The European Union has become an important arena for international politics. Many social movement actors desire a presence in Brussels, in order to push for their interests. To do so, however, they need to adapt to the European Union multi-level governance system by speaking with one voice. As this thesis demonstrates, at the national level this adaptation may entail a number of organizational challenges for movements.

The thesis studies national-level social movements adapting to international structures. Taking the cases of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements and their relation to the European Union as examples, the analysis follows two processes of forming and maintaining nationwide meta-organizations – that is, organizations of organizations – that can speak for the two respective movements. The study explores the challenges involved when a new layer of organization is added to a social movement.

The results show that organizing the voice of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements has been particularly challenging when conditions such as a tradition of umbrella organizing and stable financial resources are absent at the national level. The results also show that competition and conflicts are apparent in both cases and inherent in meta-organizations, and that they have been possible to deal with differently depending on the two movements’ national settings. A wider implication of the study is that issues such as these are to be expected whenever the internationalization of national movement activities takes the form of meta-organization.

Eva Karlberg is a sociologist at Södertörn University. This study is her doctoral thesis, written within the research area of Politics, Economy and the Organization of Society (PESO) and the Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS).

Sociology, Politics, Economy and the Organisation of Society, School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University.

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Organizing the Voice of Women
A study of the Polish and Swedish women’s movements’ adaptation to international structures
Eva Karlberg

Södertörns högskola
Subject: Sociology
Research Area: Politics, Economy and the Organisation of Society
School: School of Social Sciences

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Abstract
The European Union has become an important arena for international politics. Various actors try to influence the European-level executive and legislative authorities. Lobbyists in Brussels are not the only type of actors promoting the interests of others. Today, national-level social movement actors too are present at the European level, pushing the interests of various citizen groups and social issues. To do so, however, they need to adapt to the European Union’s multilevel governance system by speaking with one voice. As this thesis demonstrates, at the national level this adaptation may entail a number of organizational challenges for movements.

Organizing the Voice of Women regards national-level social movements adapting to international structures. Taking the cases of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements and their relation to the European Union as examples, the analysis follows two separate, yet similar, processes of forming and maintaining nationwide meta-organizations – that is, organizations of organizations – that can speak for the two respective movements. Through the cases of the two women’s movements’ adaptation to international structures, the study explores the challenges involved when a new layer of organization is added to a social movement.

The results show that organizing the voice of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements has been particularly challenging when conditions such as a tradition of umbrella organizing and stable financial resources are absent at national level. The results also show that competition and conflicts are apparent in both cases and inherent in meta-organizations, and that they have been possible to deal with differently depending on the two movements’ national settings.

With an organizational perspective on social movement coalitions, this study contributes to the classic question of institutionalization, formalization and bureaucratization of social movements. It ultimately asks what it means to organize a field of social movement actors and what happens at the junction of organization and social movement, at the intersection of national and international interests. A wider implication of the study is that the issues it highlights are to be expected whenever the internationalization of national movement activities takes the form of meta-organization.

Keywords: Organizing, Social Movements, Meta-Organization, Social Movement Coalitions, Decided Order, Resource Mobilization, the Women’s Movement, Interest Representation.
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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPK</td>
<td>Centrum Praw Kobiet (Women’s Rights Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUK</td>
<td>Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet (Democratic Women’s Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWL</td>
<td>European Women’s Lobby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Meta-Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWW</td>
<td>Network of East-West Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OŚKa</td>
<td>Ośrodek Informacji Środowisk Kobiecych (the Information Centre for Women’s Communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWL</td>
<td>Polish Women’s Lobby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>Social Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWL</td>
<td>Swedish Women’s Lobby</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Part I
On a rainy day in March 2016, I joined the crowd of umbrellas that had gathered in front of Warsaw’s landmark Palace of Culture & Science. It was the yearly “Manifa” – a women’s march which was taking place for the 17th time and organized by the Women’s 8th of March Alliance (PK8M). From the Palace, we marched along Świętokrzyska street, past the metro station Nowy Świat-Uniwersytet and turned left onto Krakowskie Przedmieście street with its restaurants, cafés and tourist shops, to finally arrive at Sigismund’s Column in the Old Town. During this march, we demonstrated for women’s rights under the slogan “Abortion – in Defense of Life!”. With one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe, the Polish women’s movement was once again mobilized around the issue of sexual and reproductive rights.

Later that spring, in April, I attended a couple of demonstrations in front of the Sejm, the Polish lower house of Parliament. The Law and Justice (PiS) government had backed a call from the Catholic Church, and the initiative from an NGO, Ordo Iuris, to introduce a full ban on abortion (Grzebalska & Petö 2018). This time we brought coat hangers – as a symbol for all the illegal and dangerous abortions women will have to go through if this proposed ban is implemented – and hung them in the trees in front of the Parliament building.

A few months later, in October, I was back in Warsaw and participated in a demonstration in front of the Sejm again. This time, everyone was dressed in black, due to the initiative and hashtag #czarnyprotest (#blackprotest), to show that they mourn women’s loss of their right to their own bodies. Agnieszka Dziemianowicz-Bąk from the newly founded Razem party and important women’s rights figures such as Wanda Nowicka from the Federation for Women and Family Planning were among the initiators. Inspired by a 1975 women’s strike in Iceland, there was a nationwide strike on the following Monday, called Black Monday, which interrupted traffic in central Warsaw and people filled the Old Town for hours with their black
umbrellas. Tens of thousands of women (and men) around the country went on strike. Three days later, the PiS government rejected the bill as a result of the protests.

On the 5th of March 2017, a year after my first visit, I walked with approximately 4000 people through central Warsaw in a march for women’s rights once again. 2017’s “Manifa” had the slogan “Against authoritarian abuse” and continued a few days later when I stood with thousands of protesters at the Constitution Square on the 8th of March. The whole day was filled with events such as Freedom Disco, an International Women’s Day march, music, speeches and the mass protest. The atmosphere was filled with anger and frustration over the PiS government’s continued threats to make the already limited abortion rights even stricter.

As I was leaving, a Polish friend of mine asked whether my view of Poland is only based on protests. It strikes me that almost all my visits to Poland so far have been filled with various protests and that, yes, my view is probably very biased here. During fieldwork in Sweden, I have not attended protests or demonstrations. Not that Swedish women do not take to the streets – there are of course 8th of March demonstrations, and there have been several important events recently, such as #metoo manifestations and marches against maternal mortality and for women’s rights to good maternity care – but it has not been necessary to attend these in order to come in contact with informants for the purpose of this study.1 For, in reality, the protests are exceptional and sometimes spontaneous and ad hoc events which are spurred by sudden threats. The “Manifas” and the International Women’s Day marches are of course central events for the women’s movement. However, most of the time women do not protest in the streets or go on strike. Instead, on an everyday basis, women’s movement actors perform less sensational, sometimes mundane, yet equally important activities (cf. Freeman 1978). Many of these activities are performed inside organizations, and organization makes up a large part of the movement, creating structures for its various voices and actions.

At the Crossroads of Organization and Social Movement

Organizations and organizing are essential for social movements (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Zald & McCarthy 1979). It is via social movement organizations that a lot of mobilization can take place, and people use the

1 See chapter 3, for a discussion on fieldwork and differences in Poland and Sweden regarding data generation.
1. INTRODUCTION

The structure of organizations to accomplish things together. Via organization, people can for instance join forces and speak with one voice – which is necessary when talking to the world outside of the movement, for instance when trying to influence policy makers. Yet, organization is a classic problem in social movements. As noted for instance by Michels (1983), large-scale membership organizations tend to become oligarchical, and organizations can be stiff and inflexible in their rule-following logics. As such, organization can challenge the notion of what a movement is and may threaten the spontaneous, inclusive, voluntary and liquid character of movements. Yet, both social movement and organization are forms of collective action. Sometimes a social movement can be equated with one specific organization, while an organization may claim that it is a movement. It can be difficult to distinguish what is movement and what is organization in social movements. Social movements are so much more than the collection of their social movement organizations, yet at the same time organizing is a crucial factor in social movements.

In this thesis, I approach the issue of organization in social movements by studying two cases of organizing the voice of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movement in relation to the European Union (EU). As we will see, there is a constant tension between organizational aspects and social movement aspects when “the voice of women” at national level is organized in order to be represented at the international level. In this thesis, the aim is to explore this junction of organization and social movement, and what it means for a social movement to become more organized. It starts at European (international) level but essentially deals with inter-organizational relations at national level, looking at the tensions that arise within the fields of Polish and Swedish women’s organizations. As such, the two cases are examples of both the classic question of the role of organization within movements, and how movements adapt to the international level.

Social Movements at International Level

Organizations such as Attac, Occupy Wall Street, Extinction Rebellion and Real Democracy NOW! are important actors criticizing economic globalization within the global justice movement; and events such as Social Forums, protests at the start of the millennium in for instance Washington and Gothenburg, and the recent School Strike for Climate and Fridays for Future, are expressions of social movements relating to the global or transnational level.
Social movements have, traditionally, put pressure on the nation state and its various authorities. However, with the increased relevance of other powerful actors and relations beyond the national border, social movements are more and more inclined to direct their actions outside the nation state (Teune 2010; Marks & McAdam 1996). Globalization, internationalization, transnational governance and free trade – all are processes and social phenomena which impact our daily lives and have consequences for issues which social movements aim to approach, such as human rights, peace and environmental rights. There is a power shift when international and regional actors such as the EU, the UN, the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF increasingly gain significance and influence in the world (della Porta & Tarrow 2005:2). When the nation state has lost some of its authority to various actors at supranational level, social movements are affected by and want to exert influence beyond the national level.

Della Porta and Caiani (2009:8f; 2013:1) point out that social movement actors, compared to political parties and unions, tend to be less rooted in the nation state. This tendency, in combination with the fact that with a reduced cost in new channels for communication (via the Internet), means that the incentive to organize transnationally is relatively strong for social movement actors. Regarding the European level, the incentive for social movement actors to focus more on EU politics increases when the relevance of EU institutions grows (Tarrow 1995; della Porta & Caiani 2009; 2013). Today, public policy is no longer only a product of the nation state but can, in many cases, be the result of decisions taken at several levels within EU institutions. In this multilevel system of governance, it is crucial for collective actors to be able to mobilize at various levels simultaneously (della Porta & Caiani 2009:8ff).

The European level not only entails a need to be active at the international level, but provides social movement actors with an additional channel of access to power holders. Particularly those social movement actors which may be weak in their national context can gain leverage via the EU (della Porta & Caiani 2009:12). Social movement actors’ ability to organize at the European level and to be active in EU politics depends however on their access to resources – both material and symbolic (della Porta & Caiani 2009:8). To organize transnationally can be difficult, and the question is whether social movements are capable of adapting to the multilevel governance system, and – if they adopt – how. Studying the Europeanization process “from below”, della Porta and Caiani (2009:13) argue that if Europeanization entails more layers of decision-making, social movements are expec-
1. INTRODUCTION

ted to adapt to multilevel governance by forming networks and collective action at all levels.2

How do social movement actors act in the context of Europeanization, and what interest does the EU, as a polity, have in shaping social movements? In the next section, the relation between the EU and social movements will be discussed.

The EU and Civil Society Organizations

This thesis is about organization in social movements. Yet, the term social movement is for the most part replaced by the term civil society in the following section on the EU. There are two reasons for this. First, “civil society” is EU language: in EU documents, civil society is considered the voice of the citizens, and the involvement of civil society organizations in governance is considered a remedy to the EU’s democratic deficit (see discussion below). Regarding the collective action of the EU’s citizens, civil society, rather than social movements, is in focus. Second, in general terms, social movement is but one sub-category within the broader concept of civil society. According to Diamond (1994:5), for instance, civil society is “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules”. Diamond (1995:6) adds that civil society is “concerned with public rather than private ends” and that it “relates to the state in some way but does not aim to win formal power or office in the state”. Civil society is the civic self-organized sphere which exists in between the private and public sector. Within this sphere, there are a vast array of actors that are, among other things, cultural, religious, communal, educational, interest-based, issue-oriented and civic (Diamond 1994:6). Some of these issues, actors and organizations are part of social movements.3 To make a

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2 Europeanization commonly refers to the process of European integration and the impact of the EU on nation states (Radaelli 2003). Generally, Europeanization literature focuses on the effect of EU policy on state policies and how member states deal with its implementation (Graziano & Vink 2007). However, Europeanization has also come to be studied from a civil society and social movement perspective, as provided here by della Porta and Caiani (2009:25) who define Europeanization from below as happening “of and by civil society”.

3 In the section on the EU, the term “civil society organization” (CSO) will also be used even though in the rest of the thesis I mainly refer to “social movement organizations” (SMO). As part of the main explanation here, I argue that SMOs are a sub-category of CSOs and, for the purpose of aligning with EU language, the term “CSO” is temporarily used here. As part of resource mobilization theory, however, the term SMO has more of an analytical purpose than the term CSO. It is also common, both among European-
conceptual distinction, social movement actors and organizations are more contentious and grassroots-based than the overall civil society actors and organizations, which can operate via more conventional political channels (della Porta & Caiani 2009:25f). In practice however, social movements tend to overlap with the overall civil society sector, and it can be difficult to distinguish if a civil society organization is a social movement organization or not. In chapter 2, a more elaborate definition of social movements is presented – a definition which is meant to function as a conceptual tool in relation to the definition of organization in this thesis. For now however, it is enough to point out that social movements are commonly understood as the more contentious part of civil society.

What interest does the EU have in shaping civil society at national level? In the following, I present how the EU wants to simplify its environment and make it more predictable by shaping European civil society organizations as representative actors.

The EU is no longer the inter-state association it used to be but has grown into a complex supranational political entity. The EU has not only grown in membership, from the six European states which formed the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to the 28 member states of today, but also in terms of expanded numbers of policy areas and authority covering most issues in EU citizens’ lives. Many decisions taken at EU-level regard social issues and have relevance for the welfare state. As such, there is a “social dimension” of the EU (cf. Tomšič & Rek 2008; Johansson & Hvinden 2011). When European integration leads to more decisions being taken at the international level, issues of democracy and governance at international level become more crucial (Warleigh 2001). Not only is the increased capacity of the EU frequently criticized by its citizens but Europeans also show resistance and mistrust towards the supranational polity as a whole – a “Eurosceptism” is growing (EC 2017b). “Brexit” is only one, though extreme, expression of this kind. Already in 2001, the European Commission stated in its *White Paper on European Governance*, that: “people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not in-
interested in them” and continued “The Union is often seen as remote and at the same time too intrusive” (EC 2001:3). As a remedy, the Commission argued that European governance has to be reformed, and thus promoted “greater openness, accountability and responsibility for all those involved” in policy-making processes (EC 2001:3).

One important suggestion in the White Paper concerned the role of civil society “in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people’s needs” (EC 2001:14). In order to include civil society, the Commission wanted to increase and improve consultation – especially online consultation – but also public hearings in the European Parliament (EC 2001:15f). The Commission placed much hope in the inclusion of civil society organizations in the policy-making processes to enhance EU democracy. Similarly, the Commission argued in a discussion paper that NGOs as cooperation partners should be encouraged because NGOs: (a) provide citizens with additional ways to participate in EU democracy, (b) contribute “to the formation of a ‘European public opinion’”, and (c) promote European integration (EC 2000:5). Lang (2013:164) argues for instance that “[b]ecause transnational governance arenas lack an identifiable demos and thus traditional modes of legitimacy, NGOs and their networks have advanced to become stand-ins for citizen voice in international negotiations”.

However, it was emphasized by the Commission that with participation in policy-processes comes great responsibility. In the White Paper, the Commission urged civil society organizations to “tighten up their internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativity, and prove their capacity to relay information or lead debates in the Member States” (EC 2001:17); and in the discussion paper, organizations at national level were encouraged to “work together to achieve common goals” and to join “European networks” (EC 2000:5). The Commission argued that via “common associations and networks at the European level” the consultation process would be facilitated but that participating organizations “need to ensure that their structures are representative, in particular regarding their roots in the different Member States of the European Union” (EC 2000:9). As such, the Commission wanted civil society organizations to be of a cer-

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5 In the Eurobarometer 2015, the Commission reported that “distrust has dropped below 50% for the first time since spring 2011” (EC 2015). Yet, as shown in the report “Reaching out to EU Citizens”, written by Juncker’s advisor, Eurosceptism endures and is still an issue for the EU (EC 2017b).

6 Such as trade unions and employers’ organizations, NGOs, charities and grass-roots organizations (see EC 2001:14).
tain kind. Only civil society organizations with a particular democratic and representative structure and capacity to be active at the EU-level in the policy process could be seen by the Commission as bridges between the citizens of the EU and its “institutions”. Essentially, the Commission wanted civic actors to be aggregated in professionalized NGOs, and sorted according to their expertise in specific social policy areas (cf. Lang 2013:168).

The White Paper generated intensified scholarly debate, which is still ongoing, as the ambition of the Commission has led many scholars to discuss the EU’s creation of a European civil society (Trenz 2009; Rumford 2003); to question whether NGOs (and other forms of civil society organizations) actually can function as the bridge between Europe and its citizens (Warleigh 2001; Johansson & Lee 2014; Kröger 2013), and to discuss the various effects of Europeanization of civil society (Sánchez-Salgado 2014; Imig & Tarrow 2001; Marks & McAdam 1999). As pointed out by Trenz (2009:35), there is “a dichotomy between participation as the realm of civil society and representation as the realm of national governments and parliaments” which makes EU governance and the ambition to include civil society problematic. What the EU “wants” is for civil society organizations to be representative; however, representativity is normally territorially defined – that is, based on citizenship which is obligatory, and connected to the nation state – whereas civil society is constituted on the basis of voluntary membership and participation. A European civil society would then mean that civil society actors play a double role: as both “participants in EU-governance and as representatives of their own – frequently undefined – constituents” (Trenz 2009:38).

So, how representative are and can civil society organizations be? Warleigh (2001) for instance, argues that, given the focus on expertise and professionalism of many NGOs, they suffer from a lack of internal democracy and fail to include their grassroots in their lobbying work, which makes them unsuitable to function as “catalysts for democracy” and as the link between EU institutions and citizens. Johansson and Lee (2014), in their study of EU-focused civil society organizations at European level, conclude that these organizations adopt a traditional formalistic type of representation, typical for electoral representative actors, by relying on formal structures in which accountability and control of membership is emphasized. However, as these Brussels-based civil society organizations’ memberships are based on different types of organizational forms and geographical bases, and because it is sometimes unclear whether an organization “works for” or
represents a group/interest, it is difficult to define whom they represent (Johansson & Lee 2014:421).

For some civil society actors, the EU can be an arena in which it is important to be present and exert influence on policy makers. There are various ways and opportunities for civil society organizations to influence the EU. First, in cases where civil society actors see their national government as influential, the government can be used to influence EU policy; second, Brussels-based organizations can be used to participate at the EU level; and third, there are opportunities to influence policy in the context of multi-level governance via participation at EU level (cf. Ruzza & Bozzini 2008). This last one is sometimes referred to as the “boomerang effect” (cf. Keck & Sikkink 1998): when transnational advocacy networks are used to “hit back” on national policy makers. The “boomerang effect” was, for instance, used among women’s rights organizations during the accession period in Central and Eastern European member states (Roth 2007; Sudbery 2010). Leverage in gender equality issues was for a while gained when the accession states were eager to fulfil the EU _acquis communautaire_ (Císař & Vráblíková 2010; Roth, 2007:477).

Regarding civil society organizations’ actual participation in EU governance, Sánchez-Salgado (2014) shows through her extensive research on the topic that there is a gap between domestic civil society organizations and Brussels-based civil society organizations. Few civil society organizations participate in EU lobbying and advocacy activities as “only a limited number of national civil society organizations appear to have established regular and direct connections with European institutions” (Sánchez-Salgado 2014:58). When looking at social movements, Imig and Tarrow (2001) and della Porta and Caiani (2009), found that national-level social movement organizations instead tend to only target the EU indirectly through the nation state. Social movements’ abilities, action repertoire and various organizational characteristics depend on political opportunity structures (Kriesi et al 1992:239; McAdam 1996:24). For national-level civil society organizations, research shows the importance of domestic political opportunity structures and civil society organizations’ organizational characteristics for the effects of Europeanization. For instance, a corporatist and decentralized state tends to give civil society organizations little incentive to turn to the EU (Klüver 2010), whereas there can be a misfit between the domestic conception of civil society participation and that of the EU (Saurugger 2007; Sánchez-Salgado 2014:95).
Instead, it is what Sánchez-Salgado refers to as “EU-level peak associations”, registered under Belgian law, which are the most active and which are the most consulted by EU institutions (Sánchez-Salgado 2014:58f). In Brussels there are EU-level peak associations for most groups, interests and issues, such as: European Disability Forum, European Network Against Racism, European Youth Forum, European Roma Information Office, Green 10 (for environmental organizations) and so on. For the women’s movement, there is the European Women’s Lobby (EWL). These associations are normally European-wide civil society organizations that gather national civil society organizations in the member states and thus claim to represent citizens across Europe. Sánchez-Salgado argues that the gap between the EU-level and national-level civil society organizations’ participation in EU governance is partly due to national civil society organizations’ lack of time and resources. An office in Brussels is indispensable when trying to keep up with everything that is going on at EU level, but also to be able to submit contributions in time for the narrow time slots given in EU consultations, and to be able to, literally, lobby – that is, to spend time in EU institutions corridors and lobbies in order to establish informal contacts and keep up with the latest news (Sánchez-Salgado 2014:57ff). In short, it is essential to be present where the action is taking place. For some domestic civil society organizations, participation in “EU-level peak associations” can be essential when lacking the means to participate directly and to keep up with the information flow from EU institutions. Yet, it is not uncommon for representatives of local and national-level civil society organizations to be unaware of their organization’s membership in organizations at international level. According to Sánchez-Salgado (2014:60) this is due to the fact that “peak associations” in Brussels are more interested in representation than in engaging their members in participation. This interest in representation is of course promoted by the above-mentioned interest in representation within the Commission, which trickles down to national and local civil society organizations. It can thus be argued that the EU is shaping European civil society actors in terms of creating incentives to focus on representation rather than participation.

Moreover, among many European civil society actors, Europeanization has entailed a shift in focus from political claims-making, confrontation and contentious action to expertise and partnership in the multilevel governance system of the EU. Sánchez-Salgado writes that “EU-based [civil society organizations] avoid confrontation and try to establish long-term relationships based on mutual trust with members of the Parliament and
Commission staff” (2014:170f). This tendency among civil society organizations at European level is due to the fact that the EU not only urges representativity, but also sectoralization, specialization and technicality in its policy-making processes. Because grassroots groups “do not dispose of the necessary analytical skills to identify the underlying political opinions implied by technical and specialized regulations” (Sánchez-Salgado 2014:172). As Teune (2010) points out, European protest has become noticeable; however, following Sánchez-Salgado, I argue that broad European-wide civil contentious action is difficult at EU-level due to the obstacles mentioned above.

The view presented in the 2001 White Paper on governance and in the 2000 discussion paper on the role of NGOs has had a major impact on the relationship between EU institutions (especially the Commission), and civil society actors. Even though it was stated in the 2001 White Paper that “participation is not about institutionalizing protest” (EC 2001:15), through its various policies regarding European civil society and view of civil society organizations as the bridge between citizens and the EU level, the Commission has an interest in shaping civil society and “structur[ing] the EU’s relationship with civil society” (EC 2001:33). The Commission wants civil society organizations to function as the voices of citizen groups. For simplicity, the Commission appreciates one voice per issue or group interest.

In practice, this means that the EU creates a pressure on interest groups, activists, social movement organizations, NGOs and other civil society actors to organize in a certain way: that is, by forming “EU-level peak associations”. Essentially, these are associations at an international level with national-level organizations as members. Associations of organizations are generally referred to as umbrella organizations – both by actors in the field and by scholars. For analytical purposes however, in this thesis, I will refer to associations of organizations as meta-organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). In chapter 2, meta-organization as a concept and analytical tool is developed and placed within the theoretical framework of this thesis. In the context of the EU and civil society, I argue that it is only when civil society organizations join forces and cooperate in meta-organizational forms that their voices can be aggregated and united within the EU framework.

For policy-making, the EU needs to consult civil society, but it is difficult to interact with a multitude of organizations within each field. Meta-organizational structures are consequently preferred and encouraged by the EU

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7 For instance Jutterström (2004) refers to umbrella organizations in his study of business firms joining forces when lobbying the EU. Among the people I have interviewed, the term was especially used by Swedish interviewees.
because the meta-organization can speak for many organizations, narrowing down the number of possible actors to a more predictable and manageable number. Meta-organizations also entail a formal, representative and professional structure of local, national and European level which fits in well with the multi-level governance structure and lobbying logic of the EU.

From the point of view of civil society, meta-organization can also be an advantage. Given that it is difficult, not to say impossible, for small and domestic civil society organizations to keep up with the constant flow of information, EU “technicalities”, important contacts and lobbying going on in the “EU corridors” and, finally, to have any influence at EU level, it is no surprise that it is “EU-level peak associations” – that is, meta-organizations – that are the most influential and are consulted on a regular basis by the Commission and Parliament.

A key question in research on the EU and civil society has been whether civil society organizations can live up to the preferences of the EU (Wartleigh 2001; Johansson & Lee 2014; Kröger 2013). The question essentially concerns the representativity of civil society organizations, their internal democratic structures and whether they have the capacity to provide a “voice” and be a bridge between the grassroots and the EU. I argue that it is through the form of meta-organizations that civil society has managed to live up to the demands of the EU. This does not, however, mean that “EU-level peak associations”, or meta-organizations at European level, are always representative and democratic (as has been discussed above), but it means that they are able to be legitimate actors in the eyes of the EU and that they have the capacity to have influence in the complex policy-making processes happening at EU level. It is meta-organizing that works within the EU and therefore, for national civil society organizations who want to exert influence on the EU, it is important to be part of these European level meta-organizations.

*The European Women’s Lobby*

At EU level, the organization with the greatest lobbying capacity and the most influential actor regarding women’s rights is the Brussels-based meta-organization the European Women’s Lobby (EWL). Lang (2013:171), for instance, argues that no other European women’s NGO “comes close to having EWL’s institutional influence, transnational membership base, or yearly funding from the European Union” (but see also Helfferich & Kolb 2001; Strid 2009).
Since its inception in 1990, the EWL has aimed to gather women’s organizations from all EU member states, and as a joint force lobby the Commission and Parliament. The EWL has an organizational structure and capacity that fits in well with the above-mentioned demands from the EU. It is a meta-organization with a secretariat in Brussels. Its membership base consists of one “national co-ordination” in each member state, and European-wide member organizations which are organized at a transnational level (see Figure 1). Due to its formal hierarchical character (organizing both European-wide and nationwide women’s organizations), aggregating voices and demands from the grassroots and national level via the national “co-ordinations” to the supranational level, the EWL fits in perfectly in the multi-level governance structure of the EU. With this structure, the EWL is able to perform “multilevel action coordination” (Helfferich & Kolb 2001:158) – that is, to lobby both EU institutions and member-state actors simultaneously. This is possible via mobilization of the national “co-ordinations” (the nationwide full member organizations) which lobby their own governments, members of the European Parliament and citizens’ groups, while the secretariat of the EWL simultaneously lobbies the Commission and Parliament. National “co-ordinations” are very important to the EWL, not just for coordinating action but also for legitimacy. The EWL needs to show the EU that it represents women all over Europe. With 31 national “co-ordinations” which, in theory, aggregate women’s organizations at national level, and 19 European-wide member organizations, the EWL claims to represent around 4000 women’s organizations all over Europe at different levels (EWL 2017a; Strid 2009:15).

The aggregation of voices from local to national, and from national to European level fits in with the ideal of electoral representativity. For the Commission, which the EWL mainly lobbies, this multi-level hierarchical structure of the EWL enables a regular and predictable working relationship in which the Commission only needs to confer with one organization as regards women’s interests. Also, the EWL is in turn a member of another, larger organization, the Social Platform – an EU-level platform for all international civil society organizations dealing with social issues (there is a similar one for environmental issues etc.) – which further facilitates the inclusion of interests in EU policy production as the Commission can simply refer to a handful of civil society organizations (Cullen 2010).
At the secretariat in Brussels, 16 paid, multilingual staff members and three interns carry out the daily work of the EWL (EWL 2019). This makes the EWL secretariat larger than most of its national members’ offices. The secretariat has throughout the years built up a lobbying competence and the technical policy expertise needed within EU policy making. Decisions however are taken by the Executive Committee and by the Board of Administration. The Board is composed of one representative, and their alternate, from each national co-ordination and each European-wide member organization. The Board members are elected for two years by the General Assembly, which delegates nominated by full members attend and vote based on consensus. The General Assembly also decides on changes in the statutes. The Board in turn elects the Executive Committee, which is composed of a president, two vice-presidents, a treasurer and three members of the Executive (EWL 2017a; Strid 2009).
Another important aspect of the EWL which makes it suitable for EU lobbying is that it has a close relationship to the Commission (Lang 2013:171). The EWL’s budget is mainly based on a grant from the Commission. In 2016, 76% of the EWL’s budget came from the Commission (EWL 2017a; EWL 2013). Not only is it mainly financed by the Commission, but the EWL was also, partly, initiated by the Commission. In 1987, 120 women met at a conference in London and adopted two resolutions calling for the “creation of a structure for influence, open to all interested women’s organisations, to exert pressure on European and national institutions to ensure better defence and representation of women’s interest” (EWL 2017a). In the resolutions, the women also urged the Commission for support to create such structures and in 1990 the EWL was set up, partly due to an initiative from women within the Commission, and as a result of the financial help they received through a grant from the Commission (Strid 2009). Already in 1991, Hoskyns described the newly created EWL as an organization which should have a “permanent representation of women at the level of the European Community” (Hoskyns 1991:67). Today, the EWL is an established dialogue partner for the Commission (Lang 2013:171). Strid (2009:27) additionally points out that there has been an overlap of staff between the EWL and the Commission. The first EWL Secretary General, for instance, left for the Cabinet of the European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs.

Considering its close contacts and working relationship with the Commission, and especially the fact that it is mainly financed by the Commission, it could be argued that the EWL is co-opted or institutionalized by its sponsor. Certainly, there was a pressure from the EU as the Commission wanted a unified organization to coordinate women’s organizations (Strid 2009:138), but the initiative also came from, and was supported by, women from national women’s civil society actors who believed that a unified EU-level lobby was needed for influence at domestic and EU level (Strid 2009:182). Strid argues that the EWL is admittedly so close to the Commission that it is sometimes hard to distinguish the two and that the EWL is both professionalized and institutionalized to some extent. Yet, it is because of its ability to be both inside and outside the Commission that the EWL has been successful at influencing EU policy, Strid argues (2009:27). As an example of successful lobbying, the EWL managed to influence the formulation of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 so that it includes a gender mainstreaming principle and policies against gender discrimination beyond discrimination on the labour market (Lang 2013:188; Helfferich & Kolb
In sum, the EWL has been successful in its endeavour to become “the voice” of European women, mainly because it has adapted to the EU multi-level governance structure and the logic of EU lobbying, and because of its close working relationship with the Commission (Lang 2013; Helfferich & Kolb 2001; Strid 2009).

What are the international pressures on national-level social movement fields? What consequences does the EWL have on women’s movements at national level? I agree with Strid that the EWL is an important civil society organization in terms of promoting women’s issues. It functions as a watchdog, keeping an eye on EU policies which could affect women’s lives, and it is a strong voice at the level of the EU when it comes to campaigning and lobbying for gender equality measures. However, the close relationship to the Commission and the way the EWL is structured have wider implications than the issue of professionalization and institutionalization of the EWL itself. As will become clear in the coming chapters, the relationship to the Commission and the organizational structure have implications for women’s movement actors at local and national level too.

Aim and Research Questions

This thesis is about national-level social movements adapting to international structures. With the women’s movement and their relation to the EU as examples, I follow two separate, yet similar, processes of forming and maintaining nationwide women’s meta-organizations in relation to the EWL. One is the Swedish women’s organizations’ efforts to form and maintain the Swedish Women’s Lobby (SWL). The other is the Polish women’s organizations’ efforts to form and maintain the Polish Women’s Lobby (PWL). I see meta-organizing as one result of adaptation to international structures. With the introduction of meta-organization into a field of social movement organizations, the question arises whether a whole movement can be organized and how this is dealt with within the movement. The overall aim of this thesis is thus to use the two cases of meta-organizing in the Swedish and Polish women’s movements to explore the junction of organization and social movement, at the intersection of national and international interests and demands, asking the question of what it entails when a social movement becomes more organized?

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8 However, as is common for transnational women’s advocacy organizations providing gender expert knowledge to policy makers, the EWL is seldom credited for its input and not visible in final public policy documents (Lang 2013:189f).
There are three parts to the aim of the thesis, each with their own subsidiary questions.

First, the aim is to investigate the conditions for social movement adaptation to an international structure. In the case of the EU and the women’s movement, it is obvious that there is a predefined organizational structure –.meta-organization – and a model for exerting influence which can prove both an obstacle and an opportunity to movement actors wanting to participate in EU policy-making processes. The EU, via the EWL, imposes a “one size fits all” solution to the issue of influence in the international arena for women’s movements at local and national level. Depending on the political context, national-level social movements may be more or less apt to adjust to a meta-organizational structure. The first part of the aim thus concerns the compatibility between the conditions in national-level social movement fields and the EU multilevel governance system. To meet this aim, I ask the following questions:

- What were the motives behind the formation of the two nationwide women’s meta-organizations in Sweden and Poland?
- What conditions in the two women’s movement settings facilitated or obstructed such formation?

Second, the aim is to show how organization in social movements can be challenging, by studying the two processes of forming and maintaining social movement meta-organizations. Even though the two processes turned out differently – with the result that the SWL is today an established and resourceful organization and the PWL is going through its third attempt – there are remarkable similarities. The purpose is to understand the tensions and conflicts which come to the fore when one actor – the meta-organization – not only speaks for the movement but, in terms of authority and resources, also competes with those it represents. Here, I connect speaking for and representing the movement with the issue of meta-organization, given that the main goal of forming a social movement meta-organizations is to have one actor to speak with a united voice. To meet this aim, I ask the following questions:

- What challenges, but also benefits, does this form of organization entail for a group of social movement organizations?
Why does it create tensions among the field of women’s organizations to have one single actor speak for and, effectively, represent the women’s movement?

The choice of national settings – Sweden and Poland – contributes with a broader scope for analysing the conditions for adaptation to the EWL and, essentially, the EU. The choice also allows for resistance within adaptation, and nuances in the tensions that come with meta-organizations, to be visible when the two processes are compared. The Swedish case contributes with an example of what type of conditions are favourable for the kind of adaptation investigated in this study, and the Polish case provides us with an understanding of when the demands at international level are not compatible with the needs and conditions at national level. Together, the Swedish and Polish cases show that, despite different contextual conditions, the problems experienced in both cases are inherently (meta-)organizational in form.

Third, the aim is to make a theoretical contribution to the classic question of the institutionalization, formalization and bureaucratization of social movements (Staggenborg 2013a & 2013b; Michels 1983; Skocpol 2003; Papakostas 2009), as it ultimately asks what it means to organize a field of social movement actors and what happens at the junction of organization and social movement, acting at the intersection of national and international interests. The analysis is based on the specific cases of forming meta-organizations within the Swedish and Polish women’s movement in relation to the EU. However, it contributes with an understanding of what it means to organize a social movement internationally and why this is a challenge for national-level social movement actors. It starts at European (international) level but essentially deals with inter-organizational relations at national level, looking at the tensions that arise within the field of Polish and Swedish women’s organizations.

Timeline of the SWL and the PWL

In this section, I give a simplified and chronological presentation of the two cases in the form of tables. In chapter 5-7, for the purpose of analysis, the two cases are discussed in a thematic way, and it may not be easy to follow how the key events and various organizations involved are connected to each other. For this reason, I provide a quick picture of what has happened so far in the stories of the SWL and the PWL before moving on. The outline
is given here as a scene that can be referred back to, when needed, in the analysis.

**Timeline of the Swedish Women’s Lobby**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Sweden joins the EU, and the 4th UN World Conference on Women takes place in Beijing. Parts of the women’s movement discuss the need for cooperation and international representation. A couple of women’s organizations with an EU focus are set up. Attempts are made to gather the women’s organizations in relation to the EU and EWL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Two representatives from the Swedish section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (IKFF) meet with the Undersecretary of State at the Gender Equality Unit in the Ministry of Labour. The Undersecretary of State is encouraged to invite women’s organizations to a meeting about the need for an umbrella organization for the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>In September, representatives from 22 women’s organizations meet at the Government Chancellery, invited by the Undersecretary of State.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>In February, representatives from 41 women’s organizations decide to form an umbrella organization: the Forum for the Cooperation of Women in Sweden10, which would later change its name the Swedish Women’s Lobby (SWL). Nine board members, a chairperson, and representatives for the EWL are elected. In November, the SWL holds its first annual meeting. It has 34 member organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Discussions in the SWL become dominated by party politics. Several party-political women’s organizations and the main shelter organizations ROKS and SKR leave. The Gender Equality Unit at the Government Offices claims that the SWL is no longer representative of the women’s organizations and as a consequence withdraws grants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The SWL chair resigns. The SWL decides to exclude all party-political women’s organizations. The Swedish government steps in to pay the EWL membership fee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9 See appendix for lists of participants/organization at various meetings.
10 “Samverkansforum för kvinnor i Sverige” in Swedish.
A representative from the SWL becomes the EWL president (2004–2008).

2005 The SWL starts receiving a yearly organization grant of SEK 650 000 from the Swedish state.

2014 Together with women’s movement organizations in other Nordic countries, the SWL arranges the conference ”Nordiskt Forum” in Malmö. For this it receives a project grant from the Swedish government.

2016 The SWL organizes its first “Forum Jämställdhet” – an annual conference on gender mainstreaming for professionals in both the private and public sectors.

2017 The SWL founds a limited company and starts providing gender mainstreaming courses to companies and public sector organizations.

2019 The SWL has 47 member organizations.

Sources: SWL 1997a,b,c,d; SWL 2012; 2015; 2017a; 2019a,b,c; Interviewees “Britta” and “Astrid”; Dagens Nyheter (2003); Swedish Government (2015); Göteborgsposten (2005).

Timeline of the Polish Women’s Lobby

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Foreign foundations invest money in civil society in the Central and East European region. The American Ford Foundation initiates the formation of a resource centre for the Polish women’s movement, after a similar initiative had been implemented in Russia. The resource centre is introduced to function as a platform for discussions and information sharing for the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1996</td>
<td>Representatives from eleven women’s organizations meet in Warsaw and set up the National Women’s Information Centre, OŚKa, with the help and financial support of the Ford Foundation. OŚKa has a supervisory board of women scholars and representatives of various women’s organizations, and an office with seven employees. It is one of the few financially strong women’s organizations in Poland.</td>
</tr>
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11 OŚKa is an abbreviation of the Polish name “Ośrodek Informacji Środowisk Kobiecyh”.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>In May, the EWL organizes a seminar at which a representative from the Women’s Rights Centre (CPK) and OŚKa attend.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In June, eight representatives of women’s organizations attend a meeting at the office of OŚKa to discuss EWL membership. They decide that a Polish Women’s Lobby (PWL) in the form of a coalition, rather than a formal association, will be set up. The participants form an initiative group to prepare a nationwide meeting, to which women’s organizations from across Poland and representatives of EWL are invited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The Eastern enlargement: Poland joins the EU.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In February, ten representatives of women’s organizations meet at OŚKa’s office to prepare the program for a nationwide meeting in May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In May, 23 representatives of women’s organizations meet at OŚKa. A representative from the EWL, and a representative from the Latvian EWL member, are invited. The Polish participants decide to set up the PWL as a signed declaration of cooperation, and decide that it will be coordinated by the office of OŚKa. OŚKa is in charge of an e-mail list for communication within the PWL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In June, nine representatives meet to discuss membership and representation in the PWL.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In July, eleven representatives of member organizations and four non-members (informal groups) meet to discuss rules and the functioning of the PWL. By now, 41 women’s organizations have signed the declaration of cooperation.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In August, the first general assembly of the PWL is held at the office of OŚKa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>During the early 2000s, OŚKa is questioned by the Ford Foundation regarding its financial reporting. After three years of not fulfilling Ford Foundation’s reporting obligations OŚKa is asked to reimburse 570,000 USD. The Director of OŚKa leaves her post.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2006</td>
<td>OŚKa loses funding and struggles to survive. Its activities are put on hold and some of its employees move to the newly-foun-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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12 CPK is an abbreviation of the Polish name “Centrum Praw Kobiet”.

13 See Appendix for list of signatories and list of organizations represented at the meeting.
ded organization Feminoteka, the first online feminist book-
store in Poland.

The PWL loses its base and coordinator when OŚKa struggles
to survive. A representative from CPK steps in to represent the
PWL at the EWL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The Wrocław office of Democratic Union of Women (DUK) receives public funding and sets up a second version of the PWL. The “Federation of the Polish Women’s Lobby” is now coordinated by DUK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The new PWL is accepted as the Polish EWL member. The chairwoman of the PWL sends a letter on behalf of the PWL and its members to the European Parliament asking the President of the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee to undertake action regarding Poland’s implementation of the European regulations concerning equal treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The last Director of OŚKa leaves her post. No more activity from OŚKa has been recorded after this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The PWL has 15 member organizations, but is struggling to remain in the EWL as it has not paid the membership fee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>The Gdańsk-based Network of East-West Women (NEWW) initiates a third attempt to set up the PWL. Six women’s organizations show interest in forming and joining a new PWL. In May, the PWL coordinated by DUK is formally excluded from the EWL. In October, NEWW is formally approved by the Board of the EWL as the new Polish Co-ordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>In May, NEWW calls a meeting and participants from a few women’s organizations decide to re-start the PWL. A representative of NEWW participates at the EWL general assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>In June, representatives of NEWW “speak up in the name of member organizations of the Polish Women’s Lobby” in a statement against morning-after pill limitations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OŚKa (2004; 2005); PWL (2013); McMahon (2002); Ford Foundation records (1999); Batory Foundation (2005); DUK (2010; 2016); NEWW (2008); EWL (2017b; 2018); Personal communication with Lafon (2016); Kobiety Kobietom (n.d.); E-mail correspondence with EWL (2017-2019); interviewees “Agata”, “Beata”, “Cecylia”, and “Honorata”; E-mail correspondence with NEWW (2017–2018).

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14 DUK is an abbreviation of the Polish name “Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet”.
1. INTRODUCTION

Disposition

Following our underlying question of what happens at the junction of organization and social movement, the theoretical framework, presented in chapter 2, focuses on organization as an ideal type and a special kind of system with certain implications when practiced in social movements. The concepts of *decided order* and *meta-organization* will be presented, and a definition and discussion of the terms *organization* and *social movement* is given, which is needed to set the scene for the rest of the thesis. Chapter 3 presents the design, methods and data used. Chapter 4 gives the reader a short historical background and relevant contextual aspects of the Swedish and Polish women’s movement. This is done in order to offer an understanding of the setting in which the two women’s meta-organizations were formed and operate. The background functions as a tool to explain, in the following chapters, why the establishment of a meta-organization has been more difficult in one case compared to the other. As such, it relates to the first part of the aim.

In part II, three empirical and analytical chapters are included. Chapter 5 starts at the European level by taking off where this introduction chapter has left the reader: How did the Swedish and Polish women’s movements adapt to the demands from the EWL and what were the conditions for this adaptation? As such, it relates mostly to the first part of the aim. Chapter 6 analyses resources and dependencies in setting up meta-organizations for the women’s movements. It relates to the first part of the aim because resources are part of the conditions for establishing a meta-organization, but also to the second part of the aim because resources have an impact on the way a greater degree of organization is received in a social movement. Chapter 7 analyses the consequences of the two previous chapters by looking at tensions within the field of women’s organizations when meta-organization is introduced and how these tensions are dealt with. As such, it relates mostly to the second part of the aim. In chapter 8, which is the concluding part of the thesis, I summarize the analysis by answering the research questions directly, and by relating to the third part of the aim through a discussion on what the two cases indicate about the intersection of organization and social movement.
Chapter 1. Introduction, Aim & Presentation of the Cases
Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework
Chapter 3. Method
Chapter 4. Context of the Polish and Swedish Women’s Movements

Figure 2. Disposition of the thesis, giving an overview of all chapters.
CHAPTER 2.

Theoretical Framework

The aim of this thesis is to explore the junction of organization and social movement, at the intersection of national and international interests and demands, by asking the question of what it entails when a social movement becomes more organized. To understand the two cases of the Swedish and Polish women’s movements and the organizational challenges that the adaptation to the EU entails, a theoretical framework is needed in which organization can be understood as a process and as something crucial to, yet analytically different from, social movements.

I see the EWL and its national coordinators as a specific way of organizing: as meta-organizing. The SWL and the PWL are cases of meta-organizing national-level social movements. The meta-organization organizes its member organizations – in this case women’s organizations – and claims to represent and speak for them and the whole (countrywide) movement. As such, the movement becomes more organized: an additional layer of organization is added to the movement. From this point of view, understanding the SWL and the PWL requires an organizational perspective in a social movement setting. This chapter deals with the question why organization what does it mean that a social movement (at national level) becomes (more) organized?

First, however, we need to know what it is that is being organized. The chapter therefore starts off with a definition of social movements. Because I am interested in the tensions that are reinforced when organization is imposed at movement level, I use a definition that is analytical (rather than descriptive) and that distinguishes social movements as a social phenomenon different from organization. The definition of social movement will be used as a contrast to organization. Second, I present how the concept of organization has been used and understood traditionally within resource mobilization theory in social movement research and how the concepts of social movement organizations (SMOs) and coalitions are helpful when
studying the SWL and the PWL. Third, I present my understanding of organization, based on Ahrne and Brunsson’s definition of organization: organization as a decided order. I argue that this understanding is helpful when studying organization in social movements because it does not assume organization as entity; rather, it allows for organization to be understood and visible at once within, outside and between organizations. With the concept of meta-organization, I further present a theoretical understanding of the specific form of organizing organizations. Fourth, I develop a model in which I connect the above-mentioned steps. Here, organization and social movement are contrasted as two separate social phenomena, or systems. This model is theoretical and based on the concepts of organization and social movements. In a second model, these two systems slightly overlap to visualize how, in practice, movements contain organization and show how this overlap sometimes create tensions. As social movement meta-organizations, the SWL and the PWL exist in both systems and reinforce this tension by increasing the degree of organization.

Defining Social Movements

What is a social movement? The term “movement” suggests that a social movement is a phenomenon that moves and changes, something fluid. Regarding the women’s movement for instance, it has been described in terms of waves – its visible activity comes and goes (see Dahlerup 2006), and sometimes it is considered to be in abeyance (cf. Taylor 1989). Others see movements as going through cycles of protest (Tarrow 1989). Movements move. Melucci (1996:114) pointed out that “contemporary movements resemble an amorphous nebula of indistinct shape and with variable density”, and are thus something which cannot be perceived by observers – at least not as unified entity (Melucci 1980:18). There are, of course, many different definitions in the social movement literature. The main dividing line has been between the American schools – Collective Behaviour, Resource Mobilization, and Political Process Perspectives (such as Zald & McCarthy, Tilly) – which tend to focus on the availability of resources, and the European new social movements perspective in which scholars tend to focus on collective identity in post-industrial society (such as Touraine, Melucci. For an overview see Diani 1992). However, there are shared notions. Many define movements as including some sort of conflict or challenge to the power holders, power structures and/or norms and values. Touraine for instance, defines social movements as “organized conflicts or as conflicts
between organized actors over the social use of common cultural values” (Touraine 2002:90). And Goodwin and Jasper define social movement as

a collective, organized, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities, powerholders, or cultural beliefs and practices. A revolutionary movement is a social movement that seeks, at minimum, to overthrow the government or state (Goodwin & Jasper 2009:4).

It is thus a type of collective action with political ambitions which is in conflict with the prevailing system. Melucci (1980) takes collective action as a starting point in his definition of social movements and argues that “collective action implies the existence of a struggle between two actors for the appropriation and orientation of social values and resources, each of the actors being characterized by a specific solidarity” (Melucci 1980:202). Yet, for collective action to be a social movement it also needs to include “all the types of behaviour which transgress the norms that have been institutionalized in social roles, which go beyond the rules of the political system and/or which attack the structure of a society’s class relations” (Melucci 1980:202). Diani (1992), who has tried to synthesize the definitions of social movements by the four American and European schools, also includes conflict as a defining feature:

A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of shared collective identity (Diani 1992:13).

Diani argues that it is possible to combine the American and European schools by focusing on social movements as “networks of informal interaction”. Networks are important in social movements as they connect “SMOs, constituents, adherents and bystander publics” (Diani 1992:8). Networks are needed for both mobilization and identity formation in movements. Networks and informal ties are also a recurring theme in social movement definitions (cf. Castells 2015; Melucci 1996:113f), and according to Diani, both American and European schools acknowledge that there are a variety of actors involved in social movements and that they are linked in a networked way (Diani 1992:8). Still, just as social movements are more, and something other, than organizations, networks cannot be the defining quality of social movements because of the term network’s descriptive character here. I argue that social movements are not simply networks, even though when analysing the actors involved in social movements their
interactions and relations can best be described in network terms such as informal ties and unknown borders. However, to move beyond a descriptive and empirical understanding and definition of social movements, we have to see social movements as something more than the involved networks, groups and organizations. Turning to Melucci again, we need a definition which sees a social movement as “an analytic construct and not an empirical object” (Melucci 1980:202). Melucci’s own definition is thus useful as he sees social movements as a type of collective action which is in conflict over resources and social values with a political system and/or attacks the structure of society and transgresses norms connected to these structures (Melucci 1980:22).

In line with Melucci, Eyerman and Jamison (1991) argue for a cognitive approach in which movements are seen as processes and spaces for collective knowledge production. Because movements “make power visible” and “challenge dominant meaning systems or symbols of contemporary everyday life” (1991:48), they are spaces of cognitive praxis in which new knowledge can be created and ideas articulated. With the concept of cognitive praxis, social movements are seen in processual and dynamic terms. For if a movement is seen as a social space, or territory, in which ideas are formulated and identities created through the constant interaction between different actors coming and going, it can never be constant. Eyerman and Jamison (1991:59f) argue that “the distinctiveness of social movements, indeed their very historical significance, lies in their impermanence, disorganization, transience, in short in their motion”. When actors, such as organizations, individuals and groups meet and interact in the social spaces provided by movements, there will be tensions between them over the definitions and actions they create. These tensions then (re)form the identity of a movement (Eyerman & Jamison 1995). Eyerman and Jamison (1991:55) further argue that it is this cognitive praxis that defines a movement: “It is precisely in the creation, articulation, formulation of new thoughts and ideas – new knowledge – that a social movement defines itself in society”.

For the two cases of this study, I argue that a cognitive approach is relevant and useful as it clearly separates social movements as something essentially and analytically different from organizations (and other phenomena), yet leaves space for seeing organization as an important part in social movements. If social movements are social spaces for cognitive praxis, the place of organization in Eyerman and Jamison’s view is that of vehicles and instruments. Organizations are mediums for “carrying or transporting or even producing the movement’s meaning” (Eyerman & Jamison 1991:60). In
this view, specific organizations are historical manifestations of social movements, but they are not movements. Based on this definition, I see a social movement as a social space for cognitive praxis in which collective action and new knowledge are created, held together by solidarity and collective identity, and whose interaction can best be described in terms of informal ties and which challenges and/or is in conflict with authorities, the political system, and/or dominant norms and social values. Moreover, I see the two cases as attempts at creating and maintaining meta-organizations within and in relation to a social space that is the (Swedish and Polish) women’s movement, and in which elements of organization are used as vehicles and both contested and embraced as means of (self-) defining the movement.

Organization in Social Movement Theory:
Resource Mobilization

The role of organization has indeed been discussed and dealt with in social movement studies; and at least one important strand of theory – that is, resource mobilization – is heavily influenced by organization theory. The resource mobilization theory and adjacent perspectives on social movement organizations are relevant for this study. However, as will be discussed, the role of organization in social movements has to a large extent been understood as entity and discussed in terms of its beneficial or detrimental effects on a social movement. In the following, I present how organization has been used and understood traditionally within resource mobilization theory in social movement research and how the concepts of social movement organizations (SMOs) and coalitions are helpful when studying the SWL and the PWL, but also why this perspective and understanding of organization in social movements is not sufficient if we are to understand the SWL and the PWL, and the issue of organizing a social movement at national level.

The place of organization in social movement research has mainly been within the Resource Mobilization (RM) perspective. The RM perspective was developed in an American context during the 1970s – mainly by Zald and McCarthy. RM scholars were greatly influenced by rational choice approaches within economic theory, and thus, in comparison with past theories focusing on individual social psychology, the RM approach shifted attention to more entrepreneurial and organizational aspects. Social movement phenomena were no longer seen as irrational and spontaneous and caused by exceptional grievances, but as rational action performed by organized individuals weighing costs and benefits in their strategic actions.
(McCarthy & Zald 2001:533; Jenkins 1983:528; Tarrow 1988:426). McCarthy and Zald (1977:1215), for instance, argued that pointing out tensions and dissatisfaction is not enough to explain social movements since discontent and support for a movement will always exist. The decisive element is instead the level of organization and amount of resources available.

Within the RM perspective, the question is not why individuals participate in movements or how they arise, but rather how mobilization is possible and why some movements succeed better than others (della Porta & Diani 2006:15). As a consequence of this shift, the focus of analysis came to be set on social movement organizations (SMOs) – that is, organizations aiming to adhere to the goals of a specific social movement. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977:1218f), a social movement is generally represented by a range of different SMOs working in the same broad direction; altogether they represent a social movement industry (SMI). The centrality of SMOs and SMIs, rather than individual participants or the macro-level of social movements, is important as it emphasizes the variety within movements and that movements to a large extent are composed of organizations (Zald & Ash 1966). Seen like any other organization, SMOs strive for organizational survival, and need resources to be able to achieve their goals. In general, SMOs obtain resources through support from their constituents and their adherents (people believing in the goals of the movement). Given that social movements are not fully cohesive, SMOs within the same SMI compete for the same resources, because they all appeal for support among the same adherent pools (Zald & McCarthy 1979:1). Competition, ultimately, leads to differentiation between the organizations – SMOs will specialize on tasks, focus, identities etc. New SMOs may also pop up offering more narrow goals and strategies. Furthermore, SMOs will compete over legitimacy in the eyes of those whom they try to influence and/or from whom they may receive funding – such as grant institutions or state authorities (Zald & McCarthy 1979:12; McCarthy & Zald 1977:1234).

SMOs: In between Efficiency and Movement Ideals

With the theoretical tools provided by the RM theory and the concept of SMOs, social movement scholars could see how organization was used to strategically mobilize resources and that organization was needed in order to sustain a movement. It is in SMOs that a movement is given some sort of durability, it was argued. Also, the RM perspective was inspired by an institutional perspective provided by Philip Selznick, which made visible the tension between “value commitments and survival concerns” shaping or-
ganizations (McAdam & Scott 2005:6). For social movements, this is especially critical as ideological notions about, for instance, participant democracy may collide with the need for efficient decision-making in a SMO.

Connected to the RM perspective, there is thus a discussion on the issue of formalization and bureaucratization and their possible benefits and disadvantages for social movements (Tolbert 2013; Staggenborg 2013a; 2013b; de Bakker et al 2017; den Hond et al 2014). Here, Robert Michels’ (1983) analysis of oligarchy in political organizations has been influential. In his classic study of the German Social Democratic party, Michels argues that large-scale membership organizations tend to become oligarchical. Once the organization is growing, it becomes difficult to maintain internal democracy – that is, equal member participation. Instead, a division of labour is needed, and a small elite of leaders are separated from the grassroots for the purpose of quick decision making. Michels argues that these “oligarchs” then develop a vested interest in their positions and consequently tend to prioritize maintaining their power over the original purpose of the organization (Tolbert 2013; Staggenborg 2013a; 2013b; de Bakker et al 2017:215).

The RM perspective has also been complemented by ideas borrowed from population ecology. This strand of organization theory emphasises the evolution and diversity of organizations within a sector and how these change over time due to competition and environmental selection (Minkoff 2013; Hannan & Freeman 1977). Thus, in a social movement, SMOs compete with each other over space, legitimacy, members and resources. Those SMOs which are most able to adjust to the current possibilities in the environment – for instance, by shifting their goals or organizational structure – are more likely to survive over a longer period of time. Niches are thus important. If a SMO manages to be dependent on a specific combination of resources which no other SMO can depend on, it has found a niche and can thus outcompete other organizations in that population (Langton 1987; Minkoff 1993). When a SMO grows in terms of members, it inhibits the growth of other SMOs (cf. Stern 1999).

The RM and population ecology perspectives are relevant for this study: both perspectives allow for an understanding that the two cases consist of women’s SMOs which try to cooperate, but that this cooperation is difficult due to competition for the same scarce resources – be they financial, material or social – and because the women’s SMOs represent different collective voices and identities within the movement. The RM perspective also highlights that there could be tensions within and between women’s SMOs.
because the need for organizational survival and efficiency could collide with movement ideals and internal democracy (cf. oligarchy).

In addition to the RM approach, more recent work has tried to develop the view of organizations in social movements. Going beyond both the instrumental view of SMOs, and the legacy of Michels’ “iron law”, these new developments pay attention to the varieties of SMOs and draw from insights of symbolic interactionism, i.e., that SMOs can also be seen as arenas of interaction (Clemens & Minkoff 2004:156f). As Zald and Ash (1966) have pointed out, there is no clear path between SMOs and goal displacement or conservatism. Instead, SMOs are organized in various ways. Not all are official, professional organizations – which has been assumed within earlier versions of RM theory – there are also more participation-oriented organizations or grassroots organizations with fewer resources, no staff and a looser structure (della Porta & Diani 2006:138). The way a SMO is organized affects the internal culture, and who is likely to join. Moreover, it will shape the organization’s culture or rules of interaction. In line with Melucci’s, and Eyerman and Jamison’s definitions of movements discussed above, SMOs could be seen as nodes between which a fluid network of people come and go, interact with each other, and participate in identity and knowledge formulation. SMOs are thus important parts of the imagined community for movement participants (according to Melucci, in Clemens & Minkoff 2004:157), and arenas for cognitive praxis. In the cases of the PWL and SWL, this is relevant as there are a multitude of Polish and Swedish women’s organizations which are not all in the same format and there are divisions and discussions within the movement on the way the movement should be organized.

**Coalitions and SMOs**

SMOs often form coalitions, networks and alliances in which they cooperate for the purpose of achieving common goals. Coalitions are essential for meso-level mobilization within movements, especially as they can coordinate large protests.

A coalition among SMOs is neither a merger (in which participating organizations merge their identities and structures into one organization) nor a network (in which participating organizations share information but keep loose informal ties with little focused action). Instead, a coalition is a type of relationship which resides somewhere in between merger and network as it entails “cooperative joint action while distinct organizational identities and structures remain intact” (McCammon & Moon 2015:327f).
One way to form a coalition is to set up a meta-organization which aggregates the various organizations within a social movement under one “umbrella” while they keep their identities and organizational particularities. There are numerous examples of this kind of cooperation. With their many local offices and chapters all over the US, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and National Organization for Women (NOW) are two such examples.

Van Dyke (2013) argues that “a complete understanding of social movement dynamics is impossible without knowledge of organizational alliances and the factors that inspire or inhibit their formation”. To form coalitions is, however, a challenge for any type of organization and such is also the case for SMOs who compete for funding, membership, and legitimacy (cf. Staggenborg 1986). Van Dyke & McCammon argue that “coalitions need to organize in ways that do not threaten the resources and visibility of member organizations” (2010:324). Within the RM perspective, competition is evident. Nevertheless, resource mobilization theorists have also been interested in why cooperation is quite common between SMOs (Zald & McCarthy 1979).

Staggenborg (1986), in her analysis of coalitions within the American abortion rights movement, shows for instance that coalitions between SMOs are most likely when there are extreme opportunities or threats, but coalitions may cause internal tensions. Staggenborg (1986) argues that the tensions are due to a conflict between the maintenance needs of the participating SMOs and those of the coalition itself. The conflict is especially an issue when the coalition takes on a formal form – i.e. a new organization is set up – and/or when external funding is not available. A coalition is also more likely to succeed if it has a limited, focused task, such as lobbying (Staggenborg 1986:388). Van Dyke and McCammon (2010) explain the difficulties in coalitions along the same line. First, they argue, cooperation is possible when SMOs share goals but differ in strategies or tasks. Secondly, sometimes incentives for cooperation are external, such as authorities encouraging SMOs to cooperate. Cooperation is, however, complicated and many times ambiguous given the fact that SMOs both want to join forces in order to achieve the aims of the movement, but at the same time they want to remain independent and visible actors within the movement in order to attract constituency support (Van Dyke & McCammon 2010). In line with this, Obach calls this issue the “coalition contradiction”:

Organizational maintenance needs require that a SMO remain able to distinguish itself from others. Yet this distinctiveness reduces issue overlap with
other organizations and inhibits the potential for coalition work, a dilemma that I refer to as the ‘coalition contradiction’ (Obach 2004:129).

Van Dyke (2013) also stresses that joining a coalition can be a risk for a SMO. It can drain its resources, and it can weaken the commitment of its members if they feel their organization is moving away from its original goals or frames when trying to adapt to the coalition.

The study of social movement coalitions thus calls attention to the difficulties in intra-organizational cooperation due to organizational dynamics such as the struggle for resources and autonomy. For the two cases of creating the SWL and the PWL, which essentially means creating a formal coalition between SMOs, this perspective is indeed useful. The coalition perspective in combination with a RM approach helps us to understand the challenges involved in setting up a formal coalition between women’s organizations as both competition and cooperation are emphasized within the theory. The coalition perspective enables an understanding of the role of resources and external actors, and why there is a tension between the need for cooperation among the women’s SMOs and the need for their organizational visibility and independence. Particularly Obach’s concept of the “coalition contradiction” is useful. However, when SMOs cooperate, social movement scholars tend to refer to this cooperation in terms of coalitions or networks, rather than in terms of organization (cf. Hathaway & Meyer 1993; Diani & McAdam 2003).

For the purpose of this study, a resource mobilization perspective is thus helpful – because it acknowledges competition and tensions within fields of SMOs – but it is not enough. The understanding of organization in the RM perspective assumes that organization is entity and associated with the study of SMOs. De Bakker et al (2017:216) argue for instance that the understanding of organization in social movement studies has for too long assumed a particular form of organization – that of the mass membership-based, bureaucratic, centralized and hierarchical organization, and that this view confuses what organization is and how the study of organization can be useful for understanding social movements. In line with this, I argue that to understand the SWL and the PWL, it is important to see that they concern attempts to set up an organization at movement level and that the complexities following from this are inherently organizational in character yet entangled with movement aspects and the movement context. For an understanding of what it means to organize a social movement, and the specific cases of forming associations of SMOs, a different view of organ-
izations is needed. I will turn to Göran Ahrne and Nils Brunsson’s understanding of organization, in tandem with other recent developments within organization theory which see organization as process and consequently not necessarily in terms of, or connected to, a specific entity. This is crucial both for understanding organization in/of social movements in general, and the SWL and the PWL in particular.

What constitutes organization and what does organization “do”? In the next section, these questions will be answered through a definition and understanding of organization based on an organizational perspective developed by Ahrne and Brunsson.

Defining Organization as Decided Order

Following Ahrne and Brunsson (2011; 2019), I see organization as decided order. By “decided” they mean that organization, compared to other types of social order, is not emerged but intentionally created by people. Ahrne and Brunsson point out that organization is a form of relationship in which people can achieve co-ordination and co-operation.

Organization is but one form of social order, which draws upon and often intersects with the other, non-decided, forms of social order. Compared to organization, the other two forms of order that they identify, networks and institutions, are emerged social orders. As emergent, these forms of orders are not deliberately created but spontaneously. Ahrne and Brunsson argue for a conceptual distinction between the three forms of order, as they are fundamentally different from each other in the way they function and are built up.

I agree with Ahrne and Brunsson on the need for these distinctions, and, for the purpose of clarity, in the analysis I abstain from using organization, network and institution in the everyday sense of these words. As an analytical concept here, a network, is an informal and non-hierarchical type of relationship between social actors which is maintained by reciprocity, trust and social capital. Networks have unclear boundaries and can be flexible and spontaneous because they are embedded in social relations (Ahrne &

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15 At the same time, I am aware that organizations are commonly referred to as networks and institutions, both in research, media, everyday talk, and by organization members themselves. It is common to use the label “network” for organizations such as associations, and the label “institution” when we are talking about certain well-established, dominant and societal organizations such as churches, courts, universities, or certain state bureaucracies. Also important parts of international organizations such as the EU are commonly referred to as institutions.
Brunsson 2011:6). This informal and spontaneous character has added to the confusion and comparison between networks and social movements which will be discussed later. Institutions are also different from organizations because they are not decided, and different from networks because they are not connected to any specific actors. Institutions have been defined in different ways, sometimes equated with organization. Ahrne and Brunsson’s definition of institution builds upon Berger and Luckmann’s (1966), but also Meyer and Rowan’s (1977), view that institutions are “built by common beliefs and norms” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:7). Thus, in institutions, culture and knowledge are key. However, most importantly, what distinguishes institutions from organizations is that institutions are taken for granted while organizations are decided.

Seeing organization through the lens of social relationship, Ahrne and Brunsson (2019:7) argue that there are five fundamental elements in all social relationships which link people together:

1. They know who is involved in the relationship;
2. They have some common ideas about what the relationship involves and what they are expected to do;
3. They have the means to acquire some knowledge about the extent to which the others do what they are expected to do;
4. They have some possibility of influencing each other in a way that makes them fulfill the expectations;
5. They have common ideas about who can take initiatives and who can act in order to maintain and develop the relationship (Ahrne & Brunsson 2019:7).

In organization, these five fundamental elements are decided. First, deciding who can participate and be involved means that the borders of a relationship are defined. Essentially, this means that decision about membership is an element of organization. Secondly, deciding about meaning and expected behaviour essentially means that rules are an element of organization. Third, rules need to be followed and consequently it is important to decide on how behaviour can be monitored. Fourth, if rules are not followed, there should be a way to punish this behaviour, and sometimes good behaviour deserves encouragement or praise. Deciding on this means that sanctions are in place. Fifth, deciding upon who can take initiatives and who can act creates a hierarchy. With these five organizational elements – (1) membership, (2) rules, (3) monitoring, (4) sanctions and (5) hierarchy – organizers can organize others, both individuals and organizations.

Comparing the three social orders, we can see that organization is a special type of relationship and order in that its elements are decided. This
becomes more apparent when we compare the five organizational elements with their equivalents in the emerged social orders of network and institution. In table 1 below, I have placed the three social orders next to each other to facilitate the comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization: decided order</th>
<th>Network: emerged order based on interpersonal relations of trust</th>
<th>Institution: emerged order based on taken-for-granted beliefs and norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>membership</td>
<td>interpersonal ties, friendship</td>
<td>symbolic boundaries: imagined community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rules</td>
<td>personalized trust &amp; reciprocity</td>
<td>generalized trust &amp; common beliefs: norms, traditions, culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring</td>
<td>social control: rumours &amp; gossip</td>
<td>socialization, self-discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanctions</td>
<td>bullying &amp; favouring</td>
<td>pride &amp; shame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>leadership based on centrality in multi-person relationship, high status, social capital, access to resources, charisma</td>
<td>Taken-for-granted power structures based on norms, culture and established legitimacy of leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Ahrne and Brunsson (2019:13), all five organizational elements can be seen through their functional equivalents of friendship, norms, gossip, bullying and leadership. I have used these to build a comparable image of organization, network and institution. As Ahrne and Brunsson (2011:84f) point out, by keeping the definitions of the three orders narrow, it is “possible to see the phenomena they stand for as alternative forms of order with different characteristics, causes and consequences”. In what follows, the separation of the three orders will function as a basis for the analytical framework. As I will come back to, my understanding of social movement will be placed within/in relation to all three forms of social order and, as a subsequent step, used in comparison with organization.
Partial Organization

The key argument in this section is that seeing organizational elements independent of (complete) organization as entity, it becomes possible to observe organization at once within, outside and in between organizations, in social movements too. Instead of only looking at organization as complete organizations, it can be fruitful to understand collective action as happening on “a scale of degrees of organization” (Brunsson & Olsen 1998:25; see also Ahrne, Brunsson & Seidl 2016, Ahrne & Brunsson 2008), as “a continuing sequence of more, less or changed organizational elements” (den Hond et al 2014:300), as different degrees of “organizationality” (Dobusch & Schoeneborn 2015), as process (Hernes 2008), or as partial organization.

First, however, in order to understand the five organizational elements, we need to understand that they are decided. The fact that organizations are decided orders has certain implications connected to communication at the centre of organization. Drawing upon Niklas Luhmann and his analysis of organizations as social systems, Ahrne and Brunsson (2008:49f; 2011:99) argue that organizations reproduce themselves on the basis of decisions (or decision communications). Organizations are self-producing systems because once a decision is taken it will function as a prerequisite for the next decision which is the basis for the following decision, and so on, forming a process of decisions (Ahrne, Brunsson & Seidl 2016). Decisions are here to be understood as distinctions: a decision is a selection of one alternative from all given ones. However, decisions are paradoxical: if there are real alternatives, the chosen one appears less justified and less decided, but if the chosen one is justified as the right one the alternatives are seen less as alternatives, and, thus, the decision is not really a decision (Seidl & Becker 2006:26). Decisions entail uncertainty and can consequently be questioned. As such, organization is tentative, in process, and has to be constantly decided (re-produced). Organizations are both fixed and questionable. The main understanding taken from Luhmann is that it is only retrospectively that organization is created and that decisions make alternatives visible.

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16 Luhmann sees social systems as self-producing systems, or autopoietic systems as he calls it. As one of the main autopoietic systems (included in the overarching autopoietic social system), organizations reproduce themselves on the basis of communication (rather than action or subjects/individuals). In this way, Luhmann’s view on organizations (and other social systems) de-centres the subject, as part of a communicating system. Instead of focusing on subjects, it is the relational aspects, the interactions, which become central (Hernes & Bakken 2003).
Starting from this understanding of organizations, Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) discuss the existence of partial organization. To this end, they identify a full organization as based on the decisions regarding the five elements mentioned above: membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring and sanctions. When all five elements are used, there is “complete” organization, or what in everyday talk is referred to as a “formal organization”. However, Ahrne and Brunsson argue that it is also possible and very common that organizers only use one or a few of the five elements. In this case, partial organization is at play. As such, organization does not necessarily mean entities (organizations) but organizing can also occur outside, inside and between formal organizations, as a process (organizing) (cf. Hernes 2008). Following this view, organization exists on a scale from no organization (no elements of organization), to partial organization (one or more elements), to complete organization (all five elements).

In the following, each element of organization is discussed in detail and related to organizing in social movements.

**Five Elements of Organization**

Ahrne (1994:25) argues that affiliation “is the single most decisive feature of the figuration of organization”. Affiliation – or in other words membership – sets the boundaries of an organization. Without membership, it is unclear what the organization is – where it starts and where it ends. For the members, membership “brings a certain identity” which distinguishes them from those outside the organization (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:86). As members they are both expected to act and to be treated in a certain way by the organization. Membership brings responsibility, loyalty and identity. Moreover, compared to acquaintances in a network, for instance, members are accepted and excluded based on decisions.

Using membership on its own is possible and has considerable impact. Companies can for instance organize customers by the use of membership in “clubs”. By joining these clubs, customers can receive special offers or discounts, while the company has found a way to further encourage more purchases. However, there are no rights or obligations. Members do not have a say in the company, and the company cannot impose rules on its “club members” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:87). Organizers can also add membership to a network, which will change it dramatically as it now has clear boundaries – who is in and who is not – as well as burdening it with responsibility towards its members (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:92). Adding membership to a network may also stir questions about the network – both
from the inside and from outside. With membership, the network has become visible and its boundaries can thus be questioned, whereas before it could comfortably exist without attracting attention. Becoming visible can have the benefit of being able to speak for a group or a cause, of making the voice of the network heard. But it also burdens the network with having to defend itself against those questioning the meaning or structure of the network, and it burdens it with responsibilities towards the members who can suddenly have expectations on the network (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011).

It is also important to point out here that there are different types of members in different types of organizations, but also different types of members within one organization. Instead of membership, Ahrne (1994) distinguishes different types of affiliation, among which membership and employment are the ones relevant in voluntary associations. There is an important difference between these two forms. Membership in voluntary associations entails certain rights to participate in decision making and the election of representatives, but members in voluntary associations are not paid. Employees, on the other hand, have different rights and obligations than members but are paid for their participation. Employment means that affiliation is based on a professional interest rather than on dedication to a cause. With these two forms of affiliation in one organization, it can happen that members fear that employees’ interests in efficiency and earning money will override the ambitions of the members (Ahrne 1994:66ff). What is evident is that members and employees have different interests and different relations to the organization and that this has implications for how they relate to the organization and each other.

In organization, rules are pronounced (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:86). This means that they have been decided and have to be communicated explicitly if people and organizations are to follow them – normally this is done by writing down the rules and making a written document communicated officially to those concerned. The fact that rules are explicit makes them easy to formulate. Rules are important because they guide members in how to behave and facilitate the daily management of an organization. Rules are like laws, scripts, or blueprints. Norms on the other hand, which are taken for granted, are not easy to get a grip on. Sometimes norms are decided upon and thus turned into rules, and sometimes some rules become so taken for granted and the reasons for why they were decided upon are forgotten to such an extent that the rules have been institutionalized and thus become norms (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:95). Without any other organizational elements rules can be used in the form of “standards” or “soft
laws” which are voluntary to follow (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:87). The International Organization for Standards (ISO) is one of many standard-setting organizations which have influence on other organizations’ behaviour without any other means than proposing standards which organizations are free to live up to or not. As pointed out by Haug (2013; 2014), rules can also be used in social movements, independently of other organizational elements, for instance at meetings between various social movement actors. At these meetings, it can be decided what should be discussed and who is allowed to talk when and how. It is not uncommon for social movement actors to use guidelines for how to behave at meetings and other gatherings (den Hond et al 2014:297).

Monitoring is simply an element used in order to check if the rules are followed or not. Monitoring can be about verifying how well members perform. Compared to gossiping, which serves the same function in networks, monitoring in organizations is performed via decided systems for information access (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:86).

Sanctions are used when monitoring has shown that members do not perform well – or when they do, because sanctions can be both positive and negative. Members can be punished, for instance through exclusion or a decrease in salary. Members can also be endorsed, for instance through awards, change in status, promotions or a salary increase (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:86).

Hierarchy can be demanded by actors who want to communicate with another actor, such as a social movement. In these cases, hierarchy means that representatives are chosen who speak for the social movement and become responsible for the movement’s actions (Ahrne & Brunsson 2019:12f).

If all five elements are used, we have a “complete” organization, such as a firm, a bureaucracy or an association. As stated above, however, each element can be used on its own or a few of them can be used in different constellations, creating partial organization. Examples of partial organization are, for instance, when membership and voting rules are added to a meeting for a network of activists, or when rules are imposed on organizations in terms of standards, such as environmental certifications of products or companies. Sometimes prizes are used to organize individuals or organizations as these function as sanctions, but without any other element of organization being used (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:5).

One central claim of the partial organization perspective is that “decisions are attempts at creating certainty” (2011:8, my italics). Once a decision is taken, it becomes apparent that an alternative could have been chosen,
that things could have been different. Decisions are therefore contested and create uncertainty. This can be compared to norms that have emerged as part of an institution and therefore are less contested. Norms and institutions are taken for granted, decisions and organizations are not. An organization is thus a precarious social order. As Ahrne and Brunsson (2011:8) point out, “organization tends to be challenged because it competes with established institutions and networks: a standard reason to organize is to try to establish an order that differs from the one that would exist otherwise”. In the next section, it will be shown how the elements are used in meta-organization.

**Meta-Organization**

A meta-organization is an organization which has organizations as members, rather than individuals, and consequently it creates order among organizations instead of individuals. Generally, order between organizations can be organized, sometimes to a lower degree as in partially organized settings, and sometimes to a higher degree as in meta-organizations. Just like partial organization, meta-organizations order others by adding elements of organization, thus altering the relationship between the organizations. This means that, in theory, the meta-organization, like other organizations, has access to all five organizational elements. However, in practice, also just like other organizations, it may or may not use all five elements – either because not all elements are needed, or because it is not possible to implement them. As pointed out by Ahrne, Brunsson and Kerwer (2019:394), meta-organizations tend to be weak organizations and struggle more than others to use all organizational elements. The resistance to organization is stronger when the members are organizations compared to individuals, when both organization and member are autonomous actors (organizations) in the same field. This is due to meta-organization entailing a threat to the autonomy of its members, as this means that some decisions are now taken at a hierarchical centre above the member organization.

In meta-organizations, as in organizing in general, membership is the most essential element (Ahrne, Brunsson & Seidl 2016). Membership is the basis for meta-organizations as their identity and reason for existing are built upon the identity of their member organizations. After membership, there are, however, differences in which elements are used and considered important in different types of meta-organizations. As Ahrne, Brunsson and Seidl (2016) point out, organizational elements are not always welcomed, either by individuals or by organizations, and sometimes organiza-
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As Ahrne and Brunsson argue, irrespective of whether a meta-organization applies all five elements or not, by adding membership to a group of organizations, a new order is created among organizations. Before the advent of meta-organization, the member organizations “constituted an environment for each other” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:43), whereas now they are all part of the same organization (see Figure 3). The environment is important to all types of organization as they all try to influence and control their environment in one way or another. The establishment of a meta-organization can therefore be seen as an attempt to influence parts of the environment as a new order is created. The environment is difficult to exert influence upon and predict, but as other organizations such as the state, companies or NGOs, are part of one’s environment, the creation of a meta-organization for a certain group of organizations limits the number of actors and creates a higher degree of order in one’s environment (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:64f).

To understand a meta-organization, it is essential to understand its origin and reason for existing. According to Ahrne and Brunsson, there are several different reasons for creating a meta-organization. First, it might be necessary to improve the communication and interactions within a group of organizations. A meta-organization can help member organizations to share information with each other and thereby increase internal knowledge, but also facilitate collaboration as a meta-organization “changes the conditions of interaction”, for instance through rules, a new authority or joint resour-
ces (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:66f). Second, a meta-organization allows organizations to join forces and create a new and stronger actor that coordinates and expresses the group’s shared opinions (cf. Fries 2011; Jutterström 2004). This is commonly expressed as the strength of “speaking with one voice”. By joining forces and pooling resources, greater power to change the environment can be obtained, which may be done through lobbying or campaigns as the aim is often to influence the rules of other organizations – the environment – in the name of its members’ interests (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:69). In the case of the SWL and the PWL, the EU tends to prefer a united voice when interacting with civil society. Third, meta-organizations only accept organizations within a specific category – for instance, Swedish women’s organizations – which may give its members a certain status and identity. Besides, the potential members are normally known in advance and in many cases the meta-organization started at a conference to which all of them were invited (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008:70ff). Consequently, a meta-organization may create, reinforce or confirm an identity and by its limited membership it may also give those accepted as members a certain status as they are seen as “proper” organizations within a certain category. This occurs if the meta-organization has managed to connect itself well enough to this certain category, and meta-organizations do in fact demonstrate a tendency to reach monopoly, which is why an organization may decide to join only as a safeguard and on the basis of not wanting “to be left outside” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:81ff). However, a meta-organization might want more actors to be involved without diluting its own identity. This dilemma can be solved by allowing anyone wanting to support the meta-organization to become an associate member (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:70ff).

In addition to interaction, joint forces and common identity, Ahrne and Brunsson also – similarly to Zald and McCarthy’s (1979) observation that SMOs may cooperate as a consequence of external incentives – argue that the reason for creating a meta-organization may come from the outside. Other organizations may find it convenient to have one in place as “they want to change their environment”, by reducing the number of individual organizations to only one major organization to relate to. In addition, a meta-organization, for example at international level, might cause the establishment of other new meta-organizations at national level that can become members, creating a “meta-meta-organization” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:75). This further enhances the convenience for external actors desiring to interact with this group of organizations.
Irrespective of the reason for constructing a meta-organization, this specific form of joining forces comes with issues. Specifically, combining “complete” organizations, with their own specific interests, forms a source of conflict which does not exist in organizations with individuals as members. Every organization has a need for, and is in pursuit of, autonomy and uniqueness. These interests may collide with the fact that the meta-organization’s existence is built upon some sort of similarity between its members. Ahrne and Brunsson argue that an organization risks losing some of its autonomy in joining a meta-organization if the meta-organization has authority when implementing decisions or making its members follow rules that have been decided upon. It is not evident that the members of a member organization should accept this. On the one hand, accepting rules decided by the meta-organization will bring into question the importance of the member organization as such, since some of its autonomy has been reduced. On the other hand, the meta-organization needs to have some impact on its members and be relevant to its environment, or it will see its own importance and reason for existence being questioned (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:111). This dilemma is also connected to identity. The meta-organization is dependent upon similarities between its members because it strengthens its own identity and internal homogeneity. However, the common identity and unity undermine the member’s claim to be unique – important for volunteer organizations as they want to attract donors and attention to their issues (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:111f). Similarly to the “coalition contradiction” in social movement coalitions, meta-organizations need to deal with the balance between not demanding too much of their members and still remaining an important actor with the ability to be effective. Consequently, meta-organizations tend to make decisions based on consensus, or at least through qualified majorities. Consensus allows the meta-organization to claim legitimacy for its decisions and the members to uphold their autonomy (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:123). Another way of avoiding tensions and conflict in meta-organizations is to limit “the area within which the organization can make decisions”, since the more the meta-organization is able to make its member organizations do, the more it threatens its member organizations’ authority and autonomy (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2005:442).

There is also the question of “who does what”. Given that both individual-based organizations and meta-organizations are organizations with the ability to act, there will always be a risk of an overlap between the meta-organization and its members, which, according to Ahrne and Brunsson,
may lead to competition between them. The meta-organization needs to be careful in its operations so that it does not hijack its members’ functions and activities. Moreover, a large, resourceful and/or very important member might claim to be the actor that decision-makers should listen to and therefore find it challenging if the meta-organization is formulating opinions to its environment (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:109). This member might even find it difficult to see any reason to remain as a member, especially if it has a higher status and capacity for action than the meta-organization. Since strong organizations may struggle to see the advantage of becoming a member, there is the risk of a “meta-organizations for the weak” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:82). For credibility and status, the meta-organization becomes dependent upon those who are already known and important within the category in question. The meta-organization needs to prove it actually is representing this particular category, and thus some organizations may become more interesting as members than others (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:86).

Meta-organizations typically also differ from individual-based organizations when it comes to voting. In other cases, voting is based upon the general norm that all individuals are equal and therefore the rule “one person, one vote” is applied. It is difficult to claim that all organizations are equal, but should larger organizations and organizations with more members or that contribute more have more votes? Additionally, as the voters do not represent themselves but the member organization, their vote can be questioned (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:118f). A further difficulty for a meta-organization is the fact that the member representatives cannot meet on a daily basis as is the case in smaller and more local organizations, and as a result they normally meet only at annual summits. This demands from the participants that they make decisions on many issues at once as the opportunity to make decisions is so rare (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:129). Many meta-organizations have secretariats dealing with the day-to-day administrative work and a strong secretariat may have its own interests, such as expanding the meta-organization’s ability to make decisions, since this will enhance its own role and importance within the organization. Moreover, if the secretariat is able to claim expertise in a particular area, it will strengthen its role and the meta-organization’s authority, but weaken that of the members (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:129f). In sum, the meta-organization and its members “compete with and tend to undermine each other” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:112).
Bor (2014) argues that the membership dimension per se is not enough to understand the specificity of meta-organization. Instead, she argues, we need to differentiate between forms of membership and the role these may play for the meta-organization. In her terminology, the dimension of constitutional membership is key. The concept of constitutional member makes visible different types of participants in an organization. A constitutional member is “an organization that is member of the meta-organization or an individual who is member of an association” (Bor 2014:6). Other participants in organizations can be employees, managers, subsidiaries, or representatives. These participants constitute what Bor refers to as hierarchical membership. With the concepts of constitutional and hierarchical membership, Bor points out that it makes a difference to an organization whether it is built on one or the other, or a combination, of the two types of membership. Constitutional members are owners of their organization and each member has a say in the organization. This last point is important because it means that new members reduce the power and ownership of existing members when the membership base expands (Bor 2014:127ff). In constitutional membership, there is also low stratification, because all members are equal and decision-making is commonly done through the policy of “one member, one vote”, contributing to a sense of ownership and commitment among members. However, in meta-organizations, low stratification among member organizations can cause tensions as organizations are more differentiated than individuals (in terms of power, resources, influence and size). Some decisions are more important to some members than to others, which can also create tensions and conflicts within the meta-organization (Bor 2014:132).

Bor also connects constitutional membership with resources. An organization can have access to direct and indirect resources. When members contribute with membership fees or participate in the organization’s activity, it has access to indirect resources. In addition, the organization can use external funding or use resources such as its own personnel, office space and other material resources, thus utilizing direct resources. According to Bor (2014:133), Ahrne and Brunsson take for granted that a meta-organization is dependent upon indirect resources and consequently dependent upon its members’ resources. However, as an organization with constitutional membership, the meta-organization can in theory use both types of resources. It is thus important to look at what type of membership the organization has and what type of resources it has access to and can use. If the meta-organization cannot rely on the resources of its member organ-
izations, and/or has access to its own, direct, resources then it is less dependent upon its members. Bor argues that using direct resources is “a way of making the resource-base of the organization more certain, it gives the organization a capacity for action non-dependent on the ability and willingness of the member organizations to contribute resources” (Bor 2014:133). This means that a meta-organization that has access to direct resources can have a “life on its own” and stability (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:48). Using only direct resources also has the advantages that there is no question about uneven participation and contributions from member organizations, and it simplifies administration to only concern the collection of membership fees (Bor 2014:275). However, the disadvantage of using only direct resources is that it can create a gap between the different roles among participants. Feelings of ownership and identification grow among the personnel, while the owners of the meta-organization, that is the member organizations, can lose their sense of identification when their resources and participation become less important. If the meta-organization instead uses both direct and indirect resources, conflicts can arise as the issue of ownership intensifies, and because there are differences between the employees and participants representing member organizations. These differences can be in terms of status, power, identification, and responsibility (Bor 2014:141). It is important that a clear division of labour is set up as it can easily happen that employees contribute with more time and effort than do other participants (Bor 2014:275f). Here, Bor points to the specific difficulty inherent in meta-organizations as they have organizations as members:

Organizations which utilize both indirect and direct human resources might need to deal with tensions and conflicts, which can be expected between those working directly for the meta-organization and those working indirectly for the meta-organization, especially due to a different status as well as a different relation with the organization (Bor 2014:134).

In other words, the fact that member and organization are both organizations and will compete over autonomy, authority and identity is interlinked with the question of resources and the different roles of participants. It makes a difference if the meta-organization is dependent upon the resources of its member organizations or if it can also draw upon other resources.

The fact that members are organizations also makes a difference as it means there are several roles and types of relationships within the meta-organization. First, there is the formal relationship from the member organ-
ization to the meta-organization regarding democracy and ownership. Second, there is the formal relationship from the meta-organization to the member organization regarding rules and policies. Third, there is the formal and often hierarchical relationship inside the meta-organization, such as work groups with leaders, committees with heads, projects with leaders and the power relations among the employees of the meta-organization. Fourth, there is the informal relationship between individual member organizations, which can be based on networks and loyalties outside the meta-organization. Lastly, there are informal and “indirect” links between member organizations and the meta-organization, based on indirect resources (Bor 2014:284ff). With these various and complex relationships, it is not obvious “who” the meta-organization is. Bor (2014:288) further argues that there is a potential source of conflict here as “participants may experience conflicts of interest as their loyalty and commitment to the MO needs to be balanced with a loyalty and commitment to the member organization as the member organization remains their employer”.

A representative of a member organization has different interests and loyalties than an employee at the office of the meta-organization. The representative must take its organization into consideration and be loyal to those s/he represents. However, a representative of a member organization does not necessarily act or express the same views as that of the rest of the member organization, and even though s/he is satisfied with a decision in the meta-organization it does not mean that the member organization is satisfied. It is thus extra difficult in meta-organizations to create unity among participants (Bor 2014:137). Likewise, a participant in one of the activities arranged by the meta-organization has different interests and loyalties than both employees and member representatives. There is also a difference among the member organizations as some contribute more than others and can consequently have different expectations on the meta-organization (Bor 2014:273). At the same time, participants can take on several roles or positions simultaneously which Bor argues “leads to conflict of interests and possibly lower trust in the loyalty of participants to represent the member organization” (2014:274).

The purpose of the meta-organization also has implications for the relationship between it and its member organizations and the resources it needs. If, for instance, the purpose is to exchange information and knowledge or to collaborate, then the meta-organization needs the member organizations to be actively involved, whereas if the purpose is lobbying or concerted action then the meta-organization is more in need of employees.
who can take care of lobbying for instance, while member organizations are needed for shared decision making (Bor 2014:282).

Social Movement Meta-Organizations

Research taking a meta-organizational perspective on organizations has so far mainly focused on large international meta-organizations – such as the EU, WTO or Fairtrade International (e.g., Ahrne, Brunsson & Garsten 2002; Kerwer 2013; Casula Vifell & Thedvall 2012; Bor 2014). There are however a few meta-organization studies focusing on the national level (e.g. Fries 2011; Cropper & Bor 2018). The meta-organization perspective has been used primarily within management and business studies, which is also the case regarding discussions of the theory (e.g., Berkowitz & Dumez 2016). Even though, as pointed out by Ahrne and Brunsson (2008), meta-organizations are common within all sectors, little attention has been paid to civil society or social movement organizations as meta-organizations. There are a few exceptions, such as Bonfils’ (2011) study of a nationwide disability association in Denmark, Laurent with colleagues’ (2019) study of a French national federation within the addiction field of civil society organizations, and my own study of the Swedish Women’s Lobby (Karlberg & Jacobsson 2015; Karlberg 2017). Thus, one contribution of this study is to demonstrate how social movements at national level too can be studied through a meta-organizational perspective.

With the concept of meta-organization, I see the association of women’s movement organizations in the cases of the SWL and the PWL as organized relations and as social movement meta-organizations. The concept of meta-organization and the concept of partial organization belong to the same view of organization: a decided order involving decisions on membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring and sanctions. A meta-organization is in theory a “complete” organization, which has access to all five organizational elements in relation to its member organizations; however, in practice it can be partial as some elements are difficult to use (as noted above). As such, the meta-organization imposes organizational elements upon other organizations and relations between them which hitherto had not been organized, but ordered in a different type of relationship such as in a network.

Moreover, I argue that Ahrne and Brunsson’s definition of organization as a decided order is useful and applicable to the study of organization of and in social movements because by clearly defining and breaking down the concept of organization into five elements, and defining organization as a decided rather than an emerged social order and relationship, it becomes
possible to see how the spaces in between or within social movement organizations and other social movement actors are organized. With this as a starting point for understanding organization, it is also possible to see that the Polish and Swedish women’s movements are partially organized, but that with the advent of meta-organization, a new level of organization is introduced. Being a decided order, and supposedly representing the (Swedish/Polish) women’s movements, this new level of organization collides with the notion of what a social movement is.

With the concepts of partial organization and meta-organization, I contribute to the study of organization in social movements because the concepts help us to see and study the issue of organization at movement level: of adding a level of organization. Admittedly, the resource mobilization theory, with its understanding that SMOs are organizations, and the study of social movement coalitions share many important aspects with the perspective presented by Ahrne and Brunson via the concepts of partial- and meta-organization. Both meta-organization theory and social movement coalition research call attention to the difficulties of intra-organizational cooperation. Both perspectives recognize that there can be organization in social movements; that (social movement) organizations share certain inherently organizational characteristics which may collide with ideals or other social orders; and that formal coalitions between organizations are complicated due to conflicting issues such as maintenance needs and issue overlap, diversity and uniqueness, autonomy and competition.

The meta-organizational perspective is useful for the study of the two specific cases, and for the general understanding of challenges which take place when the internationalization of national movement activities takes the form of meta-organization. On the one hand, the meta-organization perspective makes clear that what is under discussion is a formal association of organizations and provides a deeper understanding of the issue of associations of organizations. The concept of meta-organization also provides us with a whole framework in which organization is distinctly defined as a decided order including organizational elements and shows that these elements can be problematic to implement in a field of organizations (or among SMOs in a social movement) because of their “definite” decision character. On the other hand, the meta-organization perspective is not useful when it comes to understanding movement-specific issues such as competition for the same scarce resources, which is why the resource mobilization and social movement coalition perspectives complement the meta-organization analysis.
By studying social movement meta-organizations, in which several SMOs join forces, the meso-level of a social movement comes to the foreground and provides insights into the challenges of organizing a social movement (cf. Haug 2013). Moreover, studying social movements through a meta-organizational perspective can also contribute with new insights on meta-organizations as social movements have different dynamics and purposes than markets and states. As social movement meta-organizations, the cases of the SWL and the PWL can be understood as organizing in a social movement context and at social movement level.

A question arising here is: what is it in organization that creates tensions in a social movement context and, consequently, what is challenging in setting up a meta-organization for the Polish and Swedish women’s movements?

Understanding Organization and Movements

Bromley and Meyer (2015:4) argue that there is a tendency in contemporary modern life to create (more) organization whenever a problem occurs. This phenomenon, which they refer to as “hyper-organization”, is also apparent in social movements. Associations, NGOs and other forms of organizations abound in social movements. As Ahrne and Papakostas (2006:110) point out, it is not easy to distinguish what is movement and what is organization in social movements. Organizations are sometimes taken for being a social movement. “Attac” has, for instance, come to be seen as the representative for the social justice movement by the media and by the public in general (della Porta & Diani 2006:137). And as for the two empirical cases of this thesis, the EWL and its national members have a tendency to monopolize the voices of the movements, which of course raises questions of representation and identity in connection with organization. Moreover, sometimes business organizations present themselves as movements, because in everyday speech movements have more positive connotations than organizations do. Movements are associated with flexibility and something that moves forward – it is energetic and free-floating, compared to organization which is associated with stiffness and rule-following. Organizations talking about themselves as movements and organizations described or analysed as being a movement add to the confusion about what a movement is. Nevertheless, there are also some apparent similarities between social movements and organizations. Both are forms of collective action in which unity and common action are necessary (Ahrne & Papakostas 2006:111). In addition, there are
many overlaps between organization and movements, as organizations are common actors within movements.

Organizations are also useful because they make the movement visible to the general public and to those authorities that the movement might want to challenge. It is not possible to speak to a social movement, but it is possible to speak to an organization (Ahrne & Papakostas 2006). Organizations can also function as representatives and voices for social movements in interaction with authorities, the media, and others who might want to speak to the movement. It is within SMOs that a lot of common action, movement goals and collective identities are formulated. Organization is an effective way to get things done.

Still, organization is a classic problem in social movements (Papakostas 2011; 2012). On the one hand, to form a SMO is a standard way of, for instance, mobilizing resources, bringing people together, coordinating protests and other movement events. Many social movement networks or groups typically turn into organizations with time and pressure towards formalization – sometimes these organizations take the form of professionalized lobbying advocacy organizations, commonly referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Lang 2013; Papakostas 2011; 2012).

On the other hand, organization challenges the idea of what a movement is and threatens the spontaneous, inclusive, voluntary and “liquid” characteristics of movements. As discussed above, I see social movements as social spaces for cognitive praxis in which collective action and new knowledge is created. In these social spaces, ideas and identities are (re)formulated but not decided upon. People participate in movement activities, identify with a movement and identify others as belonging to a movement, but there is no definite boundary to a movement.

Because organizations are common and important for social movements, it is easy to assume that they are the movement. However, this equation is problematic in two ways. First, because it assumes they have more voice and power than they do. Social movements are larger than one or a few social movement organizations. An organization can never represent a whole movement. A movement does not have borders and includes more actors than the visible social movement organizations. Second, because analytically we need to see social movements as something else, and more, than organizations (Diani 1992:13). This is important if we are to continue to understand social movement as a special kind of collective action with its own dynamics, and as powerful political and cultural forces which have major impacts on societal change.
Within and between social movement organizations there are challenges and conflicts, which I argue are based on tensions that arise when organization aspects meet social movement aspects (cf. Ahrne & Papakostas 2006:124). As pointed out above, organizational efficiency and maintenance needs typically collide with movement ideals and goals such as spontaneity, participatory democracy and plurality in voices. In most cases however, the collision between organization and social movement concerns a smaller part of a movement. Typically, tensions arise within a specific SMO when members feel that their organization diverts from its original goals or when a small group of decision-makers (such as a board of representatives or a secretariat) replaces general assemblies in which all members can discuss. Another issue regarding the collision between movement and organization typically arises when social movement organizations have to compete for the same resources while at the same time working for the same overarching movement goals. At other times, some social movement organizations may want to cooperate in the form of a coalition. Here, tension arises because the different participating organizations are unique and have different identities while they share a common collective identity as part of the same movement, or because the coalition may take on organizational features and threatens to obscure the variety of voices and identities among the participants (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway & Meyer 1993).

In these examples – even in coalitions between several organizations – only a part of a movement is concerned as the collision between organization and movement rarely applies to the whole of a movement. If a whole movement was fully organized, would it still be a movement or would it be an organization? Yet, in the cases of the SWL and the PWL, we have (or are supposed to have) organizations that are expected to speak for, and claim to represent, the whole women’s movement in each country. The meta-organizational structure means that the whole (Polish and Swedish) women’s movement is concerned. At least in theory, the two women’s meta-organizations are expected to organize all other women’s organizations in the field and ultimately the whole movement. In this view, I argue that the cases of the SWL and the PWL can show how social movement meta-organization exaggerates and intensifies the collision between movement and organizations and the subsequent tensions and challenges. As such, the cases of the SWL and the PWL can serve as extreme cases of the issue of social movement organizing.

Following this view of the SWL and the PWL, the question is: what happens at the intersection of social movement and organization? How does
the intersection play out when the Polish and Swedish women’s movements are pressured into forming a meta-organization, and how is this meta-organizing met and dealt with within the two movements? To answer these questions, an analytical model in which organization and social movement are understood as separate yet comparable phenomena is necessary.

Analytical Model

Haug (2013; 2014) and den Hond, de Bakker and Smith (2014:294) – who each base their argument on Ahrne and Brunsson – argue that social movements are at once partially organized and partially emerged orders. Social movements contain significant elements of organizing, however the degree of organization varies in different movements, and in different times and places. Yet, irrespective of the degree, organization is present and may facilitate continuity and endurance, in tandem with ameliorating the mobilization and management of resources, as well as drawing upon institutions and networks.

The fact that social movements are partially organized, but also partially networked and institutionalized, creates a tension between the different logics of respective order (Haug 2013:713). The tension is what leads to a constant re-formulation of the movement, its identities and actions. The tension can lead to changes in the structure of a movement field, to changes in how actors in movements organize, and changes in strategies.

In short, the tension between the three orders of organization, network and institution can make a movement “move”. For the purpose of this study and the cases of the SWL and PWL, this is view relevant because it highlights the potential transformations that come with adapting to the demands from the EU (via the EWL). By adding an organizational layer to the two countries’ women’s movements, a heightened tension between the three forms of order is at play. Therefore, I argue that the cases of the SWL and the PWL exist (foremost) at the intersection of social movement and organization and that this intersection generates tension. Social movements consist, as we have seen, of all three orders, but in the case of setting up meta-organizations in the Polish and Swedish women’s movements, it is the arrival of more organizational elements on the women’s movement which is challenging. Because it is a decided order it is also easier to question, as compared to emergent orders which are taken for granted.

Based on the definition of organization as decided order and the discussion of organization in social movements, I have summarized aspects of
social movement and contrasted them with the five elements of organization (see Figure 4). In order to show where the collision occurs and what it is about in the cases of the SWL and the PWL, this analytical model portrays organization and social movement as two different ways of doing collective action.


Given that my ambition is to apply an organizational perspective to the study of social movements, but without losing sight of the emergent and dynamic character of social movements, and its specific dimensions and processes, the definitions of social movement and organization are used here as ideal types contrasted to each other for the purpose of stressing the constant tension between organization dimensions and social movement dimensions inherent in the two cases.

Den Hond, de Bakker and Smith (2014) go through all five organizational elements and relate them to ideal-typical “anti-organizational elements”. First, regarding membership, social movements have participants instead of members. Participants are anyone who takes part in social movement activities. Even though there are members in social movement organizations, many of these organizations de-emphasize membership and thus their organizational character, and instead emphasize their network character (den Hond et al 2014:296). Social movement is about personal engagement, participation, involvement and voluntary association rather than rules and decisions about formal affiliation. The ideal social movement actor is an activist, not a member. Secondly, social movements are expected to be autonomous and not structured by rules. For coherence, however, movements rely in practice on both rules and on the socialization of people into the com-
mon cause of the movement (den Hond et al 2014:298). Third, instead of monitoring, movement participants rely on social control of one another. Fourth, instead of sanctions, movement relations are ideally based on mutual aid, solidarity and cooperation (den Hond et al 2014:299). Fifth, social movements are ideally not hierarchically structured but rather leadership is something that emerges or, preferably, there is no leadership at all but collective action is structured through direct democracy (den Hond et al 2014:297).

Connecting the two phenomena social movement and organization with the specific cases of the SWL and PWL, I also use a second model (see Figure 5 below). Here, the two ideal types are portrayed as a Venn diagram in that they slightly overlap each other. It is in this overlap that I argue that the cases of the SWL and the PWL exist, in the form of social movement meta-organizations. Seeing the two cases as attempts at meta-organization highlights the fact that there is a change in the relations of the women’s organizations, and that when organizational elements are added there is a heightened tension between the organization dimensions and social movement dimensions. The top rectangle symbolizes how meta-organizing is a demand from the EU, via the EWL.

![Figure 5. Model of the case of a social movement meta-organization (SM MO) placed in relation to the concepts of organization and social movement.](image-url)
Coming back to the aim of this thesis – to explore the junction of organization and social movement, at the intersection of national and international interests and demands, by asking the question of what it means that a social movement becomes more organized – I will use the analytical models presented here in order to answer this question through an analysis of the SWL and the PWL in the following chapters. With the organizational perspective, and the models presented above, I see the SWL and PWL as (attempts at) meta-organizations, which entails an emphasis on organizational elements in social movements and the tension between organization dimensions and social movement dimensions (cf. Ahrne & Papakostas 2006:124).

The models are used as a theoretical tool in which organization and social movement are ideal types, applied to explain why organization in and of social movements is complicated. As such, the models relate to the third part of the aim: that is, to the classical question of institutionalization, formalization and bureaucratization of social movements. Within these analytical models, the concept of meta-organization is central because it highlights the inter- and intra-organizational dynamics in the cases of the SWL and the PWL. Meta-organization emphasizes tensions, conflicts and competition in social movement-level organizing, and contributes with an understanding of why this way of organizing can be challenging to SMOs. Partial organization and the five elements of organization are used to see what it is in organization that causes tensions in a social movement setting and why meta-organization is questioned. The elements are also contrasted to notions of social movement (movement dimensions) in order to see why meta-organization is particularly challenging in social movements.

With the analytical model presented above, in the analysis of the SWL and the PWL I will analyse tensions and conflicts among the SMOs involved; the resources available in the two movement settings; incentives to cooperate in the form of a meta-organization; and occasions where organization and notions of social movements collide and others where organization is desired and accepted. What movement-specific notions does the introduction of organization collide or accord with?

Following this, the analysis is structured as follows: First, and related to the first part of the aim, incentives or motives for nationwide cooperation and meta-organizing in the Swedish and Polish fields of women’s SMOs are analysed in order to understand the compatibility between the conditions at national-level social movement fields and the EU multilevel governance system. Second, and also related to the first part of the aim, because resources are essential both in SMOs and meta-organizations, the analysis deals
with the issue of what resources were available and how this impacted the way the histories of the SWL and the PWL unfold. Third, and connected to the second and third parts of the aim, I analyse the tensions in the field of Swedish and Polish women’s SMOs when a meta-organization is set up. Here, specific issues to meta-organizations are analysed by asking: how are the organizational elements dealt with and how can tensions among the women’s organizations be understood in the light of meta-organizational challenges? In the final stage of the analysis, I connect variations in the contexts (conditions) with the scale of organization and the outcomes identified in the SWL and the PWL.
CHAPTER 3.

Method

As always, to get to a point at which the material in front of you makes sense is a long and winding road, sometimes even (seemingly) circular. Setting out on the journey to understand the two organizations at the centre of this study – the Swedish and the Polish Women’s Lobbies – in order to explore the junction of organization and social movement, and the intersection of national and international interests, has not been easy. In this chapter, I describe and discuss the research process, including the methods used for data generation, the data and material analysed, how this analysis was done, and relevant ethical considerations.

This thesis is based on a case study. However, the cases are not the SWL and the PWL as organizations. Instead of treating the cases as entities, I see them as something that is happening, as a process and something relational. With a process view on organization, the two empirical cases are not the SWL and the PWL, but rather the two processes of organizing the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements in relation to the EU and EWL. This is thus a case study of two attempts at creating and maintaining a certain type of organization – that is, a meta-organization for the Polish and Swedish women’s movements, respectively, which can function as a link between the national level and the EU level via membership in the EWL. The aim is not foremost to compare the two cases, but to use them as empirical cases to illustrate a phenomenon: the PWL and the SWL are seen as analytical cases of organizing the voice of a social movement, making it heard from the national to the international level. As such, studying the SWL and the PWL may shed light on aspects of a theoretical phenomenon and “give meaning to abstract propositions” (Bryman & Bell 2003:63). Instead of attempting to achieve generalizability, I argue with Siggelkow (2007:23) that studying a case cannot prove that A leads to B, but it can show one “example of how A leads to B”. The two cases in this study are thus examples of how organizing the voice of a social movement can be challenging and why.
Case studies are appropriate when the aim is to understand a phenomenon in depth, as they allow for rich contextual data, via data triangulation, concerning one or several cases (cf. Yin 2009; Flyvbjerg 2006; Swansborn 2010). Because case studies allow for in-depth analysis of many different aspects of a phenomenon, they are suitable for identifying contradictions (Flyvbjerg 2006:11), and essential in order to achieve a deep understanding of complex human interaction and social phenomena (Flyvbjerg, Landman & Schram 2012:1f). I use the cases investigated in this study to shed light on different aspects of both the phenomenon of meta-organization and that of social movement organizing in relation to the international level. Through these cases, I also hope to enhance our understanding of how the same type of organization may have different outcomes in different national settings.

More specifically, this study is about the Swedish and Polish women’s movements and the process of establishing and maintaining a joint organization, a meta-organization, for the respective national-level movements, in relation to the European Women’s Lobby. As such, it is limited in space to Sweden and Poland. Sometimes, the European level is taken into consideration. However, this is only done in order to demonstrate how the Swedish/Polish women’s organizations adapt to, or resist, the European level/organization, and to show how their specific relation to the European level affects actions at national level. The study is also limited in time: from the initial idea of joining the EWL and forming a common women’s movement meta-organization, to the present. In Sweden, this means that I have followed a process in time from around 1995 (when Sweden joined the EU), and in Poland from around 2003 (when Poland acceded to the EU). However, as is visible in the timeline in chapter 1, for the Polish case, the process is strongly connected to the 1990s because of the centrality of foreign funding and the organization OŚKa. The analysis in the case of the PWL stops shortly after 2016 when NEWW has been accepted as the new Polish coordinator by the EWL. For the SWL, the analysis in time stops shortly after at 2017 when it founded a limited company and started to provide gender mainstreaming courses and conferences. This is the latest major change in the SWL.

Despite these delimitations, both cases extend in time and space beyond the main focus of this study. Taking into consideration that the SWL and the PWL are set in specific historical and political contexts, which will be developed in chapter 4, events and actors in the past have connections to, and consequences for, the two cases. As the study focuses on the Swedish
and Polish women’s movements’ EWL relations, it is also limited in scope regarding which organizations and actors are of interest. Because the SWL and the PWL speak for and are supposed to represent the Swedish and Polish women’s movements, in practise, this study only looks at those women’s organizations which have been or which are been part in the process of forming and maintaining the SWL and PWL, or which have been directly affected by this process.

**Conducting Fieldwork**

To grasp the process and to gain as full a picture as possible of the PWL and the SWL, various accounts from different types of actors involved and their perspectives have been crucial. The main method for data production has been semi-structured interviewing. For data triangulation, written communication with relevant individuals and organizations, and document analysis have also been conducted. Documents are here understood as all kind of texts written by the involved actors, which have been produced independently of my own participation (i.e. not e-mails which I have received). Examples are: official organizational documents, organization reports, meeting minutes, websites, state reports, and recorded e-mail lists.

The present thesis is, partly, a study of organizations. Organizations can be difficult enough to study to start with, but what about organizations which do not exist anymore, or are inactive, such as in the Polish case? In the following, this difficulty – how I handled it, and what it has meant for the analysis – is discussed. In the following, I also explain the procedure of finding the people I interviewed, what I asked (and why) during the interviews, and other aspects of conducting fieldwork in a social movement setting.

**Finding and Selecting Actors**

Given that their main purpose is to function as a link between the EWL and the national level regarding EU lobbying, neither the PWL nor the SWL organizes protests or demonstrations. Yet, in Poland, I have participated at protest events and other events within, or related to, the women’s movement. These have not been structured “participant observations”, but mainly used to meet people, to have informal chats with activists and to get an

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17 There are a few exceptions: the SWL has for instance taken the initiative for a campaign and slogan about equal pay (“Lön hela dagen!”) around which a demonstration is held every year on the 8th of March. And the EWL takes part in the campaign “One million rising” by demonstrating on the 14th of February against violence against women (and encourages its members to do the same).
understanding of certain key events within the Polish women’s movement. As stated in the introduction, I have been present at the 2016 and 2017 “Manifas” – the 8th of March demonstrations – and a couple of “benefit Manifa” parties in Warsaw; I attended several strikes and demonstrations in relation to the proposed ban on abortions, such as the All-Poland Women’s Strike on Monday the 3rd of October 2016 – also known as Black Monday and the Black Protest (#czarnyprotest) – and a similar national strike in the spring of 2017; I attended the 2016 Women’s Congress in Warsaw, and a conference on gender equality in April 2017. Sometimes, these observations and participation at events led to contacts with women whom I later on interviewed, or to people who could direct me towards possible interviewees. Sometimes, it led me nowhere in terms of finding people who could help me understand the situation with the PWL, but still gave me a better understanding of the Polish women’s movement and the sense of urgency of the issues it struggles with. I conducted fieldwork in Poland during an especially urgent and threatening time regarding women’s reproductive rights.

As mentioned in the introduction to chapter 1, several major protests and demonstrations concerning women’s rights took place in 2016 and 2017. Taking part, or at least being present, at these events also gave me to a certain extent a common frame of reference with the women I interviewed – many asked, for instance, if I had been to the “Manifa” or the Women’s Congress. In Sweden, participation at women’s movement events was not necessary in order to find relevant people to talk to. Instead, it was relatively easy to know who to talk to and to find people and their contact details via the websites of relevant women’s organizations. Most Swedish women’s organizations have websites and are transparent about who their representatives are and how to contact them. I did, however, attend a few events: “Feministiskt Forum” in Stockholm, at which the SWL participated as organizers of several seminars, and some of the 8th of March demonstrations in recent years. The purpose of attending these events was not to study the SWL, but to contribute to my general understanding of the Swedish women’s movement. Similarly, I have followed both Polish and Swedish women’s and feminist organizations and groups on social media in order to keep track of what is going on within the fields of the Polish and Swedish women’s movements.

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18 The Women’s Congress (“Kongres Kobiet”) is an important annual event, which gathers women from all over Poland during a couple of days full of seminars, panels, book and information tables, and key note speeches by politicians, activists, businesswomen and researchers. It is an event in which many women’s organizations take part, for instance by organizing seminars and providing book and information tables.
The people interviewed for the study have partly been selected strategically, and partly been chosen “for me” for reasons of accessibility. The former mainly relates to the Swedish case. Because of the convenience in having a website and an organization (the SWL) to visit, and access to a list of member organizations and their contact details, I had the opportunity to make a strategic selection of relevant people to contact. Due to my initial focus on the relationship between the SWL and its member organizations, and on the relationship between the SWL and the EWL, I was interested in speaking to both board members and employees of the SWL; representatives of its member organizations and former member organizations; and Swedish delegates to the EWL. Given the lack of research on the SWL, I also needed to speak to people who could give me information about its formation and history, and therefore former board members and representatives were of interest. Having early on adopted a meta-organizational approach to the SWL, I expected there to be conflicts or at least tensions between the SWL and its member organizations. Representatives of member organizations that might find it problematic being members of a common “umbrella” for the movement were consequently chosen. Following the meta-organizational perspective, organizations that are strong, and organizations that are different in some respects (such as organizational structure and identity) could find it challenging to be part of a meta-organization because of an imposed authority, common identity, and, consequently, loss of autonomy (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011). Examples of such organizations are old and established women’s organizations, women’s shelter organizations (because of their specific role within the movement), and radical feminist organizations.

Contacting relevant actors and asking about the possibility to be interviewed was easy in Sweden, and I had a number of potential informants to choose from. I mainly used the procedure of writing to the e-mail address of the main representative of an organization, or the organization’s general e-mail address and asking if we could meet for an interview. In a few cases in Sweden, one interviewee led me to another. As is regularly the case, the volume of e-mails (or other enquiries) sent out was not matched by the number of positive replies. For instance, one of the member organizations that I wanted to get in contact with on account of its radical feminist image proved difficult to reach, and once I did get hold of contact information I never received a response to my requests for an interview. In the end, the “selection” of interviewees in Sweden was decided both by strategy and by accessibility reasons.
As already mentioned, in Poland the situation was more complicated. Having already studied the SWL, I had some ideas about what kind of information I needed, but since there was no website and there seemed to be no organization, I initially had no idea who I could interview regarding the PWL except for one person who was mentioned on the EWL website. Therefore, I had to use a different approach than that used in Sweden. Before going to Poland, I made a list of those Polish women’s organizations I already knew of, and those I had read about in reports, research articles and on websites, and gathered as much information as was available on websites. After this, my first step was to contact the person mentioned on the EWL website, and those women’s organizations I had on my list.

While in Poland, I made contact with researchers and activists within the field, and could confirm via them which organizations were the main ones. With time, and with more knowledge and more refined and innovative internet searches, I found more people and organizations to connect with. Sometimes contact information, or at least names, were given to me by interviewees. As such, the selection of interviewees in Poland was mainly via “snowballing” and availability of information: I contacted anyone I could and hoped they had some knowledge of the PWL. Sometimes it turned out that the person I had been referred to or found via internet searches knew nothing or very little of the PWL; sometimes they had themselves been involved in the PWL. Consequently, a strategic approach to the selection of interviewees was not possible in Poland. In the end, those I have spoken to are a collection of women who have been directly, indirectly or not at all involved in the PWL. The majority of them were involved in one or several of the versions of the PWL and/or its member organizations, some were involved indirectly via OŚKa, while some were interviewed as activists or representatives of major women’s organizations in Poland but without involvement in the PWL. In the latter case, it was interesting to hear their opinions on the PWL and the EWL, or benefit from their knowledge of the Polish women’s movement in general and its international relations.

There is of course a weakness in the selection of interviewees given that “snowballing” and chance in many cases determined which people I ended up interviewing. This way, a bias towards one part of the PWL (and possibly also the SWL) may exist in the sample. Yet, as stated above, I have not studied the SWL/PWL as cases of organizations per se. I have studied two processes of organizing the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements in relation to the EU and EWL. From this perspective, a full description of the two meta-organizations and their member organizations is not sought for.
Moreover, for the situation in Poland – in which there was no specific organization to turn to in order to understand the whole process – “snowballing” was the most appropriate method of selecting people. Given the variation in the interviewees’ relation to the PWL/SWL, and the fact that I have interviewed people with diverse attitudes towards the PWL/SWL, I further argue that the interviewee accounts, together with the document analysis, provide a broad and nuanced picture of the two processes. I have, for instance, interviewed women who strongly identify with the SWL/PWL, and those who feel distance towards it. Some interviewees expressed criticism of the SWL/PWL, whereas others praised it, or saw its potential. Some interviewees remembered certain events, whereas others remembered other events. In sum, the interviews cover those aspects of the two processes which are relevant for the questions of this study.

*Semi-Structured Interviewing*

Given the different situations of the two organizations at the center of the processes I study, I could neither select interviewees in the same way in both countries, nor follow a structured interview guide. Instead, a semi-structured approach (Weiss 1994; Aspers 2011:143) was taken in order to allow for flexibility. Considering the different roles and/or relations to the SWL and the PWL possessed by different actors, the interviewees were asked different types of questions. However, considering my theoretical approach, the interviews were not unstructured, but focused. In general, I asked about their views and knowledge of: the EWL; the establishment, organizational structure and resources of the PWL/SWL; the purpose and activities of the PWL/SWL; and its membership base and relations. In addition, I was interested in potential disagreements, tensions and conflicts within the PWL/SWL, and between the Swedish/Polish level and the EWL. Considering the analytical focus on tensions between the concepts of organization and social movement, I was also interested in how interviewees saw the issue of organizing a whole movement under one organization, how one organization can speak for the others, and if they had any concerns regarding organization and meta-organizing in general in a social movement setting. In Poland, given the situation of the PWL and the difficulty in finding people who had direct knowledge of it, I had to ask more general questions about the women’s movement and its actors. This way, I learned much about tensions and conflicts within the field, and its general structure and difficulties regarding resources and organization.
To create flexibility, yet maintain focus, I designed a thematic interview guide (Nilsson 2014:158; cf. Aspers 2011:150). Depending on the person I interviewed, I first made divisions regarding type of organization, or level: (potential) member organization (local/national level), SWL/PWL (nation-wide level), and the EWL (European level). Within these divisions I sorted questions into different themes. The guide was updated on an ongoing basis (due to new knowledge), and adapted to the specific person I was interviewing. One effect of this was for instance that I re-interviewed two interviewees. In table 2 below, an example is given of what a thematic interview guide could look like in a situation where the interviewee represented the SWL/PWL and/or a member organization of the SWL/PWL.

Table 2. Example of thematic interview guide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization X</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose/general</td>
<td>Type of organization; structure; purpose &amp; activities; membership/affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Is the organization a member/part of any networks/coalitions/umbrella organizations? (at national and international level)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SWL/PWL

| History | Was your organization/were you active in the process of forming the SWL/PWL? What was discussed at initial meetings? Who summoned them and why? What did the process of forming it look like? Who was involved? |
| Structure | How is the SWL/PWL structured and why? Does it work? Issues with the structure? |
| Participation | Have you/your organization participated at meetings or other events organized by the SWL/PWL? How are decisions taken? Who participates? How were you informed about the activities? |
| Purpose | The aim and purpose of the SWL/PWL? Why is it needed (or not)? What do you think it should do? |
| Cooperation | How is cooperation among the member organizations possible? Example of when cooperation possible/important? When is membership helpful? |
| Conflicts | Example of when cooperation did not work out? What happened? Example of disagreements? When is membership problematic? |
In both Sweden and Poland, I had to combine an interest in specific organizational details (such as when and where a meeting took place, who was there, who the member organizations were) with an interest in more elaborate accounts of an event, actor or issue. At times, especially in Poland, I felt like a detective or journalist eager to “get hold of” the relevant “facts”, whereas the interviewees were instead more interested in telling me the overall story of the time when, for instance, the PWL was first discussed, or about some urgent women’s rights issue or important work their organization had done. My sometimes clumsy “investigative” behavior originated in the lack of official records and research on the history of the SWL/PWL, and in my confusion regarding when things had taken place and who had been involved. This was especially the case in Poland. In general, however, I tried to create a sense of conversation in which the person I interviewed told me her memories, opinions and view of things related to the study. Occasionally this meant that the interviewees went “off topic”, and I had to spend some time bringing them back to the theme of my research. Most of the time, however, it meant that I was given stories packed with detail, explanations, emotions and ambiguities, which opened up for new areas to ask about. The flexibility of the interview guide allowed me to pick up on things that had been said in passing, and to learn new things about the cases which would (probably) not have been expressed if I had followed a very structured interview guide.

Interviews took place in interviewees’ offices, at cafés, and (in some cases in Sweden) in interviewees’ homes. I would let the interviewee suggest where to meet, unless they asked me to tell them where to meet. The length of the interviews varied between 20 to 120 minutes, with an average length of 75 minutes. All interviews in Sweden were performed in Swedish.
Because I do not speak Polish, in Poland most interviews were performed in English, with the exception of two that were interpreted between Polish and English. Conducting an interview in which both interviewer and interviewee speak their mother tongue, compared to when both (or one of them) speak their second, or third, language, makes a difference. On the one hand, it was easier for me to interpret what the other person said when we both spoke Swedish, and this made the interview process smoother. It also made the interview situation more equal when our access to the language spoken was on an equal level. On the other hand, it is possible that things were taken for granted when we both spoke our mother tongue. I noticed during interviews when both interviewee and I spoke English – our second (or third) language – that I had to express myself in a more precise way, and that I had to ask the interviewee for explanations more often. Using a language which is not “mine”, and on the topic of something that takes place in a context (Polish women’s movement) which I am not used to, I could not take things for granted. As such, during these interviews I was more active (Holstein & Gubrium 1995, see below) and the interviews, consequently, more “rich”, but also less efficient since explanations were constantly needed. In the two interview situations when I spoke English and the interviewee Polish, I had to rely on my interpreter to convey the meaning of what I said and what the interviewee said. As I have noted in my fieldwork records, I felt on one occasion like a passive observer rather than an active interviewer. Because the woman I interviewed in this case was very talkative and tended to interrupt my interpreter when she was translating to me, I had little chance to follow up on things. It was only afterwards, when I had the translated transcript of the interview, that I could properly understand what had been said during this interview. However, this way, the interviewee could express herself without language barriers (from her side) whereas in other cases when the interviews were performed in English, I noticed sometimes that the interviewee found it difficult to express herself exactly the way she wished.

With the benefit of a little distance to the fieldwork, I can now see what Holstein & Gubrium (1995) mean with the “active interview”. They argue that the ideal of objectivity in interviews (as well as in surveys) is both vain and inappropriate. Interviewers are commonly given advice on how to ask questions so that s/he will not “contaminate” the data, as if the latter was already out there ready to be collected by the researcher. This view implies that surveys or very standardized interviews are more objective than in-depth, semi-, or unstructured interviews as questions are controlled. But
this is a false assumption. From a social constructivist point of view, knowledge is instead understood as something subjective connected to the meaning-making work we all participate in and thus “what passes for knowledge is itself a product of interaction” (Holstein & Gubrium 1995:3). In a way, all interviews are “contaminated” by the researcher as all interviews are “interactional events” – that is, we cannot ask people without interacting with them and consequently we need to acknowledge that there are two parties, or two actors, involved in interview situations (Holstein & Gubrium 1995:2f).

When I interviewed women in Sweden and Poland, we were two individuals who interacted and created a conversation together. Certainly, what “Irena” said, during the hour I interviewed her on a sunny afternoon in a café in central Warsaw, she could just as well have said to anyone asking her about the same topic. Yet, I believe that we both acted and reacted in relation to each other. What she shared with me was both unique and general, because the knowledge she shared with me is not simply something that she has had inside her until the very moment I asked her my questions, but also something created at that very moment in collaboration with me. For instance, I noticed that some interviewees emphasized different things depending on how I posed a question. At one point they seemed to think that cooperation among women’s organizations is easy and frictionless, while at another point they can talk eagerly about tensions and conflicts between organizations. Now, is this a problem? According to Holstein and Gubrium: no. In fact, they see it as an advantage and an asset to be used in order to get more out of interviews. I agree with this. Whenever I asked straightforward questions about conflicts, I only had short answers such as “everything’s fine, we work well together”. More interesting stories were told when I asked about specific events or a specific decision. This is because the interviewees actively selected and constructed parts of their diverse knowledge to share with me depending on what role they promoted (or took on) at various points in the interview (Holstein & Gubrium 1995:30). In the first example, they saw themselves as representatives of the whole movement or of the meta-organization gathering the women’s movement and thus only spoke about unity. In the latter, I helped them to take on the role as a representative of a part of the movement, of a smaller organization that is not always so keen on letting the meta-organization interfere with its own autonomy, for instance, and thus they shared experiences of disagreement and conflict. This also proved to be the most valuable data for me, which is why I agree with Holstein and Gubrium’s claim that, as researchers, we need to be active in interviews.
Data & Material

Because I have interacted with people and been interested in their accounts, their views and their memory of a specific case, the key material is ethnographic.

Interviewee Accounts

In Sweden, 12 interviews were conducted in 2013 and in 2016 (see list below). These include women who are former chairwomen of the SWL; a former chairwoman of the EWL; former EWL board members/Swedish representatives in the EWL; employees at the office of the SWL; and representatives of the SWL member organizations. One interviewee was interviewed twice: the first time in relation to the SWL, focusing on her role as a representative of one of the first member organizations, and the second time in relation to the PWL, focusing on her role as a former EWL chairwoman. In addition, Mikael Gustafsson, Swedish member of the European parliament (Left party) and former Chair of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality was interviewed.

**Interviewees in Sweden**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Astrid”</td>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td>Former chair of SWL, representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Britta”</td>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td>Former chair of SWL, representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Christina”</td>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td>Former chair of SWL, representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Dagny”</td>
<td>April 2013 &amp; April 2016</td>
<td>Former chair of EWL (SWL delegate), and representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Elisabet”</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>Former board member of SWL, representative in EWL Observatory on Violence against Women, and representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Freja”</td>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td>Former SWL representative in EWL and EWL board member, representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Gabriella”</td>
<td>April 2013</td>
<td>Employee at SWL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Helene”</td>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td>Employee at SWL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ingrid”</td>
<td>April 2013</td>
<td>Representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. METHOD

“Jenny” June 2013 Representative of a women’s organization
Mikael May 2013 Swedish member of the European parliament (Left party), and former Chair of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (2011–2014).

In Poland, the situation was different given that there had been several coordinators and different versions of the PWL, and the fact that the first coordinator does not exist anymore. It was also unclear to me when I initiated the fieldwork in Poland whether the PWL itself existed. Consequently, the interviews related to the Polish case had to be more flexible and exploratory – at least at first. In fact, it was not until a couple of weeks of conducting fieldwork in Poland that I realized there was actually no PWL, at least not an active one. As shown in the timelines of chapter 1, the PWL coordinated by DUK had been excluded from the EWL and was suffering from inactivity and internal conflicts, and NEWW was only accepted by the EWL as the Polish “co-ordination” in 2016. Instead, as mentioned earlier, a somewhat “detective-like” work had to be performed, in which endless searches on various websites and asking around led me to one person or organization, which in turn led me to another person or organization, while I was constantly trying to find more information about the PWL on websites and in documents. This technique also led me to feminist activists and/or researchers in Poland who are not directly linked to the PWL, whereas in Sweden all interviewees were directly linked to the SWL, its member organizations, or former member organizations. In some cases, I made contact with Polish interviewees via events such as demonstrations and conferences, and in other cases I came in contact with interviewees via Polish scholars.

In Poland, 14 interviews were conducted in 2016-2018 (see list below). These include women who had been involved in the key organization the National Women’s Information Centre OŚKa (including employees, a director and a board member); women who had been representatives of the PWL (in its different versions); representatives of key Polish women’s organizations; and women who were interviewed in their role as both researchers – with knowledge of the Polish women’s movement field – and activists (and as former employees/representatives of OŚKa, in two cases). I have also conducted a follow-up interview with my first interviewee in Poland as it turned out she became more involved in the initiative to set up a new PWL during the time I conducted my research. As already mentioned, I also conducted a follow-up interview with one of the Swedish
interviewees when I realized she had been the EWL chairwoman during the time the PWL was a member.

### Interviewees in Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Agata”</td>
<td>February 2016 &amp;</td>
<td>Representative of a Polish women’s foundation and regional/international association based in Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Beata”</td>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>Representative of a Polish women’s foundation and regional/international association based in Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Cecylia”</td>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>Representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Dorota”</td>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>Representative of regional/international association based in Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Edyta”</td>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>Representative a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Franciszka”</td>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>Former employee at OŚKa and former representative of PWL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Grażyna”</td>
<td>April 2016</td>
<td>Former representative of PWL, and representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Honorata”</td>
<td>April 2016</td>
<td>Former representative of PWL, and representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Irena”</td>
<td>September 2017</td>
<td>Former OŚKa director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Olga”</td>
<td>September 2017</td>
<td>Former employee at OŚKa, and representative of a women’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Karolina”</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Former employee at OŚKa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Liwia”</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Representative of a feminist organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Martyna”</td>
<td>September 2017</td>
<td>Researcher &amp; activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Wiesława”</td>
<td>April 2018</td>
<td>Former OŚKa board member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With some people I needed to communicate to acquire some basic facts or to understand a limited aspect of something concerning the two cases. In these cases interviews were not necessary. For instance, I learned about both the PWL and the SWL via online communication with several people (see lists below). Most importantly, via E-mail correspondence, Ingegerd Sahl-
ström, the Undersecretary of State at the Gender Equality Unit in the Ministry of Labour during the Social Democratic government in 1995, answered my questions about the government’s relation to the creation of the SWL. I have via e-mail also corresponded with representatives from four organizations which are no longer members of the SWL (see list below). I also re-contacted, via e-mail, one earlier Swedish interviewee, asking her about her memory of the PWL in the EWL. To understand the Polish case, I have spoken (via e-mail and online call), to Dr. Gesine Fuchs, political scientist at Münster University, who has studied the PWL, about her understanding of the first version of the Polish EWL member. Additionally, I have communicated with a former manager of the Batory Foundation for some clarifications regarding OŚKa. In both the Polish and Swedish case, several of the interviewees were contacted by e-mail after the interview to clarify something they had said during the interview or to answer my questions regarding something new which had come up during my research.

E-mail conversations (Swedish case)

Ingegerd Sahlström  June 2013  Former Undersecretary of State at the Gender Equality Unit in the Ministry of Labour (Social Democratic government).

A representative  April 2013  Riksorganisationen Haro
A representative  June 2013  Centerkvinnor/Center Women
A representative  May 2013  Kvinnor för fred/Women for Peace
A representative  June 2013  Liberia Dujar Association

Online conversations (Polish case)

Gesine Fuchs  April 2016  Researcher
Batory Foundation  March 2018  Former Representative

Documents

In addition to talking with or writing to people, I have consulted and analysed written documents such as statutes, annual meeting statements, various women’s organizations’ websites, ministry reports, and news articles, amounting to approximately 1000 pages of text. This has meant that interviews were cross-validated with these other sources of information. In Sweden, a key document has been a booklet published by the SWL itself, which gave information on how the organization saw and wished to present its formation and first ten years of existence (see SWL & Alfredsson 2008). Regarding the formation of the SWL, I have also analysed annual meeting
proceedings and annual reports, which I read at the archive at the SWL’s office in Stockholm. This archive is open to researchers on demand. Recent annual reports and the SWL statutes are available on the SWL’s website. Regarding the resources of the SWL and its relation to the government, I have mainly consulted two “Swedish Government Official Reports”/Committee Reports (SOU 1980:44; SOU 2004:59); government policy reports and propositions; and documents published by state agencies in charge of funding civil society.

While statutes and women’s organizations’ websites are harder to find in Poland, I have found several useful resources online. One key source is an e-mail conversation. This conversation was part of the PWL e-mail account, which was hosted by OŚKa, in which the work and coordination of the first PWL is discussed among its representatives (see OŚKa 2005). Unfortunately, the website of OŚKa, the website of the first version of the PWL, and parts of the website of NEWW do not exist anymore. I have used the search tool Wayback Machine at the Internet Archive, which enabled me to find random snapshots of URL:s of some parts of some old websites. However, I was lucky to be given minutes and reports for the establishment of PWL by (the above mentioned) Gesine Fuchs, who had saved the material from the old OŚKa website (see OŚKa 2004) during her own research on the PWL. The two sources from OŚKa were written in Polish, but translated for me into English. Another important document is a booklet published by DUK (see DUK 2010), generously given to me by one of the interviewees, in which the second version of the PWL is discussed. Other useful information was mainly found on the websites of NEWW, Karat Coalition and DUK.

Regarding the resources of the PWL, and especially in relation to OŚKa, I have mainly consulted annual reports by the Stefan Batory Foundation (Batory Foundation 2005). The Batory Foundation is the Polish office of the international Open Society Institute, which also received funding from the Ford Foundation. Via its “Fund for Women” – a grant program for women’s initiatives – the Batory Foundation provided OŚKa and other Polish women’s organizations with financial resources in the 1990s and early 2000s. From the Ford Foundation, I have retrieved documents via Rockefeller Archive Center, in which its relation to OŚKa is documented. As mentioned above, I also communicated with a former manager of the Batory Foundation for some clarifications regarding the funding of OŚKa.

19 See https://archive.org/web/ for more information about this search tool.
During the whole process of studying the PWL, I have sought information about which organizations were members of the different versions of the PWL. Via the material from OŚKa I know which organizations were members of the first version. However, I do not have information about which organizations joined and remained as members in the second version. In 2013, the PWL had 15 member organizations (PWL 2013), but it remains unknown to me which ones. One interviewee said at the end of the interview that she would e-mail me an updated list of the member organizations, but after several attempts from my side I never received this e-mail.

Regarding the EWL, Strid’s study from 2009 has been instrumental in order to understand its history and role in the EU. However, to better understand the EWL and its relation to its national “co-ordinations”, I have also analysed the statutes, membership rules and other documents and information available on the EWL website. For further understanding of the EWL and its relation to the national-level women’s organizations, I have communicated with several people, via e-mail and online calls: an employee at the EWL secretariat in Brussels; two representatives of the Latvian EWL member about their experience of joining the EWL; and PhD student Claire Lafon, at Université Saint-Louis in Brussels, who has studied the French and Belgian EWL members. Moreover, Lafon was generous enough to share with me her information from the 2016 general assembly of the EWL, at which the situation of the PWL (and other members) was discussed. These communications took place in June 2016 and in April 2018.

**Processing the Material**

Interviews in Sweden and Poland were conducted between spring 2013 and spring 2018. Most interviews were recorded. When recording was not possible, for instance when the interview was done by phone, extensive notes were taken during and immediately after the interview.

As a first step to process the interviews, I transcribed them. This was done word for word, and allowed for pauses, laughs and other such nonverbal expressions to be visible in the transcript. Transcribing was difficult and took longer when the interview had taken place in a café, due to background noise. A handful of words were impossible to hear because of this, but this has not had an impact on my general understanding of the interviewee’s account. Each transcript has been given a date, a number, and a short description of the interviewee – based on her own presentation and information from websites, if available. As an introduction to each interview transcript, I have written a short comment on the setting, such as
location and time, the weather, my own feelings and thoughts, and a first impression of the interviewee. This comment functions as a fieldnote and reminder to myself whenever I read through the transcript.

When quoting interviewees in this study, I have edited the language by deleting all the “er” and “ah”, and some insignificant use of words such as “like” or “yeah”. Swedish quotes have been translated to English by me, whereas Polish quotes were translated by my interpreter shortly after the transcription had been completed, and later edited by me. In all quotes, whether originally spoken in Swedish, English or Polish, I have edited the English in order to make for an easier and more intelligible read. Mostly, this type of editing concerns spelling out what they mean by a certain use of word – for instance, “the lobby” becomes “[the SWL], or anonymizing the name of a person or an organization (when needed) while being careful as to not change the meaning of the account.

The names of all interviewees representing women’s organizations or interviewed as individual activists have been withheld in order to treat their accounts with confidentiality. While true anonymity is difficult to promise, and not always desired by the interviewees, I have chosen to give them anonymity as far as I can due to the tensions apparent within both the Swedish and Polish case. An equally important motive was that I want to direct focus away from individuals and towards organizational issues. Instead, I use pseudonyms based on generic Polish and Swedish female given names such as: “Agata”, “Beata”, “Olga” and “Astrid”, “Britta”, “Helene”. When needed for the analysis, the organization that they represent has been named instead of the pseudonym. I avoid connecting interviewees with a specific organization when personal background conflicts are at risk of being forefronted. Given that the focus is on the process of meta-organizing, rather than on specific organizations or individuals, the reader’s understanding of a scenario described should not be significantly affected by this limitation.

As shown in the lists above, I do name a couple of interviewees – Sahlström and Gustafsson – because as politicians I consider them public figures. Likewise, I have mentioned by name the researchers Fuchs and Lafon. These individuals are not part of the processes that I study, nor are they part of the Swedish or Polish women’s movement field in the sense that the information they have provided me would be considered “sensitive” by actors in the field. They have given me information and a story of the field “from the outside”. In contrast, I have spoken to a few women, in Poland, who are both researchers of the Polish women’s movement and feminist
activists and/or representatives of a women’s organization. As such, they are both “inside” and “outside” of the field, and consequently not named.

The Analytical Procedure

Parts of the material – i.e. interviews – are ethnographic, but the study itself is based on a theory-driven process. From the very start, I was interested in meta-organizational issues and the intricate question of what happens when social movement actors attempt to make the movement more organized.

However, the Polish Women’s Lobby (PWL), and the Polish women’s organizations’ relation to the EWL, confused me. Because I had already studied the Swedish Women’s Lobby (see Karlberg & Jacobsson 2015; Karlberg 2017) during my master’s studies, I had a certain idea about how the establishment of a EWL national “co-ordination” would look. First of all, I expected there to be a clearly-defined organization in Poland. Instead, it was unclear whether the PWL even existed and, if it did, who represented it. In Sweden, on the other hand, the situation of the present SWL was unambiguous. Even though the events surrounding the establishment of the SWL and an internal crisis of the meta-organization which had happened more than 10 years ago were unclear and difficult to understand, it was in general easy to find information about the SWL and to find people to interview. As mentioned above, the SWL has a website with contact details for all of its representatives, it has an office, employees and an archive of saved documents, such as meeting minutes and reports. In Poland, there is no website for the PWL, no office, and no one had (or wanted to share with me) access to the old proceedings and lists of member organizations. It was also uncertain if there existed someone who represented the PWL. The organization and contact person I initially spoke to, and whom I thought was one of the representatives of the PWL, referred me to another person and organization. It took me a while before I could interview this person, and meanwhile other women I interviewed argued that there was no PWL, or that it was inactive. When I finally spoke to the woman I had been referred to, I was, to say the least, confused. She confirmed, however, that the PWL did indeed still exist and that her organization was the coordinator of it, but that the PWL had been struggling financially, thus making it less active. After several interviews and endless hours searching for information on websites and previous research about the PWL, I was not only confused but also concerned. It had become clear to me that the PWL was not an established organization in a stable situation, but rather a project run by another
organization, which was not appreciated by several other women’s organizations. There were, apparently, tensions among (at least some of) the women’s organization regarding the PWL. Moreover, I had found out that there had been a previous version of the PWL, coordinated by an organization which definitely did not exist anymore, and which had not left any documentation behind it, and that this organization had suffered from internal conflicts that interviewees were hesitant to talk about. How could I study an organization which was, in a sense, inactive and, in another sense, did not exist anymore? And which, furthermore, was in embroiled in conflicts? After some months of doubt, instead of seeing this as a problem or a drawback for my study, I started to see it as a strength, and as a particularly interesting case of intra-organizational tensions in a social movement field.

If the initial study of the SWL had directed me towards the concept of meta-organization, the study of the PWL rather directed me to the question of why organization in social movements is complicated/challenging and the concept of partial organization. The case of the SWL showed that meta-organization is complicated and that the internal relations are inherently conflictual. However, the case of the PWL showed instead that even when a meta-organization is not “in place”, there are meta-organizational tensions and that a meta-organization does not necessarily be formed as a new and separate organization but coordinated by an existing organization as its “side project”. This insight led me to the general question of what it means/entails that a social movement becomes (more) organized, because meta-organizations too can be partially organized. As such, the research process has been theory-driven and iterative. The Polish case helped me to broaden my view, to look beyond my initial static view on meta-organizations.

If the SWL was well-funded, supported by the Swedish government, and an established meta-organization that was able to be active in the EWL (as one interviewee had said, the SWL is appreciated by the EWL because it, compared to many other members, is good at replying to e-mails and sent motions), how was the situation for less privileged women’s organizations in other countries? While studying the SWL, I came across research (see Hašková 2005; Roth 2007; Sudbery 2010; Císař & Vráblíková 2010) on the situation of women’s organizations in Central and Eastern Europe during the EU accession, which suggested to me that the SWL is an “extreme case”, in the sense of being particularly well equipped with the resources needed to participate in the EWL. Research on Central and Eastern European women’s organization and the EU also informed me that the European level is of particular interest to these women’s organizations, in comparison to Swe-
dish women’s organizations, in terms of leverage and empowerment vis-à-vis their domestic governments and parliaments.

The analysis was to a large extent defined by the idea of meta-organization as one aspect of Europeanizing the women’s movement at national level, and consequently the starting point was organization. However, with time “in the field” in Poland, and exposure to movement literature, my interest also turned towards social movement issues. It was soon obvious that compared to the Swedish case, the Polish women’s movement had a harder time reaching and adapting to international structures. It also became apparent that the Polish women’s movement was less organized and more resistant to organization on movement level, compared to the Swedish women’s movement and its many membership-based associations and institutionalized paths to the state. Whereas Swedish interviewees seemed to take meta-organizing of the movement and government connections for granted, the Polish interviewees expressed ideas about autonomy, resistance, “safe space”, non-hierarchy, participation, protest, networking and grassroots – that is, movement ideals – much more. Yet, at the same time, they discussed the need for NGOs, organizational resources and competence, formal structure, decisions and membership. In Sweden, too, this ambiguity was apparent. Even though Swedish interviewees tended to take the high level of organization for granted, they also expressed that there is a difficulty in trying to combine the necessity of organization with social movement ideals. These sentiments were foremost expressed when the SWL was criticized – for instance for not being in touch with its grassroots and for not being sufficiently independent (from institutionalized politics). Through comparing the PWL to the SWL, it became clear to me that the processes of organizing the Swedish and the Polish women’s movement in relation to the EU and EWL, at their core, concerned tensions at the junction of social movement and organization. This tension thus added to my understanding of the meta-organizational issues and why it is a challenge to set up meta-organizational structures for a social movement at national level.

A key insight that the Polish empirical data provided me with was that a meta-organization does not necessarily have to be a “complete” organization. It can be run as a project, and be attached to an organization. This finding opened up for the view of organization as partial, decided and based on the five elements presented in the previous chapter. The empirical data of the Polish case, which had initially confused me, turned out to move the analysis forward by helping me to see organization beyond entity and “com-
plete” organization. This further inspired the idea mentioned above, that organizing in movements creates tensions.

The research process was, as pointed out, theory-driven and iterative. The iteration was due to the difficulties and ambiguities which the data constantly provided me with. The analysis is thus a result of both theory-driven ideas and ideas originating in processing and analysing the material.

Ethical Considerations

To agree to be interviewed by a researcher and thereby expose oneself to a stranger – a stranger who, furthermore, might quote you in an academic text – is a difficult choice. I feel great gratitude and responsibility towards everyone I have interviewed, or in other ways asked questions, during this research process. I would therefore like to end this chapter by reflecting on ethics in the research process. First, as is the convention in the social sciences when conducting ethnographic methods (Aspers 2011), I always explained who I was and what my research was about in the e-mails I sent to those I wanted to interview. When we met, I started the interview by, again, explaining who I was, my research interest and what the study was about. Of course, at the point of conducting fieldwork, the exact aim and research questions were not formulated, but I could inform them of the general purpose of the study. I always asked if I could record the interview and explained that it was only me (and in a few cases my interpreter) who would listen to the recording and read the transcript. As mentioned, I have used pseudonyms when referring to the interviewees (except for the two public figures), but it is not possible guarantee anonymity only confidentiality (Vetenskapsrådet 2017:41). I informed them that I would not refer to them by name in my research, but asked if the name of their organization could be referred to. This was always agreed to, and some interviewees even said they did not mind if I would refer to them by name. In the process of writing, however, I decided that it was best not to connect a pseudonym with a specific organization, to safeguard discretion when personal conflicts were involved, or when a statement by an organization representative could be interpreted as a critique of another organization or its representative. The field of women’s organizations in a country is, after all, a small world and I do not want to contribute to possible tensions and conflicts within it. Instead, I want to divert focus away from the interpersonal and towards the organizational.
Second, it is important to consider power relations when conducting fieldwork. Because the interviews concerned organizations and organizational processes and relations within a social movement field, I did not interview the women as individuals. I was not interested in their personal lives and have to date very little knowledge about their personal background, such as social class, level of education or marital status. Instead, I interviewed “NGO experts”, organizations’ representatives and public figures – some of them were used to being interviewed about their work and women’s rights issues. Most were also older than me, with a long history within the women’s movement. I feel that this was to my advantage: it made interviewees relaxed and certain of their own knowledge (gave them confidence) and sometimes I noticed they felt the need to explain things further because I was “so young and probably did not know about this”. For the most part, interviewees saw me as a student interested in women’s organizing and relation to the EU. They were the ones with the knowledge who explained things to an interested listener. However, with some women it happened that their immediate behaviour towards me was influenced by their habit of talking to journalists or politicians (i.e. trying to convince or defend themselves). Once I reminded them of my role, by proving my unfamiliarity with a certain issue, or by simply showing my personal feminist commitments, they soon changed attitude by becoming relaxed and welcoming. In Poland, on the other hand, I did notice with some interviewees that the power relation between us was unbalanced, to their disadvantage. During two interviews, which were conducted in English, I noticed at the start that the interviewee was unsure of herself due to language barriers. Luckily, this changed over the course of the interview. When an interviewee did not seem to find her words, I assisted by suggesting she say it in Polish (because I had started to pick up some basic Polish by then) or German (which is a common second language in Poland and close to Swedish), or by asking if she meant this or that word. It always worked!

There is another issue concerning power relations in Poland. Not only was I seen as the student from Sweden interested in the Polish women’s movement and its organizing in relation to the EU, sometimes I was also seen as a representative of a country with a “successful” women’s movement, and a “successful” membership in the EWL. In a few cases I got the impression that I was seen as someone who was “inspecting” the Polish women’s movement when interviewees nearly apologized for their organization’s lack of resources, the conflicts within the movement, or the movement’s “inability” to remain in the EWL. Was I contributing to a wes-
ternized view of movements and feminism? Did I convey a colonial view of the Polish women’s movement as “lagging behind”? (cf. Koobak & Marling 2014)? To tackle this imbalance, I emphasized my understanding of the difficult situation in which Polish women’s organizations find themselves due to the stigmatization of feminism and general lack of financial resources. I also stressed that I was aware of the privileged situation of the Swedish women’s movement, and underlined that conflicts and tensions are common in Sweden too, not least within the SWL. At one point, I also made it clear that the importance of a Polish or Swedish Women’s Lobby is not something self-evident, and that the possibility of representing a whole movement could be questioned.
CHAPTER 4.

The Social Landscapes of Two
Women’s Movements

The focus of this thesis is set on the Swedish and Polish women’s movements’ adaptation to international structures by implementing a meta-organizational structure. The predefined organizational forms that this adaptation entails, and the challenges this poses to the Swedish and Polish women’s movements, can only be understood if the specific historical, political and cultural settings which shape conditions for women, and for women’s organizing, are explored first. Following the theoretical discussions in Chapter 2, and the analytical model presented, it is obvious that movement specific elements may collide or accord with organization and that conditions for meta-organizing depend on the setting in which the Swedish and Polish women’s movements exist. A contextual presentation including relevant aspects of the Swedish and Polish settings is therefore given here.

Sweden and Gender Equality

In international comparison, Sweden is one of the most gender equal countries. Sweden is for instance ranked number four both in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap report (WEF 2016) and the United Nations’ Human Development Report (UNDP 2016), meaning it has a low degree of gender inequality according to the criteria of the two rankings.20

20 In the 2015 ranking by UNDP, Sweden was listed number four out of 188 countries on the Gender Inequality Index (GII), and in the WEF Global Gender Gap Index Sweden is ranked number four out of 144 countries. The GII measures maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; the proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females; the proportion of adults with at least secondary education; and the rate of women and men participating in the labour force (UNDP 2016). The WEF index on gender equality is more extensive but measures similar aspects such as: female labour force participation, wage equality and ratio of female managers; female literacy and ratio of secondary education; female healthy life expectancy; ratio of female seats in parliament and at ministerial level, and number of years with a female head of state (WEF 2016).
Following Esping-Andersen’s (2013) ideas of the three welfare regimes, Sweden can be described as a Social-Democratic welfare regime since it offers individual independence for women (and men) through universal social benefits, individual taxation, an extended public childcare and paid gender-neutral parental leave. Regarding gender equality in the labour market, 79% of Swedish women participate in the labour force (WEF 2016) – a relatively high score. More than any of a factor, the Swedish state’s provision of child care and extended parental leave has encouraged and enabled this. Regarding women’s political representation, too, Sweden scores high on gender indexes: 43.6% of Swedish Parliamentarians are women (since the election in 2014, SCB 2015), and in 2016, female ministers made up 50% of the government (SCB 2016:93). Regarding women’s reproductive rights, abortion has been legal in all cases (up to week 18) since 1974.21

Despite a relatively high level of gender equality, Sweden suffers from a gender-segregated labour market (women work predominantly within the public sector), which impacts the gender pay gap: women earn 86% of what men earn. Women also tend to work part-time more than men; and unpaid household work is not equally divided between the sexes (SCB 2014, see also Borchorst & Siim 2002:95).22

Yet, as mentioned, Sweden is among the most gender-equal countries in the world according to international rankings. Florin and Nilsson (2000), and Peterson (2016), argue that the women’s movement played a major role in the implementation of feminist and women-friendly policies as well as in the creation of a widespread positive attitude towards gender equality. As several researchers demonstrate (Peterson 2016; Thomsson 2000; Florin & Nilsson 2000; Dahlerup 1986), there is a complex and intertwined network of actors working both within and outside the state: major women’s movement organizations, grassroots feminist activists and groups, feminist journalists, academics, but also “femocrats” and women within unions, political

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21 The abortion issue is interesting here because in the 1950s and 60s, there was a debate on the “Poland trips”: many Swedish women went to Poland to have legal abortions (Florin and Nilsson 2000:32; Lennerhed 2016). Nowadays, the trips go the other way, at least for those Polish women who can afford an abortion abroad.

22 Even though women still take the major responsibility for childcare and domestic chores, Swedish men are increasingly taking the opportunity to go on parental leave. However, the pace is slow: in 2014 fathers took 25% of the total provided parental leave (SCB 2014).
4. THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPES OF TWO WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

parties and the government. Social movements interact with the state at multiple levels (Peterson 2016:333).

This complicated interaction of intertwined actors began in the 1920s and 1930s when an equal rights ideology within the Social Democratic Party and its concept of “Folkhemmet”, the “People’s Home”, paved the way for the gender equality politics that we can see the results of today (Florin & Nilsson 2000:21ff; Sörensen & Bergqvist 2002:20). However, it was during “the radical years” of the 1960s and 1970s that gender equality really became an issue and was widely discussed. In a famous speech in 1972, Prime Minister Palme argued that the government wanted to remove all obstacles to women’s equal rights and equal opportunities (Florin & Nilsson 2000:11). During “the radical years”, gender equality became an accepted and given goal in politics and new laws and policies with the aiming to achieve equality between the sexes were implemented within a relatively short period of time. What happened during the 1960s and 1970s certainly opened and paved way for an institutionalized path for women’s demands via bureaucracy, the party system and established organizations as the government together with various actors created legitimacy and urgency for gender equality and women-friendly policies (Florin & Nilsson 2000:18f).

Swedish Civil Society

Scandinavian countries share a certain peculiarity regarding their universalist welfare states, where civil society has traditionally played the role of interest representation and interest input rather than welfare service provider (Wijkström & Zimmer 2011:11). Civil society actors have traditionally been involved in the state’s policy design, acting as carriers of ideas and as pressure groups (Wijkström 1997). There has, however, been a shift away from voice and a move towards more social service provision (Wijkström & Zimmer 2011:13; Kings & Kravchenko 2018). Yet, Swedish civil society is characterized by a relative high level of “interconnectedness with the political sphere”, in which organizations are established partners of the state (Wijkström & Zimmer 2011:11).

Swedish civil society has historically been characterized by a high level of participation in organizations. The “Popular Movements” (“Folkrörelser-

23 “Femocrat” is a term composed of the words feminist and bureaucrat, used to describe those feminists who have entered the state bureaucracy. It is most commonly used within Australian gender and feminist studies. See for instance: Eisenstein, H. (1991). Speaking for women? Voices from the Australian femocrat experiment, Australian Feminist Studies, 6:14, 29-42.
na”) in the early 20th century – such as the union, labour, temperance and revival movements – were based on membership in formal organizations (associations) and have inspired later ways of organizing (cf. Trägårdh 2007:2f; Papakostas 2009). There is a trend towards more “memberless” organizations in civil society and more volunteer-, donor-, and professionalized organizations (Papakostas 2012; Wijkström & Zimmer 2011:14), yet Swedish civil society is still strongly shaped by membership in associations. Another peculiarity in Sweden is that the membership-based organizations share a tradition of internal democratic structures and practices in terms of elected representatives and annual meetings, which has given them an important role as democratic educators. Typically functioning in a corporatist relationship to the state, these associations regularly participate in the political sphere as referral bodies (Wijkström & Zimmer 2011:11).24

Swedish civil society is also characterized by a tendency to form national federations gathering a group, interest or movement.25 There are national federations for almost all interests, such as: teachers, the visually impaired, sports genres, the Saami people, and various immigrant communities. A national federation is a type of umbrella organization – it is the highest vertical level of an organization with local or regional sub-levels (Wijkström & Zimmer 2011:14). This form of organizing is so common that, for instance, Iranians in Sweden who wanted to organize voluntarily as Iranians soon adapted to the Swedish context by forming the Federation of Iranian Associations (Emami 2003)

The Swedish Women’s Movement
The key organization during the first wave of the women’s movement in Sweden was the Fredrika Bremer Association (FBA). Fredrika Bremer (b. 1801), a writer and agitator for women’s rights, raised the issue of the position of unmarried women in her novel Hertha (1856). This led to a debate in Parliament and contributed to a new law that gave adult unmarried women legal status after the age of 25 (Manns 2000).

Another important organization was the National Association for Women’s Suffrage (LKPR), which at its peak in 1913 organized over 17 000 women (Manns 2000:22). Parts of the first wave of the women’s movement in Sweden were also connected to the labour movement and many of the political parties’ women’s wings were founded during this first wave: the

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24 “Remissinstanser” in Swedish.
25 ”Riksförbund” in Swedish.
Left Federation of Swedish Women (SKV) was established in 1914, the Social Democratic Women of Sweden (S-women) in 1920, and the Centre Women in 1932 (Eduards 1985). Party-political women’s organizations and groups have been relatively prominent and influential as opinion makers within Swedish politics, and have also taken up a large space within the women’s movement. S-women, in particular, has been strong and influential (Dahlerup & Gulli 1985:16). Another important organization within the first wave was the National Council of Women in Sweden, founded in 1896 as an umbrella organization for the movement and part of the wider International Council of women (ICW). What is interesting in the case of the Swedish member is that it dissolved in 1981, whereas its counterparts in other Scandinavian countries are still active, especially the Danish Council of Women which has a broad base and functions as the main actor in the field and the Danish EWL member (Dahlerup & Gulli 1985:14). The Swedish umbrella organization dissolved because the party-political women’s organizations withdrew from it in the 1940s. As much as party-political women’s organizations have been important actors throughout the 20th century, at times these organizations have also contributed to a divide within the women’s movement. One of the reasons, according to Acker (1992:6), is that “in the labour movement, independent feminist organizations that might unite women across party and class lines were seen as a bourgeois movement that presented a danger to the unity of men and women in the working class”. Thus, in the 1940s and 1950s, the Swedish women’s movement was to some extent “in abeyance” (cf. Taylor 1989).

In the 1960s and 1970s, a “new women’s movement” grew out of the New Left. Focus was at first set on working women. However, moving towards feminist socialism, many organizations shifted their focus towards sexual oppression, prostitution and pornography (Dahlerup & Gulli 1985:26). The two decades of the 1960s and 1970s was the time when the new women’s movement flourished, not only in Sweden but internationally. New organizations, groups, communities and networks were established and emerged. They differed from their sisters in the traditional women’s movement both in their goals and actions, and in regard to their ways of organizing. First, the basis was solidarity and sisterhood, as liberation from patriarchy was the goal, and many groups thus focused on consciousness-raising. The point in meeting and organizing was for women to learn and be aware of oppression and how to fight it. For this reason, only women could participate – which is different compared to for instance FBF which is still accepting men as members. Second, they avoided formalizing and instead
aimed for smaller, autonomous groups or organizations which were anti-
hierarchical with horizontal structures. Dahlerup and Gulli (1985:21) point
out that “the way was the goal”, walking the talk was the way to achieve
women’s liberation. Yet, some organizations, such as Group 8, became
more formalized and less horizontal with time. Instead of operating within
institutionalized politics – that is, within state institutions and parliament –
and trying to amend how things work, the new women’s movement wanted
to fight for systemic and disruptive change from outside of institutionalized
politics (Dahlerup & Gulli 1985:24). Protest and consciousness-raising were
common activities during this time.

The influence and effectiveness of women’s activists and women’s
organizations in dealing with the state and institutionalizing gender equality
is demonstrated in a number of key moments in the history of the new Swe-
dish women’s movement. In 1976, new and old women’s organizations all
over the country joined forces and raised objection to an official govern-
ment report on rape and sexual abuse. The main actor within the field of
these new feminist organizations, Group 8, initiated an appeal that several
key women’s organizations supported, among them FBF, Lesbian Front,
and all the main parties’ women’s wings (Thomsson 2000:51f). The aim of
the report was to investigate the code on violations’ regulations regarding
public-order crime with an ambition to contribute to a “modernized” view
on sexual life, which in practice meant that the crime of rape would be
made less serious, the terminology would change and penalties be miti-
gated. Representatives from 13 women’s organizations met in Stockholm
and wrote a joint statement which was sent to the Ministry of Justice de-
manding a new report and a new group of authors comprising more
women. In this statement, they objected the way women were depicted as
sexual objects, as constantly available to men, and they underlined the
report’s use of “sexual liberal” arguments to justify sexual assault. They also
emphasized that despite diverging goals and political views they had de-
cided to criticize the report as it was urgent for them as women. For Group
8’s members it was important to create an inclusive cooperation, as they
wanted to attract women who normally would not sympathize with femi-
nists and the new women’s movement, and they proved to be rather suc-
cessful in getting women to join forces (Thomsson 2000:53f). However, the
organization S-women did not participate due to its loyalty towards the
Social Democratic party.

Parliament decided to dismiss the report and appoint four female mem-
bers of parliament to write a new one. The influence of the women’s move-
ment here is evident and has become typical for the state-movement relation: many women’s organizations have for a long time functioned as referral bodies and been seen as specialists on certain public policies (Dahlerup & Gulli 1985:35). Yet, this role is only possible for those women’s organizations that have adapted to formal representation structures. The Swedish women’s movement field is thus typically dominated by large associations – even though there are many other types of women’s organizations, groups and networks which are less visible and have fewer resources (cf. SOU 2004:79).

Following the debate on rape and violence against women, a women’s shelter movement emerged in the early 1980s. In 1981, several women’s shelters had their first national meeting which led to a demand for state funding. Since then, the women’s shelter movement has been strong in Sweden, with ROKS and Unizon as the main national umbrella organizations. The issue of violence against women was also important to the movement and had a uniting force. Feminists and women’s groups protested at local level. For instance, in 1983, women in the city of Umeå occupied a women’s house, which resulted in negotiations with the municipal government and the decision to establish a women’s shelter in the city (Peterson 2016:330f).

The actions of the women’s movement, and its focus on gender-based violence were highly effective, and in the 1990s, domestic violence became part of the gender equality political agenda.

During the 1980s, the women’s movement in Sweden diversified, as new activities, interests and groups were spreading. Activities such as self-defence, women’s papers, bands, theatre groups and crisis centres were common. Day-care, women’s employment, violence against women, pornography and prostitution were politicized in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the Women’s Front (“Kvinnofronten”) – a feminist organization organizing women’s circles – initiated several protests and actions against pornography in the late 1980s called the “people’s campaign against porn”. Peterson (2016:33) points out that during this time internal disputes and ideological splits led to many new women’s organizations. An attitude of “don’t join us, do what we do”, and new differences between women on the lines of generation, ethnicity and class also contributed to a greater diversity within the new women’s movement (Borchorst & Siim 2002:93). Thus, in the 1990s, the women’s movement was on the one hand specialized, fragmented, and weak because there was no common platform for mobilization and resource.

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26 Unizon is formerly known as ”Sveriges Kvinn- och Tjejjourer Riksförbund” (SKR).
building (Peterson 2016:33). On the other hand, one of the most noted events within the women’s movement took place in 1991 when all political parties’ women’s wings came together under a coalition called the Support Stockings (“Stödstrumporna”), after the representation of women in Parliament had fallen worryingly.\textsuperscript{27} This coalition was active until the next national election as they demanded improved female representation in all elected assemblies and threatened to form a women’s political party (SOU 2004:55). In the 1994 election, the number of women elected to the parliament was record high. Thus, having achieved their goal, the coalition dissolved as there were no other issues they could agree on (Rönnblom 2002).

In the 1990s, the Swedish women’s movement experienced an increased internationalization connected to the Swedish EU membership and the UN Beijing Platform for Action in 1995. Swedish women were more sceptical towards the EU than men: a majority of women voted no to EU membership in the 1994 referendum whereas a majority of men voted yes. This difference is still apparent as more women than men have a negative opinion on EU membership (SCB 2016). It has been highlighted that the EU posed a threat to gender equality, and that the Swedish women’s movement had “more to give than to gain” in joining the EU given the strong Swedish gender equality laws and policies (Roth 2008:4; see also Hellgren & Hobson 2008). As we will see, the SWL is concerned about protecting existing gender equality measures in Sweden from international policies that might challenge these achievements, and their lobbying activities at EU level are more focused on improving policies for women in other countries and spreading a “Swedish model” for gender equality. The EU membership also brought other new women’s organizations: The Women’s Council of Sweden, the Western Swedish Women’s Lobby and the Swedish Women’s European Network were formed in the 1990s in relation to the EU membership.\textsuperscript{28}

Today, many of the organizations presented above are still in operation and play significant roles in the Swedish women’s movement. From the first wave, the Fredrika Bremer Association is still one of the most visible organizations and one with a lot of resources. From the radical years of the new women’s movement only the Women’s Front and Lesbian Front still exist, while Group 8 has dissolved. ROKS and Unizon are still the main shelter organizations. Many new organizations have appeared in the field such as immigrant women’s associations, media-critical women’s groups, women’s

\textsuperscript{27} Inspired by the Redstockings, a radical women’s movement group in New York in 1969.  
\textsuperscript{28} “Sveriges Quinnoråd” (SweQ), “Västsvenska Quinnors Lobby” (VSQL) and “Svenska Kvinnors Europänätverk” (SKEN) in Swedish.
organizations for various business sectors, organizations working against sexual violence, girls’ groups, women’s organizations fighting honour-related violence, local women’s and girls’ shelters, and feminist forums in social media. In 2005, the political party Feminist Initiative was founded and in 2014 it won one seat in the European Parliament (which it lost in 2019). Even though Feminist Initiative has not attained a seat in the national parliament, it does have seats in some municipal councils. It also forms a voice in public debates and has successfully gained attention since its foundation.

The main split within the Swedish women’s movement today is based on ideology, in three ways: first, between the party-political women’s organizations who are not able to agree and work together due to their party loyalties. Second, there is a split between party political women’s organizations and the rest of the women’s movement, given that the former are a different type of organization with strong political agendas overshadowing pure women’s or feminist issues, and the latter is seen as, and see themselves as, more independent and autonomous – as the “real” women’s movement. Third, there is a split between more radical feminist organizations, emphasizing the importance of seeing the problems with patriarchy and the structural oppression of women, and those which are more liberal feminist or traditional women’s organizations focusing on women’s equal rights, career and representation.

Regarding coalitions, the Swedish women’s movement has typically united around single issues, such as women’s political representation and sexual abuse. Compared to other issue groups, there have been few attempts at forming formal coalitions. The shelter organizations Unizon and ROKS gather local shelter organizations. However, there has not been a national federation for the whole of the women’s movement (SOU 2004). As Dahlerup and Gulli (1985:15) emphasized, it has been difficult to form coalitions on a strategic, long term basis because of the splits within the movement pointed out above. Thus, the Swedish Women’s Lobby from 1997 is unprecedented as it aims at gathering the whole movement under a formal umbrella organization.

Poland and Gender Equality

In international comparison, the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap report (WEF 2016) and the United Nations’ Human Development
Report (UNDP 2016), rank Poland 30 (out of 188 countries) and 38 (out of 144 countries) respectively.

Gender equality during state socialism in Poland was ambivalent. Women enjoyed formal equality and, as Grabowska (2013:3) argues, state socialism entailed higher levels of literacy and higher educational levels for women. However, gender equality was mainly symbolic (Einhorn & Sever 2003:168), as in practice women earned less than men, few women had positions in politics and management (Fuszara 2005:1064), and the state ignored the unequal division of labour at home (Einhorn 2002). Women’s situation created a constant feeling of guilt given that the roles of mother, homemaker, worker and active citizen were impossible to live up to at the same time. Ambivalent gender equality politics during state socialism and the authorities’ assertion that gender equality came with worker’s liberation has left a bitter taste: women felt obliged to accept an imposed view of gender equality while in practice they experienced the opposite. Gender inequality was not discussed and consequently, without an acknowledged frame and legitimate problem, women were left without the means to raise their voices against their oppression (Fuszara 2005:1064).

Since the change of political and economic system in 1989, there has been a revival of the traditional family model in which the symbolism of “Matka Polka” – the Polish Mother – is present. Matka Polka is a maternal, caring and feminine figure who enjoys a worshipped place within the family. At the start of the new millennium “many women in Poland [saw] their position in the family as one of strength” (Einhorn 2002:64), and the family (together with the Catholic Church) functioned for many as a uniting force against an oppressive state during state socialism (Einhorn 2002:60). If the second wave of feminism in the West advocated for women’s right to escape the home, Einhorn (2002:60) argues that for women in Poland, it has rather been seen as empowering to have the choice between working and staying at home.

Regarding politics today, measures on gender equality have been ambivalent. For instance, a “Plenipotentiary for Women’s Affairs”, a branch of the Council Ministers’ Office, was set up by the first democratic government (Malinowska 2001:197). However, it was later changed to “Plenipotentiary for Family and Women’s Affairs”, and in 1997 the coalition government of the Solidarity Election Action and the right-wing Freedom Union left out the word “women” and directed focus away from gender equality issues to the problems facing the Polish family (Malinowska 2001:198; Fuchs 2006:58). Particularly the conservative Law and Justice (PiS)
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governments in 1997-2001, and 2005-2007 meant that formerly gender equality policies were lost or threatened (Fuchs 2006:58). Since PiS regained power in 2015, this direction has continued (Graff & Korolczuk 2017a; 2017b). After EU accession and adjustments to the acquis communautaire there was initially a change within the public discourse as gender inequality was legitimized as a real problem (Grabowska 2013:4). However, because the economic sphere and labour market are the main concern for the EU, EU membership has not had any profound impact on gender equality and women’s rights in Polish politics (Grabowska 2013:10).

Perhaps the most crucial issue for women and the Polish women’s movement after 1989 has been sexual and reproductive rights issues, and especially the right to abortion – something of which recent protests are a clear sign. During communist rule, Poland had a liberal abortion law. In the 1960s, many Swedish women, for instance, came to Poland to get an abortion because abortion was restricted in Sweden until 1974 (see Lennerhed 2016). However, in the summer of 1989, the right to abortion in Poland was challenged due to a proposed bill which that make abortion illegal again (as it was before 1932). In 1993, Parliament enacted restrictions that mean that Poland today has one of the strictest abortion laws in Europe, next to Ireland and Malta. Only in cases of rape, severe damage to the foetus or when the woman’s life is in real danger is she permitted to have a legal abortion (UN 2002). Recently, the abortion law has been brought into question and condemned as being too liberal and a bill that would make abortion illegal in all cases was proposed and sent to parliament in 2016. The bill was initiated by anti-abortion groups and representatives from the Catholic Church (Grzebalska & Petö 2018). The abortion issue has been a much-debated and controversial topic for several decades now. The constant threat to women’s reproductive rights and right to their own bodies has been a uniting and mobilizing factor for Polish women’s movements. Large-scale mobilizations around the issue have been frequent since the early 1990s. Most recently, as presented in chapter 1, women protested and went on strike under the slogan “Black Protest” due to the proposed total ban on abortion in 2016.

As Graff and Korolczuk (2017a; 2017b) and Petö (2015) point out, there is a strong anti-feminist and anti-gender mobilization in Poland.29 An already negative attitude and public debate around feminism and the notion

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29 As these researchers also point out, the anti-feminist and anti-gender mobilization is not restricted to Poland, but has also been discussed as an issue in Hungary, Turkey, Sweden.
of gender has lately become harsher. For instance, in 2013 the bishop Tadeusz Pieronek stated that “gender ideology is worse than communism and Nazism put together” (quoted in Graff & Korolczuk 2017a). Grabowska (2013:6) reports that in 2012, the former Polish Minister of Justice, Jarosław Gowin, “criticized the Council of Europe’s convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence and claimed that the convention is an expression of feminist ideology and thus threatens traditional family values” (Grabowska 2013:7). Catholic critics see feminism as social engineering and compare it with communism, as seen in the above statement by the bishop. These are two extreme examples, yet it is not uncommon for politicians, religious and other public figures to criticize and express a very negative view on feminism and what it is sometimes called the “gender ideology”. A turn to the right in Polish politics is one of the reasons for this harshened public debate. Within the anti-gender mobilization in Poland, feminism and “gender” are often depicted as an international conspiracy against local traditions and values, and against common decent people. Graff and Korolczuk (2017b:2f) argue that “the anti-gender movement link ideological colonization with economic power – a power crucially described as located in transnational institutions and corporations”. The recent combination of neoliberal and reinforced conservative sentiments in Poland has made it even harder for the women’s movement to win legitimacy and fight for women’s rights.

Polish Civil Society

After the end of communism, social scientists anticipated an outburst of protests and a reinforcement of civil society participation in Central and Eastern Europe (Cisar 2017). Yet, a lively civil society did not appear in Poland, at least not in the way that was expected. Polish civil society has been characterized as weak and social engagement as low. For instance, Poland has among the lowest voter turnout in Europe as it has rarely passed 50 % since 1991 (Electionguide 2019) and, similarly, participation in civil society organizations has been low (Cisar 2017).

Analysing the strength of civil society in post-communist societies based on other data than the level of voluntary membership in associations, Ekiert and Foa (2011) reveal a different picture. Poland has a pluralistic civil society with many organizations but also high turnover as various sectors and movements tend to be fragmented and marked by competition (Ekiert & Foa 2011:23). Jacobsson (2013) argues that Polish civil society is shaped by “multiplication by conflict”: interpersonal conflicts, general mistrust and
competition within a field lead to splits and fragmentations, leading to a civil society characterized by many new organizations and initiatives but few coalitions and long-lasting structures of cooperation. One major reason behind the many and “memberless” organizations in Polish civil society since 1989 has been a process of NGO-ization. American and West European foundations started to heavily invest in, fund and initiate new NGOs as soon as they could after the collapse of communism to build a civil society in the region (Císař 2017; Ghodsee 2004:224; Mendelson & Glenn 2002). However, many of these NGOs lack a grassroots base and few are based on membership. Instead, they are based on a small group of employees (cf. Císař 2017; Ghodsee 2004). In connection to the Eastern enlargement of the EU, many Western foundations left the region. The region was no longer considered by the Western foundations to be in need of their support. Partly because Poland and other new member states could receive EU funding, and partly because the civil society in the region was considered to be “built up” and organizationally developed. The change in funding relations had a huge impact on Polish civil society organizations, who struggled to survive financially on their own (Ekiert & Foa 2011).

Initially at least, international funding was beneficial for the Polish civil society. It provided civil society organizations a source of political autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Thanks to external funding, some organizations could challenge and oppose prevailing social norms, a process which Císař (2017) calls “democratic channeling”. On the other hand, international funding led to competition for funds within a movement or sector, and a major part of civil society actors became dependent on foreign funding and patronage instead of mobilizing people locally. Several researchers argue that the NGOs that emerged were not based on grassroots initiatives and participation, nor were they anchored in the local community and its needs (Císař 2017; McMahon 2001; Mendelson & Glenn 2002). The perceived “weakness” could thus be understood as a consequence of Western intervention and international actors imposing a certain organizational structure – that of the NGO (see Ghodsee 2004).

Others have pointed out other forms of collective action than NGOs and mass-mobilization (Jacobsson & Saxonberg 2013). Petrova and Tarrow (2007) argue for instance that networking advocacy organizations making claims in the name of someone rather than making use of members is common in post-communist societies. And Jacobsson (2013:31) argues that
Polish civil society is not weak at all, but that it is in fact innovative and has simply adapted to what is the most effective way given the circumstances.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{The Polish Women’s Movement}

The legacy of communism has played an important role in the case of the PWL. There were two formal women’s movement organizations that were officially acknowledged during the communist regime: the Polish Women’s League\textsuperscript{31} founded in 1945, and the Circle of Rural Housewives (CRH) founded in 1877 (Malinowska 2001). The League was an initiative from the communist party and had to “perform ideological functions” (Malinowska 2001:195). Malinowska (2001:195) argues that “many women belonged formally to the League but never derived any benefits from membership”. The CRH on the other hand, was specifically for rural women, and its activities were focused on agricultural and household education (Malinowska 2001:194). After 1989, the CRH continued as usual, while the League, which was “identified as a state organ”, and not seen as free from political pressure from the party, struggled to survive. In time it lost financial resources and its base for operations, but has in some places remained in the format of local and regional boards (Malinowska 2001:196f).

In the early 1980s, when women’s groups began to organize in relation to the Polish independence struggle and the Solidarity movement, things started to change (Fuszara 2005:1064). An important factor was a proposed act on abortion in 1989, which spurred a mobilization “from below” (Fuszara 1997:132). In her analysis of the situation of feminist and women’s movements in Poland in 1994-1995, Matuchniak-Krasuska (1998) could state that the main motivation for mobilization was to prevent new legislation with stricter abortion rights. Another major reason for mobilizing was the new economic situation for many women. Unemployment and poverty formed a real threat to many, given the transition from a state-regulated market to a free one. Since the early 1990s, there has been a major increase in activity, mobilization and organizations (Matuchniak-Krasuska 1998). Most important, however, was the freedom to form associations. Underground feminist and women’s groups now started to register as “legal organizations” (Bystydzienski 2001:505). Examples includes the Polish Feminist Association (which existed informally since 1981), Pro-Femina.

\textsuperscript{30} There is of course a long tradition of civic activism in Poland, both before and during state socialism – of which the Solidarity movement is one of the most important events in Polish contemporary history (Císar 2017).

\textsuperscript{31} ”Liga Kobiet Polskich” (LKP), in Polish.
the Women’s Foundation eFKa, Network of East-West Women (NEWW), Federation for Women and Family Planning (“Federa”), the Women’s Rights Centre (CPK), the Polish Clubs of “Amazons” (women after mastectomy), the Polish Women’s Council (revived from 1924), and the Parliamentary Group of Women (which organized female MPs). On average there were 10 new women’s organizations registered each year in the early 1990s (Malinowska 2001:19). Among the larger ones were the Democratic Union of Women (DUK), the Women’s Section of the Labour Union, the “Amazons”, and the Women’s Section of Solidarity. DUK adopted structures similar to political parties and is also closely connected to the social democratic movement and the former ruling Labour Party (Malinowska 2001:197).

The majority of women’s movement actors that sprung up in the late 1980s and early 1990s organized in a more informal way than had been done by the officially acknowledged women’s organizations during the previous regime. Many of these new women’s groups and organizations also prioritized autonomy in relation to the state, the government, political parties and former institutionalized women’s organizations. This was a way to develop identity but also to mark a distance towards the Polish Women’s League and the typical hierarchical structure of the old regime’s organizations (Bystydzienski 2001:503f). By the mid-1990s, there were already significant divisions within the women’s movement: first, there was a divide between feminists and Catholic women’s groups; secondly, women’s and feminist organizations working within a more ideological-political field were also divided based on their political affinities dating back to the 1980s (Matuchniak-Krasuska 1998). Most collaboration thus took place at local level whenever organizations needed to react quickly to specific local problems and social needs (see Malinowska 1999).

Considering that the Polish government has been reluctant towards including the women’s movement for policy input and gendered claims have been dismissed as irrelevant, international arenas have presented an opportunity for Polish women’s organizations. The EU has for instance opened up for new resources such as funding, legitimacy and voice (Regulska & Grabowska 2008). And the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 was an important event for the Polish women’s movement. In preparation for it, twelve women’s organizations formed the Social Committee of Non-Governmental Organizations (SKOP) in 1994 to write a shadow report for the conference. In 1995–1997 and in 2001–2005 women’s organizations cooperated with the government regarding the implementation of
the Beijing Platform for Action. Above all, Beijing had a legitimizing effect for Polish women’s organizations’ demands. However, within the movement it led to further fragmentation between feminists and Christian women’s organizations (Fuchs 2006:57f).

International donors such as the Open Society Institute, Soros Foundation, Ford Foundation and Global Fund for Women supported many Polish women’s organizations in the 1990s and early 2000s. One of the most important initiatives in this respect was the National Women’s Information Centre OŚKa, which was set up and funded by Ford Foundation (McMahon 2002:37). Given that the Polish state did not fund women’s organizations, foreign sponsors and funding via international projects were more than welcomed by the women’s movement (Malinowska 2001:199). Europeanization and foreign funding have, however, meant that certain demands are placed on women’s organizations, such as reporting and accounting, and that formal decision-making structures have to be implemented. Parts of the Polish women’s movement are consequently characterized by NGO-ization, with the result that many women’s organizations are based on advocacy and expertise performed by a small group of employees, rather than broad participation and strong grassroots connections (cf. Hašková 2005, Čísař & Vráblíková 2010). This process has provoked competition between actors who otherwise could have been allies (Petrova & Tarrow 2007:78). Another effect has been project-orientation among Polish women’s organizations. Because they adapt their activities to funding possibilities – such as employment projects for women – they also form organizations around the issues where there is funding (Fuchs 2007:3). Today, Polish women’s organizations can no longer rely on international donors: since Poland joined the EU, donors have moved elsewhere and EU funds are too complicated and unreliable to be worth applying for.

In the early 2000s, a new type of street-level activism spread: the “Manifas” organized by PK8M32 around the 8th of March every year. The “Manifas” have become increasingly popular and well attended. Recently, there have been many large protests around the country focusing on women’s rights, such as the 2016 and 2017 Black Monday or Black Protests initiated by All-Poland Women’s Strike: a mass-protest as a reaction to the planned total ban on abortion. All-Poland Women’s Strike describes itself

32 The Women’s 8th of March Agreement, or ”Porozumienie Kobiet 8 Marca” in Polish.
as an “informal, nonpartisan initiative of women belonging to different women's organizations, as well as non-members”.

As a consequence of the above-mentioned stigmatization of feminism, the competition for scarce resources, NGO-ization and international donors, most Polish women’s organizations are small in terms of staff and organizational capacity. The women’s movement as a field is characterized by ad-hoc and rather spontaneous events, and consists either of less formal actors such as groups, networks and grassroots initiatives or professional-ized NGOs that are expert-based rather than based on member influence (Korolczuk & Saxonberg 2015). In 2013, it was recognized that there were about 300 women’s organizations active in Poland and that a majority function as service providers (Fuchs 2013:27).

Summary

Swedish civil society is shaped by the tradition of mass or popular movements which played a major role in the construction of the Swedish welfare state, giving civil society in general and the women’s movement in particular a special connection to the state (cf. Trägårdh 2007). As has been shown, the Swedish women’s movement has to a significant extent been included in policy making regarding gender equality and family issues. The Swedish women’s movement functions in many instances like a partner to the state, providing it with policy input through the process of acting as referral bodies. Moreover, it has been common to form umbrellas for each movement, group, sector etc. within Swedish civil society. Membership-based organizations mobilized people, and the tradition is still characteristic of Swedish civil society regardless of a trend towards “memberless” organizations.

In Poland, gender and feminism are stigmatized concepts, and gender inequalities were not visible and discussed during the communist regime, which left women as a group without the means to organize officially. Recently, the Polish women’s movement has seen a move towards “illiberal” democracy, making it even more difficult to raise women’s issues and to be seen as legitimate partners in policy-making.

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The major impact of international donors wanting to create civil society structures in the new Polish democracy in the 1990s has led to an NGO-ization of Polish civil society. A combination of not anchoring the activities and the structure of women’s NGOs in local needs and conditions; of competition between women’s organizations for scarce funds; and of a suspicion and de-legitimization by policy makers who see women’s organizations as products of foreign powers, has created a particularly difficult situation for the Polish women’s movement and one which impacts on its ability to cooperate more than in ad-hoc terms.

The Polish women’s movement has adapted to the needs of women; i.e. providing social and legal services which the state does not offer and, thus, filling a gap, rather than cooperating with or trying to influence the state. Above all, the lack of legitimacy for and recognition of gender equality and women’s rights issues has proven to be an obstacle for the movement to acquire a leverage position vis-à-vis the state. The Polish women’s movement still depends on international rather than domestic funding.
Part II
Adapting to International Structures

Women’s organizations show great heterogeneity. Some are large and resourceful, others are small and struggle to survive financially. Some have employees, others base their work on volunteers. Some provide services to women, whereas others focus on lobbying and advocacy work. There are women’s shelter organizations focusing on violence against women, mainly working for the protection and support of women who experience men’s violence; there are women’s organizations working with sexual education, and lobbying for sexual and reproductive health and rights; there are women’s organizations supporting women in business, or women in the media, in culture, in politics et cetera.; there are women’s organizations focusing on gender equality whereas there are others who exclusively work on women’s empowerment; there are women’s organizations which are feminist and those which reject feminism; there are conservative women’s organizations as well as socialist, anarchist and liberal ones; there are women’s organizations focusing on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and those working on issues such as racism, homophobia, or ableism. With such variety, how is it possible and why is there an interest in joining forces to cooperate under one “umbrella” at international level? In this chapter, attention will be drawn to three aspects of the formation of national meta-organizations in relation to the EWL: the motives behind the formation of the nationwide meta-organizations in the Swedish and Polish women’s movement; the conditions for such organizing; and why adapting to international structures can be difficult for social movements at national level.

As a starting point, this chapter presents the motives behind the formation of the Swedish Women’s Lobby (SWL) and the Polish Women’s Lobby (PWL). The discussion presented in chapter 1 – on the European Union’s (EU) interest in civil society and the European Women’s Lobby’s (EWL) relation to the European Commission – is used here as a backdrop in order to understand these motives. As a second step, this chapter looks at
the changes that had to be made at national level in order to live up to the demands from the EU and the EWL, and the difficulties in adapting, thus answering the following questions: (1) What was required to set up a meta-organization for the Polish and Swedish women’s organizations and (2) what were the obstacles? The chapter relates to the first part of the aim of the thesis: to understand the conditions for social movement adaptation to an international structure.

Motives to set up Nationwide Meta-Organizations

As Ahrne and Brunsson (2008:62ff) point out, there are a number of reasons for meta-organization formation, and it is common that the incentive comes from “outside” the field of organizations that potentially would join the meta-organization. In the case of the SWL and the PWL, the incentive essentially came from the EU, which has contributed to the creation of many meta-organizations. Regarding, for instance, European-level trade associations, Ahrne and Brunsson (2008:75) argue that “by establishing the industry’s collective opinion, these trade associations save the EU from having to perform that task, and allow it to negotiate with a few associations rather than thousands of companies”. As we have seen, for the same reasons, the EU prefers to confer with one, or at least a handful of women’s organizations when making policies.

As discussed in chapter 1, the EU pressures the EWL to demand from its national members that they be nationwide and representative associations of women’s organizations. The EWL is a meta-meta-organization initiating the creation of other meta-organizations which can become its members (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:75; 2010:5). Like most meta-organizations, the EWL has achieved monopoly in terms of being the largest European-level women’s organization that lobbies the EU, covering a large proportion of EU member states in its membership base (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:88).34 According to a Swedish former chair of the FEMM Committee35, the committee normally prefers to ask the offices of Brussels-based “umbrella organizations”, such as the EWL, for input since “they know exactly what we want”, and hence it is “easier” to go that way (Interview with

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34 There are other European-level women’s organizations, such as the European Women Lawyers’ Association, New Women for Europe, Black European Women’s Council, and the European Network of Migrant Women, but either they represent a certain category of women or of women’s issues, or their membership-base is not as large as that of the EWL.

35 The FEMM Committee is the European Parliament’s committee for women’s rights and gender equality (EP 2019).
For instance, the EWL knows how to write an amendment, and it can write its proposals in a way that easily fits in with a piece of text from the European Parliament – an ability which national-level organizations generally lack. Consequently, the EWL is the main actor for the FEMM Committee, according to the former chair of the FEMM Committee (Interview with Gustafsson). For Polish and Swedish women’s movement organizations, the incentive to join the EWL is therefore strong.

As is common within social movement organizations in general, women’s organizations have an interest in facilitating communication amongst themselves. In both Poland and Sweden, interviewees have expressed a strong need for the movement to collaborate in terms of exchanging information regarding EU issues and knowledge (Interviewees “Grażyna”; “Agata”; “Honorata”; “Franciszka”; “Freja”, “Britta”). Interaction between women’s organizations can and does take many forms, not least in networks and ad-hoc coalitions. Regarding EU-lobbying however, it is difficult to imagine that networking could be enough. With the constant flow of information and demands for policy-input from the EU, concerted action, and a common centre of EU knowledge and information is crucial. Therefore, it is also in the interest of the women’s organizations at national level to, the very least, set up some form of stable interaction among themselves in relation to the EU. Following Ahrne and Brunsson (2008:66), it is clear that the Polish and Swedish women’s organizations had at least two motives for setting up meta-organizations: (1) to change the conditions of interaction so as to empower themselves vis-à-vis EU bureaucracy, and (2) to create a new actor in order to fulfil the demands from the EWL. Whereas the first motive is more based within the movement itself, the second is rather based on pressures from above – that is, from the EU and the EWL. In the following, both motives will be discussed, but focus will be set on the pressures from above, as I argue it has been the strongest factor in the setting up of the SWL and the PWL.

In Sweden, the formation of the SWL was not only a result of pressures from the EWL. It was rather a result of a combination of two factors: (1) two international events which raised the question of national representation in international forums, and (2) the interest of the Swedish government. One event was, of course, the Swedish EU membership in 1995, and the subsequent need to join the EWL. However, as pointed out in chapter 4, the Swedish EU membership coincided with the 4th UN world conference on women in Beijing in 1995. Given that women from all over the world would meet in Beijing to discuss the situation of women, Swedish women’s
organizations had to consider the question of joining forces for external representation. According to a former board member (Interviewee “Astrid”) of the SWL, the Swedish UN Association invited many women’s organizations to a meeting prior the conference and tried to prepare and to inform Swedish women’s organizations on international, and especially UN, matters around this time. The former board member also remembers that when the group of approximately 800 Swedish women came back from the conference, there was the question of how they would continue and follow up on this work and cooperation. Consequently, the idea and the need for an association of the movement’s organizations had started to grow (Interviewee “Astrid”). There was thus an incentive from within the movement to form a meta-organization in order to facilitate interaction and Swedish representation and to coordinate international action.

Meanwhile, in 1995, Sweden joined the EU, something which was certain to have an impact on women’s lives and interests and on gender equality measures. As has been expressed in interviews, and pointed to in chapter 4, Swedish women’s organizations tended to see the EU as a “threat” to women’s interests and gender equality measures achieved in Sweden rather than a polity that would contribute to progressive gender equality policies or “save” Swedish women from state policies (Interviewee “Gabriella”). The incentive to participate at EU-level lobbying was thus, and has continued to be, to “protect” the national level from irrelevant or challenging policies (Interviewees “Britta”; “Christina”). Another key incentive has been to spread a Swedish “model for gender equality” to other EU member states (Interviewee “Britta”). According to Hobson et al (2007:462), Swedish feminists engaged at EU level tend to “view Sweden’s role as an exporter of ideas and policy to other European societies”. The SWL has been proactive on issues such as violence against women, prostitution and surrogate motherhood. The SWL has for instance pushed the EWL towards taking a stance on the issue of prostitution based on the Swedish Sex Purchase Act, in which paying someone for sex is criminalized whereas selling is legal (Interviewees “Britta”; “Elisabet”; “Dagny”; Hellgren 2012:158). This stance is controversial and far from common outside Scandinavia. In short, there was a need both to influence the impact that the EU would have on Sweden, and to “export” the Swedish gender equality model, and the EWL was the obvious forum through which to participate.

In addition, there existed another external actor with an interest in forming a meta-organization for the Swedish movement: the Swedish government. To understand the motives of the Swedish government, it is impor-
tant to emphasize its long-term interest in incorporating women’s organizations in gender equality policy-making, discussed in chapter 4. At the time of EU-membership, the Social Democratic government strongly prioritized gender equality and women’s rights issues. Former Undersecretary of State at the Gender Equality Unit remembers how ministers, director-generals and employees of government offices were informed and educated on these “red-hot issues” (E-mail correspondence with Sahlström). Contacts with organizations focusing on gender equality were therefore important to the Gender Equality Unit as part of its role in implementing the Social Democratic government’s goals on gender equality (E-mail correspondence with Sahlström). The former Undersecretary of State explains that the government communicated on a regular basis with both political parties’ women’s groups and other women’s organizations, mainly via a gender equality council. Given an upsurge in women’s organizations in the mid-1990s, the government was also increasingly contacted by various women’s organizations with demands for participation in different contexts. In combination, this meant that the government had an interest in making the interaction with women’s organizations more efficient and simplified. The former Undersecretary of State says that she personally wished that some organizations would “keep pace”, and that through unity the work for increased gender equality would be facilitated (E-mail correspondence with Sahlström). For the government, just as for the EU, it was thus an advantage to have one organization to speak to, rather than a myriad of different voices. A former chair of the SWL remembers that the government showed strong support for a meta-organization for the women’s movement:

They wanted a common [gemensam] organization. [...] I think it was because they wanted to strengthen the women’s movement. There was an ambition. You know, Margareta [Winberg] was gender equality minister and had always been very proactive in this so, well, there were no misgivings at all, rather they thought it would be good if something like this was formed (Interviewee “Astrid”).

In a booklet in which the SWL summarizes its first ten years of existence, the former Undersecretary of State explains that:

We needed one voice which spoke for the Swedish women’s movement [...] and Sweden needed an umbrella organization that could represent the
Swedish women in the EWL (quoted in SWL & Alfredsson, 2008:10, my translation).

As we have seen in the timeline of the SWL, and which will be developed in chapter 6 and 7, the government also provided the initiative to set up a meta-organization for the EWL membership with direct support when the former Undersecretary of State functioned as the convener for the first meeting of women’s organizations to discuss the EWL membership. The interests of the Swedish government were in many ways the same as that of the EU, and typical when it comes to motives of “outsiders” for creating meta-organizations: it wanted to facilitate communication between itself and the Swedish women’s movement, and it wanted a representative discussion partner that could provide legitimacy to the government’s work on gender equality.

Compared to the case of the SWL, there was no interest coming from the Polish government relative to the PWL. Yet, in Poland, the motives for creating a meta-organization in relation to the EWL were similar to those shown in the case of the SWL: it was important to take part in the EWL as it is a large influential European association for women’s organizations at EU-level, and with the Polish EU membership in 2004 it became important to take part in EU lobbying.

However, compared to Swedish women’s organizations, Polish women’s organizations had a different relation to the EU. According to several researchers (Hašková 2005; Roth 2007; Sudbery 2010; Císař & Vráblíková 2010), women’s organizations in the new member states during the Eastern enlargement placed much hope in the EU in terms of funding, coalition building across national borders and transnational advocacy networks such as the EWL. As pointed out in chapter 4, however, most importantly they gained access to EU institutions and were empowered by the EU through their national governments’ ambitions to live up to EU standards. The new member states thus had an incentive to implement gender-sensitive legislation which earlier had not been considered an issue (Roth, 2007:476; Sudbery, 2010:143f). At least during the accession period, Polish women’s organizations gained leverage because they could use the attractive EU membership to pressure their government. However, when Poland finally joined the EU this leverage was lost, when the EU did not hold specific governments accountable for not conforming to the aspect of gender equality in the *acquis communautaire* (Císař & Vráblíková 2010:214; Hašková 2005:1087ff; Roth 2007:477).
Still, considering the difficulties in advocating for women’s issues and gender equality in Poland, much hope was placed in the EU, and the EWL was an important way for reaching into this new arena of politics. As we have seen in the timeline of the PWL, there was a meeting of representatives of Polish women’s organizations in 2003 at which a possible EWL membership was discussed. At this meeting it was stressed by some meeting participants that the EWL is a “strong and effective pro-European organization”, sharing relevant information and taking important actions. It was also emphasized that participation in the EWL brings with it commitment and contribution to this international arena (OŚKa 2004).

Another motive for the Polish women’s organizations to join the EWL was simply the fact that the EWL had achieved monopoly in the category of EU-level women’s associations and the Polish organizations did not want to be left outside (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:81ff). As will be developed below, women’s organizations in Poland struggled to join the EWL by forming a national association, at the same time as there was the question whether a regional Central and East European “network” might be more beneficial for the Polish women’s movement. At the meeting to set up the PWL, however, some participants expressed that there was a difficulty in defining a common identity for Central and East European women, and that as a regional “network” it could fuel the idea of “Old and New Europe”, of West and East. Instead, the meeting participants argued that the creation of a Polish association could be “a chance to cooperate in the creation of an enlarged Europe, without cultivating the old divisions between East and West” (OŚKa 2004). The meeting participants, therefore, eventually agreed that they should not ask “whether to join the EWL” but “how to do it” (OŚKa 2004). The reason behind this decision is similar to when the EWL membership was discussed within the Czech women’s movement: that “[i]t is better to be in than to be out” (Interviewee cited in Hašková 2005:1103).

As is clear in both the Polish and Swedish cases, even though there existed an internal interest in the respective women’s movements, the main motive for creating meta-organizations came from “outside”, in the form of the EWL rules for membership: that is, to form nationwide women’s associations. Nevertheless, in the Swedish case, the Swedish government also had an interest and played a major role, which will be explored further in chapter 6 and 7. In the next section, conditions at national level for European-level adaptation will be explored by an analysis of the two cases.
Adapting to the European Level

The EWL does not decide how a national “co-ordination” is formed, or which organization should take on this role but awaits an application for membership which it approves or rejects. This means that any women’s organization can apply for membership or several women’s organizations can apply at the same time, however only one can be accepted as there can be only one national coordinator per country (Strid 2009:158; EWL 2013), so as to mirror the EU structure of member states. The EWL evaluates the application based on the rules of full membership stated in the statutes. Apart from having to demonstrate a commitment to gender equality and support for the UN convention CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action, a full national member must “have legal status in their own member state/country” as a NGO, or “have a signed protocol of co-operation [...] with the view to establishing a legal status recognized in national or international law” (EWL 2013). A full national member must also “be representative of a broad range of women’s organizations across the whole of the member state/country”, and “act independently of any political party or religious authority or governmental body” (EWL 2013). Just as the EWL itself covers the EU member states via their national “co-ordinations” in each state, the national full members also have to cover a major part of the women’s movement in their country, and these member organizations need to have legal status as NGOs – in other words, members have to be formal associations of organizations. This is important to the EWL as it has to show the European Commission that it represents European women and the European women’s movement.

Some EWL national “co-ordinations” are women’s meta-organizations which existed prior to the time of EU membership, such as the Danish Women’s Council founded in 1899 or the National Council of German Women’s Organizations founded in 1951.36 In this case, the structure was already in place and little was needed in order to become a EWL national coordinator.37 Sometimes a coalition, network or other type of platform might exist and it must be transformed into a formal organization to fit the demands from the EWL. However, when structures are not in place there is a need for a completely new organization to be formed, as was the case in both Poland and Sweden.

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36 “Kvinderådet” and “Deutscher Frauenrat”.
37 However, this does not necessarily mean that the new role of the old association bring any important changes to the field of women’s organizations.
The EWL membership essentially entails three changes to the Polish and Swedish women’s movements: (1) to speak and act in a concerted way; (2) to organize under one actor; and (3) to create national representation. To achieve this, certain conditions are needed.

Conditions
With the introduction of the EWL membership, hierarchy was introduced into the field of Polish and Swedish women’s movement organizations. First, the EWL membership entails a new hierarchical center at EU-level with the EWL secretariat in Brussels and the EWL board making decisions and speaking for “European women’s organizations”. Second, the EWL membership entails that the Polish and Swedish women’s movement organizations need to create internal hierarchy. Either a new meta-organization is set up which women’s organizations become members of, or an already existing meta-organization will gain a new and more central role in the field of women’s organizations, pushing more women’s organizations to join. In any case, a new hierarchical centre will be in place at national level because there will be an office and/or a board established which will make decisions and speak for the women’s organizations. As an organizational element, hierarchy makes a difference to the relations between women’s organizations in the field (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:45ff; 111ff). However, the “scale” of the meta-organization influences to what extent and in what ways the hierarchy makes a difference. In theory, the SWL and the PWL are only about hierarchy in relation to the EU – that is, being a link between the national-level women’s organizations and the EU multilevel governance structure (via the EWL). In practice, the SWL and the PWL can take up more responsibilities and “space” in the field of the national-level women’s movement. Something that is not spelled out by Ahrne and Brunsson (2008) is that meta-organizations differ greatly in their scope and capacity. One meta-organization could be merely the coordinator of a specific and narrow issue, while another could have a wide range of activities and areas of interest. The scope of meta-organization matters as it increases or decreases the tensions inherent in the relationship between the meta-organization and its members. If the SWL and the PWL become more than the EU-link and coordinator of EWL communications, their sphere of action threatens to overlap with that of their members and their members’ autonomy is challenged (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:124). The scale of meta-organization of the SWL and the PWL thus matters for what it means to introduce hierarchy.
In the following, I first turn to the conditions for introducing, in particular, hierarchy, but also rules and membership in the field of women’s organizations in Poland and Sweden. It is argued that the preconditions for introducing hierarchy were the opposite in the Polish and the Swedish cases. I analyse contextual factors facilitating or providing an obstacle to setting up a meta-organization in the two cases. The level of analysis here is the Swedish and Polish women’s organizations’ relation to the EWL.

*Regional Solidarity*

In Poland, there were several contextual aspects working against the changes and the creation of a national meta-organization for the movement. First, as pointed out in chapter 4, strong divisions within the Polish women’s movement posed an obstacle. In particular, the division between the old organizations associated with the communist regime and newer women’s organizations has had a major impact in the case of the PWL. The new generation of feminist and women’s movement organizations organized in a more informal and autonomous way (in relation to the state, the government, political parties and former institutionalized women’s organizations) in the interest of developing their own identity, but also to mark distance towards the Polish Women’s League and the old regime (Bystydzienski 2001:503f; Malinowska 1999; Fuchs 2006). As pointed out by one of the interviewees, who represents a Central and East European regional “network” organization, there is distrust and power struggles in the Central and East European region in general due to the power of old women’s organizations such as “the X Women’s League” from the former socialist regime (Interviewee “Beata”). Several interviewees argue that there is distrust between the newer and older organizations and an unwillingness to cooperate (“Interviewees “Agata”, “Beata”; “Franciszka”).

This brings us to the second, and key, obstacle: the Polish women’s movement’s resistance towards hierarchy. Since the change of regime, there has existed a resistance among Polish women’s movement actors towards centralized organizational structures, like meta-organizations, which are associated with the Polish Women’s League (Bystydzienski 2001:503f). As these older women’s organizations were structured in a centrally-controlled, hierarchical and formal way, any type of meta-organizing is associated with the women’s organizations that existed during the communist regime and consequently resisted by some women’s groups and organizations that emerged after 1989. A representative of one women’s organization argues
for instance that large associations with a hierarchical structure such as the EWL are associated with exploitation of the members:

We probably still have this trauma after communism, after socialism. So, being a member, this doesn’t mean anything but legitimization, of people who use their members just for legitimization of their own decisions. So for us, for my generation, the most attractive thing was to be able to found organizations from below, [to not] be part of any bigger structures (Interviewee “Edyta”).

Similarly, according to a representative of the Karat Coalition38, the demand from the EWL to form meta-organizations was problematic for the coalition’s members who urged less hierarchy and more independence:

In the beginning, there were a lot of small NGOs because everybody wanted to have a safe space, to have finally the freedom to talk with other women who think the same way and not to be in a huge umbrella organization. So, when we heard from abroad that you need an umbrella organization: whoa! Never! Because, we would like to find a way to be free, to say what we want to say, and not to be part [of an umbrella organization], and then listen to what the central body says and obey them (Interviewee representing Karat Coalition).

The representative also remembers that the Karat Coalition had to change its own organizational structure, in order to avoid internal tensions, because it had started off as a meta-organization:

We noticed that our structure, to have this kind of organization in each country responsible for communication didn’t work at all! Because certain women from this previous regime organization wanted to keep this information for themselves, to be first everywhere, to be only them […] But we changed the structure. […] We wanted to have, not this organization in each country, but to have members. So, if for example several organizations from one country are interested they can join and there is no hierarchic structure at country level like in the European Women’s Lobby (Interviewee representing Karat Coalition).

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38 “Koalicja Karat”, started in 1997 as a trans-regional network but registered as an association in 2001 "as a response to the invisibility of women from Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS)" (Karat 2015). It has its base in Warsaw, but has both an international and a Polish board. In 2018, it had “42 organizational members from 25 countries and 12 individual members from 6 countries” (Karat 2019).
The legacy of communism, in terms of divisions and of resistance towards large associations of organizations within the Polish women’s movement was consequently a constraint for the Polish women’s movement in the case of formal cooperation in relation to the EWL.

A third obstacle in the context of Polish women’s movement was the need for Central and East European solidarity and regional organizing, rather than national organizing. An aggregated identity would not necessarily be formed around the Polish nationality. Instead, regional East European cooperation and solidarity was considered more important by many Polish women’s organizations (Grabowska 2014:20), and some felt that these interests, and a regional identity could be weakened by a Polish EWL membership (Interviewees “Beata”; “Dorota”). On the one hand, it was important to take part in the EWL as it is a large influential European association for women’s organizations. On the other hand, the EWL had not shown much interest in Central and East European women’s interests and their movements (OŚKa 2004). As several researchers point out, the EWL has had issues throughout the years with lack of inclusiveness and diversity. Hoskyns (1991:68), argued in 1991 that the EWL, through its formal demands, excludes “any direct representation of poor women or of black and ethnic minority women who are not organized in that way”. Strid (2009:248f) claims that the EWL functions as a “gatekeeper” against other women’s representation and demands, and Stubbergaard (2015) found that the European Forum of Muslim Women felt it was not accepted by the EWL. Similarly, in relation to Eastern Europe, the EWL has been criticized for not being interested in including women from Eastern Europe, and for lacking an understanding of women’s issues and situations in former communist countries (Hašková 2005:1103f; Roth 2007:471).

In meeting minutes from one of the first meetings about a Polish EWL membership (see OŚKa 2004), that took place at the office of the National Women’s Information Centre OŚKa, in July 2003 (see timeline of the PWL), it is stated that several Polish women’s organizations discussed the fact that the EWL in the past had been rather reluctant towards any form of cooperation with women’s organizations from outside of the EU, and that due to pressures from the European Commission it changed its statutes in 2003 so that representation from accession countries would be possible too. The women at the meeting argued that this was the main reason behind why the EWL now showed some interest in Poland. There was, thus, a suspicion that the EWL did not have a genuine and independent interest in
including the Polish and other Central and East European women’s movements (OŚKa 2004).

Another problem for forming a base for a common European women’s identity was the fact that abortion and reproductive rights were non-issues for the EWL at the time. As pointed out by Strid (2009:17), the EWL showed relatively little interest in reproductive health and the family. This is maybe not surprising, considering that the EU lacks legal remit in reproductive rights and violence against women, as well as the fact that the usage of economic terms impedes an interest in family matters such as child care (Strid 2009:114). However, for the Polish women’s movement, as we have seen in chapter 4, the right to legal abortion was the most urgent issue given the country’s strict abortion laws, and the one that often united the women’s movement. The ambiguous relationship to the EWL was even further augmented by the fact that several Central and East European women’s organizations, with whom Polish women’s organizations maintained strong relations, criticized the EWL for not being interested in including women from Eastern Europe, for lacking an understanding of women’s issues and situations in former socialist countries, and for not helping them enough during the accession period. Roth (2007:471f) argues that this negative appraisal of the EWL originated in the fact that the EWL was constrained in its Eastern enlargement activities because it lacked a mandate from the European Commission to spend funding on non-member states.

Partly as a consequence of the perceived exclusion from and feeling of distance towards the EWL, there existed several relatively new European organizations with a Central and Eastern European identity – such as the Karat Coalition, the Central and Eastern European Women’s Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (ASTRA), and the Network of East-West Women (NEWW) (Hašková 2005; Roth 2007). As many women’s organizations in the region had already joined NEWW and Karat Coalition in the 1990s or early 2000, while the EWL only became relevant later, there was a stronger identification with the Central and Eastern European regional organizations, despite the fact that they are, in comparison with the EWL, evidently less powerful and influential (Hašková 2005). These East European regional coalition organizations, many with a base in Poland, were also founded with the aim of strengthening women’s cooperation in the region. This was for instance the case with Karat Coalition, ASTRA and NEWW, who all argue that it was important to establish platforms for regional dialogue and the exchange of knowledge and resources. The wider European identity was not strong at the time. Both in interviews and on
websites, it is argued that there was a great need for women in the region to get together as a regional movement with a common ground, identity and shared experiences (Interviewees “Agata”; “Beata”; “Dorota”; Karat 2012; NEWW 2017a). After the change of regime, and at the beginning when connections to the EU (and other international organizations) were made, there was a fear among women’s organizations that (1) women’s rights and needs would not be part of the negotiations and discussions of policy makers in their respective countries, and (2) that the shared experiences and specific needs of women in the Central and Eastern European region would become invisible and/or disregarded in relation to the established and comparatively wealthy Western European women’s networks and organizations (OŚKa 2004; Grabowska 2014:20; Interviewees “Beata”; “Grażyna”).

Taken altogether, this meant that when Polish women within the movement started to discuss a possible membership in the EWL, many were worried that their voices and needs as Central and East European women with the experience of state socialism would not be heard, or at least not be strong enough, if they joined the EWL as a Polish (national) member. They voiced a fear of losing the regional identity within a meta-organization that is based on national identities (forming a “European” one). In essence, the Polish women’s organizations cared for a different identity than the one the EWL advocated. The uniqueness of the Central and Eastern European region’s women’s organizations was seen as standing in contrast to the unity of European women’s organizations that the EWL wanted to promote.

At the initial meeting in Warsaw, in July 2003 (see timeline), the participants therefore discussed whether a nationwide meta-organization and an EWL membership would benefit the movement, or whether it would be more beneficial to have a regional Central and Eastern European representation at EU level, which could cooperate with but not be a part of the EWL (OŚKa 2004). Given that only “national co-ordinations” or “European-wide” organizations with representation in at least one third of the EU member states are accepted as full members (EWL 2013), a Central and Eastern European regional network could not have representation in the EWL. As discussed above, the EWL has to show the European Commission that it represents European women and the European women’s movement. National representation is one way of doing this. However, as some organizations exist at a supranational level, such as the European Network of Migrant Women, gathering a specific group of women’s organizations, the EWL also has a “European wide” form of membership. Representation in terms of covering at least one third of the member states is also felt to be
important so as to mirror the EU structure. It was consequently not possible to imagine an alternative in which women’s organizations all over Europe could join the EWL directly and individually without going through the step of joining “national co-ordinations” or “European wide” members. If this alternative had been possible, nationwide cooperation or a united “national” voice had not been necessary. Instead, each women’s organization at local, regional or national level would represent itself and its (individual) members directly in the EWL. In interviews with representatives of Polish women’s organizations, it has been expressed that such an alternative would facilitate EWL participation for the Polish women’s movement given that formal cooperation has turned out to be so problematic (Interviewees “Agata”; “Grażyna”; “Beata”). For the EWL however, this type of “direct” membership is not an alternative because it would mean increased administrative costs for reaching out to a larger number of members. In terms of decision-making and efficiency, “direct” membership would also constitute a problem for the EWL. It already suffers from having a large board and has issues in gathering representatives from each member organization each year for the annual meetings at which the agenda of the EWL is set and other important decisions are taken (Interviewees “Christina” and “Freja”).

Thus there existed no alternative for the Polish women’s organizations to join the EWL but to form a nationwide meta-organization. Therefore, despite their ambiguous relationship towards the EWL and their fear of losing their regional voice and solidarity with women in the East outside of the EU, representatives of Polish women’s organizations decided at a meeting in 2003 (see timeline) to join the EWL and consequently to form an “umbrella” of Polish women’s organizations (OŚKa 2004). The reasons behind this decision were, as mentioned above, that it was better to be in than left outside, and that it would prevent an East/West divide (OŚKa 2004).

Yet, the need for regional solidarity has remained as an issue. Even though the Polish women’s movement had to comply with the demands for national organizing, the PWL was clearly seeking a way to hold on to an East European regional identity, interest and solidarity. An example of this comes from a meeting held in May 2004 (see timeline), at which it was decided that one of the powers and activities of the PWL should be to: “act as the expert to women’s organizations from Eastern European countries outside the EU (in particular Ukraine and Belarus), to build a bridge between the EU and these countries/organizations” (OŚKa 2004).

In later years the EWL has made some efforts to accommodate its CEE members’ needs for visibility and solidarity among themselves. In 2015, the
EWL implemented a “Central and Eastern European Task Force” (EWL 2015). On its website, the EWL explains that EU members in the East Central European, Baltic and Balkan States share persisting challenges “in terms of pay gap, women’s political participation, violence against women and political space for women’s organisations” and that “EWL membership has identified a need to come together to discuss common strategies” via this task force (EWL 2015).

In April 2016, the EWL and the Swedish foundation “Kvinna till Kvinna” co-organized an event in Brussels at which the participants discussed the “challenges and backlashes that EU’s Enlargement to the East, in Central European, Baltic and Western Balkan States have generated as regards women’s rights” (EWL 2016). Specific attention was given to Poland due to the ongoing threats to abortion rights, and it was explained that: “This meeting took therefore place at a very crucial time to support the work of women’s organisations to help them respond to those challenges” (EWL 2016). The Central and Eastern European Task Force could be seen as a sign that the EWL has realized its need to empower, include and make visible women in post-socialist societies as having specific needs and demands compared to women in the old member states. An interviewee explains that together with women in other CEE member states, Polish women felt that the EWL was not doing enough for them but that this is now changing:

… Because this special region has very special needs; because we are poorer, because we don’t have so much capacity, our governments are often very conservative lately. Hungary and now in Poland. That we should have some kind of special attention from the European Women’s Lobby. I think this is very important and they are answering our question. They helped us establish this task force for Central and Eastern Europe and we are meeting by Skype but also personally […] And it gives us space to discuss what is important for us (Interviewee “Agata”).

Yet, the Central and Eastern European Task Force is a working group, just like the EWL Observatory of Violence against Women, and not a member of the EWL. This means that Polish women’s organizations cannot influence the EWL agenda and activities in a formal way. Nevertheless, both the Task Force and the Observatory have allowed representatives of Polish women’s organizations to participate in the EWL even though there is no PWL, i.e. no Polish member, at the moment. This standing reflects the point, made by Ahrne (1994) and Bor (2014), that membership, affiliation and participation all entail different rights and types of relations to the core
organization. Thus, the Polish representative in the Task Force can contribute to the discussions within this forum, and influence its agenda, but she cannot contribute with a Polish voice in the EWL in general. The Polish women’s movement consequently has access only to parts of the organization EWL.

Compared to the Polish case, the need for regional organizing in Sweden has not been critical, but regional cooperation has at times been activated. A former representative of the SWL (Interviewee “Dagny”) claims for instance that the SWL cooperated with the other Nordic countries’ members in the EWL to make sure that the EWL chair was occupied by a “Nordic” representative:

And then we had a Nordic cooperation [samverkan]. We thought that we, in the Nordic countries, that we have a special … developed gender equality, so we cooperated at that point. From Finland and Denmark, and Sweden, we talked, and among us we said that it would be good if one of us could try to get [the EWL chair] (Interviewee “Dagny).

As a result of this cooperation, a Swedish representative became chair of the EWL for some years. As expressed in the quote, there was a sense of regional belonging with other Scandinavian and Nordic countries, and this belonging was based on a sense of common gender equality regimes which have to be protected from EU policies and shared with Europe as a good example (Interviewees “Christina”, “Gabriella” and “Helene”). Yet, organizing based on national identity was never an issue at the start of the SWL. Nor has it been discussed as a problem per se, although it has been argued that Nordic cooperation is important for the strengthening of a Nordic gender equality perspective.

**National Federations**

The idea of setting up a meta-organization at national level for the Swedish women’s movement fitted well into the structure and tradition of Swedish civil society in general. As pointed out in chapter 4, civil society in Sweden is characterized by a tendency toward forming national federations, gathering a group, interest or movement (Wijkström & Zimmer 2011:14). However, no national federation for the whole of the Swedish women’s movement had previously existed. Thus, the SWL is unprecedented as it claims to re-

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39 There is one exception in history: the Swedish member of the International Council of Women founded in 1896. It dissolved however in 1981, and had lost its significance
present the Swedish women’s movement and has managed to establish itself as an organization gathering 45 women’s organizations (SWL 2017b).

Another facilitating factor in the Swedish case was that the idea of a meta-organization for the women’s movement was supported by the Swedish government. As already mentioned, the Social democratic government provided the initiative to set up a meta-organization for the EWL membership with direct support from the Undersecretary of State at the Gender Equality Unit, who functioned as the convenor for the first meeting to discuss the EWL membership. As will be developed, this had the effect that representatives of women’s organizations could come together and agree on the creation of the SWL despite underlying tensions within the movement. The tensions are especially connected to party-political associations, as well as to a fear that one organization would have more power over a new meta-organization than others, and a fear that the meta-organization itself would take up too much space and resources from the movement (Interviewees “Astrid” and “Elisabet”). In fact, there were a couple of women’s organizations which were founded in the mid-1990s in relation to the Swedish EU membership, which had tried to gather the Swedish women’s organizations: “Sveriges Quinnoråd” (SweQ), the Women’s Lobby of Western Sweden (VSQL) and “Svenska Kvinnors Europanätverk” (SKEN). However, these organizations did not manage to gather the Swedish women’s movement, according to “Dagny”. Or rather, they did not manage to convince enough women’s organizations to cooperate by joining forces under the coordination of already existing women’s organizations. In comparison to such organizations, the government could function as a broker and supporter of the initiative, which facilitated the establishment of the SWL. Additionally, relative to the Polish women’s movement, Swedish women’s organizations are well-funded, which creates less competition within the field of women’s organizations and makes it easier to set up a new organization. Furthermore, the Swedish funding situation makes it possible for member organizations of the SWL to pay membership fees, which allows this new organization to, at least, have a coordinating role in relation to the EWL. As will be developed in chapter 6, the SWL nowadays receives annual state funding, and has a stable position and financial situation, allowing it to do much more than merely be the link between the EWL and national level.

already in the 1940s when party-political women’s organizations withdrew, whereas its counterpart in Denmark is the Danish EWL member (Dahlerup & Gulli 1985:14).
5. ADAPTING TO INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES

Two different Outcomes: Separate and Attached Meta-Organizations

Looking at their differing conditions, we can see that the Swedish and Polish women’s movements adapted to the EWL demands and to the EU structure in the ways that were possible given their different circumstances. Altogether, the favourable Swedish conditions made the creation of a Swedish women’s meta-organization comparatively easy. The SWL was formed as a formal coalition from the very start. There were no discussions on whether the SWL would be less formal, thus functioning more as a network or on an ad hoc basis. As a formal coalition, the SWL has a hierarchical structure of representation and decision-making. Most importantly, however, the SWL is an organization in its own right: it has its own office, staff and financial resources, which are separate from those of its member organizations. As will be developed in the following two chapters, the question is what effects this independence from its members has on its relationship with the member organizations.

Moreover, the SWL has a similar meta-organizational structure to that of the EWL and has in this way adapted “well” to the EU and the EWL. The SWL has the capacity to fulfil its EWL membership on a daily basis as it has the resources to keep up with all the campaigns, projects and demands for lobbying coming from the EWL secretariat. When talking about participation in the EWL, “Freja” who has had the experience of being a EWL board member, says:

Sometimes they [meaning the EWL office and board] don’t get much input [from members], but we [the SWL] always make sure to give comments, to keep deadlines. And apparently we are alone in that [laughs] (Interviewee “Freja”).

The SWL, thus, has the resources to be an active member: its representatives participate at General Assemblies (and other meetings in Brussels), and provide the EWL with motions and standpoints of the Swedish women’s movement (Interviewees “Christina” and “Freja”). In short, the SWL fulfils the role of being the Swedish national co-ordination of the EWL.

In the Polish case, adapting was problematic. A separate meta-organization has so far not been possible. Since October 2016, the women’s organization NEWW has been accepted as the Polish coordinator and EWL member while it forms a third version of the PWL. From 2004 and some years onwards there was a PWL which was accepted as the Polish EWL
member. However, the PWL was never an organization in its own right. Instead, the PWL was attached to one of its member organizations: first, the women’s resource centre OŚKa, and later the Democratic Union of Women (DUK) coordinated and hosted the work of the PWL. As such, the PWL was run like a side project by OŚKa and DUK.

In Figure 6, the different types of meta-organization are illustrated. The SWL is represented by the model to the left, in which an ideal-typical meta-organization (as it was presented in chapter 2) is visualized. Here, the meta-organization is separated and “independent” from its member organizations. The PWL is represented by the model to the right, in which an attached meta-organization is visualized. Here, one of the member organizations is both a regular member and the coordinator, or host organization, of the meta-organization.

The cases of the SWL and the PWL thus show that there are two different ways of forming a meta-organization: as a separate and new organization, and as coordinated by an already existing organization. The latter I have chosen to name attached meta-organization, or meta-organizing as attachment. An attached meta-organization is run within an organization, as a project, while it organizes other organizations. Meta-organizing as attachment can thus be seen as a form of partial organization within an organization. As will be developed in the following two chapters, this structure of attachment has had major implications for the case of the PWL.

The SWL and the PWL are examples of two different models of cooperation and organizing of a national-level social movement. These two models “fit” more or less well, or are more or less compatible, to the EU and EWL structure. Even though the formation of the SWL was not without
difficulties the SWL is an example of when adaptation to international structures is relatively easy and an example of when preconditions for this very specific way of organizing, that is meta-organizing, have been in place to facilitate the adaptation.

Discussion

The motives to join the EWL were similar in Sweden and Poland: as the largest and most consulted European women’s association at EU level, membership in the EWL was desirable. Swedish and Polish women’s organizations wanted to join the EWL because they wanted to have a voice in this important organization lobbying EU policy-makers. They also wanted to have access to the EWL’s EU-competence and information. Regarding setting up a new meta-organization for the women’s movement, motives were also similar: to change the conditions of interaction as to empower themselves vis-à-vis EU bureaucracy, and to create a new actor as to fulfil the demands from the EWL.

However, whereas Swedish women’s organizations were interested in having a watchdog which could keep an eye on EU policies which could threaten gender equality measures achieved at national level, or to use the EWL to export a “Swedish model for gender equality”, Polish women’s organizations were more interested in the EWL and the EU as an arena to use for leverage vis-à-vis Polish policy-makers. Despite a stronger need for the EWL among Polish women’s organizations, EWL membership was more contested and more difficult to achieve for Polish women’s organizations than it was for Swedish women’s organizations.

There are different types of social movement coalitions, ranging on a scale of minimal to maximal formalization. At one end of the scale the participating SMOs form a loose network, perhaps on an ad hoc basis, often for the purpose of sharing information. At the other end the coalition takes the form of a permanent organization with a broad agenda that can claim to speak for its members – that is, a meta-organization. The coalition may also have a more narrow or broad scope, in regard to focus and activities. As pointed out by Staggenborg (1986), informal coalitions and those with a narrow focus tend to be durable because they reduce tensions and facilitate cooperation among diverse actors (see also Hathaway & Meyer 1993; Jacobsson & Johansson 2009). Interestingly, the SWL is a formal coalition (a meta-organization) which has a broad scope of activities, yet it has become
more than simply the link between the Swedish women’s movement and the EWL. How was this possible?

As we have seen, the preconditions in Sweden were in favour for a women’s movement meta-organization whereas in Poland several contextual factors worked against such cooperation. Setting up and maintaining a meta-organization is difficult because it demands from member organizations that they give up some of their autonomy, uniqueness and visibility. Meta-organizations are actors which organize in the name of other actors. Instead of speaking for themselves, the meta-organization speaks for and represents its member organizations. As such, the meta-organization emphasizes unity while playing down the diversity among its members. Fries points out that meta-organizations do not only represent their member organizations but their identities refers to something beyond the pure organizational boundaries (2011:221). In the case of the SWL, for instance, the identity of the meta-organization refers to the whole field of Swedish women’s movement organizations, and the SWL also claims to represent the women’s movement. However, the SWL does not equal the women’s movement. Why would Swedish and Polish women’s organizations allow for such loss of autonomy and for an actor claiming to represent the whole movement? I argue that certain organizational contextual characteristics in the two women’s movements worked for or against a meta-organization and the adaptation to the EWL.

First, the Swedish women’s movement existed within a context of a civil society in which national federations are common, and had an institutionalized path, or indeed access, to the government. As pointed out in chapter 4, the state–civil society relation in Sweden is characterized by a tradition of corporatism. This tradition of inclusion and cooperation, and the practice of forming federation – i.e. meta-organizational structures – for each group or issue means there was an opening for the women’s movement when the SWL was to be formed. The meta-organizational structure could also be seen as preferred by the state, as the aggregated voice facilitates and fits in with the process of referral bodies. In Poland, there existed rather a resistance towards this type of organizational structures. The legacy of communism and the consequential resistance towards centralized membership-based organizations within Polish civil society was a constraint for the Polish women’s movement when it came to the establishment of the PWL. Nor were Polish state–civil society relations in favour of the PWL: feminism and the women’s movement is rather stigmatized by current and previous Polish governments than invited to dialogue and cooperation in policy-making.
Second, the SWL was partly initiated by the Swedish government and supported by it. The fact that a government representative functioned as a convener for the first meeting gave the SWL legitimacy and at the same time as it provided a platform for the Swedish women’s organizations who were interested in setting up the SWL. Instead of relying on one or a group of already existing women’s organizations (as in the case of the PWL), the SWL from its initiation was disconnected from its members. No women’s organization had more access to the meta-organization than the others – at least in theory. With the government as supporter and convener, the SWL was given the image of being democratic in the sense of not being occupied by any women’s organization in particular but to exist for all of them equally. In Poland, no such external supporter and convener existed, which meant that the Polish women’s organizations were left with their internal divisions, distrust and tensions – especially between new feminist organizations and the “old” women’s organizations with associations with the old regime – and the already dire situation of competition for scarce funding.

Third, the SWL can be understood as a result of Swedish women’s organizations’ interest and relation to the Swedish government, and vice-versa. Not only was the SWL set up to have representation in the EWL and to lobby EU policy-makers: interestingly, the SWL was also set up to interact with and to lobby the Swedish government (and other national-level actors). There was, consequently, a strong interest in national cooperation. In Poland however, the need for Central and East European regional cooperation, representation and solidarity was among many women’s organizations stronger than national cooperation and representation – and this need clashed with the demands from the EWL. In addition, prior to the Eastern enlargement and the possibility to join the EWL there were Central and East European coalitions and associations with a base in Poland which further contributed to a disinterest in a Polish association for international representation.

Altogether, I argue that the meta-organizational form fitted the Swedish and Polish women’s movement contexts differently. With the advent of meta-organizing, and consequently an additional layer of organization on the domestic women’s movement, a decided order among women’s SMOs is supposed to be implemented. Movement specific characteristics and the structure of the two women’s movement fields played a role in how much organization could be “accepted” in the two women’s movements. The decided order was both wanted and resisted in the two women’s movements, yet it was only in the Swedish case that it was fully implemented in
the form of the SWL. Considering the contextual setting, the Polish women’s movement relies on participation (movement element) rather than on membership (organization element), whereas Swedish women’s movement to a larger extent typically relies on membership. I thus argue, that the SWL was possible because the organizational elements – especially those of membership, hierarchy and rules – were generally accepted among the involved women’s organizations due to a notion of the women’s movement, formed in a field of Swedish civil society organizations, in which national federations are common, and close connections to the government normalized. This last point allowed for a government representative to function as a democratic convener, or a broker, and platform for the start of the SWL. In Poland, setting up the PWL was complicated because the women’s movement was set in a context in which organizational elements were less allowed for. While hierarchy was sometimes embraced (in terms of NGOs), organization was also resented: there was a stronger notion of freedom from the state and consequently a stronger notion of independence from top-down authority (as a meta-organization essentially is); and membership-based organizing was not a common practice. National-level social movements’ adaptation to international structures in terms of demands for meta-organization consequently depend on the structure of the domestic social movement and how much organization it allows for.

As with all SMOs, movement coalitions and meta-organizations, also resources played a central role in the adaptation to the EU in the cases of the SWL and the PWL. Because the source and type of resources are essential for how the two women’s meta-organizations were set up and unfolded, the whole of the next chapter is devoted to this topic.
To organize, resources are essential. With the resource mobilization perspective, Zald and McCarthy (1979) argued that social movement organizations, just like any organization, strive for organizational survival, and need resources to be able to achieve their goals. As we have seen, and as was pointed out by for instance Sánchez-Salgado (2014:57ff), civil society actors need resources in order to participate at EU-level. Normally, national-level civil society organizations lack the amount of resources for EU-level participation. In regard to both Polish and Swedish women’s organizations, they generally lack resources to participate in EU lobbying, which is one of the reasons why they wanted to join the EWL. However, to come together and set up a coordinating meta-organization to be the link between the EWL and the national-level women’s organizations, has been difficult, partly due to issues connected to resources. Resources have been at the centre of conflicts and tensions in both the Polish and Swedish case. As social movement organizations, the PWL/SWL and its (possible) members compete for the same resources (cf. Zald & McCarthy 1979:12; McCarthy & Zald 1977:1234). The PWL/SWL posed a threat to other women’s organizations’ chances of funding. In a context of scarce funding (especially in Poland) and typically for meta-organizations, this situation creates tensions in the PWL/SWL and the field of women’s organizations. Resources thus complicate things. On the one hand, the need for resources creates competition and division within the women’s movement. On the other hand, resources can provide stability and conditions for representation: with resources, representatives of women’s organizations can meet and form a voice for the movement, a voice which subsequently can be presented in different forums and to various actors, for instance to the EWL. In this chapter, the resources available to the PWL and the SWL are discussed, and the role of resources for the specific structures of the two meta-organizations are analysed.
Edwards and McCarthy (2008:118) argue that resources are unevenly distributed among social movement groups – for instance, middle class-related movement groups generally have access to more resources than others, and the availability of resources “are unevenly distributed within societies and among them”. There are for instance more resources available to Swedish women’s organizations than to Polish ones, especially in a recent political climate of “war on gender” (as discussed in chapter 4).

Worth to consider here is that (1) there are different sources of resources, and (2) there are different types of resources. First, there are several actors which can provide social movements with resources, such as state agencies, foundations, religious bodies and individuals. Edwards and McCarthy (2008:120f) argue that these actors may act out of “altruism, enlightened selfinterest, compassion, religious conviction, or ideological commitment”, or because they want to “co-opt and thereby to control to some extent the goals and tactics of a movement”. In short, it matters from where/whom the resources are provided. The origin of the resources shapes the conditions for what the resources can be used for.

Second, social movement actors do not only draw upon financial resources. Edwards and McCarthy (2008:125), highlight the importance of moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources. Moral resources include legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support and celebrity. From a new institutional organizational perspective, actors gain legitimacy when they “mimic institutionally legitimated features” (Edwards & McCarthy 2008:125). It could, for instance, be said that the EWL has mimicked the norms for EU-lobbying and this way gained legitimacy in the eyes of the European Commission and Parliament. Cultural resources can be widely spread knowledge or cultural products such as music, films and magazines. Cultural resources include, for instance, tacit knowledge “about how to accomplish specific tasks like enacting a protest event, holding a news conference, running a meeting, forming an organization, initiating a festival, or surfing the web” (Edwards & McCarthy 2008:126). Social-organizational resources can be either movement-specific and intentionally created for social movement goals, or disconnected to a social movement whose actors somehow gain access to resources through the social organization. The most common form of social organization resources are infrastructure, social networks and organizations. This means that these types of resources can be embedded in infrastructures, social networks or organizations which do not “belong” to the social movement but used by it if its actors have access to it in some ways (Edwards &
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McCarthy 2008:127). Piven and Cloward (1977), for instance, showed that poor people’s movement actors used other organizations, such as a church, to mobilize. It is also common that university campuses and their material resources are used by student protest groups (van Dyke 1998). Human resources are inherited in individuals and include categories such as labour, experience, skills, and expertise. Human resources may be limited, for example due to individuals’ competing obligations, personal economy or other social relationships. Finally, material resources are both financial and physical capital such as money, property and equipment (Edwards & McCarthy 2008:128f).

Because the PWL and the SWL are meant to be meta-organizations, it is also important to take into account the roles of resources in this type of organization. As pointed out in chapter 2, it makes a difference if the meta-organization relies on resources from its members or if it relies on other resources: what Bor (2014) refers to as indirect and direct resources. A meta-organization which does not have to rely on its members’ resources can to a larger degree have a “life on its own” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:48). Contrary, the meta-organization which is dependent on its members’ resources suffers from instability and intensified issues of ownership and competition because the “indirect” resources can create an unbalanced relation among the members (Bor 2014:141).

One conclusion to be drawn from the three points made here, is that social movement resources commonly are provided by organizations – such as state agencies, foundations, trusts, institutes, charities, university campuses or churches – which means that social movement organizations usually depend on other organizations. In the cases of the PWL and the SWL, dependence on other organizations – yet very different types in each case – is evident and will be analysed.

In the following, I will come back to the various sources of resources; the five types of social movement resources; and the role of direct versus indirect resources in meta-organizations, and use them to show that it mattered to the PWL and the SWL what kind of resources could be used.

Resources of the SWL

In 2019, the SWL has five employees and one intern working at the office in central Stockholm, and many activities, including for instance: connecting the Swedish women’s movement with the EWL; national and supranational lobbying work; conducting gender equality budgeting and CEDAW shadow
reporting; campaigning for equal pay, individualized parental leave, and porn free hotels (SWL 2019a). Since 2017, the SWL also arranges the largest conference on gender mainstreaming in Sweden – “Forum Jämställdhet” – and courses in gender budgeting for companies, municipalities and others (Forum Jämställdhet 2019a). Such capacity requires resources. Considering that the SWL started as a very small organization and a narrow range of activities based on voluntary work conducted mainly by its first chairperson (Interviewee “Astrid”), this development and expansion is important and has meant a considerable change regarding the amount and type of resources collected.

Typical for many Swedish associations, each member organization of the SWL has to pay an annual membership fee. For organizations with less than 3000 individual members the fee is SEK 600, and for those organizations with more than 3000 individual members the fee is SEK 3000 (SWL 2019b). Taking into account all 47 member organizations, the membership fee brings in, at maximum, SEK 141 000.\(^{40}\) The SWL also receives contributions from supporting members (minimum of 150 SEK per year) and project funds (SWL 2017c; Interviewee “Helene”). The membership fee is of course an important resource for the SWL, but it is far from enough to cover costs for office rent, employees and all the organization’s activities.

**State Funding**

The main source of income has from the start been the Swedish state, which has played a key role in the history of the SWL. Today, the SWL receives an organization state grant of, on average, SEK 650 000 per year via the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society and, lately, the newly set up Swedish Gender Equality Agency. With this grant the SWL is able to maintain stability and run the organization, according to one of its employees (Interviewee “Gabriella”). The two state agencies have also provided the SWL with project money. Since 2011 the SWL has received money for one to three projects per year, varying between SEK 430 000 to 833 000 per project (MUCF; Jämställdhetsmyndigheten 2019a).\(^{41}\) Additionally, the Swe-

\(^{40}\) Calculated on the basis of 47 organizations paying the higher fee of 3000 SEK.
\(^{41}\) State funded projects: Duktiga flickor kostar inte – budgetanalys (2011); Beijing +18 för nordisk kvinnokonferens 2013 (2011); Kvinnor i kris – vad händer med jämställdheten i finanskrisens spår? (2012); Nationell mobilisering för nordiskt Forum Malmö 2014 (2012); Etiska riktlinjer för företag i fråga om sexköp (2012); Nationell mobilisering inför nordiskt Forum Malmö 2014 (2013); Skuggrapport av regeringens CEDAW-rapport nr 9 & 10 (2015); Leder regeringens integrationspolitik till jämställdhet? (2016); Ta
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dish government donated 10 million SEK to the SWL’s work on Nordiskt Forum in 2014, which enabled a separate and temporary office with three full time employees. (Interviewee “Helene”). These grants, especially the yearly organization grant, provided by the Swedish state are crucial for the SWL as they create stability and allows for long-term planning. The state grants are appreciated by the SWL office and board (Interviewees “Astrid”; “Dagny”; “Britta”; “Christina”; “Helene”).

It has, however, not been a given that the SWL would be significantly supported by state funding. This support is a result of interactions between SWL representatives and government representatives, and many years of lobbying by the SWL itself, various women’s organizations and others. The support from the government thus should be seen against the backdrop of the Swedish state’s relation to and view of civil society and the women’s movement in general, and the SWL in particular.

In general, the Swedish state’s objective of its civil society politics is to support and have a dialogue with civil society organizations as these are seen as an essential part of democracy. Civil society organizations are also seen as contributors to society and the common welfare (Swedish Government 2015). For the Swedish state, the role of civil society organizations is, thus, to be both collective voices and service providers (for instance women’s shelter organizations provide shelter and psychological help to women who have been subjected to men’s violence), however the former is the most important one (Swedish Government 2015). The Swedish state provides several types of grants to civil society organizations. The most common ones are: (1) organization grants (organisationsbidrag), the most basic type, funding an organization for its role as a democratic force but without any specific demands regarding activities; (2) activity grants (verksamhetsbidrag) funding the services provided by an organization to its members and/or the general public; and (3) project grants funding specific and short term activities. In addition, civil society organizations can work on behalf of state agencies in which case they are reimbursed for the mission they carry out for the public good, and is strictly not a grant. A goal for the Swedish state is to give long-term funding. In 2016, the Swedish state allocated approximately SEK 13.7 billion to civil society organizations, of which a majority consisted of organization and activity grants (Swedish Government 2018:24f).

Regarding state funding of women’s organizations, the story starts in 1979 when the coalition government of Fälldin decided to investigate the issue. Since the middle of the 1970s, the Government Offices had been reviewing the conditions for the “popular movements”, and as a consequence the question of state grants for women’s organizations was raised. A Committee was appointed with the purpose of reviewing the issue which resulted in the Committee Report “Grants to women’s organizations” (Bidrag till kvinnoorganisationer SOU 1980:44). In the report, it was argued that women’s organizations have played an important role in the work for increased gender equality and that they have been contributing to women in community work and public debate. It was emphasized that women’s organizations contribute to the education and activation of women, for example when they provide education in meeting techniques, argumentation and other skills useful in organizations. In so doing, they contribute to the engagement and participation of women in decision-making bodies. In the Committee Report it was therefore concluded that women’s organizations need a financial base in order to provide courses (SOU 1980:17f). In addition, it was argued that other types of organizations such as youth-, sports-, and temperance organizations already received state funding on a regular basis whereas women’s organizations only had received a few project-based grants (SOU 1980:7ff). Following the Committee Report, a regular state grant system for women’s organizations was introduced in 1982, which marked women’s organizations as part of the popular movements and as promoters for gender equality, according to the government itself in 2005 (Swedish Government 2005). From 1982, women’s organizations with at least 1500 members and with local affiliations in at least half of the country’s municipalities could apply for state funding. A basic grant of approximately SEK 125 000 per year and organization supported 15 to 18 women’s organizations the next 20 years (Swedish Government 1981; Swedish Government 2005).

It was not until 2003 that the issue of state funding for women’s organizations was raised again and reviewed in a new Committee Report, “Women’s organizing” (Kvinnors organisering SOU 2004:59) – a report which would play an important role for the SWL. The main objective with this new Committee Report was to review the changed conditions for women’s organizations, and how state funding could be adjusted to better

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42 The Fälldin government consisted of the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the Moderate Party.
fit these changes (Swedish Government 2005). The reviewer and Committee Report writer estimated that a new government funding of SEK 30 million would support 35–60 women’s organizations per year. Following the Committee Report, the Social Democratic government of Persson raised the grant for women’s organizations to SEK 25.5 million in 2006 and SEK 28 million in 2008 (Swedish Government 2005). In addition to this large increase in government grants to women’s organizations some changes were made regarding who could apply for state funding. Contrary to the opinion of the Committee Report writer, the government decided that also “umbrella organizations” for women’s organizations would be eligible for state funding. The main argument behind this decision was that umbrella organizations within other areas, such as youth organizations or the disability movement, were given state funding and that there should be a comparison in the allocation of grants. Several referral bodies had also pointed out that grants for women’s umbrella organizations were important as individual smaller women’s organizations have few possibilities of pursuing the larger general issues for women (Swedish Government 2005).

The 2004 Committee Report and subsequent change in government directives for the funding of women’s organizations have had a major impact on the structure of the organizations of the Swedish women’s movement. First, it meant that more women’s organizations could apply and receive funding which also led to more women’s organizations being (officially) registered. Second, it meant that “umbrellas” – that is, meta-organizations – for women’s organizations could receive funding. In 2018, the newly established Swedish Gender Equality Agency distributed SEK 24 million to 72 women’s organizations (Jämställdhetsmyndigheten 2019b) – a major increase from the barely 20 women’s organizations supported by state grants since the 1980s.43

**Government Support**

Regarding the SWL and its relationship to the Swedish state and government, there are several important points for the issue of resources, and not only financial ones. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, the SWL was partly initiated by the Social democratic government in 1995 which undoubtedly implied that the SWL was considered important by the govern-

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43 Previously, the grants were distributed by the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society, which still provides some youth-, HBTQ- and ethnic- women’s organizations with grants (MUCF 2019).
ment. Moreover, a link between the SWL and the Swedish government was established from its onset.

As discussed in chapter 5, following the 4th UN conference on women in Beijing and the advent of a possible EWL membership (due to the Swedish accession to the EU) in 1995, actors within the Swedish women’s movement had started to discuss a more stable cooperation and representation internationally, while the Social Democratic government showed a great interest in gender equality issues and thus had an interest in a united voice of the women’s movement for the purpose of policy-making input and legitimacy. When two representatives from the Swedish section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) met with the Under-secretary of State, and mentioned that there had been a discussion on creating an “umbrella organization”, the idea was more than welcomed. The three of them agreed that the Undersecretary would invite women’s organizations to a meeting to discuss this further. Consequently, the former Undersecretary of State sent out an invitation to 22 women’s organizations, which the government perceived as the most active in the work for gender equality, for a meeting at which it was decided that the SWL would be set up (E-mail correspondence with Sahlström). As mentioned in chapter 5, and which will be developed in chapter 7, the government representative was considered a democratic convener and played a major role in the success of setting up a women’s movement meta-organization.

With the support of, and co-initiated by, the Swedish government, the SWL had been awarded legitimacy. It had a good start in terms of relations with the state. After some time of unstable economy and a lot of voluntary work it also received money from the Social democratic government. In fact, the SWL received up to SEK 1.2 million (Interviewee “Britta”) – a sum which it has since never been granted. However, this was given on an ad hoc basis and, according to a former chair of the SWL, was quite arbitrary:

There were no decisions back then, regarding support and grants, but it was a bit of a chance if one got any [money] or not (Interviewee “Britta”).

The former chair further argues that the SWL in the beginning was “in the hands of” who was in government (Interviewee “Britta”). It would take a while before the SWL was granted stable state funding which was independent of a specific temporary government.

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44 ”Internationella kvinnoförbundet för fred och frihet” (IKFF), in Swedish.
The second important event in the history of the SWL’s relation to resources and the Swedish government was an internal crisis of the organization around year 2003. From its very start, party political women’s organizations or women’s wings – such as Social Democratic Women, Centre Women, Moderate Women – could be members and wanted to be members of the SWL. Already around 2000 however, these organizations started to cause problems for the SWL as the discussions had become infected by party politics. One after another, the party-political organizations started to leave in 2003. Moreover, the two women’s shelter organizations SKR and ROKS decided to make common cause to leave, as they found the SWL undemocratic and lacking transparency, especially when it came to which member organizations would represent the SWL internationally, according to a representative of one of the shelter organizations (Interviewee “Jenny”).

The fact that such important members as the party-political women’s organizations and the women’s shelter organizations left created a crisis when the Gender Equality Unit at the Government Offices claimed that the SWL was no longer representative of the women’s organizations and consequently withdrew the grants (Marianne Laxén, quoted in Dagens Nyheter 2003). According to some interviewees, the Social Democratic government had decided to withdraw the grant because the chairperson at that time (1998-2004) was associated with the Centre party (Interviewees “Britta”; “Astrid”). One of them also suggests that the government was frustrated with the SWL:

There was a conference in Johannesburg about the climate to which the SWL had sent a delegate. Something happened there which irritated the government (Interviewee “Britta”).

According to a former chairperson, the Gender Equality minster informed the SWL that she “did not have the permission to give money to umbrella organizations anymore” (Interviewee “Britta”). In 2004, the second chairperson resigned at her own request, due to the political conflicts in the SWL (Dagens Nyheter 2003), and a new chairperson, who was not associated with any political party, took office. To solve this crisis the SWL also decided at their next annual meeting to exclude all party-political organizations (Interviewee “Britta”). Instead, Q-sam, a women’s network for all political parties and the SWL, was set up to encourage cross political

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45 Mona Sahlin was gender equality minister at that time.
cooperation (SVT 2005). The SWL was now without money yet had to pay rent, bills and the EWL membership fee. Its board had to fire employees and sell its computers (Interviewees “Britta”; “Astrid”). It was indeed a difficult time for the SWL, and could easily have been the end of the first meta-organization for the Swedish women’s movement. However, the SWL was saved by its role as the Swedish EWL coordinator. With some help from the excluded party political women’s organizations who lobbied the government, the government office eventually stepped in and paid the EWL membership (Interviewee “Britta”). Because of this vital link to the EU, the SWL was an important actor in the eyes of the government. Gradually the SWL also managed to change not only the internal distrust but also the government’s attitude towards it – mainly through intense lobbying work, according to a former chair:

Well, there were government meetings every Thursday to which we sent in and applied for money. […] Eventually it came up as a suggestion and we got an establishment grant. (Interviewee “Britta”).

With renewed support from the government, and some help from party political women’s organizations, the continued existence of the SWL was ensured.

The financial support from the government could have been temporary and dependent upon continued goodwill from government representatives, if it was not for the third, and most significant, event for the SWL in regard to funding: the above mentioned 2004 Committee Report on women’s organizations which led to grants for women’s umbrella organizations and consequently secured grants for the SWL (Interviewees; “Astrid”; “Britta”; “Dagny”). One former representative of the SWL remembers the importance of this report:

Then this report on women’s organizing came, in which the SWL plays a very strong role. It also showed the need of such an umbrella organization. [It] plays a big role in mobilizing the organizations and to be active in the referral round which led to the conclusion that there was a big need for funding of women’s organizations and that entailed that also the funding of the SWL was secured. (Interviewee “Dagny”). The 2004 Committee Report and its subsequent referral process and government decision on increased

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46 “Remissomgång” in Swedish, which is described by the Swedish government as. “Before the Government takes up a position on the recommendations of a commission of inquiry, its report is referred for consideration to the relevant bodies. These referral
grants led to the now established organization grant of approximately SEK 650 000, which the SWL receives each year. According to a former representative/chair, this grant funds the administration of the SWL and allows it to employ people (Interviewee “Britta”). According to two other former representatives, it means that the SWL is no longer dependent on the government (Interviewees “Dagny”; “Britta”). However, according to an employee and the chair (at the time) the organization grant is not enough (Interviewees “Christina”; “Helene”):

We only have grants from the Agency for Youth and Civil Society, and the tiny amount we get from the membership fee, except for the money we now have for a project on advertising. Regarding long-term, this is what is difficult with project grants. It is not enough for the enormous work we do. (Interviewee “Helene”).

Despite stable state funding, the SWL is looking for more and new ways of collecting financial resources.

The fourth important point for the SWL and its relation to the government was, in this context, an opportunity which would later open up for more prospects regarding financial recourses. This opportunity was “Nordiskt Forum Malmö 2014 – New Action on Women’s Rights”. Nordiskt Forum was a four-day long regional conference in Malmö, arranged by the SWL and the women’s movement in the Nordic countries. It was a continuation of similar conferences in Oslo, Norway 1988 and in Turku, Finland 1994. The aim of the conference was “to shape new strategies to promote gender equality and end discrimination against women” by using the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and the CEDAW documents from 1995 as starting points. Approximately 20 000 people visited the conference, and many NGOs, activist networks, governments, academia and companies were represented. Nordiskt Forum also received much attention in media, and caused a public discussion regarding the event in itself, feminist goals and feminism in general (Nordiskt Forum 2014a).47 As a result bodies may be central government agencies, special interest groups, local government authorities or other bodies whose activities may be affected by the proposals. This process provides valuable feedback and allows the Government to gauge the level of support it is likely to receive. If a number of referral bodies respond unfavourably to the recommendations, the Government may try to find an alternative solution” (Government Offices of Sweden 2018).

47 Nordiskt Forum was also strongly criticized, among other things for not being inclusive enough, for having invited transphobic and racist speakers and for being too expensive (see for instance Feministiskt Perspektiv 2014).
of the conference, 63 feminist agreements and demands were handed over to the Nordic governments in a final document (Nordiskt Forum 2014b).

Nordiskt Forum also meant that the SWL’s relation to the Swedish government improved. On the website of the conference, former Gender Equality Minister Ahrnholm expressed the Swedish centre-right government’s positive view and support of Nordiskt Forum:

Gender equality is a prioritized issue for the government and we contribute, via the support to Nordiskt Forum, to promote a lively discussion on gender equality political challenges. The women’s movement is valuable for the development of gender equality work in Sweden and in the world! (Ahrnholm, quoted in Nordiskt Forum 2014c).

The Swedish government was in fact one of the key supporters and donors of the conference. In addition, the Government Office and state agencies the Equality Ombudsman, the Swedish Institute, the County Administrative Boards, the Civil Contingencies Agency and the Agency for Youth and Civil Society acted as sponsors of the event (Nordiskt Forum 2014d). The SWL was the initiator, and together with women’s organizations in the Nordic countries planned and arranged the conference.48 Already in 2012, the Swedish government decided to grant the SWL with SEK 10 million for the planning and implementation of the conference (SWL 2012; Nordiskt Forum 2014a). Due to this support, the SWL could set up a special secretariat with a manager and employ three people to work specifically on the conference (Interviewee “Helene”; “Astrid”).

The idea that the SWL would organize a Nordic conference came from member organizations of the SWL. According to a representative of one member organization, it was mentioned at a seminar organized by a member organization that there were several millions left in the government’s gender equality budget, and that these could be invested in a Nordic women’s conference similar to the one in Finland in 1994. A letter was then written and sent to the SWL, and the issue was discussed at the annual meeting (Interviewee “Dagny”). The chair of the SWL also contacted other Nordic women’s organizations, and they all met to further discuss the conference, according to a former representative of the SWL (Interviewee

48 The other Nordic women’s organizations were: Kvinderådet, Denmark; FOKUS – Forum for Kvinner og Utviklingsspørsmål, Norway; Krisesentersekretariatet, Norway; Nytkis Kvinnoorganisationer, Finland; Kvenfélagasamband Iceland; Kvenréttingafélag Iceland.
“Britta”). Eventually, the SWL handed in an application about financial support to the government, which decided to grant the request: by providing the SWL with SEK 10 million over a three-year period (SWL 2012; Interviewees “Astrid”; “Freja”; “Christina”). Due to this special grant from the government, the SWL increased its contacts with the Gender Equality Minister prior the conference. With Nordiskt Forum, the relation to the government was reinforced and intensified (Interviewee “Christina”). The SWL was now, more than ever, seen as a valuable organization in the eyes of the government.

Despite close relations with the government and secured state funding the SWL continues to search for more resources, and to notify the government of its importance (Interviewee “Helene”). The SWL and other women’s organizations have for instance continued to argue for more, and a separate source, of state funding for women’s umbrella organizations (SWL 2018), which will be developed in chapter 7.

The Swedish government has supported the SWL financially, and in terms of moral resources by giving it legitimacy. It could also be argued that the government has provided the SWL with social-organizational resources, in that there are established networks and structures for communication and lobbying in which the SWL is included as a given actor (such as being a referral body or having regular contacts with government representatives).

Following Edwards and McCarthy (2008:120f), it could also be argued that the government has co-opted the SWL and thereby, to some extent, controls the Swedish women’s movement. When talking about Nordiskt Forum and the relationship to the government, a former chair of the SWL, argues the opposite:

Yes I met Arnholm today … we had a meeting about Nordiskt Forum there, so we have been there to inform about how it’s working out. Because they gave us 10 million. And even though the money are given unconditionally, because they are given just to be used for the preparations and implementation of the conference, there are no other demands. But it is obvious that we want to inform the government on what is going on […] but they shouldn’t have any influence on our opinions… And they don’t. We think what we think, we write what we want. (Interviewee “Christina”).

However, even if representatives of the SWL are keen on emphasizing the autonomy of the SWL, it is still financially dependent on state funding, and dependent on the government’s view of the SWL as a legitimate representative of the Swedish women’s movement.
Limited Company

Apart from membership fees and state funding, the SWL has recently started to look for other types of financial resources. According to its website, the SWL tries to “create its own sources of income” by applying for more long-term project grants. It has for instance received money for a project on sexism in advertising via crowdfunding (Catapult 2019), and been granted project funding from Nordic Information on Gender (NIKK) and the Postcode Foundation (SWL 2017c).

Another way to create its own sources of income is to start selling services and materials. In 2017, the SWL founded a limited company to offer courses, workshops, conferences and books to anyone interested. On its website, the SWL writes:

Hire the Swedish Women’s Lobby Ltd. to do gender equality assessments, give courses or to organize theme days. (SWL 2019c).

The SWL Ltd has a revenue of 4 070 000 SEK and its profit margin is 14,6% (Ratsit 2019). Its work is based on implementing gender mainstreaming as a strategy in any type of process, activity and decision within companies, state agencies, schools and municipalities. It also offers courses in gender budgeting for elected officials, managers and officers (SWL 2019c). Its main activity however is Forum Jämställdhet (Forum Gender Equality). On its website, the SWL claims that Forum Jämställdhet is “Sweden’s largest gender equality conference”. It has so far been organized once a year since 2016, gathering managers, elected representatives and experts from public and private sector (Forum Jämställdhet 2019b). The idea of this annual conference originated from Nordiskt Forum at which the SWL “noticed a need for a professional conference with a focus on gender mainstreaming” (Forum Jämställdhet 2019c) The conference is supposed to provide competence development for those working with gender equality and spreading knowledge about gender mainstreaming (Forum Jämställdhet 2019c).

It is yet to be seen what this recent development will bring. Still, with its limited company and Forum Jämställdhet, the SWL has taken important steps regarding resource allocation, which can bring in a significant amount of money to be used for its core activities. While this development may allow the SWL to be less dependent on state funding, it is due to the initial

49 2016 in Malmö (under the name Jämställdhetsdagarna), 2017 in Örebro, and 2018 in Karlstad. In 2019 Forum Jämställdhet is in arranged Luleå.
and long-lasting close relationship to the Swedish government that the SWL managed to get to this point at which it can organize “Sweden’s largest gender equality conference”, and set up a limited company. Without the financial support from the state and the legitimacy and general encouragement it has received from the various Swedish governments since its beginning, the SWL would not have managed to become an established organization with so many and diverse activities as it has today. State funding has provided the SWL with stability allowing it to continually develop.

Via Forum Jämställdhet’s focus on gender mainstreaming, the SWL relates well to the Swedish government’s gender equality policy goals which takes gender mainstreaming as point of departure and as a strategy to reach the policy goals (Swedish Government 2016). This fortunate connection is something the SWL is keen to point out:

[Forum Jämställdhet] enables the realization of the government’s vision of being a feminist government as [it] facilitates knowledge and methods around gender mainstreaming (Forum Jämställdhet coordinator, quoted at SWL 2015).

Following this, it could be argued that the SWL seeks and gains legitimacy from the Swedish government. Interestingly, Forum Jämställdhet, and the courses, workshops, conferences and books provided by the SWL limited company, are activities neither connected to the EWL, nor benefits its member organizations directly. As is common in meta-organizations, the hierarchical centre and the headquarters may have its own interests, such as expanding the meta-organization’s role and activities, whereas member organizations may want to limit the sphere of action of their meta-organization (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:129f). The reason why the SWL has been able to expand to the point that it now offers activities and organizes events which are not (directly) relevant for neither its member organizations nor the EWL connection is because it has been provided with the room to manoeuvre via both moral and financial government support. Without this support, the SWL would have been more dependent on its member organizations, and consequently had a harder time expanding its sphere of action to this point. On the other hand, having its own source of income curbs its dependency on state funding and being on good terms with the government.
Resources of the PWL

If the Swedish case is characterized by government support, the Polish case is instead characterized by a lack of government support and lack of financial resources in general. As pointed out by Fuchs and Payer (2012:164), the main obstacle for women’s organizations in Poland, and other Central and East European countries to participate in EU governance is lack of financial resources.

Scarce Financial Resources

In general, financial resources are scarce in the field of Polish women’s movement organizations. Regarding state funding, for instance, the situation has worsened since the Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in 2015, introducing more conservative policies directly affecting women’s, feminist and LGBT organizations (Grzebalska & Petö 2018:169). Those few women’s organizations that for a longer period of time had received state funding, such as the Women’s Right Centre (CPK), have since 2016 either lost state funding or been threatened to. A representative of CPK says that:

We were refused the money we used to get from the government for providing services for women. We were refused and the reason was that we provide services only to women and the government wants the services to be open for men as well. So that was their official argument, actually, used this year (Interviewee representing CPK).

With the PiS government, it has become increasingly difficult for NGOs/organizations not aligned with the government’s views to receive funding. Some women’s organizations have been accused of being discriminative simply for supporting only women (as shown in the quote above), whereas other organizations have been discredited as being too ideological and working against the government’s conservative family politics (Politico 2017; Grzebalska & Petö 2018:169). Several members of parliament had written to the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy and complained that Fundacja Autonomia – a NGO working for human rights and anti-discrimination – is problematic as it refers to “LGBT ideology”. As a result, the ministry withdrew its funding of Fundacja Autonomia (Helsinki Foundation 2017). Several human rights activists, NGO representatives and Polish civil society actors claim that the PiS government has an agenda of shaping the landscape of Polish civil society according to the party’s own ideology by starvation and fright (Grzebalska & Petö 2018). Recently, the
PiS government has set up a new state agency, the National Freedom Institute-Centre for the Development of Civil Society (NFIC), which is now funding civil society organizations, instead of ministries and local administrators (Helsinki Foundation 2017). According to Fuszara (2009), the relationship between the Polish state and the Polish women’s movement was, however, difficult also before the change of government. The Polish government or state is, and has not been, a reliable source of resources for the Polish women’s movement. Rather than being a supporter, the Polish state is seen as an obstacle by a large part of the women’s movement, for example by repeatedly threatening the very limited abortion rights and by making it difficult for women’s organizations to exert influence on policies (Fuchs 2006; Graff & Korolczuk 2017a; 2017b).

The Polish Law on Public Benefit Activities and Volunteerism, however, provides the possibility to women’s organizations to benefit from income tax payments. Since 2003, individuals may choose to allocate one percent of their tax payment to a chosen non-for profit/”public benefit” organization registered in Poland (ICNL 2019; Piechota 2015). This law, commonly referred to as the “1 % tax law”, has had but a marginal impact on women’s organizations. Several interviewees representing women’s organizations (“Agata”; “Grażyna”; “Edyta”), argue that the law has on the one hand provided them with some money, but on the other hand the amount has been small and has entailed a lot more paperwork and reporting to the Ministry of Labour and Social Issues. “Agata”, for instance, argues that the strict rules in reporting is not weighed by the small amount of money they receive in the end:

Last year we collected… 500 euro [laughs]. But it’s ok […] for Polish people, one percent, if somebody is a retired person, it’s like two euro, for example, because people have so small pensions and so on. But when you see that you get 100 retired people give two euro each, it’s so nice and so on that they give you, but when you put it together, it’s not too much you know (“Agata”).

A representative of an organization working with abortion issues argues instead, that her organization has not registered for the “1 % tax law” because it would mean a risk for the organization:

Because we sometimes act against government policies, and we would like to be independent. If we take this advantage from one percent we would report everything to the government, every year. You know, a very detailed report. […] Because the issue [meaning abortion] is very problematic for them and
they will use this information somehow against us and against foundations and agencies who support us(“Cecylia”).

The recent combination of neoliberal and reinforced conservative sentiments in Poland have made it even harder for the women’s movement to win legitimacy and fight for women’s rights. Because of stronger anti-feminist sentiments and anti-gender mobilizations in Poland, women’s organizations have become even more cautious. The abortion issue is again under debate and the very limited rights to abortions in extreme cases are under threat, as pointed to in chapter 4. This makes it impossible for most women’s organizations to receive any state funding or to register for the “1 % tax law”. Because the state and the government are not reliable sources for neither financial nor moral resources, Polish women’s organizations need to turn elsewhere.

**Foreign Funding**

As pointed out in chapter 4, an important type of financial resource comes from abroad. Western foundations such as Ford Foundation, Open Society Institute Soros Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and the Global Fund for Women have played significant roles in shaping Polish civil society in general, and Polish women’s organizations in particular, by giving grants to and initiating many organizations. As we have seen, this was especially the case in the 1990s. Foreign states agencies have also played a role, such as USAID (McMahon 2002:30). These foreign and international actors wanted to build a civil society and democratic institutions in the CEE region, and they encouraged civic advocacy groups and professionalized organizations in particular (Císař 2017; Ghodsee 2004:224; Mendelson & Glenn 2002). Many women’s organizations came into being and gained financial resources this way, and many still rely on foreign funding. OŚKa was but one example. Due to foreign funding in the 1990s, Polish women’s organizations not only benefited financially and materially – for instance by being able to set up offices, hire personnel, buy computers and use Internet – the donors also provided women’s organizations, to some extent, with a source of political autonomy vis-à-vis the state. As Císař (2017) argues, thanks to external funding, some civil society organizations could challenge and oppose prevailing social norms. Similarly, it can be argued that Polish women’s organizations have gained some moral resources via international and foreign actors supporting them (cf. Edwards & McCarthy 2008). However, foreign funding has led to an NGO-ization and increased competition
among Polish women’s organizations and other civil society organizations in the country (Císar 2017; McMahon 2002; Mendelson & Glenn 2002:3). As a result, many women’s organizations are professional NGOs or advocacy organizations with a weak link to the grassroots (cf. Ghodsee 2004). In the case of the PWL, this is relevant because the first coordinator of the PWL, OŚKa, was initiated and funded by Ford Foundation, via Batory Foundation (Ford Foundation 1999; Batory Foundation 2005).

When Poland joined the EU, many American and West European donors left the region, but EU funding did not replace their functions (as discussed in chapter 4). Polish women’s organizations thus found themselves in a precarious situation, which they still have not recovered from. EU funding is not reliable and many Polish women’s organizations still hope for or rely to a large extent on foreign funding. According to several interviewees representing Polish women’s organizations, the international donors such as American ones were much more appreciated than the EU grants (Interviewees “Beata”, “Franciszka”, “Irena”, “Karolina” and “Olga”).

Another source of financial resource available to Polish women’s organizations are self-generated, such as organizing cultural events, selling magazines or fundraising, however these activities rarely generate enough income (Malinowska 2001:199). As pointed out before, the Polish women’s movement has partly undergone a process of NGO-ization since the start of the 1990s and associational forms of organizing is not strongly established (Hašková 2005, Císar & Vráblíková 2010; Císar 2017). As a consequence, neither membership is a common base for resources. Several interviewees certify that membership fees are not common and that it is difficult to recruit members (“Honorata”; “Agata”; “Irena”). One of them argues that there is no tradition of paying membership fees and that it is difficult to ask for any larger amounts of money from individuals (Interviewee “Agata”).

Partly as a result of the limited available resources, Polish civil society and its women’s movement have been characterized by both researchers (Jacobsson & Saxonberg 2013; Ekiert & Foa 2011; Fuchs 2006) and interviewees (“Liwia”, “Karolina”, “Martyna”, “Grażyna”, “Franciszka”) as fragmented, suffering from competition, and high turnover of organizations. As noted in chapter 4, it is also characterized by a tendency towards expert-based, internationally funded, NGOs rather than member-based associations (Korolzcuk & Sazonberg 2015; Hašková 2005, Císar & Vráblíková 2010).
Relying on a Member Organization’s Resources

For the establishment of the PWL, this situation has caused some obstacles. As pointed out by several interviewees, the PWL could not rely on member organizations paying a membership fee because possible member organizations already struggle economically (Interviewees “Honorata”; “Agata”; “Franciszka”). Neither could the PWL rely on any financial support from the Polish state. EU funding is also difficult as it is only project-based, and American or other Western international funding is today limited.

Most importantly, applying for funding to set up a new PWL would not be appreciated by women’s organizations as they all compete for these scarce international grants. As a consequence, the PWL has had to rely on resources in already existing women’s organizations. As we have seen, the only possible solution for the PWL was to be coordinated by an already existing organization rather than to be set up as a new and separate organization. The resource centre OŚKa had the resources, due to the grant from Ford Foundation, to run the PWL as a side-project. Similarly, DUK was able for a while to set up and coordinate the PWL, due to financial support via the government program Fund for Civic Initiatives (DUK 2016; 2010).50 Similarly, NEWW tried to set up a new version of the PWL because it has relatively secure funding (Interviewee “Agata”).

The fact that the PWL, so far, has been a type of partial organization which has been attached to, rather than independent from, another organization is central for understanding the difficulty in establishing the PWL. First, it means that the PWL has been dependent upon other women’s organizations’ resources – financial, material (such as office, e-mail list and computers) and other – which a former employee at OŚKa reminded me of:

So even though, later on, the organization managed to raise money for the [PWL] it was always not money for the [PWL] as such, but it was a kind of, you know, a project of the organization who was coordinating (Interviewee “Franciszka”).

As mentioned above, the first version of the PWL was attached to OŚKa, which at the time had “institutional grants” from the Ford Foundation (Ford Foundation 1999; Batory Foundation 2005). The stable financial situation of OŚKa and its many resources in terms of staff, office, computers and contacts within the movement through its database and email list allowed

50 “Fundusz Inicjatyw Obywatelskich” (FIO) in Polish.
OŚKa to take on a supplementary and voluntary role as the coordinator of the PWL. When OŚKa lost funding from Ford Foundation and struggled financially, the PWL was affected and consequently stopped functioning. Similarly, DUK had a relatively stable financial situation and established contacts within some parts of the Polish women’s movement. Thus, when DUK won a grant competition it could take over the coordinating role and reinstate the PWL (Interviewee “Franciszka”). The financial resources, in terms of the government program, not only allowed DUK to take on this role. The external financial resources also allowed DUK to reinstate a new version of the PWL without consent and involvement of the women’s organizations which had been involved in the first version of the PWL.

The external – or direct (Bor 2014) – resources gave OŚKa, and then DUK, freedom to act as they were not dependent upon the resources of member organizations of the PWL. Still, membership fees and member organizations’ active involvement have been requested by the headquarters of the PWL, and the lack of it has been an obstacle to the well-functioning and maintaining of the PWL. Several interviewees claim for instance that they have not been included in DUK’s coordination of the PWL and that there has not been much information or activities coming from the PWL (“Grażyna”, ”Dorota”; “Edyta”, “Cecylia” and “Olga”). On the other hand, this situation made the PWL dependent upon one specific member organization (first OŚKa and later DUK).

Due to scarce resources and a limited access to policy makers within the field of Polish women’s movement organizations, competition for funding and voice is also an issue which inflicted tensions within the PWL (this will be developed in chapter 7). After OŚKa and DUK, NEWW has tried to set up a new version of the PWL. This attempt was set up in such a way so that the PWL should not be attached to, nor rely on, one specific member organization. An obstacle was that a new and independent organization needs resources. But, as already pointed out, domestic resources are scarce, many international funders have left the region, and EU funding is possible only for already strong organizations. To base a new meta-organization on membership fees is also a major challenge. A representative of the second version of the PWL, argues that DUK had to pay for everything because member organizations were too small even to be able to pay the membership fee of 200 PLN per year (Interviewee representing DUK). Moreover, there is no strong tradition of civil society organizations being supported by private donations in Poland, according to several interviewees (“Agata” and “Irena”). As in the case of both the first and second version of the PWL,
therefore paying the EWL membership fee was a continuous challenge. A representative of NEWW explains why:

Paying the membership fee is a big obstacle because we have to give the fee of 1000 euros in June [2017, to the EWL], and not so many organizations are able to contribute to this […] and people think that why shall we pay, say 500 zloty, and not understand anything, not being able to participate at meetings with English speakers? (Interviewee representing NEWW).

The EWL membership fee has, thus, been a major problem for the Polish women’s movement already from the start. This has also been the case for many other women’s movements in the CEE and new member states (Interviewee “Agata”). The former Slovakian EWL member, for instance, lost contact with the EWL as they struggled financially (Personal communication with Lafon 2016).

Yet another obstacle to the formation of a new organization and a third version of the PWL, is a conflict between DUK and NEWW regarding ownership and legal status of the PWL. According to a representative of NEWW, DUK is not willing to let go of the PWL (Interviewee representing NEWW), despite the fact that it has not been able to pay the EWL membership fee since 2013, has not participated at EWL meetings and general assemblies, and not replied to communications from the EWL secretariat (Personal communication with Lafon 2016). A representative of NEWW referred to the situation of the PWL in 2016 as a “deadlock”: DUK was not able to call to meetings because of distrust towards itself among Polish women’s organizations, nor send a delegate to the EWL, but at the same time DUK was not willing to let anyone else take over the coordinating and representative role for the PWL (Interviewee representing NEWW). This situation has caused a problem for NEWW because it has had to wait to register a new PWL. DUK argued that it had the legal right to the name and organization of the PWL, and that it could take it to court, if other organizations were to register a new PWL or apply for EWL membership (Interviewee “Agata”). The EWL rules for membership have also posed an obstacle: members either have to resign themselves or be inactive for a couple of years and/or not pay the membership fee before the EWL can expel them (Interviewee representing NEWW; EWL 2013). The EWL only accepts one member per country at a time, and as long as the PWL was not expelled or had resigned, NEWW had to wait. One of its representatives explained the situation accordingly: “So we were waiting for the decisions of
the [EWL], if they want to keep this organization not functioning, not paying and so on [...] and that’s why it took so long” (Interviewee representing NEWW).

The question is why DUK is so concerned about its ownership of the PWL, when it apparently lacks the capacity to fulfil the coordinating role. According to a representative of one women’s organization involved in all three versions of the PWL, DUK was hoping for some benefits in terms of prestige and funding from the EWL. According to one of its own representatives, and stated in its own publication (DUK 2010:8), DUK also sees itself as the strongest and most important Polish women’s organization. Considering that DUK is a meta-organization itself, with local chapters all over Poland; an established position within the field of Polish women’s associations since 1990; and close connections to politicians (such as former deputy Prime minister Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka51), it is understandable that its representatives sees DUK as the given coordinator of the representative of the Polish women’s movement via the PWL. In a publication celebrating two decades, DUK (2010:56) describes the PWL as its “child” and “project”, and writes that:

[DUK], as the largest member organization, has been ensuring the organizational support, seat, substantive assistance and expertise for the Federation [meaning PWL] since its inception (DUK 2010:42).

As will be developed in chapter 7, DUK and OŚKa were both seen, by some parts of the women’s movement, as competitors to funding opportunities and to legitimacy and space in the field of Polish women’s organizations.

Discussion

The organization process of the PWL and the SWL turned out differently. The different characteristics of the two cases are summarized in Table 3 below. I argue that these differences are connected to the source and type of resources which the SWL and PWL rely on.

Although the first version of the PWL became more of a “complete” meta-organization with time, it never became an organization in its own right, as did the SWL. The PWL has thus been more of a project run by

51 Jaruga-Nowacka was a politician who belonged to the Polish Democratic Left Alliance party, but also a former chairwoman of the Polish Women’s League. Together with former President Kaczynski she was one of those killed in the Smolensk airplane accident in 2010.
another organization. It has been attached to an organization and consequently dependent upon this organization’s resources (financial, symbolic, and social), meaning that the resources of the PWL come from one specific member organization. As such, the PWL draws mainly upon indirect resources (Bor 2014). Neither version of the PWL had its own office or employees as they lacked the resources for this, but relied on the office and work done by OŚKa and DUK. It could also be argued that the PWL had a double structure: it was both an association for organizations, and attached to one of its member organizations. OŚKa and DUK have remained as the women’s organizations they were, while at the same time organizing other women’s organizations within their organization through the coordination work of the PWL.

Table 3. Differences in resources and structure of the SWL and PWL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SWL</th>
<th>PWL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainly direct resources</td>
<td>Mainly indirect resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent/separate organization</td>
<td>Attached to an organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single structure</td>
<td>Double structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing outside of organization</td>
<td>Organizing within organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instead of relying on the members, the SWL is financially dependent on another organization too, however, in this case it is the Swedish state and government which provide the meta-organization with resources. The state grants have allowed the SWL to have an office, staff and to expand its activities. In short, the grants have bestowed the SWL with stability. As such, the SWL draws mainly upon direct resources (Bor 2014): the main resources do not originate in the member organizations. The SWL’s ability to maintain a typical meta-organizational structure is mainly due to these direct resources. The SWL is an “independent” organization in terms of having resources on its own (not from members), and because it has a single structure: it is equally separated from all of its member organizations. The Swedish women’s organizations are thus organized outside any of the SWL’s member organizations.

Bor (2014:133) argues that when meta-organizations can rely on direct resources rather than only on resources that belong to member organizations, it has a capacity for action which does not rely on member organization’s ability or willingness. Considering that Polish women’s organizations in general struggle to survive and compete for resources to a higher
degree than Swedish organizations, and that the PWL has been attached to one of its member organizations, it becomes understandable why the PWL has been in a precarious position. There was no external convening actor which could provide the PWL with a starting ground and support. The PWL had to be set up on the basis on being coordinated by an already existing women’s organization. Through attachment the PWL lacks its own, separate and independent foundation. The SWL on the other hand, which has been able to use direct resources, has a more stable position and a capacity for action. As Ahrne and Brunsson (2008:48) says, resources “give organizations a ‘life of their own’ and a certain stability”. With the support from the Swedish government the SWL managed to create alliances, social capital, and a stable foundation on which to expand its sphere of action beyond the aim of being the link between the EWL and Swedish women’s organizations. The support from the government also helped the SWL to overcome internal movement tensions, such as at the start when the government representative was needed as a convener for the initial meeting of the SWL.

In the case of the SWL, there were also negative implications of some resources. As we will see in chapter 7, government dependency has sometimes become problematic. It could also be argued that the SWL has been co-opted by the government. How much “movement” is there in the SWL when it depends on state funding and government support? The SWL is at risk of losing some of its legitimacy in the eyes of women’s organizations and other actors in the women’s movement.

Another issue for the SWL regards who the association exists for: its member organizations, or is it an organization with its own interests? The SWL has “independence” from its members, and it has in its own right expanded its sphere of action. As we will see in the next chapter, the position which the SWL has been taken in the field of Swedish women’s organizations has created tensions. This is also the case for the PWL attempts. Even though the PWL has not taken up much space, the (threat of) existence of it – or rather, the threat that one women’s organization would have the control of the PWL – has nevertheless created tensions within the field of Polish women’s organizations and prevented the PWL to sustain.
In chapter 5, we have seen how the question of joining the EWL was connected to the issue of hierarchy: with EWL membership, Polish and Swedish women’s organizations become subject to a decision-making centre based in Brussels, and they are required to form a similar hierarchical structure among themselves at national level.

In the Polish case, both aspects of hierarchy were problematic: (1) the EWL membership was in itself not an obvious choice for the Polish women’s organizations, and (2) the meta-organizational structure was questioned and met with resistance among a large part of the movement. The conditions were not favourable for setting up a Polish meta-organization in relation to the EWL. In Sweden, the conditions were different, facilitating the creation of the SWL. As we have seen in both chapter 5 and chapter 6, the Swedish government played a major role in this process, providing the SWL with both legitimacy and financial resources. The Swedish government essentially helped the Swedish women’s organizations to overcome underlying obstacles to forming a meta-organization. Yet, as we have seen, resistance was not absent in either case. Instead, resistance, tensions and conflicts have been present among both Polish and Swedish women’s organizations. In this chapter, these tensions will be analysed further.

Ahrne and Brunsson (2008: 48) argue that in organizations, “a high degree of concentration, often achieved via strong hierarchy, makes it plausible to conceive of the organization as a single ‘actor’” and that, joined together in a meta-organization, several organizations can therefore construct a common identity. However, for the Polish and Swedish women’s organizations, identity has been a major issue in the process of forming the SWL and the PWL. On the one hand, a meta-organization’s identity depends upon similarity among its members (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008: 85; 92). On the other hand, member organizations need to maintain their autonomy, so as to remain differentiated from each other. In meta-organizations there
are, consequently, tensions between similarity and dissimilarity (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:93) – tensions that also play out in the SWL and the PWL.

First, a typical source of conflict in meta-organizations is the diversity among its member organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson 2005:440). Whereas meta-organizations are based on one specific characteristic which its member organisations have in common (for instance, Swedish women’s organizations), the member organizations can be diverse in other respects. Jutterström (2004:159), who compares meta-organizations with political organizations, points out that whereas the latter are dependent on the diversity of their members, the former are dependent upon “homogenous preferences”. There is consequently a dilemma inherent in meta-organizations. In the case of European trade organizations for instance, Jutterström (2004:164) could see that the meta-organization needed to communicate clear and uniform preferences to its surroundings (especially to EU decision makers), whereas its member organizations (that is, business firms) developed a variety of opinions. This inherent dilemma creates tensions within the meta-organization (Ahrne & Brunsson 2005:440; 2008:107f).

Second, given that the “most serious sacrifice” for an organization joining a meta-organization is a decrease in its autonomy (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:81; 2005:434), tensions between the meta-organization and its members are to be expected when organizations are subjected to hierarchy and authority. Both aspects of tensions concern competition: member organizations compete with each other because they are diverse and have different interests; and member organizations compete with the meta-organization over autonomy and actorhood.

In this chapter, attention will be paid to the tensions at field-level – that is, the two fields of Polish and Swedish women’s organizations. What happens in the field when a new hierarchical centre, ultimately a meta-organization, is being formed?

The perspective taken is that of the (prospective) member organizations, i.e. women’s organizations in Poland and Sweden who have an interest in joining forces to join the EWL. Based on Ahrne and Brunsson’s understanding of conflicts in meta-organizations, there are two types of tensions analysed here: (1) among the (prospective) member organizations, and (2) between the meta-organization and its member organizations. The tensions are, as a third and final step, connected to the issue of trust in organizations. It is argued that in order to join a meta-organization, representatives of women’s organizations need to feel confident that the coordination of the meta-organization is not dominated or controlled by a specific organization.
or group within the movement and that they have equal access to the meta-organization. They also need to feel confident that the meta-organization is capable of serving their interests, that it has the capacity represent its members. When there is a lack of trust between the meta-organization and its (potential) member organizations, tensions are hard to overcome.

**Competition among the Member Organizations**

*Diversity and Decision-Making*

Diversity is always an obstacle for decision-making in an organization. In meta-organizations, difficulties in making decisions are heightened by the fact that their members are organizations instead of individuals (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:114). As discussed at the start of this chapter, these member organizations are diverse in size, resources, structure et cetera, making it difficult to make decisions based on majority vote appear legitimate. Should each member organization have the right to one vote? Or should larger and “richer” members have the right to more representatives/votes than smaller ones? On the one hand, larger organizations may argue for more votes with reference to their own large membership. On the other hand, smaller organizations may not be able to exert their voting rights if they, for instance, lack the resources to attend meetings (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:120). Because there is no established norm for how voting should be done when members are organizations, “any principle can be criticized as being unfair” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:119). Because of this difficulty in decision-making, there are limitations to a meta-organization’s hierarchical authority.

In the PWL, for example, at a meeting in June 2004 (see timeline) a working group of nine representatives of women’s organizations discussed whether organizations with local branches in different Polish cities should participate as one association or as several member organizations. Either all branches join the PWL separately, and consequently get one vote and one representative each like any other member organization; or only the “mother” association joins the PWL but attains the right to a larger number of votes and representatives. At the PWL’s first general meeting in July 2004, it was decided that the second option would apply, meaning that:

Organizations with up to ten branches in different cities will have the right to elect two delegates to the General Assembly. These organizations will be entitled to two votes. Organizations with more than ten branches in different cities will have the right to elect three delegates to the General Assembly. These organizations will be entitled to three votes (OŚKa 2004).
Organizations affected by this rule were DUK, CPK and the Polish Women’s League, who were entitled three votes each. In the SWL, however, associations of women’s organizations are entitled one vote each, rather than one per “branch”, no matter the size or amount of branches they have (SWL 2017a). Issues of voting and decision-making have been visible in the cases of the PWL and SWL, and contribute to an understanding of the constant tensions among their member organizations. It is difficult to agree on common statements, joint actions or rules when the grounds for making those decisions are uncertain and could easily be questioned (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:118). Moreover, it is extra difficult to create unity in a meta-organization because members’ representatives must take their organization into consideration and be loyal to those they represent, but the interests of these latter do not necessarily correspond with those of their representative (cf. Bor 2014:137). As we will see, uncertainties such as these have contributed to greater tensions and distrust among the women’s organizations in the case of the PWL than in the SWL.

Within Occupied Spaces

In Poland, the main tension has been among the (prospective) member organizations of the PWL. This is because, in practice, the PWL was an organization attached to another organization, in the first instance OŚKa, in the second DUK, and in the third and most recent version it is NEWW coordinating the PWL.

The attachment and double structure have caused a few problems for the PWL and the Polish women’s organizations wanting to take part in the EWL. One way to understand this is to turn to Ahrne and Papakostas (2014:104), who argue that there are open spaces in between organizations in the social landscape and that some are “free” whereas others are “protected”. Protected spaces are open in the sense that there are resources and possibilities, but protected because access to them is controlled by other organizations (2014:107). In the case of the PWL, one could argue that the space for organizing the PWL was not free but rather protected by an old organization (that is OŚKa or DUK), and that the PWL was created in “the shadow of” this old organization. Or as they write, “it is a question of new organizations being created within the domains of old organizations and protected by their boundaries. We call this type of protected space shadowed spaces.” (Ahrne & Papakostas 2014:104, my translation). On the one hand, organizing in shadowed spaces can give the impression of something other than organization (Ahrne & Papakostas 2014:109) – they can for in-
stance be perceived of as networks or movements. Apart from the question of economic resources, avoiding the impression of organization was another reason why the PWL was initially attached to OŚKa, rather than being a separate organization. According to “Franciszka”, it was a strategic choice by the Polish women’s movement organizations. Attached to OŚKa, rather than being a new and separate meta-organization, the PWL was considered by some of its representatives to appear less controversial and threatening to the women’s movement organizations (interviewee “Franciszka”). On the other hand, organizing in shadowed spaces is still organizing, and takes at least the form of partial organization.

One major issue with attachment, or the shadowed space, is that the “place” of organizing is not neutral – or “free” as Ahrne and Papakostas (2014:105) would define it – but rather occupied and filled with the interests of the host organization. The “place” could also be seen as being monopolized by one out of many possible organizations who, in theory, have equal right to this place. There are several examples of this within the EWL. For instance, the European Network of Migrant Women, who work in coalition with the EWL, argue that when they tried to copy the model of the EWL, it became obvious that women’s migrant organizations either did not have a common national association or there was an association or “platform” which was monopolized by a certain organization (Personal communication with Lafon 2016). Among national EWL co-ordinations, there are several examples. According to a former representative of the EWL, the Latvian women’s organization MARTA was the coordinator of the Latvian Women’s Lobby at first, but was later challenged by another organization which was more focused on gender equality rather than strict women’s issues. This challenger managed to take the role as the EWL coordinator (Interviewee “Dagny”). In Spain, Italy and Holland there have also been conflicts over the control of the EWL membership (Personal communication with Lafon 2016; Interviewee “Dagny”). Competition over the ownership or control of a coalition, coordination or meta-organization is thus common among social movement organizations at both national and transnational level.

Essentially, in the case of the PWL, the attachment and double structure has led to tensions among member organizations, who wanted to have equal influence over it and did not trust other organizations to be the host or coordinator. One reason for this tension and distrust towards the coordinating organization was that the organization that had the coordinating role of the PWL brought its own characteristics and history into it. As each
(women’s) organization has its own identity and unique set of traits, it also has diverging interests and opinions compared to other (women’s) organizations. Each organization has its own history and has been created and formed in a certain context. The specific moment of the creation of an organization will impact on its future, locking the organization into a certain state and identity. This “path dependency” makes all organizations inherently inert (Ahrne & Brunsson 2014:63ff;129).

One example of the problem with attachment is that each organization has loyal members. As DUK has local branches in various Polish towns, many of the member organizations of the second version of the PWL were in fact these branches, as well as other women’s organizations with close connections to DUK. This meant that when NEWW initiated a third attempt to establish a PWL, it could not simply transfer the member organizations from the former version because of the loyalty of many of these organizations to the headquarters of DUK. A representative of one of the (former) member organizations of PWL explained to me that:

Some [members of the second version of PWL] were the chapters of the Democratic Union of Women [DUK] […] from different cities, and they have the legal status, they could act independently. They were all members also. But now since [the director of DUK] is not involved, [these chapters] don’t want to be [members of the PWL]. So, this way, some of them were lost (Interviewee “Agata”).

In the case of DUK and the second version of the PWL, the issue of loyalty also goes the other way around: other women’s organizations did not want to join the second version of the PWL because they did not like DUK. DUK was never funded by Western donors. Instead, it is one of several women’s organizations which has been sponsored by local government. It is also an organization with strong links to the former socialist state, as it has connections to and similar structures to the socialist-era, mass-membership based Women’s League (Funk 2006:274). In a publication summarizing its first two decades of existence, DUK (2010:8) explains that when initiating DUK, “[t]he original plan was to develop a new organization, including the Polish Women’s League”. Despite initial close cooperation, the League eventually decided not to join DUK but to preserve its “autonomy and organizational independence” (DUK 2010:8). Yet, this background suggests that DUK and the Polish Women’s League have close connections. Considering the tensions between the old and new women’s organizations discussed earlier, and the fact that many new women’s and feminist organ-
izations wanted to mark their distance towards the Polish Women’s League (Bystydzienski 2001:503f), DUK’s association with the Polish Women’s League has contributed to its negative image among some parts of the women’s movement. This attribute, in combination with its involvement in party politics, creates a general distrust towards DUK in feminist circles, with some expressing that they felt excluded from the PWL during the time it was run by DUK (Fuchs & Payer 2012:174). In particular, organizations within the new women’s movement consider the centralized organizational structure of DUK undemocratic, and too connected to the socialist-era. “Agata”, the representative quoted above, thinks that this is one of the reasons why so few women’s organizations wanted to join the second version of the PWL.*52

There was always a type of division between the former communists and the new feminist organizations. […] And the new feminist groups were very different… and this may also be the reason for the division and lack of trust and so on (Interviewee “Agata”).

The new feminist and women’s organizations established after 1989 wanted to distance themselves from the old socialist organizations. Foremost, this was attempted by constructing autonomy versus the older organizations and forming their own identities (Fuchs 2006). This view is corroborated in my material, where informants claim that the interest in autonomy later became an obstacle to intra-move ment cooperation and communication (Interviewees “Beata”, “Karolina”, “Irena” and “Martyna”). Moreover, because DUK is based in Wroclaw, it lacks connections to women’s organizations elsewhere, especially those in Warsaw and those that were connected to OŚKa.

Consequently, this meant that DUK also struggled to attract the former members of the first version of the PWL. This is shown by the fact that only one interviewee’s organization (apart from the interviewee representing DUK) was a member of the second version of the PWL, even though most of them represent organizations which had taken part in the first version. Interviewee “Grażyna” also confirms this picture, saying that DUK and the second version of the PWL were “practically not connected with women’s organizations”. And “Olga”, representing one of the main feminist organ-

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*52 Compared to the first version of the PWL, which had 41 member organizations reported in 2004 (OŚKa 2004), the second version had 15 member organizations reported in 2013 (PWL 2013).
izations, argues that the PWL was not known among feminists and the women’s movement. Several interviewees are also dissatisfied with the fact that this very organization had the coordinating role of the PWL (Interviewees “Beata”; “Grażyna”; “Agata”). “Grażyna”, for instance, claims that she has been asked to represent the PWL in the EWL, but that she turned this offer down as she got the impression that the PWL was “not working very well”, and that there was not much support behind it except for the women around DUK. For “Beata”, the choice of organization was “not good”: its representatives were not able to attract people because they did not manage to clarify the purpose of the PWL. “Agata” thinks that DUK simply acted irresponsibly when it coordinated the PWL. For NEWW, when it initially tried to form the third version of the PWL, DUK caused problems because it refused to let go of its coordinating role despite obvious difficulties in carrying it out:

But they could give up this role of coordinator of [the PWL], but they don’t want to give it up, and this is the problem, because I don’t understand why they don’t want to… for example just be an organization instead of coordinating something which they cannot, they are not able to, for some reason, to coordinate (Interviewee representing NEWW).

Following Ahrne and Papakostas (2014), it could be argued that DUK considered the PWL as its own protected space. Even though the PWL is meant to exist for the Polish women’s movement and its organizations, DUK had managed to gain control and ownership of it. DUK had invested resources and interest in its “project” which it was not willing to give up easily. From a meta-organizational perspective, it could also be argued that because DUK functioned as the secretariat of the meta-organization, it had different interests and loyalties to the other member organizations of the PWL. It is a common phenomenon in meta-organizations that the secretariat develops feelings of ownership and identification with the meta-organization and desires to enhance its importance (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:129f ; Bor 2014:141). In addition, considering that the PWL was dependent on its resources, DUK could claim ownership.

Another example of the problem with attachment and the fact that the coordinating organization brought its own characteristics and history into the attached organization is that tensions and conflicts within the coordinating organization, too, are transferred, or “spill over” into the attached organization. This was the case with the first version of the PWL, which was
attached to the women’s movement’s resource centre OŚKa. This centre had stable resources via “institutional grants” from the Ford Foundation, via the Batory Foundation, which made it independent from other women’s organizations – i.e. it did not have membership fees as it did in fact not have members. Instead, representatives from the women’s movement had been invited to sit on the board of OŚKa, as this would give the organization credibility in the opinion of its financers. “Irena”, a former director of OŚKa explains that:

The foundation [meaning OŚKa] was established with the support of Batory Foundation […] And the idea was to have representatives of the groups [within the women’s movement] which were the strongest, the best functioning in the best way, so they would give credibility to the foundation. So, it was necessary to engage all those who were the most active (Interviewee “Irena”).

“Irena” and another representative of OŚKa spent a couple of months travelling from town to town, to get an idea of what women’s organizations there were and what they needed and to establish connections with them. However, having representatives of various women’s organizations on the board and council turned out to be problematic for OŚKa (Interviewee “Irena”). In theory, OŚKa was free to act as an organization in its own right, according to its own purpose and interests. The board and council, however, which consisted of women from both women’s organizations and academia, was filled with conflicting interests. A former employee of OŚKa explains how this had an impact on the organization:

It meant that a leader who was a member of the council of OŚKa was not very much interested in the development of OŚKa because it would be a competition, regarding money et cetera, […] And I think there was always a division, so some of them would like to see OŚKa developing and they didn't mind OŚKa growing […] that it is doing a lot of things, et cetera. But other members of the council, they didn't want OŚKa to grow, because [they] perceived OŚKa as a kind of danger for their organizations, as a kind of competitor, and as far as I remember, there were always internal conflicts within the council of OŚKa (Interviewee “Franciszka”).

“Irena”, the former director of OŚKa adheres to this story:

[The management board] was not working in the best interest of the foundation because it was more important for them [the board members]
In OŚKa, those organizations with representatives in OŚKa council competed with each other over influence within OŚKa. Whereas some wanted OŚKa to expand upon its activities, others saw this as a threat and wanted to keep OŚKa to a minimum regarding its sphere of action. In a sense, the representatives in OŚKa council struggled to find a balance between being loyal to OŚKa (and the whole movement) and to their own “home” organizations.

OŚKa was an association of individuals working in the interest of the women’s movement. It had employees and an elected board and council, but it did not have organizational members. OŚKa was not a meta-organization. However, because other women’s organizations, via their leaders who sat in OŚKa’s council, tried to influence the aim of OŚKa and the scope of its activities, OŚKa struggled with similar problems to those of a meta-organization: which activities should OŚKa perform (and what should its “members” do), and who should it essentially work for? At one point, the director of OŚKa wanted to solve this problem by organizing a training session, in order to educate the council members on their role within OŚKa and on cooperation. However, the effort was not well received, but rather seen as an effort from the director to exert too much control over the council (Interviewee “Irena”). OŚKa struggled to be something which other women’s organizations (for whom it worked) did not want it to be. Again, OŚKa suffered from tensions typical in meta-organizations as it was perceived as a competitor to other women’s organizations who did not want it to exert control over them. The loyalties of the representatives in the council lay primarily with their “home” organizations, not with OŚKa.

Another problem was that OŚKa’s identity and boundaries were unclear. It was not only board and council members who wanted to have influence. Other actors in the women’s movement saw the organization as their own. For instance, in August 2005, the grassroots feminist group PK8M53 sent an e-mail to OŚKa expressing their support and hope for a solution to the organization’s financial problems. They also pointed out that the successful heritage of OŚKa is not only due to the achievements of its council and board but to the entire community of feminists, and that OŚKa had become a kind of “public good” which is why they – as members of the women’s

53 The Women’s 8th of March Alliance, which organizes the annual “Manifas”.

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movement – would like OŚKa to take their opinions into account when making decisions (OŚKa 2005). From an organizational point of view, I see PK8M’s e-mail as a criticism of OŚKa, suggesting that the ownership of the organization should be wider than its board and council.

In addition, within the Polish women’s movement, OŚKa was perceived as an “umbrella” organization, according to one former employee:

It was a foundation, a single organization, however it was perceived as a kind of umbrella organization. However, it has never been an umbrella organization but the main purpose of OŚKa was to serve as a kind of platform for the women’s movement in Poland (Interviewee “Franciszka”).

In an interview with a representative of one of the major women’s organizations in Poland, the view that there was or should be a membership in OŚKa is apparent:

So OŚKa wanted, had to be a kind of umbrella organization and we were as one of the significant organizations, we also wanted to have access but, this group was quite strongly dominated by a group of women from one city and those women dominated this organization and without any explanation we were just not [laughs] accepted in this group, but they wanted us as supporters but not as members (Interviewee “Edyta”, my emphasis).

The fact that OŚKa was perceived as an umbrella, or meta-organization, even though it was not, is interesting. Had OŚKa not communicated its purpose and structure to the field of women’s organizations? Or was it because representatives of various women’s organizations had been involved in its creation and sat in its board? Or was it because, as a platform working for the women’s movement in Poland, the women’s organizations also wanted to influence it, as shown in the quote by “Edyta”? All three reasons are probably true, but the key here is that because OŚKa was a resource centre and platform for the women’s organizations, it created expectations among those it worked for. And the fact that OŚKa was perceived as a meta-organization contributed to meta-organizational tensions.

OŚKa thus suffered from conflicting opinions on what type of organization it was, and from having an unclear purpose and ownership, even before the PWL was formed. Who did OŚKa really belong to and what was its identity? As a platform working for the movement, many women’s organizations and other actors regarded OŚKa as belonging to them and wanted to influence its agenda and activities, whereas staff at OŚKa main-
tained that the organization had its own financial resources and thus only those working at OŚKa (staff and council members) should decide its activities. A former employee at OŚKa explains that:

A lot of women’s organizations had a lot [of expectations]. [...] A lot of women’s organizations from Poland [had opinions on] what OŚKa should do for other organizations but they [were not part of] the OŚKa foundation. And OŚKa tried to find finance from outside, and we tried to do what we wanted to do, ok? And I think that was part of the conflict between the OŚKa foundation and other organizations. [...] Because you know, when you have an independent organization and you are looking for funding for this, and the staff is working for this idea, and other organizations are trying to say what you should do, that is the first step to conflict, because: why are you telling me what to do? You don’t find money for this. You don’t work for this. You are not a part of this foundation, you only tell me something, to push what we should do (Interviewee “Olga”).

As shown in this quote, the typical meta-organizational conflict between the office and the “members” was present in OŚKa, too, even though it was not supposed to be a meta-organization. The employees at the office and in the council of OŚKa experienced that the autonomy of the organization was challenged when other organizations started to have opinions on its decisions. The conflict regarding the different perceptions and expectations of OŚKa, between its employees and its constituency, eventually contributed to the end of OŚKa.

**Conflicts spill over**

The conflict in OŚKa contributed to the end of the first version of the PWL, when the conflicts spilled over from the organization (OŚKa) to its “project” (the PWL). This happened mainly because the director of OŚKa also functioned as the coordinator and official representative for the PWL and board member in the EWL. In addition, there was an overlap between those women and their “home” organizations involved in OŚKa council and the member organizations of the PWL. According to several interviewees, OŚKa – via its office – also contributed to the first PWL losing its credibility in Poland. Member organizations complained, for instance, about the lack of information on what was going on between the EWL and the representative(s) of the PWL (Interviewees “Olga”; “Agata”; “Grażyna”; “Honora”). Even in the EWL, OŚKa had caused doubts to arise regarding the
PWL, as one interviewee representing DUK and the second version of the PWL recalls:

I had a troublesome situation, because we [meaning the first version of the PWL] had behaved so unserious before, so the EWL looked at us with reservation (Representative of DUK).

Not only was the PWL financially and materially dependent upon OŚKa, it was also associated with this organization’s fortune and reputation. It is thus not too surprising that the first PWL did not arouse great enthusiasm within the Polish women’s movement.

Having learned from the experiences of the first and second versions of the PWL, representatives of women’s organizations today express concern regarding attachment to an already existing organization as a way of cooperation in relation to the EWL (Interviewees “Agata”; “Franciszka”).

The case of the PWL shows that organizing social movement organizations through attachment – as a way to avoid the visibility of organization – raises issues of ownership, identity competition and dependence, because the organizing takes place within another organization rather than outside of it. Interests, identities and resources connected to the organizations coordinating the PWL are impossible to ignore here when trying to understand why the PWL has gone through at least two versions. Like any social movement, the Polish women’s movement is composed of a wide range of organizations with varying views, interests, key issues, activities, organizational structures, resources, constituencies and so on. As argued above, both DUK and OŚKa have specific identities as organizations, and are consequently perceived in certain ways by other actors in the Polish women’s movement field. As is clear from interviews and field notes, these perceptions, or rather feelings and notions, were transferred onto the PWL, and thus affected other organizations’ willingness to join as members or not. As argued above, because the PWL was attached to another organization, it existed in a shadowed space of this organization (Ahrne & Papa-kostas 2014:104). The space for organizing the PWL was not free for it to construct its own formation, but protected by OŚKa, and later DUK. As such, OŚKa and DUK were simply not neutral places for the PWL, for these were organizations occupied and filled with interests. Given that women’s movement organizations are diverse and struggle for their own survival, it was difficult for OŚKa and DUK to gather any larger part of the Polish women’s movement. As “non-neutral places”, OŚKa and DUK were per-
ceived by (possible) PWL member organizations as competitors, increasing tensions within the field of Polish women’s organizations. The fact that the PWL lacked a “place” which was not already occupied and associated with another organization’s identity and interests propelled the tensions among member organizations inherent in meta-organizations.

**Party-Political Conflicts**

In the Swedish field of women’s organizations, competition among the (potential) member organizations of the SWL has mainly concerned party-political loyalties. Coming back to the start of the SWL (discussed in chapter 5), when the former Undersecretary of State invited women’s organizations to a meeting, there was already then a fear that the new meta-organization would be marked by party-political connections, and a fear that one organization would have more power over the SWL than others (Interviewees “Astrid”; “Elisabet”). For instance, the first chairwoman remembers that she could not have welcomed the women’s organizations at the initial meeting because she was associated with the union movement and had a Social Democratic “image” (Interviewee “Astrid”). Instead, the former Undersecretary of State was asked to step in and function as the meeting convener.

The issue of distrust among the Swedish women’s organizations and the issue of political party loyalties came back at the beginning of the new millennium. Initially, the SWL had accepted all of the political parties’ women’s wings, sections or clubs as members just like any other women’s organizations. However, the party-political women’s organizations started to cause problems for the SWL when discussions became dominated by party politics (Interviewees “Britta”; “Elisabet”; “Dagny”). There are dividing opinions on what actually happened during this time, but what is clear is that some member organizations argued over the specific influence of party politics on the SWL. On the one hand, “S-kvinnor” – the Social Democratic women’s section – claimed that the SWL had started to work against them (Dagens Nyheter 2003). On the other hand, “Centerkvinnorna” – the Centre Party’s women’s section – perceived the SWL to be linked to the Social Democrats and too leftist in its solutions to gender equality problems (Email correspondence with Centre Women). Most party-political organizations used exit to show their discontent (cf. Hirschman 1970). In addition, the two women’s shelter organizations SKR and ROKS left the SWL at this time. According to a representative of one of them, the two women’s shelter organizations decided to make common cause to leave as they found the
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SWL undemocratic and lacking transparency. To their minds, this was especially the case when it came to which member organizations would represent the SWL internationally (Interviewee “Jenny”). The two organizations differ from other members because they represent a distinct part of the women’s movement: the women’s shelter movement. For the meta-organization SWL, which claims to represent the women’s movement, it thus becomes essential to keep the women’s shelter organizations as members or else it will lose some of its credibility as a representative body. The head of the Gender Equality Unit at the Government Offices claimed that the SWL was no longer representative of the women’s organizations after the political women’s organizations and the shelter organizations had started to leave the SWL in 2003, and consequently the government withdrew the its funding. A former chairwoman of the SWL asserts that the SWL saw the women’s shelter organizations as a very important part of the movement and consequently, during these years of difficulties, started to have meetings and even “negotiate” with them to gain their trust and get them back as members (Interviewee “Britta”). A different account suggests that the funds were withdrawn because the SWL had publicly criticized the prime minister and the Social Democratic Party (Hobson et al 2007:461).

A first step the SWL took to solve the crisis was to rearrange its boundaries. At an annual meeting the decision was taken to exclude all party-political organizations to prevent the other women’s movement organizations being overshadowed by party-political discussions. The idea was to regain confidence both externally and internally by not being connected to party politics. Instead Q-sam, described as a women’s network for all political parties and the SWL, was set up to encourage cross-political cooperation (SVT 2005).

The crisis that arose in relation to the party-political women’s organizations is an example of the inherent opposing forces in meta-organizations: that member organizations care about their uniqueness the meta-organization is both based on and dependent upon similarity among its member organizations. In the case of the SWL, some of its members proved to be too diverse and perhaps more concerned about other identities than that of the “Swedish women’s movement”, namely the party-political identity, such as for example “Social Democrats” and the “Centre Party”. When these organizations left the SWL, it did challenge its credibility in the eyes of the government. Still, because the SWL as a meta-organization is interested in unity, the quarrelling in regard to its membership base would have meant a threat to its identity if they remained as members too. Thus, seeing them
leave gave the SWL a chance to redefine itself, and thereby maintain a coherent identity.

It is, however, expressed in interviews with member representatives that there has always been a fear that the SWL is “dominated” by certain party-political preferences, or that other members with certain political views have too much influence on the SWL (Interviewees “Ingrid”; “Britta”; “Elisabet”). Even though the party-political organizations were excluded, there are still member organizations with opinions and objectives which are grounded in some sort of political ideology: several member organizations can be labelled according to the political scale of conservative, liberal and socialist. The member organization Women’s Front, for instance, is grounded in a radical feminist understanding of women’s rights whereas the member organization Fredrika Bremer association is grounded in liberal feminism. Whereas the former strongly believes in separatism, the latter encourages cooperation with and the inclusion of men. A representative of Fredrika Bremer Association objected, for instance, to the SWL’s decision to not include men in the preparations for “Nordic Forum” in 2014 (Interviewee representing the Fredrika Bremer Association). Then there are, of course, instances where members of the SWL struggle to agree, such as the stance towards the EU, which is why the SWL avoids making any decisions on the issue (Interviewee “Gabriella”), or the issue of shared parental allowance (Interviewee “Britta”). As one member organization representative observes, considering that the membership base of the SWL is diverse, it is not surprising that it is sometimes difficult to agree (Interviewee “Jenny”).

A former chairwoman also argues, however, that it is the diversity of the member organizations that makes the SWL “strong”. Because of this, it can pick up the strongest position from each member and make it a common issue for the women’s movement (Interviewee “Christina”). Two interviewees also point out that because the members of the SWL nowadays are not linked to political parties, the SWL does not have to take into consideration that, for instance, abortion is a sensitive issue for some political parties (Interviewees “Christina”; “Dagny”). Yet, the differences among the member organizations are a potential source of tensions within the SWL.

Competition between the Meta-organization and its Members

As noted above, tensions and competition in meta-organizations are not only due to variation among member organizations, but are also caused by
similarity between member: as organizations, the members can, in theory, do the same things as its meta-organization (Ahrne & Brunsson 2005:440). The most serious sacrifice for an organization joining a meta-organization is the risk of losing some of its autonomy (Ahrne & Brunsson 2005:434). Meta-organizations can be a threat, or at least a challenge, to their member organizations and to potential member organizations because they speak for them. When a meta-organization speaks for, acts in the name of, or imposes rules on its members, members’ autonomy – and consequently their visibility as unique organizations and important actors – is reduced (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:83). Because both are organizations, there is a potential overlap: what the meta-organization can do, some of its members can do too, and vice versa – that is to say, they are similar. As Ahrne and Brunsson (2005:109) point out, this “easily generates conflicts between those who think that the meta-organizations should carry out certain tasks and those who think the member organizations should do so”. Due to the similarity between a meta-organization and its member organizations (because both are organizations) there is an inherent risk for tensions in terms of conflicts and competition over autonomy, authority and identity. Crucially, this means that any meta-organization needs to find a balance between allowing its members to be seen as actors, and being an actor itself (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:111). In the following, aspects of competition between the meta-organization and its members are analysed in the cases of the Polish and the Swedish Women’s Lobbies.

**Avoiding the Threat of Organization**

As discussed above, organizing in shadowed spaces can give the impression of something other than organization – for instance, a network (Ahrne & Papakostas 2014:109). This was also one reason behind the decision to start the PWL as a “coalition agreement”, letting OŚKa coordinate it. At a meeting in May 2004 (see timeline), a representative from the Latvian EWL member had been invited to present the reasons of the Latvian women’s organizations for forming a national platform and joining the EWL. The Latvian representative argued that women’s organizations had realized they needed “a more systematic mode of cooperation” in order to successfully lobby their government and that membership in the EWL would strengthen their position. Interestingly, they had decided to form a “cooperation agreement” rather than a separate organization. The Latvian representative also explained that the Latvian information centre MARTA was assigned the role as coordinator of the Latvian Women’s Lobby. At this meeting, in-
spired by the Latvian women, the Polish women’s organizations decided to form a “coalition agreement” too (OŚKa 2004).

Interestingly, the East European regional “network” Karat Coalition did not participate in the preparatory meetings, and the Federation for Women and Family Planning (“Federa”) later withdrew from the PWL (Fuchs 2006:61). A representative of “Federa” argues that her organization has never been particularly interested in taking part in the EWL. At first, “Federa”, whose main work concerns Polish women’s rights to abortion, wanted to cooperate with the EWL but felt that the European organization was unclear regarding its position on abortion and not supportive towards Polish women’s situation:

I don’t count on them [the EWL] to be supportive on abortion issues, everybody is so frightened of this. They want to decide you know from the top (Interview with representative of “Federa”).

Today, the representative argues that “Federa” is strong enough to act on its own at EU level via its East European regional “network” ASTRA. Karat Coalition used to have “good relations” with the EWL, according to one of its representatives. However, this changed when Karat Coalition’s knowledge of East European women’s organizations was ignored by the EWL:

The women in our region were very frustrated because of how the [EWL] acted in our region, because they choose the organization [national coordinators] by themselves, without recognition of the situation among the organizations. [...] Very often they were organizations which were not quite influential and had not strong leadership so they were not able to build a platform of cooperation with other organizations (Interview with a representative of Karat Coalition).

Considering that Karat Coalition and “Federa” (via ASTRA) are regional organizations already active at the international level, they had less of an interest in participating in the Polish cooperation. It is also possible that the PWL posed a threat to these two established organizations in the field of East European women’s “networks”. Why would they join this meta-organization and thereby give it legitimacy if its existence could question their own reason for existence? As shown in the quote above, for Karat Coalition it was also a question of competition over recognition.

As the examples above show, there were frictions between the EWL and the Polish/regional “networks”. However, there were also frictions within
the Polish women’s movement. The decision to form the PWL as a “co-
alition agreement” – that is, to give it a more informal character – is under-
standable. This way, its organizational character could be less visible and
challenge other Polish women’s organizations less, in terms of power and
space within the field. It was a strategic choice by the Polish women’s
movement organizations not to form a new and separate meta-organiza-
tion. A former representative of OŚKa remembers that by keeping the PWL
more or less “informal”, the coalition was considered to remain less con-
troversial and threatening to the women’s movement organizations:

We didn’t even think of raising money for the [PWL] because it would
immediately cause a lot of problems. There was a lot of suspicion that maybe
you wanted to set up an umbrella organization to be able to raise money et
cetera, so at that time we knew we couldn’t do it because otherwise it would
kill this initiative […] Because it was another problem that [laughs] that
because there was a lot of suspicion towards any umbrella organization, so
when we set up [PWL] we decided that we would not register as a separate
organization, and it would be done in that way according to the rules of
EWL. Because at that time, I don’t know how it is now, but at that time the
federation of women’s organizations, the national platform, could be for-
mally registered or not. But of course, it should follow all the democratic
rules et cetera (Interviewee “Franciszka”).54

Similarly, a former representative of the PWL says that due to tensions
among women’s organizations and the question of leadership, it was
decided that the PWL would start off as an “informal network” (but
coordinated by OŚKa):

I think because we generally in Poland, at that time especially, although still
now, there are a lot of, I think, tensions among NGOs. So about the leader-
ship and, generally I think that was one of the main reasons, at that time we
decided that there would be this informal network and then [OŚKa] will play
the role of a place where the coordination will take place (Interviewee
“Grażyna”).

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54 The statutes of the EWL, adopted in 2013, state that national members must “have
legal status in their own member state/country as a non–governmental organisation re-
representing women’s non-governmental organisations or have a signed protocol of co-
operation to act as the coordinating body for the EWL in their member state/country,
with the view to establishing a legal status recognised in national or international law as
set out in the Internal Rules” (EWL 2013:3, my emphasis).
As an attached organization, in the shadow of OŚKa, the PWL could pass as a network, something more or less informal. It was made less visible as organization and thus perceived as less threatening (cf. Ahrne & Papakostas 2014:104ff). Accordingly, due to its perceived network character, the PWL’s existence was rendered possible. The PWL was also possible because as a “shadowed space” it could use other organizations’ resources. As shown in chapter 6, to attain “new” (financial) resources in order to establish a meta-organization has been difficult for the Polish women’s movement. The format of attachment was the solution to the problem. Still, in the long run it caused other problems, as described above, because attachment caused competition and distrust among the women’s organizations. A former employee of OŚKa argues for instance that when Polish women’s organizations started to compete for EU funds, OŚKa suddenly became a threat to those it was supposed to work for because:

OŚKa was the biggest, the strongest and maybe a lot of other women’s organizations were afraid of this organization [...] And, this is my opinion, because the board of OŚKa foundation, it was people from other feminist organizations in Poland, and it [the board] was not comfortable to have another strong organization to start [getting] your grants. And after, I think two years, OŚKa was dead (Interviewee “Olga”).

When OŚKa “died”, the first version of the PWL stopped functioning. Ultimately, the consequence of “attachment” has been that the Polish women’s movement has struggled to keep its representation and to participate in the EWL.

The fact that the Polish women’s organizations strategically sought to avoid organization by starting off as a “coalition agreement” and letting OŚKa function as a coordinator is noteworthy here because it suggests that a separate and “complete” meta-organization was too much of a challenge to the (potential) member organizations. As a meta-organization, the PWL would have been perceived by other Polish women’s organizations as a threat and competitor, not only regarding autonomy – as Ahrne and Bruns-son (2008:434) emphasize – but most importantly regarding financial resources, as suggested in several of the citations above. Not only do members of social movement meta-organizations compete with each other over resources, they also compete with their meta-organization for the same type of resources. As we have seen, funding (financial resources) is scarce for Polish women’s organizations – particularly since American and other international donors have left the field (Ghodsee 2004; McMahon 2001;
Mendelson & Glenn 2002) and the Polish government has shown little interest, or even hostility towards women’s organizations. The issue of setting up a new meta-organization for the women’s movement that could compete for the same limited funds was, understandably, sensitive.

In discussions of a third version of the PWL, alternatives to attachment have been considered by representatives of women’s organizations. Based on her experiences from the two previous attempts, “Agata” explains why she wants to avoid attachment:

I don’t think it would be useful for the [PWL] to be attached to one organization, it is better if the secretariat is moving in between different organizations or if it is established as an independent organization and independent secretariat. We have to think about different models. But I don’t think it is good if it’s attached to one strong organization because then it is identified with it and some groups wouldn’t like to join because they for example don’t like this organization. It has to be independent or mobile (Interviewee “Agata”).

However, as of autumn 2019, such an independent or “moving secretariat” for the PWL has not been realized. Instead, yet another women’s organization is coordinating other women’s organizations in an attempt to set up a new PWL. Since October 2016, the Network of East West Women (NEWW) has been accepted by the EWL as the Polish national coordinator and link to the Polish women’s movement while a new Polish Women’s Lobby is under construction. Compared to previous versions of the PWL, NEWW is however eager to leave its role as coordinator so as to avoid previous issues of unclear ownership, competition and conflicts, according to one of its representatives:

I would be happy that the Network [NEWW] is no longer the structure, that it is the platform for Polish NGOs, and a new organization would be established. [E: Ok so the goal is to have a new organization?] This is what we will decide at the meeting. […] But I think it would be better if it is more clear and transparent, that there is a separate organization of the [PWL] (Interviewee representing NEWW).

NEWW has called for a meeting a couple of times, with the aim to gather interested women’s organizations and discuss the future of the PWL. Five organizations (apart from NEWW itself) – eFKa, Society for Crisis Intervention, “Federa”, Opole Polish Platform, and Gdańsk Women of the Left –
have said that they want to join the new PWL, according to a representative of NEWW. Nevertheless, it has been difficult for all involved to find a time and place to have this meeting. They were supposed to meet in June 2016, but not all involved organizations not make it. In April 2017, a new attempt to meet was made, but again the meeting was cancelled because two organizations could not come (Interviewee representing NEWW; E-mail correspondence with NEWW). The plan, according to the representative of NEWW, is to have a general assembly, at which the representatives make a public statement to inform other women’s organizations about the decision to form the new PWL, and that a board has been elected (Interviewee representing NEWW).

There are, however, several obstacles to a third version of the PWL: the problem remains that a new and independent structure demands the creation and formal registration of a completely new organization. The representative of NEWW argues that one possibility to solve the problem of founding a formal meta-organization for the PWL would be to transform the structure of NEWW. At the moment, it consists of one part which is a “foundation” registered in 2003 in order to be able to sell books, and one part which is the “association”. Instead it might be possible to change this composition, according to its representative:

So, I am thinking that maybe the foundation could continue our work which we do as an association and which could change the association’s by-laws and become a federation of organizations. Because already there are many organizations who would like to continue to have a Polish Women’s Lobby, and we are just thinking of what to do next (Interviewee representing NEWW).

However, this would still mean that the PWL is associated with one of its member organizations, that is NEWW, even if it is not directly attached to it. So far, it has not been possible to do that or to register a new organization, which is why NEWW found an interim solution: to serve as a platform of Polish women’s organizations and the communication link to EWL temporarily. The interviewee representing NEWW argues that to register a new organization in Poland in order to present a “federation for Polish Women’s Lobby” to the EWL general assembly would take too long. In place of DUK and the second version of the PWL, NEWW is now recognized by the EWL as the Polish representation (Interviewee representing NEWW).
Who Does What in a Meta-Organization?

As a social movement meta-organization, the SWL is also a competitor to its members and other women’s organizations. The SWL is for instance aware of the fact that it competes for the same funds as its member organizations. The SWL has therefore lobbied for a change in the way civil society organizations are funded by the state. When the government published a Committee Report on long-term support to civil society in 2018, the SWL, as one of the referral bodies, responded by arguing that despite the fact that there are more women’s organizations applying for state grant money since 2008, the total grant has not been increased. Most importantly, the SWL argued that grants to umbrella organizations should be separate from general grants in order to avoid competition with member organizations (SWL 2018; SWL n.d.). However, if competition in the PWL concerned financial resources, in the SWL competition has instead been more about symbolic resources and, characteristically, autonomy. In the following, examples of competition over autonomy in the SWL are analysed.

The first example resembles what happened in the first version of the PWL, as some Swedish women’s organizations also initially resisted formal cooperation. As such, therefore, the first example concerns the threat that formal organization poses to already established organizations in a field. In the case of the SWL, it was one women’s organization in particular – the old and established Fredrika Bremer Association – which saw its own position in the field threatened. Right from the start of discussions on forming the SWL, the Fredrika Bremer association expressed resistance to the creation of a new actor in the field of Swedish women’s organizations. At the initial meeting in 1996, the women’s organizations discussed the possibility of the SWL being a public consultation body. According to a representative of another member organization, the Fredrika Bremer Association opposed the idea since it had been a major public consultation body for years before (Interviewee “Dagny”). Later, at the SWL’s first annual meeting, the Fredrika Bremer Association decided to leave the newly formed meta-organization (SWL 1997c). According to a representative, the association left because of the social democratic “dominance” and as a consequence of the SWL’s statements going against the association’s opinions (Interviewee representing the Fredrika Bremer Association). The official record, however, differs. When the election committee at the first annual meeting in 1997 suggested that the elected board members represent the meta-organ-

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55 See Ds 2018:13 ”Långsiktigt stöd till det civila samhället”.
ization rather than their individual organizations, the Fredrika Bremer Association objected and called for the proposal to be referred back for further consideration. When this was rejected, the association announced that it would not participate in the election, and promptly withdrew entirely from the SWL (SWL 1997c).  

The Fredrika Bremer Association was unwilling to give up parts of its autonomy and independence to the newly formed meta-organization. Zald & McCarthy (1979:5) argue that some SMOs can gain “symbolic dominance” within a field of SMOs. With a long history of working for gender equality and women’s rights, the Fredrika Bremer Association is certainly an established actor with a “symbolic dominance” in the field of Swedish women’s organizations.  

As such, it likely perceived the creation of a new actor claiming to speak for the women’s movement as a challenge. This established association’s actions show how identity and autonomy are always sensitive issues and a matter of dispute in meta-organizations. Similarly to the case of the PWL, and the logic reported by both Staggenborg (1986:384) and Hathaway and Meyer (1993:172), it is likely that the Fredrika Bremer Association would have preferred a more informal cooperative network which could have kept a lower profile, and thus allowed it to protect its own visibility. Such an arrangement would have been less of a challenge than the autonomous representative and formal organization which the SWL in fact became. Additionally, the Fredrika Bremer association was not the only member that displayed a cautious attitude towards the new organization. According to a former representative of the SWL, other member organizations too were “anxious” about not having their candidates included on the board (Interviewee “Astrid”).

The second example of competition over autonomy in the SWL concerns the risk of overlapping activities between the meta-organization and its members. If a meta-organization resembles its members, there is a clear risk of competition; indeed, if a meta-organization performs the same tasks as its members, the latter’s reason for existing may be questioned (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2010:16). At the same time, the meta-organization needs to act. The very base of every organization is its autonomy and identity, which

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56 In a statement, the Fredrika Bremer Association argued that it did not intend to participate in the election of the Board since the proposal of the election committee was known the very same day as the meeting was held and the association could therefore not discuss it internally. As a consequence, it handed in “a written notice of withdrawal from [the SWL] with immediate effect” (SWL 1997c).

57 It was founded in 1884 and is therefore the oldest of the SWL’s members.
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derive from its actions and self-determination. Thus, if an organization does not make decisions or act, it can be seen as irrelevant (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008:110f). Consequently, a meta-organization needs to find a balance between what it can do and what it should leave up to its members, so that it remains relevant to its environment while at the same time not encroaching too much on its members’ activities.

Since all of its work, according to the statutes, emanates from the UN documents CEDAW and Beijing Platform for Action, the SWL naturally deals with UN-initiated assignments contained in these documents, such as the yearly analysis of the government’s budget propositions (SWL 2013a). It is also a given participant in the Swedish delegation to the annual Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) meetings in New York. Depending on the theme of the session, other organizations from the women’s movement may be represented as well. For example, given the theme “violence against women” in 2013, the two shelter organizations SKR and ROKS had one representative each. However, both UN Women and the women’s shelter organizations felt overruled and rendered invisible by their meta-organization as “they always snitch the seat in the delegation”, according to a representative of a member organization (Interviewee “Elisabet”). The member organization UN Women naturally also focuses on the Beijing Platform for Action and CEDAW, and consequently sees itself as the key actor in the Swedish CSW delegation. UN Women has, according to a representative of a member organization, several times expressed that “the UN is their area” and that the SWL should instead be more engaged in the EWL and the EU level (Interviewee “Elisabet”).

Another example of overlapping activities concerns the issue of violence against women. For the women’s shelter organizations, it is important to be acknowledged for the expertise that they have accumulated over 30 years of working against violence against women. At the same time, combating violence against women is a major and crucial issue for the women’s movement, and as we have seen, it has encouraged joint action in the past. The SWL could therefore be an important platform and cooperation partner for the women’s shelter movement. The SWL ran a campaign called “The Sex Purchase Act 2.0”, in which it argued for an expansion of the Swedish law to apply abroad.\footnote{The Swedish law on prostitution and sex purchase criminalizes the buyer, not the seller.} In September 2012, the SWL also started a project in cooperation with ROKS and SKR to involve Swedish companies in their work.
against prostitution by implementing ethical policies against the buying of sexual services. Since these campaigns overlap with the member organizations’ work, there has been an internal discussion on the issue according to a former board member of the SWL (Interviewee “Elisabet”):

[… and this is the dilemma: when I was on the board, we discussed this a lot because, this whole thing with the prostitution project was a borderline case, was it the [SWL] who should run it or respective [member] organizations?

In the end, she thinks, it turned out fine since it became “clear” that SKR and ROKS were the experts. In this case, the issue of overlapping activities between the meta-organization and its members does not necessarily have to be a problem, but the meta-organization has to be careful so as not to overrule members who see themselves as experts in a certain area. Consequently, it seems safe for the SWL to run campaigns within such an area as long as the members are engaged and identified as the experts. The SWL managed to act and thus strengthen its relevance to the environment while not challenging its members. In the case of the CSW however, the SWL has been less successful because some members, especially UN Women in Sweden, felt that their meta-organization had taken over their own tasks. For the SWL, it is a constant balancing act between maintaining its own relevance and keeping internal tensions down (see also Karlberg & Jacobs-son 2015; Karlberg 2017).

The third example is also about overlapping activities and the question of “who does what”, but on the specific question of who is to convey opinions to the outside world (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008:109). A meta-organization is often created in order to give its member organizations a chance to join forces and “speak with one voice” (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008:69). However, it can sometimes be a challenge to speak with a united voice. Often, a social movement coalition manages to remain unified and “speak with one voice” more easily if it maintains an informal character (cf. Jacobsson & Johansson 2009:184ff; Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway & Meyer 1993) or when “the lowest common denominator” is sought out. In the case of the SWL, the situation is of course different because it is a formal body of cooperation, while at the same time comprising of members with differing views and opinions. Consequently, the SWL has had to manage the situation differently – however, not without internal challenges.
The SWL wants to speak with one voice, and is also expected to do so. Its unity is one of the SWL’s advantages, according to a former chairperson. However, unity is difficult when the members are diverse, and some issues are controversial. One way to clearly speak with one voice to one’s environment is to make a statement on a certain issue. Every year the board invites an inspiring speaker to the SWL’s annual meeting. In 2011, for instance, the writer Kajsa Ekis Ekman was invited to talk about her book on prostitution and surrogate motherhood. According to an employee at the SWL’s office (Interviewee “Helene”), the talk inspired the participants to make a statement on the latter issue. In the statement the SWL referred to the European Parliament FEMM Committee’s demand for a directive which states both prostitution and surrogate motherhood to be a form of violence against women. The SWL also pointed out that it sees surrogacy as a trade with women’s bodies (SWL, 2011). Later, in several articles, the SWL explained how it views surrogacy as a form of violence against women regardless of whether the woman does it for money or out of altruism. A former chair highlights that the SWL desired to demonstrate to the Swedish parliament that everyone did indeed agree on the statement (Interviewee “Christina”). This is however a contrasting picture to that given by some of the other interviewees representing member organizations. Instead, they argue that the standpoint was not obvious, and that not all member organizations agreed with it, or they found it difficult to take a position (Interviewees “Ingrid”; “Elisabet”; “Britta”).

The SWL’s actions in this case made it impossible for its members to anchor their votes within their home organizations. Since the question of surrogate motherhood suddenly came up at the annual meeting as a new and unprepared issue, several representatives of member organizations participating at the meeting simply did not know what their respective organizations thought on the matter. Moreover, there was no time to have a discussion within the member organizations and thus no possibility to anchor their votes. Some members consequently found it problematic that the SWL wanted to make a statement about it. For instance, the Fredrika Bremer Association does not agree with a total ban: “It’s too bluntly reasoned; we don’t want to forbid that you, for example, want to help your sister [to have children]” says a representative (Interviewee “Ingrid”). For IKFF, working with peace-related topics, surrogate motherhood was not even an issue, and therefore felt to be difficult to take a position on. According to a representative of one member organization (Interviewee “Dagny”), this was especially challenging as there had not been any discussion.
The IKFF therefore pointed out that it was wrong to make such a statement. SweQ, on the other hand, could back the statement even though they were not completely familiar with the issue. SweQ has also pointed out the importance of emphasizing that only the participants at the annual meeting had signed a statement, as it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the SWL as a whole and the individual member organizations. An interviewed representative of a member organization sees this as an example of what can be problematic with umbrella organizations and asks: “do member organizations actually back this?” (Interviewee “Dagny”). A former board member of the SWL sees the case of surrogate motherhood as problematic and questions how many member organizations had the time to form an opinion before the statement was taken. Instead, she proposes, the SWL could have formed a working group on surrogate motherhood, which would have entailed a longer discussion as well as a process of learning within the women’s movement, and after that a position could have been taken (Interviewee “Britta”; see also Karlberg & Jacobsson 2015; Karlberg 2017).

Why then did the SWL rush ahead in the case of the statement on surrogacy? The SWL runs a risk in a situation like this as members who disagree or feel it was unjust to make such a statement could later on state this publicly, which could damage the SWL’s credibility. The SWL could easily have ignored the issue, just like it has not taken a position on the EU – in that particular topic, as already noted, there are also diverging opinions among its members. Was the ambition to “speak with one voice” (externally) stronger than that of anchoring (internally)? I find this likely considering the following statement by the above-mentioned board member when discussing this episode:

So you can say it was like a show of power, I think at the meeting two years ago […] Then we made a common statement. And all agreed (Interviewee “Christina”, emphasis added).

By inviting an inspiring speaker, the board of the SWL wanted to make sure that the participants, the member organizations’ delegates, would agree on a certain issue, and thus ensure that the whole SWL would speak with one voice on the matter. As some representatives of member organizations pointed out above, this is problematic. First of all, not all member organizations were represented at the meeting. Secondly, not all of those present agreed on the position taken. Thirdly, since the issue was unprepared, some of those individuals representing their organization were forced to vote
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without knowing their organization’s standpoint. Consequently, the manage-
gement’s urge to demonstrate the unity of the SWL to its environment was
prioritized over being representative of its members.

Moreover, this is yet again a case of how a meta-organization, just like any other organization, needs to demonstrate its own identity and autonomy to its environment (here: the Swedish political context), which collides with its member organizations’ resistance to the extent of similarity enforced upon them and the meta-organization speaking on their behalf (Ahrne & Brunsson 2010:12f). Considering the board member’s comment on the annual statement as a “show of power”, it is probable that the SWL was eager to display unity and similarity and thereby reinforce its relevance as an organization. Given that the SWL is a social movement meta-organization and cannot change its members’ behaviour or impose rules upon them, the ability to express common opinions becomes very important in order to be visible as an actor (see also Karlberg & Jacobsson 2015; Karlberg 2017).

Together, the cases of the PWL and the SWL show that social movement meta-organizations typically suffer from conflicts and tensions due to diversity among member organizations. Ahrne & Brunsson (2008:116) argue that as “most meta-organizations are established on the basis of common interest among the members, the discovery of diverging interests is not likely to change the set of members” – instead they are normally stuck with each other because it is difficult to expel members in meta-organizations: there is a limited number of organizations which could be members and the meta-organization depends on them wanting them to join. However, in the case of the SWL and the party-political women’s organizations, the scenario was different. The crisis was solved by the fact that most of the party-political women’s organizations left on their own initiative, and the SWL took the decision that this type of women’s organizations would no longer be allowed membership. As such, the SWL rearranged its boundaries to safeguard itself from future conflicts based on certain internal differences. Meta-organizations “harbour even more sources of conflict yet have more limited capacity to resolve conflict than do organizations comprising individuals” (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:107) – which is why it was necessary for the SWL to exclude one part of its membership.

In both the Polish and the Swedish case, the women’s organizations competed with each other over access to and influence within the meta-organization. In the Swedish case this was strongly visible when connected to party-political loyalties, in that this group of members caused a crisis for the SWL. In the PWL it was differences among the (prospective) member
organizations that created tensions and, ultimately, competition among them. In the case of DUK, it was also linked to politics because DUK had certain political connections and a certain political image which prevented it from being seen as a legitimate coordinator of the PWL. However, in the case of the PWL, given that it could only function attached to an already existing women’s organization, competition among the women’s organizations was not exclusively connected to politics but rather to the more general question of who should be in control of the PWL. The attachment character of the PWL heightened already inherent tensions among member organizations within a meta-organization, whereas in the SWL these inherent tensions were reduced because it was formed as a new and separate organization without any direct connections to a specific member.

As pointed out in chapter 6, the resources available have had an impact on the structure of the two meta-organizations. We have seen that the two meta-organizations have both had to deal with issues of competition characteristic of meta-organizational structures. However, whereas the SWL as a separate meta-organization mostly had to deal with competition between itself and its members, the PWL as an attached meta-organization was mostly paralyzed by competition among the (possible) member organizations. It was first set up as a “coalition agreement”, and a project run by OŚKa, because applying for funding to set up a separate meta-organization was considered a threat to existing women’s organizations. However, the attached meta-organizational structure meant that tensions in the field of Polish women’s organizations were intensified within the PWL. As an attached organization, it could never be neutral but was always associated with the organization coordinating it.

In the next section, attention will be given to another aspect of tensions in the fields of the Swedish and Polish women’s organizations: trust. How does the level of trust towards the meta-organization affect how the women’s organizations deal with the tensions in the field?

Trust in Social Movement Meta-Organizations
As discussed in chapter 1, the EWL structure is based on a form of representation in which voices from local women’s organizations are aggregated in national “co-ordinations”, which in turn are aggregated at the European transnational level. Because the EWL demands nation-wide or European-wide meta-organizational structures, women’s organizations at national level can only be represented by other organizations, never directly. How-
ever, in both Poland and Sweden, the matter of letting one (new) women’s organization speak for and represent other women’s organizations has been problematic, contributing to further tensions in the field.

When an organization becomes a member of a meta-organization, a new level of authority is added. The organization is now represented by the meta-organization in certain contexts, and the meta-organization makes decisions on opinions and preferences for the member organization on certain issues. A new layer of representation, and therefore organization, is in place. The question directing the analysis in the remaining part of this chapter is: why is representation through another organization contested? I submit that the issue of being represented by another organization is connected to trust. To allow a new level of authority and a different actor to represent you and speak on your behalf is not an easy thing, because it essentially means giving up parts of your control and autonomy. For an organization, this demands trust in the organization that will represent it. In meta-organizations, representatives of prospective member organizations therefore need to feel certain that they can trust the meta-organization before joining.

Following Schoorman, Mayer and Davis (2007:347), I define trust in organizations as “the willingness to be vulnerable to another party”. However, this trust is always set in the context of the wider society. As argued by Papakostas (2009) for instance, general social trust in a society is a result of the structure of its social and organizational landscape, in which certain structuring mechanisms in the public sphere can reinforce or prevent interpersonal trust. As such, trust can be an inert structure rooted in a specific social landscape.

In organizations, trust is based on rules. Organization participants can trust each other because there are collective (as opposed to individual) decisions about who does what, how and when et cetera. Because of decisions such as these, rules are transparent and in principle dependable. However, not everything in organizations is decided collectively in a transparent manner, and many instances of interaction and action in organizations take place without being transparently decided, because network and institutional orders always interact with organizational orders. In networks, trust is personal and based on reciprocity, whereas in an institutional

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59 In their original article, the full definition is: “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a certain action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” (Mayer et al 1995).
order, trust is generalized and based on common beliefs and norms (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2011:7). Likewise, both the PWL and SWL exist at the intersection of the three orders of organization, network and institution, and even more so at the intersection of social movement and organization. In addition, because it is more difficult for meta-organizations to use all five elements of organization (Ahrne, Brunsson & Kerwer 2019:394), trust cannot solely be based on rules.

In order to convince representatives of organizations that a coalition and common voice is needed in the first place, and that membership in such a coalition is useful and worthwhile, coordinators need to build trust, and the coalition or meta-organization needs to be seen as trustworthy by prospective members. I suggest that a key to understanding the issue of trust here is to see it in relation to identity, autonomy and representation. As we have already seen, the identity and autonomy of an organization are threatened when it joins a meta-organization. When some decisions are taken at a hierarchical centre above the member organization, it loses some of its autonomy, and because the meta-organization is based on similarity among its members, the uniqueness (identity) of the member organization risks becoming overshadowed.

As organizations, possible members of the SWL and the PWL are concerned about their own (unique) identity and autonomy. Joining a formal coalition in which a layer of organization is added is a risk in many ways, as discussed above. Trust towards a meta-organization, or the coordinator(s) of it, is consequently crucial.

I see trust as three aspects of organizing: (1) confidence that the organization is honest and open about what it does and how decisions have been taken (transparency); (2) confidence that the organization will express the opinions of its members (representativeness); and (3) confidence that the organization will be able to accomplish something, both in relation to the national and the European context (efficacy and actorhood). Below, I will present these three aspects of trust in organization through the cases of the PWL and the SWL.

**Transparency**

Trust in organizations is based, as mentioned, on rules, which in turn are based on collective decisions. As decisions, rules are explicit and known to all organization members – or can at least be found and consulted in statutes and other organizational documents. Rules are therefore transparent and certain. For prospective member organizations, the SWL and the
PWL need to be transparent in order to be reliable. It would be a major concern for them if they were unaware, for instance, about the rules for how ..., for then their own participation and influence would be obstructed. The crux of the issue here is related to the fact that meta-organizations are supposed to produce homogenous preferences, but have to use democratic means in order to do so (cf. Jutterström 2004:159f). Thus, members need to take part in decision-making or at least acknowledge decisions in practice.

In the case of the PWL, transparency has been an issue ever since OŚKa was the coordinator. Representatives of member organizations and of prospective member organizations have suspected that the coordinators of the PWL act out of self-interest, that they are not transparent about what they do with their financial resources, that they are not clear with the aim and purpose of the PWL, that they keep information to themselves and that they are not interested in including others in making decisions (Interviewees “Agata”; “Grażyna”; “Irena”; “Cecylia”). A representative of one women’s organization argues that many women did not trust DUK as coordinator for the PWL:

People distrust the Wrocław group [meaning DUK] and so they didn’t want to come [to a meeting]. […] And think that maybe they want to keep the formal … coordination of the organization for the best issues, and something like this. I see no other reason actually (Interviewee “Agata”).

A representative of CPK explains that she had been asked to represent the PWL at the EWL general assembly. She declined this request, because she never received enough information – about how things would be done and who would pay – for her to invest time and effort in such a commitment (Interviewee representing CPK). The financial issue has been especially troublesome for the second version of the PWL, because member organizations and prospective members could not be certain about how DUK used the resources for the PWL. When DUK received funding for a second version of the PWL, it had not been transparent and inclusive in the process. Member organizations from the first version of the PWL felt they were neither informed about the PWL’s activities, nor invited to meetings about the new PWL or the application process for the funding (Interviewee “Grażyna”). A clear example of this lack of transparency is that member organizations collected money for the EWL membership fee, but then learned that DUK had not sent this money in time, and that the PWL as a
consequence had been excluded from voting at the general assembly and expelled from the EWL (Interviewee “Agata”).

It is not only DUK that has been perceived as not being transparent when taking on the role of coordinator. Member organizations (and others) were dissatisfied with how OŚKa in its role as coordinator of the former PWL communicated with its members. According to some interviewees, there was not enough information on what was going on between the EWL and the PWL representative, at least not towards the end of OŚKa (Interviewees “Grażyna”, “Olga”, “Franciszka”). A former representative of OŚKa (referring mainly to the situation in OŚKa) argues that lack of transparency in a social movement coalition organization can lead to distrust and internal conflicts:

There is no established way, and the example of OŚKa is a perfect example, if you don’t talk about power, if you don’t talk about … transparency, if you [are] not really clear about what you want to achieve with whom and why, then you have this very strange story of unclear motivations, personal ambitions, lack of strategies, and then also lack of institutional memory (Interviewee “Irena”, emphasis added).

She also argues that distrust in OŚKa was connected to its financial situation. The former representative remembers how she tried to find new ways for OŚKa to bring in money, for instance via publications, but that the board members resisted any initiative involving this way of raising money. She further explains that:

Because if there are some types of relations, and especially if money is involved, it has an impact on the relations, it has impact on the way people function, and when it is not addressed and when it is not transparent then it is causing a lot of damage so I don’t know if it can be done differently (Interviewee “Irena”).

In general, when speaking to representatives of Polish women’s organizations about the PWL, several of them express doubts about the role of the PWL. A representative of a feminist organization argues for instance that neither the EWL, nor the PWL, has a clear role and that this fact has made her doubt whether it is worth joining the PWL:

It has to have a concrete sense, has to have something to do. Just to be a member of a structure… I would need to have a real exchange and a common vision, ideas and really an exchange and possibility to hear each other,
to talk about current strategies and problems. I didn’t notice anything like this in my short contacts with the [EWL]. But I was not very active in working in such contacts. Only, I didn’t feel especially invited to such exchange and conversations (Interviewee “Edyta”).

Doubts were also raised as to whether the PWL even existed, as few interviewees had heard of any activities or been invited to meetings. One interviewee representing an organization which has not been a member of the second version of the PWL says:

But there are …no, no activities, no contact on a regular basis. So, it’s only, you know, the name is great: [laughs] ‘Women’s Lobby’. What does it mean ‘Women’s Lobby’? There is no link between us and the European Women’s Lobby or Polish Women’s Lobby, no (Interviewee “Cecylia”).

The fact that “Cecylia”, who represents one of the key women’s organizations in Poland, and other interviewees express that they have not heard of any activities of the PWL and even doubt that it exists, shows not only that the PWL lacks relevance for some parts of the movement, but that there is a lack of transparency within the second version of the PWL.

In Sweden, lack of transparency has also been an issue for member organizations. A representative of a shelter organization, for instance, remembers how her organization once left the SWL because they believed that the SWL had not been transparent enough regarding the selection of participants and representatives for international conferences (Interviewee “Jenny”). Another example is that the SWL has up until recently not been seen as sufficiently transparent regarding how project funds have been spent. A representative of a member organization explains:

They [meaning the SWL office and chairperson] haven’t even reported what they have done earlier with their project money. But now we have decided, at the annual meeting, that [the SWL] has to report: what do they do with all of these millions? You could also say that [the SWL] are to blame, because they don’t say much but instead, with these projects, they have kept it to themselves (Interviewee “Ingrid”).

The member representative argues that, via projects, the chairperson and office of the SWL have managed to work on things without including the member organizations in the decision-making procedure. Given that the annual meeting (that is, the meeting involving the member organizations) does not make decisions related to project work, the question is, she argues,
whether the decisions made in this area are good ones (Interviewee “Ing-rid”). By applying for external project money, the SWL can more easily act as an organization in its own right rather than as a meta-organization for and by its member organizations. However, overall, lack of transparency has not been a major issue within the SWL. In comparison to the case of the PWL, this can be understood in the light of the fact that the SWL is an established and separate organization: its structure and rules for decision-making are explicit and clear to member organizations because of the high level of organization: in the SWL, representatives can be called into account more easily than in the PWL. This way, the organizational elements in the SWL contribute to trust and thereby decrease tensions within the meta-organization.

**Representativity**

As the second part of understanding trust in the two cases of the SWL and the PWL, representativity concerns women’s organizations’ confidence that the meta-organization will express the right opinions and represent them faithfully. In order to trust the meta-organization, prospective member organizations need to believe that it, in a democratic manner, will speak for its members and on the issues brought up by its members – in other words, that it is representative.

As discussed in previous chapters, given that DUK is associated with, and similar in structure to, the former Polish Women’s League, it is automatically considered undemocratic by many feminist and new women’s movement organizations which were formed in the 1990s or later, and which started either as grassroots initiatives or as NGOs with the help of foreign funding. Several interviewees argue that there is a division within the Polish women’s movement, between the old and new types of women’s organizations, which has created distrust between them, conflicts and an unwillingness to cooperate (Interviewees “Agata”; “Beata”; “Franciszka”).

For DUK, which was both centrally and hierarchically organized and associated with the old regime’s style of civil society organizing, it was difficult to function as the new coordinator of the PWL. Representatives of women’s organizations could not be sure that their voices would be included and represented in the new version of the PWL. Likewise, OŚKa struggled to gain trust from women’s organizations regarding representativity in the PWL, and had to avoid formal organization and fundraising in order to avoid even more suspicion, as pointed out by “Franciszka” above (see “Avoiding the threat of organization”).
In Sweden, the issue of representativity has more or less been restricted to the issue of party politics. As the history of the SWL shows, there was an issue of (unwanted) party connections from the very start. Interestingly, the Undersecretary of State was seen as “neutral” here, according to a former chair of the SWL:

Well, the government shouldn’t stick its nose in, but it was supposed to be a bit neutral because there were so many [organizations]. [The former Undersecretary of State] got the mission and she was sort of a support (Interviewee “Astrid”).

The neutrality of a government representative may seem contradictory, but should be understood in the context of political parties’ women’s groups, women’s groups within the union movement or any other organization or representative which might be associated with a political orientation. It should also be understood in relation to earlier failures of some women’s organizations to form a meta-organization in order to join the EWL, mentioned above. The key point here is that a representative of any women’s organization would have found it difficult to convince a larger number of women’s organizations to come to a meeting to discuss cooperation and the formation of a meta-organization for the women’s movement because she would have been perceived as a competitor and challenger in the field of women’s movement organizations. As the first chairperson of the SWL remembers, she had to be cautious at the very first meeting at which women’s organizations had been invited to discuss the possibility of forming an umbrella organization, due to her (possible) connections to a specific political party:

I have been active in the labour union movement, one knows which party I vote for, and it’s not a secret. So, we said like this: [name of a woman from IKFF] says welcome. She was completely neutral […] she had no political label (Interviewee “Astrid”).

However, when the representative from IKFF started to explain the agenda of the meeting, someone in the audience protested nonetheless by asking “who has said that you are going to form this association?”, according to the former chair. She also recalls that the start of the SWL was a bit unstable (Interviewee “Astrid”):
There was a bit of a row all the time when we had annual meetings because everybody wanted to have their candidates included. But this is nothing unusual, everybody fights for their members’ sake (Interviewee “Astrid”).

It was, thus, difficult for representatives of the Swedish women’s organizations to let someone from another women’s organization represent them and the movement by speaking for them at meetings. The women’s organizations, via their representatives, did not trust the board of the SWL to represent them if they were not present themselves. They were worried that the interest and voice of their own organization would be lost if they were represented by other organizations that could promote their own agenda. The quote by “Astrid” reminds us of the situation in Poland when both OŚKa and DUK were questioned for having taken the role of coordinators of the PWL. According to a representative of a member organization and former representative of the SWL, these tensions were also due to competition for resources within the movement – women’s organizations were afraid that they would lose funding and visibility when a new actor was set up in the field of Swedish women’s organizations:

Well, Sweden is small. It has always been a struggle for women’s organizations, and a lot of it is about the fact that the women’s movement has had to fight for its survival. [The organizations] were afraid of disappearing. So that’s why it became so important how this [the SWL] was formed. Because it has always been scarce resources and a struggle for survival (Interviewee “Elisabet”).

In a context of many, and differing, organizations within a field where they all want to have a voice and gain influence and recognition, and all compete for the same type of (scarce) resources, a government representative is thus someone from the outside who could be seen as a “neutral” actor. The situation of the “neutral” government representative is also illustrative of Swedish relationship between the state and civil society, given a general notion of the state as benevolent towards civil society organizations, and the fact that many organizations are interconnected with the political sphere and considered partners with the state (Wijkström & Zimmer 2011). The “neutral” government can also be understood as illustrative of the attitude of the Swedish women’s movement, given the notion of a “women-friendly welfare state”, and the tradition of close cooperation between women’s organizations and the government, especially as the women’s movement played a major role in the implementation of feminist and women-friendly
policies during the “radical years” of the 1960s and 70s (Borchorst & Siim 2002; Florin & Nilsson 2000; Peterson 2016).

**Efficacy & Actorhood**

I see efficacy, in the case of the two women’s movement meta-organizations, as the ability to create joint action. Meta-organizations provide collectives with an actor (cf. Fries 2011:28f). Efficacy and actorhood are consequently seen here as connected. As Jutterström (2004:14) points out, actorhood in organizations is based on an illusion and institutionalised ideas about the actor – that it has a clear identity which separates it from other organizations, fixed and distinct preferences, rational decision-making procedures, autonomy and room for manoeuvre. For efficacy and actorhood of an organization to be visible, the participants have to be able to make common decisions. Following Luhmann, Ahrne and Brunsson (2011:8) argue that “[d]ecisions are attempts at creating certainty, at establishing what the future will look like”. A decision on the boundaries of the organization (who can be a member or not) is a clear indication to the environment that this organization has an identity, that it is distinctive. A decision to make a joint statement on a particular issue is a clear indication that this organization has preferences and is capable of coordinating collective action to speak with one voice, which is particularly important for national women’s meta-organizations. Meta-organizations thus have to convince their immediate environment – member organizations and possible member organizations – that they are actors. A key to showing efficacy and actorhood, and thereby creating trust, is thus to make decisions.

For possible member organizations, there has to be a belief that their meta-organization is capable of making decision and thereby coordinating action. Given that women’s organizations’ resources are scarce, it has to be meaningful to join a meta-organization or coalition. However, if there is a risk that joining will entail a lot of effort and resources which later on lead to failure, such as not being able to achieve something together at the international or national level, organizations are less likely to join.

The issue of trust with regard to efficacy is evident both in the Swedish and Polish women’s organizations. Polish and Swedish women’s organizations doubted the meta-organization’s efficacy, and hence some hesitated to become members. In the Swedish case, despite the fact that the SWL has had a relatively secure financial position from early on in the process, some interviewees express a scepticism towards the SWL’s ability to act in the capacity of a platform and representative of the women’s movement.
“Ingrid”, representing one of the larger member organizations, argues that the SWL lacks the competence needed for the important role of being the overarching representative and coordinator of the movement. According to “Ingrid”, there is a lack of knowledge in the organization. As an overarching umbrella for the women’s movement, she argues, the SWL would need to use more knowledge from all of the women anchored in the movement rather than mainly relying on the daily work by a handful of “young employees” (Interviewee “Ingrid”). Moreover, according to “Ingrid”, the SWL lacks the resources in terms of people, knowledge and finances for the amount of work required, for the reports they carry out and the government budget analyses they execute on a regular basis. To her mind, the SWL also lacks the contacts and networking skills needed for the role of being a representative and coordinator of the movement. “Ingrid” argues that its work is mainly executed by staff rather than by its grassroots base. As a consequence, she argues, the SWL is incapable of having an effect, of producing an outcome:

So, there are no conflicts. It’s just that nothing happens! […] They have their board, but what they do is that they get these project grants, and they have girls working on reports, and the question is what will come out of it? Do you understand, it’s that. They present a report of the government budget, but who will take care of it? (Interviewee “Ingrid”).

For instance, they did this report on women’s health, young women’s health, based on very old material which they presented at some conference. Yeah, well, what happened to it after that? Then they’ve had some girl working on it half a year or a year, but what happened to it after that? (Interviewee “Ingrid”).

In the same vein, a former chair of the SWL points out the importance of competence as she argues that the SWL ”needs to be seen as working for women’s rights, as a competence organization” in order to be trusted (Interviewee “Britta”). The lack of outcome, according to “Ingrid”, is due to a lack of competence in the organization, but also a lack of anchoring of the work among the member organizations. In her opinion, the SWL tends to work on projects it has received money for, but ignores the job of reaching out and making its work relevant to the members, or lacks the ability to do so. She is also sceptical as to the SWL’s ability to mobilize and unite the movement, for instance prior the 2014 Nordic conference “Nordiskt Forum” (Interviewee “Ingrid”). On the one hand, this member representative says that she does not trust the SWL to be able to act in the capacity of
a platform and representative of the Swedish women’s movement: essentially, that it is a weak organization. On the other hand, she seems to suggest that the SWL is doing too much – such as running a lot of projects and producing reports – but also that: “You could say they [the SWL] do their own stuff [...] they’re just the board” (Interviewee “Ingrid”). I interpret this ambiguity as part of the tension between organization and social movement: there is too much organization (employees, office work, projects, board decisions) and not enough social movement (participation and knowledge anchoring among the grassroots). It could also be argued that the SWL has become too much of an organization in its own right (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). Another interviewee suggests that this is the case:

Well, the commitment is strong among those working at the office and in the board but not so much among the member organizations [...] Very often it results in the umbrella doing its own stuff and then the members come once, to the annual meeting, and they elect a board. And then there isn’t much more than that [...] An umbrella should actually be its members and it feels maybe as if the [SWL] is becoming its own women’s organization (Interviewee “Elisabet”).

On the one hand, representatives of (potential) member organizations need to trust that the meta-organization is capable of being an actor – by having the capacity to act in the interest of the Swedish women’s movement. As such, the women’s organizations expect the SWL to be a strong organization, to use many organizational elements. On the other hand, representatives of (potential) member organizations need to trust that the meta-organization is connected to its “grassroots” – that it allows for participation and that its voice/expertise/knowledge is genuinely anchored within the women’s movement. As such, the women’s organizations expect the SWL to show social movement elements. The contradictory expectations contribute to the tensions within the field of women’s organizations, and within the SWL. Efficacy and actorhood, accordingly, are not only about organizational elements. The women’s movement meta-organization’s ability to create joint action is also dependent upon its social movement character in the eyes of its members.

In the case of the PWL, the social movement meta-organization had to show efficacy and actorhood in terms of ability to act as a platform and representative of the women’s movement too. As one interviewee recalls, one reason that the first version of the PWL struggled to attract and maintain members was that women’s organizations in Poland did not believe
that this new organization could show strength, nor could they see the point in having a national organization for the purpose of European-level action. As we have seen, they pointed to the fact that there already existed Eastern European networks which had the capacity to work internationally (Interviewee “Grażyna”; OŚKa 2005). Moreover, a recurrent issue when speaking to representatives of Polish women’s organizations is that they have seen no activity at all from the PWL since it was removed from OŚKa. There was, for instance, for a very short while, an attempt made by the member organization CPK to continue the role as coordinator and as the connection to the EWL, but the CPK lacked the resources to keep up this demanding role. As one interviewee, a former representative of OŚKa/PWL, remembers, this was a problem:

[…] but it depended mostly on, you know, the capacities of the organizations. Because at that time in OŚKa, we had such capacities, so we could do it and later on [CPK] was criticized for doing nothing. I think that they took this role, but didn’t have enough capacities to be able to perform the tasks. And that was the problem (Interviewee “Franciszka”).

Polish women’s organizations simply could not see any purpose of a PWL membership anymore, especially since the CPK could not provide them with any information about what was being done at the European level, nor were they able to arrange national meetings. The second version of the PWL, attached to DUK, also lacked the ability to coordinate a coalition for the women’s movement. Several interviewees express scepticism about the capacities of DUK and this version of the PWL:

From what I understand, here in Poland, there was one person for several years who had the title, and nothing was really happening. There was no real organization behind her, no activities, nothing… But then the title was staying. […] What was the purpose? And for who? To try to be this [PWL]… (Interviewee “Irena”).

And then last year, I think, I was invited. And I kind of knew that it is not working very well. And I was invited by someone last year to renew this [PWL]. And I came there, […] and I expected there would be several women’s organizations, but there was practically three women from Wrocław and [a representative of NEWW], two women from Warsaw, apart from me. And they were practically not connected to women’s organizations (Interviewee “Grazyna”).
No. I don’t know anything about it. I don’t know, [the PWL]. It is not popular in the feminist movement in Poland because, I don’t see any activity of this… maybe this group will be active and do something, but I don’t see it (Interviewee “Olga”).

I mean, the last four-five years, it was [name of a DUK representative], and nothing much was happening (Interviewee “Agata”)

There used to be [formal decisions] when there was better communication with this formal body in … Wrocław, but actually, they stopped calling for meetings. [E: Why?] Because probably of lack of finances and capacities and so on (Interviewee “Agata”).

Similarly to the case of the SWL, the Polish women’s organizations expected there to be a strong organization behind the name of the PWL. As the quotes above show, there was a lack of organization in the case of the second version of the PWL: “Irina” even suggested that it was based solely on one person (“There was no real organization behind her…”). Moreover, given that women’s organizations’ resources are scarce, it has to be meaningful to join a meta-organization or coalition. However, if there is a risk that joining will entail a lot of effort and resources which later on lead to failure, such as not being able to achieve something together, social movement organizations are less likely to join. Thus, what the interviewees express above is that there has to be some kind of guarantee that if they put their effort (and resources) into this cooperation and coalition it will not be in vain, and something relevant will come out of it. If the coalition can show that it is capable of acting together, that it has efficacy and actorhood, possible members can have confidence that it is relatively stable. Hence, there has to exist “something” already established which can act. This “something” is the ability to make joint decisions and a structure of decided relations: who is included, how/who to decide, what the identity and aim is. In other words, there has to be an organization in place, which gives the confidence of a decided order that is established enough to be trusted in having capacity.

Given that the main purpose of the SWL and the PWL, as meta-organizations for a social movement or interest group, is to gather the Swedish and Polish women’s movements and speak with one voice, its ability to act will essentially be understood as its ability to cooperate and show unity. That is why, when attempting to form a third version of the PWL, NEWW tried to summon a smaller core of organizations which would decide on the basics and then make a joint statement. The latter was an important tool to
convince the Polish women’s movement that this is an actor to count on as the members are able to work together. Or, as a representative of NEWW explains:

I think that when we will have our general assembly of six organizations, and we will publish a statement and inform other organizations that we exist and if somebody is interested they can join us. Because now it is very difficult [for them] to say if they are willing to cooperate. […] I mean, when we announce in social media that the Polish Women’s Lobby has chosen its board, or whatever, we just announce it – in this way I mean a statement. Like from the conference yesterday: ‘there was a meeting and 50 people read and decided on this and that’. This kind of thing I mean (Interviewee representing NEWW, emphasis added)60

And she continues:

Also there was the Centre of Women’s Rights [CPK] but they are very … how can I say, very careful, they don’t want to, they want to wait, [see] how it will develop. Hopefully they will also join. […] [CPK], and some organizations, want to wait and see what will happen, instead of paying the fee now, and to find out whether it will be another disaster [laughs] (Interviewee representing NEWW).

Possible member organizations thus want some form of certainty that joining will be worth the effort, so they wait to see some actions that would suggest that the PWL really is “in place” and has the capacity to act as a platform and representative of the Polish women’s movement. Sometimes, access to resources can indicate capacity and stability, generating trust from others. For instance, when DUK initiated the second version of the PWL, the grant they received from the Civil Initiatives Fund provided the cooperation with a “concrete dimension” (Interviewee representing DUK) – i.e. certainty or stability – yet, it was not enough in the long run to maintain the PWL. As the case of the PWL shows, lack of ability to show unity and to cooperate has been detrimental to its image as a trustworthy organization and consequently to its survival. Internal conflicts have thus been looked upon, both from within the women’s movement but also from the external environment, with scepticism.

60 The six organizations are: eFKa, Society for Crisis Intervention, NEWW, “Federa”, Opole Polish Platform and Gdansk Women of the Left (Interviewee representing NEWW).
This lack of cooperative efficacy has also been the case in Sweden. As the former chairperson of the SWL remembers from her initial contact with the SWL, a lack of unity was an obstacle for her and her organization to trust the newly established meta-organization:

I thought that there were mostly conflicts and power battles in the SWL. […] The SWL was totally new for me, but I attended an annual meeting. I thought it was a rowdy meeting. I thought to myself: who are these people? I saw them as an elitist group in Stockholm (Interviewee “Britta”).

Remembering difficulties and internal tensions in the history of the SWL, the former chairperson also argues that the meta-organization had a hard time convincing the women’s movement and member organizations that it was capable of unity and cooperation – that is, efficacy:

It was all very messy back then, which made people shy away from joining. There was more and more of a distrust towards the chairperson (Interviewee “Britta”).

There was a lack of trust, both within and towards the SWL. That’s why, for me as chair, it became the key point to work on the internal, but also to work externally to get a respectful response. That’s what we were dealing with back then. To bring certainty (Interviewee “Britta”).

The background is the incident around 2003 (see timeline), when the SWL had lost funding from the state, and several of its member organizations (mainly party political women’s wings and the two shelter organizations) had left the meta-organization. Distrust towards the SWL’s ability to be a strong and united actor for the movement was evident. As described earlier, this crisis was solved by the decision to exclude the party-political women’s wings, and to shift focus more towards the role as the EWL coordinator. However, political tensions continued to be a threat to the unity of the SWL, until a new chairperson with an ability to unite the member organizations was appointed, according to an employee at the SWL office:

Due to the previous conflicts she’s been good to have because she is unifying. She stands above the quarrels. Her point of departure is: what is the goal? (Interviewee “Helene”).

As both the Swedish and Polish cases show, it has been essential for the SWL and for the coordinators of the PWL to build trust among member or-
ganizations and possible member organizations that the women’s umbrellas have efficacy and actorhood. To do this, a show of unity has been the most important way forward. However, whereas unity and other organizational characteristics (based on decisions) have been essential, also social movement elements are expected among the women’s organizations. However, compared to the case of the SWL, the Polish women’s movement representatives quoted above express that there is a lack of both organization and social movement in the case of the second version of the PWL. DUK struggled to maintain the PWL because it lacked participation from, recognition in, and anchoring within the wider Polish women’s movement. In the case of the process of forming and maintaining the PWL, the issue of trust in terms of efficacy and actorhood has mainly concerned the importance to show (both the EWL and Polish women’s movement) that there is a capacity to be a link between the EWL and the Polish level. In the case of the SWL, the issue of trust in terms of efficacy and actorhood has, instead, concerned a much larger capacity. The SWL has become more than the link and the Swedish women’s voice in EWL, and has been criticized for not doing things well enough and for doing too much. Its activities have been questioned as irrelevant, badly run or not anchored among its members or in the wider women’s movement. Considering that some interviewees suggest that the commitment among the member organizations is low and that the SWL is merely the office and the board (that it is becoming “its own women’s organization”), and the fact that it nowadays has a limited company, it could be argued that the SWL has actually become too much organization and too little social movement.

In the case of NEWW and the third version of the PWL, it is still uncertain how much organization there will be. Since it was accepted by the EWL in October 2016 as the Polish coordinator, representatives from NEWW have participated at EWL general assemblies, called to national meetings in Poland, and announced a joint statement against morning-after pill limitations in the name of the PWL (EWL 2017). However, a meta-organization does not exist. Given the aggravating circumstances discussed throughout the analysis of the process of forming and maintaining the PWL, and the recent changed conditions for feminism and women’s organizations in Poland discussed in chapter 6, it will be difficult for the women involved in the third version of the PWL create trust within the field of Polish women’s organizations, and, hence, to introduce more elements of organization beyond membership, such as hierarchy and rules. As pointed out in chapter 4, Polish civil society has been characterized by general
mistrust and competition in which coalitions and long-lasting structures of cooperation are rare. Following Papakostas (2009), it could be argued that the Polish women’s movement – with its internal tensions and distrust as shown earlier in the analysis – is rooted in a context of the structure of its social and organizational landscape, in which interpersonal distrust is being reinforced. A legacy of communism and recent developments in the landscape of Polish civil society (such as NGO-ization, increased competition for funding, and lack of institutionalized paths to policy-makers) does not contribute to a stable situation for women’s organizations in which some of them can easily create a new actor such as the PWL and thereby gain trust from the field.

As we can see in the two cases of the SWL and the PWL, for a social movement meta-organization to be perceived as having efficacy and actorhood requires a combination of organizational elements and social movement aspects. This combination of course creates ambiguity. In spite of movement actors perceiving organization as necessary, it is resisted and meets with obstacles. This is more obviously the case in Poland, yet the ambiguity and resistance are apparent in Sweden too. Whereas organization is needed in order to take steps such as making joint statements, too much organization risks losing the element of participation and relevance for the movement, and causing the notion of what the women’s movement is to be questioned. In the next, and final chapter, these results will be discussed in the light of the more general interest in understanding the often troublesome dynamics of movement organizing.
Conclusions

We have followed two processes of women’s movement organizing at the intersection of national and international interests: the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements’ attempts at forming and maintaining nationwide women’s meta-organizations for the purpose of having a voice in the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) and, thereby, in the EU. In one case, a Swedish women’s meta-organization was formed and has become an established actor with many members and activities. It has not only managed to have a strong voice at international level and be active in the EWL, for instance via the former Swedish chair of the EWL; it has become an influential voice also at national level since it is a key organization for the government regarding women’s rights and gender equality issues, and organizes conferences and courses on gender mainstreaming. In the other case, a Polish women’s meta-organization was initially formed, but in the shape of a “coalition agreement” which was attached to one of its member organizations. Over the years, the meta-organization has struggled to survive and has been coordinated by several member organizations, while its popularity and recognition within the Polish women’s movement have thus declined. The two women’s meta-organizations turned out differently, yet, as we have seen, the processes show many similarities. In this chapter, I will disentangle this complexity. As a first step, I will summarize the analysis by answering the research questions, and, as a second step, I will discuss the theoretical contribution of this thesis and its wider implications for the study of the internationalization of social movements at national level.

How Could the Women’s Movements Adapt?

The overall aim of this thesis has been to use the two cases of meta-organizing in the Swedish and Polish women’s movements in order to explore the junction of organization and social movement, at the intersection of national and international interests. To this end, the aim was divided into
three parts. The first aim regarded conditions for social movement adaptation to an international structure. This was investigated by asking two questions.

The first question concerned the motives behind the formation of the two nationwide women’s meta-organizations in Sweden and Poland. The Swedish and Polish women’s organizations had several motives to form nationwide meta-organizations. Most importantly, they were interested in a membership, and thereby representation and voice, in the EWL. As the largest civil society organization for the women’s movement at EU level, with its established contacts in and support from the European Commission, the EWL was difficult to ignore. As an established meta-organizations itself, the EWL has a monopoly in terms of the representation of women vis-à-vis EU policy makers (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008). Both Swedish and Polish women’s organizations thus saw the EWL as the way to the European Commission. They saw it as necessary to have a voice in this influential organization, but also to be able to receive information about what was going on in Brussels and to participate in a forum to exchange knowledge and experiences with other women’s organizations.

However, there were some differences in the two women’s movements’ motives. The Swedish Women’s Lobby (SWL) was not only set up in order to have representation in the EWL, but it was also seen as a way to interact with and lobby the Swedish government (and other national-level actors). National cooperation at both domestic and international level was thus important to the Swedish women’s organizations. Moreover, the initiative to form the SWL was not only related to the EU, but also to other international arenas such as the UN. A key here is that the Swedish women’s movement desired international representation in order to spread a Swedish model for gender equality and in order to protect this model from international legislation and policies that could potentially jeopardize it.

In Poland, women had placed much hope in the EU. With a welfare state that did not benefit women on many levels, governments that stigmatized feminism and gave little support to women’s organizations, and restricted abortion laws, Polish women’s organizations were anticipating leverage in their fight for women’s rights from the EU and transnational advocacy organizations such as the EWL. The EWL was attractive because it could help Polish women’s organizations to gain legitimacy and support at national level. As other movements had done, the women’s movement in Poland wanted to make use of the EU as a lever for the movement’s causes (Hobson, Carson & Lawrence 2007). There was also a desire to cooperate
with women “in the West” as part of the process of overcoming the gap between the Old and New Europe, or West and East. However, at the same time, there was a strong desire among many Polish women’s organizations for Central and East European regional cooperation, representation and solidarity, rather than national cooperation and representation, as in Sweden. Many Polish women’s organizations were worried that, as a Polish voice in the EWL, the regional solidarity and an understanding of women’s situation in the “East” would get lost. To join the EWL in the form of a regional cooperation was however not possible.

The second question concerned the conditions in the two women’s movement settings that facilitated or obstructed the formation of a national meta-organization. As the literature on opportunity structures emphasizes, context is crucial for understanding the particular forms of organizing of collective actors. These develop in relation to, and in interaction with the surrounding society (Jacobsson 2012:2). In this study, context meant both national and international, introducing EU as an actor the movements could – and would – relate to. The specific national contexts of the two women’s movements had a major impact on how the processes of the two women’s meta-organizations developed. In the Swedish context, there are three main factors that facilitated the formation of the SWL and a Swedish EWL membership, all of which are intertwined. First, the SWL exists within the context of a civil society in which national federations – “riksförbund” – are common. “Riksförbund” are essentially meta-organizations at nationwide level gathering a group of civil society organizations. This form of organizing is so common that, for instance, Iranians in Sweden who wanted to organize voluntarily as Iranians soon adapted by forming the Federation of Iranian Associations (Emami 2003). However, despite this tradition, the SWL is unprecedented within the Swedish women’s movement. There were meta-organizations for the women’s shelter movement, and certain larger women’s organizations had local branches, but there was no nationwide “umbrella” for all of them.

Even allowing for the common practice of “riksförbund” in Swedish civil society, it may still seem contradictory that it was relatively easy to form the SWL despite the fact that this form of durable nationwide women’s organizing had not taken place before. The answer to this is connected to the second factor: the Swedish government. With its strong interest in gender equality politics in the mid-1990s, the Swedish government was eager to have one actor (i.e. one voice) in the women’s movement that it could collaborate with and through which it could gain legitimacy for its gender
equality policies. This way, the government could also to some extent curb the women’s movement (cf. McCarthy 2008:120f): through the SWL the women’s movement was not only more foreseeable but also more easy to control if its plurality was limited. A representative of the government thus encouraged the initiative to set up the SWL, and further provided it with a “base” by functioning as the convener for the first meeting of Swedish women’s organizations discussing the EWL membership. The government further supported the SWL by providing it with legitimacy and an institutionalized path to policy-making. The access to, and support from, the government facilitated the formation of the SWL, but has also allowed it to expand its sphere of action. This is connected to the third factor: resources. With its close contact to the government, the SWL managed to establish itself as an important actor, lobby the government, and thereby receive stable state funding. This has allowed the SWL not only to be active in the EWL, but also to become an organization in its own right with several employees, an office and many projects which are not necessarily connected to the EWL/EU level, nor to the needs of its member organizations. By not relying on the resources of its members, and instead depending on state funding, the SWL is an organization partly exogenous and decoupled from its members which to some extent can act independently from the commitment, contribution or involvement of its members (cf. Bor 2014).

In Poland, there have been several factors obstructing the formation of a nationwide women’s meta-organization. First, the above mentioned need for Central and East European regional cooperation, representation and solidarity, was an obstacle because it contributed to some Polish women’s organizations’ lack of interest in national cooperation, but also because it had created distrust towards the EWL, which had not proved to be understanding towards the women’s situation in the region. Second, the structure of the field of Polish women’s organizations posed an obstacle. With a newly gained right to officially register associations, many women’s and feminist organizations were formed in the 1990s, and many of them made a conscious choice to distance themselves from the Polish Women’s League and the type of civic mass-membership organizing which was associated with state socialism. Meta-organization was in this context consequently looked upon with suspicion.

Moreover, American and West European foundations that had started to initiate and fund many civil society organizations in the region created a situation in which many Polish women’s organizations were formed as expert-based and memberless NGOs, dependent upon this type of external
international funding. In combination with a general sense of distrust towards formal cooperation with others conditioned by “multiplication by conflict” (cf. Jacobsson 2013), a drastic change in the funding situation in the early 2000s (due to EU accession and foreign donors leaving the region), rendered the field of Polish women’s organizations even less fit to adapt to the EWL.

In addition, in comparison to Sweden, the Polish women’s organizations lacked external support, both in terms of legitimacy and financial resources. State funding was either unreliable or non-existent, and given the recent change of government, the situation has been aggravated, especially for women’s organizations working for abortion rights. As a consequence of these factors, forming a meta-organization was complicated because there was no basis for setting up a new organization for “the voice” of the movement. Instead, the Polish Women’s Lobby (PWL) came to be set up as a side project of one of its member organizations. The fact that the PWL has thus been attached to an existing women’s organization, in a context of divisions within the movement, has contributed to the difficulty in maintaining a meta-organizational structure.

As situated within two distinct nation states – in which the relationship between the state and civil society; traditions of civil society organizing; the legitimacy of feminism and the women’s rights movement; and the situation for women differ – the two women’s movements have exceedingly different conditions for adapting to international pressures and to the very specific way of organizing which the EWL membership entails. In sum, the European/international structure matched the needs and conditions of the Swedish women’s movement better than those of the Polish movement.

Organizing the Movement

Movements are associated with flexibility and something that moves forward – they are energetic and free-floating compared to organization which is associated with stiffness and rule-following. In practice, forms of organization play a part in most movements (cf. Haug 2014). The introduction of more organization may come easy at times, but not always, as is clear from this study. The second aim of the study was therefore to draw on the two processes of forming and maintaining social movement meta-organizations, in the interest of deepening our understanding of how organization in social movements can be challenging. Two general questions were posed to this end.
The first regarded the challenges, but also benefits, that meta-organization could entail for a group of social movement organizations. The analysis of the two cases show that there are several benefits for a group of social movement organizations when cooperating in the form of a meta-organization. Above all, it is a way to effectively create an actor for the movement because the meta-organization can speak with one voice. Organization fundamentally facilitates interaction. When there is a hierarchy within an organizational field, and a definite border – that is, membership – several organizations can act together as a single actor, for instance by making joint statements (Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:48). With the meta-organizational structure, representation is simplified when there is an aggregation of the various voices, interests and actors from local to national and to international level.

For the EU, and the Swedish government, this was attractive because it simplified the women’s movement and made it more predictable (cf. Ahrne & Brunsson 2008:56ff). For the Swedish and Polish women’s organizations, speaking with one voice was beneficial because it could make their claims stronger and more easily heard by external actors. Also, the EWL desired that the Swedish and Polish women’s organizations speak with one voice because it simplified its decisions-making procedures. Unity was thus both required and a benefit. However, a show of unity renders some voices within a social movement invisible. Because the notion of social movements presupposes plurality, this can be challenging to the image of the women’s meta-organizations. As we have seen at the Swedish level, the issue of unity posed a constant dilemma and ambiguity for the SWL: the women’s organizations desired it in order to be a legitimate interlocutor in relation to the Swedish government (and the EWL), and therefore decreased pluralism while emphasizing unity. However, unity decreases plurality and thereby representativity, which risks putting the SWL’s role as a legitimate actor for the movement into question. It can also cause members to criticise their meta-organization, if it portrays a unity which does not exist, as we have seen in the case of the SWL and its statement on surrogate motherhood. A meta-organization thus also brings challenges. To produce one voice is not easy, neither at European (EWL) nor at national (PWL, SWL) level, because the women’s movement is composed of many different voices.

Another challenge, in social movement meta-organizations, is to make joint decisions while allowing member organizations to be autonomous and unique. Social movement researchers, such as Staggenborg (1986) and Hathaway and Meyer (1993), have pointed out that social movement organ-
izations tend to prefer informal rather than formal coalitions, because the former reduces tensions. As we have seen in Poland, a formal coalition was initially avoided because of its perceived threat towards possible member organizations. This was also the case in Sweden, where some women’s organizations resisted being spoken for by a new organization and the hierarchy which a meta-organization entails.

In Sweden and Poland, women’s organizations struggled to let another organization have authority and represent them. As is inherently the case in meta-organizations, the women’s organizations struggled with coming to the fore as autonomous actors while at the same time being part of a larger organization. From the point of view of the management or coordinators of the meta-organization, however, it was important to have this authority otherwise the meta-organization ran a risk of being perceived as meaningless – if it cannot make decisions, act, and speak for its members, what is its purpose of being? One major challenge for the SWL and PWL was thus to deal with the “coalition contradiction” (Obach 2004), or the typical meta-organizational issue of having to balance the need to act with the needs for autonomy of diverse member organizations.

Yet another challenge was to create trust towards the meta-organization, or its coordinators. In particular, the women’s organizations needed to have confidence that the organization representing them would be able to accomplish something. That is to say, that it would show efficacy and actorhood. However, connected to the challenge discussed above, efficacy and actorhood implies that a greater extent of organizational elements are used and, again, that the plurality and uniqueness of the various member organizations are overlooked. To be perceived as having efficacy and actorhood requires a combination of organizational elements and social movement aspects. This combination of course creates ambiguity. While the representatives of the women’s movement organizations expressed a need for more organization, it was equally resisted and met with obstacles. Whereas organization is needed in order to make joint statements for instance, too much organization risks causing participation and relevance for the movement to get lost, and the notion of what the women’s movement is to be questioned. In sum, the challenges for social movement organizations cooperating in the form of meta-organization are, essentially, about the contradiction between forming an actor and avoiding having this actor take up too much space within the movement.

All of these challenges created tensions within the women’s meta-organizations and among the field of Swedish and Polish women’s movement
organizations. This leads to the second question: why was this so? Why did constructing one single actor to speak for and, effectively, represent the women's movement create tensions among the field of women's organizations?

The tensions in connection to the process of forming and maintaining the SWL and the PWL are both inherent in meta-organizations and due to the complicated process of organizing a social movement – or the conflict between organizational elements and the notion of social movement. The tensions can be divided up into three parts (all, however, intertwined): (1) competition among member organizations, (2) competition between the meta-organization and its member organizations and (3) trust in social movement meta-organizations.

Within the first part, tensions in the Polish case can be explained by the fact that the PWL was always coordinated by, and thus strongly associated with, one of its own member organizations. I call this way of meta-organizing attachment. Given the various tensions already existent within the field of Polish women’s organizations, attachment meant that the PWL has never had a neutral base but instead existed “within occupied spaces” (Ahrne & Papakostas 2014). One consequence of that was that conflicts from the coordinating organization spilled over into the PWL. In the Swedish case it was easier to overcome tensions among the women’s organizations, such as between the party-political women’s organizations, because the SWL was set up as a separate organization without any connections to a particular member organization. As such, it was easier to accept as democratic and equally controlled by its members. The SWL also had the benefit of being supported by a third, and external, actor – i.e. the government – which, interestingly, functioned as a broker and “neutral” convener to the formation meeting. The attachment structure of the PWL, in addition, meant that the PWL did not have its own resources. As such, it depended financially, materially and morally on the coordinating organization that it was attached to.

Within the second part, tensions can generally be explained by the fact discussed above: a meta-organization poses a threat to its member organizations and has to perform a balancing act between emphasizing its own identity, autonomy and authority, while not overshadowing the visibility and uniqueness of its member organizations. As a social movement coalition, the tensions in the SWL and the PWL can be understood as the result of a conflict between the maintenance needs of the participating social movement organizations and those of the coalition itself (cf. Staggenborg
8. CONCLUSIONS

The situation was full of tensions because the women’s organizations both wanted to join forces in order to achieve the aims of the movement, but at the same time they wanted to remain independent and visible actors within the movement (cf. Van Dyke & McCammon 2010). In the SWL, which was an established and stable meta-organization with the resources to perform many tasks, this issue was of course more prevalent than in the PWL which struggled merely to survive and be a link between the EWL and the Polish women’s movement. One example of why the SWL created tensions was that sometimes the activities of the meta-organization overlapped with those of its member organizations. In another example, some member organizations felt that their meta-organization rendered their expertise and role within a specific area of women’s rights invisible. As meta-organizations with the potential for performing the same activities as their members, the SWL and the PWL constantly have to deal with the question: who does what? However, this was more of an issue in the SWL, whereas in the PWL – due to the attachment character – the major conflict concerned: who has access to, or control of, the meta-organization? Competition between the women’s movement meta-organizations and their (potential) member organizations also concerned resources. Given that social movement organizations compete for the same type of financial resources (cf. Zald & McCarthy 1979:12; McCarthy & Zald 1977: 1234), the SWL and the PWL posed a threat to other women’s organizations’ chances of funding. In Poland, where funding is particularly scarce, a separate meta-organization (which would demand its own financial resources) was seen as such a threat to women’s organizations that it was decided that the first version of the PWL would be established in a less formal way: as a coalition agreement coordinated by the women’s resource centre OŚKa. In the case of the SWL, where thanks to government grants, the situation is more stable and financial competition less acute, it was other resources such as legitimacy (i.e. being seen as the representative or expert), which the SWL and its members competed for. Resources have been at the centre of conflicts and tensions in both the Polish and the Swedish case.

Within the third part, tensions can generally be explained by a lack of trust towards the meta-organization (or its coordinators). First, for prospective member organizations, the SWL and the PWL had to be transparent in order to be reliable. Because meta-organizations are supposed to produce homogenous preferences, but have to use democracy in order to do so (cf. Jutterström 2004:159f), members need to know what the decisions are and how they were made. Essentially, a higher level of organization is required
in order to have transparency: explicit rules for decision-making. Lack of transparency, and thereby trust, was thus more of an issue in the case of the PWL. Second, when women’s organizations lacked the confidence that the meta-organization would in a democratic manner speak for its members – i.e. that it would be representative – distrust and tensions became a fact. Again, the PWL suffered more from this due to its attached structure. Instead of having a “neutral” base such as the SWL had, the PWL was connected to, and sometimes seen as dominated by, one of its member organizations. As such, it was particularly difficult for the Polish women’s organizations to believe that the PWL would represent them. Third, trust was also based on the perceived level of efficacy and actorhood of the two meta-organizations. Again, unity and more organization has been the solution in order to show action. However, for a social movement meta-organization to be perceived as having efficacy and actorhood a combination of organizational elements and social movement aspects have been expected, creating ambiguity.

Institutionalizing a Movement?

Organization is a classic problem in social movements (cf. Staggenborg 2013a & 2013b; Michels 1983; Skocpol 2003; Papakostas 2009; Ahrne & Papakostas 2006). Organization can challenge the notion of what a movement is and may threaten the spontaneous, inclusive, voluntary and liquid character of movements. Yet, organization is both common and a crucial factor in social movements. When social movements organize in the form of a nationwide meta-organization, however, such as in the cases of the SWL and the PWL, we have (or are supposed to have) an organization which is expected to speak for, and claims to represent, the whole women’s movement in a country. As such, a social movement meta-organization poses the question: if a whole movement is fully organized, is it still a movement or is it an organization? The aim has thus also been to make a contribution to the classic question of institutionalization, formalization and bureaucratization of social movements. In order to do so, the question was asked what it means to organize a field of social movement actors and what happens at the junction of organization and social movement, acting at the intersection of national and international interests?

With the theoretical framework of this thesis, applying an organizational perspective on social movements, it became clear that because organization is a special type of social order, which is both resisted and required within
social movements, adaptation to international structures in the form of meta-organizing inevitably creates friction. I defined organization as a decided order containing the five elements of Membership, Rules, Monitoring, Sanctions and Hierarchy. Social movement was defined as a social space for cognitive praxis in which collective action and new knowledge are created, held together by solidarity and collective identity, and whose interaction can best be described in terms of informal ties and which challenges and/or is in conflict with authorities, the political system, and/or dominant norms and social values. In order to contrast the organizational elements, I argued that there are equivalents in social movements. These are Participation, Autonomy, Social control, Solidarity and Emerging leadership. As such, the notion of a social movement is that it is emergent and has a dynamic character, in comparison to the definiteness and inflexible character of organization.

The understanding of social movement and organization were seen as ideal types contrasted to each other for the purpose of stressing the constant tension between organization dimensions and social movement dimensions inherent in the two cases. I argued that to organize a field of social movement actors means that several of the organizational elements are implemented at social movement level, and that this creates tensions because the applying of organization elements clashes with equivalents of the order that social movements form – liquid as they are. Organization challenges the idea of what a movement is and threatens the spontaneous, inclusive, voluntary and “liquid” characteristics of movements.

In addition, the elements of organization, which often form part of international interests, may collide with national interests, as we have seen in the case of the PWL: there was a stronger notion of freedom from the state and consequently a stronger notion of independence from top-down authority (which a meta-organization essentially is); and membership-based organizing was not a common practice. In the context of the Swedish case, organizational elements in the form of a meta-organization were more easily allowed for than in the Polish case.

The two cases of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements’ attempts at forming and maintaining nationwide women’s meta-organizations, for the purpose of having a voice in the European Women’s Lobby, thus showed that organizing social movements is complicated because with the meta-organization there was a change in the relations of the women’s organizations. As all the tensions described above show, when organizational elements were added there was a heightened tension between the or-
ganization dimensions and social movement dimensions. Conflicts, competition and trust issues came to the fore when the women’s organizations tried to cooperate in the form of a meta-organization. Not only did it reinforce the inter-organizational tensions and conflicts already present within the two women’s movements, but it also brought out the eternal questions of what is a social movement and who represents a social movement? Who does and can a social movement meta-organization really represent?

In the context of EU multilevel governance and the inclusion of civil society, Trenz (2009:35, emphasis added) argues that there is “a dichotomy between participation as the realm of civil society and representation as the realm of national governments and parliaments” which makes EU governance and the ambition to include civil society problematic. Can social movement meta-organizations be representative and is that part of the movement aim? Is it still a movement if representation rather than participation is expected? For the women’s movement, this consequently concerns the question of what is the voice of women? Is there only one voice and what happens when the plurality of women’s voices is played down for the sake of unity and access to policy makers?

With the meta-organization and its boundaries in terms of membership, rules and hierarchy, a social movement becomes distinguishable – it has a concrete form – and possible to talk to. As is typically the case with social movement organizations, the organizational entity or the introduction of organizational elements (partial organization) allows a group of social movement actors to collaborate and speak to the outside world such as politicians, journalists and the community it is part of. However, for the movement organizers, it also entails a balancing act between maintaining efficiency and access to political arenas without losing sight of that “liquid”, participatory and inclusive dimension which makes a movement.

When does a social movement organization (SMO) become too much organization and too little social movement? The answer may lie in who the SMO exists for. If we look at the SWL, it could be seen as existing for the Swedish women’s movement, or at least its member organizations. However, considering that the SWL was “a trans-national import” (Hobson et al 2007:461), it could also be argued that it mostly exists for the EWL, because it helps the EWL to fulfil the demands from the European Commission to be representative. Furthermore, considering the Swedish government’s initial interest and continued support, it could be argued that the SWL exists for the government by providing its gender equality policies legitimacy. And finally, following both interviewees and the meta-organizational
perspective, it could be argued that because it mainly relies on direct resources the SWL has become “its own women’s organization” that exists for itself, and which uses its relevance for the government and other external actors as a way to maintain itself more than its relevance for the movement. The newly founded SWL limited company and its gender mainstreaming conferences and courses for private and public employees and managers are examples indicating this.

The answer to the question of what it means to organize a movement at the intersection of national and international interests, is that doing so inevitably creates tensions. Many may benefit from the new organization, but the issues of deciding who is to represent the liquidity of the movement will most likely come to be seen as a matter of conflict. The mechanisms driving these tensions are fundamentally based on the setting of membership. Who can be part of the new organization and not?

With a partial organization perspective, in which organization is seen as decided order, it is possible to construct two contrasting notions of organization and social movement to show why organization is challenging and can create tensions in social movements. With the meta-organizational perspective, placed within this framework, it is further possible to study how the above-mentioned tensions are accentuated when national-level social movements try to adapt to international structures by forming one voice.

As such, one contribution of this study is that it relates to research on the Europeanization of civil society and social movements. Not only does it contribute with a detailed account of what Europeanization can entail for a field of social movement actors at domestic level. The two cases of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements’ attempts at forming and maintaining nationwide women’s meta-organizations also stress that Europeanization typically brings one specific form of organization which does not open up equal paths for social movement actors to connect to the international level. The cases draw attention to the fact that the possibilities for national-level social movements to participate at the EU level are limited: only a few actors are able to be represented in EU-level meta-organizations and take advantage of the international arena.

Another contribution of this study relates to the meta-organizational perspective. First, the study highlights the fact that there are two different ways of forming a meta-organization: as a separate and new organization, and as a project coordinated by an already existing organization. The latter I have chosen to name an attached meta-organization, or meta-organizing as attachment. An attached meta-organization is run within an organization,
as a project, while it organizes other organizations. Meta-organizing as attachment can thus be seen as a form of partial organization within an organization. This form can have other difficulties than those identified in standard meta-organizations, such as internal struggles over ownership, and consequently deserves more academic attention. Second, attachment highlights the importance of resources in meta-organizing. However, while Bor (2014:283) suggests that there are circumstances under which meta-organizations are more or less likely to use indirect or direct resources, I argue that for the cases of the SWL and the PWL it is rather the other way around: the type of resources available directs, enables or obstructs the type of activities and structure of the meta-organization. Third, due to the fact that the two cases concern the formation of social movement meta-organizations, this study contributes to a wider understanding of the term meta-organization and to why these particular types of meta-organizations are faced with additional challenges compared to other types, such as meta-organizations of firms. I argue that social movement meta-organizations are even more similar to their members than other types. Both member organization and meta-organization often exist in order to speak for their members, to perform advocacy work and to spread the message of the movement. Often the meta-organization and its members also compete for the very same and scarce resources. Competition in social movement meta-organizations can thus be more acute than in other types of meta-organization.

Policy Implications

Research on the Europeanization of civil society shows that it is “EU-level peak associations” – that is, Brussels-based meta-organizations – which are the most active and which are the most consulted by EU institutions (Sánchez-Salgado 2014:58f). For the EU, it is thus the meta-organizational form which is the preferred way to connect with its citizens. But can these organizations function as the voices of civil society and, ultimately, the citizens of the EU? (cf. Warleigh 2001; Johansson & Lee 2014; Kröger 2013). What implications for policy-making at EU level does this relationship have?

As Hobson, Carson and Lawrence (2007) show, international governance takes various forms in an interactive process involving different actors, including social movement actors, at different levels. This study shows one example of how social movements adapt to and are affected by international structures, and how social movements act at the intersection of international and national interest. A wider implication of the study is
that issues such as the ones discussed above, and shown in the two cases, are
to be expected whenever the internationalization of national movement
activities takes the form of meta-organization. The meta-organizational
structure can thus be understood as one answer to globalization.

As an international political arena, the EU is attractive to civil society
and social movement actors, while these actors are equally of interest to EU
legislative and executive authorities such as the Commission and the Parlia-
ment. The meta-organizational form of collective action has become one
answer to the question of how the two can interact. Taking the examples of
the Polish and Swedish women’s movements’ processes of organizing at the
intersection of national and international interests for the purpose of having
a voice in the European Women’s Lobby, this study contributes with an
understanding of what types of tensions the meta-organizational form pro-
duces. The two examples can thus be used as an indication that this form of
social movement organizing should be employed with caution, and with
attention to local social movement circumstances. As we have seen, it is
understandable that the EU wants one voice (of the women’s movement for
instance), but this appeal often corresponds inadequately to the dynamic
field of social movements, and to the abundant and multifaceted civil
society that the EU wants to connect to and be enriched by in terms of
democratic input.


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Appendix

1. The Swedish Women’s Lobby

Participating organizations at the meeting in February 1997 (number of representatives if more than one):

UNIFEM Sverige (3), Centerkvinnor, Folkaktionen mot pornografi, Fredrika Bremer Förbundet (2), Kvinna Skaraborg (2), Handikappförbundens samarbetsorgan, Haro, Huset AB, Humodersförbundet Hem och Samhälle, IKFF (2), IKF (2), IOGT-NTO, Jämställdhetsarbetares förening JA, Kristdemokraternas Kvinnoförbund (3), KSAN, Kvinna till Kvinna, Kvinnofronten, Kvinnor för fred, LO (2), Miljöpartiet Kvinnoutskottet (2), Moderata Kvinnoförbundet, QWEB Sweden, RIFFI, S-kvinnor (2), Samerna rikspartiet, Sáráhkká, SKEN (2), Svenska kvinnors vänsterförbund (2), Kvinnor Kan, Mälardalens kvinnolobby (2), Stiftelsen Radio Q, Svenska Baptisternas Kvinnoförbund, Svenska FN-förbundet, Sveriges ekumeniska kvinnoråd (2), SweQ (3), Tealogerna, Tösabanken (2), Vänsterpartiet, VSQL (2), Synskadades Riksförbund, Yrkeskvinnors riksförbund (2).

Source: SWL 1997a;b;c;d.

Members of the SWL, in November 1997:

Centerkvinnorna, Disas Vänner, Fredrika Bremer Förbundet, IKF, IKFF, IOGT-NTO kvinnor, KSAN, Kristdemokraternas kvinnoförbund, Kvinna Skaraborg, Kvinnor för fred, Kvinnor i svenska kyrkan, LO:s kvinnor, Miljöpartiets kvinnoutskott, Mälardalens kvinnolobby, RFSL, RIFFI, ROKS, SKEN, S-kvinnor, Svenska kvinnliga läkares förening, SweQ, Svenska UNIFEM kommitteen, Vänsterpartiets kvinnopolitiska utskott, VSQL, Yrkeskvinnors riksförbund, Folkaktionen mot pornografi, Forum Kvinnor och Handikapp, Föreningen Kvinnomuseer, Ja-föreningen, Sáráhkká, Svenska kvinnors vänsterförbund, Sveriges ekumeniska kvinnoråd, Synskadades Riksförbund, Tealogerna.

Source: SWL 1997a;b;c;d.
Members of the SWL, in 2019:
1,6 & 2,6 miljonerklubben; Bosnien och Hercegovinas kvinnoriksförbund i Sverige; Business and professional women (BPW) Sweden; Dea-föreningen för kvinnohistoriskt museum; Doris film; EQ kvinna; Female integrity/kvinnointegritet; Födelsehuset; Förenade kvinnor; Föreningen tillsammans; Forum – kvinnor och funktionshinder; Fredrika Bremer förbundet; Gröna kvinnor; Internationella kvinnoförbundet (IKF); KSAN/ kvinnorganisationernas samarbetsråd i alkohol- och narkotikafrågor; Kurdistans kvinnoförbund i Sverige (KKF-S); Kvinnlig anhopning av svenska tonsättare (KVAST); Kvinnlig prioritet; Kvinnliga akademikers förening; Kvinnofronten; Kvinnojouren Anna; Kvinnor i svenska kyrkan; Kvinnorman!; Kvinnors rätt; Niejda; Operation 1325; Örebro läns kvinnolobby; Östersjöfred; Riksförbundet internationella föreningen för invandrkvinnor (RIFFI); Riksorganisationen för kvinnojourer och tjejerjourer i Sverige (ROKS); Riksföreningen stödcentrum mot incest och andra sexuella övergrepp i barndomen (RISE); Svenska kvinnors européanätverk (SKEN); Svenska kvinnors vänsterförbund; Svenska riksföreningen av delta kappa gamma; Sverigesfinsk kvinneforum; Sveriges ekumeniska kvinnoråd; Sveriges kvinnliga läkares förening; Sverigeunionen av soroptimistklubbar; Sveriges Quinnoråd (SweQ); Tantpatrullen; Tjejer rätt i samhället (Tris); Unizon; Varken hora eller kuvad; WIFT; Winnet Sverige.
Source: SWL 2017b.

2. The Polish Women’s Lobby

List of organizations represented at meeting in 2004-07-15:
Centre for Women's Rights/CPK (Warsaw); the Center for the Advancement of Women, (Warsaw); Democratic Women’s Union/DUK; Association of Active Women, (Gołdap); Kujawsko-Pomeranian Center for the Advancement of Women (Toruń); Liga Kobiet Polskich/ the Polish Women’s League; OŚKa (Warsaw); Women’s Association of Active and Creative (Wrocław); Association of Women after Mastectomy “Amazons” (Włocławek); Association for the Advancement of Women (Lublin); the Association of Defense Against Violence VICTORIA (Poznań); Women’s Club Creative (Warsaw); “Women too” (Warsaw); Anti-Bullying Centre Association (Warsaw); the European Coalition of Women (Radom).
List of 41 organizations that had signed a protocol of the establishment of the National Coordination/the first version of the PWL:

Women’s Professional Promotion Agency at the International Association of Employees of Employment Offices in Poland (Gdańsk); Family Support Center (Olsztyn), Women’s Rights Center/CPK (Warsaw & Gdańsk offices); Democratic Women's Union/DUK (National Council & Gdańsk, Kwidzyn, Olsztyn, Poznan, Włocławek offices); Gołdapsk Association of Active Women (Gołdapsk); Foundation Center for the Advancement of Women (Warsaw); EFKa Women’s Foundation (Kraków); the National Women’s Information Centre OŚKa (Warsaw); Kujawsko-Pomorskie Association Women’s Promotion Center (Toruń); Legnica Women’s Association (Legnica); Polish Women’s League (Main Board & Warsaw, Elbląg, Katowice, Łódź offices); Inter-municipal Rural Women’s Forum; International Women’s Foundation (Łódź & Warsaw); Self-help Women’s Association “Rural Climate” (Kobylnica); Active Women’s Association (Sosnowiec & Radlin); “AZYL” Association for Helping Women and Children; Association Gorzowskie Towarzystwo “Amazons” (Gorzów Wielkopolski); Association of Women Club after Mastectomy “Amazons” (Main office and & Włocławek office); Association of Active and Creative Women (Wrocław); Women’s Association “Lat Latymy” (Jaworzno); the Women of Europe Association (Legnica); Association for Women’s Development (Lublin); VICTORIA Defense Against Violence Association (Poznań); “Let Live” Help for Single Mothers (Zielonka); Association “PROMYK” Against Family Violence (Krakow); “Krąg” Self-Help Association (Gdańsk); Association “Free from Violence” (Warsaw); NEWW Poland (Gdańsk).


Members of the PWL, in 2016:

EFKa, Society for Crisis Intervention, Federation for Women and Family Planning, Opole Polish Platform, and Gdańsk Women of the Left.

Source: E-mail correspondence with NEWW.
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17. Renata Ingbrant, From Her Point of View: Woman's Anti-World in the Poetry of Anna Świrszczyńska, 2007
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169. Eva Karlberg, *Organizing the Voice of Women: A study of the Polish and Swedish women’s movements’ adaptation to international structures*, 2019
The European Union has become an important arena for international politics. Many social movement actors desire a presence in Brussels, in order to push for their interests. To do so, however, they need to adapt to the European Union multi-level governance system by speaking with one voice. As this thesis demonstrates, at the national level this adaptation may entail a number of organizational challenges for movements.

The thesis studies national-level social movements adapting to international structures. Taking the cases of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements and their relation to the European Union as examples, the analysis follows two processes of forming and maintaining nationwide meta-organizations – that is, organizations of organizations – that can speak for the two respective movements. The study explores the challenges involved when a new layer of organization is added to a social movement.

The results show that organizing the voice of the Swedish and the Polish women’s movements has been particularly challenging when conditions such as a tradition of umbrella organizing and stable financial resources are absent at the national level. The results also show that competition and conflicts are apparent in both cases and inherent in meta-organizations, and that they have been possible to deal with differently depending on the two movements’ national settings. A wider implication of the study is that issues such as these are to be expected whenever the internationalization of national movement activities takes the form of meta-organization.

Eva Karlberg is a sociologist at Södertörn University. This study is her doctoral thesis, written within the research area of Politics, Economy and the Organization of Society (PESO) and the Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS).