DEMOCRACY RECONSIDERED

The Prospects of its Theory and Practice during Internationalisation – Britain, France, Sweden, and the EU

Hans Agné

Stockholm Studies in Politics 104
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Diagram 5.3. Turnout in French general elections, 1945-2002. ............................................. 218
1. Democratic theory and internationalisation in Europe

Most theories of democracy are concerned with the domestic politics of individual states. The tendency for this to be so proceeds both from a common view that democratic procedures can be used only within single states or nations and from a general lack of interest in international matters among the contributors to democratic theory.¹ But the world we live in is not only one of domestic politics and individual states. It is also a world where market and state functions connect different territories. In contemporary Europe territories are connected to a historically unprecedented degree.²

How can we fit the theory to these facts? Or do they fit together at all? Are theories about democracy general enough to account for a situation that is radically different from the one that inspired their construction? Can the changes of internationalisation even permit existing theories to better serve their original purposes; e.g., conceptualising the essence, determining the preconditions, and judging the moral value of democracy? Or must democratic theory be altered in the light of internationalisation? If so, precisely what positions should be adjusted, and in precisely what way? And how should we proceed to properly answer such questions?

This theoretical query is often overshadowed by politically more striking arguments, such as that international politics should be to some extent democratised (for example Held 1995: 221-286; Weiler 1999: 349-356; Zürn 2000: 200-12; Karlsson 2001: 280-86; McGrew 2002: 286-7) or that contemporary internationalisation should not, or cannot, extend democracy beyond the level of states (for example Grimm 1995: 292-97; Scharpf 1999: 7-10, 189-88; Dahl 1999: 19-36; Offe 2000: 85; Greven 2000: 52-56). However, there is at least one reason to keep clear the distinction between theory and practical political recommendations. To apply any kind of political

¹ Goldmann (1986: 1-4) separates different versions of the view that democracy cannot or should not be applied to foreign policy, as argued by, among others, John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Walter Lippmann, and James Rosenau; for the explicit application of similar arguments to the specific area of international political economy, see for example Kaiser (1971: 202 pp.). Moreover, Mill (1861/1991: 428-429) and Miller (1995: 96-98) regard a common nationality as a precondition for democracy, and Grimm (1995: 297) and Scharpf (1996a: 26-27) use the concept of collective identity to argue a similar point. For influential contributions to democratic theory that disregard international matters altogether, see for example Schumpeter (1950/1975; expect the chapter “Historical Sketch of Socialist Parties” of limited relevance to the democratic theory that Schumpeter proposes); Downs (1957); Eckstein (1961); Pateman (1970); Dahl (1979/1998); Putnam (1992). For other references to support the same point, see Held (1995: 23 p.), and for a similar judgement on the domestic and national orientation of traditional democratic theory, see Weiler (1999: 279).

² Section 1.3.1 below will describe in more detail the facts of current internationalisation.
theory and derive recommendations in a new context, such as that of internationalisation, begs the question of whether the theory is valid given the new context. Moreover, it does not facilitate an unbiased scrutiny of a theory while advocating a political program that presupposes the validity of that theory; so while there is already a large number of contributions on what democrats should do in the face of internationalisation, there is, expectedly, still a wide open question as to what positions, if any, in democratic theory persist under contemporary international conditions.

An academic engagement with this problem may derive from no other source than the current absence of a solution, but the fact that it provokes a wider political interest calls for additional inquiry. It seems important to recognise that a democratic reform is always grounded in some democratic theory. At the very least, a successful effort to sustain or further the practice of democracy requires a notion of what represents a democratic improvement and what action is likely to yield such an improvement under what conditions. The first step in any democratic reform must then be to consider if the theories that suggest this reform are valid. Hence as the experience of internationalisation has largely been unaccounted for by earlier contributions to democratic theory, and the context of contemporary politics is very much and increasingly international, any attempt to further democratic practice today should be preceded by a scrutiny of democratic theory.

While this argument may sound rather abstract, it could be illustrated with very specific results from the present study. For example, it will be suggested that it is probably a mistake to hold on to the traditional principle that everyone affected by a decision has a democratic right to participate in making that decision, especially in the context of internationalisation (see Chapter 2). Hence we should turn our attention towards more severe failures of international democracy than the mismatch between politically affected and politically responsible persons. One example of such a more severe failure of international democracy appears from other results obtained here. It will be showed that some traditional democratic theory exaggerates the extent to which democratic practice at the state level can normatively justify politics at the international level (Chapter 6) and, moreover, that at least one influential argument in favour of non-democratic procedures in international politics makes empirically unjustifiable assumptions (Chapter 7). Hence this result yields a new and stronger motive for democrats to reform the not-very-democratic decision-making procedures in international organisations. Or to take another example, by way of empirical observations it will be argued that international deliberation is more difficult to establish than suggested in previous research (Chapter 8). To safeguard democratic qualities we may then intensify our efforts to establish international deliberation, but also try to
realise democratic qualities that empirically seem more achievable during internationalisation, such as parliamentary political participation (Chapter 5). Or to take a final example, when the major interpretations of this study is finally put in the nutshell of a definition, regarding democracy as a kind of politics where as many as possible decide as much as possible (Chapter 8), a direct purpose of that concept is to simplify the identification of problems and possibilities relevant to democracy in the course of internationalisation.

The intention here is not to summarise major results of the study (which is done at the end of each chapter as well as very briefly in Section 8.1.8) but only to illustrate that theoretical insights obtained can help to guide practical democratic reform. To see the full implication of this argument, let us recall that democracy is not only the characteristics stipulated by any of its many definitions, but also the characteristics on which its practitioners set a high value. A public authority that can explain how its policies follow from a democratic procedure has an undeniable strength when it comes to popular support and legitimacy. Thus, if, as internationalisation goes on, the present political system diverges from our main notions of democracy, or if we systematically lose sight of relevant democratic problems and possibilities in the course of that process, there is a strong motive for inquiring into the discrepancy between theory and practice, and for deliberating on possible strategies for remedying the situation, ultimately to prevent an erosion of political legitimacy and social stability.\(^3\)

If democracy, in theory or in fact, vanishes from the scene, some of our most fundamental social values will vanish with it.

### 1.1. Purpose and delimitations

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether some positions in democratic theory should be adjusted or abandoned in view of internationalisation; and if adjusted, how. The concept of internationalisation is then used broadly to cover a process during which something – anything – becomes increasingly shared or affected among state territories, as in the case

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\(^3\) Reconsidering democratic theory in the light of internationalisation for the purpose of securing the value of democracy does not require any assumption that the content of democratic norms is equivalent to empirically observed political practice. No conclusion drawn in this study presumes that an is implies an ought. More precisely what role empirical observations and awareness of context can play in normative analysis will be returned to in the below sub-section “Relating aims to each other” (page 9) as well as when empirical observations are actually used to further normative theory in later chapters (most directly in Section 8.1.5).
with, for instance, the globalisation of finance or the integration of European states.4

More specifically the study is undertaken with three aims in mind. The first aim is explanatory: to evaluate various attempts to explain levels of democracy as consequences of internationalisation. The second aim is conceptual: to investigate whether the taking into account of internationalisation reveals, or provides, any reason to reconsider what democracy is or what it means. The third aim is normative: to suggest normatively defensible interpretations of democracy that cohere with the adjustments of conceptual and explanatory theory made in the course of dealing with the other two aims.

When empirical methods are used, the scope of the study is restricted to West European parliamentary democracies and their international affairs. More particularly, the focus is on the making of budget policy in Sweden, Britain, and France after the Second World War, and recent budget policy in the European Union. The aspects of democracy that will be empirically analysed are political autonomy, participation, and deliberation. The material then considered includes parliamentary debates, official statistics, economic forecasts, elections manifestos, shadow budgets, general election turnouts, regulations of budget decision-making, staff numbers in government and parliament budgetary divisions, among other things. The rationale behind these delimitations, and the restrictions they imply as to what can and cannot be concluded, is explained in the section on method of this chapter (1.3.1) and in the course of the material analysis.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is organised in four parts. The first part presents the three aims in more detail and explains how they relate to each other. The second part surveys previous research and contributes to the definition of the research problem of democratic theory and internationalisation. The third part makes a few considerations concerning

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4 The present use of the terms *international* and *internationalisation* is not intended to imply anything about the importance of states in European or world politics (see Bartelson 2000: 184 or McGrew 2002: 287 for authors who do restrict the use of these terms to contexts where states play an important role). The only assumption made on the relevance of states is that their different territories can in fact be distinguished. This should permit transposition of most arguments developed in this study into discourses on globalisation or European integration, as it permits transposition of many arguments developed in those discourses into my vocabulary of internationalisation. The more general term *internationalisation* is preferred here because the changes under consideration are both wider in scope than European integration (e.g. the globalisation of finance) and narrower than globalisation (e.g. the emergence of European supra-statism). For methodological reasons it is also preferable to state arguments in as general terms as possible (disregarding for instance the matter of geographical scope) in order to permit the investigation of implications in ever new contexts and accumulating knowledge in passing from one individual study to another (George 1979).
method and it designs the empirical inquiry; as a preliminary to the selection of material, this part also describes political and economic internationalisation diachronically and geographically in Europe. The forth part presents the overall structure of this dissertation.

1.1.1. The explanatory aim

Explanatory democratic theory aims to inform us why democracy attains, or does not attain, a certain level under certain conditions, most often (but not necessarily) by identifying a group of causes. To improve this kind of theory we may ask: Does the process of internationalisation affect the level of democracy in any general way, and if it does, for what reason does the effect take place?

This question is important against at least two different backgrounds. First, the standard political science approach to explaining democracy has not paid much attention to international factors (for references see the later part of footnote 1). Investigating the democratic effects of internationalisation hence bears the potential of revealing causal patterns unaccounted for in the standard literature.

Secondly, a traditional restriction of democracy to domestic politics is based on the idea that international factors are incompatible with either democracy or a normatively defensible form of democracy (see Goldmann 1986: 2-4 for a survey). Even if this restriction is generally not argued in more recent contributions to democratic theory, its main implication is very much alive in the belief that democracy is challenged because internationalisation erodes the autonomy of democratic states (see for example Held 1995: 16-23, 135-140; Schurp 1999: 27; Thompson 1999: 118; Rosow 2000: 32; Warren 2002: 175). Hence investigating democratic effects of internationalisation and related normative issues serves to evaluate the support for claims that international conditions are more or less incompatible with (i) democracy itself or (ii) normatively defensible forms of democracy or (iii) democracy located at the level of states.

But not only is empirical support for various incompatibility claims still a largely unexplored field; such claims are often stated in tautological terms. This easily happens when democracy is taken to require that all persons affected by a decision have the right to participate in making that decision (see for example Held 1995: ix; Habermas 1999: 47-49; Zürn 2000: 186). On that interpretation the compatibility of democracy and internationalisation must, on at least one point, be dauntingly problematic, for as things now stand democratic participation is limited by state boundaries and even the most
minimal understanding of internationalisation implies, quantitative or qualitative, strengthening relations across state boundaries (this argument is developed in Chapter 2). The poor empirical record of some research on democracy and internationalisation is grounded in such linguistic terms as permit the analyst to conclude a problem of internationalising democracy with no empirical evidence at all.

It is hence about time to come to grips with an empirical research agenda on explanatory questions of internationalisation and democracy; to define the basic problem so as to allow explanation and empirical investigation without falling into empty tautologies; and, in relation to previous contributions which have already taken that step, to place empirical research on a more systematic footing. Moreover, empirical evaluation of explanatory hypotheses is valuable both in its own right and because empirical findings may stimulate the rethinking of democracy by adding elements not thought of in abstract discussion.

As already mentioned, the explanatory analysis is focused on three central themes in the literature on internationalisation and democracy: political autonomy, deliberation, and participation. Each of these will be investigated both at the level of states during internationalisation and on different political levels, national and international. In a more comprehensive study other aspects of democracy could have been included as well, such as transparency, representation, accountability, and human rights. While it is of course never a strength to omit important aspects of the material under consideration, the seriousness of such an omission should not be exaggerated. As will be further argued in Section 1.3.1, the aspects left out, for example transparency, representation, and accountability, do, to some degree, overlap in content with the aspects selected for investigation. Moreover, the selection of aspects does not in any way predetermine the outcome of the analysis: political autonomy, participation, and deliberation are all treated as variables that can move upwards as well as downwards in the course of internationalisation.

This takes us to specific questions like the following: (i) Is it true that internationalisation inevitably erodes the political autonomy of states, or may political autonomy even increase during internationalisation? (ii) Does internationalisation reduce the political participation of citizens and their democratically elected representatives, or is democratic participation rather linked to something else? (iii) Is it true that public deliberation in internationally organised semi-democratic bodies is of low quality as compared to deliberation at the level of states, or is insufficiency of public deliberation unrelated to the process of internationalisation? (iv) Do governments exploit international organisations to gain advantages in information vis-à-vis other domestic actors, and furthermore to evade their
domestic political responsibility, or have the advantages which governments draw from their participation in international politics been exaggerated? (v) Are democratic procedures such as majority voting morally indefensible at an international level because majorities give no regard to minorities in the absence of a common identity, or may other factors intervene and allow for good international democracy?

As mentioned, to answer these questions the empirical field will be limited to budget policy in Sweden, Britain, and France over the last decades, and, for those questions that concern a difference between national and international political levels, to the current budgetary policy of the European Union. The methodological approach seeks falsification rather than confirmation of hypotheses. The definition and nature of data to be used will be expounded in later chapters.

1.1.2. The conceptual aim

Conceptual democratic theory aims to sort out what democracy is or means in a given area. This task may be accomplished at an abstract level by formulating an idea and relating it to others; at a concrete level by pointing to a practice of democratic politics; or at any semi-abstract level by identifying, for example, democratic states or institutions. To improve this kind of theory we may ask: Does the taking into account of internationalisation provide or reveal any reasons for reconsidering what democracy is, and if so, what new understanding of democracy is implied by such reconsiderations?

The reason for posing this question will be clearer if we recall the historical and conceptual transformation from direct to representative democracy. In the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, democrats were frustrated by the seemingly insurmountable problem of realising the ancient idea of direct democracy in states many times larger in population, territory, economy, and functional complexity than was the city-state of Athens, wherein the idea of democracy was first conceived. The political conditions of the territorially extensive sovereign state seems to constrain the realisation of democracy, most obviously because of the practical difficulties involved in assembling millions of citizens to deliberate and vote directly on public affairs. That problem was solved in part by a conceptual refinement, as the notion of representative democracy was developed and democrats became able to focus on realistic democratic prospects. As Thomas Paine pointed out at the end of the eighteenth century: “By ingrafting representation upon

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5 The ambiguous term “nation-state” will not be used unless the purpose is to discuss the relation between nationality and state.
democracy, we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and population.” (Paine 1792/1987: 281)

Internationalisation resembles at some general level the transformation from a world of city-states to one of territorially extensive states. It expands the size of the political and the economic system. It increases the complexity of actors and societal functions. It provides a new set of political conditions that could well be regarded as insurmountably difficult to interpret and act on democratically. This should remind us that conceptual refinements today may help us to identify better the democratic problems and possibilities of an increasingly international political situation, just as the understanding and realisation of democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was made possible by the development of a representative theory of democracy (Held 1995: 138; cf. Ake 1997: 283). So while there is not much originality in seeking to refine democratic ideas against the background of major political transformations, a conceptual reconsideration of democracy today should, none the less, appeal to anyone interested in analysing or realising a democratic political system.

More specifically, the conceptual analysis to follow is focused on democratic community, political autonomy, participation, deliberation, and delegation versus alienation of political authority. (Among the concepts not considered, but still relevant to democracy and internationalisation, we have, for instance, those of accountability, transparency, and human rights.) There are several reasons for dealing with these concepts but a particularly important one (seen from the perspective that this study combines empirical and conceptual analysis) is that their analysis concerns the significance of

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6 More famously Robert Dahl (1989: 319 p.) has illustrated the internationalisation of contemporary democracy by the territorial transformation from city-states to territorially extensive states; his argument is mentioned for example by Wessels (1996: 64), Petersson et al. (1997: 132), Eriksen and Fossum (2000: 2) and Karlsson (2001: 287). However, it seems to have escaped Dahl’s argument that the conceptual transformation from direct to representative democracy – which he undoubtedly recognises – conditioned the very territorial transformation of democracy, and so by analogy, that the internationalisation of contemporary democracy may involve conceptual as well as territorial questions. The reason why Dahl hesitates to simultaneously analyse the territorial and conceptual transformation of democracy may be that his procedural conceptualisation of democracy does not discriminate between direct and representative democratic institutions. From his perspective there was hence never any essential need for a conceptual shift since his view of democracy prevails in both direct and representative democratic periods.
empirical observations for assessing the relation between internationalisation and democracy.

This will lead us to concentrate on questions such as the following: (i) Is the democratic idea of a people ruling itself compatible with interdependence among states, or what does democracy require in terms of popular self-determination and self-governance? (ii) Are delegations of power to international organisations democratically equivalent to those delegations of power that regularly take place in domestic politics, or may international delegations be fundamentally different, and in that case, how should they be democratically assessed? (iii) Is it a reasonable democratic principle that all individuals affected by a political decision should be afforded the right to participate in the making of that decision? And once we have treated these specific questions: (iv) What general definition of democracy, if any, do the answers amount to? Or to get on to a quite different kind of conceptual query: (v) What should we look for in democratic practice to recognise possible democratic implications of internationalisation?

These are some of the conceptual questions that will be specified and answered in the following chapters.

**Relating aims to each other**

The reason for distinguishing a conceptual, an explanatory, and a normative aim is not to represent studies that are independent of each other, but rather to facilitate the making of a transparent account of the relationships between these aims. This section makes a brief comment on the relation between the conceptual and explanatory aims, as well as the role played by empirical observations in normative analysis.

The explanations analysed in this study consist in a proposed relationship between cause and effect. Under that interpretation of what an explanation is, analysis of concepts will often be instrumental to analysis of explanations: before the empirical grounds of an explanation can be investigated, it must be clear what the cause and effect inherent to the explanation are, and to define those matters more precisely is a question of conceptual theory (see the

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7 Other grounds for dealing with these concepts is that their political importance allegedly increases during internationalisation and that their, in my view, most reasonable answers require the alteration of established ideas in democratic theory.

8 For example, does the principle appear problematic when recognising that a process of internationalisation may provide a situation where the political influence of every single individual will increase by excluding some individuals (in one country) from making some political decisions (in another country) which however affects all individuals (in both countries)?
definitions of explanatory and conceptual theory on page 5 and 7 respectively).

The role of conceptual analyses as allowing for analyses of explanations becomes particularly important if we turn to the existing literature for hypotheses to be tested. When hypotheses are taken from an author who is not him- or herself involved in the matter of empirical investigation they are rarely put forth in operationally unambiguous terms. More often, the conceptual theory presumed in such hypotheses is imbued with problems, such as that the hypothesised cause and effect is covered by one and the same concept (in which case the hypothesis is tautological), or indeed when there seems to be no reasonably valid operationalisation of the concept covering either the cause or the effect (in which case the hypothesis can be neither confirmed nor falsified by empirical methods). Under such circumstances, one may wish to investigate whether some less problematic interpretation of the hypothesis under scrutiny is available – and thus make another contribution to conceptual theory.

When this study pursues its conceptual aim the contribution it makes will often be instrumental to its explanatory aim, in the sense just described. In somewhat more detail, reconsiderations of what democracy is or means may seem motivated in the context of internationalisation (the investigation of which constitutes the conceptual aim of the study, as first formulated on page 4 and then developed on page 7 and onwards) because such reconsiderations are required to allow for an empirical testing of existing attempts to explain levels of democracy as consequences of internationalisation (which constitutes the explanatory aim of the study, as first formulated on page 4 and then developed on page 5 and onwards). But conceptual analyses will also be undertaken for other purposes than to permit explanatory analyses. To mention just a few other aims; democratic concepts will be defined at times so as not to oppose fundamental notions of established democratic theory, to avoid making assumptions which are valid only in domestic politics, and to fit with our most common intuitions of what represents a democratic improvement (further examples of aims guiding the analysis of conceptual democratic theory are given in Section 1.3.2). Hence in reconsidering the concept of democracy, or any of its component elements, for other purposes than to permit explanatory analyses, there remain several distinct criteria to be met for an adequate conceptualisation. This is important. The reader will notice that concepts are always defined for

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9 To illustrate with an example from Chapter 3, to investigate if internationalisation has a negative effect on political autonomy the concepts of internationalisation on the one hand and political autonomy on the other must be defined independently of each other and in accordance with the arguments that predict the (negative) relation to be investigated.
certain analytical purposes, but never tailored to lead to a particular empirical result.

Furthermore, there are cases in which explanatory analyses are instrumental to conceptual ones (and hence related in a reverse fashion to the idea initially presented). This occurs most significantly when a concept is used to formulate what is simultaneously good and achievable politics. Let us assume that a certain concept of democracy embraces what is good politics but that democracy so conceived is found, by way of an explanatory analysis, to be achievable only in inverse proportion to the degree to which it is subject to internationalisation. In that case one may consider several conceptual strategies to permit, as much as possible, using the concept of democracy for its original purpose (i.e., to formulate what is both good and achievable politics). One strategy would be to conceptualise democracy in a way that makes more central in democratic theory those features which have become more difficult to achieve. When a good becomes increasingly difficult to achieve, it is possible to safeguard it by increasing one’s efforts to achieve it and by adjusting normative theory – in this case including the concept of democracy – so as to recommend precisely that increased effort. Another strategy would be to revise one’s conceptualisation of democracy so as to simplify the identification of democratic possibilities actually achievable under the new conditions. These strategies will be outlined in more detail where appropriate below (Sections 1.3.2 and 8.1.5). At present it is sufficient to keep in mind that the empirical results of explanatory analyses may, when a concept is used for normative purposes, provide a basis for ranking one conceptualisation above another.

It should be emphasised that to let normative and empirical investigation take account of one another’s findings does not mean that an is implies an ought. This study will not use empirical observations to identify the content of a morally justifiable concept of democracy, but rather to identify conditions under which an aspect of democracy – political autonomy, participation, or deliberation – is particularly difficult to achieve and additional efforts are required to achieve it. If, say, public deliberation is empirically found to be increasingly difficult to realise in the course of internationalisation, the value of public deliberation may still be protected by additional efforts to realise it and a normative democratic theory that suggests precisely that additional effort. Without making ought dependent on is, empirical observations can also be used to analyse arguments which – in

10 See the methodological section, 1.3.2, for an elaboration on the view that concepts should be defined in accordance with the purpose for which they are used.
11 Nor is the naturalist assumption opposed in the study. The arguments developed simply do not require it to be made. A distinct assumption, which will be made in Section 8.1.5, is that an ought implies a can (Weale 1999: 8-9; Lord 2004: 7).
opposition to arguments authorised by this study – do treat *ought* as an implication of *is*. If, say, parliamentary political participation is observed to intensify in the course of internationalisation, arguments such as *democracy must be reshaped because internationalisation has eroded parliamentary participation* (see Andersen and Burns 1996: 230-31 for an elaboration) can be rejected without even attempting a discussion of the philosophical premises of that argument.

1.1.3. The normative aim

While democracy is not by definition a preferable form of government, it is all but universally valued in contemporary politics. One should be aware, therefore, that conceptual judgements regarding what is a better or worse definition of democracy, and empirical judgements regarding what is a more or less realised democracy, will often be interpreted as bearing a normative judgement on the matters under investigation. In order to pursue our conceptual and explanatory aims freely, and without having methodological considerations unconsciously biased by personal opinions, it is then preferable to engage with rather than ignore the moral questions which emerge from the analyses: What should be done about democracy and internationalisation?

The normative aim of this study is not to answer the whole of this question, but to propose normatively defensible interpretations of democracy that cohere with the theoretical adjustments made in the course of meeting the explanatory and conceptual aims, as specified above. Various approaches are pursued, such as considering democratic effects of alternative actions, scrutinising theories that aim to identify democratically beneficial actions, and identifying conditions under which democracy is preferable to other forms of government. The normative aim of the study could be regarded as subordinate to the other aims.

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12 That a political entity is normatively justified is surely not a sufficient reason for regarding it as, in some given sense, democratic. Nor is democracy by definition a preferable form of government. This is often recognised by authors concerned with international matters (for example by Bellamy and Castiglione 2000: 65, 70, 82 and by Lord 2004: 5p.). However, normative considerations may still play a role in the definition of democracy if other reasons do not discriminate between alternative conceptualisations (see Section 1.3.2 for some non-normative reasons that can be used to determine the process of conceptualisation) or if the normative value of democracy is assumed in a given use of language to which a definition of democracy aims to accord. Hence the normative aim formulated above – to propose interpretations of democracy that cohere with adjustments made of explanatory and conceptual theory – can be taken to permit, in certain cases, the concept of democracy to be defined for the purpose of covering normatively defensible positions. An argument of this kind will be used in Section 8.1.6.
1.2. Previous research, problems, and new contributions

This thesis began by approaching a research problem from a sceptical viewpoint: We do not yet know whether established democratic theories hold under conditions of internationalisation. But are there any more positive and substantial reasons why internationalisation should be investigated in terms of democracy?

Previous research provides plenty of answers. (It should be noted that I do not myself subscribe to all the assumptions made in stating the following research problems.) Internationalisation opens up questions about what constitutes or should constitute a democratic community (for example Walker 1991: 257), and in more detail, it renders problematic which out of many possible majorities is democratically entitled to make a given decision (Thompson 1999: 112). Internationalisation may conceal the inability of democratic procedures to define membership of a political community (Näsström 2004, Ch. 1). It expands political systems (Dahl 1989: 319). It weakens the policy autonomy of individual states, and even the state system itself (for example Dahl 1989: 319; Held 1995: 16-23; Scharpf 1999: 27; Habermas 1999: 48-49). It leads to a mismatch between the individuals who make decisions and those who are affected by them (for example Held 1995: ix and Habermas 1999: 47-49; Zürn 2000: 186-89; according to Zürn 2000: 190, internationalisation of state functions may also rectify this situation). In the European Union, where the scope and intensity of political internationalisation reach unique levels, it disperses accountability and power between state and supra-state levels (Gustavsson 1998a, b), or transfers power from procedurally more democratic states to international forms of governance which are less democratic (for example Karlsson 2001, Ch. 3). In the same context it challenges present conceptions of what democracy is (for example Wessels 1996; Schmitter 1997a; Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Agné 1999, 2002a, b). It may have led to a decline in voter turnout in national elections (for example Petersson 2000: 97) while achieving an even smaller turnout in international ones (Agné et al. 2000). It may spread politics out to a territorial level where there is no collective identity, no common policy discourse and no mass-media and party framework to hold politicians accountable (for example Grimm 1995; Scharpf 1996a), or simply, where there is no common nationality (Miller 1995). Internationalisation may also erode conditions for public deliberation at the level of states (for example Miller 1995: 155-157; Goldmann 2001: 162) and reduce the prospects for popular or parliamentary political participation and an informed public debate (Kaiser 1971: 710-15, et passim; Goldmann 1986; Stenelo 1990: 349). And
these are only a few of the many formulations of the nature of the democratic problem of internationalisation.

Suggestions that internationalisation might increase democratic possibilities are less considered in the literature. They involve the following: possibilities for improved deliberation, both in the sense of richness of ideas and information in national debates (Stenelo 1990: 354-55; Goldmann 2001: 162) and in the sense of rational communication within international organisations such as the EU (Eriksen 2000: 59-60); the spreading of democratic ideas and traditions throughout the world (Bhagwati 1997: 278); and increasing democratic political autonomy or efficiency in particular policy areas (see for example Goldmann 2001: 156).

Against this background it seems less important to suggest yet another arguably more pertinent formulation as to why internationalisation is democratically interesting. More important would be to formulate an idea that permits relating the various already existing formulations to a coherent position on why internationalisation and democracy are an interesting object of study.

For that purpose we may start with a very general formulation, that the democratically relevant change introduced by internationalisation is one of a growing territorial asymmetry of social connections. The term social connections is then used to cover all systems or relations among human beings, be they political, cultural, economic, or whatever. As a result of internationalisation, the argument goes, some kinds of social connections are territorially expanded while others are not; or some kinds of social connections that have already been territorially expanded are intensified as compared to others; or some new kind of social connections is introduced over a territory that is larger or smaller than the one which encompasses most other kinds of social connections. The democratically relevant change of internationalisation may be formulated, in short, as one of an increasing territorial asymmetry of social connections.

Developing this formulation, various research problems could be described by specifying different territories and different kinds of social connections. To use extremely broad categories, one may identify as a research

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13 For my present purposes the term social connections is preferable to the perhaps more common term social interactions. The term social interactions presupposes that the relations of interest are created only by involved actors. This is questionable. For example, parts of the international system of finance function automatically when computers sell and buy at predefined price levels, and the effects of the total turnover are certainly not calculated, let alone intended, by any individual actor.
problem, for example, the group of questions arising when political connections are territorially expanded while cultural connections are not (typified by analyses of the democratic deficit in the European Union); as distinguished, for example, from the questions that arise when economic connections are territorially expanded while political connections are not (typified by analyses of democracy and economic globalisation); or, to take a final example, the group of questions that arise in response to the growing territorial asymmetry of any kind of social relations (typified by purely theoretical and abstract analyses of globalisation or European integration).

The formulation can also be used to summarise and substantiate the questions of this study, as outlined in the preceding section: What kind and level of territorial symmetry of social connections does a valid democratic theory require or tolerate in order to classify politics as more or less democratic (conceptual theory), to predict a high or low level of participation, deliberation and political autonomy (explanatory theory), and to judge that democracy amounts to a preferable kind of politics or that established institutional structures are democratically beneficial (normative theory)?

Finally, this formulation concerning asymmetry of social connections can also be used to explain how the preceding question, and hence the present study, gains significance during internationalisation. Without making too much of an over-simplification, the democratisation that took place in Europe from the eighteenth to the twentieth century presumed two answers to the question of what democracy requires or tolerates: first, that democracy requires those resident in the territory controlled by a state to be integrated as citizens of that state; second, that democracy requires every nation (in the sense of a culturally integrated collective) to constitute its own state. As is well known, these two assumptions were reconciled in the idea of the nation-state, every person who lives in whose territory is a citizen of the state and a member of the nation. But those assumptions are of course also the ones that are challenged from a contemporary perspective: Are states and nations still politically important units, in conceptual, explanatory and normative respects, during a process of radical internationalisation? Or must we introduce other concepts to specify what kind of territorial symmetry of social connections is democratically acceptable or required?

Let me demonstrate how some of the claims as to why internationalisation is a democratically important object of study fit into this construction and, at the same time, how they relate to the main lines of the present study.
1.2.1. Conceptual issues

Community

According to the first item in the above inventory, internationalisation draws attention to what constitutes or should constitute a democratic community. Already more than a decade ago the problem was summarised as follows:

[I]n the very broadest terms, contemporary thinking about democracy seems to be directed both toward the realization and perfectibility of accounts of political community fixed within the spatiotemporal coordinates of state sovereignty but also toward the reconstruction of what we mean by political community under novel spatiotemporal conditions. (Walker 1991:257)

There is however no reconstruction of meaning that does not have a history. Any theory of democracy must have a notion of which individuals or groups are presumed to be included in which political processes. John Stuart Mill, for instance, considered this question. In some writings, which have provoked discussion over whether Mill was a democrat (Pateman 1970: 32), he argued that voting rights should be distributed according to level of education. In the twentieth century Robert Dahl developed a position that seemed very much like a theoretical reconstruction and justification of the political practice that had developed since the time of Mill, to include in the political process those, and only those, who live in a territory controlled by a certain state, or as Dahl puts it – with a universalising of the definition – those “subject to the rules and decisions of the association” (1979/1998: 109).

But the question provoked by the context of internationalisation – what territorial symmetry of social relations democracy requires – is not fully accounted for by earlier contributions. First, and most obviously, the question dealt with by, amongst others, Mill and Dahl is taken to a higher level of abstraction when formulated in a context that challenges both the nationalist and the statist assumptions. Second, and more difficult to spell out, is the fact that the arguably more abstract question leads on to sub-questions that appear to have been dealt with far less ambitiously by previous democratic theory. For example: What are the democratic limitations on how far a single polity may be integrated with, or stay in isolation from, another polity? One answer to that question was mentioned above: that anyone affected by a decision has a democratic right to participate in making that decisions (for example Held 1995; Saward 1998; Habermas 1999; Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Føllesdahl 2000; Zürn 2000).

And this raises the first point with which the current study proposes to deal. According to arguments developed in Chapter 2, it is problematic and ill-founded as a theory to believe that whoever is affected by a decision has, ipso
facto, a democratic right to participate in making that decision; moreover, such a belief conceals a need for empirical analyses of the relation between democracy and internationalisation. In the concluding chapter, Chapter 8, an arguably less problematic position will be set forth, drawing on the concept of democratic political autonomy developed in Chapter 3, concerning the kind and degree of territorial symmetry of social connections required in order to classify politics as more or less democratic

Political autonomy

One should not expect a problematic concept always to be called by the same name. Variation in terminology may even be a sign that a concept is becoming problematic and that a conceptual shift is about to take place (Kurunmäki 2000: 64). This may or may not be the reason why the problem that in the present study is referred to as one of political autonomy – or slightly more generally in terms of collective action capacity – may also be discussed as a problem of self-determination, political agency, effective fate control, fulfilment of policy preferences, popular sovereignty, state sovereignty, efficiency, effectiveness or power. Three somewhat different starting points for sorting out a useful concept in this network of terms and ideas will be mentioned.

The first approach to political autonomy is to engage in traditional discourse. Historically it has been common to describe states as sovereign, in the classical sense of constituting an absolute, indivisible power, limited only by territory; though in democratic theory it has been more common to attribute sovereignty to the people. To this tradition some scholars propose the additional idea that internationalisation has replaced the classical kind of sovereignty with a “divided sovereignty” (Held 1995: 138) which stretches across territories, peoples and organisations; and moreover, they hold that democratic theory needs to be developed so as to yield recommendations for action regarding this kind of sovereignty. In the context of internationalisation the same author proposes the concept of state autonomy, in the sense of possibilities to “translate national policy preferences” into “effective outcomes” (Held 1995: 100). Slightly different kinds of preference fulfilment have also been treated as democratic qualities in the same context by, for example, Scharpf (1997b: 28), who assumes psychologically mature preferences; by Goldmann (2001: 156), who assumes objectivist preferences; and by Dahl (1989; see beginning of Section 3.1 for a characterisation of Dahl's position). The first approach to understanding political autonomy is to investigate whether conceptual innovations like these provide understanding
or confusion regarding the matter of democracy in a time of internationalisation.\footnote{To separate confusion from understanding regarding conceptualisations, see a list of traditional points in Section 1.3.2.}

A second approach to conceptualising political autonomy is to recognise a certain implication of the above mentioned view that a person affected by a decision has a democratic right to participate in making that decision (as mentioned, this is argued by, for example, Held 1995; Saward 1998; Habermas 1999; Føllesdahl 2000; Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Zürn 2000). To uphold that principle, persons outside a given community would have to abstain from affecting that community; otherwise the people in the community will be affected by a decision that they cannot participate in the making of. This corollary represents a very strong notion of democratically required political autonomy. It could be contrasted with, and developed in relation to, the view that a democratic state can be considerably strengthened in relation to its own citizens by way of internationalisation. As for an illustration, recall The European Rescue of the Nation-State, a book in which Alan Milward (1992) argues that nation-state welfare and security capacities are strengthened by the territorial expansion of both political and economic connections. On this account, the capacity of a people to rule itself is not only logically independent of any territorial asymmetry of social connections – which would be argued also by, for example, Goldmann and Scharpf – but some kinds of international integration and collective action capacity are also taken to be positively correlated.

A third approach to political autonomy is to start from explanatory arguments that predict internationalisation will have a certain effect on the political autonomy of democratic states, and then investigate more precisely what concept of political autonomy is inherent in such arguments. To pick out only one example, there is a standard argument why economic internationalisation is expected to reduce economic autonomy at the level of states. It is thus expressed in the words of Fritz Scharpf:

The loss of national boundary control and lower costs of transportation and communication make it easier for investors and producers to avoid burdensome national regulations and taxes, and for consumers to avail themselves of products produced under more attractive regulatory and tax regimes. To the extent that governments depend on keeping capital, firms, and production within the country in order to provide jobs, incomes, and revenue, they must also be concerned about the possibility that their own regulations and taxes may drive capital, firms, and jobs out of the country. Increasing international mobility thus creates conditions in which territorial states are
forced to engage in regulatory competition against each other in order to attract or retain mobile factors of production. (Scharpf 1999: 89, ital. in original)

To emphasise: conceptually speaking, we are not concerned with the empirical correctness of the prediction that something like political autonomy is expected to decline because of economic internationalisation, but with what exactly it is that is predicted.

Here is then a second area of conceptual theory to which this study seeks to contribute. The conceptualisation of democratic political autonomy developed in the first parts of Chapter 3 (the grounds for which are prepared in Chapter 2 and which is investigated empirically in the later sections of Chapter 3 and from which implications are extracted in Chapter 8) seeks to satisfy the reasonable demands derived from all three of the above perspectives.15

**Democracy**

Internationalisation may turn attention to assumptions of community and autonomy as inherent in the concept of democracy, but the interest in how to understand democracy has not been limited to these two concepts. Especially in the literature on European integration there is a common argument that any concept inherent in democracy should be opened up and possibly reformulated. Here is a typical example of how the claimed novelty of the European Union is interpreted:

[I]nnovations at such a scale require not simply attention to the empirical nature of the novel governance arrangements. They also require serious re-examination of the concepts available to depict these developments, and thereby the theoretical frameworks and attendant standards that we can use to assess the democratic quality of this nascent system of governance. (Eriksen and Fosssum 2000: 2)

Similar arguments have been made also by, for example, Wessels (1996), Andersen and Burns (1996), Majone (1996, final ch.), Schmitter (1997a), Eriksen and Neyer (2003), and Lord (2004). In comparison to the literature considered above, these authors are to my view strikingly more focused on empirical matters, though they purport (among other things) to conceptualise democracy.

To merge conceptual and empirical analysis is however not without difficulties, especially when the concept dealt with can be used for both

15 The fact that one and the same conceptualisation satisfies demands from different perspectives is a coincidence rather than a central claim of the study, though it is a happy coincidence since it simplifies my argument.
normative and descriptive purposes. It would be an obvious mistake to name as democratic all political structures that develop in democratic states. Still, we should not disregard the fact that concepts are often invented and refined in very concrete contexts, which should permit conceptually oriented theorists to benefit from knowledge about the world in which their concepts may be used (cf. Zürn 2000: 189-90; Lord 2004: 11-13). The intention here is not to embark on a thoroughgoing methodological discussion, but only to mention that some of the contributions by this study to the above debate will proceed from methodological criticisms regarding what can and cannot be learned by empirical observation when it comes to reconsidering the concept of democracy. Most explicitly, the matter will be dealt with in Chapter 8, the latter part of which tries out a concept of democracy designed to capture more efficiently the democratic problems and possibilities of internationalisation.

1.2.2. Explanatory issues

Political autonomy at the level of states

Though it is yet unclear what political autonomy is, there is an empirically oriented literature that sets out to answer whether political autonomy – or some closely related concept – tends to decline at the level of states because of economic internationalisation. (See the above citation from Scharpf for an argument why this may be expected.) Bernauer and Achine (2000: 227) conclude from a large sample of both OECD and non-OECD countries that state “internal power” or “state dominance” has increased rather than decreased because of economic internationalisation. More precisely their result is an arguably robust positive correlation between openness to trade and the size of the public sector. Huber, Ray and Stephens (1999) consider only OECD countries, but complement statistical analyses of public spending with analysis of party composition in governments as well as case studies. Their conclusion is somewhat ambiguous: that there is today a “political constraint” to public spending, “not an inexorable economic constraint”; but in the next sentence they suggest that “political choices” are “more constrained [today] than in the golden age.” (Huber et al. 1999: 193). Another quantitative study that suggests the continuing importance of political choice has been undertaken by Garrett (1998). Weiss (1998) argues from less systematic evidence that the state has by and large not lost power in economic matters during internationalisation.

However, empirical studies like these have not reduced the number of counter claims that economic internationalisation reduces power, political
autonomy, or capacity at the level of states (see for example Held 1995: 16-23, 135-140; Scharpf 1999: 27; Thompson 1999: 118; Rosow 2000: 32; Warren 2002: 175). The reason for this gap in the literature is probably not, at least not only, that theoretically oriented students are unwilling or unable to account for empirical results. More likely, the empirical studies conducted thus far have failed to identify what is really at stake in arguments over democracy and globalisation or internationalisation, and so the empirical studies have been premised on operational indicators that are perhaps found less relevant by theorists.

Against this background, it is important to develop operational indicators that are more sensitive to the problems identified at the theoretical level. Rather than to collect ever larger samples and to use ever more sophisticated statistical techniques, the explanatory analysis in Chapter 3 of this study aims to develop measures of political autonomy that are theoretically more relevant than previous attempts, and then to undertake empirical analysis on the basis of those measures. Hopefully that could bridge the gap between a mainly empirical research agenda on welfare regimes in capitalist economies and a more theoretical agenda on globalisation, democracy and political autonomy.

Chapter 3 will also deal with alleged autonomy effects of the internationalisation of state functions, to the limited extent that such internationalisation has appeared in the area of budget policy in the European Union.

**Political participation at the level of states**

Democratic political participation can be understood broadly as the means or activities by which a decision-making power is partitioned equally among a group of individuals, regarding both the demos as a whole and their elected representatives. If considered at all, international factors have most often been regarded as difficult to reconcile with democratic political participation. This line of argument has been traced back to John Locke, who thought that domestic politics should be regulated by law but that

> what is to be done in reference to foreigners depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth. (Locke 1690/2000: 169)

In other words, whatever the role Locke would give to democratic decision-making in domestic policy – certainly a small one by our standards – he thought that foreign policy should be left to experts.
Depending on the type of international connection at issue, the view that internationalisation hampers democratic political participation could be more or less trivial. If the international connection consists in the making of collectively binding decisions by majority rule and with direct legal effect, as in some policy areas in the EU, then the negative effect on democratic participation at the level of states would be close to tautological; if authority is transferred from one political unit to another, the purpose of the transfer is to reduce the direct political influence of parliaments in the units from which authority was transferred. None the less, this effect has provoked burdensome empirical efforts, the results of which do not make much difference to judgement on parliamentary power during internationalisation, but may be very useful for the internal organisation of parliaments (for example Hegeland 1999; Lindgren 2000; Ahlbäck Öberg and Jungar 2002).

If by contrast, the international connectedness consists in an international market, the effect on democratic participation becomes a more open question. While some traditional reasons as to why the making of foreign policy is less democratic than the making of domestic policy are not regarded as relevant to the case of market internationalisation by everyone (for example not by Goldmann 1986: 32; but see Kaiser 1971: 710-15 for an opposite view), the most recent period of such internationalisation has provided additional reasons why democratic participation at the level of states may decline. For example, if political autonomy is eroded at the level of states as an effect of internationalisation, general elections and parliamentary procedures will become less important and parliamentarians as well as ordinary citizens will have less incentive to participate in their respective activities (Stenelo 1990: 292; Petersson 2000: 97; Agné 2000a: 118-21; Radealli 2000: 11). Another reason for expecting the same effect would be that a territorial expansion of economic connections provides market actors with the opportunity to impose higher costs on what are perceived as the long-windedness and unpredictable outcomes of parliamentary democratic participation; decisions by executives – faster and more definite in implementation – would be comparably more efficient. A still different argument is that the scope and importance of negotiations in politics is expected to increase, which in turn is expected to increase the power of governments at the expense of parliaments in the course of internationalising either state functions (Goldmann 1986) or market functions (Kaiser 1971).

As theoretical considerations lead to different conclusions, the case for empirical analysis is strengthened. Li and Reuveny (2003: 53) investigate the relation between something like democratic participation and economic internationalisation in 127 countries from 1970 to 1996, and conclude drastically that “globalization erodes the prospects for democracy.” Hadenius
(1992: 95-96) uses a similar method, but reports positive correlations between democracy on the one hand and direct investments and (total) foreign trade on the other.

A problem with these quantitative studies, however, is that operationalisations are not sufficiently developed to capture the rather fine theoretical predictions that we are interested in, such as an alleged increasing passivity of parliaments in relation to governments as a consequence of internationalisation. In fact, these studies are largely unable to pinpoint any democratic variation at all within the group of western European states: all are assigned a maximal democratic value, or just below that, in every year.\(^{16}\)

What is needed to settle the theoretical issue is empirical material collected more in accordance with the predictions to be evaluated. An attempt will be made to do this in Chapter 5, focusing mainly at the level of elites and the relation between parliaments and governments in respect of budget policy. Levels of turnout in general elections will also be given some attention.

**Political deliberation at the level of states**

Political deliberation – for the moment taken broadly as a public discussion guided by arguments and correct information, rather than coerced by interests – could be linked to internationalisation in the same way as participation is. If a decreasing level of political autonomy is taken to erode incentives for political participation, the incentives for political deliberation will be eroded as well. If international market actors are taken to punish democratic participation because it is long-winded and unpredictable, political deliberation will not be rewarded.

A more particular reason why deliberation may be negatively affected by internationalisation resides in its presumed cultural preconditions. *Successful* communication may depend on a certain amount of trust, so that arguments and questions are taken seriously (Miller 1995: 96 p.), and that there is a community of understanding and values (Goldmann 2001: 152; or ibid. 162 for objections to the same view). A problem will then appear because internationalisation may challenge what used to be a culturally more homogeneous population, both by making it less different from populations in other states in economic and political regards and by devaluing such symbols, cultural artefacts, and historical memories as serve to create and reproduce a sense of community. If internationalisation challenges cultural communities in this way, the quality of public deliberation is expected to decline during internationalisation.

\(^{16}\) The data are more suited to help understand democracy in developing countries.
The scholarly attention paid to the quality of public deliberation hitherto has centred on rather abstract and general arguments (see for example Elster 1986/1998; Habermas 1996; Warren 2002). The main exception to the purely theoretical approach, in our area, is the empirical studies of deliberation in European Union expert committees (Joerges and Nyer 1997a, b; Jacobsson and Vifell 2003; Pollack 2003), one of which concludes that “deliberative supranationalism is already more [practicable] than Utopia” (Joerges and Nyer 1997b: 609).

Nevertheless, the Comitology of the European Union, however interesting, constitutes but a very small part of the political machinery, and it is yet unknown how internationalisation relates to deliberation in core political democratic institutions such as parliaments. Chapter 4 in this study is devoted to operationalising and evaluating the claim that democratic deliberation decreases during internationalisation, empirically focusing on parliamentary budget debates in Sweden, Britain and France.

**Democracy compared between different political levels**

Democratic effects of internationalisation may be studied in international organisations that are themselves products of internationalisation. An international organisation concerns a territory that is, to a greater extent than the individual territories of its constitutive states, composed of different nations, languages, histories, economies, political parties, etc. On these grounds democracy could be expected to differ between otherwise similar organisations one of which is national and the other international. Though he did not of course have the opportunity to analyse the international organisations of our time, John Stuart Mill developed arguments as to why democracy is unrealistic or impossible under any international conditions.

Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. The influences which form opinions and decide political acts, are different in the different sections of the country. An altogether different set of leaders has the confidence of one part of the country and of another. The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what opinions, or what instigations, are circulating in another. The same incidents, the same acts, the same system of government, affect them in different ways; and each fears more injury to itself from the other nationalities, than from the common arbiter, the State. (Mill 1861/1991: 428-429)

Since the expression by Mill of this pessimism concerning international democracy there has been an enormous strengthening of international
organisation and law (see Section 1.3.1). It is therefore more difficult for us
than it was for Mill simply to dismiss the possibility of international
democracy. However, contemporary arguments why democracy is expected to
differ between national and international politics are still echoing notions
a common nationality among the deliberators. According to Grimm (1995:
292-97), the absence in international politics of institutions to mediate
preferences and hold politicians accountable, as well as the lack of collective
identity among peoples, prevent international organisations from yielding
legitimacy by majoritarian (democratic) decision-making procedures. Scharpf
takes a similar stand to Grimm’s, but also suggests the argument that
international majorities treat their minorities less benevolently than national
majorities treat theirs minorities (Scharpf 1996a, 1997a, 1999:7; see Section
7.1 for further details of this reading of Scharpf). On this account,
democracy, taken as decision-making procedures based on the majority
principle or political equality, is not normatively desirable in the alleged
absence of a collective identity at the international level.

The difference between national and international politics could also be
theorized in terms of political autonomy, for the moment understood broadly
as capacity for collective action. (I take the argument by Miller to concern
deliberation, and that by Scharpf to concern participation.) Drawing on either
of the allegedly opposed broad traditions of functionalism (Haas 1958;
Balassa 1961: 16-17, 26 et passim) and realism (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1999),
it would seem reasonable to expect international organisations to possess
above all such political autonomy as has disappeared or never existed at the
level of states (see Section 7.3 for further details on this interpretation).

As for empirical research on deliberation and participation, more or less
systematic descriptions of the European Union, and more or less explicit
comparisons with member-state politics, are commonplace in the literature on
the democratic deficit (for example, Scharpf 1996b; Lord 1998; Gustavsson
1998a, b; Karlsson 2001; Lord 2004). There are also studies particularly
concerned with the setting of budget policy in the European Union (e.g.
Laffan 1997).

But studies of political procedures in particular policy areas have, to my
knowledge, not yet delivered more than impressionistic interpretations in
terms of democracy, and the more advanced studies on democracy have
generally been occupied with the European institutional structure as a whole,
and not recognised the great variety of levels of democracy across policy
areas and institutions (Lord 2004 is an exception and a substantial
improvement in this regard). For that reason we do not yet have much
knowledge about the actual difference or resemblance between nationally and internationally organised democracy in particular policy areas.

The present study makes a limited effort to fill this void in Chapter 7. Theoretically expected differences between the making of European and national policy are then empirically investigated in terms of deliberation, participation and autonomy. The analysis serves to evaluate, among other things, the above-mentioned argument, attributed to Scharpf, that democratic procedures are undesirable at the international level.

As a preliminary to the empirical analyses of Chapter 7, Chapter 6 conceptually scrutinises the argument that international organisations are democratically justified to the extent that powers have been delegated to them from democratic states. The result in Chapter 6 is that a democratic justification of international organisations must follow, to a greater extent than proposed by previous analyses, from empirical descriptions of international politics itself.

1.2.3. Normative issues

A large part of the research presented above makes normative contributions in addition to presenting conceptual and explanatory arguments. The normative contributions of this study, however, are less systematically related than its conceptual and explanatory contributions to previous accounts. It may be recalled that the normative aim of the study is to give a consideration to the adjustments of conceptual and explanatory theory that are made in the course of the study and to develop a coherent normative interpretation of them. The main contribution of this kind by the study is integrated with conceptual and explanatory positions in Chapter 8, but it will also appear in Chapters 2 and 6.

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The survey of previous research may be summed up by detailing the question that we started out from: What kind and level of territorial symmetry of social connections does a valid democratic theory require or tolerate in order to classify politics as more or less democratic (conceptual theory), to predict a high or low level of participation, deliberation and political autonomy (explanatory theory), and to conclude that democracy amounts to a preferable kind of politics (normative theory)? Among the relevant concepts we have those of political community, autonomy and democracy itself. Among the relevant explanations we have those concerned with autonomy, participation,
and deliberation, applied both at the level of states over time and at different political levels. Interpreted as composite elements of democracy, there are normative considerations to be made in relation to all of the preceding concepts. The present study aims to contribute to all of these points.

1.3. Design, material selection, methodology

Having outlined the problems of the study, it is time to consider how they could be approached. Most of the methodological justifications are developed in the course of the material analyses in the following chapters, but some general principles will be considered in this section. Two comments on how to achieve the conceptual and explanatory aims will be made, the latter of which are more extended and include a brief description of internationalisation (the independent variable) in order to guide the selection of empirical material. Methods of normative analysis will not be considered here. Such originality as the present work possess in this regard is more easily explained in context (see especially Section 8.1.5).

1.3.1. Analysing explanations – including a description of internationalisation

The standard view of earlier decades is still familiar, that research efforts to falsify a theory are able to yield knowledge beyond particularities while efforts to confirm, or verify, a theory are incapable of doing so. In accordance with this view, scientists should design their inquiries to permit theoretically significant falsifications rather than confirmations of particular instances and relations.

However, a much more representative view in social science today argues, in direct opposition to Karl Popper, who developed and defended the falsificationist position, that “this is not the way social science should be conducted” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 103). These authors do not reject the relevance of falsification altogether, but by seeking to reconcile it with confirmation they deny to the original idea of falsification its full influence over research designs.17

17 Another effort to allow for both falsification and confirmation, and hence to downgrade the relevance of falsification proper, was made by Harry Eckstein in a famous article on social science methodology (Eckstein 1975: 119). Falsification may also be reduced to an illustrative contrast to confirmation, while questions more exclusively relevant to falsificationist designs become less well accounted for.
Nonetheless, there are to my view compelling reasons to recognise an asymmetry between falsification and confirmation as proposed by Popper, and hence to design inquiries to maximise the prospects for falsification, rather than confirmation. Since this view diverges from those of contemporary authorities and yields substantial implications for empirical study, it will be defended before a research design is outlined in accordance with the arguments presented.

Prerequisites of meaningful comparisons

A first reason in favour of falsificationism starts from the view that explanations should claim universal rather than particular validity. To claim universal validity for an explanation is to say that if something is to count as the cause or mechanism of a certain effect, it should be assumed to produce that effect always.\(^{18}\) This view implies a falsificationist approach because explanations which claim universal validity can be falsified but not confirmed.\(^{19}\)

Why then should universally claimed explanations be preferred to explanations concerned only with particulars? For the interest of this study we do not need to go into the reasons provided by philosophers. In empirical social science a decisive advantage of universalist explanations is that when more than one explanatory interpretation is compatible with empirical observations of some particular events or processes – which is pretty often the case – it becomes impossible to decide which interpretation is preferable

\(^{18}\)This does not imply that we should aim at as general explanations as possible (though general explanations can be desired for other reasons). The universality of an explanation implies that all cases covered by that explanation perform as the explanation claims, while it does not imply anything about the scope of the explanation in terms of how large a group of cases it covers. The proposition \textit{all swans are white} is equally universal as the proposition \textit{all swans chased by children are white} although the latter is more specific. The difference between universal and particular propositions is one in terms of all or some individuals in a given category, while the difference between general and specific propositions is one of how inclusive or exclusive categories are. Hence to suggest that explanations should make universal claims of validity does not imply that explanations must be general. Neither does a claim for universal validity suggest that we can know anything more definite about causal relations than the probability that something will follow from something else. The presumed existence of a cause (ontology) is distinct from the knowledge we can have about it (epistemology).

\(^{19}\)That a definite relation between two variables can be established in every observed case does not imply that the same relation exist in all cases, including those which have not been observed. From the proposition that all observed swans are white it cannot be inferred that all swans are white. Hence universally claimed empirical propositions cannot be confirmed, while their falsification can be made, in principle, by pointing to a single counter-example (Popper 1957: 27, 41, \textit{et passim}).
if the validity claims of the explanations are restricted to the particular context.

Say for instance that we would like to explain the particular decision to enact the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93. From a realist point of view it was an effect of the reunification of Germany, which is assumed to have terrified the French state and led it to seek influence over the currency used in the German economy – an aim that was in fact achieved by the treaty’s introduction of a common currency. From a functionalist viewpoint, the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty was the product of industrial lobbying groups and a spillover from a common market already functioning and the Single European Act (in force since 1987).

It is fair to say that these two hypotheses could compete with each other; both could also be regarded as compatible with empirical observations. So how should the issue be settled? If each hypothesis is derived from a theory, claimed to be universally valid, about integration, our understanding of the matter could be furthered by testing the two hypotheses – integration as an effect of functional spillover, integration as an effect of states protecting their interests – in other cases of integration, in different times and places. In particular, we would study cases of integration where only one of the two possible grounds for explanations is present. But if the validity of the two hypotheses is claimed only with regard to Maastricht, then all such further observations are by definition irrelevant to the matter in dispute; the explanation is then by definition restricted to those empirical observations that have already been made and which raised the problem of interpretation.

Hence one of the standard procedures of social science, the investigation of causal relations by comparing cases, seems to presume that explanatory propositions claim validity outside the context actually investigated.\(^{20}\) What can of course be achieved by a particularist explanatory analysis is coherence between hypothesis and observation (McKeown 1999: 170-71). The problem emerges when such a coherence is not enough to separate two potentially competing explanations both of which fit a particular case.

**Avoiding self-confirming research**

Another reason, grounded in social science practice rather than philosophical arguments, in favour of falsificationism is to avoid self-confirming research. The abundance of potential empirical observations in any research area makes it necessary to select material. However, as everyone knows, the selection of material can be made to confirm pre-analytical judgments just as much as to

\(^{20}\) Statistical analyses restricted to explain variation within a *particular* sample or population are from this perspective very problematic.
openly investigate a hypothesis. When new observations can be made at a very low cost, as for instance in case studies or text studies, this problem cannot evidently be handled by the “good intentions” of the researcher. The aim to include all relevant details can easily lead into an activity where observations are selected to confirm, rather than to investigate, a hypothesis.

There is something of an equivalent problem in research aimed at falsification: exceptional observations can be selected because they lead to falsification. But although such a strategy should be avoided, because it makes the falsification less significant than if concluded from an unbiased selection of observations or a selection whose bias is against falsification, it is not necessarily misleading. Whether or not the falsification of a theory by way of an exceptional observation is misleading depends on how determinate is the claim of the theory. If a theory suggests that all social history is the history of struggling classes, it would be fair to point out even exceptional cases where that theory does not hold.

If on the other hand the hypothesis to be tested is (unfortunately) weak and probabilistic – for example claiming that there is a probability of between 55 and 85 percent that historical change is caused by social conflict – then it would be misleading to deliberately select exceptional observations to arrive at a falsification. None the less, the problem of being misled by a bias in the selection of observations is, as demonstrated above, less generally a problem in research designed to permit falsification than in research aiming at confirmation.

Pragmatic reasons in favour of falsificationism

At a principal level, it does seem that falsification of universally claimed explanations is preferable to the confirmation of particularist ones. On the other hand, the strength of confirmation is important in the pragmatics of research. For there is a social and political expectation that a researcher should explain something, rather than merely allocate resources to prove that something is wrong.\(^{21}\) And even if there surely is a constructive side to falsificationist research – encouraging the researcher to continuously work out new explanatory hypotheses – its positive results will rarely sound as striking as a definite confirmation.

However, there are situations where a falsificationist approach is preferable even on pragmatic grounds. For example, there may be an unusually large

\(^{21}\) The temptation to turn to confirmative claims is particularly strong when writing for large audiences. For example, in one of the bestsellers by physicist Stephen Hawkings (1988: 10) the author passes from recognising that all theories are “provisional” and impossible to “prove” to claiming that Einstein's theory of relativity has actually been “confirmed”, and he does this within the run of a single page.
number of empirically unsubstantiated and theoretically rivalling hypotheses in an area. Only one in a group of rivalling exclusive explanations can be confirmed, while all (or all expect one) can be falsified. Under such circumstances the researcher is more likely to succeed in falsification than in confirmation. For economic reasons it may then be preferable to design the study so as to permit interesting falsifications rather than interesting confirmations.

Furthermore, a falsificationist approach may be preferred for economic reasons in a case when the research problem contains only two variables (for example internationalisation and democracy). To make a serious attempt to confirm a causal relation between two variables, it is necessary to consider a large number of other variables. Even if we were initially interested only in the two variables of internationalisation and democracy, a confirmative approach to the matter would require us to analyse as well all possibly important processes that are parallel to that of internationalisation – for example, medialisation, commodification, economic growth, emancipation of women, de-colonisation, ageing populations, decline of political parties, etc. A falsificationist strategy would have fewer problems of this kind. If the theory to be tested is assumed to be explanatively stronger than the sum of theories that predict the opposite effect, which will most often be assumed at least by the advocates of the theory, then it would in principle be sufficient to observe one single (negative) case to reject the theory (Eckstein 1975). Under the same favourable assumptions, however, it is not possible to confirm a universalist theory. Even if the theory to be confirmed is assumed be more powerful than the sum of all theories predicting the opposite effect, an

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22 It is obvious that if the theory to be tested were probabilistic rather than deterministic, it would be necessary to rely on a few more observations. But not so many more. Say that a theory suggests that, in at least 85 % of cases, two variables, x and y, are positively related. If the theory is right, there is a probability of 15 % that we will find a negative relation between the two variables if we observe only one case. (For the sake of lucidity we interpret cases when the variables are unrelated as instances of a negative relation.) If we observe two cases, the probability of finding a negative relation between the variables in both cases becomes 15 % x 15 %, or in other words, 2.25%. This probability is already below the 5% insecurity that is standard in statistical procedures assuming a normal distribution for generalising from a sample to a population. The probability of finding a negative relation in, say, five cases out of five, if the theory claims to be correct in 85 % of the cases, would be about 0.008 %, that is about 8 chances in 100 000. This is so small a probability that, even if there is no logical possibility definitely to falsify a probabilistic theory, the range of its validity would in this case be so narrow that it would be more rational to leave the old theory behind and start considering another one. This shows that if a deterministic theory is rejected after a few observations, selected in a fair way, it does not help the theory much to reinterpret it in probabilistic terms.
observation in accordance with the theory being investigated could still have been predicted by yet other theories.

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Summing up, there are both pragmatic and theoretical arguments for designing the present study to permit falsification of universalist explanations rather than aiming at confirmation of particularist ones. We may then move on to questions that are more specific: What explanatory propositions are worth analysing? What cases should be selected for empirical study? What are the empirically observable patterns that can lead us to reject a hypothesis about the democratic effects of internationalisation?

**Selecting and testing hypotheses**

What predictive power should be expected from a hypothesis? Answering this question takes us to two interrelated matters: first, what patterns of empirical observation falsify a given hypothesis; second, what hypotheses are strong enough to be susceptible to falsification by given patterns of empirical observations.

Ideally, the explanatory power of a hypothesis should be specified by the theory from which the hypothesis is derived. It would then be incontestable what empirical observations should count as falsifications. In the social sciences that degree of theoretical specificity is, however, rare. Hypotheses to be tested tend to be taken from public or academic debates, rather than from clearly delimited theories. Fortunately, these debates exist only in so far as some explanatory power of the hypotheses under consideration is taken for granted. If we became interested in a theory via public or academic debate, a benchmark of how much explanatory power we are justified in expecting from that theory would be defined by the expectation that created our interest to the theory in the first place. If a theory is made known under a certain assumption about its explanatory power, that very assumption should guide the testing of the theory.

Now, in many political science debates there is a good deal of agreement that a theory, in order to attract our interest, must be sufficiently strong to predict accurately at least the direction – positive or negative – of a material development. To illustrate, if a theory claiming a positive causal relation between variables x and y were so weak as to permit a negative material relation between them, because some third variable, z, had a negative effect on y
removing the positive effect of $x$, then the theory would not be likely to attract any wide interest in either political or academic debate.

This can help us to identify what is a valid falsification under imperfect conditions. If a theory predicts a positive relation between $x$ and $y$, then that theory is rejected if such observations turn out not to be more common than the opposite ones. This criterion can be used when we are concerned with theories, the public or academic interest in which is conditioned by a claim to explanatory power of the kind just described.

The predictive arguments analysed in this study, concerning an effect of internationalisation on political autonomy, deliberation, and participation, fit well with this methodological requirement. The arguments to be analysed have been collected and developed from contributions to the literature. This literature indeed attributes to the arguments the very explanatory power required for us to investigate the validity of the predictions in the above way: the literature often presents the arguments as if the prediction made had already been realised.

Apart from this justification of the selection of political autonomy, deliberation, and participation as theoretical starting points in the explanatory analysis, let me mention three other reasons.

First, while there are theoretical contributions in previous research revolving around each of the three aspects, none of them has yet been firmly established within an empirical research agenda in the context of internationalisation. Hence in each case there are voids in previous research to be filled in.

Second, to make the investigation more fruitful, hypotheses should be derived from arguments rather than from intuitive judgements. If an intuitive judgement about causal relations is empirically rejected, there are no spin-off questions to investigate. If on the other hand, the hypothesis to be analysed is derived from some set of assumptions, a limited argument, or a grand theory,

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23 The arguments were introduced in Section 1.2.2 and will be detailed in the following chapters.

24 This literature will be described in more detail in later chapters. For the moment let me cite just one example of the considerable explanatory power attributed to arguments that link internationalisation to democracy: “The boundaries of a country, even a country as big as the United States, are now much smaller than the boundaries of the decisions that significantly affect the fundamental interests of its citizens. A country’s economic life, physical environment, national security, and survival are highly, and probably increasingly, dependent on actors and actions that are outside the country’s boundaries and not directly subject to its government. Thus the members of the demos cannot employ their national government, and much less their local governments, to exercise direct control over external actors whose decisions bear critically on their lives. (...) [T]he demos of a country … will suffer a considerable reduction in its capacity to control decisions on matters of importance to it.” (Dahl 1989: 319)
then its rejection leads to questioning the assumptions as well. Hence it is an advantage that the three concepts selected above are all integrated in theories that link them to the concept of internationalisation (as will be shown more fully in Chapters 3, 4, and 5).

Third, it is possible to regard democracy as consisting of these three elements. While the precise definition of democracy can and should be endlessly debated, the concepts of political autonomy, participation, and deliberation are sufficiently general and open to new interpretation to permit a formulation of democracy in terms of these three elements.

As mentioned in previous sections, other aspects of democracy could certainly be regarded as relevant in the context of internationalisation – aspects such as representation, accountability, and transparency. It would indeed strengthen any empirical analysis to include every possibly relevant theoretical aspect (ignoring the fact that the number of these is potentially infinite). However, this would bring us up against the law of diminishing returns. Moreover, to a great extent the concepts of political autonomy, participation, and deliberation overlap with those of (for instance) representation, accountability, and transparency.

All in all, it does not seem excessively problematic to delimit the explanatory part of this study to the effects of internationalisation on political autonomy, deliberation, and participation.

The selection of a single policy area: budget policy

We now turn to the grounds on which selection of empirical observations will be made. To evaluate an argument that predicts how internationalisation affects democracy it is preferable for the cases to be maximally different with regard to internationalisation. The aim is then to give the arguments a fair chance of being predicatively correct, as to make their possible falsification a significant result rather than a truism following from the design of the inquiry.

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25 Also, the greater the number of propositions necessary to an argument, the greater the risk that the argument is wrong and, hence the more interesting the argument is, provided that it stands up to testing.

26 Participation in general elections may be regarded as the method of arriving at politically representative assemblies. Participation in general elections and parliamentarians’ participation in political decision-making and debate can also be seen as the method of holding politicians accountable. Transparency, finally, can be seen as one element in the deliberation.

27 Fairness or generosity towards theories are more appropriate selection criteria, when falsification is attempted, than the more commonly proposed “most likely” selections (Eckstein 1975: 118; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 109). Cases that are most likely to confirm a theory, or cases that are very similar to these, are those that we have already
There are several possibilities for collecting observations that are different as to degree of internationalisation. One may compare different territorial units, different times, or different policy areas. The latter option is problematic because of the difficulties in assessing the level of internationalisation across policy areas. For example, even if everyone agreed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an instance of the internationalisation of security, it would still be difficult to say for sure whether this example represented more or less internationalisation than does, say, the deregulation of trade in currencies in the world of computerised interaction. For this reason, it is preferable to focus on a single policy area.

The selection of a single policy area depends on whether or not we wish to make comparisons over time, since not all policy areas have been equally internationalised over time. To see the importance of adopting a chronological perspective, recall that the rejection of a theory is more significant if there are few competing theories making different predictions. A theory that does not predict correctly in the absence of contrary theories is even less likely to do so in the presence of such theories. This is a falsificationist argument in favour of the traditional methodological proceeding of controlling for as many background variables as possible. For the sake of generosity to the hypotheses, we aim to focus on the effects of internationalisation rather than on the (contrary) effects of other processes, but we have no illusions that controlling for background variables will permit us to confirm any hypothesised effects of internationalisation. Now, with few exceptions, the best way empirically to isolate changes in one variable from changes in another is to observe the same unit at different periods of time. Even if the time period being used in the comparison is rather long, it will probably be accompanied by greater stability in constitutional frameworks, electoral procedures, party systems, administrative traditions, language, and culture than if a comparison is being made between, let us say, different states during the same time period.

It can now be explained why economic policy, and in particular budget policy (defined as the political determination of public incomes and spending), has been chosen for study. It is easy to establish that consumption, production, and investment have become significantly more international in the post-war period for all relevant countries (empirical observations to this effect will be presented in a section below). Hence investigated and classified as such. But to select such cases for empirical (re)investigation would have little power for improving our knowledge.

28 The discussion will not be pursued in terms of welfare policy, which depends on much more than the allocation of public finance, for example the size and the needs of the population, unless such issues are explicitly accounted for.
concentrating on economic policy should permit us to evaluate hypothesised effects likely to appear, which should in turn increase the significance of a rejection of the hypothesis.

Another reason for making this selection is that the internationalisation of market functions has only recently, and then only marginally, been followed by internationalisation of such state functions as decision-making on budget deficits, interest rates, and public debt (as demonstrated in a subsequent section). The material observed would hence permit us in some measure to distinguish the effects of the internationalisation of market functions from those of the internationalisation of state functions.

Finally, there are an abundance of hypothesised democratic effects of internationalisation in the area of economic policy (we will see this more fully in Chapters 3, 4, and 5). As explained already, the great number of these should improve the prospects of arriving at significant results from a study oriented towards falsification.

We can then turn to the question of which country or countries are appropriate to follow through a period of internationalisation in the area of budget policy.

Selecting a group of countries: Sweden, Britain, and France

It is necessary to restrict this study to countries which were democratic before the recent acceleration of internationalisation. To compare, for example, a self-sufficient totalitarian state with an internationally involved democratic one would not allow us to reach any conclusions concerning the effects of internationalisation on democracy. As mentioned, it is also advisable that there be included in the study as much variation as possible in degree of internationalisation. This allows us to filter out rejections which are truly significant.

Both these criteria can be fulfilled by focusing on West European states. More or less democratic regimes have been in place in Western Europe longer than elsewhere. And as will presently be shown, the international connectedness of European markets and politics has been growing steadily since the Second World War.

Having decided to focus on the region of Western Europe, are there any criteria by which an individual country, or several countries, should be selected? This question bears on the degree to which we can generalise from the rejection of a theory in one particular instance to its rejection in all instances. Having, by a particular observation, thrown doubt on a theory's universal claims, it is still an open question how broad the category is for which that particular observation is valid (see the distinction between universality and generality as outlined in footnote 18). From a material point
of view, the way to proceed is simply to broaden the empirical scope of the study so as to cover as great a variety of experiences as possible. The selection of countries should then reflect the diversity of European democracies and permit assessing whether the possible absence of any observable effect of internationalisation is a general or a specific finding. For the sake of diversity it is necessary that at least two countries be taken into consideration, and the diversity that concerns us the most is (as given by the hypotheses to be analysed) economic diversity.

Because of their different tax structures and welfare systems (as well as their relatively long periods of stable democracy and active involvement in the process of internationalisation) the first selection of countries includes Sweden and Britain. To cover the middle ground between these two, France seems to be an appropriate choice. The great differences between these countries in the above mentioned regards will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. For now it is sufficient to point out that in a famous book about welfare regimes in capitalist economic systems, the three countries here selected are described as belonging to different worlds of welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990).

One may notice that none of the selected countries is a federal state. This eliminates a consideration of a certain constitutional difference. This sacrifice however seems worth making for the sake of bringing out economic differences as clearly as possible.

**Market internationalisation: preliminary to selection of time periods**

The following pages survey the process of economic internationalisation during the most recent decades in Sweden, Britain, and France. From the description of the process of internationalisation we will be able to make an educated guess as to when a theoretically predicted effect of internationalisation on democracy will take place if the theories are true, and hence what time periods are most relevant for empirical study.

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29 Several other considerations would also be relevant to determining how generally relevant a single counter-instance may be. Among other things we would need to know what empirical observations support the opposed theoretical claims, since the relevance of a counter-instance will be more general if the opposed claims have no empirical support at all. We also need to know how strong the theoretical claims are which we are about to evaluate, since a claim that can only be understood in a very strong sense is more easily refuted in general terms than one that is open to less strong interpretations as well.
Table 1.1. Export as percentage of GDP (constant prices) for selected countries and years.

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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Goldblatt et al. 2000: 180, who have compiled information from various sources.

From the 1950s and onwards the table shows a growth of the export sector – the proportion of the national production consumed beyond the state’s boundaries – in all three countries. The levels, and the most intense periods, of internationalisation differ between countries. On this indicator of internationalisation, the Swedish economy has been more internationally integrated than those of the other two for all the years except 1913, which may be understood as an effect of the greater need for a small economy to profit from the division of labour and product specialisation which are fostered by internationalisation. From looking at the chart we see that France and Britain, being more nearly equal in population, follow each other in levels of internationalisation in 1973, 1987 and 1997, while Britain was considerably more internationalised in 1913 and 1950. The explanation for this could perhaps be located in the comparably late industrialisation and modernisation of France. But although levels and periods of highest intensity vary between the countries, it is quite clear that production and consumption have tended to be increasingly international during the last decades. This is also reflected in the reduction of tariffs by the same countries over the same period (Goldblatt et al. 2000: 180).

The figures for 1913 indicate that it is just as well to confine our study to the years following the Second World War. As shown by the table, no process of economic internationalisation took place between 1913 and 1950, but rather an opposite trend, towards greater self-sufficiency. To extend our study to the period before 1950 would therefore not be helpful in evaluating hypotheses about the effects of internationalisation on democracy. In the region of Western Europe the period after 1945 also confines itself to democratic states, defined as states governed by popularly and fairly elected parliaments. In this minimal sense, Sweden and Britain were democratised following the First World War, while in France voting rights were first afforded to women after the Second World War. Hence the need to study democratic states during internationalisation is a second reason for delimiting the period of investigation to after 1945.
Another vital function in an economy is that of allocating financial capital. It has been noted that “[c]onsistent data on international capital markets really only commence in the 1970s”, and furthermore that this “is more than a statistical accident” and reflects the change from “negligible levels in the 1960s” to the “huge expansion of these [i.e., financial] markets” in later periods (Goldblatt et al. 2000: 202). It may be objected here that measuring the flows of finance across national boundaries gives a misleading impression of the extent to which an international economy has emerged. If incentives to move capital are absent because rates of return on all kinds of investments in different countries are equal, data on financial flows will not give an accurate picture. However, because of its falsificationist approach, this is not a problem in the present study. The risk created by flow data is one of underestimating, rather than overestimating, the degree to which an international economy has in fact emerged. Hence if internationalisation has proceeded further than indicated by flow data, the theories under scrutiny are even more likely to predict correctly, which gives and even greater theoretical significance to their possible falsification.

Table 1.2 shows the gross foreign direct investment plus portfolio investment flows for various periods. A foreign direct investment is defined as the acquisition of overseas productive assets, while portfolio investments are made on a possible short-term basis and with no direct involvement in production, as for example in stock trading. The pattern of internationalisation is here more or less repeated. The only exception to a uniform increase is observed between the periods 1985-89 and 1990-95 in Britain – a country which shows, on the other hand, the strongest development of all over the whole period. In sum, there has without question been a major internationalisation of investments during the past few decades.

Table 1.2. Gross foreign direct investment plus portfolio investment flows, 1970-1995, as percentage of GDP.

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Goldblatt et al. 2000: 224

While the rates of foreign direct investment were also high in previous historical periods (although probably not as high and widespread as today), the current development of the international money market is more spectacular. Trade in foreign currencies has typically been correlated to export
figures, since producers and consumers need to use their domestic means of payment even when transactions take place across national boundaries. But during the 1960s and 1970s trade in foreign currency started to evolve in a more independent fashion. The number of capital controls in the OECD-countries decreased from a mean of 2.5 capital controls in operation in each country in 1967 to virtually none in 1996 (Simmons 1999: 42). This facilitation of trade has been increasingly exploited during the past two decades, as seen in the growth of turnover in foreign exchange (Table 1.3).

Table 1.3. Estimated annual world turnover in foreign exchange, 1979-95 (trillions of US dollars).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World foreign exchange turnover</th>
<th>World exports</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1:61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>252.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1:54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>297.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1:60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Goldblatt et al. 2000: 224; Lairson and Skidmore 1997: 102 reports an even more dramatic change on the same indicator.

Although the figures are not specified with regard to our selected countries, the transformation described is so great – from 12 times to 60 times more trade in foreign currency than export – that it is clear monetary internationalisation over the past few decades should not be ignored.

**Internationalisation of state functions: Preliminary to selection of time**

State functions have become increasingly international during the post-war era. Between 1945 and 1975, the number of treaties in force between governments more than doubled, from 6351 to 14061 (Goldblatt et al. 2000: 53). The number of such treaties that embrace intergovernmental organisations rose from 623 to 2303 (ibid.) while the number of intergovernmental organisations went from about 100, in 1950, to about 2600, in 1996, although they peaked at about 3900 in 1980 (ibid. 54). The number of international non-governmental organisations has increased almost steadily from about 100 in 1950 to 5472 in 1996 (ibid.).

Counting the number of organisations and treaties will, however, not reveal the most important fact about internationalisation of state functions in Europe, namely the process that has presently led up to the EU. In the story that the EU itself seeks to canonise it all started in 1950, on May 9, at a press
conference in Paris, where the then French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, presented a declaration on what was to become the Coal and Steel Community (in force 1952). Although Schuman himself conceived of this moment as a first step towards the federation of Europe, it took time until this new conception of “Europe” attained the dimensions which have provoked the hopes and fears familiar to us today. Britain joined what had then become the European Community (EC) in 1973. In the EC all issues dealt with by the Council of Ministers (which was arguably the most powerful institution, although it was far from unrivalled by the Commission and the Court of Justice) were still taken by unanimous voting. Although the Community had the power to abolish subsidies, harmonise indirect taxation, and raise its own money, within limits decided by the member-states, its main occupation was with product regulation and the creation of a common market; it was essentially a politically directed process of market function internationalisation.

It was not until the Single European Act (in force 1987) that majority voting was introduced in the Council of Ministers. This step came together with increases in the freedom for movement of persons, commodities, services, and capital, as well as increased decision-making powers in regard to environmental and social matters. But perhaps most importantly, the Single European Act paved the way for the European Monetary Union, finally agreed upon in the Maastricht treaty (in force 1993). At this point the name of the organisation changed from the EC to the present EU. With the introduction of the European Monetary Union there also followed a series of what were called convergence criteria, designed to measure which member countries should be allowed to share the common currency and interest rate. This is important, because some of the convergence criteria concerned budgetary policy, the making of which was therefore to some degree internationalised, introducing a new level on which to examine the political activities which are the subject of our study (without however ignoring the old one). According to the convergence criteria, budget deficits must not, under normal conditions, exceed three percent of GDP, and public debt should not exceed 70 percent of GDP.

From a democratic perspective it may also be noted that the very turbulent ratification of the Maastricht Treaty established European integration issues higher and more firmly than ever before on the political agenda. At least by

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30 The juridical principles of the supremacy of EC law over, and its direct effect upon, national laws were introduced by the Court of Justice in the early 1960s (Weiler 1999: 10-96).

31 The Danish people voted no in a first referendum; then there was a less than two percent margin in favour of the yes vote in a hastily organised French referendum; in Germany,
1993, and possibly even by 1987, the European integration of state functions had become significant. Before that internationalisation in Europe mainly concerned market functions (and the politics of regulating those functions). Sweden entered the EU on the first of January, 1995.

Selecting time periods

Having reviewed the process of internationalisation in France, Britain, and Sweden, looking only at state and market functions, we are better equipped to select a relevant period for investigation. Generosity to the hypotheses suggests that we accept a certain time lag between any stage in the process of internationalisation and its democratic effect. For this reason we should make our comparisons among points in time spread over a long period. This should permit us to handle the possibility that internationalisation produces its effects very slowly.

In accordance with the above description, we will concentrate on three periods. The first period centres on the years following immediately after the Second World War. This stage – which may be referred to as one of a low level of internationalisation – is characterised by comparably low levels of GDP in the export sector, very limited amounts of foreign direct investment and international trade in currency, and as well very limited international political co-operation, at least in budgetary matters. The second period centres on the early 1970s. This stage – which may be referred to as one of a medium level of internationalisation – is marked by a significant growth of the export sector, some limited movement of capital across national boundaries, no increase in the limited amount of international co-operation in budgetary matters, but a general trend toward the internationalising of state functions. The third stage centres on the mid 1990s. This stage – referred to as one of a high level of internationalisation – is distinguished by its even greater export sector, huge developments in international finance, a strong general trend of political co-operation at the international level, and a not negligible measure of budgetary power at the international level.

This sub-division of internationalisation onto three different levels will be worked out more precisely as necessitated by particular arguments. But for a methodological guideline the present description is sufficient. To the extent that empirical material is accessible, it should be collected from each of the three levels of internationalisation mentioned above. In cases where empirical

which did not put the question to a referendum, there was a clear no majority, according to opinion polls; in Britain, the House of Commons did not ratify the Treaty until the Conservative government threatened resignation if its Euro sceptic fellow party members did not approve it. (See Lord 2004: 3 for a somewhat different interpretation of the democratic importance of this turbulence).
material is difficult to access, the above classification suggests that we should at least be able to include observations from more than one level of internationalisation.  

1.3.2. Analysing concepts

Although a theory is always about something, it is not always evident what a theory is about. The fact that an explanatory theory is about explanations, or that a conceptual theory is about concepts, does not say anything about what should count as proper explanations or concepts. The object of an explanatory theory is often specified by the theory itself, possibly suggesting causal mechanisms, coherent interpretations, or covering-laws as the relevant kind of explanation. When it comes to conceptual theory the same level of detail is more rare and perhaps also more difficult to achieve. What is a proper definition of a concept, it will be proposed here, depends on the purpose for which the concept is being used, and so the object of a conceptual democratic theory (aiming to define democracy) depends on what purpose the concept of democracy is taken to serve. Let us have a few examples of different and possibly rivalling purposes for which relevant concepts may be used and hence different objects of conceptual theory.

**Concepts used to express opinions**

In some contexts the concept of democracy will serve to express a political opinion. For example, a negative opinion of a certain reform may be expressed by describing it as undemocratic. In this context an adequate definition of democracy should capture exactly what is expressed, or possibly what is intended to be expressed, by the term democracy. In other words, the definition should describe the precise political circumstances that lead one to refer to the reform as undemocratic. Hence if anyone were interested in developing a theory aimed at conceptualising democracy in this very context – e.g., someone expressing a personal opinion on a certain political reform – the

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32 What has been described so far is the selection of observations from which the most significant kind of rejection may be inferred. But with strong theories there is a possibility of rejection even when all cases are on the same level of internationalisation. If a theory predicts that, given a certain level of internationality, a certain level of democracy must follow, but what we find is a huge variation in degree of democracy, then the theory has failed to predict accurately. However, rejection on these grounds is less interesting than rejection following the method presented above, since a theory may first show its quality when applied to various levels of internationalisation. If data from only one level of internationalisation are used they must be interpreted with much greater care than if they are taken from several levels of internationalisation.
proper method for evaluating the theory would be to investigate whether its
definition of democracy actually captures what is being expressed, or is meant
to be expressed, by the term “democracy” in that context. If the answer is
negative, the conceptualisation should be revised.

Few people will ever have a conceptual theory worked out to capture their
personal understanding of democracy in a particular speech-act. But the
method of evaluating definitions instanced above can be applied to generally
more important cases, such as when the object of conceptual democratic
theory is to capture the meaning that the concept takes on in a certain body
of literature or discourse. In that context there will often appear different and
incompatible meanings of the term. The analyst will then need to balance
different interpretations against each other, perhaps by describing, as
coherently and with as much general applicability as possible, the meaning that
democracy takes on in the material as a whole. If coherence and general
applicability are in fact taken as methodological guidelines, the same criterion
can then be used by any other researcher to evaluate the resulting
conceptualisation. Hence, if it is shown that another interpretation of
democracy scores higher on coherence and general applicability, in the analysis
of the same body of literature, the first interpretation should be rejected.

To capture the meanings that various authors have given to the terms they
use will indeed be a purpose of several analyses undertaken later on in this
study. It was noted in a previous section that such conceptual contributions
will often come as the first step in the evaluation of a cause-and-effect
hypothesis. For example, when this study investigates the prediction that
internationalisation damages some deliberative qualities of predictive
democracy, those deliberative qualities should be defined in accordance with
the argument to be evaluated. This does not necessarily mean that a valid
conceptualisation of deliberation should follow the exact definition of
democratic deliberation employed by authors involved in the relevant
academic debates. Their definitions could be misleading. The mere use of a
concept is no guarantee of the consistency or adequacy in its definition.
Rather than taking for granted that authors using a concept define it
appropriately, we should take as our rule to define the concept that could
most reasonably be assumed as inherent in the arguments of these authors.
The criterion of reasonableness thus introduced may imply preferring
coherent, simple and generally applicable interpretations to diffuse and
complex concepts of limited applicability; but the reasonableness of a certain
interpretation may also be argued in terms of a more concrete analysis.
Concepts used to construct explanations and theories

A more straightforward purpose for which a concept may be used is to permit explanation. Explanation is here understood to involve the description of the relation between discrete entities. Although this notion of explanation is not especially controversial, its requirements are often difficult to meet in practice. In an earlier section, it was indicated that a common view about the relation between internationalisation and democracy is tautological; that is, its conclusions are built into the very definition of the two concepts it employs. Instead of describing the relation between two different things it describes a single thing. To arrive at a useful explanation therefore, one may have to adjust the definitions of the concepts so that they refer to distinct matters. Since one aim of the present study is explanatory, this criterion will at some points be relevant to deciding which of two conceptualisations is preferable.

A concept may also be adjusted to make an explanatory claim stronger by broadening the definition of that which is to be explained, the explanandum, or by narrowing the definition of that which explains, the explanans, or to weaken the explanatory claim by narrowing the definition of the explanandum or by broadening that of the explanans.33

A similar role played by concepts is that of permitting the construction of good theory. While theories are not made up of concepts alone (important functions must also be carried out in the form of propositions) concepts are necessary elements in all theories (including such theory as aim to define concepts). Depending on how concepts are defined, therefore, the theoretical outcome will be more or less successful. The criteria for what constitutes a good theory may vary between fields of study, between individuals, and indeed over time. None the less, it is not unusual to hear that a theory is either more likely valid or more academically interesting if it is, among other things:

- consistent rather than inconsistent,
- empirically accurate in its descriptive propositions,
- designed to employ a minimum of unverifiable or untestable assumptions,
- systematically thorough in description rather than impressionistic,
- general rather than specific in application,
- capably of accurately predicting unobserved cases,
- inter-subjective rather than private with regard to evidence,
- testable rather than immune to critique,
- focused on variables, rather than constants, as explanatory factors,

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33 Some authors treat it as a partly empirical question whether concepts should be redefined for this purpose (for example King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 101-04), although they do recognise that the approach may immunise theories to empirically derived critiques.
• capable of solving difficult problems rather than simple ones,
• susceptible to development rather than self-restricted,
• requiring minimal revision of previously established theories and concepts,
• publicly accessible in its formulation, rather than esoteric,
• rich rather than poor in its implications, practically as well as logically.

Of course it is impossible to fully satisfy every point in the list at the same time; of course several points overlap and may compete with other points; of course no mention is made of all the qualities a theory may serve to elucidate in a given context. What the list intends to demonstrate is that there are indeed a number of theoretical qualities that may require one definition of a concept rather than another. The right concepts are necessary to fashion a good theory, and the right definitions are necessary for the fulfilment of that purpose.

**Concepts used to identify realistic instances**

A yet different purpose often relevant for the concept of democracy is to identify concrete democratic possibilities that can be realised and sustained, preferably at a low cost, rather than possibilities that can be realised only under the most favourable conditions.

The background of this purpose is the fact that general definitions of democracy may differ regarding their ability to identify concrete democratic problems or possibilities. For example, it may require a greater intellectual effort to derive practical advice on how to organise public administration from a definition of democracy in terms of rule by the people than from a definition of democracy in terms of popular political participation. The same goes for the degree of realism of democratic reforms derived from different definitions. For example, a definition of democracy in terms of direct participation may suggest less realisable reforms in international politics than a definition of democracy in terms of indirect participation.

It should be recognised that two definitions that are different regarding their respective ability to identify realistic instances may completely overlap in content. That is the case when one definition is nothing but a more detailed version of the other. While one definition distinguishes different ideas, institutions or practices, the other relies on more general categories. The level of detail does however not imply anything about the ability of a definition to identify practicable instances. While more details are likely to help, if they are worked out in the political context where the concept is applied, they may also misdirect attention, if the concept is applied in a new and different political context.
The prime example of theoretical development for the purpose of better identifying practicable democratic possibilities has been mentioned several times already: the transformation from direct to representative democracy as parallel to the expansion from small city-states to territorially extensive states.

A less often cited example is the change from a participatory to a more elitist view of democracy that occupied several theorists in the aftermath of the Second World War. According to Carole Pateman, the common points of authors like Schumpeter, Berelson, Dahl and Sartori illustrate this trend towards a less participatory view of democracy. According to Pateman:

The theory, referred to as an empirical or descriptive one, focuses on the operation of the democratic political system as a whole and is grounded in the facts of present-day political attitudes and behaviour as revealed by sociological investigation. In the theory, 'democracy' refers to a political method or set of institutional arrangements at a national level. The characteristically democratic element in the method is the competition of leaders (élites) for votes of the people at periodic, free elections. 'Political equality' in the theory refers to universal suffrage and to the existence of equality of opportunity of access to channels of influence over leaders. Finally, 'participation', so far as the majority is concerned, is participation in the choice of decision-makers. (Pateman 1970: 13-14)

It is at least possible that this conception of democracy was constructed for identifying realistic concrete democratic possibilities. To see the point, recall that the relevant works by Schumpeter and his followers were published after the out-break of the Second World War, and that the most intensive period of publication was in the 1950s and 1960s. Having seen several European democracies transformed into fascist tyrannies, with an undeniable amount of popular support, and how the decolonisation and liberation of many Third World countries led to periods of unstable democracy and often to authoritarianism, it may well have been democratically preferable (also from a participatory perspective) to search for a more liberal, stable, and elitist kind of democracy. The empirical discovery of instability and authoritarian tendencies produced by democratic states themselves may have suggested a limitation of what level of political participation is democratically optimal, both as measured by other democratic qualities such as freedom of expression and political equality, and as measured by the sustaining of popular political participation itself over time.

A possible purpose of concepts is hence to facilitate coming to grips with concrete instances. As for the concept of democracy, that purpose is important in the response to the challenge of establishing territorially extensive states, or meeting the forces of fascism and Nazism, as well as copying with the context of radical internationalisation.
Contrasting approaches to conceptual theory

Thus far we have come across a few purposes that a concept may serve and pointed out what should count as a proper concept in different cases. As for conceptual theory – the business of defining concepts – this has also served to point out what should count as the proper object of a theory. The intention has indeed not been to cover all possible purposes of concepts, but rather to describe the general way of developing and evaluating conceptual theory which is relied on in the chapters to follow. The following is the most general and fundamental description of the method used in the conceptual analyses of this study. The method assumes that concepts serve purposes which could be stated more or less explicitly. Hence if we observe that a certain concept does not accomplish the purpose or set of purposes that it is used to serve, then there is a reason to reconsider its definition and possibly to replace the concept with another. A somewhat stronger way of putting this, is that once a concept is used for a given purpose, there comes into being a distinct object which demands to be accounted for by the definition of that concept.

This may look like a very instrumental view of what language is – rationally constructed to serve predefined purposes. However, that would be reading too much into my position. To evaluate a definition against the purposes a concept is supposed to serve does not presume any view of language as merely a rational activity. Although this method is proposed for making rational decisions concerning the definition of concepts, it makes no claims as to the nature of the driving force behind the actual practice of defining concepts.

It would have simplified this procedure if the general outline of this method could be considered trivial, but it cannot. It clashes with several traditions in the analysis of concepts. According to traditional structuralism, for example, the meaning of a concept or term is determined by what it is not in the language system taken as a whole (Saussure 1915/2001: 38). On that assumption, the most accurate method for specifying the meaning of a concept is to describe its relation to everything else in the language. There is no need here to refute Saussurian structuralism or any of its currently more fashionable developments, but it should be noticed that it is indeed a more practical method to define concepts by a limited reference to their purposes, than by reference to the vast complexity involved in the description of a whole language system.

At the other extreme there is the position that scholars are free to stipulate whatever definition they want, as long as their use of language is consistent. The only problem with idiosyncratic definitions, according to this view, is that
Democratic theory and internationalisation in Europe

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those not predisposed to the definitions may lose interest in the argument (Goldmann 2003: 32; for arguments that may be used to support this view, see Popper 1945, Ch. 11, Sect. 2). From the methodological perspective outlined in this section, it is a weakness not to recognise that once a concept is used to serve a purpose – which is pretty much always the case – there is every possibility that not only uninteresting but also misleading and mistaken definitions may be suggested. Moreover, to admit an element of arbitrariness into conceptualisation is unnecessarily to limit the role of reason in the process. This seems to be a mistake in particular when the overall context is that of scientific research.

A method used to define more specifically the concept of democracy is to require definitional propositions to be morally justified. This view is implicit in some arguments put forth by Dahl (1979/1998: 110) and explicitly defended by Saward (1998: 8-14). There are surely cases where it is difficult to separate conceptual and normative analyses. For example, when common intuitions are called upon to decide whether something is democratic or not, it may be difficult to know if the intuitions in question concern what is good (normative analysis) or what is the meaning of democracy (conceptual analysis). However, the latter does not necessarily depend on the former. Indeed, the assumption that it does would create obstacles to the analysis of arguments which assume democracy to be undesirable. Such arguments are certainly relevant in the world of international politics (Bellamy and Castiglione 2000: 65, 70; Lord 2004: 5p; see for example Dahl 1999 for the similar argument that while democracy is impossible under international conditions, international organisations are still desirable). Hence the moral value of (a given interpretation of) democracy should be investigated in its own right rather than simply made part of a definition.34

1.4. Structure of the argument to follow

Chapter 2 investigates the tenability of the principle that everyone affected by a decision has a democratic right to participate in making that decision. One result of this analysis is a reinforced reason for developing an empirical approach to the investigation of links between various aspects of democracy and internationalisation.

34 The normative investigation of a given interpretation of democracy may start by considering its coherence with shared intuitions of what is good or bad and, given a discourse that clings to democracy as a moral value, by investigating the meaning of democracy and what political practice is in conformity with this concept.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 undertake some of the empirical analyses that, according to the arguments of Chapter 2, are necessary to an understanding of the relation between democracy and internationalisation. Chapter 3 deals with autonomy, Chapter 4 with deliberation, and Chapter 5 with participation. All these chapters evaluate the validity of arguments which predict certain impacts on democracy as a result of internationalisation and each ends with a summary of major results, including conceptual and methodological points made in the course of the analysis.

Chapter 6 analyses politics at the level of international organisations. Like the investigation in Chapter 2, which suggests the empirical analyses to be carried out in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, Chapter 6 scrutinises the politically influential argument that the politics of international organisations originates in a delegation of authority from states, and hence that international organisations are democratically justified to the extent that their member-states are democratic. Once again one result of the investigation will be a reinforced reason to develop an empirical approach to investigating the relation between democracy and internationalisation, this time between the national and the international political levels.

Chapter 7 takes on the required empirical analyses by comparing budget policy-making in the present-day European Parliament, on the one hand, and the making of budget policy in Sweden, Britain, and France, on the other, again in regard to political autonomy, participation, and deliberation.

The general structure of this study could hence be seen as one of reconceptualising the relation between internationalisation and democracy so as to allow empirical observations to evaluate the validity of various hypotheses, and then to undertake relevant empirical analyses. However, no mass of empirical analysis can by itself generate a theory. Without a hypothesis to organise observations it would even be hard to collect them in the first place. For that reason the final chapter makes an attempt, albeit a modest one, to assemble some of the conclusions and observations of the foregoing chapters into theoretical categories general enough to transcend the particular points made in those chapters.

The theoretical argument outlined at the end of Chapter 8 suggests that democracy is a system where as many as possible decide as much as possible. The practice of democracy, thus defined, makes it possible to understand both the realism of certain democratic virtues, such as the capacity to change government without resort to violence, and the continuity and change, during internationalisation, of such features as democratic deliberation and participation. In addition, the theory implies new solutions to several problems analysed in previous chapters, such as what territorial symmetry of
social relations is democratically required and what transfer of authorities to international organisations could be democratically justified.
2. A dogma of political inclusiveness and autonomy

Every polity operates on a formal or informal rule specifying who can participate in the making of collective decisions and who is subject to collective action. Likewise, every democratic theory must specify who should be able to participate in the making of what collective decisions for the polity to qualify as democratic. An assumption often made on this point is that for a polity to be democratic the individuals making a certain decision should be the same as those affected by that decision. This idea of democratic inclusiveness, which will here be referred to as the symmetry principle, furthermore implies an extremely strong notion of democratic political autonomy, since it requires anyone who is not subject to a given political procedure to abstain from affecting the people who are; otherwise the people will be affected by a decision that they cannot participate in the making of.\(^{35}\) In this chapter it will be argued that these concepts of political inclusiveness and autonomy are problematic and ill-founded, and should be replaced by others serving the same purpose. The aim of the critique is to arrive at a notion of democratic inclusiveness and autonomy whose reasonableness is not restricted to the realm of national and domestic politics, and also to open up more fully to empirical research the relation between internationalisation and democracy. Before developing this critique, however, the principle under scrutiny will be described in more detail.

2.1. Symmetry between affected and politically included individuals

Let us take a few examples of how the symmetry principle has been formulated in the literature. When Michel Zürn analyses the democratic challenge of what he calls de-nationalisation he suggests that the democratic process “consists of two components – a democratic principle – that is, everyone affected by a decision should have a chance to participate – and a deliberative principle – any decision should be backed by arguments committed to values of rationality and impartiality.” (Zürn 2000: 186) It is important to recognise that the symmetry principle is not, according to Zürn, a notion in the periphery of democratic theory, but is rather its core definition. Analysing questions similar to those raised by Zürn, although in terms of globalisation, David Held

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\(^{35}\) It could be questioned whether this idea should even be temporarily referred to as democratic political autonomy. In the next chapter that label will be reserved for a very different concept.
explores a number of disjunctures all of which centre on the “challenges to democracy deriving, on the one hand, from the world political economy and the web of relations and networks which stretch across national borders and, on the other hand, the divergence that sometimes exists between the totality of those affected by a political decision and those who participated in making it” (Held 1995: ix, my ital.).

Still in the context of globalisation or internationalisation, but less restricted to democracy proper and more inclined in addition to consider the matter of democratic legitimacy, Jürgen Habermas seeks to explain one idea which has guided post-war European politics by paraphrasing the symmetry principle: “If we read our constitutions in this material sense, as texts about achieving social justice, then the idea of citizens prescribing laws for themselves – according to which those subject to the law should regard themselves as the ones who make the law – takes on a political dimension: that of a society which deliberately acts upon itself. In constructing the welfare state in post-war Europe, politicians of all stripes were guided by this dynamic conception of the democratic process.” (Habermas 1999: 47) This “dynamic conception of the democratic process” is also what Habermas himself finds conceptually accurate: “Deficits in democratic legitimation arise whenever the set of those involved in making democratic decisions fails to coincide with the set of those affected by them.” (Habermas 1999: 49)

Appreciation of the symmetry principle is, however, not restricted to the field of internationalisation and globalisation. For example, when Arend Lijphart characterised the consensus model of democracy – as opposed to majority rule – he followed the economist Arthur Lewis in saying that “the primary meaning of democracy is that ‘all who are affected by a decision should have the right to participate in making that decision.’” (Lijphart 1984: 21) Here, once again, it is clear that the symmetry principle is located at the absolute centre of democratic theory. And needless to say, many others have taken identical, or closely related, theoretical positions.

One may separate two main concepts in the principle that are common to all of the above formulations: the capacity of individuals to participate in collective decision making and the effects of collective decision making on individuals. These two concepts could each be understood as dichotomous (either you can participate or you cannot, either you are affected or you are not) or as graded qualities (to a greater or lesser extent you have the capacity to participate, to a greater or lesser extent you are affected by the collective decision). In some cases it might also be instructive to distinguish between participation in the making of a single decision and the making of a group of decisions unified by, for example, ideology. Of less relevance to the critique formulated in this chapter – but of great interest to later following chapters –
there is also a wide range of distinctions between different methods for participating in collective decision making. For the moment it is enough to stipulate that the possibility of participating in free, fair, and regularly held elections is necessary and sufficient for concluding that the individual who has that possibility also has the possibility of participating in any collective decision that depends on the outcome of such elections.

If for the sake of simplicity, we concentrate on treating the two concepts of the principle as dichotomies, and restrict our discussion to concern only individual decisions, it is fair to conceive of only two ways in which the principle can be violated, and only two ways in which it can be realised. The principle can be violated either if an individual is excluded from participating in the making of a collective decision that he or she is affected by – which will here be referred to as *illegitimate exclusion* – or if an individual is afforded the right to participate in the making of a collective decision that he or she is not affected by – which will here be referred to as *illegitimate inclusion*. Or conversely, the principle can be realised either by allowing an individual to participate in the making of a collective decision which he or she is affected by, or by excluding him or her from participating in the making of a collective decision in the absence of any tendency to be affected by it. The two possibilities are illustrated in Diagram 2.1.

Diagram 2.1. The symmetry principle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual participating in making a decision</th>
<th>Individual affected by a decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate exclusion</td>
<td>Illegitimate inclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

True, these distinctions, and hence the possibilities of realising and violating the principle, are not worked out by the authors referred to above, who might claim that this interpretation introduces additional elements to their respective positions. The following critique does not, however, depend for its validity on
the acceptance by the authors in question of both of the abovementioned illegitimacies as violators of the symmetry principle. One will do.

Illegitimate exclusion – an individual being affected by a collective decision he or she cannot participate in – is typically exemplified by a state that has taken even some minor step in the process of internationalisation, globalisation or any other process characterised by increasing interaction across national borders. By definition, internationalisation implies that citizens will increasingly affect or be affected by factors or actors outside their national boundaries and outside the direct control of their government, and hence, that an externally made policy will affect citizens who were never included in deciding on it, however democratically it may have been made with regard to the (external) citizens who were. Note that this conclusion – that internationalisation, by definition, violates the symmetry principle – does not depend on a thick, or controversial, understanding of the term “internationalisation”. To reach the conclusion we have to admit only that internationalisation is – among many other things – a process in which something – anything – becomes increasingly shared among different countries, or increasingly affected across national boundaries. Hence the possible and probable contextual variation in a number of matters frequently discussed in connection with internationalisation (for example, the sort of societal functions internationally affected or shared, the geographical scope of the relation, the intensity or speed of the international effect, the technical means for achieving the effect or the reasons for which the whole process started) does not affect the validity of the implication. In times of internationalisation, democracy at the level of states is not a political system in which individuals affected by a public policy are generally included in the determination of that policy. Indeed, there is no way it could be so. As long as democratic participation is restricted by national boundaries, the most efficient way to approximate the symmetry principle is to pursue an extremely nationalistic policy, to set barriers between the citizenry and the outside world.36

Illegitimate inclusion – individuals being allowed to participate in the making of decisions by which they are not themselves affected – typically

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36 Note that the authors cited above do not propose any qualification concerning the democratically negative value of an external effect. No distinction is made between, for example, positive or negative, desired or undesired, enforced or optional effects. Rather, every effect from the outside should be regarded as a violation of the principle. Furthermore, even if the principle was qualified in some of the above senses, it would be vulnerable to parts of the criticism that will be developed below (see Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 – though the critique developed in Section 2.2 could be avoided with some minor adjustments).
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requires a certain degree of heterogeneity among the members of the collective. That nearly all polities are stratified by some criteria – for example cultural, religious, geographical, constitutional, biological, psychological – is incontestable. This predicament of collectives may, but need not, lead to a violation of the symmetry principle. To affirm that there is illegitimate inclusion, in the dichotomous interpretation we are now considering, it is not enough to verify the commonly made observation that a collective decision may have a different effect on different individuals all of whom have taken equal part in the decision-making process. A taxpaying voter, for example, is more heavily affected by the collective decision to tax him or her than is a fellow voting citizen who is neither required to pay the tax nor benefits from it by way of redistributive policy or publicly produced goods. An illegitimate inclusion requires more, namely that there be at least one individual who is not at all affected by a collective decision in which he or she has none the less been allowed to participate.

The latter requirement, that at least one individual be totally unaffected by a decision, is, of course, harder to support empirically than the former, that some individuals be less affected than some others. Is it really true, to follow our previous example, that a citizen is totally unaffected by a certain collective decision to tax his or her fellow citizens, as long as he or she neither pays the stipulated tax, nor benefits from it by way of redistribution or public production? It appears that the question cannot be answered in any definite form. On the one hand, empirical research may be unable to confirm that the non-tax-paying citizen is affected by the taxation of other citizens. And if the effect is invisible to empirical research, while the more stubborn minded idealist still claims it to be real, one could argue that the notion of being affected has shown to be empty of content. On the other hand, there is a clear theoretical argument that the non-tax-paying citizen is indeed affected by the taxation of his fellow citizens, even under the circumstances specified here, viz if the effect cannot be corroborated by empirical research. For the taxing of some individuals may affect the extent to which other individuals are taxed (pace the cynics, fiscal policy is not driven solely by punitive motives). In one sense all potential providers of revenue are in the same boat. The contribution of each decreases the need to contribute of the others.

Both positions could probably be taken and defended: that the individual is affected and that he or she is not affected. At least I have not been able to decide which alternative is true. (As the alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaustive it is of course not possible that both are true, or that neither is – however polite such relativism might be.) So instead of devoting our time to a possibly unsolvable problem, we could specify in greater detail the circumstances under which it is logically possible for a collective decision to
have an effect on every individual involved in making it. To focus on logical conditions, although far from satisfactory, is the best we can do to explain what would give rise to an illegitimate inclusion.

In a nearly tautological explication, illegitimate inclusion can be avoided when the collective decision concerns a property that is shared by all individuals in the collective, or a property that causally depends on some other property shared by all the individuals. If we assume, in accordance with the previous example, that every citizen living under the same tax regime is affected by a collective decision to tax certain citizens, the validity of our assumption depends on all citizens, whether tax-payers or non-tax-payers, being potential contributors to the same public treasury. At a more general level the explanation of why all individuals are affected, assuming they are, would be that every citizen can benefit from the functioning, or does not benefit from the non-functioning, of one and the same political economy.

This analysis would appear to be helpful since it clarifies how a collective institution – typically a state – must act if it seeks to put the symmetry principle fully into practice when the principle is violated already by an illegitimate inclusion. The political collective must then increase the degree of uniformity prevailing among its diverse members, and it must do this by fostering other forms of collectives, in addition to the political: for example economic, judicial, cultural. The political collective must construct or discover common features shared by all its members, features that may give rise to a common interest and possibly a common collective identity. Hence if illegitimate inclusion is not present in political organisations today, it is because collective decision-making takes place in rather integrated contexts – from a social, cultural, economic, judicial or any other perspective – which makes for at least one politically central characteristic shared by all individuals who are afforded the right to participate in decision making. If, on the other hand, illegitimate inclusion is present, the symmetry principle impels governments to further their integrative efforts and to make their citizens more nearly interchangeable for all political purposes.

Several instruments could be used to increase homogeneity, one of which is certainly to isolate the polity so as to limit culturally and politically fragmenting effects coming from outside. Once again, therefore, internationalisation seems to be in opposition to the symmetry principle, this time causing, not illegitimate exclusion, but illegitimate inclusion. The latter illegitimacy does not, like the former, follow from internationalisation by definition, but it is a likely effect as internationalisation brings foreign elements and, supposedly, heterogeneity into a pre-existing well-integrated collective.
The hypothesised illegitimate inclusion can be understood more clearly if we temporarily cease interpreting the effect dimension of the symmetry principle as a dichotomy and instead conceptualise it in terms of degrees, hence stipulating that different individuals can be affected to a greater or lesser extent by the same decision. A given individual may thus be more or less affected than others by any collective decision, depending on the individual's position in the social structure. This conceptualisation opens the way to many new possible re-phrasings of the symmetry principle, among which the following is perhaps the most obvious: Every individual included in the making of a collective decision should be equally affected by that decision. To realise this strong version of the principle requires all individuals to be alike with respect to the characteristics with which the collective decision is concerned. With respect to economic policy, all must enjoy equal economic conditions; with respect to criminal policy, all must be equally likely to commit, or be the victims of, crimes; etc.

From this it can be learned that neither the strong nor the weak version of the principle can be realised without a considerable uniformity among the individuals making up the political collective. Moreover, the fact that the symmetry principle in both interpretations requires both considerable homogeneity in the population and considerable isolation from the rest of the world suggests that the best social contexts for realising this principle are a thoroughly homogeneous and economically self-sufficient population. (Under certain circumstances of advanced technology, it is possible that such a highly integrated and economically independent community would have to include the whole of humanity.) It is not much of an exaggeration to say that only a nation-state, firmly founded on a mythology of unity and autonomy, can wield the social powers required by the symmetry principle. It would seem to follow that the symmetry principle can be regarded as an element of nationalist theory.

In what follows the application of this principle to democratic theory will be subject to criticism.

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37 We will however retain the dichotomous interpretation of the participation dimension, implying that all individuals who participate in decision making necessarily participate to the same extent.
2.2. No *a priori* link between internationalisation and democracy

As already noted, some students think that an inescapable consequence of internationalisation – namely that policies will affect individuals who had no part in deciding on them – is injurious to democracy. However, that view seems to represent a small but significant jumping to conclusions. It is not necessarily injurious to democracy that the citizens of one state affect those of another. It could well be the case that the internationalised policies of one democratic state, not only benefit the citizens of that state itself, but also strengthen democracy in other states, whose citizens had nothing to do with making those policies. Let us start by considering a few examples.

Recall the democratisation of politics in South Africa at the beginning of the 1990s. The international community actively supported this process, using the means of diplomatic condemnation and trade embargo against the regime, and furnishing various forms of support to the pro-democratic opposition. True, the process of democratisation did not start because of international pressures on the apartheid regime or international support for the opposition. But equally true, no one could claim that action on South Africa from abroad – for example financial and moral support of the African National Congress – in any way limited the scope of South African democracy, even though (and this is most important) no South Africans were allowed to participate in making the international decisions which would affect them. In this case the cause of democracy was furthered by the international effect: state decision making became more inclusive and more equalitarian. Now, one trouble with the symmetry principle is that it would have judged it as more democratic to abstain from international action vis-à-vis the apartheid regime than to interfere with it. And that difficulty remains in spite of the fact that there is a third possibility, consistent with both the symmetry principle and shared intuitions about what is democratic, namely to include all individuals living in South Africa equally in the political processes of that state.

38 The solution to the problem thus defined can be found either by expanding the geographical scope of the political system, bringing into the same political procedure all individuals affected by the same policy, or by reversing internationalisation so that policies can once again be restricted to the national territory.

39 It may be noticed that the relevance of this example remains although South Africa was not democratic in the first place. The authors cited at the beginning of the chapter also apply the symmetry principle in a context which has not yet become democratic (in the sense that, for example, South Africa today is democratic) namely the international political system. Therefore even the authors cited implicitly acknowledge the application of the principle beyond the range of already constituted democracies. Moreover, if the symmetry
A similar case was that of Estonia, when it struggled for secession from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and finally became independent in August, 1991. Estonia had by then been incorporated in the Soviet Union for 46 years and had as a result lost the autonomy and sovereignty it had acquired at the end of the First World War. Several states, individuals, and organisations, including elements of the mass media, applied considerable scrutiny and exerted much pressure on the Soviet Union, thereby greatly raising the potential cost faced by the Gorbachev regime – highly concerned with its reputation in the West – were it to strike back at the liberation movement with military force. Like the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, the liberation movement in Estonia was not started by international pressure, and did not draw most of its dynamism from external sources; nevertheless, these played a positive part in the re-achievement of Estonian autonomy and sovereignty. To the extent that autonomy and sovereignty are important to democracy, international pressure clearly helped the cause of democracy in Estonia.

A less dramatic example could be taken from television broadcasting in border areas, for example the area encompassing southern Sweden and eastern Denmark. Danish state television reaches Swedish territory. In style and quality Danish programs closely resemble Swedish ones, and most inhabitants of the parts of Sweden close to Denmark easily understand Danish. The fact that Danish television reaches Swedish territory is policy-determined. But while it has an impact on people on both sides of the border (for example the range of information and entertainment they can choose from), the Danes alone had a say in deciding that policy. Nevertheless, as far as one can tell, this policy of the Danish state has never been considered in any way harmful to Swedish democracy. Such an idea would be strange indeed, since the policy enriches the store of information available to Swedish citizens, and thus, if anything, is beneficial to Swedish democracy. This is but one small example of a situation which has become almost universal in the era of international broadcasting.

These three examples would seem to show that being subject to international policy – made without one’s own participation – is not necessarily a defect in democracy. Whether internationalisation is good or bad for democracy should be judged in terms of somewhat finer categories, and one way to proceed would be to investigate what actually happens to democracy in the course of internationalisation.

principle is taken as a definition of democracy, it must also define various stages of democratisation.
However, it would not be surprising if some of the theorists cited earlier were to contest this conclusion. It would seem that the strongest and most persuasive objection to my conclusion is based on the assumption that democracy is a multidimensional concept and not only defined by the symmetry principle. The objection might go something like this:

While the examples provided by Agné demonstrate that international factors sometimes contribute to some aspect of democracy – for example political equality – that implies nothing as to whether international effects are harmful to democracy in another sense – namely the degree to which the symmetry principle is realised. The point is not that all effects of international action are negative in terms of democracy, only that at least one of them is. If we understand democracy as a multidimensional concept the democratically positive effects suggested by Agné can be fully accepted without recognising any reason to abandon the symmetry principle as essential to the definition of democracy.

Note that this defensive strategy of argument deprives the symmetry principle of its central position in democratic theory and places it among a range of democratic aspects of which all cannot be realised at the same time. Hence the answer is probably not consistent with the position that Arend Lijphart associates with a consensus model of democracy. As already noted this position states: “the primary meaning of democracy is that ‘all who are affected by a decision should have the right to participate in making that decision.” (Lijphart 1984: 21, my ital.) If something is the primary meaning of democracy it cannot at the same time be treated as one among many aspects of it. For the same reason, the above reply would not seem to be an option for Michel Zürn (see beginning of this chapter).

For these authors, the reasonable step is probably to admit that their conceptualisation of democracy is too strong, since it excludes from the category of democratic improvements a number of examples which, according to strong intuitions, fit well into this category. But for the other

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40 Among the less convincing – and less interesting – objections to the conclusion drawn above are the following glosses on the symmetry principle: (i) It is all right to be affected by a decision you did not make as long as the effect is desired. The trouble with this is that to set aside a democratic principle whenever you wish is not itself compatible with democracy. Democratic theory would be meaningless if taken to embrace even the violation of its own principles. (ii) It is all right to be affected by a decision you did not make as long as the effect is not costly. This response could be valid, depending on what is regarded as a cost; the trouble is that defining the concept of cost is not only a problem in itself, but also a problem which brings out risks of making mistakes as serious as those inherent in the symmetry principle itself (as will be demonstrated in the first sections of Chapter 3). (iii) The symmetry principle applies only to constituted political units and, therefore, examples from the field of international politics are irrelevant. But, as we have seen, those who defend the principle constantly apply it in the (un-constituted) anarchic context of international politics.
Theorists referred to a few pages earlier, namely Held and Habermas, the neutralization of the symmetry principle here proposed could be a suitable strategy for refuting the critique.

The following three sections will outline a number of reasons why even such a more modest interpretation of the symmetry principle is theoretically untenable. First, it will be argued that the symmetry principle is unimportant as compared to other aspects of democracy. Second, it will be argued that the symmetry principle is not well suited to support the function it is most often claimed to support in democratic theory, viz. the delimitation of the demos, or, in other words, the definition of citizenship. Third, it will be argued that the symmetry principle is incompatible with the principle of political equality. These conclusions, it will be contended, are sufficient for overthrowing the claim that the symmetry principle has a place in the family of democratic principles – however tempting that claim may be to the nationally inclined.

2.3. The relative unimportance of the symmetry principle

The symmetry principle is sometimes confused with a principle of political autonomy according to which the people should be able and free to act upon themselves. These are of course two different principles. That actor A affects actor B does not by itself mean that there are fewer or less important possibilities of action available to B, nor that B is prevented from performing any particular action. The effect caused by A may indeed have been to increase B’s possibilities to act (consider for example the possibility that one state affects another by a policy of foreign aid, and only by that policy). Hence to be affected and to have possibilities to act are best regarded as two different things.

Once this distinction is made, much of the attraction of the symmetry principle disappears. It seems that persons who say they support the symmetry principle in reality do not, but have only confused it with the notion of the freedom and ability of a people to decide their own future, or have come to believe that the symmetry principle is logically equivalent to that of political autonomy properly understood. If the symmetry principle were logically equivalent to the principle that the people should be able collectively to decide their own future, it would be a contradiction in terms to say that “Western states and mass media positively affected Estonians’ capacity to

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41 An arguably proper concept of democratic political autonomy is further developed and defended in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 in the following chapter.
decide their own future in the early 1990s”. And surely, no one believes that is a contradiction in terms.

We have therefore to consider, in addition to the symmetry principle, the principle of political autonomy (tentatively defined as requiring that the people should be free to act upon themselves). Separating the two principles opens the possibility of reflecting upon which is more central to democracy. However, the criterion against which we measure both principles, democracy, may itself be partially defined in terms of these principles. Hence, using a predefined concept of democracy to evaluate which of the principles is closest to it may give an answer before the question has been posed. Fortunately, there are other ways to understand the concept of democracy than through explicit definitions of the term. Definitions always depend on context. If a term or concept never had a context — no relation to other terms and concepts, no relation to human practice — no one would attempt to define it, and some would question whether it can be defined at all, or indeed whether a term that never had a context could even be said to exist. It is helpful to keep this in mind. Instead of using a certain definition of democracy as a benchmark, the centrality to democracy of the two principles will be considered here in the light of generally shared democratic intuitions. These intuitions largely draw upon a rough distinction between democratic and undemocratic states: that a state is undemocratic if it uses its apparatus of violence to prevent portions of its citizenry from having political influence, and that it is democratic if its citizens are free and equal in their opportunities to influence politics. One should be aware, therefore, that if the conclusions in this section are accepted, it is only because the examples and interpretations are in line with this intuition of the meaning of democracy, the adequacy of which intuition is not itself an object of evaluation.

Now, imagine a situation where the political autonomy of a people can be strengthened only at the cost of their being affected by some external actor from whose decision-making procedure they are excluded. What would be the most democratic thing to do in that situation? Before attempting an answer one should remember that this is not an unusual situation. Consider, for example, the relation between Sweden and Finland during the Second World War, when Finnish democracy was threatened by the totalitarian pressures of the Soviet Union. To some extent Sweden supported the autonomy of Finnish democracy with state loans and the participation of volunteer corps. Was it democratically right or wrong for Sweden to affect Finland in this way? True, the political procedure preceding the Swedish decision to affect Finland did not include Finnish citizens. (Had it done so, the effect would have been much more substantial; see Nykopp 1979.) But that is obviously not enough to conclude that democracy required Sweden not to intervene on the Finnish
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side. Whatever small gains in terms of Finnish political autonomy might have been the result of Swedish action, that gain undoubtedly did more good for democracy than the incontestable, concomitant violation of the symmetry principle did harm.

Furthermore, this conclusion seems not to depend on the fact that Finnish citizens wanted Sweden to affect them. Consider an opposite case, the relation between the USA and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Japan had been ruled by an emperor for more than a hundred years. However, the USA, occupying Japanese territory, opted for a democratic and liberal constitution. Was that policy democratically positive or negative? The symmetry principle says negative, since Japanese citizens became the object of a decision which they had not themselves any part in making; and moreover, the policy of democratisation would probably not have been implemented if the Japanese state or its citizens had had any say in the decision. 42 Now, comparing a parliamentary system with an autocratic empire, the democratic standing of the USA policy is however rather easy to evaluate. One may oppose the occupation of Japan for many reasons, but democratic motives can hardly be among them. Undoubtedly, the USA's policy significantly fostered democracy in Japan, whatever violation of the symmetry principle it entailed.

So far we have seen that the symmetry principle provides an argument for not intervening in other states, even when the intervention is generally supported by influential actors in the receiving state or when it might, for example, protect a parliamentary system against the threat of totalitarianism. But one should not therefore conclude that the symmetry principle necessarily forbids military intervention; it could even be used to justify it. An illegitimate exclusion occurs, for instance, when two states affect each other by one being dependent on the other. Given the often inevitable dependence that exists among states, all other things being equal, those willing and able to dominate others are by definition closer to realising the symmetry principle than weaker or less ambitious ones. This would not be so provocative if the symmetry principle was regarded in isolation from any theoretical context. But if understood as a democratic principle, the implication seems at least unjustified and possibly absurd, namely that, other things being equal, states which are willing and able to dominate other states are by definition more democratic than states that are not!

The implications of the symmetry principle are, however, even more troublesome. Consider the fact that a state must sometimes act in order to

42 This can be read from the Japanese nickname of the 1946-constitution “oshitsuke kenpō” – “the imposed or enforced constitution”. I am indebted to Japanese-speaking political scientist Linus Hagström for this note.
safeguard its relative independence. Extra-territorial measures, such as diplomatic pressures, trade restrictions, or military operations, cannot be excluded on principle. And as this is true for every state, the symmetry principle, taken as a definition of democracy, is a justification for never-ending rivalry, possibly leading to war, among states claiming to be democratic, over whatever resources are needed to avoid or support effects which cross national boundaries.43

What these examples attempt to illustrate is that, when comparing the symmetry principle to its rivals, or when investigating what sorts of foreign policy it demands, one is generally inclined to consider it to be of little or no democratic importance. Because this conclusion relies on the extent to which the interpretations so far presented converge with common democratic intuitions, one must be aware that any divergent interpretation of examples provided would reject the conclusion. The arguments elaborated in the following two sections are, however, less dependent on common intuitions, while they yield the same conclusion.

2.4. Indeterminacy of the symmetry principle

One principle should be preferred to another, not because of the eloquence of its formulation, but because of the degree to which it realises a theoretical purpose. The purpose of the symmetry principle is to determine who is or should be included in the democratic decision-making process. The symmetry principle is, however, not the only alternative for handling this problem. Robert Dahl thinks that democracy requires the demos to include every adult person who permanently lives under the binding rules of an organisation, a principle that is reminiscent of but not identical to the symmetry principle (Dahl 1979/1998: 109, 123); he also rejects the symmetry principle outright as a universal criterion for defining the demos: “[i]t seems obvious that the Principle of Affected interests must be curbed by the criteria of Competence and Economy” (Dahl 1970: 66). Joseph Schumpeter does not explicitly state a principle for defining the demos, but his position could be thought to imply that the demos of a democracy consists of those persons who have the power to participate in competition for public office (Schumpeter 1950/1975; cf. Dahl 1989: 122). It would hence be unreasonable to prefer the symmetry principle simply because there are no alternatives. Instead, the criterion should

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43 This argument may illustrate the point made at the end of Section 1.3.2. When an intuitionist method is relied upon to judge an interpretation of democracy, it is not always evident if the intuitions relied upon are moral or linguistic. The conclusions aimed at in this analysis follow in both cases.
be whether the symmetry principle effectively serves its purpose. The question is, Does it?

A useful principle must be able to determine which of two matters observes the principle more closely. A normative principle that gives no reason for preferring one action to another is empty of content, just like an empirical principle that says nothing about what is to be observed. On this crucial point of determinacy, the symmetry principle seems to leave us with more problems than we began with.

Consider once again the South African apartheid regime. A majority of South African citizens lived under laws that they had not participated in making – a case of illegitimate exclusion. Imagine now that this violation of the symmetry principle could be rectified, but that a necessary condition for this to happen was that the international community had to put the South African state under severe pressure. What course of action would the symmetry principle recommend in this situation? It could not recommend that the international community put the apartheid regime under pressure, since that would legitimate the taking of action vis-à-vis the citizens of South Africa, who had had no say in deciding on that action. Nor could it advise the international community to allow the apartheid regime to go on as usual, since the South African state of that time forbade large numbers of its citizens to participate in the making of decisions that affected them. Thus there are cases in which the symmetry principle is impotent to direct a course of action.

Some optimistic supporters of the symmetry principle may think this defect can be remedied if only we leave the either-or version of the principle and substitute one of degree. Instead of thinking dichotomously, they suggest, we should see the dimensions of the principle on a continuum. Making such a move opens the way to a number of alternative interpretations of the symmetry principle. Only what appears to be strongest of these will be dealt with here. This alternative says: Everyone affected by a decision should have the right to participate in making that decision, and if all cannot be included, then those who are most affected should have priority of inclusion.

Could this, more sophisticated, version of the symmetry principle overcome its difficulties in furnishing specific advice in the South African case?

It is generally not a good solution to make a theoretically problematic principle more complex. Most often all that happens is that the problem reappears in a more complex form. And this is what happens here. True, the modified principle could advise the international community to take some appropriate action, if the collective decisions of the apartheid regime affect the politically excluded South African citizens more than the international community affects all of the South African citizens, politically included and
excluded alike. Now the crucial question becomes how to determine which
group is more affected by the political actions in question, the group of all
South African citizens who would be affected if the international community
broke up their constitution, or the group of South African citizens excluded
from political participation although they are continually affected by the South
African state’s decisions?

To justify actions by the international community on the South African
state one must claim as correct the following proposition: The politically
excluded South African citizens are more affected by the South African state
than the whole South African population would be by the actions of the
international community. But once again the symmetry principle is silent on
the dilemma exactly where we look to it for advice, i.e. on the correctness or
incorrectness of this proposition. And this silence should come as no
surprise. For who could seriously even try to measure the magnitude of
effects regarding, on the one hand, an international community breaking up
an apartheid constitution and, on the other, an apartheid state continually
violating its citizens’ democratic rights.

It is not meaningful to state that the removal of a certain violation of
citizen rights is “greater” or “lesser” than a certain constitutional change; the
entities – citizens and constitutions – are simply not commensurable. And yet,
what the symmetry principle, thus modified, requires in order to propose an
action strategy is precisely a judgment of comparative magnitude concerning
the matters in question. We could therefore repeat the previous conclusion,
that the symmetry principle is not generally able to determinate courses of
action, a conclusion now reinforced by our observation that it is valid under
different interpretations of the symmetry principle.44

The symmetry principle can by now at least not be seen as a perfect choice
for those democratic theorists who seek to answer the question, Who should
be included as a citizen in a democracy? The most severe problem with the
symmetry principle is, however, not that it yields new theoretical problems
when used to solve some already existing problems of democratic theory
(other proposed solutions may prove even more problematic under scrutiny –
but see Section 3.1 and Chapter 8 for an arguably better solution), but rather

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44 Sometimes when disagreement between conflicting parties must and yet cannot be
resolved, a democratic decision can cut the Gordian knot. But it is worth noting that this
strategy cannot solve questions of the present kind. When the conflicting parties argue
over matters of inclusion, resort to democratic procedures is no solution, since the conflict
concerns exactly who should be afforded the right to participate in such procedures (Dahl
1989: 193, 204). Nor is it likely that any tribunal could settle the question. The conflict did
not arise because there were different interpretations of some codified rules or arguments
which needed clarification by experts, but out of a purely political conflict concerning rival
power groups.
that it appears to be in outright contradiction to the principles of political equality and majority rule. That is the point to be developed in the next section.

2.5. Incompatibility of the symmetry principle with political equality

The idea of political equality is that the voices of all members of a polity should be taken into account, and equally taken into account, when a political decision is made. The most often advertised, though not the only, implication of this principle is that a minority must follow the decision of the majority; for if the minority were allowed to prevail over the majority, then individual minority voices would count as more important than individual majority voices, which would violate the idea of political equality. According to democratic principle, it is always right for the majority to decide (see Section 5.1.1 for a development and qualification of this conclusion and for some further references).

The symmetry principle resembles that of political equality in its focus on both individuality and equality. But it seems a much stronger position is ascribed to the individual by the symmetry principle than by the principle of political equality. This can be seen most clearly at the point of decision-making. While the principle of political equality requires that a minority obey the decision of the majority, the symmetry principle can, at least in some interpretations, make a further requirement, namely that the dissenting minority voters should still have some influence. If a majority totally refuses to negotiate a compromise with a minority, then some interpretations of the symmetry principle are violated, though the principle of political equality is not.

It is difficult to say if this implication of the symmetry principle is recognised by all of its supporters. The conceptualisations provided by, for example, Habermas, Held, and Zürn, are not clear on this point, but Lijphart is explicit. According to him, the consensus model of democracy, which he

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45The critique developed in this section applies more widely than to Lijphart, whose interpretation appears to be grounded in a maxim of Roman law: “Quod omnes similiter tangit ab omnibus comprobetur.” (Justinian’s Code 5.59.5.2; “Let that be submitted to the approval of all, which touches all in like manner”. I am indebted to Paul Leopold for this idea of the origin of the symmetry principle as well as the translation.) According to this formulation it seems that everyone should approve certain decisions, rather than only being able to participate in making (without guaranteed influence over) those decisions. Hence the position taken by Lijphart is no theoretical accident, but rather a natural interpretation in
bases on the symmetry principle, is preferable to the majority model in countries of heterogeneous composition where strong minorities may threaten to break up the state if their political influence is not constitutionally guaranteed (Lijphart 1984: 21 pp.). On this point, according to Lijphart, a minority preferring to block a constitutional amendment should prevail over a majority in favour of it (ibid. 189-191) and general elections to some political assemblies should be designed to increase the voting power of members of certain minority groups (ibid. 26).

Furthermore, according to Lijphart’s definition of the consensus model of democracy, there is no limit to how small a minority group can be and still have the right to block constitutional amendments. Remembering that Lijphart relies on an economist, Arthur Lewis, in defining his consensus model of democracy, we should not ignore the ultimate possible result of the consensus model and the symmetry principle, namely a “democratic” constitution requiring that every affected individual accept a proposal in order for it to be put into effect. This would be a truly market-oriented constitution! It would guarantee that no collective decision is ever made.

But we do not have to go that far to realise that Lijphart’s understanding of the symmetry principle is exactly the one that contradicts, by definition, the principle of political equality. For it is a contradiction to give to a minority the constitutional right to influence decision-making, and to the majority the right to decide regardless of the minority. Any unified democratic theory has to make a choice as to which of the principles will be observed. In view of the many problems and irrelevancies of the symmetry principle indicated above, it would appear that the best solution is to retain the principle of political equality and omit the symmetry principle from further consideration.

2.6. Summary and further conclusions

The argument so far has been against the integration of the symmetry principle into the concept of democracy or into theories of democracy in general. The primary reason is that the symmetry principle is too strong. It excludes from the category of democratic improvements a number of instances that strong intuitions would include within this category. The various examples of democratic improvements could, however, be reconciled with a more modest version of the symmetry principle, disclaiming its pretensions to be essential to the realisation of democracy. But even in that

the theoretical tradition which he shares with Held, Habermas, and Zürn. The critique developed above applies to the whole of this tradition.
case there are a number of theoretical shortcomings in the symmetry principle which caution us not to apply it in defining the essence of democracy: (i) it is democratically unimportant as compared to other democratic principles; (ii) it cannot generally determine what policy is most in line with itself; (iii) in its most thoroughgoing interpretation it is contradictory to the principles of political equality and majority rule. All in all, the symmetry principle seems more suitable for describing nationalistic policies than democratic ones. Once we have removed the symmetry principle from our concept of democracy, we no longer need to understand internationalisation, globalisation, and related processes, to be necessarily problematic for democracy. Until further – preferably empirical – investigations show otherwise, at least some fears of a negative effect of internationalisation on democracy at the level of states can be put aside.

It may be suspected that theorists who explicitly subscribe to the symmetry principle have betrayed their own intentions and that, in view of an analysis like the one above, such theorists would adopt a less tautological conceptualisation of how democracy relates to internationalisation. What if these people actually pursued such a reconceptualisation? Would it alter their judgement that democracy is severely challenged by internationalisation? In the following three chapters a less tautological interpretation of the relation between internationalisation and democracy will be developed and investigated empirically.
3. Political autonomy during internationalisation

Does internationalisation challenge democratic political autonomy at the level of states? This chapter attempts to answer that question in three stages. First, it proposes and defends an idea of democratic political autonomy in the context of internationalisation. Secondly, it develops operational indicators of democratic political autonomy conformable to that idea. Thirdly, it uses these operational indicators to give an empirically grounded answer to the question we began with. An account of the methods used and the results obtained appears at the end of the chapter.

3.1. Principles and predictions of political autonomy

3.1.1. Earlier interpretations

The first step is to consider how internationalisation, democracy and political autonomy have been construed in the literature that first aroused our interest in these matters. The purpose is then to identify relevant problems of interpretation and, if possible, to find shared understandings which may help to come to grips with such problems.

One interpretation concerns the effect on democracy of scale. The problem with internationalisation, according to this view, is that countries are smaller than the structures that affect people. A few comments by Robert Dahl may serve to elucidate this:

The boundaries of a country, even a country as big as the United States, are now much smaller than the boundaries of the decisions that significantly affect the fundamental interests of its citizens. A country's economic life, physical environment, national security, and survival are highly, and probably increasingly, dependent on actors and actions that are outside the country's boundaries and not directly subject to its government. Thus the members of the demos cannot employ their national government, and much less their local governments, to exercise direct control over external actors whose decisions bear critically on their lives. The result is something like the … transformation [from city-state to territorially extensive state] writ large on a global scale. (…) How then does this new change of scale transform the limits and possibilities of democracy? (…) [T]he demos of a country … will suffer a considerable reduction in its capacity to control decisions on matters of importance to it. (Dahl 1989: 319)

So far it would seem that democracy, according to Dahl, logically presupposes political autonomy of some kind and degree. Indeed that interpretation would seem rather trivial, as it does not add much new to what Dahl has already said
– namely that international matters “significantly affect the fundamental interests” of the citizens, that the demos will “suffer a considerable reduction in its capacity to control” such matters, and that this development transforms the “possibilities of democracy”. But on the crucial point, whether or not some kind and degree of autonomy is a necessary condition for democracy to prevail, Dahl is evasive. In a following paragraph he writes that

whereas the relative autonomy for democratic states has varied prodigiously, the quality of democracy in a country does not appear to depend directly on the extent of its autonomy. While judgements as to the “quality of democracy” in different countries are debatable, the smaller European democracies may serve as a useful illustration. In general, the smaller an advanced country is, the more the economic well-being of its citizens is dependent on foreign trade: in addition, smaller countries tend to be more vulnerable to invasion and more dependent on allies. Yet even though more of their control over key matters has been pre-empted by international actors, many of the smaller European democracies display a vigorous and self-confident political life. (ibid. 320)

At this point, it seems more as if political autonomy was not a logical prerequisite for democracy to prevail, but an independent phenomenon that might causally effect some “qualities of democracy” like the “self-confidence” of the population in its political life (ibid.). Bringing together the two paragraphs, then, does not amount to a definite answer to the question of whether democracy requires some degree of autonomy. If it does, the second paragraph cited is both simplistic and misleading. If it does not, the paragraph cited earlier exaggerates to the point of incomprehensibility.

What make these shifts in Dahl’s argument worth considering is their possible purpose as a rhetorical cloak to cover a problem pointed out by Brian Barry in his review of Dahl’s Size and Democracy (co-authored with Edward Tufte, 1973). Barry there proposed that democracy has virtually nothing to do with the action capacity of the democratic unit:

[A] state is democratic if the government acts in accordance with the wishes of the citizens – and it is not less democratic if there are some things of concern to the citizens that the state has limited control over, like sea pollution, nuclear war or worldwide inflation. ‘System capacity’ is, surely, in itself neither democratic nor undemocratic, since it refers to the range of options open to those who set the policy of the country – whoever they may be. (Barry 1974: 495)

In a later section it will be demonstrated that this critique has less detrimental effects than Dahl might have feared, but it none the less illustrates that, at least in the early seventies, it was not evident that a full conceptualisation of democracy required a notion of action capacity. Possibly it is the experience
of internationalisation that has directed the attention of later contributions to the matter of democratic agency.

A somewhat different way of phrasing the general problem of internationalisation and democracy suggests that states are no longer as important political actors as they used to be. The problem with internationalisation, according to this view, is not that states become increasingly dependent on other states, which was an open possibility according to Dahl, but that the system of states itself has become less influential in comparison to other systems. This idea is especially prominent among authors using the concept of globalisation, as when Jürgen Habermas considers the impact of this process on democracy and on states:

The international economic system, in which states draw the borderline between the domestic economy and foreign trade relations, is being metamorphosed into a transnational economy in the wake of globalization of markets. Especially relevant here are the acceleration of world-wide capital flows and the imperative assessment of national economic conditions by globally interlinked capital markets. These factors explain why states no longer constitute nodes endowing the worldwide network of commercial relations with the structure of inter-state or international relations. (Habermas 1999: 48) 46

When accounting for the effects of internationalisation on state autonomy and democracy, however, Habermas reintroduces the notion of states having their action capacity constrained by other states:

The loss of autonomy means, amongst other things, that a state can no longer count on its own forces to provide its citizens with adequate protection from the external effects of decisions taken by other actors, nor from the knock-on effects of processes originating beyond its borders. In question here are, on the one hand, ‘spontaneous border violations’ such as pollution, organised crime, arms trafficking, epidemics, security risks associated with large-scale technology, and so on, and, on the other, the reluctantly tolerated consequences of other states’ calculated policies, which affect people who did not help formulate them no less than people who did – think, for example, of the risks caused by nuclear reactors that are built beyond a state’s borders and fail to meet its own safety standards. (Habermas 1999: 49)

46 To avoid misunderstandings on this point, recall that in this study international is used as a generic concept to cover both what Habermas refers to as transnational (which in his vocabulary seems to regard relations between private market actors) and international (which their seems limited to relations between states). When my argument requires a specification of what kind of actors have a relation across national boundaries, or to what extent such relations are controlled by one or several states, it is preferable to give a more detailed account than is possible by relying on the prefixes inter- and trans-.
The two interpretations are not easily reconcilable: that a state’s action capacity is reduced because internationalisation has made it dependent on other states, on the one hand, and, on the other, that its action capacity is reduced because internationalisation has so increased the power of private market actors, at the expense of the state system, that states as such can hardly be depended on. Hence there are different, and perhaps even incompatible, reasons suggested as to why globalisation (or internationalisation) is likely to erode action capacity at the level of states.

Another possible restriction on democratic action capacity derives from international law and international organisations. Some of the literature on the democratic deficit in the EU, for example, has been summarised under the view that the deficit “arises when powers are transferred from ‘more democratic’ national institutions to ‘less democratic’ European ones.” (Lord 1998: 14, my ital.) According to this view, the less action capacity in the more democratic political units, the less democracy.

An example of how this view has been applied in empirical and historical analysis of the EU can be discerned in the following paragraph by Fritz Scharpf:

Historically, there is no question that neither the governments negotiating the Treaties of Rome nor the parliaments ratifying them had any intention to use European competition law to challenge the existence of service public functions in the member states of the Community. In fact, Art. 90 II TEC contains language which suggests exactly the opposite. (…) Nevertheless, when agreement on a common transport regime could not be achieved, the Commission and the Court proceeded on their own to liberalize the sector (Héretier 1997). From a democratic perspective, this assumption of law-making powers by the Commission and the Court in politically highly salient policy areas must appear problematic. (Scharpf 1999: 63-64)

When decision-making powers move further away from the democratic states – in this case from their own ministers in the Council to the supra-state officials in the Court and the Commission – a democratic problem arises, which becomes especially severe in this case when the move in question was never ratified by parliaments at the national level. Hence the less action capacity possessed by democratically controlled actors, the less democracy, according to Scharpf.

The authors considered thus far have all concentrated on the negative relation between internationalisation, on the one hand, and state autonomy and democracy, on the other. This interpretation can be grounded in normatively opposed traditions like Marxism and liberalism (taken as perspectives in international relations rather than in democratic theory).
On the liberal assumption that actors rationally maximise their own profit, internationalisation of trade and finance represents an opportunity for economic actors to invest and consume where such transactions are most profitable. Hence states concerned with upholding new investments and existing production in their territories must increasingly follow the preferences of economic actors in the course of internationalisation (see for example Clayton and Pontusson 1998: 71 or Scharpf 1999: 89). Other things being equal, the need increasingly to follow the preferences of economic actors corresponds to a decreasing level of action capacity at the level of states. The "other things being equal" clause is however particularly significant in this case. The liberal theory of trade would also imply that the overall amount of resources grows because of internationalisation (see for example Pierson 1998: 133). On the production side of the economy, internationalisation is expected to lead to a more efficient division of labour, and, on the consumption side of the economy, the expectation is that there will be a higher level of competition, lower prices, and greater efficiency.

On Marxist assumptions, internationalisation of trade and finance represents the possibility for owners of capital to shift their main object of exploitation from the working class of single countries to that of many countries. As far as the dominant class is concerned this is a great improvement. Not only is an international market larger than a domestic one, resulting in greater potential profit, but the workers outside the state boundaries are more easily exploited since they lack access to the political instruments which might redistribute to them some of the resources accumulated by the owners of capital. Thus internationalisation decreases action capacity at the level of states, at least in countries large parts of whose population is easily exploitable, but potentially in all countries, since internationalisation will tend generally to enrich and empower the owners of capital.

Though a negative relation between internationalisation and state action capacity seems to dominate in the literature, there are also voices of dissent:

Internationalization takes, but it also gives. You lose some options, but you gain others. (...) Specialisation makes you dependent, but it also makes you resourceful. (...) This, moreover, is a matter not only of economic relations but also of political institutions. If you join an organization, you undertake to implement what the organization decides, and this reduces your autonomy. If you do not join, you lose an opportunity to influence what is important to yourself, which is also negative from the point of view of your action possibilities. (Goldmann 2001: 90)
Even further from the received opinion there is the position that internationalisation generally strengthen the capacity of states. As previously mentioned, a radical process of internationalisation, such as that undergone by European states since the Second World War, has been described as the “rescue of the nation-state”, a process taken to strengthen action capacity in the fields of welfare and security (Milward 1992).

3.1.2. Identifying the most relevant kind of capacity

Having considered some previous contributions, we are now better equipped to develop a relevant concept of political autonomy. In accordance with the method outlined in 1.3.2, various definitions may be judged according to what purpose the defined concept is taken to serve. In this case, the overarching purpose of the concept is to permit the evaluation of an explanatory claim derived from a certain discourse. This purpose leads on to more specific criteria. Since the discourse being considered is one of democracy, it is preferable for the conceptualisation to be consistent with established notions in democratic theory. Since this discourse is also a theoretical one, it is preferable for the conceptualisation to permit qualities like simplicity, coherence, and generality in the arguments that rely on the concept. Since the discourse embraces opposite views on how internationalisation affects democracy, it is preferable for the conceptualisation not to make any a priori discriminations among these views. And most importantly, since the aim is to investigate the accuracy of a prediction, the concept should be construed to cover what is predicted and only what is predicted.

To make the presentation as simple as possible, action capacity will be used as a generic concept to cover, among other things, independence, sovereignty, preference fulfilment, power, political autonomy, effective fate-control, while political autonomy is treated as a species of action capacity to be defined in the course of the analysis.

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47 It was mentioned in the introduction that the concept to be developed in this chapter will also serve the purpose of replacing the symmetry principle as a criterion for identifying what political community, or inclusion and exclusion, democracy requires. This purpose will, however, not guide the following development of the concept, but we will have reason to look at it again in the final chapter.
The relevant capacity: objectivist or subjectivist?

One might wish to distinguish between an objectivist and a subjectivist interpretation of capacity. The objectivist interpretation refers to the possibility of an actor to take action, while the subjectivist interpretation refers to an actor’s possibility to take, not just any action, but one that the actor subjectively appreciates. Hence there are two independent requirements for confirming an instance of subjectivist capacity: that an actor is capable of performing an action, and that the actor subjectively appreciates that action. The objectivist interpretation requires only the former criterion to be met.48

It will be demonstrated that the objectivist and the subjectivist interpretations lead to incompatible conclusions as to whether any given development increases or decreases the capacity of an actor. Hence anyone who hopes for a firm interpretation of political events in terms of action capacity must have a firm view on whether the objectivist or the subjectivist position is preferable.

Robert Dahl was cited above as posing the question: “How then does this new change of scale transform the limits and possibilities of democracy?” (Dahl 1989: 319) His answer was: “the demos of a country … will suffer a considerable reduction in its capacity to control decisions on matters of importance to it.” (ibid.) But in between his question and his answer he made a qualification in terms of action capacity which I omitted in the previous citation. The qualification concerns the degree to which the process of internationalisation can be controlled:

The answer requires one to judge whether the trend is reversible – reversible, that is, without costs that too many people will be unwilling to accept. While it would be a mistake to interpret the trend as uniform and inevitable with respect to all matters, in my judgement for the foreseeable future transnational forces will continue to erode national autonomy with respect to the matters I just mentioned. (ibid., my ital.)

This is as close as Dahl gets to specifying the action capacity relevant to democracy and internationalisation. It can be inferred from his definition of reversible – “without costs that too many people will be unwilling to accept.” This reveals a subjective interpretation of capacity. What it is possible politically to do, according to Dahl, is a function of how much people are willing to sacrifice. If people become willing to accept a higher cost for a

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48 The more precise meaning of subjective appreciation might vary among different political contexts and analytical purposes, qualifying the subjectivist requirement as what is preferred, desired, needed, ideologically justified, believed necessary for national security, etc. Except when the term is used to interpret the meaning of other writers, subjective appreciation is intended to cover actions which the actor considers intrinsically good.
political action, then their action capacity has grown. And the other way around, if people become less willing to accept the cost for that same political action, then, according to Dahl's conceptualisation, their action capacity has been reduced.

Another commentator who seems to have assumed a subjectivist interpretation of capacity is David Held. The term “political autonomy”, which is central to his analysis in Democracy and the Global Order, is defined as “the capacity of state managers and agencies to pursue their policy preferences without resort to forms of international collaboration or cooperation.” (Held 1995: 100, my ital.) A still different subjectivist position is taken by Fritz Scharpf who assumes that the democratically relevant capacity is one which aims at realising psychologically mature, undistorted desires (Scharpf 1997b: 28).

Although there may be some differences between Dahl, Held, and Scharpf, each of them can be contrasted to Goldmann, who prefers to define the concept in explicitly objectivist terms as “the possibilities for effective action by nation-states, that is … the menu of options available to their government and citizens.” (2001: 64)49 Hence persons interested in the problem of democracy and internationalisation prefer different and sometimes contradictory conceptualisations of that problem, which leads to the question of which conceptualisations are more or less useful for which purposes.

Taking action possibility and subjective appreciation as each being either-or conditions, one may illustrate the different positions as in Diagram 3.1. The diagram illustrates possible and impossible actions, wanted and not wanted, in the universe of a single actor. The letters \( x \), \( y \), \( z \), and \( a \) are used to symbolise four different actions. The left ellipse covers all actions that are wanted by the actor and the right ellipse covers all actions of which the actor is capable. Action \( a \) is outside both ellipses and represents an action that is neither

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49 In some intuitive contrast to his terminology, Goldmann believes that an instance of objectivist autonomy also requires the capacity to realise preferences – though not the preferences of the actor under study, but possible preferences stipulated by the analyst (ibid. 65). He does not specify more precisely what preferences an actor must be able to realise to confirm that actor’s possession of objectivist autonomy. If he is interpreted as claiming that all possible preferences are relevant to judging an actor’s level of objectivist autonomy, there is no important difference between his position and the one I label “objectivist capacity”, as regards the argument that I am about to develop (though there are significant differences regarding other arguments which we will return to). If Goldmann is interpreted in some other way, so that only a limited set of preferences are taken as relevant to judging an actor’s level of objectivist autonomy, it will be more accurate to place him among the subjectivist theorists, Dahl, Scharpf, and Held, since the level of autonomy would then depend on the choice of the analyst to focus on one set of policy preferences rather than another. Since the first position is vacant, and to my view more reasonable than the other, I interpret Goldmann in the former way.
wanted nor possible (not possible even if other stronger actors demand it). According to an objectivist interpretation of capacity, such as that of Goldmann, \( y \) and \( z \) are instances of capacity, while \( x \) and \( a \) are not. This follows from the previous definition of objectivist capacity.

Diagram 3.1. Possible and impossible actions, wanted and not wanted.

The subjectivist interpretation of capacity is somewhat less easy to define comprehensively, and that is important when clarifying the relation between Dahl on the one hand and Held and Scharpf on the other. The fact that \( y \) is an instance of subjectivist capacity is obvious, since it is covered by both ellipses; and also that \( x \) and \( a \) are not instances of subjectivist capacity, since they are not covered by the right ellipse. The difficulty is the action \( z \), which the actor may be forced to undertake, but which will not be chosen freely. According to Dahl’s definition, \( z \) would not be an instance of capacity. The fact that \( z \) is possible for the actor to perform, but either deliberately abstained from by the actor or forced upon the actor by nature or some other actor, has, in Dahl’s terminology, the following implication: the action demands a cost that the actor is unwilling to accept. According to Dahl in a previous citation, that is equivalent to the proposition that the action cannot be undertaken (Dahl 1989: 319). Hence from Dahl’s conceptualisation it follows that the actor does not have the capacity to undertake \( z \).

This conclusion will probably seem counterintuitive, since it denies that an actor has the capacity to perform an action simply because that actor does not wish to do so. But there is no point, from Dahl’s perspective, in denying the conclusion since it follows from his own conceptualisation. Held and Scharpf are both less explicit than Dahl, and the question is whether they can avoid the problem. However, the risk which theorists like Held and Scharpf run if seeking to avoid Dahl’s implication is that the category of subjectivist capacity collapses into the objectivist one. Simply to claim that an actor has the capacity to perform \( z \), even from a subjectivist point of view, would eradicate
every difference in the above model between a subjectivist and an objectivist interpretation. Both interpretations would then claim that the actor has the capacity for \( y \) and \( z \), and both would deny that the actor has the capacity for \( x \) and \( a \). In this case, there would be no valid reason for Held and Scharpf to use, as they do, criteria like *national policy preferences* or *psychologically mature desires* in their respective definitions of the relevant capacity. Does this then leave them with a third possible interpretation?

There is one, although it is not very attractive. What Held and Scharpf could claim is that \( z \) is irrelevant when estimating an actor’s capacity. The only thing that matters from a subjectivist perspective, according to this hypothetical view, is whether the actor has the capacity to perform those actions that the actor wishes to perform. Expressed in the more technical terms of the diagram, all that matters is if the actions included in the left ellipse (\( x \) and \( y \)) are also included in the right ellipse (\( y \) but not \( x \)). What falls outside the left ellipse (\( z \) and \( a \)) is irrelevant when assessing the actor’s capacity. This view is a possible one for Held and Scharpf to take; but not for Dahl, according to his formulations cited above. As mentioned, however, there are some problems with this view. As a theory of action, it is less comprehensive than either an objectivist interpretation of capacity or the kind of subjectivism preferred by Dahl. To handle problematic cases by declaring them irrelevant is an easy way out, but it lessens the generality of a theory.

A more serious weakness is, however, common to all the above versions of subjectivist capacity. To understand the full extent of this weakness, one must remember that the reason these conceptual questions appeared in the first place is that they are part of an existing discourse that deals with the democratic challenge of internationalisation. Now, it seems impossible to adopt any kind of subjectivist view of capacity along with the view that action capacity has a democratic value in democratic states. This has to do with the divergence between subjectivist and objectivist conclusions. To sum them up: in a case where an actor is able to pursue a policy, \( P \), but for some reason chooses not to pursue it, or is forced to pursue it by nature or another actor (\( z \)), then only the objectivist position is that the actor has the capacity to pursue \( P \), while the subjectivist position is either that the actor either lacks the capacity to pursue \( P \) or that \( P \) is irrelevant to assessing the actor’s capacity. This divergence, it will now be proposed, makes it unreasonable to regard a subjectivist interpretation of capacity as an integral aspect of democracy.

Say, for instance, that policy \( P \) is pursued and considered a good thing by a majority at the point of time \( T_1 \), and is not pursued and not considered a good thing by a majority at \( T_2 \). According to the subjectivist view, the conclusions must then follow that capacity in the relevant policy area has declined between \( T_1 \) and \( T_2 \). But this conclusion would obviously be
mistaken if the concept of capacity were integrated as a dimension in the concept of democracy. It would imply that, in regard to some policy area, the degree of democracy has decreased between T1 and T2. And yet all we know about the situation is that citizens have changed their minds between two points in time and that the polity accordingly has changed its policy in the relevant areas. Such a process of change is an example of how democracy works, rather than an instance of the decline of democracy. The same situation interpreted from an objectivist point of view yields the much more reasonable conclusion that nothing can be concluded about capacity or democracy, since political preferences have changed at the same time as policy; and the description does not provide the necessary information for discriminating between two equally possible casual explanations of that policy change: whether it is a change in capacity or a change in political preferences. If only the political preferences (and not the possibilities to undertake P) have changed between the two points in time, the degree of democracy has remained stable. Changing one’s political views is, other things being equal, neither democratic nor un-democratic, according to fundamental notions of democratic theory. Democracy may be regarded as a certain distribution of power among citizens or as a specific way of making decisions (for example Schumpeter 1950/1975: 269; Dahl 1979/1998: 109; Barry 1989: 25; Warren 2002: 173). But there seems to be no concept of democracy which requires citizens never to change their political views in the direction of more limited public policy (for example not to pursue policy P). Hence the important observation is, if we find it appropriate to integrate a dimension of capacity into the concept of democracy, what should be integrated is an objectivist interpretation.50

50 To continue the argument from a previous footnote on Goldmann's position, a subjectivist interpretation that assumes every possible preference to be equally relevant (and not limiting the argument to preferences actually held by actors) could be taken as an integral dimension of democracy without problematic implications of the above kind. However, this position would have internal problems. If we assume that it is democratically crucial to realise preferences, it seems odd – to say the very least – to let these be defined from above by an analyst (even when the analyst aims to account for all possible preferences) rather by the people itself. Moreover, if the realisation of every possible preference is regarded as democratically relevant by definition, it seems redundant to consider preferences at all; on such assumptions, the interesting and important question is whether an action can be performed, not whether it is preferred. The concept of preferences may then be left out from a theory of democratic autonomy in order to eliminate insignificant concepts.
The relevant capacity: possible or realised?

The previous section has to some extent anticipated an issue that will now be dealt with in more detail. My use of the word capacity reveals a conviction that the relevant property – which according to the previously identified discourse is affected by internationalisation – should be regarded as a possibility rather than a realisation. However, no reason for that judgement has yet been considered, and so the question, Is the relevant capacity a possibility or a realisation? should still be regarded as open.51

Seen as a realisation, a capacity does not exist where it does not result in realisation. For example, a state that pursues no welfare policy cannot, from this perspective, be said to have the capacity to pursue a welfare policy. Seen as a possibility, capacity does not have to be realised in order to exist. For example, a state may have the capacity to pursue a welfare policy and still not pursue such a policy, provided that the policy is deliberately refrained from.52

In macro sociology and economics, concepts similar to that of political capacity have frequently been understood as forms of realisation. A prominent example may be seen in the concluding chapter in Kitschelt et al. (1999a), which attempts to analyse, among other things, the effects on welfare of the internationalisation of finance and trade (page 458). For that purpose, the term “political control of allocation of scarce resources” is defined as follows:

direct state control of the economy (i.e. the scope of state ownership of productive resources and the extent to which state actors are guided by criteria other than profitability in allocating those resources); indirect state control of the economy (i.e., the extent of state intervention in markets via subsidies, taxes, and regulations); welfare state intervention (i.e., the extent to which the state decommodifies labour and redistributes life chances); and labour market organisation (i.e., the scope and intensity of collective versus market allocation in determining conditions of work). (Kitschelt et al. 1999a: 439-420)

According to this conceptualisation of political control, it is a contradiction in terms to have control but not exercise it. By this definition, political control weakens if the production of welfare services is transferred from public authorities to market actors. Hence it is an example of capacity as realisation.

51 To keep the terminology of this section uniform with other parts of the chapter the liberty has been taken of speaking of “capacity” as “realisation” although native speakers of English may find this usage unusual.

52 Morriss (1987: 14 pp.) makes the same distinction by using the term dispositional concepts, which he contrasts with various formulations concerning features which need to be exercised in order to exist. As noted by Morriss, the distinction between a disposition and its exercise goes back at least to Aristotle.
However, this conclusion is reasonable only under the false premise that all states are ruled by something like socialist governments. Imagine that a market liberal government has been elected, promising to reduce the number of publicly undertaken welfare programs, but that this policy is so heavily opposed by civil servants and well-organised interest groups, that the policy is not implemented.53 Kitschelt’s conceptualisation would then imply that the government has more political control over the allocation of resources when it is forced to implement a welfare program that it does not support than if it succeeded in implementing its own privatisation policy. This seems counterintuitive, to say the least. An ideologically more general and neutral conception of “political control of the allocation of resources” would also imply a capacity to transfer economic functions from the state to the market. If such an aim cannot be achieved by political means – such as general elections, the formulation of policy programmes, institutional changes, enactments of law, etc – then a government has less political control over the allocation of resources than if it could achieve that aim.

It seems clear that Kitschelt et al. fail to account for capacities to transfer economic functions from the public to the private sector, and thus reveal an ideological bias in their conceptualisation. Capacities needed to implement a market liberal ideology are left unaccounted for, while capacities needed to implement a socialist ideology are emphasized. This bias moreover, is a general trait in all conceptualisations that treat political capacity as a realisation rather than a possibility. If capacity is understood as something that must be realised in order to exist, there can be no capacity involved in a case where one actor is able to take over some or all of the activities performed by another but chooses not to.

The ideological bias of the view of capacity as realisation is at odds with a fundamental notion in democratic theory. As mentioned in the previous section, democracy may be regarded as a specific way of making policy (for example Schumpeter 1950/1975: 269; Dahl 1979/1998: 109; Barry 1989: 25; Warren 2002: 173). But according to no interpretation, it seems, is the existence of democracy taken to depend on its citizens pursuing any particular policy (as long as the policy is not hostile to democracy itself).

Defining capacity as something possible, rather than something realised, avoids the problem of making the degree of democracy dependent on the pursuance of socialist policies. To view capacity as a possibility is to acknowledge that an actor may be in control (as in the previous example) of

53 According to Pierson (1996) that is partly what happened in England after Margaret Thatcher was elected on a neo-liberal programme in 1979, which she did not succeed in fully implementing.
the allocation of scarce resources, even if that actor prefers not to exercise the control. According to this view, if an elected market liberal government is not capable of preventing, for example, labour unions or its own public administration from intervening in the market, then it is lacking in action capacity. The understanding of this case as one of limited democracy is both intuitive and in line with the fundamental notion of democratic theory just mentioned.

Hence if we integrate a dimension of capacity into the concept of democracy, we should interpret it in terms of possibilities rather than realisations.

The relevant capacity: “additive” or “multiplicative” in relation to other properties?

A third point of possibly conflicting views concerns how the relevant kind of action capacity relates to other aspects of democracy. The background is that a certain kind of action capacity is only one of several democratic aspects, and that there are different ways to relate various democratic aspects to each other when drawing conclusions about democracy as a whole.54

Two general methods for relating various democratic dimensions may be considered. The first is addition: if democracy, y, is made up of two variables, x1 and x2 then y = x1 + x2. The second is multiplication: if democracy, y, is made up of two variables, x1 and x2, then y = x1 · x2. The theoretically important difference between these methods is that, although the value of y is dependent on the values of x1 and x2 in both cases, the multiplicative operation integrates the included terms one step further than the additive does. If, for example, one of the variables takes the value 0 and the other 1, then addition will describe the unit as to some extent democratic, while multiplication will describe it as empty of democratic content.

The most frequent strategy in the literature is probably to relate different democratic dimensions by addition. That was how Dahl and Tufte proceeded in the book Size and Democracy (1973), mentioned earlier as the object of Barry’s critique. Dahl and Tufte do not explicitly state that the two democratic dimensions “system capacity” and “citizen effectiveness” should be related by addition, but it follows from the lines in one of their diagrams illustrating the relation between the two concepts (ibid., p. 24). The indifference lines in their diagram illustrate which different values of “system capacity” and “citizen

54 For the moment it is less important what or how many democratic aspects an accurate definition of democracy must rely on in addition to some idea of action capacity. It is enough to say that there must be something more: for example, a criterion concerning decision-making procedures or the conditions for public deliberation.
effectiveness” could be combined when the value of “democracy” is held constant. Only if the relation between the two concepts is additive, can there be indifference lines. If the relation had been multiplicative, the lines in the diagram would have been curves.

It is not easy to find anyone who explicitly uses a multiplicative method to relate different democratic dimensions. However, nothing explicitly prevents Fritz Scharpf from being guided by that idea when he claims that the “input” democratic problem of the EU decision-making processes must be understood in relation to the “output” prospects of problem solving capacity at the European level (1996b). A multiplicative reading of his work may also be supported by an explicit remark (although he does not elaborate on this point) proposing that “where the effectiveness of democratically legitimated policy choices tends towards zero, so too democracy comes to an end.” (ibid. 138) This conclusion would not have followed if the method for relating different democratic dimensions had been additive. In that case, democracy does not necessarily “come to an end”, even though one of its constitutive dimensions does (0 + 1 = 1). On the other hand, “coming to an end” is exactly what would happen if the method was multiplicative (0 · 1 = 0), which supports the interpretation that Scharpf implicitly adopts that method.

Now, which of the two methods is the better one from the perspective of understanding action capacity in relation to democracy and internationalisation? Let us return to Brian Barry’s critique of Dahl and Tufte. After outlining Dahl and Tufte’s two dimensions of democracy – citizen effectiveness and system capacity – Barry states:

I think that the rather confusing overall impression made by the book stems from the introduction of this second ‘dimension’ of democracy. Surely the normal way of understanding the term ‘democracy’ is to suppose that it refers to the internal distribution of power within a political unit. (…) Whether an organisation (or political unit) is democratic is one question; how important are the matters with which it deals is another question. (Barry 1974: 493-94)

At this point in the argument it is easy enough simply to disagree with Barry. The intuition on which he relies is not self-evident. One could certainly claim that conditions external to the democratic unit must not limit democracy to a concern with administrative trivialities, lest the concept of democracy become irrelevant to theories in which it is in fact important. But then Barry comes up with some implications which seem so absurd that, if they followed from Dahl and Tufte’s concept of democracy, the latter would simply have to be abandoned. He claims that the two-dimensionality of democracy “could entail
(depending on the quantities and trade-offs) that Adolph Hitler increased ‘democracy’ in Germany between 1933 and, say, 1944, since he certainly dramatically increased the country’s ‘system capacity’ (Barry 1974: 495).

To imply any absurdity, however, Barry must read two rather strange assumptions into the position he hopes to refute: first, that the growth in action capacity between 1933 and 1944 was not outweighed by a parallel change in other democratic dimensions; second, that the two democratic dimensions are related by addition. Neither assumption is reasonable, but it is enough to consider the second one.

If an additive method is used, a gain in action capacity will (other things being equal) lead to the conclusion that the Nazi regime grew in democratic standing over the years. But if the two dimensions are instead related by multiplication, no such absurd conclusion will follow. The fact that the Nazi regime did approach zero level on several other dimensions of democracy – for example inclusiveness of the citizenry and freedom of speech – guarantees an approach to the zero level in the overall estimate of democracy.

Hence if action capacity is adopted as an integral aspect of democracy, it is preferable to relate it to other democratic aspects by multiplication rather than by addition. However, this does not mean that we should, from now on, state democratic theory in mathematical terms. The purpose of using mathematical terms in this section has been to contribute to an existing discourse by settling Barry’s disagreement with Dahl and Tufte. In the final chapter, action capacity will be related to other dimensions of democracy by a non-mathematical construction whose implications are closer to multiplication than to addition, but still distinct from both.

The relevant capacity: compatible or incompatible with dependency?

Over the last thirty years, a recurrent question in the literature on international politics has been whether, and if so, in what way, states are dependent on other actors – principally other states, but also corporations, international organisations, NGOs, etc. The close connection between this literature and that dealing with democracy, action capacity, and internationalisation is obvious. In their book *Power and Interdependence*, first published in 1977 and since then recognised as a signpost in the field, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye noted that interdependence – i.e., mutual dependency – often “results from international transactions – flows of money, goods or people, and messages across international boundaries. Such transactions have increased dramatically since World War II.” (Keohane and Nye 2001: 8) This description is not different from those referred to in the first section of this chapter. Furthermore, to explain the democratically troublesome effects of
internationalisation during recent decades, theorists use the concept of dependency. As already noted, Dahl finds it democratically troublesome that a country should become “dependent on actors and actions that are outside the country’s boundaries and not directly subject to its government.” (Dahl 1989: 319, my ital.) It seems important therefore to consider whether the action capacity relevant to democracy and internationalisation must be possessed independently of other actors.

Dependency means that actions by different actors condition each other (Nye 1999: 179). That is clear enough, but there is no agreement in democratic theory about the proper role of the concept. While Dahl regards independence as important to a democratically relevant action capacity, Goldmann takes a different view, namely that the democratically relevant action capacity of states – autonomy or effectiveness in his terminology – should not be defined in opposition to dependency (Goldmann 2001). Goldmann’s position has some advantages, but according to the argument presented below he has perhaps not accounted explicitly enough for the problem, and as a consequence he is led either to unacceptable conclusions or to the notion that some idea of dependency could be reintegrated, albeit at a more implicit level, into his concept of autonomy.

The problem of dependency and democracy may be explained by the diagram used previously. The interpretation of the letters is the same as before.56

55 My reading of Goldmann may need some justification. He explicitly argues against defining autonomy as the opposite of interdependence (2001: 89). As is most often the case, interdependence seems to be equivalent to mutual dependency between at least two countries. The opposite to interdependence (and dependency) is called independence by Goldmann (ibid. 90). Hence it is fair to conclude that, according to this view, autonomy should not be taken as equivalent to independence. Goldmann works out this conceptualisation as an aid to understanding the relation between internationalisation and autonomy, but he also treats autonomy as an integral aspect of democracy (ibid. 156), most evidently in the theory of liberal democracy, but possibly also in those of deliberative and republican democracy (ibid. 144 p.). In the democratic theory context, Goldmann uses the term effectiveness more often than autonomy (ibid. 144), though both terms are defined as action possibilities (ibid. 64, 155 p.) and sometimes used interchangeably (ibid. 156).

56 As described earlier: The letters \( x \), \( y \), \( z \) and \( a \) are used to symbolise four different actions. The left ellipse covers all actions that are wanted by the actor and the right ellipse covers all actions that the actor is capable of undertaking. The action \( a \) is outside both ellipses and illustrates an action that is neither wanted nor possible, not even if the actor was pressed to take it by nature or some other actors.
We may now concentrate on the right hand ellipse, covering actions which the actor is able to perform, \( y \) and \( z \). Remember that it is not possible to conclude from the diagram that either \( y \) or \( z \) is in fact performed by the actor. The actor may avoid \( y \) if its performance precludes the performance of some other action to which an equal or higher value has been attributed, although \( y \) is possible in the sense that its cost exceeds the total resources possessed by the actor (see Section 3.1.3 for a development of this notion of possible action). And although the actor would like to avoid performing \( z \), since it is not considered an intrinsic good, the actor may none the less be constrained to do so by natural limitation or the intervention of some stronger actor. So if we focus only on the right hand ellipse, we are not committed to saying anything about what actions are in fact performed. The actor may be constrained both to perform \( z \) and to abstain from \( y \).

From these observations it follows that the right hand ellipse does not fit with a democratically relevant idea of action capacity. Democracy requires that the people, rather than some other actor, have the possibility to act, while the right hand ellipse also includes such actions as the actor would like to perform and has the capacity to perform – in the sense of possessing enough resources to cover the costs – but which the actor none the less avoids under the pressure of other actors of opposed ideological position and sufficient action capacity to bring their will to bear.

This clash between democratic theory and the right hand ellipse is perhaps what makes Dahl introduce an idea of dependency as the opposite to democratically relevant action capacity (although that is probably not the right thing to do). He could then state that, from a democratic point of view, it is not enough that actions are, in the above sense, possible or impossible but moreover that the possible actions are performed, or abstained from, independently of other actors.
Unfortunately, the concept of independence is insufficient to achieve that purpose. It excludes too much from the democratically relevant concept of action capacity. To demonstrate this, let us return once more to the above diagram, remembering that dependency implies that actions by different actors condition each other (Nye 1999: 179). Now, say that action $y$, which is considered an intrinsic good by the actor, is performed, but that it could be undertaken only because of a relation of dependence to another actor. If there were no relation of dependency, then $y$ would not be performed. Introducing a requirement of independence would imply therefore that the action possibility $y$ was excluded from the category of relevant action capacity. But that would be absurd, since it would exclude any political action from the relevant category. No collective actor has ever done anything independently of other actors, since by definition it must depend on at least the individuals that comprise it. Since political problems concern what may be done together with or in opposition to other people, and not the decisions of an isolated individual, it can hardly be a controversial view that a criterion of independence is much too strong for the purpose it was taken to serve in this context.

It seems unclear how Goldmann can take a satisfactory stand on this problem without altering parts of his position. As he omits from consideration all questions of independence (or dependence) as criteria of the relevant concept, one may suspect that he is indifferent to the implication that some of the action possibilities he finds democratically relevant may be determined by external actors. But that interpretation would seem to be mistaken, since he apparently also attributes a democratic importance to the notion of free choice (Goldmann 2001: 64, 156). Defending his position with reference to a notion of free choice would, however, confront Goldmann with another problem. It is far from obvious how his crucial, but hardly articulated, concept of free choice differs from the concept of independence, which he has omitted from consideration, wherefore the concept of independence may re-enter the discussion at a more implicit level. Furthermore, one common interpretation of free choice is deeply problematic in this particular context. This concerns the interpretation of free choice as realising what an actor wishes (for example Sen 2002: 13). Thus understood, the notion of free choice would enter a subjectivist criterion of what is more or less democracy, and we have already found that to be incompatible with fundamental notions in democratic theory (see the above section on objectivist and subjectivist capacity). Hence if the concept of free choice is relied upon, it must be defined precisely so as to avoid the problem of subjectivism.
For the purpose of avoiding the difficulties pointed to above, we may now suggest that what is democratically relevant is the possibility to take action—or to abstain from action—in freedom from determination by other actors, in the sense that the actor acts in the same way as if no other actor had tried to make the actor act differently. The italicised criterion of freedom can be met either if an actor is under pressure from other actors but acts as if that pressure did not exist, or if the actor is in fact not under any pressure from other actors. One may also notice that the criterion does not rely on any assumption that a capable actor is capable of realising, for example, intentions or desires.

From this definition of freedom it is obvious that actors are generally not free in their actions, at least not in all their actions and in relation to every other actor. But even if none of our actions can be perfectly free, there is more freedom in having many, rather than few, options to choose among, however determined by other actors any of the actions in question may be. And there is also more freedom in choosing among extremely different action possibilities than in choosing among nearly identical ones. So even if the above definition of what is democratically relevant might lead to a certain cynical estimate for the human capacity for free action, it is still useful for saying whether more or less action capacity is operative in a given situation.

It is important to notice that there are various methods by which an actor, A, may remain free from determination by another actor, B: A can seek alliances with other actors, C and D, and so reduce the importance and influence of B; A can take counter-measures against B; A can attempt to convince or trick B into adopting A’s own conception of what is valuable; or A can simply prevail by increasing its capacity to exploit resources within its own territory. In view of all these possibilities, there is no necessity for a state to become more determined by other actors in times of internationalisation. An economically self-sufficient state would have fewer alternative alliances (such as suppliers of capital, private companies, labour unions) than an internationally integrated state. On the other hand, it is obviously easier to take counter-measures against the opposition of internal actors than against that of external ones (see Chapter 6 for an elaboration). Hence even when the freedom requirement is introduced, it remains an open empirical question what happens to the democratically relevant action capacity during internationalisation.

**The relevant capacity: democratic or not?**

Until now it has been taken for granted that some concept of action capacity by definition relates to democracy, in other words, that it may be regarded as a necessary criterion for democracy to exist. That view, however, needs to be argued rather than assumed. It is not enough to demonstrate that certain
critiques are unfounded, as in the case of Brian Barry in a previous section.\textsuperscript{57} There must also be some positive reason in favour of the view.

It is an important fact that a number of political scientists seriously dealing with the relation between democracy and internationalisation actually conceive of democracy as including an element of political action capacity. This was established in Section 3.1.1. In attempting to contribute to such a discourse, it would seem inappropriate to start by leaving aside the very concept that attracted our attention in the first place. We have found no absolute consensus on the crucial point. Yet it is certainly more common in the context of internationalisation to regard capacity as inherent to the concept of democracy.

At a more general level, there is agreement on the notion of democracy as rule by the people. This nearly uncontested\textsuperscript{58} core meaning of democracy assumes both that there is such a thing as action capacity (to rule) and that the people possess such a capacity.

In relating action capacity to democracy by definition, as we have done, we arrive at a very simple and clear relation between the two concepts. And as long as no analytical problems emerge from such an \textit{a priori} definition, it has the advantage of simplicity.\textsuperscript{59} And a specific kind of action capacity may therefore very well be seen as integral to democracy.

\textbf{The relevant capacity: affecting all or only those who possess it?}

Consider the people who are affected by the political unit possessing a relevant kind of capacity. Should they be the same as those possessing the capacity? Or should the relevant kind of capacity be regarded as a capacity to affect just anyone?

There are two reasons to assume that the relevant capacity regards that of a collective actor to take action only on the individuals who comprise it. In the first place, it was argued in the preceding section that a certain kind of

\textsuperscript{57} Alf Ross (1948) could have added the critique that action capacity has traditionally not been the strength of democratic states but of autocratic ones. What Ross seems to ignore is, however, that action capacity may be important to both democracy and autocracy; like so many other political elements, it may be important to more than one kind of rule. Acknowledging this fact does not lead to any difficulties in distinguishing between, for example, democracy and autocracy, since action capacity is not the only element in the respective definitions of the two concepts.

\textsuperscript{58} It is however not totally uncontested. Hanson (1989) notes that the original core meaning of democracy could be spelled out more adequately as rule by the \textit{common people}, which is at least in nuance different from rule by the \textit{people}.

\textsuperscript{59} By taking a certain kind of action capacity as integral to democracy we have not in any way precluded empirical questioning of the relation between that dimension and other aspects of democracy.
capacity should be seen as an aspect of democracy. Everywhere without exception in the literature, democracy is regarded as a political system in which a population rules itself, and not one in which one population exercises rule over another. It would distort conceptual theory to the point of incoherence to suggest that, other things being equal, the level of democracy enjoyed by a people raises automatically when it acquires capacity to determine the politics of another.

In the second place, we recognised in Section 2.3 a normative difficulty with the symmetry principle, namely that under some conditions it seems to require its upholders to engage in a competition for resources which determines cross national effects, and which issues in violent confrontations. Though the analysis in this chapter is not concerned with defining a normatively defensible interpretation of action capacity, it is, other things being equal, preferable to keep open for later chapters the possibility of using the concept for normative purposes. We should therefore not build into the concept of political autonomy any requirements that its upholders try to control other people.

* In view of the above qualifications, the action capacity relevant to democracy has been construed as (i) the possibilities of a collective actor to take action on the individuals constituting it, while (ii) disregarding such possibilities as the actor is determined by other actors either to perform or refrain from, and (iii) being synthesized with other democratic elements by a method of multiplication rather than addition. An appropriate label for this concept could be democratic political autonomy – “political” because it is a collective capacity, and “autonomy” because it supposes freedom from determination, and “democratic” because it has been formulated to fit with notions of democratic theory and is taken as an aspect of democracy.

Only for practical reasons, some possible definitional requirements have been disregarded: for example, that democratic political autonomy may be defined as also requiring a certain kind of deliberative capacity and certain constitutional regulations, such as monism rather than division of power, and majority rule rather than unanimous voting. This implies that the conceptualisation of democratic political autonomy presented here ignores the democratic importance of individual autonomy. For this reason it should be understood in conjunction with the democratic requirements of participation and deliberation dealt with in the theoretical sections of Chapters 4 and 5, which describe the democratic role of individuals (as well as collectives).
3.1.3. Determinants of the emergence of action possibilities

Thus far action possibilities have been treated as indivisible phenomena, that is as if they are either present or absent and cannot be present only to a certain degree. In terms of the diagrams in use, an action possibility is either inside or outside the relevant ellipse, and different levels of action capacity have been conceptualised as different amounts of individual action possibilities. We will now move on from this simplification (while introducing other simplifications) in order to grasp the conditions under which actions are performed or abstained from.\(^{60}\)

Furthermore, permitting a graded judgement of action possibilities will focus our interest on a whole interval of political actions, rather than on some absolute line between capable and incapable actors. This is preferable on the grounds that arguments should be as generally applicable as possible. For example, it is unnecessarily restrictive to focus only on the question of what entity is sovereign here and now, since relations of political capacity may change dramatically even if the sovereign – understood as the highest authority – remains unchanged.

Besides, the theory which will be expounded below has the advantageous side-effect of integrating in one coherent argument two seemingly contradictory positions on how economic internationalisation affects democratic political autonomy.

An economic interpretation of democratic political autonomy

The following account of the conditions for political action is based on the concepts of costs and resources.\(^{61}\) For the sake of lucidity, it ignores several criteria of democratic political autonomy, most importantly that of freedom

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\(^{60}\) It has already been demonstrated that the concepts of possible action and perceived intrinsic goodness should not be taken to explain what actions are performed by an actor, at least not in a democratic theory context. (See the sub-sections in this chapter on subjectivist and objectivist capacity, and on dependency.)

\(^{61}\) According to a different theory, it is rules and resources that explain the emergence and possibility of social action (Giddens 1979: 65 pp.). It is indeed possible to distinguish rules from resources, as when an actor that possesses resources breaks a rule and has to make use of the resources to undo the effects of the violation. However, rules can also be used as themselves a kind of resource, as for example when one actor uses codified rules to dominate another. To reduce as much as possible the number of assumptions needed to explain something, one should avoid overlapping categories; and of course, if two explanatory factors overlap in content it is pointless to resort to empirical methods to find out which carries more weight in explaining a particular group of actions. To understand action without resorting to overlapping categories the concept of resources is better combined with that of costs. A cost is never a resource and a resource is never a cost.
from determination. Once the general lines have been drawn, however, it can be seen how they apply to democratic political autonomy as defined above. But for the next few pages, the object of analysis is better referred to by the more general term action capacity.

The capacity of actor A to pursue policy P can be paraphrased as the possibility to realise P by means of the resources controlled by A. According to another, almost tautological explanation, incapacity can be paraphrased as the impossibility of deciding and implementing policy P at any cost. In this sense, qualifying a political actor as incapable of undertaking a certain action means that the action cannot be performed, no matter what goods the actor is willing to sacrifice. To simplify later distinctions, we may illustrate with a diagram the difference between capacity and incapacity. Consider first a situation where the actor is incapable of pursuing a given policy.

The left hand vertical dimension of Diagram 3.2 symbolises the actor’s resources: the higher the point is on the line, the more resources the actor has. As the point is above zero, the actor possesses some resources (possibly borrowed from other actors); had the point been below zero, the actor would be understood to have no resources but rather debts. For the moment there is no need to specify what kind of resources we are implicitly assuming. All means by which an end can be reached – if an actor chooses to make use of them – are conceived of as a resource, for instance money, personal skills, weapons, or constitutional provisions. The right hand vertical dimension symbolises the cost to the actor of a given policy. As with resources, it is convenient at this point not to specify exactly the nature of the cost. Every means that must be used in order to achieve a certain end is reduced here to the single dimension of cost. The marking on the cost dimension has also been placed above zero, and somewhat higher. Assuming that cost is the opposite of gain, the diagram illustrates that the actor does not gain resources from pursuing the policy. Had the point been placed below zero, the actor would have gained some resources from pursuing it. Now, the positive slope of the line between the two dimensions illustrates the idea that the actor’s resources amount to less than the costs of the policy, and hence, following our previous definition, that the actor is incapable of pursuing the policy in question.62

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62 If cost is conventionally defined in terms of resources, the two dimensions are best understood as separated in time and to describe the actor’s resources before and after a policy is pursued.
Diagram 3.2. Incapable actor

A real-world illustration of this structure, where the policy cost is much higher than the totality of the actor’s resources, could for instance be Sweden’s capacity to occupy the territory of France – an aim which it would be materially impossible for the Swedish state to achieve, whatever goods it was willing to sacrifice. (This case would however not represent any lack of Swedish democratic political autonomy, since the proposed policy is aimed at affecting individuals outside the collective actor of the Swedish state.) A negative line or a horizontal line between the two dimensions, on the other hand, symbolises that the actor has the required capacity, for example:

Diagram 3.3 and 3.4. Capable actors
The left diagram (3.3), where the line between the two dimensions is horizontal, is an extreme situation, in which the actor may use the total amount of resources available to it in order to realise a single policy. A real world instance of this might be a state engaged in waging and winning a “total war” against another state or some group of its citizens. Or, perhaps a better example, a politically constitutive event in which a new sovereign body uses all its resources to overcome rival pretenders to power. The right hand diagram (3.4), where the slope is negative and the cost-point is below the zero mark, illustrates, for example, a successful taxation policy in which the (taxing) actor makes a dramatic gain. Regarded as an illustration of taxation capacity, the diagram on the right is, however, too simple, even for my present rather simplistic purpose. Every taxation policy has an initial cost, when the revenue is collected, and the long-term gains of taxation are a matter of contention, especially in circumstances of internationalisation. A more neutral description of taxation capacity would therefore differentiate between gains and costs at different points in time: for example,

Diagram 3.5. Taxation capacity

As the term *possibility* is now being used, it is obvious that many policies that are sometimes judged impossible are in fact possible. For instance, it is *not* impossible for a contemporary Western state to undertake a monetary policy of substantially lower real interest rates than those of other Western countries. This can be done at certain costs, for example the loss of economic resources that would result from a programme of national isolation, or the diminution of aggregated demand resulting from excessive imports. What might be materially impossible to achieve in the domain of economic policy is a certain set of policy aims. Even though a country can fix its interest rates at a level much lower than those of comparable countries, such a policy may *in the long run* be materially impossible to combine with, for example, a policy calling for
free trade, an international flow of capital, and stable exchange rates. This situation is illustrated in Diagram 3.6.

Diagram 3.6. Capacity of a set of policies

As we are interested in the consequences of economic internationalisation for state autonomy, we should not restrict our investigation to the fine distinction between capacity and incapacity in the sense of the distinction between possible and impossible policies. Imagine that a state has the material possibility to pursue a certain policy, but that the cost of pursuing that policy is the non-pursuance of another policy which the state ranks as more important than the first one. Then the political result will be the same as if the former policy had in fact been materially impossible: the actor will not pursue its desired policy. For example, a state may be able to pursue a policy of full employment, but only at the cost of a cutback in unemployment replacement rates which, for ideological reasons, is too severe to be practicable. In that case it will be for both ideological and capacity reasons that the policy was not pursued. This can be illustrated as follows:

Diagram 3.7. Capable actor not undertaking action

A – Actor’s total resources
B – Cost of policy 1 when pursued together with policies 2 and 3.
C – Cost of policy 2 when pursued together with policies 1 and 3.
D – Cost of policy 3 when pursued together with policies 1 and 2.

\[ A < B + C + D \]
If the relation between full unemployment and replacement rates is believed by the actor to be a necessary one, and if the actor (for ideological reasons) refuses to accept a cost consisting of unemployment benefits above the zero level (which is here not taken to have any specific meaning in terms of, for example, a certain fraction of the salary), then the actor will not pursue a policy of full employment, even if there are enough resources to pursue such a policy. It would appear that such instances are valid indications of a certain, though not a total, lack of capacity. Moreover, we should recognise that a reasonable operationalisation of capacity, as well as of democratic political autonomy, should strive to give full account of such instances and of the possibly changing relation between different policies (for example that between unemployment and replacement rates). In opposition to analysts claiming that a democratically relevant capacity change occurs only when sovereignty is in question (Lundström 1998; Karlsson 2001: 45 p.), it should be recognised as a theoretical improvement to state the conceptualisation in more general terms and to recognise that a capacity change is democratically relevant over whatever interval in capacity it occurs. The very limited interval when an actor’s total resources are or are not ultimately sufficient for pursuing a distinct policy is not in principle different from any other interval between different degrees of capacity.

Thus, after having assessed what policy options are made impossible by the process of internationalisation, our investigation should proceed to questions such as: What is the cost of manifesting a certain kind of autonomy in political action and what are the resources possessed by the actor? And how does a process of internationalisation affect cost and resources? This does not necessarily lead to a traditional cost-benefit analysis. As will be argued in Section 3.2, to estimate resources directly, without reference to their eventual use, is indeed problematic, and, as will also be argued, there are less problematic alternative methods.
Hypotheses restated in theoretical language

We saw in the first section of this chapter that internationalisation may reduce action capacity, because it permits market actors increasingly to evade territorially situated political structures; and that it may increase action capacity by allowing for a more developed division of labour and a higher level of competition.

On the principle that arguments should be as generally applicable as possible, it is an advantage that the conceptualisation proposed here reconciles these two predictions to the extent that it logically permits both of them to be true at the same time.

What happens is that the two arguments are interpreted as concerning two different matters, policy costs and resources, both of which are necessary to political action capacity. The arguments that relate internationalisation and action capacity in a positive way could be interpreted most reasonably as implying that there is as a result of internationalisation an overall growth of economic resources – including those possessed by or accessible to the state. This hypothesis is illustrated in Diagram 3.8.

Diagram 3.8. Hypothesis: effect of internationalisation on state resources

![Diagram 3.8: Hypothesis: effect of internationalisation on state resources](image)

But this suggested difference between a nationally and an internationally oriented political economy does not contradict the sceptical argument that internationalisation increases the cost of policies opposing the interests of strong economic actors, for example policies of redistributive welfare spending. This hypothesis is illustrated in Diagram 3.9.
Diagram 3.9. Hypothesis: effect of internationalisation on state costs

What these diagrams illustrate is that there is no theoretical reason to expect that a state’s action capacity necessarily varies between the circumstances of a nationally and an internationally oriented political economy. For nothing excludes \textit{a priori} that both hypotheses mentioned may be correct, and that the two distinct dimensions of autonomy may be affected, and affected to the same extent, by the process internationalisation. Perhaps the idea is easier to grasp as represented by a single diagram (Diagram 3.10).

Diagram 3.10. Hypothesis: effect of internationalisation on resources and costs accompanying a redistributive welfare policy
The fact that the line connecting the two dimensions is horizontal is not important. The basic idea – that the relation between the two dimensions is not necessarily affected by internationalisation – is not conditioned on any specific slope of the line. Seeing this relations expressed by diagrams should not, however, blind us to the possibility of only one of the dimensions being affected by internationalisation, or that they may both be affected to different extents. For in such cases of internationalisation we are justified in saying that internationalisation indeed changes the degree of political autonomy. This is perhaps best demonstrated by focusing on another policy area than that of redistributive welfare spending.

Diagram 3.11 depicts a view of how internationalisation may affect the capacity to pursue competition policies. The rate of resource growth moving from a national to an international political economy is represented as the same as in the previous examples; the policy cost is shown as decreasing.

Diagram 3.11. The effect of internationalisation on state resources and state costs in the case of competition policy. A hypothesis

The slope of the line connecting the three dimensions becomes more negative as we pass from a national to an international economy. Diagram 3.11 therefore illustrates the hypothesis that internationalisation increases state
capacity with regard to competition policy. The argument is that in a larger economic system there is a larger number of producers and hence a greater potential for competition. Whether or not actual political development follows this hypothesised trajectory in the course of internationalisation is of course an empirical question. What should be remembered is only that, when operationalising action capacity, one should take both dimensions into account; this require us to specify the relation between two estimates, or, speaking in visual terms, to determine the slope of the line between the two dimensions.

**Integrating action capacity and democratic political autonomy**

To improve lucidity, the current argument (illustrated in Diagrams 3.2-11) has been phrased in terms of action capacity rather than democratic political autonomy. However, the above understanding of action capacity can easily be imported into the more specific field of democratic political autonomy. In addition to the terms inherent in the above conceptualisation of action capacity, the main general qualifications of democratic political autonomy are (i) freedom from determination – in the sense of an actor performing the same actions as if no other actors were attempting to lead the actor to act differently – and (ii) the limitation of the objects of action to the constitutive members of the collective actor possessing the capacity. To formulate the above argument in terms of democratic political autonomy we need only to disregard the action possibilities (the structures of resources and costs) that do not meet both of these criteria.

**3.2. Operationalising democratic political autonomy**

Following the above conceptualisation of democratic political autonomy, it would be tempting to look for empirical indicators of resources and costs. Efforts to that effect have indeed been made, as when state power is analysed by quantifying national capabilities (see Morgenthau 1948: 80-108 for a classic example, or Sjöstedt 1987: 66 for a survey) and in cost-benefit analyses as commonly used in, for example, public administration.

Nevertheless, to describe directly the relevant costs and resources, leaving aside whatever actions they permit or prevent, is not an obvious approach to empirically estimating democratic political autonomy. To assess an actor’s

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63 For the Swedish case, *Konkurrensverket* (2001: 43-46) tries to estimate how competition efficiency has evolved over the past twenty years.
political autonomy by describing the actor’s available resources, the analyst must entertain some theory about what resources are important for what actions, without ever being able to investigate the validity of that theory (Morriss 1987). This problem is not always serious, but with regard to complex collective actions (for example when decisions about public income and expenditure are implemented in a welfare state), it would indeed be unfortunate simply to take for granted the mixture of resources (for example organisational, financial, territorial, educational or military) which is required for a policy to be successfully implemented. Similarly, empirically to investigate the cost of an action without studying the action itself presupposes a more or less arbitrary assumption about the costs incurred by the action.

So while the concepts of costs and resources may have helped us to understand why an action is performed or not and how an action possibility emerges, costs and resources are best regarded as purely theoretical concepts and not ones whose purpose is to cover discrete classes of empirical observations. The empirical approach to democratic political autonomy developed in the following section begins with what can actually be observed, namely the collective actions that are in fact carried out. At a theoretical level this approach fits better to the definition of democratic political autonomy which disregards the distinction between resources and costs. The relevant quality is then (repeating the conclusion in Section 3.1.2) the possibilities of a collective actor to take action on the individuals constituting it, while disregarding such possibilities that the actor is determined by other actors either to perform or refrain from.

Three operational indicators of this quality will be suggested and defended: (i) the degree to which spending policies pursued follows policy preferences expressed in election manifestos; (ii) the accuracy of public forecasting of GDP growth rates; (iii) the difference between budget policies pursued by governments and those proposed by opposition parties.

It will be argued that these three indicators are reasonably valid, in the sense that they are preferable to the ones relied upon in earlier analyses of the same theoretical question. It will also be argued that the indicators above to some extent complement each other, in the sense that a defect in the validity of one can be corrected for by another indicator.

3.2.1. Convergence between policy and preferences

In the area of international political economy, the level of public spending seems to afford a standard approach to estimating the action capacity of
states (see for example Garrett 1998; Esping-Andersen 1999a; Kitschelt et al 1999b; Huber et al 1999; Bernauer and Achine 2000). Like many methods, it is often taken for granted rather than explicitly argued. For example Huber et al. (1999) begins by endorsing “the widely accepted view that the sea changes in advanced capitalist economies of the past two decades, above all the increasing internationalisation of these economies, have constricted the policy options of the governments of these societies (e.g., see Scharpf 1991).” (Huber et al. 1999: 164, my ital.) This point of departure is then linked to an empirical investigation of policy indicators such as the total public expenditure and the transfer payments of different countries. Even though the authors do not explicitly link policy options to policies pursued, let alone support the operationalisation with arguments, the former notion undeniably points to a discourse to which their empirical analysis claims to be relevant; and this claim can be justified only if the policies pursued are taken to indicate the policy options that were available.

The logic underlying this approach may at first seem very obvious: if a policy is pursued, then the state had the capacity to pursue it. But from the perspective of democratic political autonomy there is a problem here. To the extent that action capacity is identified with policy pursued, this indicator ignores the possibility of an actor having the capacity to pursue a policy but choosing not to pursue it. In other words, it is to prefer a subjectivist interpretation of capacity to an objectivist one, which is strongly problematic in a democratic theory context. Furthermore, to conceive of capacity as a realisation rather than a possibility, such as the realisation of a certain spending policy, is to attribute a higher level of capacity to socialist than to liberal regime types – an ideological bias at odds with an understanding of democracy as neutral between such ideologies. (For the arguments underlying both of these objections, see relevant sub-sections in Section 3.1.2.)

All the studies mentioned above are susceptible to these objections, but not equally susceptible. Garrett (1998), Huber et al. (1999), and Kitschelt et al. (1999b) do take into account the party composition of governments in office at the time of particular policies, in order to estimate the importance of ideological choice for policy decisions. However, to take party composition into account is not sufficient to avoid the problems indicated above and to make the analysis democratically relevant. In order not to assume a subjectivist interpretation of action capacity we must know a government’s ideological

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64 The studies mentioned draw no conclusions in terms of democratic political autonomy, and so are safeguarded from the most problematic implications. However, it is not ideal to rely on a method that prevents them from learning things about democratic political autonomy which would otherwise (if applying another method) be within the scope of study.
position on specific policies, so that we can sort out the cases of non-pursued policy that should not be taken to instantiate absence of action capacity. Such information could be derived from the party composition of governments only if alternative governments differ ideologically across all the policy issues we are interested in and, moreover, if the ideological differences among them are stable over time and from one country to another.\textsuperscript{65} That seems much too strong an assumption. Indeed, the contrary is possible and even likely – that ideological tension over, for example, welfare policy will decline once such policy has been established and incited the organisation of new interest groups, or that ideological tension will intensify as market internationalisation enforces the income difference between those who are competitive and those who are not. Hence to avoid the problem of subjectivism it is not sufficient to control for party composition of governments.

A preferable way of proceeding would be to identify more directly situations in which an observed shift in policy is best explained by a change in action capacity, and distinguish such situations from ones in which the policy shift is best explained by a change in the ideological convictions of the actor pursuing the policy.\textsuperscript{66} Let me outline some empirical conditions which would justify various interpretations.

For the sake of lucidity, the extreme complexity of ideology will here be reduced to a single-dimensional property at the nominal level: a positive value is assigned where an actor considers a particular policy intrinsically good; a negative value, where an actor does not consider a particular policy intrinsically good (a negative value does not imply that the policy is considered intrinsically bad: ignorance and indifference are common political elements). Also for the sake of lucidity, the variable policy pursued will be dichotomized. We may assume furthermore that both variables, ideology and policy pursued, are observed only at two different points in time, T1 and T2. Given these simplifications, we arrive at $2^4$, that is 16, possible structures of observation, displayed in Table 3.1.

\textsuperscript{65} If ideological tension between alternative governments increases over time, a regression analysis may report an over time increasing effect of governments’ party composition on policy indicators, even in cases where political action capacity remains constant (cf. Garrett 1998). If ideological tension between alternative governments decreases over time, a regression analysis may report an over time decreasing effect of governments’ party composition on policy indicators, even in cases when political action capacity remains constant (cf. Huber et al. 1999).

\textsuperscript{66} In accordance with our overarching falsificationist approach, we should investigate whether changes in ideology are a possible explanation for the shift in policy, and only insofar as that possibility is empirically refuted consider ourselves in a position to assume that a change in democratic political autonomy has taken place.
Table 3.1. An operationalisation of democratic political autonomy. Convergence between policies and preferences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point of time, T1</th>
<th>Point of time, T2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy A is pursued by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A pursued by government – yes or no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy A considered a good thing by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A considered a good thing by government – yes or no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. No increase, decrease, or constancy can be concluded
   - Yes
   - Yes
   - Yes
   - Yes

2. No increase, decrease, or constancy can be concluded
   - Yes
   - Yes
   - Yes
   - No

3. Decrease of autonomy can be concluded
   - Yes
   - Yes
   - No
   - Yes

4. No increase, decrease, or constancy can be concluded
   - Yes
   - Yes
   - No
   - No

5. No increase, decrease, or constancy can be concluded
   - Yes
   - No
   - Yes
   - Yes

6. Constancy of autonomy can be concluded
   - Yes
   - No
   - Yes
   - No

7. Autonomy both increased and decreased
   - Yes
   - No
   - No
   - Yes

8. Increase of autonomy can be concluded
   - Yes
   - No
   - No
   - No

9. Increase of autonomy can be concluded
   - No
   - Yes
   - Yes
   - Yes

10. Autonomy both increased and decreased
    - No
    - Yes
    - Yes
    - No

11. Constancy of autonomy can be concluded
    - No
    - Yes
    - No
    - Yes

12. No increase, decrease, or constancy can be concluded
    - No
    - Yes
    - No
    - No

13. No increase decrease, or constancy can be concluded
    - No
    - No
    - Yes
    - Yes

14. Decrease of autonomy can be concluded
    - No
    - No
    - Yes
    - No

15. No increase, decrease, or constancy can be concluded
    - No
    - No
    - No
    - Yes

16. No increase, decrease, or constancy can be concluded
    - No
    - No
    - No
    - No

The table ought to be self-explanatory. What remains then is empirically to investigate at various points in time whether certain policies have been

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67 One may distinguish between five different interpretations of the 16 different structures of observation. First, that control of policy A has not changed between T1 and T2; this
pursued or not and whether or not those policies were considered intrinsically good.

Concerning policy, the standard approach is here being followed as outlined in the studies commented on above: whether or not a particular policy is pursued is indicated by amount of public spending in different policy areas, as well as by the distribution of income and wealth among citizens. Concerning perceptions of intrinsic goodness, recourse will be made to the content of election manifestos put forth by political parties in government at the relevant times. More technical issues relating to this measure will be discussed in Section 3.3.1 together with the empirical findings.

Validity problems

In a context of democratic theory, the above operationalisation has a clear advantage over previous approaches, as argued above, but there are still validity problems to be faced.

First we should remember that the theoretical concept democratic political autonomy is distinct from the degree to which policy references are realised in political practice. Democratic political autonomy refers to the possibilities of a collective actor to take action with regard to itself while being undetermined by other actors, in the sense of taking the same actions it would have taken if no other actors had tried to make it do otherwise. This quality can only be approximately described by information concerning the realisation of preferences. However, under the assumption that nature, in the widest possible sense of the term, is not growing increasingly hostile to the actor under investigation, a decreasing realisation of preferences is caused by an intensified determination by other actors. That should suffice for evaluating the hypotheses in which we are interested.

Secondly, one may question the trustworthiness of election manifestos. A political party may put forth manifestos which are conditioned more by its desire to win elections, or its need to legitimate decisions already taken, than by its ideological view. However, the problem of trustworthiness is probably

appears to be the case in Rows 6 and 11. Second, that control of policy A has been gained between T1 and T2; this appears to be the case in Rows 8 and 9. Third, that control of policy A has been lost between T1 and T2; this appears to be the case in rows 3 and 14. Fourth, that control of policy A has been both gained and lost between T1 and T2; this appears to be the case in Rows 7 and 10. In Row 7 the polity loses the possibility of pursuing policy A between T1 and T2, but it also gains the possibility of not pursuing A, a possibility that it did not have at T1. In Row 10 the polity gains the possibility of pursuing policy A, but it also loses the possibility of not pursuing policy A, a possibility which it had at T1. Fifth, that nothing can be safely concluded from the structure of observation; this appears to be the case in Rows 1, 2, 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, and 16, where the structures of observation are consistent with both change and stability of autonomy.
less severe when drawing information from election manifestos than when drawing it, for example, from government declarations. Elections manifestos are produced at an institutional distance from executive decision-making. Hence it is less likely that a party in government will use election manifestos merely to legitimate decisions made by the government. Moreover, election manifestos are usually compiled by a more inclusive group of party-members than are various government documents. Hence the desire to be re-elected is arguably a less powerful motive for the production of manifestos than for the production of programs issued by the government itself. Election manifestos are the political documents in which uncompromising ideology is free to express itself, where pragmatic considerations are less important than in many other political documents.68

A third possible problem stems from the fact that a policy may be abstained from, not only because it is impossible or considered ideologically undesirable, but because politicians mistakenly think it is impossible. One reply to this problem is to admit that the estimates are dependent on an unjustified assumption that decision-makers’ perceptions do not vary systematically over time in terms of true or false beliefs about political autonomy. Instead of merely recognising the unjustified assumption, one could at best also estimate the level of relevant misperception. (The indicator of democratic political autonomy proposed in the next section is developed partly for the sake of retrieving that kind of information.) A more positive reply, however, would be to deny that there is a problem at all and to claim that a valid indicator of democratic political autonomy should be dependent on what politicians believe is true; for the important thing is what actual politicians are actually capable of doing, not what they would be capable of if they knew more or thought differently.

3.2.2. Knowing the economic future

Accuracy of information is related to democratic political autonomy in several ways. First, incorrect information that an action is impossible will preclude

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68 Another way of dealing with the problem of trustworthiness in election manifestos is to control for their ideological stability over time. For example, if a neo-liberal government describes the welfare policy W as a good but impossible thing in T2, but as an intrinsically bad thing in T1, when the government is social democratic and W is actually pursued, and it is therefore difficult to object that W is impossible, then the publicly stated preference of the neo-liberals at T2 is less trustworthy. If on the other hand, the neo-liberal party expresses support for W at T1, when W is actually pursued by a social democratic government, then its judgment in T2 that the policy is impossible would be more trustworthy.
realising the action just as much as would an unfavourable composition of resources and costs. Secondly, correct information that an action is possible will free resources otherwise used to protect against the risk of something going wrong. Thirdly, correct information about the effects of an action, or about the future situation in which the action is expected to deliver its effect, is a necessary prerequisite to preferring one action to another.

By no means do all arguments about the effects of internationalisation recognise the significance of information, but some do. In particular it is often suggested that the internationalisation of finance makes an economy more turbulent, complex, difficult to monitor, and to control. According to one author, “it is not simply that international financial flows are highly sensitive to global flows, but their movements are unpredictable. Financial innovations and the unpredictability of market response has made it increasingly difficult to target macroeconomic policy for domestic objectives.” (Perraton 2000: 66). The political importance of this line of reasoning can be seen in current demands for introducing taxation designed to reduce the speed and turnover of international finance (see for example the organisation Attac, www.attac.org/indexfla.htm, accessed 2004-01-05).

While researchers have no privileged position to judge the accuracy of information, anyone could estimate the accuracy of at least one kind of politically important information, namely the economic forecasts that governments produce and rely on. The accuracy of the information inherent in a forecast is obvious to anyone by the time forecast. Furthermore, accurate information on this matter is theoretically important. As just seen, the claim that markets have been decreasingly predictable during internationalisation has been taken to imply a decrease in political autonomy in the course of internationalisation (see the argument by Perraton 2000: 66 cited above).

It is proposed here that we investigate the accuracy of forecasts of national GDP growth rates made by central government agencies. If it is true that internationalisation of finance creates a non-trivial effect in terms of economic turbulence, and eventually leads to a politically less manageable economic situation, then we should be able to observe a decreasing accuracy in forecasts of national GDP growth rates in the course of internationalisation. If we observe the opposite pattern – namely increasing forecast accuracy during internationalisation – at least we know that

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69 A more ambitious analysis might include forecasts on many more variables, for example consumption, investments, exports. But to keep the analysis relatively brief, it is preferable to focus on what can be regarded as the most general variable, aggregating several of the others. According to all governments considered in this study, the future growth rate of national GDP is important in developing budget policy, and it should therefore help the political autonomy of these governments if accurate information of this sort is available.
democratic political autonomy has not declined because of an increase in economic turbulence accompanied by a decrease in accuracy of information.

Observations and more technical issues related to this measure are reported in Section 3.3.2.

**Validity problems**

It might be argued that the information whose accuracy is being investigated should be the same as the information relied upon by the political actor whose democratic political autonomy we are interested in. If this argument is accepted, it becomes problematic that we can never know for sure what is the source of information on which a government proposal relies.

A somewhat defensive strategy for handling this problem is to study forecasts from central government agencies, as proposed above, rather than those made by, for example, commercial banks or rating institutions. Even if governments prefer commercial bank forecasts to those made by their own agencies (which we can never know), it can nevertheless be assumed that forecasts made by government agencies are at least available to governments.

On the other hand, it is not necessary to interpret the indicator of forecast accuracy as depending for its validity on its inclusion of only the information which guide government action. It may be more relevant to know whether the future economic performance of a particular country has become more or less predictable during internationalisation, regardless of who learns from a prediction. The argument that we cited from Perraton earlier concerned predictability of the political economy in general, not predictability of the political economy given only the information relied upon by governments. With this interpretation the indicator is not intended to yield knowledge about the quality of the information possessed by the government, but rather about the knowledge accessible to any actor at various levels of internationalisation. Since it is grounded in a literature to which we seek to contribute, this appears to be the appropriate interpretation of the indicator.

3.2.3. Thinking differently: Distance between budgetary alternatives

The third operational indicator of democratic political autonomy to be proposed will address the financial difference between budgetary alternatives preferred by the opposition and those preferred by government.

A difference between government and opposition budget proposals will presumably be a measure of political autonomy because only if there is a structurally imposed limitation on the budgetary room for manoeuvre can one expect ideologically opposed actors to propose one and the same financial
policy. And by the same token, the larger the financial difference between budgetary proposals, the larger the budgetary room for manoeuvre. Moreover, distance between budgetary alternatives may be conceived of as a precondition for the citizens’ collective choice over budgetary matters. If there is no financial difference between different parties, then the voting act cannot be rationally linked to political change and outcome, and therefore it reduces the citizens’ room for manoeuvre as well as their incentive for political participation.

In more detail, the focus of the indicator is on proposed public outlays, not on proposed public incomes. Of course it would be valuable to pursue a parallel investigation of differences in proposed incomes (which do not equal the outlays, because public deficits and surpluses are commonplace). The focus will be put on outlays here because they are commonly justified directly by reference to ideology, while a policy of public income is usually understood not as an aim in itself but as a means for financing outlays. A focus on the more ideological side of budgetary policy would be expected to yield a larger difference between ideological counterparts and hence permit a clearer description of development over time. This is preferable in terms of generosity towards the hypothesis under consideration.

Validity problems
If we rely in part on this method, we must be aware of two difficulties. First, for anyone reading budgetary documents it is obvious that accountancy is a deeply political matter. What constitutes income or expense is sometimes a matter of contention. Moreover, no public information is ideologically

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70 The fact that proposals from the opposition need not be fully realistic does not necessarily change the fact that the difference is significant. If the opposition is regarded as generally unrealistic in its proposals that assessment should also hold across time, and then comparisons across time are not biased by different degrees of realism in the opposition proposals.

71 See for example the parliamentary preparation of the Swedish budget in force from June 1995 to December 1996 (that year the fiscal year was moved to coincide with the calendar year, and the budget was prepared for a period of 18 months). The motion of the Moderate (conservative) Party relating to the budget proposal by the government (Riksdagen 1995a: 48) claimed that the Moderates wanted to strengthen the budget by 45,019 million kronor as compared to the government proposal (disregarding tax cuts and budget categories for which the Moderates proposed increasing expenses). In the report by the relevant select committee (Riksdagen 1995d: 33), the corresponding figure is reported as 500 million kronor less than the figure given in the party’s motion. The only probable explanation for this difference is that the select committee in question (in which the Moderates were in the minority) did not accept the Moderates’ estimate that tax revenue would increase by 500 million kronor as an effect of increased spending on tax collecting activities.
neutral in such matters, since either government or opposition parties are involved in its compilation. For this reason it is appropriate to let each party define for itself what it considers to be income or expense. Accordingly, the relevant sources of information are motions compiled by parties or members of parliament, rather than the official reports published by the select committees which prepare the parliamentary response to the budget.

Secondly, as an indicator of autonomy (but not as an indicator of possibilities for a collective choice by the citizens), the measures require that there be a significant ideological difference between the political parties, and furthermore, that the resultant ideological tension not vary from one case to another, or at least that any such variation be controlled for. That there is an ideological tension between political parties with regard financial matters is obvious and can be assumed without any further empirical investigation. To account for the more troublesome possibility that ideological tension between parties may vary, the same material and observations will be used as when accounting for ideology in the construction of the policy/preference indicator presented earlier in this chapter.

Observations are reported in Section 3.3.3.

3.2.4. Complementarity of the indicators

None of the three operational indicators proposed can account completely for the theoretically defined concept of democratic political autonomy. However, some of their respective weaknesses are in an asymmetrical relation to one another. What is problematic in one indicator is less so in either or both of the others. There is therefore an opportunity for the indicators to complement each other so as to give a more valid description.

The main indicator, it would seem, is the convergence between policy and preference, as defined in Table 3.1. Two weaknesses of this indicator are that we must rely on the policy-maker’s perception of the situation and that the indicator does not permit any assessment of capacities that are not, and have never been, politically manifested.

The first weakness could be lessened by information from the second operational indicator, that is, the accuracy of public forecasts of GDP growth. This measure does not take a certain perception of the situation for granted, but rather investigates to what extent politically important perceptions are accurate. If perceptions of future GDP growth are increasingly accurate, for example, it would be problematic to infer from observed cuts in welfare that the actor cannot pursue such policies for lack of knowledge.
The second weakness could be diminished by information from the third operational indicator, that is, the difference between the government’s and the opposition’s budget proposals in cases where the opposition produces a shadow budget. It is part of the role of an opposition to propose alternative policies. What alternative policies an ideologically opposed actor believes are possible is probably as close as one can get to an estimation of latent action possibilities.

The existence of this asymmetry between the indicators would appear to be a strong reason for making a qualitative judgement of autonomy with reference to information on all three indicators, rather than interpreting each indicator as directed to measure exactly the same feature as the other two.72

Neither the second nor the third indicator seems to have been used in any previous analyses of political autonomy or related concepts. In view of this, as well as the fact that the construction of the first indicator itself represented a refinement of previous methods for analysing political autonomy, we may expect a reasonable validity in the operationalisation: it is both broader and more specific than previous empirical approaches.

3.3. Empirical observations of democratic political autonomy

3.3.1. Convergence between policy and preferences

The two components of the first indicator are dealt with in separate sections, starting with that of budget policy.

Budget policy during internationalisation

Table 3.2 sums up total government spending over time in Sweden, Britain, and France. Comparing the points of minimal and maximal internationalisation, 1958 and 1997 respectively, there has been a sharp increase in government expenditure policy for all three countries: 32 percent increase in Sweden, 29 percent in France, and eight percent in Britain. Moreover, a comparison between 1958 and 1997 in absolute figures, as opposed to the above percentages of GDP, would demonstrate even greater differences, as GDP has grown substantially over this time span.

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72 In contrast to what might otherwise have been suspected, the fact that there are three operational indicators of democratic political autonomy does not allow for testing validity of the indicators by analysing the correlations between them.
Table 3.2. Total Government Expenditure as percent of GDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Twelve out of the 15 figures in the table follow another figure from the same country; eight of them show an increase in government expenditure as a fraction of GDP, one is constant, and three show a decrease. If internationalisation is taken as going on over this whole period of time (which is a reasonable interpretation, as argued in Section 1.3.1), it seems at least difficult to argue any general tendency of internationalisation to reduce the level of government expenditure. Table 3.2 indeed shows a general policy shift from lower to higher total expenditures.

To understand what these observations imply in terms of political autonomy, let me translate them into the terminology described in Table 3.1. The general development over time may then be expressed in two different ways: either a low expenditure policy was pursued in T1 but not in T2; or a high expenditure policy was pursued in T2 but not in T1. To begin with our attention may be confined to the formulation that a high expenditure policy was pursued in T2 but not in T1.

Now focusing on autonomy to pursue high expenditure policy over time, the actual observations in Table 3.2 match four simplified structures of observation: Rows 9, 10, 13, and 14 (see excerpt from Table 3.1.). These are the only rows where Policy A is pursued in T2 but not in T1, which corresponds to the observations reported in Table 3.2. The four rows represent four different and incompatible answers to what has happened to political autonomy between T1 and T2. Row 9 represents an increase in the capacity to undertake high expenditure policy. Row 14 represents a decrease in the capacity to undertake low expenditure policy (or put in terms of high expenditure policy: a decrease in the capacity to abstain from high expenditure policy). Row 10 represents the situation in which the capacity to undertake high expenditure policy is increased while the capacity to undertake low expenditure policy is decreased.

\[ \text{The unit described by Huber and Stephens (2001) is the United Kingdom rather than Britain. Nevertheless, to relate as simply as possible the figures in Tables 3.2-3.5 to other parts of the study the term Britain is now used, slightly broader than commonly, so as to refer to the whole of the United Kingdom.} \]
expenditure policy has decreased. Row 13 represents a situation in which nothing can be safely concluded.

But none of the rows represents a case in which capacity to pursue high expenditure policy has decreased. Hence even at this early stage, when we have not yet consulted any information about ideological development, it can be concluded that the observations in Table 3.2 are incompatible with the claim that democratic political autonomy has generally decreased during internationalisation. The hypothesis could be rejected more decisively by further establishing that political autonomy has actually increased in the course of internationalisation (Rows 9 or 10 but not Rows 13 or 14). That conclusion, however, would require an account of ideological changes, and will therefore be reserved for a following sub-section.

Rows 9, 10, 13, and 14, excerpted from Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy A is pursued by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A considered a good thing by govt – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A is pursued by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A considered a good thing by govt – yes or no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Increase in autonomy may be concluded</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Autonomy both increased and decreased</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. No increase, decrease or constancy can be concluded</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Decrease in autonomy can be concluded</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus far my interpretations of Table 3.1 have concerned the general development of expenditure, during the whole period of internationalisation. To be more generous to the hypothesis under investigation, however, one may argue that the important period of change does not start in 1958 but in 1980. One would then have to recognise that the indicator decreases in Sweden and Britain, by three and five percent respectively, while it increases in France by eight percent. If the development is in different directions in different countries, more empirical material must be analysed to support or reject the hypothesis; but even so one would also need information about ideological changes during the same period.

One approach to further analysis of the present observations is to consider simultaneously the variation over time and across countries (what might, in statistical jargon, be referred to as a pooled time-series cross-
sectional analysis). From that viewpoint, it will be noticed that all three countries remain rather close to each other until 1973, when the largest difference is that between Sweden and Britain, a mere 4 percent. But thereafter the difference between Sweden and Britain rapidly grows to 21 percent in 1980 and 23 percent in 1997. Without additional arguments this observation cannot be reconciled with the position that state autonomy diminished after 1973 – when the Breton Woods system of currency exchange broke down, a time sometimes regarded as the starting point of a more radical internationalisation of finance. The growing divergence rather points in the opposite direction, that since 1973 states have been increasingly able to decide levels of government expenditure autonomously. However, to reach that conclusion we need, once again, to take ideology into account. It is possible that the large cross-national difference in total public expenditures of 1997 could have emerged already in 1958, but that Sweden and Britain preferred not to realise it (in the case of which no change in autonomy can be concluded), as well as it is possible that the two countries would have preferred to not break their respective previous trajectories in the early 1970s (in the case of which autonomy may even have diminished).

A decrease of total government expenditure is certainly presupposed by the hypothesis that internationalisation sets of a “race to the bottom” as well as by more general argument that markets actors gain power from states because of internationalisation (see Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3). But the relevance of such arguments is not limited to the aggregated indicator of total expenditure. One may suspect that there are certain more specific kinds of welfare policy that market actors regard as especially opposed to their interests, most evidently in areas where welfare policy tends to redistribute market allocated resources. In such cases – a few of which will be considered now – the downward pressure exerted by of internationalisation should be stronger.

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74 See Scharpf 1999: 85-120 for various qualifications of the “race to the bottom” hypothesis. In certain cases of environmental regulation, for example, he expects rather a “race to the top”. In either case, Scharpf believes that the “race” is run by international market actors and market liberal international institutions, and so democratic political autonomy is damaged either way, though social democratic policies (which are desired by Scharpf) are not challenged in cases of a “race to the top”. Taxation and expenditure policy, at issue in this study, is taken by Scharpf to follow the “race to the bottom” logic (ibid. 113-19).
Table 3.3. Social Security Transfer Expenditure as percent of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The pattern over time in Table 3.3 is, however, very similar to that in Table 3.2. The difference is that with regard to social security transfer expenditure there is a steady increase in all countries over the entire period, with no exception. In terms of political autonomy this means that regardless of when the process of internationalisation is believed to have started or to have become important, it is impossible to infer that political autonomy regarding policy of high social transfer expenditures has decreased during internationalisation. Whether autonomy regarding high expenditure policy has, on the other hand, increased during internationalisation requires an account of ideological developments.

An overlapping but more inclusive measure of social efforts is reported in Table 3.4. Here the source of information is no longer the OECD, but the International Labour Office, ILO. And once again we find the same pattern of increasing expenditures. No downward pressure on social spending is visible.

Table 3.4. Social Security Benefit Expenditure as percent of GDP

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.5 reports the OECD estimate of civilian non-transfer expenditure. (The exclusion of military expenditure should strengthen the case of the hypothesis under investigation: one could argue that market actors have an interest in financing military activities in order to maintain stability in the environment of production and investment.) Here the trend goes in different directions over different periods, generally increasing until 1980, then
somewhat decreasing in two out of three countries until 1991, and then again
generally increasing, or stable, until 1996. The development over this last
period, 1991-1996, coincides with a period in which, as no one would deny,
the process of internationalisation has already gone very far. In the case of
civilian non-transfer expenditure, as with all other kinds of expenditure
considered, the claim that internationalisation diminishes political autonomy
in respect to high expenditure policy cannot be supported.

Table 3.5. Civilian non-Transfer Expenditure as percent of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures from Stephens and Huber (2001: 52-53 and Appendix), whose source is OECD
statistics and a data set compiled by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1997). * figure for 1960, **
figure for 1994.

Is it true, then, that for every kind of high expenditure policy it is impossible
to establish that internationalisation has constricted the political autonomy of
states? When it comes to levels of public spending, the best answer is
probably yes – with a possible exception made for national contributions to
intergovernmental organisations, as will be mentioned in the final chapter. But
the conclusion is limited to budget policy strictly understood. The analysis
does not account for retrenchments in, for example, politically decided
pension and unemployment rights (cf. Palme 1990). Nor does the analysis say
anything about whether the state is continually able to do what is generally
regarded as socially needed (cf. Clayton and Pontusson 1998). That a social
need is not met at T1 to the extent that it was met at T2 does not imply that
budget democratic political autonomy has diminished between T1 and T2,
since it is possible that the need has grown over time and that it could
therefore not have been met in T1 if it had arisen then.75

75 This possibility is sometimes ignored in academic debates over state capacity to reduce
unemployment (see for example Clayton and Pontusson 1998). While it may be true that
internationalisation of finance and trade markets creates unemployment because it
decreases the efficiency of Keynesian expansionist measures on the demand side of the
economy (Esping-Andersen 1999b), that is not sufficient to establish that
internationalisation of trade and finance has reduced state capacity to achieve aims of low
unemployment. If unemployment may arise for other reasons than lack of Keynesian policy
measures, which is certainly the case, the crucial point is, What capacity has the state ever
had to reduce unemployment? To answer that question it is not enough to know what
unemployment levels have accompanied various levels of internationalisation; one must
Returning now to the inquiry into public spending, there is one important aspect where a constraining effect of internationalisation cannot be immediately ruled out. The matter is not about expenditure levels, but about how equally economic resources are distributed among citizens by public expenditure. Here the hypothesis to be investigated would be somewhat different: not the claim that internationalisation decreases the amount of public undertakings, but the claim that it limits the capacity of public expenditure to redistribute incomes initially distributed by the labour market. Internationalisation arguably makes it easier for net providers to remove themselves or their assets from redistributing states, and without net providers there can be no net receivers of redistribution.

To evaluate this claim we begin by describing how social inequality has developed over a period of internationalisation. Diagrams 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 describe the equality of net income distribution over time. The reported measure is a gini-coefficient that may vary between 0 – which represents maximal equality, in the sense that every individual has the same income – and 100 – which represent total inequality, in the sense that all resources are possessed by one individual only and none by any other. The units among whom equality is estimated are households, not persons.  

The overall development in Sweden, Britain, and France is described in Diagrams 3.12-14.  

Also know what levels of unemployment are produced by the labour market in the first place. To claim anything about decreasing state capacity before the latter point has been settled is unwarranted.  

For this reason the indicator is not able to account for inequalities between persons in one and the same household, that is, the indicator is blind to most gender and some age differences. Furthermore, the available data are not as systematically collected as in the previous series, in that different sources of information have been used for different data points and that the time points are not exactly the same for the three countries. This will be further commented on in those cases where the validity of a conclusion is concerned.  

In Diagrams 3.12-3.16 use has been made of the database of the World Institute for Development Economics (WIDER), a division of the United Nations University (accessible at http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm). The sources mentioned in the titles of these diagrams are those given by that database. These sources have not been independently consulted for the present study.
Diagrams 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14. Gini-values of net incomes for households over time in Sweden (LIS/WIDER), Britain (Goodman and Webb 1994/WIDER), and France (LIS; Lis-Vleminckx; Sawyer 1976/WIDER).

Around 1980 in all three countries there seems to have been either a break in a trend towards greater equality of net incomes (France) or the beginning of an opposite trend towards greater inequalities (Britain), or both (Sweden). In all three cases the lowest point on the curve appears close to 1980. The data for France were collected from three different sources, of which the one placing the point at 1970 (namely Sawyer 1976) is judged “less trustworthy” by the WIDER database. On the other hand, the difference between 1970 and 1980 in France is so large that the best interpretation is still that there was in fact a development towards greater equality there during those years. This interpretation may be further supported by the gini-coefficient for the distribution of gross incomes among households in France (Diagram 3.15).

Diagram 3.15. Gini-coefficients of gross income of households in France over time (United Nations 1985/WIDER)

That the development in France resembles those in Sweden and Britain is supported furthermore by the fact that an alternative source, the World bank, estimates a higher income inequality in France during the later time period (Diagram 3.16):

It is reasonable therefore to conclude that in all three countries around 1980 there was either a break in a trend towards greater equality or the beginning of an opposite trend towards inequality. It cannot be ruled out that the state did possess the capacity to diminish market-produced inequalities until the early 1980s, as they did in France and Sweden, or at least that the state was able to prevent a development towards greater inequality, as occurred in Britain.

To assess this development more definitely one must distinguish between two structural explanations of the shift in distributive policy. This may be caused either by factors in the labour market – *viz* agreements between employers and employees – or by factors in state income and expenditure policy – *viz* the structure of public revenue and benefits. The trend of political autonomy should be interpreted according to what causes are operative. If the only factor behind the observed development towards greater inequality is the labour market, then it becomes problematic to suggest that state political autonomy has diminished, since it would be possible that the state was *never* able to reduce higher levels of inequality caused by the labour market.78

That any market may produce social inequality (and not only international trade markets under conditions famously specified by the Heckscher-Ohlin model; see Krugman and Obstfeld 1997: 67-88 for a layman-friendly account) is more than just an empirical possibility. A simple and basic reason to expect such an effect is based on the principle of diminishing marginal utility – that the utility an actor can extract from consuming a product decreases as the

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78 This is not an argument against the causal importance of internationalisation, for that process may be the reason why either the labour market or the state tends to move towards greater inequality. What is here being considered is the causal importance of alternative intermediary variables – state action in taxation and expenditure policy, on the one hand, and labour market agreements, on the other – both of which are followed by one and the same dependent variable – namely distribution of income. This study is concerned with the action capacity of democratic states, not with the collective action capacity of the individuals who sell their labour.
total amount of such products already consumed by the actor increases. Therefore, somewhat simplified: if two actors cannot agree on a mutually beneficial transaction, the poorer actor (who consumes few products) has more utility to lose than the richer (who consumes many). This should push the price in the direction of the richer actor’s maximal gain (although there will be no transaction at all if the price is pushed so far that it deprives the poorer from any gain). Another reason for the same effect is that richer actors engage in a larger volume of trade than poorer ones, which gives them a general advantage in price negotiations. If such labour market factors alone can explain the break in trends for all three countries around 1980, there is little reason to conclude any decrease in states’ autonomy to redistribute market allocated resources.

Against this background it is a significant observation that states indeed have been actively involved in making distribution of income less equal, at least to some extent. Diagram 3.17 shows from what social groups what proportion of total revenue has been collected in relevant years in Sweden. A trend towards less progressivity in the taxation system is undeniable. The higher income groups, defined as earning more than 300 000 Swedish Kronor per year, assuming 1998 price levels, decrease their contributions over time, while the lower income groups, defined as earning less than 150 000 Swedish Kronor per year, increase theirs.

Diagram 3.17. Direct taxes as a percentage of total assessed income for different income groups. Figures in thousands of Swedish kronor, price levels of 1998.

Data from Riksskatteverket 2000: 143.

In Britain the state was less active but still involved in the reinforced trend of inequality. The progressivity of the tax system was not altered, but since levels
of taxation and national insurance contributions were generally lowered as fractions of income (see Diagram 3.18), high income groups benefited the most.

Diagram 3.18. Income tax as percentage of income, by marital status and level of earnings.

Another illustration of the active involvement of politics in increasing income inequality in Britain can be seen in Table 3.6. It shows income inequality at two different stages in the allocation of income: Original (market income, no benefits included, no taxation excluded) and Post-tax (social income, including benefits, excluding taxation). As we see, the increase of inequality over time is slightly greater in the case of post-tax income (an increase of ten percent between 1980 and 1990) than in the case of original income (an increase of eight percent between the same years), and so the difference between original and post-tax income decreased over this time. Thus while the labour market is increasingly producing inequality over the whole period of time, and the system of taxation and benefits does reduce a large proportion of that income inequality, changes in the taxation system have made an independent contribution to the increased inequality of income.
Table 3.6. Gini-coefficients (as percent) for income distribution among all British households at two stages in the economic system in three different years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000/01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original income</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-tax income</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the French case it has not been possible to gather information of exactly the same kind, but on a less precise indicator, France does seem to resemble Sweden and Britain in the relevant regard. The highest rate of marginal tax on incomes, as well as the gap between highest and lowest marginal tax rates on incomes, decreased in France as well as in Sweden and Britain from the mid 1970s to the end of the 1980s (Garrett 1998: 93-94). Hence it can hardly be disputed that the trend towards inequality after 1980 in all three countries is to some extent an effect of state action – and not only of a labour market producing more social inequality than formerly.

The next question, then, is whether such state actions were justified simply as good action or rather as necessary action in view of a problematic environment – nature, structures, other actors, or whatever entities might have limited action capacity. This brings us to a consideration of party preferences.

**Preferences**

To describe the ideological positions of policy-pursuing actors we will rely on a data set produced by the The Party Manifesto Group (for the most complete methodological discussion of their work, see Bara et al. 2001). The group has analysed quantitatively the content of election manifestos for most parties in Western democracies from 1945 to 1998. The data set shows what percentage of the total text in single election manifestos is devoted to particular preferences. Fifty-seven generally stated policy preferences are coded in each party manifesto analysed.

Reducing the content of all election manifestos to a single scheme of analysis makes it possible to compare the content over time and across different parties and countries. But of course, this measure may be made so thoroughly systematic only at a cost to its validity: contextual factors have to be overlooked – not to mention the impossibility of accounting quantitatively for different intensities in formulations about one and the same policy issue. Is it possible, then, to indicate the ideological position of a political party
depicting what percents of the text in its election manifests are devoted to favouring one or the other issue?

Surprisingly, the best answer to this question appears to be positive. The quantitative indicators deliver about the same results as qualitative expert judgements of the placement of different parties on the left-right dimension (McDonald and Mendez 2001: 141, et passim). The great advantage of the quantitative measures, then, as compared to expert indexes, is that they account for variations among both policy issues and time periods (see discussion on page 106 why such variation is important).

Diagrams 3.19 to 3.21 survey ideological positions of the government party or parties in the relevant period (in the French case, data on the Fourth Republic have been omitted because of the turmoil in governments and parliaments at that time; from 1946 to 1958 there were twenty-nine different governments in France, the most durable of which lasted only six months; Huber 1996: 1-2).\(^{79}\)


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\(^{79}\) When the government is composed of a party coalition, the value represents an unweighted mean of the different values of the government parties. This means that no importance is given to the number of parliamentary seats held by individual parties in the coalition. The argument behind this method of calculation is that each party, however large or small, is able to veto the future existence of the government.
Concerning social justice and welfare expansion, there are no clear long-term trends or long-term stability in any of the three countries (which suggests that we will have to look at shorter time periods to conclude anything about trends). On the other hand, levels rather than trends are important when it comes to estimating political autonomy by investigating if policy tends to change in opposition or in line with ideological conviction. Emphasis on
welfare limitations, however, is a rather stable indicator, being either totally absent for the whole period, or covering only a minimal proportion of the election program except for the French government in 1967. With the same exception, in no governing party election manifesto has welfare state limitation been more important than either social justice or welfare state expansion. In Sweden and Britain welfare state expansion has generally been more emphasised than social justice, while in France it has depended on which parties were in government. Although the variation between different governments is undeniable, one may note that in all three countries there has been, for all governments over the period investigated, at least some manifesto space devoted to emphasizing the importance of welfare state expansion and social justice.

A few things need to be studied more closely. First, we should investigate whether the preference for social justice has been less important in the three countries during the periods of stable or growing inequality, as compared with periods of reduced inequality. If the importance of social justice has declined during the relevant period among political parties in power, the growing inequality may be regarded as a product of political choice. If the importance of social justice has grown or remained stable among governing parties during the period, the hypothesis that internationalisation challenges democratic political autonomy in this regard would be supported. The period of increasing social inequality began in 1980 (see the Diagrams 3.12-14). It would therefore be relevant to compare in more detail the preferences for social justice between roughly the two periods 1965-80 and 1980-95.

Diagram 3.22 gives a general picture of the emphasis placed on social justice by the governing parties in all three countries since 1965 (notice that the dates on the horizontal axis refer to a mix of election dates from the three countries; see previous diagrams for more information on exact dates of elections). Although this diagram shows a rather messy picture, it is fair to say that there is no striking difference between the two 15-year periods before and after 1980. This may be grasped more easily by comparing the means for the two periods.

---

Somewhat aside of my purpose it is interesting to note (i) that the countries follow each other to a certain degree and (ii) that Sweden and Britain follow each other to a greater degree than do Sweden and France or Britain and France. That election manifestos of governing parties develop along the same lines in different states over time may reveal a common structure of opinion-formation, the alleged absence of which structure is often taken to constitute a part of the EU democratic deficit (for example Grimm 1995; Scharpf 1996b). Further research on governing party election manifestos could test the theory that Europe lacks a common structure of opinion-formation.
Diagram 3.22. Governing parties emphasis on the good of social justice

In no case is the difference between the means of the two periods larger than the British 0.9 (Table 3.7). Furthermore, the standard deviations – that is the mean deviations of observations from their group means – are more than double that figure in all cases. Hence the variation between government positions in one and the same period and country is considerably greater than the variation of means between the two periods.\textsuperscript{81} One could perhaps argue that this is an effect of the time periods chosen, and that it would be more reasonable to include, for example, the British election of 1979 – when Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government came to power – in the latter period. Such a change would, however, not make a radical difference: the first period would then have a mean of 3.1 (instead of 3.0) and the second period would retain its mean of 2.1. Given these very small differences, it would be a hard case to argue that the development towards inequality either followed or was followed by an ideological trend in the same direction.

\textsuperscript{81} To be statistically more precise one may calculate an ANOVA that compares means and variations of social justice within and between different periods. The resulting so called \textit{mean square} of social justice is 20.9 within each period, and 1.9 between periods (not distinguishing countries), which indicates that there is much more variation within the periods than between them. Hence the time period has no significant effect on the emphasis on social justice by government parties (F=0.091; p=0.764).
Table 3.7. Means and standard deviations of governing party emphasis on the good of social justice in two periods, in Sweden, France, and Britain (as percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. dev.</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Bara et al. 2001

On the other hand, the above information does confirm a certain emphasis placed on the good of social justice in all three countries. It is worth recognising here that it is rare to find any policy issue scoring as high as social justice did in Sweden (c.a. 8 percent of election manifesto content) and France (c.a. 6 percent). There are, after all, other things that a party may need to articulate beside its view on social justice (57 policy issues were coded in total). It would therefore not seem reasonable to say that social justice has been an unimportant political value in any of the countries investigated during any time period. This could be further substantiated by describing, instead of governing party positions, the mean of all parties in parliament – which could perhaps be referred to as the party system as a whole (see Diagram 3.23).

Diagram 3.23. Party system as a whole on the good of social justice. Unweighted means of all parties in parliament.

Data from Bara et al. 2001
Hence in the party system as a whole, there has been a preference for social justice over the period in question, although it has fluctuated somewhat between different election campaigns and taken somewhat high levels in Sweden and somewhat low levels in Britain. Nevertheless, the development in income inequality took a new direction in all three countries around 1980, to some extent because of state action and not only because of developments in the labour market. The facts are not unambiguous, but the most reasonable interpretation would appear to be that, with regard to social justice and income inequality, the findings approximate the following structure of observation, taken from Row 3 in Table 3.1:

Row 3 excerpted from Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point of time, T1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Point of time, T2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy A is pursued by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A considered good thing by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A pursued by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A considered good thing by government – yes or no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Decreasing autonomy can be concluded</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been a preference for social justice throughout the whole period, but only after 1980 was there a policy change from stable or diminishing inequality to either growing or stable inequality. Or to put it more dramatically, there is reason to believe that democratic political autonomy with regard to social justice and income inequality has decreased since about 1980.

We should also seek to interpret the allocation of public finance in terms of democratic autonomy. On this point, it was observed in Section 3.3.1 that there have been only marginal and temporary limitations in budgetary categories such as civilian non-transfer spending, social security benefits, and transfer spending; and furthermore, this established that political autonomy to pursue high spending policies in these areas has not declined during the period in question. But this analysis leaves two questions open. First, is there reason to believe that political autonomy has indeed grown in the area of high social and civilian spending? Secondly, is there reason to believe that political autonomy to pursue low spending policies in the area of social and civilian spending has diminished during the post-war trend of increasing public spending?

Concerning the first question, we should focus on whether or not there was a period in which a policy of high expenditure was not pursued although
considered good, preceding the period in which such a policy was both pursued and considered good. The relevant question then becomes whether large and increasing welfare state undertakings were desired before they were actually implemented: or in terms of the categories of Table 3.1, which of the following three structures of observation is closest to the actual observations made; whether Rows 9 or 13.

Rows 9 and 13 excerpted from Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point of time, T1</th>
<th>Point of time, T2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy A is pursued by government</td>
<td>Policy A considered a good thing by govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- yes or no</td>
<td>-- yes or no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Increasing autonomy may be concluded</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. No increase, decrease or constancy can be concl.</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would seem that actual observations approximate the structure of observation shown in Row 9, and hence that a certain increase in autonomy to pursue a high expenditure policy has occurred during the relevant period. For this purpose, let us recapitulate Diagrams 3.19, 3.20, and 3.21. With the exception of France, there was from the mid 1950s well into the 1960s a strong desire among governing parties to take welfare expansionist measures, and this was not satisfied until the 1970s and 1980s (when there had already been a significant growth in welfare state undertakings, and policy preference for expanding welfare undertakings had diminished).

This conclusion is further supported by completing the analysis introduced in the previous section, which compares simultaneously across time and countries. We have already seen that the spending difference between countries grew dramatically after 1970 (Table 3.2). As also mentioned, this would not necessarily represent an increased range of policy options, since the policies that result in such differences might not have been desired until after 1970. However, a quick look at the actual ideological development strengthens the interpretation that political autonomy regarding levels of public spending has grown since the 1960s. As seen in Diagrams 3.19 and 3.20, the two extreme countries – Sweden and Britain – experienced a continuous government desire for welfare state expansion during the 1950s and 1960s, that is, before the policy divergence of the 1970s and 1980s although the Swedish government emphasised its desire more strongly and for a longer
period of time. Hence it was most likely capacity limitations, rather than ideological convictions, that prevented both countries from undertaking, already in the 1950s or 1960s, the spending levels they would attain by the 1970s. This result is, of course, not consistent with the received opinion that internationalisation of state or market functions reduces the autonomy of democratic states (for example Held 1995: 16-23, 135-140; Scharpf 1999: 27; Rosow 2000: 32; Thompson 1999: 118; Warren 2002: 175).

Finally, we should investigate whether political autonomy to decrease spending (or to undertake policies of low spending) has changed since the Second World War. Since such policies first appeared in the 1980s they may have been largely facilitated by internationalisation. In this case, where we are considering policies undertaken in T2 but not in T1, it is sufficient to concentrate on Rows 9, 10, 13, and 14 from Table 3.1.

**Rows 9, 10, 13, and 14 excerpted from Table 3.1.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point of time, T1</th>
<th>Point of time, T2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy A is pursued by government – yes or no</td>
<td>Policy A considered a good thing by government – yes or no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Increasing autonomy may be concluded</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Autonomy both gained and lost</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Neither increase decrease nor constancy can be concl.</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Decreasing autonomy can be concluded</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the cases of Sweden and Britain the government preference to limit welfare undertakings was negligible over the whole period under study (see Diagrams 3.19 and 3.20). This would take us to the structure expressed in Row 14, indicating that there has been decreasing political autonomy to undertake limitations of public expenditure. That interpretation would certainly be compatible – though not equivalent – with the interpretation of a growing political autonomy to undertake high or increasing expenditure. It may be noticed that this does not support the contention that internationalisation has made it easier to undertake cutbacks in welfare expenditure (in other words, the observations did not agree with the structure of Row 9).

The French case does not follow exactly the same pattern. During the last thirty years there have been three governments devoting approximately two
percent of their party manifestos to a preference for welfare state limitation, and one government devoting as much as six percent. This could be interpreted as suggesting there has in fact been a preference for limitations of the welfare state in France, although such a preference has never been realised. However, the fact that this study has revealed no period of decreasing public expenditure in France prevents us from concluding that internationalisation has been accompanied by a strengthening of autonomy in that respect. Possibly France comes closest to suggesting consistency in its autonomy (Row 11 in Table 3.1).

Setting the French experience against those of Sweden and Britain, only a weak conclusion can be drawn regarding autonomy to undertake high expenditures. Such autonomy is either stable or it increases during internationalisation.

3.3.2. Knowing the future economy

The indicator dealt with in the preceding section – convergence between policy and preferences – does not enable us to recognise whether a political action is abstained from because political autonomy is weak or because politicians are unaware or unsure of their strength. This inability of the indicator points to an insecurity in the conclusion that autonomy to realise income equality has declined in recent decades. Two mutually incompatible interpretations equally well fit the facts observed: on the one hand, that political autonomy has decreased because the internationalisation of finance accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s and made the effects of social policy less predictable, and hence expenditure on it more risky and therefore more costly; on the other hand, that in the 1980s and 1990s, as internationalisation was making the world financial system more chaotic, politicians came to have inadequate information about action possibilities available to them, although such possibilities existed as before.

Both of these interpretations make the empirical assumption that internationalisation, especially of finance, renders political economy less predictable and more difficult to control (Perraton 2000: 66; see also Kapur 1998: 124). In this section we shall investigate whether political economy has actually become less predictable during the period of financial internationalisation. And if it has not, we shall have to reconsider both of the rival interpretations and look for still other ones.

The general logic of the indicator was presented in Section 3.2.2, so we need look only at the more technical details here. Forecast accuracy of individual years will be estimated by the absolute difference between the
predicted value for a certain year ($P_t$) and the observed value for the same year ($O_t$). Different statistical methods are available, but we will confine ourselves to what is arguably the simplest possible measure, that of Absolute Error ($AE$). If $P$ refers to the predicted value and $O$ to the observed value, then:

$$AE = |P_t - O_t|$$

Notice that the measure derives from absolute figures. For example, if GDP is predicted to decrease by 3.5 percent and then observed to increase by 1.0 percent, the absolute error assumes the value 4.5. The measure is therefore constructed to describe prediction accuracy rather than a systematic under- or over-prediction. The higher the $AE$, the less predictable is the economy. Hence $AE$ is expected to rise during a period of internationalisation.

What should count as the observed value ($O$) for a certain year is not evident. According to Barot and Öller, whose data have been generously supplied, “[a]ll national statistical offices first publish a preliminary figure, which can best be described as an informed guess ... Successive revisions, some many years later, will reduce the share of approximation in the figure, but they never eliminate it completely.” (Barot and Öller 2000: 107-08) In the analysis below the predicted GDP growth rate was taken from national public institutes, and the observed outcome was taken from the December issue of *Economic Outlook* (OECD) one year after the national forecast was published. To use a fairly short time horizon is preferable, one may argue, because it keeps down the risk that methods for calculating GDP will be altered between the time of prediction and that of observation (Bergström 1995).

The forecast growth rates of the British, French, and Swedish GDP have been taken from three national public institutes: In Britain The National Institute for Economic and Social Research; in France the *Direction de la prévision*; in Sweden *Konjunkturinstitutet* (Official English name: The National Institute for Economic Research).

The accuracy of forecasts of Swedish GDP growth rates is revealed in Diagram 3.24. If the hypothesis is right, $AE$ should increase during this period of internationalisation, especially from the mid-1980s when finance became radically more international.
What we observe in the Swedish case – a slight improvement of forecast accuracy over time – is hardly compatible with the hypothesis. Especially during the 1990s, when we should expect the internationalisation of finance to have exerted a heavily damaging effect on the predictability of the political economy, we see no signs of extraordinary forecasting troubles.

Diagram 3.25 shows the accuracy of forecasts of British GDP growth rates over the same period. Here the negative trend is even weaker than in the Swedish case, but there is still no support for the hypothesised positive relation. And the French experience is very similar to the British one (see Diagram 3.26).

To put it briefly, the observations are not compatible with the hypothesis that internationalisation of finance will decrease political autonomy by making the political economy more turbulent and less predictable. One may argue over whether or not the forecasts are impressively right or embarrassingly mistaken, or how to explain why predictive accuracy varies from year to year;
and one may certainly wonder why errors in prediction seem to follow roughly 8-years cycles (most obviously in France, but recognisably also in Sweden and Britain). But no such spin-off questions, however interesting, should allow us to ignore the very simple observation that forecasting errors have not increased over the period of internationalisation of finance. The only recognizable trend takes the exact opposite direction. Errors in forecasting have declined over the very period in which they were expected to increase. Hence the assumption of causal mechanisms was not valid.


While there is no perceived decline in predictability during internationalisation, a very weak interpretation of the hypothesis that internationalisation has a negative effect on predictability has not been disproved. A negative effect, it may be argued, is counterbalanced by positive effects stemming from, for example, improvements in analytical skills or technical resources. However, this weaker hypothesis is not the one we set out to evaluate. If the presumed negative effect of internationalisation on forecast accuracy were allowed to exist only in this weak form – so as even to admit the possibility of an increase in forecast accuracy during internationalisation – it would never have attracted the interest it has among participants in academic debate and social movements. (See Section 1.3.1 for a more incisive discussion of what strength can be read into a hypothesis.) Let us repeat a formulation of the hypotheses that suggests a considerably stronger and empirically unjustified effect: “it is not simply that international financial flows are highly sensitive to global flows, but their movements are unpredictable. Financial innovations and the unpredictability of market response has made it
increasingly difficult to target macroeconomic policy for domestic objectives.” (Perraton 2000: 66).

How can we reconcile the findings on this indicator with those on convergence and divergence between policy and preferences? We may consider three possible interpretations.

1. Predictability of the economy is a crucial factor in democratic political autonomy. Hence the continuance of predictability indicates that autonomy has not declined during the period in question. The conclusion that internationalisation may be thought of as reducing autonomy with regard to income equality should therefore be reconsidered.

   This would be the coherent response from someone who believed firmly in the logic of the hypothesis that has just been discarded. If predictability was ever thought to be important for political autonomy, it does not become less important because we observe that predictability remains undiminished. However, those of us who have always regarded the “chaos argument” as less important than arguments about market actors exploiting internationalisation to promote their interests would not agree. Indeed, there are other factors that may increase income inequality beside difficulties in predicting economic policy, for example individual and collective struggles over resources.

2. Predictability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democratic political autonomy. Hence the continuance of predictability, if it refutes anything, it only refutes the claim that the economy in internationalising has become less predictable. Democratic political autonomy may decrease simultaneously with improved predictability.

   This interpretation is more robust and at the same time less interesting. It detaches the theoretical arguments underlying the two indicators – forecast accuracy and convergence between policy and preferences – and therefore results in two more specific arguments rather than one more general one. However, this interpretation does have a political interest. For example, proposals to introduce taxation on international financial transactions may be argued on the ground that democratic political autonomy requires predictability. From the perspective of the second interpretation such an argument is not valid.

3. Forecast accuracy is an indicator of the general quality of the information available to politicians. Hence the continuance in predictability suggests a continuance in validity of the other indicator of democratic political autonomy considered thus far, namely convergence between policy and preference.

   The significance of this point should not be exaggerated. While the validity of the policy/preference indicator can indeed be regarded as premised on the availability of accurate information (see page 110 for arguments in favour and in opposition to this view), accurate information regarding future GDP growth rates is only one among many pieces of relevant information. None the less, there is something to this interpretation. Knowing the future
growth rate of the economy is important, and since such knowledge does not seem to deteriorate in the course of internationalisation, the validity of indicators that assume politicians to be well informed has stood up to at least one test.

3.3.3. Thinking differently: Distances between budgetary alternatives

The estimates of democratic political autonomy derived from convergence and divergence between policy and preferences still have one significant weakness: they are unable to identify action possibilities that are not, and have never been, converted into political action. (This, by the way, explains why so many structures of observations, as defined by Table 3.1 above, yield no firm interpretation in terms of democratic political autonomy.) Now the material we are about to analyse could, in principle, help to solve this problem. It is an essential role of a parliamentary opposition to consider alternative policies. Hence the financial differences between budgetary alternatives proposed by government and those proposed by opposition parties may well be a measure of latent action possibilities.82

The three countries, Sweden, Britain, and France, are very different in respect to the extent to which opposition parties formulate their own budget policies. At a minimum a budget is a document in which either total public spending or total revenue is estimated. In that sense, most opposition parties in the Swedish parliament have produced shadow budgets since 1977. In Britain this happens much more rarely. As far as I have been able to learn, the British Conservatives have not produced any shadow budgets at all during the period under investigation.83 The Labour party produced a shadow budget in

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82 Let us recall at this point that there are two distinct aspects of political autonomy for which this indicator is important. The first concerns autonomy at the level of elected representatives and political parties. Financial differences in the budgets proposed by opposite political parties would indicate some level of political autonomy, since only if there is a structurally imposed limitation on the room for budgetary manoeuvre can one expect ideologically opposed parties to propose identical budget policies. The second aspect concerns autonomy at the level of citizens. Distances between budgetary alternatives (as proposed by rival political parties) are a precondition for citizens’ choice in budgetary matters, since if two proposals are identical, the act of voting is nugatory and the citizen has no room for manoeuvre or incentive for political participation.

83 This conclusion is based on extensive communication with representatives of the House of Commons Information Service and the Conservative Party headquarter, as well as staff members at the Party’s archive in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. Printouts of e-mails will be provided on request.
Political autonomy during internationalisation

1992, but that was apparently unique for the Labour party in this period.\textsuperscript{84} The Liberal Democrats have produced shadow budgets at least three or four times between the 1960s and 1990s, and more frequently in recent years.\textsuperscript{85} Nevertheless, to observe only the Liberal Democrats, who have never been close to occupying a government position during the period investigated, may yield relatively poor information about opposition behaviour in British politics. In France there would seem to have been no shadow budgets produced during the entire period.\textsuperscript{86} In view of the greater amount of relevant material available for Sweden it will be the focus of what follows.

In 1977 the Social Democratic party presented what appears to be the first ever shadow budget to the Swedish Parliament in modern times (Riksdagen 1977). The step was however less original than it might seem. The Swedish Moderate (conservative) Party in particular had drawn up ambitious budgetary documents during the last years of the preceding Social Democratic government. For example, in 1972 the Moderate (conservative) Party produced a 126-page party bill opposing the budget proposed that year by the Social democratic government.\textsuperscript{87} What singles out the 1977 shadow budget of the Social Democrats from earlier budgetary documents by opposition parties is not a greater depth in its analysis, but its level of specificity, for it gives various estimates for financial allocation for different budget lines.

Since then most opposition parties in the Swedish Parliament have presented shadow budgets for most years. If we look at the context, the explanation for this adjustment in opposition behaviour may seem obvious. After the Parliamentary election in 1976, the Swedish Social Democratic Party was in opposition for the first time since 1932, and, as one may guess, it had both the staff and the expertise to produce a more comprehensive budgetary policy than its predecessors in opposition ever had. And once the Social Democrats had introduced this new norm in opposition behaviour – they still being the dominant party, elected in 1976 by 43 percent of the voters, the

\textsuperscript{84} I am told that the Labour member Hugh Gaitskell presented a shadow budget in the early 1950s, although no documentary evidence for this has been found in the Party archive at the John Rylands Library, Univ. of Manchester.

\textsuperscript{85} The documents that have been consulted are found in the party’s archive in the library of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

\textsuperscript{86} The supposition that there are no shadow budgets in France is based on public documentation and personal communications with politically concerned French citizens. Repeated attempts (in French) to obtain more detailed information from the national assembly information service, its party group leaders, or the party headquarters have been unsuccessful.

\textsuperscript{87} For the Moderate’s party bill, see Riksdagen (1972a). For another example of the pre-1977 rather ambitious budgetary documents by Swedish opposition parties see the joint party bill from the Liberal and The Centre Party (Riksdagen 1972b).
Centre party being the next largest with 24 percent – the other parties took up the custome and, when the Social Democrats returned to power in 1982, presented their own shadow budgets.88

Table 3.8 surveys some years of government and opposition budgetary policy in regard to outlays in Sweden. The opposition polices showed are those which differed most from the government proposal in financial terms, one proposing higher public spending (ideological left) and one prosing lower (ideological right).

Table 3.8. Expenditures proposed by Swedish Government and its most greatly opposed parties in billions of Swedish kronor and as percents.89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period budget was in effect:</th>
<th>Govt proposal90</th>
<th>Opp. neg. dif. to govt. (A)</th>
<th>Opp pos. dif. to govt. (B)</th>
<th>A + B (absolute percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-1 (-0.8 %) Soc</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/8191</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>-18 (-6.1 %) Mod</td>
<td>+11 (+3.3 %) Vpk</td>
<td>9.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>-18 (-6.8 %) Mod</td>
<td>+12 (+4.5 %) Vpk</td>
<td>11.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>-2192 (-5.1 %) Mod</td>
<td>+18 (+4.4 %) Vpk</td>
<td>9.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/93</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>-1193 (-2.2 %) ND</td>
<td>+15 (+3.1 %) Vp</td>
<td>5.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88 The fact that the main opposition party of the 1950s and 1960s, the Liberal party, was led by Bertil Ohlin – winner of the prize in economics “to the memory of Alfred Nobel” – may indicate that superior economic expertise among Social Democrats was not the only explanation for the change in opposition behaviour. Election results can be accessed at www.scb.se (Statistiska centralbyrån, Swedish Official Statistics).

89 Unless otherwise noted, figures for the government budget proposal are taken from the government budget bill (Budgetpropositionen) accessible in Riksdagstrycket (Parliamentary Publications). Figures for the opposition proposals are taken from the party motions that respond to the budget bill as a whole (Riksdagen 1977; 1980; 1983a, b; 1986a, b; 1990a, b; 1992a, b; 1995a, b; 1997a, b). Since the interpretation of shadow budgets in terms of proposed outlays can be somewhat complicated, the interpretation of two less evident cases is described in Appendix 1.

90 All the figures in these columns include interest rate payments yielded by public debt.

91 There was no shadow budget produced by the Social Democrats this year (see Riksdagen 1980: 14)

92 This is based on the party motion in response to the complementary budget bill (Kompletteringspropositionen; Riksdagen 1990a). The party motion in response to the main budget bill was not financially specified.

93 Calculated according to my own definition of an expense. The motion does not separate expenses and incomes.
The most revealing column is the one on the far right. It reports the maximal interval between budgetary proposals made by all parties in parliament. With the exception of the preparation of the budget in effect 1977/78, the period which saw the first shadow budget in the Swedish Parliament, there is a remarkable decrease of about half over the entire period. The trend is clearest to the political left of the government, though both the parties which propose lower expenditures (third column from the left) and those which propose higher ones (forth column from the left) gradually approach the government proposal.

Now, this development must be understood in the context of ideological developments over the same period. If the ideological tension between the parties is as great as ever, then it is a reasonable interpretation that there is an increased structural constraint on budgetary policy, that is, a decrease in democratic political autonomy. If by contrast, ideological tension between parties has decreased dramatically over time, then it is at least possible that the causes of increasing consensus in budgetary policy stem from an ideological change in the party actors involved and not from any restriction of their action capacity.\textsuperscript{96}

Diagram 3.27 depicts the ideological tension over time between the main extreme parties of Table 3.8, that is, the Moderate Party and the Left Party.\textsuperscript{97} The reported left-right measure is a composite of the parties’ preferences on

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Proposals & Difference (\%) & Government & Opposite Party \\
\hline
1995/96 (18 months) & 968 & -58\textsuperscript{94} (-6.0 \%) & +9 (+0.9 \%) & Vp 6.9 \% \\
1998 & 688 & -33 (-4.8 \%) & +4 (+0.6 \%) & Vp 5.4 \% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{94} The Moderate’s party motion (\textit{Riksdagen} 1995a: 48) specifies a 38.55 billion kronor difference in outlays from the government proposals for a period of 12 months. To make that figure comparable to the government figure, which covers a period of 18 months, 38.55 has been multiplied by 1.5 to get the approximate figure of 58 billion in financial difference, as shown in the table.

\textsuperscript{95} The figures of shadow budget of this year disregard proposed changes in the social insurance system (which are not accounted for in the state budget though commented on in shadow budgets) as well as proposed changes in the budget margin (which is not directly linked to public spending at issue here).

\textsuperscript{96} In the context of internationalisation or globalisation it is sometimes suggested that it is a decreasing action capacity that causes a decreasing ideological difference between parties. Taking that position does not affect the validity of the indicator. If ideological tension between parties remains, one does not have to consider the interpretation that decreasing difference between budget alternatives originates only from an ideological change, and then, according to the methodology presented above, the position that action capacity has been reduced would be strengthened.

\textsuperscript{97} The party New Democracy will be excluded as it would be relevant for only one year (1992/93).
26 policy issues, among them the previously reported measures of social justice, welfare state limitation, and welfare state expansion.

Diagram 3.27. Ideological tension (left-right composite measure) between parties proposing extreme budget policies in Sweden 1976-1998. Positive values represent right-wing orientation and negative values left-wing.

Data from Bara et al. 2001

From a reading of the diagram it would appear that both parties have moved slightly to the right over time, although the sum of the two parties is more to the left than to the right (the unweighted mean for all years and both parties is -2.3). For a more detailed description, see Table 3.9 which shows the actual figures for each party and each year.

Table 3.9. Left-right preferences of the Swedish Moderate and Left Parties in election manifestos 1976-1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Moderate + Left (absolute figures)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>+ 2 %</td>
<td>- 38 %</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>+ 23 %</td>
<td>- 47 %</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>+ 25 %</td>
<td>- 40 %</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>+ 60 %</td>
<td>- 37 %</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>+ 37 %</td>
<td>- 37 %</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>+ 44%</td>
<td>- 43 %</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>+ 40 %</td>
<td>- 27 %</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>+ 37 %</td>
<td>- 36 %</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If there is anything like a trend in these figures (which one may indeed doubt), it is that of an increased ideological tension between 1976 and 1985 followed by a relaxation until 1998. At this stage of analysis the observations do not in any obvious way match the development of financial difference between the different budget alternatives presented in Table 3.7. Further investigations would be required to conclude anything definite, but at this stage the most reasonable interpretation would seem to be that there is no correlation between developments in opposition budget policy and opposition ideology.

On these grounds (and applying the same disclaimers as previously) one should conclude that the narrowing of the gap between budgetary proposals probably indicates an increased restriction on democratic political autonomy in the case of budgetary spending.

3.4. Summary and further conclusions

The view that internationalisation may challenge democracy and political autonomy could be stated somewhat more generally, and at the same time more precisely, in the following way: A process that increases the extent to which something is shared or connected across the boundaries that separate political collectives (internationalisation) may reduce the possibilities for any such collective to take action, while being undetermined by other actors, on the individuals that constitute it (democratic political autonomy).

Furthermore, to define the element of action capacity more precisely one should, in a democratic theory context, rely on objective properties like resources and costs, rather than subjective notions about what an actor is willing to sacrifice (although subjectivist notions are crucial to understanding when an action is performed).

This conceptualisation has several advantages as compared to others in the literature. It is consistent with and supported by established notions in democratic theory. It permits integrating seemingly opposite claims about the effects of internationalisation into a single view. It opens for empirical judgment the crucial matter of contention, viz. whether internationalisation challenges democratic political autonomy.

Empirically to estimate the concept of democratic political autonomy thus construed, it is not possible to rely on standard indicators of political capacity or power such as figures of public spending. Instead we have developed measures of convergence between policy and preferences, the accuracy of public forecasting, and the difference between policies proposed by
government and those proposed by parties ideologically opposed to
government.

Applying this method to the experiences of France, Britain, and Sweden at
different levels of internationalisation during the past few decades, we find
that a hypothesis that dominates the literature – namely that
internationalisation constrains political autonomy and democracy – is not
generally supported. By contrast, political autonomy to increase public
spending and to undertake a high expenditure policy, including social
spending, in fact seems to have grown during a period of
internationalisation.98 Nor is there any reason to assume that the
internationalisation of finance creates a more unpredictable, and for that
reason less controllable, economy. However, there are also areas where the
hypothesis is supported. When it comes to equal distribution of economic
resources internationalisation does seem to be accompanied by decreasing
political autonomy. Although this analysis does not confirm a causal link
between internationalisation and increased inequality of income, this
hypothesis cannot be rejected for any of the three countries, and that itself
represents an argument in favour of the hypothesis.

The investigation of the financial gaps between budget policies proposed
by government and those proposed by opposition parties points in the same
direction (although this method yields much less precise conclusions), namely
towards some form of political autonomy disappearing in the course of
internationalisation. The narrowing gap of government and opposition
budget policies may coincide with decreasing autonomy in pursuing aims of
income equality (in favour of this interpretation is the fact that left-wing
opposition has tended to come closer to government positions than right-
wing opposition has), but it could also indicate decreasing political autonomy
in areas where policy has never been undertaken and where it could therefore
not be accounted for by an action-oriented policy/preference approach to
political autonomy.

This mixed picture of how democratic political autonomy develops during
internationalisation could be reconciled with general theory by maintaining a
distinction between the effects of internationalisation on (i) the amount of

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98 While the period of investigation includes internationalisation of both market and state
functions, it is important to recall that budget policy has yet only to a small degree been
integrated in international structures of legal superiority to national ones, which is why the
most heavily constraining effects of internationalisation on political autonomy continue to
operate only to a relatively small degree (see the sub-section on participation in Section
1.2.2). Furthermore, Section 8.1.2 will present additional evidence to suggest that state
function internationalisation exerts a substantial constraint on political autonomy, even
when the internationalised functions are not legally binding.
resources available for policy-making, which is expected to grow as long as the division of labour develops and the competition is intensified during internationalisation, and (ii) the costs involved in undertaking certain policies consisting in increasing demand for imports and departure of capital abroad. It is possible to argue that an increase of resources during internationalisation has permitted expenditure levels to stabilise and even to grow, while such undertakings have been decreasingly redistributive because of costs imposed by net providers on redistribution. Given this interpretation, contemporary levels of expenditure are not necessarily safe in the long term. There is a point in time at which no more resources can be gained from internationalisation, a point defined as that at which the division of labour is optimal and firms are competing throughout the world, while the increasing cost that internationalisation permits economic actors to impose on states when undertaking certain policies may go on perpetually (though there may, of course, be kinds and levels of public spending that will not be challenged by market interests).

Looked at from a more political point of view, internationalisation does create a specific problem for those political parties which have traditionally relied on strong states to achieve aims of social justice, e.g., parties favouring social democracy (Plant 2002: 249). Although the levels of public spending are not at present challenged by internationalisation, the redistributive functions may well be. In other words, internationalisation possibly increases the extent to which state controlled parts of the economy favour the interests of prosperous social groups in a market economy at the expense of the less advantaged. More safely, it can be concluded that the old insight that economic equality may condition political equality and therefore democracy itself (for example Dahl 1989: 114-15) becomes more and more pertinent in the process of internationalisation.
4. Deliberation during internationalisation

Any link between internationalisation and the deliberative element of democracy would have to take into account a long series of intermediary variables. A full account of them would draw on, among other things, language and education policy, the practice and regulatory framework of the mass media, the transparency and openness of public administration, and the relation between civil society, state, and market. Although the arguments about internationalisation and deliberation found in the literature are less explicit on such factors than one could hope, several of them are sufficiently developed to warrant an empirical analysis. This chapter will begin with some remarks on the concept of deliberation and its relation to internationalisation, then develop operational indicators of deliberation and select material to permit, finally, an empirical analysis of hypothesised effects of internationalisation on democratic deliberation.

4.1. Principles and predictions of democratic deliberation

The deliberative requirement of democracy may be differently construed depending on what purpose deliberation is taken to serve. In a relatively weak interpretation, a public discussion marked by freedom of speech and plurality of information is required (for example Dahl 1979/1998: 113; Saward 1998: 63-64). Such deliberation may serve to air political opinions and to correct asymmetric information distribution among individuals (Eriksen 2000: 47), as well as to guarantee that all relevant decision alternatives are put before the people rather than kept outside the political agenda (cf. Bachrach and Baratz 1962). We can refer to this as liberal or pluralist deliberation.

According to a somewhat stronger interpretation, democracy requires, in addition to freedom of speech and plurality of information, a forum where public opinion can be formed through communication free from constraints, compulsion, and coercion. That is close to what has been termed a discourse-theoretical interpretation of deliberative democracy, or more briefly, discourse democracy (Habermas 1996; Eriksen 1999: 19-22; Eriksen 2000: 45-55). Such deliberation is arguably capable of realising the aims associated with a liberal or pluralist interpretation, but in addition could benefit other objects: for instance, it may legitimise political outcomes by grounding them in arguments that are valid for everyone (Eriksen 2000: 48); again, it may protect minorities from being unfairly treated by a majority; or indeed it may build consensus and overcome the problems of social choice which appear when individual preferences are aggregated and no alternative is backed by a majority of voters.
(Elster 1986/1998). To sum it all up, liberal or pluralist deliberation is not obviously sufficient to achieve these objects. For public deliberation to legitimise political outcomes, for example, it seems that influential arguments must not simply reflect social interests, but must also draw on a shared conception of which arguments and politics are right or good. For public deliberation to protect minorities from being exploited by the majority it seems that the majority must either be committed to some normative principles, or to some extent care about what happens to the minority; otherwise public information will make no difference.

The concepts of liberal (or pluralist) and discourse-theoretical deliberation could be viewed as the former encompassing the latter. The fact that a certain kind of rationality is required for something to be regarded as deliberation from a discourse-theoretical perspective does not prevent that practice from being regarded as deliberation in a liberal (or pluralist) sense as well. Moreover, if ideas and information were completely absent, it would be difficult to imagine a discussion that was rational in a communicative sense. Hence all practices referred to as deliberation from a discourse-theoretical perspective could be taken as being covered by a liberal or pluralist concept of deliberation as well, while there are practices that would be regarded as deliberation only from a liberal or pluralist perspective – for instance, if freedom of public speech is combined with racist or sexist arguments. As illustrated in Diagram 4.1, the two kinds of deliberation would hence not be completely overlapping. Since the discourse-theoretical concept is more recent in democratic theory literature, it will be presented in somewhat more detail.

Diagram 4.1. Two kinds of partly overlapping deliberation

A central point in discourse democracy can be traced back to Immanuel Kant, whose importance in this particular area has often been acknowledged (for example Eriksen 2000: 50). From the Kantian perspective, morality is an implication of pure rationality, and the latter can operate only if the subject is free from any kind of social, physical, or psychological constraint.
Furthermore, since this kind of pure rationality originates from within the subject itself, the moral laws that bind the subject are imposed, once again, by the subject itself. The implication of this argument is a normatively positive understanding of autonomy. A subject acts morally only when it is autonomous, that is, when determined by itself and nothing but itself, that is, when determined solely by rationality and unaffected by any non-rational constraint (Kant 1785/1953: 98,108 et passim).99

In the theory of discourse democracy this argument has been transformed to require an autonomous public sphere where opinion is formed by impartial arguments, where “pre-existing status attributes – such as wealth, family, and ethnicity – lose their sway in the distribution of civic authority.” (Price 1995: 24 interpreting Habermas) Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the original argument formulated by Kant was not intended to support a democratic kind of autonomy. Kant considered it a duty of his own philosophical spirit, rather than of the general public or the majority of citizens, to undertake the purely rational deliberation that would discover moral principles and actions and establish autonomy. It is not surprising therefore that there is a normative tension within discourse democracy between the concepts of majority and rationality: What should determine politics if communicative rationality and popular majority recommend different actions? The most common response has been to demand consensus, or super-majorities, as a prerequisite to the making of a democratic decision; or at least to demand the intention to reach consensus (for example Miller 1995: 96; Habermas 1996: 166; Føllesdahl 2000: 104; cf. Eriksen 2000: 53,59, and especially Warren 2002: 182). This response does not, however, reconcile the normative tension so much as it emphasises the value of rationality at the expense of majority will. If everyone is “rationale”, everyone will reach the same conclusion, and if some “rational” people reach different conclusions then deliberations may be continued until agreement is achieved. Behind the faith in super-majorities there may therefore be an assumption of a determining, ultimately uniform rationality. But more importantly and definitely, to require super-majorities denies, by definition, the right of the majority to decide. Any requirement of super-majorities implies a general minority right to veto any proposed change of the status quo, whatever the status quo is.

This normative tension is worth considering in its own right (the final chapter and especially Section 8.2.5 will propose a concept it can be

99 In the second edition, which is sometimes used for standard pagination, these pages of the book are referred to as 70 and 87. A similar argument to that of Kant, and more easily applicable to politics, was published by Rousseau some twenty years earlier; according to him popular sovereignty was equivalent to the exertion of a general will, which was in turn defined by its reasonableness to the people (1765/1992: 51-52).
reconciled with), but the reason for identifying the problem at this stage is a methodological implication of immediate empirical relevance. Eriksen, among others, seems to suggest that deliberation may be indicated by the use of qualified majorities (Eriksen 2000: 57). For the sake of coherence, this is less than optimal. Deliberation is here taken as an aspect of democracy, as it is by Eriksen; but assuming super-majoritarianism is, as just seen, a democratically problematic way of converting Kant’s principle of autonomy into a democratic theory. In a following section (4.2.1) less abstract problems of taking super-majoritarian decision-rules to indicate deliberation will be addressed, but what has been found here would appear already enough to conclude that deliberation should not be methodologically mixed up with voting procedures.

Another point of diverging interpretations with a methodological implication is the relation between deliberation and the common good of the deliberators. Eriksen seeks to distinguish the discourse-theoretical interpretation of deliberation, or legitimacy, from a civic-republican one (2000: 49). Defenders of the latter interpretation conceive of public deliberation as aiming to sort out which political actions are inherent in a pre-existing collective identity and its shared notions of what is good. The discourse-theoretical understanding of deliberation, by contrast, prefers to rely on the “procedures and the system of rights [which] institute and regulate the political process”, given that such a political constitution is based on notions of “public and private autonomy” (ibid. page 50, ital. in original).

But even if the democratically relevant kind of deliberation is conceived of as conceptually independent from collective identities and shared conceptions of what is good, as Eriksen suggests, there may be causal relations between collective identity on the one hand and successful deliberation on the other. This possibility is crucial for an argument that links discourse democracy to internationalisation; such an argument will be presented in the following section.

4.1.1. Adherence to communicative rationality within nations

It may be argued that a discourse-theoretical kind of deliberation benefits from a common culture, identity, and history among the deliberators, even though the concept of deliberation is not defined as a collective discovering of a common good. Hence to the extent that internationalisation undermines the existence of the allegedly required cultural elements, or situates politics in territories where no such elements have ever existed, it is expected that
deliberative qualities will be damaged. Let us follow how David Miller develops this argument.

Miller does not phrase his argument in terms of discourse democracy, but his definition of deliberative democracy points clearly in that direction: “a political community in which decisions are reached through an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake where the aim of all participants is to arrive at an agreed judgement.” (Miller 1995: 96) This kind of politics, it is argued, functions most effectively when situated within the boundaries of a single nation. The baseline of the argument is that principles of communicative rationality will be followed only if the people enjoy the mutual trust and solidarity inherent in a common nationality. A crucial point is to take arguments at their face value, rather than as indices of social interest:

> Reasons given in political debate should be sincerely held, and not merely adopted as an expedient way of promoting sectional interests. Connected with this is a requirement of consistency, namely that if you advance an argument in one case where it works in favour of an interest or cause of yours, you should be willing to concede that the same argument applies to other cases that are similar except that now it counts against your personal interests. (...) Once arguments are no longer taken at their face value, but simply regarded as indicators of the interests that different groups want to pursue, there is no longer any point in searching for grounds of agreement. Democracy can still exist in some form – interests can be aggregated by procedures that give each person’s preferences approximately equal weight – but the deliberative ideal has been abandoned. (Miller 1995: 96-97)

Assuming that commitments to rational arguments and communication are premised on a common nationality, as Miller does, it is a crucial question how internationalisation relates to the existence or significance of nations. On this point Miller argues that national identities and loyalties have in fact not declined significantly because of internationalisation, and therefore common nationalities still actually work to the benefit of deliberative democracy. But whether or not he is correct on this point is a complicated empirical issue which is yet far from conclusively settled (Goldmann and Gilland 2001), and other theorists take the exact opposite view (for example Saward 1998: 149; Rosow 2000: 40-4), often under the presumption of an increasing fragmentation of existing cultures. The arguments why internationalisation may be understood to weaken existing nationalities, and in turn deliberative democracy, must therefore be taken seriously. Miller distinguishes four different arguments, all concerning different examples of internationalisation.

First, the internationalisation of trade implies that patterns of consumption become more alike in different countries. This concerns not only what people eat and wear, but also how they conceive of themselves. An
important part of trade internationalisation concerns cultural commodities like television, film, music, and books. “And so”, Miller observes in the present context of internationalisation, “it becomes hard for people to think that they are living in a way that distinguishes them from others, or indeed that it matters very much where they choose to live.” (Miller 1995: 155-56)

Second, the internationalisation of people – the crossing of boundaries by immigrants, refugees, tourists, or migrating labourers – contributes to the same effect. “In so far as our belief that we share a distinct national identity depends upon a certain degree of ignorance about how people actually lead their lives in other places, it is eroded by direct contact with those cultures.” (ibid. page 156.)

Third, people increasingly identify themselves with groups other than their nationality, for example religious, ethnic, professional, and political groups. Though this is not by definition incompatible with acknowledging a national identity, “it may still be the case that the strength of national identities, the extent to which they matter to people, has diminished as these other loyalties and allegiances have strengthened.” (ibid. page 156.)

Fourth, the internationalisation of state functions, most importantly the emergence of the European Union, may challenge the capacity of nations to act as unified entities and to decide the future of their members. To the extent that people agree with membership of, for example, the European Union, they “will begin thinking of themselves as at least in part European, or, moving in the other direction, as Catalan or Bavarian.” (ibid. page 157.)

In sum, the above argument suggests: (i) that a common nationality is important to a discourse-theoretical kind of deliberation, or more specifically to the adherence of individuals to principles of communicative rationality; (ii) that various kinds of internationalisation tend to undermine the significance or even the existence of actual nations; and hence (iii) that internationalisation tends to decrease the level of discourse democracy, or more specifically, the adherence of individuals to principles of communicative rationality. (For a similar formulation of this argument, see Goldmann 2001: 152.)

The same conclusion may also be argued from strictly rationalist assumptions, as opposed to cultural or identity-oriented ones. From a rationalist perspective internationalisation may be taken to relocate the interests and engagements of individuals in the public forum. If more products are exported to other countries, and more investments flow from one country to another, and the political autonomy of the state is reduced, etc, then there will be a perfectly rational motive to pay less attention to public debate within the state. As a consequence, formerly vital public fora may lose much of their vitality and become less capable of hosting the confrontation of opposing arguments and claims and less capable of committing individuals
to a communicatively rational form of public behaviour. Hence the prediction that internationalisation may weaken discourse democracy can also be derived from arguments that do not assume nations or cultures to be deliberatively important.

4.1.2. Adherence to communicative rationality among nations

Deliberation can take place not only within already existing nations; it can also take place across national boundaries. International deliberation does not necessarily require an international forum where deliberators meet in real time. Political arguments can be transmitted, immediately or with delay, by various media, so that deliberation can occur across both time and space. In any case, the argument put forth in the above section would suggest that international deliberation does not function well: there is by definition no shared nationality on both sides of a national boundary. However, staying with the same set of assumptions, economic and political internationalisation are expected to improve the quality of international deliberation.\textsuperscript{100} To the extent that internationalisation brings about common patterns of consumption, greater awareness of living conditions abroad, and the redirection of political attention away from the nation, and to the extent that such processes condition the existence of nationalities (as proposed by Miller, though he was not himself convinced of the power of such causes), international deliberation is expected to improve during internationalisation.

This conclusion is far from unimportant. If the prediction were to be empirically confirmed, and shown causally important, several problems of democracy and internationalisation would diminish dramatically, most obviously the democratic problem of one state being illegitimately determined by another. To illustrate with the democratically most positive scenario, it might be the case that state political discussions within a state are held in full awareness of the effects that state produces on other countries; it might even be that in state level political debates there is a certain tendency to form public opinion to the advantage of individuals residing outside state boundaries. A certain self-restriction on what decisions are made could then be assumed, to the benefit of democratic political autonomy at the level of states. This optimistic scenario is here outlined not because it is likely, but because it

\textsuperscript{100} Let us temporarily accept the simplified view that national boundaries coincide with state boundaries. The process of internationalisation – increasing the extent to which something is shared or affected across state boundaries – will then also increase the extent to which something is shared or affected across national boundaries.
illustrates the importance of investigating the possible effects of internationalisation on international deliberation at the level of states.

4.1.3. Access to information and ideas in states or nations

Internationalisation may also affect access to politically relevant information and ideas. This impact of internationalisation would be important from both a discourse-theoretical and a liberal perspective. By contrast to the deliberative quality dealt with in the preceding (commitment to communicative rationality), access to information and ideas within single states or nations has been theoretically related to internationalisation in both positive and negative ways. Let me begin with the negative predictions, of which there are several varieties.

Negative predictions

International politics can be modelled as an ongoing negotiation (Kaiser 1971: 707; Goldmann 1986: 5-6; Stenelo 1990: 283; Jerneck 1996: 166), and the process of internationalisation can be seen as increasing the scope and significance of such negotiations. The internationalisation of markets implies that actors can choose more freely where to produce, consume, invest, etc; which opens up a possibility for them to negotiate with different states over public policy. The internationalisation of state functions implies that a state must deal with other states to reach an outcome, and since other states are generally stronger than the actors that a state encounters in domestic politics, the likely effect is, once again, a more negotiative style of politics.

Now, it is often argued that increasing the scope and importance of negotiations in politics overall will diminish public access to relevant information and ideas. In the first place, negotiations tend to reach better informed decisions when they are held in secret. Only a negotiator with no public commitments to specific standpoints can safely succumb to the force of the better argument (Gargarella 2000: 200). Secondly, the commitment to maximising benefit to the party for whom the negotiator is acting tends to limit the spread of information; to be successful a “negotiator needs to be able to take positions and change them in a way which would upset particular interest groups and his bargaining stance.” (Nicoll 1994: 192, cited in Gargarella 2000: 201; see also Stenelo 1990: 284). Thirdly, to reach a maximal bargain a negotiator must not reveal to the opposition exactly how far he or she is prepared to go in order to reach an agreement, and hence public debate on preference orders must be limited before negotiations takes place.
To sum up the argument, internationalisation extends the importance and scope of negotiations; a negotiative style of politics is more efficient when little relevant information is handed out to the public; internationalisation therefore reduces public access to politically relevant information and arguments. It may be noticed that this argument has a wider application than the internationalisation of state functions: it has been explicitly applied to the case of intensified “transnational relations” (Kaiser 1971: 706p.), a concept which includes internationalisation of markets, and several authors do not distinguish one kind of internationalisation from another while elaborating it (for example Stenelo 1990: 283).101

The validity of this argument may none the less be doubted for various reasons, for example that even the purest domestic politics is highly negotiative in character (see various contribution in Stenelo and Jerneck 1996), and hence that internationalisation does not make a significant difference. This kind of theoretical objection will not be dealt with here, but the evaluation of the argument will be made in the empirical section below. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are other arguments predicting the same effect of internationalisation on democracy, which do not assume an increasingly negotiative style of politics during internationalisation.

One such alternative argument would suggest that there is a **supreme national interest** in the making of policy in relation to outsiders, and that political opposition and debate may under such conditions be regarded as dangerously disloyal. This mechanism is perhaps most powerful in the area of security policy, and in particular when a state is under military or terrorist threat from a foreign power (Goldmann 1986: 33). In such cases domestic opposition to a government’s security policy may be dealt with as severely as action by a foreign power against which a war is being or may soon be fought. To say the least, one should not expect a domestic public debate to be conducted under such circumstances with an abundance of information and complete freedom of argument.

It is possible that notions of supreme national interest will also restrict the public debate in the area of international political economy. It has indeed been argued that any issue can be **securitized**, in the sense of being publicly treated as crucial for survival (Waever 1997). International political economy can be interpreted as an opposition between the national **us** against a foreign **them** (as for example in strategic trade theory or when one speak about international finance “attacking” a national currency or interest rates). Furthermore, given the comprehensiveness of contemporary welfare states it

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101 The relevant definition of internationalisation is given earlier in the introduction to the volume (Stenelo and Hansson 1990: 7).
is not implausible to interpret economic crises as a matter of security. To the extent that such structures of interpretation evolve, economic internationalisation is expected to reduce the intensity of public debate by imposing a supreme national interest that political parties can deviate from only at a significant cost.

Both of the above arguments – that modelled on negotiations and that modelled on supreme national interest – represent developments of traditional explanations as to why the making of foreign policy is less democratic than the making of domestic policy. Nevertheless, the most recent period of internationalisation has provoked additional arguments, three of which can be be mentioned in brief.

First, if political autonomy is eroded by internationalisation at the level of states, citizens and parliamentarians alike will have less incentive to contribute to public debate. Secondly, internationalisation provides market actors with the opportunity to impose costs on what may be perceived as unpredictable processes of opinion formation, and hence governments may wait to enter public debate until they can back up any information or argument with a proposal ready for decision. Thirdly, markets actors – whose power allegedly expands during internationalisation – are relatively uninterested to participate in public debate (Stenelo 1990: 294).

**Positive predictions**

Most arguments that link internationalisation to public access to information and ideas suggest a negative relation between these two variables, but it is not difficult to imagine a positive relation as well, namely that internationalisation enlarges the public supply of politically relevant information and ideas (Stenelo 1990: 357; Goldmann 2001: 162). Such entities can themselves travel from one state to another, and when the flow increases, the vitality and rational potential of variously located public spheres may improve. Especially when democratic ideas travel from one country to another there could be an indisputable gain in democratic deliberation (Bhagwati 1997: 278).

To understand the full impact of this argument one should remember that ideas and information are immaterial entities, in the sense that they can be held by any number of individuals without diminishing.\textsuperscript{102} Hence if the intellectual system expands, as when people in one country can increasingly access the minds of people in another country, each and every individual is...

\textsuperscript{102} While it is true that academics often avoid being associated with ideas they consider degradingly commonplace, that does not mean that ideas cannot (unlike intellectual prestige) be widely shared without diminution of their value.
enriched with the ideas and information that he or she can access while losing nothing of his or her original intellectual assets.

The enrichment of the public sphere in various states and nations can also be argued from rationalist assumptions. The process of internationalisation will increase the number of persons and organisations that have at least a minimal interest in the politics of the internationalised state, and this may be enough to sharpen their focus on public matters. To agree with this argument it is not necessary to deny that internationalisation reduces the political importance and public interest of each territorially limited public debate and its associated politics; it is enough to claim that the density of information and ideas in a territorially limited public debate is caused mainly by the number of actors having some level of interest in it and by the totality of interest that all actors have in the debate.

* 

To sum up the sections linking deliberation to internationalisation: According to the discourse-theoretical concept of deliberation, the formation of public opinion should be determined by the arguments that make up the discussion rather than by social interests and pre-discursive identifications of friend and foe. In nationally delimited deliberation, the process of internationalisation is theoretically expected to compromise that conception, while in cases of international deliberation, internationalisation is suspected of having the opposite effect, namely of strengthening deliberation. According to the liberal or pluralist concept of deliberation, the main task of the public sphere is to supply information and ideas. Regarding that kind of deliberation, different arguments predict opposite effects of internationalisation.

The next section will consider which concrete properties one should look for to estimate whether politics is more or less deliberative in the above respects.

### 4.2. Operationalising democratic deliberation

#### 4.2.1. Adherence to communicative rationality within nations – answering questions

We are concerned now with how to measure the extent to which people involved in public debate adhere to principles of communicative rationality, here taken in the limited sense of a propensity seriously to engage with positions argued by others.
Attempts to formulate this aspect of deliberation at an operational level of analysis have not yet proceeded very far. Most academic contributions in the area have concentrated on issues far removed from empirical observation and the few operational indicators that have been proposed are not immediately convincing. For example, when Eriksen tries to capture the practice of discourse democracy, he seems to identify it with the institutions in which deliberation allegedly takes place, assuming that an institution deciding on a consensus rule reaches a higher degree of deliberation than one deciding on a majority rule (Eriksen 2000: 57, see also Joerges and Neyer 1997b: 618). Not only are such indicators limited to comparisons between institutions, assuming that the quality of discourse democracy is always the same within each institution, but they also seem to have left the original idea far behind. According to all of the theoretical literature considered in previous sections, discourse democracy is about how and to what extent people communicate, and not about how voting procedures are undertaken. It must certainly be possible – in fact it is a standard description EU politics – that actors working inside an institution that decides on consensus rule are predominantly concerned with reaching a good bargain of their own, rather than being involved in a serious exchange of arguments. Furthermore, as noted in a previous section, to require super-majoritarian decision rules is not compatible with the traditional democratic notion that a majority is entitled to rule.

Another, probably more valid, indicator of discourse democracy is the extent to which participants alter their initial points of view during a debate. It seems as if Joerges and Neyer (1997a: 291-92) have something like this indicator in mind, among other things, though they do not apply it systematically in their investigations of Comitology in the EU. This is possibly a good indicator of deliberation in the institutional environment studied by Joerges and Neyer, but for politics at large it presents severe limitations of fruitfulness. In arenas such as, for example, plenary sessions of parliaments or international meetings of government ministers, it is indeed a rare thing that participants admit that they have changed their views; and to the extent that they may in fact change their views, they have an interest to disguise the fact; and this impedes our possibilities to estimate the level of deliberation through manifest alterations of position.\(^{103}\) It is however important to recognise that

\(^{103}\) There are several reasons why politicians tend not to alter their positions or to admit they have altered them. First, a politician may be elected on a collective belief that he or she will articulate a certain ideology – and some kind of sanctions may then be expected if he or she suddenly turns to a new position. Second, participants in public debates generally seek to persuade an audience, and the rhetorical means for doing that often involve taking on the role of an authority with no reason to change its standpoint. Third, participants in debate may be leaders of some kind, and in that case there is a definite limit on how far
such conditions do not imply that deliberation is absent in parliamentary sessions or international meetings of ministers. Following the theoretical discussion a few pages back, it is not a necessary condition for deliberation that positions be changed. The insight to be gained is rather that deliberation must sometimes take a different shape from that of explicitly changing position. For example, it may take the form of seriously engaging with positions argued by others and then letting an external actor – for example the people as a whole, a parliament, a party-meeting, or the mass media – decide on a regular basis whether or not individuals – as well as the position they advocate – should continue to play a role in the discussion or be replaced. This implies, finally, that the extent to which initial positions are changed (overtly or covertly) is not a generally fruitful operationalisation of deliberation among political professionals (and indeed, this was confirmed in the preliminaries of the present empirical study). We should try to find a more direct way of measuring the seriousness of deliberators’ engagement with each other’s positions.

The arguably optimal way of measuring discourse democracy would be to investigate how opinions held by individuals are actually formed. To what extent are opinions based on correct rather than incorrect information, exchange of arguments rather than confrontation of interest, rational conclusions rather than psychological obsessions? This time the problem is one of economy. Taking the preceding question seriously would mean a single researcher spending years analysing the formation of a handful of opinions argued by a handful of persons. And yet the answering of any research question about the relation between internationalisation and discourse democracy would require a great deal more observations than that. In order not to lose sight of the original research question in the face of methodological problems, a somewhat more superficial measure would be preferable. At its best, such a measure would concentrate our efforts to a maximal degree on the hypothesised effect to be investigated, namely the adherence of individuals to principles of communicative rationality.

To approximate as much as possible the criteria dealt with above (validity in relation to Eriksen, fruitfulness in relation to Joerges and Neyer, economy in relation to an optimally valid method), the following indicator will now be proposed: the extent to which participants in political debates answer the questions posed to them by other participants. Or as formulated by focusing on the persons who pose the questions, the indicator is the extent to which participants in debates pose questions which other participants judge worthy of an answer. The
higher the proportion of questions that are answered rather than avoided – or taken as pretexts to talk about something else – the more seriously, according to this methodological thinking, the participants are engaging with each other’s positions.

There may be various reasons why a directly posed question is not answered. The person to whom the question is addressed may lack sufficient knowledge, or attention, or respect for the poser of the question. It may also happen that the questioner lacks sufficient knowledge, making the question irrelevant and an unfit subject for rational debate, or that he or she asks without sufficient attention or respect, which will dispose the person questioned to be unwilling to answer. For all of these possible reasons there is a distinct lack of deliberative virtue in one or the other, or both, of the persons involved.

To this one could add that there are similar operationalisations at the same level of analysis, for example the extent to which participants in debate refer to the same political issues, or the extent to which they address criticism to actual persons rather than to a straw man, or the extent to which they lead in to a topic by referring to what has been said by another speaker. It would certainly not damage the analysis to incorporate such measures as well. However, the implied investigations have to be pursued at a micro-level and have proved to be very time-consuming. A choice had to be made for reasons of economy. For the purpose of measuring discourse democracy, two main reasons lead us to deal only with the answering of explicit questions. First, an explicitly posed question is easily identified, which simplifies research proceedings. Second, to leave a question unanswered is always a weakness in deliberation,\textsuperscript{104} while fragmented structures of topic and unaddressed criticisms may, according to context, also be interpreted as a sign of uneven intellectual development among debate contributions.

The fact that the answering of questions has a comparably stable interpretation in terms of deliberation across different contexts corresponds to the generality of the linguistic operation of posing and answering questions. In any political debate, at any time, one may expect questions to be asked. If no questions are asked, that is a striking fact to be reported rather than a warrant to disregard the linguistic feature. Furthermore, if participants in a debate treat each other as equals, there is a normative justification to require that explicit and direct questions be answered. Hence the answering of

\textsuperscript{104} One could think that a debate with maximal question answering rate is less deliberative than one with a medium question answering rate if all questions in the former case are trivial and all questions in the latter are significant. There may be something to this objection, and the way to handle it is to identify, if possible, the significance of the questions posed. Relevant measures will be taken to investigate this in the empirical section.
questions can be analysed in any political debate – if, exceptionally, no questions are asked in a political debate that absence should itself be analysed. This argument is important; it permits us to apply the proposed indicator systematically, that is, to follow the same proceedings in different cases.

The generality of the linguistic operation of posing and answering questions also has an effect in terms of validity. It is sometimes objected that quantitative content analyses compare terms across contexts which create the very meaning of those terms (McQail 1992: 189). That is basically a fair criticism. Not to respect the fact that every political debate is a verbal structure that goes beyond individual terms will often leave one with results that are difficult or impossible to interpret, as illustrated by many content analyses confined to the counting of words. However, the approach to estimating discourse democracy according to the answering of questions is different. In question-answer interactions answers are conditioned by the questions that produce them. Hence the cases whose properties we are about to compare across space and time are themselves sufficient containers of meaning for the actors involved to understand and respond to them. The applied indicator should therefore not be accused of breaking up the context that pours meaning into linguistic entities. We do not deal with arguably meaningless pieces of information like the frequencies of terms, but with highly meaningful information about the extent to which explicit and understandable questions are answered.

A more difficult problem with the question-answer approach resides in the qualitative judgement as to when a question has been answered, rather than answered only in part, or not answered at all. These judgements have often been difficult to make. None the less it has been found continually meaningful to classify directly addressed questions into one and only one of the following three categories: the question is answered; the question is answered but only in part; the question is left unanswered. A more complete description of the coding procedure and examples of coding difficulties are given in Appendix 2 as well as in a later chapter (7.2), where the same measure is applied to debates in the European Parliament. Here we will not only two points in the coding procedures.

When a question is simultaneously addressed to more than one member of parliament, it is coded as if it were posed as many times as there are persons being addressed.

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105 To be covered by this indicator the interlocutor must gives the name or the position of the person from which an answer is expected. Otherwise an absence of answers to questions could represent nothing but a misunderstanding of who was addressed.
It may also happen that one question is repeatedly posed to one and the same person, without being answered. Although such instances might indicate a more intense problem of deliberation than if the question is posed only once and not answered, the material has been coded so as not to make any difference whether the question had been posed previously or not. The reason is that it is too difficult to judge the deliberative quality between, on the one hand, an instance in which a question is completely ignored when being posed the first and the second time and then completely answered the third time and, on the other hand, an instance in which the question is only partially answered the first or the second time it has been posed.

The selection of the material described by this indicator will be argued in Section 4.2.3 before reporting observations in Section 4.3.1.

Validity problems
One possible criticism against the question-answering indicator is that it does not sufficiently discriminate between strategic and communicative rationality. According to this line of criticism, a question may be answered only for strategic reasons, perhaps because a powerful actor expects questions to be answered or because the answering of questions produces social trust that can be exploited in the future. However, this objection does not actually damage the validity of the indicator. First, the indicator does not seem to underestimate the level of deliberation; if no directly addressed questions are ever answered, there is a deliberative problem, even if the questions addressed are left unanswered for strategic reasons. Secondly, the indicator does not seem to exaggerate the level of deliberation; if all directly addressed questions are actually answered people are seriously engaging in positions argued by others, regardless of what psychological dispositions lead them to do so. At the level of elected representatives this focus on visible behaviour has a particularly deep democratic meaning. As argued above, points of view are not, under such conditions, generally altered because of processes internal to individual subjects, but because of political processes in which some group of people holds a representative accountable. When political processes are used to form public opinion there is no need to make psychological assumptions concerning how an opinion is formed.

Another, and more severe, problem of validity is that the operationalisation is thin, in the sense that it does not capture more than a minute piece of the political practice that is relevant from a discourse perspective on democracy. While this operationalisation may still be a reasonable choice for economic reasons, this does not itself make it sufficiently valid. However, we should regard the operationalisation as sufficiently valid for two reasons. First, though there is a problem of thinness,
the operationalisation is preferable, as argued above, to other operationalisation which have already been relied upon (and considered sufficiently valid) in previous empirical contributions to the same theoretical issue. Secondly, the thinness of the operationalisation corresponds to the thinness of the hypothesis under investigation. The hypothesis, derived from an argument taken mainly from David Miller, does not predict that all practices relevant to discourse democracy will deteriorate during internationalisation, but rather that the there will be a decline in a more specific phenomenon, namely the tendency of individuals to engage seriously with positions argued by others. On that point, at least, the proposed indicator would supply relevant information.

4.2.2. Access to information and ideas – plurality of sources and references

In this section we are concerned with how to measure the richness of ideas and accuracy of information in political discussions. The basic methodological problem in seeking to account empirically for the first aspect (richness of ideas) resides in the fact that we – the persons interested in such analyses – are not even close to agreement on what differentiates an important idea from a trivial one or a single idea from a complex of ideas. In fact, the classification of a given utterance in one or the other of such categories may be exactly what the political debate is all about. 106 Instead of directly judging the density of ideas in various debates, some indirect operational indicators will be used. The indirectness of the measures means that they do not seek to describe the relevant quality itself, but rather some property that could in a certain context be expected to correlate with the relevant quality, being either a likely precondition or a likely effect of the property itself.

The measure that is developed over the next paragraphs concerns only public debate among professional politicians. It is based on the assumption that ideas are not generally invented or created by politicians, but rather imported from the surrounding intellectual milieu. This is not altogether implausible. To invent or conceive a genuinely new idea is not only a very rare event in general (if indeed it ever happens by mere human agency, as distinguished from evolving social relations, philosophically conceived immaterial worlds, gods, or whatever natural or transcendental entities have been argued over the centuries to condition the human pool of ideas), but

106 It is perhaps worth noting that this insight was gained during a series of fruitless efforts to identify distinct ideas about cause and effect, different valuations of given effects, and the perspectives of different groups.
under the specific conditions of political responsibility, intellectual creativity and analysis are even rarer events. The political mission consists in taking problematic decisions and then supporting them wholeheartedly for the sake of legitimacy. Most famously, this argument was developed by Max Weber, who argued that because of the simultaneous need in modern societies for both knowledge and political agency, universities should be organised independently from political institutions (Gustavsson 1971: 1-58). This view is also common among politicians themselves.107

Accepting the assumption that ideas are not generally invented by politicians themselves, one may assume that intellectual material must somehow be imported into the decision makers’ environment. What a researcher can then hope for is that, in some (though not all or even most) cases of such intellectual importation, the politicians will reveal their intellectual source.108

Now, if there is, over time, a general increase of references to possible sources of ideas, we should accept that more ideas are being imported into the political debate; and vice versa, if there is a general decrease over time of such references we should conclude that fewer ideas are imported into the political debate. And the importation of fewer ideas into the political debate means that there are fewer ideas in the debate, given our initial assumption that decision makers generally do not create ideas themselves. The first indirect measure of richness of ideas, therefore, is the number of references to possible sources of ideas. Three kinds of references will be observed: national and international mass media; national and international policy experts; and international comparisons. For specific coding instructions on each point, see Appendix 3. Needless to say, the information collected on this indicator must be interpreted with care.

Another indirect indicator of idea richness is concerned not with the preconditions for the supply of ideas and argument in political debates, but

107 For example, in the budgetary debate of 19 Jan 1951, the leader of the Swedish Moderate Party, Hjalmarson, made an attempt to found a rhetorical alliance with his main adversary, the Social Democratic party, by claiming that according to the former Social Democratic Finance minister, Wigfors, “It is no secret that people in high official stations, obliged to take decisions, are left with no time to think.” (“Det är ingen hemlighet att människor i hög officiell ställning, som skola fatta beslut, inte få någon tid över att tänka.”; Riksdagen 1951: 47)

108 A reference to a certain source may serve other purposes than merely revealing the origin of an idea, eg, legitimacy or prestige building. This is, however, of minor importance; the main thing is that references also reveal the sources of ideas.
rather with the likely effects of a professional politician having an idea. One might assume that in the context we are now considering ideas have a tendency to be expressed by those who hold them. If a politically active person has many ideas that person will express him- or herself more often than if he or she has very few or no ideas. Drawing on this argument, it would be relevant to know the extent to which politicians choose to express themselves; one of several methods for discovering this would be to count the number of Private Member's Motions put forward by parliamentarians.

Regarding quality of debate in terms of accuracy of information, one would want to focus on the ultimate indicator, namely the correctness of information used in debate. However, that approach would be far too time-consuming, and it would arguably be impossible to sort out what is correct information beyond a rather narrow time interval. (It is to borne in mind that the design of inquiry, as developed in Section 1.3.1, involves measuring from different points in time and different countries.) Some kind of meta-indicator may, nonetheless, be considered. Even if we cannot know the extent to which the information accessed through public debate is correct, we can agree that it is best to have a wide range of sources and expertise. We will then want to look at the number of different sources of information beings used. From the perspective of internationalisation, it may also be worth the effort to distinguish between national or international sources of information. If internationalisation has increased the plurality of sources and expertise, new international sources and experts must not have been introduced at the expense of any pre-existing national ones.

**Validity problems**

As with the question-answering approach, a main problem with the indicators dealt with in this section is their thinness. There is obviously more to public access to information and ideas than plurality of references and sources of information. By contrast to the question-answering approach, however, the thinness that we come across here cannot be defended on the grounds that the hypothesis to be tested is equally thin. Section 4.1.3 outlined four different arguments to the same effect, which should indicate that the predicted phenomenon is broad rather than narrow. Hence the problem of thinness is real. However, this is no argument for rejecting the observations we can actually make of the indicators currently presented. What is warranted is not scepticism about our possibilities for gaining knowledge about public access to ideas and information during internationalisation, but rather a certain modesty in regard to theoretical inferences. It should also be recalled that the possibility of drawing theoretical conclusions from empirical observations depends not only on the comprehensiveness of the indicators applied, but
also on the degree of congruence between the pattern of observation and theoretical expectations.

4.2.3. Adherence to communicative rationality between nations – interest in foreign consequences

From both a discourse-theoretical and a liberal or pluralist perspective, it would be relevant to know whether or not something like deliberation across national boundaries has developed parallel to the process of internationalisation. This kind of deliberation could (but need not) take place in international political institutions. Chapter 7 will take up the discussion of deliberation in an international assembly, namely the European Parliament. Regardless of its territorial extent, a public may be more or less aware of its effects or conscious of its dependence on, or more or less inclined to consider the interest of, people outside its own territory. To the extent that such awareness is manifest in public debate, it can be interpreted as evidence of international deliberation.

4.2.4. Selection of material

Contemporary publics contain vast amounts of material. Before reporting on how deliberation has developed during internationalisation, a few material selections will need to be made and have their theoretical implications considered. This is the subject of the present section.

Deliberation should ideally be observed in discussions among political representatives as well as private individuals. Public discussions of all kinds – in newspapers, on the Internet, in private associations, etc – are theoretically relevant. None the less, the empirical investigation of deliberation is here limited to parliamentary debates. The main reason for this choice is to follow as closely as possible those investigations which focus on political autonomy (Chapter 3) and participation (Chapter 4), but it should also be noted that there are several reasons why the limitations of the study do not rule out the drawing of theoretical inferences.

All of the hypotheses set out above are general in character, not distinguishing between public deliberations in different arenas; hence they claim validity in the field here being investigated as well as in others. For example, there is nothing in the argument taken mainly from David Miller (Section 4.1.1) that restricts its claim of validity to discussions outside parliamentary assemblies. While deliberation is a more common object of empirical consideration in mass media than in parliamentary studies, this
tendency represents a convention and not a corollary of the theory investigated here. From a democratic theory perspective there are even advantages in focusing on parliamentary rather than mass media debates. In some politically important regards a parliament represents the people and could conceivably therefore be treated as a stratified sample from the population as a whole. Obviously, members of parliament are not representative of the citizens on every empirical dimension, but surely to a significant extent on those dimensions that are sufficiently important to mobilise political parties and participation in general elections.

The fact that the parliament is unique as an institution representing the people as a whole may imply that its kind and level of deliberation deviates from those of the mass media. It could perhaps be argued that, because of the central position in political life of national parliaments, their debates have a built-in tendency towards confrontation and against deliberation. However, the fact that debate participants may not agree and may not change their positions is not a sign that deliberation is impossible nor even that it is absent or weak. As argued above, when political processes are used to form public opinion, deliberation can occur when debate participants never alter their initial positions, or even when they do not even try to reach a common understanding (see pages 160 and 164). The crucial point is whether participants in debate take seriously the views of each other, so as to allow for an external actor – most democratically the people as a whole – to rationally decide whether certain arguments should continue to be a part of the debate. But in any case, the possibility that parliamentary debates tend towards confrontation and against deliberation does not diminish our capability of evaluating the hypothesis that internationalisation works against political deliberation. The degree to which deliberation is present or absent in parliamentary debates, as compared to those conducted in other forums, is simply irrelevant from the perspective of the hypothesis under investigation. The hypothesis investigated predicts that deliberation decreases in the course of internationalisation, not that there is a certain degree of deliberation at a given place or time.

From an opposite, and more cynical, perspective, it may be argued that parliamentary debate, far from playing a unique role in domestic politics, is a mere ritual without political importance. If this is the case one may wonder what purpose could be served by describing the deliberative qualities of parliamentary debates. But even on this view a parliament is an important public forum, not only because of the legislative powers and responsibilities of its members, but also because of the public attention paid to it and its
function as a place of encounter for all major political parties. And even if parliaments were politically unimportant, that would not affect our analysis of the hypothesis under scrutiny. The argument that deliberation tends to diminish in the course of internationalisation need make no assumption about the political importance of debates.

All in all, the delimitation of the empirical study to parliamentary deliberation does not seem to prevent us from drawing theoretical inferences. We can therefore move on to the next aim that should direct our selection of material, namely to evaluate the accuracy of predictive arguments. Following the design argued in Section 1.3.1, parliamentary debates should be selected for analysis so as to guarantee maximal variation in level of internationalisation of the political systems within which they occur. It would also be beneficial to be able to control for as many background variables as possible. Furthermore, the possibility that the effects of internationalisation on deliberation evolve very slowly suggests that we compare a limited number of points which are incontestably different in terms of time and levels of internationalisation. For these reasons, parliamentary debates will be analysed at three levels of internationalisation. For the low level of internationalisation, the period 1948-52 is used; for the medium level, 1972-74; and for the high level, 1993-99. For all of the three countries, two budget debates at each level of internationalisation will be covered.

The final selection of budgetary debates cannot be grounded on rigorous methodological considerations. In some countries and for some years it is doubtful whether there have been any budget debates at all, in the sense in which there have been numerous of budgetary debates for other years and countries. For example, according to a public report, in Sweden there were seven general budget debates in the year 2000 (Riksdagen 2000a: 73), while the only Swedish debate in the 1950s which is similar in regards of subject and importance would be the first part of the debate which followed the inauguration of the Parliamentary Spring session, after the Finance Bill was submitted to Parliament, every January.

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109 Some of the empirical observations reported in Chapter 5 seriously questions the view that the significance of parliaments is low or in decline.

110 One of several reasons for dealing with two debates from each country at each level is that the design should be capable, at least in principle, of distinguishing the effects of internationalisation from those of the economic cycle. Although there is no shared definition of the concept of economic cycles – growth rate of GDP, upcoming industrial orders, the proportion of industrial capacity in operation, employment figures, etc – there is usually a political perception of “good times” and “bad times”. We will come back to these terms in characterising individual years if it proves relevant to the conclusions reached.
What could none the less be argued is that the selected budgetary debates (and the question-answer interactions that they contain) should have budgetary importance, since we are interested in deliberation not as a political distraction, but as an element in the solving of political problems. One evidence of the importance of debates is that the Ministry of Finance is always expected to participate in them. Another point is that the debates selected should permit the addressing of questions in connection with individual speeches, since the same selection of material will guide what question-answer interactions are analysed. Admittedly vague considerations like these have led to the final selection of the budgetary debates displayed in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Selected budgetary debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of debate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>18.01.1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.01.1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01.03.1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.03.1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>08.03.1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.11.1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>16.05.1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>07.04.1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.04.1972</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>09.05.1974</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.04.1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.04.1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>01.12.1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01.04.1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.10.1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.10.1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.10.1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.10.1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participation of the Minister of Finance should not, however, be made a definitional requirement for selecting a particular debate, since the participation of the Minister of Finance is interesting as an indicator of the political centrality or marginalization of parliaments, and therefore variation in that factor should not be restricted in making selections.
In each debate three individual speeches were selected. On this point the aim has been to include politically important speeches and to reflect ideological and institutional variation. Generally, the most influential speakers are also those who speak first in the debate. The three speeches selected are therefore those delivered by (i) the government’s official representative, regardless of when he or she enters the debate, (ii) the first speaking representative of the parliamentary group of the governing party, and (iii) the first speaking representative of the parliamentary group or groups which proposes either to vote against the government or to abstain from voting on some financial matter. (See Appendix 4 for more details.) The only exception to this order of selection is the French debates in 1948 and 1952, in which the speeches were very short and the debates rather turbulent, which would have caused the above selection order to yield far too little material. (See Appendix 5 for an exact account of what material has been included in the analysis, in France as well as in the other countries.) By reflecting the differences between institutions (cabinet and parliament) and ideologies (parties in government and in opposition), the design should, at least in principle, be capable of assessing the relative importance of such factors.

**Units of analysis**

When a content analysis is used for comparative purposes, one must in some way standardise the units between which comparisons are made. That is not a problem regarding the question-answering indicator, which may express the number of answered questions as a fraction of the number of questions asked.

Measures for counting references, however, create more of a problem regarding the standardisation of units.

The number of references or sources could be expressed as a fraction of the total size of the analysed text, and that size could in turn be estimated by its length in pages, centimetres, or, more exactly, number of characters. These are however problematic ways of proceeding. It is difficult – arguably impossible – to spell out how the size of a text is actually understood by the actors involved. Some politicians compose their messages in many words, others in few. There is not even any definite presumption of how one and the same person economizes his or her words.\(^{112}\) There is simply no hope of

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\(^{112}\) For example, the record for both the longest and the shortest budget speeches in the House of Commons are held by the same Chancellor of the Exchequer, Benjamin Disraeli,
establishing that the size as such – however reckoned – would have a similar meaning to everyone involved in a given public debates. Hence the methodological requirement developed on page 163, derived from the fact that public debates are part of a language structure, would not be met by expressing the number of references as a fraction of the size of the text under analysis.

Aiming at a ratio based on observations that are themselves sufficient containers of meaning for the interlocutors to understand and respond to them, my suggestion is to count not individual references to sources of ideas, but individual speeches in a debate. The unit of analysis is, then, the single speech, not the single reference, and can be classified as to whether or not it makes a particular reference. Given that we select a certain number of individual speeches in a parliamentary debate, we could then compare, over time and across countries, the proportion of individual speeches in parliamentary debates that contain any given reference.

The lengths of different speeches will of course differ. This is a weakness, but what is gained is more important. Regardless of their length, speeches to an assembly are a political standard genre to separate friends from foes. Hence the methodological requirement developed on page 163, recapitulated above, would be met.

Focusing on qualities of individual speeches, there is another kind of advantage as well. In observing international comparisons made in public debate, or various kinds of references made in the same, we often discover a considerable overlap with other observations of the same kind. It is often difficult to see where one international comparison or reference ends and another begins. This problem of possibly overlapping categories is serious, as it may lead to an overestimation of the number of observations. But by observing individual speeches the problem is overcome. We will then have confined our analysis to whether a certain kind of reference is or is not made within an individual speech. There will thus be no possibility of one observation category overlapping with another, since these are defined by different individual speeches.

who spoke for five hours in 1852, including an interval, and for 45 minutes in 1867. Excluding interval, his rival William Gladstone delivered the longest budget speech when, in 1853, he spoke for 4 hours and 24 minutes (see House of Commons Factsheets (n. d.) No. 5, p. 3).
4.3. Empirical observations of democratic deliberation

4.3.1. Communicative rationality within nations

To begin with a general outline of the data set that will inform later conclusions, Table 4.2 shows the dispersion of 230 intended question-answer interactions across budgetary debates across different times and countries. All interactions reported in the table are classified as being of a non-trivial character.113

Table 4.2 Number of intended question-answer interactions in different debates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of debate</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.01.1951</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.04.1952</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>07.04.1952</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.03.1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20.04.1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.10.1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.03.1974</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.05.1974</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.10.1974</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.04.1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.10.1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.03.1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.10.1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.04.1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.11.1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, some debates have a very low number of intended question-answer interactions – in Sweden for 1949 and France for 1952 as low as only one interaction. None the less, on all three levels of internationalisation there is an acceptable number of cases for all countries – never fewer than 12

113 Though not reported in any table, it can be noted that there is no pattern of triviality of interactions when comparing different levels of internationalisation. Thirteen interactions have been excluded from the following tables as trivial, in most cases on the grounds that the question concerned the order or procedure and had no substantial implications.
(France 1948 + 1952), and on one point as many as 59 (Sweden 1995 + 1999). There are also considerably more question-answer interactions in the Swedish and the British part of the material (totals of 90 and 93 respectively) than in the French (total of 47). But as long as the difference in frequency between different categories is controlled for, we should conclude that a mere insufficiency of independent observations will not prevent us from testing the hypothesis.

Table 4.3 depicts the distribution of question-answer interactions across different institutional and ideological contexts. According to the figures, parliamentary question-answer interaction is mainly engaged in by ideologically opposed parties, although there is some variation between the countries in this regard, with Sweden as the extreme case, having all of its interactions across ideological boundaries. In regard to the institutional context, there is less of a difference, both between countries and between the two institutional contexts, though there is an preponderance in all three countries of interaction between members of different institutions as compared to interaction within the same institution.

Table 4.3. Number of intended question-answer interactions by country, ideological context, and institutional context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological context</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of same party</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of different parties</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional context</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of parliament only</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of parliament and government</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 4.4 we may also recognise that the general growth of question-answer interactions during internationalisation is reflected in all contexts expect that of interaction between members of the same party, which remains stable. One could perhaps argue that the interactions between members of the same party are of little importance, whether from the perspective of how much parliamentary deliberation they account for or that of how much they respond to whatever changes occur over time. Apparently to be important political interaction must involve ideological conflict.
We are now prepared to approach the issue of whether the extent to which intended questions are met by answers has in fact decreased during a period of internationalisation, as predicted by a previously articulated theoretical argument. Table 4.5 gives a first glimpse of the matter. It shows the totality of question-answer interactions for different levels of analysis and the different degrees to which questions were answered.

Table 4.5. Question-answering by level of internationalisation.

The percentages are calculated so as to ignore the absolute number of interactions at each level of internationalisation. Comparing the percentages as we move from one level of internationalisation to the next, we should then be able to tell the extent to which questions are answered during internationalisation, regardless of how many questions happen to be posed at each level of internationalisation. If it is true that a discourse-theoretical kind of deliberation (and more specifically, the tendency of individuals to take seriously the positions argued by others) is challenged by internationalisation,
we should see decreasing percentages in the category “the question is answered” as we move from low to higher levels of internationalisation, and we should also see a corresponding increase in percentage figures for either or both of the other two categories (“question ignored” and “question not answered but touched upon”).

But what we actually see is something much more complex. Let us first focus on the middle row, which gives figures on questions answered only in part. Over the whole process of internationalisation there is stability, but at the medium level there is a ten-percent dip, which has disappeared by the highest level of internationalisation. It is then a crucial question just what we should require from the theoretical prediction under evaluation: that it is correct in all cases, in most cases, or only in some cases? If the argument had been given the weakest of these interpretations it would surely not have attracted our attention in the first place; the argument would then be of only exceptional empirical interest. So a preliminary interpretation of the middle row (the “question not answered but touched upon” category) gives us a reason to doubt the argument (interpreted in sufficiently strong terms to attract our attention to it) that internationalisation threatens discourse-theoretical deliberation.

The impression that internationalisation and deliberation form a rather complex pattern is not altered by the other two rows in the table. There is a democratically negative trend between the two extreme levels of internationalisation (ten percent increase of ignored questions and ten percent decrease of accurately answered questions), but when the medium level is compared to the high level, the main difference is democratically positive (eight percent decrease of questions ignored and two percent decrease of questions answered). This lack of a clear pattern is further marked by very low and insignificant standard coefficients.¹¹⁴

A strong defender of the theoretical argument that internationalisation tends to damage discourse-theoretical deliberation would not, however, necessarily be troubled by the above observations. The present level of analysis is rather general, not revealing much concerning the context of actual question-answer interactions nor considering whether the hypothesis is generally correct at specific stages of internationalisation. Such considerations could be met by continuing cross-tabulation to a certain extent, but that technique does run into statistical problems, as well as problems of lucidity, when we start splitting up the tables into ever-smaller categories. It should

¹¹⁴ - 0.053 for Kendall's tau-b, - 0.059 for Spearman's rho, - 0.084 for Gamma, none of which is significant at the 0.05 level. In a two-sided Chi-Square test the cross-tabulation requires a 0.25 (in)security level to be regarded as significant. These are all non-parametrical measures, usable for data at the ordinal level.
therefore be permissible to combine the cross-tabulations with techniques that make stronger assumptions concerning the quality of the data.

Table 4.6. One-way ANOVA of internationalisation and question-answering (General Linear Model).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>2.035</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>1.246</td>
<td>.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONALISATION</td>
<td>2.035</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>1.246</td>
<td>.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>185.339</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>.816</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>187.374</td>
<td>229</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6 shows a one-way ANOVA (of a General Linear Model type) between internationalisation (independent variable) and the extent to which questions are answered (dependent variable). There are several reasons why this statistical technique has been chosen, but most importantly it is relatively efficient at capturing a large amount of variation.\textsuperscript{115} To be as generous as possible to the hypothesis under scrutiny, it is preferable to use a technique that captures more rather than less variation. The following two paragraphs give a simplified description of the method and may be skipped by readers who know it already.

The ANOVA calculates the mean of a certain variable and the variation around that mean for different groups and then estimates whether the variations and means of different groups differ sufficiently for the difference

\textsuperscript{115} The fact that ANOVA accounts for more variation than, for example, linear and logistic regressions has been confirmed in analyses which will not be reported here. In contrast with ANOVA, regression analyses do not always recognise \(\vee\)-shaped or \(\wedge\)-shaped relations between two variables. Furthermore, ANOVA is more efficient at handling interaction between variables, especially when the number of relevant independent variables is limited. As compared to linear regression analysis, ANOVA is also less demanding in regard to the data requirements of the dependent variable: in principle, regression analysis requires a continuous dependent variable, which ANOVA does not. Considerations of data requirements would perhaps suggest the use of logistic regressions. However (and in addition to the reason against logistic regression already mentioned), since the dependent variable is not dichotomous (it has three steps), logistic regression would require either that the variable be divided in two (which would make the analysis unnecessarily complex) or a loss of information (if only two steps of the variable are considered). The fact that the ANOVA is here calculated as a type of General Linear Model implies, most importantly, that the significance tests do not assume observed values to be normally distributed. This is an advantage, since my selection of observations is stratified and not randomized. I am indebted to Gösta Hägglund, Department of Statistics at Stockholm University, for guidance on these techniques.
not to be merely accidental. The procedure will also estimate the effect of any interaction between variables. For example, we may find that the group of question-answer interactions in Sweden at a low level of internationalisation has a different mean value on the extent to which questions are answered, and also a different variation around this mean, as compared with the group of question-answer interactions in France at a medium level of internationalisation. If such a difference should appear, ANOVA would analyse what grouping factor created the difference and (by its interaction term) would describe to what extent both groupings (country and level of internationalisation) must be involved to produce an effect in question-answering.

Working through the various figures in Table 4.6 will help explain the technique. The sum of squares given in the first column describes the variation around the mean of different groups. As the present model includes only one explanatory variable – internationalisation – the figure of Corrected Model (or as it is sometimes called, the Main Effect) and INTERNATIONALISATION is the same (2.035). The figure indicates how much the mean values of question-answering in the three groups of low, medium, and high levels of internationalisation deviate from the mean value of question-answering in the whole group (taking together the low, medium, and high levels of internationalisation). This variation is certainly small when compared to the variation described in the error row, which summarises the deviation of each question-answer interaction from its group mean, minus the variation accounted for by internationalisation (185.339). But this does not yet indicate any lack of importance of internationalisation. To make a fair comparison of variation between different groups, we must first account for the variation that is logically possible, and that variation is of course much greater if all question-answer interactions are able to deviate from the total group mean than if three sub-group means can deviate from the total group mean. This difference is described in the third column (df, degrees of freedom). Once the variation of the first column (Sum of Squares) is divided by the figures in the second column (df), the figures become directly comparable, as reported in the third column (Mean Squares). And here we have the first measure that actually reveals the fact that internationalisation is generally unimportant with regard to the answering of questions, since the variance between groups of internationalisation (1.017) is only marginally greater than the error in the model, often referred to as the variance within groups (0.816). More precisely, it is about 1.2 times greater, as mentioned in the next column (F = 1.246). It should also be noted that this difference could only be significant if the theoretical requirement were so relaxed as to tolerate pure coincidence producing the same event in about 29 percent of cases, as
reported in the last column of the table (p = 0.29). Finally, relating the figure of the Corrected Model to that of the Corrected Total one notices that the model does not explain more than about 1 percent of the total variation (R squared = 0.011).

Let us then investigate whether there are any conditions under which internationalisation makes more or less difference to the answering of questions. It would be consistent with the above results for internationalisation actually to explain the answering of questions, if the generality of the explanation were reduced to concern with specific countries or specific levels of internationalisation. Although the hypothesis has been shown to be problematic, it has not yet been decisively rejected by the above analysis.

The model shown in Table 4.7 introduces the country as a condition that could possibly trigger a causal importance of internationalisation. This move has significantly increased the explanatory power of the model, though the latter remains modest (R squared = 0.146; p < 0.001). But the grouping according to levels of internationalisation has not changed greatly (Mean Square = 1.255); it remains insignificant (p = 0.179) and close to the error of the model (Error = 0.724). The answering of questions is considerably more dependent on country (Mean Square = 8.985; p < 0.001). There is also a certain interaction effect between country and internationalisation, which is indicated in the row which connects the two variables with an asterisk (*, Mean Square = 2.421; p = 0.011). The latter figures keep open the possibility that internationalisation may affect deliberation at least minimally, but only in certain countries, or in different directions in different countries. The interaction effect is more easily depicted in a diagram.

Table 4.7. Two-way ANOVA (General Linear Model). Internationalisation, country and question-answering.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>27.416a</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.427</td>
<td>4.735</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalisation</td>
<td>2.509</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.255</td>
<td>1.733</td>
<td>.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>17.970</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.985</td>
<td>12.413</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalisation * Country</td>
<td>9.685</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.421</td>
<td>3.345</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>159.958</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>187.374</td>
<td>229</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. R Squared = .146 (Adjusted R Squared = .115)
Each of the three lines in Diagram 4.2 represents one country. The horizontal axis (x) describes the three levels of internationalisation while the vertical axis (y) describes the mean value of question-answer interactions in different groups. The higher the value of the vertical axis, the more questions have been answered to a greater extent. The closer the three lines are to each other, the less difference is made by whether the country in question is Sweden, Britain, or France, and the nearer to horizontal the slope of each line, the less difference is made by whether the level of internationalisation is low, medium, or high.

Diagram 4.2. Mean values of question-answering by country and degree of internationalisation (according to the model in Table 4.7).

Keeping the countries apart, we see that Sweden has experienced a small but constant increase in question-answering during internationalisation (contrary to the hypothesis). This possible effect of internationalisation is, however, an exceptional case among these three countries. Though there is a decrease of deliberation in Britain and France, that effect is not general enough to cover either all stages of internationalisation (from low to medium and from medium to high) or any single stage of internationalisation across countries (when France goes down Britain is stable and when France goes up Britain goes down). From the perspective that something must always lead to a given effect in order to count as its cause – or weaker, and more generously, that it should at least produce the effect more often than it does not – the analysis of interaction between country and internationalisation does not strengthen the hypothesis under evaluation.
Furthermore, between no levels of internationalisation do the three lines go in the same direction, although two lines (Sweden and France) follow the same route when passing from a medium to a high level of internationalisation. Rather the opposite prevails: between all three levels of internationalisation there is at least one country moving in the opposite direction to the other two. Once again, this is an illustration of the limited theoretical importance of the interaction effect between internationalisation and country: although the interaction effect is more important than the effect of internationalisation itself, it does not reveal any grounds for claiming that internationalisation has a uniform effect on the answering of questions, either in general or when focusing on individual countries and levels of internationalisation.

But there is more to the context of debate interactions than the country in which they take place. From the theoretical perspective that we are currently evaluating, it might be suspected, for example, that the main damaging effect of internationalisation will occur on ideologically loaded interactions. Only then is there a communicative need for the mutual respect that a common nationality allegedly supplies. When there is no ideological division between participants in a debate, pure self-interest is all that is needed for the debaters to accord each other full respect.

The model presented in Table 4.8 introduces such an ideological variable and reveals that it is actually important for the estimation of other variables as well. Now for the first time we see a significant effect of internationalisation on the answering of questions (Mean Square = 3.058; p = 0.010), and we also see that the independent effect of country disappears (Mean Square = 0.521; p = 0.450), while a comparably strong interaction effect between country and ideological context seems to have taken its place (Mean Square = 13.001; p < 0.001). By controlling for ideological context, this model also identifies a stronger interaction effect between internationalisation and country (Mean Square = 3.498; p < 0.001).

Introducing more variables into the model would soon eliminate its degrees of freedom and its capacity to arrive at significant estimates. But no stronger explanatory importance of internationalisation was detected when adding stepwise variables like institutional context (in terms of intra-parliament or parliament/government interaction), topic of interaction (in terms of international or non-international topic, economic or non-economic topic), the chronological position of the interaction in relation to other interactions in the debate, or the position of the debate in the economic cycle (in terms of “good times” or “bad times”). So the model in Table 4.8 could well be taken to illustrate the maximal importance that can be attributed to
internationalisation. Is internationalisation then theoretically important, according to this model?

Table 4.8. Three-way ANOVA (General Linear Model). Internationalisation, country and question-answering.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>46.616a</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.586</td>
<td>5.521</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1.042</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>.802</td>
<td>.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalisation</td>
<td>6.116</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.058</td>
<td>4.708</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological context * Country</td>
<td>13.011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.011</td>
<td>20.032</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological context * Internat</td>
<td>7.042</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.521</td>
<td>5.421</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country * Internat</td>
<td>13.990</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.498</td>
<td>5.385</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological context * Country * Internat</td>
<td>3.775</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.775</td>
<td>5.813</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>139.647</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>186.262</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. R Squared = .250 (Adjusted R Squared = .205)

To test the hypothesis, we need to know whether the reported effect of internationalisation is generally positive or negative, and if it goes in opposite directions under different conditions. Once again some lessons can be drawn from diagrams that depict mean values for different groups.

Diagram 4.3 illustrates the direction of the relation between internationalisation and question-answering. It reports the mean values underlying the Mean Square of 3.058 in the model of Table 4.8. What we see is a weak positive relation between internationalisation and the answering of questions (notice that the range of the vertical axis is smaller than in the previous diagram of the same kind). While it is too early to conclude that internationalisation has a positive effect on the extent to which questions are answered, Diagram 4.3, accompanied by the coefficients presented in Table 4.8, does represent a strong evidence against the hypothesis that

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116 The other variables of the model should nevertheless be kept in mind since the mean values would have been very different had the other variables of the model not been controlled for, which was found in analyses not reported here.
internationalisation tends to diminish the taking seriously of other debater’s arguments.

Diagram 4.3. Mean values of question-answering by levels of internationalisation (according to the model in Table 4.8).

The next diagram (4.4) shows the interaction in the above model (Table 4.8) between internationalisation and the ideological context of the question-answer utterance.

Diagram 4.4. Mean values of question-answering by internationalisation and ideological context (according to the model in Table 4.8).

Once again we see a positive relation between internationalisation and question-answering and that this is mainly a phenomenon of intra-party
Deliberation during internationalisation

It seems more likely that the deliberative quality of answering questions remains stable during internationalisation. This suggests that the theoretical suspicion that motivated developing this explanatory model was partly correct: communication between members of different parties is deliberatively more problematic than communication between members of the same party. This, in turn, supports the assumption that there is a need for something more than self-interest and the rationality of actors to enable deliberation between ideological opponents; for example a common nationality may also be necessary. But the original theoretical consideration was also much too pessimistic as judged from Diagram 4.4: there is no negative effect of internationalisation on inter-party communication, but only a positive one on *intra*-party communication.\(^{117}\) From this one should not conclude that internationalisation actually strengthens deliberation under certain conditions of ideology, but Diagram 4.4 does support the contention that it is highly unlikely that internationalisation actually decreases the deliberative quality of answering questions. Hence the hypothesis, that internationalisation tends to diminish the realisation of discourse democracy in a theoretically central regard, is further damaged.

Before ending this section we should also take a second look at what happened to the interaction effect between country and internationalisation in the model and see if our first conclusion – that there is no uniform effect – is robust. Diagram 4.5 repeats the variables of Diagram 4.2 but controls for the variables and interaction effects inherent in the model presented in Table 4.8. Comparing Diagram 4.2 with Diagram 4.5, the only differences are in the French and British cases. This follows from the fact that there was no variation in ideological context in the Swedish parliamentary debates, as reported in Table 4.3.\(^{118}\)

\(^{117}\) However, the political and democratic relevance of this difference should not be exaggerated. Drawing on a previous table (4.4), we know that interactions between members of the same party account for only ca 12 percent of total interactions.

\(^{118}\) That the ideological context is constant in the Swedish case does not invalidate the present model. If we exclude the Swedish observations, the only difference is that the explanatory power of the model increases from \(R^2 = 0.250\) to \(R^2 = 0.323\), both of which are significant at the 0.001 level. See Appendix 6 for the full model.
If we focus on the British and the French case (since the interpretation of Sweden here would not differ from the previous one), we see that the conclusion drawn from the previous model is once again supported: when one country goes up the other goes down. So the conclusion derived from Diagram 4.2 holds equally for the later, more detailed models: no uniform negative effect of internationalisation on question-answering can be supported. If anything, there is a positive relation between internationalisation and the answering of questions (Diagrams 4.3 and 4.4).

At a theoretical level, moreover, we may regard as rejected the prediction that internationalisation generally limits the extent to which deliberators engage with positions argued by others. Connecting to some previously presented authors, it does not seem realistic that “[m]utual understanding and responsiveness” (Goldmann 2001: 152) within public debate decline because of internationalisation nor that internationalisation calls into question “the conditions under which citizens can respect one another’s good faith in searching for ground of agreement.” (Miller 1995: 98)\(^\text{119}\)

\(^{119}\) Neither Goldmann nor Miller has defended the view that current internationalisation in Europe has in fact reduced the level of discourse-theoretical deliberation. Goldmann describes a plausible problem of democracy during internationalisation that, according to his view, remains to be empirically investigated; Miller, on the other hand, questions the view that internationalisation has radically diminished the existence or importance of nationalities. In regard to Miller, the refutation of the hypothesis that internationalisation tends to decrease deliberative democracy is still relevant on the grounds that he is not
However, the result does not justify our leaving aside the concept of internationalisation altogether when constructing deliberative democratic theory. There is an empirically recognised, though very limited, effect of internationalisation (Mean Square = 3.058; p = 0.010). The result can hence be used neither to defend the tendency of traditional democratic theory to disregard international matters altogether (see footnote on page 1 for references to such democratic theory).

We have not attempted to confirm any causal link between internationalisation and the parallel (while limited) increase in question-answering, but hypotheses to this effect may still be suggested. Perhaps internationalisation increases the answering of questions because it expands the pool of ideas and information available to public debate (some limited empirical support for this proposition will be presented in Section 4.3.2 below) and therefore strengthens the prospects for rationality in debate. Again a common nationality may be causally important to discourse democracy (in accordance with the argument whose prediction was refuted above) while internationalisation serves (in opposition to another assumption of the same argument) to reinforce existing nationalities (see Pettersson 2002: 320 pp. for this interpretation in the context of Swedish media policy, as well as for a wider theoretical framework). Further empirical research is needed to say if there is any truth in such hypotheses.

### 4.3.2. Information and ideas in states or nations

The element in public deliberation analysed below is the plurality of information and ideas in parliamentary debates. It is relevant to both discourse and liberal theories of deliberation, but a crucial characteristic only of the latter. Recalling a previous section, there are now two rival hypotheses concerning the effect of internationalisation: the positive one, saying that internationalisation increases the density of information and ideas by expanding the intellectual system and the number of people that can communicate; the negative one, saying that internationalisation reduces the flow of information and ideas by intensifying the negotiative element in politics and by reducing the interest and capacity of people to engage in public debate. However, not to introduce more complexity than necessary, we will discuss mainly the positive prediction in the course of the material presentation, and return to the negative prediction and its support in our conclusion. As explained and justified above (see sub-section to Section 4.2.4), obviously right in his assessment of nationalities as continually important (see for example Saward 1998: 149 and Rosow 2000: 40-4 for opposite views).
the units of analysis are no longer question-answer interactions, but discrete speeches in parliamentary debate.

We will first take a look at the number of speeches containing at least one reference to national or international mass media, at various stages of internationalisation. In total 53 speeches will be analysed: 18 each in Sweden and Britain, and 17 in France; 18 at the medium and high levels of internationalisation and 17 at the low level. The only change during internationalisation that could be detected, as shown in Table 4.9, is a drop in references to national mass media, while there is never more than one speech, out of as many as 17 or 18, that refers to an international media product. On this account the positive hypothesis is problematic, since an allegedly increasing quantity of ideas and information has at least not made its way through the mass media and into parliamentary debates.

Table 4.9. Number of speeches referring to national and international mass media, by level of internationalisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National media</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International media</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One could argue that media products are not themselves sources of either ideas or information, but rather mediators of information and ideas that originate elsewhere. At least one step closer to the origin is the expertise reported in Table 4.10. The term expertise is here used in a broad sense, to include the operative quality possessed by most individuals and organisations that provide information that is used to support or weaken an argument. This may include references to, for example, OECD, national statistics, private companies, and labour unions, if they have produced any kind of investigation or analysis. Mere statements of an interest group position (which may of course be formulated by both private companies, labour unions, or other actors) are excluded from this category. Appendix 3 gives further details of the coding procedure.
Table 4.10. Number of speeches referring to national or international expertise, by level of internationalisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National expertise</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International expertise</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At all levels of internationalisation there are between 9 and 11 speeches referring to national expertise out of a total of 17 or 18. In regard to references to international expertise there is more variation during internationalisation. At the low and medium levels the numbers are 3 (out of 17) and 2 (out of 18) respectively, while at the high level of internationalisation the number of speeches making this kind of reference is 6 (out of 18). On this measure there is therefore a limited support for the positive hypothesis, although the change (by 3 or 4 references) is certainly small when compared to the number of speeches that make national references (9, 10 or 11). While our sample is too small to statistically reject the possibility that the observed trend is a coincidence, the sample is also too small to apply the relevant techniques for determining the probability of such a coincidence.\textsuperscript{120} It may be concluded that the figures above do not by themselves provide any sufficient ground for the hypothesis that internationalisation strengthens plurality of expertise – but also that observations made nevertheless conform to this hypothesis.

The above table does not give any precise account of the number of experts or expert organisations that are referred to in parliamentary debates, since it is possible, and even likely, that a speech that refers to one expert will also refer to another. To quantify the number of experts referred to in a single speech would ideally require a means of factoring in the varying lengths of the speeches (which is not equally required when the analysis is confined to counting the number of individual speeches, since a single speech is, as argued in a previous section, important in itself regardless of its length). However, the speeches that have been described in the tables above are not dramatically

\textsuperscript{120} For example a chi-square test, which would be relevant in view of the data considered here, assumes that no expected cell frequency is less than five (Walsh 1990: 168). In the above case, three out of six expected cell frequencies are less than five, which clearly points to the inappropriateness of using such a technique.
different in length. For that reason it is not obviously misleading to present information of the number of references made at different levels of internationalisation, which is done in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11. Number of different experts referred to in totality of analysed material.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the collected material is not evidently suited to yielding an unbiased picture of the number of experts cited, the figures must be interpreted with care. But as the increase of references to expertise from the medium to the high level of internationalisation is so large, the most reasonable interpretation seems to be that Table 4.11 reinforces the impression already gained from Table 4.10. A positive effect on the richness of information sources when going from a medium to a high level of internationalisation could hence be argued (though not confirmed) on these grounds. The case for this interpretation is further strengthened by the fact that an increased plurality of expertise is a uniform trend in all three countries, as shown in Table 4.12. Especially Sweden and France seem to have enjoyed a greater vitality of their parliamentary debates, regarding the plurality of expertise, during the period of internationalisation.

To the impression of an increasing density of ideas, one may add also that political initiatives taken by members of parliaments have increased dramatically over the past decades. As will be shown in Section 5.3.4, the number of Early Day Motions in Britain and Private Members’ Motions in Sweden has doubled several times in the course of internationalisation (Tables 5.7 and 5.8). To the extent that politicians tend to express the information or ideas they have, as suggested in Section 4.2.2, this growth in initiatives adds further support to the interpretation that internationalisation does not generally impoverish political debates of their information and ideas.
While these conclusions does not refute the view that some particular information and ideas are kept away from public and parliamentary debate because of internationalisation, it does cast serious doubt on more sweeping formulations such as “[p]erhaps the political silence ... is the greatest risk for democracy in the internationalised small-state” (Stenelo 1990: 351).121 If anything, according to the measures applied here, internationalisation would appear to enrich parliamentary debate and, arguably, public debate in general.

But even if there is relatively more support for the view that internationalisation increases the supply of information and ideas available for public deliberation (for example Stenelo 1990: 357 or Goldmann 2001: 162), there may still be democratic worries concerning who controls this enlarged body of information and ideas. According to one influential argument, governments control the information yielded from the internationalisation of state functions; and furthermore, governments exploit such information to strengthen their position against parliaments and other domestic actors. This argument has been used, for example, to explain why governments prefer to set up international institutions like the EU rather than rely on regime arrangements of a weaker kind; the reason given is that governments gain advantages in information as compared to other domestic actors when they transfer policy competences to international institutions (Moravscik 1993).

Is it true, then, that governments, rather than parliaments, make the most use of information from international expertise? One approach to answering this question is to compare the relative proportions of government and parliament representatives that rely on international expertise in parliamentary debate. Table 4.13 cross-tabulates the relevant groups.

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121 Translated: “Kanske är den politiska tystnaden ... den största risken för demokratin i den internationaliserade småstaten.”
Table 4.13. Cross-tabulation of institutional context and references to international expertise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker refers to national expertise</th>
<th>Institutional home of speaker</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>Members of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that there is a slight difference of about 12 percentage points in favour of the hypothesis that it is more common that government representatives refer to international expertise than that parliamentarians do; which is however not significant at the 0.05 cut-off level ($p = 0.286$ on a two-sided chi-square test). Possibly there is some small material substance to the theory, but from the knowledge yielded by this analysis, that substance, if it exists, is not sufficient to justify the theory. Rather it is necessary at this point for those who rely on the assumption to present empirical evidence that supports it. If they cannot, it should simply be left out from future theory, since there are certainly alternative explanations of European integration.

Another assumption often made by inter-governmentalists to explain European integration is that international co-operation provides governments with an opportunity to blame unpopular decisions on external actors (Moravscik 1993). However, in no speech analysed here – nor anywhere in the much larger surrounding parliamentary debate material perused in preparation of this analysis – was it the case that a critique directed at a government was dismissed by a claim that responsibility lay at another political level. Against this background, the view that internationalisation makes scapegoating easier and more frequent would seem to exaggerate the democratic problem of internationalisation.

4.3.3. Communicative rationality between nations

We now turn to the second hypothesis that suggests a democratic possibility in internationalisation, namely that international public deliberations improve. Let us start by surveying the international presence in parliamentary budget debates at different levels of internationalisation. Table 4.14 reports the number of speeches that make at least one internationally oriented comment.
(See Appendix 3 for a more precise note on what is regarded as an internationally oriented comment.) What is established is that some vague kind of international awareness is discernibly present in all countries and at all levels of internationalisation. The only theoretically relevant observation at this point is that some very limited awareness of international matters apparently can exist at the lowest level of internationalisation. A common pattern of consumption, common economic interests, common economic decisions, common economic problems, all at the level established by current internationalisation – these do not seem to be necessary conditions for the presence of an international perspective in budgetary parliamentary debates.

Table 4.14. Number of speeches making at least one international comment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches making international comment</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of speeches</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What kind of international perspective is then present in budgetary debates at various levels of internationalisation? Table 4.15 shows the number of speeches that make at least one international comparison. Here we see that the absolute level has fallen as compared to the previous table on international comments, but more interestingly that the stability shown in the first table more or less remains. To base the conclusion of an effect of internationalisation on the difference between 9 and 13 speeches, one must be rather careless about the methods used in compiling the information. A better conclusion follows the argument derived from Table 4.14 above, namely that not only international comments but also international comparisons in parliamentary debate apparently evolve independently of political or economic internationalisation.

Table 4.15. Number of speeches making at least one international comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches making international comparison</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of speeches</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A perhaps even more surprising observation is that the same conclusion holds for statements about a country being internationally dependent. It has often been argued that internationalisation makes states more dependent on each other (although the exact meaning of that statement, as well as its relation to democratic theory, has often been understood differently by different authors, as shown in Section 3.1.2). One would then expect that the more international the economy of a country, the more occupied public debate would be with the notion of international dependence. But if an empirical analysis is confined to how many speeches actually make an explicit statement of that matter, as in this study, then we should conclude that internationalisation is not a crucial factor in the public diffusion of the notion of international dependence. Table 4.16 shows that the number of speeches affirming the international dependence of the speaker’s country does not increase during internationalisation.

Table 4.16. Number of speeches stating international dependence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speeches stating international dependence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of speeches</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also some (not much) support for the conclusion that parliamentary discourse on international dependence came before parliamentary discourse on international independence. As a matter of public parliamentary debate, international independence seems to have started abruptly at a medium level of internationalisation (Table 4.17). A possible interpretation of this order of development – that a discourse in terms of dependence may have preceded one in terms of independence in the course of internationalisation – would, of course, be that the discourse on independence was brought in less to describe the predicaments of politics and more to build up a rhetorical compensation for a recent lack of independence. However, this interpretation is problematic in view of the observation that political autonomy was greater at the medium than at the low level of internationalisation in ideologically central areas such as the level of public spending and the distribution of resources in accordance with social justice (see Chapter 3). A possibly better
interpretation, therefore, is that the time of low internationalisation followed very shortly after the Second World War – that is, an example of extreme international dependence of which there was greater public awareness in the immediate aftermath of the war than twenty years later. Relevant political memory, it would seem, remains a powerful factor for five, six, or seven years, but by twenty-five or thirty years its force tends to have evaporated.

Table 4.17. Number of speeches stating international independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above analysis should soften the argument that public awareness and deliberation are conditioned by the integration of markets, the emergence of economic regimes, patterns of consumption and lifestyle, etc. But this analysis has not yet made any direct attempt to identify elements of international deliberation. If such elements were found to be strengthened by internationalisation, some democratic problems of internationalisation would be considerably reduced. International deliberation would, at its highest level of realisation, guarantee that the people of the world are always listened to when decisions are made, even in territorially more restricted polities. On the other hand, it is still possible that the hypothesis, that internationalisation strengthens international deliberation, is wrong and, moreover, that international deliberation is stable at a very low level. Let us then make an attempt to estimate the presence of international deliberation at the level of states.

To what extent has it been the case that speeches in parliamentary debate have demonstrated at least some awareness of the consequences in foreign countries of such political action as the parliament may undertake? If there are many such instances, we should conclude that at least one precondition is fulfilled for respecting the interests of people who reside outside the state boundaries. Table 4.18, however, demonstrates a great incapacity of democracy in this regard. Only two out of 53 speeches considered the consequences abroad of any political action for which the assembly is responsible; and there is certainly no positive effect that could be attributed to
increased internationalisation (which is in line with the above conclusion, namely that internationalisation does not seem to affect the international awareness of parliamentarians).

Table 4.18. Number of speeches revealing explicit awareness of international effects of decisions concerned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speeches aware of international effects of own decisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of speeches</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An even more demanding interpretation of the hypothesis would be that parliamentarians are expected to engage in the formation of public opinion in favour of people residing outside the country’s borders. This could involve arguments about refugees, foreign aid, or the welfare effects in other countries of either tax-competition or devaluation of currency. As expected, given the above results, there is not much room for such considerations in the parliamentary debate on budgetary matters (Table 4.19).

Table 4.19. Number of speeches forming opinion for people residing outside of country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speeches making opinion for people outside country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of speeches</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is fair to conclude that international deliberation has not developed at the level of states, and that it does not seem likely that it will so develop because of the ongoing process of internationalisation. However, it is still possible that there is something like international deliberation at the international level in organisations like the EU. This remains to be investigated in Chapter 7.
4.4. Summary and further conclusions

Different purposes of deliberation suggest different concepts of deliberation. To hold rulers accountable, for example, the people need information and ideas about what policies are undertaken. To justify and legitimate the form and content of political activity, to take another example, public debate must conform to a communicative rationality that is fair to everyone.

As for communicative rationality within nations, there is a theoretically expected negative effect of internationalisation, on the grounds that certain cultural preconditions for rational discussion are undermined by internationalisation, while international communicative rationality is expected to increase in the course of internationalisation. Regarding the supply of politically relevant ideas and information, theoretical expectations take opposite directions: a positive hypothesis is that internationalisation increases the density of information and ideas by expanding the size and content of the intellectual system; a negative hypothesis is that internationalisation reduces the flow of information and ideas, the most important reasons for which are that it intensifies the negotiative element in politics, reduces people’s incentive to engage in political debate, and introduces an element of superior national interest.

Investigations of national parliamentary debates on budgetary matters in Sweden, Britain, and France show that references to national and international mass media are stable from a low to a medium level of internationalisation and decrease from a medium to a high level. However, the drop is modest and the material analysed is limited. With regard to references to expertise and expert organisations, as well as to the measure of information source plurality, the pattern is the opposite: the number of references remains stable from the low to the medium level of internationalisation and increases between the medium and high levels. More research is certainly needed, but at the present stage the best interpretation – in line with the larger number of observations – is that we ought to reject the hypothesis that the present kind of radical internationalisation in Europe has reduced to a non-trivial degree the supply of information and ideas in the area of economic policy-making. With the same disclaimers, there is some support for the argument that internationalisation increases the density of ideas in public debate. Moreover, governments do not make significantly more use of expertise from international actors than parliaments do, and no signs of scapegoating international organisations in debate-interaction between parliament and government representatives have been detected.
In investigating nationally limited communicative rationality, we encounter a striking stability among levels of internationalisation. The only detectable tendency is actually — in direct opposition to the hypothesis considered — that such deliberation improves in the course of internationalisation. At the level of states we also found that international communicative rationality is stable, at a very low level, throughout internationalisation. Only exceptional speeches state awareness of effects abroad of the decisions they are concerned with, and they show an equally low effort to form opinion in favour of people residing abroad.

As for more politically oriented interpretations, the results suggest that internationalisation has a democratic potential to improve the richness of ideas and information and also that the erosion of cultural preconditions for efficient intra-national deliberation has been exaggerated as a democratic problem of internationalisation. However, a democratic challenged does appear in the fact that international deliberation at the level of states does not seem to develop at all during internationalisation. Whether or not it is possible to overcome this difficulty by means of international institutions like the European Parliament is investigated in Chapter 7.
5. Participation during internationalisation

Does internationalisation tend to diminish democratic political participation at the level of states? As in the preceding two chapters, the question will be specified and answered in three stages. First, an idea of democratic participation and its various expected relations to internationalisation are presented, then operational indicators of democratic participation are developed, and finally an empirical investigation into predicted effects of internationalisation on democratic participation is undertaken, in the same areas and countries as were considered in previous chapters. An account of the methods used and the results obtained appears at the end of the chapter.

5.1. Principles and predictions of democratic participation

While political participation can be conventionally understood as the means or activities by which decision-making power is partitioned among a group of individuals, more attention is needed to considering what makes political participation democratic. Let us begin with the principle of political equality (for its historical origins see Roberts 1996; Cartledge 1996; Raaflaub 1996, and for approaches to more contemporary matters see Dahl 1989; Beetham 1994).

The basic idea of political equality is that the voices of all members of a polity should be taken into account, and equally taken into account, when a political decision is made. One famous implication of this idea is that, if an issue is to be decided by vote, the minority must abide by the decision of the majority; for if the minority rules over a majority, the individual voices that make up the minority are given a higher value than those that make up the majority, which would contradict the concept of political equality. Hence if we accept the principle of political equality, a majority is justified in ruling over a minority (as long as the majority does nothing in prejudice of political equality itself; this and other restrictions on the majority principle are discussed by Dahl 1982: 49,195-205; Saward 1998: 53-57; Bellamy and Castiglione 2000: 75-79). Less often discussed implications of political equality are: that a political procedure, regardless of whether or not it involves voting, must be decisive, so as not to favour persons with a conservative ideological

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122 As in the chapter on democratic autonomy, the conceptual preliminaries will be exploited also in the final chapter, which justifies attention to some details that it would otherwise not have been necessary to consider.

123 One may take that definition of political participation to exclude, among other things, activities of political deliberation. See Karlsson 2001: 58-59 for different views on the relation between deliberation and decision-making.
orientation (inclined towards no or slow changes of the status quo) at the expense of radically oriented persons (inclined towards many or rapid changes of the status quo); and that a decision-making procedure must be neutral between various decision alternatives, so as not to favour persons with a certain political standpoint over persons with another.\textsuperscript{124}

However, one should recognise that majority voting does not attain a perfectly equal distribution of power among persons with different ideological standpoints. Majority voting favours individuals who share many political standpoints with many other individuals at the expense of those who share few political standpoints with few others. For example, if a group of one hundred decisions are made, majority voting will serve the individuals of a stable majority in a hundred out of a hundred cases, while political equality might require – depending on the size of the minority and the importance of each decision – some cases to be decided in favour of a minority. More specifically, individuals with standpoints that permit them to turn either of two groups into a majority – that is the median voters – will have a better bargaining position than individuals with standpoints excluding them from cooperation with any majority. These deficits of political equality are not logically unavoidable (if they were, they would be of little interest) but arise if majority voting takes place among persons with different views. For example, they will not necessarily be present if the decision method is based on the drawing of lots (although this method would lead to other problems), or if majority voting is used in a polity where every member has the same political standpoint or where no member is ideologically more remote than all the others. The idealised character of the latter examples notwithstanding, they do confirm that the two principles of political equality and majority rule are different and cannot both be fully realised in the same place and at the same time.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{124} See May 1952/1982 for a different but not necessarily incompatible way of relating these concepts of democratic procedure – political equality (or anonymity), majority rule, decisiveness, and neutrality. (May considers the conditions of majority rule, rather than the implications of political equality.)

\textsuperscript{125} It may sound dissonant that an implication (majority rule) is not fully compatible with its premise (political equality). Let me by way of explanation therefore emphasise that political equality implies that, when a voting procedure is used to make a single decision, it is closer to political equality if the majority decides than if any minority decides. The implication says nothing about cases when voting procedures are not used to make an individual decision, and in such cases the two ideas – majority rule and political equality – can therefore diverge. Nor does political equality imply that majority rule is a perfect approximation of political equality when one decision is made in the course of making several decisions, or when the boundaries between different decisions are porous.
Such considerations could lead to the rejection of either political equality or majority voting as the core principle of democratic participation, or to the rejection of both in favour of some third principle. To answer the initial question of this chapter (does internationalisation tend to diminish democratic political participation at the level of states?) it is however not required to state exactly what proposition should be relied upon in defining democratic participation. To evaluate the empirical accuracy of different hypotheses, the hypotheses do not have to be logically consistent with each other, let alone based on a common set of assumptions. Only when the purpose is to integrate different arguments into a coherent whole (as will be the case in the final chapter) must democratic participation be defined more precisely.

Moreover, in contemporary European political practice, the two principles of political equality and majority voting are hardly separable at the operational level of analysis. At least in the material of which analysis will be undertaken in this study the observations do not illustrate any divergence between the two ideas. Since the empirical investigations are then not dependent on the precise conceptualisation of democratic participation, an appropriate strategy would be to maximise the theoretical output of the analysis. This means that the group of arguments to be empirically evaluated should be identified as widely and generously as possible. One could stipulate therefore that to be accounted for in the empirical analysis it is enough that an argument connect to either majority voting or to political equality or to some closely related principle.

Not to stipulate any single definite principle of democratic participation does imply some uncertainty about what the relevant kind of participation is. But even if a category seems to have vague boundaries, it can still be precisely addressed. For the purpose of doing so, the concept of democratic participation will, from now on, be used to cover the degree to which public power is controlled by procedures approximating the principle of political equality, the principle of majority voting, or some other, closely related

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126 This conclusion will support the conceptualisation of democracy proposed in the final Chapter, 8, which relies neither on the majority principle nor on the principle of political equality.

127 It may perhaps be argued that proportional elections of representatives are closer to the ideal of political equality than majoritarian elections, while majoritarian elections of representatives are closer to the ideal of majority voting than are proportional elections. But that interpretation would not be generally convincing. At least the principle of political equality has at least been strongly emphasised as not discriminating between proportional and majoritarian methods (Dahl 1979/1998: 111). At the level of elected representatives it is even more difficult to identify operational differences between political equality and majority voting.
principle. The concept could be differentiated along several lines: (i) the proximity of decision-making procedures to the principle of political equality, majority voting or some other closely related principle; (ii) the intensity with which such procedures control policy output; (iii) the relative size and importance of the policy area so controlled; (iv) the relative number of persons who make use of various means of participation. Confining the analysis to these variables, democratic participation will be realised to the extent (i) that decision-making procedures approximate the principle of political equality, majority voting or some other closely related principle, (ii) that such procedures exercise a firm control over policy outcome, (iii) that this applies to all policy areas, and (iv) that all members of the polity and their elected representatives participate under the above conditions. At the same time, the quality of democratic participation is absent to the extent (i) that decision-making procedures oppose the principle of political equality, majority voting, or some other closely related principle, (ii) that such procedures exercise a firm control over policy outcomes, (iii) that this holds for all policy areas, and (iv) that all members of the polity and their elected representatives participate under these conditions.

Thus understood, democratic participation does not discriminate between direct and indirect participation. Contemporary democracies are direct in terms of parliamentary and presidential elections, while they make more substantial decisions indirectly, via elected representatives or their appointed executive. The executive of the parliament should, in accordance with the principles of both political equality and majority rule, be accountable before a majority of the parliamentarians at any single time, and the parliament should be accountable before a majority of the citizens at the times of regular general elections. However, what mix of direct and indirect participation is preferable from the perspective of democratic participation depends on contextual factors. If the territory or population of the polity increases, the expansion of representative measures may promote democratic participation. If the polity becomes increasingly stratified along economic lines, or if it increasingly produces socially closed elite groups, the expansion of direct participatory measures may promote democratic participation. Such contextual factors are always with us and we can never disregard them. To put it differently, there is no reason to expect to find a universally valid answer to the question of whether democratic participation ought to be direct or indirect.

Furthermore, if not justified by contextual factors, a claim that democracy requires more direct participation at the expense of representation, or vice versa, would violate the democratic notion of neutrality among decision-making alternatives, as mentioned above. Given the democratic principle of either political equality or majority rule, and when a voting procedure is being
used, only the number of votes should be decisive for the outcome, and no importance should be given to what is actually preferred by different persons, be it representative or direct participation. Hence there is not only an absence of discrimination between direct and representative democracy in regard to democratic participation, but, stipulating at a general level, such a discriminatory assumption would actually make democratic participation contradictory to the principles of both political equality and majority voting.\textsuperscript{128}

But even if a democratic theory does not stipulate any required \textit{maximal} level of \textit{direct} citizen participation, it should be recognised that direct citizen participation is important, first, because there is under all circumstances a \textit{minimal} requirement of direct participation that must be met if representative bodies are to be elected by the citizenry, and second, because more extensive direct participation might be important for the accomplishment of some additional normative aims. Regarding the second point: (i) citizens may learn to recognise that they are part of a society that affects them; (ii) it has been argued that direct participation improves social integration, and for that reason serves to realise political equality; (iii) broad popular participation in politics may facilitate consent to collective decisions; (iv) direct participation has, if nothing else, the virtue of facilitating self-expression (for all arguments, see Pateman 1970: 36,42,63,110). Hence even if democracy does not by definition require maximal direct political participation, the concept of direct political participation can serve an important function in democratic theory.

We can now move on to another conceptual investigation.

The view that an actor may \textsl{control} something \textit{to a certain degree}, which is assumed in the very definition of democratic participation, may seem a misunderstanding of the two terms. The problem would be that (from one political theory perspective) control is regarded as an absolute and indivisible property: something is either totally controlled by an actor, or the actor has no control over it at all; something is either controlled by one actor alone, or there is no control over it at all. In short, control is assumed to be absolute and indivisible. (For references to theorists who defend this view, see Dahl 1982: 22-23).

However, this concept of control (much influenced by a traditional conception of sovereignty, e.g. Rousseau 1765/1992: 52-54, Bk. 2, Ch. 2; Kurtulus 2004: 60-78), is either false or empty. It is true, by definition, that if two actors are divided over \textit{whether or not} a given policy should be undertaken, one of them will be in absolute control of the matter. A given policy is either

\textsuperscript{128} To avoid misunderstanding: maximal participation by either elected representatives or ordinary citizens may still be required. What is considered above is the kind of participation – direct or indirect – and not the appropriate level of either kind.
pursued or not. But it is obviously false to say that only one actor controls what policy is pursued. Nothing prevents the weaker of two actors from bringing to bear his limited capacity on the stronger actor, compelling the latter to settle for a decision which would not have been chosen if the weaker actor had agreed with the stronger actor, or had been absent, or had not attempted to influence the decision.

The problem is not that some theorists have been occupied with truisms, but rather that defining control as an absolute and indivisible property reduces the concept’s field of application to hypothetical cases of predefined and mutually exclusive decision-alternatives. In accord with a number of predictive arguments about internationalisation and democratic participation, the relevant kind of control is of a different nature, as will be clear from the following section. Hence, at least in the context that we are presently dealing with, there is nothing strange about relying on a concept – democratic participation – defined according to the extent to which public power is controlled by procedures approximating the principles of political equality, majority voting or some other closely related principle.

To sum up, this section has related the concept of democratic participation to an array of democratic pairs of principles: political equality and majority voting, direct participation and representative participation, political control as a qualitative or political control as a quantitative property. At a general level, the argument has been that there is no reason to restrict the concept of democratic participation to any one such principle. Hence we have not found any conceptual circumstances that restrict our freedom to define democratic political participation in accordance with the hypothesised effects of internationalisation which are to be empirically evaluated.

In what follows various arguments will be presented that predict causal relations between internationalisation and democratic participation, as the latter may be loosely defined.

5.1.1. Democratic participation and internationalisation

Most arguments that suggest that internationalisation affects democratic participation resemble the ones outlined in the chapter on political deliberation. It was there proposed, among other things, that internationalisation of market or state functions tends to expand the practice of negotiation, as opposed to a hierarchical form of decision making (see Section 4.1.3), into a wider set of policy issues. The standard suspected effect of such an expansion is, in turn, a decreasing level of political participation. A maximal outcome from international negotiations requires minimal domestic
conflicts, and one means of avoiding such conflicts is to minimize democratic participation (Goldmann 1986: 5-6, *et passim*). Participation can be reduced either because individuals – ordinary citizens or elected representatives – believe that their interest in a good bargain is best served by reducing their own participation, or because individuals are discouraged from participating by their negotiating agent – the government. Hence the deeper and more widespread the process of internationalisation, the more constrained democratic participation is expected to be, given a national preference for good rather than bad international bargains.129

This argument is vulnerable to at least one theoretical criticism. The crucial point is how to achieve national unity in a way that will improve national bargaining power. While Goldmann presents the argument that participation must be limited for the sake of national unity, the exact opposite relation is equally if not more firmly grounded in democratic theory, namely that political participation serves to create a common acceptance of collective decisions (see previous references to Pateman 1970). On the latter position, internationalisation should be expected to increase democratic participation since the latter strengthens national unity, which in turn facilitates successful negotiations.

The empirical investigations required to solve this problem cannot be undertaken in this study, but we should recognise that there are less problematic arguments which still predict negative effects of internationalisation on democratic participation. We can hold on to the assumption that internationalisation generally expands the element of negotiation in politics, but instead of arguing that a good outcome in international negotiations depends on national unity, we may suggest that a good outcome presumes that the negotiator has a certain leeway for manoeuvre during the process of negotiation (see Section 4.1.3 for authors discussing this premise). What arguments and information will be exchanged in a negotiation cannot be fully known in advance, and finding a mutually satisfying agreement has, like any rational interaction, an element of improvisation about it and requires the making of quick adjustments to fresh information. Hence as long as the demos or its elected parliament is interested in a good international bargain, it will expand the room for manoeuvre available to its executive agent which, other things being equal, represents a weakening of democratic participation.

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129 As in the chapter on deliberation this effect could be argued to be plausible only in the area of security policy (Goldmann 1986: 32), but, as also pointed out in that chapter, any policy area, and certainly that of international political economy, may be “securitized” in the sense of being publicly treated as crucial for survival (Waever 1997).
One may also suggest that, once internationalisation has increased the government’s room for manoeuvre in one policy area, the effect will spill over into other policy areas, perhaps because divisions within government administrations imitate each other in their quest for legitimacy, or because programs for training and recruitment of staff are common to more than one division of government administration.

Having considered effects that derive from the increasing importance of negotiation during internationalisation, we now turn to arguments that assume a supreme national interest in policy that is made in direct relation to territorially external or fluidly located actors. This argument is more or less the same as the one presented in the chapter on deliberation and may be put in brief: To the extent that political opposition and debate challenge what is regarded as a supreme national interest, the opposition can be regarded as dangerously disloyal and the debate as dangerously divisive; and for the same reason, the invoking of sanctions against the opposition may be expected. Since political participation is at least to some degree driven by a desire to change policies, formal or informal sanctions against those who oppose any currently dominant position are likely to reduce participation overall. Hence if internationalisation establishes something like a supreme national interest in the political procedure (as argued in the previous chapter on deliberation), it will also tend to reduce political participation, at both the level of the demos and that of its elected representatives.

On one point it is worth noting a difference between arguments about deliberation and arguments about participation. In the area of participation it is a standard claim (much more than in the area of deliberation) that since internationalisation has reduced the political autonomy of states, it is bound to reduce incentives to political participation in general. This reduction of incentives to political participation applies to both the demos and its elected representatives, since both are assumed to derive their incentives from a belief in their political autonomy.

Concerning internationalisation of market functions, Petersson et al. claim that

[a]nother reason why election turnout and membership [of parties] has gone down is, paradoxically, that voters have less power today. Globalisation has reduced the control and influence of traditional politics. Boundaries have become porous. Commodities, money, and information flow across boundaries alongside political control. All countries are more caught up in the power of other countries without this power itself being politically controlled. (Petersson et al. 2000: 97, translated)130

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130 Citation in original: “En annan orsak till att valdeltagandet och medlemskap [i partier] har gått tillbaka är, paradoxalt nog, att väljarna har fått mindre makt. Globaliseringen har reducerat den traditionella politikens styrning och påverkan. Gränserna har blivit mer...”
This argument could be strengthened by recognising that democracy is a slow and time-consuming method of making decisions, and that internationalisation of market functions reduces the efficiency of such procedures. If a slow democratic procedure increasingly makes decisions in reaction to new social and economic conditions unexpectedly created by private actors, rather than in response to social and economic conditions carefully determined by the parliament itself, then at least one of two possible consequences will follow: the decisions will be implemented too late, to the accompaniment of a certain loss of resources and control; or the intensity of democratic participation will decrease, being weakened by significantly shortened procedures. Hence, internationalisation of market functions may be expected to make private actors more influential in regard to when an economic transaction will take place, which in turn tends to decrease the efficiency of comparably slow decision-making procedures like the democratic one.

Regarding the internationalisation of state functions in the EU, the same negative prediction is developed by Radealli, commenting on Mair (1999):

> Policy issues are still debated in the national arena, but are mostly decided at the European level. By contesting national elections on policy issues that are decided elsewhere, ‘voters are being offered a voice which is likely to have little or no effect on the practice of decision-making’ (Mair 1999:25). Europeanization thus contributes to the process of de-politicization, indifference, and popular disengagement. (Radealli 2000: 11; for the same view in the more general terms of internationalisation, see Stenelo 1990: 355)

Radealli does not speak directly of citizen participation in general elections, but his remark on ‘de-politicisation’ and ‘popular disengagement’ would be incomprehensible if it made no implication of that kind. Hence it is not a marginal or obscure idea that internationalisation of market or state functions tends to decrease the political participation of citizens or their elected representatives.

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131 Before a decision can be democratically made, an issue must be discovered and formulated, a broad and unconstrained public debate must take place, and new insights must be brought to the original propositions; a political party must take the issue into its program and general elections must be held. Only then can the parliament take its decision.

132 After the above-cited remark, Radealli notes the option of re-politicization at the EU level. Empirical evidence, but no theoretical argument, is adduced in support of that view.
The suspected negative effect on citizen participation may take on a broad range of forms, but the arguably most important kind of citizen participation is participation in general elections (see various contributions in Agné et al. 2000 for analyses of the relation between general election turnout and European integration). In the first place, participation in general elections is the main means of assuring that the general policy program worked out by elected representatives is supported by a majority of citizens. Secondly, participation in general elections may help promote the acceptance of collective decisions (see Pateman 1970: 42-43 or, for an elaboration, Agné 2000a: 119). Thirdly, and in development of the first point, it may be suspected that if turnout in general elections is very low, the reason for that may be that parts of the demos is de facto excluded from political participation, albeit by informal or latent means. Fourthly, participation in general elections may approximate the principle of political equality more than any other activity in contemporary politics.

The next section will suggest and defend some operational indicators of democratic participation.

5.2. Operationalising democratic participation

For the reasons just mentioned, it is evidently useful to treat turnout in general elections as an indicator of democratic participation at the level of the citizenry as a whole. That information could be complemented by accounts of, for example, citizen membership of political parties or taking of political initiatives. But a choice has to be made, ultimately for economic reasons, and it is reasonable to focus on voter turnout.133

At the level of elected representatives, democratic participation requires that a parliament control political outcomes: to the extent that a parliament is democratically elected and able to control the sum total of publicly exerted power the exertion of public power follows the principles of democratic participation.

The parliaments dealt with in this study do not all claim power over public administration and authorities to the same extent, but all of them do seek to

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133 Another internationally relevant dimension of democratic participation concerns generality and equality in the distribution of suffrage among people who permanently live in a country. People who move across national boundaries belong to categories like “immigrants” or “refugees” that may be limited in their rights to political participation according to place and time. To investigate the relation between the internationalisation of people and the naturalisation of foreigners would be an important task for a more ambitious study.
control their respective governments. It will therefore simplify comparisons between countries to focus on the relation between parliaments and governments. A theoretically better grounded reason for imposing the same restriction is the principle that we should concentrate on the variables in which the hypothesis under scrutiny most clearly predicts an effect of internationalisation.

The relative powers of parliaments and governments have often been discussed by reference to procedural regulations stipulated by the constitution of the state (see various contributions in Döring 1995). There are several reasons why it is a complicated matter to assess the extent to which either the parliament or the government controls policy output or the extent to which parliament controls government by means of procedural regulations. In the first place, the differences that we are looking for are rather subtle ones. On the fundamental point that the government is accountable to the parliament, there is no variation in the material here under investigation. And once we turn to more subtle constitutional matters, and try to compare them over time or across countries, their interpretation in terms of democracy or power sometimes becomes undeterminable. This has to do with the fact that very different procedural regulations can be used for similar purposes. For example, in Fifth Republic France the government is free to selectively group articles and amendments of the annual finance bill in a policy package which the parliament must either reject or accept as a whole (article 44.3 in the French constitution; see Huber 1996: 3 for a discussion). That resource is not available to British governments, although the uniquely British prohibition on parliament to propose increases of taxation (May 1989, Ch. 26) can have a similar effect on the participation of parliamentarians. If relations between parliaments and governments were completely determined by regulations that are unique to individual cases, to compare them over time or across countries in terms of control or power would be extremely dependent on personal judgments – and it would be downright impossible to analyse one and the same set of variables in different cases, as methodologists sometimes propose we do (George 1979).

To the extent that constitutions should be read as a whole, they are difficult to compare across countries, but by the same token, it could be argued, still useful for comparisons over time. However, comparisons of constitutional regulations over time are even more difficult, but for another reason. Compared to most other political entities, constitutions are very stable and insensitive to the modest dislocations of power that the hypothesis under scrutiny in this chapter can reasonably be interpreted to claim. For example, it may be suggested that proportional election systems yield weak governments and strong parliaments, while majoritarian election systems yields strong
governments and weak parliaments. Still, treated as an indicator of the power balance between parliaments and governments, the measuring by election system would capture only a minimal variation during our period of investigation. France has experimented with proportional elections, the last time between 1986 and 1988 (Farrell 2001: 51), but has predominantly used a majoritarian system, while Sweden has had proportional, and Britain majoritarian, elections over the whole period.134

These problems notwithstanding, for an indication of democratic participation by elected representatives we will consider some procedural regulations that are unique to particular countries and very stable over time; it is worth doing this if only to confirm that such information is of little use for our purpose. However, because of the difficulties mentioned, the main method will be to look for institutional properties that exist in all countries under investigation and seem to be crucial to parliamentary democracy in general. Consideration will now be given to three general measures which together roughly indicate the degree of parliamentary control over budget policy output: first, the attention drawn to themselves in budgetary debate by members of parliament as opposed to members of government; secondly, the investigatory resources possessed by parliament as opposed to government; thirdly, the policy initiatives of parliament that are finally accepted in the budget as opposed to of government.

The operationalisation as a whole, like that in the previous chapter, appears to be reasonably valid, in the sense that it is preferable to measures that have informed previous analyses of similar theoretical questions. Being general in character, the measures proposed avoid the problems involved in studying constitutional regulations.

5.2.1. Drawing attention

The first general indicator is concerned with how much political attention is drawn to themselves by members of parliament and members of government respectively. More specifically, the indicator is the balance between the number of questions directed to members of parliament and to members of government respectively in budgetary debates in parliament. The methodological assumption is that the more questions being posed to the

134 The Swedish introduction of “adjustment seats” (Sannerstedt and Sjölin 1992: 103), first used in the election of 1970, made the electoral system more proportional than it used to be. Nevertheless, during the investigated period of time, the Swedish electoral system has never been majoritarian.
representatives of an institution, the more powerful that institution is in relation to the other. This could be argued from two different perspectives.

First, there is a rationalistic idea that politicians desire political influence, and that they will behave in a way that maximises their own political influence. From this perspective one should expect the attention attracted by a politician to reflect the power of the institution that he or she represents. Paying attention to politically unimportant persons or institutions would, from this perspective, be irrational.

Secondly, there is a linguistic idea that politics consist in part of communication (see the chapter on deliberation for an outline of this idea). From this perspective it is reasonable to expect that the more involved the representatives of an institution are in deliberation, the greater their political influence.

Validity problems
Both arguments in justification of the indicator may be objected to. The problem with the first would be that, even if we generously accept the rationalist assumption, politicians could be mistaken in their efforts to target politically influential persons. The power which draws attention to an institution may be illusory.

However, it is one thing to agree that all persons are sometimes mistaken, and quite another to claim that politicians are systematically mistaken and, moreover, that the extent of their mistakes varies systematically in the course of internationalisation. If the proposed indicator is to be proven invalid on rationalist grounds, it would not be enough to show that politicians are sometimes mistaken in their search for powerful objects of attention. It must also be shown that such mistakes are common and are correlated to the variable of internationalisation. If the mistakes are fewer than the correct judgements and are normally distributed across levels of internationalisation, increased attention drawn to a person or an institution would still reflect an increase in its political importance.

As for the second argument, the main problem seems to be that, even if we accept the assumption that politics consists in part in communication, it does not follow that the important political communication takes place in the public fora of national parliaments. In parliamentary debate an imbalance between the attention given to members of parliament and that given to members of government is not necessarily significant, since parliamentary debates may indicate nothing at all about political power, if the former are politically unimportant to begin with.

However, the constitutional competencies assigned to parliaments are still in the hands of the parliamentarians themselves. Only a handful of state
budgets have been implemented without parliamentary assent in the period under investigation, and all of these implementations took place during the constitutionally turbulent French Fourth Republic, from 1946 to 1958. From this alone it may be concluded that there is at least some political influence over budgetary matters distributed among the participants in parliamentary debates. This should justify the logic of the indicator: the more political attention attracted to themselves by representatives of either the parliament or the government in parliamentary debates, the more powerful is the one institution compared to the other.

5.2.2. Investigatory resources

The second proposed indicator of parliamentary power, and hence of democratic participation, is the balance between budgetary investigatory resources possessed by parliaments and those possessed by governments. The methodological justification is once again that politics is to a great extent a matter of communication. To control budget policy both parliaments and governments must present reasonable information about the effects of their proposals, and when the parliament argues for a proposal, in opposition to the government, it must possess its own investigatory resources.

Relevant information could be gained, for example, by indicating the size of the budgets of investigatory units and the technical equipment and number of personnel at their disposition. To simplify the collection of data and to compare more easily over time and between countries, use will be made here of number of personnel only as an indicator of investigative resources. A second question concerns the various organisational levels of the parliament that could be pointed to by this indicator. Here it seems reasonable – on the same grounds as above – to focus on the select committees that prepare parliamentary budget decisions. On the government side, focus will be placed on the Ministries of Finance, which are responsible for preparing and negotiating budgets.

Validity problems

Although it is common to estimate the power of an actor by comparing its resources to those of other actors, most famously in Realism of international relations (for example Morgenthau 1948: 80-108), we should remember that possession of resources is not equivalent to possession of power. The resources may, for one reason or another, not be put into use.

This problem is a serious one. It is, after all, a common observation that more staff often means more inefficiency rather than the completion of
important new missions. What could be done to measure power by resources, is to complement information on staff numbers with information on activities that they facilitate. If an increase in parliamentary resources is followed by an increase in parliamentary activity, it is less likely that the new resources are idle.

Parliamentarians and government officials participate in a number of different activities, formal as well as informal (concerning the Swedish case, see Larsson 1986: 65), and to decide what activity is most relevant, a few criteria may help. First, relevant activities should be initiated by either institution, the parliament or the government. Only then can they be conceived of as instruments by which one side can control the other. Secondly, and for the same reason, relevant activities initiated by either institution should primarily affect the other. Thirdly, the activities should concern the making of budgetary policy rather than policy in general, since parliamentary control can vary across policy areas. Fourthly, relevant activities must be formally documented, since the design of inquiry requires that information be collected and compared over time.

Concerning parliament, and in accordance with the above criteria, it would appear a reasonable choice to focus on the activity of parliamentarians in posing written or oral questions to members of government, in proposing amendments or drafting new policy, preferably in the area of budget related questions. Concerning government, and in accordance with the above criteria, it would appear reasonable to focus on the number of government bills to which standing committees on budgetary issues are constitutionally obliged to reply.

5.2.3. Successfully initiated policy output

Perhaps the most tempting method for estimating democratic participation in the making of budgetary policy is the balance between governments and parliaments regarding policy initiatives that lead to the budget finally decided on. In terms common to the parliaments dealt with in this study, this means to account for amendments to finance bills made by parliamentarians. The larger the financial difference caused by parliamentarians amending a budget bill, the greater, according to the logic of this indicator, is their control over the outcome. Indeed there appears to be an intuitive resemblance between this

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135 Another possible indicator would be the scope and intensity of reports produced by the select committees on financial issues when responding to budget proposals by the government.

136 Another possible indicator would be the scope and depth of the budget bill itself.
measure and the widespread theoretical idea that the power of an actor is manifest in the effects which that actor deliberately produces.\textsuperscript{137}

\textbf{Validity problems}

However, apart from an intuitive direct link between the theoretical concept and its operationalisation, there are a number of methodological problems inherent to this strategy for estimating parliamentary control. Two of them warrant specific attention (Goldmann 2002: 287). First, the actor over whom power is exerted may anticipate the exertion of power and be dominated without any actions taken. If not controlled for, this possibility will lead an empirical investigation of produced effects to \textit{underestimate} the exertion of power. Secondly, actors may alter their intentions or behaviour, not as an effect of exerted power, but as an effect of alterations in their own perceptions, interests, preferences, instrumental considerations, etc. If not controlled for, this complex of alternative explanatory factors will lead an empirical investigation to \textit{overestimate} the exertion of power.

The best way to handle these problems is to look, not only for the effects that a powerful actor would produce, but also for causes alternative to that of a powerful actor.\textsuperscript{138} More details on this are given in Appendix 7 as well as in the course of the empirical analysis, but to avoid being bogged down in methodological details at this point, we should perhaps give brief consideration to just four interpretations:

1. \textit{Parliament increasingly amends the budget bill, but government gains power from parliament.} If this interpretation is correct we must be able to find some evidence that the government is decreasingly able to anticipate the policy preferences of parliament (which may be concluded from the disappearance of institutions or groups set up for that purpose), or that the government is decreasingly willing to decide the details of the budget (which may be observed in government documents or statements by responsible ministers in parliamentary debate), or that the parliament is increasingly willing to decide budgetary details (which may be read from parliamentary papers as well as from statements by representatives of the select committees concerned).

\textsuperscript{137} Some holders of this view of power add the restriction that power is a matter of effects which oppose the intention or interest of other actors (e.g. Lukes 1974) but others explicitly reject this restriction (e.g. Morriss 1987).

\textsuperscript{138} The method developed in the chapter on democratic political autonomy (Section 3.2.1) served to handle the same two problems. However, that method is not directly applicable in this context because parliaments and governments are less prone to state their ideological preferences than are political parties. The method developed below could be seen as a contextual adjustment of the method formulated most directly in Table 3.1.
(ii) Parliament increasingly amends the budget bill and gains power from government. If this interpretations is correct, we must search for, and be unable to find, any evidence of the kind mentioned under the first point.

(iii) Parliament decreasingly amends the budget bill and at the same time gains power from government. If this interpretations is correct, we must register opposite findings to the ones listed under the first point. That is, we must identify evidence that the government is increasingly able to anticipate the policy preferences of the parliament (which may be seen in the setting up of institutions aimed at informing the government at an early stage about the parliamentary policy preferences in budgetary matters), or that the government is increasingly willing to decide the details of the budget (see the first point for material that can yield such information), or that the parliament is decreasingly willing to decide budgetary details (see the first point for material that can yield such information).

(iv) Parliament decreasingly amends a budget bill and loses power to government. If this interpretations is correct we must search for, but be unable to find, any evidence of the kind mentioned under the third point.

Having worked all this out, it is perhaps worth repeating at this point that the indicator proposed is still the balance between governments and parliaments regarding policy initiatives that lead to the budget finally decided. The four interpretations are listed only to distinguish cases in which that indicator is expected to suggest misleading results (numbers 1 and 3) from cases in which it is expected to be valid (numbers 2 and 4).

This was also the last general indicator to be presented, so we can now turn to empirical matters.

5.3. Empirical observations of democratic participation

5.3.1 Turnout in general elections

Diagram 5.1 describes the turnout in general elections in Sweden over the period under investigation, as a percentage of the number of registered voters.\footnote{I am grateful to Maria Gratschew at IDEA, Stockholm, for making available data for this and the following diagrams in computer files. For more details on the data collection, see IDEA (2002).}
It is important to remember that my purpose here is not to explain variation or stability in voter turnout, but rather to investigate if there is empirical support for the hypothesis, derived from the literature and outlined in a previous section, which says that turnout is negatively affected by internationalisation. Seen over the whole period, there is no trend at all (the regression equation being $y = 0.0027x + 0.8314$). But of course, one could construct, or discover, a trend by redefining the relevant time period. Empirically to support the claim that internationalisation has a significant and direct negative impact on turnout, there are two possible starting points for the trend, working inductively from what has actually been observed. According to the first possibility, the starting point of theoretically relevant internationalisation must be placed somewhere roughly between 1982 and 1985. This interpretation would however be difficult to justify theoretically. The temporal placement of the cause is rather arbitrary in relation to the process of internationalisation. The decreased voter turnout occurred roughly ten years after the breakdown of the Breton Woods monetary system, which is often conceived of as a starting point for intensified internationalisation – but the trend also occurred ten years before Sweden entered the European Union in 1995. The only aspect of internationalisation which intensified after 1985 is the formal deregulation of credit and foreign exchange markets (Wihlborg 1993: 274-282). If the whole explanatory focus is placed on that specific aspect of internationalisation, it must, however, be justified by empirical findings from other states as well; otherwise the specification of the hypothesis becomes purely *ad hoc*. The second possible starting point for

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140 It adds to the problem of this interpretation that in Chapter 3 we rejected the hypothesis that internationalisation of finance weakens the predictability of an economy.
theoretically relevant internationalisation could be placed somewhere after the election of 1994, as there was a comparatively sharp fall in turnout in the following elections: from 88.1 percent in 1994 to 81.4 percent in 1998 and to 80.1 percent in 2002. During this time a significant step in internationalisation took place: Sweden entered the EU in 1995. Both of these arguably generous interpretations of the hypothesis – that the internationalisation of finance or Sweden’s entering the EU has affected turnout negatively – could be investigated further in view of the British and French experiences.

In the British case (Diagram 5.2) we see a long period in which turnout varied between 70 and 80 percent. This observation itself renders it improbable that all kinds of internationalisation have a negative impact on turnout. Furthermore, the stability, even the slight increase, in turnout during the 1980s and the early 1990s, when internationalisation of finance was radically intensified, do not support the first of the above mentioned interpretations. The same negative conclusion applies to the second of the interpretations suggested above, as Britain’s entry in the EC (1972) was followed by a slight increase in turnout, as compared to both the next election and the whole of the following twenty years. However, the EC that Britain entered in 1972 was different from the EU that Sweden entered in 1995. The Maastricht Treaty, launching the monetary union and provoking an unprecedented public turbulence and scrutiny of European integration before it came into force in 1993. We could refine the second causal interpretation, therefore, by suggesting that something in the creation of the EU – the reinforcement of the powers of an existing international organisation or the public agitation over the matter – had a negative effect on turnout. But once again, not to be of a complete *ad hoc* character, that version of the general hypothesis must be supported by further observations independent of the first one.

The observations from the French case (Diagram 5.3) do not make a perfect match with the presumed pattern. The data may indicate the beginning of a negative trend somewhere between the elections of 1986 (turnout of 78.5 percent) and 1988 (turnout of 66.2 percent). On the other hand, there is also, in the French case, a continual decrease in turnout in the post-Maastricht period, from 68.9 percent in 1993 to 68.0 percent in 1997, and to 60.3 percent in 2002. The second interpretation of the Swedish and British experiences is therefore not contradicted by the development in France, although there are obviously other factors affecting turnout in general elections beside the radical internationalisation of state functions.

One may also recognise that an interpretation of the hypothesis that gained support neither from Swedish nor from British experience – namely that internationalisation generally affects turnout in a negative way – could actually be defended in the French case. Dividing the period 1945-2002 into three stages of internationalisation, as argued in Section 1.3.1, election turnout reaches the highest level 1945-65 and then decreases in the two following periods, 1965-85 and 1985-2002. However, since France seems to be exceptional in this respect, the theoretical conclusion already drawn should remain.


Data from IDEA (2002)

To sum it all up, the figures presented do not establish that a Maastricht kind of internationalisation necessarily affects turnout negatively, but the evidence does seem sufficient for us to reject a number of more general interpretations of the hypothesis. Among the defects of these failed predictions one should recognise the views that internationalisation generally affects turnout negatively – which it does not; the view that internationalisation of market functions, trade or financial activities, generally affects turnout negatively – which it does not; the view that internationalisation of state functions of the
kind illustrated by the British entrance into the EC affects turnout negatively – which it does not. As shown in a previous section, at least the first and the second views appear explicitly in the literature (for example Petersson), and the third view is implicit in arguments about internationalisation of state functions that do not specify which state functions are intended (for example Radealli). The more fruitful hypothesis to continue working with is the one linking turnout negatively to radical internationalisation of state functions. Or to introduce an anti-Marxian critique that will be repeated a few times in what follows: politics – here understood in the sense of citizen participation – is more likely to be dependent on the internationalisation of states than on the internationalisation of markets.

5.3.2. Budgetary procedures and regulations

At this point we should turn to what has happened to democratic participation at the level of elected representatives. This is where the scope of analysis must be narrowed down to the making of budget policy.

The view that representatives of at least some members of the public should influence budgetary policy has a long tradition in the West. In Britain the taxpayers’ right to be consulted before being taxed was written into Magna Charta (1216) which stated:

No scutage or aid shall be imposed in our kingdom unless by common counsel of our kingdom, except for ransoming our person, for making our eldest son a knight, and for once marrying our eldest daughter, and for these only a reasonable aid shall be levied. (Ch. 12, Magna Charta)

In Sweden there is the similar notion of the ”ancient right of the Swedish people to tax itself” which, though receiving its familiar formulation in the Constitution of 1809 (RF § 57), represents a legal tradition extending well back into the Middle Ages (Herlitz 1934: 9). But although the principle of popular influence has always been important in this policy area, the role of

141 Of course one could try to rescue these hypotheses by claiming that there are more powerful mechanisms working in the opposite direction. Such claims may be true but they have little bearing on the present argument. The discourse about internationalisation and democratic participation would run out of steam if it was argued that (i) internationalisation affects turnout negatively and (ii) turnout increases in times of internationalisation. In view of this situation, one should drop the concept of internationalisation and turn to factors that are more important to turnout. See Section 1.3.1 for a development of this argument.

142 In the original: ”det svenska folkets urgamla rätt att sig själv beskatta”.
parliament has varied over time and has sometimes been perceived as excessive. As Jean Jaurès complained in 1913, speaking of French politics:

>[The budget] occupies a terrible place in the parliamentary soup and you can never get through with it. What does the house do today? It debates the budget. What did it do yesterday? It debated the budget. What will it do tomorrow? It will debate the budget? (cited in introduction to *Assemblée nationale* 2000)\(^{13}\)

The same year in Britain, Lloyd George recalled a time when the amendments submitted to a Finance Bill only “… numbered something like a dozen, or twenty at outside. Now [1913] they number anything between 100 and 150 …” (cited in House of Commons Factsheets – Procedure Series No 5, Budgets and Financial Documents, p. 4).

Since budgetary institutions already had a long and contentious history when our period of study began, it is not surprising that all three countries have continued to reform their budgetary procedures since 1945.\(^{14}\) More interestingly from the perspective of this study, some changes in Swedish and French regulations seem to have been provoked by international factors.

It is a common view that the French Constitution of 1958 was established to deal more effectively with “crises in Indochina, debates on the European Defence Community, and, most significantly, the civil war in Algeria.” (Huber 1996: 1) Hence the new budget procedure in the Constitution of 1958 was partly conditioned by a French desire for increased international action capacity. The reform of the Swedish budgetary procedure in the mid-1990s followed in part from a desire to cut budget deficits and public debt in order to fulfill the convergence criteria of the European Monetary Union (see Molander 1992 for some of the economic and institutional context). In the British case, there is (to my knowledge) no evidence of any significant changes in budgetary procedure produced by international factors.

Both the Swedish and the French reform have been harshly debated in terms of democracy, but it is still difficult to establish anything definite about the resulting level of parliamentary control (see Appendix 8 for more details in support of this conclusion). No doubt the French Constitution of 1958 was designed to strengthen the government, especially in the area of budget policy. But it is debatable whether in doing so it deprived parliament of any of

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\(^{13}\) In the original: “[Le budget] tient une terrible place dans la soupe parlementaire et on n’en vient jamais à bout. Que fait la chambre aujourd’hui ? Elle discute le budget. Que faisait-elle hier ? Elle discutait le budget. Que fera-t-elle demain ? Elle discutera le budget.”

\(^{14}\) For a survey of the Swedish case see *Riksdagen* (2000b: 126-54); for the British case see Ryle (1979), and for the later period, *House of Commons Factsheets, No. 5* (n.d.); for the French case see Picard (1989), and for more recent years *Assemblée nationale* (2000).
its power. The Fourth Republic (1946-1958) had been marked by political turbulence. During its twelve years there were twenty-nine different governments, the most durable of which lasted only six months (Huber 1996: 1-2). This turbulence spilled over into budgetary politics, to the extent that for several years no budgets were decided at all. For example, the budget that should have been in operation in 1947 was divided into four different bills, three of which were not appropriated until August of that year, and the budget of 1951 was appropriated in a single Act on 24 May 1951 (Assemblée nationale 2000: 7). Hence it is possible that, whatever severe constitutional constraints the reform of 1958 imposed on parliament in the area of budget policy, parliament did not necessarily lose any of its control over budget policy. To the extent that the constitutionally stronger parliament of the Fourth Republic was unable to arrive at any budget policy, even a constitutionally very restricted parliament could not have possessed less control. From this it can at least be inferred that no certain conclusion can be drawn concerning changes in democratic participation in budgetary matters occasioned by the transition from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth.

The Swedish reform of the budget procedure mentioned above went into effect in 1996 and led up to the budget of 1997 (Mattson 1998: 51, 63). For the moment we may overlook the details of this reform and concentrate on the fact that it is regulated by particular legislation and is not a matter of constitutional stipulation (see Appendix 8 for a more detailed description of the Swedish budget procedure since 1996). An amendment to the Swedish constitution requires two votings in parliament with a general election in between, while a change in particular law is made upon a single voting. Moreover, not to blur the distinction between constitutional law and particular law (always a risk when parliamentary proceedings are governed by the latter) the financially most important regulations of the budget law are explicitly restricted to cases in which the government intends to use the procedure established by the reform of 1996, which use – and this is most important – must be agreed to by the parliament. According to the law,

Should the government intend to impose a ceiling on state expenses in the preparation of the budget proposal as well as in the implementation of the activities covered by the budget, the proposal of such a ceiling shall be included in the budget proposal. (§ 40, Budget law, SFS 1996:1059, updated to SFS 2002:1034, translated)\(^{145}\)

\(^{145}\) Citation in original: "Avser regeringen att använda tak för statens utgifter i beredningen av förslaget till statsbudget och i genomförandet av den budgeterade verksamheten, skall förslag till beslut om ett sådant utgiftstak ingå i budgetpropositionen."
Whatever restrictions on parliamentary activities the budgetary reform of 1996 entailed, the ultimate control of the budgetary procedures remains in the hands of the parliament itself. Since it is a complex theoretical questions whether ultimate control is equivalent with maximal control, this in turn permits two contradictory interpretations: the first is that the parliament has decided to alienate parts of its own power to the government; the second that any restriction of parliamentary participation inherent in the new budgetary procedure is imposed by parliament itself, so that parliament has not yielded to government any of its control over budget policy, but has simply opted for a different, and perhaps more efficient, way of exerting its budgetary control.

As in the French case, when observations permit contradictory interpretations, the most reasonable response is to admit that the material does not allow us to draw any conclusions at all. We should then proceed to what we may hope are more fruitful methods for estimating democratic participation at the level of elected representatives.

5.3.3. Budgetary attention paid to Ministers and MPs respectively

Let us now use the indicator presented in Section 5.2.1 to investigate if it is true, as has been predicted by theories and claimed in the literature, that internationalisation tends to marginalize parliaments in relation to governments and thus decrease the level of democratic participation.

Table 5.1 orders 242 intended question-answer interactions taken from budgetary debates in Sweden, Britain and France during the post-war period (see Chapter 4 for a more complete description of what material informs the analysis and on what grounds the material has been selected). The rows show the institutional contexts of the participants in the interactions, an “interaction” being one between two members of parliament or between a member of parliament and a member of government (the theoretical possibility that an intended question-answer interaction takes place between two members of government is never realised in the context of parliamentary debates). The columns show the level of internationalisation when the interaction took place or was intended, “low” referring to the late 1940s and the early 1950, “medium” to the early and mid 1970s, and “high” to various years in the 1990s (the classification of years in terms of internationalisation was set forth in Section 1.3.1).

If it is correct that internationalisation reduces the political importance of parliament and increases that of government, then the proportion of intended question-answer interactions falling into the “Members of
parliament and government” category would be likely to increase along with internationalisation. What, then, is actually the case?

Table 5.1. Institutional context of debate interaction at different levels of internationalisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional context of interaction</th>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of parliament only</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of parliament and government</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interactions</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we observe in Table 5.1 is actually something like the very opposite development. Comparing the extreme columns, showing high and low levels of internationalisation, we see that intended interactions between parliamentarians have actually increased by about 26 percent at the expense of interaction between members of parliament and members of government. The prediction would have gained support if we had compared only the low and medium levels of internationalisation. But such an effort to rescue the validity of the prediction would only add to its problems, since it results in an even greater contrast to the facts when completing the analysis by comparing medium and high levels of internationalisation (showing a percentage difference of about 36 against the hypothesis). This does not of course prove that internationalisation has a positive impact on the powers of the parliament; but it does serve as a serious objection to the hypothesis under investigation and to the arguments adduced to support it.

Now one could argue that Table 5.1 gives too general a picture and that it is necessary to focus on more specific categories to learn whether internationalisation impairs the power of parliaments. It could be claimed, for example, that parliamentarian members of one and the same party have increasingly posed questions to one another as a means of articulating party policy, and that once such spurious suppositions are eliminated from the analysis the process of internationalisation will reveal its negative effect on parliamentary power. It could perhaps also be claimed that the contexts
represented by the parliaments of Sweden, Britain, and France are so different that comparisons between them are essentially meaningless, and that to be rejected, the hypothesis must be shown to be invalid for each of the different countries. Let us investigate the empirical grounds for these objections to the proposition that the hypothesis does not hold.

Table 5.2 cross-tabulates the institutional context of interacting politicians with the level of internationalisation, while keeping the different countries apart. In the Swedish and the French cases the pattern already discerned is only emphasized. Sweden shows a steady increase in the attention given to members of parliament compared to that given to members of government. Attention given to French members of parliament and of government respectively remains practically stable between the two lowest levels of internationalisation, but then makes a sharp change in favour of parliamentarians when the focus is moved to the highest level of internationalisation.

The British case is in greater contrast to the general perspective yielded by Table 5.1. It shows a sharp decrease in questions posed to members of parliament between low and medium levels of internationalisation (43 percent) and then a slightly smaller but still large increase in questions posed to members of parliaments between a medium and a high level of internationalisation (37 percent). This implies that, estimated over the whole period, from the lowest to the highest level of internationalisation, Britain has in fact experienced a modest decrease in political attention directed to members of parliament compared to members of government (6 percent). Still, all three countries have had the same experience between a medium and a high level of internationalisation: parliamentarians have drawn to themselves some of the attention formerly given to members of government in parliamentary budgetary debates.
Table 5.2. Institutional context of question-answer interactions at different levels of internationalisation. Separate countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institutional context of interaction</th>
<th>Level of internationalisation</th>
<th>Total number of interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Members of parliament only</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Members of parliament and government</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Members of parliament only</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Members of parliament and government</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Members of parliament only</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Members of parliament and government</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number of interactions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 cross-tabulates the institutional context of interacting politicians and the level of internationalisation, while keeping apart inter- and intra-party interaction. The theoretical reason for undertaking this analysis was mentioned before: to investigate whether the general development is dependent, not on the increased political importance of members of parliament, but on an intensified preference on the part of parliamentarians for expressing their own party positions. If the latter interpretation is the better one, the increase of attention given to members of parliament over time should be found only, or at least mostly, in the group of intra-party interactions, rather than in the group of inter-party interactions.
A striking fact revealed in this analysis can be read from the rows which report the total number of intra-party and inter-party interactions. The total number of intra-party interactions is stable (11 at each level of internationalisation) while the number of interactions in the inter-party group grows significantly (from 37 to 112). The major occurrence during the period investigated is therefore not one of growing intra-party interactions, though the increase in attention given to members of parliament is somewhat greater in the (small) group of intra-party interactions than in the (large and growing) group of inter-party ones. In the first group the increase of attention given to members of parliament is about 27 percent in a comparison between low and high levels of internationalisation, while the corresponding difference for the second group is about 24 percent.

Hence the first interpretation must also be the final one, namely that members of parliaments have gained political attention from members of governments during a period for which the opposite development had been predicted. This in turn points to a democratic possibility of internationalisation, namely that traditional institutions will continue to serve the democratic purposes for which they were set up (despite the attempt of empirically unsubstantiated arguments to undermine them). Let us test the stability of this conclusion by turning to the second indicator of democratic participation at the level of elected representatives.
5.3.4. Investigatory resources of parliaments and governments

We may begin by noting the number of investigatory staff in parliament and government in Sweden, and then complement these figures with notes on Britain, for which the information collected is somewhat less precise, and France, for which less information is available.

Table 5.4 shows the number of staff in the Swedish finance ministry office and the office of the Swedish select committees preparing the parliamentary response to the Finance Bill. The selected years are roughly the same as in the analysis of question-answer interactions in the previous section. For the years 1948 and 1951 the relevant select committee is the Statsutskottet and for the later years it is the Finansutskottet.

Table 5.4. Staff numbers in the budgetary relevant government department and parliamentary committee. Sweden 1949-1999, selected years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of staff in</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>office of the Swedish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ministry of finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of staff in</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>office of the Swedish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>select committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsible for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Finance Bill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff numbers of</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>select committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtracted from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff numbers in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finance ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select committee</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff as a percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of number of ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff, percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

146 The term “select committee” is here used, as in British usage, to designate a permanent parliamentary group, and the term “standing committee” for a more temporary one. (In American usage the terms are used in the opposite way.)

147 Information has been collected from the State Calendar (Statskalendern) which purports to list all staff members of the central administration of the Swedish government employed on a permanent basis. The figures do not therefore necessarily include staff members who are shared with other offices or employed only temporarily. This seems to be a serious limitation indeed. An internal parliamentary document (Riksdagen 1961) names ten persons employed to deal with administration and investigation for the Statsutskottet in 1961 – a year in which the State Calendar fails to report any staff members for that committee. What could nonetheless justify the use of the State Calendar, despite its unreliability and apart from its easy accessibility, is that to rely on the same source of information for both the select committee and the finance ministry offices, is to rely on a source whose biases, if any, are likely to run in the same direction for both offices. It is only as likely that the editors of the State Calendar underestimate the staff number in various offices as it is unlikely that they underestimate the staff in one office while overestimating that in another.
Although the differences are small, the fraction of investigatory resources has grown in favour of the parliament over the entire period for which a fraction can be calculated. One may differentiate between a strong refutation, defined as one in which an observed pattern is opposite to a prediction, and a weak refutation, defined as one in which neither the predicted nor the opposite pattern can be observed. In these terms, the above observations point to a relatively weak refutation.

Moreover, it is not obvious which is actually the more relevant measure in this context, the development of absolute difference over time or its development in relative terms. Though it seems as if the parliament in the 1990s had the same or perhaps a larger proportion of total staff than at the beginning of the 1970s (which would weaken the case for the hypothesis), it is undeniable that in the 1990s the parliament had far fewer staff members in relation to the government as compared with the 1970s (which would strengthen the case for the hypothesis).

On this point it would surely be more comfortable not to champion the reasonableness of one measure over another; and yet to abdicate judgment in this matter opens the way to contradictory interpretations – that the parliament has both lost and gained power over the same period, and this cannot be allowed.

A conceptually weak solution to the problem would be to ask what is actually accomplished by a growth in number of staff. If an increase in staff translates into an increase in things accomplished, and therefore possibly a higher realisation of preferences over which there may be conflict with other institutions, then there is reason to conclude that the increase in staff is part of a general increase in empowerment. The reason why this approach is conceptually weak is that it does not answer the question, What precisely are the concrete requirements of the concept of democratic participation? It only points to a possible situation in which a more precise operationalisation of the concept may not be needed in order to reach the kind of conclusions we are aiming for. It suggests that we postpone our interpretations of the above observations in terms parliamentary control until measures of budgetary activities, initiatives, and outcomes have been dealt with. Before moving on to that, however, some observations on British and French staff numbers need to be presented.

In the British case the most relevant object of study would be the Treasury and Civil Service Committee. The Public Accounts Committee may be the principal financial watchdog, but the Treasury and Civil Service Committee reports in greater detail on the budget. The Budget Committee itself, which has been set up for some but not all years, is arguably more for show than a
serious investigatory or amending body. However, as far as the present investigation has been able to discern, the staff numbers for neither of these committees are documented before 1987, after which time that information is included in the *Sessional Returns*, published yearly by the The House of Commons (the lower chamber of the British parliament).\(^{148}\) Calendars such as *Dod’s Parliamentary Companion* list only the principal clerks of individual committees, although it is clear from the Sessional Returns that there are a substantial number of staff and consultants at the disposal of – in particular – the Treasury and Civil Service Committee.

But this does not add up. Taking the first observation from 1987 would not yield observations that differ significantly in degree of internationalisation – and a lack of such variation would severely restrict our possibilities of evaluating hypotheses about the effects of internationalisation (as argued in Section 1.3.1).

To repair these shortcomings as far as possible we shall chose to focus not on the number of staff in select committees, but on staff numbers in the Library of the House of Commons, which are reported annually in *Dod’s*. This substitution is not as absurd as it may seem. The Library is the major investigatory institution of the House of Commons and is staffed by numerous analysts and area experts at the service of members of parliament.\(^{149}\) Being interested in the investigatory power of the British parliament over a rather long period of time, even though we cannot obtain the most suitable information, we are not so ill-served as we might have feared by the best source which remains available to us: the internal records of the Library of the House of Commons, as reported by *Dod’s*.

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\(^{148}\) For example according to the House of Commons (1988), in the 1987-88 session, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee had a staff of six persons and was assisted by seven other “specialist advisers”. In the sub-committee of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee there were, over the same period, four staff members and two “specialist advisers”. The number of staff has remained about the same in later years, while the number of “specialist advisers” apparently keeps on growing: to eleven in the 1996-97 session (see House of Commons 1997).

\(^{149}\) As stated in a House of Commons Paper on *Assistance to Private Members*, the aim of the Library is “to provide (a) those books, documents and other materials, and (b) those oral and written information and research services, which Members need in connection with their parliamentary duties.” (House of Commons 1975: A2)
Table 5.5. Number of staff in British Ministry of Finance and House of Commons Library, various years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of staff, British Ministry of Finance (Treasury)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of staff, House of Commons Library</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry staff minus Library staff</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library staff as percent of ministry staff</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>168%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Dod’s Parliamentary Companion (various years)

Regarding staff numbers of the British finance ministry there are different sources of information, but to have facts collected as consistently as possible, the listing of government staff in Dod’s will be followed. Since Dod’s does not distinguish between political appointees and other members of civil service staff – a fuzziness that well reflects the arbitrariness of the distinction itself – every individual in the Finance Ministry has been counted, including for example the Prime Minister who ex officio is First Lord of the Treasury. The fact that information is gathered from Dod’s on all points does not, of course, exclude the use of other sources in order to triangulate on critical points, to which procedure there will be reason to return.

Table 5.5 shows the numbers of staff in the British Ministry of Finance and the House of Commons Library for the same years as dealt with in the Swedish case above. It is noticeable that the reported number of staff in the Ministry of Finance drops from 334 in 1995 to 124 in 1999. Public administration staffs are more commonly expected to increase than decrease over time. One could perhaps suspect that the drop does not so much indicate a reduction of investigatory resources as it reveals a re-organisation and re-naming of public activities, to make the size of public administration less visible to the public. These doubts concerning the accuracy of information presented should preferably be met by collecting material from a larger area of the public administration of finance, so as to estimate whether staff from the “inner office” have “leaked out” to neighbouring offices. It would also be preferable if such more encompassing material relied on new primary sources in order to estimate staff strength by triangulation.

150 For years 1949 and 1951 the figures refer to the number of “librarians”, or personnel listed under that heading in the Dod’s. The parliament library as a separate division of Parliament is described in Dod’s only for the later years.
For both of these aims – collecting material from a larger area of public administration and triangulation of sources – recourse has been had to *British Political Facts* (Butler and Butler 2000). This work describes, among many other things, the development of the Treasury’s civil service staff, as shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6. British treasury staff (as broadly conceived by Butler and Butler 2000: 309). Various years.

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treasury staff</td>
<td>1396</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>3135</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth from 1970 to 1990 and the decline over the next eight years, shown in Table 5.6, correlate well with the 1972, 1995 and 1999 pattern shown in Table 5.5. The numbers from the early 1970s increase roughly threefold until the early 1990s, and thereafter fall back to the level, or slightly below the level, of the early 1970s. This correlation would appear to be an argument for the proposition that staff numbers at the British Ministry of Finance decreased substantially in the 1990s.

If we had so far investigated only the British case, ignoring Sweden, then the evaluation of the hypothesis of the declining power of parliaments would have been less difficult to make. Judging from Tables 5.5. and 5.6. it would appear difficult to argue that the balance of investigatory power has shifted from parliaments to governments in the course of internationalisation. However, remembering the Swedish problem of a few pages back, we should not work out general interpretations until parliamentary activities have been accounted for and we have also examined the French case.

In France the investigatory capacities of parliament and government seem to be less well documented. What can be referred to here regarding the parliament is not better documented than by two e-mails from the then head of office connected with the relevant select committee, the *Commission de Finances* of the *Assemblée Nationale*, Jean-Pierre Camby (e-mails dated 2002-09-09 and 2002-09-11, posted from Annie Tellier, Camby’s secretary).

Though the details are not impressive, there is a significant development over time. The response of the French parliament to the budget proposal by the government is prepared by two separate institutions, the *Rapporteur général* and the *Commission de Finance*. From 1958 (at the beginning of the current Fifth Republic) until 1981 the staff of the *Rapporteur général* was borrowed from the Ministry of Finance. Since 1981 the *Rapporteur général* office has constituted an independent division of parliament. At the beginning of this
period it consisted of a staff of six members; it subsequently increased to ten, and at present (2002) it is eight.

These details are worth reporting because they illustrate how the French parliament built up its own investigatory resources, institutionally independent of the government, during a period of internationalisation when we would have expected the opposite development. Furthermore, the total number of staff, adding those of the *Rapporteur général* to those of the *Commission de Finance*, is today 24, a figure that has, according to Camby, if nothing else, “*plus que doublé*” (more than doubled) since 1958. Compared to Sweden and Britain, France has currently the largest parliamentary division for investigating budgetary matters in its parliament.\(^{151}\)

We will now turn our attention to some activities which are permitted by the investigatory resources described.

### Public activities

We have seen that in the course of internationalisation the Swedish parliament gains on the Swedish government in relative but not in absolute numbers of staff. The purpose of reporting activities undertaken by the Swedish parliament is to overcome the difficulty of giving a firm interpretation of what this means in terms of the power relations between parliament and government; it is also to control for the possibility of some of the growth in resources not being utilised.

Because of the mismatch between absolute and relative figures in Sweden (but not in France and Britain) the Swedish case will be described in somewhat more detail.

Table 5.7. Some activities undertaken by the Swedish parliament and government, various years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of interpellations with direct financial effects(^{152})</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of interpellations</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{151}\) Unfortunately, on the development of staff numbers in the French finance ministry I have no figures of sufficient reliability to contribute to the analysis.

\(^{152}\) The category includes issues of taxation, fees, social insurance, pensions, public investments, interest rates and monetary policy, and price policy of state-owned companies as for example the price of public railway tickets. The category excludes, among other things, issues of labour market, production and prices in the private sector of the economy, and trade policy.
The table compiles a few facts on parliament and government activities for the years that have been focused on previously in this chapter. The most general pattern is a general intensification of activities over time, not less so in the case of parliament than that of government. It is true that parliamentary interpellation concerning financial matters has been decreasing, but in view of the dramatic rise in the number of both parliamentary questions and private members’ motions, it would seem that we are justified in supposing that parliamentary activity has intensified over time. It is a fair interpretation that parliament has made good use of the growth in investigatory capacity reported in Table 5.4, and even better use than the government has made of its parallel growth of investigative resources (Sannerstedt and Sjölin, 1992: 115-23, give a more thorough description of relevant patterns of activity in the Swedish parliament and government over time). Arguably it is the Swedish parliament that gains most power during internationalisation. But in any case, the Swedish government does not seem to expand its power as predicted by the hypothesis under scrutiny.

In the case of Britain it is not necessary to compare parliamentary and government activities, as we have already demonstrated that the British expansion of parliamentary investigatory resources has, over the last decades, been larger than the British governmental equivalent in absolute as well as in relative terms. What none the less needs to be investigated is whether the growing resources of Parliament have tended to intensify its activities, or if they have contributed to administrative idleness. It is sufficient here to present two measures of parliamentary activities (Table 5.8).

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153 The relevant select committees are Skatteutskottet, Sammansatta lag- och skatteutskottet (1949-51) and Finansutskottet (subsequent years)

* These figures includes, in addition to Public bills, a less comprehensive kind of government proposal (skrivelser). The Parliamentary Protocol Register does not separate the two kinds of documents for the first period under study.

155 It may be noted that Sweden had a bicameral legislature until 1969 but since then Riksdagen has consisted of a single chamber.
Table 5.8. Activities in the British Parliament, various years.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Early Day Motions¹⁵⁶</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>1009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entries in the series “House of Commons Papers” in Government Publications¹⁵⁷</td>
<td>178¹⁵⁸</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An Early Day Motion is a motion made by a member of parliament for which no date has been fixed for debate but which, theoretically, could be debated on an “early day”. Early Day Motions are used mainly for members of parliament to express their opinions on any matter, but it may happen that several hundred members subscribe to the same motion. As seen in Table 5.8, the number of such individually initiated activities has grown substantially since the 1950s. Noticing also in the index Government Publications that there has been a significant growth in the number of entries in the series “House of Commons Papers” (the number of entries being an imprecise indicator which requires large material difference to estimate variation in activity) is enough to conclude that the investigatory resources gained by the House of Commons, as presented in Table 5.5, were put to political work rather than relegated to any black hole of administration.

Since in the French case no sufficiently detailed account of the growth in staff numbers has been recorded, it would not serve any important purpose to report on the development of parliamentary activities in France. Statistics on French parliamentary activities are also less systematically compiled and more difficult to access than those for other countries.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Data taken from House of Commons Factsheet, No. 3 (n. d.).
¹⁵⁷ Data are taken from the index Government Publications, which is published every year by Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. All entries refer to some kind of document, usually a report, produced by the House of Commons. As the number of entries in “House of Commons Papers” for one and the same year does vary according to what year of the Government Publications is used, information has consistently been collected from the issue following the year reported. For example, the number of entries in “House of Commons Papers” for the 1951-1952 session is taken from Government Publications 1952 (published 1953).
¹⁵⁸ The figure refers to the number of papers published during 1950, not the session 1949/50 which is not reported in the Government publications either 1950 or 1951.
¹⁵⁹ It would appear that this unsuccessful attempt to extract data from the French parliament is by no means unique. In the collection of comparative data on the institute of parliamentary questioning by Finnish political scientist Matti Wiberg (used but not fully described in Wiberg 1995) there is information from most European countries going back to the 1960s, 1950s or even 1940s, although in the French case his time series runs from 1978 to 1992 (too short for the present purpose).
From the cases actually investigated, however, we may conclude that there is apparently limited support for the view that parliaments relinquish power to governments because of internationalisation, at least in policy areas where final decision-making authority is still predominantly located at the state level of states, as in the case of budget policy. To a far greater extent, the observations point to the opposite effect. From this it is not possible to infer that internationalisation empowers parliaments at the expense of governments; but applying the same modesty to the hypothesis that internationalisation weakens parliamentary power, the hypothesis may now be regarded as empirically untenable (which, one should remember, also followed from our investigations into power to attract attention in parliamentary debates). One may notice that this conclusion opposes a quite widespread standpoint.\(^{160}\)

However, we will give the hypothesis one last chance to be right. In the following section we will look at policies decided by parliament and compare those initiated by parliaments themselves with those initiated by governments.

5.3.5. Policies successfully initiated by parliaments or governments

Table 5.9 reports one of several possible measures of budget policy output initiated by a parliament: the net financial effect on the final budget produced by a parliament’s amendments to budget estimates, here referred to as the net financial effect. This measure is different from the absolute sum of parliamentary amendments to a budget bill because financially positive amendments (increasing income or reducing spending) and financially

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\(^{160}\) Having had the opportunity to observe parliamentary democratic participation under a much longer period than was observed by Kaiser in 1971, it is impossible to support his general conclusion that “[t]he loss of power of parliaments in many Western countries is aggravated by the multinational connections with the environment” (Kaiser 1971: 713). A somewhat weaker formulation of this view should also be questioned, namely that voting in national parliaments becomes less politically significant when the issues voted on are dealt with at the international level (see for example Stenelo 1990: 292). Not only does the parliamentary control over government seem to remain during the relevant time period, but parliamentarians also seem to be increasingly able to attract attention in parliamentary debates at the expense of government members. These observations hold for both the years in the 1990s when budgetary matters had been partly transferred to the European level and for the previous decades, in which policies with alleged budgetary effect – for example trade policy – were increasingly made at the international level. The decline of parliaments has (erroneously) also been taken for granted by politicians themselves. For example, the then chairman of the Swedish Parliament, Anders Björck, has argued that “[e]veryone knows that the government has strengthened its position very much at the expense of the Swedish Parliament.” (Björck 2003; translated: ”Alla vet att regeringen rejält stärkt sin makt på riksdagens bekostnad.”).
negative amendments (reducing income or increasing spending) will balance each other out and not alter the net financial effect. Compared to a measure of the total sum of parliamentary amendments, the net financial effect will therefore underestimate the budgetary impact of parliaments. The net financial effect is also different from a simpler measure such as the financial difference between budgetary proposals and budgetary decisions. A budget decision can differ from a budget proposal not only because of parliamentary amendments, but also because governments amend their own proposals after their initial submission to parliament. In Table 5.9 only amendments initiated by parliaments are accounted for.

Table 5.9. Net financial effect, Sweden 1971-95, as percent of total budget. Years are those in which budget was prepared.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Mattson (1996: 188)

A superficial impression from these figures would be that the Swedish parliament does not make much financial difference. But that impression would miss the essence of parliamentarism. Even if a government always gets its policy through a parliament, it does not follow by necessity that the government dominates the parliament. Although parliamentary impotence is a possibility, it is also possible for a parliament to elect a government that satisfies its expectations and which it therefore has no reason to want to correct. It should also be noticed that state budgets are partly composed by automatic spending obligations, such as legally protected pension rights or medical costs. Accounting for such factors, the relevant perspective is not that of individual years and their levels, but that of the trend over time; only this can reveal whether a parliament is more actively involved in some periods than in others.

Is it true then that the Swedish parliament has become less involved in making budget policy during internationalisation? We do not have to go into statistical detail to conclude that the figures do not reveal any such trend. This
non-finding may be easier to grasp in a diagram that ignores whether the net financial effect is positive or negative.\textsuperscript{161}

Diagram 5.4. Absolute net financial effect of parliamentary budget amendments, as percent of budget, Sweden, 1971-95.

It could be argued at this point that measures like absolute net financial effect tend to underestimate the importance of parliaments. Since more or less automatic outlays make up part of a state budget, it may well be that both parliament and government lack control over budgetary policy output. Hence a fair assessment of the financial effect produced by the parliament should be put into the perspective of the financial effect produced by government, which is a smaller figure than the whole budget relied upon as a denominator in Diagram 5.4 and Table 5.9.

In the study of French policy there has been some effort to develop such critical observations into empirical research methods. The crucial thing, then, is to decide what the government’s room for budgetary manoeuvre is, and then

\textsuperscript{161} The linear regression showed in Diagram 5.4 is not significant (p = 0.344). If the exceptional year 1995 is taken out, the slope of the line becomes negative (in accordance with the hypothesis investigated), but the regression coefficient is then even further away from significance (p = 0.394). It should also be noted that since the Swedish budget procedure was reformed in the 1990s (as described in Appendix 8), there have been a few years when the parliament’s amendments to the budget bill have not resulted in any net financial effect at all (Riksdagen 2000a: 103-105). However, following the methodological guidelines in Section 5.2.3, that radical break cannot be interpreted as supportive of a decline in parliamentary power, since there has simultaneously occurred a radical intensification of the government’s capacity to anticipate parliamentary response to the budget bill. The Swedish minority governments since 1996 have all negotiated their budget proposals and agreed them with a parliamentary majority before formally submitting a budget bill to the parliament (see, for example, Riksdagen 2000a: 41, 65 p.).
relate the financial effects of parliamentary amendments to that figure. The French Budget Bill (Loi de finances) estimates the financial impact, in regard to both incomes and outlays, of all new legislation that the bill proposes (referred to as the aménagements des droits). Slightly developed and adjusted, this measure could, according to Hervé Message (1993: 16-22), be treated as an indicator of the government’s room for budgetary manoeuvre.\footnote{An assumption of the method developed by Message is that the government uses the full extent of its room for manoeuvre. See Section 5.2.3, Appendix 7, as well as the chapter on political autonomy (Section 3.1.2, and more specifically, the sub-section on objectivist and subjectivist capacity), for a critique of this assumption.}

Table 5.10 shows the extent to which estimated income in French budget bills has been altered since their submission to the parliament, and how such alterations relate to a measure of the government’s room for budgetary manoeuvre, as explained above. Table 5.11 shows the same measure applied to budgetary outlays.\footnote{The figures for public outlays are significantly higher than those for fiscal revenue. This may be for several reasons. The state may build up a budget deficit or repay a public debt, or it may use non-fiscal sources (such as fees paid by welfare consumers) to cover public spending.} In neither case are the time series sufficiently long for the purpose of this study. All of the data are collected from a period of more or less the same (high) level of internationalisation. The observations are none the less presented here because they reveal a high degree of variation in parliamentary involvement in shaping final budgetary outcomes. This is not a strong empirical argument, but it does show that there are no circumstances of policy-making in an internationalised environment that exclude variation in regard to direct parliamentary involvement.

Table 5.10. Fiscal incomes of the French Budget, 1991-2002, in millions of francs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government budget leeway</th>
<th>Parliament budget amendments</th>
<th>Government leeway/parliament amendment (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>23 557</td>
<td>3 850</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>30 195</td>
<td>2 276</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>19 434</td>
<td>2 484</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>29 147</td>
<td>2 878</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10 085</td>
<td>2 028</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10 708</td>
<td>3 474</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>33 744</td>
<td>1 698</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>35 687</td>
<td>7 660</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>23 181</td>
<td>5 911</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>33 440</td>
<td>6 568</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Assemblée nationale 2000: Part four, Chapter four, Section two (no pagination)
Table 5.11. Outlays of the French budget (Crédits bruts) 1991-2000, in millions of francs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government budget leeway</th>
<th>Parliament budget amendments</th>
<th>Government leeway/parliament amendment (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>184 838</td>
<td>6 209</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>159 112</td>
<td>11 163</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>169 377</td>
<td>3 038</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>226 656</td>
<td>2 778</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>181 565</td>
<td>3 847</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>215 211</td>
<td>4 332</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>181 296</td>
<td>2 327</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>150 063</td>
<td>2 270</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>166 448</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>159 806</td>
<td>5 582</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Assemblée nationale 2000: Part four, Chapter four, Section two (no pagination)

In British politics and research it seems to be a widespread assumption that the House of Commons does not alter the substance of the Finance Bills at all. Nevertheless, the House of Commons does amend Finance Bills in a way that affects total revenue.\textsuperscript{164} However, the common assumption is correct when it comes to what is actually documented. Perhaps because the House of Commons is not permitted to propose increases in public revenue and spending, the question is politically sensitive. In any case, there seems to be no official documentation of the financial effect produced by the House of Commons’ amendments to the Finance Bill and Budget estimates.\textsuperscript{165} There is hence nothing to report from Britain on this indicator.

\textsuperscript{164} The British public revenues and outlays are dealt with neither at the same time of year, nor in a unified document. In this context the word “budget” is used to cover estimates of revenues, not of outlays, with the exception of the so-called Unified Budget of 1993-96. The Budget (Financial Statement and Budget Report) is presented in the Spring and followed in turn by Resolutions, the Finance Bill, the Finance Act, the Appropriation Bill (i.e. the budget consolidation fund bill), and the Appropriation. See House of Commons Factsheets (n. d.) No 5.

\textsuperscript{165} Apart from going through public documentation and statistics, for example at the Westminster Reference Library and the House of Lords Record Office, in addition to various university libraries, consultation has been made with clerks of the Treasury Committee (Alex Kidner) and the Public Account committee (either Ken Brown or Nick Wright [unsure documentation]), as well as persons in the Treasury Department referred to by them (Narmada De-Silva and David Martin). All were interviewed by telephone on 2002-05-01. All of this research resulted in nothing even remotely resembling the relevant statistics, which easily leads to the conclusion that they are not to be found in publicly available sources.
5.4. Summary and further conclusions

It is not evident whether a democratic kind of political participation derives from political equality, majority voting, or some other similar but distinct principle. However, as argued in the first section of the chapter, an empirical analysis does not require a theoretically precise definition of what democratic participation is.

Arguments have been suggested to the effect that internationalisation leads – in the directly concerned policy areas or in functionally linked fields into which norms and behaviour could spill over – to a more negotiative, and correspondingly less hierarchical, kind of politics; that it introduces a notion of national supreme interest that overrides all ideological conflicts; that it erodes the political autonomy of states and thereby decreases the incentive for citizens and elected representatives to influence decisions; and that it increases the cost of slow decision-making procedures.

All of these effects would constrain democratic political participation, though at least the first – the intensification of negotiative politics – could also be interpreted so as to yield the opposite prediction. The argument can be construed in terms of both state and market internationalisation. With some minor adjustments, the arguments can also be applied both at the level of the demos and that of elected representatives.

At the level of the demos, we have observed that there has been no overall decline (across countries and at different times) in the turnout for general elections since the beginning of the current trend of internationalisation after the Second World War. This stands in a sharp contrast to sweeping interpretations such as that “election turnout ... has gone down [because] ... [g]lobalisation has reduced the control and influence of traditional politics” (Petersson et al. 2000: 97, translated). If a negative effect on turnout were ever confirmed, the relevant kind of internationalisation would most likely be not the internationalisation of trade, nor that of finance, but a radical internationalisation of state function such as that instantiated by the Maastricht Treaty.

However, most of the chapter has dealt with participation at the level of elected representatives, and more specifically, with the relation of power between parliaments and governments. The general lesson from the British, French, and Swedish experiences is that, contrary to most theoretical predictions, parliaments have not relinquished power to their governments in areas of budget policy during internationalisation. It appears not to be the case, for example, that “[t]he evidence that transnational relations erode the
Participation during internationalisation

...democratic process appears reasonably strong.” (Kaiser 1971: 720). This refutation is grounded in various kinds of evidence.

During the time of internationalisation, it seems that members of parliament have become more central actors in parliamentary debates than members of government. In recent times, questions in parliamentary debate have more often been posed to ordinary members of parliament than to members of government, and this was formerly not the case.

The investigatory resources possessed by parliaments do not seem to have diminished in relation to those possessed by governments during internationalisation. This can be supported by observations from all three countries (although different countries did not permit exactly the same matters to be analysed).

In Britain the balance of staff between the Treasury Department and Library of the House of Commons shifted in favour of the latter in relative as well as absolute terms.

In Sweden the number of staff on the select finance committee has, as a fraction of staff in the finance department, increased over time; but in absolute figures the government side shows the greater increase. It is not evident whether this mixed picture should be interpreted as a gain in power by government or by parliament, but in view of the dramatic intensification of parliamentary activities for influencing policy accompanied by no obvious similar intensification in government activities, the preferable interpretation is that the balance of budgetary power during internationalisation has shifted in favour of the parliament. In any case, observations of Swedish budgetary policy do not support the hypothesis that the process of internationalisation tends to transfer power from parliaments to governments.

In the French case there is no information about staff numbers on the government side, but regarding parliament, there is both a significant growth of staff, on the one hand, and a reorganisation of budget research capacity to strengthen the independence of parliamentary investigations, on the other. Although there is not sufficient information on France (as there is on Sweden and Britain) to conclude that its parliament has probably taken over control of budget policy from the government during internationalisation, no observations made support the hypothesis presently under evaluation.

A third kind of evidence for the inference that parliaments have not lost power to governments in areas of budget policy during internationalisation can be drawn from the direct involvement of the respective institutions in determining individual budget estimates. Sweden, which is the only one of these countries for which measurements over a relatively long time period are available, has not seen its parliament producing a decreasing financial effect on budget policy during internationalisation (expect for the years after 1996,
when a new budget procedure was introduced; but this cannot be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis under evaluation, since the institutional means of the government for anticipating parliamentary responses to budget bills have been greatly strengthened at the same time; see footnote 161).

If we are led by the above observations seriously to question the hypothesis in one important policy area – which I believe we are – it is interesting to notice that not even the kind of internationalisation promoted by the Maastricht Treaty – which made national budgets, to some extent, a European responsibility – seems to have brought on the effects predicted by the theory. Parliamentary strength in budgetary matters vis-à-vis that of government, seems to have been greater in the mid and late 1990s than in the early and mid 1970s.

Finally it may be noticed that (while traditional institutions for elite democratic participation in politics do seem to be stable or increasing in their political importance during internationalisation) the sole institution for popular democratic participation investigated in this study – general elections – may well be more problematic when confronted to a radical internationalisation of politics (though probably not in that of market functions). Apart from the fact that we cannot rule out the possibility that a Maastricht-like internationalisation dampens voter turnout, European elections attract far lower levels of participation than national ones.
6. A dogma of delegation and alienation of authority

Most of the arguments analysed in previous chapters were concerned exclusively with democracy (as allegedly affected by various kinds of internationalisation) at the level of states. In this and the following chapters the perspective is widened to include the democratic theory and practice of international politics and organisations.

The politics of international organisations is sometimes conceived of as democratically less important than the politics of states. A comparably strong and influential argument in favour of this view is that international organisations originate in a delegation of authority from their member-states and are democratically justified to the extent that the member-states are democratic. By implication of this argument, the overall democratic standing of politics can be analysed without taking notice of the politics of international organisations. This view will here be termed methodological nationalism.

The current chapter begins by tracing methodological nationalism back to a certain conception of procedural democracy and to an ongoing debate about the European Union; it then proceeds by critically evaluating the basic assumptions of this method. Finally it suggests that no sound democratic theory can justify the politics of international organisations by the assumption that authority is delegated to them by democratic states – or at least, that such justification should not be considered as conclusive and significant as implied by previous democratic theory and debate. Hence the analysis refutes methodological nationalism and proposes that the democratic standing of international politics must be judged from empirical descriptions of the practice itself, rather than analytically inferred from the democratic standing of the states involved.166

6.1. Democratic theory as a justification of non-democratic procedures

A procedural conception of democracy is one concerned with how decisions are made rather than with what decisions are made. Definitions of democracy that emphasize majority voting, political equality, rational deliberation, general elections, and direct participation (to name the ingredients most commonly required as essential), can all be understood as belonging to this theoretical tradition as long as they do not claim any particular policy to be more

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166 An empirical approach to the matter is developed in Chapter 7.
democratic than any another (expect, of course, policies essential for
upholding democracy itself).

A problem nevertheless arises with any procedural conception of
democracy, notwithstanding the central place of such conceptions in
democratic theory: regardless of how minimally the democratic procedure is
defined, it is an incontestable fact that most decisions made in any state or
society are not taken through democratic procedures. Take as an example the
well-known conception of procedural democracy elaborated by Robert Dahl.
According to this conception, a political procedure is democratic to the extent
that it fulfils the criteria of (i) political equality at the moment of decision-
making, implying that each citizens has one and only one vote; (ii) effective
citizen participation at the stages of agenda-setting, nomination, and decision-
making; (iii) enlightened understanding of political matters; (iv) final control of
the agenda by the citizenry; and (v) definition of the citizenry as including all
adult individuals permanently living under rules collectively decided and
binding (Dahl 1989: 106 pp.).

This democratic ideal is not realised in more than a small number of the
decision-making procedures inherent in what is usually called “democratic”
states. The procedure which is operational when citizens elect a parliament
and the procedure by which a parliament holds its cabinet accountable realise
the ideal of procedural democracy to a high degree in Sweden, Britain, and
France compared to the decision-making procedures within private
companies, labour unions, courts, and all kinds of public administration. The
theoretical query, then, is how to understand, in democratic terms, and more
particularly, from a procedural perspective, the existence of apparently non-
democratic procedures within democratic states.

At a general level, one may distinguish between three different approaches
to the matter: (i) one may deny that non-democratic procedures pose a
theoretical or political problem on the ground that democratic procedures are
not generally preferable to other ways of making decision; (ii) one may regard
non-democratic procedures as traces left over from a pre-democratic period
which have not yet been brought into conformity with democratic practice;
(iii) one may try to explain why the existence of some non-democratic
procedures is not a threat to procedural democracy.

It is worth continuing the discussion at this point by focusing on Robert
Dahl, since his ideas are both well known and sufficiently elaborated to
provide, what Popper would call, “a position really worth attacking” (Popper
1957: 3). In Dahl's writings there are traces of all three approaches, but only
his reasoning along the third line is explicitly integrated into his conception of
procedural democracy as defined above; therefore the first and the second
approach will not be dealt with here.
From his fourth criterion (iv), that citizens must possess final control over the political agenda, Dahl develops an argument as to why procedural democracy is not necessarily violated by non-democratic procedures:

According to this criterion, a political system would be procedurally democratic even if the demos decided that it would not make every decision on every matter, but instead chose to have some decisions on some matters made, say, in a hierarchical fashion by judges or administrators. As long as the demos could effectively retrieve any matter for decision by itself, the criterion would be met. (Dahl 1979/1998:114)

In Dahl’s terms, democracy affirms the possibility of delegating the people’s authority to non-democratic institutions but denies the possibility of alienating it to such institutions. If the democratic state is more powerful than any other organisation in society, in the sense that it could actually intervene in any policy that emerges from public or private actors, then there is no democratic problem involved when non-democratic decision-making procedures are used in, for example, public and private administration. Let us now see how this notion has been used in international politics within Europe.

When democratic theory found its way into the study of European integration in the 1990s it was accompanied by two reactions. First, there seemed to be an agreement that the European Union was not democratic in its procedures, as compared to the member-states. Secondly, this noted presence of non-democratic procedures at the international level was not generally conceived as constituting a major democratic problem.

An document illustrative of both points is the famous Brunner verdict from the German Constitutional Court. Upon a constitutional complaint from the Munich lawyer Manfred Brunner, the German Federal Constitutional Court was obliged to pronounce a judgement on whether the German decision to ratify the Maastricht Treaty (1992) violated the constitutionally protected right of every German citizen to live under a parliamentary democratic government. The court judged that there was no violation. The core of this theory-enriching, if rather strained, verdict was that non-democratic procedures at the European level do not violate the constitutional rights of German citizens because (and here some drastic simplifications are necessary) the EU is not a state, and Germany, as a member-state of the EU, is constitutionally bound not to implement any EU-decision that Germany has not itself authorised by delegating a distinct marginal decision-making competence to the EU. The bottom line of this argument is that at the end of the day democratic states still retain their sovereignty (Gustavsson 1998a, b: 99-104).
This version of methodological nationalism impressed several EU-members as well as political scientists. For example, Sweden referred to the German verdict mentioned above in the government bill that proposed its accession to the EU in 1995 (Riksdagen 1995c: 19,34), and both Gustavsson (1998b) and Lundström (1998) have followed, at some distance, the same argument in order to support the conclusion that a preference for democracy does not imply that the democratic deficit of the EU needs to be rectified.

Some theory of delegation and alienation, such as the one proposed by Robert Dahl, is certainly looming in the background of these contributions, both political and academic; it all boils down to the assertion that the politics of the EU originates in a delegation from politics at state level and is democratically justified to the extent that EU-member-states are democratic. To my view, the theory of delegation and alienation is the clearest and most intuitive argument yet formulated to support the position taken by, among others, the German Constitutional Court. This is also a reason for continuing to focus on Dahl as we turn to an evaluation of the italicised proposition above. If some fundamental mistake appears even in Dahl’s shrewd and subtle argument, there is some probability that we will never find a really watertight argument for democratically justifying international organisations of the EU type.\textsuperscript{167}

\subsection*{6.2. Theory of delegation as not applicable to international politics}

As with some social contract theories, the theory of delegation and alienation assumes a political history that never took place. In most cases of non-democratic decision-making it is obvious that there has never been a decision to delegate the authority from a procedurally democratic organisation. Courts and private firms, for instance, often trace their authority to long before the democratisation of the states in which they reside, and in some cases to even before the formation of those states. Dahl’s theory of delegation and alienation is also notoriously vague on the crucial point of how an example of either category should be differentiated from an example of the other.

But a difficulty with Dahl’s theory which is more important for our present purposes is that it ignores the fact that the nature of delegation and alienation varies significantly between domestic and international politics. Dahl recognises no difference between delegation/alienation from a democratic

\textsuperscript{167} I have of course no intention to hold Dahl responsible for theoretical mistakes by others who use arguments similar to his. But once the limitations of Dahl’s position are well understood they will appear relevant to the other positions as well.
state to a national institution and delegation/alienation from a democratic state to an international institution. Had his attention been less occupied with domestic political problems, he would certainly have noticed that these are two very different things. For example:

Let us say that a procedurally democratic state delegates/alienates the authority to make decisions concerning medical treatment. If the receiver of the delegated/alienated authority is a state-run national hospital, the procedurally democratic state will have several effective instruments at its disposition to control how the authority is exercised. By its own decision the state may, for example, expand or limit the hospital’s budget, provide extra resources for specific medical treatments, organise and reorganise the hospital, remove or install officials. When the delegated/alienated authority is given to a national hospital, the state may control the policy undertaken by enacting laws at any level of detail. For this reason, the medical authority could be regarded as delegated rather than alienated, according to Dahl’s argument.

But now let us take a case where the receiver of the delegated/alienated authority is a state-run international hospital, that is, a hospital constituted by an international treaty ratified in national parliaments and over which every state claims a substantial, if not equal, degree of control. In that case, the instruments possessed by each procedurally democratic state to control the delegated/alienated authority can be used only at a significantly higher cost. No single state can, by its own majority decision, enact a law that expands or limits such a hospital’s budget, provides extra resources for its dispensing of specific medical treatment, etc, since, according to international law and the principle of sovereignty, such decisions must be taken by agreement of all the states involved. In contrast, therefore, to the case of the national hospital, no single state can determine the medical policy at any level of detail. The only thing that an individual democratic state can possibly do by its very own decision (depending on how the international treaty is formulated and how powerful the state) is to withdraw from the international hospital altogether. But that, on the other hand, is a much more costly instrument of control than the measures available for controlling medical policy pursued by a national hospital, since withdrawing altogether implies either that certain forms of medical treatment will not be available to the citizens of the state, or that the state will have to build a new hospital to suit its own preferences. This relatively high cost has to be paid as soon as the state decides on its own what medical policy it wants implemented, and the higher the cost of utilising control instruments, the lower the degree of control.168

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168 Obviously the state may cooperate with other states with which it shares preferences, and a good compromise may often be better than withdrawing altogether. But these
It is obvious that what democratically justifies the national instance postulated above – effective instruments of policy control possessed by the democratic state – is to some extent absent on the international plane. So assuming that the national case is one of delegation does not imply that the same is true at the international level.

One may recognise here that there may be some variation among national cases. Most importantly, a federal state would seem to have greater difficulties in controlling authorities delegated to regional sub-units than a central state. However, the difference between national and international delegation/alienation is still there. In a federal state the regional sub-units are used to implement federal decisions to a far greater extent than any sovereign state implements decisions made by another sovereign state. Moreover, sovereign states – be they federal or central – have ultimate control over their territory, by force if necessary, in contrast to the regional sub-units of federal states. Hence the latter have far fewer opportunities to oppose their states when these seek to control a delegated authority than the sovereign states have when opposing proposed changes in authority delegated/alienated to overarching international organisations.

To provide a somewhat more determinate assessment of how democratic delegation/alienation from procedurally democratic states to international organisations may be, it is instructive to clarify two further points: (i) what we mean by authority; (ii) what we mean by revoking authority. Dahl defines delegation as “a revocable grant of authority, subject to recovery by the demos.” (Dahl 1979/1998: 114) But he is not explicit on the meaning of the authority in question. Two possibilities will be considered here: (i.i) that authority is a juridically specified decision-making competence, independent of a decision's actual content; (i.ii) that authority is power over an actual set of decision alternatives, determined by the content of these alternatives. Also concerning the second point, what we mean by revoking authority, two interpretations will be distinguished: (ii.i) that to revoke an authority is to redistribute the activity of decision-making from an institution less procedurally democratic to one more so, as for example when a decision by a civil servant is reconsidered by a democratically elected parliament; (ii.ii) that to revoke an authority is to influence the policy-making of a procedurally less democratic institution so as to follow the norms laid down by a procedurally more democratic institution,

alternatives do not change the fact that instruments for controlling state delegation/alienation to national institutions are much more powerful than similar ones for controlling state delegation/alienation to international ones.
as for example when a democratically elected parliament influences the
decisions made by procedurally non-democratic private companies.\textsuperscript{169}

None of these distinctions are mutually exclusive, but it is particularly
helpful to illustrate the main combinations of the last distinction. Table 6.1
orders various possible ways of revoking delegated/alienated authority (rather
than various possible definitions of authority itself).

Table 6.1. Possible ways of revoking delegated/alienated authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibilities for democratic procedures to take back authorities delegated to non-democratic procedures</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Position A represents the most democratic case and position I the least. It
follows that the above argument about national and international hospitals
could be expressed more generally as claiming that delegation/alienation to
international institutions will generally fall into categories below or to the right
of delegation/alienation to national institutions. With three graphic
dimensions one could of course double each category by including the first
distinction, between positions i.i and i.ii, but the above figure adequately
illustrates that a difference concerning the nature of delegation/alienation
across different contexts, national and international, needs to be described
along different dimensions. This will be demonstrated in the following two
sections. We may begin exploring different kinds of delegation/alienation by
taking as given interpretation i.i of the meaning of authority, and then
reconsider the relation by taking interpretation i.ii as given.

\textsuperscript{169} Dahl comes close to interpretation ii.i in his article “Procedural Democracy”
(1979/1998), and to interpretation ii.ii in his more explorative work \textit{Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy} (1982).
6.3. Revoking juridical competence

Let us consider first the possibilities for democratic procedures at the level of states for taking back a decision-making competence from procedurally non-democratic international organisations. Most likely the delegated/alienated competence can be retrieved from both a national and an international institution. States may ultimately secede from an international organisation and introduce new national legislation, although in some organisations, as for instance in the EU, secession might be enormously costly. The difference between the national and the international context is, rather, that internationally a state may be left with no other option than to take back the whole delegated/alienated competence, although it would have preferred to revoke only parts of it. At the international level a proposal must be agreed upon by all states (or at least by a sufficiently strong state or group of states) in order to be implemented. There is nothing in the international structure of power that guarantees a member-state of an international organisation the option of revoking only what it would like to revoke.

Certainly, a partial recovery of competence to the national level is possible, as illustrated for example by the partial secession of France from NATO under de Gaulle. But the fact that some countries have succeeded in performing this manoeuvre in some cases does not, of course, guarantee the same outcome to every state in every case. The basic fact remains that, concerning delegation/alienation to international institutions, a state preferring to recall only parts of its competence can do so only after a decision has been made by the other member-states. If a state unilaterally breaks an international treaty, the other parties to the treaty are no longer obliged to observe the treaty in as much as regards their policies towards the treaty-breaking state. This conclusions can be derived from both the fact of state sovereignty and principles of international law. (The relevant juridical regulation is paragraph 60 of the Vienna Convention of 1969.)

In domestic politics, the state to a much greater extent can follow its own preference with regard to exactly what competences shall be taken back. In Dahl’s terms, the state has final control over the agenda only in domestic politics, while in international politics the agenda must also be accepted by the other states involved. The difference between domestic and international politics in this regard can be understood from two different theoretical

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170 Note that the validity of this argument does not depend on the controversial classification of the EU as an international organisation. As many analysts think of the EU as something much stronger than a mere international organisation, the ultimate claim being made here, that its authority cannot be democratically justified by the theory of revocable authority, would actually be strengthened by accepting their interpretation.
perspectives: differences in power structure and differences in principal-agent relations.

The former difference is manifest in the unique power position of the state when acting in domestic politics – perhaps ultimately deriving from its monopoly of lawful violence but manifested also in its superior capacity to undertake, for example, large scale educational and economic policies – while the international realm is made up of a plurality of states. The state is not the only important actor in either domestic or international politics. Because of strong domestic opposition, a state is often prevented from revoking competencies from public agencies, private companies, and individuals. But there is still an important difference in power between such actors as public agencies, private companies, and individuals, on the one hand, and other states, on the other. It is easier for any democratic state to decide exactly what legal competencies it will take back from an institution constituted by non-state actors (as is the case in domestic politics) than to decide which ones it will take back from an institution upheld by a number of other states (as is the case in international politics).¹⁷¹

From a rationalist principal-agent perspective, there are two differences between national and international delegations. First, the international situation is one in which several principals control a single agent, while in the national situation a single principal controls several agents. Only in the international situation are there transaction costs for sharing information and coordinating policies between different principals, and this makes it more costly to operate control measures. Secondly, the single principal in the national situation has a wider set of alternative alliances, supplied by the plurality of potential agents in domestic politics. As in any power struggle, the ability to choose among alternative alliances is an important asset.

Now let us consider the horizontal dimension of Table 6.1. For a single state to influence the outcome of an international organisation, it must observe the principles of international law and sovereignty, at least to a greater extent than when operating in domestic politics. On this assumption, two arguments are often made about the possibility of influencing internationally exerted authorities: first, that each state has a rather strong influence over internationally pursued policy since it can block any decision by an international organisation; second, that each state has a rather weak influence over internationally pursued policy since it cannot determine policy by its own force.

¹⁷¹ This difference is valid at least if we disregard international hegemony, which is not a factor in post-1945 Europe.
In view of both these arguments, it is, however, easier to influence authority delegated to a national institution. The relation between the arguments is hierarchical. The capacity referred to by the second one embraces that referred to by the first, but not vice-versa. If an actor can make and implement a decision by the actor's own power, as can the state when acting in domestic politics, the actor will also have the negative power to veto a decision, ultimately by taking a positive stand. So regarding the first argument (which points to a democratic strength of international organisations) we should also admit that conditions are just as good in the case of state delegation/alienation to national institutions, while the second argument (which points to a democratic weakness of international organisations) remains. The constraint on the revocability of delegated/alienated revealed by the second argument is unique to international politics, in accordance with what has already been said about different power and principal-agent structures in international and domestic politics.

Summing up the results (Table 6.2), authority is more difficult to control and take back when delegated/alienated to international, as compared to national, institutions; though it is not altogether impossible to control competencies delegated/alienated to the former.

Table 6.2. Possible ways of revoking delegated/alienated juridically specified competencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibilities for democratic procedures to take over juridically specified competencies</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delegation/alienation to national institutions</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation/alienation to international institutions</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation/alienation to national institutions</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.4. Revoking power over a set of alternatives

It is now time to consider the difference between national and international delegation/alienation under the second interpretation of authority, taking it as power over a specific set of alternatives. A decision made by an international organisation has effect (ignoring marginal cases) in more than one country. If the power to implement a decision that has legal effect in different countries were revoked to a specific state then that state would have to occupy the territory of all members of the international organisation; otherwise it would not have gained power over the decision alternatives that the international organisation in fact had. The conclusion is simple: power over alternatives decided and implemented by an international organisation can never be revoked to a procedurally democratic state (or, if someone were to conceive of war as a democratic instrument, power over decision alternatives taken by an international organisation and implemented in different countries could be revoked to a single state only).

The impossibility of revoking international power should not be regarded as democratically problematic by definition. It may be that the only power that cannot be brought back to a given democratic state is the power to affect individuals living in a territory controlled by another state, and the alienation of that specific power from democratic procedures should not be interpreted as a democratic problem. As argued in Chapter 3, a democratically relevant action capacity is one of a collective actor to affect the individuals who constitute the collective itself, rather than individuals in general.

But a severe democratic problem may also occur in a case where an international organisation develops a policy that could only exist because of the existence of that international organisation: for example, policies made possible by the efficiency gains from economies of scale. Expressed somewhat more precisely, the democratically unjustifiable actions are those that could be undertaken by a procedurally democratic collective actor to affect its constitutive individuals only by delegating/alienating authority to procedurally non-democratic international organisations.

An example is afforded by the area of competition policy. If power over alternatives in competition policy is exercised at the international level, one may well suspect there to be a broader, or at least different, set of alternatives than if the competition policy were exercised at the national level. The reason is that if one and the same regulating body can set regulation standards in a large economic system, made up of a large number of economic actors, then the actual competition between market actors will be realised to a greater degree than it will in a nationally isolated economy, with a relatively small
number of economic actors (or an international economy in which states do not co-ordinate their respective competition policies). That an internationally made competition policy may be Pareto-optimal does not remove the democratic implication: even if all states involved are economically better off with than without such a policy, the case is one of alienation rather than delegation, as long as the decision-alternatives are not revocable by procedurally democratic institutions.

It is true that, according to the second interpretation of authority (i.ii), there are probably also democratic problems concerning delegation/alienation within the state, as well as concerning delegation/alienation to private actors operating internationally. For example, it might well be that the welfare achievements of contemporary capitalist democracies would disappear if all authorities exercised by market actors were brought back from private firms and labour unions to institutions that fulfil the criteria of procedural democracy.

However, this does not counter the argument that there is a significant difference, even in the power-oriented interpretation of the theory, between delegation/alienation to national institutions and to international ones. In the national case there is a realistic possibility that procedurally democratic parliaments revoke to themselves delegated power over decision alternatives, as illustrated by publicly owned companies which are market competitive under policy regulations decided by democratic parliaments. But in the most prominent international cases there is simply no such realistic prospect. For example, no state can by itself provide for as equally developed a division of labour as can the European Union or the World Trade Organisation, and so the most prominent decision-alternatives available to these organisations cannot be revoked to procedurally democratic organisations. \[172\]

Concerning the horizontal dimension, the conclusion does not differ from the one drawn in Section 6.3. An actor’s possibility of influencing what decision will be implemented is the same as that actor’s possibility of influencing how a juridically specified competence is exerted. Hence an international delegation/alienation of power over decision alternatives is less easily influenced than a national one.

The result could perhaps be summarised most fairly as in Table 6.3. The view that there is no possibility for procedurally democratic states to take back decision-alternatives in the case of international delegation/alienation may

\[172\] The same democratic problem does not apply to multi-national companies, as it is possible for a procedurally democratic state to run a multi-national company just as any private actor or group of private actors would do (except under the provision of certain EU regulations – but then the democratic problem is once again one of international organisations rather than of multi-national companies).
seem exaggerated. The qualifications made in the preceding paragraphs on this point should be kept in mind. However, there is no reason to modify the conclusion that there is a significant divergence between national and international politics in this regard.

Table 6.3. Possibilities of revoking delegated/alienated power over decision-making alternatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibilities for democratic procedures to take back power over a certain set of decision-making alternatives</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delegation/alienation to national institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation/alienation to international institutions</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5. Summary and further conclusions

As proposed above, the concept of authority may be interpreted as referring to either juridical competence or power over alternatives. In either case, the possibility of delegating/alienating authority varies between a national and an international context. But as the different interpretations confront the theory with somewhat different problems, it is desirable to assess which one is the more adequate.

To opt for the first interpretation – that the delegated/alienated authority concerns a decision-making competence – would appear to represent an ad hoc adjustment of the democratic theory, since politics, as well as democracy, is universally acknowledged to be concerned with power rather than law. This should strengthen the case for rejecting the view that the politics of international organisations originates in a delegation of authority from state level and is democratically justified to the extent that the states involved are democratic. The view is not correct as it falsely presupposes that an
international authority can be brought back to democratic states or effectively influenced through democratic decision-making procedures.

As our next step we must reject methodological nationalism. To assess the democratic standing of politics overall it is not sufficient to describe decision-making procedures at the level of states. Methodologically, the conclusion is equivalent to that of Chapter 2. A democratic assessment of internationalisation must therefore be based on empirical investigation to a greater extent than if accepting some previously established arguments in democratic theory (most notably the ruling on the Maastricht Treaty by the German Constitutional Court and the positions, inspired by that ruling, taken by academics as well as other states on the matter of democracy and the EU). Neither the judgement that internationalisation by definition threatens democracy at the level of states (dealt with in Chapter 2 and leading to the empirical investigations in Chapters 3 to 5) nor the judgement that the politics of international organisations are democratically justified by the extent of democracy in the member-states (dealt with above and leading to the empirical approach taken in the next chapter) can be derived a priori from a sound democratic theory. It is now therefore time to approach an empirical analysis of democracy at the international level.
7. Comparing national and international democracy

This chapter introduces an empirical approach to democracy at the international level, as suggested in Chapter 6. Drawing on the literature and some further critiques, three hypotheses are set forth with regard to the expected difference between national and international levels in terms of political autonomy, participation, and deliberation. The small empirical contribution is limited to the area of budgetary policy, in order to facilitate comparison with observations reported in previous chapters.

An empirical focus on budgetary policy strengthens the reason to study the European Union. In no other international organisation is there a budgetary procedure equally independent of the member states. This fits our purpose of discovering theoretically significant falsifications. If internationally organised democracies are in fact different from nationally organised ones (as predicted by the arguments that will be analysed), the difference is likely to appear when studying a case of international policy-making that is relatively independent of state policy-making and hence relatively different from it – and therefore an empirically grounded rejection of the expected difference would be theoretically significant.173

The fact that there is an institutionally independent budgetary procedure in the European Union is also one of the many characteristics because of which one may question the designation and classification of the Union as an international organisation: it may be suggested that budgetary powers belong to the definitional character of a state. It should therefore be noticed that the subsequent empirical analysis is not dependent on the assumption that the European Union can be regarded as an international organisation. The analysis assumes only that there is a difference in the degree of internationality between units like Sweden, Britain, and France, on the one hand, and the European Union, on the other. Even those who prefer to classify the European Union as a state must admit that the “EU-state” is more like the ideal-type of an international organisations than are Sweden, Britain, or France. By the same token, this analysis is not sensitive to whether the European Union is regarded as a multi-level system of governance (Marks et al. 1996), a network of experts and interest groups (Andersen and Burns

173 Optimally, the selected cases should also be as similar as possible regarding all properties other than national-international ones. However, it is less important to hold background variables constant when the aim is not to confirm any effects of that difference but to investigate the empirical support for the certain claimed effects. See Section 1.3.1 for methodological arguments along this line.
1996), a system of negotiation (Elgström and Jönsson 1999), an advanced free trade regime (Moravcsik 1993), or some new kind of polity (Schmitter 1997a).

Finally, a study of the making of budgetary policy in the European Union serves to broaden the agenda of research on the democratic deficit. While much academic attention has hitherto been given to those policy areas and institutions of the European Union in which democracy does not seem to work, it is just as fascinating an endeavour (though much less pursued) to try to understand the democracy of the European Union in institutions and policy areas where it does actually seem to work. To focus on democratic aspects of budget policy is then a case in point. In this area, the European Parliament has had comparably strong decision-making competences as long as it has been directly elected.174

7.1. Democratic participation at different political levels

There is a common yet provocative view that some kinds of democratic participation, such as general elections and majority rule, are not desirable in international organisations (see for example Scharpf 1999: 7; Gustavsson 2003: 184-185, 192). A basic argument is that individuals covered by an international organisation do not share the common identity that would permit them to transcend their individual self-interest. As argued by Fritz Scharpf when analysing the prospects for democracy in the EU: “[i]t can be shown analytically that the majority rule will lead to normatively indefensible policy outcomes if it is used to aggregate the purely self-interested preferences of individuals” (Scharpf 1999: 7). This section will attempt a critical analysis of this argument, extract one of its assumptions which can be empirically investigated, and then undertake the relevant comparisons.175

7.1.1. Assumptions of the argument that democratic procedures are not desirable in international organisations

In the above citation Scharpf claims that he is able to show analytically that majoritarian procedures are normatively undesirable in the absence of a collective identity among the individuals involved. However, showing something “analytically” to be true is rarely as simple a matter as social science

174 The parliament was directly elected for the first time in 1979 and has had the final say on non-compulsory expenditure budget policy since 1970. The non-compulsory expenditures currently comprises about 55 percent of the total budget. For further details, see The European Parliament Fact Sheets: 1.4.3 The Budgetary Procedure (n.d.).
175 The discussion follows closely Agné (2000b: 243-45).
rhetoric likes to pretend. More often the formulation offered as such proof reveals a naive faith that rigorous mathematics can cover up a weak argument. What Scharpf is able to show – in his book *Games Real Actors Play* (1997a) which he refers to after the passage cited above from *Governance in Europe. Democratic and Effective?* (1999) – is a well-known finding in social-choice theory but of questionable normative relevance.

In a context of actors maximising nothing but their own profit – actors consequently lacking a collective identity – it can indeed be shown that the majority principle will not lead to an *optimal welfare solution*. Somewhat simplified, this means that if majority voting is used to distribute a scarce resource among a group of three persons, two of them will join together to rob the third of his or her share, with possibly new constellations of robbing majorities and robbed minorities each time the majority is permitted to make the decision, if indeed the group is able to make a decision at all (see Scharpf 1997a: 154-68 for a more sophisticated discussion).

But this conclusion – that the optimal welfare solution is absent – is very different from what Scharpf claimed in the first place: that the situation is normatively indefensible. Even following the above drastic interpretation – that one person in a group of three is deprived of all of his or her share – the outcome is not necessarily normatively unacceptable. Whether it is depends on what alternatives are available.

A normatively worse alternative than the one depicted by Scharpf would be that the strongest person does away with the majority principle and deprives both of the remaining persons of all of their shares. Still worse would be not to make any decision at all, and so deprive all three persons of their shares. If the democratisation of the European union, or of international politics more generally, implies that two persons rob a third rather than the third robbing the other two, or that a resource absent for all three persons can be gained – which are options not excluded by the argument under study – then Scharpf is unjustified in claiming that the democratisation of international politics must be avoided for normative reasons.

One could perhaps defend Scharpf by claiming that the EU *status quo* theoretically represents a situation where scarce resources would be justly distributed among such a group of three. But that has not been argued by Scharpf or anyone else, and the possibility for doing so does not seem likely, since living conditions in the Union vary across morally irrelevant dimensions like geographical location and nationality. Another possible defence would be to take the nihilistic interpretation that no political solution is normatively acceptable. But in that case no political recommendation on democracy and the EU could be provided; and Scharpf is attempting to find one.
More generally, it is a mistake to compare an ideal type – democracy in a context of purely self-interested utility maximisers – with a real-world example – the government of the contemporary European Union. If the comparison had been made between two ideal types, or two real-world examples, not crossing the line between ideal and real, the outcome of the normative analysis would have been more tenable. Even if an idealised interpretation of democracy is fraught with normative difficulties, these could be less serious than the equivalent difficulties of equivalently idealised interpretations of other kinds of governance, for example aristocracy in a context of self-interested utility maximisers (which yields the outcome of a minority robbing a majority). That Scharpf is able to point out a normative problem in an idealised interpretation of majoritarian democracy cannot therefore amount to the action recommendation to avoid such democracy, as long as he has not demonstrated that all equivalently idealised alternatives escape the very same problem.

Now this theoretical critique could be more or less detrimental to Scharpf’s argument. If it is shown that majorities in international assemblies do override minorities far more often than do majorities in national assemblies, then he is at least right in his description of politics at national and international levels, and he would still be able to rescue his argument by maintaining (though, as we have seen, this is unlikely) that the EU, at its present stage, tends to act justly, while a full democratisation of the polity would lead to a situation where majorities simply trample over minority interests. He would then have made his case.

If, on the other hand, it is established that majorities in international assemblies override minorities less often than do majorities in national assemblies, then Scharpf would not even be correct in his basic description of how actors behave in the presumed absence of a common identity. There would then be no way to avoid the conclusion that his argument against democracy (in the sense of majoritarian decision-making procedures) has failed at the international level. Alternatively, he would be wrong in his assumption that there is no collective identity in the European Union.

7.1.2. The empirical grounds for not desiring democratic procedures in international organisations

To analyse empirically the extent to which majorities override the minority interest in national and international assemblies we must restrict our perspective to assemblies in which majority rule is actually an option. The majority must not be prevented, by a constitution or an international treaty,
from ignoring the minority. That requirement is fulfilled in the European Parliament and in national parliaments.

What kind of parliamentary practice should we then look for? In the area of budgetary policy one option would be to estimate the tendency of the majority to approximate its final budgetary decision to the policy proposed by the minority group or groups. This is the approach that will be developed here. If the majority follows its original budgetary proposition completely when making the final budgetary decision, it should be interpreted as overriding the minority to a greater extent than if it adjusts its original proposal in negotiation with minority representatives before making the final decision.

The representatives of different party groups in the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets often suggest alternative expenditures on individual budget lines. However, these policy deviations by the minorities are at present not summed up in any comprehensive shadow budgets, a fact that eliminates any possibility of making more precise assessment of how minorities are treated by the majority.

None the less, the chairman of the Committee on Budgets which prepared the budget for 2003, reports that there is a striking consensus on budget policy in the European Parliament, as compared to policy-making at the level of states. He supports this view by pointing to four factors: (i) the absence of such areas as taxation and social policy from the decision-making competence of the Parliament; (ii) the lack of ideologically clear divisions within the Parliament; (iii) the need to unite around a common position if the Parliament is to influence the final outcome in its negotiations with the European Commission and the Council of Ministers; (iv) the decision rules requiring a qualified majority for the Parliament to enact a budget, that is 314 votes cast regardless of how many of the 626 members are present.

The supplier of this account, the chairman of the Committee on Budgets, has not himself served as a member of a national parliament. His previous political experience is mainly with municipal politics and NGOs. This should not, however, invalidate his descriptions, for several members of the European Parliament who do have experience in national parliaments share his view. So the most reasonable conclusion is that European minorities are

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176 The information in this and the following paragraph comes from the committee chairman Göran Färm (e-mail to Hans Agné on 2002-03-08), whose efforts to provide a detailed account of relevant matters are gratefully appreciated.

177 E-mails received from Charlotte Cederschiöld, 2003-04-09, and from Anders Wijkman, 2003-04-21. Inquires were made of Robert Atkins, Per Garton, Timothy Kirkhope and Per Stenmark, from which, however, no replies were received; follow-ups also went unanswered. Apart from Stenmark, who was selected because of his responsibilities in the
more listened to by the European majority than national minorities are by national majorities.\textsuperscript{178}

Hence from the perspective of this limited empirical study the assumption relied upon by Scharpf in the argument that democracy is normatively undesirable in the European Union – namely that international parliamentarism will induce something like a tyranny of the majority – does seem untenable. To the extent that negotiations between majority and minority groups are normatively preferable to hard core majority rule (which is not a self-evident assumption, although Scharpf relies on it) the European Parliament seems to be normatively superior to national parliaments.

7.2. Democratic deliberation at different political levels

Political assemblies at the international level are composed of a greater number of collective identities than are national assemblies.\textsuperscript{179} According to an argument first presented in Section 4.1.1, we should therefore expect the participants in debate in international assemblies to be comparatively less loyal to principles of communicative rationality.\textsuperscript{180}

In the earlier chapter we rejected the hypothesis that internationalisation of market and state functions leads to international deliberation (understood as representatives being aware of, or making opinion for, people residing in other countries) at the level of states. However, this does not imply anything regarding the possibility of realising international deliberation in international organisations.

If international deliberation is recognised as a difficult aim to pursue, even at the level of international organisations, we may suspect that a common

\textsuperscript{178} The difference in voting rules between the European Parliament and national parliaments is clearly not sufficient to explain the absence of a strict majority rule in the European Parliament. There are no formal regulations preventing a majority of the European Parliament from refusing to negotiate with minority groups.

\textsuperscript{179} While the existence of distinct collective identities, for example national minorities, at the state level, should not be neglected, there is still a distinct difference between national and international politics. At the international level, it is part of the very procedure followed in composing political assemblies that representatives of different states and nationalities are to be selected.

\textsuperscript{180} In the context of the European Union the argument is sometimes referred to as inherent in the no-demos thesis, which claims that because there is no such thing as a European demos, there can be no democracy in the European Union (for example Weiler 1999).
nationality is indeed a prerequisite for serious democratic deliberations.\footnote{This observation would not necessarily contradict the conclusion that international deliberation at the level of states seems to be unrelated to internationalisation. The reason why international deliberation at the state level does not seem to develop as a response to internationalisation of market and state functions is not necessarily that an international cultural community created by the internationalisation of state and market functions is unimportant regarding effects on deliberation. For the sake of coherence, one should instead argue that the internationalisation of state and market functions does not create any international cultural community (of such a kind as would facilitate deliberation) in the first place.} If, on the contrary, international deliberation is recognised as a viable option at the international level, we would not only reject a theoretically derived hypothesis, but also conclude that the continuous absence of international deliberation at the level of states is not so much product of the international context as it is related to an institutional arrangement which does not permit face to face communication among deliberators. The deliberative problem of internationalisation, as pointed out in Chapter 4, could then be dealt with by a more careful designing of institutions (see Section 8.1.1 for further details).

The most striking difference between deliberations in the European Parliament and their national equivalents is obvious to any observer. Far fewer questions are posed in the European Parliament debates, and the intensity level of interactions is far lower, than in national parliaments. Except for Council and Commission representatives, it hardly ever happens that a speaker takes the floor more than once in the same session, which obviously makes for a certain blandness in the interactions.\footnote{As in most national parliaments there is in the European Parliament a certain time devoted to the posing of questions. This is not investigated here because it is not comparable to what we investigated at the national level. It is much easier to evade a question in debate interactions (investigated in national parliaments) than it is at a formal question time (at the European Parliament).}

The considerably lower intensity of question-answer interactions at the international level is itself a theoretically relevant observation. The discourse theoretical kind of deliberation presented in Chapter 4 requires not only that questions be answered, but more fundamentally, that they be posed in the first place. Still, it is a different problem of deliberative democracy if, on the one hand, questions are not asked, or, on the other, they are not answered; and for the sake of comparison we should at least take a glance at the few questions that are occasionally asked in European Parliament debates.

In Chapter 4, question-answer interactions were selected by the criteria of political centrality (as estimated by their chronological position in the debate), ideological diversity (including intra-party and inter-party interactions), and institutional diversity (including intra-parliamentary and government-parliament interactions) applied to three individual speeches in budgetary
debates in different years. It would certainly have been preferable if the same criteria could also have been used for selecting question-answer interactions in the European Parliament. However, that is not possible. If the same method of selection had been applied to the European Parliament, we would have ended up with, at most, one or two question-answer interactions. To obtain at least a small group of observations one might instead look for question-answer interactions in the budgetary debates of the European Parliament since 1996 (the earliest which are accessible on the internet), regardless of how they fit with the criteria mentioned above. As a partial compensation for this less systematic investigation, more qualitative information on the context and subjects of the questions will be provided here than in Chapter 4.183

The debate on the draft of the general budget in 1997 seems to have been rather intense. It would not have been particularly interesting if it had occurred in national politics, but it stands out among debates in the European Parliament:

I should like to end with two specific questions to the Commission. I should like to ask the Commissioner, who is very courageous, whether he could say something about his support for non-governmental organizations not only in the A but also in the B part of the budget. Secondly, because I appreciate enormously what the Commission is doing in terms of reform of the administration, could the Commissioner say what has been done about the transfer of appropriations in respect of posts? 300 people are concerned but if I have understood correctly very little has been happening. It would be much appreciated if you could reply to these questions. (European Parliament 1996, Brinkhorst, ELDR)

Questions are also posed in the next speech that followed in the same session, but this time to the representatives of the Council.

Gentlemen of the Council, I shall not hide from you the fact that, at this stage in the procedure, Parliament is still awaiting additional information on the Palais. What is the state of the building? What is happening about the

183 It could be argued that this selection procedure leads the analysis to over-estimate the deliberative qualities of debates, since discussions in which communicative intensity is at its lowest level will simply not be included among the material analysed. The only thing that can be done about this problem, it would seem, is to keep it in mind when making inferences. A certain awareness of the problem may be sufficient to avoid being misled. The acuteness of the problem rather depends on what empirical observations are drawn and what theoretical conclusions are claimed. If we establish empirically that deliberative qualities are low as compared to national estimates, even if the selection leads us to over-estimate the international level of deliberation, we are in a somewhat safe position to conclude that the problem of deliberation is greater in the international than in the national context.
equipment? What are the actual leasings? Will they be renegotiated? Because they can be renegotiated, as I have just said.

As regards the Economic and Social Council and the Committee of the Regions, I am sorry that Chapter XX – Buildings – of the Council’s draft does not consider the needs of these institutions now that the European Parliament has announced its intention of leaving the Van Maerlan building, agreeing to the conclusions and questions I put to it in my document No 5. I would just mention that in our draft we only have allocations committed for the first six months. What will happen if this is not brought to a conclusion in the required time and Parliament has to go on finding the rent for Van Maerlan? That is not provided for in our budget. (European Parliament 1996, Fabra Vallés, PPE)

After this both the Council and the Commission representatives were permitted to give a brief response. The representative of the Council – Mr Coveney, at the time Irish Minister of Finance – was first on the floor. It is worth citing the whole of his response, as it reveals the rhetorical means by which he avoided answering questions put to him by Parliamentarian Fabra Vallés. The Council representative devotes much time to the comment by Parliamentarian Brinkhorst, who did not address any question to him, while the only connection to the question by Parliamentarian Fabra Vallés made in the “response” by the Council representative Coveney comes in his two last sentences. There he remarks that Parliamentarian Vallés could not expect an answer to the questions that he actually posed:

Mr President, enough has been said to have a considerable debate here, and I am sure we will have that at a future time. I thank those who spoke and I have listened carefully to what they have said. Let me reiterate: we are living in an unusual period where all of the Member States are under varying degrees of difficulty with their own budgets, and clearly that has to be reflected in our work. That is why this is a particularly difficult year.

The Commissioner spoke about legal bases, as did Mr Brinkhorst; that is a key issue. We are working constructively with the authorities concerned and we hope during our presidency and in Council to make progress on this issue which, we are all agreed, is not just desirable, but absolutely necessary.

The Commissioner’s choices and priorities are of course somewhat different to our own, but as long as he appreciates that this is a time for making difficult choices and having to relinquish some of the things that we would all like, we can work together and, I hope, find a solution that we can all agree with in the end.

Mr Brinkhorst was kind enough to refer to the fact that I have tried – and I will continue to do so – to bridge the gap that does exist, but the Council and Parliament have to have different priorities at times and there will always be a feeling that cooperation could be better and we can but work in that direction. But I think that the level of dialogue this year was very real and we are not finished yet.

I can say little about the revision of the financial perspective. As you know, it is down on the agenda for the Ecofin meeting this weekend and I have no doubt that we will return to that subject. But it is not really for me to deal with
it two days ahead of my Minister for Finance, who was dealing with it in Dublin at the weekend.

I have noted what Mr Fabra Vallés has said. Many of the points were of such a detailed nature that I do not think he would expect me to respond to them this afternoon, but I will note them and I have no doubt that we will have further dialogue on them. (European Parliament 1996, Coveney, Council Representative)

It is perhaps difficult to get rid of the impression that Council representative Coveney feels free to avoid answering the question because he knows that the debate rules makes it difficult or impossible for Parliamentarian Vallés to repeat it. But this is not necessarily the only reason Coveney refuses to enter into democratic deliberation in this case. The rules of the debate are the same when, in the next speech the Commissioner with budgetary responsibility, Liikanen, although addressing himself directly to the questions posed, gives no answers:

Mr Brinkhorst raised two rather detailed questions. First of all as far as support to nongovernmental organizations is concerned he took the valuable initiative of organizing a hearing next week in the European Parliament. We have cooperated with this. We have sent letters to all the organizations and asked them to be present. I do not want to make an impromptu analysis of this report today but we are willing, later, to present an assessment to the Committee on Budgets.

The same is true regarding the transfer of credits for employment. I fully agree with him that if there is a transfer of credits for employment the idea is to decrease the dependence on external work. If that is not the case then there is no logic or justification for our efforts. I am prepared to report to the Budgets Committee on how this situation develops.

Finally, to Minister Coveney, the Commission is willing to cooperate on a budget based on the utmost rigour. But as I said before, when there is great rigour we need to agree on priorities. This is even more important under such circumstances than when there is a wide margin for expenditure. (European Parliament 1996, Liikanen, Commission Representative)

It would be difficult to argue that Commissioner Liikanen actually answers the first question posed by Parliamentarian Brinkhorst as to whether he will support non-governmental organisations “not only in the A but also in the B part of the budget”. The letters that Commissioner Liikanen begins to talk about may certainly be important, but the questioner wanted to know something about the budget, which is a different thing. To conclude that Commissioner Liikanen does not answer the first question posed by Parliamentarian Brinkhorst, we do not need to go into details on the A and B parts of the budget. As for the second question posed by Brinkhorst – on the matter of what has been done about the transfer of credits for administrative posts under reform – Commissioner Liikanen promises once again to make
an assessment of the matter to the Committee on Budgets, but in the actual
debate he is none the less unwilling, or unable, to answer the rather simple
question “what has been done”. To conclude that Commissioner Liikanen
missed an opportunity to engage in democratic deliberation, as did Council
representative Coveney, we do not need to check whether Liikanen later
presented an assessment to the Committee on Budgets, although that would
of course have shown him to be more engaged in deliberation.

It is not necessary to quote at length, as has been done above, for every
interaction analysed. But to describe more fully the arguably subjective
coding criteria in operation, it may be appropriate to show also one of the
interactions in which a question could be said to be satisfactorily answered.
Parliamentarian Dührkop asks the Commissioner Schreyer,

I would like to ask you a simple question: has the Commission, given what we
have heard here in September and today, addressed the question of how, in the
budget for 2000, we can avoid the situation whereby, in the middle of
November, we are still producing a supplementary, amending and transferring
budget? (European Parliament 1999b, Dührkop, PSE)

The response by Commissioner Schreyer does not accept the assumption
made by the questioner – that supplementary spending, among other things,
must be avoided in the mid November. But Schreyer still answers the question
by explaining how she understands the predicaments of budget policy-

If this modified supplementary and amending budget is adopted, then it will
be possible, in 1999, taking into account all the amendments, to make available
and finance an additional EUR 670 million for the PHARE and TACIS
programmes, for south-east Europe and other programmes, mainly from
unused funds in the agricultural sector. All in all, I welcome the fact that it has
been possible, on account of this reduction in expenditure, to increase funds in
the external action sector.

Several of you have criticised the fact that carry-overs of this order of
magnitude are being proposed, and indeed that it was feasible to do so. To this,
I would say that surely the reality of budgetary policy is that there will always
be developments in the course of a financial year, that is during the handling
of a budget, that will debar full exploitation of all the budgetary lines. This
does not signify a failure on the part of the Commission to accept Parliament’s
decisions. I will make it my business to see that Parliament’s decisions are

184 Suffice it here to list the parliamentarians and debates from which the interactions
analysed were taken: 1) European Parliament 1999a, Rübig, PPE: one question posed, not
answered; 2) European Parliament 1999b, Dührkop, PSE: two questions posed, one of
which fully answered, the other not answered; 3) European Parliament 1999b, Theato, PPE-
DE: one question posed, fully answered; 4) European Parliament 2001, Van Dam, EDD:
one question posed, unanswered.
adhered to. Nevertheless, we will always be faced with situations in which one or other development debars full exploitation of the lines. I will inform you whenever it is possible to predict to what extent situations of this kind will arise, and I believe that what we must do then is to jointly consider neither freezing these funds, nor employing them, but rather reallocating them to precisely those areas where Parliament too agrees that this represents constructive use of these surplus funds. (European Parliament 1999b, Schreyer, Commission Representative)

The interpretation of this interaction as an answer to the question posed seems to be shared by Parliamentarian Dührkop herself, who re-enters the debate, not without excitement caused by the response she had received a moment earlier:

Mr President, I congratulate you. This is a genuine Parliament and we are embarking on a debate. I believe that we should be grateful for that. (European Parliament 1999b, Dührkop, PSE)

On a more general account, however, the question-answer interactions in the European Parliament are less deliberative. Out of the nine questions reported above, two were fully answered and seven not answered at all (no question was interpreted as not answered but touched upon). Following the coding procedure used in the chapter on deliberation – in which unanswered questions were assigned a value of 1 in terms of deliberation, questions not answered but touched upon were assigned a value of 2, and those accurately answered a value of 3 – the mean value of deliberation in the European Parliament, with regard to the taking seriously of positions in debate, remains at 1.4. This is lower than in any of the three countries investigated in previous chapters. The corresponding mean value for both Sweden and France was 1.7, while it reached 2.3 in the British case.

Since the method of selection might have biased the estimates in favour of deliberation in the European Parliament (as pointed out in footnote 183), the best interpretation is probably that there is an obstacle to deliberation in this assembly, as compared to the situation in national parliaments. This conclusion would appear difficult to reconcile with the increasingly popular argument that discourse democracy is able to legitimise the EU (see for example Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Eriksen and Neyer 2003). The Union seems to have a particular weakness rather than a particular strength in this regard (see Sections 8.1.4 and 8.1.5 for a further discussion).

The conclusion that there is an obstacle to deliberation in the Parliament may be integrated into various theories. Let us consider two possibilities: first, a theory claiming that common nationality is important for the deliberative quality of the taking seriously of argument in debate – at this point this is the
preferable alternative, since we attempted to test precisely this theory and the theory passed the test; second, a rationalist theory claiming that the level of deliberation in the European Parliament is low because it is powerless compared to national parliaments, and that there is therefore little need for the representatives of other institutions (Commission and Council) to take the views of parliamentarians seriously; which is a counter-alternative proposed to test once again the theory which we started with.

7.2.1. Analysing rival interpretations of why deliberation level is low

The two interpretations of why the level of deliberation is low in the European Parliament can be analysed empirically. If the rationalist interpretation is correct, the European Parliament must be visibly less powerful than national parliaments. If this, however, proves not to be the case, the interpretation based on the importance of a common nationality will have passed a second test.

In Chapter 5 we used several general indicators to estimate the power of parliaments. Some of them would not be fruitful in this context, but others would. Let us compare the powers of national parliaments and the European Parliament on the indicators of investigatory resources possessed and budgetary outcomes initiated directly by the various parliaments.

In the year 2002, the Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament had seven or eight members of its investigatory staff employed full-time, in addition to a few persons employed for administrative purposes (e-mail from the committee chairman, Göran Färm, 2002-03-08). Given that the EU’s total budget is considerably smaller than those of France or Britain and about the same size as the Swedish budget, this figure indicates relatively abundant investigatory resources. We recall from the previous chapter that the equivalent parliamentary committee in Sweden had seven staff members employed in 1999; the British Treasury Committee had six (plus eleven specialist advisers) in 1996; and total personnel of the French Rapporteur général and the Commission de Finance in 2002, amounted to twenty four. All of these national figures would appear to include administrative personnel. It does not seem reasonable to conclude that the European Parliament is significantly weaker in this respect than national parliaments.

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185 For example, the indicator of attracting public attention would give rather uncertain estimates, since members of the European Parliament do not pay much attention to either fellow parliamentarians or representatives of other institutions, in the sense of posing direct questions to them.
The same conclusion follows from the observation of alterations in budgetary outcome produced directly by various parliaments. To see this clearly, we must recall that there are different measures by which parliamentary alterations to a budget may be described. As previously reported, information has been collected regarding net financial effect produced by the Swedish parliament (from 1971 to 2000), while information has been collected on the total budgetary change produced by the French parliament (from 1990 to 2000). In the British case no information has been collected on either measure.

Concerning the EU, information has been collected for both measures: financial net effects and total budgetary changes produced by the Parliament. The source used is the document “1st reading amendments adopted by the Committee on Budgets” (European Parliament 2002 and 2003), which can currently be accessed on the internet for the budget procedures of 2002 and later years. More importantly, and unlike alternative sources, it is obtainable

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186 Three considerations about the data supplied by this document need to be made. (i) The document reports neither the budgetary policy decided by the European Union nor the budgetary proposal made by the European Parliament, but rather the budgetary proposal made by the Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament. This is problematic because the plenary decision of the Parliament may sometimes diverge from the decision recommended by its committee, and then the former overrides the latter. However, this happens rarely so the problem is a minor one. (ii) Another problem of the same kind is that a plenary decision of the parliament, on its first reading, may have to be negotiated with the Council of Ministers and the Commission. Only with regard to so-called non-compulsory spending (which accounts for about 55 percent of the budget) does Parliament have the final say on spending levels, while with regard to the area of compulsory spending the final say on spending levels rests with the Council. However, the constitutional powers of the European Parliament in the area of budget policy are still considerable. Not only has it full power to determine the greater part of the budget; it can also reject the whole budget, both compulsory and non-compulsory spending, in which case the budget procedure must begin again from scratch. Moreover, if the Council decides to override the Parliament in the area of compulsory spending, it must do so by a qualified majority. Otherwise it is the Parliamentary proposal that will be implemented (see European Parliament Fact Sheets: 1.4.3 The Budgetary Procedure (n. d.)). This allows us to conclude that the European Parliament is strong enough to let us have at least an idea about its policy impact through investigating the proposals from its Committee on Budgets on the first reading. Because of the powers possessed by the Parliament the EU's budget should approximate what is proposed by the parliamentary Committee on Budgets. (iii) It should be noted that the figures in the document relied upon do not seem to cover the whole of the EU budget. Summing up the figures results in a budget of about 80 000 million Euros for each of the recent years, though other official sources suggest about 90 000 million Euros (for example EUSVAR, a databank administered by the Swedish parliament, found at www.riksdagen.se/eu/fakta/index.asp, accessed 2003-03-02). Contacts with staff members of the European Parliament have not helped to sort out the reasons for this discrepancy. However, this problem is not severe. The measures that will be used in the analyses relate figures of individual budget lines to the total budget. If certain budget lines
in a format that permits standard computer programs to make the necessary calculations. Like most EU-budgetary documents, it separates expenditures into the categories of payments and commitments. Commitments are understood as the maximal amounts that can be paid according to the EU budget. Payments are understood as the amounts that will be paid according to the same budget. Payment may be lower than commitments, for example, because member states do not request the maximal funds available. The focus now will be placed on the more encompassing category of commitments.

Table 7.1. Net effect and total change by parliaments. EU, France and Sweden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Year</th>
<th>Sweden (milj. Kr.)</th>
<th>France (milj. Fr.)</th>
<th>EU (milj. Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total budget expenditure (A)</td>
<td>692,815</td>
<td>693,380</td>
<td>1,586,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net effect by parliament (B)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total change by parliament (C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/A (Percent)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/A (Percent)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7.1 shows the relevant figures. As the differences between the national and European parliaments are huge – in one case the percentage of change being about 30 times greater in the European Parliament than in the national equivalent – it is tempting to draw general conclusions about the greater budgetary power of parliaments at the international level. On the measure of financial net effect, the figures for the European Parliament are 0.72 and 0.87

are absent (which they probably are), they will be absent also in the budget total, where the ratio between individual budget lines and total budget is not necessarily biased by the absence of any particular budget lines.

187 E-mail from Philippe Kamaris, EP press secretary responsible for budget information, 2003-04-11. However, it should be noted that the distinction between commitments and payments is in reality somewhat more complicated. It is occasionally possible to find budget lines where the payments are higher than commitments. If any more precise definitions have been given to the terms commitment and payment, these, although requested, have not been supplied.
percent of the estimated total budget,\footnote{In the case of the EU, the estimated total budget corresponds to the Draft Budget produced by the Council of Ministers, to which the parliamentary Committee on Budgets proposed amendments. The figures for the Draft Budget are presented in the same document as the amendments proposed by the Committee on Budgets.} while the corresponding figure in the Swedish case is 0.00 percent for both years. On the measure of total change, the figures for the European Parliament are 4.33 for 2002 and 3.71 for 2003, while the French figures are 0.14 and 0.33 percent for 1998 and 2000 respectively.

Recognising the methodological difficulties underlying these figures (recall footnote \footnote{This conclusion holds even though the theory was found to be mistaken in its assertion that internationalisation improves international deliberation at the level of states. The two parts of the theory – predicting accurate levels of deliberation on national and international levels, on the one hand, and predicting trends of deliberation at the level of states over time, on the other – are logically separable, and a flaw in one of them does not constitute a flaw in the other. The two observations could be reconciled under the view that common nationality is important for a discourse theoretical kind of deliberation but that a common nationality does not arise in response to internationalisation of either market or state functions nor in response to common political institutions.}) we should, however, not let interpretations go so far as to suggest that the European Parliament influences its budget substantially more than national ones do theirs. Figures representing parliamentary effect are expectedly higher in the European case because the European Parliament does not control the composition of its opposite institutions, the Council of Ministers and the Commission. Since national parliaments elect their governments, they have less reason than the European Parliament to force through budget amendments. So at this point a more appropriate reading of the above figures would be that there is no empirical support to argue that the European Parliament is significantly weaker than the national ones when it comes to controlling budgetary policy.

But that rather modest interpretation is still sufficient to establish a serious difficulty with the argument that the level of deliberation is low in the European Parliament because it lacks budgetary power. Simultaneously, the alternative theorisation – that deliberation is low because the Parliament lacks a common nationality – is strengthened because it has now passed a second test. Hence there is reason to believe that a common nationality does help the taking seriously of positions in debate. International deliberation is relatively weak, at both the level of states (analysed in a previous chapter) and the international level (analysed in this chapter).\footnote{In the case of the EU, the estimated total budget corresponds to the Draft Budget produced by the Council of Ministers, to which the parliamentary Committee on Budgets proposed amendments. The figures for the Draft Budget are presented in the same document as the amendments proposed by the Committee on Budgets.}

More generally, the analysis points to a democratic problem of internationalisation. Even though people affect each other across national boundaries deliberation across national boundaries remains low, both in
political assemblies of states and of international organisations; moreover, international deliberation does not seem to develop as a response to increases of internationalisation (here investigated only at the level of states).

7.3. Democratic autonomy at two political levels

There is no obvious theory regarding the expected difference between national and international levels in terms of political autonomy, let alone of democratic political autonomy. In the absence of better alternatives, however, one may rely on theories constructed for a slightly different purpose, namely to explain integration between states. Broad approaches, such as realism and functionalism have been used to explain why and to what extent the EU has been equipped with, for example, legislative competencies and fiscal resources. Such factors may count as particular instances of political autonomy. Possibly then, we could draw on theories of integration to understand what kind and degree of political autonomy the EU is expected to have.

Realism and functionalism yield the same prediction on one important point. From both perspectives the growing capacity of an international organisation is expected to come about in policy areas where the capacity of member states involved could be significantly increased. Following the historical origin of functionalism as postulated by organic theory, states integrate because they need integration in order to survive. Hence if there is some discrete policy area in which the state is relatively well able to satisfy its needs without integration, there is no reason to expect further integration in that area. According to a currently popular version of realism, states integrate to the extent that integration increases their control over political outcomes. Hence to the extent that the states involved already possess a comparably high degree of control over policy outcome in a certain area,

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190 What follows relies upon strong and idealised interpretations of both traditions. Weaker interpretations of both theories may adjust basic assumptions the better to follow concrete observations. Nevertheless, to sort out what theory is preferable from an empirical perspective, one may depart from stronger interpretations, in order to permit concentration on fundamentals rather than ad-hoc assumptions, as well as to keep open the possibility that either or both theories may be wrong. As for terminology, referring to ideal type interpretations, purified labels such as “functionalism” and “realism” are preferable to the various neologisms in more common use today.

191 It is common in functionalist theory to assume different policy areas to be interlinked, so that integration in one area will create tensions in the system as a whole, which can be resolved by further integration. None the less, given that a state is more efficient in performing its functions in one area than in another, there is less need for integration in the former, and hence less reason, from a functionalist perspective, to expect integration.
there is little reason to expect them to integrate with other states in order to acquire better instruments for controlling policy in that area.\(^{192}\)

Is it empirically correct, then, to say that the budgetary political autonomy of the EU has tended to arise in areas where it may compensate for losses or weaknesses of political autonomy in countries like Sweden, Britain, and France? The largest post of the EU budget (Table 7.2) is the common agricultural policy, which accounts for about 47 percent of the total expenditure, followed by the structural measures, accounting for about 34 percent of the total, which include support to physical infrastructure and production in economically less developed regions. Support for research and education, technical development, environmental protection, culture, and trans-European networks are classified under the category of internal policy, which, at 6 percent of the total, is the third largest post. External measures and administration come next, accounting for about 5 percent each.

Table 7.2. Expenditures in EU budget of 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>{PRIVATE }</th>
<th>Estimated expenditure</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>44,024</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural measures</td>
<td>31,574</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal policy</td>
<td>5,855</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External measures</td>
<td>4,358</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>4,939</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for applicant countries</td>
<td>2,114</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>93,780</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from EUSVAR, database administered by the Swedish parliament at www.riksdagen.se/eu/fakta/index.asp (accessed 2003-03-02).

\(^{192}\) This is a version of realism that permits international politics to be understood as a positive-sum game of power. It is possible for both of two states to gain power over outcomes at the same time. A realist theory of integration could also be formulated as a zero-sum game of power, according to which integration takes place when it favours the position of one (stronger) state in relation to another. Integration of states would then occur not only as a result of efforts to increase one’s own capacity, but also of efforts to diminish the capacity of others. In the context of the peaceful integration of European states, such arguments are understandably less popular than positive-sum interpretations.
To my knowledge, it has never been established that the countries which agreed upon the common agriculture policy in 1957 experienced a significantly larger restraint on action in the field of agriculture than in any other field. While it can be argued that “the potential for French and Italian agriculture exports would be enormous under any preferential arrangements that maintained relatively high prices relative to the world market” (Moravcsik 1999: 89, my ital.), this does not imply any particular difficulty regarding the national budget policy of agriculture. At the very least, there does not seem to be any strong support for the view that the EU is equipped only with budgetary action capacity that has either been lost or become weak at the state level.

Both realism and functionalism could easily be stated in weaker terms and in that way account for the situation. While such an alteration would itself be theoretically problematic (as argued in the previous footnote), both realism and functionalism would still face predictive problems when we look at what there is not in the EU budget. The most striking absence is welfare expenditures such as medical and social spending and transfers. Both as compared to other policy areas in the EU budget, and to welfare spending at the national level, the EU welfare spending is a dwarf (Pierson 1998: 124). This absence is significant in the light of what we have seen in Chapter 3 on democratic political autonomy. It was there concluded that political autonomy to promote social equality has decreased at the state level during the recent

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193 According to realist thinking, it could be suggested that the dominance of agriculture in the EU-budget stems from a French fear that the common market would result in trade advantages to industrially more advanced West Germany (McGormick 1999: 188-89; see also Moravcsik 1999: 86 pp.). A common agricultural policy is then viewed as a measure for the more equal sharing of welfare outcomes resulting from common market membership among states at different levels of industrialisation. The theoretical development consists in the assumption that power over policy outcomes is transferable between countries and policy areas. If one country gains on a certain step of integration, its gain can be distributed among all countries through negotiations and binding rules. According to functionalist thinking, on the other hand, one may propose that the plan to create a common market also created a tension in the system. France ran a risk of being beaten in competition with economically and technically more efficient West Germany, and this in turn could result in West Germany suffering instability with regard to exports and imports. The fact that the system survived is then explained by its introduction of budgetary measures in agricultural policy. However, both of these developments tend to make each theory so thin that it loses most original substance. As for realism, any case of integration can always be argued to favour some object, which can then be transferred through negotiations to other policy areas and countries. As for functionalism, any case of integration can always be argued to sustain the stability of the political system in some respect, at least in the area of budget policy since the resources described in the budget is always used for some purpose.
decades of internationalisation.\textsuperscript{194} We should recall, moreover, that social spending is a major instrument for correcting social inequality in market economies like the European ones. Furthermore, the larger and more self-sufficient an economy, the stronger the political autonomy able to oppose market actors who react negatively on redistributive policy – for example by redirecting consumption from domestic to imported products and services or by using capital in foreign rather than domestic investments. Against this background, both functionalism and realism appears to be empirically problematic on the observed absence of welfare spending at the European level. Both predict what cannot be observed, namely that international integration intensifies in those areas where states are decreasingly able to reach their aims and where those aims could be reached more effectively by the internationalisation of state functions.

Trying to explain the absence of political autonomy for promoting social equality at the international level, one should perhaps also try a Marxist argument. Politics will then be understood as determined by social groups defined by their conflicting economic interests. More particularly, contemporary state action will be regarded as an instrument in the hand of the possessors of capital. Applying this as a theory of integration among states, one should expect political autonomy to emerge at the level of international organisations to the extent that it enforces or, at the very least, does not threaten, the interests of the social group that dominates politics at the state level, in other words, of the possessors of capital.

This Marxist argument would fit nicely with the observation that the EU, like all other international organisations, is relatively weak on transfers and social spending. However, it would also create its own problems, no less severe than those created by realism and functionalism. Policy to promote social equality is absent in international organisation only in comparison to its presence at the national level, and so the Marxist argument is accurate at the international level only to the extent that it fails to explain what happens at the national level.\textsuperscript{195} Furthermore, the Marxist account leads to the strange result of regarding European farmers as a dominating and exploiting social class.

\textsuperscript{194} One may notice that the argument now to be developed does not require the confirmation of any causal (negative) link between internationalisation and autonomy regarding social equality. The (empirically justified) assumption is simply that autonomy to promote social equality has decreased at the level of states at the same time as the process of internationalisation has continued.

\textsuperscript{195} The Marxist perspective could however be fruitful in explaining an asymmetry claimed to exist between negative and positive integration. For the distinction between positive and negative integration, and the argument that European integration is more negative than positive, see Scharpf 1996a.
7.4. Summary and further conclusions

This chapter has developed and investigated three hypotheses concerning the differences to be expected between national and international levels in terms of participation, deliberation, and autonomy.

The idea that some variants of democratic participation are normatively undesirable at the international level, because of an alleged lack of collective identity at that level, does not seem to hold. In one of its most famous and influential interpretations, developed by Fritz Scharpf, the argument is limited to pointing out normative problems of democracy in a state of egoist utility-maximisers, without however recognising that alternative kinds of government would produce even worse normative problems in such a state. Moreover, it seems to be objectively false that minorities in the European Union are less well cared for by the European majority than national minorities are by national majorities. From what has hitherto been ascertained, therefore, Scharpf’s argument does not appear to make a strong case against procedures of democratic participation at an international level.

When it comes to deliberation we would expect communicative rationality to be less realised at the international than at the national level. This hypothesis seems to explain the facts. As compared to national politics, fewer questions are posed, and a smaller proportion is answered, in budget debates in the European Parliament. The effect would seem not to be caused by any weakness in the Parliament; it is more plausible – though not confirmed – that the deliberative problems derive from a lack of common identity or nationality. The democratic problem of deliberation at the international level is particularly severe since, as was shown in Chapter 4, the internationalisation of states and markets does not seem to have intensified efforts at the state level to deliberate across national boundaries.

To understand the difference in political autonomy between national and international levels, one could arguably start from traditional theories of European integration such as functionalism and realism, both of which might be understood to predict that political autonomy emerges at an international level if such autonomy cannot be attained at the national level. Nevertheless, to give an empirical account of the budget policy of the European Union, Sweden, Britain, and France, these theories have to be stretched so thin that they lose most of their original substance, and when they are used to account for what certain budget policies are not pursued, they both fail to accord with empirical observation. Marxist-like theories, on the other hand, create difficulties which are different but equally serious. At this point we ought therefore to continue our search for an explanation for why political
autonomy differs at national and international levels in the field of budget policy. Some new and possibly fruitful ideas will be considered towards the end of the next, and final, chapter.
8. Adapting democratic theory to internationalisation

The major results have been summarised at the end of each chapter. Here the intention is not to provide yet another summary (though Section 8.1.8 lists results in a condensed form), but to relate findings from different chapters to each other and to contributions from previous research, and finally to make a few suggestions as to how, in the context of internationalisation, democratic theory might be developed. Democratic reforms that respond to problems and possibilities of internationalisation will be considered in the course of the analysis.

We will start by reconsidering some positions regarding the appropriate overall context of democracy and democratic theory. Should democratic theory be restricted to domestic politics because democracy is fundamentally incompatible with international politics? Or should democratic theory be applied to international politics because the process of internationalisation has made it impossible for existing state-level democracies to decide the future of their citizens? Or are the empirically detectable effects of internationalisation on democracy so small that any assumption regarding international politics is redundant in democratic theory? Each of these questions is dealt with in its own section below.

8.1. Discussion of major results

8.1.1. The assumption that democracy can be realised in domestic politics only

Let us begin with the tendency to restrict realisation and theorisation of democracy to the internal affairs of states or nations. We have seen the restriction in classical arguments by John Locke and John Stuart Mill as well as in contemporary contributions (Chapters 1, 4, 5, and 7). The justification of such restriction, when stated at all explicitly, is basically an explanatory claim: democracy is impossible to achieve, or turns into an undesirable kind of politics, in an international environment.

The empirical findings of this study suggest a rather different conclusion. When market functions are being radically internationalised while state functions are not, as in Sweden, Britain, and France until the end of the 1980s, citizens do not become less inclined to participate in general elections, and their elected representatives take as large a part in budget policy-making as ever. When state functions are being radically internationalised there is perforce the effect that nationally elected representatives will take a smaller
part in those areas of policy-making that are transferred to an international level. But neither is there during such periods any trend towards less participation by nationally elected representatives in areas that by and large remain at the state level (as with the budget politics in Sweden, Britain and France during the 1990s), and the observed decrease in election turnout at this stage of internationalisation is certainly not dramatic. Moreover, the making of budget policy in the European Union reminds us that elected representatives at an international level may take an equal or greater part in the exercise of power as compared to elected representatives at the state level. Regarding demos participation, there is one obvious shortcoming: turnout in European elections has been significantly lower than in national ones. But that one shortcoming could hardly justify the view that internationalisation generally eliminates the possibilities of democratic theory and practice.

When it comes to public deliberation, internationalisation of market and state functions does not seem to have eroded the conditions for deliberation among co-nationals within individual countries. There is also a problem in this regard, however. When markets and states integrate across territories, international deliberation is still not taking place. This can be seen both in an international assembly like the European Parliament (where the answering rate and the number of questions posed during plenary debates was very low compared to the figures for national parliaments) and in national parliaments (where the minimal attention paid to problems experienced outside the country was stable throughout the period investigated).

Among persons whose democratic engagement revolves around the concept of deliberation alone, the last point may be taken as a reason to locate democracy (as well as politics and economics overall) within separate nations. For the moment, however, such a conclusion would seem exaggerated. The problems pointed to could possibly be handled by institutional means that have not yet been tried. To strengthen the international awareness of national parliaments one may use some version of reciprocal representation (Schmitter 1997b: 303 pp.), according to which, parliaments of different nations allocate parliamentary seats to each other. To strengthen deliberation in international assemblies one could start by copying more completely the rules of debate that have evolved in national parliaments over the centuries. A crucial step, in my view, would be to alter the debating rules of, for example, the European Parliament so as to allow selected persons to enter the debate more than once in each session and repeatedly to pose and answer questions in brief. Until such time as institutional changes of this kind have been tried and found ineffective there is no reason, from a deliberative perspective, to advocate restricting democratic theory and practice to the realm of individual nations.
The prospects for developing deliberation in the European Parliament depend on the reasons deliberation is currently weak. If the only reason is that members of parliament do not share the same nationality, a positive change would be less likely in the short and medium term than if the cause resides in the rules governing the plenary debates. Somewhat aside from these two possibilities, it was noted that the paucity of deliberation in the European Parliament could not be explained by reference to its alleged insufficiency of political power. Of more direct relevance, however, is the observation that multiplicity of nationalities does not seem to damage the cohesiveness of parliaments. The crucial observations is that international majorities seem to be more benevolent to their minorities than national ones are. And if we accept this interpretation, we should be prepared to admit that a certain kind of political solidarity has been institutionalised across national boundaries in the European Parliament.

The same observation leads us to question what is today perhaps the most developed and influential argument why democratic procedures are not desirable at the international level, in an alleged absence of collective identity (cf. Scharpf 1999: 7-8). Although the material treated here is very limited on this point, there is presently no reason to expect a democratisation of European international politics to induce any worse tyranny of the majority than Europeans are already accustomed to in their domestic politics. And since it can be taken for granted that democracy is a value in domestic politics, this result suggests it is also a value in an international context. All in all, no adequate support for the assumption that democracy and democratic theory should be restricted to domestic and nationally delimited politics has yet been found.

8.1.2. The assumption that democracy must cover international politics

Let us then turn to the view that democracy must be promoted in both national and international politics and that democratic theory should recommend political actions that help such promotion. For the sake of brevity, let me consider only one argument in favour of this position (see Section 1.2 for a survey of arguments why international politics may need democratic attention): A decreasing capacity for states to perform political

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196 Some mistakenly regards this as a rather weak argument in favour of democratisation of international organisations. In the academic debate on democracy and international organisations (for example McGrew 2002), in particular concerning the European Union (for example Grimm 1995), the effects of an alleged lack of collective identity have been cited as the major obstacle to international democracy.
action with regard to their respective populations, especially after the Second World War, has eliminated the relevance of classical conceptions of state sovereignty and popular sovereignty. (For an elaboration see, for instance, Held 1995, especially pages 16-23 and 135-140.)

The present study provides a certain support for this assumption, the evidence being neither totally absent nor particularly strong. Democratic autonomy, concerning public spending at the level of states, does not seem to be challenged by the internationalisation of market functions. As far as spending levels are concerned, international flows of capital and trade may even be exploited as a means to strengthen democratic autonomy. The picture, however, is different regarding the capacity of states to redistribute market allocated incomes. On that point, internationalisation has been followed by diminishing autonomy (though no causal relation between the two has been confirmed).

That there has been some kind of restriction on budgetary democratic autonomy can also be argued from the fact that opposed political parties, whose ideological distance from one another is rather stable over time, appear to propose more similar budget policies during the time of internationalisation of market functions (though only Sweden has been considered with regard to this point). Particularly well supported is the view that internationalisation of state, as opposed to market, functions limits national budgetary room for manoeuvre. For example, on the line in the Swedish budget that announces fees to the European Union, there was no parliamentary opposition at all to the government proposal, though two of the opposition parties advocated Sweden's secession from the Union, and all the other budget lines met with opposition in the form of alternative proposals. Hence the internationalisation of state functions seems more likely to affect political autonomy than does the internationalisation of markets, not only in areas where decision-making functions are transferred to an international level – and a negative effect is close to tautological – but also where internationalisation of state functions is much more limited and consists in nothing but a financial obligation decided at the level of states for international purposes.

197 The Left party and the Green party oppose Swedish membership of the European Union. During recent years both parties have collaborated with the Social Democratic minority government on budget policy, though neither has taken a seat in government. That the Greens and the Left do not oppose the EU-membership fees when collaborating with the government is less surprising, but neither have the parties opposed the fees in the years when they presented “shadow budgets” which opposed the government on all other estimates. See Mattson 1998: 66 for an example.
The accuracy of political economy forecasting points in a still different direction. Though it is often claimed that the growth of international finance in particular has created a less predictable and less manoeuvrable political situation, forecasts of future GDP growth are as, or more, accurate today compared to when finance was to a much greater extent predominately a national matter. We may therefore conclude that political autonomy has at least not been eroded by diminishing predictability.

All in all, this suggests a mixed judgement of how valid the argument is that democratic theory must be rethought because internationalisation has eroded the relevance of democratic theory concepts such as popular sovereignty and state sovereignty. While the argument should not be rejected outright, we need more substantial evidence before we abandon established ideas of what democracy is and by what institutional means it can be achieved in the face of internationalisation. One way to proceed, then, is to study in more detail concepts and measures deemed particularly reasonable or problematic in the context of internationalisation. But before turning to that question, we have unfinished business with the third and last position on the appropriate context of democracy and democratic theory, namely the view that internationalisation is irrelevant to the question of democracy.

8.1.3. The assumption that internationalisation is irrelevant to democracy

To some extent the conclusions from the two previous sections will determine our view on whether assumptions of international politics are redundant in democratic theory. While the conclusion drawn in Section 8.1.1 (that there are no compelling reason to restrict the theorisation and realisation of democracy to domestic politics) is compatible with regarding internationalisation as democratically irrelevant, the conclusion drawn in Section 8.1.2 (that we must make a mixed judgment on whether democratic theory needs to account for international factors) is at the same time a mixed judgement on the possible irrelevance of an international perspective in democratic theory. To the extent that democratic theory needs to account for international factors, such factors are by definition not redundant in democratic theory.

However, to leave considerations of international politics out of democratic theory is unwarranted for yet other reasons. Not only do the results in terms of democratic political autonomy suggest otherwise, as already pointed out, but the divide between national and international politics may also condition the realisation of democratic participation and deliberation. The hypothesis that internationalisation increases the amount of
information and ideas relevant to public debate (Stenelo 1990: 354-55; Goldmann 2001: 162) has not been rejected, though we have attempted to do so. While we did reject the hypothesis that internationalisation erodes the preconditions for intra-national discourse democracy (cf. Miller 1995: 98), in the limited sense of question-answering, the same analysis did reveal that internationalisation seems empirically to have some effect on the same variable – though we did not arrive at any firm interpretation of this observation in theoretical terms. An effect of internationalisation on democratic participation may also be mentioned, namely that general elections at the European level evoke a far lower turnout than general elections at the state level. And, in the three countries considered in this study, it is at least possible that a radical internationalisation of state functions, such as that instantiated by the Maastricht Treaty, has contributed to the (limited) decrease of turnout in national elections.

Apart from these observations, all of which illustrate the significance of taking internationalisation into account when trying to understand democracy, a few conceptual and normative observations point in this same direction. We have seen that a traditional distinction between the delegation and the alienation of authority loses much of its normatively justificatory power when it is transferred from a national to an international context. We have seen how the symmetry principle of democratic inclusiveness, while intuitively attractive in a national context where decisions are implemented by a relatively unified actor, if necessary by force, seems to lose its immediate attraction when considering everyday experiences in the context of international politics (though we also identified a number of deficiencies in the symmetry principle which could not be avoided by restricting its application to national politics).

In the light of these findings, the assumption that internationalisation is irrelevant to democracy (which is implicit in large parts of canonised democratic theory) cannot be upheld. Focusing more specifically on conceptual and partly normative democratic theory, it is for the moment enough to point out that the results obtained seem applicable to the general categories of national and international politics. In other words, to refine generally applicable concepts still seems to be a fruitful task for the development of conceptual and normative democratic theory in the context of internationalisation. But focused more specifically on what can be learnt in terms of explanatory democratic theory, the picture is different. General predictions concerning the uniform effect of internationalisation on democracy seem (with some exceptions) to fail; to proceed inductively – reporting in some detail what actually happens to democracy during internationalisation – does in this case not indicate an absence of theoretical ambitions, but is rather an empirically grounded theoretical standpoint.
In the next section we will study in more detail existing proposals concerning what democratic concepts and measures are particularly reasonable or problematic in view of internationalisation. The reason, as mentioned in the foregoing section, is that we should neither dismiss nor take for granted the general argument that democratic theory must be rethought in the light of internationalisation. Rather we should continue to probe more deeply into the strengths and weaknesses of specific proposals to improve democracy and democratic theory. The next section considers the concepts of participation, representation, and deliberation.

8.1.4. Concepts of alleged relevance or irrelevance to international politics

It is sometimes claimed that traditional forms of democratic participation, such as general elections and parliamentary political involvement, have lost their previous political significance because of internationalisation, and that new or different concepts and institutions should now attract democratic attention. This position can be illustrated with an article by Andersen and Burns (1996), well summarised in its title, “The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: A Study of Post-parliamentary Governance”. Their argument starts with some descriptive claims that parliaments have relinquished power to interest groups and experts as a result of, among other things, an ongoing expansion of politics to international levels – in particular in the European Union (ibid. 230). They then argue that under such conditions a new kind of democracy is preferable (ibid. 230, 231 and 237). This new kind of democracy is described as a

*de facto* democracy of organised interests, lobbies and representatives of organisations (and movements) that engage themselves in policy areas and issues that are of particular concern to them. In other words, the system of post-parliamentary governance tends increasingly to be one of organisations, by organisations and for organisations. Expert sovereignty tends to prevail over popular sovereignty or parliamentary sovereignty. (ibid. 229)

Accepting the observations made in previous chapters, this particular suggestion for a new kind of democracy is, however, flawed in its initial premise. At least at the elite level, traditional forms of democratic participation are well sustainable during the kind of internationalisation considered by Andersen and Burns (see Chapters 5 and 7). To talk about an “erosion” of parliamentary democracy in general, as well as to signal a “post-parliamentary” historical stage, is misleading. Hence the scenario that made Andersen and Burns prefer a new kind of democracy is most likely
exaggerated, and their particular suggestion to reinterpret democracy is consequently impaired.\textsuperscript{198}

While the negative effect of internationalisation on democratic participation in budget politics is at most limited, there is another, less questionable, negative effect somewhat related to participation. To see the point, let us temporarily think of democratic participation not as a means of sharing public power among citizens and their elected representatives, but as a means to guarantee that elected politicians represent the people.\textsuperscript{199} Now it could be argued that political participation at the level of states becomes less efficient in promoting representativeness when state functions are transferred to the international level. The most powerful international assemblies tend to exclude members of the national opposition. The governments in both parliamentary and presidential democracies do not include representatives from the whole of the elected assembly, and in the most important international assemblies it is the government alone that represents the state.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{198} In areas where decision-making competencies have been transferred from states to international organisations (which in respect of budget policy has happened only to a small extent in the European Union) the story told by Andersen and Burns would be more realistic. However, their interest is not with the process through which parliaments abstain from decision-making competencies in favour of more international co-operation (because of which the political role of parliaments diminishes by definition) but with the development of networks that link governments, interest groups, private companies, and policy experts, among others. This, and nothing else, is the process whose effects they seem to have exaggerated.

\textsuperscript{199} It may be suggested that political participation is the democratic method for creating politically representative assemblies and that there is hence no difference between the two interpretations of participation distinguished above. Participation is, however, only one possible method for creating politically representative assemblies, and perhaps not even the most efficient one. Public debate and opinion polls may serve the same purpose by educating parliamentarians on the political preferences of the people. Hence the distinction is meaningful.

\textsuperscript{200} Admittedly, a national opposition is not completely barred from international influence. Some states have informal traditions of seeking broad parliamentary approval for their foreign policy. Some international assemblies, such as the Nordic Council, are composed of national parliamentarians from both government and opposition parties, and at least one international assembly, namely the European Parliament, is directly elected. While these factors should not be neglected, it is clear that they cannot compensate a national opposition for its lack of governing power. The most important international organisations and assemblies are still those composed of government representatives alone, such as the European Council and the Council of Ministers in the European Union. And whatever consultation a government seeks from its opposition in the preparation of foreign policy, the relation between the two is still one of government and opposition. Moreover, a government has extensive possibilities to mislead parliamentarians in crucial matters of foreign policy, as illustrated, for example, by the Swedish policy of “neutrality” and “non-alignment” during the cold war. Hence the international influence of opposition parties would appear to be at most limited.
To see the problem more distinctly, recall that for a political assembly to be representative of a population it is not sufficient that the people elect all the members of the assembly; in addition, all parties any of whose candidates have been elected – in the sense of having been voted for – should ideally be represented in the assembly. This is the case in national parliaments, with the exception of only the smallest parties, but it is not at all the case in the most powerful international assemblies, which are composed of members of governments alone. So while both national and international assemblies are elected by citizens participating in the same general elections, this election of representatives yields less representativeness in the most important international assemblies than in national ones. Two implications of this are especially important.

First, definitions that claim democracy to consist in the electability of persons who hold public office do not indicate a fixed meaning across national and international contexts. If defining democracy as requiring that “control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials” (Dahl 1982: 10, my ital.), one may be seriously misled when moving between the two fields. This vagueness of a certain conception of democracy is politically troublesome. It may be exploited to describe, for example, international summits as “democratic” by pointing to the fact that all participants have been elected – rhetorically suppressing the fact that an elected assembly in domestic politics implies democratic qualities such as representativeness and deliberation across a broad ideological range, qualities which are less prominent in summits.201

Secondly, the concept of representativity is far from perfectly suited to formulating democratic possibilities that are unique or particularly relevant to politics during internationalisation. This point is worth making since representation is a concept often relied upon for exactly that purpose. One example is the article by Andersen and Burns (1996) mentioned above; but also contributions by Schmitter (1997a: 34) and Dinan (1994: 292) place considerable hope in the concept of representation to formulate democratic possibilities in the European Union. The realisation of representation is more problematic in the context of international politics, including that of the European Union, than appears to be recognised by these authors.202

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201 This rhetorical trick has been increasingly used in defence against social movements which target the summits of, for example, the International Monetary Foundation, the World bank, and the European Union.

202 It is correct that the abovementioned authors are interested in a broader range of representative institutions than those made up of government members or persons appointed by government. Their major concern is often interest groups and expert
Another concept that has been thought of as particularly useful to identify democratic possibilities in international politics (in addition to the concept of representation) is that of deliberation, or by the longer term used in a previous chapter, “[t]he discourse-theoretical concept of deliberative democracy” (Eriksen 2000: 51). According to Eriksen, this theory of democracy is particularly well suited to the conditions of the European Union because (and here I follow an implicit method in Eriksen’s work on how to develop normative democratic theory) it seems possible to realise the normative implications of the theory in the status quo of the Union. Leaving aside temporarily the problems of Eriksen’s normative method, he seems to consider two points on which the status quo of the European Union is particularly close to his preferred kind of deliberative democracy (Eriksen 2000: 57). First, the political procedures of the European Union are generally constructed to foster consensus. Because of the veto powers that are often afforded to member-states by the treaties, as well as the informal rule which prescribes reaching consensus in areas where unanimous voting is not required by the treaties, Eriksen believes that policy outcome in the European Union depends on actors persuading each other by good arguments. Secondly, the strong legal foundation of the European Union forces political actors to operate through claims of correctness rather than through strategy and power politics, again according to Eriksen.

The problem with this argument is that it relies on a possibly misleading operationalisation of deliberation, and that when a better operationalisation is applied it seems more likely (though nothing could be safely concluded) that politics in the European Union, when it comes to deliberative democracy, has a particular weakness rather than a particular strength. Let us elaborate on both of these points, operationalisation and actual level of deliberation.

Concerning Eriksen’s operationalisations, the fact that the actors involved are equipped with veto powers is not sufficient to conclude the presence of deliberation in politics. As illustrated by most international negotiations, all actors having veto powers is perfectly reconcilable with anti-deliberative power-oriented interactions. Furthermore, the legal claims of correctness that certainly permeate the European Union are concerned, precisely, with legal correctness – which does not imply anything about whether actors involved actually deliberate in the sense of taking each others’ arguments seriously. To justify every political step in judicial terms can be a way of silencing critics just as much as a means by which minorities voice their concerns.203

networks. However, the present critique is still relevant, since all of them believe that formal institutions play at least some part in representation at the international level.

203 The fact that many references in the making of common market policy intend to avoid discrimination between different nations does not strengthen Eriksen’s case. Communicative
As for the actual level of deliberation in the European Union, a previous chapter concluded that at least when members of the European Parliament interact with representatives of the Commission and the Council of Ministers in public debates over the community budget, the deliberative quality seems to be significantly lower than it is in national parliaments (Section 7.2). The operationalisation then relied upon was the ratio between questions posed and questions answered in debate. At the very least, such operationalisation is capable of identifying cases where deliberation is absent or of a very low quality. (Though a sceptic may argue that answering questions is not enough to conclude that deliberation has occurred, it still could hardly be suggested that deliberation has occurred if no questions posed are answered.) So in sum, this study yields no support for Eriksen’s view that deliberation is relatively achievable in the European Union.

8.1.5. Normative implications of relevant concepts

The preceding section questioned the empirical grounds that underlie three existing proposals in conceptual theory: first, that democratic participation must be reshaped because of eroding parliamentary powers; secondly, that representation is a particularly relevant aspect of democracy at the European level; thirdly, that discourse theoretical deliberation is another concept particularly well suited for identifying democratic possibilities in this context. But what would the refutation of these proposals imply in terms of normative democratic theory?

From the methodological perspective seemingly taken by Eriksen, among others – proposing that a concept is preferable to another if it seems more likely to be realised in practice – the appropriate measure would be to construct a normative theory around the concept of parliamentary participation. However, such a way of proceeding would come dangerously close to deriving values from facts. Since this problem has haunted a great deal of research on democracy and European integration, it is worth a brief excursus before we consider the normative implications of the preceding section.

Most authors who let their normative and empirical investigations take account of one another’s findings are not very interested in discussing the

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rationality does not preclude the favouring of one particular nation, as long as the nation in question has some problem which it does not share with other countries. Since all countries do not experience the same problems, communicative rationality may indeed require discrimination among counties, though in an ideal situation – where all countries are in the same situation to begin with – all should be treated equally.
relation between the two kinds of analysis; but some are. Lord (2004: 6-7), in a book about democracy and the European Union, follows Weale (1999) in arguing that while an *is* does not imply a *should*, all non-utopian normative theory is committed to the position that a *should* implies a *can*. This is certainly a valuable distinction. It should be affirmed that for an action to count as good or right someone must be able to perform it (and to find out what is possible to perform empirical observations can be helpful), while, needless to say, not all actions performed are good or right. However, the authors who take the *should*-implies-*can* position above come close to another fallacy in normative reasoning, namely that *can* implies *is*. This would mean that for something to be possible, it would have to exist, and since moral values have here already been taken to imply their possible realisation, the universe of what should be done would then be restricted to what exists now – though it would not be implied that everything which exists now should exist. Lord (2004) and Weale (1999) do not argue this position, but they come close enough to illustrate an important problem. Lord’s citation from Weale is a good example:

[I]f we hold to a principle that a certain set of institutions ought to be maintained or brought into being, then we are committed to saying that such institutions can be feasibly maintained or introduced ... thus we should need to ensure that our principles of democratic theory were consistent with what political science currently thinks to be feasible. (Weale 1999: 8-9; cited in Lord 2004: 7)

One notices how the argument slides. It is first pointed out that the moral “ought” commits the author to say also that certain institutions “can” be feasibly maintained; and then in the second part of the citation the word “can” is omitted and a much stronger point is made, namely that “principles of democratic theory” imply that “political science” considers the relevant institutions to be “feasible”. This comes very close to disregarding utopian thinking altogether, and hence to reducing normative political theory to a comparison of the values of *existing* institutions described feasible by political science!

What is more serious, however, is that the argument disregards the fact that a possibility of doing something depends to a large extent on the efforts people are willing to make to do it. If people make a greater effort to achieve a certain kind of democracy, the possibility for that kind of democracy to be realised will obviously increase. Moreover, a particularity of normative arguments is that they give people a reason to make an extra effort. Hence to protect as much as possible the value of democracy under possibly unfavourable conditions, the first step should not be to adjust the standards
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of democracy in accordance with what seems, in a particular context and time, to be possible; instead we should, as a first step, seek to formulate the case for democracy so as to induce ourselves to make the extra effort needed to realise its originally valued qualities.

This speaks in favour of the normative approach mentioned in the introduction (in a sub-section to Section 1.1.2), namely that the relevance of empirical observations to normative analysis in this study is their use in investigating whether certain aspects of democracy – mainly political autonomy, participation, and deliberation – are increasingly difficult to achieve in the course of internationalisation; and if they are, normative democratic theory should be constructed so as to suggest the additional efforts needed to realise the original qualities of democracy. And the other way around, if some democratic problem related to internationalisation seems to have been exaggerated, a proper normative analysis will seek to contribute to a theory that relieves us of the need to make democratically unnecessary efforts. This method for normative analysis should be retained together with the sound principle that a should implies a can.

Let us now return to the question of what the conclusions drawn in the previous section imply in terms of normative democratic theory. We refuted the argument that democratic participation must be reshaped because of eroding parliamentary powers, on the empirical grounds that parliamentary powers seem, if anything, to be expanding in relation to governments, in our area of study, during internationalisation. In accordance with the methodological approach just described, there is therefore no reason to construct normative theory to emphasize more than has already been done the value of parliamentary participation. One may in fact consider an adjustment in the opposite direction: to relax democratic theory’s emphasis on the importance of parliamentary participation. Such a change would, however, not be adequately motivated. The empirical pattern is unclear and difficult to interpret in positive terms (though sufficient to support the negative conclusion that the hypothesis, that parliamentary powers erode, fails). Moreover, the democratic participation of the entire citizenry – in contrast to participation by elected representatives – did seem to encounter additional constraints, both at the state level, in the last stage of internationalisation investigated, and at the international level, where, as is well known, general elections evoke a lower turnout. Hence the picture of what happens to democratic participation during internationalisation is mixed; this far in the

204 In this section it is taken for granted that if something is an important element of democracy it has some normative value. While this assumption is not self-evident in the context of the European Union (see for example Lord 2004: 16), the good of democracy will be explicitly defended at the end of this chapter (Section 8.2.6).
analysis there are reasons neither to increase nor to decrease efforts to achieve democratic participation as a whole.

Our second concern was with the view that representation is a particularly relevant aspect of democracy at the European level. Since representation was not among the concepts investigated systematically over time and across countries, our evidence for questioning this view was relatively weak. None the less, the problem that arises in terms of representation is, perhaps, not the most important one, but it is undeniable. (The problem may need to be recapitulated in brief: the electing of representatives in national elections yields less representativeness in the most important international assemblies than in national ones, for international assemblies exclude national oppositions present in national parliaments.) Since normative concepts facing increasing difficulties in their realisation should be relatively emphasized (as long as it is possible to realise them at all), this should now apply to representation.

One way of strengthening the position of representation in democratic theory is to recognise a realistic means for achieving it. One such means would be to extend the participation in international organisation assemblies to embrace all parties represented in national parliaments. That is, in foreign policy to prefer broad coalition governments to parliamentarism. This reform, if opted for, evinces some realism, since we have already noted that parliamentarians have not reduced the intensity of their participation during internationalisation.

Since the means proposed consists in extended parliamentary participation, we must now adjust one of the conclusions drawn above and recognise that there is in fact a reason to strengthen democratic participation, theoretically and practically. While its empirically observed stability during internationalisation is no reason for giving more emphasis to its normative importance, its role as a means for the realisation of representativity does constitute such a reason. For the sake of economy in concepts, one may even consider letting parliamentary participation replace the concept of representation, at least with regard to the problems at hand.205

The third concern was with the view that discourse-theoretical deliberation is a concept particularly well suited for capturing the democratic possibilities of the European Union context. In opposition to its advocates, we pointed

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205 Since representation and parliamentary participation may sometimes be used as synonyms, it should be emphasised here that representation refers to a state of affairs – the correspondence between citizens and decision-makers in some politically relevant respects – and parliamentary participation refers to an activity that may, or may not, be used to achieve such a state of affairs. It is, therefore, neither a truism nor a contradiction to say that the concept of parliamentary representations may replace that of representation.
out that its empirical grounds are weak. While there are different opinions as to whether deliberation is democratically important in the first place (see for example Eriksen 2000: 47 pp. and Saward 1998: 64 for opposite positions), anyone who attributes some democratic significance, however small, to deliberation should recognise that this quality ought to be relatively more emphasized at the European than it has been in the passed. At the state level more emphasis should also be put on international deliberation. Political reforms suggested to realise these recommendations were considered already in Section 8.1.1 (at the European level, changing rules for plenary debate; at the state level, introducing reciprocal representation).

While we have now considered the conclusions of the preceding section in normative terms, it can also be noted that regarding demos participation and democratic political autonomy there is an additional problem during internationalisation. Participation becomes democratic when all citizens have the same possibility to influence political outcomes. There is an old insight that political equality in this sense may depend on equality of economic resources; unequal distribution of economic resources can translate into political inequality (Dahl 1989: 114-15). This perennial problem takes on a new dimension in the light of internationalisation. We have seen in Chapter 3 that autonomy in redistributing market-allocated incomes decreases uniformly at a certain point in the process of internationalisation. Even if the alleged negative relation between economic and political equality is regarded as of minimal normative importance, as it is from some liberal perspectives, we should admit that it is increasingly important during internationalisation. To reinforce the value of politically equal demos participation may involve recognising a democratic reason for, and so an enhanced legitimacy in, applying political measures to promote equality in resources. Some institutional means by which this could possible be achieved, under the constraints of current internationalisation, are discussed in Section 8.2.2.

The next section considers in normative and more generally theoretical terms the conclusions drawn from the conceptual analyses in Chapters 2 and 3.

8.1.6. Democratic autonomy, inclusion, and international integration

The concept of democratic political autonomy was construed in Chapter 3 to give a coherent interpretation of a literature that relates action capacity to internationalisation and to articulate, rather than to oppose, fundamental notions in established democratic theory. It was suggested that democratic political autonomy should then be defined in terms of (i) action possibilities,
rather than preference fulfilment, (ii) possibilities for a collective actor to take action on the constitutive individuals alone, (iii) action possibilities that the actor realised – or did not realise – while being free from, rather than independent of, other actors, and (iv) an aspect of democracy that relates to other aspects of democracy by something like a method of “multiplication” rather than “addition”.

The purpose of this conceptualisation is, however, not only to permit a fair testing of predictive arguments relating internationalisation to a certain aspect of democracy. It can also be used to replace a certain view about who should be included in democratic participation. The view to be replaced – referred to as the symmetry principle in Chapter 2, where it was found untenable – is that all persons affected by a decision have a democratic right to participate in making that decision.

A seemingly better answer to the question of who should be included in democratic participation is that people should be included in a democratic collective to the extent that their inclusion yields the greatest amount of democratic political autonomy to the greatest number of people, while accounting for both those who are included and those who are excluded (Agné 2002b: 75-76). Put as a single proposition the principle will probably be of little interest, but some preliminary clarifications will at least prepare for its theoretical usefulness in the next part of the chapter (Section 8.2).

First, while most arguments regarding political autonomy put forth until now have regarded collectives only, we now relate political autonomy to the individuals who make up the collectives. Political autonomy is still regarded as a collective attribute, but we recognise that the individuals who constitute a collective benefit or suffer from, and decide the use of, democratic political autonomy. The kind of autonomy mentioned in the principle is not the autonomy of individuals, in the sense of the action possibilities available to individuals, but rather the individual shares in a collective autonomy. These are different concepts as long as one wishes to allow for the possibility that an individual may have action possibilities that do not derive from the collective to which he or she belongs.

Secondly, whether the individual shares of a given political autonomy increase or decrease by the size of the collective is a question without any obvious answer. While the likelihood that a single individual will influence how political autonomy is used tends to decline as the collective grows, the individual shares in political autonomy may also be expected to grow with the size of the polity because increasing size allows for increased specialisation and efficiency. Nevertheless, one may minimally concluded that, according to the principle, politics should be organised in the smallest possible communities that permit political autonomy and other democratic qualities to
prevail. In the context of the European Union one may think of the subsidiarity principle as an institutional illustration of this idea. It would also seem to follow that when a polity integrates with another in order to expand the range of possible action, it is bodies controlled by the people that should decide the exercise of the political autonomy gained through integration. One may think of the democratic deficit in the European Union as an example of this requirement not being met.

Thirdly, there are at least two ways in which the principle could be used to decide whether an individual, or a group of individuals, should be allowed to be included in a given polity. On the one hand, one may seek to assess the level of autonomy in a single country before and after the inclusion. This would seem to be impractical in the case of single individuals applying for permission to reside in a country, but, more realistically, the method could be applied to judging general principles of asylum policy and policies of economic and political integration with other polities (we will return to this matter in Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). On the other hand, one may seek to assess the level of autonomy in different countries (to some extent suggestively by applying the operationalisations developed in Chapter 3), and then regard it as illegitimate to bar the entrance of an individual into a polity if such entrance would supply him or her with an increased share of political autonomy.

Fourthly, the fact that the principle proposes two distinct quantities that should be maximised – the number of people and the amount of democratic political autonomy – does not seem to imply any morally problematic trade-offs. Both empirical and analytical considerations would seem to suggest that the inclusion of individuals into polities that provide them with an increased share of political autonomy is a means of strengthening political autonomy for a greater number of people, rather than a good for which something else has to be sacrificed. Empirically speaking, people tend to perform better – and make a greater contribution to collectively possessed action possibilities – under better conditions of democratic political autonomy. Hence it is at most a philosophical problem, but certainly not a political one, that some individuals would have to sacrifice their share in political autonomy for the sake of the greater political autonomy of a greater number of people. Analytically speaking, some of the most troublesome interpretations of the principle (for instance that a large group of individuals should sacrifice their

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206 In Section 8.2.1 it will be argued that the principle cannot, however, be used to justify the inclusion or exclusion of an individual by force.

207 This is a rather evident assumption, since a more efficient economy will increase the resources available for collective action. Hence to be included in a polity with a higher level of democratic political autonomy is at the same time to be included in an economy that can exploit more efficiently the resources that one brings to it.
shares in political autonomy for everyone’s small gain in the same) would not seem to be compatible with the principle itself. Since the principle suggests that two criteria should be met, and clearly abstains from giving priority to either of them, the principle must prefer a situation where both criteria are 50 percent fulfilled (whatever that means in political terms) to one in which one criterion is 80 percent fulfilled and the other 20 percent.

Fifthly, while the morally more troublesome potential trade-offs appear to be of little empirical relevance, or to be the results of mistaken interpretation, less troublesome trade-offs may yet be possible. It could perhaps happen that the political autonomy of a great number of individuals could be very much improved at the expense of a very small loss in political autonomy for a slightly greater number of individuals. What should then be done? If we could actually agree on the political interpretation of the terms used to pose this question – such as very much improved and very small loss – the principle could be specified accordingly: the inclusion of the great number of individuals whose political autonomy can be very much improved is democratically more important than the very small loss in political autonomy for a slightly greater number of individuals. However, in case of political disagreement, there are good reasons not to specify the required definitions as assumptions of democratic theory, but rather to push them into the field of ideology. To specify democratic theory “just for fun” would turn the object into nothing more than another ideology, rather than a method for mediating between opposed ideologies.208 To save the latter task for democracy improves coherence between the theory and how its object has traditionally been construed. We would then “look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits” as Aristotle argued (350 bc/2004: Bk. 1, Ch. 3). If the greatest number of people and the greatest amount of political autonomy ever came to compete with each other, there is no reason why all democrats would have to agree on every issue in the complex act of balancing the two criteria against each other.

After these preliminary clarifications one may be interested in the positive reasons for claiming that the delimitation of the citizenry is better justified by reference to the political autonomy gained by individuals than by reference to

208 Ideology is here understood as a more comprehensive body of propositions than democratic theory. Democracy is a method for choosing among different ideologies such as socialism, ecologism, or conservatism, and it is hence best defined in minimal terms compatible to all such. This does not, however, imply that democratic theory should never be expanded to cover ideologically controversial issues. At the end of Section 8.1.5 we saw a reason, justified in democratic theory terms, for considering certain distributions of economic resources as democratically more appropriate than others. The important thing is not to avoid everything that is controversial, but to bring into democratic theory only what democratic theory itself requires.
the symmetry principle. For the sake of brevity, let us list a few points without for the moment dealing with the relationships between them.

First, the principle of political autonomy avoids the counter-intuitive implications yielded by the symmetry principle. To recall only one of several examples from Chapter 2: The international actions that contributed to removing the South African apartheid regime in the 1990s would have been perfectly justified on the principle of democratic political autonomy. Although most citizens of the South African state were not included in the procedures leading up to the internationally taken actions (which yields a democratic deficit, given the symmetry principle), the democratic political autonomy of most South African citizens certainly benefited from a temporal inclusion of foreigners in South African politics (which represents a democratic improvement, given the principle of democratic political autonomy).

Secondly, by contrast to the symmetry principle, the concept of political autonomy touches on a normatively central quality. While it is no intrinsically good thing to avoid contact with groups that you have not (yet) been totally politically integrated with, it could very well be regarded as intrinsically good to possess action possibilities (Sen 1980/1989: 483) disposed at the collective level. To define democracy in terms of a normatively central quality brings the definition more in line with ordinary use of language.

Thirdly, relying on the concept of political autonomy permits us to search empirically for a democratically optimal organisation of political, cultural, economic, and other activities in territories and groups of people of different size. Relying on the symmetry principle, by contrast, a democratic problem would appear, by definition, when a political community diverges from any other kind of community. Not only does the autonomy principle seem intuitively more reasonable on this account, but its openness to the plurality and difference inherent in the world of empirical observation may insure it against a certain dogmatism in its political application.

Fourthly, there is an etymological legitimacy in conceiving of collective action capacity as delimiting and constituting a community. In one of the oldest and most widespread testimonies that we have on this matter, when the ancient Israelites declared their willingness to be the people of God, they said according to the Bible: “All that the Lord hath said will we do, and be obedient” (Exodus 24:7, KJV). The order of the words should be noted. The element of action capacity comes first – the doing – and only in the second place comes the element of conscious commitment – the obedience. To act (at the time in accordance with the will of God but in a democratic context without being determined by others) is the prime justification for a group of individuals who want to conceive of themselves as a community (see Weiler 1999: 5 for a similar interpretation).
8.1.7. Delegation and alienation of authority

To delegate authority to independent institutions, firms, or individuals can be regarded as a means to increase the efficiency of the political system, and hence to expand access to resources and enlarge the range of action possibilities. But what needs to be clarified in our context is that delegation within a state is something very different from the “delegation” of authority from a number of states to an international organisation.

When a state has to agree with a number of other states before it can alter the terms of delegation, it occupies a considerably weaker position than when it is negotiating only with non-state actors. It is, to say the least, an exaggerated position that international organisations can be democratically justified by claiming they are exerting nothing but delegated competencies. The problem is not that international delegations are suspected of being negative in regard to collective action capacity – they may very well be as efficient as domestic delegations – but that they tie up citizens and elected representatives in a system that makes authorities more costly to control. This higher cost of control must be accounted for in the attempt democratically to justify international organisations by reference to delegation.

This last argument has some political significance. It is common to claim justification for the European Union in particular by reference to its provisional character and the fact that the states are the masters of the treaties (see Shaw 1996: 64-66; Gustavsson 1998a, b; Lord 2004: 16-17 for discussions of this position). This line of argument originates from the famous Brunner verdict by the German Constitutional Court, which tried to reconcile the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty with the democratic rights guaranteed by the German Constitution. Since then it has won acceptance in both academic and political circles.

From the perspective that domestic and international delegations are fundamentally different things, the theory is, however, at best confused and confusing. Since every “master” must negotiate with twenty four fellow “masters” before acting on his “servants”, while some of the “servants” are free to initiate and effectuate policy and have notoriously been creating new competences on their own all through the process of European integration, the labels could be exchanged between “servants” and “masters” without much loss in validity. In brief, democrats should not generally be led to accept powerful international organisations because it is claimed that they operate only by delegated authority.
Whether democrats should, as the next step, democratise or dilute international politics is a different question, but recall the arguments in Chapter 7 suggesting that a normatively justifiable kind of international democracy is a more realistic scenario than formerly suggested (for example by Scharpf 1999: 7-9 and Dahl 1999).

8.1.8. Summary of major results

The major points that have seemed tenable in previous chapters and the above discussion may be listed in brief.

• It is theoretically problematic and empirically unfruitful to assume that democracy requires every person affected by a political decision to have the possibility of participating in making that decision (Chapter 2). The mere fact that internationalisation exists should not be interpreted as being a democratic problem any more than a democratic possibility. Both the question of who should be included in the democratic procedure, and what kind of effects induced from outside the polity are compatible with democracy, are better answered by reference to the concept of democratic political autonomy (see also the preceding section, 8.1.6).

• Both to solve conceptual problems and to permit empirical testing, it seems appropriate to define democratic political autonomy in terms of (i) action possibilities rather than preference fulfilments, (ii) the possibilities of a collective actor to take action on the constitutive individuals alone, (iii) action possibilities that the actor undertakes – or does not undertake – while being free from, rather than independent of, other actors, and (iv) an aspect of democracy that relates to other aspects by something like a process of multiplication rather than addition (Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2).

• Democratic autonomy regarding public spending at the level of states does not seem to be challenged by the internationalisation of market functions. As far as spending levels are concerned, international flows of capital and trade may be exploited as democratic means to increase democratic autonomy (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.1).

• Democratic autonomy regarding public spending at the level of states may, however, be challenged by the internationalisation of state budget functions, even in cases where such an effect does not follow by definition (Sections 8.1.2 and 1.2.2, sub-section on participation). Because of the still relatively weak democratic performance of the international institution that brings about this effect, it constitutes a democratic shortcoming.
It may also be that the internationalisation of markets has reduced state autonomy in the redistribution of market allocated incomes. While no empirical analysis has been designed to allow for the confirmation of such a causal relation (but see Section 1.3.1); there is a clear theoretical argument that explains the effect (Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, especially the sub-section on hypotheses of the latter); there are no observed counter-instances to the interpretation (Section 3.3.1); and the method used for empirical analysis was developed precisely to avoid exaggerated judgments on changes in political autonomy (Section 3.2.1). Since democratic autonomy regarding the redistribution of income has not been regained at any other political level, this likely effect of internationalisation constitutes another democratic shortcoming. From a normative theoretical perspective, the problem could be met by introducing or strengthening substantial notions of social justice as inherent in the concept of democracy (Section 8.1.5).

The argument that internationalisation damages intra-national discourse democracy at the level of states does not gain support from the study. At least as regards parliamentary debates and the taking seriously of questions posed by other speakers (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1), it should be rejected. Another democratically positive finding in terms of deliberation at the level of states is that internationalisation may have contributed to the increased plurality of sources and information, and possibly of ideas, in parliamentary debates (Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2). Moreover, on empirical grounds we have questioned the view that governments, to a greater extent than parliaments, make use of international expertise in parliamentary debates (Section 4.3.2, Table 4.13) arguably as a means of self-empowerment. However, it should also be noted that no kind of internationalisation has yet been significantly responded to by attempted opinion formation to the advantage of persons residing outside national boundaries (Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.3).

In contrast to a number of theoretically grounded suggestions, the relative power of parliaments versus governments does not seem to have decreased during the internationalisation of market functions (Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.3 and 5.3.2 to 5.3.4), although a radical internationalisation of state functions will have this effect, by definition, in parliamentary and presidential systems (in the discrete policy areas whose state functions are internationalised – no spillover of such parliamentary decline into the area of budget policy has been observed in this study). Concerning political participation at the level of the demos there may be a similar pattern. There is no negative trend of participation in general elections during the internationalising of market functions, which by contrast there has been
during the radical internationalisation of state functions, as illustrated by developments after the coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (Section 5.3.1). One should also be aware of the considerably lower figures of turnout in European Parliament elections as compared to national ones.

- It is theoretically problematic and empirically unfruitful to assume that international politics can be democratically justified by the fact that decision-making authorities are delegated from procedurally democratic states (Chapter 7). The theory of delegation and alienation is tacitly conditioned by a structure of domestic political power. Moreover, general elections at the state level produce ideologically less representative assemblies internationally than nationally (Section 8.1.3). Furthermore, internationalisation of state functions has a tendency to bias a political system towards conservative ideology, in the sense that the presently larger number of veto points in international politics strengthens the position of those who want to preserve, or change only very slowly, the status quo (Sections 4.1 and 5.1). For all of these reasons, democrats should take more seriously the not-very-democratic decision-making procedures of international organisations.

- The argument that democracy is normatively undesirable in the making of international politics because of an alleged lack of collective identity at this level is deeply problematic. In its perhaps most influential and sophisticated version, its conclusion relies on a confusion between ideal types and real-world observations (Section 7.1.1), as well as the empirically dubious premise that international majorities are less benevolent to their minorities than national ones (Section 7.1.2). A clear weakness of democracy at the international level, however, is that it has not yet been shown capable of reaching the same deliberative intensity and quality as nationally organised democracy (Section 7.2).

- To safeguard the value of democracy in times of increased constraints it seems that democrats should make additional efforts to realise their preferred kind of government, rather than to adjust normative standards to current practice (Section 8.1.5); but they should also conceptualise democracy with the aim of efficiently identifying existing democratic possibilities (Section 1.3.2) rather than mere utopian ones. Among the practices that seem increasingly difficult to realise – and which should hence be correspondingly more emphasized in normative theory – we have pointed to international deliberation (both at the state level and in international assemblies) and political autonomy regarding redistribution of economic resources (Section 8.1.5). Furthermore, we have recognised that intensified parliamentary participation in foreign policy-making can
serve as a means to strengthen the representativeness of international assemblies. In conjunction with the fact that internationalisation of state functions complicates representativeness, this suggests an increased normative emphasis should be put on parliamentary participation (Section 8.1.5).

- It has been suggested that explanatory theory (but not conceptual or normative theory) should at present avoid generalisations about the connections between democracy and internationalisation (8.1.3). As for the appropriate context of democratic theory, we have disproved its restriction to national and domestic politics (8.1.1) and shown the inappropriateness of the notion that the national/international divide is altogether redundant in democratic theory (8.1.3); at the same time we recognised a certain support, though not a particularly strong one, for the position that democracy should be theorised and realised in both national and international politics (Section 8.1.2).

8.2. Suggestions for a democratic theory of internationalisation

The main results of the study have now been summarised. This final section will outline some more general thoughts about the way in which democratic theory and practice can be approached in a time of internationalisation. The reason for undertaking yet some further reflections is that a mere listing of results is not useful for all purposes. The list itself does not separate what is important from what is not, and it may therefore create frustration for those who would like to continue research of the same kind, as well as for those who wish to use the results to further democratic practice. For it is a basic principle of research, as well as of politics, to notice what is important and distinguish it from what is merely visible. While my intention in this concluding section is to stay close to the results listed and simply to group some of them in more general categories, it will for the sake of coherence be necessary to introduce new assumptions. Moreover, there will be some speculation about political reforms that could realise the normative content of the general categories to be suggested. Furthermore, to not get bogged down in descriptions at this stage the required empirical analysis will often be impressionistic. For all of these reasons the expectations of validity should now be considerably lowered as compared to the level they properly assumed in previous chapters. The purpose of what follows is to offer some guidance for future attempts to identify the crucial issues of democratic theory and practice in the circumstances of internationalisation.
It has been mentioned that broad generalisations should be avoided in an explanatory theory of internationalisation and democracy, but not necessarily in conceptual and normative theory (Section 8.1.3). In accordance with this standpoint, let us start by hypothesising a definition of democracy which aims to solve some normative and conceptual problems of particular importance in the context of internationalisation.

**Definition of democracy:** Democracy is a kind of politics where as many as possible decide as much as possible.

For the sake of simplicity the phrase “as many as possible decide as much as possible” will here be referred to as *amp*, the term being used as a substantive. The following sections will extract the meaning of *amp* in view of the main terms dealt with previously in this chapter and thesis: inclusion, political autonomy, internationalisation, delegation and alienation of authority, participation, and deliberation. It will be suggested that *amp* may solve a number of previously identified problems in relation to these points, and also that it may do so in a way that makes it preferable to other conceptualisations of democracy, such as those relying on majority rule, political equality, or the symmetry principle. Political recommendations for sustaining and strengthening democracy in a time of internationalisation will be considered in the course of developing this argument.

### 8.2.1. Renewed requirements for inclusion

Every democratic theory needs to specify who should be included in what political procedures. From the perspective taken here the response is obvious: include as many as possible. This would be logically inherent in a plain interpretation of *amp*. If democracy means that as many as possible decide as much as possible, there is a certain generosity of inclusion built in from the very beginning. In this regard it becomes crucial to decide what it means to say that it is possible or impossible to include someone in the demos. What determines this is stated in the second part of *amp*: that people should decide as much as possible. To understand what it means for people to decide as much as possible we may refer back to the concept of political autonomy.

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209 A similar notion seems to have guided the authors of the recently proposed Constitution for the European Union, the draft of which begins by citing from Pericles’ Funeral Oration, as told by Thucydides: “[q]ur constitution ... is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the greatest number.” (European Union 2004). Hence the relevance of the conceptualisation below to the European Union should not be neglected.
Since this was defined in terms of possibilities to take collective action, it represents a fair interpretation of amp, and the concept of political autonomy also has the advantage of having operational indicators linked to it which enables amp to discriminate between concrete situations and to guide action. A more precise recommendation regarding who should be included in a democratic collective, extracted from the amp principle, would hence be the same as argued earlier in this chapter:

- People should be included in a democratic collective to the extent that their inclusion yields the greatest amount of democratic political autonomy to the greatest number of people, while accounting for both those who are included and those who are excluded.

Section 8.1.6 sought to clarify and defend this proposition at some length. At this point we may recall only that the democratic political autonomy referred to in the proposition is a collective attribute, in accordance with the usage of that term in previous chapters; but the normative principle which uses that concept is concerned with individual shares in such a collectively possessed autonomy.

In addition to the points made in Section 8.1.6, one might also wish to emphasise that amp could not be used to justify the exclusion by force of an individual from a collective, regardless of the potential effects on democratic political autonomy of such an exclusion. The main reason is that the requirements of amp regarding democratic participation (dealt with in Section 8.2.4) could not be met if people ran the risk of being excluded from the polity in which they live. Hence for the sake of coherence in the amp principle, we may refer to the same for advice on matters of voluntary inclusion, but not of exclusion by force.210

A proper judgement as to whether or not a concrete policy of inclusion is democratically justified should ideally draw on its estimated effect in political autonomy (not only budget autonomy as empirically estimated in Chapter 3). If that seems too complicated, a second-best strategy would be to let individuals decide for themselves where to be included. Since people are likely to prefer to participate in a strong rather than a weak democratic political autonomy, other things being equal, individual choices can be expected to yield the democratically desired result more often than not. From the perspective of amp, a liberal migration policy could hence be given weight as

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210 One may notice the similarity between this argument and those used to defend the introduction of certain citizen rights as inherent in conceptualisations of democracy, the basic definition of which is political equality; see for example Dahl (1982: 49,195-205).
Adapting democratic theory to internationalisation

constitutive for democracy. This does not mean that, for the sake of democracy, national boundaries must immediately be torn down. The recommendation is rather to continually liberalise migration policies until such time as it can be shown that the displacement of people has begun to diminish the individual shares in democratic political autonomy for the greatest number of people. Just as democracies have made it an important mark of their nature to permit individuals to exit both territory and demos, they should also affirm their right to enter the same. The morality of this is grounded in the intrinsic value of possessing action possibilities and will be further justified in an argument to be presented in Section 8.2.6.

At the level of international organisations (rather than states) the question of inclusion refers to nations or states (rather than to groups or individuals) that may enter or depart from a given international polity. This discussion is more conveniently pursued in terms of internationalisation, which takes us to the next section.

8.2.2. Renewed requirements for internationalisation

Though far from precise, the judgement concerning inclusion is also a judgement on the democratic appropriateness of internationalisation. Internationalisation is democratically required to the extent that it allows more people to decide more. The idea could be stated somewhat more precisely in terms of democratic political autonomy:

- Internationalisation should be undertaken to the extent that it yields the greatest amount of democratic political autonomy to the greatest number of people.

Once again the more precise meaning of the principle is in terms of individual shares in a collectively possessed autonomy. And once again the moral ground for this recommendation is found in the intrinsic value of possessing action possibilities.

What then are the practical implications of this reasoning? What should a democrat do in the context of the present internationalisation in Europe?

The bulk of considerations relevant to this question would exceed the capacity of any book. But the present purpose is more modest, namely to

211 One may recall that the First French Republic proclaimed a universal right for all individuals who shared the values of the revolution to become French citizens. See Schwarzmantel (2003: 96-97) for a discussion of the lack of stability of this doctrine.
show that the argument tested here is not empty of concrete political implications.

Since any answer to the above questions will depend on empirical assessment, we must first limit their scope to what has actually been investigated in this study, namely political autonomy in the area of budgetary policy. In this area we have seen contradictory developments of democratic political autonomy in the course of internationalisation, the clearest example of which is the apparently undiminished capacity of states’ to pay for their welfare services, even though autonomy in the redistribution of market-allocated incomes may indeed have diminished. What can be done about the latter problem, that democratic states seem to have lost some of their autonomy in the redistribution of market-allocated incomes?

Starting at the national level, the most important actor when it comes to distribution of income is not the state, but rather the employers and employees who together make up the labour market. From a democratic perspective the organisations of these groups may be regarded as agents to which the state or the people has delegated authority to make certain decisions, a delegation which can be revoked at any time (Dahl 1982: 6,47-53). A primary, though possibly not sufficient, instrument for improving democratic political autonomy with regard to distribution of income would be a reconsideration of such delegations to labour market actors. Politicians do not have to revoke the relevant authorities altogether, but some kind of renewed state intervention should at least be considered. One possibility is to legislate minimal and maximal wage levels, not only for the lowest and highest incomes but also across the different sectors of the economy. Another possibility is to improve transparency of the negotiating elements in the labour market, for example by publishing protocols of board meetings with a time-delay similar to that observed by central banks, or by introducing limited legal measures of public accountability for heads of labour unions and of industry. If argued by single government members, such proposals would

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212 Reforms of politics at the national level do not affect the extent to which international connections exist or develop. Such reforms rather respond to internationalisation. Hence one of the subsequent groups of recommendations falls outside the general democratic criterion dealt with in this section: that “internationalisation should be undertaken to the extent that it yields the greatest amount of democratic political autonomy to the greatest number of people”.

213 For example, the so-called new open method of co-operation that has evolved in the European Union during recent years (consisting in the establishment of labour market performance indicators and common meetings among government representatives to “name and shame” countries which fail in some regard) may be expanded to include labour and industry representatives. This method would arguably be most efficient in a national context.
not even have to be implemented to create a democratically healthy public pressure either to justify differences in income or to decrease them.

Drawing on both national and international decisions, one may also consider restricting the international connection believed to have caused the problem of decreasing political autonomy. Here it is crucial to separate different kinds of internationalisation. While the case for free trade is strong, because resources are unevenly distributed among countries and division of labour generally increases efficiency, the economic advantages of international finance are more questionable, and yet it may challenge democratic political autonomy as much as free trade may. The standard argument in favour of international finance is that market actors should be given the opportunity to invest where they believe their capital can be used most efficiently and yield the highest return. This argument is, however, premised on the truly controversial view that market actors are generally more rational than political ones. Hence one may at least consider measures that restrict the international flow of finance or prevent its further growth. To support the many countries that are dependent on foreign finance, restrictive measures may be undertaken together with democratising and strengthening the political institutions that allocate finance internationally (such as the European Bank of Investment, The World Bank, and the International Monetary Foundation).

At the international level, more exclusively, one may consider promoting ideological neutrality among the regimes of international political economy. The most powerful of such regimes today are designed to expand and simplify market connections across state boundaries, without however having the responsibility, let alone the capacity, collectively to redistribute resources that have been unequally allocated because of the operation of the international market under these regimes. This does not amount to ideological neutrality (see beginning of Section 5.1 for an argument why this is democratically problematic). Under present rules it is easier to have economic resources allocated by market actors (a traditional liberal concern) than by collective actors (a traditional socialist concern). To rectify this ideological bias would be democratically favourable in two senses: first, political outcomes should depend on their popular support and not on their ideological appropriateness; second, to upgrade our collective capacity to redistribute market allocated resources would help rectify the problem we have been concerned with in this section, namely that political autonomy to redistribute income has decreased during the period of internationalisation under investigation. In the European context, Scharpf has proposed that the Commission and the Court of Justice take the initiative to prevent tax competition between member-states (1999: 198-201), which would perhaps represent one way to promote greater neutrality in the contemporary
European political economy. This may, however, turnout to be a proposal for socialism rather than democracy. The proposed legal structure would probably do more than furnishing European politics with a capacity to promote greater income equality. In addition it may force such policy onto the Europeans, to the detriment of political capacities to achieve large or increasing inequalities – policies that are not inherently antidemocratic though, certainly, antisocialist. A democratically less problematic reform would be to equip all market promoting international regimes with a budget to have the possibility to compensate, by democratic decision, economic inequalities caused by the common market.\textsuperscript{214}

8.2.3. Renewed delegation-alienation requirements

Another singularity of \textit{amp} is that it overrides the distinction between direct and representative democracy. As long as the people participate maximally in the exertion of maximal individual shares of political autonomy, it is not important if their participation consists in electing representatives, making laws, or executing or implementing decisions. From this fact there follows a possible solution to another problem considered above, namely that of delegation and alienation (Chapter 7). The problem arose since Dahl’s assumption on the revocability of authorities was found to be conditioned by a domestic structure of power, which damaged the validity of his definition when used to assess the politics of international organisations in terms of democracy.

From the perspective of \textit{amp} the solution is once again very obvious: delegation of authority is democratically justified to the degree that as many as possible are deciding as much as possible. Political autonomy, as well as the individual shares thereof, may certainly increase by delegating authority to quantitatively less inclusive groups; and the delegation of authority could therefore also be democratically justified by the \textit{amp} interpretation – but only insofar as the same amount of political autonomy could not have been exercised by a more inclusive group of people.

\textsuperscript{214} It may be noted that the results of the study yield contradictory recommendations for the process of European integration as a whole. While it has been shown that some democratic elements seem to be less difficult to realise at the European level than argued in previous research, it could also be inferred that an alleged loss of economic autonomy at the level of states is probably an exaggerated motive for European integration and, moreover, that the present EU is not designed to improve autonomy in the areas where a decline in state-level autonomy could indeed be argued.
An authority is delegated by, rather than alienated from, the people to the extent that no more people could participate in its exercise while maintaining (the individual shares of) the greatest political autonomy for the greatest number of people.

Democrats might fear that this proposition opens a Pandora’s box for persons who are not in favour of democracy but wish to exploit its rhetorical potential to reduce the political influence of ordinary people. Such persons may argue the existence of a trade-off between democratic participation and democratic political autonomy, and then conclude from the above principle a sanction for taking every political decision away from the people and their elected representatives; even an autocracy could then be seen as instantiating a democratically justified delegation, as long as increased popular political involvement reduce the political autonomy of the autocrat.

However, this would not represent a fair application of the theory whose content we are attempting to unfold. The arguments used in Section 8.1.6 to explain the absence of morally problematic trade-offs between inclusion and political autonomy, are relevant – somewhat reformulated – in this case as well.

First, since there are two criteria that should be met according to the above principle – greatest popular participation and greatest political autonomy – the principle would not seem to justify politics in which there is no, or very little, popular involvement. Even if some kind of autocracy were to score higher on political autonomy than democracy, it could not be justified by a principle requiring political autonomy and popular participation. What would be required for the fulfilment of such a principle is, instead, that each criterion be observed as closely as possible; and if they compete with each other, then neither of them be permitted to triumph over the other. This would appear sufficient to reject the above mentioned anti-democratic interpretation as a misunderstanding of the principle proposed.

Second, while the delegation of decision-making authority from the people seems in many areas of social life to be important for the political autonomy of modern states, there are also cases when popular participation has a positive impact on political autonomy. For example, political autonomy regarding taxation policy has historically been dependent on the political involvement of taxpayers (cf. the pre-democratic slogan: “No taxation without representation!”). The same is true with political autonomy in regard to the raising of conscript armies. In Section 8.2.6 we will also argue that democratic participation is a key factor in achieving non-violent changes of government. All in all, there seems to be no possibility that the above principle of delegation and alienation (which does not share much common
ground with the one criticised in Chapter 6) could justify other political systems than democracy. Let us then consider its positive contributions.

First, the principle can be applied to both national and international politics. Since it requires no assumption that authorities can be transferred from one actor to another, the difference in strength among actors becomes unimportant for the realisation of the principle. Secondly, the distinction proposed here is arguably easier to use for testing whether a certain authority is delegated or alienated. Instead of assessing the possibilities of moving authority from one institution to another — a relatively difficult process especially when several states are involved — a test would require a piecemeal democratisation of an existing institution accompanied by an efficiency assessment of that institution. If a larger number of people can be involved in making a policy without endangering the political autonomy of the polity — and by implication the individual shares in that political autonomy — this larger number of people should in fact be involved; otherwise policy-making functions will be regarded as alienated from the people, and, as such, among democrats, without normative justification.

There are a large number of institutions which might be interrogated in this regard. For example, does European monetary autonomy reach its maximal level through the present organisation of the European Central Bank? Or could more people be involved without significant losses? One may consider different measures to improve popular involvement, e.g. increasing the number of bank directors, making them accountable to other assemblies, shortening their terms of office, abolishing treaty clauses which forbid governments to instruct them, simplifying the procedure for changing targets of monetary policy, publishing protocols of meetings of the directors, etc. To the extent that any of these changes could be undertaken without significantly decreasing the efficiency of the Bank in attaining its aims, its authority should be regarded as alienated rather than delegated from the people, according to amp.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{215} To the extent that none of these changes could be undertaken without decreasing efficiency, the judgement in terms of delegation or alienation would also depend on the precise balance chosen between “as many as possible” and “as much as possible”. To leave this judgement dependent on individual interpretations of democracy is still not problematic. To reformulate an argument suggested in Section 8.1.6, all democrats do not have to agree on a precise balance between popular involvement and political autonomy as long as they favour both criteria and do not let the realisation of either significantly erode the other.
8.2.4. Renewed participation requirements

In the case of participation, \(\text{amp}\) introduces additional democratic requirements on two points, as compared to majority rule or political equality. First, it requires an increased number of citizens or representatives to be involved in democratic politics. On this point \(\text{amp}\) accords with the view that a normatively sound conceptualisation of democracy during internationalisation should put greater emphasis on the importance of parliamentary participation (see Section 8.1.5), but it also accords with a certain value of participatory democracy yet to be explained (Section 8.2.6). Secondly, \(\text{amp}\) requires that democrats must make an effort to find proposals that are approved by the largest possible majority. On this point it accounts further for the problem of relatively weak representativeness in international assemblies (see Section 8.1.5), but it also serves (as will be seen in Section 8.2.5) to remove a tension between rationality and majority within deliberative democratic theory. In what follows the two additional requirements introduced by \(\text{amp}\) are dealt with sequentially.

Neither the principle of political equality nor that of majority voting requires any specific portion of the population actually to participate in general elections. From either of these perspectives it would be unproblematic for people freely and deliberately to abstain from voting.\(^{216}\)

\(\text{Amp}\) is here very different. It would indeed signal a democratic advantage in cases where every citizen freely participates in general elections. If as many as possible should decide, it is, by definition, better that a large rather than a small part of the population take part in politics. As in previous cases, we can use the concept of political autonomy to specify:

- The people should participate in politics in so far as their participation is compatible with the greatest size of individual shares in democratic political autonomy for the greatest number of people.\(^{217}\)

One reason for emphasising the value of democratic participation, as this principle does, is that increased parliamentary participation can solve the

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\(^{216}\) This does not, of course, deny that people defending either principle may argue the value of a high turnout for other reasons, for example that legitimacy is a good thing which benefits from high turnout (see Agné 2000a for a development of this hypothesis).

\(^{217}\) As mentioned in the beginning of Section 8.2.3, \(\text{amp}\) overrides the distinction between direct and representative democracy. As long as the people participate maximally for the exertion of maximal individual shares in political autonomy, it is not important whether their participation consists in electing representatives, in making laws, or in executing or implementing decisions.
problem of weakening political representativeness produced by internationalisation of state functions (see Section 8.1.5). Moreover, a radical internationalisation of state functions might tend to diminish the democratic participation of citizens (Section 4.3.1), and elections of the European Parliament receive a much smaller turnout than do national elections (Section 8.1.5) – problems that may as well be partly solved by the greater emphasis put here on these matters. But as mentioned several times already, behind this stress on democratic participation there is also a value premise to be discussed later (8.2.6).

There is a range of measures which could help convert this conceptual adjustment into political practice. To increase turnout in elections for the European Parliament it has been suggested that this institution be given power to tax (Weiler 1999: 355). The weakness in this proposal is that such power must be at the expense of national parliaments, whose attraction to voters would then presumably decline. Moreover, such a loss in national election turnout is, rationalistically speaking, presumed to be larger than the gain at the European level. The total of national voters is smaller than the total of European voters, and that makes rationally calculated election participation more sensitive to its possible political influence in the national case (see Agné 2000: 4-7 for the rationalist analysis). A more efficient way to increase turnout for the European elections would be to grant a certain sum of money to citizens who vote.218

Of course political participation involves much more than general elections. Amp may also be used to identify more or less new kinds of democratic participation. Concepts of majority rule and political equality are efficient at separating more democracy from less when it comes to decision making, but they are unable to suggest how decisions should be prepared and implemented (apart from the truism that what are prepared and implemented should be the decisions at issue and nothing else). In such areas it is easier to see what amp would imply: it would require the involvement of as many as possible, as much as possible, in the preparation, making, and implementation of decisions.219

The simplicity with which amp can be applied in these areas appears to give it an advantage over majority rule and political equality. The largest part of

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218 It should be noted that while such a reform is preferable to the power-to-tax proposal set forth by Weiler, the reform is not necessarily good. Both these reforms may undermine a republican interpretation of good democracy, where people vote because of commitment to autonomy and self-determination rather than to self-interest.

219 Although amp was previously conceived as the state in which as many as possible decide as much as possible, its fundamental idea is not altered if we also include the politics of preparation and implementation.
political practice currently takes place in public administration, and it is about time democratic theory started paying adequate attention to how such practice might be brought into conformity with democratic standards. Perhaps it is because democratic theory has not yet been fully developed in this direction that public opinion seems to treat administrative agencies as neutral purveyors of service rather than important sites of power. In any case, there has been a call among scholars for a broadened perspective on democratic practice, as for example in the literature on network and multi-level democracy and European integration (e.g. Andersen and Burns 1996; Jachtenfuchs 1997, Schmitter 1997a). Moreover, this call has not been restricted to studies of internationalisation, but it links on to the view of public administrations as democratically representative bodies (see Pitkin 1967: 116 pp. for a discussion and Wamsley et al. 1996 for contributions in defence of this view). It would appear to be an advantage of amp that it to some extent satisfies the demands put forward by these authors.

For more concrete suggestions of what amp implies in these areas, see examples concerning the European Central Bank suggested above in the discussion of delegation and alienation.

Let us now turn to the question of how large a portion of the population that should ideally approve a decision. The principles of majority voting and political equality would be indifferent between approving a decision by 51 or 100 percent of the voters, while amp implies that a majority of 100 percent is more democratic than a majority of 51 percent. This does not mean that amp requires super-majorities at the stage of decision-making. To postulate super-majorities would be to contradict amp since an absolute majority is by definition larger than any opposing group. Amp implies that it is democratically preferable if decisions are supported by large majorities, but not that democracy requires that decisions be made by large majorities.

The amp requirement can here be stated without introducing the concept of democratic political autonomy:

- Those who decide should be, or represent, the largest possible portion of the population.

The content of this proposition may be easier to grasp if we consider how it could be realised. According to much deliberative democratic theory, public deliberation brings forward proposals that can be supported by large majorities, or it increases public support for a given proposal: if the voice of everyone is heard before a decision is taken, that decision is likely to be
accepted by a larger proportion of the population. One way to realise the kind of participation implied by \( \textit{amp} \) is therefore through public deliberation.

It can now be seen how the \( \textit{amp} \) principle comes to grips with the problematic fact that participation in general elections at the state level tends to make international assemblies less representative than national parliaments (Section 8.1.5). To make international decisions agreeable to as many as possible, we should admit the representatives of as many as possible into the most important international assemblies. And to admit representatives of as many people as possible into such assemblies we should let a larger part of the parliament be represented in the government, at least where foreign policy issues are concerned. The aim of such a reform, let it be emphasized again, would be to improve the representativeness of international organisations and eliminate some of the silencing of minority opinions that currently takes place when state functions are internationalised. Just as many states have bi-cameral parliaments, the internationalisation of state functions would ideally require two chambers of government: one for domestic policy, accountable before the parliament, and one for foreign policy, legitimised by its correspondence to the most inclusive interpretation of the national interest.

If the above proposal for constitutional reform seems radical, it should still be noted that it is only a halfway solution towards a more thoroughgoing way of democratising international decision-making, namely by choosing the members of the most important international assemblies by direct election.

8.2.5. Renewed deliberation requirements

In Section 4.1 we encountered a problem for some theories in reconciling the deliberative and the decision-making aspects of democracy. In particular the discourse theoretical kind of deliberative democracy is unclear as to whether rationality or majority should prevail in a case of conflict. However, \( \textit{amp} \) seems able to reconcile them. As mentioned in the preceding section, the claim that as many as possible should decide as much as possible does not dissolve because an absolute majority has been achieved. The rise in support for a proposal from 55 to 65 percent may be as important as an increase from 45 to 55 percent.\(^{220}\) Hence \( \textit{amp} \) justifies the deliberative claim to let communicative rationality deal with collective problems and forge consensus, while on the ground that an absolute majority is, by definition, larger than any

\(^{220}\) The word \textit{may} is important here since the increase from 45 to 55 could be more important than that from 55 to 65 from the perspective of \( \textit{amp} \) as well, since the former, but not the latter, is compatible with the possibility that another proposal has dropped from a majority to a minority one.
opposing group, it does not displace the classical principle that the majority is fully justified in ruling over the minority. This removes the troublesome tension between majority and rationality.

Returning then to the particularities of internationalisation, it seems fair to interpret \( \text{amp} \) as suggesting that the deliberative community be extended across national boundaries in all policy areas where democratic political autonomy is affected by interaction across such boundaries. This is the same interpretation of \( \text{amp} \) as we gave when stipulating requirements of inclusion a few pages above, though deliberation is only one of several activities that an individual can be included in.

- People should be engaged in deliberation to the extent that it yields the greatest amount of political autonomy (in terms of individuals shares) for everyone, while accounting for both those who deliberate and those who do not.

As with previous interpretations of \( \text{amp} \) that use the concept of political autonomy for specification, the moral ground of this recommendation consists in the good of possessing action possibilities and the good of peaceful government change, which will be explained further in the next section (8.1.6). Moreover, the emphasis put here on international deliberation should account for the observation that no significant amount of international deliberation has, as a democrat would hope, yet emerged in response to internationalisation (Sections 4.3.3 and 7.2). As already argued several times, when a good seems to be increasingly difficult to achieve, it may at least to some extent be secured by intensified efforts to achieve it.

Reforms suggested to realise the revised concept of deliberation were mentioned above when discussing the view that democracy should be restricted to domestic politics (Section 8.1.1): at the European level changing rules of plenary debate; at the state level the introduction of reciprocal representation.

8.2.6. The normative case for amplified democracy

The foregoing sections have suggested various arguments in favour of \( \text{amp} \). It proposes reasonable solutions to previously identified problems of inclusion and delegation/alienation (Chapters 2 and 6 and Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.3). It meets the normative requirements that the importance of some aspects of democracy should be emphasized when accounting for internationalisation (Sections 8.1.5, 8.2.4 and 8.2.5). It offers some guidance on what democrats should think and do about internationalisation with regard to autonomy.
(Sections 8.1.6 and 8.2.2). And it achieves these objects in a rather unified manner, by reference to interpretations of a single principle. But *amp* is here proposed not only for these reasons. This final section will outline a certain normative justification of *amp*.

There is a famous argument that democracy is the only form of rule that permits the people regularly to change government without large-scale violence (Popper 1963/1972: 344, 350). Democracy permits us to be collectively free without suffering the pains of revolution and war. This promise may well represent the ultimate defence of democracy. For it embraces most ideological standpoints; it does not limit the value of democracy to a certain stage of economic development (as does the otherwise important argument that where there is democracy there is never famine), nor to a world where every state is democratic (as does the otherwise important argument that democracies never fight wars with each other); and it certainly draws more deeply on human experience than does any rationalistic calculation about the likelihood of an individual becoming part of a winning coalition.

Nevertheless, the argument does not stand alone. It relies on a notion that governments are actually important for social and political change. This premise has been a standard target for Marxist critique of representative democracy. Why would a dominating group be willing to relinquish any of its own power? Assuming none ever would, a Marxist would argue that nothing fundamentally ever changes when an election is won and lost: one group of officials is merely replaced by another. Therefore a more or less violent social revolution must take place before a *new government* can emerge, in the true sense of that word, so as to re-form politics outside the structures of capitalism.

There is nothing wrong with the Marxist suspicion that a powerful group of people will never reduce its own wealth and alienate its own power. The problem appears in the next step, where Marxism assumes that politics is determined by conflicts between economically defined social groups. A quick comparison of Swedish, British, and French governments and the welfare regimes in each country over time suggests the opposite, namely that electing different governments has considerable independent significance in creating different economic conditions (see Section 3.3 in a previous chapter, or Klingemann et al. 1994 for a much fuller analysis). But while Marxism is empirically problematic, one of its problems of interest is still politically fundamental. Brutally put, how can resources of the rich be transferred to the poor? If democrats are unable to answer this and similar questions they cannot rely on the justification that democracy is good because it permits people to change government – along with the distribution of resources –
without large-scale violence. On the other hand, if a reasonable answer can indeed be found, there is at the same time a very strong normative argument for the kind of democracy indicated by that answer.

From the mass participatory perspective of *amp* it could now be proposed that the reason why democracy permits the people to change government without large-scale violence is the overwhelming power of many people acting together. Facing small groups of resisters, the most advantaged social classes may, if their interests are fundamentally threatened, call in the aid not only of lobbying groups and strike-breakers, but also of security and paramilitary forces. But facing democracy, taken according to the mass participatory interpretation of *amp*, it would be rational for the better off social groups to prefer a non-violent solution to the conflict over resources. If, and perhaps only if, democracy is understood as a mass participatory movement, it would be reasonable to justify it by reference to its capacity for non-violent changes of government.²²¹

A possible normative problem at the level of this argument is that the overwhelmingly powerful mass of people may itself present a frightening prospect. How should we theoretically explain, and politically guarantee, that it does not exploit its position to the detriment of individuals and permanent minorities? The problem is classical, indicated for example by Plato in his observation that “democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing others, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power” (Plato 360 bc/2004: Bk. VIII, 557a).

But there are also a number of classical ideas on how to deal with an allegedly omnipotent and unreflective populace. According to different ideologies, one may rely on (i) institutional separation of powers and constitutionally protected human rights, these being definitely compatible with liberal politics, (ii) civil disobedience that publicly manifests common normative principles, this being more exclusively preferred by radical advocates of feminism, ecologism, anarchism and socialism, or (iii) collective identities that make the majority care for the minority as well as for itself, this being consistent with conservative or Christian democratic politics.

²²¹ To some extent this could be empirically investigated. It would be predicted that democratic states with higher levels of citizen political participation would more often deviate from market principles than democratic states with lower levels of citizen participation (under the assumption that citizens’ valuation of market principles does not correlate with their political participation). For an illustration one may compare figures of turnout (citizen participation) and public spending (deviation from market principles) between the Scandinavian countries, on the one hand, and those of the United Kingdom, on the other.
Suffice it here to recall that these possible solutions are not unique to theories relying on the \( \text{amp} \) principle, and therefore do not need to be developed here.

* 

The above argument in favour of \( \text{amp} \) could be regarded as an explanation of why the “as many as possible” element has a positive effect on the “as much as possible” one.

However, explanatory theory is important not only for understanding the normative dimensions of democracy, but also for understanding the development of democracy in the course of internationalisation. Among the observations that did not fit with relevant explanatory theories in previous chapters, there is the stability of deliberation and parliamentary participation during the internationalisation of markets (at the level of states, regarding elected representatives) and also the general difficulty of developing international deliberation at the level of states (though there is no predictive problem in this regard at the level of international organisations).

The argument presented above – that democracy is normatively desirable because mass participation in politics establishes the possibility of peaceful government change – could also arguably shed light on these more empirically oriented explanatory problems. Given that contemporary democracy approximates \( \text{amp} \), the mass of the people is likely to approve it, for it renders them (rather than, say, capital owners or an educated elite) the most capable actor in the national system. That should explain why democratic practice is relatively stable over time: if a system is approved by its most capable actor it is not likely to change in the respects that institutionalise the capacities of that actor, which in this case points to the stability of democratic institutions. This argument may account for both the democratically regrettable fact that international deliberation at the level of states has not developed in response to internationalisation and the democratically favourable fact that parliamentary participation has remained surprisingly stable during internationalisation. More generally, it would assume processes of democratisation to be path-dependent (see Premfors 1999: 6-11 for a survey of historical institutionalist approaches to democratisation).

Taking this reflection one step further, we see that the introduction of any new element to democracy will require the approval of the mass of the people, which – since the mass of the people approve of democracy – will require a new justification in terms of democracy. The direct political importance of democratic theory – the purpose of which is, among other
things, to account for the justifications of democracy – can thus hardly be exaggerated.

* 

The argument outlined in the last six sections has aimed at a view of democracy and internationalisation that is more general and unified than a mere catalogue of results obtained. The theory behind it can be put into practice most simply by answering two questions: Is it possible to involve more people in some political activity without reducing their political autonomy? And can the political autonomy of everyone be increased by some people following political directions of their own? The struggle for democracy in internationalisation can be thought of as beginning with an affirmative answer to these questions.
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Appendices

Appendix 1. Two examples of the calculation of outlays proposed in shadow budgets of two budget years in Sweden. (The complete list of shadow budgets is given in the reference list.)

Budget year: 1977/78

Shadow budget by the Swedish Social Democrats (Motion 1976/77: 1294, as published in *Riksdagstrycket* (Parliamentary Press)): “utgiftsminskningar” + “utgiftsökningar” = (-1125.8 miljoner kronor) + (469.5 miljoner kronor) = -656.3 miljoner kronor

Budget year: 95/96

Shadow budget by the Swedish Moderates (Motion 1994/95 Fi210, page 48, as published in *Riksdagstrycket* (Parliamentary Press)). This shadow budget presents its proposals in relation to the government proposals: “Avvisade ökade utgifter” + “ökade besparingar” - ”avvisade besparingar” - ”ökade utgifter” = (-10659 million kronor) + (-33 860 million kronor) - (-3269 million kronor) - (-2900 million kronor) = -38 350 million kronor

Shadow budget by the Swedish Left Party (Motion 1994/95 Fi218 as published in *Riksdagstrycket* (Parliamentary Press)). This shadow budget presents its proposals in relation to the government proposals: “Summa 1995/96” (12 months, second column): + 6000 million kronor.
Appendix 2. Examples of the coding of question-answer interactions.

The following exchange of views illustrates both the problem of one question being posed over several sentences, and the problem of classifying a certain question-answer instance in either of the two categories answered or answered only in part. (For further examples of the coding procedure, see section 7.2.)


Let me pose some very simple questions. Is there no connection between employment in Sweden and whether there are any companies here? If there is a connection between the existence of companies and the possibility to get a job – do not then the conditions for Swedish companies in relation to the conditions in other countries mean something? And in that case, Matz Hammarström,

If it is good for companies that trade with other countries to have the same currency – and that must be very difficult to oppose – which other advantages would you in the Green Party like to offer if you say no to a common currency? Is it about even lower taxes – more than the Liberal Party suggests? Or is it about some other advantages for the companies – what you usually

222 The section in original: Låt mig ställa några mycket konkreta frågor. Finns det inget samband mellan jobben i Sverige och huruvida det finns några företag här? Om det finns ett samband mellan att det finns ett företag och att man kan få ett jobb - betyder då inte villkoren för företagen här i Sverige i relation till villkoren i andra länder någonting? Och i så fall, Matz Hammarström, om det är bra för företag som handlar med andra länder att ha samma valuta - och det är väl ändå väldigt svårt att säga emot - vilka andra fördelar för företagen vill ni i Miljöpartiet erbjuda om ni säger nej till fördelen av en gemensam valuta? Handlar det om ännu mer sänkta skatter - mer än vad Folkpartiet föreslår? Eller handlar det om några andra fördelar för företagen - det som ni brukar kalla för stora nackdelar? (A series of sentences coded as only one question, Nr 1 in this utterance; my remark) När genomskinligheten enligt allas bedömningar kommer att betyda att konsumentpriserna, dvs. det som vi betalar när vi är ute och handlar, blir lägre med en gemensam valuta - vilka andra fördelar tänker Miljöpartiet föreslå för oss konsumenter när vi ska betala mer på grund av att Miljöpartiet inte vill att Sverige ska vara med i valutasamarbetet? (Coded as one single question, Nr 2 in this utterance; my remark). På vilket sätt tänker ni i Miljöpartiet se till att man i Europasamarbetet verkliga kan genomföra bättre miljöskatter osv? (Coded as one single question, nr 3 in this utterance, my remark) Ni vill ju egentligen helt och hållet gå ur Europasamarbetet, men framför allt se till att Sveriges inflytande inte alls blir så stort som det skulle kunna bli om Sverige var med och samarbetade fullt ut. Hur får vi företag? Hur får vi bättre villkor för konsumenterna? Hur får vi inflytande? (Repetition of previously posed questions 1-3, and hence not coded as additional questions; my remark)
refer to as great disadvantages? (This series of sentences is coded as one single question, Nr 1 in this utterance; my remark)

When the transparency according to everyone's assessment means that consumer prices, that is what we pay when we shop, will be lower with a common currency, which other advantages is the Green Party going to propose for us consumers that will have to pay more because the Green Party does not want Sweden to be a part of the monetary union? (Coded as one single question, Nr 2 in this utterance; my remark).

In what way are you in the Green Party going to guarantee that Green taxation, etc, can really be achieved through European cooperation? (Coded as one single question, Nr 3 in this utterance; my remark) You actually want to leave the European cooperation, but above all you want to see to that Sweden's influence does not become at all so great as it could be if Sweden participates in the cooperation wholeheartedly.

How do we get companies? How do we acquire improved conditions for consumers? How do we acquire influence? (Repetition of previously posed questions, Nr 1-3, and hence not coded as additional questions; my remark)

And Matz Hammarström, economic spokesman of the Green Party, responds in utterance number 29 of the debate (translated\textsuperscript{223}). The different sentences of the utterance are numbered, to simplify later explanations.

Regarding what can be done to favour the establishment of companies in Sweden I share Karin Pilsätter's view that lower employment (payroll) tax plays an important role. (sentence number 1, my remark) We will continue to work hard on this issue as we have done in the past (sentence number 2, my remark) It remains to be seen if we will actually have lower prices because of an accession to the EMU. (sentence number 3, my remark) At least half of Swedish export goes to countries outside the Euro-zone, so there is still a currency risk. (sentence number 4, my remark) We in the Green Party want to urge cooperation in environmental issues. (sentence number 5, my remark) As long as we are in the EU we will be active and urging in its Green group for a

\textsuperscript{223} När det gäller att gynna företagandet i Sverige delar jag Karin Pilsätters uppfattning att sänkt arbetsgivaravgift är en viktig del i detta arbete. (sentence number 1, my remark) Vi kommer att fortsätta driva frågan om detta liksom vi har gjort tidigare. (sentence number 2, my remark) Det återstår att se om det verkligen blir lägre priser genom en EMU-anslutning. (sentence number 3, my remark) Sveriges export går ju åtminstone till hälften till länder utanför EMU-området, så en valutarisk finns ju fortfarande kvar. (sentence number 4, my remark) Vi i Miljöpartiet vill driva ett miljösamarbete. (sentence number 5, my remark) Så länge Sverige är med i EU är vi aktiva och pådrivande i den gröna gruppen där för ett gott miljösamarbete. (sentence number 6, my remark) Vi anser i och för sig att Sverige också som en fristående stat utanför EU ska kunna driva ett miljösamarbete i olika internationella sammanhang. (sentence number 7, my remark)
good environmental cooperation. (sentence number 6, my remark) Incidentally we believe that Sweden even as a state outside the EU will be able to push environmental issues in various international contexts. (sentence number 7, my remark)

Let us start with what are probably the least controversial aspects, although the whole citation is chosen to illustrate significant uncertainties of the coding procedure. Pilsäter’s question nr 2 is answered by Hammarström in sentence nr 3. In that sentence Hammarström questions the assumption underpinning Pilsäter’s questions – that Swedish consumers will obviously gain from Swedish membership of the European Monetary Union – and hence rejects the relevance of the question. Pilsäter’s question nr 3 is answered directly by Hammarström in sentence nr 6-7. A more difficult problem appears in relation to Pilsäter’s question nr 1. Hammarström tries an answer when formulating sentences nr 1 and nr 2. But the information he provides does not, according to the coding rule applied here, match up to having answered question nr 1, since the question is considerably more detailed than the potential answer, relating the employment and industrial conditions to conditions in other countries and currency matters, which are absent perspectives in Hammarström’s sentences nr 1-2. If Hammarström’s sentences 1-2 were all there was for an answer to Pilsäter’s question nr 1, this question would have been coded as *not answered but touched upon*. However, Hammarström does provide some of the required information in sentence number 4 (after having answered Pilsäter’s question nr 2 in sentence nr 3). Taken together, sentences 1, 2, and 4 is, according the coding procedure applied here, sufficient for judging that Hammarström has answered also the first one of Pilsäter’s three questions.
Appendix 3. Rules for assigning values to indicators used in Chapter 4, expect question-answering.

Indicators

1) International comparisons.

To conclude the existence of an international comparison the statement must have a minimum of specificity. Accordingly a statement like “our economy is doing fine compared to other countries” does not qualify as an international comparison. In my analyses that statement would be classified as belonging to the broader and more vague category of international considerations (which is commented on below). For the criterion of specificity to be fulfilled suffice it, however, that at least two points of comparison can be roughly identified, for example on the one hand “Britain” and on the other “Western Europe” or “Norway” or the “OECD-countries”. Most often no problem of interpretation appears as the comparisons are generally more detailed, as for instance in the following comment by Alan Milburn (The Chief Secretary to the Treasury) in a finance debate on the 20 of April 1999: ”For too long, Britain has faced a competitiveness gap with our competitors. There is now a 40 percent performance gap between the UK and the United States of America and a 20 percent gap between us and France and Germany. This Finance Bill will help tackle that productivity problem.”

To conclude an instance of international comparison it is not necessary that a state be compared to another. What is required is that the two points of comparison be found in different countries, for example the public spending on agriculture in Normandy compared to public spending on health care in Bavaria, or that the points of comparison consist of measures aggregated from different countries, such as the total economic output of the OECD compared over time.

A comparison is further identified with the feature that is being compared between different units, not by the number of units included in the comparison. The above formulation by Alan Milburn, for example, is understood as one single international comparison, although “the performance gap” is identified by comparing Britain to both the United States of America and France and Germany. Furthermore, if more than two features are compared between two or more countries, for instance comparing unemployment and inflation between Sweden and Finland, but expressed
together by the speaker to support one single point, for example economic efficiency, that statement is recorded as a single international comparison.

A comparison which is identified by the feature it is comparing could be counted more than once, if it is expressed at different stages in the speech. On the other hand, the comparison is not counted twice only because it is expressed two times in a row. To be counted twice a comparison – identified by the feature it is comparing between two or more units – must have between its two verbal formulations at least one other verbal act, such as a description or a recommendation, of an independent character. That the classification of some instances will in the end rely on the admittedly vague notion of independency of verbal acts does obviously require a careful qualitative judgement. The justification for counting as two international comparisons any pair of comparisons separated by an independent verbal act is that the meaning of a comparison might very well depend on where in the structure of verbal acts it is being stated. What may at first sight seem as a repetition of a previously mentioned idea, or even a previously used formulation, will most likely reveal at least some new aspect of it, since the speaker found the comparison worthwhile again the second time. Obviously it warrants a more ambitious qualitative investigation to sort out the difference between two international comparisons and one single international comparison repeated again and again – an investigation more ambitious than could be pursued in this inquiry which, after all, should be concerned mainly with a different problem, that of internationalisation and democratic theory.

2) Statement of international dependency

A perception of international dependency means than some person claims that the country is forced or heavily induced to pursue a certain policy because of international factors. As in the case with international comparisons a perception of a certain dependency may be counted twice, but only if there is one independent verbal act in between (incidentally, perceptions of this kind are so rare that there is only a minimal chance that they occur more than once in any given speech).

3) International consideration

Every other formulation referring to an international phenomenon. As “international phenomenon” is not regarded remarks concerning exchange rates, exports and imports, or competitiveness, as long as such references are
not combined with for example to what happens “internationally” or “abroad” or to whatever country except the one where the utterance is made.

General for 1-3: those categories are treated as mutually exclusive, implying that every observation is counted in one and only one category.

4) Questions. Generally, only questions that are directly addressed are considered. To be directly addressed a question does not have to mention the name or title of the addressed person, but it must be obvious from the context to whom the question is directed. For examples of how a question may be answered, answered only in part, or not answered, see Section 7.2 in the book as well as Appendix 2 above.

5) References to national media

Naming a newspaper or broadcast and referring to what has been said. Anonymous references like “it appeared in the paper that …” are not coded. No difference is made depending on how referred media are valued.

6) References to national experts

Here the term “experts” is considered in a very broad sense, including most individuals and organisations that provide some information that is used to support or weaken an argument. This may include references to, for example, OECD, national statistics, private companies and labour unions, if they have produced some kind of investigation or analysis of a matter. Mere statements of an interest group position (which may of course be formulated by both private companies, labour unions and other actors) are however excluded. Also excluded from the category is information produced by a media source (which is accounted for under Indicator 5) and official reports that are compulsory within the legislative procedure (references to optional official reports, that are not routinely produced before the relevant kind of decision, are however included). An expert referred to by way of a media article, is however counted into the category (as well as into the category of media references under Indicators 5 and 7). The expert need not be active in the time period of the debate but may be of historical origin. Literary references (for instance poems or aphorisms) are excluded. References to earlier theorists and philosophers (for example Marx or Erasmus) are however included.
7) References to international media.

The international counterpart of Indicator 5.

8) References to international experts

The international counterpart of Indicator 6.

9) Explicit awareness of what international effects the national policy-making might produce.

Self-explanatory.

10) Opinion formation to the advantage of foreign citizens residing abroad.

Self-explanatory.

11) Statement of national independence

A statement that the state or nation is independent of some international factors under consideration.

12) What expert/info organisations or individuals are mentioned?

The category includes every actor coded under indicator 6 and 8 (but not those coded under 5 and 7).
Appendix 4. Selection of budgetary debate-material for content analysis.

The content analysis of budget debates is undertaken on the ground of four different categories of material:

1) The speech by the government’s official representative, most often the finance minister or the chief secretary of finance, and questions posed and answers given in direct interaction with this speech; 2) the speech by the first speaking representative of the parliamentary group of the governmental party or parties, and questions posed and answers given in direct interaction with this speech; 3) the speech by the first speaking representative of the parliamentary party group(s) that propose regarding some financial matter to either vote against the government or to abstain from voting, and questions posed and answers given in direct interaction with this speech; 4) answers to questions being posed in a speech adhering to any of the above categories, regardless of at what later stage in the debate the answer is given, as long as the debate has not been officially ended (it sometimes happens that debates last more than a day, but more usually they take only a couple of hours).

The selection of material could be justified on grounds of political centrality of the speakers and on ideological and institutional variation in the field of study. Generally the most influential speakers (group leaders and ministers for example) are the first speakers. By selecting material for analysis from different institutional backgrounds (cabinet and parliament) and from different ideologies those of (parties of government and opposition) the design is at least in principle open for assessing the relative importance of such factors.
Appendix 5. Debate material analysed in Chapter 4.

In the following material all questions posed to a specified person or party representative have been coded in terms of (i) not answered, (ii) not answered but touched upon, and (iii) answered. It has also been coded in terms of the categories presented in Appendix 3.

Swedish debate: 18.01.1949

1. Ohlin (opposition member, Liberal Party, first speaker)
2. Fast (government party member of parliament, fourth speaker)
3. Wigfors (government party member of government, Finance Minister, seventh speaker; Foreign Minister Undén has intervened earlier in the debate, but only to respond to some foreign policy criticisms)

+ questions posed in short responses (korta genmälen) stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

Swedish debate: 19.01.1951

1. Ohlin (opposition member, Liberal Party, first speaker)
2. Fast (government party member of parliament, fourth speaker)
3. Sköld (government party member of government, Finance Minister, fifth speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses (korta genmälen) stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned
Swedish debate: 01.03.1972

1. Kristiansson (opposition member, Centre Party, first speaker)

2. Ekström (government party member of parliament, fifth speaker)

3. Sträng (government party member of government, Finance Minister, ninth speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses (korta genmälen) stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

Swedish debate: 13.03.1974

1. Burenstam Linder (opposition member, Conservative Party, first speaker)

2. Ekström (government party member of parliament, Social Democrat, forth speaker)

3. Sträng (government party member of government, Finance Minister, ninth speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses (korta genmälen) stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

Swedish debate: 08.03.1995

1. Lars Tobisson (opposition member, Conservative Party, first speaker)

2. Jan Bergqvist (government party member of parliament, Social Democrat, seventh speaker)
3. Göran Persson (government party member of government, Finance Minister, eighth speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses (repliker) stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

Swedish debate, date: 19.11.1999

1. Gunnar Hökmark (opposition member, conservative party, first speaker)

2. Jan Bergqvist (government party member of parliament, Social democrat, seventh speaker)

3. Bosse Ringholm (government party member of government, Finance minister, eighth speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses (repliker) stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

British debate: 16.05.1950

1. Douglas Jay (Financial Secretary to the Treasury, member of government, Labour Party, first speaker)

2. Anthony Eden (government party member of parliament, Labour Party, second speaker)

3. S. N. Evans (opposition party member of parliament, Conservative Party, third speaker)
Appendices

+ questions posed in short responses stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

British debate: 07.04.1952

1. John Boyd-Carpenter (Financial Secretary to the Treasury, member of government, Conservative Party, first speaker)

2. James Callaghan (opposition party member of parliament, Labour Party, second speaker)

3. Charles Waterhouse (most likely government party member of parliament, Conservative Party, third speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

British debate: 21.04.1972

1. Anthony Barber (Chancellor of the Exchequer, member of government, Conservative Party, first speaker)

2. Denis Healey (member of parliament, opposition, Labour Party, second speaker)


+ questions posed in short responses stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches
answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

British debate: 09.05.1974

1. Denis Healy (Chancellor of the Exchequer, member of government, Labour Party, first speaker)

2. Robert Carr (opposition party member of parliament, Conservative Party, second speaker)

3. John Horam (government party member of parliament, Labour Party, third speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

British debate: 26.04.1993

1. Michael Portillo (the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, member of government, Conservative Party, first speaker)

2. Harriet Harman (opposition party member of parliament, Labour Party, second speaker)

3. John Watts (government party member of parliament, Conservative Party, third speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned
British debate: 20.04.1999

1. Alan Milburn (the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, member of government, Labour Party, first speaker)

2. David Heathcoat-Amory (opposition party member of parliament, Conservative Party, second speaker)

3. Giles Radice (government party member of parliament, Labour Party, third speaker)

+ questions posed in short responses stated in direct connection to and in interaction with each of the above three speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned

French debate: 31.12.1948

Every speech, however short, until the voting of the first budget line, pages 8219-8225. This amounts to the following speeches, formed into three groups:


2. Parliament’s Opposition Group. Madeleine Braun, Fernand Grenier


+ questions posed in direct connection and in interaction with these speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned. Comments by the President of the Assembly (equivalent to the British speaker or the Swedish talman) is excepted.

NOTE. The first Queuille cabinet (11/9 1948– 5/10 1949) was composed by all parliamentary parties expect the Communists. The Communist Party was
the only opposition party, though several other parties were divided over important issues (see the diagrams of MacRae 1967: 78; the diagram are explained at page 73). To know if a parliamentarian is in opposition or not it is hence not necessary to know what party he or she represents. It is sufficient to know if he or she represents the Communist Party. The latter information has been obtainable from the debate minutes. Since it has not been possible to sort out the party affiliation of all individual parliamentarians in this part of the material, question-answer interactions that occur across the opposition-government line have been coded as “inter-party interactions” and question-answer interactions within either the opposition or the government have been coded as “intra-party interactions”.

Speak order:

1. Charles Barangé (rapporteur général, government party member of parliament, first speaker)

2. Maurice-René Simonnet (member of parliament, Government party, second speaker)

3. Joseph Delachenal (member of parliament, government party, poses questions),

4. Madeleine Braun (member of parliament, opposition party, Communist)

5. Tanguy Prigent (member of parliament; unsure party affiliation but poses no question, wherefore the validity of the question-answer indicator is not affected)

6. Fernand Grenier (member of parliament, opposition party, Communist, poses question)

7. Christian Pineau (minister of public works (travaux public), transport and tourism, interim responsible for finance)

8. Jules Moch (ministre de l’intérieur)

In addition to the above mentioned persons who address speeches there is also, within the delimitations mentioned, a minister who makes no speech but answers questions only: Yvon Delbo (education minister, fourth speaker)
French debate: 01.04.1952 (under the Pinay government, in office 8/3 – 23/8 1952)

Every speech, however short, until the end of the première séance, pages 1666-1702. This amounts to the following speeches, formed into three groups:


2. Parliament’s Opposition Group. René Lamps (Communist), Jean Crouzier (RPF), Jacques Duclos (Communist)

3. Minster’s Group. No minister participates in the debate (this holds true even when analysing a larger part of the debate)

+ questions posed in direct connection and in interaction with these speeches

+ answers given later in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned. Comments by the President of the Assembly (equivalent to the British speaker or the Swedish talman) is excepted.

NOTE. In opposition: Communists, Socialists and RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français, right-wing, Gaullist party); the rest in government coalition (MacRae 1967: 119).

Speaking order:

1. Charles Barange (rapporteur général, government party member of parliament, government party, first speaker)

2. Raymond Triboulet (rapporteur pour avis de la commission de la défense nationale).

3. Georges Coudray (président de la commission de la reconstruction et des dommages de guerre)

4. René Lamps (opposition party member, Communist Party)
5. Jean Crouzier (opposition party)

6. Jacques Duclos (opposition party, Communist Party)

**French debate: 24.10.1972**

1. Guy Sabatier (*rapporteur général*, member of parliament, government party, Union de démocrates pour la Republique, UDR (Gaullist, develops into RPR), first speaker)

2. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (minister of economy and finance, Federation Nationale des Republicains Independents, develops into Parti republican in 1977, In government coalition with UDR, third speaker)

3. Jacqueline Conavel (opposition party member of parliament, Communist party, PCF, fifth speaker)

   + questions posed in direct connection and in interaction with these speeches

   + answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned. Comments by the president of the assembly (equivalent to the British speaker or the Swedish *talman*) is excepted

**French debate, date: 22.10.1974**

1. Maurice Papon (*rapporteur général*, member of parliament, government party, UDF, first speaker)

2. Jean-Pierre Fourcade (minister of economy and finance, UDF, second speaker)

3. Francis Leenhart (opposition party member of parliament, Communist Party, fifth speaker)

   + questions posed in direct connection and in interaction with these speeches
Appendices

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned. Comments by the President of the Assembly (equivalent to the British Speaker or the Swedish *talman*) is excepted.

**French debate: 12.10.1993**

1. Philippe Auberger (*rapporteur général de la commission des finances*, member of parliament, government party, Rally for the Republic, RPR, (Gaullist), first speaker)

2. Edmond Alphandéry (minister of economy, Rally for the Republic, RPR (Gaullist), third speaker)

3. Didier Migaud (opposition party member of parliament, Socialist Party, PS, fifth speaker)

+ questions posed in direct connection and in interaction with these speeches

+ answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned. Comments by the President of the Assembly (equivalent to the British speaker or the Swedish *talman*) are excepted

**French debate: 13.10.1998**

1. Dominique Strauss-Kahn (minister of economy, finance and industry, Socialist Party, PS, first speaker)

2. Didier Migaud (*rapporteur général de la commission des finances*, member of parliament, government party, Socialist Party, PS, third speaker)

3. Jean-Jacques Jegou (opposition party member of parliament, Union for French Democracy, UDF, a non-Gaullist right-wing party, fifth speaker)

+ questions posed in direct connection and in interaction with these speeches
answers given later on in the debate to questions posed within the delimitations mentioned. Comments by the President of the Assembly (equivalent to the British Speaker or the Swedish talman) are excepted.
Appendix 6. ANOVA/GLM-Model on question-answering.

Appendix 6. A Three-way ANOVA on material from France and Britain but not from Sweden

Dependent Variable: Extent to which the question is answered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>37.808(^a)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.781</td>
<td>6.114</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>332.845</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>332.845</td>
<td>538.228</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNAT</td>
<td>4.322</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.161</td>
<td>3.494</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDE.CONT</td>
<td>6.090</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.090</td>
<td>9.848</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.744</td>
<td>.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNAT * IDE.CONT</td>
<td>7.042</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.521</td>
<td>5.694</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNAT * COUNTRY</td>
<td>11.553</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.776</td>
<td>9.341</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDE.CONT * COUNTRY</td>
<td>13.011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.011</td>
<td>21.040</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNAT * IDE.CONT * COUNTRY</td>
<td>3.775</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.775</td>
<td>6.105</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>79.156</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>.618</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>722.000</td>
<td>139</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>116.964</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) R Squared = .323 (Adjusted R Squared = .270)
Appendix 7. Government, parliaments and the assessment of power.

Consider the possibility that we find an increasing financial difference over time between the budget proposal of the government and the final budget decision by the parliament. How should such an observation be interpreted in terms of power or control? Having access to only this information, none of the logically possible interpretations can be excluded: (i) that the parliament has gained control over the government, (ii) that the parliament has lost control over the government, or (iii) that no dislocation of power or control has occurred between the parliament and the government. To most analysts, there is probably some intuitive appeal by interpretation number one. Other things being equal, increasing financial net difference points to the first interpretation. But of course there are a number of conditions – of which four will now be outlined – that can violate the ceteris paribus assumption and make the intuitive interpretation misleading.

First we should make the rather trivial acknowledgement that the assumed data of our imagined example are far from optimal for the purpose of supporting interpretation number one (i). Focusing on the net financial difference between the government budget proposal and the parliamentary budget decision, we cannot assume without further investigation that the entire difference is initiated and decided by the parliament. It might also be that the government has increasingly permitted itself to alter its own budgetary proposal, after the original proposal has been delivered. In most countries the government alters its budgetary proposal to some extent after it has been presented the first time, for various reasons, of course, but sometimes because of changing social or economic conditions. If such changes account for the whole increase over time of the net financial difference between proposal and decision, then it would obviously be false to conclude that the parliament has gained control over the government. Rather the opposite interpretation is correct, that the parliament has lost some of its control, since the government has increased its own leeway concerning when to present its real or final proposition, which obviously can be used as an instrument for manipulating the outcome of the process; for instance the government may discourage parliamentarians from ambitious and time-consuming preparations by systematically altering the budget proposal once the parliament has worked out a full response to the original proposal, and hence generate a sense of alienation among members of parliaments regarding their efforts on budget proposals.
This problem of interpretation could possibly be ruled out by collecting more detailed data. Instead of looking at the budgetary proposal and decision, one should follow each budget item through the budgetary process and register when and on whose initiative it is altered, and finally arrive at the financial difference between proposal and decision in two categories: the difference initiated by the parliament, and the difference initiated by the government. Although unproblematic in principle, this strategy may be extremely complicated to realise in practice. In some countries the state budget is divided into several thousand single items, prepared in different standing committees, altered by the government at different points in time. And even more seriously, there is no guarantee that a formal documentation of the budget procedure will reveal who has initiated a certain change, since both the parliament and the cabinet may be the object of informal pressures to alter or not to alter a specific item of the budget. It might hence be that during some time periods in some countries, the required information is simply not accessible. For a research design that requires comparable data over time in various countries, like the one of this study, it is obvious that practical constraints may impose a restriction on what conclusions can be drawn.

The second reason why interpretation number one may be misleading – though not false – concerns the aggregated level of data. Financial differences between budget proposals and decisions do not inform us about the financial extent to which government proposals have been altered, but about the extent to which the final decision is financially different from the proposal. These are obviously two different things. For example, if the parliament has increased the outlays in one area and to the same extent decreased the outlays in another area, then only the latter measure will register that the parliament has taken political action. Hence a stable or decreasing financial difference between budget proposal and decision over time is fully compatible with the possibility that the budget proposal is altered by the parliament in all its sub-divisions. Also this problem could of course be handled by collecting more detailed data, although with difficulties resembling the ones mentioned above. Refining the data would however be less urgent in this case, since it is for many theoretical purposes enough to have information about aggregated financial differences. The important thing is to not conflate that information with information about financial difference derived from individual budget amendments.

The third reason why interpretation number one might be false or misleading is a contextualisation of the general anticipation-problem mentioned at the outset of the section. An increase of net financial differences between budget proposal and decision might represent a weakened parliament if the government has simultaneously lost a considerable
part of its former ability to anticipate the parliamentary response. That the parliament initiated fewer budgetary changes in the beginning of the period was, according to this interpretation, due to a higher degree of the government’s capacity at that time to anticipate the reaction of the parliament, not to a lower degree of parliamentary control at that time.

Is this interpretation possible to evaluate on the grounds of some other information yet to be found, or do we have to accept the conclusion that increasing financial differences do not have any firm interpretation in terms of power or control? To see more clearly what solutions may be at hand, the problem could be slightly rephrased. We started from an assumed observation that there is an increasing net difference over time between government’s budget proposals and parliament’s budget decisions. This variation over time could be explained, we may assume, either by some change in the government, or by some change in the parliament, or by some change in both institutions. The problem could now be posed as a question concerning which of two possible explanations of the increasing financial difference is the better one: either is the increasing financial difference best explained by a decreasing ability of the government to anticipate the parliament’s reaction, or by the parliament’s growing capacity to control the government.

These alternative interpretations can be stated at an operational level. For example, the governmental explanation of increasing financial difference could be supported by observing weakening institutions for anticipating the parliamentary response to the budget, like the practice of negotiating the budget content with representatives of the parliament and the opposition before the budget is submitted to the parliament. Hence if our explanation of the increasing difference is a declining capacity of the government to anticipate the reactions of the parliament, we should expect also that the institution set up for anticipating the parliament’s response is weakened or eroded; otherwise the explanation is problematic. Similarly, the parliamentarian explanation of increasing financial difference can be supported by observing a strengthened institution for controlling the budget outcome. Such strengthening might be visible in the qualities presented in Section 5.2.2, namely balance of investigative resources and activities. Hence if our explanation of the increasing financial difference is an increasing capacity of the parliament to control the government, then we should be able to observe increasing trends in these indicators as well; otherwise the explanation is problematic.

The difficulty of this evaluation strategy is of course to arrive at an exhaustive account of what changes could explain the increasing financial differences. In the above cases we simply assumed that parliaments exert control through some institution in which investigative resources and activities
play a crucial role, and that governments anticipate the parliamentary responses by some negotiative institution. These causal mechanisms – to my view, nothing other than intermediary variables – may or may not be the relevant ones. And unfortunately, the empirical material that could be collected for the purpose of this study does not permit any rigorous evaluation of alternative causal mechanisms at this point, mainly because the present design of inquiry relies heavily on comparisons over time, which in turn require the empirical data to be documented; and existing documents do not contain information on every possible mechanism operating to affect budgetary outcome. Admitting such difficulties does not, however, leave the field entirely open for choosing between different interpretations without even trying to attain an exhaustive account of how parliaments and governments affect budgetary outcomes, assuming that they do; nor for leaving entirely open the question of what interpretation is preferable on empirical grounds. That nothing can be safely concluded is not to deny that different possible conclusions may be differently well empirically supported.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the overarching context of three exhaustive and mutually exclusive interpretations in terms of power might in some cases help us to determine what interpretation is preferable. For example, the first interpretation can also be confirmed or refuted by looking at how well the alternative second and third interpretations are empirically supported. If none of the alternative interpretations is empirically tenable, we can conclude that the first one is; and the other way around: if either of the two alternative interpretations is found empirically tenable, then we can conclude that the first one is not.

The fourth reason why interpretation number one might be false or misleading draws on the second general problem mentioned in the subsection to Section 5.2.3. Actors may change their proposals or behaviour, not as an effect of exerted power, but as an effect of changes in their own perceptions, interests, preferences, instrumental considerations, etc. For the sake of lucidity, these various dimensions of change will now be seen as nothing but preferential changes. Applied to the assumed observation of an increasing difference between budget proposals and decisions over time, the potential problem must then be divided in two: on the one hand preferential changes of the parliament, on the other hand preferential changes of the government. Focusing on the first possibility, the explanation of why the financial net difference increases is that the preferences of the parliament has changed from preferring that the government should take operational decision on the budget, to preferring that the parliament should itself take operational decisions on the budget. If this change can explain the whole increase of net financial difference then the first of our three interpretations
is mistaken, since the parliament has, during the whole period of time, possessed control over the budget outcome, although it has for some time opted for a strategy where the government takes the operational decisions, perhaps because the parliament is deeply impressed by the analytical skills of the government.

Focusing on the second possibility (preferential changes of the government) the explanation as to why the financial net difference increases is that the preferences of the government have changed from preferring that the parliament should decide the outcome of the budget, to preferring that the government should itself decide the outcome of the budget. If such a change can explain the whole increase of net financial difference, then – as in the first case – the first of our three interpretations is mistaken, as the government has during the whole period of time possessed control over the budget outcome, although it has at some point in time opted for a strategy to let the parliament take some operational decisions, perhaps because the government has at some point in time found it appropriate to maximise the kind of social legitimacy that parliamentary decisions seem likely to generate.

Once again being forced to rethink the intuitively appealing interpretation number one, we need to know if there is any information that would exclude the alternative interpretations or if we must finally give up our efforts to choose among different interpretations of a specific observation. Following the strategy already presented for evaluating interpretations, the crucial question is what additional observations are implied by the correctness of one or the other interpretation. Assume that the parliament has possessed the same budget control over the whole period of time, but that it has opted for a more operational participation in the decision-making in later times. If that is true we should be able to find at least some documented traces of changing parliamentary preferences along these lines, for example in the yearly budgetary debates in the parliament. Or assume that the government has possessed the same budget control over the whole period of time, but that it has opted for less operational participation in decision-making at a later time. If that is true we should be able to trace these preferential changes in some policy document.

As already pointed out, this strategy for evaluating different interpretations is not a safe one – in this case because it presupposes that we manages to survey the totality of information concerning preferential change. But also, as pointed out already, that is not a reason for abstaining from even trying to evaluate the empirical quality of different interpretations.

The possible flaws in various inferences are summarised in the following table. The columns here distinguish between only two different interpretations – increasing or decreasing parliamentary control – of one single empirical
proposition: that over time there has been an increase in the net financial difference between the government's budget proposal and the parliament's budget decision. The rows list various observations according to which one of the two interpretations they weaken (remember that weakening one interpretation strengthens either or both of the two alternative interpretations).

Table. Methodological difficulties of, and remedies for, estimating the power of parliament versus government by reporting the financial difference between the budget proposal and the budget decision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretations of the fact that difference between proposal and decision has increased over time</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The parliament has gained budget control from the government</td>
<td>The parliament has lost budget control to the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation making the interpretation problematic, 1</td>
<td>Govt. Increasingly altering proposal after it has been delivered first time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation making the interpretation problematic, 2</td>
<td>Parl. substantially altering the budget in a way not accounted for in the balance between proposal and decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation making the interpretation problematic, 3</td>
<td>The institution by which govt. anticipates the parliament's reaction, e.g. interparty negotiations, is weakening over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation making the interpretation problematic, 4</td>
<td>The institution by which parl. controls govt., e.g. investigative resources, is strengthened over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation making the interpretation problematic, 5</td>
<td>Representatives of parl. majority express intensified preference for participation in budget decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation making the interpretation problematic, 6</td>
<td>Representatives of parl. majority expresses declining preference for participation in budget decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation making the interpretation problematic, 6</td>
<td>Govt. expresses over time declining preference for making budgetary policy independent of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Govt. expresses over time intensified preference for making budgetary policy independent of parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the area of budgetary policy the stage of agenda-setting is probably more important than in most other policy areas. A budget is an enormous complex of proposals that can in principle be decided by one single vote, or it can be divided into sub-categories decided independently of each other. Hence, because of the unusual potential for variation in comprehensiveness of the budget proposal there is also an unusually large room for manoeuvre when determining what should be the decision proposals when final decisions are made. This appendix describes how Sweden, France, and Britain have developed in this regard during the last decades, as well as to analyse if the developments show any general pattern of democratic participation.

Today Sweden has a one chamber parliamentary system. When the parliament had two chambers, until 1969, they joined together in budget decisions (Stjernquist 1996: 223). Over the period of under investigation there has been no restrictions in substance of MPs’ right to amend the Finance Bill. For most of the time period parliamentary participation in budgetary politics has consisted in a long series of decisions on individual items, summed up in a single decision at the end of the spring session. However, this was significantly changed in the 1990s, when Sweden undertook a reform of its budget procedure leading to, among other things, increasingly general and encompassing decision proposals.

It is worth taking a closer look at this reform, not only because of its significance, but also because it could indeed be regarded as partly an effect of internationalisation. By tightening the budgetary procedure a decrease in public deficit and debt was expected (cf. von Hagen 1992; Molander 1992), which was at the time needed forSweden to be legally entitled to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU).

The new budget procedure was used for the first time in 1996, leading up to the budget of 1997. This year also marks the beginning of the budget year following the calendar year (Mattson 1998: 51,63). The budgetary activities of the parliament since then can be separated into three stages. First, total public expenditure is decided. Since the upper limit of public spending is projected three years ahead, this decision is actually made three times. For example, in 1996 the upper limits of public expenditure were decided for the budgets of 1997, 1998 and 1999, and in 1997 were decided the upper limits for the budgets of 1998, 1999, and 2000, and so on. These decisions are made by the parliament in response to the Spring Finance Bill (Den ekonomiska varpropositionen), presented by the government April 15 at the latest (ibid. 56).
Second, the parliament decides how the total expenditure will be distributed over a number of general policy areas. These policy areas are presented in the Spring Finance Bill, but the decision is made a few months later in response to the Budget Bill (Budgetpropositionen), presented by the government on September 20 at the latest (if there is not a newly elected parliament; ibid. 63-65). Currently there are 27 policy areas covered by the budget (ibid. 66). The distribution of finance between policy areas is decided by a single voting.

Third, individual budgetary items are debated, given the financial limits decided in the first and the second stage of decision-making (ibid. 67). The final budget decision is taken by a single vote on each general policy area.

In all three stages there is an unrestricted right for members of parliament to propose amendments to the government proposition, which must then be voted on. There is no requirement that amendments must not unbalance the budget (as in France) or that amendments must not increase public expenditure (as in Britain). But there is no right to propose amendments across different stages in the decision-making procedure. This entails that it is not “permitted” to amend individual budgetary items to surpass the financial restrictions of either total spending or the distribution of spending across the general policy areas. The word “permitted” is placed within quotation marks because the regulatory power of the procedure is soft. Its legal force resides in the fact that if the government chooses to use the described procedure, and this is agreed to by the parliament, then there is a law regulating the decision-making procedure (see the beginning of § 40 in the budget law, SFS 1996:1059). Hence, the procedure of decision-making described is not compulsory. If the parliament so decides, it can use a procedure in which it debates and decides only on individual budgetary items, without even having to amend or replace the budget law (not a basic law). However, that the parliament should choose not to apply the procedures of the budget law is something that has not yet occurred since the introduction of the procedure in 1996. Regardless of its soft legal status, then, the budget reform of the 1990s has introduced a more general level of budget decision-alternatives.

Turning then to the question of whether the reform had any effects on democratic participation in Sweden, a first observation must be that it is democratically indifferent if the budget is decided as a financial whole or in its smallest details. The concept of democratic participation (as defined in Section 5.1) does not discriminate between generality and specificity of decision alternatives. What would weaken democratic participation is an increased restriction of the parliamentary right to debate, amend, and vote at any level of generality or specificity. It is correct to say that the reform restricted some capacity of members of parliament to deal with budgetary
details. But simultaneously there has been an increased capacity to deal with more encompassing parts of public finance. To the extent that budgetary policy was previously made in the details, it was then impossible to have a determinate budgetary policy on aggregated measures like total spending, which is neither democratically more nor less important than to have a determinate policy on budgetary details.

A slightly more serious problem is that the budget procedure introduced in 1997 has an inbuilt bias towards a budget policy of low public spending. In the third stage of decision-making, as the procedure was described above, it is permitted to the parliament to diminish but not to raise public expenditures as compared to the decision made in the second stage. Such an institutional measure is not compatible either with the principle of political equality or with majority voting, and its introduction should therefore be interpreted as contrary to democratic participation.

It should yet be emphasized that this democratic problem is not severe. All restrictions of the Swedish budget procedure can be dissolved by a simple majority decision in the parliament. The democratic weakening resides in the fact that a majority inclined to increase public spending must overcome an arguably small extra effort to take a decision, as compared to a majority inclined to decrease public spending. Slightly more seriously, the procedure can be used to avoid public debate, if parliamentarians falsely claim they have no power to break their own financial restrictions. But of course, once the matter becomes serious enough, a majority in the Swedish parliament will arrive at its preferred budget policy.

In France there has been a more dramatic shift in the agenda-setting institution of budget policy, of which the most important was inherent in the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The beginning of the Fifth Republic marks the end of a period of unusual governmental instability. During the Fourth Republic, which lasted from 1946 to 1958, there were twenty-nine different governments, the most durable of which lasted six months (Huber 1996:1-2). The constitutional reform was undertaken to overcome governmental instability and permit France to deal more effectively with “consequences during crises in Indochina, debates on the European Defence Community, and, most significantly, the civil war in Algeria.” (Ibid. 1) So if democracy improved or worsened between the Fourth and the Fifth republic this should in part be attributed to an international impact, mediated through the French desire for international action capacity, although the effect is not assumed from internationalisation of either market or state functions after the Second World War but more predominantly from the international relations of colonialism and post-colonialism.
The agenda-setting budgetary institution introduced by the constitution of the Fifth Republic has stirred up harsh democratic protests from scholars as well as politicians (see Huber 1996:4-7 for a survey), and only a few points will be commented on here.224

Article 40 in the constitution precludes private members of parliament from proposing bills or amendments that have the effect of increasing spending or decreasing revenues. (Huber 1996: 31) The article obviously favours government control over the budget at the expense of parliamentary control, but one may notice that the article does not, as in the Swedish case, favour small public undertakings at the expense of large ones. Regarding the policy content the French institution is neutral.

Article 44.3 of the Constitution states:

If the government requests it, the assembly considering a bill decides by a single vote on all or part of the text under discussion, retaining only the amendments proposed or accepted by the Government.

In the context of budgetary politics this article transfers a maximum of agenda-setting powers to the government, since the budget proposal may differ in scope from a single item to many volumes of detailed policy proposals. As Huber explains: “[u]nder this procedure the government can at any time selectively group articles and amendments, excluding those it opposes. The parliament must then vote either to accept or to reject the government’s policy package.” (ibid. 3). Article 49.3 of the Constitution strengthens this effect even further:

The Prime Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, engage the responsibility of the Government before the National Assembly on the vote of a bill. In this case, the bill is considered adopted unless a motion of censure, introduced within the next 24 hours, is adopted in the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph.

This article includes the cabinet question into the set of policies that may be grouped together in a package vote. A restriction that is more specific to the making of budget policy is given by Article 47, which limits the period of parliamentary scrutiny of the budget to 70 days. If the National Assembly and the Senate do not vote on the budget by the end of this period, the government can implement it by decree.

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224 On all of the points use will be made of John D. Huber’s book *Rationalising Parliament* for translations from French to English, as well as for most of the general context.
Consider now how this regards democratic participation. Did the parliament have more control over budget policy outcome in the Fourth than in the Fifth Republic, which would support the interpretation that French desire for international power reduced its democratic participation in the area of budget policy? Looking only at the wording of the two constitutions, one would be inclined to answer in the affirmative. But that approach could not itself lead to a firm conclusion. An account of actual political behaviour makes the question more complicated. The turbulence of the Fourth Republic severely limited parliamentary control of the budget. During some periods the political system did not arrive at a budgetary policy at all. Hence it is possible that the introduction of severe constitutional constraints on the parliamentary power actually improved democratic participation – on the assumption that limiting the power of the parliament moved the state budget into the realm of politics. One could not claim that the current limited powers of the French parliament are democratically ideal, but to the extent that the constitutionally stronger parliament of the Fourth Republic was unable to arrive at any budget policy at all, the current institutional structure is still democratically preferable. This is enough to draw a minimal conclusion indeed, namely that no firm conclusions can be drawn on how democratic participation changed when the Fourth Republic gave way to the Fifth.

It is perhaps because Britain lacks a written constitution that she articulates more than Sweden and France the value of her stability in current political affairs. This may or may not be the reason why the budgetary agenda-setting institution in Britain has been comparatively stable over the period under investigation. One of the important long-lasting regulations is that Parliament can not by itself propose any expenditure, but only agree or not to the proposals of the government – or the Crown as even some non-royalist students would say in this context. By implication therefore, Parliament can amend neither Finance Bills nor budget estimates as to increase public spending (May 1989, ch. 26). Another important measure to limit the agenda-setting power of Parliament is found in the use of “guillotines”, whereby a parliamentary debate is limited. An automatic guillotine was inaugurated in 1896, on the last of the 26 days available for discussions on supply. From 1947 similar guillotines also covered supplementary budget estimates. And in 1966

[a] third guillotine was introduced to ensure a more frequent grant of money to the Government and a more even distribution of the 29 (prior to 1966, the number had been 26) Supply days throughout the session. Questions on

225 From a narrower British perspective the period however seems to be one of fundamental revision, as claimed by Ryle (1979: 404-20).
outstanding Votes under the guillotine were put en bloc, with no opportunity for individual Members to move amendments and very restricted opportunities to vote. (House of Commons Factsheets, No 6, p. 2)

An extensive use of the guillotine would bring a larger mass of questions into a single issue to be voted on and would hence make the decision-alternatives more encompassing. However, there is currently no information on the totality of outstanding questions actually guillotined. Hence even in the British agenda-setting institutions it is not possible to conclude any significant change in democratic participation over time.

Generally used variables (see appendix 2-3 for coding instructions)

Country
1. Sweden
2. Britain
3. France

Date (date of debate)
dd.mm.yyyy

Level of internationalisation of political economy (variable name in computerised dataset: Internat)
1. Low
2. Medium
3. High

Variables used for describing pairs of question/answer (see appendix 2-3 for coding instructions)

Chronological position of question among other questions of the debate (variable name in computerised dataset: deb.plac)
1 to \( n \)

Ideological context of intended interaction (variable name in computerised dataset: ide.cont)
1. Intended interaction between members of the same party
2. Intended interaction between members of different parties
3. No intended interaction

Institutional context of intended interaction (variable name in computerised dataset: ins.cont)
1. Intended interaction between members of parliament
2. Intended interaction between parliament and government members
3. No intended interaction

Importance of interaction (variable name in computerised dataset: Import)
1. Normal
2. Trivial
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions degree of directedness to other person (variable name in computerised dataset: directed)</th>
<th>Extent to which the question is answered (variable name in computerised dataset: answerin)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Question to oneself</td>
<td>1. The question is ignored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Question to unspecified person or group</td>
<td>2. The question is not answered but touched upon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Question to specified person</td>
<td>3. The question is answered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic of intended interaction, international or not (variable name in computerised dataset: topic.c)</th>
<th>The position of the speaker, in the debate as a whole, in which the question is posed or in interaction with which the question is posed (variable name in computerised dataset: speaknum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. International topic</td>
<td>1. Questions posed in the first speech analysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-international topic</td>
<td>2. Questions posed in the second speech analysed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic of intended interaction, economic and others (variable name in computerised dataset: topic.c2)</th>
<th>The institutional &quot;home&quot; of the speaker posing a question or the speaker to whom a question is posed (variable name in computerised dataset: speakhom)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Economic</td>
<td>1. Opposition party member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Security (non-economic aspects)</td>
<td>2. Government party member of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Constitutional (non-economic aspects)</td>
<td>3. Government party member of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Health (non-economic aspects)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. School (non-economic aspects)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Order of current debate (non-economic aspects)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Criminal justice (non-economic aspects)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of questions posed in the part of the debate examined (variable name in computerised dataset: n.qust.1)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 to n | }
The speech makes at least one reference to national media (variable name in computerised dataset: var00025)

1. Yes
2. No

The speech makes at least one reference to international media (variable name in computerised dataset: var00026)

1. Yes
2. No

The speech makes at least one reference to national expertise (variable name in computerised dataset: var00027)

1. Yes
2. No

The speech makes at least one reference to international expertise (variable name in computerised dataset: var00028)

1. Yes
2. No

The speech makes opinion to the advantage of persons residing outside the country (variable name in computerised dataset: var00029)

1. Yes
2. No
The speech states explicit awareness of international effects of own political decision-making (variable name in computerised dataset: var00030)

1. Yes
2. No

The speech makes at least one statement that the country is internationally dependent (variable name in computerised dataset: var00031)

1. Yes
2. No

The speech answers critique by pointing to that another political level is politically responsible for relevant decision-making (variable name in computerised dataset: var00012)

1. Yes
2. No

Political "home" of the speaker (variable name in computerised dataset: pol.home)

1. Opposition party member
2. Government party member of parliament
3. Government party member of government

The number of different experts, and producers of information or statistics mentioned in a single speech (variable name in computerised dataset: numb.exp)

1 to n

The various expertise producers mentioned (variable name in computerised dataset: exp.ment)

list of names
Dissertation series