




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The Conflict Transformation in Mozambique

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to get a better understanding of the conflict transformation in Mozambique. It has a dual focus: the peace process after the 16 years' war, and the resumed violent conflict, to understand both the constructive and destructive change of the conflict.

A field study including interviews with 23 informants was conducted in Maputo between March and June 2019. The study was guided by conflict transformation theory and employed a case-oriented comparative analysis.

The results show that the constructive and destructive change of the conflict in Mozambique were influenced by the context transformation; structure transformation; actor transformation; issue transformation; and personal transformation. Some transformations were more substantial than others, but altogether the combination of and interaction between the factors formed the conflict transformation in Mozambique. Factors which have significantly influenced the conflict are: the asymmetric relationship; the elite bargaining; the intra-party dynamics; the external support; the distrust; and the profile of the leaders of the two parties.

Keywords: Conflict Transformation; Conflict; Frelimo; Mozambique; Peace; Renamo

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1. Introduction

1.1 Statement of the problem

What builds peace and what creates violent conflict? Why do some conflicts turn into successful cases of conflict transformation, whereas others fail? These are central and complex questions in peace and conflict studies. This case study research of the conflict in Mozambique offers an explanatory example of what builds a successful story and what creates a flawed story.

After 16 years of war (1977-1992), and the loss of more than 1 million lives, local and international interventions succeeded with ending the protracted conflict in Mozambique.¹ On the 4th of October 1992, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the insurgent group (Renamo). Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries, without most of the pre-conditions believed to be favorable to support peace and democracy. Surprisingly, a decade after signing the GPA, Mozambique stood out as one of the most peaceful countries in the region and was considered as a UN post-conflict success story.² Initially, the GPA guided the end of the war, but how Mozambique subsequently transformed the conflict constructively remains unanswered by most scholars.³

While Mozambique experienced a constructive change of the conflict in the 1990s, the developments in the 2010s tells another story. A period of repeated violent attacks from both sides followed the country's 20th anniversary of the peace agreement, which eventually led to Renamo's withdrawal from the GPA in 2013.⁴ There is a lack of research

¹ Bartoli, A. et al. 2010. Peace is in Movement: A Dynamical Systems Perspective on the Emergence of Peace in Mozambique. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 211–230. Page 221-224. DOI: 10.1080/10781911003691609

² Manning, C. 2002. *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-conflict Democratization, 1992-2000*. Praeger: Westport. Page 5.

³ Adedokun, A. 2019. Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 26, No.1, Article 4. Page 1.

⁴ Deutsche Welle. *Momentos de instabilidade política em Moçambique – uma cronologia*. 2014-08-06. (Accessed 2019-06-06 from <https://www.dw.com/pt-002/momentos-de-instabilidade-pol%C3%ADtica-em-mo%C3%A7ambique-uma-cronologia/a-16912568>)

on what the differences are between these two contrasting developments in Mozambique. Besides, thus far, peace and conflict have usually been separately studied.⁵ This case study will, therefore, contribute by examining what accounts for the constructive peace process *and* the destructive violent conflict in Mozambique.

1.2 Purpose of the study and research questions

The purpose of this study is to get a better understanding of the conflict transformation in Mozambique. By focusing on the de-escalation period that surrounded the GPA in 1992, and the escalation period that surrounded the withdrawal from the GPA in 2013, this study aims to explain why the conflict in Mozambique transformed in a constructive way the former period and in a destructive way in the latter period. The intention is also to contribute to the understanding of conflict transformation.

This study will be guided by the following research questions:

- *Why did the conflict in Mozambique transform constructively in the period surrounding the signing of the GPA in 1992?*
- *Why did the conflict in Mozambique transform destructively in the period surrounding the withdrawal from the GPA in 2013?*
- *What similarities and differences can be found between the two periods?*

1.3 Delimitations

The period under study is from limited to the period posterior 1980 and prior to 2015, due to the set time frame and length of the study.

1.4 Definitions

Transition – a passage from one state or stage to another.

Transformation – a process of complete change.

⁵ Razakamaharavo, V.T. et al., 2018. Processes of Conflict De-Escalation in Madagascar (1947–1996). *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 54–63. Page 5.

1.5 Disposition

The first chapter (1) explained why it is necessary to look closer at the conflict transformation in Mozambique, and outlined the purpose and research questions. The second chapter (2) offers relevant previous research on peace and conflict in Mozambique. In the third chapter (3), the theoretical framework which helped to understand the phenomena of conflict transformation is provided. Chapter four (4) gives a thorough description of how the study was conducted. The fifth chapter (5) presents the empirical material and the analysis of the two periods separately and in comparison. The last chapter (6) holds a concluding discussion. In the end, the references and Appendix 1 are placed.

Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress

DDR – Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration

Frelimo –The Mozambique Liberation Front/Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

GPA – The General Peace Agreement

Renamo – The Mozambican National Resistance/Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

UN – The United Nations

UNOMOZ – The United Nations Operation in Mozambique

2. Previous research

2.1 Factors influencing peace and conflict in Mozambique

In “*Transition from civil war to peace: The role of the United Nations and international community in Mozambique*”, Ayokunu Adedokun studies the factors behind the successful transition from war to peace in Mozambique. Adedokun outlines five principal factors that have been put forward as the reasons for Mozambique’s transition from war to peace, namely: (1) The lengthy military stalemate made Renamo and Frelimo realize that neither could win a military victory. (2) The significantly reduced external aid to both parties, especially with the end of the Cold War. (3) The devastating drought threatened both sides with mass starvation. (4) Mozambique was simply a unique and lucky case. (5) The substantial external intervention. Adedokun argues that the previous research has overlooked the factors which sustained the peace and offers three factors that supported the peace after the war ended: (1) The international community’s facilitation of the peacebuilding process.⁶ Numerous have credited UN’s support to the peace negotiations, the demobilization of the former soldiers, the creation of a united national army, and the building of a legitimate, political opposition, for the success.⁷ (2) The local ownership of the peace process and the local participation in the peace process.⁸ A key actor was the Christian Council of Mozambique, together with the Italian lay organization Sant’Egidio, which could have a dialogue with both parties.⁹ (3) The persistent elite bargain.¹⁰

Adedokun final aspect is repeated by Carrie Manning in her book “*The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-conflict Democratization, 1992-2000*”. Manning argues the persistence of two contradictory “tracks” to manage conflicts – informal elite bargaining and formal

⁶ Adedokun, A. 2019. Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 26, No.1, Article 4. Page 1; Razakamaharavo, V.T. et al., 2018. Processes of Conflict De-Escalation in Madagascar (1947–1996). *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 54–63. Page 7-8.

⁷ Weinstein, M. 2002. Mozambique: a fading UN success story. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 141-156. Page 143.

⁸ Adedokun, A. 2019. Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 26, No.1, Article 4. Page 1; Razakamaharavo, V.T. et al., 2018. Processes of Conflict De-Escalation in Madagascar (1947–1996). *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 54–63. Page 5.

⁹ Ibid. Page 19.

¹⁰ Ibid. Page 7-8.

institutions – was the reason for the sustainability of Mozambique’s post-war political settlement. Elite bargaining was the institutional framework during the formal peace process (1992-1994) and it has continued since then. The formal institutions have rarely solved the conflicts in Mozambique, instead, parallel informal processes of elite bargaining have supplemented or replaced them. Manning argues that elite bargaining has been a useful mechanism during political dissatisfaction and an alternative to formal power-sharing.¹¹

Elite bargaining is also recurrent in research on the resumed violence in Mozambique, for example in Alex Vines report “*Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Mozambique Case Study*” and his book chapter “*Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo’s return to armed conflict since 2013: The politics of reintegration in Mozambique*”. Vines argues that, in post-conflict Mozambique, Frelimo has made efforts to sustain its dominant position by co-optation and division through elite bargains with Renamo’s leader, on the one hand.¹² On the other hand, Afonso Dhlakama’s (the leader of Renamo from 1979 to 2018) strategy has been to hinder parliamentary processes, and request high-level bilateral negotiations instead. When Armando Guebuza became president, he ended the dialogues and compromises that had characterized the relationship during Joaquim Chissano’s presidency (1986-2005). Following the election results which had posed an existential threat to Frelimo, Guebuza adopted a zero-sum strategy to impose total domination. Frelimo’s new strategy humiliated and radicalized Renamo, and as a result, Renamo ex-combatants remobilized and started to push for resumed armed violence.¹³ Vines argues that Renamo’s objective of the resumed violent conflict is to extract elite bargains through violence, by underlining Frelimo’s inability to provide basic services to its citizenry while its leadership becomes wealthier. Moreover, Mozambique’s politicians and companies created high expectations of Mozambique becoming rich in the discovery of coal, oil, and gas. This

¹¹ Manning, C. 2002. *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-conflict Democratization, 1992-2000*. Praeger: Westport. Page 8.

¹² Vines, A. 2018. *Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Mozambique Case Study*. Stabilization Unit. Page 22.

¹³ Vines, A. 2017. Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo’s return to armed conflict since 2013: The politics of reintegration in Mozambique. In *Warlord democrats in Africa: Ex-military Leaders and Electoral Politics*, Themnér, A. (ed.), 121-154. London: Zed Books. Page 151-152

increased the pressure on Dhlakama to act radically and obtain more than minor cash handouts.¹⁴ James Hlongwana similarly argues in his article “*Old habits die hard: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) propensity for military confrontation against its professed embracement of peaceful conflict resolution, 1976 to 2017*” that Renamo’s disengagement in the formal institutions and Dhlakama’s return to their military base in the bush was to use the military threat as a bargaining tool.¹⁵

Vines further argues while that the “pay and scatter” DDR strategy, and efforts to dismantle Renamo’s command and control structures during the peace process, made it impossible for Renamo to start a total war, two other factors from the peace process contributed to the resumed violence: (1) The DDR was not a long-term process, and the efforts dismissed the political inclusion. This resulted in a poor elite reintegration, partly because of Mozambican domestic politics, but also because the international community believed that the peace was secure. (2) The neglect of the disarmament process. During UNOMOZ’s presence in the country, the total disarmament of the former rebels was overlooked. A provision in GPA allowed Renamo to maintain armed men as a “transitional guarantee” until the first multiparty elections in 1994, and then the police were supposed to take over these responsibilities, however, it never happened.¹⁶

¹⁴ Vines, A. 2017. Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo’s return to armed conflict since 2013: The politics of reintegration in Mozambique. In *Warlord democrats in Africa: Ex-military Leaders and Electoral Politics*, Themnér, A. (ed.), 121-154. London: Zed Books. Page 143-149.

¹⁵ Hlongwana, J. 2018. Old habits die hard: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) propensity for military confrontation against its professed embracement of peaceful conflict resolution, 1976 to 2017. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 5, 63-68. DOI: 10.5897/AJPSIR2018.1073. Page. 63

¹⁶ Vines, A. 2018. *Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Mozambique Case Study*. Stabilization Unit. Page 11-12.

3. Conflict transformation theory

Conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation present three approaches to conflict intervention. The aim in conflict management is to reach political settlements, including compromises reached by different kinds of pressure.¹⁷ It is often criticized as only “applying a band-aid to cover deep wounds”.¹⁸ The objective in conflict resolution is to investigate the roots of the conflict and create solutions to reach a win-win outcome.¹⁹ Conflict resolution has been criticized for giving ad-hoc answers which reinforce the unchallenged structure.²⁰ Conflict transformation goes beyond reframing positions and win-win outcomes; it is a process of transforming the relationships, the interests, the discourses, and if needed, the structure of society that support the violent conflict. In this view, conflicts are transformed gradually through a series of steps.²¹ Conflict transformation theorists see conflicts as catalysts of constructive social change, and does not see the conflict itself as a problem, only the violence.²² However, critics claim that since conflict transformation implies both a deep- and wide-ranging change, it can only be a guiding notion.²³

In the field of conflict transformation, Johan Galtung’s work is probably the most influential.²⁴ Galtung’s model of conflict consists of three components: *contradiction, attitude, and behavior*. The contradiction refers to the incompatibility of goals between the conflict parties, which in an asymmetric conflict like the one between Frelimo and Renamo is defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests. Attitude refers to the parties’ perception and misperception of each other and themselves. Behavior refers to

¹⁷ Miall, H. 2004. Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In *Transforming ethno-political conflict*, Austin, A. et al. (ed.), 67-89. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. Page 3.

¹⁸ Berghof Foundation. 2012. *Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation: 20 notions for theory and practice*. Page. 20.

¹⁹ Miall, H. 2004. Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In *Transforming ethno-political conflict*, Austin, A. et al (ed.), 67-89. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. Page 3.

²⁰ Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. & Woodhouse, T. 1999. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict*. Oxford: Polity. Page 78.

²¹ Miall, H. 2004. Transforming Ethnic Conflict. Theories and Practices. In *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*, Wimmer, A. et al. (ed.), 160-173. Rowman & Littlefield: New York. Page. 162-163.

²² Goetschel, L. 2009. *Conflict Transformation*. In: *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 94.

²³ Berghof Foundation. 2012. *Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation: 20 notions for theory and practice*. Page. 26-27.

²⁴ Goetschel, L. 2009. *Conflict Transformation*. In: *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 94.

actions of coercion, cooperation, conciliation and hostility.²⁵ Galtung argues that all these three components are present in a full conflict.²⁶ Galtung sees conflicts as dynamic processes in which the contradiction, attitudes and behavior are constantly changing and influencing each other. Conflicts transform in dynamics terms as parties' interests clash and their relationship become oppressive, or as they develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behavior. By ending the violent behavior, a *negative peace* is achieved. Reaching a *positive peace* involves a de-escalation of the conflict behavior, a change of the attitudes, and a transformation of the relationship or the conflicting interests underlying the structural contradiction.²⁷

The tendency of using conflict theories too narrowly, and concentrating only on the conflict party level, leaves out the context which the conflict is embedded.²⁸ The issues, actors and interests are not fixed, they change over time because of the social, economic and political dynamics, *context* may thus be added as a component to Galtung's triangle of conflict.²⁹ Hugh Miall argues that conflict theories need to involve the factors which are exacerbating conflict and restraining conflict during different phases, and the interaction of causes and preventers at different levels (global, regional, societal, conflict party and individual). Miall has developed a framework which takes these dynamics into concern, which will be used in this study.³⁰

²⁵ Miall, H. 2004. Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In *Transforming ethno-political conflict*, Austin, A. et al. (ed.), 67-89. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. Page 5-8.

²⁶ Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. 2011. *Contemporary conflict resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts* (3rd edition). Cambridge: Polity. Page 10-11.

²⁷ Ibid. Page 11.

²⁸ Miall, H. 2004. Transforming Ethnic Conflict. Theories and Practices. In *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*, Wimmer, A. et al. (ed.), 160-173. Rowman & Littlefield: New York. Page 166-168.

²⁹ Miall, H. 2004. Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In *Transforming ethno-political conflict*, Austin, A. et al. (ed.), 67-89. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. Page 5-8.

³⁰ Miall, H. 2004. Transforming Ethnic Conflict. Theories and Practices. In *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*, Wimmer, A. et al. (ed.), 160-173. Rowman & Littlefield: New York. Page 166-168.

3.1 Operationalization

Miall's framework includes five types of transformations which can take place within conflicts, namely: context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation and personal transformation.³¹ The five transformations relate to Galtung's three components of conflict formation in the following way: context, structural, and issue transformation affect the context and the contradictions; whereas actor and personal transformation affect attitudes and behavior.³²

Context transformation refers to changes in the context which the conflict is embedded in. The context is often an important reason for the continuation of the conflict; global forces may both produce and fuel local conflicts. The end of the Cold War is an example of a major context transformation which led to an end of numerous wars. It will be studied if there are any factors in the international, regional and environmental context which have influenced the onset, continuation or end of the conflict, for example, environmental disasters and international competitions. *Structural transformation* involves changes in the structure of the conflict; the set of actors and their relationship, in the society, economy or state which the conflict is situated in. A structural transformation may involve a change in the relationship between the dominant and weaker party in an asymmetric conflict. It will be studied if there are any factors which have changed the power structure which the actors operate in, for example international support to the conflict parties or the function of formal institutions. *Actor transformation* implicates on changes of the actors' approach to the conflict. An actor transformation can be caused by an intra-party conflict. It will be studied if there are any factors which have influenced the conflict' parties approach, for example changes in the public support or in the leadership positions. *Issue transformation* contains changes of the issues on political agenda and reformulations of the parties' positions on key


³¹ Miall, H. 2004. Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In *Transforming ethno-political conflict*, Austin, A. et al. (ed.), 67-89. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. Page 5-7.

³² Miall, H. 2004. Transforming Ethnic Conflict. Theories and Practices. In *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*, Wimmer, A. et al. (ed.), 160-173. Rowman & Littlefield: New York. Page 169.

issues. By reframing the conflict issues, a settlement may be reached. It will be studied if there are any factors in the context, structure, or within the parties which have influenced the parties' positions. *Personal transformations* include changes of perspectives or will within individuals. For example, a personal transformation occurs when a leader proposes reconciliation or acceptance of the opponent. It will be studied if there are any factors which have influenced individuals attitude towards the other party, for example reconciliation commissions.³³

This conflict transformation approach is used to explain the constructive and the destructive conflict transformation. The five categories are useful in this study since the aim is to analyze what factors are causing and preventing conflict. It will be studied if there was a change in the five types of transformation in both periods, and which factors made the transformations happen. The two periods will be compared by exploring similarities and differences in how the five types of transformations contributed to the conflict transformation, and what factors have had a significant influence on both the destructive and constructive change of the conflict.

Figure 1: The analytical framework



³³ Miall, H. 2004. Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In *Transforming ethno-political conflict*, Austin, A. et al. (ed.), 67-89. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden. Page 67-90; Goetschel, L. 2009. Conflict Transformation. In: *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 95; Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. 2005. *Contemporary conflict resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts* (2nd edition). Cambridge: Polity. Page 163-164.

3.2 Conflict transformation in another case

Iwan Gardono Sujatmiko used Hugh Miall's conflict transformation framework to analyze the conflict transformation in Aceh, Indonesia in his paper "*Conflict Transformation and Social Reconciliation: The Case of Aceh*". Sujatmiko concludes that the five subjects of transformation in a conflict (presented in the theory section) were useful to understand the peaceful change. However, the different types of transformations were followed by programs of reintegration in the society and reconstruction of the society, which influenced the move from a negative peace to positive peace. Moreover, while the parties reached a compromise in the Peace Agreement, a win-win situation was established by reaching a consensus within the political system. Sujatmiko also argues why the peace efforts previously failed: the conflict parties did not want a compromise and they had a hardline approach; the structure benefitted one party; the parties had two different positions on key issues; the international community had a passive attitude towards the conflict, and; the personal feelings were dominated by negative ideas of the other party. Furthermore, Sujatmiko offers relevant criticism of the framework. Firstly, he suggests that not only the political leaders but the military leaders should be included in the framework. Secondly, the transformation of issues may be important for a third party as well. Thirdly, the role of history should be considered. Lastly, he argues that the role of the environmental context as the event of a disaster should be integrated into the framework.³⁴

³⁴ Sujatmiko, G. 2012. Conflict transformation and social reconciliation: The case of Aceh, Indonesia. *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 8, No 2, 104–111. Page 104–110. DOI:10.5539/ass.v8n2p104

4. Method and data

4.1 The design of the study

Mozambique was regarded as a successful example of post-conflict peacebuilding during the first decades after the signing of the peace agreement in 1992 but turned into an example of a flawed process with the resumed armed conflict between Frelimo and Renamo in the period 2013–2016.³⁵ It is necessary to gather empirical material about the conflict to identify the factors behind the two opposite developments, to draw lessons from both processes, to avoid the loss of lives and to build sustainable peace. Theoretically, Mozambique is an interesting case study since the conflict has changed both in a constructing and destructive way and can thus help to understand the phenomena of conflict transformation.

Explanatory research focuses on why a phenomenon occurs and what influences its occurrence. Qualitative research methods offer tools for studying what factors forces or reinforces, attitudes and behavior, for example, by in-depth examination of subjects.³⁶ Instead of examining factors that statistically correlate with ceasefires or conflict onset, for instance, this study chose a qualitative research method to be able to study the context in which the manifested conflict transformation in Mozambique occurred and to include numerous factors influencing the transformation at the same time.³⁷ When conducting a case study, it is possible to include numerous factors influencing a contemporary phenomenon, as well as the context in which it is embedded. A case study design can, thus, build a detailed and in-depth understanding of the research issue.³⁸ Since the purpose of this study was to get a deeper understanding of the conflict transformation in Mozambique, a case study design was found to be the most suitable.³⁹ A case study can comprehend the complexity of an individual case which gives the study a high internal validity, but it cannot identify

³⁵ Faleg, G. 2019. *Conflict prevention in Mozambique: can there be peace after the storm?* Luxembourg: Publications Office. Page 1.

³⁶ Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, M., & Ormston, R. 2013. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Page. 32

³⁷ Ibid. Page 41.

³⁸ Ibid. Page 67.

³⁹ Yin, R. 1994. *Case study research: Design and methods* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Page 13.

correlations between a vast number of cases, which lowers the external validity.⁴⁰ However, this study did not have the intention to generalize the results to a wider number of cases but to get an in-depth understanding of the case of Mozambique.

4.2 Material

This study used qualitative interviews as the primary data collection method to get an in-depth understanding of complex phenomena and processes. Interviews also brings the researcher closer to the context, people, and the country under study.⁴¹

The questions in structured and unstructured interviews differ to which the extent questions are identical in their form and order. Structured interviews have high reliability and repeatability, whereas unstructured interviews emphasize the individual's validity and the possibility for the participant to steer the conversation.⁴² The interviews conducted for this study were semi-structured, guided by prepared themes, which allowed the interviews to be adjusted to each participant, at the same as the interviews were guided by a set of themes that helped the researcher to collect relevant material.⁴³ A topic guide (see Appendix 1) was used as the general form for the data collection and helped to ensure the constituency of the data collection. Since the objective was to get different perspectives and insights about actors, events, processes, and other factors, influencing the conflict transformation, the informants' expertise and experience guided which subjects were emphasized in the interviews. This open approach is useful to encourage participants to shape their narrative.⁴⁴ However, the material is shaped by the dialogue between the interviewer and the informant to a high extent, why the results probably would differ to some extent if the project would be replicated by another researcher since the interviews are shaped by the researcher's and

⁴⁰ David, M. & Sutton, C. 2016. *Samhällsvetenskaplig metod* (1st edition). Studentlitteratur: Lund. Page 154.

⁴¹ Ahrne, G & Svensson, P. 2015. *Handbok i kvalitativa metoder*. Stockholm: Liber AB. Page 12–15.

⁴² David, M. & Sutton, C. 2016. *Samhällsvetenskaplig metod* (1st edition). Studentlitteratur: Lund. Page 113

⁴³ Hjerm, N., Lindgren, S., & Nilsson, M. 2014. *Introduktion till samhällsvetenskaplig analys*. (2nd edition). Malmö: Gleerups Utbildning AB. Page 149–150.

⁴⁴ Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, M., & Ormston, R. 2013. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Page 148-149.

participants' relationship and understandings.⁴⁵ In this case, factors that needs to be taken into consideration are the following: the researcher came from a foreign country to conduct the field study and was new to the context and the participants; the researcher was a young woman and most of the participants were middle-aged men (four women and nineteen men); and some of the participants worked in an organization which had a partnership with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

Purposive sampling is the selection of participants based on certain criteria, for example, based on specific experiences and roles, which enables a detailed exploration of the questions under study.⁴⁶ The selection of participants for the interviews in this study was guided by the objective of finding individuals within different organizations and sectors with knowledge about how actors, events and processes and other factors have influenced the conflict transformation – i.e. informants. The participants were chosen based on their current or previous role of dealing with issues relating to the conflict, peace, and/or development in Mozambique. For example, having a role within a non-governmental organization or a research institute. The Embassy of Sweden assisted with the contacts to the two initial organizations, thereafter, snowball sampling was used to select informants, which is an effective technique using the informants' networks to get in touch with others within the selection criteria.⁴⁷ A disadvantage of selecting a new participant through existing ones is the risk of minimizing the diversity within the sample, this was mitigated by asking the participants to identify individuals who meet the criteria but have another expertise, for example.⁴⁸

When dealing with political issues in a conflict or post-conflict area, the researcher should consider that some of the interview participants might be shaped by the current political

⁴⁵ Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, M., & Ormston, R. 2013. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Page 354.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Page 113.

⁴⁷ Ahrne, G. & Svensson, P. 2015. *Handbok i kvalitativa metoder*. Stockholm: Liber AB. Page 10.

⁴⁸ Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, M., & Ormston, R. 2013. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Page 129.

situation. The answers to the questions should, therefore, be treated with some caution, because they might be part of a conflict party's propaganda to promote a certain narrative.⁴⁹ However, interviewing individuals who have been or are, directly or indirectly, involved was vital to develop a comprehensive understanding of the two periods of study and the details within them. Moreover, considering that the peace process was more than 20 years ago, the participants might have had forgotten important details. This was compensated by fact-checking the statements, with each other and with documentary sources, to increase the reliability of the findings.⁵⁰

The interviews were conducted during April and May in 2019 in the province of Maputo. Interviews were conducted until there was no new information adding to the previous ones, which resulted in sixteen interviews; fourteen individual interviews and two group interviews. The participants choose to have a group interview instead of individual interviews in two cases. The interviews were usually held at the informants' office and a few times at a restaurant. The time of the interviews was around one hour, sometimes more and sometimes less, depending mostly on the time that the informant had available but also on the length of the answers.

The informants were the following: Adriano Nuvunga, Director at the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD). Carlos Shenga, Director at the Centre for Research on Governance and Development (CPGD). Edson Cortez, Director at the Center for Public Integrity (CIP). João Pereira, Director at the Civil Society Support Mechanism Foundation (MASC). Jose Ivo Correia, Research Manager at the Center for Mozambique and International Studies (CEMO). Luis Nhachote, Coordinator at the Centre for Investigative Journalism in Mozambique (CJIMAZ). Paulo Wache, Director, Emilio Jovando Zeca, and Calton Cadeado, Researchers, at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CEEI)

⁴⁹ Höglund, K. 2011. Comparative field research in war-torn societies. In: *Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges*, Höglund, K. & Öberg, M (ed.), 114-129. London and New York: Routledge. Page 121.

⁵⁰ Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, M., & Ormston, R. 2013. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers* (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Page 358.

at the Institute for International Relations (ISRI). The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM). Salvador Forquilha, Director at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (IESE). Hermenegildo Mulhovo, Director at the Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). JustaPaz. Roque Silva Samuel, Secretary-General of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo). Eduardo Namburete, Member of Parliament for the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). Diamantino Nhampossa, Country Representative at We Effect in Mozambique.

4.3 Data analysis method

The recorded interviews were transcribed into text documents. In order to find the relevant empirical material to answer the purpose of the study, a process of coding was conducted. Coding is a type of process where the researcher applies codes (keyword, terms, and themes) on paragraphs, and paragraphs get linked with each other to highlight similarities and differences.⁵¹ The coding process was guided by Hugh Miall's framework of the different transformation objects (see theory chapter). The two periods under study were first analyzed separately and then compared with each other, according to a case-oriented comparative analysis. By focusing on a few instances, a case-oriented comparison makes it possible to find similarities and differences within in-depth descriptions, and at the same time take into account various factors and their interaction. This analysis method was chosen because the aim was to find similarities and differences between the periods of escalation and de-escalation as well as to get an in-depth understanding of each period's particularities.⁵²

4.4 Ethical considerations

To perform ethical research, this study was guided by the five following principles: the informants were fully informed about the purpose, methods and intended uses of the research; the choice of anonymity of the information supplied by informants were respected;

⁵¹ David, M. & Sutton, C. 2016. *Samhällsvetenskaplig metod* (1st edition). Studentlitteratur: Lund. Page 271.

⁵² Ibid. Page 204.

the informants participated voluntarily; any potential harm of the research was considered, and; any conflict of interests or partiality was explicitly considered.⁵³

The interview participants got information about the purpose, method, and use of the research both before and during the interview. An inquiry was sent beforehand to enable the participant to think about the decision and determine if they wanted to participate or not. The participants were informed that their participating was voluntarily, could choose the time and place which were convenient for them. The participants were informed about their right to be anonymous, and they choose which personal information could be shared in the study, which will not be used for commercial or other non-scholarly purposes. The interview questions were free and open for the respondent to answer however they wanted, which also mitigated the researcher's voice to influence the answer. The participants have received a copy of the study and been informed about the publication.⁵⁴

⁵³ Silverman, D. 2013. *Doing qualitative research* (4th edition). Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA. Page 162–163.

⁵⁴ Vetenskapsrådet. 2002. *Forskningsetiska principer, inom humanistisk-samhällsvetenskaplig forskning*. (Accessed 2019-08-08 from http://www.gu.se/digitalAssets/1268/1268494_forskningsetiska_principer_2002.pdf)

5. Peace and conflict in Mozambique

5.1 Historical background

The Republic of Mozambique is a coastal south-east African country as large as 799,380km² and with a population of almost 30 million.⁵⁵

Image 1: Country map of Mozambique⁵⁶



Mozambique was under Portuguese colonial rule from the early 1990s and befell as an overseas province of Portugal in 1951. In 1962, various nationalist groups formed Frelimo, and they launched an armed struggle against the colonial regime in 1964. The colonial rule formally ended in 1974 with the signing of the Lusaka Accord, and Mozambique got a Frelimo dominated transitional government. On the 25th of June 1975, Samora Machel became the president of the independent People's Republic of Mozambique.⁵⁷

Since the late 1970s, Renamo has been the main opposition group in Mozambique. Only two years after independence, a new war ignited in Mozambique. ⁵⁸ A dichotomy has existed

⁵⁵ The Commonwealth. *Mozambique*. (Accessed 2019-08-09 from <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/mozambique>)

⁵⁶ World Health Organization. *Mozambique*. (Accessed 2019-08-09 from <https://www.who.int/countries/moz/en/>)

⁵⁷ Rupiya, M. 1998. Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique in *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, Armon, J. et al (eds). London: Conciliation Resources Accord Series. Page 10-12 (Accessed 2019-08-09 from <https://www.c-r.org/accord/mozambique/historical-context%C2%A0war-and-peace-mozambique>)

⁵⁸ Ibid. Page 13.

in describing the 16 years' war (1977-1992) in Mozambique as either a civil war generated by internal factors or an international war caused by external factors. The former view argues that the war was an anti-Communist liberation struggle fought by an oppressed rural population, against an oppressive Marxist Leninist one-party state.⁵⁹ The latter view argues it was an external destabilization war against the Frelimo government, as a part of South Africa apartheid regime's "total strategy" for the region, and because of the worries among conservatives in the West of the communist-inspired government's alternative development model.⁶⁰

The 16 years' war in Mozambique officially ended in October 1992, when Joaquim Chissano (president 1986-2005) and Afonso Dhlakama (leader of Renamo 1979-2016), signed the GPA in Rome, Italy. UNOMOZ and international donors supported the implementation of GPA in 1992-1994. The GPA included demobilization of Renamo's armed forces and the integration of some of its soldiers into a new, unified, national army; reforms of government security forces and reconstruction of the police force; reintegration of the territory under Renamo's control into a unified state administration; and multiparty elections.⁶¹ Moreover, the transformation of Renamo into a political party was supported by a UN Trust Fund.⁶² The general elections in 1994 ended the formal peace process.⁶³

Until 2013, Mozambique was regarded as having completed a successful post-conflict transition.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, in 2013, Dhlakama declared Renamo's withdrawal from the GPA

⁵⁹ Nilsson, A. 1999. *Peace in Our Time*. Padrigu: Göteborg. Page 3.

⁶⁰ Adedokun, A. 2019. Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 26, No.1, Article 4. Page 1; Razakamaharavo, V.T. et al., 2018. Processes of Conflict De-Escalation in Madagascar (1947–1996). *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 54–63. Page 5-6.

⁶¹ Manning, C. & Malbrough, M. 2009. Learning the Right Lesson from Mozambique's Transition to Peace. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 77-91. Page 81.

⁶² Vines, A. 2017. Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo's return to armed conflict since 2013: The politics of reintegration in Mozambique.

In *Warlord democrats in Africa: Ex-military Leaders and Electoral Politics*, Themnér, A. (ed.), 121-154. London: Zed Books. Page 130.

⁶³ Manning, C. & Malbrough, M. 2009. Learning the Right Lesson from Mozambique's Transition to Peace. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 77-91. Page 81.

⁶⁴ Vines, A. 2017. Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo's return to armed conflict since 2013: The politics of reintegration in Mozambique.

In *Warlord democrats in Africa: Ex-military Leaders and Electoral Politics*, Themnér, A. (ed.), 121-154. London: Zed Books. Page 121.

from 1992, and an armed, but confined, conflict resumed.⁶⁵ On 8 March 2012, an armed confrontation erupted outside Renamo's provincial offices in Nampula between the government's riot police, and around 300 former Renamo soldiers as well as Dhlakama's armed guard. In October 2012, Dhlakama left Nampula for Satunjira, Gorongosa, in central Mozambique, close Renamo's former military headquarters. Armed attacks started in April 2013 when the government's riot police raided Renamo's local headquarters in Muxúnguè and Gondola, in Manica province, and made arrests. Renamo reacted by attacking Muxúnguè police station and, later, by repeatedly attacking traffic on the main north-south EN1 road. Tensions increased in October 2013 when the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces occupied the Satunjira base, where Renamo had gathered.⁶⁶ Following months of violence, Renamo and the Frelimo government agreed to a ceasefire in August 2014. On the 5th of September, a second peace agreement was signed between Armando Guebuza (president 2005-2015), and Afonso Dhlakama to end the hostilities.⁶⁷ However, armed violence resumed in 2015.⁶⁸ Filipe Nyusi (president from 2015) and Ossufo Momade (leader of Renamo from 2018) signed a third peace agreement on the 1st of August 2019.⁶⁹

5.2 The peace process

The following five sections analyses why there was a constructive change of the conflict in Mozambique by presenting what factors that the informants believed contributed to the peace process from the 1980s to the General Peace Agreement in 1992, and the decades of peace that followed.

⁶⁵ Dzinesa, G. and Motsamai, D. 2013. *Renamo's War Talk and Mozambique's Peace Prospects*. Policy Brief, No 50. Institute for Security Studies. Page 1; Vines, A. 2017. Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo's return to armed conflict since 2013: The politics of reintegration in Mozambique. In *Warlord democrats in Africa: Ex-military Leaders and Electoral Politics*, Themnér, A. (ed.), 121-154. London: Zed Books. Page 121.

⁶⁶ Vines, A. 2017. Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo's return to armed conflict since 2013: The politics of reintegration in Mozambique. In *Warlord democrats in Africa: Ex-military Leaders and Electoral Politics*, Themnér, A. (ed.), 121-154. London: Zed Books. Page 138.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Page 139-40.

⁶⁸ Ibid. Page 121.

⁶⁹ Hanlon, J. 2019. *Mozambique 463: News Reports & Clippings*, August 7. (Accessed 2019-08-12 from <http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/>)

5.2.1 The context

A simple answer to why the 16 years' war in Mozambique came to an end in 1992, is because *“it was the right time in numerous aspects”*, as one informant said. During the war, there were various regional and international competitions and movements.⁷⁰ For the end of the conflict in Mozambique, it was the end of several competitions, alliances, and regimes that mattered. For example, the end of the Cold War format changed the international context and helped to speed up the peace process in Mozambique.⁷¹ Moreover, the collapse of the so-called Eastern Bloc played a significant role.⁷² The reason for this is because the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries had provided crucial political and military support to the Frelimo government. However, with the internal changes of Frelimo's eastern partners, starting during the mid-80s, the expected support ended. As a result of these changes, the Mozambican government was forced to make a split with socialism and shift to the other side – the West – to survive.⁷³ *“The powerful context made it impossible for Mozambique to remain as a socialist state”*, one informant summarizes.⁷⁴ The West, in turn, had conditionalities attached to its aid, and one of the requirements was to negotiate an end to the war.⁷⁵ The third wave of democratization also spread in Sub-Saharan Africa during this time, and the new trend in the international arena was to democratize the African countries, instead of fighting socialism.⁷⁶

One informant explains why the international community, and donors, are important to Mozambique and why they have such an influence, by saying: *“Mozambique's state budget has always been sponsored by donors, and this creates a weakness towards the donors”*. Mozambique did not have the capital it needed to provide the basic needs for its citizenry,

⁷⁰ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

⁷¹ Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; NGO. Interview 13: 2019-05-17.

⁷² Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

⁷³ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

⁷⁴ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30

⁷⁵ NGO. Interview 10: 2019-05-14; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

⁷⁶ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

to fund education and health services, for example, why *“the government needed the donors”*, and thus *“needed to accept the international community’s requests”*.⁷⁷

As a result of the changed international context and the need for donors, an economic transition of the Mozambican state started in 1984 when Mozambique turned to the IMF and the World Bank, and a political transition started in 1990 with the adoption of a new constitution.⁷⁸ Also in 1984, the South African Apartheid government, and the Mozambican Frelimo government, both of which were getting weaker, agreed to what is called The Nkomati Accord. The agreement stated that the Mozambican will not support the opposition in South Africa, the ANC, and South Africa will not support Renamo anymore.⁷⁹ For one informant, these agreements meant *“the end of the war, because they removed all the arguments of supporting Renamo”*.⁸⁰ Moreover, IMF sponsored a program for Economic Rehabilitation in 1987 which the same informant said was *“a sign that the international system also wanted to end the war and start the reconstruction of the country”*.⁸¹

Moreover, changes within the countries that supported the conflict parties influenced the conflict parties’ capability to continue the war. One informant argued that *“the change within the external actors, which contributed to the politicization of some of the internal social cleavages, influenced the conflict in Mozambique”*. The transition process in South Africa from the Apartheid regime to a new elected government resulted not only in a significant change in the whole Southern Africa, but Renamo lost their logistical support to continue the war as before. This was one factor that speeded up the talks from Renamo’s side.⁸² One informant says that he remembers that following both sides’ loss of supplies and

⁷⁷ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

⁷⁸ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30

⁷⁹ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02; Think-tank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16.

⁸⁰ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² NGO. Interview 13: 2019-05-17.

the military stalemate, *“the fighting after the mid 80’s mostly consisted of bandits from both sides raiding communities, rather than engagement between soldiers”*.⁸³

Neither the international or regional context was in favor of the conflict during the late 80s and the beginning of the 90s. The previous main allies of Frelimo and Renamo, the Soviet Union and the Apartheid regime in South Africa, respectively, had both fallen.⁸⁴ There were also fiscal crises in Zimbabwe and Malawi, which supported the Frelimo government with troops. As one informant summarized: *“the countries which had supported the war, did not support the war anymore”*.⁸⁵ Consequently, *“when the outside supporters no longer had an interest in continuing the war, Mozambicans did not have an interest in continuing the war either”*, one informant explained.⁸⁶ The war had various regional and international dynamics, for instance, *“because of the decisions that Frelimo took to belong to the Eastern Bloc and supporting the movements that were fighting the neighboring regimes”*, as one informant said, and when the regional and international issues were solved it also helped to put an end to the war in Mozambique.⁸⁷

Besides the international and regional context, the environmental context influenced the conflict and the subsequent peace process. In the 80s and 90s, Mozambique was affected by severe environmental disasters.⁸⁸ *“The internal crisis, not least because of the severe drought which paralyzed the economy and the society, significantly affected the decision to conduct the peace talks”*, one informant explained.⁸⁹ The environmental disasters and the associated humanitarian disasters put pressure on the government, which did not have access to help that was needed to face the political, economic and humanitarian crises.⁹⁰

⁸³ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

⁸⁴ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08.

⁸⁵ Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

⁸⁶ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

⁸⁷ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

⁸⁸ Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

⁸⁹ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

⁹⁰ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

The draught also affected Renamo's ability to live off the local population, thus, the environmental disasters were one factor that made both sides to sign the peace agreement.⁹¹

Various actors at the international, regional, national levels were engaged in bringing an end to the war in Mozambique. Religious organizations, the international community, and different countries played a central role during the negotiations process. For example, the Catholic Church and the Italian lay organization Sant'Egidio which had continuous dialogue with Renamo and Frelimo.⁹² The UN especially contributed in the aftermath of the peace agreement in 1992, for example with the reintegration of former guerrillas and the reconstruction of the country, and by supporting Renamo's transition from a rebel movement to a political party.⁹³ Mozambique also received funding to change guns into other means of living.⁹⁴ Moreover, when Renamo claimed that the first multiparty elections in 1994 were not fair, the international community advised Renamo to accept the results.⁹⁵ The international community was not only engaged in bringing an end to the war in Mozambique but also to make the peace last. For example, one informant said: *"there has been violence, here and there, but there has also been dialogue, and intervention of the international community, that is why there was not so much violence before 2013."*⁹⁶ Moreover, Mozambique was given debt relief from the countries that it owned a huge amount of money to, and one informant argued that *"the economic growth was a factor that pacified the situation"*, during the first decades after the peace agreement.⁹⁷

5.2.2 The structure

From 1980, Renamo moved its base from South Rhodesia to South Africa, and military factions in South Africa became the main supporters of Renamo. During that time Renamo

⁹¹ NGO. Interview 13: 2019-05-17.

⁹² Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

⁹³ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08;

⁹⁴ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08.

⁹⁵ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

⁹⁶ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

⁹⁷ Think-tank. Interview 7.

became well-equipped, the war intensified and the Frelimo government was losing space.⁹⁸ Renamo mined the lands to hamper Frelimo to pass to their zones, and by 1898, about two-thirds of the country were under the control of Renamo, whereas Frelimo's soldiers were mostly concentrated to the provincial capitals.⁹⁹ South Africa was supporting Renamo to expand in the country, and eventually, Renamo's attacks reached the capital, Maputo.¹⁰⁰ The increased strength of Renamo made the Frelimo government to start negotiations with South Africa, and as mentioned, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord in 1984, to stop the support to Renamo and ANC.¹⁰¹ The increased escalation of the war was one factor that speeded up the peace process because the parties understood that the war could not end through armed confrontation.¹⁰²

The Frelimo government was facing a debt crisis, at the same time the country experienced environmental and humanitarian disasters.¹⁰³ As mentioned, this made Frelimo turn to the West which resulted in an economic and political transition of the state.¹⁰⁴ *“On the 4th congress in 1984, Frelimo decided that they had to change because the survival of the government was at stake”*, one informant said.

With the changes in South Africa when De Klerk came to power in 1989 which eventually led to the end of the Apartheid regime, and with the changes within the Soviet Union which ultimately resulted in its fall in 1999, the conflict parties lost their main support. The set of actors involved in the conflict thus changed and left both parties without the necessary support to continue the war.¹⁰⁵ There was a military stalemate, and *“both sides were tired of the war, and the war became extremely costly, in financial, social and political terms”*, which was one factor that made both sides to decide to bring an end to the war one informant

⁹⁸ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02; Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

⁹⁹ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹⁰⁰ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30

¹⁰¹ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07; Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

¹⁰² Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

¹⁰³ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08.

explained.¹⁰⁶ In the end, the conflict structure did not benefit either party to continue to fight.

One informant explained that *“the peace process was conducted in an intertwined tension of ending the war at the same time as there was a process of democratization”*, as well as there was a parallel development of economic liberalization.¹⁰⁷ Frelimo made a legal shift when they submitted a bill for constitutional democracy, which was approved in 1990. As a result, Mozambique started a new era of multiparty politics.¹⁰⁸ *“The new democratic constitution was a preparation for the peace agreement and was one condition that allowed for the end of the war”*, one informant argues.¹⁰⁹ The parties thus moved from fighting at the battlefield to operate within political institutions.

5.2.3 The actors

Eventually, there was a willingness from both parties to reach an agreement.¹¹⁰ Various actors counseled the parties to start a dialogue to end the war. The international community has been mentioned earlier, but inside Mozambique, The Christian Church in Mozambique has been put forward as having a central role both as a communication bridge between the parties and later for the reconciliation process.¹¹¹

One reason why the peace processes succeeded was because, according to one informant: *“because of the power of the leadership, the leadership was very, very, very, strong, the former leader of Renamo could say ‘from today we are not attacking anymore’ and all strikes would stop.”*¹¹² The leadership was well respected, and the orders were followed.

¹⁰⁶ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09

¹⁰⁷ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹⁰⁸ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30

¹⁰⁹ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹¹⁰ Political party. Interview 15: 2019-05-23.

¹¹¹ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24; NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10.

¹¹² NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08.

When the peace agreement was signed and the orders came out, not a single shot was fired for about twenty years.¹¹³

The president of Mozambique before, during, and after the peace agreement (from 1986 to 2005), was Joaquim Chissano. Chissano was one of the signatories of the peace agreement and led the transition from war to peace in Mozambique.¹¹⁴ Chissano was a former minister of Foreign Affairs, and he has been described as diplomatic and moderate. The relationship Chissano had with Renamo's leader Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo's leader from 1979 to 2018), was characterized as a diplomatic and relatively easy relation. Chissano used diplomatic tools, and their relationship featured changes of favors and efforts to find political settlements during high-level negotiations – i.e. elite bargaining.¹¹⁵ Chissano also provided Renamo with resources.¹¹⁶ Chissano's approach was "*a demonstration of the commitment to peace*", one informant explained. However, Chissano was criticized for "*being more a diplomat concerned with the peace and the international donors, and less with the party*", one informant said, but Chissano's approach benefitted the peace.¹¹⁷

A reason to why Mozambique managed to sustain the peace for around twenty years, was because Frelimo and Renamo had a willingness to engage in a dialogue, and the leaders found a way to solve issues before they escalated.¹¹⁸ One informant explained this by saying: "*We managed to sustain peace for this long, thanks to two leaders, because they had found a way of solving issues as they arise*", and that "*issues always came up, but President Chissano was able to meet with the leader of Renamo and discuss issues before they became emergencies*".¹¹⁹ The leaders' willing approach to have a continued dialogue, and the persistent elite bargain thus helped to preserve the peace.

¹¹³ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹¹⁴ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹¹⁵ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15; Think-tank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

¹¹⁶ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

¹¹⁷ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30

¹¹⁸ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

¹¹⁹ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

5.2.4 The issues

At the beginning of the war, the issues related to *“ideology embedded in the context of the Cold War and fighting for the control of the state”*, according to one informant. Frelimo aspired to build a socialist state, and Renamo demanded a change of the political system, to have democracy.¹²⁰ During the progressing war, Renamo started to represent various interests, mostly concerning the *“rural people’s grievances of not getting the benefits from the independence”*, one informant explained.¹²¹ A reason for these grievances was because *“Frelimo organized the society against the social dynamics”*, for example, the traditional ways of living and the use of local languages, which turned the traditional chiefs to Renamo’s side.¹²² Frelimo also nationalized the churches, and consequently, the Catholic Church started to support Renamo.¹²³ There were *“grievances around the national project”*, as one informant summarized.¹²⁴ Renamo capitalized on these grievances and made them to political issues.¹²⁵ Renamo became, as one informant explained, *“a coalition of different groups that had been marginalized after independence, and these groups had different claims to make to the state.”*¹²⁶

Frelimo started to change their positions and addressed key issues in the middle of the 1980s, to remove Renamo’s main arguments for the conflict and stop their increasing support.¹²⁷ For example, during the late 1980s, Frelimo invited Pope John Paul II to Mozambique, to reduce the tensions between Frelimo and the Church, and the government started to give back the churches. Frelimo also joined agreements with the West and South Africa, because of the context pushed them to this direction.¹²⁸ Moreover, Frelimo decided to introduce changes in the political system, which resulted in a new constitution in 1990.

¹²⁰ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04; NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹²¹ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹²² NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; Research institution. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

¹²³ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02; Research institution. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

¹²⁴ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹²⁵ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹²⁶ Research institution. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

¹²⁷ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹²⁸ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

This made the negotiation process easier and was one condition that allowed for the end of the war.¹²⁹ One informant explained this by saying: *“the changing of the constitution was a preparation for the peace agreement because it met Renamo’s demands of democracy”*.¹³⁰

One informant said: *“Throughout the war, Frelimo had never accepted Renamo as a political movement. For Frelimo, Renamo was a group of armed bandits, and this language delegitimized Renamo. Renamo, in turn, never accept Frelimo as the legitimate government”*. As a result, the peace negotiations were mainly political about reciprocal recognition, *“on one hand Renamo wanted Frelimo to recognize them as an important political player and not as rebels, and on the other hand, Frelimo wanted Renamo to recognize them as the legitimate government”*, as one informant explained.¹³¹ *“Renamo wanted to have a legitimate, political face”*, another informant said.¹³² Whereas for Frelimo, the issue at stake was to end the war, and *“Frelimo could use the peace process to recover its aura, of the liberator”*, one informant argued.¹³³ When the negotiations started, the parties had to accept that they were partners of the peace process, and in the end, the peace agreement fulfilled these demands; Frelimo acknowledged Renamo as a political party and Renamo acknowledged that Frelimo was the government.¹³⁴

Besides the political issues, the peace negotiations had military issues on the agenda. The subjects that were discussed were about *“how to ensure the military factions and interests in the aftermath of the agreement”*, as one informant explained. For example, Renamo wanted to have their generals included in the army.¹³⁵ A period after the peace agreement was signed, Renamo and Frelimo were almost on equal numbers in the joint army, which was a pacifying factor.¹³⁶ Moreover, because of the mistrust between Frelimo and Renamo,

¹²⁹ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

¹³⁰ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

¹³¹ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹³² Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

¹³³ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹³⁴ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

¹³⁵ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹³⁶ Research institution. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

it was agreed that a group of Renamo's former combats could remain armed to guarantee the leader's security.¹³⁷ In the end, most of Renamo's objectives were achieved during the peace process and the first decades of peace. One argument for the reason for this was, according to one informant, because "*Dhlakama's name was attached to the war, and people took the threats of war seriously*", and the threats were not materialized because "*the demands were accommodated during Chissano's presidency*".¹³⁸

5.2.5 The personal

Internally in Mozambique, the population was exhausted from 16 years of conflict.¹³⁹ One factor that contributed to the peace process was that "*the people wanted to have peace*", one informant argued.¹⁴⁰ Another informant said that the local people also "*saved Mozambique from a new conflict*".¹⁴¹ When the war finally was over, people returned home, and religious organizations and the international community were present to reduce the existing tensions after the war.¹⁴² Although the top level of the two parties had an insulting language, there were no considerable tensions between individuals who had been on different sides at the grassroots level.¹⁴³ "*The reconciliation process among the people in the rural areas was not complicated*", one informant explained, and that "*the people have peace between themselves*".¹⁴⁴ The local people's attitudes towards each other was one factor that helped to preserve the peace.

On the political level, Frelimo and Renamo had difficulties to interact and made accusations of each other. However, eventually, even though the parties still attacked each other verbally, the violent rhetoric declined.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, a new perception of the former rebel

¹³⁷ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

¹³⁸ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

¹³⁹ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹⁴⁰ Political party. Interview 15: 2019-05-23.

¹⁴¹ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹⁴² NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08.

¹⁴³ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹⁴⁴ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹⁴⁵ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

movement started to emerge. In the first multiparty elections in 1994, one informant explained that there were two views of Renamo: *“people seeing them as rebels, which was mainly in urban areas, and people, mostly excluded and rural people, who looked at Renamo as a normal party, which created a new perception of Renamo”*.¹⁴⁶

5.3 The resumed violent conflict

The following five sections analyses why there was a destructive change of the conflict in Mozambique by presenting what factors that the informants believed contributed to the resumed violence, before, during, and after the withdrawal from the General Peace Agreement in 2013, up to 2015.

5.3.1 The context

As mentioned, Mozambique has been regarded as a UN post-conflict success story. One informant argued that the problem of considering Mozambique as a success story *“is what created the violent situation, because the international community took for granted that the success story will continue by itself, without paying attention to small details”*.¹⁴⁷ This indicates that international support to sustain the success was not as intense as before.

Following 2008, when huge amounts of gas and oil were discovered in Mozambique, there has been an increased attention on the country’s resources.¹⁴⁸ In 2012-2013, Mozambique experienced a significant increase in earnings from so-called capital gains, coming from global oil and gas companies operating in Mozambique. The president at that time, Armando Guebuza, had *“the budget support he needed, together with the majority in the parliament, which made him feel powerful”*, and consequently, *“he said ‘I do not need you’ to Renamo, so they started to clash”*, one informant explained. Global companies increased interest in Mozambique, strengthened the Frelimo government’s economy, and in turn its

¹⁴⁶ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

¹⁴⁷ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

¹⁴⁸ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

power.¹⁴⁹ A related factor that has influenced the conflict is the redistribution of Mozambique's natural resources. *"The huge investments coming from global companies creates huge expectations"*, one informant explained, and that *"the natural resources are getting exported from Mozambique, at the same time as the people in the communities are getting promises which are not lived up to"*.¹⁵⁰ Another informant also said that the *"expectations are not fulfilled by the private sector, by the government, or any other organization"*.¹⁵¹ Another informant summarized this by saying: *"The life of the population is still the same, and the conditions are not good, but at the same time, powerful families connected to Frelimo are becoming richer"*.¹⁵² The global influences did not directly produce the conflict, but the escalation of the conflict occurred in a context where people had expectations the discovery of the natural resources at the same time as the inequalities increased.

5.3.2 The structure

After the peace agreement, Frelimo and Renamo operated within the framework which was established in the 1990 constitution.¹⁵³ When Frelimo won the first multiparty elections, and all the elections that have followed, *"the political and economic instruments to exclude the opposition were at their disposal"*, one informant explains, and with *"the ever-growing power of Frelimo's within the state and economy further shrunk the space of other political actors and the civil society, and led to a situation of a political system dominated by one party"*.¹⁵⁴ One informant described Mozambique's as *"a centralized state with a system of the winner-takes-all"*.¹⁵⁵ In which, as another informant said, *"the monopoly of power has been in the hands of Frelimo"*.¹⁵⁶ Since Frelimo has had control over the resources and dominated in the formal institutions, it has reinforced the asymmetry between the ruling

¹⁴⁹ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

¹⁵⁰ NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10.

¹⁵¹ NGO. Interview 13: 2019-05-17.

¹⁵² Think-tank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16.

¹⁵³ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

¹⁵⁴ Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

¹⁵⁵ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

¹⁵⁶ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

party and the opposition.¹⁵⁷ For example, the benefits from the country's resources were redistributed to people who identify themselves with the ruling party, and national companies and organizations discriminated against people based on party affiliation.¹⁵⁸ One informant argued that *"the rules of the game were preparing for another war; the lack of transparency, the continuous political exclusion, and the increase of inequalities"*.¹⁵⁹ Another informant believed that *"the main factor why Mozambique has systematic tensions between Frelimo and Renamo is because Renamo lacks opportunities to get rents"*.¹⁶⁰ According to a third informant, the violence resumed, because *"the peace process did not solve the social, economic and political cleavages, and the political culture did not change"*.¹⁶¹ Altogether, the structure benefitted Frelimo, at the expense of the opposition.

One informant argues that one reason for the resumed violent conflict was because *"Mozambique did not build many formal and informal institutions that could help to prevent, manage and solve conflicts"*.¹⁶² The judicial and the electoral institutions have been biased towards the ruling party, and Renamo does not trust the formal institutions that exist.¹⁶³ One informant argued that *"we depend more on the profile of the president than on the institutions"*, and as a result, there has been a different relationship between Frelimo and Renamo depending on the leader in charge.¹⁶⁴ Another informant said that the discussions on issues *"is reduced to two people, people are stronger than institutions"*.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the periods before, during, and after the elections in Mozambique are described as tense moments. Political actors, foremost Renamo, are not accepting the results of the elections as free and fair, there have been irregularities during the process, and after every election

¹⁵⁷ NGO. Interview 13: 2019-05-17.

¹⁵⁸ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10; NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹⁵⁹ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09

¹⁶⁰ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

¹⁶¹ NGO. Interview 13: 2019-05-17.

¹⁶² Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07

¹⁶³ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07; Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08.

¹⁶⁴ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹⁶⁵ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

there are protests. The elections have predominately been a source of political instability.¹⁶⁶ Around half of the population do not vote, and one informant describe is as “*a democracy where the democratic institutions are not working*”. Moreover, there have been violations of human rights, and impunity has been high.¹⁶⁷ “*At the grassroots level, there have been political violence, gender violence, human rights violence*”, even before the resumed conflict in 2013, one informant said.¹⁶⁸ The deficient function of the formal institution did not help to reduce the tensions, instead they reproduced the inequalities and created new tensions, and as a result, the management of the issues in Mozambique has depended on the leaders of the two main parties.

5.3.3 The actors

The change of Frelimo’s leadership, and consequently their approach to Renamo, is one factor that has been put forward to explain why the violence started again. When Chissano left the office, Armando Guebuza became the new President and leader of Frelimo in 2009, and he had a different attitude towards the peace process and Renamo.¹⁶⁹ “*Guebuza was a former Minister of the Interior, and came from the political commission of Frelimo, and had a more military approach*”, one informant explained.¹⁷⁰ Guebuza felt like Renamo was over-using the soft approach that Chissano had towards Renamo, and was one of the members of Frelimo who had criticized Chissano during his presidency.¹⁷¹ Guebuza said that he will not tolerate the same things that Chissano did, and “*he was trying the hard way*” to make Renamo behave like a political party, one informant told. Chissano used to meet Dhlakama regularly, but when Guebuza came to power, the meetings stopped.¹⁷² One of the reasons was because “*the Frelimo leadership was not cooperative in trying to manage what*

¹⁶⁶ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02; Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10.

¹⁶⁷ Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

¹⁶⁸ NGO. Interview 13: 2019-05-17.

¹⁶⁹ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24; Think-tank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16.

¹⁷⁰ Think-tank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16.

¹⁷¹ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

¹⁷² Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

has been agreed on in 1992, they said that the peace agreement was signed and there is not anything else to discuss".¹⁷³ Whereas Chissano had a high commitment to dialogue, Guebuza had a low commitment.¹⁷⁴ For Guebuza, "*Dhlakama was a bandit and an enemy*", one informant said.¹⁷⁵ The attitude and behavior thus changed during this time, and the elite bargaining which had been a major feature of Mozambican politics disappeared.

A reason for the change of approach from Renamo's side to a violent behavior is believed to be because Renamo was slowly getting discredited and felt ignored.¹⁷⁶ Renamo had lost the elections over and over again.¹⁷⁷ Then, in the 2009 elections, Frelimo got two-thirds of the seats in the parliament.¹⁷⁸ With this, Guebuza was strengthened Frelimo's position and reduced the space and the importance of Dhlakama.¹⁷⁹ One informant explained that during Guebuza's presidency, "*the government cut a lot of mechanisms that were used by Chissano to help and control Renamo, and the resources that were given to Renamo to carry on the political activities*"¹⁸⁰ All this lead to an increased political, social and economic exclusion.¹⁸¹ It has been argued that Renamo did not have any alternatives left to influence the development of the country and to get access to the desired economic and political opportunities.¹⁸² "*The parliament was no longer a place to negotiate*", one informant said, and "*what Renamo had was their guns, it was their only mean to get some*".¹⁸³ "*Renamo did not have any other alternative, why they returned to conflict to press the government to continue with the support mechanisms*", another informant argued.¹⁸⁴ One informant said that Renamo claims that "*the only way to get Frelimo's attention is through threats*".¹⁸⁵

¹⁷³ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹⁷⁴ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15; Think-thank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16.

¹⁷⁵ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹⁷⁶ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02; NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

¹⁷⁷ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

¹⁷⁸ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

¹⁷⁹ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹⁸⁰ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

¹⁸¹ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹⁸² NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15; Research institutions. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

¹⁸³ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

¹⁸⁴ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

¹⁸⁵ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

Another factor that is believed to have harmed the peace is the transformation process inside Renamo. The international community tried to transform Renamo from a rebel movement to a political party in 1992-1994.¹⁸⁶ The mistake of not fully completing the disarmament has had consequences. Dhlakama has been able to have two positions: sometimes he was a politician with high legitimacy within the Mozambican population, but sometimes he leaned more toward the military branch of Renamo. *“During 20 years, there have been two Renamo: a Renamo as a political party, and another Renamo as a military force”*, one informant explained. The political wing took care of the activities in the Parliament, in Maputo, and the military wing had its headquarter in the bush, in Gorongosa.¹⁸⁷ It is argued that *“Renamo did not transform their military DNA, the military DNA still has a powerful influence on Renamo’s attitude”*.¹⁸⁸ However, *“ordinary Mozambicans do not completely disagree with this because they argue that at least there is one actor who plays an important role against Frelimo”*, *“especially poor Mozambicans, for many of them the reasons for their poverty is Frelimo’s policies since independence”*, whereas *“educated, middle class, urban people are criticizing Renamo”*.¹⁸⁹

For quite some time Dhlakama did not materialize his threats of war because Chissano accommodated his demands, but when Guebuza came to power and did not behave the same way as Chissano, *“Dhlakama used the military DNA of Renamo to affirm his power”*.¹⁹⁰ Dhlakama went to the same place that he stayed during the 16 years’ war, a military base in the bush, but according to Renamo, it was for safety reasons, not violence reasons.¹⁹¹ Frelimo eventually built a circle close to where Dhlakama’s basis was localized. *“Threats were used towards each other”*, one informant summarizes.¹⁹² *“Being in the bush was a kind of pressure to the government or to the international government to pressure the*

¹⁸⁶ Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

¹⁸⁷ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

¹⁸⁸ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

¹⁸⁹ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

¹⁹⁰ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

¹⁹¹ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24;

¹⁹² Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

government”, one informant argued.¹⁹³ One informant says that *“it has become a culture; if Renamo does not agree with something, they go back to the bush, and that becomes a way to create dialogue”*.¹⁹⁴ The military threat is perceived as an instrument to extract elite bargains.

Another reason for the political instability is believed to be caused by the internal management of Renamo. Afonso Dhlakama *“controlled the party as a big man”*, one informant said.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, one informant said that the problem is *“the way Renamo manages itself; how they act during democratic processes and the decisions of not participating in the elections”*.¹⁹⁶ For example, Dhlakama decided not to participate in the local elections in 2013, which prevented Renamo members in the local administration to get accommodation.¹⁹⁷ Dhlakama thus hindered the members of the party from full participation in the formal institutions. Dhlakama was Renamo’s candidate for all elections since 1994, and *“there was not much space for the members to air their voice”*, one informant said.¹⁹⁸ Up to 2018, the year when Dhlakama died, *“there was no difference between Renamo and Dhlakama, Dhlakama’s leadership was a one-man-show”*, one informant explained.¹⁹⁹ A reason for the changed approach was because of an intra-party conflict, *“there were expectations from people inside Renamo which were not fully satisfied”*, one informant explained.²⁰⁰ For example, one informant said that: *“Dhlakama made a lot promises to the military personnel who were not demobilized, and most of these promises were unmet”*, and *“after 20 years, these people were tired of Dhlakama postponing their demands, and using them as an instrument of power to pressure the Frelimo government”*. At the same time, some people which did not actively participate in the bush joined Renamo at a later stage and got benefits in a short period of time, for

¹⁹³ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10.

¹⁹⁴ NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10.

¹⁹⁵ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

¹⁹⁶ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

¹⁹⁹ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

²⁰⁰ NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

example getting a seat in the parliament. *“The people in the bush decided to pressurize Dhlakama to advance their cause”* one informant argued.²⁰¹ Moreover, because many people left Renamo, it is argued that *“Frelimo thought that this might be the end of Renamo”* and started to attack the leader of Renamo.²⁰²

5.3.4 The issues

Twenty years after the peace agreement was signed, many of the topics on the political agenda related to the GPA.²⁰³ One informant said that the problem was that *“it was difficult to implement all the compromises that had been made”*.²⁰⁴ Some issues that the parties had agreed on during the peace negotiations were not dealt with properly.²⁰⁵ One informant said that the GPA is a *“troubled document in Mozambique”* because the parties have had two different approaches towards the GPA. Frelimo believes that the peace agreement was implemented in the 2004 constitution.²⁰⁶ Whereas Renamo has claimed the need to enforce what was agreed on in 1992.²⁰⁷

A central issue has been the DDR process. During the transition period 1992-1994, the DDR took place according to the peace agreement. However, *“the DDR was successful in terms of demobilization, but a failure in terms of disarmament and reintegration”*, one informant argued.²⁰⁸ A reason for this was because Renamo and Frelimo have had two different expectations on the DDR process and which order it would follow. Renamo wanted to have the reintegration as the primary task, whereas Frelimo wanted the disarmament to come first. *“The reason for the disagreement was grounded in the distrust they had towards each other, which caused a deadlock”*, one informant said.²⁰⁹

²⁰¹ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

²⁰² NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

²⁰³ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

²⁰⁴ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

²⁰⁵ Think-thank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26.

²⁰⁶ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

²⁰⁷ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

²⁰⁸ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

²⁰⁹ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

The GPA allowed Renamo to remain some of their arms and military personnel, for the security of their leader and because of the mistrust of the police. The postponed integration of these military personnel into the formal, joint, structure, did not happen.²¹⁰ The guerrillas that were not integrated, stayed in the bush and wanted to be integrated into the police, to serve as the security for the leadership of Renamo.²¹¹ To conclude the processes would mean to fully implement the GPA, but “*Frelimo did not want to fully implement the peace agreement, because it would mean to allow the former rebel movement to have a broader participation in governance*”, one informant argued. As a result, Frelimo preferred to overlook that Renamo remained with arms.²¹² Renamo, on the other hand, uses the retained weapons as “*a political instrument; an instrument of bargain, to create pressure*”. Therefore, from Renamo’s side, Dhlakama postponed the completion of the DDR.²¹³

The point was to ultimately have a joint army and police force, consisting of both Renamo and Frelimo members. Only a part of them was integrated into the army and none of the former rebels were integrated into the police, and Renamo have made complaints about this.²¹⁴ One informant said that, within the army, “*there was a dissatisfaction among Renamo soldier, the group that was integrated had no proper long-term integration and could not cope with the formal structure and felt marginalized*”.²¹⁵ Later, during Guebuza’s presidency, most of the Renamo members who were integrated into the army were forced to resign, with the argument that they were too old or did not have the qualifications.²¹⁶ “*This is when the situation worsened*”, one informant explained.²¹⁷ The reform of the army was interpreted as Frelimo was throwing Renamo out.²¹⁸ People from Renamo were

²¹⁰ Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

²¹¹ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

²¹² Think-tank. Interview 10: 2019-05-14.

²¹³ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

²¹⁴ Think-tank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16; Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

²¹⁵ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

²¹⁶ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07; Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

²¹⁷ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24.

²¹⁸ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

gradually removed and the institutions became politicized.²¹⁹ This was one factor that influenced Renamo's decision to use the soldiers who had not been demobilized to launch a struggle, to force the government to change their approach.²²⁰

One informant argues that *“the mistake of not integrating the soldiers, together with the later retirement of those who were integrated, gave Renamo the strength to start the war again”*.²²¹ As a part of this, there was a growing pressure inside Renamo to resume to war, to get better conditions.²²² One informant said that *“after twenty years, people inside Renamo started to ‘ask why did we fight?’”*. Inside the Renamo it was primarily the economic and social demands that were at the forefront in the discussion, to solve the problems of the people in the bush.²²³ In the end, the military faction within Renamo pressurized Dhlakama to change the situation. Eventually, after a period of fighting, this resulted in a negotiation with DDR as one of the topics on the agenda.²²⁴

Moreover, Frelimo and Renamo have had an agreement on election funding, but during Guebuza's presidency, the funding to Renamo reduced.²²⁵ The funding previously made it possible for Renamo to support their social base, and when it was withdrawn, it became one factor that motivated the return to violent conflict.²²⁶ Most of Renamo members felt like they were excluded from economic opportunities.²²⁷ As a result, during the resumed violent conflict, an economic demand, which not existed during the peace negotiations in 1992, emerged.²²⁸

²¹⁹ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

²²⁰ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08.

²²¹ Research institution. Interview 5: 2018-05-02.

²²² Think-tank. Interview 7: 2019-05-07.

²²³ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30; NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

²²⁴ Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30

²²⁵ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

²²⁶ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

²²⁷ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

²²⁸ NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10; Think-tank. Interview 7; Research institution. Interview 4: 2019-04-30.

Another predominant issue is that Renamo has never accepted the election results.²²⁹ During the elections, both reclaim that they won the elections, and after elections, when results show that Frelimo won, Renamo complains about election fraud. *“It is always the same cycle”*, one informant said.²³⁰ Dhlakama has made threats of restarting a war because the elections are not fair, even before the violent conflict resumed.²³¹ Since 1994, there has been an expectation that Renamo will come to power, but they never won the elections, and this brought frustration.²³² Renamo felt like they were put aside from many of the political decisions making processes.²³³ As a result, Renamo came with a new demand of decentralization and power-sharing at the local level, to be able to have the power in the regions where they have high support.²³⁴ One informant said that *“nowadays the parties do not talk about ideology, they are saying ‘it is our time to eat’, and want to get control over the state and get rents”*.²³⁵

5.3.5 The personal

One factor that has influenced the resumed violence is that Frelimo and Renamo did not reconcile and continued to have negative perceptions of each other.²³⁶ Mozambique did not have a reconciliation commission, or similar. *“That is why, from time to time, the problems come again”*, one informant said.²³⁷ One informant explains that there was *“peace without reconciliation”* at the political level. The elite on both sides, which had fought each other for 16 years, continued to fight each other after the peace agreement, although not in terms of armed violence until 2013.²³⁸ Furthermore, at the political level, the distrust between the parties still existed after the peace agreement until the present day.²³⁹ The distrust led to

²²⁹ Research institution. Interview 3: 2019-04-26; Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07; NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08. NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

²³⁰ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

²³¹ Think-tank. Interview 12: 2019-05-16.

²³² NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10.

²³³ NGO. Interview 11: 2019-05-15.

²³⁴ NGO. Interview 8: 2019-05-08; Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07; NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

²³⁵ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

²³⁶ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09; NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

²³⁷ NGO. Interview 1: 2019-04-04.

²³⁸ NGO. Interview 2: 2019-04-09.

²³⁹ Political party. Interview 16: 2019-05-24; Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

negative consequences, for example, that Renamo remained their arms.²⁴⁰ Moreover, one informant argues that *“all the agreements that they made did not have a positive result because the trust was not present”*.²⁴¹ The attitude at the political level towards the other party did not change, instead, it influenced the political atmosphere and the possibility to implement the reached settlements.

5.4 Comparison between the two periods

The following sections present a summary of the five types of transformations and a comparison of the two periods, highlighting the differences and similarities within the constructive and destructive change.

5.4.1 The context

The context radically changed during the peace process. The end of the Cold War, the end of the Apartheid regime and the fall of the Soviet Union, were three vital factors. Global and regional forces that fueled the conflict in Mozambique dissolved and environmental disasters intensified the country's crises and the calls for peace. Altogether, the capability to continue the war changed. Outside actors went from supporting the war to support the peace process. The trends within the international community to promote democratization and economic liberalization influenced the weak government. The outside assistance to DDR, reconstruction, and the transformation of Renamo to a political party facilitated the process. This coincides with some of the factors that previous research highlighted as important, namely: the reduced aid, the draught, and the external intervention and facilitation.

The resumed violence was situated in another context, it was not radically changed, but some processes influenced the parties' positions. The international community regarded Mozambique as a success story and had a more passive attitude towards the conflict

²⁴⁰ NGO. Interview 9: 2019-05-10.

²⁴¹ Research institution. Interview 6: 2018-05-07.

compared to before (similar to the case in Aceh). The discovery of natural resources turned global companies' attention to Mozambique, and the country was doing well in economic terms. However, the economic, and the political, power created tensions. The country's natural resources and the presence of businesses resulted in raised expectations, but the expectations were not met, instead, the inequalities increased. The high expectations were also one factor that previous research underscored as important for the resumed violence.

In the first period, the outside factors helped to solve several issues and the asymmetric relationship became more balanced. In the second period, the outside factors indirectly reinforced the asymmetric relationship, and new issues were produced from the new context. During the peace process, there was a major context transformation, whereas the escalation did not occur together with drastic contextual changes. The only factor which appears in both periods is the international community's presence, which differed during the two periods, from highly active to more passive. A conclusion that can be drawn from these two periods is that outside attention, pressure, and support to the conflict parties matters for the developments in the local context. Moreover, environmental issues also need to be considered. While the environmental disasters were a factor which contributed to the peace, the natural resources were a factor which contributed to the violence.

5.4.2 The structure

The set of actors and the relationship between the parties changed during the de-escalation period. During the middle of the war, Renamo obtained enhanced external support, whereas Frelimo's outside support declined, which made the asymmetric relationship more balanced. Eventually, the support to both parties to continue the war drastically fell, and both parties were struck by major environmental, humanitarian and economic crises, and the conflict did not benefit any of the parties. The military stalemate, the draught and the reduced aid, which previous research has highlighted, were important factors since they altogether pushed the parties to the negotiation table. Mozambique adopted a multiparty

constitution and liberal reforms, which lessened the structural contradictions and changed the playfield in which the actors operated in.

During the escalation period, the conflict parties operated within the framework which was established in the 1900 constitution. The political arena was still dominated by Frelimo as the government and Renamo as the main opposition party. As previous research showed, Frelimo made efforts to sustain its dominant position. The new centralized and the winner-takes-all system created new tensions, which especially became manifest during elections. Frelimo had won all the elections and their power grew continuously, whereas the space of the opposition and civil society shrunk. The asymmetric relationship enlarged when the political system became dominated by Frelimo, which had political and economic instruments at their disposal. The access to opportunities and justice was not equal and the institution became politicized. The deficient formal institutions did not reduce the tensions, instead, they reinforced them, and the management of the issues depended on the leaders of the two parties. Altogether, the structure increasingly benefitted one party (the same as in the Aceh case), at the exclusion of the opposition.

In the first period, the asymmetry of the relationship lessened, while in the second period the asymmetry enhanced. The democratic constitution which was established during the first period created new tensions and the institutions did not solve the emerging issues. A conclusion from these two periods is that the structure has been more eschewed towards Frelimo, and different factors have either moderated or expanded the gap; outside support and crises during the first period, political and economic instruments during the second period. The structural inequalities are central issues of the conflict and have not been fully dealt with, thus the structural transformation was not complete.

5.4.3 The actors

Both parties changed their approach substantially during the de-escalation period. Different external and internal actors advised the parties to engage in dialogue, and eventually, there

was a willingness from both sides to go from enemies to partners in a peace process. The Mozambican churches have been credited for their participation in the peace process, which was one factor that previous research also had underlined. The leadership from both sides played a major role, the leaders changed their attitude and behavior towards each other and gave orders for the rest to follow. The relationship between the two leaders developed into a diplomatic relation featured by comprises and exchange of favors. This coincides with the previous research that has underlined elite bargain as a feature in Mozambican politics and a major factor for sustained peace. The leaders' approach to engage in dialogue and solve issues as they arise contributed to peace.

Hand-in-hand with the escalation of the conflict was the change of the actors' approach, which changed dramatically. The change of leadership within Frelimo subsequently led to a changed approach towards Renamo. Inside Frelimo, an intra-party conflict arose from the previous approach, and consequently they shifted to a more hardline stance (like the case of Aceh). There were significant changes in the behavior and attitude towards Renamo. The established mechanisms to preserve the peaceful situation were cut, most importantly the dialogues and the possibility to extract elite bargains disappeared. Moreover, because Renamo lost the elections repeatedly, and was excluded or did not participate in the formal institutions, and thus could not be used to solve the tensions. Renamo also had an intra-party conflict, generated by unmet promises and Dhlakama's management of the party, which lead to a growing pressure towards the leader to acquire better conditions. Renamo, which previously had made threats in order to get accommodated, did not get the desired attention, and therefore decided to use the military threat as a bargaining tool. This was possible because the disarmament process was not completed, and Renamo still had a military wing.

In both periods, the importance of the leaders is exposed. The relationship between the two parties have depended on the profiles of the leaders. In the first period, the leaders had

cooperative behavior, whereas in the second period it changed to a coercive behavior. However, supporters have also played a role. In the first period, the parties were advised by different actors to engage in dialogue, in the second period, a group of members was pushing for a hardline approach. There was an actor transformation in both periods, towards to opposite directions. Both periods developments depended on the elite bargaining, which previous research also has highlighted, in the former period it was a constant feature of the relationship between the parties and it was used as a mechanism to preserve the peace, in the latter period the mechanisms were cut and it caused frustration. The formal institutions appear not to have been an effective tool for conflict management, therefore, when the second track– informal elite bargaining – did not function anymore, the tension escalated, since there were no mechanisms to prevent the escalation. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that the existence, function, and the use of mechanisms for conflict management are one important factor for the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict.

5.4.4 The issues

During the peace talks, the parties changed their positions and reached compromises, which made it possible to sign the GPA. Frelimo started to address key issues even before the peace negotiations, to remove the Renamo's key arguments and to stop their support, which eased the process. Renamo had gained public support from different groups, and the context pushed Frelimo to split from socialism, which made Frelimo to change its positions: Frelimo joined agreements with the West and South Africa, started a dialogue with the churches, and adopted a new constitution. The issues on the agenda during the negotiations mainly concerned reciprocal recognition and military issues and the parties reached a settlement about these issues in GPA. Whereas the integration into the join army progressed, the total disarmament of the former soldiers was postponed. As previous research mentioned, Frelimo sustained its dominant position, at the same time as Renamo got accommodated through elite bargaining.

The parties' positions on key issues conflicted during the escalation period. When the conflict resumed, most issues on the political agenda related to the GPA. The parties had different approaches to and expectations of the agreement. The DDR reached a deadlock caused by the distrust between the parties. As previous research has stated, the DDR was not a long-term process and the total disarmament was neglected. Renamo remained with arms to use the military threat as a bargaining tool, and Frelimo avoided the full participation of Renamo in governance to sustain its dominant position. The reform of the army which removed Renamo soldiers and the reduced funding to Renamo worsened the situation. Due to the lack of economic and political opportunities, members within Renamo were pushing for better conditions. Renamo's unmet expectations of winning the elections further created frustration and created new demands on de-centralization. Frelimo's previously accommodative approach changed, consequently, Renamo reformulated their positions. None of the tracks of conflict management were used to solve the issues, which eventually led to a violent conflict.

The two periods diverge to which extent the parties were willing to reformulate their positions on key issues to reach compromises. During both periods, Frelimo has made effort to sustain its dominant position, and Renamo has taken actions to obtain economic and political benefits. The settlements which were made during the first period created new issues which were manifested during the second period. Since the peace process did not include a component of political inclusion and because of issues surrounding the functioning of institutions, elite bargaining has been used as an alternative to formal power-sharing. However, when sustained elite bargaining ended during the second period, which previous research has highlighted as a factor that supported the peace, the informal mechanism to solve tension disappeared. The neglect of the total disarmament, which previous research also has stated to be an important factor, made it possible for Renamo to use military threats to push Frelimo to change their positions. In the end, there was no complete transformation of the conflicting issues. The common factor which have either

mitigated or exacerbated the tensions is whether the mechanisms for conflict management – the formal institutions or the informal elite bargaining – could be used to solve the old and emerging issues. Another conclusion to be drawn is that even if there are political settlements, the issues do not necessarily have to disappear – comprises lead to difficulty in implementation and agreements may not involve or solve all the conflicting issues.

5.4.5 The personal

The attitude among the general population towards the opposite side changed quickly at the end of the war. The population was exhausted from the war and there was a strong willingness to make and preserve peace. When the war ended, religious organizations and the international community helped to reduce any existing tensions. The individuals at the local level had peaceful attitudes and behavior and reconciled. Moreover, Renamo got public support which helped to change the negative perceptions of the former rebel group. At the political level, the violent rhetoric declined, which showed a change in attitude. However, there was no dramatic transformation to peaceful attitudes at the political level.

Even before the resumed violence, the political level continued to fight each other, although not with weapons. There had been peace without reconciliation, and the negative attitudes and perceptions towards the other side still existed (same as in the case of Aceh). This coincides with previous research which stated that there was a poor elite integration. The distrust was present, and consequently, Renamo remained with arms and the agreements that were signed were not fully implemented.

These two sections demonstrate a clear divergence between the political and the local level: The local level had reconciled, while the political level had not; the local level changed their perceptions and had an acceptance to the other party, whereas the political level still had negative attitudes and perceptions towards each other. A conclusion to draw from this is that the conflicting attitudes did not transform at the political level and that the lack of trust is at the core of the conflicting relationship.

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to get a better understanding of the conflict transformation in Mozambique. The theoretical framework of five types of transformations – context, structure, actor, issue and personal – was useful to help to understand the constructive and destructive change of the conflict in Mozambique. Some of the transformations were more substantial than others, but altogether the combination of and interaction between the factors formed the conflict transformation in Mozambique.

The conflict in Mozambique transformed constructively in the period surrounding the signing of the GPA because: (1) The international and regional context which had fueled the continuation of war changed and were no longer in favor of the conflict. (2) The environmental disasters intensified the humanitarian and economic crises. (3) The external support balanced the asymmetric relationship between the parties. (4) External support and religious organizations facilitated the peace process and the post-conflict situation. (5) The leaders' orders were respected within the parties. (6) The reforms of the state lessened the structural contradictions. (7) The leader had a willingness to engage in dialogue and solve issues as they arise, the leaders' relationship featured reformulations of positions, compromises, and exchange of favors. (8) The people at the local level reconciled and had peaceful attitudes and behavior towards each other. (9) The violent rhetoric between the parties declined.

The conflict in Mozambique transformed destructively in the period surrounding the withdrawal from the GPA because: (1) The parties had different expectations of the GPA and their positions on key issues conflicted. (2) The DDR was neither a long-term process or a completed process. (3) The parties had negative attitudes and perceptions of each other, and the distrust was high. (4) The peace process did not include a component of political inclusion, as a result, there was a poor elite integration. (5) The international community had a more passive attitude towards the conflict, compared to their previous engagement.

(6) The discovery of natural resources raised the expectations among the population, which were not met. (7) The general lack of economic and political opportunities. (8) The formal institutions did not solve the tensions. (9) The change of leadership led to a changed approach towards each other. (10) The intra-party conflicts influenced the parties' decisions. (11) The established informal mechanism for conflict management– elite bargaining – was cut.

The differences within the two periods were the following: (1) During the peace process, there was a major context transformation in favor of the peace, whereas the escalation did not occur together with drastic contextual changes, neither in the positive or negative direction. (2) The international community attitude went from highly active in the first period to more passive in the second period. (3) The context and external actors had helped to solve key issues and lessen the asymmetric relationship, later, external factors indirectly reinforced the asymmetric relationship. (4) The democratic constitution which was established during the first period to solve the contradictions created new tensions and the institutions did not solve the emerging issues during the second period. (5) In the first period, the leaders had cooperative behavior, whereas in the second period it changed to a coercive behavior. (6) During the peace process, the parties were advised by different actors to engage in dialogue, but during the escalation, the internal dynamics worked against peace, with members pushing for a hardline approach. (7) The two periods diverge to which extent the parties were willing to reformulate their positions on key issues to reach compromises. (8) The settlements which were made during the first period to mitigate the tensions created new issues which were manifested during the second period. (9) In the former period, elite bargaining was a constant feature of the relationship between the parties and it was used as a mechanism to preserve the peace, in the latter period the high-level negotiations stopped.

The similarities within the two periods were the following: (1) In both periods the outside attention, pressure, and support to the conflict parties mattered for the developments at the

local context. (2) Different environmental issues affected the conflict, while the environmental disasters were a factor which contributed to the peace, the natural resources were a factor which contributed to the violence. (3) A central issue during both periods is the asymmetric relationship, whereas the asymmetry lessened during the period, it enhanced during the second period. The structure has always been more eschewed towards Frelimo, and different factors have either moderated or expanded the gap. (4) The structural inequalities have been central issues of the conflict, and have not been fully dealt with. (5) The relationship between the two parties have depended on the profiles of the leaders. (6) The external and internal support have had both a negative and positive impact on the actors' approach. (7) There is a divergence in the attitude between the political level and the local level. (8) During both periods, Frelimo has made efforts to sustain its dominant position, and Renamo has taken actions to obtain economic and political benefits. (9) A common factor which have either mitigated or exacerbated the tensions is whether the mechanisms for conflict management – the formal institutions or the informal elite bargaining – could be used to solve issues.

One conclusion from both periods is that since the formal institutions appear not to have been an effective tool for conflict management, informal elite bargaining has been the mechanism used to reduce tension. As a result, when the elite bargaining stopped, there were no alternative mechanisms to prevent the escalation. Another conclusion to be drawn is that even if there are political settlements, the issues do not necessarily have to disappear – comprises lead to difficulty in implementation and agreements may not involve or solve all the conflicting issues. A third conclusion from this study is that the development of the country has depended on two leaders, the president and the leader from the main opposition party, to a very high extent. On the one hand, the high-level negotiations between the two leaders have sometimes mitigated the tensions, but on the other hand, this leaves the rest of the population without influence. Moreover, the elite bargains appear to have dealt with emerging issues and short-term solutions, instead of the structural and long-term solutions.

Finally, conflict transformation is a process including several changes, and the conflict in Mozambique has indeed changed in multiple ways. However, the process of going beyond reframing positions and to transform the relationship, the conflicting interests, and the distrustful attitudes, is yet to be completed. Reconciliation, cooperation, building trust and a broader inclusion in governance, appear to be a few stepping stones towards that end.

Further research may employ Hugh Miall's framework in other cases, and examine the similarities and differences with the case of Mozambique, to be able to generalize the findings. Further research may also explore more closely how other actors within the Mozambican society influence the conflict, for example, civil society, businesses, or other political parties. Moreover, further research may contribute to a more detailed understanding of the conflict transformation at the local level.

“Peace is something that has to be nourished, nourished all the time. You don't just sit back and relax and say that peace will come on its own.”²⁴²

²⁴² NGO. Interview 14: 2019-05-21.

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Appendix 1: Topic guide

The 16 years' war

- Background information about the conflict

The peace process; the de-escalation

- Events, processes and factors influencing the process
- Context
- Actors
- Issues
- Thoughts on the peace agreement
- A successful story of a constructive conflict transformation?

The violent conflict; the escalation

- Events, processes and factors influencing the process
- Context
- Actors
- Issues
- Effects of the resumed violence
- What is needed for a constructive transformation of the conflict?