SOCIETAL CHANGE AND
IDEOLOGICAL FORMATION
AMONG THE RURAL POPULATION
OF THE BALTIC AREA 1880-1939

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Societal Change and Ideological Formation among the Rural Population of the Baltic Area 1880-1939
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Introduction to Societal Change and Ideological Formation among the Rural Population of the Baltic Area 1880-1939

Piotr Wawrzeniuk

Is there a special Eastern European agrarian path to modernity and citizenship, and if so, what are its characteristics? On the most general level, this is the question raised by this anthology. All but one of the contributions were originally presented at a workshop organized by the Södertörn University College project Agrarian Change and Ideological Formation – Farmers’ Cooperatives and Citizenship in the Baltic Sea Area 1880-1939 in Haapsalu, Estonia, in August 2007.1 The aim of the project is to explore the founding and growth of cooperative organizations in Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Poland (Galicia) 1880–1939. The main focus is on explaining how citizenship and emancipation of the peasantry evolved in the region as a result of these organizations. The focus on agrarian cooperatives is vital, as these organizations were the primary organizers in the rural areas. As the Baltic Sea Region was an agrarian area, the cooperatives had a large impact on the formulation of citizenship. The period between 1880 and 1939 was formative for the cooperative movements in the region.

There are two major theoretical approaches used to explore democratic development within the agrarian arena in the Baltic Sea Region: citizenship (defining the relationship between state and individual) and “Volk” (defining the relationship between collective and individual). Gender perspectives (with a focus on masculinity) and ethnicity are also integrated parts of the theoretical framework. The primary source informing the discussions on citizenship here is the framework developed by T. H. Marshall in 1950. His ideas on citizenship mainly involved Western liberal-reformist view on how

1 The organizers would like to thank Sofia Holmlund, Olof Mertelsman, Kristi Niskanen, Kai Struve (who also contributed with an article), Matti Peltonen, Ronny Pettersson and Roman Wysocki for fruitful commentaries. The editor would like to express his gratitude to the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press for granting the permission to use maps 1 and 2. According to a definition of the Baltic Foundation (Östersjöstiftelsen), which finances the research at Södertörn University College, the Baltic Area encompasses countries on the Baltic coast but also countries with tributary rivers to the rivers that discharge their waters into the Baltic Sea.
citizenship was created on 3 different levels: civil, political, and social. The three levels corresponded to different forms of citizenship. The civil arena involved legislation (land ownership) and some of the basic individual liberties. The political arena involved political rights (voting rights etc.) while the social arena involved economic rights. Marshall believed that the different levels followed each other chronologically, and also that each stage brought the creation of new institutions. The typology of Marshall has been developed in recent years into a broader perspective, as the original was based on only British history.

In general, theories concerning citizenship have not focused on the peasantry, but more on the bourgeois and working classes. However, Marshall’s definition can be used as a structuring agent to direct the study of cooperative and agrarian citizenship. For instance, laws governing land-ownership were extremely important for farmers, and also influenced membership in agrarian organizations. At the same time, however, there were ideas in operation that left little choice for the individuals, but instead included people in vast communities on the basis of their ethnicity. Pursuit of individual rights on the various levels described by Marshall was frequently restrained by a collective pursuit of what one could call clusters of rights as a group, in the name of “Volk”. The agrarian citizenship seems to have frequently oscillated between these two variants.

Factors such as ethnicity and gender have been critical in the process of the construction of a citizen. Ethnic minorities were often discriminated against because the idea of economic nationalism meant maximizing the common, national benefit as opposed to the individual benefit. Ethnicity is also important since the agrarian movements were vital catalysts in the national liberation groups. The concept of economic nationalism is related to the concept of “Volk”, as ethnicity is utilized as an organizing principle for all levels of society, including the economy. Generally, ethnic nationalism meant economic mobilization along ethnic lines.

The research on gender in the field of citizenship research has mainly been concentrated on the political and civil citizenship of women. However, the project also chooses to focus on the issues of masculinity, as the agrarian

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3 See the text of Anu-Mai Kõll in this volume.
Citizenship was thoroughly male, similar to other forms of citizenship. As an example, the definition of the complete citizen in Sweden in the mid 19th century was a Swedish, independent, adult, property-owning, educated, married male with a direct relationship to the state, which in turn gave certain privileges. This definition is not entirely agrarian, but all of the criteria mentioned are also central to agrarian citizenship.

The processes discussed in the articles contributed to the increased economic and political participation of the peasantry in the life of their respective countries. Economic citizenship – the securing of assets that would allow one to maintain one’s family and (as a further step) stimulate economic relations that would spur one’s participation in the political and cultural life – is an important feature in several articles.

In the study of the formation of citizenship within cooperative movements in the region, the focus is on exploring how democratic or undemocratic structures were established and/or created within the cooperative movements. This is also connected to the process of nation building in the region. In the national rhetoric, farmers were portrayed as bearers of the national heritage and as a pillar of society. The agrarian sector was seen as healthy and character building, in contrast to industrialised sectors. At the same time, the farmer was always described as male, and as a result, most of the “healthy” farm work became coded as masculine, something that became an important part of the cooperative self-image. This brings forward the question of who is the ideal farmer, and it also relates to how citizenship was constructed and viewed by the state. Central exponents for the definition of agrarian citizenship are inclusion and exclusion. By examining who were allowed to be members in cooperatives and on what basis, it is possible to determine the societal separations of the period. This affected the forms of democracy along ethnic, gendered, or religious lines.

Needless to say, a project that spans several countries, as does *Agrarian Change*, allows comparative analysis as well. This volume, however, mirrors the first steps of our joint research. A future publication involving the project participants will deal with the main questions of the project in a comparative perspective. This comparison will be based on studies of local, regional, and central organizations as well as historiography.

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The articles

The anthology mirrors a work in progress, as the name of the publishing series – *Research Reports* – suggests. Nevertheless, the articles constitute an important contribution to the history of the peasant movements and organizations in the Baltic Area. Anu-Mai Kõll’s contribution questions the east-west divide of nationalism in a territorial (“western”) and ethno-linguistic (“eastern”) in the Baltic Sea area. Such a view appeared only during the Cold War, and was then applied to the past. In fact, there was a period of convergence of east and west prior to the First World War. While there has existed a wide diversity in the Baltic Area when it comes to historical processes and development, there have also been common features. For instance, the impact of the romantic idealization of the people – particularly the peasantry – has made itself felt all over the area, with vital consequences for political development. The activists of the popular rural movements in the Baltic Area mixed romantic nationalism and Enlightenment ideas to produce a type of emancipating fusion. Particularistic ideas were frequently mixed with ones of rationality and the utilisation of science as a way of modernising agriculture. Kõll explores the emancipating and democratising features of ethno-linguistic nationalism. The development diverged due to the rise of authoritarianism in the southern part of the Baltic area, while preserving democracy in the northern part.

Johan Eellend’s article gives a broad picture of Agrarianism, the rural-based ideology that guided most of the East- and Central European agrarian political parties during the inter-war period. A basic feature of East European agrarianism was its conviction of being a third force in politics and economy, falling between liberalism and socialism. By identifying ideas presented by liberals and Marxists as not progressive, but instead as a threat to rural society, the ideology confronted the two dominating paths of modernization. As it involves regions who were on the losing side of history, this brick in the complex edifice of the history of interwar East- and Central Europe is often neglected, even forgotten. Therefore, the intention of the article is to summarize the main features in political programs and discussions on agrarianism in order to create a framework focusing primarily on explaining the agrarianist view of history, and the mechanisms of social change, political power, and the organization of society.

Angela Harre takes the reader from the general level examined by Eellend to specifics, presenting the theory and practice of Romanian agrarianism in the years preceding the First World War and during the interwar time. She finds a peasant movement trapped between the need to modernise agriculture and the economy of the country in general (meaning market adaptation and industrialization), and the need to defend the will of the rural voters and fight the transformation to capitalism. The choice fell on the latter alternative, but
the solution did not bring about substantial improvement, and proved to be disastrous after the Great Crisis hit Romania in the 1930s. The popular anti-capitalist and antidemocratic sentiments deepened considerably and confined agrarianists to the margins of Romanian politics, paving the way for the Fascists, who promised quick solutions.

Kai Struve’s article “Citizenship and National Identity: The Peasants of Galicia during the 19th Century” illuminates the process of peasants acquiring and performing citizenship in the political sphere in the Habsburg Crownland of Galicia 1848-1914. In 1848, serfdom was abolished in Galicia and the door to political representation was opened for the peasantry. Among Polish and Ruthenian peasants, a long process of learning and adaptation to the changed judicial and political circumstances began. When the Austrian constitutional reforms of the 1860s opened new substantial possibilities of political participation for the peasants, peasants initially resorted to this opportunity to represent their concerns and interests with great enthusiasm. But after the acceptance of Polish autonomy in Galicia by Vienna in 1868, peasant representation in the Galician Diet and the Reichstag decreased drastically. Nevertheless, in the 1880s and the 1890s, there was still a rise of peasant parties among the Polish population with increased roles and participation of peasants in the Ruthenian political structures. While the Polish and Ruthenian peasants acquired a growing importance in the civil society and public sphere in Galicia, they were guided on their way by members of the Polish and Ruthenian intelligentsia, who claimed the function of the tribunes of the people, and formulated the needs and interests of the peasantry in exclusivist national terms. However, this essentially emancipating process also functioned as a catalyst of increasing national tensions, which in the near future would wreck havoc upon the eastern parts of the Crownland.

Piotr Wawrzeniuk’s text takes the reader to eastern Galicia of 1904-1914. The author explores the reasons behind the founding of Ruthenian cooperatives, and studies the work of the cooperatives. The organization of a dynamic and modern economic life, one that would fulfil the basic material needs of the peasants, was viewed as a crucial step towards the full political emancipation of the Ruthenians. Only if the Ruthenians secured a substantial degree of economic strength could they then reach for the civil rights enjoyed by other peoples of the Double Monarchy, which Ruthenians of present enjoyed only nominally, it was stated. The cooperatives, frequently founded and guided from above, were to be the tool of this emancipation. There were groups whose activities (or passivity) hampered the growth of the Ruthenian cooperative movement: Poles, Jews, Moscovphiles and many of the Ruthenian women. While the cooperatives had to be protected from the obstructive activities of the first three groups, who were to be excluded from cooperative activities, women were to be educated and disciplined for the cooperative, and consequently, the national cause.
Among the features that added to the ongoing process of modernization were the revised laws and patterns of inheritance. The text of Ülle Tarkianen discusses the consequences of the changed pattern of inheritance of rural property in the decades after the emancipation of the peasantry from serfdom in Estonia 1816. The right to own the land in perpetuity, and consequently to dispose over it unreservedly enabled the peasantry to increasingly participate in the cultural, social, and political processes in Estonia. Land ownership itself was a crucial precondition for economic citizenship in the countryside. The inheritance law also turned out to be important in preventing the fragmentation of farms into unproductive units (a process at its extremes in Austrian Galicia) that could hardly sustain a family by only allowing one main heir. A social security system of a kind was created, as the heirs often were obliged to provide a material minimum for the retired parents. The emerging class of peasant proprietors were to become the backbone of the national movement in the Estonian countryside.

Fredrik Eriksson’s article shows that Swedish agrarian press used strong modernising discourse. However, technical modernization and the great emphasis placed on the importance of education did not mean that politically radical ideas gained ground among the agricultural elites. Although distrustful of cooperative ideology, the predominantly conservative agrarian elites saw the cooperation as a way of pacifying radical tendencies among the rural poor and small holders. The emancipatory ideas of cooperation were deliberately overlooked, while the economic advantages of the cooperation and its modernizing capacity were stressed. Education was of utmost importance, as it not only would bring improvement and efficiency to agricultural and dairy production, but would also ensure peace between the various strata of society. The conservative agrarian elites viewed the ownership of land as a prerequisite of positive citizenship. Ownership of land shaped autonomous and responsible men who were able to handle agricultural and political rights alike. The smallholders were frequently viewed as problematic, as they were seen as traditionalist and selfish. On the other hand, the group was also described in romantic terms by journals which aimed at smallholders as their readership.

Ann-Catrin Östman’s text examines cooperative organizing patterns in the Swedish-speaking parts of Finland. The interplay of class relations, gender positions, and local interaction is studied against a background of, on the one hand, a strongly gendered and feminine coding of milking and dairy farming and, on the other hand, communal-egalitarian traditions. Furthermore, the importance of language on local as well as regional levels is considered. The older forms of organizations had a considerable impact on the ways in which new and more modern forms of organizations in the local community were established. The author stresses the importance of traditional and homosocial patterns of social interaction during a period of mod-
ernization, and how traditional notions of masculinity were, in part, created anew through co-operative organizations.

Peter Aronsson’s “The Peasant at National Museums in the Nordic Countries” studies how changing ideas of citizenship influenced the way in which the peasants of the Nordic countries were exhibited at the national museums in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. The peasants’ route into the national narratives has hardly been a straightforward one and turns out to have been rather similar in the countries studied. Thus, in Sweden, the image of the peasantry underwent several changes due to the political needs of various political groups. From the conservative vision of an organic peasant community as a golden age, the image of the peasantry was transformed by the rising bourgeoisie into an image of carrier of traditions to be remembered and cherished in a world where modernization and progress were viewed as inevitable. This image was reinterpreted into one of an unbroken pursuit of the rights to property and political influence, only to be succeeded by the view of the peasantry as an obsolete, if not exotic societal group that had to compete with the industrial heritage in order to be treated as a relevant part of the past.

The articles presented in this anthology therefore provide various perspectives on the political, economic, and social transformation of the rural populations of the Baltic Area between 1880-1939, and – more indirectly – the relationship between the rural populations and the rest of the society. The texts tell the story of various attempts to adapt to the world in a time of rapid political and economic change – not only for the rural population, but also for society as a whole. There are stories of relative success (cooperatives) and of failure (Agrarianism); of peasant societies with long traditions as well as very short and problematic traditions of peasant political participation (Sweden and Galicia respectively); of the impact of the organization of production and distribution of agricultural goods, products, and property on gender positions and other relationships; of the imagining and visualizing of the peasant by the non-rural society as an important element of modern nation building; and of the seemingly unlikely mix of ideas of romantic nationalism and the Enlightenment as a cornerstone of the emancipating agenda produced by the activists of the rural movements during the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
The East-West Dimension of Citizenship in the Baltic Sea Area

Anu Mai Kõll

The topic of the research of the project Agrarian Change and Ideological Formation – Farmers’ Cooperatives and Citizenship in the Baltic Sea Area 1880-1939 is the political formation of the peasantry in the Baltic Sea area during the period of democratization up to the Second World War. We study the impacts of cooperation, agrarianism and corporatism on the ideas and practices of citizenship as peasants began to gain political rights in the 19th and early 20th centuries. These forms of organizations and ideologies seem to have been shared generally by peasants in Europe. The peasants’ struggle for political rights was at the root of democratization in Europe, where the majority of the population was occupied with agriculture. What they wanted and how they intended to build a society and democracy has, however, long been forgotten in favour of the visions of other social groups, in particular the bourgeoisie and the urban workers.

The Baltic Sea area includes countries on both sides of the current east-west divide in Europe, and this divide has been particularly sharp after the Second World War. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the process of European unification gaining momentum in the last years of the 20th century, the east-west divide of Europe has been reopened for attention and study. Most of these studies concern the present period, but the construction of the divide in its historical context is also part of the debate. How deep and wide this divide was before the war is a question that we intend to treat empirically, in order to avoid simple extrapolations of current views. Were the differences perceived as more or less important in the past? What about the differences in the Baltic Sea area, a periphery which in some respects was lagging behind in the 19th century? We intend to contribute to a reconsideration of the east-west divide through a study of the political formation of the peasantry in the Baltic Sea area.

In this text, the preconditions of this process are examined. It begins with a sketch of the emancipation and political participation of the peasantry in the four cases of our project: Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Galicia. The political rights of the peasantry varied dramatically over this area. In the course of the 19th century, a number of ideas and political influences spread
throughout Europe; Enlightenment ideals and romanticism, nationalism, liberalism, cooperative ideas and agrarianism all contributed to form the picture peasants created of themselves and their role in a modern and more democratic society. How these ideas and influences were received and interpreted within different national and regional contexts will be the focus of this text.

During the last few decades, the concept of citizenship has been extended from a formal category to a broader exploration of the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion on a national level, with liberal and urban citizenship as a point of departure. Citizenship as a concept also implies a national dimension, a relationship to the nation-state. In a period when freedom often was understood as national self-determination, the relations between state and nation were constantly discussed. In particular, nation-states were contrasted to nations without statehood. The latter were frequent in East-Central Europe and present in all the states of the Baltic Sea area except Sweden. The demands for autonomy and freedom for national groups were frequently voiced in the process of emancipation.

The Enlightenment movement and the romanticism of the late 18th century, directly preceding our period of study, advocated two ways of approaching the relationship between the state, the people, and the individual. Thus, the concept of citizenship was caught between individual and group interests, and was used to further both. The difference between Enlightenment ideals and romanticism has, moreover, been part of the construction of the east-west divide of Europe in the 20th century. It will be the aim of the second part of the paper to discuss the implications of this heritage and its impact on the political formation of the peasantry in the 19th century.

“Free” peasants north of the Baltic Sea

In the northern part of the Baltic Sea area, the Swedish realm included Finland until 1809. Throughout history, the peasantry had been able to participate in the political process of the kingdom, due to the fact that there was no period of genuine feudalism. The estate system of the riksdag (the diet) included peasant representation.\(^1\) The riksdag has a continuity throughout early modern history in Sweden, in spite of periods of absolute monarchy, when it was periodically inactive. In terms of peasant political influence, the tendency of kings to rely on the peasantry for support in conflicts with the landed nobility was at least as important as their formal representation in the representative body.\(^2\)

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The right to participate in representative bodies was conditioned by the status of the peasant. The formal freedom of the peasantry included land ownership for freeholders, which was contested at times but prevailed throughout the medieval and early modern period. The freeholder category and a real position in the power game were assets that were not common in other parts of Europe under feudalism. Through a reform in the late 17th century, peasant-owned land was extended to roughly one-third of arable land; a second third of the land was owned by the nobility, and the final third was owned by the state and the church. Freeholders (skattebönder) had political and economical rights; peasants renting crown lands had political rights in the 18th century, but owed labour duties or rent to state officials holding crown estates. These duties were increasingly commuted into money, and crown lands were sold to peasants already at the beginning of the 18th century. Peasant land ownership was further strengthened through the formal right to buy noble land in the 1790s, which led to the further extension of peasant ownership in the 19th century. Still, peasants living on estate lands had labour duties, just like the robot in the Habsburg monarchy, well into the 19th century. These labour duties were not officially abolished, but were instead gradually commuted into monetary rent payments towards the second half of the 19th century.

In addition to a position at the central level of government, there was local self-determination. This was strengthened in the late 18th and early 19th centuries through tax committees, land consolidation committees, and general secularization. The estate diet (the riksdag) was reformed in 1866, and estate representation was replaced by a system of male suffrage based on property, where land ownership or certain levels of income were required in order to have the right to vote. In spite of the formal conditions, the position of the Swedish peasantry actually was strengthened through this reform, as compared to the estate system.

The formal rights of the peasants also concerned the Finnish part of the monarchy. When Finland in 1809 became a Grand Duchy inside the Russian Empire, these privileges were largely maintained. The structure of Finland was egalitarian, in comparison to other parts of the Russian empire, in the sense that there were few large manors and there had never been any serfdom. The peasants could own land and participate in local government. Their political representation, however, disappeared with the Swedish riks-

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3 Gadd, *Den agrara*, p. 81.
7 Melin et al. *Sveriges historia*, p. 187-188.
In 1863, a parliament of four estates, after the model of the former riksdag was introduced, yet still only held advisory power. Nor was the ruling body changed into a government of a modern kind. The concessions of the late 19th century thus did not introduce liberal forms of government, but instead restored older forms of representation to the Grand Duchy. Still, local autonomy was retained, both in Finland as an entity inside the Tsarist Empire and in local matters within the Grand Duchy. Finland had its own laws, civil service, currency, and even military. This autonomy was challenged by the conservative rule of Nicholas II at the turn of the century, 1900. Formal general suffrage was introduced in connection with the revolution of 1905, and at the end of 1917, during the Russian revolution, Finland declared full independence. At that point, general and equal suffrage, which included females, was introduced in Finland, as was the rule in all of the new countries of Europe.

On the northern shores of the Baltic Sea, the peasantry had participated in politics throughout history, and had further strengthened their position in the 19th century in Sweden. In Finland, the process did not develop under Russian rule, but on the other hand, the changes were unexpectedly small, and Finland was quick to catch up in the early 20th century. The formal right to own land was an important part of the rights and duties of the peasantry. The peasants of the Swedish kingdom considered themselves free in comparison to the enserfed peasants on the southern shore of the Baltic Sea, and were also used as examples in the process of emancipation of the latter. Up until the early 20th century, political rights were closely tied to the ownership or disposal of land, both qualitatively and quantitatively, with gradual distinctions between freeholders, leaseholders, and the landless groups.

Land ownership and citizenship south of the Baltic Sea

In contrast, on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea, the peasantry had endured a period of serfdom stretching some four centuries beyond the feudalism of Western Europe, and emancipation took place only in the 19th century. The Baltic provinces had been conquered and Christianized by German crusaders in the 13th century, and German knights had since then been both landlords and rulers in a persistent form of feudal rule that changed little over time. The provinces were included in the Swedish realm in the 17th century, but the condition of the peasantry changed only in the last decades.

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10 Gustafsson, Nordens historia, p. 23-25.
of the Swedish rule, and had only a marginal effect. When the provinces were included in Imperial Russia at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the subordination of the peasantry was reinforced again, and was preserved throughout the century. The German *Ritterschaft* continued its local rule, including its legislative, executive, and judiciary power under the Russian authorities, despite the attempts of reform under Catherine II.

Still, the peasant condition in Germany seems to have inspired the local Baltic-German nobility. After the Napoleonic wars in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, large-scale reforms took place in Prussia, in 1807 and 1811. Serfdom was abolished, and the intention was to transform former serfs into mature citizens – mostly for military purposes. The liberal reforms in Prussia between 1807-1842 also concerned the constitution, the freedom of trade in urban areas, and education.

As a result of mediation by the German nobility, the influence from these neighbouring parts of Prussia also reached Estonian and Latvian peasants. Peasant reforms started in 1804 in Livland. Peasant judicial institutions were introduced and the sales of serfs were forbidden, as was the interference of the landlord in marriages. The peasants were formally liberated from serfdom in 1816-19, and did not have to wait until the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, as was generally the case in Russia. Since there were no provisions to give peasants credits to buy land, this reform was considered a half-measure. Labour duties continued, day-to-day changes were small, and in the process, the nobility retained ownership of all of the land. Not until the conditions for the buying of land by ordinary peasants improved in the 1860s did political rights increase significantly. Still, the diets were under exclusive noble German control, while the municipal authorities were elected with differentiated suffrage, first according to the amount of taxes paid, later to property in the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1919, after breaking away from Russia, the first national elections were held and included general suffrage for everyone.

The Habsburg monarchy had acquired Galicia in connection with the first partition of Poland in 1772. As a consequence of this transfer, the administrative system improved, and there was a limited representation of the popu-
lation in a local diet, introduced in 1817. Taxes were increased and an education system was built. In the Austrian part of the empire, serfdom had been abolished by Joseph II in the 1780s, but in Galicia special paragraphs still gave a very strong position to the dominant Polish landlords. The peasantry was not free to move, as it faced restrictions that had been abolished in other parts of the empire. Joseph II had apparently also planned to abolish the obligatory labour duties, the robot of the peasantry, in order to introduce a contractual relationship between landowners and tenants, but this reform was never carried through. The administrative language was German, but in the 19th century, more space was made for the inclusion of local languages. Polish predominated, while Ukrainian was the language of the large Ruthenian minority – 40 per cent by 1910, and concentrated in the eastern part of Galicia.

In spite of reforms, the Polish aristocracy of Galicia maintained its power hold of the province. According to one estimation, Galician nobles usurped 6 per cent of the peasant land and increased peasant obligations by 40 per cent between 1781 and 1848, thus increasing the burdens without introducing corresponding improvements. Consequently, the relationship between the peasantry and the nobility was increasingly stormy, with recurring revolts. The robot remained a bone of contention and conflict up to 1848 within the entire Habsburg Empire. Conflicts were strong in Galicia; for instance, there was a jacquerie against landowners in Galicia in 1846, and repeated Ruthenian peasant uprisings. In 1848, the revolt spread to all parts of the empire, including Galicia. By abolishing the labour duties, the court and the central authorities apparently won the confidence of the peasantry. They did not continue their support of the revolt, and left urban and liberal contenders to continue demanding political reform on their own. In many constituencies, the Ruthenian peasants refused to vote. A counterrevolution set in, inspired by Schlegel and directed by a Catholic conservative party. This Austrian romantic conservatism sought to free the population from the yoke of rationalism.

Suffrage in the local diets was extended to larger groups in the second half of the 19th century in Galicia, and finally general male suffrage was introduced in 1907. This liberalization was, however, outweighed by the increasing autonomy of the Galician province. Internal autonomy was introduced in 1868, and allowed the Polish landed and professional elite to con-
continue to dominate politics.24 National contradictions were increasing, and Ruthenian peasants were hit by both developments. The strong grip on the Galician diet of Polish landowners, and later also Polish urban middle-class interests, long blocked the political advance of the Ruthenian nationalist interests.25

A previous period of serfdom characterized the peasant condition in the Baltic provinces of Russia and Galicia as part of the Habsburg Empire. The peasantry of both the Baltic provinces and Galicia were liberated from formal serfdom at an early stage, the 1810s and 1780s respectively, compared to the rest of the Russian Empire, or to the Hungarian part of the Double Monarchy. However, in both cases the formal abolition was only a half-measure, as concessions to the local Baltic German and Polish elites severely limited the reforms. Labour duties continued and the possibilities of owning land were restricted. Whereas Galicia had a local diet with increasingly extended male suffrage, the Baltic provinces did not introduce peasant representation until the revolution of 1905.

In both cases, the contradictions between the peasantry and an ethnically defined elite provided for a national definition of emancipation and citizenship rather than an individual understanding of concepts like freedom or autonomy.

The Baltic Sea area – two kinds of exceptions

The Baltic Sea area thus represents two different kinds of exceptions to the Western European pattern when it comes to the emancipation of the peasantry. The first difference is the strong position of the peasantry in the northern part of the area, in Sweden and Finland, untouched by feudalism. The freedoms retained were in a sense a continuation of barbarian customs. They were closely linked to the ownership or disposition of land, which was widespread and consisted of family holdings as a balancing force to manors and large estates.

In contrast to the northern part of the Baltic Sea area, peasants were not able to participate politically before the 19th century in the southern part, in the Baltic provinces and Galicia. A late form of serfdom prevailed there, until 1780 in Galicia, and until 1816-20 in the Baltic provinces of Russia. Participation in local government and judicial matters occurred than participation in the legislative body. Still, local participation was nevertheless much later and less profound than in Sweden and Finland. This legacy, of course, had an impact on the formation of citizenship in the Baltic provinces and Galicia. The contrast between these cases and those of Sweden and

Finland is particularly apparent when it comes to political participation. The link between ownership of land and being “a full citizen” seems strong, actually, in all cases.

In view of these contrasts, it is rather surprising that other aspects of emancipation occurred almost simultaneously. Labour rent, which affected only part of the peasantry in the north, was not abolished until the late 19th century throughout the Baltic Sea area. General and in particular female suffrage also occurred almost simultaneously, even a trifle later in Sweden than in Finland and Estonia.

The entire coastal area was practically untouched by the revolution of 1848, at a time when the rest of Europe was drawn into a common political process. The revolution gained its strength from peasants and urban bourgeoisie, who joined forces against the autocracy. In Sweden the peasantry traditionally had held a stronger position both with regard to land ownership and political representation, and so peasant discontent was not a force in furthering liberal reform. The Nordic realm followed Europe in its transformation from monarchy to constitutionalism between 1815 and 1870, but this occurred as a result of peaceful and consecutive reforms. Still, the end result was not radical liberalism, but a moderate form of liberal regime. Sweden did not replace the estate riksdag with a representative parliament with two chambers until 1866. Suffrage was linked to property disposal and ownership, and was restricted.

The peasantry in East-Central Europe too, was ambivalent about some of the reforms advocated by the urban professional elite, in particular to liberal rule. But they made up part of the revolting forces, and were released from labour duties and other restrictions of their freedom to move about in the process. As soon as these demands had been met, however, they switched positions and to some extent became supporters of the conservative reaction, Catholic or lay, and also often monarchist.

Finland, Estland, and northern Livland were at that moment part of the Tsarist Empire, albeit under very different circumstances. The tsar, Nicholas I, was strongly against the revolution of 184. Indeed, he lent troops to the monarchist forces who crushed the revolt in Hungary in 1849. The liberal ideas coming from Europe could probably be spread undercover in Russia, but no explicit action was allowed. In the Baltic provinces of Tsarist Russia, there were no changes on the surface because of the revolution in Europe. The Baltic German nobility was affected by the crop failures of the 1840s, and large-scale reforms were probably planned in secret, but they did not materialize until Alexander II took power in 1855. At that time, the reforms concerned ownership of land, making it possible for parts of the peasantry to realize their formal freedom from the beginning of the century. Those who had the means to buy their land were also able to withdraw from labour du-

26 Gustafsson, Nordens historia, p. 167.
ties. But there was no clear-cut reform of labour duties for the rest of the peasants, even if labour duties were gradually replaced by monetary rent payments in this relatively developed western part of the empire.\(^{27}\) Along with the ownership of land and the formation of an owner-occupier peasantry, a peasant political organization also began. Some concessions were made to participation in local government, but the Estonian peasantry did not gain any representational reforms. The *Ritterschaften*, the Baltic German corporate bodies, held power until the revolution of 1905.

The Habsburg Empire, in contrast, participated in the 1848 revolution with uprisings both in Vienna and Budapest.\(^{28}\) It was a liberal movement, one in favour of political and social reform, but was also inseparable from the national question. When demands were made for a transfer of sovereignty from monarch to people, the people were linked, explicitly or implicitly, to their language group.\(^{29}\) Galicia seems to have been in the forefront of the revolution. In 1848, they obtained freedom from labour services, *robot*. The understanding of the people as ethnic groups was obvious in the demands of the Supreme Ruthenian Council, dominated by clergymen of the Greek Catholic Church, which demanded language equality and a division of Galicia which would leave the Ruthenians in the majority in the eastern half. However, in this movement there were still no contacts between Galician Ruthenians and the Ruthenians in the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire.\(^{30}\)

As in Galicia, the peasants of Estland and northern Livland were no liberals. They turned to the Tsar instead, writing petitions. Between 1845-48 in northern Livland, there was a mass conversion of peasants from Lutheranism, the faith of the Baltic German nobility, to Russian Orthodoxy, the faith of the Tsar, by peasants hoping for social benefits.\(^{31}\)

The revolution of 1848 thus did not have the same significance in the Baltic Sea coastal area as in the rest of Europe, even if it occurred for very different reasons: peaceful reform in Sweden, powerful repression in the Russian Empire, and, in Finland, an interesting combination of both. The influence of liberal ideas seems to have been less important in this area. The strong position of peasants in Sweden, and the lack of economic differentiation in the weakly industrialized area as a whole, combined to leave more room for specificities of agrarian citizenship.


\(^{28}\) Bérenger, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 158-163.

\(^{29}\) Okey, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 130.

\(^{30}\) Okey, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 131.

\(^{31}\) Raun, *Estonia*, p. 44.
Enlightenment ideals, romantic nationalism, and the people

The emancipation of the serfs in East-Central Europe was closely related to the issue of nations and languages in multinational empires. One of the central demands of the revolution of 1848 was that power should be taken from the absolute monarch and given to the people, but what did the “people” signify? One interpretation was that “people” meant ethno-linguistic groups, and freedom according to this interpretation meant national self-determination, in a federal context, or even secessionism. This understanding of the meaning of emancipation can analytically be distinguished from a liberal understanding of the concept of people and of emancipation as principally certain kinds of freedom for the individual. People in the second sense would be individuals who chose political preferences, departing from their own interests on one hand, and universal values on the other, without any strong intervention of homogenizing group interests.

This distinction works analytically along an axis defined by concepts such as collective versus individual, particularistic versus universal, and local power versus central power. As this distinction has been widely used in constructions of the East-West divide in Europe, a short digression on the different traditions is necessary. Enlightenment ideals, and the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, have often been treated as separate and opposing traditions, from the late 18th century onwards. However, among contemporaries, the concepts were often used together, or alternately in the same discourse, reflecting the fact that most people conceive of themselves both as individuals and as members of various groups. Moreover, recent history of ideas research tends to avoid these dichotomies and instead speaks about specific contradictions in a more encompassing and shapeless modernity.

The Enlightenment of the late 18th century is normally understood to include ideas about rationalism, modern science, and secularization. In a more general way, its project was to unite scientific-technological development and the freedom and happiness of mankind. Several different types of late 18th century Enlightenment thought have been discerned, for instance, the French, the Scottish, the German, and so on. For the Baltic Sea area, influence from the German enlightenment was the most direct, even if connections to France also existed. Its main emphasis was on values such as human dignity and the notion of grown-ups coming of age or being treated as minors, as used by Immanuel Kant for instance. This special emphasis can be seen as a reference to the still existing serfdom in the area. In the beginning

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of the 19th century, Napoleon in France was a very real threat to the relatively small autonomous states in Germany. This historical circumstance also contributed to a rather speedy conversion from universal values towards more nationalistic theories of superior German values, and towards arguments for the unification of many minorities to one German state.34

The impact of the Enlightenment in the Baltic Sea area has been debated for a long time. In a Swedish context the Enlightenment, narrowly defined, has been considered rather insignificant, whereas broader definitions, as expected, have yielded more evidence of the influence of the Enlightenment.35 In the southern part of the Baltic Sea area, and in East-Central Europe in general, the occurrence of Enlightenment thought has been asserted rather emphatically after the independence in the 1990s. Historian Indrek Jürjo has traced its history in the Estonian-speaking areas in a number of articles, and the grand old lady of Estonian social history, Ea Jansen, has devoted great attention to Enlightenment ideas in her later works.36

Citizenship in the texts of enlightened authors was not necessarily related to the equal value of humans, or to ideas about political rights. The citizen emerges rather as a person of responsibilities. In the work of Moses Mendelssohn, a citizen was a person who belonged to an estate and worked in a profession with fixed rights and duties.37 Several leading thinkers, such as Locke, equated citizenship with property. Equal suffrage in the form of one man one vote, on the other hand, has been considered to occur due to political developments after the French revolution, rather than to the Enlightenment proper.38 As such political developments gained momentum, the ideas of equality provoked new theories about differences. Since Enlightenment ideals had superseded former traditional hierarchies, new differences and new arguments for differences were promptly invented. For instance, gender equality was a threatening idea – to avoid it, new theories emphasizing biological differences between males and females emerged. Biological differences were also used to develop national and racist theories.39 So, if Enlightenment thought tended towards individualism, universalism, and responsibility, this was not an unambiguous tendency.

As a reaction to universalism, new particularistic ideas, which departed from differences and advocated the virtues of variety, were also formulated. The most powerful expression of such ideas has been called national romanticism. These ideas developed more as an antithesis to Enlightenment thought in the same context, and the dividing lines are far from clear. Still, in

34 Liedman, I skuggan, p. 166-168.
35 Liedman, I skuggan, p. 45.
the large empires consisting of many language and ethnic groups, the particularistic ideas became of great importance, not only because they celebrated diversity, but also because they accorded value to ordinary people, to oppressed “primitive peoples”, and to their languages, conceptions, and folk culture. This romantic nationalism was radically anti-elitist in contrast to many proponents of Enlightenment thought.

The romantic elevation of the people was most obvious in the work of the philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, whose ideas gained great importance south of the Baltic Sea and in Finland, apparently less so in the old national state of Sweden. For him, primitive peoples were almost holy, and their holiness derived from being unspoilt by civilization or by high culture. Their languages were also different from the languages of educated people, who had borrowed elements from many different cultures. The borrowing and mixing of cultures was considered harmful. Primitive peoples, in contrast, were exponents of genuine cultures. They had a soul, which found an expression in their language and folklore and was mystical in character. The mysticism of Herder was religious, as was his critique of Enlightenment thought. He considered the belief in reason and rationalism arrogant, and as a threat to make man equal to God. Real reason was that of God, and man in his fallibility could only partially understand it. Mysticism survived above all as the belief in the soul of each group of people, but the idea of the soul took secular form only later on in historicism.

The stateless peoples found support in Herder for the thought that every specific culture had the right to live and had an unquestionable value. They were also supported by Herder’s belief that they were capable of development. These components of his rather unsystematic works are obviously in the interest of oppressed peoples with an ethnically distinct ruling elite. Nationalism has sometimes taken on an aggressive form, but not much of that can be found in Herder. His disciple and friend Hamann, in contrast, spoke up aggressively against Enlightenment thought and intellectualism. He accepted pure empiricism, on the one hand, and religious belief on the other, but attacked all abstractions and formal education, which to him were both barren and domineering, a view that he shared with contemporary religious movements such as pietism. To them, it was impossible and ridiculous to divide man into parts such as human rights or citizen’s rights – one could just as well cut him to pieces. God decided and had a purpose for civiliza-

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41 Merlio, „Herder und Spengler”, p. 67.
tions.\textsuperscript{43} In Hamann’s work, one can also find the idea of undivided authority, built on trust rather than scepticism and reason.

During the Napoleonic wars in the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the romantic view of the people and its soul was put to other uses than giving some human value to the enserfed peoples of East-Central Europe. After these wars, German nationalism and peasant liberation went hand in hand. The ruling elite felt a need for a loyal and capable peasantry, able to defend the rulers when Prussia was threatened. Partly enserfed, oppressed subalterns were not efficient fighters for the state. They needed citizenship and education in order to be fully responsible and withstand an aggressor.\textsuperscript{44} So there was a liberation of the peasantry, tightly linked to the wish to make them into good soldiers. This modification of the concept of the people in the German tradition has been ascribed to Ernst Moritz Arndt. He advocated the peasants as reliable people, close to nature, and simultaneously as good material for making into soldiers. The emancipation of the German peasantry, in this historical context, later inspired new peasant laws in the Baltic provinces.\textsuperscript{45} The ideas about the people, “der Volk”, were thus linked to those of the strong state, in a specific German context of Napoleonic wars, due to a political rather than philosophical context.

Two concepts of citizenship

With Enlightenment thought versus romanticism, or universalism versus particularism, two different concepts of citizenship emerged. One was individualistic with roots in the Enlightenment, where the belonging to a nation depends on an individual decision, with the idea of a contract made by the individual in a daily “choice” of citizenship. The liberal citizen is someone who chooses his citizenship and has a contract with his state. The individual is not subordinated to a group, but is instead free to act in his own interest. The state and the leadership both mirrored the sum of such interests.

The other concept of citizenship is the romantic, where the nation is considered a natural or at least historically grown community, one that the individual does not choose but instead belongs to by birth.\textsuperscript{46} In the romantic form of citizenship, the individual is subordinated to the community; he/she is a part of it and cannot choose to leave. The duty of the citizen is to understand the common good of the people. There is a historically shaped and specific national community of values that is not universal but specific. The only

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Boockmann, \textit{Deutsche Geschichte}, p. 340-42, p. 346.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Gaier, Ulrich, „Herders Volksbegriff und seine Rezeption“ in Borsche, \textit{Herder im Spiegel}, p. 42-48
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Merlio, „Herder und Spengler”, p. 81.
\end{itemize}
possibility of individual freedom occurs inside this community. Thus, even if Enlightenment thought and romanticism should not be unduly dichotomized, they seem nevertheless to lead to quite different abstractions about citizenship, ideas which will be present in different forms in the formation of an agrarian political understanding. Not only geographical proximity, but also direct influences made for a strong impact of German ideas in the whole Baltic Sea area. The original thoughts of Herder were more adapted to the problems of the many peoples of the large empires than to later forms of German state-oriented nationalism.

In early romanticism, the people were ascribed a soul that expressed the common good. A leader should be an exponent of such a common good, an embodiment of the soul of the people, and there were also ideas about an absolute leadership. In the late 19th century, the German social economist group, the Kathedersozialisten modified this type of organic view of the soul of the people and the leader as an exponent of the soul of the people. Max Weber discussed the common good as something different from the sum of different group or individual interests. Werner Sombart analyzed the cohesive forces of a people not in organic terms but in terms of common values, conditioned by common heritage, historical destiny, and culture. The components of the religious mysticism contained in romantic thought thus were significantly modified over time, while the notion of citizenship remained distinct from the liberal understanding.

The East-West Divide in the Cold War

The East-West divide contains an implicit causal relationship between national romanticism and the emergence of Nazism and fascism in East Central Europe. Isaiah Berlin, for instance, counts Herder’s friend and disciple Hamann as part of a tradition that led up to fascism. Still, recent analysts often maintain that no such direct link exists, and Herder has rather been considered as an advocate of diversity and as a voice against state centralization. This relationship will be examined in earnest in the last part of our project, but in this text will only be briefly introduced.

During the Cold War, the American historian Hans Kohn wrote a number of works where he constructed a dichotomy between romantic nationalism inspired by Herder as a philosophy of less developed and immature peoples of Eastern Europe, and Enlightenment thought, as embraced by the more

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47 Weber, Max, Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik (Freiburg/Leipzig 1895), p. 25.
48 Sombart, Werner, Deutscher Sozialismus (Berlin 1934), p. 211-212.
49 Berlin, The Magus, p. 121.
developed and mature peoples of Western Europe. Nationalism, according to Kohn, was part of Enlightenment thought in the developed Western countries, beginning with Jean Jacques Rousseau. It was territorially defined, and was supported by the democratic aspirations of the liberal middle class. In the less-developed eastern part of Europe, nationalism in contrast was ethno-linguistic and inspired by Herder. The latter form was underpinned by invented traditions, irrational as its romanticist origins, messianistic, hysterical, and an important precondition for totalitarianism in the interwar period. The difference was because the peoples of Eastern Europe were not mature enough for nationalism, as well as lacking realism regarding their national projects. Kohn was specifically discussing Germany and the Balkan countries, allowing for some variation in the northern parts of Europe. These texts contained some derogatory epithets and built a hierarchy of nations according to an unspecified conception of political development. Finally, Kohn constructed a causality, with Enlightenment thought leading to democratic and open societies, whereas romantic nationalism led to aggressive, expansionist, and totalitarian societies.

In the West, Kohn has seldom been referred to since the 1960s, while more sophisticated analyses of totalitarianism like that of Hannah Arendt have survived and are regularly part of historiographies on Nazism and communism. Still, the connection between ethno-linguistic thought and aggressive nationalism has survived in more popularized contexts. Kohn has provoked discussion in the post-communist countries, where nationalist ideas have experienced a revival. The causal inferences made by Kohn have in particular challenged the numerous nationalist political forces in East Central Europe, but professional historians have also made the effort to reconsider and discuss his theories.

While the critics of Kohn do not deny the analytical difference between territorial nationalism and ethno-linguistic nationalism, they point out that territorial nationalism hardly has been less belligerent and aggressive than ethno-linguistic or culturally defined national movements. Furthermore, cultural nationalism is seen as an exponent of popular politics, a bottom-up process intended to emancipate and democratize oppressed peoples under authoritarian regimes. In a recent edition of Herder’s work, the philosopher Michael Forster writes that Herder was “a liberal, a republican and democrat, and an egalitarian”. He was speaking in favour of freedom of thought and expression, and Forster emphasizes that Herder advocated a broader suffrage than his teacher and contemporary Immanuel Kant. He has even detected

52 E.g. Laar, *Aratajad*, p. 76.
some “proto-feminist” tendencies in Herder, a desire to realize the potentials that women possessed.\footnote{Forster, “Introduction”, p. xxxiii.}

The influence of ethno-linguistic nationalism and J.G. Herder has been documented in all of our cases. In the Baltic countries, the link is quite clear. J.G. Herder lived in Riga, the province of Livland, between 1764-69. His short stay there resulted in the inclusion of Latvian folk songs in his collection of folklore Stimmen der Völker, on one hand, and in his influence over radical Baltic German intellectuals on the other. One of these intellectuals wrote a critique of the German conquest of the Baltic realm at the turn of the century, 1800.\footnote{Merkel, Garlieb, Die Letten (Berlin 1998).} The prehistory of the Baltic peoples was described in an idealistic and romantic mode, and their oppressed status under Baltic German local rule was deplored. The first enthusiasts of Baltic folklore and Baltic emancipation then were paradoxically of German origin, but the ethno-logical movement soon spread to educated native speakers.\footnote{Laar, Äratajad, p. 114, p. 121.}

The Estonian historian Mart Laar in, his book on early nationalism in Estonia, divides Baltic German political orientations into three groups. Conservatives thought that the Baltic peoples should remain in a subordinated social position, and should be able to use their own language. Liberals challenged the inequalities of the feudal society, and advocated German as a common language for all. The culture of native speakers was too weak, and would have difficulties in catching up with more advanced cultures like the German, they maintained. They would therefore gain from the adoption of a “higher” form of language and culture. National romantics were against the social inequalities in the Baltic realm, like the liberals, but advocated a preservation of the local languages and cultures.\footnote{Laar, Äratajad, p. 124, p. 263.} The last position thus is represented as both socially conscious and multiculturally tolerant.

The philosophy of Herder reached Finland in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century, as it still was under Swedish rule. But the Finnish national movement gained strength in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, when Finland was an autonomous part of the Russian empire. In the same paradoxical manner as the Baltic Germans had been the first advocates of Estonian nationalism, the leading society included Swedish-speaking authors and publicists. When this group finally started to publish a Finnish journal, Maamiehen Ystävä, this was clearly directed towards the peasantry. Snellman and Yrjö-Koskinen contributed to the cleavage of the national movement between Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking groups, and eventually it was connected to socio-economic demands particularly favouring the Finnish poor peasantry.\footnote{Klinge, Matti, Let us be Finns. Essays on history (Helsinki 1990) p. 82-83; Jussila, Osmo, Hentilä, Seppo, Nevakivi, Jukka, From Grand Duchy to a Modern State: A political history of Finland since 1809, (London 1995), p 57.}
Moreover, recent works have also maintained that ethno-linguistic nationalism has been a driving force of diversity, pluralism, and local power, as opposed to centralism and cultural homogenization.\textsuperscript{59} Herder, in opposition to universalist thinkers, has maintained that human concepts, representations, and attitudes were vary over time and space, and thus demand interpretation, a position which today would be relatively uncontroversial.\textsuperscript{60} Simple East-West dichotomies have also been challenged from another angle. It is not true that Enlightenment thought appeared quiet late in Central Europe, Hungarian historian László Kontler maintains in a short essay. The representation of Central European Enlightenment thought as a later copy of the original French version is misleading. The instrumentalization of reason, and the challenging of tradition and prejudice by critical reason, were at least present in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century in the Habsburg monarchy and Poland, even if mostly among the royalties and aristocracy.\textsuperscript{61} It was, moreover, perceived as patriotism and thus did not preclude nationalism in a project of improvement or social reform, e.g. through the means of the statistical and geographical description of the state of different parts of the empire. The issues of social solidarity and emancipatory patriotism were simultaneously present in this discourse.\textsuperscript{62} Kontler, however, expresses some doubts as to the existence of Enlightenment thought in Russia.

This early Enlightenment movement in Central Europe was socially but not ethnically exclusive. The language issue was raised with new force in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and was reinforced by the “sensibilities of Romanticism”. The language question could sometimes be seen as supplementing, instead of precluding, the emancipatory and social issues of the early Enlightenment, just as on other occasions it was opposed to liberal advocates arguing for a more unitary cultural development. According to these texts, the dichotomy of Kohn could just as well be replaced with another generalization: that both Enlightenment thought and romantic nationalism existed in Central Europe without being mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{63}

Within the present project, we have numerous, if late-occurring, instances of agrarian reformers using the language of the Enlightenment. The derision of tradition, the faith in science, the picture of a dark past and a light future; all are parts of this imagery.\textsuperscript{64} In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the very same persons advocated these views when speaking about economic and agricultural matters, and simultaneously they constituted the backbone of the national

\textsuperscript{59} Berlin, Isaiah, \textit{Two Conceptions of Liberty} (Oxford 1966); Laar, Æratajad, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{60} Forster, “Introduction”, p. xiv-xvii.
\textsuperscript{63} Kontler, “The Enlightenment”, p. 41-42.
\textsuperscript{64} See texts by Johan Eellend, Piotr Wawrzeniuk and Fredrik L Eriksson in this volume.
movements. Considering the empirical evidence from our cases, it seems just as impossible to uphold the dichotomy.

Recent research has thus heavily criticized the dichotomy of East and West in Europe, here represented by Kohn, and its allegations of inherently undemocratic tendencies. Mart Laar has emphasized the bottom-up and socially concerned character of romantic nationalism, Michael Forster has underlined the democratic creed of Herder and his followers, and maintains that they spoke for diversity, not for exclusion of some cultures. Finally, László Kontler has demonstrated the mutually supplementary potentials of Enlightenment thought and romantic ideas on citizenship, which co-existed with contradictory versions in the late 18th and early 19th century.

The notion of citizenship in the emancipation of Estonian and Galician peasants seems to have been informed both of Enlightenment ideas of reason and science, and ideas about ethno-linguistic nations and the people as a political subject, rather than the individual. Could this be a case of rationality in practical and economic matters, romanticism in political matters? And how did these beliefs materialize in their inclusion and exclusion within the definition of citizenship?

The socio-economic dimension of citizenship

The question has also been raised as to whether national issues have been overrated in the history of the late Habsburg Empire, and whether socio-economic conflicts have been overlooked. The Habsburg Empire had actually favoured the coexistence of different languages and national cultures, aside from some shorter periods.65 The rise of nationalism there is often described as triggered by German nationalism, as demanding a favoured position, and as a response from the Czech elite, who felt discriminated relative to the Germans in Bohemia in the beginning of the 19th century.66 Demands for less centralization and more federative types of rule were taken up by other elites such as the Hungarian and the Polish. The Czech elite, consisting of urban industrialists and tradesmen, seems to have supported liberal values including individual political rights, whereas landowning national elites did not. A class, or at least an urban-rural dimension, seems to be just as important for the character of the elite demands as the Enlightenment-romanticism divide. Urban and rural elites alike asked for more local power in relation to the central government.

The peasantry had their own agenda, where the possibility of owning land and the abolition of labour duties, robot, were principal demands, but they were not insensitive to calls for more local and ethnically defined power.

66 Bérenger, The Habsburg Empire, p. 158.
Their demands were often at odds with the landlords of the territory, whether these belonged to the same ethno-linguistic group or not. Peasant demands were not contradictory to those of urban elites in the same way, but it seems that peasants had difficulties in adopting the liberal agenda. In Galicia, they refused to vote, and in other places they expressed deference to the monarchy through petitions and letters expressing loyalty and faith in the good will of the monarch. This would point to a socio-economic dimension, which would again beg the question about the character of peasant citizenship.

Gary B. Cohen emphasizes the existence of a civil society in the Austrian part of the Habsburg monarchy, one which left room for nationalist politicians and their aspirations in the late 19th century. This was therefore not the main cause of unrest, as nationalistic historiography would maintain. Instead, the crisis of provincial diets around the turn of the century, 1900, could be seen from a class perspective, as an expression of the new strength of popular politics. Secular agrarianism was one of these popular movements, revolt against elitism. Radical nationalism was just one expression of popular and anti-elitist sentiment. The class basis depended on the people: Slovenes, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Rumanians (and Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, we might add) had more lower middle-class and peasant farmer constituencies than Germans, the Czechs, and the Italians. The former were often led by clergy and schoolteachers, the latter were more liberal and more urban. So, the problem was not that national interests did not find room within the Habsburg Empire. Unrest was instead due to class-based revolts inside the national movements against local elites, including both local landowners with economic interests that collided with peasant demands and urban liberal elites.

The characterization of local elites in national movements corresponds exactly with Miroslav Hroch’s analysis of national revival among nations without a history of statehood in East Central Europe. Hroch speaks about a typically “truncated” class system, where the development of urban and higher professional elites had been blocked by ruling groups of a different ethnicity. In these cases, the core of the national movement consisted of a rural elite with some education but without any opportunities for social advancement. These groups instead turned to the newly emancipated parts of the peasantry for support, and mobilized them using a mixture of economic and national demands.
If this is the case, we might ask what the interests were of this lower middle-class rural elite and the peasantry, as well as what their grievances were against liberalism. Was the urban middle class not addressing their problems? Did they press national issues and a position of their own in the national elite without solving the existing and harsh class contradictions in the form of landlessness, poverty, land reforms, and social issues such as education and health care? Could advocating individual freedom as opposed to group interests be one of the perceived problems?

For our investigation of the Swedish-speaking peasants of Finland, constituting a minority ethnically related to the former elite, of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) peasants of Galicia constituting an oppressed minority, and of the Estonian peasants in the Baltic provinces of Russia, constituting an oppressed majority, the intersection of class and ethnicity might be more important for the formation of citizenship than national issues alone. Still, when social and political stratifications coincided with ethnic differences, ethno-linguistic appeals could provide for mobilization. In the practices of peasant movements, another aspect of socio-economic conflict seems obvious as well. Even if the peasantry was unanimously demanding land ownership and abolishment of labour duties during the period of emancipation, their movements typically split at a later stage between more conservative parties representing well-off farmers and more left-wing parties also representing the landless or poor peasantry.

In a multicultural area, language and culture are important for the possibilities of political participation, including both exclusion and inclusion. Simultaneously, collective rights concerning ethno-linguistic groups could limit the freedom of the individual. If rights were to be negotiated on a group level, it might be in the interest of the group to demand cultural purity and group solidarity from its members. This would obviously be detrimental to individual freedom of choice, and the group would then constitute a level between the individual and state power, which is a problem for a liberal democracy. But how else could minorities be protected from majority rule in economic and political matters? This problem was the subject of a constant debate throughout the democratization processes of the 19th and early 20th century, and was raised already by J. S. Mill. Since 1989, this discussion has re-emerged in East-Central Europe. To what extent are group identities compatible with a liberal citizenship? Would they not differentiate between the citizens? At the same time, it is easy to show that attempts to eradicate group identities have backfired. A position of liberal nationalism has emerged, maintaining that national identities are necessary to create trust and solidarity in society. According to this view, cultural and political elements are closely related and impossible to distinguish, forming a common cultural

identity that integrates citizens and promotes mutual understanding. Opponents to this view retort that this is a reification of national identities, that identities are fluid and negotiated, and that nothing precludes common political values in spite of different or non-existing national identities.\(^73\)

Mart Laar has formulated the same question raised by the Baltic German and Estonian elite in Livland and Estland in the 19\(^{th}\) century as a conflict between Hegel and Herder. According to Hegel, small cultures had only a small potential for development and for catching up with the most advanced cultures of their time. Instead of supporting them, they would gain from an assimilation with the great cultures, which in the Estonian case, was the German culture.\(^74\) Whereas the Baltic Germans turned towards a Hegelian position after 1848, for liberal reforms with statehood as a prerequisite, Estonians held on to a Herderian view of the importance of their own culture. Here, Laar again points to the leading position of the lower middle class rural elite of native speakers, a product of the education system, increased local government, and finally the Herrnhut religious movement, all producing an elite from the ranks of the peasantry. In the 1850s, this elite was instrumental in re-defining the peasantry, from a socio-economic group (maarahvas, rural people) to an ethno-linguistic group.\(^75\) The issue of promoting their own culture would then have turned them away from liberal solutions.

The resistance towards liberal citizenship might not arise from cultural essentialism or loyalty towards national ideas. Another interpretation might be to see it as a conflict between an emerging, subordinated elite of native speakers and a democratically oriented but socio-economically dominating elite of Baltic German reformers. Individual freedom in a subordinated position might not have seemed to be a realistic solution to the concrete problems of the peasantry, whereas collective action seemed more promising. Citizenship was formed not by suffrage but by associations, cooperatives, and only at a late stage, by parties.

Concluding remarks: nationalism, liberalism and agrarian citizenship

Some ideas pertaining to the specificity of the formation of citizenship and in particular agrarian citizenship in the Baltic Sea area have been presented above. One problem has been the attention paid exclusively to the issue of

\(^73\) This very sketchy summary I owe to doctoral student Victor Makarov.
nationalism in humanities and social sciences in the past twenty years, which to some extent overshadows other common regional concerns that we are trying to address. But a few things seem possible to maintain.

In the Baltic Sea area, the preconditions for emancipation of the peasantry were widely differing. The almost simultaneous process of liberation from labour duties and political reforms is therefore quite remarkable. The process started from very different positions, and was certainly later in the area that long had been part of the Russian Empire, but the parallels are still striking. A certain convergence took place in this period. In the interwar period and in the Second World War, the area again diverged. Sweden and the Scandinavian countries belonged to the most stable democracies of Europe, whereas the southern part of the Baltic Sea area followed central and southern Europe in a shift towards authoritarianism. In view of such differences, an East-West divide was constructed during the Cold War between territorial nationalism and ethno-linguistic nationalism. This analysis is scrutinized and criticized by current historians and social scientists dealing with East-Central Europe.

To the extent that the agrarian political emancipation also embraced ethno-linguistic nationalism, and that these phenomena seem inextricably linked in all of our cases except Sweden, judgements on its undemocratic character have been vividly challenged in the period after the Cold War. This critique has been based on the understanding that it was a popular movement. First, the democratizing function of ethno-linguistic nationalism, particularly its character of lower-class movement working for emancipation, has been argued. Secondly, the distinction between Enlightenment ideals on one hand and romantic nationalism on the other has been questioned. Romantic nationalism and Enlightenment ideals seem to have been advocated at the same time by the same people, the same rural elite. Moreover, the link that exists to more aggressive forms of nationalism seems to be of a later date, related to the wars between France and the German lands.

Finally it has been argued that the rural and ethno-linguistic minority movements did not work for individualistic liberal reforms. A division took place between liberal and urban elites on the one hand and minority, rural and ethno-linguistic groups on the other. The distinction between liberal urban elites and new lower middle-class rural elites consisting of school-teachers, well-off peasants, lower clergy, agronomists, and civil servants thus seems to mirror the important divisions. These divisions include that between the individual and the collective solutions, the universal versus the particular, and that of central power versus local power. What emerges is an expression of the national identities of oppressed minority groups which also holds subordinate positions, manifesting itself as a bottom-up movement, and using national identity as its mobilization.
Agrarianism and Modernization in Inter-War Eastern Europe

Johan Eellend

The aim of this text is to provide a broad picture of agrarianism as an ideology, especially in Eastern and Central Europe during the inter-war period, summarizing the main features in contemporary political programs and discussions on agrarianism in order to create a framework for further analysis. The text will focus on explaining the agrarianist view of history, and on the mechanisms of social change, political power, and the organization of society. Moreover, some historiographical notes on earlier studies on East European agrarianism will be included, focusing on their understanding of the origins of agrarianism, its character, and its destiny in the region.

In Eastern Europe, agrarianism arose in a historical context characterized by numerous agrarian crises and rural uprisings, and in a situation in which agriculture and society were rapidly modernized. The rural population had rapidly increased, causing overpopulation and a great scarcity of land. Mechanization threatened the rural labourers with unemployment. Economically and politically, many parts of the region had been kept in a semi-feudal condition up to the eve of World War I. This made Eastern European agriculture lag behind Western European agriculture in most aspects. One of the prime scholars on interwar agrarian conditions in Eastern Europe, Doreen Warriner, has roughly characterized this difference by stating that the farms of Western Europe were twice as large, carried twice as much capital to the acre, produced twice as much corn to the acre, yet employed only half as many people as the farms of Eastern Europe.1 The Eastern European countryside was, further, overpopulated in proportion to its arable land and harvest capacity, and many small peasant holdings could not feed the families living on them. This problem was popularly referred to as land hunger, and the proposed solution was mostly a demand for more land. With the end of the World War I, and in the liberal spirit of the time, universal suffrage and democratic institutions were imposed from above, giving the peasants an

immediate political weight through voting privileges that they might not have enjoyed if democracy had been introduced at a later stage of economic development. Welcoming a democratic system, many peasants claimed that the economic changes and programs for modernizing society, imposed by liberals and socialists, could not be interpreted as progress. Instead, they considered the changes to be a threat to rural society, which in their view possessed distinctive virtues. The ideology of agrarianism sought to provide an answer that would promise to preserve and defend peasant virtues within a society in the process of modernization.

Agrarianism does not rest on any consistent philosophy or set of writings. Instead, agrarianism should be viewed as a pragmatic ideology, one which was inspired by other ideologies and social thinking, and developed in response to concrete social situations and problems in agrarian society. A basic perception in Eastern European agrarianism was the conviction that it was a third force in politics and economy, falling between liberalism and socialism. By claiming that ideas imposed by liberals and Marxists were not progressive, but instead a threat to rural society, agrarianism confronted the two dominating paths of modernization. However, agrarianism shared many ideas with liberalism and Marxism, and drew inspiration from science as well as nationalism.

Agrarianism primarily became a political and ideological force in Eastern Europe during the inter-war period. During that time, parties with an agrarianist ideology existed in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (Croatian and Serbian), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, and Latvia. Most of the parties also gathered in what was called the Green International in Prague, an organization intending to unite the agrarian interests against the socialist international, the international industrial capital, and the bourgeoisie interests. However, despite their ideological similarities, these parties domestically used different methods and represented diverse political paths. The most influential party in the period was probably the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. The party was formed at the turn of the 19th century, and was partly based on the rural cooperative movement. Under its leader, Alexander Stamboliski, the party held sole power in Bulgaria between 1919 and 1923. It carried out a radical land reform, and provided agriculture with cheap credits as well as expanding primary education. At the same time, it exercised anti-urban politics by coming down hard on public administration, closing higher education for a short time, and introducing mandatory manual labour duties for all citizens. Through its own majority in the Bulgarian parliament, the party began to exercise an almost dictatorial rule until its leader was murdered and its power taken over by the army in 1923.² The Croatian Peasant Party held considerable domestic influence, but represents another path. This party was

formed as a political movement by the brothers Stjepan and Antun Radic at the turn of the 19th century, and found some support in the rural self-help movement. The party had strong nationalist sentiments, and soon turned into a nationalist party representing the whole Croatian population in the Yugoslav parliament, until Stjepan Radic was murdered in the Parliament in 1929. A third path can be illustrated by the Estonian, Latvian, and Czechoslovakian agrarian party during the whole interwar period. These parties represented the rural interests in their national parliaments, and gained strong political positions by proving to be reliable coalition partners in many governments. The Estonian and Latvian paths ended in 1934, when both parties became the backbones of the authoritarian regimes, as a result of failures of the Estonian and Latvian political systems to handle the economic crisis and competition from right-wing extremism.

Judging from the empirical examples, agrarianist parties did not appear in either traditional and stagnated societies, or in modern and dynamic societies. Instead, they appeared in societies in a mood of transition, and where the gap between urban and rural society was widening. It is also worth noting that the most radical peasant parties occurred in Bulgaria and Croatia, two of the most backward agrarian societies in Eastern Europe at the time. On the contrary, the parliamentary-oriented and moderate parties appeared in relatively developed areas such as the industrially developed Czechoslovakia and the relatively rural developed Baltic states. The same is true for the domestic conditions in Poland, where the progressive and cooperation-oriented agrarian party was strongest in the more developed western areas and the radical and confrontation-oriented was strongest in the poorer eastern parts of the country. It is finally worth noting that in countries where a relatively wealthy self-owning class of farmers existed before the land reforms, as in Estonia and Poland, the agrarian movements were not able to join in a single party. The party representing the wealthier farmers also often traded their claims for radical land reforms for other benefits when they gained access to political power.

In the agrarianist spectrum, two principal types of agrarianism can be noted, a farmer-oriented, development-friendly agrarianism, and a peasant-oriented, traditionally-minded agrarianism. This distinction follows the definition of the peasant as a basically self-sufficient agriculturalist, tilling the

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land in accordance to traditional knowledge and holding to the village, and the
definition of the farmer as a mostly self-owning, market oriented and
specialized agriculturalist. The difference between these two tendencies is
also reflected in political methods. While peasant agrarianism advocated the
use of force as an expression of the peoples’ voice, farmer agrarianists pre-
ferred working through legal and parliamentary channels. It is also a ques-
tion of origin, as farmer-oriented agrarianism mostly evolved in societies
with a liberal public sphere and an ongoing class formation, while peasant-
oriented agrarianism evolved in autocratic societies with a negligible bour-
geoisie or labour movement. Most of the Eastern and Central European
peasant movements and parties should primarily be characterized as farmer
agrarianism, while peasant agrarianism was exemplified by the Russian
agrarian socialist and agrarian populist movements. The focus in this over-
view is on the development-friendly farmer agrarianism.

Sources
In trying to isolate the most fundamental ideological principles of European
agrarianism, I will study the programs and publications of different agrarian-
ist movements in some detail. The principles of the Croatian Peasant Party’s
are available in translation, as is the case for quotations from Croatian, Bul-
garian, Czech, and Polish peasant leaders. A common feature and problem
of these programs is that they were developed in the inter-war period, after
the ‘parliamentarization’ of the agrarianist parties. Thus, the programs were
intended to adapt the parties to mass political practices, while also serving to
defend and clarify previous actions. The works of the Croatian Peasant Par-
ties ideologist, Branko Peselj, and the Bulgarian ex-minister George Dimi-
trov are of special interest. Both authors published interpretations of inter-
war agrarian politics in the Balkan, and also developed ideological programs
which treat agrarianism from an agrarianist viewpoint. Their works were
written after World War II, in the anti-communist spirit of post-war Eastern
European agrarian movements in exile, and can therefore be expected to tone
down the influence of socialist ideas and to interpret the meaning of democ-

6 Herceg, Rudolf, Die Ideologie der kroatischen Bauernbewegung (Zagreb 1923); Peselj,
Branko M., Peasant Movements in Southeastern Europe, an Ideological, Economic and Po-
litical Opposition to Communist Dictatorship (PhD. Georgetown University 1952); Bell,
Peasants in Power; Livingston, Stjepan Radic.

7 Peselj, Peasant Movements; Branko M., "Peasantism: Its Ideology and Achievements”in
Black, C. E. (ed.), Challenge in East Europe (Rutgers Univ. Press 1954); Dimitrov, Georg M.,
"Agrarianism”, in Gross, Feliks (ed), European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political
Ideas (New York 1948).
to the interwar agrarianists. George Jackson has noted that the intention of the agrarianist authors writing after World War II was “to see an order and consistency in the peasant movements” which the movements did not possess. It is important to keep this remark in mind, but the consistency of agrarianist ideas as presented in previous studies on agrarianism is also useful in creating a framework for further analysis.

A Note on Earlier Studies of Agrarianism

Agrarian societies all over the world have experienced (or are experiencing) developments in times of industrialization and modernization similar to those Eastern European. Agrarianist ideas and movements appeared in postcolonial Africa as well as in 21st century Latin America, either as concepts for rural development imposed by foreign aid donors or as populist rhetoric appealing to the rural population. As a contemporary phenomenon, agrarianism in Latin America is most visible in Venezuelan rural politics as well as in Mexican and Brazilian land right movements.

Historically, agrarianist ideas have also had a strong position in America, where agrarianism has been more associated with positive ideas and developments than in Europe. Despite the often racist appeal of the southern movements, the ideas of self-owning and independence, so deeply related to American identity, are seen as the prime characteristics of this ideology and its related movements.

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8 A Peasant International including Eastern European peasant parties in exile was initiated in New York in 1950.
11 Wilpert, Gregory, Changing Venezuela by taking power: the history and policies of the Chávez government (London 2007); Harvey, Neil, The Chiapas rebellion: the struggle for land and democracy (Durham 1998); Wright, Angus Lindsay, To inherit the earth: the landless movement and the struggle for a new Brazil (Oakland CA. 2003).
In Europe, the study of agrarianism has primarily been subordinated to the study of agrarian movements and political parties. Agrarianism in the German-speaking areas has basically been viewed as being anti-democratic. The prevailing view is that German agrarianism rejected democracy and introduced populist rhetoric that helped to undermine the Weimar democracy, to fan anti-Semitism, and to pave the way for the National Socialists. Besides the link to the fall of German democracy, studies of German and Austrian agrarian movements highlight the important connection between agricultural improvement, organization, and political influence, as most of these movements were deeply rooted in rural cooperatives.

A similar approach is visible in studies of Eastern European agrarianism. Agrarianism is characterized as a reactionary ideology based on a myth of the past, and on anti-industrialism and anti-modernity. Most writers tend to take the position that these rural ideas were a thoroughly negative development, one which cut off the peasants from the Enlightenment. As in the studies of German agrarianism, a connection is made between the populist appeal of agrarianism and the rise of authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe during the inter-war period. Special interest has been given to the radical Bulgarian agrarianism in the 1920 and its attempts to re-structure the entire society in accordance to an agrarianist agenda, an attempt that ended in an agrarianist authoritarian regime and was abolished by a military government. The interest in these negative experiences of agrarianism in practice is to some extent balanced by studies of the Czechoslovakian agrarian party and its participation in the democratic process through the interwar period. In the long term, a link can also be seen between the agrarianist parties in the interwar period and the agrarian parties that supported commu-

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14 Puhle, Hans-Jürgen, Agrarische Intressenpolitik und Preussischer Konservatismus im Wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914): Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel der Landwirte und Deutsche Konservativen Partei (Hannover 1966); Hunt, James, C., The People’s Party in Württemberg and Southern Germany, 1890-1914 (Stuttgart 1975); Eidenbenz, Mathias, „Blut und Boden“: Zu Funktion und Genese der Metaphern des Agrarianismus und Biologismus in der nationalsozialistischen Bauernpropaganda (Bern 1993); Rüdiger, Mack, „Antisemitische Bauernbewegung in Hessen (1887 bis 1894)“, Wetterauer Geschichtsblätter, no. 16 (Friedberg 1967).

nist governments in Eastern Europe after World War II, especially in Poland and Bulgaria.\(^{16}\)

The general approach to Eastern and Central European agrarianism places the history of agrarianism and agrarian movements into an important context of anti-democratic development, but it also sheds light on their ideology and political influence. One of the most important aspects of the interwar Eastern European agrarianist movements was their influence on the extensive land reforms carried out in most parts of Eastern Europe after World War I. These reforms established a framework for the social and economic structure and development of the Eastern European societies in the interwar period and were decisive for which methods were used to solve the inter-war economic crises.\(^ {17}\)

Although the strong position of the Estonian and Latvian agrarian parties in the inter-war period, and its focus on rural issues in order to improve social and economic conditions are widely recognized, agrarianism as a special issue has not been thoroughly studied in the Baltic States. The economic practices of the agrarian organizations and the politics of agrarian parties during the democratic and authoritarian periods have, however, been studied and provide the necessary framework.\(^ {18}\)

Most studies of Eastern European agrarianism have been made within East European or Soviet studies. The importance of agrarianism is thereby placed in a secondary position to the rise and development of communism in Eastern Europe.\(^ {19}\) The progress of agrarianist organizations and ideology is studied in relation to communism, and as its adversary. This approach makes agrarianism appear non-ideological and particularly local. In the anti-communist approach of this literature, agrarianism is often described as even more simplified and unstructured, as it lost the power struggle to communism. A similar approach to agrarianism is also visible in studies made by Soviet academics. Here, agrarianism is considered as having good intentions, but being naïve and doomed to failure, because it fell into the trap of bourgeois thinking and supported private property. The disciplinary context pro-


vides Western as well as Soviet academic studies with a Slavic bias, visible not only in the focus on movements in Slavic countries but also in the choice of sources and interpretations of the intellectual influence. Consequently, the Eastern European movements are viewed and studied with an eye to Russian rural populism, and they are expected to share similar characteristics. This connection is rejected, especially in studies on Polish agrarianism, which primary stress the influence from Western European agrarian movements.20

The overestimation of a Russian populist influence, and the neglect of the influences from pre-Marxian socialism, Christianity, and British and French rural-oriented thought is especially visible in the approach to agrarianist ideas and basic perceptions of agrarianism. Despite those limitations, most of the studies provide useful information, bringing forward problems and sources that otherwise would have remained hidden behind the barriers of the many native languages.

The Mechanisms of History

A natural point of departure in characterizing an agrarianist ideology is to identify its understanding of history. History, in a western understanding, organizes events into a framework with a beginning, a present, and a future or end, and gives single events a meaning. All of the major ideologies have their own understanding of history and their own historical framework, in accordance to which they interpret the present and make forecasts of the future. History is thus given a legitimizing and imperative function.

Agrarianist ideology was clearly based on a western understanding of time as linear, and on ideas of progress and development. Basing his thought on a dialectic idea of evolution, one of the theoreticians of the Croatian Peasant Party, Rudolf Herceg, claimed that the main historical force in society was class struggle. According to Herceg, the bourgeoisie, whose historical mission had been to introduce civil liberties, had broken the power of the aristocracy. The bourgeoisie, however, only represented a minority with narrow class interests, and would therefore lose its power to the workers. Using the civil liberties introduced by the bourgeoisie, the peasants would finally gain the power by the ballot. The peasantry would not use its power to defend the interests of a single class, but rather would build a society based on social justice and the prevalence of peace, based on the peasantry’s values.21 The historical role of the peasantry was obvious, as its way of life was the most basic and authentic, and as all societies were built upon the wealth that the peasants produced. The belief in the moral superiority of the


peasant class was further based on the idea that the peasantry was the only class that had no interest in exploiting the labour of others.\textsuperscript{22}

The mechanism of history was understood in a similar way by the leader of the Bulgarian Peasant Union, Aleksander Stamboliski. In Stamboliski’s dialectic, the development of humankind and society went through the stages of savagery, barbarism, and civilisation. Each of these stages had a characteristic mode of production and organization. In the earliest stage of society, mankind lived by hunting and gathering. There was practically no social differentiation, although there was a division of labour between man and woman. The domestication of animals and plants gave way to a new stage, barbarism, based on agriculture. Here the idea of private property was formulated, and thereafter followed an increasing social differentiation. No longer fighting only against nature, as in the former stages, humans then began to fight each other. Finally, the stage of civilization arrived when mankind was able to appropriate the achievements of science and human enlightenment.\textsuperscript{23}

Stamboliski believed that a turning point in history would appear once the ideas of civil and political rights began to spread through the lower strata in society. When the people adopted these ideas, they would rise against the old social order of the monarchy, clergy, military, and bureaucracy. The rising people, however, did not form any unity, but would instead, after the victory split into different economic interests.\textsuperscript{24} The final battle would then take place between the two most divergent interests, the urban and the rural societies, which embodied two opposing cultures.\textsuperscript{25} Stamboliski’s dialectics were flavoured with romanticism and related theories of society from the natural and social sciences, such as Darwinism and Marxism. Thus, he believed that conflict, competition, and struggle were natural, and were the engine in history that created higher forms of society. Therefore, according to Stamboliski, the political and social order prevailing at any given time was not determined by the means of production, but by those who possessed the physical and organizational power.\textsuperscript{26} The relationship between evolutionary and revolutionary change however, is not clear. According to Stamboliski, violence and power were manifest and important forces in history, and could lead to change in society. At the same time, like many other agrarian leaders, he emphasized pacifism and the fundamental need for social order and harmony.\textsuperscript{27} This should probably be interpreted as meaning that evolution was

\textsuperscript{22} Herceg, Die Ideologie, p. 49, p. 65; Radic, Stjepan, „Die bäuerliche soziale Bewegung ist für die Bauernvölker die einzige echte Demokratie”, foreword in Herceg, Die Ideologie, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{23} Bell, Peasants in Power, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{24} Bell, Peasants in Power, p. 61-63.

\textsuperscript{25} Jackson, Comintern, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{26} Bell, Peasants in Power, p. 62; Radic, Die Ideologie p. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{27} Bell, Peasants in Power, p. 63; Peselj, Peasant Movements, p. 72; Radic, Die Ideologie, p. 3.
seen as the main force for good in the development of the society, but that revolutionary means could be needed to eliminate powers that hindered evolution. In this sense, a belief in evolution could be combined with radicalism. The relationship between revolutionary means and a claimed need for stability is one of the contradictions of agrarianism. Studying the short history of agrarianist Bulgaria, it seems as if Stamboliski practiced pacifism in international relations but not in relation to his political opponents in the domestic arena.

In an attempt to create a consistent agrarian ideology based on science, George Dimitrov, a prominent Bulgarian politician in the inter-war period and the leader of the international peasant union in the 1950s, combined dialectic ideas with a biological approach. In his *bio-materialist* view, neither history nor economics was capable of explaining the dynamics of nature and society. In his view, the human was dependent on his instincts, his animal nature, and his intellect to move forward. Instincts provided the fundamental principles, while the intellect made it possible to undertake and accumulate experience over generations. Man’s intellect and capacity for rational behaviour also made him the leading creature in nature, and gave him a superior position. Dimitrov thus attempted to intellectualize the idea of agrarianism beyond its claimed simple origins. He created a link between tradition and biology, the foundation for much of the environmental neo-agrarianism of the late 20th century.

In its understanding of history, agrarianism broke with tradition, in that society was understood as going through a slow process of transition towards something better. But it was also deeply rooted in a traditional understanding of society as being firmly rooted in agriculture, and as being subordinated to the cycles of nature.

The Peasant and the Land

The central concept, directly related to its popular appeal, of agrarianist ideology was the peasant’s tie to the land, enclosed in a peasant mystique. The relationship between the peasant and his land was complex. It contained material, emotional, and spiritual aspects.

The land was mostly considered to be not given to the peasant as an individual, but rather as the head of the family, which was the most basic unit of production and consumption in society. Thereby, the individual was equated with the family in the language of most agrarianist writers. The common work of tilling the soil bound members of the peasant family together. The

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interdependency of the family members, within every aspect of life, made them inseparable. According to the agrarianist viewpoint, it was useless to speak of humans as separate from the family.30

The material and economic ties between the land and the peasant family were obvious, as land was the prime source of income, giving the family its daily bread. In the peasant mind, humans could not be autonomous in relation to the farm they inhabited and the soil they tilled. The relation between the land and the peasant was, according to many agrarianists, special and nearly impossible to understand for those who were not tied to the soil.

A mystical understanding gave the land a life, a soul, and a will of its own. In this spirit, Ante Radic, the ideologist of the early Croatian Peasant party, envisioned the soil as the peasants’ fellow combatant in the fight for social justice. He claimed that the land itself demands a true peasant master to cultivate it with love and care. In order to obtain this, the land was willing to “shake off the yoke” of the landlord. To characterize the relationship between the man and the soil, he wrote that “the soil is like an honest woman; soil too wants a legal husband; it wishes to have a man who does not merely use it and extort it, but who loves it at the same time.”31 Here, he not only reproduced a traditional gender-coded view of Balkan village life but also emphasized the understanding of the female as close to nature and the male as representing culture. His status of a superior creature not only gives man an exceptional position, but also great responsibility.

According to most agrarianist ideologists, the responsibility for land and society could only be fully assumed by an independent man who owned the land that he tilled.32 The idea of private ownership was thus essential to Eastern European agrarianism. This distinguished Eastern European agrarianism from the late 18th century British agrarian radicals or 19th century Russian agrarian socialists, who claimed that land had such an essential value that an individual could never ‘own’ it. The agrarianist position on land ownership maintained that the means of production should be in the hands of those who utilize it and who invest labour in it. Therefore, land should not be used only to accumulate capital or for speculation. Labour was seen as a central value and as a duty towards oneself and the community.33 The peasants therefore saw themselves not only as the creators of their own wealth, but also as the builders of a just human society and culture.34 Stamboliski and Dimitrov made labour and the private ownership even more essential when they described it as a human instinct.35 Emphasizing practical work must be under-

30 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 67.
31 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 61.
stood from an emancipatory perspective, and was an idea directed against the landowning nobility who owned more land than they could till and had others to till it for them.

The agrarianist view of the individual and society and their relationship was thus based on the idea that humans became free and independent through ownership and work. Possession of the means of production provided the individual with a sense of security in relation to the present and the future. This understanding was central for all agrarian parties, and is best visualized in their claims and arguments for land reform in the first years of the inter-war period.

In the inter-war period the demand for land to be given to the rural population was one of the questions that attracted the most voters to the agrarian parties. For many landless peasants, the right to own land became a ticket to social change and freedom. From an agrarianist perspective, the right to own land was linked to the realization of full citizenship. But, in practice, a claim for every man’s right to own land became a utopian and impossible demand, since in fact increases in population were creating land shortages and prompting emigration to other countries.36

Peasant Democracy

Herceg’s perception of the moral superiority of the peasant was followed by his conception of the peasant as a natural democrat, an idea that in one way or another was expressed in most of the attempts to formulate agrarianist programs. The roots of peasant democracy were to be traced in history to the natural freedom in ancient society, a golden age.37

Generally the agrarianists were opposed to every kind of dictatorship, which was considered degrading to humanity and human dignity, and was against the peasant’s democratic nature.38 The idea of dictatorship was also regarded as a concentration of power that made it impossible to achieve social stability.39 Dictatorships, moreover were unable to represent the masses and the will of the people, nor could they guarantee the influence of peasant interests and morality. According to the Czech agrarian leader Antonín Svehlan, ties to the land were also the basis for the peasant’s deep-rooted humanism and respect for his fellow human beings.40 In return, the peasants needed and demanded “clear and stable conditions.” These could not be obtained if the power was in the hands of a small group or a single person, but

37 Bell, *Peasants in Power*, p. 60, p. 64.
39 Jackson, *Comintern*, p. 43.
only if the power was in the hands of the entire people. According to one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant party Piast, peasants had a compelling desire for sane and orderly progress, and would never be “the supporters of a dictator, either openly or covertly.” Ideally the desire for order and the rule of law made the peasants pacifists who were resistant to violent changes and revolutionary trends. Change could only be accomplished by means of hard work.

The popular election of local political institutions by universal suffrage through secret ballots was of fundamental importance for a functioning representation of the people. The need for the direct participation of the people in decision-making, whenever possible, was declared. This could be best achieved through public referendums and by public initiative with respect to referendums and legislation. Public initiative meant placing recourse to the referendum in the hands of the people or peasantry. The local initiative is an action by which the people can directly accept or reject any change in the legal or administrative system of the state by a gathering of signatures. The idea of referendums and public initiatives was not peculiar to agrarianists, but rather an idea that was often advocated in public debate of the times. It can be found in many constitutions written after the turn of the 19th century. The implementation of such ideas and institutions rested on the conviction that the constitution, and with it the legislative principles, should be the primary means to organize state power while guaranteeing the influence of the people. The public opinion however, could not be expressed only through parliamentarism. Many agrarianist parties instead favored corporative ideas, with legislative bodies based on occupational groups and other interest groups. In defining agrarianist democracy, most programs of agrarianist parties also added the principles of equality before the law, as well as civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of publishing, and freedom of assembly.

The emphasis on the collective is central to the understanding of man’s position in agrarianist ideology. It must be remembered that agrarianists viewed the family, not the individual, as being the most fundamental unit in the society. According to Peselj, a human’s value as an individual in peasant society was attributed to it because of its contribution to the collective. This was considered self-evident, since no human could live and work without interaction with others. According to him, society could be viewed as a body, and the individual “families” as cells. Cooperation and order between

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42 Jackson, *Comintern*, p. 43; Dimitrov, ”Agrarianism” p. 401; Biondich, *Stjepan Radic*, p. 79.
43 Dimitrov, ”Agrarianism”, p. 401.
the cells was essential for maintaining the health of the organism. The rights of individuals were thus limited so that they could not be used against the collective.47 This is an idea that to some extent is contrary to liberal understanding, where it is the freedom of the individual that primarily has to be protected against the collective. According to agrarianism, the liberal view on individual freedom was empty, as it was not tied to the well-being and survival of the community.48 Liberal individualism was instead seen as the expression of an excessive individualism, one which stood in sharp contrast to the agrarianist organic perception of society. The agrarian understanding of citizenship was thus primary built on the family and the collective, and to some extent measured by the family’s contribution to the collective. In reality, the picture seems to have been different. Making the family the political entity in a male-dominated and hierarchical world, and tying citizenship to ownership of course also had implications on the ability of women to assume their place as citizens. Commenting on the liberal ideal of the equality of all humankind and their right to political participation, Peselj did not reject the idea, but added in defence of the family that “women peasant voters [would] always follow their peasant husbands in their political ideas and actions.”49

The agrarianist understanding of democracy and citizenship was also closely tied to the belief in social and economic rights, and thereby the idea of an economic citizenship. Individual and political rights could only be exercised if certain social needs were fulfilled. Only then could people be free enough to take an independent position. For the agrarianists, the idea of social justice for the majority of the people was equated with the possibility of owning land.50

In agrarianist writings, humanity and dignity were primarily considered as characteristics bound to the peasantry. The peasantry was viewed as a group, a class, or an occupational group, which in most cases was the same as the ‘people.’51 This understanding clearly linked the agrarianist views to the romantic understanding of the peasant and of peasant society that was present in the nationalism of the time throughout Europe. Peselj distinguished rural work as uniting the family, while urban work split the natural family. The urban family and its members are therefore, to some extent, considered incomplete in comparison with the rural family. In some cases, the will of the peasantry and that of the people were considered equal, by virtue of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population in Eastern Europe was rural.52 An obvious condition to exploit under such circumstances was the difference between the urban and the rural populations. In the Croatian case,

47 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 64.
48 Radic, Die Ideologie, p. 4.
49 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 69.
50 Biondich, Stjepan Radic, p. 68.
51 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 108.
52 Radic, Die Ideologie, p. 18-19.
the agrarian party also turned into a predominantly nationalist movement, idealizing the peasant and making the rural equal to the Croatian in relation to the foreign urban. Stamboliski openly declared his hatred for the cities and their inhabitants, on the grounds that peasant virtues were wholly absent in urban culture. The cities were inhabited by parasites like lawyers, brokers, and bankers who made their living by exploiting people who worked with their hands. Even if this statement should not be taken seriously and its importance is overestimated, its presence demonstrates the way in which agrarianist statements might not attach the same human value to all people. It is further an example of how reliance on instincts can easily degenerate into populist rhetoric.

Organizing Society

From the agrarianist perspective, the will of the ‘people’ was best expressed in the political process through institutional arrangements that permitted the peasantry to make decisions about concrete issues. In general, agrarianists viewed the state as an oppressive lord, by no means representing the people. The chief agrarianist proposal concerning the organization of state power was therefore decentralization. This was expressed in two ways. First, emphasis was placed on the importance of local self-government, as an extension of the idea of constructing a state from the bottom up. One of the ideologists of the Croat Peasant Party, Antun Radic, argued that since the village commune was the administrative unit which was closest to the peasants, it was the institution best suited to organize schools, aid agricultural development, and solve social problems. Commune officials should be trained in agriculture and be good models for the people. This would ensure the economic and political autonomy of the local communities. In keeping with the ideas of the Bulgarian peasant party, the local community was considered sovereign, and was endowed with a far-reaching independence in the judicial system, which included the popular elections of judges. This view of village society approached the communitarian and anarchist idea of the village as the core of all kinds of political, cultural, social, and educational activities.

For Antun Radic, the state had only two tasks: upholding the rule of law and providing social and economic assistance. With the prime power of society thereby positioned within the local communities, power on the state level had to be re-organized. In accordance with the view held by Stamboliski.

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54 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 64.
55 Biondich, Stjepan Radic, p. 69, p. 71.
57 Biondich, Stjepan Radic, p. 70.
boliski, this was best accomplished through occupational organizations representing the people. These organizations should grow out of the principal occupational groups which, he believed, represented the true economic interests of society. Existing political parties would be set aside, as they represented an old form of organization and were trapped in the idea of economic liberalism. Consequently, they were unable either to freely discuss economic problems or to cope with the problems of modernization. Occupational organizations, represented in proportion to the size of their membership, would be able to openly discuss the development of the society, and more fairly distribute its burdens and benefits. From the agrarianist perspective, the influence of agrarian morality and the agrarian point of view would automatically ensure the prosperity of all other occupational organizations, as their situation in a peasant society would be connected to the well-being of the peasantry. An occupational organization, compared to a parliamentary, could better assure the agrarianist longing for social stability, as occupational organizations were assumed to change only gradually from the peasant’s viewpoint. This system of occupational organizations, together with the use of the referendum and public initiative, combines the idea of stability over time with a pragmatic approach to day-to-day problems.

Turning from ideological principles to practice, the peasant leaders were allotted a special, but not superior, role in changing the society. A belief in the peasant instinct and admiration for the peasant’s pragmatism, in preference to intellectual constructions and reasoning, formed the basis of the ideal of the active peasant leader promoted by agrarianism. To the peasants it was more important for their leaders to share their concerns and interests, and thereby to respond to their will and needs, rather than to be educated or to follow a political program. In line with the peasant mystique was the idea that peasant leaders were not creators or inventors of an agrarian ideology but rather interpreters and tribunes of the peasant views and expressions. Only such a bond between the leaders and the people would ensure that other interests or the market did not seize power. When confronted with the danger that deference to the common will could escalate into a situation in which the majority oppressed the minority, agrarianists often responded with the argument that such a result was better than the opposite.

A crucial issue facing many peasant parties was how to organize the economy of peasant farming. In order to concentrate the resources and ef-

58 Bell, *Peasants in Power*, p. 60, p. 64.
60 Bell, *Peasants in Power*, p. 66-67. In Stamboliski’s mind, the principal occupational groups in Bulgaria would be the agrarian, artisan, wage-labourer, entrepreneurial, commercial, and bureaucratic, but he thought that the more the economy developed, the more occupational groups would be needed; Bell, *Peasants in Power*, p. 64.
61 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 113.
forts of the local community in defence against destructive market forces, most agrarianist parties promoted a system of locally-based non-compulsory economic cooperatives. This emphasis on private ownership and voluntary membership distinguished agrarianist cooperatives from the forced collectivist ideas promoted by the Bolsheviks. The focus on cooperative production may not only be understood as an ideological principle but as an idea born out of reality. Many agrarianist parties obtained their main organizational support from rural self-help organizations such as cooperatives, already from an early stage of formation.

The cooperatives were designed to coordinate the economic activities of small family-owned farms and their means of production, with respect to the social and economic interests of the community. They embodied many of the agrarianist views on the local community, including self-governance and mutual social responsibility.

Family farms retained their property, but shared in the control over the production and distribution of goods and in dividing profit among the members. The cooperatives were intended to act in all spheres of the economy, production, consumption, and banking. The cooperative thereby contained the three principles on which the economic life of humanity was based: private property, responsibility towards the community, and cooperation in voluntary associations. The first two principles were natural according to the basic agrarianist views on land ownership and the importance of the local community. The third reflected the agrarianist approach to economic efficiency. It was considered that only a personal interest in production and organization could produce efficiency in all of the steps from production to consumption. Production within a cooperative framework would also eliminate the exploitation of labour, as the farmers were both labourers and owners of the means of production. Finally, the cooperative organization of the economy would ensure that land was not subjected to speculation. Instead, long-term responsibility was secured by the transfer of the land and responsibility for the land from one generation to another.

These cooperative principles were not only valid for agriculture, but ideally for the entire society. Most agrarianist parties believed that industrial workers should share in the ownership of the factories and own their own homes. Yet despite its importance, more precise forms and means of cooperative work were absent from most agrarianist party programs. At the same time, it is worth noting that the late 19th century witnessed a widespread

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63 Dimitrov, “Agrarianism”, p. 413; Mitrany, Marx Against Peasant, p. 559; Bell, Peasants in Power p. 169-170; Peselj, (1952) p. 124-126; Biondich, Stjepan Radic p. 77.
64 Peselj, “Peasant Movements”, p. 128.
popularity for cooperative ideas and solutions, adapted both to different theoretical perspectives and to practical circumstances.

For an ideology based on a dialectic understanding of history, it is logical to explain what has been and to predict what the future has to offer. A concise vision of the future or of a utopia, however, was not formulated by the agrarianist writers of the pre- and inter-war period. Such visions were expressed instead in the more concrete proposals for the organization of the state and the economy. The main characteristics must, however, be described as a cooperative society based on family-based, private ownership of land, the local community, and the decentralized organization and distribution of power in society.

The absence of a clearly formulated agrarian utopia may be understood as an expression of the agrarianist intention to deal with concrete issues rather then abstractions. This can be seen in the way agrarianists referred to living examples of visions and utopias, such as the references to the Danish and Swiss small-scale cooperatives used by the Rumanian agrarian movement.

The Roots of Agrarianism

To broaden an understanding of the agrarianist ideology, it is also of importance to trace its ideological roots and influences through its differences and similarities with other contemporary political ideas. In relation to Western liberalism, agrarianism shared a dogma of democracy and the freedom of the individual in relation to the state. At the same time, it opposed economic liberalism. According to a common agrarianist view, economic liberalism represented an excessive individualization of society, because it refused to consider the distribution of wealth, and paid attention only to economic values. While a liberal economy encouraged economic growth, the social costs were great. It thereby had done much harm to the traditional peasant society, and was thus considered to be a system that favoured the urban bourgeoisie and gave them the means to exploit the peasantry. Furthermore, a liberal economy created an instability that was hostile to the basic character of the peasant society.

Agrarianism considered Marxism’s lack of democratic political values to be dangerous. In a strong state, where the peasants were not guaranteed full political influence and were denied the right to own their land, the peasants would revert to the serfdom of feudal society. Likewise, the idea of the

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forced collectivisation of agricultural work and property was viewed as a fundamental threat, striking at the very roots of agrarian society.

According to Jackson, the influence of the Russian populists was directly evident in the development of the ideology and programs of the Slavic parties. Ante Radic, the formulator of the first Croatian party program, was according to himself a devoted student of Russian populist literature. This was especially evident in Radic’s manner of identifying the people with the peasantry, an idea common to most agrarianists. The founder of the Polish Peasant Party Piast, Boleslaw Wyslouch, studied in St. Petersburg and also became heavily influenced by the works of populists. One of the founders of the Rumanian populist movement, which later on was to be the backbone of the Rumanian Peasant Party, had been involved in the Russian populist movement. Both the Bulgarian and Serbian Parties were influenced by the Russian populists, based on the notion of Slavic solidarity.71

There is no sense in questioning these influences, but there is also another, not always as pronounced picture. Peselj, as an example states that the populist influence had little, if any, influence on the Eastern European agrarianists. Instead, he claims that influences on the Croatian party came from the contemporary Christian Democratic movement, with which the agrarianists had a common understanding of family values, a belief in God and the need of order.72 Peselj’s position may be coloured by his intention to define agrarianism as far removed from communism as possible, but his arguments are as good as others. In the same manner, but not with the same intention, Bell does not discuss the influence of Russian populism at all in his study on Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. Instead he presents the influences on Stamboliski from contemporary Marxism and the natural sciences as well as French and German philosophy, and Stamboliski’s studies in Germany. The influence from west is interesting, as it is also highlighted in Peter Brock’s study on Polish populism. He shows how contemporary British agrarian thought influenced the Polish populists and how it was adapted to the Polish conditions. The ideas of the Polish populists were later an inspiration for the Russian populists, who transformed them further before they were ‘re-exported’ to Poland and Bulgaria.73 The Russian influence on the populism is primarily visible in the introduction of revolutionary means and the Russian-mannered collective ownership of land; ideas that were not common among the European agrarianists.

Beside the populist influence, more pure forms of Marxism are often claimed to have had an influence over the Eastern European agrarianism, especially in areas where the communist parties were strong. This influence

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71 Jackson, “Peasant Political Movements”, p. 286-287.
73 Brock, Peter, Polish Revolutionary Populism (Toronto 1977).
is surely accurate. As radical movements seeking support among the less well-off in society, agrarianists and communists often tried to find support among the same groups. Mutual influence within such a situation would be highly likely. Moreover, the influence from intellectual Marxism is visible in the more theoretical parts of agrarianism, such as the dialectic understanding of history.

Some emphasis must also be placed on the influence of cooperative ideas upon agrarianism. This influence is seldom highlighted, but is worth considering since many of the agrarian parties had their roots in the cooperative movement. When foreign influences are considered in previous studies, such as Henry L. Roberts’ study on Romania, it is often done to highlight the failure of economic politics. What Roberts then misses is the importance of examples like Denmark and Switzerland, not only because of their influence, but also for the creating of models and living utopias for the movements in Eastern Europe. As sources of influence, the cooperatives both offered intellectual viewpoints and practical experience. The cooperative system then became a living tradition of agrarianism and a practice to which many of the peasants could relate and which gave them a basic understanding of the agrarianist ideas. The cooperatives were further a grass-root movement working, promoting, and developing ideas even when the agrarianist political movements were in the shadows.

The Problems of Agrarianism

Assessment of the agrarianist parties has often been negative. On the one hand, it has been claimed that the parties held utopian views, were politically illiterate, and did not achieve what they had promised. On the other hand, their failure paved the way for authoritarian regimes.

In one country after another, the agrarianist parties lost power to authoritarian regimes. The process began with Bulgaria in 1923 and continued with Poland in 1926, with Yugoslavia in 1929 and with Rumania in 1931. In Estonia and Latvia the agrarian parties, or at least their leadership, were the backbones of the authoritarian regimes after 1934. Only in Czechoslovakia did democracy remain until 1938, and the Czech Agrarian Party could take part in the government by various coalitions.

In his anthology on ideologies in 20th century Europe, Feliks Gross has explained the failure of agrarianism as a failure to formulate a fully developed philosophical system or a social myth of a perfect state.74 The absence of a fully developed philosophical system, like the Marxist, was also identified as a problem by contemporaries, for instance, one of the leaders of the

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Green International, Milan Hodza. He urged for the formulation of a scientifically-based ideology – much like the one formulated by Georg Dimitrov – which would deal with all aspects of society, the rural as well as the urban.\textsuperscript{75} This, however, seems more of an intellectual explanation, with an overbelief in the role of the ideology, as well as an underestimation of the importance of real politics. Another author who is mostly sympathetic to the ideas of agrarianism, David Mitrani, finds the causes of the failure of the agrarian parties to contain both internal and external factors. On the one hand there was difficulty in organizing the peasants and an underlying conflict between the principles of democracy and wishes for a radical change of the social order from the other side. On the other hand, the agrarianist parties in Eastern Europe did not receive support or sympathy from western European movements or governments.

Mary Samal, in her dissertation on the Czechoslovakian party, instead finds the main cause largely in external factors, stating that “all the Peasant parties of eastern Europe were cheated of their legitimate claim to power by the alliance of the crown, army, Socialist parties, and the bulk of the urban population.”\textsuperscript{76} It is true that these institutions and movements often were the major opponents of agrarianism, but they were seldom united.

Assessments of the agrarian parties should also, to some degree, be dependent on the intentions. Most important is whether land reforms were carried out primarily to create social justice or to create a prosperous agriculture. In the first case, the agrarianist politics were partly successful, and their influence remained even when the parties were not in power. In most cases land reforms failed, as the land reforms, alone, could not provide the necessary conditions for economic progress or sustainable agriculture. Land reform could even be contra-productive, as the reforms in many countries created plots that were not large enough to feed the families living on them, or the holdings were too small to be able to accumulate capital. To make small-scale agriculture, as promoted by the agrarianist, lucrative, agriculture had to be intensified, and specialized, something that needed capital and a marketing structure that could support the farmers. A solution which at least partly would help to solve that problem was at hand in the agrarianists programs by their promotion of the cooperative. In that sense, the failure of the agrarian parties was not so much the lack of a fighting program or a lack of ideas, but a lack of implementation. In areas and countries where the corporative system was developed, and where the government took an active role in supporting the cooperatives, as in Estonia, agriculture was more successful, and could even generate capital to the surrounding society.

However, it is worthwhile to note the fact that the agrarianist parties, even if they might had an lasting influence, were in power for only a very short

\textsuperscript{75} Jackson, Comintern, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{76} Small, The Czechoslovakian, p. 9.
period. As Mitrany points out, the agrarianist movements should not be dismissed because they could not hold onto political power, since, by those standards, few Eastern European political parties were successful.\footnote{Mitrany, }\

Conclusions

The text presents the main features of the political programs and discussions on Agrarianism, and creates a framework aimed at explaining the agrarianist view on history, and on the mechanisms of social change, political power, and the organization of society. Agrarianism was the rural-based ideology that was central to most of the Eastern and Central European agrarian political parties in the interwar period. The Eastern European agrarianists viewed the movement as a third force in politics and economy, between liberalism and socialism. By claiming that ideas imposed by liberals and Marxists were not progressive, but instead a threat to rural society, the ideology confronted the two dominating paths of modernization, and claimed to offer solutions that would neutralize the negative consequences of capitalism and socialism alike. As Agrarianism eventually lost the political struggle, its place in the complex history of interwar Eastern Europe is mostly forgotten or neglected.

\footnote{Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant, p. 130.}
Between Marxism and Liberal Democracy: Romanian Agrarianism as an Economic Third Way

Angela Harre

Discourses on the dissolution of an idyllic “old society”, which was said to stand in a radical contradiction to a “disastrous and chaotic” modernity, are not at all limited to Eastern Europe. Already during the second half of the 19th century these, discourses also started to dominate within Western economic philosophy discussions. Debates concerning “Englishness” versus industrialization in Great Britain, ruralization versus industrialization in Germany or – respectively – “ruralizzazione o industrializzazione” in fascist Italy during the 1920s1 all had to do with the human wish of living in a stable, clearly arranged community and the imputation of an ever-changing, modern civilization.

In the Balkan states these debates were stimulated by Russian philosophers belonging to the Slavophil and Narodnik schools. Especially agrarian socialist ideas spread to these countries in connection with the exile of hundreds of Russian revolutionaries after the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, and with Stolipyn’s agrarian reforms in 1906, culminating after the last European peasant revolt in Romania in 1907. There were apparent differences between Eastern and Western European philosophical thinking. In Western Europe, these discourses were dominated by an enormous trust in the power of an infinite human knowledge, which resulted in an unlimited optimism of economic and scientific progress, lasting as late as during the interwar period.

This optimism seems to have been limited to Western Europe. Many Romanians had a reaction of frustration instead. They dealt with economic affairs already during the second half of the 19th century. In Romania an autonomous development seemed to have been hindered by economic and societal obstacles. In order to fight the price scissoring between agrarian and industrial products on the world market, and to answer to the agrarian protectionism of Western European countries, the Romanian development strat-

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egy changed from export diversification to import substitution after the commercial war with the Habsburg monarchy starting in 1885. But a policy to close the frontiers for imports of almost any kind could not overcome the lack of capital, which resulted in an imperfectly functioning credit system. Investment capital as well as the state’s expenditures had to be extracted from the peasants, a fact that also weakened the domestic market. Romanian industry, which was not able to compete internationally, became heavily dependent on public consumption.

Consequently, the Romanian economists’ explanation of their failure to economically catch up with industrialized countries differed profoundly from that put forward by classical economic liberalism. They claimed that the internal causes of backwardness were clearly inferior to the external threats challenging the national economy. An academic group around Mihail Manoilescu and Ştefan Zeletin supported industrialization, and discussed whether a dependency on the international market was the root of Romanian backwardness (Manoilescu²) or if the country instead had to proceed through different stages of development, similar to the West, but at an accelerated pace (Zeletin³). Manoilescu’s refuse to take up David Ricardo’s thesis of absolute and relative comparative advantages in international trade might be considered one of a series of underestimated culminating points of what became genuine Eastern European economic thought. His national protectionist ideas (intended to improve their Listian origins) made their way around the world, influencing in particular the Latin American dependencia.⁴

Post-war scholars, too, dealt favourably with so-called vicious circles, which were said to hinder a self-reliant economic development and, consequently, to establish the backwardness of South Eastern Europe. Alexander Gerschenkron described the hopelessness of escalating social conflicts in backward agrarian countries with the help of several modernization dilemmas.⁵ Kurt Mandelbaum and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan concentrated on the agrarian surplus population, which sized (after Rosenstein) one quarter of the population. The phenomenon of hidden unemployment would have had a catastrophic impact on agricultural productivity. Kurt Mandelbaum closed the vicious circle; he said that peasants, who moved to the cities and provided cheap mass labour there, too, would balance out the negative productivity in the countryside with an equivalent low productivity in the urban

² Manoilescu, Mihail, Die nationalen Produktivkräfte und der Außenhandel (Berlin 1937).
³ Zeletin, Ştefan, Burghezia romana. Originea so rolul ei istoric (Bucharest 1923).
centres. The poverty of these people would create a weak domestic market, providing no basis for a self-reliant industrialization.6

The major difference between Romanian and Western European development discourses did not concern the delayed modernization processes. Frustrated by the blocked evolution, rural voters tended to reject reform-oriented party programs and to opt for those political groups which promised to fight capitalist transformation. After the introduction of universal suffrage, the dilemma of the ruling elites was that they had to decide whether they wanted:

- to give up political modernization (democratization), to ignore the voter’s voice, and to insist on economic modernization (industrialization) or
- to insist on the democratization of the country, and to fight capitalist transformation.

Both ways found their adherent within the Peasant and the Liberal (industrialist) Party. Both ways failed. The industrialists tried to further industrialization against the will of the villages, and failed because of the peasants’ determination to give their votes to the fascists. The agrarianists believed in a rural democracy, but their hopes were demolished during the world depression. The resulting economic break-down mercilessly showed the connections between Romanian agriculture and international capitalism and, thus, ended the strategy of leaving capitalism aside and of jumping directly from feudalism into a better (socialist) future.

This article deals with the agrarianist development strategy, whose rejection of capitalist transformation became a widespread phenomenon in Romania. And to a certain extent, the anti-communist assumption of recent historians who dealt with East Central European agrarianism must also be criticized. In 1954 Branko Pešelj described agrarianism as the peasant’s understanding of complex political and socio-economic matters in which he was interested and for whose solution he fought. In contrast to communism, agrarianism was not an artificial construction of single intellectuals, but instead included those ideals inherent in the peasant’s soul and character.7 This definition was formed during the early phase of the Cold War, and tried to position basic democratic traditions in the Eastern European villages against Stalinist influences. But it is questionable as to whether agrarianism (in contrast to communism) reflected ideas that were deeply written in the peasants’ souls. First of all, we have just a relatively vague knowledge about what was hidden in the peasants’ brains. And secondly, communism as well as agrarianism were responses to the shock of capitalist transformation. Agrarianism did not reflect a peasant understanding of complex political and socio-


economic matters, but was (as was communism) a theoretical construction of Romanian scholars in the name of peasants, who only partially identified themselves with their intellectual mentors.

The anti-communist assumption dominated at least until 1977, when Heinz Gollwitzer also compared the East Central European peasant parties with Western pluralist democracies. He, too, underlined that for a short moment in time there seemed to have been an international peasant movement which was opposed to the international proletarian movement. And even the slightly different definition of Stephen Fisher-Galati (1967) did not match the Romanian case. He described agrarianism with the help of three key points: a) democracy in the Western European sense of the word, b) private property, and c) social harmony.

In the Romanian case, the demand for democratic institutions and local autonomy had more to do with the agrarianists’ wish to conserve traditional social relationships. Western European democratic models were not neglected, but were instead openly criticized and adopted to the original vision of a peasant (corporatist) state, which was similar to the peasant dictatorship of the Bulgarian statesman Alexander Stambolijski (1879-1923), as will be shown later in this article.

At least during the 1920s, agrarianists favoured a so-called labour property, which was said to provide a golden third way between capitalist private property and communist collective property. Capitalism itself was given up as a promising way into a better future, and similar to the Russian Narodniki, Romanian agrarianists tried to preserve an idealized peasant past, one which needed to be liberated from its aristocratic heads – the boyars. Agrarianism seemed to answer the age-old human desire to live unharmed by societal authorities.

The rejection of traditional leaders had an influential impact on political theory. It is correct that Romanian agrarianists refused class fights and social violence. At the same time, they divided the citizens of their country strictly into “parasitizing” and “non-parasitizing” groups. Living together peacefully concerned only “productive” members of society. “Non-productive” people, who usually belonged to the urban elites, were said to live off of the exploitation of the common people, and to have no right to participate in the countries’ political life. In order to avoid interethnic struggles (Hungarians amounted to 7,9 percent, Germans to 4,1 percent, Jews to 4,0 percent, Russians to 2,3 percent and Gypsies to 1,5 percent in 193610) ethnic minorities

10 Fischer-Galati, Stephen, “Population de la Roumanie, d’après les nationalités, en pourcent“, Conjunctura economica romanesti 1936: 1, p. 27.
were granted rights of political and economic co-determination. Nevertheless, the corporatist model of a peasant state meant a segregation from traditional Romanian society as well, as will be shown later.

Part of the difficulty of defining agrarianism might be explained by the very original concepts of Romanian theoreticians. Their strong connections with Russian agrarian socialism, the visionary character of their theories, and a rural form of nationalism were unique in regard to equivalent Baltic and Central European movements. Summarizing the differences, one could say that Romanian agrarianism was rooted in the rejection of the capitalist transformation. Because neither pure Marxism nor classical liberalism seemed to provide the country with a satisfactory answer concerning economic backwardness, these scholars elaborated a very original development strategy, which combined a) Russian agrarian socialism, b) a rural nationalism, c) economic theories of the Third Way, d) patriarchal social relations and e) the utopia of a Peasant State. A closer look at these points will occur in the following sections.

The Russian sources of Romanian agrarianism

In 1881, Karl Marx responded to a letter sent by Russian Marxist Vera Zasulich (1851-1919) in a very surprising way. Vera Zasulich was part of the group Black Redistribution, followers of Georgii Plekhanov (1856-1918), and had asked Marx to mediate between Plechanov’s pure Marxism and the Narodnik ideology of Alexander Herzen (1812-1870). Herzen had successfully integrated the idea of the Russian collective village communities (obshchinas) into political theory. He had been popularized by Nicolai Chernyshevsky (1828-1889) and both theoreticians contradicted Marx by equating the communal live of the Russian peasants (untouched by the boyars) with the existence of communism.

In his answer to Zasulich, Marx supported Herzen and limited his capital theory to Western Europe. In his mind, Russian development contradicted the Western model in the sense that a governmental greenhouse capitalism transformed collective village property into capitalist private property. The extraction of immense financial resources from the villages in order to finance state factories and a state banking system replaced the original capital accumulation, and could only be overcome by the help of a co-operative movement and a revolution.\[12\]


Kurt Mandelbaum accurately underlined Marx’s indecision concerning the Russian left, against whom he had taken a very critical stance until the late 1870s. As late as 1881, following the murder of Tsar Alexander II by the terrorist Narodnik splinter group *People’s Will*, he changed his mind. However, he was less attracted by the idea of a direct jump from feudalism into communism. On the contrary, he was convinced that the fate of the European bourgeoisie was determined by the Tsar’s death and the dissolution of his reactionary army. During the period of terrorist fights, neither Marx nor Engels attacked the ideas of the Narodniki, as was also indicated in the letter to Vera Sassulitsch. But just one year later, when the murder did not give the expected results, Marx softened his point of view once again. In his introduction to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto (1882) he expected the world revolution to start again in Western Europe. And at the end of the 1880s, when the *obshchinas* retreated into extremely isolated regions of the Russian empire, Engels continued to test the progressive character of Russian capitalism.13

During the late 1890s, the Narodniki themselves became trapped in an unresolved dilemma between the unavoidable dissolution of the collective village communities and their concentration on anti-capitalism, which had been based precisely on the permanence of the *obshchinas*. Nevertheless, the idea of a direct leap from feudalism into communism still attracted Balkan intellectuals, in whose countries several varieties of such collective social structures had in fact survived. Examples of these included the different forms of the *zadruga* in the Slavic regions and the Romanian *stâna*, which had been described by Henri H. Stahl.

Stahl was fascinated by a series of totally isolated mountain villages which practiced collective forms of working and living together in a manner forgotten on the plains long ago. These people were traditionally living as semi-nomadic shepherds who drove their animals into the mountains in summer and leased pastures on the plains in winter. They traded cheese and other animal products for maize. The Carpathian region called Vrâncea was divided into fourteen “mother villages”, whose elders spontaneously called village or valley meetings if required by necessity or tradition. This archaic democracy was complemented by the strict control of the *stânas* – groups of up to twenty shepherds which controlled the allocation of their cheese production.14

In the Balkans, the power of Marx’s argumentation in favour of the Narodniki a few years before united with the Narodniks’ success of providing the first (leftist) development strategy for backward agrarian countries.

Here both circumstances gave birth to a radical Balkan agrarianism. In South Eastern Europe, agrarianism was rooted in delayed modernization processes. When classical liberalism ceased to be a promising way out of economic backwardness at the turn of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, agrarianists offered an alternative development strategy, refusing industrialization in large parts of the region. The starting point of their visionary argumentation were the stânas and zadrugas described above. With the help of these peasant family units, the construction of an alternative societal model called Peasant Democracy would be possible. Its economy would be characterized by collective work, collective property, and a rural democracy.\textsuperscript{15} Capitalist commerce, as the main cause of the exploitation of the peasant masses, would be regulated by a network of cooperatives,\textsuperscript{16} which would replace capitalism as a whole.

The founders of this ideology were the Bulgarian Alexander Stambolijski (1879-1923), the Serb Svetoslav Marcović (1846-1975), the Croatian brothers Antun (1868-1919) and Stjepan Radić (1871-1928) and the Romanian Constantin Stere (1865-1936). The ideas of these four men differed only slightly from one another, although two different forms can be distinguished:

**Agrarianist radicalism** was a left-wing, revolutionary ideology, whose leading representative was the Bulgarian statesman Alexander Stambolijski. He carried out the first and only experiment to establish a “Peasant State” - the common vision of all Balkan agrarianists. A Prime Minister 1919 and 1923, he even forbade weddings between peasants and urban dwellers, limited private landownership drastically, and tried to keep capitalism from influencing the Bulgarian national economy with the help of state monopolies and an intensive promotion of rural co-operatives.\textsuperscript{17} Cooperatives here should not be understood in the common sense of the word, but instead as the traditional Bulgarian zadrugas.

His almost total rejection of modernity was softened by **mainstream agrarianism**. Key examples were the Croatian and the Romanian Agrarian Parties. They, too, combined a romantic view of agriculture as the most moral and natural vocation with an image of the peasants as a socially undifferentiated class who should unconditionally take over the control of power. However, urban citizens were not excluded from political participation, and industrialization was not to be hindered, but should instead strictly correspond to the needs of the rural population. These agrarianists were looking for a Third Way between liberalism and communism. Their program served


to strengthen the democratization of their countries, to conserve the patriarchal peasant cultures, and to lighten the burden of capitalist transformation.

In Romania Constantin Stere (1865-1936) – a young lawyer attracted by the anarchism of Chernyshevskij – who became the founder of the Romanian equivalent of the Narodniki. Constantin Stere was born on a small boyar’s court in Bess Arabia, which at that time belonged to the Russian empire. When he was twenty-one, he joined the People’s Will as a student in Odessa and was banished to Siberia for eight years after the murder of Tsar Alexander II. After his release, he left Russia with his family and settled in Iaşi, where he continued his juridical studies. He joined a small group of other exiled Russian revolutionaries, who settled in Iaşi near the Empire’s frontier in order to provide revolutionaries beyond the borders with forbidden literature. Moreover, they not only provided their fellow combatants with Western literature, but also those Romanian students, too could not afford to study abroad in France or Germany. Together they thus created an energetic and intricate socialist community in Romania.18

The academic wing of agrarianism was institutionalized in 1917 in Iaşi, where many Romanian intellectuals fled from the advancing German troops. Here, in the centre of Stere’s agrarianism, three academics came into contact with each other: Virgil Madgearu (later the main theoretician of the Agrarianist Party), Dimitrie Gusti (the father of Romanian sociology), and Vasile Pârvan, a highly talented historian, who later refused to take part in public life after a family tragedy.19 All three agreed on the necessity of founding the Romanian Social Institute, which would become the starting point of agrarianist science and especially of rural anthropology. For instance, one of the institute’s chief scientists, Henri H. Stahl (1901-1991) responded to the industrial challenge. He analyzed the influence of foreign capitalist enterprises (backed by a modern jurisdiction unknown to the peasants) on the destruction of a traditional Romanian village culture in the isolated Carpathian Mountains. This patriarchal and independent way of life had to be given up in order to subordinate formerly free men to a market economy that meant their pauperization.20

The unbearable thirst of land, which caused the peasant rebellion of 1907, the social earthquake of the Balkan Wars (1912-13), and the First World War formed a spiritual climate which granted a lasting success for an agrarianist political movement. Nevertheless, the question of when and where the Peasant Party (Partidul Naţional Țăranist) was founded proves to be a very difficult one. The core group came together during the Congress of the Peo-

18 Hausleitner, Mariana, Die nationale Frage in der rumänischen Arbeiterbewegung vor 1924 (Berlin 1988), p. 73.
ple’s Cooperative Banks in December 1918. Under the leadership of Ion Mihalache (1882-1963), a village teacher and president of the Congress, approximately 160 village teachers, priests and wealthy peasants, who held positions of high prestige in their home villages, joined the party and allowed for its rapid extension.

Especially at the beginning of its existence, the Peasant Party benefited from powerful support across the countryside. When the ruling Liberal Party fell into a deep crisis because of the unexpected deaths of both its president Ion I.C. Brătianu and king Ferdinand I in 1927, the Agrarianists were able to call nearly 100,000 protesting partisans to Bucharest. Even if these numbers are exaggerated, they show the enormous euphoria which accompanied the breakdown of the liberal government, and the extent to which the peasant movement had become a mass movement which had to be taken into consideration politically.

The Peasant State – democratic versus authoritarian visions

The character of Romanian agrarianism becomes clearer if we take a closer look at its social background. The agrarianists were able to mobilize only a very limited stratum of the rural population. The thirst for land had increased the social differentiation between the peasants over time and had broken down the traditional village hierarchies. The upper levels of the hierarchy were held by the *chiaburi* (rich peasants), who could afford wage labourers, and by the *ţăranii cu stare* (better-off peasants), who lived the typical restricted peasant’s life, but were not forced to look for additional income outside agriculture. After the First World War, both groups represented up to 5% to 20% of the population, and were said to represent the dynamic masses of the countryside. Concerning agrarianist ideology, it is important to understand that their status as rural leaders heavily depended on the traditional, strict hierarchical and patriarchal village culture. These people might no only gain higher social status if they succeeded in replacing the urban elites in the state administration. They might have lost their present social position as well, if they were not able to fight the capitalist destruction of their village communities.

Consequently, they tried to further political democratization at the same time as they fought against capitalist transformation. The agrarianist societal


vision reflected this ambiguity. Romanian agrarianists imagined the nation as organic, but succeeded in integrating the complex socio-ethnic mixture of that region into their societal organism. Before any capitalist impact, this ethnic mixture had overlapped with a professional specialization of different minorities. Capitalism now challenged this former equilibrium, and agrarianism (as an anti-capitalist ideology) tried to maintain the traditional socio-economic structure. The agrarianist form of rural nationalism, therefore, meant a simultaneous exclusion and integration of ethnic minorities. They were integrated into Romanian society and their right of co-determination was secured, but they were excluded from “traditional” Romanian professions, such as farming. They were accepted only in their own traditional ethnic-professional role.

Thus, agrarianists tried to avoid interethnic struggles which threatened the societal integrity. Instead, they declared that the cooperation between peasants and national minorities was the only source of economic and political progress25 and elaborated a very original form of corporatism. Already in 1908 Constantin Stere wanted ethnic minorities to place themselves together in so-called “corporations of public law”.26 At this time, he still limited corporatist ideas to ethnic minorities and did not widen his concept to a model of political representation within the Romanian nation itself. This course was taken by Virgil Madgearu in 1923, who proposed to re-composing the Senate using representatives of different professional organizations whose voices in economic matters would be obligatory.27

The agrarianist conceptions contradict the fascist comprehension of corporatism in the sense that Romanian agrarianists were not at all economic nationalists, but instead granted ethnic foreigners the right of political and economic participation. By bringing different productive groups of society into harmony with each other, they envisioned a peasant democracy, one in which the Romanian peasant dominated the political landscape in a kind of grassroots democracy and in which the colourful ethnic and cultural landscape would be preserved with the help of regional autonomy and an administrative decentralization.28

However, parliamentary cooperation with ethnic minorities did not seem to be that innocent in reality. In 1907 Constantin Stere stressed the dominance of the Romanian peasant within a future state.29 In the party program of 1918 an analogy between the organizational structures of the peasant

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party and the state administration brought out the differentiation between the division of power and administrative control. Moreover, agrarianists believed that 80% of the (rural) Romanian population backed their policies. That meant that the Peasant Party activists did not even have to think about sharing power with other social groups. Parliamentary control would become a farce under such circumstances.

If we logically follow this line of reasoning, we have to state that the minorities’ right to participate in the country’s politics would not allow them to influence societal processes actively or according to their own interests. More than that, the rivalry towards ethnic minorities was accompanied by a passionate hostility towards urban elites. In his pamphlet “Agrarianism” (1923) Madgearu declared “parasites” (urban citizens, which lived by “exploiting” the common people) to be the major obstacle regarding political and economic progress. Within a future Peasant State there needed to be a clear division between productive and non-productive groups of society. Parasites should be excluded from public life.

The question is whether we have to deal with an utopia of a peasant democracy or with a vision of a peasant dictatorship. Concretely, agrarianists tried to integrate the caste system of the former agrarian society with the help of corporatist ideas into a modern, parliamentary democracy. The democratic vision of the Romanian agrarianists, therefore, seemed to oscillate between the political mobilization of the rural middle classes and the exclusion of urban elites from power. The interests of the village elites in replacing their political adversaries in Bucharest, and in climbing to the highest positions within the state administration and (at the same time) stabilizing their own leadership concerning the rural masses becomes clearer at this point. To declare that the present state elites live parasitically off of the common people meant to declare that they were without professions. But to belong to a professional group would be crucial within a corporatist state.

**An economic theory between tradition and modernity**

The rivalry concerning urban elites reflected the frustration of the agrarianists over the steady progress of industrialization. After the First World War, the National Liberal Party had given up free trade as a promising way into a better future, when the possibility of industrializing through the diversification of exports and capital imports closed for backward agrarian countries. But here, too, the ambiguity between modernization and the conservation of

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31. Madgearu, Țărânismul, p. 29-35.
traditional ways of life characterized the economic theories of Romanian agrarianists. They found themselves in the dilemma that industrialization did not seem to be a theoretical problem any more, but an non-negotiable fact and a national need in times in which import substitution seemed to be the only chance to profit from the decline of corn prices on the international markets. On the other hand, they insisted that capitalism was not just a symbol, but was instead the cause of the exploitation of the Romanian peasants.

Their double rejection of free trade and industrialization meant that the agrarianists gave up the respective means of the Western European economic modernization together with its aims. Instead, they were looking for an alternative development strategy which could replace capitalism. The decision to reject capitalism as such and to concentrate on the political vision of a Peasant State was taken already at the turn of the 19th century. In 1906 Constantin Stere founded a journal Viata Romaneasca (Romanian Life) and entered a debate about the (non)sense of capitalism with Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (1855-1920) – another Russian exile, who formerly had been a member of Plechanov’s group Black Redistribution. Stere rejected Gherea’s Marxism, instead using the economic exchange theories of another Narodnik economist Vasilij Voronkov (1847-1919). According to Voronkov, capitalism would be condemned to fail from the very start in Eastern Europe, because domestic and foreign markets were lacking. Thus, Romanian industrialization could be no more than an exotic plant without vigour.

The question of whether the industrialization of the Romanian economy should be furthered or hindered was taken up again by the president of the Peasant Party during the 1920s. Ion Mihalache just repeated Stere’s argument and was backed by Virgil Madgearu in 1924. In a debate with the liberal Ştefan Zeletin (1882-1934) Madgearu stated once more that backward agrarian countries such as those in South Eastern Europe would not have to go through the phase of capitalist transformation. Relating his conviction to the comparative advantages of the international division of labour, he claimed that the possibility of creating factories would not immediately mean the necessity to create factories.

The differences between the agrarianist and communist arguments were based on a different understanding of the term “people”. As a Marxist, Gherea concentrated on small and landless peasants who owned less than

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36 Madgearu, Țărâismul, p. 96.
three hectares, depended on external sources of income, and symbolized the
core of a future proletariat. Their dependence on wage labour provided by
large landowners should be broken in order to allow them to migrate to the
cities. Their sons should work in the factories and later lead the revolu-
tionary transformation of society. As an agrarianist, Stere related his ideas to
peasants as his ideal of human existence. Therefore, he did not talk about
urbanization or class struggle. Quite the opposite, he tried to bind these peo-
ple closer to their land. While Gherea asked for the unlimited introduction of
capitalism in order to lead people into a communist world revolution, Stere
looked for appropriate development strategies which would address the so-
cial particularities of the peasant masses.

But neither of these ideologists was able to solve the conflict between tra-
ditional and modern societal interrelations. The Marxists could not offer any
short-term hope for the impoverished Romanian peasants, but put them off
with empty promises of a revolutionary future. Consequently, they lost their
voters’ interest, which alone would have given them the chance to enter the
parliament and to participate in the country’s politics. Actually, Stere had
been right when he claimed that communism would become an exotic plant
without vigour in Romania.37 The ideas of the agrarianists seemed to be more
appropriate to the peasant wishes and, consequently, their support seemed to
be unclouded until the late 1920s.

But agrarianists, too, failed because of their efforts to generate modern
economic growth with the help of traditional collective peasant economies.
Their respective economic policy, termed “Open Doors”, concentrated on a) 
co-operatives and b) a combination of free trade in industrial matters and
agricultural protection. It included the possibility of a limited deindustriali-
zation concerning so-called “artificial industries”, which were able to sur-
vive only through the state’s assistance and had to be given up if they were
not able to adapt to the needs of the peasant consumers. Even if the agrarian-
ists did not try to completely halt industrialization, they concentrated on free
trade, through which they hoped to overcome “artificially and growing rank”
industries and to adopt industrialization to the needs of backward agrarian
states.38 Nevertheless, even the roots of their economic policy in classical
liberalism were counterbalanced by protectionist inclusions, and were justi-
fi ed by the structural particularities of the Romanian economy. Here, too, a
state-controlled industrialization could assist in providing the agricultural
overpopulation with jobs. A state intervention in that sense should hand over
capitalist monopolies to the state. Industry was not seen as an end in itself,
but should serve the independence of the peasants from the capitalist world

38 Madgearu, Virgil M., “Noul regim minier. Discurs ținut în ședința Adunării Deputațiilor din
25 iunie 1924”, Independența Economică 1924, p. 117.
market.\textsuperscript{39} If this involved capitalism in the common sense of the word, then these statements had nothing in common.

Cooperatives were said to be the heart of the agrarianist Third Way. Nonetheless, these cooperatives did not play a role similar to their Western European equivalents. According to the agrarianist ideology, they should not primarily increase the efficiency of peasant production, or organize common markets, or solve the problem of land division. In Romania, cooperatives had a utopian function. Because of cooperatives, collective forms of farming as well as economic progress without industrialization could be maintained.\textsuperscript{40}

During the 1920s, cooperative debates were dominated by Gromoslav Mladenatz (1891-1958). There were just two more volumes breaking through the mass of his writings, one of them written under his mentorship: Virgil Madgearuu added a fierce rejection of “modern slavery” and the need to establish a Peasant State in order to hinder the destructive influence of capitalist commerce on the Romanian villages. And in 1938 and 1939 a Danish cooperative analyst, Gormsen, visited almost two hundred Romanian cooperatives in order to separate the cause of their retarded development. But his results contradicted Romanian agrarianism in such a profound way that he was not able to influence the respective discourses. Gormsen claimed that the backward stage of the Romanian economy would not allow for a faster evolution.\textsuperscript{41}

Instead, Mladenatz hoped to overcome the unequal partition of capitalist economic power with the help of cooperatives, and to replace capitalist exploitation by societal solidarity.\textsuperscript{42} This societal solidarity should have been backed by a so-called labour property, which was opposed to the capitalist private property and to the communist collective property.\textsuperscript{43} In 1928 G. Mantu related its philosophical roots to passages in the Bible, saying that God has given the land to all the people. There would be no rational reason to equate capitalist private property with economic progress. It was not even clear that people needed private property at all in order to satisfy their needs. In order to obey to God’s wishes, the land would just have to be distributed in a proper way. It should belong to those who worked it.\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[41] Murgescu, \textit{Mersul ideilor economice}, p. 188-192.
\end{footnotes}
In order to significantly support his anti-capitalism, the chief theoretician of Romanian agrarianism Virgil Madgearu related his ideas to the analyses of the Russian economist Alexander Chaianov. In 1923 Chaianov had asked why the peasant family economy was able to withstand the capitalist threat for such a long time. He stated that terms of classical economics such as “wage labour” or “capital interest” were not relevant to the collective forms of living within the Russian villages, and replaced them with “self-exploitation” and “natural balance of production”. Moreover, Chaianov described several paradoxes in his comparison of the capitalist form of farming and the peasant family economy. Because hunger hurts, the peasants accept forms of production which would not have been profitable for a capitalist enterprise. If, for example, the price of maize decreases, the capitalist would switch to corn or vegetables. The traditional peasant would continue to produce maize as long as his (subjective) “natural balance of labour” in relation to the output of his work assures the basic existence of his family. The peasant family economy, therefore, survives in circumstances in which a capitalist enterprise would instead face bankruptcy.

Madgearu overlooked the fact that Chaianov had just analyzed the peasant’s ability to survive conjunctural hardships. He had not tried to prove the capacity the traditional subsistence economy had of generating economic growth. Madgearu’s major error was in trying to elaborate a theory of political progress which was primarily based on the peasant’s traditional forms of production. His development strategy came into conflict with the economic growth orientation of modern societies. The traditional collective peasant economy, which in the eyes of the agrarianists was opposed to a modern private economy, had been based for centuries just on the preservation of a very limited standard of living. Modern economic growth meant, on the other hand, a rupture with exactly these static ideals of traditional agriculture. Thus, the Romanian agrarianists would have failed to create growth even if the existing interwar government (1928-1932) had not been hit by the Great Depression. In combination with a clearly inadequate reaction concerning the conjunctural hardships of the early 1930s, they were not able to keep pace with the economic needs of an exploding population. As a result, they lost their legitimacy in the eyes of peasant voters.

Conclusion
The vision of a peasant state lost its vigour long before the outbreak of the world depression in 1926, when the Agrarianists united with the National

Party from Transylvania. The vision was taken again up during the parliamentar
crisis in 1935, when the party president Ion Mihalache reintroduced
the Peasant State into the official party doctrine. Its adherents now rapidly
divided into two different wings:

A) Representatives of the party’s left (Stere, Lupu, Iunian) declared the
peasant state to be part of a transitional phase, which would lead
from a corporate democracy towards a social democracy. These
politicians had split from the Peasant Party already in 1932 and
1933, and did not succeed in bundling their splinter groups into a
common organization afterwards, partly because their ideas drifted
into totally different directions, ranging from a radical socialism to
monarchism.

B) A series of moderate theoreticians did not develop a clear point of view
(Ralea, Mihalache, Madgearu), but instead tried to use the vague
picture of a peasant state to counterbalance the growing fascist im
pact on society with an alternative democratic state model.

To a certain extent, the revival of the peasant state followed its earlier disinte
gration, because the remaining activists hoped to regain the peasants’ votes
with its help. Already in 1926 the cooperative labour property, the core of a
Third Way, had been excluded from the party program, and in 1935 Mihala
che did not mention it explicitly. Now he just tried to replace the communist
collective property with an “organized and rationalized private property”,
but did not explain how such a rationalization would look. Anti-capitalism
appeared as a term, but was no longer filled with content. Mihalache limited
the Third Way to anti-communism, which was part of the fascist argumenta
tion as well. In 1936, the Peasant State was finally reduced nothing, when
Gheorghe Zane limited its purpose to the reconstruction of the national
economy after the Great Depression. Not even the term Peasant Democracy
seemed to survive the programmatic transformations. In his speech Mihala
che called his vision a “group democracy”, which he set against the present
(pseudo-) democracy of the ruling liberals and based his vision on the fol
owing principles: a) personal and social freedom and b) the importance of
collective versus individual interests. This vision had nothing in common
with a grassroot democratic network of peasant families.

The theoretical weakness of the Peasant State resulted in the failure of the
agrarianists to create a democratic alternative, which alone could have

47 Maner, Hans-Christian, Parlamentarismus in Rumänien (1930 - 1940). Demokratie im
48 Maner, Parlamentarismus, p. 304-305.
50 Zane, “Țărânsimul și organizarea Statului român”, p. 171-173.
51 Maner, Parlamentarismus in Rumänien, p. 305.
stopped the fall of the country into a fascist dictatorship. The question remains as to why the peasants turned away from democracy. Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu believed the Peasant Party to be a victim of a fragile democracy. In their mind, agrarianists failed to rapidly transform millions of rural peasants into self-conscious voters. In times when the rural electorate could not overcome its former passivity and refused to participate in the country’s politics, the defenders of democratic institutions could no longer withstand the authoritarian threat.52

Gellner and Ionescu wrongly equated political mobilization with democratization. In Romania reality moved into a totally different direction. It was not the Peasant Party which led the peasants into politics, but fascism itself. Their awakening during the world economic crisis did not hinder the breakdown of democracy, but instead furthered it. Electoral statistics show a growing maturity of the voters and a growing distrust concerning the democratic parties during the 1930ies. Both the National Liberal Party and the Romanian Peasant Party were threatened by the voters’ decreasing routine trust into their governmental power. In 1937 both of the more or less democratic parties lost the governmental majority for the first time in Romanian history. Under these circumstances the fragile democracy became so weak that king Carol II was able to establish the regal dictatorship just a few weeks later.53

The agrarianist integration of ethnic minorities into the agrarianist societal utopia, as well as the demand for a democratization and decentralization of the country might have calmed down many ethnic conflicts during the interwar period. A corporatist democracy became obsolete from the middle of the 1930s on, when the strongly polarized Romanian society did not resist the split between urban modernity and a rural traditional way of life any longer. When the world depression increased the poverty of the Romanian peasants, the first political steps of the lower strata of the population were directed against democracy and capitalism, and destabilized the poorly anchored young nation state. Romanian fascism, thus, was not just an overheated reaction against an ethnic mixture in which social frontiers overlapped with national seizures. The explosion of ethnic conflicts was the security regulator of a nation, which would have exploded without the regulator herself.

53 Maner, Parlamentarismus in Rumänien, p. 52.
Citizenship and National Identity: the Peasants of Galicia during the 19th Century

Kai Struve

Using the example of Austrian Galicia, the following article will discuss on how peasants acquired and actually performed citizenship in the political sphere, and which roles the changing and competing concepts of national identity had in their ability to participate in the political process. The paper will focus on the rights and the actual practice of peasant participation within the institutionalized processes of political decision-making, or more precisely, on the representation and participation of peasants in political movements and parties as well as in parliaments.

It will be argued that for the actual practice of the rights that, in principle, the peasants had held since the 1860s, the following were both crucial: the formation of a civil society, and a public sphere that included peasants.¹ The development of structures of a civil society and a public sphere was to a high degree identical to Polish and Ruthenian nation-building.² In the Polish case, the formation of a modern nation meant, in principle, the opening up of the early modern concept of the Polish nation (consisting of the szlachta, the nobility) for other social strata as well, especially the peasantry. The


Galician Ruthenians, however, became a modern nation through a transformation from a primarily religious identity into a national one. The Rusyny, as they called themselves (or in some regions also Rusnaky), were those who adhered to the rus’ka vira, the eastern rite. They were mostly peasants, their elite consisted mainly of Greek Catholic clergymen and they represented the majority of the population in eastern Galicia. The numbers of secular Ruthenian intelligentsia increased only towards the end of the 19th century; in earlier decades most of the Ruthenians who had acquired a better education began to consider themselves to be members of the Polish nation.3 During the second half of the 19th century, there were two more relevant options as to how to understand Ruthenian identity in national terms, i.e. as belonging to the Russian nation, or as belonging to a Ukrainian nation. For the Russophile of that time, the medieval Rus’, Orthodoxy, the contemporary Russian state, Church Slavonic, and the modern Russian language were all important points of reference for their nation-building project, while the Ukrainophiles created a standardized version of the vernacular language and referred to folk culture and cossack traditions. Compared to the rather elitist concept of the Russophiles claiming a Ruthenian national identity, the Ukrainophiles, or narodovtsi as they were called in Galicia, referred more strongly to the peasantry and their culture. Though both currents had different ideas about the national identity of the Ruthenians, they will be treated here as two competing orientations within one Ruthenian movement, one that asserted that the Ruthenians deserved equal treatment as one of the nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy.4

The paper will start with a discussion of the situation of peasants in the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its legacy for the relations between peasants and other social groups during the 19th century.

The early modern legacy and the changing image of the peasantry

A deep division between enserfed peasants and gentry landowners had developed in the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The noble

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3 Gente Rutheni, natione Poloni was a famous saying during the 19th century used to describe their national identity. The saying was ascribed to the 16th century philosopher Stanisław Orzechowski.
estate, the szlachta, monopolized the political rights and consequently only the szlachta, as constituted by the Commonwealth’s sovereign, according to the early modern understanding of the concept, as well as the Polish nation and its members, were considered to be citizens. This understanding began to change only at the end of the 18th century, during the political debates concerning a reform of the Commonwealth under the influence of Enlightenment ideas. These debates resulted in the Constitution of 3 May, 1791. However, the constitution itself remained ambivalent with respect to the terms “nation” (naród) and “citizen” (obywatel). In some paragraphs these terms referred to the landowning gentry, in others to all inhabitants of the state. Much more clearly, the latter Enlightenment concept of nation took hold then only in the ephemeral constitutional laws that were issued during the Kościuszko Uprising in 1794.

After the defeat of the Kościuszko Uprising in 1795, with the final partition the state disappearing, a definition of Polish national identity had to be found that was based more on history and culture than on state or estate. The new ideas of Romanticism contributed to the fact that Polish intellectuals discovered folk culture and the peasantry as one of the main pillars of Polish history and culture. While in the early modern period the peasants had been excluded from the nation, and even theories about the different ethnic descent of nobility and peasants became popular among the szlachta, in the 19th century the Polish national movement began to consider the peasants to be the basis and core of the existence of the Polish nation. The hope for the resurrection of an independent Polish state began to rest increasingly on a mass peasant patriotic uprising. This was especially true after the failure of the November Uprising of 1830-31.

However, the hope for a patriotic rising of the peasantry was to a high degree a contrafactual invocation. The depth of the divide between peasants and landlords and the peasants’ hostile attitude towards the aims of the Polish national movement became strikingly clear during the next Polish national uprising in 1846, this time in the Poznań region and in Galicia. In Galicia, the uprising ended in a kind of traumatic catastrophe for the Polish

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5 The fact that the Polish term obywatel („citizen”) could be used as a synonym for gentry landlords until the second half of the 19th century shows how strong this concept was within Polish culture.


7 Ziejka, Franciszek, Złota legenda chłopów polskich (Warszawa 1984); Cesarz, Elżbieta, Chłopi w polskiej myśl historycznej doby porozbiorowej 1795-1864. Syntyze, parasyntyze i podręczniki dziejów ojczystych (Rzeszów 1999); Brock, Peter, Polish Revolutionary Populism. A Study in Agrarian Socialist Thought from the 1830s to the 1850s (Toronto 1977); Kiciewicz, Stefan, The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry (Chicago 1969).
national movement, not because it was crushed, like in Poznań, by the partitioning power, but because of a jackson of mostly Polish speaking Roman-Catholic peasants in western Galicia that began as a fight against the Polish insurgents. The peasants brought the uprising down, except for the territory of the Free City of Cracow, within some hours after its beginning. Peasants killed the assembling insurgents, mostly landlords and officials of the manors, or delivered them to the Austrian authorities. But the peasant unrest did not stop at that point; it continued by plundering and destroying about four hundred manors and killing more landlords and their servants, altogether about one thousand people. Austrian officials in the districts of Tarnów and Bochnia, the core area of the jackson, had encouraged the peasants to defend the emperor against the complot of their landlords, but the real cause behind this massacre of Polish patriots by peasants was the strong social tensions between peasants and landlords. The peasants feared the re-establishment of a Polish state because they expected it to be the state of their landlords. Their memory of independent Poland, conveyed from one generation to the next, was one of landlord wilfulness and a lack of rights.8 By contrast, Austrian rule had brought the peasants a limited improvement of their legal status. Serfdom was abolished, some restrictions on the corvée introduced and, perhaps most important, some legal mechanisms, though not very effective, were implemented that allowed peasants to call state authorities and courts to protect them against the landlords’ infringements of their rights.9 One should not wonder that the peasants preferred the emperor’s rule to that of an independent Poland that their landlords wanted to re-establish. The peasants made use of the occasion of a breach between the two sources of power that prevented them from realizing their central interest, i.e. the abolition of the corvée and other feudal duties. However, during the following months the Austrian authorities started to force the peasants back to work on the estates with the help of the army as well as the massive use of flogging. The peasants failed to achieve their aim, but had thrown the Polish national movement into a deep crisis.

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Citizenship in a rush: The revolution of 1848

Despite the improvements in their legal status after 1772, peasants remained far from reaching any formal political participation, though some form of village self-administration was introduced that, nevertheless, remained to a high degree dependent on the landlord.10

The peasants’ exclusion from any form of political participation changed radically during the revolution of 1848. The political weight of the peasantry could be felt already in the initial phase of the revolution. The first and most important consequence of the revolution for the peasants was that the corvée was abolished and the peasants received full property rights to their farms. In Galicia, this step was announced earlier than in the rest of Austria because of a competition between the Polish national movement and the Austrian authorities for the support of the peasants. The Austrian governor Franz Graf Stadion wanted to anticipate the imminent declaration of the Polish national movement calling for an abolition of the corvée, and issued such a statement himself before a final decision was reached in Vienna.11

But the political relevance of the peasants also made itself felt in other spheres of politics in 1848. During the revolution, the Galician Ruthenians asserted for the first time their rights as one of the nationalities of the monarchy, and demanded equality with other nationalities, especially with the Poles. The conservative Greek Catholic church hierarchy was the only representation of the Ruthenians that initially existed. On 19 April, 1848, Greek Catholic dignitaries issued an address to the emperor declaring the loyalty of the Ruthenians. The Greek-Catholic church hierarchy in L’viv also took the initiative to establish the Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna Rus’ka Rada, HRR) as a representative body of the Ruthenian nationality, and as a counterbalance to the revolutionary Central National Council (Rada Narodowa Centralna) created by the Poles. However, neither the Ruthenian address of 19 April nor a declaration that the HRR issued on 10 May after it had assembled for the first time on 2 May included specific peasant interests or referred to the abolition of the corvée.12 In fact, the conservative, anti-revolutionary Greek-Catholic church hierarchy did not show much interest in

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10 The village communities could present three candidates for village mayor (Polish: wójt; Ukrainian: viiť) out of whom the landlord had to select one for the office. The communities also had to elect some “assessors” as members of the village administration “in agreement” with the mayor. However, the most important person in the village administration was the mandatariusz, who represented the landlord in his administrative rights and obligations towards the village, Rozdolski, Stosunki poddańcze, vol. 1, p. 168-173. The “plenipotentiaries”, whom the village communities had to elect as their spokespersons when they wanted to bring complaints against their landlords to the state authorities or to the courts, were more accurate representatives of the villagers than the mayors or assessors, Kieniewicz, Ruch chłopski, p. 46.
11 Kieniewicz, Stefan, Pomiędzy Stadionem a Goslarem. Sprawawłochańska wGalicji w 1848 r. (Wrocław 1980).
12 Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 87-88.
the social and political concerns of the peasantry. This changed when the Ruthenian movement spread to the province.

In contrast to the HRR, which had no peasants among its initially 66 members, peasants participated in the work of many of the Ruthenian Councils that were founded since May 1848 in provincial towns. Even more important, the Ruthenian peasants accepted the Ruthenian Councils as their representation and as an advocate of their interests. They flooded the Councils with requests for help in their conflicts with landlords or state authorities, and presented the Councils with the injustices they felt were injustices done to the Ruthenian people. They did this apparently in order to argue why the Ruthenian Council should intervene on their behalf. For the conservative hierarchy of the church and the conservative clergy it became clear that they had to take peasant interests into account in order to maintain the strength of the Ruthenian movement. Nevertheless, the HRR strongly opposed any unrest among the peasantry, occupations of estate land, or illegal logging by peasants.

Not all Greek Catholic priests shared the antirevolutionary attitude of the church hierarchy. There was a current among educated Ruthenians who sympathized with the revolution, and who wanted to move closer to the revolutionary Poles. But apparently those pro-revolutionary Ruthenians could not count on support from the peasants, who resented any cooperation with the Polish movement, which they saw as the movement of the landlords. Consequently, the revolutionary current among the Ruthenians remained weak.

In contrast to the Ruthenian Councils, the Polish National Councils (Rady Narodowe) could not mobilize any significant support from the peasantry, either in predominantly Ruthenian eastern Galicia or in Roman Catholic and Polish speaking western Galicia. The deep divide between the peasants and everything “Polish” which had become strikingly obvious in 1846 could not be overcome in 1848, either.

The elections to the Reichstag at the end of June 1848 allowed the Galician peasants the possibility, for the first time, of participation in political processes in a modern democratic form. The ballot rules were, for 19th century standards, quite democratic. Though women, landless cottagers, and to an extent also urban workers and other poor people remained excluded

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14 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. 33-35.
15 Kozik, Między reakcją, p. 50-52, p. 100-104.
from the elections, all others could participate with an equal vote. The election took place in two steps. In the first step, electoral delegates were elected who then, in the second step, assembled and elected the deputy to the Reichstag in a given district. Galicia could send one hundred members to the Reichstag, among them eighty-nine from rural districts. This provided peasants, in principle, with substantial influence and great possibilities of political participation. In the end, thirty-five peasants were elected, among them fifteen Ruthenians, but also fifty landlords and Roman Catholic priests or other members of the Polish upper classes, as well as eight Greek Catholic priests and two other Ruthenians. Forty-one of the Polish candidates had won their mandate in rural districts.

In many places the illiterate peasants did not really understand the procedure and the importance of the election, and refused to participate. Peasants feared a new intrigue on the part of the landlords and their officers who often staffed the electoral commissions. Roman Rosdolsky believes that only the peasants’ lack of understanding of the elections, manipulations, or fraud had allowed for the election of Polish candidates in rural districts. In any case, the peasants’ lack of understanding of the election and their inability to use this new possibility of participation in political decision-making should not be overemphasized. In nearly forty percent of the 89 electoral districts where peasants had a decisive vote, peasants were elected; some of the Greek Catholic priests and educated Ruthenians would also not have been successful without peasant support. Compared to the obstacles peasants had to face, this was no small achievement. This represented successful peasant participation in a modern political process and, therefore, a realization of the citizenship rights that the revolution had brought to them.

However, it is a different question as to which extent peasant deputies were able to pursue peasant interests in the Reichstag. They clearly articulated the concerns of their electorate, but, apparently, during the short period the parliament existed they were not able to acquire a position and forge alliances that would have given them real political influence.

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19 In the literature there are slight differences in the numbers because it is not possible to clearly assign all deputies to one nationality. For a discussion of the different numbers see Struve, *Bauern und Nation*, p. 95-96.


21 Peasant deputies were not popular either among the Polish or the Ruthenian “educated classes”. Both the Polish national movement and the revolutionary left attacked them as being only the “Stimmvieh” of the government. This accusation was clearly too simplistic. It should also be added that the upper class members of the Reichstag were rather reluctant to introduce procedures that would have allowed the peasant deputies to participate more efficiently in the
Peasant voting rights in the constitutional era

The defeat of the revolution in 1849 and the following phase of neo-absolutist rule in Austria ended all possibilities for peasants’ political participation (as well as, for the most part, the rest of society). The political organizations that had developed in 1848 could not continue their work. The HRR dissolved in 1851.

After 1848 and the abolition of the corvée, tensions between the peasants and the manors still remained strong, due to conflicts about the “servitudes”, the rights of peasant communes or households to use wood from forests and graze their cattle on pastures that the manors claimed as their property. In 1855, a state commission began its work in order to regulate this unresolved issue. Most of the contentious cases were finally decided in favour of the manors. As a result, the peasants lost most of their former servitudes or received only a small compensation in land or money. This resulted in anger and disappointment among the peasants, and led to a number of violent clashes and incidents when peasants tried to continue their former rights. Most of the cases had been finally decided by the commission or courts by the beginning of the 1880s, but some continued until 1895.22

Peasants received new possibilities of political participation only during the constitutional reforms of the 1860 that resulted in the constitution of 1867. In 1861 crownland diets were introduced. The electoral statute for the Galician diet that was adopted that year remained in force except for some minor changes until 1914, when a new electoral law was passed. The 150 (later 161) deputies were elected in four curia. The owners of estates voted in the first curia and could elect 44 deputies, and the peasants and other inhabitants of rural areas and small towns voted in the fourth curia that was represented by 74 deputies in the diet. The other two curias were that of the chambers of commerce and industry of Lemberg (Lviv), Cracow (Kraków) and Brody, and the third that of the cities. Only the elections in the fourth curia were indirect and public. Each block of five hundred eligible voters in this curia elected one electoral delegate, who then elected the deputy to the Galician diet. The right to vote was restricted to those persons who paid two-thirds of the tax sum in every community, beginning with the largest taxpayer.23 Though the electoral law was clearly less democratic than that of 1848, the predominantly peasant fourth curia nevertheless had a substantial influence, sending nearly half of the deputies into the diet.

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22 Himka, *Galician Villagers*, p. 36-56; Ślusarek, Krzysztof, *Uwłaszczenie chłopów w Galicji zachodniej* (Kraków 2002).
From 1873 onwards, the members of the Reichsrat were elected in a similar way. Here the fourth curia could elect 27 out of 63 deputies from Galicia. In 1882, a uniform census of five gulden was introduced in order to qualify as a voter in the fourth curia. In 1897, this was reduced to four gulden, and in the same year a fifth, “general” curia was created where no tax census applied and all male citizens above the age of 24 were eligible to vote. Fifteen additional deputies to the Reichsrat were elected in this curia; two of them in Cracow and Lemberg, the other thirteen in mostly rural electoral districts. Finally, in the elections to the Reichsrat in 1907 the curias were abolished, and all males above the age of 24 had an equal vote.  

The reforms of the 1860s also included village administration. Already in 1856 the administrative authority over the villages had been transferred from the landlords to the district commissioners (German: Bezirkshauptmann; Polish: starosta), the heads of the state district administration. The reform, which began in 1856, was finally codified in Galicia in 1866. This reform separated the villages from the territory of the manor itself (obszar dworski). The inhabitants of the latter remained under the authority of the landlord. In contrast, the villages received self-government. The village council, which that was elected every three and later every six years, elected the mayor (German: Gemeinderichter; Polish: naczelnik gminy, but usually referred to as wójt; in Ukrainian: viit) together with a number of assessors.  

Deficiencies of the village self-government were widely discussed in Galicia from its introduction until the First World War. The main problems were that the relatively small communes – many had less than 1,000 inhabitants – were unable to use the competencies they had for the benefit of their inhabitants due in part to a lack of education of the mayors, who at least in the first decades were often illiterate, and also in part because of neglect or fraud. However, the abilities of the village self-government in many communities improved, and the political skills and knowledge of the procedures the peasants acquired as village mayors or through other functions in the village self-government then became an important precondition for peasant political organization and successful peasant candidacieships in later years, both to the Galician diet and to the Reichsrat. Another area where peasants could learn political skills and procedures were the district councils that were active.

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26 See, for example, Kleczyński, Józef, „Życie gminne w Galicyi”, in: Wiadomości statystyczne o stosunkach krajowych 4 (1878), p. 97–279.
introduced in 1866, though the ballot rules for these representative bodies guaranteed a dominance of the non-peasant strata.27

In principle, the political reforms of the 1860s gave peasants, compared to earlier times, a wide range of possibilities of political participation and representation of their concerns and interests within the representative bodies of the constitutional state, despite all limitations. However, not only did it take many years or even decades until peasants learned to use the instruments of village self-government successfully for the improvement of their villages’ situation. It was also a long and intricate process for the peasants to be able to use their substantial political weight in the politics of the crownland and the empire effectively. This not only required seats in the parliaments, but also required a certain degree of inclusion in the structures of the civil society and the public sphere.

The displacement of peasants from the parliaments

In the first elections for the Galician diet in 1861, both peasant and Ruthenian candidates did remarkably well. In contrast to 1848, the number of village communities that boycotted the elections seems to have been small.28 In 1861, as in 1848, the voters of the fourth curia primarily elected peasants and priests. In mostly Polish speaking, Roman-Catholic western Galicia seventeen peasants, three Roman-Catholic priests, and seven landlords or members of the Polish intelligentsia had been elected. 47 of 48 deputies from eastern Galicia were Ruthenians, among them 18 peasants and 26 Greek-Catholic priests.29 As in 1848, the Polish elites were not successful in having their traditional dominance legitimized by the new institution of public elections. In eastern Galicia, where they were separated from the majority of the population by religious rite as well, they were totally defeated.30

However, in the following years the Polish elites succeeded in removing the western Galician peasants from the Galician diet, and in strongly reduc-

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30 Though the eastern Galician Ukrainian dialects were clearly more distinct from the Polish standard language than western Galician dialects, spoken language did not seem to have been a strongly divisive factor. However, written language and the Cyrillic script became a symbolic marker of Ruthenian identity for the national movement, and seems to have had such a meaning for broad sections of the society despite its high illiteracy, because of the connection of the script with the religious sphere, Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 378-381.
ing the number of Ruthenian deputies. Between 1876 and 1889 there were no peasants from western Galicia in the Galician diet (and from 1883-1889, no peasants at all). The number of Ruthenian deputies to the Galician diet was to 14 in 1876. In the Reichsrat elections of 1879, only 3 Ruthenian candidates received a seat, while 15 had in 1873.\textsuperscript{31}

One of the reasons behind the Polish success was a better preparation of the elections and a coordinated selection of Polish candidates. Before the elections of 1867, two Polish \textit{Centralne Komitety Przedwyborcze} (Central Pre-election Committees) for western and eastern Galicia had been established.\textsuperscript{32} They were dominated by the Polish conservatives, who primarily represented the landlords. But the mostly urban Polish democrats also participated in their work, because of a shared fear that the Polish predominance in Galicia could become endangered as a result of the strengthening of the Ruthenian national movement, and by peasants who had more trust in the emperor in Vienna than in the Polish “educated classes” in Galicia.

In contrast to later elections, in 1861 the district commissioners and other state officials maintained a relatively neutral position. In 1867, however, state officials already began influencing elections in favour of Polish candidates more strongly than before. Electoral fraud and corruption continuously increased during the following elections, and after the Polish elites had declared their loyalty to the Monarchy, Vienna then agreed to an informal autonomy of the Galician crownland in 1868. This informal autonomy placed the power in Galicia into the hands of the Polish conservatives, and provided them at the same time with an influential position in Vienna. However, the Polish conservatives needed supremacy in the Galician diet and among the deputies from Galicia in the Viennese Reichsrat, in order to maintain their influence as well as the delicate political construction of the informal Galician autonomy.\textsuperscript{33} The conservatives could rely on most of the deputies from the first, the landlords’ curia, but for a majority they needed additional seats that they could obtain in sufficient number only from the fourth curia.\textsuperscript{34} In view of the peasants’ widespread distrust and often openly hostile


\textsuperscript{33} On Galician autonomy and the negotiations before it could be implemented, see Christoph Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, \textit{Freiheit in der Unfreiheit. Die nationale Autonomie der Polen in Galizien nach dem österreichisch-ungarischen Ausgleich von 1867} (Wiesbaden 1993), p. 37-123.

\textsuperscript{34} For a still comprehensive discussion of the Galician conservatives, their different factions and their politics, see Feldman, Wilhelm: \textit{Stronnictwa i programy polityczne w Galicyi 1846–1906}, 2 vols. (Kraków 1907), vol. 1. Most of the newer studies focus on the intellectually
attitude towards the landlords as a result of the memory of serfdom as well as of the ongoing conflicts about the servitudes, apparently such a number of seats could be won only by corruption, pressure on voters, and fraud.

However, it seems that the decline of the number of peasant members in the parliaments during the 1860s and 1870s was also the result of a certain disappointment on the part of the peasant voters with the fact that the peasant deputies were unable to preserve the servitudes for them.\(^\text{35}\) In fact, the peasant deputies did not seem to have been very effective in enforcing peasant political interests. This was, on the one hand clearly a result of the unwillingness of the parliamentary majority to seriously account for peasant interests, but was also a result of a lack of education that prevented most peasants from acting successfully in the institutional setting of a parliament. In addition, peasants could not enter into stable alliances with representatives of other social groups or political parties because of different political priorities and deep cultural cleavages. Peasants not only mistrusted members of other social groups, but above all, the members of the other groups regarded peasants within the parliaments as inappropriate and compromising. This is obvious for the Poles, but pertains, though to a lesser degree, also to the Ruthenians. The Ruthenian peasant deputies were only loosely integrated into the Ruthenian clubs in the parliaments during the 1860s and 1870s and, for example, in autumn 1873 established their own club in the Galician diet together with Polish peasants. The direct cause of the split among the Ruthenian deputies was that the Ruthenian deputies from the intelligentsia refused to support a motion of the peasant deputies demanding changes of procedure in the servitude conflicts.\(^\text{36}\)

Apparently, peasant attempts to use their citizenship rights that they enthusiastically began in the 1860s had run into a crisis by the end of the 1870s. Nor could peasant deputies defend the servitudes or otherwise significantly contribute to improvements in the villages. They could not develop the necessary long-term political strategies or develop a sufficiently stable cooperation with representatives of other social groups and political movements in order to reach political decisions that would have benefited their voters.


\(^\text{36}\) On the peasant club in the Galician diet see Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 243-244; see also Chornovol, Ihor, Ukrainska fraktsiia halyshtskoho kraiovoho seimu 1861-1901 rr. (Lviv 2002), p. 77. For a more general discussion on the distance between the Ruthenian intelligentsia and the peasants in the sphere of politics during the 1870s, see Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 236-248.
Peasants and political parties

The first steps after 1848 towards a more active integration of peasants into both the Polish and the Ruthenian national movements and a reduction of the distance between peasants and intelligentsia began already in the end of the 1860s, when the constitutional reforms opened new possibilities for the development of a civil society. First, associations for the education of the “people” were established. However, most of the Polish initiatives failed after a short time, and began again only at the beginning of the 1880s. Since then they developed, especially after the turn of the century, into an increasingly dense network of associational structures that included growing numbers of the rural population within structures of organization and communication having a national profile. Significantly, only the Ukrainophile Pros-vita survived out of those associations that were established in the end of the 1860s. Later, it became the central organizational structure of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. Only some years later, in 1874, did a Russophile counterpart follow, the Obschestvo im. Mykhaila Kachkovskoho (The Mykhailo Kachkovsky Society, OMK).

They constituted in the following years the central organizational structures of the Ruthenian movement. The 1870s also saw the first more successful newspapers, usually bi-weeklies or monthlies, for the peasants, which significantly contributed to the inclusion of the villages in a transregional public sphere. While the Ruthenian intelligentsia and the Ruthenian papers always tried to mobilize the peasants for these associational structures, and also were politically in support of Ruthenian candidates, the Polish papers, in contrast, usually tried to reduce social and political tensions and to make the peasants accept the existing relations. The Roman-Catholic priest Stanisław Stojałowski, however, who in 1875 started to publish two Polish-language papers for peasants, Wieniec (The Wreath) and Pszczółka (The Bee), encouraged his readers to become active citizens and to organize themselves through self-help initiatives in order to improve conditions in the

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37 On Polish and Ruthenian associations in the countryside, see Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 139-190.
40 As to the Ruthenians, the papers Russkaia Rada and Nauka should be mentioned, edited by the Russophile politician and Greek-Catholic priest Ivan Naumovych, see Struve, Bauern und Nation, pp. 134-139. The most important Ruthenian paper of the 1880s, the Ukrainophile Batkivshchyna is analyzed in depth in John-Paul Himka’s seminal study Ukrainian Villagers.
He wanted the peasants to learn to use their constitutional rights while at the same time becoming Polish patriots. Initially, he rejected the strong peasant tendency to vote only for other peasants, and asked them to vote for candidates from other strata, but only for those whom they could trust, especially for priests. But he became increasingly critical of corruption and manipulations during elections as a widely used means to secure the victory of Polish candidates. His critical attitude towards these practices and his attempts to activate peasants politically and through self-help initiatives as well as his critique of the Austrian loyalism of the conservatives, brought him into conflict with authorities of church and state in Galicia, resulting in the loss of his wealthy parish near Lviv. From the 1870s on, he called upon the Polish electoral committees to actively integrate peasants, and to take their wishes for candidates seriously into account. Already in 1883 he suggested in his papers that peasants should establish their own electoral committees in those districts where Polish committees did not bother integrating them. But only during the campaign for the elections to the Galician diet in 1889 did he call up the peasants already from the beginning of the campaign to establish separate peasant committees, in order to choose their own candidates and to prepare the elections.42

In the same year the co-editor of the democratic Lviv daily Kuryer Lwowskii (The Lwów Courier), Bolesław Wysłouch, also called upon the peasants to establish separate electoral committees, and offered his support for their work. He started to edit a new journal for the peasants, the Przyjaciół Ludu (The Friend of the People), in order to support the election of peasant candidates in that year’s election to the Galician diet. In contrast to Stojałowski who during the 1870s had been one of the leading advocates of ultramontanism in Galicia and who saw his political activities as part of the Christian-social movement, Wysłouch was a man of the political left. He and the group of activists who supported the activities among the peasants represented a new current in Polish politics that appeared in the middle of the 1880s and placed on the one hand the “people”, the lud, in the centre of the concept of national identity and political activity, and on the other hand, criticised positivism, and demanded more active struggle for independence.43

41 He introduced, for example, the concept of Agrarian circles on the model of the Poznań region. See Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 148-152; Stauter-Halsted, The Nation in the Village, p. 115-127; on the Agrarian Circles movement in Galicia, see Gurnicz, Antoni, Kółka rolnicze w Galicji. Studium społeczno-ekonomiczne (Warszawa 1967); on Stojałowski also Kącki, Franciszek, Ks. Stanisław Stojałowski i jego działalność społeczno-polityczna, tom I (1845–1890) (Lwów 1937).
42 On Stojałowski’s political activities among the peasants, see Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 192-201. Stojałowski was an ambivalent figure; on his anti-Semitism see Bauern und Nation, p. 388-395.
43 Except for the Warsaw journal Głos, the journal Przegląd Społeczny, edited in 1886-7 by Bolesław Wysłouch in Lviv, was the most important organ of that new current. The milieu of Głos was the ideological cradle of the Polish national democratic movement, which in later decades became radical nationalist. Wysłouch’s activities, however, were decisive in the
Because for Wysłouch the peasants were the true Polish nation and the hope for a future resurrection of the Polish state could rest only on them, all national politics had to take peasant interests and the positive development of the peasantry as a starting point.\footnote{44}

In 1889, the success of peasant candidates in the elections to the Galician diet was still limited, but compared to earlier elections this nevertheless marked a significant change. Four peasants and one teacher were elected as candidates of peasant committees.\footnote{45} The number of peasant committees and peasant candidates had been larger. Also, in the following Reichsrat election in 1891, there was only one successful peasant candidate, but the number of peasant committees and the number of votes that peasant candidates could attract rose further. The breakthrough came with the elections to the Galician diet in 1895. In 11 of 26 western Galician districts candidates of peasant committees were elected, among them nine peasants and two members of the intelligentsia. In view of the strong effort of the conservatives and the Galician administration under governor Kazimierz Badeni to prevent the election of peasant candidates, this was an enormous success. The success was repeated during the Reichsrat elections in 1897, when nine peasant candidates were elected.\footnote{46}

The success of peasant candidates after 1889 was to a high degree the result of a joint movement of intelligentsia activists and peasants. Since the middle of the 1880s, circles of gymnasium and university students had been formed in many places as part of the new political mobilization among the youth. They went into the villages in order to educate the peasants and to win them for the Polish nation. In 1889 and later, they also helped to initiate and organize peasant electoral committees, and distributed the Przyjaciel Ludu and Stojalański’s papers. They were critical of the ruling elite’s loyalty and social conservatism. Many of them came from peasant families. Here the improvements in education and the extension of the network of

\textit{formation of the Polish peasant movement, the ruch ludowy.} While the national democratic movement finally imagined a disciplined, hierarchical nation that primarily should be fit for the struggle with other nations, the peasant movement took a much more democratic approach, and articulated the peasants’ social interests. On Wysłouch, see Brock, Peter, “Bolesław Wysłouch, Pioneer of Polish Populism”, in: idem, \textit{Nationalism and Populism in Partitioned Poland. Selected Essays} (London 1973), p. 181–211; Kudlański, Andrzej, \textit{Myśl społeczno-polityczna Bolesława Wysłoucha 1855–1937} (Warszawa 1978). On the Polish national democratic movement, see Porter, Brian, \textit{When Nationalism Began to Hate. Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland} (New York 2000).


\footnote{45} One of the peasants soon resigned from his mandate, apparently under pressure, in favour of a conservative landlord.

\footnote{46} While in the earlier elections Stojalański and the Przyjaciel Ludu had cooperated, in 1897 they competed with each other and most of the elected candidates were followers of Stojalański.
elementary schools and secondary schools became felt. At the end of the century in certain regions, the number of peasant sons who attended secondary schools was already significant.  

But the peasant movement also reflected the increasing ability of peasants to understand and use the mechanisms of modern politics. Peasants were increasingly unhappy about the appropriation of possibilities of political participation by people whom they did not trust. Networks of active peasants had developed which wanted to use the possibilities that the Austrian state offered them to represent their interests.

In 1895, Wysłouch and his followers created Stronnictwo Ludowe (The People’s Party) as a central organization of the peasant electoral committees. Stronnictwo Ludowe saw itself as part of and in a way as the avant-garde of the Polish national movement. In fact, by presenting the peasants as the true “core” of the nation they attacked the conservatives as being the representatives of landlords and szlachta, and as being unpatriotic because of a neglect of peasant interests. Peasant interests became national interests and, thus, the peasant movement’s concept of national identity challenged the political and social dominance of conservatives and landlords. The vision that a future independent Poland will be a “People’s Poland” (Polska ludowa) instead of the former “Gentry’s Poland” (Polska szlachecka) was able to overcome the fear and mistrust that many peasants still felt towards a re-establishment of the Polish state.

Around the turn of the century there was certain stagnation within the development of the peasant movement, and a certain decline in the number of seats in the parliaments. But after the Stronnictwo Ludowe became more radical under the leadership of the peasant son Jan Stapiński, and also due to a strong increase in political mobilization during the decade before World War I in Galicia in general, the Stronnictwo Ludowe (since 1903 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, The Polish People’s Party, PSL) also grew in strength. However, only the introduction of the new voting system for the Reichsrat in 1907, giving all males above the age of 24 an equal vote, brought the conservative rule into crisis. In western Galicia, the PSL now won more mandates than the conservatives. As a result of a complicated reshuffle of political relationships a political alliance between the western Galician Cracow

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47 Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 217-236.
48 The side of peasant activities is most clearly visible in the region of Nowy Sącz, where peasants after electoral successes in 1889 and 1891 established their own party in 1892, the Związek Stronnictwa Chłopskiego. At the beginning they closely cooperated with Stojalowski, but soon separated from him when the church hierarchy threatened the pious wealthy peasants who had formed the party, but also because of tensions with Stojalowski to whom they did not want to subordinate. See Gurnicz, Antoni, O „równej miarce” dla chłopów. Poglądy i działalność pierwszej chłopskiej organizacji politycznej w Polsce Związku Stronnictwa Chłopskiego 1893–1908 (Warszawa 1963); Szaflik, Józef Ryszard, O rząd chłopskich dusz (Warszawa 1976), p. 132-154; Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 205-217.
49 Molenda, Chłopi, p. 216-240.
conservatives and the PSL emerged, that continued until 1913. The Cracow conservatives shared power with the PSL, while the eastern Galician conservatives allied themselves with the National Democrats, because they opposed any compromises with the Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{50}

As a result, the PSL became, together with the Cracow conservatives and the democrats, a part of the “Governor’s bloc”, a kind of governing coalition. This alliance secured the PSL’s substantial influence in Galicia, but also in Vienna. Stapiński received the influential position of a vice-president of the Polish club in the Reichsrat. In 1911, a representative of the PSL, Władysław Długosz, became Minister for Galicia in the Austrian government.\textsuperscript{51}

After a long struggle against obstacles of different kinds in order to actually perform the rights of citizenship, peasants had acquired a share in political power. Apparently, this was only possible on the basis of a joint movement with the segments of the intelligentsia which created and maintained transregional structures of organization and communication.

While separate peasant parties emerged on the Polish side, in the Ruthenian case peasants acquired a larger role within the Ruthenian political structures. Since the 1880s, peasant interests had been increasingly prominent in political programmes, and peasants also participated more actively in political meetings and in the work of regional political associations.\textsuperscript{52}

After a steady decline of the number of Ruthenian deputies in the Galician diet, the elections of 1889 also marked a turning point for the Ruthenians. The number of deputies rose from eleven to sixteen. Among these were also two peasants, while there had been no peasants in the previous diet.\textsuperscript{53} Though in respect to the peasants sharing a rather humble beginning, the increasing role of peasants is more clearly reflected in the elections to the Galician diet in 1895, though not in its result. Only fourteen Ruthenian candidates were elected, among them two peasants.\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, the increasing peasant

\textsuperscript{50} The attempts to reach a compromise with the Ukrainians had their background in the rising tensions with Russia and the expectations of an imminent war. See Wendland, \textit{Die Russophilen}, p. 514-540; Bachmann, Klaus, \textit{Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Rußland. Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Rußland (1907–1914)} (Wien 2001).

\textsuperscript{51} However, the alliance with the conservatives was also a difficult and controversial reversal for the party, because it entered now into an alliance with the same political grouping that once had been its most important adversary. The tensions that arose from this move were aggravated by Stapiński’s increasingly high-handed leadership, as well as the charges of corruption against him, particularly in connection with Długosz’s nomination as Minister for Galicia. Among other things, the adversaries of the “Governor’s bloc” also used these problems in their campaign against Governor Michał Bobrzyński and his political alliance. They finally achieved his resignation in 1913 when the PSL also split into two parties. See Garlicki, Andrzej, \textit{Powstanie Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego Piast 1913–1914} (Warszawa 1966).

\textsuperscript{52} Struve, \textit{Bauern und Nation}, p. 248-256, p. 272-274.


\textsuperscript{54} A third Ruthenian peasant, Lazar Vynnychuk, was elected as a “government candidate”, but he later participated in the work of the Ukrainian faction. In fact, the size of his property resembled more a small manor than that of a peasant farm.
mobilization and participation became obvious in the large number of peasant candidates for the diet approved by Ruthenian electoral committees. While in 1889 peasants had appeared as candidates supported by Ruthenian committees in only four districts, in 1895 peasants were candidates in nineteen out of forty-two districts where Ruthenian candidates stood for election.55

During the following elections to the Galician diet in 1901, thirteen Ruthenian deputies were elected, among them four peasants. There was a slight increase in the share of peasants among the Ruthenian members of the Galician diet after the next election in 1908. Ruthenian candidates won twenty-one seats, and eight of these candidates were peasants. Nine of the candidates were Russophiles who enjoyed some support during the elections from the administration and Polish conservatives. There were eight peasants among the deputies, but only two of them can be counted among the Russophiles, while the other six joined the Ukrainophile club. Consequently, half of the members of that club were peasants. During the next elections to the Galician diet in 1913, the number of Ruthenian deputies rose sharply, but the share of peasants diminished. There were only six peasants elected out of 32 deputies. This clearly was not the result of a decline in peasant political activity. On the contrary, their political mobilization rose, and the density of the network of civil society institutions increased. Therefore, a diminishing share of peasants could be rather a sign of the peasants’ growing trust in other social groups.56

While peasants had an important share in Ruthenian deputies in the Galician diet, their share in the Ruthenian members of the Reichsrat was much lower. Only two of 49 Ruthenians who were elected to the Reichsrat between 1897 and 1911 were peasants.57 This may also indicate a diminishing distance between peasants and intelligentsia, because most of the peasants did not know enough German to be able to be efficient in the Reichsrat. If such criteria became more decisive than social identity, then this would also be a sign of peasants’ growing trust of other social strata within the Ruthenian community.

55 Struve, Bauern und Nation, p. 258-259. Actually, the elections in 1895 and 1897 proved to be especially difficult for the Ruthenians because of an unparalleled level of corruption and fraud, and because of a divide among the Ruthenians about the so-called “New era” politics, a cooperation with the government that had been started in the beginning of the 1890s, but had lost much of its initial support among the Ruthenians because of a disappointment with its results. See Chornovol, Ihor, Polsko-ukrainska uhoda 1890–1894 rr. (Lviv 2000); Levytskyi, Istoria, p. 235-272.


57 See Binder, Galizien in Wien.
Conclusion

The structures of a civil society and a public sphere in the rural areas that for the most part only developed after the constitutional reforms of the 1860s were national – either Polish or Ruthenian. They breached the isolation of the villages, and were included in networks of communication across regions and across classes. Though peasants participated actively in these structures, they were created and maintained by segments of the Polish and Ruthenian intelligentsia who had national aims, and who wanted to win the peasants over to the national movements. The language and fora they provided for articulating peasant interests were national ones. This can be understood not only as the intelligentsia spreading national messages among the peasants and raising or creating national self-identification, but also as a process where peasants who wanted to participate in these new structures, or who wanted to articulate peasant interests in the newly developing public spheres, had to do this within a national framework. This was encouraged and, in fact, peasants accepted such a framework sometimes enthusiastically (mostly the Ruthenians) and sometimes reluctantly, because reference to a national identity provided powerful symbolic resources in order to demand the recognition of peasant social and political concerns. In the Polish case, separate peasant political parties were organized that stressed their Polish identity and presented the peasants as the “core” of the nation. They challenged on this base the continuing political dominance of the szlachta and landlords in Galician politics. In the Ruthenian case, however, the dominance of the traditional gentry elite in Galician politics and society was challenged by demanding equality and a respect of the rights of the Ruthenians as a nation separate from the Poles.

As a result of the fact that there were no other languages or structures of organization and communication that allowed peasant to articulate and represent their interests in a modern political system than the national one, this increase in political participation was accompanied by an increase in national separation. The era of mass politics became the era of nationalism. The nation acted as a mediating institution in the empire to realize political participation for larger strata of the population, but at the same time it contained a more or less strong tendency which aimed at the dissolution of the empire. It helped to implement peaceful forms of conflict resolution within the constitutional democratic state, but at the same time the threat of the new violent clashes of the national era was already appearing on the horizon.
Agents of “True Emancipation”. Ukrainophile Ruthenian Cooperatives in Eastern Galicia 1904-1914

Piotr Wawrzeniuk

Galicia 1848-1914: History, economy, and demography

During the second half of the 19th century and prior to the First World War, the Austrian province of Galicia and Lodomeria\(^1\) underwent a great transformation. The peasantry, emancipated in 1848, faced the transition from a natural to a money economy, and, on the eve of the War, to capitalism. The same time saw the rise of nationalist movements – Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish – in the province. The demographic growth sharpened a bitter economic competition within and between the ethnic groups. The transformation encompassed more than economic and ethnic matters. As the nationalist movements gradually embraced the peasantry (and peasants embraced nationalist ideas), questions about participation in the public sphere and citizenship arose. As market-oriented production and interdependencies on the outer world increased, the traditional, deeply rooted beliefs of the rural society, the old local order of things, were placed in question. Tensions occurred not only between the ethnic groups or within them, but also within villages and production units as basic as the nuclear family.

In the processes mentioned above, the cooperative played a significant role as a prime mover of economic and societal change. This text examines a

\(^1\) Although first mentioned by Rus’ Primary Chronicle in 981, Galicia is traditionally understood as an Austrian province, Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien. It was absorbed into the Habsburg Empire as a result of the first partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1772 and expanded far beyond its original territory (the Ruthenian Palatinate in Poland-Lithuania) to encompass territory between the Zbruch River in the east and the area west of Kraków in the west. In 1910, Galicia had 7.9 million inhabitants. In the historical Galicia, in this text referred to as eastern Galicia, there were 62 percent Ruthenians, 25.3 percent Poles, and 8.2 percent Jews, while in Galicia as a whole, the three groups accounted for 42.9, 45.4 and 10.9 percent respectively; Magocsi, Paul Robert, “Galicia: A European Land”, in Hann, Chris; Magocsi, Paul Robert (eds.), Galicia. A Multicultural Land, Toronto 2005, p. 1-7; Hrytsak, Yaroslav, “Historical Memory and Regional Identity among Galicia’s Ukrainians”, in Hann and Magocsi (eds.), Galicia, p. 185-186.
few aspects of the ideas and practices of the Ukrainophile\textsuperscript{2} branch of the Ruthenian cooperative movement in eastern Galicia 1904-1914. The emphasis is placed on agricultural cooperatives. The ideas behind the founding of cooperatives, along with various practical aspects of the building up of a functioning network of associations, are examined.\textsuperscript{3}

In 1848, the peasants of Galicia were emancipated. In the long run, this move opened the door for peasant participation in politics and in the re-organisation of societal life from below. In the short run, however, this dramatic breach with over three centuries of institutionalized serfdom did not bring about a substantial material improvement of the lives of the peasants. Quite the contrary, during several formative, transitional decades, the new order shook the centuries-old foundations of subsistence.

If one considers the long duration and deep structures of the old system, one can certainly talk of shock therapy in the time after the emancipation. The changes that followed the enfranchisement brought economic shocks and deepened social conflict within the local peasant society, while the therapy – coping with the new situation, resolving the aroused problems, and seizing the possibilities – lingered on for a considerable span of time. Before the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the peasantry of Galicia experienced a painful discovery of the new money economy, and, just before the outbreak of the First World War, of capitalism.

In the years following emancipation, the manor owners were anxious to secure working hands by making the peasants economically dependent. In addition, an enduring, province-wide conflict about the right to servitudes – pastures and woods – occurred. Since the Austrian take-over in 1772, the landlords had been appropriating former peasant communal lands. Traditionally, these lands provided wood for fuel and construction, and pastures for the cattle. Once in control of the lion’s share of woods and pastures, the landlords viewed the peasant utilization of these lands as somewhat granted regarding the servitude carried out by the peasants. According to this logic, the favour would no longer be granted once the servitude itself ceased. The peasantry viewed access to the woods and pastures as an inviolable right they had enjoyed since time immemorial. In all of Galicia, the disputes over pastures and woods lasted over two decades after emancipation. Generally, such conflicts ended with the peasants losing time and money invested in the legal procedures and grievances, as well as their rights to the servitudes. Nor

\textsuperscript{2} By “Ukrainophile” I mean eastern Galician Ruthenian activists and institutions who believed there was a Ukrainian people who were linguistically, culturally, and historically distinct from Russian and Polish peoples and in the beginning of 20\textsuperscript{th} century formulated the creation of an Ukrainian state as a goal. Such a political entity should ideally encompass the entire Ukrainian ethnographic territory, but definitely eastern Galicia, Bukovyna and “Great Ukraine” – Ukrainian ethnographic territory under Russian rule.

\textsuperscript{3} For a more comprehensive presentation of the problem, see “The \textit{Ekonomist} and \textit{Samopomich}: tribunes of the cooperative cause” in this text.
did illegal occupations of the forests or sheer resistance by force help.\(^4\) Access to the servitudes could be granted – in exchange for labour on the manorial fields. Thus, the landlords tried to make certain that the new legal circumstances would not affect the old economic order.\(^5\)

In a region dominated by smallholder farms, the peasants strove to increase the acreage of the arable land, often by purchasing more land with money borrowed on the recently liberalized loan market. Many a peasant borrowed at exorbitant interest rates. Land was used as a security for the loans. This resulted in numerous forced auctions of the peasant farms and lands, as the debtors frequently were not able to fulfil their obligations towards the loaners. At the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century, there were 3 000 such auctions in the whole of Galicia.\(^6\)

Richard L. Rudolph has argued that the peasants of eastern Galicia became pauperized “to an extent not known elsewhere in the Habsburg monarchy.” Huge population growth, the under-employment of labour in agriculture, and an influx of industrial goods from abroad were features of the post-emancipation reality that had to be faced.\(^7\) The outcome of the legal struggle for the woods and pastures was a decrease of the total acreage of peasant land. The population growth in eastern Galicia (from 3.45 million in 1869 to 5.3 million in 1910) in combination with traditional inheritance patterns caused a fragmentation of the peasant holdings. According to custom, the land was to be divided among the children. Numerous smallholdings created in such a way were frequently insufficient to support a farmer and his family, let alone generate a surplus that could be invested in the modernization of agriculture. At the same time, there was only a limited supply of work for people who had insufficient land to support them, or even no land at all. The peasant children were to become peasants not only because of custom, but because there were few other alternatives. The level and the pace of industrialization were low. The number of small producers grew until more efficient production elsewhere put them out of business. Marginal productivity of the labour was zero in eastern Galicia, Rudolph claims. The labour was so cheap that the building of factories was impeded. At the same time, there was only a limited market for industrial goods, as the purchasing power of the majority of the people was very low.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) Himka, *Galician Villagers*, p. 38.


Stella Hryniuk has opposed a “gloom and doom” picture of eastern Galicia at the turn of the 20th century, and draws a picture of improvements in the literacy rates, agricultural production, and cattle breeding in eastern Galicia in the last decades of the 19th century. By 1900, there was a well-functioning transportation system in the region that enabled easier and more comfortable travel for the population and more effective transportation of the agricultural products from eastern Galicia to the outside markets.9

The emancipation of 1848 was a profound precondition for peasant participation in national politics. According to Himka, “without personal emancipation and mobility and without the weakening of the manor’s power in the village, the national movement could never have penetrated the peasantry.”10 The momentous reform lessened the dependency of the peasantry on the manors and created links to the central power, independent of the landlords.11

The constitutional reforms of the 1860s and 1870s in the Habsburg Empire constituted the second important precondition for the peasant entrance into, and participation in, politics. The all-Austrian constitution guaranteed freedom of association and introduced an elected parliament. Regional parties were allowed. While the former opened for the construction of various peasant organizations such as reading clubs and many others, the latter “forced the national intelligentsia in the city to undertake an effective propagation of the national idea among the newly enfranchised Ukrainian masses in the countryside.”12 This was of course also valid for the mass of Polish peasants in Galicia. However, the Polish nobility controlled the institutions of Galicia after 1868. Being socially just as alien to Polish as to Ukrainian peasantry alike, the Polish nobility was linguistically, ethnically, and religiously related to the former.

Galicia was a highly contested territory. It was seen as a “Piedmont” of not only Ukrainian but also Polish nationalism. The defeat of the Polish uprising in the Russian part of Poland in 1863-1864, along with the development of the constitutional framework of the Habsburg Empire and the virtual autonomy granted to the Polish administrators of Galicia after Ausgleich in 1867, made the conditions favourable. Further revolt was seen as pointless, and priority was given to organic, step-by-step work within the framework of the Habsburg Empire.13

The road from enfranchisement to political and national mass mobilization was not a straightforward one. It took several decades, and could only occur when a widespread mass of peasants linked an improvement of their

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10 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. 27.
12 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. xxiv; see also Kai Struve’s article in this anthology.
socio-economic situation to the national Ukrainian project. The organization of the reading rooms, temperance societies, and cooperatives (village shops, agricultural cooperatives, and other forms of associations) functioned as a catalyst of the rise of the mass national movement among Galician Ukrainians.

At the time of the emancipation of the serfs in Galicia, the Greek Catholic clergy and seminarians constituted an embryo of the national movement. The revolutionary events of 1848 in the Habsburg Empire in general and Galicia in particular, “left in its wake a nationally conscious intelligentsia, both clerical and secular.” In addition, there was a mass of emancipated peasants that could potentially be schooled into a national (Ruthenian/Ukrainian) consciousness. The Ruthenian Supreme Council (Holovna Ruska Rada) was created in order to channel the demands of the Ruthenian population. Although the members of the Council were recruited among the Greek Catholic clergy and laymen, peasants engaged in politics on an earlier unprecedented scale, and delivered twelve representatives to Vienna.14

Peasants soon began to formulate the landlord-peasant conflict in terms of a Polish-Ukrainian conflict. It was interpreted in direct and down-to-earth socio-economic terms. The peasants were often interested in the national movement insofar as it could bring about cultural and economic improvements.15

Within a few years, the Ruthenian Supreme Council’s authority waned, as it turned out to be toothless when it came to dealing with peasants’ grievances and petitions. Peasants turned their immediate attention to the emerging struggle over woods and pastures, facing the new legal and economic circumstances. However, national sentiments were awakened once again due to the long-time efforts of a group of activists who promoted nationally oriented newspapers and education in the Galician villages.

Servitude struggles turned out to be formative for many village activists. The need of education was realized, as the opponents in the struggle were often well educated, and were frequently lawyers. When the reading rooms were founded, there was a stress on education from the beginning.16 Generally, the reading rooms were “institutions that provided popular adult education with a national orientation.”17 According to Hryniuk, reading rooms played a great role in the dissemination of agricultural knowledge and education, which assisted in increasing agricultural productivity in the last years of the 19th century.18 However, the literacy rates were not encouraging – in

16 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. 52-55.
17 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. 86.
18 Hryniuk, Peasants with Promise, p. 101, p. 129-130, citation p. 130.
1890, ninety percent of the Ukrainian population in eastern Galicia and the neighbouring Bukovyna were illiterate. Ukrainian schools were generally of a lower quality than the Polish ones, and were poorly funded and overcrowded. The Ukrainian schools were also viewed as a threat to the existing patriarchal order, and found little understanding within the Polish-dominated Crownland School Council.19

From the end of the 1860s, renewed attempts were made to improve villagers’ education and propagate the ideas of self-help (shops, granaries, cooperatives) in the villages.20 The Ukrainophile Prosvita Society (founded in 1868) issued 348 titles (3 million copies) in booklet form between 1877 and 1914. During the same period, 305 titles in 2.5 million copies were distributed among the Prosvita reading rooms in Galicia.21 Its Moscowophile antagonist, the Kachkovsky Society (founded in 1872), published more than Prosvita during the first years of its existence, but it slid into decline during the last years of the 19th century. The competition between the Prosvita and Kachkovsky Societies boosted the number of publications and improved the quality of the printed matter. Both Societies encouraged the readership and the members of the reading rooms “to found cooperative shops, savings and loan societies and grain storage facilities.”22

*Ekonomist* and *Samopomich*: tribunes of the cooperative cause

In the beginning of the 20th century, the peasant masses of eastern Galicia, no matter their ethnicity, had to face in one way or another, matters of agricultural modernization, rationalization, and citizenship23. In the processes mentioned above, the cooperative played a significant role as a prime mover of economic and societal change.

The cooperative idea was used by various groups in Central Europe. This text concentrates on the ideas and practices of the Ukrainophile branch of the Ruthenian cooperative movement in eastern Galicia in the years 1904-1914. The first part of the text illuminates the logic behind the creation of the cooperatives and the ways in which Ruthenian activists in Lviv and regional centres facilitated the creation of cooperatives. The text reveals reasoning of the activists, and shows how their considerations were turned into practice.

22 Hryniuk, Peasants with Promise, p. 94-95 (citation p. 95).
23 For a comprehensive overview of the term “citizenship”, see the articles of Fredrik Eriksson and Anu-Mai Kõll in this anthology.
The second part is divided in two sections. The first section follows the growth of a few local cooperatives into a Crownland-wide Union that controlled a considerable number of dairy cooperatives. Who was allowed to join? What were the conditions of acceptance into the cooperative community? The second section identifies the groups of people who, for various reasons, were excluded from the cooperative project.

Two cooperative journals have been used. The *Ekonomist* was an economical-agricultural monthly issued by the Crownland Auditing Union (*Kraiievyi Soiuz Revizyinyi*). The journal first appeared in 1904. *Samopomich* (*Self-help*) was a supplement to the *Ekonomist*, but was designed to function independently, and could be bought separately. The first issue was published in February 1909. *Samopomich* was supposed to appeal to a wider audience and contained photos, drawings, poems, and short stories which were supposed to strengthen the Ruthenian morale.

The weak and underprivileged strike back. Advantages of the cooperative

The creation of cooperatives was described as a remedy to the ills suffered by Ruthenians in eastern Galicia. Cooperatives were the ultimate method to be used in fighting the oppression that had metamorphosed from feudalism to capitalism. “The rebelling peasant masses (Bauernkriege) have been replaced by the economic cooperatives.”

The peasantry was entering an era of peaceful, organized economic and social transition led by the cooperative movement instead of continuing along the old way of chaos and violence. The changes would be achieved with “weapons given to us by the current way of organisation, that is competition and freedom.”

The Ruthenians have been kept ignorant by aliens and by their own kind, the *Ekonomist* claimed. Although they officially enjoyed the same political rights as Germans, Czechs, or Poles, this was not true in practice. Ruthenians were too weak to claim and exercise their full rights in the way that the other peoples of the Double Monarchy did. Backwardness and oppression could be fought once credit, commerce, dairy, and other cooperatives were created. The Ruthenian institutions could improve the situation, as they practically “had functioned as our government”. This process should be initiated from below. Wilhelm Tell was proposed as a model, as he acted without “counseling, complaining, or singing” before taking action.

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24 *Ekonomist*, 1904: 12, p. 1. All issues of the *Ekonomist* used in this work are stored at the Stefanyk Scientific Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Lviv, number Ж 23763.
strong a stress on the cultural aspects of the national revival, and too feeble an inclination towards decisive action among the Ruthenian intelligentsia.

Rather than accepting the views imposed by capitalists, philanthropists, and the state, members of cooperatives should learn to conduct an independent life, and make people masters of their own lives. Hard work was needed. Thus, the Prosvita Enlightenment Society decided to engage in organizing Ruthenians in cooperatives, to battle low agricultural productivity and exploitive middle hands. There also was a fierce Polish political opposition to “true emancipation” of the Ruthenians, and an ongoing Polish colonization of eastern Galicia. The schools, the reading rooms, the saving banks, the economic cooperatives “each of our villages should be a link of the cultural chain that should encircle our whole nation in order to protect it from usury, to ensure it has access to cheap credit, and to rise its material and economic level.” A protective net would encircle the Ruthenians in eastern Galicia, and stimulate enlightenment and economic progress. Each link was to be a rampart of economic progress and national consciousness.

After 1848, the Ruthenians attained some political representation, and Ruthenian schools and university faculties were opened at the universities. However, the political struggle was not enough according to Samopomich. Among the best ways to strengthen a nation is economic self-help. The Polish lords had taken Ruthenian land, while commerce, manufacturing, and banking were also in alien hands. Economic power was entirely held by alien hands. The commercial, trade, credit, and manufacture middle-hands needed to be removed from the business. The land should be returned to those who toil it. However, “the alien exploiters” (Poles, Jews, Russians) should not be replaced by Ruthenian ones. The change was conceivable with help of the economic form of organization offered by cooperative. Three groups of people were clearly excluded: Poles, Jews, and Russians – all recognized as exploiters and aliens. Along with Ruthenians who engaged in trade or production as middle men, Poles, Jews and Muscovites were to be excluded from the cooperatives.

Cooperative was depicted as something natural, almost organic. In the beginning, there was a primordial, unconscious cooperation. It was corrupted by slave cooperation controlled, which was controlled by the great military realms, princes, and kings. Capitalistic cooperation succeeded it. It built upon total dependence of the workers on the manufacturer or estate/land

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29 *Ekonomist*, 1908: 12, p. 22.  
31 *Samopomich*, 1909: 3. Apparently, as “Muscovites” (Russians) are mentioned, the article refers to the action needed in the entire territory populated by Ukrainophones. In the article, the Ukrainian ethnographic territory is treated as one entity, with Galicia being a part of a larger all-Ukrainian context.
owner. The future belonged to a free cooperation which would encompass all spheres of life, with the motto “all for one – one for all.” Animals and people in primitive societies had always been interdependent and cooperated for joint benefit. Thus, a cooperative was a natural form of joint work, the editor noted. The image of the cooperative form of joint action was pictured as an organic, natural form of working towards a common goal. Cooperative was a suitable tool for the underdogs who individually lacked the means to transform their lives. They could only promote their goals if they acted as a group.

According to the journals, cooperation would bring about the true emancipation of Ruthenian peasants. Regrettably, the important economic matters had been largely neglected. The liberation from an economic dependence on Poles, Jews, or fellow Ruthenians who functioned as middle men on the market could be achieved only by the founding of cooperatives of various types. Cooperatives were viewed as a straightforward route to an economic mass emancipation that would strengthen the political position of Ruthenians. Cooperation was a tool of economic change, and as a natural, organic form of joint human work, an honest way of securing resources without falling into the pits of parasitism.

From theory to practice; from the centre to the regions

While the section above dealt mainly with the visions of cooperation as described by the cooperative journals, this part investigates how the visions and ideas were put into practice. A brochure published by Prosвита in 1904 explained the goals and importance of cooperatives. It also presented the model statutes of a cooperative form called “the Ruthenian People’s Home” (Narodnyi Ruskyi Dim). Cooperatives founded in accordance with RPH statutes could be created on the basis of one or several villages. Such cooperatives could buy, sell, and rent land on behalf of the members, and stock agricultural tools, synthetic fertilizers, grain, selected seeds, and various agricultural products for members’ needs. In addition, the cooperatives could refine and sell the aforementioned products, maintain model farms, and trade products and goods needed by the members. They could accept deposits for saving and grant loans to their members, and diffuse professional knowledge by arranging meetings, lectures, visitations, courses, and exhibitions. Various enterprises could be started by an RPH cooperative without the need for registering a new cooperative as long as such firms merely served the needs

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32 Samopomich, 1909: 3, p. 2-3, citation p. 3.
of the members. Several branches of economic activity could be gathered under one single organizational umbrella, it was argued.34

An RPH cooperative’s task was to gather inhabitants of one or several villages in one single association. The traditional, local community was used as a basis. The members would have the possibility of investing part of the profits in productive goals. Non-members should be excluded from the work of the cooperation. An RPH cooperation would also benefit from a tax reduction. People interested in founding such a cooperative were asked to contact the Crownland Credit Union, which would then send the statutes and forms needed for a successful registration.

Finally, more practical instructions such as where to go to register, the costs involved, and how to arrange a founding meeting in accordance to the statutes were all provided. Such a meeting would decide where the cooperative would be based and from which villages the members would be recruited. A council of the cooperative should be elected from among those present. The council should then choose three members for the cooperative’s management.35 The empty spaces in the statutes should be filled in. The members should apply for membership and pay their share. They were also expected to deposit their savings into the cooperative.36 After a cooperative was founded, CAU offered further tutorial and administrative assistance to the local cooperative activists. The practical advice and bureaucratic support mentioned above bore fruit. The Ekonomist reported sixty-nine cooperatives with RPH statutes at the end of 1907.37

In 1905, 72 of 100 various cooperatives registered by the Crownland Auditing Union were founded in 1900 or later.38 In August 1910, the number of member cooperatives of CAU was 390. 53 of those were of agricultural character. They were designed to deal with several aspects of agriculture: providing credits, consumer goods, or conducting dairy cooperatives. The number of cooperatives increased threefold between 1905 and 1910. The increase in the number of “purely” agricultural cooperatives was even more notable: fourfold, from 13 to 53.

The founding of cooperatives was supported in various ways from the central organizations. Model statutes could be provided along with a handbook and judicial and practical work. Thanks to the expertise of the Ruthenian activists at CAU, cooperatives created in accordance with the model statutes benefited from tax reductions. Ideally, the activity of a cooperation would encompass one or a handful of villages. As in most joint operations, participants were expected to pay shares. Needless to say, the requirement to buy shares and actively participate must have made membership for people

36 Ekonomist, 1905: 1, p. 15.
37 Ekonomist, 1908: 1, p. 9.
with few means cumbersome, if not impossible. There were two more aspects that limited admission to a cooperative: geographical and social. Limited geographical space not only created cooperatives of a manageable size, but also indirectly referred the members to the traditional bonds and loyalties in the locality.

A success story: Stryi Prosvita Section and the rise of Ruthenian dairy cooperatives

In this part of the text, the development of dairy cooperatives is highlighted. Dairy cooperatives developed dynamically and were viewed as an example to follow. They were also viewed as the forerunners of modernization and as a very crucial instrument in the shift from grain production to dairy production, cattle breeding, and horticulture. This shift was considered necessary because of the scarcity of arable land among the Ruthenians in Galicia. The work of the dairy cooperatives attracted intense attention from the journals, as these cooperatives apparently were considered a success story.

Frequent calls to organize the cooperatives “from below” suggest a different reality. Although there was a vivid interest in economic improvement among the peasantry, the activists had to channel it into manageable forms of work.

A half-anonymous letter writer, “Vasyl from Bizhkov”, claimed that any future organization that could gather the peasants “should organise its forces not from above, but from below.” The reality was often not as simple, and it turned out to be rather difficult to realize this ideal.

The examples of work by the activists give insights into the gradually planned and coordinated joint work by various Ruthenian organizations. In March 1904, the Ekonomist described the dynamic and well-planned work of the Prosvita section in the district of Stryi, a small town situated over 100 km south of Lviv. Questionnaires were sent out and conferences held to investigate which industry would be most suitable for the district. It was agreed that weaving and dairy farming would be the most fitting. Fourteen pupils who would become future teachers of weaving were sent to the Crownland School of Weaving in Łańcut.

The supply of arable land was scarce in the Stryi region (it is situated in a highland area on the foothills of the Carpathians), while the supply of pastures was good. Conditions were good for dairy production and cattle breed-

39 For instance, two turf cooperatives were founded in the villages of Perehnyiv and Hriada (Ekonomist, 1904: 16); a dairy cooperative was founded in Zavadiv, headed by father Ostap Nizhankovsky (Ekonomist, 1904: 11, p. 16); and another peasant (selianska) dairy cooperative was created in Myshynia close to Kolomyia (Ekonomist, 1904: 8, p. 23).
40 Ekonomist, 1904: 8, p. 12.
ing. However, Ruthenian dairy producers lacked the skills for the proper handling and processing of milk. German colonists dominated the local market. According to the organizers, the foundation for successful dairy production by the Ruthenians could be laid by teaching them about the proper ways of handling the cattle and milk. In order to meet these needs, a conference was organized in Stryi and included participation of Mr. Biedron, a former dairy teacher, and Mr. Harasevych, who had learned dairy techniques in Denmark and who had worked on dairy farms abroad. It was agreed that the Prosvita section in Stryi would organise the dairy business “for the time being”. Lectures on dairy farming and courses about the practical aspects were in high demand in many villages.

A central dairy would be created in Stryi, supported by smaller local dairies that would mainly deal with the separating of cream. The central dairy would engage in the production, distribution, and sale of butter. Finally, local Ruthenians needed to obtain appropriate schooling, so that the local dairies and the central dairy in Stryi could be managed efficiently.41

Several lectures on dairy production were held in February and March 1904. All sections of Prosvita should follow the example of the Stryi section, the Ekonomist concluded. The time for action was ripe “if we want to be a living nation.” 42 The Stryi section was presented as an example of how Prosvita sections could successfully deal with the technical aspects of the agricultural work by inquiring about the situation in a region, and by providing professionals for lectures and discussions with the peasants etc.43

In 1905, the Stryi section of Prosvita reported that several cooperatives were founded in the region. The demand for, and sales of, butter were very good thanks to its high quality. The note ended with a rhetorical question which was supposed to spur other Prosvita sections to follow the Stryi example: “Does Prosvita Society not have more sections in Galicia?”44

Father Nizhankovsky, who took part in the organizing of many cooperatives, would not leave any details unattended. A founding of a future cooperative should be preceded by a distribution of literature, lectures, courses, and general information. 45 Apparently this was being done with a great deal of success in the Stryi district.

In 1905, further expansion of the dairy cooperatives was halted, as there was a need for lectures and information, and a lack of ice-making facilities was felt. Inspired by the Stryi section, the Rohatyn and Berezhany sections of Prosvita sent people to the dairy cooperatives in Stryi District to learn and the bring back the knowledge to their home districts.46

41 Ekonomist, 1904: 3, p. 20.
42 Ekonomist, 1904: 3, p. 21.
43 Ekonomist, 1904: 7, p. 23.
44 Ekonomist, 1905: 2, p.16.
46 Ekonomist, 1905: 5, p.15.
In September 1905, the Stryi section of Prosvita opened a technical Dairy Bureau. Its task was to distribute the dairy machines and tools needed for the production of butter to all cooperatives both in the Stryi district and throughout Galicia.\(^47\) In the same month, the Crownland Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives in Stryi (Kraievyi Union Ruskykh Molocharskykh Spilok v Štryiu, from now on referred to as “the Union”) was created. Its ambition was to gather all Ruthenian dairy cooperatives into one single structure. At the specially created bureau for the selling of butter, people interested in the dairy business could consult a special commercial clerk.\(^48\) The Ekonomist viewed the Union as the main vehicle of the rationalization of agriculture, with a re-orientation from grain to dairy production as the main task.\(^49\)

During this time, other cooperatives within the agricultural sphere were started, frequently with a Greek Catholic cleric as the architect. The list of Greek Catholic clergy engaged in the formation of cooperatives was lengthy.\(^50\) The extraordinary role played by Nizhankovsky in the development of the dairy cooperatives in the Stryi region is perhaps the most illustrative example of the importance of the Greek Catholic clergy for the growing cooperative movement. Peasants were often organized and helped by the traditional village authority – the priest.\(^51\)

The cooperative dairy business continued to expand in the Stryi district and in other parts of Galicia. Interest in dairy cooperatives spread rapidly in the southern parts of eastern Galicia. In 1906, the Ekonomist reported on the founding of new cooperatives in the Zhydachiv, Drohobych, and Kolomyia districts.\(^52\)

The Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives had a wide range of activities. The Union’s ambition was the diffusion of professional information about the dairy business and to help start new cooperatives by sending an instructor. In addition, the Union would supervise the work of the cooperatives by sending controllers. When possible, it would help to find a market for butter. The Union had stored dairy machines and various dairy tools and instruments, and placed people who intended to engage in the dairy cooperative business at the already-existing cooperatives so they could practice and learn. The Union provided written information in 150 cases, for private persons and for reading rooms and associations. Fathers Nizhankovsky and Borachyk were frequently sent as the representatives of the Union to the meetings of the member cooperatives. Dairy instructors employed by the Union supervised numerous cooperatives, working between one and three days at each dairy.

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\(^{48}\) Ekonomist, 1905: 11, p. 15.


\(^{50}\) Ekonomist, 1905: 11, p. 16; 1905: 4, p. 16; 1905: 5, p. 16; 1905: 8, p. 16.

\(^{51}\) Himka, Galician Villagers.

The Union was in contact with several state and provincial organizations. It promised various forms of support and advice if a cooperative became a member of the Union. Obviously, the Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives swiftly developed into a dynamic organization that enabled and facilitated the work of the dairy cooperatives in large parts of eastern Galicia. It offered support to people who intended to found cooperatives, and provided professional advice and practical support to the cooperatives already on the market. Its function thus had double importance. The Union functioned as a supervising, co-ordinating organization and as a prime mover of transformation, modernization, and adaptation to the market of the regional Ruthenian agriculture.

Coping with growing pains

With time, the period of expansion of the Union was succeeded by a time of evaluation, deliberation, and change. Expectations as to the members and the standard procedures upon creation of the cooperatives were presented. The guidelines of how to found and maintain a financially sustainable dairy cooperative were formulated. There should be enough members to secure a daily supply of milk from one hundred cows or a daily supply of two hundred litres. If not, the income of the cooperative would entirely be eaten up by the costs of the employment of the dairy worker, the acquisition of the machines, and administration. If there were a satisfactory number of candidates in a village, a meeting should be summoned. All those who gathered should deliver all of their milk to the dairy cooperative, except for milk used for household needs. Such a text should be placed on the top of a paper, while below, there would be a table stipulating the names of the signers, the share invested by them, the number of milk cows they owned, and their signatures.

After the document was signed and completed, an application would be sent to Stryi. Then the Union would send its delegate to the pending dairy cooperative. On that day, a general meeting would be summoned with several fixed tasks: 1) the opening of the meeting; 2) the formulation of the statutes of the cooperative; 3) an election of the board direction and the supervising council; 4) a decision about location of the dairy cooperative; and 5) the question of employment of a dairy worker. The delegate of the Union would send the documents compiled at the meeting to Stryi. The Union would then make arrangements for the legal registration of the cooperative.

54 Ekonomist, 1908: 7, p. 10-11.
A dairy cooperative worker candidate would be sent to practice at one of the Union’s dairies for a period of 2-3 weeks. The worker or his future employer would pay.

The Union would deliver the machines needed for production. The more ready cash a cooperative could pay, the lower the price. The butter should be delivered to Stryi for distribution to the Union’s shops. People who were “Ruthenians at heart” and cared for the wellbeing of the nation should found dairy cooperatives, the Ekonomist commanded.55

In the 1st issue of the Ekonomist in 1909, the Union stated that its main income came from functioning as the middle man in the sales of dairy machinery and the products from the member dairy cooperatives. The Galician Diet (Sejm) granted the Union a subsidy of 3000 Kronen. The central government in Vienna added 15400. Four hundred Kronen of this sum was reserved for the forthcoming agricultural exhibition, 2000 for the publishing of a professional dairy cooperative journal, and 13000 for the purchase of dairy machines and subventions to the member dairies.56

Information about the annual meeting of the Union in 1910 gives an idea of the dynamic development of the organization and the problems it faced.57 The meeting presented the Executive Council with several urgent issues to be dealt with. Only member cooperatives which signed a document obliging them to deliver butter solely to the Union or its appointees would be granted credit for the acquisition of machines and other products. The same rule would apply to the cash credits from the Union. Cooperatives that broke these regulations would face exclusion from the Union as well as the withdrawal of credits from the Crownland Credit Union. Apparently there were several cooperatives that used the Union in Stryi merely as a source of cheap credit and know-how, and were not directly interested in the construction of the Ruthenian, nationally conscious and economically solid, cooperative body. The cooperatives that were members of the Union only formally but did not maintain commercial relations with it should establish such relations prior to 1st August 1910. The Direction of the Union was instructed to examine the local relations in these cooperatives, and to take the steps it deemed appropriate. Cooperatives which sold butter to other parties than the Union would be fined with 40 Kreuzer per 1kg of butter. A veterinarian was needed to examine the cattle that had recently purchased in large quantities by the members. Supervision of sanitation matters also called for a veterinarian’s skills. Arrangements needed to be made to locate a financial institution that would grant the Union a current account, so that the payments for the butter would reach the members quicker. The member cooperatives declared themselves to be satisfied with the work of the Union. The meeting condemned

55 Ekonomist, 1909: 7, p. 11.
56 Ekonomist, 1909: 1, p. 29.
57 Ekonomist, 1910: 8/9, p. 207.
all attacks (unfortunately not clearly referred to) against the direction of the Union as “acts of personal prejudice with detriment to the Ruthenian dairy cooperatives.” Information about the massive purchase of cattle among the cooperative members and the growing numbers of the member cooperatives of the Union certainly suggest a period of increased confidence in the future, and a time of growth, expansion, and network building of Ruthenian economic institutions on a regional level.

At the end of 1909, the Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives had two hundred members. The number had doubled compared to 1908. These numbers included 77 cooperatives and other institutions, while the remaining members were private persons – 71 belonging to “lay intelligentsia”, 36 priests, and 16 peasants, who accounted for 123 non-cooperative members. The non-organisation members strongly outnumbered the number of the organizations, which were presumably mostly dairy cooperatives. What also is striking is the tremendous growth of the number of the cooperatives, which rose from 17 to 77 in merely a year. Such a number of organizations called for increased discipline, supervision, and intervention from the side of the Union. At the same time, one finds that the cooperatives were a minority in the Union, while the majority of the members were characterized as “lay intelligentsia” or clergy. Even if one added the number of (one may presume) nationally conscious peasants – sixteen persons – to the number of cooperatives, the balance would still be 107 to 93 in favour of the traditional elite of the Ruthenians. This indicates that the movement still needed support, or was considered to need it, from the side of the patriotically-inclined intelligentsia and priests who economically supported the cooperative movement. These numbers also suggest that Ukrainian agricultural cooperatives in eastern Galicia indeed still were a “from above” project, as indicated earlier in this text.

At the end of 1910, the Union had 235 members. It generated a profit of 2291.06 Kronen in 1910. The Ekonomist found these results even more impressive, as the work had been accomplished by Ruthenians alone, despite the obstacles created by the “aliens.”

This part of the text examined the creation of dairy cooperatives on the local level and their expansion into a Crownland-wide organization – the Union of Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives in Stryi. The role of persons with no peasant affiliations, such as priests (traditionally a person of trust and authority) and so-called lay intelligentsia was important. The mission of these people seemed to have been twofold: to improve the situation of the peasantry by satisfying their most urgent economic needs, and to incorporate them in the national movement. The initiative seems to have come “from above”, as most of the dairy cooperatives mentioned in the journals were created on the

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58 Ekonomist, 1910: 8/9, p. 207.
59 Ekonomist, 1911: 1.
initiative of the local reading room under the patronage of the Prosvita Society. The initiative emanated from Lviv and from the regional centres such as Stryi, Rohatyn, and Berezhany. It emanated from the Crownland level to the regional level, rather than to a local level. The number of lay intelligentsia and clergy members of the Union points at the fact that the movement was considered to be in need of support. It also suggests that the cooperative movement was still mainly a project of the Ruthenian elite in eastern Galicia.

This was an “organic”, patient, step-by-step, and vertically-directed procedure that started with an investigation of the local conditions. The activists provided the peasants with manifold help. Representatives and instructors from Stryi were sent to supervise the first steps of the dairy production. With time, the Stryi region’s cooperatives united under the umbrella of the Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives, whose ambition was to gather all Ruthenian dairy cooperatives. The Union sold and distributed dairy machines; it bought, distributed and sold butter; it provided information to the villages where dairy cooperatives were planned and gave advice and practical help to member cooperatives. The Union provided loans for the member cooperatives. In a rather short time, there was a notable expansion, from a handful of local cooperatives to a cooperative organization at an all-Galician level. The activities of cooperative activists in the Stryi district also apparently inspired the Ruthenian activists in neighbouring districts such as Drohobych, Zhydachiv, Rohatyn, and Berezhany.

Threats to cooperation: irrational and superstitious women

The cooperatives faced other obstacles than those which had to do with economics or with faltering loyalty. Sparks of obstruction were inherent in the traditional Carpathian folk beliefs, the traditional male and female spheres in the agricultural society, and the gendered division of labour and income on the farm. In 1909, Samopomich monitored some of the problems facing the dairy cooperative in the village of Liakhivtsi. The first dairy cooperative in the Bohorodchany district was created in Liakhivtsi, and the village had 2400 inhabitants, who mainly lived off of agriculture and cattle breeding. There were smallholders and the landless, too, who often made their living from part-time farming and additional work such as transports using a horse and carriage. There were many horses in the village – over 400, while there were 2000 horn cattle, including 450 cows.\(^{60}\)

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\(^{60}\) Samopomich, 1909: 7, p. 1. The author, the signature O. O., refers to the stories published in Samopomich about the development of the dairy cooperatives in Berezhnytsia Shliakhotska (1909: 5) and Bodnariv (1909: 6).
Horses and oxen received most of the attention, while cows were somewhat neglected. There were 1000 morgi of pastures\(^{61}\), but they were in bad condition. Liakhivtsi was considered to be one of the most “enlightened” villages in the Bohorodchany district. There were two reading rooms of the Prosvita Society, and a section of the Sich Society.\(^{62}\) However, the members were only recruited among the male population, while the women of Liakhivtsi were “terribly neglected” and were drowning in “darkness and superstition.” One could usually foresee several obstacles when a dairy cooperative took its first steps, but in Liakhivtsi the problems occurred because of the beliefs of the village women and their fear and distrust of the machines. The women believed in the old saying “farmer, know your farm, but leave the pots alone”. The superstition that surrounded milk production was “ridiculous and terrifying”, the editor wrote. One finds a clear line drawn between the village men, whose activities were synonymous with “enlightened” behaviour, and the village women, who were branded as backward and as adverse to progress. One also finds a definition of what “enlightened” meant to the reporter. It was defined as an active membership in patriotically inclined cultural and economic organizations. In this case, however, “enlightenment” had not yet yielded a thoroughly rational utilization of the resources of the villagers. Several among the village men were interested in short-term gains from transportation of timber, while the women were not even guided by economic considerations, but instead by “superstitious” beliefs.

The witch was the greatest enemy of a farmwife (gazdynia). Any village woman could become a witch, leaving her house and flying out through the chimney at night to milk another farmwife’s cows. The cows lost their milk because it would immediately be passed to the witch’s cows.\(^{63}\)

A farmwife could also “provide a reason” for milk to dry out, for example if milk from one’s own cow was mixed with someone else’s cow’s milk. Then the cow would cease to produce milk. Nor was letting somebody else’s cow drink milk from one’s own cow wise. Several people demanded that the dairy worker pour processed milk on the village road rather than having such milk be redistributed among the cooperators.

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\(^{61}\) 1 morga was equivalent to 5600 m².

\(^{62}\) Sich Society was a patriotic sport organization under the patronage of the Radical Party, active in the first two decades of the 20th century. Its main goal was to improve and cultivate the physical and moral spirit of the nation. Sich Society organized demonstrations and sport events on a local, regional, and all-Austrian level; Dovidnyk z istorii Ukrainy (Kyiv 2001), p. 756-757. On the eve of the First World War, Sich Society and its politically less radical equivalent, Sokil Society, increasingly gained a paramilitary character, and functioned as an important recruiting ground for the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen Division that fought in the Austrian Army during the War, and against the Poles in the West Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918-1919; see Struve, Kai, Bauern und Nation in Galizien. Über Zugehörigkeit und sociale Emanzipation im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen 2005), p. 285-288.

\(^{63}\) Samopomich, 1909: 7, p. 2.
The founders of the cooperative certainly knew about these beliefs, but claimed not to care about the “superstition of old women” (babski zabobony). However, propagation for the cooperative cause among the village women bore no fruit. To make the matters worse, Jews who earlier had functioned as middle men in the trade dairy products campaigned against the cooperative, as they saw their earning potential slipping out of their hands.

There was another problem concerning the village women. Traditionally, the income from the sales of the dairy products (along with eggs and hens) could be spent by a gazdynia in accordance to her will. It was the sole source of income under a farmwife’s control. However, the farmer (gazda) collected the monthly return from the cooperative. This seemingly “ridiculous” reason, the editor wrote, increases in importance if one considers that the farmers often claim to, or exercise, full control over the farm’s liquid assets.64 This probably occurred on every farm, but occurred at least on each second farm, the author estimated. Several women refused to deliver milk to the dairy because they disagreed with their men as to who should collect the payment.65

Farmwomen continued from time to time to appear as a problem in the journals. Apparently the unwillingness of the women to give up the income was long-lived. In 1910, Samopomich reported that women hampered the development of a dairy cooperative in Dolyna District.66 In 1914, Samopomich complained that “not all of our farmwives know about the advantages of the dairy cooperatives.” Thus, cooperatives had yet not been “introduced everywhere”. The hardest task, however, was to convince the women that butter produced with home methods was of poorer quality than the butter produced at the dairy cooperative, and that such butter would give a meagre price compared to the price of the butter produced with modern methods.67 Thus, there were several obstacles to the fruitful development of the village dairy business (understood by the activists as gathering in one single cooperative and working jointly in accordance to rational and modern methods).

There was a tendency among the men to go for quick gains rather than to dedicate themselves to long-term efforts. This resulted in the favouring of the horses, the animals that brought an income from timber transports. Cows were neglected and malnutritioned as the result of horses having access to the best fodder. In addition, the village women were considered to be superstitious and were anxious to retain their traditional income from dairy products, the income that now was being claimed by their men.

This section of the text found that the growth of dairy cooperatives could face several obstacles. As the shift from grain production (traditionally male-

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64 Samopomich, 1909: 7, p. 2.
65 Samopomich, 1909: 7, p. 3.
67 Samopomich, 1914: 3/4, p. 3.
dominated) to dairy production (traditionally female-dominated) continued, controversies over scarce resources increased. Traditionally, the farmwife retained the income from the “female” sectors of the farm, such as dairy production, poultry and petty animals. Now, the men claimed their traditional economic authority as husbandmen to collect the income of the farm. In addition to this prevalent folk beliefs and taboos concerning the handling of milk made a switch to modern dairy farming problematic. Although several men favoured the manly coded horses, depreciated the nutrition of horn cattle, and pursued what the editors viewed as short gains, they were not seen as backward. Women, however, were mostly depicted as backward and superstitious, while men generally were described as “enlightened.” In being depicted as an obstacle to successful rise of the cooperatives (and thus, indirectly, to the patriotic cause), women were being eradicated from the positively coded field of modernization, reserved for the “enlightened” and “rational” (and therefore patriotic) and frequently land-owning men. This process was not typical for Liakhivtsi and the Galician Sub-Carpathian regions, but was a part of an European current. More often than not, the gendered division of labour was renegotiated and re-evaluated in accordance to the shifting market situation. This process occurred as the spheres formerly reserved for women (earlier regarded as rather insignificant or a complement to the tasks of men) gained more attention from the rural society because of their growing significance for the market.68

Ethnicity and exclusion: Groups potentially dangerous to cooperatives

From the late 19th century, Galician villagers, artisans, small-shop keepers, and a growing number of industrial workers felt the growing impact of the money economy and the market. The possibilities of earning a living decreased while competition for the all-scarcer resources hardened. This process lead to growing tensions between the national and ethnic groups of the Crownland. The mass-migration from rural to urban areas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries further sharpened the competition between Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews.69 According to Anna Weronika Wendland, the public sphere in Lviv during several decades of the late Habsburg rule “strengthened communication inside a national group without necessarily leading to mono-

lithic identities and mutual exclusion between groups.” However, the atmosphere was gradually “poisoned” by the increasing Polish-Ukrainian conflict.70 Although one may question whether the relations really were so cordial, there is no doubt that the inter-ethnic relations on the eve of World War I seriously deteriorated. Inevitably, such an “atmosphere” also had an impact on the economic visions and ways of action of the different competing ethnic groups.

The term “economic nationalism” has frequently been used to describe a certain set of conditions in Central Europe. Most generally, it has meant economic mobilization along ethnical lines. On the state level, economic nationalism often influenced government economic policy. Such measures, if directed inwards, could mean a favouring of the majority ethnic group, for example by supplying a legal framework that curtailed the economic activities of the minorities and favoured those of the majority (cheap loans, etc). The outward economic measures inspired by economic nationalism could mean state protectionism such as tariffs and custom fees on imports, and limitations or bans on the export of certain goods.

The call “each to its own kind” instructed an ethnic group to buy only at the shops owned by one’s own ethnic group (where, ideally, only goods produced by one’s own ethnic group were sold). The universality of this urge in Central Europe before the First World War and between the wars is obvious. The phrase exists in German, Czech, Polish, and Ukrainian.71

As the Ekonomist and Samopomich were the official organs of the Crownland Auditing Union, they mirrored the organization’s view of the other main ethnic and political groups: the Poles, the Jews, and the Moscow-philes. One finds information about why these groups were considered detrimental to the Ukrainian national cause in Galicia, and why the cooperation with these groups was to be restricted.

The theme of Polish and Jewish opposition to, and obstruction of, the improvement among the Ruthenian peasants was one of the main themes of the articles where other ethnic groups were commented. However, the motives of Poles and Jews for the actions considered as anti-Ukrainian were different. German historian Kai Struve has claimed that the main goal of the Ukrainian national movement in the end of the 19th century was to “realize equal rights with the Poles, both the Polish and Ruthenian intelligentsia saw a direct economic threat in the Jews who occupied most intermediary functions in the rural economy.” Jewish usurers and tavern keepers were held

responsible for the poor economic and health conditions of the Polish and Ukrainian rural populations.\textsuperscript{72}

“What do we do to liberate the people from the economic dependence on the Poles and their accomplices, the Jews, and protect them from de-nationalization and spiritual corruption?” – the author of the article “Cooperation and education” asked. He scrutinized and commented on the activities of the Ukrainian educational organizations in the sphere of cooperation and agriculture.\textsuperscript{73} Later in the same issue, it was found that “economic slavery is the reason behind political and cultural slavery.” The economic organisation was seen as the beginning of the Ukrainian emancipation from dependence on the Poles and the Jews.\textsuperscript{74} Clearly, the improvement of the Ruthenians’ economy was seen as the key to further improvements in the cultural and political fields.

\textit{Samopomich} was aware that exclusion on ethnic arguments was contrary to the cooperative ideals. It would be good if people in ethnically mixed villages respected each other’s “national rights”, and did not fight each other because of ethnicity, it was concluded. It would also be good if the stronger did not take advantage of the weaker. In such a situation, cooperative principles could be fully applied. However, the reality was different. Ruthenians were not the equals of Poles and Russians, “and not all the Poles in Galicia or the Russians in Ukraine grant us the right to independent national existence”. Nor were there any friends of Ruthenians at the top of the cooperative movement, resulting in an exclusion from crucial decision-making about the development of the cooperatives.\textsuperscript{75} Poles seldom wished Ruthenians any good, and would not refrain from making Ruthenians “a fertilizer for their own cultural, political, and economic development”, as a remark about registering Ukrainophone Roman Catholics and Poles in the forthcoming population survey in 1910 indicated.\textsuperscript{76} Poles took great pains to divide and debilitate Ruthenian cooperatives. The actions were orchestrated by Dr. Stefan Stefczyk, head of the Bureau of Patronage of agrarian cooperatives under the Crownland Section. Stefczyk sought to establish Polish cooperatives where Ruthenian cooperatives already operated. The newly opened Polish cooperatives were then generously showered with public funds from the Crownland Section, and could potentially be attractive to Ruthenian peasants. The \textit{Ekonomist} identified Stefczyk’s actions as an act of Polonization.\textsuperscript{77}

Never was the tone so indignant and full of sarcasm and distaste as when the activities of the Moscowphile \textit{Kachkovsky} Society and other Mosco-
phile associations were commented on. It was found that the Kachkovsky Society was denied the support of the Polish controlled Crowland Section (*Wydzial krajowy*), as the Society’s activities were deemed as detrimental to the state. Quite rightly, it was concluded. Out of 1097 reading rooms of the Society, only 426 answered the questionnaire distributed by the Society. This was an indication of the true number of reading rooms under the patronage of the Moscowphiles, the text concluded.

The author also criticized *Rilnychyi Soiuz* (Agricultural Union), founded by the Kachkovsky Society. After all, *Silskyi Hospodar* (Farmer, an Ukrainophile organization) existed already. Its task was to facilitate the work of the Ruthenian farmers. The founding of the Moscowphile *Tsentralnyi molecharskyi Union* (Central Dairy Union), a dairy cooperative organization on the Galician level, was also considered as an hostile act, as there already was an organization with such functions in Stryi. The new organization was under the patronage of *Wydzial krajowy*, the executive body of the Polish-dominated Galician Diet. The Poles probably applauded the action, as the dynamic Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives in Stryi had never been popular among them, the journal claimed. 16 of the 32 Moscowphile dairy cooperatives were gathered under the patronage of *Wydzial krajowy*.

Thus, the activities of the Moscowphiles were misdirected, as there were no “Russian” peasants in Galicia, only “Ruthenian.” Thus, there was no base for the activities of the Moscowphiles. Here, the author’s irony was directed towards the use of the word “ruskyi,” which in Russian (ruskii) refers to an ethnically Russian person, while in Polish and Ukrainian the word by this time referred to a Ruthenian/Ukrainian.

This was “treason”. The Moscowphiles spread their “poison” and weakened the nation by creating organizations that competed with already existing ones. The Moscowphiles were attempting to create a nation that was not there and manipulated “dark, blinded peasants.” In the article, the author used many of the linguistically Russian terms used by the Kachkovsky Society. They were used with sarcasm and placed in citation marks, to signify the foolishness and oddity of the *Kachkovsky* Society.

In 1912, the *Ekonomist* turned the attention of the readers and “our people” to the “clandestine and dishonest agitation of the Muscovites”. This time, it was about the attempts to talk the agents of the Ukrainophile *Dnister* insurance company into joining the Czech *Slavia* insurance company. In the Husiatyn District, the agitation among peasants fell on deaf ears, and propaganda did not work. Doubled efforts should be made to propagate for *Dnister* among Ruthenians, the journal suggested. The company donated consid-

78 *Ekonomist*, 1910: 8/9, p. 199.
80 *Ekonomist*, 1910: 8/9, p. 201.
erable sums to the national cause, and Slavia did not offer better insurance terms than Dniester.\textsuperscript{81}

The report “Moscowphile business” manifested Samopomich’s Schadenfreude over the financial problems of the Moscowphile organizations in Kolomyia. Intemperance and thefts have taken place, it was reported. Debt bills have disappeared, among other things. The case would probably be passed to a prosecutor.\textsuperscript{82} The Ekonomist reported further Moscowphile economic abuses in 1912. It was noted that a shop in a “Moscowphile” village in the Stanislaviv region went bankrupt.\textsuperscript{83}

In 1910, six Moscowphile cooperatives left the Crownland Auditing Union, according to Samopomich.\textsuperscript{84} Apparently, Moscowphiles felt pressure from the Ukrainophile activists on the local level, too. In the report for 1910, Kachkovsky Society complained that Ukrainophiles obstructed the work of the Society and its organizations. The Ekonomist rejoiced, as these activities showed that there were active, nationally conscious people out there ready to take action.\textsuperscript{85}

Thus, the actions of Poles and Jews opened the way for “denationalization” and “spiritual corruption.” Jewish and other non-Ruthenian associations could be momentously dangerous to the welfare of the Ruthenian peasantry and the national prospects of the Ruthenians in Galicia at large. Moscowphiles were, to put it bluntly, the enemy within the ranks of the Galician Ruthenians. They were described as morally corrupt and as manipulators of the “dark and blinded” peasants. At the same time, the Moscowphiles were described as being inclined towards doubtful economic machinations that would weaken the economic strength of the Ruthenian community. The Moscowphiles were declared to represent alien (Russian) interests, and had connections to Polish political (Wydział Krajowy), and Czech business interests – only to keep the Ruthenians divided.

Conclusion

This text examined several aspects of the creation and expansion of Ukrainophile Ruthenian agricultural cooperatives in eastern Galicia from 1904 to 1914. The text examined the motives behind the founding of cooperatives. The processes of founding and building up the cooperatives were also illuminated. At the same time, groups considered as problematic or directly obstructive to the functioning of cooperatives, and the strategies concerning these groups, were identified.

\textsuperscript{81} Ekonomist, 1912: 2, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{82} Samopomich, 1910: 3, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{83} Ekonomist, 1912: 1, p. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{84} Samopomich, 1911: 3-4, p. 25-26.
\textsuperscript{85} Ekonomist, 1910: 8/9, p. 200.
Cooperatives were viewed as a tool of economic liberation. Once economic strength was attained, a successful pursuit of political rights would follow, the cooperative journals believed. Cooperatives were viewed as an organic and natural form of cooperation well suited for the economically and politically weak. The activists realized that an improvement of people’s material situations would make the cooperative idea (and, of course, the national idea) attractive in the villages. The creation of cooperatives was facilitated by ready-made statutes and judicial and practical help offered by the activists in Lviv and in regional centres once a cooperative began to operate.

There were groups who were identified as obstacles to the growth of cooperatives. These groups were excluded from, or limited in, their access to the cooperatives. The most explicit exclusion was the one based on ethnicity. Poles were excluded as former feudal lords whose intentions to enslave and control the Ruthenians have not changed, although the times have. Jews were either depicted as agents of Poles or as people opposed to economic improvement among Ruthenians because it hampered their traditional position as middle men. Moscowphiles, although considered ethnically Ruthenian, were viewed as potentially dangerous because they imagined themselves to be a branch of the Great Russian people, and thus posed a threat to Ruthenian ethnicity and its economy alike.

Women were frequently viewed as an obstacle to improvement and modernization because of folk beliefs they nurtured. Women were also considered as an obstacle to improvement because many of them would not transfer the authority over the income from dairy production (which traditionally had belonged to them) to their husbands, who now claimed the right to collect the money. The activists also found it hard to explain the advantages of the modern dairy production to many women, who continued to use traditional methods and tools. At the same time, most of the Ruthenian men were described as “enlightened” and “rational”.

119
In prior research on agrarian history, Europe has been divided into regions in accordance with the dominant form of effective economic unit – either large-scale farming or a small-scale family farmstead. The difference between the two forms does not have so much to do with the size of the farms. In the case of large-scale farming (manors) the work was done by hired labour or peasants who were tied to the manor in some way or another, and the aim was to primarily produce for export. In the small-scale farmstead, the workforce consisted mainly of the family members who owned or rented the land, and who did the bulk of the work themselves. Large-scale farming was prevalent in the British Isles, Austria (except for mountainous areas), Prussia, and Poland while small-scale farming dominated in the Nordic countries, Sweden, and Finland in particular, as well as in various localities in South Europe and the Balkans. In other regions there were various intermediate forms where both large- and small-scale farming was equally important. The Baltic area was unique for its close manorial intertwining of both manorial and small-scale types of farming.

In addition to the type of production, the actual property structure becomes more important in connection with research on modernization within the agrarian sector. 19th century Europe witnessed a growing dominance of family-run landed property and land use. In all of the property types one important factor was the handing down of both material and immaterial resources from generation to generation. The family’s stability and security in granting their subsistence as well as the structure of the agrarian population depended on that. Tillers were tillers’ sons, and farm resources were handed down within the bounds of the farmstead. Passing down management from generation to generation is part of the enterprising strategy of a farmstead. Inheritance practice was remarkably flexible. In Scandinavia, the options were determined by laws and regulations, the composition of specific households, the ecological and economic conditions, and the demographic situa-
It is possible to analytically observe the types of transmission from one generation to the next in the handing down of material and immaterial heritage in by using spatial, economic, cultural, and equally, gender perspectives.

This article will examine the development of small-scale ownership and the issues related to inheritance in the Estonian area in the 19th century. Real estate that was inheritable came into the Estonian peasant’s possession only through the course of buying farms in perpetuity. An in-depth observation of one of the North Estonian counties – Järvamaa – will be carried out, although material for comparison will be drawn from various other Estonian regions. Up until now, research on inheritance has not particularly attracted Estonian historians, as this topic has primarily been of interest to lawyers and ethnologists.

The manorial system governing Estonia until the second half of the 19th century developed in its primary features during the period of Swedish rule in the 17th century, as a consequence of extensive enfeoffment. Manors dealt with large-scale grain production and exported it to Western Europe, but in the 18th century (after the Estonian area fell under Russian rule as a consequence of the Great Northern War) they began to distil spirits from grain, largely for the all-Russian market. Manor fields were cultivated by peasants bound to the manor as serfs with their own domestic animals and implements. Tenant farmers lived under the conditions of the barter system (natural economy), and land tillage was meant to satisfy the needs of only their own household, as well as, in addition to robot, paying rent to the manor in kind.

In the western provinces of Russia, the right to landed property belonged only to the nobility, although a small portion of land was owned by persons who belonged to the bourgeoisie or were of foreign nobility, and to those who had been endowed nobility for their services to the Russian crown (so-called landsassens owned 7.7% of landed property in Estonia and 15.5% in Livonia). In addition to private manors there were also crown, municipal, and rectorial manors. Crown manors belonged to the state, and their number thus varied across regions, but their number was proportionally quite small. In other words, by the second half of the 19th century, the land as a whole belonged to large-scale landlords, and the peasantry only had the right to use land.

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2 The research carried out within the framework of target financing from Tartu University is still in its initial stage. Therefore, the results presented in this paper are only provisional.
Successive reforms that had started at the beginning of the 19th century led to drastic changes in property relationships during the 19th century, and the state authorities played a major role in launching the process of reforms.\(^4\) The Russian empire quickly became aware of agrarian reforms in the neighbouring countries. By both liberating the peasantry and by gradually introducing private property in Denmark, the areas of Schleswig-Holstein, Swedish Pomerania, and Prussia in particular were regarded as most profitable. Under the influence of economic liberalism, the peasantry was freed from serfdom by the peasant laws issued in Estonia in 1816 and in Livonia in 1819. The peasantry as a class was granted personal freedom, but the land remained the property of landlords, and peasants had to rent it from the former.

In the 1840s peasant disturbances swept over the country, and led to the establishment of new peasant laws by which manorial lands were legally divided into two parts, manorial and farm land, and it was prohibited to attach farm lands to manors. This was a step forward in the principal acknowledgement of the peasants’ ownership of land. The laws also encouraged a shift to money payments and established civil-law regulations.

### Buying of farms in perpetuity

The right to buy land was granted to the peasantry by the peasant law issued in Livonia in 1849 and in Estonia in 1856. This also created the legal order for buying farms in perpetuity. As a result, the seller-landlord was a more active and managing party, deciding whether, to whom, and at which price he was ready to sell the farm.\(^5\) As late as in 1869 the Senate issued a decree on the buying of farmsteads in perpetuity, and by the time of the 1886 law, buying was made obligatory.

In many places, regulations prevented the buying of farms in perpetuity. Buying farms in perpetuity was usually preceded by parcelling land into plots that would eliminate the open field system.\(^6\) The so-called open field system was an obstacle for agricultural advancement, and obsolete land division was seen as one of the reasons behind the poor conditions of the peasantry. At one point, the use of time and the efficiency of working in the open field system definitely met a barrier which over time came to be used irra-

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tionally and ineffectively. In private manors it was only at the owner’s initia-
tive, and with his permission, that farm lands could be parcelled into plots.

On average, in North Estonia farms were bought in perpetuity thirty-forty
years later than in Livonia. This Baltic province was the most backward as
regards its level of agricultural production, and it had only 111 farms which
were sold in 1871, whereas the respective figure in the northern part of
Livonia was already 1442. The reason behind this was that the landed class
of Estonia was very conservative, and tried to consolidate their economic
positions. Similarly, peasants were highly cautious and mistrustful of it, al-
though buying land has always been every Estonian peasant’s dream and
purpose, and was the ultimate wish of parents for their children. Buying
land in perpetuity became more intensive in North Estonia only in the
1880s. Farms were bought (more exactly – were set to be bought) relatively
most frequently in Järvamaa, although the price of land was the highest
there. By 1881, 2249 farms had been bought there already. By the end of the
19th century in North Estonia, only 37% of farms had been set to be bought,
and in a more intensive buying area – Järvamaa. At that point, a parallel
could be drawn in the case of farms (71%) and also land (77%) with the
counties in South Estonia.

Liberating the peasantry from the pressure of landlords and manors in-
volved a number of components: freedom from serfdom, parcelling the farm-
land into plots, shifting from robot to money payments, buying farms in
perpetuity and parceling crown lands into smallholdings, abolishing class-
distinctive police and judicial authorities, and forming a class of independent
agricultural small-scale producers.

Creating the peasants’ right of ownership
The peasants’ right to own transferable property and to hand it down was
factual or pertaining to common law until the second half of the 18th cen-
tury. The first reference to the peasants’ right to own transferable property
appeared in positive decrees of 1765. During the 1795-1797 Diets of
Livonian and Estonian nobility, an issue to mitigate personal dependence
was worded so that the peasantry had the right to use (or to have at their
disposal) some transferable property without any interference by the land-

7 See Hoppe, Göran, “Jordskifterna och den agrara utvecklingen”, in Larsson, Bengt M. P.;
Morell, Mats; Myrdal, Janken (eds.) Agrarhistoria (Stockholm 1997), p. 258.
8 Kahk, Juhan, Talude päriseksostmise aegu (Tallinn 1993), p. 67.
9 Püvi, Toomas, “Talude päriseksostmisest Eestimaa kubermangus 19. sajandi lõpul”, ENSV
10 Pirsko, Prit, “Talud päris. Protsessi algus mitujate ja ostjate pilgu läbi”, in Jansen, Ea;
A restriction was added, to the effect that the peasant could not alienate so-called hardware—horses, cattle, and grain seed that was necessary to manage the farm and that was considered to belong to the farm. As to transferable property, this was estimated to cover nearly 9/10 of all of the property on the farm. As to the farm, the farmers received the right of succession for it. In 1804, the peasants’ right to own real estate remained barely declarative. The peasants’ right to till and use land was in contrast to the landlords’ superior right of ownership.

Agrarian or peasant laws issued in the mid-19th century gave the rural population, who had been liberated from serfdom a few decades earlier, a real opportunity to buy farms in perpetuity. In this sense, a farm that was formerly part of a manorial property complex became an object of independent civil-law circulation. The primary source of the peasant civil law was the peasant laws that contained the following norms of the peasant private law: Articles 938-1029 of the second section of the second volume of the Livonian Peasant Law (LPL), Articles 1045-1190 of the fourth volume of the Estonian Agrarian Reform Law (EARL), and the Saaremaa Agrarian Reform Law. In the Estonian province, along with members of the peasant community, the peasant private law covered all taxable persons and all artisans of the sub-community who resided on the given territory in the country. The norms of the private law of the Livonian and Courland peasant laws were enforced only on peasants.

One of the most important institutions over time has been marriage, and both property and private laws related to it. The given laws prescribed norms that were enforced on the peasant family and on inheritance, as well as on the right to make a will. Livonian and Estonian agrarian reform laws established the principle of matrimonial joint ownership of property between

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12 In the 19th century Estonia was characterized by particularism in legislation both from the viewpoints of class distinctions and spatially. Essential differences concerned legislations on the various categories of manors (such as private, church and state) and even within the bounds of one manor, norms could differ depending on the type of land (manorial, quota, and farm land).
17 The Baltic Civil Code (BCC) or common codification of local land laws and town bylaws in force since 1865 was not effective for the peasantry. The peasantry was subjected to the peasant law as civil law (in the forms of agrarian reform laws and common law of Livonia, Estonia and Saaremaa).
spouses.\textsuperscript{18} In the system based on matrimonial joint ownership of property the wife enjoyed better legal protection, and it was also more characteristic of the patriarchal family model.\textsuperscript{19} Although farmsteads were also passed on to descendants in earlier centuries, the situation principally changed in connection with the buying of farms in perpetuity – the peasant could make independent decisions as to his property. The law did not require that the farm had to be left to descendants as a whole, but but when it came to divisions, the minimum size of the farm (1/8 ploughland or 10 thalers) was legally fixed. Similarly, the law preferred a son as a property heir.

The mechanism for the realization of peasants’ rights was also established at this time. In 1866, the county community law founded a modern parish self-government system.\textsuperscript{20} The establishment of parish courts and parish self-governments attempted to reconcile the emancipating peasantry to the centuries-long privileged legal and self-government tradition of the Baltic Civil Code. Parish courts were set up in all manors where there was a community. In research on inheritance relationships and agrarian reform laws, archives are the main sources. Registry offices for real estate, credit societies, and archives of other services, as well as protocols and files of parish courts, in particular, are also of major importance.\textsuperscript{21} Parish court documents have been used relatively infrequently in research on the right of succession, up until now.\textsuperscript{22}

The system of inheritance

The right of succession and inheritance of the farm is more than a property issue for the peasant. It is related to the essence of land tenure. In addition to that, the farmstead was a dwelling place for the people concerned, and it was also an enterprise that needed to be kept in motion and managed successfully. Therefore, the planning and timing of an eventual conveyance of the farm was most essential. Definite types of demeanour and customs related to the material arrangement of life all created a system of dispositions and traditions that led to carrying out inheritance strategies.\textsuperscript{23}

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\textsuperscript{18} Anapaio, “1920. aasta põhiseaduse mõju”, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{19} BCC had established mainly joint ownership of property, according to which the husband managed his wife’s property. Thus, in the sphere of family property, the wife was clearly a subdued party.
\textsuperscript{21} Traat, August, \textit{Vallakohus Eestis} (Tallinn 1980), p. 8-9; See database Register of rural municipalities on the Estonian area 1866-1917 (www.eha.ee).
\end{flushright}
Researching inheritance, by taking into account the variations in legislation, local customs, ecological conditions, and regional economic conditions, allows for an examination of the peasant way of life on a micro-level. Thus, individual families can be observed from the standpoint that arises from concrete economic, demographic, and personal/human circumstances. Likewise, inheritance can be regarded as part of family strategies. The following issues are addressed: how the peasant mentality corresponded to the spirit of law; the common methods of conveyance; regional variations; the status of wives; the duty of the heir to the conveyor; and the issues surrounding transferable property.

Estonian peasants seemed to exist between two systems. Although thanks to the institution of parish courts, administering justice was in their own hands, they did not proceed from the common law. Valid laws and codifications had been written by Baltic German (and later Russian) lawyers of the Russian empire for the peasantry. Parish courts had to administer justice primarily proceeding from the laws issued by the Russian empire. So it definitely involved an intertwining of several juridical levels, with local people being able to administer justice but only on the basis of alien laws, with continual attempts to adapt these laws to their own local needs.24

Inheritance consists of transferring property after the death of the prior owner to his/her descendents, and thus is one part of a complex process of transmission of capital. Along with this, there are other ways of distributing property, such as dowry, presents etc. in the course of which property is transferred to the generations to come before the owner’s death. The concept of an inheritance system comprises both laws and customs, based on which an inheritance is practically carried out. Hereby it is necessary to bear in mind that laws, customs, and the actual practice of inheritance need not overlap. They may even contradict each other. Focusing on inheritance, one can pay attention to ideal types based on laws but on the other hand, only a normative approach may be misleading. Laws are not always in harmony with local customs, and in some cases may reflect the interests of a political and economic elite rather than the peasantry’s strategic preferences. In the case of two diametrically different legal inheritance ideologies, actual practice may turn out to be principally similar. Law should be viewed as susceptible rather than prescriptive. As laws do not foresee every minute detail, there is space for manoeuvring when solving a problem, given that land is not the only property or a measure of wealth of a farmer. Law is just one factor among others. Customs are defined here as the traditional rules of demeanour of peasants. Although customs are usually understood as com-

mon traditional practice, the latter may become a type of ideology, not something that actually occurs.\textsuperscript{25}

The inheritance system is seen as one of the key elements of the social organization of a peasant community. A specific type of inheritance management is connected with blood relations, family structure, settlement type, social stratification, and numerous other aspects of social organization. J. Goody et al. have attracted attention to the fact that inheritance is not only a means of reproduction of the social system but also structures social relationships.\textsuperscript{26} For example, the extent of parental power over their children partly depends on the fact of how much legal and traditional influence the parents have to decide which of their children will be the heir/heiress and what kind of support the parents expect in return in their old age. A rather obvious relationship can be noticed between a shortage of land and parental power.\textsuperscript{27} It is important to have alternatives for both the parents and children, and those in turn depend on the development of economic and political life as well as on the progress made by the educational system.

Rules of inheritance had been exactly enacted by the 1865 Estonian law of inheritance.\textsuperscript{28} The Estonian peasant left his gathered and inherited property, both real and transferable, to his legal heirs and heiresses if he had not ruled otherwise. Heirs/heiresses of the first rank were children and grandchildren of the deceased, and no distinction was made between male and female descendents. Adopted children inherited equally along with those born to the family but the adopted child did not inherit the inheritance of his/her guardian. If there were no children or grandchildren, the estate was left to second rank heirs/heiresses, among whom there were parents and grandparents. Third rank heirs/heiresses included brothers and sisters of the deceased and in the case of death, their children. All in all, six ranks were listed in the ranks of inheritance, with the last rank including more distant relations.

Inheriting after the deceased, the widow/widower inherited in the same manner as the children, but heirs of one and the same rank had a priority over heiresses, in that a male received two shares of the inheritance, while a female received only one, which was to be paid out in cash.\textsuperscript{29} The farmstead was inherited by the oldest son, and in the case of several marriages, by the oldest son born from the last marriage. In the case of minors, the wife managed the estate with the help of the trustee and children’s guardian until her

\textsuperscript{27} Abrahams, Ray, \textit{A place of their own: family farming in eastern Finland} (Cambridge 1991), p. 73-74.
\textsuperscript{28} Eestimaa 1856. aasta talurahvaseadus (edaspidi ETS 1856), § 1137-1148.
\textsuperscript{29} ETS 1856, § 1152-1157.
oldest son came of age, in the case of only daughters, until one of them got married.

Each Estonian peasant had the right to make a will regarding his property, either in writing or orally, but it had to meet the requirements set by law. If the farm-owner had nominated his successor, he/she needed to be the most appropriate choice to manage the farm.

Testamentary inheritance

A testament or will is a legal document, essentially an expression of one’s desires in the case of death about one’s property, and which may also include various arrangements. Often the will is also a contract of subsistence (alimony) or inheritance. Wills and various contracts may be also considered as devices for carrying out inheritance strategies. The significance of the will increased considerably after the farm had been bought in perpetuity. Until then, the peasant’s heritage had mainly consisted of transferable property, while thereafter real estate was added. In this connection, the conveying of an inheritance to descendents thus obtained a greater significance.

Within the period of 1880-1914, making a will was of relatively little interest. Of all cases of inheritance, only 5-10% were based on a will. Usually the testator was the owner of the farmstead who had no direct heir and so the will was the only possibility of expressing his wishes. Likewise, in the case of heirs/heiresses, the will could show the descendants the testator’s wishes, and further arrangements concerning the property in a more distant perspective. In single instances the widow also added her own will, confirming and supporting the will drawn up by her late husband in his arrangements (as e.g. the farm was left to the son-in-law).

Testators were usually old and sick owners of farmsteads who had expressed the last will and had written it down immediately before their death. On the other hand, young and middle-aged deceased left no will. It was typical of Järvamaa that a will was often drawn up immediately before the moment of death, usually a couple of days earlier.

Earlier wills were shorter and simply worded, but over the course of time both the length and tone changed. From 1902-1905, wills became considerably more complex, and contained clearly listed points. The Albu parish court had a will drawn up in 1905 that distinctly stated the reason for making a will on p.1: ”I have earned my property all by myself and therefore I can make the final law on it as I will.” There was also a supplement as the final

30 ETS 1856, § 1158-1167.
31 Abrahams, A place of their own, p. 115.
32 EAA (Estonian Historical Archives) 2544-1-194, p. 1-6.
item of the will: "/.../ if the testator were to use up his property during his lifetime, then his children have no right to make claims".\textsuperscript{35}

In accordance with traditional inheritance ideology, the oldest son became the heir of the farmstead. However, the farm could be left to a younger son or a daughter. It was common in Järvamaa that in a will the farmstead was left to one person, usually to the oldest son (or some other person chosen) who was called the main heir in some parishes (Albu). In some cases the choice of the main heir was also motivated: "/.../ because he has served me the longest and also given me subsistence".\textsuperscript{36} Another explanation states: "that my son Otto has been working on my Kokka farm for 19 years without any pay and that for the last five years I have needed his help and his mother will also be his dependant, then I think that I have the right to leave him a greater share of the inheritance than the rest of my heirs/heiresses got."\textsuperscript{37}

If one child inherited the farmstead, the others needed to be compensated, either in money or in kind. In Järvamaa, real estate was usually left to the main heir but dividing transferable property was strictly regulated.\textsuperscript{38} The heir or main heir was obliged to pay out to the rest of the heirs/heiresses. They usually received their share in money, stocks, or transferable items (like animals).\textsuperscript{39} There have been rare instances when the main heir had no obligations to the rest. In this case, an explanation was added to the effect that those had been given their fair share earlier.\textsuperscript{40} Such explanations of arrangements are not very frequent. If some of the heirs/heiresses received more, particularly in those rare cases when the legal heir was disinherited, then it was motivated as a rule. The choice was also generally motivated when there was no direct descendant available.

In some cases, the farmstead willed to the heir was handed down immediately or in a short while. Thus, after the drawing up and probation of the will a contract of donation or purchase and sale agreement was signed with the heir and as a result, the ownership was transmitted. Thus the will could be one of the intermediate documents in handing the farmstead down to a descendant. At the same time, an official change of ownership need not have resulted in a factual change of affairs. One of the reasons for an early handing of the farmstead down to the (fake) successor could be related to tax-paying (those over 60 years of age who were not owners of farmsteads were exempted from poll tax).\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{35} EAA 2544-1-194, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{36} EAA 2544-1-194, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{37} EAA 2544-1-200, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{38} EAA 2544-1-200, p. 1-10.
\textsuperscript{39} EAA 2529-1-545, p. 1-5.
\textsuperscript{40} EAA 2529-1-468, p. 1-4; 2529-1-200, p. 1-6.
\textsuperscript{41} Järs, “Selge meele ja targa mõistusega”, p. 127.
If there was no son, the will was obviously drawn up in favour of daughters or stepchildren.\textsuperscript{42} Wards or stepchildren included those orphans or illegitimate children who had been taken into the family and brought up. In everyday life, the farmers apparently did not make a very clear distinction between a stepchild and an adopted child.\textsuperscript{43} In the case of childlessness, and having brought up a fine stepson suitable for the purpose, the farmstead and property were usually left to him. If there were no first rank heirs/heiresses, the property was mainly left to close relations, i.e., brothers and sisters as well as their children and grandchildren. In some cases it has specifically been emphasized: "\ldots/ since there were no children, I can leave my estate to whom I please."\textsuperscript{44} In single instances the decision was motivated: leaving one’s property to a sister, an explanation was as follows: "with her help I have gathered all I have and that she has worked here for about 20 years without having been paid any wages".\textsuperscript{45} When naming the heir, the testators had considerably been influenced by the wish to insure and affect the future of relations or wards. Such wills often added recommendations about further management of the farm, e.g. have the farm leased, or sold.\textsuperscript{46}

The share of a heir/heiress could be compensated by parcelling a small holding from the farm. Often a descendant got his/her share in the form of education (which could be financially calculated). It is worth remembering that an inheritance does not only consist of its material aspect. One can inherit a name, status and "cultural capital". Sometimes the heir of the farmstead was so heavily taxed and burdened with liabilities that his position as owner seemed to be a punishment. Yet he was still the owner.\textsuperscript{47}

The wills examined here indicate that farm-owners did not treat of the post-mortem inheritance and the financial arrangements made during one’s lifetime as separate transactions. Principally, the will is only a document that shows an intention. At the same time, it could also list things already carried out. The leaving of property as a legacy could start long before the owner’s death, e.g. when the first child was married (dowry). The wishes registered need not have materialized, but could have been in contradiction to law, or questioned. Those who inherited could mutually agree to divide the items of inheritance shown in the will in some other way. The relationship between those items fixed in the will and actual reality could be explained in agreements signed by the heirs/heiresses. The darker sides of such transactions are revealed by the judicial proceedings among heirs or the testator and heirs.

Often, the will is also a contract for subsistence. The practice of such subsistence ("pension") contracts when handing the farm down to a young

\textsuperscript{42} EAA 2544-1-197, p. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{43} As for adoption, a juridical registration was required.
\textsuperscript{44} EAA 2544-1-197, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{45} EAA 2544-1-195, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{46} EAA 2529-1-545, p. 1-11.
\textsuperscript{47} Järs, "Selge meele ja targa mõistusega", p. 129.
owner was widely spread all over Europe. They were more spread in the areas where the landlords’ influence on appointing a new farmer was decisive. In the areas where hereditary rights on the land were obtained earlier, such practice was rare. According to M. Mitterauer, the number of such contracts doubled within several decades in the 19th century in many areas. One of the obvious reasons behind this was the lengthening of the span of life. The lack of subsistence contracts is regarded as a sign of individual rights of property and a developed market economy. In North and Central Europe those contracts were withdrawn at the end of the 19th century. In the wills of Järvamaa the requirement for subsistence is quite common. A will usually emphasizes that it is important to support one’s parents properly, both by its strength and by its content. Sometimes this has been expressed only as an obligation to support the testator and his wife until their deaths and then bury them thereafter.

The section of a will which deals with subsistence reveals a tendency to increase the proportion of money and varied provisions. In the Tarvastu parish of Viljandimaa that belonged to North Livonia, the length of peasants’ wills varied from a sentence or two to multi-paged detailed demands and descriptions: which room(s) and stores will remain or will be turned over to the widow; how much and what type of firewood has to be procured and what the temperature of the room should be, which provisions must be provided when the widow does not wish to have meals at the same table with the heir, specifying the exact amount of milk mugs and eggs; how often it is necessary to change the bed and provide clean linen, and how, exactly, the heirs should divide the land and households.

Inheritance without the will

If there was no will, inheritance was subjected to law. Usually no will was obligatory to present to the parish court if there was only one heir/heiress or when all heirs were adults. Then, in accordance with the oral wishes of the deceased, inheritance questions were solved by mutual agreement. It was standard practice that even if there was no will, the farmstead was inherited by the oldest son, and the others renounced the inheritance at the parish.

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48 In Finland, subsistence contracts were very common. On this, see Varis, Elina, Yksissä leivissä. Ruokalahtelainen perhelaitos ja yhteisöllinen toiminta 1750-1850 (Helsinki 1999), p. 111.
49 Mitterauer, Michael; Sieder, Reinhard, Patriarchy to Partnership from Middle Ages to the Present. The European Family (Oxford 1982), p. 165-166.
51 EAA 2529-1-468, p. 1-5.
In that case, inheritance was divided on the basis of oral agreement, and sometimes a preliminary agreement was drawn up. Usually the main heir/heiress had to pay the remaining part of inheritance to the others, while the payments were based on the purchase price of the farmstead (minus debts) and transferable property, calculated into money. The sum was divided between all of the heirs/heiresses without taking their gender into account. As to the farmstead, the payment proportion depended on the total number of heirs/heiresses. In some cases, domestic animals could be added to the sum of money (for instance, 1 cow and 1 sheep). As a rule, the agreement set a deadline: money could be asked for any time but never more than 25 roubles at a time.

Usually the estate was divided among the heirs in equal parts although as the law states, the heirs’ share was to be twice of that of heiresses. In the Albu parish, on the Sorwali and Jaago farmsteads of the Seidl manor, heirs inherited 1/3 and heiresses – 1/6 of the heritage. Jaan Kõkk had owned Jaago and 2/9 of his estate was left to his sons, but to his widow and daughters – 1/9. Transferable property was divided equally among all of them. In the Kaalepi community, Vainu and Käspré Matsi farmsteads were divided as follows: two sons were left 1/4 and the widow and three daughters were left 1/8 proportionally, and transferable items were divided equally among all of them. In the Türi parish, no distinction was made between the genders, and heirs and heiresses received equal shares of real estate.

When dividing inheritances, some other problems could arise when those who inherited could not find a common language or when some sum of money or bonds were at stake. Inheritance cases of cottagers and farmhands were rare, as their meagre property could be easily divided. Only when there was a considerable sum of money in the deceased owner’s bank account could the matter be taken to court. Likewise, when there was real estate and transferable property to be divided, only the claims on real estate were taken to court. When heirs/heiresses needed to settle a dispute, they used legal means. There were only a few communities that took their cases of inheritance to court. It could be supposed that in those communities social relationships were no longer based on traditional grounds, and only going to court could help. This put an inheritance under writ of attachment, and converted its divisions and claims to shares of an inheritance against the older brother who had become the owner. Sometimes it took several sessions to
pass a fair judgement on inheritance disputes or on selling inherited property.\textsuperscript{62} In a few cases the widow went to court when she had not been given subsistence based on the will.\textsuperscript{63}

In the case of the owner’s death, the parish court had to organize the guardianship for minors as well as the widow’s welfare. The trustee or guardian appointed by the court was also responsible for the maintenance of the family’s property. The trustee and guardian were appointed based on the wishes of heirs/heiresses, if possible, but the person chosen by the court was obliged to do his duty. It very seldom happened that a trustee had to be replaced later.\textsuperscript{64} Immediately after the appointment of the trustee the court began to insure the inheritance. For this purpose, inventories were made and lists were drawn up of all the property, including the liabilities and debts the household could be burdened with. To grant subsistence to a ward, the guardian could propose to sell or pledge some transferable items.\textsuperscript{65} Both real estate and transferable property were put up at public auction. The money received from the sales was first used to pay debts. At the guardian’s (trus-tee’s) discretion, the rest of money was either invested in the local credit bank or in government bonds so that the interest could be used for the ward to live on.

Based on the directions of the agrarian reform laws the property left for children had to be recorded when the parent remarried. This group of court cases was directly grounded on requirements set by the agrarian reform laws. The requirement stated that a surviving parent who wished to re-marry and who had children from the previous marriage had to notify the parish court about the property of the deceased spouse to enter it as inheritance in the court protocol, and thereby reserve it until the children came of age. After such a procedure, a respective legal certificate was issued, without which no pastor could wed the widowed parent again. In practice, the certificate was called a marriage licence or even marriage lines. The property was recorded and each got their share. The re-marrying parent paid the money to the parish court on behalf of his/her children, and the sum could vary greatly, from 10 to 125 roubles. A motivation was added ”to keep the children’s share in one piece so that when they came of age they could find their share complete,”\textsuperscript{66}

Examining the inheritance process makes it possible to observe human demeanour that was accepted and generally applied in a socially defined community, and how matters of dispute between equal parties were solved. Likewise, inheritance processes reveal conflicts between generations, an increased individual autonomy, and a decreased domination of the older

\textsuperscript{63} EAA 2529-1-516, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{64} EAA 2529-1-516, p. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{65} EAA 2429-1-525, p. 1-13.
\textsuperscript{66} EAA 2529-1-518, p. 1-14.
generation. There are instead signs of ignoring the gradual transmission of property and of power divisions between generations.

Traditionally, the Estonian custom was to leave the farm to the oldest son. It was most common in southern Estonia, which was economically more advanced and prosperous. However, in some regions it was not so important to keep the farmstead "vital". In Hiiumaa it was quite common to divide farmsteads among all heirs/heiresses. They were used not to receiving all of their subsistence from land tillage, and therefore the vitality of their farms was not an aim. The island population unanimously denounced the "custom of mainland /Viljandimaa/ peasants", according to which the farm had to be left to one of the descendants. However, only large farmsteads were frequently divided among heirs/heiresses. Parcelling out farmsteads first for purchasing them in perpetuity then dividing them among descendants led Hiiumaa to a more intensive land use. Järvamaa, on the other hand, belonged to an agricultural region where the preservation of the entirety of farmsteads was most important, and this also influenced inheritance practice.

Gender was an essential principle of structuring of inheritance. The "from generation to generation" principle concerned males, mainly, and thus patriarchal traditions were being reproduced. In inheriting, the difference in the male and female roles becomes clearly apparent. Males were more dominating and females came to the fore only occasionally, when there were no male descendants or when a widow took the farm over. Managing the farm gave some power to the female but once married, she was mostly subjected to the male. The male did not deprive the female of inheritance, however, and as to children, it was still important to secure one’s peaceful old age by means of a contract based on a will.

Modernization in agriculture

Despite numerous recommendations in the press at the time, the farmsteads found it hard to quickly reorganize their production to meet the changeable needs of capitalist markets. High redemption prices and arrears considerably slowed down the development of farms that were acquired by purchase, and decreased their potential to compete with manorial management, particularly in the market of agricultural production. However, the emergence of the principles of economizing manpower and rationalization could be noticed on

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the farms, with an aim of buying up the farm in perpetuity or paying debts made on the farm for the purchase.

Records of court proceedings listing units of real estate and transferable property on a farm as well as auction protocols make it possible to get a good overview of that farm’s economic and property status and the changes that took place on it at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries. The number of stocks taken and added to court files is not very high, as in many cases the stock-taking of inheritance was not considered necessary. Likewise, drawn-up property lists proceed from different principles. In the case of thorough property lists, one can observe their compilation scheme. First, the real estate to be inherited is mentioned, thereafter all the movable property (domestic animals, implements, corn, household utensils, equipment and objects used) and finally cash and government bonds and debts. In Järвamaa, clothes (except for fur coats) and other personal items were not usually listed but in Saaremaa, detailed lists of all these items were quite common.69

In addition to buildings as the stock of the farm there were also domestic animals, corn, implements and means of transport, harness, clothes, and various household utensils listed. Changes in both the economic life and everyday life of the farmer are conspicuous. The property inventory lists from the first half of the 19th century already include such items as an iron pitchfork, spade, and crowbar. At the end of the 19th century, an iron-axle cart or wagon was quite common.70 Household utensils usually included beds, chairs, tables, and cupboards while in the second half of the 19th century a wall clock and mirror were added. Tableware began to be used more generally than earlier bowls.71 In 1892 Saaremaa had registered two dozen plates among the inheritance.72 The spread of village artisans’ work and domestic handicraft objects can be estimated by the listed occurrence of artisans’ tools and implements. Farmsteads possessed forging tools, joiner’s benches, and handlooms.73 In rare cases, an ironing device and sewing machine were listed.74 In very few cases, the inheritance included many objects of precious metal such as silver spoons etc.75

Property lists for the purpose of inheritance indicate the evaluation of essential components of a farmer’s mundane life. The inner circle of life or household of the farmer was made up of so-called cultivated lands – the fields he tilled, his farmyard, along with the building around it. The circle

70 EAA 2529-1-537, p. 1-16.
74 EAA 2529-1-537, p. 1-11.
75 EAA 2560-1-896, p. 2-13.
also involved the farmer’s family-life, which was always very closely connected with his farm. Domestic animals have an essential function in the household’s life: on the one hand, they were economically important, on the other they formed a very essential part of the farmer’s inner circle as they belonged to the farm as naturally as did the people who lived there, as did cultivated fields, farmyards, and buildings. Domestic animals became more and more important in the farm’s economic life in the second half of the 19th century and they were treated with utmost care and caution. Such a treatment was most practical: they had to provide the household with meat, milk, wool, to plough fields, to guard the house, or at least to catch mice. Domestic animals were kept first of all for economic profit; they provided the household with sustenance and food. This is why the inheritance inventories list mainly cows, horses, pigs, and sheep. An animal was regarded as having a soul, and Estonians are known for their respect towards nature and everything alive – both fauna and flora, but according to folk tradition the animal’s soul was a degree lower.

Commercial-financial relationships were already quite common in the village community at the end of the 19th century as evidenced by the cash, government bonds, and sums of money on the bank account left by the testator. The latter varied, from a couple of tens to 800 roubles. Usually there were duties related to debt payment and debt collecting. Widowed parents and minor children were obliged to have a trustee or guardian who would then, on their behalf, collect debts. A rather significant amount of loan money is a definite indicator of the development of financial relationships in the village community. Sums of loan money again vary, in a majority of cases, from a few roubles to 500 roubles. Regrettably, court protocols are very laconic in these matters, reflecting only an attempt by the court to establish the fact of a loan and to locate the best time to pay it back. References indicate that loans were mainly taken out to pay rent, or to buy corn or domestic animals. Interest on a loan was rare, and occurred mainly towards the end of the period and when larger sums were involved.

As before, agriculture remained a primary source of profit. More extensive potato and clover crops and increased domestic hay crops required a transition to crop rotation. Farmsteads began to use multiple-course systems in the mid-19th century after the parcelling of lands into plots. In Estonia it was Järvamaa that excelled in introducing multiple course systems. At the end of the 19th century, Järvamaa was one of the best-advanced agricultural regions in Estonia and was growing potatoes as its main source of income.

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77 Loorits, Oskar, Eesti rahvausundi maailmavaade (Tallinn 1990), p. 27.
78 EAA 2544-1-211, pp. 13-16; 2544-1-516, p. 15-18.
79 EAA 2544-1-208, p. 18-20.
80 EAA 2544-1-197, p. 17-19.
Manor distilleries bought potatoes but the farming economy of Järvamaa was also closely related to Tallinn, as it was the largest city and consumer of produce of agriculture in the province.

In this new situation, with production now oriented to cover market requirements, the farmer had to focus on obtaining modern technical equipment and drainage systems, clearing fields from stones, etc. Many farms lacked the agricultural implements that manors had had in use long before. Inheritance inventories of 1902-1905 already indicated that the assortment and quality of agricultural implements had improved. However, the farms did not have enough facilities for larger investments. Cooperative societies were set up to help in procuring larger agricultural machines, primarily threshing machines. In 1897, Järvamaa established the first agricultural cooperative society – the Retla society, for the use of the threshing machine – in the province of Estonia.

From the end of the 19th century, farms began to specialize more in cattle breeding, primarily regarding dairy farming, which can be shown by the obtaining of the necessary devices and equipment for farms. Dairy-based cooperative activities were started, and in 1908 the first Estonian cooperative dairy was founded at Imavere. Cooperation facilitated the rationalization of household chores and a transition to dairy cattle husbandry, in which farms so far had been unable to compete with manorial management. Farmers were offered assistance and advice by local agricultural societies. These societies carried out agricultural advisory work, introduced respective modern literature, and organized courses, lectures, and exhibitions.

From the second half of the 19th century, internal social life witnessed a remarkable rise, including the transition of self-governments into the hands of country folk, the establishment of village schools, the formation of the Estonian press, society movements, the activities and associations of the national movement period, and the beginning of a new economic cooperative activity. All of this meant that the farmer changed from an earlier object of state authorities and landlords’ activity into a social subject. In this connection, an individual’s social position also changed, and this brought about the change in possibilities and methods. It is possible to conclude from the above that cultivating family land was a norm and ideal in agriculture, including the cultural strategies for the turn of generations, transferring inheritance, and making further progress. Transferring non-material resources by means of skills, knowledge, conceptions, positions, and relationships in society is no less important than is the transference of material resources.

Conclusion

The transformation of Estonian society that began in the second half of the 19th century is designated as modernization. In the agrarian sphere it meant the establishment of commercial-financial relationships in agriculture, the emergence of small proprietorships as a class, and a gradual emancipation of the peasantry. Modernization comprises not only economic changes but also more extensive cultural, social, and political changes that radically transform society. At the same time, it is also a turning point in an individual’s world of thought, accompanied by personal freedom and an increase in the activity of participation in social life. It took only a few decades to turn a lawless tenant into a farm-owner and land-owner who is not only formally but genuinely a plenipotentiary legal subject both in private and public laws and, along with all this, also holds the necessary economic responsibility and cultural self-confidence.

The widening of the people’s legal consciousness and juridical changes across decades considerably influenced the relationship between the entire local population and the administration of justice. The development of legal culture and the formation of Estonians as a fully literate nationality along with the revolution in reading all took place in the second half of the 19th century. The network of parish and county schools covering the entire Estonian area was formed by the 1880s. The Estonian-language press began more and more to address the problems of economics, education and legal situations. Estonians’ legal culture was transformed into a modern, private property-based legal system. In the second half of the 19th century the distance between written legal norms and social mentality began to decrease.

In Estonia and Livonia modern civil society could develop not only from mass movements but primarily from the change in legalized customs and conceptions. And this, in turn, is to a great extent related to the gradual dissipation of conservative guardianship mentality when backed up by liberal ideas and activity.

The development of peasant small proprietorship in the province of Estonia and Estonian-speaking Livonia was a prerequisite for Estonian society to move towards its independent statehood.
By the end of the 19th and during the early 20th centuries, the majority of the Swedish population lived off the land. In 1870, 72 percent of the population were engaged in agriculture, and 82 percent of the population lived in the countryside. Of the farmers, the majority were smallholders, as 64 percent of all Swedish farms had between 2 and 20 hectares arable land. This structure did not change drastically between 1880 and 1917, although the number of middle-sized farms increased.

This text attempts to explore how the agrarian sector has coped with modernization, rationalization, and citizenship. It is also an attempt to study the image of agricultural change and its relation to politics and social transformation. At the same time, the study offers an insight into the ideological and social processes in Swedish agriculture and society at the turn of the 20th century. In general, the history of the development of citizenship has focused on either the bourgeoisie or working-class groups. In many cases, the agrarian sphere has been neglected, although this included the vast majority of the population.

Focus is on agrarian organizations and cooperative formation and its relations to modernity, rationality, masculinity, and citizenship. The sources have mainly been the national agrarian press. The press lends itself well as a mirror of the ideas in circulation in the stratified agrarian society. This study is also on how agrarian cooperatives were founded, either as elite projects (top-down) or emancipatory grassroots movements (bottom-up). The idea behind this question is the notion that the founding phases of organizations

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1 Olsson, Sven-Olof, "Ensam är sällan stark. Om sammanslutningar mellan lantmän vid sekelskiftet 1900.", in Rydén, Reine (red.), Jordbrukarnas kooperativa föreningar och intresseorganisationer i ett historiskt perspektiv (Stockholm 2004), p. 172.

will provide certain institutional frames, and hence play a significant role for the future development of the organization. Secondly, I will discuss how organizations perceived and discussed citizenship with focus on cooperatives, gender, and education. Citizenship was closely related to modernity through ideals concerning rationality. It is also important to define cooperatives in relation to education, because this was one of the links to perceptions of citizenship.

There is also the need for a brief note on the translation of names of papers, institutions etc. The, at-the-time, common Swedish word *Lantman* (as in *Landtmannen* or *Tidskrift för Landtmän*) is translated to *Farmer*. However, this does not give the entire picture, since *Lantman* also entails a social position and relates to one’s standing. The closest description is perhaps an autonomous and independent farmer who leads the work at a farm. It is also a political term, since the autonomous farmer had a political position both as a voter and as being eligible for office.

**Sources**

The source material has consisted of agrarian papers, with somewhat different histories and publication periods. The *Periodical for Farmers* (*Tidskrift för Landtmän*) existed between 1880 and 1917. It originated in Lund, and its editors were H. L. O. Winberg, N. Engström, and M. Weibull. The journal was somewhat technical and semi-official, due to the close links between editors and central agrarian circles. The second journal is *The Farmer. Periodical for Swedish Agriculture and its Subsidiaries* (*Landtmannen – Tidskrift för Sveriges jordbruk och dess binäringar*), published between 1890 and 1917. From 1906, it was the official organ for *The Swedish Agricultural Teachers Association* (*Sveriges lantbrukslärarförening*). It originated in Linköping and was edited by Wilhelm Flach. The people around it were all agriculturalists, teachers, and scientists lending a connection to central agrarian circles. These papers did not explicitly address the agrarian elites, but the owners of larger farms and/or manors were nevertheless its main audience.

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3 Collier Ruth Berins and Collier, David, *Shaping the Political Arena. Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton 1991). The perspective has been common in political science, where the different founding stages of political parties have created different paths of development. Panebianco, Angelo, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge 1988).

4 A brief word concerning the footnotes. Firstly, concerning articles in agrarian journals I have given the name of the article, the year and the individual number. I have not given the page since journals only have 20-25 pages, and the articles are therefore easy to find. Secondly, sometimes the writer of an article is given, when it was presented in the journal. Otherwise it is an article written by the editorial office. Thirdly, during a brief period in the mid-1890s *Tidskrift för landtmän* was bound together in a yearly volume. In those cases I have given the page number of the official volume of the specific year.
The Farmer also had a monthly appendix called *The Farmers Monthly Appendix* (*Landtmannens månadsblad/månadsbilia*) using a simpler, more romantic language and images directed to smallholders.⁵ Stories, rhymes, and poems were used to promote modern agriculture, something not common in the other periodicals. Both *Periodical for Farmers* and *The Farmer* were merged into the paper *The Farmer* in 1917 and became the official paper of the national *Swedish Common Agricultural Association* (*Sveriges Allmänna Lantbrukssällskap*) founded the same year.

### A Brief Note on Citizenship in Theory

Citizenship as an analytical concept is always relational, since the citizen is defined through individual relationship to the state, either as individual participation or through demands on the individual, or as the relationship between rights and obligations.⁶ In terms of the agrarian sector, this liberal form of citizenship was supplemented with agrarian ideals. Agriculture was generally more traditional, less individualist, and more collectivist.

Landowning was the central agrarian concept that related to citizenship. Referencing of T.H. Marshall’s definition of citizenship, landowning belonged to the economic form of citizenship, through laws governing ownership and inheritance. It was also related to masculinity, since the ideal landowner was an independent man and the way to become independent was through landowning. This was also visible in laws concerning marriage, specifically in agrarian society.⁷ Landowning was also an ideological concept, and in Sweden it was often perceived as the very foundation of society, especially for conservative groups.⁸ Landowning was also linked to Marshall’s version of political citizenship, since Swedish farmers had held a political position for centuries, through the *Farmers Estate* (*Bondeståndet*) in parliament (*Riksdagen*). Naturally, all farmers were not incorporated and only the upper male stratum of the agricultural population was represented. The *Representation Reform* (*Representationsreformen*) in 1866 created a two-chamber parliament where the farmers became the most important political group in the *Lower House* (*andra kammaren*). The reform did not aim

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at changing political life nor at challenging the political system.\footnote{Nilsson, Göran B., "Den samhällsbevarande representationsreformen", in Scandia 1969, p. 253.} The franchise system was based on income and/or landowning and in general benefited the farmers, who were a strong political force and in 1897, 52 percent of the representatives in the \textit{Lower House} were farmers.\footnote{Wåhlstrand, Arne, "Andra kammaren under tiden omkring sekelskiftet", in Brusewitz, Axel (ed.), \textit{Studier över den svenska riksdagens sociala sammansättning} (Uppsala 1936), p. 157 and Eden, Nils, \textit{Den svenska riksdagen under femhundra år} (Stockholm 1935), p. 263 and Brusewitz, Axel, \textit{Kungamakt, herremakt, folkmakt. Författningsskampanj i Sverige (1906–1918)} (Stockholm 1951).}

Agrarianism was the ideology of the time, and it can be described as a set of beliefs outside normal ideological frameworks. In the Swedish context, agrarianism shared interests in common with conservatism and liberalism. It also incorporated the notion of a specific agrarian culture that was threatened by industrialization and urbanization.\footnote{Mohlin, Yngve, \textit{Bondepartiet och det moderna samhället 1914–1936. En studie i svensk agrarianism} (Umeå 1989), p. 1-3.} For example, the smallholder proponent Per Jönson Rösiö had developed a radical and social liberal program that envisioned a prosperous society of smallholders. The basis was small-scale ownership of land, cooperation, and agrarian enlightenment. Its ideology was not anti-modern, but it incorporated many traditional ideals. It was, in fact, a cultural revolt against modern industrial society, and an ideological program with the purpose of creating a modern agrarian identity.\footnote{Toler, John, \textit{Per Jönson Rösiö "The Agrarian Prophet"} (Stockholm 1992), p. 318.}

Agrarianism included notions of a specific agrarian economic morality separated from the general capitalist order. Agrarianism was a cultural and ideological stance against the forces of modern capitalism and society. It incorporated ideas concerning morality, something that was linked to the conservative franchise reform of 1907–1909, where the right to vote was given to all men, but with moral restrictions. There was a taxpaying qualification as well as the disqualification of all receivers of social benefits. It was also thoroughly male, since fulfilled military service was a demand for franchise.\footnote{Elvander, Nils, \textit{Harald Hjärne och konservatismen. Konservativ idédebatt i Sverige 1865–1922} (Uppsala 1961), p. 446-447.} The idea was that only the autonomous man could be a political being. These restrictions have been seen as a construction of the ideal citizen, i.e. the self-supporting male that fulfilled his obligations to society.\footnote{Berling-Åselius, Ebba, \textit{Rösträtt med förhinder. Rösträttsstrecken i svensk politik 1900–1920} (Stockholm 2005).} This was not necessarily agrarian, but it meant that farmers strengthened their political position in the \textit{Lower House}, and at the same time gained an increased access to the \textit{Upper House (första kammaren)}. Another aspect was
that agrarian groups easily fulfilled the economic restrictions in the voting system.\textsuperscript{15}

Hierarchy and patriarchy were important factors in society, especially in agrarian circles. The agrarian social hierarchy focused on the relationship between family and production. The farmer was the head of the household as well as the leader of the family as a production unit. This prevailed longer in agriculture than it did in other branches.\textsuperscript{16} The agrarian idea of hierarchy included the relationship between individual and collective. The village or local community had its own social structure that needed to be maintained according to agrarian ideology. Any reforms of the hierarchy could only be made with respect to traditional order. Agrarian society was believed to differ from modern industrial society, and it was not seen as another branch of business. Instead, it was a way of life tied to history, land, and tradition.\textsuperscript{17}

Masculinity was equally important in agrarian circles, and citizenship was formulated as a masculine project. Agriculture as such was masculine, and the farmer was by definition male. The concepts of citizenship and democracy are gender-neutral in one respect, but at the same time these concepts are imbued with notions of gender. The citizen was almost always male, the public arena was a male-dominated sphere, and the state was a male collective actor. Men were defined as citizens, especially the bourgeois man.\textsuperscript{18} It is therefore vital to incorporate masculinity as a category in studying the formation of citizenship in agriculture. The farmer became a vessel containing tradition, responsibility, collectivism, and patriotism and was seen as the defender of society against individualism, urbanization, and industry. The farmer, soil, home and countryside were masculine symbols of the nation.\textsuperscript{19} The farmer was seen as the bearer of tradition and at the same time was defined as both modern and rational.

The Founding of Cooperatives

In Sweden many of the agrarian cooperatives were founded in the 1890s, but the majority started during the first years of the 20th century. Relatively few of the early cooperatives were in fact cooperative, as many in-between forms of organization existed. The oldest agrarian organizations were the County Agricultural Societies (Hushållningssällskapen), founded by the state in the late 18th and early 19th century. The Agricultural Societies were governmental organizations with the purpose of modernizing agriculture with influences from Europe and particularly from the United Kingdom. The Royal Swedish Academy of Agriculture (Kungliga Lantbruksakademien) founded in 1811, was the top organization and the official representative of agriculture. It was the administrative nexus as well as an intermediary between government and county societies. The Academy representatives all belonged to traditional agrarian elites, and many can be traced back to the regional organizations.20

Previous research has defined that the Swedish agrarian cooperatives were largely founded through a top-down system, where the agrarian elites spread ideas and became leaders in the formative stages of organizations. Many ideas came from the Academy and the Agricultural Societies, promoting cooperative organization. But, in general, there was scepticism among elites concerning international cooperative ideology, and therefore many cooperative dairies used the names “common” and “mutual”.21

Elite Cooperatives or Cooperative Elites?

The initial question is who started and took part in organizational development. From previous research it is clear that elites were important in spreading ideas. But how is one to define said elites? The nobility, defined through birth, along with military officers and estate- and manor-owners, as well as the owners of large farms, all belong to the “old” agrarian elites. They were defined through tradition, social standing, and landowning. At the same time there was a “new” and emerging elite, defined through scientific knowledge, education, and expertise. Agronomists, dairymen, and engineers were all part of this group. This does not mean that there were strict boundaries between “old” and “new”, as there were many exchanges between the groups.22

In the agrarian press there are several examples of local organizations described through minutes and lists of participants. In general, the “old” elites were strongly engaged in establishing different associations. For example, in October 1887 the dairy producers in Gävleborg met in Storvik to discuss the export of butter and related issues. Captain A. Geijer arranged the meeting under the chairmanship of Major Lilliehöök. The meeting decided to form the Dairy Association of Gefleborg and Dalarna (Gefleborgs och Dalarnas mejeriförening). The board consisted of the two officers mentioned and Mr Steffen from Korsnäs. This was quite common in the initial stages of organization. The strong elite flavour was strengthened by the fact that all board members represented dairy companies.23 Another example was the Dairy Association of Södermanland (Södermanlands läns mejeri-idkarförening) formed in December 1894. It was not a cooperative organization, but instead aimed at strengthening dairy production in general as well as promoting new ideas in agriculture. The board consisted of eight people, including two counts, one baron, and one magistrate.24

The elites were also visible in the agricultural clubs in major cities. For example, the Agricultural Club of Malmö (Malmö landbruksklubb) met in November of 1888. The first topic was dairy production, and several participants from the educated and scientific groups participated. The second topic concerned brood-mares, and the number of officers participating was ample.25 This was also quite a common phenomenon, with “old” and “new” elites founding clubs together.

The examples portray how traditional elites engaged in agricultural organizations. In general, the Swedish case shows the importance of elites in the initial stages of organization. But there are also other examples, especially from around 1900, when smallholders became increasingly successful on the market.26

But at the same time the elites were changing, something visible through the reports from the national meetings for dairymen. Dairymen were part of the emerging agricultural groups, defined almost solely through education and expertise. The first meeting of Swedish dairymen was held in December of 1888, and was chaired by Count Hugo Hamilton (chairman of the Agricultural Society of Skaraborg).

23 “Gefleborgs och Dalarnas mejeriförening”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1887:43 and ”Mejeriid-karmöte”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1895.
25 “Från Malmö lantbruksklubs förhandlingar d. 29 Nov. 1888”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1888:49. For example ”Sydvestra Uplands Landmannaförening”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1892:45.
Table 1: Participants at the Göteborg meeting in December 1888

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>7 (incl. 1 count, 3 barons and the Lord Chancellor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>2 (members of the <em>Lower House</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors &amp; Scientists</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairymen, Directors &amp; Wholesale tradesmen</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1899 a definite change had occurred, since the strong representation of nobles was more or less gone. Instead a new group had emerged: the educated, rational, and technical. The meeting took place in Stockholm and was chaired by *Supreme Director* (öfverdirektör) Odelberg, while K. F. Lundin (a dairy consultant from Separator Company) was the secretary. Other important representatives were state consultant G. Liljhagen, engineers Petersson and Bagge, and director Hellström.27

The change shows quite clearly that a “new” elite had come forward. It is also interesting to note that it was no longer necessary to describe participants using noble titles. For example, the name Bagge is a noble name, but in this case this was not mentioned. Instead, the title “engineer” was used. This was of course a long process, and the nobility in general were influential during the 19th century. In 1851, for example, seven government ministers out of ten were noble. Twenty out of twenty-five *County Governors* (*landshövdingar*) were nobles. Twenty-nine out of thirty-one generals bore noble names. It was only in the academic sphere that a change was visible, since only one out of fifty-four professors was noble.28

The modern and rational agriculturalists were also strongly connected to cooperative dairies. One of the more important actors in this process was K. F. Lundin. He was the originator of several articles, folders, and books on the importance and structure of cooperative dairies. These were, like the emerging elites themselves, described in technical, modern, and rational terms. Denmark was always used as a positive example, and Danish cooperative dairies were described as efficient and rational, producing high-quality butter (as opposed to Swedish dairies). The important fact was a clear definition of tasks: members delivered fresh and clean milk, and the dairyman ran the production, controlled quality, and held the books.29

Lundin discussed why cooperative dairies were superior to all others, and why manors and companies were deemed inferior. He believed that competition led to lower milk quality, through a lack of expertise. The opposite was

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the well-run cooperative dairy: modern, efficient, hygienic, and emancipating.\textsuperscript{30} The development of the dairy industry was a general trend in agriculture, since dairy production was a means of meeting the market. It was a form of self-reliance, contrasting with the ongoing industrialization in society.\textsuperscript{31}

The scepticism among the elites concerning cooperatives began to disappear as the new form of organization seemed more efficient. In 1894 discussions were held in the Farmers Association of Southwest Uppland (Sydvestra Uplands landtmannaförening) on the question of cooperative dairies. The description is very interesting. The meeting was held at the manor Brogård, belonging to Count Johan Sparre, and the participants travelled there by steamer. Led by a band, the participants were given a tour of the new and magnificent castle, described as unusually tasteful and comfortable, with well-kept gardens and livestock. The closing of the meeting was equally described with grand words. “The falling sun was accompanied by music, canon salutes, and fireworks.” \textsuperscript{32} Captain Vilhelm Nauckhoff described the benefits of cooperative dairies as a very positive, economically sound, and efficient form of organization. Model regulations for cooperative dairies were also distributed. Nauckhoff himself was the secretary of the Swedish Agrarian League (Sveriges Agrarförbund).

Conservatism, Agrarianism and Agrarian Politics

The 1890s was characterized by the political battle for democratization, in which farmers were very active. The divergence between conservative agrarianism and cooperative ideology is interesting, since cooperative ideology and its emancipatory ideal often conflicted with traditional conservatism. But it seems that the conservative agrarians managed this potential conflict through focusing only on the economic aspects of cooperation.

In 1895 a new contribution to the flora of agrarian organizations emerged, with the founding of the party Swedish Agrarian League. It was a conservative, agrarian organization encompassing the traditional elites, as well as conservative parliamentarians. The discussions concerning universal franchise incorporated the conflict between different versions of citizenship.

Discussing Swedish agrarian elites, it is impossible not to mention ideological conservatism. The League was strongly conservative, and in the societal context there were challenges to conservatives and agrarians alike. First of all, the controversy with Norway concerning the union brought sev-

\textsuperscript{30} “Är vårt mejeriväsende tillfredsställande och för framtiden betryggande?”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1890:16, 17 and 21. Also Lundin, K.F., Om andelsmejerier (Stockholm 1890).


\textsuperscript{32} “Sydvestra Uplands landtmannaförening”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1894, p. 748.
eral political issues to the forefront. For one, Norway was more liberal and had a working parliamentary system and extended franchise. Secondly, agricul-
tural tariffs did not apply in trading with Norway. Thirdly, Norwegian
patriotism challenged the equally nationalistic Swedish agrarians.33

The most vital political issue was the franchise question, where liberals
demanded franchise reform. The League opposed changes on the basis that
this would threaten the influence of farmers. The purpose was to congregate
all farmers as a homogenous political force.34 It opposed industry, which it
believed to be favoured by the state, and not least of all the forest industry
threatened the agrarian community, as companies bought farmland.35 How-
ever, all agrarians were not in support of the League, since many believed
that a national agrarian organization had to politically stand between left and
right. The most important question was to keep out of the ongoing contro-
versy over import tariffs on grain, something that severely threatened agrar-
ian unity.36 The League was a political platform for both conservatism and
agrarianism, visible through lectures held within the organization. At the
yearly meeting in 1897, the topic was “the development of franchise in this
century” (“rösträttens utveckling under innevarande århundrade”) by vicar
Svensson, depicting franchise as a negative force threatening the very foun-
dations of society.37 In 1898 the B.A. from Uppsala, Carl Sundbäck, spoke
on the topic “the national importance of a self-owning estate of farmers”
(“betydelsen för vårt land af ett sjelfegande bondestånd”). The lecture was
traditionalist, and promoted the concept that farmers were the backbone of
the nation, as opposed to the working classes.38

The relationship between the League and the conservatives was not clear.
In 1903 they also changed their name to the Swedish Farmers Union
(Sveriges landmannaförbund) and incorporated a new programme said to
benefit the motherland and to guard the economic and political interests of
the farmers. At the same time, they tried to attract small farmers through
lowering the membership fees.39 These changes show that the organization
became increasingly political during the first years of the 20th century. When

33 Carlsson, Sten, Lantmannapolitiken och industrialismen. Partigrupperingar och opinions-
34 In 1903 the League created their own proposal for a franchise reform, containing strong
protective measures to preserve agrarian influence. Runestam, Staffan, Förstakammarhögern
och rösträttsfrågan 1900–1907 (Stockholm 1966), p. 112-114. Nauckhoff, Vilhelm, Sveriges
35 Edling, Nils, “Norrlandsfrågan och den organiserade kapitalismen”, in Historisk tidskrift, Nr
2 1994, p. 276-277. Also Sörlin, Sverker, Framtidslandet. Debatten om Norrland och naturre-
surserna under det industriella genombrottet (Stockholm 1988).
37 "Sveriges agrarföre" , Tidskrift för landmän, 1897, p. 143.
38 "Sveriges agrarförbunds årsmöte", Tidskrift för landmän, 1899:2. Later there were ample
discussions concerning political guarantees for the propertied classes, when a franchise reform
the Swedish conservatives founded *Allmänna valmansförbundet* (AVF) in 1904 the *Union* did not join, although the AVF had a strong representation of farmers within the party.\(^{40}\) Instead the *Union* stated that they supported AVF in general, but could not accept the strong interests from industry within the party.\(^{41}\)

**The Threat from the Worker**

Echoing the stronger political conflict in society, the agrarian forces became more active. At the national level the *Union* described strikes and trade unions in agriculture (and it is safe to say that they were strongly against both). Strikes were named “violent acts” (“våldsgerningar”) calling for state action.\(^{42}\) The same kind of discussions existed both at local and regional levels. One example was the *Farmers Organisation of Skaraborg* (*Skaraborgs läns jordbrukareförening*), founded in December 1908 with the purpose of countering the “dissolving and destructive” (“upplösande och nedbrytande”) tendencies among farmhands. It should offer support against travelling agitators and counter strikes. Its board consisted of ten members (all estate-owners, including one count).\(^{43}\)

The social tensions in society were also related to views on education, since it was believed that education brought orderliness, enlightenment, and stability. In 1895 an article defined the future threats to society as socialism, anarchism, and cosmopolitanism. The argument was that the “well-built” social structure could crumble into a shapeless mass. The answer was enlightenment through education, something that in turn would bring the classes closer together. Education and cultural refinement would “drive the threatening ghost of class hatred back into its dark den”.\(^{44}\) It was suggested that educated men, especially priests and farmers, should hold public lectures to invoke the desire to acquire knowledge among working classes.

One common concept in the political discourses of the late 1800s and the early 1900s was urbanization. It was often believed that urban life created rootless people, as the city offered leisure, amusements, and higher wages in industry. This affected the countryside, since many farmhands sought employment in other trades. Shortage of labour in the countryside was contrasted with unemployment in the cities. The agrarian press suggested a solu-

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\(^{40}\) Eriksson, *Det reglerade undantaget*, p. 55-56.
\(^{42}\) "Sveriges landtmannaförbund", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1905:11.
\(^{43}\) "Skaraborgs läns jordbrukareförening", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1909:1. The organization had predecessors, as meetings were held already in 1895. "Aggrarrörelsen", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1895, p. 34.
tion to keep the workforce in agriculture. Firstly, the employment system ("legostagdan") was outdated, and instead a system of contracts needed to be formalized, since the patriarchal system could not be maintained. Secondly, the conditions for farm labourers needed to be improved through better housing, clothing, and salaries. Thirdly, a system to counter labour organization was needed, since trade unions were seen as undesirable, but inevitable. Therefore, associations with the purpose of uniting the farmers had to be created, to build adequate housing for labourers and to distribute land to skilful and faithful farmhands. The article contained examples of how an employers association ought to be founded. Members could be any "välfrejdad" farmer employing farmhands. The term "välfrejdad" means well-reputed or well-esteemed, and needs to be discussed since it actually entails a civic reputation. Until 1918, Swedish laws incorporated "frejd" as a prerequisite of certain rights. Therefore, this is an older version of citizenship dependent on local knowledge of an individual’s reputation. The membership in the organization was also connected to landowning (tenant-farmers could not be members). The fee was decided from the number of male farmhands employed. The idea of a patriarchal responsibility for the farmhands was quite common. The system with farm labourers paid in kind ("statare") was problematic, and the agrarian press described how to improve the situation of the employees: increased salaries, good and proper housing, introduction of piecework, including children and women in the process, educate the housewives, and finally, encouraging the farmhand to save money for the future.

The question concerning the relationship between employer and employee was filled with different ideological aspects and strong ideas focusing on hierarchy and tradition. The emergence of trade unions and political activism among farmhands was seen as a foreign and negative element in Swedish society. This threatened to create a capitalist system where work was another commodity. The opposite was the traditional Swedish agrarian patriarchal system, where the employer had the responsibility for employees. The patriarchal system was believed to foster a sense of family and duty, and required giving and taking. The employer was responsible for the employee in many different ways, for example: the living conditions in general, and more specifically for pensions, etc. According to the agrarian press, the patriarchal system differed from the modern industrial system, with regards to the relationship between the classes. The fear of socialism among employers was only part of labour relations. It was quite common that the agrarian press criticized employers for expressing no interest whatsoever in the situation of

45 "I arbetarefrågan", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1899:11.
the workers. The advice was that the employer should reward honest, hard-
working farmhands instead of opposing demands.48

Modernization and Tradition

The discussions on citizenship in agrarian circles were often part of ideas on
modernization. The rational farmer was the one who supposedly would ob-
tain civic rights. On the other hand, agriculture stood between modernity and
tradition, and hence the concept of modernity was attributed with different
hierarchal and patriarchal notions. This section tries to define how rationality
was depicted in the agrarian press in relation to modernity and tradition, with
specific focus on dairies. Equally important was the relationship between
modernity and masculinity. Lena Sommestad has pointed out that a modern
and rational dairy industry completely changed gender patterns, as dairymen
subsequently took over from dairymaids (in turn described as inefficient, un-
rational, and traditional).49

Small against Large – Smallholders and Estate-owners

The smallholders were one of the most important groups when it came to
rationalization, at least from the viewpoint of the agrarian press. In previous
research, the question concerning smallholders and estates has been impor-
tant. Historian Jan Kuuse has promoted that the smallholders could not com-
pete and keep up with larger farms when it came to rationalization.50 The
opposite relationship has been put forth by economic-historians Mats Morell
and Kirsti Niskanen.51 Previous research has also showed that farmers and
estate-owners went separate ways in relation to agricultural technology. The
terms tradition-technology and reform-technology have been used to de-
scribe the phenomenon. However, it was not a clear-cut definition, but in-
stead dependent on social factors. Other studies have pointed out that com-
mercialization was strong among smallholders.52

In the agrarian press there was the notion that small farms did not pro-
gress due to the inherent conservatism among the proprietors. Political con-

49 Sommestad, Lena, Från mejerska till mejerist. En studie av mejeriyrkets maskulinsierings-
process (Lund 1992).
50 Kuuse, Jan, Från redskap till maskiner. Mekaniseringsspridning och kommersialisering
51 Morell "Småbruket, familjejordbruket och mekaniseringen", p. 72-73 and Niskanen,
52 Köll, Tradition och reform, p. 187 and Rydén, Reine, "Att åka snålskjuts är icke hederligt".
servatism was in general seen as a commendable quality, but here it was the very thing that threatened future agriculture. For example, the conservative approach led to scepticism concerning dairy production, which was more seen as a supplement to the household, rather than the most economically vibrant part.\textsuperscript{53} There were several attempts to promote rationality, for example, through a reward system initiated by the government and performed by \textit{County Agricultural Societies}. All aspects of the small farms were evaluated, and rewarded farms were intended to act as positive examples. The evaluation was a function of the traditional division of labour, since housewives were also evaluated (and the results published concerning pigs, poultry, and the barn).\textsuperscript{54} The background of the reward system was the belief that smallholders in general were uninterested in development, sceptical of new methods, and did not communicate with each other. The language used was often semi-religious, as one article called for an agricultural mission to bring the smallholders into the modern world.\textsuperscript{55} Short texts, songs, and poems were common in the monthly appendix to \textit{The Farmer} and differed from the general language in the agrarian press. Patriotism and nationalism were in general un-reflected ideas. The appendix, on the other hand, used much space to promote patriotism, anti-urbanism, and the national importance of agriculture. The patriarchal idea was that smallholders were less patriotic than other groups in agrarian society.\textsuperscript{56} The propaganda portrayed agriculture as something totally different from industry. Agriculture was healthy, patriotic, modern, could “counter emigration, settle the countryside, work the soil and push people forward to the ballots.”\textsuperscript{57} The use of short stories and lyrics was a quite common phenomenon, and advice from the Finnish \textit{Pellervo} was often translated. These consisted of a collection of one-sentence statements concerning milking. One example was, “Milk with dry hands!”\textsuperscript{58} Education was extremely important in this respect, and the \textit{County Agricultural Societies} were the chief executives. Often the same kind of language was used in promoting modern agriculture. For example, “a kitchen garden at the farm gives occupation to the children, diversified food and brings atmosphere to the home.”\textsuperscript{59}

At the same time as smallholders were believed to be too conservative, this was also attributed to manors and estates, not least concerning buildings.

\textsuperscript{53} “Kan jordbruket på mindre egendomar i Sverige i allmänhet anses gå framåt?”, \textit{Tidskrift för landtmän}, 1881:29 and “Bör man tillråda de mindre mejerierna att upphöra och istället upp-rätta bolagsmejerier?”, \textit{Tidskrift för landtmän}, 1886:35.
\textsuperscript{54} “Några framstående smärre svenska jordbruk”, \textit{Landtmannens månadsbilaga}, 1903:12.
\textsuperscript{55} “En fråga för dagen”, \textit{Landtmannen}, 1902:42.
\textsuperscript{56} Thörn, Gustaf, “Några tankar rörande jordbruket och fosterlandskärleken.”, \textit{Landtmannens månadsbilaga}, 1904:1 and “Vi måste...!”, \textit{Landtmannens månadsbilaga}, 1906:1.
\textsuperscript{57} “Småbrukets betydelse”, \textit{Landtmannens månadsblad}, 1908:19.
\textsuperscript{58} “Mjölkare!”, \textit{Landtmannens månadsblad}, 1907:6. See also Odhe, Thorsten, \textit{Kooperationen i Finland} (Stockholm 1929).
\textsuperscript{59} “Från en småbrukarkurs i Norrbotten”, \textit{Landtmannens månadsbilaga}, 1905:2.
Manors, it was said, often had “massive and prestigious buildings that would stand for centuries” or were “palace-like”. The same impressive manorial dairies had been state-of-the-art earlier, but now the very buildings countered the development of a modern dairy industry.\footnote{“Om landtmannabyggnader”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1883:5.} Opposed to this, small farms were described as having the possibility of specialization. They could more easily manage green crops and new forms of production than could larger farms. The small farm also had an advantage in animal husbandry and milking. Since it was the farmer’s own wife and daughters that worked on the farm, the farmer could easily supervise and guide them.\footnote{Insulander, Erik, ”Det lilla jordbruket i jemförelse med det stora.”, Landtmannens månadblad, 1902:8.} This view of the agrarian family as a production unit visualizes the strong patriarchal concepts in agriculture.

An example concerning the modern and rational farmer dealt with the relationship between science and practice. Sometimes, the agrarian press was believed to be too heavy on the science side. The ideal was an exchange of experiences between scientists and practitioners. The farmers had to be able to assess scientific results and the modern farmer was one who understood science and could apply it in the daily running of the farm.\footnote{“Något om konsten att läsa”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1882:34.}

Gendered dairies

In the discourses surrounding agriculture, hygiene was central, and was strongly connected to gender. Disinfection, cleanliness, and hygiene were used as arguments for developing the dairy industry, and were also linked to efficiency. Ventilation particularly became a way forward, as it was stated that good and fresh air increased working capacity both in barns and in living quarters.\footnote{“En brännande fråga”, Landtmannens månadssblad, 1910:8.} Milk quality, however, was the most important factor. This concept was integrated in the development of cooperative dairies by controlling deliveries. To enforce better quality, the cows had to be healthy, well-fed, and watered, and the barns had to be clean, airy, bright, and warm. The milking process needed structure and the farm-maids needed to be clean and properly dressed, with milking taking place at specific times. The purpose of the rules was to enforce order and discipline on the individual farm level. Farmers who were unable to maintain quality would be forbidden from delivering milk to cooperative dairies.\footnote{“Mjölkens frambringande och behandling för andelsmejerierna”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1901:22 and 24.} The modernizing agenda focused on milking, and the problem was that farmers were believed to be uninterested in proper and hygienic production. The main reason was that milking was
seen as degrading (“vanärande”). One example comes from a Danish article discussing the problem of acquiring competent farm-maids. Instead of farm-maids, many manors had to use “wives, full-grown men, and one or two maids”, leading to inferior milking. The solution was to create a new order concerning animal husbandry. The farmers ought to give a young, energetic man the responsibility of milking, feeding, and managing cows and pigs, pay him enough to have his own household, and have the staff live with him. This would, according to the writer, solve the problem of inferior quality. This article is very interesting, since it clearly portrays how milking was perceived. First of all, it was a problem that full-grown men and dilettantes were forced to milk. Secondly, the responsible young man was the one who could solve the problem, by creating a basic and hierarchal family unit.

Milking was one of the more important issues in the modernity discourse as the agrarian press promoted it. For example, scientific advice was offered on the correct way to milk cows. The barn needed to be bright, clean, and airy and the cows should be clean, well-groomed and have plenty of space. The milk buckets needed to be extremely clean, etc. The advice continues with regulations concerning hygiene, and finishes with a proclamation of the need to milk out the cow completely. All of the advice on hygiene and quality created further issues. One was that the South Sweden Dairy Organisation (Sydsvenska mejeriföreningen) in 1900 decided to nationally distribute rules for the barn.

Research and education were discussed with a gendered pre-understanding. Men were described as rational and scientific, but also as practical in the daily running of the dairy, while dairymaids were seldom mentioned at all. In one article, the only feminine actor mentioned was the nation. Sweden was described as a feminine entity, where science and practice, hand in hand, would benefit the nation, who in return always benefited science. The connection between science and practice was portrayed as the central issue for the development of agriculture.

The Ideal Housewife

It is obvious that the rationalization of agriculture brought a perceived need to control production. The patriarchal concept of rationalization also led to

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65 “Om mjölkning, mjölkrening och mjölkens afkylning”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1906:52.
66 Böggild, B., ”Om mjölkningen på herrgården”, Landtmannen, 1898:49.
67 Flach, Wilhelm, ”Se till at korna blir väl mjölkkade!”, Landtmannens månadsbilaga, 1897:3. Also ”Vigten af mjölkningens riktiga utförande”, Landtmannens månadsbilaga, 1898:11 (more scientific article) and ”Vigten af omsorgsfult utförd mjölkning”, Landtmannens månadsbilaga, 1900:6. “Om mjölkningens utförande”, Landtmannens månadsbilaga, 1903:7.
68 ”Sydsvenska mejeriföreningen”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1900:31.
69 Sebelien, John (teacher at Ultuna Dairy School), ”Om mejeriskolor och mejeriförsök”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1886:2.
ideas on how to control the household. One article describes the housewife holding mainly the same duties as the master, but within certain boundaries. The primary female quality was described as orderliness. The house should be kept clean and symmetrical, as everything should have its designated place. Daily work should be performed according to a written agenda. Meals should be served at the same time every day, sheets and towels should be changed at defined intervals. Orderliness was the cornerstone of every well-functioning home. An equally important quality for the exemplary housewife was firmness. Housemaids should be led with a firm hand, and the housewife should make it clear that she was in charge. On the other hand, a young and inexperienced housewife could take advice from the maids and the two should work together. Kindness and patience were part of the firm running of the household. She should always remain calm and not become upset or angry, since that affected the harmony of the household. A housewife with all of these qualities would become the supreme mother of the house.70

This approach signalled a need to reaffirm the traditional division of labour. At the same time, the obsession with hygiene, orderliness, cleanliness, and tidiness shows that a modern and rational running of the farm affected the traditional female sphere. It was a scientific way to re-enforce traditional boundaries.

One of the more important ideas concerned education for housewives, not least for the wives of smallholders. It points out that many farms had gone bankrupt because of female inability and ignorance. It did not matter that the man had knowledge if “the other leg of the horse” was weak. The idea was that housewives needed to be educated in the maintenance of the garden, household economics, food preparation, and animal husbandry. This would then avoid a situation where “large holes were gnawed in the wallet of the master through female ignorance, listlessness and laziness”.71

Much of the rational and scientific approach to housekeeping focused on food and the responsibilities of the housewife. First of all, the human body was described as a machine that needed food like a machine needed fuel. A well-fed body could easily work and was resilient to disease. The most important food was meat, and the article refers to the Greeks and Romans, who lived on a meat-based diet. This gave them strength and endurance, and produced skilled warriors. Fat was also important, as it kept the cold away. Water and salt were essential. The good housewife should add to this the pleasures of life such as: spices, fruit, sugar, onions, vegetables, tea, coffee, beer, wine and alcohol.72

70 “Om en husmoders pligter i allmänhet”, Tidskrift för landmän, 1890:2. The article originally came from the paper The Housewife (Husmodern).
72 “För hushållet. Menniskans föda”, Tidskrift för landmän, 1890:6. The article originally came from the German Stütz der Hausfrau.
The modernization of the home was yet another important feature of the agrarian press and agriculture, and held a specific relation to gender. A speech held by Kerstin Hesselgren at the Smallholder’s day (Småbrukardagen) in 1912 focused on female tasks in modern agriculture. The home needed a well-performing and efficient housewife. Cooking, dishwashing, and cleaning should be modernized through the use of technology. The general attitude was that housewives were inept in managing the home. One example was that children were allowed to run around without wiping their feet. The speech aimed at enforcing strict and rational routines, and at the same time reaffirmed the female sphere and its traditional responsibilities. The speech was also extremely rational in its approach, since it promoted the idea of calculating the food intake of the family in the same manner as for cattle. It was also stated that “anyone who tries to replace real food with coffee, was as un-sensible as someone who tried to fuel a steam engine with straw”.

The focus on structuring female labour in the home and maintaining female labour in the countryside increased with the outbreak of World War I. Rationality was increasingly important as food production became critical. Concerning female labour, it was stated that the new opportunities in the cities were due to female laziness and the existence of desk jobs (“frökenjobb”, a derogatory term). The article presenting this was not sceptical of modern society as such. Women had their rightful place, in industry as well as society. The problem was that women left the countryside and agriculture for the city, which was described as an anthill.

The Image of Modernity

The ever-present K. F. Lundin presented a new, modern, and rational dairy in 1898. Hamra Dairy in Tumba, outside Stockholm, was described in lyrical terms. For instance, the milk was transported directly from the barn using carts, and only required the work of one man. The descriptions all focused on tidiness and efficiency, using a technical terminology. Hygiene was important at Hamra, as veterinarians and doctors supervised the staff and the livestock. Hamra also had specific rules for personal hygiene, and incorporated a bathhouse for the staff. The purpose, of course, was to present the modern dairy and at the same time portray the future possibilities of modern dairy production.

73 “Kvinnans uppgift i landbrukarehemmet.”, Landtmannens månadsblad, 1912:21.
75 “Hamra mejeri”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1898.
Agricultural exhibitions were another arena where modernity was described. In 1901 the *National Agricultural Exhibition* (Landbruksmötet) was held in Gävle, and the contrast between old and new completely governed the descriptions. The display started with an exhibition of historical dairy production. All of the historical items were described as broken, dirty, smelly, unattractive, inefficient, and outmoded. This was contrasted to the modern dairy exhibition, where the terms spacious, airy, bright, practical, cheap, tasteful, efficient, modern, and remarkable were used.76

Yet other aspects of rationalization were centralization and standardization. From 1887 there was a Swedish dairy-agent in Manchester and in 1894 the *Swedish National Butter Tests* (Svenska smörprovingarna) were initiated. It was believed that a modern and centralized dairy industry could use technical benefits to the fullest extent, hiring the best dairymen as well as creating a “real” business.77 Against this stood household production, generally seen as outdated and lacking in quality, both by dairy consultants and others. Hand separators were increasing in numbers and efficiency. Dairy consultant K. F. Lundin was sceptical of household production (although he worked for the largest producer of hand separators). Firstly, household production threatened cooperative dairies; secondly, it led to the production of inferior butter; thirdly, it led to lower prices for individual farmers since they could not manage the market. Lundin’s proposal was, apart from strengthening cooperative dairies, that farmers should deliver cream to the dairies and keep the milk.78 The question of “farmer’s butter” (“bondsmör”) was common in the debates concerning dairy production. Although it was not seen as positive, advice was given on how to promote the quality.79

### Modern Education

Agricultural education became extremely important in the discourses concerning modernity and rationality. Agricultural education was primarily carried out by *Adult Education Colleges* (folkhögskolor), *County Agricultural Society* courses, or private schools. Another form involved travelling instructors and teachers.80

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76 “Landbruksmötet i Gefle”, *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1901:32.
77 “Smörtillverkningens centralisering”, *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1900:23 and 24.
78 Lundin, K. F., ”Vore det till vår mjölkhusållnings fördel, om de mindre jordbrukare, som sjelfva tillverka smör,i stället levererade grädde till gemensamma mejerier”, *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1902:49.
79 ”Om mjölkbehandling och smörberedning i hemmen.”, *Landtmannens månadsbilaga*, 1900:3 and ”Vår hushållsmejerier och deras upphjelpande”, *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1900:38.
80 The agricultural education system was described at length by Juhlin-Dannfelt, Herman, "Hvilka åtgärder äro lämpliga för att sprida yrkes kunskap bland innehafvare af smärre jordbruk?”, *Landtmannen*, 1904:24, 25, 26 and 27. "Jordbrukareungdomens undervisning”, *Landtmannens månadsblad*, 1912:10 and ”Landtbruket och ungdomen”, 1912:19.
The entire concept of education focused on youth, but was at the same time a function of the agrarian vision of society. Agricultural education was generally seen as positive, while student education was more problematic. In one article, the writer said that the nation needed civil servants and that this was all and well. The problem was that farmers also sent their children on to higher education, due to the negative spirit in the countryside. This was taken as evidence for the fact that agriculture had lost its position as the backbone of the nation. The solution was to invoke a new spirit, a rebirth of agriculture focusing on youth.81

Dairy education was perhaps the most important factor used to improve Swedish agriculture. Modernity and rationality, as shown by Lena Sommestad, were masculine ideals that did not encompass women, as did education. Dairymaids were often attributed with negative qualities, but there are, however, examples of other aspects relating to female education. In Malmöhus län in 1883, men and women were given more or less the same dairy schooling. The purpose was to educate able (“dugliga”) dairymen and dairymaids, with both a practical and theoretical education. The term dairyman was also used for both men and women. At the same time, the description contained a few differences between the sexes since women would also receive thorough training in writing and counting. Men were expected to have this knowledge from the beginning. Another difference was that the male students paid for their subsistence, while the female students were accepted free of charge. All students received an education in the management and maintenance of steam engines, and this also applied to the female students.82

Another example comes from descriptions of courses for dairymaids at Hvilan Adult Education College. The idea was that dairymaids employed at estate-dairies had several hours free from dairy work every day. Therefore they needed education to become useful help for housewives. Hvilan offered courses in handicrafts and housekeeping together with dairy education.83 An interpretation of this is that there was a need to control and define the exact nature of the work performed by dairymaids. It was a traditional view of managing labour, especially female labour. At the same time it was modern, since the maids received dairy education both a theoretical and practical dairy education. This is an example of one of the breaking points between modernization and tradition. The recruitment of students to Alnarp Agricultural Institute in Skåne was aimed exclusively at men, and any future student had to be: over 18 years of age, well reputed (“frejdad”), have good religious knowledge, and be free of any contagious diseases. A priest and a doctor should attest to this. Again, the older version of individual standing and mo-

81 “Studenter till jordbruket”, Landtmannens månadsblad, 1913:2.
rality was important. Furthermore, the student had to have full knowledge of the Swedish language (spelling and grammar), know arithmetic, physical and political geography, and the first six books of Euclides. The board could, however, accept students without the former education if the student demonstrated exceptional practical skills in agriculture.84

The tension between science and practice also existed in the discussions on education. It was said that the modern farmer needed another kind of education to meet the new situation. In the discourse presented, there were threads of the organic view of society, since the sons of farmers had physical strength and were used to working hard. The sons of gentlemen (“herremän”) were not, but both groups were needed to work together in a modern society. The general idea was that young farmers needed both education and hard work.85

Education had a direct ideological connection to citizenship in several ways. The idea was that schooling should increase the student’s knowledge of humanistic disciplines. History, geography, political science, singing, and gymnastics were deemed as fostering (“uppfostrande”) and patriotic. The other side of the coin was the professional training, since “no one could be a good citizen without professional skills”. The purpose was to educate good citizens and able farmers.86 The final remark was that the first priority in the education of young farmers was to create a feeling of spiritual and national awareness. From this, a willingness to learn and to educate would develop.

The discussion concerning education for smallholders had many different angles, as adult colleges and farm schools were seen as having different responsibilities. The former gave the young freeholder education for his role as a citizen, while the latter gave him the professional skills of a farmer. The problem was that education was more directed towards the running of large farms, not at smallholders. Therefore, many smallholders only took specific courses arranged locally. The real problem, according to the article, was that these courses did not include any education for the citizen.87

Denmark was also the prime example concerning adult education. It was described as being free from state influence, apart from the fact that the state had to make the farmer aware of his own interests. Danish development was described as the results of awareness and the energetic, hard work of individual farmers. The spirit of Grundtvig was the foundation of an enlightened way to prosperity. The article used a semi-religious language, where salvation and awakening created by the spoken word was important. The teachers were described as preachers with the sole destiny of inspiring the desire to learn in the hearts of the young. The most important aspect of education was

to promote a patriotic spirit, thereby promoting a will to learn, develop, and create. Apart from the patriotic spirit, it was seen as necessary that children acquired an education and enjoyed a firm upbringing. This would make them into useful and thinking members of society. Book learning was important, together with individual thinking and writing.

Patriotism was to be enforced through elementary schools, since people had to be fostered in a new way to enable them to fulfil their patriotic duty. The problem was described as a lack of moral standards and roughness of the youth which in turn led to a lack of civic responsibility. Therefore the elementary schools should invoke the spirit of agriculture, described as the healthiest and noblest of all trades, and as the very foundation of society.

Citizenship and Cooperation

Citizenship is not always an easily identifiable category, and it is obvious that there were different interpretations concerning citizenship. In general the agrarian press did not discuss it per se, but it can be found in discussions concerning education and smallholders. The word “frejd” (well reputed) belonged to an older tradition and at the same time more liberal notions often appeared in the press.

However, the formation of organizations incorporated several different kinds of notions that can be linked to citizenship proper, since membership in an organization demanded different definitions of responsibility involving demands put on potential members, codes of conduct, and rules concerning voting.

Cooperative Inclusion and Exclusion

Many different types of organizations were being created in the 1890s: dairy organizations, cooperatives, and other forms were among the most common. As mentioned above, cooperative dairy production was seen as more rational than other forms of dairy production. The cooperative ideals infused the debate concerning private dairies (seen as non-functional).

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91 The writer in this case was the omnipresent K. F. Lundin. "Är vårt mejeriväsende tillfredsställande och för framtiden betryggande?", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1890:17, 19 and 21.
The question of smallholders versus large farmers was also ever-present in the discussions concerning cooperatives. The general idea was that smallholders and small farms needed cooperation more than others. It was only through cooperatives that smallholders could make full use of their products. Agriculture as such could only survive if smallholders worked together and received all of the benefits of large farms, but without their hazards. The monthly Appendix used many examples from Finland, and regularly translated and published texts from Pellervo. Much of the Finnish material pertained to ideological issues, and came in the form of exclamations. For example, one article was full of concepts like “one for all and all for one”. Ideas concerning ownership were also addressed in the same manner “nothing is mine or yours, but everything is ours”. The cooperative movement was described as a large family: no one stood alone, but there were always friends in the cooperative.

Denmark was the positive example of rational cooperative dairies, and it was from Denmark that initial regulations for cooperative dairies came. Model regulations, for example, were published in 1890 (directly translated from Danish). Anyone was allowed to become a member after being suggested and accepted by the board. The new member had to take on part of the cooperative credit, and also pay money into the common reserve fund. The basis of membership was related to the number of cows (1-4 cows equalled 1 vote, 5-9 equalled 2 votes and more than 10 cows equalled 3 votes).

Quality was the most essential part of the regulations, and members had to deliver clean, sound, and undiluted milk. Quality problems had to be dealt with before any delivery, and the rules for fodder and its composition had to be upheld. Finally, no member could stop the board from inspecting member farms. The model regulations did not contain any reference to landowning, and it does not seem that tenant farmers were prohibited from entering. The central stratification came from the number of cows. This was a kind of informal social control leading to a willingness to deliver high-quality milk.

There were, however, other forms of model regulations taken from Sweden. None contained explicit definitions for potential members, but voting procedures were connected to landowning as well as to the membership fee. For every 10 acres the member received one vote, and for every 10 acres the member paid a fee. Tenant farmers were free to join and the same rules con-
cerning quality, mentioned above, applied to them. “Unity gives strength” was the principle.95

The law governing economic organizations came into action in January 1897, and was an important factor for agrarian organizations. Before this time, there were no clear laws defining the workings of cooperatives. This did not mean that cooperative dairies and agrarian organizations did not exist; quite the contrary. The 1890s was the formative period concerning cooperative dairies in Sweden. In 1895 there were 256 cooperative dairies in the southern parts of the country. In Skåne there were 94 cooperative dairies (all founded between 1890–1895).96

The running of cooperative dairies entailed many different relations between members, but also between the cooperative and employees. The dairyman and dairymaids were in charge of the day-to-day running of the dairy, and also in charge of the dairy-shop. The direct selling of products was hard to control, according to the article, and the dairyman was only controlled by his own conscience.97

Cooperative organizations also created other kinds of relationships between agrarian groups. There was a connection between “new” agrarian elites and cooperative dairies. This was shown in discussions concerning the need for stronger and more efficient organizations involving cooperatives. Meetings were held in Skåne during 1892 and 1893, described in the agrarian press. These give an insight into how new and educated groups defined their profession. The discussions concerned the forming of an interest organisation for cooperative dairies in the south of Sweden, as well as to how the supply of milk should be structured. Among the representatives there are no clearly identifiable members of the traditional elites, but this does not mean that there were none. However, it is evident that the number of titles concerning economic organization, i.e. director and consultant, were increasing, while the participation of noblemen had diminished. This was also the case concerning the Association for Cooperative Dairies (Föreningen för andelsmejerier).98

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96 Melin, Yngve, "Några iakttagelser och önskningsmål på mejeriområdet", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1896, p. 320. Melin was a dairy consultant.

97 "Våra andelsmejeriers organisation", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1903:1. In a following article, technical solutions to the problem were presented. "Våra andelsmejeriers kassakontroll", *Tidskrift för landtmän*, 1903:45.

Purchase-organizations

Purchase-organizations were among the first and most important developments on the agricultural scene. These types of organizations had existed for some time, but it was around the turn of the century that larger regional organizations and later a national organization were created, inspired by Germany.

One aspect was that many purchase-organizations were created in relation to other cooperative organizations. For example, it was common that members of a cooperative dairy, or a cooperative mill also created a purchase-organization. These were presented as an important part in creating modern, rational, and efficient agriculture. The farmer needed quality products (fertilizers, fodder etc) to be able to produce quality products. Another benefit was that smaller farmers could enjoy lower prices. The general problem was that estate-owners and large farmers could get lower prices by buying in bulk. Railway freight costs were also cheaper when buying in bulk. Smallholders could not attain these benefits without organization. In a series of articles from 1903, several different purchase-organizations were described. The Consumption Association of Skaraborg (Skaraborgs läns konsumtionsförening) had existed since 1896 and held a semi-official position, since board members were appointed by the County Agricultural Society. The reason was said to safeguard the reputation of the organization and profits were redistributed to the members in relation to how much each had bought during the year. Members could be either individuals or organizations. The agrarian press argued that purchase-organizations were very important, as merchants could be bypassed using unity and direct links to producers. The best system was cooperative, where the member acquired shares in relation to the size of the farms. Private limited companies required more capital, and did not attract smallholders. Tradesmen were often described as capitalists only interested in profit, as opposed to farmers. The suggestion was that small local organizations would be created, and that the board should know every individual member. In turn, the local organizations would create regional organizations.

The process went quickly, and in May 1905, interested parties met in Stockholm to discuss how a national organization should be created. The ideological foundation was described as self-defence, since Swedish producers of fertilizer refused to trade with the regional purchase-organizations. The Farmers (Landtmännen) was founded as an umbrella organization, with membership only for large organizations, and initially there were several different kinds. Although the larger organizations were important, the major-

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99 "Hvad betydelse hafva inköpsföreningar och huru böra de organiseras?", Tidskrift för landtmän, 1903:36.
100 Leufvén, G., "Om inköpsföreningar och deras organisation", Tidskrift för landtmän, 1903:40, 42 and 43. Leufvén was a Swedish agronomist.
ity of the individual members were actually smallholders. The founding organizations were the cooperatives: Farmers’ Central Organisation of Skåne (Skånska landtmännens centralförening), Farmers’ Central Organisation of Södermanland (Sörmländska landtmännens centralförening), the Consumption Organisation of Skaraborg County (Skaraborgs läns konsumtionsförening), the Farmers’ Union of Westernorrland County (Vesternorrlands läns landtmannaförbund), and the Central Purchase Organisation of Halland County (Hallands läns centralinköpsförening). Limited companies were also members: Farmers’ Union in Gefle Ltd. (Aktiebolaget landtmannaförbundet i Gefle) and Farmers of Blekinge Ltd. (Aktiebolaget Blekinge landtmän). Although there were anti-capitalist ideas in the creation of the organization, the traditional elites were represented on the board, many with strong links to business and industry. The chairman was Count Hugo Hamilton, followed by Baron J. Bennet, estate-owners Edvard Beijer and G. Sederholm, directors Tor Bergqvist and Henry Hvid, and finally county-agronomist E.O. Arenander.

Firstly, it was an economic association with the expressed purpose of fighting Swedish trusts. According to The Farmers, the fertilizer trust had the expressed purpose of countering the founding of agrarian organizations, through maintaining higher prices for them. Secondly, it was an arena for ideological discussion, where all forms of cooperative ideals were discussed. For example, at the first yearly meeting in February 1906, discussions were held concerning cooperative butcheries and state sponsored storage facilities for grain. Thirdly, it was a political force that could obtain state support for different kinds of investments. This was in large part due to the fact that the board members were mostly political figures (mainly conservative). For example, at the yearly meeting in 1907 a lecture was held on the topic “Swedish yeomen arming against socialism” (“Sveriges allmoge beväpnar sig mot socialismen”).

Before the creation of the national organization there had been a period of quick and comprehensive regional organization. Apparently there was a need to structure how the members bought supplies through the organizations, and also the exact nature of them. For instance, there were strong rules concerning how and when payments should be done. It was also forbidden for the purchase-organizations to deal in coffee, sugar and other supplies.

In 1904 Farmers’ Central Organisation of Skåne was created with the purpose of buying agricultural supplies, organizing the selling of agricultural products, and working for the economic good of the members. The members

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101 Swedish historian Rydén writes that 60 percent of the members were smallholders. Rydén, “Att åka snålkjuts är icke hederligt”, p. 70.
102 Leufvén, G., ”Svenska landtmännens riksförbund”, Tidskrift för landtmän, 1905:37.
104 Arenander, E. O., ”Föreningsrörelsen i Westernorrlands län”, Landtmannen, 1902:3.
could be either organizations in which members together had at least 200 hectares, or individuals with more than 200 hectares of arable land. The membership fee was 5 kronor/hectare. These were the initial proposals, but in the regulations which passed, the 200-hectare limit had disappeared.\textsuperscript{105} The probable reason for relaxed entrance demands was a will to incorporate more or less all of the farmers in the region.

In April 1905 Farmers’ Central Organisation of Södermanland was created at a meeting under the chairmanship of county governor Erik Gustaf Boström (former Prime Minister) using the same regulations as in Skåne. In an article describing the formation, it was clearly stated that there was a rift between large farmers and smallholders. The large farmers were not that interested in participating in the organization, as they had less economic incentives. The writer stated that large farmers had to step out of their isolation and participate for the common good, and that the smallholders were risking just as much as an estate-owner.\textsuperscript{106}

Conclusions

The agrarian press was one of several important vehicles for agricultural change and modernization. In general, the press did not discuss citizenship, albeit discourses were visible primarily concerning education and smallholders. One reason for this was the Swedish political system and the character of the press. The system allowed farmers access to the political sphere through the general liberal notions concerning citizenship. The other reason was that the agrarian press focused on farmers and estate-owners, groups who already had political access. Discussing smallholders, it is obvious that the press as such held patriarchal beliefs concerning the need to educate and “nationalize” smallholders. They had to become good patriots through education (amongst other things in citizenship) with the outspoken idea that they had to be saved from socialism. At the same time there seems to be a separation between different kinds of schooling. Education for the citizen was separated from professional education. Articles directed towards smallholders focused mainly on promoting a specific agrarian culture of modernization. The existence of strong and prevalent agrarian discourses, portraying rural life as superior to city life, was integral in the discussions concerning citizenship and smallholders. One factor might be that elite groups saw smallholders as potential allies against the growing working classes.

There are indications that citizenship as such was discussed with a specific agrarian touch. Landowning was extremely important, since it created

\textsuperscript{105} “Förslag till stadgar för Skånska Landtmännens Centralförening” and ”Stadgar för Skånska Landtmännens Centralförening”, enclosed Landtmannen, 1904:4.

\textsuperscript{106} Insulander, Erik, ”Sörmländska Landtmännens Centralförening”, Landtmannen, 1905:15.
autonomy, something that in turn affected membership in cooperatives and citizenship. It was the autonomous man that could take responsibility for debts and membership payments. Ownership or control were the identifying markers for voting procedures within agrarian organizations.

Agrarianism and conservatism were important ideologies in the societal discourse concerning franchise and agriculture. The very negative views on franchise of the Agrarian League actually defined their idea of citizenship. Concepts of hierarchy and masculinity imbued the conservative-agrarian notion of citizenship. Landowning and farming created responsible men: firmly rooted, traditional, patriarchal, strong, and able to participate in the decision-making process. They were educated, professional, rational, and modern. Smallholders, on the other hand, were often seen as egocentric and conservative, only interested in their own farms.

One important thing is that the agrarian press mainly addressed large farmers, and it therefore was quite elitist. There were, however, other examples of papers and groups addressed specifically to smallholders. Apart from Rösiö, mentioned earlier, John L. Saxon’s paper *The Sower (Såningsmannen)* was a proponent for cooperative and emancipatory ideals. He was a strong proponent of adult education colleges. At the same time, he encompassed the common agrarian ideal of viewing urbanization as an unnatural state.107 Another example was Anders Larsson-Killian, who wrote poems and worked for adult education. His work had a very romantic touch in portraying the hard-working smallholders. He combined romantic descriptions of nature with advice on how to use fertilizers.108

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Traditions of Gender, Class, and Language: Cooperative Organizing in a Finland-Swedish Community

Ann-Catrin Östman

Focusing aspects of class, gender, and language, this paper explores patterns of cooperative organizing in the Swedish-speaking parts of Finland. Depicting the establishment of dairy cooperatives, this study will focus the conjuncture of traditional and new forms of organizations in a rural community. The community under study, Purmo, is located in Ostrobothnia in the western, Swedish-speaking part of Finland. As Anu-Mai Kõll states in her introduction, the peasantry of Sweden and Finland traditionally held a strong position both with regard to landownership and to political representation. The province of Ostrobothnia in Western Finland was characterized by an early dominance of freehold peasants, and social differences were less marked here than in other parts of Finland. In this region, there were very few manors and few representatives of higher estates. Moreover, the model village ordinance which had been drawn up in Sweden in 1742 was used rather vividly in both Swedish and Finnish-speaking Ostrobothnia.¹ Forming the basis of the political representation, the importance of the freeholder category also influenced the communities on a local level as well as patterns of self-government. This article is stresses the importance of traditional and homosocial pattern of social interaction during a period of rapid change. Earlier studies have also stressed the importance of traditional forms of interaction which occurred when cooperatives were founded in the Finnish countryside.²

The point of departure is local: from a microhistorical point of view, the paper examines social and economic interaction in a Swedish-speaking community, Purmo, in the western part of the country. The discussion will focus on the impact of class and language on local interaction as well as on women’s and men’s possibilities of participating in political and social are-

nas connected to agriculture. From the 1880s onwards, butter production was commercialized, and the production of milk increased. At the same time, the first peasant-owned dairies for butter production were created. In 1893, twelve small dairies were producing and exporting milk in the municipality of Purmo. By 1917, three cooperative dairies, which mainly produced butter, had been founded in this community with roughly 2000 inhabitants. Furthermore, the article will present some examples of how cooperative organizing was envisioned and depicted in cooperative journals published in Swedish in Finland, thus providing comparisons between local patterns and regional understandings of cooperative organizing.3

Language and cooperative organization

At the turn of the century, the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland amounted to 12.9 percent (approximately 350,000 people). The Swedish-speaking population was heterogeneous and consisted of different groups, including working classes. The upper classes and the nobility had historically been Swedish-speaking. The Swedish-speaking people in Finland were often described by the terms "the educated" (de bildade) and the peasantry. This dividing into two parts rendered other groups, for example the rural and urban working classes, invisible.

The almost unilingual community under study is located on the language-border – a border which was given a new meaning at this time when the idea of "Swedish-speaking Finland", a Swedish territory within Finland, was established, and when nationalist ideology was utilized in order to create bonds between these different social groups in the late 19th century. The term Svenskfinland ("Swedish-Finland" or "Swedish-speaking Finland"), referring to communities where Swedish was the dominant language, was established in the 1910s, and the concept finlandssvenskar (Swedish-speaking Finns, e.g. Finland-Swedes) is also a construct of this decade. The majority of the Swedish-speakers lived in rural areas along the coast: in Ostrobothnia, in Nyland (Uusimaa) in Southern Finland, in the archipelago region of Åbo (Turku), and on the Åland Islands.4

One of the earliest Finnish cooperative dairies, Broända Andelsmejeri, was founded in the Swedish parts of Ostrobothnia. Established as a com-

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3 Some parts of the text about the local community have been published earlier, in longer version, in the conference-proceedings from the conference “The impact of Markets in the Management of the Rural Land”, Zaragoza 22-23.9.2006; Östman, Ann-Catrin, “Women’s work, masculine ideals and milk on the market. Cooperative organizing and economic agency”, in Pinella, Vincente (ed.), Markets and Agricultural Change in Europe from the 13th to the 20th century (Brepols 2008).

pany in 1887, it was given a new name and organized according to cooperative ideals in 1891.\(^5\) Compared to other parts of Finland, peasant-owned dairies were founded early in Ostrobothnia – both in the Swedish, and Finnish speaking parts. Many small dairy companies worked in this area in the 1890s. The establishment of companies was simplified by a law taken in 1895.\(^6\)

The ideas of cooperative ideology had spread early to Finland. The earliest societies were, however, focused on consumption. The first brochure presenting the ideas of cooperative dairying was published in 1893. It was written in Swedish by two Swedish-speaking Finns, Arthur Granström and Gösta Grotenfelt. This text *Om Andelsmejerier* (“About Dairy cooperatives”) won a prize question arranged by the Finnish economic society (*Finska Hushållningssällskapet*).\(^7\) It was translated into Finnish the same year. In the 1880s Grotenfelt had studied in Copenhagen, and he was particularly interested in the improvement of agricultural teaching.\(^8\) From 1901, Grotenfelt held the first chair of agricultural economy and agriculture at the University of Helsinki. Granström was a lawyer, who later participated in the writing of the law text on cooperatives.\(^9\) When he published another pamphlet about cooperatives in 1898, Granström presented a wide range of different societies.\(^10\) This text was also translated into Finnish. Granström has, however, fallen into oblivion, and the establishment of Finnish cooperative organizing has later on almost exclusively been associated with Hannes Gebbard\(^11\), an historian and social scientist who had studied in Germany in the 1890s, and who published a book on cooperatives in 1899\(^12\). In the Finland-Swedish context, the early writings of and the early work of Swedish-speaking activists of cooperative organizing have remained almost undisclosed in scholarly texts. There are very few scholarly studies of Swedish cooperatives in Finland.\(^13\)


\(^7\) Grotenfelt, Gösta and Granström, Arthur, *Om Andelsmejerier* (Åbo 1893).


\(^12\) Gebhard, Hannes, *Maanviljelijän yhteistoiminnasta ulkomailla* (Helsinki 1899).

Initiated by Hannes Gebhard, Pellervo, a central and national cooperative organization was founded in 1899. The main language was Finnish, but this organization also worked in the Swedish-speaking areas and strived to engage Swedish-speaking members. Between 1900 and 1919, the organisation published a journal named *Pellervo* in both Swedish and Finnish. A cooperative act was passed in 1901, and during the following five years many cooperatives were founded in the Finnish countryside, especially in Finnish-speaking areas. There were relatively few dairy cooperatives in the Swedish-speaking areas of southern Finland (Nyland), which was a more urbanized and industrialized district characterized by larger class difference and relatively large percentages of manor lands. There were, however, many cooperatives in Swedish-speaking Ostrobothnia and on the Åland Islands.\(^{14}\)

Initiated by Pellervo, a central cooperative selling organization – Valio – was established in 1905. Swedish-speaking representatives of Ostrobothnian cooperatives gathered to discuss a possible membership in Valio in November 1905. This meeting with representatives from this formally bilingual organization was adjourned after long discussions, which mainly seem to have touched on questions about money and credits. The following day a separate Swedish organization, Unity (*Enigheten*), was formed. This Swedish umbrella association, which mainly functioned as a central cooperative educational organization in Swedish-speaking Ostrobothnia, began in 1906. In the history books about Swedish-speaking cooperative organizing written by lay authors, this decision is related to aspects of language. Nevertheless, the quotations presented from the inauguration meeting stress financial aspects. However, a major part of the cooperative dairies working on the Åland Islands, a totally unilingual Swedish area, chose to sell butter to the central Finnish organization Valio.\(^{15}\)

Pellervo, the cooperative union, was divided in the 1910s. First, leftist consumer cooperatives left the organisation. Some years later, in 1919, the Swedish cooperative union of Finland (*Finlands Svenska Andelsförbund*) was founded. This Swedish union was a loose organization which aimed at gathering Swedish-speaking cooperatives. Even if cooperative organizing coincided with the heyday of Swedish nationalism in Finland, this new union never managed to create entirely Swedish organizations. It was depicted as an “independent brotherly organization” of Pellervo (“självständig broderorganisation”).\(^{16}\) The consumer cooperatives were organized into bilingual organizations, and it was not until 1974 that three regional dairy associations, among them Unity (*Enigheten*), were united under the umbrella of the Swedish dairy union of Finland (*Finlands svenska mejeriförbund*). In 1919

\(^{14}\) Mattsson, *Huvuddragen*, p. 8-12; Mauranen, "Osuustoiminta – kansanliikettä", p. 191; Wallén, *Centrallaget Enigheten*, p. 5-10
the Swedish edition of the journal Pellervo was no longer published, and the new organization started to publish Odalmannen (Freeholder), mainly – but not exclusively - aimed at members of dairy cooperatives.

Microhistory and the community

My study has a microhistorical frame. The source material comes from a limited area, and consists mainly of meeting minutes from dairy farms and cooperatives, but also of contemporary newspaper articles and ethnological data. Using a microhistorical approach, I analyze both social practices and deeply rooted concepts of gender difference. Moreover, this approach makes single individuals – important agents – visible.

The whole area of Ostrobothnia was characterized by a low level of industrialization and modernization. In 1910, 89 percent of the population in the studied rural area was, according to official statistics, active in the agricultural sector of the economy. During the 19th century, the population grew rapidly and many new farms and crofts appeared. At the same time, the proportion of the rural population without property increased. Emigration, which was very common from the beginning of the 1880s, also affected the landed peasantry. In 1910, 74 percent of the farms were independent. Because of land reforms in the 1910s and 1920s, the number of independent farms and dwarf farms increased. In this district, agriculture was to a large extent based on small-and medium sized holdings. In 1910 the average size of the holdings in Swedish-speaking Ostrobothnia was 8.5 hectares. Cattle-raising had traditionally been important in this district, which was characterized by open fields and large natural meadows. In this province, market integration also resulted from incomes gained from forestry and other activities. Yet Matti Peltonen, among others, has shown the vital role of cooperative dairy associations in the commercialization of agriculture in Finland. At the turn of the century, the income from dairy farming dominated the cash flow on many ordinary farms, including smaller holdings.

18 Ownership of tenant holdings was made possible by a law passed in 1918, and a series of laws passed in the interwar period improved the possibilities of land ownership and settlement. A major law was passed in 1922; Peltonen, Talolliset ja torpparit, p. 301-303.
19 Peltonen, Talolliset ja torpparit, p. 156-175.
Traditional village interaction and gender

This article argues that the local public sphere is important during a period when the community is becoming increasingly involved in market relations and other processes of modernization. I want to emphasize that cooperative organizing was based on older forms of local interaction. In order to better understand patterns of social interaction, I will borrow a term from gender studies, namely homosociality. Early writers of women’s history often used the concept of “separate spheres”. Later on, this concept was criticized for being too simplified and dichotomous. Scholars of Finnish women’s history have also pointed out that there was no gendered distinction between a private and a public sphere in the countryside. By emphasizing the agrarian structure of production and culture, in which the household played an important part, the historian Irma Sulkunen stresses the wholeness and integration of rural societies. In my opinion, the category of the public can be used in a study of agricultural development. This concept of homosociality refers to how masculinity is defined in men’s relations to other men. I will argue that notions of masculinity are constituted through homosocial interaction.

The old village community of Purmo remained almost intact until the first decade of the 20th century. Formal village organizations, with elders, were mostly founded in the western parts of the country. Although the practice of village ordinance drawn up in Sweden in 1742 did not spread to all of Finland, which at that time was a part of Sweden, the ordinance was adopted in Ostrobothnia. The village collectively maintained, for example, roads, bridges, and hedges. Under customary law, the folk associations also had to take care of tasks such as building ships and burning tar. These two forms of cooperative work were based on the ownership of land. Evidence gathered from popular culture shows that women rarely took part in these activities. On the farms, women were responsible for a wide range of activities – domestic as wells in the fields. Women, however, seldom participated in work organized by the village or by economic folk associations. Men owning no land could join as labourers, though, and the master – or the head of the household – was, when active in these arenas, called a byaman (village man). Although women were not explicitly excluded, it seems to have been

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20 The discussion presented here originates, in part, from my doctoral thesis also mentioned in footnote 17, Milk and Land: On Femininity, Masculinity and Labour in an Ostrobothnian Agrarian Society ca 1870-1940. Further references can be found in this study. For a longer discussion in English, see Östman, “Women’s work”.
considered unsuitable for them to partake in these activities. Not even women in a master position, as matrons responsible for the farm while their husbands were absent or deceased, would take part in these kinds of meetings. Thus, on an informal level, the folk associations were strongly homosocial. Consequently, the patterns of rural collective work were highly gendered and gendering. Co-operation outside the farm were the responsibility of men. In the late 19th century, the possibility to act as a village man played an important part in the construction of agrarian masculinity in this apparently egalitarian peasant community.24

Participation in these more modern organizations and in the traditional forms of co-operation seems to be interconnected. At the beginning of the 20th century, participation was partly tied to the tradition of ‘village men’, and landownership seems to have been of crucial importance. Women were not explicitly excluded, but it was regarded as natural that men represented everyone within the household. Interaction in the local community was characterized by homosocial aspects and relations between men. These patterns of interaction reveal interesting links between aspects of class and gender. In a society where class differences were less obvious than elsewhere, homosociality was apparently an important factor in the formation of masculinity.25

Peasant-owned dairy companies

From the 1880s onwards, dairies, that is, small plants for processing cream into butter, were founded in Purmo. A railway connection built in 1887 made it easier to export butter. One of the first dairy companies was founded by an urban trader. This dairy, which was in use for only few years, is the only plant mentioned in the government’s list of loans granted to dairies. In the early 1890s several small dairies were founded; in 1891 nine dairy companies were reported to the authorities, and in 1893 dairy companies were functioning in this commune.26 One of these was Klåvus dairy, which had eight shares and seven owners. In the first dairies, ownership was not always divided equally. Siisbacka dairy association (mejeriförening), which was founded in the church village in 1892, had eight members of which seven were peasants (bönder) and one a farmer’s son. Galenfors dairy, which had twelve members, was equipped with a hand-separator and a water-driven

churn. In the beginning, most of the small dairies processed milk by cooling. But after a couple of years, most of the units seem to have been equipped with some kind of separator. The precise number of members is difficult to estimate. Documents are to be found only from some of the plants. According to the available material, the main owners were landholders who were often referred to as freeholders (hemmansägare) or “peasants”. Although the members were independent landowners, it may have been possible also for others, such as crofters and cottagers, to sell milk to these butter-producing dairies. The dairy company in Åvist, founded in 1892, exemplifies the importance of class. Altogether there were ten landholding peasants in this little village. Of these ten peasants eight were members of the dairy company, but none of the crofters who lived in this peripheral area took part in this joint venture. In one of the dairies situated in Vilobacka near the Finnish-speaking parish of Kortesjärvi, almost one-third of the owners were tenants. This company is reported to have had, all in all, thirty-one members (or shareholders). A considerable number of the members came from villages in Kortesjärvi, or from other villages where Finnish was the main language.

According to a report from the county sheriff made in 1897, there were ten dairy plants in the small municipality of Purmo. Six of the units appear to have had several owners. One unit is called a “company”, another is called a cooperative, and two were apparently owned by individual farmers. Although the dairies in general were not characterized by high capital intensity, the small plant in Galenfors was not interested in the local markets. According to contracts from this plant, the aim of this dairy was to produce butter for export (“har till ändamål smörproduktion för export”). Two of the dairies were, according to the report, exporting to England, whereas the rest of the units sold their goods to Denmark. The dairy at Backa was owned and run by, among others, Jakob Östman (great-grandfather of the author of this article). This dairy sold butter to “Manjäster” (Manchester) in England. This dairy was called “cooperative”. When selling their products, some of the dairies used middlemen from the nearby towns. Four units used ordinary peasants as salesmen, but one may wonder whether these men really were able to access the foreign markets all by themselves. Johan Lassfolk, the wealthy freeholder from the village of Lassfolk, reportedly handled the export business of five dairies, including the largest plant, which he himself ran together with other villagers. The dairy at Lassfolk produced about 15,000

27 Backa Mejeri, Ca Räkenskaper, H8 Hemmanshandlingar Mattjus/Östman; Räkenskaper, Siisbacka mejeriförening 1891-1898; Galenfors mejeri 1894, Klåvus mejeri, Klåvus hemmans arkiv H6 1889-1893. Purmo lokalhistoriska Arkiv (PLA).
29 Vilobacka andelsmejeris arkiv (ÖPA). Östman, ”Mångfald”, p.152.
kilograms of butter annually at a time when the largest dairies in Finland produced about 50,000 kilograms per year.\textsuperscript{30}

In the 1890s there was a saying that there was “one dairy, or more, in every village” (\textit{i varje by, ja, flera i varje by}) in Purmo. The first dairies were often founded at estates but, in both the Finnish- and Swedish-speaking parts of Ostrobothnia, the number of peasant-owned dairies was relatively high. Reasons for this can be sought in the traditions of the old village communities and economic associations under customary law. When accessing the market, these groups of men called freeholders seem to have used and reformed older patterns of community work.

Conjunctures of traditional and modern organization

In 1894 the assembly of the municipality, in which all taxpaying men (except for farmhands), widows, and other women without formal guardianship could take part, proposed that all of the milk and butter produced in Purmo was to be gathered and marketed under the same brand: “[S]everal dairy owners had declared an interest in gathering all the cream in one dairy where it would be churned and collected under the same brand”.\textsuperscript{31} The proposal was postponed, however, and seems never to have been discussed again. Yet it is interesting to note that such a proposal was put forward as a matter for the whole local community, to be discussed by the assembly. The idea of establishing a common dairy cooperative was discussed at the municipal assembly a year after the pamphlet about dairy cooperatives had been published by the Finnish Economic Society.\textsuperscript{32}

In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century the first local farm clubs, or peasant associations, were founded in Swedish-speaking Ostrobothnia. The local clubs belonged to regional and larger provincial agricultural economic societies, which had been founded already in the 1860s. These early associations included mostly freeholders. The members were usually landowning peasants, who were sometimes explicitly referred to as the “village men”. At first, these were called \textit{husbondeföreningar} (patron societies). After the turn of the century they were called \textit{lantmannagillen} (yeoman clubs). In 1902 such an association was founded in Purmo. The farm clubs were associations that promoted teaching and education, and they often preceded the foundation of cooperatives. In Purmo the first cooperative dairy was founded in 1903, that is, one year after the first farm club was set up. Among the founding members were

\textsuperscript{31} Östman, “Mångfald”, p. 152
\textsuperscript{32} Grotenfelt and Granström, \textit{Om Andelsmejerier}.}
a local schoolteacher and the only farmer with large holdings in Purmo, Johan Lassfolk, a wealthy freeholder.\textsuperscript{33}

In Purmo there were plenty of peasants with freehold tenure, whereas tenants made up a smaller part of the population. Yet remarkably few of the crofters, some of whom had fairly large farm units, joined these associations. In the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century large steam-thresher cooperatives (with up to fifteen shareholders) were set up, and in the 1920s smaller associations also bought motor-driven threshers. Few crofters and, to an even lesser extent, women took part in these more practical activities.\textsuperscript{34} Although many farms in the area were run by widows or by women whose men had emigrated overseas, women remained peripheral to these organizations.

The initial meeting of the local farm club was held in the new school building. The records from the inauguration meeting show that the participants were called “village men” and “citizens”. The terms used illustrate how the societies were invested with different meanings. They also reveal connections between different traditions of participation. The more traditional and household-based form of participation was that of the “village man”, whereas the concept of “citizen” carried more modern and possibly individual connotations. Men’s participation in the farm clubs was thus affected by an older tradition that valued the collective and the household more highly than the individual, as well as by a new understanding of citizenship.

There were few references to older forms of local self-government in the early editions of the cooperative journals. The name of the journal, Pellervo, alludes to history: Pellervo refers to the tradition of national epics, Kalevala. The first number of Pellervo featured an article titled “Older forms of cooperation”. Interestingly, this article did not mention older forms of local self-government. Oddly enough, it presented civil servant departments, churches, and secular schools – thus stressing aspects seen as more civilized than the rural past.\textsuperscript{35} In several texts in the Swedish edition of Pellervo, the main architect of the Finnish cooperative movement, Hannes Gebhard, stressed the undeveloped conditions of the Finnish countryside. Rural traditions were sometimes depicted in negative terms, and the countryside and the people were usually considered to be somewhat backward.\textsuperscript{36}

It is noteworthy that there were very few references to ideas about a relatively independent Finnish peasantry in Gebhard’s texts. Moreover, in public lectures on cooperation, Hannes Gebhard presented Finland as the last country in the civilized world to abolish serfdom. He was referring to minor re-

\textsuperscript{33} Östman, ”By, bonde”, p. 365-368; Olin, Tommy, Purmo lantmannagille 100 år (Purmo 2002), p. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{34} For archival examples, see Purmo tryskvärsandelista, Purmo Maskinandelslag 1906-1911; Backa tröskandelskag, Gustafs Swahns Privat Arkiv, (PLA).
\textsuperscript{35} Pellervo, 1899:0, p. 8-9.
\textsuperscript{36} Pellervo, 1900:1, p. 69-71; Pellervo, 1901:1, p. 2-3; Pellervo 1901:3, p. 71-73.
forms of tenant laws. By doing so, he also placed Finland in a historical narrative of emancipation. The questions of land reforms were discussed publicly in Finland over a long period of time. The journal *Odalmannen* also presented several texts about the emancipation of the crofters and tenants in the early 1920s.

In one of the texts presented in the Swedish edition of Pellervo, the cooperative of Broända is presented as one of the oldest dairy cooperatives in Finland. Terms like *byaman* ("village man") are sometimes used in the *Pellervo* journal – especially in educational texts promoting the establishment of cooperatives. But the term "citizen" is also used in early editions of Pellervo. The term *lantman* ("yeoman") is used mainly in texts published in the 1910s.

Cooperatives – formal organization and informal structures

In 1901 a cooperative act was passed. A couple of years after, the village Lillby, which is situated in the middle of the municipality of Purmo, received its first proper dairy cooperative. Its name “Purmo Dairy Cooperative” (*Purmo Andelsmejeri*) reveals the intention to reach farms throughout entire community. After a visit from a regional extension service officer, Arvid Rosenberg, in the autumn, the dairy was founded in January 1903. The first three cooperatives were formed in the upper part of the municipality. The fourth was founded in 1930, in a somewhat less peripheral church village situated twenty-five kilometres from the sea and from the town of Jakobstad.

The first dairy cooperative had eighty-two members, which was almost one-third of the total farm units in Purmo. Johan Lassfolk was chairman of the board, a position he held for over twenty-five years. Whereas the members had an average of 8.4 cows (or shares), Lassfolk had 30. At a time when about 31 percent of the farm units in general were dependent, 10 percent of the members were crofters. Three women, all with the epithet ‘peasant’ and obviously widowed, were among the founding members. Neither the crofters nor the women were represented on the board.

The cooperatives, which concentrated on dealing with economic issues, had a somewhat larger proportion of crofters and female members than the farm clubs. But, at the same time, the same dominating group of men was

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37 National Archives of Finland, Hannes Gebhards collection, Manuscripts, Kansio 22. University lectures.
38 Pellervo, 1900: 1, p. 2-3, 12; Pellervo, 1906:5, p. 147.
39 Pellervo (Finnish edition), 1900:2, p. 65-75.
40 Purmo andelsmejeri m.b.t. 30.1.1903, (ÖPA).
active in several different associations, in the farm clubs, and in the cooperatives. Considering the egalitarian emphasis on cooperative ideology and the comparatively homogeneous structures of the local society, it is interesting to observe how these small cooperatives in general were exclusive or hierarchical in terms of class and gender. When members were listed in the inauguration protocols, the owners of the oldest and largest farms near the dairy were mentioned first. For example, on the list of members from the Vilobacka Dairy Cooperative (*Vilobacka Andelsmejeri*), the ones with smaller farms, or the tenant members from peripheral areas, were mentioned last. In the minutes from Purmo Cooperative, the first to be mentioned were the men living in the middle of the main village.\(^41\)

Few of the minutes list the participants at the meetings; but when they do, only men are mentioned.\(^42\) Men’s participation in these organizations was probably related to property-owning. In the early 20\(^{th}\) century, Finnish women could not rule over their own land. Not until 1929 was the husband’s formal guardianship over his wife repealed.

The owners of an older dairy in Lillby seem to have been the most active members of the cooperative. When a cooperative society was founded, a new house was built and more modern machines were bought. The cooperative dairy used a radiator, a new separator, and a mechanized churn. Non-members could also sell their milk to this cooperative.

Two of the older peasant-owned dairies, the ones situated in the more peripheral villages of Vilobacka and Åvist, were directly transformed into cooperatives in 1915 and 1917. In these cases, the re-organization also coincided with an upgrading of buildings and technology. The cooperative in Åvist seems to have been especially inclusive in terms of issues of gender and class, since one-third of the members were tenants. No tenants, however, were given positions on the board, although two women signed the minutes from the inauguration meeting.\(^43\) Probably the landholding owners of the old dairy company in this village used the cooperative form in order to able to build new buildings and acquire new technology. This exemplifies an encounter between local, and probably hierarchal, forms of cooperation and cooperative ideology.

### Cooperative activity and gender

Milking and milk processing were traditionally regarded as part of the housework. The work in the cowshed was traditionally a predominantly fe-

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\(^{41}\) Purmo Andelsmejeri m.b.t., *Vilobacka Andelsmejeri* e.g. 24.1.1914, 14.10.1916 (ÖPA).


\(^{43}\) Åvist Andelsmejeri 27.4.1917 (ÖPA), Nygård, *Byn som landskap*, p. 368-370, Östman, "Mångfald", p.s 153
male activity. Apart from the separators, however, few of the innovations bought by farmers were directly used in dairy farming. Instead, parts of the working processes were taken over by the dairies, and the removal of the dairy processing from the households to small plants changed the structure and content of women’s work. The cowshed and the equipment were, to a higher degree than before, required to be clean. By 1910, the dairies had begun to use systems of quality control, which probably increased the workload for women.

The first dairy cooperative, which also was the largest unit throughout the period, employed a male manager and a female dairymaid. The other two dairy cooperatives hired a dairymaid and a part-time male bookkeeper. At these small plants, women – who were usually young farm daughters with some kind of vocational training – were responsible for the milk processing. In the beginning of the 1920s, the largest dairy cooperative in Purmo also engaged a male technician and a male manager. But when the unit won a prize in a butter contest, it was given to the female dairymaid, Anna Pellas. This exemplifies how the working patterns were structured by the assumption that milk belonged to the female sphere. Milk processing and processing cream into butter were exacting tasks, both of which required skill and experience.44

During the interwar period, modern farmers and educated young men who had taken agricultural courses were beginning to take on more responsibility within this working sphere. According to interviews, men who had been active in vocational organizations, as chairmen of farm clubs or leaders of cooperatives, for instance, were most active in this field. In the 1920s, the local newspapers published reports of controls that dairies and other associations had carried out in the cowsheds. In 1933 the farm club arranged a local cattle exhibition, which was visited by a parliamentary candidate in the general elections. By now, dairy farming and milking had become matters of common interest. According to the local newspaper, “every village had its own issue” (varje by har sin mjölkfråga).45

Very few women were, however, involved in the local cooperatives societies.46 However, the journal of Pellervo encouraged farmwomen to be active in cooperative societies. The texts in Pellervo which were aimed at farmwomen dealt mainly with the domestic sphere and home-making as well as women’s work in the cowshed.47 Furthermore, several texts about outdoor-

45 Pedersöre, 18.4.1929. (The local newspaper)
work were including women. In texts about cattle-breeding men were also addressed; one education text titled “Letters from the cowshed” starts with the salute “Brother!” Repeatedly the journal urges and recommends that women be active members of dairy cooperatives. This same tendency can also be seen in the Swedish journal founded in 1919. It presents articles about women as independent farmers. Calling the farmwomen *odalkvinnor*, the journal also invoked a feminized version of its title *Odalmannen* in order to engage women.

**Language and regional organizing**

There were several bilingual persons living in the villages of Vilobacka and Åvist, which were both situated very close to the language border. Both dairy cooperatives also had active members from the Finnish-speaking neighbouring communities; the Finnish-speaking farmers seem to have been allowed, maybe even welcomed, to join. These Finnish-speaking members of Vilobacka dairy cooperative also stayed loyal to the Swedish cooperative society in Purmo in the period between the wars. According to the minutes and lists of members, the society had Finnish-speaking members in this period as well. In the minutes from these local cooperatives in Purmo, the question of language is not touched upon. In 1925 the dairy cooperative in Åvist invited farmers from the Finnish neighbouring village to become members. When this collective membership was discussed, only the costs of milk transport were touched upon.

In *Pellervo* it is repeatedly stated that “the work of the farmer is the same, whatever language he is speaking”. When a separate Swedish cooperative journal, *Odalmannen*, was founded in 1919, questions of language were discussed to some extent. In the first number it is stated – in the following order – that the journal aimed at creating love for the occupation of the farmer, at creating love for the Swedish homelands, and at creating love for the common, free and independent country. Furthermore, it is stressed that the freedom of the new nation (Finland) requires a “broad-minded, purposeful, skillful corps of yeomen and rural workers.” In addition, it is said that only cooperative organizing can lay the economical foundation on which “Swedish nationality” can exist.

During these years, there was rather intensive work on the part of the Swedish community activists. This was a key moment for the Swedish-

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49 Vilobacka Andelsmejeri, e.g. 14.10.1916, 8.7.1927, 5.2.1939, 9.8.1939. (ÖPA)
50 Åvist Andelsmejeri e.g. 27.10.1925, 13.3.1926 (ÖPA), Nygård, *Byn som landskap*, p. 368-370. Östman, ”Mångfald”, p. 155.
speaking community; there were plans in 1918 for self-government, to give the Swedish-speakers an autonomous status, but the demands for equality, rather than autonomy, were realized. The idea of a Swedish nation in Finland never materialized into a political territory, but there was a project of nationbuilding that involved the politicalization of the language and other elements connected to the process of nation-building, a linguistic representation of a territory, and an ideology shaped around the language. Furthermore, the peasantry was idealized. Through the descriptions of early settlement by Swedish peasants, the Swedes gave themselves a right to live in Finland. Furthermore, the peasants were seen as safeguards of the territory. In Finland they guaranted the geographical space, the so-called "Swedish soil".

In 1917, the question of language and cooperative organizing was publicly discussed in several newspapers. While several young students proposed Swedish-only cooperatives, the leading cooperative activists stressed the importance of bilingual organizations.

The cooperative journal Odalmannen placed itself both in a Swedish-speaking community and in the Finnish nationstate. In the presentation of the new journal and the new Swedish Union (Finlands Svenska Andelsförbund), the Swedish language is emphasized in the same manner as the entire Finnish nation. These two aspects were intertwined. The very title of the journal, Odalmannen, alludes to an understanding of the Scandinavian past, namely to ideals of the free peasant. However, the texts published in Odalmannen never depict traditional peasant society in idealized ways.

The Swedish-speaking umbrella association, Unity (Enigheten), which was founded in 1905, was functioning as a central cooperative selling organization. It marketed butter produced by about twenty dairies in the Swedish-speaking area of Ostrobothnia. According to the history of this organization Enigheten, the Purmo Dairy Cooperative joined as a member in 1907 and stayed as a member of this organization until 1974, when it was closed down. However, the largest dairy cooperative in Purmo seems to have marketed butter through this exporting association for only couple of years. According to the local minutes, this dairy cooperative seemed to have func-

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53 Both Finnish and Swedish were recognized on an equal basis as "national languages" in the constitution of 1919. The law also guaranteed cultural autonomy and separate Swedish-speaking institutions, for example schools. See Engman, Max, “Finns and Swedes in Finland”, in Tägil, Sven (ed.), Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World (London 1995), p. 179-216.

54 For a discussion about the uses of the peasantry in a Finland-Swedish context, see Lönnqvist, Bo, “Folkkulturen i svenskhetens tjänst”, in Engman, Max and Stenius, Henrik (eds.) Svenskt i Finland 1. Studier i språk och nationalitet efter 1860 (Helsingfors 1983), p. 178-205; Högnäs, Sten, Kustens och skogarnas folk. Om synen på svenskt och finskt (Stockholm 1995); Engman, Max, “The Finland-Swedes: a case of a failed national history?”, in Branch, Michael, National History and Identity (Helsinki 1999), p. 166-177.


56 Mattsson, Huvuddragen, p. 78.
tioned as an independent cooperative actor. Prices and market relations were discussed at the meetings, as were the possibilities of finding a market for the butter. Johan Lassfolk, mentioned earlier, seemed to have been the actor in this respect as well.\textsuperscript{57}

*Enigheten* is said to have cooperated with Ants (*Muurahaiset*), a similar Finnish organization. The Swedish cooperative butter exporting association was organized anew in 1918. During the following years, the number of Swedish cooperatives increased. In the 1920s, all of the cooperatives in Purmo joined the renewed regional exporting organization. Also in this period, these cooperatives seemed to have tried to market their butter independently from the regional organization for a couple of years.\textsuperscript{58} However, they did not join the larger Finnish central organization, *Valio*. In 1922 the association of *Enigheten*, who mainly gathered members from the Swedish-speaking parts of Ostrobothnia, sold about one tenth of amount of butter exported by the central and nationwide organisation of *Valio*.\textsuperscript{59}

In 1931, a fourth cooperative dairy was founded in the lower part of the municipality. It was immediately registered as a member of *Enigheten*, and in the 1930s all four dairy cooperatives were, and stayed contentiously, engaged in this organization. It is noteworthy that the cooperatives in Purmo were not loyal to the Swedish central cooperative in the early 1920s, which was a period characterized by intense discussions about the Swedish language. *Enigheten*, however, succeeded in engaging all of these cooperatives during the 1930s, a period characterized by a severe economic depression.

**Discussion**

The article thus illustrates the significance of homosocial and traditional patterns of interaction during a period of rapid organizational modernization. In a district characterized by egalitarian traditions and a relatively homogeneous social structure, men's participation in dairy cooperatives work was connected to community interests and to issues of landownership and formal guardianship. Traditionally, men's positions were characterized by the duty, the right, and the privilege to act and work outside the farm. At this point in time, a membership in the cooperative organization also appears to have been related to the owning of a farm. Traditional concepts of masculinity also played a key role in the modernization and commercialization process.

\textsuperscript{57} Purmo Andelsmejeri, e.g. 15.8.1913, 19.12.1914, 19.9.1915, 24.10.1915, 23.10.1916, 24.4.1920. (ÖPA)


Traditions of local communities were, nonetheless, seldom stressed in early cooperative journals. The journals tried to engage women in cooperative activities. On the local level women seem to have been excluded both in informal as well as in formal ways from the cooperative arena and from the associational movement. At the same time, traditions of class seem to have been pivotal: the early cooperatives were led – and used – by landholding farmers. The dairy cooperatives gave smallholders and crofters the possibilities of marketing their milk, but they were initiated and run by landholders. The microhistorical approach also shows the importance of individual men, especially Johan Lassfolk in Purmo, who seemed to have the skill to act on a market level as well as a contact to cooperative advisors. In this unilingual community, language seemed to mainly play a minor role.

Conclusion

This article discusses patterns of cooperative organizing in the Swedish-speaking parts of Finland. The interplay of class relations, gender positions, and local interaction will be studied here against a background of, on the one hand, a strongly gendered and feminine coding of milking and dairy farming and, on the other hand, communal-egalitarian traditions. Furthermore, the importance of language on local as well as regional levels will be considered.

Firstly, older forms of organizations and the establishment of new and more modern forms of organizations in one local community are presented. Secondly, patterns of cooperative organizing and the impact of class, landownership, and gender on a local cooperative organization will be examined. In addition to this, the articles shortly discuss how traditional forms of cooperation were touched upon in early texts about cooperative organizing and how early cooperative journals envisioned women’s cooperative activities. The article stresses the importance of traditional and homosocial patterns of social interaction during a period of modernization, and traditional notions of masculinity were, in part, created anew through cooperative organizations.
The Image of the Peasant within National Museums in the Nordic Countries

Peter Aronsson

National narratives are crucial to the construction of legitimate citizenship: who belongs to what community, what qualifies inclusion and exclusion, what virtues are celebrated and what vices are refuted? These questions do not have arbitrary answers, but instead are connected to rather stable ideas of states and nation, and are continuously changing alongside the emergence of new ideals and new territorial boundaries.

The new ideas, which restructured earlier sets of feudal relationships at the turns of 18th and 19th centuries, show a remarkable resemblance, at least superficially, to those appearing in many parts of the world where social and political conditions might instead imply a greater variety of ideals. Cultural transfer and the creation of narratives of uniqueness appear hand in hand.

The idea of citizenship itself might be seen as an infusion of aristocratic ideas of individual rights into a bourgeois setting, a Bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit, developing an independent sphere of equality, freedom of speech, tolerance, and mutual respect. But at the same time as rapid change and turmoil, historical vision imagery was transformed from an earlier construction of a glorious past with Biblical and classical references into a national history where the persistence of an independent peasant culture that supposedly thrived before the development of a stratified society and the state created a decisive starting point. This is true for 19th century cultural Swedish heroes such as E.G. Geijer and E. Tegnér – but also for Karl Marx. This is the case for Sweden, which had a large number of historical free-owning peasantry within 18th and 19th C societies, but also for Denmark, which had just created a class of that standard, and for Iceland, which was more dominated by fishing than by toiling the soil, and finally for Romania. A similar idea of a pre-state condition of equality, freedom, and happiness unites the narratives of the Bible, Das Kapital, and the bourgeois elites trying to secure their understanding of citizenship and territorial sovereignty in the 19th century.¹

¹ Patterns of national historiographies have been mapped by Berger, Stefan, "National Historiographies in Transnational Perspective: Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", Storia della Storiografia, no. 50 (2006), p. 3-26.
The timing and more precise connotations of bringing the peasantry into the narrative of the national-state – and possibly out of it – as manifested at national museums in the Nordic countries are the focus of this essay. Furthermore the relationship between representation in other public forms, for instance regional museums, will be discussed to establish the point when and how the peasant was moved into the centre of national narrative in national museums of archaeology and ethnology, and open-air and art museums. What values of relevance to the construction of political community and citizenship are communicated through the representation of peasantry in the public sphere, specifically within the contemporary displays of national museums? The text’s ambition is to present the need for and challenge of a full investigation of the subject, rather than fully exhausting it.

Ideas of citizenship

In the early modern state, the main issue was rather how to make people accept the inclusion demanded by the rulers to adhere to the right religion and law, and the king’s right to levy taxes and soldiers and to deliver war power. Examples of the territorial ambivalence are manifold during the Middle Ages, not only in the politics of the aristocracy but also within the decisions made by the organized peasantry to participate on the side of one particular group rather than another – or to stay at home to "defend their own country", meaning the old provincial district, not the territory of the state. But we can also find more positive demands for the right of political participation, rule of law, and a direct relationship with the state/the king. In the 17th century this is articulated in terms of national identity similarly to the "working class of pastoral England": fri odalbonde, a freeholder, is an even more demanding identity than the equivalent "free-born Englishman" because it not only implies secured property rights and protection under the law, but also implies direct political participation in the forth Estate of the Diet, based on the argument of custom existing from time immemorial.2

It is by now well known that the late 18th century is the point at which the ideology of nationalism charges citizenship with its more wide-ranging aspects of cultural, moral, and historical heritage and closes the scope of economics, culture, and education within the national borders with a high degree of ideological legitimacy. The issue of exclusion became, according to the minor research field that deals with the development of historical citizenship in Sweden and Scandinavia, ideologically demanding for ordinary people

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due to the development of a mobilizing nationalism in the 19th century, and economically demanding due to the emergence of the modern welfare state in the 20th century. Between these came military conscription, individual income tax, and universal suffrage.³

It is possible that the early implementation of military tenure (indelningsverket) and the subsequent successful mobilization of an army loyal to the king, which reinforced a direct link between the king and the peasantry, helped to pave the way for a complex framework for the formalized power of the fourth estate. In the 18th century, the fourth estate gradually became more and more a “pure” estate of freeholding farmers. An overall broad participatory political culture with strong judicial rights, local participation in parish life and regional courts, and the use of negotiation rather than violence for governance was developed at an earlier stage in Sweden than in countries with mercenary armies.⁴

The groups discerned by contemporary discourse as “the people”, notably the virtuous middle class, were in most countries identified with the bourgeoisie, but in Sweden the alternative of including the peasants, or rather the freeholder, was articulated successfully even among the intellectuals and in the pre-revolutionary parliament. The concepts used for drawing the line between “virtuous” and “dangerous” people could vary. Perhaps a continuum could be drawn from the American case, which not only lacked an aristocracy, but also a peasantry (understood as an uneducated manual labouring mob), leading to the Swedish/Nordic inclusive concept, which first incorporated not only the small farmers into the people, but also, and quite readily, the workers, which was formalized through political alliances during the 1930s. On the other extreme of the continuum, one can place Germany with its more exclusive concept of Volk, making for an entirely different political


The role of peasant varied depending on the claims made on citizenship in these different political cultures.

In the Swedish 19th century debates on (communal) citizenship, an interesting array of arguments was brought forward. Behind the prevailing arguments for a census and graded votes based on *property* was either a meritocratic idea that the wealthier were among the best in virtue of their success, or the old-fashioned opinion of an inherent connection between wealth, better birth, and virtue. A more communal view was expressed by the argument of participation according to the dues and duties performed. This principle was also conversant with the commercial model of an incorporated company. Everyone who contributed to the execution of the decisions should in this line of argument have a say – perhaps in accordance to the size of the work or money placed into the common effort. In this argument it is not property itself, but rather the ability and duty to contribute that rationalizes the privilege of citizenship. Thus, the argument for property could be developed or resonate in different discourses on the basis of participation: merit, virtue, competence, stability, or the association of taxpayers (a society or company).

There is often a broadening of the argument by the national project in both a democratic and moral dimension. In order to educate the lower classes, they have to be given a place where knowledge and responsibility could become rooted, and prepare them for national integration. This is thus the same argument for citizenship as on a national level.

As hinted at earlier, property as a basis for influence should not only be connected to the market principle where its influence is most clear-cut. Under the old regime, property was also an important basis for granting rights or access to important resources. But affluence was also regarded as a necessary sign of power and virtue, or at least as a necessary independence to provide the personality principle with some credibility. Property was clearly connected to action within the “political sphere”, above all government. The long prevailing restrictions on voting rights for people with public debts or in need of public help could be interpreted as a residual of an old concept of virtue-property. Thus property could be used for *personal* as well as *contributory* arguments for participation, as independence was a prerequisite for citizenship.

Opposed to this principle is the universalistic idea that each person has an equal value which should also have a political side to it; citizenship as a *natural right*. This view has its roots not only in the Enlightenment and the

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5 Hallberg, Peter, *Ages of liberty. social upheaval, history writing, and the new public sphere in Sweden, 1740-1792* (Stockholm 2003); Stråth, Bo and Sørensen, Øystein (eds.), *The cultural construction of Norden* (Oslo 1997).
6 See Aronsson, Peter, "Local Politics. The Invisible Political Culture", in Stråth and Sørensen (eds.), *The cultural construction*, p. 315 and p. 172-205 for a full argument and references.
7 Such restrictions on voting rights existed until the Second World War.
American and French revolutions, but is also part of a latent message within Christianity and the idea of the parish as a (religious) community as those who belong together and those who take their refuge in the same church (this is the etymology of the Swedish word “socken”, parish). The most consequent argument for a radical representation reform with a low census and equal voting rights was rooted in the peasant estate, not in the bourgeoisie, where the property dimension often was favoured. However, this is not to be seen as a breakthrough for liberal ideology, but as an instrumental view that in order to change the tax-system and get rid of privileges, one had to broaden and equalize the concept of franchise. But as part of a political culture, the politics can be traced back to a traditional contributory mentality with clear communitarian or communalist roots.

If we regard this complexity of political visions of peasant political participation as working ideas in the building of society, are there any links between this reality and the national explication of the role of peasants in national history and national museums?

**Historical narrative and the peasantry**

The idea of specific nations and states has, in Northern Europe, interacted with the idea of a common Scandinavian *culture*. In classical writing from Tacitus *Germania* onwards, there is a layer of description which recognized Nordic peoples both as part of a shared culture and as divided into tribes/nations. This dynamic between a Scandinavian cultural community and the changing borders of national states and their history has been very productive in politics, museums, and academic disciplines until today, for better or for worse. Images of *Norden* (“the North”) are laden with unspoiled nature, simplicity, social egalitarianism, protestant ethics, and democratic culture with ancient roots. These images create space for a certain flexibility and integration *within* the Nordic sphere. It has, however, also been used for racist endeavours, and might be less useful as an integrative tool for more global challenges.\(^8\)

Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland are today often regarded as belonging to the exclusive group of nation states that actually lived up to the idea of one people, one country, and one state. This statement was continuously repeated in the 19\(^{th}\) century political program of Scandinavism that was supposed to counterbalance the expanding powers of Russia and Germany.

\(^8\) A more comprehensive and comparative analysis of the development of the idea of a Nordic Culture and its representations in the developing infrastructure of national museums is presented in a forthcoming work by Peter Aronsson in 2008.
The path each nation-state took in the modernization process and the relationship between nation and state are two of the major conditions framing the context for cultural policy and its conflicts and utopias that museums were to fulfil. These vary within the Nordic countries, more so in the early 19th than the early 21st century.

Henrik Stenius has suggested that the common Nordic culture which stresses uniformity and unity has its roots in a common protestant culture. Not even in Norway, where Protestantism was forcibly introduced by Denmark, was any distance to this part of colonial heritage marked. Instead, Protestantism has been written into every national narrative as part of manifest destiny, beneficial in the long run and producing values like freedom of belief, democracy, and equality: As a bulwark against the East and Catholic Europe in Finland and Sweden, and as closely related to the national mentality in Denmark, with NSF Grundtvig’s connection of religion, reform and nationalism as remarkably influential over time. Others have further stressed the importance of the above-mentioned Gothicist and Germanic ideas of ancient tribal and Biblical descent in creating ideas of national belonging.9

Stenius argues furthermore that the differences in political culture that can be discerned are due to different relations between (civil) society and the state. In Sweden a strong civil society invades the state and creates a corporative unity. In Norway local mobilization holds its legitimacy by being the centre of politics, in Finland a strong state is the tool for unifying society, and in Denmark a dual norm system leaves the state alone and creates a civil society of complexity and independence not seen in the other Nordic countries.

The differences in the relationship between state and society became decisive, since they determined how the idea of the people, Folk, as an embodiment of the nation could possibly develop. All of these variations shared and were inspired by German thought (Hegel, Herder, Schelling) which influenced progressive historical writing in the mid-19th century, and were also influenced by people as the foundation of new disciplines and museums for documentation, preservation, and display of the nation. Typically, the history books changed their titles from addressing the state and realm (rike) to deal with the people and the nation. For example “Svenska folkets historia” (The Swedish People’s History, by E.G. Geijer 1832-36) and “Det norske folks historie” (The Norwegian People’s History, by P.A. Munch 1852-63) show the nation and people becoming the new object of history rather than a purely political state body.10

9 Stenius, in Stråth and Sørensen (eds.), The cultural construction.
10 Text on Scandinavian historiography from a joint article by Aronsson, Peter; Fulså, Narve, Haapala, Pertti; Jensen, Bernard Eric, "Scandinavia and Finland", an article in a forthcoming volume to be published by Palgrave MacMillian with working title Society and the Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender.
To Geijer, the concept of people, and for that matter the concept of society, is readily associated with the history of the kings. According to Geijer, a nation state is constituted by the oath and trust between the common people (*allmoge*) and the kings. The aristocrats are more of the villains here, threatening the unity of the nation and the bonds between king and people. The myth has some foundation in reality, since the Swedish state system (including Finland) has the peculiarity of allowing formal participation for the peasantry, the dominant group of freeholders, both in the position as one of four estates in the parliament, formalized in the 17th century, and in practical participation in both judicial matters and direct proto-democratic participation in the parish administration, including poor relief and schooling. This meant that the border between state and society was constructed differently. The “public sector” in Sweden could and can mean state, municipal, and collective responsibility. Only in the late 1980’s was the term society introduced in a more independent, common European manner, reinforced by the discourse of civil society, but without leaving distinctive marks on the conception of community so far.

Different states, similar narratives

Considering the differences of the state-making paths of the Nordic countries, one might be surprised by the similarities of the structure of the modern national narratives. In fact, some traits seem more to be part of a genre of “narrating the nation”: the early arrival of the nation, its proto-democratic structure, threats and evil coming from outside, a period of trouble, and then the rise of the good society: democracy, liberal economy, and eventually gender equality. If the egalitarian “thing society” and the Vikings provide a common starting point for the foundation of medieval states, the Nordic welfare state provides the culmination, where the intermediate struggle of endless Scandinavian wars are at the bottom of the U shaped narrative – for the modern politically correct interpretation at least. The two strong ideas of common heritage communicated violence, power, and a deep democratic tradition originating in pre-historic society. It is differently interpreted in each nation as part of the national heritage moulded by the Scandinavian culture, and frequently reaches back to Tacitus’ image of the strong, healthy Germanic people not yet degenerated by high culture. This image has been popular in other countries such as England and Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm II

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donated a Viking statue of mythical Frithiof to be installed in Norwegian Vagnsnes in 1913, to symbolize the strong bonds over the sea between the Germanic people.\textsuperscript{12}

In all of the Nordic countries, the reconstruction of Viking sites is manifold, and this pre-state Scandinavian culture negotiates distinct national images of the typical Viking. In Norway, the Vikings are high-sea adventurers, setting the scene for later heroes like Fritiof Nansen. The Viking museum on Bygdøy is situated between the Folkemuseum and the modern maritime museum. In Sweden he (usually the Viking is a he) is less adventurous and more industrious, very much as a craftsman and tradesmen of the late but rapidly industrialized and neutral Sweden. In Denmark, to no great surprise, the Viking became, with the help of Erik Arup’s powerful synthesis of Danish history ”from below”, a farmer who made Denmark what it is by toiling the land and breeding the livestock.\textsuperscript{13} Even Finland invented the Finnish Viking in its nation-building process to take advantage of the shared Scandinavian heritage, when the young nation created a suitably prolonged past in order to legitimize the state-making process as a renaissance rather then an innovation.\textsuperscript{14}

The Viking burial ships from Norway and Denmark provide aesthetic objects signalling craft skills and bravery. Places with dubious and ambivalent Nordic heritage are to be found in a territory ranging from Russia in the east to England, France, and Ireland in the west, and they are subject to a very diversified use, all with Nordic resonance, but never with the Nordic as a sole reference. They combine existential, local, regional, and national implications into the very foundational myth of the Nordic that began to take shape in the 17th century and still is very much alive.\textsuperscript{15}

This narrative figure will not be developed further here but is a very good example of how the idea of a common Nordic heritage plays a role, and that the idea of a strong democratic and egalitarian society provides 19th century democratization with an ambivalent imaginary.

Kings and dynasties dominate historiography until the early 19th century, but there are early works on Nordic culture, e.g Olaus Magnus in the 16th Century, which represent peasant culture as exotic, unique, and defining. It


\textsuperscript{13} Arup, Erik, \textit{Danmarks historie, Bd. I-II}. (Kæbenhavn 1925-1932); Svenstrup, Thyge, \textit{Arup. En biografi om den radikale historiker Erik Arup, hans tid og miljø} (København 2006).

\textsuperscript{14} Fewster, Derek, \textit{Visions of past glory. Nationalism and the construction of early Finnish history} (Helsinki 2006); Petersson, Bodil, \textit{Föreställningar om det förflutna. Arkeologi och rekonstruktion} (Lund 2003); Wallette, Anna, \textit{Sagans svenskar: synen på vikingatiden och de isländska sagorna under 300 år} (Malmö 2004).

\textsuperscript{15} In Scotland, the Nordic heritage was connected to the more advanced Lowland culture supposed by the elite to be not only distinct from the English, but well above the more savage and Highland Celts. Presentation by Andrew Newby and Linda Andersson Burnett at the European Social Science History Conference in Lisbon 2008.
is, however, with the discovery of popular culture in post-revolutionary Europe that peasant culture became the defining base on which nations are built and states erected. At this time, the pre-historic and non-political character was decisive for its function as a shared foundation.

The necessity to deal with inner and outer borders manifests itself in suggested interpretations of the origins of the people. In pre-democratic Finland, Finnishness was most successfully constructed by emphasizing political-territorial unity rather than linguistic community – otherwise the culturally, politically, and economically important Swedish-speaking group would have been left outside the construction. This hard-line Fennoman argument became gradually more feasible through democratization and the emergence of a Finnish-speaking elite in the early 20th century. In Finland the idea of migration, based on the observation of a very different Finno-Ugric language, was for a long time the predominant explanation of difference, and was vital in producing otherness in relation to its long Swedish past and its long standing inner minority of Swedish-speaking Finns. However, this now seems to have been refuted based on genetic evidence. In Norway a similar interpretation, and even harder to defend, was maintained in the first half of the 19th century. The Norse tribe was then the only true Nordic survivor, while Danes and Swedes instead came from German tribes.

Similar complexities for the construction of the people, the Folk/Volk, along Herderian lines were present in the whole of Scandinavia. The Sami people and the Inuites were not really a problem during this epoch, since they played the role of the “radical other” and their different language and culture were rather seen as an asset than the opposite. Suddenly, in the late 19th century, they became important in the territorial claims of the states as inhabitants of otherwise empty territories. Norway had a similar situation to Finland regarding state-making and language, but it was even more ambiguous, since the ruling classes spoke Danish and the Norwegian reception of this as a written language was that it was too similar to satisfy high demands for uniqueness. Even when a new variant of the Norwegian language was retrieved, allegedly recreated through pre-Danish dialects by Ivar Aasen in the mid 19th century, it was in fact a new construct. In Denmark a mixed language in the south of Jutland, Schlesvig Holstein, provided one of the motifs for conflict with Germany which was solved by both war in 1864 and referendum in 1920. Here language differences were less ambiguous but were used to emphasize distinctiveness to a powerful enemy that threatened

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16 The historiographic treatment of difference is one of the comparative issues in the project *Representations of the Past: The Writing of National Histories in Europe* (NHIST) and treated comprehensively in a joint article by Aronsson, Fulsås, Haapala and Jensen in “Nordic National Histories”, in a forthcoming anthology on Macmillan Palgrave.

the existence of a sovereign state until the end of the Second World War. For some opponents of the European Union, there is a long line of threats to be aware of even today. This was especially true of the Norwegian opinion, where “union” came to signify Danish, Swedish, and German occupation and a threat to freedom. 

Peasants in public culture

The territorial link between Folk and Nation has been an even more persuasive link, even if it lacks strong narratives, heroes, and villains. If accepted, it provides a rock solid identification that can be put to work in poetry, painting, and tourism. It can also be linked to the historical narrative by archaeology. Hence, art museums with their national schools of art, landscape painting, and museums of antiquity and archaeology all play into the natural and timeless voice of the national choir.

These voices are articulated in all of the Nordic countries, but perhaps most so in Norway, where the language issue was a bit more ambiguous. Ernst Sars, one of the founding fathers of the vision of Norwegian history as an unbroken chain from the Viking era to the state-in-making in the end of the 19th century, stressed this when utilizing a Scandinavian comparative approach. It was done in order to stress differences rather than similarities, and among the unquestionable differences were those of landscape. 

This line of reasoning was part and parcel of a widespread grid of interpretation, where observations of similar artefacts along with language constituted cultural groups. Changes over time and spatial differences were interpreted as people moving, conquering, and settling as new rulers. Remaining differences within a given region were then reminders of earlier peoples inhabiting the realm who lost out in the historical chain of evolving cultures. More complex images of cultural transfer and hybrid cultures are today more com il faut among academics, but they lack the visuality and force of a map with borders – so the images prevail in the popular imagination as well as in the many public representations of colonization and early beginnings. The iconic image of this is the Scandinavian map of the Ice Age. The ice withdrew, leaving its marks in the landscape, upon which all schoolchildren are trained to observe north-south marks left on rocks and ridges by

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19 Fulsås, Narve, Historie og nasjon: Ernst Sars og striden om norsk Kultur (Oslo 1999).

20 Trigger, Bruce G, A history of archaeological thought (Cambridge1989); Svanberg, Fredrik, Decolonizing the Viking Age 1 (Stockholm 2003) and Svanberg, Fredrik, Decolonizing the Viking Age 2 (Stockholm 2003).
melting water and gravel. Under the Ice lies the map of the modern Scandinavian states along with some of the major cities, creating the illusion of Hegelian history pointing directly from the Ice Age, then early settlers, then contemporary politics, all as part of natural history rather than a contingency.

The questions of racist elements in the Nordic countries are of course relevant. Sweden has the dubious honour of leading the development of the racial ideas, so common in the 19th century, both scholarly and institutionally. The Institute for Racial Research in Uppsala was founded in 1921. The thoughts were applied to all kinds of differences. Of course a main line was drawn between the primitive cultures and the advanced. Even Ernst Sars, who opposed the racial argument as a means of distinction between European civilizations, did apply them to the Samis, as a people without history. This placed them outside historical narrative. Representation of them in museums was for the most part to take place within the natural history department, which has been the rule for most indigenous people up until the last decades.

But racist ideas were not only put to play against the radical other. Social and regional differences could also be attributed and connected to evolutionary history. Hence various models connected C.J. Thomsen’s tripartite prehistory to invasions of cultures/races. As late as during the Second World War, this idea was used to map regional variation of the Nordic race, where the long-heads marked the dominance of the latest invasion of a Nordic ruling class, pressing earlier and lower races into the periphery. The famous ethnologist Gunnar Olof Hyltén-Cavallius connected these ideas with ethnology and folklore: the trolls were a popular recollection of stone-age people, and the giants reflected the Bronze Age in the tales of later successors.21 The collection of folktales, the documentation of supposedly ancient customs, and artefacts became all a widespread activities first in a small circle of intellectuals like The Götiska förbundet (“The Gothic Association”) and soon among a more wide-spread strata of convinced intellectuals who looked for new narratives and sentiments to encourage a new community to emerge out of the withering dynastic order of feudal society.22

The teleology of all of the Nordic narratives started with a communal peasant society, much as in Marxist schematic development. The common enemies of the natural goal of a unified and peaceful territorial state of contemporary territorial extension were the universal Roman Catholic Church and the class interests of the nobility. Even absolutism under monarchical rule was viewed as something good, as a necessary step on the way to order

and unification. Still, the nobility was not seen as a part of the folk, while the clergy became so through Protestantism.

In museum representation we might see a less conflicting view, since it should in theory be an objective representation of a legitimate community. Negotiations have to be made outside the scenes. In cultural historical museum, already during the early establishment of the Hazelius collection, material cultures from all four estates were represented as parts of a non-conflicting whole, representing a recent stable past which was disappearing, and thus was in need of moral and scientific rescue missions. It was represented as a losing form of life untouched by modernity and in need of honouring rituals so that the values of piety, contendedness, simplicity, strength, and stability could be transferred to further generations. Certain regions were identified as more prone to represent this culture well, and hence were especially valuable to rescue: Dalecarlia, Telemark, Carelia. Expeditions were sent out to the regions to collect items for representation in the capitals.

As an example, the actual power of farmers in contemporary Sweden was quite strong after the parliamentary reform in the 1860s, and through the agricultural revolution, to the distress of many traditional elites. The inherent drive to romanticize the ancient peasantry was therefore hampered in the state-oriented institutions like the National museum. However, a more romantic and national view could be made attractive to both bourgeoisie and socially-advancing modern farmers alike in other parts of the public sphere. These included both the regional historical associations and regional museum movements (mirroring the national institution but with a more public (allmoge) touch and tendency in its presentations), and the-ever-more successful establishment founded by Artur Hazelius. We can leave the early developments out, just noting that the starting point is when a collection of items from Dalecarlia, which became a treasured part of a rather haphazard collections within the Scandinavian Ethnographic Collections, Skansen and The Nordic Museum, opened in 1873, 1891, and 1907 respectively. In the 19th century this national structure was supplemented by a network of local history museums in nearly every parish, often built around the musealization of one or more peasant homesteads of an archaic design. The local and national representation thus came to coalesce in representing the most valuable past as a traditional peasant life-style.

Dalecarlia was considered both an province of surviving ancient peasant traditions and the place of the birth of the nation, narrated as the mobilization of the peasantry by Gustavus Vasa and the resistance to the Danish hegemony disguised as Union of Kalmar (1389-1523). The province was musealized and filled with monuments already from the mid-18th century.

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23 Björkroth, Maria, Hembygd i samtid och framtid 1890-1930. En museologisk studie av att bevara och förnya (Umeå 2000); Arcadius, Kerstin, Museum på svenska: länsmuseerna och kulturhistorien (Stockholm 1997).
This connection points to a very important theme in the narrative, with a strong and natural liaison between the monarch and ordinary people, the allmoge (wider than the peasantry, with an archaic touch to it) against the blood-sucking aristocracy and middle-men of the bureaucracy.

Professional historiography developed differently in the Scandinavian countries, leaving room for different dynamics between historians, politics, and museums. In Sweden and Denmark the historical profession became directed towards political state-making in both conservative and liberal camps, while there was more room for cultural dimensions as a part of real history in Norway and Finland. The historical museum became strongly oriented towards the scientific ordering of the findings. This made the ground open for popular history and private museum founding became especially vital and the state less active than one might imagine, due to different reasons. In the declining empire the drive was to overcome the losses of territory and “honour” during both the early 19th and 20th century and to win back the glory within the present borders. In the new states the cultural process was negotiating an external state while simultaneously explicating national pride.

August Strindberg belonged to the prominent critics of historians and archaeologists and their obsession with detail. The strong support for Artur Hazelius’ private enterprise (one which was followed by a multitude of people who created local, regional, and national links in many places) developed in the public sphere into a peculiar museum foundation that has enjoyed state grants up to the present. In Denmark, father and son Carlsberg emerged as the patrons of national museums of a more traditional kind, but here the absolutist state was more rapid and resolute in the creation and converting of its royal assets to national museums than in Sweden. The parliamentary situation in Sweden made it necessary to convince the peasant estate of the need for museums, and as peasants saw no representation of themselves in the public collections in the early 19th century, their representatives fiercely contested such establishments as long as they could.

In most Nordic countries historians held their grip on the audiences and their influence on the state for a longer period than in Sweden, at least up until the Second World War. The outcome of the secession of Norway and the civil war in Finland secured a more straightforward national interpretation of the dominant culture, but with a different political colour. In Norway, nationalism had a liberal flavour, since the unionists had been conservative, while in Finland the conservative white side was victorious in the civil war

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26 Dissertation project on the process of establishing a Swedish National museum by Per Widén, Gothenburg http://www2.iisg.nl/esshc/programme.asp?selyear=8&pap=4498.
of 1918, and the democratic reforms reduced the influence of the Swedish minority to its numerical size. A conservative Fennoman version of history entered the mainstream culture, but a strong and institutionalized minority culture produced an important national minority within the Finnish state.

Creating a national museum in Sweden was one of the major state efforts to place the nation on display in the second half of 19th century. Denmark achieved that earlier than Sweden, triggered by the Napoleonic wars and the power of the absolute monarchy. Finland began later, but did so even more comprehensively at the end of the century. Norway was similarly hampered by a union liaison, and fostered its collection within civil society or at the universities.

What significance does the representation of the peasants have for the construction of national identity and the place for common people/peasants in its community, i.e. the anatomy of citizenship? When is a peasantry identified and displayed as part of a national narrative? How is it characterized? What is the role of the peasantry in the narrative told? Sweden will here be used as the main case for some exemplary considerations and outlooks.

Swedish national museums

The early historical collections of archaeological findings dated back to the investigations made by the Collegium of Antiquities in the mid-17th century and followed the rather varied institutional shifts through the centuries. The collections were kept at the royal castle and at aristocratic palaces in Stockholm.27

The pre-historic collection was to be organized according to the new scientific tripartite principle: Stone, Bronze, and Iron Age introduced already after 1826 for the archeological findings, directly inspired by Copenhagen and Thomsen, when the collections for the first time sporadically became accessible to the public on request. But the whole collection also contained coins, documents, and royal memorabilia. Popular artefacts (peasants, Samis) were only there as either pre-historical archaeological findings or on aesthetical/ethnographical grounds as excellent handicrafts. Coins and medals took most of the space, even in 1847, when the collection for the first time opened to the public, explicitly aiming at the foundation of a national historical museum.28 It was, however, still labelled the Royal Antiquity and History Museum (Kongl. Antiqvariska och Historiska Museum). In 1855, the name State History Museum (Statens historiska museum) was used for the

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27 The overview is from Thordeman, Bengt, "Lokalfrågor och inredningsproblem", in Ad patriam illustrandam: hyllningsskrift till Sigurd Curman 30 april 1946 (Uppsala 1946).
first time, and from 1870 presented its particulars under the main heading of National Museum.29

The National Museum opened in its own building in 1866 after being fiercely contested by the peasant estate. Out-manoeuvred in 1846 and seeing tax money go to this extravagancy in the capital, the peasants became less loyal to the old parliament and more prone to see the advances of a modern two-chamber constitution, eventually put in place the same year the museum opened.30

The bottom floor was dedicated to the mixed academic and royal collection. In the new building there was much more space, but the principal division and emphasis was similar. No notice was yet given to chronology within the pre-historical exhibit, i.e. the Mesolithic revolution was not clearly established.31 The royal/national was emphasized by the S:t George monument, moved from the Stockholm Cathedral (Storkyrkan), signifying victory over the Danes in the Middle Ages, with royal heroic memorabilia and coins taking most of the space. Hans Hildebrand, in taking over from his father, Bror Emil in 1879, wanted to create a proper National Historical Museum of the antiquarian collections. Hildebrand however did agree to dispose of some objects from the modern era (executed to the full extent in 1915), and handed the peasant collection explicitly to Artur Hazelius’ successful Nordic Museum. The fact that Hildebrand fully embraced the Royal Armoury (Livrustkammaren) collection of royal memorabilia from the modern historical epoch but was ready to let artefacts of peasant culture go, was due to a combination of the success of Hazelius and a vision of “history” where the (modern) peasantry did not have any prominent role and deviated radically in its cultural expressions from the higher and more important ranks of society. Even for a dedicated cultural historian soon to be outplayed by his even more politically-oriented colleagues, the peasant culture was the least valuable part of cultural history. In 1897, Hildebrand’s colleague Oscar Montelius attempted another solution and argued for a physical merger of the two as separate institutions within the planned square together with the present Nordic Museum building, to create a proper National Museum, even more outstanding then in other countries.32 The argument illustrates conflicting ideas about the place of the peasantry in cultural and political history, and by implication, in contemporary society.

31 Nerman, ”Statens”, p. 188-189.
The displays within the museums were object-oriented and were not primarily represented in a social context. The second principle for organization was, however, territorial and regional, which were recognized as pre-state organizational units. Even if it was object-oriented and emphasized the spread of forms, the regional context represented a pre-state community. A major division later became the Neolithic revolution, turning hunters and collectors into peasants, and nomads into villagers. But in the exhibit itself, no notice was given to chronology within, i.e. the Mesolithic revolution.33

When studying Montelius’ printed guide (1872) to the museum, one gets a somewhat deeper and modified view of the narrative presented.34 The royal antecedent from 1666 is noted, but the new orientation from 1830 emphasized the actual creation of the modern institution: “a collection giving for every year a more true image of the history of Swedish agriculture from the most distant past to the latest Century” (sic).35 Agriculture is also emphasized by its first displayed objects and the evolutionary narrative. The first object is a hand-mill signifying the earliest farming practices. Between the presentation of the objects and the condition they were found in, a story is narrated with indent style. The advances are evident even within the Stone Age, when the handicrafts in stone works are presented. The idea of early farming is introduced as a novelty through arguments of comparison with Switzerland and Denmark, and through recent findings in Sweden. Burial grounds as the sites of most findings are at the forefront, and are presented in 114 numbers organized according to region. Adjectives such as “unusual”, “rare”, and “beautiful” intertwine with extensive prosaic descriptions of the skills needed to produce the objects, supposedly to compensate for the lack of images. Remarks indicating diffusion and trade from more civilized districts to the periphery, suggest the evolutionary dynamic. The idea important to the coming century was evolutionism, and was possible to apply to all kinds of collections, as it brought historical development to the centre of explanatory and illustrative power: things, epochs, and territorial difference could be presented as an ordered whole thorough diffusion (trade and migration) and evolution (civilization).

The somewhat abrupt and still soundly hesitant conclusion was “the people that lived here during the earlier Stone Age were most probably our forefathers, progenitor to the Svions and Goths [Svear och Göter] within historical times”.36

33 Nerman, ”Statens”, p. 188.
34 Montelius, Oscar, Statens historiska museum: kort beskrifning till vägledning för de besökande (Stockholm 1872). The booklet appeared in several reprints. The fifth edition was translated to English in 1887.
36 Montelius, Statens historiska museum, p. 3.
Skansen, the Nordic Museum, and the regions

There was a strong and prolonged fight in Stockholm at the end of the 19th century on the issue of who was to represent the national past, what should be represented, and how it was to be done. With varying intensity, the same question has been open for debate up to the present. The main players were academic archaeologists, historians, and antiquarians who argued for the premier importance and legitimacy of a state collection and scientific collecting (Hildebrand, Montelius). These were challenged from two flanks: civil initiatives in the capital, above all by Artur Hazelius expanding his Scandinavian Ethnographical Collection into plans for a Nordic Museum, and the opening of Skansen, an open-air museum with great international impact. His approach was more civil, public, and entrepreneurial. It was all-encompassing, and less analytical and more openly nationalistic. In the rhetorical presentation of the collection, its focus on the peasantry (allmogen) was ever more emphasized as the turn of the century approached. A three-part division of labour was agreed upon formally in 1919. The History of Antiquity (which was housed in the National Museum before 1943) would take care of archeological objects and the Roman Catholic Church – ending chronologically in 1520, with Reformation and the creation of the strong Vasa national state. The Nordic Museum, opening in 1907, took care of popular culture with a more narrow national scope than originally intended, and with an ever stronger emphasis on the scientific method. The immensely popular Skansen was more open to fostering national communal feelings and joy through living history and third-person interpretations, historic plays, and festivals, much in the same way it does nowadays with Allsång på Skansen (allsång literally meaning “community singing”) – the closest to Baltic Song festivals Sweden gets.

The third factor in negotiating peasant representation were the regional museums and their organization. This struggle echoed an earlier strife in the early 19th century with the Gothic Association (Götiska förbundet) as the challenger to the official organization – the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities (Vitterhetsakademien). We might also say that this resembles later tensions in the museum world, creating a rather stable set of challenges between civil society and the state on the one hand, and the capital and the regions on the other hand.

In the 20th century, the role of the museum as a popular educator with its roots in the 19th century increased, while the scientific role of the collections was even more pushed aside. Even more so, this occurred through post-national uses of heritage as an important part of the travel industry where art,
heritage, tourism, and conferences are features of an expanding industry involving strategic global investment.38

Political unity and cultural diversity as strategies – Swedish export

The international exhibitions in the second half of the 19th century inspired a representation not only of industrial products but also of national culture. The idea of moving not only smaller objects but entire buildings from various parts of the realm to represent a particular region in another place seems to have grown widely. In Scandinavia, Oscar I supported Christian Holst in 1882 in Oslo in opening the first genuine peasant building re-erected to represent national building tradition to the public.39

The open air museums presented an extremely successful program for displaying peasant culture and regional variation to a broad public audience. They presented a structuring idea for dealing with questions of regional diversity and national unity in Scandinavia, which was represented most explicitly in outdoor museums that opened in 1891 in Stockholm, 1897 in Copenhagen, 1902 in Oslo, and 1909 in Helsinki. The creator of Skansen was very successful in selling the idea of a living museum not only to the contemporary Swedish public but also to an international public, where this idea rapidly spread a century after the original National museum idea made its triumphant expansion as a response to the Napoleonic turmoil.40 Now the differences to negotiate were more connected to rapid industrialization, urbanization and class conflicts: A stable peasant society anchored people’s minds in a unified past where differences were looked upon as predominantly cultural – not economical or political.

Skansen collected and re-enacted milieus of regional peasant farmsteads and a multi-performing re-enacting stage for national sentiments referring to the Swedish nature, fauna, regional diversity, farming practices, and crafts as a place for rest and rejoicing in a world now lost. The image of an organic society, distinctly regional, but classless, natural, bound to harmonious and happy labour of the ground and nature, placed it outside history. Through the metaphors of soil and the labouring of the land, a narrative link between the

38 Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara, Destination culture. Tourism, museums, and heritage (Berkeley 1998); Dicks, Bella, Culture on display: the production of contemporary visitability (Buckingham 2003).
40 A comprehensive history of the open air museums is available in Rentzhog, Sten, Open air museums. The history and future of a visionary idea (Stockholm 2007).
archaeological artefacts at the National Museum was created and eventually dispersed in regional museums all over the country. A functional division of labour was established, strengthening the construction of a specific national role for peasant culture which went far beyond the struggle for legitimacy of the various ideas of science and museums that occupied the minds of contemporary competitors.

The success was immediate and global, spreading all over the world, with an emphasis on northern Europe and societies with a Germanistic or Slavic ideology. It had a strong resonance to the peasantry as the backbone of national stability and sentiment. It was so successful in its public appeal that it became a problem to deal with as the museum label had a strong scientific connotation. Adversaries claimed it went beyond the line dividing museum from entertainment or politics – both perfectly legitimate – but not worthy of the title of museum. The Nordic Museum was struggling to draw the limit, especially after the death of Hazelius in 1901. Also the secession of Norway, the opening of the new building in 1907, and outbreak of the First World War changed the role it played, and moved its legitimacy in a direction of stressing the scientific scope of its collection, taking the national delimitation more and more as a natural border despite its name, and emphasizing the peasant culture as the essence of popular culture while (still today) exhibiting all kinds of cultural objects of the past in a sometimes haphazard order.41

One might think a full-fledged Open Air museum was an even more the optimal response to negotiating regional difference with national unity in a Norwegian national community than in Sweden. In Norway, the political message had to be moderated while it remained in union with Sweden, but even after that, the idea of nationalism was less state-oriented and centred on the idea of local and regional community. The Oslo museum, however, was much more scientific in its approach than the Swedish one, which was much more inclined to living history. This showed in the number of visitors, which was ten times higher in Stockholm than in Oslo. Nationalism is obviously not the only or perhaps even the main reason for visiting a national museum: Joy, entertainment, living animals, and theatre were parts of the Skansen success in the public sphere – and some of its trouble when it was questioned whether it really was a (scientific) museum at the turn of the century.42 The tension between a program of scientific or of popular appeal is one of the most long-standing and productive in the history of museums. In Norway it was arguably even more important to secure the scientific basis for the national representation of ancient peasant culture than to attract large crowds of visitors. A parallel could be drawn to the development of scientific h-

41 Biörnstad, Arne and Baehrendtz, Nils Erik (eds.), Skansen under hundra år (Höganäs 1991); Bohman, Stefan, Historia, museer och nationalism (Stockholm 1997).
torical writing in Germany – a nation-state in the making and in need of the most solid arguments. Sweden as a stable nation-state could be a bit more slack and open to entertainment in certain sectors of the museum landscape, but had to keep its guard up to avoid diminishing the truth value of its efforts.

The program for diversified modern scientific museums became part of the development of the whole body of knowledge. Empirical science demanded factual archives and visual representations of the world. Ordering and putting things into coherent chains of evolution established knowledge. Hence the history of geology, nature, culture, societies, technology, and art was to be represented in scientific museums. This principle of understanding change was a novelty, and was juxtaposed with the older Linnaean idea of systematic taxonomy. Ordering axes by size was not enough. They had to be interpreted as part of a distinct culture, itself understood as a precursor of contemporary use. National framing was naturalized as an institutional prerequisite with no need of justification – since the whole apparatus of evolution and the fact that the nation framed these activities proved that the nation was the purpose of it all. This was a form of hidden nationalism legitimating and working through its objective methodology. Against this program were many of the museum entrepreneurs addressing the identity question by adjusting to market conditions and the need for entertainment. Only a few of the more successful managed to balance these demands to get the benefits of both market and state subsidies, embattled by academic critics and professionalized museums who wanted to safeguard the label museum for purposes of a higher order. The scene was in fact set already now for many of our contemporary battles, but not all of them.

Orientation:
Public

Schooling, hands-on
Rational Knowledge
Archive, research
Collections

Theatre, role-play
Experience
Treasury, Gallery

The Norwegian Museum of Cultural History (*Norsk Folkemuseum*) opened in 1894, and became the main focus of this idea of scientific representation, later complemented with the sacral museum of Viking burial ships and later the National Maritime Museum which connected the Viking, peasant Norway, and the great explorer with modern Norway living by the sea of fishing and oil resources. The ensemble of museums can be interpreted together rather than one by one, coming closer to the experience of a visitor and the overall architectural and visual imprint on the capitals. This broad approach to a museum landscape rather than just one collection at a time is productive when moving from a focus on visionary initiatives to the possible impact the realized exhibits and impressions have on visitor experiences and on the public sphere in general. However, this approach is not possible to pursue in its full complexity here.

**The Museum of National Antiquities**

The Museum of National Antiquities was given a new specifically-built location during the Second World War. The opening was received with standing ovations, much due to its forceful narrative on how the peasants had created the country and its richness by toiling the soil. Narratives of labour and agrarian endeavour beautifully reflected the epochal agreement between industrial labour and organized farming interests, modernity, and tradition in the 1930s.

The 20th century direction was moving bit by bit towards placing educational aspects of the exhibitions more centrally. Objects were removed to study collections, and models were constructed to show burial grounds more in principle than by using authentic remains.\(^{43}\) The credo of the exhibition was the story of an unbroken chain of evolution, where our ancestors struggled for survival, civilization, and community, building from pre-history to the Sweden of the present. Race theory was a self-evident starting point to make that point valid. The argument was that Sweden was purely Arian and was populated by long-heads already in the Stone Age. This refutes the earlier popular and powerful idea of explaining differences by reconstructing waves of migration. This idea could be dangerous, especially when the Samis sometimes were identified as belonging to an earlier invasion, and even more so with potentially successful new invaders on the doorstep. There was no problem with this as long as the evolutionary idea gave legitimacy to the strong and victorious late-comer, but what if the idea of ancestry and ancient origins was given precedence over sheer power? – which could easily happen in a world shaken by two world wars and slowly embracing

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\(^{43}\) Nerman, "Statens", p. 201-204.
democratic ideals as a part of its culture and identity.\textsuperscript{44} It was claimed that no major migration to Sweden had taken place since the Stone Age. Thus, the Swedes were heirs to the people who populated Sweden at the end of this period. Now as then, it was argued, the population of Sweden was mainly of the Nordic race, tall and with long skulls. This biological continuity was unmatched elsewhere in Europe.\textsuperscript{45}

It is very clear that the public is addressed more unambiguously, and that researchers were directed to collections outside the display. A program for pedagogical activity was launched immediately, and popular education became part of its main purpose. Of course educational efforts are not an invention. These efforts have predecessors as part of the nation-making aspect, where socializing citizens is an essential aspect of governance. Now, however, this aspect was addressed openly, and in a systematic mode.

Moving through the exhibition takes the visitor on a chronological journey of technological advances, both in the societies under scrutiny who developed adequate tools, and in the heroic archaeologists of our time as scientists who unveil hidden truths. Stories of gender are part of the unreflected reconstruction of the famous woman from Barum.\textsuperscript{46}

Now the Mesolithic age is emphatically presented, defined by the presence of a specific type of boot-shaped axe, but the story is about how gathering is complemented by agriculture and herding. "Hunters and fishermen become settled peasants. The culture advances thanks to the cultivation of soil and keeping of cattle. As a result the basis of our ancestors’ culture is created."

Nevertheless, concealed in the emphasis on technological development was a reassuring continuity on behalf of the people carrying the advances. The Stone Age passage graves are claimed to mirror the dynamic organization of the peasant Stone Age society and their excellent construction skills.\textsuperscript{48}

Evolution, not revolution, signifies change. Peace is behind the expansion ending with colonies in the present Russian territory back in Iron Age. As the Sviones mentioned by Tacitus are identified with realm of the Svea people (Sverike), Nerman can conclude that Sweden is the oldest of the nation-

\textsuperscript{44} This is especially true in the articles of Bagge and Nerman. Sven Nilsson in Sweden advocated migration arguments, but this was an international mode of explanation with great power. See Renfrew, Colin, Arkeologi och språk. Det indoeuropeiska ursprungets gåta (Stockholm 1993).
\textsuperscript{45} Curman, Sigurd; Nerman, Birger and Selling, Dagmar (eds.), Tiotusen år i Sverige (Stockholm 1945), p. Xxx.
\textsuperscript{46} See Fornvännens 2000:2 for the latest findings. The Barum woman is still contested as one of the true valuables of the story of Sweden.
\textsuperscript{47} Description and citation from Regner, Elisabet, Tiotusen år i Sverige - en idéhistorisk analys av en arkeologisk utställning (Stockholm 1995), unpublished student thesis at Stockholm University, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{48} Regner, Tiotusen år, p. 28.
The foundation of this continuity is the peasantry. It is concluded that only the Danish and the Norwegian have toiled the land for as long as the Swedish peasants, who have carried out such labour since the Stone Age. The Kingdom of Sweden was ancient. The king, elected by free men in Mora, began his royal tour of the country (eriksgata). Securing the new narrative in the century-old Geijer tradition, a bond was created between stability, peasantry, the king, and the existence of the state of Sweden. This is a strong story with the turmoil of war surrounding it, and it was received by the public with overwhelming applause. Some scholars were certainly lamenting the lack of systematic display and the sacrifice of scientific rigour on the altar of popular re-enactment. They might have been happier with the Bronze Age exhibition which was the most conservative of all, with elements of continuity from the National Museum to the recently closed exhibit. The exhibit was the second in the building (the first was a successful military exhibit of Sweden on alert) and was meant to be provisional. Its success was perhaps due to the force of the war in producing a strong national narrative, but proved to be instrumental up until the seventies. A rapid industrialization governed by Social Democrats, resting on an agreement with the Peasant Party (Bondeförbundet), and the People’s home (Folkhemmet) as the central metaphor allowed this narrative to work far beyond the war. It negotiated a neutral welfare-state well into the 1970s. After that, it can be said to have become gradually obsolete, and finally closed down in 2003, paralleled by a broad and self-critical discussion of the role of national institutions in a multi-cultural setting.

The new exhibits try to relate to all of the post-modern challenges observed, and to re-orient narratives within the specific political culture of Sweden. This means telling a reflexive, gendered, multi-cultural, class-conscious story of the territory of contemporary Sweden, explicitly stating that Sweden of course did not exist at this time. Furthermore, most of the findings are from Scania, and not from the Baltics or Pomerania. The national master-narrative is there but in a very Freudian way, which must confuse the visitor. This means, however, that technological advances are toned down and a will to bring forward individuals is emphasized, yet still within the same chronological and epochal approach.

Parallel to this is a lively debate on how a contemporary cultural heritage constructs or contributes to ideas of democracy and citizenship. This is true, for example, also in Denmark and Norway. The debate and, above all, policy

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50 Regner, Tiotusen år, p. 31.
51 Andersson, Joakim and Aronsson, Peter, 10000 år - på 90 minuter. Pedagogisk verksamhet i forntidens basutställning (Norrköping 2004), unpublished.
in Denmark is radically different with a strong emphasis on the national heritage and the need for canonical knowledge of Danish culture for all citizens. This calls for a comparative analysis. Similar ideas of founding national peasant cultures are able to develop in quite different ways, even within a cultural region defining itself as Nordic welfare states.

Conclusions

Images of a distant peasant society which founded the nation developed out of romantic nationalism all over the western world. The images rooted contemporary states in ancient tribes, the right of long labour, and documentary evidence buried in the soil. The actual political conditions in most countries varied considerably, but the pressure of industrialization and democratization had to be dealt with all over the world. Hence the magnetic power of the peasantry as an image of stability, hard labour, and collaboration; virtues expected to counteract rapid urbanization and social unrest.

The public appreciation of peasant culture in the 19th century had a precisely designated cultural value. This value at the same time was negotiating rapid change, creating a vision of a shared past and unchanging values, and placing agricultural society at large in the museum as a part of the past. In this negotiation of the two visions of the future, industrial society gained the upper hand. The farmers themselves early on appreciated the lack of support in their fierce opposition to the building of a national museum. It is only when a new societal contract was established in the 1930s that a strong narrative from below occurred with not only cultural, but also strong political implications. This was reinforced by the turmoil of the wars of the 20th century.

People’s home (folkhemmet) nostalgia was more prone to negotiate life conditions in the era of flexible capitalism in Sweden, when history and exhibitions in the western world first became a place to be recognized collectively (workers, women, minorities) and later were also the space for more individualistic, aesthetic, and existential demands.

Similar tendencies were at work in neighbouring nations. Due to differences in political culture and actual state-making, one may expect to find various roles of peasant imagery at work during different eras in history. Maybe it is possible to sketch a brief chronology of the use made of peasants in national narrative as related to the creation of a notion of the people and the borders of a political community, for further comparative purposes:

II 1840-1900: Bourgeois collection of material culture negotiating modernization and rapid change to consolidate ideas of progress while at the same time securing the foundations of an immobile antecedent to contemporary society. Now-then contrast.

III 1900-1970: Evolutionary narrative of unbroken continuity of settlement and labour to secure right to land and property and legitimate democratic rule. Progress.


These epochs have not vanished entirely. They left a heritage of narratives to be allocated new spaces by the historic newcomers. A Golden Age agenda can be reestablished by urban environmentalists or, with less political claims, by anyone on vacation in the countryside. The progress and contrasting mode of using the past is usable when advocating the necessary story of a relatively successful path of events for ourselves – collectively and individually. Again, the more fragmented view of the past as a foreign country is a heritage of the Enlightenment manner of understanding the rupture between us and the past, the very precondition for recognizing ”history” at all.

Images of the virtues of the peasantry were important in the gradual expansion of citizen rights, in reform programs of land and housing, in the communal reforms and so on. But perhaps today we are moving onto a new stage where the stable past to relate to is not an ever-more distant peasantry, but an equally imaginary high industrial welfare society? There are signs of the 1950s which can be interpreted as the Golden Age in contemporary society, rather then the 1850s.53

The epochs suggested above, however, are very crude ideal types formed by various processes into distinct varieties of peasant imagery:

- Different social strata might have different use of past peasantry. For instance, farmers cling to their centrality and radical workers might criticize this early on. Denmark as a country which modernized itself through industrializing agriculture places the peasantry differently. Even Viking society is interpreted differently based to differing national self-understanding.
- Various ways to national sovereignty give rise to different chronologies and emphases. The centrality of culture in ad-

vancing a national-state to be is greater in new nations than in old.

- Variation in actual political, social and economic structures gives resonance. The actual strength of the Swedish peasant estate hindered the establishment and strong representation of peasants at the National Museum. The agreements between labour and agrarian capital paved the way for a strong representation in the modern era.

There are many interesting differences implied in this essay. Still, I would in the end argue that there are strong epochal similarities that need to be understood and explained. For anyone visiting different museums and inspecting their representation of peasantry, the similarities are striking, their claims on national and regional uniqueness repetitive, and the impact of recognition sometimes reassuring and at other times tedious.
Maps


Map 2. The Districts of Eastern Galicia, 1910. From Himka, Galician Villagers, p. xxxii)

The Districts of Eastern Galicia, 1910

Map 2
This anthology presents perspectives on the political, social and economic transformation of rural life on the periphery of Western Europe and the Baltic Sea area, 1880–1939. Rural populations living in these peripheries adopted various strategies in response to rapid political and economic change, while they themselves were the subject of activist and elite political mobilization and nation-building rhetoric. The anthology discusses the impact of the re-organization of production and distribution of agricultural products and property on gender, ethnic and class relationships, including analyses of the relatively successful peasants’ agricultural cooperatives and of relatively unsuccessful movements such as Agrarianism. We look at the evolution of peasant politics, both in areas with long traditions of peasant political participation (Sweden) and those with short and problematic histories of rural politicization (Austrian Galicia). The anthology also analyses the rhetoric fuelling peasant mobilization. Imagining and visualizing the peasant by non-rural social classes was an important element of modern nation-building; while a pair of unlikely bedfellows – romantic nationalism and Enlightenment thinking – may be viewed as cornerstones in the emancipation agenda of 19th and early 20th century rural activists. The anthology thus provides new, comparative scholarship on the content and impact of modern rural movements, both economic, social and political; as well as the ideologies which sought to mobilize, and incorporate, the peasant population into national politics and history.