Democracy From the Outside-In?
The Conceptualization and Significance of Democracy Promotion
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Daniel Silander

Växjö University Press
Abstract


This study explores the literature on factors favorable to democratization. It is argued that there has been a domestic dominance, with international factors a forgotten dimension. It is also argued that the limited body of work dealing with international factors has been empirical in nature. This study sheds lights on one international factor in democracy promotion. The theoretical contribution of this study is the presented analytical framework for democracy promotion. The analytical framework consists of actors, interests, methods, channels, relations and impact. It is argued that, within a specific time-context (setting): (1) There are actors (2) that may promote the democracy norm and reinforcing interests. (3) They may use different methods of pursuing their interests and (4) that may be channeled towards domestic actors. (5) This may create certain relations and (6) have different impact on domestic actors.

The empirical aim of this study is to illustrate the analytical framework. The empirical contribution is to provide an improved understanding of democracy promotion and democratization in postcommunist Europe. This is done by analyzing the role of the EU as democracy promoter in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY from 1993 to 2003. The analysis illustrates different interests, methods, channels, relations and impact between the EU as democracy promoter and the targeted states in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY.

Key-words: Democratization, international factors, democracy promotion, EU, postcommunism
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1. Framing the Study

1.1 Problems and Aim

This is a study within the research on democratization.¹ Research on democratization concerns the causes of the political process towards democracy. There has been a general agreement among scholars on democratization that the 20th century was a century of ideological battles. It has also been argued that the number of democracies has increased over the last decades. The democratization from the 1970s to the 1990s (see Chapter 2.3) influenced most regions in the world and challenged right-winged and left-winged authoritarian states, military regimes as well as despotic leaders in Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. It made scholars write in terms of “the triumph of democracy” (Holden 2000a:1), “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), “the democratic revolution” (Diamond 2000:91) and how democracy had become “globalized” (Grugel 1999:19) as a third “universal language” beside money and internet (the U.S. State Department quoted in Diamond 2000:91).

The global spread of democracies raised an interest in understanding and explaining democratization. The research on democratization had traditionally explained democratization based on structure-oriented factors. However, in the late 1980s, scholars began to identify actor-oriented factors as well. This was a major intellectual shift away from the structure-oriented explanations. It was argued that democratization could be explained by actors’ interests and actions and not only by long-term structural changes. However, despite these theoretical developments, the global spread of democracies showed a growing gap between theory and empirical reality. The spread of democracies was neither explained, nor predicted (Huntington 1984). This was due to the domestic bias shared by the structure-oriented and actor-oriented explanatory factors.

The research on democratization has primarily been domestic-oriented, dealing with states as closed systems (Haynes 2003:20-21, Landman 2000:144). This has been obvious when summarizing the research done within the field of de-

¹ Democratization is conceptualized, measured and illustrated in Chapter 2.
mocratization since the 1950s (Bunce 2000, cf. Shin 1994). However, states and state politics are not independent of international relations and international politics. For instance, the UN and the U.S. intervention of Iraq in the early 1990s and 2000, the international activities in Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan and former Yugoslavia, the U.S. and EU commitment to support democratization in the Middle East, the fight against terror after the September 11 attacks on the U.S. in 2001, and the overall western pressure on Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of Soviet Union were all events that provided an intense debate on international relations and democratization (Carothers 1999:1, Barkman 1997:372). This has more recently led to a growing body of empirical literature on the subject of international factors to democratization.

The research conducted on factors favorable to democratization is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates the traditional focus on domestic factors and the recent approach of including international factors. The dependent variable is democratization. The aim of this study is to develop the theoretical thinking on factors favorable to democratization. This facilitates improved empirical knowledge of democratization as well. To fulfill this aim, two missions are conducted; a theoretical and an empirical mission. The theoretical mission consists of identifying international factors in democratization and conceptualizing one of these international factors in democracy promotion. Democracy promotion is assumed to be one essential international factor for democratization. This factor refers to an interaction process of prodemocratic actors that promotes the democracy norm towards domestic actors. The empirical mission involves applying and illustrating the significance of the analytical framework to develop a better empirical understanding of democratization. The overall ambition is to find an answer to the question: How may we understand international factors to democratization?

The main purpose with Figure 1 is to illustrate the different factors identified in the research. Figure 1 shed lights on how the factors may be categorized as dependent and independent factors as well as how the independent factors may be divided into domestic and international factors.

Democracy promotion is discussed in Chapter 3.2 and conceptualized in Chapter 4.
1.2 Theoretical Mission

The theoretical mission of this study is to construct an analytical framework for democratization that includes the role played by international factors. The theoretical approach seeks to develop an analytical framework that proposes an assumption of why some states are more democratized than others. The analytical framework consists of an assumption that there is a relationship between the identified dependent factor (democratization) and the independent factor (democracy promotion). It does not aim to find causal relations, but rather to find a logical relation. This implies that there might be deviant cases, although there is a strong pattern or logical relation based on specific criteria. This may refer to the probability probe or to finding the probability patterns (Gilje & Grim 1992, Hovi & Bjørn 1996, Denk 2002).

In order to develop an analytical framework to democratization, three steps are included as illustrated in Figure 2. The first step will be to conceptualize the dependent factor in democratization. This requires dealing with ideal types of phases (see Chapter 2.1.2). The second step will be to review the bulk of studies on factors favorable to democratization and identify as well as classify these fac-
tors into larger perspectives on democratization. This approach will identify a domestic oriented research on democratization mainly due to the comparative approach inherited in the traditional research on democratization (see Chapter 3.1). The third step is to identify international factors to democratization and conceptualize democracy promotion as one important factor. The developed analytical framework consists of this international factor and is horizontal in relation to the domestic factors (see Chapter 3.2 & Chapter 4).

![Analytical Framework to Be Developed](image)

**Figure 2: Analytical Framework to Be Developed**

### 1.3 Empirical Mission

The empirical mission of the study is to apply the analytical framework. The main purpose is to illustrate its significance, but also to shed light on the democratization of postcommunist Europe. The significance of the framework for democratization is illustrated on the EU and three postcommunist states in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY of 1993 to 2003. This study may therefore also contribute to a better empirical understanding of democratization and democracy promotion by relating the democratization of postcommunist states to the role played by the EU as democracy promoter. It may say something about the role of the EU as democracy promoter, but also about the democratization processes in the surrounding states of Central-, Eastern- and Southeast Europe. However, the primary aim of this study is theoretical; to develop an analytical framework that is identifying and defining democracy promotion as an international factor in democratization.

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4 FRY changed its name to Serbia & Montenegro in 2003. This study uses FRY due to the time coverage of 1993 to 2003 and for practical reasons.
1.4 Methodological Choices

There are four principal important methodological considerations to address in this study; a) the actor-oriented approach, b) the construction of an analytical framework, c) the research design and d) the collection of the material. This concerns a discussion on theoretical dimensions, on core concepts and their systematic relations, on comparative approach and the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and the nature of the collected material in literature, documents and interviews.

1.4.1 Actors and structures

The research on democratization has been dynamic and promising with the structural-oriented dimension, also named functionalism, emphasizing domestic environmental factors to democratization and with the actor-oriented dimension, also named genetic, stressing the importance of domestic actors and their preferences, orientations and strategies. These two broad dimensions have had quite different time-perspectives; the structural dimension focusing on long-time changes in the society, with the actor-oriented dimension being more short-termed (Hydén 2002:2-4). The nature of the relation between these two dimensions has illustrated the core issue of social sciences:

“To what degree can societal actors decide their course of action, and to what degree are they compelled to follow a course not chosen by them?” (Etzioni 1968)

More recently, it has been suggested that the answer to the nature of the relation between actors-structures may be found in the interactive process where the actions are determined by structures, but where actors also determine structures (cf. Karl 1990, Uhlin 1995). Such a notion does not stress any of the two dimensions as adequate explanatory dimensions. It rather stresses them as constitutive and dependent on each other. In other words, actors are producing and reproducing structures, but these structures are also situating the actors and their intentions in time and space. Action and structure are in a relation of logical entailment (Giddens 1981:171).

Chapter 3 presents actor-oriented and structure-oriented factors favorable to democratization. However, the analytical framework for international factors to democratization focuses on democracy promotion. The framework on democracy promotion has an actor-oriented analytical level. Democracy promotion includes an interaction of prodemocratic actors and domestic actors. The prodemocratic actors promote democracy towards the domestic actors. This interaction process
is further discussed in Chapter 3.2 and conceptualized in Chapter 4. However, democracy promotion may also establish normative structures that may be more or less favorable for democracy promotion. The established normative structures situate actors and their democracy promotion.5

1.4.2 Constructing an analytical framework

The theoretical mission of this study is to construct and illustrate an analytical framework. This framework consists of concepts that are systematically related to each other. Each concept is defined in a certain way and sets out specific characteristics that the concept is referring to. Each concept is also labelled with a term that symbolizes the definition. By using the term, the definition is presented and applied, without spelling out the definition each time the concept is used. The analytical framework consists of different concepts that are related to each other on a horizontal as well as a vertical structure. The vertical structure consists of a hierarchy of concepts where some concepts are superior to others. The horizontal structure, on the other hand, consists of concepts that are complementary related without a hierarchic order.

The analytical framework of this study consists of a horizontal level of concepts in democratization, domestic factors and international factors. The domestic and international factors are supposed to be favorable to democratization. The vertical structure sets out the meaning of each concept. This leads to an identification of the characteristics of democratization, the domestic factors and the international factors. It is one international factor in democracy promotion that is in focus in relation to democratization. Democracy promotion is conceptualized in this study into aspects. Each aspect is systematically related on a horizontal level and is complementing each other. These aspects of democracy promotion refer to actors, interests, methods, channels, relations and impact. Each aspect also consists of a vertical structure of upper and lower typologies that defines the aspects.

1.4.3 Comparative approaches and the MSSD

There are different types of comparative approaches: the descriptive type and the explanatory type (Denk 2002:8-12).6 This study is an explanatory study. The explanatory study, compared to the descriptive study, is more advanced, aiming at both describing and explaining phenomena. For example, instead of only identi-

5 As argued by Uhlin, “Societal structures are the result of past actions; old structures are continually changed and new ones created by actors” (Uhlin 1995:26).
6 There is also the approach of prediction.
fying differences in the democratization level in states, the explanatory study may be used to explain why these differences exist. There are also two types of comparative explanatory studies to choose from; the most similar systems design (MSSD) or the most different systems design (MDSD). The MSSD seeks to explore the differences in the dependent factor by existing differences in the independent factor, while the MDSD explains similarities in the dependent factor with similarities in the independent factor. However, it is important to understand that neither similarities nor differences are absolute, but should be treated as relative (Denk 2002:42-43, 62-66, Hague & Harrop 2001:73-74, Dogan & Pelassy 1990:132).

This study uses a MSSD to find differences in democratization level by differences in democracy promotion. There is, however, no universal rule on how to select the cases in a MSSD. There are different kinds of selection bias that must be considered. Firstly, the selection of cases to support the theory to be tested and secondly, the selection of similar cases on the dependent factor leaving us with no explanation of why there is a variation or not in the dependent factor. In order to develop theory, it has been of great concern to select cases with variation in the dependent factor. By doing so, there is an opportunity to illustrate the proposed analytical framework and identify when states have variation in democratization in relation to democracy promotion (Denk 2002:47-48).

Selection of cases: The EU and postcommunist states

The selection of cases has resulted in the EU and Slovakia, Belarus and FRY being picked. The EU is used to illustrate a democracy promoter: it refers to an actor with policies as well as to a normative structure.\(^7\) The EU is engaged in promoting policies within several issue-areas and there has been a democratic dimension to these issue-areas.\(^8\) The EU also provides a norm-community based on the membership of like-minded states. The norm-community has enlarged as the number of member states has increased. This study is based on the notion that normative structures may be seen as the result of actors’ perceptions and actions in a comprised form. The behavior of actors may contribute to structures as

\(^7\) It is the official policies of the formal institutions in the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament that are in focus when discussing the EU. This is a simplification of the many policies and relations of the EU, although this entity requires theoretical simplification and empirical demarcation. The EU is also used to describe policies in the past and the present, disregarding other abbreviations (such as the EC).

\(^8\) This has not only referred to relations to the close surroundings of Central and Eastern Europe, but also to the Mediterranean areas, South America, Asia and the U.S. (White 2001:3). However, despite of the role of the EU in European politics has most analysis of democracy promotion concerned U.S. foreign policies.
standards of behavior and that may constrain the activities by others. As a consequence, this study focuses on the decisions made by the EU, although taking into account that the policies foster structures that may be more or less constraining in nature. This refers to the EU as a foreign policy-maker and norm-community (Cosgrove-Sacks 2001:3, Bengtsson 2004:150-152, Peterson & Smith 2003:222, 238-240, Youngs 2001:355-356, cf. Hill 1996, Bretherton & Vogler 1999, Soetendorp 1999).

The role of the EU as a democracy promoter is related to the democratization process in three states in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY. These states have three similarities (discussed below) that are important and one difference in the achieved democratization level. A large bulk of comparative studies on democratization has focused on the successful paths towards democratization. The main reason for the selection of successfully democratized states has been that they fit existing theories on democratization (Linde 2004:33). However, rather than focusing on the success stories of democratization, or clear-cut cases in Central Europe, this study seeks to explore the role of democracy promotion by including the more reluctant postcommunist states in Eastern and Southeast Europe as well. Slovakia, Belarus and FRY share important characteristics, although being very different in the democratization level. It is argued in Chapter 5 that Slovakia has fully adopted democracy, becoming a consolidated democracy of the late 1990s and forward. However, Belarus has rejected democracy becoming an authoritarian state with totalitarian traits, while the FRY still is transitional and an uncertain case of progress and obstacles.

However, there are three important similarities between these states. The first similarity between these states is the change from Communism to postcommunism. Postcommunism is a concept that has been used since the transformation of former Communist states in the late 1980s (see Chapter 5). The concept refers in this study to the former Communist and transforming states in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe. The transition consisted of rejecting the Communist power system. The former Communist states were overall systems where the Communist party had penetrated the political, economic and social spheres of activities and to large extent undermined political, economic and social pluralism; the Communist societies were to high degree atomized societies. For instance, in comparison with the authoritarian states in Southern Europe and Latin America of the 1970s, the level of suppression has been much higher within the former Communist states (Holmes 1997:13-14, Pei 1994:11-19, Rupnik 1999:57-60, Rose 1999:54-55, Dahrendorf 1999). However, the major changes of the late 1980s and forward consisted of the breakdown of the Communist regimes. The change in ideological and political foundations made them go from Communist states to postcommunist states. These new postcommunist leaders had to face the political and economical failure of the traditional system and the new vacuum of
ideas over how to rebuild a better society. There was also a high degree of expectations among the postcommunist leaders over what would happen, but also a widespread cynicism towards the traditional system of institutions and a moral confusion over the political ideology that had guided these societies (Holmes 1997:17-19, Linz & Stepan 1996:235-254, Carothers 2004:109-110).

The second similarity between these states includes the transformation of secession, as they had to face the breaking of ties between groups of people and the territorial belonging. There was a major process of secession of the 1990s with the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, which led to 22 states. Three of these states were Slovakia, Belarus and FRY and they had to, as new states, solve the parallel processes of state-building and political and economic reconstruction. The overall illegitimacy of the former systems opened up the risk of conflict and war and could challenge the state-building process as well as the potential for democratization (Holmes 1997:16).

The third similarity concerns the transformation of democratization towards the Western model. The notion of the political and economic model of the West influenced more or less all the postcommunist states. Due to the failed Communist era, the new postcommunist states were overall highly receptive to any new political and economic ideas. The western model of liberal democracy and market economy had such attraction that many postcommunist states seemed to be dedicated to the same political and economic goal. The asymmetrical relation between Western powers and the postcommunist states gave the former a strong leverage on the changes within these societies. As a consequence, the limited sovereignty of the Soviet era was transformed into a new form of limited sovereignty where western interests had to be taken into account (Nodia 1996:15, Holmes 1997:18-21, Grabbe 2001:1014).

In summary, it is the similarities between these postcommunist states and the variation in democratization level that is of most interest in this study. It furthers an understanding of the role of democracy promotion.

1.4.4 Material
The collected empirical material is used to illustrate the developed analytical framework on democratization in postcommunist states. There are different methods available when collecting empirical material such as experiments, observations, interviews, documents and literature. This study relies on literature, documents and interviews. These sources have been crosschecked to ensure optimum reliability. For instance, there has been an on-going evaluation of the written material and the interviews.

Literature: The review of the literature identifies concepts, theories and interpretations of the theoretical body on democratization. The literature review
sheds light on the existing body of knowledge on democratization, but also on the major shortcomings. The majority of written sources in this study are found within the area of studies on democratization. However, due to the limited theoretical contributions on international factors, sources are also found within other areas of comparative politics, as well as within the research on international relations. This leads to the development of an analytical framework taking into account concepts and approaches from different fields of research.


**Documents:** This study also uses statistics and documents developed by the EU and the Freedom House. The use of the EU documents aims to gain information on the EU as a democracy promoter. This also includes getting knowledge on principles and procedures within the Union on democracy promotion towards postcommunist Europe. The documents consist of historical and current Treaties, Reports and Communications as well as published programs and contracts. *The Freedom House Survey* is an institute providing data in an easy and methodological way. For instance, the *Freedom in the World Survey* consists of annual rankings on the political rights and civil liberties in all states of the world, as well as reports on each state. The *Nations in Transit Survey* focuses on the democratization of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe of the
1990s and explains the degree of political rights and civil liberties in these states (see Chapter 2.2).

*Interviews:* This study also includes a few important interviews. The interviews are purposely-sampled individual interviews with officials within the EU (see Appendix A). These interviews target particular persons based on their expected knowledge of the EU democracy promotion and aim to gain information on the role of the EU. The respondents were selected on the basis of their knowledge of the EU democracy promotion towards Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe. The purpose of the semi-structured interviews, including thematically areas of interest followed by specific spontaneous questions, are two-fold; firstly, to obtain the interviewee’s knowledge of the role of the EU as democracy promoter and secondly, to evaluate the written material on the relations between the EU and postcommunist states (Johnson & Joslyn 1995:262-265). The first round of elite interviews, conducted in May 2003, concerned the different Directorate-Generals of the EU Commission in Brussels that deal with democracy promotion. The second round of interviews was conducted in September 2003, with officials working on democratization. The assistance for the selection came from officials within the Commission, as the “gatekeepers”, and the contact with the officials were taken through the gatekeepers as well as via email presenting the background of the study and the purposes with the interviews. In order to promote openness in the interview, the areas of interest were emailed in advance to the interview persons and due to the restrictions of the Commission, tape recorder was not used. Based on careful notes from the interview, I wrote up the interviews after each occasion as a method of collecting as many details as possible. However, being aware of the many problems that come with interviews, this study also stands on above-mentioned written sources as a way of cross-checking information (Andersson 1985, Esaiasson et al 2003).

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9 The exception was the interviews with Anne Koistinen and Raul de Luzenberger that took place at the same time.
10 Read Taru Kernisalo, EuropeAid Office, for assistance with contacts. Read Per Eklund, EuropeAid Office, for assistance with information on the Directorate-Generals.
11 There are some important elements to be aware of when implementing interviews. These elements are part of the interaction process and concern 1) the context of the interview (time and place), 2) characteristics and skills of the interviewer (social performances, skills, motivation), 3) characteristics and skills of the interviewed (social performances, rhetoric skills, willingness to participate) and 4) content of the interview (sensitivity, level of difficulty, level of interests)). These concerns guided the long process of planning, implementing and evaluating the interviews in the study (Andersson 1985).
1.5 Outline of the Study

Based on this introduction, this study is divided into three major parts. The first part, Chapters 2-4, sets out the conceptual and analytical framework with supportive illustrations. The second part, Chapters 5-6, applies the framework on the EU as democracy promoter in postcommunist Europe. Part three, Chapter 7, summarizes the research made and sheds light on theoretical and empirical contributions and limitations.

Chapter 1 has primarily set out the theoretical and empirical missions of this study and argued for the need for further theoretical developments within the research on democratization. It has also touched upon the methodological considerations.

Chapter 2 sets out to conceptualize, measure and illustrate the phenomenon of democratization. This includes definitions on what constitutes a democracy and a dictatorship. Democratization is defined as a political process from dictatorship to democracy, including several phases in the pretransition, transition and consolidation phases. The democratization process of the 20th century is illustrated based on the Freedom House Survey. It is argued that the 20th century was a democratic century as more and more states turned into democracies. The democratization process of the 1970s and forwards increased the number of democracies in the world and had an impact on most regions. This led to the expansion of free and fair elections as well as other political rights and civil liberties. The democratization process was most significant in Europe where Western European democracies established a norm-community as like-minded states.

Chapter 3 provides a theoretical discussion on the factors favorable to democratization. This chapter starts out with a classification of the traditional domestic-oriented factors favorable to democratization, stressing that the research on democratization has had a domestic dominance. It is stressed that the comparative research on democratization has continued to presume that democratization is a result of domestic factors, as the state system has been perceived as a closed system. The international factors have played a secondary role in explaining democratization and are therefore not a clear-cut theory.

Chapter 4 conceptualizes the process of democracy promotion and introduces a complementary approach by including this international factor to democratization. The conceptualization of democracy promotion refers to the promotion of the democracy norm towards domestic actors. This is particularly an actor-oriented process, although like-minded actors may construct norm-communities that also foster democratization.

Chapter 5 explores the democratization level in postcommunist Europe by discussing the possibilities and obstacles to democratization. This chapter illustrates the different paths towards democratization taken by Slovakia, Belarus and
FRY and that have resulted in the adoption of democracy in Slovakia, the rejection of democracy in Belarus and the continued democratic uncertainty in FRY. It is set out that Slovakia has become a consolidated democracy, FRY a transitional democracy and Belarus an authoritarian state.

*Chapter 6* applies the developed analytical framework of the study to democratization. It illustrates the role of the EU in influencing postcommunist states. This chapter sheds light on the EU as an actor and normative structure that promotes the democracy norm to the postcommunist states in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY. This chapter is organized according to the aspects of the democracy promotion process and provides the reader with an illustration of how the promotion of the democracy norm may be understood.

*Chapter 7* concludes the exploits of the study and summarizes the different chapters and the main findings on how to understand democracy promotion. It also elaborates on the contributions and limitations of the study and identifies important tracks for further research.
Part 1: Theoretical Mission
This chapter consists of a discussion on the dependent factor. The dependent factor is democratization. The dependent factor is illustrated in Figure 3.

**Figure 3: Analytical Framework to be Developed — Democratization**

The discussion on the dependent factor in democratization is organized in three steps. The first step concerns the conceptualization of democratization, setting out the definition of democratization as a political process towards democracy. The second step concerns the measurement of democratization and consists of a discussion on different indices of democracy. The third step concerns the phenomenon of democratization and includes an illustration of the latest worldwide trend of democratization. These three steps are illustrated in Figure 4.


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**TABLE 1: ANALYTICAL LEVELS OF DEMOCRATIZATION**

### 2.1 Conceptualizing Democratization

The theoretical discussion on democratization of this study concerns how to understand the political process towards democracy. A definition of democratization is

“…political changes moving in a democratic direction” (Potter 1997a:3).

This definition of democratization points out how we may understand democratization. Democratization is in an ongoing process. It is in this study dealt with as a complex process of overlapping phases. To understand the complex process of democratization is therefore to understand the nature of the several phases included in democratization (Sørensen 1993:1). However, it also requires defining different political regimes. A regime symbolizes the formal and operating constraints for political interaction. It consists of goals, norms and structures of authority. The goals set out guidance for the daily activities and are underlying the regime as an ideology or doctrine. The norms, on the other hand, specify the operating rules of politics including the procedures for processing and implementing demands; they specify how to behave, articulate and aggregate political demands and how to reach decisions and implementation. Finally, the structure of authority (institutions) designates the formal and informal patterns of power-distribution regarding policy-making and implementing of decisions (Easton 1965:193-207, cf. Norris 1999).

The type of regime involved influences the democratization process. There is a linkage between what regime democratization begins from and the nature of the democratization process. In short, the less democratic the former regime has been, the more troublesome the democratization process there will be (Beetham 1999:72-75). As a consequence, since democratization is a political process towards democracy, there is a need of also conceptualizing different types of democracies and dictatorships to be able to conceptualize democratization. This
The study distinguishes four types of political regimes in liberal democracy, electoral democracy, authoritarian dictatorship and totalitarian dictatorship.

2.1.1 Political Regimes
There has been a long and on-going debate on how to conceptualize democracy. It is generally acknowledged that democracy is a fuzzy and multifaceted concept. This has led to a conceptual inflation in the research on democratization. In general, democracy has been defined as government by the people (Almond & Powell 1996:63) or rule by the people (Dahl 1989:3). There have been two conceptions of democracy of relevance for this study as the debate has primarily consisted of a minimalist and maximalist perspective on democracy. These are the electoral democracies and the liberal democracies. Both the electoral and liberal democracies have had a conception that excluded social and economic conditions (cf. Rindefjäll 1998).

The minimalist perspective has defined democracy as a procedural system focusing on the institutionalization of politics through free and fair elections. The establishment of free and fair elections has been perceived as the symbol of the establishment of a democracy. For instance, Joseph Schumpeter (1942) stressed a minimal definition on democracy and became the founder of a procedural definition of democracy. Schumpeter’s definition of democracy referred to a procedural democracy where different political elites were competing for power. Democracy was a political method for choosing politicians. Democratic life was the political struggle between representatives, where citizens had the ability to check the power through elections and thereby prevent the inroad of tyranny at the same time as the mechanisms of politics were left to the knowledgeable professionals.

The importance of elections in a democracy refers to the idea that procedures (form) matter because procedures are important tools for rights and liberties (Linz & Stepan 1996:3). The minimalist perspective focuses on competition and selection of the powerful collective decision makers through free and fair elections by the adult population. Although, the minimalist conceptions of electoral democracy acknowledge more rights and freedoms, than the participation in free and fair elections, the devotion to such aspects is limited. This perspective has therefore left us with the notion of electoral democracy and has been embraced by many scholars on democratization. It has been argued that the minimalist perspective provides scholars with the ability to make easy comparisons between states; it is easy to distinguish a democracy from a nondemocracy by focusing on free and fair elections (Schumpeter 1942, cf. Huntington 1991:7, Reuschemeyer et al 1992:10, O'Donnell 1996:36, Lipset 1959). As summarized by Diamond,
“Electoral democracy is a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage” (Diamond 2003:34).

The maximalist perspective has focused on a more substantive democracy including ingredients beyond the free and fair elections. This perspective has stressed a democracy as a system of political institutions and procedures, but also of more rights and liberties. This type of democracy is based on the existence of free and fair elections, while also including further political rights that ensure participation and contestation. It also includes civil liberties that foster a democratic society beyond the democratic political system.

The main argument for the maximalist perspective on democracy has referred to the “fallacy of electoralism” (Schmitter & Karl 1991:78) as paying too much attention to the elections and missing out on other important rights and liberties. This fallacy may lead to the classification of states as democracies, although those states display major undemocratic traits and human rights abuses. It has therefore been argued that the focus on free and fair elections is too narrow a view on what constitutes democracy. To define democracy as electoral competition and multi-partyism is to discuss a political mean as a final goal or end-station: to mix up what is a political instrument with a political purpose (Beetham 1999:3, UNDP 2002:54, Munck & Verkuilen 2002:9). For instance, it has been acknowledged among scholars that states with free and fair elections may have other serious undemocratic traits. These states may become hybrid regimes combining democratic and authoritarian elements. This has been a trend in recent years of democratization, creating new names such as pseudodemocracy, illiberal democracy and semidemocracy (Diamond 2002:23-25).

Dahl has contributed with essential elements of a democracy (polyarchy). His definition of democracy may be seen as a midrange definition between a minimal and maximal definition of democracy. Dahl contributes with two dimensions of a democracy in contestation and participation. Contestation refers to organized competition through free and fair elections including opposition forces, while participation refers to the right of all adult people to participate as voters and/or politicians. He sets out eight important elements to be part of a democracy. These are freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl 1971:3).

Dahl’s two dimensions of a democracy, contestation and participation, have embedded a third important dimension in civil liberties. It has been argued that
contestation and participation have to be based on civil liberties to be meaningful. Examples of civil liberties that are crucial for contestation and participation are freedom to think, believe, worship, speak and publish one’s views as well as the freedom to form and join organizations among other things (Diamond 2003:30, 32). The liberal democracy is based on the ingredients in an electoral democracy, although it also includes additional rights and liberties. The liberal democracy requires, for example, minority rights regardless of cultural, ethnic or religious belonging, multiple of channels for political expression beyond parties and elections, multiple of sources of information as well as a wide range of freedoms including freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication and assembly, demonstration, politically equality and the rule of law, securing human rights and protecting citizens from discriminatory judiciary, unjustified detention and terror as well as torture (Diamond 2003:35-36). As argued by Diamond,

“The key distinction is whether the political process centers on elections or whether it encompasses a much broader and more continuous play of interest articulation, representation, and contestation. If we view the latter as an essential component of democracy, then there must be adequate freedoms surrounding that broader process as well…” (Diamond 2003:36).

Three fundamental dimensions of a liberal democracy may be identified in competition, participation and liberties. A liberal democracy consists of high level of competition, participation and liberties. As summarized by Sørensen,

“Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force
A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded
A level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation” (Sørensen 1993:12-13).12

Or as argued by Lipset, “First competition exists for government positions, and fair elections for public office occur at regular intervals without the use of force and without excluding any social group. Second, citizens participate in selecting their leaders and forming policies. And, third, civil
However, it is important to acknowledge that the liberal democracy may be improved. The liberal democracy is not a perfect democracy; an end-station of political development.\textsuperscript{13} The liberal democracy may be improved both in the quality of participation and contestation as well as in the protection of liberties (Diamond 2003:38). For instance, there has also been a debate on social and economic equality as an important aspect of the real chances to participate in the political life; democracy may not only include a political dimension, but has to take into account socioeconomic equality. For example, Held (1995) has stressed the importance of political, economic and social equality and the idea of improved positions for participation in politics. The fully expanded definition of a democracy, including the socioeconomic aspects of a society, has most often referred to the social democracy. The social democracy has included equality, welfare, health care and education. This notion of the democracy has for example been stressed within feminist, participative and deliberative approaches to democracy (Saward 1994:17, SOU 2000:21-23, Held 1995:285). The most common definition of a liberal democracy has, however, excluded the socioeconomic aspects in a democracy. The maximalist definition, including the socioeconomic aspects, may be too broad to use to actually identify a democracy and may lead to a broad range of regimes that are defined as dictatorial in nature, although showing major differences in a comparison (Munck & Verkuilen 2002:9). The definition of a liberal democracy has therefore excluded the social and economic aspects, although these aspects have shed light on democratization as an open-ended process (Diamond 1999:9-12).

The minimalist perspective and the maximalist perspective on democracy have both influenced the conceptualization of democratization. They have provided scholars on democratization with the theoretical notion of electoral and liberal democracy. There has been a tendency among scholars to use the minimalist definition of democracy when measuring democratization, stressing the form, in electoral democracy, as essential to substance in expanded rights and liberties. This has led to the conclusion that democratization centers on the establishment of free and fair elections. However, the expanded definition of democracy, the liberal democracy, has touched upon the possibility of further developing electoral democracies, beyond the free and fair elections, including more political rights as well as civil liberties. This has led to the theoretical notion of democratization towards a liberal democracy (Karvonen 1997:21).

\textsuperscript{13} This notion made Dahl use the term polyarchy.
The discussion on democratization in this study refers to the political process towards electoral and liberal democracy. However, the democratization process begins in a nondemocratic environment. The dictatorial dimension of regimes has included one-party-states, military regimes, dynastic rule, theocratic rule, tyranny, oligarchy, absolutism, despotism and monarchy among other regimes (Jackson & Jackson 1997:83-90, Hague & Harrop 2001:32). The research on dictatorial regimes has identified different ideal-types of nondemocratic regimes. At first, democracies stood in contrast to the totalitarian type. The totalitarian regime imposes to an unlimited degree state objectives and goals on all sectors and citizens. The concentration of power to the few aims at subordinating every activity to the control of the regime. The totalitarian society is therefore an atomized society with destroyed independent political, economic, social and judicial structures and based on total control through propaganda and terror (Linz 2000:65-70, see Arendt 1973 on propaganda and terror). This requires an official ideology, single mass party, secret police, full control of communication, monopoly of coercive methods (the regime is assisted by the police, military and/or by secret forces) and a central control of the economy (Friedrich & Brzezinski 1965:9-10). Major historical examples of such atomized totalitarian systems were the Communist systems under Stalin and Zedong and the Nazi system under Hitler (but also Islamic Fundamentalism, Dynasties and Theocracy). In the 20th century, Fascism, Nazism and Communism emerged side by side and what combined these three ideologies and systems was the oppression of democratic elements such as political competition, political participation and civil and political liberties (Hague & Harrop 2001:31-46, Jackson & Jackson 1997: 81-90,153-154,185-187).

However, the research on nondemocratic types of regimes has developed and specified two ideal-types of dictatorship; the totalitarian and authoritarian regime. It has been stated that an authoritarian regime differs from a totalitarian regime in terms of pluralism, ideology, leadership and mobilization. The authoritarian regime refers to limited pluralism, limited guiding ideology, constrained leadership and weak mobilization and has been perceived as more present among dictatorships than the totalitarian type of regime (Linz & Stepan 1996:38-39). The authoritarian regimes, compared to the totalitarian ones, have a limited official ideology that penetrate or atomize sectors of the society and there are also a less powerful and controlling police and military control (cf. Przeworski 1992:242, Calvert 2002:40, Sørensen 1993:14-16, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:6-11). The authoritarian type of regime allows for socioeconomic pluralism, without guiding ideology (but rather distinctive mentalities) or massmobilization. The authoritarian leadership also exercises power within a less defined norm-structure and with some level of internal organizational autonomy in political and administrative careers. The authoritarian regime has therefore no
chances of total control, which implies some degree of pluralism with independent and active citizens within the social and economic spheres, but also perhaps in politics (Linz & Stepan 1996:44-45, cf. Mason 1967). Authoritarianism may therefore be characterized as,

“political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small groups exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz & Stepan 1996:38, cf. Arendt 1973).

The research on dictatorship has more recently also identified other types of non-democratic regimes, although the research has been far more limited. For example, the post-totalitarian regime has a more complex play of institutional pluralism within the state, compared to the totalitarian regime. Pluralism is limited, but there might exist dissident groups in opposition to the regime as well as a second economy and culture as parallel societies. This may be due to a weakened belief in the utopian ideology, or the weakened interest in mobilization among leaders and masses. The post-totalitarian society has traits of pluralism, albeit more limited than in an authoritarian society. Also, the type of dictatorship in Sultanism has been identified and explored. This type of regime is based on a personalistic and arbitrary leadership with career possibilities based on compliance with the sultanic leaders and their personal rewards and through family ties and friendship. The ideology consists of a glorification of the ruler based on manipulation of symbols and despotic personalism. This facilitates for manipulative mobilization of parastate groups who use coercive methods towards potential enemies of the sultan. Pluralism exists, although is limited by unpredictable and despotic intervention with fusion of the private and public life (Linz & Stepan 1996:42-54, Linz 2000:151-155).

In summary, this study identifies four types of regimes in electoral democracy, liberal democracy, authoritarian dictatorship and totalitarian dictatorship. Democratization is a political process from the dictatorial types towards the democratic types of regimes.

2.1.2 Democratization

Based on the understandings of the different types of democracy and dictatorship, democratization is a political process from dictatorship towards democracy. It may include the establishment of an electoral democracy as well as a liberal
democracy. This includes a process of increased participation and/or competition (Dahl 1971:4). Increased participation refers to higher numbers of citizens receiving political rights and civil liberties, while increased competition means improved possibilities for political opposition and struggle for political power within the political system. This is illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4 identifies possible different paths of democratization based on variation in participation and competition. These paths are related to the nature of the dictatorial regime the democratization process stems from and the democratic regime that democratization is leading to.

**FIGURE 4: DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION**

This study continues to discuss the theoretical notion of democratization as phases of democratization. These phases consists of the pretransition phase, the transition phase and the consolidation phase. The theoretical idea of dealing with democratization in phases is based on Rustow’s model on the a) background condition, b) preparatory phase, c) decision phase and d) habituation phase (Rustow 1999). The background condition referred to the political community of institutions and citizens unified into one entity. The first phase, thereafter, was the preparatory phase that consisted of the political struggle between a new rising elite and the old one. The second phase, in the decision phase, occurred when the competing different groups settled into democratic procedures. Finally, the third phase, in the habituation phase, consisted of the working procedures that were
settled in the former phase and how the old and new actors respected these procedures.\textsuperscript{14}

There has been criticism against the use of phases when discussing democratization (see Carothers 2002). However, the theoretical use of phases is a way of dealing with complex processes and to better understands the possibilities and obstacles for this type of political change. It does not include the normative idea of gradualism where one state in a deterministic way goes through phase by phase towards eternal democracy. It rather points out how to understand, from a theoretical point of view, a complex political process without any clear start or end station. It is also possible to see how the research has focused on different phases at different periods. In short, the research of the 1980s focused on the phase of transition aiming at explaining why some states and not others introduced the electoral democracy of free and fair elections. The research also included the notion of liberalization that was perceived as a prephase to the transition phase. The attention shifted somewhat in the mid 1990s, aiming to explore the likelihood of seeing new democracies become liberal democracies. This ambition led to a redirection of research focusing on the phase of consolidation. In late 1990s and early 2000, the main interest shifted again towards the state-building or postconflict democracy-building phase as new states emerged and old ones disappeared (Carothers 2002:9, Plattner 2005:5-7, Huntington 1997a:5-6).

\textbf{2.1.2.1 Pretransition}

The pretransition phase of liberalization refers to the process of growing pluralism in a dictatorial state where the society is going through opening, relaxation and differentiation, which enhances societal pluralism in the socioeconomic and/or the political field. For instance, the totalitarian system has not allowed for any liberalization. This system has implied the unlimited range of governmental institutions and the concentration of power in the hands of the few. Totalitarian traits have been described as the atomization of societies or the totality of social life where the totalitarian regimes have destroyed all patterns of legitimate social, economic, political and legal structures (Calvert 2002:40, cf. Arendt 1973, Andreski 1967). An authoritarian system, on the other hand, allows liberalization in the overall restricted economic and perhaps political pluralism of active churches, interest groups and businesses. At most times, liberalization starts within authoritarian states with increased socioeconomic freedom and might lead to growing political freedom. Socioeconomic liberalization might foster better opportunities to establish social organizations as nongovernmental organizations

\textsuperscript{14} There are also other types of phases in the literature. See for example Pridham’s phases in inaugu-
(NGO), to start up new businesses, to allow for free media or to open schools for new influences from abroad. Political liberalization, on the other hand, might include easement of the right to assemble, to have political debates, to allow for political competition and opposition forces, but also rights to organize demonstrations. It is, however, important to remember that liberalization is a change in a democratic direction, but does not have to lead to democracy. Within the democratization context, liberalization occurs in a dictatorial setting and consists of socioeconomic change and/or political change.

The most recent theoretical discussion on pretransition has concerned the phase of unity (Rustow 1999, Linz & Stepan 1996). This phase has most often been over-looked.\textsuperscript{15} As argued by Carothers,

\begin{quote}
\textquotedblleft…state building has been a much larger and more problematic issue than originally envisaged in the transition paradigm\textquotedblright{} (Carothers 2004:178).
\end{quote}

The pretransition phase of liberalization may lead to the crisis in and the collapse of the dictatorial regime. This raises the challenge of establishing unification of the political community and of the people that are to be organized. This includes deciding on state (geographical) borders as well as finding support for the nation. This has especially been the case in a post-Cold War context of disintegration of the old states and the emergence of the new states.\textsuperscript{16} The pretransition phase of unity refers to the agreement among the people on what and who is to become politically organized; it is the search for acceptance of territorial and mental belonging and that may facilitate for further political development. The pretransition phase also includes the unification and standardization of cultural, linguistic and religious identity and loyalty to the political authority. In order to provide for a democracy, there must be a political community of these functions (Rustow 1999:25-35, Linz & Stepan 1996:18, Fairbanks 2001:52). As argued by Linz & Stepan,

\begin{quote}
\textquotedblleft When thinking about transitions to democracy, many people tend to assume that what is challenged is the nondemocratic regime and that with democracy a new legitimate system is established. How-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Read on the core assumptions of the transition paradigm in Carothers (2004).
\textsuperscript{16} There has also been a growing concern within the related territories, in colonies, protectorates and island dependencies of sovereign states, as well as within disputed territories in the sovereign states.
ever, in many countries the crisis of the nondemocratic regime is also intermixed with profound differences about what should actually constitute the polity (or political community) and which demos or demoi (population or populations) should be members of that political community” (Linz & Stepan 1996:16).

There are many obstacles to establishing a political community. There may be the problem of disunity among groups of the people that refuse to live together or the refusal from one group to be included in the political community, but rather seeks citizenship with another group. This may also lead to the oppression of one group by another trying to marginalize a minority or a majority with political, economical, judicial or military means. Too many and separating segmental cleavages, based on ideology, religious adherence, ethnicity, linguistic or regional belonging, and that are reinforcing rather than over-lapping in nature, may challenge the idea of unity. It is crucial for such societies to seek cooperation, based on cooperative attitudes and behavior, and to counterbalance the centrifugal forces within plural societies. It may be the role of the elite’s to establish political institutions and a political culture that crosses the segmental traits of groupings and organizations in the society (Lijphart 1977:1-11, Linz & Stepan 1996:30-33, cf. Rokkan 1987). As argued by Linz and Stepan,

“…the very definition of democracy involves agreement by the citizens of a territory, however specified, on the procedures to be used to generate and that can make legitimate claims on their obedience. Therefore, if a significant group of people does not accept claims on its obedience as legitimate, because the people do not want to be a part of the political unit, however democratically it is constituted, this presents a serious problem for democratic transition and even more serious problems for democratic consolidation” (Linz & Stepan 1996:27).

2.1.2.2 Transition
Transitions, on the other hand, entail liberalization, but are wider in the sense that they include political change going from dictatorship to electoral democracy. The transition process centres around the event of an election as a competition for office based on the preferences by the population. The transition includes the right to vote for competitive parties in free and fair elections where the electoral...
turnover is respected. There are also checks and balances between the judiciary, executive and legislative powers (Karvonen 1997:21). It is a minimum standard of democracy, although includes the introduction of free and fair elections as well as democratic principles surrounding the democratic procedures such as the establishment of constitutionalism and rule of law.

However, many transitional states have turned up as vague electoral democracies. They have had free and fair elections, but continued to face political, economic and social obstacles that have had negative impact on the democratization process. These obstacles have all together created political societies of democratic fuzziness where democratic patterns have been mixed with undemocratic ones. Such obstacles may be found in electoral democracies with patterns of restricted participation and liberties, electoral democracies influenced by the existence of personal rule and patron-client relationships, electoral democracies with the existence of human rights abuses, electoral democracies in which there is a massive and perhaps uncontrolled popular mobilization that challenges order and stability and/or electoral democracies where undemocratic actors, such as the military, continues to influence politics. All these democracies may have elections and tolerate legal alternative parties in opposition to the ruling party, but are challenged by other major problems that influence the democratization process and the democratic stability (Carothers 2004:171-173, Sørensen 1993:45-59, Diamond 1999:28, 49-63, Calvert 2002:275-276, Schedler 2002:37).

Scholars on democratization have used different names to describe these electoral democracies such as manipulated democracy, guided democracy, tutelary democracy, fragile democracy, illiberal democracy, poor democracy, empty democracy, low-intensity democracy, pseudo democracy, limited democracy, oligarchic democracy, hybrid democracy, delegative democracy, uncertain democracy, hollow democracy and frozen democracy (Schedler 2002, Levitsky & Way 2002). This inflation in names has led to an analytical differentiation in order to grasp the new different forms of democracy. It has also led to a worry about conceptual stretching where democracy is applied to several of regime types with more or less democratic characteristics (see Carothers 2002:10). The result of these two contradictory phenomena is the proliferation of hundreds of subtypes of democracies.”…involving democracy with adjectives” (Collier & Levitsky 1997:430-431).

The central idea behind all these new labels on fragile electoral democracies is the importance for new democracies to continue the political progress towards consolidation. If the shallow transitional democracies do not move forward, by strengthening the political institutions and by improving the elite and mass-support, the democracy is likely to move backward becoming a fragile electoral democracy or an authoritarian regime (Diamond 1999:64). As argued by Carothers,
In many ‘transitional countries’, reasonably regular, genuine elec-
tions are held but political participation beyond voting remains
shallow and governmental accountability is weak” (Carothers
2002:15).

2.1.2.3 Consolidation
The consolidation phase refers to a complex phase compared to the transition
phase. It involves more actors and levels or arenas of society as the consolidation
phase includes the regime and the society at large. Also, when the transition
phase ends in a new regime the consolidation phase includes strengthening the
new regime to meet old and new challenges. This refers to a negative and posi-
tive perspective on consolidation. The negative perspective on consolidation fo-
cuses on how to avoid democratic breakdown after the transition, while the posi-
tive perspective concentrates on how to deepen and complete the democracy to
become an advanced and mature democracy (Schedler 1998:92-100). In general,
a consolidated democracy has implied a deepened democracy that is more ad-
vanced as well as better equipped to counter serious challenges. The deepened
democracy is symbolized by stability, but also by continuity, persistence, sur-
vival, maintenance and endurance (Linde 2004:48-49).

A consolidated democracy consists of, besides the fundamental political
rights in free and fair elections, a form of political community in which the insti-
tutional settings are surrounded by a high level of political rights and civil liber-
ties. This type of democracy involves the societal culture by setting out the nor-
mative binding political rights and liberties that informs the political institutions
and the political orientations. The consolidation process may begin with an insti-
tutionalization process in the development of effective and representative politi-
cal institutions, legitimate regime performance, civil controlled military, execu-
tive, judiciary and legislature branches, rule of law, transparent public admini-
stration. This important process is part of the consolidation of a democracy.
However, the consolidation process also implies including the citizens into these
new institutions and develops a prodemocratic culture with far extended civil
liberties. The political institutionalization of democratization is an important part
of the democratization process, but should not be seen as equal to consolidation -
institutionalization is about structures, while consolidation is also about citizens.
While the institutionalization refers to how the democratic institutional structures
have become stable and functional over time, consolidation is an even deeper
and wider process, where democratic structures and values penetrate the whole
1999). As argued by Selbin,
“Institutionalization is a process that may be readily measured by such factors as the status or function of key government structures. Consolidation, which is related to people’s perceptions of the material and ideological conditions of their everyday lives and their relationships with each other, with the new government even with the revolutionary process itself, is not so easily measured” (1993:25).

The many studies on the third wave of democratization have stressed the consolidation of democracy as “the only game in town” (Di Palma 1990, cf. Linz & Stepan 1996:15, Schedler 1998:91-98). The only game in town metaphor has referred to democracy as the only legitimate framework for seeking and implementing political power. It has been explained in many different ways; from discussing societal arenas (political, economic, judicial and social) (Linz & Stepan 1996:7-15) to sub-societies (civil, political, economic, rule of law and state bureaucracy) and to levels on which consolidation occur (Ideology, institutions, civil society and culture) (Fukuyama 1995:7-14). There have also been discussions on the “two-election test” (Huntington 1991) and “the generation test” (Beetham 1994). Democracy, as the only game in town, has also be described in three dimensions; democratic behavior, democratic attitudes and a democratic constitution. The consolidated democracy is supported in all these dimensions; it consists of a firm institutionalization as well as a well-founded legitimacy among the politicians as well as among the masses. It rejects any behavior that questions democracy and has as the agenda to overthrow the democratic system, while the attitudes are supporting the idea that political decisions and reforms must be based on the democratic code and in accordance with democratic rules and procedures. As argued by Linz and Stepan,

“**Behaviorally**, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. **Attitudinally**, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of the public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions

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17 See also Berglund et al. (2001:13-41) and the discussion on 1) institutional and procedural consolidation and 2) attitudinal and social consolidation.
are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or is more-or-less isolated from prodemocratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, as well as habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions that are sanctioned by the new democratic process” (Linz & Stepan 1997:16, cf. Linz & Stepan 1996).

Similar supporting attempts to define consolidation have pointed to two dimensions of consolidation in norms and behavior on different levels of society. These levels of society refer to the elite-level, the intermediate level (of organizations) and the mass level. A consolidated democracy is based on democratic norms and behavior of the leaders, parties/groups/movements and the public at large (Diamond 1999:69, cf. Linz & Stepan 1996).

However, a consolidated democracy may very well include debates on democratic institutions, the performances of a democratic elected regime and how the established democracy may be improved. But, it does not consist of behavior that tries to overthrow the democracy or include larger debates on if democracy is the best alternative form of governance. This is a great difference that at times may be confused. The existence of dissatisfied democrats may very well imply the interests of improving the democracy, but not overthrowing it for a dictatorial alternative. This may refer to what Easton (Easton 1965:268-273) has discussed as the specific support. The specific support relates to the day-to-day activities by the regime and the performances it provides that may be evaluated as more or less satisfactory. Ill-performances may be met by dissatisfaction among the citizens, which may open for a new elected regime. The participation of dissatisfied democrats and their preferences for or against the regime is an essential part of a consolidated democracy. It is not a threat to democracy. The consolidation phase is therefore always under change and the consolidated democracy is not an end station (Berglund et al 2001:11).

2.2 Measuring Democratization

Studies on democratization have tried to measure the level of democracy in different ways by for instance focusing on the extension of time a democratic regime has been in office, the persistence of a system, the dynamics of the civil society, the existence of fundamental democratic institutions, the level of terror and military domination, the level of participation and the spread of democratic attitudes. Most measurements on democratization has focused on (1) the political
competition among individuals and organized political groups, (2) the political participation of citizens identifying and selecting politicians and leaders that represent their political views through free and fair elections and (3) the political rights and liberties that ensure the integrity of the competition and participation through the possibilities to develop, mobilize and express views and ideas (Sørensen 1993:13).

There is a growing body of literature on how to measure democracy, leading to the identification of numerous democracy indices (cf. Inkeles 1990, Beetham 1994). Overall, the democracy indices have been divided into approaches of dichotomy and continuum. Dichotomy refers to the separation between democracies and nondemocracies, while continuum refers to measuring democracy on a scale of more or less democracy. This has led to results within the research being nominal as well as ordinal or interval (Ersson 2001:9).

Measuring the extent of democracy may be based on objective or subjective indicators. The objective measures include for instance looking at voter turnout or the existence of competitive elections in a society. These measures are easily replicated and have finer gradations. However, the rates provided may easily be manipulated by for example governmental agencies. Also, the objective measures, in for example voter turnout, do not have to fully identify the level of political participation and competition. The objective indicators may also set out the frequency of elections and the number of parties in a society, voter turnout and gender statistics on parliamentary seats. However, these objective measures may not tell us anything about the democratic quality beyond the numbers. There may therefore be weaknesses in accuracy as well as in ability to measure changes over time (Shin 1994:146-147).

The subjective indicators refer to expert opinions about the democratic status in a society. This allows for a better understanding of the democratic quality in a society by measuring essential characteristics beyond the reach of objective measurements. This may be, for example, the level of political repression, the prodemocratic attitudes among the citizens, freedom of expression, freedom of association and fairness of elections. Subjective measures may therefore be more reliable, although such subjective indicators also have its fallacies. The shortcoming of subjective evaluations by experts may be the sensitivity for interpretations and subjective perceptions that is less likely to come with objective measures. This may be due to the political orientation of the evaluator, the relation between the home state of the evaluator and the state to be evaluated as well as the interests of the sponsor of the evaluation. There may also perhaps be problems in the quantity and quality of information available (Shin 1994:147-148, Bollen 1993:1210-1214, cf. Johansson 1998, Andersson 2002).

There are several subjective and objective indices that cover the independent states in the world and their democratic status. These indices have been devel-
oped by a group of scholars or experts or by individual scholars. They have differed in time-range where some measures covers longer time periods, while others focus on one single year (Ersson 2001:10). Munck and Verkuilen (2002) provide an overview and evaluation of alternative indices to improve the quality of measurements on democracy. Their article identifies strengths and weaknesses in many known measurements and summarizes that

“…no single index offers a satisfactory response to all three challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation. Indeed even the strongest indices suffer from weaknesses of some importance” (Munck & Verkuilen 2002:28, cf. Coppedge 2002).

Some of the most used examples of indices may be mentioned. There are for instance the Polity IV data set developed by the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management. The Polity IV Project is a revised version of the Polity III dataset (as Polity I). The Polity Project focuses on the institutional elements of democracy based on quantitative indicators. The dataset sheds empirical light on the political authority and regime type and includes 20 historical states and 161 current states. These states have all greater populations than 500,000 (measured in 1998). They are geographically located all over the world and the time-frame spans from 1800 to 1999. The dataset is based on eight weighted and added indicators and which reflects upon the level of autocracy and democracy. These consist of the regulation of executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, monocratism, and constraints on the chief executive, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of political participation and centralization of state authority (UNDP 2002:36).

Dahl has constructed a checklist on how to classify states as being more or less democratic (polyarchy). His definition includes eight criteria’s; the Freedom to form and join organizations, Freedom of expression, the Right to vote, Eligibility for public office, the Right of political leaders to compete for support, Alternative sources of information, Free and fair elections, Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl 1971, 1989). Another impressive suggestion of measuring the democratic conditions has been made by Hadenius (1992) and applied to 132 states. This index measures the situation in 1988 and not over time. Hadenius measures democracy in two dimensions in elections and freedom and rights. The first dimension in election is operationalized through variables such as public and equal participation, openness, correctness and efficiency. Hadenius operationalizes the second dimension in freedom and rights, by measuring the freedom of association, freedom of speech, political oppression and political violence. Hadenius codes the
different variables and creates a democracy index with values ranging from zero to ten and where the higher value indicates a more democratic state.

Another attempt to operationalize democracy and measure the democratic progress has been made by Vanhanen (1997) and applied to 172 countries. Vanhanen measures competition and participation as two quantitative indicators. The higher degrees the competition and participation, the more democratized.\(^{18}\) Beetham (1994) has also contributed with ideas on measuring democracy. He sets out 30 indices of democracy in the form of questions to be asked to respondents. These questions were at first developed for the audit of the U.K. The 30 questions were grouped into four areas of democracy. The first area of questions is the electoral process focusing on inclusiveness, independence, integrity and impartiality among other things. The second area concerns open and accountable government asking questions about for the responsiveness of government to the citizens and of representativeness, government openness and freedom of information. The third area of questions focuses on civil and political rights, while the fourth and final area addresses the vitality of the civil society, political culture and people’s confidence in the political system (Beetham 1994:38-39).

Finally, an impressive measurement of democracy and democratization is Bollen’s study on cross-national indicators of liberal democracy from 1950-1990 (2001). This study includes numerous of existing measures and indices of democracy, and analyzes the most frequently used measures within the field. The study includes a collection of crossnational measures of democracy with over 800 variables. It also covers most of the states in the world with political, economic and social data, including for example political rights and civil liberties as well as competitiveness of the electoral process, but also adult suffrage, executive and legislative selection, effectiveness and limitations, political party and government legitimacy, constitutional development among others. Some variables also focus on the level of freedom as well as barriers to freedom, including the freedom of assembly and association, the freedom of information and political opposition as well as the freedom of the press among other things (Bollen 2001).\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\) His democracy index ranged from noll to ten where the minimum criteria for a democratic state were 5. Competition was operationalized as the smaller parties’ share of the votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections, or both. Participation concerned the percentage of the population who voted in the election.

\(^{19}\) Besides these data, there are also surveys that measures different aspects of societal development, including references to political developments. Some examples of these surveys are Eurostat (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat), the World Fact Book (www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html), Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org), Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) and IDEA (www.idea.int) among others.
2.2.1 The Freedom House Survey

A well-known measurement and which is used in this study, is the *Freedom House Survey*,\(^{20}\) with its annual measurements on democratization in 192 states and a growing number of territories (18 in the 2004 measurement). By using the Freedom House Survey, this study allows us to compare the democratization rate from the early 1990s to 2003 in Europe based on the theoretical notion of democratization presented earlier in this chapter. Freedom House is a non-profit organization, which was established in 1941 and has since 1972/73 developed yearly evaluations of political rights and civil freedoms in the world. The Freedom House also includes the *Annual Survey of Press Freedom*, monitoring press freedom throughout the world as well as the *Nations in Transit*, focusing on democratization in newly independent states (NIS). The survey on press freedom started in 1989. This survey covers 194 states and territories in the world presenting a ranking of states’ media as free, partly free or not free. This survey measures the legal environment for the media, political pressure on the media, economic facilities and access to information.\(^{21}\) The survey on nations in transit is published once a year focusing on the developments in former communist states. This report is multidimensional measuring the political, social and economic development in postcommunist Europe.\(^{22}\)

The *Freedom House Survey* on political rights and civil liberties has the positive aspect of measuring the actual democratic situation in the state; this is different to the approach of analyzing the intents of a government or the visionary goals set up by the political system (Johansson 1998:252-253). The survey opens for a more detailed understanding of the democratic quality in states all over the world; in recent years, this survey has also come to include non-state entities in disputed territories. “Disputed territories are areas within internationally recognized sovereign states whose status is in serious political or violent dispute and that often are dominated by a minority ethnic group” (Freedom House Website).\(^{23}\)

Two things should, however, be kept in mind when using the *Freedom House Survey*. First, that this survey only offers rough approximations of the presence of democratic patterns in a state. Second, that many of the states measured on democratic quality are transforming states. This implies that the democratic quality may shift rapidly and the Freedom House can only offer snapshots on politi-

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\(^{20}\) www.freedomhouse.org
\(^{21}\) www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressuvey.htm (2005-08-29)
\(^{22}\) www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm (2005-08-18)
cal patterns under change (Sørensen 1993:17-19). However, as the economists use statistics on GNP, GDP, investment rates, inflation rates and unemployment rates, the Freedom House Survey has provided social scientists and especially scholars on democratization with easy measurements and methods to understand the overall status and trends of political rights and civil liberties in the world. Or as argued by Munck & Verkuilen in their article on indices on democracy.

“Our view is that having a data set on democracy, even if it is partially flawed, is better than not having any data set at all and that scholars should use what they have at their disposal” (Munck & Verkuilen 2002:31).

The Freedom House Survey is the result of a multi-layered process of analysis including regional academic experts using information from news reports, academic analyses, NGOs, think tanks, professional contacts and field studies. The Freedom House Survey is based on two checklists on political rights and civil liberties based on international comparative indicators in order to measure the progress on democracy. The political rights enable citizens to participate in the political life. The political rights concern the political system of a democracy, the procedures as well as the institutional set up and the freedoms that enable citizens to participate in the political life; what is often referred to as elements of an electoral democracy. The checklist of political rights concerns: free and fair elections of head of state or head of government, free and fair elections of legislative representatives, fair electoral laws and fair campaigning opportunities, possibility to endow elected representatives real power, rights to politically organize interests and ability to vote down competing parties, possibility to act as opposition and have real chance to gain power, absence of undemocratic domination of military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies and freedom of minority groups to reasonable self-determination and self-government, autonomy or participation in the political system. As stated by the Freedom House,

“To answer the political rights questions, Freedom House considers to what extent the system offers voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates and to what extent the can-

24 For an extensive evaluation of the Freedom House Survey, see Munck & Verkuilen (2002:20-22, 25). They identify weaknesses in the changed coding process over time, absence of public coding rules, failure to publicly announce identified sources of information as well as disaggregated data among other things.
The checklist of civil liberties concerns liberties beyond the political rights and includes the society at large along with the open, free and fair political institutions and the right to participate. It is the freedoms to develop views and act autonomously from the state and the political institutions; often referred to as elements of a liberal democracy. The checklist of civil liberties concerns: existence of free and independent media, existence of independent judiciary and the rule of law prevailing in civil and criminal matters treating everyone equally under the law, existence of free religious institutions and the possibility of private and religious expression, freedom of assembly, to demonstrate and to hold open discussions without political terror or oppression, freedom of political and quasi-political organizations, existence of free trade unions or other interests groups, freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption, existence of personal autonomy and social freedoms in travelling, parents hood, employment and residence and existence of secured property rights and allowance of private businesses. As stated by the Freedom House,

“In answering the civil liberties questions, Freedom House does not equate constitutional guarantees of human rights with the on-the-ground fulfilment of these rights” (Freedom House Website).

The ratings process in the Survey is based on 10 political rights questions, divided into three categories and 15 civil liberties questions, divided into four categories (see Appendix B). The total number of points on political rights and civil liberties make up the rights and liberties ratings on each state or territory. Each point total corresponds to a 1-7 rating where 1 represents the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest within both areas of research. All evaluated states are then categorized into three groups at the ordinal level. This is illustrated in Table 2.

27 Each question may be awarded a raw point from 0-4 where 0 represents the lowest level of political rights and civil liberties and 4 the highest. This leaves us with a maximum score on political rights of 40 points (4 multiplied with 10) and on civil liberties on 60 points (4 multiplied with 15). The only exception to the 0-4 scale of points is the additional discretionary political rights questions where 1-4 are subtracted.
28 Political Rights: 36-40 rating 1, 30-35 rating 2, 24-29 rating 3, 18-23 rating 4, 12-17 rating 5, 12-17 rating 6, 0-5 rating 7. Civil Liberties: 53-60 rating 1, 44-52 rating 2, 35-43 rating 3, 26-34 rating 4, 17-25 rating 5, 8-16 rating 6, 0-7 rating 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION OF STATES</th>
<th>POLITICAL RIGHTS &amp; CIVIL LIBERTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rating 1-7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Combined average ranking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>3-5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>5.5-7</td>
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**TABLE 2: THE FREEDOM HOUSE INDEX**

The rating 1 on the political right indicates far-gone development along with the political rights questions, beginning with the free and fair elections with competitive parties and/or other political groupings, with an active and important role played by the opposition and where the minority groups have reasonable self-government or may participate in the government itself. The rating 1 on the civil liberties indicates far-gone development along with the civil liberties questions, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education and religion and that facilitates for free economic activities and the strive for socioeconomic equality of opportunity. The Freedom House Survey has focused on the holding free and fair elections as the minimal requirement of a democratic state. It has been argued that the free and fair elections are in the core of the complex process of democratization as it opens for participation and power to the people as well as for institutional accountability and transparency (Pravda 2001:16). The survey identifies the electoral democracy as the state that has fulfilled the minimum standards. The electoral democracy refers to a state where,

“voters can choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals not designated by the government; voters have access to information about candidates and their platforms; voters can vote without undue pressure from the authorities; and candidates can campaign free from intimidations” (Freedom House Website).

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29 States with a 5.5 average may be partly free or not free depending on the raw scores of the survey.
However, the liberal democracy, on the other hand, also includes most of the substantial range of civil liberties (not necessarily the socioeconomic aspects). Therefore, free states are electoral and liberal democracies, but some partly free states qualify only as an electoral democracy and not as liberal democracy.

In summary, based on the Freedom House Survey, it is possible to discuss and illustrate the trends of democratization in the world. The illustration may shed light on democratization as a phenomenon and the impact of democratization on regions. This is now to be done by discussing and illustrating the latest trend of democratization from the 1970s to the 1990s. This trend of democratization has been named as the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991).

2.3 Illustrating Democratization

Based on the Freedom House Survey, the overall pattern of the 20th century sets out that the number of democracies has gradually increased (cf. Huntington 1991). The survey on the trend of democratization is also supported by other measurements (Ersson 2001). As argued by Ersson,

“It is obvious…that the indices portray roughly the same picture, and this picture seems to conform to what Huntington called a second short wave of democratization (1943-62), second reverse wave (1958-75) and a third wave of democratization (1974-onward)” (Ersson 2001:11).

The growing number of democratic states as well as of people enjoying political rights and civil liberties symbolized the 20th century of democratization. For instance, in 1900, there were only 55 sovereign states and no states with free and fair elections (electoral democracies). There were 25 states with restricted democratic practices, which only accounted for 12.4% of the world population. In 1950, there were 22 democracies accounting for 31% of the world population and 21 additional states with restricted democratic practices adding 11.9% of the world population. However, by the end of the 20th century democracies predominated. There were 120 electoral democracies out of 192 states, which constituted 62.5% of the world’s population. Of those, there were also 85 states with expanded rights and liberties (liberal democracies) representing 38% of the global population. As a consequence, many scholars perceived the 20th century as the “century of progress” (Karatnycky 2001:187-189, Huntington 1991:26, Karatnycky 1999:112).
2.3.1 Waves of democratization

According to Huntington, the century of progress may be discussed as historical waves of democratization (Huntington 1991). Huntington’s wave metaphor has been very influential, but it has also been criticized on several accounts. The criticism has concerned the unclear definition of democratic regimes, the narrowed approach to democracy in focusing on elections, the overlapping and indistinct waves and the unclear global factors behind these waves. It is important to acknowledge the weaknesses of the wave-metaphor, especially in the overlapping and indistinct time-periods. It is also important to stress that the waves mainly included the spread of electoral democracies. Some scholars have also questioned the number of waves. For instance, Whitehead stresses that the collapse of the Soviet Union triggered for a fourth wave in Eastern Europe (Whitehead 2001:4). Diamond (1999:61), on the other hand, has argued that the third wave was over by the mid 1990s since the increase in number of electoral democracies halted and the number of liberal democracies also levelled off (cf. Plattner 2005). This has also been argued by the UNDP in its Human Development Report (2002).

However, the wave metaphor is used in this study to illustrate the historical changes more than to evaluate or explain them; the wave-metaphor has the function to grasp a complex and long-term political change and provide the reader with a view on the historical democratic progress (cf. Grugel 2002, Doorenspleet 2000). The wave-metaphor, provided by Huntington, has highlighted three waves of democratization. The waves and reverse waves have suggested a two-step-forward and a one-step-backward pattern, indicating a geographical expansion of democracies and the declining magnet effects of challenging ideologies such as Fascism, Nazism and Communism. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which also sets out the reverse waves of the 20th century, where democratization halted and dictatorial systems increased in number.

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32 Huntington stresses that, “A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time” (Huntington 1991:15).
The first wave of democratization (1828-1926) was a long and complex one, which began with the American and French revolution. This wave introduced the ideas of democratic governance, political rights and civil liberties and expanded the right to vote to more groups in the societies. This happened in for instance the U.S. and England, although New Zealand became the first state to introduce the right to vote regardless of gender (in 1889). In the early 20th century, the democratization process spread to many states in the Western part of Europe as well as to Australia and Canada and had an impact on South America. Although such democracies were much more limited than today’s equivalents, there was a clear boom of democratization which was obvious after World War I when about 30 states saw transitions, including many of the new sovereign states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The democratic progress of the first wave of democratization halted, however, with World War I and the introduction of the dictatorial systems of Militarism, Fascism, Nazism and Communism. The first reverse wave flourished with Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany which resulted in the spread of antidemocratic ideas and systems (for instance Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Spain and Portugal). Beside the systems of Fascism and Nazism, new dictatorial regimes grew in other states (for instance Greece, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Spain and Japan) in the inter-war period and often due to military coups (Huntington 1991:16-17, Goldblatt 1997a:46-54).

The second wave of democratization (1943-1962) occurred as a direct consequence of the outcome of World War II and the defeat of totalitarianism in for instance Germany, Italy and Japan. Such a collapse of antidemocratic systems opened for the spread of new democracies in the world (for instance West Germany, Austria, Japan, Turkey, Greece, Uruguay, Brazil, Costa Rica, Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela). The only prevailing antidemocratic force came from the Soviet Union as one of the victory states that imposed Communism in many of the Central and Eastern European states. The consolidation of the Moscow control of these satellite states may be seen as the beginning of the second
reverse wave as the Central and Eastern European states were locked into the eastern Communist camp. Europe saw antidemocratic changes in Greece and Turkey and these continued in Latin America through several military coups (for instance Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile, Pakistan, South Korea, the Philippines, India, and Taiwan). The 1950s and 1960s were also a time era where new states were established, as a consequence of the de-colonization process, which led to the largest multiplication of new independent states in history, although also leading to mostly dictatorial regimes (Huntington 1991:18-21, Bessel 1997:71-82).

The third wave of democratization (1974-1995) began with the democratization of Southern Europe of the 1970s. It culminated with the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe (Huntington 199121-26, Goldblatt 1997b:95-96). The third wave of democratization also swept through Latin America and Asia and was of global scope, which came to interest politicians in democracies as well as scholars on democratization. This trend for democratization has been acknowledged by democratic states, international organizations and by global bodies such as the United Nations (UN). For instance, in the mid 1990s, the former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, argued that democracy was good governance and the long-term route towards progress (Ghali 1995, 2000). The UN, at the UN General Assembly in 2000, also set out the millennium development goals declaring the support for democracy and human rights as fundamental values for good governance. This global body clearly argued that democracy is the most superior political system so far explored in human history and it was stated that good governance was democratic governance (UNDP 2002:16-17, 51).

2.3.2 Regional impact of the third wave

The impact of the third wave has raised optimism when entering the 21st century. The overall consequences of the third wave of democratization changed the balance in the world between dictatorial and democratic systems. While authoritarianism was the predominant political regime type of the 1970s, democracy had now become more common in the world including electoral and liberal democracies. However, although there has not been a new reverse wave, many new fragile democracies have met problems in consolidating their systems. They have gradually been weakened as the political and economic performances declined. There have also been restrictions on political rights and civil liberties in the democracies facing threats such as the return of Communism, the resurgence of Fundamentalism and the escalation of terrorism, civil wars and ethnic tension. It is therefore important to keep in mind that democracies are always under debate and that democratization is a complex and fragile political process.
However, the third wave of democratization implied that democratization was not a Western concern, as part of a Western culture or civilization, but rather global in scope with impact on most regions (Karatnycky 2000:194). This is illustrated in Figure 6.

For instance, the third wave of democratization swept over the Americas as illustrated in Figure 7. Central and Latin America had been ruled by mostly right-winged dictatorial regimes where the military often played a powerful political role. The geographical and political presence of the U.S. and the impact of the changes in Southern Europe of the 1970s and forward were significant. During the Cold War, the U.S. pressure was at times prodemocratic as well as anti-communism in nature. This led to a mixed result of democratization and strengthened right-winged authoritarianism. The end of the Cold War opened for more prodemocratic pressure from Europe as well as the U.S. and influenced the developments of the Central and Latin American states into a region of new democracies. These new fragile democracies faced obstacles in the shape of low and unfair distribution of modernization, weak civil society and a tradition of po-

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**Figure 6: The Thirty-Year Global Trend for Freedom**

For the democratic scores presented in Figure 6-13, see www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/charts.pdf (2004-05-28)
political and economic centralization. However, the democratization process left Cuba and Haiti as the only repressive states in the region, which indicated a major change in the political landscape (Lowenthal 2000:41-55, Potter 1997b:147).

**FIGURE 7: DEMOCRATIC SCORES ON THE AMERICAS**

Major changes also happened in Pacific Asia as may be seen in Figure 8. The Pacific Asia saw decades of increasing pluralism and growing political and economic awareness among new socioeconomic groups. This was partly due to ill economic performances (as in Indonesia) or due to good economic performances (as in Taiwan and South Korea). The democratization process swept from one state to another as a domino effect and showed traits of the changes seen in Central and Latin America, although being more limited in scope. The Pacific Asia still consists of dictatorial regimes such as Laos, Vietnam, North Korea and most importantly China. However, most of these Communist states have promoted an economic liberalization with political consequences in declining centralization and growing pluralism. For instance, the modernization process in China has led to political reforms in the introduction of elections to committees on the countryside, in the growing independent position by the National Party Congress (NPC) and in the growing socioeconomic pluralism among regions and classes. The Chinese communist party has seen itself resting its legitimacy on economic performance rather than on firm beliefs in the superior role of Communism. Demonstrations at the Tiananmen Square of 1989 were brutally crushed by the com-
munist dictatorship, although these demonstrations were a symbol of liberalization (Wang 1995, Leijonhufvud et al 1995).

**FIGURE 8: DEMOCRATIC SCORES ON ASIA PACIFIC**

Although Africa has faced challenges, such as war-thorn societies and outspread poverty, the third wave democratization included some of the many African states as illustrated in Figure 9. The greatest democratization process occurred in South Africa with the abolishment of Apartheid and the democratization of the state in 1989 and forward. Such change had snowballing effects on surrounding states and we could see democratic changes in 21 out of the 47 states located south of Sahara. By the end of the 1990s, however, many African states had not been able to uphold the new democratic patterns. For instance, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Senegal, Benin and Burkina Faso are African states that have become stable democracies. Fragile democracies are found in for instance Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, while Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Congo, Gabon and Togo, among other states are dictatorial. The main obstacles to the democratic progress are the tradition of large government, weak and undeveloped civil society, low level of modernization and great economic inequality, AIDS, as well as ongoing ethnic problems and civil wars (Lindberg 1998, Potter 1997:294-319, Koblanck 7 October 2005:24-25).
FIGURE 9: DEMOCRATIC SCORES ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Although the third wave of democratization was global in scope, there has been a deviant case to the trend in the Middle East as showed in Figure 10. The Islamic region has showed a major democratic gap, compared to other regions in the world. The only democratic progress seen in the region, with the exception of Israel and Turkey, has been liberalization in Lebanon and Iran, although Iran has displayed a backlash as Khatami lost important battles. Another uncertain change has been the newly established government in Iraq after the U.S. intervention. The overall obstacles to democratization in the region has been the political way of interpreting the Koran by many dictatorial regimes – the merging of religion and politics - although other obstacles are unequal welfare and the historical legacy of rigid monarchies (Karatnycky 2002:105-106, Talbi 2000:58-68, Sivan 2000:69-83).
Europe is by far the most democratized region in the world. Many European states are consolidated democracies. This is illustrated in Figure 11. The defeat of Germany and Italy and the illegitimacy of Nazism as well as Fascism, in a post-World War II context, opened for the consolidation of democracies in a war-thorn landscape. However, it was not until the third wave of democratization began in Southern Europe of the 1970s that the Western Europe was more or less fully democratized. The third wave of democratization began with the collapse of the militarily ruled Portugal after the death of Salazar in 1970. Power was handed over to Caetano who allowed for liberalization, although within the framework of Fascism. However, in 1974, the Portuguese revolution overthrew Caetano and dismantled the Fascist framework in favor of a new Portuguese Republic. This incident triggered further changes in Southern Europe in the democratization of Spain, Turkey and Greece (Goldblatt 1997:95-100, 107-114, Huntington 1991:3-5).

Research in the 1960s and 1970s predicted a decline in democratic confidence in Western democratic states. Demonstrations, radical riots and wars triggered Western scholars to foresee the crumbling era of democracies. However, research in the 1980s and 1990s have proven such scenarios wrong as new political movements have been absorbed into the established system and provided new energy into the democratic system. There has been a continued high level of support for the democratic community and the regime principles, although a
mixed result on support for the performances of the politicians (Norris 1999:10).34

FIGURE 11: DEMOCRATIC SCORES ON THE WESTERN EUROPE

There have also been democratic changes in the Central and Eastern European states. The democratization score in Central and Eastern European states is illustrated in Figure 12. The illegitimacy of Communism resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe of the late 1980s (in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States) (Huntington 1991:25). Most political leaders in the region saw such transformation as the return to Europe and as the end of the Cold War. The recent records show that the former satellite states in Central Europe have succeeded in their progress towards democratization, while the former Soviet territory have had problems in the democratization process. There are remaining obstacles in the centralization of power, corruption and ethnic tension, although dictatorial regimes are a rare phenomenon in Europe (Karatnycky 2001).

34 As argued by Norris, “We have seen the growth of more critical citizens, who value democracy as an ideal yet who remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political system, and particularly the core institutions of representative government” (Norris 1999:269).
FIGURE 12: DEMOCRATIC SCORES ON THE CEE-FSU

The democratization process in Europe has changed the European landscape. This process has been parallel to economic and technological processes that have led some scholars to state that the European political community is in the process of being transformed (Held 2000:17, Axtmann 1996). The process of democratization has attracted attention and has come to symbolize a new era of political organization.\footnote{See the volumes on the WIDER international research project on the New Regionalism, edited by Hettne et al (1999, 2001).} The trend for democratization has provided a debate on the construction of a democratic norm-community. This has indicated the parallel processes of democratization and integration of democratic states. As argued by Whitehead,

The EU has symbolized a far developed norm-community. The integration process has led to a Union of intergovernmental as well as supranational nature; a Union with institutions representing the member states as well as the Union itself. The EU has also had changing relations with the near subregions of Central Europe, Eastern and Southeast Europe. The states in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe have had to react to the integration process as well. This has created a relation where the ins often pushed for democracy promotion to expand the norm-community and where the outs have tried to adapt to such integration. This has led to changing borders within Europe between the expanding democratic norm-community and the marginalized dictatorial states. As the democratic norm-community has allowed for new democracies to become members, remaining dictatorial states have become excluded and isolated in Europe (Hettne 2003:142-153, Pridham & Vanhanen 1994:1, Whitehead 2001:406-409, Rosecrance 1998:16).

It was argued in Chapter 1 that there has been a growing interest in international factors to democratization. This study focuses on international factors based on the phenomenon of the high number of democratized states and the enlarging democratic community in Europe. These processes have put pressure on remaining dictatorial states to democratize. In short, the assumption of this study is that the international factors to democratization should be presence in European politics, as Europe has seen an increasing number of states democratize and together establish a democratic community. This phenomenon opens for theoretical developments on international factors to democratization and empirical illustrations on the role of the EU as democracy promoter. This is theoretically discussed in Chapter 4 and empirically illustrated in Chapter 6.

2.4 Summary

The main purpose of this chapter has been to conceptualize, measure and illustrate democratization. It has been argued that the democratization process is a complex process that may be theoretically understood in terms of phases. There are different ways to measure democratization, although this study uses the Freedom House Survey. Based on this survey, this chapter has set out the 20th century as a century of democratic progress. This important trend was global in scope influencing Europe, Central and Latin America, Asia and Africa although leaving the Middle East more or less untouched. The democratic age from the 1970s and forward saw a major wave of democratization that symbolized that democratic governance was a universal aspiration. Europe has become the most consolidated democratic region of the world and which has facilitated for the de-
velopment of a democratic norm-community. The growing number of democratic states and the establishment of a democratic community have led to the assumption in this study that the international factor in democracy promotion is likely to be a presence as democracies put pressure on dictatorial states to become part of the enlarging democratic norm-community. The overwhelming presence of democracies in Europe is illustrated in Figure 13.

**Figure 13: Regional Comparison**
3. Explaining Democratization - the Domestic and International Factors

Chapter 3 concerns factors favorable to democratization. These factors are domestic and international and include an actor-oriented as well as a structural oriented dimension. It is primarily the actor-oriented factors that are in focus. This was set out in Chapter 1. The domestic factors are illustrated in Figure 14.

**FIGURE 14: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO BE DEVELOPED AND EXPLORED – THE DOMESTIC FACTORS**

This chapter is developed in two steps. The first step begins with a discussion on the traditional research on factors favorable to democratization in the domestic factors. This step sets out three perspectives on democratization. It also illuminates the gradual change over time from structural-oriented explanations to actor-oriented explanations. The second step continues with a discussion on the theoretically unexplored international factors. This step includes a discussion on why the research on democratization has had a domestic bias and identifies international factors to democratization. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the domestic bias in research on democratization and the forgotten international factors.
3.1 The Domestic Factors

The democratization processes of the 19th and 20th centuries, as identified and discussed in Chapter 2, have provided important clues to the factors favorable to democratization. Based on the experiences of the three waves, many factors have been identified in different societal settings. However, to this day, writings on democratization continue to lack a causal theory outlining a clear path between source and effect. For instance, Sørensen has examined the many different factors identified within the research on democratization, in different periods of time as well as in different cultural settings and stresses,

“It is possible to point out a number of preconditions that can reasonably be expected to favour or obstruct the possibilities for democracy. But in every case it is also possible to give counterexamples, where the expectations have not held true” (Sørensen 1993:28).36

Or as argued by Huntington,

“No single factor is sufficient to explain the development of democracy in all countries or in a single country. No single factor is necessary to the development of democracy in all countries. Democratization in each country is the result of a combination of causes. The combination of causes producing democracy varies from country to country. The combination of causes generally responsible for one wave of democratization differs from that responsible for other waves. The causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a democratization wave are likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in that wave” (Huntington 1991:38).

There have been some attempts to grasp the complex body of explanatory factors. There are many different categorizations of the domestic explanatory factors regarding democratization. For instance, there is the categorization into the Rationalist, Structuralist and Culturalist perspectives on democratization.

36 In fact, Vanhanen (1997) is one of very few scholars that perhaps stresses unicausality. He concludes that the existence of democracy depends upon the concentration of control over political resources – material as well as intellectual. Concentration of resources with the few leads to autocratic power, while the dispersion of resources and power leads to democratic structures (1997:99).
There are also the three schools in the Modernization school, Structural school and Transition school (Lewis 1997). A third way of mapping the major approaches is Elite vs. Masses and Structure vs. Agency (Elgström & Hydén 2002:2).

This section presents a categorization of domestic-oriented perspectives on democratization in the Socioeconomic, Cultural and Political. This categorization is a simplification of the many factors involved in the research on democratization and must be read as explanatory generalizations. Researchers and their explanatory factors are not always fitting neatly into an ideal type of perspective on democratization, but instead blur the theoretical borders. Further, it is not a comprehensive survey of the literature on factors in democratization. It is rather selective partly due to the fact that a full account would be indigestible for the reader, and also due to the limitations on the author. However, although the relations presented herein hosts a large number of scholars with different views, those views are similar in nature when it comes to the explanatory factors to democratization. They provide generalizations on factors favorable to democratization with almost universal application (Bunce 2000:705-715). They also provide the reader with a better understanding of the domestic dominance in the research made on democratization as well as shed light on the change of research focus from structural factors of the 1950s and forward towards actor-oriented factors of the 1980s.

### 3.1.1 Socioeconomic perspective on democratization

The domestic dominance in research on democratization grew out of numerous studies from the 1950s focusing on socioeconomic structural factors. The research was related to the development studies and the dependency school and was referred to as the modernization school or the modernization thesis. One classical study on economic development and its role for political development was Rostow’s (1971) *Politics and the Stages of Growth*, which identified stages of growth. In the late 1960s, in the context of decolonization, research also focused on stability and political order. The modernization perspective on political stability was illustrated by the classical study by Seymour Martin Lipset in (1983) entitled *Political Man*. Lipset stressed that the modernization, with a high level of GNP, promoted democratization and also found that high level of GNP made democracies consolidated. Lipset’s (1983) study on the relation between economic development and democratization examined 28 European states (stable vs. unstable democracies) and 20 Latin-American states (democracies and unstable dictatorships vs. stable dictatorships) and compared different political systems by analyzing what made some states become democratized and others not. His conclusion was that democratized states based their political systems on
higher levels of socioeconomic development including wealth, industrialization, urbanization and high educational standards. High levels of these socioeconomic structures corresponded with the more democratic states; therefore, states that performed well economically and socially would become consolidated democracies (1983:34-53).\textsuperscript{37}

Lipset’s economic hypothesis on democratization (the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy) (1960:31) has been a major and long-lasting contribution to future research on democratization. The positive relationship between democratic development and economic development has been further supported empirically (cf. Jackman 1973, Bollen 1979, Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994, Gasirowski & Power 1998, Londregan & Poole 1996). Some scholars (cf. Huntington 1991) have also specified a certain socioeconomic level as promoting democratization. The second and third wave of democratization, which occurred after a strong global economic peak, indicated how many states in different regional areas of the world went through economic growth, leading to socioeconomic changes and transition. As a concluding remark of this empirical analysis it was possible to identify a “transition zone” (at $500-$6,000 income per capita). This is the economic zone between poverty and wealth where a country’s level of modernization has promoted democratization (Huntington 1991:60).\textsuperscript{38}

More recent studies have showed a more complex picture of this relationship, while not questioning the existence of the relationship per se. Scholars have reinterpreted Lipset’s thesis by exploring the relation between social structures and democracy. Such social structures may be higher level of education and emerging shared values. It is primary the social issues, rather than pure economic development per se, that are most important - it is the effects of economic development and not economic development that promoted democratization. There has therefore been strong support for the notion of socioeconomic growth as a factor favorable to democratization: if a state develops over a long period, so that all the modernizing consequences have time to accumulate, it may eventually embrace democracy. Such consequences include prosperity, health and education, but also technology, flow of information and knowledge. All these consequences open societies and triggers growing pluralism that the dictatorial regime

\textsuperscript{37} Wealth measured as per capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle and thousand of persons per physician, and the number of telephones, radios and newspapers per thousand persons; industrialization measured as a percentage of people working outside agriculture; urbanization measured as a percentage of people living in cities with a population over 100 000; and educational standards measured as a percentage of people out of 1000 people active at college/university.

\textsuperscript{38} Huntington’s classification of rich and poor states was based on the statistics provided by the World Bank (1978), defining a rich state with a GNP per capita ranging from $6,000 to $21,000, while poor states with GNP per capita incomes ranging from $130 to $450.
must handle. The dictatorial regime has to choose between allowing for liberalization and perhaps transition or through repression halt the socioeconomic changes (Przeworski & Limongi 1997:155-183, cf. Hadenius 1992, De Schweinitz 1964).

The modernization thesis also includes the notion of regime breakdown as a result of a long time of economic ill performance. This is what has been described as the performance dilemma. At such moments, the authoritarian regime is questioned on its functionality and ability to uphold economic welfare. This is a severe challenge to its existence, since there is no founding political legitimacy that can deal with crisis as in the democratic system where ill performance is met by elections and a new government. In authoritarian regimes illegitimacy for the regime is presented as illegitimacy for the whole system (Huntington 1991:50). As argued by Huntington,

“In democracies the legitimacy of rulers usually depends on the extent to which they meet the expectations of key groups of voters that is, on their performance. The legitimacy of the system, however, depends on the procedures, on the ability of the voters to choose their rulers through elections. In office, the rulers, eventually, fail to perform, they lose legitimacy, they are defeated in elections, and a different set of rulers takes over. The loss of performance legitimacy by the rulers leads to the reaffirmation of the procedural legitimacy of the system. In authoritarian systems other than one-party systems, however, no distinction was possible between ruler legitimacy and regime legitimacy; poor performance undermined the legitimacy of both rulers and the legitimacy of the system” (Huntington 1991:50).

The domestic socioeconomic structures and changes have also had great impact on the domestic class-structures. For instance, Moore (1966, cf. 1971), in the classical study Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy - Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, stressed the importance of the outcome of the modernization in the modification of the class-structure. Rapid modernization was not sufficient in determining democratization, since such development could also lead to authoritarian systems (such as in Japan in the early 20th century) (Moore 1966:477). A favorable context for democratization was intensified industrialization, which expanded the power of the middle class and decreased the power of the landlords. Intensified industrialization also integrated the more commercialized countryside with the urban areas, linking the urban middle class and the independent rural peasants to each other (Moore 1966:418). The most supported perspective on socioeconomic classes and democratization has pointed
to the middle class as a growing political and economic class that could integrate the lower and upper classes of the society into unity and consensus. Economic development promotes the expansion of an economic strong and political ambitious middle class, which consists of business people, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, technicians, clerical, and sales-workers. For instance, in the third wave of democratization, “In virtually every country the most active supporters of democratization came from the urban middle class” (Huntington 1991:67).

However, a few studies have pointed out the working class as prodemocratic and other studies have focused on alliances between the working class and capitalists (cf. Resuchemeyer et al 1992, Przeworski & Wallerstein 1982). It has been stressed that democracy is likely to emerge as a result of industrialization and a growing power of the organized working class; democracy is extremely rare in agrarian societies. However, in opposition to most liberal modernization scholars, these scholars also argue that the triggering factor behind such democratization is the urban working class and not as traditionally stressed the middle class. The middle class is likely to favor its political role, but is more sceptical towards expanding it to the working class (Reuschemeyer et al 1992). Such statements have also come with the idea that the middle class may very well work against democratization (Thernborn 1974).

The socioeconomic approach has had great explanatory power within the research on democratization. In general, states with high socioeconomic development have tended to have high level of democratic progress. It has been identified that growing socioeconomic progress is likely to also bring political progress. This was the case with most of the industrializing Western states of the late 19th century and early 20th century. The socioeconomic perspective has also had explanatory power in the democratization of the Southern European states of the 1970s as well as in some of the Southeast Asian states such as South-Korea, Thailand and Taiwan of the 1980s (Goldblatt 1997:46-47, Huntington 1991:60-61, 67-68). However, the last decades of great political change have also showed this perspective’s fallacies. The socioeconomic perspective has been redefined several times. This has led to a complex picture of relations between the socioeconomic perspective and democratization (Grugel 2002:48-49). A few studies have also presented cases deviating from the modernization approach to democratization (Sannerstedt 1994:72, Dahl 1971).³⁹ It has been stated that authoritarian regimes often find legitimacy based on good economic performance; as the

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³⁹ Dahl’s comparison in *Polyarchy* (1971) on 118 states and 33 polyarchies and near polyarchies shows how states that have an economic development (using GNP per capital) between 700 and 800 (1957 dollars) tend to be polyarchies. However, the study also includes many deviating cases where some states are polyarchies despite lower level of economic progress.
An authoritarian regime is able to prove modernization, the political system will stay intact. The most significant deviant case to the socioeconomic perspective has been the delayed democratization in Central Europe. Despite traits of socioeconomic development, with modernization and high level of education, democratization was postponed. Many of these states had gradually incorporated Western economic policies in a context of internationalization from the 1960s and forward (Karvonen 1997:42). The democratization process finally started in these states, in for example Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, but the time lag caused by decades of Communist rule may question the explanatory power of the perspective. The democratization process also spread to most continents and regions in the world, however, it did not penetrate the Middle East and the richest oil states in for example Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman, or the tiger economies in Southeast Asia such as Singapore and Malaysia as well as China. Modernization led instead to democratization in Latin America where the socioeconomic structures were undeveloped and where there was an overall strong and privileged land-owning upper class. This was in sharp contrast to the breakdown of relatively rich and stable democracies in Latin America in the 1960s that fell back into authoritarianism and low economic standard. Another deviant case may be found in the African states where democratization occurred in some states, which were challenged by low degrees of modernization. There have been many poor underdeveloped states in the world, for example India and Botswana that faced successful democratization (Hadenius 2001a:36-40, Karvonen 1997:42-43, Wiseman 1997:274-275).

In short, the socioeconomic perspective has pointed out an important relation between socioeconomic modernization and democratization. However, there are flaws in this perspective; socioeconomic advanced states with democratic governance have seen authoritarianism, poor states have developed stable democracies and rich states have continued to be authoritarian in nature.

### 3.1.2 Cultural perspective on democratization

A second set of domestic factors has concerned the political culture. The cultural perspective has had a structural dominance in the explanatory factors as well. The idea of cultural factors, as favorable to democratization, refers to political orientations toward political objects of the society and the question of how citizens obtain, develop and organize political attitudes. This has included the analysis of the political cultural structures/context in the religious and/or civilization codes within Protestantism, Catholicism, Confucianism and Islam (cf. Weber 1978).

Most research from the 1960s and forward has, however, dealt with issues of socialization and the political orientations in cognitive orientation (referring to
the knowledge of and beliefs about the political system), affective orientation (feelings about the political system) and evaluation orientation (including commitment and support to political institutions and values and judgements of system performances) (Diamond 1999:163, Dawson & Prewitt 1969). One essential study on political culture was Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* (Almond & Verba 1963), in which political culture referred to

> “the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond & Verba 1963:12).

This study focused on the nature of the political culture that fostered consolidated democracy where political culture was the aggregation of individual political attitudes.\(^{40}\) They identified three types of political cultures; the parochial, subject and participant culture. In the parochial culture, citizens were only indistinctly aware of the political system; in the subject culture, citizens saw themselves as subjects to political affairs rather than participants; and finally in participant culture as participants of the system. Their conclusion stressed stable democracy based on participant culture, but with elements of parochial and subject culture. In the participant political culture, citizens participated in political affairs and supported political affairs, but the parochial and subject political dimension also made the participating citizens loyal to the political decisions. However, too much of a subject culture would lead to an authoritarian system. In conclusion, a specific mix of the three different subcultures created a civic culture promoting a stable democratic system (Almond & Verba 1963).\(^{41}\)

Studies (Klingemann 1999) have also focused on the political culture as a multidimensional phenomenon and measured citizens’ support of political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. Such an approach has concluded that the overall support of democracies is high in the world, but dissatisfied democrats exist. There is an increasing tension between democratic values, which are highly supported, and the confidence in democratic institutions, which is decreasing. The confidence within estab-

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\(^{40}\) Almond and Verba found in their study that Great Britain and the United States, compared to Germany, Italy and Mexico, have higher levels of social and interpersonal trust that also penetrated political relationship.

\(^{41}\) There have been some scholars arguing against this notion. For instance, Muller and Seligson (1994) have stressed an opposite relation; democracies are better off providing civic culture and not the other was around. Other scholars have stressed both these relationships between democracy and political culture. For instance, Diamond and Linz have argued that the democracies may foster democratic attitudes and democratic attitudes will foster democracies (Diamond & Linz 1989:19).
lished democracies continues to be high for the political community and the regime principles. Less confidence and support exist in regime performances, regime institutions and politicians. Potential explanations for the existing gap might be the decline in social trust and civic engagement, failure in regime performances, failure in constitutional design, or cultural explanations rooted in modernization and shifting values (Klingemann 1999:31-77, Norris 1999:10, 21-25). As argued by Klingemann,

“A significant number of people spread around the world can be labelled ‘dissatisfied democrats’. They clearly approve of democracy as a mode of governance, but they are discontented with the way their own system is currently operating. The dissatisfied democrats can be viewed as a less threat to, than a force for, reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures as the third wave continues to flow” (Klingemann 1999:32).

Inglehart (1999) has coordinated the famous World Values Survey measuring the structure of political attitudes in numerous states in the world. This survey has focused on political attitudes toward the political community, democracy as an ideal form of government and regime performance. It has allowed for comparisons of attitudes towards these three factors over time. Inglehart stresses a declining respect for authority. The overall decline in respect for political authorities, such as the police and political parties, is due to a shift in cultural values among citizens, triggered by modernization. The modernization process, leading to the modern industrial society, came with a materialistic rationality. The modernization process of industrialization, urbanization and secularization among other things, promoted a cultural shift in values. The postmodernization process has also promoted a new cultural shift in values, including a change from instrumental rationality towards individual self-expression. The modernization process, as an industrial revolution, transformed the political and cultural system based on religious beliefs in favor of political institutions and rational behavior. The postmodernization process has challenged this system in favor of postmaterialist values of maximising the individual well-being. This may explain the differences in support to the objects of democracy (Inglehart 1999:238, cf. 1990). As argued by Inglehart,

“Postmodernization de-emphasizes all kinds of authority, whether religious or secular, allowing much wider range for individual autonomy in the pursuit of individual subjective well-being” (Inglehart 1999:238).
The interest in attitudes of citizens toward the political system has been related to research on the development of a dynamic civil society. The research on civil society has concerned the aggregated attitudes in a society and the articulation and organization of such attitudes into organizations, associations, unions and clubs. The most classical study on civil society is Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (1969/1835) in which he foresaw a 19th century American prosperous democracy based on a highly developed civil society. The American democracy was vital and active due to the highly developed network of civil society in economic, social, cultural and religious organizations and associations. All together, these relations constructed the civil society as an arena between the outer bounds of government and the inner bounds of family ties. The interest in civil society reemerged in the early 1990s with Putnam’s contribution in *Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Putnam 1993). This study explored the relation between democratic stability and political institutions, socioeconomic factors as well as sociocultural factors. In contrast to theories on socioeconomic factors and democratization, Putnam argued that institutional functionality, efficiency and democratic legitimacy were related to civil society. The existence of a civil society of civic engagement, trust and reciprocity between citizens, led to higher political and administrative performances and to improved legitimacy.

The idea of the importance of a dynamic civil society for a prosperous democratization process might be understood as interacting spheres of the societal life and that all together promote pluralism. It is, however, important to identify the different NGOs within the civil society. Different NGOs in a civil society have different agendas. Therefore, associations and organizations cannot solely be defined as being prodemocratic, but must be defined in accordance with their specific orientations and strategies as well as their internal structure. There may be organizations and associations that are anti-democratic in its organizational structures and goals or that are apolitical in nature (Beckman 1997:2-5, Boussard 2003:81-83, 90-91).

Some scholars have raised a debate on how to perceive the civil society in relation to the state, arguing for a positive vs. negative definition of a civil society. The civil society may be a counter-structure to the state, but also an arena for civic education and participation (Foley & Edwards 1996:38-72, Diamond 1994:11-12). The negative definition of a civil society refers to the regulating and controlling function the civil society has toward the state and its perf...
ances. The civil society balances the power between societal forces and state institutions and makes sure that the state does not abuse its authority. The positive definition of the civil society refers to the complementing and assisting function civil society can have in relation to the state. The civil society presents an arena where citizens can articulate, aggregate and associate freely according to their wills and opinions. This form of civil society can also contribute with societal efforts to alleviate the pressure on the state and also show direction for future policy-making. The civil society has, therefore, been expressed to have several of functions (Diamond 1994:5).

Overall, the cultural perspective sheds light on the importance of pro-democratic orientations. Such orientations may very well contribute to a pluralist civil society that could check and balance the political system. The cultural perspective has explained important traits of democratization. The role of politically oriented attitudes and a dynamic civil society were obvious in the third wave of democratization where societal movements in many states expressed their hostility toward the governments to such an extent that many regimes collapsed. The 1980s proved that the civil society pursued goals that contrasted the goals set by the state (Diamond 1994:4, Grugel 2002:112, Hadenius 2001a:44, cf. Hadenius 2001b). For example, the cultural legacy of democracy played a significant role in the democratization process of Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia, but was more or less absent in for instance Belarus and Moldova. The strong and dynamic civil society in Poland led to a peaceful revolution where the civil society had great impact on the liberalization and transition of the regime. Another important example was found in the Czech Republic (Sadowski 1994, Linz & Stepan 1996:24). However, despite the events in some Central European states, the democratization process was postponed. Also, after the delayed transitions, the former pro-democratic civil society in Central Europe vanished into the political system, which questions the role of the civil society in the consolidation phase? (Smolar 1996:29). It may also be argued that there were tendencies towards growing civil society in some other states of the 1970s and forward, although not leading to consolidation. For instance, Romania saw transition based on mass mobilization, but has had problems continuing the process of consolidation. It seems the revolutionary and highly politically motivated demonstrations turned into anarchy and political distrust with low level of confidence in democratic principles. Additionally, some African states, that democratized based on an active civil society, showed patterns of ethnical or clan-based organizations and movements, which contributed to a civil society divided by deep cleavages. The

the changing material/economic structures and its impact on civil society and alliances for and against democratization.
notion of great cleavages within the population has traditionally been viewed as an obstacle to democratization, rather than a triggering factor. Latin America has also consisted of states with great cleavages based on socioeconomic injustices. This has led to a civil society with high level of criminal rates as well as revolutionary movements. Despite such traits of undemocratic civil society, were the Latin American societies greatly influenced by democratization (Hadenius 2001:44-45, Karvonen 1997:104-106). It has also been argued that democracies have flourished in cultures of Protestantism, but research on the third wave has concluded that the Catholic Church had great impact on the third wave of democratization. Although traditional research on religion and democratization had stated that Catholicism and Confucianism were antidemocratic in nature, was the prodemocratic role of the Catholic Church and the democratization of East Asian states oppose such a notion (Sørensen 1993:25, cf. Weber 1978, Huntington 1991).

In short, the cultural perspective has pointed out important factors for democratization. However, it has also missed out in explaining democratization itself. Democratization has occurred in traditionally expected antidemocratic cultures, in societies with weak prodemocratic cultural traditions and in societies with weak or strongly governmental controlled civil societies.

### 3.1.3 Political perspective on democratization

The political factors favorable to democratization have included structural as well as actor-oriented factors focusing on the political institutions, but also on the role of domestic political elites and the masses. Based on a structure-oriented point of view, it has been argued that democratization from totalitarian structures is harder and more risky than democratization from authoritarian structures. This is due to the totalitarian control that characterizes the totalitarian society and the lack of political competition, political rights, independent institutions and a dynamic civil society. It has also been argued that there are other forms of regimes that provide even worse structural conditions for democratization due to the lack of political organization and the existence of personal power. For instance, Sultanism has a strong tendency toward patrimonial patterns and the sultan rules, as it was his own domains. The leadership is highly personalistic and arbitrary without any rational-legal constrains. Therefore, traditional judicial systems and political institutions are often absent. There is rarely the rule of law, political opposition forces or any free economic or social society that are not under the control of the sultan (Linz & Stepan 1996:42-65, cf. Linz 2000).

One of the most important contributions focusing on political structures as institutions and democratization was made by Huntington in his study *Political order in changing societies* (1968). He argued that one of the unstable factors in
a society is insufficient institutionalization; “[t]he primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change” (Huntington 1968:5). Increased political and economic demands from societal forces have to be met by new institutional arrangements. Otherwise, the political system will be overload and political illegitimacy increase to such a level that the system finally collapses. A strong party system has the ability to appeal to the masses in society and link the parties to the broader population. In doing so, challenges to the system, such as those posed by revolutionary groups are undermined and the potential for consolidation enhanced (Huntington 1968:276-278, 344, 408-420, cf. Diamond et al 1997). The creation of a political party structure is therefore essential for democratization. Political parties ensure political participation and the connection between political power and the population at large. They are instruments for representing interests and aggregating preferences as well as recruiting political candidates. They are also instruments for structuring elections by crafting political alternatives and organizing the political agenda (Diamond 1997:xxiii).

There has also been a debate on the type of institutions that best favor political (democratic) stability? This debate on how to design democracies has concerned the distinction between parliamentarism vs. presidentialism. This debate was based on the contributions by Linz. His article The Perils of Presidentialism (1990) became pathbreaking stressing that presidentialism is less likely than parliamentarism to provide stable democracies. This is due to four perils of presidentialism. First, the nature of presidential elections in the winner-take-all, may lead to a presidency based on support from a minority of electorate. This could produce a legitimacy gap. Second, the fixed presidential terms and the many obstacles in removing a president make changes problematic. It has been stated that the parliamentary system is more adjustable to changing conditions. Third, the divided legitimacy between the elected president and the elected Congress and the different political opinions between these two branches could provide policy gridlock and political instability that an undemocratic force could take advantage of. Fourth, presidentialism may foster personality politics and open for inexperienced individuals as presidents (Linz 1990:51-69).\textsuperscript{43} The arguments against presidentialism provided by Linz led to a growing body of research on political systems. The potential weaknesses in the presidential systems, in minority presidents, rigid terms and difficulty of removal, policy gridlock and election of inexperienced outsiders, have been explored (see Diamond & Plattner 1996, Shugart & Carey 1992, Mainwaring & Shugart 1997, Easter 1997). Overall, the parlia-

\textsuperscript{43} However, Linz also stresses a few advantages with presidentialism, in for example executive stability, greater popular control and more limited government.\hfill
mentary democracies have also seemed to be more functionable and long-lasting compared to presidential democracies (Shin 1994:158-159). However, some studies have also challenged these arguments pointing out weak democratic structures rather than presidentialism as the root to instability (cf. Fukuyama et al 2005).

Other studies have focused on the functionality of presidentialism and parliamentarism in plural societies. The assumption in the literature has been that social homogeneity and political consensus are favorable to democracy. Therefore, plural societies with religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, racial and ethnic cleavages may become serious threats to democratic stability (Lijphart 1977:3-4). Lijphart (1999, 1977) has focused on the different forms of government and their performances in ethnical and/or socioeconomic divided societies. He stresses that an important remedy to political instability is the development of suitable institutions. These institutions may improve the societal trust among citizens. However, it requires institutions that are open to public participation and that protect minority groups. Lijphart concludes that the best performing institutions in divided societies consists of a proportional electoral system with a regime including a grand coalition of the major parties. It is also important to avoid the most severe and controversial issues among the divided groups to enter the political agenda as well as to protect core values and interests among minority groups through mutual veto. This type of political system, the consociational democracy, is best suited to provide democratic stability in divided societies. It requires, however, cooperation among different elites and commitment to overcome the challenges that come with existing cleavages. However, the consociational democracy may have weaknesses as well. These weaknesses may consist of inefficiency to reach decisions. Grand coalitions and mutual veto may become major obstacles for regime performance (Lijphart 1977:25-51, 71-75).

The political perspective was, in the 1980s, developed into an actor-oriented dimension of domestic factors; what has been referred to as the transitology or the transition paradigm. This new approach was pathbreaking within the research on democratization. The long tradition of structural-oriented explanations suddenly changed into research on actors and actors’ preferences. Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (1986a,b,c,d) provided their series of volumes on Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - Prospects for Democracy, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - Southern Europe (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - Latin America (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - Comparative Perspectives (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead) and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (O’Donnell & Schmitter). The actor-oriented arguments provided by these scholars criticized the structural dimensions of the socioeconomic perspective as
exaggerating the role of economic and social structures in determining political change and introduced research on the elites’ strategies, alliances and compromises. One statement was that the democratization of the third wave states occurred due to the balance of power within the regime and the relation to certain forces in the society, rather than socioeconomic structural conditions. As argued by Huntington,

“Whatever their motives, some political leaders have to want it to happen or be willing to take steps, such as partial liberalization, that may lead to it happening” (Huntington 1991:108).

This approach identified different fractions of political elites; two of these fractions within the dictatorial regime were the hardliners and softliners (cf. O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986, Di Palma 1990, Higley & Gunther 1992). Hardliners form the core of politicians that view democracy as something that brings chaos and anarchy and undermines the privilege of the elite. One group of hardliners firmly believe in the established dictatorial system, while the other group of hardliners is less ideological and more concerned with selfish motives. In both groups, the hardliners are prepared to use repression and violence to keep stability and order. The other faction of the regime is the softliners, who favor liberalization in order to satisfy citizen demands or to increase quality of performances and receive legitimacy. These softliners may be favorable to democratization if they believe that elections will lead to a legitimate re-election of the same elite. Democratization occurs when there is a growing division between hardliners and softliners within the dictatorial elite and when softliners are able to convince or force the hardliners to liberalize and democratize the system (Przeworski 1986a:58).

However, the elite perspective has also added two more groups of actors, (cf. Przeworski 1992:105-153) in the moderates and the radicals (revolutionaries) within the society. The radicals want to overthrow the illegitimate elite, while the moderates try to forge alliances with softliners within the elite. The transition phase usually starts with fractions within authoritarian regimes, where the linkage between elites and masses are important. This is the game of transition. The democratization process may happen as a Pact when the dominating elite and the opposition compromise or through a Reform when the masses of the so-

44 The split within the authoritarian regime was empirically verified in the democratization in Latin America and in Southern Europe (see O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). However, other scholars have falsified such a claim when looking at African regime transitions of the 1980s pointing at democratization from below rather than above (Bratton & van de Walle 1992, 1997).
ciety are stronger than the elites are, but without resulting in use of violence. The third way is through Imposition when the political elite uses violence to overthrow the regime; such elite is often the military that have the force and authority to be a political power against the elite. Finally, the fourth way is Revolution when the masses are so strong and dominant enough to use violence to overthrow the traditional ruling elite (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986:37-39, Stepan 1986a:64-84).

Most elite focused scholars have argued in favor of the Pact transition. This path to democratization is based on compromise between powerful elites and has the best chance of sustaining and transforming the political system into a consolidated democracy. Over time, this pact will develop into mutual trust, which is a very favorable condition for consolidation. The pact-strategy between elites also restricts the number of people involved in the transition, which is favorable to further democratization since fewer people enhance the ability to reach compromises. This is what Huntington has called the “democratic bargain” (Huntington 1991:169, cf. Pridham & Lewis 1996, Przeworski 1992, O’Donnell 1992, Karl 1990).

The political perspective stresses the role of political institutions and political elites. It has been argued that democratization includes the process of institutionalization. The more people that are expected to participate in the democratic life, the more pressure is forwarded towards the institutions to provide for such participation. The political perspective stresses the role of political elites in shaping the institutionalization process. Prodemocratic elites may design democratic institutions and adhere to democratic rules in their political ambitions as well as protect democracy when political, economic and social challenges may rise (Bunce 2000:709). By looking at the third wave, three different paths of transitions may be identified and in which elites played a major role (Huntington 1991:121-163). Transformation occurred when the political elite in power triggered a transition by introducing favorable political and economic reforms. Replacement occurred when the opposition undermined the legitimacy of the ruling elite and took the lead in bringing political changes after the regime had collapsed or been overthrown. Transplacement occurred where the political elite and opposition agreed to bring changes after round table discussions.

Major examples of democratization, stemming from a prodemocratic elite, were seen in Hungary, Poland and former Czechoslovakia where the political

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45 These three paths have also been identified by others scholars such as Linz who talks about reforma, ruptura and ruptforma (Linz and Stepan 1978), and by Share and Mainwaring (1986) that use concepts such as transaction, breakdown/collapse and extrication. All these concepts of paths toward democratization shed light on the balance of power between the traditional regime of hardliners vs. softliners and the opposition forces in the society.
changes were explained as negotiated transitions led by a coalition of softliners and moderates that together fostered for liberalization and transition (Linz & Stepan 1996:296-316). The political perspective has also been successful in explaining the democratization of many western democracies by pointing out a historical record of institutionalization. A gradual political institutionalization of the different branches of governance led to a political tradition of solving conflicts peacefully. This provided stable and dynamic democracies in the Scandinavian states as well as in most Western European states. An advanced institutionalization may also bring stability in states with separating cleavages. This requires performances from the political elite that facilitate cooperation and trust and that may spread to the society at large; such attempts have been seen in Bosnia, Lebanon as well as Northern Ireland, just to mention a few (Hadenius 2001:48-53, Karvonen 1997 87-88).

It has, however, been argued that many of the third wave states did not include any powerful prodemocratic elite, but that the elites there were instead hostile to, or uncertain about, regime transition. Despite these hardliners, democratization occurred as a result of prodemocratic forces beyond the control and regulation of the dictatorial regime. Another critical argument on the political perspective may be that strong leadership continued even after the transitions, in the shape of new leaders or transformed old communist leaders. The democratization process continued as a parallel process to strong and charismatic leadership. This was the case in some of the Southeast European states and East Asian states. Finally, it has also been argued that the political perspective focuses on the transition more than on the consolidation phase. The perspective is more concerned with regime change, than the long-term consolidation of the democracy. This has perhaps led to less attention to structural and contextual constraints for democratization, as the focus has been on actors and their preferences (Grugel 2002:60-62).

3.1.4 Dimensions of factors
The research of the 1950s and forward was mainly structure-oriented. The research done focused on long-term socioeconomic development and structures, as well as on the growth of civic attitudes in relation to the state, which could favor democratization and the stability of democracies. There was a shift in attention of the 1980s and forward focusing more on actor-oriented factors. Instead of analyzing long-term structural developments, more and more scholars started to believe that democratization could be the result of actors and their interests and strategies. It was perhaps the perceptions and strategies of the political elites and/or masses that could favor democratization rather than structural conditions outside the political system? The transitology of the late 1980s developed in
sharp contrast to the structure-oriented explanatory factors. It was argued that, “Democracies are created not by causes but by causers” (Huntington 1991:107). The discussion on the domestic factors in democratization, with an actor as well as structure-oriented dimension, may be summarized as in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Socioeconomic</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Elites &amp; masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Modernization &amp; Socioeconomic classes</td>
<td>Prodemocratic orientations &amp; Civil society</td>
<td>Institutions &amp; State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3: ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY OF DOMESTIC FACTORS AND DIMENSIONS**

The intellectual shift from structure-oriented explanatory factors to actor-oriented ones was a major one. The research of the late 1980s and early 1990s, was pathbreaking focusing on actors and their perceptions. This was an important contribution to the research on democratization. However, the traditional structure-oriented factors and the newly explored actor-based factors shared one flaw; the neglect of international factors. The new research on actors continued to treat international factors as secondary. It was stated that elites and masses developed their perceptions and political activities free from international influence.

### 3.2 The International Factors

The domestic-oriented perspectives have provided explanations for democratization. The complementary approaches to democratization have enlightened the public and the academic life on how to understand democratization. The understandings have consisted of actor-oriented and structural-oriented explanatory dimensions. However, despite their explanatory power on democratization, these perspectives do not prove any conclusive material on the different factors favorable to democratization. These perspectives have contained one shared flaw; the
neglect of the international factors (cf. O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead 1986a, Diamond et al 1989). There has been limited research on international factors. This section deals with these international factors affecting democratization. This is illustrated in Figure 15.

![Diagram of analytical framework]

**FIGURE 15: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO BE DEVELOPED AND EXPLORED – THE INTERNATIONAL FACTORS**

This section is divided in two steps. Step one consists of a discussion on the limited research on international factors to democratization. The second step focuses on the nature of international factors providing a classification of international factors in democracy promotion and democracy diffusion.

### 3.2.1 Comparative politics and international relations

There has been a domestic dominance in the research within the field of democratization. The dominance of domestic factors is due to two phenomena; first, the construction of separating academic disciplines in comparative politics and international relations (IR), and where research on democratization has belonged to the former; second, the vague idea of what really constitutes the international factors, reaching for anything and everything beyond the state territory (Haynes 2003:21, Pridham 1991a:1-3).

Scholars within the sub-disciplines of comparative politics and IR have traditionally adhered to different perspectives, definitions and tools in their academics. This is because comparative politics mostly focus on domestic affairs, while IR concentrates on the states and beyond. In other words, when comparatives have analyzed domestic patterns in states, IR scholars have treated these states as unitary entities with foreign policies. The comparative political analysis has overall lacked an analytical focus on international factors and has explained do-
mestic political changes by domestic factors. Most studies of comparative poli-
tics have dealt with domestic hierarchic systems comparing the political systems,
without taking into account the international environment (Pridham 1991a:8-9).
This has been quite obvious when reading introductory books on comparative
politics. For example, the contribution by Hague and Harrop’s, *Comparative
Government and Politics* (2001, 5th ed.), devotes most attention to the single state
and the state order of closed systems. Although aiming to analyze the state in a
global context and the impact of state relations on the nature of the state, the re-
sult is one unintegrated chapter on the global context (cf. Haynes 2003:21-22).
Another example is found in Calvert’s study, *Comparative Politics – an intro-
duction* (2002), dealing with the global environment as a separate chapter from
the traditional comparative assessments of domestic actors and structures. Most
research on democratization has belonged to the discipline of the comparative
politics. This has led to an approach where states are treated as more or less
closed systems. The democratization level in one state compared to another is
found in the degree of the domestic factors to democratization and what we now
can understand as socioeconomic, cultural and/or political factors. For instance,
if country A has a higher democratization level, compared to country B, such dif-
fferences have been explained by these domestic factors.

The other important reason for the dominance of domestic factors in research
on democratization is the complexity of what really constitutes the international
factors? (Pridham 1991a:2-3). At first sight, the international factors may consist
of all actors and structures beyond the state. It can be viewed as a collective term
that includes all kinds of international phenomena. As a consequence, the inter-
national factors contributing to democratization are hard to pin down and need
great attention so as not to become too vague and undefined to be used in re-
search on democratization (Pridham 2000, Schmitter 2001:28). However, instead
of conceptualizing the international factors to democratization, most scholars
have seemed to surrender such task by continuing to focus on domestic factors to
democratization. It is therefore necessary to stress that the international factors
on democratization do not create a clear-cut theory. As argued by Pridham,

“The ´international context´, really a collective term for different
external influences, clearly requires close examination to establish
its exact influence on the course of regime change in a particular
region” (Pridham 1994:7).
3.2.2 Democracy diffusion

A first step towards a conceptualization of international factors in democratization has concerned the notion of diffusion. The debate on penetration of states and linkage politics through diffusion began in the 1960s. It was argued that states were open systems that were vulnerable for penetration. These studies stressed the interdependence between domestic and international politics (Rosenau 1966, Keohane & Nye 1977, Almond 1989:246-253). For instance, Rosenaue identified the linkage politics between the international and national domains as “any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another” (1969:45). The notion of linkages and penetrated systems was also explored among scholars within the dependency school, arguing that third world states were influenced by rich states in the West based on an unjustified and unequal world economic structure. The criticism, however, pointed out the lack of specificity of how to analyze and understand international factors. The analytical frameworks presented were often too broad and loosely constructed to actually pin down the content.

In the 1980s, a new debate emerged concerning globalization. The diffusion of global characteristics, within economics, technology and culture, was said to create an intensification of interactions, exchanges and meetings in the world that enhanced interdependence. It was argued that different global processes led to such interdependence where states, regions and citizens were influenced by non-territorial changes. The global changes were said to cut through borders and challenge the domestic political, economic and cultural structures. Globalization processes were also said to decrease geographical distances in the world (Held et al 1999:3, Scholte 1997, Clark 1997, Holden 2000a, Holden 2000b). For instance, the economic globalization has consisted of the spread of new economic ideas and practices in economic liberalization, capitalism, global trade, global markets, and global transactions (Held 2002:53-74, cf. Palan & Gills 1994:9, Jönsson 1999:166, Scholte 1997:437-439). The technological globalization has referred to the developments of communication both in terms of infrastructure and virtual communication (Allardt 1999:19). Finally, the cultural globalization has implied the global spread of cultural traits, but also of a growing awareness of inherited cultural, religious, ethnic and national traits and traditions (Huntington 1996:20, cf. Held & McGrew 2000:16-18, Clark 1997:23).

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46 Rosenaue set out three different types of linkages; the penetrative, the reactive and the emulative. The penetrative linkage referred to the direct interference of the international in the national; the reactive linkages referred to the more passive interference of the international in the national, where international events were reacted to by the domestic; finally, the emulative linkage referred to the reactive linkage, although also including the emulation of the international event (Rosenaue 1969).
However, it was not until the end of the Cold War, with the peak of the third wave of democratization, that the notion of democracy diffusion gained academic attention within the research on democratization (Goldmann 1998:28). The diffusion of democracy may happen between near by locations or between geographical locations with similar political, economic and cultural structures (or historical ties). The spread of democracy is facilitated by political, cultural and economic salience often provided by geographical proximity. However, the third wave of democratization was a global democratization. The spread of democracy happened between far-off geographically locations and between neighboring states. The diffusion of democracy may therefore occur as a global, regional or neighborhood phenomenon (cf. Huntington 1991).

Overall, the diffusion of democracy demonstrates for other states a political alternative, how it may be implemented and what obstacles to avoid in the process (Starr 1991:356-361, Uhlin 1995, Huntington 1991). Diffusion agents may assist the diffusion of democracy.\textsuperscript{47} Diffusion agents act as socialization agents in a state. They transmit the global, regional or the near by spread of democratic ideas into the domestic setting by identifying and interpreting the idea to a local setting. The diffusions agents are often domestically located although with good knowledge of what is going on abroad. They may be strategically located in the domestic and global environment through transnational networks (Schimmelfennig 2002:1, 8-9, Huntington 1991:85-106, Grugel 1999:12-14, cf. Karvonen 1997, Uhlin 1995). For instance, there were many examples of diffusion agents in the third wave of democratization. Diffusion agents, such as Solidarity and Charta 77, played important roles in the democratization of Central Europe. Other important agents were students, gender movements, human rights movements, civil rights movements as well as intellectuals. These civil society agents received much of their power due to their transnational network with similar agents in the West. However, these agents were also important in the first and second waves of democratization in for instance anti-slavery movements, women’s movements, labor movements and citizen rights movements (Huntington 1991:100-106, Schmitz & Sell 1999, Karvonen 1997:110-116).

\subsection*{3.2.3 Democracy promotion}

The research on democracy promotion has come from the research on international relations and foreign policy-making. The debate within this field has concerned the role of the state in the international system as the most dominant and

\textsuperscript{47} In the literature on norms, these actors/agents have been referred to as norm entrepreneurs or nannies. The norm entrepreneurs have received growing academic attention with the debate on globalization (Florini 1996, Finnemore 1996).
powerful actor or as one actor among others? The debate also centred on the interests behind foreign policies. For instance, the realist scholars provided a state-centric approach where the international order was an order of states. The single state, based on territorial and authoritative sovereignty (much like a billiard ball), acted by self-help and with selfish motives. The ultimate goal of the state was to develop as much power as possible to survive in an anarchic order of power struggle. The primary interest was security (cf. Bull 1977, Morgenthau 1978, Waltz 1979). Other scholars, among the liberalists, argued for a more complex world order of state and non-state actors and interests. The liberalists stressed the numerous of different interests these actors provided. The complex world order of actors and interests could provide interdependence and cooperation leading to institutions among like-minded actors (cf. Hoffmann 1987, Lebow & Risse-Kappen 1995).

Foreign policy analysis and research on international relations have been intellectually challenged by a transforming world order. The proliferation of states, the development of other actors, the new trends of cross-border nature and the many different policy issues in the world have all forced scholars on IR and foreign policy analysis into new ideas and perspectives (Webber & Smith 2002:1, cf. Carlsnaes et al 2005). The foreign policy analysis has come to include a broader spectrum of actors and interests. As more actors have pursued foreign policies, new interests and issue areas have also emerged, making the relations between state and non-state actors complex (Webber & Smith 2002:20-22). One obvious symbol of such change within the research on IR has been the changed titles of many introductory books on international relations using terms as world politics, world systems and global politics instead of international relations or international politics. This change of name has referred to the idea of multiple of actors and interests in world politics (cf. Lee Ray & Kaarbo 2002, Baylis & Smith 2005).

The research on international relations and foreign policy analysis has provided insights on factors favorable to democratization by focusing on actors and actors’ interests. The foreign policy analysis has displayed a growing interest in the interest of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion refers to an active prodemocratic pressure towards domestic actors. Democratization may be the result of prodemocratic policy-making. It is primarily the most powerful actors that have the chance to play the role of policy-makers. It is their interests, strategies and methods used that provide conditions that may facilitate for or constrain democratization. Democracy promotion may result in a change of political structures and values in the targeted state (Whitehead 2001, 1986a, Schmitter 2001, Huntington 1991, Pridham 1994, 1991a, 1991b). However, a large majority of studies on democracy promotion have been empirical in nature. This is exemplified by looking at Carothers (1999:383-400) impressive bibliography of works.
on democracy promotion (assistance). Out of 209 mentioned studies on democracy promotion, less than 10% are theoretical in nature. The empirical studies cover a broad range of empirical topics such as women’s right in the Muslim World, the Clinton Doctrine and reforming civil-military relations among many other topics, virtually all without theoretical contributions.

The theoretical notion of democracy promotion began with Huntington’s groundbreaking study *The third wave* (1991). Huntington’s academic record of studies on international relations, political development and democratization and his political career in think tanks of the U.S. administration, led to an awareness of the fuzzy empirical borders between international and domestic politics. Huntington identified a historical record of democratization and argued that the spread of democracy in the world could be understood as three waves of democratization. The third wave of democratization was due to powerful actors, such as the EU, OSCE and the U.S., and the declining power of Soviet Union. These actors provided the spread of ideas and this spread of democratic ideas had snowballing effect on other states as a domino effect. The democratization of some states showed that democracy was reachable, how democratic change was possible and what obstacles to avoid (Huntington 1991:85-106).

Huntington’s study on the presence of international factors in democratization triggered more studies. Two important examples were Pridham’s studies *Encouraging Democracy - the international context of regime transition in Southern Europe* (Pridham 1991) and *Building Democracy – The international Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe* (Pridham et al 1994). Pridham argued that international factors could play a significant role in democratization. By studying the democratization of Southern Europe of the 1970s and 1980s, as the first phase of the third wave of democratization, Pridham with co-authors set out important traits of international factors to democratization. Pridham argued for an increased role of international factors in the 1990s in Eastern Europe compared to Southern Europe of the 1970s, although international factors were involved in the democratization of Greece, Spain and Portugal as well (Pridham 1994:8-9). However, more importantly, Pridham argued that international factors symbolized a forgotten dimension in the study of democratization and developed an analytical framework to democratization (Pridham 1991a:29-30, 1994:11-12). Pridham’s framework consisted of the international domain, the domestic domain and the interaction between the two (although being weakly conceptualized and operationalized) (Pridham 1994:11-12, 1991a:29-30).  

48 The outer-directed linkage referred to the nature of the state under international attention. The background variable concerned the international integration of the dictatorial system and the consolidation of treaties with the international environment. It also included the nature of the transition in the domestic sphere in terms of revolutionary movements or consensus-based negotiations.
linkage referred to the nature of the international factors in background variable, actors and influence. The background variable (situational variable) referred to the external policy of the former dictatorial state as being more or less integrated with the international order and the current situation of the geostrategic location, economic integration as well as the impact of global and regional events. The external actors referred to the nature of the actors involved in external pressure, in for instance international and global organizations, foreign governments as superpowers or major powers in the region, nongovernmental as well as organizations and associations. The nature of external actors also included their motivation behind the external pressure in terms of security, democracy, human rights, economic interests or historical links with the targeted state. Finally, the external influence from external actors referred to the means that are used to pursue the motives and where the means may be political, economic, military or cultural in content (Pridham 1994:12).

Another impressive contribution to the research on the international factors to democratization was Whitehead’s study *The International Dimensions of Democratization – Europe and the Americas* (2001). Whitehead concluded in the study on the democratization processes in Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, South America as well as Latin America that the,

“neglect of external processes and international dynamics was, from the outset, a distortion of reality, and it tended to persist far too long in the face of mounting evidence that something crucial was overlooked” (Whitehead 2001:443).

This statement was in sharp contrast to the series on transitions from authoritarian regimes of 1986 where domestic factors were perceived as the most favorable factors. Whitehead (2001) also theoretically contributed to the notion international factors and democracy promotion by exploring modes of influences. He referred to three different modes of influences in contagion, control and consent.49 Schmitter (2001:29-31) added a fourth mode in conditional cooperation.
Whitehead (2001:4-22) stressed these modes as the main headings for international factors to be grouped and analyzed under. He suggested that each heading might include different actors, motivations and processes and that could bring further light on the international factors to democratization. However, as also argued by Whitehead, the presented modes are overlapping in nature and need further clarification (Whitehead 2001:4).

Firstly, Conditional cooperation (Schmitter 2001:29-30) refers to a mode of influence implemented as carrots aiming to persuade regimes to democratize. However, these carrots are tied to formalized conditions. If the conditions are not accomplished, the support is most certainly cancelled (Giorello 2001:79, Sørensen 1993:4, Smith 2001:37). In short, “Its hallmark is the deliberate use of coercion – by attaching specific conditions to the distribution of benefits to recipient countries…” (Schmitter 2001:30, cf. Whitehead 2001:395-412, Smith 2001:38, Pridham 1999:62-63, 2000:297).

Secondly, Control implies a mode based on explicit policies and coercive methods. Influence is the result of deliberate forceful acts from actors beyond state borders, without domestic consent and is a symbol of power politics. The promoter promotes democracy intentionally as a vaccine. The mode of control may be established through intervention and isolation and aims to determine the future outlook of a state’s political institutions and political culture (Whitehead 2001:8-15).

Thirdly, Contagion implies a mode of influence as neutral, non-coercive and primarily unintentional. It is a mode where the influence does not require any activities towards the targeted state. We may from the perspective of the targeted state talk in terms of learning by watching. However, there is no certainty in such democratization since there is no active promoter and the relation is therefore only based on the power of symbolism. Contagion may lead to democratization within a specific time period and most often within a certain geographical area; democratization based on proximity (Whitehead 2001:5, Huntington 1991:100).

As argued, “[we] are searching, then, for neutral mechanisms that might induce countries bordering on democracies to replicate the political institutions of their neighbors” (Whitehead 2001:6, cf. Kubicek 2003:6).

These examples of studies shed light on a growing theoretical interest among scholars to deal with international factors in democratization. However, there is still a limited theoretical body of research done.
3.2.4 Towards an analytical framework

The contributions from the research on IR and primarily from the two branches in foreign policy-analysis and globalization have left scholars on international factors to democratization with two factors in democracy promotion and democracy diffusion. These two factors should be identified and treated as complementary to the identified domestic factors to democratization. This attention challenges the most embedded and fundamental assumption in political analysis and analysis of democratization; the idea of the world order as being comprised of closed systems (Haynes 2003:20, Uhlin 1995:2).

Most research on international factors in democratization has focused on democratization as a diffusion process; as a wave or demonstration effect. This has primarily been due to the complexity of international factors and the difficulties that exist in conceptualizing democracy promotion. It might, however, be argued that diffusion may be seen as impersonal processes. Research on democratization should perhaps avoid a deterministic position in relating spontaneous processes of globalization to democratization. It might rather be argued that spontaneous changes do not just happen. Democratization might require democratizers. The theoretical knowledge of democracy promotion may therefore be very important. However, the research on democracy promotion has been limited. More importantly, the empirical notion of democracy promotion of the 1990s and forward has not led to theoretical contributions. There has been limited numbers of studies trying to theoretically elaborate on democracy promotion. This has left scholars on democratization with a major intellectual gap between theory and empirical reality.

The analytical framework is based on the presented ideas on linkages, penetration and interdependence. It aims to theoretically elaborate on international factors by further exploring the notion of democracy promotion. Based on the notion of the state as an open system, this framework conceptualizes the international factor in democracy promotion. Democracy promotion is treated as an interaction process. The interaction process concerns the democracy promoter as well as the targeted state. The analytical framework on democracy promotion links the role of the democracy promoter to the domestic actors. This is further explained in Chapter 4 where the analytical framework is to be presented.

3.3 Summary

This chapter has been theoretically oriented. It has discussed and analyzed the research conducted on factors favorable to democratization. The research from the 1950s and forward has developed explanatory factors to democratization by pointing out actor-oriented as well as structure-oriented factors. This study sum-
marized these factors into a socioeconomic, cultural and political perspective and identified the limited research on domestic actor-oriented factors.

It was also argued that traditional research on explanatory factors to democratization has been domestic in nature. This chapter continued to explore the reasons behind the domestic dominance within the research. It was argued that the international factors have constituted forgotten factors to democratization. This has been due to the comparative approach of most democratization studies and to the problems of conceptualizing international factors. However, this chapter presented two important international factors. These factors complement the traditional understandings of explanatory factors to democratization. The two international factors are democracy promotion and democracy diffusion. There has been a growing empirical interest in democracy promotion, but with few theoretical developments.
4. Conceptualizing Democracy Promotion

This chapter aims to contribute to a better theoretical understanding of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion refers to prodemocratic policies towards domestic actors. Democracy promotion may also lead to norm-communities. This chapter consists of seven steps. The first step discusses different types of actors that may be involved in democracy promotion, while step two concerns different interests among them. The third step focuses on the methods used in democracy promotion, while step four covers the types of channels these methods may be promoted through. Step five discusses relations as demand and support and step six the impact of democracy promotion on domestic actors. These six steps are summarized in step seven, constructing an analytical framework of democracy promotion.

4.1 An Analytical Framework

The theoretical argumentation developed in this study is condensed into six succinct propositions. It is argued that, within a specific time-context (setting); (1) There are actors (2) that may promote the democracy norm and reinforcing interests. (3) They may use different methods of pursuing their interests and (4) that may be channeled towards domestic actors. (5) This may create certain relations and (6) have different impact on domestic actors.

4.1.1 Actors

The first aspect of democracy promotion is to distinguish between different types of actors. There are actors that may be policy-makers. Policy-makers pursue interests towards other actors that become policy-takers. This creates an interaction between the policy-maker and the policy-taker that is asymmetrical in nature where the policy-maker tries to influence the policy-taker.

Most research on politics has been state-oriented. There has been an assumption that states are important policy-makers. Although states continue to be core actors in domestic and international politics, there are other actors as well to take into account. This is due to what earlier was discussed as globalization and the

One way to understand the different types of actors is to identify Global-, International-, State-, Transnational- and Sub-state actors (Goldstein 1999:10-19, Russet et al 2000:10-19). The global actor concerns the largest conglomerate of interaction of states and nonstate actors through global organizations. These global actors are oriented towards global issues and are not territorially determined. There are many global organizations that have had an impact on democratization in the world. The most obvious ones have been the UN, IMF and the World Bank; the former focusing on democracy as good governance and human rights issues and the two others setting up financial developments plans and aid. The international actor, on the other hand, concerns the interaction of states beyond territorial borders and the establishment of regularized and institutionalized international entities. The international organizations may be more or less formalized, but they are institutionalizing international relations. There has been an upsurge in activity from international organizations. These organizations have most often been regionally rooted becoming the link between global organizations and the states. There are many examples of international organizations. The foremost important organizations have been the EU, NATO and OSCE promoting interests in Europe and globally.

Another type of actor is the state actor. The state actor has within politics and political science been perceived as the most important actor. This actor has organized the international order into a state order of sovereign entities. Some of these states are powerful, while others are less powerful. There has also been pro- as well as anti-democratic states in the world. The most powerful states have been found in the G8 and G24 (Smith 2001:51-52). The Sub-state actor is the transnational actor that operates cross borders within two or more states and is transnational in their perceptions, choices and strategies. Such actors may influence the performances of the state in its transnational relations. It may be groups, movements, companies, industries, local authorities and municipals active within different areas. This link may be called a global society-to-society relation (Potter 1997:29). There has been a growth of non-governmental organizations over the last decades. Some of these organizations have developed networks and become transnational policy-makers, while others have had a domestic focus. The organizations with transnational networks have come to strengthen the voices of the local communities to international attention by establishing institutionalized links between local and global affairs. The most discussed and important prodemocratic actors have been the Socialist International, the Christian Democratic International, the Catholic Church, Human Rights Watch, Am-
nasty International and anti-Communist movements such as Charta 77 and Solidarity.  

The different types of actors in the world have led to a multilevel order of political affairs. Politics are conducted on sub-state, state, international and global level. These levels of actors and activities are interrelated. Actors and activities on one level of the world system may have consequences on actors and activities on other levels. For example, decisions and activities by global organizations, such as the UN, may have consequences for other actors in their activities. However, the global organizations may very well also be influenced by decisions and activities by other actors (Smith & Baylis 2005:2-3).

4.1.2 Interests  
The political legitimacy of democracy promotion is far developed and has indicated a changing international perception on the state sovereignty norm vs. the democracy norm. There has been a gradual erosion of the state sovereignty norm in favor of other norms as well (McFaul 2005:153, Hurrell 2005:142-143). “Most generally, norms define a collective standard of the proper behavior of actors” (Schimmelfennig 2002:6). The democracy norm sets out the political game both domestically as internationally. The democracy norm sets out how politics are conducted domestically; the rules, procedures and behavior within politics. The democracy norm also sets out the expectations of international behavior in international politics by proposing a collective identity and a standard of behavior of how things are done.

The democracy norm is embedded in the democratic state and is promoted both domestically as well as internationally; both vertically and horizontally. The horizontal development refers to the introduction and consolidation of the norm at home, while the vertical development of the norm refers to the proliferation and reinforcement of democracy to others. The spread of democracy at home may spill over to other states as well when the domestic norm is externalized.

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50 We may perhaps also identify the individual actor, such as leaders or spokespersons and their perceptions, choices and actions. These individuals may be backed-up by other actors, although based on their skills, charismatic nature and activities they may influence other actors. Examples of such important individual actors are for instance political, economic and religious leaders. For instance, the former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali argued in the mid-1990s that democracy was good governance and a sustainable route for progress in the world (Ghali 1995).

51 There are different types of norms; formal and informal norms, legal and social norms, explicit and implicit norms and community and specific norms. This study does not include a distinction between these norms. It is only argued that community norms refer to the collective identity and sets out the nature of the international community, while specific norms regulate behavior in specific issue-areas. The compliance with specific norms is often the path towards adopting the community norm (Schimmelfennig 2002:6).
from one state to another. It is in the nature of any belief system that what is perceived as the best form of governance domestically also should be applied internationally. Therefore, strong commitment to democratic governance domestically also tends to spill over to a policy orientation of supporting democratization internationally (Whitehead 1986:10). For example, the Western community has been a community based on liberal norms. These norms have set out the expectations of domestic and international political behavior. The collective identity of the western community is based on liberal human rights in individual freedoms, political rights and civil liberties. These rights are part of the Western identity and make up the statehood. As a consequence, the domestic realm is based on principles of democratic political participation, the rule of law, representation, transparency and private property among other things. In the international realm, the actors value such principles and behave in a manner to develop and secure these principles (Schimmelfennig 2002:6-7).

It has been suggested (Uhlin 1995:38-40) that the vertical development of democracy may be understood in terms of Encouragement and Democratic ideas. The first object of the spread of democracy is the general encouragement to pursue political change. The object of encouragement stresses the possibility to see change of any political kind. There is therefore also the risk of discouragement, if there is a notion of failed political change elsewhere. The second object of the spread of democracy is the democratic ideas themselves. The democratic ideas refer to establishment and implementation of democracy. The democratic ideas may consist of ideas on how to cause the breakdown of the dictatorial state, ideas on how to provide for a democratic alternative in form and substance, and ideas on how to achieve democracy considering means to use and strategies to apply.

The interest in democracy promotion may be to promote the pretransition of phase of unity and/or liberalization. Promotion of unity requires creating political systems with a government that has the ultimate legitimate authority and power to enforce law and order. This includes deciding on the political entity under law and order and the establishment of the legitimate violence in a police and military (Fukuyama 2005:87-88, Ottaway 2003:314-322). Promotion of liberalization includes efforts to open dictatorial societies up to new political, economic and cultural ideas that may foster a growing pluralism. The democracy promotion may also be to promote transition with free and fair elections based on participation and contestation. Democracy promotion aims to strengthening the political institutions and provide for elections. It would also include a gradually political mobilization of the population into these institutions (Carothers 1999:94-95). Finally, democracy promotion may also be to put international pressure on electoral democratic states to unleash consolidation. This form of democracy promotion includes the stabilization of the established democratic institutions and the deepening of the democratic culture by linking the idea of democratic in-
stitutions and procedures to the political minds of the citizens. It is also possible to imagine the interest in promoting democracy towards consolidated democratic states (see Whitehead 1986a:44). Such democracy promotion would aim to further deepen an already deepened democracy. However, such support from international actors is rare, if at all existing, since promotion of democracy usually means to improve democratic standards in states that have inferior democratic standards. The promotion of democracy refers to attempts by actors to reinforce and legitimize their own democracy elsewhere. The promotion has been a strategy of constructing an international order that crafts the domestic interests and ideas internationally. This has included the promotion of market economy and security. Promotion of democracy and other reinforcing interests includes the process of creating like-minded states. It is a way of reproducing what is perceived as the good and the common, we against the other, or the friends against the enemies (Lundgren 1998:13-15). Actors that share the democracy norm may become a more or less homogenous group of actors and foster a democratic norm-community that sets them apart from the less like-minded actors (cf. Schimmelfennig 2002).

The interest in democracy promotion may be related to economic interests (market economy & welfare) and military interests (security) as well (Jönsson et al 1992, Lundgren 1998, Pravda 2001, Herring 1994, Allison 1971, Holsti 1988, MacRidis 1992, Kegley & Wittkopf 2004, Hagan & Hermann 2001). First, by providing democracy elsewhere, there might be an improved situation for economic integration and vice versa; the possibilities to engage a new market, to invest and to find new economic partners may be reasons for such action. Democracies are more open and enduring economic partners and provide more stable societies for economic trade and investments. However, an overall socio-economic progress in other states may also create economic stability and social progress that open possibility of cooperation, integration and democracy promotion. It is at times possible to see how economic and political ideas in a market economy and democracy go hand in hand and how the spread of one type of ideas

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52 It was already stated in 1795 that the developments of democratic (liberal republics) states and international commerce with mutual gains would make peace inevitable (Kant 1991/1795, cf. Sørensen 1993a:95-96). The main assumption among the scholars has been that democracies share the democracy norm and the democracy norm enlightens the actors on the standards of their behavior (Sørensen 1993, Kant (1991/1795). The scholars on democratic peace theory have also set out that violent conflicts and wars are extremely rare among democracies and when they occur it is as a result of extenuating circumstances. Many scholars have come to show, based on historical and statistical analysis, how the expansion of democratic governments has led to an expanded zone of peace in international relations. This relation between democratic governments and inter-state peace has been close to an empirical law in international relations (cf. Aklaev 1999:12-16, Goldmann 1998, Russett 1993, Adler et al 1995, Andström 1995). 6) Scholars such as Doyle (1986), Russet (1993) and Ray (1995) have added new ideas and empirical evidence to such notion.
may spillover to the other (Pravda 2001:20, Herring 1994:92-95). There are in some parts, similar logical patterns in a democracy and a market economic system. Both systems are based on the notion of freedom and pluralism aiming at political and economic alternatives. The economic developments of welfare, socioeconomic pluralism and individual choices have therefore been assumed to go along with democratization. It is a complex relation, although there seems to be a parallel trend of improvement or downfall in one having similar impact on the other (Pravda 2001:19-22, cf. Bunce 1999, Fish 1998). For example, as argued by Diamond when referring to state socialism,

“Promoting democracy also implies fostering market-oriented economies, for two good reasons. First, state socialism – meaning state ownership and control of the means of production – is intrinsically incompatible with democracy, which requires some distribution of power resources so that political competition can be real and the state can be held accountable. Second, as the past several decades have shown inescapably, state socialism does not produce sustained economic development, and statist economies lag behind. Thus, only market-oriented economies produce the conditions for legitimating democracy” (Diamond 1992:26).

The embodied interest in democracy promotion may also concern security. By linking security to state survival, democracy promotion aims at creating like-minded states elsewhere to improve the security situation in the region. Revolutionary situations, terrorism and other types of disorder often trouble dictatorial states. By establishing democracy, the level of violence may be lowered. The absence of violent methods among neighboring states may lead to domestic developments. Instead of dealing with external threats, political leaders may focus on domestic reforms such as the gradual introduction of democratic governance. A secured environment may also allow for the transfer of resources from the military sector into the political and economic sectors and may solve domestic problems and underdevelopment. For example, socioeconomic progress and welfare have concerned a complex set of issues such as health care, education, poverty, sickness, unemployment, social marginalization, technological improvements and retirement pensions just to mention a few examples. These socioeconomic issues may become greater problems for the stability of a society. Such problems may very well contribute to political instability and to growing political distrust
and which may become jeopardizing factors for the democracy (Diamond 1992:28).  

Security can also free resources to the gradual development of political trust, confidence and tolerance among the population, which is crucial in building democracy. The promotion of security and stability may therefore be a crucial concern or condition for democratization. The political development is to a high extent conditioned by the security situation in a state and/or region and vice versa (Pravda 2001:18-19, Diamond 1992:27 & Herring 1994:87, 110).

### 4.1.3 Methods

Democracy promoters use different methods that may be divided into two groups. The persuasive methods aim at convincing the targeted state to adopt democratic standards. Such methods are based on information, assistance as well as rewards. The coercive methods are based on punishment, through the threat of or use of punishment. The traditional idea of democracy promotion has included the persuasive assistance. However, the idea of democracy and human rights as universal norms opened up a debate on the coercive methods. The coercive methods are most often used when the persuasive methods have failed to democratize the targeted state (cf. Segal 1991:38-41, Pravda 2001:14, Pridham 1991a:9-10, Whitehead 1986a, Ottaway & Chung 1999:99-113, Boardi 1999:119-124, Lasota 1999:125-128).

There are at least three methods for democracy promotion. These are political, economic and military methods. First, political methods have traditionally been the central method of influence (see Russet et al 2000:105). The political method influencing a state to democratize may involve aspects of political institutionalization, the free and fair elections or the civil society-building process (cf. Pevehouse 2002:518-519, Diamond 1999, Uhlin 1995:37-43, Whitehead 2001:15-22). Political methods used in promoting democracy may include gathering of information on the targeted state on the democratic conditions, discussing the importance of democratic rights and liberties, giving advice on how such political change can be obtained, bargaining on the costs or consequences of such change and/or finding common stands and agreements. This may concern the support and advice to the regime in form of institutional assistance, agreed

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53 For instance, the reconstruction of Europe after World War II included rebuilding functional socio-economic structures to provide welfare and democracy. The notion was that a war-thorn society of high unemployment and increasing inflation could provide for aggressive nationalism and domestic violence that very well could lead to further destabilization of Europe. The U.S. foreign aid assistance in the Marshall Plan towards Western Europe aimed at providing welfare and to develop functional economy with the long-term goal of providing peace and stability in Europe (Buzan et al 1998).
standards of human rights and democratic issues and to provide international forums for discussions on democracy and human rights.

Important and often used political methods in the promotion of democracy are the assistance of international electoral observation missions in the targeted state introducing democracy, or the use of expert and fact-finding missions when there are domestic crisis on issues concerning democratization. Promotion of free and fair elections and electoral aid has focused on how to design an electoral system and ensure a good administration of the elections, voter education and election observations. The election has been perceived as a crucial step in the democratization process. Electoral observations have aimed at creating transparency to avoid electoral fraud, to hold together the elections and strengthen the administration as well as advancing the principles of free and fair elections. The electoral observations have stressed that free and fair election is crucial and mandatory to be accepted by the international community and may not be treated as a political option by the regime (Carothers 2004:85-87).

However, there is also a great need for assistance on how to develop a transparent administration, to uphold the protection of minority rights, building awareness of democratic rights and liberties and foster an independent civil society (Carothers 1999:125-128, 157-158, Carothers 2004:87-90, Smith 2001:46-48, Hyde-Price 1994:226-227, Carothers 1999:6). For instance, the civil society may function as a controller and fact-finder towards the regime and therefore critically evaluate its performances. There has also been a perception that the media may play a crucial role by informing and educating the civil society of what is going in the political life. Media, as other civil society actors, could articulate interests beyond the regime and transfer ideas between the regime and the citizens (Carothers 1999:235-236). Technological advancement has opened up systematic and rapid information flows where one way of life easily can be distributed to the rest of the world. TV, radio and film are often used channels for such political messages. In peacetime, these tools may be used as political propaganda for information and marketing of its own role and interest. In wartime, these tools may be used as psychological warfare in destabilizing the enemy regime and by mobilizing internal pro-democratic support.

The economic methods refer to economic resources as capabilities. Increasing complexity of economies and overall economic interdependence of the world has opened for possibilities of using economic methods to influence the democratization process. Economic resources are not evenly distributed in the world and the political importance of specific resources may vary over time. As a consequence, manipulating these resources is one important and often used way to influence others. Economic methods may be to challenge the targeted state with deprivation and impoverishment if not applying to democratic standards. It may also lead to the enforcement of economic sanctions in boycott (not importing goods)
and embargo (not selling goods). Economic sanctions and embargoes are often used from the dominant part toward the inferior one to trigger democratization. After the forced adaptation has been made, the policy-maker will most likely be satisfied and therefore cancel the economic sanctions. However, if the targeted regime refuses to obey, economic methods may be intensified to undermine the authoritarian regime (Pevehouse 2002:518-519). The most often used methods are tariffs, quotas, loans and credits, blacklist, licensing, freezing assets, granting or suspending aid, expropriation and withholding dues to international organizations. These economic methods may very well have a direct effect on democratization. However, the methods of using economic resources to influence the political development of a state are usually of a long-time character. It may include reforms in the technological and financial sector that are not necessarily connected to political aims. However, it may provide a growing socioeconomic standard that foster pluralism, growing socioeconomic and political awareness and an overall openness of the state towards the international context. These effects of the economic methods may very well facilitate for democratization (Pinder 1994).54

Finally, the military methods are often implemented when the other methods have failed (Pearson 1974:259-290). Military methods include the political and military objective to change or protect structural conditions in the targeted state, by for instance promoting democratization. Such democracy promotion may include establishing new democratic regimes or secure and consolidate the sitting government from antidemocratic forces (Di Palma 1990:188). Military intervention may also lead to the incorporation of the state. This may result in an interim regime, as an ad hoc solution before a more permanent status is decided on, or it may result in permanent incorporation of the former sovereign state. There are also other types of military methods that may facilitate democratization in for instance clandestine political action that support pro-democratic forces or terrorism aimed at challenging the regime, but also the demonstration of military force as a signal of power. In general, the use of military methods to promote democratization received growing acceptance in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War (especially raised with the Gulf War in Iraq in 1990-1991).

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54 The most institutionalized economic project in the Cold War era was the American Marshall plan that aimed to promote economic welfare in Western Europe. Such aid aimed to avoid the spread of Communism in Europe. The U.S. assumption was that war-thorn Europe was in great need of prosperity and welfare in order to establish stable democratic political systems. Leaving Europe in an economic crisis could lead to the expansion of dictatorial states in Europe, while an active economic aid program might instead provide for a democratic barrier toward the communist threat (Wallensteen 1971:51-52).
4.1.4 Channels

The methods of democracy promotion may be channelled into the targeted state top-down and/or bottom-up (Carothers 1999, Przeworski 1992:109). The discussion on democracy promotion through the top-down and/or bottom-up has referred to the direct and indirect promotion of democracy. The direct promotion is the top-down approach since most international methods are directed at the elites in power with the purpose of achieving direct effect in democratic outcomes. By targeting the political sphere, where the power is organized, there is an opportunity to be more efficient in the democracy promotion. However, at times, democracy promotion is better off with the indirect effect. This is most likely when the top-down approach has failed or when this channel is not available for the democracy promoter. This may be due to different interests between the international actors and domestic elites. Democracy promotion may therefore be channelled top-down as well as bottom-up.

The top-down channel for democracy promotion refers to democracy promotion towards the regime with institutions and the political elite. Most democracy promotion is concentrated on top-down and on the political elite in convincing and training the elite in democratic behavior and in establishing democratic institutions. The elite is also involved in a two-level-game (Putnam 1988), which makes it to domestic as well as international actors. The elite is negotiating and bargaining on the international arena with prodemocratic actors, based on domestic interest, but is also providing the domestic policies and influencing the domestic opinions. The elite therefore occupy the higher offices of a state and have the authority to decide and implement democratization. In short, the elite possesses’ key roles on the international arena as the spokes-persons for national interests and is therefore the link between national and international affairs; the elite is dual politicians or a linkage elite (Rosenau 1969:13).

There are primarily five institutional targets in the top-down channelling of democracy promotion towards the elite. The first target is the constitution in promoting agreed sets of rules that determines the standards of behavior within the political system. The second, third and fourth targets concern the judiciary, legislative and executive branch. The fifth and final target in a top-down approach concerns the civil-military relations and the regulation of the military as an important state institution (Carothers 1999: 158). It is primarily the judiciary and legislative branches that have been in focus. This is due to their counterbalance power to the executive power. Democracy promotion towards the judici-

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55 Dahrendorf (1999:11-24) has described the top-down and bottom-up approach to democratization as révolution and revolution; révolution symbolizing political change triggered by the regime itself, while revolution is triggered by the societal forces.
ary and legislative powers has aimed at separating powers to avoid a concentration of power to the executive branch. Assistance to the judiciary branch has been aimed at establishing the rule of law. This may include rationalizing and strengthening the judiciary management, increasing the budget, reforming judicial selection and judicial career laws, training judges and other personnel, increasing the availability and the transparency of legal materials and strengthening internal administration. It may also include rewriting laws. The assistance directed towards the legislative branch is also crucial. This concerns assistance aimed at making the legislative branch more efficient, effective and representative. The promotion includes training legislators, building the capacities of legislators on democratic substance and democratic methods, training legislative staff on budget analysis and policy analysis as well as legislative research, drafting bills and training media relations among other things (Carothers 1999:157-206, cf. Elklit 1997, Hirschman 1995).

On the other hand, the bottom-up channel involves democracy promotion directed towards the society and the population; what often is named as the civil society and the masses. Democratization from below consists of targeting organizations, associations and movements to become pro-democratic in nature. For instance, a dynamic pro-democratic civil society can promote democratization through popular organizations that train citizens into political consciousness. This requires an awareness of democracy within the civil society and a willingness to work against the dictatorial regime for such purposes. If the civil society is weak and undeveloped or not democratically oriented, democracy promotion through bottom-up is very limited to succeed. If there is space for societal activities beyond state control and regulation that are pro-democratic in nature, democracy promotion through bottom-up may very well lead to democratization. A complex and dynamic society, based on socioeconomic improvements and pro-democratic NGOs, may serve as a training-ground for democratic values, institutions and means and may foster citizens into articulation, aggregation and political participation.

The bottom-up approach of democracy promotion has many different targets. It may target advocacy NGOs to strengthen them to identify, articulate and channel preferences to the political system. These NGOs may help citizens to participate in politics by developing pro-democratic values. They may also hold state institutions accountable as they are evaluated and critically tested by the NGOs. The democracy promotion may also consist of technical assistance in training, advising and informing the NGOs on how to become politically powerful and efficient, but also financially support their activities and build permanent organizational structures for their activities. Another mission of democracy promotion through bottom-up is to make citizens aware of politics and the importance of their participation. This concerns civic education of democratic institutions and
values and how to work for democratic reforms. The role of the NGOs may also be crucial in the development of a judiciary and legislative branch. The promotion top-down towards these branches may be complemented by a bottom-up approach in building NGOs that assist and evaluate the policies provided by the institutions. Such promotion may be to aid NGOs that use law to pursue socioeconomic goals or that promotes judicial and legal reforms. It may also include training of journalists that are able to investigate and evaluate political performances. The bottom-up approach towards NGOs may also lead to support to NGOs that promote parliamentary transparency and accountability (Carothers 1999:168, 179, Carothers 1999:207-251, Diamond 1994:4-17).

4.1.5 Relations
The relation between the democracy promoter and the targeted state is an asymmetrical relation. The asymmetrical relation exists due to the methods and channels used by the democracy promoter. The methods indicate not only an interest from the democracy promoter to influence the targeted state, but also the ability to launch resources, time and capabilities to influence the targeted state. The democracy promoter pursues tools and ammunition to change the political structures and values of another state through the existing channels. This indicates an asymmetrical relation where the democracy promoter adopts the role of policymaker and tries to convert the targeted state into a policy-taker.

The relation between the democracy promoter and the targeted state is defined in terms of demand and support. The demand and support are indicators of the way democracy promotion intend to shape the democratic developments in the targeted state. Demand consists of the range of conditions or requirements set out by the democracy promoter. The demand of conditions or requirements is transmitted to the targeted state as expectations and guidance for the democratic progress. Demand may take the form of high demand or low demand (cf. Easton 1965:26-40, 63-64).

Support refers to the assistance promoted by the democracy promoter towards the targeted state. The support is aimed at helping the targeted state on its path towards democratization. The level of support may be high or low. High support refers to the commitment from the democracy promoter to assist in the democratization process. Low level of support refers, on the other hand, to disengagement from the democracy promoter towards the targeted state. This may be due to low level of commitment or the perception that democratization is not achievable. It may also be due to successful democratization (cf. Easton 1965:159-163).

The variation in level of demand and support creates different types of relations between the democracy promoter and the targeted state. The level of de-
mand may be high or low. The same goes for the support provided; the support from the democracy promoter may be high or low. There may also be a combination of high demand and low support as well as low demand and high support. The four types of relations between the democracy promoter and the targeted state may be illustrated as in Figure 16. Relation A consists of high demand and high support, while Relation B refers to high demand and low support. Relation C indicates a relation of low demand and high support, and finally, Relation D refers to low demand and low support. The relation between the democracy promoter and the targeted state symbolizes an interaction process. The relation may begin as one of the four-presented types, but change into another type during the democratization process (A, B, C & D). The relation may change as the democratization process progresses or regresses over time. Therefore, the relation between the democracy promoter and the targeted state may contain several of the relations provided.

Support from democracy promoter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand from democracy promoter</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 16: Relations of Demand and Support**

(A) The democracy promoter may set out a high level of support. The high level of support indicates a willingness from the democracy promoter to see democratic changes. The democracy promoter is concerned and involved in the political developments of the targeted state. Support is therefore targeting the state to assist the state to begin or continue the democratization process. However, a high level of demand also backs the high level of support. This implies that the democracy promoter has attached conditions or requirements to the support. These conditions or requirements have to be dealt with and achieved in order to continue to receive the high level of support.

(B) The democracy promoter may also provide a low level of support. Low level of support refers to limited encouragement and assistance. However, the
low level of support may be related to high level of demand. The democracy may set out the demand, although not attaching any support to such demand. This relation may be based on distrust from the democracy promoter towards the targeted state.

(C) A third type of relation may be based on a high level of support, but attached to a low level of demand. This relation is in sharp contrast to relation (B). This type of relation consists of support, although with few conditions or requirements set out by the promoter. This implies that the targeted state receives a high level of support, while having few requirements to comply with in order to continue to receive support. The reasons for sending support with low level of demand by the democracy promoter may be based on trust from the promoter where the promoter is convinced that the targeted state will use the assistance wisely to become democratized. Trust may also be based on successful democratization that makes demands unnecessary.

(D) Finally, the fourth type of relation consists of a low level of support and demand. This type of relation is in sharp contrast to relation (A). The democracy promoter pays little attention to the targeted state. This may be due to a low interest in the targeted state or in a perception that democratization is less likely to succeed. It may also be due to the far-gone democratic progress that makes the targeted state less interesting for democracy promotion. The demand is also set out at a low level. This may also be due to low interest from the democracy promoter or due to the perception that the demand will not be complied with. However, the low level of demand may also accompany a far-gone democratization process in the targeted state.

There are a few proposals on the interaction process between the democracy promoter and the targeted state in the literature on democratization. One hypothesis has set out that high support and high demand may be prominent in the first phase of liberalization leading to the collapse of the dictatorial regime, but become lower when the transition is on going and democracy has been adopted. The demand and support may then increase again when the question of consolidation occurs where norms, values and policies are to be determined for the state (Pridham 1994:15). Another hypothesis presented sets out that the demand and support gradually increases and becomes firmer and more formal as the democratization process progresses. This sets out that the high level of democratization opens for higher level of demands and support (Schmitz & Sell 1999:39). There might also be a third hypothesis providing that the interaction of demand and support becomes lower as the democratization progresses. This would be due to limited democratic flaws that require international attention.
4.1.6 Impact

Most literature that has dealt with the international factors to democratization has referred to the outcome, the result or the effect of the international factors. The outcome/result/effect terminology has been treated as the dependent factor in democratization; the discussion has concerned the consequences of democracy promotion in terms of more or less democratization (Sikkink 2001:94-96, Carothers 2001:141-143, Angel 2001:195-198).

The use of impact has most often also referred to the democratization process. Impact has come to symbolize the domestic impact of external pressure often discussed as the adoption or rejection of democratic institutions and values. High impact has referred to far-gone democratization in accordance with the external pressure, while low impact has referred to failed internalization of democracy (cf. Schimmelfennig 2002:9-10, cf. Uhlin 1995). The use of impact has also included an assessment of the impact of projects and programs on a micro, meso and/or macro level. The assessment on a micro-level has concerned the impact of programs/projects at the local level. The assessment on the meso-level has concerned the impact on sectors such as the civil society or the judicial system as a partial regime level and finally, the assessment on a macro-level has focused on the overall political regime and its progress or regress (Crawford 2002:922).

This study does not refer to impact as the democratization process; rather, impact is, as set out before in this chapter, an aspect of democracy promotion. It is understood in terms of 1) the nature of the reaction and 2) the scope of the reaction among domestic actors.

(1) The nature of the reaction may be positive or negative; the reaction to democracy promotion may be prodemocratic (positive) or antidemocratic (negative) (Zielonka 2001:523-527).

(2) The scope of the reaction refers to the spread of prodemocratic or antidemocratic reaction (as high or low) (cf. Easton 1965:165-167). High scope of the reaction refers to massmobilization within the population, while low scope of the reaction implies a reaction from the elite or from a smaller proportion of the population.

It is also important to remember that the type of impact may change over time. Democracy promotion may have different impact on domestic actors over time. The meaning of impact is set out in Figure 17 illustrating four alternative types.
### FIGURE 17: IMPACT AS NATURE AND SCOPE OF REACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Scope of Reaction</th>
<th>Positive (prodemocratic)</th>
<th>Negative (antidemocratic)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A) The reaction towards the democracy promotion may be positive and of high scope. There is a prodemocratic impact and the positive reaction is widely spread in the society including a high number of people that wants to see democratic change. This may refer to a positive reaction among the elite as well as within the population or among a major proportion of the citizens and may be expected to trigger democratization.

B) The reaction may also be the opposite of reaction A. The reaction may be characterized as negative and with a high scope. This type of impact refers to a large number of people holding a negative reaction to the democracy promotion. The reaction may be expected to obstruct democratization since there are a great number of people that are negative to the democracy promotion.

C) The reaction may also be positive and low in the scope. This type of reaction refers to a positive reaction to democracy promotion, but with a limited scope of people holding such reaction. The positive reaction may be found within the elite or within a smaller proportion of the population.

D) Finally, the reaction may also be negative to democracy promotion, but with a limited scope of reaction. This implies that the reaction is antidemocratic, but the number of people holding such reaction is limited to the elite or to a smaller part of the elite and/or the population.

The most favorable reaction to democratization is expected to be the positive reaction and have high scope. This implies that the elite and/or the population hold a positive feeling towards the democracy promoter. The democracy promo-
tion is positively evaluated among a large group of people in the targeted state. The positive reaction of high scope may contribute to major political changes in terms of critical events or turning points in the political process. For example, the positive reaction to democracy promotion and of large scope may over time develop into demonstrations, strikes, violent upheavals and increased political mobilization. Such reaction refers to the crafting or engineering of the impact on future democratization. However, less favorable is the negative reaction that has high scope. This implies that a large proportion of people within the targeted state hold negative feelings towards the promoter and the democracy promotion. This negative reaction may come from the population or from the elite and the population together.

4.2 Summary

Chapter 4 has contributed with an analytical framework including the democracy promotion. The conceptualization of democracy promotion consisted of aspects in actors, interests, methods, channels, relations and impact. This is illustrated in Figure 18.
Figure 18: Domestic and International Factors to Democratization

Democratization: pretransition, transition & consolidation

Domestic factors
Socioeconomic
  Modernization
  Classes
Cultural
  Orientations
  Civil society
  NGOs
Political
  Institutions
  State
  Elites/Masses

International factors
  Democracy promotion

  Actors
  Global
  International
  State
  Sub-state

  Interests
  Democracy
  Market Economy
  Security

  Methods
  Political
  Economic
  Military

  Channel
  Top-down
  Bottom-up

  Relation
  High demand / support
  Low demand / support
  High demand / Low support
  Low demand / High support

  Impact
  High / Low
  Positive / Negative

Figure 18: Domestic and International Factors to Democratization
Part 2: Empirical Mission
This chapter aims to illustrate the complex processes of democratization in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY. It identifies a variation in democratization level between the three states. It is argued that Slovakia has become a consolidated democracy, FRY a transitional democracy and Belarus an authoritarian dictatorship. The variation in democratization is important to set out before illustrating the international factor in democracy promotion in the three postcommunist states. This is done in Chapter 6. This chapter consists of five steps. The first step discusses the troublesome democratization processes from communism in Europe. Step two to four, illustrate the progress and obstacles in the democratization process in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY and sets out the variation in democratization level. Step five summarizes the main findings in this chapter stressing the differences between the three states in the dependent factor.

5.1 Democratization and Postcommunism

This study does not deal with the former Soviet Union. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union was important for the democratization processes in the Communist states. Communism was established with the October revolution in 1917, leading to the construction of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union expanded its influence after World War II into Europe. Overall, such influence led to Communist states under the control of Moscow (although differences existed in loyalty among those states). The construction of the Communist model, which atomized Central-, Eastern- and Southeastern European societies, was mainly a result of the policies by Stalin. The international pressure from the Soviet Union had great impact on the political and economic policies. These states were embedded in a zone of Soviet interest, which led to domestic policies that always had to take into account the preferences and reactions of the Soviet Union. The implementation of extreme centralization of power, with an overall political
movement that included the economic and social sectors, led to societies in which the top-down party control grew into authoritarianism and totalitarianism. The strong ties between the Communist party and the state administration and the repressive use of force facilitated this through the military and secret police if necessary (Linz & Stepan 1996:235-239, Rupnik 2000:115-129, Jerre 2005:40, cf. Berglund & Aarebrot 1997).

The collapse of the Soviet Union was therefore of historical change. There have been many scholars pointing out explanatory factors to the collapse (cf. Hogan 1992, Lundestad 1992, Brown 1991, Holmes 1997). Some of the most important factors may have been the Gorbachev factor, economic failure, the role of opposition forces, competition with the West, isolation from the capitalist system, the Marxist corrective, imperial overstretch, rising expectations, modernization and modernity, public apathy, state decay and inflexible central planning (Holmes 1997:23-62, Grugel 2002:193, Crockatt 2005:112-128). Despite the many identified factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transformation of the Communist states came as a major surprise. For instance, Huntington (1984) argued, based on the traditional knowledge of democratization, that democratization in Central and Eastern Europe was virtually nil due to the Soviet presence as anti-democratic. The dramatic and surprising collapse of the Soviet Union diminished the role of an eastern dictatorial pressure in European politics as the Soviet Union was seceded by a weakened Russia. Russia was strategically loosing important regions towards the Baltic Sea as well as in Central Asia. The coup in 1991 was a major symbol of a new era for Russia and for Central and Eastern Europe. Yeltsin, and later on Putin, opened Russia to new relations and showed willingness to play an active part in the process of building the new Europe. This was obvious in Russia’s peacemaking role on the Balkans and in its allowance to see former Soviet territory become democratized (Neumann 2001:63-64, Karlsson 1997:19-20, Kugler 1996:61-65, cf. Colton & Legvold 1992, Aron 1994).

In 1989, about 23 states were defined as Communist states. Five years later, only five Communist states existed and no one in Europe (China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam); the others had turned into postcommunist states (Holmes 1997:3-4). Although some scholars have argued against the use of postcommunism as a terminology, based on the differences between these states, the terminology may be used to identify the many former Communist states that turned onto a new political path. Postcommunism may refer to the status of states that turned away from Communist practice and into something new and unexplored (Ágh 1999:264, 1998:5-6, Nodia 1996:17).56

56 For example Ágh argues “The overused label ‘post-communist states’ blurs the many differences among the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe” (1999:264).
The transformation of European states into postcommunism happened in many different paths. The transformation from a Communist and planned economic system towards a fragile democracy and market economy met major obstacles in terms of growing unemployment, high rates of criminality and corruption. Overall, the postcommunist states met transition problems. These problems concerned how to reconstruct political life in accordance with democratic principles and how to deal with postcommunist structures and actors. There were also contextual problems surrounding the political life in economic depression and social inequalities as well as religious and ethnical challenges, which led to secessions in some states. Finally, the postcommunist systems also faced more general systematic problems such as the inability to make decisions, economic pressure on policy-decision and administrative over-kill. It is therefore fair to say that the postcommunist states faced a more troublesome democratization process than what was seen in the 1970s among the right-winged authoritarian systems in Southern Europe. This was due to the atomization of power and societal activities within many former Communist states, which led to limited market economies and civil societies (Rupnik 1999:57-62, Batt 2003:5-6, Pei 1994:11-19, Huntington 1991:208-210).

Some scholars have pinned down what they find to be the most challenging obstacles for postcommunist states to overcome. These obstacles cover most areas of a society and are usually considered as unfavorable conditions for democratization. They have argued that the obstacles to democratization have been decades of authoritarian legacy, party and political fragmentation with extreme multipartyism, xenophobia and nationalism with right-wing radicalism, absence of legal and bureaucratic traditions leading to legal arbitrariness, weak civil society organizations, political illegitimacy, economic crisis, uneven economic and social developments within and between states, stagnation of the physical environment, wars, ethnic heterogeneity and tension over minority rights (Berglund et al 2001:1-29, cf. Diamond 1999, Huntington 1997a, Zhelyu 1996, Nodia 1996, Rupnik 1999, Rose 1999). There are perhaps two obstacles that have been most prominent in postcommunist states of the 1990s; these are the authoritarian legacy from the Soviet era and the ethnic and national tension. The authoritarian legacy has triggered for centralization of power. There has been a potential danger in the new and fragile democracies that the elected party and/or leader have become fulfilled by the notion of power, resulting in centralization of power and oppression of oppositional ideas. This has created the risk of leading to obstructed political rights and civil liberties and unfree and unfair elections. The other obstacle has been the escalation of political tension that could lead to violence between national and/or ethnical groups. The political and economic transformations may open for conflicts that could lead to civil war or secession. This
was the case in the former Soviet Union and on the Balkans (Larsson 1997:60, Huntington 1997:8-13, Jerre 2005:44).

Hadenius (2001:210-226) is one of a few scholars that have tried to summarize the outcome of the third wave of democratization in postcommunist Europe. He concludes that there has been an overall progress in most Central European states. Although there has been dissatisfaction over how the newly established democratic regimes have performed, there seems to be a strong mass-support for democracy. It is primarily the economic performances that have been troublesome with continued high unemployment rates and corruption. There have also been weakly developed civil societies and the political parties have been weakly rooted in the society. However, the institutionalization of democracy has come quite far with powerful parliaments and with the rule of law where the judicial institutions seem to become more independent. In comparison, most of the Eastern European states have had free and fair elections as well. This has been a positive signal. There have been few antidemocratic attempts to mobilize support for a return to authoritarianism (the exception is Belarus as will be discussed below).

The struggle for further democratization includes to stabilize the democratic institutions, provide for democratic attitudes among citizens and to improve the economic and socioeconomic conditions of these states. Without these improvements, there may be new antidemocratic alternatives in the future that could mobilize support based on the inequality or ethnic divisions (Beetham 1999:69).

The overall variation in democratization level in postcommunist Europe is illustrated in Table 4.
Central & Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
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Former Soviet states

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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Former Yugoslavia

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (Serbia &amp; Montenegro)</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4: COMBINED AVERAGES FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS AND FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES 1991-2001**

It was in 2001 (ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union) possible to see how the postcommunist states had tackled the obstacles differently and developed different level of democratization. The former Soviet Republics were less democratized than the former satellite states of Central Europe at the same time as the Balkans varied, due to the civil wars. The *Freedom House Survey* of 2001, in *Nations in Transit 2001*, showed how the gap had widened between the Central and Eastern European states and the former Soviet Republics (except the

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58 This was a major concern and debated thoroughly in *Journal of Democracy*, October 2001, Vol. 12, No. 4. with the title “Tens years After the Soviet Breakup”.
By 2001, the average democratization scores for the Central and Eastern European states were 2.82 (partly free) and in the former Soviet republics 5.29 (not free) (Karatnycky 2001:15-17, Hadenius 2001a:210-226, 2001b, cf. Rupnik 1999). Since 2001, the gap has also continued to exist between the Central European states and the Eastern European states. As a consequence, some states have had democratic progress, while others have not succeeded at all. A third group of states have come a few steps further, although are still lacking essential democratic elements. As summarized by Karatnycky,

“Among the postcommunist countries there is now a deepening chasm. In Central Europe and parts of Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, democracy and freedom prevail; in the rest of the former Soviet Union, however, progress toward open societies and democracy has stalled or failed” (Karatnycky 2002:102).

By looking at the democratization level in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY, the variation democratization among postcommunist states becomes quite clear. Slovakia, as a Central European state, has progressed over the 1990s, while Belarus, in Eastern Europe, saw a return to authoritarianism. FRY, as a Southeastern European state, has become a transitional state after years of war and ethnic conflict. This is now further discussed and illustrated.

### 5.2 Slovakia’s Adoption of Democracy

Slovakia has faced a successful democratization process. As illustrated in Table 5, the political change into a fully consolidated democracy happened in the late 1990s, although the transitional phase began in the early 1990s. Since 1998 and forward, Slovakia has grown to become a consolidated democracy after years of reforms expanding the political rights and the civil liberties.

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59 One deviant case is the three Baltic States that are post-Soviet states, but have successfully democratized. Another deviant case is Slovenia on the Balkans.
TABLE 5: THE DEMOCRATIZATION RATE IN SLOVAKIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Slovakia Political Rights Civil Liberties Trend Status

Seccession from the former Czechoslovakia

The political changes of Slovakia began in late 1989 with massive demonstration on the streets of Prague, commemorating the 21st anniversary of the invasion of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The demonstration was followed by other movements in the context of political and economic liberalization within the Soviet Union as well as within Slovakia. The demonstration escalated in intensity over the winter and Vaclav Havel was imprisoned after his participation in commemorating the self-immolation of the student protestor Jan Palach of 1969. The demonstration sought further liberalization in Slovakia, but was suppressed by the security forces and the police, which indicated that Czechoslovakia was an authoritarian state.

In November of 1989, about ¾ of the population was involved in serious strikes and demonstrations. The Communist Party opened Round Table negotiations between the Party and the Civic Forum where Vaclav Havel was one of the leaders. The negotiations resulted in a new speaker of the Parliament (Dubcek) and a new President (Havel) and the Parliament immediately revoked the article assuring the dominant role of the Communist Party (Williams 2003:43).

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60 See the Press Release from the Freedom House of May 24, 2004 with the title Former Soviet Countries Lagging Behind in Democracy at www.freedomhouse.org/media/pressrel/052404b.htm (2005-03-08)


62 www.freedomhouse.org
The major changes in the political power of Czechoslovakia opened for political mobilization and new parties. The first free Slovakian elections, in July 1990, led to strong support for the Public Against Violence. This movement received about 30% of the votes and the new Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, decided to form the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS) in 1991 after internal political disputes over the future orientations of Slovakia. The new spirit of democratization raised the issue of secession. This was primarily a result of growing nationalism in Slovakia and the perception of a Slovakian identity. The growing nationalism originated in the crises of legitimacy with different visions of the political and economic path. Nationalism seemed to provide psychological security in a context of political and economic vacuum as Czechoslovakia faced disintegration (Leff 1996:36-38, Kirschbaum 1999:582-583, cf. Harris 2002). However, while the population in Czechoslovakia wanted to see continued strong relations between the two nations, each nationality did align with the national party. There was criticism on both sides towards the central state that did not create a firm belief in coexistence (Harris 2002:74-75). As argued by Harris,

“Without a sense of shared political destiny among all citizens there is no unity or solidarity. Under such conditions the common state is deprived of its full legitimacy and the democratisation project becomes unsustainable long term” (Harris 2002:75).

Major obstacles to coexistence were the different visions on the future outlook of a federation as well as the different level of economic standards, which made Slovaks perceiv ‘the other’ as superior. Vladimir Meciar was a charismatic leader with a nationalistic approach and who wanted to see an independent Slovakia with a new political and economic character. In the eyes of the public, Meciar was admired for his tough stand and for his ambition to strengthen Slovakia in relation to the federal level. In 1991, negotiations dealt with the federal issue, the power relations between the National Council and the federation. In June 1992, after failed attempts to find a new functioning federation, general elections were held. The election turnout triggered the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. The election resulted in two winners with parliamentary majorities in both republics with different visions on the future political and economic paths. Vaclav Klaus, within the Czech Republic, led the Civic Democratic Party. Klaus strongly supported a federation with more power to the federal level. He also stressed free market economy and the Czech-Slovak government initiated a shock therapy economic policy that hit the Slovakian government. In Slovakia, Meciar perceived a future vision of a loose confederation with greater political
and constitutional powers as well as independent economic and social policies (Harris 2002:90, Kirschbaum 1999:588).

Slovakia received its independence in January 1993 with the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. The disintegration was due to the willingness among the Slovak elite to gain more political power, but also to independently solve the economic recession and ill-developed infrastructure of the region. During the 1980s, Prague politicians had imposed a radical neo-liberal economic transition despite the fact that the reform created severe problems in Slovakia with its economic infrastructure of defense production. The two charismatic leaders, in Klaus and Meciar, had different economic agendas and different visions for foreign relations. As a result, Meciar could, without any violent methods, mobilize supporters for the independence of Slovakia and against the notion of the centralization of power to Prague (Williams 2003:44-45, Dryzek et al 2002b:173-174, Rupnik 2003:16-17).

A fragile electoral democracy

Meciar and the MDS dominated Slovakian politics and received support from the rural areas, trade unions and workers that were concerned about the Prague-inspired market-oriented economy. Meciar stressed state-subsidies for industry, social benefits for workers and slowing privatization as a mix of planned and market economy. However, his nationalistic approach and centralized view of economics indicated a fragile electoral democracy in Slovakia. The most troublesome factor in Slovakian political life was corruption, which grew with the close ties between the political elite and the economic elite. The overall blurred border between politics and economics created a society of clientelism, corruption and oppression of political and economic outsiders. The political climate also consisted of manipulation of the authority where Meciar and his supporters could place members in the legislative, executive and administrative positions. These efforts restricted the horizontal accountability within the system and opened for political centralization by questioning the presidency, the parliamentary opposition and the constitutional court. As a consequence, Meciar was accused of corruption and manipulation of the privatization process, which resulted in a parliamentary non-confidence voting, after which Meciar had to resign (Samson 2001:368, Williams 2003:50-51, Leff 1996:37-38).

However, the 1994 parliamentary election turned out to support Meciar. Meciar and his party won and formed a ruling coalition in alliance with the left-winged party Workers Association (ZRS) and the ultra-rights Slovak National Party (SNS). His support of 35% of the vote indicated that Meciar would continue to be the most important political factor in Slovakian politics. His popularity was due to his charismatic leadership and his propaganda that the newly
achieved independence and transition required firm leadership. It was the policies of anti-reform, anti-minority rhetoric and overall populism and nationalism that gained voters support from peasants, unemployed and pensioners in mainly the rural areas. For instance, the Hungarian minority was denied their legal rights to use their native language and to consolidate their own culture as the government enforced new laws. Bilingual schools were also repressed and the ministry of education decided to restrict all education on bilingual practice. Also, the government decided over some years to cut back on the financial support for cultural activities for the minority groups. Overall, the regime showed clear patterns of authoritarianism in centralization of power, anti-minority policies and a weak party system (Krause 2003:65-70, Freedom in the World 1996-1997:Slovakia Country Report, Haughton 2003:67, cf. Leff 1996).

The internal policies of centralization and restrictions of democracy developed hand in hand with at times a xenophobic view of Europe where internal domestic problems often were blamed on Europe. The regime was divided in its interest for membership in European organizations such as the EU and NATO (Samson 2001:363, 370-374). At the same time as Slovakia affirmed its historical ties to the West and a western identity, did Meciar also negotiate with Russia on economic issues. Meciar signed economic agreements with Russia as a consequence of the historical economic ties where the industries of Slovakia had consisted of arms industry (Kirschbaum 1999:590). The economic policies led to challenges in a declining economy with capital flows from Slovakia into the Czech Republic, but also in decreased trade between the two states. Foreign investments seemed to be more interested in the prosperous Czech Republic than in Slovakia. While the international community interpreted the declining Slovakian economy as ill performances from the regime, the regime blamed the historical heritage of unfavorable production structures in Slovakia (Gianzero 1993:29).

In 1996-1997, two issues had troubled Slovakian politics: the May 1997 referendum on NATO membership and the issue of direct presidential elections supported by the opposition. The opposition wanted to secure balance within the political system as the president had the ability to veto any law that was considered unconstitutional. The government decided to suspend the referendum on direct presidential elections and asked for a ruling from the constitutional court regarding the proposed change of the constitution through referendum. The government also decided to raise another issue for the referendum; that of NATO membership. Meciar presented several questions that he wanted to see being debated and voted on through the referendum. It concerned the membership of NATO, but also if the Slovakian population could accept nuclear weapons on Slovakian territory as well as send Slovakian soldiers abroad. Due to constitutional fuzziness regarding how to amend the constitution, the speaker of the par-
Parliament refused to schedule any debates and the government questioned the design of two-issue referendum and instructed the Interior Minister to remove the issue of presidential elections from the ballot. In the end, the referendum was declared invalid as only 10% of the population voted. This was a result of voter confusion on what the referendum really concerned. The Presidential position continued to be decided by a three-fifths majority in the Parliament. In 1998, Kovac’s term as president had reached an end, but neither the government nor the opposition could gather 3/5 majorities to support a candidate, which led to that the presidential position was void from March 1998 to May 1999. As a result, Meciar assumed presidential responsibilities and Slovakia’s membership of NATO was postponed, although membership had never been on the NATO agenda (Harris 2002:103-104, Gudmundsson 2000:114-117, Kirschbaum 1999:597-598).

Parliamentary election: a window of opportunity

The scheduled election of 1998 was perceived as a window of opportunity among a growing proportion of the Slovakian population. In January 1998, only 41% of the respondents believed that the scheduled election would become free and fair. This led to mass mobilization within the civil society and several NGOs established the Civic Campaign 98, aiming to ensure free and fair election. The campaign included educational projects, cultural activities, information brochures and TV film, activities that triggered political mobilization and growing awareness within the Slovakian society. Another major project was the establishment of the Democratic Round Table, framed by opposition parties, trade unions and interests groups that wanted to see free and fair elections. One important participant in these discussions was the Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ); Slovakia’s strongest labor organization, which had significant political impact on its members, but also on the political regime. The overall mobilization of political forces in Slovakian society raised the citizens’ interests in the election. The election turnout of 84% was 9% higher than in 1994 and indicated the growing political awareness of the Slovaks. It was the younger generation that showed a growing political interest. The NGOs promoted the idea of democratization and the protection of human rights, but also the vision of a better future for Slovakia integrated with the rest of modern Europe. The election of 1998 became an election between authoritarian tendencies and nationalism and democracy and openness (Bútorova & Bútorova 1999:80-95, Bútorova et al 2003:51, 58).

The 1998 years election ended the era of Meciar; the governing coalition under his leadership lost against the center-right Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and its allies in the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Hungarian
Coalition Party (SMK) and the Party of Understanding (SOP). Although, the government received 27% of the votes, the opposition, captured over 58%. The four major parties had decided to enter into a coalition and pronounce one spokesperson in Mikulás Dzurinda. However, due to last minute changes in the electoral code, demanding all parties within the coalition gain 5% to qualify for parliamentary seats, SDK and the Hungarian Coalition decided to unite as one party. The opposition parties were more politically oriented and well-known and could position themselves in relation to the regime (Bútorova & Bútorova 1999:84, Nations in transit 1999-2000:561, Bútorova et al 2003:52). The election turnout indicated a new start for the democratization process in Slovakia. As argued by Bútorova and Bútorova,

“The election of 1998 seemed to become a window of opportunity for the dissatisfied Slovakian population; the turnout of 84 percent was 9 percent higher than in the previous election in 1994 and the 1998 election attracted the younger voters and about 84 percent of the first-time voters participated in the election and mostly voting for a new government” (Bútorova & Bútorova 1999:81-82).

**Consolidating the democracy**

The change of government became a change of political path; the new government rapidly improved the political situation of Slovakia. From 1998 and forward the fragile electoral democracy of Slovakia was turning into a consolidated democracy (see Table 5). The election opened for a new government with new ideas and policies within Slovakia. The new policies signalled an ideological message of pro-market, pro-democracy and pro-west. The democratic effects of the new government were many; investigations on corruption, protection of human and minority rights with legislation protecting the Roman community and political reforms for increased transparency of political life including wider freedom for the media, were a few significant steps taken (Interview Bievert September 12, 2003). Other important changes were the government’s enactment of a suppressed law on direct presidential elections and the implementation of presidential elections. For instance, the presidential elections of 1999 resulted in the victory of the candidate supported by the new government. The election turnout was high and marginalized Meciar and the MDS in Slovakian politics (Nations in transit 1999-2000:563). Further, in 2000, amendments aimed at strengthening judicial independence, reforming public administration and protecting human rights by the establishment of an ombudsman, also included the
decentralization and the establishment of regional self-governmental bodies. In 2000, the Act on Political Parties, outlawed anonymous economic donations to parties and improved the transparency of these finances by making the parties financial reports available for the public. The parliament also adopted two new laws on preventing corruption and created the Civil Service Bureau, which was to develop a code of ethics for state employees (Nations in transit 1999-2000:569-573, Freedom in the World 1998-1999:Slovakia Country Report).

One of the most important changes, however, was the political power received by the Hungarian minority; The Hungarian Democratic Party participated within the coalition government and was therefore representing the Hungarian minority (Bútorova & Bútorova 1999:91, Interview Bievert September 12, 2003). The issue of minority rights and the role of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, as well as the marginalized Roma citizens, had been a sensitive issue for the MDS and Meciar. The regime’s policies had been quite hostile. The government had fought their legal rights back by enforcing laws forbidding minorities to use their own language in official state contacts. The change of government in 1998, which resulted in the inclusion of the Hungarian party in the government, was therefore a major change for minority groups and resulted in growing attention to minority problems, including the marginalization of the Romans. For instance, in 2001, the Parliament adopted a law that created a new position for a public defender of human rights with focus on the minority groups. The different reforms of the new government led to improved democracy through higher degrees of political rights and civil liberties.

There has been a democratic progress from 1998 and forward, going from a transitional state of Partly Free towards a consolidated democracy with a positive trend of improved political rights and civil liberties. The time-era from 1998 and forward has indicated on a mature political development in Slovakia leading to a consolidated democracy. The re-election of the government in 2002 clearly set out the democratic changes in Slovakian politics. The coalition of centre-right parties received 78 out of 150 seats. The leadership of Dzurinda was also a symbol of Slovakia’s moderate politics and received thumbs-up by the international community. This was primarily symbolized by the invitations from NATO to begin accession negotiations as well as from the EU to join the Union. These statements from the West were in sharp contrast to their policies in 1997 when both NATO and the EU turned down Slovakia’s interest to join the two organizations. The improved relations between the West and the government of Slovakia

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also influenced HZDS and Meciar. The party began a process of redirection of its political visions, stressing, among other things, the party as centre-right with interest in working closer to the other pro-European centre-right parties. HZDS also declared its support of the EU and NATO and began to distance itself towards the former ally in the Slovak National Party (SNS) (Haughton 2003:65-70, Lewis 2001:5-9).

5.3 Belarus’ Rejection of Democracy

In comparison with the developments in Slovakia, there have been major obstacles in the democratization process in Belarus. The democratization process in Belarus halted after the democratic elections of 1994. This is illustrated in Table 6 where it is possible to see how Belarus transformed from a Partly Free state into a Not Free state of the mid 1990s. The reverse transition continued under the leadership of Lukashenka, turning Belarus into an authoritarian state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belarus</th>
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<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Partly Free</td>
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<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
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</table>

**TABLE 6: THE DEMOCRATIZATION RATE IN BELARUS**

*Secession from the former Soviet Union*

Belarus was one of the last states that invoked democratization. When a resurgence of nationalism in most Soviet republics challenged the Soviet empire, Belarus seemed to lack such glue for mobilization. There was also hesitation within the political elite on how to deal with growing uncertainties of the Soviet Union and the future path of Belarus (Allnutt & Znatkevich 2002:98). The growing po-

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64 [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)
itical awareness in Belarus against the Soviet empire was a result of many different events of the time; the nuclear disaster of Chernobyl in 1986, where 70% of the radioactive waste fell over Belarusian territory, the discovery of mass graves outside Minsk where about 300,000 victims of Stalin had been buried and finally the new leadership in Moscow, in Gorbachev, who promoted political change. However, despite these events, Belarus hesitated to declare its independence, waiting until the collapse of the Soviet Union to declare itself as a sovereign state. It was the close ties to Soviet and the worries over political and economic chaos that delayed the secession. However, as the rest of Central and Eastern Europe had declared their independence, Belarus was forced to join the same path (Potocki 2002:146, Dawisha & Parrott 1997, Marples 1999, Sannikov & Golubev 1997). At stated by Garnett and Legvold,

“While the neighboring Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Moldova rushed toward independence when the chance came, Belarus only drifted into it” (Garnett & Legvold 1999:2).

The Supreme Soviet of Belarus adopted the declaration of State Sovereignty on July 27, 1990. The first parliamentary elections to the Supreme Soviet in March-April 1990 started the transition. The political process began with a collective petition from the intelligentsia to President Gorbachev followed by demonstrations in Minsk. The Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) was established in 1989 promoting itself as a mass socio-political movement with the goal to promote the Belarusian nation and identity. BNF also stressed the importance of democratization in Belarus, triggered by the major political changes in Central European states and by the policies of Gorbachev. Such promotion included the creation of a democratic club of deputies that opposed the conservative and pro-Soviet majority in the Supreme Council (Rozanov 1999:20, Törnquist-Plewa 2001:72, Freedom in the World 1992-1993:Belarus Country Report). BNF argued for neutrality of Belarus as a way of not provoking Russia and open for relations to Central and Western Europe. However, BNF met major problems in the overall chaotic situation of becoming a new independent state. BNF’s strategy of launching a new political and economic path for Belarus was met by skepticism among the population in a time when everything seemed to be challenged and changed. The democratic forces within Belarus were also limited. Opposition by the nomenclature and indirectly by a passive population, opened for manipulation of the parliamentary election of 1990. The election turnout was negative for the prodemocratic forces, only receiving 36 of 345 seats. The post-Soviet Belarusian elite continued to rule Belarus in a Communist fashion by obstructing market reforms in

The *Act of Independence* was passed on August 25th, 1991, although the declaration of full independence was postponed to December 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated. The declaration of independence was more of a forced decision due to international changes, rather than to domestic ambitions. The first years of independence consisted of political struggles over power. The sovereignty of Belarus did not change the domestic power structures in a major way. The limited democratic forces wanted to see democratization based on national identity, while the pro-Russian forces, the established nomenclature, forcefully obstructed any major changes. This led to a halted democratization in Belarus. The Belarusian party bureaucrats only supported political changes that preserved their power. This led to policies of status quo rather than, as in neighboring states, major political and economic transformations. The political elite stressed the continuation of state ownership, Russian integration and political centralization (Krivosheev 2003:166, Garnett & Legvold 1999:2). As argued by Garnett & Legvold,

“…Belarus stood out not only as one of the least venturesome of the new states, but also as an active defender of comfortable and familiar ways, including the old economic arrangements among the former Soviet republics” (Garnett & Legvold 1999:3).

The reverse transition into authoritarianism

The Constitution of 1994 provided for presidential elections in 1994 and parliamentary elections in 1995. However, the newly reorganized Communist Party continued to stress strong ties to Russia, which resulted in new agreements forming the Common Independent States (CIS) in 1991. The undecided political path led to growing frustration among the citizens and was triggered by a dysfunctional political system. The easiest solution seemed to be the return to Communism. In the Presidential elections, both candidates in Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and the head of the parliamentary committee on corruption, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, were both supportive of close Russian relations. The political atmosphere of nostalgia and the hesitation to the idea of nationalistic orientation opened for the pro-Russian and populist Lukashenka. In the run-off between Lukashenka and the opponent, in Kebich, received Lukashenka 80% of the votes, symbolizing his great popularity (Marple 1999:71, Kuzio 2001:478-479, Karatnycky et al 1999:102-103).

One important factor behind the strong support for Lukashenka was the chaotic economic situation in Belarus. The independence from the former Soviet Union led to new economic relations between Russia and Belarus. Belarus had
traditionally received subsidies, but as an independent state it now had to pay for oil and gas. The chaotic economic situation was a major obstacle to the democratic forces in Belarus that sought political and economic liberalization and that stressed the importance of independence from Russia. The first attempts at privatization had also led to an unfair distribution of welfare and the traditional nomenclature in Belarus gained enormously (Törnquist-Plewa 2001:76-77).

The Presidency of Lukashenka of 1994 and forward gradually led the state into an authoritarian state. He built his support on a campaign against corruption and accused the older politicians of misusing their power. In 1995, the manipulated parliamentary election also resulted in an important victory for the Communist Party, receiving most seats based on a program stressing a socialist economy, public ownership of land and a reunion with Russia. This was the first parliamentary election held as an independent state (Korastelva 2001:141-142). The manipulated parliamentary election established a solid foundation for an authoritarian state with major restrictions on political rights and civil liberties. The new regime began to de-emphasize Belarusian history and culture in favor of the idea of reintegrating Russia. This also included oppressing opponents and limiting political rights and civil liberties (Garnett & Legvold 1999:4).

Lukashenka also used his position to declare a referendum in 1996 on four major issues: a) if Russian would be an equal language to Belarusian, b) if the economic ties to Russia would be tightened, c) if traditional symbols such as the new flag would be abolished and d) if the president would have formal power to dissolve the Parliament in the event of systematic abuse of its Constitutional rights. Lukashenka received large support on all issues – 83.3%, 83.3%, 75.1% and 77.7%. The overall support for Lukashenka’s idea symbolized a conservative and anti-democratic Belarus. However, the referendum was also unfair in many aspects. For example, the opposition had limited access to the media, which facilitated propaganda from the regime (Mihalisko 1997:224, Marples 1999:69).

The pro-Russian outcome of the referendum opened the possibility of a foreign policy favorable to Russia and the former Soviet territories. In 1996, the Belarusian parliament declared the disintegration of the Soviet Union illegal and in March 1996, Lukashenka decided to sign an economic treaty with Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. One month later, in April 1996, Lukashenka also decided to sign a treaty with Russia about developing a political and economic union. The ambition was clearly to see closer integration with Russia, although there has been limited progress over the years. This has primarily been due to hesitation from Russia who perceives Belarus as underdeveloped. However,

65 The outcome of the referendum led to the resignation of the deputy prime minister Andrei Sanikov.
Russia has perceived Belarus as a window on Europe, improving Russia’s geostrategical location in European politics. This has especially been the case with the enlargement of western organizations such as the EU and NATO. This has led to an interest from Russia to keep close ties to Belarus, but without letting Belarus become an economic burden (Potocki 2002:144-145, Törnquist-Plewa 2001:78-79, Krivosheev 2003:171). As argued by Sherman and Legvold,

“Belarus” role only takes on significance as an echo of Russian policy. So long as Russia refuses to reconcile itself to the loss of control over developments within and among neighboring states, Belarus’ alignment with Russia inevitably renders Belarus a beachhead of Russian military power” (Sherman & Legvold 1999:8).

During fall 1996, Lukashenka declared a new referendum on major changes to the Constitution. The parliament refused to accept the proposal as the Parliament would become an instrument for the president. However, the political crisis was solved by intense negotiations by Russia and the referendum was held. The result of the referendum of November 1996 made Lukashenka tighten his authoritarian grip of Belarus by installing a new constitution, a two-chamber puppet parliament and by extending the presidential power from five to seven years. Although the Constitutional Court declared the new 1996 Constitution unconstitutional (according to OSCE dishonest and unfree referendum), the decision was denied and ignored by Lukashenka. The Court also declared that it was not in power to examine presidential decrees. The Constitutional draft gave Lukashenka more or less dictatorial control of the government and the checks and balances disappeared. The parliament became “a piece of window dressing” endorsing everything said by the president (Batory Foundation 2004:15). The new constitution also allowed him to gain power over the Supreme Court and the electoral commission (Törnquist-Plewa 2001:8, Levinson 1997). The political power of Lukashenka and his regime has included the control of the judicial system. Since 1996-1997, presidential decrees have been equalized to laws and the president has had authority to appoint and dismiss judges from the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, but also from courts on lower levels. It is primarily the presidential decrees that Lukashenka has come to use as a political tool for determining the political and judicial developments in Belarus. The judicial system is also dependent on the Ministry of Justice and Lukashenka appoints six out of 12 members of the Constitutional Court and the other six are appointed by the Council of the Republic, which consists of presidential appointees and loyalists (Karatnycky et al 1999:111-112, Interview Ramsay September 15, 2003).
Authoritarianism with totalitarian traits

There are many illustrative examples of the limitations of the political rights and civil liberties in Belarus. There has been a growing budget for security forces and presidential guards at the same time as the prodemocratic opposition, in the BNF, has sought asylum in the West. There have also been reports on how the number of prisoners of conscience have increased in the 1990s, how peaceful demonstrations have been met by violence and abuse by the police forces and of the detention of prisoners (AI 2000:Belarus). The *Criminal Code* stresses the need to restrict these rights and liberties by safeguarding the state and higher officials (Karatnycky et al 1999:111-113). This has led to reports on harassment of dissents and disappearances of opponent leaders and critical journalists. President Lukashenka has also banned opposition parties, unions and associations at the same time as new restrictions on media and the free expression have been forced into laws. For instance, in late 1997, the Chamber of Representatives passed amendments that restricted media in its reports and allowed for suspension of any media that defamed higher officials or questioned the state or that could harm Belarus (Karatnycky et al 1999:8, Freedom in the World 1998-1999:Belarus Country Report). In 1997, Lukashenka also issued a decree that curtailed the right to assembly. This was the result of demonstrations and strikes that had taken place in Minsk when some trade unions were forbidden (Karatnycky et al 1999:111-112).

In 1999, President Lukashenka began his new two-year extended term as president. The extended term was only acknowledged by Russia, while the West declared the presidency illegal. This was based on the referendum of 1996, although the end of the Presidential term was supposed to be followed by new elections before May 20, 1999. President Lukashenka ordered all political parties, unions and NGO’s to reregister their activities with governmental agencies. The issued decree, *On Some Measures on Regulation of the Activities of Political Parties, Trade Unions, Other Public Associations*, required a re-registration, but also set up standards that had to be met to be considered as a party, organization and union. The opposition forces claimed the decree to seek to register potential enemies of the state and to stop their existence. This was also one of the severe consequences of the decree; the regime refused to reregister many of the most critical and politically active parties and organizations, including specific newspapers. The security force also raided NGOs working on human rights issues and confiscated equipment and data on human rights records as well as threatened to

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66 For instance, the Independent Free Trade Union of Belarus, the Minsk Metro Trade Union and the railroad and Transport Facilities Workers Union.
ban all activities that sought to promote a new presidential election (AI 2000:Belarus). “refusals of, or delays in, registration, intimidation and repression of NGO leaders, refusals to rent office space, and slander campaigns in the state media are common occurrences” (Karatnycky et al 2002:100).

President Lukashenka has also introduced new NGO’s, trade unions and political organizations that are loyal to the regime. They have received special funding, grants and subsidies. The regime has worked against critical organizations by sending negative information about them and by ignoring events that could help them in their campaigns. Foreign journalists and their publications have also been controlled and evaluated. The regime has prohibited the import and export of printed, audio and video materials or others new media that contain information that could hurt the regime. Presidential decrees have successfully limited the free expression in Belarus. As argued,

“…Belarus has become a presidential dictatorship and a consolidated autocracy. President Alyasandr Lukashenka came to power in 1994 following an election that international observers deemed free and fair. Since then, though he has steadily strengthened his grip on power by reintroducing censorship, frustrating the work of independent trade unions, and limiting rights of candidates for elected office. His government has also severely limited civil liberties, including freedom of association, assembly, religion, movement, speech, and the press” (Karatnycky et al 2002:95).

The Parliamentary elections of 2000 and the Presidential election of 2001 were perceived by opposition forces as an opportunity to reinforce democracy in Belarus. The years of centralization of power sharpened the conflict between pro-Lukashenka and anti-Lukashenka parties. This was a sharp conflict between interests in authoritarian control or liberalization, state controlled economy or market economy and the Russian culture and language or Belarusian traditions. There has been a left bloc of parties stressing the interests presented by Lukashenka and a weak and fragile right bloc of liberalists and nationalists (Korasteleva 2001:145-150). The opposition parties decided to participate in the parliamentary elections if the regime could guarantee free and fair elections. They required a democratic and transparent election code, equal access to media and information distribution, easement of governmental harassment and imprisonment of opposition members as well as expanded duties for the parliament. However, the regime failed to meet these requirements and many opposition parties refused to participate. Most opposition parties rallied for an overall boycott of the elections, although the Social Democratic Opposition Party (Narodnaja
Hramada) decided to participate, creating a split in the opposition alliance against the regime and the elections (Törnquist-Plewa 2001:97).

The split in the opposition alliance was also obvious in the presidential elections of 2001. The opposition had not decided on a single leader and many political leaders had disappeared, were imprisoned or in exile. However, the opposition finally decided to rally around one candidate before the presidential elections. The ambition was also to mobilize support from NGOs that hopefully could bolster political interest among younger voters. The selected candidate, Uladzimir Hancharyk, was Chairman of the Belarusian Federation of Trade Union (BFTU) and had worked for greater independence of the union and had at times proposed policies against the regime. His history also related to the regime, as he was previously a supporter of Lukashenka. However, the opposition had high hopes of receiving the votes from the union members, which could provide an important base for campaigning. There were, however, major problems with the campaigning process. It took a long time to announce Hancharyk as an opponent to Lukashenka at the same time as the coordination of the union, the opposition parties, the opposition leader and the independent media showed major weaknesses. The opposition failed in marketing Hancharyk as a political alternative at the same time as Lukashenka showed great ability to provide the society with his ideas, although, his campaign was facilitated by biased and regime-loyal television as well as by the limited resources for oppositional forces within the society. He was able to mobilize support from soldiers, state enterprise-workers and farmers at the same time as he succeeded to divide and marginalize the opponents (Potocki 2002:148-149).

Oppression also surrounded the Presidential election of 2001 where president Lukashenka was accused of ordering death squads towards opposition forces. Journalists and politicians disappeared, which was a new phenomenon in Belarus. Lukashenka pronounced his victory with 78% of the votes, while the opposition forces stated that Lukashenka had received 50%. Public opinions polls before the election indicated that Lukashenka had the chance to receive between 33-48% of the total votes. It was these figures that had made the opposition forces support one candidate as an attempt to overthrow Lukashenka. The election turnout, in favor of Lukashenka, was followed by further oppression against the opposition. Journalists at major independent news papers were also sentenced to prison accused of jeopardizing the stability of the state and opposition newspapers were seized, bank accounts were frozen and the opposition was accused of treason. The 2001 market the 10th anniversary as a sovereign state, although the political development gradually had led to an authoritarian state disregarding basic political rights and civil liberties (Potocki 2002:152-153, Freedom in the World 2001-2002:Belarus Country Report).
The years after the 2001 presidential election have consisted of efforts by president Lukashenka and his regime to secure power. Such efforts have been most visible through the two pieces of legislation signed by Lukashenka to restrict civil liberties. The first legislation-concerned amendments to the Law on Religion, which banned unregistered religious activities and limited the work of minority faiths. It also provided censorship against religious publications. The second legislation, the Law on the Fight Against Terrorism, led to further centralization of power to governmental authorities to control the media if necessary. This law related to the previous decree issued in 1997 on Immediate Measures to Fight Terrorism and other Especially Dangerous Violent Crimes. They have led to lengthened mandatory sentences for specific violent crimes. However, the new measurement has far exceeded the needs to fight back on terrorism and has been used to control and oppress civil forces within the Belarusian society (Freedom in the World 2001-2002:Belarus Country Report).

The president has adopted an undemocratic “repressive tolerance” (Törnquist-Plewa 2001:81) in the society, referring to the allowance of limited opposition forces, but that are severely controlled. There are few tendencies of pro-democratic progress. The 2001 presidential election shed light on major problems within the opposition and pro-democratic forces. The Presidential election of 2004 was also preceded by tighter political control and Lukashenka was accused of death squads aimed at opposition’s politicians and independent media. The repression of media, development of secret police crackdowns on demonstrations on the streets of Minsk, and more lately the disappearance of important officials, showed that Lukashenka had no intention to lead Belarus towards democracy. Instead the Belarusian regime has developed a dictatorship accustomed to Soviet-style rule (The Batory Foundation 2004:14, Törnquist-Plewa 2001:81). In short,

“Belarus is a disappointment. Its march toward democracy has not merely been unsteady, but is in apparent full retreat… In a Europe invigorated by the triumph of modern democracy over communist failure, a Europe that so many of the ex-socialist states are clamoring to enter, the major powers do not have much time for retrograde nations” (Garnett & Legvold 1999:1).

5.3 FRY’s Transitional Democracy

While Slovakia and Belarus have symbolized clear cases of successful and failed democratization, respectively, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has faced an uncertain democratic future. The dictatorial leadership, outburst of war
and the worsened relation to the West have influenced the political developments of FRY of the mid 1990s and forward. The democratization process is illustrated in Table 7, referring to the democratization rate of FRY.

<table>
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<td>Partly Free</td>
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**TABLE 7: THE DEMOCRATIZATION RATE IN FRY**

**Secession from the former Yugoslavia**

The FRY had, under the leadership of Tito 1945-1980, consisted of six republics in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia and of two autonomous provinces in Kosovo and Vojvodina. The death of Tito in 1980 led to significant changes in Yugoslavia. The Constitution of 1974

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**Notes:**

67 For Yugoslavia, ratings from 1991-1992 to the present are for the state that remained following the departures between 1991 and 1992 of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

68 Scores on Kosovo is presented below the scores on FRY.

69 See www.freedomhouse.org
stressed the succession by a representation of leaders from all nations and provinces in Yugoslavia and with a rotating Presidency. The power vacuum after his death, however, led to nationalism with outspoken ideas of independence. This led to political tension and limited war in Slovenia, full-scale war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and later on full-scale war in Kosovo (Gallagher 2003:74-75, Ágh 1998:168-169). The Dayton Peace Accords on November 1995 imposed a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, overseen and consolidated by the UN, IMF, NATO, the EU and OSCE. The new FRY consisted of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina (it changed name to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003). However, the political developments were characterized by disagreements between the government and the opposition with irregularities in local elections and societal demonstrations. The government was blamed for obstructing democratic progress and opposition parties demanded free and fair elections and the rule of law. However, the leadership of FRY and the Republic of Serbia neglected such demands (Vuckovic 1999:3-4). Instead of opening up for democratization, FRY centralized power and created tension within the federation.

The centralization of power was most obvious towards Kosovo. The Constitution of 1974 proclaimed far-gone autonomy for Kosovo, which almost made this province equal to the other federal states of Yugoslavia; de facto the status as an own republic of Yugoslavia, but not de jure (Sturesjö & Scheiman 1997:39-40, Vicker 1998:144-168, cf. Motes 1999). For example, Kosovo received representation in all federal bodies and agencies, which decided on national issues and nationalities, in the Yugoslav Federal assembly, the Presidential Council, the Federal Executive Council, the Constitutional Court and the Federal Court. Kosovo also received veto on all issues that affected them (Vickers 1998:179, Stahn 2001:532). The Constitution (of 1974) was also culturally important in bringing rights to official national language, recognition of historical symbols and development of educational institutions and other career opportunities (Vickers 1998:179, Weller 1999:54).

The liberalization of FRY of the 1970s saw serious setbacks in the 1980s and 1990s. The new Constitution of 1974 opened for criticism among the Serbians in Kosovo and which was heard in Belgrade among the Serbian politicians. The

70 Or as expressed in Article 1 of the 1974 Constitution, “The Socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituents parts of the Socialist republic Serbia, based on the power of an self-management by the working class and all working people…” (in Weller 1999:54).

71 As stressed by Malcolm, “the New Yugoslav constitution of 1974 – which would remain in force until the final break-up of Yugoslavia – gave the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina a status equivalent in most ways to that of the six republics themselves, with their own directed representation on the main federal Yugoslav bodies” (Malcolm 1998:327).
Constitutional changes and the resurgence of Albanian rights made many Serbs move from Kosovo. One explanation for the Serbian movement from the province was the new political Albanian climate, which raised nationalism in Serbia. Another important explanation was the underdeveloped standard in the province with very low socioeconomic status compared to the rest of FRY. The new policy towards Kosovo was in many ways fostered by the intellectuals in Belgrade that in 1986 published a document, which acknowledged the complaints from Serbs in Kosovo. This document stressed how the Serbian minority was exploited by other nations within the Federal Republic and how Serbs were forced to abandon their own language, cultural traditions and political rights (Malcolm 1998:329-331, Schwarts 2000:119-122, Stahn 2001:533-534).

Pre-transitional challenges
Milosevic had in a few years developed the perception of a Greater Serbia within FRY. The nationalistic and authoritarian approach in Yugoslavian politics led to political tension within the federation. The new policy from Belgrade during the 1990s included centralization of power with amendments to the Constitution in 1989. The work of the Kosovo Executive Council and the Kosovo Assembly was suspended and the Constitutional position of Kosovo, as an autonomous unit of Yugoslavia, likewise. In 1989, Serbia’s National assembly passed amendments giving Serbia direct control over Kosovo (Weller 1999:60-61). For example, the growing tension between Albanians and Serbs resulted in open conflicts on the streets of Pristina. The demonstrations escalated in Kosovo demanding the Socialist Autonomous Region of Kosovo to become a full republic. Serbian politicians saw these riots and demonstrations as the first step towards chaos and anarchy; the claim for status of a republic would eventually be used as a foundation for claiming full independence. The last step would be the unification of Kosovo and Albania into a Greater Albania, which could challenge the hegemonic role of Serbia (Malcolm 1998:341, Schwarts 2000:101, 119-122, Sørensen 1999:1-2, 24-26, Malcolm 1998:329-331, Dryzek et al 2002a:59). On the other hand, the new Serbian policy was perceived by Kosovo Albanians as an occupation and triggered the development of a parallel society of education, health-care, social union, cultural, economic and political associations as well as an own media machine. The parallel or underground society developed into an Albanian society within the Serbian territory. It developed in protest against the authoritarian approach from Belgrade and against the policies that tried to challenge the Kosovo Albanian political power and their cultural identity (Sørensen 1999:1-2, 24-26, Schwarts 2000:119-122, Stahn 2001:533-534).

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72 The Serbian population decreased from 23% in 1971 to 17% in 1981 to fewer than 7-8% in the mid 1990s (Sommelius 1999:57).

The escalated tension towards Serbia led to tension within Kosovo’s political society. The non-violent methods used by the party and by its leaders had been neglected by the international community in years of wars on the Balkans. The neglect of the Kosovo issue and the continuation of the oppression by Milosevic fostered a growing frustration within Kosovo leading to armed military fractions. The most severe challenge to the leadership of Rugova was the establishment of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Sørensen 1999:27, Rogel 2003:175). In 1997-1998, there was an escalation of violence between the KLA and Serbian forces. In October 1998, Serbia launched an offensive attack towards KLA and the Kosovo society, which created a humanitarian catastrophe with about 400,000 refugees. KLA responded by declaring Kosovo under its own authority and by disbanding the political actors of LDK and other political parties. At the same time another paramilitary group, in the Armed Force of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) was established claiming to be the long-arm for Rugova and LDK (Judah 2000:120).

In 1999, the violence escalated into a full-fledged war, jeopardizing the safety of all civilians in the province, but also jeopardizing the regional stability (Freedom in the World 1998-1999: Yugoslavia, Kosovo Country Report).74 In October 1998, the UN Security Council had decided in Resolution 1203 to condemn the violence in Kosovo.75

The Contact Group of the Former Yugoslavia was also established, consisting of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S., calling for the stop

73 In December 1989, the new party Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was organized. By 1991, LDK had received 700,000 members under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. LDK and Rugova became symbols of a politically organized Kosovo that had the ambition to stand up against Serbian oppression and reclaim their status. In the elections of 1992 and 1998, Rugova was elected President of the Republic of Kosovo and received about 80% of the vote, while LDK won a majority in the Assembly. In July, 1990, the Assembly of Kosovo outlined a Constitutional Declaration stressing Kosovo as an independent and equal constituent unit within the federation (Weller 1999:64). In 1991, a referendum within Kosovo was also organized on the status of Kosovo. The referendum strongly stressed the people’s desire for independence as a sovereign state (of the 1,051,357 eligible voters, 914,902 (87,01%) participated in the election and out of these 913,705 (99,87%) voted in favor of Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence). Only 164 citizens voted against and 933 were invalid votes (136,555 did not participate) (Weller 1999:72-73, Auerswald & Auerswald 2000:59). The LDK and Ibrahim Rugova led the political ambitions in Kosovo.


75 The Security Council issued several resolutions (for instance 1160, 1186, 1199, 1203 and 1207), as the violence continued and which acknowledged the tragedy in Kosovo and stressed the absolute need for Serbian forces to stop the violence.
of violence and the human rights abuses. It was argued that the contact group did not support any of the two sides, but demanded to see peace and order and an enhanced status of Kosovo within the federation. On February 6, 1999, the Contact Group organized negotiations between Serb and Albanian politicians. The Rambouillet talks went on for six weeks discussing the possibility of Kosovo being administered by the international community, whilst leaving Kosovo as part of FRY. The Kosovo Albanians signed the Treaty, but the Serbian delegation was worried about the status of Kosovo. The Treaty was also problematic in its nature, acknowledging the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, but without setting out any clear status of Kosovo and the relations to Serbia. The refusal by Milosevic to sign the agreement led to the intervention by NATO. The war resulted in the forced drawback of Serbian forces in Kosovo and the interim government by the UN over Kosovo (Magnusson 1999:27-29, Auerswald & Auerswald 2000:95, 625-652, Schwartz 2000:144, Stahn 2001:536-537).

**Transition with uncertainties**

The United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) received authority over Kosovo aiming at establishing a functioning civil administration, law and order and free and fair elections. The regulation left all legislative and executive power to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo (SRSG). In 2001, the *Constitutional Framework* for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo was established aiming for self-governance and self-administration in Kosovo, although under the supervision of the international community. The Constitutional Framework implies a growing self-independence of Kosovo and UNMIK transfers powers (legislative and executive) to local institutions within areas such as economic and financial policy, fiscal and budgetary issues, education, culture, health, environment, transport and agriculture (Stahn 2001:558). However, crucial areas, such as external relations, law enforcement, the protection of minority rights and budget control still remain within UNMIK. Also, the UN has the power to intervene and correct any wrongdoings by the local authorities if their policies are inconsistent with the Constitutional Framework (Stahn 2001:539-544). However, the overall mission of the UN has met obstacles. There has been ambiguity over the meaning of the political aims stressed in the *Resolution 1244*. There have also been problems in establishing a functioning administration, including Albanian and Serbian leaders in the UN administration and to implement free and fair municipal elections with participation from all minority groups. Furthermore, all political campaigns and elections have been harmed by the ethnic tension between Serbs and Albanians and by the political tension between the political parties (Yannis 2004, Korhonen 2001). A few fundamental steps would be to democratize the region by upholding law and order, allow for full integra-
tion and participation of Serbs in a multiethnic Kosovo and show the international community that human rights are respected. The uncertainty of the future status must also be solved in the near future in order to prove for democratization (Interview Economides September 16, 2003, Sørensen 1999:52).

The loss of Kosovo was a severe challenge to the Milosevic’s dictatorial rule. The political development of the FRY had been slow since the federal state was reorganized in 1992. The leadership of Milosevic, who desired status quo and prioritized the centralization of power, halted the political progress. This strategy included the neglect of minority rights, which was most significant with the national question of Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanians. However, the escalation of war between Serbia and Kosovo and the outcome in the retreat of Serbian forces opened for political changes, including democratization. Political and economic hardship in FRY as well as the lost of Kosovo undermined the political position held by Milosevic (McGleary et al 2000:42).

In October 2000, Serbia saw presidential elections. An alliance of 18 opposition parties in Serbia united themselves under the Democratic Organization of Serbia (DOS) agreeing to nominate Kostunica to the presidential elections to challenge Milosevic. The 18 parties that made up the DOS had chosen Kostunica to challenge Milosevic, although he had been a candidate based on bargain and negotiations. The opposition had different views on his policies, but he received support from different groups within the opposition; both from the western oriented opposition that called for dramatic changes in a pro-European direction and those in the opposition that were hostile towards the West, but even more hostile towards Milosevic. Kostunica seemed to be a candidate that could trigger for massmobilization on the streets of Serbia, including different forces that allied around the idea of overthrowing Milosevic (Scahill 2001).

The election turnout was in favor of Kostunica (53.3% to 35%) although the Federal Election Commission declared the election invalid. Milosevic also ignored the result. However, major demonstrations on the streets of Belgrade forced Milosevic out of power (Rogel 2004:99, Bujosevic & Radovanovic 2003). Kostunica repeatedly called for civil disobedience and stressed the importance of strikes and demonstrations as a way of paralyzing Serbia. The opposition parties launched the first general strike nation-wide since World War II, which led to the October 5 revolt. The change of president was a result of the large scale of supports that Kostunica received from different socioeconomic groups of the society. The workers that traditionally had been in favor of Milosevic supported the strikes and demonstrations. The political and economic hardship made different groups of the society ally in favor of political and economic changes (McGleary et al 2000, cf. Scahill 2001). As argued by Rogel,
“After days of indecision in the capital, a takeover was organized. But it was not Belgrade middle classes and intellectuals, nor even the Otpor\textsuperscript{76} students who clinched the overthrow of Milosevic. Workers, miners, and persons mounted the one-day ‘revolution’ generally from provincial towns. Armed with cell phones and organizational skills, they assured the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Belgrade police and off-duty paratroopers” (Rogel 2004:99-100).

Since 2000, FRY has gradually become democratized as a consequence of the failure of Milosevic to continue to rule. In June 2001, Milosevic was sent to the Hague Tribunal. The UN Security Council established the tribunal in 1993 as a tool dealing with the human rights abuses during the wars on the Balkans. The tribunal consists of 16 permanent judges supported by lawyers, experts and analysts. By the end of 2002, after a slow start, about 100 hundred alleged criminals were in custody. There had been many efforts to see Milosevic in front of the tribunal. There were worries that an indictment of Milosevic would create demonstrations in FRY that could lead to tension. There were also hesitations within the regime to send Milosevic. This was due to the perception that the tribunal was biased and a result of western pressure. However, in 1999, the tribunal extended its investigations to also include the warfare in Kosovo. Milosevic was tried for his actions in Kosovo, but also in Croatia and Bosnia (Rogel 2004:86-88).

There have also been other prodemocratic reforms. There have been political efforts towards constitutional reforms to solve the problem of the future outlook of the federation, judicial reforms aimed at an independent judicial branch and criminal code reforms aiming to abolish old ideological prejudices. These reforms should be compared with the years before 2000 when FRY was more or less ungovernable, due to the rule of Milosevic (Nations in transit 2002:Yugoslavia Country Report, Nation in transit 2004:Serbia and Montenegro:16-17). However, the FRY has faced serious challenges in political illegitimacy and economic depression. The different political visions within Serbia were obvious with the growing tension between the prime minister of Serbia in Djindjic and president Kostunica. Both leaders were strong leaders within DOS, although after the Milosevic era, tension rose over the economic stagnation and how to turn the negative development of Serbia. While Djindjic stressed the importance of market economy, Kostunica argued for a slower approach with social policies. There were also serious political problems with an overall political apa-

\textsuperscript{76} Resistance – a student movement with about 70.000 members.
thy among citizens. Presidential elections were held three times in late 2002, but none of the elections were legal due to the low turnout of voters (Rogel 2004:101-102).

5.4 Summary

There has been an overall trend for democratization in Europe. This was discussed in Chapter 2. Despite this trend, some states have become more democratized than others. This is illustrated by looking at the democratization in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY. There has been a successful democratization of Slovakia, failed democratization in Belarus and a transitional status of FRY. Slovakia clearly adopted democratic elements of the early 1990s, although became a consolidated democracy at the end of the 1990s after the election in 1998. Democracy was rejected in Belarus after the presidential elections of the mid-1990s. The president used different political and judicial tools to centralize the power into an authoritarian state. The political changes of FRY have been more uncertain, with patterns of democratic progress of 2000 and forward.
6. Democracy Promotion in Postcommunist States

This chapter applies the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4. The aim is to illustrate the international factor in democracy promotion in postcommunist states. Democracy promotion is conceptualized as actors, interests, methods, channels, relations and impact. These aspects are illustrated in Table 8. The analytical framework is applied on the EU as democracy promoter towards Slovakia, Belarus and FRY. The illustrative analysis covers 1993 to 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1993-2003</th>
<th>Belarus (Eastern Europe)</th>
<th>Slovakia (Central Europe)</th>
<th>FRY (Southeast Europe)</th>
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Table 8: Democracy Promotion
This chapter is organized in eight steps. Step one introduces the notion of western democracy promotion. Step two to seven consist of the aspects of the analytical framework and sets out the role of the EU as democracy promoter in post-communist Europe. Step eight summarizes the empirical findings.

6.1 Introduction: Western Democracy Promotion

It may be argued that democracy promotion is an unnecessary intrusion into international relations; democracy promotion may be an aggressive form of a missionary movement and the crusades may very well lead to full-scale war or to illegitimate dominance. The notion of democracy promotion may therefore not be any different from other missionary ideologies that have provided war and disaster. However, it may also be argued that the promotion of democracy creates order and the common good. It organizes international relations and protects individual rights and liberties. Democracy promotion may therefore be something morally wanted (Whitehead 2001:8-15).

Democracy promotion is not a new phenomenon. It has existed in the 20th century, although there has been an intensification of the promotion in the post-Cold War era. It has been the major turning points of the 20th century that have been of most concern when discussing democracy promotion. The 20th century of challenging ideologies, in Fascism, Nazism and Communism, crafted alternative political visions to democracy. This was illustrated in Chapter 2 as waves and reverse waves of democratization. This led to crucial turning points in the 1919, 1945 and 1989 where democracies were tested, but also promoted. The end of these turbulent political and military eras was of historical magnitude. It was in the phase of postwar settlement that the most powerful actors aimed at structuring an environment that locked weaker and challenging states into a favorable postwar order. The most powerful actors decided how to handle the new uncertainty and how to build a new order (Ikenberry 2001:72-79). As stated by Ikenberry,

“In the chaotic aftermath of war, leaders of these states have found themselves in unusually advantageous positions to put forward new rules and principles of international relations and by so doing remake international order” (Ikenberry 2001:3).

For instance, President Woodrow Wilson stressed the U.S. engagement in World War I as a way of safeguarding democracy and the U.S. foreign policy of the
1920 and 1930s included interventions in Central America as a way of promoting democracy. President Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Churchill founded the post-World War II democracy promotion and advocated in the Atlantic Charter, “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live” (in Whitehead 1986:5). The battles in the name of democracy continued during the Cold War in order to preserve the free world. The Truman Doctrine expressed democratic principles as a strategy against communist expansion and was institutionalized in the NATO Treaty of 1949 where the U.S. with Western European states committed to “safeguard the freedom founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” (in Whitehead 1986:5). President Kennedy and President Carter further expressed democracy and human rights in the late 1970s, and included human rights issues as a guideline for U.S. foreign policy. These traits were also found in the Reagan, Bush and the Clinton administration, raising the budget on democracy promotion in the foreign aid policy. The U.S. foreign policy of democracy promotion has been described as the first and second wave of promotion; the first wave of the 1960s and 1970s was based on the efforts made by the Kennedy administration and the second wave of the 1980s, with a growing number of democracy programs based on Reagan’s anticommunist strategy. For instance, the National Endowment for Democracy was initiated in the early 1980s, aiming to coordinate U.S. efforts on democracy promotion (Whitehead 1986:5-6, Carothers 1999:23-29, cf. Carothers 2004).

However, the rhetorical claim of being a democracy promoter has sometimes been overshadowed by a failed democracy promotion. It may be due to the lack of interest in democracy promotion or due to the multiple of roles played on the international scene. Practical obstacles or other foreign policy interests have many times undermined the promotion of democracy (McFaul 2004:158-159). This has been obvious in the U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in the Cold War context, where the U.S. had dual interests in democratization and security. NATO was also concerned about the spread of Communism and the power position of Communist parties in Europe. This made NATO at times more interested in status quo, with existing right-winged dictatorial states, rather than introducing fragile and uncertain democracies (Pridham 1991b:216-223). Other examples of failed democracy promotion are the World Bank and the IMF who at times have withdrawn financial assistance when democratic principles have been abused, while in other states continuing to financially support regimes despite the use of undemocratic methods. The UN, as another example, has at times showed strength and ability to intervene to protect human rights and democratic principles, but at other times overseen human rights abuses and the collapse of democratic regimes. The neglect of the civil war in Rwanda of the mid 1990s,
where over 500,000 civilians were killed, is one recent tragic failure of the UN (Smith 2001:5).

However, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a Western policy that openly argued for the continuation of democracy promotion. The assistance more or less mushroomed within the U.S. and Western Europe and was directed towards most regions in the world, perhaps with most focus on Europe and the former Soviet territory (Carothers 1999:20-48, Diamond 1992:25). The changes in the world order also made room for democratization; the third wave of democratization of the 1980s and forward was strongly related to the declining role of the Soviet Union and the prodemocratic influence by for instance the U.S. and European actors. This led to a growing acknowledgement of the spread of democracies as well as of the activity of democracy promotion (Huntington 1991:86). As argued by Carothers,

“The relaxation of ideological tensions after the cold war, combined with the movement toward democracy in many regions, have put democracy on the global agenda in a much more far-reaching way than ever before” (Carothers 1999:8).

The notion of democracy promotion has come to be debated within the western world, as there has been a broader commitment within the West to promoting democracy. Traditionally (under the UN Charter), each state has been perceived as the ultimate authority within the territorial borders. However, each state has also been obliged to protect the citizens (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). This dilemma has called for a debate on the use of international intervention to uphold democracy and human rights. The notion of international intervention has been based on the idea of higher morality and universal values, while the counter argument has stressed intervention as a selective response based on political and cultural bias (Badom 1997:40-45, 66, Lund 1999:19-23, cf. Nye 2000). For instance, after the September 11 attacks, President Bush argued that democracy promotion would become an objective in U.S. foreign policy stressing the moral and strategic roots to the promotion. However, the U.S. intervention in Iraq opened a critical political debate on how democracy promotion is supposed to be implemented. The debate indicated that democracy had become a legitimate norm in international politics, with more states and organizations involved in the debate, although there was a great concern over how to promote the norm (McFaul 2004:147-148, 157). As argued by McFaul,

“Although increasing numbers of governments and people around the world now endorse the norm of democracy promotion, even
democratic states disagree about how to do it. Few believe, for example, that military force is justified to advance democratization. The slogan ‘you cannot force them to be free’ still resonates with many champions of democracy. Military intervention’s mixed record of success in promoting democracy only strengthens moral argument against the use of force. Democratic states have also disagreed about the morality and utility of using economic sanctions as a method for promoting democratic regime change” (McFaul 2004:157).

The debate on democracy promotion has intensified over the relation between the U.S. and the EU. When some scholars have argued for the existence of a growing rift between the U.S. and the EU, others have pointed out the historical and current transatlantic ties. Whitehead (1986) initiated the debate by discussing the notion of different historical records of democracy and anti-democratic challenges and the different records on being hegemonic powers. Kagan (2003) provided more intensity in this debate, by arguing that Europeans and Americans have profoundly different perceptions of international relations; while the Europeans would like to structure the new world order based on laws, rules and negotiations, using its soft power, the Americans find the new world order anarchic in nature, requiring pre-emptive force by the superpower. It has also been argued that differences may be turned into strength in the transatlantic relations. Being of different natures, the U.S. as a superpower of hard politics and the EU as a soft power, with far developed aid and development programs, may together have a crucial role in international relations. This requires, however, a renegotiated alliance of the 21st century (Silander 2004:129-131). As argued by Duke,

“…whatever the past and current difficulties or even antagonisms, relations between the EU member states and the United States remain of enormous mutual importance. If, however, they are to thrive again, there must be mutual recognition that the old Transatlantic Bargain, framed in terms of the post-World-War-II world, is otiose. It will take diplomacy and, above all, mutual understanding and respect to frame a new and constructive Transatlantic Bargain for the twenty-first century” (Duke 2004:1).

The intensified debate within the western world on democracy promotion has symbolized the powerful role of western actors and the increasing legitimacy of democracy promotion. The “western project” (Smith 2001:31) includes attempts to politically transform states into western standards of democratic institutions
and values. For instance, different western actors share these attempts as a collective strategy to democratize Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe (Ágh 1998:3, Smith 2001:31-32 & McCormick 1999:31). There are global organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank, WTO and UN, international organizations such as the EU, the OSCE and NATO, single states such as the U.S., France, Germany, the U.K. and Spain and transnational organizations in Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Red Cross just to mention a few. Among the many different actors, it is the international organizations that provided growing influence as powerful policy-makers. This is due to the institutionalization of Western norms into these organizations, the more developed conditions set by these organizations towards the postcommunist states and the collective strategy increasing the power and capabilities of these organizations. The increasing number and power of international organizations has come to represent an important feature in world politics (Hettne et al 1999:1, Smith 2001:33).77

It is primarily two international organizations, the EU and NATO that pursue most policy-making power in Europe.78 These Western organizations have set out their models of what constitutes a modern European state and what conditions that must be adopted to become accepted. The EU and NATO have been viable symbols of the West and have had magnet effect. The perception among most leaders and elites in the postcommunist states has been to approach these organizations. The perception among postcommunist leaders has been that NATO has functioned in a curative capacity, able to impose security, while the EU has had a preventive function with political integration based on democratic governance (Neumann 2001:62-63, 68-69, Rupnik 2000:123-124, Barany 2004:63). In short,

77 Scholars (Hettne & Odén 2002, Hettne 2003, Hettne et al 1999) have identified the rise of international organizations in two waves or generations of regionalism; the old and new regionalism. The old regionalism era was founded in the inter-war period, while the second wave of new regionalism started in the mid-1980s. The number of international organizations more than tripled from 1945 to 1985, leaving a number of 258 organizations in 1997 (Russet et al 2000:59).

78 The historical role of NATO in Western Europe is due to the dominant role of the U.S. in the Cold War era. The Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine institutionalized U.S. support in European affairs. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 after negotiations leading to the Brussels Treaty and the Western Union Defence Organization (what latter became the WEU). The core article in the North Atlantic Treaty, in Article 5, sets out that, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...” which, based on Article 51 of the Charter of the UN, gave the right to use armed defense. The post-Cold War era provided NATO with a situation where the organization more actively was able to assist the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO decided to have the right to interfere in the near abroad to stop conflicts and wars and to secure fundamental values of democracy and human rights (Brosio 1965:10-18, 176, Weitz 1993:343-345, Avery & Cameron 1998:158-159, Croft et al 1999:24-34, cf. Bring 1999, Hilsman 1959, Barany 2004).
“NATO and the European Union have become the only game in town” (Rupnik 2000:121).

6.2 Actors

The foreign policy of the EU is divided into three distinct decision-making systems (White 2001, Peterson & Smith 2003, Ginsberg 2001): the national system of foreign policies, the Community system (economic policy based within the first pillar) and the EU system (CFSP as second pillar). The national system of foreign policies continues to influence European politics, although the EU has become an important framework for each member state. The national foreign policy-making process has been developed and accepted as long as the policies have not interfered and disturbed the market integration of free trade (Manners & Whitman 2000). The Community system of foreign policy-making has concerned three main elements in trade policy, aid and development policy and actions to externalize the internal market. The EU has become an important trade partner in the world economy and accounts for about 40% of the global trade when including the intra-EU trade. Adding the development aid of the EU with the aid assistance from each member state of the Union also makes the EU the largest donor of development aid in the world. There has also been a foreign policy process through the externalization of decisions made within the Community and that in most cases has external impact on third parts. Finally, the EU system of foreign policies has centred on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP has concerned high politics and has been intergovernmental

79 The Commission, that promotes the role of the EU as a regional and global actor, consists of different Directorate Generals (DGs) that assure the role of the EU as a significant power in Europe and elsewhere. The DG for External Relations functions as a coordinator of all external relations activities of the Commission. There is also the DG for Development that formulates the development cooperation policies for developing states in the world. The DG for Enlargement is responsible for the enlargement of the Union, while the DG for Trade has had the mission to maximize EU influence in international trade and to formulate a common trade policy (Interview Eklund May 5th, 2001). The EU has a few important offices as well. The Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) has worked towards humanitarian agencies on the field to provide emergency assistance to natural disasters and armed conflicts (see Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/96 of June 1996). The European Aid Cooperation Office was adopted in January 1st, 2001, as the office to manage external aid for the Commission, except the pre-accession aid programs handled by the DG for Enlargement, humanitarian activities handled by Humanitarian Aid Office, the CFSP and Rapid Reaction Facilitate being an intergovernmental concern for the Council of Ministers and each member state. In 1999, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was established as an assistance program distinct from other programs and focusing on democracy and human rights program in third states.
in nature. The European Community has handled the CFSP and the Presidency of the Council has had a rotating schedule of six months, which includes six months of Presidency of the CFSP. The Presidency represents the Union in CFSP issues by conducting a political dialogue with third states (Peterson & Smith 2003:233-236, cf. Ginsberg 2001).  

The shared authority on the foreign policy has raised the question if the EU is a foreign policy-maker? (cf. White 2001, Smith 2002, Nuttall 2000, Ginsberg 2001, Hill 1993, 1996, Bretherton & Vogler 1999, Kegley & Wittkopf 2004, Wood & Yesilada 1996). The debate on the role of the EU as foreign policy-maker has mainly concerned structural/institutional and capacity related issues focusing on the intergovernmental and supranational structures within the EU. It has been argued that the EU is not a sovereign entity; but a hybrid of an international organization and a federation. As long as the EU has not developed into a federation, there is no such thing as a EU foreign policy (Smith 2002:2). Another argument has stressed that the EU lacks essential means to actually implement foreign policy. This debate has referred to the lack of edge in EU foreign policy-making (Winn & Lord 2001:15-16). Since the EU:s common foreign and security policy is intergovernmental in nature, there is no such thing as an EU military army beyond the member states. The ability to use military methods may be seen as the most fundamental aspects of all foreign policy-making.

However, this study assumes that the EU is a foreign policy-maker. This was set out in Chapter 1 as well. There are two main reasons for the powerful role of the EU in international affairs. Firstly, the EU has developed to become a civilian and political/military policy-maker with growing international weight participating in more policy-areas as well as using more policy tools. Secondly, the EU has developed into a normative structure of increased number of member states, symbolizing a powerful bloc of norms that most states and other actors have had to relate to. This has primarily been the case in postcommunist Europe, including the relations to Slovakia, Belarus and the FRY (Christiansen 2005:582, Peterson & Smith 2003:222).

The EU as economic and political policy-maker was primarily born out of the danger of letting nationalism get free reins in European states and was supported in those efforts by the U.S. It included the development of a common agricultural policy, external tariffs and the construction of a single market of free movements.

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80 The Presidency is assisted by the High Representative of the CFSP and works in association with the Commissioner of the DG for External Relations. This association implies that the Commission has the right and ability to initiate foreign and security policy issues even if such a right is not exclusive to the Commission. Within CFSP, the High Representative, member states and the Commission shares the initiative right.

81 It was stressed in Chapter 1 that the assumption of the study is that the EU is both an actor and structure; an actor with policy-making power and a structural norm-community.
of people, goods, money and services. The EU developed based on growing interdependence and became the richest single group of states in the world (Laffan 1998:244). Besides being an economic superpower, the EU has also come to be a growing international political policy-maker. There were attempts in the 1950s to develop a defense community. The Plevne Plan of 1950 suggested that the six member states would establish firmer cooperation on defense issues. In 1952, the European Defence Community (EDC) was signed, although was refused by the French National Assembly. The more successful developments of a EU political foreign policy can be dated back to the 1970s and the Luxembourg Report that recommended that the Foreign Ministers of all member states should work for closer European political cooperation and the ability to speak with one voice. The result, within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC), was the establishment of a Political Committee consisting of the Directors of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministers with the function to prepare for the ministerial meetings between the member states. The Single European Act of 1986 institutionalized the EPC with a legal ground (Strømvik 2005:87-93, cf. Nuttall 1992, Ginsberg 2001, Smith 2002).

It was not, however, until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that the idea of the CFSP was firmly institutionalized into the second of the three established pillars of the EU. The Maastricht Treaty stressed the EU as a global actor. The Treaty set out the mission of the EU to develop the CFSP and to prepare for a common defense policy. This mission was aimed at securing and advancing the interests of the Union. Keeping the intergovernmental nature of the decision-making procedures, the CFSP became an essential part of the Union efforts to provide a homogenous voice in foreign relations (see Maastricht Treaty Article 2 & 11). The Maastricht Treaty also created new instruments in the Common Positions, aimed at defining the approach for a determined and visible promotion of interests toward third states, the Common Strategies aiming to set out the EU objectives and providing for greater coherence and the Joint Actions setting out the ambition to act as an alliance and identify situations where action is required (Council of the European Union 2004:38-39). Further developments of EU:s foreign policy power were seen in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 where decision was made to work for shared military actions. The Treaty expanded the areas of concern for the CFSP to also include crisis management in humanitarian actions, peace making and peacekeeping in order to be able to secure core interests. The Amsterdam Treaty also decided on a High Representative of the CFSP. The High Representative became the spokesperson for the EU in foreign and security issues as a way of coordinating and centralizing authority. This political vision with military ambition was further institutionalized with the Nice summit of 2001 when the EU decided to establish the European Rapid Reaction Force tightening the military cooperation and making it possible to provide a military force of unilateral

The development of a common foreign and security policy with a military army was primarily a consequence of the crisis in Yugoslavia of the 1990s. The most powerful EU member states had stressed the importance of a European response to the crisis. However, failed attempts to stop the wars and the dependency of U.S. involvement symbolized a great weakness within the EU. The final crisis of the 1990s in Kosovo 1998-1999 also set out the existing shortcomings of the EU to act as a unitary actor in crisis within Europe. There has also been development of a European Security and Foreign Policy (ESFP), integrated to the CFSP. The ESFP consists of three parts in civilian crisis management, military crisis management and conflict prevention. The ESFP aims to cover humanitarian activities and peacekeeping missions as well as military actions (Peterson & Smith 2003:236-237, Strömvik 2005:220-226, cf. Howorth 2001).

Overall, the last decades of developments within the EU have showed a trend where the member states have obliged themselves to cooperate within more and more policy areas. This integration has strengthened the EU as a policy-maker. The overall economic and political integration has been institutionalized through the Treaties. For instance, the first post-World War II step toward the vision of economic and political integration was the formation of a customs union by the Benelux countries in 1948. The plan for a prosperous Europe developed in 1950 with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was followed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 planning for a common market and a customs union, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy (EURATOM). Later on, the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice Treaty (2001) established an ever-closer Union of cooperation including new policy-areas (Winn & Lord 2001:1-8, Nuttall 2000:14-31, McCormick 1999:203-209, Laffan 1992:151-155, Førland & Claes 1998:27, George 1996:275-283).

Summary
There have been many actors involved in reshaping Europe of the 1990s. The EU has pursued policies and symbolized an institutionalized norm-community of democratic member states. The EU has had growing power to influence European politics. The EU has set out to develop the post-Cold War Europe. This has led to a policy-making role for the EU based on the Treaties and through organizational changes. The EU is set out in Table 9.
The end of the Cold War led to an active interest within the EU in promoting democracy, market economy and security. The promotion of democracy and market economy was directed towards most of the Central European states, while the Eastern European states faced the promotion of market economy. The Southeastern European states saw major challenges in war and ethnic tension leading to the promotion of stabilization in terms of conflict prevention (Youngs 2001b:368, Smith 2001:33-36, Seidelmann 2001:128, Rupnik 2000:115-116).

The roots of the EU democracy promotion were based on the UN and the Universal Declaration of 1948 and the development of the International Covenant of 1966. The preservation of democracy was stressed in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome and further specified in the 1962 Birkelbach Report of the political committee of the European Parliament, which became EU policy. The Treaty of Rome implicitly set out the norm-community, as the six member states were

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82 The Universal Declaration and the Covenant set out eight principles for the democratic procedure. These were periodic elections, genuine elections, and the right to stand for election, universal suffrage, rights to vote, equal suffrage secret vote and free expression of the will of the voters. The EU also adopted the universal principles stressed in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and complementary documents in International Covenant on Civil and Political and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stressed in Article 21, that “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures”. Other important sources were the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo 1994), the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen 1995), and the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) (Council of the European Union 2002).
democracies. One of the most severe challenges to democracy preservation was the remaining authoritarian states in Southern Europe.\textsuperscript{83}

The legal provision for enlarging the norm-community was set out in Article 237 in the \textit{Treaty of Rome}. It was argued that any European state (European identity) could apply for membership, although not deciding what constituted a European state.\textsuperscript{84} In the 1970s, changes in Southern European states led to a new debate on conditions to enter the norm-community. In 1978, the European Council stressed that “respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership in the European Communities” (Copenhagen European Council, 7-8 April, 1978). This statement showed the Southern European states what they had to accomplish to become member states of the norm-community. However, the Council never set out the specific conditions that had to be met. Instead, democracy and human rights continued to be fuzzy conditions and more attention was spent on economic and administrative capacities (Smith 2003:110).

It was not until the 1980s and perhaps 1990s that the EU became an intentional democracy promoter (Lundgren 1998:68). The Commission of the 1990s noticed the unstructured democracy promotion. This was followed by an internal debate on the organization and efficiency that surrounded the work on democracy promotion. The responsibility of promoting democracy within the EU had been divided between the intergovernmental and supranational structures; be-

\textsuperscript{83} Greece, Spain and Portugal called for the attention of the EU. The EU wanted to see a democratization of the three states and denied further contacts as a result. The actual test of the democratic principles within the Union happened with the new military rule in Greece at the same time as the state had an association status with the Union. This status was frozen and the EU stressed that no further integration would happen until the dictatorial regime disappeared. Greece became a member state in 1981 after years of political converging. Similar pressure was also directed toward Spain and Portugal. The Parliament stressed the solidarity with the prodemocratic forces in Spain of 1981 after a military attempt of overthrowing the regime. Portugal was also faced by debates within the EPC-group that clearly argued in favor of democratization of Portugal; this was an ultimatum for further cooperation. Both states became EU members in 1986 (Pridham 1991b:218-221, Lundgren 1998:17).

\textsuperscript{84} What geographically constitutes Europe and potential European member states is quite diffuse. The eastern boundary, running along the Ural Mountains, crossing the Caspian Sea and further along the Caucasus Mountains, was stressed in the eighteen-century (Delany 1997:85-92, McCormick 1999:41, Hettne 1997:22). The European region has since then been defined by surrounding water in north, south and west and by the Ural Mountains in east. In 1986, Marocco applied for membership by arguing that Marocco was not a European state. However, in the 1990s, both Malta and Cyprus were, after their applications in the 1990, treated as candidate states. These decisions may have set out a European border in the Mediterranean. Turkey has also historically provided trouble for the EU through its long-term interest in becoming member state and with their application in 1987; the EU postponed the decision due to the human rights situation until 1999 when the EU decided to treat Turkey as a potential member state. This may have set out a southeastern border between Europe and the Middle East.
tween pillar one and pillar two (Sacristan-Sanchez 2001:70-71). The Commis-
sion, supported by the European Parliament, had under the first pillar included
democratic principles and human rights. The driving force within the Commu-
nity had been the Court of Justice, which, due to the lack of Community legisla-
tion protecting basic rights, developed a body of case law where human rights
were an integral part of the general principle common to the system and which
provided the foundation for Community law (Commission Communication COM
(95) 567 of November 22, 1995).

In 1991, the EU Commission presented the document, Human Rights, De-
mocracy and Development Cooperation Policy and argued that the end of the
Cold War allowed for an improved democracy promotion in Europe and else-
where. The new post-Cold War order required less attention to alliances and
strategy considerations, but rather facilitated for democracy promotion that could
help, for example, the new postcommunist states to democratization. The Lux-
embourg European Council of 1991 accepted the proposal from the Commission
and adopted a declaration on human rights that established a platform for democ-

racy promotion. It was decided that the Commission would annually present the
results of the resolution taken and that regularly held meetings would aim to de-
velop firm strategies for how to become a democracy promoter. It was also, al-
though without any decisions taken, proposed that future democracy promotion
had to include sanctions against third states that did not develop accordingly. The
Resolution clearly stressed that the future relations with all third states had to be

In 1992, the Commission presented a first report on how to implement the
Resolution. The Commission argued that the democracy promotion could occur
through the regular aid accounts available, the specific accounts for democracy
support targeting NGOs on human rights, the democratization projects in Latin
America and one project on human rights and democracy in developing states.
The Commission also set out the activities made and what the future activities
could consist of. However, it was soon realized by the Commission that there
was a lot of work left on democracy promotion. The different accounts related to
democracy promotion were spread to three different Directorate-Generals re-

sponsible for different geographical regions and without any internal coordina-

In 1992, in a report to the Lisboan European Council, the Commission
stressed three conditions for membership of the EU: a European identity, democ-
racy and respect for human rights. These conditions were discussed, developed
and officially stated in June 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council. The Un-
ion required stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and protection of minorities as well as a functioning market economy and
the capacity to deal with competitive pressure and market forces within the Un-
The most important notion of these criteria was the democratic criterion, although establishing a functioning market economy was seen as a parallel important process. The founding Treaties had not explicitly referred to such rights and principles (*Treaty of Rome*).

The EU coordination of policies, between the Council, Parliament and Commission, was further highlighted in 1995 and resulted in a series of Communications from the Commission to the Council and Parliament. In 1995 a new democracy clause was agreed upon stressing the suspension of aid and trade provisions in states with democratic falls. It was stressed that the respect for human rights and democracy were “essential elements” in the relations with third states (Gillespie & Youngs 2002:4-6). The Commission Communication of 1995 (216) on the *Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between the Community and Third Countries* stated that,

“A commitment to respect, promote and protect human rights and democratic principles is a key element of the European Community’s relations with third countries. These issues have been gradually incorporated into the Community’s activities over a period of time through series of commitments culminating in the insertion of explicit references to human rights and democratic principles in the body of the Union Treaty” (1995, 216:1).

Another important Communication, from May 2001, *The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries*, reaffirmed the Treaties and Charters developed over the years. It highlighted that the European Union was founded on the principles of democracy and human rights as fundamental freedoms and emphasized that such criteria were consolidated and how sanctions could be used towards those that were not respecting these criteria (The European Commission, COM 2001, 252 final on May 8th, 2001).

This was a landmark in the development of the EU as a norm-community and as a democracy promoter. The development of the EU as a norm-community has included an increasing number of democratic and market-oriented member states. The widening of the Union, out of the six original member states, began in

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85 There were for example, *The European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy* (COM (95) 567 final); *Democratization, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance: the Challenges of the Partnership between the European Union and the ACP States* (COM (98) 146) and *Countering Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism in the Candidate Coun-
the 1970s with a first wave of new states in the U.K., Denmark and Ireland and continued in the 1980s with a second wave including Greece, Spain and Portugal. In the 1990s, a third wave was accepted with Austria, Finland and Sweden, increasing the number of member states to 15. The Copenhagen summit of June 1993 decided in favor of additional enlargements in the coming decades by opening the door for Central and Eastern Europe.86

The promotion of the democracy norm has had idealistic and pragmatic motives. The idealistic motives have included the missionary idea of the morally good in promoting democracy with political rights and civil liberties. The pragmatic motives have linked the collapse of Communism to the chance of integrating new markets and to secure state interests. The EU has perceived democratization as a parallel process to marketization and security. It has been argued that democracy, welfare and security have had conditioning relations (Smith 2001:34-35). First, an expansion of democracy eastward has been perceived as the most cost-effective way to provide political and economic stability and reconstruction in postcommunist states. Second, an expansion of democracy would also lead to the expansion of the western formula and type of order that Western Europe had consolidated over time. It would safeguard western standards as more and more states adopted the formula (Smith 2001:31, Seidelmann 2001:128-130, Pravda 2001:2-3).

**Slovakia**

For instance, the EU was challenged by the growing interest among primarily Central European states to join the Union. At first, the EU tried to deal with the interest from for instance Slovakia by offering different agreements and partnerships (see section 6.4), although it was soon forced to accept the idea of an upcoming enlargement. The hesitation and worries in the EU were due to the many postcommunist states that sought membership of the Union and due to the real or perceived threat that an enlargement would endanger the norm-community by including less developed member states. This danger referred to both the financial aspects as well as to the integrative aspects of such membership. However, the member states of the EU soon realized the many dangers inherent in an exclusion of postcommunist states. Without an enlargement, the political and economic changes in postcommunist states could very well develop into alternative

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86 The European Council in Madrid of 1995 opened for negotiations with Malta and Cyprus and the Helsinki European Council of 1999 agreed to treat Turkey as a candidate state. It was openly argued that there would be future enlargements of the Union and this was formalized at the European Council in Nice in December 2000.
and challenging political and economic systems that could threaten the vision of a future Europe of democracies and market economies. Such development could also jeopardize European stability with a new dividing line in European politics between east and west. The EU therefore decided to focus on the most unproblematic states in Central Europe with good chances of becoming democracies and market economies). The Central European states perceived such closer ties to the EU as a way of benefiting politically as well as economically, but also as a way of returning to Europe (Baun 2000:xvii, 20-27, Friis 2003:187).

Belarus
However, the EU also recognized the successor state with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. It was a concern to the Union that the disintegration of the Soviet Union would not lead to chaos and anarchy that could jeopardize the stability in Europe. It was also a concern to the West that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was not replaced by a new opposing superpower. This could become the case if the fragile and newly independent states, such as Belarus, were left on its own. However, the EU was cautious towards most Eastern European states, including Belarus, very much due to the unfavorable conditions for democratization being less politically developed than the Central European states (and perhaps due to role of Russia). There was an overall perception within the EU that the states in this region would not be able to adopt the democracy norm for the foreseeable future and the interest of the EU was therefore long-termed in nature, assisting most Eastern European states gradually into the economic mainstream of Europe. The Parliament insisted on democracy promotion as well, besides the financial interest, but without effect within the EU. On the other hand, the economic assistance to Belarus could help in bringing democracy to Belarus, while a developing market economy in Belarus could open for trade and investments. The EU perceived Belarus as a potential market for EU businesses. As Belarus was a new and underdeveloped state, there was a great need of assistance from the West to develop Belarus to become a functioning state. Based on this knowledge, the EU could very well expand its market eastward providing Belarus with western accessories. Such an expansion would be a new opportunity for EU businesses. Belarus, and the other parts of the former Soviet Union, had been an insignificant market for the EU before the 1990s. Due to the Cold War, trade, development and humanitarian assistance were very limited. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union opened for an economic interest. Belarus also provided important sources of minerals, such as oil and gas. These sources made the EU financial assist Belarus and other states in supporting the export towards EU member states (Smith 2002:232-235, Dumasy 2003:183-184).
Finally, the interest in expanding democracy in Europe also had to include military interests (Pehe 2003:36-37, Council of EU 2001:10). The Southeast region faced violence and refugee flows that had become a major concern for EU democracy promotion. The wars on the Balkans were of an inter-state as well as an intra-state nature and threatened the stability of the region, but also of Europe. This had become most obvious with the early wars on Balkan of the 1990s. Many years of failed attempts by EU member states to stop the wars and the ethnic cleansing led to a growing wisdom that the Union had to become an improved foreign policy actor beyond EU territories and the economic sphere. This awareness led to an institutionalization of foreign policy within the EU starting with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In the late 1990s, the EU Commission stated that the Balkans was of great concern to the EU and a critical test of the ability of the EU to democratize the region.

The EU policy towards the Balkans and primarily the FRY was based on a security interest. The EU policy had to focus on how to reconstruct war-thorn societies, but also how to prevent future wars. Based on the failures of ending the wars on the Balkans of the early 1990s, it was obvious that the EU saw the ongoing events on the Balkans of the late 1990s as a potential threat to Europe. The centralization of power to Belgrade within the federation and reports on escalating tension between primarily Belgrade and Pristina, led to fear within EU member states of a new emerging war on the Balkans (European Council Cologne, Presidency Conclusions 1999). The threat of a widening of the conflict, from Kosovo to include former war-thorn societies, made the EU decide for closer ties to the Western Balkans. This decision marked an expanded interest from the EU, focusing on Central European states in the early 1990s to also include Eastern Europe of mid 1990s and finally Southeastern Europe in the late 1990s. Such an approach also expanded the interest from promotion of democracy and market economy to stability and security (Ágh 1998:305, Baum 2000:xvii-xviii).

In May 2004, the Union was enlarged, consisting of 25 member states. Many of these new member states were postcommunist states. This enlargement verified the notion of an enlarged norm-community of the early 21st century, including postcommunist states (Goldstein 1999:442, cf. Krenzler 1998). New efforts have also opened for new member states. In December 2004, Romania and Bulgaria ended their negotiations with the EU and the goal is to become member states in 2007. In December 2004, Turkey began negotiations with the EU on membership and in June 2004, Croatia became a candidate state with negotiations for membership starting in 2005. Macedonia also applied for membership in March 2004 and the Commission is obliged to screen Macedonia’s status and
identify necessary reforms to be taken. The enlargement process and the preparations for future enlargement should be seen as the expansion of a norm-community. Without such enlargement, Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe would remain a political and economic vacuum that could destabilize Europe. As long as the potential member states adjust and commit to the norms provided by the EU member states, the increase in member states may increase the power of the Union in European politics. The widening of the Union, including more member states, implies the expansion of the norms provided by the EU and the marginalization of opponent norms in Europe (Harris 2002:42, Friis 2003:179-180, 187, cf. Laffan 1998, Rosecrance 1998). As argued by Goldgeier and McFaul,

“[With] the collapse of communism or, more accurately, the collapse of autocratic governments and command economies that followed the Soviet model leaders are under increasing pressure to adopt international norms about economic liberalism and political democracy” (Goldgeier & McFaul 1992:475-476).

Summary

The preservation and promotion of democracy have led the EU to become an important norm-provider in Europe. The democracy clause in the external policies and in all third state agreements is a way for the Union to promote its interests beyond EU territory. The commitment to the democracy norm was officially expressed in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. Until the 1990s, the EU had been based on democratic member states, but focused less on promoting the democracy norm. However, the end of the Cold War led to an interest within the EU to promote democracy in Europe and elsewhere, targeting primarily the Central European states. For instance, Slovakia was at an early stage perceived as a prodemocratic and market-oriented state and received great attention from the EU. The EU had interest in Eastern European states, such as Belarus, as well. However, the EU perceived many obstacles for Belarus to democratize and focused the attention to economic and technological assistance aiming at market economy and economic integration. The EU also saw obstacles in expanding the democracy norm towards Southeast Europe as well. This was primarily due to the instability of the region and where FRY was a central player for the ongoing violence on the Balkans. This made the EU more interested in security than democracy, although security was seen as a reinforcing interest to democratization.

87 See www.regeringen.se/sb/d2809/a15744 (2005-08-02)
The discussion on the interests of the EU in Belarus, Slovakia and FRY may be illustrated as in Table 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1993-2003</th>
<th>Belarus (Eastern Europe)</th>
<th>Slovakia (Central Europe)</th>
<th>FRY (Southeast Europe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTORS</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERESTS</td>
<td>Market Economy</td>
<td>Democracy &amp; Market Economy</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10: Interests**

### 6.4 Methods

The EU has used different methods to promote the democracy norm and other interests to the postcommunist states. If the promotion of democracy in the 1970s was more of an ad hoc character, the 1990s has shown a more determined EU in promoting democracy, market economy and security; more institutionalized and financed. The reason for the more institutionalized and financed promotion has been the relaxation of East-West relations in Europe, which allowed for internal organizational changes within the EU (Whitehead 2001:419-420, Pridham 1994:24-25, Pinder 1994:24-25).

There has been a gradual improvement in the methods used towards Central European states such as Slovakia. For instance, in 1974, the Community offered bilateral agreements with Central European states, but due to hostility from the Soviet Union, only Romania dared to approve such an offer. In 1988, based on the EC-COMECON declaration of June 1988, the EU established diplomatic relations with USSR, GDP, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia and trade agreements followed. This opened for diplomatic relations, but also economic trade agreements. At the G7 meeting of 1989, Western leaders decided to implement an assistance program coordinated by the EU and the Directorate-General 1A within the Commission (Lundgren 1998:83).
Slovakia
The first program from the West towards Central Europe, in a post-Cold War setting, was the Poland & Hungary – Assistance for Economic Reconstruction program (Phare program). The Phare-program was established in December 1989, providing financial assistance aimed at promoting economic modernization. The Phare program focused on Poland and Hungary, but was soon extended to other states including Slovakia (Laffan 1992:162-165, Preston 1997:195-197, cf. Smith & Timmins 1999). From 1989-1999, such assistance was figured to 11 billion ECU. The Phare program aimed to support the transformation to market economies and in doing so, to also assist in establishing democracies. In 1992, the Commission decided to, after the proposal from the Parliament, to link the economic assistance to the promotion of democracy. The Phare Democracy Program economically assisted projects aimed to improve the parliamentary democracy, human rights, the rule of law, an independent media and a dynamic civil society of unions, associations and organizations (Baum 2000:28, Lundgren 19998:84).

In 2000-2006, Phare is providing an additional 11 billion Euro. Overall, the Phare program has concentrated about 70-75% on infrastructure and 25-30% on institution building (Avery & Cameron 1999:19). The Phare program has stressed the necessary reforms that have to be applied by using the financial assistance; these reforms are political in nature in the commitment to the rule of law, human rights, free and fair elections and the establishment of a multiparty system among other things (Smith 2001:40). As stated by the Commission,

“Assistance from PHARE is provided to help the candidate countries to: 1) Implement the acquis communautaire and to prepare for participation in EU policies such as Economic and Social cohesion; 2) Fulfil the requirements of the first Copenhagen criterion: the ability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Commission 2002, 3303-2:5).

The EU methods towards Central Europe was intensified by Association Agreements in 1993, so called Europe Agreements, based on Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome and which included liberalization of trade and strengthened diplomatic relations. The Europe Agreements aimed to establish a free trade area between member states and non-member states, ranging up to a 10 years period. Europe Agreements were first signed with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (then the Czech-Slovak Republic). It was later on extended to ten Central European states; Poland and Hungary in 1994, Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1995, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1998 and Slo-
venia in 1999. The *Europe Agreements* were ratified by all the member states and the Community and included cooperation in the political, economic, judicial and cultural field. However, the Europe Agreements contained no promise of membership, but rather sought to deepen the economic and political ties (Avery & Cameron 1999:21, Smith 2002:244, Preston 1997:198-1999).

At the summit in Luxembourg in December 1997, the European Council decided that the political and economic assistance would encompass a multilateral framework. The *Accession Partnership* set out in one framework priority areas, the financial means to achieve these priorities and the conditions which applied to the EU assistance. The *Accession Partnership* included details on the obligations that had to be met by the candidate states regarding democracy, macroeconomic stabilization, industrial reconstruction, nuclear safety and the adoption of the acquis. This partnership included a *National program for the Adoption of the Acquies*, which stressed the necessary reforms to be taken by the targeted states. It also set out the possibility of sanctions if a recipient state did not comply with the *Europe Agreements*. The Accession Partnership Regulation 622/98 read,

“...where an element that is essential for continuing to grant pre-accession assistance is lacking, in particular when the commitments contained in the Europe Agreement are not respected and/or progress towards fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate steps with regard to any pre-accession assistance granted to an applicant State” (in Maresceau 2003:37).

In 1997, the Phare funding was invested in the *Europe Agreements*. The Commission set out the New Phare orientations for assistance focusing on the identified weaknesses in each candidate state. The Phare program thereby operated as part of the Europe Agreements by being an important financial instrument for this development. As set out by the Commission

“The overall objective of the PHARE programme is to help the candidate countries to prepare to join the European Union. The programme continues to be ‘accession-driven’, concentrating support on priorities, which help the candidate countries to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. To achieve this, PHARE support continues to
focus on the priority areas for action identified in the Accession Partnerships” (Commission 2002, 3303-2:2-3).

Belarus
The EU methods towards Belarus and other Eastern European states (and Central Asia) have mainly been structured by the Technological Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (Tacis Program), targeting Belarus and 12 other states (including Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The first eight-year program of 1991 to 1999, with a budget of 4.226 million Euro, was decided on at the European Council in Dublin and in Rome in 1990. The program provided economic support for technical developments that could enhance the transitions in the newly independent states. In order words, technical assistance was a stand-alone activity. The EU sought to financially assist these states in becoming market economies, but also sought to strengthen the economies and then especially in the sectors of gas and oil and improve nuclear safety, the environment and the private sector development.

The EU re-evaluated the Tacis program in 1998 and decided to focus on political priorities in the promotion of democracy. A new Council Regulation adopted in January 2000 set out the new guidelines for 2000-2006 with a total budget of 3,138 million Euro (see Council regulation No 99/2000 of December 29, 1999: Article 6). The assistance targeted several different areas such as the private sector and economic development, social sector and the consequences of economic development, infrastructure networks, nuclear safety and environmental protection. The assistance with political goals was directed at reinforcing democracy and the rule of law and ensuring the observance of democratic principles and human rights.

The political assistance had been postponed for some years due to the fragility in the region in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the Tacis program from 2000-2006 included the democratic criteria. This implied that commitment to democratic values would open for further assistance (Council Regulation 99/2000, Article 3). The annual budget of political assistance, as institution building, was about 450 million Euro. The key areas for this program were among other things to support institutional, legal and administrative re-

88 There have also been other programs implemented directed towards Central Europe, although without any clear democratic dimension in the assistance.
89 Mongolia was covered by Tacis to 2003, but was then covered by the ALA program.
forms (see Council Regulation No. 99/2000 of December 29, 1999). The Tacis program stressed the necessity for the partner states to abandon the inherited legal and penal code from the Soviet system (Commission, External Relations Directorate General 2000:4). The Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 99/2000 of 29 December 1999) concerning the provision of assistance to the partner states in Eastern Europe, clearly stated that societal progress had to occur in a context of free and open democratic societies. As set out,

“Such assistance will be fully effective only in the context of progress towards free and open democratic societies that respect human rights, minority rights and the rights of the indigenous people, and towards market-oriented economic systems” (paragraph 5).

The Tacis program has mainly been structured through bilateral agreements between the single third state and the EU.92 These national programs cover 3-4 years and set out priorities and areas of cooperation, but also annual and biannual action programs identifying those projects that will be supported and funded. The political framework has come to be the Partnership & Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) that have been adopted by nine Eastern European and Central Asian states, setting out guidelines for ten years of bilateral cooperation between EU and the partner state. This agreement, from 1999 and forward, is a formalization of the partnership between the EU and the third state and in which the Tacis program functions as the main instrument. The establishment of PCA was aimed at intensifying the cooperation between the EU and Eastern European states as a way of assisting the transformations of these states, partly opening these states for EU businesses. The PCA aimed to intensify trade relations and promote the development of economic cooperation based on market economic principles. The PCA would also facilitate for an overall improved political dialogue on the developments in the region and intensify the economic integration in trade relations, economic cooperation and in the establishment of market economies (Paznyak 2003:5, Smith 2002:237).

The development of programs directed towards Eastern Europe was a result of the scheduled enlargement process of 2004 and the new upcoming borders.93

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92 The Tacis assistance has been applied within frameworks of actions programs in national, regional and small projects program. The regional programs are multi-country programs and covers major issue areas, while the small project programs (budget less than 200,000 Euro) focus on specific tasks such as governmental advice, trade regulation and cooperation in higher education. They are both focusing on cross-border issues and often touch on the sectors of environment and infrastructure.

93 As a consequence of the enlargement of 2004, a new policy, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched aiming to build a bridge between the new expanded Union and the neighbor-
This led to a new dialogue between the EU and the partner states from Eastern Europe, and an interest within the EU to redirect some funding for the Eastern European states that borders the EU (European Union Regional Policy 2001:9). There has, however, been more focus on a few of these states compared to others. For example, the EU has developed two Common Strategies with Russia and Ukraine June 1999 and December 1999, which are political documents that draw up overall policy guidelines and ensure coordination of all projects. The long-term partnership aims to develop stable democracies, stability and security and intensified political, economic and cultural links to the EU. Almost half of the Tacis budget has been spent on Russia, while Ukraine has received about 20%, leaving the rest of Eastern European states to share 30% of the budget. This showed the greater interest within the EU for influencing Russia and Ukraine as two major states in Eastern Europe compared to Belarus.\textsuperscript{94}

\textit{FRY}

In addition to the political and economic methods used towards Slovakia in Central Europe and the primarily economic methods towards Belarus in Eastern Europe, the EU has also used military methods. The EU:s overall concern over the Balkans began as early as in 1991 with the independence declarations from some of the former republics of the Federation of Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia took place at the time of the fall of the Berlin wall as well as at the time of the fall of the Communist regimes in Europe. These events made the EU overwhelmed by events, which lead to a postponed involvement from the West in supporting the Balkans. Eventually, Western actors got involved in what seemed to be a crisis management laboratory (Vukadinovic 2001:438).

The EU tried to use diplomacy to restrain the different parts from using violence. This led to a mediated cease-fire in Slovenia, an arms embargo imposed on FRY and established negotiations with Slovenia and Croatia leading to their declarations of independence in 1992. However, in 1995, it was obvious that the

\textsuperscript{94} See www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/index.htm (2005-07-10)

EU did to have adequate tools for peacemaking in the region. The negotiations in Bosnia failed and the military presence of EU troops, provided primarily by Britain and France (UNPROFOR), needed political and military back-up by the U.S., which led to the Dayton Peace Agreement (Smith 2002:254-255).

The EU methods towards FRY of the mid-1990s and forward were based on the Dayton Peace Agreement. The agreement was to be met through the Royaumont Process, launched in December 1996. This process included several projects such as civil society development, cultural projects and human rights projects among other things. The EU set out that any assistance aimed at political development in the region had to be based on intra-regional security and cooperation. The EU also decided that the assistance would be implemented on a case-by-case basis highlighting the specific priorities in each state and evaluating each state’s progress. This linked the political and economic assistance to the implementation of the peace agreement (Vukadinovic 2001:437).

In April 1997, the EU General Affairs Council adopted the Regional Approach that firmly established potential bilateral relations with the EU. This approach focused on democratic principles, human rights, rule of law, and protection of minorities and market economy reforms. The Regional approach included assessments of the developments in these states and their willingness and ability to respect the EU standards. These assessments determined if EU would develop agreements with assistance (Vukadinovic 2001:447-448, Vachudova 2003:147).

However, in early 1999, the international community failed to see Milosevic signing the Rambouille Treaty. The Treaty concerned the relation between Belgrade and Pristina within the FRY and fundamental principles of a democratic Kosovo with a Constitution, police force, election procedures, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction programs (Magnusson 1999:9). Instead of peace and development, Kosovo and Belgrade was engaged in war. As a consequence, the EU decided to impose sanctions on the FRY. However, the UN Security Council had issued several Resolutions that in different ways acknowledged the violence used in FRY. Resolution 1203 was finally signed and advocated the redrawing of the Serbian troops from Kosovo. The Resolution also opened for access for the OSCE to supervise the peace implementation. It was soon realized that there was no peace to implement.

In March 1999, NATO decided to launch a bomb-raid on Serbia as a humanitarian intervention, which aimed to be “swift”, “severe” and “sustained” (Judah 2000:227, quoting Holbrooke from BBC and News night). This was the result of the failed peace implementation. Overall, the air campaign was intensified for each week that passed by and came to include a broader definition of military targets including communication, infrastructure and energy supplies. The intensified air campaign followed the idea of proportionality and escalated as long as Milosevic refused to give in (Independent International Commission on Kosovo...
From a EU, NATO and U.S. perspective, Milosevic was the one to blame for unleashing the brutality on the Balkans during the 1990s (Pharo 2000:7-8, Henrikson 2000:41-55). The conducted air strikes involved the U.S., Canada and the EU member states in the U.K., France and Spain, but with support from all NATO members and most EU members. The EU supported the military methods and stated, on March 24, 1999, that,

“the international community had done its utmost to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict...we would like to end the isolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Europe. But for this to happen, Milosevic must choose the path of peace in Kosovo and the path of reform and democratization, including freedom of the media in the whole of Yugoslavia” (in Auerswald & Auerswald 2000:708-709).

The event in Kosovo in 1999, marked a clear shift in attention on behalf of the EU. Until 1999, EU assistance had focused on crisis management and reconstruction through economic assistance and political diplomacy, although in 1999 the EU explicitly stressed that stabilization had to be based on military presence. EU member states come to play a core function in the postwar Kosovo, as military forces from the U.K., France, Germany and Italy were included in the UN forces (Smith 2002:255-256).

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95 NATO stressed that the crisis in Kosovo represented “…a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO had stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law” and that the bombing “supports the political aims of the international community...a peaceful, multiethnic and democratic Kosovo...” (North Atlantic Council April 1999 at www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm). This perspective was also shared by OSCE in their press release of March 24, 1999 where the organization stressed that it is “…absolutely necessary to prevent a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo” (in Auerswald & Auerswald 2000:705, Ignatieff 2000:20-21). The position held by NATO, the OSCE and the EU was somewhat supported by the International Independent Commission on Kosovo, initiated by the Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, to find an independent analysis on the conflict on Kosovo. The Independent Commission argued that the origins of the crisis had to be understood in terms of nationalism that led to the rise of power by Milosevic and the official adoption of an extreme Serbian nationalist agenda (2000:1). The Commission concluded, “…the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, the Commission considers that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule” (2000:4).

96 For an overview on the positions on the US, Canada, UK, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, see Martin & Brawley (eds.) (2001) and Alliance, Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War – Allied Force or Forced Allies?

97 For further reading on positive and negative opinions on the air campaign, see Lund 1999, Mandelbaum 1999, Sørensen 1999, Booth (ed.) 2001.
In 1999, in a post-war setting, the Commission granted 378 million Euro as assistance and an additional 127 million Euro for reconstruction. In addition to the financial investments, the EU also provided military assistance of 36,000 soldiers from EU states as members of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which made up 80% of the total force. In addition to these military forces, 800 civilian police from EU member states have also served Kosovo (Vachudova 2003:150). Based on the enforced peace in FRY, the Commission stated that the future of the FRY and the other Balkan states was within the EU. The reforms, based on military force, could eventually lead to full membership (Vukadinovic 2001:448-449, Bengtsson 2004:105-106).

In 1999, the EU also decided, as a consequence of the Kosovo crisis, to launch a Stabilization Process (SAP) towards Southeast Europe and to set up Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with each state. SAP was sealed in November 24th, 2000, at the Zagreb Summit after confirmation by the regional actors to search for stabilization. It was assured that as the reforms were implemented, the stabilization process would lead to a SAA that focused on a contractual relationship in the form of tailor-made agreements. The agreed stability pact between the EU and the specific state included three working tables on democratization and human rights, economic reconstruction, development and cooperation and security issues. The SAP was finally offered to five Balkan states, including FRY (as well as Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia and the Former Republic of Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) (Vachudova 2003:141-142). The Council Regulation stressed the commitment from the EU to facilitate for integration of the states of the region “into the political and economic mainstream of Europe” (Council Regulation EC No. 2666/2000, December 5, 2000).

In May 10, 2000, the European Commission also introduced the EU program for Community Assistance, Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) amending regulations (EEC) No. 3906/89 and (EEC) No. 1360/90 and decisions 97/256/EC and 1999/311/EC. The CARDS program (former Obnova) had a total budget of about 4.6 billion Euro of 2000-2006. The CARDS was

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98 The European Agency for Reconstruction started to function in Kosovo in February 2000. Based on the guidelines from the Commission, the agency has focused on reconstruction and institution building. 260 million Euro supported this work in 2000 and 285 million Euro in 2001 covering infrastructural developments as well as institution-building efforts as well as civil society support. Overall, the EU has come to be the single largest donor to Kosovo. See www.ear.eu.int/home/default.htm (2005-03.15).

99 The European Council stressed at the top meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003, that the states on Balkan had a future within the Union if the criteria were met (Bengtsson 2004:106).

100 See also www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/index.htm (2005-01-26).

101 It replaced former programs such as the Obnova program by the repeal of Regulation (EC) No. 1628/96, Regulation (EC) No. 2666/2000.
developed out of the decisions and statements made at the European Council meetings in Lisboa in March 2000 as well as in Feira in June 2000. The main purpose was to facilitate for reconstruction and regional cooperation, economic and social development as well as democratization and the rule of law with human and minority rights. It was stated that the program was aimed at equipping each state to become and maintain stable democracies with solid democratic institutions and the rule of law as well as developing prosperous economies with strong links to the EU as well as within the region. These developments could very well lead the states in the Balkans to become candidate states for EU membership (EU Commission 2002, 490:67, Vachudova 2003:151-152).

**Summary**

The methods used by the EU to promote interests such as the democracy norm, market economy and security have covered political, economic and military methods. The EU has primarily pursued political and economic methods towards Slovakia and economic methods towards Belarus. However, the institutionalization of these methods has been far more developed towards Slovakia than towards Belarus. This was a result of the late liberalization of most Eastern European states and the unfavorable factors in these states to democratize. Besides political and economic methods, the EU also used military methods towards FRY in cooperation with other Western organizations. The EU supported the intervention by NATO of FRY and has continued to use military methods in Kosovo. The different methods used by the EU are illustrated in Table 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1993-2003</th>
<th>Belarus (Eastern Europe)</th>
<th>Slovakia (Central Europe)</th>
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<td>ACTORS</td>
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<td>METHODS</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Political &amp; Economic</td>
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**TABLE 11: METHODS**
6.5 Channels

The attempts to promote interests, through applied methods, have been channelled top-down as well as bottom-up into the domestic environment of Slovakia, Belarus and FRY. The different methods have been institutionalized into programs and contracts, such as the Phare towards Slovakia, Tacis towards Belarus and SAP and Cards towards FRY. These programs have been aimed at including the political elites and the representatives within the civil society in each postcommunist state into a larger process of socialization. The methods have primarily aimed at socializing the identities around a positive notion of the democracy norm through the improvement of political and economic standards (Youngs 2001b:355-360).

It has been argued that the EU has prioritized a bottom-up approach compared to other actors such as the U.S. By promoting democracy, through for example socioeconomic reforms, the EU has been less concerned with institutional building (Youngs 2001b:355). This is both right and wrong. The EU has focused on creating a favorable environment for institutional progress by focusing on the economic and social aspects of societal transformation. This has included an approach of moving away from election monitoring towards support for the civil society by using political and economic methods. It has also advocated strengthening accountability and transparency of institutions towards the society at large as well as assisting NGOs to become politically active. However, the EU assistance has also targeted the political elite. This has been the case through agreements, contracts and partnership. Much of the assistance directed towards postcommunist states has been agreed on with the political elite, although perhaps targeting the society as well. There has been focus on the political elite, a top-down approach, to facilitate for a bottom-up approach. The top-down approach has been aimed at establishing power-sharing institutions and supporting moderate politicians that may frame the developments in society in a prodemocratic way (Youngs 2001:366).

Slovakia

The external assistance programs in for example Phare and Europe Agreements have primarily been channelled top-down through the Slovakian elite. The support for institutional, legal and administrative reforms is aimed at redrafting legislation, supporting effective policy-making and public administration and providing support to executive and legislative bodies. There have also been projects strengthening public administration and institutions to function effectively in accordance with EU standards. They have also focused on a legislative adjustment to adopt EU legislation (the acquis communautaire) and has included transferring of know-how through twinning projects involving EU experts in the targeted
states as well as institution-building activities providing the targeted states with key institutions (Lundgren 1998:85-89).\footnote{102 www.europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/pas/phare/focus.htm (2005-08-03)}

However, the top-down approach, by seeking agreement with the elite, has also come with assistance to the civil society. For example, the Phare Democracy program has focused on citizens’ participation in civil society organizations and associations and on strengthening their capacities in the democratization process. Other programs (such as the Lien program) have supported NGOs in the social and economic sector, although based on the vision of a dynamic and prosperous civil society as favorable to democratization. These programs have been aimed at strengthening the civil society in order to become an independent sphere in the societies that may foster new pro-democratic attitudes. There has also been assistance to decision-makers at local and municipal level, in their efforts to develop social and economic policies, by supporting local political and legislative institutions and municipal decision-makers within agencies and other local institutions. The promotion of interests towards Slovakia has therefore been channelled top-down as well as bottom-up.

Belarus
The open and unproblematic channels towards Slovakia have not been present in Belarus. The prioritized method towards Belarus was the PCA as a 10-year bilateral negotiated agreement between the EU and Belarus. The EU wanted to assist Belarus in the economic development as it was obvious how the EU border would enlarge eastward. However, the PCA agreement with the Union was never signed (Paznyak 2003:14). In 1997, the EU Council decided that Tacis assistance would be limited to humanitarian and regional projects and to support for democratization. All other projects would be cancelled due to the negative political progress in Belarus. The Tacis program for 1996-1999 with a budget of 37 million Euro was suspended due to the political development in Belarus and in 1998, the EU cancelled a sub-program of Tacis. During 1996-1999, Belarus was receiving 5 million ECU/year and the same amount of money was decided for 2000 and forward with no signs of increased assistance (Krivosheev 2003:174, Davidonis 2001:25-26).

Since 1997, two Tacis National programs have been launched towards Belarus with a 5 million budget each for the development of civil society, focusing on the media, NGOs and the youth sector. The Belarusian government approved this program, although it led to tension as many journalists complained over the harsh climate for investigating politics and economics in Belarus. In 2000, another Tacis program was launched for 2000-2003 to support the development of

\footnote{102 www.europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/pas/phare/focus.htm (2005-08-03)}
the civil society. The financial statistics over the allocation of Tacis resources from 1991 and forward indicates a declining funding from the EU with no allocation after 1996 and forward except for the limited assistance to the civil society.\textsuperscript{103}

\textit{The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights} (EIDHR), decided on in April 1999, is aimed specifically at assisting from the bottom-up without the consent from the targeted state. This has led to an implementation of the initiative in states where the targeted elite has suspended EU assistance or where the situation in the targeted regime has been unfavorable for negotiations between the EU and the elite. The EIDHR approach has come to focus on bottom-up areas such as strengthening civil society, human rights and independent media beside the political and judicial institutions. This assistance program has been based on the perception within the EU that a consolidated democracy and a society with protection of human rights require NGOs, local and regional authorities and agencies.\textsuperscript{104} Based on the Council Regulations 975 and 976 in 1999, the EIDHR has had an annual budget of 100 million Euro as an added value to other programs and has been handled by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (Interview Lhoest September 17, 2003, EU Commission 2002, 490).\textsuperscript{105} However, due to the many problems in Belarus, the EIDHR was also cancelled from 2002 and forward. This was primarily the result of the new decrees implemented by Lukashenka in restricting the freedoms of the NGOs within the Belarusian society and by endorsing the creation of new governmental controlled NGOs (Paznyak 2003:6).\textsuperscript{106} The government owned media has also worked against critical NGOs by sending negative information as well as ignoring events that could work against the regime (Karatnycky et al 1999:111-112).

Another obstacle has been the fact that the civil society in Belarus has not always been prodemocratic. The EU has tried to work with those organizations that have a good international reputation and that perhaps have been connected to other western international organizations (Interview Luzenberger September 12, 2004).\textsuperscript{107} The main opposition party, BNF, has continued to argue that democratization in Belarus is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/tacis/financial_en.htm (2005-08-03)
\item \textsuperscript{104} www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/eidhr_en.htm (2005-08-06)
\item \textsuperscript{105} It should, however, be noted that EIDHR has focused on states all over the world, including around 30 states as selected states and with a time-period of 2 years. The 2-year assistance has then been evaluated and new states have been included. This should be compared with the long-term commitment from the EU through the assistance programs in Phare, Tacis and Cards (see Council of the European Union 2002:50-57).
\item \textsuperscript{106} www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/belarus/intro/index.htm (2005-05-16)
\item \textsuperscript{107} The most powerful and prodemocratic independent organizations in Belarus are the Association for Legal Assistance to the Population, the Center for Legal Protection, the League for Human Rights, the Association of Journalists, the Association of Prisoners of the Lukashenka Regime and the Movement for Free and Democratic Elections, among a few others (Karatnycky et al 2002:100).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
achievable, although the EU must differentiate between the ruling elite and the population and focus on programs and contracts for the citizens. By improving the social and economic situation for most Belarusian’s, the population could be convinced that closer ties to the EU and the West would benefit them (Batory Foundation 2003:35).

**FRY**

The top-down approach was also challenged between the EU and FRY during the Milosevic era. Just as the situation in Belarus, the EU faced resistance from Milosevic and his supporters within the government. The authoritarian rule of Milosevic and the war over Kosovo led to weakened diplomatic tools. The escalation of violence in FRY under the authoritarian rule led to an isolation and intervention policy by the West. The EU and other western actors isolated Belgrade through political and economical sanctions. The EU and other western actors also focused on strengthening the opposition forces within FRY. This included economic assistance to opposition parties and the diplomatic recognition of these forces as prodemocratic forces within FRY. Massive aid assistance was directed towards the opposition forces in FRY; first the Alliance for Change and then the DOS. The EU also used an economic blockade on Serbia during the Kosovo crisis and tried to frozen foreign assets of businesspeople closely connected to Milosevic. This also included a blockade from travelling to the EU member states. Other actors that received aid were NGOs in student groups, labor union, community associations and policy institutes. The top-down and bottom-up approach implied assistance to opposition parties, the civic advocacy sector, media and oppositional forces at municipal level. Politically oriented NGOs, such as student groups, labor unions and policy institutions among others, received western funding in their efforts to undermine Milosevic; the aid directed towards FRY was aimed at decentralizing power in order to undermine the political control by the elite (Vachudova 2003:149-150). Overall the aid was large, decentralized, sustained and coordinated and led to failed attempts by Milosevic to isolate the society from foreign involvement (Carothers 2004:54-58, Carothers 1999:53).

**Summary**

The EU has tried to adopt a top-down and bottom-up approach towards the post-communist states. The top-down approach has aimed for a direct effect on the democratization of each state as the elite has acknowledged and adopted the assistance. This has been a prioritized channel of promotion as was the case of Slovakia. However, in some cases, the domestic elite has refused to approve and adopt the methods used by the EU, which has resulted in an obstructed top-down
approach. The top-down and bottom-up approach was seen towards Slovakia while an obstructed top-down approach was visible in Belarus. As a consequence, the EU tried to adopt a bottom-up approach towards Belarus. The top-down approach was also obstructed towards FRY, due to the Milosevic rule, but the EU decided to assist the opposition forces as well as the population in large. Assisting methods top-down towards the opposing fraction of the elite assisted the top-down approach of isolation of Milosevic. The top-down channel was fully opened up in 2000 as a result of Milosevic’s downfall. The different channels are illustrated in Table 12.

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<td>CHANNELS</td>
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**Table 12: Channels**

### 6.6 Relations

The EU has developed different relations to the postcommunist states. The relation has symbolized the nature of the interaction between the promoter and the domestic actors. The EU has tried to approach most Central European states with high demand and support, offering assistance based on specific demands. The vision of EU membership and the enlargement of the norm-community have framed such relation. The relation has implied potential membership of the EU if there is a domestic implementation in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria’s (Smith 2002:250). The relation to the other states of Europe has been somewhat
different. This has been due to their status of being less politically and economically developed and therefore not perceived by the EU as potential candidate states.

*Slovakia*

For instance, in 1994, the EU Commission began to work on a pre-accession strategy towards the Central European states, including Slovakia. It was stated in the Europe Agreement that the agreement opened for political dialogue on future membership. The Slovak government set out a pro-European policy in 1995, which included an aspiration to become a member state and applied for EU membership on June 27, 1995. The Memorandum accompanying the EU membership application of 1995 highlighted how,

> “the strategic objective of the Slovak Republic is to become a full-fledged member in the EU within the time horizon around the year 2000. The Slovak Republic wishes to join the EU as an equal member actively contributing to the advantageous multifaceted cooperation” (Commission, Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, July 1997).

The Commission stated that the application by Slovakia was a symbol of Slovakia’s return to Europe. The final step was to adjust to the criteria from the European Council in Copenhagen. The EU would also provide support through political dialogue and economic cooperation aimed at membership. The economic rapprochement would lead to political convergence in a consolidated democracy. The Slovakian government also expected full EU membership of 2000 based on democratic progress and an implementation of market economy.

The Commission was entrusted with the mission to evaluate the progress within the candidate state in relation to the Copenhagen criteria as a measurement of evaluating the preparation for membership. The Agenda 2000 of 1997 included an enhanced pre-accession strategy for the Central European states. The agenda was a single framework including the Commission opinions of each candidate state to meet the demand. The progress on accession by each state was evaluated and officially reported in the annual progress reports by the Commission. These reports focused on the concrete progress made and what remained to be done. The annual reports followed the guidance from the Council Conclusions in Luxembourg describing the situation in each candidate state and the EU within the framework of the *Europe Agreements*, analyzing the political conditions and economic conditions, including the judicial and administrative capacity (Maresceau 2003:32-34, Smith 2003:115-118, Baum 2000:78-81).
In July 1997, the Commission handed over the Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union to the Council and Parliament (Avery & Cameron 1999:44-100). The opinions by the Commission set out how the Commission ranked the candidate states based on the criteria and were followed by annual Regular Reports on each state and their democracy progress. Limited progress in the commitments contained in the Europe Agreement and towards the consolidation of the Copenhagen criteria would open for appropriate steps with regard to support granted (in Maresceau 2003:37, Interview Bievert September 12, 2003).

The Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of the European Union (Doc/97/20 15th July, 1997) set out the Opinion as an examination of the Slovak application for membership and the EU Commission declared that the political developments in Slovakia were insufficient to become a member state. Slovakia was measured on its progress on institutional stability and functionality, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minorities. The evaluation focused on the political situation of June 1997 under the subtitle Democracy and the Rule of Law and Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities. The Commission noted harassment of the opposition, political manipulation of investigations of such wrong-doings, the overall disrespect for the rule of law, centralization of power, exclusion of opposition from oversight of governmental institutions, corruption and an on-going stigmatization and propaganda that pointed out the opposition forces as anti-Slovaks and enemies of the state. It was obvious from a EU perspective that Slovakia had paid lip-service to the demand set out by the Commission (Krause 2003:59-68, Pridham 1999:1222-1223, Samson 2001:364-368, Avery & Cameron 1999:45-47). As concluded by the Commission on Slovakia,

“Slovakia’s situation presents a number of problems in respect of the criteria defined by the European Council in Copenhagen. The operation of Slovakia’s institutions is characterized by the fact that the government does not sufficiently respect the powers devolved by the constitution to other bodies and that it too often disregards the rights of the opposition. The constant tension between the government and the President of the Republic is one example of this….Substantial efforts need to be made to ensure fuller independence of the judicial system, so that it can function in satisfactory conditions. The fight against corruption needs to be pursued with greater effectiveness. Apart from this the treatment of the Hungarian minority, which still lacks the benefit of a law on use of minority languages, even though the Slovak authorities had undertaken to adopt one, as envisaged by the constitution, needs to be improved. The situation of the Roma similarly needs attention
from the authorities. In the light of these elements, although the institutional framework defined by the Slovak constitution responds to the needs of a parliamentary democracy where elections are free and fair, nevertheless the situation is unsatisfactory both in terms of the stability of the institutions and of the extent to which they are rooted in political life. Despite recommendations made by the European Unions in a number for demarches and declarations, there has been no noticeable improvement” (Commission Agenda 2000:vol.3).

The evaluation by the EU was a severe challenge for Slovakia. It told the elite and the citizens that the EU membership was in question, as the state had not adjusted to the criteria set out by the norm-community. The evaluation pointed out several flaws in the democratic progress and questioned the readiness of Slovakia to become a member state. The Agenda 2000 provided consistent pressure on Slovakia and guided the elite and the population towards further democratization, including both institutional reforms as well as reforms on human and minority rights issues (Pridham 2002:204-207, Commission Regular Reports on Slovakia 1998:8, EU Commission Regular Reports on Slovakia 1998:7-12).

Belarus
Belarus’ declaration of sovereignty and the absence of violence in the secession process opened for a new relation between Belarus and the EU. Belarus also set out a pro-Western strategy by establishing contacts with western organizations. The EU and Belarus completed the negotiations for PCA in 1995 confirming that Belarus is an important European state. The agreement would include economic assistance (Dumasy 2003:179-180). However, the political progress in Belarus challenged the relation to the EU. The political development after the Presidential elections of 1994, with centralization of power, abolishment of the democratically elected parliament and repression of the opposition and the civil society, led to an unsigned PCA. The flawed referendum of 1996, reforming the 1994 constitution in a way that concentrated power to the presidency as well as replaced the elected parliament with a national assembly selected by the president, led to decisions among Parliaments of EU member states not to ratify the agreement. The EU did not recognize the new constitution and the Tacis program was immediately cancelled with few exceptions (Paznyak 2003:5).

In 1996, the EU offered discussions and meetings on the possibility of democratic progress in Belarus. However, despite these efforts, the authoritarian ruling elite in Belarus refused to implement any political suggestions by the EU and continued to restrict the rights and liberties within the Belarusian society. The EU declared that the cooperation with Belarus was non-constructive and that
the obstructive attitude from Lukashenka towards the West undermined any support (Dumasy 2003:182-183). In September 1997, the EU Council of Ministers stated,

"…the EC and their member States will conclude neither the interim agreement nor the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, Bilateral ministerial contacts between the European Union and Belarus will, in principle, be established solely through the Presidency or the Troika, Implementation of Community and member states technical assistance programs will be halted, except in the case of humanitarian or regional projects or those which directly support the democratization process."\(^{108}\)

The worsened relation of postponed support from the EU, was further intensified in 1998 as Lukashenko demanded foreign ambassadors to abandon their residences for planned building repairs (Nikonov 1999:117). This led to an end of diplomatic discussions between Belarus and most EU member states and only a few ambassadors have returned to Belarus thereafter. The ties also worsened when president Lukashenka did not extend the accreditation of the international staff members of OSCE in Minsk (EU Statement on Belarus, Permanent Council No. 418, 31 October 2002). This was due to accusations from Lukashenka that the Election Monitoring Mission by the OSCE, in the Presidential election of 2001, consisted of opposition forces. The incident led to the EU banning President Lukashenka and other highly positioned members of the Belarusian government from entering EU territory. This decision was made by fourteen member states and lifted in late 2002 (Interview Ramsay September 15, 2003, Interview Luzenberger, September 12, 2004, Rozanov 1999:21-23).

The worsened relation of declining assistance and no open channels has closed most doors for any effective support. The EU seems to have implemented a strategy of “reactive cooperation” (Batory Foundation 2004:33)\(^{109}\) towards Belarus, awaiting positive signals before launching any support. These signals must be the return of powers to the parliament, the representation of opposition in the electoral commission, fair access to media for the opposition and electoral legislation and conforming international norms and standards. However, as long as the democratization process is put on halt, the EU is most likely to ignore Belarus. This has led to a more or less isolated Belarus in Europe and where the EU has decided to cancel most contacts with the state. This has led to a relation of


low demand and support, where the EU awaits positive signals from Belarus before developing any plans (Batory Foundation 20004:43).

FRY

The post-Dayton era of EU policies towards FRY was based on high demand followed by low support. The EU demanded full compliance of the Dayton Agreement; Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia were closely followed and any support given was linked to the implementation of the peace accords. The Regional Approach, launched by the Commission in 1997, was based on a set of demands that had to adopt to be granted support by the EU. The Approach was a rough copy of the pre-accession process that had been offered to many of the Central European states, including Slovakia. The Regional Approach aimed at assessing the progress made in FRY (and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania) in adopting democracy, respect of human rights and regional stability. The assessments would determine if FRY was granted support or not through trade agreements, but also from the Phare program (Vachudova 2003:147-148). SAP was presented as an award to those states in the Balkans that showed clear traits of progress. The SAP visualized the path towards potential EU membership, although this was a long and winding path. However, it was only FYR of Macedonia that complied with the demand set out by the EU. In 1998, the Commission stated that FRY had failed to meet the demands set out by the EU. The Commission stressed major democratic weaknesses as well as human rights abuses (European Commission 15 April, 1998).

The undemocratic means in the Yugoslavian society and the police and military activities in Kosovo led to a Yugoslavia continuously viewed by the international community as a pariah state (Dryzek et al 2002a:60-61). The perception by the West was that the Rambouillet process had been halted by Milosevic and that violence and ethnic cleansing had become part of the official agenda. It was soon argued by the EU and the West, that Milosevic seemed to be the main obstacle to democratization and the potential force behind the escalation of violence. The centralization of power to Belgrade and the undemocratic methods used to stay in power as well as the human rights abuses in Kosovo were clear signals that the EU and the West had misinterpreted the role played by Milosevic in the Balkans (Vukadinovic 2001:442-443).

As stated in Article 5, paragraph 1, “Respect for the principles of democracy and the rule of law and for human and minority rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential element for the application of this Regulation and a precondition of eligibility for Community assistance. If these principles are not respected, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate measures” (Article 5, paragraph 1).
The new perception that the EU had of Milosevic resulted in the new demand to see him leave his office and to see prodemocratic changes. The demand was backed up by economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation and military intervention. The economic isolation of Belgrade, as Milosevic continued to break human rights in Kosovo and refused to acknowledge democratic principles, was followed by the economic blockade by the EU during the Kosovo crisis (Carothers 2004:54). The military intervention in Kosovo and the bombing raids on Belgrade were extreme methods that followed after FRY refused to obey. On June 12, 1999 a settlement was codified by the United Nations Council Resolution 1244 which removed Kosovo from Belgrade’s sovereignty into the control of about 50,000 soldiers (KFOR). It divided Kosovo into a British, French, Italian, German and American sector (Rezun 2001:63-66). Kosovo became, under the security of NATO, controlled and ruled as a UN protectorate – the United Nations Interim Administration Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK). The role of UNMIK has been to, with support from the EU and other actors, continue to demand democratization and offer assistance as such a process goes on. There has also been progress in Kosovo, which has been highly supported. For instance, in July 1999, the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) was established with 36 members reflecting on the mission of the UN to promote democratic self-governance in Kosovo. At the same time, Kosovo representatives joined the UNMIK’s pillar heads in an Interim Administrative Council (IAC), which functioned as advisory cabinet. In mid-2001, a second stage was entered through the transition from UNMIK institutions to structure of governance of the people of Kosovo and their representatives. In 2001, Kosovo also held election for a provincial assembly under the initiative of the UN. This effort led to the promulgation of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in 2001 and that paved the way for further democratization of Kosovo by establishing the Parliament of Kosovo with the duty to elect a president of the province. This re-

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111 The Resolution 1244 was adopted on June 10th, 1999 and stated, “Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;” (S/RES/1244 (1999). see www.unmikonline.org (2005-02-16)
112 www.unmikonline.org/1styear/iac (2003-06-24)
113 UNMIK has come to rest on four pillars. Pillar I, Humanitarian assistance, is led by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while Pillar II, Civil Administration, is led by the UN (became Police and Justice in May 2001). Pillar III, Democratization and Institution-Building, is led by the OSCE and Pillar III, Reconstruction and Economic Development, is taken care of by the EU. The work has been supervised by the head of the UNMIK in the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo (SRSG) as the most senior international civil official in Kosovo and with the executive power derived from the UN Security Council (Rezun 2001:72-85).
form was followed in 2002 by the election by the Kosovo Assembly of the president and the prime minister (UNMIK/REG/2001/9).114

The end of the Milosevic era opened for increased support. The political change in Belgrade also led to greater openness within the federation between Serbia and Kosovo. The guiding demand from the EU of compliance to peace, stability and reconciliation has been followed by support in terms of increasing amount of assistance through established programs.

**Summary**

The EU developed different relations to the postcommunist states. These relations have been characterized as demand and support. The EU has preferred a relation of high demand and support framed by the enlargement process. This relation has implied that the targeted state follows the guideline set out by the EU and is rewarded through assistance. This has been the case towards most Central European states as in the case of Slovakia. The status of being a candidate state implied the high demand in the Copenhagen criteria, but also high support to meet these criteria. However, the EU also faced failed relations with Belarus, as the elite did not accept the promotion of democracy from the EU. This led to failed assistance as the PCA was never ratified and signed by the EU. This started the process towards an eroded relation leading to a relation of low demand and support.

The FRY faced a relation of high demand and low support as the EU perceived the domestic situation between Serbia and Kosovo as a source for European instability. The EU responded by military force, as well as economic and diplomatic isolation, although came to include increased support after the end of the Milosevic era. The intervention of FRY made Kosovo an interim regime under UN supervision. Both parties had to accept the interim regime within FRY and to comply with the demand set out in the UN Resolution on the developments and the status. The EU has come to increase its support significantly to FRY to support the path towards becoming a future member state of the EU. The support has, however, been based on the high demand of preserving stability and reconciliation. The different types of relations between the EU and the three postcommunist states are set out in Table 13.

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114 [www.ecmi.de/cps/documents_kosovo_unmik.html](http://www.ecmi.de/cps/documents_kosovo_unmik.html) (2005-03-14)
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<tr>
<th>1993-2003</th>
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**Table 13: Relations**
6.7 Impact

Despite the international presence of the EU as policy-maker and norm-community, the Union has had different impact on different postcommunist states. The variation in impact has led to high and low impact and of positive and negative kind. This means that the promotion of democracy has led to a pro-democratic reaction in one state, but to an antidemocratic reaction in another. This is obvious when looking at the nature of the reactions and the scope of the reactions in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY.

Slovakia
The promotion of democracy towards Slovakia resulted in a growing scope of positive reaction among the population as well as within the opposing elite. The critical symbol of such development was the mobilization of pro-democratic and pro-European reactions surrounding the election of 1998 and that come to end the Meciar era in Slovakian politics. The election turnout was strongly related to the evaluation by the Commission on Slovakia’s membership application. The evaluation of the Slovakian progress by the EU Commission had excluded Slovakia from a first perceived enlargement and triggered political mobilization within Slovakia. A growing proportion of the population in Slovakia saw the EU as a positive point of reference and how the evaluation of 1997, excluding Slovakia from a future enlargement, led to the isolation of the state from Europe. The exclusion of Slovakia by the EU Commission in the Agenda 2000 seemed to strengthen the image of the EU in Slovakia. This was symbolized by an increase of intended promembership votes as well as in the overall positive opinion of the EU. The EU has been perceived as the most important partner for the future of Slovakia and the overall opinions on the EU have improved (Commission, CEEB, 1998, cf. Commission Eurobarometer 2004). As stated in the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB),

“It appears that the rather negative evaluation of the country’s internal situation has led many Slovaks to look for an external point of reference for their hopes and ambitions” (Commission, CEEB, 1998).

The election in 1998 was surrounded by political debate and mobilization among civilians and NGOs. The perception among the population and within the EU was that the ruling elite had politically disturbed a EU membership and disregarded democratic weaknesses in the Slovak society (for example corruption and
bad treatment of minorities). There had been growing frustration over the undemocratic means used by the regime in Slovakia and over the worsened relations to the West. It was primarily the younger generation that wanted to see a new government in 1998. They were enforced by NGOs that wanted to secure a free and fair election by informing the population of the upcoming election as well as providing knowledge on the content of a free and fair election. The upcoming election was preceded by citizen’s involvement with people engaged in political debates and town-square meetings. Although, people disagreed on many domestic issues, there seemed to be an overall agreement that Slovakia had to democratically improve (Bútora & Bútorova 1999:84, Interview Biévert September 12, 2003). The outside support from the EU and other western actors also opened for growing political awareness within Slovakia, as many understood that the election would be under international scrutiny (Pridham 2002:210-211, Pridham 1999:1238, Bútorova et al 2003:53, 55, Commission Regular Reports on Slovakia 1998:13). As argued by Pridham,

“Thus, in different ways, the perception of Slovakia’s difficult relations with the EU and the international environment and the link here with democracy in Slovakia had spread through the country, and it found an active outlet in this election” (Pridham 2002:214).

The positive reaction towards the EU and the democracy promotion was also seen within the opposition. The strong leadership of Meciar over the 1990s had been a major obstacle for opposing politicians. They had faced a massive problem in getting known among the public and to have a say in the political debate. However, in late 1990s, these politicians were well known among the population and most voters knew about their profile and their political agendas. The four major opposition parties, the center-right Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and its allies in the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) and the Party of Understanding (SOP), were allied in a coalition and pronounced one spokesperson, Mikuláš Dzurinda, as the opponent to Meciar (Bútora & Bútorova 1999:91, Interview Biévert September 12, 2003, Nations in transit 1999-2000:561). The ideological message from the opposition to the younger voters had been pro-market, pro-democracy and pro-west. This led to a massive societal force for political change as the population showed greater interest in the election and as the opposition was able to set out their agenda and future policy for Slovakia (Bútorova et al 2003:53-54). The 1998 election became a window of opportunity in Slovakia. Years of transitional status, as a fragile democracy, provided growing support for a regime change. Compared to 1989, such change was now more specified; it was not any change from Com-
munistism, but rather changes towards greater democracy, market economy and EU membership.

The positive reaction to the role of the EU and to the evaluation of Slovakia in the agenda was obvious after 1998 and forward. Based on the identified weaknesses of the democracy in Slovakia, measures were taken to solve those problems. One of the first measurements by the new ruling elite was a joint letter to the Commission stressing the willingness to rejoin Europe. Parliamentary amendments to the Constitution also enhanced the consolidation of democratic institutions and strengthened the rule of law. These amendments were steps closer to membership since they included the possibility to transfer sovereign rights to the EU and provide for the supremacy of EC law over Slovak legislation. Other domestic reforms focused on the rights and liberties of the minorities, by for instance ratifying the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages (Commission Regular Report on Slovakia 2001:14-25, Bútorová et al 2003:63-64). The elite also handled the problem of corruption by the implementation of the National Program for the Fight against Corruption (Commission Regular Report on Slovakia 2002:20-32). The Slovak Republic also reinforced the Western orientation of the foreign policy by working close with EU and NATO (Interview Biervert September 12, 2003). The Parliament approved a security and defense strategy setting out further integration of Slovakia with the EU. Slovakia also showed a keen interest in the developments of Europe and participated in the development of the CFSP at the same time as aligning with many of the statements and declarations made by the EU on crisis and conflicts in Europe. This led to participation in international peacekeeping missions on the Balkans. The pro-European commitment was visible in the crisis of Kosovo and the embargo on former Yugoslavia, but also in the monitoring work on Western Balkan and the stabilization forces (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Commission Regular Report on Slovakia 2002:116, Commission Regular Report on Slovakia 1999:53).

The new elite of post-1998 led Slovakia into full membership of the EU in May 2004. In 2000, Slovakia began accession talks and in December 2002, negotiations were concluded. The overall positive reaction to the EU also increased over the years. This was visible through an increasing percentage that had a positive opinion to the EU, saw Slovakia’s future within the EU and would use the

115 The 2002 Report on Slovakia stressed the continuation of important political reforms. “Whereas the 1997 Opinion and the 1998 Regular Report concluded that Slovakia did not fulfil the political criteria, the 1999 Regular Report came, for the first time, to a positive evaluation in this respect. Since that time, the country has made considerable progress in further consolidating and deepening the stability of its institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. This has been confirmed over the year. Slovakia continues to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria” (Commission Regular Report on Slovakia 2002:32).
The member states of the EU and the candidate states, including Slovakia, decided in December 13, 2002 on an agreement for admission. The accession treaty was signed in Athens on April 16th, 2003 and was ratified by the acceding states. In spring 2003, Slovakia held referendum on future membership of the EU. The Slovaks voted in favor of EU membership with 92% supporting the idea. This was a strong indication on the new path taken by Slovakia after the change of regime of 1998. It was obvious how the EU had been of high-value for Slovakian politics and the possible membership was an extremely good tool for political change (Interview Biervert September 12, 2003, Haugthon 2003:72-73).

Belarus

In sharp contrast to the positive reaction in Slovakia, the EU saw low and negative impact in Belarus of the mid-1990s and forward. The negative and low scope of reaction was symbolized by the unsigned PCA agreement that stopped the EU from influencing Belarus through the established assistance program. The promotion from the EU of the mid 1990s and forward led to growing hostility within the elite with accusations that the EU misunderstood the political status in Belarus. The introduction of political goals in the assistance supporting Belarus led to a harsher climate between the two. The erosion of the relation between the EU and Belarus came with harsher dictatorial grip from the ruling elite as well. The ruling elite, with Lukashenka as primarily leader, developed anti-western attitude towards the EU and other western organizations (Dumasy 2003:189). As argued by Dumasy,

“Opposition to the changes under the referendum amongst EU countries, as well as concerns over lack of democratisation and over human rights violations, have had a knock-on effect for most areas of co-operation with Belarus since 1996” (Dumasy 2003:182).

In 2001, PCA strategy papers were once again developed now covering 2002-2006, but with the exception of Belarus. Belarus was not interested in the EU, its policies or assistance and has rather perceived the EU, as the rest of the West, as a potential or real enemy of Belarus (Kuzio 2001:482). The EU may become the model for a future Belarus symbolizing a viable political and economic alternative. This requires, however, a fundamental change of perceptions of the EU both within the elite and among the population. The promotion of interests by the

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Union has been translated by the elite as a strategy of Western imposition aimed to undermine the sovereignty of Belarus (Dumasy 2003:186-187). The negative perceptions harbored by the Belarusian elite towards the West have led to negative reaction to the democracy promotion by the EU and to the enlargement of the Union. The negative impact of the promotion towards Belarus has also been symbolized by a pro-Soviet policy by Belarus. The goal has been to develop closer ties to Russia as the EU borders have enlarged eastward. In 1996, the Belarusian Parliament declared the collapse of the Soviet Union as illegal. Such policy has come with other policies that tighten Belarus to Russia rather than the EU.

The limited reaction within Belarus has primarily been obvious in the disorganized opposition and the low political commitment among the population. The opposition has experienced weakness in the absence of a strong and pro-democratic leader that could convince the masses of the possibility of a new political and economic path of Belarus. In addition, the harsh political climate supported by the regime has made any political ambitions from the opposition parties dangerous (Potocki 2002:153-154). The opposition parties have also been divided and weak with low political support from the masses. The political apathy among most citizens as well as the problems in getting access to the media to promote political ideas made the opposition parties weak and quite unknown. There have also been few signs of pro-democratic or pro-EU reactions within the population. Instead Belarusian politics has been taken care of by the elite. The limited scope of reaction within Belarus beyond the ruling elite has further obstructed the EU from continuing the democracy promotion strategy towards Belarus (Kuzio 2001:482-483, Krivosheev 2003:166, Interview Luzenberger September 12, 2003).

**FRY**

Finally, the isolation and military threats followed by military use from the West and the EU towards Milosevic led to a negative reaction from Belgrade. The Serbian elite perceived the EU, with the rest of the West, as a hostile and imperialistic power that tried to humiliate the FRY by questioning its sovereignty. This reaction was shared by a large proportion of Serbs that rallied around the leadership denying any wrong-doings by the nation in the wars of the 1990s and eager to protect the nation from the West and from Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. However, there was a change in reaction in 2000 and forward. The critical symbol was the event in 2000, in the mass demonstrations on the streets of Belgrade, which was due to the intervention in Kosovo and the western military campaigns against Belgrade. The intervention by the West in the Kosovo conflict of 1999 and the retreat by Serbian forces from claimed UN territory triggered growing frustration among the Serbian population towards Milosevic. Serbs had per-
ceived Milosevic as a strong leader protecting Serbian nationality and interests. The loss of Kosovo in 1999 to the international community clearly indicated that Milosevic no longer could provide unity and progress in FRY. It also indicated that the rest of Europe saw the regime as illegitimate and underdeveloped and a major threat to the process of European integration. The hostility from the West, with the intervention of 1999, at the same time as Milosevic faced political distrust and economic recession in Serbia, forced him to become more authoritarian, repressing political opponents and media in the Serbian society.

In 2000, the political opposition saw their chance to change Serbia politically. They demanded democratic elections and were supported by demonstrations in Belgrade calling for elections. Milosevic responded by an early call for elections. This strategy was based on the notion of a fragile opposition and the idea of gaining legitimate support for his Presidency. However, Milosevic miscalculated the support (Thompson & Kuntz 2004:165-167). In October 2000, massive demonstrations on the streets resulted in the overthrowing of the Milosevic regime and the election of the new President Kostunica. The new President, Kostunica, ended 50 years of Communist rule with the 18-party coalition with the name DOS. The end of the Milosevic era was consolidated with the parliamentary elections of December 23 where the DOS turned out as winner. This change opened for a transition in Yugoslavia. The year 2000 marked a critical turning point in Yugoslavian politics as the opposition and the people on the streets supported the idea of prodemocratic change (Freedom in the World 2000-2001: Yugoslavia Country Report). Or as argued by Carothers,

“Milosevic’s departure was only one step in what will inevitably be a drawn-out, difficult process of democratization in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, it was a major breakthrough, opening the door to genuine change at all levels” (Carothers 2004:53).

The fall of Milosevic opened for a new foreign policy in Serbia, based on an emerging positive reaction to the EU and the West. Since 2000, Serbia has embraced the idea of future membership of the EU as the West in general has been redefined in the eyes of many Serbian politicians and among the younger generation. This has led to a perception of the EU as similar to Europe and the belief that EU membership would strengthen the role of Serbia in European politics (Kostovicova 2004:23-25). The impact on Kosovo has also been mostly positive. The end of the Serbian oppression in Kosovo led to a positive reaction among Kosovo Albanians towards the EU and the West. The end of the Milosevic era triggered for optimistic visions on the future status of Kosovo (Freedom in the World 1999-2000: Yugoslavia, Kosovo Country Report). However, the final sta-
The undecided status of Kosovo has raised concerns among Kosovo Albanians over what the international community actually intend to do in the near future.

Summary

The EU has had more or less impact on the postcommunist states of the mid 1990s and forward. The impact has also shifted from being positive to the democracy promotion as well as negative. The EU has had high and positive impact on Slovakia. This was obvious in the political mobilization surrounding the election of 1998. The high scope of positive reaction was related to the rejection by the EU of Slovakia’s membership application. The opposing elite and the people on the streets demanded compliance from Slovakia to EU’s call for democratic reforms. However, the EU has had low and negative impact on Belarus. The negative reaction in Belarus was symbolized by the unsigned PCA, which led to weakened influence by the EU and a gradual erosion of the relation to Belarus. The growing passivity from the EU towards Belarus has also led to a low scope of reaction from Belarusians, leaving the politics towards the EU and the West to the ruling elite and to Lukashenka. Finally, the impact on FRY has been high and mostly positive. The intervention in FRY triggered demonstrations in Belgrade leading to the end of the Milosevic era. This was a major change of reaction within FRY from the time before the Kosovo crisis of 1999 when the political elite surrounding Milosevic and the people at large was hostile towards the West. The different types of impact are illustrated in Table 14.

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<tr>
<th>1993-2003</th>
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<tr>
<td>INTERESTS</td>
<td>Market Economy</td>
<td>Democracy &amp; Market Economy</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODS</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Political &amp; Economic</td>
<td>Military, Economic, &amp; Political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 14: Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNELS</th>
<th>Bottom-up</th>
<th>Top-down &amp; Bottom-up</th>
<th>Top-down &amp; Bottom-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONS</td>
<td>Low demand &amp; support</td>
<td>High demand &amp; support</td>
<td>High demand &amp; Low support To High demand &amp; support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPACT</td>
<td>Low &amp; Negative</td>
<td>High &amp; Positive</td>
<td>High &amp; Negative To High &amp; (mostly) Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6.7 Summary

This chapter has illustrated the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4. This framework consisted of six aspects of democracy promotion in Actors, Interests, Methods, Channels, Relations and Impact. Chapter 6 focused on EU democracy promotion towards postcommunist states in Europe. It was illustrated how the end of the Cold War led to a westernization of European politics with a powerful role for the EU in reorganizing European politics.

**Actors:** The EU has become a policy-maker as well as a norm-community towards Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe. This has challenged most postcommunist states including Slovakia, Belarus and FRY.

**Interests:** The EU has promoted the democracy norm and reinforcing interests in market economy and security. This has been a response to the complexity of the postcommunist states with their differences in political freedom, economic progress and stability. The EU has promoted democracy and market economy towards Slovakia and democracy through market economy towards Belarus. The EU has also seen reinforcing effects of security on democracy in FRY. Overall, Slovakia and Belarus have been far more stable than FRY, although Slovakia has been far more politically developed than Belarus.

**Methods:** The methods used by the EU of the 1990s were far more institutionalized compared to the methods in the Cold War context. The political and economic methods have been directed towards Slovakia in Central Europe, while economic methods was launched towards Belarus in Eastern Europe. The EU
was also involved in FRY in Southeast Europe due to the escalation of violence and the perception that violence could jeopardize the interests of the EU. This led to coercive methods in terms of political and economic isolation and military intervention.

Channels: The EU has promoted interests top-down as well as bottom-up. There has been a willingness to sign contracts/agreements with the political elite. This happened with Slovakia and facilitated bottom-up assistance as well. EU assistance was also directed towards Belarus aimed at a top-down partnership that would open for bottom-up assistance as well, targeting the civil society. However, the top-down approach was obstructed by the Belarusian elite, which led to limited assistance bottom-up. Finally, the EU pursued a top-down and a bottom-up approach towards FRY. The top-down approach consisted of sanctions and isolation of the ruling elite and of assistance to the opposing political forces. The bottom-up approach targeted prodemocratic forces in the society.

Relations: The EU has declared that the Union is open for democratic states. This policy led to a relation of high demand and support towards Slovakia as well as most Central European states. On the contrary, the failed relation to Belarus, in obstructed assistance and closed channels, led to a passive relation of low demand and support. The war-thorn FRY also opened for a relation of great uncertainty between FRY and the EU. The uncertainty resulted in a relation of high demand and low support. The EU set out criteria in security and reconciliation that had to be applied to receive any support. As FRY accomplished to follow the demand, the EU increased the support to the state. This was the case of 2000 and forward.

Impact: The EU was a triggering factor in the massmobilization surrounding Slovakia’s election of 1998, which was due to the evaluation of the democratic progress by the Commission. The positive reaction to the pressure from the EU among a growing number of citizens also rubbed off on fractions of the political elite. The EU also had positive impact in Belgrade. The high scope of prodemocratic reaction was seen in the massmobilization on the streets of Belgrade after the Kosovo intervention. The failure of Milosevic and his regime to defend FRY territory followed by political and economic ill performances contributed to growing political awareness in Serbia. This was in sharp contrast to the negative reaction in Belarus. The negative reaction from the elite has been based on the perception that EU democracy promotion aims at challenging the sovereignty of Belarus and that any form of western assistance is a potential threat to the survival of the state. This negative reaction has come with a weakly mobilized population that perceived EU:s decreasing interest in Belarus with no major signs of pro- or antidemocratic reaction.
Part 3: Theoretical & Empirical Contribution
7. Results

7.1 Presentation of Mission

The research on democratization has been based on the assumption that democracy symbolizes good governance and that democratization is a positive political process. Research undertaken on democratization has paid attention to the nature of democratization and opportunities and obstacles that exist. There has been an interest particularly in understanding the factors favorable to democratization. The aim of this study is to develop the theoretical thinking on factors favorable to democratization. The theoretical mission is to develop new theoretical insight on international factors to democratization by conceptualizing democracy promotion. This mission is based on the shortcomings in the traditional research on democratization. This study identifies a domestic dominance in the traditional research on democratization. The domestic dominance refers to the domestic bias in explaining why democratization may occur and to the neglect of international factors. The causes of the domestic bias in the traditional research on democratization are identified and suggestions are made on how to improve the understandings on democratization. The empirical mission of the study is to apply the analytical framework. The main purpose is to illustrate its significance, but also to shed light on the EU as democracy promoter and the democratization of post-communist states in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY.

7.2 Theoretical Contribution

This study presents a theoretical discussion on international factors and a conceptualization of democracy promotion. This is the most important theoretical contribution of this study. This conceptualization is based on the assumption that states are open systems that are influenced by international factors. This approach explores the literature on the subject of international factors to democratization and argues that there has been a growing interest in international factors in the literature on democratization, although there has been a great need for further conceptualization. By taking into account the research done on mainly interna-
tional relations, new theoretical insights may be developed on the subject of in-
ternational factors affecting democratization.

The conceptualization of democracy promotion is based on a thorough re-
view of the research done on democratization. The review includes a discussion
on how to theoretically define the democratization process, but also how to theo-
retically categorize the large bulk of studies on factors favorable to democratiza-
tion. The democratization process is the dependent factor. This process is theo-
retically defined into phases of change. There has been a growing theoretical
consent on treating democratization as a complex process without any ending
station. The democratization process consists of three phases in the pretransition
phase, the transition phase and the consolidation phase. The pretransition phase
includes liberalization in a non-democratic political setting as well as the phase
of unity where territorial borders, nationality and sovereign authority are agreed
on. The transition phase, on the other hand, refers to the political change from
dictatorial rule to democracy through the establishment of free and fair elections.
Finally, the consolidation phase is a long and open-ended phase in which democ-
ratric institutions and values become stable, persistent and well rooted in the po-
litical system and the society at large.

The second categorization concerns the traditional and large body of explana-
tory factors for the democratization process. It is argued that these factors, in the
research on democratization, have had a domestic bias. The causes of democrati-
ization have been searched for in the domestic context of actors and structures.
The categorization of the factors favorable to democratization results in socio-
economic, cultural and political factors. The socioeconomic factors have primar-
ily been structural-oriented focusing on long-term socioeconomic processes as
favorable to democratization. The cultural factors have concerned orientations,
values and civil society, while the political factors have concerned political insti-
tutions and political elites. It is primarily the political perspective that included
an actor-oriented approach to explanatory factors.

The identification and discussion on the forgotten factors in democratization,
the international factors, has required a thorough review of the traditional re-
search on the democratization process and the identified factors (primarily do-
mestic) triggering democratization. The identified international factors in this
study are democracy diffusion and democracy promotion. Democracy diffusion
refers to the spontaneous spread of democratic ideas. The diffusion of democracy
includes the spread of encouragement that political change is possible and the
spread of democratic ideas on how political change may be formed (how to be-
gin democratization and what obstacles to avoid). Democracy promotion, on the
other hand, is an active prodemocratic policy. The promotion of democracy aims
at democratizing other states into like-minded actors.
The theoretical contribution of this study is the presented analytical framework of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion is presented as Actors, Interests, Methods, Channels, Relations and Impact. The theoretical argumentation developed in this study is condensed into six succinct propositions. It is argued that, within a specific time-context (setting): (1) There are actors (2) that may promote the democracy norm and reinforcing interests. (3) They may use different methods of pursuing their interests and (4) that may be channeled towards domestic actors. (5) This may create certain relations and (6) have different impact on domestic actors. The conceptualization of democracy promotion provides a theoretical understanding of the different aspects of democracy promotion. It also opens for studies on democracy promotion. It may be argued that variation in the democracy promotion may cause variation in the democratization process. Such theoretical notion is interesting to further explore, as most research on factors favorable to democratization has been domestic-oriented.

7.3 Empirical Contribution

The empirical aim of this study is to illustrate the analytical framework. The empirical contribution of this study is to provide an improved understanding of democracy promotion and democratization in postcommunist Europe. Europe is a laboratory for research on democracy promotion and democratization. This is due to the many states that approached democratization. It is also due to the many and powerful international actors in Europe. This study contributes with an understanding of the EU as democracy promoter. It is argued that the EU is a powerful policy-maker and norm-community. The democracy norm has been institutionalized through the democratic member states as well as through the EU Treaties, stressing democratic principles as core principles of the community. The last decades of developments within the EU, making the Union to a powerful regional and global actor, has also come with a parallel process of enlargement of the norm-community. This has led the EU to become a potential democracy promoter in Europe as well as elsewhere.

This study explores the role of the EU as democracy promoter in three postcommunist states: Slovakia, Belarus and FRY. These three postcommunist states have all gone through major political and economic changes, facing the pressure of the EU. The EU was at an early stage engaged in assisting Slovakia towards democratization. The EU responded with institutionalized and financed methods of political and economic character. The Slovakian elite also approved the assistance. The interaction between the elite and the EU opened for demand and support aimed at consolidation and membership of the EU. The long-term assistance led to a gradual political and economic progress in Slovakia, which had prode-
democratic impact, both among the opposition forces that won the election of 1998, as well as among a growing number of citizens organized into NGOs. This resulted in free and fair elections of 1998, political mobilization and the change of government into a prodemocratic and pro-European state.

The EU was less interested in the Eastern European states and the institutionalized and financed methods were delayed towards Belarus. The EU saw a troublesome democratization process in Belarus and decided to unleash a primarily economic (and technological) assistance program to assist in the transformation from the Soviet Union. The economic and technological assistance later included a democratic dimension, although the relation to the Belarusian elite was weakened by such measures. There was a growing disagreement about the methods used and on the role played by the EU, which led to a worsened relation between the two through low demand and support. The impact on Belarus was negative, with a growing concern among the political elite that the West tried to decide the future of Belarus. As a consequence, Belarus saw a declining democratization rate as well as declining ties to the EU and the rest of the West.

Finally, the EU engagement in FRY was delayed by the many wars on the Balkans in the early 1990s. The interest in securing FRY and the rest of the Balkans forced the EU and other western actors to engage in democracy promotion. However, the activities by the EU were highly influenced by the violent clash between Serbians and Kosovo Albanians, which led to less interest in democratization and more interest in security. The hostility between the political elites also undermined political and economic agreements on how to develop FRY. Instead, the EU supported the use of military methods in FRY. The EU, with other Western actors, forced FRY into stabilization and reconciliation with the demand of peace and stability before launching any support. The end of the violent domestic hostilities in FRY opened for political and economic methods of high support that finally led to a positive reaction in Belgrade as well as in the society at large. The military use triggered political mobilization in Belgrade, which challenged and overthrew Milosevic’s regime and allowed for the implementation of free and fair elections. This ended the long-term era of authoritarianism. In short, we may summarize the empirical contribution of this study as set out in Table 15.
### TABLE 15: THE EMPIRICAL RESULT

#### 7.4 New Insight on Democracy Promotion

This study sets out that the most successful way of promoting democracy towards the three postcommunist states has been towards Slovakia. The successful democracy promotion towards Slovakia, bringing transition and consolidation in the 1990s, stands in sharp contrast to the failed attempts towards Belarus. Belarus has continued to be an authoritarian state with totalitarian traits. Finally, the case of FRY shows that democracy promotion through military methods may lead to democratization. The military use was controversial, although successful in the sense that the basic conditions for transition were enforced. The democracy promotion by the EU has led to unity and elections, although the promotion
of consolidation needs more time of political and economic assistance top-down and bottom-up.

This study shows that a successful democracy promotion seems to be based on a firm interest in democratization followed by methods used both top-down and bottom up. The methods used are characterized by high demand on the targeted state attached to high support and which most likely brings a positive reaction. Less likely is democracy promotion to succeed when the interest in democracy is limited, the methods applied likewise and when the democracy promotion process is obstructed by the regime leaving the democracy promoter with a bottom-up approach. Finally, democracy may also be enforced upon the targeted state. However, such democracy is most likely to become transitional in nature.

The empirical illustration in Chapter 6 has had theoretical implications. We may theoretically argue that democracy promotion may be understood in terms of modes of influences between the promoter and the receiver. The different modes of influences symbolize the nature of the democracy promotion between the democracy promoter and the targeted state. It was earlier discussed in Chapter 3.2 that there have been theoretical contributions on international factors as favorable to democratization. For instance, Whitehead’s illustration of modes of influences was an important contribution to the research on international factors to democratization, but was also, as he stated, in need of further conceptualization (See Chapter 3.2). This study contributes with new theoretical insight on democracy promotion as one international factor by developing the idea set out by Whitehead. The illustration on EU:s democracy promotion towards Slovakia, Belarus and FRY sets out different modes of influences and that may explain why some postcommunist states have become more democratized than others. Democracy promotion may theoretically be understood in terms of Democratization through conditional cooperation, Democratization through control and Democratization through contagion.

7.4.1 Mode 1: Democratization through conditional cooperation

Democracy promotion may be based on cooperation between the democracy promoter and the democracy receiver. This mode of influence is very favorable to democratization. It is based on an active role of the democracy promoter with interests in democratization. The interest in democracy promotion leads to a firm commitment to apply suitable methods to see democratization come true. These methods are most likely to be political and economic in nature. The methods are channeled both top-down and bottom-up to target the political elite and the population. The relation between the promoter and receiver consists of a high demand from the promoter that aims at guiding the targeted domestic actors toward de-
mocratization. Such demand sets out what obstacles to overcome to democratize and is attached to high level of support. The firm commitment from the democracy promoter, through applied method and the open channels into the domestic environment opens for a great chance of successful democracy promotion. The promotion of democracy may lead to a high scope of positive reaction within the targeted state and that fosters for democratization, both the transition phase as well as the consolidation phase. This was the case in the democracy promotion towards Slovakia.

7.4.2 Mode 2: Democratization through control

Democracy promotion may also be based on disagreement between the democracy promoter and the targeted domestic actors. The democracy promotion is characterized as the use of military force imposing democratization. The use of military methods is applied when there is security interest of the democracy promoter. The security interest is perceived as reinforcing to democracy, which opens for the use of coercive methods when political and economic methods have failed. The democracy promotion through military methods may very well establish the foundation for democratization, but may not facilitate further democratic progress. It may open up for transition, although the consolidation phase requires political and economic methods channelled in to the targeted state top-down and bottom-up. This was the case in EU democracy promotion towards FRY, finally leading to prodemocratic changes in Belgrade, although Kosovo remains quite uncertain.

7.4.3 Mode 3: Democratization through contagion

Finally, a third mode of influence is contagion. This mode of influence stands in sharp contrast to the other two modes in conditional cooperation and control. The mode of contagion symbolizes a passive democracy promoter. The passive form of democracy promotion refers to low interest in democracy promotion from the promoter, limited methods, obstructed channels from the domestic actors and low demand and support set out by the promoter. There may be a democracy promoter that of one reason or the other is promoting democracy although without any greater commitment. This may be due to reasons within the promoter, within the targeted state or both.

This study illustrates that the EU has been forced to rely on democratization through contagion towards Belarus. The hope for the EU is democratization of Belarus based on the proximity of a norm-community. The EU as a norm-community, rather than the EU as an active policy-maker, may have prodemocratic impact.
7.5 Theoretical and Empirical Limitations: future research assignment

This study has contributed theoretically and empirically to the research on and the understandings of democratization. This study illustrates that Mode 1 seems to be the most successful type of influence on democratization from the outside in. Mode 1, in conditional cooperation, consists of the active policies and methods applied by the democracy promoter, which are accepted by the political elite and representatives of the civil society. This opens for high and prodemocratic impact and that may trigger for democratization. This study also illustrates that Mode 2, in Control, may trigger democratization. This type of relation requires active policies and methods by the democracy promoter, and that are coercive in nature. Due to the lack of compliance from domestic actors, coercive methods force the targeted state into political change that may be prodemocratic in nature. However, this mode of influence may be limited to the transition phase. Finally, Mode 3, in Contagion, seems to be the mode that is less likely to promote democratization. It consists of low activities from the democracy promoter and low interests from domestic actors and perhaps the civil society and with low and negative impact as a consequence.

However, this study has limitations that open to future research. There are for instance empirical limitations in time- and contextual setting. There are also theoretical limitations such as the single-actor approach and the unintegrated international dimension to the domestic dimension. This is illustrated in Table 16 and further discussed below.
Theoretical

Analytical framework of the international dimension
Identification of the state of art on democratization with shortcomings

Theoretical assignment I: integration of international and domestic factors?

This study categorizes the traditional research on democratization and identifies the domestic bias. The theoretical aim is to develop a complementary dimension of factors favorable to democratization in the international factors. This is done through the conceptualization of democracy promotion. This is an important theoretical contribution to the existing research. It conceptualizes democracy promotion as an interaction process. However, this study does not theoretically integrate international factors to domestic factors. The next step in the research could be to theoretically integrate the complementary factors in the international factors with these domestic factors. This approach would focus on the interplay of international and domestic factors and link the prodemocratic forces in both domains together. The question to be answered would be: how may we theoretically construct an analytical framework that not only identifies the complementary factors favorable to democratization, in international and domestic factors, but also integrates them in to a horizontal and vertical relation?

Empirical

Illustration of the role of the EU as democracy promoter
Knowledge of the democratization of post-communist states.

Limited in geographical setting
Limited in time-setting

Test the framework of the international dimension in another geographical setting.
Test the framework of the international dimension in another time setting.

### TABLE 16: CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
<th>Future research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theoretical</strong></td>
<td>The international dimension as complementary, but not integrated with domestic factors</td>
<td>Integration of national and international favorable factors to democratization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single actor and pro-democratic-oriented framework</td>
<td>Multi-actor approach in the international dimension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical</strong></td>
<td>Limited in geographical setting</td>
<td>Test the framework of the international dimension in another geographical setting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited in time-setting</td>
<td>Test the framework of the international dimension in another time setting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Theoretical assignment II: the role of multiple actors?**

It is of outmost importance to theoretically conceptualize the policies and methods set out by actors. These actors may be of different types and they may all have pro-democratic interests. This study theoretically identifies the pro-democratic forces. Theoretically speaking, there are many actors involved in international politics that may be pro- or antidemocratic in nature. There is therefore a theoretical need to conceptualize a framework that takes into account the multiple of reinforcing and opposing actors with interests and methods used to influence other states. The development of an analytical framework that includes more than one actor could also take into account the different interests actors may have on the international arena, pro-democratic as well as antidemocratic in nature. The question to be answered could be: how may a multi-actor approach be included in the analytical framework in which different actors with different interests and ambitions are set out?

**Empirical assignment I: another geographical setting?**

This study shows that the constructed framework is useful when dealing with the democratization processes in postcommunist states. It illustrates that the pro-democratic interest of the EU has led to an institutionalization of democracy promotion by the Union that has influenced more or less all of Europe. The EU has been keen to stress democracy. As a consequence, the international factors are highly present in the European context. However, it is argued in Chapter 2 that the democratization process was most visible in the European context. This leads to the assumption that pro-democratic forces, such as the EU, most probably could play a significant role in the European setting of postcommunist states. However, other regions in the world are less democratized. This may lead to a weakened international pressure for democratization, as the traits of democratic governance are far less developed compared to the European setting. It would therefore be necessary and interesting to test the explanatory power of the international factors in other geographical settings as well. This could lead to analysis of the role of the EU in neighboring Mediterranean states such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, but also of the role of the EU in far-off geographical locations. This could be for instance the Latin America or the African, Caribbean and Pacific states. The questioned to be answered would be: how would the empirical explanations for the international factors to democratization look like in a non-European geographical setting near-by or far-off Europe?

**Empirical assignment II: other time-setting?**

This study is also restricted to the time period after the end of the Cold War and forward. More specifically, the empirical analysis covers primarily the mid
1990s and forward. The assumption is that the end of the Cold War was a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the illegitimacy of Communism, which led to a growing role of the West in determining the future of Europe. However, it is briefly set out in this study that the political setting might be more or less democratic and open for democratization. As stated in this study, the 20th century consisted of a few turning points after which the most powerful actors formed the political development. The turning point of 1989 and forward led to a Westernized order in which the EU and other Western actors could push for democratization. The international factors have not, however, been applied in another time-setting than the post-Cold War one and perhaps a different period would be less favorable to democratization. The selection of another time-setting could open for discussions on the increasing or decreasing role of the international factors to democratization over time. The questioned to be answered would be: how would the empirical explanations of the international factors in democratization look like in another time setting?

The discussion on contributions and the limitations of the study raise a few questions to be explored in future research. The first two questions concern the theoretical framework and the theoretical discussions on favorable factors to democratization. The final two questions concern the empirical analysis and the empirical discussions on democratization. The future research aims to include these questions into the analysis on the international factors to democratization. Such an attempt will further enhance the theoretical and empirical knowledge on the role of international factors in democratization. The main challenge would be to theoretically link the international factors to domestic factors and empirically illustrate what such linkage may look like. However, the future research would also expand the theoretical notion of the international factors by including other actors than the obvious prodemocratic ones. It would be interesting to conceptualize the international factors in terms of pro- and antidemocratic forces. Such an approach would perhaps include a focus on prodemocratic and antidemocratic forces, their relation and their impact on targeted states. This approach could be implemented in a European and non-European setting, starting out with the identification of what constitutes a prodemocratic and antidemocratic international force respectively. For instance, the multiple of actors could be identified in the EU (as a western power), Russia and for instance Iran. The inclusion of these actors would also trigger an interesting analysis of different interests promoted. This may be studied by integrating these international actors to the near-by states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and that are under cross-pressure due to their geographical location. This approach could take into account the political developments of for instance Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, as developing states from the Soviet era, and the multiple of international pressure that most certainly exist towards the domestic actors in these states. These states share
many similarities in being postcommunist states as well as facing a new political and economic agenda as sovereign states. They also share the international pressure from greater neighboring powers of different natures. This may open for an interesting theoretical and empirical study.
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Interviews & discussions

Per Eklund, Head of Unit  
EuropeAid Cooperation Office  
Monday, May 5, PM13.00  
Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 41, B-1040, Brussels

Taru Kernisalo, Project Identification  
EuropeAid Co-operation Office  
Monday, May 5, AM09.30  
Wednesday, September 17, PM12.30  
J-54 EuropeAid Office building  
Rue du Joseph II, 54, Brussels

Anne Koistinen, Desk Officer for Belarus  
European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations  
Unit E2 - Relations with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus  
Friday September, 12, AM09.30  
Rue de Loi 170 Charlemagne Building, floor 10, and office 31, Brussels

Raul de Luzenberger, Desk Officer for Moldova (former Belarus)  
European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations  
Unit E2 - Relations with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus  
Friday September, 12, AM09.30  
Rue de Loi 170 Charlemagne Building, floor 10, and office 31., Brussels

Patrick O’Riordan  
European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations –  
Human Rights and Democratisation Unit  
Friday September 12, AM10.45  
Charlemagne Building  
Rue de Loi 170, no. 11/109, Brussels

Bernd Biervert  
European Commission, Directorate-General for Enlargement, Unit A.5. Slovakia Team  
Friday September 12, PM12.00  
170 Rue de la Loi, Office CHAR 5/2 18, B-1049 Brussels

May Ann Ramsay  
European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations  
Monday, September 15, PM16.00  
Rue de la Loi 170, Charlemagne, Brussels

Miltiades Economides, Desk Officer for Kosovo  
European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations, D2 Yugoslavia  
Tuesday, September 16, PM 18.00  
Building Charlemagne 14/37, Brussels

Bernard Lhoest,  
EuropeAid Co-operation Office, Unit F-3, Democracy, Human Rights, and Thematic Support  
Wednesday, September 17, PM14.30  
Rue Joseph II Nr.54 7/73, B - 1049 Brussels
Appendix A: Interviews

Anne Koistinen, Desk Officer of Belarus, Unit E2, DG External Relations, Commission
- Discuss the overall relations between DG External Relations, DG Development and Euro-Aid Cooperation Office concerning Democracy Promotion in Eastern Europe.
- Discuss the overall relations between the Commission and other EU institutions in for instance the Parliament and the Council of Ministers concerning Democracy Promotion (authorities, budget, mandate etc. on democracy promotion).

More specifically,
- Discuss the development of new programs on democracy promotion.
- Discuss the implementation of programs on democracy promotion by the Commission and the frameworks of Tacis (time-line of programs, content of programs etc.)
- Discuss the specific relation between EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus of the 1990s. Are there any changes of democracy promotion before and after the Lukashenka era?
- Discuss existing democracy programs concerning EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus. What projects exist today and what are their content and target?
- Discuss the external relations of the EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus. What are the overall external relations to Belarus today and have these relations changed over the 1990s until today?
- Discuss the political status of Belarus since the declaration of independence. Concerning the political status of Belarus, is there any democratic progress that relates to the democracy promotion by the EU Commission?
- Discuss the future plans from the EU Commission on democracy promotion towards Belarus. What are the prospects for the next coming years regarding EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus?
- Discuss other external relations to Belarus. Are there any external relations that has negative impact on the result of EU:s democracy promotion?

Raul de Luzenberger, Desk Officer of Moldova (former Belarus), Unit E2, DG External Relations, Commission
- Discuss the overall relations between DG External Relations, DG Development and Euro-Aid Cooperation Office concerning Democracy Promotion in Eastern Europe.
- Discuss the overall relations between the Commission and other EU institutions in for instance the Parliament and the Council of Ministers concerning Democracy Promotion (authorities, budget, mandate etc. on democracy promotion).

More specifically,
- Discuss the development of new programs on democracy promotion.
- Discuss the implementation of programs on democracy promotion by the Commission and the frameworks of Tacis (time-line of programs, content of programs etc.)
- Discuss the specific relation between EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus of the 1990s. Are there any changes of democracy promotion before and after the Lukashenka era?
- Discuss existing democracy programs concerning EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus. What projects exist today and what are their content and target?
• Discuss the external relations of the EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus. What are the overall external relations to Belarus today and have these relations changed over the 1990s until today?
• Discuss the Political status of Belarus since the declaration of independence. Concerning the political status of Belarus, is there any democratic progress that relates to the democracy promotion by the EU Commission?
• Discuss the future plans from the EU Commission on democracy promotion towards Belarus. What are the prospects for the next coming years regarding EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus?
• Discuss other external relations to Belarus. Are there any external relations that has negative impact on the result of EU:s democracy promotion?

Patrick O’Riordan, Human Rights and Democratization (Thematic support), Unit B 1, DG External Relations, Commission

• Discuss the overall relations between DG External Relations, DG Development and EuroAid Cooperation Office concerning Democracy Promotion in Southeastern Europe.
• Discuss the overall relations between the Commission and other EU institutions in for instance the Parliament & the Council of Ministers concerning Democracy Promotion (authorities, budget, mandate etc. on democracy promotion).

More specifically,
• Discuss the development of new programs on democracy promotion.
• Discuss the implementation of programs on democracy promotion by the Commission and the relation to CARDS (time-line of programs, content of programs etc.)
• Discuss the relation between EU Commission, DG External Relations and the European Agency for Reconstruction.
• Discuss the specific relation between EU Commission and European Agency for Reconstruction and democracy promotion towards the Balkan of the 1990s. What are the overall changes of democracy promotion before and after the Kosovo crisis?
• Discuss existing democracy programs concerning EU Commission, European Agency for Reconstruction and democracy promotion towards Balkan and Kosovo. What projects exist today and what are their content and target?
• Discuss the external relations of the EU Commission, European Agency for Reconstruction and democracy promotion towards Balkan and Kosovo. What are the overall external relations to Kosovo today and how have these relations changed over the 1990s until today?
• Discuss the Political status of Balkan and Kosovo since the wars of early 1990s. Concerning the political status of Kosovo, is there any democratic progress that relates to the democracy promotion by the EU Commission and the European Agency for Reconstruction?
• Discuss the future plans from the EU Commission on democracy promotion towards Balkan and the issue of disputed territory. What are the prospects for the next coming years regarding UN Protectorate and the role of the EU Commission towards Kosovo?
• Discuss other external relations to Balkan. Are there any external relations that has negative impact on the result of EU:s democracy promotion?

Dr Bernd Biervert, Desk Officer Slovakia team, DG Enlargement, Commission

• Discuss the overall relations between DG Enlargement, DG External Relations and DG Development concerning Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe.
• Discuss the overall relations between the Commission and other EU institutions in for instance the Parliament & the Council of Ministers concerning Democracy Promotion (authorities, budget, mandate etc. on democracy promotion).

More specifically,
• Discuss the development of democracy promotion by DG Enlargement.
Discuss the implementation of programs on democracy promotion by the Commission and the frameworks of Tacis (time-line of programs, content of programs, conditions etc.).

Discuss the specific relation between EU Commission, DG Enlargement and democracy promotion towards Slovakia of the 1990s. Are there any changes of democracy promotion before and after the Meciar era?

Discuss existing democracy programs concerning EU Commission, DG Enlargement and democracy promotion towards Slovakia. What projects exist today and what are their content and target?

Discuss the external relations of the EU Commission, DG Enlargement and democracy promotion towards Slovakia. What are the overall external relations to Slovakia today and how have these relations changed over the 1990s until today?

Discuss the political status of Slovakia since the declaration of independence. Concerning the political status of Slovakia, is there democratic progress relating to the democracy promotion by the EU Commission and DG Enlargement?

Discuss the future plans from the EU Commission and DG Enlargement on democracy promotion towards Slovakia. What are the prospects for the next coming years regarding EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Slovakia?

Discuss the political status of Belarus since the declaration of independence. Concerning the political status of Belarus, is there any democratic progress relating to the democracy promotion by the EU Commission?

Discuss the future plans from the EU Commission on democracy promotion towards Belarus. What are the prospects for the next coming years regarding EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus?

Discuss other external relations to Belarus. Are there any external relations that has negative impact on the result of EU:s democracy promotion?

May Ann Ramsay, Human rights and Democratization (Thematic support), former Soviet Union, Unit B 1, DG External Relations, Commission

Discuss the overall relations between DG External Relations, DG Development and EuropeAid Cooperation Office concerning Democracy Promotion in Eastern Europe.

Discuss the overall relations between the Commission and other EU institutions in for instance the Parliament and the Council of Ministers concerning Democracy Promotion (authorities, budget, mandate etc. on democracy promotion).

Discuss the relation between the thematic unit and geographical units and the creation of these units.

More specifically,

Discuss the development of new programs on democracy promotion.

Discuss the implementation of programs on democracy promotion by the Commission and the relation to Tacis (time-line of programs, content of programs etc.)

Discuss the specific relation between EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus of the 1990s. Are there any changes of democracy promotion before and after the Lukashenka era?

Discuss existing democracy programs concerning EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus. What projects exist today and what are their content and target?

Discuss the external relations of the EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus. What are the overall external relations to Belarus today and have these relations changed over the 1990s until today?

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Discuss the future plans from the EU Commission on democracy promotion towards Belarus. What are the prospects for the next coming years regarding EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus?

Discuss other external relations to Belarus. Are there any external relations that has negative impact on the result of EU:s democracy promotion?

Miltiades Economides, Desk Officer for Kosovo, Unit D2, External Relations, Commission

Discuss the overall relations between DG External Relations, DG Development and EuropeAid Cooperation Office concerning Democracy Promotion in Southeastern Europe.
Discuss the overall relations between the Commission and other EU institutions in for instance the Parliament & the Council of Ministers concerning Democracy Promotion (authorities, budget, mandate etc. on democracy promotion).

More specifically,

- Discuss the development of new programs on democracy promotion.
- Discuss the implementation of programs on democracy promotion by the Commission and the frameworks of CARDS (time-line of programs, content of programs etc.)
- Discuss the relation between EU Commission, DG External Relations and the European Agency for Reconstruction.
- Discuss the specific relation between EU Commission, European Agency for Reconstruction and democracy promotion towards the Balkan and Kosovo of the 1990s. What are the overall changes of democracy promotion before and after the Kosovo crisis?
- Discuss existing democracy programs concerning EU Commission, European Agency for Reconstruction and democracy promotion towards Balkan and Kosovo. What projects exist today and what are their content and target?
- Discuss the external relations of the EU Commission, European Agency for Reconstruction and democracy promotion towards Balkan and Kosovo. What are the overall external relations to Kosovo today and how have these relations changed over the 1990s until today?
- Discuss the Political status of Balkan and Kosovo since the wars of early 1990s. Concerning the political status of Kosovo, is there any democratic progress that relates to the democracy promotion by the EU Commission and the European Agency for Reconstruction?
- Discuss the future plans from the EU Commission on democracy promotion towards Kosovo and the issue of disputed territory. What are the prospects for the next coming years regarding UN Protectorate and the role of the EU Commission towards Kosovo?
- Discuss other external relations to Kosovo. Are there any external relations that has negative impact on the result of EU:s democracy promotion?

Bernard Lhoest, Democracy, Human Rights, and Thematic Support, Unit F 3, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Commission

Discuss the overall relations between DG External Relations, DG Development and EuropeAid Cooperation Office concerning Democracy Promotion in Eastern Europe.

Discuss the overall relations between the Commission and other EU institutions in for instance the Parliament & the Council of Ministers concerning Democracy Promotion (authorities, budget, mandate etc. on democracy promotion).

More specifically,

- Discuss the development of new programs on democracy promotion.
- Discuss the implementation of programs on democracy promotion by the Commission and the frameworks of Tacis (time-line of programs, content of programs etc.)
- Discuss the specific relation between EU Commission and democracy promotion towards Belarus of the 1990s. Are there any changes of democracy promotion before and after the Lukashenka era?
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Appendix B: Checklist of the Freedom House

Political Rights
A) Electoral Process
- Are the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
- Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
- Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling and honest tabulation of ballots?

B) Political Pluralism and Participation
- Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice and are the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
- Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
- Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
- Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination. Self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

C) Functioning of Government
- Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government?
- Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
- Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections and does it operate with openness and transparency?

Additional discretionary Political Rights questions
- For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy and allow the right to petition the ruler?
- Is the government or occupying power deliberatately changing the ethnic composition of a state or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favour of another group?
Civil Liberties

D) Freedom of Expression and Belief

- Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?
- Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression?
- Is there academic freedom and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?
- Is there open and free private discussion?

E) Associational and Organizational Rights

- Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration and open public discussion?
- Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organizations?
- Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

F) Rule of Law

- Is there an independent judiciary?
- Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
- Is there protection from police terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
- Is the population treated equally under the law?

G) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

- Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?
- Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Do government officials, the security forces or organized crimes unduly influence private business activity?
- Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners and size of family?
- Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
Nedan följer en lista på skrifter publicerade i den nuvarande Acta-serien, serie III. För förteckning av skrifter i tidigare Acta-serier, se Växjö University Press sidor på www.vxu.se

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