of 1967 called on African governors to hasten development in this vital field. At the same time the OAU passed a similar resolution. When the Africa Plan Committee (it had now attained the status of a full-fledged Committee) met in 1971, the stage was set for a rapid improvement in this field, following various studies organized by the ITU and UNDP. The OAU Council of Ministers resolution in Addis Ababa

*In 1974 out of an arrear of 22 million dollars owed to the bank on its initial stocks, Egypt owed 17 million dollars.
in May, 1973, formed the basis for further action. The resolution paid tribute to the ECA among others and ran as follows:

"...Having considered the report of the Administrative Secretary-General on the implementation of the Pan African Telecommunications Network;

Noting with appreciation the studies completed under the auspices of the ITU and UNDP;

Gratified at the cooperation prevailing among the OAU, the ECA and the ITU in accelerating the progress for the implementation of the Pan African Telecommunication Network;

Conscious of the need for preserving the basic concept of an integrated Pan African Telecommunication Network for promoting economic and social cooperation among African States;

1. Calls upon the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, the Executive Secretary of the ECA, the Secretary-General of the ITU and the President of the African Development Bank, ADB, to continue to co-operate and to undertake the necessary measures and consultations to establish, organize, and administer the Fund;

2. Requests the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU to draw the attention of the ITU to the importance which Member States of the OAU attach to the interconnection of telecommunication networks, existing or in the process of being realised in African countries with the Pan African Telecommunication Network;

3. Urges all Member States of the OAU to give high priority to the implementation of the Pan African Telecommunication Network;

4. Calls upon the Administrative Secretary-General to maintain close and active cooperation with all the parties concerned and submit periodical reports to the Council of Ministers on the progress of the implementation of the Pan African Telecommunication Network."

This led to the creation of a Co-ordinating Committee to mobilize the financing of the projects on an African network. The Committee is composed of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, the Executive Secretary of the ECA, the President of the ADB and the Secretary-General of the ITU. PANAFTEL (Pan African Telecommunications Network) is progressing, with a projected investment of 150 million dollars financed by the ADB and grants from the World Bank and other institutions including the Arab Bank for Development in Africa.
The ECA has been behind studies intended to illuminate the urgency of improving road transportation between African states as a vital aspect of the bid for economic development on the continent. The ideas launched by the ECA include the trans-Saharan highway, and a route to traverse the whole of West Africa. The idea of an African highway introduced by the ECA in 1970 is a brainchild of Robert Gardiner’s. The route is intended to join Mombasa in the East, to Nigeria in the West, and will become part of a growing complex of road communication which it is hoped will in time criss-cross the continent. The OAU formally endorsed this idea in May 1973 in a Council of Ministers Resolution. The Trans-African Highway is planned to pursue a course of 4000 miles through Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Central African Republic, Cameroon and Nigeria and although much of it is going to pass through sparsely populated or completely uninhabited territory it is hoped that its existence will stimulate trade between the various countries concerned.

Other political influences have led to improved communications between African states. A case in point is the TAZARA railway (Uhuru Railway) opened on the 22nd October, 1975, between Tanzania and Zambia. The idea of the Uhuru (Freedom) Railway was prompted by Zambia’s precarious economic situation after Rhodesia, on whom the landlocked Zambia depended for routing her vital copper exports to the sea, declared Unilateral Independence. By creating the facilities of the TAZARA which the Chinese helped to build, the Zambians have broken the stranglehold which Rhodesia had on their economy. Similarly, although Botswana and Zambia do not share a common frontier, an 180 mile highway is being constructed to join the two countries linking Maun in north central Botswana to the Kazungula ferry across the Zambesi to Zambia. This highway named the BOTZAM was, like the TAZARA, prompted by a wish on the part of Botswana to reduce some of the isolation imposed on her by her neighbour, South Africa. The closure of the Rhodesian border in 1973, demonstrated the economic values of the highway as a means of stimulating trade between Botswana and her northern neighbour.

The abiding contribution of the ECA in Africa’s quest for economic development and cooperation lies in the large body of studies on African economy which the organ has produced. It has turned out numerous statistical studies of the different parts of the continent as well as of other vital areas like demography, national accounts and cartography including in-depth studies of the structure of the economy of each African state. Three centres were set up for the training of statisticians and demographers. The Institute of Development and Planning based in Dakar is an important and effective arm in these strivings. More especially, the existence of this body of studies by the ECA from an African point of view has been inva-
luable in canalizing and making more effective, the operations on
the African continent of the UN and its other organs.

We now turn to that other pillar on which the ECA concept of
development is based - namely regionalism - or in ECA terminology,
sub-regionalism. We noted earlier how the ECA subdivided the
continent into four regions - North, West, East and Central Africa.
(see Fig. 15.1). This concept which is in tune with the OAU’s idea of
functionalism on a regional basis has been promoted by the ECA for
well over a decade now. What has been the course of this policy?
Here again, we take two examples which we analyse in greater detail.

East African economic cooperation.

The East African experience of economic integration, dating
back to colonial days, has both been projected as an example worth
emulating for other African states, and has formed the cornerstone
of the few analyses of integration theories applied to the African
continent. Joseph Nye has written a major work on the subject and
Hansen, Segal and Haas among others have, to varying extents, dis­
cussed this experiment. Particularly the East African Community,
formed in 1967 at the end of the labours of a Commission on East
African Cooperation under ostensible expert advise from the ECA
and the chairmanship of the Danish Professor Kjeld Philip, has
been the subject of by and large favourable comments which have
nevertheless turned sour in recent months.

But, to begin from the beginning, a common market already
existed between Uganda and Kenya under colonial rule beginning
from 1917 when free trade was established between the two countri¬
es. Tanganyika joined this arrangement progressively between 1922
and 1927. During this period, as remained the case until 1966, the
three territories operated under a common currency issued by the
East African Currency Board. In 1948, following certain reforms
by the British government in the interterritorial administration of
the three East African colonies, an East African High Commission
was set up. The Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika
made up the Commission. There was a Secretariat with its seat in
Nairobi composed of an Administrator, Post Master General, Legal
and Financial Secretaries, and Commissioners for Transport and
Customs. Finally there was a Central Legislative Assembly. Al­
though the Assembly enacted laws, its sphere of operation was cir­
cumscribed since it could only legislate on a list of subjects stipulat­
ed in the Order in Council under which it was set up.

Tanganyika (Tanzania) became independent in 1961 and Uganda
and Kenya followed in 1962 and 1963 respectively. The approaching
independence of the three territories had called for certain changes.
The Raisman Commission which examined the possibilities for
changes in the structure of the existing arrangements with a view to preserving economic cooperation, came up with certain recommendations which led to the setting up in 1961, at the same time as Tanganyikan independence, of the EACSO (East African Common Services Organization.) It was this authority that was superseded by the East African Common Market formed in 1967. The EACSO consisted of an Executive authority composed by the Presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition there were four Ministerial Committees dealing with Communications, Finance, Commercial and Industrial Co-ordination, and Social and Research Services. It had its headquarters in Nairobi and under its provisions the railway systems of the three states were amalgamated as well as the customs and excise administrations. The co-ordination extended to the postal and to various research services. At independence the populations of the three East African countries stood as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9,104,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>10,310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7,367,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bearing in mind the degree of interterritorial trade which already existed between the three countries the total population of 27 million presented an East African market by far bigger than the market offered individually by any of the three territories. Particularly in the case of Kenya and Tanzania, geography played a crucial part in this state of affairs. Tanzanian mainland has a large area in the centre which is virtually desert and the mutual access to the national markets on the periphery was therefore seriously hampered. There was therefore brisk commercial activity between the northern parts and the bordering areas in Kenya. Also, between Kenya and Uganda, the much more severe unemployment problem in the former country coupled with the distinctive attitude towards commerce of the Bugandans in Uganda, attracted much Kenyan labour force to Uganda. Manufacturing industry was more advanced in Kenya than in the two other territories. The figures were, in Kenya about 10 per cent of the GDP, as opposed to 4 per cent in Uganda and Tanzania. In the monetary sector the corresponding figures were 13 per cent for Kenya and 6 per cent for Uganda and Tanzania. Much of Kenyan products found their markets in the whole of East Africa. According to the 1963 Census of Industrial Production in Kenya, about 20 per cent of Kenya's industrial output was sold in the rest of East Africa.

Much has been made of the lead which Kenya enjoys in industrial manufacture in the East African context. In fact, the other countries possessed marked advantages in agriculture where their total high-quality agricultural land far exceeded that of Kenya, as was to be seen by the greater earnings from agricultural exports from Uganda and Tanzania. Tanzanian diamonds and Ugandan copper represented further advantages over Kenya in natural resour-
ces. The higher average income in Kenya was attributed to the large number of non-Africans resident in Kenya.

Output per head 1964 figures ( )

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was much to unite these three states (see Fig. 15.3). The close similarities in their commercial laws and practices facilitated trade. A considerable network of roads and jointly run railways and harbours reduced the otherwise customary restricting influence to trade between African states of inadequate transport. Citizens of the three states could cross each others borders without a passport and take up jobs in each other’s territories without restrictions. English and Swahili were extensively used as the major means of communication in the three territories.

The most significant result of the Raisman recommendations was the setting up between the three East African states of the Distributable Pool. The main aim was to create an independent source of revenue for the common services which included the Customs and Excise and Income Tax Departments, the Central Legislative Assembly, the SecretaryGenerals’ Office, and various research and technical services. A further aim of the Distributable Pool was, according to the Commission, to effect a measure of “inter-territorial redistribution of income, offsetting in some degree the inequalities in the benefits derived...” This arrangement began in the 1961-62 financial year. It provided that 6 per cent of customs and excise income and 40 per cent of the returns from “income tax charged to companies on profits arising from manufacturing and finance” should be paid into a Distributable Pool. The cost of collecting the revenue was to be shared between the territories concerned and the Distributable Pool in proportion to the revenue collected from the territories. One-half of the yearly amount collected in the Pool was to be used in meeting the cost of the common services whereas the other half was to be distributed equally between the three states. According to the report the following represented the Commissions view of the redistributive effect envisaged:
Fig. 15.3 The East African States
Net payments into the Distributable Pool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanganyika</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of collection paid by territories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-Raisman system</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisman system</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP share of cost of collection allocated by territory</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial receipts from customs and excise duties and income tax:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-Raisman system</td>
<td>25,250</td>
<td>14,440</td>
<td>11,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisman system</td>
<td>23,440</td>
<td>13,645</td>
<td>10,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial contributions to DP</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial allocation of DP share of cost of collection</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (net of cost of collection) of DP from Territories</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Redistributive Effect of Distributable Pool - Raisman Report Example

(a)

Receipts (net collection cost) of DP from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total receipts of DP</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,210</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b)

Distribution of Distributable Pool:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½ to High Commission</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/6 to Kenya</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/6 to Tanganyika</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/6 to Uganda</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total payments from DP</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,210</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 15.4 22

Evidently the Commission envisaged that the redistributive effect entailed by the transfer from Kenya of £310,000 and £245,000 to Tanganyika and Uganda respectively, was sufficient compensation for the advantages enjoyed by Kenya. These advantages included, apart from the leeway possessed by Kenya in the manufacturing industry, the fact that the situation of the High Commission in Nairobi meant more spending by the Common services in Kenya than in the two other states, (see Fig. 15.5) even taking account of the fact that not all expenditures necessarily brought exclusive benefits to the country in which they were made.

Location of Expenditures & Benefits
General Fund Services
(£mn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Outside E.A.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 15.5 23

In fact Tanzania and Uganda did not perceive the effects of the Raisman recommendations so optimistically. It was felt that Kenya’s advantage in the manufacturing industry and favourable position in trade which it meant for her other partners, were not compensated by these somewhat vague fiscal measures. But it was sugge-
sted that Kenya's advantages did not necessarily reside in the effects of the Common market. The geographical situation of Kenya (as a low-cost supplier to large parts of Tanzania and Uganda,) would have brought about these advantages even in the absence of the common market. The large non-African population in Kenya constituted an incentive to the manufacturing industry by creating a greater demand for its products. There were certain products such as fresh milk which, in the absence of common market preference, would have held the East African market for lack of foreign competition. The same went for cheap brands of certain commodities and also beer and cigarettes. On the basis of these calculations, Hazelwood has worked out on the 1962 figures, the "nominal" and "effective" protection afforded by the tariff preference giving zero protection to manufactures which are "exported outside East Africa at average values higher than those in interterritorial trade." See Fig. 15.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya to Uganda</th>
<th>Kenya to Tanganyika</th>
<th>Uganda to Kenya</th>
<th>Uganda to Tanganyika</th>
<th>Tanganyika to Kenya</th>
<th>Tanganyika to Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 15.6

These arguments notwithstanding, it was felt that Kenya's lead was rendering endemic the 'relative unattractiveness for industry' of Tanzania and Uganda, bringing with it growing inequities both in the allocation of industries and the distribution of trade surplus.

Still resolved to maintain the Common Market, the East Africans met in Kampala in April, 1964, and worked out the so-called Kampala Agreement. The Heads of State met again in January, 1965, at Mbala and approved a modified version of the Agreement. These agreements were destined to remain non-legal because before they could be ordered into a treaty other developments eclipsed them.

The Kampala Agreement was based ostensibly on five specific measures to correct the imbalance in trade between the three East African countries. These measures were (a) to persuade certain firms which had productions in two or more countries to rearrange their territorial distribution of production to satisfy the desired goal of equity; (b) to allocate some major industries between the countries; (c) to achieve fairer distribution in trade by means of quotas in
interterritorial trade; (d) to increase trade by means of certain fiscal arrangements in favour of a country which was in deficit in interterritorial trade by taking some of the trade away from a country in surplus; and (e) to "devise a system of inducements and allocations of industry to secure an equitable distribution of industrial development between the three countries."

But even these measures raised, in time, certain obstacles some of which were to prove insurmountable. It seemed easy enough to persuade some of the firms to increase their production in the countries where the turn-out was little. However, in some cases the firms operated only in one or two countries and the introduction of a brand new production line seemed uneconomic. For example, the East African Industries, - a soap-producing firm when it was faced with the prospect of opening another factory in Tanzania, declared that "the investment of £500,000 would not be justified and we shall not build a factory there. It would not be economically viable." Sometimes, as in beer production, it was not the same firm which operated in the three states. In at least one other case, a shoe factory with different specialized productions in Kenya and Tanzania found it difficult to wipe out the trade imbalance by simply duplicating production in the two states. Nonetheless, despite these problems a certain progress was made.

The quota system produced a different sort of problem. At first it was decided to calculate the size of the quota by "taking the amounts of exports from the country in surplus to the country in deficit, minus the exports from the country in deficit to the country in surplus. As productive capacity in the country in deficit rises from its existing level the quota will be reduced proportionately until the quota equals zero." A curious situation would have ensued. Country X exporting £800,000 worth of commodity to deficit country Y, with an export of £300,000, would receive a quota of £500,000 (800,000 - 300,000) falling gradually to zero. If country Y directed her production to meet the fall of the demand in its home market depending on £300,000 in X's exports, the whole exercise would have tended to serve the end of territorial self-sufficiency and uneconomic duplication of production which the idea of a common market was intended to eliminate. Even when this discrepancy was detected and adjusted at the second meeting at Mbale in 1965, so that the minimum quota allowed the surplus countries to exports as much to the deficit country as she imported from the deficit country, certain problems remained.

Let us assume that country Y in the above example does not divert her production to meet home demands if, as in the case of the shoe factory, it only specialized in a certain variety of shoes, this would still leave £300,000 worth less of footwear than before the quota. Country Y could turn to suppliers outside East Africa. Even
if country Y were to contemplate a new production line, its decision might be influenced by the fact that in the absence of further measures to protect the infant production line, its capacity, at least at the start, would be less efficient than those of country X or even foreign suppliers. Notwithstanding a subsequent revised agreement stating that "the Governments, in a desire to minimise the impact of quotas to the extent possible within the objectives of this agreement, agree to take external trade factors into account when calculating the size of quotas, so long as this does not cause delays...," the problems remained. One of Kenya's complaints at a later stage was precisely that the other countries were substituting foreign products for Kenya's.

As for the allocation of major industries, a number of dispositions were agreed upon, awarding exclusive licences for certain industries, e.g. electric light bulbs were to be manufactured in Kenya; bicycle parts and nitrogenous fertilizers were to be manufactured in Uganda; radio assembly and manufacture, and the manufacture of motor tyres and tubes were to be located in Tanzania. The original agreement allocated some vehicle assembly to Tanganyika, but in the revised agreement no mention was made of this industry, and 'aluminium foil, circles and plain sheets' had been substituted as allocated to Tanzania. But there remained of course the problem of dissatisfaction due to allocations to less efficient areas in the service of equal spread of development. As Hazelwood points out "Fiscal compensations may avoid the costs of inefficient location, but for the participants they are not an acceptable substitute for development." An Industrial Experts Committee was to be set up to produce a list of "East African Industries" - that is, those industries requiring markets at least larger than that of any single East African country. The Committee was also to review "the basis for distribution of these industries" and as well as "measures for achieving rapidly an equitable pattern of industrial location." As it turned out, the Industrial Experts Committee never got off the ground. In 1965 Tanzania, followed by Uganda and Kenya, announced the establishment of a separate central bank and currency. In 1967, Tanzania nationalized her banks. Properly speaking, the disintegration of the East African Economic area had its roots in these events. The Tanzanian explanation for her decision is of the utmost significance. Her minister declared that it was the failure of the talks over an East African federation which made meaningless the adherence to a central banking system. "In the interest of East African unity we have waited and discussed for four years before taking any action to dismantle the East African currency board and to transfer the authority to the Government. This is a very great sacrifice for any country and particularly for a developing country which is anxious to promote the development of its own monetary institutions."

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Barely one year after the famous Nkrumah-Nyerere Cairo altercation, Tanzania, it might be said, was discovering just how crucial for step-by-step economic integration was the securing of a 'political kingdom.'

The East African Community.

The treaty establishing the East African Community in 1967 provided the legal basis which had been lacking after the Kampala Agreement. It consecrated a great deal of the existing arrangements between the three partner states. But above all it was a demonstration that the three East African countries still believed in economic integration between themselves. Proclaiming 'an East African Community and as an integral part of such a Community, an East African Common Market,' the Treaty stated as its aims:

"to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the Partner States to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities the benefits whereof shall be equitably shared."

The highest instance in the government of the Community became the Authority consisting of the Heads of State of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Central Legislative Assembly became the East African Legislative Assembly now with only nine members from each member state. Its function is to review the annual reports of the Corporations as well as to pass Bills concerning the running of the Community. There are three East African Ministers and their deputies, responsible for common-market and economic planning; finance and administration; and communications social affairs and research. Furthermore, there are five Ministerial Councils: (a) the Common Market Council responsible for supervising the workings of the Treaty provisions for the common market; (b) the Economic Consultative and Planning Council; (c) the Finance Council; (d) the Research and Social Council, these last three performing basically an advisory function; and (e) the Communications Council which is not only the organ for rapport between the states on communications matters but is assigned some extra tasks regarding the control of the corporations. The Councils are composed by the three East African ministers plus any three ministers from the member states except with respect to the Finance Council where only the Finance Ministers from the member states may represent their respective countries. Decisions by the Council are subject to unanimity. Disagreements can be referred to the Authority.

There is a Common Market Tribunal which is a judicial body charged with the task of making binding decisions on the interpreta-
tions and observance of the Treaty provisions on the common market. However, the Treaty contains no provision for sanctions against recalcitrant member states.

The Treaty provided for a great deal of decentralization. Where the services all had their seat in Nairobi, the new arrangement distributed the headquarters as follows:

Community headquarters - Arusha (Tanzania)
Headquarters of Harbours Corporations - Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania).
Posts and Telecommunications Corporations headquarters - Kampala (Uganda)
East African Development Bank - Kampala (Uganda)
Railways Corporation - Nairobi (Kenya)
East African Airways - Nairobi (Kenya).

As can be seen from the above, the services became public corporations. Only the East African Airways was organized in that manner before the Treaty. An intricate arrangement for the appointment of members of the board of directors aims at ensuring that their loyalty remains with the corporations concerned, instead of with the governments of their respective countries of origin.

Despite the general declarations in the Treaty in favour of harmonization of policies, it does not contain much in binding provisions which would produce the desired effect. Indeed, it has been questioned whether the Treaty created a common market as such. Neither in respect to movement of capital, factor, or labour does the Treaty go beyond establishing a system of control and mutually agreed differences in lieu of freedom of movement. There is a conspicuous absence in the Treaty of the so-called 'right to establish' and restrictions abound regarding not only agricultural products but inter-state trade in manufactures which are left to bilateral contracts. It became evident later that Tanzania, for example, could, without violating the Treaty, put in force a discriminatory measure which encouraged the restriction of her imports through Mombasa by the increased use of her own ports. The use of the TAZARA railway line instead of the customary East African Railway Corporation falls into this category and contributed, as we shall see, to the crisis in that corporation. Similarly, land-locked Uganda could, in all legality, clear her imports through customs set up in Uganda thus avoiding the entrepôt arrangements in Nairobi and Mombasa. In view of these shortcomings the harmonization of policies envisaged in the Treaty may appear to be no more than expression of a hope. The signatories to the Treaty do indeed agree in Article 19 to "use their best endeavours to agree upon a common scheme of fiscal incentives towards industrial development." But the Article leaves it
at that without going into specifics. General professions of harmonization in the field of commercial laws, taxation, national planning and transport policies appear to be of little avail when there is nothing in the Treaty to prevent the governments from practising such discriminatory measures as "deviations in a partner state's imports from another partner state to a foreign supplier as a consequence of aid agreements..." or "discriminatory purchasing in favour of its own industries as compared with those of another partner state," beyond the general admonition not to "frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between the Partner States."

On the plus side are the specific arrangements regarding external tariff and excise duties. Taxation is indeed left to the individual governments but in respect of external tariff the partners contract themselves to abolish differences which would work against the operation of the Common Market. There is also provision for "quantitative controls to be maintained where excise differences could have an adverse effect on the revenue of one of the states." Under the Treaty the Partner States may not provide tariff concessions to countries outside the Community if these concessions are not also to be open to the other Partner States. There are checks and balances for correcting any dwindling in the amount of trade between the Partner States arising from barter agreements between a foreign supplier and any of the East African states, or from the effects of the transfer tax system which we shall examine presently. Other prohibited practices include 'one-channel marketing, discriminatory taxation of another Partner State's goods, dumping, and discriminatory purchasing of foreign goods when suitable goods are available from within East Africa at comparable prices.'

The contracting parties also agreed to 'endeavour to harmonize their monetary policies to the extent required for the proper functioning of the Common Market and the fulfilment of the aims of the Community.' By the provisions of the Treaty the three East African currencies notes were exchangeable, baring minor deviations arising from transport charges. When, in 1967, Tanzania nationalized her banks, she had imposed restrictions on certain inter-state payments. The Treaty forbade such practices. The Treaty provided for the phasing out of the system of a Distributable pool by the middle of 1969, two new systems - the transfer tax system and the Development Bank having taken over the function of the Pool as a method for compensation for imbalances in the operation of the Common-Market. Also, the old system, due to its financing by fixed amounts from certain tax revenue, had allowed the accumulation of funds far in excess of the needs for the running of the so-called non-self-contained common services. These funds were now to be distributed from year to year according to the need of the services.
With respect to agriculture, the Treaty obviously could not provide for free trade despite the declarations in Article 12 paragraph 1 and Article 14 which respectively prescribe the removal of quantitative restrictions in manufactures and agricultural products and express the long term aim of extending the Common Market to agriculture and trade in agricultural produce. The major problem resides of course in the different systems in the three East African countries which produce wide differences in the price structures. Whereas the marketing of agricultural products in Uganda is virtually free from government control (apart from the marketing boards for coffee and cotton), in both Tanzania and Kenya the pricing of agricultural products are subject to government control largely in order to ensure guaranteed minimum prices.

The flagship of the Treaty establishing the East African Community is the East African Development Bank. Its aims are to advance industrial development in East Africa, to help finance projects which would have the cumulative effect of rendering the economies of the partner states complementary in the industrial field, to promote even development in the area by according priority to the less industrially developed partner states and to co-operate with other national agencies in the partner states, entrusted with the planning of industrial development. Its equity is £20 million subscribed ostensibly by the three East African states who were initially required to contribute £12 million, half of which was to be paid in by June 1, 1969, in instalments extending over eighteen months. The Treaty stipulates the proportions in which the Bank’s resources should be invested in the three countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>22½ per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>38¾ per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>38¾ per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main restriction in the functioning of the bank is the provision that its investments are to be directed towards industrial development. The definition of industry to exclude investments in infrastructure in, say, transport, building, and tourism, deprives that institution of important means of achieving its equalizing functions. Furthermore, nothing prevents other funds than those available to the Development Bank from accruing to states which are more attractive to foreign investment thereby further reducing the possibilities of the bank to effect equitability by means of its fixed investment proportions.

The transfer-tax system is designed to give added protection to the industrially weaker members of the Community. By its provisions a country with an overall deficit in manufactured products
may impose a transfer-tax on the country or countries with which it has such deficit. When the Treaty came in force, Kenya had a surplus over both Tanzania and Uganda in intra-East African trade, whereas Tanzania was in deficit also with Uganda. Therefore Kenya could not impose the transfer-tax on any of her partners, Uganda could impose it only on Kenya while Tanzania was allowed to use it against both Kenya and Uganda. By the provisions of the Treaty a country may only tax those products which it has the capacity to produce itself or which it can have the capacity to produce within three months of the imposition of the tax and in any case only if it can produce at least 15 per cent of its total domestic consumption of the product. The transfer-tax must also be lifted as soon as the country imposing it is able to export 30 per cent of its total output. Furthermore the rate of transfer-tax on any one product may not exceed 50 per cent of the external tariff of that product. Evidently these measures are designed to protect infant industries in weaker member states. Still, a possible consequence of the imposition of the transfer-tax on the products of a partner state could be to make them more expensive and thereby less competitive in relation to similar products from outside East Africa. This could cause a diversion in trade from the said East African product to a foreign one. The Treaty states that such diversions in trade should be corrected although it does not specify how. At all events this point is worth bearing in mind since it is one of the factors that have bedeviled the progress of integration in the Community despite the obvious efforts in the Treaty to circumvent them.

By the middle of 1976 the East African Community was poised on the brink of disintegration or on the threshold of a rebirth. Which way it would go depended on the outcome of the Demas Commission (A Review Commission headed by William Demas, Trinidadian, President of the Caribbean Development Bank and formerly Secretary-General of the Caribbean Free Trade Area.) Although the problems of the Community became particularly acute and divisive in 1975, they began long before that year and they were as much political as they were economic although it would seem that the political changes in Uganda which brought Idi Amin to power in 1971 instilled a large measure of crisis in the declining fortunes of East African integration. The shrill orchestration of acrimonious journalism among the national newspapers behind their respective governments during the later stages of the crisis, has tended to convey the impression that political mobilization dominated the issues. But since 1967, the fabric of the Community has been put to test by ostensibly economic issues that encompassed the viability of the corporations, the extent of trade imbalances among the partner states which in turn was linked in the public mind with the nature of the division of gains.
Whatever the shortcomings of the 1967 Treaty, it had succeeded in enshrining a Common Market and its provisions in a legal document while providing a modicum of protection behind which the least industrialized partners could attempt to attain an equal footing with Kenya. But it is not to be thought that these arrangements satisfied all parties. Indeed, in some respects it can be said that the growing crisis demonstrated the fact that none of the parties thought that its gains matched its expectations. If Kenya had expected that the competitiveness of her industries would continue undiminished thanks to the provision that the transfer tax could not exceed 50 per cent of the external tariff, she was in for disillusion. In the period after 1969, Tanzania’s imports from China increased at the expense of imports from Kenya (see Fig. 15.7.) It has been pointed out that although a good deal of these commodities are part of commodity credit agreements to finance the local costs of the TAZARA railway (Tanzania to Zambia,) the Chinese commodities are highly price-competitive and are likely to retain a considerable part of their market even after the expiration of the railway agreement. In this case China’s gain is Kenya’s loss, and it seems of little avail to point out that Kenya’s overall intra-community trade actually expanded during the same period.

It was also evident that the drafters of the Treaty had envisaged that while the transfer tax would protect infant industries which could operate efficiently in smaller individual state markets, it would leave a leeway for large-scale industries which could only operate efficiently within the combined markets of the East African countries. Since the size of the required market would discourage the proliferation of such industries, the transfer tax would not apply when once one country had set up such an industry. Practice has, however, not followed theory. In fact, many so-called large-scale industries have sprung up in two or even three of the partner states sponsored separately by their governments and their foreign part-

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source of Tanzania’s imports of certain products, 1969 and 1973</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>shs.m.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentifrices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toilet soap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detergents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Annual Trade Reports.*

Fig. 15.7

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ners. Other considerations seemed to have outweighed even the logic of economy of scale. President Nyerere was to remark:

"Each of the Partner States goes ahead on its own, trying to interest foreign firms or foreign governments in such a project. And the foreign firms do sometimes agree. After all, their main concern is to sell their machinery to us, either for purposes of extending their competition to East Africa, or simply as a means of making immediate profit for themselves. In either case the cost of the necessary subsidy will have to be borne by us. So we have the absurd position where both Kenya and Tanzania, in partnership with competing foreign firms, set up a tyre factory - each of which requires the whole East African market to be economic." (my italics.)

A look at Fig. 15.5 will show that slightly more than half of the revenues of the General Fund services is contributed by Kenya. But also a lion's share of the expenditure were made in Kenya. Despite the fact that the Treaty decentralized the organization of the Community by transferring some of the headquarters to Tanzania and Uganda, expensive services such as the Directorate of Civil Aviation and research services remained in Kenya. In the period 1971-1972 the percentage of the revenue taken by such expenditures in Kenya was 57 compared with 51 per cent of revenue contributed. In spite of this, it is conventional wisdom among the Kenyan news media, to point out that that country bears the burden of subsidizing her partners as far as these services are concerned. However erroneous this belief may be, it is the easily understandable stuff of which discontent is made.

The fluctuating fortunes of the corporations have also become the source of much bitterness between the partners. Particularly the Railways Corporation whose accounts have remained in the red, has led to measures and countermeasures between Tanzania and Kenya. In this case it was Tanzania which believes it is now subsidizing Kenya in that area even though until 1967 the Railway had been losing money in Tanzania. The problems of the Railways Corporation are deep-seated. It had always lived under the ever-present threat of competition from road haulage. Bad roads and restrictive licensing of heavy duty vehicles had kept the wolf from the door until 1967. After that, improvements in road conditions, particularly after the Nairobi-Mombasa road was provided with a tarmac surface in 1968, reduced the disabilities facing road haulage. Certain efforts were made to meet this increased competition. For example, reductions were made in the railway charges in the important traffic of petroleum products between Nairobi and Mombasa. The loss incurred from this reduction was borne by the earnings from oil trans-
portation to supply the Tanzania-Zambia railway construction. Furthermore, attempts to restrict the competition of road transport by the imposition of axle-load requirements on lorries broke on the considerable pressure from the influential Kenyan businessmen who had invested heavily in these vehicles. In this respect, political ideology was instilled into the issue to compound it. Tanzania began to feel that the capitalist ideology of Kenya was favouring her businessmen to the detriment of the Community and at the expense of Tanzania. These complications coincided with the servicing of huge debts by the Corporation as well as heavy depreciation charges. The situation went from bad to worse. In 1966 there had been a small surplus of shs. 3 m., in 1967 it deteriorated to a deficit of shs. 8 m. which grew to a staggering shs. 300 m. by 1973.

It used to be thought that the Corporations lines in Tanzania were the least lucrative since they were distributed over a larger territory and were sparsely used whereas the intensive traffic on the Kenya-Uganda line brought in most of the returns. But by now Kenya’s East African import restrictions (in order to service its external deficit), and the reduced economic viability of Uganda, had whittled down this traffic. By contrast, the Tanzanian line was experiencing a boom in traffic owing partly to the requirements of the construction works on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway and partly to Zambia’s policy of abandoning the use of her southern outlets. Little wonder that Tanzania began to feel that it was now subsidizing its other partners in the Corporation. This meant for it the end of one benefit for which the Community had seemed attractive. In 1973, because of its disastrous financial situation, the Railways Corporation could not make adequate service provisions, upon which Tanzania refused to transfer the surpluses from her lines to the headquarters in Nairobi. Kenya retaliated by keeping the revenues from the Mombasa harbour instead of transferring them to the headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. It did not help matters that in the midst of all this, a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly issued a report alleging widespread corruption in the Railways Corporation. The oil crisis caused fuel consumption to rocket and the individual states began to pay increased attention to the conservation of foreign exchange to the detriment of the interests of the Community.

Measures and reprisals began to follow in rapid succession. Tanzania imposed what was a virtual ban on KENATCO (Kenya National Transport Company) trucks, by imposing drastic traffic requirements on heavy vehicles operating between Kenya and Tanzania. Although the Tanzanians had claimed that this was necessary because of extensive damage to the road, the Kenyan’s were not to be convinced that it was not a punitive measure directed against them. They too began to interfere with communications, closed some border roads and tampered with the steamer traffic on Lake
Victoria blaming it on road works, in one case, and on the outbreak of cholera, in the other. By February 1975, the Railways Corporation's passenger traffic between Kenya and Tanzania had ceased and Tanzania had used part of her untransferred surplus to buy spare parts which it used exclusively in the operation of its own lines. Considering the extent to which these measures were backed up by a vitriolic Press in both countries, it was not surprising that the ordinary citizens domiciled in their neighbouring countries were the next to fall foul of the antagonisms. Tanzania was reported to have expelled large numbers of Kenyans who it was alleged could not, as 'capitalists', attune themselves to Tanzania's socialist policies. The undercurrent of political incompatibility had broken out to the surface. Kenya refused to pay their salaries to Tanzanian citizens working at the headquarters of the Railways Corporation in Nairobi. When they sued the Corporation in the High Court they were all dismissed.

Although the Harbours and Posts and Telecommunications were both running at a profit, they were virtually decentralized since they too were subject to the practice of refusing to transfer surpluses to the headquarters - a factor which has "made a shambles of debt service, external purchases and development projects." The Harbours Corporation was also rocked by a Select Committee report which allegedly exposed extensive corruption in the administration. The Airways Corporation which made sizeable profits until 1969 (in 1968 it was shs. 14.3 m.), acquired a deficit of shs. 60.8 m. in 1971. Apart from a catastrophic attempt to extend its routes to the Far East and the United States, it had long been evident that the domestic services were operating at a big loss and the so-called "branch line formula" (by which a government was supposed to subsidize extra lines of communications in its territory if these were not economic) did not operate effectively since there were several ways of circumventing the rule. However, after certain drastic administrative reforms including the installing of top-level foreign personnel on hire, the Airways finances stabilized. But by 1976, Uganda had set up its own airlines. The Railways Corporation, Harbours Corporation and the Posts and Telecommunications Authority were likely to suffer further reverses. Early in 1976 the World Bank suspended a loan of $50 million to the Community because outstanding debts had not been paid. Although Kenya blamed the default on Uganda, the fact that these loans are guaranteed "jointly and severally" put the three countries in one boat as far repayment was concerned. The Bank was also considering a moratorium on new loans. Finally, one event which was as ironical as it is ominous, took place in 1976. The Railways Corporation had hired the services of a firm of consultants to review the administration of the
Railways. Tanzania followed suit, hiring its own consultants. Both firms were Canadian. Disintegration was being widely canvassed.

The drama of economic rivalry between the three partner states is being enacted against the backdrop of increasing political incompatibility. Barely eight months before the East African Common Market treaty was signed in 1967, the Tanzanian government passed its Arusha Declaration which set it firmly on the path of its brand of socialism. According to Professor Kjeld Philip, this development came when the findings of his Commission had already gone into the final stage - of producing a legal draft. Presumably the Commission, completely unaware of this development was bereft of any opportunity to adapt the Treaty to these circumstances. Be that as it may, the growing socialist trend in Tanzania is in marked contrast to Kenya's subscription to what has been described as 'the acquisitive society'. Developments in Uganda since the Amin regime came to power in 1971 have all but doomed the Community to disintegration. President Nyerere is so much at variance with his military opposite number in Uganda that he would not sit with him to confer - not even in the vital Executive Authority of the Community which, for that reason, has been in abeyance since 1971. Early in 1976, Amin made certain vague historical claims on Kenyan territory. The relations between the two states have deteriorated since, once leading to bellicose manifestations on the part of Kenya. Foul murder of Kenyan citizens in Uganda has been alleged especially after an Israeli airborne raid on Entebbe airport where some Palestinians held Israeli hostages, among others, on an international airline. Kenya was suspected of being in collusion with the Israeli who had utilized the services of a Kenyan landing strip in connection with the raid. For a time Uganda cut off electricity supplies to Kenya from the power plant at Owen falls. Throughout 1976, reports of expulsions and counter expulsions of citizens of the East African countries from their neighbouring states continued to come in. In September Tanzania alleged "the unilateral eviction by Kenya of Tanzanians and Ugandans working for the East African Railways Corporations", as well as the expulsion of 391 other Tanzanians "some of whom had lived in Kenya for 37 years...". Uganda was accusing Kenya of holding up military equipment and tons of general cargo as well as some 300 rail petrol tankers destined for Uganda - a development which caused acute fuel shortage in Uganda and led to ministerial talks between the two countries to resolve the issues. But the signs were clear: the affairs of the Community were at sixes and sevens just as the tone of communication between them was strident and despondent. The speech attributed to the Tanzanian

*Professor Philip to writer. Interview
Minister for Communications and Transport was typical. Mr. Alfred Tandau was reported to have addressed his National Assembly on July 19th in the following terms:

"Despite our efforts to keep the Community intact, it is clear that we have reached a point where each partner state will have to manage its own corporations in regard to railways and harbours," He added, for good measure, that the same would go for Posts and Telecommunications Corporation if there were "signs of disintegration". The Kenyan *Daily Nation* summarized:

"The Community will not be the same again. Whatever remains of the Community will be merely a skeleton - and an edifice which will not serve the purpose of integrating the politics and economics of East Africa. And integration of the economics and politics of East Africa would have been and will remain a desirable objective." By late 1976, it was being rumoured that the yet unpublished report of the Demas Review Commission of the Treaty had recommended far reaching decentralization in the affairs of the Community tantamounting to disengagement or disintegration.

We have gone to some length to examine the economic and political aspects of the attributes and underlying causes for conflict in the East African Community. Hopefully this will aid us in our task of deciding the relative impact of these two factors in attempts at integration in Africa. It is pertinent here to mention the emphasis which some observers have laid on the divergencies in ideology between the partners of the East African Community. How deep are these ideological cleavages? Are they the most potent forces militating against integration and making for what some theorists have termed 'high-politics'? Opinions continue to differ on this issue. The Kenyan daily, *Daily Nation*, declares:

"Ideology has been blamed for the inability of East Africans to run the Community... but (the problem is) rather the absence of a will on the part of the partners for close association. Although the future of integrated economics and politics in East Africa looks gloomy, East Africans must surely hope that the will for closer cooperation will develop as a result of experience and the state of the international economy itself." (my italics)

Four factors, which we mention briefly here, suggest that the view about the lack of political will is at least questionable. Firstly, the idea of a federation has historically been a recurrent issue in East Africa throughout the sixties. It has been shown that Nyerere's call for a federation in 1963 was not merely a ploy, as some suggested at the time, to secure the independence of Kenya, but a deep-seated commitment based on an intense awareness of the affinities between the three countries.

Secondly, although much has been made of anti-community feel-
ing among some sections of the East-African elite (Nyerere's colleagues have notably been blamed for these sentiments) the East African leadership has from time to time demonstrated in times of crisis, a desire to review their positions and entrench rather than minimize the cooperation between them. This happened after independence, at the Kampala Meetings, and again in connection with the Philip Commission. It is significant that Nyerere continues, at least in public, to express faith in the ability of the East Africans to overcome their problems. More significantly, he has denied any intention to conclude other alliances with her neighbours in preference to the existing Community. Kenyatta and Amin have repeatedly expressed similar sentiments.

Thirdly, the East African Legislative Assembly has incessantly promoted the idea of Federation. Much as this Assembly was accorded scant attention and even less hope during the drawing up of the Treaty, it has grown to be a radical and at least vociferous instrument solidly committed to a federation. In 1976, after debating the report of a special Committee appointed for the purpose, it passed a resolution to create a federation forthwith as the effective means of ending the Community's tribulations. What was more, it passed the resolution unanimously.

Fourthly, when the going was good a number of East African countries (see Map) including Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia and Zambia, made determined efforts to join the Community. These countries are as different from one another in economic size and potential as in political ideology. Indeed, two of them - Somalia and Ethiopia - have long-standing border and ethnic problems and one of them has similar problems vis-à-vis Kenya. That their applications to join have not been consistently pursued has depended rather on the fluctuating fortunes of the Community than on their will to associate. This would suggest at the least that the will to co-operate turns on the success or failure of the experiments and that the reasons for the fate of the Community - whatever it turns out to be - are to be sought in its workings. We shall deal with that analysis in the final section.
Footnotes to Chapter fifteen

1. The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal problems (N.Y. United Nations, 1950.)


5. Belgium had refused to join.

6. Associate members do not have the right to vote.

7. This proposal was tabled by Tom Mboya the Kenyan delegate.


9. These and some of the proceeding discussions on the ECA are based ostensibly from the account in J.S. Magee "ECA and the Paradox of African Cooperation. International Conciliation, November 1970, No. 580.


15. See particularly Magee, J.S., op. cit., p.33 ff.


18. A bid to elect a new direction in 1976 ended in deadlock and Labidi, M. was asked to continue until May 1977.


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23. See Hazelwood, A., op. cit., p.82.


25. In the case of Tanzania and Kenya, action on cigarettes, beer, shoes and cement was expected to reduce the trade imbalance by as much as 24 per cent of the 1964 figures.


28. op. cit., p.83.

29. op. cit.

30. op. cit., p.79.


32. Quoted in Hazelwood, A., op. cit., p.76.


38. Negotiations actually began in November 1968, between ministerial delegations from these countries and the East African Negotiating Team.
Fig. 16.1 Economic Community of West African States
16. The Economic Community of West African states and others

The fifteen West African countries which recently signed the ECOWAS treaty did not, unlike the three East African states, have a considerable history of cooperation behind them. During the immediate history preceding their independence these countries were divided into two parts - the francophone and the anglophone. The countries in each sphere were not necessarily contiguous, rather, the French-speaking and English-speaking territories were, and are still, stacked like a massive sandwich along the length and breadth of West Africa. Each group was administered separately even where the colonial boundaries landed ethnic groups in two different zones such as the Yorubas in Nigeria and Dahomey or the Ewes in Ghana and Togo, to name only two examples. Apart from ethnic and other time - honoured affinities, these groups were held together, each in its different sphere, by a common foreign administration with its paraphernalia of varying degrees of economic co-ordination, common services, a common official language - English or French - and the pressures of an encroaching culture. These tendencies were evident both in the British and French spheres but were more marked in the latter.

The French government ran the AOF (French West Africa) as a thoroughgoing federation. The harmonization of the economies of the component states was centered on the rationalization of the production of certain raw materials like cotton, coffee, cocoa and oil by various means including "fixing production targets for export crops in the light of French and world demand." Commerce, dominated by French private capital and a handful of giant French concerns was characterized by centralization of industrialization e.g. in Dakar and Abidjan, and monopoly in all the territories concerned. A central bank, the Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale was responsible for issuing currency for the whole area until 1955 when this function was taken over by the Institut d'Emission de l'AOF et du Togo. The territories were all included in the franc zone, currencies enjoyed full convertibility within the zone and were fully transferable. Each territory surrendered its foreign exchange earnings to a centralized system in Paris from where they made regulated drawings under an imports programme supervised by the French Finance Ministers. Over and above the territorial budgets, there was a system of Federal
budgets which financed various expenditures and serviced debts since only the federation had the power to borrow. Among the territories in the AOF there was free trade and their external tariff was common. The common services included, with varying degrees of effectiveness, railways, ports, airways and posts and telecommunications. Finally, the system of education, geared entirely to France, tended to produce a similar culture in the territories especially with respect to elites who were usually obliged to pursue their higher education in France. These characteristics of the French zone, it must be underlined, were reproduced in the British sector, even if in a more attenuated form. Even then, as far as the formation of elites was concerned, the British system of education left an equally deep imprint on the culture in their sphere of influence and the hegemony was just as complete in the political and monetary spheres as witness the inclusion of the British area in the sterling zone, the powers of the West African currency board and certain common services - to name only a few.

These traits marked the two zones and, by the same token, marked them out from each other. Despite the sudden autonomy following independence which made inroads in their colonial co-ordination these territories continued after attaining statehood to found their alliances and economic co-ordination largely on the basic dichotomy of the colonial demarcation. During the years following independence it was feared that this demarcation had ossified. We have already followed the serpentine course of the alliances involving the various French-speaking and English-speaking states in West Africa, - the Conseil de l'Entente; the Brazzaville group which gave rise to OAMCE (Organization Africaine et Malagache de Coopération Economique); the UAM (Union Africaine et Malagache) and its organs dealing with Defence and Posts and Telecommunications; the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union in which states from the two groups joined one alliance for the first time; the Casablanca and Monrovia groups born of political conflict which divided these states not merely according to attachments to France or Britain but according to political tenets; and finally the OCAM (Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache) which took over the economic functions of the UAMCE and agreed to cede its political functions to the OAU. Despite these developments the differences existing between the two groups in West Africa have been real and often exasperating.

Particularly the cultural differences have given rise to various speculations. It was suggested that the way of life in these two groups were so wide apart as to inspire despair. As one writer summed it up:

"Dakar and Abidjan have a similar atmosphere, which contrasts strongly with that of Lagos and Accra. Deeply ingrained habits, methods, and ways of thinking cannot be abolished by decree."
Certainly the sight of West Africans at International Conferences clustering in their French-speaking and English-speaking corners and achieving only double monologues when they tried to communicate, was not such as to inspire confidence in West African cooperation.

But times have changed. On May 28, 1975, Benin, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta signed the Treaty creating the Economic Community of West African States. A number of factors have paved the way for the present attempts by the two groups in the new Community to find themselves. To begin with, whatever else might be said about him, Nkrumah's disappearance from the West African political scene has also meant the disappearance of the vortex of the turbulent politics of the middle sixties. Again, the maturity coming from the conflict resolution of the past 16 years has begun to show in the deliberate policies of some of these states based more and more on the rational appraisal of objective factors. Therefore the unceasing campaigns of the ECA to interest these states in the merits of economic cooperation between them has begun to gain a hearing. The ascendancy of the OAU - however sluggish it might be judged to be - has eroded the vitality of certain other organizations which had ceded influence by word but had remained at heart rivals to the continental organization. An example is the OCAM whose original membership of sixteen states has been reduced to nine since Gabon in September 1976 became the seventh state, since 1973, to withdraw from the Organization declaring at the same time: "The OCAM has died a natural death."

The recent economic problems which have polarized the world have also meant a drawing together of African countries in the sense that they appear more prepared than ever before to face the consequences of their common economic heritage and together draw the salient conclusions from their present position in the configuration of history. Industrialization, economic integration, producer-power co-ordination - these things have attained a new relevance for the maturing African leadership. At the same time the waning of the influence of the former colonial powers has become more distinct. Economic factors, but above all political pressures, have recently obliged the French to withdraw their forces from many states in Africa - notably Senegal, Central African Republic and Chad. Many of the francophone states have begun to demonstrate marked tendencies towards greater independence from the political influence of France. By the same token they gravitate towards greater willingness to work together with their neighbours. The post-independence years have not been spent idly in the West African countries either. There has been a modicum of eagerness to bridge the
communication gaps between the different groups. Educational reforms in both the English- and French-speaking states including growing student exchange programmes, have meant an appreciable reduction of communication problems - at least at the upper levels. Trade fairs, art festivals, intensified sporting activities have afforded the citizens of those countries more opportunities to rub shoulders with one another and develop the rudiments of a common awareness and culture. It is a sign of the times and the growing attention to the admonitions of the numerous ECA studies and OAU resolutions that both the ACP (African Caribbean and Pacific States) cooperation and the ECOWAS Treaty were concluded in the same year within four months of each other.

The coming together of the fifteen states has laid the foundation for a market of over 124 million peoples - the largest that Africa has ever known in modern history. It represents the beginnings of the realization of a line of action that the ECA has been promoting since 1964 when it came out with its report on West African Industrial Co-ordination. Studies of the pattern of trade in West Africa have long revealed that interstate commerce is low (see Fig. 16.2) even taking into account the high content of unrecorded border exchange, smuggling, and illegal currency transactions. Furthermore, all the countries of the subregion derive a substantial portion of their revenues from import and export duties making problematic any arrangements for trade liberalisation. Their commercial policies aimed at raising revenues but also at protecting infant and established domestic industries as well as balance of payments, have by their very nature erected barriers which complicate attempts at harmonization notwithstanding the recently concluded Lomé Convention. The pattern of trade also reflects the division of the area into monetary blocs as well as past colonial ties. Of the $6,422,000 dollars worth of Senegalese imports from the sub-region in 1965, over $5 million worth came from the Ivory Coast, $4,126,000 for crude materials, representing 71.7 per cent and $1,004,000 for manufactures. No imports were recorded from its next door neighbour, Ghana, which is anglophone. But its imports from Gabon (francophone) outside West Africa in the Equatorial sub-region amounted to $1,380,000, some $62,000 of this for manufactures. Compare this figure to imports of only $68,000 from Nigeria, mostly in raw materials. This traffic is reciprocated. During the same period Senegal was the main supplier to Ivory Coast to the tune of $3,856,000, ($249,000 in oils and fats; and $2,499,000 in manufactures.)

Nigeria, the largest market in the area has the lowest rate of imports from the sub-region. The absolute figures for her import from West Africa, $2,809,000, constitutes only 0.3 per cent of its total world import. Sierra Leone's (anglophone) main supplier is Nigeria which is responsible for nearly 50 per cent of its total import. Its
trade with Liberia (anglophone) across the border, though largely unrecorded, is also substantial. Some exceptions include the trade between Ghana (anglophone) and Togo (francophone). The former is Togo's most important supplier. This is due mainly to the contiguity of the two states. But Ghana is closely followed by Dahomey and Senegal - both francophone states.

There is a good deal of in-built competition in the pattern of trade in the area owing to the fact that the whole sub-region is a major producer of crude and raw materials and therefore depend on the sale of these products on the international market from which they are also supplied with industrial and manufactured goods. As far

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>West Africa</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia (1)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (2)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted average</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Only 1965
(2) Only trade with important trading partners is separately reported.

Fig. 16.2
as agriculture is concerned there is a certain complementarity depending on the divergencies in climate and vegetation between the northern and southern regions of the area. But among the southern states similarities in ecology mean that they produce largely the same agricultural goods - a fact which enhances competition.

There is a widespread use of restrictive measures in the West-African sub-region to impede trade, again mainly due to a wish to husband scarce supplies of foreign exchange. These measures include restriction through quotas and licensing controls. Usually this is done with an eye to the available amount of foreign exchange. The commodities are then divided into groups and by means of a points system amounts are allocated to individual traders taking account of the amount of trade transacted in the countries concerned and the size of investment in those countries. These considerations also govern the issue of import licences added to the fact that priority is accorded to the import of capital goods considered important for agricultural and industrial development. Apart from specific licensing the governments also resort, at times, to general import prohibitions.

Although it is generally agreed that there exists a great potential for industrial co-ordination and integration in West Africa, in fact there is comparatively little trade in industrial products between the countries in the sub-region. What on the contrary is common, is duplication in the setting up of similar and rival industries in contiguous states. There have even been bizarre examples of countries which predicate the efficiency of their new industries on the availability of the markets of their neighbours while they themselves raise barriers against imports from the self-same neighbours and while their neighbours plan to set up the same industries!

It is generally supposed that the conditions for industrial co-ordination in West Africa are particularly favourable with respect to the Iron and Steel industry. The countries in the sub-region import annually important and expensive quantities of iron and steel from overseas draining thereby their meagre supply of foreign exchange. And yet this important commodity, vital for engineering industries and rightly regarded as the backbone of any country's economy, is available in vast quantities in West Africa. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea harbour high-grade ores and there are abundant supplies in Nigeria-albeit of a somewhat lower grade. Liberia is a principal exporter of iron ores and Sierra Leone has begun to supply Japan and others with the proceeds of her mines while the neighbouring West African countries import iron and steel from abroad. There is adequate capacity for the production of iron and steel in the area. Coal, gas and surplus electric energy exist in Nigeria. Ghana is also in command of important supplies of energy. Limestone in vast reserves exists in Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria. It is therefore
evident that there is a tremendous scope for cooperation in this field. The demand for steel in the area is rising. In 1975, it was estimated at 1,371,500 tons (see Fig. 16.3). The possibilities for reaping the benefits of the economy of scale are immense. Yet some countries in the sub-region e.g. Nigeria and Liberia, have plans for integrated Iron and Steel plants. It is true that modern technological advances have reduced the minimum scale of operation required for an iron and steel plant to operate economically. By the old methods a minimum capacity of two to three million tons of ingot steel was required for an integrated plant with matching rolling mills. But by the use of modern oxygen blown steel converter, fuel injection to reduce coke rate and continuous blasting, the economic minimum can be reduced to 400,000 tons. A corresponding figure of 100,000 tons for the production of steel is even feasible using cheap electric power. All the same the economy of scale remains overwhelmingly important in the engineering and metal working field. An ECA report points out in the case of the production of ordinary products like brake drums, spring rests, or forgings for wheels or other parts, that amortising 'equipment costing, say, Frs. 500,000 per machine, the cost on a series of 1,000 items produced is Frs. 500 a piece; on a series of 10,000 it is Frs. 50 a piece, and on 100,000 it is Frs. 5. This means that if the basic price before allowing for amortisation is Frs. 500 a piece, the total price falls from Frs. 1,000 in the first case to Frs. 550 in the second and Frs. 505 in the third. The main consumers of steel are the engineering industries which have the additional merit of being labour intensive and possessing a high value added. The ECA report in 1966 on the Development of the Engineering Industry in West Africa recommended various areas in which certain countries in the sub-region could specialize such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural machines -</th>
<th>Nigeria and Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airconditioners and Refrigerators -</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriters -</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing Machines -</td>
<td>Ghana and Senegal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subsequent studies have also recommended, as the foundation for a longer term integration in heavy industries, harmonization of Standards, Research, Manpower Training and Patents. The problems involved in those areas can be summarized briefly. Regarding standards, it has long been the practice, for example, in the English-speaking states of the sub-region to use the so-called "Imperial System" of measures whereas the French-speaking areas use the "Metric" system. Although a number of countries have now plans to switch over to the metric system especially since the British reforms in that area, the harmonization has by no means been completed. One further example is the growing practice in the
West African Sub-regions Demand for iron and steel final products (a), 1975 (in thousand tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dahomey</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Ivory Coast</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Upper Volta</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy sections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and heavy plates</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Medium sections</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light sections</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.1</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>25.2</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>24.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Strip</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>58.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinplate</td>
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<td>9.8</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>273.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>116.6</td>
<td>158.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1371.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Castings and forgings excluded.  (b) Includes rails.

Fig. 16.3
sub-region to set up assembly plants for motor vehicles of multifa-rious varieties. It is feared that this trend will stand in the way of eventual harmonization based on the economic of scale. In the field of research, progress has been hampered by the multiplicity of small research institutes - a fact which not only limits the resources of each individual unit but raises the costs for the individual countries. The countries in the sub-region share certain problems which are suscep-tible to research. The Nigerian-Guinea working party stated the issue succinctly when it underlined that "in the establishment and running of industries to serve the peculiar need of the sub-region and considering the effect of factors like intense heat, temperature changes, humidity and dust on machines, equipment, materials and products, and the best way to use local resources, there will be the need to set up Industrial Research Institutes for the improvement of production. The West African sub-region should not depend only on the "transfer of technology" - if such in fact exists - for industrial development but should develop technology for its own pecu-liar needs..." The same need for standardization exists with regard to manpower training where lack of harmonization in instruction, e.g. in Technical Institutions, greatly impede cooperation. Finally, while the individual countries embark on extensive industrial pro-jects aimed at import substitution in order to conserve foreign ex-change, a constant drainage of foreign exchange is carried on through the payment of royalties and technical fees by the very com-panies set up to promote import substitution.

Various resources in the sub-region also permit considerable co-ordination in the chemical industry. The ECA report on the Che-mical Industry and Fertilizers in West Africa recommended a pattern of distribution of resources based on the availability of cer-tain raw material such as surplus natural gas in Nigeria, raw phos-phate rock of which Togo exports over 1,300,000 tons annually, and cheap electric power from Ghana. On the basis of this a nitrogen complex was recommended to be set up in Nigeria to produce ammonium sulphate fertiliser. A drawback with this suggestion is the fact that sulphur, necessary for the production of ammonium sul-phate is not exploited in the West African sub-region. Nevertheless the existence of limestone and natural gas make the production of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate quite feasible. Togo and Senegal were recommended for the production of super-phosphate, Ghana for a salt electrolysis complex, Ivory Coast for polyvinyl chloride and Dahomey and Guinea for calcium carbide.

There are fifteen countries included in the West African sub-region. This fact alone increases the common problem of economic unions - namely the measures for achieving equitable and balanced distribution and development throughout the region at the same time as economic efficiency is given a priority. For this reason it has
often been suggested that certain light and medium-scale industries can with much benefit be located in other areas of the sub-region not necessarily endowed with the relevant natural resources. Such industries would then be operated not "as national industries for co-operation through trade, but as multi-national projects through joint participation." Such industries include Textile; Cement; Light engineering, e.g. Household utensils; and Soap and Detergents. Many of these industries already exist but harmonization would not only ensure orderly marketing of the products but eliminate wasteful competition. Other areas suggested by surveys for harmonization include Agriculture, Health, Air, Rail Road as well as Maritime and Fluvial transport, Education, Culture, Sports, Energy, Information, Posts and Telecommunications.

The new Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States is intended to free the movement of persons, goods, and capital across the frontiers of member states. Affirming as their basic aim the promotion of cooperation and development in all the fields of economic activity the signatories emphasize "in particular... the need for cooperation in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial matters and in social and cultural matters." Two countries, Nigeria and Togo, played prominent roles in engineering the forces which culminated in the signing of the Treaty. It is significant that the one is anglophone while the other is francophone. After their initiative in 1972 as a result of a meeting between the Nigerian Head of State and President Eyadema of Togo, several meetings of experts and ministers took place in Lomé, Accra, and Monrovia during which the treaty was drafted stage by stage.

The institutions of the new Community include: The Authority, consisting of the Heads of State and Government; The Council of Ministers; the Executive Secretariat; the Tribunal; and Specialized Commissions dealing with (a) Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments matters; (b) Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources; (c) Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; and (d) Social and Cultural Affairs. The Authority which is required to meet once at least annually is to be chairmaned in rotation. Its decisions are "binding on all institutions of the Community." The Treaty provides that the Council of Ministers should meet twice annually. They are charged with seeing to the general functioning of the Community in accordance with the Treaty with the task of issuing directives to subordinate institutions and making recommendations to the Authority. The Executive Secretary serves a four year term which is renewable. He may be removed from office by the Authority on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The Tribunal is responsible for the settlement of disputes referred to it
by the Authority. The Authority decides on its competence composition and statutes. For the rest the Tribunal is to "ensure the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the Treaty."

After barely one year it is too early to make such substantial assessment of the Treaty. But the role of certain factors can already be discerned. One of the most important is the fact that the countries compromising the Community differ very much in size ranging from giant Nigeria to tiny states like Gambia. Naturally, this raises fears among the smaller states over the possible dominance of the bigger states. It is pointed out that Nigeria and Ghana, two anglophone states, together are far greater in size than all the francophones states put together. The recent manoeuvres by Senegal underline these fears. Late in 1975, its Prime Minister M. Abdou Diouf, called for a geographical demarcation of West Africa to enable other African States to join the new Community. He insisted that Senegal had signed the Treaty originally on the understanding that certain "central African" states would be included in ECOWAS. Certain references in President Senghor's statements suggest that Zaire is the country the Senegalese particularly wish to recruit (Senghor had spoken of certain Atlantic states like Zaire and Angola) to create a West Africa stretching from Mauritania in the North to Namibia in the South. Senghor's formula is seen as a move to counterbalance the possible dominance of Nigeria in the new arrangement. As was to be expected, the Nigerians resolutely opposed this suggestion. As one of its Commissioners declared: "...to allow any other country outside our region to join us now is to disturb, prolong and make our task more difficult. This Nigeria will not allow." Nigeria also defends her stand by referring to the ECA approach which encourages the inception of economic communities at the regional level. Other countries have rallied to the Nigerian position. This was the burden of Liberia's President Tolbert's statements in Lagos, in July 1976, criticizing the 'lukewarm attitude of certain members.' Liberia is of the opinion that the new Community should be entrenched before new members are encouraged to join. Early in September, Zaire joined the debate. Its Commissioner for foreign affairs M. Nguza Karl I. Bond declared in Lagos that Zaire "neither wanted anyone to push her into putting herself forward as a candidate, not to seek to force herself on other countries." So far it may appear that Senegal's policy has not received the support of other states. But Senegal has not yet ratified either the ECOWAS Treaty or its protocols. Its tardiness is not without its significance and it may well be that the new Community has not heard the last of this issue.

From a more economic point of view, certain of the member states also appear to have cause for apprehension. These are not only
the small states but the landlocked countries who have been insistent on the question of revenue allocation, pushing through a compromise providing for changes, as the occasion arises, over this matter.

The potential political and economic problems intertwine. As we saw in our study of the East African Community, the political ideologies in member states of a Community can come to play a dysfunctional role when they are widely divergent. Special problems face economic integration between planned economies and laissez-faire economies. West Africa offers an even broader spectrum of differing political ideologies ranging from committed socialists, such as Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to countries often described as capitalist at the other end of the scale, like Ivory Coast. It is significant that in agreeing on the Protocol for the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development some member states insisted on including an Article which states: "The Fund, its Managing Director and officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member state, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of a member state. Only economic considerations shall be weighed impartially to achieve and carry out the purposes and functions of the Fund. The Fund shall not accept loans, special facilities or assistance that may in any way prejudice, limit, deflect or otherwise alter its purposes or functions." For an organ which, among other things, should make judgements on the promotion of development projects, this is a tight rope to walk, and there is not much to protect it from politically inspired criticisms. The above Article also illustrates the penchant of these states for the jealous defence of their sovereignties - a fact which, as we saw, has plagued the life of the OAU. It will be difficult in such an atmosphere to insulate the new Community from the pitfalls created by differences in political ideology.

Another important factor which has already appeared on the scene is the fact that the member states are loath to give up their other economic and political alignments in favour of the new Treaty. The ECOWAS document expressly states that it recognizes "the existence of intergovernmental organizations and other economic groupings within the region." One of the most important is of course the CEAO (West African Economic Community) between the French-speaking states of Niger, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. Before the signing of the Treaty Senegal had sponsored the first two amendments to the draft Treaty, the first recognizing the existence of sub-groups in the sub-region and the second providing for the expansion of membership. The evident concern to shore up the position of existing, possible rivals and future allies is an indication of possible future problems. Not all the pious assurances of the Senegalese minister that the ECOWAS and
CEAO are not contradictory but that the one would consolidate the other, will remove this looming danger so soon from the horizon.

Another organization whose relation with ECOWAS is not yet clarified is OCAM. Formed in 1965 from the debris of the UAMCE it comprised 14 members. But in the past 11 years it has lost Mauritania, Chad, Zaire, the Congo, and Cameroon. The Malagasy Republic whose name embellishes the Organization has shown scant interest. But the 9 states which remain - Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta, Togo, Niger, Benin, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and Mauritius are predominantly West African and can come to counterbalance the ECOWAS to which their other neighbours belong. The fact that they have connections with other parts of the continent can also come to give them leverage as a formidable pressure group. The OCAM has been described as an attempt at Commonwealth à Francaise, its stance has been commonly held to be hidebound, representing 'a conservative francophone cabal.' This certainly seems to be the opinion of Gabon which, on leaving the Organization in 1976, described it as "a continuation of the old game of the former colonial powers in Africa. They still hold the leadership of some states in the Organization..." although it fair to point out that Gabon had more than enough selfish reasons to wish to opt out: The OAU Summit in 1977 is due to take place in Gabon and what more palliating and symbolic gesture towards the progressive African states could that country offer than leave an organization that has acquired a decidedly reactionary image. More importantly, just before the Gabonese withdrawal, the OCAM was due to create a Solidarity Fund at its next meeting. This would have placed additional burdens on its richest members in favour of the poorer states. And Gabon is its richest member. The Gabonese newspaper L'Union did not mince words: "The withdrawal of our country, always a milch-cow, will save us from enormous and useless expense from which Gabon draws no profit in return..." However, it must be noted that Gabon is not withdrawing from the specialized bodies of the OCAM. And it is in this field that the Organization, apart from its tendencious political stance (at its inaugural meeting its goal was stated to be "a sort of half-way house between the OAU and the regional economic groupings to which many of us belong"), will pose a competition for ECOWAS. Gabon is continuing with Air Afrique and its affiliate of a chain of hotels, Hôtel Afrique, both of which would assume a dubious position, to say the least, when ECOWAS integration progresses to Air communication and tourism. The same goes for other organs of technical cooperation such as industrial protection and technology transfer in which the OCAM has been relatively successful. Ominous too is the fact that its members operate BAMREL - a sort of legislative consultancy.

A statistical problem which characterizes the pattern of trade in
West Africa has already raised its head in the drawing of the Proto­
col. There are certain deficiencies in the recording of trade in the
sub-region pertaining especially to the distinction between domes­
tic and foreign trade. It is, of course, always problematic to make
clear cut distinction between domestic exports and various types of
re-export due to questions connected with bulk-breaking, filling and
other forms of initial processing. In advanced industrialized coun­
tries, adequately organized transport and customs systems make
these problems negligible. The same cannot be said for the West
African region where the transport system is far from satisfactory
and the borders are in many instances sparsely and inefficiently
supplied with custom services. Also many of the countries in the re­
region are landlocked, coupled with the fact that processes such as
bulk-breaking and filling and the warehouses are concentrated at the
harbours. Consequently, even when the trade is recorded, transac­
tions involving re-export, within the region, of merchandise import­
ed from overseas, are recorded as domestic trade instead or straight­
forward re-export. The same applies to the distinction between
intra-West African trade and trade within existing customs unions in
the region. For example, in the Customs Union of West African
states only sea-borne intra-trade is recorded and are at the same time
excluded from foreign trade. However, there is no uniformity. Sin­
ce 1966, some countries in the Union have begun to record their in­
tra-trade as foreign trade. The rule in official trade statistics of re­
cording the country of origin or of destination as that of last con­
signment or first destination inflates the share of countries neigh­
bouring to landlocked states.

Of the five Protocols presented to the ECOWAS Council of Mi­
nisters in Accra in 1976 only three were adopted. The two on which
there was no agreement relate directly and indirectly to the above
point. They were (1) "the definition of the concept of products ori­
ginating from member states" and (2) assessment of loss of revenue
by member states.

Three Protocols were adopted. The first relates to the contribu­
tions by member states to the community's budget. The fact that
the contributions to the budget are to be made in convertible curren­
cy* has added to the apprehension of the poorer member states over
the problem of equitability and the effect of this additional drain on
their short supply of foreign exchange. The final agreement on the
assessment of contributions takes account of the Gross Domestic
Product and per capita income of each member state as well as the
GDP and per capita of the Community as a whole:

*Convertible currency being as defined by the International Monetary Fund and the unit of
account for the Community's budget being I.M.F. Special drawing Rights (SDR)
The contribution of each member state...shall be assessed on the basis of a co-efficient which takes into account the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the per capita income of all member states. For this purpose, the co-efficient shall be calculated as the ratio of the GDP of each member state to the total GDP of all the member states, plus two-thirds of the ratio of the per capita income of each member state to the total per capita income of all member states. Unless otherwise directed by the Council of Ministers, all extra-ordinary expenditure will be levied in the same proportion as the above. The data published by the United Nations will be the basis of calculating the agreed co-efficients. Finally, the contributions, which should be paid into the Community's budget within three months of the beginning of the financial year, are subject to review every three years by the Council of Ministers after the recommendations of a Commission on Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments matters.

The second approved Protocol seeks to deal with the question of re-exportation of goods within the Community and how to determine the basis for regulating the amount of customs duty refundable by one member to another. For these purposes the member state importing a particular commodity is termed "the importing state" while any other member of the Community to which the said commodity is transferred is termed "the receiving state". In general, goods on which custom duties or other tariffs have been levied in the importing state are not subject to further levies. However the Protocol deals with cases where the custom duty on such goods in the receiving state exceeds that which is levied in the importing state and vice-versa. An important item in this Protocol relates to sanctions against member states who persist in "continuous infringement" of the terms.

The third Protocol concerns the Fund for Cooperation Compensation and Development. Its aim include:

1. "to finance or participate in financing development projects and specific feasibility studies in member states."

2. to provide compensation to member states which suffer losses as a result of the location of 'Community enterprises.'

3. to provide compensation and other forms of assistance to member states which suffer losses arising from the application of the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty on the liberalisation of trade within the Community.

4. to guarantee foreign investment made in member states in respect of enterprises established in pursuance of the provisions
of the ECOWAS Treaty as regards the harmonization of indus-
trial policies.

5. to provide means to facilitate the sustained mobilization of internal and external resources for the member states of the Community; and

6. to promote development projects in the less developed member states of ECOWAS."

Though it might be a vain task to attempt a thoroughgoing ana-
lysis of ECOWAS now in its infancy, some of the above observa-
tions might serve to give an insight into the problems that lie in wait for the new Organization despite the formal expression of a staunch wish to move towards economic integration in the sub-region. The drafting and ratification of the Protocols are proving to be no mean tasks. Nonetheless, the fact that they are progressing despite these issues speaks not only for the growing "we feeling" among the component states but also for considerable increase, at high levels, of the political will to unite. If the present signs are not belied, it would seem that the francophone and anglophone groups are no longer monolithic in their spheres. At the same time as the leading members of the groups are showing a greater propensity for compromise with their counterparts, a crisscross of other bilateral and multilate-
ral economic intercourse is uniting members of both groups. Before the ECOWAS Treaty was signed, the French-speaking members of CEAO had refused to enter their signature unless the Protocols were ready at the same time stating in black and white the final terms and details of the agreements. Only in this way, it seemed, could their innumerable fears of eclipse and domination be allayed. It is widely accepted that it was by dint of a sustained campaign of persuasion by one of the leading members of the CEAO - no less a personage than Houphouët-Boigny himself - that these states finally signed the Treaty before negotiating the Protocols.

Soon after the Treaty was concluded, trouble erupted between Togo and Benin. It was the existence of the Treaty which showed up the developments in all their absurdity. Stage by stage a verbal warfare carried on between these two neighbouring West African countries had escalated to a point at which they closed their borders. Shortly before, Ghana and Nigeria had concluded an agreement by which the former was to help Nigeria ease the notorious congestion of her harbours by diverting part of the traffic from the Nigerian ports to Tema in Ghana from where the consignments were to be transported by road to Nigeria. Since this meant that the land traffic had to pass through Togo, the repercussions of the Benin - Togo rupture on the economy of at least one of her neighbours was
immediate and devastating. The crisis was soon settled but other political problems have disturbed the new trend towards integration. Among these have been the frontier problems between Upper Volta and Mali over the mineral-rich zone at their borders, the tenuous relations between Togo and Ghana which are occasionally expressed in border incidents, and the diplomatic problems between Nigeria and Senegal over the Organization of the Arts Festival due to be held in Lagos in 1977. Many of these problems turn out to be minor irritants but some of them persist as embers from which conflagrations can develop.

In spite of these negative forces, there are considerable factors that instil confidence. The member states in the budding Community entertain, it seems, few illusions about the speed and scope of their new creation at least at the inception. This has been shown not only in the reluctance of the member states to increase the membership immediately but in such statements as that attributed to the Nigerian economist, Professor Adebayo Adedeji (who is now the Executive Secretary of the ECA), who played a leading part in the negotiations leading to ECOWAS, to the effect that the member states of the new Organization should not expect tangible benefits from their cooperation before the expiration of five years.

The Treaty itself sets fifteen years as its target date for the total liberalisation of trade between the member states! A common external tariff is not envisaged before the end of eight years. Also, the hardheaded approach of the negotiators is an indication of lessons learned from the history of the East African Community among others, and, if it promises long drawn-out sessions, it may at least offer the best means for obtaining a realistic basis on which to build a dynamic structure. Again, several key states, in the sense of size and diplomatic influence, like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Ghana and Togo seem to be enthusiastically committed to the idea of a West African Community. The sub-region has every prospect of producing its own positive deus ex machina within the area, to lead the way towards integration. Finally, the troubled world economic situation continues to offer a clear perspective for a realistic appraisal of the need for cooperation between African states.

A growing network of economic intercourse.

Apart from the East African community, and ECOWAS, the African scene today presents a picture of evergrowing economic ties between states on regional, bilateral, and multilateral levels. A brief attention to a few examples of this trend will reveal that many of these mushrooming Communities have remained no more than token - albeit flamboyant - gestures to mark the general vogue of
erecting institutions of intra-African economic cooperation. It is not perhaps that the purveyors of these structures are not sincere. It is rather that, apart from setting up institutions, they have not taken the various steps needed to remove the worst of the disabilities in intra-African trade which we have pointed out. If this were, however, the only traits of the new tendency, they would hardly be worth mentioning. But it brings with it other consequences which are likely to become crucial in the march towards integration. Firstly, it is this expanding web of functional activities on the continent, however fragile they are in their beginnings, which make for the functionalist prescription for integration. In this sense, they serve as a support for the overarching efforts expressed politically in the activities of the OAU and functionally in the promotive efforts of the ECA as well as the giant organizations such as the East and West African Communities. Secondly, the proliferation of different institutions aimed at developing different aspects of trade and industry has let loose an equivalent reaction in the private and semi-private sectors. Traders and businessmen, budding industrialists, middlemen and hangers-on, can be seen bracing themselves for an era of intense economic relations between African states—a transactionalist millenium.

The Riparian Communities.

Many of these Communities are grouped around some common natural resource. Thus, we observe the flourishing of economic institutions of riparian states in different parts of the continent aimed at developing economic ties between their territories on the basis of the resources of the river, lake or basin concerned. One of the most promising of these new economic structures is the Mano River Union. Set up in October 1974 between Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Union aims at harnessing the hydro-electric and irrigation potential of the Mano River Basins in order to increase the food and power production in the member states. Studies which were initiated by the Secretariat of the Union, have related to a wide range of schemes which include tariff harmonization, promotion of bilateral trade in locally produced goods, a revenue stamp scheme, coastal shipping, joint marketing of local agricultural products, deep sea fishing and cooperation in other industrial projects.

In July 1976, President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone met in Monrovia (Liberia) with President Tolbert to review the Treaty setting up the Union. The seven Protocols on which they agreed include:

a. Participation of other West African states in the Mano River Union.
b. Privileges and immunities of the Mano River Union.
c. Establishment of a Postal Union, a Union Postal Affairs Committee and matters related thereto:
d. Establishment of the Union Training and Research Board, a Union Training and Research Fund and other facilities;
e. Principles and policies affecting intra-Union trade and trade between member states and third countries;
f. Establishment of a Union Commission on Industry and Trade; and,
g. Principles and policy for the promotion of union industries.

Before this, considerable progress had been made by the Union’s Ministerial Council over the decision on a common procedure for customs control of vehicular traffic between the two states. Also, discussions were proceeding over the establishment of a Common External Tariff as well as common custom duties exemptions. Earlier, the two states had decided to set up a Commission on Industry and Trade and a Training and Research Board. A Union Training Programme for Telecommunications was set up in September 1976, and projects were under way in silviculture, forestry, maritime, postal and agricultural training. The Union’s Council of Ministers also approved a transitional budget of 372,824 leone. A Sierra Leonean Dr. Cyril Bright, was appointed Secretary-General. These arrangements which parallel the measures envisaged by the ECOWAS raise question as to the future relation between the two Organizations. The Mano River Union considers itself a viable economic unit and a foundation for building a larger organization as is demonstrated by its willingness to admit new members either on a full or partial basis. But the two states comprising it are both favourably disposed towards ECOWAS, are both willing to contribute their experience towards the consolidation of the larger Organization in which, to all appearances, they seem ready to let their union be absorbed in time. Gambia has already applied for membership in the Union and the OAU has formally supported the expansion.

Three states (Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal) make up the Senegal River States which are grouped around the River Senegal and are organized for its development. The Organization’s executive power is held by a High Commission and a Secretariat. The High Commission is headed by a Malian, M. Amadou Aw. In the past year the organization has instituted studies and plans for the building of several dams the construction of which is expected to begin in 1978. Several countries including Kuwait, West Germany, France, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Canada, are to help finance the project which will be used for hydro-electric production and will help irrigate more
than 430,000 ha. of land in the fight against the Sahel drought. A 900 km navigation canal is also planned. The biggest dam will be at the mouth of River Senegal at Diama and the other is planned at Manantali. Apart from these, new ports are planned at Saint Louis and Kayes, and 10 intermediary staging ports will be improved.

Despite long-standing border problems between them Senegal and Gambia have also entered the race for economic cooperation. Apart from their frontier problems, the concept of "Senegambia" projected by its proponents as the rational solution of the economic problems plaguing the tiny state of Gambia, has long disturbed relations between the two countries by playing on the fears of the Gambian leaders who do not wish to be absorbed into a larger state (see Fig. 16.4). At the beginning of 1976, President Senghor and Jawara announced that they had settled their border problems once and for all and were setting up a River Gambia Basin Authority. The two countries also appeared, after three years of negotiation, to have settled the question of Gambia's Southern ocean frontier - a case which was once dragged before the International Court of Justice. Gambia agreed to the building of a toll bridge to link the two parts of Senegal separated by Gambian territory - a project likely to be financed by the EEC Development Fund under the EEC-ACP agreement. Plans were being discussed for the building of two dams - one at Sanbangalou in Southern Senegal to provide power for projected iron ore mines in Senegal, and the other at Kekreti on the Guinean frontier close to Gambia to regulate the salt-water intake of River Gambia during the dry season. Guinea, another bordering state, has been invited to participate in these development projects. What is significant in all this is that Senegal is francophone while Gambia is anglophone and they have normally belonged to two different spheres in West African inter-state relations. Other areas in which projects are planned between them include fishing, telecommunications, education and culture. A modern road is also planned to link Dakar, Banjul, Ziguinchor and Bissau. The two countries have discussed sharing the air time in Senegal's television programmes until Gambia gets its own network. Finally, the two Presidents have dabbled in the field of politics by issuing joint views on topics ranging between Angola, the Middle East, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Within West Africa there is also the so-called Liptako-Gourma Authority comprising Upper Volta, Niger and Mali. In May 1976, at the eighth session of the Authority, extensive discussions were held on the strategy for regional development especially in the field of communications on which a study report was presented. All the three countries in the Authority are French-speaking.
The Niger River Commission includes Cameroons, Ivory Coast, Mali, Upper Volta, Benin, Nigeria and Niger. In 1976 its budget stood at US $30 m. At a meeting in Paris from September 6-9, the Commission approved plans for developing the Niger River Basin over a five year period. Also taking part were: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), US AID, the French Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) and the World Meteorology Organization (WMO), with Holland and the Friends of Sahel Club present as observers. The Authority aims at utilizing the potential of River Niger to combat drought and carry out other improvement schemes. But other areas of economic cooperation are also envisaged, aimed at improving the living standards of their peoples.

The Chad Basin Commission groups Nigeria with Chad, Cameroon and Niger in joint ventures centered on Lake Chad. The projects promoted by the Commission include agricultural development in which fisheries and animal husbandry play a central role. This has not prevented occasional fishing disputes between notably the citizens of Nigeria and Chad. But the Commission has played a prominent part in settling such questions. By 1976, Nigeria had contributed about US$960,000 to the Commission towards various projects such as the harnessing of the basin’s water resources. The French government was undertaking, in 1976, a project aimed at safeguarding and developing livestock in the area while US AID was financing some road projects and telecommunication links.

It is of course the large and longer-standing West African Organizations that are exclusively French-speaking which present the most difficult problem regarding the reconciliation of their roles with that of ECOWAS. Some of them have formidable and effective economic achievements to their credit and with the more of less strong backing of France and other friendly extra-African powers they have prospects to offer to their members benefits sufficiently tempting to detract from their dedication to the all West African structure. The OCAM, for example, despite the series of withdra-
wal of membership by some of its component states, still retains nine members and a new state, the Seychelles, is contemplating membership. Besides, it has formally renounced its political role for an exclusively economic one and has added an impressive list of projects to its achievements. In 1976, its budget was 387.4 m CFA francs - about US $2 m. Under its multinational maritime navigation project it expects to take charge of half of the traffic of its member-states within a few years. Its industrialization programme on a regional basis has been launched and the projects involved are expected to be heavily financed by the EEC with French sponsorship. Apart from these, the OCAM states agreed in 1976, to set up (i) African and Mauritian Institute of Bilingualism (in Mauritius) (ii) Inter-state School of Architecture and Town-planning (in Togo) and (iii) Institute for Training of Statisticians (located in Kigali-Rwanda).

The budget of the Mutual Aid and Guaranteed Loan Fund of the Entente Council stood at 700 m. CFA francs (US $3 m.) in 1976. Its Management Committee distributes substantial amounts in loan to finance economic activities in the member states. Thus in 1976, a loan of 210 m. CFA francs was given to the Togo Cement Company to enlarge its clinker factory at Lomé and a guarantee was given for a loan taken by the Upper Volta Chamber of Commerce to finance the construction of warehouses and offices for that landlocked country in Abidjan (Ivory Coast).

The West African Economic Community (CEAO) has a recurrent budget of 1,500 m. CFA francs. It sponsors various projects in the fields of agriculture, meat production, fishing, trade, and transport and communications. In 1976, it approved pilot research work into studier cereal hybrids adapted to sahelian conditions and a quarantine centre at Maradi (Niger) for screening imported plants for diseases. Other projects related to the improvement of water resources, and plans for a joint company to handle supply and distribution of petroleum products among the members in view of the rise in oil prices. The Community is also investing its resources on the Senegal, Niger, and Volta rivers, which flow through the area, by keeping those rivers navigable all the year round. Hitherto, the distribution of imports had been held up for long periods in the Community's major sea ports when the rivers were rendered unnavigable. Apart for this, the Community is planning a joint maritime and river transport company. A research project has been instituted on the exploitation of solar energy. Various studies and schemes are planned for the promotion of trade within the Community. In this connection 8 m. CFA francs was set apart for a Dakar Trade Week in 1976. In the meat trade, standardization of wholesale and retail prices is planned as well as the use of modern aid, such as telex, to centralize market information. Joint training of personnel is a part of this scheme.
Under a programme for its Development Fund (FCD) programme, (which stands at 2,280.6 m. CFA francs to date) two thirds of the fund (1,520.4 m.) will be used to compensate member states for loss of revenue resulting from the preferential trade system within the Community. One third (760.2 m.) is reserved for development plans and 650 m. of this is to go to the four least industrialized countries of the Community (Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). The Community has also created a reserve fund of 38 m. CFA francs to finance compensation payments within the preferential trade system in the event that the allocated funds do not suffice. Finally, the building of a CEAO headquarters was begun. It is estimated to cost 3,000 m. CFA francs. As can be seen from the scope and magnitude of the CEAO programmes the Organization can come to pose a real threat for ECOWAS particularly as its members have the added affinity of being all francophone.

There are some riparian Communities which comprise East and Central African states. The Tanganyika-Kivu Lakes Basin Community is made up of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. These countries were invited to a meeting in May 1975, at the instance of the ECA, for preliminary discussions leading to a formal establishment of a Community. But Zaire and Rwanda are also members of the newly-formed (CEPGL) Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes comprising in addition Burundi. The Community’s headquarters will be in Gisenye (Rwanda) and membership is open to all states in the Central African Region. Its Convention includes cooperation in economic, technical, scientific and cultural matters.

The largest economic grouping in Central Africa is the UDEAC (the Central African Customs and Economic Union). Its member states are Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Congo People’s Republic, and Gabon. Chad, which withdrew, in 1969, has now expressed the wish to join once more. In the past decade customs formalities between the members have been largely simplified and standardized and the Union is now poised to establish a full-fledged Common Market. The Presidents of the member states could be observed on September 11, 1976, each brandishing his trowel in Brazzaville, the capital city of the Congo Republic. They were laying the foundation stone of the new Central African Development Bank. With a capital of 16,000 m. CFA francs the bank will devote half of its resources for financing regional projects and the other half for national projects.

The once promising Maghreb has lost much of its momentum towards integration since Libya pulled out owing to political reasons. There are doubtless a number of strong psychological historical and cultural affinities which are conducive to cooperation between Tunisia, Algeria and Libya. Also it would seem that a consi-
derable reservoir of aspiration towards a greater Maghreb exists among the peoples of that region. According to *L'Action*, there exists a strong "belief in an economic Maghreb, the construction of which will be achieved by increased bilateral cooperation in all spheres." But despite the existence of joint commissions between Algeria and Tunisia which have been meeting for several years, not much progress has been recorded. In 1976, the two countries insti-
tuted joint projects in the production of plate glass, oil-bearing plants, and cement works and there has been increasing talk of a United Arab Maghreb or at least and Economic Maghreb, particu-
larly since a meeting was projected between Presidents Boumedienne and Bourgiba. Border problems apart, it is difficult to divorce the prospect of economic cooperation in the Maghreb from the ideological cleavages which continue to enstrange the countries con-
cerned and the greater political issues inherent in the Middle East crisis.

It would seem from the above that the African states are making assiduous and even frenetic efforts to make good their unequivocal choice of functional cooperation, expressed in regionalism, as the highroad to integration. We noted that these sprawling functional infrastructures contribute the bits and pieces of which the integrated entities of the functionalist prescription are made of. But the fact is not an unmixed blessing. We pointed out the divisive tendencies inherent in the division of the continent into groups on the basis of former colonial languages. Still worse is the fact that these group-
ings tend to be supported by extra-African powers on the same basis of colonial affinity. It is on such bases that the Godfather syn-
drome foments. Even though these groups are ostensibly economic, we observed how some of them have already begun to extend their cooperation into political spheres. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that a serious peril lies in store for the continent in view of the abo-
ve. All the same, the countries involved in these efforts have prob-
ably, by the very multiplicity of their associations, increased the amount of foreign aid which they can net in - for what it is worth. If they can make judicious use of it and sidestep as well the political pitfalls concomitant with them, they may yet be able to coordinate the functional fragments which they are now enthusiastically creat-
ing. So far the ECA seems to have taken an optimistic view of this development by not attempting to stand in way of the various Authorities, Commissions, Unions and Communities and instead positively encouraging them in the hope that a sufficient transac-
tional basis can be established between the African countries as a springboard for further ventures in integration. A remarkable no-
velty in the ECA strategy is the new integrated five year plan for African countries - the first of its kind - launched by that UN organ in 1976. It covers agriculture, industry, trade, environment, tourism and education. It accords special importance to rural development and the process of self-reliance in industry. As the ECA document put is:

"The instrumentation for industry includes African multinational corporations, long-term agreements for the supply of raw materials, intermediate and finished products, the development of surface transport and the adoption on a regional basis of common technical design standards for key products."

We also pointed out that these developments in the regional economic cooperation are paralleled by a proliferation of bilateral economic and trade agreements which in turn have set off a spate of activity in the private business sphere between African countries. We shall not go into the examination of these processes but only content ourselves with delineating briefly the different forms of the bilateral agreements. The first group relates to neighbouring countries who have had long standing cooperation from colonial times or whose similar colonial experience enable them to institute cooperation more easily. Others, like Togo, and Ghana belonged to different colonial experiences. Both of these groups have nonetheless that fact in common that the continuous crusades of the ECA coupled with the present conjuncture in the world economy have made them more amenable to rational arguments about integration. There are bilateral agreements which stem from ideological affinities. Thus Algeria establishes various sorts of cooperation with Guinea-Bissau as like-minded radical states, and mixed economies like Nigeria and the Ivory Coast can find areas of fruitful bilateral cooperation despite the ups and downs of practical politics. Other bilateral agreements have to do with the new oil politics sometimes mixed with ideology. Libya has found itself able to win friends and isolate enemies by using its revenue from oil resources to strike bilateral economic bargains in which it bears the brunt of the cost. Whatever the various reasons one fact emerges even in a vast continent with fifty odd states: a crisscross of economic transactions is fast spreading over the entire continent with all that it involves in trade, human contact, and intertwining of interest.
Footnotes to Chapter sixteen


2. The major part of the following review is taken from the report of the working party of Nigeria and Guinea to the West African Community.


5. See ECA, No. E/CN 14/INR/126.


7. See Nigeria-Guinea working paper, op. cit., p.98.


17. Summary: African integration in an analytical perspective

Theories, Karl Popper has said, are tentative solutions of problems. The problems and experiences centered around community-building in Europe have been responsible, in the main, for culling out the four approaches to theorizing on political integration which we reviewed in the first section. But we have argued that, salient as some of the findings of those approaches might be, the fact that they are informed ostensibly by the traits of a particular region imposes certain limitations on them. To the extent that the global regions do not share uniform characteristics, these theories are susceptible to a tendency to focus on certain aspects of the phenomenon of integration while neglecting others which may be equally important for the refinement of theory. In this sense the pre-theories of integration must be regarded as doubly tentative. While we do not essay on new theories, the account in the foregoing chapters is intended to enable us draw whatever knowledge is offered from focusing on a particular experiment in unification in which familiar variables from contemporary theories intermingle with novel traits of which theory has not yet taken sufficient account. At the same time, by drawing eclectically from those theories we expect to tackle more meaningfully the central questions which we posed for ourselves concerning the understanding of the conditions which have governed - and govern - the unification process in Africa.

It is not merely a question of taxomony although that is essential enough. We are more likely to extend the horizons of theory if adequate analyses are made of separate and clearly defined regions on the basis of adequately delineated traits. The findings from such rigorous taxonomies placed on the assembly line of theory are a sine qua non to an effective macrotheory on political integration. But there is an even more important question, namely the mitigation of the tyranny of ethnocentrism. The image of community and the esoteric credentials of integration have heretofore been a reflection of the body of relatively successful experiments on integration going on in Europe. Despite the growing consensus that integration is a process, this image has led to an incipient dichotomy - a way of looking at other unification experiments in other global regions - on the basis of a "present or absent" measure. We have, therefore argued that the various regional experiments in integration ought to be located on a continuum of "more or less." This is the place to recall our suggested definition of integration intended to envisage an
open-ended process capable of application to unification attempts which may not necessarily be as advanced as the European Community: For us integration is a process of cohesion between specific and previously independent groups and individuals, in terms of values, institutions, and communication, which facilitate escalating sequences of social contact cooperation and consensus.

By the same token, a process which is antithetical to the above definition would represent disintegration. In other words, this would be represented by a process in which cohesion is reduced and the avenues of social contact cooperation and consensus are narrowed down through the whittling away of common functions, values, institutions, and communication. It should not be assumed, however, that expansion or retraction necessarily take place simultaneously within the different components of our definition. Herein lies the cardinal advantage of a definition which subsumes the different aspects of integration emphasized variously by the functionalists, federalists, pluralists, and neo-functionalists, at the same time as it affords the opportunity to assess - and with adequate conceptualization operationalize - the levels attained in the different spheres. The pluralists minimize the importance of institutions, and their subscription to the primacy of the sovereign capacities of individual states leads them to upgrade the ability of these states to compromise, to avail themselves of peaceful diplomatic methods - in short their 'mutual responsiveness' measured in terms of transactions and communications. The functionalists focus on cooperation in welfare, technology and economies while in the neo-functionalist view it is the evolution of the decision-making apparatus envinced in new institutions for conflict resolution which matter in the long run. The federalists put their bet on the dramatic transfer of legal and political authority to common political institutions. Each of these approaches represents an ideal goal which by the same token, minimizes the importance of other components. By incorporating each of them into a broad definition of the phenomenon we take a dynamic view of integration. This is of particular value when we examine unification experiments which operate in the nether ends of the continuum. Within such ranges, it is, in our view, more relevant to single out the components of the process, the conditions that promote them and the direction in which they are proceeding rather than get bogged down by the largely futile task of defining the stage of integration which has been attained.

From the perspective of African histriography, this reasoning becomes doubly relevant. In one of his definitions of integration, Haas speaks of a process which links a given concrete international system with a dimly discernible future system. To begin with, one can presume that the reference to a dimly discernible goal is more in principle than in fact. Now, the African states, we have tried to show,
are generally agreed on a particular aspiration towards a goal which is projected definitely in the dim distant future notwithstanding the protestations of the radicals. We might also qualify our statement as to the general agreement on a distant goal, by pointing to their divergent motives which would imply that for some of the states this is only a verbal commitment. In short, they may be more interested in conserving the distant future than in the goal itself. Be that as it may, once we have a prima facie case showing that the experiment in unification has begun in earnest, be it partially or in toto on four fronts (functional, decision-making, social behaviour, political attitudes), it is arguable how relevant it is to enter a debate over whether integration is present or absent. For several reasons. Firstly, to the extent that the question refers to the ideal or the end-product itself, the answer is virtually self-evident. It is not conceivable that in thirteen short years these countries, burdened as they are by tremendous economic and political problems would have consummated integration. Furthermore, the question of what the end-product should look like has not been finally resolved. The most advanced of the on-going experiments at integration is also one of the oldest - if not the oldest and it may be quite some time before other experiments can be assumed to have had sufficient time to yield tangible results. Therefore it is not clear what immutable criteria could be brought to bear in the attempt to answer the question whether integration is present or absent. If one adds to all this the danger that the image of the hitherto most advanced experiment is liable to be confused with possible end-products, then it is reasonable to suggest that one of the best ways of studying budding integrated units is to focus on the dynamic aspect as suggested by our definition.

Others have also suggested various ways of breaking down the process of integration into components and levels. The neo-functionalists have been at the forefront of such exercises. A few years ago Nye suggested a means of disaggregating the concept of integration in order to "develop simple measurements for its component parts, and leave the relationship between them open for empirical verification." Three types, capable of being broken down into subtypes, were suggested-namely: economic integration (formation of a transnational economy), social integration (formation of a transnational society,) and political integration (formation of transnational political interdependence.) Furthermore, rather than generally posit the continuities between economic and political integration such as portrayed in Alker and Pachala's claim that "the level of economic interaction between nations can serve as a reliable indicator of their degree of political integration...," it would become feasible to attempt separate measurements of the two components since in certain cases one might be declining at the same time as the other is rising. Such was, in fact, the case in the East African Community in
the early sixties. Fig. 17.1 represents the scores on political policy integration \( (\text{PI}_2) \), as recorded by Lindberg's index - where \( \text{PI}_1 \) represents institutional integration, \( \text{PI}_3 \) represents attitudinal integration, and \( \text{PI}_4 \) represents security community concept of Deutsch etc. etc.

If economic Integration \( (\text{EI}_t) \) - where \( \text{EI}_5 \) represents Services integration - in the region is plotted in the form of regional trade as percentage of total trade the result would be as in Fig. 17.2.

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Fig. 17.1  LINDBERG'S INDEX

Similarly one Nordic observer, Nils Andrén, suggested a broad basic definition of integration, preferring to attempt a comparable disaggregation into functions, systems, levels and dynamics.² It is not necessary for us here to go into comparisons of the relative merits of these various suggestions. The conceptual frameworks which they suggest are salient if they offer the possibility for the researcher
to pose the relevant kind of questions in the quest for an understanding of the conditions that provide for the move towards integration in a given region. As Andrén remarks, such frameworks need not "aim at setting up 'if - then' propositions, simply because our present knowledge of integrative processes does not seem to provide the necessary basis for such propositions." Finally, each of our four components represents spheres which ought to be capable of being subdivided into subcategories that are susceptible to operationalization. We shall return to this point.

Fig. 17.2 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN EAST AFRICA

Our analysis on ideology and Pan-Africanism was rather extensive and deserves short shrift in this section. However, it might be valuable to summarize our findings. In several ways the ideology which fires the African experiment in integration can be said to be diffuse. During its history it has come to be partially eclipsed by at least one other equally pervasive ideology, namely nationalism. Further, the debates which have been going on within the OAU have resulted in an explicit agreement, at least among the African leaders, to advance that ideology cautiously. Equally, developments in the conjuncture of international politics and economics, especially in
the last decade, have begun to bestow on that ideology a new pragmatism which is vividly portrayed in the rapidly increasing number of areas of functional cooperation between African states. Finally, the ominous progress of the state of affairs among the squatter regimes of Southern Africa has influenced the development of the Pan-Africanist ideology in crucial ways.

The Pan-Africanist ideology owes its diffuseness in part to the circumstances under which it arose but also to the nature of its leadership both in the early and later stages. We traced the beginning of this ideology to the horrendous political economic and social conditions of the Africans in the Western hemisphere in the nineteenth century. Although there is abundant evidence of incipient organizations ranging from abortive revolts through religious syncretic movements to ‘Back to Africa’ movements, directed against this condition, the movement as a whole was not compactly and purposefully organized. The nature of the society in which these victims of oppression lived precluded, of course, the emergence of an outstanding leadership capable of unifying the aspirations of the Afro-Americans into a legitimate social force. Much of the leadership had to operate within the twilight world between martyrdom and notoriety. Some of them could only acquire some measure of legitimacy by assuming extremely moderate attitudes and sponsoring very diluted programmes of social advancement. For this reason, the leadership was always in the position to split the support of its followers. There were two types of Afro-Americans, it has been facetiously put: those who liked Booker T. Washington and those who did not. It is a measure of the extent of this predicament that Booker T. Washington, for all his extensive contribution to better the lot of his fellow Afro-Americans, is still remembered among a considerable part of posterity as a stooge.

Those who embraced more clear-cut and radical programmes faced opprobrium and the relentless antagonism of irresistible societal forces. Many of them found their early graves. The most famous of them, Garvey, was hounded, ostracized, convicted, imprisoned, banished from the land; died in exile and indigence and, as the story goes, was accorded the vindictive oppurtunity of reading his own scurrilous obituary on his death bed. Such destinies must have daunted other would-be leaders with the result that their followers were periodically left floating in disarray. The ad hoc nature of the series of Pan-African Congresses was in part because there was no consistent leadership. Although the services of DuBois were recognized by subsequent African leadership and have been lately sung by the Dar-es-Salaam Sixth Pan-African Congress in 1974, he had by no means the undivided acceptance of his peers.

But if the Pan-Africanist ideology in its beginnings was not an organized social force it was replete with demands. Vagueness was
not its main quality; its finest aspect was the consistency with which it advanced demands for freedom. Especially after the Africans began to dominate the movement, these demands multiplied and affected far-flung areas of the African continent - Bechuanaland, Rhodesia, Abyssinia, the Gold Coast and a dozen other areas. The two world wars, and the African role in their pursuit, helped to spur on these demands. If a man is asked to fight to eradicate oppression it will be surprising if he himself does not harden against oppression in the process. The events surrounding the two world wars confirmed the place of freedom in the Pan-Africanist ideology.

Another important aspect of the Pan-Africanist ideology was the awareness it created of Pan-African cultural affinity. The history of Pan-Africanism can be seen as the history of the growth and entrenchment in modern times of the concept that Africans have some affinities that separate them from other continents. Inspite of their excesses and some of their more unpalatable naiveté, the declarations on the African Personality and Negritude were the figurative and poetic platters on which this concept was offered. Those contemporary Africans who believe that they are kith and kin (the modern "brothers" and "sisters") are heirs of this legacy.

But perhaps the most valuable aspect of the Pan-Africanist ideology has been its role in offering a new way of analyzing the economic condition of the African continent. This concept of course interwines with strands from the consciousness of cultural affinity and the demands for freedom. Equally, it has some of its roots in some of the doctrines of the nineteenth and twentieth century including communism which erupted in time to fortify the resolve of the early Pan-Africanists. Together with the feeling of cultural affinity, it is this new economic awareness that is sustaining the modern process of integration in Africa despite the exigencies of politics.

This then, is the bedrock on which the Pan-Africanist ideology is founded. In the light of that, the rampant myth that the Pan-Africanist ideology is negative and racial recedes into absurdity. This much can be said for it however: The same early forces which rendered the movement vague also made it ineffectual. Since its protagonists had little leverage or power to produce results, it was easy to confuse this circumstantial inertia with lack of positive content. To the jaundiced eye, the early Pan-Africanists must have appeared like a bunch of politically conscious students with an axe to grind - brandishing faith without works. In recent times, however, as the movement has gathered more sinews in the form of the commitment of African states to the positive demands on freedom and economic equitability, the "negative content" argument appears at once misconceived and anachronistic. As for the arguments about the "racial content," the increasing evidence of cooperation between the African movement and the countries of the so-called third world as
well as the fact of the willingness of the movement to recognize peaceful and fair cooperation between African states and their former colonizers ought to demonstrate the fallacy of those ideas.

But the legacy of vagueness seems to persist. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity is a living record of the movement’s ambivalence. There is both a commitment to create 'a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences' and a confirmation of the 'sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence.' Our analysis led us to conclude that the Pan-Africanist ideology was of the militant type characterized by a specific demand, namely for freedom. We noted that the advent of independence to the various African states meant that this major demand was formally satisfied. This took much of the force from the ideology leaving it to assume the subsidiary role of catalyst. We also noted the advent of nationalism on the territorial levels which put more insistent demands on African loyalties at a time when the force of Pan-Africanism was weakened. Yet, within three years of the coming of independence to the majority of African states, an Organization of African Unity was formed.

Both the Pluralists and Functionalists underplay the role of conflict in the march towards integration. The Pluralists do this by their overemphasis on the role of communications, transactions and the growth of mutual responsiveness in the process of integration. The process appears then to be "cumulative and determined" leaving little room for the sort of advancement of integration that comes from confrontation and the resolution of conflict. As for the functionalists the idea that 'technical' decisions are less controversial than 'political' questions leads them to assume that integration is fostered, according to Claude, "in an international workshop where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and busy themselves only with the co-operative use of the tools of mutual interest." The functionalist conclusion about the positive effects resulting from interactions based on technical cooperation closely resembles the transactionalist's belief in the process of social learning arising out of increasing transactions. One researcher has distinguished between at least two kinds of social interaction which affect attitude change? The first is the kind of social interaction which the functionalists espouse i.e. those interactions based on technical and bureaucratic norms, the sort of 'Fabian' approach which, according to Andrén, characterizes the cooperation between the Nordic countries. Such contacts tend to cumulatively build up an "internationalist" frame of reference - a process of socialisation. In the other kind of social interaction, the participants 'attempt to influence each other's viewpoint through bargaining, offering inducements, withholding resources, and forming coalitions.' Within such contacts the technical and bureaucratic norms of the functionalist concept yield limited
influence. What the participants are after is political influence and it is the satisfaction of their demands which decide the degree of their internationalist commitment. Neither does the pluralist emphasis hold good in this variety of social contact, if it is to lead to internationalist attitudes. The pluralist process of social learning is a long term affair generally envisaged as stretching over generations. While the resulting internationalist attitude from political influence is not an instant affair it is not the long drawn-out process of the pluralist calculus and may itself provide the groundwork on which further socialization may thrive. We can, finally, observe that this latter kind of social interaction is more readily engaged in when the bone of contention is political goals, whether concrete or diffuse, in which the participants set much store - due to certain principles, e.g. national interest - on directing the strivings towards their favoured course.

If we take the Nordic countries again as an example, we find that it has been said of them that "...the concrete and long-range goals which the theorists of integration usually demand as a basic prerequisite for an integration process are hardly possible to trace as practical politics in the field of Nordic cooperation... All have decided to merge their differences in a kind of common Nordic utilitarianism." And this in spite of the extensive homogeneity between these countries both in the linguistic, cultural, ideological and economic and social spheres. The Nordic treaty of cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden states as its main goal the development of closer ties between the countries in technical, social, cultural and judicial matters as well as to avail themselves wherever possible of the benefits of division of labour among the participants. The bombastic allusions to a larger continental unity found in the African Charter is largely absent in the Nordic treaty. Doubtless, the sort of technical and cumulative integration espoused by the functionalists and transactionalists is more liable to thrive in this sort of milieu - even though the Nordic countries also have their political ups and downs.

The African states who engaged in intense conflict between 1957 and 1962 were not engaged in debate over technical or functional matters; they were at daggers drawn over political goals. One of them was over the proper approach to continental unity. The other - a corollary - concerned the defence of the national and territorial integrities. Furthermore, they were virtually all new states and had not had the time to work out a compromise over these issues. But more than that, although their newly found territorial nationalism had attenuated their commitment to continental unity, it had not dissipated it. If there was any doubt about this, the speeches of the African leaders showed that for them the issue was not whether there should be continental unity but what course it should take. It was
not a question of semantics either. Powerful states on the continent were not only committed in principle to *immediate* federation but were ready to take the first steps unilaterally, including suspected subversion. The issue was real in every sense of the word. None of the so-called moderates opposed the goal itself but merely questioned the wisdom in creating a premature federation. To further portray the concreteness of the issue, even to this day many constitutions of African states usually have an article or two expressing commitment to continental unity. In 1962, Nyerere was prepared to postpone independence for his country and forfeit narrow nationalism for the sake of an East African federation. Ghana, Guinea and Mali took the first steps to announce a Union of African States to serve as a nucleus for a greater continental unity. For the attainment of internationalist compromise in such a milieu, the pluralist and functionalist calculus are virtually of no avail; conflict seem to be the requisite engine.

In the process of integration, therefore, conflict is not necessarily disruptive, but may be anabolic by creating the prerequisites for a workable compromise. In the African case, between 1957 and 1962, conflict provided the base on which the moderates and radicals could work out a compromise. First, many coalitions were begun between African states. Most importantly, the first alliance between a French-speaking and English-speaking African state was joined as an outcome of this conflict. The significance of the fact that Ghana and Guinea were ready to join into one state in order to hasten continental unity, was not lost on the other African states. During the same period Ghana and the Congo concluded a secret treaty to join in one Community. Precipitous and impractical as some of these moves might be, they boosted the seriousness of the federal argument. At the same time, the fact that the opponents of federation joined in powerful coalitions to further their goals led in the end to the formation of the Organization of African unity. That institution was as much the child of the Pan-Africanist ideology as of conflict. It was as much an institutional pursuit of the Pan-Africanist dream as a compromise between federation and step-by-step integration. Herein lies the explanation for its ambivalence. For this reason, it would be useful for the African states to bethink themselves as to how a Charter which was useful for those purposes in 1963 is still sufficient in 1977 as a dynamic force to accelerate action on functional integration in a situation in which the political milieu no longer resembles the period of heightened conflict.

Conflict and the Pan-Africanist ideology have continued nevertheless to play their dual role in the African experiment. More recently we saw how the questions of *détente*, dialogue, and the Angolan crisis were resolved after a series of confrontations between advocates of different approaches. From these emerged a growing
consensus. The Neto government in Angola was finally recognized and admitted into the Organization. The controversy over dialogue seems to have subsided and some of the proponents of that policy are now set to tow the majority line. In this connection, the recent statement of the Liberian President, Tolbert, is significant. Early in 1976, he announced that there would be no exchange of diplomatic delegations between Liberia and South Africa pointing out, just as the OAU had done, that the proper dialogue was between the South African government and the "Black majority of South Africa." He continued:

"... in view of the intransigence of White South African leaders, we find it difficult to believe that fruitful results can be obtained from the initiation of direct dialogue with nations who stubbornly refuse to accept and adhere to the fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

Among other things he called on the Vorster Government to:
Abandon "its dehumanising policy of apartheid;"
Drop the pass laws;
Release political prisoners held on Robben Island;
Stop separating African families (through migrant labour);
Permit the people of "Zimbabwe" (Rhodesia) to discuss their problems without interference;
Make a firm declaration on "Namibia" (South West Africa) and abandon the introduction of the Bantustan policy there.

It was less than a year earlier, in February, 1975, that Mr. Vorster and President Tolbert met secretly in Liberia in pursuance of a 'dialogue' against the express inclination of the majority of African states. Once again a redefinition of approaches has emerged from conflict in a situation in which there was general agreement about aims. Finally, it must be remembered that the aims as such are able to rally a consensus because they are part of the Pan-Africanist ideology - the total eradication of dependency on the continent and the idea that continental affinity pressuposes an active part in the struggle for every African state. These observations seem to accord with Wolf's finding that the "... continuing effectiveness of (an) organization may well depend on recurrent manifestations of conflict?" To which we add that conflict is more likely to be anabolic when it is joined over the question of methods where there is consensus over the general goals.
The Pluralist neglect of conflict is only one aspect of that approach. What lessons can we draw from its other central elements, namely the role of transactions and the overriding potency of state sovereignty? First about transactions. The concept of transaction flows is of course directly linked with the socio-causal paradigm. Those who employ the measurements of transaction flows between states in order to assess the level of integration tend to use them as a proxy for political integration. Deutsch's socio-causal paradigm remains the best illustration of this reasoning. According to this, political amalgamation occurs only when a homogeneous transnational population has been created. This transnational population emerges as a result of a process of social assimilation which in turn is produced and is best measured by the intensity of rewarding transactions between states. The more the interaction and transactional flows between states the greater the probability that political amalgamation will succeed.

On the purely theoretical level, this concept raises several problems which are vital for the African case. The linkage between social assimilation and political integration has never been theoretically spelled out. And regional integration though it includes social learning and transactions has as one of its central elements political amalgamation. Our definition of integration includes, for instance, the idea of common institutions. Conceptually, therefore, it does not suffice to establish the existence or absence of intense transaction flows and then proceed to posit, by means of an assumptive hypothesis, the presence or absence of political integration. As Hansen points out, "transaction flow analysis covering trade, tourism, mail etc., may tell us a good deal about the process of social assimilation across national borders, but it is, for the most part, inappropriate for the study of international political amalgamation." 

A number of studies have demonstrated how untenable it is to assume a linkage between mass opinion and elite behaviour which is the main support of political amalgamation. In a study of the influence of mass opinion on the voting of the legislators in the American Congress, Miller and Stoke find that "direct relations between mass opinion and elite behaviour exist only in situations where a strong majority of the population intensely prefers the same position on a given issue." The dazzling figures of exchange of migrant labour, telephone and mail transactions in Europe have nevertheless not produced equivalent action on the part of the European elites to create supranational and economic institutions. For the assumed linkage between social assimilation and political integration to be theoretically acceptable, variables must be stipulated to determine the types of linkage situation and issues, the specific elites concerned and other relevant intervening variables as well as the appropriate models, constructed from empirical tests, for determining the va-
rious interrelationships between the variables.

To the extent that the socio-causal paradigm is a prolonged deterministic process, it leaves little scope for bringing about integration for areas, such as Africa, aiming at more rapid results. Two points are germane in this respect. Firstly, as Inglehart has suggested, there are certain other variables which are important in determining the relevance of social assimilation and public opinion. The three suggested factors are: the structure of national decision-making institutions; the distribution of skills within the society; and the degree to which a given decision relates to deep-seated values rather than "relatively superficial feelings." With regard to the first two factors, it should be evident that their nature will determine the amount of autonomous influence wielded by the elite in a given context. The potential for a strong head of state to carry or counteract mass opinion is obviously much more than in a national political system which is richly provided with checks and balances.

For African states, the above observations would imply that one cannot conceptually assume the nature of the prospects for integration from the dearth of inter-state transaction flows. Second, contemporary African state systems are characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of a small elite and often a lone omnipotent in the form of a powerful President who frequently retains the option to make or mar progress towards integration.

The second point relates to our earlier statement on the end-product in the process of integration. We argued earlier for a dynamic view of the phenomenon especially when dealing with experiments on the lower ends of the continuum. This point is well illustrated in the futility of attempting to use the rate of transactions as an important background factor in the integration process among less-developed states. We pointed out in our economic analysis that the cardinal benefit of customs unions in Africa lay in their role as a stimulus for giving rise to new productive capacities. In such a situation, as Nye has remarked "...to single out (transactions) is to emphasize a static analysis of existing trade patterns rather than potential trade in new (usually industrial) products which is a basic motivation for such schemes." We might add here that it is this static view which is responsible for the persistent practice of posing a dichotomy, such as in Haas' statement, between the 'industrial actor' of the Western world and the 'non-industrial actors' in other settings. We shall return to that issue.

The African march towards integration has been led and dominated by the African elites. It would certainly offer an interesting research exercise to attempt an examination in selected African countries of the degree of commitment of public opinion on integration and its impact if any on the African leaders. To the best of our knowledge no such examination has yet been made. For those who
have an idea of the obstacles facing such studies of public opinion both in the criteria for selection of respondents, their possibilities to partake and the general conduciveness of the milieu in African states to such studies, the prospect must be daunting. But such experiments, which are beyond the scope of the present work, are necessary if we are to further deepen our insight into the conditions that affect the decision among African states on the course of integration. However, the evidence available from our examination of the course of African integration suggests that it has been leaders in the very top echelons who have been solely responsible for the decisions on integration. A number of facts support this conclusion. The African states have never resorted to referendum (as has occurred in other areas e.g. Europe) to decide either membership or substantive issues in integration experiments. A look at the structure of the extant international organization in Africa, both on the continental and subregional levels, reveals the tendency to concentrate powers in the hands of groups of Heads of State and Governments. Furthermore, even in the area of conciliation and arbitration the African states have generally preferred to leave Heads of States to assume this responsibility. Even where some organs have been set up, as in the OAU, they have generally allowed them to fall into disuse. The present manoeuvres in Southern Africa illustrates clearly how the course of events are shaped by the initiatives of African Heads of State. This is not by any means to discount the probability that the public opinions in the countries concerned do filter up to influence the actions of the leadership. Certainly, there may be evidence of certain deep-seated values concerning unification among the African public. Our point is rather on the comparative structures of national decision-making processes. Even without resorting to obvious examples like the present bizarre regime in Uganda, the contemporary African ruling elite would seem to wield more decisive influence in the march towards integration than the socio-causal paradigm would allow. Our review of the Pan-African movement illustrated the same tendency. It was the African elites who engineered the movement at all times. To the extent that it tended towards a grass root organization, it was the trade unions who sponsored it. And we observed how such influences have been largely eclipsed by governmental action in Africa.\textsuperscript{16}

These limitations of the transactionalist concept as a way of explaining the causal dynamics of integration do not reduce its importance as a method of describing the existence or otherwise of a growing process of social assimilation in regional units, provided we do not exaggerate its significance as a tool for explanation. There is an inherent disability in a concept that argues that integration is caused by transactions and that transactions are increased by integration. Cause seems inextricable from effect. Research in Europe on trans-
action flows and public opinion have only revealed what has been described as a "permissive consensus" among the European public towards integration moves. Such a state of affairs would seem to leave much elbow room for the elites to manouevre in. And if this consensus can be supposed to allow elites the freedom to advance integration it can also be construed to afford them the liberty to move backwards.

A word must be said about another problem which attaches to the transactionalist concept, namely its operationalization. The attempts at measurement in this area relate to finding indicators for, firstly, measuring transactions such as mail, telephone calls, student exchanges and other forms of communications and, secondly, for attitudinal data. Generally speaking, it can be said that the rationale, suggested by Alker and Puchala, in which trade data is used as a direct proxy for political integration, is rapidly being abandoned. The idea that there need not be any causal linkange between economic and political variable for the one to be used as an indication of the other (if a high correlation of their respective indices could be established), goes against more recent agreement among theorists that the concept of political integration is a very broad one and which moreover it is necessary to break down into subcategories as e.g. in the Lindberg model.

Another use of indices from trade flows has been suggested in a recent work by Nye and Keohane. In this reasoning, data from trade can show the level of economic interdependence between states as a means of assessing the growing degrees of constraints on the actions of those state by the need to increase policy consultation or harmonization in order to support increasing interaction.

It is, however, the Deutschean concept that transactions and communication flows give rise to social integration and community which has been responsible for much of the recent attempts to measure transaction flows. The two most notable methods have been the RA-index and the GNP models. The choice of methods in these measurements has occasioned much controversy over their relative merits. The RA-index (relative acceptance coefficient) model is derived from the Savage and Deutsch null model. It attempts the measurement of the difference between the actual trade flows between countries and the flows which would be expected if the total shares of world exports and imports were distributed equally across all countries, the assumption underlying the model being that a country transacts randomly with all other countries. The difference in the figures are then expected to show the degree of preference displayed by one country towards transactions with another. A positive deviation (i.e. theoretical RA-values to infinity) shows that integration is taking place and negative deviations (RA-values down to -1) indicates the contrary. A variant of this model calculates export percen-
rational measure, i.e., the ratio of the sum of transactions from A to B by the total transactions of B. These two methods are constant-sum measures of international relationships over time since they use total international transactions as a control for size. Deutsch et al. used the RA-index model to arrive at certain conclusions about integration in Europe, suggesting that European integration having attained an apex in 1957-1958 has been declining since.

Russett employs the "chooser-chosen" GNP model based on the ratio of a country's international transactions to its gross national product. It has been pointed out that this is a constant sum ratio with respect to total economic activity but not to international relationships since "if world trade were growing more rapidly than domestic economic activity it would be possible for all countries' trade-to-GNP ratios to rise at the same time."

We shall not dwell much on the controversy between the relative relevance of these two methods. Some researchers have shown a preference for the Savage-Deutsch model while others have criticized it either for using poor indicators or for not measuring integration at all. Russett has argued in favour of "the usefulness of ratios of contact with group B to total domestic activity as a measure of the load on one's communications intake system" as the appropriate behavioral variable in an individual's contact or communication with country B as a percentage of his total level of contacts or communication of a similar sort. However, Russett himself has declared a preference for the RA-index for measuring personal contacts and communication. The point remains unresolved.

As for measurement in less developed areas such as Africa, researchers have often found it necessary to modify the familiar models in order at all to arrive at meaningful measurements. In his study of Latin America, Per Olav Reinton devised a method for mapping out interaction patterns. Since then other researchers have used yet a modification of Reinton's method in the study of the Andean Common Market. Discarding the export percentage model as largely irrelevant for Latin American conditions, Reinton uses trade interaction between pairs of nations in a bloc to measure interdependence among the units. His aim, however, is to relate the units' interaction scores to their rank in the system. All the same, his method is worth stating:
Trade between units X and Y is taken as a percentage of X's total exports and imports in the regional system. Interaction scores are calculated for all possible pairs in the region in the following manner:

\[
\frac{\text{Exports from Unit X to Unit Y}}{\text{Total Bloc Exports of Unit X}} + \frac{\text{Imports form Unit X to Unit Y}}{\text{Total Bloc Imports of Unit X}} = \text{Interaction Score for XY Pair.}
\]

The interaction score for the YX pair is found by reversing the calculation, i.e., unit Y's exports to and imports from unit X, as a percentage of Y's total regional exports and imports. When the score for XY pair greatly exceeds the YX score, say 175 to 50, the interaction pattern for units X and Y is said to be disequilibrated, with Y dominant. That is, X is more dependent upon Y for interregional trade. An equilibrated pair is, of course, one in which the interaction scores are relatively equal.

Avery and Cochrane use this method to argue "that relative equilibrium or, better, equality (my italics) of transaction patterns within a regional economic grouping is a better indicator of integrative potential than rate of transactions." Their scattergram and regression analysis of the Andean (Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru) Common Market turns out as follows. (Fig. 17.3).

In our view, such a method could be meaningfully adapted to the study of the numerous African common markets and regional groupings as an indicator of their potential for integration. There are other possible methods. Nye found it useful to base his measurement of regional economic integration on indices from shared services. It is reasonable to conclude that the familiar measurements for transaction flows and social assimilation carry certain limitations which need to be corrected before they can be usefully applied to less developed areas. Attitudinal scores generally derive from opinion polls, elite interviews and quantitative analysis of newspaper samples and these raise a different kind of problem. But there is no reason why, in their standard form, they cannot be fruitfully applied to the African case provided we bear in mind the lessons learned from the controversy over the method of interpretation of such findings. Ronald Inglehart has stressed the role of internalized values. European youths, according to him, tend towards supranational identity since they have been exposed more to such trends in their formative years than their parents who underwent the process of socialization in the years before World War II. It would be both intriguing and conceptually rewarding to ascertain how the accelerated experiment in pragmatic cooperation in recent years will have affected African youth. Naturally, the use of periodic assessments would do much to correct the static image derived from assessments of historical situations which have long been washed away with a lot of water under the bridge especially in areas such as Africa in which international politics is in ferment and subject to rapid metamorphosis.
It is not only transactionalists who devise attitudinal indicators. The neofunctionalist variable of "rising rate of transactions" found in works by Haas, Barrera, Nye and Schmitter closely resembles the transactionalist rationale. But the neofunctionalist indicators for affective attitudes and sentiments are closely bound with their emphasis on the central role of institutions in the regional system as a decision-making apparatus. Lindberg and Schiengold tried to mi-
tigate this emphasis by subdividing affective support into "identitive support" as between individuals and "systemic support" as between the regime and individuals.\(^{27}\) (see Fig. 17.4). The measurement of such indicators has been done with relative success in the Western European setting where Lindberg and Scheingold were able to conclude that integration far from being on the wane was progressing. It is doubtful however how successful the application of such a method would be in the African setting. Evidently the method has been designed with the European conditions and European-type institutions in mind. Both factors may be found either lacking entirely or drastically different in the African setting.

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<td>Identitive</td>
<td>Attitudinal indicators: mixed without ascertainable trends</td>
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<td>Behavioral indicators: relatively high and increasing</td>
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<td>Systemic</td>
<td>Attitudinal indicators: strong support for economic and cultural goals. Mixed reaction to military and diplomatic aims</td>
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<td>regime</td>
<td>Attitudinal indicators: Mixed but basically positive reactions to supranational institutions</td>
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Fig. 17.4

In theorising on integration the pluralist emphasis on the central role of the political will and national identity of sovereign states has clashed head-on with the functionalist and neo-functionalist emphasis on the role of areas of technical and common interest which, for the former, leads to the instammental elimination of the state, and for the latter, to the accumulation of authority and legitimacy, via a "spill over" process, to central institutions and elites. Hoffmann counters as follows:
...The trouble is that in the range of higher politics such objectivity becomes almost impossible. The bigger the stakes, the less applicable the method that consists of flooding the common interests with light and leaving the conflicting ones in the dark... There may be harmony when the nations’ interests are identical and deals when they diverge, but it is hard to define a "common" and superior interest detached from those of the states."

Of what relevance is this debate for the African scene and what lessons can we draw from it? The theoretical basis for both the pluralist and neo-functionalist—cum—functionalist stand on this question has often been questioned. We have already examined in the first section the intellectual antecedents of the various approaches on this issue. Suffice it here to touch briefly on certain criticisms and modifications of these concept before attempting to relate them to the African conditions.

It has been said that once it is accepted that the modern nation-state is showing increasing signs of being "penetrated" or "permeable" then the rigid adherence to the concept of unshakeable state sovereignty actually begs the question of whether international life is not being directed will-nilly into more interdependence. There is much in the functionalist argument that in several economic and social welfare spheres the nation-state is no longer the most efficient unit for satisfying human needs. It may well be that the increase in interaction between states is eroding the cultural and social traits which make up the arguments about national identities on which the traditionalist concept is erected. In this sense, the resistance to unification inherent in national sovereignty may mean no more than that the nation-state will be swept screaming into integration.

But there is more to it than that. What has, in fact, caused much of the controversy in this area has been some of the early extremist positions taken by those who, especially like the neo-functionalists, believed in the advent of a dirigiste era in politics involving what we earlier described as the end of ideology - a bureaucratization of politics based on reason and concern for economic welfare. Such a position led to other sub-concepts such as "automaticity" or the "spill-over" process and the "overdrawn dichotomy" (Hansen’s phrase) between "high" and "low" politics. It did not take long to produce a back-lash from the traditionalists and neo-realists. Hansen has suggested that the error in this over Stark image was an error of the heart and not of the head emanating as it probably did from the hopes expressly stated by the early neo-functionalist theorists for "the peaceful creation of possible new types of communities."

Recent research is whittling away this concrete barrier between the traditionalists and federalists on the one hand and the neo-functionalists and functionalists on the other. Not only is the fetish
about the "spill-over" process being dismantled but more prominence is being given to other variables, like actors and actor motivations, which are more in tune with the traditionalist arguments. By the same token the distinction between "high" and "low" politics is beginning to lose its appeal.

Even with respect to Europe where earlier neo-functionalist research, led by Haas, had seen the spill-over process and functional linkages as the supreme harbingers of integration, other neo-functionals have repudiated the concept of automatic politization and with it much of the stock-in-trade of the neo-functionalist reliance on the logic of sector integration. Lindberg and Schiengold now find for example that "functional linkages or spill-over played at most a rather small part in this systems transformation (from European Coal and Steel to Common Market)" and attribute a major role to national political leadership "particularly what seems to have been the crucial intervention of one dramatic-political actor, Chancellor Adenauer." They go even further. Their statement on the voluntarist approach and repudiation of 'spill-over' is the clearest example of neo-functionalist second thought on these issues. Their approach, they state, is "...a voluntaristic, actor-oriented one, emerging out of neo-functionalist thought, but distinct from it in the extent of its voluntarism..." Our analysis tends to show that the Community's potential needs to be activated; the mechanisms (including that of spill-over) are not in themselves processes or agents of integration or system growth."

Kaiser's criticism of the "high" and "low" politics concept is by now well known. He drew attention to the fact that such a concept was wrong if it assigned qualities to fixed situations in politics and that its relevance will depend on a clear realization that "the same issue may shift on the spectrum between 'low' and 'high' (a) according to specific circumstances, (b) within time, and (c) between different countries." Here no clear lines can be drawn either according to issues or attitudes alone." Here again Lindberg and Schiengold have recently tried to find a compromise between the two aspects of the "high" and "low" politics dichotomy. They suggest that amidst the permissive indifference of a European public two kinds of elite operate in the process of European integration guarding respectively over what other theorists have termed "high" and "low" politics. The "technocrat-politicians" i.e. the dirigiste oriented bureaucrats of the Community attempt to expand the Community system while the "dramatic-political" actors of the nation states - the so-called guardians of "pooled self-esteem" concern themselves with "policy preoccupations needs, and ambitions which impel them to view the 'European system solely in terms of its contribution to other goals which transcend the economic or welfare spheres, or the political effort to unite a long-divided Europe." Of
necessity there is a potential conflict between the two actors.

The consequences of these conceptual modifications are immense both with regard to the end-product of integration and the process. If the "spill-over" concept does not hold, if the automatic politization hypothesis is fallacious and if, furthermore, the actors retain the power to direct or check the so-called "expansive logic of sector integration," it means that the regional integration process can proceed towards e.g. the establishment of Common Markets without any automatic continuation towards political union. Neither is there any plausible theoretical basis for the assumption that economic unions without a strong political centre will disintegrate. Nye's view of the process would then seem to hold more true: "Once we admit that important decisions affecting the integration process must be channelled through the political legitimizing leadership, we greatly enrich the model by admitting the possibility of negative as well as positive syndromes of responses resulting from the impact of the process forces upon the national decision makers. Actors can pull back from common tasks and institutions as well as increase their scope and authority." For Lindberg and Scheingold the range of such options in the outcome of integration will include fulfillment, extension and retraction. They also state that these three option can be engaged in simultaneously and that "aggregate trends among the three modal outcomes can be expected to vary over time." 

For Schmitter the options for action-strategy are even more numerous:

"Typologizing crudely, the following seem to be the strategic options open to a given actor in a given context:
1. spill-over, i.e., to increase both the scope and level of his commitment concomitantly; 2) spill-around i.e., to increase only the scope while holding the level of authority constant or within the zone of indifference; 3) build-up i.e., to agree to increase the decisional autonomy or capacity of joint institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas; 4) retrench, i.e., to increase the level of joint deliberation but withdraw the institutions from certain areas; 5) muddle-about, i.e., to let the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their actual capacity to allocate values; 6) spill-back, i.e., to retreat on both dimensions, possibly returning to the status quo ante initiation; 7) encapsulate, i.e., to respond to crisis by marginal modifications within the zone of indifference." 

The idea that there is a necessary choice between further political integration and disintegration also suffers from this revised neo-functionalist view. As Nye puts it:
"...while this (choice) does seem to be the case when one looks at integration from the perspective of a simple neo-functionalist model,
it no longer seem necessarily the case according to our revised model. Indeed, our basic hypothesis is that *most political decision-makers will opt for the status quo at any level* as long as the process forces or popular pressures are not strong enough to make this choice unbearable for them. However it is not the "process forces" which decide, for Nye continues: "...If the process forces are too strong, political decisionmakers may down-grade commitment to a point at which they are tolerable..." Is this perhaps a useful way of looking at the crisis in the East African Common Market?

Before we proceed to the objective African situation, one further conceptual stumbling block ought perhaps to be put out of the way. We noted, in the first section, the neo-functionalist tendency to dichotomize between the industrial actor of the Western world and the non-industrial actor in other settings e.g. Africa. Haas' statement captures this tendency succinctly: "...because the modern "industrial-political actor" fears that his way of life cannot be safeguarded without structural adaptation, he turns to integration; by the same token, political actors who are neither industrial nor urban, nor modern in their outlook...seek refuge in national exclusiveness. Thus, countries dominated by a non-pluralistic social structure are poor candidates for participation in the integration process. Even if their governments do partake at the official level, the consequences of their participation are unlikely to be felt elsewhere in the social structure."

There are two parts to this argument, namely, industrialization or lack of it and a pluralistic-structure or the absence of it. First, about industrialization. The neo-functionalist belief in the supreme efficacy of industrialization as the avenue to integration is part of their baggage of the "expansive logic of sector integration." Somewhat crudely stated, it means that in the absence of any industrial sectors to integrate the process is virtually impossible. Enough has been said already of the revised neo-functionalist insight on the relevance of these concepts to make it clear that they have been virtually denuded of any strong theoretical basis. But we have still more issues to settle with this concept. We may begin with a point that ought to be quite trite. When Deutsch set out initially to examine the forces at play in larger political communities he used a set of historical examples which included:

1. the union of the American colonies into the United States in 1789, its break up during the Civil war and the reunion that followed;

2. the gradual development of union between England and Scotland and its consummation in 1707;
3. the struggle for German unity since the Middle Ages culminating in the unification of Germany in 1871;

4. the unification of Italy in 1859-69; and

5. the gradual integration of Switzerland which was completed in 1848.

Aside from other traits, the striking feature of these historical examples is the fact that they were all basically pre-industrial agrarian societies. How relevant is the neo-functionalist premise of the modern industrial actor in considering these examples? It is not doing that premise any undue unfairness, if it is suggested that its tendency to nullify, in advance, non-industrial actors as "candidates" in the process of integration begs the question of the processes at work in these historical examples. If even, therefore, it were true that e.g. the African states were "neither industrial nor urban, nor modern in their outlook..." this way of thinking would still not offer much help as a basis for examining the factors at work in their attempts to unify.

Matters are, however, not as simple as that. If our section on the economics of integration in Africa has done anything, it has been to offer a picture of peoples who are at various stages of development, some more industrialized than others (even if, in all certitude, less industrialized than the major advanced countries in Europe and elsewhere.) It has also offered the picture of an elite whose perception of their economic problems is dominated by their realization of their low levels of industrialization. More importantly, their outlook, the dynamic, that is to say, of the process of unification in that continent, is hinged on the efforts to industrialize and the attempts to maximize the scope of possible areas on which to mount the springboard for further industrialization. Our review of the tribulations of the East African Community certainly revealed the drawbacks of low levels of industrialization on the efforts at integration. It did not however, in our view, reveal the total absence of that condition nor a deficiency of an outlook that takes industrialization into account. On the contrary, we found that the motive force for integration among African states was the perception of the need for further industrialization and their problems were the problems attaching to the existence of different levels of industrialization. Therefore, the "neither industrial, nor urban, nor modern in their outlook" - basis for analysis in this respect is oversimplified and at best a caricature which can only inhibit adequate conceptualization. It is, finally, a static view that goes against the grain of our chosen method of viewing the integrative process in a dynamic sense.

The second part of Haas' statement concerns a pluralistic struc-
ture. Again, in our thinking, it is dominated by an oversimplified static view. It is not only the neo-functionalists who have concerned themselves with the question of what type of states are plausible "candidates" in the process of integration. As we showed in our first section, the intellectual antecedents of all the approaches, including concepts on political development and political culture, have led most of these theorists to opt for the Western-democratic-industrialized-pluralistic model. The alternatives have been first, mostly simplified models of the Communist, coerced entities—a view which has been criticized by several observers (Haas considers COMECON difficult to apply to his definition of integration:) The second alternative has been the political systems found in less industrial areas like Africa. The kind of oversimplification on which the assessment of such areas is based is well illustrated by a passage from Pentland. Speaking of the extremities of the possibilities of attitudes in a community, he speaks of the total identification which can be found in a totally mobilized situation such as in an emergency. For him, this is more unreal and occurs, if at all, for "brief periods." The other extremity is perfectly plausible for him. He continues:

"The other is a situation where individuals are completely uninvolved in and unaware of political life, (my italics) such as seems to be the case in less developed and unmobilized societies." 38

This is of course a familiar image - the image of the commonalty, in the less developed states, untrammelled by social consciousness, obtusely innocent of political awareness and indifferent to cataclysms which succeed one another in the ivory towers among their splendidly isolated elites. Recent investigations of opinions among the European public has led nonetheless to the discovery of what Puchala has described as "a pervasive disinterestedness, almost a numbness, with regard to European matters in most sectors and policy (which left pro-Europeanism still an elite cult in 1970.32)" Evidently such tendencies are not a monopoly of "unmobilized societies."

Almond and Verba similarly found wide variations of political awareness among the peoples of the United States and Mexico. Even in the face of such findings the model usually attributed to these less developed countries is a gross oversimplification if only because it fails to recognize that even the economic shoes of these 'innocents' are susceptible to pinching and that these isolated cataclysms e.g. elections, or military coups! might quite plausibly send tremors into their would-be insulated worlds. We certainly did not discover these remarkable species of "completely uninvolved... and unaware" denizens in the troubles between the East African states where we found that not only the elites of the Community and States were involved but ordinary opinion (portrayed by reports and letters to the newspapers) and the activities of business pressure groups
such as the lorry owning entrepreneurs of Kenya. In view of the above, the astonishing conclusion by Haas appears as a matter of course. (ref. "Even if their governments do partake at the official level, the consequences of their participation are unlikely to be felt elsewhere in the social structure":) What else might one expect from deliberations between isolated heads of states who have no sector integration to deliberate about and whose populace are in fact oblivious of the needs or benefits of welfare!

If, of course, we crave a more realistic view, then it is necessary to give up such static and oversimplified images - what Gary Wynia has called "the explanatory variable of the last resort." Besides, as one writer has suggested, "It seems clear that as yet there is no indication that any one particular type of state-democratic, developed, socialist or whatever - is necessarily more open and flexible (and therefore more amenable to integration in these terms) than any other." Taking only partial note of the factor of political culture, Nye has suggested that the relevant variable in the Central American case were: the ideal of union, political culture (defined as "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that govern behaviour in the political system"), integrative costs and external factors.

We are back then to the relevant variables in the African integration process. Conceptually, we pleaded for both a dynamic view and a view which moreover takes account of the salient contents of the different approaches and shod, finally, of the oversimplified and static images which impede theorizing. We shall argue that the pluralist approach, for all our criticism of it, offers a valuable way of looking at the African attempts at integration both with respect to transactions and the sovereign identity of states. The lesson of Europeanism and the neo-functionalist approach lies in the potency of institutions as a valuable way to inch a given system towards integration. As for federalism the growing recognition of the role of politics in the process of integration lends a modicum of prestige to its advocacy of "the political kingdom" in the African scheme. As Lawrence Krause was led to conclude with regard to Europe:

"What is certain is that political integration will occur only as a result of a positive political decision to bring it about, not as a result of economic pressures alone." To which we add that the functionalist emphasis on the role of the economic and welfare aspects has a particular relevance for systems on the lower reaches of the integrative process.

Once we recognize the limitations of the socio-causal paradigm we can have a clear way to seeing what has been described as the
"subtle confusion of historical perspective" involved in applying that concept to the African scene. For, although the process of social learning demonstrably contributes to the sense of community which in turn can favour integration, in systems such as Africa - where we found that the role of the elite is strong - the government and its leaders can spearhead the process of popular learning. We have already examined how the leadership in Africa has not only fostered both the ideal of unity together with the ideology behind it, but has managed the factors of conflict insofar as it has influenced integration. Instead of focussing on the futile dichotomy between "high" and "low" politics, our findings lead us to suggest that one of the major conditions that affect the interaction between African states is nationalism. This, in turn, has put a high premium, within the African context, on the pluralist reliance on the sovereign identity of states as a salient factor in the process of integration.

The set of factors which command the power of explanation for integration must be related to the specific phase of the process on the continuum. The contemporary African state is characterized by certain easily discernible traits. Hampered more or less by political instability, the leaders of these states are engaged in state or nation building and the integration of the various component parts of their societies. Plagued constantly by fiscal and monetary crises and the negative inputs of administrative disabilities, these leaders tend to concentrate on policies directed primarily to the solution of national problems. In such a situation, governments tend to husband their meagre legitimacy, and to jealously prevent even the slightest encroachment on their authority. It has also been found that one of the main vehicles for transmitting these development policies is nationalism. Nationalism offers at once a basis for legitimacy for the government and a rationale for societal cohesion. These propensities continue to flower. In 1976, a draft Nigerian constitution found it necessary to insert provisions for elaborate procedures for Nigerian schoolchildren to salute the national flag at the beginning of each schoolday.

Doubtless, such policies can plausibly be justified on the grounds of national needs. It is another matter, however, when we turn to continental integration. Our analysis of the statements of the African leaders at the 1963 OAU debate on continental unity showed that for the vast majority of African leaders their professions of belief in continental unity was counterbalanced by an overwhelming concern for their national sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their concern for principles of non-interference. In the problems that have faced the continent since 1963, we also noted how these states have shown a preference for the methods of diplomatic accommodation and mediation, for the resolution of their conflicts, rather than turn over any appreciable degree of their powers to a su-
pranational body. In short, the pluralist image of how states are impelled by their sovereign identities to seek integration through diplomatic modes predominates so far in the African context. Seen in this light, even the growing tendency of the African states to embrace functional integration is open to question. How far, for instance, does this represent a genuine commitment to the development of regional and continental unity rather than a means of shortening up their efforts in the realm of their primary concern - namely national development? The various functional groupings on the continent have proved to be excellent means of attracting funds to finance national development priorities. We noted how, in the East African Community, the participants valued the Development Fund arrangement so long as it was proved more efficient in attracting external funds than the individual national efforts. As soon as one of the partners began to feel that it could do better on its own, its commitment to the regional community was comparably weakened. The various regional functional groupings in Africa have so far received a great deal of their funds from outside Africa. For several reasons, multilateral aid arrangements have shown a preference for projects organized on a regional basis, therefore joining such organizations usually stands an African state in good stead as far as attracting funds is concerned. Even the UN Economic Commission for Africa can be seen as an excellent means of pooling external funds to finance national development programmes.

Nye isolated the same tendency in the Central American area. He suggested that the states in that region were able to continue with the integration experiment because the integration costs were low. Integration did not threaten the economic interests of the governments. The loss of revenue due to the removal of intraregional barriers was usually reduced by the use of protracted phasing programmes by which such arrangements would not come into immediate effect. Furthermore, during the early sixties rising imports and the expansion of consumption taxes helped to further attenuate the adverse effects of the removal of tariff barriers. More than that, the governments were not obliged to transfer their decision-making authority to any supranational organs. The cost of administering common regional institutions and programmes was borne largely by foreign sources such as the US AID, the United Nations and the Inter-American Bank. We noted the same tendency in Africa. The EEC has joined various European governments as well as the US and other American institutions in financing projects set up by the intra-African organizations.

From time to time in African continental politics, we have heard echoes of certain slogans which have distinguished the pluralist developments in European politics. Such is the slogan of Unity in Diversity which was so effectively used to counter the formation of the
EEC and prepare the way for EFTA. We noted how many of the African Brazzaville and Monrovia group of states, notably, incorporated this into their demands for a strategy for unification. Also, De Gaulle's *Europe des Patries* has found its counterpart in the statements of primarily African French-speaking states although they have not been the only ones.

Nationalism has imprinted the pluralist pattern on intra-African relations in yet another manner. One of the central aims of the OAU is the peaceful settlement of disputes. The evidence of African attempts to build something like the Deutshean security-community rests primarily in their development of a set of norms and institutions to act as the basis for their exercise in diplomatic accommodation as a means of reducing or eradicating the outbursts of violent conflict. Here again it was the Monrovia group of states (inclined towards a pluralist approach) who provided the rules. Article III of the OAU Charter confirms these norms. They are: the sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states; respect for the sovereignity and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable rights to independent existence; and peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.

It is with respect to this Article that the OAU has gone furthest in negating the Pan-Africanist ideology in its pristine form, it is here that territorial nationalism has posed its strongest challenge to continentalism and pluralism has engulfed federalism. The Cairo Summit of 1964 saw the member states pledging "themselves to respect the borders existing on the achievement of national independence" which meant in affect that the principle of *uti possedetis* was adopted. This decision has been applied since in the settlement of a series of conflicts on the continent. In the same way the principle of non-interference goes against the Pan-Africanist tenet that the colonial boundaries were irrational and had to be eradicated. To counter this, the Article speaks of the inalienable right of these very states to independent existence. Finally, the determination to settle their disputes peacefully led the African states to set up the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration whose members were finally elected and met for the first time in December 1967. Since then, however the Commission has been lying in disuse and the African states have preferred to use the good offices of well-known leaders or groups of Heads of States in the settlement of disputes. This fact that the African states will not even transfer this little of their sovereign authority to a common organ illustrates the degree of the hold of nationalism on the continent. If one compares it with experiences in Latin America, it shows up in all its intensity. Nye pointed to the the lack of strong nationalistic ideologies which might have diluted the sense of regional community in Central America.
By contrast nationalism is not only very strong as an ideology in Africa but seems to be on the increase. The boundary disputes, the attempts of the different states to fashion their own exclusive political ideologies, the occasional burst of measures against non-citizens which has resulted in periodic mass expulsion of Africans from other states where they are non-nationals—all these witness to the nationalism with which contemporary Africans are familiar. There are other healthy and constructive forms of it (e.g. in the development of neglected cultures) but there is no doubt that it has constituted one of the most important obstacles to integration.

The pluralist concept of a security-community lays emphasis on the absence of violent conflict. Here again, our study leads us to suggest that the criteria in that concept should be adapted to suit a more dynamic view of the process of integration by taking account of which phase is under consideration. The salient question in examining experiments like African integration ought to be what tendencies are in evidence. To answer that question it may not be conceptually of the first importance, as far as the building of a security community is concerned, that the total absence of violent conflict has been achieved. It may suffice that the use of peaceful methods for the settlement of conflict predominates over the threat or use of violence and what has been termed "the classic diplomatic patterns of self-help." If the question is approached in this way, then it seems clear that not only are the African states, so far, at the pluralistic phase of integration, but that the method works considerably. One study of settlement of conflicts between African states concludes that "the OAU provides a unique meeting place for African national leaders and is well suited for conflict management by summit diplomacy...the organization proved of some effectiveness in all of the territorial conflicts brought before it..." (see Fig. 17.5).

To conclude this section, the concept of "high" and "low" politics must be subsumed into more meaningful categories for examining the process of integration. In the present case we have found it more useful to include it as well as the variable of political culture into the variable of nationalism as an intercepting variable between ideology and functional integration. It is not the primary concern of this study to go into the numerous dimension of national policy which can be said to emanate from the pressures of nationalism and its effect on the attitudes and behaviour of the national political elites. But such an in depth examination is likely to offer insight into phenomena which are generally lumped under the vague concept of "high" politics. Similarly, it may be that political development need not constitute a negative variable in the process of integration unless it is stated as part of another variable such as nationalism which gives it direction. For the fact of political development - in the African case the preoccupation with state and nation building - ought
properly to lead to the realization of the rational merits of integration. It is the intervening variable of nationalism that directs this realization into other concerns.

### SUMMARY OF INTRAREGIONAL CONFLICTS (1963-1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicting States</th>
<th>issue</th>
<th>Primary OAU Activity</th>
<th>Outcome (as of January 1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria-Morocco</td>
<td>territory</td>
<td>legitimize cease-fire, aid communications, provide neutral site for leaders</td>
<td>bilateral settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia</td>
<td>territory</td>
<td>1964 - order cease-fire (not effective); 1967 - provide neutral site; 1973 - establish a good offices committee</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana-Upper Volta</td>
<td>territory</td>
<td>1964 - conciliation; 1965 - forum; pressure on Ghana</td>
<td>settled (Ghanaian withdrawal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea-Gabon</td>
<td>territory</td>
<td>assist negotiations, create commission to define border</td>
<td>quiescent (settlement pending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana-neighbours</td>
<td>subversion</td>
<td>1965 - attempt mediation</td>
<td>settled (conflict ended by Ghanaian coup)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda-Burundi</td>
<td>subversion</td>
<td>refugee commission attempts conflict prevention; 1966 legitimize Mobutu mediation; 1973 - establish mediation committee</td>
<td>quiescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Senegal</td>
<td>subversion</td>
<td>1971 - establish mediation commission</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania-Uganda</td>
<td>subversion</td>
<td>1973 - provide neutral site for leaders, assist Somali mediation efforts</td>
<td>settled (reconciliation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana-Guinea (I)</td>
<td>seizure of diplomats</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>settled (release arranged by U Thant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana-Guinea (II)</td>
<td>seizure of diplomats</td>
<td>inquiry (Council of Ministers, pressure on Ghana (Assembly))</td>
<td>settled (release arranged by three heads of state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Ivory Coast</td>
<td>seizure of diplomats, subversion</td>
<td>legitimize Tubman's initiatives for release of diplomats</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika (internal)</td>
<td>replace British peacekeeping troops</td>
<td>legitimize Nyerere’s actions and troop loans</td>
<td>settled (bilateral loan of troops successfully replace British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (1964-65) (some external involvement)</td>
<td>civil war</td>
<td>attempt conciliation, attempt to limit external involvements</td>
<td>settled (military victory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (internal)</td>
<td>secession</td>
<td>support federal government, attempt conciliation</td>
<td>settled (military victory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (internal)</td>
<td>secession</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>settled (some assistance from Ethiopia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (internal)</td>
<td>ethnic strife</td>
<td>minimal; legitimize government actions</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 17.5

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Federalism flourished partially and briefly in African continental politics. It had its roots as we saw in the Pan-Africanist ideology. At its height, Nkrumah could rally the support of a large section of African trade unions, radical parties and at least three governments who were prepared to go the whole hog and form a union of states as the nucleus of a Pan-African government. By the time the OAU Summit of 1963 opened, much of this support at the state government level was dissipated. Nkrumah stood virtually alone. How can we account for this development? A large portion of the responsibility must of course be placed at the door of nationalism. We noted how the new states are loath to relinquish even the minutest of their authority to supranational bodies. And federation as advocated by Nkrumah meant the immediate surrender of power by the states to a supranational body. The inclinations of the overwhelming majority of African states reduced, therefore, the task of translating the Pan-Africanist federalist approach into action to a question of traditional international politics. It must be carefully noted that in the conflict that ensued over this practical question many tactics were employed, ranging from verbal warfare and boycotts to threats and occasional violent clashes especially at the frontiers. This in despite of the fact that there was a seeming agreement over unity. It would appear then that at such levels of the beginnings of the unification process in which a *modus vivendi* is emerging, neither conflict nor coercion can with any certainty be discounted from the concatenation of salient factors. An interesting question arises. What would have been the course of the federalist approach to unity in Africa at that stage of development if it had been staunchly sponsored not by Nkrumah alone but by, say, two-thirds of the African states with the rest either recalcitrant or vacillating? One cannot escape the thought that in the federalist scheme of things which is concerned with the legal distribution of power, law, order and stability, a considerable measure of coercion, probably in all its forms, might have been introduced into the proceedings. Indeed, this was known to be the dream of certain Africans. The reasoning behind it was that nationalism in Africa had not had time to entrench itself and that the federalists should strike while the iron was hot. If we accept this appreciation of the situation then a conceptual problem arises. How solid is the theoretical basis for discounting coercion from the continuum of integration at every phase. There is a rather respectable tradition behind this tendency. Haas has questioned "whether regional conquerors and nation builders are also actors on the stage of regional integration."

He adds: "To delimit the field, therefore, it must be stressed that the study of regional integration is unique and discrete from all previous systematic studies of political unification because it limits itself to
noncoercive efforts. The study of federalism, national unification, nation and empire building is necessarily replete with attention to the use of force by the federalizer or the catalytic agent - external colonizing elite, military conqueror, or hegemony-seeking state. Our task is to explain integration among nations without recourse to these historical agents not because they have not been important but because they make the explanation too simple and too time-bound. The dominating desire of modern students of regional integration is to explain the tendency toward the voluntary creation of larger political units each of which self-consciously eschews the use of force in the relations between the participating units and groups.

The main reason for studying regional integration is thus normative...

While the main reason for the study of regional integration may be normative it need not blind us to other objective factors. In considering this question the situation within modern states which are normally regarded as highly integrated should give us food for thought. In such societies ordinary urbanity eschews force as a main means of maintaining or building integration. But it is accepted as an ingredient where necessary. Our hypothetical situation in Africa might not necessarily have resembled the bellicose, empire-building conqueror of Haas’ image. It might quite simply have been a group of elites who seemed to have the double legitimacy accorded by both the Pan-Africanist ideology and the opinion of a large part of the African populace. We emphasize African, because in that scheme of things the import of separate African nationalities would have lost much of its relevance* i.e. the situation would have been somewhat akin to the nation states we mentioned earlier. For everyone agreed that the African colonial boundaries were arbitrary. Again, coercion can be overt or disguised, direct or induced, mild or cataclysmic. The African territory in which the populace or certain elites were induced by propaganda or infiltration to rise against their leaders in support of the general continental demand for a federation would not quite have resembled a victim of an overbearing conqueror. This is what Nkrumah was accused of attempting. He suffered of course the double disability that he stood alone. The African states which, having been badly battered by strained relations and border clashes with its neighbours whom it opposed over the issue of federation, had second thoughts on the issue could with some plausibility be said to be pressured but not conquered. Coercion, then appears as a vague term. True enough, according to our normative

*A possible objection to this reasoning might of course be that, in that case, we would not be dealing with integration between nation states. However formally that would still be the case. 388
standards, such tactics may not be recommendable in the first instance but they are probable objective factors in certain environments and phases of development which theory ought to take into account. In the preindustrial societies which figured in Deutsch's studies, force, in the form of war and revolution, played a major part in the proceedings leading to integration. To take but two examples, in America integration followed a successful revolution spearheaded by a determined elite with a sense of mission. In England it was left to the elite of the "Gentleman" aristocracy to carry through the subjugation of Scotland. Had Nkrumah's fervour and sense of mission, united with a certain amount of force, permeated the African elites of the early 1960's, history might have been shunted into the track of continental unity...

Of course it did not turn out that way in Africa. The African leaders condemned force in the process of integration and placed national sovereignty on a pedestal. The experience of two or three decades of European integration has injected a new tradition into theory - that of assuming the absence of coercion at any point on the process of integration. This might turn out to be a premature conclusion when it is applied to areas "where the process is still indoubt." It might be a good way to delimit a field; there is always the danger that it puts an undue limit on the relevance of theory.

What about the classic problem arising from juxtaposing federalism with "realist"-pluralist or the functionalist approaches? Pentland stated it vividly:

"...In short, according to the 'realists,' the world is not yet ready for federalism; according to the functionalists, the era of federalism has already passed."

With all the attenuating effect of sociological federalism, the federalist approach still relies on the primacy of politics in the sense that it is the direct assault at some stage of concerted political power on circumscribed nationalist political power which can bring about integration. A charge of over politicization has been laid against this approach. It both underestimates the functionalist gradualism and overestimates the pluralist recognition of state power. It has also been said that its reliance on 'political will' leads it, especially in times of crisis, to underwrite the penchant of the apocalyptic federalists for the 'great man' theory of integration.

Is Africa not ready for federalism or has the era of federalism in Africa passed beyond recall? These questions are not properly within the scope of this study and must remain largely unanswered. This much can be said however: Africa has faced that question once during the period between 1960 and 1965 and the outcome is well known. But posterity is divided on the issue. There are those who believe that Nkrumah's ideas were anachronistic. Others think they were destructive, or that at least his methods were. Still others seem
to have a vested interest in rewriting the history of that troubled era
to detract from the stature of the man and the relevance of the ideas
he promoted as far as African unity is concerned. It is the type of
syndrome produced by a De Gaulle - although the two men repre­
sented somewhat opposite ideals. But the recent sixth Pan-African
Congress showed that there is a considerable African opinion which
still believes in the relevance of those ideas to contemporary African
continental politics, who think that rather than being anachronistic,
Nkrumah was before his time. The "great man" theory is still very
much with us and the answer to our question will depend on how far
the conjecture of coming events can resurrect or submerge those
tendencies. One thing is certain: the gradualist path to integration
has become a respectable approach in African continental politics.

We have criticized certain neo-functionalist concepts both with
regard to the end-product and with respect to the process condi­
tions. It must, however, be said that certain other components of the
neo-functionalist approach hold much relevance for the African
context. Particularly with respect to certain of their criticisms of the
situation in less developed countries viz. the limited markets, the low
levels of entrepreneurial resources, the loose interdependence of
economic sectors, the scarcity of interest group pluralism, and the
rapid politicization of economic issues. We attributed the last point
to the effects of nationalism. It is evident, however, from our review
of some of the economic groupings, particularly the East African
Community, that the failings of the structures in the African econo­
ic sector constitute a serious handicap. The European Community
has benefited from the outstanding qualities and generally high le­
vels of its industrial sector. Without relapsing into an oversimplified
dichotomy between the industrial and non-industrial actor the po­
tency of this factor in the process of integration cannot be denied.
But one of the cardinal lessons from the European experiments in
integration and the theories derived from them is, in our view, the
immense potential of institutional forces. A recent study of at least
one less developed area led to the same conclusions. Extolling the
virtues of the Junta system in the Andean Common Market (The
Junta consists of three Latin American citizens, not necessarily from
the Andean Common Market member-countries, charged to act in
the common interest and responsible only to the Commission),
Avery and Cochrane stress the importance of decision-making styles
which rely on "uninstructed (sic) technical experts?" as a means of
reducing the excessive interplay of national interests.9 The most
successful contemporary example of the blending of this method
with customary diplomatic bargaining style can be found in the Eu­
ropean community. It would appear however that it is more urgent­
ly required in settings in which the content of nationalism is high
enough comparatively to seriously threaten the outcome of the inte­
Concomitant with this method is the frequently employed tactic in Europe of strictly regulated phasing of projects and advances in integration. It is a method which has also been employed with relative success in Latin America but which the African countries have not yet tried on a continental scale. It is partly born out of the belief, which we criticized, in a choice between political advances in integration and disintegration. Cogent as that criticism might be conceptually, in empirical terms it would seem that in the method of well-defined phasing adjustments the process of integration has a considerable potential ally.

We turn at last to the concept of a *deus ex machina* or, in common theoretical parlance, the exogenous variable or still, in our chosen perspective, *the Godfather syndrome*. Once again, it may prove useful to cast our criticisms and modified propositions in the frame of some of the useful work which has been done to date in the effort to develop a more consistent method of attacking this question. Not so long ago theorists did not set much store on the exogenous variable as attention was fixed on novel neo-functionalist concepts like spill-over and automatic politicization. The sustained assault of the traditionalists on those positions has resulted in the appearance of a number of analyses devoted to the examination of the external variable in the process of integration. Naturally, most of these analyses have been consecrated to the EEC, particularly with regard to its external relations with the USA and the influence of those relations on the European integration process. The attempts to direct this awareness of the relevance of the exogenous variable on the integration process towards late developing areas have at best been half hearted. There have been two main approaches: It has been suggested that the external influence can deflect a region from the path of integration given certain conditions. But it is the second approach which has dominated analysis in this area, namely the concept of a *deus ex machina* which is by and large a positive factor in the integration process by providing either, economic, military or political support and incentive. A related phenomena has often been stressed. This is the incentive towards integration provided by an actual or potential competition or threat to a given area. Again, the potential rivalry between the US and Europe, at least in the economic sphere, together with the threat of American dominance, are cited as major incentives in European integration.

All this makes very good sense. But here again the empirical source of theory has bestowed a certain bent on the resulting con-
cepts. Despite the cogency of the arguments which draw attention to the limits of the affinities between Europe and the United States, these arguments do not go far enough, when they are turned on other areas. They have often been carried on as if the *deus ex machina* as between Europe and the US will show the same benign, or shall we say, temperate characteristics in Africa, or Asia - to take but two examples. But ordinary competent appreciation of current affairs ought to prevent such unwarranted extensions. American foreign policy does not hound communism in Western Europe in quite the same way as in Africa or Asia. For the USSR, the African scene is not quite the same arena for combating capitalism as e.g. Eastern Europe offers. The point is that the constellation of events and conditions in Africa are such that the *deus ex machina* cannot be assumed to be ostensibly a benevolent influence. There are important differences in background, methods, and aims. Hence our choice of the term Godfather syndrome.

It is not sufficient either, to dismiss the question with the rather limited relevance of the Deutschian approach which found simply that some unions were formed because of the existence of a common threat and that in the majority of such cases disintegration set in when that common threat had passed. If we want to find out more about the conditions prevailing in a successful or unsuccessful integration effort we would want to know the relationship between these "external parameters" and the ongoing process. Even as between the US and Western Europe where a great deal of affinity and considerable history of US support for European integration can be assumed, coupled with vested interest in the Atlantic alliance, it is still evident that the potential unpleasant reaction of the so-called *deus ex machina* hangs like a sword of Damocles over the possible direction of European integration. Hansen, discussing the possible alternative paths that European integration might take, suggests three different scenarios. In scenario No. 1 - Europe à la carte - the externalization would rapidly be enhanced in Europe i.e. "the attempt to hammer out a collective external position will be a high order of business within the Community." However Hansen warns that this position assumes a status quo in the international environment especially within the Community's most important external actor: 51

"That is to say, it assumes that extra-regional reactions to the internal trends described in this scenario will not be provocative enough to induce any major alterations in European Community policy. From the origin of the European Community to the present moment, this assumption would appear to have been generally valid. It is somewhat uncertain whether or not it will continue to do
so...” (my italics.)

The point is soon clarified. Scenario No. 2 envisages not the compact Community with the common front of scenario No. 1, but a more diffuse bloc-albeit "self-centred" - as a powerful customs union capable of threatening the interest of the US. "...the self-centred customs union has grown, and grown, and grown, and with each addition it has become less of a customs union and more of a discriminatory trading bloc." Here again it is "the potential for the emergence of divergent US and EC economic blocs" which is expected to whip the Community into line.

Scenario No. 3 is even more ominous. It is headlined: Come Home America. Hansen puts it this way: "...(in this scenario) much will depend upon the outcome of international economic negotiations over the next several years, upon domestic political developments which directly affect United States foreign policy, and residually upon the priorities of the American president. ...If the international waters do get rough, it is not unthinkable that America will come home in a way which would put all the supranationalist rhetoric of the Hague and Paris summits to the test.” (my italics.)

All this amounts to is actually an emphasis on the nuisance value of a particular external actor as an input in the integration process of a given region - a region which nevertheless is known not to belong among the most vulnerable either economically, politically or militarily. If we turn our attention to another setting in which the US is also the most important external actor, we remark certain differences. Avery and Cochrane have recounted the swift and devastating reaction of the US to the move to draft an Investment Code as part of the attempt to create an Andean Common Market. The modest provisions of the Fund were, namely, that foreign companies should fade out their dominance of the Andean market in order to be eligible to participate in the programme of trade liberalization, by converting to joint or domestic enterprises thus giving nationals a larger role in determining basic policies and decisions of the companies. In three of the participating countries - Chile, Colombia and Peru - these companies were given a fifteen year conversion period. In Bolivia and Ecuador they had twenty years!

We cannot do better than report Avery and Cochrane in full:

"Reaction of non-Latin American foreign interest to the investment code as a whole and to the divestment provision particularly has been widespread and, for the most part, negative. Wionczek reveals that during the negotiations, foreign companies (mainly United States) operating in the region set up an "intelligence service" in each participating country "to follow closely the headway being made and to bring pressure to bear on the different govern-
ments in order to shape the Common System to their interests."

These companies were supported in their efforts to change or block the code by the powerful Council of the Americas, an association representing some 210 United States companies with investments in Latin America. In a highly critical document, the council argued that the common system would be detrimental to United States foreign investment in the region, which had totaled 2.5 billion in 1969. *To back up its argument, the Council announced shortly after the code was approved that 84 United States investments planned for Andean countries had been suspended. Moreover, foreign investors intensified pressure on Columbia, considered the weakest link in the regional grouping because of its generally favourable investment climate...*

In contrast to this picture, the United States's reaction to adverse discriminatory efforts of the common external position of the European Community, has ranged between an insistence on a major round of the Kennedy round of trade negotiations, together with Japan, in order to effect certain adjustments in the CXT (common external tariff) to bring them in line with GATT rules, and demands for a gradual dismantling of CAP (common agricultural policy.) And although the threat of United States withdrawal of its military commitments for the defence of Europe theoretically hangs in the air, many will agree with Hansen that it is "so far beyond the realm of probability that it hardly bears considering." 54

The relations between the United States and LAFTA and CACM have led certain theorists to conclude like Haas that "a hegemonic actor can use his payoff capacity to undermine the will to integrate..." 55 He adds however that "some economic unions among late developing countries sometimes survive largely as a result of support from an exogenous actor" and he cites the French-speaking African groupings, among others, as examples. The two related modes of influencing the integration process are hard to distinguish in practice and are often operative simultaneously. That is to say, the formal support by an exogenous factor, of certain economic groupings in late developing area might have the overall effect of making the integration process more problematic instead of smoother. This has to do with our remarks about the pluralist approach. On the continent of Africa where supranational institutions are not strong, the situation is further worsened by the division of the zones into francophone and anglophone. The effect of the exclusive support of an exogenous actor of any of these zones on the basis of past colonial ties tends to produce zones of influence. And the degree to which the common institution lacks real power is often comparable to the potential of these exogenous factors to deflect their zones of influence from co-ordinated action in the region.

In this sense, the pluralist tradition in African continental politics...
is particularly conducive to the *Godfather syndrome*. We noted how many of these new states depend on their former colonial masters for economic viability and for their defence. In short, the legitimacy of the states is protected by the exogenous factor. One is reminded of Hoffmann's arguments about the propensity of "the relative and forced tameness of the world jungle" to protect the legitimacy of the nation-state. In the African case, one might say that it is the coziness and smugness arising from the patronising role of the Godfather which acts as a disincentive to further integration. We noted how this factor occasioned serious problems between African states with respect to the Yaoundé Convention and the association of French-speaking African states to the EEC and continues to decide the role of some of the sub-regional organizations whose finances are buttressed by their former colonial rulers.

Sometimes the *Godfather syndrome* assumes more overtly activist roles. Especially with respect to the resolution of conflicts on the African continent, we noted how the exogenous actor was quite often the arbiter of developments. A glaring example was the involvement of the two superpowers in the Congo conflict. The difficulties of the OAU ad hoc Commission on the Congo resided primarily in the refusal of the great powers to insulate the conflict from their vital concerns. The failure of the ad hoc Commission in its mission to Washington effectively put an end to OAU influence on that conflict. The same factor has affected the turn of events in the Nigerian civil war in a less direct manner. The impuissance of the OAU was directly related to the magnitude of the conflict and the balance of the forces involved - factors that were considerably influenced by the coincidence of the British, US and USSR interests on the same side of the issue. In the Angolan war we saw how the prospects of an acceptable African *de facto* settlement turned, for the first time, on the resolute efforts of half of the African states, led by a powerful internal elite, to resist the influence of the exogenous factor. Nonetheless, on the actual battlefield, the fortunes of war were decisively influenced by the active participation of an exogenous actor.

The heightened conflict in Southern Africa, and now in the Horn of Africa, owes much of their present intensity to the solicitude of the great powers and lesser constellations to keep the continent safe from communism or capitalism. One observer impressed by the immensity of the influence of the exogenous factor in intra-African politics concluded that, "...if one of the major powers believes that

*Although this consequence might appear as primarily incidental, the possibility should not be dismissed that it can be the deliberate policy of the external actor in pursuit of its own national interest.*
it has considerable interests in the outcome of an African conflict, the OAU will find it difficult to dissuade it from intervention."

A number of theorists have tended to see the influence of the exogenous factor in integration in terms of the incentive which it offers to certain regions, especially less developed ones, towards greater cohesion as a means of "getting out from under." This is the sense in which the 'pre-unification state' of Etzioni's paradigm is influenced by external threat. Both Haas and Nye point out this factor. Nye stresses that it is the high perception of dependence which reinforces the drive towards integration. Schmitter uses trade and security relations to measure dependence. The former is measured by taking total foreign trade as a percentage of gross national product and by calculating the percentage of total exports concentrated in the two leading exports while the latter calculates the elite perceptions of vulnerability to external threats from the percentage of the budget allocated to defence. The scores are then multiplied and then divided by 100.

As we noted, the rationale of the African drive towards industrialization and its consequence of attempts at greater co-ordination, are related to the perception of their position "down under." Sometimes, as in the ACP states' co-ordination in the Lomé Convention negotiations, this perception can lead to even wider groupings. However, as experiences in Asia and in the projected Nordic Common Market have shown, the perception of dependence cannot always be expected to aid the process of integration and might become a disincentive. The occasional call in Africa, again mostly by the francophone states, for a Eurafica belongs to this category. Finally, to the extent that it is true that military and diplomatic regional groupings based on the existence of a common military threat, tend to disintegration as soon as the threat is reduced or removed, this influence of the exogenous parameter is highly evanescent.

In sum, then, in the less developed areas, it is the disruptive influence of the deus ex machina on the process of integration, which tends to predominate over its possible beneficial influences. This is partially because of the world economic and political structure and historical factors, such as colonialism, leading to the fact that the interactions between the exogenous factor and the regions concerned are carried on on the basis of other rationale than equality or ideological homogeneity. In such a milieu the deus ex machina tends to become a Godfather as it exercises its self-arrogated role of watching over the political destinies of the region as well as candidating as an arbiter of its economic orientation. Finally, the Godfather syndrome thrives within an integration process still at the pluralist-dominated phase or those which, due to the influence of certain factors, e.g. colonialism, are susceptible to the ready establishment of spheres of
influence for multiple exogenous actors. The fear of the African federalists that regionalism poses the threat of fragmentation is therefore not to be lightly dismissed.

We must now draw up a balance sheet of our endeavours. Progressing by means of a combination of conceptual criticism of contemporary mid-term theories and analysis of empirical evidence we have delineated a plethora of variables which can be construed as salient, so far, in the process of integration in Africa. From this we can make a short list consisting of ideology, conflict, nationalism, exogenous impulses, and increasing functional linkage of tasks. Contemporary theorizing on integration has produced a great many other variables some of which can be subsumed under our short list. Still others hold relatively low saliency for our chosen region at the present stage. Nye's list of variables include, for example: functional linkage of tasks, rising transactions, deliberate linkage and coalition formation, elite socialization, regional group formation, ideological-identitive appeal and involvement of external actors. Schmitter's list further widens the spectrum. Well might Haas declare with a touch of gratification that:

"We now have our list of major independent variables and we know enough to correct earlier false assumptions about congruence and the linear projection of variables found to have been causatively significant at the beginning of a given regional integration process."

However, our study has convinced us that theorists on political integration have little to be smug about. While progress has been made in drawing up lists and mapping out impressive descriptions of the process at work especially in Western Europe, the task of verifying the assumptions with which our mid-term theories our charged is still immense. We argued in favour of a definition of integration which can take account of a broad spectrum of experiments on the continuum of the process. Our study also confirmed us in our belief that theory in this field must make determined efforts to escape the dangers of a too narrow horizon as well as ethnocentrism which can result from our staring ourselves blind on the European model. The attention of theorizing on integration has only recently begun to be directed towards the ongoing attempts in Africa at unification. Not nearly enough has been achieved so far. We drew attention to a few areas in which theory can benefit from a deeper analysis of this region despite the obvious difficulties for systematic examination on that continent owing to the indifferent standards of statistics and branching points of social studies.

Throughout this study we constantly tried to keep in mind our
contention that it is because the African experiment on integration is situated at the lower ranges on the continuum of the process that a dynamic view of that experiment was justified. It behoves us therefore, before we conclude this analysis, to attempt to specify a little more explicitly where these ranges lie, especially in relation to other ongoing processes of integration of which the European model is undisputably considered the most advanced - its increasingly apparent limitations notwithstanding.

Already the nature of some of the variables that predominate in the African regional experiment gives us some idea where these ranges might be located. There has, for instance, been a common assumption among integration theorists that in the early stages of the process national imputs dominate only to be superseded at a later stage by regional imputs. The developments in the EEC since 1965 have of course put a question mark on the second part of this assumption. The influence of national impulses on central institutions can very well persist even at a later stage. Conversely, we are able to modify earlier assessments about where the EEC lies on the continuum. The growing consensus is that it is nowhere as near the ideal terminal condition of integration as theory assumed earlier on.

But national impulses undeniably predominate within the African region as our study has sought to show, and if our earlier assumption holds good it means that we must expect to find the African states somewhat towards the tail end of the continuum.

We can proceed further. From time to time theorists have tried to demarcate the European integration process into easily recognizable phases. Thus Kaiser speaks of the European phase (1947-48 to 1959-60); the Atlantic phase (1959-60 to 1964-65); and the phase of system expansion (1964-65). The Hague Summit of December 1969 marks yet another point of demarcation. Other theorists use a different set of criteria for demarcating the process. Taylor singles out the period from 1950 to 1954 as the Federal phase; 1955 to 1969 as the Neo-functional phase and 1969 to the present as the Confederal phase. Taylor bases his judgement on the contemporary phase of the European model on three major themes: the defensive stance of European governments as separate actors in their dealings with the institutions at Brussels; secondly, what Taylor calls the emergence of a "managed Gesellschaft" system of political interaction in which the Brussels authorities have accepted the role of actor like any other governments; and, finally, "the oscillation between advanced schemes for integration and retreats into nationalism which can be seen in the stated intentions of governments." Taylor gives us no clear-cut criteria by which to compare this stage of development with others and he foreswears any suggestion that other integration processes must eventually pass through the same stage. Nevertheless, some of his observations can help us in our assessment of the stage
which the African experiment has attained.

To my mind, it is the appearance of the "managed Gesellschaft" system of political interaction which is the crucial development among the themes enumerated by Taylor. The other two are undoubtedly important also - all three being conceptually interrelated. However, the other two themes relate to variables which can already make their presence felt even at the earlier stages of integration. By contrast, the "managed Gesellschaft" phenomenon seems to be something quite new - "the undermining of the hierarchy of actors and interests both at the national and European level and as a corollary, the legitimation of an increasing range of interests which are fed into the political arena." We are reminded of the systemic consequences presumed to emanate from the Lindberg and Scheingold's model (see Fig. 17.6).  

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 17.6**

- the "curiously ambiguous 'pluralistic' system" which that model forecasts. Taylor argues convincingly that the idea of national interest in Europe has become fractured and that the status of governments is declining despite the apparently increasing pervasiveness of their activities - a factor demonstrated not only by the growing inter-national interdependence but by the increasing inability of governments to control their economies by means of unilateral efforts. As the European Community has progressively weakened the Gemeinschaft within the nation-states, governments have become obliged to seek the alliance of not only other governments but other organized groups in the running of their affairs. Furthermore, at the Community level, since the technocrats seem, for the time being, to have abandoned their former role of constituting a putative rival European government (such as was the case before 1965) seeking rather
to encourage European alliances and co-ordinate the work of Europe’s institutions, and since there is no European Gemeinschaft to take over what is being lost to the states, the European model finds itself in a phase resembling a Gesellschaft in which the hierarchy of actors is relatively equalized.

This is not the place to examine these assertions in depth. We intend to use these projections merely as a touchstone for examining the African phase on the assembly line of integration. One way of doing this is to examine the degree of institutionalization attained in Africa. Lindberg once suggested four measures for degree of institutionalization namely (a) adaptability (b) complexity (c) autonomy and (d) coherence. The adaptability measure is directed towards the chronological age of the organization concerned, its generational age-number of changes in leadership and the number of functions the institution has performed (functional adaptability.) The OAU has been in existence since 1963 - barely thirteen years. If we reckon the different phases included in the European integration we can say that it has existed since 1947 i.e. thirty odd years. The Latin American experiment has been in progress for nearly twenty years. In Africa the scene is still dominated by same men who were the founding members of the organization - despite the fact of repeated military coups! Senghor, Nyerere, Houphouët-Boigny, Kaunda, Banda, Kenyatta, Bourgiba, Sekou Touré, King Hassan, etc. etc. - these are the names that have dominated the affairs of the Organization since its inception. The Organization itself has had only two former administrative secretary-generals, the second one had a very short term of office. Far from taking on several new functions some of its original functions and organs have fallen into disuse e.g. the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. It has retained the same type of bargaining processes in which the heads of state figure largely. In short, the sort of increasing bureaucratization present in the European experiment is conspicuous by its absence. If we compare this to the pragmatic co-ordination among the Nordic countries which has released a flood of different functions among the states or the well documented work of the tecnicos in the Central American context, the African experiment is found very much wanting.

A systematic measurement based on Lindberg’s dimension must of course have command of a measure of complicated data which we cannot dispose of here but our empirical study of the African regional system revealed that both in respect of the number of sub-units and the variety of their functions, (complexity,) support by social groups (autonomy) and coherence (loyalty of membership, lack of open denunciation of the organization, frequency of dissent in decision-making) the African region lags very far behind. Possibly, high score could be achieved in the degree of identitive support since
we found that the influence of the Pan-African ideals remained particularly strong - especially with respect to liberation.

Yet it is evident that having passed through the epigenesis of institutionalization when a combination of conflict and the ideal of regional unity gave rise to the OAU, the African system has been passing through a phase in which nationalism has been the dominant content in the process of integration. More recently, the international environment, coupled with advances in the political culture, is helping to put a premium on pragmatic cooperation as is abundantly portrayed by the numerous organs and organizations for economic cooperation which are sprouting up on the continent. One of the major influences behind this has been the persistent campaigns of the ECA, and its sub-regional programme has provided a ready-made framework for this development. Politically, the region seems to have reached a stage where it can resist the fissiparous effects of excessive nationalism, and proceed by compromise based on pragmatism—if the recent results over the Angolan issue are anything to go by. Nationalism, then, marches side by side with incipient functionalism based on regionalism. With this new phase of pragmatic sub-regionalism the African region has taken another step towards greater cohesion with all that it means in the possibilities for improved communication, socialization and the further development of a distinctive way of life.
CONCLUSION

This work started out as an attempt to avail ourselves of theory in the understanding of the forces at work within the African process of integration. But we study politics, as Aristotle contended long ago, not merely in order to understand reality, but also in order to manipulate it. Theory must not be merely an abstract exercise. And in order the better to manipulate the African reality it behoves us to equip ourselves with a thorough-going knowledge of the milieu we operate in and the forces we can contend, or ally ourselves, with.

We can learn several lessons from our survey. Firstly, low as the levels are in which it operates, the African process of integration is under way. Secondly, its failure or success will not depend on some mystical 'political will' the existence of which is a matter of hope, but on the ability to direct the forces which promote the process and discourage or accommodate those which inhibit it. Bad or good management is the key. As the generation of Africans who carried forward the Pan-Africanist ideology and faced the contradiction between continental unity and national sovereignty fades away, it is already becoming apparent that bureaucratization is setting in to replace the personalized style which has stultified much of the continent's efforts at co-ordination. Furthermore, the new hands at the helm have greater opportunities, contemporary world situation being what it is, to come to terms with external forces which may affect unity. And the greater facility with which the member states undertake joint action, e.g. their 1976 action at the Olympic Games, is an index to a growing common perception of the environment in which they operate.

Furthermore, the legacy of the founding fathers of the OAU is far from being totally negative. In hindsight, the African states wisely rejected in 1963, a policy of: "marry in haste, repent at leisure." Considering the subsequent history of African politics the mind boggles at the Pandora's box which would have been opened had these states started out on a federalist path. Nor should we cavil at the African diplomacy which has grown out of the approach of those patriarchs. The practice of using elder statesmen to resolve the continent's conflicts has a venerable basis in African sociology and has proved to be relatively successful.

But the continent must move with the times. Rejection of the federalist logic need not imply a rejection of the wisdom that has accrued to other advanced experiments in integration, namely, that the task of transcending national frontiers for political and economic purposes depends upon the ability to limit national political and
economic sovereignty. As far as integration is concerned excessive nationalism is the worm in the bud. Again, although there are reasons to justify the special role of African leaders in conflict resolution, the elite of the African leadership must not constitute a cabal far removed from the aspirations of the ordinary Africans. The relevance of the transactionalist calculus cannot be denied. Integration also appertains to the minds of men. In this respect, it is a great loss in the potential of the Pan-Africanist ideology that the OAU does not publicize its ideals and activities through channels that can reach the ordinary Africans.

Viable supranational institutions, according to the neo-functionalists, are the alpha and omega of integrative advance in a community. This may not represent the whole truth. But the appalling lack of such institutions within the African experiment is a serious handicap. New forms of decision-making must be deviced and their authority progressively strengthened if African integration can advance beyond the nationalism-dominated phase. In this respect, a great potential lies in the ECA. A beginning is possible by establishing a firm convention on the continent that the ECA should be directly involved in the drawing up of the individual national plans. Such a practice is particularly attractive because at the beginning it need not conflict overly with national sovereignty if it is judiciously applied. A la longue it offers great scope for the functionalist logic to become operative. In order to derive the full benefit from such measures, it is high time that the continent addressed itself to the task of creating a solid corps of African bureaucrats at the continental level whose first inspiration and loyalty are directed towards the continent.

Karl Deutsch emphasized the cardinal importance, in the process of integration, of the attainment of a security-community i.e. a community which, among other things, is committed to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. For the pluralist, this is by no means a utopia but a very essential and basic stage on the integrative continuum. Things being what they are on the international scene, this trite finding ought to be a conventional wisdom among Africans. Yet if the truth were told, Africans will find that, despite the overriding commitment to fight the enemy to the South, we have shed incomparably more blood, wasted by far more material resources and squandered unspeakably more resources financially in fighting between African states than in the pertinent struggle to liberate the rest of the continent. This is a basic folly that would make many an early Pan-Africanist turn in his grave. It is, furthermore, a folly that renders the African states perennial puns in the game of international politics and diplomacy. Such a propensity for 'internecine' conflict, by keeping up a steady succession of continental bush fires, cannot fail to stultify the modest attempts in other spheres to strengthen the identitive bonds between Africans. In this respect, the
growing importance being attached to the arrangement of cultural events between African states, is highly salutary. As of today, many African states are still a long way off from the restraint born of a strong consciousness of affinity such as we saw recently in the "Cod War" between Britain and Iceland - despite its obviously tragic aspects. Only a large scale investment in the effort to increase friendly social contact within the continent can, in time, ensure the inculcation in her peoples of the understanding that in this day and age African states cannot afford to shoot at one another in anger.

The question of the pervasiveness of the exogenous factor on the continent must appear baffling at times. But for countries willing to go hammer and tongs at unity it is a question that sooner or later must be faced squarely. One way would be through intensified efforts to harmonize the member states' policies towards foreign business concerns. Such coordination has every prospect of immediately easing the stranglehold which such influences have on the liberty of action of individual states. But it is not enough. The mentality that regional organizations must first and foremost be agents for attracting foreign funds must rapidly be expunged. These organizations ought, if anything, to exist in lieu of foreign support. A great part of the continent's sorrowing is inextricably linked with the continent's borrowing.

Many member states of the OAU - in the north of the continent - have close and basic ties with the Arab world. While it would be grossly unfair to these states to deny the legitimacy of those ties, it would be flagrantly rash to overlook their potential for producing centrifugal forces with regard to the continent's integrative processes.* The recent eight-point Charter of Cooperation agreed between the OAU states and the 20-nation Arab League is a move in the right direction. But there is something left to be desired. President Senghor's concept of a formal union between the two groups does not seem to be a realistic approach. What is urgently needed is ways and means of establishing and enhancing the identitive ties between the two groups. It is a task that is not susceptible to performance in the twinkling of an eye and which ought to engage the imagination of the African leaders. Warning signals have already come in the form of a certain sullenness among some states over the undesirable effects of the oil crisis on the economies of African states and the operations of the ABEDIA (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa) despite the sympathetic OAU stance towards the Arab cause in the middle East crises. As usual the myth may far surpass the rea-

*Consider in this respect the attempts of Egypt, an African country, to form a union with Syria, a Middle Eastern country.
lity. In the absence of identitive bonds between the two groups, there is a ghastly potential for such irritants to escalate unnecessarily into incipient conflict. That tendency has already been adumbrated in recent events. And yet in the present conjuncture of international circumstances it can safely be said that the things that unite the two groups predominate over all other considerations. We shall be well advised to avail ourselves of that opportunity to develop the cohesion between our common organizations while accommodating other pressures.

Finally, the southern African situation is a perennial stumbling block for African unity. The riddle is not without its psychological dimension. The Pan-Africanist ideology is founded on freedom. For the continent to fully open the prospects for realizing itself, that obstacle must be removed out of the way. Its continued existence bestows an air of unreality to other legitimate aspirations to remove the political and economic shackles originating from other areas. No movement towards continental cohesion can be fully credible whilst a vast chunk of the continent remains outside the experiment. The liberation of southern Africa must therefore be the first concern of any realistic policy to further African integration.

For the rest, a dynamic view of integration will presuppose that the conditions which produce the variables we have delineated do not remain static; and the apotheosis of such variables is a cardinal error in theorizing. Variables come and go, taking their cue from the objective milieu; and the African situation is sufficiently effervescent for rapid changes for the better to be fully possible. Therefore this work must end on a somewhat self-immolating wish, namely, that the inhibiting variables we have exposed here shall quickly become irrelevant.
Footnotes to Chapter seventeen


3. See Geiss, I., op. cit.


5. See Geiss, I., op. cit.


7. See Andrén, N., op. cit., p.9.


27. Europe's would-be Polity, op. cit.


33. Lindberg, L. and Scheingold, S.: Europe's would-be Policy, op. cit., p.81.

34. op. cit.


42. Pentland, C., op. cit., p.47.


45. op. cit., p.30.


50. Such is the theme of the famous book by Scherban-Schreiber, J.J. Le Defi Americain.


53. Wionczek: Comercio Exterior (Mexico), June 1971, p.28. He maintains further that "top executives of US oil companies were especially active in this period" seeking to block the code.


57. Meyers, Davis B.: Intra-regional Conflict Management by the OAU, op. cit., p.373.


61. Europe's would-be Polity.

The following is a sample of an authorisation to conduct research - in this case, in Kenya. According to the document, at least five instances are involved with the decision in one way or another. In this particular case, it took nearly two weeks of waiting and lobbying in Nairobi before the document came through. According to information received in 1977, such restrictions have become, if anything, more stringent.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

Ref: ADM.I3/001/C 370/3

P. O. Box 30510,
NAIROBI.
6th May, 1969.

Dear Sir,

I am pleased to inform you that your application for Research in Kenya on Problems of Integration in Africa (Political and Economic) is approved, subject to the condition that you will deposit copies of your report with the Ministries of Economic Planning and Development, Foreign Affairs, the University Library and the Government Chief Archivist.

Yours faithfully,

(P.S. KIHARA)
for PERMANENT SECRETARY

c.c.
The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
NAIROBI

The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Economic Planning & Development,
NAIROBI

The Chief Government Archivist,
NAIROBI

The Principal,
University College,
NAIROBI
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2. Interviews with various officials of the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa.
3. Interviews with other officials of the OAU.
4. Interviews with a member of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
5. Interview at the East African Economic Community headquarters in Kampala, Uganda and Arusha, Tanzania.
6. Interview with Professor Kjeld Philip who led the group which drafted the East African Economic Community Treaty.
7. An interview arranged with the late Emperor Haile Selassie was taken on at the last moment, without warning, by the minister in charge of the Emperor’s Court.
8. Interviews with officials at the foreign ministeries of the following countries: Dahomey (now Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.


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