GREEK FOREIGN POLICY

The Case Study of Greco- Turkish Relations under the two consecutive Kostas Simitis Premierships


Thesis Supervisor: DR. RONNIE HJORTH

Submitted by OSMAN CENK GÜZER

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The relations between Greece and Turkey have developed at an unprecedented level in recent years. Behind this development lay certain factors notably the Simitis Governments’ strategy of redefining the parameters of Greek national interests in foreign policy and the Turkish Governments’ subsequent positive responses to this favorable atmosphere. It is thus possible to use the term ‘détente’ to refer to the period which dates back to 1996, the rise of Simitis to the Greek premiership. Some observers on Greco-Turkish Relations tend to trace the origins of Greco-Turkish détente to the devastating 17 August earthquake in Turkey. Some others try to find the origin of détente in the 1999 Helsinki Summit where Turkey was offered the candidacy status for the EU membership. This thesis proposes an alternative approach by defending the view that the rise of Simitis to the prime ministry itself heralded the chain of events which would later pave the road to the relaxation of Greco-Turkish Relations.

This thesis is a modest attempt to understand the anatomy of Simitis Leadership and its reflections on Greco-Turkish Relations. On the basis of certain turning points in a chronological fashion, it will uncover the background of an eight-year ruling term with its ups and downs. There is an irony in Greco-Turkish Relations: Outbreak of crises between the two neighbors led both the Greek and the Turkish political actors to re-examine their attitude in the following phase of their relationship. In the Simitis Era, the tensions created opportunities for building up networks of cooperation initiatives to a certain extent. I also argue here that spillover logic in Greco-Turkish Relations has started working- albeit cautiously- and that this spirit could be sustainable if managed by both sides wisely. Continuation of the Greco-Turkish détente even after the governmental change in Athens in April 2004 demonstrates that the Simitis Leadership has determined a new framework for Greco-Turkish Relations. This framework has been set through pushing Turkey to the future EU membership orientation and setting mechanisms of reward/punishment (or carrot/stick) policy on Turkey’s route to Brussels through the EU.

KEYWORDS:
Greece, Turkey, Simitis, EU, Neo-Functionalism (NF) and Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), Critical Discourse Analysis
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AK Party</td>
<td>‘Adalet ve Kalkınma’ ('Justice and Development' in Turkish) Party</td>
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<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central and East European Countries</td>
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<td>CU</td>
<td>Customs Union</td>
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<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Leftist Party</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICoJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>Nationalist Action Party</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy</td>
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<td>NF</td>
<td>Neo-Functionalism</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NI</td>
<td>Neo-Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
<td>Rational Choice Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
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To my friend Tolga Ertugrul Korkmaz who passed away in the devastating earthquake of 17 August 1999

And

To my mother
Acknowledgment

It would be a pleasure to thank Dr. Ronnie HJORTH, who has supervised me in my preparation of this thesis. His precious and critical suggestions in preparing the structural outlook of this study and in developing further arguments have always been welcome. I would also like to thank Prof. Geoffrey D. GOOCH, who has admitted me to the masters program in International and European Relations at Linköping University and recommended me to be offered a scholarship by the Swedish Institute. (SI) My study in Linköping and preparation of this thesis would not have been possible if I had not been granted ‘the Swedish- Turkish Scholarship for European Studies’ financed by the Consulate General of Sweden in Istanbul and administered by the SI. I am indebted to Prof. Sule KUT who has stimulated me to deepen my interest in the Southeastern Europe Politics through her undergraduate course ‘Balkan Politics’. Furthermore, Serhat GUVENC equipped me with the background and the evolution of Turkish-Greek Relations comprehensively thanks to his undergraduate course, ‘Turkish- Greek Relations’

Many ideas and arguments in this thesis are the results of valuable meetings and discussions at different times with a number of Turks and Greeks. Kostas KALEGOROPOULOS became a valuable friend for me with his enjoyable conversations and brilliant ideas. My thesis would not have had its current media coverage if Mehmet Ugur BILGIC had not proved me again his genuine friendship by posting me my personal archive on Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. Last but not the least; my thanks are extended to Özgur SAGMAL.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Definition of the Problem
This study is focused on the Greco-Turkish Relations during the Governments of Kostas Simitis between 1996-2004. Choosing these periods are not coincidental; because the bilateral relations underwent unprecedented shifts in terms of level and frequency (more frequent meetings on ministry of exterior level, accelerating civil society dialogue, introduction of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to facilitate rapprochement, regional cooperation in the Balkans and finally the lifting of traditional Greek opposition to Turkey’s EU candidacy) in this time context. During the same period, ‘Cyprus Republic’ acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004 under the Greek Presidency of the EU thereby injecting a new dynamism to the Cyprus Impasse. The EU’s role in Greco-Turkish Relations as an interlocutor both through Greece’s 23 year old membership and Turkey’s penchant for the Union membership accentuate the dynamism of Greco-Turkish Relations further.

Krebs attaches importance to ‘abiding distrust and enmity’ between Greeks and Turks underlying their entangled conflicts. Turks started to overrun the eastern outposts of the Eastern Rome beginning with the 11th century thus preparing the demise of the latter. Furthermore, the Greek struggle of independence from the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th Century, the expansion of Greek territory at the expense of the shrinking Ottoman territory, outbreak of the 1st World War and the Allied occupation (including Greece) of Anatolia sowed the seeds of mutual distrust and hostility. As an exception to this constant confrontation, Carley gives ‘the Detente Era’ between the Greek President Venizelos and his Turkish counterpart Ataturk culminating in the signing of the Friendship Treaty (1930). However, intensification of the Cyprus conflict in the 1950s triggered the events which would have irreversible implications on the destiny of Cyprus and that of the Greco-Turkish Relations.

1 For information on the accession treaty and the Greek Presidency of the EU, visit the webpage: www.eu2003.gr
1.2 Why write a thesis on Greco-Turkish Relations

One can understand the importance of Greco-Turkish relations and their repercussions in International Relations (IR) after thinking about how a seemingly bilateral conflict could have traumatic implications on regional (Balkan and the Eastern Mediterranean), continental (the EU), and global stability.\(^4\) Refer to the outbreak of the 1996 Kardak conflict (in Greek, it is called Imia) which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of an armed confrontation, the then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke stated the following: ‘*Europeans were sleeping through the night as President Clinton mediated the dispute on the phone.*’\(^5\) This example encapsulates the significance of Greco-Turkish relations for the US administration vividly.

Hale provides a convincing rationale for the popularity of Greco-Turkish Relations in International Politics. ‘*In a rapidly changing world, Turkey’s relations with its Greek Neighbours*\(^*\) seems to have been the theater of foreign policy which has been least affected by the end of Cold War. Tensions and Conflict remain unresolved as the 1990s became a decade of false beginnings, which seemed to be an atmosphere of permanent stalemate.*’ \(^6\)

Greece acceded to the then EC (now EU) in 1981. Turkey, an aspirant to the EU membership, has intensified its reforms to democratize its political and legal foundations. The Turkish Government is curious about the reward of such ambitious reforms: membership to the EU? or a privileged partnership status short of membership? Purpose of this thesis is not to try to find answers to these questions. But these questions have their relevance to the effect of 24 year old Greek membership and to the potential effect of the recent ‘Cypriot’ accession on

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\(^4\) NATO’s security umbrella did not end the Turco-Greek rivalry during the Cold War even if the two ‘allies’ shared the compelling logic of belonging to the same ideological pole, the liberal west.


\(^6\) Hale, W. *Turkey and Regional Politics after the Cold War: (I) Greece, Cyprus, the Balkans and the Transcaucasia*. In ‘Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000’. London: Frank Cass, 2000. p. 252

* By his use of ‘two Greek neighbors’, Hale refers to Greece and ‘Republic of Cyprus’. Both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials and academicians use either the names ‘Greek Cypriot Administration’ or ‘Southern Cyprus’ to refer to ‘Republic of Cyprus’. On the other hand, it is only Turkey that recognized the independence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. Both Greece and Cyprus Republic use the terms ‘pseudo-state’ or ‘self-declared republic’ to refer to the TRNC. My writing of such explanations here does not reflect any personal inclinations but it is an attempt to help readers realize the linguistic (discursive) pitfalls in conceptualizing and analyzing the Greco-Turkish Conflict.
Turkey- EU Relations. Greco-Turkish relations have always impacted seriously upon regional stability including Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans. For instance, Greco-Turkish relations could not be autonomous from the Cypriot Imbroglio, which underwent a new phase following the permanent division of the island into two in 1974.  

The Complexity of Greco-Turkish Relations shows itself in the diversity of disputes according to Kut:

‘I- Bilateral Disputes: Aegean-related disputes: Territorial Waters, Air Space, FIR (Flight Information Region), Continental Shelf, Remilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands by Greece, Turkey’s deployment of the Aegean Army as a response, status of disputed islets and rocky formations.

II- ‘One-and-a-half times’ disputes: Minority-related disputes, Turkish population in Western Thrace, the status of Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the closed status of Heybeliada (Halki) Theological School.

III- Multilateral dispute: The Cyprus dispute

IV-Regional Disputes: Third party involvement such as the US and EU

Although none of the problems has been resolved completely to date, the sense of goodwill remains on the agenda of Ankara and Athens. It was particularly the mental and strategic shift under the Simitis Governments and the subsequent positive response of the Turkish Governments, which facilitated the Greco-Turkish détente. The Greek Policy of ‘standing in the way of Turkey’s orientation to the EU’ has been replaced by ‘supporting the Turkish transformation for the eventual EU membership’. Simitis is not the Greek prime minister anymore and his party PASOK under the leadership of Georgos Papandreou has lost the 2004 Elections to the New Democracy (ND).

ND leader and the current Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis, made the following statement on Greco-Turkish Relations: ‘Turkey’s European orientation, “or if you like, a European Turkey”, is of interest to all and first of all in the interests of Turkish People themselves, as well as in the interests of neighboring countries. Turkey is responsible for sustaining its reform program and implementing in practice the reforms for the accession to

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7 International literature is rich on the Cypriot Conflict. For getting a compact analysis of the conflict from those parties to the conflict (Turkish, Greek, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot perspectives) and others, see the webpage: [www.cyprus-conflict.net](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net). Also see Keridis, D. and D. Triantaphyllou (ed.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalisation*. Brassey’s Inc. 2001. For a legal and comparative approach to the triangle of Brussels-Ankara and Nicosia, see Westering, J.V. *Conditionality and the EU Membership: the Cases of Turkey and Cyprus*. In ‘European Foreign Affairs Review’ 5: 95-118, 2000

8 Kut, S. *On Challenge, Threat and Violation in Turkish-Greek Relations*. In ‘Turkish Review of Balkan Studies’, Annual 1998/1999, Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV), pp.95-6
Later, Karamanlis offered his Turkish counterpart Erdogan the project of ‘strategic partnership’ and asserted that ‘Greek-Turkish Relations have entered a new orbit.’ These declarations of Karamanlis have stimulated me to explore Greek foreign policy on Turkey comprehensively.

Greece wants to keep up with its prosperous EU partners while Turkey also seeks to enhance its stability and increase its bargaining power in its troubled environment through its accession to the EU. The Greek use of its EU membership in attempting to resolve its bilateral disputes with its neighbors –as to be seen in the Greco-Turkish relations- confirms that member states can maximize their national interests against non-members (in this case, non-member is Turkey) through setting parameters for bilateral relationship and exerting influence in the corridors of Brussels. This thesis will try to explore this dynamism in Greco-Turkish Relations in detail.

Eighty one year old relations between Greece and Turkey fluctuated in frequent ups and downs. However, some are confused by the recent thaw in Greco-Turkish relations: Is this ‘spring climate’ sustainable or not? This thesis is not a paper on ‘conflict-resolution’ and ‘peace-building’ but it seeks to describe the climate of détente in Greco-Turkish Relations. The political and social factors, which presented opportunities and constraints for the Simitis Governments in designing a policy towards Turkey from the end of Simitis’ second ruling term in 2004 up till the latest developments, will find a place here. I will also place value to the shadow of the Cyprus Dispute over Greco-Turkish Relations in light of the recent developments.

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10 For the two neighbours and NATO Allies in conflict, the concept of ‘strategic alliance’ is a novelty.

1.3 Objectives and Research Questions

Primary purpose of the thesis is to describe the Greco-Turkish Relations during Simitis’ two ruling terms - (1996-2000) and (2000-2004) through empirical evidence. Furthermore, this thesis will seek to describe the developments in the aftermath of Simitis Governments. To reach to those objectives, I will discuss the following questions:

1. How did Greco-Turkish relations enter into the climate of détente under the Simitis Governments?
2. What are the prospects for the Greco-Turkish détente?
3. What impact does the EU have on disputes between its members and non-members within the context of Greco-Turkish Impasse?

1.4 Disposition:

Chapter 1 introduces the subject of the thesis and provides readers with the motivation of its importance for international relations and then with the research questions that I have integrated to this thesis study. Chapter 2 is based upon the methodology I have designed in my work and the relevant literature review in both theoretical background and my case study. Chapter 3 is divided into sub-chapters which each discusses the theoretical framework such as my justification for applying the theories of ‘Neofunctionalism’ and ‘Rational Choice Institutionalism’ in this thesis, my discussion of each theory and their relevance to my case study. Chapter 4 is an introduction for readers to the Greek politics and the rise of Simitis. The two consecutive ruling terms of the Simitis Government are divided into the two each offering a detailed account of Simitis and his policies towards Turkey. While Chapter 5 is devoted to Simitis’ first premiership period (1996-2000), his second premiership (2000-2004) will be discussed in Chapter 6. I have prepared Chapter 7 in light of the recent developments in Greco-Turkish Relations after the end of the 2nd ruling term of Simitis and have also advanced some arguments concerning the prospect of Greco-Turkish Relations. And Chapter 8 will be an opportunity for me to present my conclusions about my thesis.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Case Study

In this thesis, I endeavor to describe and analyze a case study, the Greco-Turkish Relations under Simitis. It is indeed a case study within a case study. Because I do not bid for a grand project such as analyzing ‘the Greco-Turkish Relations from the beginning to the 2000s’. Bryman defines case study as ‘the detailed exploration of a particular case which relate to a community, organization or person’¹² (Bryman, 2001:29) Greco-Turkish Relations are in a general framework an example of bilateral relations. By describing this framework on a bilateral basis, I do not deny the fact that there are some other actors (the EU, Cyprus and the US) which impacted sizably on the evolution- and even on the complication- of Greco-Turkish Relations.

To a significant extent, Greco-Turkish Relations are held hostage to ‘stereotypes’ and ‘prejudices’. This thesis is not an attempt to explore such differences but it takes ‘historical baggage’ into account. My findings in this case study, no matter how updated they can be, are destined to be challenged by newer works and findings. To reduce the problem of updatedness, I will do my best to follow the latest literature in the subject and reflect fresher horizons of thinking on this thesis. My research materials (books, articles, surveys, media coverage etc) have been overwhelmingly qualitative so I have applied qualitative research. When necessary and convincing, statistical facts will be used as supplementary evidence to my findings in my study as well.

2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Discourse is defined as ‘the use of language in verbal and written forms in order to create meaning which are inherently social and cultural’¹³ There are several examples of discourse such as political, economic, environmental or feminist discourse each characterized by use of certain concepts, descriptions and prescriptions. For example, in Socialist discourse, capitalism is dismissed as a system based upon exploitation of labor class by the propertied class. Orthodox Socialists such as Marx and Engels championed the extermination of ‘class’ from

society and the establishment of a ‘classless society’ where inequality would no longer exist. For feminist discourse, it is essential to introduce an egalitarian society emancipated from sexist and paternalist cleavages. In discourse, concepts and definitions carry with them specific meanings and perceptions, which we can not divorce from our way of understanding and perceiving things around us. For Bryman, ‘discourse can not be a neutral device passing meaning. People try to achieve objectives when they communicate verbally or orally.’ So discourse analysis should be defined as ‘the systematic study of discourse’. Phillips and Jorgensen propose a number of characteristics related to Critical Discourse:15

1) **The Character of Social processes and structures is partly linguistic-discursive.** Discourse is produced (formed) and consumed (decoded). It represents certain understanding of the social world including social identities and interactions. I have chosen critical discourse analysis for this study because both my empirical observations and the available literature on Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Greco-Turkish Conflict have provided strong justification for designing critical discourse analysis for my thesis. For Greeks and Turks, the historical turning points and their representations in social memories are embedded in mutual distrust. Concepts clash with each other constantly when Greeks and Turks refer to those mostly historically and culturally embedded representations and associate them with contemporary events. The intensity of interaction between the two nations in a long span of time severed those discursive clashes. To make critical discourse analysis applicable to my research, I have decided to analyze representation of both Turkish and Greek policies in both official (statements, interviews and articles) and unofficial (commentaries, media coverage and scholars’ articles) resources. Both countries have plethora of detailed information as the nature of Greco-Turkish Relations has proven to become conflict-driven inherently. I will try to read between the lines to grasp the social context of both Greek and Turkish discourses. The current

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14 Bryman, 2001:360
16 Ibid, 61
17 Occupation/Liberation, Independence Struggle/Invasion, European/Asian, Democratic/Undemocratic, Irredentist/Pro-Status quo, Spoiled child of Europe/Troy Horse of the U.S., Greek Coffee/Turkish Coffee, Republic of Macedonia/ Skopje, Istanbul/Konstantinopoli, Turks in Western Thrace/Muslims in Thrace and so forth. These examples are not systematically but randomly chosen to reflect the incompatibility in discourses.
18 Interdisciplinary studies on Greco-Turkish Relations are helpful in understanding the national building up in Greece and Turkey. See the Psychoanalyst work by Volkan N. D. and N. Itkowitz. Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict, Eothen Press, 1994.
Also see Milas, H. Daha İyi Türk Yunan İlişkileri İçin Yap Yapma Kilavuzu. Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, Istanbul: 2002
representations of Greece by Turkey or visa versa have led me to think that the bilateral relations have ushered in era of détente.

2) **Discourse is both Constitutive and constituted.** Discourse is in a ‘dialectical relationship with other social dimensions’ and does not only promote the formation and reformation of social identities but at the same time represents them.\(^{19}\) To make use of Furlough’s description on discourse, ‘The Greek and Turkish discourses to one another do not derive from a free play of ideas in Greeks’ and Turks’ minds but from their social practices embedded deeply in and oriented to material and social foundations.’\(^{20}\) In the thesis, I have tried to show the reader how the official Greek and Turkish discourses have undergone significant changes in recent years from ‘chronic enmity and suspicion’ towards ‘cautious but step by step reconciliation.’ However, I do not underestimate the fact that the success of this ‘cautious reconciliation’ still depends on a number of factors both internal and external to Greece and Turkey. I have found out in my thesis that the problem areas such as the Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Disputes still poison the evolution of the Greco-Turkish détente.

3) **Discourse Functions ideologically.** In critical discourse analysis, ‘discursive practices facilitate the making and reproduction of unequal power interactions between social formations thereby producing ideological effects.’\(^{21}\) To apply this principle to my research, I emphasize the fact that traditional Greek and Turkish foreign policy discourses to one another have represented clashing images such as ‘European’ versus ‘Asian’ and ‘Civilized’ versus ‘Uncivilized’. Unequal power relations are evident in the bilateral relations as seen in Greek membership to the EU as opposed to Turkey’s traumatic path to the EU membership. To counterbalance this power asymmetry bred by the Greek membership of the EU, Turkish foreign policy discourse underlined its long commitment to the European structures and the NATO membership vocally and underscored its favorable location to the triangle of Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus. My research has led me to think that the Greek official discourses on Turkey tended to be more inclusive for Turkey’s orientation to the EU while Turkish official discourse reciprocated this Greek move through enhancing dialogue and understanding in both bilateral and regional disputes. So, ideological representations between the two countries have acquired a fresh dimension, which I call ‘détente’ in this thesis.

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\(^{19}\) Phillips and Jorgensen, p.61

\(^{20}\) Ibid, 62

\(^{21}\) Ibid, 63
2.3 Data Collection

Greco-Turkish Relations are not a rarely-studied case. Eruption of conflicts between the two neighbors has attracted many to the subject. Mainly, the sources for this thesis consist of books, roundtable meetings, conference presentations, academic articles, media coverage and memoirs. My personal archive is made up of media coverage, commentaries, essays, Internet data and special surveys. In data collection, I have tried to be selective and wanted to refrain from speculative and provocative literature. However, the outbreak of sporadic crises has bred some ‘provocative media coverages’ and the rise of very marginal voices in domestic policy. Balanced media coverage can provide a rich material for preparing a sound discourse analysis. I have collected data from the Libraries of Istanbul Bilgi and Linköping Universities. The Interlibrary loan system between the Scandinavian Libraries has also helped me reach to new materials greatly.

The official web pages of the Greek and the Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs are comprehensive. I have also visited the PASOK’s webpage. The then Greek Minister of Foreign Affair, Georgos Papandreou has a personal webpage so I could have access to his statements and personal opinions on Greek foreign policy. The then Turkish minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, has just had his memoirs and impressions on Turkish foreign policy published. The first volume of that trilogy examines Turkey’s relations to Greece and Cyprus comprehensively. The EU is – or has had to be- a party to the Greco-Turkish disputes and to my thesis. But, I have sometimes got lost in the maze of the EU’s comprehensive web portal. When available and possible, this thesis will also embrace the official statements from Greek and Turkish Cypriot opinions as well. Not everything has been smooth actually. My efforts to contact with Papandreou have not born fruit as he has not replied to any of my e-mail messages. Furthermore, I could not reach to Simitis though I tried to do that several times via e-mail.
2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.4.1 Theoretical Literature Review
Rosamond’s *Theories of European Integration*22 is a comprehensive introduction for European integration theories and discusses the theoretical attempts to systematize and formulate the EU. Key documents on the European Integration are available in *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*23 by Nielsen and Stubb. Saeter’s work *Comprehensive Neofunctionalism* is a work trying to fill the gap in the formulation of European Integration through revisiting neo-functionalist premises and questioning the relevance of inter-governmentalism.24 *Contending Theories of International Relations: a Comprehensive Survey*25 by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff is a supplementary reading on neo-functionalism. For Neo-institutionalism, the major work is *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’*26 by Peters who discusses in detail different approaches in New-Institutionalism. Ranker’s working paper *Rational Choice and the Problem of Institutions*27 is based upon analyzing the core elements of Rational Choice and its place within Neo-Institutionalism.

2.4.2 Empirical Literature Review
On Contemporary Greek history and politics, *Greece the Modern Sequel: from 1831 to the Present*28 by Koliopoulos and T.M. Veremis, *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities* by Coufoudakis, Psomiades and Gerolymatos are descriptive and thematic. In *Europeanisation of Greece: An Overall Assessment*29, Iokamidis presents an account of Greek transformation triggered by the EU membership. For the discourses on Greek foreign policy

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22 Rosamond, B. *Theories of European Integration*. Palgrave: 2000
24 Saeter, M. *Comprehensive Neofunctionalism*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 1998
and scholarship, Heraclides’ study, ‘H Ellada kai ex Anatolon Kindynos’ (translated into Turkish in 2002) is helpful. On Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olaylar, Belgeler, Yorumlar by Oran is authoritative. I have regarded Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-200 as a beneficial study for those wishing to understand Turkish foreign policy in a single volume. For those looking for the works bringing together both Greek and Turkish Scholars on the Greco-Turkish Relations, ‘Turkiye-Yunanistan: Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayislar’ and ‘Greek-Turkish Relations in the era of Globalisation’ are both quite informative and representative. A Recent study, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy by Martin and Keridis, is a thorough study trying to pinpoint the latest trends in Turkish foreign policy. For Cyprus- EU Relations and its reflections on Turkey and Greece, I have benefited from Christou’s study, The European Union and Enlargement: The case of Cyprus where he Christou argues that ‘the EU membership’ as a point of attraction could help Cyprus and Turkey get integrated into EU fully and put an end to a decades-old conflict in the southern fringes of Europe.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Why choose NF and NI’s Rational Choice Institutionalism

3.1.1 Why choose NeoFunctionalism (NF)

First, my logic of choosing NF in my theoretical framework is related to my study’s relevance to European Integration. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff rightly argue, ‘much of the Neofunctionalist Theory is on European Studies and the development of the EU’ (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:512) so I have applied NF in this study. Moravski discusses that ‘NF still remains the only systematic attempt to build up a coherent and comprehensive theory in

30 Hearclides, A. Yunanistan ve Dogudan Gelen Tehlike Turkiye”. Iletisim Yayinlari: Istanbul, 2002
34 Martin, L.G. and D.Keridis. The future of Turkish Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2004
35 Christou, G. The European Union and the Enlargement: The case of Cyprus Palgrave: 2004
European Integration’ (Saeter, 1998: 11) NF’s has attempted to refine its theoretical foundations in light of interaction between ‘priorities of nation-states member to the EU’ and ‘flow of supra-national policies to those member states in the form of EU directives and resolutions’. This interaction has direct impact on the evolution of the European Integration.

Secondly, the European Integration has its genesis on the Franco-German rapprochement. The EU evolved to become a supra-national body through ‘spillover’ logic. The theorists of functionalism - both old and new- devoted much time to regional integration particularly the EU Studies. Greece and Turkey are not founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). However; both countries were eager Europeans to get integrated to the EEC. (Greece and Turkey applied in 1959 to join the EEC) Greece is an EU member while Turkey is a potential member. The EU has become a ‘magnet of attraction’ for both countries as the most ambitious regional integration project. The founders of the ECSC put their faith in erasing the memory of the past and cooperating over non-political issues such as steel and cool production. Greece and Turkey launched dialogue on ‘low-politics’ issues to resolve their ‘insurmountable differences’ and started preparing an environment conducive to peace. In my thesis, I will argue that the EU has injected a new dynamism to Greco-Turkish Relations as an ‘honest broker’ and that the EU’s presence has produced compelling rationales for both countries to end the Greco-Turkish unfriendliness.

Thirdly, the two neighbors have started cooperating in certain sectors (trade, tourism, culture, combat against crime and so on) to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding thereby applying the method of ‘spillover’. Cooperation- albeit limited in the beginning- between states is likely to promote to wider level of cooperation. With cooperation spilled over further areas, the Turkish and the Greek Governments found themselves ‘glued to the spot’ gradually where none could dare to jeopardize the ongoing rapprochement through dragging their feet. Because the incremental nature of ‘spillover’ brought further responsibilities and commitments on them and pushed them to higher level of cooperation in spite of resistance from some governmental and non-governmental actors in both countries skeptical of a possible rapprochement.

Fourthly, NF also maintains that ‘state policies are the outcome of a process where political decision-makers are influenced by a number of pressures.’ 36 I will argue in my thesis

that the Simitis Governments faced a number of opportunities and challenges in designing a coherent and credible foreign policy on Turkey and that the Turkish Governments were also challenged by domestic and external pressures in reciprocating the Greek Governments. In this paper, I will seek to understand what pressures triggered the Simitis Government to launch a détente era with its Turkish counterparts. Furthermore, I will try to reveal how Simitis’ Turkish counterparts approached to the climate of thaw. This interactive process is complex and needs special treatment.

3.1.2 Why choose Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI)

First of all, I am testing my findings about ‘a bilateral relationship’ in a certain periodical framework influenced by an institution increasingly. The EU is equipped with powerful instruments such as rewards and sanctions towards both its members, (Greece) and non-members (Turkey). Peters argues that ‘RCI is based upon defining institutions as collection of rules and motivations that set the conditions for bounded rationality and therefore defines a ‘political ground’ within which many interdependent actors can work.’ (Peters, 1999:44) This definition is important and has relevance to my theoretical argument because I view the EU as an example of this definition. It is an institution whose decision –making is based upon rationality and interdependence. The EU’s decision-making pushes the EU actors to design strategies based upon ‘rationality’ and to define ‘political grounds’ where interdependent actors can cooperate. So, we can argue here that the EU’s decision-making is based upon ‘win-win’ solutions. When an EU member has certain priorities to defend, it tries to inject them to the EU’s discussion agenda. The EU offers member states valuable instruments so that they can make use of the membership rights.

Secondly, RCI may offer a rationale on the question of ‘how actors use institutions to pursue their interest.’ What is meant by ‘actors’? Politicians, businessmen, or electorate? In relation to RCI, those actors are mostly individual actors in decision-making mechanisms. In my study, the Simitis governments’ policy of Turkey is based upon the use of the Greek membership in the EU to design an institutional framework for Greco-Turkish Détente and the ‘conditional’ support for the Turkish integration to the EU. Rakner points to ‘wide consensus amongst RCI Theorists about seeing rational action as ‘utility maximization’ and argues that

37 Rosamond, B. Theories of European Integration. Palgrave: 2000. p.203
‘actors will prefer the option that they think will work to their goals best’ (Rakner, 1996: 4) I will argue in my thesis that Simitis found it more preferable to push Turkey to the EU structures thus checking and balancing the Turkish foreign policy behavior towards both Greece and the EU. He also found it more preferable to strengthen Turkey’s orientation to Europe and reward Turkey’s performance on improving its democratic credentials. But such a roadmap deters Turkey from pursuing any ‘free-rider’ policy towards Greece, Cyprus and the EU. In other words, Turkey’s gloomy EU membership perspective stood like ‘the Sword of Damocles’ over Turkey. In this thesis, I will show the reader that a number of ‘incidents’ on the Greco-Turkish Relations during the first ruling term of the Simitis Government compelled Simitis to question the viability and productivity of the traditional Greek foreign policy on Turkey characterized by ‘the policy of obstructionism’ -marginalization of Turkey in the periphery of Europe through isolating Turkey from the Union. ‘The policy of obstructionism’ towards Turkey had certain ‘utility’. However, ‘utility’ does not have a universal and fixed meaning for all actors involved in the EU. For example, some EU actors started questioning the utility of ‘marginalized relations’ between Turkey and the EU after the Luxembourg Summit increasingly.

Thirdly, RCI tries to understand constraints/ opportunities created by institutions and invest time on the question of how actors interact with institutions. In my case study, I will argue that the institutional logic of the EU is somehow complex thus requiring actors to devise instruments that can help them materialize their goals. For example, the Simitis Governments succeeded in making a link between ‘the accession of Turkey to the EU’ and ‘Turkey’s contribution to the solution of the Cyprus problem’. How was this mechanism devised successfully? The Greek Governments made it known clear that Greece could veto any EU enlargements excluding Cyprus. Furthermore, they lifted the veto on Turkey’s entry to the Customs Union in 1996 with the EU provided that Turkey would not block the launch of accession negotiations with Cyprus. These findings denote to the flexibility of an institution in providing a member country political leverage over an outsider.

However, I will also argue in my thesis that changing parameters in the EU’s approach to Turkey particularly after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit have also compelled Greece to question its strategy towards Turkey. Some actors in the EU who realized the damage bred by Turkey’s ‘no dialogue policy’ with the EU after the Luxembourg Summit Declarations started
questioning the profit of the Greek resistance towards Turkey in the EU. I will defend in my thesis that institutions should not be viewed as ‘straight-jackets’ or ‘instruments’ in the hands of actors. I propose in my study that institutions are quite dynamic and flexible in policy formulation and implementation.

3.2 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM (NF)
Rosamond believes that ‘we can not grasp European Integration accurately without NF since ‘1) the readings on NF offers valuable assistance in constructing theories of integration. 2) The founders of the European Integration such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann proposed ideas with neo- functionalist fundamentals.’ (Rosamond, 2000: 50) Monnet witnessed the tragic legacy of Franco-German struggle and concluded that ‘men and nations must learn to control themselves in their relations to others…Such a control would be made possible via common institutions.’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1998: 20-1) Monnet demanded ‘going beyond the nation and national interest as an end itself.’ (Ibid, 22) The creation of the ECSC was, for Monnet, a ‘technical beginning which would trigger a silent revolution in men’s minds. Businessmen, civil servants, politicians and trade unionists were persuaded to work together. Economic and political attractions of cooperation weighted heavier than such a cooperation’s probable negative implications…Once these people were convinced, they pushed forth further cooperation.’ (Ibid, 22)

In relation to Greco-Turkish Détente, I argue that the Neo-functionalist logic is at work. The two neighbors launched an era of dialogue whereby they started recognizing their differences and clash of their discourse. However, each needed both ‘political will’ and ‘social preparedness’ for entering into a phase of ‘détente’ successfully. Under what circumstances did Greece and Turkey enter into this more relaxed atmosphere? Turkey and Greece found themselves at the brink of armed confrontation over the Aegean Sea and tested the fragility of their bilateral relation over the Cyprus Impasse in several occasions.

Both Greek and Turkish Governments are quite aware of the burden of huge military expenditure on their budgets. Any Greek or/and Turkish attempts to diffuse tension over the Aegean Sea or Cyprus will create more financial resources to their social expenditure notably education and job-creation. As Greco-Turkish Relations were traditionally crippled by burden of history and lack of political will, CBMs and cooperation in ‘low- politics’ came before
immediate talks on ‘high-politics’ (the Aegean and Cyprus Conflicts). In my thesis, I have also argued the dimension of Greco-Turkish civil society initiatives that helped to build up social communication. Majority of both Turkish and Greek Businessmen found it more rational and desirable to boost the volume of trade and enter into joint enterprise in both production and service industries. Monnet argued the essence of technical cooperation in Europe supported by political and business elite. I have seen that both the Greek and Turkish Governments launched cooperation schemes intensified by the business and civil society circles in both Greece and Turkey.

Monnet’s vision of cooperation in Europe was predicated upon rationality, ability to draw lessons from the past and belief in progress. For Monnet, ‘human nature remains the same but when same rules and institutions determine the orientation of international relations, peace will prevail.’ (Ibid, 26) Positive outcomes are possible when statesmen apply technical expertise to emerging problems. ‘Monnet introduced this technical cooperation in ‘low politics’ (coal and steel production) to stimulate further progress without necessarily touching upon ‘high politics’ (foreign and security policy)’. (Rosamond, 2000: 51) What level of cooperation did he envisage exactly for Europe? We don’t know that. But one fact is evident. Monnet believed in ‘expansive’ logic of technical cooperation into other spheres inevitably. Schumann, who worked with Monnet closely in the ECSC experiment, carried this technical and ambitious logic to the 1950 Schumann Declaration, which gave birth to the ECSC in 1951. ‘Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be constructed through achievements that will create a de facto solidarity…. The French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point.’ (Ibid, 52)

‘Ernst Haas, the writer of The Uniting of Europe (1958) developed NF systematically. Then came the study of Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration in 1963. Haas reformulated NF in another work titled ‘Beyond the Nation-State’ (1964) NF develops out of the need for revisiting functionalism and its relevance to the European Integration. Rosamond describes the major difference between Functionalism and NF in the latter’s decision to ‘reinstate political agency into integration mechanism.’ (Ibid, 55) In his vision of cooperation, David Mitrany did not envisage any international political bodies, which would exercise binding power over nation-states. ‘While he proposed a technocratic ‘automacy’, Haas proposed self-interested and purposeful actors who would prepare the
foundation for cooperation.’ (Ibid, 55) Technical experts, statesmen and businessmen draw the roadmap of further integration. In this sense, expectations from a potential cooperation amongst this class could be accelerated, slowed down or frozen. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 512) Haas stresses that ‘a helpful but indispensable condition for cooperation and integration would be the presence of an outsider threat, real or imagined.’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1998: 141) This stress has relevance to Haas’ empirical observation of the Franco-German Rapprochment developing from the need for averting another potential world war.

NF is linked to pluralism in political science. (Rosamond, 2000:55) Pluralism accepts bargaining and competition between different actors with different inputs to decision-making. Haas describes political integration as ‘a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states. The result of political integration process is a new political community, superimposed over the existing ones.’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1998: 148)

Haas scrutinized the ECSC Experiment: (I) high level of industrialization integrated to the international economy (II) fully-mobilized civil society interacting with politics (III) Permanent interest groups competing for influence (IV) Parliamentary and constitutional democracies regulating the interaction between actors of integration. (Ibid, 144) Haas bases his arguments on spillover inspired from the concept of ramification in Mitrany’s work. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 514) If cooperation bears fruit in one sector, actors can ramify their joint work.

Both Greece and Turkey have faced a number of challenges such as full integration to global economy and European security structures. Intensification of economic liberalization and the growing need for playing with the rules of globalization game have pushed the both countries to transform their political and economic structures to avoid political and economic marginalization. Both countries’ ruling elite have faced pressure from NGOs to come together. The main rationale was that starting cooperation in one field could stimulate further cooperation.

Haas defined spillover as ‘the way whereby development and integration of certain economic sector(s) would stimulate the need for expanding this integration to other sectors for example thanks to an authoritative agency.’ (Rosamond, 2000: 60) In my case study, I have
seen that the tourism industry is vulnerable to any armed confrontations over the Aegean Sea, the breadbasket for the two littorals. So, any Greco-Turkish cooperation against the pollution of the Aegean Coasts or illegal human trafficking would have positive implications. The growth of tourism industry would also bring that of other industries. (Construction, clothing, entertainment, catering and so forth). The intensified dialogue between the two governments accompanied the improvement of networks such as the Aegean Municipalities Council and the Greco-Turkish Journalists Association. A recent example of this spillover logic has been the decision to bring together Greece and Turkey for the first time within ‘the Balkan cultures corridor’ together with Romania and Bulgaria in 20 May 2005. (NTVSMNBC38) These examples illustrate the logic of spillover successfully.

Philippe Schmitter developed spillover further in the light of Euphoria (the successful development of the ECSC), which was replaced by that of disillusionment (De Gaulle’s policy of defending national sovereignty jealously against any other external actors such as the US and the UK or transnational bodies such as NATO and EEC). (Nicoll and Salmon, 2001: 23)

Observing these fluctuations, Schmitter introduced the seven actor strategies below (Ibid, 64-65)

I) Spillover: Increasing the level and scope of cooperation. II) Spill- Around: Increasing the scope while holding the level static III) Buildup: Increasing the decisional autonomy of joint institutions but restricting them to their current spheres of action V) Retrench: Increase the level of joint deliberation, but withdraw the institutions. V) Muddle-about: Preserving debate autonomy of regional bureaucrats but decreasing their capacity to distribute values. VI) Spill-Back: Returning to the status quo before the integration. VII) Encapsulate: Reacting to crisis through minimal changes.

Source: Schmitter 1971:242 (quoted from Rosamond 2000: 65)

Joseph Nye studied other regional integrations and wanted to reformulate NF. ‘Accepting Schmiller’s assumption that cooperative behaviors do not necessarily produce desired outcomes, Nye departed from Haas remarkably. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraft, 2001: 516) Nye defied that the rise of interaction between countries did not necessarily widen the scope of integration but could intensify the central body’s ability to shoulder a particular task. (Ibid,

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According to the webpage, Greece and Turkey have avoided joint platforms -unless necessary (NATO alliance for example) - since the outbreak of the Cyprus Conflict in 1974. Instead of participating a region-wide platform, the trilateral meetings of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania were held in parallel to those of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. The Turkish President Sezer has accepted the Bulgarian President Parvanov’s recent offer of ending these two separate meetings and bringing all the four in a single framework.
Furthermore, Nye questioned ‘the technical essence’ of cooperation in NF and underlined the significance of political factors such as elites’ perception of further integration, their constraints and opportunities.

‘Elite perception’ of cooperation is crucial in Greco-Turkish Relations, as both Simitis leadership and its counterparts in Ankara could not turn blind eye to the opportunities promised by the diffusion of tension in the bilateral relations. If Simitis did not foresee any prospects in the normalization of the bilateral relations and in the subsequent reduction of the Greek military expenditures and if he did not press forth his personal power within his party and government gradually, there would not really be a higher possibility of spring climate in bilateral relations. On the other hand, if Simitis’ Turkish counterparts did not realize the potential benefits from rapprochement with Greece such as Turkey’s re-integration to its European vocation and less military expenditure in the defense of Aegean Sea which could both polish Turkey’s tarnished image in human rights issues\(^{39}\), the current climate of détente would not materialize.

For Nye, the success of integration depends on the arithmetic strength of participant elite. He argues that ‘regional group formation’ is quite weak in world standards and that many interest groups are organized only nationally. He also implies the significance of ‘identity construction’ in creation and survival of regional integrations. Without an assertive identity, regional integration schemes would be the objects of criticism from those skeptical of integration. And finally, Nye views ‘external dynamics’ (international organizations, and other countries) as important in the development of regional integrations. (Ibid, 517) The US Administrations’ efforts of rehabilitating European democracies through generous funds in the post-2\(^{nd}\) World War Era could, in my point of view, highlight the significance of external actors in stimulating regional cooperation for infrastructural development. In the case of the Greco-Turkish Détente, the EU as a stimulating instrument designed the offer of candidacy to Turkey that could both encourage Turkey to intensify reforms at home and reduce the tension in Turkey’s relations to its members particularly Greece and Cyprus. Furthermore, the EU Commission financially supervised joint the civil society initiatives that could facilitate a Greco-Turkish détente.

\(^{39}\) Following the end of the Cold War, the EU raised its criticism for violation of human rights across the world particularly in its periphery, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. Turkey’s human rights standards became a source of criticism from both the EU Officials and some member states intensively.
3.2.1 Critique of Neofunctionalism

Rosamond points to the widening gap between the neofunctionalist assumptions and political developments in the frame of the European Integration. (Rosamond, 2000: 73) This gap applies to the institutional crisis of the EEC during the DeGaulle Leadership which in nature did not contradict with neofunctionalist premise (the actors in integration scheme are self-interested and rational) but whose implications slowed down NF’s object of attraction, European Integration. Stanley Hoffmann questioned the validity and reliability of NF in its relevance to the European Integration and proposed an ‘inter-governmental alternative’- also coined as realist critique- by looking at the two important dynamics: (1) Politics of regionalism weighted less than that of ‘purely local’ or ‘purely global politics’. For him, ‘regional politics was confined to a reduced autonomy’ (2) Nation-states in regional integration have been more ‘obstinate’ than ‘obscene.’ In this respect, spillover does not necessarily create further stimulus for cooperation in other fields. Especially, when it comes to vital interests, it is doubtful if states in an integration scheme will concede to supranational body. (Cram, 1997: 19)

So, Hoffman finds it crucial to replace ‘the logic of integration’ in NF with ‘the logics of integration and diversity’ which competed with each other (integration versus diversity) in the European Integration. (Rosamond, 2000: 77) For some, the Greco-Turkish Détente could easily break down as both countries have not intensified their efforts in some issues such as the Aegean Impasse, the Cyprus Trouble and the Minority Issues. Cooperating over environmental protection or building pipelines of integrated natural gas/oil transfer are different things. Spreading such cooperation to high-politics such as reductions in military spending and bringing controversial issues to table such as continental shelf in the Aegean or the Cyprus Dispute are different things. Hoffman offers a logical argument by questioning the ‘inevitability’ of further cooperation.

‘Russian roulette is good only when the gun is filled with blanks. Functional integration’s gamble can only be won when the method has the capacity to offer excessive gains versus losses, hope versus disappointment. Theoretically, such a case may hold validity for economic integration but it may not yield the same results for political integration.’ (Hoffman, 1966:882) (Quoted from Cram, 1997:19-20)
However, this argument can not explain why countries in cooperation do not terminate – or at least eject- their cooperation. If their sovereignty is at stake through deepening cooperation, why don’t they simply stop cooperating or reduce cooperation? Greece and Turkey have decided to exchange their views regularly on the Aegean and Cyprus Issues in recent years though both the governments seem to be avoiding the media interference. Then, we can assume that cooperation over ‘low-politics’ issues could be spilled over to other fields provided that the elite in both countries demonstrate their will to work further.

Basing himself on Hoffman’s critique of NF, Roger Hansen assessed three theoretical mistakes in NF: a) underestimating the high/low politics dichotomy is a grave mistake. b) European Integration per se is not that representative of regional integrations across the globe so; there is the problem of reliability in NF. c) NF does not see the fact that ‘supranational organizations are not necessary for mutual material gains in common market.’ (Rosamond, 2000: 79) However, Hoffman’s third criticism has no relevance to the current picture when we think about the UK-branded European Free Trade Area (EFTA) experiment, which attracted some Eurosceptic countries which did not completely abandon the possibility of eventual accession.40 Some EFTA members abandoned the EFTA in light of the prospering Common Market as they found it more rational to accede to the European Integration.

Rosamond highlights ‘ethical and normative concerns’ such as how an international authority can guarantee fundamental values like justice and freedom. (Rosamond, 2000: 73) Indeed, the second criticism has relevance to rising popular demands in the EU for more attention to socio-economic problems in the member states and the EU’s ‘democratic-deficit’. Nationalist and Marxist critique emphasize functionalist drawbacks to explain the European Integration. Ernest Mandel argued that the European Integration is an instrument of concentrating capital and legitimizing bourgeoisie expansion but not that of brings cooperation and spillover. He argued that ‘integration’ was an instrument in the hands of profit-thirsty capitalists and their collaborators. (Ibid, 82)

However regional integration outside Europe is in progress. Marxist theory falls short of explaining the level and pace of integration around the world. Mandel does not answer why

40 EFTA was founded by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK in 1960. Iceland in 1970, Liechtenstein in 1991 acceded to the EFTA while Denmark and the UK (the two founding members of the EFTA and the UK was ironically the mental father of the EFTA), Portugal (another founding member) in 1985, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 left the organization. (EFTA Official Webpage: www.secretariat.efta.int)
bourgeoisie in the founding members of the ESCS preferred to launch regional integration in Europe rather than sit at home and exploit domestic market. The Marxist obsession with materialism in explaining every social phenomenon weakens the Marxist critique in NF. Because, NF does not get stuck into predominantly political or economic argumentations in its theory designs; it tests cases and tries to develop more representative theories as seen in its efforts to design a more comprehensive theory of European Integration.

The scholars of Intergovernmentalism and Marxism did not only criticize NF. Ironically, Haas admitted a number of pitfalls in his own theory construction and accepted that ‘NF had the problem of applicability to other models of regional integration. Secondly, NF remained silent on designing a final stage in integration. Where would spillover end? NF remained silent. And thirdly, the EC experience led some to think that the short-term interests of member states could still prevail over ‘grand designs’ as the DeGaulle case revealed.’ (Ibid, 87) Under this mental shift in NF lies the impact of challenges to the European Integration (resistance of nation state to supranational body) and of international relations over the institutional structures of the EC. (The Cold war period and EC’s preference of stability over ambitious political projects presumably) (Ibid, 88)

However, the deepening and widening reforms in the EU invited the return of NF to debates particularly in the late 80s and early 90s. Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen scrutinized the neofunctionalist foundations and improved them in light of these developments. First, ‘NF is still at work and has relevance to the EU. Spillover has developed vigorously to create more cooperation between the EU members. The Single Act (1987) and the Maastricht Treaties (1992) are bold initiatives in this respect. Secondly, the pressure groups in member states are interested in enhancing the European Integration. Thirdly, theorists should lend ears to emerging theories such as intergovernmentalism and interdependence to understand the EU. (Ibid, 101) The third notion is a clear manifestation of how difficult it is to formulate and apply a consistent single theory in European Integration. That’s why I will use another theory, Rational Choice Institutionalism, to have a more representative theoretical background.
3.3 RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM (RCI)
For Elster, the fundamental logic of RCI is that ‘people usually do what they believe is likely to bring the best result when they face several courses of action’ (Marsh and Stoker, 2002: 67) There are so many available actions but only one of them is destined to bear the most delicious fruit. Using rationality to have the greatest utility is thus the objective of actors. RCI is mainly concerned with the question of ‘how actors benefit from venues in institutions to materialize their self-interests.’ (Rosamond, 2000: 203) In my case study, I will argue how the Greek Governments under Simitis benefited from the EU to materialize the Greek objectives. If we keep in mind that states seek to maximize their interest in international relations, then we can understand the essence of ‘utility maximization’. Peters mentions the three major characteristics in RCI:

1) **Individuals as the central actors in Politics:** By viewing individual actors’ self-interests as ‘rationally calculated’, RCI demonstrates its belief in the importance of individual orientations over the working of institutions. Rational actors in political process with certain influence over institution employ strategies to maximize their interests and make their policy priorities translate into concrete gains no matter how complex choice they may have. (Marsh and Stoker, 2002: 68) Seeing political actors as ‘active, participant, interventionist and powerful’ in political spectrum, RCI believes that actors can make inroads to political decisions through having a say over decisions. If an actor in an institution feels constrained by existing institutional regulations, he tries to circumvent the situation through building new institutions or force the limits of the institutions. (Warleigh, 2002: 8-9) Rosamond holds that ‘institutions in Rational Choice have been seen as constraints on self-interested actor behaviors’41. (Rosamond, 2000:116)

2) **Concern with ways of constraining the variability of human behavior:** RCI tries to understand ‘how actors in institutions can give decisions without seeing their priorities imposed through authority’. (Peters, 1999: 46) Rather than becoming passive participants in

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41 By its use of ‘constraint’, RCI does not regard institutions as imprisoning formations, which leave no spaces for individual autonomy. Institutions have certain flexibility to meet different expectations. For me, institutions offer a blueprint for actors’ strategies. If institutions do not meet the successor actors’ expectations, restructuring those institutions become vital. Actors either try to convince opposing actor(s) for the irreversibility of policy change through promotion or intimidation (dismissal, force to resignation or redefining new regulations within institutions)
decision-making process, actors are motivated by different impulses to undertake responsibility and to manipulate decisions. RCI is aware of the clashing views of different actors in institutions. It accepts the difficulty of ensuring harmonious decision-making in institutions. So, RCI is an attempt to understand the interaction between those decision-makers and executives closely. (Ibid: 46-7)

3) Institutions as ‘Tabula Rasa’: RCI sees institutions as locations whose major policy priorities are redefined with every government bringing in its own logic, priorities and red line. So, institutions are regarded as ‘Tabula Rasas’, which are rewritten in each actor change. To borrow from Marsh and Stoker, ‘RCI takes actors’ strategies and principles as causes of the actions they take’ (Marsh and Stoker, 2002:70) Actors could raise the question of ‘what went wrong’ when necessary and redefine their priorities through revising the previously-held views. Past of the institution may not have great relevance to its present or future. Besides, ‘a new set of incentives and priorities in the minds of successor actors ease behavioral change remarkably.’ (Peters, 1999: 47) In this respect, the rise of Simitis to the Greek prime ministry gave rise to the need for new policy formulations which would predominantly aim at undoing the mistakes from the previous Governments be them formed by his own party PASOK or by the opposition party ND.

3.3.1 Pros of RCI:
Warleigh holds that ‘RCI is ‘parsimonious’ (clear, specific and well-constructed) and that it presents grounded descriptions on how an institution survives and adjusts itself to the challenges emanating from political changes.’ (Warleigh, 2002: 9) ‘It is also based upon viewing equilibrium as the basis of institutions. Actors in political competition take this equilibrium into consideration and try to open up ways for themselves. Even in the bid for changing the rules of the game, they want to restore the equilibrium through revising some rules in the same institution. (Steinmo, in Clark and Foweraker, 2001: 3) Institutionalism (new or old), has certain relevance to the EU with its commitment to the importance of Institutions in decision-making. The EU is an institution evolving to become more assertive over a cluster of institutions (the member states’ governments). For Rosamond, ‘Institutionalism should not necessarily be envisaged as better in grasping the EU. But, institutionalism’s sensitivity to the
role played by institutions makes Institutionalist debates more relevant.’ (Rosamond, 2000: 116)

The EU is neither an entity based upon imposing decisions on its members, which committed themselves unquestioningly to do what Brussels tells them to do, nor is a body falling to the hands of its members, which can control all the EU decisions. I have found this description crucial and necessary on the ground that the RCI does not have a view of rigid institutions. It defends the opinion that individual inputs still matter in Institutions. 42 Pollack asserts that ‘NI can help scholars develop an unorthodox Integration theory and make it more relevant to the evolution of European Integration. Under his approach lies the belief that the EU provides arguments for permitting actors (member states’ politicians and bureaucrats) to penetrate into political process (the EU bodies such as the Commission and the European Parliament)’ (Warleigh, 2002:10)

For RCI, ‘institutions are products of conscious thought and design’. (Peters, 1999:58) In other words, institutions did not fall from the sky or did not mushroom. Under the European Integration lies rational and calculated decision of France, German, Italy and Benelux Countries to avert another war in Europe and stimulate cooperation. The ECSC developed out of rational and conscious thoughts. The subject of this thesis paper, Greco- Turkish Détente also emerged out of conscious thoughts and designs such as the need for reducing the tension between the two littorals and subsequently promoting economic growth and political stability.

RCI assumes that actors seek to maximize their benefits rationally. However, ‘building up and maintaining institutions are not a cost-free activity’ for Peters. (Ibid: 59) In the European Integration case, the costs of institution building are remarkably high. So RCI can supply relevant material to the European Integration and member states’ relations to the outside world. In my case study, the institutional presence of the EU is undeniable: One member to the Union versus a non-member, an aspirant to the Union’s membership. This presence is a costly one in the sense that Turkey criticized the EU for being much submissive to the Greek designs in the EU’s decision-making mechanisms and for failing to be an ‘honest broker’ while Greece criticized the EU for the latter’s inability to exert pressure on Turkey for resolving the Aegean Disputes and the Cyprus problem. While Greece seeks to make use of rights deriving from ‘the

42 The EU is an institution of bargaining. Every European Council summit arranged after the six month presidency of an EU member is a platform of bargaining and compromise between the members and EU Officials. At national level, bargaining both inside ministries and between different ministries is often the case.
EU membership’, an association member, Turkey, feels disappointed by ‘the EU’s failure to recognize Turkey’s strategic and economic potentials combined with its political assets in its troubled environment’. Trying to maintain institutional cooperation between the two countries in conflict is not without problems. So, the EU’s involvement in the Greco-Turkish Relations intensifies the importance of institutions in policy making.

3.3.2 Cons of RCI

RCI is not without its critiques. Firstly, there is the problem of ‘rationality of actors’. Are actors always rational and self-interested? As it is not yet easy to measure the rationality of actors, we have the problem of ‘reliability’. For Peters, ‘it is not easy to see any cases where individual actors can not be said to have rational logics.’ (Ibid: 61) Rationality is an assumption not ‘an empirically tested and proven conclusion in a laboratory environment’. We can compare this level of criticism to the one raised against NF. As described before, NF assumes individuals to be rational and cooperative actors who choose to cooperate against problems to maximize their welfare as the European Integration has demonstrated. However, the crux of such ‘rationality’ discussions is that actors in politics could and- still can- show irrational behaviors as well. Some policies with self-interested motivations could yield catastrophic results too. As Bevir and Rhodes asserted, ‘Even if an action could have born fruits for the actor, this does not always mean that the actor sought to materialize those benefits leave aside that he did so only owing to that.’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2001: 17)

Secondly, Warleigh argues that RCI is silent on explaining background in political decision. ‘By heavily investing on actors’ self- interests, RCI tends to avoid the question of how actors’ values and choices are influenced by their colleagues or the setting in which they find themselves.’ (Warleigh, 2002: 9) Interaction is important. Actors’ handling of problems can not easily be isolated from those opinions within the corresponding institutions. Even the most undemocratic institutions made use of institutions to tackle with certain technical problems and to give legitimacy to their policies. Turning blind eye to this dynamism and legitimacy concern in institutions would be to question the credibility of RCI. In my thesis, I propose to cover this niche- background of decision making through describing how the Greek

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43 This conviction is widely shared by the Turkish elite and public and has been emphasized in their handling of Turkey’s orientation to the EU Membership. However, it is a matter of question to what extent the EU confirms this perspective.
and the Turkish Governments developed their action/reaction in the face of challenges/opportunities.

Thirdly, RCI suffers from generalization problems like do many other theories of IR. This problem certainly derives from the changeability of political culture from country to country. Certain political cultures emanating from certain socio-economic roots breed or impede the development of certain institutions. While some countries are more vulnerable to actor-driven policy making because of their unitary political structures, some other countries characterized by federalism can have created institutions conducive to intensive bargaining. This paper will try to show that, in both Greece and Turkey, strong actor presence in foreign policy making is still quite tense and frequent as both countries are administratively unitary.

And finally, RCI is much preoccupied by theory rather than trying to reveal what is happening around. For some RCI has contributed to social science through offering instruments for researching policy outcomes in institutions. However, political changes complicate RCI and its relation to specific studies. When we think about the implications of the European Integration as the recently completed European Convention has shown, we could understand better the difficulty of applying RCI to case studies (member governments). Keeping these critiques in mind, I will try to operationalise RCI together with NF in this thesis study.

CHAPTER 4:
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO GREEK POLITICS & SIMITIS

The Contemporary Greek Political System has evolved to become a biparty system in which government alternates between the two major political parties, ND in the center right and PASOK in the center left. Small parties are too marginalized and fragmented to enjoy a strong presence in the political spectrum though the country’s low national threshold (3%)\(^{44}\) for elections is conducive to representation in the Vouli (Greek Parliament). This bipolar political system produces strong single-party governments and a strong party leadership, which together

\(^{44}\) Available at [http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-005t.htm](http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-005t.htm) (Visited on 11 January) Turkish National threshold for the elections is 10% which has been a source of criticism by the European Parliament for favoring majority representation at the expense of small parties.
enable party heads to introduce effective reforms in government. Modernization and Europeanization, the two very strong slogans defended by both PASOK and ND vocally, have been the major stimulants for reform promises by Greek parties. However, for some, there is a problem here. Those bids in Greek politics have not fully been accomplished yet to produce a democracy that can fully match its western European counterparts.

Diamandouros discusses the three major problems in Greek Politics: (a) anti-meritocratic, partisan and clientalist methods in state employment hence chronic corruption. (b) short-sighted strategies oriented to meeting electorate expectations through populism and demagogoy (c) a paternalist economy which bred a weak civil society and low level of industrialization. (Diamandouros, 1999:39-42) On this terrain blossomed the Modern Greek political parties. Sapelli argues that the PASOK was a typical leftist mass party characterized by a strong organizational basis, powerful ideological message against unregulated capitalism and an extremist populism in the time of Papandreou. (Sapelli, 1995:150) However, Papandreou’s successor Simitis located ‘change’ to his political rhetoric and wanted to transform PASOK into a mass social democrat party. If A. Papandreou\textsuperscript{45} had not died, what would the future hold for Greece in its odyssey of modernization? Noone knows the answer exactly. Here, there is the undoubted truth that the Simitis Era sought to extract crucial lessons from the wrong choices in Greek politics and economics in the previous periods.

Papandreou’s worsening health in 1995 brought to PASOK’s agenda the question of ‘who should be the head?’ The Greek public was fed up with \textit{gerontocracy} (rule of the aged) and wanted to see physically and mentally energetic leaders, who would end the rule of the ‘Dinosaurs’ (a popular Greek nick for veteran politicians). (Athanassopouloou, 1996: 113) The two leading figures challenged each other for the seat of PASOK presidency: Akis Tsachatzopoulos (Papandreou’s formidable ally) was a politician of experience and populism who promised more generous social welfare irrespective of costs. (Close, 2002: 187) Simitis was just the opposite. For Keridis, ‘the emergence of Simitis out of the contest for power was just the opposite. For Keridis, ‘the emergence of Simitis out of the contest for power was

\textsuperscript{45} A. Papandreou (1919-96) was an economist, a statesman and a politician who founded Panhellenic Liberation Movement abroad and PASOK. He managed to unite the Greek left against the Coup d’etat (1967-74) and entered in the parliament from 1974 up until 1996. A Eurosceptic and an anti-American by his ideological convictions, he later turned to be a strong pro-European in the aftermath of Greek Accession to the EC. He served as the prime minister in the ruling terms of 1981-89 and 1991-96. The period between 1989-91 passed under the ND Government. Papandreou’s strategies of ‘no compromises on national interests’ and ‘no privileges for anyone in allocation of social benefits’ are remembered as highlights of his ruling terms. (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2002: 107)
more the society’s imposition on a reluctant party mechanism in need of an electable leader than the climax of a long reformist process in PASOK.’ (Keridis, 2001: 7) Though acquiring the party leadership and premiership concurrently, Simitis could not exercise authority over his party immediately owing to the continued schism between traditionalists and modernizers within the PASOK. For Athanassopoulou, Simitis acquired his reputation as a man of principles, technocracy and non-populism, which contradicted the nature of PASOK. (Athanassopoulou, 1996: 114)


5.1 The Rocky Islet of Kardak/Imia Crisis: The first challenge of Simitis

Van Dyke argues that ‘the physical characteristic of the Aegean Sea and Islands when combined with the long-standing adversity between Turkey and Greece brings an extremely complicated challenge for those trying to a mutually satisfactory solution for the protracted Greco-Turkish antagonism in the Aegean.’ (Dyke, 1996: 397) Greece and Turkey have continuously found themselves in tension over the Aegean Sea. The Aegean Disputes are complicated: continental shelf, air space, territorial waters and so forth. Ankara calls a rocky island in the eastern Aegean ‘Kardak’ while for Athens the island’s real name is ‘Imia’. Fight over names. This controversy successfully epitomizes ‘the power of language and discourses in foreign policy’. What is special about Kardak/Imia?

‘On 25 December 1995, a Turkish cargo boat called ‘Figen Akad’ ran aground on the rocky islets of Kardak/Imia. As a response, the Greek Authorities offered assistance to the Turkish crew in the boat. But by the captain defended that the boat was in Turkish territorial waters and it was the Turkish Government who should provide assistance. (Rumelili, 2003: 231) For Ayman, the rocky islets in question and the question of who should have sovereignty on them brought to the minds the existence of such geographical formations in those days. (Ayman, 1998: 113) The Greek authorities launched the rescuing operation soon afterwards. As a response, on 29 December Ankara protested Athens for violating the Turkish Sovereignty. On 10 January 1996, the Greek Embassy in Ankara stated that the 1932 Agreements signed
with Italy had seceded the sovereignty of **Imia** inside the Dodecanese Islets (12 Islets in the Eastern Aegean) to Greece. (Rumelili, 2003: 232) The media in both countries, which intensified the nationalist outburst, stirred the sovereignty debate over Kardak/Imia soon.  

While the two countries protested each other through diplomatic notes, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Pangalos who has already had a reputation for his ‘open-minded’ remarks on Turkey declared ‘Turkey’s irredentist ambitions and questioning of the status quo in the Aegean Sea for the first time’. (Oran, 2001: 464) ‘The new Simitis Government, , encountered a very serious dispute (maybe a ‘fait accompli’) which could bring the countries to the brink of armed conflict even before the vote of confidence to be held on 1 February 1996. ’ (Athanassopoulou, 1996: 114) Simitis kept a low-profile attitude amidst the nationalist outrage in both capitals. PASOK was divided over the crisis: While the moderate and modernist wing targeted their arrows of criticism on the new government for failing to handle the dispute rationally, the radical wing wanted Simitis to take a hard line against Turkey. The Greek Public, on the other hand, started to question the ability of Simitis to respond to the challenges in foreign policy. (Ibid: 114)

The Greek and Turkish media inflamed public sentiments over the Kardak/Imia Crisis systematically. Hadjidimos asserts that ‘the clash over an islet too small to inhabit any living creatures more than some goats would have remained as a low-density conflict had not Ant 1 (a Greek TV Station) ignited a debate on the exchange of notes between Athens and Ankara’.

(Hadjidimos, 1998:8) On 25 January, the mayor of Kalymnos, a Greek Island adjacent to the Kardak/Imia, with a number of people (some churchmen to journalists) foisted a Greek flag on the rocky formations. That recorded performance rocked the discussions in the Turkish media. (Oran, 2001: 464) One of the top-circulating Turkish Newspapers, *Hurriyet*, led the media fight (should also be described as a national clash) through sending some of his correspondents including a famous journalist, Fatih Altayli, to the island.

To complicate matters, *Hurriyet* made a triumphant coverage of replacing the Greek Flag with the Turkish one and bred the nationalist sentiments in both countries. (Hadjidimos, 1998: 8) Alarmed by the escalation of this crisis into a probable armed confrontation, Simitis requested the Greek Naval and Air forces to be poised to a rapid action should a clash break

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46 A Greek Newspaper *Gramma*, made an extensive coverage of the disputed islets on 20 January 1996 with the headline *The extreme agitation from Turkey* and the eyes in Greece were soon turned to the Eastern Aegean (See Ayman,1998: 114)
out. On 29 January, the Greek Special Coast Unit’s made up of three boats landed at the rocky islets to remove the Turkish Flag and foist the Greek flag. Ankara demanded the removal of Greek flag and Greek military forces from the rocky islets immediately but Athens did not take the Turkish demands seriously. (Ayman, 1998: 114)

Greece had just recovered from ‘the period of ambiguity’ after the deteriorating health of Papandreou thanks to the emergence of Simitis as the new prime minister. However, some of the ministers in the new government were viewed as ‘a group of actors which competed for getting the leading role on the scene’ in the Kardak/Imia Crisis. (Kramer, 2001: 251) The Turkish government did not fare better than its Greek counterpart over the crisis. The Turkish politicians and bureaucrats were deeply confused by results of the newly-held general elections of December 1995 ‘which brought the increased popularity of Islamist Welfare Party (WP) led by Necmettin Erbakan. Then came the second the Motherland Party (MP) (a center right party) under the leadership of Mesut Yilmaz. The True Path Party (TPP) under Turkey’s first female Prime Minister Tansu Ciller secured an electoral support which offered the TTP even more seats than the MP. Leadership strife and intra-party divisions weakened the Turkish Center Left (Republican People’s Party-RPP- of Deniz Baykal and Democratic Left Party (DLP) of Bulent Ecevit). The two parties got much fewer seats than the others’. For Zurcher, the election was ‘a true watershed in modern Turkish History.’ (Zurcher, 2004: 298) 47 Turkey entered into the Kardak/Imia Crisis in such a political uncertainty and divisions.

In order to divert the public attention away from the political chaos (the rise of the WP versus the electoral earthquake in the Turkish center right) in Turkey, Ciller managed to exploit the Kardak/Imia Crisis on time and attracted the attention of the public to the rocky islets successfully through her famous declarations ‘That flag goes, that soldier leaves’ and ‘we never give territory, not even a pebble. We give lives! ’which together mobilized the Turkish public behind Ciller and which also directly addressed to Simitis and Greek Public. (Oran, 2001: 465) In an operation made by the Turkish Operation Team (SAT) under the auspice of Turkish naval forces late night on 31 January, a group of commandos landed at the rocky formation adjacent to the rocky formation where some Greek soldiers were deployed. The two rocky formations with a 325-meter distance from each other became the beds of an imminent armed confrontation. (Ibid, 465)
Lacking a solid common foreign and security policy, the EU failed to mediate between Athens and Ankara successfully. The White House rather than Brussels succeeded in averting a Greco-Turkish War after 74 years. In spite of Simitis’ efforts to inject ‘territorial integrity of the EU’ to the Amsterdam Summit (1997) decisions, the European Council avoided being dragged into a Greco-Turkish tension in one occasion. (Barchard, 1998:7-8) The probability of an armed clash between its two NATO allies and such a clash’s catastrophic vibrations across Eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe led the then US President Clinton to launch ‘telephone diplomacy’ together with his envoy Holbrooke promptly. (Oran, 2001:65) NATO’s the then General Secretary Xavier Solana also conducted a shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara for mediation. The Intensive hours of diplomacy gave result: Both the flags and soldiers disappeared immediately.

A potential war was averted thanks to the timely US Mediation. However, Simitis was despondent about ‘the EU’s ability to safeguard Greek national interests in the Aegean Sea though still being wedded to the ideal that it is the EU Integration which can secure concrete political and economic benefits for Greece.’ (Athanassopoulou, 1996: 115). Simitis recognized the power and willingness of the US Administrations undeniably to preserve the delicate balance between Athens and Ankara, which had together join NATO under the American Initiatives in spite of reluctant Western Europeans. So, Simitis’ statement that ‘Greece will seek new activities that could enhance his relations to the other side of Atlantic’ is not a coincidence but a logical conclusion. (Ibid, 115) Athens tested the capacity and willingness of the EU to handle protracted conflicts with Turkey. Under the US initiatives, Simitis agreed to launch talks with Turkey on resolving Aegean Disputes with the condition that he is given time until the PASOK Congress in June 1996. (Oran, 2001: 465) After requesting an investigation on who were responsible for the crisis, Simitis dismissed the Chief of Military Staff for his ‘irresponsible behavior’. (Kirbaki, 09/01/04)

Considering that hardcore national interests tend to be exploited within both inter-party and intra-party debates, it was quite wise of Simitis to delay the discussion of delicate Greco-Turkish disputes. Otherwise, the Opposition in PASOK, which has already expressed its dissatisfaction with Simitis’ performance in Kardak/Imia

Crisis, might have launched an offensive in the party congress through supporting ‘the hawks’ in the PASOK.

Exporting an unprecedented level of dispute into NATO and the EU, the Kardak/Imia Crisis provided excellent lessons about International Relations: a) the capacity of media to inform as well as manipulate public through mass bombardment and agitation.  

b) The transformation of a minor event (a ship running aground) into a bilateral confrontation and potentially a catastrophic war. c) The delicacy of Greco-Turkish relations in Southeastern Europe d) the dangers of zero-sum strategies and strident nationalist remarks in foreign policy making and e) the inability of the EU to diffuse an explosive crisis and indeed to create a common foreign and security policy.

Soon after the diffusion of the crisis, Turkey made a comprehensive examination of the Aegean islets and rocky formations not attached to the treaties. It also introduced the concept of ‘Grey Zone’ to refer to the islets whose sovereignty is still undefined. (Oran, 2001: 466) The Ciller Government was succeeded by the Yilmaz Government which found the same Aegean file on the table owing to another dispute. The debate on Grey Zones was revitalized in May 1996 out of Turkey’s demand to exclude the island of Gavdos to the southeast of Crete from the planned NATO Exercise ‘Dynamic Mix 1996’ because of Gavdos’ disputed status. (Internet Webpage Greek Spider: Greco-Turkish Relations in light of the Cyprus Tragedy and the ongoing Aegean Crisis) Alarmed by the Turkish reaction, the Simitis Government protested the Turkish Government in a stern tone and sought to secure international support (Kramer, 2001: 252) through EUizing the Greco-Turkish Clashes over Aegean Sea in the

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49 Panagiotou offers an excellent coverage of Greco-Turkish Conflicts in Greek media. Some Greek papers’ headlines during the Kardak/Imia Crisis: Eleftherotypia 01 February ‘And now what will we do if Turkey hits back again?’ Eleftherotypia 29 January ‘Shame on us, we have been humiliated by Turks’ Eleftherotypia 05 February: ‘Ciller is threatening with another war.’ Eleftherotypia 10 February ‘Greece is being left while Turks are cruising. Another Slap in the face: Simitis in Brussels surrendered totally to Turks. Three Juntas are fighting against each other. The country has been left to the mercy of Americans and Turks.’ (Panagiotou, N.) On the other hand, Turkish media has equally made a sentimental coverage of the crisis. Milliyet 28 December ‘We accomplished the task with pride’ and ‘the air of victory in Ankara’ Hurriyet 30 January ‘that flag will be taken down.’ (Oran, 465-8) The Turkish columnist, Murat Birsel, wrote in Sabah Newspaper that ‘It is the time to remove the image of ‘aggressive Turk’ and replace it with ‘aggressive Greek’. We should market their image across the world to demonstrate the Greek’s real image.’ (Rumelili, 232)

50 A.Papandreou defended that ‘any discussions with Turkey would mean risking the Greek national interests.’ (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 312) So, ‘the politics of exclusion’ rather than ‘that of inclusion’ should be regarded as the building block of the Papandreou Governments’ policy of Turkey.

51 ‘Europeans were sleeping through the night as President Clinton mediated the dispute on the phone’ US Envoy Holbrook’s statement relating the Kardak/Imia Crisis. (Gordon, P.H. 1997: 74)
corridors of Brussels and Strasbourg and through ensuring support-albeit cautious-of Washington. The EU Council of Ministers in July 1996 later declared that Turkey-EU relations should be based on *respect for international treaties* (here 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) signed by Greece but not Turkey referred), *sovereignty and territorial integrity of the EU members* (Greece referred) (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2002: 322)

The Turkish and the Greek Theses on the Aegean Sea contradict with each other. Athens recognizes only ‘continental shelf’ while Ankara underlines ‘a number of problems’ – ‘Territorial waters, delimitation of continental shelf, airspace, militarization of some Greek islets adjacent to Turkish waters, Flight Information Region Line, Grey Zones (those disputed islets and rocks)’ (Keridis and Triantaphyllou, 2001: 81) While Athens demands the adjudication of the Aegean Problems to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Ankara insists on ‘bilateral talks and bargains.’(Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2002: 323) The inability to come to an agreement even on the nature of conflicts leave aside the ways of resolving them is a complicating factor in the Aegean Disputes. Without the presence of the third party (ies), Greco-Turkish Disputes have become much explosive and flaming over the Aegean.

5.2 **1997 Madrid Summit of NATO: Signs of mutual understanding?**

For Pangalos, ‘Greece supports the establishment of normal good-neighbor relations based on respect for international law while securing his sovereign rights from international law.

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52 The EU Commission stated later that ‘The EU and Greece are in solidarity in this crisis and Greece’s southern border is the EU’s southern border. Following Turkey’s entry into the Customs Union in 1996, the EU’s relationship with Turkey will be enhanced provided that Turkey adheres to international law, democratic principles and that it refrains from ‘the use of force’. (Oran, 2001: 466) This statement probably originates from Brussels’ need to mend the fences with Athens after the former’s failure to exhibit concrete support for Greece during the Kardak/Imia Crisis.

53 The EP criticized Turkey for violating ‘Greece’s sovereignty on the Aegean Sea’ in several occasions.

54 Perceptual difference is reflexive of the depth of bilateral disputes in Aegean. For Athens, Ankara is a revisionist power seeking to tip the balance in its favor systematically through questioning the status quo in the Aegean and harassing the Greek air zone via initiating dogfights. (Official Greek Position accessible at [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)) For Ankara, it is Athens which has introduced the policy of extending its waters to 12 miles and revitalizing his Megali Idea (Greek Irredentism in the 19th and early 20th Centuries) to prison its eastern neighbor in its own waters. In the Greek popular media, Turkey has been viewed as ‘the aggressive protectorate of the US’ while Turkish Popular Media Culture has presented Greece as ‘the spoiled child of Europe.’ (These descriptions do not reflect any attitudes of the author but are given here to enlighten the reader on the role of discourses in Greco-Turkish Adversity) Turkish Position on Aegean Sea accessible at [www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)
However, Turkey seems to ignore such values.’ (Pangalos, 1996: 5) In spite of suspicious sentiments in Pangalos’ statement above, Greece entered into dialogue with Turkey in the NATO’s 1997 Madrid Summit. Pangalos and his Turkish counterpart Cem pledged to abide by the following set of principles- not binding legally but morally under the presence of the then US Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Madeline Albright: ‘(I) Mutual commitment to peace, security and good neighborliness in relations. (II) Respect for each others’ sovereignty. (III) Commitment to international law. Mutual respect for each other’s vital and legitimate concerns and interests in the Aegean. (IV) Commitment to refrain from unilateral acts such as armed confrontation (V) Resolving disputes through common will and peaceful means.’ (Cem, 2004: 89)

Every article of this commitment has association to the two confrontations, Kardak/Imia and Gavdos. Concerned about the lack of goodwill in Greco-Turkish Relations and its potential impacts upon NATO’s solidarity and European security, the US encouraged the parties to sign an agreement be it binding or a gesture of goodwill. The signatories were the then Turkish President Demirel, Simitis and Albright while Pangalos and Cem joined the ceremony as the writers of the historic document. (Ibid: 89) A careful reading of the text gives important signals to the Greek and the Turkish Governments: Neither Greece nor Turkey shall resort to unilateral acts on the Aegean. ‘Sensitive and legitimate concerns of the neighbors in the Aegean shall be respected and taken into account by each other.’ This clause deters both the parties from doing any unilateral acts and leading to another escalated crisis. While the agreement document acknowledges Athens’ sensitivity on ‘respect for international treaties (here 1982 UNCLOS signed by Greece referred), it also furnishes a ferment ground for Turkey’s security concerns emanating from the Greek Government’s insistence on its right to extend its territorial waters into 12 miles. Rather than bring a ‘zero-sum’ solution, the US-driven Madrid Agreement is a ‘win-win’ solution rather than ‘one’s victory versus other’s defeat and humiliation.’

However, both domestic pressures in both countries crippled Greco-Turkish Relations. Just after the Madrid Ceremony, Simitis argued in a press briefing that ‘the issue of Greek decision to keep its right to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles was a subject concerning Greece and International Organizations. The agreement was non-aggression pact and Greece

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55 Another positive result of the Greco-Turkish meeting in Madrid has been the decision to ‘assign two representatives each to exchange opinions between Greece and Turkey. Rather than directly tackling with the bilateral problems, those representatives would be able to understand each other.’ (Extracted from Xavier Solana, then NATO General Secretary’s Press Release: Available at NATO Webpage: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-049e.htm Visited on 01 January 2004)
still keeps such a right.’ (Ayman, 2000: 283) Alarmed by the briefing of Simitis, Ankara soon made the following statement: ‘Turkey shall not remain silent to any possible Greek attempts to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles and turn blind eye to the declaration at any time’ (Ibid: 283) To make things worse, the opposition in PASOK criticized Simitis’ ‘conciliatory attitude’ in Madrid. 22 PASOK MPs accused Simitis of ‘selling off’ the Greek national interests by retreating on Greece’s right to extend its territorial rights. (Ibid: 283)

Although Simitis was moderate, cautious and rational in both domestic and foreign policy issues when compared to his predecessor, the cadre legacy of Papandreou in PASOK remained largely unchanged because it was not all easy for a new party leader to hold the party control. Rather than igniting the oppositional insurgency in the party and preparing a possible government downfall, Simitis sought to make use of institutions’ capacity to enlarge his maneuvering space both in the government and Brussels though the latter had some limits in its capacity and willingness to accommodate the Greek security interests against Turkey. Simitis assigned the two key figures in PASOK to the two key posts, the Ministries of Exterior and Defense thereby securing the party integrity and support for his reform plans on politics and economics.

After a meeting with his Turkish counterpart in New York, Pangalos made the following statement which intensified the tension in PASOK and triggered the Grecosceptic sentiments in Ankara: ‘Turkey is irredentist and a wing of Turkey’s military and diplomatic circles has coveted to Greek Islets in the Aegean. Leave aside dialogue; we cannot enter into exchange of opinions. You cannot meet the bandit, the murderer and the rapist.’ (Milliyet, 26 September 1997: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/09/26/t/dunya/pan.html) Following the explosion of Pangalos’ declaration in the Turkish media, Cem stated that ‘he definitely rejected Pangalos’ unbalanced and unpleasant descriptions reflecting an insane mentality and that Greek Public did not deserve this shame committed by someone like Pangalos.’ (Cem, 2004: 98) Amidst the exchanges of notes and protests between Greece and Turkey, Simitis adopted a low profile policy which aimed at keeping intact the party opposition and avoiding a potential public confrontation at home.
5.3 1997 Luxembourg Summit: An accident on the EU-Turkey Relations?

Only a month after the entry of Turkey into the Customs Union (CU) with the EU in 1 January 1996, the eruption of Kardak/Imia Crisis poisoned Turkey-EU Relations through Simitis Government’s decision to toughen its stance on Turkey. (Kramer, 2001: 282) For Simitis, the institutional facilities of the EU offered Greece the mechanisms that would help Greece maximize its bargaining power towards an outsider, Turkey. The asymmetry of bargaining positions is further complicated by Turkey’s penchant for the Union Membership. Simitis first sought to show its influence over Turkey’s track to the EU through vetoing the activation of financial protocol \(^{56}\) in the CU and through maintaining solidarity with the EU on the Aegean Impasse. (Ibid: 282) The Cyprus Problem was already on Brussels’ table thanks to the Cypriot Application to the EU in 1990.

Reflecting the CU as a stepping stone to Turkey’s EU membership and as her party’s own victory- though the EU Governments and several EU experts refrained from making such a link- Ciller sought hard to accelerate the Turkish orientation to the EU as the statement she made in Dublin in December 1996 shows: ‘Three reasons necessitate Turkey’s inclusion to the forthcoming wave of enlargement: a) We are the first country to sign the association agreement. b) We are the only candidate as a NATO member. c) We are the only country reaching to Customs Union level amongst all candidates.’ (Ibid: 283) However, none of the EU members shared Ciller’s ‘justification of intensifying the EU-Turkey Relationship’ since noone in the EU viewed the Turkish Candidacy as ‘realistic’ and ‘possible’ in light of political developments in Turkey precipitated by WP’s rise to the coalition government, the subsequent impasse between the WP and Turkish bureaucratic elite, the ongoing Greco-Turkish Rivalry and- the last but not the least -reluctance of the EU Governments to recognize eligibility of Turkish accession for the foreseeable future.

The Commission released its ‘Agenda 2000 Report’ in July 1997 after the European Council’s request from the Commission to assess analytically what challenges and opportunities the next enlargement would bring forth to the Union. The report evaluated the

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\(^{56}\) In relation to Turkey’s association agreement, the EU committed itself to release ECU 375 Million as budgetary assistance for five and a half years, funds from Mediterranean Programme and concessionary loans from the European Central Bank but the budgetary assistance would face Greek Blockade soon afterwards.( Hale, 2000:237)
thirteen countries and recommended the start of accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Estonia in the first wave. The remaining countries were put into the second wave of enlargement. (Oran, 2001: 345) Turkey was evaluated in a separate chapter. For Ankara, the report was nothing more than ‘humiliation and disappointment’. Simitis succeeded in inserting ‘Cyprus’ to the first wave of enlargement amidst Ankara’s protests. Though not becoming a legally binding but technically influential document, the Report should be regarded as success for the Simitis Government in the sense that Greece managed to delink Cyprus Republic and Turkey’s status as a guarantor over the republic regulated by the founding treaties of Cyprus Republic in 1959 and 1960.

For Ugur, the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 and its immediate aftermath were ‘one of the lowest ebb s in EU-Turkey Relations.’ (Ugur, 2003: 167) Because the Summit confirmed that ‘the accession process of the ten CEECs and Cyprus under a single framework would commence on March 1998.’ (Conclusions of Luxembourg Summit) To refer to Cyprus, the Council stated that ‘the accession of Cyprus should benefit both the communities and stimulate civil peace and reconciliation and that ‘Turkish Cypriot Community Representatives should also be included in the accession negotiations.’ (Ibid) Though reiterating its commitment to a settlement under the aegis of the UN, The EU put forward its first bold step towards EUising Cyprus Problem presumably in my opinion. Simitis has already reiterated the possibility that Greece could veto any enlargements excluding Cyprus. (The Economist, 26/07/ 1997: 44)

The Council designed ‘A European Strategy for Turkey’ by confirming Turkey’s eligibility for EU Accession but mentioned Turkey’s ‘political and economic conditions which would not open the door for starting accession talks yet.’ ‘Bringing Turkey closer to the EU in every field’ would comprise ‘intensification of Turkey’s Association Agreement and Customs

57 Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Malta, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey were officially integrated to the Agenda 2000 Report. The report spared a chapter where it confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for the candidacy. However, it underlined Turkey’s problems (democratization, economic reforms, human rights and the situation in Southeastern Anatolia) as the obstacles to its candidacy. (Oran,2001: 345) The Commission Reports are technical assessments, which help the European Council shape its approach to the aspirants to the EU membership. For instance, it has been possible only after the Commission’s ‘Turkey’s Progress Report in 2004’ that the Amsterdam European Council has decided to launch accession negotiations with Turkey in fall 2005.


59 Greece sought to internationalize the Cyprus Impasse through the UN Corridors during the Cold War. However, Washington’s concern about the probability of open confrontation between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, and Moscow’s probable meddling with the conflict slowed down the peace mediation efforts during the Cold War.
Union, implementation of Financial Cooperation, approximation of the Acquis Communitaire and integration of Turkey to certain Union Programs.’ (Ibid) However, such a strategy was conditional upon ‘Turkey’s continuation of its political and economic reforms, legal amendments (improvement in human rights, minority rights), establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey, settlement of disputes, by a legal process, including International Court of Justice (ICoJ) and support for reconciliation talks for Cyprus under the auspices of UN and on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions.’ (Ibid)

The Turkish Government interpreted the summit with a deep sense of humiliation and defeat, viewed European Strategy as ‘discriminatory, politicized and made under the Greek influence.’ (Eralp, 2004:71) and also maintained that ‘Turkey had not been evaluated within the same framework, the same well-intentioned approach and objective criteria as applied to other candidates.’(Hale, 2000: 240) Referring to the Greco-Turkish Conflict in both Cyprus and Aegean Issues and putting Cyprus into the list of first wave of enlargement but shutting the door behind Turkey, the Luxemburg Summit reinforced Eurosceptic sentiments amongst the Turkish elite which emerged strongly after EU’s rejection of Turkish membership in 1987. (Eralp, 2004: 72) To show its harsh criticism of the EU, The Yilmaz Government declared soon afterwards ‘Turkey’s suspension of its political dialogue with the EU but the continuation of keeping the links with the EU.’ (Hale, 2000: 240) Yilmaz also added that ‘furthering relations would depend on the EU’s more constructive approach to the Turkish Candidacy.’(Ibid, 240) For many, Turkey was slamming the door behind Brussels’s face by turning down the EU’s discriminatory attitude. Veremis and Koliopoulos argue that ‘Ankara’s reaction combined elements of its bitterness at being denied candidacy in Luxembourg and its reflection of the EU membership as not an obsession.’ (Veremis and Koliopoulos, 2001: 325)

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60 The sentences written with italic characters denote to the importance of Simitis Factor in influencing the content of Turkey-EU Relations. Rather than handle Turkish-Greek Relations on a bilateral basis, Simitis succeeded in taking advantage of EU’s flexibility as an institution. By this, I refer to RCI’s arguments in IR Theories. Under rational assumptions, actors seek to maximize their self-interests. Here Simitis both seems to have secured safe entry of ‘Cyprus’ into the EU and have confronted Brussels with the protracted Aegean Conflict. Thus, Brussels was assumed to exert substantial pressure on Turkey through the lure of ‘the EU membership’. I argue that such a policy could also be termed ‘stick-carrot policy’

61 Christophers de Bellaigue argued that ‘at one ill-considered stroke, the EU had destroyed the weight it exercised over Turks’ in relation to the Luxembourg Decisions. (Hale,2000: 256)
Watching with grave concern about the exclusion of Turkey from the wave of enlargement, ‘Clinton told Simitis that the Greek reservations to the development of Turkey-EU Relations could precipitate future crises. However Simitis defended that Greece could not press for modifications concerning paragraphs to Turkey in Luxembourg Summit and that Turkey would be held responsible should any crises break out.’ (Hellenic Resources Network Webpage: http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cmpress/1998/98-06-18.cmpress.html) For Ugur, ‘the Luxembourg Decision was counterproductive not because it did injustice to Turkey as a country credibly wedded to the EU membership aspiration. It was counterproductive because it played to Turkey’s hand. Simitis’ success in linking the pace of Turkey-EU relations to the development of Turkish-Greek Relations on Aegean and Cyprus Disputes was what Turkey resented repeatedly and would bring this issue to the table repeatedly. Furthermore, the summit surfaced one of the EU’s shortcomings: The failure to make critical decisions on policies which require unanimity.’

Furthermore, the EU gave Turkey a golden opportunity by interpreting ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ as a document sacrificed to Greek pressure instead of Copenhagen Criteria to be applied to all candidates rather than help it improve its democracy and resolve its disputes with Greece on Aegean and Cyprus conflicts’ (Ugur, 2003: 169)

Anxious to avoid Turkey lose its vocation for EU membership and slow down its speed of democratization subsequently, the EU tried to introduce measures to mend the fences with Turkey such as designing a more inclusive strategy for Turkey in the European Conference in London (March 1998), Cardiff (June 1998) and Vienna Summits (December 1998) which were all found to be still ‘discriminating’ and ‘insufficient’ by Ankara. (Oran, 2001: 349) Both the German and the Greek oppositions to the Turkish application served to nothing but impair the relationship between Ankara and Brussels. Germany under the Christian Democrat Government of Helmut Kohl emerged probably as the greatest opponent together with Greece.

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62 As a member of the EU, Greece adopted the policy of confronting Turkey through EU’s organizational power traditionally since its accession to the EC in 1981: economic (blocking of release of financial funds to Turkey) and political sanctions (paralyzing the EU-Turkey Association Meetings). The EU Institutions ranging from Council of Ministers to the European Parliament and European Commission provide any member states with the assets to exploit in their favor vis-à-vis outsiders. While Turkey insisted on viewing Turkish-EU Relations as a ‘bilateral relationship’ that should not suffer the Greek blockade, Greece defended its tough stance in the EU table as a ‘necessary and logical strategy’ facilitated by its membership. Through unanimous decision-making, the EU could be argued to have applied its decision-making not a policy to discriminate another country.

63 For the diplomatic confrontation between Kohl and Yilmaz over Turkey-EU Relations Issue, see the following web pages: http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/98-03/mar12c.rfe (Visited on 2 January 2005)
in the EU’s attempts to resume the Turkish orientation to the EU through bypassing the Greek blockade. The Commission in 1998 tried to overcome the Greek veto by recommending the release of financial assistance to Turkey directly without the Council of Ministers approval but this met the Greek threat of suing the Commission to the European Court of Justice (Kramer, 289-92) The Simitis Government exercised whatever influence it could exert to fashion the destiny of Turkey-EU Relations on the basis of Greek ‘national interests’.

5.4 Öcalan Crisis (1999): The Anatomy of a severe confrontation

‘The 1990s in Turkey witnessed the intensified questioning of its national identity and unity, particularly by its Kurdish-origin population.’ (Kirisci, 2004:277) This questioning involved a) several attempts to get formalized through formation of political parties which did not necessarily identify them with Kurdish identity. b) Individual Integration attempts of Kurdish origin Turkish dignitaries to catchall political parties and c) Explicit or implicit support provided to terrorist organizations (particularly the PKK) seeking to carve out the Kurdish-populated territories from Turkey to establish a separate Kurdish State. PKK tried to organize armed resistance against Turkey at home and political / psychological battle abroad. For Kramer, ‘Turkish elite and public were in several occasions disappointed by their western allies’ perception of terrorism. Some European Officials’ and NGO’s criticisms of the Turkish Armed Force’s combat with terrorism and of the Turkish Army’s periodical incursions to Northern Iraq led the Turkish public to question European solidarity with Turkey on the battle against terrorism.’(Kramer, 2001:305)

Some of Turkey’s neighbors’ sheltering of the PKK complicated this picture in the eyes of Turkish public. For instance, Turkish diplomatic and military bureaucrats have watched Syria with suspicion for a long time. One of the Turkish top military officials’ declaration that ‘their patience has run out against the Syrian support for terrorism’ in fall 1998 in a town

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64 Out of its concern for territorial integrity, the 1982 Constitution strictly banned the foundation of political parties on ethnic and religious lines in Turkey.

65 ‘National Strategic Concept’ presented by the Turkish Chief of Military Staff in 29 April 1997 described Iran and Syria as the neighbors which systematically sheltered fundamentalist (Pro-Islamic) and separatist (Pro-Kurdish) terrorism against Turkey. It also spelled the possibility of implementing economic, political and military measures against those countries. (Oran,2001: 563)
bordering Syria triggered a chain of events resulting in the capture of Öcalan in Nairobi in 1999. (Hale, 2000: 305) ‘Alarmed by that declaration, the Syrian Government expelled Öcalan in 9 October 1998 and Öcalan left for Russia where he requested asylum. However, the Russian Government- cautious to keep its delicate relations with Turkey- expelled Öcalan in 12 November. The next destination was Italy.’ (Kirisci, 2004: 278) The situation was complicated by the Italian Government’s refusal to extradite Öcalan to Turkey because of the pretext that capital punishment- though not enforced since 1984 - had still been in force in Turkey. ‘In 16 January, Öcalan was expelled from Italy and left for another safari to Belarus, Russia and Greece.’ (Hale, 2000: 201) What is the connection of Greece in this web of flights and rejections?

The fall of Yilmaz Government after the corruption scandals brought Ecevit to power as the caretaker prime minister from 25 November 1998 to the April Elections in 1999. (Zurcher, 2004: 302) It is widely known that Turkish Governments and Military Elite criticized Greece in several occasions for ‘the sheltering of PKK terrorists in the Greek territories and pursuing ‘the policy of encirclement’ through a ring of agreements with Turkey’s neighbors all in conflict with Turkey. (Greek Cypriots, Syrians, Iranians and Armenians.) However, all Greek Governments including Simitis’ denied repeatedly having provided economic and military support for PKK and maintained that the Greek assistance was limited to humanitarian help for the Kurdish origin refugees.’ (Oran, 2001: 476)

Öcalan left for Athens and landed in Greece in 29 January and was received by some of his Greek sympathizers there. However the Greek authorities rejected grant of asylum to Öcalan and ordered his immediate departure from Greece. Öcalan’s failing attempts to secure asylum in Belarus and the Netherlands turned his attention back to Athens again. However, Athens again denied him an entry. (Oran, 2001: 31) Simitis faced another enormous crisis after the Kardak/Imia Crisis: the question of what to do with the most-wanted terrorist in Turkey who undermined Turkey’s political stability and material prosperity for the past two decades.67

66 Ecevit has acquired a ‘bad reputation’ in Greek and Greek Cypriot societies in the sense that Turkey’s 1974 Military Operation at Cyprus to avert the inter-communal violence took place during Ecevit’s Premiership under his coalition Government with the National Salvation Party of Erbakan. For Zurcher, Ecevit and Erbakan committed themselves to a marriage of convenience under the shared distrust of Western influence and big Capital. (Zurcher,2004: 261) Both the politicians could be regarded as traditional Grecosceptics in Turkish Politics.

67 The Greek and the Turkish Discourses clash with each other severely on the Kurdish Issue as well. For Black, Greek Public Opinion tends to construct similarities between ‘the Greek Independence from the Ottoman Empire
Black argued that, the Greek Government had four options on the Öcalan Affair: ‘a) Granting him asylum b) Expelling him like the other European countries did previously c) Arresting and returning him to Turkey d) Denying him an asylum grant but temporarily hosting him outside Greece until another country agrees to host him permanently.’ (Black, 1999: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/jjblack) The first scenario would grant Turkey a golden opportunity to exploit the long-defended connection between the PKK and Greece and Turkey would intensify its pressure on the Simitis Government through the US and Greece’s partners in the EU. (Ibid) For Black, the second scenario was the least problematic. However, the Greek government could suffer severe consequences both inside the party (particularly the hardliners who defended ‘all or nothing approach’ in Turkish issue) and in the public (succumbing to Turkish demands and betraying ‘Kurdish struggle’). (Ibid) For Black, the third option was nothing but ‘a suicide’ for Simitis in the sense that Simitis could never rise from the ruins of his government after harsh criticism at home. Such a ‘suicide’, however, could give strong signals for Turkey that Greece was sensitive to his neighbor’s territorial integrity. (Ibid) For Black, the last option looked the most rational one as Simitis could thus eliminate the risk of a very severe clash with Turkey while keeping the Greek public’s sentiments on the Kurdish issue undisturbed. However, this option involved risks too. Black argued that it required much confidentiality and organization. Greece had to minimize a possible information leakage to Turkey and/ or the US. (Ibid)

An official from the Greek Intelligence convinced Öcalan that he leave the country for another unspecified place where Öcalan would be hosted in a Greek Embassy and then probably be provided with asylum grant. On 2 February, Öcalan was transferred to the Greek Embassy in Kenya. (Ibid) On 16 February, International Media broadcasted the seizure of Öcalan by the Turkish Commandos with breaking news. 68 Tsakonas and Dokos argued that ‘the Greek role in the Öcalan Affair was seen by Turkish officials and scholars as a clear indication, if not proof, of Greek designs to support Turkey’s dismemberment.’ 69 (Tsakonas

in the late 19th Century’ and ‘the newly- diffused Kurdish Tension in Southeastern Turkey’. (Black, J.1999: Available at:  http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/jjblack/) (Visited on 3 January 2004)


69 The Turkish Officials’ Reaction to Simitis Government was tough after the finding of a specially prepared and fake named Cypriot Passport on Öcalan. Ecevit argued that ‘Greeks and Greek Cypriots were caught on the crime
To intensify its pressure on Greece, Turkey accused Greece of being a ‘terrorist state’ and supporting the PKK, and then threatened to take Greece to the international court should it not renounce its collaborative activities. While getting exposed to international criticism intensively, the Greek Public and political parties were divided on the situation. The situation was divisive in the sense that a terrorist sought for long by INTERPOL had suddenly emerged out of the Greek embassy like ‘a genie in a bottle’. However, the genie complicated Greek national interests and prestige rather than providing Greece with more assets against its eastern adversary, Turkey.

Simitis faced the pressure of criticism from both the PASOK and the opposition ND in the parliament, press and some activists suddenly. For Triantaphylou, that criticism grew out of some groups’ following motives: They wanted to open up more publicity for themselves either by championing the admission of Öcalan into Greece and criticizing Simitis’ inability to keep Öcalan safe or by putting the blame on the Simitis Government for the international embarrassment that could Simitis’ survival of the crisis. (Triantaphylou, 2001: 77)

Kurdish origin refugees and some Greek nationals allied to the cause of Öcalan and PKK held joint demonstrations in Athens while some members of the Kurdish Diaspora across Europe were outraged by the Greek Government and occupied many Greek embassies. To strengthen his post and confront Turkey’s criticism of Greece, Simitis requested the resignation of the three key ministers in his government: the Minister of Foreign Affairs Pangalos, the Minister of Interior Papadopoulos and that of Public Order Petsalnikos. In his declaration of resignation on 18 February, Pangalos stated the following: ‘whatever done, I have done it in the acknowledgment of Simitis.’ (Cem, 2004: 117) However, Simitis rejected Pangalos’ views. Though having criticized the Greek Government for meddling with the Öcalan Issue, the US

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70 Hristos Kipuros, a PASOK MP who actively lobbied for the Kurdish issue in his party, submitted his resignation from the party under the pretext that the Simitis Government had responsibility for the Öcalan Affair. ‘Apo Lobisinde Istifa’ Radikal: [http://www.radikal.com.tr/1999/02/24/turkiye/apo.html](http://www.radikal.com.tr/1999/02/24/turkiye/apo.html) (24 February 1999)


73 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/281815.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/281815.stm)
and many EU member governments notified to the Turkish Government that any tough Turkish attitude to Greece would not be welcome. (Kramer, 2001: 257)

Ironically, the Öcalan Crisis, which troubled the Simitis Government internationally, enabled Simitis to suppress the intra-party resistance of those PASOK MPs skeptical of Simitis’ more liberal and moderate approach to political and economic issues through the ministerial purges. For Triantaphylou, Öcalan crisis made it possible for the Simitis Government to push for a *modus vivendi* with Turkey. (Triantaphylou, 2001: 77) Hale argues that ‘Simitis looked anxious to turn over a new page in Greco-Turkish Relations after the Öcalan Affair.’ (Hale, 2000: 257) Excluding hardliner Pangalos and the two other ministers from his government, Simitis could open up larger space for his foreign policy (particularly Turkish and Cypriot issues) and economic reform schemes. By appointing G. Papandreou to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Simitis signaled for a possible rapprochement with Turkey and guaranteed the commitment of veteran PASOK MPs who felt nostalgia to the surname of Papandreou. Punishing the wrongdoers in his cabinet, Simitis also attracted the attention of the other EU Capitals and Washington which cast their doubts on Greece’s respect for the territorial integrity of Turkey. Thus Simitis could soften the widespread criticism against his government for being obstructive in the EU-Turkey Relations. Without doubt, this crisis prepared ferment conditions for Simitis’ rational decision to mend the fences with Turkey and polish Greece’s image in international spectrum.

5.5 August –September 1999: The Earthquakes devastating not only buildings and lives but also deeply-held prejudices?

The Elections of April 1999 promised Ecevit’s DLP and Bahceli’s Nationalist Action Party (NAP) the prospect of a coalition government. 74 The new government also included Yilmaz’s MP. Ecevit was designated to the prime ministry while Cem, a DLP deputy, was appointed to the post of the ministry of Foreign Affairs. With a letter posted in 24 May, Cem suggested Papandreou they sign a cooperation agreement on terrorism that could stimulate a probable

74 For Zurcher, two major factors prepared the demise of the two center right parties TPP and MP and the triumphant emergence of DLP and NAP: a) The long-desired capture of Öcalan came true during Ecevit’s caretaker government and Ecevit strengthened his ‘clean image’ as a politician. b) NAP’s popularity originated from 1) Bahceli’s questioning of his party tradition’s extremist tendencies which reached to apex in the political instability of the 1970’s 2) his ability to attract rural and conservative electorate in the Central Anatolia through promises of legal improvements (the lure of ‘lifting the bans on the wearing of headscarf in public education’) 3) his capturing of the floating votes and finally from 4) his ‘clean image’ in politics. (Zurcher, 2004: 302)
‘spillover effect’ between the two countries. ‘The introduction of joint Turkish-Greek combat against terrorism facilitates the handling of long-standing disputes with an increased mutual trust. I proposed that such an initiative be integrated to an ‘action of reconciliation’ on the basis of UN Resolutions.’ (Cem, 2004:121) As Haas previously described, political cooperation and integration depended on the presence of external – real or imagined- threats. And purposeful and self-interested actors who want to maximize their gains make such cooperation possible. Cooperation over terrorism would help Greek and Turkish elites acquire sense of mutual trust and commitment to peace and territorial integrity. Trying to get incorporated to the European economy deeply, both Turkey and Greece could eliminate the challenges of political instability and economic marginalization.

The Civil Society Initiatives in both countries intensified their pressure to their respective governments. For example Bertrand maintained that some peace movement-oriented NGOs and ‘the Coalition of the Left’ in Greece sought to pressure the Simitis Government for facilitating the Turkish Orientation to the EU rather than obstruct it in spite of the Kardak/Imia Crisis. For Bernard, those groups defended that keeping Turkey’s vocation to the EU membership would compel Turkey to anchor itself to the ocean of peace, international law and democratization. (Bernard, 2003: 8-9) Haas attributed much importance to NGO input in neofunctionalist orientation. Both Greece and Turkey -though lagging behind their western and northern counterparts in terms of the development and strength of the NGOs in politics- felt the NGO pressure for further rapprochement.

Papandreou’s reply to Cem’s letter manifested the Greek interest in developing the bilateral relations on the basis of an expansive and functional logic: ‘Certain subjects should be handled piece by piece on the basis of confidence-building. We should adopt a realistic approach making further steps possible. We can resume the multi-dimensional dialogue we sought to launch in the past. Culture, Crime, Environment, Economic Cooperation and Tourism could be included in our meeting agenda.’ (Cem, 2004: 125) The message was clear: Time was for mending the fences with Turkey and establishing mutual confidence in relations.

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75 When there is no strong will to cooperate with each other, steps towards mutual trust is of utmost importance. Greece and Turkey showed very low level of cooperation though sharing similar security and economic concerns.

76 Kadritzke argued that about 130 Greek and Turkish NGOs by far 2000 had joined the confidence-building attempts between two countries through multi-level cooperation. He also argued that for the two countries dragged to a potential war in 1996, the intensity of NGO Initiatives was impressive. (Kadritzke, N. ‘Greece’s Earthquake Diplomacy’ in Le Monde Diplomatique: English Edition. June 2000. Available at: http://mondediplo.com/2000/06/06greece (Visited on 3 January 2005)
Several bilateral meetings during July 1999 included exchanging views and cooperating on ‘organized crime, drug and illegal immigration traffic, terror, tourism, tourism, cultural and business’ while ‘hot issues’ such as the disputes over territorial waters and continental shelf in the Aegean were not even mentioned because of the latter’s problematic nature.’ (Hale, 2000: 257) ‘Five working groups were created immediately to hold meetings in Athens and Ankara.’(Cem, 2004:127) 

On 17 August 1999, a devastating earthquake hit the Marmara region of Turkey. The Turkish government seemed to be incapable of intervening in the huge human and material loss timely. This failure triggered widespread criticism in both Turkish media and public. (Zurcher, 2004:303) Feeling touched by the tragic scenes deeply, international public launched assistance programs to the Turkish Government under fire immediately. Yalcinkaya argued that Greece was one of the countries offering prompt assistance to Turkey and that the Greek media had regularly broadcasted the tragedy of 17 August Earthquake. (Yalcinkaya, 2003:171-3) In their eagerness to rescue the quake survivors from the ruins, the Greek Emergency Aid Team (EMAP) aroused sympathy in the Turkish Press. (Colakoglu, 1999). The image of Greeks as ‘the arch-enemies of Turks’ were shaken by both the 17 August Earthquake and the Greek public’s heartfelt readiness to provide assistance.

To refer to the atmosphere of solidarity between the two neighbors, Papandreou stated that ‘the people had surpassed the politicians, political intransigence and past tensions by calling for peace, cooperation and mutual goodness by working together.’ (Papandreu, 1999: http://www.papandreu.gr ) The Greek Press was all flooded with the articles on the severity of material and human damage in the Marmara region. Many commentators questioned the relevance of deeply held prejudices and adversity between the two neighbors. 78 The Turkish

77 The climatic improvement in Greco-Turkish Relations manifests itself in Cem’s following example: No Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs had visited Athens for the last 30 years. No Greek Ministers of Foreign Affairs had visited Ankara for the last 25 years. (Cem,2004: 132) For the two neighbors living in arms length particularly in the Aegean Sea, this rarity of visits looks quite unusual.

78 Eleftherotypia: An article by Anna Stergiou: ‘When we saw the dead bodies of Turkish mothers and babies, our eyes were filled with tears. Maybe these same mothers would be crying for their children after a possible Greek-Turkish Confrontation. We have been spending much money for armament and now we feel something we never felt before. The great pains of these people did not make us happy. The pains of these people left a sour taste and a lump in our throats. (Rumelili, 2003: 238) Politis, A Greek Cypriot Newspaper, published the following comment about the earthquake: ‘. After witnessing the horrible condition of human beings in agony, one can not stay doing nothing. We also know very well what disaster is and what these people are suffering the same pain we suffered in the past. What we resisted was not a natural disaster but was committed by natural creatures.’ (Yalcinkaya, 2003:181)
media also made coverage of the Greek assistance within sense of ‘sympathy ‘and ‘disillusionment with the reality’ and criticized the hysterical reaction of the Turkish minister of Health to the Greek Government’s offer for assistance.  

Not much time after the Marmara earthquake, an earthquake hit Athens. Ankara’s immediate offer of aid to Athens speeded up the relaxation of strained relations in the press and public opinion. (Hale, 2000: 257) An unprecedented level of cooperation came true when Turkey and Greece backed up a joint resolution-in the UN’s history- for the creation of ‘Standby Disaster Response Unit.

I) The greatest consequence of the earthquakes was the intensification of public rapprochement between Greek and Turkish publics. The media coverage of human suffering in Turkey successfully by the Greek Media and that of humanitarian assistance by Athens in Turkish media helped this rapprochement. The ‘surprising’ eagerness of the Greek and Turkish NGOs to heal the wounds of the two devastating earthquakes helped both governments polish their images as the neighbors ready to heal each other’s wounds in troubled times.  

2) Intensification of social dialogue between Greece and Turkey encouraged the two governments to further the détente period through search for more cooperation. Simitis and Papandreu capitalized upon the opportunity of Turkish-friendly sentiments in their public and secured political support within both his party and the parliament. It is here important to mention that domestic factors always played-still do so- substantial role in the destiny of Greco-Turkish Relations.  

3) The rise of official dialogue between Greece and Turkey enabled the EU to soften its stance on Turkey which had since the Luxembourg Summit adopted the policy of ‘no-dialogue’ on political issues with the EU.

Neo-functionalist logic here is apparent as ‘piece by piece cooperation’ between self-interested and purposeful actors served as catalyst in furthering dialogue and spilling over

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79 Sabah: 22 August 1999: ‘Biz Seni böyle bilmezdi komsu’ (‘we did not assume you to be that helpful Neighbour!’ ‘In the last one week, Greece showed us his face which had either been unknown or he never wanted to show us.’ By Stelyos Berberakis. The commentary is an inherently positive but it also reflects ‘surprise and mental confusion in the Turkish Public against their Greek neighbors’. Accessible at http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1999/08/22/d02.html) Sabah: 23 August 1999: ‘Bravo Komsu!’ (‘Well done Neighbour!’ By Berberakis. Accessible at: http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1999/08/23/d01.html For the Turkish Minister’s of Health flat rejection of Greek Assistance which exploded wide criticism, see Hurriyet: 22 August 1999: ‘Bakan Yunan Diye yardim Kabul etmiyor’ (‘The minister is rejecting the aid as it comes from Greece’) Accessible at http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/99/08/22/gundem/20gun.htm The Turkish press criticized the minister in an air of consensus for his mishandling of international assistance issue. It is here to be noted that Durmus was an MP entering to the parliament from the ranks of NAP , a political party defending tough nationalist stance on Turkish foreign policy including the Aegean Disputes and the Cyprus Conflict.

bilateral cooperation. Simitis and Ecevit Governments made use of the changing atmosphere to maximize their positions through speeding up the rapprochement under public support from both countries. From a RCI perspective, one sees that Papandreou succeeded in redefining Greek national interests and strategies soon after his appointment to the ministry post. If there were a ‘Tabula Rasa’ as discussed RCI theorists, it was Simitis’ ally, G. Papandreou who wrote on Greco-Turkish ‘tabula rasa’ the revised priorities: The policy of confidence-building between Turkey and Greece while at the same time settling the disputes in an atmosphere where Turkey would continue to retain its European Perspective. Papandreou concluded that Turkey’s exclusion from European Perspective would serve to nothing but to intensify Turkey’s rigidity on Greece and Cyprus.

5.6 1999 Helsinki Summit: The Turkish Candidacy on a bumpy Road?

Under the Finnish Presidency in 1999, the European Council declared that (Article 12) ‘Turkey was a candidate state destined to join the Union on the same set of criteria as applied to other candidate states.’ (Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions: 10-11 December 2003) After confirming the performance of the accession countries including Cyprus, the Summit Conclusion gave important messages to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus: With Article 4 it requested that ‘the candidate countries make every effort in resolving any outstanding border disputes and other related issues and should they fail in this, they bring the dispute within a reasonable time to the ICoJ.’ It also committed ‘the council to review such disputes –if any- by the end of 2004.’ (Ibid) With article 9, the council welcomed ‘the ongoing peace building talks under the UN’ and ‘affirmed its preference for a political settlement on Cyprus. (Ibid) Should the political settlement not be arrived at, the Council’s decision on the Cypriot accession would be made without a prior condition under the consideration of all relevant factors’ (Ibid) From Luxembourg to Helsinki, many factors played role in the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate to the EU membership.

Eralp argues that the major change had come more from the EU than from Turkey 1) The EU underwent a stage of self-criticism about its Luxembourg decisions and its loss of leverage

on Turkey. 2) The 1998 Elections in Germany brought the coalition government of ‘Social Democrats- Greens’ into power thus heralding the possibility of a more inclusive strategy for Turkey. 3) For Eralp, the EU made a strategic consideration: After the diffusion of Kosovo Crisis in 1999 thanks to the successful joint Greco-Turkish efforts under the NATO Commandment, the EU members and the Commission examined their attitude to the Southeastern Europe’s future. Thinking that chronic differences between Greece and Turkey could pose enormous challenges to the S.Eastern European Stability and the newly- designed European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the EU contemplated the probability of integrating Turkey. (Eralp, 2004: 79-9) 4) Oral describes an ‘external factor’: the US Administration’s intense lobbying for the inclusion of Turkey to the EU enlargement wave. The US’ interests in inserting its NATO ally into Brussels for more ‘American influence’ on ESDI and for strengthening political and economic stability in Turkey have been hotly-debated. 5) The capture of Öcalan accompanied by Ecevit Government’s ongoing political and economic reforms served as positive ingredients to EU’s changing perception of Turkey as well. (Oral, 2001: 352)

EU Council of Ministers meeting in Helsinki on 6 September gave a pale light to Ankara: Greece lifted its veto of releasing aid to Turkey surprisingly and contemplated supporting the Turkish candidacy to the EU membership. (Radikal, 7/12) The intense discussions amongst the EU 15s on how to re-incorporate Turkey to its European orientation took place. Sweden and Greece still kept their reservations to the offer of an ‘unconditional candidacy’ to Turkey. Following her meeting with Cem in November, Anna Lindh signaled the change in the Swedish position about Turkish candidacy: the lift of conditionality for declaring Turkish

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82 The Christian Democrats under Kohl in Germany remained cold to the Turkish Membership in the EU owing to Turkey’s perceived ‘cultural and economic differences’. Under the decision of Luxembourg Summit lies also this German resistance combined with the Greek reservation to Turkey’s EU Accession. The other 13s kept their cautious attitude to the Turkish candidacy, thus watching the Greek and the German reservations with silence.

83 Kirbaki made the media coverage of reactions in Greek parliament as well. ND found PASOK Government self-contradictory. It was the same Simitis who had threatened to take the Commission’s offer to release aid fund for Turkey. Eleftheros Typos interpreted the Greek tactic as ‘Papandreou’s opening the door of EU to Turkey.’

84 For an exclusive interview of a Turkish Journalist, Yavuz Baydar with Lindh, see Milliyet: (9 October 1999) ‘Lindh: İnsan Haklarında Adım bekliyoruz.’ (in English ‘We are expecting further steps in human rights.’ http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1999/09/22/entel/ent00.html (Visited on 4 January 2005) Lindh supported the conditional grant of candidacy to Turkey.
candidacy on 3 December. Simitis defended the insertion of the two conditions for lifting its opposition to the Turkish Candidacy consistently: ‘a) The Aegean Dispute should be referred to the ICoJ for adjudication. b) The Cypriot Accession should not be delayed for the sake of an eventual political settlement.’ (Radikal: 8 December 1999) Papandreou described Greek the conditions for improvements in Turkey- EU Relations to Cem. After confirming Cem’s commitment that ‘Turkey would respect the Agenda 2000 which requested the resolution of the disputes (Aegean dispute in this case) under the Adjudication of ICoJ’, Papandreou expressed ‘their readiness to shoulder the responsibilities of saying ‘yes’ to the Turkish candidacy. (Kirbaki, Y. 1999: 11)

Tsakonas and Dokos argue that ‘Greece’s decision to lift its veto and support Turkish candidacy to the EU did not come out of the blue.’ (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2004:112) If it did not come out of the blue, what could be the Greek rationales on this mental transformation? It was the same prime minister, who resisted the Turkish candidacy to the EU membership in the Luxembourg Summit. I argue that five factors combined together to produce a less resistant Greek position on Turkey:

1) The Cyprus Imbroglio: Simitis had to make a rational decision, which would not jeopardize the Greek national interests against Turkey on the long-standing Cyprus Dispute. Coming from the same ethno-religious genesis and sharing the same cultural heritage Greeks in Greece and Greek Cypriots at Cyprus on one hand and Turks in Turkey and Turkish Cypriots at Cyprus shared a mutual sense of distrust towards each other. For some, ‘the 2000 Elections in Greece compelled Simitis to defend the joint Greek/ Greek Cypriot position over the Cypriot Issue in the Helsinki Summit: the unimpeded accession of Cyprus to the EU and the imposition of such an accession on both Turkey and the EU. Any significant retreats of Simitis from the Greek/Greek Cypriot position could be interpreted as ‘selling off’ at home. Greek Cypriot public and elite would not remain silent to Simitis ‘betrayal of the Cyprus Cause’ either. (Ibid)

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85 Radikal (5 December 1999) ‘Atina tek basina’ ( ‘Athens is on its own’): Commenting on Turkey’s EU Orientation, Lindh stated that Turkey should be offered a roadmap for improving its democracy and human rights though it still has a lot to do.
86 Radikal: ‘Atina’nın cifte derdi var’ (Athens has double concerns.’ )
87 Radikal: 8 December 1999 ‘ Cem Papandreu’yu rahatlatti.’ (‘Cem calmed Papandreu down’)

51
2) Troubled waters on the Aegean Sea: Simitis realized that Turkey in the Kardak/Imia Crisis had challenged the Greek discourse over the Aegean Sea seriously. Hale discusses that ‘the EU lost much leverage over Turkey by alienating Turkey from the enlargement wave in Luxembourg and its role became counter-productive for settling the Aegean and Cyprus conflicts.’ (Hale, 2000: 158) This analysis explains Simitis’ strategy of referring the Aegean disputes to the ICoJ precisely. Simitis and far-sighted Papandreou knew well Turkey’s long-desired and strategically defined orientation to Europe which may tempt Turkey to show signs of compromise on the tough Aegean Issues. 88 Tsakonas and Dokos argue that ‘Greece sought to enmesh Turkey in European Integration where Turkey would have to follow European “rules of the game” rather than “logic of coercive deterrence” in its vocation to the EU membership.’ (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2004: 113) This assessment has significant relevance to the entry of both Turkey-EU and Greco-Turkish Relations into a new phase following the Helsinki threshold.

3) ‘Core versus Periphery’ Dilemma: Simitis felt the pressing need of raising Greece to the level of material prosperity enjoyed by its EU partners. 89 Arghyrou argued that Simitis’ speeches were characterized by descriptions on why Greece had to be integrated to the EU fully to become a ‘core European actor’ in the globalised economy and to escape from tragic consequences of remaining peripheral.’ (Arghyrou, 2002: 6 90) The EU’s recent enlargement has deepened the economic gap between the members drastically since the new entrants (with the partial exception of Cyprus 91) are not economically that prosperous. The prosperity of Greece lies in its reach to the core membership status: Stronger economy and more assertive international presence.

88 The European Integration Project was regarded by many Turkish politicians as a ‘great magnet of attraction’ for Turkey’s transformation to become a fully-fledged European and western country. The EU membership could be a beacon for Turkey’s incomplete identity search in the minds of pro-Western Elite.

89 Though the following Eurostat Release reflects the GDP per capita figures in 2003, it is illuminating of relative backwardness of Greek GDP per capita. When the EU 15 GDP per capita average is found to be 109, the Greek GDP per capita is 79 while the lowest performance comes from Portugal with 75. For the details visit EUROSTAT’s webpage: http://epp.eurostat.ec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-03062004-AP/EN/2-03062004-AP-EN.HTML (Visited on 4 January 2005)


91 The Cypriot GDP per Capita in 2003 is 83 out 109. A performance higher than the average of Greece 79 (Eurostat)
4) **The Eurozone Accession:** Simitis took drastic economic and public measures to restructure the economy, which would be crowned with the Greek Accession to the Eurozone in 2001. What is the relevance of Eurozone Accession to foreign policy? For Iokamidis, the answer is quite clear: Eurozone membership can provide Greece with a huge ‘security asset’ whereby Greece can bolster its external security against possible aggression from hostile powers. Iokamidis goes on to argue that emergence of threat to a Eurozone member will automatically alarm the other members for a joint action. (Iokamidis, 2002) In his statement, Iokamidis does not explicitly refer to any specific countries. But I have assumed that he referred to Turkey presumably as one of those threats described in his rationale. My attempt here is just to show the reader that the EU’s logic of spillover has a lot to offer the members in raising their awareness of opportunities and challenges. Entering into monetary zone, some EU members demonstrated their will for deeper integration clearly. Here again we see ‘self-interested’ and ‘purposeful actors’ who have designed certain visions for their countries.

5) **Potential Impact of the Big bang (2004 Enlargement) on the EU’s Southern (Mediterranean) Dimension:** The EU’s 2004 enlargement pushed the EU’s geographical and demographic gravity eastwards significantly.10 out of 12 the new entrants are geographically CEECs. Unless the Turkish accession to the EU comes true in the medium-term, the erosion of the EU’s Mediterranean Dimension is irreversible.92 Though open to challenges, the EU’s decision making on certain policies is influenced by the members’ geographical characteristics and corresponding priorities to a certain extent. For example, the EU’s Mediterranean partners (Italy, Greece, Spain and even Portugal) share similar concerns on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as they all have sizable agriculture-related industries. Not surprisingly, they are sizably dependent on tourism industry. Furthermore, their close contacts to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean littorals make the southern EU members more receptive to the political and economic developments in the Mediterranean rim and to the volatile political atmosphere in the Middle East. Keridis argues that ‘Greece does not have an interest in excluding its great neighbor from the European Structures and Greece can gain a lot from consolidation of Europeanization in Turkey. (Keridis, 2001:14) He also defends the view that ‘stable and

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92 Not surprisingly, the greatest level of support towards the Turkish membership came from the South Europeans such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.
democratic Turkey sharing strong cultural ties with Greece would be a great asset for the new European, Southeastern and Near Eastern Order.’ This scholar assessment about the real Greek interest will be tested in the following years.

Panagiotou argues that the Greek Media was divided in the Helsinki Conclusions: (a) Those (Eleftherotypia, Vima and Kathimerini) which supported Simitis’ maneuver of endorsing the Turkish Candidacy officially and (b) those (Eleftheros Typos and Rizospastis) which criticised the Greek position on Turkey. (Panagiotou, 2003:18) To refer to the long bargaining between Greece and its EU Partners, Eleftherotypia wrote that ‘the Turkish-Greek Love had started 24 hour earlier than Helsinki.’ While Kathimerini commented that ‘the candidacy of Turkey was watched like a diplomatic adventure movie and the formula for Turkey’s candiday would soon be found before the Summit.’ On the other hand, Eleftherotypia remained bold on the pre-Summit bargaining and claimed that ‘the EU had granted Turkey ‘everything’ but had rejected Greek theses.’ For the newspaper, ‘The Greek Government was trapped.’ (Radikal, 9 December 1999)

Mainstream Turkish Press applauded the Summit’s Conclusions in general but remained divided on their interpretation of Greek factor. The headlines were optimist (‘Meeting of the Century’, Milliyet 11/12)93 (‘We are in Europe’, Radikal 11/12) (‘The wind of Turkey’, Hurriyet 11/12)94 and cautious (‘The diplomacy on the edge of knife’, Zaman)95 Hasan Unal, interpreted the summit as “the diplomatic victory of Athens over Turkey” and criticised the politicians and the ministry of foreign affairs for failing to commit themselves to Turkish causes on the disputes with Greece.’ (Unal, 1999) Soysal in Hurriyet heavily criticized the Turkish Government with his title ‘5 cent Candidacy’ to refer to the poor quality and prospect of the candidacy after the conditional Greek approval. (Soysal, 1999)

95 http://www.zaman.com.tr/1999/12/11/index.html (Visited on 4 January 2005) Zaman wrote that the Turkish candidacy had come true due to the EU’s acceptance of Greek theses.

6.1 Greco-Turkish Relations from Helsinki to Copenhagen

Cem reciprocated Papandreou’s visit to Turkey by visiting Athens in January and February 2000. (Cem, 2004:133) The two ministers signed nine bilateral agreements on tourism, culture, environment, business, regional cooperation (Black Sea and Southeastern Europe), crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Furthermore, the two governments intensified bilateral cooperation on agriculture and energy through a protocol on agriculture in June 2000. (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2004: 114) Cem wanted to exclude the Cyprus issue from the bilateral meetings and suggested Papandreou that the issue be seen within a domain of the two Cypriot nations. He also suggested Papandreou they handle the Aegean issues at a later date. (Cem, 2004: 134) Cem’s main fear was that the appearance of such flammable materials on the meeting table could ruin the talks. The talks also included the making of a Greco-Turkish team on preparing Turkey for Acquis in diverse headlines ranging from economy to agriculture and university cooperation (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2004:117)

Simitis’ first ruling term was full of challenges. (Strong opposition within PASOK and the need for economic and foreign policy reforms) Greece in April 2000 went to the elections regarded as the performance test of Simitis by his public. PASOK based its election strategy upon ‘Simitis’ image and his performance in the economy. (Prospective Euro zone accession preparations, public infrastructure schemes and modernization) (Kazamias and Papadimitriou, 2000: 652) The bones of contention between PASOK and ND became unemployment, taxation and Greco-Turkish Relations. The election result spelled Simitis’ victory though won with a wafer-thin majority: 43, 7 % for PASOK versus 42.7% (Ibid, 651) Simitis had to develop his future policies cautiously as the election did not promise PASOK a landslide election victory.

In July 2000, Greece and Turkey decided to develop their cooperation on their natural gas networks as they are both energy-thirsty economies. In 2001 ‘EU and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Conference’ the two countries repeated their interest in strengthening their energy dialogue and signed an agreement for a joint gas network. They also took part in the project ‘INOGATE’ (Interstate Oil Gas Transport to Europe) jointly funded and administered by the
EU. Taking advantage of the existing cooperation mechanisms, Greece and Turkey sought to bolster their bilateral relations. Dialogue and cooperation in one field, if succeeded, thus spilled over other areas of cooperation. Cooperating on a very significant resource, energy, both Athens and Greece wanted to rehabilitate their infrastructure and get prepared against a probable energy crisis. Turkey’s geographical proximity to the oil resources became the major reason for the Greek Government’s decision to cooperate inevitably.

Tsakonas and Dokos assert that ‘Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) came to the discussion table in early 2000 when Ankara paid attention to the need for initiating mutually-agreed measures that would help both parties build trust to each others. (Tsakonas and Dokos, 115) For example, they affirmed their commitment to take measures for reducing tension and building up good neighborliness. (Ibid, 115) In looking at the nature of cooperation areas, one sees that the two neighbours stepped forward to a delicate field. The Agreements on reducing tension, on Good Neighborliness and Understanding which all signify cooperation on more serious issues. Though triggered by a sequence of lessons in the past, Greco-Turkish Détente faced a challenge. Spillover or Spillback? Turkish and Greek officials probably choose the former in that situation as ‘Papandreou and Cem declared in Ankara their joint plan to prepare themselves to become the parties to the 1997 Ottawa Convention which banned anti-personnel land mines and their destruction.’ (Ibid, 116) First of all, the clearing of mines field in the Greco-Turkish border in Thrace illustrates the blossoming trust between the two countries. Secondly, the convention committed the two neighbours to abide by an international convention and pacify their mutual propensity to find themselves in a ‘neck to neck confrontation’ though not guaranteeing a ‘farewell to arms’ period in Greco-Turkish relations. And finally, such a sign of good faith would have positive impact across the Western Balkans and Middle East if one keeps in mind that both Greece and Turkey enjoy certain prestige and acceptance in both regions.

Ankara and Athens spilled over their cooperation to sport field as well. Turkey offered Greece the project of joint hosting for the 2008 European Championship. The Greek Government encouraged the Greek National Football Association (EPO) to accept the Turkish

offer. EPO President Alexandridis argued, ‘there is a need for further steps which will be swift,
decisive and effective.’ 97(BBC Webpage98: 9 May 2001)

In Balkans, Greece and Turkey launched a cautious period of cooperation.Buyukcolak
argues that the end of Cold War in the early 1990s turned both countries’ attention to Balkans
and triggered a regional rivalry between them for extending their sphere of influence in the
reconstruction of the Balkans.’ (Buyukcolak, 2002: 114) For Kramer, Turkish ruling elite
consistently reflected their Balkan politics as a natural expression of Turks’ geographical,
historical and cultural links to the Balkans dating back to Ottoman times. (Kramer, 2000: 219)
In the eyes of Greek ruling elite and scholars, Greece was a Balkan country sharing the
region’s destiny for centuries under the Ottoman nation. The weight of history on relations was
substantial. For some, Greece could translate its influence over Balkans into concrete political
and economic assets because of Greece’s following characteristics: 1) Greece is the most stable
parliamentarian democracy of the region 2) It is the most homogeneous country (90% of its
population having ethnic Greek origin) in a region suffering from ethno-religious rivalry 3) It
is the only country with membership to both EU and NATO. (Constas and Papasotiriou,
1999:217-8)

Greece defended multilateralism characterized by a blend of economic cooperation and
political dialogue with its neighbors. (Triantaphyllou, 2001:61) As a region in need of
economic reconstruction and investment, the Balkans attracted the Greek entrepreneurs despite
demic instability in the Western Balkans in the early 1990s. Greek Governments were
always aware of the opportunities and the challenges in this respect. With the implosion of
Former Yugoslavia and subsequent revival of ethnic struggles in the successor states, both
Athens and Ankara spent much of their time and resources to Balkans in the first half of the
1990s separately. Outbreak of the Kosovo Crisis in 1999, however, necessitated a Greco-
Turkish cooperation in the Balkans. Gundogdu argues that the crisis and its potential
repercussions on the regional stability led both countries to intensify regional dialogue and

97 The Greek and the Turkish football teams have not been not put into same groups in both European and
International Football Championships for a very long time. The UEFA was concerned that any sport events
between the two national or private teams could be poisoned by nationalist outrage and hooliganism. A Greek and
Turkish cooperation in a joint football championship should be viewed as the child of the recent Greco-Turkish
Détente Climate in this regard.

98 ‘Greece, Turkey in joint Euro Bid’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/1321498.stm
shoulder a joint responsibility under the NATO-led crisis intervention. (Gundogdu, 2001: 3) Cem discusses about other cooperation initiatives in the Balkans such as Greco-Turkish support for the Romanian and Bulgarian accessions to NATO and Cem’s own initiative for trilateral closer cooperation between Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece. (Cem, 2004:137)

In summer 2002, the Government of Ecevit was devastated by a severe economic downturn in Turkey. Things were complicated by the emergence of intra-party (DLP) and intra-coalition animosity. For many, calling for an early election was quite natural and practical. The elections were soon held. 3 November 2002 Election brought AK Party (Justice and Development Party) into power with a landslide electoral victory and placed RPP as opposition party in the parliament. Erdogan’s comment before the election that ‘the Belgian federalism model for the settlement of Cyprus Conflict is worth-discussing’ excited the Greek and the Greek Cypriot politicians who together started expecting an satisfactory solution of Cyprus conflict prior to Cypriot accession to the EU. (Macedonian Press Agency, 05/11)99 However, Erdogan’s reference to the Belgian model triggered criticism from both the Turkish Ministry of Exterior and the RPP. Under this influence, Erdogan retreated from his comment and mentioned that ‘the Belgian model was just an inspiration’ and that ‘he meant two equal states and peoples at Cyprus’.100 (Milliyet, 06/11)101 Soon after his electoral success, Erdogan reaffirmed his party’s commitment to Turkey’s EU vocation and to meet the Copenhagen Criteria in several occasions. Encouraged by such positive messages, Papandreu asserted the Greek preparedness to sustain Greco-Turkish Cooperation and his expectations from the new Turkish government to put bolder steps on Cyprus and continue to the reform process for meeting the Copenhagen Criteria. (Hurriyet, 4/11)102

Erdogan visited all the EU members starting with Greece to secure support for his party’s commitment to the EU path and requested ‘a date for opening accession negotiations’ in the coming Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. Though Ayata interpreted AKP’s vigor as ‘an irony for the secular Turkish republic represented in EU corridors by a political party with Islamic roots’, (Ayata,2004: 269-70) the party and its leadership refused to be identified with

99 'Erdogan Pleases Macedonia on Greece.' http://www.mpa.gr/article.html?doc_id=304149%3C/a (Visited on 4 January)
100 No Turkish Governments seriously questioned official Turkish positions on the Cyprus Impasse until the electoral triumph of the AKP in the 2002 elections. Simitis soon invited Erdogan to Athens to show his interest in meeting Erdogan and examining the latter’s discourses on Cyprus closely.
101 'AK Partiden "Kibris" icin U dönüs’ (‘U Turn from AKP on Cyprus)
102 Batur,N. ‘Her Hukumetle Calisiriz’ in Hurriyet
Islamism repeatedly. In the first day of the summit, the then Turkish Premier Gul attempted to adopt the policy of psychological blackmail towards the EU15s. He told Simitis that the grant of EU membership negotiation date to Turkey would facilitate ‘the solution for problems’ particularly the Cyprus Stalemate and Aegean Impasse. However, Simitis told Gul that ‘any positive Turkish steps on UN-based Koffi Annan Plan would facilitate both Greco-Turkish and Turkey-EU Relations. (Milliyet, 13/12)\(^{103}\)

Turkey’s promises did impress neither Greece nor the other EU14, which were already busy with the forthcoming Enlargement. The US Administration’s lobbying for Turkey in EU member governments did not bear fruits either. (Radikal, 14/12)\(^{104}\) The psychological warfare between the EU and Turkey resulted in the approval of following conclusions. The Summit Conclusion in Article 9 repeated that ‘the Council preferred strongly the accession of a united Cyprus and wanted to see the settlement of the problem on the basis of the UN-sponsored Plan by the end of February 2003’ (Copenhagen European Council Conclusions, 2002: 3)\(^{105}\) In article 12, ‘it decided to suspend the exercise of Acquis in the North part of the island’ (Ibid, 3)

After long talks and bargaining, The EU Council and the conclusions’ Article 19 regulated that ‘the EU would open negations with Turkey without delay if the Commission recommends in its ‘2004 Progress Report’ that the Copenhagen Criteria’s political clauses has been met and if the European Council confirms this recommendation.’ (Ibid, 5)

The Greek Media remained divided over the Summit: ‘For Kathimerini, Turkey was “the winner of week” and ‘got the date of rendezvous’. Ta Nea argued that Turkey deceived itself by believing that it could get the EU membership with US supervision. Eleftherotypia claimed that European leaders had lectured Ankara on ‘how to trust on himself not on others’. (Sabah, 15/11)\(^{106}\) Turkish media was cautious and did not reflect any sense of optimism owing to use of the term ‘without delay’ in the conclusions. (‘Continuation of path to Europe’, Radikal: 14/11)\(^{107}\) (‘Conditional Date’, Milliyet: 14/11)\(^{108}\) Sabah was euphoric in its coverage of the

\(^{103}\) ‘Kibris’i tarih çöz" in Milliyet (Date will resolve Cyprus Problem)
\(^{104}\) ‘ABD ve AKP’ye elestiri oku’ in Milliyet. (‘ Arrow of Criticism to the US and AK Party’)
\(^{106}\) ‘Avrupa da Bölündü’ in Sabah. (‘So is Europe divided’) The newspaper describes the perplexed attitude in European media about Copenhagen Conclusions for Turkey.
\(^{107}\) ‘Yola Devam’ as original headline in Radikal
\(^{108}\) ‘Sartli Tarih’ as original headline in Milliyet
summit with its headline (‘we are European in 2010’, Sabah: 14/11)\textsuperscript{109} The Turkish President Sezer expressed his \textit{dissatisfaction} with the summit conclusions while Denktas, the president of TRNC criticised the EU ‘for seizing Cyprus island while lying to Turkey for its \textit{indefinite} accession’ and the UN for ‘setting a very short time for the signing of set of principles agreement between the south and north’ (Radikal, 14/12) The Cyprus Issue became central to the debates between Greece and Turkey in the summit.

If we examine the Copenhagen Conclusions on Turkey, we may see that pluralism in Neofunctionalist logic clearly works in the EU decision-making. Different actors with different domestic and foreign policy agendas were involved in bargaining to arrive at an optimum level of progress for Turkish candidacy. The Greek Government wanted to safeguard the Cypriot Accession to the EU without any disturbance from Turkey but at the same time keeping Turkish orientation to the EU undisturbed. This is a hard process if we remember that Cyprus has occupied a significant agenda in Greek public because of historical and cultural links to the island. The same logic also applies to Turkish public, which has not lost its attention on the island increasingly after 1974. To borrow from Schmitter’s ‘7 pillar- Spillover’, Greek and Turkish positions at the end of the Summit could be given as an example of ‘encapsulate’-reaction to the situation with minimal changes. In other words, the Turkish candidacy did gain the momentum it had done after 1999 Helsinki Summit.

\textbf{6.2 Pandora’s Box opens: The Accession of Cyprus to the EU}

The European Council’s ‘strong preference’ for the accession of a ‘United Cyprus’ into the Union encouraged the Turkish Government to intensify its pressure on Denktas for a satisfactory truce over the Cyprus problem. The Annan Plan\textsuperscript{110} prepared by the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan became the foundation for a search of an eventual peace settlement in Cyprus. The Turkish Government exchanged its opinions with Denktas intensively while the Greek Government launched a similar diplomacy towards the Cypriot Government and the Cypriot President Papadopoulos. Simitis stated that ‘the negotiations between Denktas and Papadopoulos (the President of Cyprus) start immediately for settling down a peace until the

\textsuperscript{109} ‘2010’da Avrupaliyiz’ as original headline in \textit{Sabah}
\textsuperscript{110} ‘Annan Plan first emerged in November 2002 and was revised three times in December 2002, February 2003 and March 2004. Annan presented the last version of the plan for ‘United Cyprus Republic’ in March 2004 to the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots simultaneously. For full text of the plan visit \url{http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Plan Information.html} (4 January 2005)
end of February set in Copenhagen Summit.’ (Hurriyet, 19/12) While Denktas raised his doubts to shortcomings of the plan, which he thought could jeopardize the future of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, Turkish Cypriots in the island organized massive demonstrations against Denktas Leadership and for Annan Plan. (Radikal, 15/01/03) The Turkish Government expressed its goodwill to the Annan Plan in several occasions but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military elites and the RPP put their reservations particularly to the plan’s ‘drawing of internal borders of constituent states’ in the new republic’ and ‘return of Greek Cypriots to the North’.

The search for ‘an eventual peace in Cyprus’ intensified rapidly after the Copenhagen Summit as the Council set the end of February 2003 for a final consideration of the Cypriot Accession. None of the meetings under the aegis of the UN succeeded in bringing the parties closer to an eventual consensus until Papadopoulos’ signing of the Accession Treaty in Athens under the EU Greek Presidency (January—July 2003). This was a significant turn in Cyprus conflict and Greco-Turkish Relations. The Cypriot Accession shifted Cyprus from the position of a government not recognized by Turkey to a government, which Turkey could hardly ignore, on the negotiation table together with the other 24 EU members. Once internationalized, the Cyprus Problem has recently got fully EUised.

In Kathimerini, Iordanis argued that ‘Cyprus would no longer be dependent on Ankara’s disposition nor on Athens which had repeatedly disappointed Greek-Cypriot expectations.’ (Kathimerini, 21/04) This opinion is realistic to a certain extent because the Cypriot Government emerged as one of the 25 negotiators on Turkey’s EU membership bid. Furthermore, the equality of EU members in principle enabled Greece to stop having to carry the heavy Cypriot rock on its shoulders on its own in Brussels. Greek Cypriot Press celebrated the accession with the headlines: (‘Cyprus has become a European soil yesterday’, Simerini)

111 Organised by the Turkish Cypriot Opposition parties, the demonstrations attracted international attention because of the slogans and banners carried by the demonstrators. ‘We don’t want to live in the open air prison’ ‘Hear us Ankara, respect our will!’ ‘The solution now immediately!’ ‘Resign Denktas!’ ‘Erdogan to the mission, the dinasour (Denktas referred here) to the museum!’ In Radikal, ‘Cözüm onbinlerin İsteği’ (‘The solution is the demand of Ten thousands’)

112 The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Webpage offers a detailed account of its bilateral relations with the current EU members but Cyprus. For a country not recognizing another country, this behaviour is understandable. But one must keep in mind that Cyprus has become a member of the EU and is taken to be the sole representative of the Cyprus Republic. The current picture on Turkey- ‘Cyprus’ Relations is quite gloomy. (www.mfa.gov.tr) The Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not recognize TRNC and refers to it as ‘occupied territories’. (www.mfa.gov.cy)
(‘Good Morning our Europe. A sweet spring’, Alithia) 113 Turkish Press was disappointed by absence of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in the accession ceremony: (‘The island from whose center the EU passes’, Radikal: 18/04) 114 (‘Bitter Picture’ Sabah: 17/04) 115 Simitis visited Papadopoulos (the Cypriot President) and held a meeting with members of the leading Turkish Cypriot Opposition parties. Koliopoulos and Veremis state that ‘Cyprus and Aegean Problems are not officially linked in Greek foreign policy but Cyprus has been a catalyst in Greco-Turkish Relations.’ (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2002:324) This assessment has significant relevance to the realities as the following message of Simitis to Turkey implies: ‘Greece replaced its policy of obstructing Turkey’s European path with that of facilitating it. Turkey should examine its Cyprus policy and make necessary revisions. If it wants to accede to the Union, it should see certain realities. Turkey can not now ignore a country which has been an EU member.’ (Sabah, 20/04) 116

Simitis affirmed his support for any positive Turkish contributions to the settlement of Cyprus Problem. Though the two countries launched cooperation talks on ‘low-politics’ issues and made certain progress, the Cyprus dispute appeared as a barrier – a definitely ‘high-politics’ issue - before Greco-Turkish Relations undeniably. Neither Erdogan nor Simitis were prepared to make painful sacrifices and retreat from their official positions. Retreating from official positions could be viewed as a blow by opposition in both countries and even bring about the downfall of governments. The possibility of referendum to be held in both Greek and Turkish Cypriot Societies before Cyprus’ eventual accession to the EU in May 2004 prevented the parties from coming to a very severe confrontation in my opinion.

While the UN-sponsored talks continued, Denktas sought to strengthen his hand on the Cyprus Standoff by relaxing the regulations of movement from the south to the north. (Hurriyet, 21/4) 117 Papandreou expressed his pleasure by viewing Denktas’ move as ‘the immediate effect of Cypriot Membership ’ while the Greek Cypriot authorities tried to counterbalance Denktas’ innovations through the following proposals: eased regulations for the Turkish Cypriots in employment, travel, education, sport, Turkish language education and grant of Cypriot passports which could ease the mobility of Cypriot Turks without the

113 Rum Basini’ in Hurriyet (‘Greek Press’) 18 April 2003
114 Ortasindan AB Gecen ada’ in Radikal
116 Kibris’ta tarihi bulusma’ in Sabah (‘Historic Meeting in Cyprus’) 20 April 2003
117 Kibris’ta tarihi karar’ in Hurriyet (‘Historic Decision in Cyprus’) 21 April 2003
These ‘action-reaction’ packs, however, fell short of ending the Cyprus Impasse as the referendum in April 2004 has shown bitterly: The Greek and the Turkish Governments expressed their support for a ‘mutually satisfactory’ peace within the context of the Annan Plan officially, whereas Denktas and Papadopoulos demonized the Annan Plan publicly and underlined ‘the inherent dangers’ embedded in the plan out of ‘security’ concerns. The referendum which resulted in ‘75.8% Greek Cypriot opposition and 64.9% Turkish Cypriot approval’ (BBC Webpage, 25 April 2004) reinforced the accession of Cyprus divided from the very middle. The irony here has been the exclusion of the society, which approved the Annan Plan from the EU Integration while the society, which rejected the same plan, has joined the European Family. This irony remains to be thought by the next generations in the island and by the EU itself presumably.

Before the General Elections in March, Simitis submitted his resignation from the PASOK leadership on 8 January 2004 but stated that he would not step down from his post until the end of his ruling term. (Athens News Agency, 9/01) Having become a modernizer seeking to undo the political and economic failures, Simitis could not escape from the rain of criticism such as ‘his authoritarian inclinations in the PASOK such as choosing the successor leader by purging oppositional figures from important posts and bypassing democracy’ in the words of Angelopoulos. (Kathimerini, 08/01) The charisma and accomplishments of G. Papandreu in the Simitis Governments did not promise PASOK another ruling term after the 2004 elections. For the Economist, the PASOK’s election defeat emanated from PASOK’s failure to exterminate web of cronyism and corruption inherent in public sector while consuming much energy on foreign policy and Eurozone accession’ (The Economist Webpage, 2004)

118 ‘Rumlar Paketi acti:Turklere AB yolu’ in Sabah (‘The Greeks opened the pack : the EU path to (Cypriot) Turks’ 1 May 2003
119 Bryant quotes from a Turkish Cypriot NGO leader who stated that ‘those who voted for NO in the referendum, voted for ‘Denktasopoulos’.
CHAPTER 7:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS, SOME PREDICTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS

7.1 Recent Developments

ND under Kostas Karamanlis succeeded PASOK after March 2004 Elections. Karamanlis appointed Molyviatis- a veteran politician known with his septic remarks on Turkey- to the ministry of exterior.\(^{122}\) (The Economist, 31/13/04: 31) Erdogan and Karamanlis sustained the climate of détente amidst the shadow of Cyprus. Greek politicians were divided over whether or not they should support the Annan Plan. While G. Papandreou publicly launched a campaign of NAI** from Greek TV stations to emphasize the good spirit behind the plan, Karamanlis and his party remained silent on the issue for a while. (Hurriyet, 09/04/04)\(^{123}\) This silence in my point of view is both derived from the ND Government’s cautious handling of Turkey and the strength of Cyprus issue in Greek political and public agenda. ND as a political party with a deep legacy of Constantine Karamanlis- the politician who restored the Greek democracy after the seven-year military dictatorship had pursued a cautious foreign policy on Turkey and Cyprus issues in the 1970s and 1980s. However, ND policies on Turkey were less confrontational when compared to the heydays of A. Papandreou Governments.

Karamanlis expressed ‘his government’s respect for the Greek Cypriot popular will’ and confirmed that ‘the Greek support for the Cyprus Issue would continue thereafter for an eventual peace.’ (Hurriyet, 28/04/04)\(^{124}\) This message addressed to two parties: The Papadopoulos Governments and the Erdogan Governments. ND Government was well aware of the level of progress in Greco-Turkish Relations during Simitis and did not want to upset the climate of spring with an unquestioning Greek support for uncompromising Papadopoulos. He also wanted to make it known to Ankara that further development of relations and Turkey’s European orientation would critically depend on Turkey’s approach to the Cyprus Issue. Any positive moves from Erdogan or Denktas would thus help Karamanlis legitimize a further

\(^{122}\) His appointment was also a clear message of sympathy to veteran elite in the party.
\(^{123}\) ‘Rumludere savas acti’ in Hurriyet. (‘He launched an offensive against the Greek Cypriot President.’) [http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,nvid~395539,00.asp]
\(^{124}\) ‘Karamanlis’ten Papadopulos’a tam destek’ in Hurriyet (‘Full support from Karamanlis to Papadopoulos’) [http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,nvid~404937,00.asp]
** NAI (‘YES’ in Greek)
Greco-Turkish Detente in the eyes of Greek Public. On 14 May, the Turkish Government has announced its cancel of a tender for its military modernization. On 17 May, the Greek Government has reciprocated this gesture by its cancel of a military tender worth two billion euros.’ (EUbusiness Webpage, 17/04)\(^\text{125}\) The following table in 2003 manifests the logic for cutting down military expenditure by Turkey and Greece:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Expenditure</th>
<th>% of Mil. Expenditure to the country budget</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>USD 7,288.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>USD 12,155 billion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5.3</td>
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</table>

(CIA Internet Webpage: [http://ww.cia.gov](http://ww.cia.gov))

During Erdogan’s visit to Athens in September 2004, Karamanlis stated the following: ‘I do not believe that December 2004 should be set as the deadline for resolving the thirty year old Aegean Disputes. Should we obstruct Turkey’s EU perspective because of that? No.’ (Radikal, 13/09/2004)\(^\text{126}\) Following the release of EU Commission’s 2004 progress report on Turkey which suggested the European Council open the accession negotiations with Turkey, the European Council in Amsterdam set -after intense debates and bargaining- October 2005 for the start of accession negotiations. Article 20 of the Summit suggested ‘unresolved border disputes having repercussions on accession if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice’ (EU’s Dutch Presidency, 2004: 5)\(^\text{127}\) The summit once again revealed Greco-Relations’ inability to get isolated from Cyprus Issue though Cyprus is not a part of bilateral relations officially. It looks quite possible that Greece will seek to distance itself step by step from the Cyprus Issue- albeit keeping its solidarity with Greek Cypriot discourse on Cyprus problem- and leave Cyprus and Turkey alone on the table officially as Turkey has just received a date for negotiation talks. Valinakis, a Greek foreign affairs official, has just stated that

\(^\text{125}\) ‘Greece cancels 2 billion-euro military contracts after Turkish defence contracts’ [http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040517142743.8ug1a6uz](http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040517142743.8ug1a6uz) (Visited on 4 January 2005)


\(^\text{127}\) This statement indeed reflects the concerns of two members, Greece and Cyprus. Territorial conflicts with Greece, as described in this paper before, originate from the Aegean Sea. The Cyprus problem is also meant here, as any countries but Turkey do not internationally recognize TRNC. Full text of the 2004 EU Council Conclusions in Amsterdam available at [http://www.eu2004.nl/default.asp?CMS_TCP=tcpAsset&id=8EBC25BB369148B28C3626C4ABC0DE31X1X68039X52](http://www.eu2004.nl/default.asp?CMS_TCP=tcpAsset&id=8EBC25BB369148B28C3626C4ABC0DE31X1X68039X52) (Visited on 4 January 2005)
‘Turkey should re-examine its Cyprus policy as it is going to be Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) which will fashion the pace of Turkish accession process.’ (Milliyet, 09/01/04)\textsuperscript{128}

7.2 Some Predictions and Suggestions

What could be the prospects for Greco-Turkish Relations? Tsakonas and Dokas argue that ‘the Greco-Turkish Relations will not develop fundamentally unless the Cyprus Problem is resolved on the basis of a mutually satisfactory peace plan.’ (Tsakonas and Dokas, 2004: 125) However, the result of referendum for Annan Plan has complicated the Cyprus Problem and confused minds about feasibility of a plan designed by the UN but not approved by all the Cypriots. Should Turkish-Greek relations still be held hostage to the Cyprus Issue especially after the referendum which has been approved by Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly but rejected by Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly and after the preparation of roadmap for Turkey that could elevate Turkey to the EU membership eventually? At this point, both Greek and Turkish Governments should review their positions on Cyprus again and ask if the Cyprus issue should still remain as a thorny issue. This review should- under the present circumstances\textsuperscript{129} - come from Greece more as the Turkish Government under Erdogan has so far concretely supported Annan Plan while the Greek Government under Karamanlis has hesitatingly pronounced a weak ‘yes’ for the plan and not shown concrete commitments to the plan.

Unfortunately, the two governments could not get a joint initiative for a comprehensive and mutually satisfactory peace settlement in the Cyprus Deadlock. G. Papandreu has publicly declared his support for the plan. So has Simitis. But these verbal commitments have not sufficed to exert influence on Papadopoulos who maintained his tough stance on the plan. Greek foreign officials give the signals that Cyprus problem has turned to be a bilateral problem between Turkey and Cyprus in the EU. However, time remains to be seen if such declarations will be fulfilled.

To calm down the Greek Cypriot apprehensions on Turkish military presence\textsuperscript{130} which has been on the island since 1974 under the pretext of safeguarding the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish Government could remove – or to be more realistic reduce- the Turkish military

\textsuperscript{128} ‘Yunanistan: Turkiye’nin AB Gidisatini Rumlar denetleyecek.’ in Milliyet (‘Greek Cypriots will monitor Turkey’s path to the accession’ www.milliyet.com.tr (9 January 2005)

\textsuperscript{129} In here, I refer to the AK Party Government, which has been in power since November 2002.

\textsuperscript{130}
presence in the TRNC. The pressure that the Turkish Government can exert on the Turkish Cypriot elite is not unlimited, as the vigorous Turkish Cypriot opposition movement, which together organized massive strikes and demonstrations against Denktas about Annan Plan, has shown. The Turkish Cypriots voted with an overwhelming majority for accession into the EU and antagonized with their popularly elected veteran leader Denktas and some of the Turkish elite over the future of the island. To appease the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot apprehensions on Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots should also launch the process of demilitarization in the island including ‘the evacuation of the British sovereign bases on the south.’\footnote{\text{The political and military officials in Turkey argue that it is quite ironical to see the continued deployment of British soldiers and protection of the two British Sovereign bases in the Greek-Cypriot controlled south while the Greek Cypriot Elite and Greek Politicians oppose the deployment of Turkish military in the Turkish-Cypriot controlled TRNC territory vehemently. I propose that both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish officials try to diffuse the tension through reducing military presence in the island. Thus, ‘lack of political will’, the Achilles’ heel in the Cyprus Impasse, will soon give place to ‘determination to restore peace’.}} As Cyprus has acceded into the Union, it is under the umbrella of the Union. It is not that rational neither for Cyprus and Turkey to feel threatened by each other within the current EU perspective. The EU will need to launch the policy of informing Greek Cypriot public about ‘the importance of an inclusive strategy for Turkish Cypriots under a United Cyprus Republic’ and about ‘Turkey’s irreversible integration to the EU’.

Negative possibilities on Greco-Turkish Relations? The worst possibility would be the Turkish exclusion from the Union as a consequence of Cypriot reservations and Turkey’s subsequent closure to its nutshell by taking a hard line on its Cyprus and Aegean Issues. Can Cyprus in the EU be prepared and willing to trigger another ‘Greco-Turkish Rivalry’, which has already cost more stressful relations and higher military expenditure to both Athens and Ankara? In the light of recent developments in Turkey and EU, a negative possibility (outbreak of a Cypriot Greek-Turkish Rivalry) can not be ruled out. It is a matter of question if the US Administration will want to intervene in another bone of contention in the Aegean or a Cypriot Greek-Turkish confrontation. Both the Turkish and the Greek economies are heavily dependent on tourism. So is the Cypriot economy. Any severe confrontations like Kardak/Imia Crisis in the Aegean Sea would be a severe blow to their economic stability and international image.

Kupchan argues that ‘unless festering disputes- those confrontations over the Aegean Sea - the frequent, 	extit{mob and hostile dogfights} and sovereignty claims referred here- the problems of these two neighbors will continue to trouble the EU’s decision making and drain the EU’s
diplomatic and military resources.’ (Kupchan, 2003:268) Indeed, the problems of these two neighbors seem to turn into the problem of three neighbors after the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Papadopoulos confirmed in several occasions that the route of Turkey to Brussels would be conditional upon Turkey’s recognition of ‘Cyprus’. The scenario- the encirclement of Turkey’s EU Path by a ‘joint Hellenic block’ and Turkey’s subsequent distraction from its European orientation- is for me the least-desired one. Turkey’s marginalization from its European orientation will have no utility for Cyprus and Greece. Neither the EU officials nor Turkish Governments are prepared to shoulder such a painful relationship between Ankara and Brussels. It is important here to note that the Greco- Turkish Relations have been challenged by bitter lessons in the past and there are strong signs that the politicians in both countries drew lessons from ‘the lost years’ without cooperation and dialogue.

In International Relations, friendships and enmities are not eternal. Today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s friends. The opposite situation is also possible. Some may still highlight deeply-the seated prejudices in both countries’ pasts. In here, I can not help myself from asking the following question: Why should not those who read or observed the achievements of the Franco-German Détente after the 2nd World War put the similar faith to the prospect of Greco-Turkish Détente? As Couloumbis and Dalis rightly argue, ‘a Greco-Turkish détente will enable Turkey to spare more time for its own security and economic problems both at home and in its eastern boundaries.’ (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004:85) In addition to this, I find it important to mention that Greece will also be able to spare more time for the ‘name crisis’ with Macedonia and for its integration of rising immigrant society particularly the Albanians. I am convinced that Greco-Turkish Reconciliation in the Southeastern Europe is important for prosperity and stability of both countries, which have to date enjoyed sizable political, economic and cultural influence in their regions.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to describe and analyze ‘the Greco-Turkish Détente’ under the two consecutive Simitis Governments in Greece. At the end of this thesis, I have reached to the following conclusions:

I have found that the Greco-Turkish détente has its very origins on Kardak/Imia Crisis at the very beginning of Simitis’ first premiership. The introduction of ‘confidence building measures’ between Greece and Turkey under the auspices of the NATO is an initial symptom of this détente. I argued in my thesis that RCI is at work in the policies of Simitis. As a strong individual actor who managed to make his way through institutions both at home and the EU level, he succeeded in materializing his priorities towards Turkey. Without strong individual leadership oriented towards mending the fences with its neighbor, a stronger tone of ‘Greco-Turkish Détente’ would not be possible. Here, we should remember that the first and only successful détente period between Greece and Turkey came to the fore after the 1st W.W. under the strong leaderships of Ataturk and Venizelos. After a tragic event, the parties had initiated the policy of mutual dialogue.

A number of factors prepared a ferment ground for ‘the Greco-Turkish Détente’: Simitis has come to realize the dangers of excluding Turkey from European orientation and losing the ground for settling the bilateral disputes. In a rational logic, Simitis decided to pull Turkey further to the European norms through revitalizing Turkey’s European Orientation, which received a deadly blow after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. Institutions are not straightjackets restricting actors but flexible instruments which can – if wisely used- offer benefits and assets. Simitis’ ability to use institutions both in government and in EU level has led me to think that Institutions are not bodies imposing on actors straight-jackets and that they could show certain level of flexibility for inputs of actors. Simitis and Papandreou succeeded in exercising autonomy in the institutions that they occupy. In other words, Simitis and Papandreou managed to redefine national interests of their country even at the expense of resistance.

RCI sees as institutions as ‘tabula rasa’ to be rewritten by each actor in each governmental change. However, there is a discontinuity here. The successor government of ND in Greece did not dare to depart from the PASOK’s foreign policy on Turkey though feeling the electoral pressure, which has still shown skepticism on Turkey’s intentions over the
Aegean and Cyprus. This leads me to the prediction that ‘strong individual involvement’ can leave lasting impact on institutions. Thus, the heritage of the Simitis rule with reference to the policy on Turkey could not be undone. I have found in my thesis that neo-functionalist logic continues to work successfully in the Greco-Turkish Relations as both countries have spilled areas of cooperation in regional level even after the end of the Simitis Government in 2004. The decision to bring Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania and Greece in a single working platform on the Balkans after 32 years is a strong indicator of this ‘spillover’ at work. It must be noted here that the Greek Government did not show resistance in setting October 2005 as the EU’s ‘rendezvous’ with Turkey for launching accession negotiations.

Early positive signs of the detente have been the intensification of bilateral dialogue on ‘low-politics’ issues from tourism to culture. Such cooperation initiatives between the two neighbors, which have chosen the policy of ‘no cooperation’ for many years, are unprecedented. So I have found spillover logic useful for triggering international cooperation. Purposeful and self-interested actors in foreign policies of the two countries facilitated this cooperation process. Cooperating on low politics, has not of course, yet resulted in the resolution of disputes over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. But both the Greek and the Turkish Governments continued to cooperate with each other. The basis prepared for Greco-Turkish Relations is now ‘the EU’. Cooperation on preparing Turkey for the Acquis and working together under an EU-funded natural gas network are some of those encouraging signs that the two neighbors can work within the EU.

Simitis succeeded in benefiting from capacity of institutions to maximize his government’s interests in policy making. He sought to improve his economic and policies remarkably through pushing Greece to the EU structures deeper. Those institutions are largely defined by EU but also are open for member governments’ inputs. However, I have also found that the attempts of transformation in the EU members are not confined to the directives of Brussels. In other words, the members could also try to inject their logic, priorities and problems. In my thesis study, I have found that Greece has EUised its disputes with Turkey. The EU membership of Greece has provided Simitis with a significant diplomatic leverage on Greece’s relationship to Turkey in my opinion. The Greek membership to the EU enabled Simitis to attach the two major Greek priorities into the pending Turkish candidacy in the EU: ‘Referring to International Court of Justice on Aegean Sea problem’ and ‘ensuring Cypriot
accession to the EU without any interruptions from the EU’. This Greek leverage has not been written here to make subjective remarks on Greco-Turkish Relations. It is written here only to describe a realm I have witnessed in my study.

The Greco-Turkish Relations have entered into a new era where Greece lifted its traditional block on the Turkish vocation to the EU membership and instead launched the policy of encouraging Turkey to strengthen its democratic credentials, normalize its bilateral relations to both Greece and Cyprus. However I have found out that there are both opportunities and challenges for both countries in this era of ‘détente’:

The opportunities derive from redefinition of Turkey- EU relations which was once defined as ‘the relationship between an association member and the EU’ but which evolved into ‘the relationship between candidate Turkey and the EU’ particularly with the 1999 Helsinki Summit. This new relationship envisages the accession of Turkey into the Union in the future provided that Turkey fulfills certain political and economic criteria in the Copenhagen Criteria. Institutions, which are set of beliefs, moral and practices, offer actors with instruments for effective decision-making and greater access to power. As the most sophisticated example of institutions with the features of ‘security provider’ and ‘democracy consolidation’, the EU enjoys certain international attraction made possible by its economic weight and increasing political assertiveness. It regulates not only behavior of its members but of its ‘potential members’ waiting in the anteroom of Brussels. I see that Turkey and Greece should be evaluated in this perspective in their relationship to the EU. Turkey is fully aware of mechanisms and privileges enjoyed by the EU members including Greece.

Rather than get stuck into ‘the relationship of association’ with the EU, which has continued for more than four decades, Turkey has been offered ‘the prospect of EU membership.’ The ball is in Turkey’s court now. I have found out that there is a compelling logic for Turkey to intensify its efforts for normalizing its relations with Greece. This logic largely emerges from Turkey’s long-desired aspiration to get integrated to European structures fully and thus stabilize its economy and politics successfully. If we keep in mind that (a) it has been traditionally a strategic choice as much as a political necessity for Turkey to join all Western and European Organizations and that (b) Turkey’s weakness in tackling with its problems with some EU members- for example Greece and now ‘Cyprus’ - has intensified the
Turkish passion for the EU membership, then it is not naïve to argue that Turkey has developed a sense of ‘compelling reason’ in its accession bid for the EU.

However, the challenges derive from the same source, ‘redefinition of Turkey-EU Relations’. Turkey’s disputes with Greece and Cyprus have been located to the heart of this newly-defined relationship. Accordingly, the progress on Turkey’s path to the EU will largely depend on the progress that Turkey makes on resolving its Aegean Sea and Cyprus problems. Greece does not set an organic link between the problems of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea officially. The minor problems—such as the Status of the Patriarchate and Minorities—also are additives to entanglement of bilateral disputes. In spite of official statements from Greek Governments that there is no ‘direct link between the Cyprus Problem and the Aegean Disputes’, this thesis has found out that there is. Furthermore, the accession of Cyprus—albeit divided—to the EU in 2004 includes to this picture a second actor which Turkey shall have to face. If wisely managed, the Cypriot membership in the EU could facilitate the solution of the problem thereby preparing the Turkish accession and the inclusion of the TRNC to a ‘United Cyprus Republic.’ If managed poorly—intimidating Turkey and marginalizing the Turkish aspiration to the EU membership—such a Cypriot membership could have disastrous implications for the region and the EU. I have found in my thesis that both the Greek and the Turkish Governments should invest their time and resources to bring the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot negotiators to the table as both Greece and Turkey have sufficient political and social influence on the both communities of the island.

The EU is equipped with strong mechanisms and attractive instruments for regulating behavior of both its members and non-members. However, the EU is not sometimes regarded as an ‘honest broker’ and an interlocutor in disputes, which involve a member and a ‘non-member’. This distrust towards the EU is evident in Greco-Turkish Relations and the EU’s approach to the bilateral disputes. I have found in my thesis that Turkish elite has been suspicious of ‘Greek conditions’ on Turkey’s roadmap to Brussels. The Greco-Turkish Rivalry epitomizes this finding successfully. Interestingly, the representations and discourse of Greece in Turkish political elite and media started changing positively following the change of behavior in the Greek Government towards Turkey. Discourse in both sides of the Aegean is not tough and uncompromising anymore. While Greek Governments confirm the significance of consolidating Turkey’s democracy within the framework of the EU membership in several
statements, Turkish Governments seem more aware of the need for resolving the bilateral disputes with Greece and for finding a mutually satisfactory solution for the Cyprus Impasse. Time remains to be seen to understand if such change of behavior is sustainable in the long run. But the current détente era could be sustainable as long as the successive governments in both countries are fully committed to normalization and Turkey continues to its reforms for the EU membership.

The current ND Government’s policy on Turkey-in spite of its cautiousness- encourages me to keep my optimism on the current détente. Because both the policies and discourse in both capitals are not confrontational and obstructive towards each other anymore. The EU membership prospect could be an influential drive for pulling Europeans in trouble to the EU structures and transforming them to become fully-fledged democracies in the medium-term. Turkey is one of those Europeans in trouble. And finally, improvements in one’s foreign policy have immediate effects on the political foundations of its neighbor(s) in conflict. The Greek foreign policy has improved positively in recent years. In this respect, more trust and cooperation between Greece and Turkey will encourage both parties to allocate fewer resources for their defense capabilities. Thus normalization of Greco-Turkish Relations will pay off in the future and bring the long-desired stability to the Southeastern fringe of Europe.
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