Department of Theology
Spring Term 2022

Master's Thesis in Human Rights
30 ECTS

Rights accumulation in the refugee camps in the Aegean Sea

A study of the difference between humanitarianism and justification

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the communication of six different non-governmental organizations present in the refugee camps in the Aegean Sea, to understand which problems they identify as critical and how the communication may be interpreted in the light of the needs of the organizations. The second purpose is to review the discrepancy between the humanitarian perspective and the justification perspective, by applying the theoretical framework consisting of framing theory and two discourse-theoretical theories on the results of the content analysis.

According to the non-governmental organizations, the camps do not meet seven of the nine basic needs identified by Sphere and UNHCR. The material does not provide enough information regarding the last two needs, the right to non-refoulement and accessibility for people with disabilities. While the organizations might have an interest in existing, the analysis shows that the most evident receivers of the reports are political stakeholders and the general public, and the most evident intent is to conduct advocacy and raise awareness.

The theoretical analysis shows that the camps cannot be considered justified as the prerequisites for a fair and functioning decision-making process where every individual subject to the decision is recognized are not fulfilled. Hence, there is a discrepancy between the humanitarian perspective and the justificatory perspective, in which the justificatory perspective sets higher requirements focusing on equal humanitarian preconditions and political rights, while the humanitarian perspective solely focuses on basic needs fulfillment.

Key words: *refugee camp, justification, basic needs, Aegean Sea*

Innehållsförteckning

1. Introduction

1.1 Problem formulation, purpose, and research questions

> *"There is a strange interdependence between thoughtlessness and evil."*
> *– Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem*

Migration is an inherent part of human life. While the numbers of international migrants have grown over the last 50 years, the relative share of the human population lies still: around three percent of the world's population are international migrants (de Haas et. al. 2020, 5). Most migrants leave their homes to seek a better future somewhere else, rather than having been forced to leave their countries (de Haas et. al. 2020, 4). However, in 2021, 84 million migrants had been forcibly displaced from their homes (UNHCR 2021). Among those, some 30 percent live in rural refugee camps (Muggah and Erthal Abdenur 2018). Human rights violations are common in refugee camps and humans living in camps for too long risk becoming dependent on the humanitarian aid provided in the camps (UNHCR 2014, 4; see Crisp 2000; Farmer 2006; Verdirame and Pobjoy 2013). Moreover, camps often cause both economic and ecological problems for the society in which they are located (UNHCR 2014).

Some of the, to Sweden, most geographically adjacent refugee camps are the ones in the Aegean Sea. Between 2016 and September 2020 when it burned down, the refugee camp Moria on the Greek island Lesvos was the biggest camp in Europe. Despite efforts to relocate some of the refugees from Lesvos and the camps in the Aegean islands Chios, Samos, Kos and Leros, the five islands still hosted more than 14 700 people in January 2021 (Cossé 2020; Rentsch 2021). The number of arrivals declined heavily after the EU and Turkey met an agreement to hinder further migration to Europe in March of 2016, however the number of

refugees living in the camps grew exponentially (UNHCR n.d; Apostolou 2019). The low standard of living in the camps have led to immense critique by several non-governmental organizations as well as from the UN (see Sjöblom 2021; Red Cross 2020; Save the Children 2020; UN Committee Against Torture 2019).

As non-governmental organizations play an important role in providing basic needs in the camps, their communication is a relevant tool to understand what basic needs are not met. At the same time, the organizations are relying on donors and publicity for survival, which may tilt the communication. An example of this is the continuously debated visual communication by humanitarian actors, which is often accused of upholding a passive and post-colonial narrative about migrants (see for example Dogra 2012; Sakue-Collins 2021).

The purpose of this study is therefore to analyze the communication of six different non-governmental organizations present in the camps, to understand which problems they identify as critical and how the communication may be interpreted in light of the needs of the organizations. By reviewing the communication, I aim to deepen the understanding of a migration management structure dependent on civil society.

It is however important to note that the chosen non-governmental organizations work to hinder further human rights violations, through practical work in the camps and through advocacy work. Hence, they are primarily focusing on the consequences of the current migration management. A critical concept is therefore that of *justification,* as it focuses on the underlying structures of injustice rather than the consequences of them. Such a perspective allows us to consider a wider range of revisions of the refugee management than non-governmental organizations tend to do. A second purpose of the study is therefore to review the discrepancy between the humanitarian perspective and the justification perspective. That will further the understanding of how the camps as such may be considered rights violations. The study's theoretical framework is cleft, with the *framing* perspective providing valuable acumen on how to justify the composition of the group with decision-making power and the *discourse-ethical* perspectives serving relevant insights to what conditions the actual decision-making dialogue should be characterized by to be considered justified. The understanding of *justification* is therefore rather ambitious, which may benefit a further discussion on whether our current regimes of refugee management, among which refugee camps are important parts, are at all possible to develop to such a degree that they may fulfill the justificatory postulates.

To carry out the study, three questions have been formulated:

1. How is the humanitarian situation described by NGOs present in the camps and how may the communication be interpreted in the light of the organizations' own interests?

2. How can the situation in the refugee camps in the Aegean Sea be explained from a framing perspective?

3. How can the situation in the camps be understood from a discourse-ethical perspective?

1.2 Background

1.2.1 The hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey deal

In 2015, the EU decided to implement a "hotspot approach" in Italy or Greece, to assist the countries with the irregular and unusually large number of migrants arriving in the EU (European Parliament 2016, 8). In Greece, there are five hotspots, or Reception and Identification Centers (RIC): Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos (Greek Council for Refugees 2020). The hotspot approach was complementing the joint action plan, which the EU and Turkey decided on in the fall of 2015, to reduce the number of refugees and migrants arriving in the EU from Turkey (Corrao 2019). In March of 2016, the plan was followed by a statement. The deal states that the European Union should send refugees and migrants who have traveled to Greece from Turkey and whose applications have been declared inadmissible back from the Greek Islands to Turkey (Corrao 2019). For each refugee sent back from the islands, the European Union resettles another Syrian refugee from Turkey. Alongside this, the EU agreed to speed up the disbursement under the investment *Facility for Refugees in Turkey*, which is allocated to making sure that the needs among refugees in Turkey are met (Corrao 2019; European Commission n.d.). Furthermore, Turkey should take measures to prevent irregular migration between Turkey and Greece, in exchange for visa liberalization for all Turkish citizens traveling to Schengen (Corrao 2019). The visa demands have long been on the table, and according to the EU-Turkey deal the requirements were supposed to have been lifted before June of 2016, although in May of 2022, they still have not (Corrao 2019; Schengen Visa Info n.d.).

While both the number of refugees coming to the Greek islands as well as the deaths during crossing from Turkey to Greece decreased, the number of refugees coming to the islands remained higher than the amount being relocated to Turkey (European Commission 2017). The deal and hotspot approach combined have received criticism for being focused on keeping refugees in the camps, rather than on creating ways for those who qualify for asylum to be transferred to other EU countries, and those who do not to return (Popp 2021, 22).

1.2.2 The situation in Greece and the new Greek law on asylum

The biggest share of the migrants and refugees arriving in the Greek islands in January 2020 were Afghans (48 percent), Syrians (19 percent), Palestinians (6 percent), Somalis (6 percent)

and Congolese (8 percent) (UNHCR 2020a). While the exact numbers differ, Afghans and Syrians are often the biggest groups arriving in Greece (see for example: UNHCR 2020b). The management of the refugee camps has been marred by ad hoc solutions and criticized decision-making. For example, a great number of people were forced to sleep in the streets after Moria burned down, before a makeshift camp, Mavrovouni, was set up on the other end of the island (Mantoo 2020). Moreover, the camp Kara Tepe was closed despite protests by humanitarian actors, who found the camp to be a well-functioning exception (see: Oxfam 2021, ANSA 2021a, Refugee Support Aegean 2021).

With economical support of the EU, new, permanent camps are currently being built on the five islands (Smith 2020a). In Samos, a new camp was done in September 2021 (Deutsche Welle 2021). While having facilities like restaurants and air conditioning, the new camp has been described as "a prison" by Médecins San Frontiers and Greek Refugee Council (Smith 2021; ANSA 2021b).

As of January 2020, Greece has a new asylum law, whose purpose is to speed up the processing of asylum applications in order to fulfill the EU-Turkey deal. The legislation has been immensely criticized by human rights organs and organizations as well as the Greek ombudsman for lowering the protection standard for asylum seekers and putting even more pressure on people seeking international protection, as well as on judicial and administrative instances handling the applications (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2020). Specifically, the legislation includes tough demands for people seeking international protection to fulfill, putting them in a situation where they risk being sent back to Turkey despite actually having the right to stay in Greece (ibid.) Moreover, the legislation has complicated for asylum seekers to appeal to asylum decisions, and made detention centers legal. The idea behind the law was to speed up the process of sending people who had gotten a rejection on their asylum application back, which would lead the camps on the islands to close, and the refugees still there to be moved to the mainland (Apostolou 2019).

However, the EU-Turkey deal has also had deep effects on Greece, especially for the tourism sector in the islands (Ivanov and Stavrinoudis 2018; Tsartas et al. 2019). While there is a low tolerance towards minorities and other religious beliefs in Greece overall, the enduring crises in the islands has made the opposition to immigrants, and Syrians in particular, notably higher in the Aegean Sea (Pew Research Center 2018, 5; Kalogeraki 2019, 373). The islanders are

more likely to support a decrease in the number of people who are granted asylums and a ban on letting refugee children attend school (Hangartner et al. 2019, 450). Aside from general discontent, the negative attitudes regarding the demographic change in the archipelago of the Aegean Sea have led to violent protests by the islanders (MacGregor 2020; France 24 2020; Bathke 2020). Protests against the overcrowding and abysmal standard of living have also been initiated and carried out by refugees (Smith 2020b; Bell 2020).

1.3 Method and material

In the following section, the study's method and material will be described. Firstly, the usage of content analysis is described and argued for. Secondly, the coding scheme used in the content analysis is described. Thirdly, the material is presented. Fourthly, the pros and cons of the method are discussed as well as the delimitations of the study. Lastly, the disposition of the thesis is presented.

1.3.1 Content analysis

To understand the situation in Greece, I am doing a qualitative content analysis of five reports by six different non-governmental organizations. The organizations and the reports will be presented more closely in the material chapter below.

Content analysis is suitable when attempting to understand the meaning of different types of communication, including texts (Drisko and Mashi 2016, 90). More specifically, content analysis may be used in cases where one wants to "reveal the focus of individual, group, institutional, or societal attention" (Weber 1990, 9). In comparison to quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis is typically focusing on *how* and *why* the results of the content analysis came to be (Morgan 1993, 115). Therefore, there is also a difference in how the data is coded. Where quantitative analysts usually use preexisting codes, qualitative codes tend to be based on the data itself (ibid.). The reason for this is that qualitative content analysis is more subjective, and has wider codes than quantitative research (Morgan 1993, 115).

Practically, the answer of the first question is structured with the support of the basic needs identified by Sphere and UNHCR. The needs are presented separately, however, many of the needs overlap. The answers to the second and the third question are structured through the creation of eight different categories in which all the reports fit. The questions, the basic needs and the categories are explained in the chapter below.

1.3.2 Coding scheme

The basic questions used in content analysis are (1) Who says, (2) what, (3) to whom, (4) where, (5) why, (6) in what medium, (7) with what intent, and (8) with what effect? (Watt Boolsen 2007, 53). While the questions were actually formulated by Aristotle, they are

usually called the *Lasswell's model of communication* after the researcher Harold D. Lasswell (ibid.).

The purpose of the study is to understand what needs are not met in the camps and to reveal the possible discrepancy between the humanitarian perspective and the justificatory perspective of the camps. I am therefore solely looking at the questions of (2) what, (3) to whom and (7) with what intent. Question (1), (4), and (6) are already answered in the material chapter, hence, neither of these are relevant to analyze. Question (8) is not within the scope of the study.

The coding scheme that has been applied to all of the reports is therefore as follows:
1. What basic needs are not met?
2. To whom are the reports written?
3. With what intent are the reports written?

As mentioned in the previous chapter, categories in which one or more of the reports fit have been created for questions 2 and 3. While the questions are directed towards two different issues, the categories have counterparts in one another. For question 2, the categories chosen are "the general public", "practitioners", "political stakeholders" and "donors". For question 3, the categories are "raising awareness", "practical aid", "political advocacy" and "raising funds". All the reports fit in more than one category.

My understanding of "basic needs" is based on the UNHCR publications *A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum systems* and the 4th edition of the *Handbook for Emergencies* as well as the fourth edition of the *Sphere Handbook*, which are relying on international humanitarian law and in some cases on international refugee law, hence the principles are well-established and widely agreed upon (Nicholson and Kumin 2017; UNHCR 2015; Sphere 2018).

The needs that should be met for a refugee camp to be considered fulfilling basic needs are the following:

1. Shelters should provide physical safety and protected and adequate living spaces (Sphere 2018, 244). Refugee camps should be planned in a way that every person living

there should have access to minimally 35 sqm (UNHCR, 2015). However, the UNHCR recommends 45 to 55 sqm in cold climates (ibid.).

2. Appropriate and timely healthcare should be ensured (Sphere 2018, 292).

3. Proper water supply and sanitation facilities are crucial for a dignified response that ensures health for the camp residents (Sphere 2018, 244). After the initial emergency phase, when 1-20 persons can share one latrine, every family is supposed to have their own latrine (UNHCR 2015).

4. The refugees should be able to access livelihoods, education and social services (Nicholson and Kumin 2017, 74).

5. Everyone should have the right to legal assistance (Nicholson and Kumin 2017, 202).

6. The refugees should not have their right to non-refoulement taken from them. This is particularly important for large-scale movements of mixed groups of migrants and refugees, where the risk for the principle being undermined is even bigger (Nicholson and Kumin 2017, 75).

7. When constructing shelters and settlements, social cohesion should be promoted (Sphere 2018, 241).

8. The camps should ensure accessibility for people with disabilities (Sphere 2018, 244; UNHCR 2015).

9. The special attention that some forcibly displaced may need (due to discrimination or special protection needs) should be safeguarded (Sphere 2018, 245).

1.3.3 Material

In this thesis, five reports produced by six non-governmental organizations present in the camps have been analyzed. The NGOs are International Rescue Committee, Amnesty International, Refugees International, Human Rights Watch, and Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees. Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees have co-written one report, which is why there is a difference in numbers between the organizations and reports.

As the islands have become hotspots not only for refugees but for international organizations and civil society volunteers, there are millions and millions of testimonials out there concerning the state of the camps and the well-being of the people forced to live there (Guribye and Mydland 2018; Parsanoglou 2020). However, I have chosen only to rely on well-established organizations with activities in other similar contexts. The organizations all have high credibility and deep knowledge of the situation for forcibly displaced persons and all of the organizations except for Amnesty provide practical aid in the camps. Nevertheless,

they are all donor-based organizations, which risks exaggerating their communication. The second and third question of the content analysis do however acknowledge that risk.

All of the reports, except for the Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees report, were written in 2020. The report by Oxfam and the Greek Council for Refugees was written in December 2019. As the situation changes rapidly, not least due to the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic, a limited time span is crucial to identify political and humanitarian practices. The most important example in regard to the chosen time frame is the Greek asylum law which was implemented in January 2020. As the legislation had great effects on the possibility for the inhabitants of the camps to assert their rights, choosing material highlighting the role of the law was critical. The same applies for the effects of the pandemic and the restrictions introduced after its outbreak.

All of the reports have different focuses, and despite the fact that they hardly cover all of the personal stories, nor all angles from which one can view the issues on the islands, they do cover a wide range of topics. The International Rescue Committee report is focusing on mental health in relation to containment, the report by Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees on the access to legal information and assistance, the Refugees International report on the consequences for women and girls, the Human Rights Watch report on the risk of lead poisoning in Mavrovouni, and the Amnesty International report on pushbacks. All the focuses are thus connected to the hotspot approach and the treatment of the refugees in the camps.

1.3.4 Delimitations, and advantages and drawbacks of the method

The study only focuses on the camps in the Greek islands and not on the camps on the mainland, as it is only the camps in the Greek archipelago that are subject to the EU-Turkey deal (Corrao 2019). However, many of the conditions in the camps are shared, which is why the results of the study might be applicable to the camps on the mainland too, as well as to other refugee camps. Therefore, studying one set of camps may say something about the greater development of encampment as a migration management strategy.

Despite there being a judicial difference between the labels *"migrant"* and *"refugee"*, I use the words interchangeably throughout the study. The same applies to the verbs linked to the labels: *flee* and *migrate.* The reason for this is that the study does not intend to analyze migration regimes from a juridical perspective or to make a difference between people with juridical status. The fact that not all persons living in the islands may be considered refugees

does not mean that they are not vulnerable to atrocious living conditions, nor does it mean that they have not been forced to leave their homes, for reasons such as security threats or economic hardships (see Scalettaris 2021; Monsutti and Donini 2021). I therefore agree with Tazreena Sajjads claim that focusing too much on the labels risks undermining the global responsibility to protect displaced persons (Sajjad 2018).

Content analysis is a qualitative method with a normative ethical approach, hence the main intent with the study is to provide a normative view upon the situation in the camps. However, I am convinced that substantiated ethics can contribute to more functional and human political policy. The method is positive as it allows us to penetrate material and therefore acquire information without meeting the target group. At the same time, it has an inherent critical approach to the material, by reviewing the intentions of the sender. In this study, this is relevant as the survival of rights organizations depend on rights violations.

Moving focus to the sender of the communication also removes focus from the actual situation, hence instead of analyzing the actual situation, the opinions of NGOs are being analyzed. A more balanced picture of the situation in the camps might have been portrayed if communication from other stakeholders would have been analyzed too, or if triangulation would have been used. That is however not the purpose of the study.

1.4 Disposition

Following this introductory chapter, a literature review will follow, where I will describe and discuss previous research of relevance for this study and what research gap the study is filling. Thereafter, I will present the theoretical framework, which is built upon theories by Nancy Fraser, Rainer Forst, and Seyla Benhabib.

In the chapter following the theoretical framework, the results of the qualitative content analysis are presented. The analysis is followed by a chapter of theoretical analysis, where I, with the help of the theoretical framework, outline whether the situation in the camps can be considered justified. In the last chapter, the results of the study are presented. Thereafter, a short discussion regarding the usefulness and limitations of them is conducted.

2. Literature review

In this chapter, some relevant previous research in the fields of migration management in the Aegean Sea, securitization and encampment is presented. The chapter is divided into two parts: "The EU-Turkey deal and migration management in Greece and Turkey" and "Refugee camps as phenomena".

2.1 Migration management in Greece and Turkey

A lot of studies have been carried out regarding the situation in the Aegean Sea, both in Turkey and in Greece. Therefore, I will only mention a number of particularly relevant issues related to the EU-Turkey deal and to the Greek asylum law of 1 January 2020, while thereafter mentioning relevant research concerning migration management overall.

2.1.1 The EU-Turkey deal

The EU-Turkey deal has refugees take bigger risks to make it into the EU and increased the dependency upon smugglers (van Liempt et al. 2017, 28). In Turkey, it has led to ambiguous political rhetoric, where Syrians at times are promised working permits and citizenships, while later having their humanitarian aid withdrawn. That has not only led Syrians in Turkey to experience extreme insecurity, but also to be subject to reactionary treatment and violent assaults (Baban, Ilcan and Rygiel 2017, 82). Maltreatment of Syrians who have been sent back from Greece to Turkey is also common, and upon arrival in Turkey, being incarcerated without access to information or health care is common practice (Tunaboylu and Alpes 2017, 10,12). Baban, Ilcan and Rygiel claim that the EU-Turkey deal has transformed Syrian refugees to objects in need of humanitarian aid, from the political subjects they actually are (Baban, Ilcan and Rygiel 2017, 82).

As mentioned in the delimitations chapter, Sajjad claims that the labeling terminology of "refugee" versus "migrant" affects the fairness in the asylum process. The same applies to quotas of how many refugees should be granted asylum each year (Sajjad 2018, 46, 48). Moreover, the overarching distrust is creating a biased system which undermines the protection of refugees (Sajjad 2018, 48).

2.1.2 Securitization of migration and non-entrée politics

The development of the Greek refugee management and the EU-Turkey deal could be explained by the securitization of migration and border politics, and more explicitly with what Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway call politics of non-entrée (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 241). The rise of the non-entrée politics derives from the will of countries to fulfill the principle of non-refoulement (a principle within international human rights law that guarantees that no one, no matter of their legal status, should be sent back to a country where they may face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm) while at the same time wanting to escape the responsibility over displaced persons (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 242; OHCHR n.d.). One way for high income countries to implement non-entrée politics is to externalize efforts to keep migrants out to transit countries, by creating international partnerships (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 248).

2.2 Refugee camps as phenomena

The usage of refugee camps is a relatively new phenomenon. While the first containment camps for people fleeing from conflict were established around the beginning of the 20th century, it was only after the Second World War that refugee camps became a common way to cope with refugee crises (McConnachie 2016, 404). There is a wide range of designs for refugee camps, from tented makeshift settlements to poorly constructed tenement areas, such as the Shatila camp in Lebanon which has been used for decades (McConnachie 2016, 404; UNRWA n.d.).

There are two main differences between refugee camps and other types of confinements. First of all, refugee camps are of biopolitical nature, as they exist to manage and control populations (McConnachie 2016, 398). Other types of confinements, such as prisons or drunk tanks, exist to handle individual lapses. Second of all, refugee camps are dependent on political conditions and should therefore be temporary. The other category of confinements exist regardless of politics (ibid.).

In Europe today, refugee camps function as a way of socio-spatially excluding refugees from the societies in which they seek protection (Kreichauf 2014, 4). The exclusion hinders integration and part-taking in societal life (ibid.). Serena Parekh argues that encampment as a way of solving migration crises should be abandoned, and seen as morally harmful (Parekh

2016, 83). She is basing this opinion on Arendt's two points regarding statelessness, that non-belonging to a political and legal community lead to deprivation of rights and freedoms, and to what Parekh calls *ontological deprivation*, meaning the loss of the fundamentally human in you (ibid.). What Parekh, drawing on Arendt's idea, calls *ontological deprivation* is similar to what Agamben calls *bare life,* meaning pure existence, a stance that we share with animals (Agamben 2010, 1). In Agamben's view, invoking a *state of exception* is a way to control the possibility for people to engage in *political life* and instead banish them to a *bare life* (Agamben 2010, 1, Agamben 2005, 29). In camps, the *state of exception* has become the normal order, which leads to an eradication of the possibility for those living in the camps to claim their rights to active participation in political life (Agamben 2010, 179, 181). Agamben therefore argues that the focus when discussing rights violations in refugee camps should be put on the judicial and political mechanisms allowing the camps to come to existence in the first place, rather than the structures and organizational setups of the camps (Agamben 2010, 181, 182).

The anthropologist Michel Agier agrees with Agamben's view and argues that today's refugee regimes only focus on the bare life of refugees (Agier 2008, 49). With the help of humanitarian aid, refugees are being "kept alive", however, because of the victimization of refugees, they are simultaneously seen as undesirable, and therefore excluded from political participation (ibid.). This type of pure humanness is also the prerequisite for being seen as eligible for humanitarian aid, as humanitarian aid is not reserved for people of a certain group or ethnicity but given to beneficiaries because they are *human beings* (Agier 2011, 133).

2.3 This study's contribution

This essay provides insights on the difference between a refugee management regime based on provision of humanitarian rights and one characterized by justification. The results of the content analysis paint a picture of camps lacking the possibility to fulfill basic needs. At the same time, the study shows that the camps do not live up to the prerequisites for justification from a *framing* and *discourse-ethical* perspective, nor would they if they were to fulfill the basic needs set up by UNHCR and Sphere. Hence, the results relate well to Agamben's notion of *bare life* and Parekhs *ontological deprivation,* as the inhabitants of the camps are provided basic needs but are excluded from the political community. The camps may also be viewed as examples of Agier's argumentation, as they lodge refugees and give them the possibility to survive but deprive their inhabitants of political rights. The thesis therefore furthers the

understanding of encampment as an impossible strategy in a system based upon the idea that every individual is entitled to not only socio-economic rights but also civil and political rights. Being two important pawns in upholding the humanitarian regime, the EU-Turkey deal and the Greek asylum law may be seen as examples of non-entrée politics upholding the humanitarian regime.

3. Theoretical framework

While the material focuses on practical fulfillment of basic needs, the theories focus on how to create justified decision-making procedures. Hence, there is a discrepancy between the theoretical perspectives and the material, where the theories set considerably higher standards to what conditions may be considered justified than the organizations writing the reports. The choice to use these theories was made to highlight this specific difference and to investigate the possible deficiencies in the humanitarian approach.

3.1 Framing

According to Fraser, the Westphalian model gave life to the idea that the nation state is the only area where politics was civilized, rights were distributed, and law and order upheld. The international arena, on the other hand, is often described in realist terms, as a place of power conflicts, a "state of nature" – a place where justice is a non-issue (Fraser 2009, 4). However, this division is in Fraser's eyes neither possible nor correct any longer – both because of our international human rights regimes and of globalization making nation states more bound to one another, which has created a situation where problems of injustice often affect persons from more than one country (Fraser 2009, 5). Therefore, holding onto the Westphalian way of solving issues of equality, leads to an exclusion of populations that are poor and unwanted in some way, such as refugees, even though many areas of politics preeminently concern them (Fraser 2009, 21).

In order to avoid those mistakes, Fraser has developed a theory of *post-westphalian democratic justice*. By moving the focus from the question of *what* should be distributed equally to *who* should be part of the group that is deciding how justice should be achieved, she creates a framework for how to acquire proper social arrangements (Fraser 2009, 16, 22, 32). Fraser calls the process of deciding who should be part *critical-democrati*c and means that this should be done through reasoning on several levels, in order to create a reflexive type of communication which seeks to reveal power relations (Fraser 2009, 41, 42).

Fraser's model can be divided into three levels: *distribution*, *recognition* and *the political* (Fraser 2009, 16, 17). While the first two are self-evident, the latter is harder to understand without explanation. She defines *the political* in the "constitutive sense, which concerns the scope of the state's jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation"

(Fraser 2009, 17). Hence, *the political arena* is where the decision of who should be part of the decision-making process is taken. The political dimension is predominantly focused on two different types of representation: *inclusion* and *framing*. While *inclusion* concerns the issues that may arise due to classical problems relating to the organizing of the electoral system, *framing* concerns issues relating to how the group is composed. Therefore, misframing may have serious consequences for a just and fair decision-making process, including issues related to distribution of goods, representation and recognition (Fraser 2009, 19). Just like Hannah Arendt and Ayten Gündoğdu, among others, have already noted, migrants are among those who are most likely to be precluded from decision-making processes, while simultaneously often being beneficiaries of aid (Fraser 2009, 20). Hence, the theory is in the case of rights claims in refugee camps not only symbolically powerful, as one figuratively enclosed group has the power to decide over another literally enclosed group of people, but also politically very relevant to create recognition among everyone affected by the politics shaped within the frame.

Fraser's proposal for a new type of frame is therefore based upon the "all-affected principle", which, as the name reveals, is the idea that everyone who is subject to a decision should be able to participate in the decision-making process (Fraser 2009, 24). When changing the view of *who* should participate, *how* decisions are made also needs to change, as the setup of the democratic discussions is important for the possibility to participate, as well as for the outcome of the decision (Fraser 2009, 26).

To understand which means are necessary for a just dialogue, the issue needs to be addressed from another angle. For that, discourse-theorists Rainer Forst and Seyla Benhabib, which both use a dialogical approach, provide relevant thoughts.

3.2 Two discourse-theoretical theories

According to Rainer Forst, the unwillingness to accept injustice derives from a will not to "be dominated, harassed, or overruled in one's claim and basic *right to justification*" (Forst 2017, 155). Hence, in Forst's view, justice should not be viewed as something arising as soon as we build a perfect machine to distribute goods, both because this view withdraw the agency from the persons or groups that are treated unjustly and make them passive recipients of goods, and because this view ignores the power structures forming the production of the distributed goods (ibid.). Only focusing on goods therefore tends to lead to poorly chosen measures to

create justice. Moreover, Forst makes a distinction between inequalities that have arisen due to natural catastrophes, and inequalities rooted in economic or political exploitation. While both of the situations require action, the actions taken must be different, as the roots to the problems are completely different (Forst 2014, 5). The first of the two problems needs acts of solidarity, the second acts of justice (ibid.). If this differentiation is not done, we risk portraying acts of justice as acts of generosity (Forst 2014, 6; Forst 2012, 246).

Forst believes that free and equal deliberation is the only way to achieve the moral norms that may lead us to justice (Forst 2014, 4, 5). To find out which norms to follow and how to create them, Forst separates morals from ethics, and states that for moral norms to be correct and relevant, they need to be applicable in practice (Forst 2012, 64). Ethics, on the other hand, are not subject to this claim, but are only important as signposts to guide the way (Forst 2012, 64, 65). However, both ethics and moral norms arise, in Forst's eyes, from reasoning (ibid.). That is a belief inspired by Kant's moral philosophy (see Forst 2012, 62).

As free and equal deliberation with the goal of achieving intersubjectivity only functions if social relations are justified and there is an equal distribution of justification power among individuals or groups, Forst has developed a *principle of justification* (Forst 2012, 248, 249; Forst 2017, 155). The basis for the principle is that everyone who is subject to a political or social structure should be able to have the structure justified with arguments that cannot be *reciprocally* or *generally* rejected (Forst 2012, 49, 249). Forst divides the first of the two claims, *reciprocity*, into two different categories: *reciprocity of contents* and *reciprocity of reasons* (Forst 2012, 49). To fulfill the claim of *reciprocity of contents,* no one should be able to reject or justify a moral norm or action by claiming contents they are not ready to reciprocally secure others. To fulfill the *reciprocity of reasons*, the moral norm should not be based upon the assumption that others share the convictions, interests or needs that one holds. For a norm to pass the claim of *generality*, it must be based upon reasons that have the ability of being shared by everyone. Moreover, objections to the norm by people who are affected must be respected (ibid.).

When developing his principle of justification, Forst is working on two different levels. While the usage of the norms in themselves should be considered to belong to applied ethics, the justification of the norms, or as Forst calls it, the *principle of justification,* could rather be said to belong to normative ethics (Duignan n.d.).

Seyla Benhabib criticizes Forst's principle of justification for being too deontologically extreme (Benhabib 2015, 781). She claims that his validity claims are not always possible to apply on actions, instead of only on moral norms. While negative claims usually do not create confusion, positive obligations such as "Speak the truth" may give rise to situations in which an action following the claim could lead to horrible consequences (ibid.) Moreover, Benhabib is skeptical of the practicability of Forst's validity claim of *reciprocity of reasons,* and how to separate between interests based upon individuality and interests based upon humanness (Benhabib 2015, 781).

Hence, instead of Forst's principle of justification Benhabib argues for a concept she calls *communicative freedom* (Benhabib 2015, 779). The idea is based upon Arendt's notion "the right to have rights" – but instead of, as Arendt, mainly understanding the right to have rights as the same as the right to belong to a *political* community, Benhabib claims that human rights primarily should be seen as *legal* rights which must be ensured by the international community (Benhabib 2007, 11). The juridical universalism ought to be linked to justification procedures, which must rely on a moral consensus based upon *communicative freedom* – a concept Benhabib explains as the responsibility for everyone to respect other people by acknowledging their possibility to oppose or agree with an argument because of reasons whose validity they accept or do not accept (Benhabib 2007, 13). In Benhabib's eyes, the main task of human rights is to protect this freedom, both in moral and legal form (Benhabib 2007, 14). Hence, she does not try to certify a number of rights that need to be upheld in order to have the box of human rights to be ticked, but she rather points to the fact that we may and ought to have visions of how we should treat each other (Benhabib 2012, 196). From this point of view, universalism is something we may only aim for, by creating a normative model which includes a process in which as many perspectives as possible are heard and respected (Benhabib 2007, 24).

The *communicative freedom* proposed by Benhabib differs from Kantian logic, by pointing to a *dialogical process* through which we together can decide what is justified and what is not, rather than being based on a priori thought experiments (Benhabib 2007, 14). Thus, behind the idea of *communicative freedom* lies the assumption that all human beings that can communicate in any language have the possibility to say yes or no (ibid.).

To create an atmosphere where dialogue can happen, Benhabib proposes three postulates: all of the participating parties are *equal*, meaning everyone may initiate conversation and take part under the same conditions, all of the parties have *symmetrical* entitlements to speaking, and there is a reciprocity to the roles of communication, so that questioning or answering, raising new issues and the creation of the rules are not only reserved for some parties but open for everyone (Benhabib 2007, 17).

In Benhabib's eyes, putting the focus on the possibility for all individuals to motivate their reasons to justify certain behaviors creates agency, as agency is only created through communication, reasoning and action (Benhabib 2007, 15). This argument clearly draws inspiration from Arendt's ideas of action being the way for people to make an appearance into the political world. Just like Arendt, Benhabib claims that the possibility for people to act and to set goals does not precede the possibility for people to reason about the same goals and actions (Benhabib 2012, 196). The agency is also key in understanding *communicative freedom,* as the concept presupposes a respect for our, as humans, common attributes, needs and wishes, while simultaneously acknowledging our individuality.

The agency is also the basis of Benhabib's link between moral universalism and juridical universalism, as she claims it to be as important to view humans as creators of the law, as it is to view them as subjects to it. For that to happen, what Benhabib calls *democratic iterations* (meaning democratic deliberations) need to take place (Benhabib 2007, 21). It is only through such discussions that the rights can be truly justified, since they may be challenged, and the understanding of the words linked to the rights may deepen (ibid.)

Practically, the *democratic iterations* need to form a part of the every-day political process (Benhabib 2007, 21). Hence, only through creating a political structure based upon public opinion, the right to have rights may be viewed as it should: a way for people to exercise their agency (ibid.; Benhabib 2007, 22).

4. Content analysis

In this chapter, I will present the results of the content analysis. The analysis was made of the five reports presented in the material chapter, and the results are divided into two main headlines: "What basic needs are not met?" and "To whom are the reports directed and with what intent were they written?"

The first question is structured with help of the basic needs by the UNHCR and Sphere. Each need will be presented on its own, however, many of them overlap.

4.1 What basic needs are not met?

All of the reports identify that the camps lack *physical safety and protected and adequate living spaces*. Overcrowding is a big problem – in the beginning of 2020, all the camps gave shelter to more than six times the population than they were built for (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 7). Despite the fact that the amount decreased radically during 2020 due to covid-19 as well as efforts by the Greek authorities to relocate people, the number of people was still way above what they were built for. In September 2020, when the International Rescue Committee report was written, almost 4800 people lived in the camp Vathy at Samos, which was constructed for 648 persons. In Vial at Chios, which was constructed for 1014 persons, more than 3600 persons lived (ibid.).

Among other effects, the amount of people has made it impossible for the residents to protect themselves from covid-19, as social distancing is impossible (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 9, 10). Moreover, the lack of cooperation made the process of creating a quarantine area for arriving refugees unnecessarily lengthy, creating a situation where newcomers posed a threat of spreading the virus (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 11).

The overcrowding can be directly linked to the fact that the inhabitants of the hotspot camps are not allowed to leave the islands, which has led to more and more people sharing the limited space (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 9). This has had extreme effects on the adequacy and safety of the camps (ibid.).

Violence as stabbings, fighting or theft is common. The IRC calls attention to the fact that the residents live in constant fear of experiencing violence as victims or bystanders (Roussou and

Carthaigh 2020, 19). In the eight months of 2020 before the camp Moria on Lesvos burned down, seven persons died in the camp and at least 50 persons were injured, due to violent clashes (ibid.).

The risk for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) such as rapes, sexual harassments, physical assaults and transactional sex is also high in all of the camps (Cone 2020, 15). However, the most widespread form of SGBV is domestic violence, which is also a problem linked to the lack of social services and legal aid. For those needing a safe shelter after having experienced sexual violence, there are limited possibilities, due to the limited space and resources. Moreover, language barriers and problems acquiring the health certificates needed makes it practically hard for persons to access the shelters. There are no resources for persons who risk harming themselves, hence the problem is particularly critical for those in biggest need of help (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 20). The insecurity in the camps can also function as a reminder of the violence or trauma that many women and LGBTQI persons have experienced in the past, worsening their mental health and prolonging the process of recovery (Cone 2020, 15).

In the new camp Mavrovouni, another major health risk is lead poisoning. As the camp is built upon an old shooting range, the risk that the soil is contaminated is imminent (Human Rights Watch 2020). That may lead to serious neurological, biological, and cognitive health effects. The fact that dust and dirt often make their way into the tents, and that ammunition, cartridges and projectiles have not been cleaned up is therefore problematic. The problem is particularly severe for children – both because they absorb higher levels of lead, and because they often play on the ground and are more likely to put their hands in their mouth directly after touching the soil. Pregnant women are also particularly at risk, as lead contamination can negatively affect the development of the brain in the fetus, or in worst case result in miscarriage or stillbirth (ibid.).

Lastly, the possibility for the refugees fleeing to Greece by boat to disembark on the islands is not secured in a safe manner according to the Amnesty report, as locals often prevent migrants from getting off the vehicles (Amnesty International 2020, 15). Furthermore, many of those able to disembark on the islands have faced extreme insecurity the first days or weeks. Some migrants have, for example, been left in beaches without any shelter, sanitation

facilities or registration possibilities (Amnesty International 2020, 14). Others were kept in a ship without sufficient access to toilets and water and without medical care (ibid.).

The material did not provide any information regarding the size of the living space for the refugees in the camps. However, as physical safety and adequate living spaces could not be ensured, *this basic need cannot be considered met.*

Accessing *appropriate and timely health care* is not easy for the inhabitants in the camps, despite that facing health problems is common in the camps (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 14). When it comes to mental health, 74 percent of the ones assisted by the International Rescue Committee before the covid-19 pandemic experienced symptoms due to poor mental health. Typical symptoms were depression, insomnia, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Many also used self-harm and experienced suicidal thoughts, or, worse, had tried to take their own lives (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 14, 15).

The pandemic has had a worsening effect on the mental health among people in the islands – the number of persons experiencing depression increased from 74 to 81 percent. Self-harm and experiencing psychotic symptoms also increased drastically, from 9 percent using self-harm before the pandemic restrictions to 15 percent after the implementation of restrictions, and 14 percent experiencing psychotic symptoms before the pandemic to 24 percent experiencing them after (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 16). The high number of people facing mental health issues can possibly be linked to the fact that a big share of the migrant population in the islands, 60 percent of the ones that the International Rescue Committee assists, have one or more vulnerabilities which may expose them to harm or rights violations (ibid.). The vulnerabilities include torture, violence or SGBV, experience of shipwrecks, abuse and neglect (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 14).

The International Rescue Committee calls the living conditions in the camp "a double burden", as they, in many cases, are contributing to worsening physical and mental health (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 17). While the shortage of medicines, medical personnel and equipment risks leading to chronic diseases and mental health issues not being treated and hence worsening, the overcrowding also enhances the risk of communicable diseases spreading (ibid.). Despite this, there is a lack of doctors in the islands and especially specialists (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 17). In the primary healthcare facilities in the RIC:s,

there is a lack of medical health care personnel, medicine and medical spaces and equipment. The lack of equipment also leads to a higher referral rate to the hospitals for primary health care issues that should have been able to be examined in the RIC:s (ibid.). After arrival, every refugee must go through a screening conducted by a Greek doctor, however, in the screening process there is also a great lack of doctors. Moreover, many of the NGOs working on the islands express that the staff may not have relevant experience or training to conduct the screening (Cone 2020, 18). Combined, all these problems create delays in diagnosing and treating severe diseases. It also puts extra pressure on the system as a whole, due to the accumulation of work piling up, which risks leading to symptoms not being detected. This is particularly probable when it comes to mental health issues (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 17). *Hence, this basic need is not met.*

There is no sufficient *water supply* and not enough *sanitation facilities.* Since the EU-Turkey deal has existed since 2016, the emergency face must be said to be over, which means that each family should have their own toilet, to live up to the Sphere standard. According to the International Rescue Committee report, 35 percent of the 422 chemical toilets in one RIC at Lesvos providing shelter to 7500 people were inutile, which leaves approximately 274 latrines – meaning a little over 27 persons per latrine. None of them are accessible for persons with disabilities (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 22). According to the Refugees International report, some of the camps had 200-300 persons relying on one latrine (Cone 2020, 15). The lack of toilets creates long lines, and many must walk long distances. Moreover, experiencing the toilets as unsafe is common (ibid.). The risk of getting attacked on the way to the bathroom or while waiting in line scare many women and girls into not using the toilets. The fear was particularly strong during the night, as the toilets are not lit (Cone 2020, 15). Moreover, many of the showers and toilets do not have locks (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 20). Therefore, some residents expressed to be peeing in bottles or wearing diapers to be able to stay in their tents or trailers. One woman expressed that she tried to avoid drinking, in order to not have to use the bathroom (Cone 2020, 15).

Another problem is the lack of warm water, which forces people to swim in the most-part-of-the-year cold ocean to wash themselves, or shower using a bucket (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 22). The lack of water and sanitation has also made it impossible for people to protect themselves from covid-19 by washing their hands with warm water and soap (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 10, 11). *Thus, this basic need is not met.*

Access to *livelihoods, education and social services* has not been properly ensured. Social services can include many parts of the other categories as well, including health care and legal assistance. However, other services that are lacking are support to women and children, electricity and provision of information and education (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 9; Cone 2020, 15, 18, 25).

Unaccompanied children are a group experiencing the consequences of the lacking social services (Cone 2020, 25). Not only do the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex sometimes register children as adults since they have not shown sufficient identity cards, but there are also limited amounts of safe accommodation and guardians. At the time of Refugee International's visit in Samos where accommodation is gender-separated, 20 girls and counting were living in a trailer assigned for eight girls (Cone 2020, 27). The newer girls had to sleep outside. To feel some sense of security, they chose to sleep in front of the police station (ibid.). Worryingly, there are also reports that girls often go missing, without anyone knowing where they are (Cone 2020, 27).

Moreover, there are not enough support systems to prevent child exploitation (Cone 2020, 25). The fact that the family reunification processes are so protracted also lead children to take help of smugglers to be reunited with members of their family, which is unsafe and can have dire consequences for the child being smuggled (Cone 2020, 28).

There is a lack of education in the camps (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 21). As the refugees to a great extent rely on the education provided by NGOs, the hostile environment leading to NGOs reducing their activities on the islands have had a great impact on the ability to receive education (Amnesty International 2020, 16, 17). Moreover, extensive covid-19 restrictions were applied in March of 2020, including, among other things, restrictions on movement within the camps, and restrictions on NGOs working within the camps. That led the already poor access to education to decrease further (Amnesty International 2020, 17). The travel restrictions have also made it harder for volunteers who uphold operations in many of the NGOs to get to the islands (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 19).

The material does not provide enough information about the possibility for the inhabitants of the camps to enter the labor market. Although, factors such as the high number of migrants,

the impact the camps have had on the local economy, and the restrictions of movement make it doubtful that there are any wide possibilities for the majority of the migrants to work in legal and healthy jobs to support themselves. However, if the understanding of livelihood were widened from only including wage labor to, for example, include exchange of services or goods or humanitarian aid and cash assistance, it is relevant to point to the fact that the camps in the Aegean Sea are organized and not informal settlements, since it plausibly increases the possibility to secure livelihood. Although, as the provision of basic needs is not sustainably secured, proper access to livelihoods cannot be said to be ensured. *The basic need is thus not met.*

The possibility to access *legal assistance* is lacking severely. According to the Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees report, only two out of 100 people in the Aegean islands are able to access free legal assistance (Bouchetel 2019, 5). In December 2019, when the Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees report was written, there were only 30 lawyers present in Lesvos. The number of migrants arriving at the island throughout the year was 23 000 (ibid.). Moreover, the new law created several obstacles to receive legal help. For example, every asylum seeker must sign an authorization and have proof that the signature is theirs, which can be received by the police or the citizen centers (Bouchetel 2019, 9). The measures are demanding and time consuming for asylum seekers (ibid.). There is also a lack of interpreters, which is problematic as interpretation is essential for people to understand the process and be able to tell their history correctly (Bouchetel 2019, 5).

According to the International Rescue Committee, the possibility to receive legal aid has worsened due to a number of legal reforms, including the new asylum law (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 22). The fast-track border procedure creates both timely and psychological pressure on the asylum-seeker – sometimes to the degree where the rule of law might suffer seriously (ibid.). An example of this is that the new asylum law forces asylum seekers to appeal to a negative decision within five days after the rejection (Bouchetel 2019, 7). The extreme lack of lawyers and interpreters as well as the measures asylum seekers need to take before getting legal assistance makes it impossible to find legal assistance in such a short time, which creates a situation where appeals are impracticable – especially since the authorities confiscate identity cards from asylum seekers getting a rejection on their asylum application (Bouchetel 2019, 7, 9).

The law also allows Greek authorities to deport asylum seekers during the appeal process –
contrary to settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Bouchetel 2019, 8). The
rhetoric by the Greek authorities has also shifted to becoming more hostile towards Afghans
and people from sub-Saharan Africa, by suggesting that their asylum claims cannot be legit
(Bouchetel 2019, 7). That is a violation of the internationally, and by Greece, recognized right
to asylum. *Consequently, this basic need is not met.*

The material does not provide enough information regarding whether the refugees have their
right to non-refoulement assured. As the idea of the EU-Turkey deal is to send refugees
without the right to asylum back to Turkey, the risk for the right to non-refoulement is
relatively small, as Turkey is not considered an unsafe country. However, after the Act of
Legislation was decided upon in March of 2020 as a response to Erdogan's decision to open
the border between Turkey and Greece, the right to seek asylum was suspended, which led
Greek authorities to refrain from sending migrants arriving in Lesvos to the RIC, which is
common practice, but to send them to a ship outside of Mytilini, where they were held for
days, before being providing the information that they would be sent back to Turkey
(Amnesty International 2020, 12). As the refugees came from several different countries and
were not allowed individual assessment, this could be considered a violation of the right to
non-refoulement, as the Greek authorities cannot know whether the migrants face dangers in
Turkey (ibid.). Moreover, it might be relevant to question how safe Turkey is for refugees, as
human rights violations and maltreatment of refugees occurs on a common basis, as shown in
the literature review chapter. Although, as this is the only information regarding the principle
of non-refoulement that is provided in the material, *it is impossible to say whether this basic
need can be considered met.*

Social cohesion has not been promoted in the camps, nor in Greek society. The geographical
limitation of the RIC:s as well as of the islands as such can be seen as a way to not promote
social cohesion, as the possibility to integrate is way smaller than if the refugees had lived
among other inhabitants (see Kreichauf 2014).

The fact that many groups are living side by side in the poorly conditioned camps poses a
security risk, which is not positive for social cohesion (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 8). The
tension between the refugees and the local population can also be explained with the hostile
rhetorique from the Greek government regarding the NGOs working in the camps (Amnesty

International 2020, 15). Thus, by talking negatively about the organizations, the government has not propagated social cohesion. Furthermore, the Greek police have failed to prevent violent deeds against the NGOs, as well as hostile approaches against journalists (ibid.; Amnesty International 2020, 16). However, the authorities have taken some measures to punish those who have committed such attacks (Amnesty International 2020, 17). Moreover, it might not be completely just to place all of the guilt for the deeds on the authorities, as the actions are performed by individuals.

The support system for those of the asylum seekers who receive a positive answer on their application was changed in May of 2020 (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 23). From previously receiving six months of economical support, the refugees only receive one month with the new changes (ibid.). This is negative for the social cohesion, as it, without support, is impossible for people to integrate in the Greek society after having been able to leave the islands. *Hence, this basic need is not met.*

The material does not provide a thorough answer regarding whether the camps ensure *accessibility for people with disabilities.* However, the few answers the material offers indicate that the camps are not accessible, at least not for all disabilities. As previously mentioned, none of the toilets are accessible (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 22). Moreover, the general lack of information and access to legal aid risks hitting people with cognitive disabilities or mental health problems harder. The same applies for all of the issues mentioned above, such as the lack of proper and functioning health care (meaning issues to access proper assistive devices and tools) (see Roussou and Carthaigh 2020). While a more thorough focus on the possibilities for people with disabilities to claim their right would be needed, the small insights that the material provides hint about the *basic need not being met*.

The *special attention* that some groups need has not been sufficiently safeguarded. Many of the issues that are problematic for all the migrants on the islands are particularly problematic for people who risk facing discrimination and/or persons that for other reasons need special attention, as they often have greater needs to have their safety and basic needs ensured. One example is the volatility that children face in Mavrovouni at Lesvos – while all inhabitants of the camp face the risk of being poisoned, the risk is way higher and the effects more severe if children are being affected (Human Rights Watch 2020). Another one is the lack of mental

health programs and sufficient health care for people with chronic diseases (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 17).

Furthermore, special mechanisms to prevent sexual violence and harassment against LGBTQI persons are not activated, and such practices are commonly reported in the camps. According to the International Rescue Committee report, a man in Samos even states to have been attacked in his own tent because of his sexual orientation (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 20). Due to narrow norms regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, there is a fear among LGBTQI individuals to reveal sexual assaults, hence extra support would need to be in place for this basic need to be met (ibid.).

The same applies to women, girls and transgender persons who need to have proper access to water and sanitation when changing menstrual hygiene products (see Cone 2020, 15). Not washing one's hands before and after changing a menstrual hygiene product is not only undignified but can also lead to infection. *Hence, this basic need is not met.*

4.2 To whom are the reports directed and with what intent were they written?

As mentioned in the method chapter, question 2 and 3 have been answered through the creation of eight categories. To allow an easier understanding of the results of the content analysis made to answer question 2 and 3, the presentation of them have been merged. The order in which the categories will be presented is "The general public and raising awareness", "Practitioners and practical aid", "Political stakeholders and advocacy" and "Donors and raising funds".

4.2.1 The general public and raising awareness

All of the reports are directed to the general public to inform about the humanitarian situation in the islands. Hence, they all fit in the categories "the general public" and "raising awareness".

Only one of the reports, the Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees report, states in the report that it *"[...]is part of a series of papers written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues"* (Bouchetel 2019, 2). The other organizations do not specify that their goal is to raise awareness (Human Rights Watch 2020; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020; Amnesty International 2020; Cone 2020). Practically, however, the focus is seen through the

relatively simple phraseology in all the reports, and the introductory level of the communicated information (Cone 2020; Bouchetel 2019; Amnesty International 2020; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020; Human Rights Watch 2020). An example is the background description of the EU-Turkey deal in the Refugees International report, which is general and relatively short, without any details being specified (Cone 2020, 7). This is particularly clear in the sentence *"[…] and made several other political gestures beneficial to Turkey [...]"*, in which none of the political gestures are specified. Would the description be directed towards practitioners or political stakeholders, the gestures would most certainly have been specified or, even more probable, the description might not have been included due to the already high awareness regarding the deal in the specific groups (see Cone 2020, 7).

Two other examples of descriptions at a very introductory level are the Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees explanation of the right to a lawyer *"In all EU countries, asylum seekers must have access to a free state-appointed lawyer after a first rejection of their asylum application (the appeal stage)."* (Bouchetel 2019, 5) and the International Rescue Committees report of the EU pact on Migration and Asylum "*[…] there were positive suggestions to introduce greater elements of responsibility sharing [...]*" (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 25)

4.2.2 Practitioners and practical aid

All of the reports, except for the Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugee report, are to some extent based on the migrants that they themselves as practitioners have met in the camps (Cone 2020; Amnesty International 2020; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020; Human Rights Watch 2020). However, none of the organizations evaluate whether their own efforts are efficient or if they could reach more migrants or whether they could change the overarching political system. Instead, they are all focusing on the authorities and what they should do differently (Cone 2020; Bouchetel 2019; Amnesty International 2020; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, Human Rights Watch 2020). The forum may be one reason for this, as the primary aim with the reports is not internal review or to map how other NGOs are spending their resources but to direct focus on the governance allowing a humanitarian disaster.

At the same time, ignoring the responsibilities of NGOs when looking at the human rights situation in the Greek islands is startling and one-sided, as a majority of the support available is provided by NGOs and they therefore become bodies of power. That could for example

have been acknowledged through the provision of tips and/or prompts related to the respective areas of work of different types of work. Only one organization, Refugees International, provides recommendations directed directly towards the NGOs, concerning how to best cooperate with the Greek authorities and the UNHCR to provide sufficient education regarding and support for victims of SGBV (Cone 2020, 6). They also call for aligning the resources available (ibid.).

4.2.3 Political stakeholders and advocacy

All of the reports fit in the categories "*political stakeholders*" and "*advocacy*", and the will to advocate for better humanitarian and juridical conditions is the most obvious aim in all of the reports (Cone 2020; Amnesty International 2020; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020; Human Rights Watch 2020; Bouchetel 2019). The intent to advocate is seen both in *what* is communicated, as well as *how* it is communicated.

As mentioned in the first category, one of the reports, the Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees report, states in the report that its goal is to inform the public on issues related to development (Bouchetel 2019, 2). That could also be viewed as a type of advocacy. The Human Rights Watch report and the International Rescue Committee report do not specify towards whom it is directed (Human Rights Watch 2020; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020). The Amnesty International report does not specify towards whom it is directed, however, in the end of the methodology chapter of the report, it states that parts of its content *"have been shared for comment with the Greek and Turkish authorities in March 2020",* before publishing the report (Amnesty International 2020, 6). That signalizes that one of the objectives of writing the report is to influence the political development in Greece and Turkey. The Refugees International report is not specifically directed towards someone, however, the recommendations in the end of the report are not solely directed towards the Greek authorities and the EU and its member states, but also to UNHCR and NGOs. Hence, a reasonable interpretation would be to view the receiver as both political stakeholders and as practitioners. One recommendation where this is particularly clear, is the already mentioned recommendation directed towards UNHCR and NGOs which exhort cooperation with the Greek authorities to reach asylum seekers with information about rights claiming, SGBV and incident reporting (Cone 2020, 6).

Four out of the five reports express prompts: the Oxfam and the Greek Council for Refugees report, the Refugees International report, the International Rescue Committee report and the Amnesty International report (Boutchel 2019, 9; Cone 2020, 5,6; Amnesty International 2020, 18; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 31). All the prompts are aimed at political stakeholders such as the Greek authorities and Turkish authorities, the EU and its member states, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Many of the prompts call to end the containment policy, ensure proper legal aid measures and fulfill international humanitarian standards (ibid.). Many of the prompts also urge political stakeholders to cooperate. One example is the previously mentioned Refugees International recommendation (Cone 2020, 6). The Human Rights Watch report does not bring forward explicit prompts, however, the report ends with reminders of legal obligations linked to the conventions as well as international, national and EU law.

All of the reports criticize the deteriorating humanitarian situation due to the regulations introduced in the beginning of 2020, due to the new asylum law in Greece and the tough covid-19 regulations (Boutchel 2019, 6; Amnesty International 2020, 11; Cone 2020, 24; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 10; Human Rights Watch 2020).

The Refugees International report points out that the vulnerability criteria existing in Greek law was removed by the new asylum law, worsening the situation for those who have experienced SGBV as there are insufficient resources in the islands and those identified as vulnerable are no longer exempted from the geographical restrictions (Cone 2020, 23, 24). Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees suggest that this change may impact their possibility to not be deported, as they are unable to receive proper support before going through with their asylum interviews (Bouchetel 2019, 7).

Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees also highlight the fact that the law was immensely criticized by several humanitarian organizations before being implemented (Bouchetel 2019, 6). Furthermore, they shed light on the fact that asylum seekers, under the new law, must appeal a negative decision within five days, which is extremely hard to manage without proper legal support (Bouchetel 2019, 7). The huge lack of lawyers (only one state-appointed lawyer and the non-sufficient number of NGO-based lawyers) is one reason for the time being insufficient (ibid.). They also point to the fact that asylum seekers may not stay in Greece during the process of having their appeal tested in a court of first instance, which results in the

risk of being sent back to Turkey before the claim has been tested. According to Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees, this is "*extremely concerning when you look at the increase in positive appeals (overturning a first negative decision) by asylum seekers during 2018*" (Bouchetel 2019, 8).

Amnesty International highlights both the impossibility for the refugees to create a sustainable living situation while residing in the camps and the fact that they must have their cases processed in order to move on from the islands (Amnesty International 2020, 17). By doing so, they are shedding light on the negative consequences that the political measures have had for upholding human rights in the camps.

When it comes to *how* the issues are being discussed to conduct political advocacy, the choice of verbs and in many cases strengthening adverbs play an important role. An example is: "*Both the EU and the Greek government can and must urgently do more to address [...]*" (Roussou and Carthaigh 2020, 32). Another example is the recommendations brought forward by Oxfam and Greek Council for Refugees, where "*calling on the Greek government [...] to immediately take measures [...]*" and "*rapidly allocating*" are used (Bouchetel 2019, 9f).

The willingness to put focus on the actors behind the deteriorating humanitarian situation is seen through the usage of active form rather than passive, which directs the attention to the actor rather than the action. In many texts, the actor is also spelled out. An example of this is the prompts by Human Rights Watch directed towards members of the Greek Parliament (Human Rights Watch 2020).

The verb moods do, however, not change to imperatives from indicative. The reason for this is probably that imperative is perceived as a less mannerly and professional form. In many of the reports where the finite verbs in the sentences could have been written in imperative (such as direct recommendations or prompts) indicative in present or present participle is used instead. An example is: "*Urgently restore the right to seek asylum in the country*" (Amnesty International 2020, 18). In some cases, the present participle is directly followed by an infinitive-form, for example: "*Rapidly allocating additional funding to better inform people seeking asylum of their rights and obligations*" (Bouchetel 2019, 9).

4.2.4 Donors and raising funds

When it comes to the fourth category, *donors* and *raising funds,* none of the reports makes it specifically clear that they are focusing on donors (Boutchel 2019; Amnesty International 2020; Cone 2020; Roussou and Carthaigh 2020; Human Rights Watch 2020). However, all the organizations are based upon donations from private and corporate donors, hence, while not the primary goal of the reporting, one probable goal of the reports is to acquire new donors and to bind current donors closer to the organizations through visibility. Aside from providing humanitarian work and/or raising awareness among politicians and the general public, the organizations also have a responsibility to inform their donors of what their donations are going to. Therefore, the reports could also be viewed as directed at least partly to the donors.

The same applies to the absent calls to action. None of the reports have calls to action focused on donating. The reason for this is most probably related to the form – calls to action are common to include in web articles and social media posts, but unusual in reports and/or papers where the primary goal is to deliver credible expert information.

4.3 Summary of the content analysis

According to the reports, all the basic needs listed by Sphere and UNHCR are lacking to the extent that they may not be considered met, except for *accessibility for people with disabilities* and *right to non-refoulement* to which the material does not provide enough information.

The primary target group of the reports are political stakeholders and the general public, and the main intents with the reports are to conduct political advocacy and to raise awareness. However, the political advocacy primarily focuses on basic needs rather than recognition and agency for those living in the camps.

None of the organizations are discussing their own role as an actor of power in the islands. Hence, while their communication should be considered trustworthy and reliable due to their expertise in the field and wide experience of non-governmental work in contexts of humanitarian need, it should be interpreted in the light of the fact that the organizations do not want to cease to exist and therefore avoid analyzing their own role in the bigger system.

5. Theoretical analysis

5.1 A framing perspective

If we were to apply Fraser's *framing* theory on the situation in the Greek islands, the lack of representation in the decision-making process would be pointed to as one main reason for the dire situation in the camps. Currently, the composition of people in the decision-making process is distorted, as it only includes Europeans and Turks. The consequence is that only wishes and opinions on immigration held by Europeans and Turks are part of forming the decisions regarding the camps, and that no perspectives by the ones who actually flee to Europe and have to live in the camps, and suffer through the conditions there, are included. From the view of the refugees, the tensions between the local population and the refugees could therefore be seen as a way to demand not only a certain humanitarian standard, but to be acknowledged as political subjects.

In a reframed political process, where the all-affected principle would be applied, the discussion would be defined by an equilibrium where the different perspectives could be weighed against one another, and where the understanding for one another would grow. That could increase the possibility of fulfillment of the basic needs in the camps, as those living there most probably would advocate for better conditions. Moreover, the new asylum law would probably be reformulated to, among other things, include longer-running financial aid to those who have gotten their asylum application accepted and to allow appeals to negative decisions longer than five days. Conclusion: an equilibrium would increase the possibility of rights fulfillment and through that, strengthen the justification of the camps.

Although, if we presume the main reason human rights are not upheld to be misframing of the group making the decisions, a logical continuation of that assumption would be that the possibility to acquire human rights depends upon group affiliation. However, that is an assumption contrary to the core idea behind human rights – that everyone should be able to claim rights, as the right to human rights is not dependent on which political or legal community you belong to, what family you are a part of or what characteristics you have, but on your intrinsic value as humans. If reframing is the only way of securing human rights, then the original idea is not upheld. Hence, while framing is a relevant and important way of approaching the problem of recognition, it should not be viewed as the only tool to create

conviction regarding human rights-based politics. Therefore, Fraser's critical-democratic approach is important to acknowledge.

That conclusion allows us to open up for the possibility to take steps to create just migration politics today, despite living under the rule of an undemocratic decision-making process. As the camps do not even meet the basic needs of the inhabitants, closing them, or possibly restoring them completely until they do meet the basic needs they ought to meet, would be a first step in the process of changing the migration policy.

A second step could be to open the process of migration, by allowing refugees to decide where they would like to apply for asylum. Such a change would be of particular value in the Greek islands, as the migrants are not only socially excluded but also spatially excluded. The possibility to choose would facilitate reunification with family and friends, which for example would decrease the risk of unaccompanied minors using smugglers. That could create communities and alleviate the process of relocation. However, as an open migration process in combination with welfare and housing politics of low standard risks leading to inequalities, a prerequisite for a porous migration process would be a well-functioning welfare which includes refugees, possibly in combination with special support directed specifically towards migrants.

The most important characteristic in Fraser's critical-democratic approach is that it allows us to view migrants as active agents rather than passive victims. Such a change contributes to fulfilling the main purpose of reframing: to recognize everyone being subject to the political structures creating the force to migrate. A more transparent process focusing on recognition would be positive for social cohesion and integration, as the possibility to learn the language, get a job and develop a sense of self-worth increases the likelihood for participation in the surrounding society. Placing the responsibility of financial support and livelihoods with the state rather than with NGOs would strengthen the democratic foundation and decrease dependency on donors and unreliable streams of volunteers.

If we were to apply an all-affected principle, we would need a way to figure out how to decide who is a subject to a political structure. That becomes harder and harder, as the more globalized and intertwined the world gets, the more people get affected by political decisions. Should, for example, only the populations of Europe and Turkey, as well as persons who are

already situated in the camps be able to take part in the decision-making process or should people conferring to potentially migrate to Europe also be part? As the slow asylum processes and the substandard conditions in the camps today might stop people from choosing to flee to Europe, despite actually having reasons to want to, such an inclusion would seem reasonable, although it would increase the amount drastically.

The problem seems to duplicate when considering the parts of the EU-Turkey deal that affect Turkish citizens, such as the visa demands. Exclusion from European territory is not only a problem concerning the migrants that are being sent back to Turkey, but also migrants trying to reach Europe through other countries (because of international partnership being a way of externalizing non-entrée politics (see Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 248). Hence, including more voices in the process may create an increase in such demands raised by other countries too. While the EU-Turkey deal would most probably not be accepted any longer if we were to create a frame based on the all-affected principle, the example still reveals the snowball effect which might occur as a consequence of creating an inclusive frame. When considering such side effects, it might be tempting to use an as limited interpretation as possible to understand the all-affected principle. However, as the goal of the reframing is to create a decision-making process shaped by recognition and participation, such temptations may never hinder an open interpretation of the principle. The outcomes of reframing must therefore not be given too much credence, as that might affect how the all-affected principle should be interpreted. Instead, the focus on revealing power must be kept in mind. Therefore, complementing the reframing with other changes, which have to do with *how* things are decided and what consequences the decisions might have, is relevant.

5.2 Two discourse-ethical perspectives

Both Forst and Benhabib would agree with the argument that a political process in which a big share of the affected by the have no possibilities to influence the decisions taken is an unjust process, as it would correspond to the core point in both of their analyses: justice is not being given resources but being acknowledged as a person with agency. However, instead of only pointing to the composition of the frame, they would also point what prerequisites must be in place for the discussions to be considered just. As their argumentations partly look different, I will apply their respective arguments separately.

Starting with Forst, the reason *why* people have migrated to Europe is of utter importance. Beginning in the assumption that no one would leave their home to live in a substandard camp if they did not have reason to believe that they could create a better and safer future somewhere else (in Europe, in this case), it is therefore relevant to look at the political situation in the countries from which people in the camps in the Aegean Sea flee. Such an investigation would make problems stemming from the inequalities in the world visible, such as the war on terror and huge inequalities that have arisen due to unsuccessful prevention of terrorism in Afghanistan, the war in Syria, the occupation of Palestinian territory, violence, poverty and long-term humanitarian crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the civil war in Somalia. According to Forst, these problems cannot be solved by solidarity in the form of substandard shelter for those who manage to flee to the European continent, but they are issues that need to be handled through reforms leading to justice. Hence, the camps lack justification as their humanitarian character is only an expression of solidarity, in a structure based upon domination.

In order to create a *right to justification* for each and every migrant on the islands, the *validity claims of generality* and *reciprocity* would need to be fulfilled. As the content analysis above showed, the camps do not meet the basic needs of their inhabitants and the mental health among the inhabitants of the camps is poor. However, even if the conditions were tolerable, it is doubtful that a moral norm stating that one, if one is forced to leave one's home, should be placed in a confined socially and geographically isolated camp, while waiting for a pending asylum application, would be accepted by everyone. Hence, the camps in the Aegean Sea could probably not be said to fulfill the *reciprocity of reasons*. However, the argument that refugee camps should exist at all rests upon the assumptions that conditions for migrants should be differently designed than conditions for people who are not migrating. Not everyone would agree with that assumption. For the *reciprocity of reasons* to be fulfilled, everyone must be able to agree with the arguments building the foundation for the argumentation. Hence, the moral norm which approves encampment as strategy would not live up to the *reciprocity of reasons*.

The *reciprocity of contents* claims that only those norms or actions are accepted, which are based on contents that can be secured for everyone. However, it is reasonable to also apply this claim negatively. Hence, rather than asking "Can I secure others these conditions?", the question should be "Can I accept others to live under these conditions?", or, if asked by

someone not living in the camps "Can I accept living under these conditions, which others live under?". The inherent unfreedom and social and geographical exclusion in refugee camps makes it hard to believe that anyone would respond positively to these questions. Adding the de facto problems with human rights violations including overcrowding, scarcity of sanitation facilities and lack of healthcare and legal aid, as well as the additional restrictions of movement due to covid-19, the probability decreases even more. Hence, the *reciprocity of contents* is not fulfilled.

The last claim, the *claim of generality*, demands objections by persons who are subject to the political structure behind the camps to be taken into consideration. For the claim to be met, a reframing of the group in power would need to take place, as inclusion in the decision-making process would be the only serious way to bring objections into light. Only then could a number of arguments for the migration management norm be found, which everyone could agree upon.

Forst's division between solidarity and justice is also relevant when looking at the difference between organized refugee camps and informal settlements. While the material does not provide sufficient answers regarding the possibilities for inhabitants of the camps to secure their livelihood by working, it does provide information about some of the other assets that may be included in the concept of livelihood, such as shelter, water and health care. These are provided by the different actors working in the camps. It is impossible to say how the refugees would secure their livelihoods if there were no camps, however, today, we may say that the *organization* of the refugee camps is the reason why basic rights are at least partly secured. If the basic needs were to be fully met, the link between solidarity and rights would be even more evident. This, however, is not enough, according to Forst's model, as the arguments for the camps still do not live up to the validity claims.

Therefore, it is interesting to question if informal settlements would be a better alternative. In the organized camps, the restrictions of movement and the spatial exclusion, as well as the abysmal living conditions, create unfreedom and dependency. If we, for a second, ignore the fact that there might be laws regulating settling and other ways of controlling populations, informal settlements are per say not confined, nor are they regulated by exclusion mechanisms such as fencing and movement restrictions. Not being spatially and mentally excluded may increase the feeling of freedom and autonomy. Practically, an increased

freedom might also have positive effects on the possibility of entering the labor market. Being able to have a job and pay lease could also increase the ability to feel respected and recognized as a full human being with agency, as well as exchanging goods with neighbors and friends which might increase social cohesion. Obviously, the freedom would require legal possibilities for migrants to receive a working permit.

On the other hand, migrants would probably still face obstacles related to their societal status. Examples of such barriers could be discrimination hindering migrants from entering the labor market or get a leasehold. As tolerance towards minorities and immigrants is low in Greece overall and particularly low in the Aegean Islands, the risk of such obstacles arising is plausible.

Moreover, informal settlements would not be supported by the state or municipality. That means that the possibility to access municipal water and electricity grids would be small and possibly illegal. The same applies for the construction of settlements, as mentioned earlier. Hence, satisfying basic needs would be made a responsibility for every household instead of, as in organized camps, being secured through the cooperation between the state, municipality, and NGOs. Furthermore, private access to basic needs might be expensive. Thus, the risk of dependency on humanitarian aid of some kind, such as water trucking or cash assistance, is imminent in informal settlements too.

Taken together, the arguments above seem to indicate that the *right to justification* might not be secured in informal settlements either. While the claim of *reciprocity of contents* would or would not be accepted depending on the situation in the settlement, the *reciprocity of reasons* would probably not be achieved, as the informality as such excludes the inhabitants of the settlements from societal resources. Moreover, it does not allow those with special needs, such as disabilities or traumas to have their needs fulfilled. As not everyone would agree with norms building on such arguments, the claim of *reciprocity of reasons* cannot be fulfilled. The same applies for the *claim of generality*, as the frame still does not include those affected by the migration management. From this perspective, informal settlements would only provide a false freedom. While they might function as solidarity solutions, the origins of the problems would need to be addressed for true justice to prevail.

I will now move over to discussing Benhabib's concept of *communicative freedom.* First of all, Benhabib would probably point to the fact that it is questionable if the deliberation conditions of *equality*, *symmetry* and *reciprocity* could really be fulfilled in a situation where the roles of power are as uneven as they are in the camps of the Aegean Sea, and many other refugee camps (organized or informal). If the inhabitants of the camps wish to escape the camps, and the European political actors wish to keep the migrants in the camps, and all the power lies in the hands of Europeans, it is plausible that the communication would be influenced by the respective interests. Feelings such as resentment, fear, hope, racism, non-recognition and hopelessness would prevent the participants from securing one another *communicative freedom.* If the foundational mechanisms of the deliberation are not in place, it would not matter if we assumed that everyone, inhabitants of the camps included, were able to evaluate arguments, and that some arguments may be considered valid, as they would not be able to evaluate whether they can actually be considered valid.

Moreover, an unequal foundation might affect which topics are brought to light. If the migrants living in the islands are not accepting the overarching conditions, solving the water access or the access to legal aid would not only not be representative of the overall stance, but it would also not be sufficient to create a justification for the camps. That would only occur if the main problem were addressed: that the camps are discriminatory per say, as those staying in the camps are not, to the same extent as other inhabitants of Europe, viewed as judicial subjects whose basic rights should be secured.

Hence, in the Aegean Sea, the implementation of a dialogical approach would have to be preceded by a reconstruction of the political structure. Here, Fraser's frame, which is limited to those being affected by the decisions taken, could function as a just and democratic replacement structure. While Benhabib does not specify who should be part of the *democratic iterations*, a frame focusing on those affected by the situation in the camps would not only be easier to justify, it would also not be as complicated to implement practically as would a decision- making process open for everyone including those not concerned by the decision. Institutionalizing deliberative practices concerning the camps and migration management generally would allow us to move away from the no longer sufficient post-westphalian decision-making. Moreover, it would increase the chances of the inhabitants of the camps being acknowledged as people with agency, power and a right to have rights.

However, Benhabib also interprets *communicative freedom* as a utopic way of shaping deliberative discourses. If we allow ourselves to adapt this view, the focus would be put on how we *would like* democratic discussions to be shaped, rather than how they *are* shaped today. Paradoxically, that could simultaneously secure a more thorough web of rights through which everyone's intrinsic value and dignity would be cherished, as the concept would be something constantly fought for. Such a thrive would plausibly also decrease the long-term dependency on humanitarian aid, as a system focusing on creating a sustainable democratic process where everyone is included would move us away from inert asylum processes and obstacles for people in the camps to make use of their autonomy and agency by, for example, promoting the possibility for everyone to work and support themselves as soon as possible.

If we imagine that the camps could continue to exist, it is interesting to speculate about which of the basic needs would be met because of deliberations as those proposed by Benhabib and Forst. While some of the basic needs, such as physical safety and accessibility for disabled people, might be detected through the deeper understanding created by deliberation based on *communicative freedom,* others, such as healthcare and the sizes of the shelters, might not be as revolutionary to discuss in deliberative forums, as they are needs all humans can relate to, and therefore would not need as much discussion to be addressed. While that does not mean that such topics cannot be part of deliberative discussions, or that *communicative freedom* or the *right to justification* are not good theories to keep in mind when structuring the discussions, it might provide an understanding for what to expect from deliberative discussions.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the correlation between understanding and opinion is not to be taken for granted. More knowledge might lead to changed convictions regarding some issues, possibly to a higher degree in cases when facts are particularly shocking (such as women peeing in their tents to avoid risking being attacked on the way to the bathroom). Although, in other cases, more knowledge might just create sympathy, which is a feeling that is not necessarily linked to a willingness to change the political system (but possibility to solidarity actions instead – such as donating to humanitarian NGOs). On the other hand, one can assume that deliberation would lead to more social cohesion as the discussions would be arranged to create respect for every participant. That would plausibly contribute to an openness towards experiences by refugees.

It is in the space between understanding and opinion where Benhabib's membership in a juridical community becomes relevant, as the membership persists in cases when the understanding does not change opinions in a human rights-based direction. In that way, the membership may function as protection against populism and intolerance, also in situations when the participating parties have not taken their responsibility linked to communicative freedom. The only problem with this idea (and that is a big one) is that the laws themselves should only be founded after a deliberative process, hence, the problem is circular. While better monitoring mechanisms linked to the rights might be a temporary solution, the project of constantly aspiring for a respectful human rights-based democratic process cannot be driven through if there is no moral conviction. While that is an issue faced by all ways of implementing human rights, it is still a relevant critique against Benhabib. Therefore, it would have been interesting if Benhabib not only put focus on the agency created through the possibility to participate in political decision-making, but also on how the deliberative processes can create and uphold moral conviction.

5.3 Summary of the theoretical analysis

Neither the framing perspective nor the discourse-theoretical perspectives find the refugee camps to be justified solutions, as they do not fulfill the prerequisites for the respective theories. The camps in the Aegean Sea are due to the humanitarian situation particularly unjustified, although the theoretical perspectives also reject the refugee camp as such due to their inhabitants incessantly being deprived of political rights, and more specifically the right to participate in decision-making of processes to which they are subjects.

The *framing* analysis explains the absence of justification with the fact that the ones affected by the structures forming the camps (such as the EU-Turkey deal) are not involved in the decision-making process. In the absence of a just decision-making process, promoting recognition of the fact that the inhabitants of the camps are autonomous and active agents, which is the main goal of just framing, in other ways is of relevance. Two examples proposed by the analysis are fulfilling basic needs in the camps and opening the process of migration to strengthen autonomy. They are, however, not enough to justify the camps.

The first part of the discourse-ethical analysis, where Rainer Forst's *right to justification* is applied, points to the prerequisites for justification not being fulfilled as a main reason that the refugee camps are not justified. The first prerequisite (validity claim) is the idea that

encampment is assumed to be an accepted migration management tactic, the second is the factual humanitarian conditions and the third is the exclusion from the decision-making of those affected by the decision.

The second part of the discourse-ethical analysis, in which Seyla Benhabib's *communicative freedom* is used, also sheds light on the flawed decision-making process, which precludes a justification of the camps. The unequal roles between the inhabitants of the camps and those being part of the decision-making process is pointed to as the primary explanation for the camps not being considered justified. The reason for this is that the unequal foundation does not allow a conversational atmosphere where every participant acknowledges each other's possibility to oppose or agree with arguments because of reasons whose validity they accept or do not accept (Benhabib's own definition of communicative freedom).

6. Conclusion and discussion

The communication analyzed in this report depicts the situation in the refugee camps in the Aegean Sea as abysmal with seven of the nine basic needs identified by Sphere and UNHCR not being met. The last two needs, the right to non-refoulement and accessibility for people with disabilities, are not sufficiently described in the material. Both the framing theory and the discourse-ethical theories provide reasonable and important interpretations of how justified the camps may be considered and why. While the camps in the Aegean Sea are not justified from any of the theoretical perspectives, the explanations to why differ.

From a framing perspective, the exclusion of those affected by the decision-making is the primary explanation to why the camps may not be considered justified. The discourse-ethical perspectives point to unequal preconditions shaping the decision-making process (the humanitarian situation only being one) as well as to the norms laying the foundation for the camp regime. Hence, no matter the possibility by the state, the municipality or NGOs to fulfill the basic needs set up by Sphere and UNHCR, the refugee camps would not be justified. The same applies to all camps and informal settlements built on the same unequal political foundation as the camps in the Aegean Sea.

The theoretical analysis shows that fulfilling basic needs is inherent in the justificatory perspective, however the justificatory perspective also ensures that every individual has political rights and the rights to influence their own situation. Hence, there is a discrepancy between the two perspectives: the humanitarian perspective ensures a more limited number of rights. As the current system is based on the humanitarian perspective, a change in the attitudes regarding migration management in general and encampment in particular would be needed for migrants to be secured political rights. That could only occur if the view upon and narrative around the target group was to be shifted to a genuine belief that each and every human has the right and ability to be equal parts in the democratic processes they are subject to. Being recognized as an autonomous agent is the first step to create possibility and readiness to participate in political conversations. Recognizing others as political subjects may also increase the understanding and willingness to oppose discriminatory practices. Creating a deliberative atmosphere characterized by recognition might therefore be one way of creating moral conviction for human rights. In that sense, both Fraser's and Benhabib's aspirational approaches are inspiring and relevant, as they shed light on the important fact that

we must constantly continue to try and prevent domination techniques and arbitrary power usage.

As the provision of certain basic rights is inherent to the demand of creating a justified migration management, having civil society vouch for the provision of the same is deeply troubling. While the analysis of the intents of the organizations do not demonstrate any particularly outstanding intentions, it is still important to remember that they do have an interest in existing – and that their survival depends upon human rights violations. Moreover, the analysis shows that neither of the organizations analyze their own role in upholding the narrative and the migration system. As pointed out by Michel Agier, a migration regime based on humanitarian aid will not care for anything other than the most basic needs being fulfilled, which inevitably puts the beneficiary in dependency and deprives them of their agency. Hence, to change the overarching system of domination, NGOs should continue to conduct advocacy around the issues in the camps but also start highlighting their own role in upholding a discriminatory system.

Of course, viewing the state as an impartial actor without interests of its own is naïve, however, by creating a just decision-making process, as suggested by the theoretical analysis, welfare services provided are more likely to mirror the wishes of those affected by the problems while simultaneously recognizing everyone's right to participate and affect their own future, than the current regime upheld by non-governmental actors.

The idea that the refugee camp practice would be abandoned within the near future is highly unlikely. Therefore, we might have to turn to the second-best alternative. This essay has proved that the non-entrée politics of the EU today actively not only deprives people affected by them of basic needs but also agency, autonomy and recognition by putting them in a state of what Parekh calls *ontological deprivation* and Agamben *bare life,* where they have no possibility to participate in political processes. Two examples of non-entrée politics are the asylum law in Greece and the EU-Turkey deal. Reformation of them could lead to an order, in which the reception would not be characterized by geographically isolated detention centers in islands scattered in the Aegean Sea, but by recognition of the fact that all humans are political subjects entitled to rights. While changes of these regulations would not solve the enormous issue of rights being bound to citizenship, it would simplify a part of the rights accumulation process which could help avert classic obstacles encountered by migrants and

thereby shorten the process of integration. That would not only benefit those migrating to Europe but also Europe itself.

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