Tanzania – a democracy by elections?


Bachelor thesis in Development Studies
Spring term of 2020
15 ECTS
Author: Maja Gunnarsson
Supervisor: Anders Sjögren
Word count: 10 789
Number of pages: 32
# Table of contents

1. Introduction 3

2. Purpose of the study and research question 4

3. Previous research and theoretical framework 4
   3.1 Previous research on democratization 4
   3.2 Lindberg’s research 5
   3.3 Critique of Lindberg’s research 6
   3.4 Lindberg’s theory on democratization by elections 7

4. Research design 10
   4.1 Method and material 10
   4.2 Operationalization 12
   4.3 Definitions 13

5. Results 14
   5.1 I1: Voter turnout 14
       5.1.1 2005 14
       5.1.2 2010 14
       5.1.3 2015 14
   5.2 I2: Opposition participation 15
       5.2.1 2005 15
       5.2.2 2010 15
       5.2.3 2015 15
   5.3 I3: Autocratic guard gone? 16
       5.3.1 2005 16
       5.3.2 2010 16
       5.3.3 2015 16
   5.4 I4: Results and power distribution 16
       5.4.1 2005 16
       5.4.2 2010 17
       5.4.3 2015 17
   5.5 I5: Losers’ acceptance of results 18
       5.5.1 2005 18
       5.5.2 2010 18
       5.5.3 2015 19
   5.6 I6: Peaceful 19
       5.6.1 2005 19
5.6.2 2010 19
5.6.3 2015 19

5.7 I7: Electoral regime survival 19
  5.7.1 2005 20
  5.7.2 2010 20
  5.7.3 2015 20

5.8 I8: Freedom of expression 20
  5.8.1 2005 20
  5.8.2 2010 20
  5.8.3 2015 21

5.9 I9: Alternative sources of information 21
  5.9.1 2005 21
  5.9.2 2010 21
  5.9.3 2015 22

5.10 I10: Associational autonomy 22
  5.10.1 2005 23
  5.10.2 2010 23
  5.10.3 2015 23

5.11 I11: Freedom and fairness 24
  5.11.1 2005 24
  5.11.2 2010 24
  5.11.3 2015 24

6. Analysis 25

7. Conclusion and discussion 26

References 28
1. Introduction

In 2006, Staffan I. Lindberg presented his theory on democratization by elections, taking stance in an empirical examination of the 48 states in sub-Saharan Africa. His hypothesis was that repeatedly held multi-party elections would by time lead to increased levels of democracy regardless of the elections’ quality. Since then, the world has witnessed an increase in number of autocratic regimes and for the first time since 2001, the number of people living in autocratic states are in majority (Lührmann et al., 2020).

Lindberg’s theory has since the publishing of his book received criticism. The main arguments presented are how there are empirical evidence speaking against Lindberg’s hypothesis, problems concerning the study’s validity and how its conclusions are not applicable on the national level since it was based on Africa as whole, not considering local conditions and contexts (Bogaards, 2013). The last one of these criticisms is what this study will look into, by examining if Lindberg’s (2006) theory is relevant and accurate on a single case’ state-level.

In order to test the theory of democratization by elections on a single state, Tanzania has been selected. The state was created in 1964 when the mainland of Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar merged into the United Republic of Tanzania (CIA, 2020). The country abolished the single-party system in 1992, and in 1995 the first multi-party election was held. Since then, five multi-party elections have been held. However, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling party during the time of the one-party system, has won every election held so far (ibid.; Ewald, 2011).

One of the main reasons why Tanzania was chosen as the object of the study is that it was one of only three states that still confirmed the democratization by elections-theory in 2014 (Bogaards, 2014). Since then, one more election has been held, and yet one is planned to take place later this year (NDI, 2020). With the addition of the 2010 and 2015 elections, Tanzania has now arranged five succeeding elections, making it qualify for the highest classification used by Lindberg for his study in counting elections: “4 elections or more” (ibid.: 15). According to the study, over 70 % of the breakdowns of electoral cycles occurred after the first election, and if it happened later, premature elections was a big cause (ibid.: 84ff). Also, the risk of regime breakdown after three or more elections happen “only in very rare instances” (ibid.: 3). About third elections, Lindberg (2006) writes:

“[they] represent a point of separation with the past, as the average quality of the elections increases significantly then. Many more of third, fourth, and later elections were free and fair than were first and second elections, electoral participation and competition increased significantly, and the authoritarian rulers left the scene in increasing numbers […]”. (ibid.: 86).
Lindberg’s study only included the first two elections in Tanzania, making it even more relevant to re-examine Lindberg’s theory almost 15 years after its publishing. This study takes on where Lindberg’s ended, examining the third, fourth and fifth consecutive elections in Tanzania.

2. Purpose of the study and research question

The purpose of this study is to empirically test Staffan I. Lindberg’s theory about democratization by elections by applying it to Tanzania in the years of the three most recent elections: 2005, 2010 and 2015.

The research questions follow:

1. *How has the level of democracy in Tanzania changed between the times for the elections held in 2005, 2010 and 2015?*

and

2. *Does the case of Tanzania support or contradict Lindberg’s theory on democratization by elections?*

3. Previous research and theoretical framework

3.1 Previous research on democratization

The research field on democratization can roughly be divided into three categories or approaches: *the structural approach, the social forces tradition and the strategic approach*. Some researchers also count the *economic approach* as a separate category, which it will be in this study as well (Anderson, 2013; Teorell, 2010).

One of the most well-known theories on democratization is the structural approach – also known as modernization theory – with Lipset (1959) in the forefront. Lipset (1959) argued that states need to undergo a modernization process, constituted by many parallel processes such as industrialization, urbanization and increasing levels of education, in order for democratization to happen. The structural approach theories all have in common that they view democratization as a cause of changes in social and/or economic structures, institutions that human agents do not directly control. Such causal factors can be economic crises, income inequality, dependency on natural resources, country size, colonial heritage, social capital, religious composition, globalization and more (Møller & Skaaning, 2012; Teorell, 2010).

---

1 The study was published in 2006, however the research only covered the period of 1989-2003.
The social forces tradition instead focuses on the social classes of society, with democratization occurring because of the characteristics of and relationships between these social classes. The collective actors main driving-forces are material interests. If these interests of one class do not align with the authoritarian state’s interests, the class is more likely to fight for democracy. This way, democracy is forged from below by the power struggle between different classes with different material interests (Teorell, 2010).

The economic approach is similar to the social forces tradition but includes more actors than just social classes. Here, the entire population’s preferences in terms of material resources and structural preconditions are central; lower classes can express their opinions by protest actions. The approach also includes a deductive formal model, where the actors’ assumptions are mathematically analysed in a sort of game-theoretic style (ibid.).

Lastly, the strategic approach instead sees democracy as a result of several phases. These theories also unite in the notions that there are (almost) no prerequisites existing prior to the democratization process that causes the process to begin, instead agency and strategic decision making, mostly by political elites, are key (ibid.). Within this field, Rustow (1970) is the pioneer scholar. He argued that democratic behaviour creates and fosters democratic values and in order for a state to democratize it must go through four faces: national unity, the preparatory phase, the decision phase and the habituation phase. All of these phases with its respective features must happen one at a time or else the democratization process will paralyze (ibid.). Lindberg (2006) backs Rustow’s (1970) theory and extends it with his own research.

3.2 Lindberg’s research

Lindberg’s (2006) main hypothesis is that uninterrupted, repetitive elections – even flawed ones – are one of the most important causal factors for the process of democratization. An increase in democraticness is thereof an effect of holding elections. The longer series of uninterrupted elections held in a state, the more imbued with democratic values and qualities its society will become. He also makes clear that unlike other scholars, he does not view the holding of elections in democratizing countries as the completion of democratization, but rather the beginning of it (ibid.: 2). Elections, he argues, facilitates the institutionalization and deepening of civil liberties as well as democracy and liberalization.

In his study, Lindberg (2006) mapped all the elections that took place between 1989 and June 30th, 2003 in the 48 sub-Saharan African states examined and analyse their level of democraticness based on his own measurement indicators. The elections add up to 232 in total, of which 97 were presidential and 135 parliamentary ones. He goes on to perform multi-variate statistical analyses that point in favour of
his hypothesis: there is indeed a positive correlation between the number of elections held and the level of democracy in a state, where democracy level is the dependant variable (ibid.).

The following year, Lindberg (2007) published a revision of his theory, where almost 50 new elections were included. He then argued he was even more confident about his theory since a) the analysis including new cases showed the same – if not even stronger – results as his first study and b) similar findings had emerged within both regional and global studies performed by other scholars (ibid.: 21f). Seven causal links that would explain the causation between held elections and increased level of democracy were identified:

- Citizens become voters
- Democratic “lock-in” mechanisms
- Self-fulfilling prophecies
- Civic organizations
- New roles for state institutions
- The role of the media
- Scrutiny of foreign media

(ibid.).

3.3 Critique of Lindberg’s research

The democratization by elections theory has been the object of various critique since first published. The first main point of the critique is how there are empirical examples as well as other studies speaking against Lindberg’s (2006) findings of a positive relationship between the number of held elections and the democratic level. One African state contradicting Lindberg’s theory is Zimbabwe (Bogaards, 2014). Hence, it is not possible to know when repeatedly held elections will lead to democratization and when they will have the opposite effect, scholars argue, with many agreeing on a small or no impact at all of elections on democraticness (Bogaards, 2014; Appiah-Thompson, 2017). Some scholars even go as far as arguing that repeatedly held elections can actually fortify autocracy within a state (Morse, 2017).

The next big point of criticism concerns the method of Lindberg’s (2006) study. The causal mechanisms accounted for are said to be underdeveloped and Lindberg (2006) fails to account for the possibility of a spurious relationship, diminishing the study’s validity (Bogaards, 2014). Also, Bogaards (2014) questions the operationalization of democracy used for the study. Another alleged problem with the methodology of the study is that it uses a large n-analysis to draw conclusions on a micro-level. The last methodological deficiency is pointed out by Morse (2017), who sees a lack of defined causal factors explaining the alleged relationship between elections and democracy.
The last main point of criticism is how the study is performed on Africa as a whole, making it questionable whether it is applicable on individual states or not (Bogaards, 2014). When Bogaards (2014) empirically tested the theory on the individual states in sub-Saharan Africa, he found that only three states confirmed Lindberg’s (2006) theory, namely Senegal, Ghana and Tanzania. Appiah-Thompson (2017) later re-examined Ghana and argued against the possibility of making general conclusions valid for all states. Historical memories, group loyalties, political economy issues, aid dependency and geopolitical realities all impact the democratization, thereof it is crucial to examine each national context, preferable by small n (few case), historical studies, he argues (ibid.). When testing the theory by Lindberg (2006) on regions outside of Africa, none or little evidence have been found speaking in favour of it (Morse, 2017).

When reading Lindberg’s book, I have discovered a few additional points of critique. First of all, Lindberg (2006) only measures the democratic qualities of elections by his operationalization but yet he goes on to draw conclusions on the level of democracy in general. Further, what is measured is only the results of the elections, there is no indicator of the procedure of the election, for example indicating whether the counting of votes was conducted correctly or compliance with the secrecy of the ballot.

This study aims at further investigating the applicability of Lindberg’s (2006) theory on individual state cases by empirically applying it on one of the three countries that still confirmed the theory according to Bogaards in 2014. This study thus contributes by offering a single-case analysis of Lindberg’s theory. Following the critique on Lindberg’s general research, where he fails to see to individual states and instead analyses Africa as whole, this kind of evidence is necessary to test the validity of the theory on state-level. Since no previous research on the level of democracy in Tanzania over the last three elections has been made, this study also offers some empirical contribution on the recent Tanzanian democratic development.

Also, the critique of Lindberg’s (2006) operationalization will be considered, and the original operationalization designed by Lindberg (2006) will be modified to better measure the level of democracy. However, the first point of criticism regarding if and when elections leads to democratization will not be tested. This is mainly because the design of this single-case study does not enable general conclusions to be made concerning all possible cases. This will instead be left for future research to cover.

3.4 Lindberg’s theory on democratization by elections

The main theory of which this study will build upon is the one presented in Staffan I. Lindberg’s book *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (2006). Lindberg (2006) uses Rustow’s (1970) thesis that democratic behaviour produces democratic values as the basis of his study. For his study, Lindberg (2006) uses repeatedly held elections as the democratic behaviour, and increased democracy level instead of
democratic values. By instituting multiparty elections in a state, liberalization is fostered, and the repetitive elections create incentives for political actors by fostering the deepening and expansion of democratic qualities. The correlation between multi-party elections and democracy level is cyclical, meaning that they both enhance each other, creating a spiralling effect. Lindberg’s work (2006) shows how elections works as one of the mechanisms that promote democratic behaviour, which in turn leads to an improved democratic culture. The correlation can be summarized by the following figure:

As most other research within the field of democracy research, Lindberg uses Dahl’s (1971, 1998) definition of polyarchy to define democracy. Dahl (1971) defines democracy as an ideal constituted by five criteria. As a real-type definition, Dahl introduces the concept “polyarchy”, which is a real-type definition of democracy on a continuous scale. The institutions needed for polyarchy are 1) elected officials, 2) free, fair and frequent elections, 3) freedom of expression, 4) alternative sources of information, 5) associational autonomy and 6) inclusive citizenship. (Dahl, 1998). To this, Lindberg (2006) also adds another dimension concerning legitimacy when defining democracy.

Democracy is defined by Lindberg (2006) as self-government and is operationalized as the three qualities participation, contestation and legitimacy, listed as Q’s below. These three are then researched by using in total ten indicators, categorized by the quality they act as an indicator of. The indicators are listed as I’s below:

\[ Q1: \text{Equality of political participation} \]
- \[ I1: \text{Voter turnout} \]
- \[ I2: \text{Opposition participation} \]
- \[ I3: \text{Autocratic guard gone?} \]

\[ Q2: \text{Free political participation} \]
- \[ I4: \text{Winner’s share of the votes} \]
- \[ I5: \text{Largest party’s share of seats} \]
- \[ I6: \text{Second party’s share of seats} \]
- \[ I7: \text{Turnover of power} \]
**Q3: Procedural legitimacy**

- **I8:** Losers’ acceptance of results
- **I9:** Peaceful
- **I10:** Electoral regime survival

Additionally, the freedom and fairness of each election is evaluated and included into the evaluation, here labelled as **I11**.

Political participation (Q1) is rudimentary for any form of democracy, Lindberg (2006) argues, and is manifested through elections. In the representative system, the popular political participation is exercised through voting. Also, political participation means that all political parties and individuals should have equal rights and opportunities of existing and fielding candidates. **I1** is measured in how many of the registered voters voted. Whether the opposition parties participated or boycotted elections indicates political parties’ equality regarding participation (I2). Lastly, if there are presidential candidates or leaders of parties with close connections to former authoritarian regimes is used to determine the levels of pro-democratic behaviour. This termed as ‘autocratic guard gone?’ (I3).

Free political participation (Q2) requires some level of electoral competition and builds on accountability and responsiveness of the elected representatives in a representative democracy. **I4**, winner’s share of the votes, measures the winner’s share of all valid votes in the presidential election. **I5** focuses on the number of seats in parliament obtained by the largest party, and in combination with **I6**, the second largest party’s share of the seats, it depicts the competitiveness of elections as well as the strength and weaknesses of oppositions. **I7** indicates if the election led to a change of officeholders, which Lindberg argues tells something about the competitiveness as well as losers’ acceptance.

For an election to be considered fully democratic, apart from the two previously mentioned qualities, legitimacy is crucial (Q3). This is fulfilled when the actors involved consent and can testify its legitimacy. Whether the losers accept the elections’ result and how rapidly this happens is used as **I8**. Further, **I9** refers to the absence of political violence during campaigning and on election day. Since usage of violence signals failed institutionalization, Lindberg (2006) uses this as one of the signals of failed legitimacy. **I10** denotes whether or not the electoral cycle prevailed after elections had taken place. If coups, civil war or any other reversion into autocratic rule occurred, the electoral cycle should be considered broken and a proof that key elite groups did not find the election legitimate.

Lindberg (2006) uses four measurement tools of democracy in his operationalization. First, Freedom House’s scores for political rights. Second, Freedom House’s scores for civil liberties. Third, his own ten indicators of the democratic qualities (I1-I10). Fourth, his own view of the elections being free and fair, based on election observation reports (I11).
Throughout his book, Lindberg (2006) argues for the self-reinforcing power of the electoral cycle as a positive spiral leading to increasingly democratic elections. He also argues that the third election mark a significant cut-off point after which the improvement of democratic qualities tends to intensify considerably. By adapting an electoral system with multi-party elections – no matter the quality of them – the constitutive and regulatory power distribution that is inherent in the system serve as incentives for upholding the rules within the electoral system. As Lindberg (2006) himself expresses it:

“[p]olitical actors either adapt to or learn about both the rules and the incentive structure.” (ibid.: 71).

4. Research design

4.1 Method and material

In order to test the statement by Lindberg (2006) that multi-party elections lead to increased democraticness in a state, this study will focus on three years where elections were held, by assessing the levels of some central democratic qualities. Since the numbers of elections held will increase by each year, an increase in the level of these democratic values for each year would support Lindberg’s (2006) theory.

The method of research for this study will be a theory testing case study of Tanzania where Lindberg’s (2006) theory on democratization by elections will be examined on a single state. Tanzania has been chosen as the object of study since it was one of the few countries still confirming the democratization by elections-theory as of 2014, when Bogaards (2014) published his re-evaluation of the study. To give Lindberg’s theory best possible preconditions in accordance with the principle of most-likely cases, Tanzania has been chosen as the object of study. Using this design will increase the ability to refute the theory if it is proven not adequate and valid on the case of Tanzania (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 161ff).

The study aims at researching the development in terms of level of democracy in Tanzania over time by examining three different years with five years in between. In Lindberg’s (2006) original study, all years when there was an election were included into the data. So is the case for this study. This is because some of the operational indicators used requires an election to take place. Also, there is no reason to believe that the data from the election years are not correct or representative of the period, hence these years have been chosen. Further one big advantage of using these years is the increase of media coverage as well as observatory material from the election periods. The years to be covered in this study are 2005, 2010 and 2015, with emphasis on the period surrounding the elections. Following the 2015, a re-election in Zanzibar was held in early 2016. For those indicators where this year is of importance, facts about 2016 has been included under the 2015-section.
Since a considerable amount of time has passed since the elections took place, a field study or a study based on contemporary (2020) sources or informants would not be suitable. Instead, to achieve better reliability, the study will be performed as a theory-testing case study examining sources from the time of each election. The material mainly consists of election observation reports and data from democracy indices such as V-Dem, the World Bank Group and Reporters without Borders. In addition to this, articles, newsletters and databases have been consulted. When statistics or indices are used, these ones are briefly described following the indicator used for, before the results are presented. When referencing to these indices, other text material such as election observation reports have been consulted in order to give a complete and accurate depiction of the situation as possible, since social sciences and democracy issues are often too complex to only be revised into numbers.

The material was collected by first researching which actors had been present at the elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 respectively. Out of these, the ones who had an obvious bias were excluded, such as the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) (Makulilo, 2011). The remaining ones were then searched for and read through. However, one problem was that many of the reports were not available to access and some of them appeared to once have been published on the internet and later removed since empty webpages were quoted. How come this was unclear, but in order to avoid bias in the material that was accessible due to censoring, the information used in this study was cross-referenced and validated by other sources. The final election observation reports on which this study was built upon were NORDEM’s in 2005, The Commonwealth’s from 2010 and 2015, The European Union’s report of 2010, The African Union’s in 2015 and 2016, LHRC & TACCEO’s report from 2015 and SADC’s in 2015. The reports by the African Union and Zambia were used consciously that they might be biased. In order to compensate for the shortage in reports covering the elections in 2005, other resources such as the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), the Institute for Security Studies and what was written about the 2005 elections in later reports were used to give a fuller depiction of the 2005 elections.

One may question why this study is mainly based on text and index analysis while Lindberg’s (2006) study combined field studies with multi-variate statistical analysis. First, the reason why Lindberg needed to perform extensive field studies were that no large-scale mapping of election and democracy data in sub-Saharan Africa was accessible by the time of his study. Now, the data collected by Lindberg and his team have been summarized in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020b). Since the V-Dem data is collected and verified by over 3000 researchers and is well-recognized as one of the most extensive and influential social science data collection focused on democracy and governance, it is a reliable source with no risk of being biased. Hence, there is no need for a new field study to collect the very same data (Board of Principal Investigators, 2020). Also, the multivariate statistical analysis is suitable when working with a large N-analysis. For this study, only three units of analysis will be examined (Tanzania in 2005, 2010 and 2015) and these can easily be surveyed and compared by non-
A problem initially expected was how to handle Zanzibar in the data. Even though Tanzania officially refers to both the mainland and Zanzibar, the previously independent island is still somewhat separated from the mainland and its institutions. Zanzibar is semi-autonomous with its own parliament, and thereof holds separate elections that do not always take place at the same dates as in the mainland (CIA, 2020; Matloga, 2005). However, when collecting data, it was made clear that Zanzibar and the mainland are for the most treated as a whole in the statistics, with the exception of some election observation reports from 2015 and 2016 – which makes perfect sense since they were two different elections at different times. Thereof, in this study, both the mainland of Tanzania and Zanzibar are included as one, sole object of analysis, and whenever the name ‘Tanzania’ is being used, it refers to them both.

4.2 Operationalization

In Lindberg’s (2006) theory, the dependant variable is democracy-level whilst the independent variable is number of elections. His hypothesis is that the relationship between the two is positive, practically meaning that the more elections held, the higher the level of democracy. In order to enable comparability and to be able to critically test Lindberg’s theory (2006), this study uses the same independent and dependent variables, and aims to replicate the operationalization used by himself in his study as much as possible. However, as mentioned in 3.3, Lindberg (2006) has received criticism on his operationalization, mainly because it only measures the quality of the elections – and not democracy as whole – which is a potential flaw in terms of validity. Thereof, his operational indicators have been merged with Dahl’s (1998) institutional guarantees for polyarchy to better capture the level of democracy.

Lindberg (2006) himself uses Dahl’s (1998) definition of polyarchy as his definition of democracy. According to Dahl (1998), six institutional guarantees are required in order for polyarchy. These are:

1. Elected officials
2. Free, fair and frequent elections
3. Freedom of expression
4. Alternative sources of information
5. Associational autonomy
6. Inclusive citizenship

(ibid.: 85f).

By Lindberg’s operationalization into the eleven indicators, he satisfactory captures the two first ones of Dahl’s (1998) institutional guarantees. However, number three, four, five and six – can not be
measured by Lindberg’s (2006) operationalization. Hence, number three, four and five will be added to Lindberg’s list of operational indicators, in addition to the original eleven. The reason why number six, inclusive citizenship, will not be included into this study is simply a matter of space. In order to investigate if the other institutions are applied equally to all citizens thorough research on demographic structure and legislature would be required. The scope of doing so would simply be too large and not possible to do within the time frame of this study. Instead, this gap will be left for future researchers to fill. However, issues related to this will instead be embedded into the research of the other indicators if any inequity of the application of rights is found when researching these. Due to this, the exclusion of this institution should not affect the opportunity to draw conclusions too much.

The three categories with the operational democratic qualities used by Lindberg (2006) have been removed since democracy is simply operationalized as the following indicators. Also, I4: Winners’ share of the votes, I5: Largest party’s share of seats, I6: Second party’s share of seats and I7: Turnover of power have been merged into one indicator named I4: Results and power distribution. Further, the order of the indicators has been somewhat changed from Lindberg’s original order in favour of logic. The new operationalization with the indicators follows:

- I1: Voter turnout
- I2: Opposition participation
- I3: Autocratic guard gone?
- I4: Results and power distribution
- I5: Losers’ acceptance of results
- I6: Peaceful
- I7: Electoral regime survival
- I8: Freedom of expression
- I9: Alternative sources of information
- I10: Associational autonomy
- I11: Freedom and fairness

4.3 Definitions:

**Democracy** – this study uses Dahl’s real-type definition of democracy, *polyarchy*. The definition states that six institutions are crucial for polyarchy. These are 1) elected officials, 2) free, fair and frequent elections, 3) freedom of expression, 4) alternative sources of information, 5) associational autonomy and 6) inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 1998). Democracy is viewed on a continuous scale, where a society can be more or less democratic.

**Democratization** – refers to the process of transforming a non-democratic society into a democracy. However, it does not indicate that the society must be fully democratic for democratization to have
occurred. Rather, it is an increase in democratic institutions and advancement on the democratic continuum.

5. Results

Tanzania is a presidential state with a simple majority system, also known as ‘First Past the Post’ system. Regarding the seats in the Parliament, proportional representation is practiced. There are also seats allocated by quotas for women, Zanzibaris and special appointees selected by the President (Kipobota & Olengurumwa, 2016).


5.1.1: Voter turnout

5.1.1.1 2005

In Tanzania’s presidential election 2005, 11 875 927 votes were cast. Out of these, 510 450 were labelled invalid, making the total of valid votes add up to 11 365 477. The total voter turnout was 72.23 % (EISA, 2010a; IFES, 2020a). Although, it should be noted that in some regions the voter turnout was reported to be 100 % or above, indicating that the numbers are not completely reliable (Mørck, 2006).

5.1.2 2010

The presidential election in 2010 yielded 8 626 283 votes. 227 889 out of these were declared invalid and 8 398 394 were valid votes. The total turnout was 42.84 % (EISA, 2010b; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010:31). Possible explanations behind this significant decrease were thought to be a general belief that CCM would win no matter the turnout, the opposition failing to convince voters, lacking interest in democratically held elections due to the long history of one-party rule, inadequate voter education and the lengthy campaign that was dominated by CCM (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010).

5.1.3 2015

The total number of votes in the 2015 presidential election were 15 589 639, of which 402 248 were rejected. Hence, the valid votes were 15 193 862. The total voter turnout was 67.3 % (The Commonwealth, 2015:38).
5.2 12: Opposition participation

5.2.1 2005

For the 2005 elections, there was an increase in the number of applications by political parties to register for competing in the elections compared to previously held elections. In total, 18 parties were fully registered to compete in the elections, and further six parties were provisionally registered for the elections (EISA, 2010a). As for candidature in the elections, a political party must sponsor him or her, hence no individual candidates are allowed (Mørck, 2006).

Another noteworthy thing was the handling of the death of the vice-president candidate of the opposition party CHADEMA, three days prior to the planned elections. Due to this, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) postponed the elections in order for CHADEMA to nominate a new candidate, something speaking in favour of fair treatment of opposition parties (EISA, 2010a).

In NORDEM’s election observation report, there were reports from one of the opposition parties, CUF, that the local electoral authorities had tried to make it difficult for CUF to register their parliamentary candidate as well as bribing him to withdraw his candidacy. CUF supposedly filed complaints on this to the NEC, but received no formal response (Mørck, 2006).

5.2.2 2010

For the 2010 elections, in total 16 parties participated (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2011). To stand as candidate for presidency as well as parliament, one had to belong to a political party (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010: 17).

5.2.3 2015

The 2015 election was labelled “one of the most competitive in the history of the country” by the Commonwealth’s observer group (The Commonwealth, 2015: iv). For the elections, a total of 20 political parties participated. No individual candidates were allowed (African Union Commission, 2015: 18). The biggest change from previous elections – allegedly being the cause of the increased competitiveness – was that the four major opposition parties formed an alliance called UKAWA (African Union Commission, 2015; The Commonwealth, 2015). UKAWA was formed by CHADEMA, CUF, NCCR-Mageuzi and NLD but these were all registered individually for the elections. However, they all worked together and agreed on fielding and supporting unity candidates for the elections (The Commonwealth, 2015).

Due to alleged election fraud, the results in the Zanzibari elections were nullified by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, something which was met with widespread criticism where the opposition accused the commission of annulling the results because CCM had lost (African Union Commission,
2016; Awami, 2015). As a result, Zanzibar’s largest opposition party CUF announced their boycott of the re-run of the elections taking place in 2016 (African Union Commission, 2016).

5.3 I3: Autocratic guard gone?

5.3.1 2005

In 2005, the politics in Tanzania still contained close ties to the previous authoritarian rule. This because CCM was the governing party prior as well as after the elections. CCM was founded in 1977 by the merging of the two parties governing Tanzanian party TANU and Zanzibar’s governing party ASP. TANU and ASP had both un-consecutively ruled the regions since the independence from Great Britain in the 1960’s. CCM continued to rule Tanzania throughout the entire period of autocratic one-party rule (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2020).

5.3.2 2010

CCM was the ruling party before and after the 2010 elections, hence there were still close ties to the previous autocratic rule within the political system (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010).

5.3.3 2015

Before and after the elections, CCM remained the governing party in Tanzania. Thereof the autocratic guard was not gone in 2015 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2020).

5.4 I4: Results and power distribution

5.4.1 2005

In the election for parliament CCM got 69.99 % of the total votes, CUF received 14.24, CHADEMA 8,20 %, TLP 2,83 and UDP got 1.44 %. With the addition of the female quotation seats, the distribution of seats was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
<th>Percentage of seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>264 (206)</td>
<td>85.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>30 (19)</td>
<td>9.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>11 (5)</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(EISA, 2010c).
In the election for President, CCM’s candidate Jakaya Kikwete received 80.24 % of the votes, CUF’s Ibrahim Lipumba 11.7 % and CHADEMA’s candidate Freeman Mbowe received 5.89 %. The remaining seven candidates received less than 1 % each (Nyang’oro, 2006).

5.4.2 2010

As for the general elections of 2010, no official results of the parliamentary elections can be found. In the report by the European Union’s Election Observation Mission (2010), it is expressed how they were still waiting for the results by the time of authoring the report, although the members of the legislative had already been sworn in (ibid.: 35). However, the distribution of seats in parliament was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of seats³</th>
<th>Percentage of seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>259 (186)</td>
<td>74.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>48 (23)</td>
<td>13.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>36 (24)</td>
<td>10.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2011).

In the presidential elections the results were delayed which caused oppositional protest in several parts of the country (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010). The sitting President Kikwete (CCM) won 61.17 % of the votes, CHADEMA’s Dr Slaa 26.34 %, CUF’s candidate Lipumba received 8.06 %. The remaining four candidates received 1.20 %, 0.31 %, 0.20 % and 0.15 % respectively (ibid.: 35).

5.4.3 2015

In the parliamentary elections of 2015, CCM won 55.04 % of the votes, CHADEMA 31.75 % and CUF got 8.63 %. ACT received 2.22 % of the total votes and NCCR-Mageuzi 1.50 % (IFES, 2020b). The distribution of seats is presented below.

³ Number of seats without the addition of female and Zanzibari quotation and the members directly appointed by the President in parenthesis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
<th>Percentage of seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>253 (139)</td>
<td>68.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>70 (34)</td>
<td>19.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>42 (32)</td>
<td>11.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2020).

For the presidential election, CCM’s candidate John Pombe Magufuli won with 58.64 % of the votes, followed by Lowassa for CHADEMA/UKAWA with 39.97 %. ACT’s, ADC’s and CHAUMA’s candidates received 0.65 %, 0.43 % and 0.32 %. The votes for other candidates added up to 0.15 % in total (The Commonwealth, 2015).

5.5.15: Losers’ acceptance of results

In V-Dems Data, losers’ acceptance is coded by the variable “v2elaccept_ord”. The variable indicates whether the losing candidates and parties accepted the results within three months, and it rates from zero to four. 0 indicates that none of the losers accepted the results, 1 – a few, 2 – some, 3 – most, and 4 indicates that all losers accepted the results (Coppedge, M et al., 2020a; Coppedge M et al., 2020b).

5.5.1 2005

Following the election of 2005, Tanzania received a scoring of 3, indicating that most of the opposition parties accepted the elections’ result within three months after the election had taken place (ibid.).

5.5.2 2010

In 2010, Tanzania scored 3 (ibid.).

Though, CHADEMA’s presidential candidate Dr Slaa did not accept the outcome of the elections. The candidate – who had become historical with his high levels of support as an opposition politician in Tanzania – requested a re-run of the presidential elections since “the results released by the NEC did not reflect the will of the voters” (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010: 38). CHADEMA later announced that they would not recognize Kikwete (CCM) as the President (ibid.).

---

* Number of seats without the addition of female and Zanzibari quotation and the members directly appointed by the President in parenthesis.
5.5.3 2015

In 2015, the losers’ acceptance scoring of Tanzania remained 3 (ibid.). Tanzania thus remained in the same category as previously where most of the opposition accepted the turnout within three months.

5.6 16: Peaceful

5.6.1 2005

The 2005 elections were relatively peaceful on the mainland but in Zanzibar there were clashes between the opposition’s supporters and the police reported (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2010). Also, excessive use of force, violence and torture by security forces in connection with the election was reported in Zanzibar. The violence was directed against opposition politicians as well as supporters (Mørck, 2006).

5.6.2 2010

The elections in 2010 were in general described as peaceful, with a few incidents reported on the mainland. During the election week the tension increased, and the first fatality was reported during a political rally. The Tanzania People’s Defense Forces (TPDF) issued a statement where they warned that they would not tolerate any electoral violence. The statement raised questions regarding the security forces’ political neutrality. The election day was overall orderly and peaceful (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010).

5.6.3 2015

The general elections in 2015 were reported of as peaceful (African Union Commission, 2015; The Commonwealth, 2015). However, leading up to the re-elections in Zanzibar in 2016, there were several violent incidences. For instance, supporters of the opposition went out on the streets to protest where some of them were arrested, the police detonated two explosive devices found in the capital, there were reports of arsons of nine homes as well as the burning of a mosque with 16 people being severely injured (African Union Commission, 2016).

5.7 17: Electoral regime survival

In V-Dem’s data, the variable “v2x_elecreg” is used to code if scheduled elections went on as regular on the course as stipulated by electoral laws or well-established precedents. “Yes” is coded as 1, and 0 implies that the elections did not proceed as planned, indicating a breakdown of the electoral regime after the elections had taken place (Coppedge M et al., 2019; Coppedge M et al., 2020b)
5.7.1 2005

There were no incidents correlated to the 2005 elections that abruptly the electoral cycle, coded as “1” by the V-Dem Institute. Hence, the electoral regime survived (Coppelde M et al., 2020b).

5.7.2 2010

The year of 2010 was coded as “1” by the V-Dem Institute, indicating that the electoral regime survived, and the future scheduled elections preceded according to plan (ibid.).

5.7.3 2015

2015 was also coded as “1” in V-Dem’s data, hence no electoral regime breakdown occurred during the period. The following year, when the re-elections in Zanzibar was held, Tanzania also received a “1” in the coding (ibid.).

5.8 I8: Freedom of expression

The Freedom of Expression Index is compiled by the World Bank Group (2020) and is constituted by combining indicators from V-Dem and CLD. Whereas the V-Dem variables are more specific, the CLD variable is quite broad, making the aggregated index very broad in its coverage. The index rates from zero to one, one being the highest possible score.

5.8.1 2005

In 2005, Tanzania scored a 0.67 in the Freedom of Expression Index (ibid.).

NORDEM expressed some concerns regarding the registration of political candidates and the restriction of expressing some political opinions. This was seen as an infringement on the freedom of expression (Mørck, 2006).

5.8.2 2010

In 2010, the score had decreased from previous years to 0.64 (ibid.).

In the election observation reports, threats against the media were seen as a limitation on the freedom of expression within Tanzania (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010). Also, the outdated legislature on freedom of expression was criticized for potentially limiting such freedoms. Overall, the view of the observers was that freedom of expression was generally respected (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010).
5.8.3 2015

The rating in 2015 was even lower than previous years, scoring 0.63. The following year, when the re-
elections in Zanzibar took place, the score had dropped significantly from previous year, down to 0.55
(ibid.).

This can possibly be explained by the new legislature passed in 2015 and 2016. In 2015, two
controversial bills were passed by the government, namely the Statistics Act and the Cybercrimes Act.
In 2016, the Media Services Act was passed (Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2018). These three bills
have received immense criticism for their restraint on freedom of expression (Cross, 2019; Legal and
Human Rights Centre, 2018; The Commonwealth, 2015). There are numerous examples of people being
harassed or convicted based on these laws for sending WhatsApp messages or writing Facebook posts
criticizing the President (Cornet, 2017).

Just as in 2010, the legislature on freedom of expression was criticized for enabling censoring of media
by the government (The Commonwealth, 2015).

5.9 I9: Alternative sources of information

The Worldwide Press Freedom Index is compiled by the organization Reporters without Borders. The
index measures the level of freedom available to journalists by indicators of pluralism, media’s
independence, quality of legislative framework and journalists’ safety. The scoring ranges from zero to
100 where zero is the best possible score and indicates complete freedom of the media (Reporters
without Borders, 2016a; 2016b).

5.9.1 2005

In 2005, Tanzania scored 17.50 in the Worldwide Press Freedom Index. Ranking the countries based on
their score (where the best score was number one), Tanzania came in on 74th place out of 180 countries
in total (Reporters without Borders, 2016b; 2016c).

NORDEM concluded that all political parties received media coverage during the election period, but
CCM dominated, especially in the state-owned media. The interests of the owners of the media channels
were believed to influence how the elections were covered. NORDEM also suggested that the opposition
parties were not fully aware of their rights to use state-owned media, which would be one explanation
of the lack of oppositional coverage (Mørck, 2006).

5.9.2 2010

Tanzania had improved their score in 2010 from previous election year, to 13.00, making them place 41
in the world (Reporters without Borders, 2016d).
However, in some of the election reports, concerns were raised on the media’s coverage of the elections, where the ruling CCM was clearly over-represented. Also, one of the leading Swahili newspapers, Mwananchi, was threatened with closure by the Director of Tanzanian Information Services due to publishing negative coverage on the government (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010).

5.9.3 2015

In 2015, Tanzania’s scoring in the Worldwide Press Freedom Index had changed to 28.09, placing them in 75th place out of the 180 states (Reporters without Borders, 2016e). No other country in the ranking have experienced such a drastic decline in recent years. Reporters without Borders (2016g) themselves prescribe this observed change to the election of Magufuli as President since he “tolerates no criticism of himself or his policies” (ibid.). By the time of the Zanzibari re-elections in 2016, the score had further worsened to 28.65 (place 71 in the world) (Reporters without Borders, 2016f).

This significant decrease of free press is also represented in the election observation reports where observers express great concern for the lack of free press, especially following the approval of the Statistics Act and the Cybercrimes Act (African Union Commission, 2015: 20; The Commonwealth, 2015).

5.10 110: Associational autonomy

Using V-Dem’s dataset, associational autonomy can be measured through looking at the three variables “barriers to parties” (coding name v2psbars_ord), “party ban” (coded as v2psparban_ord) and “opposition parties autonomy” (v2psoppaut Ord) (Coppedge, M et al. 2020a).

The “barriers to parties” variable answer the question “How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?” connected to restraints such as requirements of membership, financial restraints or harassment. It is coded as a number between zero and four, where 0 indicates that no parties are allowed and 4 that no substantial barriers exist (ibid.).

“Party ban” indicates whether any parties are officially banned from competing or not, not including parties that are barred because they fail to meet registration requirements or support thresholds. It is expressed as a value between zero and four, 0 meaning that all parties except the regime are banned, and 4 is that no parties are officially banned (ibid.).

The variable “opposition parties autonomy” [sic] indicates if opposition parties are independent and autonomous of the ruling regime. It may adapt a value between zero and four, where 0 translates to “opposition parties are not allowed” and 4 means that all oppositional parties are autonomous and independent of the regime (ibid.)
For all the variables above, the values in between zero and four indicates differences in degree on an ordinal scale (ibid.).

5.10.1 2005

In 2005, Tanzania scored 4 on all three of the variables mentioned above (Coppedge, M et al. 2020b).

There are no indicators in the documents related to the elections of it being otherwise. However, what is not measured by V-Dem’s variables is the candidacy of individuals in the elections. In 2005, Tanzania was criticized for not allowing individual candidates with no party-affiliation to participate in the elections (Mørck, 2006).

5.10.2 2010

Tanzania scored 4 on all three variables related to associational autonomy in 2010 (Coppedge, M et al. 2020b).

No implications of it being otherwise can be found in the election observation reports either. As for individuals running in the elections, this was not allowed in 2010 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010: 17).

5.10.3 2015

In 2015, just as previous years, Tanzania scored 4 on both the “barriers to parties” variable and “party ban” variable. The “opposition parties autonomy” score had however dropped to 3, indicating that not all but most significant opposition parties were autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. The same scoring as in 2015 applied to the following year of 2016, when the Zanzibari re-elections were held (Coppedge, M et al. 2020b).

In the report by the African Union Commission (2015), some opposition politicians expressed concerns regarding the right to hold public meetings. This was legal if the police was notified but claims that the police insisted on the parties instead seeking approval were reported from oppositional parties. The parties claimed that this could possibly restrict them in their political activities (ibid.: 18f).

No individual candidates without the support of a political party were allowed to candidate in the 2015 or 2016 elections (African Union Commission, 2015).
5.11 I11: Freedom and fairness

5.11.1 2005

Both national and international election observers deemed the 2005 elections to be largely free and fair. However, there was some disagreement whether the overwhelming victory of CCM was simply a reflection of the enormous support for the party amongst the population or a sign of the election process not being completely fair (Mørck, 2006; Nyang’oro, 2006). Also, the report by NORDEM directed some critique on the negligence on controlling for multiple voting (Mørck, 2006). Some observers also argued that the requirement of candidates belonging to a political party and the prohibition of certain political opinions from Tanzania’s assembly were serious flaws in terms of electoral freedom, contradicting international standards and human rights law (ibid.).

5.11.2 2010

The overall picture presented in the election observation reports that the 2010 elections were mostly free and fair, with some infringements (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010). Zambia’s electoral observation mission regarded the elections in 2010 as free and fair (Pande, 2010).

Some of the points of critique related to the exclusion of non-party affiliated candidates, prisoners’ voting rights and the absence of opportunities to challenge the election of President and the decisions made by the National Electoral Commission (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). Also, the unproportionate amount of resources, amongst them state resources, the ruling power CCM possessed gave them an unfair advantage when campaigning. In the media, CCM also enjoyed a clear advantage with them being overrepresented (ibid.). The impartiality of the electoral administration and the lack of transparency by not allowing the observers to attend meetings and the delay of publishing the election results also made observers question the freedom and fairness of the elections (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2010). Also, the European Union election observers criticized the level of control possessed by the government as “fostering a system where advantages can be awarded in exchange for political loyalty” (ibid.: 4).

5.11.3 2015

In 2016, the LHRC/TACCEO announced the 2015 elections to be free but not fair. This was based on the unlevel playing field where CCM used public resources for their campaign, benefitted from having the majority of media coverage whilst the coverage of the opposition mainly depicted negative incidents and how some candidates and parties succeeded the limitation on expenditures on their campaign declared by law. Other main issues criticized where the allegations that the National Electoral Commission only skimmed through the tallying of the votes in the presidential elections and the
friendperson of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission’s unprecedented decision to nullify the election in 2015 with at least 75% of the votes already being counted and announced (Kipobota & Olengurumwa, 2016; The Commonwealth, 2015).

The observation reports by the African Union Commission (2015) were more positive when describing the 2015 elections level of freedom and fairness. Although, some criticisms were raised, mainly regarding the lack of opportunity to challenge the election result, inability for individual candidates to compete and the lack of legal provisions for establishing official party coalitions (ibid.). When evaluating the re-election in Zanzibar in 2016 however, they were more sceptic. They concluded that the vote counting process lacked in terms both of accountability and transparency (African Union Commission, 2016).

Taking all the provided information from the reports into consideration, the view of this study is that the 2015 and 2016 elections were mostly free but lacking in fairness.

6. Analysis

To sum up, the changes and development of the eleven indicators will briefly be presented here.

11: voter turnout saw a slight decrease over the time period in general. 2010 stood out with a significantly lower turnout than the other two elections where several undemocratic institutions and qualities were presented as possible reasons. However, since the turnout numbers of 2015 had almost recovered back to the 2005 turnout as well as the 2005 numbers not being completely reliable, it is difficult to point to any significant trend neither in democratic increase nor democratic decay.

12: opposition participation saw a slight increase from the 2005 election to the 2015 election. Once again 2010 differed from the other two elections with a lower number of opposition parties participating than both previous and following election.

13: autocratic guard gone? remained the same throughout all three years.

Regarding I4: results and power distribution, there seems to have occurred a levelling out of CCM’s advantage throughout the years. Even though the party and the party’s presidential candidates remained in power, their number of seats in parliament, the percentage of votes for their presidential candidate as well as the in the parliamentary elections (with the exception of 2010 where the numbers are missing) did wane. This would indicate an increase in the level of democracy.

For I5: losers’ acceptance of results, the levels were basically unchanged throughout the time period.

The same applied to I6: peaceful, no significant change in the level of peacefulness could be observed. There was indeed more extensive violence experienced on the islands of Zanzibar, but this was the case during all three election periods. Hence, no significant change was observed regarding this indicator.
I7: electoral regime survival stayed the same during the entire period.

When researching I8: freedom of expression, a significant downward trend was observed. The level of freedom of expression decreased throughout all three years. The most significant decrease was observed between 2015 and 2016, possibly ascribed to the passing of legislature that restricted this freedom.

As for I9: alternative sources of information, once again 2010 stood out. This time it was because of the significant improvement compared to the other years. The general trend was however a negative one, with significantly lower levels of alternative sources of information in 2015 and 2016 than in 2005.

Regarding I10: associational autonomy a slightly negative trend was observed since the levels in 2015 were lower than previous years.

The last and more broad, over-all indicator than the previous ones, I11: freedom and fairness, also witnessed a slightly negative trend. The first two elections were deemed mostly free and fair, whilst the 2015 elections were considered free but not entirely fair.

7. Conclusion and discussion

Relating back to the two research questions presented in the beginning of this study, some conclusions can be drawn. The questions were:

1. **How has the level of democracy in Tanzania changed between the times for the elections held in 2005, 2010 and 2015?**

and

2. **Does the case of Tanzania support or contradict Lindberg’s theory on democratization by elections?**

Following the findings presented in this study, some conclusions can be drawn concerning question number one. First, it appears as to indicators number three, five, six and seven, no significant change can be observed in Tanzania. Second, the elections in 2010 stands out in the data by deviating from the general trend in at least three of the eleven indicators. Third, indicator eight, nine, ten and eleven all point towards a negative trend in the level of democraticness in Tanzania. Overall, when combining the results from all indicators of democracy, it appears that the democratic level in Tanzania have deteriorated somewhat from 2005 to 2015. In regard to the year of 2010, it is not possible to say how the level of democracy related to the other two elections. This is because in some indicators, significantly higher level of democraticness were experienced in 2010, in others the levels in 2010 were significantly lower, disabling any general conclusions to be made.

As to question number two, the results presented for question one can not be said to support Lindberg’s theory that repeatedly held multi-party elections in a state would lead to higher levels of democracy.
within the country. In order for the theory to be supported, as stated in section 4.1, the findings would have to point towards an increase in democracy level by time. This is not the case. Yet, the results can not be used to contradict the theory completely either. The findings do suggest a small decay in democraticness by time and number of held elections, however these results are not distinct and strong enough to be used as a sole evidence against Lindberg’s (2006) theory. Though, the results are not null, but points towards a contradiction. In combination with more research on the case of Tanzania as well as other African states, the results of this study could thereof be used to question Lindberg’s (2006) research; but it does not hold up to do so completely on its own. Hence, further research on the subject is desirable, tentatively after the 2020 Tanzanian elections, and by including other indicators into the analysis or examining other African states. The findings of this study could also be used to question Lindberg’s statement that third elections signify a breaking point after which democratic breakdown is very unlikely.

An interesting aspect of the results is which ones of the indicators signalled a democratic decrease, and which ones did not. Looking at the first seven indicators that were based on Lindberg’s own indicators, none of them pointed towards declining levels of democracy. Most of them indicated that no change had occurred, some were not possible to analyse and 14 even pointed towards increased democratic levels. The only indicators with clear and coherent results were the ones based on Dahl’s criteria of polyarchy. All these indicators also signalled a democratic decrease throughout the period.

Following this, the validity of Lindberg’s variables can be questioned. Even though Lindberg’s variables were slightly altered for this study, their essence remained the same, which is why this deficiency should not be ascribed to the methodology of this study. Instead, it appears that Lindberg’s indicators do not succeed in measuring democracy adequately, at least not for the case of Tanzania. As has been discussed previously, democracy is a very complex and multi-faceted concept. Whereas the criteria built upon Dahl’s institutions are more abstract in their nature (some may say harder to measure…), Lindberg’s indicators are more concrete, but do not go as deep. Considering the complexity of the concept, may it be that Lindberg’s indicators are too shallow to measure the true essence of democracy?

This study does not claim to determine whether Lindberg’s theory is valid or not, but it contributes with some empirical evidence to the discussion at large. With the case-study of Tanzania somewhat speaking against the democratization by elections theory, only one African state remains confirmative of the theory: Senegal. This remains for future research.

Further one election is planned to take place in the state of Tanzania, later this year (2020). When looking at the figures used for this study, one can distinguish a novel, possible downward trend in level of democracy where the figures in 2015 and especially 2016 are alarmingly similar to the ones in 2005, and sometimes even lower. Following this, the elections in 2020 are of utmost importance and interest for anyone interested in Tanzania’s democratic evolvement. In many aspects these elections will
determine which future route Tanzania will take – the long and sometimes winding road towards democracy, or a U-turn back to autocratic rule?

I would like to wish them the best of luck.
References


Board of Principal Investigators. 2020. “About V-Dem”. Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Available at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/about/ [290420]


Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2010. “UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA Bunge (National Assembly)””. Available at: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2337_05.htm [110520].


