Gone with the Crisis?

A Case Study on Aid Flows in Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom in Times of Crises

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ABSTRACT

Determining whether great crises in donor countries, such as the contemporary COVID-19 pandemic, alter foreign aid allotment represents an urgent research problem. This thesis aims to disentangle if and how aid is increased, reduced or remained the same during crises. The work conducted is a case study of three donor countries: Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. Their aid is scrutinized in relation to three crises, the Nordic crisis, the global crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic. An identified disagreement in the previous research helps create the theoretical framework guiding this study. A hypothesis is drawn from said framework, that aid allotment is to decrease during crises in donor countries. The findings of this thesis can neither confirm nor reject the hypothesis. Case-specific patterns emerge, implying a relationship between crises and alterations of aid. Seemingly, crises affect foreign aid allotment both positively and negatively, opening up for further research to verify the relationship.

Keywords: crises, foreign aid, ODA, donor countries, COVID-19 pandemic, Nordic crisis, global crisis of 2008, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom
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1. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has had unimaginable and severe impacts on nations worldwide during 2020. Never before has the modern world seen a transnational crisis\(^1\) of this magnitude. It has left no country unaffected and it continues to shake domestic conditions of high and middle income countries. However, such a disaster has the potential to strike low-income countries twofold, as evident in Frot (2009). It has previously been showcased how acute crises in recipient countries tend to increase provision of foreign aid (Dang et al., 2013; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Roodman, 2008a). In these countries, where public health systems are frail to begin with as well as poorly funded, a reduction in foreign aid would be particularly detrimental. Yet, as the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates, with notable consequences in donor countries, the recipients and the foreign aid providers are entangled in the same crisis (Kobayashi et al., 2020: 5). The pandemic is, according to World Bank Group (2020: 15), the worst worldwide recession since World War II, illustrating the graveness of the situation. What is to become of the much needed aid in a scenario when the crisis is not only affecting recipient countries, but also forces donors to consider their domestic troubles? The severe economic outcomes of the pandemic open up for analysis of aid during this time.

There is reason to believe provision of foreign aid is to be reduced during crises affecting donor countries, as states become required to prioritize their domestic spendings (Dang et al., 2013; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). Conversely, several scholars (Mold et al., 2010; Kharas and Desai, 2008) argue that economic hardships do not necessarily correlate with foreign aid reduction. Instead, for example Mold and Prizzon (2012) find that distribution of foreign aid might be increased during crises in donor countries. As the recipient countries are in greater need of assistance one might suspect that foreign aid will see an upsurge. Consequently, if aid flows will be altered by crises in donor countries and what patterns it could take in doing so is arguably a relevant inquiry to the field of development as well as to the global community, including policymakers and regulators. This is thus a research problem which needs investigating. This thesis will explore the links between two previous financial crises (the Nordic crisis of the early 1990s\(^2\) and the global crisis of 2008\(^3\)) and the ongoing pandemic’s effects on a selection of donor countries’ foreign aid allocation. Three donor countries are particularly enthralling in regards to their foreign aid disbursement: Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. Sweden and the United Kingdom are among the greatest

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1 In this thesis, crises are defined as ”a difficult or dangerous situation that needs serious attention” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). This definition is chosen due to its wide scope which encompasses all crises relevant for this thesis.
2 Scholars have had difficulties distinguishing a definite beginning and ending of the Nordic crises, due to spillover effects. Englund (1999) holds that in Sweden, the crisis began 1991, and the recovery started 1993/1994.
3 Henceforth, the crisis will be referred to as the global crisis of 2008. The crisis started 2007, and reached its deepest nadir 2008 (Ryan, 2008: 1606). This is why 2006 is considered the year before the crisis and is included in the coding scheme (see 2.4. Material), rather than 2007 being the starting point.
ODA (official development assistance)\(^4\) donors considering ODA/GNI (Irwin, 2019: 1; Aza, 2016). The United States is the largest ODA donor in real terms (OECD, 2020a), not accounting for ODA/GNI. Its influence on the field is therefore considerable. A case study, examining the donor countries’ aid distribution during a previous crisis and during the current pandemic is fruitful in order to distinguish pathways aid can take during crises. The case studies will be conducted considering our aspirations to scrutinize the donor countries’ unique aid allocation during crises. This design will capture potential correlation between crises and aid flows, but cannot determine whether such a link is causal.

The research undertaken in this thesis is considered relevant for numerous reasons. Humanity could stand before an amount of challenges in the coming times, such as looming climate disasters of various magnitude. As part of a global world, the hardships felt by some, are felt by everyone. We argue that examining previous financial crises and the current pandemic’s impacts on aid sectors will help in preparation for forthcoming hardships. OECD (2009: 27) illuminates how economic crises both heighten the difficulty and the importance of predicting aid flows, which is in line with what this thesis sets out to achieve. Thereupon this study aims to contribute to the field of foreign aid by filling in blanks concerning the different directions of aid alloted by donor countries during crises.

As aforementioned, the work of this thesis is case studies of Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. The phenomenon scrutinized in the thesis is their aid allotment during crises. The three specific donor countries are selected due to their prominent stance in the international aid community (see Selection of Cases 2.2.). The United States and the United Kingdom’s aid distributions will be analyzed in relation to the global crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic and Sweden’s foreign aid in relation to the Nordic crisis of the early 1990s and the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of the study is not to compare the crises with each other nor to compare the countries’ responses to them but rather to elucidate how the individual country’s aid allocation is altered by crises. The reasoning behind not comparing the cases with each other lies in the many potential underlying variables that are beyond the aim of this thesis, such as political strategies, political systems, public opinion etcetera. Our starting point ought to be found in crises’ effects on aid distribution in donor countries. With the selected cases we can illustrate scenarios where the countries previously have been affected by crises and accordingly any alterations in aid that might have occurred then. Now faced with the contemporary pandemic, this thesis strives to illuminate if and how aid might take similar pathways as it did during previous crises. Will aid decrease, increase or remain the same?

\(^4\) Refer to 1.2. Aid for a closer explanation.
1.1. Purpose and Research Questions

The field of research this thesis touches upon is aid disbursement during crises. This study relies on a theoretical framework regarding a major disagreement in the previous research, whether crises in donor countries increase or decrease provision of foreign aid. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to examine whether different crises will have similar effects on donor countries’ foreign aid distribution. Is there a correlation between crises and alterations in aid? Aid allocation in Sweden will be compared during the Nordic financial crisis of 1991-1994 and the COVID-19 pandemic, to see if its foreign aid takes similar pathways in decreasing, increasing or remaining the same. Aid allocation in the United States and the United Kingdom will be compared during the global crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic to see if foreign aid takes similar pathways in decreasing, increasing or remaining the same. To meet the purpose, the overarching research question is:

Do crises similarly affect the patterns of aid allocation in donor countries, and if so, how?

Changes in aid can be many. In this thesis, it is the amount of aid allocated that is of interest. In order to answer the overarching research question, two sub-questions are:

1) Did the aid allocation in Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom increase, decrease or remain the same following the Nordic financial crisis of 1991-1994 and the global crisis of 2008?

2) Did the aid allocation in Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom increase, decrease or remain the same following the COVID-19 pandemic?

1.2. Background and Key Contextualization

In the ensuing paragraphs, aid and the financial crises necessary to grasp the context this study navigates within will here be explained.

1.2.1. Aid

Aid is a multifaceted concept. This thesis will focus on official development assistance (ODA) which is “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions[...]” (OECD, 2018). DAC stands for Development Assistance Committee and is the coordinator of the Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) ODA. The DAC has 37 member countries, among which Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom can be found (OECD, 2020b). The DAC mandate is to promote development cooperation (OECD, 2020c). ODA recipients include, in

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5 Although the terms foreign aid and ODA are not completely synonymous, they are in this thesis used interchangeably.
the least developed countries category for example Afghanistan and Haiti, in the lower income countries and territories for example Moldova and Sri Lanka and in the upper middle income countries and territories for example China and Turkey (OECD, 2020d). The donor countries have agreed on a target where 0.7% of the country’s GNI is supposed to be allocated to ODA (OECD, 2020e). However, this target has yet to be achieved by several donors.

Since Sweden is a key actor in this thesis, it is relevant to illustrate its aid system. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) is delegated by the Swedish government to organize the Swedish ODA (EBA, 2018). Sida is in charge of approximately half of the overall Swedish aid budget (Sida, 2017). In 2019 Sweden assigned $5.4bn, representing 0.99% of the country’s GNI as ODA (OECD, 2020f). As another key actor in the thesis, the United States’ aid system differs from Sweden’s. While allocating $45bn in 2019 for overseas disbursements (USAID, 2020), the net ODA (over $33bn in 2019) was only 0.16% of its GNI, low for the country’s relative economic size (OECD, 2020a). USAID categorizes the United States’ foreign assistance as economic and military. Military is a considerable share of the assistance, closer to 30% of all foreign support (USAID, 2020). Lastly, the United Kingdom’s foreign aid is channeled through ODA. The country allotted 0.7% of its GNI in 2019, illustrating $19.4bn (OECD, 2020g).

1.2.2. Financial Crises
In the following paragraphs, we set out to explain why the Nordic crisis of 1991-1994 and the global crisis of 2008 have been selected for the purpose of analysis alongside the pandemic. It is important to note that the area of inquiry is not to compare the severity of the crises but rather to highlight how the countries responded to the earlier crisis contra their response to the current pandemic, concerning aid disbursement. As the COVID-19 pandemic has had great impacts on the financial sector as well as the health sector, it can be perceived as a financial crisis (World Bank Group, 2020: 15). However, as it is unique in its kind, questions might be raised about how the impacts of the pandemic will be greater than the impacts of previous crises. Throughout the coming sections, we therefore briefly explain similarities between the Nordic crisis and the pandemic and the 2008 crisis and the pandemic, despite how they are not to be compared in severity.

The Nordic crisis occurred in the early 1990s (1991-1994) and shook the economies of Sweden, Finland and Norway⁶. In Sweden, a mixture of real estate and stock market peakings, increasing interest rates and simultaneously overly expansionary fiscal policies lead up to the crisis which spread to the banks. Between 1991 and 1993, Sweden’s GDP fell with

⁶ The reasoning behind not including all Nordic countries in the thesis is due to the desire to only have influential cases (see 2.1. Research Design and 2.2. Selection of Cases) in the analysis. Finland and Norway are not considered key actors in the foreign aid industry, for example not portraying great soft power (McClory, 2019).
5.1% in total. The end of 1993 saw the overnight rate decrease to a staggering 7.75%, the lowest rate in more than a decade (Englund, 1999). These numbers testify to the magnitude of the banking crisis and the widespread impacts on the Swedish economy. For Sweden, the recession was one of the greatest in modern history. The reason the 2008 crisis has not been selected for analysis in Sweden’s case is that during that crisis, Sweden was relatively spared compared to other countries, in the sense that it was able to bounce back fast (Calvo et al., 2013). The quick recovery after 2008 would make it difficult to see how aid distribution is altered during an average recovery period7.

For the United States and the United Kingdom, the global crisis of 2008 had severe consequences. The United States’ annual GDP dropped with 0.14% in 2008 and 2.5% in 2009 (World Bank, 2019). The labor market was critically struck, leaving unemployment at over 9% in 2010. The recession has been called the worst economic catastrophe since the Great Depression (Amadeo, 2020). In the United Kingdom, the effects of the crisis were evident as well. Fall in retail sales, bankruptcy of significant businesses and rise of unemployment were some impacts caused by the recession. The United Kingdom’s GDP fell record low with 5% in 2009 (2.6% in one quarter) and the country formally entered a duration of recession (Allen, 2010).

As illustrated, both the Nordic crisis and the 2008 crisis have represented great tasks for the countries’ economies, and have therefore forced them to prioritize their spendings, including aid provision. The COVID-19 pandemic can be said to be a global recession (World Bank Group, 2020: 15). The extent cannot yet be determined. However, how the countries responded to the earlier crises provide a useful yardstick for further analysis that will be undertaken in this thesis. Parallels have been drawn between the pandemic and the 2008 crisis previously during 2020. While different due to the pandemic’s intersectional repercussions (Roland Berger, 2020), scholars have displayed their inherent similarities. Strauss-Kahn (2020) highlights aspects in which the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008 crisis are alike. First, uncertainty is analogous for both crises. Domestic leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom may respond to the unpredictability of the pandemic similarly as during the 2008 crisis, which could have implications for ODA. Second, the collapses caused by both crises hold similarities. The two recessions have been deemed the largest from the time of the Great Depression (ibid.). Lastly, fiscal policies following the eruption of the crises have provided substantial support in both instances.

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7 Evidently, the Nordic crisis was not a global financial crisis and did not have the potential to strike recipient countries “twofold”. We argue it is interesting to include a non-global crisis, as it gives the thesis nuance. According to one view in the literature (see 2.2. Theoretical Framework), a crisis such as the Nordic, which only struck donor countries should not have increased foreign aid, but rather diminished it (other scholars advocate either no relationship between crises and altering aid flows or an increase of aid despite it not being a global crisis).
As discussed above, the Nordic crisis is included as Sweden’s recovery period was longer following it, than it was after the 2008 crisis. In the material it is explained why Sweden is a key actor, clarifying why we have chosen to adapt this study to a specific country. Even if the Nordic crisis did not have a global widespread impact as the pandemic and the 2008 crisis, this is of minor importance, as it is not the crises themselves being compared, but rather how the individual countries responded to them. To our knowledge, no systematic study has been conducted of the Nordic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, making the connection intriguing for further scrutiny.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the following sections, key contextualizing concepts as well as the previous research discourse vital for the execution of this thesis will be introduced. The theoretical framework underlying this study will also be presented. Previous research will be the focus of the forthcoming sections and in 3.2., the theoretical framework developed is introduced.

2.1. Previous Research

Throughout this thesis, we will draw on Roodman’s work from 2008, in which he develops a new measurement of foreign aid distribution. It builds on the same underlying data reported from the DAC as ODA does, but excludes the cancellation of old non-ODA loans. Roodman calls this new data set NAT, a net transfers concept. The standard data set for measuring ODA is net ODA, which is capital flows. NAT includes interest received on ODA loans, whereas net ODA is solely the net of principal payments on said loans (Roodman, 2008b). However, for the three countries in this study, the difference in numbers between net ODA and NAT is marginal (see Table B)\(^8\). We deem these differences to be so slight that they will not be of concern when comparing Roodman’s data with other data not calculated with the NAT system (that is, ODA from 2019 and onwards). Applying the NAT system rather than the net ODA is due to the evident lack of clear data from OECD concerning the years of the Nordic crisis. Even though the difference between NAT and net ODA is minor when observing our three cases’ aid distribution, we wish to highlight and distinguish between the systems for transparency and intersubjectivity.

**Table A: Net ODA/GNI 2009 Versus NAT/GNI 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor countries</th>
<th>Net ODA/GNI 2009</th>
<th>NAT/GNI 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While many researchers (for example Faini, 2006; Dang et al., 2013; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) argue the provision of aid is negatively affected by crises, others (Bertoli et al., 2008; Kharas and Desai, 2008) claim that aid is to increase during crises, or even that there is no direct correlation between harsh fiscal domestic conditions and foreign aid allocation. As the field of previous research has been probed, we have identified this standpoint where scholars

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are at odds. There is disagreement on whether large budgetary deficits, such as ones followed by crises, result in reductions of foreign aid or not. In the following paragraphs we briefly outline the contrasting positions on how crises influence foreign aid allotment, which theories later are drawn from to build a theoretical framework.

Dang et al. (2013) suggest aid flows are to decrease during recessions, pointing at fiscal debt as a main factor. Using history as a guideline, global financial crises could persist in substantially decreasing aid allotments over the next decade (ibid.: 247-248). In the same manner, Faini (2006: 9) and Over (2008) conclude that large budgetary deficits have negative effects on the provision of foreign aid. However, the study of Mold and Prizzon (2012) provides contrasting empirical evidence, namely that the global crisis of 2008 will not have such severe consequences as many researchers previously expected. On the contrary, their results found how in the aftermath of the financial crisis, between the years of 2008 and 2009, the total net ODA from DAC members actually increased by 6.8% (ibid.: 165) (This is however not accounting for debt relief). In their research conducted on Italy’s foreign aid flows, Bertoli et al. (2008: 14) discover that large deficits in the economy might actually increase the distribution of bilateral aid. Kharas and Desai (2008) too indicate that harsh fiscal conditions do not necessarily decrease aid allotment. They argue there is no statistical relationship between the United States’ net ODA and fiscal fluctuations. Instead, they suggest that infrequencies in foreign aid allocations are likely to stem from other political and institutional components, such as the many varied approaches from different donors, as well as the easy accessibility for American legislatures to fund other purposes with the foreign aid piggy bank (ibid.).

Another scholarly disagreement identified in the previous research concerns estimates on how much foreign aid distribution is to be reduced during crises. Provided that crises do in fact decrease provision of ODA, the question is how much one can expect aid to dwindle during harsh fiscal conditions, such as ones following the pandemic? Dang et al. (2013: 238) suggest that aid distribution reaches its nadir at 28%, whereas Frot (2009) predicts aid allotment to fall with 13%, based on the evidence from six crises in the 1980s and 1990s, which all shook the economies of donor countries. In turn, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015: 47) claim that on average, growth recessions lessen the distribution of foreign aid by 11%. Moreover, Mendoza et al. (2009: 8-9) discuss how, based on the wide array of results in their study, one can anticipate ODA to be reduced between 13-30%, a considerable span. These varied results give an indicator to the difficulty of estimating just how much ODA would decline during crises, if that is the case. While we here have provided a brief overview of where scholars stand regarding this question, we have chosen not to elaborate on this in the analysis, as one at this point of the thesis cannot be sure if crises will see decreases in aid or not.
The section on previous research will be concluded with a brief summary on our takeaways and standpoints. Based on the evidence presented by Faini, 2006; Over, 2008; Roodman, 2008; Frot, 2009; Dang et al., 2013 and Dabla-Norris et al., 2015, this thesis reckons that the outlook in favor of a decrease is better-grounded as it is supported by more scholars. As elaborated on at the end of 3.2 Theoretical Framework, we anticipate aid to diminish. Since we have located an apparent lack of consensus in the previous research, the work of this thesis strives to unravel the complex terrain on possible alterations of aid flows.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework is derived from the standpoints introduced above, whether crises reduce or increase foreign aid, or if it remains the same. The different positions are here elaborated on. Having developed this framework, we argue, will help in tackling the research problem, if aid flows will be altered by crises and what patterns it could take in doing so. The framework will guide us in approaching the research question and purpose, is aid to decrease, increase or remain the same as a result of crises?

Roodman (2008) comments on why the causal relationship he presents in his paper, between crises and reductions in foreign aid, occurs. In his case study of the Nordic crisis and the Japanese crisis of the 1990s, freeze-ups, slowdowns and donors pouring a great amount of money into their own banks are suggested as reasons for the aid declinement. Roodman’s (2008) results are that in Sweden, aid is reduced by 17% following the Nordic crisis, recovering to its original allotment nine years after the start of the crisis. Even though the author highlights the difficulties in predicting alterations in foreign aid, he presses the notion that one can expect aid allotments to decline over the years following a crisis (ibid.). Over (2008) agrees that a crisis is likely to reduce foreign aid allocations.

Faini (2006: 14) finds dual effects of great budget deficits. The first effect covers how the provision of foreign aid will diminish directly as a consequence of a significant budgetary deficit. Second, a permanently great budget deficit will increase the public debt, which in turn will lower the country’s GDP. Faini estimates that for the European Union, a great increase of public sector debt (circa 25% of GDP) would reduce the aid budget with 0.1%. Seemingly small, this is, as explained by the author, enough to almost eradicate e.g. the Italian foreign aid budget. The independent variables used by Frot (2009) in order to predict the consequences of financial crises on foreign aid budgets is GDP, government balance (overall difference between spendings and revenue) and unemployment rate. While Frot finds that aid is reduced following a financial crisis, he claims only GDP has a significant influence on aid disbursement (Frot, 2009: 26-27). In their research from 2015, Dabla-Norris et al. also find that harsh fiscal conditions in donor countries diminish aid flows. Similar results are distinguished by Dang et al. (2013). They propose a possible pathway for why this occurs, which is in the attempts by governments to manage a significant fiscal debt following a
banking crisis. The authors present three scenarios to how donor countries will respond to crises. When donors suffer economic hardships they can 1) seize the opportunity to diminish their own aid budget, 2) compensate for reductions made by others and thus increase aid, or 3) coordinate in an effort to sustain the levels of aid flows prior to the crisis (ibid.:248). Dang et al. (ibid.) imply that the first and third options are most likely, once again reinforcing the stance that financial crises will reduce aid. An additional interesting finding is that donors will reduce aid when faced with idiosyncratic shocks, shocks specific to one country, but not with common shocks, which is crises suffered by multiple countries (ibid.).

Mold et al. (2010) suggest several grounds to why aid flows could decrease during a recession, foremost that under palpable pressures for governments and policy makers to cut expenses, the dominion of foreign aid is a strong candidate for reduction. The recipients of aid cannot affect the domestic politics, nor is keeping the aid budget intact a vote-winner (ibid.: 7). However, in their research, it is argued that aid is not to diminish as a result of crises. On the contrary, they claim one might expect aid to increase during economic recessions. They propose two arguments for why this is the case. First, donor countries may experience a moral responsibility to succeed in their pledge to international ODA aims. Second, the donors’ debt reliefs to the heavily indebted poor countries is additional and not substitutional to ODA, that is, debt relief will not replace aid (ibid.: 22).

Kharas and Desai (2008) discuss how in practice, foreign aid has not been driven by the fiscal conditions of donor countries, and therefore one ought to be skeptical towards a possible relationship between recessions and a lower disbursement of foreign aid. The authors display two arguments justifying the skepticism on aid decreasement. Firstly, aid flows are volatile despite GNI. Secondly, there is little evidence that business cycles in donor countries have a direct effect on foreign aid distribution (ibid.). Bertoli et al. (2008: 14) write that larger budget deficits increase the foreign aid distribution, quite the opposite of what scholars such as Faini (2006) and Frot (2009) find. Moreover, the authors also demonstrate, with the case of Italy, that even considering the country’s unfavorable economic situation, the same aid gap (as during economic upturns) in relation to the target of 0.7% of GNI persists (Bertoli et al., 2008: 16-17).

To summarize the theoretical framework, the two positions regarding the alleged alterations in the distribution of foreign aid can be labeled contradictory. One side advocates foreign aid reductions as a direct result of economic crises, while the other either finds that crises increase the provision of aid or that no relationship between distribution of aid and fiscal conditions is to be found. This theoretical framework will be utilized in analyzing the results from the reports. With the framework we hope to bring clarity to if, and how ODA is impacted by crises.
We believe there might exist a relationship between crises striking donor countries and reductions in aid. We cannot, however, at this point, be certain whether financial crises increase, decrease or not affect aid flows. Yet, our understanding is that the evidence in favor of a crisis causing decreasing aid flows is stronger. While the research debate is clearly divided into two separate positions, more scholars tend to lean towards the side advocating the relationship between economic struggles and a decreasing foreign aid. Based on this, following the framework presented, a hypothesis is constructed ensuingly:

*Crises affecting donor countries will result in decreasing foreign aid allocation.*

We thus assume that the independent variable is crises, which will alter and affect foreign aid allocation, the dependent variable.

2.3 Operationalization

In order to answer the two research sub-questions we categorize each year of the material to the two different sides of the theoretical framework. The question: *Did aid increase, decrease or remain the same this year?* is posed to the material. This is marked by Y, X and Z for each year. Y represents a decrease from the previous year, as proposed by for example Frot (2009), Roodman (2008) and Faini (2006). X represents an increase from the previous year, as advocated by for example Mold et al. (2010) and Bertoli et al. (2008). If aid allotment remains the same from the previous year, this will be marked with Z. The results will be presented in tables which will compare aid allocation of the individual country during the two crises. By this operationalization, the theoretical framework is covered in the analysis. The operationalization will arguably provide high validity as it measures if and how the aid allocation was decreased, increased, or remained the same, aligning with the aim of this thesis. The foreign aid distribution will be collected through numbers from OECD, Roodman (2008), Donor Tracker (2020) and statements and estimates made by donor governments by a question posed to the material: *How much foreign aid was allocated this year?*

It is important to note that the data utilized in this thesis is time series data. Our data illuminates trends over time and is thus dependent on the aspect of time (Teorell and Svensson, 2007: 81). The aid budget could be dependent on several factors, such as previous budgets and changes in governments, among other issues. Budgets tend to fluctuate. Also, as explained by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015: 53), donors tend to view previous figures when determining present and future aid budgets, which comes with a possibility that past aid flows might affect present aid flows. A shortcoming is so that the numbers in our thesis may mirror a trend. Keeping this in mind, minor alterations in foreign aid budgets presented in our analysis may be a result of normal budget fluctuations. However, we argue that the data showcased in this thesis is still interesting to study, as great decreases and increases which may not follow the pattern of the previous years can be made visible. As this study will
illuminate potential deviating patterns in aid allocation, it also opens up the possibility for future studies to incorporate the results found here in further research.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHOD AND MATERIAL

In the following sections, the research design, method and material will be discussed, as well as the selection of cases. Limitations and adjustments of the material will also be briefly described. The research design will be case studies of three countries and the method used a statistical analysis with a complementary coding scheme.

3.1. Research Design
This thesis is case studies of aid allocation within Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. The design has been chosen to best capture the aim of this thesis, to see if crises increase, decrease or do not alter donor countries’ aid flows. The reasoning behind this choice of design is to be able to provide more detailed and nuanced explanations of three important actors in the field of foreign aid. The decision to conduct a case study with few carefully selected cases, rather than having a more quantitatively structured study with many cases draws inspiration from Schraeder et al. (1998). Their research suggests that the foreign aid scope is as puzzling as it is complex. No case in their comparison of foreign aid distribution were alike. This correspondingly calls for a more in detail examination of individual cases (ibid.: 319), highlighting the need for this case study. Schraeder et al. select their countries on the criteria that they are Western industrialized democracies as well as key actors in the African foreign aid context. Our selection process was influenced by their work. Our cases are industrialized democracies in the West, and substantial actors in the foreign aid dominion.

In this thesis, no comparison will be made between the countries, but rather of aid allocation during two points in time in the country. We have chosen not to compare the different cases with each other due to the possibility of then distinguishing patterns of the country’s individual aid flows. In the following paragraphs, the cases will be closely introduced.

3.2. Selection of Cases
This section entails the reasoning behind choosing Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom as cases. In the following paragraphs we go into detail on why each individual case is deemed interesting. The three countries are considered significant examples, partly due to their international stance within the foreign policy community. In the 2019 Soft Power Index all three were among the most prominent soft powers in the world (Mclory, 2019). This is of importance when considering the European Commission’s findings from 2009, how governments will be more willing to reduce their aid distribution when they are under the impression other donors are doing the same (Hallet, 2009: 1). Therefore, if and how these three countries will change their aid allocation in response to a crisis could have notable implications for how other donors will choose to dispense their aid. Using the words of Teorell and Svensson (2007: 151-152), these three countries are substantial cases. Each country is particularly relevant in the discourse of aid allotment. For this study it is relevant to analyze DAC countries, since their aid standards are set with the same target goal of 0.7%
of the donor’s GNI (OECD, 2020e). The United States is the most generous donor in terms of absolute measures, whereas the United Kingdom is among the greatest DAC donors. Sweden by far exceeds the 0.7% limit by dedicating 0.99% of its GNI in 2019 to ODA (OECD, 2020h). Additionally, all countries are in the midst of handling the COVID-19 pandemic, affecting their domestic priorities and politics. For these reasons, we claim a case study of each country’s aid allocation will fit the thesis’ aim.

Sweden is a great ODA donor, thus influential in the foreign aid sphere. The official Swedish foreign aid can be dated back to the 1960s (Bigsten et al., 2016: 2). Moreover, Sweden became the first country to reach the target of allocating 0.7% of its GNI to ODA in 1975, and its ODA allotment has been consequently above that threshold ever since (OECD, 2020f; Irwin, 2019). Sweden possesses a global reputation as a leader on human rights and health related issues, having both traditionally and presently been thoroughly engaged in multilateral affairs (ibid.: 2). Therefore, both the historic input of the country as well as the contemporary dimension of Swedish foreign aid contributions outline a solid foundation to having Sweden as a case in this thesis.

As the United States is the largest and thus potentially the most influential actor in the field of foreign aid, it is relevant to analyze its ODA flows. The United States holds the spot as the primary bilateral and humanitarian development co-operation provider of all DAC countries. Its contribution represents 23% of the DAC members’ overall ODA in 2019 (OECD, 2020a). Yet, several studies find that the United States’ ODA has been negatively affected by crises (Garret, 2006; Mendoza et al., 2009). However, results also suggest the country’s aid allocation has increased during some years of crisis (OECD, 2012). This indicates that crises have varying effects on the provision of foreign aid, opening up for further scrutiny on the United States’ aid flows during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Historically, the United Kingdom is one of few which has managed to reach the ODA target, of 0.7%. In 2013, the target was met, having remained at that threshold since (Aza, 2016). The country is, more specifically, the third largest ODA donor in absolute terms, indicating its great influence in the field of foreign aid (Donor Tracker, 2020). Despite the global crisis of 2008, the United Kingdom’s GNI nearly doubled during the years 2007-2013 (Aza, 2016). The patterns taken by the foreign aid allocation during this time are thus enthralling, as is what patterns we can expect the aid allocation to take today. The United Kingdom remains intriguing when exploring its ODA during the COVID-19 pandemic and is therefore one of the cases in the thesis.

Before proceeding to the method and material, a discussion on causality is necessary. The research design selected is not suited to make claims on causality. Although interesting to investigate potential causal links between crises in donor countries and alterations in aid
flows, this thesis does not fulfill the causality criteria of isolation, covariation and counterfactual conditions (Teorell and Svensson, 2007: 64-65). Thus, this thesis has descriptive ambitions rather than explanatory. In addition, making claims on causality requires controlling for an extensive amount of variables that might differ for each country. As the selection of cases for this thesis is not based on a most similar design, the potential underlying variables become many, yet some speculations regarding whether crises are responsible for alterations in foreign aid, or what other possible variables could intervene are carried out in the discussion and conclusion. Still, this is not to say this thesis aims to explain possible alterations in aid allotment, but rather to investigate aid flows in times of crises, steering clear from making possible causal claims. A descriptive study, as conducted in this thesis, is needed when new phenomena are to be explained. As aid during the COVID-19 pandemic, part of what is investigated here, is a contemporary issue, we argue it has yet to be thoroughly described. A descriptive study thus provides a solid foundation for explanatory research.

We deem it intriguing to have three separate cases, rather than to scrutinize just one country’s aid flows during crises. The countries are significant cases, which we claim makes it important to unravel their own aid allotment in times of crises, to learn more about these specific, impactful countries. Our study, moreover, opens up for further research on these countries and their aid allotment.

3.3. Method and Material

3.3.1. Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis is the method used to answer whether the COVID-19 pandemic is generating similar patterns in aid distribution as previous financial crises, capturing the aim of the thesis. Statistical analysis is a method to summarize large numbers of data, in order to uncover trends (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 361). Here, it is utilized due to the interval scale’s inherent strength in determining distance between categories, so called metrical information (ibid.). By applying this method, we hope to recognize the potential diversity of aid allotment before, during and after crises. The material (see 2.4. Material) will be categorized with a coding scheme, to shed light on the donor’s aid distribution prior to, during and after crises. The coding scheme is used to elucidate whether the ODA has decreased, increased or remained the same for the respective cases. By this we can analyze and distinguish possible similar patterns from the two financial crises as with the current pandemic. In the analysis, aid allotment during the two previous crises will be compared with aid allotment during the pandemic. As noted, what appears to be a correlation between crises and alterations in aid flows can rather be a result of underlying upwards economic trends etcetera. For a closer discussion, refer to 2.3 Operationalization.
The following structure will guide the analysis and results section: All data is categorized in tables, which are to be found in the appendices. The data is then used to create diagrams. Firstly, a diagram related to the financial crisis will be presented alongside a summary of said diagram. Secondly, a diagram related to the COVID-19 pandemic will be showcased with a summary. Thirdly, possible alterations in aid allotment for both crises for each case will be compared and illuminated in a table. The results will then be discussed and the theoretical framework will be applied. The design is to be repeated three times, one for each individual case.

3.3.2. Coding Scheme
A coding scheme will be used in order to showcase the possible variation in aid disbursements. The first box is the question posed to the material. The first column is years. The second column shows the country’s allocated aid during the same year. The third column entails the difference in percentages from the previous year.

**Table A: Coding Scheme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4. Material
A variation of material is selected in order to distinguish if the pandemic will imitate (increase, decrease or not alter ODA distribution) the two earlier financial crises. To analyze the United Kingdom and the United States’ foreign aid allotment during the 2008 crisis and the following recovery period, official reports from OECD on ODA from the countries each year will be used. The distribution of Swedish foreign aid in relation to the Nordic crisis will be investigated through the utilization of a net aid transfers system, developed by David Roodman. This reliable although differing material is applied as there are no official ODA reports from OECD for the years 1992-1994. As this thesis was written during the fall of 2020, there is no updated data on the ODA distributed during the year of 2020. However, there are estimates and statements given by each government, which evince aid allotments this year and the next coming year. Here, it is important to note that ODA for 2020 and 2021 are projections and not real term aid allocations.

3.4.1. Delimitations
The scope of years included in the analysis is limited to 11. This limit is drawn partly due to Roodman’s (2008a) work, where he arrives at the conclusion that during the Nordic crisis, Swedish foreign aid recovered to pre-crisis level (that of 1990) in 2000, ten years later. When including the year prior to the crisis (1990), which is relevant for comparison of aid levels,
the scope becomes 11 years. Similar conclusions were made by Frot (2009: 27), who writes that at a five year horizon after the onset of crises, allotment of foreign aid has not significantly changed. At a ten year horizon, however, impacts of the crises are made visible in the aid allocation. This strengthens the reasoning of an 11-year scope. Dang et al. (2013: 2) further advocate the idea that crises in donor countries are long lived, with aid flows plummeting ten years following a crisis. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) approach this field of research on a broader notion, utilizing material spanning over 1970-2005. This is beyond our aim. We argue the delimitations will allow us to include years deemed interesting by previous researchers (as ten years evidently is the limited scope of several scholars), but yet exclude years not seemingly affected by crises.

3.4.2. Adjustments of the Material
As aid allocation during the 1990s and 2008 and onwards is to be related to aid allocation today, inflation needs consideration. The data provided by Roodman for Sweden’s aid allotment 1990 through 2000 is illustrated in billion Swedish krona (SEK). For the sake of consistency, United States Dollar (USD) will be the standard throughout this thesis. As we convert Roodman’s data, which is adjusted for inflation of 2000, we will convert the SEK of 2000 to USD exchange rate of 2020, to match the numbers of 2019 and onwards. First, we adjust the SEK of 2000 for inflation of SEK 2020. Second, we convert the SEK of 2020 to USD of 2020. Since all data from OECD on the 2008 crisis and onwards also will be converted to 2020’s exchange rate, the fluctuations of the USD seen during 2020 will not skew our results.

One minor reliability issue is that exchange rates are constantly changing, resulting in that the numbers presented in this thesis will have to go through additional conversions if the method is to be repeated at different points in time. Apart from this, the reliability is deemed high as the systematic categorization of decreasing and increasing data during the years leaves little room for own interpretation.
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, the results and analysis will be presented. First, the individual cases’ aid allocation in relation to the previous crisis and the current pandemic will be displayed in two diagrams\(^9\), alongside with explanations of the results. Then, the results will be analyzed, using the theoretical framework outlined above. The aid distribution from the previous crisis in the respective countries will be compared with the aid distribution during the pandemic, as we strive to fulfill the aim of this thesis. In doing so, we anticipate to answer the overarching research question:

*Do crises similarly affect the patterns of aid allocation in donor countries, and if so, how?*

4.1. Case 1: Sweden’s Foreign Aid During the Nordic Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic
*Nordic crisis:* To start the analysis, Sweden’s aid distribution during the Nordic crisis and the following recovery period will be summarized. The years of scope for Sweden are 1990-2000. Roodman’s (2008a) data is used. An example of the table is given below (Table C). First, the aid allocation of 2000 is expressed unchanged in the parentheses with SEK as the currency. Second, the SEK of 2000 is adjusted for inflation to the SEK of 2020, also expressed in parentheses. The tool used to adjust for inflation in SEK is SCB’s *Prisomräknare*\(^10\). Lastly, the SEK of 2020 is converted to USD of 2020. The tool used to convert the SEK of 2020 to USD of 2020 is *OFX Historical Exchange Rate*\(^11\). In October 2020, one USD equals 0.113242 SEK. The final numbers (USD of 2020) are presented in bold in the box. These are the numbers displayed in the diagram. The third column entails the difference in percentages from the previous year. Roodman has rounded off his decimals at two. As there is no other data from the beginning of the Nordic crisis, the same measures will be taken in our analysis. A possible slight margin of error between our figured numbers and Roodman’s may occur, since we are unable to calculate using his exact numbers. Still, as these differences are minor, they are insignificant for the overall result.

*Table C: Example of Usage of Coding Scheme Sweden*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>(14.64bn SEK of 2000) (18.92bn SEK of 2020) <strong>S2.14bn of 2020</strong></td>
<td>Y 0.4% decrease from 1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) Complete tables for each case are to be found in the appendices.

\(^10\) [https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/prisomraknaren/.Årsmedeltal](https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/prisomraknaren/.Årsmedeltal), the annual average for 2000 is used. For 2020, the month of October is selected, which is the most recent value of the currency to date (November 17 2020).


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Diagram 1a: Sweden’s Foreign Aid Allocation During the Years 1990-2000, in Relation to the Nordic Crisis of 1991-1994

Diagram 1a: The year 1990 is considered unaffected by the Nordic crisis. In 1991 the aid allocation slightly decreased and in 1992, a year after the crisis started, aid distribution peaked. 1993 and 1994 showed a downwards trend and the lowest point was reached 1995. 1996 saw an increase before a slight decrease in 1997 and 1998. In 1999 aid once again rose, to recover to its original level and beyond in 2000.

COVID-19 pandemic: As the year of 2020 is not yet over when this thesis is concluded, we rely on estimates and preliminary commitments for the years 2020 and 2021, made by the Swedish government in September 2020 (Donor Tracker, 2020a). For 2019, the data from OECD (2020b) will be utilized and for the years 2020 and 2021, Donor Tracker’s (2020a) data will be applied.
Diagram 1b: Sweden’s Foreign Aid allocation During the Years 2019-2021, in Relation to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Diagram 1b: The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic became visible during 2020. Hence, 2019 is considered unaffected by the crisis. From the year of 2019 to 2020 one can recognize a significant increase in the aid allotment. In 2021 the aid distribution remains the same in billion USD ($6bn) but a minor increase is visible in Swedish Krona (52.1bn SEK in 2020 versus 52.3bn SEK in 2021).

As part of the statistical analysis, a categorization of the changes in aid disbursements for Sweden during the two crises is demonstrated in Table D. The first row is the years of scope (year 1=1990 for the Nordic crises and 2019 for the pandemic, year 2=1991 and 2020 for the pandemic etcetera). The following two rows display the increases and decreases in the provision of foreign aid. The first row is the Nordic crisis and the second row is the pandemic. Increases are marked by X and decreases by Y. Z is when aid allocation remains the same. In doing this, ordinal data is created, illuminating possible trends which then can be analyzed.

Table D: Comparison of Sweden’s Aid Allocation During the Nordic Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordic crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D: As illustrated in Diagram 1a, the decrease in aid during year 2 (1991) is minimal, of 0.4%\textsuperscript{12}. One can therefore not completely reject the possibility of aid allocation taking similar pathways in the beginning of the crises, even if it was instead increased in the case of the pandemic in 2020. During the third year of the scope, which is 1992 and 2021, increases occurred in both cases. However, the increase during the year 1992 was great, of circa 9% and in 2021, it is estimated the increase will only be circa 0.4%. Even though a pattern can be distinguished here, the correlation between the years appears to be weak. This suggests that even though it is possible to predict that in 2022, there will be a decrease in aid allotment, if the pandemic follows the pattern of the Nordic crisis, it is difficult to estimate an exact number. One potential reason that the years at the onset of the crises, 2020 and 1991, differ (2020 saw an increase of 5% from the previous year and 1991 a decrease of 0.4%) in the provision of foreign aid is Sweden’s more prevalent role as a key actor in the field of foreign aid today, its aid distribution being tied to credibility (Irwin, 2019).

When applying the theoretical framework, it is feasible that the two crises have affected the foreign aid differently, supporting each position of the research debate. The Nordic crisis illustrated a mostly negative effect on aid allotment. Although considering some fluctuations, this result suggests that aid is not unaffected, nor increased by financial crises, as claimed by scholars such as Bertoli et al. (2008) and Kharas and Desai (2008). Yet, as not all other variables have been controlled for, it is not possible to, with absolute certainty, credit the Nordic crisis for the swift changes in aid allocation during the period. In the case of the pandemic, aid allocation is seemingly increasing. This is contrary to the academic stance in favor of crises creating declining aid allocations, as hypothesized in this thesis. Rather, it supports the stance advocated by for example Mold et al. (2010: 22) as they suggest donor countries during crises experience an increased moral responsibility. Thus, upturns in aid are to be expected. Yet, as not all variables have been controlled for, one cannot dismiss the possibility that other factors intervene other than solely the pandemic. Yet, one can consider that the pandemic is resulting in a heightened moral responsibility, drawing on Sweden’s before mentioned role and reputation in the foreign aid field, making the country feel obliged to increase its foreign aid during the pandemic (ibid.). Discovering if potential relationships exist is however a task for future research.

4.2. Case 2: The United States’ Foreign Aid During the Global Crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 Pandemic

2008 crisis: The United States’ ODA before, during and after the global crisis of 2008 is to be summarized. A scope of 11 years is again the selected timeframe, 2006-2016. The material used are two different reports from OECD. The first is Development aid: Net official development assistance (ODA) 2012 (OECD, 2012), which covers data from 2004-2011. The second report is the United States’ development cooperation profile by OECD, with data over

\textsuperscript{12} Once again, for numbers and percentages of each case, refer to the appendices.
the years 2008-2019 (OECD, 2020a). Since neither report is adjusted for inflation of 2020, this is regulated by us, using an USD Inflation Calculator\textsuperscript{13}. The data from 2004-2011 are adjusted for inflation of 2012, which will be what is converted to USD of 2020. The original numbers provided by OECD will first be presented in parentheses. Then, the United States’ ODA adjusted for inflation of 2020 is presented in bold. The third column is, as with the previous case, the difference in percentages from the previous year. OECD’s numbers are rounded off\textsuperscript{14}, therefore, ours will be too. An example is provided below (Table E). The complete tables used to create the diagrams are to be found in the appendices.

\textbf{Table E: Example of Usage of Coding Scheme The United States}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>The United States</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>($21.787,\text{bn of 2012})</td>
<td>\textbf{7.4% decrease from 2006}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textbf{$24.709,\text{bn of 2020}$}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Diagram 2a: The United States’ Foreign Aid Allocation During the Years 2006-2016, in Relation to the Global Crisis of 2008}


\textsuperscript{13}https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/

\textsuperscript{14}The same is true for The United Kingdom’s numbers.
COVID-19 pandemic: Proceeding to the current pandemic, Foreign Assistance (2020) provides the data for the year of 2020. For 2021, the estimates given are $32.7bn in requested foreign assistance (ibid.). It is important to notice that the requested numbers do not always perfectly match the figures actually spent during the year.

Diagram 2b: The United States’ Foreign Aid allocation during the Years 2019-2021, in Relation to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Diagram 2b: 2019 is considered unaffected by the pandemic. In 2020 a sharp downfall of ODA occurred. It is estimated that an upswing will happen in 2021, not quite rising to the levels of 2019, that of before the crisis.

A categorization of the alterations in aid disbursements for the United States during the two crises is demonstrated in Table F. The first row is the years of scope (year 1=2006 for the 2008 crisis and 2019 for the pandemic, year 2=2007 for the 2008 crisis and 2020 for the pandemic etcetera). The following two rows display the increases and decreases in the provision of foreign aid. The first row is the 2008 crisis and the second row is the pandemic. In the table, increases are marked X, decreases marked Y and Z equals remained unchanged.
Table F: Comparison of the United States’ Aid Allocation During the Global Crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 Pandemic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008 crisis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F: Both crises saw decreases of ODA flows in the first year impacted (2007 and 2020). The foreign aid was reduced with circa 7% in 2007 and 38% in 2020. Here, a pattern is distinguished, even though the decrease was not as drastic in the beginning of the 2008 crisis as it was 2020. 2008 saw a considerable increase in aid distribution (21%) and it is estimated that 2021 will follow this pattern, with an almost 54% increase. Since a pattern to date has been followed, one could now expect an increase in aid flows until 2026, six years after the beginning of the pandemic. This is where a slight drop is noticeable during the 2008 crisis, in 2013. In year 10, 2028, one could expect a decrease, based on the patterns provided by the 2008 crisis, which saw a decrease of ODA in 2015.

Making use of the theoretical framework, one can after the decrease at the onset of the 2008 crisis detect a sequence of years where ODA is on the uprise, thus to a widening extent giving merit to the scholars favoring increased aid as a result of crises. Although somewhat fluctuating, there is seemingly a correlation between economic deficits and increased aid allotment (again, it cannot be ruled out that other factors intervene). The COVID-19 pandemic saw a sharp decrease in aid allocation 2020, but ODA is predicted to rise in the following year. This follows the testimony presented by both sides of the research field. It is thus in the example of the two crises’ impacts on the United States’ ODA not possible to verify either school of thought.

4.3. Case 3: The United Kingdom’s Foreign Aid During the Global Crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 Pandemic

2008 crisis: The United Kingdom’s foreign aid before, during and after the global crisis of 2008 will be presented. The amount of years included in the analysis are 11, 2006 through 2016. The material for this case is once again two reports from OECD, Development aid: Net official development assistance (ODA) 2012 (OECD, 2012) and the United Kingdom’s development cooperation profile, with data covering the years 2008-2019 (OECD, 2020g). As aforementioned, the numbers have not been adjusted for inflation. The same procedure as in Case 2: the United States will be used for adjusting (see 4.2.).
Diagram 3a: The United Kingdom’s Aid Allocation During the years 2006-2016, in Relation to the Global Crisis of 2008.

Diagram 3a: As mentioned above, 2006 is considered unaffected by the 2008 crisis. In 2007, the beginning of the crisis, aid allotment in the United Kingdom plunged before increasing in 2008. 2009 saw a slight downturn. In 2010 and 2011 there was an upwards trend before aid dipped once again in 2012. One can then detect a significant rise of ODA in 2013, followed by a modest increase in 2014 and 2015, and a slightly larger increase in 2016.

COVID-19 pandemic: As with the two other cases, confirmed numbers for the United Kingdom’s aid distribution during the pandemic are lacking. Instead, reliable projected data will be drawn from Donor Tracker (2020b) and OECD (2020g). In a statement made in June 2020 by Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, he declared that the United Kingdom would reduce its foreign aid with 2.9bn GBP (Worley, 2020), resulting in an aid budget of circa 17.34bn USD for the year 2020. However, recently Raab announced that the country would not be able to meet this target of 0.7% of the United Kingdom’s GNI (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, 2020). As there is no other recent data on how much ODA was allocated in 2020, this is still the estimate we proceed from. For 2021, it is said that the United Kingdom will allocate £10bn, circa $13bn as ODA (Donor Tracker, 2020b; the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 2020).
Diagram 3b: The United Kingdom’s Aid Allocation During the Years 2019-2021, in Relation to the COVID-19 Pandemic.

As previously, the year 2019 is considered unaffected by the pandemic. The United Kingdom’s aid allocation plummeted in 2020, and is predicted to decrease even more in 2021.

A categorization of the changes in aid disbursements for the United Kingdom during the two crises is done in Table G. The first row is the years of scope (year 1=2006 for the 2008 crisis and 2019 for the pandemic etcetera). The following two rows display increases and decreases in the provision of ODA. The first row is the 2008 crisis and the second row is the pandemic. Increases are marked X, decreases marked Y and no alterations Z.

Table G: Comparison of the United Kingdom’s Aid Allocation During the Global Crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 Pandemic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008 crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G: In both crises, the first year affected by the economic conditions (2007 and 2020) saw a great drop in aid, almost 21% versus almost 16%. One can accordingly recognize a
common pattern in noticeable decreases in the beginning of the crises. However, the following year (2008) of the 2008 crisis saw an increase with almost 17%, while the projected decrease of ODA for 2021 is a 25% downfall. Hence, the crises are going in different directions after the onset. Regarding why the estimate for 2021 does not follow the increase visible during the third year of the previous crises, several determinants could play a part. Political factors such as Brexit, in connection to the harsher magnitude of the current pandemic than the 2008 crisis, might be explanations to why foretelling the future of aid flows is challenging. The United Kingdom’s aid allocation during the 2008 crisis saw a distinct recovery year eight, 2013, six years after the financial collapse. If this pattern is replicated by the pandemic, it is feasible to expect a recovery in aid allotment 2026, six years after 2020. Albeit an interesting projection, the mixed previous evidence blurs clear cut estimates on future pathways of the United Kingdom’s distribution of foreign aid following the COVID-19 pandemic.

The 2008 crisis indicated ambiguous results, as it did not follow a clear pattern itself. Henceforth, one can perceive both scholarly sides on aid flows as accurate. In the beginning of the global crisis of 2008, ODA dropped. In the following years aid increased to not plummet to that level again. This trend indicates that crises lead to increased foreign aid allocation by donor countries (not accounting for the year 2007 and 2012), as favored by for example Bertoli et al. (2008), Kharas and Desai (2008) and Mold et al. (2010). In the case of the pandemic’s impact on aid distribution, one can discern a differing scenario. Aid allotment fell drastically in 2020 and is said to be cut even further the following year. Even though the pandemic cannot be promised to be the sole source behind this drop, the results still sides with the scholarly stance (of e.g. Frot, 2009; Roodman, 2008; Over, 2008; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) advocating crises’ negative impacts on aid disbursement for donor countries. Hence, when applying the theoretical framework to the mixed results in the case of the United Kingdom, neither side is more endorsed.

4.4 Summary of Results and Analysis

To conclude this chapter of the thesis, the countries’ aid allocation during the crises will be summarized in short. During the Nordic crisis, Sweden’s aid fluctuated, yet mostly sided with the scholars advocating reduced aid as a result of crises. The COVID-19 pandemic has instead shown an increase in Swedish aid, supporting the other scholarly fraction, that crises increase aid allotment. No clear or a weak pattern can be distinguished here, yet these results indicate crises indeed have effects on foreign aid allocation in this case of Sweden. In the United States, during the global crisis of 2008, results mainly indicated that aid flows increase when facing crises, thus positioning itself among scholars arguing that an increase of foreign aid during crises is visible. The pandemic on the other hand provides a puzzling result, with both noticeable decreases and increases of the United States’ ODA. The results endorse neither scholarly division. A pattern emerges in that both crises first see a decrease in
aid and then considerable increases follow. The United Kingdom’s aid in the beginning of the 2008 crisis experienced a sharp downturn, before increasing again. Although fluctuating, an upwards trend is visible, giving some credit to those favoring aid increases as a result of crises. In the case of the pandemic, a downwards trend of foreign aid is evident. ODA is plummeting, as predicted by researchers anticipating aid drops. In the beginning of the two crises, the United Kingdom’s ODA was reduced greatly, creating a pattern. However, after the first years, no pattern is followed.

Although neither the three countries nor the crises are to be compared with each other in this thesis, but rather the specific country’s own aid allocation during crises, it is interesting that the majority of cases\textsuperscript{15} show significant aid drops on the onset of crises. Nevertheless, the alterations in aid allotment after the first years are seemingly individual. In all cases, there is supposedly a relationship between crises and alterations in foreign aid disbursement. Some researchers advocate no relationship between the two components. This is however not found by us. This brief comparison gives rise to a set of new questions interesting for the academic field. Underlying factors to why the cases differ to such an extent when entangled in the same crisis (the COVID-19 pandemic) is a relevant inquiry for further research.

\textsuperscript{15} Excluding Swedish ODA during the COVID-19 pandemic.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis, this section will first entail a discussion of the results. Secondly, the aim, research questions and the hypothesis will be considered in the conclusion and final remarks.

5.1. Discussion
In the theoretical framework, two contrasting stances among scholars were illuminated; one stance on crises in donor countries’ positive effects on aid flows and one stance on crises in donor countries’ negative effects on aid flows. This thesis endorsed the latter stance in the hypothesis, that ODA flows would experience a downturn when faced with crises. The results indicate that crises do change the pathways of aid allocation in donor countries. The results are however diverse and this thesis can thus not support either scholarly side more than the other, but provides limited support to both. No general pattern between the countries emerges except for during the onset years, yet, to analyze this was not the intended aim of the study, but rather if patterns are to be found inside the significant donor countries. Another interesting finding of this study is that aid is seemingly directly affected by crisis, even at the onset years. This contradicts the results from Frot (2009: 27), who claims that crises’ effects on aid allotment would not be made visible on a five-year horizon.

As mentioned in the analysis, the reasons aid is not taking similar pathways in the United Kingdom today as it did during the 2008 crisis, might be political, such as Brexit, or that the COVID-19 pandemic has had more severe domestic impacts than the 2008 crisis had. Nonetheless, it is interesting to discuss the idea introduced in Hallet’s (2009: 1) economic brief, how governments are willing to reduce their aid if they believe other donors will too. In a statement, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab stressed how many other donor countries are redistributing their ODA spendings in the wake of the pandemic (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, 2020). One can interpret this as an argument for cutting the foreign aid budget in the United Kingdom, thus supporting Hallet’s notion. What implications will this have for the aid community and ODA in the future? One concern could be that other donors will follow in the United Kingdom’s footsteps, as it is more legitimate to decrease aid if others already have. On the other hand, Sweden’s actions, to increase its aid distribution when faced with a crisis, could also have implications for donors, perhaps enforcing their sense of responsibility (as discussed in Mold et al., 2010).

Dang et al. (2013: 248) found that donor countries will reduce aid allotment when faced with idiosyncratic shocks, which are shocks limited to one country, but not during common shocks, that is, crises affecting multiple countries. This thesis has not included idiosyncratic shocks. Yet, one interesting finding from our results is that during the three common shocks included, it is evident that aid in a number of cases has been reduced. We are thus not able to
support Dang et al.'s (2013) findings. However, can one be certain that it is only the crises that affect aid disbursements? As all feasible variables have not been controlled for, it is not possible to, with certainty, credit the pandemic and the previous crises as the sole explaining factors (which is, as previously explained, beyond the scope of this thesis). One could assume that the extent to which the countries have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic would affect their current aid allotment, as during the previous financial crises, the countries’ economies were greatly affected. Yet, all three donors have been severely struck by the pandemic (WHO, 2020), still Sweden increases its aid distribution, the United States plans to increase its ODA and the United Kingdom will decrease foreign aid even further. This overview indicates that how badly the country is struck by crises is seemingly not the only explanation for alterations in aid allotment.

It is also not possible to, with confidence, solely credit the pandemic for any similar pathways distinguished between it and the previous crises. However, in Frot’s research from 2009, a regression is conducted, where GDP, government balance and unemployment rate is controlled for in relation to the aid budget. He finds that out of the three variables, only negative shocks in GDP influence aid distribution negatively and significantly (Frot, 2009: 26-27). He therefore concludes that fiscal deficits have an intrinsic effect on aid flows. Frot’s conclusion strengthens the line of argument permeating this thesis, that crises (both the previous financial crises and the pandemic) affect the levels of aid allocation. Although an interesting discussion, finding a causal relationship between crises and levels of aid is a task for future research.

5.2. Conclusion and Final Remarks
The purpose of this thesis was to examine whether different crises would have similar effects on donor countries’ foreign aid distribution, more specifically, if and how aid allocation increased, decreased or remained the same during two crises in three donor countries: Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. In the case of Sweden, the Nordic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic were scrutinized, and in the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom, the global crisis of 2008 and the pandemic were examined. In order to meet this aim, a research question was posed with two sub-questions. The first sub-question was:

1) Did the aid allocation in Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom increase, decrease or remain the same following the Nordic financial crisis of 1991-1994 and the global crisis of 2008?

This question was answered by that in Sweden during the Nordic crisis, the provision of foreign aid was mostly negatively affected by the financial crisis, witnessing a decrease. In the case of the United States during the 2008 crisis, ODA first dipped but then kept an
upwards trend and in the United Kingdom during the same crisis, ODA first decreased to then show a modest and fluctuating increase in the following years.

The second sub-question was:

2) Did the aid allocation in Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom increase, decrease or remain the same following the COVID-19 pandemic?

This question was answered by that in Sweden, foreign aid has seen an increase since the onset of the pandemic. In the United States, aid decreased at the beginning of the pandemic, but is estimated to rise in the forthcoming year. In the United Kingdom, ODA has decreased since the beginning of the pandemic, and will continue to follow this negative trend.

With the answers above, the overarching research question is to be answered:

Do crises similarly affect the patterns of aid allocation in donor countries, and if so, how?

This question is answered by that in Sweden, there is seemingly no or a weak pattern regarding changes in aid during the pandemic and the Nordic crisis. In the United States, a pattern was made out in that aid decreased during the first years of the crises and then a relatively clear pattern of increasing ODA emerged. In the United Kingdom, the opening years of both crises saw sharp decreases, suggesting a pattern. However, this pattern was not followed in the next coming years. ODA was raised in 2008 during the 2008 crisis and is said to decrease further in 2021. Thus, crises have created and affected certain patterns, answering the research question. When applying all results to the two sides of the theoretical framework, no side can be given more support than the other. This is interesting as the results can neither support nor reject the hypothesis formulated in this thesis, that crises affecting donor countries will result in decreasing foreign aid allocation. Linking back to the purpose, that is whether different crises will have similar effects on aid flows in donor countries, this thesis discovers what appears to be a correlation between crises in donor countries and altered aid allocations, with both decreases and increases, thus some similar effects are evident. Yet, as aforementioned, one cannot dismiss the possibility of other factors intervening.

The research problem identified, if aid flows are altered by crises striking donor countries and what patterns it could take in doing so, cannot be completely disentangled with this single study. However, our thesis indicates that aid flows are indeed altered by crises. In the research debate, the findings of this thesis position us between the side advocating decreased aid allotment as a result of crises and the side advocating increased aid allotment following crises. Further, this study has contributed by illuminating patterns taken by aid flows in three donor countries, and stipulates a correlation between crises and changed volumes of ODA. In
addition, this thesis has provided projections of the changes future ODA might take, which in turn can be useful for the aid industry when preparing for forthcoming crises. Although this study has limited generalizability, common patterns, such as initial decreases of aid at the onset of crises can be made out. As the conclusions are limited to the cases and material presented here, it is our recommendation that future research conducts studies including a greater number of cases, in order to draw more general conclusions.

Moving forward, it could be adequate to control for a wider spectrum of variables in order to heighten the precision of the potential relationship between crises and aid flows. The results, even though additional\textsuperscript{16} underlying variables have yet to be controlled for, have implications for not only the field of foreign aid but also for policymakers, to be aware of crises’ possible impacts on ODA. It is crucial to consider how crises might alter aid. As explained by Mold et al. (2010: 7), the aid sector is one of the first areas in danger of cuts during crises in donor countries. A crisis, such as the pandemic, thus has potential to strike recipient countries twofold, if first, they suffer the effects of said crisis and second, if aid allotment diminishes. It is therefore of utmost importance that this research problem is further investigated, as the consequences of a global crisis will be felt most by aid recipients.

\textsuperscript{16} In this thesis, the severity of the COVID-19 virus on donor countries has been highlighted by us, and GDP, government balance and unemployment rate by Frot (2009).
6. REFERENCES


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7. APPENDICES

The first box is the question posed to the material. The first column refers to the years of scope. The second column shows the country's allocated aid during the same year. The third column entails the difference in percentages from the previous year. The variable “X” represents an increase from the previous year, while “Y” represents a decrease from the previous year.

APPENDIX 1: Sweden

*Table 1a: Sweden's Aid Allocation in Relation to the Nordic Crisis*

The first column refers to the years of 1990-2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$(14.70\text{bn SEK of 2000}) $(19.00\text{bn SEK of 2020}) $2.15\text{bn of 2020}$</td>
<td>$\text{Y} \quad 0.4%$ decrease from 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$(14.64\text{bn SEK of 2000}) $(18.92\text{bn SEK of 2020}) $2.14\text{bn of 2020}$</td>
<td>$\text{X} \quad 9%$ increase from 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$(15.99\text{bn SEK of 2000}) $(20.67\text{bn SEK of 2020}) $2.34\text{bn of 2020}$</td>
<td>$\text{Y} \quad 9%$ decrease from 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$(14.54\text{bn SEK of 2000}) $(18.79\text{bn SEK of 2020}) $2.13\text{bn of 2020}$</td>
<td>$\text{X} \quad 0.2%$ increase from 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$(12.08\text{bn SEK of 2000}) $(15.61\text{bn SEK of 2020}) $1.77\text{bn of 2020}$</td>
<td>$\text{Y} \quad 17%$ decrease from 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>$(13.45\text{bn SEK of 2000}) $(17.38\text{bn SEK of 2020}) $1.97\text{bn of 2020}$</td>
<td>$\text{X} \quad 11.3%$ increase from 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$(13.27\text{bn SEK of 2000}) $(17.15\text{bn SEK of 2020}) $1.94\text{bn of 2020}$</td>
<td>$\text{Y} \quad 1.3%$ decrease from 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1b: Sweden’s Aid Allocation in Relation to the Covid-19 Pandemic
The first column refers to the years of 2019-2021.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (SEK of 2000)</th>
<th>Amount (SEK of 2020)</th>
<th>Difference from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>(12.67bn)</td>
<td>(16.38bn)</td>
<td>Y 4.5% decrease from 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.85bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>(13.32bn)</td>
<td>(17.22bn)</td>
<td>X 5.1% increase from 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.95bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>(16.13bn)</td>
<td>(20.85bn)</td>
<td>X 21% increase from 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$2.36bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (SEK of 2020)</th>
<th>Difference from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>(48.5bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5.71bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 5% increase from 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>(52.1bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$6.0bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>(52.3bn)</td>
<td>X 0.4% increase from 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$6.0bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2: The United States

*Table 2a: The United States’ Aid Allocation in Relation to the Global Crisis of 2008*

The first column refers to the years of 2006-2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>The United States</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009 ($28.83bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$32.7bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 9% increase from 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 ($30.35bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$34.42bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 5.3% increase from 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 ($30.75bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$34.87bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 1% increase from 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 ($34.85bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$39.52bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 13% increase from 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 ($33.93bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$38.48bn of 2020</td>
<td>Y 2.6% decrease from 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 ($35.26bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$39.99bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 3.9% increase from 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 ($32.67bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$37.06bn of 2020</td>
<td>Y 7.3% decrease from 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 ($35.92bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$40.74bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 10% increase from 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2b: The United States’ Aid Allocation in Relation to the Covid-19 Pandemic

The first column refers to the years of 2019-2021.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>The United States</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019 ($33.30bn of 2018) $34.53bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 $21.29bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y 38% decrease from 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021 $32.70bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>X 53.6% increase from 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX 3: The United Kingdom**

*Table 3a: The United Kingdom’s Aid Allocation in Relation to the Global Crisis of 2008*

The first column refers to the years of 2006-2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>The United Kingdom</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009 ($11.28bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$12.80bn of 2020</td>
<td>Y 1.9% decrease from 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 ($13.05bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$14.80bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 15.7% increase from 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 ($13.74bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$15.58bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 5.3% increase from 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 ($12.94bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$14.68bn of 2012</td>
<td>Y 5.8% decrease from 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 ($16.56bn of 2020)</td>
<td>$18.78bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 28% increase from 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 ($16.65bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$18.88bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 0.5% increase from 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 ($17.18bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$19.48bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 3.2% increase from 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 ($18.53bn of 2012)</td>
<td>$21.01bn of 2020</td>
<td>X 7.9% increase from 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3b: The United Kingdom’s Aid Allocation in Relation to the Covid-19 Pandemic

The first column refers to the years of 2019-2021.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>How much foreign aid was allocated this year?</th>
<th>The United Kingdom</th>
<th>Difference in percentages from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>$20.57bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$17.34bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>$Y$ 15.7% decrease from 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>$13.0bn of 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>$Y$ 25% decrease from 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JÄmnt fördelat författarskap - kandidatuppsats i statsvetenskap

Härmed intygar vi att båda författare har bidragit i lika stor utsträckning till uppsats

Gone with the Crisis?

A Case Study on Aid Flows in Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom in Times of Crises

Som författats under termin HT2020 vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala universitet.
INTYG
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