FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

COOPERATION IN TIMES OF TURBULENCE
This thesis deals with cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom within the area of foreign and security policy. Two case studies are presented, one of them concerning cooperation between the three states within and outside institutions in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the other dealing with cooperation concerning the crisis in Macedonia in 2001.

In accordance with the approach of neoliberal institutionalism the primary hypothesis is that cooperation is primarily determined by the interests of states but it is also limited by norms and affected by the institutions of which the three states are members.

The study describes the large variety of forms of cooperation that exist between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, in which the United States also plays an important part, and which also includes their cooperation within a number of international institutions.

The study concludes that cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom in 1980 and 2001 was highly similar. In both periods the relationship to the US formed a vital part of their foreign and security policy. In accordance with the primary hypothesis, perceived interests turned out to be the predominant factor for cooperation, but norms and institutions also played certain roles. A second hypothesis, serving as a precision of the first one, suggests that institutional cooperation is determined by (1) an institution’s capability to initiate work quickly, (2) an institution’s competence within the relevant areas, and (3) country support. The study finds that even if the factors related to institutional capability often coincide with the involvement of institutions, the factor of country support is decisive to determine their involvement.

The study also points to the new forms of interaction between states and institutions that have come about since the Cold War ended, and which give a stronger role to institutions and the cooperation between them. Still, however, states retain a decisive role in cooperation within the field of foreign and security policy.

Key words: France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations, OSCE, WEU, NATO, European Union (EU), Afghanistan, Macedonia, cooperation, foreign and security policy, CFSP, ESDP.
FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

COOPERATION IN TIMES OF TURBULENCE

Gunilla Herolf
Photos

Soviet forces patrolling the streets of Kabul 31 January 1980.
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Stockholm August 2004
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CiO</td>
<td>Chairman-in-Office (OSCE)</td>
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<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCom</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Comité des Représentants Permanents de la CEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>ECMM</td>
<td>European Community Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>General Affairs Council (EU)</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSZ</td>
<td>Ground Safety Zone</td>
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<td>HCNM</td>
<td>High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE)</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>Kilometre</td>
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<tr>
<td>KVCC</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee (EU)</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Military Staff (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLA</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPG</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Prosperity (Macedonia)</td>
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</table>
PDPA    People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PfP     Partnership for Peace
PLO     Palestinian Liberation Organization
PSC     Political and Security Committee (EU)
SAA     Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SALT    Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SPD     Social Democratic Party (Germany)
TNW     Theatre Nuclear Weapons
UAE     United Arab Emirates
UN      United Nations
UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNMIK   United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPREDEPUnded Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
USOC    US Olympic Committee
WEU     Western European Union
Part I
Design and Theory
Chapter 1.

A Study of France, Germany and the United Kingdom

1.1. Why This Study?
This thesis deals with cooperation within the field of foreign and security policy between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Its aim is to establish and demonstrate the way in which interests, norms and institutions determine this cooperation and to connect it to a theoretical approach.

Two hypotheses are presented in this and the following chapter. According to the primary hypothesis, states are primarily led by their perceived interests, but norms and institutions also have an impact on their behaviour. The second hypothesis presented, a precision of the first, predicts that for institutional cooperation three particular factors determine cooperation: (1) the capability of an institution to initiate work quickly, (2) its competence within the relevant areas and (3) country support.

Three dependent variables will be used to describe cooperation: pattern signifies which countries and institutions are included in cooperation, content describes which areas they work in and impact stands for the effect in terms of commitment by the countries involved.

The thesis is motivated by two particular interests. One of them has to do with the fact that the three countries are by far the most important in Western Europe, and cooperation between them therefore assumes a special importance: when united they wield a formidable influence on the rest of Europe; when they disagree this affects Europe as well. This fact alone is a reason to examine cooperation between them. The fact that the relations between them have been surrounded by many oversimplified conceptions gives added reason to do this: one common view, for example, is that France and Germany collaborate closely because they see things in the same way, whereas the UK is left, or prefers to remain, outside European cooperation. Other simplistic views relate to their relations with the United States, whose close connections to the three countries also form part of this study. Together these views create a picture of a Franco-German engine moving towards a common goal, while an equally close British–American couple seeks to direct development in another direction. While dispelling such misconceptions, the ambition here is to investigate what determines the pattern, content and impact of cooperation between these three European powers.

The other particular interest is based on theoretical curiosity. Cooperation in general, and thus including that between France, Germany and the United Kingdom...
Kingdom, has been theoretically interpreted in widely different ways. There is a spectrum of views: on the one side some observers whose intellectual roots are in realist thinking consider cooperation as difficult to achieve since states act in accordance with their conceptions of self-interests. Not trusting each other, they will usually refrain from cooperation and, when they do cooperate, norms will be of no significance. At the other end of the spectrum, others with liberalist/idealist roots see institutions as eradicating the anarchical conditions that encourage self-centred behaviour, including hostile behaviour. As states gradually grow closer to each other, endorsing the same norms and acquiring the same interests, their cooperation will unavoidably lead towards deeper integration.

This first chapter will initially be devoted to a short description of the study. Thereafter it will mainly concentrate on an account of the choices that have been made. It will describe why France, Germany and the United Kingdom were selected. It will thereafter delimit the area of study. The next task is to define institutions and explain why the European Communities/European Union (EC/EU), European Political Cooperation (EPC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) were chosen for the study. The chapter will also deal with other cooperation arrangements since these are also an important part of the study. Thereafter it will describe the comparative method of the study, as well as the categories of sources used. It ends with a description of the outline of the book.

### 1.2. Brief Description of the Study

In this thesis a hypothesis based on the theoretical approach of neoliberal institutionalism will be tested. Like both realism and liberalism/idealism, neoliberal institutionalism sees states as rational actors, thus acting in terms of their own self-interests. Seeing interests in particular, but also norms and institutions, as having a certain impact on the behaviour of states, it falls between the positions of realism and liberalism/idealism. I will describe and analyse how states, sometimes with competing and conflicting goals, will still cooperate with each other, sometimes following and sometimes in defiance of the norms to which they have declared their allegiance.

The theoretical approach of neoliberal institutionalism is complemented by the comparative method. Two cases present some similarities and some differences, which, as argued in this chapter, are useful for comparison. Of particular importance is the fact that one case deals with cooperation before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, whereas the other takes place after this event. This makes it possible to analyse the impact that this otherwise so crucial event had on cooperation between the three.

The first case deals with cooperation between France, Germany and the UK in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. The invasion and the American attempts to make other countries apply sanctions against the Soviet
Union gave rise to European cooperation of various kinds, including the British proposal for Afghanistan’s neutrality and the European Middle East initiatives.

The second case study deals with cooperation between France, Germany and the UK during 2001 in connection with the crisis in Macedonia. This crisis was characterized by unanimity of views among these states and the US, unprecedented cooperation between the main institutions, and a strong connection to the just developing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), towards which the US had some reservations.

This study is different from many others in that it focuses on cooperation within several different institutions and between certain states during a particular and rather short period of time. By focusing in this way it does not cover the possible evolutionary development of institutions or relationships that might take place over a longer period of time. Instead it seeks to gain the advantage of getting a fuller picture of the rich variety of types of cooperation taking place on particular issues. Above all, however, this wider framework has been chosen because it reflects the reality of European foreign and security policy cooperation in which all states are engaged in a multitude of cooperation arrangements.

This multitude of arrangements means that cooperation may potentially assume many forms. For institutional cooperation, external events set certain procedures in motion: statements are made, meetings are called, decisions are taken and so forth. Much cooperation, however, remains outside such formal givens, depending instead on initiatives taken within or outside institutions. In addition, the highly overlapping pattern of institutions and groups in Western Europe, including the central role of the United States, means that cooperation may take on a variety of patterns. The mechanisms that determine which type of cooperation actually comes into being therefore need to be studied.

1.2.1. Theory and Hypotheses
The primary hypothesis tested in this study is based on the neoliberal institutionalist approach, according to which states are guided by their own interests but also by norms. States thus largely behave in accordance with their perceptions of their own interests – a concept that is composed of several elements, including beliefs and capabilities. They cooperate with others within and outside institutions when they see this as favourable to them and cooperation between states is to a large degree determined by the combination of interests between them. As described in more detail in the next chapter, all combinations of interest (common, compatible and conflicting) may lead to cooperation, depending on the circumstances.

States are, furthermore, influenced in their behaviour by their perceived norms for behaviour. These norms do not (as constructivists see it) constitute the identity of the states. For neoliberals they have a more limited role, acting rather as constraining factors for states on their own behaviour and as a yardstick when assessing the behaviour of others.

In addition, according to the same approach, institutions may in various ways influence cooperation among states. They can provide valuable frameworks for
cooperation in which states may gradually feel more confident even when they do not immediately benefit from all agreements.

I will also test the second hypothesis, a precision of the first, according to which institutional cooperation depends on three factors, of which two are indicative of institutional capability. The first factor is the capability of an institution to initiate work quickly. This capability is established in terms of the existence of a continually working body, in the institution’s rules for calling meetings and in the frequency of regular meetings. The second factor of institutional capability is that of competence within the relevant areas. This factor is assessed in terms of the formal right to handle the particular issues, as well as the existence of an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and implement decisions. Together these factors describe the capability of the individual institutions. No single one of them constitutes a sine qua non for cooperation.²

The third factor, country support, is the effort put in by individual states aimed at forwarding cooperation within a particular institution or another cooperation arrangement: if a state supports cooperation on a specific issue within a certain institution only, this increases the weight of this institution in comparison to the others. If states see an institution as less relevant, its weight is similarly reduced.

Together these three factors – capability to initiate cooperation quickly, competence within the relevant areas and country support – will determine institutional cooperation. With the exception of the first of the three factors, they are all issue-related. All the three factors may change over time.

Cooperation may, however, assume an even more intricate character. There is a complicated interplay among states in which unilateral policies as well as bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation will be present both within and outside institutions. These policies and cooperation will be described and their conformance with the hypotheses will be tested.

1.2.1.1. The Dependent Variables

As mentioned above, cooperation will be established by three different indicators: pattern, content and impact. ‘Pattern’ describes which countries and institutions are included in cooperation, whereas ‘content’ signifies which areas it encompasses. The third indicator is ‘impact’, which denotes the result of cooperation in terms of commitment of the cooperating states. It may be a change of policy or the adoption of a new policy, the latter meaning that the country or institution concerned renounces the option of pursuing another policy.

1.3. The Choice of France, Germany and the United Kingdom

The choice of countries is, as previously mentioned, primarily motivated by the weight of France, Germany and the UK. These are the three most important countries in Western Europe, each with its own particular policy. When international foreign and security matters are in the focus, so too are most often the policies and positions of these states.

² See chapter 3, section 3.4.3, tables 3.2 and 3.3.
The choice is motivated also by the closeness and variety of cooperation between these countries, making their relations complex and therefore not easily categorized. On the level of the state their cooperation takes place in combinations of two or three or in a wider setting. In this the bilateral cooperation between France and Germany has been intensive, and is labelled by some as the motor of European integration. Significant cooperation takes place in all the other combinations as well, however. Cooperation between all three together, while less institutionalized, is the object of much interest because in combination they have a great influence on West European politics. Lack of cohesion between the three is deplored by some as being a serious impediment to a joint West European policy; on the other hand, close contacts between them are seen by some as a negative sign signifying the existence of a ‘directoire’ in which the three dominate at the expense of small countries and the institutions.

The involvement of the three in the major changes of the institutional landscape has been strong. While the EC and NATO, as previously, played the major roles, France, Germany and the UK during the 1970s contributed to the growing role of the EPC, the birth of the CSCE and the (albeit temporary) decrease of power of the WEU.

Franco-German cooperation, through the Elysée Treaty of 1963, acquired a more formal structure. This treaty, extended many times, has provided a framework of close cooperation, including frequent meetings on a variety of levels and, often, joint proposals for EC/EU policies. The Elysée Treaty itself is a good example of the terms of the Franco-German cooperation: the German Bundestag ratified it only after having added a preamble stating the priority of the Atlantic Alliance for German security. The views of France and Germany have been different on a variety of issues and the degree of rapprochement has accordingly varied as well. The French withdrawal in 1966 from NATO’s integrated military structure, while giving a basis for increased Anglo-German cooperation within NATO (see below), had little effect on other parts of the Franco-German cooperation, however, based as it was on common history and geographical proximity. More important in the late 1960s was Germany’s rapid economic recovery, combined with an active policy towards the East, the Ostpolitik, which caused France to worry about the future German power and finally made France more willing to accept the UK as a member of the EC. Germany simultaneously saw in the UK a counterweight to France, and the British entry into the EC in 1973 was therefore initially welcomed by both France and Germany. The British policy, initiated as early as in 1974 by the new Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, of presenting demands for changes to the UK’s share of the EC budget did, however, serve to widen the distance between the UK and the others and to bring France and Germany closer, this time under the likewise new leaders Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. In spite of their different views on a range of important areas –

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4 Morgan, 1985a, p. 13.
agriculture, economic issues and many others – Franco-German cooperation still proceeded in a pragmatic manner. Among their major successes was the establishment in 1978 of the European Monetary System (EMS).  

The nuclear component of the French armed forces was basically outside Franco-German cooperation. The nuclear weapons developed by France during the 1970s were entirely under French command. While it was recognized that West Germany would be immediately and directly affected by any nuclear exchange between East and West, there were no plans for involving Germany in decision-making concerning the use of the French nuclear weapons.  

In the first case study, Franco-German cooperation within this framework is one of the most important parts of foreign and security cooperation. In the second case study the prerequisites for European cooperation had changed, partly as a consequence of the Franco-German initiative shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 aiming at the creation of a stronger EC. The French and the German conceptions of the future EC have, however, been different, and their cooperation, while intensive, has often been characterized by a search for compromises and common denominators.  

The Franco-British relationship has undergone considerable turbulence over the years. The Nassau Agreement of December 1962, seen by the French as a confirmation of the priority that the British gave to Anglo-American relations, contributed to the French veto against British membership of the EC in January 1963. President Charles de Gaulle again prevented British entry in 1967, until finally Georges Pompidou accepted British membership in 1973. Generally, the early 1970s was a period of good relations between France and the UK: the pro-European British policy pursued by Edward Heath as prime minister and the discarding under Pompidou of the Gaullist anti-Atlanticist policy provided a fertile basis for cooperation.  

Franco-British relations within the EC were, however, plagued from the outset by suspicions on the part of each that the other was undermining cooperation. The UK’s preoccupation with its share of the EC budget and criticism of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in which it saw France’s views as based only on its own interests, and a French view of the UK as seeking to distort the EC, dominated the discussions.  

On the other hand the French and the British have been close to each other on several issues. Nuclear matters, while obviously different in the sense that only the

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6 As part of the regular biannual meetings between the West German chancellor and the French president, the latter in February 1986 agreed, time permitting, to consult the chancellor before using French ‘pre-strategic’ nuclear weapons on West German territory. The ultimate decision as to whether to use the weapons was, however, to remain with the French president. (Europa-Archiv, no. 9, 1986.)  
7 Grosser, 1978, pp. 206–207. In the Nassau Agreement the US and the UK affirmed the need for a multilateral NATO nuclear force. The UK was to receive Polaris submarine-launched missiles, without warheads, from the US. The UK would manufacture the warheads and install the missile on British submarines. The hope was that a similar deal would be accepted by France as well.  
UK remained within the integrated NATO cooperation, have nevertheless been the subject of some cooperation, although often this has not led as far as France has hoped.\(^\text{10}\)

Generally, Franco-British relations have been at their best when dealing with defence-related matters and, like the Franco-German relationship, have contributed greatly to the changes in Europe. Not least important is the fact that the two countries are the major military powers of Europe, whereas Germany’s investments in its military are still small in comparison with the size of the country. This is particularly so for the period after the Cold War. The years of close cooperation in Bosnia, as well as rifts with the United States over the handling of this crisis, contributed to Franco-British rapprochement. The meeting at Saint-Malo in December 1998 was highly significant. As the French and the British spoke up for the need for the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, other EU members agreed. This meeting therefore came to serve as a trigger for the exceptionally rapid development that has taken place since within the EU, which also serves as an important element in the second case study.\(^\text{11}\)

British–German relations have been less conspicuous. The annual Königswinter conferences have been held since 1950, since 1978 alternating between the two capitals.\(^\text{12}\) Early disagreements on plans for nuclear sharing, for instance, over the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) in the early 1960s, gave way to common views and close consultations during the late 1960s. The British so-called ‘shift towards Europe’ in the late 1960s entailed the withdrawal of all troops east of Suez and a second application for membership of the European Communities in 1967. At the same time the German Ostpolitik, including its acceptance of the territorial status quo, was entirely in line with British views. The two countries cooperated in a range of bi- and multilateral settings, and relations were said to be particularly close between Helmut Schmidt and Denis Healey, the two defence ministers.\(^\text{13}\) With France since 1966 outside the militarily integrated part of NATO, Germany

\(^{10}\) In 1995 the two countries agreed on a declaration according to which each would be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend the ‘vital interests’ of the other. This declaration followed the seventh meeting in six months between President Chirac and Prime Minister Major. The UK and France in a statement said that they would ‘pursue and deepen’ nuclear cooperation through the Franco-British Joint Nuclear Commission as a way of strengthening the European contribution to overall nuclear deterrence. There was, however, no question about changing the status of independence of the two nuclear forces. (FT, 31 Oct. 1995.)

\(^{11}\) Not least important was the American acceptance. The Saint-Malo Agreement was greeted by the United States as a good sign of Europe’s willingness to give more military support to the handling of conflicts on the European continent. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, however, required that cooperation would include no duplication (of NATO resources), no discrimination (against European non-EU NATO countries) and no decoupling (of NATO). See AN, 8 Dec. 1998.

\(^{12}\) The Königswinter conferences are different from the Franco-German meetings within the framework of the Elysée Treaty. The former are informal discussions between elite representatives, whereas the latter to a great extent are meetings between officials of the two countries. See Morgan, 1985b, p. 132.

and the UK cooperated closely within the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG, established in 1965) on important issues such as discussions on Theatre Nuclear Weapons (TNW) in the early 1970s and the Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) in the late 1970s, and on armaments issues in Eurogroup.\footnote{France was invited but had declined to participate in both the NPG and the Eurogroup. In 1976 the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was formed, including French participation, and took over some of the more important tasks of the Eurogroup.} The bond that linked the two countries together more than anything else was the common defence of the East–West border in Germany, in which the British commitment for Berlin and the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) were tangible elements.

Whereas the NATO-related cooperation was smooth, that on issues connected with the EC was not. The UK’s complaints about its share of the EC budget soured the relations after 1973. Moreover, the German and British economic policies were different, and the oil crisis added to the problems, Germany being highly dependent on oil imports and expecting British cooperation to ease its difficulties. The views of the two on European integration were fundamentally different. Although no serious clashes took place, together these issues prevented closeness between the two. All in all, the lack of visibility of German–British relations is striking. It could be described as a combination of lack of strong common causes and of serious conflicts, both of which would have given rise to more intense communications, meetings or joint proposals.

The bilateral relationships described above were also set in another framework which was that of relations with the two superpowers. Whereas the UK had its ‘special relationship’ with the USA and few contacts with the USSR, Germany and France both had links with the latter. The German Ostpolitik, mentioned above, coming to the fore in the late 1960s, was largely based on Germany’s acceptance of its present borders and led to trade agreements and Soviet concessions on humanitarian issues. France, while firmly on the side of the US in times of crises, launched the idea of a Europe ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’ as de Gaulle initiated a new policy towards the USSR centred on détente in.

As argued in the theoretical part of the study,\footnote{See chapter 2, section 2.5.2.2.} it is impossible to deal with European cooperation within the area of foreign and security policy without including the influence – implicitly and explicitly – exerted by the United States. The closeness in ideologies, in combination with the European dependence in the intertwined security of the US and Europe, gives the US a role that is unchallenged by any other country or relationship. This does not mean that the US is the fourth country under study. American policy is vast in its scope and implications, and only a small part of it is covered in this study. However, their bilateral relationships with the US, albeit different, are of considerable importance for all the three countries. The fact that the countries themselves are important also means that the US gives a certain weight to their policies. This has an impact on European foreign and security cooperation and contributes to the rich variety of forms it can assume. In one important respect the two case studies differ: the first includes some disagreement with and pressure on the Europeans, whereas in
the second the initial views of the US and the European countries on how to deal with the crisis coincided.\textsuperscript{16}

1.4. The Area of Study

The area of study concerns cooperation within the field of foreign and security policy. Activities within the area of foreign and security policy are defined widely here. They are considered to be ‘all activities that are pursued in order to fulfil ambitions and protect interests which the countries see as related to the foreign and security area.’\textsuperscript{17}

This means that activities or measures related to other areas – for example, economic and trade policy – can be used as well. In this study this concerns above all the situation in 1980 when not only the EPC but also the EC (in the shape of one of the three communities, the European Economic Community, EEC) became engaged in cooperation related to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{18} An example from 2001 is the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Macedonia, used as a means to encourage Macedonia to solve its problems without violence.

The foreign and security policy area, labelled ‘high politics’, is sometimes seen as fundamentally different from the economic area, denominated ‘low politics’. High politics is considered to be harder to agree on, controversial, and less well suited to integration. The EPC cooperation when it was introduced was dealt with through intergovernmental cooperation and was kept at arm’s length from the EC and its EEC cooperation, which dealt with economic issues in supranational cooperation. While both the EPC and the EEC are now part of the EU, and political cooperation has grown to include security policy cooperation, this distinction remains in the form of rules for decision-making.

However, the borders between the two have never been firm. Economic cooperation within the EEC and political cooperation within the EPC were, for example, both motivated by the wish to see political unification in Europe. The means may vary – the motivation behind the European Political Cooperation (according to the Davignon Report in 1970) was to make ‘a concrete effort towards foreign policy coordination to show the world that Europe has a political mission’.\textsuperscript{19} Endorsement of political coordination should, however, not be interpreted as meaning that all the member states that had signed it supported it to the same degree or that any of them were prepared to put high priority on coordination with others when it conflicted with other interests.

\textsuperscript{16} Bilateral relations have been described in a number of publications. See, for example, Costigliola, 1992; Hanrieder, 1989; and Bartlett, 1992.

\textsuperscript{17} See Smith, 2003, p. 2. Smith defines foreign policy cooperation as ‘the activity of developing and managing relationships between the state (or in our case the EU) and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests of the state or actor in question’.

\textsuperscript{18} See section 1.5.2 below and appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.

Among the EC countries the distinction was commonly made between security and defence policy, according to which the former was pursued with civilian and the latter with military means. However, no firm and uncontested borderlines can be drawn between the two, institutions and countries varying in their definitions of which concepts include which activities.

In this study defence policy is seen as part of security policy. This is in accordance with the way in which the two were defined at Maastricht: ‘security’ is the overarching term. Article J.4 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty, formulated in 1991, gives what might be seen as a key to this distinction: ‘The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. 

The expression points to a conviction held at Maastricht that, logically, the term ‘security’ covered defence policy, even though security cooperation within the EU, created through the Maastricht Treaty at this time, did not — a belief that was confirmed by later events within the EU as the ESDP became part of the CFSP.

In this study the focus is on states cooperating inside and outside institutions over what they see as relevant issues within the field of foreign policy and security. While definitions of terms differ, the course of events during the 1990s has served to illuminate the complex ways in which all kinds of problems, ethnic, religious, cultural, social and others, may interact and provide a fertile ground for unrest, including also military factors. They have also demonstrated the need for states to resort to a new set of means other than only military means to protect themselves. Moreover, the state-centric view of security has been increasingly questioned as many of the new conflicts have taken place between entities other than states.

1.5. The Institutions

1.5.1. The Formal Structure of Cooperation Arrangements

A study on French, British and German foreign and security policies would be incomplete if it did not include their institutional cooperation. The institutions are important not only in themselves but also as a forum for the activities of member states. Countries, not least the three countries under study, launch their proposals both outside and as part of institutional cooperation.

One of the central issues in the theoretical discussion concerns the extent to which institutions are independent of member states. This study deals with intergovernmental cooperation in the area of security, which is one over which

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20 An example of this terminology is the Franco-German cooperation, originating in the Elysée Treaty of 1963, which, when revived in 1982, included the establishment of a Joint Committee on Security and Defence. See the chapters by Lothar Ruehl, German Ministry of Defence, and Isabelle Renouard, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Kaiser and Lellouche, 1986.


22 See section 1.5.2 below and appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.

23 A number of researchers have dealt with the new security concepts. Buzan, 1991, for example, replaces the notion of threat, generally seen as emanating from the outside, with vulnerability, which applies also to internal threat. See also Wagnsson, 2000 and Engelbrekt, 2001, pp. 39–76 for surveys of the discussion on the concept of security.
countries traditionally keep close control. It is therefore not to be expected that institutions will be substantially independent of their members. Even so, cooperation arrangements vary in terms of the immediate control member states have over them. One way of measuring this is to look at how formalized cooperation is and what the capabilities of institutions are. Based on such factors, cooperation arrangements have been given different names.

Four common categorizations are *organizations, institutions, regimes and conventions*. According to Keohane, institutions are:

pervent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations. Since an institution’s rules must be ‘persistent’ they must continue to be taken into account by participants, but no minimum standards of effectiveness are implied. International institutions include formal intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international regimes, and conventions. International organizations are purposive entities, with bureaucratic structures and leadership, permitting them to respond to events. International regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations. Conventions are informal institutions, with implicit rules and understandings, that shape the expectations of actors.

Organizations have a stronger institutional structure than other types of body. In Keohane’s definition they are ‘purposive entities with bureaucratic structures and leadership, permitting them to respond to events’.

One possibility would be to distinguish between cooperation within organizations and that within other cooperation arrangements. For the purposes of this study, however, rather than ‘organization’, the wider concept of ‘institution’ is employed. As is evident from the definition of Keohane, this concept comprises several forms of cooperation of which some are of a significantly weaker character than organizations. The reason for this choice is that the strength of institutions in a general sense is seen in this thesis as only one of the crucial elements that need to be established when the institutional component of cooperation is to be determined.

Relating to the three factors that, according to the second hypothesis, determine cooperation, general capability is only partly relevant. It is primarily evident in the first factor – the capability of an institution to initiate work quickly, which is measured in terms of the existence of a continually working body, in rules for calling meetings and in frequency of regular meetings. The other two factors are more dependent on the specific issues dealt with. In the case of the second factor – competence within the particular area involved, which is measured by the formal right to handle the particular issues and the possession of an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and implement decisions – the first criterion in particular, that of the formal right to handle a particular issue, will vary between institutions, independent of their general capabilities. The third factor, country support, is irrelevant for describing institutional capability and independence. It is,
however, important when seeking to establish the impact of certain institutions vis-à-vis others, which is part of the task of this study.

For these reasons the dividing line in this study has been drawn between on the one hand institutions, which are distinguishable units of cooperation for which criteria such as those above can be used, and, on the other, various other forms of cooperation between governments.

1.5.2. The Institutions Under Study

A great many institutions deal with security widely defined. Among these this study includes only those that are most important in terms of involvement in security and defence matters. The first case study includes the United Nations (UN), NATO, the WEU, and the European Communities (EC)/European Union (EU), all being formal organizations. The EC comprised the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). EC cooperation in the first study takes part within the EEC. In addition, cooperation within the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) is included. Also part of the first case study is the EPC, pursued among EC countries as inter-governmental cooperation. The second case study includes the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the European Union (EU). The difference reflects the changes in the European security situation between 1979–80 and 2001, which have in various ways affected the institutional landscape.

Among the institutions the United Nations has a unique role through the particular responsibility of its Security Council for peace in the world. In this capacity it was important in both the cases described. While the UN was the only institution that was formally unchanged, in practice the transformation from the Cold War system and the difference in power and behaviour of the Soviet Union/Russia gave it a different and more influential role.

The OSCE originated in the CSCE, which it replaced in 1995. As the name indicates, this was for about 20 years primarily a set of conferences. As such it was not of major importance for the first case study, and it is therefore not included. After the fall of the Berlin Wall it gradually changed character, acquiring a number of new bodies and thereby strengthening its institutional character. Because of the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, it has furthermore acquired new tasks, which were relevant for the Balkan crises, including the Macedonian one.

NATO as the major military alliance, including an integrated military structure, played an important role in both case studies. While retaining its military alliance obligations (Article 5 of the NATO statutes), after the Cold War NATO acquired new capabilities and missions. With the assumption of the Petersberg tasks,

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25 See also appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.
26 The Petersberg Declaration established the following tasks for the WEU: ‘Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of the WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks for
which, while they originated within the WEU, became a prominent part of NATO’s activities as well, NATO took the step into crisis management. Supported by its considerable military strength, NATO thereafter became the main organization for pursuing such tasks in Europe, and primarily in the Balkan wars.

CoCom, established in 1949, in 1980 included all NATO members (except Iceland) plus Japan. CoCom was an intergovernmental institution, tasked with coordinating national policies on the export of strategic items. While formally independent it was close to the United States and to NATO, but without any formal relationship to NATO.\(^\text{27}\) The CoCom system was not binding, however, and could only be enforced through the domestic legislation of member states.

The WEU, like NATO a military alliance but in reality having transferred this role to NATO, served as a forum for West European discussions from its establishment in 1954 until 1973, when the UK joined the EC (and the EPC). At that point its Ministerial Council stopped meeting at ministerial level. This was the situation in early 1980 as the cooperation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place.

During the 1980s, the WEU’s importance increased and it became the ‘security component’ of the European Union through the Maastricht Treaty. With the adoption of the Petersberg tasks in June 1992 it acquired – albeit weak – institutional capabilities. This development was later reversed, its tasks being gradually transferred to the EU, and by the spring of 2001 the WEU had been stripped of its crisis management tasks.

The EC was the organization that underwent the most dramatic changes of all in connection with the transformation of European security. While initially foreign and security policy was not part of its statutes, it is involved in the first case study, serving as a means for pursuing foreign and security policy through the pursuit of economic sanctions.\(^\text{28}\)

The EPC cooperation was a separate entity in early 1980, conducted according to a different set of rules and within different areas from the EEC cooperation. It was, however, in many ways hard to distinguish analytically from the EEC cooperation, since it included the same countries and, while only connected to the EC via treaties, had close connections to it. During 1980 the EPC did not yet have much of an institutional structure. Its competence was furthermore restricted to the political aspects of cooperation, not including the area of security.

At the Maastricht European Council in December 1991 the decision was taken to establish the EU, to succeed the EC and the EPC. The Maastricht Treaty and thereby also the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) entered into force on 1 November 1993. With this a development of increased capabilities in the areas of foreign policy, security and defence began and the concept of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was formed, constituting part of the CFSP.

\(^{27}\) Mastanduno, 1992, p. 6.

At the same time the ambition to provide more capable military crisis management was substantiated in the Helsinki Headline Goal. In early 2001, as the developments in Macedonia took place, only some of the new capabilities had been installed.

The activities of the presidencies of the EC/EU will be described when they are relevant for the subject of this study but their impact will not be analysed. The Presidency was held by Italy at the time covered by the first case study (1980), and by Sweden and Belgium at the time of the second case study (2001), so that its role does not involve any of the three countries under study.

1.6. Other Forms of Cooperation Under Study
Other forms of security cooperation are more or less formalized. One example of more regulated bilateral cooperation is that between France and Germany, based on the Elysée Treaty of 1963, for which a structure exists in the shape of established areas of cooperation, meetings scheduled to take place at regular intervals, and the involvement of civil servants in preparing the issues for discussion. However, this cooperation does not meet any of the criteria of independence set out by Keohane. The regular meetings are part of the ongoing cooperation between France and Germany, and there is no separate bureaucracy. Those who prepare the issues for discussion do so in their capacity of French and German officials and are therefore not working for a separate unit but for their own governments.

Trilateral cooperation including France, Germany and the UK is even further removed from the criteria defining an institution. This type of cooperation, often called a directoire, is usually of an ad hoc character and meetings are not accompanied by communiqués or press conferences. One step away again from institutional cooperation are visits by an official of one of these countries first to one of the other countries and then to the other to discuss the same issue. Telephone conversations are yet another means.

Even this kind of cooperation is essential, however, for this thesis. One question under study is whether the various patterns of bi-, tri- or multilateral meeting can be seen as particular entities, thus having a particular influence on the substance of the cooperation. This might happen when such groups play a particular role in the pattern of cooperation which cannot be filled by any other existing arrangement. The existence and the particular role of such informal patterns will be an issue for analysis in the study.

The Helsinki Headline Goal stipulated that the EU by 2003 would be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year up to 60 000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of the Petersberg tasks. This was not a standing force, however. Furthermore, the commitment and deployment of these national contributions would be based on the sovereign decisions of the EU member states.

Unlike other forms of cooperation, the kind of cooperation that takes place between the three big states is not regarded by all as beneficial. This type of cooperation has been seen by others as proving the existence of a directorate (directoire) and thus as detrimental to those not included, as well as to the formal procedures of organizations. Allegations that important issues which are formally dealt with by organizations are settled beforehand at trilateral meetings have been made by other European states and rejected by the three.
1.7. The Comparative Method and the Selection of the Two Cases
This thesis is an example of the use of the comparative method – sometimes
called comparative politics – which, as Lijphart states, is the only subdiscipline of
political science that carries a methodological instead of a substantive label.\footnote{See Lijphart, 1971, p. 682.} The
comparative method is therefore no substitute for theory. It cannot select the
hypothesis to be tested, nor can it determine cases to be studied, since such
choices have to be based on theoretical thinking. Rather the comparative method
is a means for structuring comparisons across cases.

As Ragin puts it, within the comparative method 'cases are examined as wholes,
which means that the causal significance of an event or structure depends on the
context (that is the other features of the case). This strategy highlights complexity,
diversity, and uniqueness, and it provides a powerful basis for interpreting cases
historically.'\footnote{Ragin, 1987, p. xiii.} This makes it possible to handle the complexity associated with
every situation of cooperation, which is essential for the analysis.

The fact that in this study the comparative method is combined with the
theoretical approach of liberal institutionalism means that within each of the two
cases the analysis is carried out according to the theoretical approach. Between the
two cases, however, the comparison is in line with the comparative method.

\textit{Periods of Turbulence}

After selecting the comparative method, a number of other decisions have had to
be made. The first choice made was to delimit the area of study to include only
\textit{periods of turbulence}.

There are several reasons behind the choice of focusing on such periods. First,
the choice reflects the theoretical approach according to which relations between
states are partly determined by international conditions. An analysis of European
relations that did not include the impact of this outer framework would, I argue,
be insufficient.

Second, major external events give rise to a situation of turbulence among and
within states, which highlights the process of cooperation since they trigger a
reaction among states and institutions. These are occasions when states and insti-
tutions are affected at the same time by the same event. These occasions therefore
offer a better opportunity for the analysis of institutions and states than do
periods of tranquillity. Depending on the magnitude of the crisis, reactions will
vary. At the least it will lead to an exchange of information and consultation
through which the mechanisms of cooperation can be studied. At the other end of
the spectrum, external events might totally change the preconditions for
cooperation.

Third, periods following certain external events are periods of particularly
intensive cooperation, but they are more than that. They are also periods when the
stakes are high, leading statesmen to take over to a greater extent from their
subordinates. This means that much of what takes place during these periods is less typical for cooperation during other periods. It therefore cannot be said to reflect the way in which cooperation is generally pursued. However, a study focusing on foreign and security cooperation during periods when it is in the limelight is believed to be more relevant for the study of the determinants behind cooperation than a study centring on periods of ‘benign neglect’, the results of which might be reversed when foreign and security cooperation later receives increased attention.

A fourth reason for focusing on periods following external events is related to the fact that external events may not only lead to reactions to the particular event; they may also trigger proposals for new activities and for changes in the structure of cooperation. Proposals for new structures of cooperation cannot be analysed only in connection with the external events that trigger them. They do, however, bear witness to the reaction of certain actors regarding the roles and importance that institutions or states or other actors have had in the course of the preceding events and to how they would like to see them changed.

*Differences and Similarities*

The two cases might seem to be different as regards the factor of turbulence. Whereas the first case of cooperation took place in a strategic context, the second was a regional issue. The stakes were therefore not of the same magnitude. Another difference concerned the element of surprise in the Afghanistan case, which was lacking in the Macedonian one. Yet another difference was that in the first case the object was to revert to an earlier situation, whereas the second was a case of conflict prevention or peace-building. Neither of the two latter differences was of major importance, however. While the Macedonian crisis was not of the same magnitude as the Afghanistan invasion and was not preceded by a particular devastating event, the attention given to it demonstrates its importance well. It should be seen against the background of the series of conflicts and crises that had been going on in the former Yugoslavia for more than ten years and, apart from the tragedy itself, had also been damaging the reputation of all the institutions involved.

The second case is therefore, just like the first, characterized by turbulence. Both illustrate the particular situation when, after a negative series of events, the security institutions and countries involved are faced with the perceived need to do something to prevent disastrous events happening, either in the form of the Soviet Union advancing or, as in the second case, in the form of conflict spreading across a region. In 1980 as well as in 2001, furthermore, there was a need for European unity in order to make sure that a positive development took place. France, Germany and the UK, as major actors in Europe, therefore had to act. Their own interests, the institutions in which they were engaged and the perceived norms of the institutions to which they belonged, I argue, decided how.

Another similarity between the two cases is the fact that in both there was a considerable degree of unanimity among the three countries (albeit in 1980 only after more than a month had passed). There were, furthermore, in both cases
instances of reservations from the American side towards the European plans – in 1980 the neutrality proposal and the Middle East initiatives and in 2001 the ESDP.

The two cases are, however, also different from each other in two important respects. First, by selecting the cases of cooperation in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 and that over Macedonia in 2001, cooperation within the same group of states is compared at two entirely different points in time in terms of international relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the final days of 1979 took place during the Cold War and led to a new wave of it. The Macedonian crisis of 2001 took place after the Cold War was over. The stage on which France, Germany and the UK pursued their cooperation was therefore totally different. The bloc confrontation of the Cold War no longer dominated the relations between the major external actors.

Second, apart from the general political situation, institutions had changed as well. The ESDP was still in its infancy but some important innovations, such as the position of the High Representative for the CFSP and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), were made in 1999, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) started its work in January 2001.

This is another factor to handle in the comparative analysis. Will cooperation change when institutions become more capable? According to the hypothesis, when all other things are equal, it will.

Generally, the hypothesis that countries will be primarily led by their perceived interests does not predict that cooperation would be substantially different after the Cold War was over. Testing this hypothesis in two such vastly different situations as before and after 1989, is, however, a hard test for it considering the enormous consequences the fall of the Berlin Wall had on European foreign and security policy in general.

The ideal situation in comparative studies is generally one in which all background variables are identical. This is not possible here. There are, however, solutions to this problem. The analysis of the importance of institutions will not be handled primarily by the comparative analysis between the cases but by the analysis within each of them in accordance with neoliberal institutionalism. Thereby, within each of the two cases a more detailed analysis of the possible conditions under which institutions will have an impact will be presented.

Number and Design of Cases
A second crucial decision concerned the number of cases. This study covers only two. The case related to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, while it consists of three different instances, focused, in the first, on reactions (to American demands for sanctions) and, in the other two, on initiatives (the British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and the European Middle East initiatives). The three instances are, however, not separate cases – the second and the third are to a high degree dependent on the first and they influence each other – and therefore they do not fulfil the criteria for an independent case. They are instead necessary elements for a case which aims to demonstrate cooperation among the three major European countries in the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion. To exclude any of them
would have given a different picture of cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Within the first of these instances of cooperation a distinction can, however, be made between the three (or rather two) time periods, which can be compared to each other and in which particularly the influence of the capability to react quickly can be tested.

This is neither a case of ‘most similar systems design’, which is the common approach, nor a case of the ‘most different systems design’ outlined by Przeworski and Teune. According to that approach, by comparing cooperation in settings that are as different as possible the strength of the hypothesis is tested in a more demanding way than it would be if the two cases had taken place in similar settings. Here, however, only two – albeit important – variables differ between the two cases, whereas a number of other variables remain the same or similar. For the purposes of this study this is, I argue, the preferred approach. While reality can never approach laboratory conditions, this mix of difference and similarity is better suited to isolating the variables that are to be analysed.

While the ambition is to hold as many background variables as possible constant, no country is unchanged after 21 years. This is obvious in the case of Germany, but it applies to the other two countries as well.

1.8. The Sources

The sources used for this study contribute in different ways to the scrutiny of the factors behind security cooperation between France, Germany and the UK. They may be categorized in different ways. One is to consider their reliability in describing what has been said and agreed to by the main actors.

One group of sources is treaties, joint communiqués from meetings between states, and the protocols from meetings of institutions, bodies and groups of various kinds, reprinted in official publications or on the web sites. These are the agreed presentations of the results of meetings or negotiations, presented in a form that guarantees their authenticity.

A similar category is that of government declarations, important speeches and press conferences when reprinted in official publications. These are reliable sources of what the various actors stand for. Parliamentary official records are also part of this category, since they document exactly what has been said by government and opposition representatives. These two categories are indispensable sources, reliable in their expressions of what governments and institutions have done and stand for. They are not sufficient, however, since this kind of source does not cover all events – above all, not the informal ones.

A third group of sources must therefore be included, of a type which is by necessity less reliable. Some of these are of a special character. They are here represented by the news agencies, such as Atlantic News, European Report and Europe, which because of their close associations with the EC/EU, NATO and
the WEU have particular knowledge of the events. This does not of course guarantee total accuracy. A fourth group of sources is other newsletters, newspapers and journals reporting on activities. This group is one step further away from the actors. The words of those who are interviewed may be misunderstood or sometimes even intentionally distorted. These sources are therefore treated with more caution than those in the third category. References to these types of source will reflect the difference in character between them and others.

The inclusion of a variety of sources is therefore important: they complement each other in the analysis. A full picture of the rich cooperation that takes place is not possible without including several types of source. Some of them generate additional information about events taking place or provide additional opportunities to pursue an analysis of events that have been covered in statements and agreements. When states and other actors describe their own motives and behaviour this gives important but not sufficient information. Parliamentary debates and the press enable opposition parties and others engaged in the debate to point to important issues and force the government representatives to explain their policy. The arguments used in these debates are crucial for the analysis of what the motives for the activities pursued are.

1.9. Outline of the Study

Part I, including this first chapter, gives a short introduction to the purpose, the theory and the empirical areas of this study. The next chapter, ‘Theory: Neoliberal Institutionalism as Applied in This Study’, deals more in detail with the particular version of neoliberal institutionalism used and in doing this brings out the most important theoretical choices made.

Chapter 2.

Theory: Neoliberal Institutionalism as Applied in This Study

2.1. Theory and Hypotheses

This thesis will seek to answer the question what guides foreign and security cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Their cooperation, as I see it, is a complicated interplay between states and institutions as these countries pursue uni-, bi-, tri- and multilateral activities within and outside institutions.

The primary hypothesis put forward here, in accordance with the theoretical approach of neoliberal institutionalism, is that countries when cooperating with each other are led primarily by their perceived interests. Common, compatible and conflicting interests may all lead to cooperation. Countries are also led by the perceived norms associated with the institutions to which they belong, norms acting like constraining factors. In addition, institutions play a role through their particular institutional capabilities and by creating networks that facilitate agreements between countries and also have an effect on cooperation.

This hypothesis is complemented by a more precise one, according to which institutional cooperation depends on three factors, of which the first two are indicative of institutional capability. These are ‘capability to initiate work quickly’, ‘competence within the relevant areas’, and ‘support from countries’. Together the two hypotheses explain the three dependent variables of the study – the pattern, content and impact of cooperation.

This chapter will deal in some detail with the theoretical approach of this study, connecting the question asked, the hypotheses, their theoretical basis and the method. This will be done first by examining the main elements that constitute neoliberal institutionalism. Thereafter the constitutive elements of this study will be discussed: cooperation itself, states, interests, norms and institutions. As each of these elements is described, its connections to the theoretical discussion will be commented on and the position taken in this study will be explained. The different parts of the primary hypothesis will also be elaborated as the respective theoretical components are treated.

In section 2.2, neoliberal institutionalism will be described, first in a comparison with neorealism, the approach which lies closest to it, and in relation to which it has largely been identified. The variety of views within neorealism and liberalism as well as the most important strands of institutionalism will also be depicted.

In section 2.3, dealing with cooperation, the concept itself will first be defined. Thereafter the basis on which all theoretical approaches based on rationalism treat this concept will be described, after which the rich variety of forms of existing cooperation will be set out. In addition, the dependent variables of this study, the pattern, content and impact of cooperation, will be described further.

Section 2.4, dealing with the states, will bring up such concepts as that of the unitary actor and the role of the domestic level, and show why in this study I have
chosen to deal with the state as a unitary actor and not to include the domestic level.

Section 2.5 considers interests and underlines the fact that neoliberal institutionalism sees interests as exogenous factors. Belief systems influence the way interests are perceived; this explains why no theory can determine the interests of individual states. The reasons why France and Germany made détente rather than another type of policy a basic element of their foreign and security policies are therefore outside the scope of this study.

Neoliberal institutionalism does, however, also argue that capabilities in terms of a state’s position in the international power system influence its perceived interests. Capabilities demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of a state. For example, the contrast between Europe’s capabilities and those of the US point to a European dependence on the United States, which in its turn will influence the kind of cooperation the various states will pursue. In the same way the differences in the power of different European countries influences European cooperation by creating possibilities and limitations for activities.

I furthermore assume that once a country has declared its policy goals, then the fulfilment of these goals will be in its perceived interests. The policies once chosen may therefore be analysed in terms of consistent behaviour in different circumstances – the consistency of a state, when cooperating with others and selecting institutions or other forms for cooperation, in seeking such means as will maximize the chances that the policies it has decided to be in its interests will succeed. This section brings up the different types of interest (common, compatible and conflicting) and sets out the conditions under which they are all able to lead to cooperation, depending on the circumstances.

The question when seeking to find out how far behaviour is interest-driven is therefore whether activities, within and outside institutions, in terms of choosing certain areas (content) and certain forms (pattern), reflect consistent action in terms of following the declared policies, bearing in mind the country’s capabilities, in terms of using opportunities and avoiding problems. If states were seen in this study often to choose other cooperation areas and patterns than those consistent with such declared goals, this would serve to falsify the hypothesis.

In section 2.6, on norms, the limitation in this study of dealing only with norms related to institutions is explained. Using the common definition of norms as rights and obligations, I also agree with the common view that norms, if they are to make sense, are largely shared and that they are associated with the possibilities of punishment by others when not adhered to. In addition to this, as explained in section 2.6, I argue that it is necessary to introduce the concept of ‘perceived norms’. The perceived norms will be established for each country according to the statements that each state has made during the half-year period of time studied, relating to itself as well as to others.

The issue here is, first, to find the norms, compare them to each other and analyse the differences between them. Second, it is to see the extent to which states, after having stated certain norms as applicable to themselves and others,
follow them in problematic situations and the extent to which norms play a role in cooperation.

Clearly, norms and interests interact. Countries will often see it to be in their interest to follow certain norms, since they do not want to suffer the consequences of breaching them.

_Institutions_, treated in section 2.7, fulfil a number of functions. They facilitate cooperation and in doing this they also affect cooperation. These effects are connected to both interests and norms. A variety of types of interest – common, compatible and conflicting – may all lead to cooperation. Without the help of institutions, however, they are less likely to do so. As will be exemplified in sections 2.5 and 2.7 below, on interests and institutions, this can take place in several ways, for example, by providing services of various kinds but also in providing a focus for coordination. ‘Package deals’ provide the issue-linkages that states need in order to come to agreements with each other. Institutions also provide ‘the shadow of the future’, which is conducive to agreements where exchanges are not equal in value. The fact that coercion may take place is further evidence of the importance of institutions.¹

Institutions also affect cooperation through norms. Countries when joining different institutions are not able to foresee the situations in which they will find themselves or the consequent demands on them to uphold the norms that others see as relevant. This effect will become clear from the analysis within the two cases.

The three factors of capability to initiate work quickly, competence within relevant areas and support from countries concern institutions vis-à-vis each other. However, the analysis will also determine whether the first two – which together indicate institutional capability – are the stronger or if country support is the deciding factor. In this connection the issue of what motivates a certain country to choose a certain institution is vital, and the discussion seeks to establish the links between the institution-related activities and other forms of cooperation.

### 2.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism

#### 2.2.1. The Crucial Elements

Since this study is a test of a hypothesis based on neoliberal institutionalism, some comment on its most crucial elements is needed. It will be identified below largely as it has been defined in contrast to neorealism in discussions between prominent representatives of these strands of theory who describe themselves as one or the other.²

The basis for cooperation, as agreed by neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists alike, is the recognition that it takes place within an international system that is

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¹ For explanation and further elaboration of these terms see sections 2.5.4 and 2.7.1.

² One of these discussions took place in a series of articles in 1994–95. See, for example, Mearsheimer, 1994/1995 and 1995; Keohane and Martin, 1995; and Ruggie, 1995. A number of other scholars were also involved in this discussion, either as participants or as references. See also summaries of the differences between the two approaches in Baldwin, 1993, pp. 4–8, and Kegley, 1995; Holsti, O.R., 1995; and Nye, 1988.
anarchic. While neorealists argue that this is a serious impediment for cooperation, for neoliberals the expression is interpreted in terms of the system lacking a common government or a common authority. Within the field of foreign and security policy states are the principal actors, acting on conceptions of their own self-interest. This applies also to countries such as France, Germany and the UK which are closely associated in a number of ways. For this reason neorealists see cooperation in general as hard to achieve. According to neoliberal institutionalism, however, cooperation can take place in an anarchic world and it is quite compatible with the view that states act in accordance with their conceptions of their self-interest. In the words of Stein: “The same forces that lead individuals to bind themselves together to escape the state of nature also lead states to coordinate their actions even to collaborate with one another. Quite simply, there are times when rational self-interested calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in favor of joint decision making.” Stein underlines that this formulation presumes the existence of interdependence: self-interested actors would not be motivated to cooperate if they were independent in the sense that their choices affected only their own returns. Another prerequisite is that actors develop a common interest or a common aversion, giving them a mutual interest in cooperation. Without this cooperation will not take place.

Another issue, closely related to the issue of the likelihood of cooperation, on which neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree is that of the importance of relative gains. Neorealists argue that the fear of seeing others gain relatively more through cooperation is a serious impediment to its taking place. Neoliberals claim that the situation in which by focusing on relative gains actors are unable to enter into cooperation agreements is not the most likely one. While relative gains are relevant for the analysis, bilateral relationships that take place in a world of many actors are unlikely to produce constant-sum games in which one player’s returns are gained only at the expense of another player.

As regards priority of state goals institutionalist theory argues that states’ conceptions of their interests should be treated as exogenous, that is, unexplained within the terms of the theory. This also means that neither security nor the

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3 Helen Milner, 1991, has pointed to the ambiguity of the concept of anarchy. It is still ambiguous, she argues, when anarchy is given the definition of ‘lack of a common government’, since for different scholars the term ‘government’ may denote different things – the use of force, the existence of institutions and laws, or particular functions of government. Even using a precise definition of anarchy, a distinct line between the capacities of the international and those of the state level is hard to draw.

4 This does not, however, mean that neoliberal institutionalists share the view of neorealists that states do not form close bonds to each other, as exemplified by Mearsheimer’s view that ‘alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience, where today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance partner’ (Mearsheimer 1994/95, p. 11).

5 Whereas realists do not dispute the fact that cooperation takes place, according to Grieco, states are fundamentally disinclined to cooperate (Grieco, 1988, p. 490), and Mearsheimer emphasizes that cooperation has its limits (Mearsheimer, 1994/95, p. 9).


8 Stein, 1982, pp. 45–47. Similar arguments refuting relative gains as a hurdle to cooperation have been raised by Powell, 1991; Snidal, 1991; and Keohane, 1993b.
economy will be presumed to have priority. In the same manner the dividing line drawn by realists between security matters and economic matters is believed to be non-existent in real life.\(^9\)

Furthermore, according to neoliberal institutionalism, the *intentions and capabilities* of states must both be included as factors of analysis, the former traditionally associated with liberal thinking and the latter with realist thinking. Keohane, however, objects to this division, seeing neorealist thinking on relative gains as part of an emphasis on intentions.\(^10\) Capabilities, while important in realist thinking, can also be interpreted in other ways than as a measurement of the possible threat they represent to others or as the sole determinant of world order. Stein, as a neoliberal institutionalist, claims that the distribution of power should be viewed as one determinant of interests and that the extent of a state’s power is thereby one of the things that explain its preferences.\(^11\) This is also the thinking in this study. This is true not only among potential enemies but also in relations among countries that are friends and even allies. In their relations, relative capabilities create limitations and possibilities and contribute in forming the context of cooperation by influencing perceived interests.

The role of institutions is another contested issue between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. While a neorealist such as Mearsheimer claims that institutions have minimal influence, Keohane and Martin argue that institutions can ‘provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity’.\(^12\)

The above survey, centring on cooperation, relative gains, the priority of state goals, intentions and capabilities, and on institutions, is obviously simplified as concerns both neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist views. Above all, in spite of the fact that it seeks to draw lines between two different approaches, this should not be interpreted as if there were no connection or overlap of views between the two.\(^13\) Another important point is the fact that there can be wide differences of views on essential tenets of theory within these approaches. One example of this is that between two such prominent neorealists as Grieco and Mearsheimer, the latter naming his own version as ‘offensive realism’ as compared to Grieco’s ‘defensive realism’. Basing themselves on Waltz, Morgenthau, Aron, Wolfers and other major realists, they have each set up two sets of five core assumptions.\(^14\)

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\(^10\) Ibid., pp. 278–283.


\(^12\) Mearsheimer, 1994/95, p. 7; Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 42.

\(^13\) Keohane has emphasized the fact that neoliberalism has borrowed as much from realism as from liberalism and therefore it is almost as misleading to refer to it as liberal as to give it the tag of realism. (Keohane, 1993b, 271–272.)

\(^14\) Mearsheimer, 1994/95, pp. 11–12. See also Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1962; Aron, 1966; Wolfers, 1962. Grieco has the following list of assumptions: (1) states are the major actors in world affairs; (2) the international environment will severely penalize states if they fail to protect their vital interests or pursue objectives beyond their means. States are thus sensitive to costs and behave as unitary–rational agents; (3) international anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of states; (4) states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflicts and competition, and
On the liberal side, the variety is equally great.\textsuperscript{15} Neoliberal institutionalism is only one of several different liberal and institutional approaches. Moravcsik, a liberal intergovernmentalist, shares the typically realist view that institutions have no influence on outcomes. Generally, he claims, the preferences and influence of national governments are the major determinants of treaty-amending bargains.\textsuperscript{16} Still, Moravcsik sees the institutionalist approach as too close to realism to merit the prefix ‘liberal’. Like Grieco, calling neoliberal institutionalism ‘modified structural realism’, Moravcsik claims that this version of institutionalism shares all the realist core assumptions apart from the fact that it assigns a higher probability to the existence of international cooperation among self-interested actors. He draws a picture of neoliberal institutionalism as a theory which, taking state preferences as fixed (or exogenous), seeks to explain state policy as ‘a function of variation in the geopolitical environment’\textsuperscript{17}.

\subsubsection{2.2.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism and Other Varieties of Institutionalism}

After neoliberal institutionalism several other versions of institutionalism have evolved. Rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, sometimes together called the ‘new institutionalism’, share a number of important elements with neoliberal institutionalism while differing on others.\textsuperscript{18}

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\textsuperscript{15} For description of the early variety of strands of liberal theory, see Zacher and Matthew, 1995.

\textsuperscript{16} Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik, 1999. Milward, an economic historian, has put forward similar views. States have actively sought to limit the consequences of interdependence, and their will and capacity to do so have grown since 1945. The development of the EU has not led to a supranational unit as predicted by neofunctionalists and transactionalists. Instead, by sacrificing certain areas to supranational decision-making, nation states have given their own citizens large gains in security and economic matters, and in doing this states have also secured their own survival. (Milward, 1992.)

\textsuperscript{17} Moravcsik points to the different nature of liberalism, which permits state preferences to vary while holding power and information constant, explains policy as a function of the societal context, and focuses on how domestic conflict, not international anarchy, imposes suboptimal outcomes. (Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 536–537.)

Grieco describes neoliberalism in the following way: ‘What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments – that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation – remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.’ (Grieco, 1988, p. 486).

\textsuperscript{18} On the origins of their development, see Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998, p. 647. See also Hall and Taylor, 1996.
Rational choice institutionalism is related to microeconomics. International politics is dominated by self-interested actors with a fixed set of preferences who behave instrumentally in order to attain these. The behaviour of actors is characterized primarily by strategic choice. The role of institutions is to structure the interactions: they affect the alternatives available, and provide information and enforcement mechanisms. Also typical for rational choice institutionalism is the emphasis on the positive aspects of institutional cooperation: cooperation is voluntary and there are benefits to all in creating and maintaining institutions. At the same time, by applying and enforcing rules for all, an important role of institutions is to serve as restraints on the activities of the actors.\textsuperscript{19}

The characteristics of rational choice institutionalism enumerated here do not present a complete picture of this theoretical strand. Many proponents have developed their own individual versions of it. One example of this is the fusion thesis of Wessels, according to which the long-term growth of the EC/EU is explained by the rational choice of governments and administrations as well as a growing range of public and private actors. Seeking to meet the demand for increased welfare and public service, and in the face of increasing interdependence, they have to use the joint problem-solving instruments of the EU. In this process, however, states will transform themselves and the EU institutions will play a role in shaping the perceptions of national actors.\textsuperscript{20}

Historical institutionalism tends to work with a wider definition of institutions than rational choice institutionalism: ‘formal institutions; informal institutions and conventions; the norms and symbols embedded in them; and policy instruments and procedures’.\textsuperscript{21} As this description implies, historical institutionalists see the values and norms of institutions as capable of influencing the actors. Furthermore, they give a prominent role to the institutions in forming the roles and preferences of actors. Decision-makers are not always aware of the implications of their decisions: decisions are to a considerable degree the product of a particular situation and are path-dependent, which means that the policy choices made in these situations will determine subsequent events. This is, however, not a situation of equality among participants: while rational choice institutionalists see voluntary behaviour as dominating cooperation, the approach of historical institutionalism emphasizes the effects of power, and in particular asymmetries of power, when developing and operating institutions.\textsuperscript{22}

Sociological institutionalism is characterized by three particular tenets. First, institutions tend to be defined more broadly and to include what others would call ‘culture’. Second, sociological institutionalists see institutions as giving cognitive maps to individuals, which forms their view on the behaviour of others. This results in a relationship between individuals and institutions that is mutually constitutive; thus there is a close relation between this branch of theory and

\textsuperscript{20} Wessels, 1997.
\textsuperscript{21} Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{22} Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 938–942; Rosamond, 2000, pp. 116–119. See also Bulmer, 1996; and Pierson, 1996.
constructivism. Third, according to sociological institutionalism, the reason for institutional change might well be based on the added value it gives in enhancing the social legitimacy of the institution. ‘Social appropriateness’ may even be more important than instrumentality. Like historical institutionalism, but in contrast to rational choice institutionalism, it can therefore explain inefficiencies in policies and reforms. The works of Risse-Kappen illustrate the close link between social institutionalism and constructivism. Referring to Kant, Risse-Kappen claims that it is not power relationships that determine influence in alliances among democracies but the common identities, values, norms and decision-making procedures.

Drawing lines between these approaches is not easy, since they change with time as researchers develop their ideas. Suffice it to say here that neoliberal institutionalism is close to rational choice institutionalism in many ways, for instance, in its emphasis on voluntary cooperation rather than the path-dependency favoured by historical institutionalists. Decision-makers are not seen as being unaware of the implications of their decisions as historical institutionalists believe. This means that the interests of countries involved play a more important role, and institutions and norms therefore a correspondingly less vital one. Norms do play a role in neoliberal institutionalism which seems more important than their role in rational choice institutionalism, whose emphasis is on the microeconomic element. That role is weaker, however, than it is in historical institutionalism, and also weaker than in sociological institutionalism, in which existing institutions are believed to structure the field of vision, thereby creating a common culture.

2.3. Cooperation

2.3.1. The Definition of Cooperation

The definition of cooperation used here will be a broad one. Thus, cooperation is defined as ‘mutual and purposeful activities’. The choice of the term ‘mutual’ means that no activities that are unilaterally decided or carried through will be included. The situation in which one country simply adjusts its behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others is therefore not called cooperation here. ‘Purposeful’ denotes that the activity is not merely coincidental coordination but is a conscious activity.

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27 This definition is very close to the one of Maud Eduards, who has defined cooperation as ‘ömsesidigt och bestämt handlande’ (‘mutual and defined action’: see Eduards, 1985, p. 12). A similar definition is that of Lisa Martin, who in her work Coercive Cooperation defines cooperation as ‘joint activities’ (Martin, 1992a, p. 11).
28 Axelrod and Keohane, however, see such situations as examples of cooperation. (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, p. 226.)
No assumption of a common goal for cooperation is inherent in this definition. The activity may take place between actors who harbour a variety of interests and the only degree of commonality that is necessary for cooperation to take place is the common interest to pursue it. The three varieties of common, compatible and conflicting interests will be described further in section 2.5., on interests, in this chapter.

Nor does the definition of cooperation include any assumption that adjustments of position or concessions are made by one or several of those cooperating. This is in contrast to the view of Axelrod and Keohane, who in their joint article (1985) claim that cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interest. My argument is that, while cooperation agreements may be achieved as a result of concessions from one or the other party, this is not a necessary element. Agreements may well be made between parties whose policies are in harmony. While such countries do not require the other party to change its policies, there is a reason for cooperation in that they seek an effect on others by pursuing a common policy.

Coercion in the context of cooperation might seem like a contradiction. This situation might apply when states with a strong interest in pursuing a certain policy seek to pressure one or several of the other members to agree to adopt the same policy. Since cooperation, according to the definition, is a mutual activity, countries under pressure are on such occasions free to say ‘No’, so long as they are not breaking any rules associated with membership, and even to leave the institution or discontinue the cooperation arrangement, so long as they do so according to the rules. Since, according to neoliberal theory, the assumption is that countries in general behave rationally, they will most probably say ‘No’ if they perceive that the disadvantages of institutional membership or of a long-term cooperation agreement with other countries outweigh the advantages. NATO, for example, but not the Warsaw Pact, was formed and worked in accordance with this criterion of membership being voluntary and possible to discontinue if a country so chose. Relations among Warsaw Pact states could therefore not be defined as cooperation.

31 Martin, 1992a, p. 4, when describing coercive policy, speaks about the use of ‘persuasion, threats, and promises’. This kind of behaviour is, however, likely to be interpreted in different ways by different persons, depending on the situation, individual and cultural ways of behaviour, the tone of voice and so on. A precise definition is not important, however. The essential point is that cooperation is initiated because countries wish to do so and that a member, when perceiving that it is to its disadvantage, may secede from such cooperation agreements.

32 Martin, 1992a gives examples of coercive cooperation taking place in cases such as that of human rights in Latin America, the Falkland Islands conflict, Western technology export control after the Afghanistan invasion, and the Polish crisis and the gas pipeline sanctions. See also Martin 1992b, which deals exclusively with the Falkland Islands conflict.
2.3.2. The Basis for Cooperation

The traditional starting point from which cooperation has been discussed within all kinds of approaches emanating from rationalism is game theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which the crucial choice is whether to ‘cooperate’ or to ‘defect’. This is the basis for thinking here as well, even though it must be modified in certain respects. Jervis has pointed to a number of limitations of this approach. The Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, he claims, must be seen in the context in which the problem occurs, since the context shapes the preferences. These preferences are not always easy to establish as the only way to find out may be from the activities, which might lead to circular reasoning. They may furthermore be changed by the moves in the game or by new knowledge, and may also be inherently unstable. In addition, it is questionable whether actors themselves perceive the game as one of Prisoner’s Dilemma and, if they do, whether they can achieve a beneficial outcome through bargaining.

Jervis sees the concepts of cooperation and defection as problematic as well. In some cases a continuum could be better than a dichotomy between the two; in other cases outcomes could be characterized as having a high degree of both cooperation and defection and in still other cases the outcomes may be totally outside such a continuum. A specific issue is the choice of time span. The outcome of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game may be highly dependent on the point in time at which it is described: defection may turn out in the long run to be a prerequisite for future cooperation. Also, according to Jervis:

In other cases, the very meaning of cooperation is unclear. It usually denotes doing what the other actor prefers, but how do we characterize a response that is undesired but is designed to benefit the other, and/or has that effect? How do we classify behavior when one side desires a high degree of friction with the other and the other responds with the sought-for hostility? What do we say about cases in which neither side thinks about the impact on the other? Does the notion of defection imply something more than, or different from, non-cooperation? The labels may squeeze out much of the reality that we are trying to catch.

33 The difference between rationalism (including both realism and liberalism/idealism) and constructivism, the theoretical strand that can most clearly be distinguished as the alternative to rationalist theories, has been described by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner in the following way: ‘Rationalist theories derived from economics, for instance, offer the following heuristic: if you have a puzzle, formulate it as a problem for rational actors with unproblematically specified interests, competing in a situation characterized by scarce resources. Constructivist theories, in contrast, look to the humanities and sociology for insights into how “reality”, including the interests that partially constitute the identity of actors, is socially constructed.’ (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998, p. 646.) See also Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 40–41; Wendt, 1987, pp. 335–370; and Ruggie, 1998.

34 For each of the two prisoners in the game the best outcome is in the following order: (1) the actor defects while the other cooperates, (2) both actors cooperate, (3) both defect, and (4) the actor cooperates while the other defects. Many books and articles have been published using this perspective. See, for example, Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1985; Snidal, 1985 and 1991; Jervis, 1988; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; and Powell, 1991.


36 Ibid., p. 330.
Some of these points will be addressed in this study. Neoliberalism has addressed the way in which repeated games will change the way actors behave. Some of the other points brought up are harder to deal with, partly because there is not enough knowledge and partly also because the time frame for this thesis is too short. Generally, however, it is impossible to find a point in time at which a conclusion can be reached as to what the results of cooperation are. Even when an issue is finally resolved, the positive or negative experiences of cooperation will be reflected in the attitude of the participating countries when pursuing new rounds of cooperation.

### 2.3.3. Forms of Cooperation

#### 2.3.3.1. The Variety of Forms of Cooperation

As the theoretical approach of this study is that of neoliberal institutionalism, states are assumed to be the primary actors in foreign and security policy cooperation, albeit with certain possibilities for institutions to influence cooperation. One particularly important corollary for this study of the assumption that states are the primary actors is the possibility for cooperation to assume a great variety of forms: cooperation among the three countries examined here is not determined solely by such factors as membership of relevant institutions and their rules for cooperation but also by initiatives taken within and outside these institutions. Since, according to neoliberal institutionalism, states will act to further their interests, they can be expected to take advantage of the possibilities that different kinds of cooperation might give them at different stages of the treatment of an issue or for a certain issue. The particular shape that cooperation assumes outside institutions, for example, in bilateral cooperation, will interact with institutional cooperation, in which a variety of other factors work as well.

This fact also serves to complicate the picture of cooperation as described in the previous section on the basis for cooperation, as thought of in terms of games involving such problems as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In reality cooperation and negotiation will take place not always as iterated games between the same participants in a group but also in a more ad hoc manner, with the compositions of the groups varying greatly.

#### 2.3.3.2. Uni-, Bi-, Tri- and Multilateral Activities

The terms uni-, bi- and tri- and multilateral activities will be adapted here to the object of study. Uni-, bi- and trilateral activities of one country will thus relate to the other countries of cooperation. A unilateral activity is therefore pursued when a state acts without consulting others or establishes contact with countries in the region concerned, for example, the Middle East, without coordinating this with the others.

Uni-, bi- and trilateral activities are usually seen as alternatives to institutional cooperation. In this study one of the foci will instead be on the varieties of role these forms of cooperation play – they may complement, compete with or be part of institutional cooperation – and on how these roles may vary during different phases. A state may, for example, consciously divide its activities on a certain issue.
into stages: at the first stage one form of activity is seen as most suitable, after
which a change to another is deemed necessary in order to achieve greater
leverage.

These varieties may, however, also be present at the same time. For example, in
order to solve a problem a state may simultaneously 1) seek unilaterally to con-
vince another country to change its policy, 2) work bilaterally, 3) work trilaterally
and 4) work multilaterally to solve it. It might also work in various groups with the
aim of presenting proposals to other groups or institutions. These might con-
stitute formal working groups in order to prepare questions but they might also be
informal groups, created in order to facilitate, within the institution, the achieve-
ment of a joint solution and/or in order to have an impact on the institution’s
joint proposal.

2.3.4. Dependent Variables: Pattern, Content and Impact of Cooperation
Cooperation will be measured in terms of its pattern, content and impact.

The pattern of cooperation describes which institutions and states cooperate on
an issue and the timing of their involvement. An institution may be the only one
dealing with an issue or the issue may be dealt with by several institutions at the
same time. Institutions may be dealing with certain cooperation issues from early
on or they may become active after a period. States may, as described earlier in
this section, pursue many varieties of activity: unilateral, bilateral, trilateral or
multilateral.

The content of cooperation is often related to the pattern of cooperation. When
initiatives are launched or pressure is applied on countries, the initiatives or
demands may be multifaceted. Pressure for sanctions, for example, may concern
several different areas and several different institutions will be involved. States and
institutions may also widen cooperation to include new areas.

Each country may directly affect pattern and content, but only to a degree.
Countries may pursue unilateral activities and may initiate raise issues in certain
institutions in order to veto others’ proposals. The total picture of pattern and
content is, however, the result of their combined activities, and cannot be
controlled by an individual state.

Impact means the difference that cooperation will make in terms of commitment
among the cooperating states. It may denote a change of policy or the intro-
duction of a new one, so that a state or an institution renounces the possibility of
pursuing another policy. The term ‘impact’ is therefore not used here in the usual
way, that is, to signify the effect of an agreement on a third party (e.g., the effects
sanctions had on the Soviet Union).

Impact can relate to different things: it might concern the extent to which an
agreement affects the policies on a certain area of cooperation or it might relate to
the terms of cooperation in a more general manner. To a degree the two are the
same: countries forsake the option of pursuing another policy when they tie
themselves to the other collaborating partners.

Impact can also relate to different kinds of effort. In the part of the first case
study which deals with sanctions related to the invasion of Afghanistan, coopera-
tion takes two particular forms and the impact of both is relevant. One is the American–British attempt to convince other countries to apply sanctions against the Soviet Union, which is the dominant effort in terms of themes of meetings within the institutions. The other concerns the Franco-German cooperation to seek another policy.

While commitment is established in the same way for all the countries, the significance of taking this step and renouncing the option of pursuing another policy may be different for the different countries. Germany’s troubled history has given it considerably less room for such activities as well as for pursuing a policy that may encounter American criticism.

Ideally, the impact of cooperation should be established after an agreement of some kind made among countries. This is unfortunately seldom the case in this study. The impact of cooperation can, however, also be identified at stages when the statements and behaviour of the participants give evidence of a change in commitment, and this is the way in which it is established in most cases in this thesis.

2.4. States

2.4.1. The Variety of Approaches

A common assumption within the field of international relations is that states are unitary actors in the sense that a country is represented in an aggregate manner by its government rather than by a variety of actors. This perspective has been the dominant one for a number of years, among realists often combined with a view of states as having national interests. Another common view is that the domestic level of politics can be excluded from the analysis of international relations.

In the approach of this study, in accordance with neoliberal institutionalism, states are treated as unitary actors. They are not seen to have national interests, however, and the domestic level is not included in the analysis.

The next two subsections will describe the great variety of views in these respects and explain the reasons for the approach taken here.

2.4.2. The Unitary Actor

In contrast to the general realist view of the state as a unitary actor, often with given national interests, liberals in general have discerned domestic actors on the international arena. The views of a number of influential realists and liberals have been more complex, however, involving several additional elements related to the conception of the state and the interplay of other actors. Thus, elements that differ from those that are typically representative for researchers of each of the theoretical strands are present in their theories.

Krasner gives an example of the unitary actor approach but also of the heterogeneity of views when defending what he himself labels a ‘state-centric or realist paradigm’. The basic premise underlying it is that states (defined as central decision-making institutions and roles) can be treated as unified actors. States should furthermore be conceived of as having peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of their own, which can be described as national interests. On the other hand
Krasner also argues that states cannot be likened to billiard balls but must deal with private actors in their own societies as well as with other actors in the international area.\(^{37}\)

The complexity of views is also illustrated by the fact that the standpoint that the state can be treated as a unitary actor – usually seen as a typical realist standpoint – is also shared by Moravcsik, a liberal. However, seeing individuals and private groups as constituting the fundamental actors, Moravcsik does not consider the state as a truly unitary actor but as ‘a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical “transmission belt” by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.’\(^{38}\)

For Moravcsik, as for several other researchers, the perceptions of the state will, however, depend on the area concerned: ‘In many traditional areas of foreign policy, “policy stops at the water’s edge” and there is strong coordination among national officials and politicians. In other areas, the state may be “disaggregated”, with different elements – executives, courts, central banks, regulatory bureaucracies, and ruling parties, for example – conducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests.’\(^{39}\)

Similarly, Milner contends that the choice of relevant unit for the analysis should be a pragmatic one. Systems analysis does not require that states are used as units. Other actors, such as executives, legislatures, interest groups or militaries, may be just as useful. Referring to Frey, she sees two forms of criteria for choosing the appropriate one: ‘One should use (1) the highest level of generality subject to (2) the ability of this collectivity to act as a coherent unit.’\(^{40}\)

### 2.4.3. The Domestic Level

Earlier in the history of international relations theory the domestic perspective has at times been prominent, above all during the period when neofunctionalism and transactionalism flourished. As the works of E.B Haas and Deutsch gradually came to be seen as either altogether or partly irrelevant, however, for a while there was little emphasis on this kind of research.

Allison’s study on the Cuban missile crisis, published in 1971, changed this by pointing in a convincing way to domestic factors in an area traditionally not seen as prone to include such factors.\(^{41}\) Allison’s work has been strongly influential in

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\(^{38}\) Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 516–518. Moravcsik’s distance from Krasner is also obvious from the fact that, by referring to Ruggie and others, he argues that a state may pursue a policy of trade-offs in essential areas, and in this even abandon what might be seen as fundamental concerns, such as the defence of its territorial integrity. (Ibid., pp. 520. See also Ruggie, 1983.)

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 519.

\(^{40}\) The crucial criterion is the second one. It is essential, in order for it to be fulfilled, that all actors ‘display sufficient behavioral cohesion so that knowledge of the relevant behavior of some few group members (leaders, spokesmen, representatives, etc.) permits prediction of the behavior of the rest’. (Milner, 1998, pp. 767–768; Frey, 1985, p. 142.)

\(^{41}\) Haas, E.B., 1958; Deutsch et al., 1957; Allison, 1971.
demonstrating how varying assumptions and elements affect the result of the analysis. There were, however, obvious complexities of model building, not all of which were considered in his study.\textsuperscript{42}

Another type of approach is that of Charles Putnam, who as a liberal has a view of individuals acting in a social context. Putnam sees the domestic and international levels as intertwined and describes interaction as a two-level game:

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.\textsuperscript{43}

Many other examples have been given by a number of researchers of the domestic level interacting with the international one, through the institutions. Generally, Putnam views the effect as depending on the situation. Broad domestic support might, for example, reduce governmental negotiators’ chances of reaching a favourable international agreement. The reason for this is that the negotiators would not be in a position to gain extra concessions by referring to the need to convince domestic opponents – a technique used to entice others to compromise.\textsuperscript{44}

Another type of interaction occurs when in international negotiations, as concessions are contemplated, complicated negotiations with domestic groups may again be necessary.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, when international agreements have to be ratified by a general referendum there is no certainty at the time when negotiations are going on what the final outcome of the referendum will be. There are also examples of groups seeking to influence primary decision-makers when pursuing foreign policy. These groups may make some of their impact on the legislative level, but they can also do it on a higher level, thus influencing the primary decision-makers directly when pursuing foreign policy.\textsuperscript{46}

Martin and Simmons suggest that the institutionalist approach may be developed by bringing in domestic politics and institutions in a systematic manner rather than dealing with domestic politics as a residual layer. One of the fundamental ways in which international institutions can change state behaviour, they claim, is by

\textsuperscript{42} See, for example, Bendor and Hammond, 1992, pp. 304–318.

\textsuperscript{43} Putnam, 1988, p. 434. Putnam divides the process of interaction into a negotiation phase, consisting of bargaining among the negotiators, and a ratification phase, in which separate discussions are held within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. They need not be sequential in time, but even if no prior consultations and bargaining have taken place, it is likely that at least expectations of the views of the constituents will be part of the negotiations. In the process of ratification those who have bargained an agreement may defect. This might be a voluntary defection, which is the case when someone after having once agreed re-evaluates the agreement and decides that it is not advantageous enough. It might also be an involuntary defection, due to the failure of ratification. (Putnam, 1988, pp. 434–438.)

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 440.

\textsuperscript{45} Putnam, 1988.

\textsuperscript{46} Kahler, 1998, pp. 929–932.
NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AS APPLIED TO THIS STUDY

substituting for domestic practices. A crucial question in this context concerns the conditions required for domestic actors to be willing to substitute international for domestic institutions. Martin and Simmons answer the question by referring to the situation when domestic institutions have been captured by particular interests. Another case when domestic actors may be willing to substitute international for domestic institutions is when international organizations can give greater stability over time than domestic institutions can. In both these cases the society as a whole might find it advantageous to have issues settled by international bodies. An important point, here, however, is that these issues are brought into international institutions with the permission of the central government.\(^47\)

Several researchers have endorsed the establishment of a model in which domestic interests are aggregated. Above all, the relationships between actors should be determined and included in it. This model seems elusive, however. The task of developing it is complicated by the fact, as Milner sees it, that domestic politics are not, as sometimes believed, characterized by hierarchy but they are not anarchic either. Instead they can best be described as polyarchic, all states being somewhere on the spectrum between hierarchy and anarchy.\(^48\)

Cooperation patterns become even more intricate due to the fact that the issues themselves tend to lead to issue-linkages. While issue-linkages are an established part of institutionalist theories, dealing with the international level, according to which states are likely to establish such links in order to facilitate agreements, these linkages are a part of domestic cooperation as well and must therefore be included in models describing this cooperation.

2.4.4. The Approach of This Study

The view in this study agrees with the liberal one, according to which there is no assumption that the state is an entity that pursues a policy that is qualitatively different from that of any other institution in society. This means that this study is not based on a belief that national interest as a concept exists. Interests may have different longevity and support but this does not give any one of them a character different from the others. Finally, there is no claim that a single view exists among top-level decision-makers. Views may vary for several reasons: decision-makers may represent different interests or they may come to different conclusions when seeking to find solutions to problems.

In spite of these beliefs, this thesis will deal with the state as a unitary actor. There are several reasons for this. One is that the primary interest here is not to find the origin of views or examine their complexity. Each issue has its particular roots and their characters may differ widely. At a certain point in time, however, a government has to come to a conclusion. Those who represent the country, while

\(^{47}\) Another important question relates to whether particular domestic actors are regularly advantaged by the ability to transfer policy-making authority to the international level. This question receives a similar answer: those who are internationally minded will have an interest in doing so. So also do groups which are in the minority in their home country but whose view is endorsed by a majority within the international organization in question. (Martin and Simmons, 1998, pp. 747–749.)

possibly still harbouring dissenting views, will then need to fall into line. States are thereby, when in an international negotiation or other similar situations, represented by a single view and as a rule domestic viewpoints of importance are integrated into the calculations before decisions on positions are taken.

Another reason for this choice relates to the area of study. As pointed out by Moravcsik and Milner, in some areas the state is strongly coordinated whereas in others it is more disaggregated. Security policy, with which this thesis deals, belongs to the former group. In each country security policy is highly dominated by only a few actors. The interests of various actors have been aggregated through a process in which the state is represented by a hierarchy composed of persons who may correct or remove those who do not express the views of their superiors. When examples are given of the variety of goals among those who represent the state, these are typically taken from political economy, an area in which this disaggregation is very clear. An example that is frequently mentioned is the independent position of central banks. Milner even uses political economy as a heading for the approaches which include domestic actors.49

This position is, however, not totally uncomplicated for the area of security policy either. One issue for this particular study is whether countries really are unitary actors when governments are represented by different actors representing different political parties. In this study this is exemplified by Germany, and primarily by the participation of Chancellor Schmidt of the Social Democratic Party and Foreign Minister Genscher of the Free Democratic Party. The German Government was a coalition based on a programme, and policies had to be pursued according to this. In the end, however, this must be seen as an empirical question.50

In this, as in many other studies based on neoliberal institutionalism, the domestic perspective is missing. This is not because the existence of links between the domestic and the international level is denied, but should rather be seen in terms of analytical trade-off. As Martin and Simmons see it, while institutionalism has produced a number of insights, ‘its analytical bite – derived from its focus on states as unified rational actors – was purchased at the expense of earlier insights relating to transnational coalitions and, especially, domestic politics.’51 Putnam, as well as Martin and Simmons, has given examples of situations in which it is fruitful to bring in the domestic level. The decision on what and how much to include, can, however, not be made on a general level, but must be established for each specific study.52 While in this study the inclusion of the domestic level would, I argue, be unwieldy and lead to a loss of focus, an analysis of domestic factors as a separate analysis and a complementary study would add valuable information.

50 See Genscher, 1997, pp. 160–161 on the break-up of the coalition in September 1982 and Genscher’s view that Schmidt had then departed from this programme.
52 See also Goldmann, 2001: ‘The utility of this [i.e., the unitary actor] approach is contingent on one’s view of what a satisfactory explanation is like, on the subject matter at hand and on empirical evidence; there is no basis for an all-out rejection.’
For the reasons described above, there is in this thesis no underlying theory of how the interests of the particular states are formed, only the assumption that states are likely to pursue their interests (within the limitations given by their norms and the institutional cooperation as described elsewhere). The place of interests in the theoretical framework of this study will be described in the next section.

2.5. Interests

2.5.1. Some Underlying Factors

According to neoliberal institutionalism, interests play an important role in explaining cooperation among states. This is also the view of this study. Interests are recognized by neoliberal institutionalists as being multifaceted, not, as Moravcsik says they see them, as only ‘a function of variation in the geopolitical environment’. Neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge a range of other factors to be present and affect what action states perceive to be in their interest to pursue. Domestic factors are among those seen as important for shaping the policies of states. However, as stated above, for reasons of focus, they are generally not included in neoliberal institutionalist analysis and are also outside the scope of this thesis.

On another level, and outside the scope of analysis, belief systems play an important role. According to Goldmann, belief systems, which can loosely be defined as a system of empirical and normative ideas about reality, have a considerable impact on how states define their interests. This concept embraces what is perceived as knowledge about ‘past, present and future states of the world, as well as attitudinal elements, establishing goals and preferences’. The term thus encompasses a wide range of phenomena, including political ideologies as well as strategic doctrines.

The existence of belief systems or – as expressed by Goldstein and Keohane – ideas is compatible with the assumption of rationality: ‘Even if we accept the rationality premise, actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarify principles and conceptions of causal relationships, and to coordinate individual behaviour. Once institutionalized, furthermore, ideas continue to guide action in the absence of costly innovation.’

A corollary of this is that some beliefs may be shared among countries and thus influence their behaviour towards each other and others in a similar direction. On other occasions, the impact of beliefs may lead countries to adopt different

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53 Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 536–537.
55 Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 3. Goldstein and Keohane define ideas as ‘beliefs held by individuals’.
56 Ibid. p. 5. Belief systems are thus not seen as representing the antithesis of interests; actors are believed to harbour them while simultaneously expressing rational behaviour in pursuing them. Nor should beliefs be interpreted as having originally been developed independently of actors’ interests. Their origin, however, is of less interest once they have become internalized in the minds of people.
strategies. Two similar states may therefore draw different conclusions from what others perceive as the same experiences and choose different paths of action. The origin and thereby the contents of belief systems may vary: beliefs, as Goldstein and Keohane express it, may have risen to assume an important role solely because of the interests and power of their progenitors. After they have become institutionalized, however, their origin is irrelevant and does not affect their importance.

Belief systems are vast concepts, embracing both cultural and historical elements of a country, and therefore not possible to include in an analysis of this type. Since belief systems also influence interests, it is not possible to explain the entire nature of each state’s interests. Yet, according to neoliberal institutionalism, to a degree it is possible to deduce perceived interests from objectively assessed information.

### 2.5.2. Capabilities of States
#### 2.5.2.1. Capabilities and Interests
According to neoliberal institutionalism, capabilities are one of the factors that play an important role in determining the behaviour of a particular state as well as other states’ behaviour towards it, the other being intentions. Changes in capabilities may therefore lead to a change in the way in which a state conceives of its own interests. As expressed by Keohane: ‘Relative capabilities – realism’s “distribution of power” remains important.’ In the words of Stein: ‘The distribution of power should be viewed as one determinant of interests. In other words, a state’s degree of power in the international system is one of the things that explains its preferences, and the distribution of power between states determines the context of interaction and the preference orderings of the interacting states and thus determines the incentives and prospects for international regimes.’

Capabilities are the factor emphasized by realists. Realism stresses the insecurity of each country and the uncertainty about the future intentions of others, even those with which it has friendly relations and among those which share its most important values. Differences in capabilities and vulnerabilities between all states are therefore capable of influencing relations between them.

In contrast to the concept of belief systems, changes in capabilities are often concrete and therefore easier to discern. This is primarily the case for military capabilities. Economic capabilities can be ascertained as well through such criteria.

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57 One example of this is the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the different conclusions drawn by France and the UK, two formerly powerful countries humiliated by the United States, whose supremacy was now apparent. While this experience strengthened the French determination to acquire increased capabilities of their own, the British chose to repair relations and stay close to Washington. (Costigliola, 1992, pp. 113–116; Bartlett, 1992, pp. 82–90.) A similar example is the Kosovo war of 1999, from which the lesson France drew was that Europe must develop increased military capability in order for the EU to conduct substantial military operations on its own, whereas the lesson the UK drew was that the poor European capability had demonstrated the need for cooperation with NATO. (See [France], ‘Les Enseignements du Kosovo, 11/99’; and [United Kingdom], ‘Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis’.)

as the possession of certain raw materials. Other capabilities or vulnerabilities that have an impact on relations among Western European countries are much harder to pinpoint as they may be of both a concrete and an abstract character, and also of a historical character. The German vulnerability, as a heritage of the Second World War, is well known, albeit impossible to tie to a concrete present capability or lack of capability.

Putting all this into the context of this study, the three countries whose cooperation is to be studied faced a new situation as external events unfolded. In the first case the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and in the second the crisis developing in southern Serbia and Macedonia in late 2000 forced them to consider what it would be in their best interest to do. This estimate, for each country, was based on a range of factors, including belief systems (which are exogenous factors as seen by neoliberal institutionalism) and their own and others’ capabilities, which are possible to include in the analysis. Together these concepts formed their perceived interests for states. As states undertook activities they were led by what they perceived to be in their best interest, constrained by the perceived norms associated with the institutions to which they belonged, and subjected to the impact of institutional cooperation.

For cooperation between European countries the difference in capabilities must be seen on two levels. One of them concerns the difference between the European countries and the United States, the other the differences between the European states themselves.

First of all, the particular character of European foreign and security cooperation – the fact that for all European countries the supremacy of the United States is of vast importance – will be dealt with.

2.5.2.2. United States–Europe

A particularly important example of differences in capability between states is that between the United States, on the one hand, and the West European countries, on the other, in matters of foreign and security policy. The American supremacy is a relevant factor not only in situations in which one or several West European states engage in discussion with or cooperate with the United States, but also among European states only.

The American supremacy is of two types. The first is based on the unique strategic capabilities as well as the quantitatively vast resources which make other Alliance members ultimately dependent on the United States for their security. Within the foreseeable future, even by giving this high priority and pooling their resources, the European countries cannot provide for their own security in a major conflict. This type of dependence continues even at a time when the main antagonist, the Soviet Union/Russia, is no longer the ideological adversary. The US stands for a guarantee against a number of potential military threats in a future that cannot be predicted.

The other type of American supremacy relates to specific tasks for which the US has capabilities that surpass those of all the European countries put together. These types of task are more relevant after 1989, as the dominant Cold War
scenario of an all-out military attack has been replaced by a reality that at times has involved actual war-fighting, albeit in much lesser scale, in Europe. Such capabilities might concern a certain type of technology or weapon system or resources within a particular and limited area, such as transport capability. The size of its economy, including its technological supremacy, makes the US extremely important for the European countries in this respect as well. Unlike the first type of supremacy, this type may be at least partly redressed if there is a political will to do so. However, this would take time and resources, involving increased military spending and cooperation in terms of production and procurement of weapons on a Europe-wide basis.

For the first type of supremacy, that of general supremacy, dependence is basically the same among the European NATO countries – with the exception that for each country its geographical position in Europe has made it more or less vulnerable according to the different possible scenarios that are envisaged. Among the three countries studied here, West Germany before 1989, since it bordered directly on the Warsaw Pact, was particularly vulnerable to a Soviet attack, which was then the predominant threat scenario.

For the second type of supremacy, the dependence is basically also the same in that Europe for all but the smallest operations needs to rely on US resources. For some scenarios, however, this dependence is somewhat smaller. For scenarios based on vaguer threats and less related to conventional military operations, the wide-ranging capabilities of the European Union have been particularly valuable. Even within the military sphere the new developments in Europe have made it possible for European to conduct some – albeit very small – operations. The prospect, and thereafter the conclusion in December of 2002, of the Berlin-Plus agreement\textsuperscript{61} with NATO opened up the possibility of the EU undertaking more substantial military tasks. In this, however, the agreement of NATO will be necessary in order for the EU to have access to NATO resources. The second type of American supremacy may thus create an impetus for European cooperation, as European countries might join forces in order to attain the capacity to pursue as demanding tasks as possible in areas associated with crisis management. In the short term, however, the second type of dependence is as strong as the first one.

The supremacy of the United States in relation to allied states is likely to have affected American behaviour as well. It creates an inclination to ask for support from other NATO members in situations where the US has an interest in achieving a coordinated reaction. While the American supremacy is a clear asset, a range of other factors are involved as well. European support when interests conflict is therefore by no means assured, even though, as Martin has noted, ‘variables that increase the coercive power of the leading sender should increase the observed level of cooperation.’\textsuperscript{62}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Martin, 1992a, p. 15.
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The differences in capabilities between the European countries also play a role in their relations with each other. Among the three countries that are part of this study the main difference lies between, on the one hand, France and the UK, the only West European countries with a military capacity that can be projected beyond their own national borders, and, on the other, Germany. With a history that has led many Germans to emphasize the non-military dimensions of security and to a military share of gross domestic product (GDP) that has been considerably lower than those of France and the UK, Germany has lacked military capability commensurate with its size.\footnote{For statistics on military expenditure see \textit{The Military Balance} published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). See also Maull, 2000, for an analysis of German attitudes to military and civilian defence.}

During the Cold War, as deterrence was the main task of NATO, the American strategic military capability was of great importance, constituting the main protection against the Soviet Union. While France and the UK had both developed nuclear weapons, these could in no way replace the American ones, and the difference between France and UK on the one side and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the other, while considerable and a matter of prestige, would hardly have been decisive in the all-out war envisaged at the time.

After the Cold War, with new scenarios and a new reality, as mentioned above, the United States remained of great importance for security in Europe. Increasingly, however, crisis management tasks are being envisaged to be pursued in a European-only framework. As the bulk of the participating troops are European, the existing differences between the European states’ capabilities have become relatively larger: the process initiated at Saint-Malo in December 1998 was, not unexpectedly, initiated by France and the UK. The further process, as it continued in Helsinki through the 1999 decision on the Headline Goals, was aimed at redressing at least to a degree the power relationships with the US in an effort in which not only the major EU member countries but all EU members were needed. A major difference between the previous situation in which for all scenarios the United States was the undisputed leader is that, in the build-up and exercise of European crisis management capabilities, no clear leadership based on superior capabilities can be wielded.

Economic capabilities are important among European countries as well and, as indicated in the survey made for chapter 3, particular assets and vulnerabilities may be related to the scenarios envisaged. Trade dependences and the possession of raw materials are thereby more or less crucial, depending on which area of the world is concerned and which countries are involved. Economic capabilities and vulnerabilities can to a degree be assessed objectively, but should also be seen in relation to the aspirations of the various countries. Here, the long-term strategies of the countries under study, involving different policy goals, are important.
2.5.3. Perceived Interests

In this study, in accordance with neoliberal institutionalism, states are hypothesized to behave largely in accordance with their perceptions of their own interests and to cooperate with others when they see this as favourable to them. Yet they are also influenced by the norms that they perceive as relevant within the institutions to which they belong. Furthermore, institutions may in various ways have an impact on the cooperation pursued.

This means that, to the extent that states do not perceive themselves as subject to the rules and obligations of institutions, they feel free to undertake their own policies. They do this by taking advantage of the possibilities given by cooperation within institutions, through unilateral activities and within bi-, tri- and multilateral cooperation of various types.

In this manner France, Germany and the UK are assumed to seek to conduct their foreign and security policies within and outside institutions in such a way that the cooperation pursued in terms of pattern, content and impact reflects what they see as their own interests. Being all three fairly big countries, their international contacts are on a more global level and are more extensive than those of smaller countries in Europe. This is particularly so for France and the UK, whose previous colonial roles are still manifested in close contacts with certain areas and countries.

The assumption here is not that states are always rational – rationality is a simplification of human behaviour. Nor does the hypothesis claim to identify exactly what their interests are. Belief systems filtering conceptions of events, domestic factors of various types and so on contribute to make all perceived interests unique and multifaceted. It is therefore not possible to give a full picture of the perceived interests of a country.

Nor do I assume that some interests are of a special character, for instance, such as might constitute national interests. Some interests can empirically be seen to have a certain consistency, but this is not because of their particular character but because of other consistent factors relevant for forming interests. The way in which such factors might interact and contribute to the formation of interests is a vast subject in itself and not possible to deal with here.

The task of this study, however, is to analyse whether certain states, when cooperating with other states and within institutions, act in conformity with their perceived interests.

This is done in two steps. The first is to look at the capabilities and their relative distribution to see what is the actual framework for possibilities and limitations. The next step is to look at the policies that countries put forward, the argument being that it will be in a country’s interest to pursue the policy it has officially announced. The question is then whether, in its cooperation with others, the country will seek to follow this policy consistently.

The analysis based on capabilities is individual for each state. Therefore, in the analysis of their cooperation, states will be assumed, if acting according to their perceived interests, to seek to forward their stated policies, but they would also need to do so in such a manner as to maximize their individual possibilities and
minimize the vulnerabilities of each state. They would prefer to work within institutions in which they have more influence, rather than the opposite, and to use unilateral activities as well as bi-, tri- and multilateral cooperation in such a way as to advance their influence. They are also assumed to choose ways of cooperating in such a way as to seek protection from criticism, added security, and safeguards from others’ abuse of cooperation.

One further clarification should be made. Bearing in mind the cautionary words of Jervis quoted at the beginning of this section, it is not possible within the framework of this study to judge whether the acts that are seen in the short term as satisfying perceived interests will also satisfy those interests in the long term. Seen in a short-term perspective, perceived interests, norms and institutions may sometimes be in conflict with one another. In the long term, however, it might be in a country’s interest to adhere to norms and to give room for institutions, even when this would seem at the moment not to maximize perceived interests.

### 2.5.4. Interests and Cooperation

The pursuance of perceived interests does not, as I see it, reduce the likelihood of cooperation. Rather, a number of different combinations of interests – common, compatible and conflicting ones – may lead to cooperation. In accordance with neoliberal institutionalism, cooperation with others might be a rational way to pursue one’s own interests.

A situation of pending cooperation might be characterized by all these varieties of interests. Two or three of them may be present at the same time and all of them may lead to cooperation, although the circumstances will vary. In practice, as Sebenius points out, different interests tend to be inextricably intertwined and cannot be separated. The tension between cooperative moves to create value jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantage is central and inescapable.\(^\text{64}\)

*Common interests* exist when parties have the same and not competing interests. A certain commonality of interests is necessary for cooperation to take place but it only needs to be minimal: it is sufficient if those cooperating see a common interest in cooperation taking place. The common interest to pursue cooperation may also be wider than that, incorporating an interest to achieve common goals through cooperation. Cooperation on an issue therefore does not necessarily imply that underlying conflicts exist among the participants: the reason for it will be the added value in the form of effect on others that it will achieve.\(^\text{65}\) The difference that countries seek to achieve is the one between coordinated and uncoordinated behaviour. In these cases, individual behaviour is simply not Pareto-optimal.\(^\text{66}\)

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\(^\text{64}\) Sebenius, 1992, p. 330.

\(^\text{65}\) See section 2.3.1 on the definition of cooperation.

\(^\text{66}\) Pareto stated that the optimum allocation of the resources of a society is not attained so long as it is possible to make at least one individual better off in his own estimation while keeping others as well off as before in their own estimation (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*).
Situations might be envisaged when the effect on others is not relevant. Stein’s view, for example, is that there is no need for a regime when each state obtains its most preferred outcome by making independent decisions, since there is simply no conflict. This will be true in cases when the issue is not of a type that benefits from coordinated behaviour more than uncoordinated behaviour, for instance, when all the potential problem-makers are already part of the group.

Compatible interests exist when interests are different but not in conflict. This is also a situation of harmony of interests. Countries may have different interests in cooperation because they get different things out of it or because they believe that they will do so. These goals, however, will not be achieved at the expense of others’ goals.

Conflicting interests mean that the interests of one participant are achieved at the expense of others. This combination of interests might prevent cooperation from taking place, since at least one of the parties deems it to have a negative impact on his/her own situation. But we may also find examples of cooperation when the participant who is at a disadvantage still cooperates. This might be a case of coercion, which can take place if the overall balance of benefits accrued from cooperation is deemed as positive by the coerced party. It may also be a situation that is related to the concept of ‘expectations of diffuse reciprocity’, in which for the participants no balance of perceived advantages is necessary in each specific deal since the advantages of cooperation are expected to be balanced in the long run. A third possibility is related to situations characterized by conflicting interests in specific issues in combination with a possibility, when in the bargaining process several issues are tied to each other, of creating a ‘package deal’ in which the disadvantages connected to a concession in one area are seen as offset by the advantages connected to an agreement within another area.

The three mechanisms of coercion, diffuse reciprocity and package deals are in a certain sense similar: a perceived disadvantage is considered as being evened out by advantages which might be given in another area or at a later time. All three are closely related to the existence of institutions.

It is not the task here to find out the conditions under which cooperation will or will not take place. Nor is it possible when looking at the three categories of possible types of interest described above – common, compatible and conflicting – to determine this. This will in the end depend on other factors as well. Examples such as coercion, diffuse reciprocity and package deals, however, serve to prove that certain combinations of interests deemed unlikely to lead to cooperation might yet result in a situation of countries agreeing with each other.

68 See Keohane, 1986a. Keohane defines specific reciprocity as situations when specified partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence. Diffuse reciprocity describes situations when the definition of equivalence is less precise, one’s partners may be viewed as a group rather than as particular actors, and the sequence of events is less narrowly bounded.
69 See section 2.7.
70 When looking at the possibilities for cooperation one approach is to see which particular games can lead to a cooperation agreement. Martin, in her study of economic sanctions, has used the three categories of coincidence, coercion and co-adjustment to specify the conditions under which sanctions
2.6. Norms Associated with Institutions

2.6.1. Characteristics of Norms

Belief systems have been mentioned already in connection with the concept of perceived interests. Defined as ‘a system of empirical and normative ideas about reality’, they will obviously have an impact on all kinds of perceptions, including norms. As Goldstein and Keohane state, beliefs may become embedded in rules and norms and thereby constrain public policy. The way in which they will do so is, however, outside the scope of this study.

Norms are important in foreign and security policy cooperation. Referring to norms, as they perceive them, states judge themselves and others. As argued below, norms are to a considerable degree subject to perception. The variation in statements on norms and in the relevant activities is therefore highly important for the analysis of each country’s foreign and security policy and cooperation.

In this study I make a limitation in that the focus is on the norms associated with membership of institutions. One reason for this is that this is a very common way for states to consider norms. France, Germany and the United Kingdom, when elaborating on the issue of norms, refer to rights and obligations that are relevant for countries as members of institutions, not between countries in general. This is to be expected since norms are usually connected to the formal obligations that countries acquire and agree to when they join institutions. It is true that the concept only covers part of cooperation – it is self-evident that norms between countries exist as well. These are, however, also to a large degree covered by the norms of the institutions: the institutions dealing with foreign and security policy prescribe the behaviour among the members, thereby also to a considerable degree covering their behaviour towards member states of these institutions even in bi- and trilateral cooperation. Some additional norms are specific and concern particular states.

In this study, as elsewhere in international relations theory, norm-driven behaviour is contrasted to interest-driven. This is, however, a simplification: to a degree the two may be impossible to distinguish from each other. When we consider, for example, the fact that the act of breaching a norm is likely to result in some kind of sanction, it is clear that it might be in the interest of the country in question to follow the norm rather than to suffer the sanctions. As Shannon expresses it, for neoliberal institutionalists norm-driven and interest-driven behaviour are connected through the long time horizons that are generated by an institutional relationship. These change the pay-off matrix to account for the long-
run absolute gains of staying within the confines of the norms and the reputational costs of violating the norms.\textsuperscript{73}

Constructivists go even further on this point, claiming that norms shape interests and therefore cannot logically be opposed to them.\textsuperscript{74} While such influence undoubtedly exists, this is, I argue, too categorical a statement. The relationships between norms and interests may be complicated but a number of empirical cases can be brought up which demonstrate that a distinction can be made between the policy that a country on a number of occasions has expressed as suitable in order to follow the proper norm, on the one hand, and the policy that in a particular situation would be in its interest, on the other. A number of such instances will be dealt with in this study.

Several definitions of norms exist. According to Krasner, norms constitute ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’.\textsuperscript{75} This definition is the one used here. Others have defined norms as ‘collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity’ (Katzenstein) or ‘a standard shared by the members of a social group to which the members are expected to conform, and conformity to which is enforced by positive and negative sanctions’ (Gould and Kolb).\textsuperscript{76} Finnemore defines norms as ‘shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors’, and adds that, unlike ideas, which may be held privately, norms are shared and social. By necessity they also include behaviour, she claims, giving an alternative definition as ‘collectively held ideas about behavior’.\textsuperscript{77}

One important element, present in only one of these definitions, is that of sanctions. Goldmann sees the possibility of sanctions as a necessary characteristic of a norm.\textsuperscript{78} This is the view taken in this study as well: rights and obligations presuppose a context in which countries have expectations of other countries’ behaviour and may demonstrate their disapproval when these expectations are not fulfilled, in a way which is felt negatively by the country in question. The nature and the extent of sanctions are, however, left open here. Suffice it to say that among the closely connected countries in this study even a verbal condemnation by others is so unusual as to be considered as a sanction directed at the reputation of the country concerned.

Generally in studies dealing with norms the assumption is that norms are shared, as can be seen from the definitions mentioned above. The view of norms as a concept on which there is a certain agreement is also the starting-point here: the concept would not make any sense if it were based entirely on individual interpretations of rules and obligations. There is a common element, which has to be fairly large, in terms of which norms are relevant for a certain institution and

\textsuperscript{73} Shannon, 2000, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{74} See, for example, Finnemore, 1996a, pp. 27–28; and Herrmann and Shannon, 2001, pp. 624–625.

\textsuperscript{75} Krasner, 1982, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{76} See Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5; and Gould and Kolb, 1964, p. 472. See also Goldmann, 1971, p. 343.

\textsuperscript{77} Finnemore, 1996a, pp. 22–23.

\textsuperscript{78} Goldmann, 1971, pp. 20–22.
which type of behaviour associated with membership of the institution in question is the appropriate one.

2.6.2. Perceived Norms

In spite of what is said above on the common element inherent in norms, I argue that the analysis of norms associated with membership of institutions is insufficient without bringing in another concept, that of ‘perceived norms’. The reason for this is that no objective list of norms can be made. Certainly, the rules of each institution can be enumerated. This will, however, not totally reflect what the norms are in the eyes of the members. The rules are of different characters, they are more or less clearly formulated, they are of different weights and they have different time perspectives. Some norms to which members would give strong support are not even included in the statutes. All these factors give room for some variety in the individual interpretations. It is therefore unlikely that all members of an institution would end up with identical perceptions of all these norms. To this can be added the factor that the interests of individual countries might influence their perceptions of some norms. As statements regarding norms are made in different situations, there is furthermore the possibility that the issues that are of particular concern in these various situations may influence perceptions.

The term ‘perceived norms’ must not be understood as standing for total freedom of interpretation. As will be described and exemplified in this study, states continually express their views on how they perceive their own and others’ obligations. While this gives room for some variation among them, in order for a country to have the necessary credibility there must be a certain consistency in the interpretations of norms it makes on different occasions. Other countries will note and comment on inconsistencies and, in particular, on interpretations that they perceive assignifying a withdrawal from obligations.

Some rights and obligations related to membership of these institutions will be spelled out with particular precision. This is especially likely when they form part of treaties and agreements. Since these are important to member states and subject to negotiations, the process of formulating them is likely to be meticulous. Furthermore, other agreements that have been made within the frameworks of these institutions may also have contributed, whether explicitly or not, to specify the rights and obligations of members. Even these, however, may be subject to different interpretations since the formulations of rights and obligations are unlikely to cover all possible future situations and all possible details of their implementation.

Norms may, however, also be formulated in such a way as to give considerable leeway regarding their interpretation. They may, for example, be expressed as goals towards which members are to strive. This type of norm gives room for different interpretations as to how the goal should be achieved and in which time frame it should be seen. Each state will make its own decision on this and in some situations differences of interpretation are likely to lead to questioning of whether other states have a proper interpretation of their obligations or whether they are acting in accordance with a proper interpretation.
A further source of vagueness is the fact that choices might have to be made between different norms of a single institution. While they might not be contradictory in themselves, in a particular situation one might exclude the other. As Krasner points out, international society has been characterized by competing and often logically contradictory norms rather than a single coherent set of rules. States have referred to norms such as religious tolerance, human rights and international security and when following them committed breaches of other norms such as that of not violating another state’s territory. States may even endorse mutually contradicting norms, often in the same document.\footnote{Krasner, 1999, p. 52.}

Another source of vagueness in interpretation among countries is related to the fact that states are members of several organizations. France, Germany and the UK, all being members of the UN, NATO, the WEU, the CSCE/OSCE and the EC/EU, are part of a complex pattern of rights and obligations in accordance with the various rules of these organizations. (In the case of France, moreover, its NATO membership obligations are of another nature.) To this can be added the EPC, which, without constituting an organization, had its own rules for cooperation and a structure different from that of the EC. There may, for example, be different opinions as to the weight of certain obligations towards one institution as compared to obligations towards another institution or state. Here the perceived importance of the institution and the perceived importance of the area in question will be decisive. This kind of conflict among rights and obligations is particularly likely to happen when goals are expressed in vague terms and when long-term and short-term goals are weighed against each other.

When action needs to be taken within an institution in an area that is related to important rights and obligations, many members will see it as crucial that all in the end agree on the interpretation of the relevant norms. At the other end of the spectrum, where areas are not of particular importance and no pressing situation forces countries to take positions, divergence among views on norms may be accepted – at least for a while. Generally, the norms of institutions are seen as important and when disagreements on their interpretation are openly aired they become questions of importance for the individual countries. When countries interpret norms in different ways discussions are likely to be conducted within and outside the institutions, and pressure is therefore likely to be put on the various states by others who have opposite opinions. States that do not behave according to norms, as perceived by others, may consequently have to face some kind of sanctions from aggrieved members.\footnote{Shannon has a similar kind of reasoning but from the perspective of political psychology. He suggests that leaders who value their standing in international society seek to avoid negative social judgements and are likely to violate the norm only if there is room for interpretation of the norm or the situation: ‘Due to the fuzzy nature of many norms and situations, and due to the imperfect interpretation of such norms by human agency, oftentimes norms are what states (meaning state leaders) make of them.’ (Shannon, 2000, p. 294.)}
2.6.3. Establishing the Existing Norms

The conception of norms as being individually perceived by states implies that particular attention must be given to each country. Apart from this, the concerns of the present study are the same as in other types of study on norms, the main problem being that of which means to use in order to find out which they are. One alternative is to study the actual activities of states. This is complicated, however, one reason being that behaviour is not steered by norms only.\footnote{Goldmann, 1971, p. 36.}

In this study another method is sought. The norms that countries associate with membership of institutions will be established for each country by recording statements on norms made over the period of study. This includes statements made in situations when countries are justifying and explaining their own behaviour and when they accuse others of not acting within the common norms. This means that states might find themselves confronted with a situation that they have themselves commented on earlier when they were judging the behaviour of others.

No attempt will be made here to establish the extent to which norms and interests interact as norms are created. Nor will it be possible to see if, when countries follow these norms, they do so voluntarily or because they feel pressed by the threat of sanctions being imposed by others. The important thing here will instead be to find out to what extent their perceived norms differ from each other and to what extent countries follow the norms themselves that they refer to under other circumstances as valid for all.

The obvious question in this context is whether declared norms are equivalent to the ‘real’ perceived norms. The link between norms and justifying statements is, I argue, considerably closer than the connection between norms and behaviour. Still, statements of justification cannot be completely equated with perceived norms. A state may conceivably act in a way that is contrary to what it believes to be right and thereafter seek to convince others that its action is still within the norm as it considers it to be. There is, however, limited scope for such attempts to deceive others, and the scope for this is particularly limited for the countries studied here. The closeness of these states to each other and the openness of their societies mean that the other countries and the general public within their own countries are likely to know fairly well what has taken place.

The possibility of sanctions does not only discourage deception. It is also a restriction at the stage when norms are created: even if states are inclined to interpret the rules of an institution in a way that is very different from that of other countries, they might hesitate to do so since others might call this a clear breach against what they see as accepted norms and react with some kind of sanction. This influence of norms on states is, however, not possible to establish, since such deliberations take place in the minds of decision-makers before they formulate their policies.

In spite of these delimitations, it is still possible to envisage cases when states do not follow the norms that they themselves have earlier declared to be valid.
such behaviour might be accompanied by apologies, it might also be supported by justifying statements. These occasions do not necessarily constitute deceptions, however, so long as there is no hiding of the facts involved. An aberration from a previously declared norm which is openly defended by the authorities may be a sign that the perception of this norm has changed. In such cases the future policies and statements will determine whether the aberration is or is not a violation of the norm. Frequent changes and reinterpretations of norms are a sign that there is a case of violation of the norms. Other examples concern cases when countries, when referring to a particular norm, are not as strict on themselves as on others. Krasner mentions the situation — calling it organized hypocrisy — when institutional norms are enduring but not adhered to and at the same time power asymmetries prevent the enforcement of norms.

Another claim by Krasner is that violations usually go unpunished. Apart from the reasons for this mentioned above there are also the facts there is no authority structure to adjudicate in controversies and there are power asymmetries between states. The most important function of justifications is usually on the domestic arena, and justifications are therefore often addressed to the domestic audience.

I would argue that this depends on the situation. It would certainly be safe for a state which has superior capabilities and is geographically far distant from the countries that might react to break the rules, since such activities would probably go unpunished. The only relevant audience here is the domestic one. This is not, however, the case for France, Germany and the UK. All three are of similar size and dependent on each other. Even though for them as well justifications are certainly directed to a great degree at a domestic audience, other countries need to be convinced too. While the three cannot be presumed never to violate norms, the fact that others are watching their behaviour and have the possibility to punish them, at least in the form of reproaches, is a discouragement for these states, which need the recognition of their close collaborators. The choice to violate a norm is therefore likely to be taken only after a calculation has been made, ending with the conclusion that the country will gain enough by doing this to make it worthwhile to suffer the consequences.

2.7. Institutions

2.7.1. Institutions in General

A distinctive claim of institutionalists is that, despite the lack of a common government in world politics, there are possibilities for cooperation among nations when the preconditions are right. International institutions may facilitate such a process of cooperation since they may give the opportunities for negotiations, reduce uncertainty about others’ policies and affect leaders’ expectations. In this way institutions may affect the strategies that states choose as well as their decisions.

82 See also Goldmann, 1971, pp. 51–53.
83 Krasner, 1999, pp. 6–9.
84 Ibid.
85 Keohane and Nye, 1993, pp. 4–5.
Keohane and Nye see institutions not as imposed on states but as created and accepted by them

in order to increase their ability to seek their own interests through the coordination of their policies. Typically, such international institutions do not enforce rules on powerful states, although they may serve as the agents of powerful states to enforce rules on the weak. Among the powerful they encourage agreement, and compliance with agreements, by establishing overall rules and practices that make negotiations easier, and by facilitating the exchange of information about the actual behavior of states with reference to the standards to which they have consented. Thus, they constrain opportunistic behavior, and they provide focal points for coordination. They make a difference, not by imposing order ‘above the nation-state’ but by creating valued networks of ties between states. Among potential adversaries they may alleviate the security dilemma. In short, institutions provide a point of common reference for leaders trying to struggle with turmoil and uncertainty.86

It is important to note that, according to institutionalist thinking, institutions are not believed to be capable of preventing war or maintaining stability under all imaginable conditions. As Keohane and Martin state:

Institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities. Institutions are important ‘independently’ only in the ordinary sense used in social science: controlling for the effects of power and interests, it matters whether they exist. They also have an interactive effect, meaning that their impact on outcomes varies, depending on the nature of power and interests.87

The degree of emphasis on the way in which institutional cooperation works varies between the different approaches. While they are not diametrically opposed to each other, it is a matter of emphasis. An important characteristic of neoliberal institutionalism is the view that actors create institutions in order to resolve the collective action dilemma. Institutions can guarantee complementary behaviour by all members, which creates a better collective outcome than when individuals seek to maximize their own profits.88 Expressing it in another way, institutions might prevent market failure, which is the result of the sometimes suboptimal outcomes of market-mediated interactions.89

Collective action analysis alone, however, is not sufficient. Krasner, as a realist, claims that this type of analysis best explains situations characterized by coordination problems and at the same time a symmetrical distribution of power. Krasner has drawn attention instead to the existence of distributional conflicts for actors seeking to achieve the best possible agreements. According to him, for certain areas to which the two criteria of coordination problems and a symmetrical

86 Ibid. pp. 2–3.
87 Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 42. Keohane and Martin make this point in their discussion with Mearsheimer, according to whom liberal institutionalists claim that NATO per se maintains stability in Europe. See Mearsheimer, 1994/95, p. 14.
88 The collective action dilemma – that of choosing between maximizing individual gain and the limited gains that cooperation can give – might result in a situation when individual maximizing will give less benefits than cooperation. The classical example of this is ‘The tragedy of the Commons’. (Hardin, G., 1968.)
89 Keohane, 1984.
distribution of power do not apply, distributional conflicts are more prevalent than market failure. Some institutional arrangements are therefore better explained by the distribution of power capabilities than by other factors. The analyses centring on market failure have tended to dominate and thereby obscure issues of power, since results will be achieved without concessions by anyone, Krasner claims. Distributional problems, in contrast, are solved not by cleverness but by power threat and coercion, and gains by one participant are made at the expense of others.⁹⁰

The inclusion of distributional conflict does not cause a problem for institutional theory, according to Keohane and Martin. Rather it is a factor that may render institutions more important. Such conflicts, they argue, when there are several possible outcomes, might easily produce stalemate, especially if the situation is complicated and there are many states involved. Institutions, by giving information, may assure states that gains will be evenly distributed over time (through specific or diffuse reciprocity) and therefore increase the possibility of agreement being reached.⁹¹ As pointed out by Keohane, states, however, seldom have the same obligations and the ‘evenness’ is therefore based on their own perceptions.⁹²

Sebenius, while reflecting on the two explanations of cooperation mentioned above, argues that by bringing in the concept of epistemic communities⁹³ it will be possible to improve explanations of certain classes of international policy coordination. He has drawn attention to distributive conflicts in issue areas in which there are considerable technical, economic or environmental uncertainties. As he sees it, when other authors bring in both knowledge-related gains and distributional aspects to the analysis they treat the concepts in a binary way. His suggestion instead is to analyse cases in which both are included in the form of a negotiation-analytic approach.⁹⁴

All the three examples above – the collective action dilemma, distributional conflicts and the negotiation-analytic approach – are compatible with neoliberal institutionalist thinking. The perception of the common interest in coming to agreement does not mean that there is no competition among states for the gains involved. The negotiation-analytic approach describes the way in which learning acquired through continued reiterated games will have an impact on the outcome of these games. It also comes closer to real life according to Sebenius, who points out that there is a difference between negotiation and games in that the latter presume full strategic rationality on a level which negotiation does not.⁹⁵

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⁹⁰ Krasner, 1991. As Krasner expresses it, in the terminology of this discussion, global communications (which is the area he uses to illustrate his thoughts) are characterized not by Nash equilibria that are Pareto-suboptimal but rather by disagreements over which point along the Pareto frontier should be chosen. (Krasner, 1991, p. 336.)

⁹¹ Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 45.


⁹³ Epistemic communities are here understood as a ‘transnational group of “believers”, with shared values, causal models, and validation criteria, as well as a common policy project’. See Haas, P., 1989.


The three examples of the way in which institutions work are all similar in that they point to a variety of interests among actors as the basis for cooperation. States enter institutions in order to get some benefits out of them. Mechanisms mentioned earlier, such as diffuse reciprocity and package deals, point to ways in which diversity of interests may be handled and result in cooperation thanks to the framework of an institution. Diffuse reciprocity indicates that members of an institution feel confident that in the long run they will benefit from membership and can therefore accept an agreement that is not to their immediate advantage. Issues are in this way linked in a time perspective. Package deals demonstrate how institutions can help in making linkages in which the participants will not have to wait, since the disadvantages in one area are offset by advantages gained in another. Such deals are difficult to achieve among countries outside the framework of an institution. Coercion is another mechanism, different from the others. Here the strength of the overall agreement is tested. If the country being coerced sees the overall balance of institutional membership as becoming negative when it does what it is asked to do, it may leave.

Reciprocity is also related to the norms associated with the institutions. Going beyond the practice of specific reciprocity and engaging in diffuse reciprocity can be seen as a way to behave well towards others without expecting rewards from them. Specific reciprocity is the expected behaviour when norms are weak but, if they engage successfully in specific reciprocity for a long time, states may move in the direction of diffuse reciprocity.\(^6\)

### 2.7.2. Individual Institutions

In this study the issue is not only that of states and institutions. An important part of the study concerns the institutions vis-à-vis each other. Thus the question is not only whether institutions will make a difference but also which institutions will be the dominant ones in cooperation and under what circumstances.

The second hypothesis in this study is that certain factors, two of which are indicative of institutional capacity, will determine this. The first factor is the capability of an institution to initiate work quickly as a certain issue becomes urgent. This capability is established by the existence of a continually working body, in the existence of rules for calling meetings and in the frequency of regular meetings. The second factor is the institution’s competence within the relevant areas. This factor is assessed through its formal right to handle the particular issues, and in the possible existence of an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and implement decisions.

The third factor is not related to the capability of institutions themselves but to the support given by states. States may have several kinds of reason to favour a certain institution. It may be argued that the competences of institutions are the dominant reasons behind such a choice. This would, however, not explain the fact that countries sometimes favour different ones. While a number of suggestions may be given as to why certain countries tend to favour certain institutions, the

important thing is, first, to establish that they actually do so, second, to explain their preferences and, third, to see the effect of their choices.

According to the hypothesis, the three together determine the institutional involvement in cooperation within a certain issue area and during a certain period. Except for the first one they are issue-related. In addition, they may change over time.

It might seem as if the questions whether institutions make a difference and which institutions will be the dominant ones are very different. Rather, they complement each other. The two criteria related to institutional capability, although connected to specific institutions, also give an indication of the extent to which institutions in themselves are important.
Part II
The Afghanistan Crisis, 1980
Afghanistan and South-West Asia in 1980
Chapter 3.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Issue of Sanctions

3.1. Introduction
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to an intensive exchange of communications among Western states, and in particular between the United States and its main European allies, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Their reactions to the invasion were different, the US being more concerned than any of the other countries. A number of demands made on its allies by the US led in turn to extensive cooperation, involving various countries and institutions.

The American demands were above all for:

- measures in the diplomatic field, for the suspension of aid,
- the introduction of a partial agricultural embargo,
- the cancellation of export credits,
- an embargo on the export of technological and strategic goods to the Eastern bloc, and
- a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games.

The American demands and the European reactions to them, as well as the cooperation that evolved, will be described and analysed in this chapter.

Some initiatives related to the Afghanistan events, however, were also taken on the European side. The United Kingdom presented an initiative for a neutral Afghanistan as a means of resolving the impasse. In addition, all three European countries, now seeing the Middle East as a more crucial area than they did before the Soviet invasion, were very active in increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with this area. This included attempts to bring about a peace agreement between the Arab countries and Israel. The European initiatives concerning a neutral Afghanistan and on the Middle East will also be included in the first case and are the subjects of the following two chapters.

These were not the only European initiatives related to the Afghanistan invasion. Germany shortly after the invasion suggested the introduction of a new work-sharing arrangement among NATO countries in order to cope better with the new situation in the world. The UK proposed new rules for the EPC in order to improve its crisis management mechanism. While these will be mentioned here, they will not be treated as separate cases: the German proposal, while generally endorsed, did not lead to any major discussions among countries or within institutions, and the British proposal, first suggested in early February, was not launched more formally until November 1980, in Lord Carrington’s ‘Übersee speech’.¹

¹ Carrington, 17 Nov. 1980.
An outline such as that decided on for this thesis creates problems in selecting a cut-off date for the analysis: no firm end date can be determined for what in fact constituted continually ongoing cooperation in which the invasion of Afghanistan gradually became less relevant. The decision here is to end the analysis with the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Ankara on 25–26 June 1980 (which was preceded by the Western Economic Summit meeting in Venice on 22–23 June). After these meetings the invasion of Afghanistan is given considerably less emphasis in the communiqués — a sign that the focus on this incident was diminishing. Later events became more prominent: in September 1980 war broke out between Iraq and Iran, and by the end of the year the threat of a Soviet invasion of Poland loomed over Europe.

This chapter together with chapters 4 (The British Proposal for a Neutral Afghanistan) and 5 (The Middle East Initiatives) forms the first case study. Its conclusions are presented in chapter 6 (Conclusions to the First Case Study).

### 3.1.1. The Analysis

In line with the aim of the thesis, the analysis of this case seeks to determine the forces behind cooperation (defined here as ‘mutual and purposeful activities’)

among three countries: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The focus is on cooperation among states and institutions after the invasion of Afghanistan. Basing the analysis on neoliberal institutionalism, described in the previous chapter, I will test the hypothesis that the pattern, content and impact of cooperation between these three states are largely explained by a number of factors, related to institutions, states and the way states cooperate. As described in chapter 2, the pattern relates to the constellations of institutions and countries that are involved in cooperation, the content concerns the areas covered by cooperation and the impact signifies the effect in terms of states’ commitment.

According to neoliberal institutionalism and the hypothesis to be tested here, states seek to establish a pattern, content and impact of cooperation in accordance with their perceived interests. Conflicting, compatible and common interests may all lead to cooperation between them. According to the hypothesis, however, states are also guided by their perceived norms (here defined as rights and obligations), which act as constraints for their behaviour within the institutions to which they belong.

In accordance with neoliberal institutionalist thinking, institutions are believed to have an impact on cooperation in functioning as valued networks and a focal point for coordination. In addition, a more specified hypothesis is tested — that certain factors will determine the influence of institutions: the capability to initiate work quickly, competence within the relevant areas and the support given by countries. (The first two factors are aspects of institutional capability; the third is an external factor.)

States cooperate in a variety of ways, such as informal bi-, tri- and multilateral cooperation. This takes place outside the institutions as well as within them in

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2 See chapter 2.
preparations before meetings and/or in informal meetings between sessions. This cooperation has an important impact on other types of cooperation and may at times seem to have acquired a quasi-institutional character. Among these other types of cooperation are the Franco-German cooperation, established in 1963, and the more elusive *directoire* among the three.

While, as stated in chapter 2, I claim that the pattern, content and impact of cooperation between France, Germany and the UK are largely explained by the theoretical approach to be used, it is clear that other factors influence cooperation as well. Domestic factors are, for example, well known to have an impact on foreign and security policy. In the case of cooperation after the Afghanistan invasion, the upcoming elections in the US and France were frequently mentioned as factors which were influencing their respective presidents’ reactions. While this and other domestic factors of a more or less permanent character may clearly influence cooperation, it is still claimed here that a theory based on the factors mentioned above suffices to explain cooperation. This will be tested by applying the theory under varying circumstances.

3.1.1.1. Time Periods and Method of Analysis

This case has been described as analysing two types of cooperation: that which took place following the American demands for sanctions, and that concerned with the European proposals. Whereas cooperation of the first type continued over a long period of time, the European proposals were dealt with over a fairly limited time period. With the first, time was an important factor. The period under study has therefore been divided into sub-periods.

The *first sub-period* concerns the first few days after the invasion of Afghanistan and relates to the need to establish each country’s first reactions to the invasion. This makes it possible to compare these first reactions with the opinions and views which emerged later in the process of cooperation in order to see whether and how they change. Ideally the initial positions should be ascertained before any contact had been established between actors, since this might result in changes of positions, but this ideal cannot be met here: in this study the decision has been to incorporate reactions up to and including 28 December 1979. The first American statement came on 26 December, whereas those of the European countries were issued on 28 December, which was also the day on which President Jimmy Carter made telephone calls to European leaders. While it is safe to say that the Europeans were well aware of American reactions before they issued their own statements, it is not possible to ascertain whether the telephone conversations took place before those statements were issued. However, it is clear that they had not yet participated in any meeting, since the first, a North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at ambassador level, took place on 29 December.

The *second sub-period* of a few weeks is characterized by several particular features. Important elements were the intense American engagement in information sharing and in seeking to establish a common attitude and behaviour with the aim of forming a joint position by 15 January 1980. This was the day when three
important meetings were to be held: the first EPC meeting, an EC General Affairs Council meeting of foreign ministers, and an NAC meeting.

In terms of the theoretical approach, the analysis of this second sub-period will seek to answer a number of questions. First, by analysing the capabilities inherent in institutions to initiate work quickly and their competences within the relevant areas, it will seek to explain the institutional pattern of cooperation in terms of why some institutions became active as well as its content in terms of why certain institutions cooperated within certain areas. It also seeks to explain the impact of cooperation, as expressed in the effect that institutional agreements had on states’ commitments.

Second, by adding countries’ choices of policy and of cooperation approaches (unilateral, bilateral, trilateral and multilateral), the activities within and outside institutions will be analysed in terms of the dominant element of neoliberal institutionalism – the perceived interests of states.

The third sub-period studied covers the whole period of approximately six months after the invasion. The aim of the analysis of this period is to give a fuller picture of the cooperation among the three countries and within the institutions and to distinguish the differences – if any – between the situation up to 15 January and that during the remainder of the period. It will also give a more complete analysis of how perceived interests, combined with perceived norms and institutions, steered their cooperation.

3.2. Background
Before dealing with cooperation, the background to it should be described. This section includes a description of security relations between the United States and Western Europe, followed by a description of the trade relations between the US and the three European states under study on the one hand and the USSR on the other. It also includes sections on Afghanistan before the invasion and its relations with France, Germany, the UK and the US, as well as one on the events leading up to the invasion.

3.2.1. Security Relations between the United States and Western Europe
The fact that NATO, the leading defence organization, included the United States as well as Western Europe meant that a number of important issues between the US, France, Germany and the UK were also NATO issues. France, since 1966 outside the militarily integrated command of NATO, remained a member of the political part of the organization and was thereby represented in its supreme decision-making body, the NAC.

The military doctrine of NATO, ‘flexible response’, was adopted in 1967. A NATO front was envisaged in which forwardly deployed forces would have the capability to deal with any Soviet non-nuclear attack other than an all-out attack. If these forces were overrun, the West could take nuclear action. In order to dominate the escalation process NATO should have nuclear superiority.

The flexible response doctrine was adopted after several years of discussions in which France had been very critical, interpreting it as a withdrawal of the
American nuclear guarantee: the emphasis on conventional weapons was thought by France to make war more likely since it reduced deterrence against what was perceived as a conventionally superior Warsaw Pact. The French withdrawal from the militarily integrated structure contributed to the adoption in 1967 of flexible response, as it relieved the European NATO nations of their conflict of loyalties. Changes of government had earlier brought to power the favourably inclined Labour Party in the UK and the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Another factor enabling the adoption of flexible response was a compromise on the content of the doctrine between the American view that conventional forces would create the stronger deterrent and the European view that the threat of escalation to nuclear weapons was a more effective deterrent: the formulations were made deliberately ambiguous in order to cover wide areas of difference regarding the circumstances in which escalation would take place.

The concerns within NATO were from now on focused on safeguarding the credibility of flexible response rather than on replacing the doctrine. These efforts centred on nuclear modernization programmes and on efforts in the area of defence with conventional weapons.

The 1970s were characterized by a succession of events and issues in which questions of extended deterrence, credibility and trust became central features. The Kissinger proposal for a new Atlantic Charter in April 1973 was intended to generate a rededication of the Alliance but served only to alienate the Europeans by stressing the status of the US as a world power as compared to the regional character of European interests.³

Some issues served to generate a feeling of distrust between Europe and the US and to contribute to a European desire for what was perceived as a concrete link between them. One such issue was the vacillations of President Carter in connection with the neutron bomb. When Carter in 1978 finally deferred production of the neutron bomb, at a time when agreement within the Alliance on deployment was imminent, the governments in Bonn and London were said to have lost much of their confidence in him.⁴

The question of extended deterrence was vital when modernization of tactical nuclear weapons became an issue. NATO took the so-called ‘double-track decision in December 1979. This dual approach included the deployment of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and 108 Pershing IIs in Western Europe as well as the proposal to initiate arms control measures for this type of weapon.⁵ Among the issues contributing to the decision were the new developments in the Warsaw Pact’s tactical nuclear weapons, such as the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile.⁶ Also highly influential was the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture of October 1977 by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt which was

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³ Kaplan, 1980, p. 3.
much referred to and largely interpreted as a request for long-range nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{7}

Weapons alone, however, could not guarantee that a nuclear conflict would not be limited to Europe. Nor could they ensure that a conflict would involve deeper American commitment before extensive nuclear destruction of Europe took place. The political will of the US was necessary as well, and European countries were highly sensitive to any possible fluctuations in that will.

In addition to the concern related to nuclear issues, there was also great concern in the US as well as Europe regarding the possibilities of maintaining a conventional defence of Europe. The NATO Long-Term Defence Programme, on which a decision had been taken in 1978, reflected the increasing preoccupation with the danger of a surprise attack from the Warsaw Pact. The first of ten task forces, of which nine were related to conventional defence, was set up to consider readiness. Another task force, proposed by the US, was to increase the defence expenditures of NATO countries by some 3 per cent in real terms annually in the period 1979–84.\textsuperscript{8} The improved economic situation in the US and in Europe went a long way to explain the ease with which this programme was accepted.\textsuperscript{9}

It soon became obvious that the 3 per cent goal would not be accomplished, and this realization fuelled the old debate on burden-sharing within NATO, which had resulted earlier in the 1970s in several proposals by Senator Mike Mansfield for the withdrawal of American forces from Europe. The debate also included discussion on the arms trade, which the Europeans considered a one-way rather than a two-way street.

In spite of these long-term controversies the situation in December 1979 was one of relative harmony within the Alliance. This was largely due to what seemed to be the resolution during the year of two long-running issues. One was the double-track decision, agreed upon in December; the other was the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, SALT II, which had been signed on 18 June 1979 by the Soviet Union and the United States but was not yet ratified.\textsuperscript{10}

A new problem had arisen, however, when in October 1979 a number of Americans were taken hostage in Iran. The events in Iran came to interact with those in Afghanistan. Like the Afghanistan invasion, they became an issue of sanctions and of loyalty within the Alliance. While the analysis of the Iran hostage crisis is not part of this study, allusions to some of its effects on cooperation in connection with the Afghanistan issue will be included.

\textsuperscript{7} See \textit{Survival}, vol. 20, no. 1, Jan./Feb. 1978, pp. 2–10 for a full reproduction of the speech (quotation on p. 4).


\textsuperscript{9} Facer, 1985, pp. 38–44.

\textsuperscript{10} Neither of these proceeded according to expectations, however, the former finally leading to the resignation of Schmidt in 1982 and the latter becoming caught up in the Afghanistan crisis.
3.2.2. The US and the Three European States:
Trade Relations with the USSR

Large parts of this chapter will deal with sanctions on the Soviet Union, primarily in areas related to trade, which the US tried to convince its allies to impose. According to the theoretical approach described in chapter 2, the capabilities and vulnerabilities of countries contribute in forming their interests and thereby their policies. Since trade relations indicate in which areas the countries concerned were strong or vulnerable, either as exporters or as importers, they will be described here.

Table 3.1 gives a first indication of the differences between different countries’ trade relations by showing the regional distribution in 1979–1980 between the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and those belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, also called Comecon), the body for economic coordination within the Warsaw Pact. As these figures show, the American share of total East–West trade was quite small at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, whereas the FRG accounted for around a quarter of it. These statistics do not give the whole picture of strategies, strengths and weaknesses, however. Countries’ political approaches to trade as well as their different trade dependences in various areas need to be established.

The United States. There had long been several unique factors in the American view of trade with the Soviet Union. It was seen essentially as a political means and thus a product of the relationship at the time with the USSR. In the early 1970s trade was liberalized, as part of a linkage policy instigated by President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. During Carter’s presidency decisions oscillated between the hard-line position of the National Security Council and the pro-détente and pro-trade positions of the departments of state and commerce.

Another factor was that American legislation permitted East–West export controls to be utilized not only for national security reasons but also for short-term political ones, for instance, to punish states for breaches of certain principles.

Moreover, a variety of domestic actors were powerful in forming American policy. Since 1963 the administration had placated the farm lobby, which had led to a dominance of grain exports, whereas all other types of export were discouraged. There were many domestic actors, all with potentially different opinions on East–West trade policy. In addition, each new administration tended to reorganize and redefine East–West trade laws and procedures. Thus, the chances for a coherent and consistent policy were slim.

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11 See Woolcock, 1982, p. 16.
12 Trade dependence is measured as the proportion of the total trade of a country that is directed towards a particular foreign market. (Woolcock, 1982, p. 17.)
14 Rode, 1985, pp. 184 and 188–191. Kissinger saw liberalization of trade as a concession which was expected to result in political concessions by the East. During the Carter presidency human rights were an important part of the linkage.
Table 3.1. Regional Distribution of East–West Trade, 1979–80

Figures are percentages of total Western imports from and total Western exports to CMEA countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or area</th>
<th>Imports from CMEA 1979</th>
<th>Imports from CMEA 1980</th>
<th>Exports to CMEA 1979</th>
<th>Exports to CMEA 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRG*</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG**</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-9</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD Europe</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes intra-German trade with the German Democratic Republic (GDR).
** Includes intra-German trade.

Source: Based on OECD, Foreign Trade Statistics, Series A.

The American dependence on trade with the CMEA countries in 1979 amounted to only 3.3 per cent of total US exports and 0.6 per cent of total US imports. However, for some sectors this trade was important. Exports were dominated by agriculture, which accounted for 65 per cent of the total. According to American law, export was not a right but a privilege. Its legislative bases were the 1979 Export Administration Act (EAA) for industrial dual-use items and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act List (Battle Act) for arms and munitions. The former was administered by the Department of Commerce, the latter by the Department of State. The Commodity Control List (CCL) contained all items that required a licence for their export. Two types of licence were issued: a qualified general licence (accounting for about 95 per cent of all exports) and a validated licence, which meant that consignments were cleared individually.

The United States had a strong position within CoCom (the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls), and was also the country of origin of many of the technologies under discussion. Seeing trade with the East as a political matter rather than business-related, the United States’ view on which items to include was more stringent than that of other states. The US was, however, also asking for far more exceptions to be made than other states, and its motives for acting were sometimes questioned in Western Europe.

France. The French approach was different. The political element existed in French trade policy as well but was of a different nature and supported by eco-
In 1979, when President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing visited the Soviet Union, a new ten-year economic accord was signed, applying for the period 1980–1990. One month earlier a group of French companies had sold computer equipment to the news agency TASS for the 1980 Summer Olympic Games. This was originally an American deal which President Carter had vetoed because of the trials of dissidents in the USSR.

Three reasons have been given for France’s strong interest in East–West trade. One is that France, being an export-dependent country, has sought to increase its exports and secure employment. Trade with CMEA countries did not account for a major share of French trade: in 1979 it constituted 4.2 per cent of total exports and 3.1 per cent of total imports. However, it was disproportionately important for certain sectors. In 1979 industrial goods and equipment accounted for 44 per cent of France’s exports to the Soviet Union by value, whereas energy imports accounted for 60 per cent of its imports from the Soviet Union.

A second reason that has been suggested was the need to diversify French energy imports for national security reasons. In 1978 net oil imports constituted 94.8 per cent of France’s total oil consumption and 57.1 per cent of its total energy needs. Extensive efforts were made during the 1970s to establish long-term contractual arrangements with Arab oil-producing countries under which oil imports would be paid for by the export of French industrial products, technology, nuclear power reactors and arms. Generally the result of these efforts was meagre, however.

A third reason was considered to be the political aspect of furthering détente and trade in order to maintain Franco-Soviet communication links and thereby contribute as well to a certain independence of policy in relation to other Western countries.

The French wish for independence of action was seen to affect its behaviour towards CoCom, and in particular was seen as a reluctance to follow American policies within CoCom. While it was a member of CoCom, France was reluctant to recognize its existence and was of the opinion that security controls should be decided nationally. However, it maintained an export control list that was not dissimilar from those of Germany or the UK, thus reflecting the CoCom consensus.

*Germany.* Germany was the only country to comply with American requests for a ban on exports of large-diameter pipe to the USSR in 1962–63. In addition, the

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FRG had a restrictive policy on credits which benefited its West European competitors. A change in German policy came with the election of the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party (SPD–FDP) government in 1969. After this break with the policy of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, all German governments pursued similar policies, seeing benefits in continuing trade relations with Eastern Europe.

Germany, like France, was trade-dependent and, while its trade with Eastern Europe was considerable, it did not account for a major share of total trade. Some particular branches, however, were more crucial than others. One reason for the German interest in trade was the opportunity to maintain or increase exports and thereby guarantee employment. Excluding trade with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), in 1979 its exports to CMEA countries accounted for 5.1 per cent of its total exports, of which machinery and transport equipment accounted for 38 per cent. A second reason lay in the structure of Germany’s imports. Excluding the GDR, its imports from the CMEA countries amounted to 5.0 per cent of total imports in 1979. Of these, as in France, energy played a crucial role, accounting for 43 per cent of all imports from CMEA countries. A third reason for Germany’s promotion of trade with the CMEA countries, as with France, was political. The explanation in Germany’s case lay in its need for preserving stability, maintaining détente and keeping contact with the USSR, all with particular reference to its situation as a divided nation, rather than the desire for independence of action. The German experience was that negative sanctions did not work, and its political interest therefore lay in the use of positive sanctions in order to achieve such aims as family reunifications.

The law regulating German exports, the Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG) of 1961, was different from the corresponding American law. The AWG encouraged the granting of licences unless it could be proved that they would be damaging to Germany’s economic or political security.

The German system of export credits was different from those of all the other countries in this study. Commercial bank credits were readily available for the CMEA countries and were guaranteed by the Hermes Insurance Company, acting on behalf of the government.

Two particular factors served as impediments for Eastern trade. One of them was the Eastern shortage of hard currency. The other was the American view of Germany’s Eastern trade policy. While that policy was generally viewed in

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27 Stent, 1985, p. 100.
28 Stent, 1983, p. 44.
29 Steel accounted for 23 per cent, chemicals for 16 per cent and agricultural products for 4 per cent of exports to the CMEA countries. See Woolcock, 1982, table 2, page 18; Stent, 1983, p. 45 and figure 1, Composition of US and German exports to and imports from CMEA, 1979. Stent's source is Roosa, Matsukawa and Gutowski, 1982.
30 Consumer goods accounted for 11 per cent and manufactured goods for 10 per cent of exports. See ibid. The 1978 figures for net oil import dependence were similar to those of France: 96.4 per cent of total oil consumption and 51.8 per cent of total energy needs. See Lieber, 1980, table 1, p. 143.
Germany as contributing to stability and peace, Germany felt pressed to consider the American points of view as well.\textsuperscript{31}

The United Kingdom. Traditionally the UK had maintained a consensus on continuing to trade with the CMEA countries. It was also the leading trade partner of the CMEA countries in the West until the mid-1960s. Together with France, the UK pressed for economic relations to be normalized and for export controls to be limited to include only items of military importance. Essentially both countries preferred national controls to multilateral controls under American leadership.

With the change in policy of the United States and the FRG on supporting trade with CMEA countries, the UK tried to meet the new competition by seeking liberalization of the CoCom rules, by providing favourable credit conditions and by forming East–West trade commissions. As American controls were for some time more restrictive than the British or CoCom controls, British companies’ positions were improved, and the US as a consequence blocked the granting of a licence for certain ICL computers in CoCom. The ‘Wilson credit’ of 1975, while granting favourable terms to the USSR, failed to redress the British trade deficit with the USSR and was criticized by the Conservatives, particularly for being ineffective.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite its efforts, the UK’s trade with CMEA countries fell. Expressed in terms of total trade it was not important for the UK even in the 1950s. In 1979 exports to CMEA states amounted to 2.3 per cent of total British exports – less than for any of the other three states. Imports from the CMEA countries amounted to 2.8 per cent of total imports.\textsuperscript{33}

The structure of British exports and imports was similar to those of the other European states under study. In 1977 machinery accounted for 37 per cent of British exports to the CMEA countries. Petroleum constituted 33 per cent of British imports from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{34} One important difference, however, concerned their respective dependences on oil. From a position of having been 100 per cent dependent on foreign oil in 1960, the UK in 1978 had a net oil dependence of only 43 per cent of total oil and 19.6 per cent of total energy consumption.\textsuperscript{35}

Conclusion. As this short résumé of trade relations demonstrates, the political considerations related to trade with the CMEA countries were different for each of the four countries, varying in type as well as scope, the US being at one end of the spectrum and the UK at the other. Economic factors varied as well, trade dependence being higher in Europe, particularly for France and Germany. Generally export and import dependence was low, however, even if it was higher for certain areas. Trade was very similar in the three European countries under

\textsuperscript{31} Stent, 1983, pp. 46–64.
\textsuperscript{32} Woolcock, 1985, pp. 141–142.
\textsuperscript{33} Woolcock, 1982, table 2, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{34} Chemicals made up 26 per cent and manufactured goods 23 per cent of British exports to the CMEA countries. No figures are available for the extent of the CMEA countries’ oil import dependence. See Woolcock, 1985, table 3, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{35} Lieber, 1980, table 1, p. 143.
study. Exports were mainly industrial goods, machinery and chemicals, whereas imports were made up of energy and raw materials. In contrast, American exports consisted predominantly of grain.  

This section has highlighted some historical traits of trade policy for each country, but no attempt will be made here to analyse any of these differences in more detail. Such a study would certainly shed more light on the reasons behind the different policies and opinions among the Western countries. Even this short survey has, however, demonstrated the considerable distances between the countries – not least that between the European countries and the United States – as regards the political and economic factors related to trade with the USSR. It also gives a background to the policies of these countries towards the Middle East.

3.2.3. Afghanistan Before the Invasion

The strategic position of Afghanistan has contributed to make the history of this country particularly eventful. Commercial as well as military interests have focused on Afghanistan as a route to other areas or as a base from which to pursue political ambitions. During the 19th century Britain invaded the country twice in order to deter Russia from using it as a starting point for an attack on India. On both occasions it had to withdraw and Afghanistan instead became a buffer state, appreciated as such by the Russians as well as by the British. Some British control remained, however, in that Afghan foreign policy was controlled by Great Britain. The third Afghan war, started by King Amanullah in 1919, resulted in the full independence of the country but was also followed by a period of unrest which lasted until 1933, a year which marks the start of 40 years of relative calm under Zahir Shah.  

The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, dating back to 1919, increased sharply after the accession of Mohammed Daoud to the post of prime minister in 1953. The Soviet Union gave economic assistance to such projects as the building of two grain silos as well as technical aid and credit arrangements for the construction of a gasoline pipeline and storage tanks. In 1956 the Soviet Union became involved also in the build-up and modernization of the Afghan army. This involvement in time led to Afghanistan being almost totally dependent on the USSR for spare parts, ammunition and petrol.  

A new era of turmoil started in 1973 when the Afghan monarchy was replaced by a republic. Mohammed Daoud, who had been replaced as prime minister in 1963, now deposed his cousin the king and assumed the posts of president and prime minister. Daoud, although himself not a communist, received some support from members of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Members of this party were also represented in his government. The initially good

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38 Earlier attempts to get American military assistance had been rejected. The main reason was Afghanistan’s demand for autonomy for Pashtunistan, an area within the borders of Pakistan, ally of the US.
relations soured, however, and as a result of changes in government as well as in foreign policy Daoud increasingly appeared less reliable in Moscow. In April 1978 Daoud was overthrown and killed in a coup carried out by the PDPA. While it is not known whether the coup was directly instigated by Moscow, the new regime was immediately recognized diplomatically by the Soviet Union and the relations between the two countries were strengthened. In December 1978 a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation was signed between them and the Soviet presence was now steadily growing. According to a statement on 19 August 1979 by Hafizullah Amin, the prime minister, there were at that time between 1000 and 1500 Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan. The country was receiving wide-ranging financial help and also military aid from the Soviet Union, he said, and claimed that as a result of the Afghan–Soviet Treaty ‘we can do anything to protect our revolution’. The PDPA was not a cohesive party. In 1977, after a ten-year split, the Khalq and Parchim factions had formally agreed to restore party unity. This had not ended their feud, however. After the coup of 1978 fighting soon increased between them. President Nur Mohammed Taraki, leader of the Khalq faction, was able to suppress the Parchim faction but his policies, including a land reform, a literacy campaign which applied also to women, and a sharp reduction in the size of bride payments produced strong negative reactions among rural people and tradition-minded Muslims. Taraki’s situation was aggravated when army units joined his opponents. In September 1979 he was overthrown by his prime minister, Amin, imprisoned and later murdered.

3.2.3.1. France, Germany and the UK

The British political influence in Afghanistan, once of great importance, more or less ended in 1947 with the granting of independence to India and Pakistan. Economic relations declined in importance as well when after the Second World War the US replaced the UK as the major market for karakul skins, the principal export item of Afghanistan. However, the UK still retained some trade with Afghanistan and provided it with some aid.

France and Germany, like the UK, had a long history of relations with Afghanistan, although never of the same significance as the UK’s. After the Second World War, when the main foreign actors were the US and the Soviet Union, France and Germany like the UK maintained trade relations with Afghanistan and continued to provide aid in spite of the fact that on occasions the Soviet Union

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40 Daoud had made rapprochements with Pakistan and Iran and diversified his requests for aid, resulting in proportionately less Soviet aid.
44 Arnold, 1985, pp. 73–84; Bradsher, 1983, pp. 86–116.
chose to cast suspicion on them. Aid continued to be given after the coup of 1978. Afghan newspapers even published articles about Western aid donations.\textsuperscript{46}

3.2.3.2. The United States

Relations between the United States and Afghanistan after the Second World War were strongly influenced by the American commitment to Pakistan and the consequent problems in giving military aid to Afghanistan. Afghanistan received help in several other areas, however, such as construction of roads and airports, and in particular for the Helmand Valley irrigation project. During the period 1950–59 American assistance amounted to US$ 148.3 million, to be compared with the Soviet aid amounting to US$ 246.2 million.\textsuperscript{47}

There was a clear element of competition between the US and the USSR in their relations with Afghanistan. After the Soviet–Afghan arms deal was concluded in 1956, the US had quickly offered assistance in the civilian area. Afghanistan was also offered the opportunity to send students to military schools in the US.\textsuperscript{48} The goal for aid was spelled out in 1958 as being to secure maximum internal political stability, promoting friendly economic relations with Afghanistan’s Free World neighbours, and minimizing any possibility that Afghanistan might be either a victim of or a pathway for Soviet domination in South Asia.\textsuperscript{49} In 1969 the aim was stated to be (1) preserving Afghanistan’s independence and territorial integrity, (2) creating a viable political and economic system that would be responsive through evolutionary change to the needs and desires of the people, (3) preventing Soviet influence in the country from becoming so strong that Afghanistan would lose its freedom of action, and (4) improving Afghanistan’s ties with Pakistan and Iran.\textsuperscript{50} The fact that the American policy goals could not be met has been seen as due to several factors, not least the indecisiveness which characterized the US after the end of the Vietnam War. After the coup of 1978, however, the US saw itself as having little scope for action left in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{51}

The kidnapping and killing of Adolph Dubs, the American ambassador to Afghanistan, in February 1979 led to a severe deterioration in the relations between the two countries. President Carter accused the Soviet Union of involvement in the incident, cut off aid programmes and withdrew most Americans from the country. The spread of guerrilla warfare and the activities of the Soviet Union were now also causing concern in the United States. During 1979 the Soviet Union received a large number of warnings from the United States not to intervene in Afghanistan. On 19 December the signs of the coming events were so

\textsuperscript{46} Nyrop and Seekins, 1986, p. 194; Arnold, 1985, pp. 50 and 88.
\textsuperscript{47} Arnold, 1985, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{48} Bradsher, 1983, pp. 28–29.
\textsuperscript{49} Arnold, 1985, pp. 38–39.
\textsuperscript{50} Bradsher, 1983, p. 51. According to Bradsher this is a policy statement identified as NSCIG/NEA 69-23, as cited in a ‘formulation (that) varies only slightly’ from the original, in airgram no. A-71 from the American Embassy in Kabul, 26 June 1971.
\textsuperscript{51} Arnold, 1985, pp. 130–131.
clear that the US informed a number of other nations that a Soviet force of several divisions was preparing for combat in Afghanistan.\footnote{See Bradsher, 1983, pp. 98–100 and 150–153. The information about American warnings to other governments is taken from British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980, p. xxxv. See also *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, Apr./May 1980, p. 99.}

### 3.2.4. The Events Leading up to the Invasion

In the September 1979 coup, in which Prime Minister Amin took power, the Soviet Union played a certain part. Shortly before the coup Amin had been invited to visit President Taraki. After assurances by the Soviet ambassador, Amin went to the palace, where he was attacked and only just escaped. Thereafter Amin overthrew Taraki and later expelled the ambassador.\footnote{Arnold, 1985, p. 83.}

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan started on 24 December 1979 in the form of a massive airlift. During the following days Soviet airborne troops led an attack on the Darulaman Palace and radio station. President Amin was killed and succeeded by Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parchim group. Within little more than a week some 50,000 Soviet combat troops had arrived in the country and were clashing with Afghan army forces.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 94–95.}

The Soviet behaviour can be seen against a background of profound distrust of Amin. There were doubts as to whether he was a devout Marxist and also as to whether he was capable of holding the country together. A Soviet general, Ivan G. Pavlovskiy, heading a military delegation, arrived in Afghanistan in September and stayed for about a month. He is believed to have left with the impression that Soviet intervention was necessary in order to prevent the disintegration of the country.\footnote{Bradsher, 1983, pp. 152–153; Halliday, 1999.} The Soviet Union was therefore facing the choice of backing out of Afghanistan or invading it.

For the Soviet decision-makers a decision not to intervene must have been seen as leading inevitably to increased American influence in the country. It is difficult, however, to determine how far the decision was a defensive or an offensive one. The ideological element is another factor in the equation whose importance is difficult to assess. Lastly, the Western reaction is likely to have been considered and found to be a bearable cost.\footnote{Amstutz, 1986, pp. 40–45; Bradsher, 1983, pp. 148–163.}

### 3.3. The Reactions up to and including 28 December: Messages to the Soviet Union and the General Public

The first American reaction to the airlift of 24–25 December came on 26 December 1979 as Department of State spokesman William Hodding Carter III read out a statement to news correspondents informing them about the events. The American belief, he declared, was that members of the international community should condemn this blatant military interference in the internal affairs of an independent state. The United States itself would make its views known
This statement was followed the next day by that of Harold Brown, the US secretary of defense, who stated that the Soviet military intervention had contributed to instability in Afghanistan: the United States would certainly protest and felt that international condemnation was in order. American views were also brought to the USSR's attention by Thomas J. Watson, the American ambassador to Moscow, as he met with Mal Tsev, the Soviet deputy foreign minister.

On 28 December the United States sent a formal protest to the Soviet Union in which it called for a withdrawal of Soviet troops. Also on 28 December, President Carter used the 'hot line' to urge the Soviet Union to withdraw and warned of the consequences of a failure to do so. The same night, Carter in a television statement condemned the invasion and reported that Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in reply to the American demands had referred to an Afghan invitation. This was, in Carter's mind, 'obviously false', since President Amin – who, according to Brezhnev, had invited the Soviet Union in – was murdered or assassinated shortly after the USSR carried out its coup.

On 28 December, France and Germany and the UK, after having been informed by Soviet representatives, all issued statements expressing their concerns at the situation. The declaration from the French Foreign Ministry stated that the French Government, having taken note of the Soviet explanations, still found that the present situation could arouse legitimate worries for the peace and stability of the region as well as for the fate of the Afghan people, with which France had been connected by ties of friendship and cooperation for half a century. The declaration further recalled that in this part of the world, as in others, peace and progress could only be based on the right to self-determination and sovereignty of all states. In the German declaration, presented by a government spokesman, the situation was described as 'extremely momentous and grave' and as 'raising basic questions of international relations'. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) condemned the invasion in a declaration expressing the belief that the people of

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57 Hodding Carter, 26 Dec. 1979, p. 65.
58 FT, 28 Dec. 1979; Europe, 29 Dec. 1979, p. 3.
59 Keesing's, 9 May 1980, p. 30232. In his television speech Carter mentioned that he had been speaking on the telephone the same day with several other heads of state and government (France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan and the UK) and that he was sending Warren Christopher, deputy secretary of state, to Europe for consultations with NATO allies.
60 Ibid. After repudiating Western allegations of Soviet interference in Afghanistan on 23 December, Pravda on 30 December described the invasion as a response to a request for aid by the Afghan Government which was caused by external interference from the United States, China and Pakistan. The Soviet aid to Afghanistan, according to Pravda, was aimed to prevent armed interference from other countries. Troops would therefore be withdrawn as soon as they were no longer needed. Similar information was given by TASS on 20 December. (NATO's Fifteen Nations, Apr./May 1980, pp. 99–100.)

Brezhnev, in addition to his answers to the Western leaders, also stated his position in the Soviet press. On 12 January he defended the Soviet policy in an article in Pravda in the same way as previously. In this article he also called the US an 'absolutely unreliable partner' but expressed his belief in a future of détente in Western Europe. (Keesing's, 9 May 1980, p. 30236.)
Afghanistan had the right to choose their own government without outside interference.\textsuperscript{61} As to the contents of the four statements, they were all unanimous in their view of the invasion as a serious incident. Although they were expressed in slightly different ways, none of them demonstrated any understanding for the Soviet action. The evaluations of the invasion, to the extent that they can be seen from these short statements, are therefore very similar. The US is conspicuous in one particular respect in these statements as the only country which indicated what it expected of other countries. As will be seen below, the attitude to this varied among the allies.

3.4. The Period up to 15 January
In the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States played a particular role. As seen above, in its very first statements the US hinted at what other countries were expected to do and to a great extent it dominated the continued Western exchange. This part of the chapter will therefore begin by describing the American evaluations and initiatives.

3.4.1. The United States

3.4.1.1. The American Evaluation of the Invasion
The \textit{seriousness} of the invasion was a recurrent theme of the statements by the American leadership. In his television appearance on 28 December 1979 President Carter called the invasion ‘a threat to world peace’. The president’s address to the nation of 4 January 1980 and Ambassador Donald F. McHenry’s statement to the UN General Assembly of 12 January pointed out that the invasion posed a serious threat not only to countries in South-West Asia but also elsewhere. President Carter in his briefing to members of Congress on 8 January even labelled it ‘the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War’ and declared that, in his judgement, ‘our own Nation’s security was directly threatened’. Comparing it to the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Carter saw the invasion of Afghanistan as more serious since the other two countries were already subservient to the USSR. Using more cautious language, he stated in his State of the Union address of 23 January that it could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.\textsuperscript{62}

The issue of Soviet \textit{motives} is closely related to that of the gravity of the situation. Apart from the more limited one of securing control in Afghanistan, it was suggested that more expansionist motives might exist. Carter, in his address to the nation of 4 January, spoke of an extremely serious threat of further Soviet expansion into neighbouring countries. On 8 January he described the motives as follows: ‘There is no doubt that the Soviets’ move, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again and again


until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world’s oil supplies.63

A striking feature in the statements of the president is his change from the present tense used on 4 January to the past tense when describing the threat as seen in the two quotations of his 8 January speech. In the president’s mind the American responses had apparently reduced the Soviet threat.64

3.4.1.2. The American Initiatives

The United States, in concordance with its view of the Soviet invasion as a very serious incident, assumed a very active role at an early stage, condemning the invasion and delivering protests to the Soviet Union. President Carter interrupted his vacation on 28 December and returned to Washington for meetings with his closest aides and the National Security Council.65

In order to demonstrate to the Soviet Union how serious a view the United States took of the invasion, some specific measures were taken. On 2 January the American ambassador to Moscow was recalled for consultations, as was the ambassador to India. On 3 January President Carter, while reaffirming his commitment to SALT II, asked the Senate to adjourn the debate on the ratification of the treaty. The objective was still, he said, that it should be ratified and enter into force; ‘however, in the light of the events in Afghanistan, we believe that other issues should now take higher priority for the moment’. His action was greeted with satisfaction by critics as well as supporters of the treaty.66

A number of sanctions were announced in the president’s address to the nation on 4 January. Apart from a delay in the opening of any new American or Soviet consular facilities, as well as deferral of most of the cultural and economic exchanges under consideration, three particular areas of exports were singled out: no sales of high-technology or other strategic items to the Soviet Union would be licensed; and fishing privileges for the Soviet Union would be severely curtailed. In addition, there would be no delivery of 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union, in excess of the 8 million tons which the US was committed to sell. This grain, it was pointed out, was for building up livestock herds, not for human consumption. As regards the Olympic Games, President Carter stated that the US would prefer not to withdraw but warned the Soviet Union that its aggressive actions might lead to participants and spectators not attending. He drew attention to the military and other help which the United States and other countries would be supplying to Pakistan and, if needed, to other countries to defend their independence.67

64 See also US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981a, p. 19. The authors of this report compare the 4 January words with those of the 23 January speech and attribute the change in tone to the reaction in the US and abroad, according to which the earlier view was an exaggeration.
65 Keesing’s, 9 May 1980, p. 30232.
During the following week these decisions were implemented in various ways. With respect to the export to the USSR of high-technology and other strategic items, on 8 January President Carter sent memoranda to the secretary for commerce and to the secretaries of state and defence, asking them to review and revise the American policy. The following day he ordered a total halt to the export of goods covered by validated licences pending completion of the review.\(^{68}\) The president also instructed the two latter secretaries to consult with their CoCom partners ‘to reexamine precedents established in the past for CoCom exceptions, in order to secure their cooperation’.\(^{69}\) The fishing restrictions were enforced by sending coastguard cutters to the Bering Sea. The US also asked 17 Russians who were in the process of setting up a consulate in New York to leave, and told Aeroflot to reduce the number of its flights to the US from three to two per week.\(^{70}\)

There appears to have been little hope among the Americans that sanctions would lead to a Soviet withdrawal, even though this expectation was expressed by Warren Christopher, deputy secretary of state, on 6 January. On other occasions Christopher himself, as well as President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, declared that such a development was hardly likely, and that sanctions were being introduced in order to make it clear to the USSR that it would continue to pay a heavy price as long as it remained in Afghanistan or in order to ensure that the USSR understood that aggression would be countered wherever it occurred.\(^{71}\) These statements can be compared with those of Carter which might attribute the decline of threat to responses to the invasion. Thus, it seems that the introduction of sanctions in American eyes was seen as having possibly reduced the threat by leading to a halt in Afghanistan, but not more than that.

The American effort to achieve a coordinated response among allied countries took several forms and started early. On 28 December Carter made the first telephone calls to heads of state and government in France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan and the UK.\(^{72}\) Warren Christopher left for Europe, where he attended the meetings in London on 31 December and in Brussels on 1 January. Back in Europe again on 14 January, he visited London and Rome just before the NATO and EC meetings, and Bonn and Paris immediately after.\(^{73}\) In addition, according to newspaper reports, American ambassadors during the first days of January were making calls to a number of foreign ministries in order to plan responses to the invasion.\(^{74}\)

Most of the admonitions were made behind closed doors. On 6 January 1980, however, Christopher in an interview pointed out measures which the United States expected of its allies. First, it expected that they would not move in to

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\(^{68}\) For an explanation of these terms see section 3.2.2 on ‘The US and the Three European States: Trade Relations with the USSR’.


\(^{70}\) \textit{Keesing’s}, 9 May 1980, p. 30235.


\(^{72}\) \textit{Keesing’s}, 9 May 1980, p. 30235.

\(^{73}\) \textit{NYT}, 18 Jan. 1980.

supply the grain which the US had denied the Soviet Union. Second, they should terminate their aid programmes for Afghanistan. Third, the allies were expected to react with respect to their diplomatic representation. Finally, some activities parallel to the American ones in the economic field were expected. Christopher mentioned the denial of export credits as an example.\(^{75}\)

3.4.2. Western Contacts and Cooperation: 15 January 1980
Among the Western countries, and in particular between the US, France, the UK and Germany, contacts and cooperation were intensive and varied during the weeks following the invasion of Afghanistan.\(^{76}\)

This section and section 3.4.3 will deal with cooperation within NATO, the UN, the EC, the EPC and the WEU,\(^{77}\) and will include one ad hoc meeting – that in London on 31 December 1979. Sections 3.4.4 to 3.4.6 will deal with the evaluations, initiatives and contacts emanating from the three West European countries under study, as well as their cooperation outside institutions.

3.4.2.1. The London Meeting
The meeting on 31 December 1979 between Warren Christopher for the United States and representatives of Canada, France, the FRG, Italy and the UK took part within a group of states independently of any institutional affiliation. The differences between the statements relevant to all aspects of this meeting give an indication of the differences in the views on how to react to the invasion of Afghanistan.

The first problem concerned which group should meet in order to discuss these issues. According to Douglas Hurd, minister of state at the British FCO,\(^{78}\) the US had felt that a reasonable procedure was for a small group consisting of the countries most concerned to meet first before the process of consultation branched out to include a large number of institutions.\(^{79}\) His French counterpart, Jean François-Poncet, gave another explanation at a press conference – that the meeting was originally planned to take place in Brussels within the NATO framework, but this had been changed at the insistence of the French, who had pointed to the fact that the conflict was taking place outside the territory covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.\(^{80}\)

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\(^{75}\) Christopher, 6 Jan. 1980, p. 6.

\(^{76}\) A number of contacts were also made with Rome, as Italy held the presidency of the EC during the first part of 1980.

\(^{77}\) See chapter 2 and appendix 1 for a discussion on the selection of organs and for a survey of their formal rules.

\(^{78}\) Douglas Hurd was third in rank at the FCO. Lord Carrington, the foreign secretary, being a member of the House of Lords, spoke there. Sir Ian Gilmour deputized for him in the House of Commons and occupied a seat in the Cabinet.

\(^{79}\) Hurd, 14 Jan. 1980. This explanation was given when a Member of Parliament asked why the London meeting had been restricted to only four EC members.

Another difference of view concerned the purpose of the meeting. The press communiqué published after the meeting stated in general terms that the meeting had been summoned in order to examine the serious situation created by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. A more specific purpose was given by Douglas Hurd, according to whom it was called ‘to discuss what steps might be taken’. In another statement Hurd and Christopher both stressed that the London meeting was not for decision-making. The first priority was to ‘nail the Russians’ by getting action at the UN.

As to the results of the London meeting the press communiqué issued afterwards was vague. It stated inter alia that representatives had given their respective governments the appropriate recommendations in the spirit of the public declarations already made. British and American oral statements to the press were more specific, however. Christopher stated that he had found broad support for a number of measures, including a review of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and individual NATO countries. The issues included Western relations with other states in the region and a referral of the question to the United Nations. After having said this Christopher declined to answer further questions. Hurd, however, confirmed to the press that the meeting had actually dealt with American requests for a reconsideration by the European countries of commercial, sporting and cultural exchanges with Moscow and even participation in the Summer Olympics in Moscow. British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, for his part, stated in a television interview that ‘We had a consultation about what we should do and what measures we should take and one of the things we decided to do was to go to the United Nations’ Security Council.

In Paris the attitude was one of considerable irritation. The official reaction at the Quai d’Orsay was to refer to the press communiqué, published by the six delegations, as the only valid text which treated this subject. According to what ‘French authoritative sources’ told *Le Monde*, the agreement among the participants at the meeting was that comments should be kept to the content of the communiqué and Christopher had gone beyond this in his comments to the press. According to the same sources the agreement in diplomatic circles was that an honourable way out should be left for Moscow in order to permit the withdrawal

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87 Carrington, 3 Jan. 1980.

(paragraph 32): ‘Nato should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonising their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now divide the world.’
of its troops. According to Le Monde, the Quai d’Orsay had indicated that Christopher alone was responsible for his comments and that the opinions of the other participants at the meeting were considerably more prudent. The newspaper furthermore claimed that the assumption that France would modify or break off its diplomatic contacts with Afghanistan because of the Soviet occupation was seen in Paris as completely without foundation.

François-Poncet, when asked about the meeting, was reported to have declared with obvious irritation that it had been a meeting in which the allies had been informed of unilateral activities already undertaken by the US. In contrast to Hurd he claimed that no one had demanded anything from the French. The meeting had only served to explore the subject through an exchange of information. He further underlined that France did not understand why its diplomacy should suddenly be aligned with that of other states. Consulting with its partners was one thing, but to engage in a collective decision-making process, which would jeopardize the independent character of the activities which France intended to undertake, was a different matter. When asked by a journalist whether France would not seek concerted action even in a purely European context, he replied that France naturally did this, regularly and with great success.

In conclusion, the effect of the London meeting was to bring up for discussion all the issues that could be contested: which institution(s) should meet, what would be the purpose of its (their) meetings and in which way were the participating countries to handle disagreements among themselves? At this stage a clear dividing line on these issues was formed between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and France on the other, with Germany assuming an at least outwardly passive role.

3.4.2.2. NATO Meetings

The Meetings of 29 December and 1 January

NATO dealt with the Afghanistan crisis mainly through the NAC, its highest authority. Usually the countries at these meetings are represented by their permanent representatives (at ambassador level), but on occasions during this period they raised their level of representation. The NAC, according to NATO’s statutes, has the same status regardless of whether it meets at ambassadorial or ministerial level or at heads of state and government level, and its decisions have equal value. While its meetings ordinarily take place every week, it now met twice during a short period of time.

89 Ibid., p. 3.
90 Ibid.
91 As France had pointed out, because it was outside the territory covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, Afghanistan could not be the subject of NATO activities. In so far as the deliberations within NATO concerned specific actions, they could therefore only involve the coordination of activities pursued by individual states. Political consultation within NATO is not limited to its territorial area.
The first meeting was in special session and took place on Saturday 29 December. It was reported to have been mostly devoted to a detailed report by the American representative. Since NAC meetings at ambassadorial level are of an informal character, they do not usually result in any written or oral statements. This time, however, a communiqué was issued, stating briefly that the Council had met in a special session to discuss the Soviet military intervention and would continue its close and extensive consultations. In addition, on this occasion, Joseph Luns, NATO secretary general and chairman of the meeting, issued a statement in which he called the Soviet action a ‘gross interference’ in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and ‘a matter of major concern to the entire international community’.  

The other special session of the Council took place on 1 January 1980, when Warren Christopher was present as well. A similar short communiqué again reported that the Council would continue its close consultations on this matter. Again Luns made a declaration in his own name, calling the Soviet aggression ‘a flagrant violation of international law and peace’. Noting that this was the first time the Soviet Union had used its military power directly and massively in a country that did not belong to the Soviet bloc, he stated that: ‘More than ever, solidarity and unity of purpose and decision between the allies is imperative.’  

Officials present at the 1 January meeting reported to the media that discussions had taken place regarding the Olympic Games, the stopping of export credits, cultural exchanges and the sales of grain, but no decisions had been taken and consultations were therefore to continue. Furthermore, according to reports from representatives attending, working groups would be set up and there would be more consultations within the next few days. The press reported that the issue of an Olympic boycott had been raised by the West German ambassador to NATO, Rolf Pauls, thereby catching German officials by surprise. Pauls and other German officials later made efforts to play down the significance of these statements.

For both meetings the vagueness of the joint communiqué, in particular in contrast to the views expressed by Luns, gives a strong indication of lack of unanimity among member states. The American-dominated atmosphere of the two NATO meetings was described by the then British ambassador to NATO, Sir Clive Rose. He depicted the meetings according to a list of categories for NATO meeting procedures: the meetings began by being category 3 consultations (‘advance warning of actions, or decision, with a view to receiving the comments of allies and/or their endorsement’) but soon became category 2 meetings (‘communication of actions or decision which have already been taken or are imminent’).  

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94. Ibid.
96. NATO Review, vol. 31, no. 1, 1983. See also appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.
The Meeting of 15 January

Following the London and NATO meetings, ‘reprisal lists’ were to be sent to the Political Committee at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In these member states were to set out the sanctions that they might take against the Soviet Union. The lists did not arrive, however, and it became clear that among the three big European states only the UK was totally behind the idea. In what was seen as an attempt to speed up the process, the US sought bilateral contacts with the various capitals by asking its ambassadors to visit the foreign ministers. Meanwhile the process continued within NATO aiming at a coordinated response.

The US had expectations of the NAC meeting of 15 January. Eight of the 15 member states were represented by high-ranking officials from their capitals, whereas seven were represented at ambassador level. Warren Christopher, when interviewed at the airport before leaving for Europe, declared that ‘the US has taken strong steps and we are expecting our allies to join us’. He added that the US sought coordination of the allies’ restrictions on the export of high-technology goods and joint action with the allies on aid to Pakistan. Christopher himself and other American officials also announced to the press, however, that the major purpose of the meeting was to gain a consensus on the nature of the problem, but that action which was to be taken by individual governments was up to those governments. It was a question of taking ‘parallel or concerted action’ according to Christopher. This view was underlined by officials from other member states as well.

NATO Secretary General Luns again issued a written declaration after the meeting. Although issued in his own name, it was claimed to represent the consensus of the proceedings. He also indicated that members had approved it. The Soviet invasion was said to contravene fundamental principles of international behaviour and to represent a serious blow to the Alliance efforts to build a framework of constructive relations with the Soviet Union. The allied governments had taken and were considering measures to make clear to the Soviet Union ‘the deep concern with which they view the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, their belief that détente is indivisible and must be reciprocal, and their conviction that actions of this sort cannot be taken with impunity’. The allies had also expressed their conviction that ‘efforts in the pursuit of detente to which they remain committed will be gravely undermined so long as Soviet forces occupy Afghanistan. Each member was to take appropriate individual measures and steps, and all agreed that actions taken by one should be taken into account by other member states.’

No detailed account of discussions or decisions was presented, even though, according to Luns, ‘nearly all countries gave a list’ of the actions they were

100 *AN*, 17 Jan. 1980.
planning. In addition, ‘nearly all countries’ mentioned the need for more aid for Pakistan and ‘some countries even gave details’ of what they planned to give.\textsuperscript{103} He also declared that this was ‘a very useful and very positive meeting’ and that ‘there was consensus on the need to take parallel action, though not necessarily the same action at the same time, and we will be consulting further in the weeks ahead about the measures to be taken.’\textsuperscript{104}

The American reports were positive as well. Christopher stated that he was encouraged that there seemed to be ‘a good measure of support for a restrictive high-technology list’ and that there was ‘broad support for following that list in a disciplined way’. According to an anonymous American official there was strong support for the idea that no NATO state should deviate from the CoCom list currently under preparation. There was also a ‘good measure of support among the European allies for withdrawing or restricting subsidies or credits to the Soviet Union’. Finally, Christopher was encouraged by what seemed to be a determination among the allies not to undermine or undercut steps that the United States might take with respect to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{105} As regards the Olympic Games both Christopher and the American ambassador to NATO, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr, underlined that a number of countries were questioning the appropriateness of Moscow as the site.\textsuperscript{106} Bennett also excused the lack of European support by referring to the shortness of the time available between the American announcement and the 15 January meeting. He said further that individual NATO countries would be announcing their lists of measures in the next few days and weeks.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{The Results of the NATO Meetings}

A comparison between the statements from the three NATO meetings reveals a clear difference between those of 29 December and 1 January on one side, and that of 15 January on the other. This is particularly true when the tone of the two joint statements of 29 December and 1 January is compared with that of Luns’ ‘consensus declaration’ of 15 January: the latter is considerably sharper. The declaration of 15 January also differs from earlier statements by Luns in reflecting a more detailed analysis of the effects of the invasion and a unity which had previously not been expressed on the need to take account of other states’ actions.

However, in spite of the positive reports from American and NATO officials, the results of the three meetings must be seen as a failure for the Americans compared to what they had previously stated as their goals. On no single issue had a joint agreement been reached apart from the generally formulated promise of 15 January that the actions taken by one should be taken into account by other member states. In participants’ interviews after the 15 January meeting France was frequently mentioned as being negative to coordinated action. France was said to prefer to conduct its policy individually in the fields of high technology and export

\textsuperscript{103} See the report of the press conference in \textit{AN}, 17 Jan. 1980.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Guia.}, 16 Jan. 1980, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{AN}, 18 Jan. 1980.
credits. Greece and Turkey were also mentioned as being reluctant to introduce the suggested trade embargo.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{3.4.2.3. The United Nations}

The UN Security Council met on 5 January 1980 after a petition had been tabled by the UK and signed by a large number of other countries calling for an urgent meeting to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. France was not among these countries.\textsuperscript{109} The reason for this, according to the French statement in the Security Council, was the particular responsibilities of the French delegation at a time when France was chairing the Security Council.\textsuperscript{110} Le Monde, furthermore, declared that France as chairman of the Security Council did not have to take part in signing the petition.\textsuperscript{111}

The US, the UK, France and Germany in their statements to the Security Council all commented on the Soviet explanations and allegations related to the Afghanistan invasion in a tone of utter disbelief. They brought up inconsistencies such as a supposed Afghan request for military assistance which must have been written after the invasion had started and which furthermore resulted in the leadership being executed by the invaders. The Western powers also commented on the Soviet references to Article 51 of the UN Charter, on the right of self-defence, and to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1978 between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Both these were seen as totally inappropriate as a basis on which to legitimize the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan was attacked, not supported, by the Soviet Union, and a Security Council meeting was therefore in order so that peace and security could be restored.\textsuperscript{112}

France and Germany in their comments also brought up the subject of détente. Both their statements referred to détente as being indivisible and therefore damaged by the Soviet action. The Germans recalled the long-standing cooperation in Europe between the Soviet Union and the FRG, which they believed had been an important contribution to securing peace, and statements on the indivisibility of peace and security in all parts of the world in the declaration signed by Schmidt and Brezhnev in 1978. The Germans could now see how the principles had been pursued in real life and they were disappointed. The French emphasized that détente, relying on mutual confidence, was now undermined by the Soviet policies. French confidence in the Soviet Union would be seriously shaken if the latter did not withdraw from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{113}

As expected, the draft resolution calling for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan was vetoed by the Soviet

\textsuperscript{109} Europe, 5 Jan. 1980, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{110} ‘Texte de l’intervention française . . . 7 janvier 1980’, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{111} LeM, 5 Jan. 1980.
\textsuperscript{113} ‘Texte de l’intervention française . . . 7 janvier 1980’; and ‘Erklärung im VN-Sicherheitsrat’, ibid.
Union. There were 12 votes in favour of the motion, one abstention (Zambia) and two votes against (the USSR and the GDR). Also as expected, an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly was convened.\footnote{114 \textit{Europe}, 9 Jan. 1980. For the draft resolution of the Security Council see \textit{DSB}, Jan. 1980, p. D. The General Assembly may be summoned by the secretary-general, if the Security Council so wishes, or by a majority of member states. See appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.


In the \textit{General Assembly} meeting, which started on 10 January, the Soviet Union repeated its declarations referring to Article 51 and the Treaty of Friendship, and the US, the UK, France and Germany in their turn reiterated their mistrust of the Soviet declarations. They also repeated their demands for the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan. The tone of the statements was somewhat different, however, in the phrasing of the demands for a Soviet withdrawal. The United States used harder language than any of the other states in phrases such as: ‘It is imperative that we demonstrate that we cannot be duped into ignoring our responsibility to defend the principles of the charter by tortured explanations that insult our intelligence.’ The US also underlined its demands with illustrations of sanctions (such as withdrawal from cultural exchanges, trade missions and the 1980 Olympics) which, it was claimed, the United States and other nations were considering in order ‘to further demonstrate to the Soviet Union the magnitude of its error’. The other states expressed the same demands in a different way: the UK declared that ‘only by immediately withdrawing its forces could the Soviet Union right this wrong and restore its standing in the international community’ and Germany assigned to the General Assembly the task of making it clear to the Soviet Union that the community of states was now waiting for it to withdraw its forces at once. France again launched an appeal to the Soviet Union to withdraw immediately and unconditionally. Only then could the confidence in the Soviet Union that was necessary for détente be restored.\footnote{115}

The Italian delegate, as representative of the country holding the EC Presidency, made a declaration in the name of all EC countries. In this he iterated the view that the EC states could not accept the Soviet claim that its intervention was justified by the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Nine furthermore stated that they saw an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghan territory as necessary in order to re-establish mutual confidence – the basis for détente – which had been jeopardized by the invasion.\footnote{116}

The meeting ended with a resolution, taken by 104 votes to 18, with 18 abstentions. It called for ‘the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan’. It also asked the Secretary-General to keep member states and the Security Council informed of all progress towards the implementation of the resolution and asked the Security Council to consider ways of implementation.\footnote{117}
None of the four countries suggested that UN sanctions should be applied to the Soviet Union. This was not surprising, considering the fact that such decisions are taken by the Security Council, where they would have been stopped by a Soviet veto.\footnote{As Kim Richard Nossal points out, the UN Charter gave the international community the benefit of a flexible response. This was in contrast to the Covenant of the League of Nations, according to which in a situation such as the invasion of Afghanistan sanctions were required. (See Nossal, 1987.)}

Comparing the behaviour and the statements of the four countries within the UN, they fall well into the pattern seen at the London meeting and the NATO meetings. Thus, while the evaluations of the invasion were strikingly similar, countries disagreed on the proper steps to be taken, the US being more eager than any of the others to apply sanctions. On the matter of which institution to use, the French stood out in not signing the petition to the UN Security Council. Considering their evaluation of the invasion, however, it is not likely that this signified a reluctance to proceed within the UN. Confident that a sufficient number of countries would sign, France might well have used this policy to emphasize its independent policy and its special position as chairman of the Security Council.

The result of the meetings is likely to have been roughly similar to what was expected. A Soviet veto in the Security Council was certain. The benefit of the discussions in the Security Council and the General Assembly – and the reason why the matter was brought to the UN – was most likely the opportunity to demonstrate to the world how hollow and inconsistent the Russian explanations were. In that sense the Russians were, as Hurd and Christopher envisaged, ‘nailed’.

3.4.2.4. The EC

The Suspension of Aid

The EC reacted early on the issue of aid to Afghanistan. On 3 January measures were taken to suspend the implementation (not yet begun) of the 1979 programme for food aid. At the meeting of the Commission of the European Communities on 9 January, the first session after the invasion, Claude Cheysson, commissioner for development, further proposed that the aid be replaced by indirect aid through international relief institutions. At the Council meeting on 15 January the temporary suspension by the Commission was followed up by the cancellation of the aid programme and its replacement by emergency aid for Afghan refugees.\footnote{Bull. EC, no. 1, Jan. 1980, p. 47; Europe, 4 Jan. 1980; Europe, 10 Jan. 1980.}

An Agricultural Embargo

On the issue of agricultural exports, some measures were taken at the Commission meeting of 9 January and that of its Management Committee on Cereals on 10 January. These were announced as technical and temporary, pending the grain exporters’ meeting on 12 January and the EC Council meeting on 15 January. France refused to participate in the voting in the committee, and several other member states apparently abstained; in the end, however, their opinions were given, enabling the Commission to act. These measures implied the halting of
exports of grain and poultry-meat. Similar measures were taken on 11 January as regards butter and butter-oil.\textsuperscript{120}

Some days earlier President Giscard d’Estaing had given assurances that France would not supply grain to substitute for the American grain withheld from the Soviet Union. President Carter had contacted him, France having substantial stockpiles of grain ordinarily at hand.\textsuperscript{121} In order to pursue the issue of allies supporting the American policy of a grain embargo, a meeting was held in Washington on 12 January. Canada, Australia and the EC, the latter represented by Claude Villain, director general for agriculture – reiterated their promises not to supply grain to replace American grain, whether directly or indirectly, on the Soviet market. They also agreed to set up a group to supervise the trade flows for grain.\textsuperscript{122}

At the EC General Affairs Council meeting of 15 January,

The Council laid down the principle that Community deliveries must not replace, directly or indirectly, United States deliveries on the USSR market. With this in mind, the Council requested the Commission to take the necessary measures as regards cereals and products derived therefrom and to propose other possible measures for other agricultural products while respecting traditional patterns of trade. A consultation procedure was being instituted with the other main cereal-exporting countries in order to avoid disturbances on the world market.\textsuperscript{123}

France and the UK, in particular, were at odds when discussing agricultural sanctions. Their disagreement concerned above all the question of butter. According to Sir Ian Gilmour, deputy for Lord Carrington in the House of Commons, solidarity with Washington implied the extension of the existing embargo on grain supplies to all other farm products. The British were in favour of suspending butter exports, not seeing them as part of the ‘traditional pattern of trade’, while France and some other countries opposed this. The French foreign minister argued that, since the US was not a supplier of butter to the Soviet Union, the EC would not be undermining any American sanctions by exporting it. It was also at the instigation of the French delegation that the statement included the instruction that ‘traditional patterns of trade’ should be respected. Thus, the earlier decision was revoked and, in addition to butter, exports of wine, poultry and sugar were also to continue.\textsuperscript{124} In the discussion between the French and the British, the Germans were reported to have expressed understanding for the British viewpoint. In the end, however, they supported maintaining the normal level of trade.\textsuperscript{125}

In conclusion, while the EC countries had heeded the American demands on others not to move in to supply the grain that the US had denied the Soviet


\textsuperscript{121} Carter, 8 Jan. 1980.


\textsuperscript{125} FAZ, 5 Feb. 1980.
Union, it was by no means a full victory for the Americans. The Council was less forthcoming to the Americans than the previous decision by the Commission and the issue was not yet finally determined.

**Export Credits and Technological Embargo**

Another area in which the United States asked for European support was that of export credits to the USSR. The issue was brought up at the EC Council meeting of 15 January without any specific decision being taken. The Council merely declared that, apart from the items previously mentioned, ‘other possible measures should be examined concerning trade, with particular reference to export credits’. According to *Europe* this was a last-minute addition. Efforts were now to be made to reach an agreement on keeping credit at its present level by granting new credit only as previous loans were repaid. Compared to any expectations the Americans may have harboured, this outcome must have been a disappointment.

Regarding the technological embargo it seems that, in contrast to the NATO meeting, the EC Council meeting did not discuss it. NATO’s remit was certainly more closely related to the issue of a technological embargo, of which the main purpose was to deny the USSR an increased military capability. The most relevant institution, however, as described above, was CoCom, which would deal with the issue from now on.

**3.4.2.5. The EPC**

In sharp contrast to the early reaction of the EC, the EPC did not hold its first meeting after the invasion until 15 January. On this day the foreign ministers met not only as the EC General Affairs Council to discuss inter alia Afghanistan sanctions, but also within the EPC. In the EPC they reaffirmed their grave concern about the invasion, which they labelled ‘a serious violation of the principles of international relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations’ and ‘a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a non-aligned country’, constituting ‘a threat to peace, security and stability in the region, including the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and the Arab world’. Furthermore, ‘convinced that détente is indivisible and has a global dimension’, they urged the Soviet Union to allow the Afghan people to determine their own future without foreign interference.

According to the rules of the EPC, a meeting could have been called earlier only if all nine foreign ministers had agreed to this. Reportedly, France was not willing to call a meeting before 15 January and therefore none of the others formally asked for it. The EPC’s lack of activity was deplored by Lord Carrington, who referred to it when presenting his initiative on a new structure of this type of cooperation, first launched at the EPC meeting of 5 February. According to *The Economist*, his suggestion was that every individual state was to be given the right to

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127 See section 3.5.1.
call a meeting. When it was outlined in greater detail in July and November, the proposal was that three states would be needed to trigger a crisis meeting.\textsuperscript{129}

3.4.2.6. The WEU

The WEU, despite being an organization for which security was the central issue, remained passive during this period. The Ministerial Council, the only organ with a mandate to formulate opinions and act, did neither. Nor were there reports of any meetings of the Permanent Council. Such meetings were generally not reported, however.\textsuperscript{130} A reason for this may have been that the Permanent Council, which was made up of the member states’ ambassadors to London and a British FCO employee, and met under the chairmanship of the secretary-general, had a very limited mandate. It was confined to ‘discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the Ministers and to follow up their decisions’.\textsuperscript{131}

The WEU furthermore included a small secretariat and a Parliamentary Assembly. Kai-Uwe von Hassel, president of the Assembly, felt compelled by comments regarding WEU inactivity to make a statement. In this he pointed out a recommendation made by the Assembly at its December 1979 meeting in which it invited the Ministerial Council either directly or indirectly, through their membership of the EPC, to discuss the events in Afghanistan and Iran. Von Hassel drew attention to Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty: ‘At the request of any of the High Contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability’. He deplored the fact that the Council was required to meet only at the request of one of its members, not at the request of the Assembly.\textsuperscript{132}

Shortly after this statement the Committee of Presidents, the governing body of the Assembly, at a meeting deplored the fact that no government of a WEU member state had found it appropriate to demand the convening of a Council meeting and that the Assembly, the only European one competent in defence matters, should have to remind the WEU governments of their responsibilities.\textsuperscript{133}

3.4.3. Conclusion: The Outcome as Explained by Institutional Capability

In this first conclusion the pattern, content and impact of the cooperation taking place during the first three weeks following the invasion are explained according to what is here called institutional capability.

\textsuperscript{129} Econ., 9 Feb. 1980; Europe, 6 Feb. 1980. The British initiative was mainly pursued after the period dealt with in this study. It was first outlined in detail by Douglas Hurd in Parliament (see Hurd, 31 July 1980, cols 1873–1876) and then by Lord Carrington at the Übersee Club in Hamburg (see Carrington, 17 Nov. 1980).

\textsuperscript{130} The Council annual report briefly reported that 14 meetings had taken place in 1980.

\textsuperscript{131} This mandate was referred to in the Rome Declaration of 1984.


\textsuperscript{133} Europe, 31 Jan. 1980.
As seen in the preceding section, during this period of time three institutions formed a particular group in reacting more quickly and being more active than others. NATO was first to act, its first NAC special session meeting being held already on 29 December, followed by several others. The EC met on several levels to discuss some of the areas under discussion, reacting for the first time on 3 January, whereas the UN held its first Security Council meeting on 5 January.

In contrast to this group the EPC and the WEU can be described as passive, not addressing these issues at a level appropriate to formulate opinions. The Ministerial Conference of the EPC did not meet until its pre-scheduled meeting of 15 January, and the WEU Ministerial Council did not meet at all during this period of three weeks.\footnote{\textsuperscript{134} The WEU Council at ministerial level did not meet until 14 May 1980. (See WEU, \textit{Proceedings, Part I: Assembly Documents, June 1981}, p. 17.)}

As described in chapters 1 and 2, the pattern, content and impact of institutional cooperation are seen in this study as derived from three factors, two of them related to institutional capability and the third to country support.

Institutional capability is based on (1) an institution’s capability to initiate work quickly. This capability depends on the frequency of regular meetings and on the rules for calling an extra meeting. The extreme cases would be, on the one hand, an institution which meets very rarely and requires all members to agree before a extra meeting is called and, on the other, an institution whose members meet very often and which can meet at the request of one. The other factor is (2) competence within the relevant areas. This capability is based on (a) the formal right to handle the particular issues involved and (b) the existence of an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and to implement decisions.

The third factor, country support, which also determines the pattern, content and impact of institutional cooperation, will be considered in chapter 6, which is the conclusion of the first case.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Capability to Initiate Work Quickly: a Comparison of the Institutions}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\hline
 & Frequency of & Members needed to \\
 & scheduled meetings & convene extra meeting \\
\hline
UN (Security Council) & High & 1 \\
NATO & High & 1 \\
EC & High & 1 \\
EPC & Low & 9 (\textsuperscript{= all}) \\
WEU & Low & 1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\footnote{For an explanation of high and low frequency, see the text below.}

When seeking to explain the differences in levels of activity between the institutions according to the different aspects associated with the first factor – that of \textit{capability to initiate work quickly} – the results seem to support the hypothesis that institutional capability is important. The UN’s superior decision-making body, the Security Council, in principle works continuously. The statutes of NATO stipulate
weekly meetings of the NAC, as well as the option of holding extra meetings in between at the request of the chairman (the secretary general) or any of the members. The EC has an executive organ, the Commission, of which the top level – the commissioners themselves – meet as a body once a week and more often if needed.

The opportunities to meet quickly were more limited for the two passive institutions than they were for the active ones. The EPC’s Ministerial Conference met regularly four times a year (to which can be added the meetings of the European Council, three times a year). The Ministerial Conference had no right to meet in between unless called following a unanimous decision by the member states. The possibilities were somewhat better for the WEU: its Ministerial Council, while ordinarily meeting only twice a year, could have been summoned immediately for a meeting if any one of its member states had called for it.

Here, the level at which a particular institution has to be engaged before it can be said to be active is relevant. For the UN, obviously the Security Council is the only relevant level. Within NATO, the NAC’s decisions are always binding, even when taken by ambassadors, and therefore all NAC meetings are of the same level. The EC I see as being active when meetings are called within the Commission, even though formally the Council may reverse its decisions. The EPC, however, cannot take any decisions until foreign ministers become involved. The WEU, finally, is not seen as being active when only the Permanent Council meets, since its members are not mandated to take decisions. These have to await the meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers.

In conclusion, a comparison between the actual pattern of institutional engagement and the institutional capability to initiate work demonstrates that the differences between the activity of the more active institutions and the more passive largely corresponds to the differences between their institutional capabilities. The most marked difference is that between the EPC and the others in terms of the ability to call a meeting in order to bring up the issue of the Afghanistan invasion.

When comparing the institutions in terms of the second factor – competence in the relevant areas – the first aspect, the formal right to act, is seen to take different forms. The UN and the EC were in a special position thanks to their authority to form and implement policies, including sanctions, against the Soviet Union. NATO, since Afghanistan was outside the area of the North Atlantic Treaty, lacked the formal competence to act as a unit. It was, however, allowed to conduct discussions to coordinate national opinions. The two passive institutions, the WEU and the EPC, had the formal authority to discuss political matters (in the case of the EPC) and political as well as security matters (in the case of the WEU), but no capabilities to introduce sanctions.
Table 3.3. Competence in the Relevant Areas: a Comparison of the Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal right to deal with issues</th>
<th>Infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and to implement decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>On a half-yearly basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For an explanation of terms, see the text below.

The formal right to act was furthermore determined by the particular areas of sanctions. The UN had the formal right as well as decision-making and implementation capabilities. The EC by virtue of giving aid to Afghanistan had the authority to discontinue it. In addition, it had the right to form and implement a common agricultural policy and an export credit policy towards the Soviet Union. NATO was more closely involved in the area of an embargo on exports of high technology than any other institution thanks to its military component and its closeness to CoCom.¹³⁵

In terms of the second aspect – that of an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and to implement decisions – there is a clear difference between the active and the more passive institutions. The UN, the EC and NATO all had the advantage of an infrastructure continually working. In this respect the EPC and the WEU were weaker than the active institutions. The EPC rested with the presidencies, residing in the national capitals and starting anew with each presidency. It was, however, connected to the EC Commission in several ways, not least by the fact that the issue of sanctions was treated simultaneously in both the EC and the EPC. The WEU might seem the stronger institution, since the London ambassadors were in one place and were supported by a small secretariat. This must, however, be qualified by the fact that the mandate given to the ambassadors was very limited.

In conclusion, therefore, the UN, the EC and NATO had a competence that was superior to that of other institutions in at least one area.

The UN, while doomed to be stalemated by a Soviet veto in the Security Council, was of importance in its capability to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that a large part of the world condemned the invasion. This included not only the Western world but also Third World countries and, in particular, the states in the areas surrounding Afghanistan.

The EC and NATO together covered the area of sanctions. The sanctions were of different types. This was not reflected in the way NATO brought up almost all for discussion, but it was seen in the way in which work was pursued, particularly that of the EC concerning agriculture and export credits, whereas NATO was involved in the technology sanctions issue.

¹³⁵ CoCom cooperation was secret and it is therefore not possible to establish exactly when it was initiated. It will be described further in section 3.5.1.3.
The EPC and the WEU had a unique competence in that they were purely European institutions, even though, in contrast to the active institutions, they lacked competence related to any of the sanction areas. They could thus not be deemed unimportant for Europeans seeking a platform from which their opinion regarding the Soviet Union (or any other country) could be voiced. However, during this first period no such political or security-related European platform was sought by any country through the WEU or by a sufficient number (that is, all countries) through the EPC.

In terms of the theoretical approach the outcome, as regards the pattern and content of institutional involvement, supports the hypothesis: the institutions that had the capability to initiate work quickly and those with a competence in the relevant areas were those that became active during this period. This fits with the neoliberal institutionalist claim that institutions play a useful role in cooperation. In the following section the possibility that the result may also be explained by country support will be analysed further as the behaviour of the various states will be added to this analysis.

The impact of cooperation in terms of commitment of the cooperating states was poor. For this period, when several institutions were dealing with the same issues, the analysis shows that the magnitude of the promises undertaken in the sense of limiting future behaviour varied between the institutions and the issues. The EC was most radical in deciding that aid to Afghanistan was to be terminated and that relief would be given to Afghan refugees instead. This was not a big question, however, since it did not involve any major costs or concessions by any of the member countries. On the more crucial issue of supporting the grain embargo of the United States, the response of ‘not undercutting it while respecting traditional patterns of trade’ was vague and limited. Finally, the wording on credit restrictions was more an indication of further work to be done than a decision on measures to be taken.

The NATO decision as regards sanctions was even more limited than that of the EC since it did not even mention the areas concerned by the statement that ‘actions taken by one should be taken into account by other member states’. This can be interpreted as reflecting NATO’s lack of competence to implement a policy: it was only able to coordinate one.\textsuperscript{136} Another way of interpreting this vagueness is by relating it to the lack of unanimity that was clearly visible on the large number of areas which, according to the participants, were discussed at the meeting. Comparing the outcomes of the EC and NATO meetings, it therefore seems possible to explain the difference between them in terms of competence within the various areas but also in terms of disagreement among member states.

This is the last of these explanations to be explored below.

\textsuperscript{136} There were some complaints at the time about NATO even discussing the subject of export credits, since they were supposed to belong within the EC’s areas of responsibility. (\textit{FAZ}, 2 Feb. 1980.)
3.4.4. The French, German and British Evaluations of the Invasion

As mentioned above, all four countries in their first comments were united in condemning the Soviet invasion. On the issue of evaluating the seriousness of and the motives behind it they differed, however. This section will compare the views of the three European countries during the period up to 15 January.

3.4.4.1. The French Evaluation of the Invasion

The French position during this period was above all one of indecision. The foreign minister openly stated that more time was needed to allow a thorough analysis to be carried out: meetings were to be held with the Soviet Union at which the consequences of the Soviet policy were to be made clear to it. The outcome of these meetings would determine France’s definite position.137

This indecision may have been the reason why a number of French statements as to the seriousness of the invasion were contradictory or vague. On New Year’s Eve Giscard d’Estaing (although not mentioning the invasion of Afghanistan by name) brought about a rush of calls to the switchboard of the Elysée Palace by alarmed Frenchmen as he announced on television that ‘the danger of war exists. We are going through a period when the world’s equilibrium depends on the cool-headedness of a few men.’138 In contrast to this expression of the gravity of the situation, the communiqué from the meeting of the Conseil (Cabinet) of 2 January did not mention any such threats, nor did Giscard d’Estaing in his New Year speech to the diplomatic corps on 3 January mention the invasion in his international exposé or describe any of the other events mentioned as giving rise to such fears. Answering a question at the New Year reception for journalists on the following day, the president acknowledged that the situation in Afghanistan gave rise to serious problems but described the tensions growing in the Middle East as more alarming.139 However, the effects of the invasion were described as serious when, on 11 January, Ambassador Jacques Leprette, in the declaration to the UN General Assembly, spoke of the threat it posed to peace and international security.140

Rather than emphasizing the effects on peace and stability, which were several times described as being threatened on the regional level, the more common French approach was to stress the damage done to détente. Détente and other principles such as sovereignty and independence were seen as being weakened on an international level, the indivisibility of these principles being stressed. A typical statement was that of Prime Minister Raymond Barre referring to the legitimate concerns for peace and stability within this region of the world which in their turn affected international détente. Similar expressions were used by François-Poncet on 7 January as he stated that the invasion had first of all to be put into the

Afghan context, later adding that the effects of the invasion had impacted on the global character of détente.\textsuperscript{141}

As regards the motives for the invasion, the French leadership distanced itself from the American position. President Giscard d’Estaing on 4 January at the New Year reception for journalists stated his belief that the invasion need not have been premeditated; it could actually have been determined by the internal situation in Afghanistan. On 7 January, answering a journalist’s question, François-Poncet said that it was not possible to say anything about the fundamental motives which had led the Soviet Union to take this decision, and on 15 January he said that speaking about the motives involved more speculation than certainty. On an Afghan level it should be noted that the country, which had been within the communist camp since 1978, had fallen into such a state of disorder that the Soviet influence was at risk. At a regional level it was undeniable, François-Poncet said, that the Chinese factor had played a major role in the Soviet strategy. Finally, he believed, the energy dependence of the West was clearly a factor in Soviet perceptions.\textsuperscript{142}

\textbf{3.4.4.2. The German Evaluation of the Invasion}

The German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, spending his Christmas holidays in Majorca, did not interrupt his vacation but had his pre-recorded television speech changed to include some remarks on his concern about the advance of the Soviet Union in Asia and Africa. He was subsequently heavily criticized for having expressed himself vaguely and for not mentioning the invasion of Afghanistan explicitly, and thus for not blaming the Soviet Union for the events which had taken place.\textsuperscript{143}

In Schmidt’s absence the opinions of the German Government were for some time mainly expressed by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the spokesman for the government, Armin Grünewald. This fact is likely to have at least contributed to the vagueness as to the seriousness of the invasion which can be seen in the German statements.

The main issue in Germany was the effects of the invasion on détente. As in France, it was generally emphasized that the peace and stability of the particular region was at stake rather than there being a risk of an East–West conflict of international scope. This was evident in Genscher’s declaration at the Cabinet meeting of 2 January, when the importance of the region was repeatedly stressed, as well as at the press conference after the meeting at which Grünewald explicitly stated that regional aspects were in the forefront, whereas East–West relations


\textsuperscript{143} See \textit{NZZ}, 9 Jan. 1980; and Kohl, 17 Jan. 1980, p. 15585. \textit{Le Monde} on 3 January referred to the chancellor’s ‘inquiétude’ under the heading ‘Un chancelier trop optimiste?’.
were the second point on the agenda. While Genscher spoke after the Cabinet meeting about the indivisibility of détente, and while in the declaration given to the UN Security Council on 7 January it was twice emphasized that world peace depended on stability in the Third World, there was also much ambiguity about the connection between the two. One example of this is Grünewald’s words on 2 January, claiming that the effect on détente in Europe and on peace and security in Europe could not be calculated.

Schmidt was back in Bonn in the morning of 10 January for the meeting of the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat). The declaration after the meeting used considerably stronger words when describing the effects of the invasion than the declaration after the Cabinet meeting of 2 January. The invasion was seen as a serious violation of the principles of non-interference and national sovereignty. Moreover, the fact that a non-aligned country like Afghanistan was invaded was considered to have demonstrated, above all to the Third World, that Moscow did not shrink from using its power against a sovereign state.

The 10 January declaration was couched in equally strong language when dealing with the effects on East–West relations. The Kremlin, it said, had inflicted severe damage on the cooperation between East and West, which was based on refraining from the use of violence and on mutual confidence. In a radio interview during the weekend of 10–13 January, Genscher also used a stronger tone than before, emphasizing that the invasion did not concern the Third World only. Because of the indivisible nature of détente, Moscow’s aggression concerned East–West relations as well: ‘Therefore we are affected in the same way.’

In contrast to the representatives of other countries, Genscher mentioned his own country as particularly exposed in a crisis. One reason for this was that West Germany was situated at the dividing line between East and West. Another was the fact that one out of four German workplaces was dependent on exports, and thus on an expansion of the world economy. In addition, Germany relied on the import of raw materials and energy.

The German statements as regards the motives for the invasion were not specific: they did not contain allusions to warm-water ports or to pending threats to other named countries of the region. They were not lacking in criticism, however: in the statement to the UN Security Council expressions such as ‘power policy’ and ‘power spheres’ were used in connection with the Soviet policy, and in an article of 10 January Genscher described the Soviet activities as a ‘late imperialist policy of dominance and the creation of zones of influence’.

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147 Ibid.
149 Genscher, 10 Jan. 1980, p. 51.
3.4.4.3. The British Evaluation of the Invasion

The British view of the seriousness of the invasion, as described in the statement to the UN Security Council, was that the invasion constituted ‘a threat to international peace and security’. Similarly, Douglas Hurd, in his speech to the House of Commons on 14 January, described it as ‘a serious threat to world peace’. While the official British statements were similar to those of the US, none of them repeated President Carter’s words about the worst threat since the Second World War. However, like the American president, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Carrington and Hurd, comparing the Afghanistan invasion to the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, declared that the former was more serious in that it took place outside the Yalta area.151

As regards the possible motives, the British analyses were again similar to those of the American leadership. Carrington referred to the possibility of the Soviet Union reacting because Amin had been unsuccessful in his policy, but he also mentioned a historic Russian ambition to reach the Indian Ocean. Hurd pointed to the need for the West to act in a forceful manner: further attacks could be expected elsewhere, he believed, ‘unless the international community shows clearly that acts of this kind cannot be undertaken with impunity’.152

In conclusion, it is evident from this survey that the statements of the seriousness of and the motives for the Soviet invasion varied as between the three European countries. This may certainly explain some differences in their behaviour within and outside institutions. However, in order to give a more complete picture of their evaluations, the reactions of the different countries must first be established as regards the internal handling of the issue, their policies towards the Soviet Union and their policies towards the United States. In addition, it has to be established how these reactions were expressed – unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally.

3.4.5. French, German and British Reactions to the Invasion

3.4.5.1. The French Reactions

The internal handling of the issue. As described above, France did not in general express as grave a concern about the effects of the invasion of Afghanistan as the other countries. Nor did the French leaders see the motives for the invasion as being so clear as the other countries believed them to be. This did not mean that France in any way condoned the Soviet policy. The declaration of 28 December and the statements in the UN, which have been mentioned earlier, demonstrated clearly that the French condemned the invasion strongly.

In addition, the internal handling of the issue of the invasion suggests that it was given significant weight. Even though the French Government after its meeting on 2 January did not mention the invasion in its communiqué, on the same day

President Giscard d’Estaing invited the opposition leaders to a briefing on the issue by the foreign minister, François-Poncet, who also appeared before the two parliamentary standing committees on foreign affairs. In addition, the Cabinet meeting of 9 January resulted in a press communiqué denouncing the invasion.

Policy towards the Soviet Union. Examination of the early French reactions to the Soviet Union’s action reveals other signs as well which suggest that France evaluated the invasion as extremely serious. The ambassador to Kabul was recalled for consultations as early as 2 January, long before the British ambassador. Furthermore, according to Le Monde, the foreign minister had a very frank discussion with the Soviet ambassador to Paris, Stepan Chervonenko, on 7 January.

The French statements as to what should now be done in reaction to the Soviet policy towards Afghanistan centred to a large extent on the concept of détente. Even though the invasion was seen as a serious blow to détente, this policy, for which France had worked so hard, could still be saved. Détente was a French concept from the start and France therefore had a special responsibility for its survival, the alternative being a return of the Cold War. Instead of taking revenge on the Soviet Union France was to conduct talks in order to demonstrate how deeply attached it was to this concept. It was, however, stated repeatedly that France’s devotion to détente was not unlimited. Détente required mutual confidence, and this confidence had to be restored by a change in Soviet policy.

Policy towards the United States. From the French side it was made clear from the start that France had no intention of following the American demands as regards sanctions on the Soviet Union. France saw sanctions as counterproductive, as mentioned above in connection with the London meeting. By not using sanctions a diplomatically easier way would be found for the USSR to withdraw. François-Poncet, explaining the French view, referred to the particular character of the American–Soviet trade, which was based on an American surplus, as compared to the Franco-Soviet one, which was of a more normal type. However, after President Carter had talked to President Giscard d’Estaing over the telephone, France did state that it would not undermine the American embargo. On the Olympic Games the French attitude was similarly opposed to the American position. According to François-Poncet this was not an issue for the political authorities but for the national Olympic committees.

159 François-Poncet, 7 Jan. 1980, pp. 10–11, 14, 15. See also section 3.5 on sanctions in this chapter.
3.4.5.2. The French Cooperation Pattern

Unilateral activities. The French statements emphasized or assumed that French policy decisions were taken independently of others. The foreign minister stressed that France’s policy did not exclude consultations with its partners and allies. Such consultations, which were now taking place, should, however, be of a kind which was proper for France to undertake and which could not engage France in a collective decision-making process. However, during this period the French policy in terms of sanctions does not seem to have deviated from those of the other countries. No openly advertised contacts were taken with the new Afghan leadership and those with the Soviet Union as reported condemned the invasion. Like the other two countries under study, France pursued unilateral activities related to the Afghanistan invasion towards other parts of the world, as described in chapter 5, concerning the Middle East.

Bilateral cooperation. France’s main contact partner was Germany, the meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt taking place as early as 9 January on the chancellor’s way home from holiday in Majorca. No meetings took place with any of the other leaders, although a number of telephone calls were made between the major countries.

Multilateral cooperation. Although it was present at the London meeting of 31 December and the NATO meetings, France still kept its distance from the multilateral efforts. Two aspects seemed to be prominent in its considerations. One was the American procedure of acting without prior consultation with its allies, the meetings thus being devoted to the Americans informing others of actions they had already taken. The other was France’s reluctance to see NATO as the forum for consultation. French representatives drew attention to the fact that NATO’s remit was limited in the sense of territory and Afghanistan was outside this area. Considering the dominant position of the United States within NATO, these two aspects seem to have been linked.

Cooperation within Europe was another matter, however. This is evident in François-Poncet’s comments to the London meeting. It was also expressed in the French communiqué on the occasion of the visit by the German chancellor, in which the importance of finding a common European position was stated. The French position need not reflect a view that any institution had to be involved: ‘European’ may also signify cooperation among two or a few European states.

3.4.5.3. The German Reactions

The internal handling of the issue. A number of governmental meetings and press conferences took place dealing with the situation created by the Afghanistan invasion. Before the chancellor’s return there were two Cabinet meetings, on 2 and 9 January, both chaired by the foreign minister. On 10 January Schmidt was back for the meeting of the Federal Security Council. To this body, which

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161 See, for example, Commission sénatoriale, 15 Jan. 1980, pp. 33–35.


normally included several ministers and high-ranking officers, the German ambassador to Moscow and a representative from each of the two government parties were now invited as well. On 11 January Genscher informed the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the discussion within the Federal Security Council.\footnote{NZZ, 11 Jan. 1980; NZZ, 13–14 Jan. 1980.}

As in France, the significance of the situation was demonstrated in the government’s action when on 7 January Genscher informed the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the FDP of the government’s evaluation of the situation. The SPD had been informed during the weekend.\footnote{FAZ, 8 Jan. 1980.}

Policy towards the Soviet Union. Like France, Germany was quick to react diplomatically. The ambassador to Kabul was called home for consultations on 3 January. Like the United States, but unlike France and the UK, Germany later recalled its ambassador to Moscow as well.\footnote{DT, 4 Jan. and 10 Jan. 1980.}

Other reactions involved the cancellation of a concert tour by a Soviet pianist, and a scheduled session of the joint Soviet–West German Economics Commission, which was to discuss the broad outlines of trade and financial relations between the two countries, was postponed.\footnote{The initiatives were, however, not to be attributed to Germany alone. The spokesman of the German Government was quoted in the press as having said on the one hand that the USSR had called off the meeting and on the other that the meeting was postponed by mutual agreement. A German Foreign Ministry official was alluded to as having stated that the reaction of official West Germany was one of relief and that it was a matter of the USSR getting to the telephone first. According to another newspaper, however, Schmidt had indicated his willingness to participate in future meetings. (See NYT, 10 Jan. 1980; FAZ, 10 and 11 Jan. 1980.)}

Emanating from these meetings, as well as from speeches and press conferences, were a number of statements regarding the way in which it was seen as proper for Germany to react. Like the French, the Germans, when considering their own reactions, referred to the possible effects on détente as an important factor.

Germany’s first statements were similar to those of France. On the basis of the view already mentioned that the invasion was primarily a concern for the area surrounding Afghanistan and did not affect East–West relations and détente in Europe more than marginally, the government spokesman, Grünwald, declared that Germany would urge restraint on its NATO partners since it was not prepared to be drawn into a cold war.\footnote{See the declaration of the foreign minister to the Cabinet on 2 January 1980, Genscher, ‘Zu den Vorgängen in Afghanistan’, p. 16; the declaration of Grünwald after the meeting in FAZ, 3 Jan. 1980; and Gua., 3 Jan. 1980.}
between East and West which had been built up, not recklessly destroy them, and would continue to conduct a realistic détente policy.\footnote{FAZ, 10 Jan. 1980.}

As mentioned in connection with the evaluations of the invasion, around 10 January the German commentators all changed attitude. This also applied to the emphasis on détente, which was still mentioned but was much less prominent in the speeches. The declaration of the Federal Security Council, for example, mentioned détente only in the very last paragraph.\footnote{FAZ, 12 Jan. 1980; NZZ, 13–14 Jan. 1980.}

**Policy towards the United States.** Whereas sanctions were mentioned explicitly in the French statements, this issue was surrounded by vagueness in the German statements or not mentioned at all. This was illustrated by expressions such as ‘solidarity’, ‘concerted action’ and others. Genscher, while calling for European solidarity in his speech on 6 January, did not express any specific support for the measures Carter had announced on 4 January. In his radio speech he did not go further than saying that Germany would not undermine the embargo measures announced by President Carter. Grünewald at a press conference on 7 January said that Germany did ‘not want to march ahead of the company, in one direction or the other’.\footnote{NYT, 7 Jan. 1980; DT, 8 Jan. 1980; FT, 14 Jan. 1980.} In addition, as Grünewald mentioned the need for concerted action, he also added that states would not be taking their own measures in parallel with others. When asked what types of sanction might be envisaged, he referred to the forthcoming NATO meeting.\footnote{FAZ, 10 Jan. 1980; NZZ, 11 Jan. 1980.} In connection with these statements no reference was made to the possible efficacy of sanctions, thus indicating that this was more than anything else an issue of loyalty to the United States.

Vagueness also surrounded the statements regarding a boycott of the Olympic Games. Press reports of such a proposal being made by the German NATO representative, Rolf Pauls, produced denials by Grünewald and others, who said that no German proposal of any such kind had been made at the Brussels meeting, nor had it been discussed at the Cabinet meeting of 2 January. Furthermore, it was a decision for the national Olympic committee to make.\footnote{FAZ, 3 Jan. 1980.} The interior minister, Gerhart Baum, also ruled out a government role in such a boycott in a statement in which he said that sport could not be used for political ends.\footnote{NYT, 7 Jan. 1980; NZZ, 9 Jan. 1980.}

In contrast to the generally continuing vagueness as to sanctions, the change that became apparent around 10 January meant that from now on there was a strong emphasis on the importance of the United States and NATO for Germany. The change from the first statements can be illustrated by the declaration of the Federal Security Council of 10 January mentioned above, in which it was stated as important that the Alliance and the Western world act together. Above all, the
government would act in solidarity with the United States in the future. NATO was seen to be the cornerstone of German foreign policy.\textsuperscript{175}

While the change in German attitude can be seen in the statements of all three main representatives of German foreign and security policy, there was a discrepancy, although one of emphasis rather than substance, between Schmidt and Genscher. The latter tended to point more to the importance of the United States, while Schmidt on one occasion also stated that, whereas Western solidarity was important, European solidarity was particularly important. Grünewald agreed when asked whether he, like Genscher, saw Washington’s interests as synonymous with those of Germany, but declined to answer a question as to whether solidarity with the United States had priority over agreement with the French.\textsuperscript{176}

### 3.4.5.4. The German Cooperation Pattern

**Unilateral activities.** The German policy, like those of the other countries, was to establish no contact with the leadership of Afghanistan while contacting the Soviet Union only to express its condemnation. According to the Germans they would also have cancelled previously arranged understandings if the Soviet Union had not done so first. Unilateral initiatives related to the invasion of Afghanistan were, however, taken towards the Middle East, as described in chapter 5.

**Bilateral cooperation.** On the bilateral level, Schmidt commented on his visits to Madrid and, more significantly, to Paris. Without disclosing more than that it had dealt mainly with Afghanistan he said that the latter visit had been very friendly and demonstrated a convergence between the French and the German analyses.\textsuperscript{177}

Referring to his external contacts during this period, Schmidt also mentioned his contacts with Thatcher. The closest contact, however, according to Schmidt, was that with Carter, whom he was also to see later on.\textsuperscript{178}

Several German representatives had visited the United States already in January. The first of these visits took place before 15 January and was followed shortly afterwards by Genscher visiting Vance in Washington.\textsuperscript{179}

**Multilateral cooperation.** Like the other countries, Germany participated in the multilateral meetings following on the invasion. The increasing warmth in the expressions of NATO’s importance for Germany and the need for solidarity formed a striking contrast to Germany’s coolness about introducing sanctions. The German leaders obviously wished to make it clear that solidarity was not equivalent to participation in sanctions. The references to multinational organizations in connection with sanctions may be interpreted as a shield: either an

\textsuperscript{175} FAZ, 12 Jan. 1980. See also Genscher, 10 Jan. 1980, in which the EC and NATO were termed the foundation of Germany’s existence.

\textsuperscript{176} FT, 14 Jan. 1980; FAZ, 14 Jan. 1980; FAZ, 15 Jan. 1980. An indication that this was a matter for discussion within the SPD is provided by an article in Der Spiegel by Willy Brandt, in which he argued for a policy like that of de Gaulle, of exploiting the gap between the superpowers, and stated that he saw solidarity with European countries, and in particular with France, as more important than solidarity with the United States. (FAZ, 14 Jan. 1980.)

\textsuperscript{177} LeM, 11 Jan. 1980.

\textsuperscript{178} Schmidt, 17 Jan. 1980, p. 15582.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 15590.
organizational veto would make Germany immune to criticism for not introducing sanctions or the organizations would be able to see to it that burdens were evenly divided.

3.4.5.5. The British Reactions

The internal handling of the issue. In line with the British evaluation of the invasion of Afghanistan, the British leaders pursued an active policy. This was manifested not in meetings and press conferences held in order to clarify the British position but rather in action vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

Policy towards the Soviet Union. The UK pursued a forceful policy towards the Soviet Union. On 28 December, after the first press release about the invasion of Afghanistan, the British leaders again expressed their concern about its consequences and their disbelief in the Soviet explanations. Prime Minister Thatcher on 29 December sent a letter to President Brezhnev expressing her ‘profound disturbance’ and her puzzlement as to the Soviet allegations that the intervention was carried out in order to counter external interference. In addition, as the Soviet ambassador to London, Nikolai Lunkov, delivered Brezhnev’s reply to Thatcher’s previous letter on 3 January, she and Lord Carrington made it very clear to him that the Soviet explanations were unconvincing.\(^\text{180}\)

Another consequence of the invasion was the closure of the British Council office in Kabul and the termination of the aid programme, relief aid being given to Afghan refugees in Pakistan instead. The cutting down of formal diplomatic relations was also brought up. The British had reportedly considered recalling the ambassador to Moscow but saw it as preferable for him to remain there for the time being. The UK suggested that NATO countries’ embassies in Kabul avoid all political contact with the new regime and withhold recognition for an indefinite period. The UK itself had issued such instructions to its own embassy in Kabul.\(^\text{181}\)

Compared to some other countries, however, the UK’s recall of its ambassador came late: not until 11 January did the FCO announce that he was to be recalled for consultations. The delay was explained by officials as being due to a wish to coordinate such measures with other countries in order to make them more effective.\(^\text{182}\)

The cancelling of visits was another issue. The forthcoming visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was cancelled and the Coal Minister, Boris Bratzenko, received the message that he was no longer welcome.\(^\text{183}\)

Policy towards the United States. Generally the British position was that there was a need to demonstrate solidarity with the United States and to act against the Soviet Union in coordination with other states.\(^\text{184}\) After Carter outlined a number of measures in his speech on 4 January 1980, the official British FCO comment was

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that: ‘We welcome these measures and are ourselves urgently considering with our allies measures which we and they should take.’ At the same time, however, some FCO officials mentioned to the press that the steps that were being considered were diplomatic and not economic.\(^{185}\) The Cabinet on 10 January gave its full support to the American measures; the ministers were said to be determined to ensure that these activities should not be of such a character that normal relations would soon be restored.\(^{186}\) On 14 January, the day before the NATO and EC meetings, Douglas Hurd stated to the House of Commons that it was ‘highly desirable, in our view, that the measures by Western countries should be concerted, especially in the economic field, where solidarity with our community partners will be particularly important’.\(^{187}\)

As regards the Olympic Games the British Government kept a low profile during this period. Officials and Douglas Hurd in his speech to the Commons pointed out that this was a matter not for governments but for the sporting authorities and for the athletes themselves. Officials confirmed on 5 January that Thatcher was considering an appeal or advice to athletes not to compete but that this was only a possibility and well down the list of measures under consideration. In his statement of 14 January, however, Hurd declared that a boycott should be considered in the context of what had happened.\(^{188}\)

Like the Americans the British seemed to have little hope of achieving a Soviet withdrawal by applying sanctions. In an interview with the Panorama television programme, Carrington, despite advocating that the UK should continue to press the Soviet Union to withdraw, admitted that he did not believe that this would happen at least for some time.\(^{189}\)

3.4.5.6. The British Cooperation Pattern

**Unilateral activities.** The British, like the French and the Germans, expressed their condemnation of the invasion to the Soviet Union through the established diplomatic channels. They also broke off contacts but pursued no other unilateral politics in connection with the sanctions.

Another part of British policies was the initiative on neutrality for Afghanistan and the initiatives on the Middle East, the latter starting immediately with the quick decision to send Lord Carrington on a tour to six Middle East countries.\(^{190}\)

**Bilateral cooperation.** The pattern of cooperation seems to have been clearly aimed at securing support for the United States. The UK hosted the 31 December meeting in London. It was also the initiator of the matter being brought to the United Nations. Contacts with the US were said to be unusually close, with almost hourly consultations.\(^{191}\) Like the other West European countries, the UK was

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\(^{185}\) *NYT*, 5 Jan. 1980.


\(^{189}\) Carrington, 3 Jan. 1980.

\(^{190}\) Hurd, 14 Jan. 1980.

\(^{191}\) *AN*, 16 Jan. 1980.
approached by the American ambassador. According to *Le Monde*, this took the form of a joint British–American meeting held on 3 January at the British FCO when the American ambassador and Douglas Hurd reportedly named a number of diplomatic and economic sanctions that could be taken against the Soviet Union, starting with commercial, technological, cultural and sporting exchanges.¹⁹²

**Multilateral cooperation.** For the UK multilateral cooperation seems to have been important in several ways. A coordinated response to the Soviet invasion was essential since it would be more effective than individual approaches. Bilateral cooperation was relevant here as well, since it was a preliminary step in order to arrange for coordination at the NATO and EC meetings. The same mechanism as Germany used, of seeking shelter behind a multilateral arrangement, may also have been behind Lord Carrington’s stressing in his Panorama interview of 3 January that it was more important to act together than to act quickly when it came to sanctions.

### 3.4.6. Conclusion

As described in the introduction, the decision in this thesis to analyse cooperation after three weeks had passed since the invasion of Afghanistan is based on the hypothesis that certain characteristics of the relevant institutions had influenced cooperation. This section will therefore seek to establish and analyse, for the first three weeks after the Afghanistan invasion, the early evaluations, reactions and cooperation patterns, ending with a conclusion as to the pattern, content and impact of cooperation.

Cooperation patterns have been analysed in several steps. Earlier in this chapter institutional cooperation was described and then analysed in terms of institutional capabilities.¹⁹³

In this analysis of the first weeks the role of the US as an initiator and the three European states’ evaluations of the invasion, their choices of policy towards the USSR and the US, and their patterns of activity (whether uni-, bi-, tri-, or multilateral) will be summarized and analysed in terms of *perceived interests*, as described in chapter 2, section 2.5. Thereafter the analysis regarding states and the previous analysis on institutional capability will be merged to result in an overall judgment as to what governed cooperation in Western Europe during the first weeks after the Afghanistan invasion.

#### 3.4.6.1. The United States as Initiator

The United States shaped its role as initiator in several ways. It was the first country to react, and the other countries were thereby put in the position of having to decide whether they agreed with the American reaction. In its first statement of 26 December the United States, furthermore, indirectly admonished the others to react when referring to the American belief that the international

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¹⁹³ See sections 3.4.2. and 3.4.3.
community would condemn the invasion. By calling a number of statesmen and sending his deputy secretary of state to Europe to hold further meetings, President Carter also made it clear to the Europeans that the United States strongly wished to see them follow the American policy. The theme was thus given: by joining the United States in its reactions, the European states were showing their loyalty to the US and could help in achieving a coordinated and effective Western reaction.

The United States, as described, continued its efforts by trying in various ways to convince European countries to join the American sanctions on the Soviet Union – acting rationally to seek to influence their individual responses by using NATO, the only relevant institution of which the US was a member, and seeking to influence the EC and the EPC meetings beforehand via telephone and personal meetings between American representatives and European leaders.

3.4.6.2. European Evaluations and Reactions

After the first European statements of 28 December, in which the unanimous shock and condemnation of the Soviet activities were expressed, the evaluations of the United States and the European states were expressed through a number of statements issued during the period up until 15 January. These statements, dealing with the effect of the invasion on the security situation and on the possible motives for it, contained a pattern in that the United States used the strongest language in terms of seeing the effects as more serious and in seeing the invasion as part of a premeditated policy. The UK was closely behind the United States, however, in its expressed views. For most of the period up to 15 January there was a marked difference between these two states on the one side and France and Germany on the other, although Germany during the later part of the period changed to a tone similar to that of the UK. For France and Germany, détente was an essential element of their policy towards the Soviet Union. The effects on détente were, however, judged differently: while France indicated that a change in Soviet policy would re-establish mutual confidence (seen as essential for détente), German statements reflected no hope of this actually happening.

In one important respect, however, there was a great similarity between the four countries: on many occasions all four condemned the Soviet Union’s breaches of the basic principles of self-determination and sovereignty.

When looking at the reactions of France, Germany and the UK in terms of activities rather than evaluations, the picture differs from that which emerges from their evaluations. One of the areas in which the US was eager to see Western activity was the diplomatic one. In this field France and Germany were the two countries to react early, recalling their ambassadors from Kabul – Germany, however, being the only country to follow the US in recalling the ambassador to Moscow as well. In other ways too, such as by informing opposition parties, the French and German leaders demonstrated their concern.

On the issue of grain exports, export credits and technology sanctions, the UK was alone in following the US, endorsing the initiative immediately and calling

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194 Hodding Carter, 26 Dec. 1979, p. 65.
repeatedly for coordinated action. The exception was the issue of an Olympic boycott, a subject which Germany and the UK dealt with by referring to the institutions dealing with it. France on the other hand was clear in stating that it had no intention of going along with the American proposals. It should, however, be recalled here that the costs of sanctions varied between the three states. This has been described in section 3.2.2 at the beginning of this chapter and will be dealt with in more detail in section 3.5. While the UK gained on sanctions on agricultural products, since the EC subsidies would be reduced, France and Germany would lose important export income. Only the Olympic boycott hit them all in the same way.

3.4.6.3. Choice of Policies towards the Soviet Union and the United States
The connection between statements using strong words against the Soviet Union and emphasizing affiliation to the US is obvious: the British and the Germans, the latter primarily during the later part of the period, stated their allegiance to NATO and the United States, whereas the French made no such statements.

France, Germany and the UK followed three different lines in their views of the relationship between reactions to the Soviet invasion and the demands for loyalty from the United States. The UK was at one extreme in that it made no such distinctions: reactions to the Soviet Union were frequently referred to as constituting an act of loyalty to the United States, the only exception to this being the formal issue involved in an Olympic boycott. France, on the other hand, emphasized this distinction. When France’s statements and acts are analysed, a strong French reaction against the Soviet invasion is visible: to the extent that France could react on its own without being part of any US-led coalition, it did so. France thus emitted strong signals signifying that the Soviet Union had broken the norms of international behaviour but that this could be remedied – a process in which France saw sanctions as unsuitable.

Germany, in contrast to France, was caught in a dilemma since two main tenets of its foreign policy – détente and the close relationship with the United States – were now largely irreconcilable. Seemingly without any illusions that Soviet policy would be reversed, and at the same time eager to demonstrate solidarity with the United States, Germany wavered. Like France, Germany condemned the Soviet disregard for international rules of behaviour and demonstrated its concern. Initially there was a certain avoidance of the use of strong language towards the Soviet Union in terms of motives and effects of the invasion, but this policy was rather abruptly reversed.

Their relations with the USSR and the US during this period fit well with the hypothesis that France and Germany would seek to satisfy their perceived interests in the form of continuing to pursue well-established policies – the Ostpolitik for Germany and an independent policy on the USSR for France. The change in German policy may thus have been caused by a signal from the US that some correction was necessary. For the UK no such particular policy existed. Presumably the UK’s policies followed the views its leaders saw fit while it and the other two countries sought to avoid sanctions that would be costly to themselves.
3.4.6.4. Cooperation of States

France, Germany and the UK, all being important states, all pursued their independent foreign policies and therefore all undertook what are here called unilateral activities. This signifies cooperation engaged in by one of the three countries, on the one side, and by one or several countries in the troubled area around Afghanistan or the Soviet Union, on the other. These unilateral policies were, however, not so much connected to the issue of sanctions as related to the particular initiatives, and they will therefore be dealt with later in this study.\(^{195}\)

There were two striking bilateral relationships during the period following the invasion of Afghanistan. One was that between the United States and the UK, which were united in their evaluations of the seriousness of the invasion and the motives for it, and largely in agreement as to how the Soviet Union should be handled. The other relationship was that between France and Germany, which had a different view of the approach that should be taken towards the Soviet Union. Whereas the first couple was a highly asymmetrical one, the UK declaring its loyalty to the US and its willingness to follow the American policy, France and Germany in the other couple were seemingly on the same level of importance. The American dominance of the agenda gave the Franco-German cooperation something of the appearance of a joining of forces before the EC and NATO meetings of 15 January. The extent of the Franco-German relationship should not be exaggerated, however. Both Genscher and Schmidt emphasized the fact that they had close contacts with others, above all with Carter.

Multilateral cooperation within the institutions was closely connected to the unilateral and bilateral activities. In the cases described above, unilateral approaches and bilateral cooperation were preliminary and parallel to multilateral cooperation meetings dealing with the same issues.

Multilateral cooperation also has another component in that it gives a certain protection to member states. The issue of sanctions remained sensitive and therefore seems to have been avoided by using the institutional activities as a shield. Both German and British statements indicated that they were reluctant to be too specific on the issue of sanctions in areas where to introduce them would be costly for them.

Looking at the different cooperation arrangements, they give the impression of being loose. The bilateral relation between France and Germany (the strongest in terms of structure) was also strong in terms of similarity of views on the importance of détente but was weakened by the German shift in the direction of closer relations with the US. The links between the UK and France seemed non-existent at this time, and thus no directoire cooperation is seen either. In combination with the closeness of the views expressed by the UK and the United States on the issue of sanctions, this meant that no joint European view could be formed.

\(^{195}\) See section 3.6.
As described earlier, two of the institutions most heavily involved in the discussions up to 15 January were NATO and the EC. All four countries had their particular relations to these two. In the case of NATO this was especially true for the US and France. For the US, NATO was the most important institution. Choosing NATO was natural, it being the only institution within the security field of which the US and the West European countries were all members. The American view that this was a case of East–West confrontation also made NATO an obvious choice for discussion and coordination of the activities of individual states. However, since Afghanistan was outside the territory covered by NATO activities, NATO as such was not in a position to act.

France, which did not classify the invasion of Afghanistan as an East–West confrontation, consequently did not see NATO as an obvious institution for discussion and therefore tended to emphasize its lack of formal competence. In addition, due to the informal but strong American influence within NATO it was not the preferred forum for action for the French.

Neither the US nor France had control over NATO, however. The US could dominate NATO’s meetings but could not on its own get a consensus decision if other states were strongly against its proposal. France for its part could only prevent the first meeting among high-level politicians from being a NATO meeting.

European institutions, while not including the United States, were still important for the US since it had the authority not only to coordinate but also itself to undertake sanctions against the Soviet Union. The US, therefore, attempted by various means to secure a favourable outcome at the 15 January meeting. Not surprisingly, however, since the member states at the EC and the EPC meetings (like the NATO one) could not agree, they were only capable of reaching a limited degree of consensus on the issue of sanctions.

As regards the third of these institutions, the United Nations, there is less of a difference, the United States and the three European countries endorsing the UN treating this issue. On the surface there was a difference between the British, who brought the Afghanistan issue to the institution, and the French, who abstained from voting to do so; but France’s behaviour should be seen as an expression rather of its unilateral approach to the treatment of the issue than of a different opinion. This is made evident by a host of French condemnations of the Soviet behaviour, not least in the United Nations.

It has been shown above that the group of institutions whose capability to initiate work on an issue quickly was identical to those which actually became active. However, the survey of the activities of the countries within and outside institutions points to the individual member countries as the dominant actors in this cooperation. There are no signs of institutions working independently of states. This is to be expected, considering that the cooperation was intergovernmental and that the issues involved were generally of high saliency, with the leadership of states being continually involved, instructing representatives and correcting aberrations.
The factors of institutional capability and country support are, however, hard to distinguish since the EC, NATO and the United Nations, whose capabilities surpassed those of others, were also the institutions that were of most value to states as tools for action. It is therefore likely that support from countries, in this case the United States, contributed to increase their importance. They were, however, also vulnerable to vetoes, which took the UN and NATO partly out of the picture.

The United States as an initiator, on some issues with the help of the UK, thus succeeded in activating the institutions which were of importance for producing a coordinated response to the Soviet Union. It succeeded less well in generating such coordination in substance, however. Neither before (as it would have preferred) nor at the NATO or EC meetings of 15 January did the US get the support it sought from the Europeans.

The European states together with the US had met the Soviet invasion by condemnations referring to certain recognized principles. They had conferred in cooperation patterns such as the Franco-German and the British–American, largely on the basis of their views as to how the Soviet Union should be treated. They had consulted with other major countries and in some institutions that had the capability to initiate cooperation and competence within the areas of sanctions, and that were preferred by some of the participants.

The way in which cooperation took place thus points to the importance of all three of the elements enumerated. The capabilities of the institutions to initiate work quickly and their competences in relevant areas were important. Above all, however, it indicates that the process was led through the support of states, primarily the United States.

The process was not ended on 15 January. It went on and led to new initiatives and forms of cooperation. The continued discussions on sanctions and the new initiatives taken by the Europeans which were related to the situation after the Afghanistan invasion will be analysed and compared with the state of cooperation existing on 15 January. In this way it will be possible to see whether the policies of the first few weeks had made an enduring impact on cooperation between the three European states.

3.5. Analysis of the Whole Period
While the period preceding 15 January was characterized by intensive efforts by the United States to achieve a coordinated Western policy, after this date the situation was different. The US continued to strive for more European support for its policy but there was now also an awareness of the differences of approach between states. In addition, deadlines, to the extent that they existed, were no longer as tight. Both these factors gave room for varying kinds of cooperation between France, Germany and the UK.

This section, on sanctions, will be an account, for each area of sanctions, of the events – the continued activities and the way in which these issues were treated by the institutions. The outcome in terms of pattern, content and impact will thereafter be analysed according to the criteria of institutional capability.
In the next section, 3.6, the three states are in focus. Their activities and patterns of cooperation are described and analysed in terms of their perceived interests and their perceptions of the norms relevant for their behaviour towards institutions.

3.5.1. The Issue of Sanctions and the Institutions

3.5.1.1. The Agricultural Embargo and the EC

**Developments in the United States**

In the US the support for the grain embargo, which had initially been strong, grew weaker during the spring of 1980. The farmers and the grain companies were strongly opposed to it and a first initiative in the legislature to end the embargo was taken in June. It was clear by then that the embargo was not succeeding in depriving the USSR of grain. According to its opponents the embargo was more costly for the United States than for the Soviet Union and the farmers were bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of maintaining it.\(^{196}\) A reason for the failure of the embargo was that American grain had been replaced on the Soviet market by exports from a number of other states which abandoned their traditional markets, as the USSR paid considerably more. (American grain dealers in turn sold to those who were now deprived of grain.) Among those were several countries that had been present at the 12 January meeting in Washington. They had promised not to exceed their normal level of grain exports to the USSR – a measure which was extremely vague, since the amounts exported varied widely from year to year.\(^{197}\)

During the spring of 1980 the American Administration was thus faced with what it perceived as a lack of solidarity from the NATO allies’ side and with increasing domestic opposition. The former led to American pressure on Allied states, while the latter led to the abandonment of the embargo – although not until April 1981.

**Developments in the EC**

As indicated in the EC Council decision of 15 January, the EC regulations concerned not only grain but also other agricultural products. Among them were certain products in the meat, dairy and poultry sector, such as meat, poultry meat, milk, butter and eggs. During January and early February a large number of regulations were adopted by the Commission in order to reduce agricultural exports to the USSR.\(^{198}\)

These measures were far from uncontroversial. Representatives of the Commission, when accepting them, underlined that they represented a considerable step by the Europeans. Director General for Agriculture Claude Villain, presenting the regulations adopted on 25 January, pointed out that the US did not export

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poultry – an item for which a new system of export control had been introduced the day before. Roy Jenkins, president of the Commission, emphasized the differences between the trade between the US and the USSR and that between the EC and the USSR. Whereas the United States’ agricultural exports consisted almost exclusively of grain, European exports were much more diversified. It was therefore more complicated to find benchmark figures and to check the actual destinations of all these products. Jenkins also stated that, although the American Administration clearly wanted ‘political, moral and practical’ support from the EC, the latter had its own responsibilities and judgement.

As at the Council meeting of 15 January, the issue of butter exports continued to be the subject of some conflict. The UK did not count butter as a ‘regular supply’ and preferred to suspend such exports altogether. France and Ireland in particular criticized the Commission for its handling of the issue of export controls. Butter was not part of the EC’s pledge not to replace American deliveries, they claimed, because the US had never exported any butter to the USSR. Furthermore, since the EC had exported butter, this product was part of ‘the traditional pattern of trade’. Jenkins, who, among other things, had stated that ‘in fact we anticipate no exports of butter to the Soviet Union in the near future’, was accused by Dublin and Paris of having overstepped his mandate as expressed in the decision of 15 January. At its 5 February meeting the Council thereafter decided to confirm the decisions of 15 January. In addition, it decided that the Commission should report to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) regularly and in detail on the measures being taken.

The first sale of butter took place in late April 1980, after a decision had been made by the Management Committee. The British, having been outvoted by others in these matters, continued to pursue the issue on a number of occasions within the EC.

EC Sales to the USSR
While the Americans were not pleased with the level of European support, it is difficult to ascertain whether or how far the EC states kept their promises not to exceed traditional levels of trade. The statistics on EC grain exports show a fourfold increase during the period July 1979–June 1980 as compared to the same period 12 months before – from 200 000 tons to 800 000 tons. According to

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200 Europe, 1 Feb. 1980. See section 3.2.2 of this chapter on trade relations.
Paarlberg, most of this was, however, delivered under licences issued before the American embargo was declared.\footnote{Paarlberg, 1987, pp. 194–195.}

Paarlberg does not interpret these fairly low figures as signifying any European deference to the US. First, Europe had no history as a grain supplier to the Soviet Union – it had only recently become a wheat surplus region and had sold no wheat to the Soviet Union during the years preceding the invasion. Second, wheat in Europe was grown at costs that were above prices on the world market, and could therefore only be sold at a cost for the EC, which paid the subsidies. Heeding the embargo therefore meant that the EC saved money.\footnote{Ibid., p. 195; see also LeiM, 8 Jan. 1980.}

The fact that exports were expensive also indicated that there might be economic motives for stopping them. According to The Economist, British attempts to stop butter exports were seen by other EC countries to be based on economic reasoning, the background being that the UK had long objected to the EC subsidies for the sale of food surpluses, notably butter, which was sold at prices that were four times world price levels.\footnote{LeM, 8 Jan. 1980.}

The butter sold to the Soviet Union by late spring of 1980 amounted to 20 900 tons. This may be compared to 134 600 tons sold during 1979 (but only 21 000 during 1978). The view of Commissioner for Agriculture Finn Gundelach was that 60 000–80 000 tons could be sold during 1980 while still respecting the agreement not to sell more than the traditional amounts of butter. The British, however, argued that 35 000 tons should be a maximum.\footnote{Econ., 19 Jan. 1980.}

Thus, while the fact that butter was sold at all might indicate a certain demonstration of independence vis-à-vis the United States, the small amount of butter exported – well below the figures indicated as the maximum that could be tolerated – suggests that states had no incentive to export butter to the Soviet Union. Thus, this was no example of Europe demonstrating independence vis-à-vis the US, or of its making sacrifices in order to demonstrate loyalty to it.

### 3.5.1.2. Export Credits and the EC

The question of export credits, which had been discussed at the EC Council on 15 January, was brought up again by the Americans during the visit of Roy Jenkins to Washington shortly thereafter. The US expressed the hope that the EC would consider further steps to control export credits to the USSR. Jenkins’ answer was that the EC was ‘urgently’ examining a cut.\footnote{US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981a, p. 103; Econ., 10 May 1980, p. 59.} The 5 February Council meeting decided to apply the OECD guidelines without exemption. This meant that the three countries – Italy, France and the UK – which had granted the USSR better terms than those recommended by the OECD had to change them.\footnote{ER, 2 Feb. 1980; Europe, 1 Feb. 1980; Bull. EC, no. 1, Jan. 1980, p. 30; ER, 2 Feb. 1980, p. 3; Europe, 7 Feb. 1980.}
There was also a variety of opinions regarding export credits. France considered that the credit lines that had been opened before the OECD ‘consensus line’ was agreed upon were not covered by the new policy. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had announced beforehand that it would not be renewing its present credit line (which had been established by the Wilson government in 1975 and was to expire in February). The UK had asked the other EC countries to do likewise, but had not received support from either France or Germany, the latter referring to its specific system, in which the banks rather than the government managed the credit lines. This British proposal was therefore not accepted at the meeting.\footnote{At the end of February France and the Soviet Union signed a new protocol, renewing the rules associated with Soviet purchases of industrial goods in France. According to Le Monde the interest rates agreed upon now were stated to be within the limits prescribed by the OECD guidelines. According to other sources, however, the fixed interest rates and other terms of credit were more favourable to the USSR than these arrangements.\footnote{3.5.1.3. Embargo on High-Technology and Strategic Items: the EC and CoCom}

At the end of February France and the Soviet Union signed a new protocol, renewing the rules associated with Soviet purchases of industrial goods in France. According to Le Monde the interest rates agreed upon now were stated to be within the limits prescribed by the OECD guidelines. According to other sources, however, the fixed interest rates and other terms of credit were more favourable to the USSR than these arrangements.\footnote{3.5.1.3. Embargo on High-Technology and Strategic Items: the EC and CoCom}

3.5.1.3. Embargo on High-Technology and Strategic Items: the EC and CoCom

The sanctions in the area of technology were different from several of the other sanctions in that they were of a more systematic and long-term character: in contrast to the other measures deliberated as a consequence of the Afghanistan invasion, they were considered within a framework of already existing restrictions inherent in the CoCom cooperation.\footnote{The coordination of export control in CoCom is defined by Mastanduno as a regime in accordance with Krasner's well-known definition, according to which a regime is 'a set of rules, norms, and expectations around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue-area'. (See Mastanduno, 1992, p. 5; Krasner, 1982b.)}

Consequent upon the measures announced by President Carter on 4 January and President Carter's memoranda of 8 January to the secretaries of commerce, state and defence,\footnote{See section 3.4.1.2.}

the American Department of Commerce in January 1980 suspended some 700 export licences or applications for licences, to be considered on a case-by-case basis. A number of licences were revoked, including, on 21 January, those for the export of computer spare parts for the Soviet Union's Kama River truck plant.\footnote{Goldman, 1980, pp. 32–33.}

On 25 February the administration announced the banning of a US$ 20 billion superphosphate sales deal, and on 28 March President Carter ordered the secretary of commerce to refuse licences for goods and technology intended for the Moscow Olympics.\footnote{US, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1980, Congress and Foreign Policy 1980, p. 23; Goldman, 1980, p. 34. Indications were that some of the Kama trucks had been used in Afghanistan.}

At a number of meetings the Americans sought to convince European politicians to agree to restrictions on exports of high technology: Richard Cooper,
under secretary of state for economic affairs, accompanied Warren Christopher to Europe in mid-January, and Luther Hodges, deputy secretary for commerce, visited (at least) Brussels and London 23–25 January, while simultaneously Roy Jenkins discussed these matters during his visit to Washington. The European response, as expressed by Jenkins, was to assure the Americans that they were looking at these matters urgently but still waiting for precise American proposals. The EC General Affairs Council meeting of 5 February did not include the issue on its agenda, however. The discussion was postponed, the EC referring to the institution not yet being ready to take any final decision on the questions of technological exports.

Informal discussions were taking place, however. Richard Cooper, after consultations with the Commission and NATO, reported on 24 January to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the allies had agreed not to replace items embargoed by the US. With the exception of the French Government they were also envisaging tighter CoCom licensing criteria. Their willingness, however, was in most cases conditional on others following suit.

The American review initiated on 8 January was announced as completed on 18 March. The new and more restrictive guidelines were now to be applied. Following the review the United States introduced a number of proposals for tightening up the CoCom licensing criteria.

Since the discussions within CoCom were confidential no details on deliberations or on the exact proposals are available. A later report to the American Congress by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, however, contains a list of items that were believed to be included among the likely American proposals. These proposals, among other measures, centred on limiting exports of certain goods and on setting up more stringent criteria for licensing some items. According to the report: ‘For the interim the CoCom members have reportedly agreed not to request exceptions from the licensing guidelines and not to approve the export of some high technology items.’ In addition, according to the Congress report the French Government had still pledged not to take advantage of American restrictions of trade, even though it had stated that it was not undertaking any ‘reprisals’ against the Soviet Union.

By early June, however, according to The Economist, in spite of such assurances the suggestions made by the United States were still only under consideration and nothing had actually been agreed.

Mastanduno has described the European reactions to these proposals further: the ‘no-exceptions’ policy was one to which the Europeans acquiesced, American officials having made it clear that they expected this at the very least. In addition, disagreeing would not have made much

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219 US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981a, pp. 74–75.
220 Ibid., pp. 66–67 and 75.
221 Ibid., pp. 74–75, referring to the US International Trade commission, 23rd Quarterly Report, Apr./June 1980, p. 29.
222 Econ., 7 June 1980, p. 46.
sense since the US would have vetoed any such requests. The Europeans were also willing to add some, although not all, of the items suggested by the Americans to the CoCom list. However, they rejected the American proposals for more restrictive rules for exports of computers, American policy being seen by the Europeans as promoting particular American interests. Moreover, according to Mastanduno, an initiative that would have led de facto to an embargo on the export of know-how was categorically opposed since it did not concern products and technologies of direct military significance.

There is room for different interpretations of the extent to which European states agreed voluntarily or only after American pressure to accept this limitation on exports to the USSR. Mastanduno gives a mixed answer to this question, the process rather being one of co-adjustment in which American officials had to compromise and defer to the preferences of their allies. Lisa Martin, on the other hand, emphasizes the coercive elements, claiming that the United States ‘managed to force other CoCom members to agree to a “no-exceptions” policy to the Soviet Union’. Coercion took place by the US linking other issues to high-technology sanctions. The American method of defining control of technical exports as a matter of national security rather than simply a foreign-policy matter was one example of such linkage. By using this method the US gained British support. Martin furthermore states that American negotiators suggested to the Europeans that their own access to American technology might be at stake.

Another question is to what degree the Europeans really did comply with their own promises not to replace American firms. American sources refer to a number of cases of European companies stepping in after American companies had withdrawn. The conclusion of a 25-year agreement on economic cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union, which concerned advanced technology and increased deliveries of oil and other energy sources, was stated by the Germans not to cut across the CoCom arrangements nor those on credit restrictions since they were financed by banks at the commercial rate of interest.

The overall American judgement was that, since most of the Soviet projects under discussion with American suppliers had been taken over by other Western

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223 Mastanduno, 1992, pp. 224–233. Mastanduno bases these views on interviews carried out at the British Ministry of Defence and the Economics Ministry, Bonn, and on other occasions.

224 Ibid., p. 10.


226 Ibid., p. 197.

227 Two examples of this were the French company Creusot-Loire, which signed a contract to build a steel plant, and the German Klöckner group, which signed a contract for an aluminium plant. Both companies claimed that the technology involved was different from that which would have been used by the American companies. (US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981a, pp. 70–71 and 75–76; Falkenheim, 1987, p. 120.

228 Econ., 7 June 1980. See also US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981a, p. 106; and FAZ, 31 May 1980.
contractors by December 1980, the short-term impact on the Soviet economy appeared to be negligible.\footnote{US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981a, p. 7.}

3.5.1.4. The Olympic Games and the EPC

Another issue brought up by the Americans was that of participation in the Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in July 1980. In his address to the nation of 4 January 1980 President Carter had warned that the Soviet Union was endangering the participation of athletes and spectators at the Olympic Games. In press conferences given by the secretary of state and the deputy secretary of state, the issue was described as being under review. On 20 January Carter sent a letter to the president of the US Olympic Committee (USOC) urging it:

\begin{quote}
in cooperation with other national Olympic committees, to advise the International Olympic Committee that if Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will be an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and goodwill. Should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its troops within the time prescribed above, I urge the USOC to propose that the games either be transferred to another site such as Montreal or to multiple sites, or be cancelled for this year. If the International Olympic Committee rejects such a USOC proposal, I urge the USOC and the Olympic committees of other like-minded nations not to participate in the Moscow games. In this event, if suitable arrangements can be made, I urge that such nations conduct alternative games of their own this summer at some other appropriate site or sites. The United States Government is prepared to lend its full support to any and all such efforts.\footnote{Carter, 20 Jan. 1980, p. 51.}
\end{quote}

On the following day Carter sent messages to more than 100 heads of government seeking their support for the above policy.\footnote{Keesing’s, 9 May 1980, pp. 30238–30239.}

The House of Representatives and the Senate took the same line as the president. The House on 24 January approved a resolution in which the USOC was asked to press for the transfer or cancellation of the games if the Soviet Union had not withdrawn its troops by 20 February. In addition, it asked the USOC to boycott the games if this did not happen.\footnote{Keesing’s, 9 May 1980, p. 30239. The House of Representatives voted for the resolution by 386 votes to 12. The Senate on 29 January supported it by 88 votes to four.}

The Olympic Games were on the agenda when Cyrus Vance visited Bonn on 20 February for a meeting with a number of European foreign ministers and thereafter a number of European capitals. During this trip, after having announced the ‘irreversible’ American decision not to participate in the Moscow Olympics, Vance added that he hoped that those European countries that had not yet made a decision would follow the American example. After talks in Paris he underlined to reporters that it was his ‘understanding that the French have not yet arrived at any decision’ (see below, section 3.6.1.3.).\footnote{Europe, 21 Feb. 1980; AN, 27 Feb. 1980.}

In accordance with the recommendations of the Congress, the USOC took the decision on 12 April, by 1604 votes to 797, to boycott the Moscow Olympics
unless Carter declared by the end of May that this would no longer be in the national interest.\textsuperscript{234}

In spite of the attempts by the United States to convince the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Moscow was unanimously reaffirmed as the site of the Olympic Games at a meeting on 9–12 February. The resolution tabled by the USOC was rejected and the speech by Cyrus Vance, who was representing the US, was criticized by the director of the IOC for being the first political speech ever to be delivered at an opening session of the IOC.\textsuperscript{235}

On 24 May 1980, the deadline set by the IOC, 85 national committees had voted to send athletes to the Moscow Olympics, while 29 committees had decided to boycott the games and 27 had not yet replied. The West German national committee on 15 May voted for a boycott by 59 votes to 40. The French national committee had decided two days earlier by 22 votes to 1 in favour of participation. The decision by the British committee had already been taken on 25 March, when it voted by 18 votes to one, with four members abstaining, in favour of participation.\textsuperscript{236} The American disappointment was particularly strong after the French Olympic committee made its decision. Ed Muskie, the new secretary of state, spoke of the ‘moral’ sanction being ‘of a scope that could not be overlooked’.\textsuperscript{237}

The Olympic Games took place in Moscow between 19 July and 3 August. In all, 81 countries participated, including all EC members except West Germany; 62 countries and territories stayed away. Among the participating EC states, Italian and British athletes took part in defiance of the expressed wishes of their governments.\textsuperscript{238}

\textit{The Role of Institutions}

As described above, the issue of participation at the Olympics had already been dealt with by NATO on 1 January, and thereafter at the 15 January NAC meeting, without unanimity being achieved. There is no information to indicate that the issue was treated at any later NATO meeting. Among the other institutions the EPC rather than the EC Council dealt with the Olympic boycott since it concerned the non-economic aspects of the Afghanistan invasion. The Olympic Games were not discussed at the EPC meeting of 15 January, however. According to Gilmour ‘this was because of lack of time as much as anything else.’\textsuperscript{239} The EC Foreign Ministers’ meeting of 5 February started with an EPC gathering, followed by an EC Council meeting. At the former the games were brought up for discussion but no joint statement was issued, the reason given being that the matter would be taken up again at the EPC meeting in Rome on 19 February. In the statement issued by the president of the Council, the Italian Foreign Minister,
Attilio Ruffini, the participants were said to have agreed on the formula that it was up to the Soviet Union to create conditions that would enable the Nine to go to the games. These conditions were not specified, however. Moreover, governments’ policies were said to be at various stages of development.  

Several newspapers reported from the press conference following the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on what they saw as a move towards a decision to boycott the games, and referred to statements by the French foreign minister, according to whom the Nine should decide on a common position at the EPC meeting on 19 February. This position should deal not only with participation in the Olympics but also with the Soviet Government’s decision on 22 January to exile Andrei Sakharov from Moscow and with the Madrid meeting of the CSCE planned for the autumn of 1980, at which the USSR’s adherence to the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 was to be scrutinized.  

Le Monde, without mentioning François-Poncet’s name, reported that a declaration on these two matters would ‘no doubt’ be published on 19 February but also referred to a state secretary, according to whom it might be premature to expect a joint position on the issue of the Olympic Games on that day.  

In spite of aspirations expressed at the meeting on 5 February, including the positive remarks by François-Poncet, France was reported as having been instrumental in preventing a decision in favour of a boycott at the 19 February meeting. The Olympic Games were discussed but no further unanimity could be established. Nor was any statement issued, the French reportedly having exerted pressure to prevent this. There was agreement to continue to study the issue, however.  

While the change in the French attitude came as a surprise there were reports that other EC countries were vacillating as well. Lord Carrington was also said to be hesitating, even though he had pursued the issue of a boycott strongly before. The general view among EC countries was said to be that Carter’s insistence on the 20 February deadline was a mistake. Carrington’s view was reportedly that the American president had overstressed his opposition to the Moscow Olympics and should concentrate on more positive steps. At this meeting Carrington was launching his own proposal for a neutral Afghanistan, justifying it by arguing that it would be ‘a good idea to be more constructive and to contribute to a lessening of tension’.  

The issue of an Olympic boycott was finally dealt with at the Luxembourg European Council meeting of 27–28 April, a few days after the failed American attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran. The meeting being closed, the only mention of a discussion of the issue was a short sentence stating that a

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244 See, for example, Gna., 19 Feb. 1980; DT, 20 Feb. 1980.
growing number of countries were recommending that their Olympic committees ask athletes not to take part in the games.\textsuperscript{246}

3.5.1.5. Conclusion: The Outcome as Explained by Institutional Capability

The US’s efforts to secure European support for its policy towards the Soviet Union, first intensively pursued in the hope of achieving a coordinated answer by 15 January, continued after this date in the hope of increasing the European commitment. As described above, some of these efforts were formally pursued over a longer period; in practice, however, they all took place during a period of a few months or even less.

In the previous section, two factors of institutional capability were brought up. The first – the capability to initiate work quickly – is not relevant for the analysis of the period starting 15 January, since three weeks had already passed since the invasion. The pattern of cooperation during the first period will, however, be compared to that of the second period since changes in the pattern of cooperating institutions might coincide with the possibility for new institutions to deal with these matters as time passed.

The second factor is highly relevant also for this period. This is the factor of competence in the relevant areas. This, it should be recalled, includes two criteria, one being the formal right to handle the particular issues and the other an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and to implement decisions. While this factor was seen as relevant during the previous period it might be assumed to be even more important in a longer time perspective.

A third factor which might explain the role of an institution is that of country support. This factor will be treated in the conclusion following the next section, which deals with the different countries’ activities.

3.5.1.6. The Pattern and Content of Cooperation

The previous period was characterized by three institutions being active – NATO, the EC and the United Nations. The EPC did not meet until its prescheduled meeting date of 15 January and the WEU Ministerial Council did not meet at all.

This later period presented some differences in this pattern. As stated above, it was a period in which the questions previously dealt with continued to be discussed. An embargo on exports of agricultural products and export credits were still dealt with by the EC. An embargo on exports of high-technology and strategic goods continued to be a NATO, or rather a CoCom, matter, whereas a boycott of the Olympic Games was no longer treated by NATO but instead by the EPC (including the European Council).

Seeking to explain these differences between the first period of three weeks and the whole period of six months, the first factor, that of \textit{capability to initiate work quickly}, goes some way towards explaining them. While the rules of institutional procedure remained unchanged, the longer period under study meant that both the EPC and the WEU regular meetings were now included. The activity of the

\textsuperscript{246} Europe, 28/29 Apr. 1980.
EPC after 15 January suggests that the rules as to how a meeting could be called were the only obstacle to its being active, whereas the passivity of the WEU remains unexplained by institutional factors.

The factor of competence in the relevant areas may again be a probable explanation of why the agricultural embargo and export credits were discussed by the EC, which as seen earlier was competent as regards all the relevant aspects. CoCom, which dealt with high-technology and strategic goods, had a unique competence in being particularly designed for handling matters related to the control of exports of these but lacked infrastructure for implementing such decisions. The United Nations, although it met the criteria of competence, was no longer involved. Having fulfilled its only possible role of a platform for demonstrating worldwide disapproval with the Soviet policy, it no longer had any function.

For the third active institution, the EPC, the Olympic Games were a matter that fell into its area of competence, which makes its involvement natural. In terms of formal competence the WEU might, however, also have been engaged.

Generally the pattern of cooperation, while only marginally changed, coincided fairly well but not completely with the pattern of competences. It also constituted a movement in the direction of European cooperation: the EPC became the leading forum for discussion of the issue of Olympic participation, while NATO, previously the only institution to deal with the areas of participation at the Olympics and a technological embargo, was now dealing only with the latter, through CoCom.

There was another change as well: there was no longer any overlap among the institutional tasks. Instead each issue was dealt with by one institution only. Essentially this meant that NATO, which had initially dealt with all issues, now stuck to only one.

3.5.1.7. The Impact of Institutional Cooperation

The impact of cooperation is here assessed in terms of its effect on the commitment of the cooperating states as policies were changed or new policies adopted limiting countries’ future options. Generally, the outcomes using this criterion were meagre.

Within the agricultural area the vague and limited agreement of 15 January – not to undermine the American efforts while at the same time respecting the traditional patterns of trade – was confirmed on 5 February. However, no decisions were taken on extending the sanctions, and they therefore still did not come up to American expectations. Continued discussion on the meaning of this agreement did not reduce the distance between different countries’ interpretations of it. Rather, as described, it created distrust within the EC organs, with the consequence that matters were to be dealt with on a higher level.

Regarding export credits, no agreements were ever reached that went beyond that of 5 February according to which the OECD guidelines were to be adhered to with no exemptions. Just as in the case of the agricultural embargo, support for the decision was not total, the French claiming that the decision was not valid for
agreements made before it was taken, and there was disagreement as to whether the French were actually adhering to it.

In the area of high-technology and strategic goods consensus was found on a ‘no-exceptions’ policy, a disappointment to the USA, but a step further than the Europeans had wanted to go. As regards a new, more restrictive list, discussion continued but there was no agreement during this period. Regarding the boycott of the Olympic Games, in spite of a number of signs indicating reluctance to participate in the games, only Germany in the end abstained from doing so.

The elusiveness of this concept of impact has been touched upon earlier when dealing with the particular issues concerned. In the area of agricultural sanctions one of the important benchmarks – the level of traditional trade – has been more or less impossible to ascertain. Furthermore, the fact that the export of wheat was pursued at a cost to the EC rather than generating a surplus for it does not make sanctions in this area easy to assess in terms of concessions. A further problem can be added – the system of selling under licence, thus with a delay in deliveries.

Another problem associated with establishing impact come up in connection with sanctions on technological and strategic goods. This is the question whether the policies actually pursued were in accordance with the decisions taken. The American view was that the Europeans had not fulfilled their promises.

3.6. France, Germany and the UK: Interests, Norms and Cooperation

This section will bring in cooperation of a more varied kind than that of institutions, seeking to connect it to institutional cooperation and explaining positions and forms of cooperation in terms of perceived interests and norms.

3.6.1. France and the Sanctions

3.6.1.1. The Economic Area

The French policy vis-à-vis economic sanctions can be explained as a way for France to pursue its perceived interest in continuing to trade with the USSR, which, as seen in section 3.2.2, was of some importance for the country. As the foreign minister explained, France took its decisions totally independently and assumed that other states did the same. American exports were steered by political motives, whereas French exports were of a traditional economic nature. Franco-Soviet trade was also more even and diverse. Furthermore, the French made it a principle not to use commercial relations for political ends. France therefore had no intention of modifying its commercial relations with the USSR and could not imagine substituting for the trade of a country which had severed its trade relations for political reasons.247

Another argument was that the American policy of politicization had the effect of increasing tension, whereas France by continuing its process of communication with the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy aimed at reducing tension. According to President Giscard d’Estaing, sanctions were for those who saw no possibility of

a Soviet withdrawal, since they might well aggravate the situation.\textsuperscript{248} In several statements the French repeated that France had an independent policy in this matter and no intention of using its commercial policy for political means. This policy did not exclude consultations with allies, above all with its partners within the EC, but this was not collective decision-making.\textsuperscript{249}

There were, however, also signs of some French hesitation as regards its policy towards the Soviet Union. The origins of this may be found in two almost simultaneous events: on 22 January Andrei Sakharov, the prominent nuclear scientist, was arrested and thereafter exiled to Gorky; and on 24 January an entirely unapologetic Georgy Kornienko, first deputy prime minister, visited Paris.\textsuperscript{250} The announcement of the former event led to the immediate return to Paris of Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the speaker of the National Assembly (Assemblée nationale), who was in Moscow at the time for, among other things, talks with President Brezhnev.\textsuperscript{251}

This hesitation is evident in the words used by Jean-Claude Paye, director of economic affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, at the meeting of the ‘Small Commission’ (Petite Commission) in Moscow on 11–13 February. Economic and scientific cooperation between France and the USSR was not unconditional, he declared, and the recent events had led to concern among French participants that must be considered. France was to ‘continue for the time being because we want to avoid contributing to the deterioration of the process and to give the USSR time to correct what has been done. If it does not do so, in my opinion, it is inevitable that cooperation will deteriorate.’\textsuperscript{252}

Apart from these reasons, some further factors may have contributed to France’s hesitations. According to \textit{Le Monde}, in the economic sphere there had been a sharp reduction of Soviet contracts, and within the scientific sphere the exchange was seen as severely lopsided, to the disadvantage of France. The expulsion of Sakharov from Moscow had led to the decision by numerous French scientists to boycott scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{253}

The hesitations overcome, the French continued to pursue their independent policy. The sanctions on agricultural goods, export credits and high-technology and strategic goods were no longer frequently referred to by the French leadership or in newspapers, and they were hardly mentioned in parliamentary debates.

\textbf{3.6.1.2. France and the Olympic Games}

Where participation in the Olympic Games was concerned, the French leadership expressed the same opinions as they did regarding sanctions in the economic area.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{248} Giscard d’Estaing, 5 Feb. 1980, p. 80.
\item \textsuperscript{249} François-Poncet, 10 Jan. 1980, p. 27; Commission sénatoriale, 15 Jan. 1980, pp. 33 and 35.
\item \textsuperscript{250} See François-Poncet, 24 Jan. 1980, p. 50; and ‘Conseil du 23 janvier 1980’, p. 225. See also \textit{IHT}, 7 Feb. 1980, which quotes a French diplomat, attributing the change to Kornienko’s visit. According to \textit{NZZ}, 27/28 Jan. 1980 (referring to the spokesman of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs), François-Poncet had brought up the case of Sakharov with Kornienko.
\item \textsuperscript{251} Observer News Service, 22 Jan. 1980.
\item \textsuperscript{252} \textit{Europe}, 14 Feb. 1980, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{253} \textit{LeM}, 14 Feb. 1980.
\end{itemize}
François-Poncet and Giscard d’Estaing on a number of occasions stated their view that this was not an issue for the political authorities but for the national and international Olympic committees. Both of them, in addition, declared that sports boycotts were not appropriate political weapons.\(^{254}\)

The same view was expressed by the government: in the communiqué of the Council of Ministers (Conseil) of 23 January 1980, reference was made to the Olympic rules, according to which the site of the Olympic Games was decided by the IOC and the participation of the individual countries by the national committees. For this reason, the communiqué said, the government had no intention to intervene in the decisions.\(^{255}\)

The French hesitation, which was obvious at the EPC meetings in February, was never expressed in open deliberations regarding a possible a change of view.\(^{256}\) The Olympic Games remained an issue, and ministers in interviews continued to declare that participation was a decision for the French national Olympic committee only. As the committee took its decision in May, France’s crucial worry was visible as François-Poncet voiced his concern that participation might be mistaken for a wish to support Soviet policy. He also emphasized that the picture in France was nuanced: the athletes competing in sailing, shooting and the equestrian events had chosen to boycott the games.\(^{257}\)

### 3.6.1.3. Cooperation Patterns

#### Unilateral Activities

By accepting only the sanctions agreed upon on 15 January and by continuing its dialogue with the Soviet Union, France apparently believed that there was a chance to achieve a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Apart from the visits and contacts described above in connection with trade-related contacts, two high-level meetings took place. First, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, visited Paris in April at France’s invitation. The meeting was a failure: an Elysée spokesman was said to have described the two countries’ positions as ‘totally diverging’.\(^{258}\) Another meeting, on 19 May between Giscard d’Estaing and Brezhnev, also seems to have been a failure rather than the breakthrough that France must have been aiming for.\(^{259}\) Taking place without any prior notification to France’s allies, it was widely criticized. Above all, as described in section 3.6.1.4

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\(^{254}\) See, for example, François-Poncet, 7 Jan. 1980, p. 15; Giscard d’Estaing, 5 Feb. 1980, p. 78; François-Poncet, 21 Apr. 1980, p. 56.


\(^{256}\) *Le Monde* after the EPC meeting of 19 February saw it as likely that even the French would withdraw from the Olympic Games if they did not take place in a ‘normal way’, that is, with American participation. (*Le Monde*, 23 Feb. 1980.)

\(^{257}\) François-Poncet, 24 May 1980, p. 128. According to *IHT*, 28 May 1980, it was widely known that the government did not want the athletes to go but did not want to be seen to tell them that they must not. According to *SvD*, 14 May 1980, the meeting of the French national Olympic committee, although the result was a unanimous vote to go, lasted for six hours.

\(^{258}\) *Europe*, 26 Apr. 1980.

\(^{259}\) Giscard d’Estaing, 19 May 1980, p. 114. When leaving Warsaw the French president first wanted to refrain from using any adjectives but then described the talks as ‘useful’. See *Europe*, 19/20 May 1980.
below on norms, the meeting led to adverse comment on France’s observance of norms that it considered valid for others.

Bilateral Cooperation

Unilateral activities were combined with a variety of bilateral ones. The Franco-American contacts involved telephone calls and contacts on a variety of levels, for instance, when American representatives visited Europe. Here the French leaders’ policies were apparently designed to remove any possible misunderstanding on the part of the US that the French standpoints might have caused. A number of visits to the United States therefore took place. Prime Minister Barre, on what was called a private visit to the US on 7–9 February, defended the French position in speeches at several institutes. France condemned the invasion, he said, but did not want to contribute to the adoption of extreme positions similar to those that were taken up at the beginning of the Cold War. It also wanted to preserve all possibilities for dialogue in order to reduce tension.  

Foremost among bilateral relations, however, was the Franco-German cooperation. The 35th summit meeting under the Elysée Treaty, lasting from 3 to 5 February, was generally interpreted as signifying a hardening of the French position towards the Soviet Union. The two leaders referred several times to the Atlantic Alliance and stated clearly that it was now up to the Soviet Union to act in accordance with its words. As mentioned earlier, this was in line with the German change of tone that took place around 10 January and the French disappointment at recent Soviet activities. The two countries were also able to agree on formulations, describing them as pursuing a policy of creating stability but without mentioning a particular policy towards the Soviet Union as part of this. Sanctions were not mentioned: no agreement on a common policy was apparently feasible. Giscard d’Estaing at his press conference mentioned that the Olympic Games were discussed and that the views of France and Germany were very similar. A joint communiqué was presented the same afternoon at the EC General Affairs Council. According to newspaper reports, Schmidt reported the results of the meeting to the US whereas France informed the USSR. The US and NATO expressed their satisfaction with the hardening of the standpoints, whereas the Soviet Union accused France and Germany of having succumbed to pressure from the United States.

Looking at cooperation in terms of likely perceived interests, for France Germany served to broaden the basis for its own views. Views that were clearly French could in unilateral statements become German, or even European. In his press conferences the French president referred to the fact that only two views had hitherto been heard, the American and the Soviet, and other countries were expected to relate to those. There was, however, a need for a third voice, he claimed, referring to the capacity and importance of Europe, and particularly to

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the need to listen to France and Germany, which had suffered so much through war.\textsuperscript{263} Franco-German cooperation was thus, without any need to explain the logic behind it, seen as equivalent to the core of evolving European cooperation. Giscard d’Estaing’s view of the Franco-German agreement of 5 February, expressed some three weeks after the event, was that this was a milestone in the reappearance of Europe as a new centre of influence and decision-making in the world.\textsuperscript{264}

The communiqué of the two countries was given a mixed reception at the 5 February EPC meeting. While several ministers expressed dissatisfaction about the procedure, the text as such was welcomed and seen as a starting point for the regular EPC meeting of 19 February, when the issue of the Olympic Games was to be brought up again. As described above, the consensus that had seemed close was not achieved at that meeting either.\textsuperscript{265}

The next bilateral meeting between the French president and the German chancellor took place on 16 March at Schmidt’s home in Hamburg and had a different character. Announced only a few days in advance, it was of a private character and was said to concern international events in the light of their recent visits – Schmidt’s to the United States and Giscard d’Estaing’s to the Persian Gulf states. Little information was given at this meeting and none that indicated that it concerned sanctions in connection with the Afghanistan invasion. Giscard d’Estaing, when leaving Hamburg, only noted that he and Chancellor Schmidt had had a useful meeting preparing for the forthcoming European deadlines.\textsuperscript{266}

Newspaper reports indicated that the tenability of a continued policy of dialogue with the Soviet Union was on the agenda. While the policy as such was not questioned, it was considered increasingly difficult to pursue it since no development in the direction of a Soviet withdrawal was visible.\textsuperscript{267}

Franco-British cooperation was of a different kind. The two countries were in contact and visits were exchanged to discuss their positions on the invasion of Afghanistan and the issue of sanctions. These visits did not, however, produce joint statements or press conferences. Sir Ian Gilmour’s visit to Paris in late January resulted in a brief statement, enumerating the large number of EC issues discussed, none of them, however, touching on Afghanistan. In early February, just before the arrival of Schmidt, Lord Carrington visited François-Poncet. The visit was the subject of some speculation and of a comment by Lord Carrington as he left Paris, signifying that the two countries’ views were not so very distant from each other, but nothing from the French host. In connection with the end of the Franco-German meeting, as Giscard d’Estaing was asked about the contacts with the UK, he acknowledged that France had contacts with the UK as it had with the US, but they were of a different kind from the Franco-German contacts.\textsuperscript{268}

\textsuperscript{263} Giscard d’Estaing, 5 Feb. 1980, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{264} Giscard d’Estaing, 26 Feb. 1980, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid. See also \textit{ER}, 6 Feb. 1980; and \textit{Europe}, 6 Feb. 1980.
\textsuperscript{266} \textit{LeM}, 18 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{268} Giscard d’Estaing, 5 Feb. 1980, p. 79.
Considering the situation, the French silence is logical: the same day as Lord Carrington left, Schmidt arrived in France for a meeting at which the French had most likely hoped to achieve a common agreement on a number of issues on which they disagreed with the British. While the discussions between the two foreign ministers might have been constructive, a common declaration would have confused the situation for France at a time when it was focused on the Franco-German cooperation as a European core. To this can be added the immediate problems between the two countries with the escalating conflict over the EC budget. In this conflict the British stood against the French, the problem finally being solved in late May by some French but above all German concessions.269

**Multilateral Cooperation**

The French multilateral cooperation fell well into a pattern of choosing those institutions that best served France’s stated policies, considering its capabilities and vulnerabilities.

To the extent that any multilateral institutions were seen as appropriate and relevant by the French, they were the EC and the EPC. The French sought to influence the policy of the former in the cases of agricultural and export credit sanctions. There was in addition during February an aspiration to reach a common European position through the EPC as regards participation in the Olympic Games. This failing, no remaining organization was suitable.

France’s sensitivity about a meeting that could in any way be connected to NATO is obvious from its refusal to participate at the Bonn meeting of Vance and a number of foreign ministers from other countries.270 The reason for this was that the meeting was extended to a larger group than just a few, thus, as the French claimed, giving it a ‘bloc character’.271 As Giscard d’Estaing stated, on 5 February France was ‘ready to pursue consultations with its partners on various aspects of the international situation’ but it was ‘opposed to the holding of a joint meeting which is not of a nature to reduce international tension’. The fact that a meeting took place in Paris between the French leaders and Vance in what turned out to be a series of bilateral talks suggests strongly that the French action was a reaction against the NATO character of the planned meeting rather than against the US.272

Seen from a French position, an additional factor – the timing of the Bonn meeting – would have made the adverse effects of a bloc meeting worse. Held on the day of the American deadline for an Olympic boycott, the meeting might damage Franco-Soviet relations.273

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269 See *Times*, 31 May 1980; and *FT*, 27 June 1980.
270 See section 3.5.1.4.
271 According to French sources the French foreign minister had been invited by Genscher to an informal dinner in Bonn together with Vance and Carrington. A few days later, after the *New York Times* had published information implying that a summit meeting was to take place in Bonn involving a larger group of countries, the French stated that they were not to participate.
Another constellation – that of a directoire – had, however, no negative connotations. In connection with his meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw, Giscard d’Estaing expressed himself to be in favour of meetings between a small number of states, those which exercised major responsibilities in the world.\footnote{Giscard d’Estaing, 19 May 1980, p. 114; see also François-Poncet, 24 May 1980, p. 129.}

3.6.1.4. The French Perception of Norms in Relation to Institutions\footnote{See chapter 2, section 2.6, where the method is described.}

The question is whether norms had any influence on the French positions. While until now positions have been explained in terms of perceived interests, norms have not yet entered the analysis. This section will describe the French perceived norms, together with French and others’ views on whether France adhered to these norms. To recall, neoliberal institutionalism does not see norms as constituting more than constraining factors in behaviour, which is largely shaped by perceived interests.

NATO was at the centre of French statements on norms. Because France’s policy came in for more criticism than that of any of the other three countries under study, the issue of norms related to NATO membership was likely to become a critical one.

Not surprisingly, an important part of the French justifications and explanations was to point to norms that were unrelated to NATO and to the limited character of NATO obligations. Giscard d’Estaing saw three elements as vital for France: its membership of NATO, its independence and its solidarities. In regard to the third element he stated that France was above all a Western democracy. It therefore felt solidarity first and foremost with the democracies in America and Europe, but also with other democracies wherever they existed. Next in importance was that type of solidarity which was of a geographic character and which originated from the fact that France was a European state. Finally, France felt a historic and cultural solidarity with all the countries, in particular in Africa, which shared a history or their language with France.\footnote{Giscard d’Estaing, 26 Feb. 1980, p. 106.}

François-Poncet expounded this difference in a speech in the United States in which he spoke of the links uniting the liberal democracies as being related to a commitment to the same principles, a respect for the same values, the fraternity that existed during the war, and gratitude for peace. Whereas Americans tended to confuse these links with the Atlantic Alliance, he said, American lawyers knew quite well that the common links went beyond the scope of a text whose area of application was stated in a restrictive manner.\footnote{François-Poncet, 1 June 1980, p. 148.}

For France the obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty were not only the central ones for NATO but also largely what NATO was about. The agreement that ‘an armed attack against one or more of them [the parties] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’ was often referred to when NATO obligations became the issue. On those occasions France

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{274} Giscard d’Estaing, 19 May 1980, p. 114; see also François-Poncet, 24 May 1980, p. 129.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{275} See chapter 2, section 2.6, where the method is described.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{276} Giscard d’Estaing, 26 Feb. 1980, p. 106.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{277} François-Poncet, 1 June 1980, p. 148.}
repeatedly assured other countries that in such a situation it would honour its obligations.\textsuperscript{278}

The reasons why France made these assurances cannot, of course, be established with complete certainty. One reason may have been to dispel any misconceptions about this, considering the French stand. Another may have been that the message was intended to point to Article 5 as the NATO obligation and to the fact that France fulfilled this obligation.

In addition to putting a strong emphasis on Article 5 tasks, the French leaders pointed to \textit{NATO’s geographical specificity}. These statements referred to NATO’s lack of competence to act as an organization outside a defined geographical area and were based on paragraph 6 of NATO’s statutes in which the geographical limitation related to the task of collective defence was described. It was this limitation that was thus seen as preponderant, although there were no limits on NATO’s scope for undertaking political consultations.\textsuperscript{279}

One example of the consequences of this interpretation was that it led to the French reaction described earlier against a NATO meeting in Brussels dealing with Afghanistan. Like the emphasis on Article 5, this restriction of NATO’s area of competence logically implied a widening of the scope for activities of other institutions or of individual countries.

In the British and German statements a concept emerged which might be called \textit{political solidarity} with NATO and by extension with the United States.\textsuperscript{280} While no equivalent of this was to be found in the French statements, the French leaders were keenly aware that France might be perceived as failing in the requirement of solidarity, and therefore devoted a good deal of effort to explaining why an independent policy was fully reconcilable with France’s obligations as a member of NATO.

One argument was that a French policy of independence was not only based on France’s right to pursue its own interests. It was also a logical conclusion, stemming from the fact that France was a sovereign country. Any other policy, it was argued, would reduce France to the status of a province under a superpower.\textsuperscript{281}

The argument most often used to defend France’s independent policy, however, was that it was above all serving the interests of a world peace that was currently threatened by tension between the blocs and by the rivalry between the two superpowers. France, as the initiator of détente, was described as having a specific responsibility to pursue such a policy, seeking to maintain contact whenever

\textsuperscript{278} See, for example, Giscard d’Estaing, 26 Feb. 1980, pp. 104–116.


\textsuperscript{280} This concept, which differed slightly as between Bonn and London, is described in the following sections on Germany and the United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{281} Giscard d’Estaing, 26 Feb. 1980, p. 106.
possible. This was an endeavour in which Europe also was sometimes described as having a specific role.\textsuperscript{282}

In sum, the French position of not accepting an obligation of political solidarity was thus argued to be legally correct, logical, and ultimately based on a higher goal. Still, it was important for France that others as well understood that France was on the side of the Western democracies.

Another obligation – that of joint consultations – was more complicated, since both American and French compliance were under discussion. The French recognized that membership of NATO implied an obligation to consult other members. In addition, according to the French, this obligation also applied within the EC and other groups. A number of statements describing the compatibility between French independence and consultations with others gave a broad picture of who was to be consulted.

The nature of consultations was another important point. As described above, France had brought up this point in connection with the London meeting, in which the Americans were seen by the French as informing rather than consulting. Neither in connection with the London meeting nor in relation to sanctions was the French criticism related to NATO obligations (since France did not see this as a NATO matter); rather it was criticism of a superpower seeking to impose its will at the expense of others.\textsuperscript{283}

According to François-Poncet, consultations had their specific rules. The first was that they should be carried out within the appropriate group, according to the subject. They need not always be carried out within NATO since its scope was geographically limited and since NATO did not always have the necessary competence, for example, in economic matters. The second was that consultations should be reciprocal and balanced. They were not so if one of the partners took a unilateral position, after which others were asked to rally behind it. Nor were they reciprocal and balanced if specific aspects of a policy were discussed but not the principles and the analyses which determined it globally. The third rule was that pluralism had to be respected. The Alliance was no monolith and had no interest in appearing to be so. This diversity should be seen as an asset, François-Poncet claimed, not as a weakness.\textsuperscript{284}

These comments should be seen against the background of the French criticism of the United States mentioned earlier, on the one hand, and American criticism, together with British and German irritation at France’s behaviour, on the other. The criticism against France concerned two specific events. One was the French refusal to join in the meeting with Vance in Bonn in late February; the other was

\textsuperscript{282} See, for example, Giscard d’Estaing, 5 Feb. 1980, pp. 77–83; and Giscard d’Estaing, 26 June 1980, pp. 210–222.

\textsuperscript{283} See François-Poncet, 10 Jan. 1980, p. 27; and François-Poncet responding to questions in Commission sénatoriale, 15 Jan. 1980, p. 33. In the former François-Poncet speaks of France’s consultations with its allies; in the latter he speaks of consultations with its allies and particularly with its partners in the EC.

\textsuperscript{284} François-Poncet, 27 June 1980, p. 232. See also François-Poncet, 1 June 1980, p. 148; and Giscard d’Estaing, 26 June 1980, p. 198, in which very similar points are made.
the meeting that took place between Giscard d’Estaing and Brezhnev in Warsaw on 19 May without other Alliance members being informed in advance.

The Vance meeting was primarily an issue between the United States and France. France’s declaration that, while endorsing joint consultations within the Alliance, it declined to take part in meetings conducted in an atmosphere of confrontation was seen by the Americans as a strategy of abstaining from joint consultations in order to be able to form an independent policy towards the Soviet Union.285 The West Germans, while reportedly dismayed at France’s bluntness, expressed understanding, since the character of the meeting had been changed after the French had agreed to it. Both the Americans and the French after this exchange sought to play down the disagreement. France’s statements justifying its position were slightly apologetic, stating, after recognizing the obligation to consult others, that consultations had taken place when Vance as secretary of state came to Paris.286

Criticism of France was especially severe in connection with the Giscard d’Estaing–Brezhnev meeting. The newly appointed American Secretary of State, Ed Muskie, expressed his belief that France’s objective was to underline its determination to be independent, calling it ‘frustrating at times and even more’. He also pointed out what he saw as an inconsistency in the French approach, saying that he was ‘concerned that when I was being given a lecture on consultation, that the lecturer was not inclined to practice what he was teaching’.287 Carrington, when asked in the British Parliament about the possible motives behind Giscard d’Estaing’s visit to Warsaw, suggested that the questioner address himself to the source.288 Although the German Government called the initiative ‘a step in the right direction’,289 there were also reports of a certain chill in the relationship between Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing after the latter’s sudden departure for Warsaw, which was seen as being in stark contrast to Schmidt’s own ‘carefully concerted’ visit to Moscow in June–July.290

The French leaders’ response to the criticism was to refer to the planned meeting between Schmidt and Brezhnev, as well as that between Muskie and Gromyko on 16 May in Vienna, questioning the relevance of criticism directed against France for a policy that was being pursued by others as well.291

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287 Muskie, 20 May 1980, p. B.
289 Keesing’s, 1 Aug. 1980, p. 30384.
290 ER, 14 June 1980, p. 693.
Another French comment on the criticism was that France needed no authorization to act and would continue to pursue an independent policy. It would do so in concertation with its partners and allies, but using its liberty to pass its own judgements and take its own initiatives.\(^{292}\)

François-Poncet defended the clandestine way in which the meeting with Brezhnev was arranged at a press conference. The fact that the French president and foreign minister took off from Vienna, without informing others (including Muskie), was seen by one reporter as a valid reason for Muskie to feel that he had been fooled by the French. François-Poncet, while not agreeing with the word ‘fooled’, expressed understanding for Muskie’s feelings. His explanation was that formally it would not have been correct to inform a foreign minister, since the meeting took place on a higher level. When asked why President Carter had not been informed, François-Poncet stated that the reason was the risk of information being leaked, which would have attracted too much attention from the media and the general public.\(^{293}\)

The norm of joint consultation is the one in respect to which compliance was contested more than any other at this time. While France criticized the American behaviour of acting individually before consulting others more than any other country did, it had problems itself in explaining the secrecy at times of its own behaviour. For others the French seemed to perceive the obligation to consult others as being limited and as possible to circumscribe by a number of conditions, some of them appearing to be of dubious character. A norm that permitted secret meetings seemed to enjoy no credibility among others, and France had to pay the price of sarcasm from its closest allies.

### 3.6.2. Germany and the Sanctions

German policy was very different from the French as regards both economic sanctions and an Olympic boycott. The fact that in American eyes sanctions were a litmus test of solidarity made them a sensitive matter, and Germany’s frequent declarations of solidarity bear witness to its need to pursue its policy with great caution in order not to provoke the United States.

It was obvious that the German Government was critical about imposing heavy sanctions on the Soviet Union; but it was also critical of American policy at large. German diplomats and members of government under conditions of anonymity voiced their views that the American policy had been erratic and that its policy on sanctions centred on punishing the USSR, and was thus likely to lead to a reaction that would be damaging to Germany.\(^{294}\) Schmidt, in an interview, expressing himself more cautiously than others, gave some examples of the American president’s behaviour, which, he said, might give the USSR a false sense of irresolution.\(^{295}\) In a

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\(^{292}\) François-Poncet, 21 May 1980, p. 118.

\(^{293}\) François-Poncet, 24 May 1980, p. 132.


\(^{295}\) *Welt*, 1 Feb. 1980.
speech to a restricted group, however, he went so far as to call Carter ‘almost unpredictable’.

While they were clearly worried, although most likely also because of a felt need to defend a continued policy based on their perceived interests of continued trade and détente policy – thereby acting in a similar way to France – the German leaders emphasized the need for a cool-headed German policy. Schmidt in his declaration to the Federal Assembly (the Bundestag), on 17 January said that this situation of ‘bad weather in world politics’ forced Germany to reflect calmly on its own and Western interests and to navigate through the turbulence with a steady hand. Instead of nervousness, cries of crisis (Krisengeschrei) and excited talk or even agitation, Germany needed careful, well-considered crisis management. In the same vein Genscher emphasized in an interview the present need for common sense, steadfastness, sobriety and foresight, which could only be achieved when emotions were not dominating the scene. It was repeatedly stated that the continued contacts with the Soviet Union were part of this. Schmidt’s view was that the recognition of détente as being indivisible did not mean that tension had to be imposed on an area in which there were no tensions.

The German position was, however, more vulnerable than the French. While they saw no chance of avoiding endorsing the sanctions, the Germans apparently found a possibility of damage limitation through emphasizing the concept of a long-term strategy. This concept, which should also be seen in the context of the ongoing conflict with Iran in connection with the taking of hostages, was repeatedly suggested to the Americans. The idea was that each state would contribute in proportion to its own capabilities according to a work-sharing agreement, a Gesamtkonzept. The proposal also included a list of measures to be taken in which Germany would assume certain responsibilities, such as aid to Turkey and Pakistan. Germany was also to foster action by the EC to cultivate cooperation with Persian Gulf states, including Iraq.

3.6.2.1. The Economic Area

The German statements reflected the differences between Germany and France in terms of vulnerability to American criticism. This can be discerned in the continuous pattern after the meetings of 15 January whereby official German statements would refer to the then-agreed measures and relate them to German loyalty to the United States. The invasion of Afghanistan was treated for the first time in the Bundestag debate of 17–18 January 1980. Chancellor Schmidt declared that Germany would act in accordance with American demands for sanctions and would do so in particular within the frameworks of the EC and CoCom.

A position of loyalty was also assumed in the Bundestag discussion by Genscher, who stated that on the previous day he and the chancellor had assured the

American deputy secretary of state that the United States could rely on Germany and the European Community. He recalled that the latter had promised not to stab the US in the back by stepping in to replace American exports – a promise, which, he said, included not only foodstuffs.\textsuperscript{301}

Similarly, in the next Bundestag debate, a few days before his visit to the United States, Chancellor Schmidt claimed that the government had done what it could by promising, together with the other EC states, not to step in instead of the Americans by selling agricultural or technological products. Germany could also imagine making the CoCom rules sharper. As regards exports, the government was working within the framework of the OECD consensus. Schmidt further declared that Germany was prepared to join in the catalogue of measures that the US was expected to suggest soon on condition that its allies and other partners did the same.\textsuperscript{302}

While Schmidt’s words on Germany’s willingness to sharpen the CoCom rules were seen as a move towards the United States, the precondition that other allies must also join in the measures demonstrated the German Government’s hesitancy about sanctions. A further example of this was given in the Bundestag at government question time on 5 March, when the government representative, when asked whether Germany would act in solidarity with the US if unanimity were not achieved within the EC or CoCom, declined to answer, calling the question hypothetical.\textsuperscript{303} Moreover, while explaining that Germany would not exploit any advantages presented by the actions of others to strengthen the Soviet war potential, Schmidt in the Bundestag stressed that trade and scientific cooperation with all the East European countries were important elements of European stability.\textsuperscript{304}

The same was true for German–Soviet business relations, which were mainly developed for political reasons, the chancellor claimed. Furthermore, Germany’s exports consisted mainly of investment goods, which had long-term effects. These investments also produced greater returns to Germany than comparable exchanges of other countries that were now discussing these issues.\textsuperscript{305}

While Schmidt and Genscher expressed themselves very cautiously, the Minister for the Economy, Count Otto von Lambsdorff, was more outspoken when declaring that sanctions and boycotts ought to be a means of last resort in trade policy, and in particular in foreign policy. These means, he said, in a speech in New York in early February, might boomerang, hurting the sender most. He did, however, tell his audience that Germany would not ‘violate its treaty obligations’ if it came to economic sanctions.\textsuperscript{306}

\textsuperscript{303}Hamm-Brücher, 6 Mar. 1980, p. 16417.
\textsuperscript{304}Schmidt, 20 Mar. 1980, p. 16622.
\textsuperscript{305}Ibid. See also NYT, 5 Mar. 1980, reporting a press conference during the visit to the United States.
3.6.2.2. Germany and the Olympic Games

The German vulnerability towards the US was obvious in the case of the Olympic Games as well. This issue was symbol-laden and difficult to circumvent, even though (unlike its responses in the cases of other sanctions) the German Government had not promised at the outset to support the US in the boycott of the Olympic Games. The issue was first discussed on 23 January in the Bundestag, when a state secretary stated that the government had great understanding for the American president’s initiative and reminded the members of the Bundestag of Germany’s proven solidarity with the US in critical times. However, the sports organizations themselves were responsible for the decision on participation. The government had initiated discussions on solidarity with its European partners and German sports organizations, and had established contact with sports ministers of the EC countries.\(^\text{307}\)

A recurrent theme of German statements was to refer to the Soviet Union as being responsible for the situation. It was therefore up to the USSR to create the conditions for all countries to participate in the Moscow Olympics. Genscher used this expression at a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Semënov on 25 January, and he and Schmidt used it thereafter on many occasions.\(^\text{308}\) As described earlier, it came to be used by others as well, including at the EPC meeting of 5 February.

On the issue of how much of their positions to reveal, Schmidt and Genscher took different lines. In early February Schmidt declared that the government would at present not state any opinion regarding participation but use the respite given by President Carter.\(^\text{309}\) Genscher, in spite of this, declared that, if the United States chose not to participate in the Moscow Olympics, Germany would abstain as well. The US could trust Germany: those who expected American solidarity as regards the freedom of West Berlin could not deny the US German solidarity on this matter.\(^\text{310}\)

While this difference between the two was a recurrent element, it was clear that both Schmidt and Genscher saw it as necessary to follow the American view. Both, however, stressed the need to achieve a common American–European position. At the parliamentary debate of 28 February Schmidt, after declaring that it was up to the Soviet Union to create the possibilities for all to attend and reminding the Bundestag that the deadline was not until the end of May, assumed that by then the European and American positions would have been reconciled.\(^\text{311}\) Genscher pointed to the German national Olympic committee’s statement that it had the sole authority to take the decision but also that it would inevitably consider political views when doing so. Until this decision was made, Genscher

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\(^{308}\) See, for example, FAZ, 26 Jan. 1980; and Schmidt, 28 Feb. 1980, p. 16170.


\(^{310}\) NZZ, 6 Feb. 1980. See also LeM, 1 Mar. 1980.

\(^{311}\) Schmidt, 28 Feb. 1980, p. 16170. See also Schmidt, 20 Mar. 1980, p. 16622, and Genscher, 20 Mar. 1980, p. 16638, when this position was generally restated and the chancellor and the foreign minister reiterated the view that it was up to the USSR to create the possibilities for others to attend.
said (coming back to Schmidt’s words), everything would be done from the German side to unite the European and the American positions. The fact that the important view was the American one became quite clear from his statement that the invasion of Afghanistan concerned Germany as much as the US. It was therefore wrong to use the invasion as a test of solidarity vis-à-vis the United States: ‘When we decide we will do so on the basis of our own convictions and our own interests, which are identical with those of the United States.’ Responding to a question, Genscher again confirmed that he could not imagine Germany participating at the Olympic Games in Moscow if the US were not attending.\(^{312}\)

The ambiguities associated with the German position became apparent during Schmidt’s visit to the United States in early March. According to the joint press communiqué: ‘The President and the Chancellor agreed that participation in the Olympic Games would be inappropriate as long as the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan continues.’ Also according to the communiqué, the chancellor emphasized that it was up to the Soviet Union to create the conditions in which athletes from all countries would be able to participate in the Games and that at present such conditions did not exist.\(^{313}\) While these phrases indicated that a boycott was deemed likely, Schmidt’s statement at the press conference that followed was that Germany would wait until 24 May before making its decision on participation known.\(^{314}\)

This statement illustrates the dilemmas for German policy of seeking to maintain close relations with the US and at the same time with France. At this stage, the chances of a common EC position, while slight, were still not ruled out, and a German statement would have made its chances even more remote. Schmidt may also have seen premature declarations of a boycott as putting an end to all hope of a Soviet withdrawal.\(^{315}\)

However, Germany’s decision was taken earlier than Schmidt had said. On 12 April, the day when the US Olympic Committee voted to boycott the games, Schmidt stated that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan ‘prevents the participation of West German athletes’. The conditions for this had not been met and the USSR had little time left in which to meet them.\(^{316}\) On 23 April 1980 the German Government took the decision to recommend the German national Olympic committee not to send athletes to the Moscow Olympics. The declaration referred to the words of the German–American declaration of 5 March 1980 stating that the German Government did not consider German participation suitable as long as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan continued. On this issue as well, said the declaration, Germany supported its allied partner. The Bundestag

\(^{315}\) See also FAZ, 1 Feb. 1980.
\(^{316}\) Europe, 14/15 Apr. 1980.
The government's decision, the vote resulting in a strong endorsement of the government proposal.\textsuperscript{317}

### 3.6.2.3. Cooperation Patterns

#### Unilateral Activities

The German policy, like the French one, included an element of unilateral behaviour in the continuation of contacts with the Soviet Union. Like the French, the Germans believed that their own policy was more likely to save détente than that of the US. Germany, like France, therefore worked actively for and maintained contacts with the USSR. For Germany, however, it was even more important than it was for France that others, in particular the United States, understood that it in no way condoned Soviet behaviour.

Some events attracted specific attention from others. One was the letter of early February from Schmidt to Brezhnev. The background, according to newspaper reports, was Soviet pressure on Germany to distance itself from the US.\textsuperscript{318} Dismissing this, Schmidt also expressed his willingness to meet Brezhnev, thereby accepting a previous invitation. The visit to Moscow, which took place in early July, was preceded by intensive argumentation by Schmidt, who was clearly seeking to avoid accusations similar to those the French had had to endure by being secretive about their plans. Referring inter alia to Muskie’s and Giscard d’Estaing’s Soviet meetings, he claimed that the renewal of talks was part of a policy now being pursued by others as well.\textsuperscript{319} Obviously, the visit was greatly desired on the German side, although it was not obvious whether the reasons for this were concern for the Ostpolitik, a wish to play the role of mediator or any other.

#### Bilateral Cooperation

While the Germans, like the French, saw a need to communicate with the Americans, *German–American* contacts were of a different character. On Germany’s side they involved not only explaining the German position as regards sanctions but also seeking American acceptance of this policy, and the policy of maintaining contacts with the Soviet Union. The *Gesamtkonzept*, described above, was the means by which Germany aimed to make sanctions less dominant in its relations to the United States by emphasizing its willingness to contribute to stability by financial aid, primarily to Pakistan and Turkey.\textsuperscript{320}

The *Franco-German* contacts were important for Germany as well, the two countries sharing the conception of the need for détente and a fear that strong sanctions might make the situation worse. The biannual meeting under the Elysée


\textsuperscript{318} *FAZ*, 12 Feb. 1980. The Soviet argument was that it was impossible to be a proponent of détente in Europe while maintaining close relations to the US. See also *LeM*, 12 Feb. 1980.

\textsuperscript{319} Schmidt, 4 June 1980.

\textsuperscript{320} See, for example, Genscher, 20 Mar. 1980, p. 16637.
Treaty of February started one day early at Germany’s request. It must be seen as a success for Germany. The joint communiqué reflected important German concerns such as loyalty to NATO and included no sensitive elements such as sanctions, and was consequently positively received by the US and NATO. Immediately preceding the EC/EPC meetings and – as regards contents – positively received in these forums – it was as influential as it could possibly have been.

While cooperating with France, Germany also needed to continue to ‘anchor’ its policies in larger groups, including the US. The French president’s remarks at his press conference after the meeting therefore needed to be corrected in order not to be misunderstood. The German Cabinet, meeting shortly after the Franco-German and EC meetings, without referring to the French president’s statements, declared that there was no such thing as a third position to which he had alluded. As the Germans must have perceived their interests, Franco-German statements against sanctions would not have made much difference apart from exposing Germany to criticism.

The German–British cooperation was of a different kind. For Germany, as for France, relations with the UK were complicated, being partly shaped by issues related to the invasion of Afghanistan but also by the British plan for a neutral Afghanistan (described in chapter 4) and by cooperation in the Middle East (described in chapter 5), and influenced by issues in other areas such as the EC budget conflict. Since the conflict between France and the UK was acute, Germany was generally seen as a mediator – a role not appreciated by Helmut Schmidt. Several meetings took place during this period. When the budget conflict was resolved in late May a reduction in the British contributions to the budget was achieved, at the expense of France and above all Germany. Many meetings took place during this period in which Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Thatcher, Sir Ian Gilmour and Genscher were involved, dealing with the issues mentioned above.

**Multilateral Cooperation**

For Germany *multilateral cooperation* in itself had many advantages. For it, as for France, bilateral cooperation served as an important step on the way to exerting influence or to getting multilateral cooperation. Unlike France, however, Germany had no aversion to NATO. The active German role in staging the meeting with Vance on 20 February demonstrated clearly that Germany did not share the French dislike of meetings of this character.

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322 *FAZ*, 7 Feb. 1980. See also Genscher in *FAZ*, 17 Mar. 1980. According to the *FAZ*, 2 Feb. 1980, the German declaration before the meeting was carefully worded in order not to create any misconceptions. The deliberations with the French were said to have been undertaken in order to contribute to the formation of a common view among the Nine.

323 Genscher stated that he had told Carter on his visit to the US that he would have to discuss the matter of an Olympic boycott with his Common Market partners. (*NYT*, 25 Jan. 1980.)

324 *Times*, 31 May 1980; *FT*, 27 June 1980. Germany, like France, was not entirely neutral in the conflict. Whereas the French had a conflict as regards lamb meat, the Germans argued that reductions in the prices of fish and North Sea oil should be part of the deal. See, for example, *FT*, 13 Feb. 1980.
NATO played little role for Germany as regards sanctions, the simplest reason for this being that the issues belonged to the EC’s area of competence, CoCom having taken over the role that NATO first had as regards sanctions for high-technology and strategic goods. The EC and the EPC, however, were forums in which Germany’s ambitions, and well as its hesitation – the latter in its view on sanctions – would not be as visible to the US as they would be within NATO.

3.6.2.4. The German Perception of Norms in Relation to Institutions

In Germany, as in France, references were made to the common values uniting the Western countries. The basic difference between the French and German statements was that in the German case these values were not seen as a reason for keeping value-based cooperation out of NATO. Rather the common values were regarded as constituting the foundation for the creation of NATO and as the basis for cooperation within it. In contrast to the French statements, Germany thus referred to NATO as being more than a military alliance.325

The fact that Germany’s situation was different from that of France meant that some differences in norm-related statements were only natural. The general conception of a Warsaw Pact attack was that it would involve German territory at a very early stage. Together with the fact that Germany, in contrast to France, was a member of the integrated military defence of NATO, any references to Germany being loyal to its Article 5 obligations in case of an attack would have been seen as superfluous, since the conception was that Germany, because of its geographical situation, would be a major beneficiary of other countries’ fulfilment of their obligations.

A further norm associated with NATO membership was that of solidarity in a more general sense than that related to a military attack on Europe. The concept of political solidarity may have been seen as particularly relevant at this particular period in time, when Europe was not immediately threatened but tension was heightened. The statements mentioning this norm, while certainly seen as valid for all, were of special importance for Germany because of its particular situation. Thus, while German speakers generally spoke of solidarity within NATO and of Germany as a reliable member state,326 it was obvious that this solidarity was seen as emanating primarily from the relationship with the United States, NATO being the means rather than the object of loyalty. The argument was that the United States had proved its own loyalty to Germany on a number of occasions, in particular as regards Berlin, and Germany was determined to be loyal in return – a policy which required sacrifices such as non-participation in the Moscow Olympics.327

Whereas the German leaders gave the issue of demonstrating solidarity with NATO and the United States much weight, another important issue was also

327 See, for example, Genscher, 17 Jan. 1980, p. 15596; Lambsdorff, 19 Feb. 1980; Schmidt, 4 June 1980.
prevalent in their statements. This was Germany’s strong interest in demonstrating that its solidarity with NATO was compatible with other lines of German policy.

Germany’s first concern seemed to be European cooperation. German spokesmen repeatedly mentioned NATO and the EC together, the purpose seemingly being to demonstrate that solidarity with the one was compatible with solidarity with the other. Its leaders furthermore emphasized the important and positive contribution of European cooperation and integration to world politics. In addition, Germany’s cooperation with France was described as close and at the same time as contributing positively to transatlantic cooperation. There was no need for Germany to choose between the United States and France.\(^{328}\)

The other area of concern was that of preserving an element of German sovereignty in determining its own policy even in crises that required solidarity. Here the message was more subtle, for instance, in the statements by Schmidt on the need to steer Germany with a steady hand through turbulent times.\(^{329}\) In addition, in noting with approval that the Americans were again starting their dialogue with the USSR, Schmidt seemed to deliver a very mild version of the French rebuke to the United States that it could not criticize the Europeans, in seeking to maintain a dialogue with the Russians, for behaviour that it was pursuing itself.\(^{330}\) It was stressed on many occasions, however, that the German policy was not one of Alleingang.\(^{331}\) In sum it seems that for the Germans the obligation of political solidarity was not seen as requiring Germany to fall in with each and every American demand. The ideal was an American endorsement of the German policy and understanding of Germany’s approach when it differed from the approach preferred by the Americans.

Political solidarity with NATO/the United States was to be demonstrated not only by Germany, however, but also by the EC. In order to do this well and to achieve the desired impact on the US, the Europeans had to attain cohesion. Cohesion was not enough, however, according to Genscher: the impact Europe could make also depended on the visibility of European solidarity, expressed in common action and based on a common strategy.\(^{332}\)

Another norm associated with NATO membership was that of joint consultation. Whereas Germans seemed to hesitate about accusing the Americans of not consulting, this problem was openly mentioned during Cyrus Vance’s visit to Bonn on 20 February, at which Schmidt stated that he had heard about the ultimatum for the Olympic Games on the day it was announced, which, he said, was ‘a little late’. The American awareness of this became apparent as Vance declared that the US was willing to improve the methods of consultation.\(^{333}\) Also, in late February Schmidt spoke about having been in close contact with the French president, the British prime minister and the American president since the

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\(^{331}\) See, for example, Apel, 7 Mar. 1980.

\(^{332}\) Genscher, 10 Feb. 1980. See also, for example, Schmidt, 5 Feb. 1980.

invasion. Genscher on one occasion stated that the form of consultations was of secondary importance, and on another that this was not a new problem and that it should be handled through candid efforts.\footnote{334} 

A prominent feature of statements by the German leadership, and one which for obvious reasons was not part of the French picture, is that they pointed to the obligation of member states to contribute to the common NATO defence.\footnote{335} The German leaders repeatedly emphasized the way in which their country fulfilled its obligations towards NATO. Examples mentioned were the building up of the German armed forces, the German contribution to NATO’s Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP), Germany’s support of NATO’s ‘double-track’ decision of December 1979 and the expressed willingness of German leaders to contribute even more in the future.\footnote{336} 

As described by the German statements, the goal to be achieved by NATO’s member countries, when contributing to the common defence, was to create a balance in military capabilities between NATO and the supposedly militarily superior Warsaw Pact. This concept was more than a goal in itself, however. For the Germans it served also as a link between the obligations of a NATO member and Germany’s own goals. A balance, it was claimed, was necessary in order to achieve détente between the two blocs and was thereby also a means for increased security for the whole of Europe. Furthermore it was a requirement for the German Ostpolitik.\footnote{337} The German policy, moreover, was to achieve a balance at a level of armaments lower than the present one, which was pursued through a variety of policies.\footnote{338} 

The allusion to the link between NATO demands for increased military efforts on the one hand and the German goal of achieving détente on the other may have been made with two different audiences in mind. One reason for it may have been to convince the proponents of détente and Ostpolitik that increased military spending could reduce tension (the other road to détente being disproportionate military reductions by the East). The other reason for pointing to this connection may have been to convince the United States and other NATO members that the German policies of détente and Ostpolitik were compatible with the obligations of a loyal NATO member. The latter seemed to have been in Genscher’s mind when he stated that the fact that balance was a precondition for every realistic détente policy refuted the thesis that détente was irreconcilable with solidarity between Europeans and Americans.\footnote{339}
A further means to establish the compatibility between NATO norms and German policy (seemingly intended primarily for an American audience) was to refer to the legality of the agreements within the Ostpolitik. Schmidt declared that Germany, expecting others to do the same, would respect existing agreements with Eastern countries as with Western ones.\textsuperscript{340}

German statements, like French ones, dealt mostly with norms in relation to NATO. This is natural considering that the crucial issue at this time centred on whether member countries adhered to the norms of this organization. The German politicians, however, also included *solidarity with the EC* in their statements when pointing to the relevant norms which their country sought to follow and which were important for their own security. Thus, while both the French and the Germans referred to consultations within the EC, the German statements also spoke about their own country as a loyal member of the EC.\textsuperscript{341} There is a difference between the kind of cohesion mentioned above and this one: while the former was aimed at achieving influence in relation to the United States, this was directed at the EC itself.

For the Germans, far from seeing any competition between the norms associated with the EC and those linked to NATO, there was a positive connection between them: cohesion within the EC was an obligation but also a means to achieve increased influence over NATO/the United States, to which the EC member states also had an obligation of solidarity. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Americans were positive towards European unity, having said that a Europe that spoke with one voice was a better partner than a divided Europe.\textsuperscript{342} The self-interest and the obligations were thus in harmony.

The interesting difference here is that, while the German obligation of political solidarity was expressed as a binding and specific one, the obligation of the EC to support NATO was formulated in vaguer terms and seen to need the support of the argument that this was in the self-interest of these states. Apparently such an obligation was not believed to be supported by all and therefore needed some support.

**3.6.3. The United Kingdom and the Sanctions**

Generally, the British view, like the American and (largely) the German views but in contrast to the French view, was that the situation following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was irreversible. An example of this was Lord Carrington’s speech of 24 January, in which he justified the sanctions by saying that it was right that the USSR should feel the strength of the world’s disapproval since this would help it to avoid miscalculation in the future.\textsuperscript{343}

There was one important element of difference, however, between the two types of sanction. In the case of economic sanctions, the positions of other countries were important, since their participation would determine the effects on the UK.


\textsuperscript{341} See, for example, Lambsdorff, 19 Feb. 1980; Schmidt, 28 Feb. 1980; and Genscher, 20 Mar. 1980.

\textsuperscript{342} See Genscher, 4 May 1980.

\textsuperscript{343} Carrington, 24 Jan. 1980, col. 535.
In the case of the Olympic Games there was a strong wish for others to boycott them as well, but only because that this would increase the effect on the USSR.

3.6.3.1. The Economic Area

The British leaders during January 1980 gave their total support to the American policy on sanctions.344 In the words of Margaret Thatcher: “The United States is the final guarantor of European security. It is demonstrating clear leadership, and we should back it.” 345

In late January a new set of unilateral British measures was announced: the government was to avoid high-level and ministerial contact with the Soviet Union for the time being, military exchanges under consideration would be cancelled, cultural and other events would be avoided, and broadcasts to listeners in the Soviet Union were to be increased.346

Clearly also, the UK, like France and Germany sought to minimize the damage to its own economic interests. For the UK, like Germany, while it endorsed sanctions, there was also a case to be made for saying that long-term policies should be exempted from sanctions. Underlying this argument seems to be the thought that temporary measures should not cause harm that could not be undone.

The UK, as described earlier, was eager to achieve a more precise definition of the EC decisions of 15 January, including a wide range of goods. The British spoke out strongly against the export of agricultural products to the Soviet Union, stating that the government would be pressing other European countries and the EC Commission.347

As regards export credits, the now expiring credit agreement between the UK and the Soviet Union was not to be renewed, since its terms were considered too favourable to the Soviet Union. Credit would instead be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Lord Carrington in a parliamentary speech also referred to the studies of a tighter application of the CoCom rules which the UK was now undertaking together with other countries.348

At the same time British leaders were also concerned about the effects of these measures. ‘Solidarity within the EC’, it was declared, also involved burden-sharing of costs related to sanctions among the EC states. There was therefore no point in forsaking trade if the only result would be others taking it over.349

There was also – unrelated to others’ willingness – a reluctance on the part of the UK to endure too much hardship in connection with sanctions. Already in January, as new proposals for sanctions were being made, Sir Ian Gilmour,

344 Hurd made his statement in the House of Commons on 14 January, while Carrington, as a member of the House of Lords, presented his in this chamber on 24 January. On 28 January Thatcher made a speech on Afghanistan in the Commons.
347 Ibid., cols 533 and 540.
348 Ibid., col. 533.
speaking about British engineering companies, stated that the UK had no intention of hurting itself. Lord Carrington at the same time spoke of the need to continue to pursue some relations with the Soviet Union, including ‘commercially justified trade and other arrangements of mutual benefit’. The same view was stressed by Gilmour in the parliamentary debate of 17 March: while strongly opposed to doing anything that might facilitate the Soviet war effort, the UK was not advocating the severance of trade links where opportunities existed, especially for non-strategic capital goods. However, it was difficult, he admitted, to strike the right balance – to do more harm to the Soviet Union than the UK did to itself.

A number of questions in Parliament demonstrated mistrust of the West European allies, in particular France and Germany. The questions centred around their perceived lack of solidarity and what the UK could do to encourage it. The answers, sometimes vague or evasive, were generally reassuring, stating that the degree of unanimity in Europe was not to be underestimated and that some differences were inevitable among free nations. More pointed answers were given by Lord Carrington when stating that the UK ‘will be pressing our colleagues in Europe as hard as we can and the Commission as hard as we can’ and by Sir Ian Gilmour when he said that ‘it is certainly our objective, through cooperation, to bring them into line’. In no answer, however, were the representatives of the government openly critical of other European countries.

In late February a change took place in the British support for the American approach. According to a large number of newspapers at the time of the launch of the neutrality proposal for Afghanistan, Lord Carrington was ‘reliably reported’ to believe that the clamour for a boycott of the Olympic Games and for sweeping economic sanctions had ‘got out of proportions’. Measures were now needed to bring about a resolution of the crisis. His own contribution, as described in chapter 4, was to launch a proposal for the neutrality of Afghanistan.

3.6.3.2. The UK and the Olympic Games

The issue of sanctions later came to focus on the Olympic Games. On 17 January Prime Minister Thatcher informed Parliament that the government would like the games to be moved from Moscow. On 22 January she wrote to the British Olympic Association urging them to forward this proposal to the International Olympic Committee. After receiving a negative answer, on 14 February she told the House of Commons that the government had decided to advise British athletes not to go. A lengthy debate was held in the House of Commons on

354 See, for example, IHT, 20 Feb. 1980; and Gmt., 21 Feb. 1980.
355 British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980: see in particular p. xl and (Statement by Hurd given 20 February 1980) pp. 16–17; British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs
17 March 1980 resulting in acceptance of the government motion with the same advice by 315 votes to 147.\textsuperscript{356} On 25 March, in spite of this, the British Olympic Association accepted the invitation to participate in the games.\textsuperscript{357} Some of the sports bodies, however, chose not to participate. Hurd on 17 June met with representatives of most of those still committed to go in an attempt to persuade them to boycott the games.\textsuperscript{358}

The initial British reaction had been hesitant, but opinion in favour of a boycott strengthened later. Hurd, Carrington and Thatcher in their speeches in Parliament all argued against the view that political considerations were irrelevant and inappropriate to a sporting event: ‘As in 1936 for the Nazi Government, so now for the Soviet Union, the Olympic Games are a major political undertaking designed to impress the whole world with the prestige of the system. For the Games now to be held in Moscow would appear to condone Soviet aggression abroad and repression at home.’\textsuperscript{359}

The British Olympic Association was seemingly unwavering in its decision to participate. In the debate in the House of Commons on 17 March, after which the motion of the government advising against participation was passed, Gilmour expressed his understanding of the dilemma in which athletes might find themselves and underlined that the government did not initially advise a boycott of the games but rather a relocation to another place. These efforts were still ongoing, he said, with the minister of state at the moment conferring with representatives from a number of like-minded countries in Geneva.\textsuperscript{360}

In the British debate on boycotting the Olympic Games, other countries played an insignificant role. Comments sometimes deplored the lack of cohesion within the West.\textsuperscript{361}

In spite of the British leadership’s consistency in arguing against participation in the Olympic Games, there was, as described above, a change in Lord Carrington’s view of the British policies pursued so far. This led to consequences for British policies, although in another form than changing the policy of sanctions. Other types of statement, centring on the need for cooperation and a relaxation of tension, took over. These were said not to be a substitute for strong sanctions, but rather to complement them.\textsuperscript{362}

\textsuperscript{356} [Debate on participation in the Olympic Games], 17 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{357} \textit{Select Committee}, vol. 10, no. 4, Apr. 1980, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{358} Monro, 2 July 1980, col. 1504.
\textsuperscript{359} Carrington, 24 Jan. 1980, col. 534.
\textsuperscript{360} Gilmour, 17 Mar. 1980, cols 32–46 (quotation on col. 39).
\textsuperscript{361} HC, vol. 981, 17 Mar. 1980. See, for example, the statements by McNamara, col. 141, and Sir Ian Gilmour, col. 35.
3.6.3.3. Cooperation Patterns

Unilateral Activities

The British approach on the issue of sanctions was focused on deterrence and punishment, and the unilateral activities therefore consisted of proclaiming the UK’s willingness to impose sanctions. High-level contacts with the Soviet Union were seen as useless and were discontinued. This view later changed, however. In connection with the neutrality proposal, different positions on the need for cooperation were expressed. In May British leaders participated at the Vienna meeting (on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the end of the occupation of Austria) with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Lord Carrington hosted a breakfast meeting for Gromyko and the French and West German foreign ministers at the British Embassy in Vienna.³⁶³

Bilateral Cooperation

As described above, the UK pursued bilateral policies primarily with the United States on the basis of common views. It did not, as France and Germany did, need to establish close contacts with the US in order to convince the latter of its loyalty or the effectiveness of its policy. Also, the British prime minister had visited the US in December 1979. Instead the American—British contacts took place in a multilateral context, in which organizing meetings was a prime task.

Franco-British bilateral contacts were the least frequent. Lord Carrington’s visit to his French counterpart was one example of bilateral contact. To recall, he expressed himself positively when leaving the meeting, claiming that the positions of the two countries were not too far apart, whereas François-Poncet did not make any statement. While for the British a closer relation on certain issues with the French was not problematic, for France, having a more complicated agenda, and seeking, as the president expressed it, to express a third view, expressing similarity of views with the British would have confused others.

While the initial positions, of British declarations of total loyalty and French defiance of American demands for loyalty, changed as their hesitations grew about a boycott of the Olympics or participation, both finally pursued their original inclinations. Cooperation had to wait for other issues in which benefits could be reaped from it, sanctions being an area in which changes of policy were costly in terms of prestige.

British—German relations were again different. They were not characterized by the shared evaluations and shared perception of a need to join forces that were present in the relations between the UK and the US. As described above, Germany was at times depicted, together with France, as less loyal to the US. Germany and the UK, however, had a common interest in keeping the United States convinced of their loyalty, while at the same time not being hurt by sanctions. This was considered unproblematic by the British when the call for

³⁶³ British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980, ‘Chronology’. 
sanctions concerned above all products which it did not export itself, but the difference in trade dependence on the USSR between Germany and the UK made the meeting of minds difficult. While the UK was also ultimately vulnerable to sanctions that might become costly, and thereby vulnerable to the possibility of American criticism, the differences between the two countries were too great for cooperation to be possible.

In addition, the fact that the EC budget crisis coincided in time with discussions on sanctions unavoidably had an impact on relations, since the British sought German mediation. This role made Bonn more popular in London than vice versa, not least since the price of North Sea oil was a heavy burden for oil-dependent Germany.

**Multilateral Cooperation**

For the reasons mentioned above, multilateral cooperation was much sought by the British and they prided themselves on a very active role, having been instrumental in bringing the issues into the frameworks of the UN, NATO and the EC. During the first period, as the British response to American demands was unequivocal, the British efforts served as a multiplier of the effect, and British statements underlined the fact that both NATO and the EC played important roles.

As with Germany, they were also a shield as the prospect of costly sanctions loomed – a way in which it was possible to avoid being criticized for policies that the UK did not endorse. While agricultural sanctions were profitable for the UK, the technological ones were not and here it was important that others would also have to carry the burdens imposed by the no-exemptions policy.

**3.6.3.4. The British Perception of Norms in Relation to Institutions**

The British position relating to norms was different from that of France and Germany. As described earlier, from the outset the British leaders’ evaluations of the invasion of Afghanistan, both as regards its seriousness and as regards the possible motives behind it, were similar to those of the American leaders. The UK was therefore initially not in a position to be criticized by the United States for not living up to its obligations within NATO or the EC. The situation changed somewhat, however, after the British Olympic Association (against the recommendation of the government) decided for participation in the Moscow Olympics.

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364 The situation was not the same in the case of Iranian sanctions. The UK, while initially stating with fervour the need to comply, turned out to be the only country of the three not to introduce retroactive sanctions.


366 Genscher in his memoirs criticizes Thatcher for her conduct: whereas the Germans had first informed the sports organizations and asked for their support, Thatcher had at once announced that she wholeheartedly endorsed Carter’s call for a boycott. Yet the British athletes went to Moscow: ‘By way of explanation, London commented tersely that British sports organizations were independent. I observed that firmness was good, iron firmness even better, but cast-iron firmness no good at all in response to serious provocation – it was mere lip service.’ (Genscher, 1997, pp. 156–158.)
Typical for the whole period, however, was the British way of expressing norms. In contrast to the French and German leaders, the British did not usually bring up the subject of norms related to institutions as a subject in itself. The British statements concerned specific measures that should be taken, thus connecting the proposed activities to norms in an implicit rather than an explicit manner.

In the UK, as in Germany, there were no specific assurances that the country would be loyal in the event of attack against a NATO country, as specified by the Article 5 obligations of the NATO Statutes. One reason for this was that the UK, as part of the integrated military defence of NATO and would thus have very limited possibilities to escape being involved if it had wanted to do this. Moreover, while the UK was not as exposed to attack as Germany, for the British this type of statement was certainly seen as superfluous: British statements on loyalty to NATO and the United States went far beyond the very basic loyalty inherent in fulfilling the treaty obligations.

As in Germany, a more general type of solidarity – here called political solidarity – was a more relevant norm to address than that of adherence to Article 5. There were some differences between the British and the German concepts, however. Again, the British leaders spoke in general terms more than they spoke about the UK in particular. Political solidarity (a term coined by Lord Carrington) was connected to activities which were to be pursued and to their effects rather than to demonstrating loyalty to a particular organization.

Political solidarity was thus related to unity among Western nations and stated to include NATO and the EC but phrased in such a way that other institutions were not excluded. While, as in Germany, political solidarity included supporting the United States, it was not (as in Germany) described as the price of membership of NATO but as the normal way to behave. The kind of statement made by Lord Carrington, while being very common during the first part of the period, was almost totally absent after the end of February.

The UK had to endure some criticism for this kind of statement. The fact that illustrations of political solidarity were taken from the economic area was not seen as convincing. Others questioned whether this was actually a policy of solidarity considering the fact that the UK itself had no exports of the agricultural commodities in question and could only gain by an embargo on butter, which would otherwise be sold at a loss for the EC.

The most striking difference between Germany and the United Kingdom – and a similarity between the UK and France – was the scope of the declared independence of their own country in decision-making: the analysis on which the British policy was based was declared to be a British analysis. Thus, the British initiatives, which were frequently referred to, of bringing the issue of Afghanistan to the UN, NATO and the EC were not expressed as being taken after American pressure had been applied. Simultaneously the UK’s view of itself was also applied to others: on many occasions the British leaders defended the lack of results

367 See, for example, Carrington, 24 Jan. 1980.

within NATO and the EC in the area of sanctions by referring to the fact that these institutions were composed of free and independent states. Progress was being made, they said, but could only be expected to be slow, since states could not be forced.\textsuperscript{369} British declarations pointing to the wide scope for independent decision-making by different countries were frequent, and no fewer during the period when the UK was close to the United States than during the later period, characterized by a greater distance.

The obligation of joint consultations was unproblematic for the British in the early stages of the Afghanistan conflict since, according to the statement of Sir Ian Gilmour, ‘during the past few weeks we have been in continual discussion with our partners in both the Atlantic alliance and the EC to determine how best we should respond to the new situation’. Generally, the British leaders spoke of themselves as having the initiative. Gilmour even expressed it as the UK having ‘taken a lead in NATO and European consultations’. In addition, Lord Carrington mentioned that he had consulted and informed ‘my American, Community and Commonwealth colleagues’ in connection with his trip to the Middle East. It can be assumed from the way in which this matter was treated that consultations were seen to be part of NATO norms of behaviour as perceived by the British. It can also be assumed that the British leaders, who saw themselves, together with the United States, as leading the Western response to the Soviet Union, felt that they had an obligation to consult and inform others just as much as a right to be consulted or informed by them.\textsuperscript{370}

The issue of joint consultations was unproblematic for the British in connection with the Afghanistan conflict and the British themselves did, as mentioned before, criticize the French in connection with the Giscard d’Estaing–Brezhnev meeting. However, as will be seen in connection with the Middle East initiatives and the proposal for a neutral Afghanistan, the United Kingdom itself also got its share of criticism from the Americans for not having shared information.

Another type of obligation mentioned by British leaders was that of contributing to the common NATO defence. On this point the British statements were very similar to those of Germany, alluding to the undertaking to increase defence spending by 3 per cent per year in real terms, the LTDP adopted in 1978, and the double-track decision of December 1979. As in Germany there were also allusions to a willingness to contribute more to NATO’s defence. The contribution made by the British nuclear weapons was mentioned as well. According to British Defence Minister Francis Pym, ‘We see our contribution essentially as part of Alliance deterrence and a reinforcement of that deterrence’.\textsuperscript{371}

While expressing a need for deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the British also sought to delineate the scope of the new policy by stating that this was not a

\textsuperscript{369} See, for example, Thatcher, 28 Jan. 1980, col. 943.

\textsuperscript{370} Gilmour, 28 Jan. 1980, col. 1086 and 1080; Carrington, 24 Jan. 1980, col. 566.

\textsuperscript{371} British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980 (Evidence taken on 20 February 1980); Pym, 24 Jan. 1980, col. 678.
complete break with the past policy. Like the German leaders, the British stated that efforts were to continue in order to reach arms control agreements.  

Like the French and the Germans, the British leaders focused more on norms related to NATO than on norms related to the EC. When treating the issue of norms relevant within the EC, the British, like the Germans, put the emphasis on cohesion within the EC. Again, there was a difference between the two: in the British statements this cohesion was connected with increasing the effectiveness of deterrence against the Soviet Union, whereas in the German statements such allusions were of a more general nature and closely related to increasing the impact on the United States.

Solidarity with the EC as such was not part of the British way of expression. Instead the emphasis on the rights of the Europeans, within the EC, to express their own point of view formed a vital part of the British conception, in agreement with their European partners and in some disagreement from the American side, which saw this scope of independence as a breach of norms.

3.7. Concluding Remarks

3.7.1. The End of the Issue of Sanctions

The discussions on sanctions were never formally concluded (apart from discussion on the Olympic Games, where the individual national Olympic associations served in this role). The other discussions simply faded away as the realization dawned on all that the necessary support did not exist.

A painful process neared its end. For all the countries involved the issue brought disappointments. The United States saw the agricultural sanctions as largely failed, others having compensated the USSR for the American grain imports it had lost. Nor were the Europeans helpful when it came to export credits or exports of high technology, and they were only partly helpful when it came to the Olympic Games. In the Americans’ eyes there were also a number of breaches of these agreements in the allies’ contacts with the Soviet Union.

For the Europeans it was not much better. Long-drawn-out and painful discussions on the sanctions had been held and, whatever view one might have on their scope, the effect on the Soviet Union was not to be seen. To the extent that the EC member countries were against the introduction of far-reaching sanctions, they seem to have succeeded. Here France was more outspoken than the others and had to take much criticism for this, but all three countries were reluctant to undertake sanctions when this involved costs.

For the European countries this had also been a matter in which all their most important policies had been challenged. While all condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and expressed this clearly in the United Nations Security Council, they did not agree on the policies to follow. As the United States raised the stakes, the challenge was to pursue the policies they believed in and which they saw as conducive to the best possible outcome (which only France believed could be a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan) and which served themselves best, while still

372 See, for example, Thatcher, 28 Jan. 1980, col. 942.
keeping the Americans convinced that they were loyal to their common obligations.

As seen in this chapter, the three states took quite different approaches during the period when sanctions were being discussed. During this period they also on occasion hesitated as to whether they would continue on the path chosen.

For the French policy of détente, the American and British policies, as introduced during the last days of 1979, were clearly detrimental. France’s attempts to explain its policy to others were accompanied by unilateral approaches in order to seek a withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The results of its ambitious policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union were, however, disappointing. The détente policy became ever more difficult to pursue as no Soviet response was seen. The major disappointment was that in spite of French efforts no Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan took place. This effort had been costly for France, leading to accusations by others that it had breached norms.

Germany was in the same position as France in seeking to maintain a détente policy, which was a crucial element of its foreign and security policy, and it met the same lack of success. While it harboured little hope that a détente policy would achieve withdrawal, Germany still hoped that it would produce some response, and, like France, it was disappointed. For Germany, however, the situation was more complicated than it was for France, since it was difficult this time to combine the two central elements of its foreign and security policy – détente policy and Ostpolitik on the one hand, and a close relationship with the United States on the other. The situation was made even more complicated by the fact that the German leaders had little confidence in President Carter, seeing him as erratic. While stating its loyalty to the United States, Germany sought to limit the damage of economic sanctions by requiring others to follow as well. Only when considering the boycott of the Olympic Games was there no way out – this was a highly political issue for which the norm of political solidarity applied.

The United Kingdom did not share the problems of the other two in pursuing a policy according to its perceived interests. Initially sharing the views of the United States, it would stand behind the call for sanctions. However, even during the early period, when British support for the American measures was at its height, when discussing the issue of sanctions the UK showed no enthusiasm for causing damage to itself. Like Germany, the UK sought to combine loyalty to the US with minimizing the costs of sanctions.

Another crucial matter was the way cooperation took place and the role of the European states vis-à-vis the United States. France, in particular, was critical to the way in which cooperation was being pursued: it was taking place on American terms, the US taking a position after which others rallied behind it. For France’s interest in playing a role in European foreign and security policy, the cooperation that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused a number of problems. Cooperation should have taken place on equal terms, and France sought to accomplish this with the help of Germany, while at the same time another couple – the Anglo-American one – had been formed.
In spite of this – remarkably, in the midst of their different policies as regards the Afghanistan invasion – there was also ongoing cooperation among the three in other areas, such as the Middle East. As the British realized that the policy towards the Soviet Union had not been a success, and when in February Lord Carrington announced that it was to change to be less ‘condemnatory’ towards the Soviet Union, a process of more intense cooperation could gain speed.

The cooperation that now took shape is closely connected to the issue of sanctions. The British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and the Middle East initiatives are part of the first case study. They will be dealt with in separate chapters – chapters 4 and 5, respectively. To avoid repetition, chapter 6 will include the conclusions of the present chapter as well as those of chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4.
The British Proposal for a Neutral Afghanistan

4.1. Introduction
The invasion of Afghanistan also led to other kinds of activity than those aimed at introducing sanctions. As time passed after the invasion, and a number of measures had been taken by the Western countries, states had to consider the new situation. The British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was based on a British appraisal of this. This time only one institution, the EPC, was in the focus. The EPC, aided by bilateral activities by the various countries – primarily the United Kingdom – pursued this initiative and, finding it unsuccessful, finally abandoned it.

Here, as in the previous chapter, the aim is to see what the forces behind cooperation were: what determines their pattern, content and impact?

The present chapter, chapter 3 and chapter 5, on the Middle East initiatives, taken together form the first case, dealing with cooperation after the invasion in Afghanistan, the conclusion of which is presented in chapter 6.

4.2. The Background
The British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was presented officially at the EPC meeting in Rome on 19 February 1980, and approved. It was based on UN General Assembly Resolution of 14 January, in which an appeal was made to other states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country.1 The proposal was endorsed again at the European Council meeting in Luxembourg of 27–28 April, as well as at the Venice European Council of 12–13 June and the Western Economic Summit on 22–23 June 1980. The last of these meetings in practice marked the end of the proposal.2

These meetings were the formal occasions on which the proposal was treated, but other meetings and initiatives in a variety of forums and constellations of countries also took place and influenced the development of the proposal. In this process the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States also played a role.

The reason behind the proposal was explained by Lord Carrington who, in an interview, referred to the statements issued by the EC on Afghanistan, which he saw as ‘really more declaratory and condemnatory than anything else’. He stated furthermore that: ‘We have been thinking for some time in London that we ought to try and be rather more constructive and do something which should be an initiative in the sense of trying to contribute once again to the lessening of tension

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1 See chapter 3, section 3.4.2.3.
and be a positive step forward in defusing what is potentially, as we all know, a very serious situation in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood.\(^3\)

A second reason given was that of meeting the Soviet accusations: ‘If the Soviet Union are claiming that they have to occupy Afghanistan because of their fears for their own security, then of course a neutral Afghanistan overcomes that particular difficulty.’ A third reason could be seen in the initiative paving the way for the USSR to retreat without losing face. As Lord Carrington put it: ‘It enables the Soviet Union if they are prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan to do so on a perfectly respectable basis.’\(^4\)

These motives were also expressed in Lord Carrington’s speech of 20 May 1980 when he confirmed his determination to relax the tension between East and West and spoke of the need for open lines of communication in order to create greater understanding. Coming back to the Soviet quest for security, Carrington claimed that a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, with guarantees of its independence, would remove ‘any justification for the presence of Soviet troops or Soviet anxiety for their security’.

The third motive – that of providing an excuse for a Soviet withdrawal – was mentioned indirectly as Carrington spoke of what he saw as a realization in the Soviet Union of its miscalculation as regards the reaction of the rest of the world.\(^5\)

In speaking about meeting the USSR’s need for security, Carrington did not subscribe to the Soviet version of events. He referred to two possible motives for the invasion – a need to replace an incompetent President Amin and a decision that Afghanistan was to be a platform for further expansion – and for these a strong reaction in the form of sanctions was appropriate. But sanctions were not enough. Steps had to be taken to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and this was the reason for the neutrality proposal.\(^6\)

4.3. The Soviet Attitude

The British proposal caused a number of reactions from the Soviet Union and its puppet regime in Kabul. The first was a TASS comment of 20 February, in which the idea was dismissed as absolutely unacceptable. At the same time, however, a number of Western newspapers noticed some positive comments from Romania, which they interpreted as possibly signifying that the USSR was interested.\(^7\)

A speech of 22 February by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, referring in one passage to the circumstances under which the Soviet Union would be willing to leave Afghanistan, gave rise to different kinds of comment, some more hopeful than others.\(^8\) Moreover, statements made in March by Amin’s successor, Babrak

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\(^3\) Carrington, 22 Feb. 1980.

\(^4\) Ibid. See also Gilmour, 12 Mar. 1980, cols. 1309–1311. According to the *Guardian*, the idea grew out of Carrington’s conversations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when he was visiting India in January. (*Gua.*, 5 Mar. 1980.)

\(^5\) Carrington, 20 May 1980.

\(^6\) Ibid.


\(^8\) ‘I want to state very definitely, we will be ready to commence the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of outside interference directed against the government and people of Afghanistan are fully
Karmal, were very critical of the proposal and said that the neutralization proposed by Carrington was aimed at camouflaging ‘various forms of intervention and aggression against his country’. In April Karmal assumed a more positive attitude when offering talks with Pakistan and Iran on ‘normalizing’ the region. Similarly in May Karmal again proposed that talks be held, for the first time not insisting that a Soviet withdrawal be preceded by American guarantees. In June, as the Western Economic Summit was gathered in Venice, came an announcement of the withdrawal of some Russian troops. By then, however, as the response made obvious, Western Europe had given up hope for this proposal.

### 4.4. The American Attitude

The Americans greeted the European proposal with some reservations. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, visiting Europe just after the Rome meeting of 19 February, stated that he was ‘in general agreement’ with the proposal. Hodding Carter, spokesman for the State Department, who accompanied Vance, pointed out the complexities that remained to be resolved and the need for support from the countries of the region.

These first comments were followed by others that were similar in tone. According to these, the US was eager to see a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan and was willing to be one of the countries guaranteeing the genuine neutrality of Afghanistan and non-interference in its internal affairs. However, the prior withdrawal of Soviet forces, which was a prerequisite for this, was seen as very unlikely. Moreover, as long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan the American sanctions would remain in force.

Hodding Carter, while stating the American interest in the proposal, also declared that the US did not wish to take the lead and preferred others, primarily the Muslim states, to do so. American officials were reported to have explained privately the American unwillingness to talk to the Russians on this matter: such talks would have given legitimacy to Moscow’s allegations that the invasion was a defensive move. The British proposal, since in American eyes it was most likely to fail, would thereby not only cost time but also weaken the message of condemnation.

This issue reflected a transatlantic rift regarding the way in which the Soviet Union should be treated. In addition, the issue of consultation was again a source of irritation among the allies. This time, however, it was the United States that considered that it had reason to complain. State Department aides were reported to have expressed annoyance over the lack of consultation before the UK began its initiative and thereafter, while the initiative was being treated on a European

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10 *Bull. EC*, no. 6, June 1980, p. 19. See section 4.5.1 below on the EPC.
level.\textsuperscript{14} It should be recalled here that this proposal was launched at the time when Cyrus Vance was visiting Europe and felt compelled to apologize for the American lack of consultation. It was to be expected that the Americans thereafter would keep a close watch on others’ adherence to this norm.

4.5. The Institutions

4.5.1. The EPC

According to the declaration made as the proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was launched in the EPC, the crisis ‘could be overcome constructively through an arrangement which allows a neutral Afghanistan to be outside competition between the powers’. However, the proposal, although approved by the other members of the EC, was still at an early stage and needed to be more thoroughly worked out by the political directors within the foreign ministries of the member states.\textsuperscript{15} The decision was that the nine EC countries were ‘to concert their position on the subject with all allied and friendly countries and with all countries having an interest in the equilibrium and stability of the region’.\textsuperscript{16}

Work on elaborating the British proposal continued with the active participation of members of the EPC. Italy, holding the presidency of the EC, had a coordinating role, seen in the intensive programme of visits by Attilio Ruffini, its foreign minister, to the different capitals for discussions with his counterparts and in the coordination of the work of the political directors.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, other member states took initiatives in forwarding the proposal, as described below. The idea was to submit a detailed proposal ‘very shortly’ to the USSR. However, the reactions from the Soviet side were said to have created uncertainty regarding the right approach. Finally, at the end of March the EPC members agreed not to make a detailed plan. The uncertainty as to whether the general idea was accepted was seen as making such an approach meaningless. Instead the proposal remained deliberately vague in order to create room for bargaining.\textsuperscript{18}

As the proposal was turned over to the political directors of the member states, some factors at once became the subject for discussion. One of these was the character of the proposed neutral status. The question was whether Afghanistan’s neutrality, like Austria’s, should be guaranteed by the great powers or whether guarantees should be given by the neighbouring states. A further issue was raised by the non-aligned countries in the region, which voiced criticism of the use of the word ‘neutral’ first by the UK and then by the EC. Initially India, Yugoslavia and Algeria, the three founders of the Non-Aligned Group, were all against the proposal.\textsuperscript{19} The term, they believed, indicated a dependent state. This resulted in the expression ‘neutral and non-aligned’ being used thereafter.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{14} NYT, 7 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{15} See appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.
\textsuperscript{17} See, for example, F-AZ, 26 Feb. 1980.
\textsuperscript{19} Keesing’s, 1 Aug. 1980, p. 30382.
At the Luxembourg European Council meeting of 27–28 April the various issues that had been discussed since the February meeting were settled and resulted in the following communiqué:

The European Council reaffirmed the view of the Nine that a solution in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly could be found in an arrangement which allowed Afghanistan to remain outside competition among the powers and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned state.

Respecting the right of the Afghan people freely to determine their own future, they believe that to this end the great powers and the neighbouring States should undertake to respect the sovereignty and integrity of Afghanistan, to refrain from interference in its internal affairs and to renounce all forms of military presence or association with it.

The Nine are ready to support, in concert with friendly and allied countries, any initiative designed to promote such a solution, emphasizing that their own proposal is neither rigid nor exclusive. In this connection they believe that the Islamic and non-aligned countries have a particularly significant role to play.\(^{21}\)

Again, at the Venice European Council of 12–13 June, the Nine reiterated their conviction that ‘a solution could be found in an arrangement which allowed Afghanistan to remain outside the competition of the powers and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned state.’ This was the last EPC meeting at which the proposal was dealt with. The final declaration on this initiative was that of the Western Economic Summit of 22–23 June, which stated that the Soviet occupation was unacceptable and that Afghanistan should be enabled to regain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character it had once enjoyed.\(^{22}\) However, it was evident from the response they gave at the same time to the announcement of the withdrawal of some Russian troops that the leaders at the summit entertained little hope that this would actually happen. Including a passage in their joint declaration to the effect that they had taken note of it, they stated that only if a withdrawal were permanent and total would it establish a situation compatible with peace.\(^{23}\)

4.5.2. Other Institutions

Neither NATO nor the WEU was involved in the attempt to create a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. NATO was formally informed of the EPC decisions. At the North Atlantic Council’s ministerial meeting on 25–26 June 1980, the member states ‘stressed the need for a political settlement which must necessarily provide for the total and immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces so as to enable the Afghan people to decide on its future peacefully with complete freedom and without any outside pressure’.\(^{24}\) However, there was no allusion to the EPC proposal.

The WEU Council in its annual report for 1980 referred to the activities of its member states within the UN, NATO and the EC. In the replies to an Assembly Recommendation and a written question (which did not directly concern this


\(^{22}\) Bull. EC, no. 6, June 1980, pp. 11 and 19.

\(^{23}\) Gua., 23 June 1980; Bull. EC, no. 6, June 1980, p. 19.

issue), the Council pointed to the efforts within the EPC, starting with the meeting of 19 February. It noted with satisfaction the positive reactions of several Third World countries, particularly the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to this proposal.  

4.6. Institutional Capability: the Pattern and Content of Cooperation

Except for being mentioned by NATO and the WEU, the proposal was dealt with entirely within the EPC. For this initiative there was no need for any particular capability to initiate work quickly, since this was not a crisis situation. The remaining factor, that of institutional competence in the relevant areas, fits well with the actual pattern of cooperation: only the EPC (and the WEU) had the formal competence to deal with these matters. With NATO again there was the impediment that its remit was limited geographically. The content, this being a diplomatic matter, made the EPC the most suitable institution. Compared to the WEU, the EPC had an asset in the presidency, which was capable of securing the consent of members thanks to the visits made by the Italian foreign minister.

This was, however, also a matter in which the crucial component was to get the Soviet Union’s agreement to the plan. The fact that the WEU was also a military alliance would hardly have been conducive to convincing the USSR of the merits of the proposal.

The EC Presidency acquired a particular role in this initiative. In contrast with the issue of sanctions, this initiative was not plagued by deep rifts between the members and the considerable economic consequences of the policy choices. The necessary coordination of positions could therefore be handled by the country holding the presidency.

4.7. The Three European Countries and the Proposal

4.7.1. The British Activities

Before the proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was launched within the framework of EPC cooperation in Rome in February, it had been discussed among the three major states, as London had sounded out opinions in Paris and Bonn. During the week immediately prior to the meeting the UK had spoken to other EC countries, and even after the launch of the initiative in the EPC, and while its details were still being discussed among the political directors, the UK continued to pursue it in high-level meetings with other states. Meetings between British and German leaders were particularly frequent.

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27 Carrington visited Bonn for discussions with Schmidt and Genscher on 26 February. The previous weekend Schmidt, while on a private visit to London, had met Thatcher and Carrington. Genscher and Carrington met again in Rome on 27 February. (FAZ, 23 and 27 Feb. 1980; Gna., 27 Feb. 1980; Europe, 27 Feb. 1980.)
After the initiative was anchored within the EPC, the UK still had a particular interest in carrying it through. Brezhnev’s negative comments of 22 February came as a blow. In an interview on Bonn on 26 February, Carrington spoke of the urgent need to proceed with efforts to find the best proposal and spoke of the Brezhnev speech as not entirely discouraging. On television the same day Carrington admitted that there were ‘very considerable problems’ but claimed that this was the plan most likely to succeed.28

Fresh blows came on 29 February as the proposal was presented to Nikolai Lunkov, the Soviet ambassador to the UK, and a few days afterwards in Moscow. On the latter occasion a deputy foreign minister gave a cool reception to the British envoy, Sir Curtis Keeble, and a Russian weekly made the comment that the EC plan was ‘not even worth discussing’.29

In addition to all these problems among the countries that were crucial for the success of the proposal, France decided to conduct its own negotiations rather than join the EPC initiative. The UK regarded the lack of full Western endorsement for the proposal in a conciliatory way: ‘This process of acting together is never simple. Differences in the Western response are an inevitable reflection of the openness of our societies.’30

The British policy itself was not without complications. While, as Lord Carrington described it, the previous British policy had been ‘declaratory and condemnatory more than anything else’, the change did not mean that the UK had abandoned the idea that sanctions were necessary. It continued its efforts to achieve sanctions in the agricultural sector and its policy on a boycott of the Olympic Games.

The two strands of policy met at the Rome meeting of the EPC on 19 February. This was not only the meeting at which the neutrality proposal was launched but also the one at which the EC members had planned to formulate a common response to the proposal for an Olympic boycott. When Carrington was asked immediately after the Rome meeting about possible connections between the two, he denied that the Olympic issue had any relation to the neutrality proposal: the UK and the other countries had discussed the Olympic Games and concluded that they would return to this matter in future meetings ‘in the light of the situation which may or may not arise’.31

On 17 March the two issues were again connected as the British Government, in a motion before Parliament, condemned the invasion and advised against British participation in the Olympic Games in Moscow. In his speech opening the debate, Sir Ian Gilmour referred to the initiative on neutrality. The Soviet reaction, according to him, suggested that the USSR did not want to close the door to further discussions: ‘We are therefore considering the next step in our initiative.

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30 Gilmour, 17 Mar. 1980, col. 35.
31 Carrington, 22 Feb. 1980. Newspaper articles reported that the fact that no position was taken or at least made public was due to French opposition, France being critical of President Carter’s deadline, which was for the following day. (DT, 19 Feb. 1980; Guia., 19 Feb. 1980; LeM, 19 Feb. 1980.)
Equally, we must be on our guard against any Soviet attempt to use the prospect of discussions as a means of gaining the faint-hearted acquiescence of third countries in a permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Yet’, he said, ‘the search for a political solution will be long and arduous. To succeed, we need to keep up and indeed increase the pressure on the Soviet Union. We must increase the measures that we and our partners have, from the beginning of this year, been working together to apply.’

Problems associated with combining this initiative with the pursuit of sanctions were seemingly non-existent.

No progress was made, however, and the initiative slowly petered out. At the end of March a Foreign Office spokesman was reported to have stated that the UK was still pursuing the plan through bilateral talks with a number of contacts. On 16 April Douglas Hurd described the plan as still being discussed and developed. The UK was now studying the Soviet reply to the EC proposal and was to decide later whether to continue the exchange with the USSR and, if so, how to do this. At the invitation of the British, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, Habib Chatty, arrived in London for talks on the proposal. The Pakistani foreign minister was also due in London at the end of April. A further sign that the EC had not totally abandoned the proposal was evident in late April when the European Council repeated the suggestion for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, which was also endorsed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Parliament.

Afghan proposals of May centring on withdrawal elicited a fairly cool reception in London. Carrington’s opinion was that they showed ‘little if any change from previous Soviet and Afghanistan proposals’. Thatcher saw them as ‘not really very different’ but promised that the UK would look at them.

On 20 May Carrington described the proposal as still being pursued. There was no reason, he said, why the Soviet Union should not accept it. Furthermore, it was accepted by Iran and Pakistan and, as he saw it, had generally gained ground. He admitted that there were still problems regarding timing and method, and the plan had to be linked to other problems in the same area, in Iran and the Middle East. Still, he believed that the Soviet Union had realized that it had miscalculated the reaction in the world.

By June, however, Carrington’s hopes had apparently vanished. Learning of the Soviet troop withdrawals, he called them cosmetic and saw them only as attempts to convince West German athletes to abstain from their boycott of the Olympic

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32 Gilmour, 17 Mar. 1980, cols. 32–36. In the same vein Peter Blaker (Minister of State), stated: ‘If we are going to succeed in our policies of hoping to create or to encourage a neutral Afghanistan ... it is important to maintain pressure on the Soviet Union.’ (British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980 (Evidence taken on 26 Mar. 1980), p. 58.)
35 Gna, 2 Apr. 1980.
36 Thatcher, 29 Apr. 1980, col. 1151.
37 IHT, 16 May 1980; Times, 16 May 1980 (HC debate).
Games. The ailing proposal for neutrality and non-alignment for Afghanistan was now dropped by the British as well.

4.7.2. The French Reactions

The first French reaction to the British proposal was positive, if somewhat cautious. Immediately after the Rome meeting, Foreign Minister Jean François-Poncet told a journalist that the Nine had decided to explore the ways and means to make a Soviet withdrawal possible. They had decided to study the proposed type of solution and thereafter to talk to different states in the region as well as to friends and allies. François-Poncet stated that the aim of the Nine was to re-establish the conditions for peace and that such proposals as this one could contribute to this. He emphasized, however, that it was a suggestion, not yet a proposal, which the Nine had yet to develop.

A further indication that France was distancing itself from the British proposal came when President Giscard d’Estaing, without mentioning it, formulated his own – and very similar – proposal for a Soviet withdrawal. The French saw the solution in re-establishing the earlier situation, which should include three elements: (1) the retreat of foreign military forces from Afghanistan, (2) the right of the Afghan people to decide their own affairs, and (3) the need to ensure that Afghanistan did not constitute a threat to its neighbours. This should be accomplished by guaranteeing that Afghanistan did not become a stake or an instrument for rivalry between the superpowers.

The French dissociation from the EPC proposal was also manifested in concrete action. On 4 and 5 March, the day after Sir Curtis Keeble’s visit to Moscow, Bruno de Leusse and Gabriel Robin (respectively secretary-general and political director of the French Foreign Ministry) met their opposite numbers, Kornienko and Lovaliev, in Moscow. The meetings, later described as failures, were set up to launch the French proposal. The proposal met with no response, however, and the meeting proceeding along the same lines as when Kornienko had visited Paris in January, except that this time de Leusse and Robin were not given the opportunity to speak to the foreign minister.

A working visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Paris on 23–25 April and the French president’s meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw on 19 May also formed part of the French policy of trying to convince the Soviet Union in bilateral communication to withdraw its troops, connecting this with a non-aligned status for Afghanistan. None of these efforts showed any immediate results. Giscard d’Estaing spoke of them as conversations, useful for the exchange of views and reflections.

39 Gua., 23 June 1980.
The French dissociation from the EPC proposal was also spelled out as François-Poncet appeared before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the French Sénat (Senate) on 13 March. François-Poncet conceded that the proposal of the Nine actually satisfied the third of the criteria set out by the French president – ensuring that Afghanistan did not constitute a threat for its neighbours – and might therefore usefully contribute to a resolution of the crisis, but said that the impression must not be given that the intention was to impose a particular status for Afghanistan from outside.  

As François-Poncet marked France’s distancing itself from the EPC proposal, the outline of the French proposal was presented. France intended to consult with its allies, but without engaging in a collective decision-making process. Furthermore, it was extremely important that the voice of the international community was heard, above all at the United Nations. The same message was repeated before the Senate in late June: the roads to take were now obvious, and the president had indicated since February which they were. The UN was the forum to provide the proper solemnity and the necessary guarantee.

France sought the necessary association with the countries neighbouring Afghanistan by means of policy towards India (a visit in January), towards Pakistan and Iran (several visits), and towards the Islamic Conference, whose Secretary-General, Chatty, had recently visited the Elysée Palace. Although he was very cautious about declaring an opinion about the significance of the announcement in June that some Soviet troops were to be withdrawn, François-Poncet saw the fact that France was the first to be informed of it as a sign that its policy on the neighbouring countries was useful for restoring Afghanistan’s liberty and independence.

François-Poncet did not exclude the European element from his statements. On 13 June, after the Venice European Council, he spoke of the declaration on Afghanistan as signifying that the EC had now emerged in a political role. This was a new and important phenomenon of which the whole world should be aware. Furthermore, in his statement to the Senate he declared that the European countries’ firm and measured attitude to Afghanistan at the meeting of industrialized countries in Venice had been echoed in the world, and in particular among the Islamic countries, those most directly concerned.

4.7.3. The German Reactions

Germany’s reactions to the British proposal, as expressed by its political leaders, were uniformly positive. Referring to it as an EC proposal and not mentioning the

46 Ibid., p. 225–226.
role of the United Kingdom in any of the important speeches, Germany spoke of it throughout as providing a constructive approach to resolving the present crisis.  

Germany attached considerable weight to the proposal. A number of meetings were held in late February between the German chancellor and foreign minister on the one hand and their British counterparts on the other, which included this subject. The proposal was brought up by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in his discussions with Vance during the latter’s visit to Europe in February, and by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with President Jimmy Carter during his early March visit to the United States. Genscher discussed the proposal in his talks with the ASEAN countries in early March. Its importance can also be seen in Schmidt’s speech of 20 March to the German Federal Assembly (the Bundestag) when in his enumeration of key European activities within the framework of a joint Western policy he started with the proposal for a non-aligned, neutral Afghanistan.

Both Schmidt and Genscher stressed the American support for the proposal, Schmidt in his Bundestag speech of 28 February mentioning that Germany in all its work and consultations was maintaining close contact with the United States. Genscher claimed that the American support meant that the West was now united behind a Gesamtkonzept for a solution to the Afghanistan crisis and said he was surprised that the opposition had not understood this.

The German reaction to Brezhnev’s first comments of 22 February was fairly positive: Schmidt reportedly spoke of a period of reflection having begun and Genscher of a possible light at the end of the tunnel. However, the continued negative attitude of the USSR finally influenced German commentators. Genscher stated that, while he saw little reason for optimism, he still believed that there was an obligation for the West to continue to search for a political solution to the crisis. In a speech on 20 March he pleaded with the Soviet Union to reply to the proposal, urging that it was a serious one, intended to leave Afghanistan outside disputes between superpowers.

While no progress was made in relation to the USSR, the European Council meeting in Venice was still regarded as a significant success in terms of demonstrating a common attitude on the Afghanistan issue. Genscher saw the EC as becoming more and more the instrument of a common foreign policy and stated that this new role was particularly significant for Germany. How could Germany have conducted a policy of detente and relaxation in the situation it was in if it had not been supported in each phase by other states with the same opinions? For this

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reason Germany should never act on its own, only when embedded in the EC or the Atlantic Alliance. This was also a way to secure American support.⁵⁶

4.8. Cooperation between the UK, France and Germany
While the factor of institutional capability indicates the EPC as the most suitable institution, cooperation among states demonstrated rational behaviour, largely in support of their perceived interests in terms of their declared policies and within the framework of their capabilities and vulnerabilities.

4.8.1. The United Kingdom
For the United Kingdom, in contrast to the other two European countries, this initiative was not part of a long-term strategy to which it had bound itself. It was also in part a breach with the UK’s previous policy of lining up closely behind the United States. A weakening of the UK’s relations with the US might therefore be expected, and did indeed take place. On the other hand, the proposal gave the UK an opportunity to establish better contact with the other two countries, whose policies of maintaining ongoing communication with the Soviet Union the UK now adopted. Apart from indications of a British wish to lessen tension between East and West, a number of commentators spoke of the proposal as being motivated by a wish to improve relations among the West European countries, or between Western Europe and the United States, or between France and Germany on the one hand, and the UK and the US on the other. In addition, there were said to be differences of opinion between Carrington and Thatcher, with Carrington being reported to have become strongly critical of the previous policy centred on sanctions.⁵⁷

The British pursued their contacts with others in a variety of ways. Bilateral and trilateral contacts were strong, above all in the early phases. Most likely this was seen as a pragmatic way of ensuring the support of the major states before bringing the matter to the other members of the EPC. However, the Franco-British cooperation was weaker than the British–German, since Germany’s endorsement of the initiative was stronger.

The relations with the United States were entirely different. British leaders many times emphasized that this was a British initiative and that in this connection the United States had been informed but had had no input to the proposal.⁵⁸

The number of statements in which the European aspects of the initiative were deemed as very positive is striking when compared with the very different British attitude in the early phase of considering sanctions in connection with the invasion of Afghanistan. Sir Ian Gilmour described it as ‘a specifically European approach’. In connection with this he also commented on what he saw as a remarkable development among West European countries, starting off from ‘certain difficulties of perception and reaction’ which had later been ‘largely dissolved’. He also

⁵⁶ Genscher, 17 June 1980.
⁵⁸ See, for example, Blaker, Peter (Minister of State), in British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980 (Evidence taken on 26 March 1980); and Gna., 20 Feb. 1980.
referred to ‘a remarkable area of convergence in the European Community in its approach to Afghanistan’. Likewise, Douglas Hurd in his statement to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee spoke of the decision of 19 February as ‘rather a striking example of the way in which European political cooperation can work’.

4.8.2. France

For the French this was basically a good proposal since it endorsed the kind of policy that France itself had long been pursuing and saw as beneficial for Europe. It was a proposal along the same lines as France had been working on consistently since the invasion – in opposition to those who favoured a policy focused on deterrence towards the Soviet Union.

France was therefore largely positive to the initiative and, as described, also involved in the discussions leading up to it. Consequently, the French leaders were not against any of the details of the proposal: they had endorsed it at the preparation stage and at the 19 February meeting, and they had no criticism of it later. The caution expressed in France’s reactions to it and its own strikingly similar initiative can therefore not be interpreted in terms of any different evaluation of the situation by France.

The British initiative did, however, undermine the basis for French policy – its independence and France’s special relationship to the Soviet Union. French policy after the invasion had centred on seeking to convince the Soviet Union through bilateral contacts to withdraw from Afghanistan. France had been much criticized for this policy, and the only way of defending it was to produce results that could be clearly attributable to France. It is therefore not surprising that the French leaders sought to distance themselves from the EC proposal, while pursuing a largely identical one in a parallel process of bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union.

4.8.3. Germany

For Germany the British proposal was a welcome convergence with its own positions of many years, which it had had to defend since the invasion. Seeking ways to reduce the tension between East and West was a familiar pattern of German policy, and the change in the British one must in itself have been received very positively in Germany.

A willingness to consider the USSR’s security concerns was a vital element of the proposal for the Germans as well. Genscher stated that, if the only motive for the invasion had been to prevent a change of power that would have been unfavourable to the USSR (although he believed it to be one of several motives), then the USSR should receive this proposal positively. The willingness to respect and, if so desired, to guarantee the territorial integrity, sovereignty, political

60 British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980 (Evidence taken on 20 February 1980), p. 18; see also p. 21.
independence and non-alignment of Afghanistan served the interests of all the countries in the region, including the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{61}

The third motivation for the proposal – relating to what was perceived as the Soviet miscalculation of the reactions to the invasion – was also seen as relevant. Defence Minister Hans Apel stated that it was now up to the West to make it easy for the Soviet Union to take the decision to set out on the road to withdrawal.\textsuperscript{62}

Germany seconded the belief in the need to give the Islamic countries a crucial role, which was prevalent in EC statements and underlined by the British and French policies. Nothing could be achieved against their will. Both Schmidt and Genscher stressed the West’s support for the meeting of the Islamic Conference.\textsuperscript{63}

Germany’s great eagerness to promote the British initiative was evident from the level of its contacts with the British and others. For Germany, this approach was preferable to sanctions as it would provide a test of whether the USSR was being honest in claiming that concerns for its own security lay behind the invasion of Afghanistan.

Germany promoted the initiative unilaterally and in all possible variations of cooperation – bilateral, trilateral and multilateral. However, for the Germans there was the very considerable problem of pursuing this proposal while maintaining a good relationship with the United States. This became obvious from the timing of the German chancellor’s visit to the US in March. It was most likely seen as necessary to announce his willingness to introduce sanctions before he left for the US.

4.8.4. Cooperation and Interests

Looking at the three countries’ cooperation in terms of combinations of interests, there was basically a common interest, shared also by the United States, in achieving an agreement that would bring peace to the region. Only the means caused some conflicts – between the USA and the others because of the risks of failure, which the Americans feared would put the West in a worse position, and between France and the others in the event of success in terms of who would get the credit.

This initiative gives an illustration of the interwoven nature of security cooperation. Unilateral, bilateral, trilateral and multilateral activities were pursued in parallel throughout the process of cooperation. Bilateral cooperation was prominent, in particular between the British and the Germans; Franco-German cooperation seemed non-existent. Here no common interests can be found between the two, France preferring a unilateral policy and Germany the multilateral proposal. This initiative furthermore provided examples of cooperation between the three of them, most probably seen by the UK as a normal procedure in order to anchor its own views among the principal EC member countries before taking its proposal to the EPC.

\textsuperscript{61} Genscher, 28 Feb. 1980, p. 16187.
4.9. Norms

Political solidarity with the United States was a norm to which the UK had often referred. For the US, complaining about lack of European loyalty, political solidarity may have been connected to the norm of joint consultations: this was again brought up, this time by the US against the UK. The British claimed that they had mentioned their initiative to the Americans but had not involved the Americans in decision-making. This might be interpreted as a British declaration that the norm of joint consultation was not the same thing as joint decision-making.

The same principle would apply for the French vis-à-vis the EPC initiative. As mentioned in the exposé of norms in chapter 3, for none of the three countries in question did membership of the EC (and the EPC) include the same level of obligations as membership of NATO did: the EC cooperation was a project more than an obligation, and the British criticism of France was therefore very mild.

The norm of political solidarity was more clearly expressed in the German statements than in those of the other countries. Demonstrating independence while facing hostile American comments was difficult. The US’s comments had to be positive, so that was how Germany interpreted them.

Norms did play a role as a frame of reference. The Americans at this time were clearly sensitive to European aberrations and complaints, and saw it as a breach of norms when the United Kingdom, their recently close ally – deliberately not consulting the Americans, only informing them – set off in the wrong direction. Germany, the other close ally, took the same route. For the Europeans the gains from their policy were seemingly worth the price paid in American criticism.

4.10. Conclusions: Pattern, Content and Impact

As seen above, institutional capabilities pointed to the EPC as the obvious institution to deal with this proposal. The content – a diplomatic matter – made the pattern – the EPC as the only institution involved – natural. As the United Kingdom deliberately chose the EPC for its initiative, none of the other countries opposed it.

As regards the other possible institutions, the members of the WEU Council bowed to the EPC this time as well. NATO was unsuitable or unthinkable for several reasons above all the fact that the US was not behind the proposal. Generally, for the choice of the EPC, clearly institutional competence and country support went hand in hand.

As stated in chapter 2, it is difficult to try to establish impact in the absence of agreement. This is especially so when a proposal, as in this case, never really took off, being endorsed by the EPC members but not in a more precise form.

Impact was defined in chapter 1 in terms of commitment among the cooperating states – the extent to which countries committed themselves to change their previous behaviour and/or abstain from pursuing their own policy in future. Looking at the behaviour and statements of the three countries, it seems clear that

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64 See the survey of norms in chapter 3, which is applicable for the case as a whole.
the fact that all three (as well as other EC members) were united behind a common policy was more important than any formal falling into line behind a policy with an EPC label. Considering the individualistic character of European security policy, this was a great step forward. The real impact of the proposal, while not a formal commitment, was therefore the increased sense of cohesion and a common view on a political role for the EC/EPC, pointing forward towards closer cooperation. It should be recalled here that this proposal was pursued at the same time as the Middle East initiatives, which certainly influenced the effect of each of them.
Chapter 5.

The Middle East Initiatives

5.1. Introduction
The proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was not the only initiative to be taken by the European states in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of the country. Within a short time France, Germany and the UK had initiated policies towards the Middle East region that were all in some way related to effects of the Soviet invasion. The initiatives were, however, not only triggered by this event and related to other Western activities dealing with the Afghanistan crisis. They were also another example of West European cooperation concerning problems that were central for the United States as well and where the US was involved as a forceful actor. The Middle East initiatives were similar to the neutrality proposal in that they had a strong European component and there was unanimity of views, but in several other ways they were quite different.

Three initiatives, described below, were proposed. With the first two, the Europeans sought to emphasize the economic aspects of cooperation, which were a matter for the EC. Their cooperation partners in the Middle East for their part were interested in the political aspects, thereby making cooperation a matter for the EPC.

Together with the proposal for sanctions on the USSR following the invasion of Afghanistan dealt with in chapter 3, and the proposal on neutrality covered in chapter 4, these initiatives form the first case study, the conclusion of which is found in chapter 6. As with the previous initiatives, this chapter seeks to answer the questions of what determines the pattern, content and impact of cooperation.

5.2. Background
The Middle East initiatives concerned three particular issues:

- cooperation with the Gulf states;¹
- the revival of the Euro-Arab dialogue, and
- dealing with the Arab–Israeli problems in a renewed effort to arrive at a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The Palestinian problem was of particular importance as it was seen as the core problem. The Europeans deemed that the process towards a solution had stalled after the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (the Washington Treaty) in March 1979.

Involvement in Middle East problems was not a new field for the European states. Their historical ties to the region and long-standing involvement meant that the new initiatives in the early 1980s were part of a long-term relationship. The American claim to be the only rightful Western actor in this region was therefore

¹ These were Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman.
contested in Europe. Europe was also geographically closer to the Middle East. As the dramatic events in Afghanistan unfolded, this closeness, together with the American Middle East policies, and particularly combined with Europe’s dependence on oil and the recent steep increases in oil prices, created a feeling of vulnerability among European countries. In addition, the countries of the Middle East were a market for European arms and high-technology civilian products, both of which were in demand there.

During the late 1970s the European interest in the region had resulted in different EC countries taking a number of initiatives and in the EC launching some proposals. France, for example, had pursued an initiative related to the Gulf countries in 1979. Other attempts had been made to revive the Euro-Arab dialogue between the EC and the 21 Arab League countries, a process that had been initiated in 1974 and thereafter stalled, partly because of the expulsion of Egypt from this organization in connection with the Camp David agreement of 1978.

Major efforts were already being made within the EC for a UN Security Council resolution that would supplement Resolution 242 by including the rights of the Palestinians. Not even the British, who had introduced Resolution 242 in 1967, saw it as the solution to the Palestinian problem. In 1973 the foreign ministers of the EC had urged that account should be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Later, the declaration of 29 June 1977 recognizing the Palestinians’ ‘need for a homeland’ and their right ‘to give effective expression to their national identity’ as well as the ‘right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries’ became the platform for European policy. The Europeans therefore saw the Camp David agreement and the Washington Treaty as only the first steps towards a comprehensive settlement, since they did not mention the occupied territories or the rights of the Palestinians. In September 1979, in the UN General Assembly, the Irish foreign minister, representing the Presidency of the EC, urged that the Palestinians’ right to a homeland be respected and that their representatives should play a part in negotiating an overall settlement.

The UK, France and Germany all demonstrated their concern about the effects of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the Middle East. The initiatives launched in early 1980 were accompanied by visits by several high-ranking officials to the region. The German initiative, launched in January 1980, concerned the Gulf states; the British initiative in early February was related to the Palestinian issue and the need for a supplement to Security Council Resolution 242 to include the rights of the Palestinians. The Italian presidency of the EC, starting in January 1980, dealt with the Euro-Arab dialogue. The visit of the French president to the Middle East in early March gave a powerful impetus to intensified cooperation,

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2 UN Security Council Resolution 242, 22 Nov. 1967. The resolution satisfied the Arabs by emphasizing the illegitimacy of the acquisition of territory by war. The wordings used on withdrawal of Israeli forces were such that they were acceptable to Israel.


4 See Bull. EC, no. 6, June 1977, p. 62; and Bull. EC, no. 9, Sep. 1979, pp. 107–114, respectively. See also Artner, 1980, pp. 432–434.

5 See section 5.6 below.
above all over the Arab–Israeli issue. In this way the issues were placed on the agenda of the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in April.

In the process, relations between the Europeans and the Americans became increasingly problematic, especially during late May and early June in connection with the announcement of the declaration to be made at the European Council meeting in Venice in June.

5.3. The American Attitude

For the Americans the invasion of Afghanistan made the Persian Gulf area even more vital than before. The so-called Carter Doctrine, intended to deter any further Soviet advances, was formulated on 23 January 1980.\(^6\) In seeking to create a policy on the various countries in the area, however, the US faced such a variety of needs and concerns among the countries in the region as to make a comprehensive approach difficult.

The ongoing negotiations with Israel and Egypt on the terms for Palestinian autonomy were also complicated by the fact that this was election year in the United States, and any raising of the question of Arab interests would be certain to anger Jewish voters. The issue of autonomy, however, was not considered urgent by either the Egyptian or the Israeli leadership. The talks thus proceeded slowly and were finally broken off in May, before the agreed deadline of 26 May connected to the Camp David process could be met.

The main issue of contention between the US and the European countries was the terms on which the Palestinians could be involved in the negotiations: the United States refused to deal with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as long as the organization did not recognize Israel’s right to exist and did not accept Security Council Resolution 242.\(^7\) The Europeans, while not recognizing the PLO, took a different view of its role. The differences between the American and the European approaches were noticeable on a number of occasions, for instance, in the American support for Israel in the United Nations.\(^8\)

Against this background the prospects for the US endorsing the European initiatives were not good. Generally, the Americans saw them as being made in order to advance European interests and as unhelpful for the peace process:

“Obviously, Western Europe has an interest in taking positions that are not regarded in the Arab world as detrimental to Arab interests when it comes to the Arab–Israeli problem.”

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\(^6\) ‘Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.’ (Carter, 23 Jan. 1980, p. B.)

\(^7\) See, for example, Muskie, 13 June 1980, p. B.

\(^8\) See ‘Chronology March 1980’, DSB, May 1980, p. 20; and Vance, 20 Mar. 1980, p. 62 for Cyrus Vance’s explanation of the incident on 1 March when the United States first supported a resolution that was critical of Israel’s settlement policy and shortly afterwards changed its vote, damaging its relations with the Arabs as well as the Israelis. For other examples of American support of Israel (in the form of abstention) in the UN Security Council see the Chronology for June 1980 (Resolution on 5 June ‘rebuking’ Israel for failing to protect Arab lives in the occupied West Bank) and 30 June 1980 (Resolution deploiring Israel’s persistence in ‘changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure, and status’ of Jerusalem), both in DSB, Aug. 1980, p. 85.
Since Western Europeans do not have the capability to influence progress toward an honest resolution of the Arab–Israeli problem, their way of dealing with that pressure is to take positions friendly to the Arabs. The United States is under the same pressure, but the United States has the capacity to help the governments in the Arab–Israeli area to move toward an honorable solution to the problem. That requires us to take positions, as we well know post-Camp David, that are not always popular in the Arab countries.\(^9\)

Apart from this substantial issue, the main American criticism of the EC was that it had no clear alternative to the Camp David process to offer. Rather, the EC was seen as producing rhetoric that was unlikely to lead to any positive input into the peace process and more likely to upset it.\(^10\) At times the US put strong pressure on members of the EC, for instance, in early June when President Carter threatened to use the American veto in the UN and Secretary of State Ed Muskie had an exchange of words with his French counterpart Jean François-Poncet.\(^11\)

The Americans did not criticize or deplore other West European activities related to the Middle East. Rather, they saw European military and civilian projects and the strong Western private-sector engagement in the region as a means to increase the Western presence and to contribute to stabilization. American representatives particularly mentioned German aid to Turkey, the British historical role in Oman and the Gulf states, and the British and French provision of military supplies and training to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.\(^12\)

### 5.4. The Institutions

#### 5.4.1. The Initiative on the Gulf States: the EC

The German initiative on the Gulf states, launched in January 1980,\(^13\) since it centred on the conclusion of trade and economic agreements between European and Gulf states, was primarily an issue for the EC rather than the EPC. The EC Council, at its meeting on 15 January, decided to study the possibility of proposing cooperation agreements between the EC on the one hand and on the other the Gulf countries and other Arab countries with which the EC had not yet concluded agreements. These agreements should initially essentially cover energy, technology and science with a view to including new sectors within trade and industry. Several countries, including the UK, were positive, although France, which had earlier received a lukewarm response to similar ideas, was said to have reservations.\(^14\) The EC Commission contributed in forwarding ideas in January on how to strengthen these links, and it was decided that they would be discussed at the meetings of early February, both by the General Affairs Council and by the EPC.\(^15\)

At the meeting of the General Affairs Council on 5 February 1980 the foreign ministers took note of the fact that none of the countries concerned had

\(^11\) *Europe*, 2/3 June 1980.
\(^12\) Saunders, 24 Mar. 1980, p. 42. See also Komer, 2 Apr. 1980, pp. 78–79.
\(^13\) See section 5.6.3 below.
\(^15\) *ER*, 26 Jan. 1980.
responded yet to Germany’s unofficial soundings. The Council decided that the Commission and the Presidency should make some exploratory contact with these countries before deciding on the context of any agreement. However, progress on this issue was slow and some signals indicated that the countries concerned were more interested in political than in economic cooperation. Positive responses finally came from Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whereas among the others Iraq and Saudi Arabia were reported to be negative – in the case of Saudi Arabia reportedly because of fear that the proposal might undermine the importance of the Euro-Arab dialogue. At the Luxembourg meeting of the General Affairs Council of 22 April the European Commission, backed by Germany, argued for discussions to be started with those countries that were positive, whereas other EC member states, including France, thought it more appropriate to wait until all had given positive responses. With this decision the project in practice ended.

5.4.2. The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Arab–Israeli Problems: the EPC

5.4.2.1. The Euro-Arab Dialogue

When it was initiated in 1974, the Euro-Arab dialogue was primarily the result of French efforts. It had been in limbo since 1978 and had never really taken off, being plagued by divisions among both European and Arab members on important issues. As the EC now sought to revive it, Italy, holding the Presidency and having long been interested in seeking cooperation with the Arab countries, had declared itself willing to pursue this work.

As with the initiative on the Gulf states, in the Euro-Arab dialogue the interests of the two parties differed. Even here the European states wished to continue talks on economic and technological questions, such as the protection of investments, transfer of technology and so on, whereas the Arab League representatives were more interested in resuming what they called ‘the global dialogue’, including political aspects such as recognition of the PLO. There were also indications from the Arab side that they believed access to oil to be the real motive for the European interest. Again, cooperation never really got started. The EPC meeting of 17–18 May 1980 in Naples had agreed to upgrade the dialogue to bring in political aspects in cooperation, but there was still hesitation about doing this since, implicitly, this was tantamount to recognizing the PLO as one of the negotiators on the Arab side. Agreement on the terms and conditions of talks proved to be difficult, and the issue did not advance further. The Venice Declaration in June was therefore limited to noting the importance of the Euro-Arab dialogue and ‘the need to develop the advisability of holding a meeting of the two sides at political

16 ER, 6 Feb. 1980; Europe, 7 Feb. 1980; ER, 12 Mar. 1980. It was also discussed at the EPC meeting on 5 February 1980 but no joint statement from that meeting was issued.
20 Europe, 19/20 May 1980; ER, no. 686, 21 May 1980. Lieber 1980b claims that the agreement to include political aspects was made following Arab pressure.
level. In this way, they [the Nine] intend to contribute towards the development of cooperation and mutual understanding between Europe and the Arab world.’ 21

5.4.2.2. Arab–Israeli Problems

The problems of the Euro-Arab dialogue related to the recognition of the PLO also came to influence the third area of cooperation – the Arab–Israeli problems. By and large, because of these problems the initiatives on the Middle East became a discussion between the Europeans on the one side and the Americans on the other. The British initiative on the Arab–Israeli situation 22 was part of a process within the EC by which the member countries were gradually endorsing views on self-determination for the Palestinians. 23 The process was boosted as the French president in early March 1980 visited the Middle East area. Other EC states endorsed the views expressed by the French president, and the Arab–Israeli problem came on to the agenda of the European Council in Luxembourg on 27–28 April. At this meeting the Nine expressed their belief that only a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement could bring true peace to the Middle East. It was, however, agreed among the Nine that they would delay the declaration envisaged until after 26 May – the day Israel and Egypt were to complete their talks on Palestinian autonomy as part of the Camp David process. 24

The European attempts to resuscitate the peace process were met with intense American criticism, which in Europe was seen as unfair and counterproductive. Challenging the accusations, the Europeans claimed to have no intention to recognize the PLO or to undercut the Camp David process in general. 25 The strong American criticism did, however, have an impact on foreign ministers at the informal EPC meeting in Naples on 17–18 May: according to reports, the ministers, while agreeing on making a declaration in Venice in June, asked the political directors to draw up a report and stated that their report would lead to a further initiative in Venice only if it were seen as giving new impetus to the Egyptian–Israeli negotiations, thus breaking the deadlock. 26 Moreover, any attempts to pass a supplement to Resolution 242 were deemed to be meaningless after the US president declared that he would not hesitate to use the American veto in the UN Security Council against it. 27

As the Venice meeting approached, the statements being made on both sides became more conciliatory. Muskie on 9 June declared that the United States would raise no objections to an eventual initiative so long as it was constructive and not prejudicial to the Camp David process, and the new Italian Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, after a visit to the White House, stated that the Nine had no

21 Bull. EC, no. 6, June 1980, p. 11.
22 See section 5.6.5 below.
23 Some newspapers reported in March that the EC was examining the possibility of recognizing the PLO. See Gua., 6 Mar. 1980; and Times, 6 Mar. 1980.
25 See, for example, Gua., 7 June 1980; and IHT, 6 June 1980.
27 Europe, 2/3 June 1980.
intention to present an initiative which might be interpreted as going against the Camp David process.\(^{28}\)

As expected, the declaration of the European Council meeting in Venice on 12–13 June was less ambitious than originally envisaged. Still, it went further than any European declaration before. In the declaration the EC states asserted two specific principles. The first was ‘the right to existence and to security of all the States in the region, including Israel’. While the necessary guarantees were to be given by the United Nations, the Nine expressed their willingness to participate in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees. The other principle was that of ‘justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’. The Palestine people had to be placed in a position ‘to exercise fully their right to self-determination’. The PLO would also have to be associated with the negotiations leading to a peace settlement. Furthermore, the Nine stressed the need for Israel to put an end to the occupation of territory that it had maintained since 1967.\(^{29}\)

Muskie alluded to the American pressure in a press conference on 13 June after the meeting. The Europeans, he said, ‘may or may not have been influenced by the discussions that I have had with the various members of the NATO governments as to the importance of not undercutting the Camp David process, supporting it – not diverting it’. Muskie did not want to go so far as to say that the EC initiative was helpful, only that he did ‘not see anything on its face which directly challenges the Camp David process or seeks to divert the effort of the parties to the Camp David process from their work. And that being the case, I see no reason why we should not be able to proceed with the Camp David process.’\(^{30}\)

Egypt also received the declaration fairly positively, but the PLO was disappointed that the EC states did not see it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and Israel was extremely negative, calling the Europeans ‘cynical and hypocritical’ and the meeting ‘a new Munich’.\(^{31}\) The deadlock over the Palestinian issue was thus not broken and, in spite of some efforts by the Luxembourg Presidency in the autumn, the process slowly petered out. There were suggestions that the British interest in establishing good relations with President-elect Ronald Reagan contributed to this.\(^{32}\)

\(^{28}\) *Europe*, 7, 9/10 and 13 June 1980.

\(^{29}\) *Bull. EC*, no. 6, June 1980, p. 10.

\(^{30}\) Muskie, 13 June 1980, pp. A–D.

\(^{31}\) *ER*, 18 June 1980. The Israelis had consistently criticized the European initiatives – first the British proposals to amend Resolution 242 and then Giscard d’Estaing’s joint declarations with Gulf countries – for not mentioning Israel’s need for secure borders. Their criticism of the Venice Declaration was exceptionally severe. See, for example, *Gua.*, 16 Feb. 1980; *LeM*, 5 Mar. 1980; *FAZ*, 26 Mar. 1980; and *Times*, 20 June 1980.

\(^{32}\) Lord Carrington in an interview in the *IHT* had stated that the UK was against any further initiatives being carried out during the next few months until the advent of a new American administration. In response to this the French Foreign Ministry in an official statement declared themselves ‘surprised’ and against any abandonment of the Middle East policy. (*FAZ*, 1 Dec. 1980.)
5.4.3. NATO

The Middle East and the specific problem associated with the Arab–Israeli issue were already on the NATO agenda before the invasion of Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Council meeting of 13–14 December 1979 had emphasized the importance of ‘elaborating and implementing a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement’ of the conflict on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. The communiqué after the meeting also spoke of the need for a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, including the achievement of the ‘legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the context of the negotiated settlement that ensures the security of all states in the region, including Israel’. In these negotiations all the people concerned should participate, ‘including representatives of the Palestinian people’.  

The communiqué from the NAC meeting of 25–26 June 1980 was very similar to that from the December meeting, but now with an addition to one sentence, which now read ‘... ensure the rights of all states in the area, including Israel, to live within secure, recognized and guaranteed boundaries’. While agreement was reached on this change, the attempts to include the term ‘self-determination for the Palestinians’ stranded. Muskie, claiming that he was not the only one to object to the use of this expression, referred to self-determination being a subject for negotiation in the Camp David process and to the fact that there were different views as to how it ought to be defined and what the final result ought to be. For these reasons he believed that it should not be included in the communiqué.

5.4.4. The WEU

The WEU did not play any independent role on the issue of the Middle East. The Council, as in the other cases, referred to the activities of its member states within the EC. As could be expected, the Council’s views when expressed were very similar to those expressed by the EC and differed from the NATO statements, thus reflecting the members’ views. On 26 March 1980, replying to a Parliamentary Assembly recommendation, the Council referred to the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the need for Israel to end its occupation of territory. It also asked for respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and for their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Finally it declared that in establishing a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland.

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35 Muskie, 26 June 1980, pp. 40–41.
5.5. Institutional Capability: The Pattern and Content of Cooperation

For these initiatives, as for the British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan, the conditions in which the various institutions had to act were different from those that obtained in the crisis directly connected to the Afghanistan invasion. Initially there was no external pressure for the European states to arrive at solutions quickly; the initiatives were their own and, while the problems were important, neither other countries nor the problems themselves were pressing for immediate solutions. For the institutions the capability to initiate work quickly was therefore not so important.

The Middle East initiatives were similar in several ways to the British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan, including in terms of the pattern and content of institutions involved: primarily both were pursued in European forums. While the former initiative was conducted within the EPC only, the latter also included the EC. NATO and the WEU, again, had similar roles in the two cases, stating their members’ views but not engaging in the issues.

Again, this pattern largely coincides with institutional capability. The EPC and the EC both had the formal competence to deal with their respective issues as well as the institutional infrastructure needed. NATO, while having no formal right to pursue activities outside its geographically limited area, was giving attention to this area that was so vital for its members, whereas the WEU, having this right, as in the case of neutrality for Afghanistan, was not suitable, primarily since it lacked the capabilities of the EC.

5.6. The Three European Countries and the Initiatives

All the three countries were active in proposing new or, rather, renewed cooperation with the countries in the Middle East. Their ideas largely coincided, but individual ideas or forms of cooperation were also proposed. In this section, the activities of each of them will be described first, and thereafter their actual and/or proposed forms of cooperation, connected to their perceived interests, will be examined. Their perceived interests are based on their previous economic and security ties to the countries in question.

5.6.1. The French Activities

As mentioned above, EC cooperation acquired a new character as the French chose to state their views in joint declarations with a number of countries in the Middle East region. This took place during the official visit of President Giscard d’Estaing to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Jordan between 1 and 9 March 1980. The trip ended with a brief visit to Saudi Arabia for meetings with King Khaled and Prince Fahd. The situation of the Gulf states, the Euro-Arab dialogue and the Palestinian question were at the centre of the discussions. The

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38 The visit to Saudi Arabia was decided at short notice and was of an informal character. An official visit by Prime Minister Raymond Barre, planned to take place on 27–29 February, had been cancelled due to the illness of King Khaled. See ‘Chronologie, janvier–mars 1980’, p. 237; and LeM, 3 Mar. 1980.
joint declarations of France and each of the four Gulf countries stated the importance of the Gulf countries having the responsibility for their own security and remaining outside international conflicts. In each of the five declarations a paragraph on the Euro-Arab dialogue spoke of the need to pursue actively the dialogue between the EC and the Arab countries. On the Palestinian question, all the joint declarations included two main principles: the demand for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination. This was the first time the term ‘self-determination’ was used in a French diplomatic text. One of the joint declarations, that between France and Jordan, contained in addition a reference to the right of all countries to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. This statement also mentioned the PLO as natural partners in negotiations.

The French continued to keep a high profile in the EC discussions on the Middle East initiatives, on one occasion using a harsher tone against the United States than the other EC states saw as constructive. However, although it was considered by many to be more sympathetic to Arab demands than other countries, France was not going any further than the UK or Germany in substance in its statements. Thus the French declarations spoke about the Palestinian right to a fatherland (patrie), not the right to form a state (état). Furthermore, while the French acknowledged that the PLO was a legitimate representative in negotiations, they did not claim that it was the only representative of the Palestinians. Finally, France was not willing to give the right of representing the Palestinian people de facto to the PLO by accepting a visit to Paris by Yassir Arafat under present conditions. Such a visit, it was said, could only be accepted as part of a negotiation process.

The Venice Declaration, according to the French foreign minister, was based mainly on a French text. Both the foreign minister and the president declared that they were content with the text agreed and rejected the Israeli criticism, emphasizing the fairness of a declaration that took into consideration both Israel’s need for security and the Palestinians’ rightful claim to self-determination. As regards American criticism, Giscard d’Estaing declared that he had been surprised that the Europeans had been under pressure not to state their opinion. If Europe had a position, it had the right to express it. It was self-evident that the US must par-

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40 See Giscard d’Estaing, 26 June, pp. 213–214; LeM, 10 Mar. 1980; and Artner, 1980, p. 436. However, as has been seen in the preceding sections, the term ‘self-determination’ had been used in resolutions in the UN which France had supported.
42 François-Poncet in a discussion with Muskie during his visit to the United States (Europe, 2/3 June 1980).
43 See, for example, François-Poncet, 19 Mar. 1980, p. 180; and Barre, 14 Apr. 1980, p. 36.
45 See, for example, François-Poncet, 13 Mar. 1980, p. 172.
ticipate in the peace process, since Europe could not solve the problems without the US. As the French foreign minister put it, it would be naive to believe anything else. However, Europe had to make the effort to ensure that it would be involved as well.46

5.6.2. The French Patterns of Cooperation

For France the form of cooperation mattered, since different policies and activities were pursued in different forums. However, linkages were perceived between the various areas. Security was thus closely related to technical and economic matters.

The French approach was partly unilateral where relations with the Gulf states were concerned. During his visit to the Gulf states, Giscard d’Estaing alluded in his statements to the complementary nature of the interests of these countries and France in the area of technological development, and a number of agreements were signed.47 Arms sales were a significant factor. All the countries visited had earlier bought French equipment through arms deals in which the UK was seen as a main competitor, and the result of the president’s visit was a number of new arms deals concluded during 1980.48

Another factor was the oil factor. A significant link between the two is suggested by the fact that the countries that supplied the largest quantities of oil to France (Saudi Arabia and Iraq) were also the countries with which France had concluded the largest arms deals.49 The percentage of French oil imports that came from the Gulf countries was fairly small,50 but these countries were still important because some 70 per cent of French supplies passed through the Gulf.51 A great many comments were made to the effect that oil supplies were the motive behind the French policy, but both the president and the foreign minister strenuously denied that oil in general or the recent increases in oil prices had anything to do with the French policy of establishing closer relations with these countries.52

The unilateral approach can also be attributed to France’s view on the roles of the superpowers and other states in relation to the Middle East. The superpower influence was challenged by the French, who saw several alternatives. These included an individual role for France. In connection with Giscard d’Estaing’s visit to the Gulf countries it was stated several times that the French policy was formed partly in response to a demand from these countries. According to Giscard d’Estaing the Gulf countries, which were aware of the tensions in the world but

50 French oil supplies during January–June 1980 came from Saudi Arabia (32.87 per cent), Iraq (23.43 per cent), Nigeria (10.05 per cent), United Arab Emirate (5.7 per cent), Algeria (4.33 per cent), Kuwait (3.98 per cent), Iran (2.53 per cent), Qatar (2.37 per cent), Libya (1.91 per cent). (Moïsi, 1980, p. 81.)
not themselves immediately threatened, saw a need to shape their policy outside the framework of the superpower rivalry. They considered that they were themselves responsible for the security of their own region and wanted no superpower protection. Their view of France, the president explained, was that of a country which was respected and whose orientations they approved of, and they wanted France to have an influence and a position in their area.\(^53\)

Within the initiative on Arab–Israeli problems, cooperation among European states was reported to be intensive. In particular this was reported to be *bilateral*, concerning cooperation between France and the United Kingdom aimed at elaborating the proposal later to be presented *multilaterally*, within the framework of the European Communities.\(^54\) As France saw it the American dominance in the Camp David process should be replaced by a ‘global arrangement’ in which the guarantees were provided by the United Nations.\(^55\) Such a change would benefit a French interest in increasing its influence. While it would move the Arab–Israeli negotiations onto a global level it would also involve another small body, the UN Security Council, of which France was a permanent member.

Still another element in the French design of cooperation was the concept of the *Trilogue*, which was proposed to the states Giscard d’Estaing visited. The idea behind this was that of linking the Euro-Arab dialogue with European–African cooperation, thus strengthening the triangular relationship between Africa, the Middle East and Europe. The economic element was not insignificant here: it was envisaged that Arab money could be used for development projects in Africa.\(^56\) The obvious consequence of such cooperation, if it were successful, would be the reduction of American influence.

Finally, in the French statements there was a strong European context which was particularly noticeable on the issue of Arab–Israeli relations. While, as described above, the French assigned the role of guaranteeing the agreement to the United Nations, the EC was seen as playing the important role of providing the solution to the problems. This was obviously the only possible role for a weak Europe that was unable to fill the role that the US had in the Middle East.

### 5.6.3. The German Activities

The German reaction after the invasion of Afghanistan indicated considerable concern about its effect on the Middle East countries. It was repeatedly stressed that Germany sought a renewal of the Euro-Arab dialogue\(^57\) and Foreign Minister Genscher launched the initiative centring on reinforcing trade and economic ties with the Gulf states as early as January.\(^58\) Germany had also taken a position early

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\(^{54}\) See, for example, *DT*, 7 Feb. and 31 May 1980.

\(^{55}\) See, for example, Communiqué Bahrein, 3–4 Mar. 1980, p. 147; and François-Poncet, 17 Apr. 1980, p. 45.


\(^{58}\) *ER*, 26 Jan. 1980.
on the issue of Palestinian self-determination, Genscher supporting this principle during two trips to Arab capitals during 1979.\textsuperscript{59} This had led to criticism from then Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, who in September 1979 pointed out that Germany was the only EC country to use the term ‘self-determination’.\textsuperscript{60} In early 1980 the Germans were repeatedly expressing their support for a solution, including the right of Israel to exist and to have secure and guaranteed borders and, at the same time, the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.\textsuperscript{61}

In Germany there was a certain irritation at the much-publicized French declarations made in connection with Giscard d’Estaing’s tour of the Gulf states. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, while declaring his support for them, indicated that these were not new approaches to thinking about the issues in Europe.\textsuperscript{62}

The German position was outlined in a radio interview given by Genscher shortly after the French declarations. Genscher underlined the Palestinian right of self-determination together with Israel’s right to exist as the two fundamental conditions for peace. He also declared that, while the Europeans were free to and should initiate a revival of the Euro-Arab dialogue, they had to be very careful not to disturb the ongoing negotiations between Egypt and Israel. However, since no one could predict their success, a declaration should be prepared.\textsuperscript{63}

During the spring of 1980 the Germans, facing American criticism of the European initiative, seemed eager to clarify their positions. Like the French they made it clear that self-determination did not mean a Palestinian state. They did not clarify what it might mean, however, Genscher stating that this could not be prescribed by others.\textsuperscript{64} It was further declared that Germany only recognized states, not organizations.\textsuperscript{65} Israel, which did not hesitate to remind the Germans of the atrocities committed during the Second World War, was assured that Germany had by no means abandoned its interests.\textsuperscript{66} Like France, Germany voiced its discontent with the American criticism, Chancellor Schmidt finding it surprising and wrong to suggest that the Europeans were not allowed to launch their own proposals.\textsuperscript{67}

5.6.4. The German Patterns of Cooperation
The German activities, like those of France, included unilateral elements. The Gulf initiative was the most visible example of this. These were not in competition with multilateral initiatives: the Gulf initiative was planned for a multilateral forum. As with France, there was also a close connection between economic matters and security. The stability achieved through (primarily) multilateral means would give

\textsuperscript{59} Artner, 1980, p. 438.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.; and FAZ, 20 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{63} SDZ, 13 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{64} FAZ, 20 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{65} Europe, 17–18 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{66} Gna., 7 June 1980.
\textsuperscript{67} FAZ, 23 June 1980.
good opportunities to pursue German interests in terms of securing oil imports and of trade, not least in weapons.

For Germany, as for the other countries, the arms trade was important. Since it was not mentioned in the context of relations to the Middle East, it was apparently a sensitive matter. German arms exports were, however, much discussed among and within the political parties in terms of the rules for the export of armaments. While Germany’s arms exports were considerably smaller than France’s, it was still exporting weapons to most of the countries in the Middle East, and a number of new arms trade agreements were concluded with Middle Eastern countries during 1980.68

In contrast to the French, the Germans spoke openly about the importance of energy as a factor in European–Arab cooperation. According to German Defence Minister Hans Apel, the shift of power in favour of the oil-producing states and their historically unique ascent to key positions within world policy had made the vulnerability of the Western economies evident. In addition, the numerous conflicts of the Third World were a threat to the whole world since they endangered the security of access to raw materials on which the industrialized countries relied.69 Europe had to make itself less dependent on raw materials, conflicts had to be avoided in regions that were important for the supply of raw materials, and regional balances had to be established or re-established. Germany was determined, Apel said, to make an effort to re-establish the balance in the Near East, which had been damaged by the invasion of Afghanistan, and to bring up the issue of Palestinian self-determination in order to achieve a fair, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region. Germany, he stated, was furthermore pursuing an intensification of the Euro-Arab dialogue in order to be able to speak to the oil-producing countries on the connection between the supply of energy and world economic development.70

Germany, like France, was involved in bilateral meetings in the preparations for the proposal on the Arab–Israeli issue: for instance, a meeting between Schmidt and Prime Minister Thatcher in February was mainly devoted to this.71 Generally, however, the effort was multilateral.

For German policy, as for French, the general setting of the relationships between countries was important. In Germany’s case two important aims could be distinguished: to reduce the distance between the European states (above all the distance between France and the UK); and to reduce that between the United States and Europe. The German idea of a Gesamtkonzept was highly relevant. The Middle East initiatives, like the neutrality proposal, were repeatedly mentioned as

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69 Apel, 12 Apr. 1980, p. 331.
70 Ibid., pp. 332–333.
71 Gua., 26 Feb. 1980. Germany at this time also discussed the issue with Spain, obviously motivated by Spain’s good relationship with the Arab countries.
parts of this concept.\textsuperscript{72} Germany’s efforts to conduct a European policy and at the same time to have it accepted by the United States were evident in connection with the European initiative as well. During the period of strong American criticism in the spring of 1980, the Germans were said to be contemplating removing any mention of the PLO from the Venice Declaration.\textsuperscript{73} Another example of this was the satisfaction expressed by Schmidt at the absence of American criticism after the Venice Declaration.\textsuperscript{74}

For Germany security had to be created through multilateral means; but this was not to be done by treating Germany on an exactly equal level with other countries: special consideration had to be given to its situation. This was evident in the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) after the Venice Declaration as Genscher, challenged by opposition leader Helmut Kohl, had to defend Germany’s signing of a declaration in which there was mention of guarantees for Israel. This did not imply, Genscher claimed, that German soldiers would have to be sent to this area. As a member of the United Nations, Germany had on many occasions contributed in financial or other ways, and this would be the rule for the future as well. Other states in other positions might do otherwise.\textsuperscript{75}

5.6.5. The British Activities

The UK, like the other countries under study, was quick to see the implications for the Middle East region of the invasion of Afghanistan. Lord Carrington, the foreign minister, brought forward a visit that had already been planned, leaving for Turkey on 9 January 1980, continuing through Oman, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (with a quick stop-over in Bahrain), and ending in India on 18 January.\textsuperscript{76} In his speech in the House of Lords of 24 January, after stating that the first requirement was for the West to help Pakistan, he pointed out the need to help Turkey, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, and above all to settle the Arab–Israeli conflict.\textsuperscript{77} Douglas Hurd undertook a six-day trip to Arab states in March.\textsuperscript{78}

As regards the Gulf countries, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office memorandum of 20 February referred to the UK’s long-standing association with these states and declared that it would continue to contribute to their security ‘through the provision of defence equipment, advice and military training, and cooperation in the economic, commercial and cultural fields’. The government also stated that it would be ‘working for a dialogue between the European Community and the Gulf states’.\textsuperscript{79} Between the UK and Oman connections were particularly close, British officers having crucial positions within the Omani defence forces.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{GuA}, 7 June 1980.
\textsuperscript{74} Schmidt, 17 June 1980, p. 17946.
\textsuperscript{75} Genscher, 17 June 1980, pp. 17958–17959.
\textsuperscript{76} According to \textit{Times}, 9 Jan. 1980, and \textit{DT}, 4 Jan. 1980, the trip was previously planned for February and originally envisaged as a visit to Saudi Arabia and Oman only.
\textsuperscript{77} Carrington, 24 Jan. 1980, col. 532.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{GuA}, 8 Mar. 1980.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
Carrington, when answering questions to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that the UK intended to maintain this position.\(^{80}\)

The UK had supported and actually helped to draft the initiative in the United Nations in September 1979 as regards supplementing Security Council Resolution 242. Shortly after its defeat, Carrington, in a speech to the UN, declared that the resolution as it now stood was incomplete inasmuch as it treated the Palestinians only as a refugee problem, not taking account of their legitimate political rights or their belief that they were a separate people with a right to their homeland. Carrington stressed that the proposal suggested that the resolution be supplemented – ‘not, I emphasise, replaced, amended or distorted, but supplemented to meet this point’.\(^{81}\)

In early February 1980 there were reports in the press that the UK was pursuing a new initiative. The reason for this was attributed to Carrington’s conviction, acquired during his trip to the Middle East, that this was needed to break the stalemate between the Arab and Israeli standpoints. The first part of the British proposal was reported to be a supplement to Resolution 242, including the Palestinian rights, which was then to be accepted by the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the second part a proposal for a new conference on these matters. This proposal had reportedly been consolidated through discussions with other EC countries, above all with the French foreign minister.\(^{82}\)

The British proposal, although not yet formally presented, led to a protest from Israel on 15 February.\(^{83}\) In addition, the Americans were said to be asking the British for a delay until 26 May, while waiting for more results to be achieved in the Egyptian–Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy. A further complication was said to be opposition within the British Cabinet by some pro-Israeli ministers.\(^{84}\)

The British reaction to the French declarations during Giscard d’Estaing’s visit to the Gulf was very similar to the German reaction. The UK supported the French views, the FCO declared, and the British Government was to recognize the Palestinians’ right to self-determination ‘within the framework of a negotiated settlement’.\(^{85}\) Ian Gilmour, like Helmut Schmidt, declared that the French president was ‘stating what has been the politics of the Nine since last autumn’.\(^{86}\) Newspapers, however, reported ‘ill-disguised irritation’ at the ‘orchestrated publicity’ given to Giscard d’Estaing’s statements.\(^{87}\)

The American reaction to the European initiatives on the Middle East caused irritation in the UK as elsewhere. Reportedly, the British Government was disappointed at President Carter’s threat to use the America veto in the UN Security Council, since Lord Carrington had always stressed that Europeans would consult

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80 British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 July 1980, p. 57.
83 Gua, 16 Feb. 1980.
the United States fully before making any new moves.\textsuperscript{88} Douglas Hurd in a statement to the WEU Assembly on 2 June declared that: ‘Europe has an entirely legitimate and genuine interest in this matter. If we believe, if the heads of government come to the conclusion, that Europe can make a contribution at this stage in the present situation, which is increasingly tense and violent, on the West Bank and the present situation as between Israel, Egypt and the United States, I believe that we have the right and possibly the duty to do so.’\textsuperscript{89}

The British comments after the Venice Declaration reflected the continued aspiration to pursue a European Middle East policy. Prime Minister Thatcher in the House of Commons explained that the European Council had decided ‘to make contact with all the parties in order to ascertain their position’ with respect to the principles set out in the declaration. The diplomatic activity was to be ‘complementary to the Camp David process’. Likewise, Carrington in the House of Lords expressed his belief that the Europeans had a particular role to play in that the presidential election created obvious difficulties for the United States over the coming months.\textsuperscript{90} Nor had the terms of this diplomatic activity been abandoned: Thatcher declared that, while the UK could not recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the reality of the situation was that there would not be a comprehensive settlement in this area unless the PLO were associated with it.\textsuperscript{91}

\section*{5.6.6. The British Patterns of Cooperation}

The United Kingdom pursued a partly unilateral approach in its relations with the Gulf states. As with France, this was openly stated and seen as important. The British view of the Palestinian issue, however, was that it had to be approached in a multilateral context. As described in connection with France and Germany, the way in which the three proposals on cooperation with the Gulf states, the Euro-Arab dialogue and the Arab-Israeli problems had been prepared was largely multilateral, the three countries being in close contact with each other. The most intense contacts, according to newspapers, were, however, those between the UK and France.\textsuperscript{92}

In the UK’s pursuit of its interests in the Middle East, as with the other countries, security factors were combined with technological and economic factors. An FCO memorandum of 20 February, assessing the effects of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for British policy, stated that the prime responsibility for resisting further Soviet aggression in the area rested with the states most directly affected. ‘But the countries of the region are vital economic partners of the West, with whom they also have important political links. This gives the West a major interest

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\item \textsuperscript{88} \textit{Gua.}, 3 June 1980.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Hurd, 2 June 1980; WEU, \textit{Proceedings, Part II: Minutes of the Report of Debates, 1980}, p. 103.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Thatcher, 16 June 1980, col. 1127, Carrington, 16 June 1980, col. 850.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Thatcher, 16 June 1980, col. 1134. For a similar statement see also Carrington, 14 Apr. 1980, cols 7–9.
\item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{DT}, 31 May 1980.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
in the region’s stability. Carrington may thus have feared repercussions in the economic area – in addition to other concerns – when, on his return to London after his Middle East tour, he declared that: ‘The danger point would be to have either the Soviet Union or a puppet of the Soviet Union in an area of such strategic importance in the middle of the Moslem world capable of fomenting unrest and subversion in the area.’

The British arms trade was smaller than that of France, accounting for 2.5 per cent as compared to 5 per cent of total exports, and declining. Even so, arms sales seemed to be an important part of British efforts during the official visits to the Middle East. British weapons were part of the inventories of most of the countries in the Middle East and a number of arms deals were concluded in 1980.

The UK’s attitude to the roles of states was different from those of both France and Germany. There was no specific advantage for the UK in keeping the Americans outside cooperation (as there was in the French case), nor was there any perceived need to make an effort to keep the Americans aligned with cooperation (as there was for Germany). The British in their statements seemed confident that they had a good policy for breaking the deadlock in the Camp David process and the right to pursue this policy.

For the UK as for the other countries under study, the cooperation over Middle East issues had a strong European character. It coincided in time with the proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and it seems that the element of revelation in the British reaction to the possibilities of European cooperation was present in both. This is reflected by Douglas Hurd who, in his statement to the WEU Assembly, declared that: ‘Among all the perplexities of that region, there is one thing that has impressed me perhaps more than any other in the last year, and that is the extent to which governments and peoples of the Middle East now, when they look at us, think in terms of Europe rather than of individual nation states and ask themselves “What will Europe do on our behalf, and when?”.’

5.6.7. Cooperation and Interests

For all three states in question, the Afghanistan crisis was the trigger for a reinvigorated policy in the Middle East. Fearing an American military intervention in the Persian Gulf and seeing a chance to end the stalemate over the Camp David peace process, they must have seen it as worth the attempt. The United States was the most important actor, and a necessary component in the final agreement. The EC and the EPC, however, were also possible actors, the members perceiving themselves jointly as capable of playing a role in the problem-solving stage. European and individual ambitions were at this stage complementary.

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94 Keesing’s, 9 May 1980, p. 30240.
To this can be added the economic interests that France, Germany and the UK all had in the area. For all three countries, as has been seen above, there were substantial gains to be made in terms of sales of arms and technology. For France and Germany their dependence on the energy resources of the Middle East was another factor of vital importance.

The cooperation among the European countries was to a high degree a case of common interests; but there was also a coercive element present as the United States – formally not part of EC/EPC cooperation – managed to dilute the Venice Declaration. Thanks to its power and the support it provided to Europe’s security through NATO, the United States was able to put pressure on the Europeans. A rational calculation by the Europeans could only result in their evaluating the American contributions to their security more highly than a more forceful declaration at Venice, and the overall judgment would therefore be in favour of continued cooperation with the US.

There was also an element of conflicting interests among the European countries themselves. They were competing against each other for markets in arms and technology, all three being important exporters, and for privileged access to oil. If they sought closer cooperation with the Middle East region on a European level, this was not at the expense of their individual aims in this respect.

5.7. Norms

Norms played a role in the Middle East initiatives, as in the other cases, even though they cannot be seen as changing the behaviour of the actors.

The American arguments that the Europeans were solely looking after their own interests, bending their opinions to gain Arab support and in the process not refraining from undermining the Camp David peace process, were clearly put forward as evidence of a breach of the norm of political solidarity. All three countries contested this, claiming that their motives were only to help the peace process and arguing that no norm existed according to which the EC did not have the right to deal with the Middle East problems. Carrington also clarified this by saying that they had envisaged to have joint consultations with the US on this matter.

For Germany, regardless of the fact that it saw the American accusations as unfair, acceptance by the US and the Gesamtkonzept were important. At the same time the special character of Germany’s position was underlined when Helmut Schmidt assured Helmut Kohl that Germany was under no obligation to send troops. As on earlier occasions, it would be permitted to contribute in other ways. Here the perceived norm was in Germany’s favour.

Obviously, countries were speaking past each other here – deliberately or because they interpreted the situation differently. It is possible that the Americans interpreted the European Arab–Israeli policy as purely opportunistic. How far the European policy was based on their interest in getting access to Arab oil, an ambition to play a role or genuine worries about an irrational American policy is impossible to say. The elements of all can be seen. The Europeans bowed to the

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97 See the survey of norms in chapter 3, which is applicable for the case as a whole.
Americans not because of norms but because of American pressure and the threat to use the veto in the UN Security Council. Norms had an importance, however, in that they set the framework of discussion. The discussions on where to draw the line of the norm of political solidarity served to underline the fact that such a norm existed.

5.8. Conclusions: Pattern, Content and Impact
Among the three initiatives it was fairly soon obvious that two would fail, whereas the third became the focus of intense activity for some time.

The pattern and content of institutional involvement, as seen above, fitted well with the institutional capability hypothesis. The EC and the EPC both had the formal right to engage in these initiatives, the EC having strong institutional competence in the Commission, and the EPC, while weaker, having a presidency. In accordance with the economic strength of the EC and the political tasks of the EPC, the three initiatives were divided between them.

As in the other cases this was also a matter of country support – or lack of it. For all three countries, seemingly very interested in pursuing cooperation with a European label, the EC and the EPC were the preferred forums. NATO, while obviously not a forum for a European initiative, could easily be used by the US to block the European proposal on the Arab–Israeli issue, formally through its veto and informally as Muskie spoke with his colleagues. The United Nations was neutralized by the US through its threat to veto any European proposal in the Security Council. In the WEU, however, a different European viewpoint could be expressed.

The Middle East initiatives, like the proposal for neutrality for Afghanistan, demonstrated the existence of a common European attitude to the Middle East problems. Like the earlier initiative they failed to gain the acceptance of others – here the United States and the prominent actors in the Middle East.

Looking at the impact in terms of the commitment of the three countries, the Venice Declaration is the more important, since the other two initiatives failed early. The agreement on the declaration can be seen as a considerable step for the three countries (and for the other EC members), taken after a process during which they had gradually come to the same conclusion. It was also highly controversial in relation to the United States. For Germany in particular, this was a major undertaking and clearly only decided on with difficulty since it was against the wishes of the US.

Like the proposal for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, these initiatives had the effect of bringing the three countries closer together. Their representatives seemed to enjoy the fact that they were united – witness the pleasure expressed by Hurd that others were looking to Europe rather than to the individual countries.
Chapter 6.

Conclusion to the First Case Study

This chapter seeks to answer – for the period of approximately half a year following the invasion of Afghanistan – the question of what determined cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. According to the first hypothesis, states are primarily led by their perceived interests, but norms and institutions also have an impact on their behaviour. A second hypothesis predicts that three particular factors – the capability to initiate work quickly, competence in the relevant areas and country support – will determine institutional cooperation.

The three preceding chapters have described cooperation taking place over a period of six months. The instances of cooperation which they cover – the cooperation related to the American demands for sanctions, the British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and the Middle East initiatives – together constitute the first case study. While they are separated here for the sake of clarity into three different chapters, they were in fact interrelated to such an extent that they cannot be seen as separate cases. This chapter forms the conclusion of the findings of the previous three chapters.

6.1. The Interests of Countries

According to the first hypothesis, the perceived interests of countries would be strong factors in predicting cooperation. This is corroborated by the analysis of the first case.

France and Germany, in particular, had for a long time consistently pursued policies of détente towards the Eastern bloc. These were policies that were not only anchored politically but were also seen to serve the two countries to reach other goals. Throughout the period of study their activities were to protect these policies. Moreover, all three countries were in various ways involved in economic cooperation with the Eastern bloc as well as with the Middle East. Changes of policy could be costly in political and economic terms, and on a wide range of issues they therefore needed to, and did, look after their interests in the volatile situation that characterized the area of South-West Asia after the invasion of Afghanistan.

It was also clear that vulnerabilities and capabilities had an impact on their perceptions of interests, in particular concerning relations with the US. For Germany its great dependence on the US made American acceptance of its policies when related to the East–West conflict important. Even for France, which took the most independent position, dependence on the US made it important not to be misunderstood. For the UK, initially agreeing with the US, the situation was easier. The UK, however, also sought to define the proper extent of sanctions in such a way that no harm, or as little harm as possible, was done.

As the United Kingdom changed its policy, thereby getting closer to the path chosen by France and Germany, the foundation for cooperation between the
three was laid. The proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and the Middle East initiatives were examples of cooperation that came into being because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fears of the new instability in the region. They were, however, also triggered by the worries caused by the American policy in the region and its possible effect on South-West Asia, and thereby also on Europe.

6.2. The Involvement of Institutions

By starting with an examination of a limited period of approximately three weeks after the invasion of Afghanistan, the hypothesis was tested that the capability to initiate work quickly might be important for the involvement of institutions. Another institutional factor was competence within relevant areas. It was found that the pattern of institutions involved and the content of cooperation supported the hypothesis of the importance of both these factors: on the issue of sanctions the three active institutions – the EC, the UN and NATO – were all strong both in terms of capability to initiate work quickly and in terms of competence in the relevant areas. Engaging in several and sometimes the same issues, the strengths of the EC and NATO obviously varied depending on which issue was in question. The passive institutions, the EPC and the WEU, were accordingly generally weak.

When the longer time perspective is examined a different pattern emerges. The institutions most heavily involved in cooperation as regards sanctions were now the EC, the EPC and CoCom. This pattern was largely congruent with the pattern of competence within the particular areas of cooperation. In contrast to the previous period, issues were now functionally divided among the institutions, each institution dealing only with the issues in which it was competent.

The pattern of institutions involved in cooperation was moreover largely compatible with the idea that capability to initiate work quickly was a relevant factor: the EPC, which was unable to function during the first period, became an important institution in the continued cooperation. The WEU, however, remained passive.

Examination of the British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and the Middle East initiatives also supported the hypothesis that the institutions most capable of dealing with issues were the ones that were used. For these initiatives the capability to initiate work quickly was not relevant. As European initiatives they were functionally divided between the EPC and the EC. The WEU again assumed a passive role, which was here not surprising – a military alliance would hardly be the best means for a politically highly sensitive proposal such as the neutrality proposal. Nor was it ideal for the Middle East proposals in which EC and EPC matters were tightly linked.

In all the three instances of cooperation the third factor, that of country support, was also particularly strong, all countries seeking to pursue cooperation within the institutions that were most conducive to their interests. During the earlier period of the issue of sanctions – up to 15 January 1980 – the activities of the US, supported by the UK, pursued in order to enlist European support for its policies, appeared to be the most powerful factor in activating the three institutions that were particularly suitable for the American purposes.
Looking at the rest of the period the institutional cooperation and the interests of countries go well together. Apart from the fact that the EC and the EPC were the most capable ones – and to a degree the only conceivable ones – France, Germany and the United Kingdom all had incentives to cooperate within these institutions. For the European initiatives these two were the natural choices. The US, which for all these initiatives needed to be involved in the end, was to be convinced by the way in which the Europeans on their own had cut through the dilemmas, and for this NATO was not the suitable forum.

The EU and the EPC, as compared with institutions in which the USA was present, had further advantages. For France the EC was the proper forum for discussing an agricultural embargo and export credits in order for France to be able to influence the outcome, in particular through earlier discussions with Germany and the establishment of a common view between the two. The same applied also for the EPC concerning the boycott of the Olympic Games. The reason why France was opposed to an EPC meeting before the pre-scheduled one may well have been the fact that time was needed to prepare the issues and a prematurely summoned EPC might have served only as a vehicle for American interests.

For Germany likewise the EC and the EPC were the legitimate European forums in which Franco-German proposals could be launched and constituted a kind of counterweight to American pressure, thus for Germany serving as a shield against American criticism.

For the UK as well the two were good forums for discussing European matters. Whereas at the start the UK saw the EC and the EPC mainly as bodies that were to be convinced of the American–British view on sanctions, later, as they did for Germany, they constituted a protection against criticism and a means to spread burdens.

NATO, because it was dominated by the US, was unacceptable as a forum for France, which also succeeded in preventing meetings that could have the semblance of a NATO forum. While Germany and the UK did not share this feeling, the strong role that the United States was initially able to give NATO was now counteracted by French policy. Its role was reduced to its connection with CoCom. Cooperation through the latter was obviously not the positive choice of any of the countries but was unavoidable, and they seem to have done what they could to limit the trade restrictions.

The continued passivity of the WEU, in spite of its having some institutional competence, can be explained by some weaknesses as regards certain kinds of tasks. There was, however, in addition an unwillingness to use this institution after 1973, when the UK joined the EC/EPC. The close similarity of its membership, all WEU members being also members of the EPC, meant that there would be a needless repetition of discussion if the WEU brought up the same themes as the EPC. There is some support for this hypothesis in the remarks the WEU Council itself made in its annual report of 1980, demonstrating to the critical members of
the Assembly that the WEU states had pursued a variety of the hoped-for activities through their membership of other institutions.¹

6.3. Other Forms of Cooperation
Apart from formalized cooperation, there was also a variety of more flexible forms of cooperation during the half-year following the invasion of Afghanistan. In relation to sanctions, two couples were initially formed – an Anglo-American one and a Franco-German one.

The Anglo-American couple was based on their common interest, as they saw it, to meet the Soviet Afghanistan invasion with the proper means. For this, bilateral cooperation served as a way to join forces aiming at convincing others in institutional cooperation to agree to the American proposals.

As regards sanctions certain common and compatible interests existed between France and Germany. Prominent among their common interests was the wish not to end the policy of détente or to disrupt economic cooperation with the Eastern bloc. For both, however, the impact of Soviet intransigence was a strain on their policies and for both the fear that the United States would misinterpret their policies was strongly felt. Germany’s greater dependence on the United States was, however, a factor that set the two apart on some issues and prevented closer cooperation. As the Germans expressed it, there was no third voice in Europe.

Their cooperation was also serving interests that were compatible rather than common. For France cooperation with Germany was able to increase the leverage of its proposals by putting them in a bilateral context, whereas for Germany cooperation with France, as expressed many times, was a way towards acceptance by others.

Like the Anglo-American couple, the Franco-German one made attempts to influence institutional cooperation – most prominently in early February as the Franco-German declaration served as an input to the EC and EPC meetings immediately following.

As the discussions on the European initiatives came into focus, both the Anglo-American and the Franco-German cooperation became less prominent. Relations between the US and the UK obviously chilled somewhat with the British enthusiasm for European cooperation. Franco-German cooperation became less intense as well, in spite of the fact that French and German interests continued to be largely common or compatible. There was now less need for their cooperation since the UK and other European countries had the same views. Others also saw a need for communication with the Soviet Union and, as both the UK and the US met Foreign Minister Gromyko, the disagreement was no longer on whether this was a good thing but rather on whether others should learn about it beforehand.

Moreover, France’s unilateral way of promoting a neutrality proposal separated it from Germany, for which the EPC was the natural choice. Instead German–British cooperation in the early phases of the neutrality proposal, directed at the

common interest in having it accepted by others, was intense. In the Middle East proposal, while the British–French cooperation seems to have been the most intense, all three countries were involved in a variety of forms of cooperation.

As the European component grew, cooperation between the three became a natural group of reference, not least since they were the three dominant powers in Europe, which made contacts natural. The question was to what degree this should include or exclude others.

The French policy demonstrated reluctance to participate in meetings associated with American leadership but still a wish to be part of a group composed of major states. In these kinds of group France had no problems in cooperating with the United States. Thus, the pattern of cooperation was a way to project the image of an independent and major state.

Neither Germany nor the UK shied away from flexible high-level cooperation. However, since their relations with the US were different, this cooperation was a complement to rather than a substitute for NATO. Such cooperation gave exclusiveness, setting some countries apart from the smaller ones, but was also a convenient way to solve internal and external problems.

Cooperation among the three major states of the EC (the \textit{directoire}) was also strongly criticized by the smaller ones, and therefore not openly advertised. This period gives few examples of cooperation between the three in the area of sanctions. This may be due to the fact that the mechanism was one of secret meetings or telephone conversations. Most likely, however, it was an area where the positions were set early and no possibility was seen of changes to them.

Close cooperation between the three seems to have been more common in connection with the neutrality proposal as the UK sought to anchor it. Most probably it also took place in connection with the Middle East initiative, considering the dominant role that the three countries had.

Clearly, each of the three countries looked upon the other two as the other most important European states: their statements give clear evidence of this. When partners were enumerated, the other two were in a special category as compared to other countries. This does not mean that a \textit{directoire} was working in the sense usually indicated by this term, of three countries dominating cooperation in Europe by settling issues with each other rather than referring them to institutions. The three worked with each other when in agreement and then, through their combined force, tended to dominate. On other issues or in other phases of the same issue they disagreed and cooperation then took other shapes. Throughout this process institutions were present, either as alternatives or as targets to be influenced by means of cooperation among a few.

6.4. Norms

The question is whether and to what degree norms mattered as a factor for determining the behaviour of the states.

First of all, as mentioned in chapter 2, it is unlikely that all norms will be spelled out. There is hardly any reason to do so when countries share an understanding of what the norms are and compliance is unproblematic. Norms that are spelled out
are likely to have a special character: they may be contested by others, and therefore worth making explicit, or made explicit when one country comes in for criticism to remind others of the limitations of the norms in order to prove that it is abiding by them.

Generally, Germany and the United Kingdom seemed fairly similar in their view of what NATO’s norms were – political solidarity, joint consultations and, finally, the contribution to the common NATO defence. In contrast to this, French statements on norms, rather than speaking of political solidarity, took a judicial view of members’ obligations. The emphasis in France’s statements on loyalty in respect to obligations under Article 5 was not complemented by similar statements from the other two countries, most probably because the UK and Germany, in contrast to France, were militarily integrated in NATO and therefore saw this as self-evident. Germany, in addition, was seen as the country that had most to benefit from Article 5, since many thought that it would be the most likely battlefield.

Summarizing the differences in attitudes to NATO norms, France focused on an argumentation that demonstrated that it was conducting its policy in accordance with them. Germany, defining these norms in a more demanding way, was likewise seeking to demonstrate that its policy was consistent with them, whereas the UK, seemingly convinced that others would perceive the UK to be acting within the norms, was focusing more on others’ behaviour.

EC norms were much less of an issue and at the same time more complex. Clearly, for all three countries, the norms relating to the EC were less strict than those of NATO. They were, furthermore – unlike the NATO norms – used for a variety of purposes, for instance, as a shield, demonstrating that there were other obligations than those to NATO (France) and that these obligations were not a menace but an asset to NATO/the US (Germany). For all the three countries, when pursuing their own initiatives, the EC norms were used as protection against criticism from the United States.

The norm of political solidarity was important for Germany and the UK, the two countries that referred to it, and the pain involved in adhering to it was seen in the German discussions, while the British, with a wider view of the scope of national independence, were less inhibited about voicing their own economic concerns. They did not, however, escape criticism for using this norm only for some types of sanction, while in the case of the Olympic boycott British athletes ended up attending the games. A clear case of Germany bowing to the perceived norm was the boycott of the Olympic Games, whereas the economic sanctions may have been less strictly observed in the implementation phase.

The bloc confrontation that was associated with the American plea for sanctions was not present in the Middle East initiatives. The heated discussion between the United States and the European countries in connection with the Middle East initiatives could therefore not be connected to the norm of political solidarity. This discussion is the only example of Germany going strongly against the United States, obviously feeling that its own policy was within the confines of this norm and possibly gaining strength in doing this because this was not a bloc issue.
The norm of joint consultation was another crucial one over which France was more attacked than any of the other countries, the intensity of the discussion being increased by the fact that the French themselves had been very critical of the Americans. With the other European countries being critical of France as well, this looks like a case of breach of a norm, leading to sanctions in the form of sarcastic comments. The UK did not escape being accused of breaking this norm either: like the French in relation to the Brezhnev meeting, the British admitted that they had not consulted with the US on the issue of the neutrality proposal, only informed it. This time, however, since the European partners agreed with the British policy, the criticism came only from the United States.

In summary, the perceived norms did play a role. Even though there are few examples of norms being adhered to when a country saw its interests as being better provided for by taking another position, it is also likely that the consequences in terms of strong criticism from others were a deterrent for the same country in another situation or for another country when tempted to do the same.

Another factor here is that, while some aspects of cooperation were clearly norm-related, not all of them were. It was certainly in the American and (in the beginning) the British interest to describe the situation in norm-related terms: the European allies had a duty to heed the American pleas for sanctions. The Germans in carefully worded statements and the French referred to norms as well when explaining their policies.

Political solidarity is a vague concept, not being based on any written obligation. It is by no means obvious that compliance with this norm would require countries to follow the advice of others arguing for a certain policy. Joint consultation, on the other hand – the only norm that is clearly involved here – is clearer. It is therefore not surprising that the sharpest criticism from others came on this point.

6.5. Do Institutions Matter?
As the first hypothesis suggests, perceived interests have proved to be a good predictor of the way in which states have pursued cooperation. Norms have likewise been seen as playing a role. Whether a country adheres to them or, in the eyes of others, breaks them, they matter. So, how about institutions?

As seen in the preceding chapters, institutional competences coincide well with the pattern and content of cooperation. On the other hand, countries have also been seen to favour institutions that can be expected to serve their own interests well.

The question is whether, as neoliberal institutionalism claims, institutions have a role in cooperation in the sense that states would not be able to accomplish the same results in ad hoc cooperation. Two prominent institutions can be seen in this first case. The first is the United Nations, which gave legitimacy to the condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The second is the European cooperation in the form of the EC and the EPC. To a degree in the neutrality proposal and even more in the Middle East initiatives, while they were controlled by states, cooperation was highly focused on the EC/EPC. In stark contrast to the initiative on sanctions, this time cooperation started out without a strong
divergence of views. Instead institutional competence in the form of a presidency, together with the individual states’ efforts, was able to produce a common view.

Also, strikingly, in the midst of strong differences over the issue of the sanctions and the budget crisis, the comments made give evidence of a strong feeling of a joint purpose for Europe. A common mistrust of the American irrationality and emphasis on punishment seems to have interacted with concern for the situation as such.

The remarkable thing here is the change in the atmosphere among the three, in particular in the remarks coming from the UK. The focus of its comments is to a very high degree on the EC/EPC and the changes that had come about, centring on the EC/EPC. The possibilities for Europe to play a role in the world when it was equipped with an institution to focus around had become clearly apparent. As seen here, institutions were not able to change the views of countries, but when countries were close to each other in their views the role of an institution could make a difference in coordinating them and thereby increase cohesion.

6.6. The Impact of Cooperation
To recall, the impact of cooperation is established in terms of the commitment of the states involved in cooperation. This is seen in the extent to which they commit themselves to change previous behaviour and/or limit their future behaviour.

As described in chapters 3–5, the impact of the various institutional agreements made seems to have been insubstantial. Looking at the results from the American side, the agreements made were few and limited, and the implementation stage led to even worse results. Studying sanctions from the Franco-German angle, the evaluation is more difficult. Outwardly their statements did not break new ground. Yet, considering the fact that the outcome as regards the agricultural exports and export credit areas was weak, the question is whether their cooperation was the reason why far-reaching commitments were not made. Considering the views of other EC states, the poor results were also due to the opposition from a number of other countries.

Generally, impact was not much affected by cooperation: when countries did not agree from the outset, cooperation did not take them much further. There is one clear example of the opposite – countries changing their minds after pressure to do so: the European states felt obliged to make a more modest Middle East declaration at the Venice European Council meeting after the US had applied considerable political pressure. The sources are, however, contradictory in the case of sanctions on exports of technology – the area where the issues were most sensitive and in which negotiations were held in secret.

While cooperation during this period may have had little impact, the mood in June 1980 among the three European states under study was changed and considerably more positive. Their feeling of increased commitment did not rest on any success reached at the negotiating table but in the increased sense of cohesion within the EC. The neutrality proposal had failed and the Middle East initiatives were not winning any praise among the countries in the region either. Still, the Middle East initiatives in particular were proof of a common view among the EC
countries which in itself was of major importance, since it showed that Europe was a factor to be reckoned with in the world.
Part III
The Macedonian Crisis, 2001
Macedonia

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Chapter 7.

The Macedonian Crisis

7.1. Background

The cases of 1980 and 2001 might at first sight seem to present many more differences than similarities. First, whereas the Afghanistan invasion happened during, and actually initiated, a new wave of the Cold War, the Macedonian crisis of 2001 came about in a situation when the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia no longer characterized each other as enemies.

Furthermore, the cases were different in that, while the geographical position of Afghanistan was of great strategic importance, that of Macedonia, although important and a reason for the continued attention to the ‘Macedonian Question’, was a regional issue¹ and not one of the essential elements of the crisis of 2001.

Third, in the case of Macedonia there was no strategic surprise, as there was in Afghanistan. No dramatic event took place similar to the discovery of a Soviet invasion under way.

Finally, the cases were different in the sense that the former concerned reactions to an event which had already taken place, and in which the aims were to restore the earlier situation, whereas the latter concerned conflict prevention or peace-building.² While peace-building rather than conflict prevention is the heading under which, in his report of the work of the UN for 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the activities related to the Macedonian crisis, in most cases peace-building, when undertaken in order to prevent a conflict, is considered part of conflict prevention.³

While the difference in terms of the time – one crisis taking place during and one after the Cold War – is important and a reason for selecting these two cases, the other differences are not fundamental. Basically the situation was the same in that in the Macedonian crisis, like the Afghanistan crisis, Europeans and Americans alike saw a need to remedy a situation that might develop to become even more problematic because of its links to other areas of unrest and other, ongoing conflicts.

¹ Macedonia controls the main north–south route from Central Europe to Salonika and the Aegean down the Morava and Vardar valleys. It also controls the lesser route down the Struma Valley. Among these the Vardar route is the crucial one and the one that has made the possession of Macedonia important. (Barker, 1950.)

² See also Kofi Annan at the Security Council meeting on ‘Peace-building: towards a comprehensive approach’: We tend to think of peace-building as taking place primarily in post-conflict settings. Here, the goals are to consolidate peace, reinforce an often hard-won and fragile instrument, which can address the underlying, root causes of conflict, and which can also be used before the actual outbreak of war. A society on the brink of breakdown is as much in need of such an instrument as one in which disaster has already struck. (UN Security Council, ‘Peace-building: Towards a Comprehensive Approach’, S/PV.4272, 5 Feb. 2001, p. 3.)

Other similarities relate to the fact that the three European states had a common view on how to deal with the problems, as they did when presenting their proposals on a neutral Afghanistan and the Middle East initiative. This was the fact with the Macedonian crisis itself as well in terms of the ESDP, of which initially the Americans showed considerable mistrust.

Thus, while the situation differed in important respects, the Macedonian crisis, just like that over Afghanistan, posed fundamentally the same challenges for cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, albeit now with the aid of institutions which had changed and adjusted to the new European needs.

7.2. Relations between the United States and Western Europe

Some changes in the institutional set-up in Europe should be dealt with before the scene of this conflict is described. The first are those that can be immediately attributed to the end of the Cold War. A second concerns changes in formal authority, such as in the right to assume new tasks. A third relates to additions or reductions in capabilities.

For the United Nations, the end of the bloc confrontation meant that the Security Council and the secretary-general could now pursue their activities without the expectation of the unavoidable Soviet veto in the Security Council. This new possibility for the Security Council of solving problems has led to a diminution of interest in the General Assembly. The most important change, however, is the increased opportunity for the UN to be part of conflict-solving in a multilateral setting in the role of the honest broker, thus taking on a more crucial role than before.

NATO since its Rome meeting of November 1991 had changed its character to include political aspects of cooperation. Apart from full members, a wide range of countries are connected to NATO through such forms as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). In 2001 the first former Warsaw Pact countries had already joined NATO. For others, such as Macedonia, full membership of NATO was a highly desired goal and membership of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was part of the preparations.

During the 1990s the EU rapidly developed greater formal rights in the area of security and defence. The meeting of the EC in Maastricht led to the decision on the Treaty on European Union and the start of an intense development of a security and defence element of the EU as well, which was extended at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 to include a military element.1

While NATO and the EU could both be seen as winners in this process of change – both were now dealing with areas of great importance – the WEU, while at first strengthened, finally lost its crisis management capabilities to the EU.

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1 EU, ‘Helsinki European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency’, Bull. EC, no. 12, Dec. 1999. See also chapter 1, section 1.5.2, and appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.
2001 there remained little of importance for the WEU to do: the ambitions of those who wanted a stronger Europe in terms of security now rested with the EU.

While the WEU was weakened as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the CSCE lost its old role as the institution that sought to create links over the Iron Curtain. In its place came the OSCE, whose role, although reminiscent of the CSCE’s in its tasks of building security and confidence, was now played in close collaboration with the UN, NATO and the EU. Therefore, while the CSCE was not relevant for the Afghanistan crisis, the OSCE will be included in the analysis of the case of Macedonia.

At the same time as the institutions were being strengthened, however, it was also clear that their influence continued to be limited. Regardless of the capabilities of the institutions, their member states were not willing to renounce their powers. The impasse in the Bosnian conflict was resolved only after the Contact Group (including France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) was developed, thereby starting at the other end by giving the role of problem-solving to the major states.

7.2.1. Interests of States

The concept of interests of states has been dealt with above, first in terms of theory in chapter 2 (see section 2.5) and thereafter in connection with the states under study in the following chapters. According to the primary hypothesis states are presumed to act rationally (within reasonable bounds) in order to satisfy their perceived interests, expressed in the declared policy goals. In addition, the relative power of European countries will influence cooperation by creating possibilities for activities as well as limitations on the scope for activities. States are assumed to seek to gain benefits whenever possible and to avoid vulnerabilities. This means that they will seek cooperation within the institutions that are most likely to satisfy their goals and avoid institutions that will make goal fulfilment difficult.

The crucial positions on foreign and security matters held by France, Germany and the United Kingdom after the end of the Cold War are in many ways similar to those they held before 1989. They were again manifested in the discussions held during 1990 and 1991, leading up to the transformations of NATO and the WEU and to the formation of the European Union. France was still the country most eager to establish a role for itself and for the EU that was as independent as possible from NATO/the United States, whereas the UK, which was closer to NATO/the United States, did not perceive a need for this independence. Germany, as previously, sought to be closely embedded in both. Again, as previously, the French and British independence vis-à-vis, in particular, the EU was visible in their intergovernmental approach as compared to the German federalism.

The agreement of 1998 at Saint-Malo (see chapter 1, section 1.3) and the subsequent developments within the EU were of major significance for the Union. For the United Kingdom, it was not a change of basic principles, but one of attitude towards pursuing cooperation within a European framework. As such, however, it was important.

European dependence on the US remained as well. While it was not of the same character as before, it was still impossible for Europeans to pursue more than very
limited peacekeeping tasks without American support. Unavoidably, this was reflected in their perceptions of their interests, depending, however, on the individual country’s own vulnerability and the character of the situation (see chapter 2, section 2.5).

7.3. The Analysis
7.3.1. The Time Period Covered
The study of the Afghanistan crisis was divided for the purposes of analysis into three periods. The reason for this was related to the strategic surprise of the Afghanistan invasion. The surprise effect made it possible to contrast the first reactions of the countries involved with their later evaluations of the event. The second period was imposed in order to be able to study the effect of the first intensive attempt by the US to convince its allies of its views and at the same time the extent to which it was possible for institutions to initiate work quickly. The third period, finally, was the whole period under study.

The Macedonian crisis was not characterized by strategic surprise – rather the opposite. The spillover of crisis to this country had long been feared and the institutional set-up that already existed in Kosovo was partly relevant for Macedonia as well. For this reason the whole period of the crisis will be dealt with as one period. This does not mean that the capabilities of institutions, including their capacity to initiate work quickly, are irrelevant. The nature of this crisis, involving a long series of mini-crises, makes the same capabilities as in the Afghanistan case important for this one as well.

7.4. The Macedonian Crisis of 2001
The Macedonian crisis of 2001 was complex. It was related to the past Yugoslav war and to historic events and current problems on the Balkan Peninsula. It should be recalled here that this study does not aim to analyse the crisis itself, only the way in which the three countries – France, Germany and the UK – dealt with it, inside and outside institutions, in accordance with the theory proposed in chapter 2. The following sections do not claim in any way to be sufficient for a full understanding of it. They are included here only in order to present some basic factual background for an understanding of the behaviour of the institutions and of the three countries’ cooperation on this issue.

7.4.1. Macedonia and the Macedonians
‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonians’ are vague as well as contested terms and therefore need some clarification. Macedonia is a geographical as well as a political concept, the former including not only the Republic of Macedonia but also parts of Greece and Bulgaria. In this study the focus is on the political entity and the term

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5 The geographical area of Macedonia is bounded to the north by the Skopska Crna Gora and the Shar Planina mountains, to the east by the Rila and Rhodope mountains, to the south by the Aegean coast around Thessalonika, Mount Olympus and the Pindus mountains, and to the west by the lakes Ohrid and Prespa. The Republic of Macedonia comprises some 25 000 square kilometres out of the total of 67 000 square kilometres.
‘Macedonia’, if not otherwise indicated, will be used as synonymous with Republic of Macedonia.

In the same manner the term ‘Macedonian’ may be applied in a number of ways. The intricacy of this term is not only due to geographical reasons but is also connected to the complex ethnic composition of this country, today’s Macedonia usually being described as composed of Slav Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma or Vlachs.6

The term ‘Macedonian’ may therefore stand for at least three different things. It may be used as a denomination for all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia or only for the citizens who consider themselves as ethnic Slav Macedonians. It may moreover be the term to classify persons within a wider geographical area, including the Slav Macedonian diaspora. In this study the term ‘Macedonians’ will be used to denote the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia; for the different ethnic groups, specific denominations will be used.

7.4.2. The Historical Background to the Crisis

Like Afghanistan, Macedonia7 has seen many rulers over the centuries. The brief period as a major power, ending with the death of Alexander in 325 BC, was followed by domination and struggles over the area by Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Bulgarians, Serbs, Turks and others. After a long period of Ottoman Turkish rule, this power weakened during the 19th century and thereafter Macedonia, like its neighbours Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, when seeking liberation, was involved in a variety of events and linked to Balkan as well as non-Balkan powers.

The basic problem for Macedonia was the late arrival there, compared to its neighbours, of the nation-building process. The development of a distinctive Macedonian character was therefore accompanied by the considerable impact of Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek and even Romanian nationalism. Citing religious, linguistic and cultural arguments, the representatives of these movements made demands on Macedonian territory and its inhabitants. The Bulgarian influence was particularly strong.8 By the turn of the last century, however, there were also Macedonian attempts at autonomy, not least through the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO/IMRO). Even so, it should be noted that the concept of Macedonia was vague and contested among the many groups fighting for various types of autonomy, annexation to another state or state-building, and which suffered a defeat as the Ilinden uprising of 1903 was crushed.9

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6 The two dominant groups are Slav Macedonians and Albanians. According to the census of 1994 they make up 66 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively, of the population. Among other groups according to the categorization of the census are Turks, Roma, Serbs, Muslims and Vlachs. (Statistical Office of Macedonia, *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Macedonia, 1999*.)

7 ‘Macedonia’ is here used without any specification of the area for which it stands. Between the 4th century BC and 1912 Macedonia belonged to several empires in succession and its borders fluctuated greatly. It is therefore not possible to indicate with any precision what constituted ‘Macedonia’ during various periods of this long history.


The Turks were defeated in the two Balkan wars of the early 20th century, each of which resulted in Macedonia being partitioned between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. Bulgaria, being the main loser of the second Balkan War in terms of the annexation of Macedonia, sided with Germany in the First World War as a way of retrieving areas lost. Again Bulgaria was on the losing side and the war resulted in a large part of Macedonia being given to Greece, whereas its Slavic part was included in what was in 1929 to be called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Many Macedonians had fought on the Bulgarian side during the war and continued their activities in the form of guerrilla warfare, with the aim of seeking in the end autonomy or statehood for Macedonia.  

During the Second World War, Yugoslavia was occupied by Germany and Macedonia was partly annexed by Bulgaria. The remainder of Macedonia, controlled by Marshal Tito, was the scene of anti-Axis partisan warfare, leading to the proclamation of the Macedonian People’s Republic in August 1944. The final result of the Second World War, however, was that in 1945 the Macedonian People’s Republic became part of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.

7.4.2.1. Independent Macedonia

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent effects on the unity of Yugoslavia resulted in 1990 in the first multiparty elections being held in Macedonia, and in January 1991 in the appointment of Kiro Gligorov as president. In September 1991, after a referendum in which a majority of those voting were in favour of independence, the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia declared itself independent under the name of the Republic of Macedonia, thereby leaving the Yugoslav federation. In November 1991 the new constitution was approved.

During the following years a large number of other countries recognized Macedonia’s independence and it was admitted to certain organizations. The country was recognized by some as Macedonia and by others under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In 1993 Macedonia was recognized (as FYROM) by the EU and joined the United Nations. In 1995 it became a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. The same year it was also admitted as a member of NATO’s PfP programme.

As in the case of the other new republics that were formerly part of Yugoslavia, relations between Macedonia and its neighbours have been troubled. The above list enumerating ethnic groups in the present-day Republic of Macedonia does not nearly describe the vast range of peoples who have entered the area of geographic Macedonia. On the whole these peoples have kept their identities and not assimilated. Generally also they have kept their history alive, often with competing

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11 The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) became the largest party with 37 out of the 120 seats in the Parliament. Second came the reformed communists, from 1992 to be called the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM) with 30 seats. The Party for Democratic Prosperity (PPD), which was mainly supported by ethnic Albanians, won 24 seats. (Ackerman, 1999, p. 57.)
claims to territory. In the Republic of Macedonia the expression of the ‘Four Wolves’ reflects the fears of the ambitions of the four neighbouring countries, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia, each of which at some time has been heavily involved in Macedonian politics. Even today, with the partial exception of Greece, all four have substantial political parties with claims over Macedonian territory or which seek a revision of the position of the respective minorities they represent. An additional problem for achieving cohesion within the country is the way in which the different minorities of Macedonia have tended to concentrate in certain areas, for example, ethnic Albanians in the western part of the country.

Greece, seeing Macedonia’s history as part of its own, did not accept the name of Macedonia and succeeded in preventing Macedonia being recognized by others until 1993. The provisional name of FYROM was not satisfactory to Greece and in February 1994, just after the recognition by Russia (as the Republic of Macedonia) and the United States (as FYROM), Greece introduced a border blockade against Macedonia. The conflict was resolved in September 1995 when the Greek and Macedonian foreign ministers signed an agreement on the normalization of relations between the two states.

Relations with Bulgaria have been complicated by the shadow of history more than by actual conflicts. The Treaty of San Stefano of 1878, imposed by Russia on Turkey, resulted in an independent Bulgaria incorporating all three parts of the historical Macedonia. Before the end of 1878, Macedonia had once again become Turkish territory. San Stefano, however, is far from forgotten in Bulgaria. Bulgaria claims that no Macedonian language or identity exists, but this has not prevented the two countries from having a generally good relationship. Bulgaria was one of the first countries to recognize Macedonia.

Relations between Albania and Macedonia have been dominated by the presence of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and the contacts between Albanians on both sides of the border. In spite of occasional tensions between the two countries, no real crisis has taken place. Diplomatic missions were established in 1992 and in 1994 the port of Durres in Albania was opened to Macedonian trade.

Relations with Serbia have been complex. Macedonia was the only one of all the republics of the former Yugoslavia to secede without any hostilities. The reactions in Belgrade to the Macedonian declaration of independence were, however, negative, the Serbs regarding it as an act of disloyalty, and relations during the period of conflict in the area were on occasions tense. Border delimitation, religion and cross-border trade were among the disputed issues. There were worries in Macedonia, particularly during the early part of the Yugoslav conflict, that the existence of its Serb minority (2.1 per cent of the population) would provide a pretext for a Serbian invasion. In connection with this there were also Serbian accusations that Macedonian Serbs were not treated well. Discussions held between Serbian representatives, the Macedonian Government and the CSCE

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12 See Poulton, 1999.
15 Ackerman, 1999, p. 75.
Working Group resulted in August 1993 in an agreement establishing the rights of Serb Macedonians.\textsuperscript{16}

The most complicated period was that of UN sanctions against Serbia, lasting between June 1992 and November 1995.\textsuperscript{17} Macedonia during this period helped to mitigate the effects of the sanctions on Serbia through large-scale smuggling along the Serbian–Macedonian border, thereby also making economic gains itself. One problem between the two was that Serbia also sought a good relationship with Greece, which, because of the conflict over what Macedonia was to be called, had succeeded in postponing the recognition of Macedonia’s independence by the EU. As other important institutions also delayed their recognition, with the consequence that important sources of finance remained unavailable, fears rose in Macedonia that it would be the next victim of the Balkan conflict.\textsuperscript{18}

After the 1995 Dayton Agreement, relations between Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the FRY, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) were normalized during the spring of 1996. Flights were resumed and an agreement was made to regulate normal relations and promote cooperation. In April 1996 the FRY recognized the country under the name of the Republic of Macedonia.

7.4.2.2. The Ethnic Problems of Macedonia

The major problem of Macedonia has concerned the largest minority of the country, the ethnic Albanians. In the census of 1994, carried out under international supervision, the Albanian share of the population was estimated at approximately 23 per cent. According to the Albanians themselves, however, the figure should rather be between 30 and 40 per cent. Albanians have claimed that the citizenship laws are discriminatory, whereas Slav Macedonians have argued that some Albanians living in Macedonia are recent refugees from Kosovo.\textsuperscript{19}

On the basis of their claim to constitute a large proportion of the population, ethnic Albanians demanded a number of rights, first of all that they be given the status of ‘constitutive nation’ as they were in the former Yugoslavia. They also demanded territorial autonomy, some, however, reframing their claim as ‘internal self-determination’.\textsuperscript{20}

Albanians furthermore claimed extended constitutional rights to use their own language, part of the reason for their discontent being delays in implementing the existing constitutional right of the use of Albanian in local self-administration in areas where they constituted a majority or a considerable number of the population. Another problem concerned higher education. With all university teaching

\textsuperscript{16} Ackerman, 1999, pp. 108–110; Dobrkovic, 1999, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{17} See Europe, 1/2 June 1992; and UN Security Council Resolution 757 (30 May 1992). This embargo (which also included Montenegro) was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and was total, thus including among other things trade, oil and air service as well as the freezing of financial assets abroad, the reduction of Serbia’s and Montenegro’s diplomatic staff and the suspension of technical cooperation and cultural exchanges.

\textsuperscript{18} Dobrkovic, 1999; Pettifer, 1992 p. xxi.

\textsuperscript{19} Ackerman, 1999, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 62.
being carried out in the Macedonian language, Albanians demanded to right to set up their own university – an issue that became one of the most complicated.

Ethnic Albanians, moreover, complained about discriminatory practices against them, especially in the armed forces, in the police, in the legal professions and in political office. Some positive steps were taken by the government in this respect, however. All governments since 1990 have included four or five Albanians. They were allowed to form political parties freely, as well as operating television stations, radio and newspapers.

International organizations became involved in the Albanian minority issue in Macedonia with the forming of the CSCE/OSCE Working Group. This group, active between early 1992 and 1996, resolved a number of issues but failed to achieve an agreement on the use of the Albanian language or on the creation of an Albanian-language university.

1.4.2.3. International Attempts to Prevent the Conflict Spreading to Macedonia

During 1991 a number of institutions tried actively to halt the events unfolding in the former Yugoslavia. The EC attempted in several ways, unsuccessfully, to stop hostilities and resolve the crisis. In July 1991 the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was established as the EC set up a coordination centre to monitor events in Slovenia and Croatia.\(^{21}\) The aim was to provide information on the political, economic and humanitarian situation in the countries covered by its mandate. Later, other countries were included – Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, Macedonia and Albania.

On 7 September 1991 in The Hague the EC opened the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord Carrington.\(^{22}\) The conference had little success in achieving its goals, however, and the frustration among the 12 EU member countries when facing constant violations of these principles was obvious from their declarations, which resulted in the decision on 8 November to apply Community sanctions against Serbia.\(^{23}\)

The CSCE continued its gradual change, aimed to address the new threats in Europe.\(^{24}\) Decision-making was, however, generally difficult since it was based on consensus. As the FRY was a member, it could easily stop all decisions it did not approve of. At the Helsinki meeting in July 1992 the FRY was temporarily suspended from the CSCE. The suspension was to last until November 2000.\(^{25}\)

The CSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje was established in September 1992 with the aim to ‘promote respect for territorial integrity and the maintenance of peace, stability and security; and to help prevent possible conflict in the region’.\(^{26}\)

\(^{21}\) Europe, 15/16 July 1991.
\(^{24}\) See appendix 1, ‘The Institutions’.
In comparison to those of other institutions, the role of the WEU in Yugoslavia was limited. Views were, however, divided within the WEU itself as to its role. Here France was the most ambitious state, suggesting that the WEU ‘could be the instrument enabling the deployment of the peacekeeping force, wholly or partially’. Finally the member states were unable to agree on a document defining the role of the WEU.  

During 1992 the WEU assumed a new role, however, in that it adopted the Petersberg Declaration in which it declared itself willing to take on certain tasks in the field of humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The WEU at the Helsinki Summit meeting of 9–10 July 2001 declared itself willing to pursue the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. This meeting took place one day before the NATO meeting at which NATO declared itself willing to pursue the same tasks.

The political base for NATO’s engagement in the former Yugoslavia was established in June 1992, as NATO’s foreign ministers declared themselves willing to support, on a case-by-case basis, peace-keeping activities (i.e., the Petersberg tasks) under the responsibility of the CSCE, and in December also under the UN. With the support of all members these activities came to include the former Yugoslavia. From July 1992, as NATO together with the WEU started to patrol the Adriatic in support of the UN arms embargo, a wide range of tasks were undertaken. From February 1994, at the request of the UN, these included a number of air strikes against weapon systems attacking civilian targets. After the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995 a new role for NATO was to head the Implementation Force (IFOR), followed in December 1996 by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.

The United Nations was also involved. On 25 September 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 713 in which the UN declared its support for the activities of the EC and the CSCE to restore peace and dialogue in the former Yugoslavia and called on all states to implement an embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. In October 1991 Cyrus Vance

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27 *Europe*, 30 Sep. 1991 and 18/19 Nov. 1991. It should be remembered that at this time the issue was not only that of how to react to the events in Yugoslavia. The role of the WEU, and Europe in general, was a crucial issue in discussions between the United States and European states connected to NATO’s and the European Communities’ new roles. These issues were at least partly resolved by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome in November 1991 and the Maastricht meeting of the European Council in December. The role of the WEU was given in an annex to the declaration provided by the WEU states. See ‘Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation’, *Europe Documents*, no. 1744, *Atlantic Documents*, no. 76, 13 Nov. 1991; and Treaty on Political Union, Final Draft by the Dutch Presidency as modified by the Maastricht Summit. See in particular Annex V, Declaration of the Member States of Western European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, *Europe Documents*, no. 1750/1751, 13 Dec. 1991.


29 *Europe*, 11 July 1992, Special WEU Council. At this meeting it was decided to send five or six ships into the Adriatic to monitor observance of the embargo. All the WEU countries that had a navy would participate on a rotating basis. Italy, holding the presidency of the WEU, would coordinate the mission.

was appointed by UN Secretary-General Javier de Perez de Cuellar to be his personal envoy for Yugoslavia.

A number of explanations have been given as to why Macedonia did not become part of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia – the Serb minority was too small to motivate a Serbian intervention; the Yugoslav army chose to send the troops that were stationed in Macedonia to the Bosnian war scene; Serbia needed Macedonia in order to circumvent the international sanctions; and the Greek Government wanted to avoid further destabilization of the area, which might have led to the creation of a Muslim state in Bosnia – an outcome considered worse than an independent Macedonia.

In addition to these explanations the preventive deployment of UN troops must be considered a strong explanatory factor.\textsuperscript{31}

The first appeal for a preventive force was made to Cyrus Vance by President Gligorov in December 1991, just two months after Macedonia had declared its independence.\textsuperscript{32} In February 1992 the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established with the goal of creating the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.\textsuperscript{33} In December 1992, the UN took the decision to authorize the immediate preventive deployment of UNPROFOR troops along the Macedonian borders with Albania and the FRY.\textsuperscript{34}

In March 1995 the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) succeeded the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia. The specific goal of the mission was to monitor and report any developments in the border areas that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory. UNPREDEP was deployed on the Macedonian side of the borders with Albania and the FRY, a stretch of 420 km.

The UN Security Council renewed UNPREDEP’s mandate several times, in July 1998 also authorizing an increase in troop strength to 1050.\textsuperscript{35} The mandate was also extended to include monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other activities that had been prohibited by the Council in December 1997.\textsuperscript{36} On 26 February 1999 China in the UN Security Council vetoed a further extension of its mandate (with Russia abstaining and the other 13 members voting for extension), and its functions therefore came to an end on 28 February.\textsuperscript{37} Although

\textsuperscript{31} Ackerman, 1999, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 64.


\textsuperscript{35} As of February 1999 the UNPREDEP military component consisted of two mechanized infantry battalions, a Nordic composite battalion and a United States Army task force, with personnel of 650 and 350, respectively, supported by a 50-strong heavy engineering platoon from Indonesia, in addition to military observers and civilian police monitors. (UN, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm.)


\textsuperscript{37} China stated that peace and stability in FYROM had not been adversely affected by regional developments. The situation in the country had apparently stabilized in the past few years, and its relations with neighbouring countries had improved. Moreover, the Secretary-General in his recent report had indicated clearly that the original goals of the Security Council in establishing UNPREDEP
the Chinese deny this, the reason for the Chinese veto is believed to have been Macedonia’s recognition of Taiwan.  

7.4.2.4. The Kosovo Conflict

In 1998 hostilities in Kosovo became a major source of threat for Macedonia. The events took place in a region that had long been seething with tension. Kosovo had enjoyed autonomy within Yugoslavia from 1974 until 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic, then president of Serbia, abolished this status. The Albanians, in opposing oppression of the Albanian majority, which constituted 90 per cent of the population of the province, had formed the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) under Ibrahim Rugova, its pacifist policies being endorsed by a majority of Kosovars. The aim changed, however, as the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia continued, and in 1991 Rugova declared Kosovo’s independence with himself as president. In 1997 the long-standing domination of the DLK ceased as a guerrilla group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, or UCK after its Albanian title), increased its underground activities against Serbs in Kosovo.

As the Kosovo Serb leaders in 1998 responded by escalating hostilities strongly, the situation became an issue for international organizations and leaders in the West, not least because there were now some 300,000 refugees in Kosovo, including some 50,000 that were without shelter. UN Security Council Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998 demanded that all parties cease hostilities, FRY forces withdraw and negotiations begin. International organizations should be allowed entry into Kosovo to monitor the situation and provide humanitarian relief. On 13 October 1998, preceded by NATO warnings and preparations for military attacks by air, an agreement was negotiated between US Special Emissary Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic, containing an 11-point strategy. The OSCE was to monitor compliance with Resolution 1199, supported by NATO air verification, and the elections that were to be held. Government and local police forces were to be set up, their composition reflecting that of the population. However, in spite of continued pressure, including another UN Security Council resolution, and the deployment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the situation did not improve.

International efforts intensified after the massacre of Racak in January 1999. The aim was to press the Albanians to accept negotiations for autonomy and Belgrade to persuade the Kosovo Serbs to withdraw their security forces. A number of

had already been met. In that context, there was no need to extend the mandate of the mission further. (UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate of United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 25 Feb. 1999.)

38 Ackerman, 1999, p. 128.
39 One reason for this was the sudden availability of inexpensive weapons, a consequence of the crisis in Albania in 1997 caused by the collapse of pyramid banking schemes. (Judah, 1999, pp. 11–13.)
states and institutions were very active in this. Chief among them, however, were NATO and the Contact Group, which, now, apart from France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, also included Italy. NATO increased its military presence in the Mediterranean and continued to threaten Serbia with military attacks. The Contact Group, at the same time and in cooperation with NATO, pursued the diplomatic track by calling on the two parties to initiate negotiations.

The negotiations led by the Contact Group, at Rambouillet outside Paris, were in vain. After two rounds of negotiations they ended on 18 March, a document having been signed by the Kosovo Albanians but not by the Serbian delegation – the stalemate being caused by new Serbian demands. At the same time there was a build-up of Serbian security forces inside and around Kosovo and a general worsening of the situation, as a consequence of which the OSCE verifiers had to leave Kosovo. After a last round of failed mediation, on 24 March, as threatened during the negotiations, NATO initiated air attacks against targets in Serbia. Continuing for 78 days, during which several attempts were made to solve the problem, the air attacks were finally suspended after a Military Technical Agreement was signed by NATO and the FRY commanders on 9 June 1999 and after the beginning of the implementation of one of the obligations, the withdrawal of FRY forces, had been verified. Among the other obligations were the establishment of an Air Safety Zone (ASZ), defined as the airspace above a 25-km zone, and a Ground Safety Zone (GSZ), a 5-km zone, both extending beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. Under no circumstances were any forces of the FRY or the Republic of Serbia to enter, re-enter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the two zones.

The Military Technical Agreement was followed the next day by a UN Security Council resolution welcoming the FRY’s acceptance of a political solution. The UN went on to demand the withdrawal of FRY forces and decided on the deployment in Kosovo, under UN auspices, of international civil and security presences. The task of the security presence was among other things to demilitarize the KLA. Under the mandate of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), NATO was given the task of leading the international peacekeeping mission to Kosovo, the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

45 The Military Technical Agreement was consistent with the agreement reached on 3 June between the FRY, on the one hand, and the two special envoys, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari (for the EU) and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (for Russia), on the other. (NATO, Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.)
46 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.
47 NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Relation to Kosovo’. UNMIK brought together four pillars under United Nations leadership: Pillar I, led by the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for humanitarian assistance (phased out at the end of June 2000); Pillar II, led by the UN, for civil administration; Pillar III, led by the OSCE, for democratization and institution-building; and Pillar IV, managed by the EU, for reconstruction and economic development.
Macedonia was involved in the Kosovo conflict in several ways. The Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre (KVCC) and the Extraction Force (XFOR), whose task was to help OSCE verifiers in need of emergency evacuation, were both located in Kumanovo, close to the border between Macedonia and the FRY. XFOR remained in the country during the bombings, now under the name of Enabling Forces and scheduled to become part of KFOR. During the period of the bombings the size of this force was increased continually in order to make it possible for KFOR to start its mission immediately after an agreement had been signed. During this period NATO repeatedly expressed its gratitude, while also several times asking for Macedonia’s permission to bring in new troops. As the bombing stopped, 16 000 soldiers were deployed in Macedonia and it had promised to accept a total force of 30 000. For its part Macedonia repeatedly but in vain sought closer formal relations with NATO in order to get the protection for itself that it saw as necessary. In March 1999 it asked for NATO membership, and in April the Macedonian leadership stated that they would not allow the country’s territory to be used for an invasion of Kosovo unless NATO granted Macedonia associate member status.48

Its proximity to the Kosovo conflict caused a number of problems for Macedonia. Before the NATO bombings were suspended, more than 850 000 people had fled Kosovo, some 360 000 of whom sought refuge in Macedonia. This was a huge problem as the country lacked the resources to take care of all of them and feared that there were KLA fighters among them aiming to find recruits for the war and smuggle weapons into Kosovo. In addition, the help promised by Western organizations was delayed. For Macedonia, in the situation of seeking affiliation with the Western institutions, it was difficult to voice its criticism of this too openly.49

7.4.3. The Macedonian Crisis
The Macedonian crisis is hard to demarcate in time. It involves the relations between ethnic Albanians and Slav Macedonians and is therefore of ancient origin within Macedonia. It is also related to the wars fought in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The events of Kosovo in the spring of 1999, the violence in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia and the events in Macedonia were all connected to each other.

7.4.3.1. The Presevo Valley in Focus
The increased violence by extreme Albanian groups in the Presevo Valley, on the border between Kosovo, the FRY and Macedonia, which had already started in 2000, worsened in early 2001. At the same time violence increased across a wider region, including Kosovo and Macedonia. There was no coincidence in the choice of Presevo as an arena. It had 100 000 inhabitants, around 70 000 of whom were Albanian. Memories of previous atrocities were vivid and resentment against the

49 Perry, 2000.
division of ethnic groups caused by the drawing of artificial national borders was strong among the population, and to these had been added harassment during the Kosovo bombings. Other factors were the strategic importance of the area: the road and the railway through the Presevo Valley together constituted the main communication line from Serbia to Macedonia and Greece. The valley was also situated in the future oil pipeline corridor that was being discussed at the time: it would cross the Balkan Peninsula, bringing oil from Central Asia.\textsuperscript{50}

For the first time Western institutions and the government of the FRY came to be engaged in a common effort. The FRY Government had been engaged since December 2000 in efforts to bring the Ground Safety Zone back under Serbian control. The argument was that this zone, originally designed to keep Serbs out of Kosovo, was now being used instead by ethnic-Albanian terrorists entering and damaging security in southern Serbia.\textsuperscript{51}

With Western institutions now actively dealing with the problems, the new FRY leadership in February 2001 presented a peace plan for southern Serbia, the Covic Plan, named after Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic, to which the Western institutions gave a positive response. New terrorist attacks in southern Serbia and Kosovo were followed by the FRY presenting new demands to NATO for the reduction or abolition of the Ground Safety Zone.\textsuperscript{52}

The Western institutions were also disturbed by the use of the GSZ, and started to consider a reduction. NATO’s Permanent Council on 8 March took the decision to permit a conditional and phased return of FRY forces into the GSZ under the supervision of KFOR.\textsuperscript{53} Other measures were also taken to curb the violence in the area, including in Macedonia, where it had escalated after the ratification on 2 March of the recently concluded border agreement between the FRY and Macedonia.\textsuperscript{54} In late February and March the EU and the OSCE announced increases in the number of monitors, and KFOR announced increased surveillance along the border with Serbia, and ‘robust measures’ and an increased number of troops inside Kosovo along the border with northern Macedonia. On 7 March, after a plea by Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski following an

\textsuperscript{51} AN, 4 Jan. 2001.
\textsuperscript{52} AN, 14 and 21 Feb. 2001. The peace plan contained a phased demilitarization of the region, including withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and security forces and the introduction of joint Serb and Albanian patrols instead. The Covic Plan was based on the presumption that the Presevo Valley would remain part of Serbia with no change in the borders and no autonomy. The plan also included a number of reforms aimed at ending discrimination against Albanians and a number of confidence-building measures. (See International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long Term Solution?’, 10 Aug. 2001, p. 5.) For a description of the situation in Kosovo see UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, S/2001/218, 13 Mar. 2001.
\textsuperscript{54} Ethnic Albanians on both sides of the border reacted strongly to the fact that they were not part of the negotiations. (International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion’, 5 Apr. 2001, p. 6.)
attack by Albanian guerrillas at Tanusevci on 4 March, the UN Security Council held an emergency session.\textsuperscript{55}

On 12 March 2001, a ceasefire was negotiated between the FRY Government and the Kosovo Albanians, this being a precondition set by NATO for the return of FRY forces into the GSZ. Discussions thereafter continued in order to prepare the ground for formal political negotiations. This process reached its conclusion when on 31 May FRY forces took possession of the last sector of the border between Kosovo and Serbia while KFOR forces and European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) supervisors monitored the operation. The weapons amnesty declared earlier had led to a large number of weapons being handed in to NATO.\textsuperscript{56}

7.4.3.2. Problems in Macedonia

Meanwhile, in February, problems had been worsening further west on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. Albanian extremists were now directing their attacks to the area around Tetovo.\textsuperscript{57} The Macedonian army, after an ultimatum of four days, launched an offensive, which lasted between 25 and 29 March 2001, against the rebels. The government also turned to NATO and the EU, receiving the support of both. The NATO Permanent Council on 21 March decided to send additional troops, observation missions and patrols to the border zone in Kosovo and, in order to cope with these added tasks, it endorsed the need for further troops for KFOR.\textsuperscript{58} However, as NATO underlined, Macedonia had made no request for the intervention of combat troops on its territory.\textsuperscript{59} At the same time, as part of the strategy for stabilizing Macedonia, on 9 April the EU and Macedonia signed the first Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and a Balkan country.\textsuperscript{60}

In late April, however, the situation along the border between Kosovo and Macedonia grew worse. Violence erupted first around Tetovo, after which the attacks moved to the area north of Kumanovo, close to the Presevo Valley. The violence was strongly condemned by the international community on a number of occasions. While the Macedonian Government was receiving full support, the rebel troops were declared to have no democratic legitimacy and thus no place at the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} AN, 2 and 7 Mar. 2001; OSCE, ‘The OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje’, Mission Survey (undated).
\item \textsuperscript{56} AN, 14 and 21 Mar. and 6 June 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{57} According to research by the ICG, the reason for this was that the activity on the Kosovo border had led to pressure from Macedonian and US (KFOR) forces and drawn criticism from mainstream Kosovo Albanian leaders. They therefore decided to open a new front in an area associated with the Albanian struggle for freedom and recognition. (International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion’, 5 Apr. 2001, p. 6.)
\item \textsuperscript{58} AN, 23 Mar. 2001; NATO, ‘Statement by the Secretary General of the Situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 21 Mar. 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{59} AN, 23 Mar. 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{60} AN, 11 Apr. 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{61} NATO, ‘Statement by NATO Secretary General on the Situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 3 May 2001; NATO, ‘International Concern over Violence in the Former Yugoslav
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
7.4.3.3. Coalition Government and New Problems

There was again some relief when a coalition government was formed in Macedonia by the four major parties.\(^{62}\) It was established on 13 May after seven weeks of negotiation and strong international pressure. However, a serious conflict among the parties broke out as it became known that on 22 May representatives of the two Albanian parties and the ethnic-Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) had met in the town of Prizren in Kosovo and agreed on a solution to the Macedonian problems. Their proposal was not very different from one already suggested by the special envoy of the OSCE chairman-in-office (since late March 2001), the veteran American diplomat Robert Frowick. The main problem was the secrecy of the meeting, the president and the prime minister denying all knowledge of the negotiation and accusing the Albanian parties of supporting the extremists. There were also accusations that Frowick himself had been present. The meeting, however, also reflected a general rift within the new government, since on 22 May the National Security Council had also met in Skopje without the sole Albanian adviser being invited.\(^{63}\) The crisis was defused at a meeting on 29 May of the four party leaders with President Trajkovski, at which the EU’s high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, was also present, and the Prizren document was declared to be no longer valid.\(^{64}\)

7.4.3.4. NATO Gets Involved

With continuing attacks by ethnic-Albanian guerrillas, the agreement was to no avail. As guerrilla troops approached Skopje the situation became increasingly tense. On 11 June, however, the Macedonian Government and the NLA were able to agree on a ceasefire and the following day the Macedonian Government accepted President Trajkovski’s peace plan. The plan was presented to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and Solana, who visited Skopje on 14 June and on this occasion reaffirmed their support for the Macedonian Government. The basic elements of the plan, which corresponded to a proposal made by Robertson, provided for disarmament of the guerrilla fighters under the supervision of KFOR and the EU and a resumption of the dialogue between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians. The rebels were to be given amnesty as they surrendered their weapons.


\(^{62}\) The following four parties constituted the government: the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) (these two parties having governed since 1998), and the two opposition parties since the 1998 elections – the Social Democrats (SDSM) and the main rival of the DPA among the Albanians, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP). (See International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace’, 20 June 2001, p. 7.)


\(^{64}\) AN, 1 June 2001.
On 20 June NATO declared that it was willing to send a force to supervise a voluntary weapons handover by the Albanian guerrillas. The precondition for this mission, named Essential Harvest, was that a ceasefire and a political agreement had been achieved. In order to be prepared as soon as these requirements were fulfilled, NATO agreed on a Concept of Operation and asked its military authorities to develop an Operation Plan.\textsuperscript{65} NATO, when formulating these demands and plans, was in close contact with the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and in particular with Solana.

During the following days, however, there were new outbreaks of hostilities in Macedonia and the situation grew increasingly serious. Describing the hostilities as ‘complete folly’, Robertson urged the political leaders in Skopje to ‘get serious’ about producing a political solution and focus urgently on achieving an agreement. He furthermore declared that he wanted to make it clear that NATO was not to be engaged in establishing or policing any form of partition or demarcation lines inside Macedonia. In the view of the Western institutions it was now clear that the work had to be continued on two fronts: first, stabilizing the country, with the ceasefire just achieved as the first measure and, second, working hard on the political front. There was, however, a different view on the NATO activities from the Slav Macedonian side, their opinion being that NATO should have been more active militarily against the Albanians.\textsuperscript{66}

7.4.3.5. The Crisis of Late June

Further Western attempts to improve the situation were fruitless. A ceasefire negotiated by Solana was broken by Macedonian government forces only hours after he left Skopje. On 25 June NATO made a failed attempt to reduce the tension as it organized the evacuation of rebels with their weapons from the village of Aracinovo. This village, only 10 km from Skopje, had been occupied by rebels since 9 June and attempts by the Macedonian army to recapture it had failed. The result of the NATO operation, however, was that violent protests erupted by Slav Macedonians who thought that NATO should have acted more forcefully against the Albanians. Another event on the same day contributed to the strong reactions in Skopje. As was reported the same night on several television channels and the following day in all newspapers, at the Luxembourg meeting of the EU Council, the Macedonian foreign minister had been told in blunt words that Macedonia would not receive further financial assistance as long as the money was ‘being spent to buy weapons’. The country was now on the brink of civil war.\textsuperscript{67}

In this critical situation it was underlined from NATO’s side that the evacuation of Aracinovo had been pursued with the consent and full information of the


\textsuperscript{66} NATO, ‘Statement by the Secretary General Concerning Renewed Fighting in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 22 June 2001.

The evacuation was also defended on 26 June by President Trajkovski, whereas Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski, addressing the nation on the same day, referred to EU initiatives as ‘another punishment the country must endure’. He furthermore spoke of corrupt Europeans ‘benefiting from narco-trafficking’.

The seriousness of this situation resulted in the international community taking several measures. The EU foreign ministers appointed former French Defence Minister François Léotard as their permanent representative to act under the authority of Solana, the argument being that it was impossible for Solana to be in Skopje the whole time. An American proposal, advanced by the American representative to the OSCE, was to give a stronger role to the EUMM and the OSCE in order to reassure the population. The United States also appointed a special adviser, James Pardew, to work alongside Léotard in Skopje.

7.4.3.6. The Essential Harvest Plan and New Agreements
On 29 June 2001 the Essential Harvest operational plan was formally adopted by NATO’s member states. It would involve the sending of a force to disarm the ethnic-Albanian groups and collect their weapons. It would, however, be implemented only on certain conditions. In all, NATO set four conditions: (a) a political agreement signed by the main Macedonian parliamentary leaders; (b) a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with Macedonia and agreed conditions for the Task Force; (c) an agreed plan for weapons collection, including an explicit agreement by the ethnic-Albanian armed groups to disarm; and (d) an enduring ceasefire.

These initiatives gave the impetus for further progress. On 4 July the leaders of the Macedonian parties announced that they had made an agreement to discuss a proposal for a constitutional reform – a request made by the ethnic Albanians – and on the following day the guerrillas and the Macedonian Government signed a ceasefire. On 9 July negotiations for a new constitution started, based on a proposal by Pardew and Léotard, drafted by former French minister of justice, Robert Badinter. The proposal included the use of Albanian and other minority languages at local level and in national institutions, such as the Parliament. It also included the rule of a two-thirds qualified majority when deciding in Parliament on any laws that concerned ethnic or cultural identity. The proposal did not, however, meet the Albanians’ expectations (a) that Albanian would become the second language of the republic and (b) that they would have a veto on issues of this type, rather than a two-thirds majority in Parliament being enough.

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73 AN, 6 and 11 July 2001.
7.4.3.7. The Crisis of Late July

Late July 2001 saw a worsening of the situation. The negotiations on the constitution were deadlocked and, while NLA attacks on Tetovo led to some 20,000 persons fleeing the area, the government increased its anti-Western rhetoric. Léotard and Pardew were the objects of vicious personal attacks in the newspapers and the government spokesperson, Antonio Milosiski, claimed that ‘NATO is not our enemy but is the friend of our enemy’. Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski spoke about the ‘brutal fashion’ in which Europeans and Americans behaved. According to him, the ‘so-called Western democracies’ would cause the break-up of Macedonia. NATO, he declared, was doing everything except bomb Macedonia. Georgievski in an open letter to President Trajkovski demanded that an ultimatum be given to the Albanian forces, and he was supported by people in the street who directed their feelings against the international community, attacking embassies and consulates of the EU, France, Germany, the UK and the US.

The joint response by Robertson and Solana was equally sharp. Pointing out that the international facilitators were in Skopje at the invitation of the government, which had furthermore been informed of every move made, they rejected the statements as an undignified response to international efforts to assist the country. They underlined their criticism by cancelling their planned trip to Skopje.74

The deadlock was broken by the determined approach of the Western institutions. Already on 24 July NATO officials were negotiating with the political leader of the NLA for a ceasefire.75 As the ceasefire was announced and in order to get the negotiations started, on 26 July Robertson, Solana and the OSCE chairman, the Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana, made a visit to Skopje at which they spoke to the president, the prime minister and other representatives of the coalition government as well as leaders of key political parties. At these meetings and at press conferences prior to his departure, Lord Robertson gave the message to the Macedonian actors that a political settlement was the only viable option, that no party could advance its interest through force and that the maintenance of the current ceasefire was of the utmost importance. He also urged them to consider what a tragedy it would be if Macedonia slipped into civil war and stated that the whole international community was determined not to let this happen.76

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75 Contacts had been made with the NLA already in early July after a long period of indecisiveness. While Léotard when taking up his position spoke of the need for such contacts the reaction was strong and he had to retract his statement. Shortly afterwards such contacts in the form of ‘consultations on technical issues’ were confirmed to have taken place between NATO envoy Peter Feith and the NLA. (AN, 6 July 2001.)
The result of the meeting was that the negotiations led by Léotard and Pardew were resumed and the looming civil war was avoided. This did not mean the end of atrocities: on a number of occasions hostilities took place. Still, negotiations could continue and thereby remove the last stumbling block, that of the use of the Albanian language. It was decided that Albanian would be the second official language in regions where at least 20 per cent of the population were ethnic Albanians. This meant that the Ohrid Agreement could be concluded and thereafter finally signed by the parties on 13 August 2001.\textsuperscript{77}

7.4.3.8. The Ohrid Agreement

The signing of the Ohrid Agreement did not mean that there was unanimity among people. The agreement, although finalized five days earlier, had not been signed until 13 August because skirmishes were still going on between Slav Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. After the signing, which was not televised live, the terms were withheld from the public in order not to provoke hardliners to take action against the agreement.\textsuperscript{78}

The signing of an agreement was, however, a success and a necessity if further progress was to be made. With the conclusion of this agreement the last criterion for the launching of the Essential Harvest operation, that of political agreement, had been satisfied. The NATO Council on 22 August gave its go-ahead to the deployment of this mission, which was scheduled to last for 30 days and whose prolongation would be very difficult to achieve, according to Secretary General Robertson. A total of 3500 persons from 14 NATO countries were to participate in the mission to disarm ethnic-Albanian groups and destroy their weapons.\textsuperscript{79} NATO and the ethnic-Albanian guerillas made an agreement that 3300 weapons were to be collected by NATO. This was the number that the NLA had voluntarily offered to surrender. According to Danish General Gunnar Lange, the commander of the force, the figure also corresponded to NATO’s estimates of the size of the NLA arsenal.\textsuperscript{80}

As the Ohrid Agreement was signed and the weapons collection was initiated there was no assurance that the process would continue successfully. Both the two tracks were fragile – the constitutional changes to be made by the Macedonian Government and the voluntary handover of weapons by the Albanians. The proposed changes of the constitution were still not ratified. Among other problems were the feelings of Slav Macedonians, some of whom thought that the deployment of NATO troops served Albanian interests. The problems associated with the weapon collection itself were numerous. Many thought that 3300 weapons was

\textsuperscript{77} AN, 17 Aug. 2001.
\textsuperscript{80} AN, 24 and 30 Aug. 2001.
far too low an estimate. Many also doubted that all weapons, or even the majority of them, would be voluntarily handed in by the ethnic Albanians. The time limit of 30 days was not seen as realistic.

In order to make the process of weapon collection easier for the two parties it was divided into three stages, the first one to be completed when one-third of the weapons had been handed in. Weapons collection started on 27 August and after only three days General Lange was able to report that this target had already been reached. This was the condition for the constitutional process to be initiated in the Macedonian Parliament. On 6 September the Parliament voted (by 91 to 19, giving a safe margin for the required two-thirds majority) for a constitutional change involving extended rights for the Albanian minority. Thereby the NATO mission was able to proceed to the second stage, in which the aim was to collect two-thirds of the weapons. When all weapons had been collected, which according to the plan would be before 27 September, the Parliament was to adopt the full legislative package.

In order to implement the Ohrid Agreement, François Léotard established an overall coordinating body, which included the senior representatives of NATO, the OSCE, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), the European Commission and the United States. Four working groups were formed, the division of tasks being the following: the UNHCR chaired the working group on returns of displaced persons, the European Commission chaired that on reconstruction, the OSCE chaired the working group on police and monitoring tasks, and the OSCE, together with the Council of Europe, chaired that on legislation tasks. Moreover, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) launched a campaign to raise awareness and support for the Ohrid Agreement.

Within two days after the signing of the agreement, NATO had promised to send a small force, to be deployed in conflict areas. Shortly afterwards the full deployment of 3500 soldiers (later augmented to 4500) was decided. The NATO deployment quickly improved the situation, many refugees returning to their homes.

### 7.4.3.9. Plans for the Future

During the final period of weapons collection, discussions took place on the continuation of international missions in the country. It was clear to all that some kind of presence was needed and several suggestions were being made. One proposal by Léotard was that EU troops should be sent. This idea was dismissed by the EU

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81 Robertson was among those who defended this estimate, claiming that these numbers were very close to NATO’s own estimates and that the weapons already collected by NATO should also be considered. (AN, 5 Sep. 2001.)


84 Ibid., p. 10. The briefing refers to a UNHCR source saying that almost 35,000 ethnic Albanian refugees returned between 13 August and 3 September.
foreign ministers at their meeting at Genval on the grounds that the EU Rapid Reaction Force was not yet operational.\(^{85}\)

Another proposal was launched by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, suggesting that a military presence should exist but it must not be used for drawing a line between the different ethnic groups, as this could cause a rift. The main security problems, he argued, were the return of Macedonian armed forces to Albanian regions, the return of refugees and protecting observers.

Another issue was whether an international mission should have a UN mandate. Since it would be invited by the Macedonian Government, there would not formally be any need for it. Even so, the Germans proposed a UN mandate, which the mission did in fact receive, although the UK was opposed, considering this to be adding further complication.

The conclusion of these discussions was that the EU agreed to support the German proposal for a NATO force under a UN mandate. Thereafter the EU set out to convince Macedonians, NATO and the UN Security Council to agree to this.\(^{86}\)

On 19 September President Trajkovski called on NATO to send a ‘light’ mission to Macedonia to complement a mission consisting of OSCE and EU observers. The role of the NATO force would be the protection of the observers, whose numbers were to increase.\(^{87}\) The OSCE Spillover Mission had already been increased once in September from 26 to 51 persons. It had been stated then that their role was to monitor and report regularly on the security situation, including the situation in the northern border areas, illicit arms trafficking, the humanitarian situation and any recurrence of hostilities. On 28 September the decision was taken to increase it even more, the total now reaching 210.\(^{88}\) The EU foreign ministers had agreed at their Genval meeting that the number of EUMM observers should increase as well, from 29 to 58, and that the EU representative should remain in Macedonia even after Essential Harvest was concluded.\(^{89}\)

On 26 September Essential Harvest ended, according to the original plan, after having collected close to 3900 weapons. On the same day the UN gave the mandate to NATO, which approved the operational plan for the new mission, Amber Fox, to be led by Germany. NATO was to send 700 troops, which, if thought necessary, would be strengthened with the 300 personnel remaining in Macedonia. Amber Fox was scheduled to last for three months with the option to consider a prolongation depending on the situation in the country.\(^{90}\)

This is also where this study ends. The end of September 2001 was in no way an end of the problems of Macedonia, but it was an end to the troubled period of 2001, characterized by violence and by the international community’s close

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\(^{85}\) See ‘Special Envoy Seeks EU Force for Macedonia: Plan for Troops to Follow NATO Mission’, *FT*, 6 Sep. 2001; and International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum’, 8 Sep. 2001, p. 14. The Genval meeting was what was called a ‘Gymnich meeting’, named after the place in Germany where this kind of informal meeting was first held in 1974.

\(^{86}\) *AN*, 12 Sep. 2001.

\(^{87}\) *AN*, 21 Sep. 2001.


\(^{89}\) *AN*, 12 Sep. 2001.

\(^{90}\) NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.
involvement in which a range of institutions and countries pursued various roles. As NATO had agreed to a new period of protection of monitors, and the OSCE and the EU had agreed to supply Macedonia with these monitors in increased numbers, the first period of anxiety immediately after the Ohrid Agreement was over. The development continued, with some progress and several setbacks, but the main direction was positive.

Amber Fox was extended several times, finally to end on 15 December 2002, when it was replaced by Allied Harmony, a significantly smaller mission. On 1 March 2003 the EU took over the mission, now named Concordia, thereby commanding its first peacekeeping mission.

As for the constitutional changes, the process slowed down after the events of early September, which made it impossible to call the donors’ conference for Macedonia scheduled for 15 October. Again, Robertson, Solana and Geoana had to go to Skopje. Finally, on 16 November the Macedonian Parliament passed the set of constitutional amendments that were agreed to when the Ohrid Agreement was signed. On the same day President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for the Albanian rebels, which was in line with the international requests made. These events did not lead to harmony. The Ohrid Agreement was still contested within the country, in particular by the Macedonians because of the concessions it made to the Albanian minority. Nor did these events relieve any of the tensions in relations between Macedonia and its neighbours – Greece still vetoing international acceptance of its name, Serbia denying the autonomy of its church and Bulgaria (while accepting the existence of the state) denying the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.

Still, in spite of lingering problems, the crisis of Macedonia in 2001 should be seen as having been successfully resolved with the Ohrid Agreement and the Essential Harvest mission. Events in Macedonia did not take the course they had taken in most other parts of the former Yugoslavia and the reforms carried out are likely to contribute to the avoidance of any repetition of them.

### 7.5. The Roles of International Institutions in the Macedonian Conflict

In sharp contrast to the conflict in Afghanistan, that in Macedonia was characterized by intensive cooperation between several international institutions. Here the roles of the United Nations, the OSCE, NATO and the European Union will be dealt with. The fact that the roles of these institutions differ from what they had been in the Afghanistan case, and that the WEU is no longer relevant, whereas the OSCE is now included, has much to do with the changed situation after the Cold War and the ensuing changes of the institutions. It is also related to

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91 NATO, ‘Operation Amber Fox (Task Force Fox): NATO’s Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, updated 12 Feb. 2003; NATO, ‘NATO to Continue Supporting the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 29 Nov. 2002. According to the press release: ‘It will have the capability to liaise with local authorities in the former crisis areas and will contribute to support the international monitors, while acknowledging that the local authorities have the primary responsibility in this regard.’

the inherent character of the particular crisis. These, however, are not the only explanatory factors. The countries that are members of these institutions, according to the theory used here, actively shape the roles of the institutions. The following description will take up the activities of the institutions and of their members in order to create a basis for the concluding analysis.

Apart from the bodies and institutions mentioned, a number of others were also engaged. These were, however, to a great degree humanitarian rather than political. They will therefore not be part of this study.

7.5.1. The United Nations

7.5.1.1. The General Role of the United Nations

It was mainly the difference in situation that made the role of the United Nations in the case of Macedonia different from its role in Afghanistan. The latter involved a direct attack on a member state and action therefore came under Chapter VII, Article 51 of the UN Charter. The case of Macedonia concerned the task, described in the Preamble of the Charter, ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. To this end member states are to ‘take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace’.

The UN became involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia from an early stage, assuming different types of role depending on the areas involved. Peacekeeping missions such as UNPROFOR, UNMIK and UNPREDEP all differed.

As compared to other missions in the former Yugoslavia, the UN role in Macedonia was less prominent. It was primarily support of other organizations with more specific tasks. Secretary-General Kofi Annan spoke of the UN as supporting the EU and NATO, which remained in the lead, and exploring areas where the United Nations might be of assistance.

UN involvement took two different forms. One was connected to the unique role of the UN in the creation and preservation of peace and stability in the world. The other was its particular role in the area, in which the UNMIK mission in Kosovo was important. Under its leadership a United Nations unit dealing with civil administration, an OSCE unit for institution-building and an EU unit for reconstruction were organized. Moreover, KFOR, under a UN mandate, had the responsibility to deter renewed hostilities, establish a secure environment, demilitarize the KLA, support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with, as well as support, the international civilian presence of UNMIK. The situation in Kosovo was made worse by the problems of Macedonia, and vice versa, and the many UN Security Council meetings in which UNMIK was evaluated.

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93 UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1.
94 On the variety of types of peacekeeping missions, see Mingst and Karns, 1995, pp. 68–76.
therefore tended to concern Macedonia as well and the effects of the Macedonian crisis on the situation in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{97}

The UN’s role in conflict prevention is not precisely defined in the Charter. Kofi Annan’s initiative aiming at a more active conflict prevention policy was widely supported by the members.\textsuperscript{98} These views concerned future changes and they cannot be considered to reflect cooperation during 2001. They were still important, however, since the debate and the willingness to include the UN in the framework of cooperation already existed.

\textbf{7.5.1.2. The Roles and Activities of UN Bodies}

\textit{The Security Council}

During the spring of 2001, the Macedonian Government turned to the UN Security Council on a number of occasions as the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{99} The activities of the president and the foreign minister demonstrated a strong wish for a substantial international military commitment, including a stronger UN role. The Security Council, however, consistently sought to avoid bringing in military means that might make peace enforcement operations necessary. Instead the UN’s aim was to prevent, primarily through KFOR, extremist elements and their weapons from crossing the border into Macedonia (and southern Serbia) and to encourage Macedonia to create a stable multi-ethnic society within its borders.

In a number of statements following the UN Security Council meeting of 19 December 2000, as well as those of 7 and 16 March 2001, the Security Council strongly condemned the violence by the Albanian extremists. While the meeting in December 2000 concerned the violence in the Presevo Valley, the Security Council calling for it to cease, that of 7 March 2001 was an emergency session, following immediately after the incidents at Tanusevci. The Macedonian Government, which had requested this meeting, sought increased protection of the Kosovo–Macedonian border, asking for the support of KFOR in this. The meeting on 16 March, which dealt primarily with Kosovo, concerned Macedonia as well after pleas by President Trajkovski to the Security Council to follow developments along the border between Kosovo and Macedonia closely and be ready to act.\textsuperscript{100}


\textsuperscript{99} As stated in the UN Charter (Chapter 6, Article 34) the Security Council ‘may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’. Furthermore, according to Article 35, any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

At its 21 March 2001 meeting, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1345, which thereafter became a reference point in the further discussions. Like the earlier statements, this resolution strongly condemned extremist violence, including terrorist activities in certain parts of Macedonia and southern Serbia, noting that these had the support of ethnic-Albanian extremists outside these areas. It also reaffirmed the commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and Macedonia, and welcomed the steps taken by Macedonia to consolidate a multi-ethnic society within its borders and by the FRY to resolve the crisis in southern Serbia peacefully. It demanded that all those who were engaged in armed action against the authorities of those states immediately cease all such action, lay down their weapons and return to their homes. It called on Albanian leaders to condemn violence and ethnic intolerance. Finally it welcomed the efforts by UNMIK, KFOR, the EU, NATO and the OSCE to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area.\textsuperscript{101}

As the long negotiations ended on 13 August 2001 with the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, the Security Council welcomed the agreement and called for its implementation. It also called for the implementation of Resolution 1345 and asked all concerned, including the Albanian communities, to condemn violence and use their influence to secure peace. Welcoming the efforts of the EU, the OSCE and NATO in supporting the Ohrid Agreement, the UN called on the international community to consider how best to assist Macedonia in implementing it.\textsuperscript{102}

Finally, as a result of intense discussion among the states and institutions involved in the Macedonian crisis management, the decision had been made to deploy another NATO mission, Amber Fox, to protect the EU and OSCE monitors, and to seek a UN mandate for this mission. In Resolution 1371, unanimously adopted on 26 September 2001, the Security Council demonstrated its intention to continue to monitor the situation in Macedonia. While endorsing all the efforts made by the international institutions and member states involved to support the implementation of the framework, it strongly supported the establish-
ment of a multinational presence in the country to help protect the security of the observers.\textsuperscript{103}

\textit{The General Assembly}

The Security Council was not the only UN body to be involved in the efforts to come to terms with the Macedonia crisis. The General Assembly, although only to a limited degree, brought up the Balkan problems, including Macedonia, for discussion. However, as the Security Council was dealing with the issue of Macedonia and had the primary UN responsibility for threats to peace and stability, the General Assembly became of secondary interest. In contrast to its position during the Afghanistan crisis, the Security Council was not hampered by a Soviet veto, so that the role the General Assembly had had in 1980 – serving as a forum for condemnation of activities – was not needed.

\textit{The Secretary-General}

Of more importance were the activities of the secretary-general. During the Macedonia crisis he was closely involved in the intensive pattern of cooperation, including the EU, NATO and the OSCE, as well as individual Western countries and actors in the area. In separate meetings he held discussions with the foreign ministers and prime ministers/presidents of the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as a range of other countries.

The work of Kofi Annan reflected the role of the UN in seeking to prevent the conflict becoming worse and at the same time being involved in peace-building – all these activities in cooperation with other institutions and countries.\textsuperscript{104} The aim, as Annan viewed it, was to see the territorial integrity and unity of Macedonia respected but at the same time to handle the crisis in a manner that would not lead to a new outflow of refugees or exacerbate the situation. Like others he also emphasized that the problems could not be solved with military means.\textsuperscript{105} Like the Security Council, he appealed to the extremists to stop fighting and to the Macedonian Government to continue to show restraint. Personally or through his Balkans representative, Carl Bildt, Annan participated in a number of meetings, seeking to coordinate the response to the crisis.


\textsuperscript{104} The Charter gives the Secretary-General an essential role in peace-building. As expressed by the Security Council, this relates in particular to the establishment of strategies in this field and their implementation. See UN Security Council, 4278th meeting, S/PV.4278, 20 Feb. 2001.

7.5.2. The OSCE

7.5.2.1. The General Role of the OSCE

The OSCE, like the United Nations, acquired a new role in the new Europe, its tasks largely focusing on seeking stability through early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

The variety of the OSCE’s functions was evident in connection with the crisis in Macedonia. The previous survey of events has mentioned the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, which gave early warning by monitoring developments along the borders with Serbia and Albania. Early warning is also one of the main tasks of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).\(^{106}\) The HCNM has the responsibility to provide early warning and, as appropriate, take action at the earliest possible stage in cases of tensions involving national minority issues that have a potential to develop into a conflict.\(^{107}\) In Macedonia work included efforts to create an ethnically joint police training and higher education for the Albanian community.\(^{108}\)

For the OSCE, as for the UN, a distinction can be made between, on the one hand, conflict prevention in the sense of coming to terms with acute threats and, on the other, peace-building in terms of creating long-term stability. Since this study concerns activities designed to alleviate immediate threats, only the former will be considered here.\(^{109}\)

7.5.2.2. The Roles and Activities of OSCE Bodies

During 2001 the OSCE made great efforts to alleviate the Macedonian crisis. Below, these efforts in terms of decision-making and activities will be described, particularly in the OSCE’s two principal bodies.\(^{110}\)

The annually rotating chairmanship, the OSCE’s main executive body, was held in 2001 by Romania and supported by a Troika (of the previous, current and next chairs – in 2001 composed of Romania, Austria and Portugal), as well as by the special representatives of the chairman-in-office (CiO).

The highest decision-making body, the Summit, and the Ministerial Council (composed of the foreign ministers of member states and taking place once a year), held no meetings during the period being studied. Instead, as in the NATO structure, the Permanent Council was the primary decision-making body.

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\(^{106}\) This position was held by Max van der Stoel between 1993 and 1 July 2001, and thereafter by Rolf Ekéus.


\(^{108}\) See, for example, ‘South East European University Opens in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, OSCE Newsletter, vol. 8, no. 10, Nov./Dec. 2001.

\(^{109}\) This also means that the links between the OSCE activities in Kosovo and the Macedonian crisis will not be included. The reason is that, in contrast to the United Nations, the OSCE activities in Kosovo had shifted to emphasize long-term sustainability. See OSCE, Secretary General, Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities (1 Nov. 2000–31 Oct. 2001), pp. 26–31.

\(^{110}\) A number of OSCE bodies are excluded from this study either for the reason that they are not crucial in the decision-making or acting process or because they work with long-term issues rather than with immediate threats.
A third body, the OSCE Secretariat, has a supporting role. During this period it was in a phase of adding new and important capabilities in terms of conflict prevention, early warning and crisis management, but these were not prominent in the Macedonian crisis.  

The Chairmanship

During 2001 Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana as CiO was responsible overall for executive action. In reacting to the events in Presevo and Macedonia, his messages were very similar in tone and content to those of the United Nations. Geoana condemned the hostilities as they arose and urged those responsible for them in strong terms to stop. Likewise, he declared that the OSCE supported the unity and territorial integrity of Macedonia and praised the Macedonian Government for its restraint.

During the early phase of the Macedonian crisis the Troika held a number of meetings, directing statements and action at the belligerents and the Macedonian authorities, and calling for meetings of the Permanent Council. As the CiO explained, the OSCE’s activities in Macedonia involved a certain division of labour: the HCNM pursued the inter-ethnic aspects while the head of the Spill-over Mission to Skopje concentrated on the border crisis, and the personal representative of the CiO engaged the OSCE in coordinated effort alongside the other international organizations present in the area.

One theme of the chairmanship was to argue for more coordination and cooperation among the international organizations. Geoana, when making his case to other institutions and bodies, cited the flexibility of the OSCE and the variety of its tasks. Meetings with the UN Security Council and Kofi Annan took place in January and February 2001 and Geoana presented detailed proposals for such improvements.

Geoana, however, just like the representatives of the United Nations, was clear that the EU and NATO were the main actors in this crisis. As he put it, ‘The EU has taken the leading role in promoting the political dialogue. We applaud the dedicated efforts of Javier Solana and Lord Robertson and their teams. NATO is...

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111 The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) is responsible for the implementation of tasks within the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, as well as for daily follow-up and liaison with regard to the OSCE’s decisions. The Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT), which became operational in April 2001, consisted of a pool of experts from member states, supplying various types of expertise useful for the areas in which the OSCE acted. (OSCE, Decision No. 364, Strengthening of OSCE Operational Capacities (REACT, Operation Centre, Restructuring of the OSCE Secretariat), 29 June 2001.)


ready to implement the demilitarisation phase of President Trajkovski’s plan. The OSCE is standing by to offer its own unique capabilities and skills.\footnote{OSCE, Parliamentary Assembly, 10th Annual Meeting, ‘Statement by H.E. Mr Mircea Geoana, Romanian Foreign Minister, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE’, Paris, 6 July 2001.}

As the early efforts of the OSCE and others were to no avail, work intensified, Geoana announcing on 21 March his intention to appoint Ambassador Robert Frowick as his personal representative with the instruction to develop a concept for coherent action by the OSCE in Macedonia.\footnote{OSCE, ‘Need for Intensified Political Dialogue in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 30 Mar. 2001.} The contested role of Frowick in connection with the Prizren meeting (see section 7.4.3.3) between the two Albanian parties and the guerrillas caused increased tension in Macedonia and led to distrust of the OSCE on the part of the Slav Macedonians. Pictures in Macedonian newspapers featured OSCE vehicles and personnel standing beside them involved in conversation with guerrilla fighters. The OSCE described the pictures as forgeries and Frowick himself declared that at no time had he been in direct contact with NLA representatives. The result, nevertheless, was that he left Macedonia.\footnote{OSCE, ‘Chairman-in-Office Condemns Extremist Violence in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 25 May 2001; OSCE, ‘Skopje Mission Speaks Out Against “Patently False and Potentially Dangerous” Media Reporting’, 25 May 2001; OSCE, ‘Chairman-in-Office Meets with Personal Representative Frowick’, 26 May 2001. Reports on Frowick’s direct contacts with the Albanian guerrillas had already been published before the Prizren meeting, with the comment that this was at odds with unequivocal official Western support for the Macedonian Government’s backing for negotiations with the rebels. (Reuters, 18 May 2001.)}

In Western Europe newspapers gave their views of the incident and of Frowick’s role in the OSCE. While one newspaper claimed that Frowick in reality was the special representative of Washington only,\footnote{NZZ, 26 May 2001.} several commented that the consequence of the Macedonians’ vehement reaction was that the EU, NATO and even the OSCE itself had distanced themselves from him.\footnote{FAZ, 28 May 2001; Gna., 29 May 2001.} Another comment concerned the fact that few people within the OSCE had apparently been informed about his activities.\footnote{NZZ, 26 May 2001; FT, 25 May 2001.} The CiO as of 1 July gave the position of special representative to Max van der Stoel, who had just retired from the position of HCNM.\footnote{OSCE, ‘Van der Stoel Appointed Personal Envoy of Chairman-in-Office’, 29 June 2001.}

\textit{The Permanent Council}

The Permanent Council, the body for dealing with political consultation and decision-making, meeting regularly once a week, was much occupied with the Macedonian crisis. Its members, the permanent representatives of the OSCE member states, like the UN Security Council, took their decisions in unanimity. The statements of the two councils were identical in the opinions presented and the decisions were highly complementary.
During 2001 two special sessions were held, on 6 March and 30 March, to discuss the problems of Macedonia. At the 6 March session the Permanent Council expressed its deep concern over the violence, condemning the actions. Praising the Macedonian authorities for their restraint, the Council stated its support of Macedonia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the inviolability of its borders. It also welcomed the cooperation between the Macedonian authorities, NATO, KFOR and the international community. Finally, it instructed the OSCE Spillover Mission to develop the monitoring activities of its mandate and to keep in contact with the Macedonian authorities in order to contribute to the normalization of the country.\footnote{OSCE, ‘OSCE: Violence Escalating Tension in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 6 Mar. 2001.}

In response to the continued violence, the Permanent Council extended the capacity of the Spillover Mission. On 22 March its size was increased from eight persons to 16. The additional staff persons were to work particularly in the border area, with a view to strengthening the mission’s capabilities to monitor and report developments there.\footnote{OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision no. 405, Temporary Strengthening of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, 22 Mar. 2001.} On 7 June it was again extended because of an upsurge of violence, now to 26 persons.

With the Ohrid Agreement the mandate of the OSCE Spillover Mission became more precise and related to the new situation. The violence was now less, although it was not over. To fulfil its mandate, the mission was increased to 51 persons on 6 September. Another addition, to 210, was made on 28 September.\footnote{They will monitor and report regularly on the security situation in the host State, including: the situation in the northern border areas including illicit arms trafficking; the humanitarian situation, including the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and trafficking in human beings; the situation in sensitive places with communities not in the majority; and cases of incidents and recurrence of hostilities. They will not monitor the arms collection process or conduct operations aimed exclusively at observing compliance with the ceasefire. The increase in size decided on 28 Sep. 2001 included 72 confidence-building monitors, 60 police advisers, 17 police trainers and 10 administrative staff, totalling 210 persons. The role of the police advisers was to assist in ensuring a phased redeployment by the national police. The police trainers were to assist in the implementation of the Policy Academy project. (OSCE, ‘The OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje’, Mission Survey (undated).)}

7.5.3. NATO

7.5.3.1. The General Role of NATO

NATO was the dominant institution in European security during the Cold War and remained so. Its transformation from a body dealing almost entirely with territorial defence to an institution for which crisis management and the creation of stability became the principal tasks was also the transformation of European security.

NATO’s important role in the Macedonian crisis was related to its new and evolving crisis management capabilities. At the same time, its military structure, acquired over decades, was also an important asset for these tasks. Finally, the fact that the US was among its members was of such importance that it more than anything else defined the institution.

\footnote{OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision no. 405, Temporary Strengthening of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, 22 Mar. 2001.}
In contrast to the early illusions, European crisis management had turned out to be militarily more demanding than first imagined. Not only was there therefore unanimity in Europe in 2001 about the need to keep NATO and the US involved in the future. Plans for achieving an agreement with the US on the terms under which the EU would be able to use NATO resources in operations where NATO as a whole was not engaged had been ongoing for several years but were deadlocked during 2001 because of the conflict between Greece and Turkey.\(^{125}\)

NATO had several, quite different, roles in the Macedonian crisis. First, as described above, it was one of the signatories of the Military Technical Agreement of June 1999 and therefore empowered to make changes to the GSZ. Second, through KFOR, NATO worked under the UN in Kosovo with tasks such as demilitarizing the KLA and seeking to deter fresh hostilities. In relation to Macedonia, a primary task for KFOR was to seek to prevent the passage of extremists and arms and other forms of trafficking across the border. Third, other efforts concerned conflict prevention in Macedonia, in particular together with the EU. Finally, after the Ohrid Agreement, NATO was first tasked, in the Essential Harvest mission, at the request of the Macedonian Government, with collecting the guerrillas’ weapons and, thereafter, in the Amber Fox mission, under the UN, with leading a peacekeeping mission to the country.

7.5.3.2. The Roles and Activities of NATO Bodies

**The North Atlantic Council**

The NATO structure of 2001 was identical to that of 1980: the North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body, meeting at least once a week on the level of ambassadors (the permanent representatives). Whether it meets on ambassadorial level or on the level of foreign ministers or heads of state or government, its decisions have the same validity.

The violence in the Presevo Valley was a matter for NATO from an early stage. On 27 February 2001 it was dealt with at an extraordinary meeting at the level of foreign ministers, called in order to take advantage of Colin Powell’s visit to Europe, his first to the NAC as secretary of state. At the press conference after the discussions, which among other things had dealt with possible changes to the GSZ, Lord Robertson, NATO secretary general, stated that details of this were still being worked out.\(^ {126}\) The issue was followed up at the NAC meeting on 8 March 2001, at which, as described earlier, the decision was taken to permit a conditional and phased return of FRY forces into the GSZ under the supervision of KFOR. The first step in this would be taken immediately and further controlled return should continue in defined sectors subject to approval by the North

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\(^{125}\) The problem was not solved until the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in December 2002. Shortly afterwards the agreement was signed. See NATO, ‘EU–NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 Dec. 2002’.

Atlantic Council. On the following day the NAC met the foreign minister of Macedonia, Srgjan Kerim, to discuss coordinated approaches regarding the ongoing violence along the border.  

The last stage of the return to the Ground Safety Zone was preceded in April by some problems related to certain of the criteria not having been fulfilled. On 25 April, Nebojsa Covic met the NAC for what was called ‘a frank and open exchange on the situation in Southern Serbia’. On 13 May Covic in a letter to NATO highlighted the measures that had been taken since then, which led the following day to the decision by the NAC to authorize the commander of KFOR to allow the return of FRY and Serbian forces into the last section of the GSZ.

The increased violence that took place in Macedonia during March was met by a number of measures. On 21 March 2001 the NAC decided to send more KFOR troops to the border area and asked contributing countries to send more troops. Furthermore, a new senior representative, Ambassador Hans-Jörg Eiff, was sent to support the existing NATO liaison officer based in Skopje, and a military liaison team was established, run by a senior NATO military officer and based in the Ministry of Defence in Skopje.

A series of high-level meetings in late May and June concerned the Macedonian crisis only partly. The fruitful cooperation between NATO and the EU was highlighted at the joint NAC–General Affairs Council (GAC) meeting in Budapest on 30 May 2001, the first formal meeting ever between the two. On this occasion the foreign ministers took stock of the situation, welcoming the peaceful development in the Presevo Valley but noting that both parties still needed to implement the decision on a joint Serb–Albanian police force. Again, the continued commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia was reaffirmed. The less successful efforts were also considered as the EU and NATO agreed that the Prizren agreement was no longer relevant, the ministers reaffirming that the international community would work only with the legitimate political representatives and not with armed extremists or their representatives.

The NAC met again on 7 June 2001, now at the traditional half-yearly meeting at the level of defence ministers, and at a special meeting at the level of heads of state
and government on 13 June 2001. Both these meetings dealt with the Balkans, including Macedonia, in an atmosphere of cohesion and unanimity, the statements produced being largely in agreement with those of the Budapest meeting.\(^{132}\)

A new role again was initiated for NATO when on 20 June the NAC, responding to a request from President Trajkovski, promised to assist Macedonia in demilitarizing the NLA and disarming the extremists. NATO’s condition for this was a successful outcome of a political dialogue between the parties and the implementation of a ceasefire. The operation plan for Essential Harvest, drawn up by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and approved by the Military Committee, was finally approved on 29 June.\(^{133}\)

Interrupted by outbreaks of violence, and with constant attention, support and cajoling by NATO and other bodies, the process continued. On 15 August, two days after the Ohrid Agreement, the NAC authorized the deployment of a headquarters for Essential Harvest. On 22 August, finally, the NAC took the decision to ask the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Joseph Ralston, to issue the Activation Order for Operation Essential Harvest.\(^{134}\)

The Secretary General

Lord Robertson as secretary general of NATO, and therefore chair of the NAC, worked intensively on the Macedonian crisis. While KFOR sought to cut off the supplies of arms from Kosovo, Lord Robertson’s continuous message to the Albanian extremists was that a political solution had to be found and that violence would not lead to borders being changed. At the same time the Macedonian Government received constant reminders of the need to seek dialogue, improve conditions for the Albanian community and moderate its military action.\(^{135}\)

The outbursts of violence and political crises in Macedonia led to NATO intensifying its activities. Fact-finding teams were sent to investigate the situation and Robertson on several occasions strengthened his contacts with the government by sending NATO representatives to work in Skopje. Working in close cooperation with Javier Solana, he visited Skopje with Solana on a number of occasions with the aim of avoiding escalation of the conflict or the suspension of negotiations, or seeking a resumption of interrupted negotiations.\(^{136}\)

On many occasions very frank exchanges and sharply formulated speeches were used to try to influence actors. Expressions like ‘cowardly acts of extremists’ were used to condemn the violence of Albanian extremists, but the Macedonian


\(^{135}\) NATO, ‘Press Point by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, and the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Dr Srgjan Kerim’, 19 Mar. 2001.

Government was also criticized sharply at times, not least in the troubled weeks in late July, when Prime Minister Georgievski’s statement criticizing the EU and NATO was called ‘undignified’. Robertson also criticized the slow progress towards constitutional changes.\(^{137}\)

### 7.5.4. The European Union

#### 7.5.4.1. The General Role of the European Union

The European Union in 2001 was better equipped to deal with crises than the EC of 1980. As described at the beginning of this chapter, as the members of the EU faced the crises in the Presevo Valley and Macedonia, several new organs had just started to work, and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) headed by the high representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, had been in post since 1999. The inclusion of these new capabilities gave the EU increased possibilities for continuity and quick reaction to crises, in addition to those of the Presidency of the Council, which as of 1 January was held by Sweden, succeeded by Belgium on 1 July.

As the survey of events above shows, the EU had acted since 1991 through the ECMM, later the EUMM. Like the OSCE Spillover Monitoring Mission, the EUMM gave early warning of coming violence.

The traditional role of the EU remained, however. One of the essential means by which it sought to influence the behaviour of the actors in Macedonia was the economic means. Large sums were given as aid in a variety of fields. A particularly important role was played by the SAA, which was seen as the first step towards EU membership and was signed by Macedonia – the first Balkan country to achieve an SAA – on 9 April. As the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, underlined at the signing ceremony for the SAA, the agreement meant that Macedonia now had the possibility to trade on preferential terms with the EU but also that it would be expected to open up its own markets. Furthermore it would have to reinforce its institutions, strengthen efforts in the field of asylum and migration, and step up the fight against illegal activities such as trafficking and smuggling. Last but not least, she said, the Macedonians were expected to establish full respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in order to consolidate a truly multi-ethnic society.\(^{138}\)

Another example of this EU policy was seen in the troubled period of late June, following the events at Aracinovo, when the EU Troika met the Macedonian Foreign Minister, Ilinka Mitreva, telling her that no additional aid would be given

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to Macedonia before a political settlement was reached.\textsuperscript{139} The same condition was also set after the Ohrid Agreement in early September when Javier Solana and the EU Commissioner of External Affairs, Chris Patten, on a visit to Skopje, reminded the Macedonians that aid would not be available until after the peace agreement was implemented, at least the vote on reforms in Parliament.\textsuperscript{140}

7.5.4.2. The Roles and Activities of EU Bodies

The Presidency

Comparing with the previous structure of the EC/EU and the role it played in the earlier case study, it is clear that the new institution of a high representative for the CFSP, while strengthening the EU as such, led to a weakening of the Presidency. The Presidency has some particular roles, however, one of which is to organize and carry out the daily business of the Union for six months, including setting up meetings and drafting the agendas. The Presidency must also coordinate the views of member states in order to reach common positions and at the same time move the issues on the EU agenda forward. Two specific tasks are to represent the Union in the UN and the OSCE.

Part of the Presidency’s work within the CFSP is to be involved also in the immediate problem-solving activities and in the ministerial Troika, as well as in direct cooperation with Solana and Patten. Furthermore, the Presidency representative leads the work of the PSC.\textsuperscript{141}

During the Swedish Presidency, Anna Lindh became directly involved in the problem-solving related to Macedonia, partly through work within the GAC but also as part of the ministerial Troika, with which she visited the FRY and Macedonia a number of times. Since the Swedish Presidency ended at a time when the problems were still great, the Belgians were preoccupied with a different set of problems after the Ohrid Agreement of 13 August.

The European Council and the Council of the European Union

A large number of meetings dealt with the Macedonian crisis. This survey shows the constant attention devoted to it, as well as the interrelations between the institutions involved.

The EU’s major decision-making forum, the European Council, held two meetings during the period under study, the first in Stockholm on 23–24 March and the second in Göteborg on 15–16 June. Both addressed the conflict in Macedonia. In addition, several EU Council meetings in the form of GAC meetings brought up various aspects of the crises.

The GAC meetings of 22–23 January and 26–27 February 2001 were both dominated by the problems of the Presevo Valley. At both the Council expressed its concern at the level of tension and violence, and condemned the actions in the Presevo Valley, as well as the increasing number of incidents in Macedonia. It also

\textsuperscript{139} AN, 27 June 2001.
\textsuperscript{140} Europe, 6 Sep. 2001.
\textsuperscript{141} See the subsection on the new EU bodies below.
supported the initiatives of the Belgrade government to find a solution to the situation in southern Serbia. At the February meeting it took the decision to increase the number of EUMM monitors to 30, provided their security was assured.\footnote{EU, Council, 2327th Council meeting – General Affairs – Brussels, 22–23 Jan. 2001; EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Conclusions from General Affairs Council, 26 Feb. 2001’.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Council Conclusions: General Affairs Council, 9 Apr. 2001’. However, not all opposition parties present. The Albanian PDP refused to attend.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Conclusions from General Affairs Brussels, 14/15 May 2001’.

The subsequent meetings followed a similar pattern of welcoming some progress while condemning continued violence. At the \textit{GAC of 19–20 March 2001}, the Council welcomed the ceasefire of 12 March in southern Serbia and the assurances given by NATO regarding security arrangements for EUMM personnel.\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Conclusions from General Affairs Brussels, 14/15 May 2001’.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Council Conclusions: General Affairs Council, 9 Apr. 2001’. However, not all opposition parties present. The Albanian PDP refused to attend.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Conclusions from General Affairs Brussels, 14/15 May 2001’.

At the \textit{European Council meeting on 23–24 March 2001} in Stockholm, President Trajkovski was present. After the meeting with him the European Council issued a declaration in which it referred to its close coordination with NATO and welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 1345. The European Council assured the president and the Macedonian Government of the EU’s support for Macedonia’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders, also again asking the ethnic-Albanian community to remain committed to a democratic process and the renunciation of violence. The EU furthermore declared that it would augment its assistance to Macedonia within the already existing framework of civilian aid from 25 to 40 million euros.\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Declaration after Meeting with the FYROM President’, 24 Mar 2001; EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Summary of the Conclusions of the EU Summit in Stockholm’, 24 Mar. 2001.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Council Conclusions: General Affairs Council, 9 Apr. 2001’. However, not all opposition parties present. The Albanian PDP refused to attend.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Conclusions from General Affairs Brussels, 14/15 May 2001’.

The \textit{GAC meeting of 9–10 April 2001} took place at the same time as the signing of the SAA between the EU and Macedonia. As this was also a period of relative calm in Macedonia, positive expectations were reflected in the statement by the Council afterwards. Other positive elements mentioned were President Trajkovski’s initiative to establish an institutional mechanism for enhanced dialogue in Macedonia and the fact that a wide range of political forces were present at the signing of the agreement.\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Declaration after Meeting with the FYROM President’, 24 Mar 2001; EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Summary of the Conclusions of the EU Summit in Stockholm’, 24 Mar. 2001.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Council Conclusions: General Affairs Council, 9 Apr. 2001’. However, not all opposition parties present. The Albanian PDP refused to attend.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Conclusions from General Affairs Brussels, 14/15 May 2001’.

Again, at the meeting of the \textit{GAC on 14–15 May 2001} the situation was positive in Macedonia, the new coalition government having been formed a few days earlier. The EU promised to support this process through an immediate visit by the Troika and the continued personal involvement of Javier Solana. The violence of late April did, however, also influence the meeting; it declared the actions to be utterly unacceptable.\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Declaration after Meeting with the FYROM President’, 24 Mar 2001; EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Summary of the Conclusions of the EU Summit in Stockholm’, 24 Mar. 2001.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Council Conclusions: General Affairs Council, 9 Apr. 2001’. However, not all opposition parties present. The Albanian PDP refused to attend.
\footnote{EU, Swedish Presidency, ‘Conclusions from General Affairs Brussels, 14/15 May 2001’.

The joint EU–NATO (GAC–NAC) meeting in Budapest on \textit{30 May 2001} (see section \ref{sec:7.5.3.2}) again demonstrated the strength of the newly forged ties between the two.

The GAC meeting on \textit{11–12 June 2001} again took place in the midst of problems in Macedonia, with continued terrorist actions, but the peace plan presented by President Trajkovski (see section \ref{sec:7.4.3.4}) presented what the Council saw as a
constructive approach and it encouraged the authorities to start to implement it as soon as possible. In contrast to the developments in Macedonia, the situation in southern Serbia had improved and the Council therefore welcomed the unilateral demobilization of the Albanian armed groups and the peaceful completion of the entry of FRY security forces into the Ground Safety Zone, for which the roles played by the EU, NATO and the OSCE were seen as important.\textsuperscript{147}

At the \textit{European Council meeting on 15–16 June 2001} in Göteborg, the need for a political solution was reaffirmed. The European Council urged the Macedonian Government to make tangible progress on opening a genuine dialogue and called on all democratic forces in the region to unite against extremism. Commending NATO and the US for their good cooperation and Solana for his decisive action in the current crisis, the European Council decided to appoint, for a limited time, a representative of the EU who was to act under Solana’s authority, and declared that the EU would continue to act in close cooperation with NATO.\textsuperscript{148}

At the \textit{GAC meeting of 25–26 June 2001}, the tense situation in Macedonia was reflected in the declaration issued. The EU declared that the political leaders had a heavy responsibility to act in order to prevent further violence. The EU would itself continue to contribute to a political solution to the crisis in close cooperation with NATO and other bodies. As a further step towards this the appointment of François Léotard as the EU representative was announced.\textsuperscript{149}

At the \textit{GAC on 16 July 2001}, the first under the Belgian Presidency, the Council was able to welcome the start of the political dialogue between the leaders of the main political parties in Macedonia on the basis of the framework document submitted to President Boris Trajkovski by François Léotard and James Pardew. The Council called on all parties to observe the ceasefire in force and welcomed the role played by the EUMM.\textsuperscript{150}

At the Genval meeting \textit{8–9 September 2001} (see section 7.4.3.9) the foreign ministers discussed the future of their involvement in Macedonia. The result was the decision that the EU was not yet ripe to undertake missions on its own. This issue would enter the agenda again during the autumn, but for some time the 11 September attacks on the United States dominated the meetings instead.

The \textit{New Bodies}

The institutional structure decided at previous European Council meetings took form during the first half of 2001. At the GAC meeting of 22–23 January it was decided to transform the interim PSC into a permanent committee with effect from the date the decision was adopted. The decisions were also taken to transform the two interim military bodies – a Military Committee (MC) and a Military Staff (MS) – to become permanent committees as soon as their structures were complete, which was expected to be in June at the latest. At the same meeting the


Council also confirmed that meetings between the NAC and the PSC were to be held not less than three times and EU/NATO Council meetings not less than once during each EU presidency. Additional meetings could be requested by either body.  

The High Representative for the CFSP

The position of high representative for the CFSP and the PPEWU, later called the Policy Unit, established in October 1999, were new to the EU, and Javier Solana was the first person to hold this position. It was actually a double role since the high representative was also secretary general of the Council – a role that was wider in that it also encompassed tasks that were outside the CFSP. Another possible role envisaged was that of chairing the PSC in crisis situations.

Like Lord Robertson, Javier Solana engaged himself on a daily basis in the Macedonian problems, travelling to this and other areas, on his own, together with Robertson, and at times with the ministerial Troika or in other constellations. Like his NATO counterpart he was engaged in a number of roles depending on the situation in Macedonia, condemning the violence, negotiating with the parties and arguing with the actors in the area in order to bring them back to the negotiating table. The task was frustrating, and ceasefires were constantly broken, on one occasion only hours after he had negotiated it.

The establishment of the position of François Léotard as a Special Envoy under the high representative was a French idea, for which German support had first been rallied. The argument that Solana needed support was strong, not least since he had at the time become even more engaged in the problems of the Middle East. The fact that France had to carry the costs of this position indicates, however, that other countries may have seen it as less crucial than France did.

7.5.5. Linkages Among Institutions

The Macedonian crisis of 2001 is a striking contrast to that which followed the invasion of Afghanistan in the degree of cooperation that took place among the institutions and the way in which institutions sought cooperation with others. Cooperation was sometimes formal and long-term, and sometimes it took the form of ad hoc meetings where members came together to solve the problems of Macedonia jointly. Between these two extremes there was a variety of combinations.

The problems of Macedonia were closely connected to the areas surrounding the country and interwoven with those of Kosovo and southern Serbia. It was therefore natural that cooperation patterns would also be similar to those in the other areas.

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7.5.5.1. The Kosovo Connection

As described above, the Kosovo conflict had resulted in a complicated peacetime cooperation pattern in which the civilian administration of the province was organized under the leadership of UNMIK, and KFOR, the OSCE and the EU had complementary roles.

The most prominent connection between Kosovo and the efforts to come to grips with the Macedonian crisis was the efforts by UNMIK and NATO to prevent Kosovo from being used as a staging area or sanctuary for Albanian extremists and to keep control over a long border in order to prevent armed groups and weapons crossing to Macedonia.

UNMIK Regulation 2001/10, which entered into force on 4 June 2001, prohibited unauthorized border/boundary crossings. KFOR's role was to detain individuals, and in cases where there was sufficient evidence of criminal activity the task of UNMIK was to investigate those cases and prosecute. ¹⁵³

The fact that the UN was the leading institution in terms of legitimacy and leading the civilian mission in Kosovo as well did not mean that the UN had the overriding power to decide. As seen in this chapter, the decision to evacuate the Ground Safety Zone was taken by NATO alone, it being the institution that had concluded the Military Technical Agreement with the FRY in 1999. After NATO had taken this decision, the NATO secretary general informed the secretary-general of the UN. ¹⁵⁴

7.5.5.2. EU–NATO Cooperation

The linkages between NATO and the EU in this crisis came about after a long period when cooperation was non-existent. Many have described them – as Lord Robertson put it – as ‘two organizations in the same city but on different planets’. These people, according to Robertson, now had to change their tune. ¹⁵⁵

One of the prerequisites for cooperation between the EU and NATO was the institutional changes within the EU by which new bodies were being created which could connect with similar bodies within NATO. During early 2001 this meant only the PSC; the MC and the MS were not yet operational. The NATO Military Committee and the MC did not meet until 12 June, when they exchanged information with a view to strengthening their cooperation in military crisis management. ¹⁵⁶

The NAC–GAC meeting in Budapest of 30 May mentioned above was the highest-level meeting during this period. In addition, the PSC and the NAC met


¹⁵⁵ NATO, ‘Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson’, 7–8 June 2001.

on a number of occasions during the period under study. Among the issues raised were those of practical EU–NATO cooperation, the security of the EU monitors, and the various trouble spots in general as situations arose. In addition, a number of other constellations of cooperation have come into being.\footnote{\textit{Europe}, 24 Feb. and 15 Mar. 2001; \textit{AN}, 4 Apr. and 29 June 2001; NATO Update, 22 Aug. 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0820/e922a.htm.} After all these meetings the representatives of the two institutions underlined the commonality of views and the crucial effect this cooperation had had on dealing with the crisis.

With the establishment of the PSC and the position of high representative for the CFSP, an important element for cooperation between the EU and NATO had been put in place, since each now had persons and bodies that had a counterpart in the other. The close cooperation between the representatives of the two, in the first place Solana and Robertson, has already been described, and its importance was widely testified to. The effect of their joint trips, joint statements and joint efforts when the situation was critical was of major importance for removing the threat of a new war in the area. This kind of close personal cooperation also took place on a daily basis in Skopje, with Peter Feith for NATO, François Léotard for the EU and James Pardew, the American representative.

7.5.5.3. Other Coordination

A variety of coordination among independent organizations took place as events unfolded. ‘Coordination Meetings on the Balkans’, led by Kofi Annan’s personal representative, Carl Bildt, were held on some occasions. On 22 February the stabilization of the Presevo Valley was discussed at NATO headquarters at a meeting at which, apart from NATO, the EU, the UN, the OSCE and the UNHCR were represented. The aim was to coordinate efforts in order to reduce the number of armed incidents and prevent spillover to neighbouring regions. Both the EU and NATO announced measures to be taken.\footnote{\textit{AN}, 2 Mar. 2001.}

A number of other linkages existed as well. That between the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje and the ECM/EUMM dated back to the establishment of the two in the early 1990s. During the first quarter of 2001 their joint task was to monitor the crisis areas of Tetovo and Kumanovo. After 5 July, when the ceasefire agreement entered into force, the tasks of the Spillover Mission and the EUMM were to monitor compliance with it. In performing their tasks they kept in daily contact with each other as well as with NATO.\footnote{OSCE, Secretary General, \textit{Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities (1 Nov. 2000–31 Oct. 2001)}, pp. 31–32. Another kind of functional link was that between the various bodies within the organizations. For the OSCE the linkages between the OSCE Situation and Communication Room (Sit/Com) with its counterparts in the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping in New York and the Situation Centre in the General Secretariat were of importance. The value of establishing a link to the newly developed counterpart of the EU was also underlined by Solana at his appearance before the OSCE Permanent Council. See \textit{OSCE Newsletter}, vol. 8, no. 1, Jan. 2001, pp. 5–6.}
7.5.6. Outcome as Explained by Institutional Capability

As seen from the preceding survey, all four institutions were actively and in cooperation with each other seeking to prevent the crisis of Macedonia worsening and to help in creating a stable multi-ethnic society. In sharp contrast to the previous case, the institutions referred to each other and their efforts overlapped very little, except when the situation warranted. Their assessments of the threat were the same and they had a common view on the means to use. In addition, the previously strong division between European and Atlanticist solutions is not to be seen.

The question here is whether the outcome in terms of pattern and content of cooperation – with NATO and the EU as the dominant institutions and the UN and the OSCE as the supporting ones – can be explained by the two criteria of institutional capability.

The first factor of institutional capability, that of the capability to initiate work quickly, was relevant for this case but was of a different character from the capability needed in the Afghanistan case. The Macedonian crisis can be described as one in which an innumerable series of events needed the quick attention of those who were trying to resolve it. In terms of capabilities to initiate work quickly, all the institutions were well equipped. The UN Security Council, the Permanent Council of the OSCE, the NAC and the PSC, apart from meeting frequently, could also be summoned at short notice.

In terms of the second factor, that of institutional competence within the relevant areas, in the Macedonian crisis there was not only one type of competence but many that were valuable for resolving or remedying the situation. This meant that no single institution would suffice on its own. For example, the first criterion, the formal right to deal with the crisis, was dependent on the task in hand. NATO, as regards the Ground Safety Zone between Kosovo and the FRY, and UNMIK within Kosovo had specific rights to act. In Macedonia, on the other hand, the activities of all institutions were based on the invitation of the Macedonian Government. The EU and the OSCE had long been involved in the country, in the ECMM/EUMM and the Spillover Mission, respectively, at the invitation of the government. NATO’s weapon-collecting mission was entirely based on the invitation of the Macedonian Government.

The second criterion related to competence in the relevant areas is the existence of an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and to implement decisions. For this all the institutions were fairly well equipped from the start, but they also increased their capabilities as the crisis went on. In the UN, the secretary-general, his special representative for Balkan issues and UNMIK were continually involved. For the OSCE the chairman-in-office, complemented by the Troika, the HCNM, the two consecutive special representatives and the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje were continually involved, and within the institutions rapid reaction capabilities were being built up. In NATO Lord Robertson worked intensively on the crisis and the positioning of his special representative, Peter Feith, in Skopje made it possible to deal with these issues constantly. A similar pattern can be seen in the EU, where Solana was the equivalent of Robertson –
from July 2001 with the addition of Léotard. In addition, within the EU, the PSC and the presidencies, including the Troika, worked on resolving the crisis.

As this survey has demonstrated, however, apart from the ability to initiate work quickly, the specific capabilities of each institution are the important ones. The Macedonian crisis was of a type in which the institutions involved all had their specific niches: while they were to some degree comparable, in the majority of their tasks none was exchangeable for any of the others. Looking at the pattern of institutions involved and the content, that is the areas within which each of them dealt, they reflected well the institutional capabilities of the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EU.

The particular capabilities of the different institutions were, however, related not only to the particular situation but also to the demands of actors. During the period under study the actors in the area – the Macedonian Government and the Albanian community – had their reasons to appreciate certain capabilities of the various institutions, whereas the institutions were not always prepared to get involved. The eventual composition of involvement was dependent on a judgement of the situation – as seen by the international community supplying the help and by those in Macedonia who felt that they needed this help. The way in which demand and supply met was very much at the core of this crisis.

The UN, thanks to the legitimacy it could give to activities, had a particular value. In this case the Macedonian Government had an interest in demonstrating that the conflict was international in nature, and thereby a matter of relevance for the UN, rather than only of internal origin.

In terms of some of these capabilities, institutions could be measured against each other. This was the case, for example, with military power. Essential Harvest was a mission that demanded little in terms of military power. Still, NATO was the preferred institution to take it on because of its superior military capacities. NATO was especially favoured by the Albanian community, since in their eyes it constituted a counterweight to the Macedonian authorities and people. Most likely the prospect of NATO membership, which the Macedonian Government was aiming for, was another reason to have the institution involved.

The EU was important in the same way as Macedonia wished to join it. The SAA was a reminder that the responsible conduct of its national politics would lead it in this direction.

The EU and NATO, while well equipped institutionally to deal with the continuing problems of the region, had particular capabilities in this situation in which a particular bargaining power was necessary in relation to the actors in the area.

Finally, an essential factor in the Macedonian crisis was the importance of having a good historical track record. A not-so-tangible but certainly valuable asset for the United Nations in Macedonia was its popularity among the population, based on the fact that its preventive deployment mission, UNPREDEP, had succeeded in maintaining stability within the country for a number of years.160

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Generally the pattern of cooperation seems to be fully explained by institutional capabilities.

The third factor, that of country support to the individual institutions, which is included in the theoretical approach of this study in order to explain which institutions become active, will not be dealt with at this point. It will be included after the survey of countries’ activities.

Generally, the institutions seemed content with their own roles. Some proposals were, however, made for changes. As mentioned above, efforts to increase the role of the UN and the OSCE were both met positively by other institutions and countries. In the first case general support for the UN could be interpreted as a way to ensure increased legitimacy for the crisis management tasks in the area, but other possible reasons were that the UN would give a stronger preventive role in crisis management, and the general feeling of a need for increased coordination that permeated all discussions on this subject. The support for an increased role for the OSCE is likely to have been closely related to the importance of its preventive work.

For those involved in Macedonian crisis management it was a demanding task, taken on at a late stage in a conflict, and preventive efforts at early stages were therefore seen as extremely valuable.

7.6. The Countries Involved

7.6.1. The United States and the Macedonian Crisis

7.6.1.1. The American Evaluation of the Crisis

The American evaluation of the crisis, seen from the American Administration’s declarations and activities, seems to have been identical to that of all the institutions. The US was heavily involved in the work of helping prevent the spread of conflict to Macedonia and solving the particular problems of Macedonia along the lines spelled out by all the institutions. It followed developments in southern Serbia and Macedonia closely, condemning some activities and welcoming others, and referring to and encouraging the work of the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN.

Thus the Americans greeted the Covic proposal for the abandonment of the GSZ between southern Serbia and Kosovo positively, seeing it as a good starting point for a peaceful process to end the conflict in that area. On numerous occasions Americans condemned the violence by ethnic Albanian extremists in Macedonia. The US, furthermore, declared its support for the territorial integrity of Macedonia and the efforts of its government to protect the rule of law, while at the same time encouraging reforms for the sake of the Albanian community. Another frequent element was encouragement to the Macedonians to continue to use proportionate force when defending themselves militarily against the terrorists.\(^{161}\) The US was also involved in seeking to bring together Albanian and Slav

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Macedonians in a broad dialogue, which bore fruit on 13 May 2001 with the establishment of the coalition government.\footnote{162}{Macedonian Parties Agree to Grand Coalition’, US Department of State, 11 May 2001.}

\subsection*{7.6.1.2. The American Role in Macedonia}

Even though the American evaluation of the crisis was similar to that of the institutions and of other states, the role of the US was different from that of the other countries, as sought both by itself and by others. The Albanian and Slav Macedonians, while disagreeing on most other things, both sought an influential role for the US in the country, apparently based on the view that only the US had the capability to give the desired military protection. The challenge was therefore to convince the Americans to remain involved. The more specific motives differed. The Albanians saw the US as the key to change, which in the end would lead to the fulfilment of their own political goals, whereas the Slav Macedonians saw the US as being needed in order to create a strong state that was capable of defending itself.

For some Slav Macedonians, the wish for closer connections with the US was combined with lingering doubts about where American sympathies lay. These doubts were expressed on several occasions at press conferences, as questions were asked about apparent passivity on the part of, in particular, US KFOR troops in policing the border zone against infiltrating Albanians and about the well known fact that the former Clinton administration had been close to the Albanians. There were also reports that Albanian forces, with the presumed goal of their participating in the effort to bring down Slobodan Milosevic, had been given direct military support in the winter of 2000 in the form of training camps run for them by Americans in the Presevo Valley.\footnote{163}{‘Macedonian Parties Agree to Grand Coalition’, US Department of State, 11 May 2001.} In the aftermath of the turbulence caused by the evacuation of NLA groups from Aracinovo on 25 June, reports that 17 American ‘trainers’, retired US military officers, had been present in the city appeared in newspapers in Europe and were categorically denied by the US.\footnote{164}{The article was originally printed in the \textit{Hamburger Abendblatt} on 28 June, and thereafter quoted by other newspapers. ‘Macedonia: US Embassy Denies German Press Claim About US Trainers of Rebels’, BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, 1 July 2001.}

It is difficult to assess whether the accusations made against the Americans during 2001 were based on hard facts or circumstantial evidence, or were just a means used by the Slav Macedonians in order to put pressure on the US to give favours to the Slav population. On 21 May 2001 a Macedonian television channel accused the head of Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Richard Griffiths, of passing information about the Macedonian security forces’ plans for action to the NLA. The American embassy in Skopje called the accusa-
tion completely untrue and pointed out that Griffiths, a retired two-star general, was in Macedonia at the request of the Macedonian Government to help reform the Macedonian military in conformity with NATO standards.165

The Frowick incident (see sections 7.4.3.3. and 7.5.2.2) made the situation more difficult for the United States and was a handicap for all the Western countries and institutions that had worked hard for the formation of the coalition government and for a policy of measured response to terrorist acts. The realization of the implications of this may have been the reason why the US, like others, was quick to distance itself from Ambassador Frowick, whether or not it had initially supported his policies. On 24 May the American embassy in Skopje, on behalf of the American Administration, expressed its full support for the statement already made by the Presidency of the EU on the matter and rejected any kind of attempt to bring the NLA into the negotiation process. Ironically such contacts were taken up little more than a month afterwards.166

In late June the US took another track. Appointing James Pardew as its special envoy, as widely requested, it assumed a more openly active role in Macedonia. At the same time Pardew worked in close collaboration with the EU envoy, François Léotard. This solution gave the US a privileged role in Macedonia and was also reassuring to those who feared an American withdrawal from the region.

7.6.1.3. The American Initiatives and Activities

As requested by the Macedonians, the US maintained continuous contact with the Macedonian Government in the form of frequent high-level telephone conversations, as described by Colin Powell, reciprocal visits and meetings in other cities, predominantly Brussels. Powell took part in the Contact Group meeting on Macedonia in April, after which he left for Macedonia where he again met President Trajkovski and Foreign Minister Srgjan Kerim, as well as others. In early May Trajkovski visited Washington at the invitation of President Bush, meeting Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as well. On 5 June Vlado Buckovski, defence minister of Macedonia, met his counterpart Rumsfeld. On 12 July, Foreign Minister Ilinka Mitreva visited Washington, where she met Powell, Joseph Biden, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and representatives of the White House Staff as well as the National Security Council. President Bush visited Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo on 24 July, his speech addressing the problems of Macedonia as well as Kosovo.167 In addition to these high-level visits and contacts a number of lower-level visits and contacts took place as well.

The United States also supported Macedonia in various ways to increase its military capabilities and to strengthen civil society. President Bush’s response to

167 As in June, when President Bush was planned to go to Macedonia, the safety of the president could most probably not be guaranteed in the country.
the violence of March was to send American drones to KFOR for patrolling the border between Macedonia and Kosovo.\textsuperscript{168} In early June it was announced that six Heliborne Early Warning (HEW) aircraft were to be delivered.\textsuperscript{169} Civilian aid offices were opened in Tetovo and Kumanovo in order to speed up the programme for these cities, and the US also supported the Southeast Europe University at Tetovo.\textsuperscript{170} In all, during 2001 Macedonia was scheduled to receive $50 million in aid in different forms.\textsuperscript{171}

The uncertainties surrounding a new American administration and the possibility that it would choose a policy of non-engagement in the crises in the Balkans were strongly felt in Macedonia in early 2001. At the joint Macedonian–American meetings the Macedonian side’s wishes for an American engagement in their country were expressed in strong terms. As President Trajkovski declared at the visit by Powell in April to Skopje:

I affirmed to Secretary Powell the necessity that the U.S. develop or define a clear and coherent policy towards Macedonia and towards the region. I also invited State Secretary Powell and pointed out the world’s right and obligation to remain involved together with the European partners in the region. I also pointed out to the Secretary that the U.S. has to continue affording assistance in Kosovo, and to Yugoslavia as part of a comprehensive policy towards the region and once again I underlined the need that Kosovo becomes a source of stability in the region.

I hope that the USA will remain involved not only in military but also economic and political terms. I hope that we can rely on our friends from the USA that we can work together as partners in finding just and equitable solutions.\textsuperscript{172}

Powell’s answer on this occasion, as on others, was reassuring: Macedonia could be sure of American support for its efforts – political, economic and military. Powell also stated that as the White House saw the danger Macedonia was in he immediately began consulting with the Macedonian president, the two speaking to each other every few days.\textsuperscript{173} He did, however, underline that the US would not act alone. When asked about military options, he declared that the US would participate in whatever actions the Alliance believed were necessary and would work within the Alliance on this issue. The United States was constantly reviewing its troop levels in the Balkans but had not established any time by which American

\textsuperscript{169} ‘Macedonia to Receive Arms from Russia, USA and Ukraine’, BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, 5 June 2001.
\textsuperscript{170} The visit by American ambassadorEinik also gave the Macedonians the opportunity to speak of their lack of representation in Tetovo, dominated by Albanians. ‘Ethnic Macedonians Inform US Ambassador of Lack of Representation in Tetovo’, BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, 6 July 2001.
\textsuperscript{172} ‘Remarks with Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski, Secretary Colin L. Powell and Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski’, US Department of State, 12 Apr. 2001.
\textsuperscript{173} ‘Press Remarks with Macedonian Minister Kerim, Secretary Colin L. Powell and Macedonian Foreign Minister Srdjan Kerim’, US Department of State, 12 Apr. 2001.
troops would be out. The reassuring phrase often used was that the US and its allies went into the Balkans together and they would leave together.174

Direct military engagement in Macedonia, however, was a different matter. Like the other countries, the United States was very hesitant about seeking to resolve the crisis by military means by sending NATO troops, which might end up taking on a peacekeeping role that might be hard to end. President Bush expressed this reluctance openly but did not exclude the possibility that NATO troops might in the end be sent to Macedonia.175 Sending troops to assist in weapons collection was a different matter, but even here the US hesitated. While the US together with other NATO countries agreed at the NAC meeting in June 2001 to NATO taking responsibility for Essential Harvest, it was stated that the American contribution would consist of using troops already in the area dealing with communications and logistics back-up. The decision caused some worries in Macedonia, Foreign Minister Ilinka Mitreva, on her visit in Washington on 12 July 2001, asking the US to reconsider and send troops for the disarmament tasks as well.176 For President Bush, who had promised the withdrawal of troops during his presidential election campaign, there was a need to explain the American decisions and why they were not in conflict with the commitment to NATO. During his visit to Kosovo in July, Bush expressed his understanding of the vital role the US played – both militarily and politically – but also his wish to hasten the day when peace would be self-sustaining. In order to accomplish this, civil institutions had to be built and the rule of law promoted.177

The 11 September attacks on the US did not have any effect on discussions on Macedonia: the American military involvement was of little significance. On the Balkans as a whole, on the occasion of a visit by Lord Robertson Bush assured him that the US would not leave the Balkans under the pretext of transferring resources to the fight against terrorism.178

7.6.1.4. The United States and its Partners

The United States and France

French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine visited Colin Powell on 26 March, discussing, among other matters, the problems of Macedonia. At their joint press conference Powell declared that he and Védrine had strongly condemned extremist violence in Macedonia and that, through NATO and the European Union, they were both working to promote stability and end violence in the area.179

175 President Clinton’s declaration in 1999 in which he excluded the use of American ground forces was generally seen to have been a major mistake. NATO, ‘Press Conference with Q&A by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and US President George W. Bush’, 13 June 2001.
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was clearly the subject of some disagreement. Powell declared that the US would welcome an ESDP that strengthened NATO and increased Europe’s capacity to deter and manage crises where NATO as a whole chose not to engage. He also claimed that both he and Védrine saw the ESDP as a complement to NATO. However, lack of agreement is discernible in his reference to the fact that he had restated the American position that there should be no duplication of planning or operational activities and that non-EU European NATO members must be assured of the fullest possible participation in EU defence and security deliberations that affected their interests.\textsuperscript{180} The fact that no joint communiqué was issued at the meeting might be attributed to rather strong disagreements on this matter.

In spite of these disagreements (the conversation was described as candid), the atmosphere was apparently good, as evident in Colin Powell’s description of it: “The Minister and I had, as you have already noted, excellent conversations. The relationship between our two nations is very, very strong and has been for many, many years. We have areas of great agreement and occasionally areas of disagreement, but we will work through our areas of disagreement in the spirit that has kept us friends for over two centuries.”\textsuperscript{181}

Other meetings were held as well between French and American leaders. President Chirac had been the first national leader to meet George W. Bush, as they met informally in January before President Bush was sworn in. He was also among the first to appear in person to pledge support when he visited Bush on 18 September 2001 after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Most of the other meetings between them, however, were held on the fringes of meetings of the institutions.

\textit{The United States and Germany}

The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, visited the United States and his counterpart, Colin Powell, on 20 February 2001. At their joint press conference the two ministers gave witness to the friendship and cooperation of the last 50 years, Powell describing Fischer as ‘a committed champion of transatlantic relations and a true friend of the United States’.\textsuperscript{182} About a month later Chancellor Schröder made a working visit to the United States, when he met President Bush and discussed the same issues, reiterating their statements of friendship and commonality of views.\textsuperscript{183}

Both visits included discussions on the problems of southern Serbia and Macedonia, President Bush praising Germany for its deep engagement, civilian and well as military, in the region. The joint communiqué of Schröder and Bush

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{182} ‘Press Availability with German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer’, US Department of State, 20 Feb. 2001.

\textsuperscript{183} ‘Remarks by the President and German Chancellor Schroeder in Photo Opportunity’, The White House, 29 Mar. 2001.
expressed their common view on the Macedonian crisis, which was identical to that described above for France and all the institutions. As with Védrine’s visit, the ESDP was part of the discussions, but on the occasion of Schröder’s visit the American position was included in a joint communiqué. The US welcomed the European efforts, involving:

- Developing EU capabilities in a manner that is fully coordinated, compatible and transparent with NATO;
- The fullest possible participation by non-EU European NATO members in the operational planning and execution of EU-led exercises and operations, reflecting their shared interests and security commitments as NATO members;
- Working with other EU members to improve Europe’s capabilities and enable the EU to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged.

In this way the US had set up its expectations not as a ‘reminder’ as in the case of France, but in a way that clearly expressed what it could and could not accept of the German policies in connection with the ESDP.

The United States and the United Kingdom

Personal contacts with the United Kingdom were established at an early stage of the new administration. British Foreign Minister Robin Cook visited Colin Powell as early as 6 February and Prime Minister Tony Blair visited President Bush in late February. These visits were followed by those of Defence Minister Geoffrey Hoon in March and Jack Straw in early July. Straw, who had replaced Robin Cook as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in early June, visited the US in order to prepare for President Bush’s visit to the UK in July, which, unlike the others, was to be an official visit. The tone in all these encounters was warm, the leaders of both nations referring to their long-standing cooperation and recent shared efforts, such as Operation Desert Storm. Powell, when meeting Cook, declared that the United States had always counted on its special bond with the UK to ensure that their common values prevailed, and Bush, welcoming Tony Blair to Camp David, called the UK ‘our strongest friend and our closest ally’.

At the time of the first of these visits Macedonia was not yet an acute problem and was therefore not mentioned. As events unfolded in the country, they were reflected in the agenda of the talks and a consistent commonality of views on the nature of the crisis and on how to meet it can be seen. Straw’s visit took place as Pardew and Léotard were negotiating their proposal for a new Macedonian constitution, and their work was strongly endorsed by both sides.

185 Ibid.
As with France and Germany, the ESDP was a subject that attracted much interest in these meetings, judging from the space given to it in the joint communiqués. As in the case of the French and German visits, the American–British joint communiqués focused on the way the ESDP should be designed to ensure that it would not damage NATO in any way. The same criteria as for the other countries were enumerated at length. The difference between the communiqués and press conference after the German and the British visits is the way in which these criteria were presented. Powell and Bush used expressions such as ‘having been reassured’ and ‘resting hopeful’ for the development of the ESDP along the lines they wished. Obviously both Powell and Bush saw the British as genuinely convinced that the ESDP should be formed in accordance with these criteria and these alone, and were relying on them to see to it that all these criteria were fulfilled in the implementation of the ESDP.\(^\text{188}\)

### 7.6.1.5. The American Cooperation Patterns

In addition to the unilateral activities towards Macedonia as described, the United States was also engaged in seeking to solve the problems in cooperation with its partners and the institutions.

Bilateral contacts, as described above, with France, Germany and the UK, were not limited to the visits described. Since France, Germany and the UK participated in all the important forums within which Macedonia was discussed – the Contact Group meeting in April in Paris (and another in Rome in July), the NAC meetings in February, May and June, the European Summit in Göteborg in June (at which President Bush was present), and the G8 meeting in Genoa in July – they had a number of opportunities to meet.

The American cooperation pattern was predominantly multilateral. As regards policies towards Macedonia there was little need for close bilateral cooperation: the developments the US preferred to see were taking place anyway. Because there was agreement on the basic elements of the crisis – a sovereign, multi-ethnic Macedonia with unchanged borders and improved rights for minorities – the emphasis was on how to accomplish this. Even here there was agreement on avoiding the use of military means unless absolutely unavoidable. The negotiations could therefore largely be handled by the institutions. The final issue in focus was that of the US versus Europe, the American long-term interest being to find the right level of American and European engagement at a time when the ESDP was an unknown component in the equation. This issue was also resolved without

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\(^{188}\) As quoted from President Bush: '[Prime Minister Blair] assured me that NATO is going to be the primary way to keep the peace in Europe and that the United States – and I assured him the United States will be actively engaged in NATO, remain engaged in Europe with our allies. But he also assured me that the European defense would no way undermine NATO. He also assured me that there would be a joint command, that planning would take place within NATO, and that should all NATO not wish to go on a mission, that would then serve as a catalyst for the defense forces moving on their own. And finally, I was very hopeful when we discussed the Prime Minister’s vision that such a vision would encourage our NATO allies and friends to bolster their defense budgets, perhaps’. ‘Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Blair in Joint Press Conference’, The White House, 23 Feb. 2001.
problems, with great effort from the European side, which must have pleased the Americans.

NATO was of particular importance, and here the distinction is often made between the military side of NATO, with which Colin Powell was in close contact for assessments of the situation, and the political side, which was handling the crisis on a daily basis.

The EU was important, too, although more so at the second attempt, when the US chose the new track of the cooperation between Pardew and Léotard. Their cooperation seems to have worked well and the American view of it was uniformly positive.

The role of the European countries and the connection to the ESDP came up on occasion in the context of American policy towards Macedonia, in particular during the first months as the US was taking stock of their intentions. An illustrative example from late July of a more relaxed American attitude to the role of European and American engagement, as well as the preferred actors in cooperation, is President Bush’s connecting the American wish for a reduction in the numbers of American troops in the Balkans with his desire for the Europeans to contribute more troops: ‘I similarly welcome the willingness of our allies to provide the bulk of the NATO task force posed to collect the insurgents’ weapons after a peaceful settlement in Macedonia. The cooperation of the United States, NATO and the EU in Macedonia is a model that we can build on in the future.’

The formula was seemingly found, the United States having a considerable degree of control but the bulk of the work being done within the institutions. Generally, while the US spoke appreciatively of all the institutions and countries involved in resolving the Macedonia crisis, the American focus throughout the crisis was on the United States, NATO and the EU.

7.6.1.6. Norms

One specific phrase, used many times by Colin Powell and President Bush, was that the Europeans and the Americans went into the Balkans together and would also leave together. The expression ‘in together, out together’ dated back to the days when, after the Dayton Agreement of 1995, the Implementation Force (IFOR) was being organized. At that time the Europeans, in the light of their experiences with UNPROFOR, insisted that they would not maintain ground troops in Bosnia without US participation, warning the US that if it left they would do so as well. Clearly the Americans had noticed the anxiety of the Europeans, including Macedonians, that Bush’s campaign promises of troop withdrawals would materialize. The phrase now served as a reminder that the US had not forgotten the earlier understanding of solidarity with its allies and that it took that understanding seriously. While in the available material the European worries were not expressed in terms of accusations of breaches of norms, the American reassurances most probably took this form – of reminding the Europeans of an

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earlier understanding underlying their joint presence – in order to increase the
effect of reassurance.

In putting continuous pressure on the Europeans as regards the development of
the ESDP, American statements are full of references to norms concerning
political solidarity as well as the contribution of NATO’s defence capabilities. The
list of criteria that the Europeans would need to fulfil in order not to breach their
NATO obligations (see above) was long. The ESDP at this point in time was not
very far developed, and the US did not accuse the Europeans of breaches at this
time. The intense American admonitions should therefore be interpreted rather as
warnings that the US would not accept such a development. The fact that the
administration was new may have contributed to the strength of the reactions;
they gradually relaxed during the spring.

The American reaction to the Frowick incident can also be seen in terms of
norms. The quick dismissal of Frowick after the incident in Prizren was explained
above by an American realization of the damage that had been done to the peace
process by the secrecy of Frowick’s behaviour. Obviously it could also be inter-
preted as an admission of a breach of the norm of joint consultation with allies
and partners, and the way in which cooperation with the EU was undertaken
thereafter could be seen as a way to repair the reputation of the US. It is not a
strong case, however, since other reasons were supporting the new policy as well.

Norms do not seem to have been very important in determining the American
activities. While the US said a great deal to the effect that it would not leave the
Balkans until the Europeans left as well, it is doubtful that the understanding with
its allies was the decisive reason for this. The American policies could well be
explained by a belief that a swift withdrawal was unrealistic. Signs of a future
withdrawal were certainly present.

7.6.2. The Role of Russia

In the earlier case – the invasion of Afghanistan – the USSR was the ideological
adversary and directly responsible for the acute problems. Cooperation with it
would be undertaken for particular reasons – economic or as a means to relieve
tensions – but the country could not be counted on as a reliable political partner.
In 2001, as the events in southern Serbia and Macedonia evolved, the situation
was not totally positive since the antagonism arising from the intervention in
Kosovo was not yet entirely overcome: Russia still saw the NATO countries as
biased in favour of the Albanian community. Even so, the difference between the
erlier situation and the situation now was fundamental.

Russia was not one of the major decision-makers in the Macedonian crisis. As a
member of the UN and the OSCE, the two supporting but not central insti-
utions, it was unable to wield more than limited influence in most questions.
Russia and other major states were in contact on this issue, and Russia and the
NATO/Russia Permanent Joint Council discussed it, expressing agreement on the
vital points.\textsuperscript{191} Russia’s particular power lay in the link that was felt between it and

\textsuperscript{191} AN, 29 June 2001.
Macedonia as two Slavic peoples. This background explains the occasions when Russia and the Western powers were in disagreement on the Macedonian issue. One of these concerned the fact that NATO became responsible for the collection of ethnic-Albanian weapons. Russia, which had earlier stated its willingness to contribute to this task, thought that it should have been undertaken by another institution (presumably the OSCE). Another occasion concerned the issue of the status of the Albanian language: Western attempts to raise its status were criticized by Russia, which compared them to what it saw as a Western dismissal of the concerns of the Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic countries.

On many other points, however, there was agreement, for example, on the emphasis on the sovereignty of Macedonia and the inviolability of its borders. Macedonia never really became a problematic issue between the Western countries and institutions on the one side and Russia on the other. President Vladimir Putin on several occasions expressed his belief that there was agreement on the basic elements of how the crisis should be dealt with. Russia had demanded that any international presence with a military component should have a UN mandate, and saw this mandate given in late September.

The United States and Russia maintained contact on matters related to Macedonia, the first meeting between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin taking place on 16 June in Slovenia, to be followed by several others. In the American–Russian discussions Macedonia was, however, a much less prominent issue than that of the future of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

### 7.6.3. France and the Macedonian Crisis
#### 7.6.3.1. The French Evaluation of the Crisis

The French opinion on the regional actors in connection with the crises in the Presevo Valley and inside Macedonia was unchanging throughout the crisis and was identical with those expressed by the United States and the institutions. France on many occasions condemned the atrocities committed by the extremists and pointed out to them that their goals could never be achieved by violence. It supported the Macedonian Government and praised its restraint in the use of force. At the same time it underlined that the Serbian Government (in the case of the problems of the Presevo Valley) and the Macedonian Government (in relation to the internal problems in Macedonia) were expected to pursue a dialogue with the Albanian community and carry out reforms in order to improve the Albanians’ positions in society. France also declared that the sovereignty and stability of

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Macedonia and the inviolability of its borders were primary concerns for the international community.

On many occasions, France stressed that all the members of the European Union and NATO, including the United States, were in agreement that the problems of Macedonia must be described on the lines described above. France supported the decision by NATO to permit the return of FRY forces to the GSZ, pointing out that this decision was shared by all – by all the members of the European Union, by NATO members, by Russia, by neighbouring states, such as Serbia and Montenegro, and Bulgaria, and even by the Albanian prime minister.

Two points were important for the French from the start. One was that the solution had to be political, not military. The other was the importance of coordination within the international community in order to achieve this, and in this coordination between the EU and NATO was key.

7.6.3.2. The French Initiatives and Activities

France, like other countries, contributed in several ways to the process of crisis management pursued during this period. It also sought to demonstrate to others that it had a strong interest in the successful conclusion of the enterprise.

The French activities took various forms and were particularly prominent during periods of acute crisis. In early March President Trajkovski visited Paris, on which occasion President Chirac assured him that France would do all it could to support the Macedonian authorities. Shortly thereafter the foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, extended a trip to the Balkans to include Macedonia. While underlining that all the countries within NATO, the EU and the region were in agreement, the aim of his trip, he declared, was to declare again France’s engagement and its support for the stability and territorial integrity of Macedonia.

Throughout this period a number of trips were made to the area, primarily by Védrine, but also by Defence Minister Alain Richard, the latter in connection with the French troops’ arrival in Macedonia.

In view of the situation on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, France promised to supply drones for NATO’s reconnaissance missions along the border. It also promised to supply transportation vehicles and night vision equipment to...
As the decision on the task force Essential Harvest was taken on 22 August, the French contribution of 530 Foreign Legion men left to join the total force of (initially) 3500. It also participated in the much smaller Amber Fox mission.

Another French initiative was that of re-establishing the Contact Group, which had been active in solving the problems in Bosnia in 1995 and which had not met since the autumn of 2000. The first meeting took place in Paris on 11 April 2001. As Védrine expressed it, France was seeking a reactivation of the Contact Group because of the dangers of the new situation, in particular in Macedonia. At its meeting the group discussed not only Macedonia but also the FRY, Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia–Herzegovina. The resolution from the meeting was very similar to those of the institutions and the individual policies of states, emphasizing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia, condemning violence by the extremists, encouraging Macedonia to exercise restraint in its responses, encouraging KFOR to continue strengthening the border controls, and reminding Macedonia, which had just signed its Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, of the need to consolidate a multi-ethnic society.

Another French initiative concerned the work in Macedonia. At the press conference following the European Council meeting in Göteborg in June, the French representatives announced that the meeting had accepted the creation of a new position within the European Union, that of personal representative of Javier Solana. It was also mentioned that France was suggesting that François Léotard should fill this position. At the EU Council meeting in Luxembourg in late June, agreement was reached on appointing Léotard. This proposal, which, according to Hubert Védrine was conceived by himself and Joschka Fischer, was also explained as originating in the need for an agreement in Macedonia and in the heavy workload carried by Solana, who at this time was deeply engaged in the Middle East crisis as well. Védrine stressed that Léotard in his position represented Europe, not France. This was not, he stated in his answer at a press conference, a question of French leadership and did not emanate from any disagreement with the United States.

Léotard’s work, in cooperation with James Pardew, was generally successful. The extent to which he could distance himself from his French nationality is not

possible to estimate. His proposal for a European military unit to succeed the NATO Essential Harvest mission was rejected by the EU, including the French. Clearly, however, the idea had support in France, which later became the driving force for EU’s first peacekeeping mission, Concordia, which took over from NATO in Macedonia in March 2003.

7.6.3.3. France and its Partners

France and the United States

The administration just installed in Washington and its policies were carefully watched, the French ministers receiving many questions as to their impressions of their counterparts. Because the United States kept a very low profile vis-à-vis the Middle East, the French were anxious to see whether the same would apply for Macedonia.

The French ministers when responding to questions on the American engagement in the Balkans were highly appreciative of the American policies. Hubert Védrine, on his visit to the United States in March 2001, told French journalists that such elements as the commitment to the integrity of Macedonia, the principle of respect of its borders and the refusal to accept violence by terrorists were shared and no discussion was needed on those points. The activities of Europe and the US had been identical as well, in that both of them for the past few days had been pressing the Macedonian Government in order to convince it to take political initiatives towards reforms.\footnote{\textquote{Visite aux États-Unis. Entretien du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec plusieurs radios et télévisions françaises}, 27 Mar. 2001, p. 129.} Another important element, as expressed by Védrine, was that at the meeting of the Contact Group in April Colin Powell had clearly demonstrated that the new American Administration was not against multilateral concertation.\footnote{\textquote{Compte-rendu de l’audition du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, devant la Commission de la Défense de l’Assemblée nationale}, 17 Apr. 2001, p. 225.}

The way in which issues were separated from each other is apparent in the statement by the Foreign Policy Committee of the French Assemblée nationale, based on a hearing of Hubert Védrine. This statement criticized the United States sharply for some of its policies, such as its environmental policy, its policy towards the International Criminal Court and the death penalty, but praised its policy on Macedonia.\footnote{\textquote{Audition du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, par la Commission des Affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée nationale}, 3 Apr. 2001, p. 174.}

The American view of the EU’s defence ambitions was of some concern to the French, to judge by the many times Védrine brought up this matter during his visits to the United States in March and June. While explaining that the effort was based on a Franco-British initiative, which had been embraced by all in Europe, Védrine sought to explain that it could only serve to strengthen NATO and was of a complementary rather than competitive nature.\footnote{\textquote{Visite aux États-Unis. Entretien du ministre des Affaires étrangères M. Hubert Védrine avec “CNN”}, 27 Mar. 2001, pp. 131–133.}
The French vision of the desirable result of the European efforts was, however, also framed in a more ambitious way. As Védrine expressed it, the European countries should emancipate themselves from the US which, after the fall of the Soviet Union, was the world’s hyperpower. The present situation was leading to American immoderation, he claimed, and therefore entailed some risks. Védrine emphasized that his views were not connected to anti-Americanism or to any conflict with the United States: ‘Our cooperation with the United States has never been stronger.’ Nor had NATO collaboration after 1996 ever been better: ‘We are friends and allies, but not aligned.’

France and Germany

The clash between Germany and France that took place at the European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000 as regards the number of votes of each country to be established in the Nice Treaty was seen as serious. The vision of Europe’s future was another issue where the two countries disagreed. It was obvious to all that the German belief in a federal Europe was far from the largely intergovernmental views of France. There were therefore in early 2001 serious question marks over the Franco-German cooperation.

When President Chirac, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, Foreign Minister Védrine, Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer met at Blaesheim in Alsace on 31 January, they seem to have done so without having prepared any understanding in advance. However, the meeting – a single dinner – was considered to have been a success in terms of mending the relations and giving new life to Franco-German cooperation. As President Chirac explained, the French and the Germans had felt that there was a need to continue their cooperation and even intensify it: the German chancellor and the French president and prime minister were now to meet every six to eight weeks.

Other meetings took place between the foreign ministers, at more frequent intervals. Some of the meetings that followed were also accompanied by joint press conferences. Whereas the future of Europe continued to be a major issue, on which the ministers made efforts to give an impression of unity, foreign policy and security were generally minor issues. Macedonia was brought up repeatedly, however. A number of joint communiqués were made, all well in line with what the institutions had already agreed on, and the two foreign ministers described

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207 ‘Entretien du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec le quotidien allemand “Handelsblatt”’, 13 Mar. 2001, p. 44. In 1996 France took some steps towards reintegration into NATO’s military command, but the American reactions to this caused it deep disappointment.

their cooperation as very close. Some French initiatives were the suggestions that the Swedish Presidency invite President Trajkovski to Stockholm for the March European Council, that the position of an EU special envoy be created, and that France’s and Germany’s contribution to the Essential Harvest mission should be a joint one: they would send two companies each, together with a Spanish one, to serve under French command.209

The general impression of the Franco-German cooperation in connection with the Macedonian crisis is that the crisis in itself was an issue where their views were identical from the start. For France this unanimity served as a welcome opportunity to demonstrate identity of views and cohesion after a period of tension and at a time when the divergence of views on what the French called the ‘European construction’ made cooperation more fragile than before. As always under the Elysée Treaty, the Franco-German bilateral cooperation was also useful for anchoring proposals, since a proposal launched by France and Germany jointly would carry great weight. Third, since the meetings often took place just before those of the institutions, they were useful in preparing possible bilateral positions to be taken at these meetings.210

France and the UK

Relations between France and the UK, often close in defence matters, had grown even closer during the years of the Yugoslavian conflict. Their common interests finally manifested themselves with the Saint-Malo meeting in December of 1998. Here, the two countries, which together accounted for the bulk of European military capabilities, had initiated their first joint major project in the defence area for a long time. The general differences of opinion between them as regards the role of NATO were still there, but the ambition was not to let this stop the project, in which their common aim was to create a militarily stronger Europe, better able to handle conflicts in its own area.

Saint-Malo did not lead to continued bilateral cooperation of the type seen between France and Germany, however. Instead it became part of the institutionalized cooperation within the EU. This happened as early as June 1999 at the European Council’s meeting in Cologne, followed by its meetings in Helsinki and Nice, to enter the implementation stage during the spring of 2001.211 The UK was helpful when seeking to dispel the American fears of the French undermining NATO: the argument that France and the UK together had initiated the ESDP was often used.

Nor were there substantial differences of view between the two countries as to the general direction of the European Union. The annual meeting between

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209 LeM, 10 July 2001.
210 Meetings between Schröder, Chirac and Jospin took place on 20 March, just before the European Council Stockholm meeting, on 12 June, just before the NAC meeting, and on 5 September, just before the EU Genval meeting.
211 Part of the Saint-Malo agreement remained bilateral, however. This was the agreement to engage bilaterally in Africa. After December 1998 a number of joint trips to Africa had been made by Védrine and Cook.
President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair, which took place at Cahors in February 2001, was mainly devoted to non-security issues, according to reports. Both were reluctant to accept the German visions and were said to have agreed on describing theirs in the French term ‘federation of nation states’ as a final goal.\(^\text{212}\)

Macedonia does not seem to have been a subject for much deliberation between France and the UK. This is not surprising, as opinions in the two countries seem to have coincided from the start of the conflict in the area in terms of both their evaluations of the crisis and their opinions on the means of resolving it. There was no one who needed to be convinced about Franco-British cohesion, nor was there a common major project on Europe’s future. In contrast to the cooperation with Germany, therefore, for France for the time being there was nothing to be gained from bilateral cooperation with the UK. In terms of giving a stronger European character to the operation in Macedonia, the UK was helpful as well, without any need for closer cooperation, thanks to its greater military capability: it contributed far more than any other country to Essential Harvest.

### 7.6.3.4. The French Cooperation Patterns

France’s policies vis-à-vis the Macedonia crisis, like those of the US, included some unilateral activities as France pursued close contacts with the Macedonian Government. The policies were not unilateral, however, the messages France was sending being identical to those of others. France also provided military help for the Macedonian army, in the same way as other major states did.

Bilateral cooperation, as in the case of the United States, was of less importance since all were agreed on all major aspects of the crisis. Cooperation with Germany was the exception. As described above, the Macedonian crisis was useful for the new start of Franco-German cooperation – one of the major elements of French policy – while at the same time this bilateral cooperation was also helpful for France and Germany in anchoring their proposals.

The French view on multilateral cooperation was generally positive in that all institutions and states were seen as performing their special roles in a functional way, but there was also an emphasis on Europe in the French positions. This was not in confrontation with other institutions or states. Rather it was complementary.

The two French initiatives – the installing of François Léotard and the meeting of the Contact Group – were both connected to multilateral cooperation. Both, however, also increased France’s leverage. Léotard’s position of special envoy provided the opportunity to introduce French views in the negotiation process. The Contact Group (as compared to EU and NATO discussions) gave France a privileged position as one of the six major countries.

Both initiatives were judged to be important in explaining the successful ending of the crisis, the meeting of the Contact Group on occasion being described as giving a synergy to the cooperation. The Ohrid Agreement of 13 August was therefore attributed to the European component. In an interview he gave to a German broadcasting company, Hubert Védrine described the analysis of the

\(^{212}\) *Europe*, 12–14 Feb. 2001.
Macedonian question as having been started by the Europeans – initially France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. These countries had made the analysis, diagnosed the problem and proposed a policy, from which the issue had been pursued during the spring. The Europeans had achieved its acceptance through the Contact Group. They could therefore be sure that the Americans, and the Russians up to a certain point, would follow the same line, and thereafter the Council of Europe, the EU Council and the Group of Seven industrialized countries (G7), but also NATO. France and Germany, Védrine declared, had always taken the same line here – the insistence on a political solution\textsuperscript{213} (although, while he stressed the political solution, Védrine also acknowledged the need for a military component at some point).

The statement of the Defence Committee of the Assemblée nationale puts the Contact Group meetings in the context of the enterprise labelled ‘Europeanization of the Balkans’, which it described as a long-term task which had made progress during the past five years. While it stated that the initial reactions in Europe and the US were identical, it described the meeting of the Contact Group in the context of the Europeans’ ambition to take more responsibility for the Balkans, and the need for their presence there was stressed.\textsuperscript{214}

It is obvious that for France the link between the Macedonian crisis and the ESDP was strong. The ESDP was a new and fragile creature, not yet fully developed, but the Macedonian crisis, limited as it was compared to other crises in the Balkans, offered a possibility not only to introduce stronger European elements but also to contribute to its development by describing the process as more European than it really was.

7.6.3.5. Norms

Where France was concerned, the Macedonian crisis in itself produced few references to or disagreements over norms. France endorsed what others did vis-à-vis the Macedonian Government and the terrorists. The closely connected issue of the development of the ESDP was, however, a major issue, as seen above, in the relations between the United States and the EU.

The American suspicions that NATO was being undercut by the ESDP were directed more against France than against any other country. Formulated in terms of norms, the US saw the European build-up of crisis management forces as damaging to NATO’s military capability and as a breach of the political solidarity

\textsuperscript{213} ’Il faut voir que sur cette question de la Macédoine, ce sont les Européens, à commencer par la France, l’Allemagne, l’Italie, la Grande-Bretagne, qui ont fait l’analyse, qui ont fait le diagnostic, qui ont proposé une politique dès que la question a commencé à être préoccupante, au printemps dernier. Nous, les Européens, nous l’avons fait adopter par le groupe de contact. Donc, nous étions sûrs d’avoir les Américains et les Russes jusqu’à un certain point sur la même ligne, et ensuite le Conseil européen, les Conseils des Affaires générales, le G7 mais aussi l’OTAN ont agi dans ce même sens. Et depuis qu’il a fallu s’occuper en urgence de la Macédoine, la France et l’Allemagne ont toujours été sur la même ligne: solution politique; nous avons soutenu à fond les efforts de M. Solana et de l’envoyé de l’Union européenne M. Léotard, en liaison avec l’envoyé américain, M. Pardew.’ (’Entretien du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec la radio allemande “ARD”’, 28 Aug. 2001, p. 223.)

member countries were expected to demonstrate, and clearly tied it to a
perception of France as disloyal and harbouring anti-American feelings. The
American suspicions were strongly felt in France, judging from the number of
times they were brought up in statements and interviews.

The French president and a number of ministers defended the European
defence initiative in detail, emphasizing its compatibility with the norms of
membership of the Atlantic Alliance. They emphasized that it was a Franco-British
initiative, later subscribed to by all EU members, and one in which the non-EU
members of NATO were interested. The French asked whether the United States
really thought that all these countries would have been willing to agree to a plan
that was designed to weaken the transatlantic link. They stressed that the
development of the ESDP would be carried out in consultation with NATO and
would lead to a strengthening of NATO, as a strengthening of Europe’s military
resources was part of it, and questioned whether the US would have preferred
passivity on Europe’s part. France also stressed that two institutions were involved
which, in its view, were different in character, the EU through the ESDP having
more civilian tasks than NATO, and that these differences were an asset.\textsuperscript{215}

Generally the French statements were seeking to demonstrate that the American
interpretations of norms were too narrow, that in this context the US mis-
understood France, and that a certain scope for national interests was only natural
and should not be interpreted as hostility. Obviously, France had no intention to
adjust a policy that was not only within the norms of the Atlantic Alliance but also
favourable for the US as well as for Europe.

7.6.4. Germany and the Macedonian Crisis
7.6.4.1. The German Evaluation of the Crisis

The German evaluation of the regional actors in connection with the crises in the
Presevo Valley and Macedonia was the same as that of the United States and
France and of the institutions dealt with in this study. Germany condemned the
violence taking place on many occasions and demanded that the extremists cease
their activities. Like others it stated its support for the Macedonian Government
but also required that the latter initiate reforms for the Albanian community. The
territorial integrity of Macedonia and the inviolability of its borders were alluded
to many times.\textsuperscript{216}

Like France, Germany emphasized the unanimity of views on Macedonian
matters. It named the EU and NATO as the most important institutions and
emphasized the good cooperation between Javier Solana and Lord Robertson.\textsuperscript{217}

\textsuperscript{215}‘Discours du président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac, devant l’Institut des hautes études de
defense nationale’, 8 June 2001, pp. 237–242; ‘Chicago council on foreign relations. Discours du ministre

\textsuperscript{216}See, for example, ‘Bundesregierung verurteilt gewalttätige Übergriffe albanischer Extremisten in

\textsuperscript{217}See, for example, Scharping, 6 July 2001.
In contrast to French statements, however, the German statements many times emphasized the fact that crisis management, apart from its military component, also had a civilian component. For this purpose Germany would send judges and policemen, businessmen and administrators in order to create and support democratic structures.\textsuperscript{218}

7.6.4.2. The German Initiatives and Activities

There were a number of German initiatives to help in the creation of a multi-ethnic community and to support the Macedonian Government in its efforts to protect itself against the terrorists. In the civilian area support was given to the Albanian-language university at Tetovo, for humanitarian relief, and for civilian crisis management in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{219} Military help was given as well: in late April it was reported that Germany had decided to support Macedonia with armoured personnel carriers, cross-country vehicles, ambulances and night vision devices.\textsuperscript{220}

There was also a good deal of contact with the Macedonian Government and with institutions dealing with the crisis. German ministers visited the area, received Macedonian ministers visiting Germany, and discussed the problems with OSCE Chairman-in-Office Geoana and Kofi Annan among others.

The close political cooperation between Germany and Macedonia was also connected to their close economic cooperation. Germany, Greece and the FRY are the most important trading partners of Macedonia. In 2000, 19 per cent of Macedonia’s export went to Germany and 12 per cent of its imports came from there.\textsuperscript{221}

The discussions on the options in Macedonian crisis management demonstrated German sensitivities but also the fact that Germany had undergone gradual changes in this respect after the end of the Cold War. It was taking part in the KFOR mission in Kosovo, although its conditions for participating in KFOR were more demanding than those of most other states in Europe: a mission would require a United Nations mandate and would have to be accepted by the Bundes- tag by majority decision. Furthermore, when considering military options in the event of no agreement being reached between the Macedonian Government and the Albanian community, Germany explicitly excluded military enforcement.

\textsuperscript{218} Schröder, 3 Feb. 2001.


\textsuperscript{221} International Monetary Fund (source: the Statistical Office of Macedonia). Macedonia’s exports to Germany consist mainly of raw materials, agricultural products and textile goods. Imports include above all raw materials for textile processing, finished products, technical products, cars and machinery. (German Auswärtiges Amt, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laenderausgabe.html.)
missions. Other countries, while very reluctant to undertake such missions, declared the option still open for the sake of deterrence.  

As NATO decided to undertake the Essential Harvest mission, Germany declared itself willing to participate. As described above, this mission was different from a military intervention and from KFOR. However, in contrast to KFOR, Essential Harvest had no UN mandate, NATO being in Macedonia to collect weapons at the invitation of the government.

For the German opposition, the lack of UN mandate was a good pretext to refuse participation in Essential Harvest. The real issue, in fact, was a conflict over the defence budget, in which opposition parties were in favour of an increase. One of their arguments was therefore that the German forces were not well equipped for this task. While all favoured German participation in principle, the decision was postponed because of this.

Schröder, Fischer and Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping argued forcefully in the Bundestag for German participation. Schröder reminded people that it was in Germany’s interest to participate in the Macedonian force: instability would sooner or later spread to Germany and there would be a political and an economic price to pay. Macedonia was special since here there was a possibility to save a democratic regime, rather than as in other cases undertaking a mission after a war. A further argument was that Germany could not ask others to take on the burden while it evaded its duties. Germany, which in European matters – not only economically and ecologically but also in security and defence – was a motor of European integration, could not do whatever it wanted to do. Germany, Schröder said, could not have its cake and eat it.

When this protracted issue was finally resolved, a new chapter for Germany opened immediately when for the first time it offered to lead a military mission, Amber Fox, the successor mission to Essential Harvest. Even though, again, it was to be undertaken on Macedonia’s invitation, Germany started to seek a UN mandate. This was finally achieved after a process in which the UK was the primary opponent. On 27 September the Bundestag by a large majority across party lines supported this proposal. In addition to leading the Amber Fox operation, Germany was to contribute roughly one-third of the approximately 1000 soldiers, whose task was to protect the EU and OSCE monitors. The mission started officially on the same day, with an initial three-month mandate.

As the discussions, or rather declarations, by party representatives took place in the Bundestag, both the foreign minister and the defence minister spoke of the fears many had as Essential Harvest started, of the positive process that had taken place in Macedonia and of the pride Germany took in this new mission, based as it

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222 ‘German Chancellor Opposes Possible NATO Intervention in Macedonia’, BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, 13 June 2001.
223 Schröder, 29 Aug. 2001. Participation was finally approved by the Bundestag with 497 votes against 130, eight persons abstaining.
was on negotiations rather than military action and on a UN mandate, initiated by Germany.\textsuperscript{225}

7.6.4.3. Germany and its Partners

\textit{Germany and the United States}

For Germany, as for France, it was important to establish good relations with the new American Administration. The day before Bush was inaugurated, Gerhard Schröder in an article in a German newspaper described the close partnership between Germany and the United States and, underlining its great importance for Germany, ended the article by promising the new president and his administration that in Berlin they had a friend and partner on whom they could count.\textsuperscript{226}

There were, however, for Germany as for France, some issues over which there was a divergence of views. Germany was critical of American policies in the environmental area – to the point of the chancellor sending an appeal to the American Administration not to abandon the Kyoto Protocol.\textsuperscript{227} Where the proposed American National Missile Defense (NMD) system was concerned, Germany was more cautious, explaining that these matters should be discussed in the natural forum, NATO, in order to find the right solution.\textsuperscript{228}

Macedonia as the most acute ongoing crisis was an important issue for discussions between Bush and Schröder. Here again, as with the French, views seemed to coincide. As described above, their joint communiqué brought up the same point as all other similar communiqués as regards support to the Macedonian Government and admonitions to the government and the Albanian terrorists, as well as welcoming the work done by NATO, the EU and the OSCE to come to terms with these problems.\textsuperscript{229}

As in the case of France, the ESDP was the most important issue on which Germany sought to convince the United States. The arguments were the same: the German ministers claimed that the implementation of the ESDP would strengthen rather than weaken NATO. As first Fischer and thereafter Schröder made ‘working visits’ to the United States in February and March, respectively, the ESDP seemed to be a major issue on the agendas. The chancellor, in an interview in connection with his visit, expressed surprise at the fact that some American military personnel and officials were having strong reservations about the ESDP, since this project sought to achieve what the Americans had always demanded from the Europeans – the capability to react in response to regional crises. There were no elements within the ESDP that were in competition with NATO. This, as the chancellor saw it, was proved by the fact that Europe still needed American

\textsuperscript{227} This appeal had been preceded by attempts by the foreign minister and the minister for the environment to convince their counterparts. See ‘Bundesregierung appelliert an die US-Regierung’, 3 Mar. 2001.
\textsuperscript{228} See Fischer, 16 Mar. 2001.
\textsuperscript{229} Schröder, 29 Mar. 2001.
troops on the continent.\textsuperscript{230} The Macedonian crisis also gave an opportunity to describe the American role in Europe. When asked whether the new crisis management units would give the Europeans the capability to handle such crises by themselves, Schröder explained that this would not be the case. Europe would continue to provide the bulk of the troops, as it was now doing in Kosovo, but for some time it would need the support of the United States and NATO for crises of this type.\textsuperscript{231}

As described above, the US’ endorsement of the ESDP, even after the discussions with Schröder, was less than wholehearted even though it expressed its reservations not in the form of criticism of what Europe had been doing in developing the ESDP but as necessary criteria for the future development of the ESDP.\textsuperscript{232}

\textit{Germany and France}

The Franco-German clashes during the Nice meeting resulted in questions being put to the German ministers on many occasions on the state of affairs between the two countries. The ministers chose not to deal with the difficulties associated with this meeting. A speech by the German foreign minister on 30 January, the day before the Blaesheim meeting, demonstrated that Germany was already intent on continuing cooperation with France before they met.\textsuperscript{233}

In this speech Joschka Fischer stated that Europe was based on German–French understanding and close partnership. This relationship was not exchangeable and would prevail for the future of European integration. European integration could only succeed when these two countries made it their common cause. This, he said, explains why there was in this century no alternative to the Franco-German relationship. Without close European and transatlantic partnership Germany would suffer reservations in other countries’ perceptions of it and scepticism. Cooperation did not exclude other countries, however, even though history connected Germany and France to each other in a way in which no other countries had ever been connected.\textsuperscript{234}

As described above (section 7.6.3.3), a range of meetings took place during the period – another three between Chirac, Jospin and Schröder, and several more between Fischer and Védrine. Macedonia was mentioned, France and Germany repeating the usual messages to the extremists and the Macedonian Government.\textsuperscript{235} While several French initiatives were launched at these meetings, the

\textsuperscript{230} ‘Interview mit Bundeskanzler Schröder am 26.3.2001 in der L.A. Times’ (see the web site of Bundesregierung, Interview).

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{232} Schröder, 29 Mar. 2001.

\textsuperscript{233} Joschka Fischer and Hubert Védrine had met already on 11 January in Paris (Fischer visiting the city in order to attend a dinner for the outgoing Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright).

\textsuperscript{234} Fischer, 30 Jan. 2001.

\textsuperscript{235} ‘Bundeskanzler: Zusammenwirken von Deutschland und Frankreich ist unverzichtbarer Baustein der Europäischen Union’, 11 May 2001 (see the web site of Bundesregierung, Pressemitteilungen); ‘Deutsch-französischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat – Erklärung von Freiburg vom 12. juni 2001 (see the web site of Bundesregierung, Pressemitteilungen).
major German initiative seems to have been that taken at the meeting on 6 September, immediately before the EU Genval meeting, when Germany reportedly sought French support for the idea that it would lead Amber Fox. A few days later Fischer, just returning from Macedonia, urged a UN mandate for Amber Fox.

As for France, bilateral cooperation between the two countries seems to have been important for Germany. As the decision was made to continue cooperation with France, Macedonia came in handy for Germany as well. In addition, just as Germany was useful for France, Germany needed France for launching its proposal, since, as described by Joschka Fischer – even after the end of the Cold War and long after the Second World War – it needed the support of others in order not to be suspected of ulterior motives.

**Germany and the United Kingdom**

There is a striking contrast between Germany’s close cooperation with France and the sparsity of its bilateral cooperation with the United Kingdom. When asked by a journalist whether there was any possibility of including the UK in an avant-garde for EU reform, Schröder answered in the negative: the Franco-German cooperation was of another kind, their cooperation had a historical background and people expected them to work in unison. The project of cooperation with France, based as it was on conflicting views as much as on common ones, had no equivalent driving force in any such project with the UK.

A minor incident in the seemingly good cooperation with the UK in relation to the Macedonian crisis took place in September 2001, as reported at a meeting by Scharping and Germany’s top military officer, General Harald Kujat. According to the Germans the British had denied them access to certain roads in Macedonia.

Another disagreement between the two took place at the Genval meeting in September in connection with EU discussions on the need for a UN mandate, in which the UK and Germany were at the opposite ends of the spectrum of views as to whether a mandate was needed or not. Whereas the UK argued that a UN mandate would only be a complication, for Germany it was a necessity, as things stood, if it was be able to assume its first NATO military mission. Reportedly, the issue was only settled after long negotiations. It is not unlikely that some irritation was felt in Germany at the UK not considering the importance of this for Germany, unfavourably comparing the British approach to the French one.

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238 This incident might have been made public as a way to damage the German defence minister, who was described as having the responsibility for it, since he had revealed the route that the German troops were planning to take. Scharping was at this time under severe attack for allegedly having used German official aircraft for private trips. ‘Scharping criticises UK soldiers’, The Scotsman, 13 Sep. 2001; ‘Troubled Berlin defence chief attacks MoD’, Gua., 13 Sep. 2001.
7.6.4.4. The German Cooperation Patterns

The German cooperation pattern was almost identical to the French in terms of activities. A number of unilateral activities were taken, none of them in competition with those of other countries or institutions, but designed as relief for the area and help to the Macedonian Government.

Bilateral activities were pursued together with France, as described above. In general, the two countries described them in the same manner and as being in the interests of other countries as well. For Germany as well as France, cooperation was important in a general sense, quite apart from the importance of the Macedonian crisis. Apparently, for both countries the effort to get the Franco-German ‘engine’ going again was important in the light of recent problems and the now obvious discrepancies in the visions of Europe.

Germany took part in the multilateral cooperation over Macedonia, this being unproblematic and apparently also desired in Germany, even though the process was complicated by internal budget disputes. Amber Fox, because of the character of the crisis and the way in which it had been resolved, was an excellent opportunity for Germany to prove its commitment to the new Europe and continue to get away from its old role of only being the paymaster. Germany’s ambitions were also most probably related to the ESDP and Saint-Malo. For a Germany seeking to discard *Singularisierung* it was a way to assume a role on a par with those of the UK and France. Finally, it was a signal to the United States, signifying that Germany was not seeking to avoid taking its share of the responsibility for European security.

7.6.4.5. Norms

The issue of norms, as for France, was predominantly a question of American perceptions of German adherence. For Germany the compatibility of membership of the ESDP and loyalty to NATO was a very serious matter. There were two particular NATO norms involved: contributing to the NATO military defence and demonstrating political solidarity. During the period under study, Germany repeatedly declared that it was adhering to these two norms.

The question posed to Chancellor Schröder during an interview referring to the comparatively low level of defence expenditure in Germany concerned the first of these two norms, and was closely connected to the ESDP. Would Germany spend more of the already too small allocations to military expenditure on matters that would not benefit NATO? For Germany this was an important question, since in the US loyalty to the Alliance could easily be measured in terms of military expenditure. The chancellor did not agree with the interpretation that a country’s contribution to security was limited to its military expenditure. He drew attention to the costs of the German reunification, to the fact that Germany was taking on a heavier burden for the stabilization of Russia than any other country, and to other costs in connection with making Europe a more stable continent.\(^\text{239}\)

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A third issue was participation in Essential Harvest and Amber Fox. This norm was relevant not only vis-à-vis the United States but also vis-à-vis all EU and NATO members. Again, this was a serious matter for Germany. While other countries had formerly been adverse to seeing Germans in uniform abroad, now the opposite was true – a German refusal to take part in Macedonia would no longer be accepted by other countries. In the choice between being cautious as to a foreign presence and observing the norm according to which Germany must demonstrate solidarity to European security and the institutions – the EU and NATO – the choice of the two German government parties was the latter. This was a predictable outcome and not the first time that Germany had faced this problem with the same final outcome.

As regards the ESDP, Germany was refusing to accept any interpretation that implied that it was not showing loyalty. In the case of the two NATO missions, however, the choice was simple: German wishes and NATO norms coincided, indicating participation.

7.6.5. The United Kingdom and the Macedonian Crisis

7.6.5.1. The British Evaluation of the Crisis

The United Kingdom demonstrated the same pattern as all the institutions and the other countries in this study when it came to the evaluation of the actors involved in the crisis and its view of the crisis itself. There was a striking similarity in the formulations used in condemning the violence and in the Albanian extremists being seen as the guilty party. The motives attributed to the extremists were the same as well – the wish to make the conflict more violent in order to bring about a revision of the borders. The UK, like the other countries, expressed support for the Macedonian Government while at the same time urging it to exercise restraint in its military response to the outbursts of violence and underlining the importance of reforms in favour of the Albanian community. Also like the other countries, the UK supported the Covic Plan for the Presevo Valley, seeing it as providing an opportunity for the Albanian community in the region to have confidence in their future within the FRY.240

The United Kingdom, like the other two EU countries, cited the total support within the international community for the policy pursued. On many occasions it stressed the efforts of the EU and NATO as well as the UN and the personal efforts of the individuals involved.

7.6.5.2. The British Initiatives and Activities

The United Kingdom, like the other countries, maintained contacts directly with the Macedonian president, the prime minister and the two consecutive foreign ministers. These contacts took the form of visits by British officials to the area and

visits by Macedonian ministers to the UK, or telephone calls. As in the case of the other countries, there were different reasons for these contacts. Some were to express support and discuss the particular problems of the situation. On other occasions British ministers were visiting their own units.241

Before the Kosovo crisis the United Kingdom had already established a defence relationship with Macedonia, providing assistance through the Ministry of Defence’s Outreach Programme for Central and Eastern Europe, including visits, courses and other activities. For 2001 the UK was providing assistance on matters such as defence planning, peacekeeping operations, civil–military relations, border control, logistics support and military law. A British army brigadier had been attached to the Macedonian Government as defence adviser since July 2000. In early 2001 two staff officers were deployed to Skopje to support him, and an additional ten-man team travelled to Macedonia to see what further assistance the UK could offer.242 Like France, during the critical period in late March 2001 the UK supplied reconnaissance drones for KFOR to support its work of monitoring the border between Kosovo and Macedonia.243

A major British contribution was its leadership of Essential Harvest and its contribution of the bulk of the forces (1900 out of 4500), the British brigade commander for this mission serving under the Danish commander for Macedonia.244 The United Kingdom had taken on this task because none of the other European NATO countries had the rapid reaction capabilities needed: British light infantry could be flown in to Macedonia in 48 hours, which a British official reportedly stated was the reason why NATO had asked the UK.245 Nor did other countries have the specialists that were required. Among the 1900 soldiers, the UK was expected to send 820 specialists such as bomb disposal experts, reconnaissance troops, engineers, logisticians and medics.246

The UK’s effort in Essential Harvest was a major one in terms of its resources. In late September, as Essential Harvest was nearing its end, according to the press the British armed forces were overstretched. A British official was reported as saying that the UK would only supply a few hundred to the Amber Fox mission, and it was now up to other countries to take the role the UK had had.247

7.6.5.3. The United Kingdom and its Partners
The United Kingdom and the United States

For the United Kingdom, as for the other countries, there were still some question marks over the incoming American Administration as the year 2001 started. Robin

241 For the UK a painful event was the murder of a British soldier in the first days of Essential Harvest, which led not only to the defence minister visiting Macedonia but also to contact with President Trajkovski and some discussion in the UK. (Straw, 30 Aug. 2001.)
243 See, for example, ‘UK Helps Stabilise Situation in Macedonia’, 26 Mar. 2001.
Cook in early February was the first European foreign minister to meet Colin Powell, and Tony Blair, visiting the United States in late February, was the first European head of government after the inauguration to see President Bush.

On all these occasions the atmosphere was friendly, as was evident in the joint press conferences, Robin Cook declaring that the United States was the United Kingdom’s oldest friend and closest ally, and Tony Blair speaking of the difficult times at which the two countries had stood together. In July 2001 President Bush visited the UK on his fourth trip to Europe and the first one that was devoted to an individual European country. Similar warm statements about a special relationship were made. Macedonia, as described above, was discussed with full unanimity.

Even so there were problematic issues between the two countries. The UK, like Germany and France, supported the Kyoto Protocol and was hesitant about the American plans for a missile defence system. These issues were discussed by the two in Washington and in London but without agreement being reached. At the press conferences the differences in views were acknowledged but toned down.

For the United Kingdom, as for the other European countries, the ESDP issue was initially problematic in relation to the United States. The British view, as presented by Geoff Hoon at the annual Munich Security Conference in early February, was similar to that presented by his German and French colleagues, and it was obvious that it was addressed to the US and Donald Rumsfeld, who participated in the meeting. Hoon underlined that the initiative was about strengthening the military capabilities of Europe’s armed forces so that the Europeans could make a better contribution to NATO and undertake military crisis management tasks where the Alliance as such was not engaged. It was not a matter of competing with NATO and the EU would not set up separate military structures. Like the others he stressed the particular assets of the EU, which were valuable in coordinating the range of foreign policy and crisis management tools available. NATO and the EU were therefore complementary, not competing.

The fact that this American anxiety gradually subsided is substantiated in a parliamentary report, which describes the Americans as initially cautious. In his statement in this report Jack Straw (taking office on 8 June 2001) claimed that the American Administration had never said anything disobliging about the ESDP to him. For the British the substantial input in Essential Harvest – as compared to

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249 He had previously seen President Putin in Slovenia and attended the European Council meeting in Göteborg and the NATO Summit in Brussels.
251 Ibid.
the participation of the US, which was limited to logistics personnel – was if not a justification for avoiding American criticism at least clearly helpful in avoiding it.

The United Kingdom and France

The change in government in the UK and the ensuing change in its European policy, which combined with a number of other factors led to the Saint-Malo meeting in December 1998, brought the UK and France even closer to each other. Without illusions among the two or elsewhere that they had an identical view on European defence matters, both sought to emphasize the common elements, clearly determined to increase the chances of the common project of the ESDP succeeding. Only on occasions were discrepancies in their views apparent, as they were over the issue of whether NATO would be the first choice for crisis management tasks that affected the whole of Europe.254

The annual Franco-British Summit at Cahors in early February was the only bilateral meeting that took place between the French and British leaders. The Balkans were among the issues discussed but played a minor role. There was total unanimity between the two.255

As described above (section 7.6.3), the meeting was instead dominated by issues related to the future of Europe, on which the French and the British were already close. Tony Blair, while declining to refer to the phrase ‘federation of nation states’, declared that he shared the views of the French president when the latter referred to them as resting on nation states pursuing their own interests, but doing so in cooperation with one another. The Europe of the future, declared Blair, would be both stronger and more united.256

For the United Kingdom, just as for France, there was little reason to enter into a close bilateral relationship in relation to the Macedonia crisis. No problems needed to be solved between the two, nor was there for the UK a need to promote a common view in order to add weight to its own. Both countries were following the same line, contributing with their military and other resources when needed and asked by others, and taking the same, positive view of the efforts of the institutions involved. Both also in this way and in the spirit of Saint-Malo promoted the ESDP in the sense of being militarily active in a way that could not offend the United States.

The United Kingdom and Germany

As for France, Germany during this period constituted something of a problem for the UK. This problem was caused by the German leaders’ activity in launching their visions for a new Europe, which, centring on a federalist construction, were far from the visions of most British people. For Prime Minister Blair, who with the Saint-Malo agreement had launched a new and more pro-European Union

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course for the UK, this was problematic, and many politicians and others were eager to point out to him that this was the direction towards which others would steer the Union.

Blair attacked this problem in the same way as the French politicians. While he had spelled out his own visions in his speech in Warsaw,\textsuperscript{257} he was not eager for a discussion with the Germans and therefore sought to avoid them. After an article in which Gerhard Schröder had outlined his ideas, the spokesman for Tony Blair referred to the fact that at this stage it was ‘only a policy paper produced by a political party in Germany which had yet to go through all the channels to become a German Government policy document’.\textsuperscript{258}

British–German relations were seemingly friendly but lacked the drive of the Franco-German cooperation; they were limited to single meetings and the annual Königswinter meeting, which did not take place during the period under study. A discussion between Blair and Schröder over dinner in London in late January did not result in any joint press conference.

In the relations between the UK and Germany the Macedonia crisis played little role. They agreed on how to deal with the crisis and in their view on how the institutions should deal with it. Only when the institutions seemed to be failing were special contacts necessary.

Germany, since it did not pose any security problems and was not a partner in a specific joint effort, offered no incentive for particularly close cooperation. European leaders regularly saw each other at meetings which gave them opportunities to check out each others’ opinions. A significant illustration is that on one occasion, when asked about the British–German cooperation, Tony Blair’s spokesman mentioned the socialist parties’ meeting soon to take place.

\textbf{7.6.5.4. The British Cooperation Patterns}

The UK, like the other countries, pursued a number of \textit{unilateral} activities which were seen by itself and others as contributing to a resolution of the conflict. It also, more often than the other two countries, described itself as an actor, working outside the institutions as well as within them. Expressions such as ‘the strong support of Britain and of the European Union’,\textsuperscript{259} ‘the United Kingdom has acted quickly to help shore up democracy and peace in Macedonia’\textsuperscript{260} and ‘the resolve of the United Kingdom, the EU and NATO’\textsuperscript{261} differ from those of Germany and France. Whether these expressions were used as a way to appease the internal opinion that was negative to the EU or for other reasons, in terms of activities the UK was pursuing the same line as the other countries.

\textsuperscript{257} Blair, 6 Oct. 2000.
\textsuperscript{258} ‘10 Downing Street, Lobby Briefing: 4pm Monday 30 April 2001’.
\textsuperscript{259} ‘Supporting the Reconstruction of Yugoslavia: Edited Transcript of a Press Conference given by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, and Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Goran Svilanovic, Belgrade, Wednesday 4 April 2001’.
\textsuperscript{260} Blair, 26 Mar. 2001.
\textsuperscript{261} Straw, 22 June 2001.
In bilateral European cooperation, as seen above, the UK was less active than France and Germany. In terms of the crucial issues of foreign and security policy things were going well (although the threat loomed of having to address the issues of the future of Europe, which in the eyes of all would unavoidably concern security as well). The focus therefore for the UK in early 2001 was on the US, ‘our closest ally’, with which relations had to be established anew with an incoming administration. The disagreements on a range of issues and the initially unfavourable US view of the ESDP made cooperation even more important.

The UK supported multilateral activities within institutions and obviously considered them to be generally well handled within the institutions. In a report from the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, in which Jack Straw outlined government policy towards the area of the former Yugoslavia, he strongly endorsed the work of the institutions. Straw argued that the government was convinced that the closest possible coordination between the EU and NATO offered the best means of coping with such crises, and (the report being published in July) that it should take ‘the most urgent steps to galvanize the international community into giving both the UN and NATO a clear remit to bring the situation in Macedonia under control’.262

In addition when work within the institutions seemed not to be succeeding, other possibilities were seen as favourable. In the troubled days of late June 2001, Tony Blair suggested to George Bush and Jacques Chirac that talks could be held in a similar format to those held at Rambouillet, at which the Contact Group had tried unsuccessfully to solve the problems of Kosovo. The discussion on new forms of negotiation was later extended to include Colin Powell, Javier Solana, Lord Robertson, Joschka Fischer and George Papandreou, foreign minister of Greece. While the response was reportedly cautious but positive, nothing came of this.263

7.6.5.5. Norms

For the UK as for others, the issue of norms was primarily related to the American conception of norms, its focus being on the rights and obligations of NATO membership.

For the British it was therefore important that the ESDP be understood by the US as a project it could agree with. Any questioning of the UK’s adherence to the norms associated with NATO membership, whether as related to political solidarity or to the norm of making a strong contribution to NATO’s defence, was therefore considered serious. The opening phrase of Geoff Hoon’s speech at the important annual Munich Security Conference, in the presence of Donald Rumsfeld, where he mentioned the ESDP’s role as a contribution to NATO in the first place, is telling: ‘It is about strengthening the military capabilities of Europe’s armed forces, so that we can make a better contribution to NATO, and so that we

can undertake military crisis management tasks through the European union, where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.264

At the same time the UK was committed to the Saint-Malo–ESDP process. Leading Essential Harvest (causing some overstretch of capabilities) was for the UK, just as for Germany, a way to contribute in accordance with its promises both to NATO and to the EU.

7.7. Conclusions

In this second case, as in the first one, the goal is to establish whether the cooperation that took place confirms the two hypotheses. The question to be answered is therefore whether the events in Macedonia confirm that France, Germany and the United Kingdom were primarily led by their perceived interests, but norms and institutions also influenced their behaviour. In addition, as the second hypothesis suggests, the question is to find out whether three particular factors – the capability to initiate work quickly, competence in the relevant areas and country support – were of importance for the involvement of institutions in cooperation.

Cooperation when seeking to solve the problems in Macedonia (including those in the Presevo Valley) relates to the way the three countries sought to handle the problems in the region itself vis-à-vis the local actors, but also to the way they acted when establishing the means for putting a military presence into the area. In this the developing ESDP was of crucial importance.

The Macedonian crisis management is generally seen as a success, standing out against a background of many failures. By devoting constant attention to it, as one crisis followed another, the institutions and countries involved prevented the conflict from escalating into a full-blown war, doing so by political rather than military means, and by the end of September 2001, as Essential Harvest ended and Amber Fox was launched, the immediate danger was over.

7.7.1. Interests

All the European countries and the United States had a strong common interest in resolving the crisis and thus preventing it from developing like the many other crises in the former Yugoslavia. The fact that the costs of the previous mistakes had been heavy for all was spelled out many times by the political leaders.

For the Europeans the wish to come to terms with crises of this kind underlay the efforts that led to the decisions taken on the ESDP. Now, at an early stage of the development of the ESDP, came the Macedonian crisis, to which it would be very directly applicable.

Still, however, Europe was highly dependent on the United States’ military capabilities. Both the Albanian community and the Slav Macedonians (who equated NATO with the US) feared a US withdrawal from the area in accordance with President Bush’s campaign promises, as did France, Germany and the UK as well.

While the Europeans and the Americans were of the same view regarding all the important elements of the origin, character and resolution of the crisis, the Americans were initially suspicious of the ESDP, the new administration not yet having discussed the matter with the European leaders. In spite of the strong signals that the ESDP gave of a European ambition to become more independent, not even the most ambitious visions of autonomy saw the American NATO capabilities as being dispensable. The response to the Macedonian crisis therefore had to fit in between the various interests – the US' long-standing ambition to be involved without carrying the main burden, and the European interest in keeping the US involved but only to a degree (on which point the three states were not in agreement).\footnote{See Schmidt, 1996.} For the US this was furthermore a question of norms related to NATO membership.

### 7.7.2. The Involvement of Institutions

In the Macedonian crisis the pattern of institutional cooperation matched the institutional capabilities. The UN, the OSCE, the EU and NATO all had the capability to react quickly as their relevant bodies could meet at short notice, which was necessary in order to deal with the quickly changing scenarios. The same was true when the criterion of competence in the relevant areas is applied: all had the formal capability to deal with their respective parts of crisis management. All also had an infrastructure that made it possible for them to deal with the issues on a continuous basis and to implement decisions.

In a similar way the content of cooperation coincided with the capabilities of the institutions, the needs of the situation and the wishes of the two parties engaged in the conflict. The EU supplied aid, the EUMM monitors and the SAA, with the prospect of EU membership which it offered, while at the same time using this prospect to press the Macedonian Government to introduce reforms. NATO, although the Macedonian Government regarded it with a degree of distrust as being pro-Albanian, was seen as necessary to efforts to prevent terrorists and arms from reaching Macedonia from Kosovo, and held out the hope of membership through its Membership Action Plan (MAP) programme. For the ethnic Albanians, the hope for future border revisions rested with NATO, which had once proved to be their friend.

In a similar way the OSCE, acting through the Spillover Mission and the HCNM, among others, and the UN, in a number of roles in the area and globally, gave support in a variety of ways, which also made it possible to push the different actors towards more constructive policies.

While these capabilities made the four institutions useful, there were two other aspects that accounted for the cooperation between them. First, the institutions were highly complementary in their capabilities, sharing very few of them. These factors accounted for NATO and the EU acting as a couple in their relations with the Macedonian Government and the Albanian community, the EU, with its big toolbox, being the primary institution on the civilian side and NATO having the
same position on the military side. The build-up of capacities that had taken place in the period after the Cold War had benefited both in their respective roles. Second, with the introduction of new capabilities within the EU, contacts between the EU and NATO had become easier. Since 1999 the NATO secretary general had had a counterpart in the EU’s high representative for the CFSP, and in January 2001 as the PSC became operational meetings between it and the NAC became possible. The importance of this change in the atmosphere was evident from remarks made by Lord Robertson at the time, when he described the previous situation as ‘two organizations in the same city but on two different planets’.266

The picture should not be exaggerated, however. The institutions were not able to control the process freely: intergovernmental cooperation meant that the member states could have withdrawn their support at any moment. Cooperation between institutions rested on their approval and their unanimous view on how to resolve the crisis.

The efforts of the institutions and the good cooperation between them were generally praised by the states. No state or institution sought to take over any of the tasks of another. While this united front was a new development, it is also probable that the particular character of the conflict increased the likelihood that it would emerge. Feelings in Macedonia were at times highly antagonistic to the West European states (in particular France, Germany and the UK) and to the United States, and any rifts among the Western states or between the institutions would have weakened them considerably.

On two occasions, however, discussions took place on the role of institutions. One of these concerned the situation in September 2001 as François Léotard sought to position the EU as the head of the new peacekeeping mission. This was seen by the other EU members as premature but it was in line with French thinking and also with the thinking of other EU countries at a later stage as the development of the ESDP had advanced further.

The other example concerned the same discussion, when the UK resisted the German proposal to seek a UN mandate for Amber Fox. The UK referred to the fact that this was not necessary because Amber Fox was in the country at the invitation of the Macedonian Government. According to one newspaper report a further reason was that it would be more convenient to continue as things were than to have a formal UN mandate in which Russia and China would have more substantial input.267

Even as institutions dominated cooperation, there was room for countries to play more or less important roles. Some countries sought or were asked by others to take a more prominent role in the Macedonian crisis management than participation on the same terms as others would have given them. Rather than seeking to forward certain institutions, which in this kind of conflict would be against everyone’s interest, new forms of participation, by adding special represen-

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266 NATO, ‘Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson’, 7–8 June 2001.
tatives to institutions, were found. The reasons for this varied. While the role of Robert Frowick, formally under the OSCE but in reality working outside the institution, was contested – at least after claims that he was associated with the guerrillas – that of James Pardew was asked for by others who were anxious lest the United States leave the Balkans. Germany and the UK as the heads of the two military missions thereby gained in influence and, as France lobbied for the position of special representative to be filled and paid for by itself, it cannot be discounted that its motive for this was to have more insight and influence.

7.7.3. The United States–Europe
The situation, as evident in the summer of 2001, was that the United States and the Europeans had compatible and also highly complementary interests. One important point in time was the NAC meeting in June 2001 when NATO took the decision to send a force for collecting combatants’ weapons, but only after an agreement had been made between the ethnic Albanians and the Slav Macedonians. This was agreeable to all, since with the restrictions in place there would be no danger of the NATO operation turning into a peace enforcement mission.

The US, while it did not withdraw its forces, preferred to take a very modest role in Essential Harvest. While this was against the wish of the Macedonians, the presence of its logistics unit was enough to give the impression of an American presence. In this way the interests of all could be met: the US in accordance with its wishes could avoid a major commitment that would have been in conflict with the campaign promises of President Bush.

The Europeans were able to fulfil their ambitions to start to be of more importance in European security by taking a dominant role in both the Essential Harvest and (later) the Amber Fox missions, thereby reassuring the US that they were prepared to back up their words with troops. When Europe was able to translate its ambitions into action in this way, the ESDP showed itself to be an asset rather than a burden for NATO.

7.7.4. Other Forms of Cooperation
France, Germany and the United Kingdom were without doubt the three most important West European countries in the Macedonian crisis management. As seen from the preceding survey, all three undertook unilateral activities as regards Macedonia, giving substantial help to the area. Together with the United States, these were the countries that saw each other – as well as being seen by others, including the actors in Macedonia – as the major players. This had the consequence that they were deeply involved in helping the Macedonian Government (and that their embassies were attacked in the troubled days of late July).

There was also evidence of a number of instances when only the major states conferred with each other. This group was often the same or similar, according to the accounts – France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, sometimes with the addition of a representative of the EU, NATO and the country holding the EU Presidency. This constellation reflects both the increased
role of institutions in this crisis and the fact that major countries find it useful to deal only with each other, whether to inform each other or to settle problems. As regards the traditional directoire of only the three countries, most probably there were more meetings and contacts than were mentioned in the press, most of them taking place on the fringes of other meetings in the shape of contacts between representatives on a lower level, and telephone contacts.

The Contact Group – which, prominently, also included Russia – is another constellation that had the important role of including Russia’s points of view in the discussion, while still keeping the meetings small. These meetings would most likely be more valuable at times when Russia’s points of view differed from those of the other states or when a decision that was important to Russia needed to be ‘anchored’. Even though the Contact Group meeting of April, after which a communiqué was sent out, only reiterated points on which agreement had been reached earlier, it cannot be excluded that this meeting and the July meeting were valuable in adding to the cohesion among participants.

Generally, groups formed for the transmission of information or problem-solving seem to have been set up on the basis of seeking the smallest possible number of participants needed in order to deal with the matter in hand. For the sake of efficiency, this would be better than involving all at the same time. In the discussion between the UK and Germany on the UN mandate, the British line (if correctly described by the newspaper) could be seen as a way to avoid the risk of a stalemate, in particular as regards China, whose veto on renewing the mandate of UNPREDEP was not appreciated.

7.7.4.1. Bilateral Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation was of comparatively little relevance in efforts to come to terms with the Macedonian crisis, since countries agreed with the way the institutions were handling it. Its existence and absence can be explained by the combinations of interest that were conducive or not conducive to cooperation.

France and Germany were the only two countries that had intense and ongoing cooperation. For both, after a troubled period followed by the decision to intensify cooperation, there must have been a common interest to display unity. The Macedonian conflict was a convenient issue to discuss and one on which joint communiqués could be issued since agreement on the essential elements was strong.

At the same time their conflicting interests where Europe’s future was concerned was a factor that made cooperation important. For both France and Germany, cooperation was the only way to deal with this matter: non-cooperation would have destroyed the basis of their relations with the EU, which were of fundamental importance for both.

Franco-German cooperation was also well served by the compatibility of interests, as it was useful for discussing and acquiring support for proposals which were thereafter launched in a wider forum. Their meetings were therefore more than symbolic in nature, as was seen when France used them to suggest a role for
Léotard and Germany to make the case for a UN mandate. As always, they were also connected to EU meetings.

None of these reasons applied for the other possible ‘couples’.

For France and the UK, neither the areas where they agreed nor those where they disagreed provided any reasons for bilateral cooperation. The parts of the Saint-Malo agreement on which they had different views concerned NATO and should rather be left alone in order not to compromise the future development of the ESDP, in particular when the new American Administration was watching them carefully. In other regards they were of the same opinion, but so was everyone else, so there was no one that needed to be convinced through bilateral statements. Finally, on the intergovernmental approach, for France it would not have been constructive to enter into bilateral cooperation that was directed at Germany, since this would have put the credibility of the Franco-German cooperation in doubt.

The same applied, as was often the case, to German–British cooperation: there was general unanimity between the two, but in areas on which others as well were agreed, and there was therefore no need for cooperation. On the issue of Europe’s future the British had the same attitude as the French – both playing down the differences – but close British–German cooperation in this area would not have had any purpose.

### 7.7.5. Norms

Norms played an important role in connection with the Macedonian crisis, but not as an issue in the relations between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. They were all united and saw the other states and institutions as living up to their expectations.

First, norms were important for the three countries in their relations with the Slav Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians in seeking to convince the two parties to seek new methods of solving their differences. The two were constantly reminded of the rules they had to obey if they sought increased integration with Western Europe.

Norms were also of vital importance in the relations between the United States and the three European countries. However, as described above, as regards the closely connected issue of the ESDP, during the first months of 2001 the US questioned whether the Europeans were adhering to the norms of NATO in developing the ESDP.

It is hard to say whether the Europeans’ taking the responsibility for both Essential Harvest and Amber Fox was really a way to subordinate themselves to a norm. In the British case there might be a norm element due to the fact that no other country was really capable of assuming this task, and also because, according to one newspaper, there was an oversstretch of resources. Germany’s motivations also pointed to what others expected them to do. In both cases, however, the expectations were vested just as much in the EU as in NATO. For both

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countries this was fully in line with their expressed will to seek to play a more important role in European crisis management. In the German case as well it was an important step in becoming a member of the EU and NATO on the same terms as others.

7.7.6. Do Institutions Matter?
As seen above, institutional competences have proved to coincide well with the pattern and content of cooperation. The institutions involved in cooperation all had the capability to react early as well as the institutional competence in the relevant areas, including that of cooperating with each other. Their specific competences were of considerable importance since the states involved would not have been able to conduct negotiations on their own. Moreover, those who did – the representatives of the EU and NATO – represented much more than the member states. On the level above that of military and economic benefits for the Macedonians, joining the two institutions also represented the entry into Western Europe.

While institutions as a whole were more important because of their capabilities, none of them on its own was sufficient for solving the type of problems they met in Macedonia. Cooperation as it took place in this crisis was highly successful but was also fragile, since it had to rely on a common view between institutions to be formed as a crisis erupted. While institutions have been strengthened in order to make cooperation easier between them, there is still the risk that they might not see things alike.

A sign of the new and flexible relations between states and institutions – and an effect of the new importance of institutions – is the constellation of the United States, the EU and NATO. It might be seen as a logical constellation involving the USA, the only remaining superpower, or hyperpower, as the French labelled it. Seen as a compromise – the alternative being American unilateralism – it might be what the Europeans could expect in the future. It is, however, institutionally highly complicated as one state (and potentially also other states) is a member of an institution at the same time as having the role of cooperating with institutions on a par with them.

7.7.7. The Impact of Cooperation
The impact of cooperation has been defined as to be seen in the extent of the commitment made by the participating states. Here too the Macedonian crisis gave an unusual example of success. The unanimity among countries in the evaluation of the origin and handling of the crisis, and the cooperation between NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the UN, were striking in comparison to previous crises in the former Yugoslavia, when no common approach had been accomplished. The Kosovo crisis of 1999 was a case of developments being allowed to go too far before the international community became engaged.

The achievement of common positions was therefore to a considerable degree a result of the previous experiences of lack of agreement and an appreciation of its
consequences. The agreement now was to solve the problem by political means as far as possible.

The agreement on the basic elements and the solution was there very early. The sacrifice was in the way the various countries and institutions took the time to coordinate cooperation, and the way they abstained from promoting their own importance or seeking importance for themselves. All in their statements constantly paid witness to the fact that all were agreed and witnessed to the good work of others. This concerned France as well as the other countries, even though, in its ambitions to give momentum to the ESDP, it had given this joint effort a European label.

While countries adjusted their previous policies to a considerable extent, and their doing so demonstrated a high degree of commitment to this crisis, it was not applicable for the future. No rules were put down on paper by which institutions and states promised to apply the same self-discipline in not promoting their own role at the expense of others. This was the weakness of the rules of the ESDP, and the next crisis management task would have to rely again on their joint evaluation being the same.
Part IV

Conclusion
Chapter 8.
The Results of the Study

8.1. Introduction
The purpose of this study has been to establish and analyse the foreign and security policy cooperation taking place between France, Germany and the United Kingdom in connection with two specific events – the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and the crisis in Macedonia in 2001. The cooperation that followed, or took place during, these two events constitutes two case studies which have some similarities and some dissimilarities. The case studies also include the three countries’ relations to the United States, which had and has a dominating role in European affairs, and the most important international institutions within which they pursue their policies.

The theoretical approach chosen is that of neoliberal institutionalism. The primary hypothesis tested in the study is, according to this approach, that states are primarily guided by their own interests when pursuing cooperation, but they are also influenced in their behaviour by their own perceived norms as members of certain institutions and these norms act as constraining factors on their behaviour. In accordance with neoliberal institutionalist thinking, institutions may also influence cooperation between states in various other ways in facilitating cooperation.

The following sections will summarize and conclude the findings of this study. Section 8.2 will deal with the influence of institutions on cooperation and section 8.3 with the influence of other forms of cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, while section 8.4 will deal with the way in which norms have affected cooperation. Thereafter, in section 8.5, the impact of cooperation – the way in which cooperation has affected the commitment of the three countries – will be dealt with, after which in section 8.6 the two cases will be compared in order to find out whether the results of the preceding analysis hold in two very different circumstances. The final conclusion in section 8.7 will consider the explanatory power of the hypotheses. Finally, section 8.8 on the impact of the new Europe will express some thoughts about what can be expected of the future in the light of the findings of this study.

8.2. The Institutional Influence on Cooperation

8.2.1. Institutional Capabilities versus Country Support
Within the area of foreign and security policy, cooperation is intergovernmental and the degree to which institutions can act without the support of states is accordingly low.

In spite of this, neoliberal institutionalism predicts that institutions can play an important role in cooperation. An additional hypothesis is that three factors will determine institutional cooperation. Of these two can be attributed to institutional capability, and the third is country support. The first two are (1) the capability of an institution to initiate work on an issue quickly and (2) its competence within the
relevant areas. The first depends on the existence of a continually working body, on the rules for calling meetings and on the frequency of regular meetings. The second depends on the formal right to handle the particular issues and the existence of an infrastructure to deal with issues on a continuous basis and implement decisions.

Looking first at the pattern of activities, as seen in the conclusions of the two cases, there was overall a strong relation between the capability to react early and the institutions involved. Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan the institutions that met – the UN, NATO and the EC – were the same as those which were able to do so according to their rules.

After a period, however, the set of institutions involved changed and their composition coincided better with competence to deal with the issues in question – they were now the EC, the EPC and CoCom. This composition reflected the variety of sanctions being discussed – agricultural sanctions and export credits being treated within the EC, the issue of a boycott of the Olympic Games by the EPC, and the technological and strategic issues within CoCom.

In the same way the British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan concerned an initiative which from the start was well known to be primarily endorsed in Europe. Quite logically it was therefore treated within the EPC. The Middle East initiatives were launched within the EC and the EPC, both being the logical choices for European proposals that dealt with economic and political issues.

In the Macedonian crisis the most relevant institutions – the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EU – all took part in this crisis management operation. All having quick reaction capabilities, they were also well suited for reacting quickly to the rapidly changing scenarios.

This involvement of institutions points to a mechanism according to which institutional capabilities were strong determinants of institutional involvement.

So also, however, is the factor of country support. Country support for institutions can, according to the hypothesis, largely be explained by which institutions might seem to suit countries’ own interests best when acting rationally in the pursuit of declared policies. States may for a variety of reasons prefer certain institutions rather than others to deal with specific issues. As seen above, in this study the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have often supported those institutions that were most capable of handling the issue in question. Judged by these factors, it is therefore in many instances not possible to distinguish the influence of institutions from that of states.

Throughout the study it is, however, possible to see that in terms of their perceived interests the support countries gave to particular institutions was logical and consistent with established policies. Since they had the right of veto they could block proposals and exclude institutions to be involved. The American policy of favouring NATO as a forum for activities that the Americans themselves endorsed, such as enforcing sanctions against Afghanistan, is explained by this being the institution in which the United States had and has a unique influence. France, since it generally resisted this influence, consequently sought to avoid NATO’s involvement. Here a distinction must be made between NATO as a
political decision-making institution and NATO’s military role. NATO, with its unique military potential, was perceived as an asset by all. France supported NATO’s role in Macedonia during the period when the danger of the crisis escalating was imminent and during the period when weapons were being collected. Thereafter, as seen first in the proposals of François Léotard (which were clearly premature), it sought as soon as possible to replace NATO by a European force.

For the United States the European institutions were outside its direct control but for this very reason were not to be avoided. Their support was to be gained since they could be useful when conducting a policy that agreed with American policy, for instance, when enforcing sanctions. The period after the Afghanistan invasion gives examples of the means used by the US to influence their members to take the ‘right’ position.

For Europeans, when seeking to promote a proposal that was not endorsed by the US, it was of value to start by settling the details within a European institution, since the US would not be able to use its veto or its influence there. The EC and the EPC were thus of good use for the proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and within the Middle East initiatives. In the same way these institutions provided protection for individual countries, which could hide behind common agreements and not be exposed in discussions on issues where the United States had strong views.

The passivity of the WEU Council was quite obviously the result of a decision taken by the countries involved. The overlap of membership and tasks between the WEU and the EPC was certainly one reason. The other reason why the wide capabilities of the WEU (in being able to bring up matters of security) on no occasion led to a decision to use this institution may be either the fact that the issues brought up here were closely related to economic or political matters and/or the fact that the WEU as a military alliance was not seen as a suitable forum for pursuing cooperation aimed at creating closer links with the Soviet Union, such as the neutrality proposal.¹

The United Nations was the instrument sought by all since it had the most powerful means at its disposal. It was therefore natural to seek help from the UN as long as there was any hope of success. In those cases when either the Soviet Union (as in the Afghanistan crisis) or the United States (in the case of the Middle East) used its power of veto to block the UN from being involved, this was a serious blow to it. Obviously also in matters where there was disagreement between states that were members of the Security Council it was stalemated.

¹ The ‘reactivation’ of the WEU, formalized in 1984, which inter alia raised the level of ministerial attendance at WEU Council meetings, actually started as early as in 1981, as President Mitterrand took initiatives towards removing some of the restrictions for the FRG on the development and production of some conventional weapons. The initiatives were largely interpreted as motivated by a fear of German neutralization, resulting from the decision on deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and the Pershing II, which had led to very large demonstrations in the country.
8.2.2. The Role of Institutions

As seen above, the capability to react quickly and competence within the relevant areas explain much of the cooperation within institutions. As obvious from the analysis, when the factor of country support is also brought in the institutions may easily be rendered unimportant by the veto of states. Institutional influence is therefore closely intertwined with states.

According to the hypothesis and as seen here, institutions may facilitate cooperation through a variety of mechanisms. In doing this they played different roles in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, as the focus now was on seeking to convince countries to change their positions, from those they played later as they dealt with the European proposals. In the first case this is seen primarily in the CoCom cooperation as the United States allegedly put pressure on its allies to introduce sanctions while the European counties sought to avoid these, or at least as far as possible to reduce the costs to themselves of introducing them.

These discussions have been described as coercion: the US pressed for concessions while outlining the consequences in terms of European countries’ access to high technology if they did not make concessions. This linkage could be made more easily through an institution than by contacting and negotiating in a large number of bilateral formats.

A different kind of role and mechanism for an institution acquiring a decisive role for cooperation was the EC/EPC cooperation during the spring of 1980. As the EC states realized that they had similar views on the issue of a neutral Afghanistan and on several Middle East issues, and at the same time doubted the American policy in the area, the institutional mechanisms for coordinating them proved very useful in helping to create the common European view. The EC/EPC thereby became a focus not only for coordination but also in giving an identity to the common efforts as others noticed that a common view had developed among Europeans.

In the Macedonia case as well the condition of broad unity on the crisis at hand was satisfied. This unity meant that it was possible to pursue institutional work as coordination. Here, rather than on one institution the focus was on cooperation within and among several, and a rich variety of frameworks were present in order to coordinate work among them, the EU and NATO being at the centre and establishing particularly close collaboration, and the UN and the OSCE acting as supporting institutions.

The preconditions for the institutions to work varied between on the one side the early period after the Afghanistan invasion and on the other side the later period after the invasion, which was characterized by European cooperation, and the period of the Macedonian crisis. In the first period after the invasion, institutions’ work with these issues failed to produce decisions since countries were not united in their views. In the latter the countries were well in agreement from the start and the institutions provided the necessary coordination. As focuses for coordination institutions could work well and in this process further develop their relationship with the member countries: countries, without abandoning their own
means of control, entered into a new kind of relationship in which institutions were much more than fora for cooperation.

Cooperation had not yet reached such a level that diffuse reciprocity can be seen as a common feature. Specific reciprocity, in which countries have fought for equal value in each exchange, has been common when the same kinds of goods are exchanged. In NATO, in which the US is predominant, the likelihood of diffuse reciprocity is considerably higher, since the main American contribution, as the security guarantor for Europe, cannot be measured against other kinds of good.

A comparison between the Macedonian conflict and the earlier case illustrates well the change in the role of institutions: no institution can handle a conflict on its own, since the number of factors involved in such a crisis is infinite. This means that cooperation among institutions will be necessary. It also means that the various countries, if they are serious about trying to resolve a conflict, will be forced to seek the help of institutions. Intergovernmental decision-making might remain, but attempts by countries to exert direct control over all aspects of cooperation will be increasingly futile because of the complexity of the problems, which require delegation.

8.3. The Influence of Other Forms of Cooperation

While institutional cooperation has been rich, there has also been evidence of a diversity of approaches among the countries under study.

In this study activities have been divided into categories depending on the number of parties. Unilateral stands for those instances when a state has dealt directly with the party whose policies it seeks to affect. Such activities are to be expected when the states under study are big and in particular since two of them, France and the UK, have historical connections to a large number of other states and therefore maintain a global policy. The already existing links were visible in the first case study in the European policies towards the Middle East area. It was also possible to see in the Macedonian crisis that the three countries had a particular role as individual countries.

Unilateral activities as such can be undertaken within a variety of frameworks and with a variety of intentions. First, they may be a natural part of cooperation projects, as all states seek to contribute with the means they have available to accomplish the common goal. The two cases give a number of examples of countries using their resources either in the preliminary stages or alongside the common activities to achieve the agreed goals.

Unilateral activities may also be conducted in the pursuit of a country’s own interests rather than within the framework of the common endeavours, thus constituting a unilateral policy. The French policy competing with the EPC proposal for a neutral Afghanistan is one example, even though the proposals were more or less identical.

There is no clear borderline, however, between unilateral activities and unilateral policy. Activities pursued to support a policy agreed by others also in many cases had a national character. This was in general not disturbing, since in this area
national policies were the norm and the important thing was not to ensure that all countries were subservient to the generally agreed policies but to bring about a solution to the immediate problem.

The vagueness of the borderline can be seen well in the relationship with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1980, as France had to take much criticism in the early part of the period for its policy of continued contacts, which gradually became the policy of all. Germany also maintained such contacts, especially in the planning of a visit to the Soviet Union by Helmut Schmidt – seeking to be open about it in order to avoid criticism – and the British took a similar path in order to promote the neutrality proposal. Finally the United States came along as well, with the meeting in Vienna in May with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Bilateral activities were also of different kinds. They were part of a current cooperation schedule or they took place in the form of ad hoc meetings. They were sometimes motivated by the needs of the relationship between two countries, for instance, to solve a problem, or they were pursued in order to discuss how others could be influenced. The objects of such meetings could be general, for example, the exchange of information about recent visits, meetings and events, or they were focused on practical work within ongoing projects. Some were initiated in order to pave the way for a proposal, either initially or during the course of a project, whereas others were pursued while the project was also being dealt with in a multilateral framework. Some, finally, were conducted with a view to the effect on others of showing that the bilateral cooperation was intense and important.

8.3.1. British–German Cooperation

The British–German relations of 1980 bore a strong resemblance to those of 2001. Among the three countries the British–German couple was the most low-key. The leaders of the two countries meet for annual summits, the so-called Königswinter meetings, but without much fanfare. In terms of interests the two countries had little need for close bilateral cooperation. Each saw the United States as its closest ally, and for Germany France was the other necessary partner for its foreign and security policy. There were informal contacts here as well but the mechanism which the other two constellations of bilateral cooperation had was missing. Between 1980 and 2001 the most important link between the UK and Germany disappeared: in 1994 the UK’s concrete commitment to the defence of the East–West border, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), was disbanded. This had been the link that made relations between the two different from those between Germany and France.

The dividing issue between the two was their different views on European matters in the context of the EC/EPC/EU. The upsurge in contacts as the UK changed its attitude to such cooperation in February 1980 contributed to increased German–British contacts. The prominent example here is in connection with the British proposal for a neutral Afghanistan. Here Germany found a welcome change of the British policy towards the Soviet Union to the policy that Germany had preferred all along and wished to pursue. The fact that the proposal was
connected to a multilateral forum was another positive aspect for Germany, for which multilateral fora were always preferred.

The situation in 2001, while again giving little evidence of bilateral contacts, was different in that the UK had already changed its attitude to European cooperation in terms of the ESDP. However, the British angle on the ESDP was primarily the military one, and the two countries still differed over what Germany saw as the accompanying changes in creating the Europe of the future. This did not create a conflict between them, nor was there a need to demonstrate a joint view, and there was therefore no reason to solve this problem through cooperation.

For the reasons outlined above, bilateral cooperation pursued between the UK and Germany was of a pragmatic nature, dealing with the issues where their interests met, such as paving the way for a proposal endorsed by both with the aim of anchoring it in a multilateral context. In the turbulent period after the invasion of Afghanistan they also had meetings at which they were said to have exchanged information about current events.

8.3.2. Franco-German Cooperation

The Franco-German cooperation is the most formalized of these constellations. Established already in 1963 through the Elysée Treaty, it has several times been ‘intensified’, which usually means that meetings have been more frequent and more bodies have been established, such as a Finance Council and a Defence and Security Council.

The basic elements of Franco-German cooperation, as expressed by the two countries, remained the same between 1980 and 2001: the Franco-German cooperation is a necessity and without it European integration would lose its motor. Still, there is a difference created by the end of the Cold War and the establishment of a reunited Germany. Germany has on occasions been more confident in marking its new position in Europe and done this also in its relations with France. The clash over the voting rules in Nice was the most evident example of a development by which Germany is increasingly able to express its wishes.

Cooperation with France, however, still remains a necessity for Germany and an important part of the connection to the EC/EU, the institution within which Germany can pursue initiatives without being accused of Alleingang, thus meeting the fears that others might have that the new and even stronger Germany will put its imprint on Europe. The difficulties within cooperation, as seen in 2000–2001, were therefore met by setting up an even more intense meeting schedule.

The limits imposed on cooperation from the German side relate to the even stronger link to the United States: even when Germany is no longer a front-line state to the Warsaw Pact, the US remains the closest ally. This priority, evident already with the preamble to the Elysée Treaty, has been seen in both cases. One way of avoiding American criticism has been for Germany to pursue cooperation within European institutions in which its standpoints have not been as visible as they are in transatlantic contexts.

Germany has been valuable for France for several reasons. As the only major country devoted to a European agenda, it was the ideal partner for France with
which it could pursue a number of projects. Proposals supported by the two have had a strong chance of being accepted by the EC/EU as well. German acceptance was not always a given, however. When in connection with the Afghanistan invasion France and Germany discussed the issue of sanctions on the Soviet Union, the joint communiqué issued was closer to the German views than to the French. On many other occasions joint communiqués were sent out in which France and Germany declared their common view on an issue. As in the case of the Macedonian crisis these communiqués were often bland and seemingly based on the common interest in projecting their cooperation as important. The Franco-German cooperation is, as the French have expressed it, a constructed relation, not a natural one, and therefore effort has to be put into it. It rests on the needs of both countries and they therefore have to do their utmost to find common ground.

The issue on which the new Germany felt most free to pronounce its own views was that connected to the future of European integration. As a vision based on federalism, and therefore set in an institutional framework, it was unlikely to create apprehension among others about German unilateralism. It did, however, create some problems for France which, without giving up its own vision, did not want to reveal an open rift. Efforts were therefore made to find issues on which they agreed. Here the Macedonian crisis came as a welcome opportunity to demonstrate common views.

The bilateral cooperation between France and Germany was by far the richest of the three constellations. They used this form to exchange information constantly, to settle conflicting interests and, when their interests were compatible, to anchor their proposals in bilateral cooperation before launching them in other contexts. The common interest of projecting their cooperation as the core of European integration was in addition clearly visible in the richness of their published communiqués.

8.3.3. Franco-British Relations

Franco-British relations were and remain free from the ties that bind Germany and France together in a marriage of convenience. In the Franco-British relationship the full freedom to express their true sentiments has been employed by both countries. In this study the two can be seen to have nurtured all kinds of feelings, from quite frosty to very cordial. On some occasions different kinds of atmosphere can be seen within different areas of cooperation, for instance, in the spring of 1980 when the disagreement regarding the British contribution to the EC budget poisoned the atmosphere to the extent that it led to the postponement of a European Council meeting.

Generally, France and the United Kingdom have cooperated with more success in the defence sector than in other areas. For each country the other has been a trusted partner, the only one with a military force of a size to project power outside Europe. This has led to a number of agreements in this field. Their possession of nuclear forces and their membership of the United Nations Security Council are other bonds between them. Some experiences, like that of the
UNPROFOR mission, in which France and the UK supplied the bulk of the forces, also left an imprint, for instance, in the Saint-Malo agreement, which later came to determine developments within Europe.

The crucial element has been the British attitude to the EC/EU. For France’s aspirations for an increased European role in the world, resting on increased military capabilities, the British contribution was necessary. The British changes of policy in February 1980 and at Saint-Malo were triggers for cooperation in spite of the fact that the main elements of British policy remained the same.

### 8.3.4. Directoire and Other Core Groups

A more elusive form of cooperation is the trilateral one. Usually called the directoire, it is believed to have existed for a long time among the three. Since this is an informal type of cooperation, sometimes carried out in the form of telephone calls or as joint breakfasts on the fringes of a multilateral meeting, it leaves few traces. It is seen as natural and important by the countries in question whereas other countries view it with irritation, since they see it as being pursued at the expense of small states and institutions. This study contains some examples of directoire meetings, but because of the very nature of this kind of cooperation many more can be expected to have taken place.

There were furthermore examples of statements from France and Germany expressing wishes for a directoire to be established in which the United States and the three major states in Western Europe would be the members. According to unconfirmed reports, such directoire meetings had been taking place for some time at the State Department in Washington, attended by the respective European ambassadors. The motivation behind these meetings was said to have been their efficiency combined with the fact that they did not come to public attention.²

Between 1980 and 2001 this closer form of cooperation in the shape of the Contact Group had demonstrated the usefulness of a limited group of countries. After other attempts had failed the Contact Group, consisting of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, gathered and finally agreed on a solution, after which the plan was accepted by the institutions and other states, leading to the Dayton Agreement in late 1995. The Contact Group (now also including Italy), failed at the Rambouillet meeting to prevent the Kosovo war, but the formula itself was still considered an efficient means for solving problems. In the Macedonian case the Contact Group met again twice, but since views were already shared among its members the importance of the meetings is hard to judge.

The concept of core groups became increasingly frequent in discussions in Europe during the 1990s, the Schäuble-Lamers paper and the proposal of Jacques Chirac outlining various forms of concentric circles. The discussion partly centred on whether these groups would be closed or open to all who wished to participate. The British emphasized the need for free entry. There is no reason to believe that the enlarged EU will not see such tendencies. Some have expressed the wish that

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² AN, 26 June 1980; Die Zeit, 1 Feb. 1980.

The variety of types of activity demonstrates the substantial degree of flexibility that states have kept for themselves. All in all this cooperation formed an intricate web of connections within and outside institutions. Its importance was augmented by the fact that France, Germany and the UK were the three most important countries in Western Europe. It demonstrates that, as institutions achieve increasing capabilities and are indispensable parts of European foreign and security policy cooperation, they are still to a large degree reliant on the initiatives of states and dependent on their support.

### 8.3.5. Interests

When explaining the outcome of cooperation, I have claimed that common interests were forceful as explaining the unanimity demonstrated by the United Kingdom, France and Germany. When initiatives were launched aiming at creating stability, the various countries’ interests did not differ greatly.

Compatible interests were also present to a considerable degree in this study, as exemplified by the Franco-German cooperation, within which France and Germany launched proposals in bilateral cooperation, each receiving the support of the other. The interests of the Europeans in seeking a role in Macedonia for the ESDP and the interests of the US in seeking only a nominal presence for itself were not only compatible but also highly complementary.

Conflicting interests have also been present in cooperation between countries: states which have different interests have still chosen to cooperate. Here the institutions have been of crucial importance, since they give the framework in which issues can be tied to each other through package deals and by relying on specific or diffuse reciprocity. For the UK and France, while they were not in agreement on the role of NATO, it was still possible to conclude the Saint-Malo agreement since it was the first step in a development of the security dimension within the EU. Coercion also, reportedly, came in here in 1980 through the CoCom discussions on high technology as the United States was able to convince the others to apply sanctions by referring to other areas in which they were dependent on the US.

### 8.4. Norms

According to the hypothesis of this study, in addition to interests and institutions, norms influence the behaviour of states. The ambition has been to analyse the norms associated with the institutions of which they were members. As mentioned earlier the method used to establish these norms for each country has been to study the statements made by the countries themselves, justifying and explaining
their own behaviour while also at times accusing others of not complying with the norms.

NATO was at the centre of the statements and the discussions on norms. In 1980, during a period dominated by the Afghanistan invasion, this is not surprising. References to EC norms were almost non-existent, apart from some statements by France and Germany. In the case study on the Macedonian crisis as well, NATO norms were in the forefront as the US questioned whether the European NATO members’ participation in the ESDP was compatible with the norms of NATO membership.

The norms that were brought up were almost the same in 1980 and 2001.

In 1980, Germany and the United Kingdom declared themselves loyal to NATO in terms of a general or political solidarity, the contribution to the common NATO defence and joint consultations. France had a different way of expressing its norms, speaking about its loyalty to its Article 5 obligations (which for Germany and the UK were certainly too obvious to mention) but excluding political solidarity and contributions to the common defence – the latter for the obvious reason that France was outside NATO’s integrated military cooperation.

In 2001, political solidarity and contributions to the NATO defence were central. The issue of the latter was connected both to the ESDP and to the low level of military expenditure in Europe. In 2001 the American admonitions concerned all three countries even though France was considered the driving force behind Europe’s seeking autonomy. This questioning concerned the issue of whether they were detracting from the NATO defence by giving resources to the EU’s new crisis management capabilities and whether the ESDP project was compatible with the political solidarity expected of NATO members.

The defence of the European position was also similar to the arguments made in 1980, with the difference that the fact that the ESDP was now a concrete commitment now made the discussion more heated. The compatibility between the goals of NATO and the ESDP, both leading to the strengthening of capabilities, was stressed. For the Europeans their contributions to Essential Harvest and Amber Fox served as proving their point, and for a while the issue of norms connected to the ESDP was laid to rest.

The norm of joint consultations was an issue only in 1980. In 2001 as expected the dense net of contacts combined with the positive development of crisis management related to the Macedonian crisis and therefore this issue was never raised as a problem.4

The reactions to such accusations varied. Cyrus Vance was apologetic for not having consulted others and promised to do better. The French excuses in connection with the Brezhnev meeting were also such that their awareness that this was a breach of a norm was obvious. In connection with the Middle East initiatives there were, however, strong protests by the Europeans, this time also including the Germans, against the American interpretation of political solidarity.

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4 The norm of joint consultations was, however, brought up by the United States on a number of occasions, as the American leaders assured the Europeans that the issue of missile defence would be brought up in joint consultations.
as including Europe’s abstaining from taking initiatives in the Middle East. The strong reactions to these perceived breaches underline the fact that sanctions (at least in the form of verbal accusations) did take place. The clearest example indicating that norms had an impact on behaviour can be found in German comments in connection with the boycott of the Olympic Games. On this occasion Germany referred to the norm of political solidarity and added that this required sacrifices. Many cases were, however, inconclusive. Norms, but also self-interest, may have accounted for the behaviour in question. The two concepts are also related: it might be in a country’s interest to follow a norm.

These and other examples demonstrate, I conclude, that norms did exist as a valid factor in the behaviour of states. They did not on many occasions lead to an obvious change in behaviour but they were recognized as valid, being based on the rights and obligations of institutional membership, and since they led to some consequences for those who in the eyes of others did not conform to them, they also served to inform others about the price to be paid for breaching norms.

8.5. The Impact of Cooperation

The impact of cooperation has been harder to establish than its pattern or content. As spelled out in chapter 3, this is especially true for the economic area, where a number of factors make it very difficult to see whether the decisions taken really meant an increased commitment. Still, the general verdict among the Americans was that the result was poor. European countries had only committed themselves to minor changes of their previous policies. From the perspective of France, Germany and the UK, they had managed to avoid a commitment they did not wish to make in the form of costly sanctions, the exception being Germany’s abstention from the Olympic Games.

Impact stands for the difference made to the commitment of the cooperating states. It should preferably be established in terms of an agreement, but can also be established at another stage, for example, when countries have agreed among themselves. The neutrality proposal was agreed to at an early stage when it was not fully elaborated, and the Middle East initiatives never went further than the Venice summit. Still, both of them contributed to a feeling of success and increased sense of commitment among the European states because they had managed to unite and Europe had been recognized by others as an actor.

Furthermore, while the Middle East initiatives did not go further than the Venice Declaration of June 1980, it should be recalled that the process of closer cooperation still continued in the shape of efforts to improve the rules for calling meetings within the EPC. These became part of the development of the EC, the first steps of which were the Übersee speech of Lord Carrington in November 1980 and the London Report of 1981.

The Macedonian crisis was different in terms of countries’ changes of policy in comparison to the earlier crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Since there was no agreement there were no guarantees that the countries had renounced the possibility of pursuing another policy in the future, but the Macedonian crisis and the way it was dealt with have had an impact for the future all the same in that it has
become a model, serving as an example of the good results that can be achieved when both the political will and the capabilities for coordinating policies exist.

Impact may, as seen here, be of two different kinds: one concerns the commitment among those who cooperate to cooperation itself, for example, to another form of decision-making, such as meeting more often or meeting at the request of only one cooperation partner. The other kind is the commitment to forsake other policies, for example, by committing themselves to a common policy as regards the Middle East.

In terms of the approach of this study the two types of impact are likely to be interrelated. As states engage in successful cooperation in which the benefits are obvious they will be more prone to commit themselves to more binding forms of cooperation if they believe that the benefits from this will outweigh the risks of losing some sovereignty.

8.6. The Two Cases

The two cases – one related to cooperation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the other related to the crisis in Macedonia, as spelled out in chapter 1 and chapter 7 – were both related to cooperation in times of turbulence (albeit of different kinds) when the stakes were high.

The two cases were, however, also very different.

First, one took place during the Cold War and the other some years after. It is therefore a hard test for the primary hypothesis put forward here to see whether it holds in two such different sets of circumstances between which so many elements of European security had changed. A second important difference is the level of institutionalization in Europe: institutions were better equipped in 2001 to deal with the problems and cooperate with each other. The question here is whether the differences in cooperation could be attributable to the difference in situations.

The lack of tension and the fact that the United States was no longer needed in Europe for its immediate defence needs might seem to be reasons to expect their relations to change. In the event, relations between the three states under study and the US turned out to be fundamentally the same.

As explained by the approach of this study, the difference between a Cold War and a post-Cold War setting was not substantial in the sense of changing the relationships between France, Germany, the UK and the US. Differences in capabilities, which in this study are seen to influence perceived interests, remained after the Cold War. The dependence on the United States created by these differences also turned out to be an important factor in post-Cold War European–American relations.

The European policies towards the United States were therefore largely similar, shaped by the need for them to achieve the consent of the US for their policies. The policies of the individual states towards the US remained as well, both the United Kingdom and Germany calling the US their closest ally, whereas France, while keeping more of a distance from the US, was eager not to be misunderstood in its policies.
Relations between the individual countries also remained similar. A change of German policies might have been expected as Germany was now the biggest country in Western Europe, having been relieved of its Second World War heritage of a divided nation. This did not take place, however. Germany became freer to express its views, for instance, on Europe’s future, but both in its policies and in official statements the need to cooperate closely with France and to be embedded in institutions continued to govern its policies. Considering the fact that Germany’s policies were now watched even more closely by others, seeking to find out whether they would now become unilateral, it was apparently seen to be in Germany’s interest to continue its previous policy even under the new circumstances.

The second area in which the two cases differ is related to the institutions. In 2001 the continuing build-up of the institutions which started in the early 1990s had given them the capability to react quickly, an infrastructure for handling issues on a continuous basis and not least the capability to work together with others, which was particularly important for the EU and NATO.

The question is whether it was the build-up of capability itself or the fact that the crisis took place after the end of the Cold War that accounted for the difference in institutional involvement and impact in the Macedonian case.

First of all, it is not easy to draw a line between the two, since obviously the fall of the Berlin Wall affected the way in which institutions worked. The roles of the UN and the OSCE were fundamentally different from what they would have been if the bloc confrontation had still been going on. In the case of both the EU and NATO the development of institutional capacity rested on post-Cold War experiences.

It was, however, not achieved immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Macedonian crisis can be compared to other crises in the Balkans. One decisive factor in the Macedonian crisis was the commonality of views. The other was the existing new capabilities. As seen in the analysis, even if the views of the countries involved had been identical, without the help of the new capabilities they would not have been able to manage the vast amount of work and coordination that was achieved.

8.7. Final Conclusion
The primary hypothesis set up – that states are primarily led by their perceived interests, but that norms and institutions also influence their behaviour – has been seen to have a strong explanatory power. Institutions have assumed a vital role but not independently of countries. In a complicated interplay with countries they have, however, become important and even more so after the end of the Cold War because of the complexity of problems that require their involvement.

Norms have proved important too, primarily as relevant yardsticks for assessing the behaviour of others. States that do not, in the eyes of others, follow the norms that others perceive as valid will suffer some consequences and the likelihood is that will affect their calculations in the future.
Above all, however, the perceived interests of states, in the form of pursuing their declared policies in such a way as to maximize their benefits and avoid areas where they are vulnerable, have been seen to explain the behavior of states in cooperation. Common, compatible and conflicting interests have all proved to lead to cooperation. The interests of states were, as hypothesized, also the ground for their cooperation within and outside institutions. This was after all intergovernmental cooperation.

Institutional capabilities, I argue, have as stated in the second hypothesis been relevant factors in explaining institutional cooperation in terms of the pattern and content of cooperation. As the hypothesis would predict, however, country support turned out to be decisive for cooperation. The impact of institutions on cooperation was, however, not limited to supplying certain institutional capabilities. As the study shows, they had important roles in 1980 in the European proposals, as well as in 2001. In various ways they facilitated agreements and proved indispensable for governments. Still, this cooperation is fragile as unanimity among countries is still the basis for it.

8.8. The Future: The Impact of the New Europe

As seen in this study, the experience of the Macedonian crisis diverges in many ways from that of the previous crises. A relevant question is whether cooperation as seen in the Macedonian case will be the pattern for the future.

The kind of cooperation seen in the Macedonian crisis, will I believe, be the most probable scenario for future crisis management when this takes place in Europe. This is roughly what all the struggles in the former Yugoslavia have been about, and with disastrous results. Looking only at the European Union, the cohesion that now surrounds crisis management in Europe is striking and can only be explained by conflicts such as these having helped the learning process. All now realize that the price of diverging views or of promoting national objectives at the expense of common objectives is very high.

While the ground for European success in crisis management is weak in the sense that it rests on continued unanimity, there are other capabilities that are helping Europe to be more effective. After the events of 2001 the institutional build-up has continued within the EU. Within all the institutions the capability for rapid reaction and knowledge of how to meet the new types of threat have gradually expanded. The problem might, however, still be related to capability. As seen from the survey of events, the Macedonian crisis received an exceptional level of attention from the highest officials of countries and institutions, without which the efforts to resolve it would most probably not have succeeded. This might be hard to repeat, especially if several crises were to erupt at the same time.

The issue becomes different if areas outside the European continent are involved. The reason for this is that the motivation might not be as strong. Furthermore, the EU has never been united on the issue of what a global policy for the Union would entail. Disagreements in this area are not only related to the US (towards which the UK, France and Germany have different types of relationship) but also to the variety of interests of the most important members in other
areas of the world and, finally, to the variety of ideas as to the role the EU should have in the world, where members also differ. The chances of a Macedonia scenario being repeated are therefore higher for a possible European conflict than for one in which any of the interests mentioned were at hand. There is also a serious problem for a future European scenario in that the EU is now in a situation of ‘enlargement fatigue’; and the powerful ‘carrot’ that the EU and NATO were able to offer Macedonia – the hope of eventual membership – will not be available, at least in the short run, for a number of other countries that might hope for it. Without this powerful tool even constant and high-level attention to a crisis might be to no avail.

Another factor, as described in the Macedonia chapter, is that in the new Europe there are still different driving forces for the various countries. It is still important for countries to put their own imprint on cooperation or on Europe. National influence and national prestige have not ceased to have an impact on cooperation even though in the Macedonian case none of this detracted from the joint effort. In order for European stability to be maintained, all states in Europe need to see the future in subordinating their views to a wider, European view and continue to keep fresh in their minds the price that all of Europe will have to pay if they forget the lessons learnt in the former Yugoslavia.

A vital question is the relation to the United States. The Macedonian example, set in the framework of the ESDP, is certainly limited, but it provides clear evidence of a continuation of a pattern of the transatlantic relationship. The dependence on the US was strong in a period when the threat was evident to all. It is, however, strong also today when the military threat is reduced. For the EU to take on more demanding military tasks requires the consent of NATO in terms of NATO’s agreeing to lend it resources.

If the crisis in Macedonia is compared with the Iraq war, the contrast – unity in Europe on an issue close to Europe but disagreement on a global issue – is evident. In 2001 the threat of a conflict close to their own countries forced the European countries to unite. The Iraq issue, coupled as it was to a number of economic and other interests, made unity much more difficult. Iraq was in that sense Afghanistan 1980 all over again in the roles taken by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, the continuation of the conflict also shows a similar pattern: the three major European countries once again sought each others’ help in patching their policies together. After the invasion of Afghanistan this took the form of the proposal for a neutral Afghanistan and the Middle East initiatives; after Iraq there were several unsuccessful meetings and, finally, the new UN resolution, in which countries that were against the attack are now united in their commitment to building the country. It is a familiar pattern: the three major countries of Europe do not change strongly held views in order to accommodate each other, but they are happy if, when they see the consequences of disunity, they can once again come closer.
Appendices and References
Appendix 1. The Institutions

This appendix is not a comprehensive description of the history, tasks and organs of the institutions mentioned in the text. It is intended rather to provide a background to the information on the institutions' tasks and capabilities that is given in the chapters.

1. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom)

CoCom was formed by Western governments in 1949 to prevent the transfer of military-related technology from the West to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1980 it included all the NATO members (except Iceland) plus Japan. CoCom was an intergovernmental institution, tasked with coordinating national policies on the export of strategic items. For controlled items, CoCom procedures were intended to prevent their acquisition by a named list of countries. Procedures applied to other countries were designed to prevent the diversion of controlled items to the target states.

While formally independent, it was close to the United States (operating from a small annex to the US Embassy in Paris). It was also close to NATO, but without any formal relationship to it. The CoCom system was not binding, however, and could only be enforced through the domestic legislation of member states.¹

Every three years negotiations took place on a detailed list of items to be subject to control. Member states met regularly to discuss proposed exceptions to the list.

The CoCom list included three basic lists: (1) an atomic energy list, (2) a munitions list and (3) an industrial commercial list. While the first two included clearly military commodities, the last was the most controversial list, as it covered dual-use products.

In November 1993 in The Hague representatives of the 19 CoCom member states agreed to terminate CoCom and establish a new multilateral arrangement, later to be called the Wassenaar Arrangement.

2. The CSCE/OSCE

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) originated as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. For some 20 years it served as a series of meetings. The Paris Summit of November 1990 set it on a new course, establishing in the Charter of Paris 1990 a Secretariat, a Conflict Prevention Centre, and an Office for Free Elections. In 1994 the Budapest Summit agreed to change its name to the present one, which reflected its institutional development.

The Bodies

The Permanent Council is the OSCE’s main standing body for political consultation and decision-making. Its members are the permanent representatives of the participating states, who meet weekly in Vienna. The foreign ministers of the 55 member states hold annual Ministerial Council meetings except in years where a Summit of the heads of state or government takes place. The Chairman-in-Office (CiO) of the OSCE (in 2001 Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana) is the foreign minister of the country holding the chairmanship, who has the overall responsibility for executive action. The chairmanship rotates annually. The present, former and future chairs constitute the OSCE Troika, which advises the CiO. The chairman can appoint personal or special representatives to deal with specific issues or situations.

The OSCE also includes a Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General (in 2001 Jan Kubis of Slovakia). Other instruments at its disposal are the Office for Democratic Institutions and

¹ Mastanduno, 1992, p. 6; McIntyre and Cupitt, 1980, pp. 82–90.
3. The European Communities

The European Communities (EC) were composed of three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1952, and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), both established as the Treaty of Rome came into force on 1 January 1958. In 1967 the institutions of the three communities were merged, a single Commission superseding the High Authority of the ECSC and the Commissions of the EEC and EAEC. At the same time a single Council of Ministers superseded the Councils of the ECSC, EEC and EAEC. In 1980, the EC included Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Increasingly thereafter, the European Communities began to be called the European Community.

The Bodies

The European Council, the highest authority in which heads of state and government meet, in 1980 met three times a year.

Meetings of the Council of Ministers, representing the national level, were held normally once a week and the composition of the Council depended on the subject under discussion. In principle only one member of each government was to represent the country. Each country in rotation held the Presidency for six months. When held by foreign ministers, its meetings were called the General Affairs Council. The foreign ministers were given the tasks not only of discussing foreign policy matters but also of exercising general coordination over the work of the other ministerial councils. The General Affairs Council usually met about once a month. Decisions were taken either unanimously, by simple majority or by weighted majority.

Heads of delegations and ambassadors of EC countries, the Permanent Representatives, met in the COREPER (Comité des Représentants Permanents de la CEE), whose task was to prepare the ministerial meetings and resolve national disagreements as far as possible. When they all agreed, a draft proposal was normally given to the subsequent Council meeting and adopted. The Council also had a Secretariat.

The Commission in 1980 had 13 members appointed by the member states for a term of four years. It met as a body once a week. It was led by a president, in 1980 Roy Jenkins of the UK. The tasks of the Commission can be summarized as being those of law-making initiative, supervision and implementation. It had the right to put proposals before the Council of Ministers, to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty were carried out and to implement decisions taken by the Council. The Commission acts by unanimity vote.

Decisions within the Communities were embodied in regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. Regulations are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all member states. Directives are binding as regards the result to be achieved but the form and method are left to the individual states to decide. Decisions may be addressed to a government, an enterprise or an individual. They are binding in their entirety on those to whom they are addressed. Recommendations and opinions are not binding.

4. European Political Cooperation (EPC)

The basic procedures of the EPC were established through the Luxembourg Report of 1970 and the Copenhagen Report of 1973. Later they were expanded in the Single European Act of 1986, finally to be replaced in 1993 by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. The goals of the EPC were: (1) to ensure, by means of regular consultations and exchanges of information, improved mutual understanding as regards the main problems of
international relations; and (2) to strengthen solidarity between governments by promoting the harmonization of their views and the alignment of their positions and, wherever it appears possible and desirable, joint action.  

The Copenhagen Report also states, under the heading ‘Priorities to be set in respect of the matters to be dealt with within the framework of Political Cooperation’:

Governments will consult each other on all important foreign policy questions and will work out priorities, observing the following criteria:
1. The purpose of the consultation is to seek common policies on practical problems: and
2. The subjects dealt with must concern European interests whether in Europe itself or elsewhere where the adoption of a common position is necessary or desirable.

On these questions each State undertakes as a general rule not to take up final positions without prior consultation with its partners within the framework of the political cooperation machinery.

The Bodies

The presidencies. The EPC was an intergovernmental form of cooperation among the foreign ministries of the EC member states and thus of a different nature from the external cooperation which was treaty-bound and shaped by the Community institutions. It was led by the country that held the Presidency of the EC and therefore had no permanent meeting place. The Presidency was in charge of some implementation of decisions taken at meetings and made proposals on its own or another member’s initiative to initiate consultations. The EPC had no common secretariat and no bureaucracy apart from that supplied by each of the presidencies.

The European Council, established in 1974, was common for the EPC and the EC, being the highest authority for both. In 1980 it met three times. Foreign ministers within the political cooperation met as the Conference of Foreign Ministers, also called the Ministerial Conference. The meetings took place four times per year and when foreign ministers happened to come together on other occasions. The informal so-called Gymnich meetings between foreign ministers, which started in 1974, were another form of EPC cooperation. In 1980, for extra meetings to be convened, all nine member states had to agree to do this.

The Commission also had a role in the EPC. The Copenhagen report stated that ‘For matters which have an incidence on Community activities close contact will be maintained with the institutions of the Community.’ The Political Committee, composed of the political directors of member states, prepared the Ministerial Council meetings and also carried out others tasks given to them by the foreign ministers. The Political Committee meetings took place as frequently as the intensification of the work required, usually at least once a month. The Group of Correspondents of the foreign ministries were responsible for following up the implementation of political cooperation and studying problems of organization and those of a general nature. For certain matters they were also to prepare the work of the Political Committee. The COREU (CORrespondence EUropéenne) system, through which an extensive amount of information was handled, was another part of this infrastructure.

EC–EPC Links

The distinction between Community-based cooperation and the EPC, which had been strong at the outset, became weaker in 1974 as the decision was taken that during Council sessions ministers would be allowed to meet as a political coordinating body. The establishment of the

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3 Bonvicini, 1982.
European Council during the same year was another link between the two. On a high level, the president of the Commission or the commissioner responsible for external affairs participated regularly in the European Council and the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

The Commission was invited to make its views known in accordance with common practice. In addition, the Council, through the president of COREPER, was to be informed by the Presidency of the agreed conclusions resulting from the political cooperation.

5. The European Union

The European Union was established on 1 November 1993 upon the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). The Maastricht Treaty organized the European Union activities in three areas: Community activities, the CFSP and cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA). The members in 2001 were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In 2004 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined.

The European Council and the Council of the European Union (also termed the EU Council—previously the Council of Ministers) are, as previously, the main decision-making bodies, COREPER preparing the EU Council meetings. The six-month Presidency chairs the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the subordinate bodies, provides the impetus for and follow-up of the Union’s work, is responsible for the implementation of decisions, and represents the Union internationally.

Title V of the Treaty on European Union replaced the EPC with an intergovernmental ‘pillar’, the CFSP, the aim being:

– to safeguard the common values and fundamental values of the Union;
– to strengthen the security of the Union;
— to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
– to promote international cooperation; and
– to develop democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.

In consecutive steps the CFSP has been strengthened through more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making. While the general rule of unanimity voting remains, it is also possible to adopt measures by a qualified majority vote, with safeguards such as constructive abstention. The Commission has also become more involved.

The role that the WEU had previously has been gradually assumed by the EU, the first step being taken at the Amsterdam European Council meeting in June 1997. In Cologne in June 1999 the European Council agreed to give the EU itself the means and capabilities needed for the implementation of a common European security and defence policy (ESDP), which forms part of the CFSP. The ESDP is divided into three components, of which two — civilian and military crisis management — are the Petersberg tasks. The Petersberg tasks incorporate humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The third task is conflict prevention.

This development continued in October 1999 as the Secretary-General of the Council was also given the role of High Representative of the CFSP, contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of decisions and acting on behalf of the EU Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties. External representation and implementation of the CFSP are further strengthened by the work of the Troika, which incorporates the minister for foreign affairs of the country holding the EU Presidency, the commissioner responsible for external relations and, if necessary, a representative of the country that will hold the next EU Presidency. At the same time the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) was set up, led by the High Representative and with the aim of providing effective and more united reactions.
The military component was introduced with the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, when the Helsinki Headline Goal was established, setting among others the following target: ‘Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50 000–60 000 persons capable of the full range of tasks stated in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union.’

Under the terms of the Nice Treaty of 2001, the Political Committee (PoCo) was replaced by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which started work in January 2001. In June 2001 the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and under its direction the European Union Military Staff Office (EUMS) started work.

6. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949, is the basis for the Atlantic Alliance, a defensive political and military alliance, which when founded had 12 members. In 1980 they were 15, in 2001 they were 19, and in April 2004 they became 26. The objectives of the Atlantic Alliance are implemented by NATO. Their memberships do not, however, coincide completely; most prominently, in 1966 France left the integrated military structure of NATO. As member of the Alliance, however, it remains in the civilian structures.

The members of the Atlantic Alliance in 1980 were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the US. In 2001 it also included Spain (since 1982) as well as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (since 1999). In April 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty defines the character of a military alliance:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 or the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Article 6 defines the area of Article 5 as ‘on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer’.

The Bodies

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal authority of the Alliance. Its task is to work towards the fulfilment of the Treaty’s basic objectives – international peace and the security of its member countries. It is chaired by the Secretary General of NATO, in 1980 Joseph Luns of the Netherlands and in 2001 Lord Robertson of the United Kingdom.

The Council usually meets at the level of ambassadors of the member countries (permanent representatives). The permanent representatives are the representatives of their own countries and act on instructions from their national capitals. Meetings take place once a week or more often if requested by the chairman or any of its members at about two hours’ notice. The Council also meets at the level of foreign ministers and defence ministers (twice a year) or at the level of

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4 Greece was outside the integrated military structure of NATO between 1974 and October 1980.
5 The second part of Article 6 adds ‘on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the tropic of Cancer’.
heads of state and government. Regardless of level of representation, its decisions have the same validity.

Decisions are taken by consent; no voting takes place. Once adopted by the Council decisions become binding and can only be reversed by the Council itself.

The end of the Cold War initiated a transformation of the Atlantic Alliance, not least through the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) created in December 1991 was a forum for consultation in political and security matters with Central and Eastern Europe. In January 1994 the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was formed, in which practical military and defence-related cooperation activities were carried out, based on bilateral framework agreements. NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 1997.

**Political Consultation**

Political consultation ranges over the whole field of foreign policy and is not limited to NATO’s geographical area. Thus, any political issue may be raised by any of its members. Political consultation rests on the report of the ‘Three Wise Men’, approved by the Alliance in 1956, in which the Alliance members are required to consult each other as follows:

- They should inform the Council of any development significantly affecting the Alliance and should do this not as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation.
- Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character.
- A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible.
- In developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council.
- Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies; when, for national reasons, the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that, when an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council’s discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national action or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.\(^7\)

Other important reports of the Atlantic Alliance have also underlined the need for improved political consultations, among them the Harmel Report of 1967 and the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations of June 1974.\(^8\)

### 7. The United Nations

The United Nations was established on 24 October 1945. Its four principal purposes are: (1) to maintain international peace and security; (2) to develop friendly relations among nations based on the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (3) to achieve international


\(^7\) The above text is a summary of the report, in *NATO Handbook*, 1989, p. 187.

cooperation in solving international economic, social, cultural or humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and (4) to serve as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends.

The Bodies

The General Assembly

The General Assembly consists of all the members of the UN, each country having one vote. Decisions on substantive issues are taken by a majority or by a two-thirds vote depending on the importance of the matter.

Regular sessions are held once a year, commencing in September and normally lasting until mid-December. Special sessions may be convened by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council, of a majority of the members of the UN or of one member if the majority of the members concur. An emergency special session may be convened within 24 hours of a request by the Security Council on the vote of any nine members of the Council itself or by a majority of the UN members or by one member if the majority of the members concur.

The General Assembly is empowered to discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any UN organ and, except where an issue is being discussed by the Security Council, to make recommendations on it. Recommendations, as a general rule, have no legally binding character and cannot create direct legal obligations for members.

The Security Council

The Security Council consists of 15 members, with five permanent members – China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia (in 1980 the Soviet Union) and ten non-permanent members, elected for a two-year term. The Security Council is organized in such a way as to be able to work continuously. Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine members. On all other matters decisions are made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring vote of the permanent members. The presidency of the Council rotates on a monthly basis.

The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Members of the UN have agreed to carry out its decisions. Whenever the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace exists or that a breach of the peace or act of aggression has taken place, it may decide upon measures to meet the situation. The right of veto may, however, not be used by a permanent member if this member is party to a dispute. In practice an abstention by one of the permanent members is not seen as a veto.

The Security Council has a wide range of policies at its disposal, including that of taking military action against a country that has been declared an aggressor in the Security Council. Another means is to call on member states to apply sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force in order to prevent or stop aggression.

In 1980 Kurt Waldheim of Austria was the Secretary-General and in 2001 Kofi Annan of Ghana.

8. The Western European Union (WEU)

The origin of the Western European Union is the Brussels Treaty of 1948. It was established under its present name through the Brussels Treaty as amended by the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 23 October 1954. The founding members were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The FRG and Italy acceded as the Brussels Treaty Organization was incorporated into the WEU.

In December 1950 (following the establishment of NATO in 1949) the Brussels Treaty Organization transferred its defence function to the NATO command.

Article V defines the character of the WEU as a defence alliance: if any of the high contracting parties is the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

The preceding Article IV, however, describes the transfer of authorities to NATO:

In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The Bodies

In 1980 the supreme authority, the WEU Ministerial Council, met once or twice yearly. Originally it consisted of the foreign ministers of the member countries, but in practice ministers were not present, apart from the one representing the country holding the Presidency. The Permanent Council met at the level of ambassadors. Before 1993 it consisted of the ambassadors to London and a British Foreign Office employee, and met in London under the chairmanship of the Secretary General. Meetings took place once or twice a month. (In 1980 they met 14 times.) The Permanent Council was ‘mandated to discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the Ministers and to follow up their decisions’ (Rome Declaration 1984).

As a rule decisions were taken by unanimity. According to the Treaty the Council was to be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. According to Article VIII: ‘At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.’

The Presidency rotated annually among the members. In 1980 Luxembourg held this position. A small Secretariat was established in London and headed by the Secretary General, who in 1980 was Edouard Longerstaey of Belgium. The Parliamentary Assembly was composed of the member countries’ representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and met twice a year. It was empowered to address recommendations or transmit opinions to the Council, national parliaments, governments and international organizations.

The Development of the WEU

The WEU has undergone several vital changes. Between 1963 and 1973 it served as a link between the EC and the UK, this role ending with the entry of the UK into the EC. It lost further relevance when the European Political Cooperation was formed, partly overlapping in area and including all WEU members (plus Denmark and Ireland).

A new lease of life started in the early 1980s with the so-called reactivation of the WEU (by the Rome Declaration of 1984), leading to more frequent meetings and meetings on a higher level. In 1993 the Council and the General Secretariat moved to Brussels, thereafter meeting once a week.

In the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force 1 November 1993, the WEU, as the defence component of the EU, was requested to ‘elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications’. The Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 had identified three categories of missions for the possible employment of military units under the aegis of the WEU: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and crisis management, including peace-making. A military Planning Cell, and later other structures, were established to advise on crisis management.

The WEU also acquired an operational role, first in the Persian Gulf (in 1988–90) and later, through the events described above, in the context of the Yugoslavia conflict.

From 1997 the development went in the opposite direction. First, at the 1997 Amsterdam European Council (through the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999) the EU took over decision-making. In Cologne in June 1999 the decision was taken that the EU would take over also the implementation of crisis management tasks. Little now remains of the WEU. No ministerial meetings
have been held since that of November 2000 (in Marseilles). The main residual functions are (a) the modified Brussels Treaty: Article V and Article IX: institutional dialogue with the Assembly, and (b) administrative financial and linguistic support to the WEU armaments cooperation bodies (the Western European Armaments Group, WEAG, and the WEAO Research Cell).

The Assembly of the WEU is now the Interim European Security and Defence Assembly.

A number of Petersberg tasks were undertaken by the WEU but, because its military resources were limited and it had to rely on European capabilities only, these missions were all very small.9

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9 During 2001 the WEU was still leading two crisis management missions: the Multinational Advisory Police Element to Albania (MAPE), which ended on 31 May 2001, and the WEU Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia (WEUDAM) which terminated on 30 November 2001.
Appendix 2.
The Most Important Meetings of the Institutions

1979–1980

29 Dec. 1979    North Atlantic Council
31 Dec. 1979    London meeting
1 Jan. 1980     North Atlantic Council
5 Jan.          UN Security Council
10 Jan.         UN General Assembly
15 Jan.         EC General Affairs Council
                EPC Conference of Foreign Ministers
                North Atlantic Council
5 Feb.          EPC Conference of Foreign Ministers
                EC General Affairs Council
19 Feb.         EPC Conference of Foreign Ministers, Rome
18 Mar.         EC General Affairs Council
10 Apr.         EPC Conference of Foreign Ministers
14 Apr.         NATO: Special meeting of Defence Planning Committee (DPC)
21–22 Apr.     EC General Affairs Council, Luxembourg
22 Apr.         EPC Conference of Foreign Ministers
27–28 Apr.     European Council, Luxembourg
5–6 May         EC General Affairs Council
14 May          WEU, Ministerial Council
17–18 May       EPC Conference of Foreign Ministers, Naples
30 May          EC General Affairs Council
2 June          WEU Assembly
12–13 June      European Council, Venice
22–23 June      Western Economic Summit, Venice
25–26 June      NAC Meeting of foreign ministers, Ankara

2001

22–23 Jan.      EU General Affairs Council
5 Feb.          First meeting between North Atlantic Council and EU Political and Security
                Committee
26–27 Feb.      EU General Affairs Council
27 Feb.         Extraordinary North Atlantic Council meeting
6 Mar.          OSCE Permanent Council
7 Mar.          UN Security Council
8 Mar.          North Atlantic Council
16 Mar.         UN Security Council
19–20 Mar.      EU General Affairs Council
21 Mar.         North Atlantic Council
21 Mar.         UN Security Council
22 Mar.         OSCE Permanent Council
23–24 Mar.      European Council meeting, Stockholm
30 Mar.       OSCE Permanent Council
9–10 Apr.    EU General Affairs Council
11 Apr.      Contact Group, Paris
14–15 May    EU General Affairs Council
30 May       North Atlantic Council – EU General Affairs Council
7 June       OSCE Permanent Council
7 June       North Atlantic Council
12 June      First meeting, NATO Military Committee and EU Military Committee
11–12 June   EU General Affairs Council
13 June      North Atlantic Council, meeting at level of heads of state and government
15–16 June   European Council, Göteborg
20 June      North Atlantic Council
25–26 June   EU General Affairs Council, Luxembourg
13 Aug.      UN Security Council
22 Aug.      North Atlantic Council
6 Sep.       OSCE Permanent Council
8–9 Sep.     EU General Affairs Council, Genval
26 Sep.      UN Security Council
28 Sep.      OSCE Permanent Council
Appendix 3.
The Leading National Figures

United States, 1980
President: Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State: (1) Cyrus Vance (resigned 21 April 1980); (2) Edward Muskie (appointed 8 May 1980)
Secretary of Defense: Harold Brown

United States, 2001
President: George W. Bush
Secretary of State: Colin L. Powell
Secretary of Defense: Donald H. Rumsfeld

France, 1980
President: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
Prime Minister: Raymond Barre
Foreign Minister: Jean François-Poncet
Defence Minister: Yvon Bourges

France 2001
President: Jacques Chirac
Prime Minister: Lionel Jospin
Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine
Defence Minister: Alain Richard

Germany, 1980
Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt
Foreign Minister: Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Defence Minister: Hans Apel

Germany 2001
Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt
Foreign Minister: Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Defence Minister: Rudolf Scharping

United Kingdom, 1980
Prime Minister: Margaret Thatcher
Foreign Minister: Peter, Lord Carrington
Defence Minister: Francis Pym

United Kingdom 2001
Prime Minister: Tony Blair
Foreign Minister: (1) Robin Cook (to 8 June); (2) Jack Straw (from 8 June)
Defence Minister: Geoffrey Hoon

Italy, 1980
Prime Minister: (1) Francesco Cossiga (to 18 March); (2) Francesco Cossiga (from 4 April)
Foreign Minister: (1) Franco Maria Malfatti (to 14 January); (2) Attilio Ruffini (14 January–18 March); (3) Emilio Colombo (from 4 April)
Defence Minister: (1) Attilio Ruffini (to 14 January); (2) Adolfo Sarti (14 January–18 March); (3) Lello Lagorio (from 4 April)

Sweden, 2001
Prime Minister: Göran Persson
Foreign Minister: Anna Lindh
Defence Minister: Björn von Sydow

Belgium, 2001
Prime Minister: Guy Verhofstadt
Foreign Minister: Louis Michel
Defence Minister: André Flahaut

Macedonia 2001
President: Boris Trajkovski
Prime Minister: Ljubco Georgjevski
Foreign Minister: (1) Srdjan Kerim; (2) Ilinka Mitreva (from 13 May)
Defence Minister: (1) Ljuben Paunovski; (2) Vlado Bukevski (from 13 May)
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**Note**
The conventional division of the list of References into (1) Official Documents and Publications and (2) Books, Reports and Articles means that the reader who turns from the shortened citations in the footnotes to identify complete references must decide in which part of the following references to look. This should in all cases be apparent from the context.

**Key to Abbreviations**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Atlantic News</td>
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<td>Bulletin of the European Communities (European Commission)</td>
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<td>Dagens Nyheter</td>
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<td>Department of State Bulletin (US)</td>
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<td>Financial Times</td>
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<td>The Guardian</td>
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<td>Obs.</td>
<td>The Observer</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Survey of Current Affairs (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office)</td>
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<td>Süddeutsche Zeitung</td>
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<td>Sunday Telegraph</td>
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<td>SvD</td>
<td>Svenska Dagbladet</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDB</td>
<td>Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages</td>
</tr>
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*Atlantic News (AN)*

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*European Report (ER)* (European Information Service)

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Key: AN = Atlantic News


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**France**

Key: *PEF* = *Politique Étrangère de la France*


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Germany

Key: Bulletin = Bulletin der Bundesregierung, VDB = Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags


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