



# Addressing the Climate Change in Europe: A security threat, or a risk?

A Qualitative Content Analysis upon the European Commission's addressing of  
the climate change

By *Özge Demirel*

Department of Global Political Studies  
International Relations BA – IR 61-90, IR 103L  
Bachelor's Thesis, 15 Credits  
Supervisor: Dr. Erika Svedberg  
Submission Date: 2<sup>nd</sup> of November, 2023

## Abstract

Climate change not only corresponds to scientifically proven future implications, but also poses a politically relevant study of climate security analysis, affecting the study and practice of (international) politics in different ways. In the same vein, the EU as an international organization have been getting more involved in discussions of climate-related security risks, in which the European Commission (which represents the Union's common interests) have been publishing a set of consecutive policy documents addressing the climate change since the early 2000's. Accordingly, this thesis studies five big policy documents produced by the Commission addressing the climate change between 2007 and 2021, by conducting a Qualitative Content Analysis upon the discourses and conceptualizations used to inform how the issue is to be understood, while basing on the theoretical model developed by von Lucke et al.'s (2014) that distinguishes levels of referent objects and risk-security approaches. In doing so, it finds that the Commission often draws indirect connections between the climate change and its social, political and economic implications to the EU at the territorial (and individual) level, while heavily employing risk-based approaches and promoting rather business-as-usual solutions.

Word count: 13.387

List of Figures

Figure.1: Contrasting keywords in Riskification and Securitization .....10

Figure 2: Exemplified model of climate discourses.....13

Figure 3: This thesis’ approach to study climate-security discourses.....15

# Table of Contents

<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. <i>Research problem, purpose, Research Question and Design .....</i>	1
1.2. <i>Thesis structure .....</i>	2
<b>2. Contextual Background: The Commission and the EU.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>3. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>4</b>
3.1. <i>Broadening the Security concept.....</i>	4
3.2. <i>'How to Construct?': the Climate-Security Nexus.....</i>	5
3.3. <i>'Securitization' of Climate Change: the Copenhagen School and the Beyond.....</i>	7
3.4. <i>'Risk-based' versus 'Security-based' Securitizations: A New Security Logic in the Politics of Climate Change .....</i>	9
<b>4. Methods.....</b>	<b>14</b>
4.1. <i>Definitions.....</i>	14
4.2. <i>Qualitative Content Analysis .....</i>	15
4.3. <i>Data Selection and Collection .....</i>	17
4.4. <i>Coding protocol and process .....</i>	18
4.5. <i>Limitations .....</i>	19
<b>5. Analysis.....</b>	<b>20</b>
5.1. <i>Territorial Level.....</i>	21
5.2. <i>Individual level.....</i>	25
5.3. <i>Planetary level .....</i>	29
<b>6. Conclusion.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Appendices .....</b>	<b>40</b>

## 1. Introduction

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges our world faces today. Although environmental problems began to gain relevance in political discourse in the 1970s with the depletion of the ozone layer; it was not until 1990's that an international political response began towards the global issue of climate change (Garcia, 2010: 476). Triggered with the need for further scientific enquiry into the man-induced crisis; the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 defined 'climate change' as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods" (Article 1.2.). In the same vein, the IPCC report (2021) shows that the global warming is expected to reach or exceed 1.5°C over the next few years, which means getting closer to heat extremes to reach critical tolerance thresholds, at an increasingly alarming pace (IPCC, 2021).

In fact, more warming means more changes; and these changes also include ones on the current human life on earth, which puts forward the socio-political implications of climate change. In doing so, the challenges of climate change pose (or might pose) simply do not escape the agendas of policymakers, as well as IR academics.

### *1.1. Research problem, purpose, Research Question and Design*

As noted above, not only corresponding to scientifically proven future implications; climate change also poses a politically relevant study of climate-security analyses, shaping the study and practice of (international) politics in different ways. In the same vein, research suggests that international organizations are getting more involved in discussions of climate-related security risks in different parts of the world, with efforts to mitigate and adapt them (Trombetta, 2008; Scott & Andrade, 2012; Floyd, 2015). Yet, "there is still a limited understanding of how discourse and action on climate security develop and diffuse in and across different institutional settings in various policy fields and geographical contexts" (Bremberg et al., 2022: 342). In the same vein, the European Union, emerges as an important and interesting actor/organization in the international realm, with its specific institutional position and ability to influence climate policymaking within and around itself.

In the same vein, this thesis reckons that the European Commission plays a central role in the functioning and governance of the European Union, and hence, valuable for a study of

climate-security discourses. In doing so, it seeks to understand how the climate change is addressed in its published policy documents on the issue of climate change, which not only represents its official stance and but also informs how the climate change is to be understood. In line with this, this thesis asks one research question:

- *How can the European Commission's addressing of the climate change be understood as specific climate-security discourses at play?*

This thesis responds to this research question by conducting a Qualitative Content Analysis upon five big policy documents published by the European Commission between 2007 and 2021, which center upon the climate change and its implications. It is thereby aimed to systematically analyze the EC's official stance on the issue of climate change, informing how the issue is to be understood in the EU (and beyond).

## 1.2. *Thesis structure*

After introducing and discussing this thesis' research focus (Section 1), the upcoming section (2) gives a brief background discussion on the EU and the Commission's position and ability to inform climate policymaking by addressing the climate change.

The third (3) section then presents and discusses previous research on the climate-security nexus and the theoretical disposition of this thesis. In doing so, it starts from the mainstream approaches to security and goes towards discussing the security-based and risk-based approaches, including von Lucke et al.'s (2014) model that is utilized in this thesis.

The fourth (4) section subsequently dives into the methodological orientation of this thesis. It first defines the research subject and the ways it has been analyzed, in which the selected QCA method to this analysis explained, and its limitations discussed.

The fifth (5) section consists of the analysis, where findings of the codes/markings and a respective discussion of them are presented at three levels, answering the research question.

Finally, the sixth (6) section concludes this thesis by developing the central argument of this thesis, which claims that the Commission has been employing a heavily risk-based approach in addressing the climate change over the years, even though its construction between climate change and security centers on rather traditional security concerns. At the same time, it gives a brief summary of the thesis, and gives with a short discussion on the contribution of this study to the IR academy and the opening of further avenues to be explored on the (discursive practice of) climate-security.

## 2. Contextual Background: The Commission and the EU

Aiming to study the specific ways and discourses addressing the climate change, this thesis selects the European Commission as the actor/case providing valuable data for its analysis of climate-security discourses. The reason for that is, the Commission presents a specific ability to inform the how the climate change is to be understood within and around the EU, through its central role in the functioning and governance of the EU and representing the common interests internationally.

Briefly, the EU is a regional, partly supranational institution with intergovernmental foundations, which primarily concentrates on the regional (political and economic) integration of its currently consisting of 27 member states, and their policy harmonization within Europe. The union is presented as aiming to “promote peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens”, while “[offering] freedom, security and justice without internal borders” (european-union.europa.eu). In doing so, it not only internally encompasses its 27 member states with diverse foreign policy preferences as a multilevel and semi-supranational polity; but also externally engages with other international actors with an increased involvement in the full spectrum of international issues (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013). In doing so, its main institutions the European Commission, European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers) operate in complex ways and make and set policies for the Union - alongside a broad range of bodies and agencies.

Subsequently, making one of the most crucial institutions of the EU, the Commission serves as a common institution, charged with drafting proposals and implementing policies once they agreed (Kenealy et al., 2018: 50). Moreover, it is charged with representing the general interest of the Union; and in this capacity acts as a guardian of treaties, defending them in letter and spirit, managing and verifying correct applications of the legislations, negotiating international trade and competition agreements, while making the authority for the EU single market with powers to vet (ibid.). Thus, “above all, nothing (or very little) can become EU legislation unless the commission proposes it, [making] the commission perhaps the most powerful international administration in existence” (Kenealy et al., 2018: 51).

In relation to the climate change, it emerges as the name behind the European Green Deal which aims to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050; while discussing climate security as a threat-multiplier since early 2000’s under it is institutional radar (consilium.europa.eu, 2008). Thus, it presents an valuable point of departure and a source of data for this study.

### 3. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This thesis seeks to understand how the climate change is addressed and understood in selected policy documents of the Commission. To study this, one should discuss the nexus of climate-security to understand how the issue of climate change can be discursively constructed in certain ways, either as a security threat or a risk. In doing so, this section first discusses the development of security studies for the incorporation of the climate change into the security realm towards more specific discursive origins of it. It then discusses the mainstream security approaches and beyond, into the discursive climate-security model used in this study. The previous scholarly research on these topics, discussed below, demonstrates relevance for the general disposition and the theoretical foundations of this thesis.

#### 3.1. *Broadening the Security concept*

The roots of the climate-security nexus can be found in the early discussions of widening/broadening traditional security frameworks. Whereas the Cold-War era was marked by an extensively narrowed down concept of security with a large military focus on a bipolar nuclear arms race and the theories of deterrence; with the end of the Cold-War, realist assumptions about the primacy of the military security was questioned and discussions on incorporating non-military aspects of security acquired ‘security studies’ a different character (Buzan, 1997: 6-7). Ullmann’s (1983) famous study upon “Redefining Security”, in the same vein, argued that the falsely defined/tackled concept of ‘security’ conveyed misleading and dangerous images of reality that maybe ignore more harmful dangers (ibid., 129-132).

Although still having realist roots of state-centrism, studies on international economic issues (Moran, 1990), or international migration flows (Weiner, 1992-1993) suggested that the “traditional security concepts rooted in the realist paradigm and Clausewitzian conceptions needed [...] to *adapt* to the changing environment and forge ahead with the creation of policy-relevant theory, [with] changes and critical reflection[s] [being] necessary” (Crawford, 1990: 309). Thus, an avenue to tackle a wider/broader array of issues that can extend to societal, economic, environmental, and even gender-based approaches of ‘security’ was opened.



### 3.2. 'How to Construct?': the Climate-Security Nexus

In line with broadening efforts on the concept of security, environmental issues took an increasing place in the field of IR security studies.

A major strand of scholarly approach has been highlighting traditional security implications of climate change, where environmental conflict is studied in generating potentially violent conflicts over resources (and scarcities of them), often through its role as a 'threat multiplier' (ECC, 2008). Brown et al's (2007) study on climate change in contributing conditions of violence, or Le Billon's (2004) study of 'resource wars' as armed conflicts revolving around the pursuit or possession of critical materials make some of the scholarly examples of this strand. These studies employ a closer-to-traditional state-centric approach towards the concept of 'security', focusing upon state security threats that are climate-induced in their origin. Hence, threats that indirectly result from climate change are recognized as exposing the existence and survival of states to danger. Homer-Dixon (1994) similarly pointed that environment/climate-induced scarcities cause (1) 'simple-scarcity conflicts' between states, (2) 'large population' movements, which causes group-identity conflicts, or (3) economic deprivations that cause institutional disruptions, which generate civil strife or insurgencies. Similarly, "the Toronto group around the work of [...] Homer-Dixon, [...] sought to prove a relationship between environmental change, conflict and migration and warned, among others, of 'waves of environmental refugees'" (Baldwin et al., 2014: 124). This type of an approach/discourse is eventually characterized by a narrow view on the relationship between security and the environment, and has been called as *environmental conflict discourse* by Detraz and Betsill (2009: 305).

On the other hand, climate change is linked to a broader concept of security in '(wellbeing of) human-security' terms. The 1994 Human Development Report of UNDP proposed human security as a 'new concept of security', as it means, "first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression. And second [...] from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP, 1994: 23). In line with this, security could be defined in terms of human vulnerability to climate change, focusing on the security of individuals and communities. Although not explicitly using the term 'human security', Detraz and Betsill (2009) name this approach as *environmental security discourse*. Dodds and Pippard's study (2005) that argues climate change and environmental degradation needs to be addressed as an underlying human security issue, or, Detraz's (2009) study that sees a conceptual affinity between feminist approaches to

security and the human security that cannot afford a lack of gender-sensitivity in its approach exemplify some scholarly work of this strand, stressing over the issues that underpins human security. Yet, some scholars discuss it as becoming increasingly divorced from its potentially heterodox and critical roots in human security (Elliot, 2015), or seeming as a discourse of security limited in its “extent to which it constitutes a Western project, predicated upon the values of the developed world”, among other things (McDonald, 2002: 293). However, Detraz and Betsill (2009: 3007) emphasizes that it is important to note that ‘human security’ discourse is/should not be used as a catch-all term for every environmental issue, but rather as highlighting specifically looking into environmental issues that present a security risk for human populations (Detraz & Betsill, 2009: 307). This approach, therefore, moves away from traditional security notions, as the climate change has consequences and security implications for individual human beings, rather than merely for the state.

Briefly, a further approach is found bringing climate-induced securitizations of ecology, which furthest moves away from traditional security notions and highlights “negative impacts of human behavior upon the environment that has historically stemmed from traditional conceptions of security” – although its IR relevance blurs as a weakness (Detraz, 2009: 347-353). In doing so, previous approaches are criticized for presenting anthropocentric arguments, with the need and responsibility for humans to securitize the nature, planetary ecosystem and its subsystems as the referent object with their own value is suggested (Barnett, 2001). Detraz (2009) names this approach as *the ecological security approach/discourse*.

While these abovementioned approaches of climate-security concepts hold different emphases, different referent/main objects, primary concerns, or relationships to traditional security notions; they in common indicate different ways of conceptualizing the climate change depending on its implications, threats and risks.

Lastly, some scholars can be found in challenging the idea of considering the climate change as a security issue at the very first place, due to its risk to create counterproductive policies with an undesirable militarization of climate change (Deudney, 1990), its inability to enter the realist, military perception of legitimate security threats that are addressed/acted upon (Floyd, 2015), its diversion of the attention from more immediate threats to vulnerable societies, or its “analytical challenge to distinguish the role of climate change from other environmental, economic, social and political factors (Brown et al., 2007; Theisen et al., 2011).

However, one can argue that the literature about the climate-security shows that climate change has already passed the to- or not-to-consider as a security issue debate. These criticisms can be said more generally aligning with the criticisms aimed at traditional security logics and the way the Copenhagen School's understands security by developing a strict security (and securitization) framework, conditioning what would make 'successful' securitizations.

### 3.3. *'Securitization' of Climate Change: the Copenhagen School and the Beyond*

This thesis is based upon a relaxed, alternative approach to constructing the climate-security nexus, with an attention to the ways the climate change can be conceptualized as an issue by the force of discourse; which does not conform to the specific theoretical framework that was originally formulated by the so-called Copenhagen School (Buzan et al, 1998). However, it discusses the key arguments and premises of this original securitization theory in this section, which paves the way towards the theoretical backbone of this research.

Coined by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde; the Copenhagen School (hereinafter CS) focuses upon examining the issues of security, where discursively constructed threats of specific issues result in an issue's elevation into the realm of high politics from normal politics, with extraordinary measures taken to tackle the issue -as the most influential take in security studies. In doing so, the securitizing move is established by 'speech acts' via articulations of a salient issue as an existential threat to the referent object. The actor(s) who discursively engages with this process becomes the securitizing actor who convinces the audience that this issue makes an existential security threat to the referent object, which must be protected – thus, playing an important role in generating those extraordinary/emergency measures which would go beyond normal rules that otherwise would not. Thus, a 'successful' securitization would be transforming a (salient) issue into a security issue and the way of dealing with it.

Moreover, the CS not only suggests separating securitizations from politicizations (where the problem turns into a public matter); they also imply a negative value to security, as securitizations of issues are seen as a failure of handling them in normal politics (Buzan et al, 1998: 29). Therefore, just as a securitization of an issue; a de-securitization of previously securitized issues is possible, and actually preferable: "as a long-term goal normatively, [...] issues should be solved within the political realm where political debate and discussion are possible" (Buzan et al., 1998: 4).

However, it is important to be able to distinguish their theoretical arguments from their developed analytical framework. While theoretically bringing a constructivist perspective to the discussion of security; analytically, they provide a clear and universal framework/route for the security analysis by presenting a clear-cut units to look into: “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful)” (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). Altogether, CS’s theoretical approach and its suggested framework have been used to analyze issues such as the global war on terrorism after 9/11 through securitizations of terrorism (Buzan, 2006), securitizations of asylum and migration in the EU (Léonard, 2010), the securitizations around the COVID-19 through war-alike representations (Kirk & McDonald, 2021) et cetera.

However, climate change as an environmental issue, and the attempts to securitize climate change (or the environment) meets with doubts from the CS. Pointing out to the controversy behind the issue’s existential urgency and stressing about the problematic side effects of a sloppy application of the mind-set (and the label) of security; environmental security attempts are seen either unsuccessful or failed, not leading to any emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998). This could be specifically the case considering “the failure to expand and extend the Kyoto Protocol, or the non-binding resolutions of a series of conferences in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC” (Von Lucke et al., 2014: 858). Nevertheless, scholars such as Trombetta (2008) and Floyd (2008, 2016) argues for breaking free from the exceptionalist logic ‘determined by the realist tradition’ within the CS of securitization, and advocates for revising what makes ‘successful’ securitizations: climate change identified at the international level, and followed by a -even small- change of behavior/action by a relevant agent could be an effect of successful securitization (von Lucke et al., 2014: 858).

In fact, while the CS’ theory and framework of securitization can provide relevant insights on many subject/topics; it nevertheless falls short in analyzing the securitization of global climate change in terms of working with extremity (calling for exceptional measures) and not realizing that specific forms of securitizations depend on the context. In this manner, the so-called sociological approach, mainly associated with Balzacq (2005) and Stritzel (2007), is found building up a critique aimed at contextualizing the process that turns an issue into a threat, where the point is having a less-decisionist, more social understanding of securitization (Stritzel, 2007: 373). Furthermore, The Paris School (also known as the International Political Sociology) can be also found providing a sociological and practice-oriented variant of

security conceptualization building on a Foucauldian idea of ‘governmentality’ (Bigo, 2014); or the Welsh School (also known as the Aberystwyth school), which places a stronger emphasis on normative dimensions in order to align security practices with moral principles. Moreover, the CS has also been criticized for its ‘striking absence of gender as a subject of discussion’ (Hansen, 2000), its theoretical Eurocentrism (Wilkinson, 2007), and more.

Eventually, the changes proposed to the securitization theory might tend to be very diverse and sometimes incompatible, and Copenhagen School’s popularity can be attributed to its strong suit and appeal on its analytical value deriving from its clear and practical framework (aside its theoretical conceptualization).

Similarly, von Lucke et al. (2014) builds upon “relaxing the “existential threat” and “emergency” criteria of securitization, which opens up the literature to *the concept of risk*, frequently applied to environmental and particularly climate issues” (ibid., 860-1).

#### 3.4. *‘Risk-based’ versus ‘Security-based’ Securitizations: A New Security Logic in the Politics of Climate Change*

Refusing to favor a ‘robust contextualism’ that uses securitization theory as a useful starting point; Corry (2012) suggests that “although securitization theory has been widely criticized on methodological and normative grounds, the Copenhagen School account of the specific logic of ‘security’ has hitherto not been challenged by a rival description of a dominant logic of security” (ibid., 240). In fact, looking into shifting disease-related discourses on Africa towards a security-risk context within the context ‘war of terror’, Abrahamsen (2005) had similarly noted that most security was concerned with the much more mundane management of risk rather than emergency; where the process of securitization is better understood as gradual and incremental, and most importantly as an issue that can be placed on the security agenda without ever reaching the category of existential threat (ibid., 59).

In contrast to strict versions to security, “risk constitutes a threat which is more diffuse, uncertain and less imminent” (Corry, 2012: 241). For instance, “climate change can be constructed as an immediate and existential threat to the survival of an entire island that requires urgent counteraction (“Security”), or it can be constructed as a potential threat that may gradually undermine the way we live today and should lead us to take precautionary measures (“Risk”)” (von Lucke et al., 2014: 861).

Naming as riskification and securitization, Corry (2012) argues that one can differentiate risk-based approaches from security-based approaches along three elements. First, (1) *the type*

of causality implied, which is “the existence of conditions of possibility [...] of future possible harmful events” in risk politics (ibid., 246). This leads one to think in ‘constitutive causes’ of harm, rather than ‘direct causes’ of harm, in the way that risks are generally less immediate than threats, more future-oriented and not based on specific threatening actors (ibid.). This contrasts with the CS’ view of security not only as existential threat also as direct in causal terms. Second comes (2) *the locus of security action*. Whereas CS involves an emergency action to defend the referent object against a threat; in risk politics, ‘a plan of action is implied to govern the conditions of possibility for harm’ (Corry, 2012: 247). Here, a threat in CS realm would be logically constructed as external as it can only be defended against (hence accepted ungovernable); whereas a risk in risk politics implies the referent object and its vulnerability to referent danger leads to an internal locus of control, in order to be more resilient against it (ibid.). And lastly, (3) *the political effects* differ risk-based approaches from security-based approaches. Risk politics suggest “a long-term and radicalized version of securitization, where exceptionality and [unconstrained, breaking-free-from-normal measures] become more widespread and permanent” (Corry, 2012: 248). Consequently, risk politics promote ‘long-term thinking and investment in governance capabilities’ as well as legitimating ‘preventive and pre-emptive measures characterized by the precautionary logic’ focusing on the conditions of possibility for harm” (ibid.). See Figure.1 for associated keywords.

Figure.1: Contrasting keywords in Riskification and Securitization

Keywords	
Securitisation	Riskification
Threat, security, short-term, immediately, urgent, existential, extraordinary, direct, certain, clear-cut, clear, inevitable, emergency, emergency-measures, survival, defence, destruction, eradicate	Long-term, risk, risk-management, resilience, probability, risk groups, risk areas, uncertainty, contingency, statistics, diffuse, unclear, indirect, scenario planning, precautionary principle, precaution, risk reduction, preparedness, manageable

Source: Franziskus von Lucke, Zehra Wellmann & Thomas Diez, (2014), “What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach”, in *Geopolitics*, vol. 19, no. 4, p. 863.

However, it is important to note that the boundaries differentiating risk-based approaches from security-based ones might not appear always clear-cut, as Corry (2012) theoretically

might claims. As a rather complex phenomenon, in certain instances, the existence of two might emerge overlapping in levels.

Therefore, ‘to make it possible to pursue a comparative and empirically based research agenda’; von Lucke et al. (2014) develop a model of climate security constructions that allow one ‘to analyze climate security articulations more systematically’ (ibid., 863). Based on horizontally distinguishing approaches focusing on risk or security, different types of discourses emerge on three vertical levels of the referent objects (territorial, individual, and planetary) with their logic of discourses. This research takes this model as a base, which is discussed and elaborated below.

First, on the *territorial level*, security-based discourses concern with the indirect socio-economic effects of the climate change on social orders, which affects the state or the geographical region -as the referent object- with the possibility of violent conflict due to limited or degrading resources that climatic changes cause (von Lucke et al., 2014: 864). Thus, the threat is not the climate change itself as a direct physical threat to the state, but the indirect socio-economic effects of it (ibid.). Consequently, it concentrates on extra-ordinary short-term actions to counter those indirect socio-economic effects with immediate adaptation measures instead of long-term mitigation efforts (ibid.). In doing so, it resembles the *environmental-conflict discourse* discussed above. On the other hand, risk-based discourse on this level focuses on the probability of the climate induced threats, which would be identified by statistics and for planning scenarios (von Lucke et al., 2014: 865). Proposing the possibility to prevent the worst outcomes; the focus lies on building resilience to deal with the effects of climate change in case associated risks would become a reality (ibid.). In the same vein, due to the long temporal nature of the risk construction of climate change, it would entail longer time periods for the implementation of counter measures, such as resilience building and readiness, in contrast to the direct identification of threats (ibid.).

On the *individual level*, security-based discourses emphasize the vulnerability of humans (either as individuals or groups) and the direct implications of a changing environment “for the everyday life of human beings such as decreasing crop yields, water scarcity, disasters and the spread of vector-borne diseases” (von Lucke et al., 2014: 866). Therefore, strategies aimed at the reduction of the direct vulnerabilities of humans -which induced by the climate change- is needed “by increasing development aid, providing technical support in building dams or organising the relocation of threatened populations” (ibid.). This type of discourse, thus, resembles to the above-mentioned *environmental security discourse* which builds on the human security concept; that becomes the “rather favorable” type “as it supposedly avoids

confrontational and military focused conceptions of security” (von Lucke et al., 2014: 866). Conversely, individual risk-based discourses highlight the probability of diverse climate risks, specifically accepting “a general level of uncertainty concerning the scope and regional impact of these effects” on statistically identified risk groups (von Lucke et al., 2014: 867). Focusing upon long-term, preventive strategies to mitigate climate change and increase the coping capacity (resilience) of individuals and communities; this discourse aims to reduce “contextual” vulnerabilities of communities in working towards strengthening the society or community as a whole (ibid.).

Lastly, on the *planetary level*; security-based discourses concern with the health of the global ecosystem as a valued but threatened referent object, while recognizing the embeddedness of human nature in the ecosystem and the interdependence between humans and the environment (von Lucke et al., 2014: 868). Partly as a criticism to linking national security to the environment in the territorial security discourses; this discourse emphasizes the direct and concrete threats at the planetary level “that lead to harm in the ecosystem” (von Lucke et al., 2014: 868). Subsequently, it proposes rather immediate and radical measures to halt human activities that harms the planetary security such as global greenhouse gas (GHG) productions, which plays a relatively minor role in political debates (ibid.). This discourse also resonates with the *ecological security concept* discussed above. However, planetary risk-based discourses highlight “statistically identified long-term risks for the well-being of the global ecosystem, to prevent possibly destructive consequences of climate change from becoming actual threats” (von Lucke et al., 2014: 869). Moving with the precautionary principle, this type of discourse suggests measures that do not have to be as extreme and immediate but involving ‘a management of the risk to keep it at a tolerable level’ – in contrast to a complete eradication of the threat (ibid.). von Lucke et al. (2014: 869) suggests this discourse is often employed to support arguments made on the security level, therefore usually presented first.

Figure.2 presents a visualization of the discourse types discussed in this section.



Figure 2: Exemplified model of climate discourses

Logic of Discourse Level of Referent Object	Security	Risk
<b>Territorial</b> <i>Speech act Example</i>	Territorial Security <i>Climate Change as increasing violent conflict that threatens state security</i>	Territorial Risk <i>Climate change as long-term risk for states located in risk areas, e.g., low-level islands</i>
<b>Individual</b> <i>Speech act Example</i>	Individual Security <i>Climate Change as threatening daily food and water supplies</i>	Individual Risk <i>Climate Change as increasing the risk of periodical flooding</i>
<b>Planetary</b> <i>Speech act Example</i>	Planetary Security <i>Climate change as destroying the ecosystem</i>	Planetary Risk <i>Climate change as creating ecological imbalances with unforeseeable consequences</i>

Source: Franziskus von Lucke, Zehra Wellmann & Thomas Diez, (2014), “What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach”, in *Geopolitics*, vol. 19, no. 4, p. 864.

Firstly, it is important to note that von Lucke et al. (2014) name these types as different forms of ‘securitizations’, unequal to the Copenhagen School’s theory or framework. Similarly, Trombetta (2008) also imply that securitization may not per se is detrimental to the political debate and could be complemented with the logic of risk; although Corry (2012) highly stresses upon not mixing risk politics with securitization analytically and empirically, as it would ‘overshadow conditions of possibility of harm’ (ibid., 257). However, there are indeed significant differences between security- and risk-centred securitizations with solutions & politics proposed for it, and either can have pitfalls and shortcomings in their politics – “even normal politics can have its dangers” (Corry, 2012: 257).

On the other end, criticisms or shortcomings of applying a risk-based security approach to the issue climate change originate from needing to allow for measures that are ‘appropriate to the threat in question’ in security studies (Floyd, 2011), which means recognizing themes like risk management and preventive approaches of risk politics should be brought into security discussion as a different logic of security in order to analyze non-traditional sectors like the environment (Trombetta, 2008: 590-1).

Nonetheless, risk-based approaches also might generate dangers such as “the permanence of governance justified in relation to curbing danger [...] potentially abused by security professionals and politicians” (Corry, 2012: 257). Similarly, Oels (2013) mentions the danger of vulnerability mapping and the monitoring of vulnerable populations (including the stigmatization), where sovereign violence can be legitimized and employed in the light of risk management (on the vulnerable that can become dangerous to global circulation, for example by engaging in uncontrolled mass-migration). As another criticism, von Lucke et al. (2014)

themselves recognize that managing the risks and keeping them at tolerable levels can also have 'counterproductive effect of doing less than needed' - although favoring mitigation policies (ibid., 875).

While being touched upon these, it is important to note that this research does not aim to develop an argument targeted to study the strong suits or shortfalls of these approaches. It rather employs this model developed by von Lucke et al. (2014) to identify climate-security discourses that are employed in the selected EC documents where "some discourses have come to prevail over others in the struggle for the representation of climate change, in [names] they are invoked, and [...] the political debate on climate change [...] they reconfigure" (von Lucke, 2014: 876). Likewise, this thesis shares the view with von Lucke et al. (2014) that the climate security issue is a complex phenomenon, and using any of the climate security discourses identified in their paper remains 'a double-edged sword'. Each articulation, each securitizing move must be scrutinized closely and critically, regarding its discursive information for actual consequences. In line with this, next section on methods and research design discusses the ways and extent this thesis goes onto analyzing the documents selected.

## 4. Methods

The purpose of this section is to provide a discussion on the methodological framework and methods used for this research. In doing so, the research design of this thesis, and selection of Qualitative Content Analysis is discussed in the upcoming sub-sections.

### 4.1. Definitions


Firstly, it is important to make it clear what this thesis aims to investigate. In aiming to detect discourses linking climate change to security or risk conceptions on different levels; this thesis departs from a 'broad understanding of climate security' as a concept. As a rather elusive one, 'climate security' can be broadly understood as referring to "the security hazards created, directly or indirectly, by changes in climate patterns" (Egeland, 2022: 3). However, this definition only suggests there is a relationship between the climate change and its security implications, but it does not specify the nature of it.

In the same vein, this is operationalized by reckoning 'differences between framings of this climate-security relationship is not only more specific and nuanced, but also politically

significant’ (McDonald, 2013: 44); while adopting von Lucke et al.’s (2014) model of climate security discourses.

This typology vertically distinguishes levels of referent objects with their logic of discourses, under horizontally differentiated risk-based and security-based approaches, which defines the relationship between climate and security (for detail, see the theory section). Eventually, this means, when there is the abstract concept of climate security, there are also specific/empirical discourses that gives meaning to security, climate change and their relationship in different ways. This, points to a constructive conception of discourse, which implies that these different discourses of “meaning - in this case of security, climate change and its relationship- can be powerful and indeed constitutive” (McDonald, 2013: 44). Lastly, these discourses are referred regularly in policy statements (documents, proposals) and other reports, as indicators (containing data) – just as the analyzed documents of the Commission. This approach is summarized below in the Figure 3. Potential limitations of these are discussed in the upcoming sections.

Figure 3: This thesis’ approach to study climate-security discourses



4.2. Qualitative Content Analysis

Although texts have been for long sources of information about the most fundamental questions in IR research; interest and awareness of importance of language and meaning for political research have only grown in recent years (Halperin & Heath, 2020: 364). In the same

vein, two forms of textual analysis have become prominent within IR: content analysis and discourse analysis. Whereas *content analysis* studies the text to draw inferences about the meaning/intention of a text abstracted from its context (mostly by analyzing the usage and frequency of words, phrases and patterns); *discourse analysis* goes beyond towards the broader context which a text was produced, and analyzes not only the text itself but the relationship to its context - with relations of power and authority that shape that context (ibid.).

Content analysis involves the systematic analysis of textual information that can be done in two different ways depending on one's research question and design: qualitatively or quantitatively (Halperin & Heath, 2020; 376). Quantitative Content Analysis can be described as a more objective and systematic method to analyze the observable, manifest content of the communications (i.e., counting the number of times a particular word, phrase or image occurring in a communication). In contrast, Qualitative Content Analysis (hereinafter QCA) concerns with the meaning of the text that does not reside on the surface but 'between the lines' (i.e., latent content), assuming that "it is possible to expose [those] meanings, motives, and purposes embedded within texts", although still might include counting (Halperin & Heath, 2020: 376).

Halperin and Heath (2020) describes four steps to put qualitative (or quantitative) content analysis in practice. The first is selecting and identifying the relevant material to be analyzed in relation to the variable one wants to investigate. Second step is to define categories one aims to search for in the material selected. Then comes the third step, which is to choose the recording unit (of the content) that will be analyzed based on the nature of categories, such as words, sentences, paragraphs, themes etc. Lastly, the fourth step which can be briefed as 'coding', where researcher creates a coding protocol (set of decisions/rules to be used consistently throughout coding), then creates codes that will be indicating different values of the categories, to lastly code. That is, marking the recording units with the appropriate codes (tags) to identify categories investigated in the documents (Halperin & Heath, 2020: 380). In doing so, one can also resort to computer-aid, which would help organizing data in selected material and yielding a more effectively use of QCA.

QCA software often yield quick and efficient results in cases where large amounts of data are to be examined and analyzed. Although not analyzing a very large number of documents that can be completely coded manually; this thesis utilizes the computer software program NVIVO to benefit from digital organizations of the data collected from the documents, which still relies on a manual and interpretivist analysis of them. Thus, aiming to draw valid

inferences from the Commission's policy documents that addresses the climate change, this thesis finds computer assisted QCA as an appropriate method to employ. The coding process and the application of this software program is presented in detail in the upcoming sections.

#### *4.3. Data Selection and Collection*

In aiming to analyze discourses employed in the Commission's discussion on the issue of climate change; this study has collected data from the European Union's official website of EUR-Lex ([eur-lex.europa.eu](http://eur-lex.europa.eu)), where publications from the Official Journal of the European Union, EU legislation and other legal documents and information are published.

Subsequently, a set of six consecutive policy documents produced by the Commission are selected for the analysis. All documents tackle environmental/climate issues, and are marked with COM, which are type of legislative proposals and other documents directly relating to the legislative process produced by the Commission. Altogether, they are documents that has been published on the issue of climate change and the further incorporation of climate adaptation since the early 2000's. The first published document goes back to the year 2007, providing a time period of 14 year to analyze until the Commission's last big publishment on the issue climate change in year 2021.

Thus, they are deemed valuable in representing the Commission's official stance on the climate change issue, which represents the common interests of the EU and informs the EU and its surroundings on how the issue is to be understood (mentioned in detail in the contextual background section, introduction). Other empirical material produced by the Union, such as reports, coverages, and debates relating to the management of climate change has not been included in the data collection, although still recognized having a great potential in providing relevant insights.

Eventually, five documents are selected as providing insights about the discourses employed in Europe to address the climate change, with ways the Commission formally states its position on the climate change issue and aims to influence (if not only to inform) how the issue is understood:

- The EU Commission Green Paper on “Adapting to climate change in Europe – options for EU action” (2007)
- The EU Commission White Paper on “Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action” (2009)

- Communication from the Commission: “An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change” (2013)
- Communication from the Commission: “Forging a climate-resilient Europe - the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change” (2021) (Developed on the evaluation of the 2013 version of it mentioned above)
- Communication from the Commission: “The European Green Deal” (2019) (Above mentioned the new EU adaptation strategy is stated to be a part of this deal).

#### 4.4. *Coding protocol and process*

“Coding involves the identification of passages of texts [...] and applying labels to them that indicate they are examples of some thematic idea” (Halperin & Heath, 2020: 380).

Simultaneously, conducting a QCA (although critical) requires developing a set of decisions/rules to ensure the reliability of the study (ibid., 379). Firstly, this thesis uses a primarily predetermined set of categories within a two-stage coding process, in light of the previous literature upon the climate-security discourses. Second, it does assign a general flexibility from choosing themes as the coding unit which asserts a single idea. In order to avoid ambiguity, it marks the dominant code if found cross-referenced. In doing so, the coding altogether has been conducted with the aid of the computer software program NVIVO to organize and structure the data.

As the first step, all the documents have been imported to NVIVO as files and they have been manually read to make general notes about the themes and levels of discourses that characterize each document, with earlier research on climate-security discourses in mind (open coding). Subsequently, three categories/themes of (1) Territorial level, (2) Individual (Human) level, and (3) Planetary levels of discourse have been developed, in relation to their Referent Objects (see; Appendices for matrixes for each level of discourse).

As the second step, five sub-categories have been developed for each category based on the von Lucke et al.’s (2014) model of discourses and the theoretical framework on the different climate-security discourses (discussed under the theory section):

- ‘(A) Distance of the Implications’,
- ‘(B) The Nature of the Threat’,
- ‘(C) Actions to counter’,
- ‘(D) Ultimate Goal’,
- ‘(E) Focus’.

In doing so, codes have been established for each sub-category; for instance, for category (A) Distance of Implications, codes were developed as ‘A.1. Indirect’, and ‘A.2. Direct’. Then, the documents were reviewed with these themes again, and references were accordingly marked/tagged with specific codes belonging to specific categories in NVIVO (closed coding). In doing so, NVIVO has been registering and organizing the counts. Codes that indicate an ‘indirect identification of threats’, ‘uncertain, diffuse nature of threats’, ‘long-term actions suggested to counter threats’, a ‘management, or reduction of threats to keep it at tolerable levels as ultimate goals’ and ‘resilience as focus’ have been considered as risk-based properties; while a ‘direct identification of threats’, ‘inevitable, identifiable nature of threats’, ‘short-term actions suggested to counter threats’, a ‘complete eradication of threats as ultimate goals’ and ‘defense as focus’ have been considered as security-based properties. Detailed matrixes of the markings done can be found in the appendix in a matrix form for all levels (Appendix.1, 2, 3). All in all, a QCA with a clear protocol have been followed to uncover the underlying properties of the present climate-security discourses in the selected documents.

#### *4.5. Limitations*

With QCA the main advantage is using an unobtrusive method of analysis. Used to systematically analyze textual information, QCA works with secondary data that does not require data to be collected by the researcher at the first place (such as surveys or interviews). This eliminates bias that relies on participants and material itself; as there is no interaction with the sample, there is no Heisenberg effect as well as big ethical problems. However, a QCA has nevertheless a qualitative methodological orientation, subjected to the weaknesses of an ontologically constructivist and epistemologically interpretivist approach.

Firstly, this thesis’ a post-positivist socially constructivist ontology might suggest an utterly magical view of discourses through stressing their constitutive/constructive power as a departure point. However, this should not be confused by equating the concept security with uttering the word security. Instead, this thesis emphasizes that discourses are “‘performatives’ as opposed to ‘constatives’ that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity tests” (Balzacq, 2005: 175). Similarly, leaving the ‘constituted’ aspect of discourse outside of the scope and focus of this research should not be confused with disregarding this aspect.

Second, its interpretivist epistemological assumptions might bring concerns about the researcher's biases and interpretations, which means it is up to the author to decide what to be marked as indicating certain themes and categories and how to draw inferences from the findings. This position affects the whole count and the outcome, which brings *validity* concerns of a challenging approach to achieve complete objectivity in analysis, that might lead to invalid data. However, this thesis assumes producing coherent and valid inferences on the matter (of the discursive practice of climate-security) given its subtle and social nature that would otherwise (quantitatively) not made sense of, or easily explained.

In the same vein, to address the concerns of *reliability*; this thesis' qualitative methodological orientation (based on subjectivity and contextual boundaries) might suggest a limited ability to generalize its findings beyond its specific research setting (of climate-security discourses in selected Commission documents). However, by creating a clear coding protocol followed through the analysis, it aims to increase the repeatability or consistency of its findings. Yet, due to the nature of the research problem, another coder might still discover other themes or mark the material with different codes. It is important to note that “[i]n qualitative analysis, the results are valid and reliable to the degree that they are plausible to others: that is, if the researcher explains how they came up with the analysis in a way that the reader can make sense of” (Halperin & Heath, 2020: 385). This thesis aims to achieve this in this section.

Lastly, this thesis recognizes that official documents might not always unveil actors' (the EU/EC) actual stances and understandings on specific matters, such as upon the climate change; specifically, if they are produced by a political body (entity) and might be articulated in ways to fit certain agendas. Nevertheless, as produced and conveyed by the Commission; this study views its selected documents as actively building and promoting what climate change means for the Europe (rather than mere political outputs).

## 5. Analysis

This chapter discusses the findings of the analysis performed on the Commissions five big policy documents on the issue of climate change. In doing so, it employs categories and codes developed following the structure of von Lucke et al.'s (2014) discursive climate security



model that distinguishes between approaches focusing on risk or security, while differing on three vertical levels of the referent objects (territorial, individual, and planetary) with their logic of discourses. It starts with discussing the territorial level of findings of the documents, which is then followed by an analysis of individual and planetary level of findings. In doing so, it analyzes Commission's climate security articulations systematically, based on their security- or risk-based logic of discourses (ibid., 863).

### *5.1. Territorial Level*

References coded in the analyzed documents shows that the Commission's thinking on the connection between the climate change and security focuses most on the territorial level logic of discourses, taking the EU as a referent object -with a count of 168 references in total (See; Matrix.1 under appendices). In doing so, it profoundly bases upon risk-based properties of 154 markings, even though often connecting its references to traditional security concerns to the environment (Detraz, 2009: 347). In contrast to this, no references of 'defense' or a 'complete eradication of articulated climate threats' have been found among the documents.

Climate-security discourses at the territorial level focuses on security conceptions with the state or a geographical region as the referent object (von Lucke et al., 2014: 864). At this level of discourse, the actual threat is usually not climate change and its direct physical effects; rather the indirect socio-economic effects of it on social orders (ibid.). These concerns often build upon earlier research emphasizing the relationship between climate change and armed conflict, highlighting climate-induced threats to the sovereignty and institutional capacity of the state (McDonald, 2013: 45). Although the EU is not a nation-state, it is a political entity that can present a unified, collective actor/agency for both its internal and external audiences. As representing its interests, the Commission can display its territorial concerns that are compatible for this level of analysis (Dupont, 2019: 375).

Accordingly, it can be inferred that the Commission often constructs an indirect link between its territorial security/interests and the social, economic, and political implications of the climate change that would go against its territorial interests and stability. In doing so, it puts a heavy emphasis upon the risks of climate induced migration that could reach the EU. That is, however, not done with a rather strict version of constructing climate-security nexus where climate change is constructed as an immediate and existential threat to the survival of the region; but rather as a potential threat that gradually undermines the European status quo and the way Europeans live today (von Lucke et al., 2014: 861). Moreover, it is found that

even when the references suggest security-based approaches, exceptionality and breaking-free-from-normal measures are not proposed as the solution. Instead, it is often concentrated on the resilience building towards the climatic change effects that could spillover to the EU, which complements its promotion of adaptation measures and risk-management strategies for what it sees climate change as a manageable condition.

First, the Commission's is prevalently found recognizing the climate change as "a significant threat multiplier and a source of instability" (CEC, 2019: 21). It is argued that the climate change and its following "*ecological transition will reshape geopolitics, including global economic, trade and security interests. [And] this will create challenges for a number of states and societies*" (ibid.). In doing so, analyzed policy documents often construct climate change as proposing the possibility of violent conflict, and thereby migration, in the face of limited and degrading resources such as water - as a result of it. Commission's first published paper on the climate change, Green Paper (2007), states that "*Climate change will further reduce access to safe drinking water. Glacier melt water currently supplies water to over a billion people; once it disappears, populations will be under pressure and are likely to migrate to other regions of the world, causing local or even global upheaval and insecurity*" (CEC, 2007: 4). This suggests that climate change serves as a potential catalyst for conflict through generating scarcity of natural resources like water, where tensions over these resources can create migratory pressures, causes territorial insecurities (Floyd, 2015: 132).

Accordingly, the Commission often highlights "*the impacts of climate change have knock-on effects across borders and continents [where] even local climate impacts have regional or global repercussions, and such transboundary climate risk can reach Europe*" (CEC, 2021: 21). In doing so, it marks the European territory as the referent object that is (to be) under risk, or is threatened by climatic changes.

It is important to note that the Commission's territorial discourses are found to be putting an emphasis on the dangers that climate change poses to both national and international stabilities and status quo in the analyzed documents; due to the EU's dual, collective figure that can address the international community both around it and the one consisted of it (i.e., member states) in similar international settings. Those references are often articulated interchangeably; either way portraying the referent object of security ultimately as the (maintenance of) the global order, where climate change is seen as a threat to the rules and norms of the international society (McDonald, 2013: 47). In the same ways the Commission is found calling for international cooperation in climate-adaptation and resilience building.

Moreover, constructing climate change as increasingly contributing to underlying conditions that are conducive to migratory pressures, Commission views the climate-induced threats rather external in their origin. In doing so, it is found often cross-referencing with human security connotations that plays a secondary role, possibly in order to avoid a controversial, or territorially too pretentious rhetoric. For instance. The Commission states that “*climate change multiplies the threats to international stability and security, which affect in particular people in already fragile and vulnerable situations*” (CEC, 2021: 19). This also seems as a trend among the analyzed documents where the humanitarian dimension of climate-induced territorial risks are brought up alongside naming regions specifically located in risk areas, while building up on suggesting political risks of climate-induced migration.

Some regions or states are mentioned specifically, as “*the least developed countries in Africa, parts of Latin America and Asia, and small island states [that] will be hit hardest. [which] could lead to vast displacement of populations, including in regions close to Europe*” (CEC, 2007: 22). Thereby, the Commission discursively informs that environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world (Dixon, 1994), while portraying climate change as “*a serious challenge to poverty reduction in developing countries and threatens to undo many development achievements*” (ibid.).

Those references are also found connected to the articulation of the ‘EU’s need for relations with third countries’ as the Commission calls for different policy domains to integrate climate adaptation by taking these sorts impacts of climate change into account. For instance, the Commission states that the “*EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has an important role to play in enhancing the EU’s capacity to prevent and deal with conflicts such as border disputes and tensions over access to natural resources and natural disasters accentuated by climate change*” (CEC, 2007: 21-22). As a solution to these concerns, the Commission often addresses its member states by promoting a more comprehensive climate agenda where “*climate policy implications should become an integral part of the EU’s thinking and action on external issues, including in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy*”; and also claims that “*the EU will work with all partners to increase climate and environmental resilience to prevent these challenges from becoming sources of conflict, food insecurity, population displacement and forced migration, and support a just transition globally.*” (CEC, 2019: 21). Therefore, the Commission’s suggested solutions to its territorial (often migratory) concerns seem to associate developmental and environmental aid with containment, combining local actions with

attempts to protect borders and limit migration [while] these conditions are supposed to be achieved locally” (Trombetta, 2014: 142-144). For instance, an example of its support for climate-adaptation efforts in the African region can be found in investing against the possibility of the climate-induced migration risks and their spillover effects to the EU:

*“The World Bank estimates that, in Sub Saharan Africa alone, climate change may trigger the migration of up to 70 million people by 2050. The EU is already committed to helping Africa adapt to a more hostile climate [...] Over the period 2014-2019, the EU mobilised approximately EUR 3.4 billion to support climate adaptation in the region” (CEC, 2021: 18).*

Thus, by helping others adapt, they are also helping themselves.

However, although migration typically plays a crucial role in the securitization of climate change; several risk discourses are also found statistically identifying climate-induced threats to the EU, where statistical risk assessments and scenarios and promoting adaptation measures are more portrayed as a window of opportunity. The Commission is found using this approach with the sectors such as food production or energy, where the climate change is portrayed having effects on both the supply and demand of the products/services; which in turn goes against the EU’s economic security. This sort of a link can be/is counted as an indirect connection in the coding. For instance, risks of increasing costs of climate change for the EU is found emphasized among the analyzed documents, where Commission signifies the economic losses/costs of climate change more than the magnitude of disasters. The Commission states that *“economic losses from more frequent climate-related extreme events are increasing. In the EU, these losses already average over EUR 12 billion per year. Conservative, lower bound estimates show that exposing today’s EU economy to global warming of 3°C above pre-industrial levels would result in an annual loss of at least EUR 170 billion (1.36% of EU GDP)” (CEC, 2021: 1).* Yet, references portraying climate change as a potential threat to Europe’s economic competitiveness and growth have not been found.

Furthermore, the Commission is found constructing climate change as a long-term risk that would jeopardize availability of resources for the EU, which then might put an internal pressure on the EU through internal displacements of persons or forced migrations. This is rather an unusual approach. Although references seem to take European people’s wellbeing as a reference point; the implied risk lies on the EU, where *“failing to act or delaying action may put pressure on EU cohesion”*, which concerns with its regional status quo (CEC, 2013: 3). The Commission states that the *“Climate change will cause significant changes in the quality and availability of water resources [...]. Limited water availability already poses a problem in many parts of Europe and the situation is likely to deteriorate further due to climate*

*change, with Europe's high water stress areas expected to increase from 19% today to 35% by the 2070s. This could also increase migration pressures*" (CEC, 2009: 5). The EU is therefore called to *"strengthening its analysis and early warning systems and integrating climate change into existing tools such as conflict prevention mechanisms and security sector reform"* (CEC, 2009: 15-16).

Ultimately, the Commission stresses over an effective-immediate adaptation of climate adaptation measures as *"if there is no early policy response, the EU and its Member States may be forced into reactive un-planned adaptation, often abruptly as a response to increasingly frequent crises and disasters, which will prove much more costly and also threaten Europe's social and economic systems and its security"* (CEC, 2007: 9). And in doing so, it employs risk-based discursive properties.

## 5.2. Individual level

References coded in the analyzed documents shows that the Commission's on the connection between climate change and security second often focuses on the individual level logic of discourses, which takes the human communities (European citizens in particular) as a referent object -with a count of 76 references marked in total (See; Matrix.2). In doing so, it heavily employs risk-based properties in its climate-human-security nexus constructions with a count of 63 risk-based units coded, in contrast to the alarmist, threat-based security ones.

It is important to remember that climate discourses on the individual level typically emphasize vulnerabilities of individuals and human communities to both direct and indirect climatic impacts, with its implications to their lives and livelihoods. In doing so, the link between the climate change and humans is often constructed through the concept of human security, concerned with the climate-induced disruptions to the everyday life of humans such as decreasing crop yields, water scarcity, disasters and the spread of vector-borne diseases (von Lucke et al., 2014: 866).

In the same vein, the Commissions is found to employ non-alarmist Individual Security discourses with a concern over human health and well-being, which is initially tied neither to particular states nor regions. The Green Paper (2007) states that:

*"Climate change clearly has detrimental impacts on health through heat waves, natural disasters, air pollution and infectious vector-borne diseases. In addition, waterborne, food borne and zoonotic diseases in humans can be amplified by other stressors, e.g. exposure to ozone and fine particles during a heat wave. Long-term exposure to fine particles in ambient*

*air worsens a number of health problems such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, which makes people more susceptible to further climate-induced stress”* (CEC, 2007: 15).

This stance can be said departing from a quite universal human well-being concern, stressing over climate-induced human health problems or diseases that would be exacerbated by the climate change. This is rather a safe, non-controversial way of addressing the climate change. In doing so, a straightforward and rather direct link is drawn by between climate change and its implications on human populations.

On the other hand, climate change is found addressed as undermining human well-being and security by resulting in forcing people to flee their homes over rendering increasingly scarce natural resources. This can also be found in the Green Paper (2007), with the references concerned on the ‘access to safe drinking water’:

*“Climate change will further reduce access to safe drinking water. Glacier melt water currently supplies water to over a billion people; once it disappears, populations will be under pressure and are likely to migrate to other regions of the world”* (CEC, 2007: 4).

In the same vein, the Commissions 2013 Adaptation Strategy includes what seems to be universal Individual Security passages where climate change is stated threatening water quality as water quality must be ensured for ‘all’ people (CEC, 2013: 17). This is a rather universal human security conceptualization.

Similarly, the Commission is also found constructing a link between the climatic change and the financial risks that it might pose to individuals or human communities, as *“climate change and the effects it generates in terms of property damage, business interruption and forest fires”* (CEC, 2007: 20). In fact, Commission claims that *“People are concerned about jobs, heating their homes and making ends meet”* because of the climate change (CEC, 2019: 22). Thus, a more indirect link is also constituted between the individual security and the climate change, through damages caused to humans’ livelihoods.

Furthermore, the Commission acknowledges the effects of a changing climate which not only increases direct or indirect risks and threats to human well-being, but also magnifies social factors of vulnerability, such as poverty. For instance, the 2013 Strategy can be found calling for climate-adaptation as the climate change is seen to widen social inequalities and vulnerabilities of disadvantaged groups. The Commission claims that *“climate change impacts are also expected to widen social differences across the EU. [Therefore] we need to give special attention to social groups and regions which are most exposed and already disadvantaged (e.g. through poor health, low income, inadequate housing, lack of mobility)”* (CEC, 2013: 3). In doing so, it acknowledges that *“the poorer segments of society will be*

*more vulnerable to the [climatic] changes, and calls for an attention to be paid to the social aspects of climate adaptation, including threats to employment and impact on living and housing conditions. For example, young children and elderly are more vulnerable to heat waves”* (CEC, 2007: 11).

These references imply that climate change not only creates direct vulnerabilities but also exacerbates existing ones. That further means, certain segments of the populations lack sufficient sources for an effective climate-adaptation. Departing from this approach, the Commission calls for *“solidarity among EU Member States in order to ensure that the poorer and disadvantaged regions and those regions that will be hit hardest by climate change will be able to take the necessary measures”*, which reminds the concept ‘environmental justice’ (CEC, 2007: 14).

In the same vein, the Commission is found identifying certain vulnerable groups or communities that would be hit hardest by climate change outside of Europe, and naming climate change ‘as a serious challenge to poverty reduction in developing countries that threatens to undo many development achievements’:

*“Poor communities in these countries depend highly on the direct use of local natural resources. They have restricted choice for their livelihoods and limited capacity to cope with climate variability and natural disasters”* (CEC, 2007: 22).

In doing so, it calls for particular attention *“to ensure that financial resources reach the most vulnerable communities in developing countries, such as those with a traditionally limited institutional capacity to absorb international financial resources, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries. [...] These include insurance of public assets, contingency funds and credit lines, and sovereign or private insurance”*, which focuses on cross-border resilience building and long-term efforts for the human security (CEC, 2021: 20).

Nevertheless, this approach could be taken with a pinch of salt, as the Commission’s identification of vulnerable populations outside the Europe might be motivated by its territorial security interests that often cross-reference with the risks of climate-induced migratory flows (as discussed in the previous section). Accordingly, the Commission is often found mentioning the least developed countries in Africa, parts of Latin America and Asia, and small island states under its individual level concerns; however, this has the potential to make a problematic approach, *“extending vulnerability towards destabilised, weak or failing states, large-scale migration movements, terrorism and widespread conflict, which in turn could transform into national security concerns for industrialised states”* (von Lucke et al., 2014: 874).

In a similar fashion, although some of the Commissions individual level references might seem projecting human-wellbeing concerns that could be seen rather universal; most of the references coded at the individual level ultimately found stressing over the significant ‘social costs of climate’ over the Europeans well-being. Similarly, the Commission can be found employing statistical risk assessments identifying risks of climate-induced causalities, in the European context:

*“Floods in the EU resulted in more than 2500 fatalities and affected more than 5.5 million people over the period 1980-2011. Taking no further adaptation measures could mean an additional 26 000 deaths/year from heat by the 2020s, rising to 89 000 deaths/year by the 2050s”* (CEC, 2013: 4).

This can be considered as an Individual Risk approach, which also exemplifies references coded with uncertainty risk properties, where a threat is constructed as being more diffuse, uncertain and less imminent in contrast to direct identification of threats. It is important to remember that territorial arguments may arise from individual and human (in)security concerns loaded with territorial connotations (von Lucke et al., 2014: 866).

Nevertheless, the Commission claims to recognize the potential effects of climate change on human well-being that are rapidly and dangerously increasing, and wants to *make sure that the potential effects of climate change on human health and well-being are reduced and kept to a minimum* (CEC, 2007: 16). This is also an indicator of the ultimate goal presented in the discourses employed at this level, which notably promotes managing the climate risks and keeping them at tolerable levels by climate adaptation strategies, rather than a complete eradication of them with security-based conceptualizations.

For instance, the Strategy (2013) states that the Commission will promote direct adaptation measures through different infrastructure investments, urban land use plannings, building layouts and natural resources management and etc. (CEC, 2013: 6). In indirect terms, soft adaptation measures such as “reskilling and requalification of workers for a just and fair resilience with education and training” among other development of skills, methods and technologies are also advanced among the analyzed documents. In fact, the Commission’s claims that *“the EU will promote long-term economic diversification strategies and policies that enable workers to requalify and move towards green growth sectors, while ensuring sufficient and highly skilled workforce. This will require improving our understanding of the effects of climate change on workers, working conditions, health and safety, assessing the related distributional effects, and involving social partners”* (CEC, 2021: 9). This can be considered not only as an indicator of its strategies focusing on long-term solutions to govern



the conditions of possibility for harm aimed at the reduction of the direct and indirect vulnerabilities of individuals; but also, an indicator of its rather business-as-usual approach that invites technocratic and managerial solutions promoting low-cost, win-win and no-regret climate-proofing strategies (Remling, 2018: 490).

All in all, the discourses and discursive properties employed at this level suggests a risk-based approach employed by the Commission in addressing the climate change.

### 5.3. Planetary level

Among all type of discourses, the Planetary level discourses are found to play a minor role in the analyzed policy documents. In total, 60 references are coded at this level, where 43 of them belonging to risk-based approaches.

Firstly, planetary level of discourses is expected focus on the rather negative impacts human behaviors have on the environment, where the well-being of the ecosystems becomes the matter of concern. In doing so, it views “human beings [as constituting] one part of the environment, [...] not necessarily present in all ecosystems” (Detraz, 2009: 351). It also emphasizes strong interdependencies of human activity with the environment, often in negative correlation.

Yet, a clear negative correlation between the contemporary political, social and economic structures or activities (such as, typically environmentally harmful growth-centered and fossil resource-based systems) is far from highlighted in the analyzed documents. Instead, the documents are found to be (if something) cautiously expressing the economic growth or carbon-based economies as important climate change contributors, with their role in contributing the global climatic system pollution, and harming the biosphere.

For instance, the Green Paper (2007) opens as arguing ‘a global low-carbon economy’ is a central pillar of the EU’s integrated climate change and energy policy and calls for a ‘swift’ transition where “*severe climate change impacts can only be prevented by early, deep cuts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions*” (CEC; 2007: 3). While this type of an articulated effort can also be found following a reminder of the EU’s objective of keeping the global average temperature increase below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels in several documents (CEC, 2007; 2013); if anything, the documents only focuses on reductions on the EU’s global emission share, rather than concerning with the global scope of it.

In the same vein, Commission’s Green Deal (2019) seems to be overly optimistic in terms of the roles of economies in causing dangerously high CO<sub>2</sub> levels, and instead promotes the

Deal as ‘a response to these climatic challenges’, by its “*aim to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use*” (CEC, 2019: 2). Indeed, the Deal bases on its territorial ambitions, even when it makes arguments based on the planetary wellbeing.

While the Commission’s economic-decoupling arguments can be problematized on the grounds that economic growth almost inevitably involves more manufacturing, use of fossil fuels and other pollution-intensive activity, or can be found justified with arguments such as the need for environmental protection capital (Fiorino, 2011: 372); the Commission’s is found often framing “economic growth as a necessary prerequisite for any viable adaptation response, rather than framing it as a culprit” (Remling, 2018: 485). Thus, it’s approach to address climate change is far from conforming to security-based climate discourses on the planetary level.

Yet, several documents state that the EU must reduce its greenhouse gas emissions as a mitigation action, and it must take adaptation action to deal with the ‘unavoidable’ impacts of climate change (EC, 2009: 3), which sounds rather ambitious, fitting to the planetary-security discourses argument. It also states that “*even if the world succeeds in limiting and then reducing GHG emissions, our planet will take time to recover from the greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere. Thus, we will be faced with the impact of climate change for at least the next 50 years*” (ibid.). This statement can be considered implying urgent actions.

It also reminds the Planetary Risk discourse, as it highlights long-term risks for the wellbeing of the global ecosystem that are statistically identified (von Lucke et al., 2014: 869). The Commission similarly stresses over the heat extremes climate change has caused, and uses a rather alarmist tone that suggests a security-based logic in highlighting the overall trajectory of global warming where “even drastic temporary decreases of emissions, like those caused by the 2008 financial crisis or the economic disruption from the COVID-19 pandemic, have little effect on” (CEC, 2021: 1):

*“The world has just concluded the hottest decade on record during which the title for the hottest year was beaten eight times. People, planet and prosperity are vulnerable to climate change, so we need to prevent the un-adaptable and adapt to the un-preventable. And we must do it faster, and in a smarter and more systemic way”* (CEC; 2021: 1).

In a similar vein, the Green Deal (2019) states that it is ‘this generation’s defining task is to deal with environmental-related challenges’: “*The atmosphere is warming and the climate is changing with each passing year. One million of the eight million species on the planet are at*

*risk of being lost. Forests and oceans are being polluted and destroyed*” (CEC, 2019: 2). This reference suggests the health of the species (thus an intact biodiversity) as important goods; although it does not indicate who or what is it that is perceived as causing this destruction.

Similarly, the Commission is found stressing over the importance of ecosystems, those wellbeing are threatened:

*“Ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration, flood protection and protection against soil erosion are directly linked to climate change and healthy ecosystems are an essential defence against some its most extreme impacts. A comprehensive and integrated approach towards the maintenance and enhancement of ecosystems and the goods and services they provide is needed”* (CEC, 2009: 10).

Yet, this approach can be interpreted in two ways among the documents. Firstly, it might be considered as being concerned over ecosystems wellbeing as they provide services reducing the further decline of biodiversity (CEC, 2013: 3); or, it might be viewing ecosystems as their wellbeing also meaning the human wellbeing on the individual level with their ability to buffer natural extremes for the people. However, to decide which approach prevails, considering the Commission’s stance as a whole in all the analyzed documents would help.

In doing so, references are marked on suggesting planetary level concerns are most often found placed in the introductory segments of these documents, suggesting they were “employed to underline the universal scope of climate change as a challenge for mankind and life on earth to prepare the ground for individual and territorial arguments” (von Lucke et al., 2014: 868). In the same vein, although the documents analyzed include planetary and ecosystems wellbeing several times in their introductory settings, they do not employ an approach where “species and ecosystems are preserved for their own sake, not for their value to humans” (Detraz, 2009: 351). On contrary, the references suggest that the climate change is perceived through its impacts on ecosystems, specifically on natural capital, biodiversity and the flow of ecosystem services in terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems; as these significantly affect economies and societies (CEC, 2007: 17). That means, *“the impacts of climate change on man are largely mediated by natural systems. Healthy ecosystems will be more resilient to climate change and so more able to maintain the supply of ecosystem services on which our prosperity and wellbeing depend. They lie at the centre of any adaptation policy”* (ibid.).

Accordingly, concrete measures such as a global GHG moratorium (a stopping of an activity for an agreed period of time) or taxes to secure the conservation of the ecosystem and

atmospheric stability have not been found in any documents. If something, the solutions proposed can be interpreted as closer to a Planetary Risk approach, where concrete measures fostering of energy efficiency or renewable (green) energy sources have been suggested (although ultimately in relation to the EU's prosperity).

Moreover, references that are marked on this level are commonly coupled with individual (human) arguments, but also with European territorial connotations, which often concerns with the climatic changes in water levels, temperatures and flows as they in turn affect food supply, health, transport (and other industries) and ecosystem integrity (CEC, 2009: 3). This suggests that items like water, fertile soils, and fossil fuels are not viewed as parts of the total environment, rather as resources available for human consumption (Detraz, 2009: 351).

Therefore, the low count of references marked on the Planetary level, although mostly risk-based, can be generally explained with not fully addressing the planet and the ecosystems as the referent object (McDonald, 2013: 48).

## 6. Conclusion

As discussed above, climate change not only corresponds to scientifically proven future implications, but also poses a politically relevant study of climate security analysis, affecting the study and practice of (international) politics in different ways. In the same vein, the EU as an international organization have been getting more involved in discussions of climate-related security risks, often with efforts to adapt them (Trombetta, 2008; Floyd, 2015; Remling, 2018). The fact that the European Commission (which aims to represent the Union's common interests) have been publishing a set of consecutive policy documents addressing the climate change since the early 2000's is indicative of this. Yet, "there is still a limited understanding of how discourse and action on climate security develop and diffuse in and across different institutional settings in various policy fields and geographical contexts" (Bremberg et al., 2022: 342).

Therefore, this thesis regards five policy documents on climate change between 2007 and 2021 as providing valuable insights into the discourses employed in addressing the climate change in Europe. These documents, not only displays how the Commission formally states its position on the climate change issue; but also shows how it aims to influence (if not only informs) how the issue is understood within and around EU.

In doing so, this thesis answers its research question “*How can the European Commission’s addressing of the climate change be understood as specific climate-security discourses at play?*” by conducting a Qualitative Content Analysis upon those five big policy documents produced by the Commission, registering and analyzing discursive properties and conceptualizations used, based on the theoretical model developed by von Lucke et al.’s (2014) which not only differs vertically on three vertical levels of the referent objects (territorial, individual, and planetary) with their logic of discourses, but also horizontally distinguishes approaches focusing on risk or security.

In doing so, this thesis finds that the Commission most prevalently constructs an indirect connection between the climate change and its social, political and economic threats to the EU on the territorial level. Although these references often base upon more traditional security concerns (such as climate-induced migration); they are found profoundly basing upon risk-based approaches. Moreover, the Commission is found second often concerning with the individual/human securities, however more in European context where European citizens wellbeing is stressed over, rather than universal human wellbeing. Lastly, planetary level approaches where the well-being of the ecosystems is the matter of concern have been found in a miniscule scale, often employed in introductory settings to prepare the ground for individual and territorial arguments among the analyzed documents.

Thus, systematically analyzing the Commission official stance on the issue of climate change shows that it profoundly informs how the issue is to be understood in EU (and beyond) as a risk rather than a security threat, even though heavily concentrating on the EU’s territorial and citizenry well-being. In fact, the Commission is found often addressing the EU member states specifically, even though it uses the national and international status quo conceptions interchangeably (although calls for international cooperation can be found highlighted over migratory concerns where climate change is portrayed as a threat to the maintenance of present global order). Along the same vein, suggested policy options advocated in the documents were primarily those of rather long-term climate change adaptation measures, enhancement of adaptive capacities and resilience buildings, particularly for the most vulnerable groups and communities (both in- and outside the EU, due to its spillover effects). In doing so, the Commission seem to follow a business-as-usual trajectory building on a (green) growth, (low) carbon-based economy; constructing climate-change as a problem serious enough to warrant an attention, but not serious enough to demand fundamental changes in the way society is organized (Remling, 2018: 490).

That being said, expecting the Commission to introduce radical changes to the European Union is perhaps overly optimistic (ibid.). As stated, the EU is not a nation-state but a political entity consisted of its member states; thus, constructing climate change as an existential security threat to convince its member-states to adopt radical (or extraordinary) policies and commit more resources and pledges to combat the climate change (such as ambitious emissions cuts) can lead to tensions and disagreements among member states, facing considerable resistance from them. The Commission seem to be aware of this, cautiously addressing the climate change that would not jeopardize its regional cohesion in any way; although itself (as one of the main bodies of the EU, representing its common interests) has a rather significant institutional position to inform the climate policy making around it in the ways to effectively combat the root causes and impacts of climate change. Moreover, the EU's lack of sufficient jurisdictions and decision-making competences that often fails to override its member states' national policies, and the fact that climate/environment policy area compete with more highly prioritized policy domains (such as economic security) might explain the Commission's risk-based stance in addressing climate change, without ambitious objectives, resources and policy instruments.

However, as stated under limitations; this thesis analyzes the Commission's official stance on the issue of climate change, and how it informs the climate change and its policy making to be understood in EU (and beyond); through a post-positivist, socially constructivist ontology stressing over constitutive/constructive power of discourses as a departure point. This also does not mean it employs a magical view of discourses; but rather informs that the 'constituted' aspect of climate-security discourses and the actual practices of climate-policy making in Europe falls outside of its research scope.

Thus, this thesis' identification of highly risk-based climate-security discourses at play in the Commission's addressing climate change -with their information and implications for the climate policy- can be understood as opening a further avenue for future research: to further analyze the alignment of these discursive practices and the actual social practices performed in addressing the climate change. Similarly, types of authority, government or discourses which would be the most effective in addressing the climate change in Europe, (as well as other institutional settings and geographical contexts) to reverse the trend of climate change could be explored.

## Bibliography

- Abrahamsen, Rita., (2005), “Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear”, *Alternatives*, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 55–80. DOI: 10.1177/030437540503000103.
- Baldwin, Andrew., Methmann, Chris. & Rothe, Delf., (2014), “Securitizing ‘climate refugees’: the futurology of climate-induced migration”, *Critical Studies on Security*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 121-130. DOI: 10.1080/21624887.2014.943570
- Balzacq, Thierry. (2005), “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, *European Journal of International Relations*, SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 171–201. DOI: 10.1177/1354066105052960
- Barnett, J., (2001), “*The meaning of environmental security: Ecological politics and policy in the new security era*”, London: Zed.
- Bigo, Didier., (2014), “The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts”, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 209–25. Accessed via JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26292341>
- Bremberg, N., Mobjörk, M., and Krampe, F., (2022), “Global Responses to Climate Security: Discourses, Institutions and Actions”, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 341–356. DOI: 10.1177/15423166221128180
- Brown, O. et al., (2007), “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat: Implications for Africa”, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, vol. 83, no. 6, pp. 1141–54. Accessed via: JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4541915>.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., and Wilde, J., (1998), “*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*”, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Buzan, Barry., (1997), “Rethinking Security after the Cold War”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 5-28. Accessed via: JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45084375>.
- Buzan, Barry., (2006), “Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?”, *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 6, pp. 1101–1118. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00590.x
- Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (2007), “*Green Paper: Adapting to climate change in Europe – options for EU action. Green Paper*” from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and

- Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007) 354 final. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0354>
- Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (2009), “*White Paper: Adapting to climate change: towards a European framework for action*”, COM(2009) 147 final. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0147:FIN:EN:PDF>
- Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (2013), “*An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change*”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2013) 216 final. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0216>
- Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (2019), “*The European Green Deal*”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2019) 640 final. Available at: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC\\_1&format=PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF)
- Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (2021), “*Forging a climate-resilient Europe - the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change*”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the committee of the Regions, COM(2021) 82 final. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0082&from=EN>
- Commission of the European Communities, (ECC) (2008), “Climate Change and International Security”, Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S113/08. Available at: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf)
- Corry, Olaf., (2012), “Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235–258. DOI: 10.1177/0305829811419444
- Crawford, Neta., (1991), “Once and Future Security Studies”, *Security Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 283-316. DOI: 10.1080/09636419109347469



- Detraz, Nicole. and Betsill, Michele M., (2009), “Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts”, *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 10, pp. 303–320.
- Detraz, Nicole., (2009), “Environmental Security and Gender: Necessary Shifts in an Evolving Debate”, *Security Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 345-369. DOI: 10.1080/09636410902899933
- Deudney, D., (1990), “The case against linking environmental degradation and national security”, *Millennium*, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 461- 476.
- Dodds, Felix. and Pippard, Tim., (2005), “*Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change*”, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Dupont, Claire., (2019), “The EU’s collective securitisation of climate change”, *West European Politics*, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 369-390. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2018.1510199
- Egeland, Kjølsv., (2022), “Climate security reversed: the implications of alternative security policies for global warming”, *Environmental Politics*, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2022.2146934
- Elliott, Lorraine., (2015), “Human security/environmental security”, *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 21, no.1, pp. 11-24. DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2014.993905
- European Union (european-union.europa.eu), “Aims and Values”, Available at: [https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_en)
- Floyd, R., (2008), “The environmental security debate and its significance for climate change”, *International Spectator*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 51-65.
- Floyd, R., (2011), “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory”, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 42, no. 4-5, pp. 427–439. DOI: 10.1177/0967010611418712
- Floyd, R., (2015), “Global climate security governance: A case of institutional and ideational fragmentation”, *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 119-146.
- Garcia, Denise., (2010), “Warming to a Redefinition of International Security”, *International Relations*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 271-292.
- Halperin, Sandra and Heath, Oliver. (2020), “Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills”, ed., Oxford University Press: New York.
- Hansen, L., (2000), “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School”, *Millennium*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 285-306. DOI: 10.1177/03058298000290020501

- High Representative for CFSP and the European Commission, (2008), “*Climate Change and International Security*”, S113/08. Available at:  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf)  
. Last accessed: 1 Nov. 2023.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., (1994), “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases”, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 5–40. DOI: 10.2307/2539147
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2021), “the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, Available at:  
[https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg1/IPCC\\_AR6\\_WGI\\_FullReport.pdf](https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg1/IPCC_AR6_WGI_FullReport.pdf)
- Kenealy, Daniel., Peterson, John., and Corbett, Richard., (2018), “*The European Union: How does it work?*”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kirk, Jessica and McDonald, Matt., (2021), “The Politics of Exceptionalism: Securitization and COVID-19”, *Global Studies Quarterly*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 1-12. DOI: 10.1093/isagsq/ksab024
- Le Billon, Philippe., (2004), “The Geopolitical Economy of ‘Resource Wars’”, *Geopolitics*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1-28. DOI: 10.1080/14650040412331307812
- Léonard, Sarah., (2010), “EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices”, *European Security*, vol. 19, no.2, pp. 231-254. DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.526937
- McDonald, Matt., (2002), “Human Security and the Construction of Security”, *Global Society*, vol. 16, no.3, pp. 277-295. DOI: 10.1080/09537320220148076
- McDonald, Matt., (2013), “Discourses of climate security”, *Political Geography*, vol. 33, pp. 42-51. DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.01.002
- Moran, Theodore H., (1990), “International Economics and National Security”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 5, pp. 74–90. DOI: 10.2307/20044602
- Niemann, Arne., and Bretherton, Charlotte., (2013), “EU external policy at the crossroads: The challenge of actorness and effectiveness”, *International Relations*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 261–275. DOI: 10.1177/0047117813497306
- Oels, A., (2013), “Climate Security as Governmentality: From Precaution to Preparedness”, in J. Strippel & H. Bulkeley (ed.), “*Governing the Climate: New Approaches to Rationality, Power and Politics*”, pp. 197-216. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107110069.016

- Remling, Elise., (2018), “Depoliticizing adaptation: a critical analysis of EU climate adaptation policy”, *Environmental Politics*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 477-497. DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2018.1429207
- Scott, Shirley V., and Roberta C. D. Andrade., (2012), “The Global Response to Climate Change: Can the Security Council Assume a Lead Role?”, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 215–26. Accessed via JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590874>
- Stritzel, H., (2007), “Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 357-383. DOI:10.1177/1354066107080128
- Theisen, O. M., Holtermann, H. and Buhaug H., (2011), “Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim That Drought Breeds Conflict”, *International Security*, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 79-106. Accessed via: JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428110>.
- Trombetta, M. J., (2008), “Environmental security and climate change: Analysing the discourse”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 585-602.
- Ullman, Richard H., (1983), “Redefining Security”, *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 129–53. DOI: 10.2307/2538489
- United Nations Development Programme, (1994), “*Human development report*”, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: <https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/hdr1994encompletenostatpdf.pdf>. Last accessed: 1 Nov. 2023.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), (1992), “*United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*”, FCCC/INFORMAL/84, GE.05-62220 (E) 200705, Available at: <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>
- von Lucke, F., Wellmann, Z., & Diez, T., (2014), “What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach”, *Geopolitics*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 857-884. DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2014.913028
- Weiner, Myron. (1992), “Security, Stability, and International Migration”, *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 91–126. DOI: 10.2307/2539131
- Wilkinson, Claire., (2007), “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?”, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 5-25. Accessed via: JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26299738>

## Appendices

Matrix.1: Territorial level references

CATEGORIES Description, Referent Object	SUB- CATEGORIES Logic of discourse	CODES
1. Territorial	1.A. Distance of the Implications	1.A.1: Indirect (Social, economic, political) Count: 25
		1.A.2: Direct (Physical, material, tangible) Count: 9
	1.B. The nature of the Threat	1.B.1: Inevitable, identifiable, or even personalizable (Existential, direct and urgent) Count: 4
		1.B.2: Uncertain, Diffuse (Potentiality and possibility of them) Count: 8
	1.C. Actions to Counter	1.C.1: Immediate, short-term Count: 1
		1.C.2: Long-term Count: 47
	1.D. Ultimate Goal	1.D.1: Complete eradication of the threat Count: 0
		1.D.2: Management/reduction of it to keep it at a tolerable level Count: 23
	1.E. Focus	1.E.1: Defense Count: 0
		1.E.2: Resilience Count: 51

Matrix.2: Individual level references

<p>CATEGORIES</p> <p>Description, Referent Object</p>	<p>SUB-CATEGORIES</p> <p>Logic of discourse</p>	<p>CODES</p>
<p>2. Individual</p>	<p>2.A. Distance of the Implications</p>	<p>2.A.1: Indirect (Social, economic, political)</p> <p>Count: 30</p>
		<p>2.A.2: Direct (Physical, material, tangible)</p> <p>Count: 13</p>
	<p>2.B. The nature of the Threat</p>	<p>2.B.1: Inevitable, identifiable, or even personalizable (Existential, direct and urgent)</p> <p>Count: 1</p>
		<p>2.B.2: Uncertain, Diffuse (Potentiality and possibility of them)</p> <p>Count: 7</p>
	<p>2.C. Actions to Counter</p>	<p>2.C.1: Immediate, short-term</p> <p>Count: 0</p>
		<p>2.C.2: Long-term</p> <p>Count: 7</p>
	<p>2.D. Ultimate Goal</p>	<p>2.D.1: Complete eradication of the threat</p> <p>Count: 0</p>
		<p>2.D.2: Management/reduction of it to keep it at a tolerable level</p> <p>Count: 9</p>
	<p>2.E. Focus</p>	<p>2.E.1: Defense</p> <p>Count: 0</p>
		<p>2.E.2: Resilience</p> <p>Count: 10</p>

Matrix.3: Planetary level references

<p>CATEGORIES</p> <p>Description, Referent Object</p>	<p>SUB-CATEGORIES</p> <p>Logic of discourse</p>	<p>CODES</p>
<p>3. Planetary</p>	<p>3.A. Distance of the Implications</p>	<p>3.A.1: Indirect (Social, economic, political)</p> <p>Count: 4</p>
		<p>3.A.2: Direct (Physical, material, tangible)</p> <p>Count: 14</p>
	<p>3.B. The nature of the Threat</p>	<p>3.B.1: Inevitable, identifiable, or even personalizable (Existential, direct and urgent)</p> <p>Count: 0</p>
		<p>3.B.2: Uncertain, Diffuse (Potentiality and possibility of them)</p> <p>Count: 9</p>
	<p>3.C. Actions to Counter</p>	<p>3.C.1: Immediate, short-term</p> <p>Count: 3</p>
		<p>3.C.2: Long-term</p> <p>Count: 10</p>
	<p>3.D. Ultimate Goal</p>	<p>3.D.1: Complete eradication of the threat</p> <p>Count: 0</p>
		<p>3.D.2: Management/reduction of it to keep it at a tolerable level</p> <p>Count: 6</p>
	<p>3.E. Focus</p>	<p>3.E.1: Defense</p> <p>Count: 0</p>
		<p>3.E.2: Resilience</p> <p>Count: 14</p>