Governing from Above

The focus in this study is on governance in Nigeria’s new capital city of Abuja. The Abuja city government, like many others, is seeking to reduce its role in service delivery but it faces many challenges. Some are related to the position of Abuja in Nigeria’s history and national politics. Others have to do with the complex set of relations and power structures at the local level. The government saw the relocation to Abuja as an opportunity to propel the country into modernity but things have not turned out as planned. Contrary to the intention of the government and planners, Abuja houses the fastest growing slum in the country, Nyanya. This settlement provides the setting for the discussion of the forms of governance in this study. These forms are brought out by examining solid waste management, a sector which, due to the many actors involved and its high visibility, is the choice for studying governance in service provision. Drawing on the concepts of space and place and a variety of methods, including interviews, this dissertation shows how governance in Abuja is, contrary to common notions, conducted at higher levels with prominent roles given to federal institutions while the municipal government, community and households remain largely invisible.

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Governing from Above

Solid Waste Management in Nigeria’s New Capital City of Abuja

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Abstract

This doctoral dissertation examines how the symbolic character of a relocated capital city influences and intersects with local conditions to shape the governance structure and relations in service delivery. The focus is on Abuja, the new capital city of Nigeria, and the sector studied is solid waste management. Abuja was planned to avoid the numerous problems facing other Nigerian cities. Contrary to the intention of government and planners, the city now houses the fastest growing slum in the country. There are various possible explanations for these outcomes but this study pays particular attention to the conception of Abuja as a symbol of national unity.

The ‘good governance’ agenda is often promoted by the World Bank and donors as a way of handling the numerous challenges facing African governments, including service delivery. A major expectation of the agenda is that local governments manage the urban development process in conjunction with an array of institutions ranging from the private sector to community groups and households. An underlying notion is that of a minimalist national state. This is not the case in Abuja, where governance is conducted at higher levels and the municipal council remains largely invisible. This is manifested in solid waste management, where the municipal council has no jurisdiction over the sector. In addition, community groups and households play very minimal roles in the governance of services. Drawing on the concepts of space and place, the study concludes that the types of institutions found and their roles and relations are shaped by the national function of the city and the local power relations.

The study draws on primary and secondary data. Interviews were conducted with state officials, community leaders, households and interest groups, such as the private sector. Secondary data were obtained from government documents, studies and newspaper reports.

Key words: governance, space, place, solid waste management, relocated capital city, Abuja, Nigeria
This book is dedicated to my late father, Adakole Adama.
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Above all, I would like to thank God for giving me the opportunity to conduct this research.

Stockholm, May 2006

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<tr>
<td>AEPB</td>
<td>Abuja Environmental Protection Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AMA</td>
<td>Accra Metropolitan Assembly</td>
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<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Abuja Municipal Area Council</td>
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<td>AMMA</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPE</td>
<td>Bureau of Public Enterprises</td>
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<td>CASSAD</td>
<td>Centre for African Settlement Studies and Development</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOVAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ENA</td>
<td>Egba Native Authority</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCDA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authority</td>
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<td>FCT</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCTA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEPA</td>
<td>Federal Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FME</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWA</td>
<td>Gbagyi Women’s Association</td>
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<td>IUSB</td>
<td>Ibadan Urban Sanitation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCC</td>
<td>Kampala City Council</td>
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<td>LAWMA</td>
<td>Lagos State Waste Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGCs</td>
<td>Local Government Councils</td>
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<td>MFCT</td>
<td>Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory</td>
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<td>MSWM</td>
<td>Municipal Solid Waste Management</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>Nairobi City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NESP</td>
<td>National Environmental Protection Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMBY</td>
<td>Not In My Backyard</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPN</td>
<td>National Party of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>NISER</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Project Management Committee</td>
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<td>SSNC</td>
<td>Swedish Society for Nature Conservation</td>
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<td>STDA</td>
<td>Satellite Town Development Agency</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Waste Management Department</td>
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Figure 1. A boulevard leading from Asokoro district. The National Assembly is in the background. Asokoro district is a high-income neighbourhood located in the Phase 1 area of Abuja. (The Author, 2003).

Figure 2. A major road in and out of Abuja. Nyanya, a major focus of the study is in the background. The road divides the settlement into two. Though not in the master plan, Nyanya has been incorporated into Phase 2. (The Author, 2003).
Figure 3. Map of Nigeria showing the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. (Adapted from Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory, 1998 by Katrina Strömdahl).
Chapter 1 Introducing the Study

It is thirty years now since the decree establishing Abuja as the Federal Capital Territory was enacted … But for many Nigerians, the city of Abuja is a bundle of contradictions. [Lagos] the federal capital had become congested … a new federal capital territory, neutral in ethnic colouration and spare [sic] in population would minimize these multifarious problems and give a sense of belonging to all Nigerians regardless of ethnicity or religion. It was also envisaged that the city would be planned. [The] Abuja dream was a phantom as current events have shown … [not] surprisingly the city’s original master plan, and violations of it, have remained subjects of unending controversy. … In the years ahead, the cultural and ethnic diversity of the city, and the idea of its collective ownership should be given expression. The problem of the slums should be addressed before it becomes too embarrassing.¹

Introduction

Today, Abuja, the new capital of Nigeria, can be described as a city of paradoxes and disparities. There are various reasons why countries relocate their capitals. The decision on February 3, 1976 to relocate Nigeria’s capital to Abuja was based on two major visions, as reflected in the excerpt above. One was the desire to build a modern capital. Abuja was to be a modernist project conceived in the tradition of the “garden city” of Ebenezer Howard.² A major step taken to realize this goal was the commissioning of an American firm, International Planning Associates, to produce a master plan. The second vision was that of Abuja as a symbol of national unity and hence a place where every Nigerian would have a sense of belonging, irrespective of ethnic origin. When the official relocation took place in December 1991, the event was described as a “dream come true” for all Nigerians.³ In summing up the challenges of capital relocation, Schatz points out that it involves huge financial investment, that many attempts stall and that it is not uncommon for such cities to become partially completed monuments to utopian ideas.⁴ In this context and considering the rapid growth of the city, Abuja has

¹ The Guardian Editorial Opinion (2006, 5 November)
² Mabogunje 2001, p.3. The Garden City concept was developed by Ebenezer Howard, a city of London Stenographer. It emphasizes spaciousness and environmental quality.
⁴ Schatz 2003
been relatively successful. As Vale describes it, when the Nigerian government made the decision to relocate the capital to Abuja, it was proposing the “largest building venture of the twentieth century”. The area in which Abuja is located has indeed undergone a spatial, economic, sociocultural and political transformation. The round huts that dotted the landscape have been replaced by ‘modern’ buildings made of glass or concrete, and the narrow passages and footpaths that served as streets have given way to paved streets and boulevards (see Figure 1).

In addition to the physical transformation of the area, Abuja is no longer inhabited by specific indigenous tribes but is now a microcosm of Nigeria, with the various ethnic groups represented. As the seat of national government, Abuja houses major federal government institutions, the judiciary and the National Assembly. On the international front, the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and embassies are located in the city. Another sign of ‘success’ is the rapid growth in population captured in the statement that Abuja had more infrastructure than residents in the early stages. The city recorded a population of 378,671 in the 1991 census and 1.4 million in the 2006 exercise.

There is, however, another side to the story of Abuja. A city is much more than buildings and roads. There was the hope that building a city on a relatively empty expanse of land would give the government and planners the opportunity to avoid some of the problems plaguing Lagos and other Nigerian cities, such as traffic congestion, inadequate housing and uncollected garbage on city streets. To the contrary, Abuja has been described as “dysfunctional” and “physically deteriorating”, to the extent that the “government and well meaning Nigerians have raised grave concerns about the future of the Federal Capital”. This physical deterioration and dysfunctionality are manifested in solid waste management.

The situation is so deplorable that heaps of refuse have become landmarks... major sources of pollution to both surface and ground water resources, breeding grounds for disease-causing pests (vectors), unsanitary conditions and often times blocks [sic] roads and drainage...making the FCT environment a far cry from what it should be.

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5 Valle, 1992, p. 134  
6 Abuja can also lay claim to hosting international gatherings such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held from 5 to 12 December, 2003.  
7 Garba 2006. The statement was made by the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory  
8 Ukwu 2001, p. 89  
10 Mabogunje 2001  
11 Contained in a speech by the Vice-President (in Kalgo and Ayileka, 2001, p.xi).  
12 Chukwuocha 2003, p. 5
In the search for the underlying causes of the problems facing the city, the distortion of the Abuja master plan is the major factor often singled out. The way the relocation from Lagos to Abuja was handled has been described as a “mad rush” that led to devastating consequences for all sectors of the plan.\textsuperscript{13} The rapid population growth that followed put severe pressure on the facilities and hastened environmental degradation, uncollected solid waste, traffic congestion and inadequate water supplies, among others.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, despite the declared intentions of the government and planners, Abuja is facing similar problems as other Nigerian and African cities. The distortion of the plan, though important, does not offer a comprehensive explanation for the numerous problems facing the city government.

From Lagos which is ranked as one of the fastest growing cities in the world and yet the dirtiest and least liveable to Abuja, our supposedly modern capital city … the story is the same. There is entropy or organized disorder, decay of infrastructure facilities … inefficient waste management system … [Abuja] was properly conceived to contrast with the crisis-ridden Lagos … Greed, corruption and avarice of highly placed government officials, including politicians thwarted the Abuja plan … Consequently, unconformity and chaos reigned in Abuja.\textsuperscript{15}

The word “chaos” used above to describe the situation in Abuja may be an exaggeration but, from every indication, there is some dysfunction in the way the city is governed and this is evident in solid waste management. For a supposedly modern city, waste collection is erratic, disposal methods are rudimentary and where you live largely determines the quality of services you receive. There are marked differences between high-income districts of Asokoro and Maitama and the peripheral settlements, such as Nyanya, which is described as the fastest growing slum in the country.\textsuperscript{16} Located on the eastern periphery of Abuja, it is a major gateway into the city and symbolizes a lot of what has gone wrong with Abuja (see Figures 2 and 7). The settlement does not exist in the Abuja master plan but is now a major feature of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) landscape.

The problems mentioned above can be associated with the problems of governance. In the ‘good governance’ discourse, reference is often made to a change from government to governance.\textsuperscript{17} The word change may not be applicable to Abuja since, being a new city, there were no existing structures or systems to change. However, this by itself aided the production of the form of governance that exists in the city today. Unlike the former capital, Lagos,

\textsuperscript{13} Olomola 2001, p.193.
\textsuperscript{14} Adejuwon 2001, p.20.
\textsuperscript{15} Onyekakeyah (2006, 5 September)
\textsuperscript{16} The comments on Nyanya is based on an interview with a Director in the Federal Ministry of Environment in Abuja in 2002.
\textsuperscript{17} Swilling 2001, p. 3
where the colonial government had left its footprints, Abuja as a relocated capital offered a ‘blank canvas’. The national government had the opportunity to not only design the city but also shape its governance through the creation of institutions and an administrative system. For a sector such as solid waste management, in which the different actors are expected to perform specific functions, this has implications for the nature and extent of their involvement.

In seeking explanations for the particular forms of governance found, the study focus can fruitfully be on place or specific characteristics of Abuja. This draws attention to Abuja as a relocated capital and the role of national politics in its development. As Vale puts it, while the planners of Abuja drew inspiration from capital cities such as Brasilia, Washington, D.C., London and Paris, and shared a commitment to rapid modernization, the situation is, in this case compounded by “deep ethnic schisms” in the country.18 Hence, while a major challenge facing relocated capitals is how to achieve modernization, Abuja has the extra burden of being a symbol of national unity.

Increasingly, agency in governance goes beyond the state to include other institutions or actors. A major expectation, in today’s notion of governance, is that local governments manage the urban development process in conjunction with an array of civil society organizations and the private sector.19 In the context of this study, this means that, as pointed out by Pile, understanding cities requires a “geographical imagination” that can look both beyond and within the city.20 This is of particular relevance in a relocated capital city. While Abuja is expected to perform a national function, the city has to be governed and services provided. As in many other cities, the city government is seeking to encourage the participation of the private sector, the community and households in service delivery. Studies have shown that the participation of these actors faces many challenges in African cities. In solid waste management, the common picture is that private sector participation, though on the increase, is minimal; community participation is limited; and there is not much cooperation from households.21 These features may be common but are not necessarily manifested in similar forms or to the same extent, nor are the causative factors the same. How actors participate in governance processes cannot be divorced from their experiences of the city and their relations with others in a particular setting. The aim of this study is to examine how the national function of a relocated capital city influences and intersects with local political conditions to shape the governance structure and relations in service delivery. Solid waste management is the sector chosen to address the major themes raised.

18 Vale 1992, p. 134
19 Swilling, 2001, p. 11
20 Pile 1999, p. 49
The Municipal Solid Waste Management (MSWM) Problem

The problem of solid waste management is not new to society but the magnitude and solutions adopted have changed over time and space. Today, most governments and citizens alike are becoming increasingly aware of and concerned about the quality of the environment. Arguably, most of the attention is on global warming or climate change. The latest is a documentary by America’s former Vice President, Al Gore, “An Inconvenient Truth”.22 At the Global Conference on the Environment and Development, held in Rio in 1992, about 180 countries agreed to strive for long-term, sustainable development.23 This was an important landmark in drawing attention to environmental problems in general. In more recent times, from May 20-23, 2001, over a hundred countries from around the world met in Stockholm, Sweden, to sign the convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the first global attempt aimed at eliminating some of the most toxic and damaging chemicals from the earth’s biosphere. One of the concerns raised at the conference was that municipal waste incineration accounts for 37.6% of the annual worldwide release of dioxins.24

Cities are a central focus when it comes to the problem of solid waste management. Rapid population growth and urbanization accompanied by high consumption rates have brought many challenges. Urbanization may be a relatively recent phenomenon in Africa, but in less than 50 years, some countries have gone from being largely rural to a situation where about half of the population lives in cities.25 The problem is that the ability or capacity of African governments to keep up with this growth remains minimal. Studies show that more waste is produced in cities of the North than in those of the South. In Canada, the average waste generation rate is recorded to be 3.3 kilograms per person per day26 while in some African cities, the figure may be as low as 200 grams.27 However, most of the waste produced in African cities is not collected and of the waste that is collected, only a fraction receives proper disposal,28 making the threat of diseases a constant possibility.

Schübeler et al. identify a complex set of issues – financial, technical, political and social that shape MSWM.29 The financial is related to budgeting and accounting, capital investment, cost recovery and reduction. In this, the level of economic development of the country is a factor. For example, on

22 The film opened in the week of September 18, 2006 in the United Kingdom.
23 Environmental and Health Protection Administration 1997, p. 6
24 World Wildlife Fund 1999
25 Myers 2005
26 Sawell et. Al., 1996, p. 352
27 Medina 2002
28 Coolidge et al., 1993, p. 1
29 Schübeler et al., 1996
average, developing countries allocate 5% of municipal budgets to waste disposal, compared to 20–30% in developed countries. The technical aspect refers to the planning and design of MSWM systems, waste collection and transfer systems; waste recovery and disposal; and hazardous and special waste treatment. In cities in developed countries, the attention has shifted from the practical tasks of waste collection and transportation to waste prevention and safe scientific treatments, but in developing countries, the focus is still on the public health perspective, due to ineffective collection, transportation and disposal systems. In addition, the technical systems adopted in developing countries are judged to be poorly suited to the operational requirements of the cities, an outcome of the large-scale importation of technology but with local capacities for maintenance missing. The political dimension of MSWM examines the participation of the state, market, community and households. This is the major focus of this study. Relevant areas of interest include the allocation of functions between the different branches of the state and the formulation of partnerships. The social aspect of MSWM includes a wide range of issues such as waste generation patterns; waste handling by households and other users; and the social conditions of workers.

The Research Problem and Questions

From the pre-industrial urban centres to today’s so-called global cities, cities have provided both a challenge and an interest to scholars in various fields. The global and world cities may take most of the attention in current debates, but as Robinson points out, there are cities that do not fall into these categories and possibly never will. Capital cities are another specific group of cities but Campbell opines that they are often marginalized in urban research. If this is the case, by further narrowing the focus to relocated capital cities, this study is addressing a group of cities that have received little attention. This does not mean that there are no studies on relocated capital cities. However, where they do exist, the focus seldom goes beyond identifying the reasons for relocation. For those that do go further, the primary interest is often a reflection of the interests of specific disciplines and, arguably, architecture and planning have dominated. For example, in relation to Brasilia, Holston documents the intention of the government and planners to use ar-

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30 Coolidge et al., 1993, p. 7
31 Onibokun et al., 2000
32 Onibokun, 1999, p. 244
33 Robinson 2002, p. 531
34 Campbell 2000
35 See Vale 1992, Gritsai and van der Wusten and Holston 1989
chitecture and planning to transform social values. In the case of Abuja, Vale has drawn attention to how the application of modern architecture and urbanism was influenced by ideas or ideals of national unity. A relocated capital city has to be governed, and the theme of national unity examined by Vale, but in relation to architecture and planning, can also be extended to governance.

The rise of the idea of ‘good governance’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s and its applicability in the developing world context has attracted a lot of attention. Though a ‘universal’ concept with origins in the west, it is more widely applied in the developing world. The ‘good governance’ concept identified certain key areas: public sector management, accountability, legal framework, information and transparency. Its application has been promoted as a ‘solution’ to the litany of development problems facing developing countries. In service delivery, the devolution of social welfare functions to lower levels of government and the establishment of public-private partnerships and other “networked” forms of governance are the major hallmarks.

Today, there are certain common notions about how solid waste management should be governed. National governments are expected to formulate policies and establish the institutional and legal frameworks while local governments provide or manage solid waste collection and disposal services. The private sector and community groups, organizations or leaders are to be more directly involved in the management of the sector through partnerships, while cooperation is needed from individuals or households in areas such as payment for services and proper waste handling practices. However, the situation in Abuja does not reflect this trend. The major problem addressed in this study is to understand how a national function of a relocated capital city, in this case its symbolic character as a centre of national unity, influences and intersects with local political conditions to shape governance processes and how this is manifested in solid waste management.

The concept of governance, considered by many to be based on neoliberal ideologies, has been subjected to a lot of criticisms. The ‘change’ has been described as the replacement of the language of the market by that of a notion of governance stripped of politics. Others question if the market has indeed been replaced. Crucially, another allegation is that there was the basic assumption that ‘good governance’ ‘has universal developmental rele-

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36 See Holston 1989
37 Vale 1992
38 World Bank 1992, p. 3
39 Leftwich 1993
40 Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 341
41 Schübeler et al., 1996
42 Schübeler et al., 1996
43 Chandhoke 2002, p. 44
44 Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist, 2004, p. 2
vance for all cultures and societies in the modern world”. This approach neglects the specific historical, social, political and economic contexts under which governance takes place. As has been reported in a study on the governance of solid waste management in three African cities, despite the apparent sameness in African development planning, how policies are implemented is shaped by specific historical and political forces. This view is not limited to Africa. In a study on urban regimes and a comparison of North American and European cities, Leo points out that while they appear to face similar problems and have adopted similar solutions, a combination of differences in local and national politics results in differences between the two. This is a crucial argument in this study.

A relevant starting point for a discussion of the governance processes in Abuja is the role of the national state. The nature of national state involvement in service delivery has changed over time and space. In Europe, the post-war Fordist regime of the 1940s championed national state intervention, but the depression that followed is reported to have challenged the capacity of national governments to maintain the high standards of social welfare. Today, the emphasis is on the ‘withdrawal’ of the state and greater market-led intervention. In the case of Africa, in the 1980s, governments were urged to replace the state-led development paradigm that followed independence with the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), advocating the withdrawal of the state from service provision. However, the expected benefits of greater growth stabilization of financial markets and political order did not materialize: hence the concept of good governance. A central component of ‘good governance’ is the decentralization or, specifically, devolution of power from national to local governments. Though not new to Africa, decentralization gained prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of the ‘good governance’ agenda under which it is seen by international agencies and donors as a central element in the democratization process and as a tool for promoting efficient service delivery. Many African national governments, due to dwindling financial resources and external pressure, have adopted the policy of decentralization, but the problem is that there remains a huge gap between policy and practice.

45 Leftwich 1993, p.1
46 Myers 2005, p. 5
47 Leo, 1997
48 Gboyega 1998, p. 3
49 MacLeod and Goodwin 1999
50 Stein 2001
51 Chandhoke 2002
52 Chikulo 1998, p.84. Benjamin (1998) adds that in Nigeria, in pre-colonial times, some type of local administration existed through the Emirate system but this was reformed by the British colonial government.
53 Devas 1999 and Chikulo 1998
Several reasons have been given for the marginal role of local governments across Africa. These include the lack of financial and human resources. In the case of finance, one argument is that money is scarce in general, leaving little to be transferred to local governments.\(^{54}\) This is coupled with the inability of local governments to generate independent revenue. There is, however, the notion that a lack of financial autonomy does not necessarily have to erode local autonomy. Mawhood, in a reaction to this, argues that this may be true in developed countries, where there are many different ways of putting pressure on local governments, but less so in developing countries, where there is little control over government activities. This introduces the relevance of politics, the state and leadership in Africa. Along these lines, Enemou cites the authoritarian tendencies of African rulers as a key factor in the marginal role of local governments.\(^{55}\) While acknowledging this, authoritarianism and state practices in general, should be examined in the context of broader societal conditions. As Bratton puts it, the disposition of a particular state is influenced by the distinctive historical experience and cultural endowments of the society in which it is embedded.\(^{56}\) This takes us to the national state in Nigeria, the wider historical and political contexts under which it operates and how Abuja fits into it. To address this, I will pose the question:

How and why is the governance of Abuja dominated by the national state?

A useful starting point is to define Abuja as a place. Abuja is a capital city, but this is not unique since it is assumed that every country should have one. Abuja is a relocated capital city. Once again, there are other relocated capital cities, including New Delhi, Brasilia, Canberra, Astana, and Ankara. Furthermore, Abuja, as has been established, has a symbolic character as a centre of national unity. This is also not unique as can be seen in the comments on capital relocation by Wolfel that place “is an important source of identity for nations”.\(^{57}\) However, and still on the perspective of place, what is important is how the symbolic character of a relocated capital city shapes governance processes. The assumption is that, even though it is common for relocated capital cities to have a national or symbolic function; it is still important to examine how it is manifested in governance processes in a specific place.

The first aspect of relocation, that is relevant to understanding the eventual outcomes for governance processes, is the reasons. It is difficult to attribute capital relocation to one factor, but the history of a country is a useful

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\(^{54}\) Mawhood 1993  
\(^{55}\) Enemou 2000  
\(^{56}\) Bratton 1988  
\(^{57}\) Wolfel, 2002, p 488
place to start from. Wolfel describes capital cities as “icons” that can be used to rewrite the history of a country and gives the example of the return of Germany’s capital to Berlin after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the wall.58 In the same way, in Kazakhstan, the collapse of the Soviet Union and accelerated national identities are cited by Wolfel as providing some impetus for relocation. A related factor is the role of nation- and state-building.59 Schatz, in a study on Astana, Kazakhstan, describes capital relocation as one of the more innovative tools for nation- and state-building.

By state building, I mean the effort to undermine alternative, rival power bases and develop viable institutions. By nation building, I mean the effort to secure the loyalty of broad populations inhabiting the territory represented by the state. In practice, these processes invariably are closely intertwined60

Similar to Astana in Kazakhstan, in Abuja, Mabogunje reports that the decision to relocate the capital is traceable to the experiences and aspirations of a nation that had survived a 30-month civil war and had come to accept the imperative of national unity.61 Nigeria obtained its independence from Britain in 1960 but has had an unstable political landscape ever since. The civil war between 1967 and 1970 underscores the cultural and ethnic divide. Throughout the years, different national governments have taken steps aimed at forging national unity and the decision to relocate the capital to Abuja, can be seen as one more attempt. As contained in the master plan, a new capital was needed to “help in generating a new sense of national unity.”62 The relocation of the capital from Lagos, a place closely associated with a particular ethnic group,63 to Abuja, located in a vast area not linked to any of the major ethnic groups, was another act aimed at uniting a diverse society.

A relevant point made by Schatz is that nation- and state-building occur simultaneously. Schatz gives the example of Europe, where the process of building viable state structures often went hand in hand, but added that in developing countries, “states were established without having to develop a government to administer control over the territory or inspire the loyalty of the populations that inhabited a particular area”.64 In another example, Schatz points out that when colonial states like the United States, Canada and Australia, established capital cities, they expanded gradually over space and in most cases without security threats from militarily weaker and numerically smaller indigenous population.65 On the other hand, Herbst reports that how

58 Wolfel 2002, p. 487
59 See Vale 1992 and Schatz 2003
60 Schatz 2003, p. 8
61 Mabogunje 2001, p. 3.
62 The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979, p. 27
63 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998
64 Schatz 2003, p 3
65 Schatz 2003.
to exercise power over sometimes huge territories and the “consolidation of states” remain central political issues in Africa. In a further confirmation of the linkage between national state intervention and nation-building, Chikulo notes that the devolution of power to lower tiers is often viewed with suspicion by African leaders who see it as capable of reinforcing ethnic and regional identities and hence jeopardizing political stability. A major inference that can be made from the comparisons of state formation in Europe and developing countries by Schatz is that, the timing of relocation or establishment of a capital city, relative to the history and level of political development of its country, is a factor. In this context, in Nigeria, Abuja was established at a time when the desire to enhance national unity was high on the political agenda.

Still on nation- and state-building and national state intervention, in the case of Abuja, apart from the desire for national unity, one of the official reasons given for relocation was that Lagos, the former capital, was incapable of performing a dual role as federal and state capital. The lack of adequate (physical) space was given, but there was more to it than physical space. To confirm this, Migdal has drawn attention to how the desire to shape state norms is one reason why states attempt to create their own spaces for officials through separate office buildings or by building new capital cities. It is important to note that both capital relocation and nation-building privilege the national tier. It is the branch of the state, often conferred with the authority, and is the one, in the position to provide or mobilize the financial resources needed for relocation. The process of nation-building places the national state as the ‘neutral’ force in society, so it has the opportunities to undermine other institutions. Building a new capital involves much more than the construction of office buildings. A common way in which the national state exerts influence is through the creation of institutions and administration. Migdal describes institutions as the “critical realm of action” for the state. This description is particularly appropriate in the relocated and new capital context, where there are no pre-existing institutions.

Under the ‘good governance’ agenda, the local government is expected to be the major actor in urban governance. This extends to service delivery, which some see as the justification for the existence of local governments. Even in capital cities, noted for their high level of national state intervention,
solid waste management is still considered the function of municipal or local governments. In Kampala, Uganda, the Kampala City Council is the institution that collects waste from the streets of the city. The same goes for Nairobi, Kenya, and in the United States, solid waste management is “traditionally a function of individual local governments”. This is not the case in Abuja. A major reason behind this outcome – the high level of national state intervention has already been highlighted. My interest is to go further to examine how the municipal council is marginalized in governance processes through an examination of events in the solid waste sector and hence the question:

How is the municipal council marginalized in the management of solid waste services?

The marginal position of the municipal council is manifested in different ways. Reference has already been made to the creation of institutions, as one of the major ways, in which the national state dominates governance processes. In solid waste management, this is reflected in the type of state institutions created and the functions allocated to them. This is backed by legal provisions that deny the municipal council authority over solid waste management. This is the defining feature in Abuja that differentiates it from other cities, including other capital cities. In addition, the autonomy of the institution created to handle solid waste services and the absence of formal channels of contact with the municipal council further reduces the possibility of the council having any influence on the management of services. Added dimensions include the unclear definition of roles and the limited capacity of the municipal council to challenge intervention from higher tiers.

Apart from central-local relations, there are other sets of relations that are relevant to the governance of a city and that of solid waste management. A common feature of “good governance” is that the state manages services in collaboration with other actors. This makes the formation of partnerships, which is seen as offering a more efficient and sustainable way of providing services, a major component. The city is made up of different groups and institutions, which means the possibility of different types of partnerships. With the current emphasis on development, a common type is the public-private partnership in which the state goes into an alliance with the private sector. This is also the case in solid waste management. However, in the developing world context, this type of partnership is often limited to medium and high class areas of cities. Community-based solid waste management,
involving community organizations, groups and leaders, households and informal enterprises, tends to be the preferred approach in low-income neighbourhoods. A Habitat report refers to this approach, as more likely to provide durable solutions in low-income areas due to the requirement for simple equipment, relatively little capital and economic benefits through employment or income-generating activities.\textsuperscript{81} Beyond this, a major aspect of community participation is the formation of partnerships. However, as with all partnerships, a first crucial question is:

Who are the members and whose interests dominate and why?

The heterogeneous nature of cities means the possibility for many types of partnerships. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, local authorities, community leaders, private contractors and external donors have been identified as the major actors and some alliances between them have been observed.\textsuperscript{82} In Cotonou, Benin Republic, community groups participate in the collection process under contracts with the municipal agency. Outside Africa, in Chennai, India, different types of public Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and community alliances, involving waste pickers, itinerant buyers, dealers and wholesalers, exist.\textsuperscript{83} In addition, the mix of modern and traditional has become a major feature in African cities.\textsuperscript{84} In solid waste management, in the absence of organizations, a common practice is for the state to go into partnership with informal leaders, including traditional rulers.\textsuperscript{85} A study on community-based solid waste management reports that traditional rulers can play crucial roles such as carrying out education campaigns, controlling the behaviour of households and helping in mobilization.\textsuperscript{86} However, their success, and that of state-community partnerships in general, depends also on place characteristics such as the history of cooperation, the types of political arrangements and local power structures.

Not all partnerships have functioned according to expectations. A study on a partnership involving community leaders, an NGO, state institutions and the Zabbaleens, a group of settlers with a long history in recycling in Cairo, Egypt, notes its relative success and the opinion that it could be a model for developing countries.\textsuperscript{87} On the other hand, in Hanna Nasif, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a partnership between local officials and a Community

\textsuperscript{81} United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 1989, p. 1 Other possible reasons are the unattractiveness of low-income areas to private companies who are in business to make money and absence of infrastructure such as roads to allow for the use of collection vehicles.
\textsuperscript{82} Bakker et al., 2000
\textsuperscript{83} Baud, Grafakos, Hordjik and Post 2001
\textsuperscript{84} Aina 1997
\textsuperscript{85} Anschutz 1996
\textsuperscript{86} Anschutz 1996
\textsuperscript{87} Myllyä 2001
Based Organization (CBO) faced many challenges.88 The high-handedness of local officials, undue interventions in the affairs of the CBO and the failure to seek the views of the CBO and local residents on major issues were given as factors that contributed to its failure. In the Cairo case, relations between the state and community leaders and groups are reported to have been largely cooperative. The Dar es Salaam study confirms that partnerships are often plagued with processes of exclusion. This can be traced to the unequal capacity of actors, based on differential access to power. In the end, those with more power will exert more influence.89 Apart from identifying the nature of relations between members, it is necessary to go further to examine how and why the amount of influence members have, may be dependent on the political arrangements and relations in a place. This also addresses the larger question of why cooperation may be particularly difficult or easy in a particular place.

Stone, in a study on urban regimes, points out that places vary in the challenges they face and the effectiveness with which they address problems, and that cooperation is likely to be easier in some places than others.90 In this study, the focus is on a partnership between state officials and community, mainly traditional, rulers. The question then is: what are the specific characteristics of Abuja and Nyanya, the settlement in focus, that are likely to shape power relations in the partnership? A major contention is that the effectiveness of traditional or community leaders can be influenced by political forces at the city level. In this study, this is related to the state institutional and administrative framework.

A major argument in favour of devolution to local governments is that they are closest to the people and are therefore better placed to provide or manage services.91 In this context, devolution can be seen as a means to an end. In the case of solid waste management, Ali and Snel point out that linkage with the municipality is crucial in community-based schemes.92 They add that where the linkage of the community with the state is weak, likely outcomes include: lack of transparency in roles, responsibilities and obligations; a lack of legitimacy; uncertainty about the nature and level of assistance from the municipality; and a lack of two-way communication between the community and the municipality.93 Ali and Snel, as is often the case, make specific reference to local governments as the managers of solid waste services. There are, however, cases where this is not so. It is therefore important to examine the implications of this for the capacity of community leaders involved in the partnership with the state. A major premise is that the

88See Majani 2000
89 Elander 2002
90 Stone 2004, p. 109
92 See Ali and Snel 1999
93 Ali and Snel 1999
lack of responsibility of the Abuja municipal council over solid waste services removes a valuable medium through which community and traditional leaders can exert influence in partnerships and in governance processes.

Another challenge likely to confront community leaders is related to the heterogeneous nature of urban communities. There is a high possibility that heterogeneity can weaken inter-group relations and make cooperation among community leaders much more difficult. There is the contention that governance processes involving traditional institutions may be more likely to face problems of governance. Hyden makes reference to a “communitarian” regime common in former communist countries and in Africa. Made up of primary social organizations, ethnic loyalty is a common feature and governance structures are reported to be socially embedded in multifunctional relations. A relevant point to draw from this is that ethnic loyalty may take precedence over the general interests of the partnership. Furthermore, commenting on state strategies and hegemonic projects, MacLeod and Goodwin observe that where a hegemonic power emerges through a hegemonic project, “competing or non-complementary collective identities and interest groups” may have little influence. In addition, they also note that at specific periods and in specific places, there can be the hegemony of a particular elite or social bloc. In this context, the process of relocating the capital to Abuja can be seen as having contributed to the hegemony of the national state. In this case, while on the surface, the national state is attempting to include community leaders in service delivery, in practice, such groups cannot wield much influence.

This discussion has shown that partnerships are usually embedded in power relations. Inevitably, gender relations, a relation of power between men and women, are an integral part. In this case, gender is the basis for inclusion or exclusion. In today’s notion of ‘good governance’, women are expected to play a more active role in local governance. A major argument for this is the belief that women are most active at that level and share a common interest with local state officials in enhancing service delivery. As a result, the decision by the state to form a partnership with the community should be accompanied with benefits for both men and women, but particularly for women. However, as Lauria puts it, the change from ‘government to governance’ implies a change in regulatory mechanisms to include social institutions, social relations in civil society, cultural norms and the activities of the state apparatus. This statement highlights the role of two major actors that feature in this study: traditional institutions and the state in shaping gender relations. The question to address is that when the state decides to go

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94 Post et al., 2003
95 Hyden 1992
96 MacLeod and Goodwin 1999, p. 13
97 Phillips 1996
98 Lauria 1997, p. 6
into partnership with the community, who makes it into the partnership, men and/or women? To address this and from an analytical perspective, the concept of gender contract, developed within Scandinavian feminist research is adopted. I see the concept as particularly relevant because it highlights issues of power, space and place, which form a central focus in this study. The gender contract contains ideas, norms and rules about places, tasks and qualities of men and women and space is considered a medium through which social life is produced and reproduced.99

The city is also made up of households or individuals who are the primary users of services and they can participate in service delivery in different ways. Popular participation in solid waste management contains different components, ranging from proper waste handling practices to participation in the formal political processes.100 It is, however, a complex process influenced by numerous factors including those related to the type of service or sector to the social and political. The sector-related include the low priority often given to waste and the tendency to see it as the responsibility of the government.101 The social draws attention to the behaviour of users or social practices.102 However, in the bid to give attention to local politics, I give particular attention to community or collective initiatives. To address the major issues raised, I pose the question:

What are the factors shaping popular participation and to what extent is the outcome a reflection of the political characteristics of the place?

Community or collective action is an important component of popular participation, and as Ali and Snel point out, self-help initiatives in solid waste management arise in response to local conditions and are often geographically defined.103 This clearly demonstrates the relevance of place. Lewis points to the “perceived failure of state-led development approaches” of the 1980s and a “new policy agenda” that draws on “neo-liberal economic policy prescriptions” and the “good governance” agenda as having contributed to a renewed interest in voluntary organizations.104 Tripp reports that in Tanzania, as a result of the economic crisis of the 1980s, people were ‘forced’ to withdraw their reliance on the state and depend more on their own efforts through the activities of voluntary organizations and other survival strategies.105 Reaffirming this, some add that such organizations render much of

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99 Larsson and Schlyter 1993 and Forsberg 2001
100 Schübeler et al., 1996 and Louw 2003
101 Cointreau-Levine 1994 and Onibokun and Kumuyi 1999
102 Kendie 1999
103 Ali and Snel 1999
104 Lewis 1999, p. 1
105 Tripp 1992, p. 221
the bulk of the services ‘enjoyed’ by the poor in many African cities. Others have, however, cautioned against the danger of over-dramatizing their role, pointing to the over-dependence on the state or donors due to the lack of finance and skilled personnel as major problems.107

My aim is to go further to point out that contrary to popular notions, voluntary action is absent in some places even when the perceived major catalyst for it, state failure, exists. In solid waste management, the failure of the state to provide adequate services is also considered the primary reason for community action.108 This is buttressed by the notion that “no collection” is the largest incentive for community initiative.109 What can be inferred from this is that people will inevitably take action when services fail, possibly due to threats to public health. This, however, borders on rational choice thinking, which “locates the origins of practice in the mental decision-making of the rational actor”.110 The decision to initiate or join community action is a complex one that cannot be attributed to one factor but is instead governed by a “whole range of rationalities and irrationalities” that varies between actors or institutions.111

Place or the setting, in this case the city, is a relevant factor in popular participation. The city provides a setting for several networks and interactions.112 The heterogeneous nature of urban populations has already been acknowledged. For example, Phillips has drawn attention to the difficulty of voluntary action in urban centres as compared to rural areas.113 This is because urban households are made up of people from different economic, social and geographic backgrounds and the resultant heterogeneity reduces social capital and makes cooperation difficult. This was observed in a study on solid waste management in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which revealed that the degree of homogeneity of the ethnic or regional origin of residents influenced community initiatives.114

In the context of place, the symbolic character of Abuja is seen as a factor influencing community action. The interest is to establish if the conception of Abuja as a symbol of national unity has indeed generated enough unity among the different groups to come together, through collective efforts to improve the quality of services. The expectation is that the symbolic character of Abuja will instead put undue focus and sensitivity on ethnicity and make cooperation and collective action more difficult. This will be examined

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106 Swilling 2001, p. 10
107 See Hyden 1995 and Semboja and Therkildsen 1995
108 Ali and Snel 1999
109 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 1989, p. 8
110 Painter 1997, p. 135
111 Painter 1997, p 138
112 Pile 1999, p. 49
113 Phillips 2002, p. 137
114 Pargal et al., 1999. The study reported that those who belonged to the same ethnic group were more likely to cooperate and take collective action
through the nature of associational life and the nature and content of local politics. Another place-specific factor is the state institutional and administrative framework. This is examined in the context of the capacity of the people to protest against the poor state of services. The highly centralized system removes the major channels and avenues for protests.

Research Approaches

This section presents the set of procedures adopted to examine how the governance of a relocated capital city is shaped by national and local forces. The discussion includes the choice of strategy, the study area and sector and some brief comments on data collection and analysis. More information on methods, including sampling techniques and major challenges encountered during the course of data collection are contained in an appendix. The appendix also contains a list of the major institutions visited and actors interviewed.

Choice of Research Strategy

There are several research strategies – including experiments, histories, surveys, archival information and case studies – and all have their advantages and disadvantages. In choosing the method adopted for this study, which is the case study approach, I have been influenced by certain factors. The first is that this study is part of a collective research programme: People, Provisioning and Place (PPP), based at the department of Human Geography, Stockholm University. A major aim of the programme is to understand the conditions that shape the access of the poor to services in the city where they live and work, and to relate this to the specific historical and current characteristics of the particular city.115 Along the same lines, this study is essentially about how governance processes in Abuja have been shaped by historical and current forces. Such a framework necessitates the use of a variety of sources of evidence and has an emphasis on explanation, which makes the case study method relevant.

Yin proposes three major factors as guiding the choice of a research strategy: the type of research question, the amount of control over behavioural events and the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomenon.116 In relation to research questions, Yin notes that those beginning with ‘what’ and ‘who and where’ are better addressed by surveys or archival records. In the case of ‘what’, the major interest is in outcomes, and a survey can be used. For ‘who and where’, the focus is on the incidence or preva-

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115 See Andrae 2003, p. 1
116 Yin 1994, p. 1
lence of a phenomenon. My interest goes beyond outcomes and prevalence. I want to know how certain processes are manifested in places and why. This leads to the case study method, which Yin recommends for questions beginning with ‘how’ and ‘why’. A major reason is that ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more suitable for seeking explanations. It is does not, however, stop at this since Yin adds that histories and experiments can also be used to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. Notwithstanding that, the case study method still has an edge over these other two in the context of this research. This has to do with the extent of control over behavioural events and a focus on contemporary or past events. As Yin adds, histories are preferable when there is no access or control, since the researcher is dealing with the “dead” past and there will, hence, be a primary reliance on secondary sources.\footnote{Yin 1994, p. 8} Experiments are preferable when the researcher can manipulate behaviour as, for example, in a laboratory or field setting. In this study, the case is the process of governance as manifested in solid waste management. This is primarily a contemporary real-life problem. To address the issues raised, the study relies a lot on data from interviews, which means there is little control over behavioural events.

**Space/Place**

It is necessary to have a brief discussion on the relevance of the concepts of space and place to this study before proceeding to the choice of the case study area. This study is about governance, and specifically, the power relations between actors. Governance, as defined by Jessop, involves “tangled hierarchies” and parallel power networks, and entails different forms of complex interdependence across different functional domains.\footnote{Jessop 1997, p. 59} One way of making sense of this complexity is to see power as conceived in and expressed across space.\footnote{See Allen 2004} This is where the concept of space production is relevant. The idea that space is produced is widely acknowledged and has been of interest to geographers, social theorists and other scholars over the years. Interests have differed, ranging from the material/physical production of space as reflected in the built environment or architecture to relational space, which pays more attention to power relations. Inevitably, since the study area is a new city, some attention is given to the material production of space, but my main interest is in relational space. Drawing largely on Lefebvre, I focus on not only how space is produced but also how certain types of spaces favour particular actors in terms of power relations.\footnote{See Lefebvre 1978 and 1991} While most of the attention is given to the production of state spaces highlighting power...
relations within the state, space production is also relevant in areas such as gender relations.

It is worth mentioning that studies adopting space often emphasize events and actors at the global scale. Brenner refers to this trend as the “spatial turn” in contemporary globalization studies. A major consequence of the preference for global processes and actors is the tendency to over-emphasize economic forces and downplay the role of national states and politics. Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist draw attention to this, noting that little attention is given to local politics as a result of the portrayal of globalization as a homogenizing force that subordinates states and people everywhere and hence eradicates distinctiveness. They add that contrary to common beliefs, globalization does not mean the end of sovereign national states and politics. This study is more in line with the views expressed by Harriss et al. and gives attention to national states and local politics.

Place became a key concept among geographers in the late 1970s and 1980s, mostly as a reaction to the preoccupation with space. The concern for place led to phrases such as “geography matters” and “places matter.” Place, like most concepts, is plagued with the problem of many definitions and applications. The humanistic approach emphasizes an individual’s attachment to specific places and the symbolic quality or meanings that link events, attitudes and places in order to create a whole. Economic geographers see place as “manifesting specificity within the context of general processes” while historical geographers draw on structuration theory and see place as an integral part of the structuration process. In the latter, human actions are said to be structured in everyday and place-specific contexts. Political geographers subscribe to the belief that places influence political behaviour. The above definitions of place are reflected in this study to varying degrees.

It is pertinent to draw attention to how both place and space have been adopted in this study. There is the common belief that while both concepts are useful in the social sciences, space has received more attention. Taylor attributes this to space being more abstract and more amenable to discursive interrogation, as evident from words like spatial, spacious, spatialization and spatiality, while there are no references to placial, placious, placialization or placiality. The controversy, however, goes beyond that of semantics to the difficulty of applying both concepts in a study. The use of one often pre-
cludes the other and Massey sees part of the problem as the tendency to put space and place on opposing sides.\footnote{Massey 2004} She thus argues for a relational concept of space and place in which the identities of places are the product of relations that spread way beyond them:

‘The spatial’ then, it is argued here, can be seen as constructed out of the multiplicity of social relations across all spatial scales, from the global reach of finance and telecommunications, through the geography of the tentacles of national political power, to the social relations within the town, the settlement, the household and the workplace. [The] identities of places are always unfixed, contested and multiple…Places viewed this way are open and porous.\footnote{Massey 1994, pp. 4-5}

I adopt a similar approach of not drawing a clear line between space and place in this study. Abuja as a place is porous and open to influences located at different spatial scales. This is reflected in the attention given to national forces in this study, even though the primary focus is the local. Following Massey, what makes Abuja a place extends from the national political sphere to the local, community and household spheres. This is reflected in this study with specific chapters on the national, local, community and household.

Choosing the Case Study Area

Several factors influenced the choice of the study area but I will also try here to relate the discussion to the prior one on place and space. Having decided on the topic – the governance of solid waste management – the next task was to choose the study area. Abuja was not an obvious choice. This is because, being a new city and supposedly planned, I did not think there would be an interesting practical problem to address. In addition, I had lived in the city in the early 1990s and there did not seem to be any major problems with solid waste management or other services. However, when I first arrived in Abuja, it did not take too long before I began to question my earlier assumptions about the city.\footnote{The visit was in February 2002} Compared to when I lived there, I was struck by the contrast. There were heaps of uncollected garbage on city streets and other public spaces. At this point, I still did not think of Abuja as the choice.

Since I was in Abuja and the Federal Ministry of Environment, which represents the national government in environmental issues, is located in the city, I decided to start my investigations there. This was based on the belief that I would be able to obtain a comprehensive view of solid waste management in Nigeria and hence be able to choose a study area. When I got there, I specifically told the officials I met that I was particularly interested in a

\footnote{Massey 2004} \footnote{Massey 1994, pp. 4-5} \footnote{The visit was in February 2002}
place with a history of community participation, especially in the area of self-help initiatives. I was told that that form of community participation was very low in the country in general. The more common form was that initiated by the government or international agencies. I was given the examples of the Sustainable Cities Programme (SCP) in Ibadan and a pilot community-based project that had been launched by the government in Nyanya, Abuja.

I still felt the need to make further enquiries after the visit to the Ministry. I went to the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER), the Centre for African Settlement Studies and Development (CASSAD) and the University of Ibadan, all in Ibadan. Unfortunately, no new information came up and once again, it was confirmed that community participation was low in the country. The first thing I realized was that I had to broaden the scope of my study. The next was that Abuja was indeed relevant from the perspective of place, but I came to realize later that it was equally important from the perspective of space. In the case of place, which was a major focus right from the beginning, obviously as an influence from my research group, Abuja had certain attractions. For example, in the course of discussions with state officials, reference was often made to how things are different in Abuja. The reason is, of course, obvious: it is a capital city. I became curious to see how this has shaped the way governance is conducted in the city. In this context, as noted in the prior discussion, Abuja as a place is manifesting specificity in the context of general processes. This is the view of place by economic geographers. In addition, I saw the community-based solid waste project in Nyanya as an entry point into a discussion on how place shapes power relations within the state, between the state and community as well as the perceptions and behaviour of individuals and the implications for solid waste management. In this case, the view of place by political and historical geographers, which draws attention to place and the behaviour of actors, is relevant.

During the course of my investigations and data collection, I realized that seeing Abuja as just any capital city does not provide a comprehensive account. It became obvious that its being a relocated capital with a symbolic character mattered. I felt an appropriate way of incorporating this was through the concept of space. In this context, I see Abuja as produced materially and non-materially. The material or physical production of the city is reflected in the planning and architecture. The non-material relates to relational space or power relations. This is addressed through the production of mental spaces, which features in the major reason for relocation: nation-building and the territorial, which involves the creation of institutions and administration. Both spaces draw attention to the national state, and specifically in terms of power relations with other institutions.

A lot of the discussion draws on events in Nyanya, so it is also important to state why it was chosen versus any other settlement in Abuja. The first
obvious reason is the aforementioned solid waste project. As already noted, I felt this would provide an opportunity to examine power relations between the various actors as well as issues related to popular participation. Beyond this and as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there were two visions behind the relocation of the capital: the desire to build a modern city as well as a city to enhance national unity. The existence of Nyanya as a huge slum says something about the extent to which the aim of a modern capital city has been achieved. Furthermore, Nyanya is the largest settlement in Abuja and is made up of the indigenous ethnic group and others who have migrated from the rest of the country. This makes it an appropriate place to examine the vision of Abuja as a symbol of national unity. Finally, as pointed out in the introduction, Nyanya is described as the fastest growing slum in the country and this guaranteed the existence of practical problems and the prospects of interesting research problems to address.

Why Waste?

When it came to choosing the sector, my first choice was solid waste management. With hindsight, this decision can be attributed to several, interrelated factors. One is the high visibility of the sector, especially when it fails. This also confirms the existence of a practical problem. In the case of the research problem, the high visibility of the sector is useful in pointing to a ‘failure in governance’.

It can be argued that ‘governance failures’ can, of course, be examined in relation to other services. While acknowledging this, my contention is that solid waste management has certain characteristics that make it particularly relevant in a study that is primarily about actors and relations. A major one is the multiplicity of actors involved as users, regulators or providers, from the point where waste is produced to the final disposal. Governance is referred to as the “self-organization of inter-organizational relations”, and is concerned with the role of various forms of political coordination that span the public-private divide. With the wide range of actors involved, solid waste management presents a useful case for examining the complex alliances, partnerships or relations likely to result. A related factor is the tendency for roles to be specific and spatially defined. Hence, households, the different branches of the state, the private sector, community and men and women are expected to perform specific tasks. An example is in the case of central-local relations, where the notion that solid waste management is the responsibility of local or municipal governments is taken as a given and rarely questioned. In a reference to African cities, Devas reports that municipalities may sometimes have little control over services but adds that in some cases,

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132 Jessop 1997, p. 59
133 Schübeler et al., 1996
municipal governments can do little more than provide waste collection and
street cleaning services. This suggests that while other services may be
taken away, waste collection and street-sweeping is always the responsibili-
ties of local governments. The Abuja case, where solid waste management
has never been a municipal function, should therefore make a compelling
and interesting reading. Another example is gender relations, where men and
women are allocated specific tasks located in specific spaces.

Besides partnerships, central-local relations and gender relations, the
specificity of solid waste management also extend to the area of popular
participation. Anschütz reports that compared to other services, solid waste
management needs more cooperation and on a continuous basis the most. I
go further to add that it may also be the sector where cooperation is the most
difficult to achieve. This is traceable to the low priority given to waste com-
pared to other services and the common perception that it is a public good
and should be provided free by the government. The latter problem is not
unique to the sector but is considered more pronounced. For example, a
study on the privatization of water services in Dar es Salaam reported the
same problem. However, unlike in water services where those who fail to
cooperate can be disconnected, this is more complicated in solid waste man-
agement where it comes with the threat to public health. A likely outcome is
less incentive on the part of households to cooperate.

Data Collection

Having chosen a research strategy, a case study area and sector, the next task
was to collect the relevant data. This process has been classified under three
main headings – exploratory phase, main fieldwork and follow-up visits –
and is contained in the appendix. The discussion here is a summary of the
type of data collected and their relevance. Different types of data were used
to address specific areas of interests. Starting with secondary data, since
Abuja is a new city, not many studies exist on it, and this has meant some
reliance on government-commissioned reports, memos and documents.
These, of course, a high degree of the possibility of bias by the authors but
such documents were relevant in this study mainly in relation to basic infor-
mation, such as the physical characteristics of the study area, the allocated
roles of state institutions, policy or programme objectives or guidelines. The
need for biased reporting in such areas should be minimal. Specific exam-
pies of secondary sources include the Abuja master plan, which provided a
lot of information on planning. Another is a study commissioned by the Fed-

134 Devas 1999
135 Anschütz 1996
136 Onibokun and Kumuyi 1999
137 Kjellén 2006
eral Ministry of Environment under the Integrated Waste Management Facility (IWMF) project, and this provided information on waste generation, composition and treatment in Abuja. Apart from these, studies conducted by the Urban Development Bank of Nigeria and the Centre for African Settlement Studies and Development (CASSAD) have been useful in providing general and historical accounts of solid waste management in Nigeria.

I also found secondary sources, especially newspaper reports, useful in addressing current and sensitive issues related to the restructuring of state institutions, the implementation of the master plan and the relocation exercise in general. Interestingly, a government-commissioned report on the review of the Abuja master plan was valuable in this regard. Several authors, including architects, geographers and planners, made critical contributions. While it was initiated by the government and hence there was the possibility of bias, the fact that the government tasked the authors to highlight the failings of the implementation process and come up with solutions meant they were not necessarily constrained in their criticisms. Of course, it helped that they were addressing problems that had supposedly been caused by previous governments.

However, in addressing the major research questions, interviews were the major sources of data. A total of 65 interviews, some semi-structured but most open-ended were conducted during the study period. Additional data came from focus group meetings and personal observation. The three methods each have their advantages, depending on the specific focus or interest. Interviews, for example, provided me with more detailed information than focus group meetings or personal observations. Focus group discussions, on the other hand, have the advantage of providing a wide range of responses to a specific issue or issues at the same time. Personal observations, apart from corroborating evidence from other sources, can add new dimensions for understanding a phenomenon.

In relation to the research question of how and why the national state dominates the governance of the city, while secondary sources provided the background information on the different stages of the relocation exercise, I still needed to demonstrate how national state intervention is manifested in the governance of the city. A major way of approaching this was to examine the governance structure in the city with a focus on central-local relations and how this is manifested in the administration of solid waste management. Interviews were conducted with officials representing the different institutions involved in solid waste management to establish their nature and extent of involvement. The Nyanya solid waste pilot project, in which three state institutions representing the three tiers of government in Nigeria participated, proved particularly useful. Questions regarding the allocation of func-

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138 Mikkelsen 1995, p. 106
139 Yin 1994, p. 87
tions and the level of cooperation were put to the officials. The expectation was that the information gathered would be analyzed to show the extent of the marginalization of the Abuja municipal council in solid waste management.

Another major research question addressed in the study is related to partnerships: who are the members and whose interests dominate and why? Once again, the focus was on the solid waste project in Nyanya, in which a decision had been taken to go into partnership with community leaders. Interviews with the state officials who represented their institutions and with community leaders provided the bulk of the material collected. The questions asked addressed the functions performed by members, the extent of cooperation, the decision-making processes, the sociocultural characteristics of Nyanya and the nature of linkages or relations between the different state institutions and the community leaders. The data from these were useful in assessing the nature of relations between state officials and community leaders and intra-community relations and they influenced the capacity of community leaders in the partnership. A major area, in which the data collected was relevant, is on the linkage of the state with traditional authorities. I used this to highlight the relevance of place by drawing attention to the state institutional and administrative framework in Abuja.

The gender dimension of the partnership was also examined. To address the question of how gender influenced the membership and direction of the partnership, I conducted interviews with officials of state institutions and the community leaders that participated in the partnership. In order to obtain the views of women, focus group meetings and interviews with individuals were conducted. The major questions asked during the meetings were related to the prescribed roles of men and women according to culture, the specific functions performed by men and women in solid waste management and participation in decision making-processes. Following the focus group meetings, I was able to carry out individual interviews to explore the issues raised in more detail. This also made it possible to obtain information on personal circumstances.

The third major question that was addressed is popular participation: the different factors shaping participation and the extent to which the outcome is related to the specific political characteristics of Nyanya and Abuja. To address this, interviews were conducted with community leaders and local politicians, state officials and households. Questions were asked concerning the extent of organizing around solid waste services, the nature of associational life, the extent of participation in local elections and the issues on the election agenda. In addition, at the household level, questions related to the specificity of solid waste management, such as its ranking compared to other services and perceptions about who should be responsible for providing services, were also posed.
Another area where the nature of solid waste management, particularly its high visibility, proved useful is direct observation. This was useful observing the problem of illegal dumping of waste and hence the social behaviour of the people and the failure of the overall system. Repeated visits to the study area over a four-year period meant it was possible to notice improvements to or further deterioration in sanitary conditions.

Data Analysis

Yin suggests two general strategies in analyzing case studies: relying on theoretical propositions and developing a case study description.\textsuperscript{140} For the former, the expectation is that the objectives, research questions and data collection would have been shaped by a major hypothesis. In this study, the hypothesis is that the governance of solid waste management in Abuja has been shaped by the symbolic character of the city and local political conditions. This has to a large extent shaped the research questions and data collection, as has been presented. Within the broad categorizations, Yin identifies four dominant techniques that can be used when the choice is that of theoretical propositions.\textsuperscript{141} One is pattern-matching, in which the task is to compare the pattern observed from empirical data with the predicted one. The argument is that if there is a match, it enhances the internal validity of a case. Yin adds that a case can have many dependent variables and thus several outcomes and that one way of strengthening the case would be to develop an overall pattern that is relevant to each of the variables: that is, that would tie up the cases together. An overall pattern in this case is that governance processes have been shaped by the symbolic character of Abuja. This is reflected in the major themes examined.

Yin does not believe that it is compulsory to use multiple models but he does suggest others in addition to pattern-matching. A related model is explanation-building. Yin concedes that it is much more difficult and complex. He describes this model as involving the gradual building of an explanation in which a set of ideas are continuously refined.\textsuperscript{142} It requires taking certain basic steps, such as an initial proposition, comparing the findings based on the data against the proposition, revising the ideas or proposition, comparing other details of the case in relation to the revision and repeating the process as many times as possible.\textsuperscript{143} A constant threat, as Yin points out, is deviation from the original interest. This model proved useful to me in the process of writing this report. It has been a continuous process of refining ideas in line with the major propositions of the study.

\textsuperscript{140} Yin 1994, p. 103
\textsuperscript{141} The others are explanation-building, time-series and program logic models
\textsuperscript{142} This also involves entertaining rival ideas or explanations.
\textsuperscript{143} Yin, 1994, p. 111
The task of analyzing data is complex and not as tidy as has been presented. For example, rival explanations and views have to be acknowledged and accommodated. In addition, while I have discussed this study in the context of Yin’s approach, I put less emphasis on theory in my analysis. Stake has argued that case studies may be useful as a small step towards grand generalization but cautions that there is a problem when the desire to create theory is so strong that the researcher’s attention is taken away from the important features of the case or cases. 144 My aim has not been a desire to make ‘grand’ generalizations even though I do acknowledge similarities between Abuja and other places. I have been more interested in carrying out an in-depth examination of a case in order to bring out the specific detailed information about the case. To achieve this, I have used multiple sources of data to build a case without being concerned that it may or may not be generalizable. A researcher, as has been acknowledged, can use multiple forms of data to build an in-depth case. 145 Yin also subscribes to this by noting that “any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information”. 146

144 Stake 1998, p. 10
145 Cresswell 1998, p. 134
146 Yin 1994, p. 92
Chapter 2 The Study Area

[Abuja] represents for the Nigerian people a new city. Its roads are well paved. It is a well-planned city where almost everything works … Its near-pristine serenity contrasts sharply with the disorderliness of other cities. On the surface, its smoothness compares favourably with that of any modern capital … [It] is sad though that many slums have since been created within and around the city, and the cost of living within it is high. It is also gradually becoming congested.¹⁴⁷

Introduction

The paradox and contradictions of Abuja are evident in the comments above. Our attention is drawn to the good roads and orderliness compared to other Nigerian cities. However, a key point of interest, are the words – “on the surface”. This suggests that, things are not the way they appear to be. The next sentence confirms this with a reference to the creation of slums. This chapter not only presents the physical characteristics of Abuja but traces the events that have led to the production of slums and the problem of spatial differentiation in the city.

It is, however, necessary to begin with a brief introduction of Nigeria and specifically its political development since Abuja is so closely tied to it. Some of the problems facing the city are better understood when seen against this background, as will be proven later. This chapter therefore begins with an outline of the national context before proceeding to the discussion on Abuja. The focus on Abuja starts with a presentation of the geographical characteristics, which highlights location, climate, vegetation and planning. This is followed by an examination of the processes leading to the production of slums and spatial differentiation. The specific focus is on the role of planning and the implementation of the relocation exercise. Thereafter, Nyanya, the major focus of this study is introduced. This is an appropriate stage to introduce Nyanya, because its existence today, as a slum on the periphery of the city can largely be attributed to how the relocation exercise was implemented.

¹⁴⁷ The Guardian Editorial (2006, 5 November)
The National Context

Nigeria covers an area of 923,773 square kilometres and is located in the West African sub-region. Its southern boundary is the Atlantic Ocean, to the east is Cameroun, to the west is the Republic of Benin and Niger is to north (See Figure 3). The climate is mainly tropical with warm temperatures throughout the year. As a result of the little variation in temperature, precipitation is used to describe the seasons. Two seasons are identified and they are the rainy and dry seasons. The vegetation ranges from the tropical rain forest in the south to the savannah and montane in the north. The country derives its name from the river Niger, which joins its major tributary, the river Benue, at Lokoja in the Middle Belt part of the country and flows southwards into the Atlantic Ocean. The latest census, which was conducted in 2006, records a population of 140 million people, making the country the largest in Africa.

Administratively, Nigeria is divided into 36 states excluding Abuja (see Figure 3). Before colonial rule, the different ethnic groups existed and operated largely as “self-contained communities”, each with their specific history and culture. The entity now called Nigeria came into being on January 1, 1914, following the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates but Burns confirms that prior to this, differences between the two existed.

WHEN I first arrived in Nigeria, in 1912, Northern and Southern Nigeria were still separate administrations, with different traditions and distinct histories. Those Europeans who were interested in one Protectorate knew little of the other … while among the inhabitants of the country the lack of a uniform system of government had accentuated the already existing differences of race, religion and culture.

Amalgamation was in part designed to save expenses for the colonial administration. Following amalgamation, the country was grouped into the Northern and Southern Provinces and the Colony of Lagos but in 1939, the Southern Province was sub-divided into Eastern and Western Provinces. Thus, by the time Nigeria became independent in 1960, it consisted of three regions. However, the differences referred to by Burns above continued during colonial rule and to the present. The colonial government encouraged the separate development of the regions through different administrative sys-

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146 Iyoha 1997, p. 194
147 Burns 1972, p. 21
148 Onuorah 2007
149 Ailoje 1997, p. 65
150 Burns 1972, p. 16
151 Burns 1972, p. 11
152 Hatch 1971, p. 12
153 Burns, 1972, p. 16
tems, which kept the course of development in the regions apart.\textsuperscript{156} There is also the problem of disparity in the population and area with the North accounting for more than half of the population of the country and about 80 percent of the land area.\textsuperscript{157} This has made the national census a highly sensitive and controversial issue in the country. A report in a national newspaper on the latest exercise conducted in 2006 began with the words “prominent Nigerians from across the country yesterday took different positions on the provisional census figures”.\textsuperscript{158}

The close association of the regions with specific ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yorubas in the West and the Ibos in the East has particularly reinforced the differences and tension. In addition, apart from these major ethnic groups, Nigeria consists of numerous so-called minority ethnic groups, which further complicates the political landscape. The linguistic groups number over 300.\textsuperscript{159} In May 1967, the Ibos in the Eastern Region seceded from Nigeria and declared itself the Republic of Biafra.\textsuperscript{160} The federal government resisted this and war broke out and lasted until January 1970 when the Biafran forces surrendered. Herbst makes this assessment of Nigeria.

Nigeria … has scattered areas of high population density and it fought a civil war as well, to preserve its territorial integrity. The difficult population distribution has been aggravated by the complex ethnic divisions of the country, coupled with religious polarization between Muslims … and Christians … Since independence, Nigerian governments have had to engage in balancing acts aimed at allaying fears of ethnic domination and religious expansionism.\textsuperscript{161}

The existence of different ethnic groups and hence different interests has meant a continuous search for a national identity. This search, described above as “balancing acts” by Herbst, includes the rotational presidency in which political parties try to ensure that the choice of candidates allows each geopolitical zone to have an opportunity.\textsuperscript{162} Others are the federal character principle and the division of the country into smaller administrative units. The federal character principle, enshrined in the constitution, is to ensure that all ethnic groups are represented in federal government institutions and appointments with the hope that this would reduce primordial loyalties.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{156} Ailoje 1997, p. 66  
\textsuperscript{157} Ailoje 1997, p. 66  
\textsuperscript{158} Obiagwu et al., (2007, 11 January)  
\textsuperscript{159} Benjamin 1999, p. 4  
\textsuperscript{160} Burns 1972, p. 17  
\textsuperscript{161} Herbst 2000, pp. 149-150  
\textsuperscript{162} Ailoje 1997, p. 71  
\textsuperscript{163} Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
Figure 4. Map of Nigeria showing the central location of Abuja. The former capital Lagos, is to the southwest. (The Federal Capital Development Authority, 1979).

The practice of creating more and smaller administrative units goes back to the colonial era with the division of the country into three regions. Just before the civil war, with ethnic tensions running high, the then-military ruler, General Gowon, divided the country into twelve states. It was an attempt to restructure the country in a way so that no region could threaten Nigeria’s existence as one country.\textsuperscript{164} The 12 states increased to 19 in 1975, 21 in 1991 and 36 today. The states represent the middle tier but the lowest tier has also been affected. The number of local governments increased from 229 in 1970 to 301 in 1979 and to 776 in 1996.\textsuperscript{165} Furthermore, Nigeria operates federalism, which connotes a decentralized system of government, in which the three tiers, federal, state and local derive their powers from the constitution.\textsuperscript{166}

This discussion sets the scene for the production of Abuja. Vale refers to the radials on the map in Figure 4 as “vectors of political control, gestures of
inclusiveness, and spatial promises of unity”. The location of Abuja therefore embodies the desire of the ruling elite to exercise control over the entire populace and also reflects the promises of national unity. In the latter case, Abuja is described as a “mediator” in Nigeria’s “factious population”. The two issues raised by Vale: political control and national unity are reflected in this study through references to state- and nation-building respectively. These are taken up later (Chapter Four).

Introducing Abuja

Abuja is located in the geographic centre of Nigeria, in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), an area that covers 8000 square kilometres. The site of the capital itself covers an area of 250 kilometres and is located in the north-eastern part of the territory. The FCT falls within the Gwagwa plains, made up of numerous inselbergs which give the site a scenic beauty. It experiences two climatic seasons a year, a rainy season from March to October and a dry season from October through to March. The region falls within the savannah zone vegetation of West Africa, characterized into three types: the park or grassy savannah, savannah woodland and shrub savannah. In the national and geopolitical context, the FCT is in the Middle Belt part of Nigeria. In administrative terms, it is divided into six area councils created in 1984: Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), Gwagwalada, Kuje, Abaji, Kwali and Bwari (see Figure 7). AMAC, in which the main city area lies, is the focus of this study. The council is made up of twelve wards including Nyanya. The Abuja master plan ‘carved’ the FCT into four phases (see Figure 5). Phase 1 consists of the Central Area and four residential districts of Garki, Wuse, Asokoro and Maitama. The Central Area is made up of:

- The Three-Arm Zone (National Assembly Complex, Supreme Court and Presidential Complex).
- The Ministries Zone (government and public institutions).
- The Cultural Zone (houses buildings of “national importance” – National Cathedral, National Mosque, National Theatre).
- Central Business District
- The National Sports Complex
- The Embassy Area

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167 Vale 1992, p. 134
168 Vale 1992, p. 135
169 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998, p. 8
170 The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979
Construction work in Abuja started in the early 1980s in Garki and Wuse districts (see Figure 6). Both were planned as medium density areas but have become high density districts.\textsuperscript{171} Maitama and Asokoro are high-income, low density areas. Phase 2 is to consist, when completed of 14 residential districts and 4 sector areas, while Phases 3 and 4 are to consist respectively of 14 and 16 residential districts, but the plans for their development have not been drawn up.\textsuperscript{172} Some development, especially in the form of federal government housing projects (examples are Gwarimpa and Life Camp shown in Figures 6 and 7), has taken place in Phase 2. It also contains satellite settlements such as Nyanya. Overall, most of the development so far in Abuja is concentrated in Phase 1.

\textsuperscript{171} Federal Ministry of Environment 2001, p. 5 and 36
\textsuperscript{172} Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998
Figure 6. Administrative Map of the Abuja Municipal Area Council. The map shows the location of Maitama, Wuse, Kado, Gwarimpa and Lugbe. (Adapted by Johan Cederström from a map obtained from the Federal Capital Development Authority).
The Nigerianization of Abuja

The surrounding areas of the capital city, regarded as its administrative territory must reflect the sophistication and modernity of the city being built to international standard. The contrast and disparity between phase 1 area of the city and the settlements of Jabi, Kado, Mabushi, Durumi and Kabusa, is an embarrassing clear illustration. The settlements of Idu, Karmo and Gwagwa have become sprawling urban slums, a horrifying eyesore close to the ultramodern city.\textsuperscript{173}

In Holston’s account of how architecture and planning became part of the process of creating new social values in the bid to modernize the residents of Brasilia, he coined the phrase the “Brazilianization of Brasilia”.\textsuperscript{174} Holston sought to draw attention to how peripheral and slum settlements were produced contrary to the visions of the government and planners. He attributed this to the neglect of Brazilian history, the structure of its society, the conventions of metropolitan life and specific actions of the government and planners. In terms of capital cities, Abuja and Brasilia have a lot in common. Both are modernist projects. Abuja, it should be recalled was planned in the tradition of the “garden city” of Ebenezer Howard (Chapter One). This concept emphasized nature, spaciousness and self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{175} In the excerpt above, reference is made to the “sophistication and modernity” of Abuja. Both Abuja and Brasilia are also relocated capital cities meant to produce some social transformation in their societies. Brasilia was planned as a “bureaucratic center free from the social disorders that plague other Brazilian cities”.\textsuperscript{176} In Abuja, the desire to unite a highly diverse society was high on the agenda.

Both Abuja and Brasilia were also to be different from other cities in their countries in their avoidance of slums. To the contrary, slums are a landmark in both cities. In the case of Brasilia, Holston points out that, peripheral settlements are part of Brazilian society and history, with the class structure playing a major role. In addition, Holston reports that the government reinforced the class system by regulating access to residence which resulted in a dual social order. The result, Holston notes, was impoverished satellite settlements filled with those excluded from the centre.\textsuperscript{177} Hence, Holston describes Brasilia as a “utopian experiment in modern urbanism”.\textsuperscript{178} Two key

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{173} Abanobi 2001, p. 186
\bibitem{174} Holston 1989, p. 289
\bibitem{175} Jacobs 1961, p. 27
\bibitem{176} Holston 1989, p. 290
\bibitem{177} Holston 1989, p. 290
\bibitem{178} Holston 1989, p. 1
\end{thebibliography}
points raised by Holston are relevant – the actions of the government and planners and social practices. The focus on social practices probably reflects Holston’s interest in anthropology. The discussion on Abuja acknowledges social practices, but most of the attention is on the role of the government. The main areas of interest are the master plan and its implementation and the implementation of the relocation exercise.

Planning and Implementation

A Central Area design was a major part of the Abuja master plan. Its importance is underscored by the setting up of a Central Area Urban Design Team made up of a Japanese and three Nigerian firms.\textsuperscript{179} Based on the Central Area focus, the master plan produced a crescent-shaped urban design form designated into four phases. Phase 1 was in the centre while the rest spread outwards, with Phase 4 the farthest.

The location, definition and internal organization as well as the arrangement of symbolic elements were found to be matters of prime importance and therefore played a significant role in the selection of the central area within the overall Master Plan elements.\textsuperscript{180}

The emphasis on a dominant centre reflects the centre-periphery model and can be seen as laying the foundation for spatial differentiation. With origins in geopolitics and economics, a major argument associated with the model is that a centre develops due to “inherent advantages of physical conditions and location”.\textsuperscript{181} In the case of Abuja, the reasons may be related to government practices but what is important, is that a centre will inevitably have a periphery. In a reference to Abuja, Vale has drawn attention to how the master plan aided spatial segregation on the basis of income and on specifications of type of buildings and where they should be located.\textsuperscript{182} Vale points out that the layout as contained in the plan promotes the unequal distribution of income groups and identifies residential splits between white collar/blue collar and civil service/non-civil service. The situation is summed up thus:

Though the language of the master plan emphasizes that “the New Capital City is for all the people, evidently “all” will not be equally welcome everywhere.\textsuperscript{183}

The observation made by Vale seemed to have been proved right several years later. In 2005, the city government embarked on a demolition exercise

\textsuperscript{179} Ahmadu 2001
\textsuperscript{180} Ahmadu 2001, p. 131
\textsuperscript{181} Roberts 1995, p. 48
\textsuperscript{182} Vale 1992, p. 146
\textsuperscript{183} Vale 1992, p. 146
and most of those affected were from the low income brackets.\textsuperscript{184} Their houses and shops were demolished, hence rendering them homeless and jobless at the same time. As reported, the city government used the master plan to defend its actions but the “dogmatic, albeit lopsided, interpretation of the master plan gives one the impression that el Rufai and his team actually want to run the less privileged out of town”.\textsuperscript{185}

One of the aims of a dominant centre as contained in the master plan was to “achieve efficient functioning of government and the commercial sector”.\textsuperscript{186} It is doubtful if this has been achieved. For example, the official opening hour is 7.30 am but, as has been observed, junior workers hardly get to work before 9.30am, which means that most government offices cannot operate effectively before that time.\textsuperscript{187} This problem is traceable to the social and spatial stratification that exists in the city. In this case, it is manifested in the distance from home to work. Most low income workers live outside the city in the peripheral settlements. They not only have to travel long distances but they also face problems of transportation. A similar observation was made in relation to Brasilia where distance from the centre also determines basic features of daily life such as type of residence, nature of employment, approximate standard of living and amount of time spent commuting to work.\textsuperscript{188}

In Abuja, both the lack of professional personnel to understand the philosophy of the plan and the failure to carry out detailed planning and design before its contents are transformed into construction activities appear to have contributed to the problem of spatial differentiation. One outcome cited is that Phase 1, which was to mainly provide for public buildings and a population of 250 000, was over developed while Phases 2 and 3 which were to focus on the major residential areas, were ignored.\textsuperscript{189} Over the years, infrastructure and services have been concentrated in Phase 1. For example, the government admits that sewage and electricity have been concentrated in the centre.\textsuperscript{190}

As already noted in Chapter One, the implementation of the master plan remains a major subject of debate in the country. In part due to the agitation and complaints from the general public, the federal government convened a workshop between 29 November and 1 December 1999 to carry out a review of the plan.\textsuperscript{191} The Vice-President, in a speech read on his behalf by the Minister of Works and Housing at the opening ceremony surmised that the im-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{184} Ohwahwa (2005, 19 September)
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Ohwahwa 2005
  \item \textsuperscript{186} The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979, p. 65
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Mabogunje 2001, p. 5
  \item \textsuperscript{188} See Holston 1989
  \item \textsuperscript{189} Oseni 2001, p. 15
  \item \textsuperscript{190} Department of Planning, Research and Statistics, 2001, p. 20
  \item \textsuperscript{191} There was also the view that the plan needed a review after so many years since some of the recommendations that seemed feasible then may no longer be possible.
\end{itemize}
plementation of the “Abuja project” had been “dogged by serious flaws, anomalies and distortions”. The Minister of the Federal Capital Territory acknowledged the “numerous achievements” in the physical development of Abuja but also noted the “significant distortions and unwholesome deviations” which had inhibited the full realization of the provisions of the plan. At the end of workshop, the following was noted:

There had been numerous distortions during the implementation of the Plan as a result of frequent changes of key personnel, political interventions, executive fiat, inadequate technical and managerial capacities of implementors and frequent changes in government policy especially with regard to phased movement into the city and inadequate development control.

One of the issues mentioned above – the failure to keep to a phased relocation programme - has attracted a lot of comments. The master plan contained basic concepts highlighting a long-range, staged plan and programme for functional systems, land use and design features. However, with events largely dictated by the political climate in the country, what followed was anything but long-ranged and planned. A major stimulus was the 1979 elections and the politicization of the relocation exercise. One of the presidential candidates promised that if elected, he would expedite relocation to Abuja. The candidate won and hastened the pace of relocation. As Mabogunje points out:

“The civilian administration that took over from the military regime in 1979 had a different agenda … it was less concerned with any of the principles that had underlay the original conception.”

Hence, when the movement from Lagos began, the existing infrastructure and services in Abuja were not enough to support the incoming population. Furthermore, the pace of housing development has been slow and has contributed to the provision of temporary facilities, a common feature of slums. Shantytowns and squatter settlements such as Karu, Karmo and Gwagwa developed rapidly and were generally unplanned, overcrowded and lacking in basic amenities (see Figure 7). Mabogunje adds that while some attempt was made to destroy much of the “rushed housing” within the city area, the development of shanty settlements in the periphery persisted due to lack of housing accommodation for low income workers within the city.

192 Kalgo and Ayileka 2001, p. xi
194 Kalgo and Ayileka 2001, p. ix
195 The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979, p. I
196 Mabogunje 2001, p. 4
197 Mabogunje 2001
The phenomenon of squatter settlements is further worsened by the fact that the city is highly over-priced and unaffordable to lower income people, giving rise to a situation where the rich live in the city and the poor at the periphery.\textsuperscript{199}

In addition to the rushed movement from Lagos, the delay in resettling the indigenous population and frequent changes to the resettlement policy aided the emergence of squatter settlements. The initial policy of the federal government was to move all 845 villages out of the FCT.\textsuperscript{200} To this effect, it authorized a census of the economic assets of all the inhabitants, and pledged to pay compensation and bear the cost of resettlement outside the territory.\textsuperscript{201} The government later realized that this would be too costly and so limited relocation and compensation only to those within the immediate capital city area. This was followed by another change to the policy, in which it was argued that since the original settlers themselves are Nigerians, it would be unwise to move them out and replace them with other Nigerians.\textsuperscript{202} Over the years, the resettlement policy has become highly politicized.\textsuperscript{203} This has consequences for planning and has contributed to the development of slums. Abanobi cites the example of the illegal sale of land by indigenes and the clamour for compensation, which slows down government efforts to undertake new developments.\textsuperscript{204}

The delay and indecision of the government in relation to the resettlement policy are particularly manifested in the cases of Garki and Nyanya villages. While similar settlements have been relocated outside the main city area, Garki village remains in the heart of the city. Shuabi reports that a pilot scheme was initiated to upgrade and integrate the village into the city but several years later, Garki village is largely inaccessible by road transport, has an uncoordinated sewage system and poor housing and stands out like a “sore thumb”.\textsuperscript{205}

### Historical and Social Practices

In addition to government practices, it is worth acknowledging the role of historical and social practices. In the same way as Brasilia, slums have a long history and also reflect a class structure in Nigeria. In pre-industrial traditional urban centres, the settlement pattern reflected power and social hierarchy with the ruling class and their associates occupying the central

\textsuperscript{199} Kalgo and Ayileka 2001, p. ix
\textsuperscript{200} Abumere 2001, p. 36
\textsuperscript{201} Mabogunje 2001, p. 3
\textsuperscript{202} Abumere 2001, p. 38
\textsuperscript{203} There have been agitations and claims of ancestral rights, land, compensation and privileges from the indigenous population.
\textsuperscript{204} Abanobi, 2001, p. 188
\textsuperscript{205} Shuabi 2003, p. 23
portions while the less privileged lived on the fringes. What is also evident is that social conditions have also played some role in encouraging the production of slums. In Nigeria, this problem has been traced to the colonial era. Commenting on health and sanitation problems in the Nigerian city of Abeokuta, Akinyele had this to say:

At first, the intervention of the E.N.A appeared to have produced the desired result. At least, the Annual Report of 1923 shows that there was a marked improvement in environmental sanitation in Abeokuta. The situation soon changed because of the reluctance of the people to obey the rules. For instance, in 1937, the Alake expressed his displeasure at the fact that many people still preferred to dump their refuse in the bush even when the conservancy system cost only two shillings per month.

Several decades after the end of colonial rule, poor social practices continue to be a problem even in the ‘modern’ capital city of Abuja. For example, state officials accused residents of using transfer stations for other purposes, such as storing goods for sale, and instead disposing waste on the ground.

There is worrisome concern on the total neglect and abuse of public properties by the public e.g wastes are bagged indiscriminately dump [sic] in drainages, walkways, road shoulders, open spaces etc. without caring [sic] the consequences. Waste receptacles are being set on fire … vandalised etc. and generally they don’t care to keep receptacles clean … Some of the receptacles have been turned to other uses than the original uses e.g storage of water, grains etc.

The relevance of social practices is taken up further in the discussion on popular participation in Nyanya (Chapter Eight). What can be said at this point is that conditions in Nyanya are similar to the Abeokuta case. In Abeokuta, the intervention of the ENA (Egba Native Authority, i.e, the colonial administration) can be likened to that of the government in Nyanya in the form of the solid waste project (Chapter Seven). Just as in Abeokuta, there was marked improvement in the immediate aftermath but the situation soon changed and poor waste handling practices contributed to it.

206 Olukoju 2003, pp. 12-30. During the colonial period, this model is said to have been less pronounced but segregation continued as reflected in terminologies such as the “European Reserve” and “Government Reserved Area” with the African and white populations segregated from each other.

207 Akinyele 2003 p. 296

208 Interview with Assistant Director (FME) 2005. As a lesson from the Nyanya project, the government has decided to abolish the use of transfer stations and instead increase the frequency of collection in subsequent projects.

209 Mohammed 2004, pp 8-9
The Production of Nyanya

The decision to hasten the movement of civil servants from Lagos to Abuja is noted to have led to “helter-skelter building activities” within the city and denied planners the opportunity to test out the various plan concepts and more seriously, made it impossible to use the “Accelerated District” to house the workers.210

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210 Mabogunje 2001, p. 5
were to be housed in the Accelerated District in Phase 1, a move aimed at preventing the development of shanty towns.\textsuperscript{211} When the date of relocation was moved forward, the district was instead used to house civil servants being relocated from Lagos. This meant alternative accommodation had to be found for the construction workers and a decision was taken by government to build a labour camp in Nyanya.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{labour_camp}
\caption{A major road in the Labour Camp in Nyanya. (The Author, 2003).}
\end{figure}

Over the years, the labour camp has been neglected by the government. It was constructed in 1982 and was to be temporary but it remains a major part of Nyanya and provides accommodation for many civil servants. The roads constructed in 1982 when the camp was built have not been maintained (see Figure 8). In addition, a survey conducted in 1996 reported that 69.46% of the houses needed major repairs and 22.82% needed minor repairs while only 7.72% were in good condition.\textsuperscript{212} The houses are arranged in compounds with shared facilities (toilets, baths and kitchens) that are centrally located. In many cases, the huge growth in population has led to the conversion of these facilities to residential accommodation. It is therefore common to see people cooking outside in the open or in poorly constructed sheds (see Figure 19). Some residents have gone as far as adding extensions to the

\textsuperscript{211} Mabogunje 2001, p. 5
\textsuperscript{212} Akpanke 1996
original units. These additions are sub-standard and have contributed to the problem of the high density of houses in the area. The quality of services, such as piped water, electricity, kitchen, water cisterns and bathrooms, is poor. About 35.57% of the houses had only two out of the five services, 30.20% had three, 20.59% had four and only 13.42% had all five.\textsuperscript{213}

Figure 9. A section of Nyanya Village. The houses are old and of poor quality. In the foreground is a blocked drainage channel. (The Author, 2003).

Nyanya is made up of much more than the labour camp. There was already an existing settlement, now known as Nyanya village before Abuja became the capital. This original settlement was founded in 1923 when the indigenous ethnic group, the Gbagyis moved down from the surrounding Nyanya hills to the present location.\textsuperscript{214} This followed the relative peace that had come to the area with the arrival of the Europeans. Prior to this, the people had taken refuge in the hills to escape the menace of the many inter-tribal wars of the time. In line with the federal government’s resettlement policy, Nyanya village was to be relocated to a new place called “New Nyanya” but this has not been implemented.\textsuperscript{215} Today, this part of Nyanya is still predominantly made up of the indigenous population. Predictably, the houses

\textsuperscript{213} Akpanke 1996
\textsuperscript{214} Interview with Chief of Nyanya, 2003.
\textsuperscript{215} Abumere 2001, p. 38
are very old and of poor quality (see Figure 9). There are no roads and residents instead rely on footpaths or spaces between houses.

Apart from the labour camp and village, there is also the ‘New Layout’, carved out by the government. It is the newest part of the settlement. The government allocates plots to people to build houses and this has encouraged the construction of new houses. It also contains government housing projects. The housing units are less populated and are mostly occupied by single families, most of whom are intermediate and senior government or private company officials.\textsuperscript{216} Most of the people who live here are rich enough to own their houses or high enough in the government service to be allocated such houses. The result is that today, Nyanya is a superimposition of three settlements. This has implications for social and spatial differentiation and demonstrates that the problem is not limited to the city scale.

A major feature of the settlement is its rapid growth in size (area) and population. In 1989, Nyanya was about 17 km from the centre of Abuja\textsuperscript{217} but this distance has been considerably reduced due to the development that has taken place on both sides. In terms of population, the 1991 national census gives a figure of 20,748, making Nyanya second only to Garki and constituting 5.58% of the population of the FCT.\textsuperscript{218} There are no current reliable figures but a government commissioned survey in 2001 arrived at a figure of 80,000 and an average of 4-5 persons per household.\textsuperscript{219} The phenomenal growth in population is in part attributed to the close proximity of Nyanya to the main city area. This makes it attractive to civil servants and others who want to live relatively close to the centre.\textsuperscript{220} Nyanya is said to house most of the labour force of Abuja.\textsuperscript{221} Accompanying the growth in population is the presence of various economic activities. Today, apart from the major market and a motor park, commercial shops line both sides of the major road that divides the settlement into two (see Figure 2). In 1989, Nyanya had 136 open market stores and 255 locked up stores, about 10% of the share of the FCT.\textsuperscript{222}

The growth in population has not been matched by a corresponding increase in infrastructure and services. Pipe-borne water is scarce and many have to resort to buying water from vendors for cooking, washing, drinking and general sanitation.\textsuperscript{223} The story is the same in solid waste management. Before Abuja became the capital, Nyanya was under Keffi division in Plateau State, one of the 36 states in Nigeria. At that time, Nyanya was report-

\textsuperscript{216} Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2001, p. 5
\textsuperscript{217} Ukwu 2001, p. 97
\textsuperscript{218} Ukwu 2001, p. 89
\textsuperscript{220} Interview with Secretary (PMC) 2003.
\textsuperscript{221} Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2001, p. 1
\textsuperscript{222} Ukwu 2001, p. 93
\textsuperscript{223} Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2001
edly a clean settlement. Traditional rulers interviewed attributed this to the high profile of sanitary inspectors, but the relative small population at the time may also have helped. An official from the Abuja Environmental Protection Board confirmed that Nyanya was relatively clean when the Board took over waste collection in the early 1990s but things began to change in the mid-1990s when Abuja and Nyanya in particular began to witness a huge influx of people. As the official added, this coincided with other factors. Deteriorating roads made evacuation of waste a difficult task and hence drainage sources became blocked in many parts of the settlement. In addition, the Board started experiencing problems of finance and human resources at the city level. Waste collection became erratic with no services extended to Nyanya for weeks or months at a time. Only one vehicle was in operation. Accounts from state officials and community leaders noted that sanitary conditions deteriorated to such an extent that there were reports of outbreak of diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera and meningitis. The pilot solid waste project launched in 2001 was seen as a timely intervention. This does not mean that this intervention solved the problems of solid waste management in the settlement. The problems remain as reflected in this comment by my daughter who had accompanied me to Nyanya in July 2004, three years after the project:

“Mum, you say you are studying solid waste management but there is no management here”.

While it may be an exaggeration to say there was no management at all since some residents had taken their own initiatives by paying informal waste collectors to dispose of their waste, the comment is a reflection of the state of solid waste services in Nyanya.

Summary

This chapter introduced the study area. It began with the national context, which sets the scene for a major reason behind the relocation of the capital to Abuja – nation-building. This is followed by a brief presentation of the geographical characteristics of Abuja. The next issue, presented as the Nigerianization of Abuja chronicles the events that led to the production of slums in the city. A master plan was developed to achieve the desire to build a modern city, but certain actions and inactions of the government – mainly related to the politicization of the relocation programme – contributed to the production of slums. In addition, this and the emphasis on a centre in the

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224 Based on interviews with traditional rulers in 2004.
225 Interview with Head of Division, Solid Waste Department, AEPB, 2004
226 Ogwuda 1995, p. 51
master plan have contributed to the centre-periphery model. Today, there is a social and spatial order with the poor living in peripheral settlements while the rich are found closer to the centre. The chapter ended with a presentation of Nyanya. Nyanya is a good illustration of the problem of social and spatial stratification. It also confirms the problems of service delivery, particularly that of solid waste management.
Chapter 3 Governance: A Space and Place Perspective

Introduction

A major contention in this study is that capital relocation is a major tool through which the national state is able to reinforce its power in governance processes. In addition to this, relocated capital cities are also places where different networks or actors and processes come together to produce certain outcomes that have implications for the way the city is governed. In today’s usage, governance is a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted concept applied in various contexts. In the academic milieu, two broad uses of the term can be identified.\textsuperscript{227} The first focuses on the nature of organizations, institutions, actors and policies. The second emphasize the nature of relations between institutions or actors and pays particular attention to partnerships. These two approaches are reflected in this study but from a space and place perspective. This chapter examines how space and place shape the institutions and relations of governance.

The discussion is structured around four major themes: the process of capital relocation, decentralization versus centralization, partnerships and popular participation. The chapter begins with capital relocation. This introduces the relevance of space. It draws largely on Lefebvre’s concept of space production. The production of space features in two major areas: the reason for relocation and the creation of institutions and administration. The discussion on decentralization and centralization acknowledges that while both are spatial processes, a place perspective can be incorporated by drawing attention to why decentralization or centralization is the common feature in a particular place. The discussion on partnerships draws attention to power relations, the capacity of actors and how these can be related to the political characteristics of a place. The gender dimension of partnerships is also examined with attention to not only the role of the state and traditional institutions but also how place and space feature in gender relations. The chapter ends with an examination of popular participation, which draws attention to the household level. The discussion highlights the importance of the nature of urban communities and local politics.

\textsuperscript{227} See Swilling and Hutt 1999 and Johnston et al. 2000
Capital Relocation and State Space Production

The process of relocating a capital city can be broken down into certain components. First is the decision. A major part of this is to convince the people that it is necessary to relocate a capital especially due to the huge costs involved. Once the decision is taken, the next major step is to actually build the city in cases where there is no pre-existing one as was the situation in Nigeria. Once constructed, a city has to be governed and a first major step is the creation of state institutions. This section examines how space features in the process of capital relocation, specifically in the reasons for relocation and the creation of state institutions and administration.

Space may have been at the heart of geographical enquiry since antiquity but questions remain about its meaning and applicability. These do not appear to have reduced the amount of interest in space. In geography, the concept has evolved from the relative space used in spatial analysis. Today, economic geographers pay special attention to spatial and locational foundation of economic life; Marxist geographers see space as an integral part of the capitalist mode of production while feminist geographers draw attention to the relevance of space in power relations between men and women. Many have drawn on the works of Henri Lefebvre, the French philosopher, especially his thesis on the production of space. Obviously, it is not only the (national) state that produces space but Lefebvre points out that it is the only institution that is capable of managing space on a “grand scale” due to the resources, techniques and capacity at its disposal. This study adopts a similar view. The relocation of a capital city necessitates a strong national state intervention. This coupled with its privileged access to and control of space makes the national state the dominant actor.

Mental Spaces: Nation building

Schatz points out that capital relocation, is an undertaking most leaders would be afraid of taking due to the “financial, logistical, and political costs”. Hence, convincing the populace that it is needed is a crucial part. While acknowledging the complexity of identifying and understanding why countries relocate their capitals, Schatz sums up the reasons for capital relocation into three categories as authoritarianism, rational-technical, and the political geography of nation- and state-building. A similar set of factors

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228 Unwin 2000
229 Simonsen 1996
230 Johnston et al., 2000
231 See Lefebvre 1991
232 Lefebvre 1978, p. 90
233 Schatz 2003, p. 2
were also reported by Wolfel.\textsuperscript{234} In relation to authoritarianism, Schatz cites the personalities or preferences of authoritarian rulers who move capital cities amidst popular opposition.\textsuperscript{235} However, Schatz acknowledges that authoritarianism may be a necessary condition but is not enough for the decision to relocate a capital. In the case of the rational-technical, relocation is a way of bolstering economic performance and enhancing administrative functions. This has a special resonance in developing countries and is linked to a colonial legacy. Schatz gives the examples of Africa and Asia, where most capitals had been located along the coast to favour the commercial interests of the colonial masters.

A city, their reasoning goes, designed to serve the commercial and geo-strategic interests of a colonizing power, is ill-equipped for the economic and administrative challenges of independent statehood. A new city could be located and designed to be the hub of economic exchange, the central node for infrastructure, and the model of effective administration.\textsuperscript{236}

This may be a plausible reason but Schatz adds that in the case of boosting economic and administrative performance, it is often for the benefit of international audiences and may not be considered legitimate by a domestic one. Schatz acknowledges that it is actually difficult to find an example where capital relocation has been based primarily on economic and administrative motives.

The third reason, the political geography of nation- and state-building, is essentially about two different, albeit related processes. In the case of nation-building, a major aim of the state is to unite a diverse populace. This is an act that entails the production of mental spaces. Lefebvre describes mental space as a “space that includes the representations of the state that people construct”.\textsuperscript{237} Hence, a major aim is a desire by the state to influence the way people think.

This ideology also entails the representation of a certain transparency – of a space in which the elements of society would be made transparent and would coexist peacefully.\textsuperscript{238}

As Brenner puts it, mental space occupies everyday consciousness and generates a space that leads to social consensus and mass support for state operations.\textsuperscript{239} This statement is highly relevant in this case. By putting nation-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{234} Wolfel 2002
\item \textsuperscript{235} Under such circumstances, it is added, the elite will be willing to support the ruler with the hope of some future political or economic gain.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Schatz 2003, p. 6
\item \textsuperscript{237} Lefebvre 1978: 85
\item \textsuperscript{238} Lefebvre 1978, p. 95
\item \textsuperscript{239} Brenner 1997, p. 277
\end{itemize}
building at the top of the agenda, the national state is likely to generate the level of support it needs. As has been observed, capital relocation can be a tool for nation-building.

Capital moves also serve as nation-building strategies, since they may help to promote broad identification with a larger cultural community. In order words, capital relocation is used to generate the loyalty of a broad citizenry.\textsuperscript{240}

In diverse societies where there are often competing interests and mutual suspicion, the national state, as Lefebvre points out, occupies the ‘neutral space’ and becomes the arbiter in society.\textsuperscript{241} Lefebvre adds that mental space is so powerful that it overlays physical space and if successful, it is difficult to separate the interests of the state from that of the general population.\textsuperscript{242} Hence, by putting nation-building on the agenda, the state is more likely to obtain legitimacy for its actions.

Legitimacy involves an acceptance of the state’s rules of the game, its social control, as true and right. It means the acceptance of the symbolic order associated with the idea of the state as people’s own system of meaning.\textsuperscript{243}

However, the type of legitimacy described by Migdal above can be seen as, a form of social control. In the relocated capital context, a major next step is the creation of institutions. With the ‘legitimacy’ conferred on the national state, this is an area where it is able to wield considerable power.

**Territorial Spaces: Rescaling State Spaces**

Nation-building as noted in Chapter One, often occurs simultaneously with state-formation. While the national state is seeking to unite a diverse population, it is at the same time trying to reinforce its power and undermine other institutions. The traditional use of the term ‘state’ emphasized territoriality but today, the state is taken to be much more than a territory. While acknowledging this, territory is a useful starting point for understanding the link between the state, space and power. As Allen puts it, the unique power of the state is based on its control of territory, within which it is recognized as offering legitimate rule, exercising a monopoly and storing up knowledge of its citizens through a complex bureaucratic infrastructure.\textsuperscript{244} This is also reflected in Lefebvre’s concept of territorial space. Lefebvre refers to space as a privileged instrument in the ‘hands’ of the state. Privileged in this con-

\textsuperscript{240} Schatz 2003, p. 10
\textsuperscript{241} Lefebvre 1978, p. 95
\textsuperscript{242} Lefebvre 1991, p. 281
\textsuperscript{243} Migdal 2001, p. 52
\textsuperscript{244} Allen 2004, p. 7
text can be due to its control of territory. Drawing on Lefebvre’s analysis, the process begins with the mapping, modification and transformation of physical or material space.\textsuperscript{245} These are often carried out through policy, urban planning and master plans. Abuja is a new city and this means the master plan played a crucial role.

In a study on housing in South Africa, Lind presents territorial space as the state’s territorial and institutional framework, in which spaces are carved up, categorized, demarcated and controlled.\textsuperscript{246} Hence, apart from the mapping of physical space, the creation of institutions is a central part.

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With its technostucture controlling energy questions, the state gradually becomes the master of them, not only because it controls the units of production, but because it partitions space under the surveillance of its technicians and police.\textsuperscript{247}
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As Lefebvre suggests above, institutions and those who manage them are major tools through which the national state maintains control over space. This view has also been echoed by Migdal:

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The offices, roles, and organizations express the order inherent in the central value system. No group of people has completely homogenous values; the institutional component implements the values of the center throughout society. Its authority is the motor of social change.\textsuperscript{248}
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Closely related to the creation of institutions is administration. Lefebvre describes the modern state as “a spatial framework characterized by the domination of a centralized administrative apparatus”.\textsuperscript{249} Lefebvre adds that the space produced by the state implies a “bureaucratic centrality” termed “civic” but occupied by the “decision-making powers”.\textsuperscript{250} In a study on the post-apartheid South African state, Robinson cites administrative power as an aspect of state power that is spatial.\textsuperscript{251} A major way through which this is expressed is through the internal organization of state apparatuses. Robinson reports that the “geography of these apparatuses” is an important part of the growth and the functioning of state power.\textsuperscript{252} Brenner also expresses similar views on the close relationship between the state, space and power through the concept of state spatial projects:

\textsuperscript{245} Lefebvre 1978, p. 84  
\textsuperscript{246} Lind 2003, p. 49. In the context of post-apartheid era in South Africa, Lind sees housing provision as influenced by territorial, institutional and symbolic elements.  
\textsuperscript{247} Lefebvre 1978, p. 90  
\textsuperscript{248} Migdal 2001, p. 44  
\textsuperscript{249} See Brenner 1997, p. 277  
\textsuperscript{250} Lefebvre 1978, p. 88  
\textsuperscript{251} Robinson 1996  
\textsuperscript{252} Robinson 1996, p. 12
On the most basic level, state spatial projects are embodied in the state’s internal scalar differentiation among distinct tiers of administration, as defined by subnational, provincial, regional, metropolitan, and local territorial boundaries. This scalar differentiation of the state occurs in close conjunction with intergovernmental projects to coordinate administrative practices, fiscal relations, political representation, service provision and regulatory activities among and within each level of state power.253

Apart from the reference to the state’s internal scalar differentiation, Brenner specifically cites service provision as an example of an area where the scalar differentiation of the state is evident. This is a useful point for this study. Brenner goes on to point out that while centralization concentrates political authority at one scale, often the national, decentralization leads to the transfer of various regulatory tasks from the centre to lower levels.

In ending this discussion, it is important to recall some of the criticisms that have been levelled against Lefebvre’s concept of state space production. For example, Unwin refers to Lefebvre’s concept as Eurocentric and urban biased.254 On the point of Eurocentrism, this study probably proves that some aspects of his approach have relevance for places outside Europe. I have not however adopted his thesis in its entirety but have rather adapted it to suit my specific interests. An example is that while Lefebvre is more interested in modern capitalism, I am primarily concerned with issues related to nation-building. Regarding the allegation of being urban-biased, it is true that Lefebvre’s approach has been adopted mainly in the urban context and this study is one. I do not necessarily see this as a negative thing since urban areas do have particular characteristics that define them. One can therefore argue that just as some models may be more appropriate for rural settings, others are better suited to the urban. Another criticism of Lefebvre is the neglect of place. Unwin refers to Lefebvre’s abstract space as representing the triumph of space over place in such a way as to favour homogeneity over heterogeneity at every turn. Lefebvre makes subtle references to place by referring to space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols and the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’, and he notes that ‘users’ in France are different from those in Japan, Spain, Italy or the USA,255 but not much attention is devoted to place in his analysis. This study argues against homogeneity so adopting Lefebvre’s concept alone may not be beneficial. This why, attention is also given to place.

253 Brenner 2004a, p. 92
254 Unwin 2000, pp. 14-26
255 Lefebvre 1978, p. 86
Decentralization versus Centralization

Based on the prior discussion, it is evident that decentralization and by implication, centralization, are spatial process. However, this section will draw attention to why there are differences between places. This takes the focus to national politics and the character of national governments. Decentralization is defined as the sharing of part of the governmental power by the central ruling group with other tiers with each having authority within a specific area.\textsuperscript{256} This definition limits the process to the state but decentralization is also extended to include actors beyond the state.\textsuperscript{257} However, the discussion here is primarily concerned with state decentralization defined as the degree of dispersal of power and responsibilities between different tiers of government.\textsuperscript{258} The other aspects feature later in the chapter. A cursory look at the literature on decentralization reveals three major forms, deconcentration, delegation and devolution.\textsuperscript{259} Centralization is defined as the process in which power is concentrated in a central authority at the national level.\textsuperscript{260} Not much reference is often made to centralization probably because the concept is self-explanatory and is assumed to be the opposite of decentralization.\textsuperscript{261}

The discussion here will highlight the role of the national state and national politics. The attention is therefore on how and why national state intervention is higher in certain places than others. In a comparison between the United States and Canada, Leo notes that a clear distinction between national and local spheres makes sense in the former while in Canada this distinction breaks down.\textsuperscript{262} For example, while the Canadian Federal government does not supervise local land use, which is also the case in the United States, it does interfere significantly in local development through other measures. The comparison between Europe and the United States is even more striking. Europe is reported as exhibiting a level of national intervention in local affairs that is nearly unthinkable in the United States. Leo links this to the American political scene in general which calls for a strong market involvement often in partnership with local governments.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[256] Mawhood 1993
\item[257] See Chikulo 1998.
\item[258] Chikulo 1998, p. 89.
\item[259] Chikulo 1998, pp. 91-93. Deconcentration involves the transfer of power by administrative means to locally-based offices of central governments; devolution the conferment of authority on formally constituted autonomous local bodies or agencies to carry out specified functions while delegation is the transfer of managerial responsibility to local, regional or functional authorities that act as agents of central government with ultimate responsibility remaining with central government.
\item[260] Chikulo 1998, p. 90
\item[261] Chokulo 1998, p. 90
\item[262] Leo 1997
\end{footnotes}
...these political conventions are reinforced by the characteristic features of American political culture...a belief in local autonomy, which takes the concrete form of the widely observed principle of local “home rule”; a suspicion of “big government”, especially if that government is a national government; and a suspicion of powerful interventionist government, whether local, regional, or national.263

The conditions mentioned above are not conducive to national state intervention in local functions. On the other hand, in Europe, Leo reports that there is more emphasis on the promotion of equal development between cities which necessitates a greater intervention from national governments. This is particularly pronounced in France, a country described as having a centralized national government.

In developing countries, there is a greater scope for national state intervention. For example, contrary to the American case, private sector participation in service delivery remains marginal.264 Another reason is the absence of ‘powerful’ regional actors. In Europe, regionalism and the increasing role of regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) can have some implications for national state involvement. Gibbs and Jonas report that in the United Kingdom, many environmental responsibilities have been delegated to the European level and at the same time, much of the responsibility for implementing EU policies has been passed to new parastatals and other responsibilities have been devolved downwards to local authorities.265 It is worth pointing out that this has been challenged by some. Brenner, still on Europe, argues that the national state not only reacts to external economic forces: it is also able to produce and reshape the institutional landscape within which the spatial dynamics of globalized capital accumulation take place and hence retain much control.266 What is however important here are the conditions in developing countries in relation to other places. While Africa is recognized as having the world’s oldest customs union, it has a poor record in creating and maintaining regional frameworks.267 In comparative terms, lesser private sector participation and absence of regional actors suggest a greater scope for national state intervention in developing countries.

Going back to the role of national politics, Enemuo cites Uganda under Yoweri Museveni as a country that has made some progress in the devolution of power to lower levels of government while Nigeria has made little progress.268 In Nigeria, a plethora of local government reforms and constit-

263 Leo 1997, p. 94
264 Semboja and Therkildsen 1995
265 Gibbs and Jonas 1999, p.6.
266 Brenner 2003a
267 Goldstein 2002. Ideological differences, weak infrastructure, low level of intra-regional trade, a high dependence on export crops, marked differences in income and foreign policy are cited as major underlying problems.
268 Enemuo 2000
tional provisions have acknowledged that local government councils should have substantial controls over local matters but national and regional governments continue to retain control.\textsuperscript{269} While the 1976 local government reforms recognized that local government councils should have substantial controls over local matters, it did not give them the amount of administrative and financial autonomy needed.\textsuperscript{270} In the same vein, the 1979 and 1989 constitutions guaranteed constitutional status for local governments with a list of functions and statutory allocation of revenues from State and Federal governments but national and regional governments continue to intervene.\textsuperscript{271} Benjamin sums up the situation by noting that the concentration of political and economic power at the centre remains a crisis of governance in the country.\textsuperscript{272}

There are other possible explanations for the high level of national state intervention in local functions including those linked to colonial rule and its legacy. In the case of Nigeria, Enemuo reports that under colonial administration, local governments had no autonomy and were subject to the control of the central governments for which they served as local representatives.\textsuperscript{273} The related argument by Enemuo is that the centralization of power has been carried over for self-serving purposes by the leaders. This makes authoritarian or elite interests relevant. Indeed reference has been made to the “dynamics of personalistic politics within states-in-formation in sub-Saharan Africa” to draw attention to the personal ruling style of African leaders in which association or allegiance to them is paramount.\textsuperscript{274}

This statement by Rutherford sums up most of the reasons for national state intervention:

\begin{quote}
At independence, social services began to take on new importance for the state…For many governments, social services were seen as vehicles extending their legitimacy, forging nationalism amongst culturally and regionally diverse populations, and promoting modernity as well as more particularistic national images…Consequently, the rather haphazardous, neglected, and/or segregated social services of the colonial period were centralized by post-colonial governments under some form of social policy.\textsuperscript{275}
\end{quote}

Some indicators of national state intervention highlighted above include the desire of rulers to achieve legitimacy, unite culturally diverse groups and promote modernity. An important one is nation-building. It should be noted that while the threat of secession, a result of the multi-ethnic composition of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{269} Benjamin 1998
\item \textsuperscript{270} Benjamin,1998
\item \textsuperscript{271} Benjamin 1998
\item \textsuperscript{272} Benjamin 1999, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{273} Enemuo 2000, p.184
\item \textsuperscript{274} Bratton 1988, p. 408
\item \textsuperscript{275} Rutherford 1997, p. 14
\end{itemize}
some societies is a popular argument used to explain the unwillingness to decentralize, some see it as self-serving. Enemou argues that centralized rule has not yielded the dividend of national unity as can be seen from the frequent civil wars.\footnote{Enemou 2000, p. 186} In this study, the aim is not to prove the veracity of the argument but instead to examine how nation-building operates alongside state formation and how capital relocation fits into it. On this issue, the timing of relocation relative to the country’s political development is important. In Chapter One, I drew attention to the reference made to Europe by Schatz: \footnote{Schatz 2003, p. 3}

In much of Europe, the processes of state and nation building began after the modern state emerged. Westphalia simply made an international law of what was becoming reality on the ground – elites had already created states through taxation, enlistment of soldiers, and infrastructure development and had begun the drive to homogenize and purchase the loyalty of diverse populations. Clearly much remained to be done after 1648; state and nation building continued afterwards. But for our purposes, it is significant that these processes had already begun.\footnote{Campbell 2000, p. 10}

State- and nation-building, as can be summed up from the above, are not static processes, but what is important is that in contrast to the case of Europe, in post-colonial countries, statehood was established first and then the attempt to create viable state structures and to secure the loyalty of diverse peoples followed. A further confirmation of the relevance of a relocated capital city perspective in understanding the extent of decentralization or centralization can be drawn from the following:

A second element of the capital city’s growing complexity was the increased differentiation between local and national interests. Municipal and national institutions competed for space at the city centre and for control over political and economic affairs. While the nation-state constructed additional bureaucratic, parliamentary and symbolic buildings, the municipal government also expanded its role and physical presence in the capital city’s built environment\footnote{278}

The increasing differentiation between local and national interests is noted above as a key source of conflict between the different tiers. Reference is made to the competition for space. I see the relevance of both material and non-material space in this. In the earlier discussion on mental spaces, it was noted that if mental space is successfully deployed, it becomes difficult to separate the interests of the (national) state from that of the general population. The result is little differentiation. If seen in the context of central-local relations, the little differentiation in national and local interests means fewer grounds for conflict. In the case of material space, it can also feature in
power relations between national and local or municipal governments. On this particular issue, the relocated capital perspective is particularly important. The opportunity to build a new city makes it easier for the national state to determine the amount of physical space to be occupied by each tier as well as the type of buildings. This spatial expression of power in the Abuja context is briefly discussed in Chapter Four.

Forming Partnerships

The emphasis on less state involvement in service delivery has put partnerships at the top of the development agenda. Today, governance includes a diverse range of institutions of different origins, types and histories instead of the limited set of state institutions. Hence, the formation of partnerships has become a major way of bringing state and non-state institutions together in order to address specific problems. As a method of analysis, the concept of governance is considered a useful tool for examining the gap-filling functions of associational life, collaboration between NGOs and local authorities and struggles between them. However, one accusation is about the failure to pose specific questions:

Who are such actors likely to be? Presumably they include individual leaders, factions, and coalitions both within the state elite and outside of it. What sort of political resources – of ideology, skill, and organization – do they bring to bear? Those in state office probably enjoy structural advantages in access to material resources, while actors in civil society may be able to draw on greater reserves of moral or social authority. What kinds of action strategies do they pursue: confrontational, or accommodative? isolated or coalitional? planned or reactive?

My contention is that the failure to pose such strategic questions as outlined above not only neglects power relations but also the relevance of place. Elander proposes the adoption of urban regime theory not only in setting the partnership approach within a broader theoretical perspective but also for empirical research in terms of inspiring a number of questions.

Which interests, and which players, will be included in partnerships, and which will be left outside?

279 MacLeod and Goodwin 1999, p. 4
280 Tostensen et al., 2001, p. 20
281 Bratton and Rothschild 1992, p. 270
282 Elander 2002
283 Elander 2002, p. 194
Another usefulness of urban regime theory, considering the focus on place, is its emphasis on local conditions. Much of the discourse on urban regime theory centres on seeking explanations for how and why coalitions emerge, dissolve or consolidate. This privileges local politics. For example, Horan in a study of Boston’s governing coalition between 1945 and 1992 not only cites economic restructuring and the mobilization of business but also the political orientations of the city’s mayors and neighbourhood politics dominated by class and racial issues as major factors that shaped the membership, policy and goals as well as the performance of the coalition. This is also reflected in this comment by Leo:

My argument is that, in politics of planning and development, cities are subjected to a wide range of pressures for homogenization…At the same time, urban governance asserts local particularity – local ideas about how cities should be governed, how they should look, and what the social milieu should be…

The discussion below is primarily concerned with the composition of partnerships, the nature of power relations, who is likely to exert the most influence, what strategies are used and the relevance of local politics.

The Composition

The composition of partnerships can be influenced by a combination of place-based factors ranging from the economic to the political. For example in the case of America, Stone reports a bias towards a state-market partnership because American cities are heavily dependent on local revenue and hence give economic development a high priority. In this case, business elites have resources that make them particularly attractive to local governments and they exercise considerable power. Outside America, other actors may be more important. In Europe, appointed local state officials, technocratic managers and professionals play a crucial role. This is linked to the greater involvement of national governments in local affairs. In Africa, apart from the state and the private sector, reference has been made to the contributions of different ‘third sectors’ in an acknowledgement of the role of NGOs, CBOs, voluntary organizations and community leaders. The role of community leaders is particularly relevant to this study. Community leaders can be traditional, formal and informal:

284 Lauria, 1997, p. 2
285 Horan 1997
286 Leo 1997, p. 78
287 Stone 2004, p. 10
288 Stone 1989
289 Painter 1997, p. 129
290 Gough 2000, p. 14
Traditional leaders derive their authority from hereditary rights and from their status in local culture. Formal leaders are appointed by the government or elected as local representatives of the government. Informal leaders are influential members of a community on the basis of their personal status or of their activities in community-based organizations such as political parties, churches, youth and women’s organizations, etc. All three types of local leaders may have different roles in solid waste management.291

What is important to note from the above is that who makes it into a partnership will to a large extent depend on the level of emphasis on economic development, the type of institutions found and existing political arrangements.

Power Relations

In examining power relations and cooperation between actors in a partnership, governance and regime theorists often focus on indicators of trust, reciprocity, accountability and authority.292 Such concepts are useful in identifying the nature of relations between actors but say little about the differential access to power or the capacity of actors. As Elander points out, in any partnership, it is important to examine the range and balance of power between actors.293 This implies that different actors have different access to and capacity to influence decisions. Beyond this, the amount of influence or capacity of actors can also be related to place-based factors.

In the context of state-society relations in Africa, Hyden’s contributions have been widely acknowledged, applied, commented upon and referred to as providing “ground-breaking insights”.294 Hyden defines governance as the “conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm”.295 He sees the study of governance as the identification of the conditions that facilitate ‘good governance’ and effective problem solving.296 A major contribution by Hyden is to simplify an otherwise complex process into four major components: the actor, structural, governance and public realms. In the actor dimension, he sees the behaviour of actors as guided by power, authority, reciprocity and exchange. In the structural dimension, structures are seen as the normative frameworks created by human beings in order to pursue social, economic and political ends. This dimension is shaped by compliance, trust, accountability and innovation. The third, the “public realm” is defined as the arena in which state and civil society organizations interact and compete for influence. Hyden compares it to a football field where the game cannot be effectively played

291 Anschütz 1996, p. 18
292 See Stone 1989 and Hyden 1992
293 Elander 2002
294 Bratton 1988, p. 413
295 Hyden 1992 p. 7
296 Hyden 1992, p. 15
unless players or teams adhere to certain rules. As he points out, actors expect to have access, be treated fairly and have influence and will withdraw or rebel if rules are not adhered to.

Bratton and Rothchild, whom Sjögren (1998) describe as “benevolent but partly critical readers of Hyden”, question whether Hyden actually paid enough attention to human agency and power relations. They see Hyden’s definition of governance as the conscious management of regime structures as implying that action comes before structure, but in subsequent accounts, he devotes more time to the structures, values and norms of regimes than to identifying political actors and actions that can cause regime change. Furthermore, in Sjögren’s opinion, Hyden’s civic realm is one of virtues and consensus. While acknowledging these criticisms, in this study, the concept of public realm is still useful in examining the nature of relations between the state and society and can be used to introduce the relevance of space in power relations. The ‘arena’ referred to by Hyden in which the state and civil society interact and compete for influence can be translated to mean the creation of a space, a space that can be characterized by cooperation and/or conflict. Most now acknowledge that governance is a spatial process. From the perspective of partnerships, Allen notes that the formation of partnerships means that the state now shares the institutional playing field with NGOs and multinationals among others and a major result is indirect forms of control:

Leverage is obtained through indirect means of regulation and resource constraints; instead of rigid discretionary limits to individual action, control is maintained through performance targets, monitoring practices…rather than clearly defined lines of authority, roles and responsibilities are redistributed outward to a variety of quasi-governmental agencies in the private, voluntary and informal sectors.

Hence, Allen acknowledges that governance constitutes a spatially diffuse and fragmented array of decision-making practices and refers to new styles of governing at a distance where the powers of the centre is “delegated through a variety of bureaucratic positions” and concretized through administration.

Going back to power relations, the level of cooperation and the power of actors can be shaped by the specific characteristics of a place. While cooperation is seen as crucial in cementing relations between partners, it is not a

297 See Sjögren 1998, p. 23
298 Bratton and Rothchild 1992, p. 270
299 Sjögren 1998, p.22
300 Allen 2004, p. 22
301 Allen 2004, p. 26
302 Allen 2004, p. 24
In Africa, the ‘withdrawal’ of the state from service delivery and attempts by people to ‘fill the gap’ on one side and the renewed emphasis on decentralization on the other has contributed to the emergence of traditional and community leaders as important players in service delivery in cities.\textsuperscript{304} The influence of traditional authorities extends to cities even though their power may be more limited compared to rural areas.\textsuperscript{305} The need to involve traditional authorities in governance processes dates back to the colonial and immediate post-independence period.

\begin{quote}
[At] the same time, African leaders knew that they simply could not crush traditional leaders. In fact, they coveted the legitimacy that traditional leaders had because, if harnessed by the central state, those sentiments could be an extraordinary means of getting around their own administrative weaknesses and the physical and emotional distance from their populations.\textsuperscript{306}
\end{quote}

As can be seen from above, national governments may have ‘needed’ traditional rulers but the relationship between the two has been a contentious and contradictory one. The problem, however, has to do with much more than legitimacy. A key factor is differential access to financial resources.

In all the poor countries, the state has grown into the largest domestic repository of resources for economic growth and social welfare, and this fundamental fact has altered the nature of relationship between state and society in the process of modernization. Precisely because the state has the potential to be the dominant agent of social transformation\textsuperscript{307}

The state is likely to use the greater access to financial resources to its advantage whenever possible, including partnerships.

Another relevant aspect of partnership with the state is authority. State officials are often conferred with some form of authority which gives them power to take decisions over others.\textsuperscript{308} Harris et al. add that in many cases, power resides within state institutions and political parties and is granted to individuals and representatives.\textsuperscript{309} The following particularly draws attention to the relevance of place:

\begin{quote}
[the] balance of power in local political spheres will be influenced by the resources (in terms of different forms of capital) of political institutions and actors and the relations among them.\textsuperscript{310}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{303} Stone 1989, pp. 7-8
\textsuperscript{304} Aina 1997 and Beall 2005
\textsuperscript{305} Herbst 2000
\textsuperscript{306} Herbst 2000, p. 176
\textsuperscript{307} Bratton 1988, p. 407
\textsuperscript{308} Feldman 1997, p. 39
\textsuperscript{309} Harris et al., 2004
\textsuperscript{310} Harris et al., 2004. p. 17
\end{footnotes}
The balance of power in local political spheres referred to above can be derived from the political arrangements in a place. Once more, reference can be made to studies on urban regimes. For example, in the American context, as noted earlier, the local and national political conditions favour a bigger role for local governments in conjunction with the private sector. The private sector wields tremendous influence. For example, in Boston, the private sector had become the most powerful political interest in the city by 1959 and was able to frame the goals of the regime and the principal instruments for realizing the goals.\footnote{Horan 1997, p. 159} On the other hand, in France and Italy, the private sector has less influence on governance processes and the national government has more compared to America.\footnote{Leo 1997} In the case of Africa, as discussed earlier, there is limited private sector participation in Africa and the national state retains considerable influence. Even though the partnership in focus in this study, does not involve the private sector, this is still relevant. What is being stressed is that the political climate in a place can shape the power of members of a partnership and this can be included to one with community leaders.

In a partnership with the state, internal differences between community leaders linked to the heterogeneity of the post independent African society is another factor that affects cooperation and further limits the capacity of community leaders.

The heterogeneity of the African ethnic, religious, and regional groupings requires a complicated, even laborious, bargaining process, both within the group as well as with other groupings in the community at large.\footnote{Bratton and Rothchild 1992, p. 276}

The problem of heterogeneity is particularly pronounced in urban areas as a result of their heterogeneous nature.\footnote{Phillips 2002} In differentiating between the “collectivist” societies in developing countries and the “individualistic” ones in the west, Greif notes that in the former, the social structure is “segregated” since individuals interact mainly with members of specific ethnic, religious or familial groups.\footnote{Greif 1994, p. 913} The relationship between the different groups is often characterized by non-cooperation. The contention is that under such circumstances, it will be difficult for community leaders to unite and confront state officials as a group.

Legitimacy, as mentioned earlier is one area in which traditional authorities appears to have an edge over the state but reference is now made to the “modern” chief, seen as increasingly looking like the state elite, which causes the perception that close contact with them may lead to contamina-
Another problem is traceable to the colonial era. Chiefs were sometimes viewed with suspicion due to their close association with colonial governments which made them agents in people’s eyes.⁵¹⁷ Today, their association with the state is also sometimes questioned. All these are likely to undermine the power of traditional authorities.

While references have been made to urban regime theory, this does not mean I have adopted the concept in its entirety. The concept has been useful to me in two specific areas: posing research questions and drawing attention to local politics. There are certain controversies associated with the concept that should be acknowledged. One is the meaning of the word regime and its applicability to developing countries. In Stone’s earlier work, he defines regime as the “informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions.”⁵¹⁸ This suggests some stability and Stone himself acknowledges that a regime has to be studied over time. In the African context, as Gough points out, the notion of a stable regime does not apply in many cases.⁵¹⁹ Stone has addressed this problem in recent times:

> Over time, I have come to feel strongly that asking whether a given locality or a set of localities pass a litmus test to qualify as urban regimes is the wrong question. Inquiry needs to focus on the character of local governing arrangements, what enables them to pursue an agenda, and what shapes the strength and direction of a locality’s problem-solving efforts.⁵²⁰

Painter joins the debate by arguing that a regime does not need to be very successful nor longstanding to be called a regime.⁵²¹ He adds that the regime concept would have a more general applicability if the need to produce insuperable problems of empirical validation to prove the existence of a regime or lack thereof is avoided. Notwithstanding this, whether what I am studying is a regime or not is not central to this study. I am more interested in how different actors come together, the nature of power relations and how their capacity is shaped by place conditions. I am not particularly interested in how successful the regime or partnership is, or if indeed it is a regime.

Another criticism of regime theory is the dominance of the market. This may be related to its close association with the United States where the market plays a dominant role in governance. Outside the United States, other interests may be more central as in many European cities where appointed local officials, professionals and technocratic managers play dominant

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⁵¹⁶ Herbst 2000, p. 179
⁵¹⁷ Herbst 2000, p. 175
⁵¹⁸ Stone 1989, p. 6
⁵¹⁹ Gough 2000, p. 12
⁵²⁰ Stone 2004, p. 9
⁵²¹ Painter 1997, p. 130
roles.322 In a defence of Stone, he did acknowledge that a regime is much more than a coalition with business and also involves labour-union officials, party functionaries, officers of non-profit organizations and church leaders.323 Gough draws attention to the contributions of different ‘third sectors’ in any regime analysis in the developing world where NGOs, CBOs and various community groups play active role in governance today.324

Resistance

Much of the discussion has been on domination but resistance is often present in some form. For example, Allen points out that involving non-state actors in governance implies a disjointed pattern of institutional authority in which the power of the centre may have been compromised as these agencies negotiate their interests.325 Sharp et al. define dominating power as attempts to control others while resisting power sets up situations, groupings and actions that resist dominating power.326 Resisting power can be expressed in various forms. Those who on the surface appear to have no power can revert to “soft subversions”, defined as indirect, subtle, hidden or confrontational forms of resistance that may appear and fracture the façade of totalizing power.327 As a result, resistance to the state ranges from direct mass political action to the unobservable such as apathy. It is also important to note that space features in both dominating and resisting power.

Our use of the term ‘entanglements’, suggesting an image of knotted threads, is intended to underline the deep ‘spatiality’ of this spinning together of domination and resistance within power.328

Sharp et al. add that the modern state is made up of different branches and interests, and claims to territory are one way in which resistance is expressed. Dominating power is not only located within the realms of the state but also in the economy and civil society and is articulated within social, economic, political and cultural relations. It therefore goes beyond central-local relations to include state-community relations and gender relations.

The Gender Dimension

Governance often raises the question of who participates and participation can be based on different sources of social stratification such as class, ethnic-

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322 Cox 1997
323 Stone 1989, p. 7
324 Gough 2000
325 Allen 2004, p. 26
326 Sharp et al., 2000
327 Sharp et al, 2000, p 22
328 Sharp et al., 2000, p. 1
ity, age and gender. Among these, gender is said to be the most pervasive.\footnote{Kabeer 1994, p. 62} As a result, partnerships, as noted in Chapter One, do have a gender dimension. Over the years, different concepts have been used to explain the differential access to power by men and women and their participation in society. An example is the concepts of masculinity and femininity. Hegemonic masculinity guarantees the dominant position of men and the subordination of women\footnote{Connell 2001, p.38} and operates at the level of the whole society shoring up male power and advantage.\footnote{Hooper 2000, p. 60} Femininity, on the other hand, prescribes ‘appropriate’ behaviour for women. It evokes maternal values, meekness and self-sacrifice.\footnote{Laurie et al., 1999} Femininity is reinforced by a situation in which women are more likely to be given respect within their community for conforming to its norms and be penalized for disobeying, and more crucially, women’s values and actions often reflect those of the wider community and reproduce its injustices.\footnote{Kabeer 2002, p. 46} Patriarchy is another. It refers to the practice whereby through social structures and practices, men dominate, oppress and exploit women.\footnote{See Duncan 2002}

The concept of gender contract is another method that has been adopted to examine power relations between men and women. Gender contracts are defined as invisible social contracts that regulate relations between men and women at all levels of the society.\footnote{Larsson and Schlyter 1993} The argument is that in each society and over time, a gender contract develops between the different genders and sets out rules for what the different sexes should do or think.\footnote{Duncan, 1994} When put together, they create gender systems.\footnote{Larsson and Schlyter 1993} A gender system arranges people into genders according to two principles: the separation of all areas into male and female and the allocation of a higher value to the male norm.\footnote{Duncan, 1995} Once established, it is maintained and reproduced through culture, social integration in institutions and socialization.\footnote{Larsson and Schlyter 1993, p. 12} An important component of the concept of gender contract is that it incorporates both place and space.

A major inference is that both place and space are important to the construction of gender contracts. As Forsberg puts it, place is an actor that “creates
social order specific gender relations”. This means places provide the arena for the development and interaction of social relations including gender relations. Culture, religion, images and ideologies, and social norms combine to define and dictate the tasks to be performed by men and women. As a result, as Lund points out, the way men and women live in specific places is gendered according to the local culture, and economic, political and social structures. What is also important is that the actors, institutions or individuals are able to reinforce, uphold or change gender contracts. In this study, particular attention is given to the role of the state and traditional institutions such as the community and households.

There is the caution that the role of the state should not be overemphasized in terms of gender contracts. However, whether it makes an impact or not, the state is an actor and its role should be examined. The state can shape gender contracts through policies, programmes and legislation. In a study on housing conflicts in Southern Africa, Larsson and Schlyter identified legislation as one means through which the state can preserve, reinforce or bring about changes in the gender contracts. This suggests that the presence of an official document or policy can make some difference. However, the state is accused of being a gendered institution. Taylor argues that subordination and discrimination against women is a persistent feature of women’s engagement with the state. Connell adds that men are more likely to hold state power.

In a partnership with the community, the state can make an impact through the stated objectives and the formation of committees. The formulation of the objectives is useful place to address the gender imbalance. However, as Ashworth points out, the “lack of a written and citable political commitment to social and gender equality from the executive or any national plan of action to make changes to current disparities” is one of the barriers that women face. Related to this is the failure to institute affirmative action. This is particularly relevant when it comes to selecting members into a partnership. As Kabeer puts it, power is not limited to any single aspect of the social system but in the social relations which enable men to mobilize a greater range of resources; political, economic and familial. Simply put, men have more power and hence greater access to the opportunities that may come with a partnership.

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341 Forsberg 2001, p. 162
343 Lund 1993, p. 6
344 Forsberg 2001
345 Larsson and Schlyter 1993
346 Taylor 2000, pp. 19-21
347 Connell 2001, p. 43
348 Ashworth 1996, p. 9
349 Kabeer 1994, p. 66
How the state implements policies is one way of showing its relevance but it also draws attention to place. The policy of decentralization may be a step towards the greater involvement of women but how it is implemented is also relevant to the outcome. As a result, there are mixed results. For example, Jain gives the example of India and cites the “enormous expansion of women’s representation in decentralized government structures” which “highlights “the advantages of proximity”.350 Others are more skeptical. In addressing the question of whether women are more likely to participate as equals when power is decentralized to the local, Phillips suggests that this assumption implies that the local is more significantly open to women’s interests.351 The reservations expressed by Phillips were confirmed by Beall in a study on South Africa. Beal acknowledged that the local government is closest to the people and more likely to have a closer relationship with women but also points out that “competing interests remain clustered around power and resources” in ways that facilitate the exclusion of women.352 What the two cases in India and South Africa tell us is that the outcomes for men and women differ between places, in this case, as a result of different state practices.

Apart from the state, the community, represented by elites and traditional rulers is another relevant actor in shaping gender contracts. In an attempt to draw attention to a common misconception, Staeheli points out that while the community appears to offer women the greatest opportunities for participation, it is also a site of social control.353 Chiefs, heads of households and elites are major actors endowed with decision-making authority within particular institutional contexts.354 In the study on South Africa by Beall mentioned earlier, she identifies the “entrenchment of local relationships and power structures”, especially those of traditional authorities as a major challenge faced by women.355 There is, therefore, the caution against the reliance on traditional institutions in the context of participation based on the argument that they may uphold and reproduce rather than change locally-specific configurations of inequality and exclusion.356

It is difficult to examine gender relations at the level of the community and exclude the household. The household has been described as the smallest decision-making body that divides familial and communal tasks according to custom by gender and age and hence provides the starting point for explaining the exploitation of women by virtue of their sex.357

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350 Jain 1996, p. 3  
351 Phillips 1996  
352 Beall 2005, p. 253  
353 Staeheli 2002, p. 818  
354 Kabeer 2002, p. 20  
355 Beall 2005, p. 254  
356 Cleaver 2001  
357 Lund 1993, p. 1
edly literal attachment of women to the ‘home’ tends to define their roles in relation to those of men. A dominant image is that of women as wives and mothers performing the practical tasks necessary for the smooth running of society. The argument continues that, due to their innate predispositions, women cannot participate effectively in the political or decision-making sphere. Some of the traits women are accused of lacking include aggressiveness, competitiveness and pragmatism.

Space is also a common feature in gender relations. Reference has been made to “women and everyday spaces” and the “spatiality of everyday life”. In these, everyday life is bound into power structures that limit and confine the movements of women and space is a medium through which this is expressed. As was stressed in Chapter One, it is not my intention to draw a clear line between space and place and this extends to gender relations. My contention is that gender relations are rooted in power and that this can be expressed through space and place. Massey has also drawn attention to this.

[But] there are other ways, too, in which space and place are important in the construction of gender relations and in struggles to change them. From the symbolic meaning of spaces/places and the clearly gendered messages which they transmit, to straightforward exclusion by violence, spaces and places are not only themselves gendered but, in their being so, they both reflect and affect the ways in which gender is constructed and understood … Moreover, the two things – the limitation on mobility in space, the attempted consignment/confinement to particular places on the one hand, and the limitation on identity on the other – have been crucially related.

Like all dichotomies, that of place/space has attracted a lot of comments. Massey, as reflected above clearly suggests a close linkage between space and place.

**Popular Participation**

Governance also extends to the level of households or individuals where the process becomes even more complex. As reported in Chapter One, several factors ranging from the type of service, to social practices and the nature of local politics shape participation at this level. The discussion here will however focus on the nature of urban communities and local politics.

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358 Domosh and Seager 2001, p. 1  
359 Bourque and Grossholtz 2000  
360 Bourque and Grossholtz 2000  
361 Rose 1993  
362 Massey 1994, p. 179
The Urban Community and Local Politics

The term community tends to invoke the presence of common needs, interests and goals but a community is highly differentiated on the basis of gender, class, race, ethnicity, culture and other kinds of social stratification. The term community is a highly contentious and controversial concept. It is not my intention to engage in the debate but to draw attention to how it can relevant to a discussion on popular participation in cities. Bowles and Gintis define community as “a group of people who interact directly, frequently and in multi-faceted ways”.363 In this sense, professional and business networks and groups of friends and some neighbourhoods are considered communities. They see connection and not affection as the defining feature. Some definitions add territory, defining a community as a group of interacting individuals in a defined territory.364 The term community has also been explored from the perspectives of place, interest and communion.365 In the case of place and where geography plays some role, community is used to describe a situation where people have a common interest in something that is geographical (limited to a specific place). As for interest, people are said to share things other than place. This could be in terms of ethnic origin, religion or profession. On the third issue of communion, community is described as an attachment to a place, group or idea.366

Urban communities in particular are seen as not very amenable to collective or popular participation. This is commonly attributed to the heterogeneous nature of urban communities. This is often examined in the context of social capital with the argument that heterogeneity is likely to limit amount of social capital and hence the capacity to take popular or collective action.

Urban ‘communities’ are highly differentiated and tend to be more heterogeneous than rural ones, being made up of individuals and households from different social, economic and geographic backgrounds who come together as strangers. … It is often argued that social capital is weaker in urban areas because of the heterogeneity and mobility of the population.367

Social capital is defined as the “norms and networks that enable people to act collectively”.368 Apart from heterogeneity, there is also the view that there is less social capital in newer communities.369 Another problem is poverty. The poor have fewer resources of time and money to devote to “organizing and sustaining collective action”.370 Social capital is therefore likely to be nega-

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363 Bowles and Gintis, 2000
364 Johnston et al., 2000, p. 101
366 Religion is an example.
367 Phillips 2002, p. 137
368 Woolcock and Narayan 2000, p. 225
369 Phillips 2002
370 Devas 2002, p. 214
tively affected if the settlement in question is mainly inhabited by people from the low income bracket. The concept is commonly adopted in studies on collective initiatives in solid waste management. In a study in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Pargal et al. use measures of trust, reciprocity and sharing to examine the relevance of social capital in collective action.\textsuperscript{371} It was observed that cooperation may be affected by the degree of homogeneity on the basis of ethnic or regional origin of residents. However, Beall, in a study on community involvement in waste management, draws attention to the shortcomings of the concept of social capital in ignoring local power structures.\textsuperscript{372} This study adopts a similar approach by acknowledging the role of power relations both within and outside the community in shaping popular participation. This is done through the emphasis on place.

The incentive to participate can be related to the level of emotional attachment to a place. Different approaches of the concept of place have highlight how the behaviour of people as well as their perceptions about participation can be subject to the characteristics of the place. An example is the term ‘sense of place’, defined as the essence of place-specific identity that gives coherence and meaning to the actions of the inhabitants.\textsuperscript{373} It is logical to assume that people will be less willing to engage in collective action if they have no attachment to a place. This has been confirmed in a study on community initiatives.

\textsuperscript{371} Pargal et al., 1999
\textsuperscript{372} Baell 1997
\textsuperscript{373} See Taylor and Flint 2000 and Johnston et al., 2000
\textsuperscript{374} Post et al., 2003
\textsuperscript{375} Phillips 2002, 135
\textsuperscript{376} De-Shalit 2000

Under the circumstances highlighted above – lack of emotional attachment to place of residence – social networks are more likely to be based on kin, place of origin and other areas that emphasize short-term interests in which finance or money is the major motive.\textsuperscript{375}

While heterogeneity of ethnic origins or interests may be an obstacle to popular participation, there are other views. For example, there is the belief that people do not have to know each other to feel they are members of a community. De-Shalit adopts this approach to examine community participation in environmental issues.\textsuperscript{376} It is seen as relevant in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies where community can be a process of collective reflection. This could then lead to some form of consensus that would enable
the people to go beyond primordial relations. A similar approach is that adopted by governance and urban regime theorists who highlight the relevance of trust and reciprocity. For example, Hyden sees trust as the extent to which individuals and groups cooperate across basic divisions such as ethnicity, race, religion and class. However, a common impression conveyed is that while trust is an important mechanism for cooperation, it is often difficult to establish. As a result, members may look beyond trust to other mechanisms such as reciprocity. Reciprocal action entails a continuing relationship where people act based on expectations that others would likewise. The belief is that reciprocal action can generate new forms of consensus, which enables the political community to transcend existing boundaries of trust. Interestingly and in a reference to a major aim of this study, reciprocity is established through norms based in a territory and is hence place-based.

The city environment itself has a complexity that is likely to influence the behaviour of actors, including their willingness to participate in service delivery. Political behaviour, as has been pointed out is the outcome of the contexts within which people live their lives in specific places. In the African context, what constitutes local or city politics is also highly influenced by national politics. This is attributed to their primary role in the economic, political and cultural spheres. This is a reference to cities in general but this problem is likely to be ‘exaggerated’ in a capital city.

When the major reason for relocating and building a new capital is the desire to unite a country, this ideology is likely to shape the resultant politics. The pre-occupation with larger national concerns instead of the practical needs of the people such as shelter or services is a common feature of politics in African cities. Again, this is likely to be more pronounced in relocated capitals where nation-building has played a primary role. A related factor is the prevalence of urban-based ethnic organizations whose interests and resources are often directed towards their places of origin.

377 Hyden 1992, p. 14
378 Jessop 1997
379 Hyden 1992
380 Hyden 1992
381 Feldman 1997
382 Griffiths and Johnston 1991, p. 186
383 Aina 1997
384 Campbell 2000, p. 1
385 Aina 1997, p. 412
386 Aina 1997
The extent of national state involvement in local functions can also influence popular participation in governance processes. For example, in North American cities, community groups with few resources can wield influence while in European cities and with Paris as a specific example, mass opposition to the political elite is highly limited and citizens do not influence policies to a significant degree.\textsuperscript{387} France is referred to as a “strong-state society”.\textsuperscript{388} The high level of national state intervention in African countries had already been documented and this is expected to have some effect on popular participation.

Summary

This chapter examined governance in the context of relocated capital cities in a developing world perspective. It began by presenting capital relocation as entailing the production of space drawing largely on Lefebvre. A major reason for relocation – the desire to unite a diverse society or nation-building – is discussed in the context of mental spaces in which a major feature is the desire of the (national) state to influence the people and obtain support for its actions. A city has to be governed which means the creation of institutions and administration. This is discussed in the context of territorial spaces. Through this, the national state has the opportunity to (re)define the role of the different branches of the state. The major result is a highly centralized administrative system that leaves the municipal council on the margins in terms of governance. The next major topic is on what can be seen as the dilemma of decentralization. It highlights the role of national politics in the level of decentralization or centralization. This is particularly relevant in a relocated capital that is closely tied to the history of its country.

The third major theme focused on partnerships. It examined power relations between actors, how they are expressed across space and particularly how the capacity of actors can be shaped by the specific political characteristics of a place. The discussion on partnerships ended with an examination of the gender dimension. It focused on how the activities of the state and traditional institutions shape gender relations. The chapter ended with an examination of the theme of popular participation with emphasis on how the nature of urban communities and local politics shape the participation of households or individuals in service delivery.

\textsuperscript{387} Leo 1997
\textsuperscript{388} Leo 1997, 88
Chapter 4 Creating Dominant Spaces: Relocating and Administering the Capital

Nigeria – ever experimenting with various forms of institutional reform to placate its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional population – moved its capital from Lagos to Abuja in part because Abuja was located between the largely Muslim North and the Christian South so it was aligned geographically with both and was not partial to either one.389

Introduction

The relocation of capital cities is not new. In the case of China, the relocation of the capital from Nanjing to Beijing occurred in the 15th century while the frequent changes between Moscow and Saint Petersburg date back to the 18th century.390 More recent examples include Brazil, Kazakhstan, Cote D’Ivoire, Libya, Malawi, Botswana and Tanzania. The reasons for relocation are complex. In a reference to Moscow and St. Petersburg, the nature of successive political regimes and the position of the two cities in them are cited.391 In Brazil, modernism and the associated desire to create a new social order through architecture and planning are seen as the foremost reasons for relocation.392 Authoritarian tendencies, the political will of leaders and the desire to stimulate economic growth in a hitherto undeveloped part of the country are also reasons for capital relocation.393

In Abuja, several reasons – including the desire to build a modern capital, promote economic development in the Middle Belt, a relatively underdeveloped part of the country, and the enhancement of administrative functions – were given as official reasons for relocation.394 In addition to these, a primary reason was to promote national unity among the different ethnic groups, as

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389 Schatz 2003, p. 10
390 Schatz 2003
391 Gritsai and van der Wusten, 1989, p. 33. St. Petersburg is referred to as “a capital turned to the outside emphasizing Russia’s European vocation” but Moscow was an “inward looking capital” representing the distinctive spiritual values of Russia.
392 Holston 1989
393 Schatz 2003 and Wolfel 2002
394 The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979
reflected by Schatz in the excerpt at the beginning of this chapter. By all accounts, this received most of the attention. However, as noted in Chapter One, nation- and state-building occur simultaneously. In this case, the desire to enhance national unity takes place alongside the (re)structuring of the state in favour of the national state. The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of nation-building in relocation and how it influenced the resultant state institutional and administrative framework in the city.

In relation to the research question, this chapter examines how and why the national state is the dominant actor in the governance of Abuja. The analysis draws largely on the concept of space production discussed in Chapter Three. The discussion begins with the various reasons for relocation. While other reasons are acknowledged, the central focus is on the role of nation-building which is presented as entailing the production of mental spaces. A central part of this is the national government’s desire to influence the people in order to obtain their support. This is followed by a discussion on the creation of institutions and administration, also conducted in the context of space production.

A lot of the data is from secondary sources such as government documents and reports. Some additional data is from interviews with state officials.

**Improving Administrative Functions**

One of the reasons for capital relocation identified by Schatz is the rational/technical (Chapter Three).\(^{395}\) In this, the aim of capital relocation is to enhance administrative functions and bolster economic development. In the developing world, this is often associated with a colonial legacy. It was common for colonial governments to locate capitals based on their own interests. Nigeria is no different. As noted in Chapter Two, Nigeria had been divided into two protectorates – the southern and northern – before it was amalgamated into one nation in 1914. Lagos was the capital of the southern protectorate and Kaduna that of the north.\(^{396}\) As the story goes, Sir Frederick Lugard, the governor-general recommended Kaduna as the capital of the country but the British government back in Britain took account of their economic interests and chose Lagos instead.\(^{397}\) The location of Lagos on the Atlantic coast may have favoured the British but not the emerging post-colonial state. For a country covering an area of 923 773 square kilometres, the location of the capital in Lagos meant those in the north were far re-

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395 Schatz 2003  
396 Ministry of Federal Capital Territory 1998  
397 Ministry of Federal Capital Territory 1998, p. 2. The name “Nigeria” is said to have been coined by a mistress of Lugard.
moved from the seat of national government. Hence, it is not surprising that one of the arguments put forth for relocation was that a centrally located Federal Capital with easy access to all parts of the Federation was needed.\footnote{398}

**Political Will and Authoritarianism**

Since capital relocation is a huge undertaking, the commitment of leaders can be crucial. However, as reported in Chapter Three, leaders often have their motives. A common feature is the desire of the elite or ruling class to reinforce their interests. Wolfel gives the examples of President Kubitschek in Brazil and President Banda in Malawi.\footnote{399} In the case of Nigeria, and using the landscape for inspiration, Vale draws attention to the location of Abuja in the central highlands, from where political power flows in all directions (see Figure 4).\footnote{400} In Astana, Kazakhstan, Schatz sees the authoritarian tendencies and personalized ruling style of President Nursultan Nazarbaev as one of the reasons for relocation. Schatz also cites the example of the military ruler, Babangida in Nigeria referred to as the one who created the new capital but this deserves closer scrutiny. It was not Babangida that took the decision to relocate the capital. The decision was taken by another military ruler, about ten years before Babangida came into power. Babangida’s role is to have been the one to officially relocate the capital when he moved his residence from Lagos to Abuja in December, 1991.\footnote{401} Before this time, some government institutions had indeed been relocated from Lagos to Abuja by a previous civilian administration.

A related argument by Schatz is that capital relocation is easier to carry out or implement under authoritarian regimes as a result of the massive investments it requires. This implies that democratic governments may lack the political will to undertake such a huge financial project. In the case of Nigeria, both the decision and official relocation did occur under military regimes but most of the actual work in terms of physical construction took place under a civilian administration.

Of particular note was the Shehu Shagari administration (1979-83). In fact, it was one of the campaign issues before the 1979 general elections. The then presidential candidate of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Shehu Shagari, had promised that if elected, he would expedite work on Abuja. He did. To the extent that during that period, Abuja could perhaps pass for the largest construction site going on in the continent of Africa, and perhaps on earth.\footnote{402}
The tempo of the work that occurred under this civilian administration is linked to the politicization of the relocation exercise, already noted in Chapter Two as contributing to the production of slums. In this case, it can also be seen as patronage which Schatz also cites as a feature of capital relocation. In this case, the leader promises to reward his supporters. In another example of patronage, Abuja has been described as “synonymous with patronage and waste”. The waste is, of course not, solid waste but financial.

Another factor linked to authoritarianism, which occurs when relocation is carried out amidst widespread opposition from the people. On this particular issue, I do not share the view by Schatz who seemed to imply that that was the case in Nigeria. As can be seen from the example of the Presidential candidate, relocation was popular to the extent that it was the major campaign issue, and crucially, the subsequent victory of the Presidential candidate is linked to his support for relocation. As further discussions below will show, relocation was welcomed by the majority of Nigerians.

Abuja as a Symbol of National Unity

Schatz describes the relocation of the capital from Almaty to Astana (Kazakhstan) as designed to meet “acute state- and nation-building challenges in the early 1990s.” Schatz takes the time to point out that while Kazakhstan is not in Africa, the events there are similar to those in post-colonial Africa. Wolfel attributes the existence of two major identities in Kazakhstan to Soviet national and economic development policies. The Abuja case conforms to the pattern observed in Kazakhstan. At this point, it is necessary to recall the discussion in Chapter Two on the national context. The amalgamation of different communities, each with their own culture and history by the British was noted. So also were the continuous ethnic tensions and the search for national unity. One of the official reasons given for relocation was that “the city of Lagos was identified with predominantly one ethnic group” and “a new capital was needed as a symbol of Nigeria’s aspirations for unity and greatness”. The desire to encourage national unity was important to the extent that other reasons were often linked or subordinated to it. For example, Abuja is not the only capital city located in the geographic centre of its country. Rome and Madrid are other examples but in Abuja, the choice of a geographic centre is linked to national unity as reflected in the quote at the beginning of this chapter. This is confirmed in the master plan with a cen-

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403 Vale 1992, p. 138. The quote itself was made by Major General Mamman Vatsa in the magazine West Africa, 7 October 1985.
404 Schatz 2003, p.2.
405 Wolfel 2002, p. 485
406 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998, p. 4
407 Campbell 2000
trally located federal capital described as an asset to the nation because it
would help in generating a new sense of national unity.408 Even infrastructure
was seen in the same context:

[the] planned infrastructure improvements will create a context which is the
physical embodiment of many of the national goals for unity.409

Vale’s study on Abuja is another confirmation of how planning was to be
used to promote national unity.410 In a further confirmation of the primary
attention given to national unity, Mabogunje identified seven principles, both
explicit and implicit, as underpinning the development of the new capital but
adds that perhaps more important is the principle of “equal citizenship”
where the expectation is that unlike in Lagos, no one can claim “any special
privilege of indigeneity.” 411

The idea of a capital, where every Nigerian would have a sense of belong-
ing and equal opportunities regardless of ethnic background, appeared to
have struck a chord with the populace. Most Nigerians welcomed the idea of
a new capital but it is the implementation process that has not met their ex-
pectations.412

[The] new administration spoke the minds of millions of Nigerians when it
expressed its strong desire to create a new capital for the federation … Con-
ceptually, Abuja was to provide a platform for national unity … But the mil-
tary rulers were in a hurry to relocate … This resulted in much abuse, and not
surprisingly the city’s original master plan, and violations of it, have re-
mained subjects of unending controversy.413

This commentator blames the military rulers, but as presented earlier in this
chapter and in Chapter Four, the civilian administration has taken most of
the blame. The military administration of Babangida made relocation offi-
cial, but the process began before he came into power. Whatever the case,
the little opposition from the people confirms the ‘effectiveness’ of mental
spaces, a process in which the state seeks to influence the opinion of the
people in order to gain their support as discussed in Chapter Three. A com-
mon feature of mental spaces is that people are made to feel part of the proc-
 ess.414 In Nigeria, one of the first steps the Federal government took was to
set up a committee made up of seven “wise men” in August 1975 to examine

408 The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979, p. 27
409 The Federal Capital Development 1979, p. 27
410 See Vale 1992
411 Mabogunje 2001, p. 2. The seven principles are equal access, equal citizenship, environ-
mental conservation, city beautiful, functional city, effective regional development and na-
tional economic growth.
412 See Mabogunje 2001
413 The Guardian Editorial Opinion (2006, 5 November)
414 See Lefebvre 1991
the idea of a new capital. The members toured the country and held public meetings with the aim of gathering the opinions of the people. Not surprisingly, following the official relocation of the capital to Abuja, credit was given to the “entire Nigerian people who built the place”. In another possible indicator of the wide acceptability of the idea of relocation, the committee produced a unanimous report which it submitted ahead of schedule. In a country not known for consensus on national issues, this is a good indicator of the support of the people.

In Chapter One, attention was drawn to how nation-building privileges the national state and occurs simultaneously with state-building. The rest of the discussion will examine the relevance of this statement in relation to Abuja.

Creating Institutions and Administration

Over the years, different scholars have adopted different approaches in order to examine the process of state formation. In this context, Ferguson presents the state as having spatial properties through which they secure legitimacy and represent themselves as superior to other institutions. The issue of legitimacy has been highlighted in the prior discussion. While the comment by Ferguson on superiority is in the context of relations between the state and other institutions, the same can be said about relations within the state. The state is made up of different branches and it is inevitable that power relations will arise. This section examines how the national state, through spatial processes – specifically, the creation of institutions and administration – is able to usurp the functions and powers of the lowest tier.

In Abuja, the Federal Capital Development Agency (FCDA) established in 1976 was the first state institution to be created. It was charged with the planning, designing and development of the FCT. Among its duties was the provision of municipal services and coordination of the activities and agencies of government. However in 1985, the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT) was created and subsequently took over the affairs of the agency. The functions of the Ministry included the planning and development of the FCT, the arrangement for the provision of social services and the administration of the territory. The creation of the Ministry and its superimposition on the FCDA is regarded as one of the distortions of the master plan. What is of utmost importance to this discussion is that this decision

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415 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998, p. 4
417 Ferguson et al., 2002, p. 982
418 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory, 1998
419 Oseni 2001
can be seen as a major way through which the federal government inserted itself into the governance of the city.

Through the years, the status of Abuja has been a source of conflict between the federal and state governments. In Nigeria, the state is divided into three branches: federal, state (regional) and local. While the federal government refers to Abuja as a state, state governors disagree, arguing that since Abuja is run by a ministry under the supervision of the Presidency, it should be treated as any other federal government ministry. 420 State governors took the case to the Supreme Court in 2002 and successfully argued that Abuja is not a State and should therefore not enjoy direct allocations from the Federation Account. Added to this is the imprecise stipulation in the 1999 constitution that states that all the “provisions of this constitution shall apply to the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, as if it were one of the States of the Federation”. 421

Equating Abuja with a state has implications for the way the state is structured and the functions performed by state institutions. It also reveals a spatial dimension to power relations between the different tiers. As noted earlier, Nigeria operates a system of government where the federal, state and local governments each derive their power from the constitution. The thirty-six states in the country are run by elected governors (in times of civilian administration). On the other hand, Abuja is run by a minister appointed by the President and all the “powers and functions vested in the FCT Minister are those powers delegated by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” 422 This implies that the minister combines the powers of two tiers of government. Furthermore, the 1999 constitution stipulates that reference to governors, their deputies and State Executive Councils in the rest of the country translate to the President, the Vice President and the Federal Executive Council in the case of Abuja. 423 Not only does this make the President the ‘governor’ and the Vice President the ‘deputy governor’ of Abuja, there is no reference to area councils in this arrangement. A similar system exists in Astana, Kazakhstan. Dillinger et al. report that sub-national administration consists of two levels: provincial (oblasts) and districts (rayons). 424 Both are headed by chairmen (akims). Astana and Almaty, the former capital, have provincial status, the equivalent of states in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, since state governors derive their power from the constitution, they are expected to have a reasonable measure of autonomy from the federal. There is no evidence that the minister who runs Abuja has the same level of autonomy. In an interview with a director in the legal department of the Ministry, he acknowledged that in practice, the minister does not have

420 Ogbu 2004
421 Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
422 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998, p. 61
423 Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p. 112
424 Dillinger et al., 2005
In his opinion, state governors have more powers since they are elected by the people. The subordinate role of the minister is reflected in this comment to journalists when asked about the role of the President in the appointment of directors to head new agencies that had just been created:

He approved the appointments. He gave me a free hand to appoint, but I didn’t do so unilaterally but allowed the President to do the appointments. 426

In the Abuja case, establishing a ministry and equating it with a state effectively means creating a space that in administrative terms, does not exist in Abuja. In the rest of the country, the space occupied by the minister is occupied by elected governors. In Abuja, it is occupied by an appointee of the President making the federal tier a major actor.

The long and contentious debate on the status of Abuja contributed to the decision by the President to abolish the Ministry with effect from December 31, 2004. 427 The report noted that the President had become tired of the complications that had arisen from the different interpretations and the imprecise statements in the 1999 constitution. 428 Following the scraping of the Ministry, the city government embarked on a restructuring exercise. A series of reforms were made. A new administrative structure was created with the minister at the apex and supported by four others (see Figure 10). What is notable is the absence of the municipal council from this arrangement. Interviews with municipal council officials confirmed that they were not consulted at any point during the restructuring exercise. Those supporting the minister take care of a wide range of activities. For example, the Chief of Staff handles political matters, area council and chieftaincy affairs in addition to others not reflected in the diagram such as religious affairs, protocol, security and budget. A Coordinating Executive Secretary is to run the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) and a newly created agency: the Satellite Town Development Agency (STDA). In the case of service delivery, so-called ‘Mandate Secretariats’ were to be established and headed by Mandate Executive Secretaries. The specific areas identified are agriculture and rural development, education, health, transportation and social development. In addition, some parastatals were termed critical. These included the newly created Abuja Metropolitan Management Agency (AMMA) and STDA, FCDA, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board

425 Interview with Director, Legal Services Department (MFCT) 2004
426 Abubakar 2004
427 Oloja (2005, 1 March)
428 The Ministry is also said to have been created without any legal backing by the administration of President Shehu Shagari through an official government gazette.
(AEPB), the Water Board and the Abuja Investment and Property Development Board.

Figure 10. The Administrative Structure in Abuja. The diagram is based on the restructuring of state institutions carried out in 2005.

While it may too early to assess the efficiency of the new reforms, some questions were raised immediately:

Much as we are desirous of the efficient and effective administration of the FCT, little doubt exists that the latest administrative changes would have benefited from a much wider consultation…Nothing shows that the National Assembly ever had an input into the President’s order.429

The above comment is a subtle reference to the dominant role of the Presidency in the restructuring process and the exclusion of others particularly the National Assembly. The 1999 constitution stipulates that the administrative and political structure of the FCT be determined by an act from the National Assembly.430 For reasons which could not be ascertained, there is no such act.

429 The Guardian Editorial Opinion (2005, 14 March)
430 Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p. 113
In addition, there is no evidence of any real changes from the former system. The Ministry was replaced by the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA), headed by the same minister who was running the Ministry. He was renamed the Administrator of the FCT but remained a minister under the Presidency. What can be seen as an anecdote from the restructuring exercise is that in recommending the scrapping of the Ministry, the President is reported to have been “fascinated” by the arrangements in Washington, D.C. where there is no ministry, a Mayor runs the city, the President runs the country and Congress makes laws.\textsuperscript{431} The closest similarity between the two places is the reference to Congress making laws but in the case of Abuja, the National Assembly which should be performing this function has not been doing so.\textsuperscript{432} It is true that Washington, D.C. is not run by a ministry but what we are not told is that the President of the United States does not appoint people to run the city. In addition, Abuja, unlike Washington, D.C. has never had a mayor. During the military regime of Babangida, elections were held for the post of mayor but the election was subsequently cancelled.\textsuperscript{433} It is tempting to conclude that the changes made under the restructuring exercise are mainly that of semantics: a major one being the change from the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory to the Federal Capital Territory Administration.

It is equally worth pointing out that the court rulings and scrapping of the Ministry has not ended the controversy surrounding the status of Abuja:

The Delta State government yesterday criticised the continued allocation of funds from the Federation Account to the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (FCT) and its council areas. … the Supreme Court has settled the beneficiaries of the account when it listed them out as the Federal Government, States and local councils only. … the apex court stated unequivocally in its April 5, 2005 judgement that FCT was not a state …the same thing applied to council areas in the FCT because they are not local governments in a state.\textsuperscript{434}

Before ending this discussion, it is necessary to make a reference to the position of area councils. The same controversy that surrounded the status of the Ministry extends to the area councils. As contained in the excerpt above, just as in the case of the Ministry, the argument is that area councils are not the same as local governments and hence do not have the same constitutional rights. An added dimension is the creation of “area councils” instead of local governments. Area councils exist only in Abuja. The explanation for this is the desire to maintain the “neutral status of Abuja as an entity different from other states of the Federation”.\textsuperscript{435} This once more confirms the attention

\textsuperscript{431} Oloja (2005, 1 March)
\textsuperscript{432} Interview with Deputy Director (Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs) 2004
\textsuperscript{433} Interview, Ward Head, Nyanya 2006
\textsuperscript{434} Ogefere and Akhaine (2006, 29 August)
\textsuperscript{435} Abuja Municipal Area Council, 2000, p. 2
given to the symbolic character of Abuja. However, it is used as further proof by those who argue that area councils are not the same as local governments. In practice, while a publication by the city government reports that area councils have the same status, rights and privileges of local government councils in the rest of the country,\(^\text{436}\) there is very little evidence to support this. In interviews with officials of the Abuja municipal council, there was consensus that local government councils have more powers than area councils in Abuja. While area council chairpersons are elected just the same as their counterparts in local governments across the country, a common opinion was that those of area councils in Abuja can hardly act independent of the FCT Minister.

Furthermore, the marginalization of the Abuja municipal council is also spatial, in the physical sense. The master plan paid particular attention to how topography or landscape could be used to enhance the position of the national government.

The plan for the New Federal Capital City is organized around the seat of National government, which has been given a prominent dignified site adjacent and opening out to the surrounding Zuma Bwari Aso Hills.\(^\text{437}\)

Aso Hill, the largest rock outcrop in the city influenced the plan. Today, the Presidential Villa is located at the foot of this hill and is called Aso Rock. On the other hand, while federal government establishments are strategically located and tower above the skyline, the municipal council continues to occupy a temporary and nondescript building, several decades after relocation. There are indications that its marginalization may become more pronounced.

He said that it was proper that the FCT should not have an area council within its jurisdiction and hoped that in the near future, the AMAC Headquarters would be moved outside the Federal Capital where there are more areas for development.\(^\text{438}\)

The comments above are credited to the minister of the FCT. No reason was given by the Minister as to why it is not proper to have a municipal council in the capital but it cannot possibly be attributed to the lack of physical space. It should be recalled that the main city area covers an area of 250 square kilometres and the FCT 8 000 square kilometres. What makes the comments of the minister more strange is that, it has been pointed out, that there was no need for the government to have carved out such a huge expanse of land for the capital and hence the suggestion it reduces the size of the capital.\(^\text{439}\)

\(^{436}\) Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, 1998

\(^{437}\) The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979, p. 61

\(^{438}\) Garba (2006, 7 February)

\(^{439}\) See Mabogunje 2001
In ending this discussion, one observation is that opposition to the role of the federal government in the city has been limited to the area of finance or revenue allocation in particular and not how the city is governed. Those who have given some attention to the administrative structure of the city still appear to favour a dominant role for the federal government. For example, a report by a committee had argued that the FCDA and not the Ministry should be in charge of the city, but also recommended that FCDA have an executive chairman with direct access to the President.\textsuperscript{440} The same report added that if it was indeed necessary to have a minister, the minister should be in the President’s Office and this is what the recent restructuring exercise has produced.

Summary

This chapter examined two major processes: the relocation of the capital from Lagos to Abuja and the creation of institutions and administration. The desire to unite a diverse society was promoted as the major reason for relocation by the federal government. In a country in search of national identity such as Nigeria, linking capital relocation to national unity appeared to have made it easier for the national state to obtain the support of the people. The process of nation-building privileges the national state over other institutions since it is seen as the neutral force in society and hence as the arbiter among the diverse groups. In addition to the physical construction of the city, the federal government undertook the task of creating institutions and putting an administrative framework in place. A major result was the allocation of the functions commonly seen as those of the lowest tier to the institutions created. Through this, the national state maintains a considerable hold on the governance of the city. This chapter is a useful starting point for understanding the role of the symbolic character of Abuja in shaping the governance of the city and thus serves as a useful background to the rest of the discussion.

\textsuperscript{440} Oseni 2001, p. 16
Introduction

Before proceeding to examine the governance structure and relations around solid waste management in Abuja, it is necessary to have an overview of Municipal Solid Waste Management. Thus, this chapter serves as background and at the same time introduces the solid waste component of the study. The primary aim is to highlight the major features and issues that feature in MSWM. To achieve this, the analysis is structured around the global, national and local scales. The global perspective presents the waste hierarchy and privatization, two dominant issues at that level. In addition, attention is drawn to differences between developed and developing countries in order to point out the relevance of place. The national context takes the case of Nigeria to examine the perceived role of national governments, policy-making and legal frameworks. It also includes a discussion on the role of the different branches of the state, an important focus in this study. The third and final section examines the state of solid waste services in Abuja. This provides an opportunity to draw attention to the practical problems confronting the sector in the city. The problem of spatial differentiation is given particular attention.

The Global Perspective

The Waste Hierarchy

The quest for a cleaner and healthier urban environment has amounted to a continuous search for solutions. One is the waste hierarchy, an integrated approach aimed at reducing the amount of waste that goes for final disposal. The waste hierarchy ranks different elements in such a way so that the least desirable occupies the lowest position while the element seen as the best option is at the top. The major elements ranked in order of priority are: waste
prevention, minimization/reduction through recycling, composting and incinerators and final disposal in sanitary landfills.

The ‘global’ concern about the high rate of waste generation has put waste prevention on the top of the waste hierarchy. Reducing the amount of waste produced can have certain practical benefits. These include fewer collection vehicles, personnel and waste handling facilities as well as a longer life for landfills.\(^{441}\) The problem is that it may be the most difficult to achieve since it centres on changing people’s habits. For example, in the year 2000, every Swede was recorded as having produced 3-5% more waste than in 1999.\(^{442}\) In 2001, an official of the Stockholm Waste Management Administration pointed out that Stockholm residents were more environmentally conscious five years earlier.\(^ {443}\) She attributed the problem to economic prosperity and its attendant consumerism. The measures being taken to make people produce less waste differ between countries and cities. In Sweden, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) has carried out some campaigns and undertaken research on eco-labelling.\(^ {444}\) Eco-labelling provides consumers information that would encourage them to buy environmentally friendly goods. Some city governments are taking more draconian measures. In Zurich, Switzerland, the city government has adopted tough rules such as high price for garbage bags ($4.25 each) which can only be bought from the government.\(^ {445}\) One resident is reported as saying, “When they charge so much for Zuri-Sacks, you think twice putting things into the garbage”. The effort is said to be paying off with a decrease in household waste generation by 40% since 1992.

A related strategy is to not only encourage producers to produce environmentally friendly goods but also to produce less waste in the production cycle and to take more responsibility for the waste they produce. For example, in Sweden, there is a statutory producer responsibility for packaging, waste paper and tyres.\(^ {446}\) In the United States, the Pollution Prevention Act encourages minimization through input substitution, product reformulation, production redesign or modernization.\(^ {447}\) At the other end of the spectrum are cities in developing countries where waste prevention hardly features on the agenda of city governments. For example, as recently as October 2006, an interview with the head of the solid waste division of the Abuja Environ-

\(^{441}\) Medina 2002, p. 17
\(^{442}\) Interview, May, 2001 with an official of Green Peace Stockholm.
\(^{443}\) Interview with Nina Brensen, Waste Management Administration, May, 2001
\(^{444}\) The society started the eco-labeling campaign in 1988 on laundry detergents and paper and through it’s the “Good Environmental Choice Scheme”, it lays some ground rules on how eco-labeling can be used, for example in advertising (Interview with official of SSNC, 2001).
\(^{445}\) Rosenthal (2005). Other measures are the reduction of household waste collection to only once a week, paper and cardboard to only once a month. This is based on the belief that people would not want to sit at home with uncollected garbage for a long time.
\(^{446}\) Hartlen 1997, p.386
\(^{447}\) Eighmy and Kosson 1997, p.363
mental Protection Board revealed that there were no enlightenment programmes aimed at sensitizing people in waste prevention methods and no arrangements yet to involve private companies.

Next on the hierarchy are waste minimization or reduction methods. A major element is recycling which is defined as the use of a waste material as a raw material for the manufacture of a similar or new product. It is considered to be a viable waste reduction strategy, since by reducing the amount of waste that goes for final disposal, it helps reduce the environmental risks that come with some treatments. In most developed countries, there are legislations in place to act as guidelines. In Germany, the “Packaging Ordinance” stipulates that packaging materials are manufactured from environmentally compatible materials to facilitate recycling and reuse. In Stockholm, recycling is reported to be on the increase but with varying degrees of success.

In the case of African countries, the opinion is that there has not been the political will or the enforcement of regulations to initiate waste sorting, a necessary requirement for recycling. Most of the recycling that takes place is done informally by scavengers or small family businesses. In Nigeria, Onibokun et al. report that the plastics industry is the most active with an organized level of recycling with many small and medium sized recyclers found in the urban centres.

Composting or anaerobic digestion is another waste reduction method. It is the process by which organic waste is converted into fertilizers without the use of oxygen. Composting is viewed as an economically viable means of permanently removing the organic material from a waste stream but its success depends very much on the availability of stable markets. A study in Sweden revealed that out of the 60,000 tonnes of compost produced, a little under 20,000 finds a market as fertilizer and most of it ends up as landfill cover. In developing countries, the proportion of organic matter in the waste generated is quite high making composting a viable option but the reality is different. In Dakar, Senegal and Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, two industrial composting plants were in operation in the 1970s but were unsuccessful mainly due to mechanical failures and have since closed down. In Nigeria, Onibokun et al. add that composting had been carried out in Kaduna, Kano and Maiduguri in the past but is no longer practised on a large scale.

448 Sakai et al., 1997, p. 341.
449 Sakai et al., 1997, p.345.
450 Interview with Nina Brensen, Waste Management Administration on May 14, 2001.
451 Onibokun et al., 2000, p. 83.
452 Onibokun et al., 2000, p. 87.
453 Sakai et al., 1997, p. 342.
456 Onibokun et al., 2000, p. 92.
During the process of incineration, another waste reduction strategy, waste is sterilized and the volume is reduced. An additional benefit is the recovery of energy. In the United States, Waste-to-Energy plants generate about 2750 megawatts of electricity which is used by about 2.4 million homes.\(^457\) In developing countries, incineration is not a popular mode of waste treatment; a major reason being that most of the waste generated contains high moisture and organic content and this is not suitable for incineration.\(^458\) Experiences have been largely negative. In Lagos, Nigeria, a study reports that incinerators were built at a cost of $10 million but the moisture content was so high that they could not operate normally resulting in one being abandoned and another turned into a community centre. Furthermore, the high technological requirements and operational costs involved make it unattractive.\(^459\) In addition, incinerators come with the risk of pollution which explains its low position on the hierarchy.\(^460\) Where they do exist, there are often stringent guidelines.

Sanitary landfills are facilities designed for the final disposal of waste and occupy the lowest position on the waste hierarchy. An important aspect of the design is the lining of the bottom and sides of the disposal site with liners in order to prevent leachates from polluting nearby surface water or aquifers.\(^461\) After disposal, the waste is supposed to be covered with a layer of earth daily. Sanitary landfills require significant investments and may come with opposition from residents or what is commonly referred to as “not in my backyard”.\(^462\) As a result of the associated risks, there are moves to limit the use of landfills. In Canada, over 74% of municipal solid waste ends up in landfills but the amount of waste being diverted into recycling has increased.\(^463\) In Europe, the introduction of taxes is one method being adopted to discourage the use of landfills.\(^464\) In developing countries, waste is often disposed of in open dumps. In Nigeria, 163 local governments claim to use landfills but further investigations showed that all were operated as open dumps.\(^465\) In Egypt, a study reports that 95% of the waste collected by municipalities is disposed of in open dumps.\(^466\) Also, with little or no waste sorting, it is common for household and industrial wastes to be deposited on the

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\(^{457}\) Zannes 2004.
\(^{459}\) Federal Ministry of Environment 2000, p. 59. In addition, in Nigeria, while 21 local governments said they use incinerators, most were found to be locally constructed and sub-standard and hence unsafe (Urban Development Bank of Nigeria, 1998).
\(^{460}\) During incineration, a portion of solid mass is changed into combustion gases and this leads to the emission of harmful substances such as dioxins and furans mainly from plastics.
\(^{462}\) Medina 2002
\(^{463}\) Sawell et al., 1997, pp. 352-3.
\(^{464}\) Themelis and Verma 2004, p.41.
\(^{466}\) Bushira 2000, p.65.
same site. The result is a high potential for leachate and contamination of ground water since the land is not prepared prior to disposal.467

Privatization

A major avenue through which the private sector takes part in service delivery is through privatization. This entails the transfer of certain functions and services from the state to the private sector. Fiscal constraints and increasing disenchantment with the performance of state-run services are some of the factors behind the decision by governments to seek alternatives such as the use of private capital for urban services.468 In addition, Elander observes that in many European countries in the 1990s, the decision taken by central governments to cut back funding and shift more responsibilities downwards made local governments become more business-like and a major outcome was to contract out part of their duties to private producers.469 In the African context, the poor performance of state-run institutions is also given as a major reason for privatization.470 In Nigeria, the federal government cites the gross failure of public enterprises to live up to expectations and it sees privatization as a way of addressing the major shortfalls in urban infrastructure and services.471 An added dimension in Africa is that privatization was a major policy under the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the 1980s and retains a prominent position under the ‘good governance’ agenda through the emphasis on partnerships.

Cointreau-Levine identifies two forms of private sector participation in solid waste management: a reduction in government activity or in government ownership.472 The methods of private sector involvement include franchise, contracting and concession. The different methods assign different roles to public (state) and private parties. In contracting, private firms provide collection services under contract with the local government and are paid from general revenues or through monies raised by direct user charges.473 With the franchise system, the firm collects user charges from each client and bears the cost of billing and collection of charges. Under concession, the private firm is expected to finance and own solid waste facilities for some time.

468 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2000
469 Elander 2002, p. 191
470 Chikulo 1998
471 Bureau of Public Enterprises 2003
472 Cointreau-Levine 1994. A reduction in government activity occurs when the private sector participates in service delivery while a reduction in government ownership takes place when a) a government enterprise is divested to unregulated private ownership and b) commercialised, that is, reorganised into accountable and financially autonomous semiprivate enterprises
473 Cointreau-Levine 1994
Private sector participation may be a common feature in MSWM in cities of the North and South, but there are differences. First is the extent of the involvement of the private sector. In the United States, more than 10,000 private firms are engaged in municipal solid waste services, 80% of municipal waste is collected by private firms and 73% of resource recovery facilities are operated by private contractors.\textsuperscript{474} On the other hand, it has been observed that in African cities, even when there are indications that market conditions are right, new waste management firms are slow to emerge.\textsuperscript{475} Another area of difference is the nature of private sector involvement, especially in relation to the role of the state. While privatization in developed countries often means a clear division of roles between the private sector and the state, a study on East Africa observed that the distinction between the private and public is blurred and the process of privatization may imply a casting off of state activities or an invasion of state facilities by non-state actors but rarely disengagement by the state.\textsuperscript{476}

Another problem is funding. In a partnership with the state, the private sector is expected to provide the capital\textsuperscript{477} but in the developing world context, this is not often the case. In Abuja, when the city government privatized waste collection services in 2004, a fixed sum of money was paid to contractors every month by the government regardless of the revenue generated through user fees.\textsuperscript{478} With most people unwilling to pay for services, the implication is that it is the government rather than the private sector that has been funding operations. In Nigeria, the private sector is described as having “waxed and waned in response to general economic conditions” and only a handful of firms have made an investment in appropriately designed refuse vehicles.\textsuperscript{479} The problem is worsened by low revenue collection, which means a high dependence on state allocations, as reflected in the Abuja case.\textsuperscript{480} Furthermore, where privatization does exist in African cities, it is for areas with predominantly high income households and industrial and commercial establishments.\textsuperscript{481}

There are other issues related to the political. These include political support for the initiative, the ability to conduct a fair and transparent process and a legal framework to enter into a contract.\textsuperscript{482} In developing countries, privatization of services is often a source of conflict between governments and the public. In South Africa, anti-privatization movements see privatization-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{474} Cointreau-Levine 1994
\item \textsuperscript{475} Thuy 1998, p. 12
\item \textsuperscript{476} Semboja and Therkildsen 1995, p.3
\item \textsuperscript{477} Schübeler et al., 1996
\item \textsuperscript{478} Based on interviews with contractors and officials of AEPB in 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{479} Cointreau-Levine 1994, p. 33
\item \textsuperscript{480} Onibokun 1999, p.236
\item \textsuperscript{481} Cointreau-Levine 1994
\item \textsuperscript{482} Eggerth 2005
\end{itemize}
tion as disenfranchising and further alienating black communities. In the case of conducting a fair and transparent process, there are complexities in the qualification and registration of companies. In Abuja, an official of the Abuja Environmental Protection Board accused some contractors of giving false information. He alleged that the contractors had simply put their company stickers on hired vehicles and passed them off as theirs. In addition, the existence of strong, efficient and credible public controls with corresponding mechanisms is essential but lacking in cities in Africa. Furthermore, contracting is a popular method but as Cointreau-Levine points out, an effective contract should contain well-defined performance measures, enforceable sanctions and lay the foundation for effective monitoring through clear stipulations. In Abuja, contractors complained that the statistics on which certain items of the contract were based were wrong and that there were no clearly defined mechanisms for measuring performance.

The National Context

Legislations/Policies

Not much is documented about solid waste management in Nigeria before the colonial period. It has however been noted that in traditional Nigerian societies, there were no formal laws regulating solid waste management. Environmental development and control was the joint administrative responsibility of the entire community. Formal laws were introduced with the advent of colonial rule. Examples are the Public Health Act of 1909, the Township Ordinance No. 29 of 1917 and the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1946. The colonial administration placed a lot of emphasis on environmental sanitation. This relied mainly on the use of sanitary inspectors for enforcement.

It is the primary role of the Federal government, represented by the Federal Ministry of Environment to design and formulate government policies and provide legal frameworks on the environment for the entire country. Over the years it has enacted decrees and a national policy to address environmental problems in general. The Harmful (Toxic) Waste Criminal Provi-
sion Decree No. 42 of 1988, promulgated after the discovery of five shiploads of toxic wastes of Italian origin at the port of Koko in the southern part of the country is noted as one of the first attempts by the government to regulate the sector. 493 The National Environmental Protection Regulations Decree No. 58 (1988), which sought to identify solid, toxic and extremely hazardous wastes dangerous to public health and environment, followed soon after. 494 The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) was created in 1988 and charged with the preparation of a National Policy on the Environment. In 1999, a policy aimed at achieving and securing a quality of environment adequate for good health and well-being, raising public awareness and encouraging individual and community participation in environmental improvement efforts was produced. 495

The Allocation of Functions

In the case of the role of state institutions, the most recent effort targeting solid waste management is a blueprint produced by the Federal Ministry of Environment in 2000 with the aim of presenting strategies for sustainable management of waste through an integrated programme. 496 The document also contains the various functions to be performed by the three tiers of government: federal, state and local. Those of the federal level include the provision of engineering designs of appropriate waste disposal and treatment systems; the specification of waste disposal sites that guarantee the safety of surface and ground water systems; setting up and enforcing standards for adequate sanitary facilities for the disposal of solid wastes; the establishment of monitoring programmes; the establishment of early warning system for the identification of potential waste disposal problems; and the establishment of contingency plans for the identification and clean up of abandoned land-based waste dumps. 497

The next level of government, the states are expected to carry out some regulatory and monitoring activities, which sometimes necessitates the enactment of legislations. Following the creation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) in 1988, it mandated each state to create an Environmental Protection Agency. The functions of these agencies represent the functions of states and appear below.

- To create an institutional environmental management and legal system that will ensure the effective implementation of protective measures;

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494 Federal Environmental Protection Agency 1991
495 Federal Environmental Protection Agency 1999, p.3
496 Federal Ministry of Environment 2000
497 Federal Ministry of Environment 2000, p. 16
To establish environmental guidelines, criteria, specifications or standards for environmental protection generally; and  
To implement applicable laws on activities related to the environment.498

In the more recent guidelines released by the Federal Ministry of Environment, state governments are to be responsible for:

- Imposing recycling responsibilities on industries and businesses;
- The supervision and enforcement of bye-laws;
- The promotion of environmental matters within individual states;
- The provision of land for waste management infrastructure; and
- Assisting in capacity-building.499

Local governments represent the lowest tier of government. The 1976 Local Government reforms define the statutory role of local governments in the country as:

- Making appropriate services and development activities responsive to local wishes and initiatives by developing or delegating them to local representative bodies;
- Facilitating the exercise of democratic self-government close to local levels;
- Mobilizing human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public in the development of their environment;
- Providing a channel for communication between local communities and government.500

Local governments are constitutionally empowered to handle solid waste management. One of the functions of local governments as contained in the 1999 constitution is the “provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewerage and refuse disposal”.501 In the local governments across the country, the responsibility for waste management is often given to the department of health under a medical officer whose functions include the following;

- Identifying strategic and convenient sites for the placement of bins or erecting refuse depots;
- Collaborating with other agencies to collect and dispose refuse of all kinds;
- The provision of support services in other aspects of environmental sanitation;

498 Urban Development Bank 1999, p. 27
499 Federal Ministry of Environmental 2000, p. 15
500 Urban Development Bank of Nigeria Plc 1998, p. 147
• Monitoring the spread of disease/epidemic and facilitate appropriate remedies; and
• Maintaining local government equipment and facilities for waste management.502

While Nigeria does not deviate from the ‘global norm’ in the allocation of functions, the intervention of higher tiers in local functions is common. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

The Abuja Situation

Provisions in the Master Plan

Solid waste management did receive some attention in the Abuja master plan. A consortium, Messrs BERGER-SOGE-UNECON was hired to design a solid waste collection and disposal system for the city.503 As stipulated in the plan, the primary focus was to utilize solid waste residuals as a resource, to protect human health and incorporate management systems that could be operated and maintained at low cost and with semi-skilled or unskilled staff.504 Being a new city with no existing data, planners had to rely on assumptions. For example, it was assumed that the city would have a solid waste composition with a higher percentage of organics, that there would be a lot of paper products in the waste stream as a result of the presence of government offices and that solid waste generation rates would be related to land use and zoning.

As contained in the plan, collection was to be carried out in a two-step system: on-site handling, storage and processing and a coordinated transport system to a central disposal area. Transfer stations were to serve as major collection points, satellite maintenance and equipment storage yards and local administration points. Some processing before disposal was also recommended in order to improve the efficiency of the system by reducing the waste and hence landfill requirements. An anticipated benefit was the recovering of materials or products that could be converted with the possibility of extracting energy. Sanitary landfills were to be used for final disposal.

The above items are, however, assumptions and recommendations. Three decades after the decision to relocate the capital, what is the actual situation on the ground?

503 Dikko, 2001, p.139
504 The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979, p. 208
Waste Generation, Storage, Collection and Disposal

Estimating the amount of waste generated may be difficult problem even in countries with well-organized collection and disposal systems.\(^{505}\) In Abuja, a study estimated the quantity of waste generated by households to be 0.28 kg per capita per day.\(^{506}\) The rate of generation does not differ significantly between districts but the nature and magnitude of the waste stream is related to factors such as population density and types of activity.\(^{507}\) Gwarimpa, the area with the highest number of people per household, also has the highest rate of generation. Apart from population, waste generation is also linked to the seasons (rainy or dry season), culture and personal income. More waste is generated during the rainy season and high income earners produce more waste.\(^{508}\)

The standard waste storage equipment is a green heavy-duty plastic bin but it is in short supply. A household survey revealed that less than half of residents – 42.2\% – used bins for storage.\(^{509}\) This contributes to the problem of the illegal dumping of waste and the use of sub-standard equipment. Collection systems in Abuja comprise door to door, back to back, kerbside and communal depots. Communal depots are often found in highly populated areas and commercial centres where users dispose of their waste in large containers and the waste is then collected for onward disposal. House to house collection is mainly for residential areas. The frequency of collection is reported to range from daily to once a week but a study revealed that 41\% of waste was collected once a week, 14\% twice a week, 15.5\% thrice a week and 5\% once a month.\(^{510}\) In addition, 24\% of residents received irregular services and 6\% disposed their waste in illegal dumps. Of the waste that is generated in Abuja, less than ¼ is collected.\(^{511}\) A related problem is transportation. Not only are there not enough vehicles, in some cases, half of them are not in service.\(^{512}\)

Recycling, especially of paper, due to the presence of federal government institutions, was to be encouraged as stipulated in the master plan.\(^{513}\) Quite an appreciable amount of cardboard, newsprint, magazines and office paper is produced (see Table 1). The total paper content of household waste is recorded to be 12.\% of the total waste generated.\(^{514}\)

\(^{505}\) Bushira 2000, p. 26  
\(^{506}\) The Federal Ministry of Environment, 2001 \n\(^{507}\) The Federal Ministry of Environment, 2002. \n\(^{508}\) Olusheyi 2000  
\(^{512}\) For example, out of 17 compacting trucks, only 6 were functioning and out of 4 pay loaders only 1 was operational (Mohammed, 2003). The estimate is that about 500\% of the current level of equipment is needed to meet the challenges it faces. \n\(^{513}\) The Federal Capital Development Authority 1979, p. 208 \n\(^{514}\) Federal Ministry of Environment 2001, p.39
Table 1. Waste Generated in Abuja City in 2001 (Metric tons per annum)
Source: Federal Ministry of Environment 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions from</th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Public Institutions</th>
<th>Industrial &amp; Commercial</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compostable Food Waste</td>
<td>90,026</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>23,701</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>114,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-compostable Food Waste</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>9,770</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferrous Metal</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>4,104</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Metals</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardboard</td>
<td>4,537</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>32,354</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>120</td>
<td>2,313</td>
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<td>Glass</td>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,600</td>
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<tr>
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<td>127</td>
<td>4,963</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plastic Container</td>
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<td>7,697</td>
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<td>1,731</td>
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<tr>
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<td>N.E.W.1</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sharps (Hazardous)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious (Hazardous)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other hazardous waste</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stones and Sand</td>
<td>270,946</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>270,946</td>
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<tr>
<td>Packaging Materials</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The absence of formal recycling activities is a notable feature in Abuja. The first step, waste sorting at source, is almost non-existent. The NICON Hotel is noted as the most organized in waste sorting, able to provide a five-year waste stream data (see Figure 11).515

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With no meaningful effort from the government in the area of recycling, the gap has been filled by scavengers.

Resource recovery of certain types of materials has been developed informally in the city, in terms of scavengers collecting materials such as glass, paper and metals ... from primary and secondary collection points.\textsuperscript{516}

A visit to the dump site at Papei in 2005 revealed the large presence of scavengers. The materials collected include plastics, metal and cellophane bags. Beyond the issuance of identity cards by the Board, which permits scavengers to enter and operate on the premises, there is not much other contact between the Board officials and scavengers.

Composting is also minimal in Abuja even though food waste accounts for the largest amount of household waste produced (Table 1). In Maitama district, about 70\% of the household waste produced is organic.\textsuperscript{517} While the possibility of composting is high, not much has been done to reap the potential benefits. Once again, the NICON Hotel has the lead in this area. Part of the food waste is turned into compost and used to provide fertilizers for the hotel gardens.\textsuperscript{518}

There are no incinerators and landfills in operation in Abuja. Out of the four sites proposed in the master plan for the construction of sanitary land-
fills, only one remains, the others having been converted to other uses. This site, located on the way to the airport is to accommodate both solid and liquid waste. A study team visited the site and reported that the vegetation covering the area had withered cells where toxic constituents had been dumped since waste is not sorted.\textsuperscript{519} The site was used for some time but latter abandonment.\textsuperscript{520} With no functioning land fills, the alternative was the dumping of waste at an abandoned quarry site at Papei. This site is located along a major highway and a visit in 2003 revealed that it was not being maintained properly and the waste had encroached on the major road (see Figure 12).\textsuperscript{521} A follow-up visit in 2005 showed a remarkable improvement (see Figure 13).\textsuperscript{522} By the following year, 2006, the Board had once more decided to go back to the site along the airport road. It was however still not being operated as a sanitary landfill but an open dump.

Several reasons account for the problems mentioned above. Some are related to the failure to implement the recommendations of the master plan. One is the absence of transfer stations meant to reduce turn-around.\textsuperscript{523} In the absence of these stations, waste collection teams have to travel long distances amidst the increasing traffic congestion in the city, which reduces the daily coverage of the teams and contributes to waste accumulation in many neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{524}

The city government is also faced with the problem of a lack of a solid waste database system for proper planning, monitoring and management.\textsuperscript{525} This problem is not limited to Abuja. In Stockholm, no regular measurements of wastes are taken and there is a lack of data related to the amount of waste sent to landfills or for incineration.\textsuperscript{526} A major difference is that in Stockholm, the government has various programmes through which it generates information on a more regular basis, which makes planning easier.\textsuperscript{527} There are no such regular programmes in Abuja.

\textsuperscript{519} Federal Ministry of Environment, 2001, p. 6
\textsuperscript{520} Interview, Head of Solid Waste, AEPB, 2003.
\textsuperscript{521} A contractor using the site attributed the problem to the highly bureaucratic nature of getting the money meant for the maintenance of the dump site from the relevant account (interview, Managing Director, Morgan Environmental Services, 2003.
\textsuperscript{522} The access road had been rehabilitated and bull dozers were busy leveling the waste that had been deposited. To help maintain the site, the Board was charging users. Contractors were charged 2\% of their contract sum as tipping fees and hotels, companies and embassies were also charged various sums.
\textsuperscript{523} Mohammed 2003
\textsuperscript{524} Based on interviews conducted with private contractors in 2004
\textsuperscript{525} Mohammed 2004, p. 3
\textsuperscript{526} Interview, Nina Brensen, Waste Management Administration, May 14, 2001
\textsuperscript{527} For example, every five years, the City Council commissions the Environment and Health Protection Administration to produce an Environment Programme (see Environment and Health Protection Administration, 1996). This practice dates back to 1976.
Figure 12. Entrance to the disposal site at Papei in 2003. Notice the waste encroaching unto the main road. (The Author, 2003).

Figure 13. The same site in Papei in 2005. Notice the huge improvements. Maitama district, the high-income neighbourhood appears in the background. (The Author, 2005).
Rapid population growth and inadequate finance and human resources constitute wider problems.

With the population influx into Abuja, the once fairly clean city of Abuja slipped and became a not-so-clean capital city with a waste management problem.528

Related to the problem of population is the emergence of slums and squatter settlements within and on the periphery of the city.

These slums, apart from their unsightly nature, have generated and compounded environmental problems of proper and effective waste management in the FCT by indiscriminate disposal of waste and unplanned layouts, which make it difficult for any accessibility of disposal equipment to collect waste in these areas.529

Other problems associated with slums include unauthorized structures such as the conversion of residential areas into commercial uses and over-populated markets. The result is that the waste produced has not been planned for.530

The rapid growth in population has not been matched by a corresponding increase in finance and personnel. For example, the Solid Waste department of the Abuja Environmental Protection Board had a staff of 100 in 1991531 and by 2003, an interview with a staff of the Board revealed that this had increased to only 110. While it was not possible to obtain data on the financial status of the Board, the lack of finance was often mentioned by the officials interviewed as responsible for problems such as the poor equipment level.

Spatial Differentiation in Solid Waste Services: the Historical Context

The practice of favouring certain parts of cities in infrastructure and services is not new or limited to Abuja. Urban governments in Africa are described as elitist and concerned primarily with providing services to those who are well off.532 In Johannesburg, the “massive differences” in the quality of solid waste services is said to continue despite recent political changes.533 In a study on the Cape Coast Municipality of Ghana, Kendie points to the tendency of the government to give preference to high-income areas as the

528 Federal Ministry of Environment 2001, p. 3
529 Chukwuocha 2003, p. 5
530 Chukwuocha 2003
531 Ogenyi 1991
532 Coolidge et al, 1993
533 Onibokun 1999a, p. 227
cause of the poor sanitary conditions rather than the common reasons of population growth and inadequate funding.\footnote{Kendie 1999} As Kendie observed, when faced with limited budgets, the metropolitan authority handles the rich less badly than it does the poor. In Abuja, reminiscent of the Ghana case, when the Board started experiencing financial problems in the mid-1990s, a decision was taken to concentrate services in the main city area and leave out the satellite settlements.\footnote{Interview with Head of Division, Waste Department, AEPB 2004} Historically, some parts of Abuja have enjoyed better services than others. The following is a reference to Maitama and Asokoro districts, both high-income areas:

These districts were very clean probably due to its low density and being the official residence [sic] of many top government and political functionaries. In addition to the clean environment, flowers around the mansions and trees along the streets and in private gardens enhanced aesthetic value of the districts.\footnote{Federal Ministry of Environment 2001, p. 5}

The same report draws attention to Nyanya and Karu, described as densely populated satellite towns with unpaved roads or paved roads in disrepair and where both “sides of the road serve as refuse dumps and everywhere is littered.”\footnote{Federal Ministry of Environment 2001, p. 6}

Discrimination can manifest at any point, from storage to disposal. In the case of storage, garbage bins are visible in districts such as Maitama and Asokoro but peripheral and low-income settlements have no such facilities. In the latter case, residents have to improvise with sub-standard containers, such as buckets, cartons or plastic bags not designed for waste storage. As an official of the Abuja Environmental Protection Board acknowledged, in some areas, people are simply told to dump their waste in open spaces. In a housing estate in Lugbe, a settlement about 15 kilometres from the city (Figure 6), the failure of the Board to provide bins was blamed for the refusal of residents to pay user fees.\footnote{Interview, Managing Director M/S Rosam, 2003} Residents were given plastic bags but no bins to put the bags in as is the practice in the main city districts. They complained that it was easy for dogs to tear the bags and litter the surroundings, rendering their efforts unproductive. This case implies that physical distance can contribute to the neglect of settlements and hence reinforce spatial differentiation.\footnote{In addition to the poor solid waste services, roads are poorly maintained, there is no pipe borne water and residents have to rely on wells}
The frequency of waste collection may be the most noticeable aspect of preferential treatment by government authorities. An official of the Board asserted that the frequency of waste collection in the city ranges from once a day to two and three times a week. Differences in population density, the amount of waste generated and the type of land use (residential or commercial) were given as responsible for the different frequencies. However, closer scrutiny shows that the most highly densely populated areas, which should attract the highest frequency of collection, are the ones offered the fewest services.

...the high population density districts of Garki and Wuse are provided with AEPB dustbins that usually overflowed with refuse whereas the low population density districts of Maitama and Asokoro do not have this problem. Nyanya and Karu, which are satellite towns at the outskirt of Abuja metropolis belong to the very high population density area and are littered with refuse. An official of the Board interviewed, admitted that some areas receive no collection at all. In terms of the underlying factors, they are numerous and

540 Interview, Engineer, (AEPB) 2003
541 The Federal Ministry of Environment 2001, p. vi
complex. For example, physical distance was mentioned as a possible factor earlier but this is not always the case. Wuse district which is mentioned in the excerpt above is located closer to the city centre and hence the place of government than Maitama and Asokoro but receives fewer services (see Figure 14). In this case income differential is a more likely explanation. A study by Beall in Faisalabad, Pakistan confirmed the relevance of income over distance in relation to the spatial differentiation of services. Of the three areas covered in the study, the medium and high-income development areas on the periphery of the city received better services than the low-income area found in the central district. In Abuja, Maitama and Asokoro are high-income areas housing top government and political functionaries and receive better services. Compared to the satellite areas such as Nyanya, Wuse and Garki are still provided better services. As pointed out by an official of the Board, these areas, especially Garki contain a lot of commercial and government establishments and do therefore receive some level of attention.

The Role of Privatization

Private sector participation in Abuja, albeit in different forms, dates back to when construction work in the city began. An American-based company, M/S Philova & Jackson was the first to be contracted by government in 1982. In 1985, the government, through the Environmental Pollution and Control division of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) took over waste collection services. As more houses were built and the population grew, the FCDA could no longer cope and decided to involve the private sector once more. A company, M/S Waste Management Limited based in Lagos was hired in 1988 to take care of waste collection and disposal in the satellite towns. Two other companies, M/S Kleenol and M/S Duraclean were later included. In protest over non-payment, the companies abandoned their duties in 1992. Between this time and 2003, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board handled waste collection services. Waste collection during this time was largely restricted to Phase 1 leaving the satellite areas without any services. Citing problems of finance and human resources, the Board launched a pilot privatization project in 2003. This metamorphosed into a major exercise on July 1, 2004.

In the earlier cases of private sector involvement, residents were not required to pay for services. This has changed and residents are now expected to pay for services. In addition, a major feature of privatization in the city is that it has been limited to certain areas. Both the 2003 and 2004 exercises

542 Beall 1997
543 Mohammed 2004
544 Interview with Engineer (AEPB) 2003
cover specific areas. This practice has both political and spatial dimensions. In a study in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Kironde reports that the decision to privatize the Central Area first was mainly political. He observed that privatization had been made possible after the passage of the Dar es Salaam Collection and Disposal of Refuse Bye Laws of 1993 which enabled the city council to impose refuse collection charges. The Central Area is reported to have been privatized first because the government believed the charges were more likely to be accepted in those areas. In the case of Abuja, it is not clear why privatization was limited to specific areas, but a possible explanation is that these areas are more developed in terms of infrastructure especially roads and the residents belong to the higher income groups.

However, the important point is that privatization widens the gap in the quality of services between places or areas. In Abuja even among the areas covered by privatization, income differential played some role in the level of services provided. One of the expected benefits of privatization, as seen by the Board when the pilot scheme was launched in 2003 was that coverage will increase and hence ensure a clean environment. The problem is that no attention was given to how this was to be achieved. Specifically, the Board did not come up with any mechanisms as to how any shortfall in revenue would be accommodated. The contractors were simply told to extend services to everyone including those who could not pay. Under a system where contractors were to be paid 75% of the revenue generated at the end of each month, it is not surprising that this ‘directive’ was ignored by them. Unsurprisingly, in an assessment of the project, the Board noted the concentration of waste collection on “juicy” customers rather than covering all areas. Kado, which contains a housing estate, was cited as one of the areas whose residents received poor services due to poor revenue generation. A confirmation of the role of income is that the revenue generation differed considerably between districts. Table 2 confirms that Maitama and Asokoro generated the highest revenue while Kubwa had the least. It is no great surprise that at the end of the pilot project, the contractors that covered Maitama and Asokoro were rated to have performed the best coming first and second. What we are not told is that those contractors covered high-income areas that generated the most revenue. What is most evident is that while a lot of attention is being given to privatization, not much is said about the areas not under coverage.

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545 In Abuja, privatization has been limited to the districts in phase one and some housing projects in phase two.  
546 Kironde 1999  
547 Interview with Engineer (AEPB) 2003  
548 Mohammed 2004, p. 9 [emphasis in original]
Table 2. Revenue collected between January and November 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Revenue Collected (Naira)</th>
<th>Equivalent in USD$49</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Kubwa</td>
<td>3,469,270.00</td>
<td>25,139.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asokoro</td>
<td>24,146,330.00</td>
<td>172,473.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maitama</td>
<td>30,903,635.00</td>
<td>220,740.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,519,235.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>417,994.45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The new tempo being witnessed in privatization efforts can in part be attributed to a change in leadership. The Minister of the FCT who launched the latest exercise was formerly in charge of Nigeria’s privatization programme at the Bureau of Public Enterprises and as an official of the Board pointed out, has made privatization a cardinal objective of his administration. On two visits to Abuja in 2003 and 2004, I noticed some improvement in the areas under coverage. However, this contrasted with the peripheral settlements. In Nyanya, both state officials and community leaders confirmed that waste collection had come to a standstill. The Board attributed this to the lack of money. There are plans to extend privatization, albeit in a different form, to peripheral settlements. Nyanya is one such settlement. During my last visit in 2006, a contractor had just started operations in Nyanya but had only been operating for a week and hence it was difficult to make any assessment. The contractor is the same one covering Asokoro district, one of the high-income areas mentioned earlier. He described Nyanya as a challenge. At the time of the interview, he had not started charging user fees. Asked why, his response was that he wanted to offer free services for a month in the hope that the people will be convinced by the good quality of services he would provide and thus pay when asked to do so.

Summary
This chapter presented a brief overview of MSWM, highlighting the major issues at the global, national and local levels which cut across the technical, financial, social and political. At the global scale, two features, the waste

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$49$ Exchange rate of N138 to $1$ in July 2004.
hierarchy and privatization were presented. The waste hierarchy draws attention to the technical aspects of MSWM as well as the social ones. The former deals primarily with safer scientific methods for waste treatment while in the latter, the focus is on consumption habits or patterns. What can be summed up is that while the waste hierarchy dominates the agenda in cities in developed countries, it receives little or no attention in developing countries. In many cases, city governments in Africa are still grappling with the practical tasks of waste collection, transportation and disposal. In addition, privatization was also examined as a common feature of MSWM in both the developed and developing countries, but there are differences that can be attributed to the different financial, technical and political circumstances, among others.

Under the national context, the focus was on the role of national governments, in this case, the Nigerian government. While the government has made some efforts at legislation on environmental issues in general, there is no policy on MSWM. The allocation of functions to the different tiers, a task also performed by national governments was also examined. The roles allocated to the different tiers in solid waste management were documented. The final section examined the city level with emphasis on the practical problems confronting the sector in Abuja. The major problems identified include inadequate finances, equipment and human resources. A considerable attention was also given to the problem of spatial differentiation in solid waste services. The practice of favouring richer areas by the government and the tendency to limit privatization to certain areas were identified as the major causes of spatial differentiation.

Having ended this chapter with the practical problems of solid waste management in Abuja, the rest of the chapters will focus more on the political dimension.
Chapter 6 Administering Solid Waste Management

Abuja has not put in place a system of urban waste management that can cope with Abuja … there is no uniform administrative system.  

Introduction

As already noted in Chapter One, there are common notions about the roles to be performed by the different tiers of the government in solid waste management. It is important to stress that it is considered a municipal or local government function. However, a study on the governance of solid waste management in selected African cities revealed a high level of national state intervention in local functions, noting that “higher tiers definitely dominate the lower ones”. It is worth mentioning that the cities covered in the study – Abidjan, Ibadan, Dar es Salaam and Johannesburg, though large cities in their respective countries, are not capital cities. Since capital cities are noted for the concentration of national state power, it is therefore logical to assume that the level of intervention may be higher. However, this is still rather simplistic since it was also pointed out in Chapter One, that even in capital cities, the common pattern is that solid waste management is the responsibility of the lowest tier of government. What this complexity suggests is the danger of generalizing and the necessity of examining specific cases.

A major argument behind the notion that solid waste management and indeed services in general should be managed by the lowest tier of government is that local governments are closer to the people and hence in a better position to provide or manage services efficiently (Chapter One). However, efficiency may not be the basis for allocating functions to the different tiers of government in some cases. Chapter Four has already documented the processes leading to the relocation of the capital to Abuja and the creation of state institutions and administration. The functions performed by the different tiers of government in solid waste management in Abuja, have to be con-

550 Interview with Assistant Director (AEPB) 2002
551 Onibokun 1999, p. 229
sidered in the context of the national function of the city and the resultant political arrangements. We now know that the Abuja municipal council, which represents the lowest tier of government, is largely invisible in the affairs of the city. It is, however, relevant to use a sector such as solid waste management, which as noted in Chapter One is even more closely associated with local or municipal governments than other services to show the nature and extent of the marginalization of the council. The excerpt at the beginning of this chapter cites the lack of a uniform administrative system in Abuja as a major problem in solid waste management. This may be true but it is a symptom of a larger problem. This chapter examines the nature of the involvement of the Abuja municipal council in the administration of solid waste management.

The chapter addresses the specific research question posed in Chapter One of how the Abuja municipal council is marginalized in the management of solid waste services. The discussion begins with a presentation of the state institutions involved in solid waste management and their functions. This features the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB), the agency created to manage solid waste services, and the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC). The remaining issues deal with how the council is marginalized and the form it takes. Some attention is given to other cities, both in Nigeria and outside Nigeria, including capital cities, to emphasis the specificity of Abuja.

The primary data are from interviews with officials representing state institutions such as the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (now Federal Capital Territory Administration), the AEPB, AMAC and the Federal Ministry of Environment (FME). Secondary data are from government publications, newspaper articles and studies conducted by other researchers.

The Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB)

The Federal Capital Development Authority was the first state apparatus to be created in Abuja and also the first to handle solid waste management. Through the Environmental Pollution and Control division, it took over from an American firm in 1985. Its operations are reported to have relied heavily on the little equipment it inherited from the company. The creation of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory was later followed by the establishment of thirteen specialized agencies to handle different services. The Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) was one of them. The Board was created in 1989 but given formal status by Decree 10 of 1997. It has primary responsibility for solid waste management. Its statutory functions include the protection, conservation and sustainability of the Federal Capital

552 Mohammed, 2004
The Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) 

The Territory environment. The Board has four operational and three service departments. The former consists of Open Space Management, Liquid Waste, Solid Waste and Public Health. The Liquid and Solid Waste departments were merged into one department, Waste Management, in the restructuring exercise in 2004. The functions of the solid waste division include:

- The procurement and distribution of waste receptacles to tenement and public places;
- Refuse collection/Transportation:
- Street cleaning and litter control:
- The development and management of Special Waste (health care and hazardous wastes):
- The sanitary disposal of waste collected; and
- Waste Recycling and Reuse.

In administrative terms and reflecting the three-tier structure in Nigeria, the Board represents the ‘state’ in environmental matters in Abuja. The problem, however, is that the functions listed above are not those allocated to state governments (see Chapter Five). The basic responsibilities of state governments revolve around regulatory and monitoring activities, the enactment of legislations and assisting local governments in capacity-building.

Until December 2004, AEPB was under the supervision of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory. Following the scrapping of the Ministry, it was put under the FCDA. The Director who runs the Board is appointed by and reports to the Minister. Crucially, the Board is autonomous of the municipal council.

The Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC)

The Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) represents the lowest tier of government in environmental matters. It has six departments, namely: Administration, Agriculture, Accounts, Education, Works and Health. Solid waste-related activities fall under the Department of Health. The 1999 constitution gives local governments the primary responsibility for solid waste management (Chapter Five). As also reported in Chapter Five, the usurpation of local functions by higher tiers is common. However, my argument is

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553 Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2003
554 The service departments are Administration and Supplies, Finance and Accounts and Planning, Research and Statistics.
555 Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2003, p. 7
556 Urban Development Bank 1999, p. 27
that the nature and extent of intervention in Abuja is particular to the city. There is very little to say about the Abuja municipal council in relation to solid waste management. The council is responsible for waste collection in markets and has a Market Waste Management Byelaw, the aim of which is to ensure that all markets within the municipality are kept clean at all times.\textsuperscript{557} Besides this, the only solid waste related activity it performs is in the area of sanitation. However, this is limited to peripheral or satellite communities where environmental health officers monitor the environment and enforce regulations. The rest of the discussion will examine specific areas where there are differences between Abuja and many other places in order to draw attention to the nature and extent of marginalization of the municipal council.

Marginalizing the Council

Poor Performance

In relation to solid waste management, the poor performance of local governments is the most common reason given to justify the usurpation of local functions by higher tiers in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{558} For example, a study reports that most state governments have created task forces and ad-hoc bodies that take over waste collection activities, often citing the inability of local governments to carry out their tasks.\textsuperscript{559} In Lagos, the Lagos Waste Management Authority (LAWMA) was created because local governments were accused of being incapable of performing their functions.\textsuperscript{560} The view that sees poor performance as justification for the usurpation of local functions is also shared by some outside the government. The report of a national poll indicated that most Nigerians are unhappy with the performance of local governments.\textsuperscript{561} More than 50\% of respondents said they were not satisfied with the performance. In the same report, the President cited “massive corruption” at the local government level as a major reason for yet another local government reform. What was also evident in the poll is that many Nigerians are ignorant of the activities of local governments, with more than 40\% saying they knew nothing about the activities of their local governments. However, the blame for poor service delivery is on local governments as captured in this reaction to the decision by the Lagos State government to return solid waste management to local councils:

\textsuperscript{557} Abuja Municipal Area Council 2001
\textsuperscript{558} Urban Development Bank of Nigeria 1999, p. 26
\textsuperscript{559} Urban Development Bank of Nigeria 1999, p. 26
\textsuperscript{560} Olokesusi 1994, p. 317
\textsuperscript{561} The Guardian Editorial Opinion (2004, 9 February)
that] the State Government plans to return the management of urban wastes in Lagos to the Local Government Councils (LGCs) is least expected and a step in the wrong direction. It is an invitation to crisis of urban management in the city. The local councils have failed woefully in the past in this aspect; they can’t do it this time around…The State Government has effectively managed the hydra-headed problem of urban wastes in the metropolis….I really can’t understand why the Governor wants to thread the path of unreasonable and irrationality.562

However, in Abuja, the creation of the specialized agency in the form of AEPB can hardly be attributed to the poor performance of the municipal council. By the time AEPB was created in 1989, the council was already in existence – it had been established in 1984 - but had never been responsible for solid waste services. However, along the same lines as the national trend, when asked why the Abuja municipal council has no meaningful role in solid waste management, a common reaction of state officials representing higher tiers was to point to the poor performance of local councils in the country in general. While the reasons appear far fetched, the Minister of the FCT has also accused area councils of poor performance.

I think what we should begin to consider now is [sic] to take some sanctions about the poor environmental sanitation of the area council. There is no excuse for them not to clean their environment.563

While the above may be applicable to the other area councils in the FCT, it is difficult to include the Abuja municipal council which has never had responsibility for solid waste management. The council has not had the opportunity to under-perform. This makes poor performance an irrelevant explanation in this case.

The Lack of Jurisdiction

The lack of jurisdiction of the municipal council over solid waste management is a major factor in its marginalization. In Nigeria, while the usurpation of local functions is common across the country, local governments are still recognized as having the legal authority over solid waste management. In Ibadan, local governments have “full constitutional responsibility” for management of sewerage and waste disposal.564 In Abuja, the chairman of the municipal council sums up the situation thus:

562 Onyekakeyah (2006, 2 May)
563 Garba (2006, 7 February)
564 Onibokun and Kumuyi 1999, p. 67
Currently the Abuja Municipal Area Council does not have jurisdiction over the municipality. We are carefully sidelined to the satellite towns. We are not allowed to handle relevant municipal functions such as environmental protection. We are not also allowed complete control over city markets and abattoirs.565

The word “currently” as used above is misleading. A possible interpretation is that the council may have had jurisdiction before it was taken away. This is often true for most local governments in the country. Political differences between the various arms of government and other reasons may result in roles being taken over by higher tiers.566 The emphasis on the word ‘taken’ is meant to draw attention to the fact that local governments had responsibility at one point before it was taken away.

...in many parts of the country, the state governments have had to intervene in solid waste management from time to time. But such interventions have not been permanent, so the responsibility for waste management has shifted several times from the municipal and local governments to the state governments and vice versa.567

On the other hand since the municipal council in Abuja has never had jurisdiction, this flexibility does not exist and this means intervention is more ‘permanent’ in nature.

The discussion can also be extended to the international level to include a comparative analysis with other capital cities. Post et al. point out that Kenya, like most other African countries adopted a state-led development paradigm after independence but had to embrace the Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1990s.568 However, the system is reported as characterized by the state’s firm control on the economy and as the largest dispenser of resources making state power a central preoccupation of politics. The lack of commitment in scaling down state involvement in service delivery is also noted. Post et al. attribute Kenya’s economic and governance problems are attributable to the peculiarities of its political system. What is important is that, despite this, solid waste management is still the responsibility city council.

The Nairobi City Council (NCC) is still a significant actor in SWC and continues to be the exclusive provider of street cleaning and disposal services. The NCC delivers SWC services through the cleaning section of the Department of Environment (DOE) ... The DOE holds overall responsibility for SWM in the city.569

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565 Abuja Municipal Area Council 2000, p.11
566 Onibokun et al., 1999, p. 85 [emphasis mine])
567 Onibokun and Kumuyi 1999, p. 65
568 Post, Obirih-Opareh, Ikiara and Broekema 2005
569 Post, Obirih-Opareh, Ikiara and Broekema 2005, p. 109
To the contrary, in Abuja, the municipal council is an insignificant actor in solid waste management and has no legal right to handle collection and disposal services. Street cleaning services used to be managed by Abuja Zoological Gardens, an institution under the Abuja Environmental Protection Board. Following the privatization of solid waste services, the function has been transferred to contractors who are of course under the supervision of the Board.

It is not my intention to give the impression that there is no intervention in other capital cities. In the case of Kenya, it is reported that the country’s political system – aggravated by the continuous political struggle between the Nairobi City Council and the central government that controls the funds for local authorities – has limited the capacity of the council in solid waste management.\textsuperscript{570} In Accra, Ghana, the central government intervened in 1999 by contracting a Canadian firm and granting it a monopoly to handle solid waste disposal services in the city.\textsuperscript{571} The failure of the Waste Management Department (WMD) of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) to improve services despite privatization was the reason given for intervention. What is important is that in these cases, local councils still played some role in solid waste management even after intervention. For example, in Accra, the WMD/AMA maintained some presence by being responsible for paying the private firm. In Dar es Salaam, the Health and Social Welfare Department that manages waste lacks autonomy in certain areas crucial to its operations but unlike in Abuja it has overall responsibility for solid waste management.

The problem of the lack of jurisdiction of the Abuja municipal council was brought to the fore in the community-based solid waste project that was launched in Nyanya in 2001. According to an official of the Federal Ministry of Environment (FME), the project was an opportunity to test the Ministry’s ideas on decentralization, a major one being a desire to share power with lower tiers of government.\textsuperscript{572} However, when roles were allocated between the three state institutions involved in the project – FME, AEPB and AMAC representing the federal, state and local tiers respectively – AMAC did not have much to do. A meeting of the three institutions was called in which tasks were allocated. Tasks were allocated as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Publicity
  \item Awareness
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{570} Post et al. 2005  
\textsuperscript{571} Baud et al., 2005
The provision of garbage bags
- The construction of transfer stations
- The construction of the fertilizer plant
- The registration and training of marshals

B) The Abuja Environmental Protection Board:

- Provide electricity for the fertilizer plant
- Construct an access road to the plant
- Fence in the area where the plant is located

C) The Abuja Area Municipal Council:

- Assist in community orientation and enumeration
- The collection of levies
- The provision of land

The FME had the most duties and financial commitment worth N49 million (about USD 400 000); AEPB had N30 million (about USD 240 000) and AMAC N1 million (about USD 8 000). The problem of jurisdiction was manifested at the end of the project period of six months, when the FME was leaving the scene. As discussed in Chapter Five, the FME is a policy-making institution and its involvement in the project was for a limited period. Contrary to the notion that local government councils are the ones to develop and delegate initiatives to local representative bodies, not only did the initiative come from a federal government institution, but the project was handed over to the Board and not the council. A closer examination shows that there could have been no other outcome even amidst the talk of decentralization. It is difficult to see how the FME could have handed the project over to an institution that lacks the legal authority to receive it. Furthermore in line with the three-tier structure in Nigeria, the FME is expected to relate directly to states and not local governments. In Abuja, the state government in this case

572 Interview with Deputy Director, FME, 2004.
573 Calculation based on exchange rate of N128 to $1 in June 2003.
574 Urban Development Bank of Nigeria 1998, p. 147
is represented by the AEPB so handing over the project to the Board conforms to this arrangement. The argument can be taken further to say that this should not remove the possibility of the Board handing over the project to the municipal council. As noted earlier, this is possible and does happen in other cities in the country but not in Abuja. The lack of jurisdiction of the Abuja municipal council is a major explanation.

The Unclear Definition of Roles

The appropriate distribution of responsibilities, authority and revenues between national and local governments is reported as crucial to achieving an effective MSWM system.

It is thus obvious that the capacity to address waste management will depend on the local governance scenario. This, in turn, depends on the national governance structure, that is, basically, the number of tiers in national governance and how these tiers (central, state/regional/provincial/local/municipal) interrelate in the context of constitutional responsibility of task allocation.\textsuperscript{575}

In Nigeria, a common problem is the existence of many institutions that do not have specifically defined roles.\textsuperscript{576} In Abuja, the problem takes on an added dimension. The decree establishing the Abuja Environmental Protection Board puts it in charge of the ‘FCT environment’. It is not exactly clear what the ‘FCT environment’ means. The FCT consists of six area councils so one interpretation could be that the Board is in charge of solid waste management in all the area councils. However, the name “Abuja Environmental Protection Board” links it specifically to the Abuja municipality. In an interview with an official of the Board, his opinion was that AEPB is only responsible for the Abuja municipality. He acknowledged that the Board had intervened from time to time to evacuate waste in other area councils but attributed this to the non-performance of the councils. A related problem centres on the stipulation of the decree establishing the Board. It states that the Board “shall cover but not be limited to…”\textsuperscript{577} This was interpreted to mean that officials of the Board have “no restriction in the sphere of their authority”.\textsuperscript{578} However, this very broad and imprecise statement can only create confusion as to the exact functions of the different institutions and gives the Board a wide scope for intervention. In the end, the impression I got is that, the jurisdiction of the Board like the status of Abuja itself, as discussed in Chapter Four, is open to different interpretations.

\textsuperscript{575} Onibokun et al., 2000, p. 16
\textsuperscript{576} Onibokun et al., 2000
\textsuperscript{577} Chukwuocha 2003, p. 9
\textsuperscript{578} Chukwuocha 2003, p. 9
Limited Scope for Cooperation

In Nigeria, the National Policy on the Environment stresses the establishment of effective institutions and linkages within and among all tiers of government as a pre-condition to the successful management of environmental concerns.\(^579\) However, conflict between different tiers of government in solid waste management is common. Ill-defined and overlapping roles, competition for power resulting in strife, distrust and envy and the disposition of various tiers to pursue programmes without collaboration with others are cited as major underlying causes.\(^580\) In Abuja, officials of both the Board and the municipal council confirmed that there was very little cooperation between the two. However, the difference is that most attributed the problem to the status of the city.

...the functions of AMAC are curtailed because of the status of Abuja. There is the usurpation of power by the MFCT. Some markets that should be under AMAC are not. AMAC is not actually involved in services.\(^581\)

An official of the Federal Ministry of Environment involved in drafting a sanitation policy for the country that would enhance the role of local governments opined that the “situation in Abuja is indeed complex”.\(^582\) He confirmed that area councils should operate independently but AEPB has encroached on their activities and he specifically cited the case of markets. The situation is further complicated by the presence of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory or FCT Administration. Environmental health officers of the council operating in Nyanya complained of encroachment not only from the Board but also from officials of the Ministry. As one noted, Ministry officials go about telling people that inspection is their role and not that of the council.\(^583\) As for the reason, she pointed to inadequate finances and the shortage of environmental health officers, which, in her opinion, leaves a huge gap that is then exploited by AEPB and Ministry staff, but she also added that “the situation is better in the States”.

Besides the duplication and usurpation of functions, the absence of any forum or ‘umbrella’ organization to facilitate the interaction of officials from the Board and council is another factor. This is worsened by the autonomy of the Board. For example, in Ibadan (Nigeria), the representatives of five local governments and the Environmental Protection Commission (EPC) representing the State government interact with each other through the Ibadan

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\(^{579}\) Federal Environmental Protection Agency 1999, p. 38
\(^{580}\) Onibokun and Kumuyi 1999
\(^{581}\) Interview with Information Officer (AMAC) 2004
\(^{582}\) Interview with Staff of Pollution Control and Environmental Health Department (FME) 2004.
\(^{583}\) Interview with Environmental Health Officer (AMAC) 2004.
Urban Sanitation Board (IUSB). The IUSB is not immune to conflicts and there have been subtle moves by some local governments to opt out but what is important is that it offers a linkage between local and state governments. In Abuja, there is no such forum to bring the two institutions together. An official of the Board acknowledged that local governments in the rest of the country have ways of liaising and cooperating with State governments. He attributed the problem in Abuja to a lack of accountability on the part of the council pointing out that while it collects grants directly from the federal government just as local government councils do in the states, it is not “accountable to anybody”. I was however, left wondering what the council should account for since it has been allocated very little functions.

As pointed out earlier in the case of Accra, Ghana, funding can be a means of involving local governments in the management of solid waste services. What this implies is that it can also be a way of establishing and maintaining linkages between different state institutions. This was cited in the case of Lagos (Nigeria).

Administratively, LAWMA is a state parastatal. Its relationship with the local government is largely superficial – mainly concerned with the flow of funds to LAWMA. The relationship may be superficial but funding does provide an opportunity for the local government to be part of the process. Also in Kampala, Uganda, the Kampala City Council (KCC) is the only institution allocated funds from the national budget for solid waste management. In Abuja, AEPB gets its funding from the federal government through the FCT Administration. The council plays no role in the funding of the Board.

The practice of separating the task of sanitation from solid waste management adds another dimension to the little scope for cooperation. While the two are closely related, the municipal council has responsibility for sanitation but not for solid waste collection in peripheral settlements. As a health officer from the council pointed out, while solid waste collection is not the statutory duty of the institution, the council has been forced to intervene to evacuate waste from communities when the health of residents was threatened. In effect, this means an encroachment on the affairs of the Board.

The solid waste project in Nyanya can once again be used to illustrate the problem of cooperation between the state institutions. As part of the implementation of the project, a Stakeholders Committee made up of the three

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584 Onibokun and Kumuyi 1999
585 Onibokun et al., 2000
586 Interview, Assistant Director (AEPB) 2002.
587 Olokesusi 1994, p.317
588 Kabananukye 1994: 291
589 Interview with Environmental Health Officer (AMAC) 2004.
state institutions – FME, AEPB and AMAC – was set up. A major aim was to ensure some form of unity among the institutions before and during the project period. To the contrary, there is consensus from all the officials representing the three institutions that there was little cooperation. As noted earlier, the FME had the most tasks. A member of the committee used the analogy of the construction of a house to describe what happened thereafter. As he put it, before building a house, there is the need to gather the materials, then a foundation is dug, walls erected and then a roof added. In this case, in his opinion, those responsible for putting on the roof did so even though the walls had not been erected. He acknowledged that the project failed largely because it was poorly coordinated. A major feature as he saw it was that each institution acted independently and this encouraged the lack of transparency and made cooperation particularly difficult.

Limited Capacity for Resistance

The discussion so far has focused on relations of domination but in any relationship of power, resistance is not often far away. However, while acknowledging that power is not the preserve of one actor or institution, the capacity of the municipal council to resist domination from higher tiers is particularly limited as a result of the specificities of Abuja. Situating the analysis in a national context would shed more light on the problem. The following is the reaction of the Lagos State government to perceived federal government intervention in the activities of one of the local governments in the state:

The attention of the state government has been drawn to the nefarious activity of...in the appointment of a private refuse collector in Losofe local government. Lagosians should ignore him and disregard any similar development in the state by the Federal Ministry of Works and its cohorts. Refuse disposal and management are the residual responsibilities of local and state governments.591

The statement goes on to emphasize that refuse disposal and management are the responsibilities of local and state governments. Some inferences can be made about Abuja in comparison to this response. First, the State government is acting as an ‘ombudsman’ by coming to the aid of the local government council. In Abuja, there is no such ombudsman to perform this function. The state or regional tier, as it exists and as discussed in the previous chapter, is in many ways an extension of the federal tier. Also, the Lagos State government is taking recourse under the constitution to challenge the federal government. In Abuja, not only does the municipal council lack ju-

590 Interview with a member of the Stakeholders Committee, 2004
591 Momodu (2004, 16 July)
risdiction, but its status under the constitution remains a subject of debate and controversy.

Clearly, the conditions for the type of response noted in the case of Lagos do not exist in Abuja. Resistance is more subtle and less confrontational in the latter. Apathy is a common response from municipal council officials when confronted with the problem of their marginal position. For example, one of the steps taken during the restructuring exercise was the creation of a Satellite Town Development Agency (Chapter Four). The problem is that area councils in Abuja are already supposedly in charge of satellite or peripheral communities.\textsuperscript{592} Asked why the city government created another institution to take charge of the development of these settlements, an official of the council responded that “duplication already exists, not only in solid waste management but also in roads and primary health care”. Once more, he attributed this to the status of Abuja.

Summary

This chapter examined the nature and extent of involvement of the Abuja municipal council in the management of solid waste services. The major aim was to show how the council is marginalized and to, at the same time draw attention to the differences between Abuja and other cities to emphasize the specificity of the city. The functions performed by state institutions in solid waste management in Abuja do not conform to the pattern identified in Chapter Five. Contrary to common expectations, the municipal council is not in charge of solid waste services. This function has been allocated to an institution created by the national government. This outcome is a reflection of the state institutional and administrative framework presented in Chapter Four. As a result, the major reason given for the usurpation of local functions in solid waste management in Nigeria does not apply to Abuja. The chapter examined how the marginalization of the council is manifested and reinforced in specific areas. A major one is the lack of jurisdiction over solid waste management, an unusual phenomenon even in capital cities. In addition, the unclear definition of roles, the limited scope for cooperation and the capacity to resist intervention were presented as other factors that could also be linked to the status of Abuja and which further reinforce the marginal position of the council. This chapter also serves as useful background for the rest of the chapters since central-local relations is a recurring theme.

\textsuperscript{592} Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998, p.157
Chapter 7 Co-opting the Community: The Nyanya Solid Waste Project

The objective of this model is mainly to develop strategies for a sustainable Municipal Solid Waste Management. In this regard, a multistakeholder participatory approach was to be the fulcrum of implementation and community ownership of the project as the fuel for sustainance [sic].

Introduction

The formation of partnerships is a central component of the ‘good governance’ agenda. A major argument in favour of partnerships is that it is a more effective and sustainable means of service delivery since it draws on the capacity of more than one actor. However, the multiplicity of actors implies the high probability of power struggles and conflict. In forming a partnership, there are certain expectations: members will expect to perform specific functions and wield some influence; there should be an enduring relationship; a shared responsibility for the outcomes; and a desire to serve a public interest.

On June 14, 2001, a community-based solid waste project was launched in Nyanya. The project was described as “the first of its kind in Nigeria” and was to be replicated in selected cities across the six geopolitical zones in the country. As indicated in the excerpt at the beginning of the chapter, a partnership approach was a major component and a decision was taken to form a partnership with community leaders. According to accounts by state officials and community leaders, there was optimism that the partnership and the project would be a success. This was not far-fetched since the two institutions – the state and community had something to gain. The project would enable the state to fulfil a major goal of MSWM: protecting the health of the

593 Part of a speech by the Minister, Federal Ministry of Environment at the launching of the Nyanya pilot solid waste project on June 14, 2001
594 Goodwin and Painter 1997, p. 26
595 Post et al., 2003
596 Contained in a speech by the Minister, Federal Ministry of Environment at the launching of the project on June 14, 2001. The location of Nyanya in the capital and its notoriety in terms of poor sanitary conditions made it an obvious choice for the pilot project.
population, especially those in low-income areas, who are the most prone to suffer from poor waste management.\footnote{Schubeler et al., 1996} In addition, the state would be promoting a new policy initiative aimed at reducing its role in solid waste management.\footnote{Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board, 2001, p. 9} On the part of the community, apart from the obvious benefit of improved health, the project was to be accompanied by income-generating activities, such as recycling and composting, as well as employment. However, mere desire and intent may not be enough to ensure the realization of these goals. The aim of this chapter is to examine how a partnership between state officials and community leaders in a solid waste project in Nyanya was shaped by existing local power structures and relations.

This chapter addresses the research question of who makes it into a partnership, whose interests dominate and why. The analysis begins with the actors or members of the partnership. Particular attention is given to how this is related to the sociocultural make-up of Nyanya in the case of community leaders and to the political arrangement at the city level in the case of the state. The next major theme examined is power relations in the partnership, as manifested in the Project Management Committee. This discussion can be situated in the context of Hyden’s concept of ‘public realm’, defined as the arena in which the state and civil society interact and compete for influence (Chapter Three). As reflected by the research question, a major interest is to identify who exerts the most influence and then go further to examine why an actor or some actors exert more influence than others. This also puts the focus on strategies and in this, the greater access to financial resources is acknowledged but the issue extends beyond finance to the political realm. One factor that features under this is intra-community relations, which is traced to the heterogeneous nature of the community. Most of the attention is, however, given to the linkage of traditional authorities with the state. The rationale for this is that it draws attention to the political arrangement at the city level and specifically, the state institutional and administrative framework. Another aspect related to the symbolic aspect of Abuja – the desire by the state to weaken the power of traditional authorities in the city – is also acknowledged. The gender dimension of the partnership is also examined. The interest is on how state practices intersect with those associated with traditional institutions to shape the participation of men and women.

The bulk of the data comes from interviews with community leaders in Nyanya and state officials representing the Federal Ministry of Environment, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board and the municipal council. There is additional data from focus group meetings and household interviews as well as secondary data from the project documents.
The Actors

In Abuja, the idea of a community-based solid waste project was first conceived in 1999 by the now-defunct Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). FEPA was subsequently merged with the Federal Ministry of Environment. This is how the Ministry became the initiator of the project. Apart from the Ministry, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB), in its capacity as the institution responsible for solid waste management in Abuja and the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) which performs certain administrative functions in peripheral settlements were contacted. The three institutions represented the federal, state and local tiers of government respectively.

In solid waste management, it is not uncommon for the state to go into partnership with different NGOs, CBOs and other community groups to enhance service delivery. In the absence of such groups, a common practice is to go into partnership with community and particularly traditional rulers (Chapter One). For example, in Commune IV in Bamako, Mali, traditional rulers played the important role of facilitating cooperation between the state and the community in an urban waste management initiative with the municipality in 1992. At the time, Mali was experiencing political turmoil and traditional and religious leaders appeared to be the ones who enjoyed the popular trust and confidence of both the state and the people. This is a reflection of the discussion in Chapter Three on how the state has historically relied on the support of traditional rulers when it lacked legitimacy. In a further confirmation of this, another study on the decentralization of solid waste management in Zaria, Nigeria, observed that most residents have more respect for traditional authorities than for state institutions.

In the case of Nyanya, the role of legitimacy was not addressed directly, but a state official acknowledged that the residents of Nyanya had lost faith with the state due to its poor performance over the years and hence it was necessary to involve traditional rulers. I was more interested in how the sociocultural and political characteristics of Abuja and Nyanya shaped the composition of the partnership. The poor implementation of the resettlement policy which led to the failure to relocate villages such as Nyanya outside the FCT, means traditional institutions now co-exist with the ‘modern’ in the city (Chapter Two). In Nyanya, the chief of Nyanya was the first to be contacted by state officials. However, the chief of Nyanya is also the chief of the Gbagyi, the major indigenous group in the community. Historically, Nyanya has been governed by a succession of chiefs from the Gbagyi ethnic group. The practice continues with the current chief or Etsu, in power since

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599 Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2001, p. 9. The agency was subsequently merged with the Federal Ministry of Environment.
600 Keita 2001
601 Stare 2005
However, Nyanya is no longer the ‘homogenous’ settlement that existed before Abuja became the capital. Today, the population is mixed with ‘pockets’ of spaces inhabited by specific ethnic groups in what can be described as ‘communities within a community’. This also means that apart from the chief of Nyanya, there are other albeit ‘lesser’ chiefs or ‘wakilis’ representing other ethnic groups. In addition, a lot of commercial activities take place in Nyanya (Chapter Two) and there are various organizations representing different interest groups. Hence, apart from traditional rulers, the heads of professional associations such as the National Union of Road Transport Workers and Nyanya Market Association and educational and religious establishments were also contacted.

The initiators of the project, the Federal Ministry of Environment acknowledged the diversity of Nyanya by pointing out that one of the first things it did, was to identify the “character of the community of Nyanya” and bring people together across traditional, ethnic, youth and professional groupings. The process of involving community leaders started with a request from state officials to the chief of Nyanya to call a meeting of the other traditional leaders to inform them about the project and solicit their support. Most of them were representatives of other ethnic groups. By the time the Project Management Committee (PMC), which formalized the partnership, was formed, the community was largely represented by traditional rulers, heads of professional associations and elites.

The criterion for the selection of community members is not clear but according to a representative of the FME, community leaders were advised to select capable people bearing in mind that some areas needed special skills. There is no evidence that this took place. However, ethnic origins played a part. Community leaders acknowledged that steps were taken to ensure that each of the six geopolitical zones in the country was represented in the PMC. This action reflects the principle of federal character which allocates posts, resources and employment on an equitable basis along geopolitical and ethnic lines (Chapter Two). It should be noted that the principle of federal character is expected to be implemented at the federal and not local level, yet it is being implemented at the community level in this case. This is one aspect that differentiates Abuja from other cities in Nigeria. In another example, unlike in the rest of the country, land allocation is done on the basis of federal character.

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602 Part of the speech by the Minister at the launching of the project in 2001.
603 The principle of federal character is often reflected in federal government appointments such as ministers and ambassadors, employment into the civil service and admissions into federal government educational establishments.
604 Another major example is the allocation of land in the city on the basis of federal character (See Mabogunje 2001).
The Objectives

The main aim of MSWM as stated in the beginning of this chapter is to protect the health of the people but in low-income areas, the common practice is to emphasize income-generating activities that serve as incentives and help promote the development of such communities. The organizers of the project in Nyanya seemed to have acknowledged this. The overall aim was to encourage community members to play a more active role in the day-to-day management of solid waste services but attention was also given to the economic benefits. In an official document released at the launching, the specific objectives mentioned included: the desire to sensitize the community to engage in welfare and environmental projects with a dividend of improved health; to integrate informal waste handlers into the formal system; to create jobs by demonstrating solid waste management as a profitable business enterprise; and to perfect community participation and private sector involvement in solid waste management in Nyanya for replication in other communities in the country. In addition, the development of recycling and income-generating activities through the processing and upgrading of waste materials is often a major component of such projects. In Nyanya, waste sorting and recycling were to be conducted at the waste dump and a composting plant aimed at producing fertilizers was to be built.

A cursory look at the objectives would confirm that some basic needs and interests of residents were acknowledged. Reference was made to improved health, the creation of jobs and the promotion of income-generating activities. The state did not leave out its own interest, as reflected in the desire to promote the health of the people and the need to change people’s perception of the government as the sole provider of services. It is, however, important to note that the objectives were drawn up without consultation with or the participation of community leaders.

Relations in the Project Management Committee (PMC)

As observed in a study in India, committees can be “the interface between government and slum communities” as well as an instrument for mobilizing people’s inputs into a project. In Abuja, the idea of forming a committee to implement the project, enhance community participation and foster coopera-

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605 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 1989
606 Interview with Assistant Director (FME) 2003.
607 Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2001, p. 10
608 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 1989, p. 2
609 Interview, Assistant Director, FME, 2003
610 Phillips 2002, p. 138
tion between the state and community originated at the Federal Ministry of Environment. The Project Management Committee (PMC) was subsequently formed to provide a forum for the interaction of state officials and community leaders. It had the chief of Nyanya as the chairman and another traditional ruler as his deputy. The state was represented by officials of the three institutions: FME, AEPB and AMAC. From every indication, the PMC was to be the mainstay of the project. It was charged with the following functions:

- To fix the fees payable in respect to waste collection and disposal, subject to the approval of stakeholders.
- To collect fees and issue receipts for and on behalf of the Nyanya solid Waste Management Project.
- To employ the services of revenue collectors and fix their remuneration, subject to the approval of the stakeholders.
- To determine the period of meetings and the procedure and power of such meetings.
- To discipline members of the committee and officers of the project, including the suspension and removal of erring members and staff.
- To authorize an officer to sign documents and to use the seal on behalf of the committee.
- To make and enforce rules and regulations relating to the operations of the project.

The PMC did appear to have functioned at the early stages holding meetings once a week, but differences soon emerged. In a partnership, as noted in the beginning of this chapter, members expect to carry out concrete activities or specific tasks. This makes the allocation of functions a crucial factor in shaping the direction of partnerships. Keita, in the study on urban waste management in Bamako, Mali echoes this by pointing out that, balancing priorities according to the roles and responsibilities of the government, pri-

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611 Interview with the Secretary (PMC), 2003.
612 Enclosure “B” Rules and Regulations Governing the Body. Article 6 (obtained from the secretary of the PMC in 2004).
613 Interview with the Secretary (PMC) 2004.
Private sector and civil society is crucial to the success of solid waste management schemes. For example, community leaders, NGOs, CBOs and other voluntary groups are expected to help mobilize residents, be useful linkages with the state and also manage the daily operations of waste collection and associated tasks, such as finance and labour.

The first problem in Nyanya was that, curiously for a community-based project, tasks were largely allocated without the participation of community members in another committee, the Stakeholders Committee, which was made up only of state officials. The result was that state institutions ended up with most of the tasks. One of the functions of the PMC was the awarding of contracts. With the project entailing the construction of a composting plant, 30 transfer stations, 70 toilets, 30 baths and the provision of 15 wash hand basins and 7 water points among other items (see Figures 15 and 16), the issue of how contracts were to be awarded was high on the agenda. An understanding had been reached between state officials and community leaders that contracts would be awarded to companies operating in Nyanya or to local residents. Three reasons formed the basis for this decision. One, there was the belief that resident contractors would have a vested interest in keeping Nyanya clean and hence perform better. Two, it would be easier for dissatisfied residents to complain or demand better services and hence there would be greater accountability. Three, it would enhance the feeling of ownership. Things turned out differently.

Community leaders complained that the major contracts, such as the transportation of waste from the transfer stations to the final disposal site, and the construction of toilets and baths were awarded to people from outside Nyanya. For example, in the case of the transportation of waste, they had suggested earlier that this task be given to local transporters through the National Union of Road Transport Workers (Nyanya branch). Both community leaders and some state officials in the PMC, complained bitterly about this ‘outsourcing’. They saw it as contributing to the feeling of a lack of ownership. In what community leaders considered a justification for the argument that contracts for the construction of transfer stations, baths and other facilities be awarded to residents, the facilities built by contractors were judged to be substandard (see Figure 15). In addition, the contractor in charge of transporting waste to the dump site was accused of burning the waste instead and hence encouraging pollution. A common complaint from community leaders was that the FME and its consultants took over most of the activities, a charge denied by FME officials.

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614 Keita 2001, p. 11
615 Schübler et al., 1996 and Swilling and Hutt 1999
616 Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2001a, p. 10
617 Based on interviews with the Secretary of the PMC, officials of AEPB and AMAC in 2004.
Figure 15. A Transfer Station constructed under the solid waste project. (The Author, 2003).

Figure 16. A building containing baths and toilets. (The Author, 2003).
Besides the allocation of functions, how to manage the finances was another source of conflict. The PMC was empowered to determine the purpose for which funds could be applied, the mode of custody and its investment.618 A decision was taken to open a bank account into which money for the project would be paid and joint decisions were to be made on how it should be utilized. The hope was that this would ensure accountability and transparency and that finance would not determine the nature of participation of members.619 The account was opened but no money was paid in. Each state institution simply went ahead and spent whatever amount of money it had contributed without consultation with the others. This means that decisions about how money was to be spent were made outside the PMC. As summed up by a member, the PMC was “not carried along in financial matters”.620 Community leaders protested and asked for more control over finance, but do not appear to have succeeded. The FME as the institution with the largest financial contribution felt it should also control how the money was to be spent.621 The insinuation here is that having made no financial contributions at all (not that they were asked to), community leaders were not in a position to agitate for any control. Behind this lay the lack of trust on both sides. The FME felt its direct involvement was needed to ensure that money was utilized appropriately. Community leaders on the other hand, wanted more control because they did not trust state officials.

The failure of state institutions to honour their obligations resulted in more tension. The FME appeared to be the only institution to have honoured its financial obligations.622 A major casualty of this problem was the composting plant. A contractor had been hired to build the plant, which was central to the government’s desire to generate employment and encourage income-generating activities.623 The plant was also to be of benefit to farmers through the production of fertilizers and was to sustain the project financially. The plant was built but there was no water or electricity to run it. Accounting to accounts, the contractor made his own arrangements and dug a well and hired a generator to test-run the plant.624 The fertilizers produced were sent out as samples and judged to be of very high quality after scientific tests were carried out. Some interested parties across the country placed

618 Enclosure “B” Rules and Regulations Governing the Body. Article 6 (obtained from the Secretary of the PMC in 2004).
619 Interview with the Secretary, PMC, 2004
620 Interview with Environmental Health Officer, 2004.
621 Interview with Deputy Director (FME) 2004.
622 Out of the N30 million (USD 240,000) pledged by the AEPB, only a third, N10 million (USD 80,000) was actually spent. The Board said it constructed wells and the road to the composting plant but was unable to fence the site. As for AMAC, an official of the Council maintained that out of the N1 million (USD 8,000) the council was to contribute, it contributed half amounting to N500,000 (USD 4,000).
623 Interview with Assistant Director (FME) 2003
624 Interviews with Assistant Director (FME) 2003 and Secretary (PMC) in 2003 and 2004
orders but actual production never got off the ground. Apart from the failure to provide the basic facilities, the contractor was not paid for his services and he abandoned the project.

There were other areas in which the lack of finance had negative consequences. An example is the withdrawal of two contractors at different periods from the transportation of waste from Nyanya to the disposal site.\(^\text{625}\) Another is the failure to pay waste collectors. The chief of Nyanya lamented that most of the waste collectors were married men who had responsibilities to fulfil but could not. Another activity affected was the programme aimed at training the people to acquire the necessary skills needed for recycling. The same contractor who built the plant was to conduct this exercise but did not due to the lack of finance. At this point, a comparison can be made with a similar project involving the Zabaleens (traditional waste pickers) in the Mokattam settlement in Cairo, Egypt.\(^\text{626}\) Just as in Nyanya, the desire to improve the lives of the people and involve them in decision-making was on the agenda. However, a primary concern was whether the people had the skills to run the project which also consisted of a composting plant and recycling activities. Unlike in Nyanya, the people were trained and incorporated into the system thereby ensuring community participation and sustainability.

Most of the discussion has so far focused on the shortcomings of state officials. It is also important to draw attention to the activities of community leaders. State officials accused them of lacking honesty and commitment. The desire to serve a public interest was cited as a major component of such partnerships earlier. This implies some level of altruism on the part of members but in Nyanya, community leaders agitated for financial rewards for their participation. A community leader complained to me that money was a problem adding that “state officials did not take care of us”. The request for financial benefits was turned down by state officials. This was based on the argument that most of them had other jobs, were only involved on an ad-hoc basis and should see their role as voluntary and a service to their community.\(^\text{627}\) Thereafter, community leaders were accused of failure to attend meetings. Some community leaders countered this and saw this development as a way of showing their frustration with state officials, whom they accused of appropriating most of the roles and not listening to them.

It is worth pointing out that community leaders were not completely helpless. For example, when their disenchantments and complaints could no longer be ignored, state officials called a meeting under the auspices of a Consultative Forum to address their grievances. Community leaders were told that the meeting was a forum for the state to convince them that the

\(^{625}\) Interview with Secretary (PMC) 2004. The first contractor is said to have complained that he had taken a bank loan and had therefore been put at great risk.

\(^{626}\) Myllylä 2001

\(^{627}\) Interview with Assistant Director (FME) 2004.
project was theirs and that government was willing to listen to them.  

Several points of contention, including the way contracts were awarded, control of finance and non-performance by the state surfaced at the meeting. Some concessions were made as state officials promised to give them a greater role in the implementation of the project. For example, community leaders were told to suggest names for some jobs. However, the extent to which state officials followed through on the promises is not clear and by every indication, the project and partnership faced other problems.

Intra-Community Relations

The difficulty of getting community leaders to work together started right at the beginning but the chief of Nyanya is said to have intervened and brought the situation under control.  

If this was the case, it did not last. Community leaders did not play a major role in financial matters but were involved in areas such as payment of waste collectors. There were allegations and counter-allegations of misuse of funds among community leaders. A community leader felt so strongly about the purported misappropriation of funds that in his view, the government should not be blamed for not releasing more money for the project. The wrangling got to a point where a group of community leaders went to the offices of the Federal Ministry of Environment to bring the matter to the attention of state officials. At the end of the meeting, community leaders asked for more money to be put into the project but were told that they should “put their house in order” first.  

This clearly demonstrates that internal differences affected their capacity to exert influence on the state.

In addition, allegations of favouritism in the payment of workers also surfaced. Some community leaders believed that only certain workers or segments of the community were being paid due to their relationships with the more influential members of the PMC. In an example of how ethnicity became an issue, there was the allegation that only certain sections of the population were being made to pay user fees. With the general unwillingness of residents to pay fees, it emerged that the traders in Nyanya main market formed the bulk of those paying the fees.  

The reason given was that it was easier to identify and charge traders. Not everyone believed this version of events. The problem is that a significant number of the traders belong to a particular ethnic group. A community leader who was also a member of the PMC and belonged to the same ethnic group felt his people were being spe-

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628 Interview with sub-committee chairman on community awareness, 2003.
629 Interview with Deputy Director (FME) 2005.
630 Interview with Deputy Director (FME) 2004.
631 Interview with a PMC member 2004
specifically targeted and saw it as unfair. His response was to mobilize the traders against the payment of fees. In an ironic twist, the sensitivity to ethnic origins in the selection of members into the PMC may have ‘helped’ at the initial stage but it was now being used to undermine the PMC. In this case, allegiance to ethnic interests became much more important than the overall success of the partnership or project (Chapter Three).

In addition to the PMC, there was another committee, the Board of Trustees which was made up solely of community leaders. This was to be the highest decision-making body. In practice, there is no record of any activities performed by this Board. A possible explanation for its marginalization could be that it was a threat to state officials and it was in their interest to make it redundant. This way, they will have more scope and leverage over the running of the project. Another possible scenario is the inability of community leaders to come together, activate it and make it relevant. In Nyanya, it appears that it is not the practice of community leaders to initiate contacts amongst themselves. For example, meetings of the Traditional Council of Chiefs are often at the instance of the government. The same pattern appeared to have been repeated in the course of the solid waste project. There is no evidence of community leaders coming together to form a formidable opposition against state officials. When they complained, they did so individually and not collectively.

The Linkage of Traditional Authorities with the State

The partnership was shaped by issues beyond the usurpation of functions, the use of finances to exert control by state officials and intra-community differences. There were also those with origins outside the immediate confines of the partnership. A major one is the position of traditional authorities. The practice of seeking the ‘help’ of traditional authorities by governments especially in the area of mobilizing the people is an established one in Africa but the relationship is often fraught with conflicts (Chapter Three). In the Nyanya case, the problem is much more than conflicts. It is also linked to the political arrangements at the city level, specifically the state structure and administration and the symbolic character of Abuja. These, have implications for the participation and capacity of traditional authorities.

Apart from the perceived advantages that traditional authorities are expected to have over the state, such as closer contact with residents and greater legitimacy (Chapter Three), they can be valuable in community-based solid waste projects where Anschütz reports that they can carry out

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632 Interview with Secretary (PMC) 2003
633 The difficulty of getting community leaders together was confirmed by the author when several attempts to get them together to conduct a focus group meeting failed.
education campaigns, control the behaviour of households and help in mobilization as well as linkages between the state and community. However, a crucial factor that would enable traditional rulers to perform these roles is linkage with the state and the extent of influence over state officials. As Ali and Snel point out, community-based solid waste schemes can become part of the municipal system if the linkage between the community and municipality is addressed at the inception stage. We now know that in Nyanya, the declared intention of the government was to make the scheme part of the overall MSWM system but there is no evidence that any consideration was given to the linkage between the community leaders and state institutions. In particular, Ali and Snel mentioned the linkage with the municipality and this is where the major problem in Nyanya lies.

Studies have documented the increasing role of traditional rulers in service delivery in Africa, especially following the Structural Adjustment Programme, and the ‘withdrawal’ of the state and the renewed emphasis on decentralization. An example is a study on water provision in a peripheral settlement in Kano, Nigeria. Confirming the high profile of traditional authorities, Andrae reports that in the last decade “opinions have usually been channelled through lobbying and negotiation by the traditional authorities” in alliance with town associations and self-help group representatives, all of which are highly dependent on traditional rulers. This intersection of the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ means that:

As a whole, the decentralization of supplies to the local community makes popular access to them increasingly sensitive to influences from the traditional authorities.

A key point to address based on the quote from Andrae above is if, the decentralization of services to the local community can produce the same result in Abuja. The two places have specific characteristics likely to produce different outcomes. First is the historical context. As Andrae observes, Kano is an old city and owes its growth largely to the pre-colonial trans-Saharan trade and subsequent colonial trade in cotton and ground nuts. Above all, a legacy of the British colonial policy of indirect rule in which local governance was dominated by chiefs is a “parallel authority structure which in this predominantly Muslim region gives the Emirate within the Sokoto Caliphate continued scope for influence”. On the other hand, Abuja is a relatively new city and owes its growth largely to an agenda pursued by the federal government (Chapter Four). Colonial rule did have some impact on the area

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634 Anschütz 1996
635 Ali and Snel 1999
636 Andrae 2005, p. 132
637 Andrae 2005, p. 132
638 Andrae 2005 p. 124
now known as the FCT, but probably not to the extent and form identified in Kano. Unlike in Kano, which is identified with a predominant ethnic group, historically, the FCT has been highly fragmented, dating back to pre-colonial times when the different ethnic groups were administered as autonomous kingdoms.639 This fragmentation is likely to reduce the possibility of a central powerful figure emerging as is the case in Kano where Andrae reports the presence of a powerful Emir.

There is still another and more fundamental factor besides the absence of a powerful traditional or religious figure in Abuja or Nyanya. In Nigeria, the statutory role of local governments includes the mobilization of human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public in the development of their environment.640 It is therefore logical to assume that in a community-based project, local or municipal governments would be the most visible of the different branches of the state. To the contrary, the Abuja municipal council was the least visible state institution in the project in Nyanya (Chapter Six). In Abuja, area councils are responsible for “grassroots administration”.641 In this context, the Abuja municipal council “caters” to the needs of over 49 communities; each presided over by a village chief.642 Nyanya is one such community. The needs include the provision of roads, boreholes, electricity, health centres, agricultural extension services, primary schools and women education centres.643 Another major function is non-financial assistance to communities that embark on self-help projects.644 In addition, community development officers from the municipal council monitor community self-help projects and offer non-financial assistance whenever possible.645 This is one way in which some contact is maintained between council officials and traditional authorities.

Another indicator of the linkage between traditional rulers and municipal council officials is that some traditional rulers, including the chief of Nyanya, are on the payroll of the municipal council. In addition, there is a forum, the Traditional Council of Chiefs, which provides a space for traditional rulers and officials of the municipal council to meet and discuss issues related to Nyanya.646 Going back to the study in Kano, Andrae reports that

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639 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998, p. 19. In the colonial era and in line with the indirect rule policy, emirates were established with emirs and first class chiefs at the apex of the administrative and judicial hierarchy
642 Abuja Municipal Area Council 2000, p. 3
643 Abuja Municipal Area Council 2000, pp. 4-8
644 Examples are the completion of classrooms, installation of transformers and grading of roads.
645 Interview with Community Development Officer (AMAC) 2004. The officer gave the example of a reception room that was being built by the community for the chief of Nyanya and indicated that he was going to recommend to the municipal council to provide furniture.
646 The chief had asked for a police post, clinic, fire service and school from the Council. The school was built but citing financial problems, the other services had not been provided.
the connecting link between traditional rulers and the municipality is the local government to which the village or ward heads relate. In Abuja, there is no local government to provide this link but there are village and ward heads in Nyanya and they relate with the municipality. However, this linkage does not translate into a meaningful influence on service delivery as observed in Kano. The explanations are not far-fetched. In Kano, policy issues are regulated by the local government and negotiations for public water at the local level are made by the local government chairman. Hence the local government through the chairman is a major target of negotiation. In Abuja, policy issues concerning service delivery are not regulated by the municipal council. This means the chairman can hardly be a target for negotiations.

In a related issue, an important role of traditional rulers as pointed out earlier is that they can be agents through which the people make demands on the state. In the case of Zaria, Nigeria, Stare reports that when the people of Hanwa village want to complain about waste, they turn to their emir or the village head that then passes on the complaint in the traditional authority system. In Kano, the importance of traditional authorities as regulators of social life and agents through which the people make demands on the state is stressed by Andrae. For example, ward heads, as representatives of the Emir or on their own, through district heads or with the support of the Emir are able to approach the local government bureaucracy. In Nyanya, ward, village and district heads have contacts with officials of the municipality and can make demands either directly or as representatives of the Graded Chief (the equivalent of the Emir). Such demands are limited to the areas where the municipal council has jurisdiction and this is not much. The chief of Nyanya did point out that he had made demands on the municipal council in terms of electricity, water, roads, fire station and schools and that a school was subsequently built. In the case of solid waste management, the possibility of traditional rulers making demands on the state is almost non-existent. While traditional rulers have linkages with municipal officials, it is not logical for them to lobby council officials who have no jurisdiction over solid waste management. In addition, they have no linkages with officials of the Board who manage services.

It is necessary to take the argument further to include the two visions of Abuja: a modern city and a symbol of national unity. It is reasonable to assume that a ‘modern’ capital would require a ‘modern’ system of administration rather than a traditional one. In Abuja, an attempt was made through the resettlement policy to relocate existing villages and the indigenous population outside the territory (Chapter Two). This would have effectively taken the ‘traditional’ out of the city. However, a more relevant factor is the sym-

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647 Andrae 2005, p. 124
648 Stare 2005, p. 44
649 Interview with District Head, Nyanya 2006
bolic character of the city, which was the major motive behind the resettlement policy. A major aim was to avoid a situation whereby the indigenous population would start laying claims to the territory. This was expected to foster a sense of belonging among all Nigerians. The justification may be based on the notion that traditional authorities often represent specific groups of people and hence their presence would be counter-productive to the dream of national unity. These comments appear to confirm this:

Conceived as a no-man’s land, or one to which all Nigerians could lay claim, the FCT has since 1976 undergone a metamorphosis often at variance with the original dream. … Whereas, the territory was no longer to have “indigenes” because the people were to have been resettled, the phenomenon of indigeneship is alive and well in the territory. There are also traditional rulers whose existence reinforces indigeneship.650

The continued presence of traditional rulers, albeit by default is viewed with suspicion. This is not to say the federal government has not tried to limit their power. There have been complaints from some ‘aggrieved’ parties who want to claim more ‘space’ in the political arena.

Honourable Members are very much at home with the plight of the original settlers of the Federal Capital Territory. This problem has its origin in government’s policy inconsistencies. Every community in this country has its duly recognized Chief. The indigenes consider it a breach of their fundamental human rights to deny their duly chosen traditional fathers proper recognition.651

These comments were made by the chairman of the Abuja municipal council in an address to the House of Representatives Committee on the FCT. As a politician, he/she may be making ‘political capital’ out of the issue but it does confirm the attempt to weaken traditional authorities. A further confirmation of this is that traditional authorities no longer have the control they used to have over land. Decree No. 6 of 1976 vested ownership, control and governance of Abuja in the federal government.652 Apart from “freeing the territory from primordial claims”, this was to allow the government to plan and develop the city without any “encumbrance”.653 In this context, traditional authorities constituted an encumbrance.

It is worth mentioning that the agitations by traditional rulers have caught the attention of the government. A government report notes the upgrading of traditional rulers with about eleven chiefs to first, second and third class, and attention was drawn to the fact that it was the first time such an exercise was

650 The Guardian Editorial Opinion (2005, 14 March)
651 Abuja Municipal Area Council 2000, p. 9
652 Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory 1998, p. 6
653 Jibril 2006, p. 1
carried out in the FCT. In an interview with the chief of Nyanya, he confirmed that some attempt had been made to give them more powers. Notwithstanding this, the overall picture is that the influence of traditional authorities in Abuja is highly limited.

To sum up, it is necessary to draw some conclusions based on the comparison with Kano. Historically, traditional rulers have been given more recognition by both the state and the people in Kano than in Abuja. In addition, the symbolic character of Abuja in the national context has further weakened the influence of traditional authorities. Overall, the conditions that should allow for the influence of traditional authorities do not exist in Abuja.

This account is not meant to convey the impression that relations between traditional rulers and local or municipal council government officials are always perfect. For example, in Kumasi, Ghana:

There was also a claim that assembly members favour private sector realization of community projects because this enables them to either compete for the projects themselves or to receive bribes.

The suggestion is that municipal officials do sometimes sabotage community efforts. In addition, the local administration was perceived to be bureaucratic, unresponsive and self-serving, with most officials considering themselves to be experts and finding it difficult to appreciate wider community involvement in decision-making despite the emphasis on decentralization. Apart from the fact that such an assessment cannot be carried out in this case, due to the marginal position of the municipal council, my main aim is to highlight some of the specific challenges faced by traditional authorities in a particular place.

Gendering Participation: The Intersection of State and Traditional Practices

It is necessary to add a gender dimension to the discussion, for the obvious reasons that Nyanya is made up of men and women and the basis for exclusion or inclusion in a partnership could be gender. Addressing this, requires an understanding of the type of place Nyanya is, in relation to gender relations and the activities of the major actors involved in the partnership. Women, can participate in different ways in solid waste management. Anschütz points out that they can: be initiators of a solid waste management project; carry out education campaigns; be involved in the management of the system; operate and manage a solid waste service as members of a mi-

655 Post et al., 2003
cro-enterprise; exercise political pressure on local governments and act as watchdogs of the community. In the case of community-based schemes, Anschütz adds that women are the foremost users of services, have a greater knowledge of and interest in the needs of the community and are hence the “ideal beneficiaries of solid waste management projects”. Hence, a common view is that women are crucial to the success of community-based solid waste schemes. However, Anschütz also points out that not all community based waste management projects recognize the crucial role of women and under-representation in such schemes continues to be a major problem. In Nyanya, evidence suggests that women hardly featured in the partnership. There are various possible explanations but this section will examine how state and traditional practices intersected to shape the participation of men and women.

The analysis draws on the concept of gender contract. Forsberg proposes some major ways of studying gender contracts as: identifying “sex/gender distinctions in specific places”; analyzing the “gendered actions of institutions and individuals”; and characterizing the “structure of power relations in the construction and maintenance of the contract” and the resistance and tendencies towards weakening of the contract. The presentation will give consideration to these issues.

The Gender Boundary in Waste: the Household

Solid waste management is described as a socially and culturally complex issue. In this context, gender, is a factor. A starting point is the argument that the marginal status conferred on both waste and women tends to create a perceived affinity between the two. In many cultures, the perception is that women should be responsible for keeping the house and its immediate surroundings clean. A result is what Scheinberg et al. refer to as a “gender boundary”, which defines the limits of women’s autonomy and control of waste materials. In this, it is considered the responsibility of women to take the waste to the point of the boundary of the household but thereafter, they lose control.

In Nigeria, in general, the task of keeping the house clean is considered to be a female responsibility. The same observation was made in Nyanya.

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656 Anschütz 1996, p. 20
657 Anschütz 1996, p. 19
658 Ali and Snel 1999, Scheinberg et al., 1999 and Anschütz 1996
659 Anschütz 1996
660 Forsberg 2001, p. 164
661 Anschütz, 1996 50
662 Scheinberg et al., 1999
663 Anschütz 1996
664 Scheinberg et al, 1999, p. 13
665 See Olowookere et al, 2001
Both the men and women interviewed expressed the similar opinion that cleaning, sweeping and keeping the house clean are the responsibilities of women. In an interview with the chief of Nyanya, I was told that according to the Gbagyi culture, it is the responsibility of a woman to keep the house clean. In interviews with male and female respondents, statements such as “our culture stipulates that it is the duty of my wife”, “cleaning is purely for women so my wife does it” and “our religion says it is the duty of the woman” were common. In a focus group meeting with the Gbagyi Women’s Association (GWA), they confirmed that their culture stipulates that women take charge of the practical tasks of managing the home while men are expected to engage in activities outside the home such as farming to earn some income to take care of the family. By now, the presence of a gender contract is evident. As noted in Chapter Three, culture plays a major in the production of a gender contract and also highlights the relevance of place. In addition, and as documented in Chapter Three, space also features in the production of the gender contract.

[identities] embrace, among other things, our conceptions of female and male behaviour. We say that social processes of necessity must take place in a space and therefore you can say that space ‘speaks’, i.e. the spatial organization expresses the social order between the parts included. This also means that space is a co-actor in the social play.

In Nyanya, the relevance of space was reflected in statements such as “women are solely responsible for cleaning the inside of a house” while men can assist with the outside. A female respondent acknowledged that her husband sometimes ‘helped’ with cleaning the outside but never the inside of the house. All these point to a distinction between ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ spaces. The discussions here, confirms the notion that the household is a site for both social and spatial relations.

Traditional Practices: the Community

The community, in terms of gender roles and relations, is often an extension of the household since women tend to perform the same tasks. This can be taken as the first sign of the presence of a gender contract. In solid waste management, some activities take place at the community level. They are mainly those related to paid employment, income-generating activities or decision-making such as membership in committees.

666 Focus group meeting held in 2004
667 Forsberg 2001, p. 161
668 Interview with the chief of Nyanya in 2003.
669 Jarvis et al., 2001, p. 94
670 Moser 1987
In the case of Nyanya, the first place to begin the examination of the community in the partnership is the composition of the PMC. Of the fifteen members of the committee, two were women, one a principal of a secondary school and another representing the Abuja municipal council. This means only one woman was chosen to represent the community. It should be recalled that no specific guidelines were given for the selection of members but ethnic origin played a major role. When asked if gender was considered during the selection process, community leaders replied in the negative. In a confirmation of the primary role of ethnicity, the reason given for the selection of the sole female member was that she was to represent a particular geopolitical zone in the country.

There are several possible explanations why no consideration was given to women but a major one is that women are not expected to feature in decision-making processes as dictated by the gender contract. Anschütz, draws attention to this with the observation that, in solid waste management schemes, even when women participate, their voices are seldom heard and their participation in community decision-making is minimal. In Nyanya, the women did not even make it into the partnership. I would like to address this in the context of ongoing changes in Nyanya. Forsberg points out that in places where there is an ongoing economic transformation, gender contracts or relations would also be subject to changes. Interviews, supported by secondary sources, showed that Nyanya was largely an agrarian community before Abuja became the capital. As reflected earlier by the women in the focus group meeting, the division of labour was that women stayed at home and took care of practical tasks while men went to the farm. Things have changed and Nyanya is no longer the predominantly agrarian society it used to be.

In addition to the changes mentioned above, attention has been drawn to the loss of male breadwinners in the developing world context. The increasing participation of women in economic activities has been captured by a well-developed literature on gender and global/national economic restructuring. A common outcome of restructuring, often reported is that women have been ‘forced’ to take on economic activities, mainly in the informal sector, to supplement the family income. In Nyanya, interviews revealed that unemployment was high but alongside this is the increasing participation of women in the informal sector. In a focus group meeting with members of the GWA, the women acknowledged that due to economic hardships, most of them were engaged in petty trading in the local market selling fire-
wood and various food items. A result is that women now make contributions to household finances. They cited the payment of children’s school fees, the purchase of school uniforms, and food. It should be recalled that it is the same group of women who said earlier that it was their duty to stay at home, to clean, cook and take care of the children. Most male respondents admitted that their wives made contributions to the household income. This suggests a change in gender roles or contract but the change is limited.

In Mexico, a study reported that as a result of the increasing participation of women in export-oriented production, some men adjusted their working hours so one parent was available during the day while the other was at work. For example, men cooked, cleaned, shopped and took care of the children while the women were at work. This does not mean that men took equal responsibility for household management but, as Pearson points out, it does show some response to the changing employment patterns of women. No such response was observed in Nyanya. While the women are crossing the ‘gender boundary’ to earn a living and help take care of family needs, there is no corresponding movement of men into the traditional female sphere of cleaning and cooking. In a focus group meeting with a group of women employed to clean Nyanya market, it was revealed that they left for work at 6 a.m. and returned at 1 p.m. To do this, they had to wake up very early to clean their houses and upon their return start preparing the family meal. Those who had grown-up children said they sometimes got some assistance from them. This is not unique to Nyanya as Moser found out in Ecuador:

Women, unlike men are primarily involved in other forms of work relating to their reproductive roles. Acceptance of the sexual division of labour, and the home as their sphere of dominance, has meant that women take primary responsibility for the provision of consumption needs within the household…

In Nyanya, the women added that even though their work burden had increased, they did not expect to get any help from their husbands in relation to household tasks. When asked why, the first reaction was laughter, possibly suggesting that it was a ridiculous idea. They then explained that whatever the case, it was their duty to take care of the home. A similar reaction came from the chief of Nyanya who acknowledged that “things have changed today” and that some women engage in income-generating activities outside the home to provide for the family but, “no matter how rich or successful a woman is”, she cannot be the head of the family. As he saw it, a woman is always under “the authority of her husband”. A common opinion among

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677 See Pearson 2000
678 Pearson 2000
679 Focus group meeting held in 2005
680 Moser 1987, p. 167
male respondents was that they did not expect their wives’ financial contributions to necessarily give them greater scope or power in decision-making in the home.

In trying to introduce a gender dimension to the failure of the solid waste project, I asked the chief of Nyanya if, as chairman of the PMC, he thought the committee would have performed better if women had played a more active role. He agreed that the PMC would have performed better but because “women would have encouraged men”. The same question was put to members of the GWA in the focus group meeting. I was also told that the PMC would have performed better since they (women) know the community better and would have given useful advice to the men. This confirms the report from Anschütz noted earlier that women have a greater knowledge of the community. More crucial, it confirms the presence of a gender contract. Both men and women seemed to agree that decision-making was not a task for women. A similar result was observed in Guayaquil, Ecuador, where, even though women made up the majority of the members of committees formed around services, most had men as presidents and women did not see themselves as leaders.

In addition to the absence of women from the PMC, there was also the gendering of employment. The notion that ‘paid work is men’s work’ is traceable to the separation of private/public, home/work and place/space. In the case of Europe, the argument is that major socioeconomic and geographical changes from the 15th century onwards had contributed to the categorization of home as place and separate from work. Only work that included wages was defined as work and even when women contributed to the economy, it was “not-work”. Before this time, there were no clear divisions. A reflection of this argument in the case of solid waste management is the notion that men get involved only when there is pay involved while women are not expected to be paid, even in activities such as community clean-ups and street sweeping. For example, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, a community organization employed only men first “arguing that garbage collection was a ‘typical’ job for men.” In Nyanya, women were not employed as waste collectors by the committee. When asked why, the secretary opined that waste collection is not suitable for women since they do not have the required physical strength. A woman, was however, employed as the treasurer because, as the secretary saw it, women are better at managing money than men. That women and men not only manage money differently

681 Interview in 2005
682 Moser 1987, p. 176
683 Domosh and Seager 2001, p. 2
684 Domosh and Seager 2001, p. 37
685 Scheinberg et al., 1999
686 Scheinberg et al., 1999, p. 11. This later changed when the project was not yielding the expected benefits. Women were then employed and the situation improved.
but that women do so more responsibly has been observed in community-based solid waste schemes. Another possible explanation is the common belief that women are better suited for jobs that require tedious repetitive tasks. Managing and accounting for money apparently fit this description.

The State as a Participant

A major way in which the state can address gender imbalances is through the formulation of gender-sensitive policies (Chapter Three). In Nigeria, there is no comprehensive policy on solid waste management and this removes this possibility. However, in Nyanya, there was the opportunity to introduce gender-sensitivity during the process of formulating the objectives for the project. A cursory look at the objectives presented earlier in this chapter would reveal a notable absence of any reference to gender even though social interest groups such as informal waste collectors, youths and the private sector were acknowledged. There are cases where the deliberate targeting of women in project documents has enhanced their participation in community projects. In Faisalabad, Pakistan, even though a slum development programme is reported to have had limited impact on poorer and marginalized groups, the most significant impacts were on women because the project considered gender to be an issue right from the outset. The relevance of this was confirmed in Nyanya, where three years after being told about the possibility of waste sorting and recycling, women were still coming to ask for updates. The suggestion is that if these activities had been implemented, women would have gained financially from it. The failure to see women as a social group and to recognize their interests in the objectives of the project was the starting point for their exclusion.

The process of mobilization is another opportunity for the state to make some impact. We now know that traditional rulers were the first to be contacted by state officials. Since there are no female chiefs in Nyanya, women did not feature at this stage. Next were the associations. This is where reference was made to the women’s wing of the Nyanya Market Association. Contact is said to have been made with the head of the association who was told to call a meeting of her members, inform them about the project and seek their cooperation. This was the only time women were mentioned during interviews without any prompting from me. However, there was no evidence that this women’s wing played any role beyond the mobilization phase, if at all it did.

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687 Scheinberg et al., 1999
688 Marchand and Runyan 2000, p. 16
689 Phillips 2002, p. 143
690 Interview, Secretary PMC, 2004.
691 Interview with Assistant Director (FME) 2003. I was unable to confirm this due to changes in the leadership of the union and the difficulty of tracing the said leader.
Another major stage is the selection of members into the committee. There is no evidence of any affirmative action on the part of the state to facilitate the inclusion of women. The representative of the FME, the initiator of the project acknowledged that attention was not given to gender during the planning stages. A study in India on a slum improvement project noted that in cases where gender systems are particularly problematic, one option is the setting up of separate women’s committees.

In some cases, separate women’s committees were established in recognition that women would need space to overcome social and cultural norms which discouraged their participation in community decision-making.\textsuperscript{692}

That the creation of separate committees appears to have worked in the Indian case does not necessarily mean it would have succeeded in Nyanya but it does show a determined effort to get women involved in the project which was lacking in Nyanya.

Another relevant factor is the extent of decentralization. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, women groups have been able to form community-based solid waste schemes and enter into ‘partnerships’ with local governments.\textsuperscript{693} This means that women have access to and contacts with local state officials. Though not a guarantee, this outcome is possible only when the local government has the responsibility for services. This is not the case in Abuja. Despite this, the observation is that the municipal council is the only state institution whose officials have contacts with women. This is limited to areas where the municipal council has jurisdiction. For example, the women referred to earlier, who were employed to clean Nyanya market, were employed by the municipal council. This is possible because the council has jurisdiction over markets. I came across some of them on a visit to the council headquarters. Earlier, they had informed me that the employment started in July 2004. The wages were quite low, N2000 a month (about 15 USD), but it was important to them. It was the first time they had been given an opportunity to earn an income and they were very enthusiastic about it. While this does not show the same level of contacts identified in the Tanzanian case, it does imply that the municipal council has the potential to enhance the participation of women in governance activities and in solid waste management in particular.

However, it is worth pointing out that, it is not my intention to romanticize the role of local governments. As Beall observed in relation to South Africa, decentralization to local governments does not automatically enhance the participation of women.\textsuperscript{694} A major problem identified is the tendency of local governments to rely on traditional institutions which limits the space

\textsuperscript{692} Phillips, 2002, p. 138
\textsuperscript{693} Majani 2000
\textsuperscript{694} Beall 2005
for women’s participation. There is a high possibility of a similar outcome in Nyanya if the local government is given more powers. This is because it has already been established that municipal officials have close contacts with traditional authorities. As has been confirmed, traditional authorities are likely to limit the space for women’s participation. Furthermore, relations between the women and council officials have not been perfect. The women complained that while they were employed in July 2004, they were not paid until October. Thereafter, there was a lull in activities but things picked up again in January 2005 and their salary was doubled, but by May of 2005, the salary had gone back to the previous figure. They then decided to complain to the chairman of the council who promised to intervene. At the time of the interview in July 2005, the women were anxiously waiting for developments. However, it is worth acknowledging that the employment has opened up some channels of communication between the women and the council.

Summary

This chapter examined the complex processes that often arise in state-community relations, through a focus on a partnership in Nyanya. The evidence presented suggests that it was a failure. The PMC, which symbolized the partnership, was to become a ‘permanent’ fixture of solid waste management but functioned only for a brief period. Several possible explanations for the failure were documented. These include the allocation of functions in such a way that the initiator of the project, the Federal Ministry of Environment was given most of the tasks. Others were the strategy of using finance to exert influence, the taking of decisions outside the PMC and mutual mistrust among state and community members. On the part of community leaders, lack of commitment and intra-group differences were mentioned. However, particular attention was given to the linkage between traditional authorities and the state in an attempt to emphasize the specificity of Abuja. The existing political arrangement at the city level in terms of the state institutional and administrative framework removes a useful link through which traditional authorities can exert influence. This is related to the marginal role of the municipal council. The role of the symbolic character of Abuja in terms of the deliberate attempt by the government to weaken the influence of traditional authorities in the city was also examined. The existence of traditional authorities is contrary to the vision of Abuja as a place where all Nigerians are to have a sense of belonging and equal opportunities.

The chapter ended with an examination of the gender dimensions of the partnership and project. As documented, women were not visible; an outcome traced to the gendered nature of the sector but particularly due to the intersection of traditional and state practices. The state failed to make an impact through the project objectives, mobilization and the composition of
the committee. At the level of the community, the PMC or partnership fell into the decision-making and hence male sphere, an area not associated with women.
There are no facilities for solid waste disposal within Nyanya. The indigenes are very enthusiastic about this project. They are hoping that, things would work out for them this time. We were besieged by interested people.695

Introduction
The desire to get households or individuals more involved in service delivery is now a common agenda of city governments, a development that can be attributed to ‘good governance’ and the emphasis on participation. Abuja is no different. The previous chapter documented the solid waste project that was launched in Nyanya to promote community participation. However, the focus was on the partnership between the state and community leaders. The project was about much more than the partnership. Indeed, the partnership can be seen as a means to an end. In his opening address at the launching of the project, the Minister representing the Federal Ministry of Environment made reference to the desire to create awareness and to mobilize the people against a filthy environment.696 To this end, the cooperation of the people was needed in areas such as proper waste handling practices and payment for services. However, cooperation may not be an easy task to achieve. The Minister seemed to have acknowledged this by pointing out that “there is no community without is [sic] bad eggs”.697 As he saw it, the solution was to put in place some enforcement measures that would serve as punishment for defaulters.

The excerpt at the beginning of this chapter is taken from a government-commissioned study on Nyanya. The report highlights some issues that are relevant to this discussion. It confirms the poor state of solid waste services

695 Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board, 2001a, p. 8
696 Speech by the Minister, Federal Ministry of Environment at the launching of the project on June 14, 2001, p.3.
697 Speech by the Minister, Federal Ministry of Environment at the launching of the project on June 14, 2001, p. 3
in the community. It suggests that the community’s hope for a clean environment has been raised and dashed many times, which implies the difficulty of finding a sustainable way of handling solid waste management there. We are told that the people were very enthusiastic about the prospect of the solid waste project, but why did they not initiate the action themselves? The solution suggested by the Minister appears to be too simplistic to address the complex factors that shape popular participation. What is involved goes beyond the behaviour of a few individuals or poor social habits to the type of service, community-level relations and local politics. The aim of this chapter is to examine the complex factors that shape popular participation in solid waste management but with special interest in the role of intra-community relations and local politics.

This chapter addresses the research question which seeks to identify the factors shaping popular participation and the extent to which the outcome is a reflection of the characteristics of a place. The analysis is structured around the sector-related, social and political themes. The sector-related examines the low priority given to waste and the tendency to see waste as the responsibility of the government. It is useful to have this discussion first because it provides a relevant background to the rest of the discussion. The contention is that how people handle waste or their willingness to organize around the sector, which are the major themes examined after, are also often influenced by the priority given to it or their perceptions of the government’s role. The discussion on waste handling practices draws attention to the performance of providers and the social practices of the people. The rest of the chapter examines the political dimension of popular participation through two topics: self-help initiatives and protests against poor services. The former highlights the history of collective action, the types of organizations and heterogeneity on the basis of ethnicity. The latter emphasizes the content and nature of local politics as well as the state institutional and administrative framework at the city level.

The bulk of the data is from interviews with households, community leaders and state officials.

The Low Priority Given to Waste

Waste is noted to be low on the priority list for most African governments and people. In a national poll in Nigeria, people were asked to rank services in order of priority, indicating which ones they would like their local governments to spend money on. A striking feature was that solid waste management was not listed as one of the desired services by the organizers.

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698 Onibokun 1999
of the poll. The list comprised health, roads, water, education and farming and a category called ‘any other’. Furthermore, the low ranking of waste is more pronounced in low-income areas:

In low-income residential areas where most services are unsatisfactory, residents normally give priority to water supply, electricity, roads, drains and sanitary services. Solid waste is commonly dumped onto nearby open sites, along main roads or railroad tracks, or into drains and waterways.701

The above aptly describes the situation in Nyanya. It is a predominantly low-income settlement where most services are unsatisfactory (Chapter Two). This study found out that solid waste services occupy a very low position on the priority list of residents. In interviews with residents, when asked about the general state of services in the community, waste was seldom mentioned. In the structured interview with sixty households, out of six services - roads, electricity, water, school, hospitals and waste - 20 respondents ranked water as number one. Solid waste was ranked last as number six by 33 respondents, more than half of the total. Only 5 ranked it as number one. Anschütz observes that the ranking of water as number one is common in low income communities due to the belief that the threats associated with poor solid waste management are not as immediate as those that come from a lack of water.702 A similar argument is advanced by Ali and Snel who point out that people do not often see the relation between waste collection and improved health benefits.703 In Nyanya, when asked why waste was ranked as the least important, the common explanation was simply that other services were more important. The few who gave priority to waste cited the threat of diseases as the main reason. However, the awareness of solid waste management problems and its priority differs between places. For example, a study in Cairo, Egypt, reported that people were primarily concerned with the problems they could see and experience and hence ranked solid waste disposal as the number one environmental problem.704 Air pollution and water supply were ranked second and third respectively.

Public or Private Good?

The nature of solid waste management as both a public and private good is another aspect that makes cooperation particularly difficult. As a private good, users or producers of waste are expected to pay for services and this is

700 Health was ranked first followed by education, roads and water.
701 Schübler et al., 1996, p. 20
702 Anschütz 1996
703 Ali and Snel 1999
704 See Myllylä 2001. The original study was conducted by Hopkins et al., 1995
often the rationale for privatization.\textsuperscript{705} While there is the notion that waste services can easily be converted into a private good since such services are easily “divisible among consumers”\textsuperscript{706}, in practice, the problem is much more complex due to the consequences for public health. Cointreau-Levine reports that as a public good, solid waste management is considered as nonexclusive, nonrivalled and essential and the primary responsibility of municipalities.\textsuperscript{707} It is thought of as nonexclusive because once provided to some, it benefits everyone in the community and not just the resident who receives the service; nonrivalled since anyone can enjoy the service without diminishing the benefit to others; and essential because it is not feasible to deny service to those who do not pay, since public health would be endangered.

A major point raised above that has relevance for popular participation is the tendency to see waste as a public good and hence the responsibility of the government. In a study in Bangalore, India, Beall observed that despite “their low opinion of and faith in the municipal waste collection services, householders all saw the Bangalore City Corporation as ultimately responsible for SWM in the city”.\textsuperscript{708} The same was observed in a study in Ibadan, Nigeria:

On the one hand, most segments of the population believe that they should not bear any responsibility whatsoever for waste collection and disposal, as they consider it a social service and the responsibility of the local governments.\textsuperscript{709}

The story is the same in Abuja:

When it comes to [sic] Environment/Sanitation, the people see it as the sole responsibility of the government, that government should clean the environment including their homes for them as a social obligation.\textsuperscript{710}

There is a hint of exaggeration in the statement that people want the government to clean their homes for them above, but what is evident is that though this is a common problem, the perception that the government should be responsible for solid waste management appears pronounced in Abuja:

It is not easy for people to sit down and conceive ideas about solid waste management especially in a capital city which is seen as belonging to government.\textsuperscript{711}

\textsuperscript{705} Interview with Assistant Director (FME) 2003
\textsuperscript{706} Baud and Post 2003, p. 47
\textsuperscript{707} Cointreau-Levine 1994, p. 1
\textsuperscript{708} Beall 1997, p. 955
\textsuperscript{709} Onibokun and Kumuyi 1999, p. 91
\textsuperscript{710} Mohammed 2004, p. 8
\textsuperscript{711} Interview, Secretary PMC, 2004.
What I would, at this time, call the ‘Abuja factor’ is evident in the above comment from a community leader in Nyanya. In a confirmation of his opinion, in interviews with households, there were comments such as “this is the FCT”, “this is Abuja” and the “government should do something”. These comments portray the perceptions of the people about Abuja as a place.

Another problem linked to the perception of solid waste management as a public good and the responsibility of the government is free-riding. Free-riding occurs when those who have not contributed to a service end up benefiting.712 As noted earlier, in solid waste management, it is not feasible to deny services to those unwilling to cooperate due to the implications for public health. For example, when solid waste services were privatized in Abuja, in 2003, contractors were told by the city government, to extend services to everyone including those unable or unwilling to pay. The same was the case in Nyanya during the solid waste project in 2001. Painter’s comments on collective action sums up the implication for free-riding:

> Because cooperation involves the expenditure of time and effort, and the subordination of immediate interests to long-term and possibly rather uncertain future gains, individuals have little incentive to cooperate, especially if any longer-term benefits that are produced are likely to be distributed widely.713

Beall, in the previously mentioned study in Bangalore, India also noted the problem of free-riding in solid waste management. She observed that most households were prepared to enjoy the service but not ready to get directly involved.714 The specificity of solid waste management is evident. While free-riding can be a common problem, it is easier to manage in other services. For example, it is easier to disconnect users from services such as electricity and water compared to that of solid waste which carries a health risk to the entire community. The incentive to participate is therefore less in the case of solid waste management. While the comments by Painter above are not on solid waste management, his views confirm the specificity of the sector. People will have less incentive to participate in a sector like solid waste management because the benefits are distributed widely.

It is also worth mentioning that the perception of waste as a public good, and hence the responsibility of the government has specific implications for sustainability of solid waste schemes. A study in India observed that it has implications for the overall sustainability of any solid waste management scheme.

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712 Free riding occurs when consumers use or benefit from a public good without contributing to its creation (Painter 1997).
713 Painter 1997, p. 133
714 Beall 1997, p. 955
Even quite successful initiatives are faced with households unwilling to pay ... Citizens’ initiatives are dependent on the goodwill and commitment of the residents, as they are not recognized by the municipal authorities. 715

In Nyanya, solid waste services had always been provided free by the government, even when a private contractor was hired to provide services in the 1980s. In line with the desire of the government to reduce its financial commitment, the expectation was that users should start paying for services. When residents were told to pay collection fees for the first time in 2001, under the solid waste project, they resisted. In a meeting with state officials, community leaders argued that waste was a social service and should be provided free by the government. 716 However, in interviews with residents, they blamed the poor performance of the providers. Some indicated that they were paying when services were provided but stopped when the level and quality of services declined or stopped altogether. Some added that the fact that they were paying informal waste collectors to dispose of their waste suggests that they are willing to pay for services.

Waste Handling Practices

Apart from the problems of low priority given to waste and the perception that it should be provided free by the government, an examination of waste handling practices will reveal other aspects of people’s behaviour. Waste handling practices, as presented in this chapter, refers to the proper storage of waste and the use of public collection points. The other aspects cited in the statement below - waste separation and placement of containers - are not relevant since waste separation is non-existent and households have no standardized containers. 717

Even where waste collection services are provided by municipal authorities, user cooperation is essential regarding such factors as proper storage of household waste, waste separation, placement of household containers and discipline in the use of public collection points. 718

Historically, residents of Nyanya have used sub-standard equipment for waste storage. A study conducted by Ogwuda in 1995 showed that residents used unsuitable equipment such as baskets and cartons. 719 The solid waste project in 2001 provided the first opportunity for residents to use proper storage bags. About 350 bags were distributed free to residents as a way of

715 Zurbrügg et al., 2004
716 Interviews with Deputy Director (FME) and Secretary (PMC) 2004.
717 This was discussed in more detail in chapter five.
718 Schübler et al, 1996, p. 36
719 Ogwuda 1995
encouraging the proper storage of waste.\textsuperscript{720} Prior to this time, the usual practice was for residents to drop their waste at designated communal points from which the Board would collect the waste for onward transportation to the final disposal site. This system did not give any consideration to how the waste was to be stored before disposal. The use of proper storage bags was, however short-lived. When residents were told to start paying the sum of N20 (about 0.06USD) per bag, they protested.\textsuperscript{721} As this study found out, the problem continues. In the structured interview with 60 households, 29 said they used plastic bags (not the recommended type), 27 used buckets and the remaining 4 other sub-standard equipments. A government publication acknowledged that the absence of waste bins for houses has encouraged “indiscriminate refuse dumps near residential homes”.\textsuperscript{722}

Discipline in the use of communal disposal points is another major problem. There are no figures for waste generation in Nyanya\textsuperscript{723} but what is not in doubt is that some of this waste ends up in unauthorized places: between and at the back of houses and in public spaces (see Figure 17). A visit to Nyanya in 2002, a year after the solid waste project was launched revealed major improvements in sanitation but a subsequent trip, a year later in 2003, showed that sanitary conditions had deteriorated considerably. This was confirmed by state officials and community leaders. The problem of blocked drainage and indiscriminate littering had reappeared. Nyanya has a history of the illegal dumping of waste. Ogwuda, in her study also observed that even though there was quite a number of legal dumping points, the majority of residents still disposed of their waste on streets and about 15\% of the 450 respondents admitted to disposing of their waste in drainage channels.\textsuperscript{724}

Several factors account for the poor disposal practices. As Ogwuda found out, distance to collection points is one of the problems encouraging illegal dumping of waste in Nyanya.\textsuperscript{725} Those who lived far away were more likely to engage in the practice. This study found out that, as part of the solid waste project in 2001, two types of disposal points were identified: primary and secondary. The former were located close to houses while the latter, in the form of transfer stations, were located further away. The primary collection points were subsequently closed down and transformed into gardens. Based on personal observation, this certainly beautified the environment but could have reinforced the problem of illegal dumping since some residents now had to walk greater distances to the secondary points.

\textsuperscript{720} Based on interviews with the Secretary (PMC) and Assistant Director (FME) in 2003
\textsuperscript{721} Interview, Secretary (PMC) 2003. A major complaint was that waste was not being evacuated on time and hence there saw no reason to buy bags.
\textsuperscript{722} Federal Ministry of Environment 2001, p. 9
\textsuperscript{723} Several attempts to get the figures arrived at by the firm that carried out the feasibility study failed because the government had not paid them for their services and they did not trust me enough to give me the information.
\textsuperscript{724} Ogwuda 1995
\textsuperscript{725} Ogwuda 1995
In what can be seen as a reflection of the spatial differentiation of services and infrastructure in Nyanya, no transfer stations were located in the village. This meant that after the closure of the primary collection points, residents from the village had to walk longer distances. A related problem is inadequate disposal points. Community leaders complained that the number of transfer stations built under the solid waste project were not enough. Only ten out of the projected thirty-two stations were constructed.

The poor quality of disposal facilities also appeared to have aided the illegal dumping of waste. Most of the transfer stations built collapsed due to poor construction and engineering. In addition, it was later discovered that the transfer stations were too high for children who constitute a proportion of those responsible for waste disposal. Furthermore, the design was found to be defective for the tipping trucks being used to collect and transport the waste. As a result, informal waste collectors were hired to climb up to shovel the waste into the trucks. During this process, as observed on a visit to Nyanya and confirmed in interviews with community leaders, a lot of waste

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726 The lack of roads in this part of the settlement for waste collection vehicles to use is an obvious explanation.
727 Of the 60 households interviewed, 13 said children were responsible for transporting waste to the disposal points.
ended up on the ground surrounding the transfer station rather than in it (see Figure 15).

Social values and practices also contribute to poor waste handling habits. A study in Ghana reported that imbibed behavioural patterns and acquired values were superimposed on recommended waste practices and that this often resulted in poor disposal habits.  

Reference has already been made to the case of Abeokuta in colonial Nigeria (Chapter Two). In the case of Abeokuta, there was the belief that the epidemic that had arisen as a result of poor sanitary conditions was caused by the “sopona god” and could only be tackled if the god was appeased. No such dramatic incidents were observed in Nyanya, but the problem was manifested in other ways. State officials and community leaders alleged that some residents waited until it was dark (night) and then sent their children to dump waste at intersection points or other public spaces. In another example, among the Gbagyis, waste is traditionally disposed of at the back of houses and thereafter burnt and used on the farms during the rainy season. The practice of dumping waste behind houses continues today.

The need for force or threat of force to ensure compliance can also be linked to the social habits of the people. Environmental health officers from the municipal council whose main duty is to enforce sanitary regulations pointed out that they had contended with the reluctance of residents to adopt proper waste disposal habits for a long time. As one put it, residents comply only when threatened and not because they see compliance as good for their health or welfare. To further reinforce her argument, the health officer added that whenever the municipal council was unable to carry out inspections for a considerable length of time due to shortage of staff and finance, sanitary conditions often deteriorated.

A further confirmation of the relevance of social practices is the need for the National Environmental Sanitation Programme (NESP), a nation-wide federal government initiative launched in 1985. Under the NESP, the last Saturday of every month is set aside to be observed as a sanitation day. The movements of people and vehicles are restricted within a specified period, during which residents are expected to clean their immediate surroundings. The success of NESP in Nigeria has been questioned as it is alleged that residents only complied due to the threat of force and that they went back to their old habits of indiscriminate dumping and littering soon after. 

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728 Kendie 1999
729 Akinyele 2004, pp. 301
730 Interview with chief of Nyanya, 2005.
731 An example of a resident who disregarded several warnings to pay a fine for illegal dumping but promptly complied when threatened with imprisonment was given in an interview with the Secretary of PMC in 2005
732 Anozie 1994
733 Anozie 1994
ing the introduction of the solid waste project in Nyanya in 2001, a decision was taken to abolish the NESP, based on the belief that it was no longer needed. We now know that the project was a failure (Chapter Seven). The subsequent deterioration of sanitary conditions that followed was blamed on the cancellation of the NESP. This led to a reversal and sanitation days were re-introduced. The problem is that, as has been observed, while such efforts can produce temporary benefits, if there is a lack of social cohesion and control in the community, it is not a sustainable solution. A study in Nyanya confirmed this by reporting that the settlement was often clean immediately after sanitation days but sanitary conditions often deteriorated soon afterwards.

A related problem is the lack of education and awareness on environmental matters. A study in Nepal reported that after a clean-up campaign, the behaviour of households did not change since they went back to putting their waste in the courtyard. However, the situation improved following an extensive education campaign which led to a change in the perception and behaviour of households. In an interview with a traditional ruler in Nyanya, he identified the lack of education as the single most important problem facing solid waste management in the settlement. In his opinion, most of the people are illiterate and largely ignorant of environmental issues. In a seeming acknowledgement of the relevance of education, another community leader pointed out that the level of education of residents had been one of the factors used to determine the location of primary collection points during the solid waste project. Those with little or no education were considered more likely to dump waste illegally, which explains the decision to site many collection points in the areas identified as having a large population of uneducated people. Class is an underlying element or is implicated when addressing the role of education. In a study in Cairo, Egypt, it was reported that the upper middle class often blamed the poor for environmental problems while the poor blamed themselves. This suggests a link between class and poor waste handling practices. In practice, the situation may be more complex. For example, in Nyanya, a report drew attention to the “mountain of refuse by the central market, the blocked gutter by more powerful citizens”. In this case, the richer members of the community were the guilty ones.

734 Interview with Community Development Officer (AMAC) 2003
735 Anschütz 1996, p. 30
736 Ogwuda 1995
737 Anschütz 1996, p. 30
739 Interview with Secretary (PMC) 2005
740 Myllylä 2001
741 Federal Ministry of Environment and Abuja Environmental Protection Board 2001, p. 9
The Absence of Self-Help Initiatives

The failure of the state to provide adequate services is often cited as the primary reason for self-help or collective initiatives in solid waste management (Chapter One). A study in India confirmed this by attributing the presence of numerous community initiatives to the “unbearable solid waste conditions in residential areas”. In this case, the people took action because of deteriorating sanitary conditions but community action can also be influenced by other factors. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, apart from the concern for deteriorating sanitary conditions, unemployment, the absence of income-generating opportunities in other sectors, and the safety of children after a child was knocked down by a car while on his way to dispose of waste were the reasons why a group of women launched a community initiative. The Dar es Salaam case introduces another form of community action, the one aimed at economic benefits. This type is, however, not the focus here. I am more interested in attempts to improve the quality of services.

If the failure of the state to provide services is enough to spur community action, then community initiatives should be thriving in Nyanya. This is because the community has faced huge solid waste management problems over the years as has been documented. However, the NESP is the closest to community action but it should be recalled that it is a government initiative. The question is, what are the characteristics of Nyanya that make community action particularly difficult?

History of Collective Action

Experience gained from prior involvement can be useful in initiating community efforts in service delivery. In a reference to Kano, Nigeria, Andrae reports that community-based self help groups are able to build on traditions of communal labour in supplementing public services. However, it is obvious that the age of the settlement is a factor. This was noted in the discussion on social capital in Chapter Three. Older settlements are more likely to have stronger community ties and hence greater cooperation in initiating solid waste schemes. Abuja is a relatively new city, which means there is less to build on. In addition, in Nyanya, the traditional approach to solid waste management does not encourage collective efforts. It relies on an unspoken agreement that each household is expected to keep its immediate surroundings clean and hence renders collective effort unnecessary. This approach may have worked when Nyanya was made up of only the indige-

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742 Zurbrügg et al., 2004
743 Bakker at al., p. 9
744 Andrae 2005, p. 131
745 Pargal et al., 1999
746 Focus group meeting with GWA, 2004
nous ethnic group and probably a more closely knit society, but it is clearly not enough in today’s circumstances where the settlement is more diverse. A community leader claimed that some social groups sometimes evacuate waste and clear blocked drains. This was countered by another leader who saw this action as an exception that occurred only because the people were hoping to make some financial gains from the solid waste project of 2001. The only visible forms of ‘collective’ initiatives are those with economic motives as seen through the activities of the informal waste collectors and scavengers. The scavengers have been able to form a union made up of about 200 members. They have chairman, vice chairman, secretary and public relations officer. Their activities revolve around the collection of recyclables, such as plastics, iron and bottles, which they sell through middle men. Informal waste collectors also have a union and have played the important role of filling the gap left by the state. As mentioned earlier, these types of initiatives (economic motives) are, however, not the focus of this discussion.

The Role of Community Organizations

In a study on community based-solid waste schemes, Ali and Snel observed three broad categories of primary collection initiatives. The first is when an activist or group of households obtains the services of a person, agreeing to a minimum fee and paying individually. In the second, an activist or group of households manages the system, arranging the collection of fees and payment to the contractor. The third involves a small contracting operation where an individual or group starts the collection as a business taking on various risks including responsibility for investments and employment of waste collectors. For these to take place, Ali and Snel identified three major actors: households, waste collectors and intermediary organizations such as NGOs, and CBOs. However, an initiator is needed. This is where NGOs, CBOs and other community groups become crucial. NGOs, as has been observed, can increase people’s awareness of solid waste management problems and improve their organizational capacity. Beall, in the study in Bangalore, India, identified some categories of NGOs in this context. Some are concerned with poverty reduction and social justice using waste recovery and recycling for social mobilization amongst children. Others are concerned with environmental advocacy and have initiated city-wide schemes. Crucially, Beall reports that in low-income areas, NGOs are catalysts for CBOs in self-help schemes.
Some of the conditions identified by Ali and Snel earlier exist in Nyanya. For example, as a result of the poor state of services, there are households in need of services and (informal) waste collectors to offer those services. A major problem is that there are no activists in the form of NGOs or CBOs to bring the two together to produce the types of initiatives Ali and Snel found in their study. No organizations or individuals interested in initiating solid waste services were found in Nyanya.

Ethnic Heterogeneity and Lack of Sense of Belonging

Heterogeneity in its various forms (class, race, religion, and ethnicity) is common in cities and can affect collective action in a number of ways. One way in which this is relevant is through the effect on social capital. Heterogeneity can weaken social cohesion between groups and hence reduce the likelihood of collective action (Chapter Three). However, my interest is to go beyond measures of social capital to include the political characteristics of the place. A useful starting point in addressing the problem of heterogeneity in Nyanya is to identify what people organize around. The people organize around economic or income-generating activities. In addition to the ones mentioned in Chapter Seven, there is the women’s organization, the Akpu Dealers Association whose activities centre on the processing of cassava. In relation to solid waste management, the informal waste collectors and scavengers can also be put in this group. However, what is more relevant here is that the people organize mainly along ethnic lines as pointed out by a leader:

> The number of organizations in Nyanya is high. Many are tribal organizations. Organizing around services is low.\(^752\)

At this point, reference can be made to the discussion on community in Chapter Three. The place perspective of community is when people have an interest in something that is geographical, that is, limited to a specific place. We can put solid waste management in this category. However, a community is also defined in terms of interest and in this case, people share things other than place and ethnic origin was cited as one. How does Nyanya fit into these two definitions?

It was pointed out in Chapter Three that a community can transcend differences and initiate or join collective efforts if some indicators are present. Trust and reciprocity were mentioned. In the case of solid waste management, Pargal et al. report that trust has little relevance in community action.

We conjecture that the relatively low stakes involved, and the transactional nature of coordinated action for solid waste disposal may mean that trust between neighbors is not particularly important for setting up such systems. Af-

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752 Interview with Secretary, PMC, 2004.
Of the three norms of trust, reciprocity and sharing, reciprocity was found by the authors to have the “greatest impact” and best represented the “relationship underlying the phenomenon of organizing for SWM in the neighbourhood”.  

In a study on social movements in South Africa, Stokke and Oldfield identified “self-reflexive identities among actors” as one of the factors influencing collective action. In this particular case, the production of collective identities by social movements was noted. The suggestion is that, where this exists, actors can overcome differences to initiate collective action. The question is, do the conditions for the production of collective identities exist in Nyanya? In the production of collective identities, past experiences, largely based on the struggle against apartheid was observed as useful in the South African case. On the surface, it should not be too difficult to produce collective identities in Nyanya if we recall that the settlement is located in the Federal Capital Territory, a place where everyone is expected to have a sense of belonging and hence attachment to. However, in a reference to Abuja and the rural/urban, Moslem/Christian and ethnic divide in Nigeria, Vale points out that national identity is easy to claim but difficult to implement. This statement confirms this opinion:

[Also], there have been complaints in some quarters that Abuja has been cornered by a section of the country both in terms of the ethnic distribution of its administrative staff, the dominant culture, and the character of the city’s official architectural designs.

There is obviously the suspicion by some that some ethnic groups are marginalizing others in Abuja. Instead of the goal of achieving national unity, Abuja may be reinforcing ethnic differences. Vale echoes this by noting that Abuja contributes more to divisiveness than unity since it is becoming a symbol of the North-South discord.

How is the divisiveness of Abuja or ethnic differences manifested in community action in solid waste management in Nyanya? We now know that the people tend to organize mainly along ethnic lines, especially in the form of hometown associations. This type of associational life is a common

753 Pargal et al., 1999, p 19
754 Pargal et al., 1999, p. 18
755 Vale 1992, p. 145
756 The Guardian Editorial Opinion (2006, 5 November)
757 Vale 1992, p. 139
In terms of larger political issues, these organizations concerned themselves with struggling for resources to be allocated to their home towns, villages, or neighbourhoods.\footnote{Mabogunje 1990 cited in Aina 1997, p. 429}

In Nyanya, the hometown associations meet monthly and members pay dues and raise money for specific projects in their villages. The associations also help members through contributions towards childbirth, wedding and funeral expenses. However, the implication for community action is reflected in this statement by a community leader:

> While people are willing to contribute money to develop their home towns, they wouldn’t develop Nyanya.\footnote{Interview with Secretary (PMC) 2004}

This problem is common in urban centres where people consider themselves temporary residents hoping to go back to their place of birth (Chapter Three) but the interest is to reveal the specifics of Nyanya and Abuja. For example, as implied by the community leader above, if those who have migrated to the city are not willing to invest in Nyanya, what about the indigenous population? Are they willing to invest their time and resources in community efforts? In the study in Dhaka, Bangladesh, the authors observed that people from the same ethnic group were more likely to engage in collective action.\footnote{Pargal et al., 1999} There was no evidence of this in Nyanya. A possible explanation could be the traditional approach to solid waste management, which does not encourage collective efforts, as mentioned earlier. The Dhaka study also acknowledges this by pointing out that homogeneity may have a negative side by reinforcing inertia and reluctance in changing old ways of doing things.\footnote{Pargal et al., 1999} However, the practices of a community are not fixed but are constantly being shifted, renegotiated and reinvented.\footnote{Paechter 2003, p. 71} This draws attention to the changing political and sociocultural conditions in Nyanya. At this point, it is important to recall another definition of community, noted in Chapter Three. This is the community as communion, that is, attachment to a place. Officially, Nyanya no longer ‘belongs’ to the Gbagyis. This is likely to weaken their attachment to the place. While not explicitly stated, it was quite obvious during the course of interviews that the original settlers saw Nyanya as belonging to them first and foremost and were feeling ‘threatened’. The outcome for community action is that both the indigenous groups and those

\footnote{Mabogunje 1990 cited in Aina, 1997, p.429}
who have migrated from other parts of the country to Nyanya do not have enough attachment to the place to commit their time and resources to collective efforts.

To sum up, I will go back to the question I asked earlier about how Nyanya fits into the definitions of community based on place and interest. The place perspective talks about a common interest in something that is geographical or place-specific. It applies to Nyanya to the extent that solid the problems of solid waste management are geographical. Beyond this, there is no evidence that the people see it as a common interest. In the case of community as interest, the argument is that people share things other than place and ethnicity was mentioned. This is highly relevant in this case as has been proven by the nature of associational life. It may be the more appropriate definition for Nyanya.

**Why People Do Not Protest**

Why people protest or do not protest, as in the case of self-help initiatives, is expected to be conditioned by several factors. The type of service could be a factor. Cointreau-Levine reports that “solid waste services is highly visible and uncollected waste generates strong sentiments among constituents”. 764 The problem is that this strong sentiment does not necessarily result in concrete actions on the part of users. The low priority given to waste by users including residents in Nyanya has been established. There is no record of any organized protests against the poor state of services. People are less likely to expend their time to protest in relation to a service they rank very low. Beyond this, the political arrangements and nature of politics in a place can also shape the capacity of the people to protest. In the South African study by Stokke and Oldfield referred to earlier in this chapter, they identified four sources of capacity of actors: ability to mobilize individuals and groups, relations with key actors and institutions in the political field, the ability to participate in the struggle over rights, issues and policies and self-reflexive identities. 765 The following discussion will draw on some of the issues raised by Stokke and Oldfield.

**Mobilization**

Stokke and Oldfield identified the presence of committed and continuous leadership as important for mobilization towards protests. Apart from associations or organizations, an individual can also initiate community action. I did come across a case in Kado, another part of Abuja where a resident had

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764 Cointreau-Levine 1994, p. 13
765 Stokke and Oldfield 2004, p. 130
taken some initiative to mobilize the people on water and solid waste services. The ‘activist’ started by forming a residents association through which he was able to sensitize the people on their roles and what to expect from the government. In an interview with him in 2005, he attributed his decision to experiences gained when he lived in England. According to him, through this effort, residents were able to put some pressure on the officials of the Abuja Environmental Protection Board and the contractor in charge of solid waste services in the area, and this led to improved services.

In the case of Nyanya, attention has already been drawn to the absence of activists either in the form of organizations or individuals. However, it can be argued that traditional rulers should be in a position to perform this role. It should be recalled that, their relevance in mobilization is the major reason why the government decided to go into partnership with them (Chapter Seven). There is no evidence of traditional rulers mobilizing the people around services in general including protests. There are several possible explanations but it can be linked to the nature of inter-group relations. The chief of Nyanya admitted that things were a lot easier when Nyanya consisted of only the village and he was the chief of only the Gbagyis.\textsuperscript{766} He is still the chief of Nyanya but he now has to contend with representatives of other ethnic groups. As he added, the multitude of tribes and their different understandings and cultures make his job and cooperation with the others much more challenging. The effect of this on mobilization was confirmed in a study on community initiatives in Kumasi, Ghana:

> Although the chief’s ceremonial position is usually widely acknowledged, his authority may in fact be limited. When he summons residents to take active part in a particular project only his own people (the Ashanti) will feel socially compelled to do so.\textsuperscript{767}

In the case of Nyanya, with no effective community-level structures, my observation was that the allegiance and loyalty of the people lie more with their own representatives rather than the paramount chief. Traditional rulers have close contacts and influence among their people. For example, the chief of Nyanya chairs a meeting of the Gbagyis once a month. The other traditional rulers have similar arrangements and relationships with their members.

A related factor identified by Stokke and Oldfield, is a regular forum where the residents can meet and discuss community issues, and have the ability to build alliances but at the same time not take the focus away from collective mobilization. They cite an example of a specific movement, the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign.

\textsuperscript{766} Interview, 2004.
\textsuperscript{767} Post et al., 2003
The cornerstone of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign (MPAEC) has been the weekly community meeting with large numbers of residents attending. The community meetings discuss the problems facing the community and make decisions about strategies and activities.768

In Nyanya, the regular forums where residents meet are mainly the hometown associations based on ethnic origins or the professional ones. Based on personal observation and interviews with residents, the main topics of discussion during the home town meetings are issues surrounding assistance to members or those related to the development of their places of origin. The needs of the community at large, including service delivery, are not often on the agenda.

A possible forum for traditional rulers to make an impact in mobilization is the Traditional Council of Chiefs. This is chaired by the chief of Nyanya and made up of other traditional rulers representing the various ethnic groups. However, there was no evidence that it has been a forum for mobilizing residents either towards self-help initiatives or protests against poor services. Its involvement in mobilization appears limited to the election period and is often at the initiation of the state or specific circumstances, such as the solid waste project which again was initiated by the state.

There is also a spatial dimension to the limited capacity of traditional authorities. For example, the title “chief of Nyanya” suggests that his authority extends to all parts of Nyanya but this is not feasible. Nyanya now consists of three settlements: the village, labour camp and New Layout (Chapter Two). The chief resides in the village where most of the people from his ethnic group are found. It is difficult to see how his authority can extend to the labour camp, which is largely inhabited by civil servants from all parts of the country, people who have no specific reasons to owe any allegiance to him.

The Content of Local Politics

The issues that dominate the local political agenda are likely to influence the behaviour and perceptions of the people towards participation in many aspects of city life, including protests. Stokke and Oldfield acknowledge that in South Africa, political participation is facing challenges from increasing poverty and inequality and the co-optation of civic organizations by the state. Notwithstanding that, the country has a history that facilitates protest movements. A major one is that services feature in the political agenda, an outcome related to the anti-apartheid struggle.

768 Stokke and Oldfield 2004, p. 141
Public service delivery was a key issue in the anti-apartheid struggle and has been crucial to post-apartheid attempts to ensure actual socio-economic rights.  

In another example, and a reference to solid waste management, Beall observed that in Bangalore, India, some NGOs are able to take up solid waste management as a campaign issue. In Nyanya, this study found out that issues related to service delivery are absent from the political agenda in general and local elections in particular. Local politics is largely shaped by national political circumstances, often expressed through ethnic loyalties and affiliations. While not explicitly stated, ethnic interests dominate the political scene in Nyanya. This starts with the choice of candidates. The Gbagyi, the original settlers of Nyanya, make up the single largest indigenous group in Abuja as a whole, constituting 64.9%. They also form the largest group in Nyanya. However, in line with the vision of Abuja as a symbol of national unity, other ethnic groups would want to have equal opportunities in the political arena. According to the chief of Nyanya (a Gbagyi), he encourages candidates from other ethnic groups to contest councillorship elections since without his support or that of his members, no one from another ethnic group can win. Candidates from other ethnic groups have contested and ‘won’ elections, but often with controversy. For example, the councillor elected in 2004 was from another ethnic group but accounts suggest that the election had been mired by controversies. The allegation is that the ruling party “forced” a candidate from the Gbagyi ethnic group to step down for someone from another ethnic group and this created a lot of disaffection among the Gbagyis who felt they had been “robbed”. In an interview with the councillor, the tension generated by the election and how ethnicity dominated the elections was evident. I began by asking him about the issues that dominated his campaign. Expecting to hear the usual promises of better services or tackling unemployment, I was taken aback when he responded that his job was not to represent one ethnic group but the people of Nyanya. Since I did not make any reference to ethnic differences, this clearly shows the prime attention it receives during elections.

As has been observed, a focus on a single issue and specific group interests is capable of fragmentation and the emergence of alternatives such as ethnic and religious interests. This appears to be the case in Nyanya. The pre-occupation with ethnicity leaves little room for services or the practical needs of the people. Perhaps not surprising, even when they protest, they do.

769 Stokke and Oldfield 2004, p. 136
770 Beall 1997
771 Abuja Municipal Area Council 2000
772 Based on interview with a municipal council official in 2004.
774 Harris et al., 2004, p. 19
so along ethnic lines as demonstrated by the community leader who mobilized people from his ethnic group against the payment of services (Chapter Seven).

Linkage and Relations with Key Actors

Stokke and Oldfield also cited relations with key actors and institutions in the political field as relevant to the capacity of the people to protest. They give the example of a movement, the United Civic Front of Valhalla Park, which is able to work “within and outside of state-accepted norms of behaviour”.775

The Valhalla Civic Park has chosen persistent and direct engagement with officials in the police and the health and housing departments who work in the Valhalla Park local area. By building up relationships with local officials over a long period of time, Civic Leaders have found ways in which to make them more responsive.776

The above quote contains certain implications that are crucial to understanding how relations with other actors shape protests. First, is a direct and continuous relation with those in charge of service delivery. In Nyanya, there is an elected councilor who lives in the community. In an interview, the councilor informed me that the people do go to him to complain about various problems, including services. However, the direct contact and relationship with the people, in this case, cannot enhance their capacity to protest. A major reason for this is that the councilor is not a useful target for protests. This outcome is traceable to the marginal role of the Abuja municipal council. As the councillor put it, much of the effort of the council is “subsumed under the federal”.777 The councillor has an office in the council headquarters and takes part in council affairs. However, we now know that the council has no major role in service delivery, especially solid waste management. In addition, the councillor, has no formal links with the Abuja Environmental Protection Board, which manages solid waste services and hence very little knowledge about the sector. It is not logical to protest against someone who has no influence.

Stokke and Oldfield also point to the relevance of informal networks. They note that beyond formal rights conferred by, for example, the constitution, which provides a formal framework for participation, political channels and relationships some of which take place through informal channels play a decisive role in the access to rights.778

775 Stokke and Oldfield 2004, p. 138
776 Stokke and Oldfield 2004, p. 138
778 Stokke and Oldfield 2004, p. 130
suggests the presence of informal channels in Nyanya. Specifically, I gave
the example of residents who go to his house to complain about various is-
sues. However, and for the same reason above, the marginal position of the
municipal council, there is no possibility of these informal channels being
used to facilitate protests.

Still on the linkage and relations with other actors, one of the key actors
identified by Stokke and Oldfield is local state officials. They observed that
community activists are able to engage persistently and directly with state
officials and then are able to oppose policies through overt and covert
means. Much of this is an outcome of relations between community leaders
and local state officials over a long period of time. In Nyanya, community
leaders have relationships with municipal council officials, for example,
through the Traditional Council of Chiefs, but as pointed out by Stokke and
Oldfield, one of the benefits of such a relationship is that people have access
to information that they can then use to frame protest movements. This is not
practical in Nyanya, where council officials are not likely to have access to
information about services due to the marginal position of the council. To
add to this, the people have no linkages with the staff of the Abuja Environ-
mental Protection Board. An official of the Board acknowledged that the
solid waste project in 2001 was the first time its officials had direct contact
with community leaders.

By this time, it is obvious that strategies also play a part in protests. In
South Africa, one of the strategies adopted by activists is the physical occu-
pation of the offices of the municipal council. In Nyanya, the municipal
council has an office and officials operating in the community. The impor-
tance of this presence was confirmed on a visit in 2004, three years after the
launching of the solid waste project. Health officials from the municipal
council were the only state officials physically present in the community,
offering some skeletal services in the area of sanitation. The Federal Minis-
try of Environment, having been involved only during the project period of
six months, had left the scene. Citing financial difficulties, the Board that
took over had ‘disappeared’, offering no services at all. Once more, the
physical occupation of premises is not a viable option. The municipal coun-
cil has offices, but why occupy the offices of an institution that has little or
nothing to do with what you are protesting about? On the other hand, the
Board that has responsibility for waste services has no offices in the settle-
ment. In addition, prior experience in protest movements is also crucial in
the case of strategies. For example, in another study on South Africa, activ-
ists are able to adopt strategies they had used during the apartheid era to
confront the post-independence government of the African National Con-
gress (ANC) on issues related to service delivery.779 Interestingly, the strate-

779 Louw 2003
gies adopted were spearheaded by the ANC during apartheid rule. The people of Abuja and Nyanya have no such past experiences to draw on.

I would also like to draw attention to participation in formal political processes as a form of protest. Devas observes that participation in local elections is one avenue through which the poor can wield some influence in urban governance processes. There was consensus among community leaders interviewed that there is a high voter turn-out in Nyanya during elections. This was also confirmed in the household interviews. As for the reasons, opinions differ. Some community leaders attributed it to the ‘attractiveness’ of Nyanya, due to its huge population and the intense mobilization that this necessitates. As the chief of Nyanya put it, no politician can win the chairmanship of the Abuja municipal council without the support of the people of Nyanya. On the other hand, the high voter turn-out is also attributed to financial inducements from politicians. According to a community leader, this produces a patron-client relationship where politicians are not responsive to the needs of the people. It can also be argued that a patron-client relationship is not conducive to protests. People are less likely to protest if they have already been ‘rewarded’.

However, what I want to stress is that contrary to the view expressed by Devas, formal political participation in Nyanya is not an avenue for the people to make their voices heard. This can be addressed from the perspective of accountability. As the World Bank puts it,

> In a city the citizens choose an executive to manage the tasks of the municipality (delegation), including tax and budget decisions (finance). The executive acts, often in ways that involve the executive in relationships of accountability with others (performance). Voters then assess the executive’s performance based on their experience and information. And they act to control the executive----either politically or legally (enforceability).

The relevant words above are delegation, performance and enforceability. In Abuja, the citizens are not the ones that choose the executive to manage the tasks of the municipality. This is done by the federal government. Hence, contrary to the position above, the tasks of managing the municipality is not delegated to the municipal council and its elected officials. Furthermore, as pointed out above, the executive is expected to act in relationships of accountability (performance) and voters should be able to assess their performance and act politically or legally to control the executive (enforceability). What the Bank is saying is that, if those in charge of services fail to perform their duties, the people should be able to protest or hold them accountable through elections. This is not practical in Nyanya for reasons that are now familiar. Those who stand for local elections have no role in service delivery.

780 Devas 2002
781 World Bank 2003, p. 47
as has been demonstrated in the case of the councillor. Officials of the Board that manage services are civil servants or appointees of the government and do not stand in local elections.

Summary

This chapter addressed some of the complex issues that shape popular participation in solid waste management. The analysis began with an acknowledgement of the sector-related factors of the low priority given to waste and the common perception that it is the responsibility of the government. Next was a reference to the social, as seen through poor waste handling practices. The rest of the chapter focused on two forms of community action: self-help initiatives aimed at improving solid waste services and protests against poor services. Both are not common in Nyanya. The failure of the state to provide adequate services may be the primary reason for community initiatives in solid waste management but this has not spurred residents in Nyanya into action. This outcome was traced to some characteristics of the settlement including a limited history in collective initiatives, the absence of organizations or individuals who could act as catalysts and the heterogeneous nature of the community. In the case of protests, the inability of community leaders to mobilize the people, traced to the heterogeneous nature of the community, the content of local politics and the state institutional and administrative framework were identified as major factors. A lot of the analysis was based on a comparison with a study in South Africa. The evidence provided suggests that the conditions that exist in Nyanya do not allow for the type of patterns identified in the South African study. The different political characteristics of the two places play a major role in this.
Chapter 9 Concluding Discussion

Introduction

This study has shown how governance processes in a relocated capital city are shaped by the influence and intersection of a national symbolic function with local power structures. Through an examination of solid waste management, it was established that the governance structure in Abuja, the roles performed by the different actors and the nature of the relations between them are traceable to the way the symbolic character of the city and the local political arrangements and relations intersect. Abuja is highly embedded in national geopolitics as a result of its conception as a centre of national unity, but it also provides a setting for interaction between different groups in the context of service provisioning. Within the broader debate on the changing role of the national state in service delivery, the major observations made in the case of Abuja do not conform to the currently common notions. The expectation is that of a minimalist national state and an increasing role on the part of local or municipal governments as well as other actors, such as the community and households. To the contrary, in Abuja, governance is conducted at higher levels and the municipal council remains invisible, as do community groups and households. This final chapter presents the major conclusions drawn regarding the main themes of the study: central-local relations, partnerships and popular participation in the context of wider debates. I also address the problem of spatial differentiation.

Before going into the discussion, it is useful to sum up the approaches used to address the research problem of understanding how the national function of a relocated capital city influences and intersects with local political conditions to shape governance processes and the major observations. In the case of central-local relations, I addressed the problem by examining a major reason for relocation – nation-building – and how this has influenced the state institutional and administrative framework at the city level. Thereafter, I presented how the state structure and administration is manifested in the administration of solid waste management. In solid waste management, the intersection of the national function and local political arrangements and relations is expressed through the roles performed by the different state insti-
tutions and the resultant relations. The major observation I made is of the invisibility of the Abuja municipal council.

In regard to partnerships, the approach was to examine the composition of participating members, the roles they performed and who exerted the most influence and then seek explanations. The relevance of the national function was found to be reflected in the privileging of the national tier over other institutions, in this case, the community. I addressed this by examining the linkage of traditional authorities with the state and analyzing the implications for the capacity of traditional authorities. I also examined intra-group relations within the community. I found out that the marginal role of the Abuja municipal council removes a major avenue through which traditional rulers could influence governance processes. This was evident in the partnership, where they had limited capacity to exert influence. In addition, the conception of Abuja as a centre of national unity necessitates the deliberate attempt to weaken the influence of traditional authorities. This is because having strong traditional institutions, which often represent specific interests, would be contrary to the vision of Abuja as a symbol of national unity. In the case of intra-community relations, the emphasis on ethnic interests, related to the symbolic function of Abuja, makes intra-group relations more challenging. In terms of analyzing gender relations, I found out that while the state is a participant and have opportunities to influence gender relations, its role is minimal. Traditional institutions play a bigger role.

On the theme of popular participation, while sector-related and social forces were acknowledged, I addressed the research problem by examining how the political characteristics of Abuja and Nyanya, in terms of local political arrangements and the nature of local politics shape the participation of the people. The intersection of the national function and local is expressed through the nature of associational life and local politics. I found out that the level of organizing or participation in solid waste management was very low and protests against poor service delivery non-existent. This was attributed to the tendency of the people to organize largely along ethnic lines, the little or no attention given to services on the election agenda, and the marginal role of the municipal council, which has created a huge gap between the state and the people.

Usurping the Space of the Local

In the course of analysis, references were made to decentralization and the downwards movement of national state power. This is a major underlying component of ‘good governance’ and has indeed received a lot of attention. What has become evident is that the debate surrounding governance, and particularly the role of the national state, is closely linked to that of globalization. In the globalization debate, one school of thought that “privileges an
economic logic” sees national governments as “transmission belts for global capital” and “sandwiched between increasingly powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of governance”. 782 In recent years, the supremacy of globalization is being questioned. One argument is that the power of the national state has not disappeared but is being transformed and that through this process, they retain considerable influence over a range of domestic issues, including services, tax and welfare. 783 Others have gone further to show how national governments retain influence through spatial processes. For example, Brenner, in a study on institutional reform and the rescaling of state space in Western Europe, reports that contrary to popular beliefs, national states, instead of being undermined by global forces, continue to produce, reproduce and reshape the institutional/regulatory landscapes. 784 His analysis is conducted within current debates on regionalism, metropolitan governance and the production of new state spaces. Brenner adds that instead of the often-reported downwards and upwards movement of national state power, national state power is being reorganized functionally, institutionally and spatially through new ways of regulating urban governance. 785

This study adopts an approach similar to Brenner’s to show how the national state is able to dominate governance processes in a relocated capital city. The study documents not the expected downwards movement of national state power but the rescaling of governance upwards. However, unlike Brenner, whose analysis is framed around globalization or modern capitalism, my context is capital relocation, nation- and state-building in the developing world perspective.

The process that led to the high level of national state intervention in the affairs of the city began with one of the major reasons put forth for relocation: the desire to unite a highly diverse society (Chapter Four). This was presented as entailing the production of mental spaces in which an ultimate goal is the desire of the national state to influence the way people think in order to obtain support for its actions. In the geopolitics of Nigeria, with states and local governments largely structured along ethnic lines, the national state occupies the ‘neutral’ or ‘mental’ space referred to by Lefebvre (Chapter Three). This gives the national state an edge over other institutions. The recursive relationship between relocation and nation- and state-building can be seen in the context of Migdal’s model of state-society relations. 786 Migdal recalls how European leaders in the 19th century used states to shape their societies and observes the same tendency in post-colonial African leaders. As he puts it, for African leaders, the “organization of the state became

782 Held 1999, p. 3
783 Laurie et al., 1999
784 Brenner 2003b
785 Brenner 2004b, pp.37-38
786 Migdal 2001, p. 41
the focal point for their hopes of achieving a new social order”. 787 By promoting Abuja as a symbol of national unity, the hope was that capital relocation would create a new social order in Nigeria. However, as implied by Migdal, the organization of the state is also an integral part of the process of creating a new social order. In the case of Abuja and borrowing from Migdal, the “state was to be the chisel in the hands of the new sculptors”. 788 Crucially, the two processes – the creation of a new social order and the (re)organization of the state – are embodied in Abuja.

The level of national state intervention in Abuja cannot, of course, be attributed to a single factor. The (un)willingness to decentralize power can also be linked to elite interests and the authoritarian tendencies of rulers (Chapter Three). Indeed, Vale describes the emphasis on national identity by the promoters of Abuja as “rhetoric”. 789 The political and personal motives of the leaders were acknowledged (Chapter Four). However, the idea of Abuja as a symbol of national unity may well be rhetoric but what is important for this study, is that it paved the way for the high level of national state intervention and the resultant centralized system of governance that exists in the city. A similarity can be found in a study on Tanzania, where Hyden sees clientelism as not just a manifestation of corruption or a potential cause of it but an integral part of the power dynamics that keep the country together. 790

The World Bank, a major proponent of decentralization, acknowledges that even though decentralization may be driven by fiscal concerns or a desire to move services administratively closer to the people, it is in many cases a political act aimed at greater regional autonomy. 791 This is of special resonance in a country that has fought a civil war to keep the different groups together. While the concentration of power at the centre is a national problem in Nigeria, in yet another similarity with Brasilia which Holston describes as a “detached center of political power”, 792 national state power is not only highly concentrated in Abuja, but is also evident at the local level. A defining feature is the relocated capital perspective and specifically the timing of relocation relative to the history and level of political development of the country. This was further confirmed with reference to Astana, Kazakhstan, where nation- and state-building played a role in relocation. In both places, there is a high level of national state intervention in local functions. This is manifested in solid waste management which, contrary to the ‘global’ norm, is not a municipal or local government function in the two cities.

787 Migdal 2001, p. 42
788 Migdal 2001, p. 42
789 Vale 1992, p. 134
790 See Hyden 2005
791 World Bank 2003
792 Holston 1989, p. 3
The discussion has been about domination but power is not usually concentrated in a single institution (Chapter Three). Much has been said about the high concentration of power at the centre in Nigeria. However, this power is often resisted. The example of the Lagos State government, which resisted national state intervention in one of its local government areas, was noted (Chapter Six). Another was the controversy over the status of Abuja between the federal and state governments. As documented, state governors had drawn on powers based on their control of territory (space) in order to challenge the federal government (Chapter Four). The subsequent scrapping of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory was largely a result of the resistance put forth by state governors. At the city level, however, the observation is that resistance is much more limited and this was attributed to the state structure and administration in Abuja and the constitutional provisions. Resistance, where it exists, is more likely to be at the personal and not the institutional level. While officials from the council can and do challenge those from higher tiers, the type of resistance put forth by the Lagos State government was not observed in Abuja.

This study is also about service delivery. It is thus imperative to end this part of the discussion with a reference to one observation made: national state intervention does not translate into efficient services. Going by the literature on governance and decentralization, there are pros and cons associated with the devolution of power to local governments. The pros include accountability, legitimacy, increased participation in the political process, greater access to services and improved quality of services while corruption, increased local and regional disparities and political instability are identified as some of the cons.\textsuperscript{793} In some cases and on some specific issues, national state intervention is considered a more effective option. An example is France, where the relatively high level of national state intervention in local functions is seen as a way of preventing or reducing unequal development between cities (Chapter Three). In the African context, local governments often under-perform, especially in service delivery, due to problems of, among other things, finance and personnel.\textsuperscript{794} This means that decentralizing services to local governments will not automatically translate into efficiency. In Abuja, this line of argument is not relevant. The performance of the municipal council in solid waste management cannot be assessed since it has not been given the opportunity to manage the sector. The fact that Abuja is witnessing huge problems in solid waste management (Chapter Five) shows some level of failure on the part of the managers, the institutions created by the national state to run the city. Apart from the practical problems facing the sector, as outlined in Chapter Five, the national state is primarily concerned with national issues and this should be expected. The problem is that,

\textsuperscript{793} Chikulo 1998, pp. 101-105
\textsuperscript{794} Post el., 2003
this takes a lot of the attention away from the practical tasks of governing the city or providing the needs of the people. There is no real evidence that service efficiency has played any major role in the allocation of functions to the different tiers including the latest restructuring exercise (Chapter Four). To sum up, I refer to Bratton’s statement that the African state is weak by any conventional measure of institutional capacity and yet remains the most prominent on the institutional scene.\textsuperscript{795} The national state dominates the political scene in Abuja but does not appear to have the capacity to manage services effectively.

The Contradictory and Contentious Role of Traditional Authorities

The assumption that traditional rulers enjoy more legitimacy than the state and hence are more likely to be effective, especially in the area of mobilization, is one reason why they are seen as crucial in governance processes (Chapter Three). This study has, however, established that this alone is not enough to ensure the effectiveness of traditional authorities. In forming a partnership with the state, they face certain challenges. First, the practice of formalizing participation through partnerships produces exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies since members have differing access to power. In this instance, the capacity or their ability to exert influence can be related to local power structures. Another challenge is the heterogeneous nature of communities, in what Guijt and Shah refer to as the myth of community.\textsuperscript{796}

The decision of the state to go into partnership with community leaders in Nyanya shows that the state does need the support of other institutions in society in order to implement policies, even in relocated capital cities. However, the often contentious and contradictory relationship between the national state and traditional authorities was observed (Chapter Seven). The relationship follows the pattern of non-cooperation identified in African cities (Chapter Three). As is common in partnerships, actors have differential access to political, social and financial resources and hence have differing capacities to influence the direction of the partnership. In Nyanya, state officials had greater access to finance and they used this to their advantage, while traditional rulers had closer ties to the people, which made them the major actors at the mobilization stage (Chapter Seven). In addition, the authority bestowed on state officials meant it was easier for them to dictate the terms of the partnership. While both had some leverage over the other, the state had greater resources and capacity.

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\textsuperscript{795} Bratton 1988  
\textsuperscript{796} Guijt and Shah 1998
A major deciding factor in the balance of power between state officials and traditional authorities is the existing political arrangement at the city level. In view of the decentralization debate, particularly the role of the different branches of the state, it is logical to assume that in a community-based solid waste project, the municipal council representing the lowest tier would be the most visible and active. In this context, decentralization to lower tiers is expected to enhance the formation of partnerships and popular participation and hence be a means to an end. This was not the case in Nyanya (Chapters Six and Seven). The municipal council hardly featured and it disappeared from the scene after the mobilization phase, something it shared in common with community leaders. This did not occur by accident but is a reflection of the political arrangement in the city. What is especially important to stress is that this has implications for the capacity of traditional rulers. For them to be effective members in a partnership with the state or in governance processes in general, the presence of established links between the two is crucial but is lacking in Abuja.

As documented, the Federal Ministry of Environment handed over the project to the Abuja Environmental Protection Board and not the municipal council (Chapter Seven). This was an inevitable outcome considering the fact that the municipal council has no jurisdiction over solid waste management. However, the Board that was to supervise and monitor the project had no formal or informal links with traditional rulers, unlike the municipal council. With no prior links and coupled with the marginalization of traditional rulers during the project period, there was nothing to build on. On the other hand, the municipal council, which has established ties with traditional rulers, was not a major actor in the partnership. Hence, while the role of traditional authorities in mobilization was acknowledged, attention was not given to their linkage with the state institutions involved in the project.

A related factor is the deliberate attempt by the state to weaken the power of traditional authorities in Abuja, more evidence of the relevance of the symbolic character of the city (Chapter Seven). If national governments in Africa are often suspicious of traditional rulers and are always seeking means of limiting their influence (Chapter Three), then it is easy to see why this will take on an added dimension in a relocated capital city that is a symbol of national unity. The existence of traditional authorities go against the two major visions of Abuja: a modern capital and a place where every Nigerian is expected to have a sense of belonging. The historical development of Nyanya may have made a partnership with traditional authorities a necessity, but traditional authorities exist in the city by default. The conception of Abuja as a symbol of national unity makes the existence of strong traditional institutions highly unlikely. This is because they are predisposed to furthering the interests of specific groups instead of that of the overall society. This was confirmed in Nyanya, where traditional rulers represent specific ethnic
groups and are more concerned with the interests of their members (Chapters Seven and Eight).

It is important to acknowledge that traditional authorities face ‘internal’ problems that limit their influence in partnerships and in governance in general. The term ‘community’ may invoke the presence of the same interests but in practice, this was not often the case. Nyanya has grown from a settlement dominated by one ethnic group to one where other ethnic groups are also represented by their own leaders. The result is a highly fragmented system, with various leaders representing specific ethnic interests and with little capacity to come together to challenge state officials or to represent the needs of the people. There was very little cooperation between traditional or community leaders. In this context, Nyanya is the same as many other heterogeneous communities in African cities, but the symbolic character of Abuja, make the situation even more complex. This was demonstrated when community members were being selected for the Project Management Committee (PMC). A major concern was to ensure equal representation of the six geopolitical zones in the country. The principle of federal character adopted by community leaders is practiced at the national level but Abuja is the exception. I would like to draw attention to how this incident demonstrates the articulation of space and place, as noted in Chapter One, and the ‘effectiveness’ of mental spaces, as discussed in Chapter Three. The idea of allocating posts and positions on the basis of ethnic origin can be seen as the production of mental spaces by the national government. At the level of the community (place), we see how this is reflected or manifested in the membership of a committee. I see this as the manifestation of spatial processes in place. Going back to the partnership, this step did not help in promoting cooperation between the leaders. There was still mutual mistrust and no attempt was made by them to come together as a group to challenge state officials. When they protested, it took on an ethnic ‘colouration’ (Chapter Seven).

The launchers of the solid waste project did acknowledge differences in Nyanya on the basis of ethnicity, age and professional associations, but no consideration was given to the underlying power relations that often accompany these categorizations. It can be argued that there was also very little cooperation among the state officials and this should have influenced their capacity to exert influence in the partnership. However, the major difference is that state officials have other means of exerting influence. In this case, finance and authority were the primary tools.

It is worth recalling the controversy about the separation or independence of traditional rulers from the state, briefly mentioned in Chapter Three. The complexity of this argument is reflected in this study. Traditional authorities were brought into the partnership as representatives of the community and not the state. However, I did point out that some traditional rulers are on the payroll of the state. By all accounts and since they had very little influence,
one can argue that they were agents or an extension of the state rather than representatives of the community. This is evident if we recall that the state needed and used them at the mobilization phase but they were thereafter excluded, especially in decision-making processes.

To sum up, the notion that community leaders, particularly traditional ones are now major actors in post-structural adjustment Africa does not apply to Abuja. Much of this has been traced to the political climate in Abuja, where traditional rulers have less recognition by the state and people and where the political arrangements – especially how the state is structured – ensures that they remain marginal in governance processes. However, this does not mean that traditional authorities in Abuja are powerless. They have had some success in putting their interests on the political agenda (Chapter Seven).

Keeping Women Out

Partnerships are open to processes of exclusion and inclusion and this study has shown that gender can be the bases. At the broader level, two processes: globalization and governance are commonly seen as having gender dimensions. Gender relations, are being transformed by global and national economic restructuring. A major expectation is that this would create opportunities for women to re-negotiate gender roles and transform gender relations.797 In the case of governance, decentralization is expected to lead to an increase in the participation of women in local governance. Through the concept of the gender contract, this study found out that these major assumptions do not apply to Abuja. The exclusion of women in governance processes is not unique to Abuja or Nyanya, but the aim was to show how the form and extent of exclusion is specific to the place.

Through the concept of the gender contract, I identified the tasks expected to be performed by men and women and the underlying factors behind the established pattern. The gender contract is highly visible at the household and community levels. Practical tasks, such as sweeping and cleaning, are labelled ‘feminine’ while those involving decision-making are ‘masculine’. I consider this separation as central for understanding the marginal role of women in the partnership. Solid waste management was found to be specifically gendered, with particular notions about the tasks to be performed by men and women and where those tasks are located (Chapter Seven). With women expected to perform the practical tasks of cleaning and sweeping, they are mainly active at the household level. The implication is that women are absent in community-level decision-making structures. This explains the absence of women from the partnership and the committee.

797 Pearson 2000
A major observation made is that the increasing participation of women in economic activities has introduced some changes into the gender contracts. Contrary to the common norms, women now make contributions to household finances. However, this change is limited since women continue to perform the traditional tasks of keeping the houses clean and with little or no help from the men. Hence, instead of the expected ability to re-negotiate gender roles and relations, the result is an added work burden.

Much of the outcomes above were traced to the traditional practices at the household and community levels. An underlying force is the balance of power between men and women, which is often reflected in the gender contract. The relevance of this is that the tasks that accompanied the solid waste project, including membership in committees, were gendered, with the expectation that they will be carried out by a specific sex. This explains why no reference was made to gender by community leaders when members were selected. In a further confirmation of the gender contract, both men and women seemed to agree on their respective roles. A major feature of this ‘agreement’ is the absence of women in decision-making processes at both the household and community levels. It should also be noted that the gender contract is maintained through culture, religion, social norms and values.

The state was a major actor in the partnership and the solid waste project but its participation had little influence on gender relations. This observation supports the notion that the state is not often a central character in shaping gender contracts (Chapter Three). Amidst ongoing changes such as the increasing participation of non-state actors in governance, questions have been asked if the resultant blurring of the line between the public and private can create more spaces for the participation of women in community decision-making institutions.\(^7\) A central part concerns the amount of influence the state can have on traditional institutions. Larsson and Schlyter point out that while the state can make a difference in gender contracts through legislation or policy, such actions may not be enough to bring changes since the dominant sex can use other methods of control.\(^8\) In the case of Nyanya, I have already noted that there was a dominant gender contract. This means that intervention from the state may have not made much impact. However, this cannot be assessed since the state did not attempt to make any impacts through policy or affirmative action. It can probably be argued that, in this case, the state has had an impact through non-action. In the broader context, a conclusion can be drawn that the outcome for men and women in governance is related to the characteristics of a place. In this study, the practices of the state and traditional institutions have been used to show how.

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\(^7\) Staeheli 2003
\(^8\) Larsson and Schlyter 1993
The (Un)Willingness to Participate

While community-based approaches are not new in Africa, they have received greater attention in the last two decades as part of a major policy drive championed by international agencies or donors, as well as the increased interest from researchers who want to identify and examine the ‘solutions’ to state failure in service delivery. For the former, the expectation is that participatory approaches are a way of improving the access of the poor to services while for the latter, the assumption is that people will find ways of providing services for themselves when the state fails. By launching the community-based solid waste management project in Nyanya, the government was doing what it was expected to do under the ‘good governance’ agenda. The familiar buzzwords of ‘participation’, ‘community’, and ‘stakeholder’ featured (Chapter Seven). That the project was a failure and that participation was not achieved has been documented. As is often the case in participatory approaches, there were simplistic assumptions about the motives for participation (Chapter Eight).

The study confirmed that popular participation faced many challenges in general, some related to the type of service, people’s social habits and the political characteristics of Nyanya. It was established that solid waste management occupies a low ranking on the priority list of users and that poor waste handling practices are prevalent. In the bid to emphasize the relevance of place, I gave special attention to reasons behind the low level of self-help initiatives and protests. In the case of self-help initiatives, the limited history of collective action and the absence of organizations or committed individuals were acknowledged. However, a notable problem was that of heterogeneity and the lack of a sense of belonging. The common notion that the failure of the state to provide adequate services is likely to spur residents and communities into taking voluntary action does not apply in this case. The observation is that, when services fail, there are no collective initiatives from residents. The result is that services continue to deteriorate until the government intervenes, as it did through the solid waste project in 2001.

An important conclusion that can be drawn from the absence of collective efforts is that it further reinforces the marginalization of the people in the management of services. Membership in voluntary organizations can be seen as one way through which individuals and groups can become part of the overall governance system. An example is Dar es Salaam, where Community Based Organizations engaged in solid waste management were subsequently incorporated into the MSWM system. The same phenomenon was

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800 Cleaver 2001, p. 37
801 Lewis 1999
802 Cooke and Kothari 2001
803 See Majani 2000
documented in Bamako, Mali.\textsuperscript{804} Initiating and organizing voluntary efforts may not be a guarantee for an effective and sustainable solid waste management system, but it can provide an avenue for the people to take part and have a say in how the system is managed.

The heterogeneous nature of the community and the nature of local politics were identified as limiting the capacity of service users to protest against the poor state of services. The absence of services from the election agenda and a focus on ethnic interests means low sensitization to issues related to service delivery. A related factor is the associational life of the people, which revolves around ethnic origins and takes the attention away from services. In addition, some attention was given to the relevance of the political arrangement in the city. For protests to take place, the people need information about services and, hence, contacts with the relevant state officials. This is not feasible in Abuja, where residents do have contacts with municipal council officials but the council is not in charge of services. Also, there should be clearly identifiable and accessible targets of protests. The conditions for these do not exist in Abuja either, and for the aforementioned reason. While elected politicians and council officials have physical presence in the community, the marginal role of the council removes the possibility of them becoming targets of protests.

The heterogeneous nature of the community is indeed a factor in the low level of popular participation but it does not provide a complete explanation. For example, voluntary efforts can still take place in heterogeneous urban communities (Chapter Three). However, in such cases, there is the presence of other indicators or forces likely to enable members overcome differences in order to achieve a common interest. The example of South Africa, where a shared history and previous experiences in protest movements aids the capacity of actors to take collective action was documented (Chapter Eight). In this case, the legacy of apartheid serves to bring people together. Such a history and shared experience is lacking in Abuja. The relatively young age of the city could be a factor. More crucially, and in what can be described as a paradox, the high sensitivity to ethnic differences, which was aimed at promoting national unity appears instead to have reinforced ethnic divisions. This makes Abuja divisive rather than the envisaged symbol of national unity. The conditions observed in Nyanya point to this direction. When services fail, instead of collective efforts, households opt for individual ways of dealing with the problem making coping strategies individualistic rather than collective.\textsuperscript{805}

\textsuperscript{804} Keita 2001
\textsuperscript{805} See Anschutz 1996
The introduction to this study highlighted the problem of spatial differentiation in Abuja. A major observation is that relocated capital cities can also be sites for the (re)production of spatial inequalities. This phenomenon was observed by Holston in relation to Brasilia (Chapter Two). In the case of Abuja, the different processes that led to spatial inequalities were also documented in Chapter Two. The result is that the poor live in peripheral settlements while the main city area is inhabited by the medium-to high income groups. Governance processes and practices in cities have implications for all residents, and the case of women was presented earlier. As Devas points out, the poor are often most affected.806 In Abuja, governance is spatially differentiated. Examples are the patchy administrative coverage, uneven levels of service provision and the adoption of different policies for different places.807 The efforts of the Federal Capital Territory Administration are concentrated in the main city area, while the peripheral settlements are neglected or at best, managed by the area councils, who have very little capacity. For example, the Abuja municipal council administers Nyanya. It is evident, and this was confirmed in interviews with officials, that the council lacks the financial and human resources to administer these communities.

Another mechanism that reinforces the marginalization of the poor is the selective practice of the state, as witnessed in the privatization process. Privatization is the dominant feature of solid waste management in Abuja at the moment and it gets a lot of attention and priority from the city government. It has, however, mainly been limited to the medium-and high-income areas. The areas where the poor live are either completely ignored or, as in the case of Nyanya, a different approach is tried. This approach was a failure. From interviews with the officials of the Board and contractors, it was evident that privatization is facing a lot of challenges in the city but what is important is that it has led to some improvements, albeit limited in some places.

The lack of a comprehensive policy on solid waste management may have several implications but a notable one is that it reinforces the exclusion of the poor from services. As noted in the case of gender, a policy can provide an opportunity for the state to address specific needs. How to extend services to poor areas is a central component of MSWM.808 The suggestion is that the lack of a policy in Abuja removes the possibility of the government addressing this crucial issue. During the course of data collection, I did not come across any specific references to ways of improving service delivery in poor areas by the city government. A major source of the exclusion of the poor is the little attention given to funding and this by itself is linked to the absence

806 Devas 2002
807 See Goodwin and Painter 1997, pp. 23-25
808 See Schübeler 1996
of a policy. As documented in Chapter Five, there were income differentials in the places that were privatized (medium versus high-income). Even though the city government told contractors to extend services to those who could not or were unwilling to pay, the areas that generated low revenues were underserved. This is because the government did not address the crucial issue of how to make up for any shortfall in revenue.

Conclusion

This dissertation began in Chapter One with a reference to the two visions of Abuja: the dream of a modern capital and a symbol of national unity. Based on the observations made in this study, it is logical to conclude that the dream remains just that, a dream. However, my main interest has been to establish how the conception of Abuja as a symbol of national unity defines Abuja as a place, and the impact on governance processes. Few will argue with the notion that capital cities have a symbolic character and are produced within specific national histories. Going further, relocated capital cities, provide an appropriate setting for examining how the national state, through a rescaling of state spaces, exerts considerable influence on city governance. In the case of Abuja, I have shown how the symbolic character of the city has shaped the types of institutions, their functions and relations. Through solid waste management, I also examined the implications of the symbolic character of Abuja and of local politics for the participation of the community and households. Both of these have considerably influenced the relations and capacity of the actors. In summary, Abuja is an appropriate case to examine how governance takes specific forms in specific places.

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Appendix

The Research Process

Some information concerning the choice of research method, the case study area and sector as well as the types of data collected and the questions they addressed were presented in Chapter One. This appendix contains supplementary information on data collection, some of the challenges faced during the process and information on the major institutions visited and the actors interviewed.

The Exploratory Phase

The data collection process began with an exploratory phase in July 2003. Having identified and established some contacts on my prior visit in search of a case study area, the aim during this visit was to go back to some of the contacts and possibly find new ones. In relation to the specific data, I needed background information on solid waste management at the city level in the areas of storage, collection, transportation and disposal and on the activities of the Abuja Environmental Protection Board and the challenges facing the sector. The information was obtained through interviews with officials at the Board and secondary sources, in the form of documents. Another aim was to obtain information on any ongoing policy changes. At the time of my visit, the Board had launched a pilot project on privatization. I was able to obtain information on the terms of agreement between the Board and contractors and identify the areas under coverage. I was also given the names of some of the contractors involved in the project by officials of the Board and was able to interview the managers of three companies. This gave me the opportunity to verify some of the information already obtained from the Board. The information gathered on privatization is relevant for the discussion on the spatial differentiation of solid waste services in Abuja.

Another actor that featured at this stage was the Federal Ministry of the Environment. Through interviews and documents, I obtained information about the state of solid waste management in Nigeria in general and the role of the Ministry in particular, which highlighted policy issues. In addition, as the initiator of the solid waste project in Nyanya, I was able to obtain valu-
able information on the objectives of the project and the planning and implementation from officials of the Ministry. I was also given the names of the actors that participated in the solid waste project in Nyanya by officials of the Ministry. I followed up on this by going to Nyanya. My first point of contact was the secretary of the Project Management Committee (PMC), which was set up to manage the project. I was able to obtain some official documents from him about the role of the committee and through interviews, I obtained data on how community leaders became involved. I also met and discussed with the chief of Nyanya who provided information on the historical development of the settlement and his opinions on the state of solid waste services. In addition, I interviewed health officers from the Abuja municipal council operating in Nyanya. I obtained data related to the tasks they perform in Nyanya in general.

Semi-structured interviews with representatives of the state, the community and households were particularly useful at this stage. As Mickkelsen points out, in semi-structured interviews, some questions are pre-determined, many are formulated during the interview and irrelevant questions are dropped.810 I prepared some questions in advance as a guide but in many cases I did not follow them strictly. As interviews progressed, some questions were altered, others adapted or dropped or new ones added.

**The Main Fieldwork**

The major fieldwork took place between June and August 2004. Having obtained some preliminary data on previous visits, I was now able to prepare some questions in advance to address the major themes that feature in this study: central-local relations, state-community partnership and popular participation. At this point, in-depth interviews consisting of open-ended questions in which respondents were asked about facts of a particular issue became more relevant. The added advantage was that this made it possible for respondents to talk freely about any issues they felt was relevant. There was thus the possibility of obtaining new information. This type of interview featured mainly with my key informants: state officials and community leaders.

In addressing the research question of how and why the national state exerts so much influence in the governance of the city, as presented in Chapter One, the starting point was to examine its role in the relocation process. The data used for this came mainly from secondary sources. However, I needed to go further to examine the way city governance is structured and the functions performed by the different state institutions. Secondary sources were also useful in this but supplementary and updated information was obtained through interviews with officials of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Terri-

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810 Mickkelsen 1995, p. 102
tory (MFCT), the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) and the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC). The next task was to examine the nature of power relations between the different state institutions. To address this, I had to extend the investigation to solid waste management and specifically, the solid waste project, launched in Nyanya in 2001, in which the three state institutions – the Federal Ministry of Environment (FME); Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) and Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), representing the three tiers of the state – participated. During the solid waste project, a Stakeholders Committee had been formed to encourage cooperation between the state institutions. The officials that represented the different institutions in the committee were interviewed to ascertain the nature of relations and level of cooperation.

Another major area of interest was state-community relations. Once again, the solid waste project was a major entry point. The research questions that guided data collection revolved around the membership of the partnership that was formed between the state and community; the nature of relations, with emphasis on who dominated; and the extent to which the outcome is traceable to the political characteristics of the place. Concerning the first part of the question, I made two basic but related assumptions: a partnership is not open to all and the political characteristics of a place can shape membership. To address these, I needed data on power relations and the characteristics of Nyanya and Abuja. Power relations were examined through events in the Project Management Committee that had been set up to manage solid waste management in the community.

In order to address the relevance of place, interviews were conducted with community leaders to identify the major social stratifications in the community. Two major bases of stratification have been used in the study: ethnicity and gender. In the former, interviews revealed the major ethnic groupings, but the latter is obvious. In examining the relevance of the political characteristics of Abuja and Nyanya, I focused on the state institutional and administrative framework as well as local politics. In the former, a major interest was the linkage of the community with the state institutions. I conducted interviews with state officials and community leaders to obtain the relevant data that would enable me identify which institution has closer ties with the community. In the case of local politics, the interest was on the heterogeneous nature of Nyanya, the resultant politics and the effect on inter-group relations. Being a sensitive issue, the questions posed to community leaders were framed around the nature of associational life and forums where they can meet and discuss community needs.

I was also interested in the gender dimensions of the partnership between the state and community. The main question was to address the composition of the partnership and examine why women played very minimal role despite the common notion under ‘good governance’ that women should be more involved in local governance. To examine the underlying causes, I
needed data from three major sources: state officials, community leaders and women themselves. Being the initiators of the project, state officials from the Federal Ministry of Environment were in the best position to address the question of whether gender had been considered by the state at the planning stages and if any steps had been taken at any stage to address gender imbalance.

From community leaders, information concerning the role of culture and gender systems in shaping the participation of men and women were obtained. This was to draw attention to the role of place, which is seen as crucial in determining how men and women behave and what tasks they perform. In the bid to highlight the role of place through culture or gender systems, I decided to focus on women from a specific ethnic group, the Gbagyis. This choice was based on the fact that they form the major and largest indigenous group, and the chief of Nyanya, whom I found to be a very valuable source of information on Nyanya, also belonged to the same ethnic group. In order to obtain the perspectives of women themselves, focus group meetings and interviews with individuals were conducted.

Popular participation in solid waste management was also examined. I needed data on the various factors shaping popular participation and the extent to which it was an outcome of political conditions in the place. The complexity of the issue was reflected in the methods used. Apart from in-depth interviews, focus group meetings and secondary sources, it required a pilot study, a survey and personal observation. The purpose of the pilot study was to test the structured questionnaire. The questions had multiple answers and respondents were expected to choose one answer per question. As a result of this excursion, I realized that I had too many questions and had to drop some, and that some were too long and others needed clarification. The questionnaire that was eventually administered contained questions related to the extent of popular participation in solid waste management. First were those that focused on waste handling practices, such as storage and disposal. It also included questions about the level of priority given to waste in relation to other services as well as about perceptions about who should be responsible for solid waste management. Another was to identify the level of participation in local politics. For example, they were asked if they vote during elections. This exercise served two useful roles: framing the questions to be asked during the household interviews, since it gave me some general indications about specific issues and the selection of households for in-depth interviews. After going through the data, I identified some respondents I particularly wanted to interview further based on their responses to some issues. For example, most had ranked waste very low on their priority list. As a result, I was particularly eager to include the very few who had ranked it high. From the survey, I also had information concerning the occupations of the people so I made sure I had different occupations
represented. Gender was also considered. I did not want a situation where all the interviewees belonged to the same sex.

In the follow-up interviews, the questions were grouped into the sector-related, the social and the political. I wanted to know how they ranked waste compared to other services and why. I also asked questions regarding who they thought should be responsible for the management of the sector. The nature of associational life and local politics also featured. Additional information on popular participation came from focus group meetings with a youth group and with scavengers. To improve the validity of the data, I also interviewed state officials and community leaders to get their own views on the main points of discussion with households. Personal observation also proved useful in validating or disproving some of the data obtained from respondents. The high visibility of the sector is particularly relevant. By walking through the community, I was able to observe major problems such as the illegal dumping of waste.

Follow-up Visits

Follow-up visits have proved useful in two key areas: obtaining additional information and updating data. In the course of writing the report, certain gaps were identified and there has been the need to follow-up. For example, I felt the need to have another focus group meeting in relation to gender issues in 2005 with groups of men and women. I succeeded with the women but not the men. For the opinions of men on gender relations, I have had to rely on interviews at the household level and with community leaders. On the second issue, since I embarked on the study, there have been several changes at the city level from personnel to policies. A change at the top of the management level led to a restructuring exercise in which some officials of the Board lost their posts. The change in personnel was accompanied by changes in policy areas such as the launching of the privatization programme in 2004. Such sudden “twists and turns” mean that there remains the danger of some of the data presented here becoming quickly outdated.

Sampling Techniques

Different sampling methods were used depending on the unit of analysis and type of information required. Purposive sampling, a procedure which involves intentional selection, was useful at various stages. This method was adopted mainly with state officials and community leaders who were in a position to give information on specific areas of interest. Also, according to Mikkelsen, purposive sampling is used when you interview people or groups based on criteria such as class, gender, age, and ethnicity.\textsuperscript{811} For example, I

\textsuperscript{811} Mikkelsen 1995, p. 205
used this method when, following the household survey, I decided to choose some specific respondents based on gender or on the information provided in the survey for further inquiry. The same rationale underscored the choice of focus group interviews in which women, scavengers and youth groups.

Systematic random sampling was used for the household survey in the labour camp in Nyanya. The camp is divided into six sections – A, B, C, D, E and F. I chose area A because it is the most densely populated and active, as it is closer to the commercial areas and offices, and appear to have the most problems with uncollected waste. The buildings in the camp are identical and are arranged in a compound-like manner, with each compound made up of eight or six blocks (see Figures 18 and 19). Having randomly identified two clusters in Area A for the survey (a cluster is made up of 6 compounds), and with the use of a map, I chose every tenth house for the structured interview.

Figure 18. The Labour Camp showing the type of buildings. The space separates one compound from the other. (The Author, 2003).
Figure 19. The inside of a compound in the Labour Camp. Notice the extensions to the original structures and cooking in open spaces. (The Author, 2003).

Figure 20. Nyanya Village showing how houses are arranged. (The Author, 2003).

A total of forty households were interviewed in the labour camp with the help of an assistant. In the case of Nyanya village, it was more difficult to be systematic due to the fact that this area is unplanned and houses are not ar-
ranged in any particular order (see Figure 20). Also, unlike in the camp, I could not find any map of the village. As a result, I got my assistant to make a sketch of the area. I used the map to identify some clusters and then chose twenty houses at random, while making sure that each cluster was represented.

Snowball or chain sampling came in useful when, during the course of an interview, a name or names of useful potential informants came up. This happened when an interviewee remembered someone who could give me some additional information. An added advantage was that it helped check the authenticity of some information already provided by others. With state officials, this led to interviewing people in other state institutions or in different departments or branches within. At the level of the community, an interview with a community leader could lead to interviews with others whom the informant felt could give me additional information.

**Asking Sensitive Questions**

Addressing sensitive subjects always poses a challenge to researchers.\(^\text{812}\) I encountered this problem in two areas: gender and finance. For example, in the case of gender relations, a particular respondent demanded to know the linkage between solid waste management and gender and thought any references to gender was an invasion of his privacy. Not all male respondents were hostile but I found out that focus group meetings provided a less contentious atmosphere for exploring gender relations. Unfortunately, I did not succeed in having one with men. However, I was able to obtain the necessary information about gender systems from key informants such as traditional rulers. In the same way, I got information related to the gender dimensions of the solid waste project from community representatives in the committee and state officials who represented their institutions. I also had problems obtaining information regarding finances. For example, I could not get documents about revenue and expenditures from government officials at the Abuja Environmental Protection Board. My questions were often met with silence or I was told that the relevant document could not be found. Fortunately, this was not central to the study.

**Limited Data**

Some of the problems I faced have already been mentioned. This included the dearth of secondary sources and frequent changes in government institutions and policies. In the case of data, this was manifested in two fronts. First is the lack of data on solid waste management in general both within and outside academic circles. In a poignant manner, some argue that “waste man-

\(^\text{812}\) Mikkelsen 1995, p. 111
agement is universally unpopular.”. A related issue is the bias on the technical aspects. A cursory look at the available literature within the sector will reveal an obvious bias in favour of technical issues. At the Sustainable Wastes Management Conference in 2003, “traditional topics such as landfill, leachate and gas lining and capping, incinerator residues…remained prominent” and the greatest number of papers focused on the control of landfill emissions. These are important topics but may not be very relevant to developing countries at the moment. As has been noted, technologies have proven to be too expensive to acquire and maintain in the face of economic difficulties in developing countries and this makes the focus on the technical less appropriate. However, this problem is minimized in this study, since being a study on a current real-life problem; I had access to the relevant actors and was able to obtain data through interviews.

Validity of Data

In social science research, there is often the problem of validity of data. This problem can, however, be addressed at the data collection stage. A major way to increase the validity of data is to use multiple sources of data. On any crucial question, I tried to collect information from as many sources as possible to enable me establish the general pattern. Where opinions differed, I have also endeavoured to point it out. An example of the relevance of using multiple sources concerned the question of illegal dumping of waste. Research on Nyanya by others and interviews with state officials and community leaders had pointed to illegal dumping of waste as a common feature in the settlement. However, I found out that in interviews with households, they were not willing to admit to the practice. At this point besides the evidence collected from the interviews with community leaders and state officials, I also had to rely on personal observation which confirmed the problem of illegal dumping.

Another way of strengthening the validity of data is to have key informants review your report on prior interviews. I was able to do this during my follow-up visits in 2005 and 2006. In addition, I used the opportunity to update the data by asking for any new developments since my previous visit.

813 Robinson and Knox 2000
814 Anschütz 1996. The problem is attributed to the low priority given to waste by governments, donors and citizens.
815 Robinson and Knox 2000, p. 115
816 Kendie 1999, p. 4
817 Yin 1994, p. 33
Major Institutions Visited and Actors Interviewed

The Federal Ministry of Environment
   A) Director (Pollution Control and Environmental Health)
   B) Assistant/Deputy Director (Solid Waste Management and Technology Branch)
   C) Head of Sanitation Division

The Abuja Environmental Protection Board
   A) Assistant Director
   B) Engineer (Head of Solid Waste Department)
   C) Principal Environmental Officer (Solid Waste Department)
   D) Supervisor (Waste Dump)
   E) Acting Head of Solid Waste Department
   F) Head (Abuja Zoological Gardens)

The Abuja Municipal Area Council
   A) Officer (Primary Health Care Department)
   B) Head of Community Division
   C) Information Officer (Information Unit)
   D) Health Officer 1 (Environmental Health Unit)
   E) Health Officer 2 (Environmental Health Unit)
   F) Community Development Officer (Nyanya)

The Private Sector
   A) Morgan Environmental Services
   B) Sole Scissor Ventures Ltd
   C) Rosam Cleaning and Refuse Disposal Services

Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory
   A) Director (Legal Services Department)

Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Youth Development and Special Duties
   A) Deputy Director (Policy)

Nyanya Community
   A) Chief of Nyanya
   B) Chief of Hausa Community
   C) District Head (Nyanya/Karu)
   D) Secretary, Project Management Committee
   E) Local Councilor
   F) Head of Nyanya Market Association
   G) Gbagyi Youth Committee
H) Gbagyi Women’s Association
I) Scavengers

Coordinator (Kado Residents Association)

Household Survey
Total number of respondents – 60
Women – 24
Men – 36

Household Interviews
Total number of respondents – 15
Men – 9
Women – 6


4. Gerger, Torvald: *Patterns of Jobs and Geographic Mobility*.  


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