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Prelude to Islamic extremism

*-a study of radicalization among Muslims in
Sweden and the effects of Islamophobia*



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Abstract

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On 27 April 2017 Sweden was struck by an Islamic terrorist attack which with various terrorist attacks in Europe, lead to increased Islamophobia and far-right populism in the country. This has seemingly led to Swedes becoming more prone to believe Islamophobic conspiracy theories. Such as the notion that Muslims are terrorists and Islam a violent religion from which terrorism springs to life. This twisted perception and further Islamophobia can lead to Muslims being perceived as a potential threat, due to being associated with terrorism. Since radicalization has been linked to social alienation and discrimination, the concern regarding increased Islamophobia in Sweden and what consequences it has on radicalization among Muslims in Sweden is warranted.

Islamophobia is a form of discrimination against Muslims, but research regarding radicalization has not fully integrated the concept of Islamophobia with Islamic terrorism and its radicalization. This despite the increase of global Islamophobia and the witnessed increase of Islamic terrorism in forms of [Western] foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), as well as home-grown cells and planned lone wolf attacks in recent years, which all indicate a potential increase in Islamic radicalization.

As Islamophobia, far-right populism and extremist sentiments are growing in Sweden, this thesis presents a desk study through a qualitative text analysis, to investigate how the current climate and development affects Muslims in Sweden, and whether they are excluded as a result to presumably enhance national security. This is done through an abductive approach with an analytical framework focused on radicalization processes and the perspectives of inclusion and exclusion. The potential correlation between Islamophobia and radicalization among Muslims, where Sweden is used as an example to exemplify the consequences of Islamophobia regarding Islamic radicalization and security through exclusion contra development through inclusion is presented in this desk study.

Key words:

Islamophobia, Muslims, radicalization, terrorism, violent extremism, Islam, inclusion, exclusion, security, Sweden

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Abbreviations

CNCDH – the French National Human Rights Commission

DPP – the Danish People’s Party

FTFs – Foreign terrorist fighters

IS – the Islamic State

UN – United Nations

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction and research problem

On 27 April 2017, Sweden suffered what's considered its first completed Islamic terrorist attack, and further arrests related to a planned Islamic terrorist attack in 2019 shocked the country. Swedish citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq in order to join IS and other Islamic terrorist organizations. But attacks on Swedish soil has so far been limited (Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p 63). The events in 2017 and onwards, together with various terrorist attacks in Europe, have created room for Islamophobic sentiments and far-right populism to grow also in Sweden. As can be seen in the Swedish Democrats' electoral success, and the increased gusto and influence from far-right extremists (Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 59-65; SVT 2018). Noticeably, Sweden is no longer spared from the wave of nationalistic far-right populism and political polarization seen all over Europe. The fear of Islamic terrorism has been continuously used by far-right populists to enforce their political agenda. But the terrorist attack in Paris 13 November 2015, accompanied by the migration crisis the same year, furthered the fear and legitimized the perception that Muslims are terrorist and posing as refugees to sneak into European countries to commit terrorism (Lean 2017).

Islamic terrorism has been at the center of media and academic attention since the 9/11 attack on World Trade Center in New York. As a result, research has given insight into Islamic radicalization, where strong linkages between social alienation and discrimination to radicalization have been established (Sageman 2004; Bhui et al 2012, p. 4-7; Sajoo 2016, p. 31). There are historical indications of how anti-Semitism lead to minor acts of Jewish violence prior to WW2, which in turn can mean that discrimination such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia can lead to radicalization within the afflicted group (Saunders 2012, p. 135-136). This indicates that Islamic radicalization

presumably is affected by Islamophobia. However available research regarding radicalization has so far not applied the concept of Islamophobia to investigate how radicalization among Muslims is affected by it, and whether a correlation exists. It is no secret that Muslims face an increasing level of discrimination in today's global society, with the terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand 2019 being a clear indication of its severity. Since the rise of Islamophobia in Sweden has seemingly followed the global trend, the question of how it affects Muslims in Sweden should be considered.

With IS on the defensive all through 2018 the recruitment/radicalization to the organization decreased and there were reports of a decrease in terrorist attacks during 2018. It is hard to determine whether Islamic radicalization has decreased as a result of the witnessed decrease of terrorist attacks, but the increase of home-grown cells and planned lone wolf attacks in 2017-2018 indicates the opposite (NCT 2019, p. 1-2; Europol 2018, p. 23-25). Furthermore, the analysis of how Islamic radicalization is developing has concluded that individuals without affiliation to terrorist organizations are radicalized into committing acts of terrorism. The individual desires the extremist ideology of Islamic terrorism rather than the group-identity of a terrorist organization, which instead functions merely as an inspiration (Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 59-60). Moreover, with foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who have travelled abroad as recruits for Islamic terrorist organizations, the interest and activism in Islamic terrorism in Western societies is a clear result and evidence of the Islamic radicalization (Europol 2018, p. 26).

The current situation in Sweden, with polarization, increased far-right populism, extremism and growing Islamophobia due to fear of Islamic terrorism and perceived Islamization, prompts investigation. The Swedish public seem increasingly prone to believe Islamophobic conspiracy theories. Like the notion that Muslims in general are terrorists and that terrorism is

created from Islam due to its violent nature. This twisted perception leads to the idea that Muslims are dangerous and should appropriately be considered a threat. The far-right is quick to use the public's fear to spread this notion, in order to push for strict migration laws and the exclusion of the perceived threat, Muslims. This further indicates the importance to establish whether Islamophobia in turn affects and increases radicalization among Muslims in Sweden.

1.1.1 Research problem

If Swedes consider Muslims a threat to their security, it enables far-right populists and extremists to pursue further Islamophobia in society. This in turn risks a development of severe, structural discrimination against Muslims in Sweden, since the public demands politicians and governmental institutions to act against what they perceive as a threat. There is cause for concern regarding the safety of Muslims in Sweden and future development in the country, with the increased support for and success of the far-right party the Swedish Democrats, and other major parties' shift towards far-right politics (Lind 2018). Also, with the existence of Islamic radicalization in Sweden implied by the 2017 terrorist attack, and the amount of Swedish foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), the current development in Sweden can arguably be considered alarming (Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 63; Kriminalvården 2017, p. 6-15).

Despite that social alienation and discrimination is linked to radicalization the concept of Islamophobia has not been fully incorporated in research regarding Islamic terrorism and radicalization. Thus, potential linkages and/or effect on Islamic radicalization by Islamophobia has not been addressed. This thesis aims to investigate this. The increase of Islamophobia in Sweden will be used to investigate whether Islamophobia affects Muslims in Sweden to push them into radicalization, due to a sense of social alienation and discrimination.

Furthermore, since Muslims in Sweden are increasingly being perceived as potential terrorists, and thus a threat, this thesis will also aim to investigate whether the state of Sweden is currently using Islamophobia to exclude Muslims in Sweden to ensure enhanced security against Islamic terrorism.

1.2 Relevance and justification

This study is relevant considering the current threat of Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. It is also relevant with the global political climate, where far-right populism and the increased Islamophobia and far-right extremist sentiments systematically gains support. Meaning researching how the current societal and political climate and its Islamophobia affect radicalization among Muslims is warranted. Research at hand have already established that Islamophobia is a form of discrimination and that radicalization is linked to both social alienation and discrimination (Bleich 2011; Bhui et al 2012, p. 4-7; Sajoo 2016, p. 31). But it has not investigated the phenomenon of radicalization together with the concept of Islamophobia. Therefore, the lack of research regarding a potential correlation between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization needs to be remedied. This thesis aims to fill the research gap by investigating the situation in Sweden as an example. Sweden was chosen due to its current political climate with the electoral success of the Swedish Democrats and considering that Sweden welcomed a large influx of immigrants during the refugee crisis in 2015, many of which were Muslim.

Radicalized individuals are part of society before and after they are radicalized, and radicalization processes are affected by societal and political situations and changes (Khosrokhavar 2013, p. 286; Doosje et al 2016, p. 79-80). Theoretically social alienation and discrimination can be remedied through socio-economic/socio-political programs and by furthering

development through e.g. inclusion. Strong indications of that these development programs and societal interventions can help combat and prevent radicalization has been found through research (Bhui et al 2012). Since radicalization leads to violent extremism and terrorism it is perceived as a threat to national security and continued peace. This makes this study relevant to peace and development studies, as it aims to investigate how Islamophobia affects radicalization among Muslims and Sweden's national security, and the ties between radicalization and conflicts, as well as to society's responsibility in enabling development opportunities for individuals to prevent potential radicalization.

This thesis aims to investigate the correlation between Islamophobia and radicalization among Muslim to inquire whether Islamophobia affects Muslims to become radicalized. It also aims to investigate if Muslims are perceived as a threat and excluded to enhance security as a result. As such this thesis is relevant for future research about Islamic radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Future research regarding radicalization prevention and counterterrorism can find this study relevant as it investigates a potential cause for radicalization. Sweden is used as an example in this study which can be used for future research about Sweden's situation with Islamic violent extremism, terrorism and radicalization. This research can also lead way to future research regarding correlation between Islamophobia and radicalization among Muslims, which can be useful in radicalization prevention.

1.3 Research objective

The objective of this study is to investigate whether Islamophobia leads to Islamic radicalization, and whether perceived Islamophobia increases Islamic radicalization among Muslims in Sweden. Furthermore, this thesis aims to answer if the state of Sweden perceives Muslims as a threat to such a degree

that they will intentionally or unintentionally exclude Muslims in Sweden from all aspects of society, to enhance national security.

1.4 Research questions

This thesis aims to answer the following questions:

- Is there a link between increased Islamophobia and increased Islamic radicalization?
- Are Muslims in Sweden more prone to being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and terrorism due to perceived Islamophobia?
- Are Muslims in Sweden excluded in the society to enhance Sweden's security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism, with the use of Islamophobia? If so, does it enhance Sweden's security or jeopardize it against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism?

2. Theoretical approach

In this chapter, the theoretical framework used to analyze this thesis research problem will be presented. The concept of radicalized individuals and how they differ will be explained. Also, the process of radicalization, and what might lead a person into it, will be explained. Lastly, the perspectives of inclusion and exclusion as well as biopolitics and the Security-Development Nexus will also be explored.

2.1 Radicalization, extremists and terrorists

Radicalization is a complex issue and thus the individuals and groups who are considered radicalized are the same. Individuals find their way to an extreme worldview, where they gradually adopt a radical ideology and ultimately reach a point of violent extremism or terrorism (Kriminalvården 2017, p. 7-8). Radicalization is, thus, a process where people increasingly move towards the concept of using violence against e.g. civilians and governments, in order to ensure their goal of political and behavioural change of society. This is often influenced by politics, history, and social and cultural factors (Doosje et al 2016, p. 79-80; Bhui et al 2012, p. 1; Khosrokhavar 2013, p. 286). Moreover, radicalized individuals' and groups' politically charged ideologies create a perceived reality, where the injustice and discrimination they and their peers experience is a construction by authorities and its institutions (Bhui et al 2012, p. 3-4). The individuals are thus affected by the ideology which creates a new and twisted version of reality, granting them a radical worldview that deviates from the norm. Not every radicalized individual reaches the point of violent extremism or terrorism. But the sentiments of grievances, alienation, and political and societal injustice are initially the same (Sajoo 2016, p. 31; Doosje et al 2016, p.79).

Since social alienation and discrimination is a common factor for why many individuals are radicalized, it is important to locate their respective causes, which has proven hard due to the individualistic nature of radicalization. Explanations like poor socio-economic and socio-political backgrounds are not adequate, since various people of all social ladders and education, as well as nationality, ethnicity, and religious and political affiliation can be, and have been, radicalized (Bhui et al 2012, p. 6-7; Sageman 2004, p. 118-129). It is, thus, not necessarily a matter of e.g. unemployment or poor education that is an immediate factor/indicator for radicalization. This is further implied by how most individuals from poor socio-economic and socio-political backgrounds are not radicalized. Thus, radicalization cannot be fully understood or remedied through relative deprivation and other perspectives of fluctuating frustration. In other words, the background of a radicalized individual does not matter, since perceived discrimination, injustice and social alienation is found among extremists/terrorists regardless of their radical ideology. A matter of concern for potential radicalization is poor psychological health and access to health institutions, which has been shown to develop under discrimination such as racism, with signs of Muslims peaking these numbers (Bhui et al 2012, p. 2-5).

Radicalization and terrorism research has been centered around Islamic terrorism since 9/11. Discrimination, social alienation, and a sense of exclusion and injustice among Muslims, have been prominent in this research. Many Muslims who are radicalized come from a more secular and/or moderate religious home environment, with good living standards and a higher education (Bhui et al 2012, p. 6; Sageman 2004, p. 107-129). Some, however, mainly from the Maghreb, come from poorer circumstances with less education and often a background of petty crime (Sageman 2004, p.73-77; Schmid 2013, p. 23; Sajoo 2016, p. 32). Regardless, discrimination and social alienation, and other social concerns seemingly prompt radicalization. This

together with an extreme ideology founded in politics and history, a sense of global injustice towards Islam and Muslims, and past experiences of exclusion can result in justification of violence (Khosrokhavar 2013, p. 305; Sageman 2004, p. 115-116). The perceived injustice and discrimination for many Muslim terrorists, tend to be associated with their religion, customs and traditions, as well as political and religious polarization, that can be manifested in lack of job opportunities or experiences of micro-aggressions, which is smaller, often systematic and structural forms of discrimination, usually unnoticed by people outside of the afflicted group (Kriminalvården 2017, p.29). In connection Sageman (2004) argued in his research that Muslims holding sentiments of patriotism or identified with their nation, were less likely to commit terrorism or violent extremism due to a sense of belonging and love for their country, but noted that the risk increased the more discrimination and social alienation they experienced (Sageman 2004, p. 157-167).

Violent extremists and terrorist have a lot in common, both with how they are radicalized and how their ideologies function. Despite their similarities there is an important difference in the intended consequence of their violence. While both violent extremists and terrorist aim to alter the political and behavioural nature of society, contrary to violent extremists, terrorist also aim to instill fear within society and its population, marginalized groups and their appointed out-group (Kriminalvården 2017, p. 7-8; Doosje et al 2016, p. 79).

Criminals are often considered likely to be radicalized in prison and therefore might be perceived as similar to terrorists. However, research shows that prisons are not the most common or likely forum for radicalization (it occurs but is quantitatively declining), and that with appropriate rehabilitation and countermeasures it can be avoided (Skillicorn et al 2015, p. 240; Khosrokhavar 2013, p. 284; Kriminalvården 2017, p. 28-34).

2.2 Radicalization processes

A lot of research has been conducted on radicalization, creating various concepts of radicalization processes. Concluded is that radicalization is when an individual gradually embraces a violent and extremist ideology based on politics and/or religion, where the current societal, political, economic and cultural status quo is questioned (Khosrokhavar 2013, p. 286; Skillicorn et al 2015, p. 239; Bhui et al 2012, p. 1). The radicalization process is highly individual with a timespan from a few weeks up to several months and sometimes even years (Schmid 2013, p. 23; Doosje 2016, p. 80).

Doosje et al (2016) explains the radicalization process in three phases where the radicalized individual first experiences a sensitivity towards an extremist ideology, where they long for a sense of belonging and security. They then enter phase two by joining a radical group where they experience a perceived injustice and view certain out-groups to be responsible for said injustice. Thirdly, they enter the so-called action phase where the individual is ready to perform violent actions for the group, e.g. a terrorist attack, as they have now reached a point where the out-group is 'demonized' and considered 'evil' (pp. 79-81; Schmid 2013, p. 23-24).

Radicalization processes are complex and can be described in different stages. But they also involve a multitude of layers where individualism, group processes, belief systems, and social and economic factors play a key role (Decker et al 2011, p. 153; Sageman 2004, p. 107-173). Doosje et al (2016) exemplifies the multilayered radicalization process in micro (individual), meso (group) and macro (societal) levels, all including factors which are dependent on whether an individual will become further radicalized (Doosje et al 2016, p. 81). In Figure 1 these factors and how they influence the different phases of radicalization, are illustrated.

	<i>Micro</i>	<i>Meso</i>	<i>Macro</i>
<i>Sensitivity</i>	Lack of status prompting feelings of insignificance, strong humiliation and poor career prospects spurs quest for significance. Remedied by radical group's structures/norms.	Impressionable due to significantly relying on relationships with family, friends and other groups. Perceived injustice towards themselves and peers. Belief that none other suffer equally.	Influenced by societal factors, e.g. globalization, dominance of foreign economics, culture and politics. The dominance/presence of the West (driving factor for radical Muslims)
<i>Joining a group</i>	Fusing with in-group and conforms to their norms/structures, causing strong loyalty	Encouraged to sever ties with old social environment, social isolation to in-group. Increasingly tied to radical group through e.g. initial rights, training and coaching.	Political, territorial and/or military advances of radical group/ideology proves its legitimacy and strength.
<i>Action</i>	Personal loss, e.g. death of family member, relative or friend.	Out-group dehumanized by e.g. compared to vermin and perceived as a threat. Withdrawal chances decreased through testaments.	Appeals from authorities/other actors to use violence against in-group

Figure 1, phases of radicalization and dependent factors (Doosje et al 2016, p. 81-82).

Contrary to popular belief, terrorists do not have to be mentally ill to be radicalized and commit a terrorist attack (Schmid 2013, p. 21; Sageman 2004, p. 129). In other words, an entirely normal and healthy individual, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, culture, and religious/political affiliation can be radicalized. This knowledge and the factors found above in figure 1, showcase how multilayered and individual radicalization processes are, and that the factors on micro, meso and macro levels are significant. Within these layers a two-way resilience against radicalization or its counterpart de-radicalization (the abandoning of a radical ideology) exists. It can be referred to as a resilience shield which gradually weakens radicalization/de-radicalization until it breaks and rebuilds against its counterpart. For example, the resilience shield against de-radicalization can be penetrated, thus enabling rehabilitation (Altier et al 2014, p. 647; Doosje et al 2016, p. 81).

Thus, radicalization processes are not easily explained and vary greatly between individuals. But the concept of social alienation and discrimination is seemingly present in most cases of radicalization. With globalization and how technology and modern communication systems give opportunity for terrorists/extremists to share their radical ideologies, whereby a significant forum for radicalization is created (Decker et al 2011, p. 152, 160). Furthermore, while a background of poor socio-economic and/or socio-political circumstances does not necessarily lead to radicalization, this background can cause deeper feelings of exclusion and humiliation. Thus, further risk radicalization through a quest for significance and group-identity (Doosje et al 2016, p 81; Sajoo 2016, p. 30-32; Schmid 2013, p 27).

2.3 Exclusion and inclusion

The phrase social exclusion was coined by Renee Lenoir, in France during the 1970s and has since been a great influence on European politics. According to

Lenoir there were individuals in France that could be described as an 'exclu' i.e. an outcast. They varied from physically and mentally disabled, to those suffering from mental illnesses or various addictions (Davies 2005; Rawal 2008, p. 177-178). Lenoir's definition of social exclusion focuses a lot on sociopolitical aspects. Such as non-participation in politics, poor health and geographic isolation, which he identified as forms of exclusion (Davies 2005, p. 4). The concept was furthered by using the multifarious concept of social deprivation regarding particularly institutional and cultural aspects. With the point being made how social deprivation is multilayered in which poverty is only one cause (Rawal 2008, p. 165). Foucault had previously argued that exclusion functioned systematically in a social construct by society to enable social control, in which individuals were separated between subjects and non-subjects. Non-subjects were considered abnormal and therefore treated inhumanely and excluded from society via prisons and mental asylums, often due to being perceived as a threat (Peters and Besley 2014, p. 100-103). This means that social exclusion is not solely a poverty or economic problem but rather a multilayered issue where both socio-economic and socio-political aspects matter. Thus, society has a responsibility to understand individuals who are deviant from the norm when contemplating excluding them to enhance security versus including them for further development.

It has further been argued that social exclusion is mainly an economic problem brought on by e.g. laziness and that the excluded thus have a personal responsibility to gain inclusion. In other words, the existence of excluded individuals is not a construct by society, therefore not its responsibility. Others, however, argue that social exclusion is caused by poor access to cultural life and discrimination from society and its linkages to when individuals are denied their human rights, exemplified by e.g. segregation (Peters and Besley 2014, p. 105-106; Davies 2005, p. 4; Rawal 2008, p. 168).

As such, social inclusion has become a natural continuation and intentional countermeasure to social exclusion. Social inclusion has thus been defined with the concept of ‘common membership’ which would enable individuals to take part in every aspect of society. Such as political participation, education and the labour market, i.e. a method to gain development by including marginalized and excluded individuals through various development programs (Davies 2005, p. 14-23; Peters and Besley 2014, p. 105-106). Thus, the concept of development through inclusion views every individual with resources useful to society, therefore efforts to enable their societal participation is important. Hence socio-political/socio-economic projects are aimed to attack common forms of exclusion, by building human and social capitals, developing local infrastructure to enhance economy, improving public health and education services, and ensuring a healthy civil society in all regions/neighbourhoods. Ergo enabling security and presumably a sense of belonging for marginalized and/or excluded individuals (ibid.)

2.4 The Security-Development Nexus and Biopolitics

The crucial balance between security and developed is usually referred to as the Security-Development Nexus. According to Buur (2007) it has a long lineage and can be generalized in how militarized forms of power is used to create and preserve sovereignty, linked to softer forms of power which utilizes human resources and progress for change. Softer forms of power refer to non-traditional security with a strong focus on development, human capital and individuals’ rights, including perceived threats. Whereas militarized forms of power refer to traditional security such as national security, i.e. external threats such as other nations threatening national security (pp.10-15).

With the modern world’s security threats from terrorism, “failed states” and criminals, the threats are often more internal, rather than traditional external

threats. Therefore, when states use force to enhance security it becomes problematic, as it might be their own citizens that pose a security risk. The concept of biopolitics is associated with the modern state and as a result the development and protection of its sovereignty, as well as the populations welfare and right to exist. It does however recognize when individuals become potential threats and thus warrants exclusion. As such in the name of 'liberal freedom' and sovereign security, individuals deemed as risks are excluded from society to theoretically ensure security. Thus, Buur (2007) argues, sovereignty can be used to hopefully ameliorate the population, to ensure they hold ideologies and qualities of good citizens, making them worthy of the nation and state (Buur et al 2007, p. 14-16).

Understandably security is clearly connected to identifying perceived threats and how to combat them while keeping a balance to development. Usually it is a state-led identification of threats to maintain individuals and states security. Issues are 'securitised' in order to put them outside of the established democratic sphere to create a different kind of politics, and thus be able to combat these perceived threats e.g. criminals and terrorists. All the while keeping a balance between security and development, as to not jeopardize either crucial societal function (Buur et al 2007, p. 12). Since many of societal issues are connected to development and civilians it becomes clear through a perspective of biopolitics and sovereignty, that security and development coincide and are interdependent, creating a need for proper balance. If there is too much security a state risks a decline in development through lack of individual's rights and freedom, which might restrict change and can also cause civil unrest out of frustrations. But if it on the other hand is too little security there is a risk of increased crime and fear within the civilian population from both external and internal threats. The lack of security can thus lead to a restrictive development and public agitation, which in turn can enable civil unrest and/or conflicts (Duffield 2007, p. 2-85). In other words,

the importance to keep the Security Development Nexus in mind when identifying and combat perceived threats is important for a continued prosperous state.

2.5 Utilization as theoretical framework

This chapter has explained the theoretical perspectives which will be used as this thesis analytical framework. The concept of exclusion and inclusion, as well as biopolitics and the Security-Development Nexus, will be used to analyze whether the state of Sweden utilizes exclusion as a security measure to alienate Muslims in Sweden. These perspectives will also be used to analyze whether the best course of action is to exclude them for enhanced security, or rather include them in hopes of further development. The analysis will focus on whether the exclusion of Muslims in Sweden indeed enhance security from radical Muslims and Islamic terrorism. Or if it instead increases Islamic radicalization and terrorism, thus resulting in decreased security. In this case the perspective of inclusion will be used to analyze whether its approach creates enhanced security compared to the approach of exclusion. The concept of biopolitics and the Security-Development Nexus is connected to inclusion and exclusion and is used to further highlight the narrative of state actions and how these actions are impacted by its collective society. As the thesis aims to answer if Sweden as a state is currently excluding Muslims in Sweden as a security measure.

Segments explaining radicalization processes and radicalized individuals are necessary perspectives to analyze and understand the potential linkages between [increased] Islamophobia and [increased] Islamic radicalization. They are also necessary to analyze the potential connection to exclusion contra inclusion, thus answering the remaining research questions of this thesis.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research method

This thesis's research topic relates to radicalization, terrorism and discrimination. Therefore, the chosen method is that of a desk study through a qualitative text analysis of empirical data related to Islamophobia and Islamic extremism, terrorism and radicalization, in order to investigate the individualistic and unobservable layers found in these mentioned phenomena. A qualitative text analysis aims to investigate and uncover undiscovered motifs on the chosen subject through scrutinizing, analyzing and interpreting existing documents and literature. Since individuals interpret texts differently the same text can give various conclusions. As such a qualitative text analysis grants the opportunity to reveal a hidden social reality, by interpreting historical and social contexts through reconceptualizing the collected material. Thus, readers and other researchers can interpret the study differently and potentially continue the research and give yet another perspective (Bryman 2011, p. 500-508).

In accordance with a qualitative text analysis and to ensure a structured collection of relevant material, a mind-map was created in the image of the research problem and questions, see appendix 1 (Creswell 2014, p. 36-39; Bryman 2011, p. 345-346). The subjects of radicalization, terrorism, Islamophobia and the affected group (Muslims) were presented to the mind-map. Next reliable search engines were used via Linnaeus University to locate scientific articles about said subjects. The topic Islamophobia was quickly altered to a combination of the words Muslims, Islam, discrimination and negative attitudes (Muslims + Islam + discrimination + negative attitudes) in the search engines. This was done due to the lack of hits on Islamophobia. Very few articles use the keyword Islamophobia. Instead the keyword Muslims was found to be more common and therefore the search for relevant scientific articles regarding Islamophobia was changed. All found articles

were scrutinized to determine their relevance and validity for the intended study. After this initial stage empirical literature in the forms of books was located either through found articles or through searching the subjects from the mind-map. Nathan Lean's book "The Islamophobia industry" was chosen due to its empirical material and valuable societal and political context. Doug Saunders's book "The myth of the Muslim tide" was also chosen for its empirical material and for its historical and societal information. These two books became the focal point of the findings and complemented with various scientific articles and reports from institutions/organizations.

Radicalization and terrorism research was obtained through scientific articles and Marc Sageman's book "Understanding terror networks", which was chosen due to its good reputation and witnessed utilization in terror-related research. Once appropriate and relevant literature was found it was obtained and scrutinized to gain an understanding of the already existing knowledge, perceptions and interpretations of the subject. The topics of Islamophobia and radicalization was prioritized due to them being the core element of this study and was chosen as semi-predetermined categories which was looked for in the sources (Bryman 2011, p. 505). In the case of Islamophobia, historical background and information as well as studies and research were scrutinized. Whereas the informative articles and books about radicalization processes and research was obtained in order to gain an understanding of the phenomenon. The gained understanding and knowledge was then added to findings. Reports from governmental and international institutions/organizations was obtained and scrutinized to gain further empirical data on Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization. These reports were located and obtained from the respective institutions/organizations' webpages. News articles, documentaries and other forms of news material deemed relevant to the subject, was obtained, scrutinized and added to the study in order to observe and interpret the current societal and political occurrences and climate.

Following Danermark's (2003) explanation of abduction, an analytical framework based on radicalization perspectives and the perspectives of inclusion and exclusion was established to analyze a potential correlation between Islamophobia and radicalization among Muslims. The Security-Development Nexus and Buur's (2007) theory of biopolitics and inclusion and exclusion was added to the analytical framework to tie the thesis to peace and development studies. These added perspectives and theories were also added to analyze the research question regarding the potential exclusion of Muslims in Sweden to enhance national security. Lastly the analytical framework was applied to the findings of the thesis in order to gain a new understanding and explanation of the socially constructed phenomenon this study investigates (Bryman 2011, p. 32).

By applying the created analytical framework to the findings from literature this thesis performs an abductive research where a form of reconceptualization of already existing perceptions is performed to gain a new perspective (Danermark et al 2003, p. 181). In other words, the already existing perceptions of reality cannot be disproven, thus interpretations are a focal point in abductive research, where depending on applied perspectives/theories and the researcher's interpretation of relevant material, grants new insights into the subject of research. However, they can never claim to have proven that the conclusion is an absolute truth, as it is not factually proven and instead only give a new perception through interpretations used within a frame of interpretation (pp. 183-184). As a result, an abductive research method like a qualitative text analysis, aims to grant new ideas, structures and strategies to view the research subject/phenomenon for further research and understanding (pp. 89-95).

3.2 Research design

The aim of a qualitative text analysis is to utilize the researcher's creativity and associative ability in order to gain a new perspective, insight and perception of the chosen topic, to develop new ideas for future research and understanding. Through the in depth investigation of relevant material with current and historical factors, the text analysis can give light to previously overlooked perceptions and interpretations.

3.3 Limitations

The limitations of this thesis are time constraints and lack of opportunity to perform a study with in depth interviews and/or surveys to gather information on Muslims' experiences with Islamophobia and interest in Islamic violent extremism/terrorism. Such a study was originally of interest since it would give valued information to the analysis. But the academic level for this thesis would make such a study hard to finalize with a certain level of quality, due to time and opportunity limits. The time constraint and capability of obtaining a sufficient and relevant group for interviews/surveys was another reason for why a qualitative text analysis was chosen instead.

3.4 Delimitations

Despite the limitations of this thesis, the delimitations are that the text analysis enabled for a more in depth and thorough investigation into Islamophobia. The concept and its consequences on Muslims were investigated through empirical and historical literature. Time spent on reading relevant literature, research and studies also gave an insight into radicalization processes which enabled for a more conclusive thesis. Through this the final result was more productive and

at a higher quality. Further delimitation is that the author is Swedish and thus could utilize local and national media of the chosen country/state for this study.

4. Findings

This chapter will present findings from literature used to investigate the research problem. In order to fulfil the aim of this thesis the concept and phenomena of Islamophobia will be explained. Linkages between Islamophobia and other forms of discrimination will also be explained, as well as how far-right movements utilizes Islamophobia and the unrest in the Middle East to further their political agenda. Historical information and potential linkages to radicalization and extremism/terrorism will also be explained.

4.1 What is Islamophobia?

The concept of Islamophobia first emerged in 1997 and has since been vigorously used by media and further established by political activists, NGOs and international organizations. It has been used to explain and highlight the social phenomena of prejudice, discrimination and negative sentiments towards Muslims and Islam. However, the term lacks a specified definition and depending on who is asked, what Islamophobia is and how it manifests itself can vary greatly. Some will even argue it does not exist at all. Thus, Islamophobia is still a contested concept where even some academics consider its use in research/academics ill-advised, due to its broadness and controversial nature (Bleich 2011, p. 1581-1584; Kunst et al 2013, p. 226). The broadness of Islamophobia could be compared to the broadness and complexity of racism and anti-Semitism. Therefore, arguably academia should use the concept of Islamophobia to further research and explain discrimination/hatred towards Muslims and Islam.

Despite that Islamophobia has been defined as an irrational fear of Muslims and Islam, due to the usually strong connections to the afflicted group's faith, the similarity to racism and anti-Semitism highlight how Islamophobia is a social phenomenon that is affected by social, political and cultural contexts.

As such a systematic increase of prejudice is garnished until it reaches a level of hate, where the marginalized group is considered a threat, resulting in hostility and exclusion such as segregation (Kunst et al 2013, p. 226-235; Hutchison et al 2015, p. 330-341; Bleich 2011, p. 1584-1586). It is also not a form of discrimination solely based on religion but stretches over to cultural and traditional norms and ethnicity, e.g. how non-Muslim Arabs experience discrimination as they are assumed Muslim (ibid.). Therefore, it can be argued that Islamophobia should not be treated as a mere phobia and psychological term, but instead be treated more equally to racism and anti-Semitism.

While the term Islamophobia is rather new, the sentiments and prejudices depicting Muslims and Islam in a negative light are not. They stem centuries back to when European and Arabian kingdoms battled over dominance in the Middle East, Maghreb and southern Europe. In other words, the still common notion of a clash of civilizations between the West/Christianity versus the East/Islam (Said 1978). As Edward Said explains in his book *Orientalism* (1978) Muslims and Islam were targeted by an abundance of well-respected European/Western scholars from the considered legitimate academic field of Orientalism, the study of Asian cultures. They wrote about the despicable, uncivilized and violent Arab who could not be trusted to behave in line with civilized Westerners, nor with their own safety, well-being and civilizations, and of the inherent danger they posed to the West and its Christian values (Said 1978, p. 95-455). Thus, Orientalism functioned as a forum to spread ignorant assumptions and conclusions about Arabs, Muslims and Islam often referring to racial biology. Which enabled the validity of the white man's burden towards Muslims/Arabs and helped justify European colonization of Muslim countries. All in favour, according to Said, for Western political and economic interests in the region (pp. 68-435). Orientalism upheld a respected and valued reputation into the mid-20th century and its legacy impacted further research, academics and politics, which resulted in many of these preconceptions about

Muslims/Arabs and Islam to become integrated in Western societies (pp. 321-481). The similarities between what we today refer to as Islamophobia and the concepts brought forth by Orientalism are uncanny, proving the long history of Islamophobia even though the term is considered new.

Bleich (2011) establish that due to that Islamophobia can take various forms and manifest in different ways, while being perceived differently between groups and individuals and its documented long history, it should be defined as “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims” (pp. 1585). In other words, he argues that Islamophobia is a broad and complex concept that we are only just starting to establish and determining proper research-methods for (pp. 1593). Thus, the importance to not view it as only being associated with irrational fear and disgust, where the societal, political and historical context of the phenomenon is not fully considered, is seemingly important.

4.2 Consequences of Islamophobia

The knowledge of how Islamophobia affect Muslims and our societies is limited. With Islamophobia being a new concept and the fact that Islamophobia is perceived differently between Muslims, depending on their geographic location and culture, makes measuring Islamophobia difficult. Ergo gaining a proper understanding of its consequences. Naturally one side-effect of Islamophobia is violence directed at Muslims. As could be seen in the terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand 2019, where the alleged terrorist was a self-declared white supremacist holding strong Islamophobic sentiments, which explicitly showed that a consequence of Islamophobia can be excessive violence/terrorism (Versi 2019).

Besides the obvious consequences of violence, another consequence of Islamophobia is deteriorating psychological health. Previous research has

found several indicators of poor mental health due to discrimination and/or racism (Kunst et al 2013, p. 226). Kunst et al (2013) set out to determine whether Islamophobia causes negative psychological health. As predicted Muslims who had experienced a high level of perceived Islamophobia showed elevated signs of stress and other negative mental health ailments. In the study the media was found to play a key role in spreading and creating perceived Islamophobia. They concluded that anti-discrimination laws do not entirely protect Muslims against discrimination, as they have no affect against social norms, which often clashes with Muslim customs and traditions, enabling Islamophobia to manifest (Kunst et al 2013, p. 234-235). In other words, Islamophobia causes a decrease in overall well-being and potentially a sense of alienation.

Another potential consequence of Islamophobia could be a negative effect on Muslims national identity, i.e. how well they identify with the nation and society they live in. In another study by Kunst et al (2016) they established that when Muslims experienced high levels of Islamophobic discrimination, they identified less with their national identity, and more towards their ethnic (Muslim) and religious (Islam) identities. They also established that added pressure to assimilate, incited distance to non-Muslim communities, thus risking exclusion and potential social alienation (pp. 254-256). Furthermore, another study found that xenophobia and hostility towards Muslim immigrants was more common than to their Christian counterparts (Creighton and Jamal 2015, p. 92-101). These studies imply that Islamophobia causes xenophobia, decreased national identification and potential social alienation through segregation.

In conclusion the consequences of Islamophobia can be established to cause violence, hostility and threats towards Muslims as proven by various violent attacks against Muslims and vandalization of mosques (EUMC 2006a). It is also established that it can cause negative national identification, poor mental

health and increased hostility and opposition towards Muslims and immigrants.

4.3 Islamophobia and anti-Semitism

Since the end of WW2, it has gradually become more accepted and known what anti-Semitism is and the despicable consequences it can bring. It has also resulted in how Jews increasingly have been accepted as part of the West where their religion, culture and customs, unlike Muslims, are considered compatible with Western/Christian values (Bunzl 2007, p. 26-34; Saunders 2012, p. 127). Today the way Muslims and Arabs are being treated are very similar to how anti-Semitism manifested in society during the end of the 19th century and in to the 20th century.

The knowledge of how terrorism is believed connected to Islam and thus terrorists are believed Muslim, is a widespread global belief and current in the Western hemisphere. What is probably less known is the previous common belief that terrorism and Judaism and Catholicism had a strong affiliation. In other words, that Jews and Catholics were believed prone to extremism and terrorism, a notion that was furthered through the acts of terrorism and violence done by Jews and Catholics in the 19th-20th century (Saunders 2012, p. 115-135; Lean 2017, p. 31-33). However, ever since 9/11 there has been a strong focus on Islamic terrorism and Islamic radicalization. This focus, while not unfounded due to the present threat of Islamic terrorism, has created the perceived worldview that terrorism is founded in radical Islam thus mainly perpetrated by Muslims. This however is counteracted by practice when looking at violence and killings in the West. Where Islamic terrorism in America of 2016 stood for only 0,1 percent of American murders, and terrorist attacks in Europe of 2010 were mainly perpetrated by separatists (Lean 2017, p. 13; Saunders 2012, p. 106-107). In other words, the focus on Islamic

terrorism and more importantly the fear of it, is seemingly overshadowing reality, ostensibly a repetition of history with Jewish and Catholic terrorism/extremism.

Noticeably, the way Muslims are being viewed in Europe and America today is strongly connected to the fear of terrorism, but also to xenophobia. Due to the inflow of Muslim refugees/migrants which culminated in 2015, the notion that Muslims are immigrants is strong. Like Muslim immigrants today, Jews who immigrated to Western Europe/America from Central Europe, due to exclusion and persecution caused by anti-Semitism, were treated with suspicion and contempt and with anti-Semitic prejudices (Saunders 2012, p. 127-128). Again, a repetition of history is taking place with how anti-Semitism created notions of how Jews were uncivilized and violent, prone to crimes and packed in segregated neighbourhoods. Their orthodox lifestyle separated them from the secular crowd, which furthered prejudices and fear (pp. 128-133). Due to these circumstances Jews became scapegoats for elevated crime rates and violence, blamed on their religion and culture. A historical mirror to modern views of Muslims, where the fear of Judaism has been replaced with Islam (pp. 2-133; Bunzl 2007, p. 16-42; Lean 2017, p. 10-250). In other words, the phenomenon of Islamophobia and the prejudices against Muslims is a repetition of history with the alteration of which group is considered as outsiders and a perceived threat.

4.4 Conspiracy theories

The idea that Muslims are swarming into the West to take over the Western world posing as refugees/immigrants, is often referred to as the Eurabia conspiracy theory. It can arguably be considered a strong component in Islamophobia. The belief is that the increasing number of Muslim immigrants with large families, will within a few decades demographically be the most

prominent in Europe's and America's populations. After which they will refuse to adopt to Western secular laws and customs and impose Islam on the West, often through segregated Muslim neighbourhoods (Saunders 2012, p. 4-28; Lean 2017, p. 7-96). Furthermore, it is believed Islamic terrorists pose as refugees to infiltrate Western countries, although there is no indication of such a systematic system (ibid.; Europol 2018, p. 28). The alleged end game of this grand Muslim conspiracy is to change Europe and the West to resemble their native countries and culture. This will be achieved by outnumbering the non-Muslim Europeans/Americans in every institution and aspect of society, until they rule politics and eradicate European and Christian-Judeo values, customs and traditions in favour of Islam and Sharia law (Saunders 2012, p. 16-28; Lean 2017, p. 14-144).

The problem with this conspiracy theory is that it draws merit from twisted statistics and historical and political facts, usually taken out of context and framed with colourful semantics and atrocity propaganda (Lean 2017, p. 87-195; Saunders 2012, p. 12-72). The statements are however not completely false with e.g. the reality of that many Muslim immigrants tend to have more children than Christian/Jewish Westerners. They also live in neighbourhoods with predominantly Muslim residents, where a more exotic and often Middle Eastern flare tend to be present (Saunders 2012, p. 48-75). In these neighbourhoods the likelihood of hearing foreign languages might be increasingly common. The combination of these Muslim neighbourhoods and the witnessed foreign appearance can give the impression that a cultural invasion is happening, prompting perceived legitimacy to the Eurabia conspiracy theory.

Like the historical mirror to Muslims, of Jews and Catholics alleged vocation for terrorism, the historical repetition also applies to conspiracy theories. Jews and Catholics were believed, due to their large families, to have a malicious plan of cultural and religious conquest. In other words, a plan to impose and

alter Western societies after their image, namely Judaism and Catholicism (Saunders 2012, p. 115-136). These conspiracy theories proved to be unfounded as most relatives of both the Jewish and Catholic immigrants have become well-integrated and usually secular Western inhabitants. They fit seamlessly into society while still nurturing their customs, traditions and cultural heritage, which have blended and become an accepted part of Western society (pp. 161-162). In other words, they have not imposed culturally and/or religiously, nor demographically to their host country. Like their historical counterparts, Western-born Muslims are seen adopting secular values and Western customs, including having less children. Hence Muslims are seemingly following the same trend of integration like Jews and Catholics, a strong indication of how the Eurabia theory of Islamization holds little to no merit (Saunders 2012, 44-68).

Furthermore, predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods share the same similarities to their historical Jewish and Catholic counterparts. Like the view of modern Muslim neighbourhoods, the notion of segregated and increasingly alien neighbourhoods, riddled with crimes and uncivilized behaviours, created through a self-imposed exclusion due to a refusal to assimilate/integrate was common about Jewish and Catholic neighbourhoods (Saunders 2012, p. 115-136; Lean 2017, p. 216-223). However, these Jewish and Catholic neighbourhoods are today well-functioning, highly Western places where the residents are either well-integrated Jews and/or Catholics or the residents have changed to other newly arrived immigrants. Prompting the obvious that Jews and/or Catholics never were the problem but rather socio-economic and socio-political factors (Saunders 2012, p. 2-5). This is a clear indication of that the same development awaits Muslims and their neighbourhoods as well, if not interfered with too much.

4.5 Islamophobia and the far-right

Islamophobia is often found in far-right extremism and far-right politics. The fear of the outsider, the foreigner or person with a different religion, culture and/or tradition has always struck fear and concern into the general public. The far-right has shared these sentiments but also chosen to manipulate and enforce said fear. Like the propaganda machine of Nazi Germany where anti-Semitism not only flourished but was nurtured, the modern far-right movements have used Islamophobia to create a well-oiled propaganda machine through various media (Lean 2017; Saunders 2012, p. 134-135; Kriminalvården 2017, p. 6; Ennaji 2010, p. 17).

There is an abundance of blogs and social media accounts where Islamophobic conspiracy theories and sentiments is spread. A lot of which has direct ties to far-right organizations, movements and politicians (Lean 2017, p. 7-20). Via these blogs and social media accounts, videos and professionally produced movies financed, spread and supported by both Pro-Israel, conservative Christian and various other organizations, movements and individuals who support the supposed war against Islam and Islamization of the West, can be accessed (Lean 2017, p. 16-162). With how the modern man increasingly gain their news online over social media, and how mainstream media is forced to access and share similar content from dubious sources, Islamophobic disinformation spreads easily (Lean 2017, p. 87-88). Furthermore, the Islamophobic content, whether its professionally made or not, is not always accidently brought into mainstream media as can be seen with the example of the American media outlet Fox News. Where Muslims are depicted as dangerous, vindictive people aiming to infiltrate American politics and institutions, and as dangerous terrorist (Lean 2017, p. 88-92).

Lean (2017) explains and highlights how far-right politicians, movements and individuals are using Islamophobia to further their political agenda with the concept of fear. The fear of Islamic terrorism has been used to spread

misconceptions and conspiracy theories to ensure that the public gain a belief that most Muslims are terrorist, and those who are not supports Islamic terrorism due to a century old hate against the West (Lean 2017, p. 14-145). Despite reality contradicting this notion as most Muslims are law-abiding civilians and a known crucial asset in counterterrorism and radicalization prevention, the twisted perception of Muslims and Islam persists (pp. 13-203; Saunders 2012, p. 81-88).

The propaganda machine with its disinformation, has reached high political spheres. Seen in Donald Trump's presidency which arguably influenced increased hate crimes and violence towards Muslims, with his Islamophobic rhetoric functioning as a legitimization for hate and hostility against Muslims (Lean 2017, p. 206-207) Similarly far-right populist politicians have gained political power and/or increased popularity through Islamophobic rhetoric during the 21th century, indicating a global normalization of Islamophobia (ibid.). In conclusion far-right politicians, movements and organizations utilizes their Islamophobic propaganda machine to further their political agenda of enforcing an inaccurate, fearful worldview of perceived Islamization and Muslims as violent, dangerous terrorists.

4.6 Liberal and social democratic- Islamophobia

While most Liberal politicians and their voters/supporters tend to be less Islamophobic and strict on Muslims than their far-right counterparts, the fear of Islamization, Eurabia and the dangerous, violent Muslim exists even in these circles. The fear is often hidden under a guise of progressive values as these sentiments traditionally clash with Liberalism (Lean 2017, p. 163-167).

Far-right politics fear Muslims due to a cultural and traditional perspective of preservation against Multiculturalism and Islam. Liberal politics on the other hand are caught in the web of Islamophobic prejudices and conspiracy

theories, due to their secularism and strong belief in its values (ibid.). They view Islam as a religion that is misogynistic and thus naturally oppress women. A notion that has been supported, thus legitimized, by high-profiling, female Muslim activists (Lean 2017, p. 164-171). Ultimately the Islamophobia existing in Liberal politics considers Islam to be incompatible with Western values due to its rejection of secularism (a notion tied more to Islamic countries' political history, and history of colonialization, than Islam) and a danger to the West. Gender equality and the rights of the LGBT community is used to showcase and further these beliefs, despite that many of their claims have little merit and goes against the values/politics they profess to have (pp. 172-178; Saunders 2012, p. 150-153). Other self-proclaimed progressive Liberals with large demographic following and outreach, share content and sentiments like their far-right counterparts, further legitimizing Islamophobia. Albeit they strongly object any comparison between them and the far-right despite the obvious similarities. In other words, any implication they are not progressive Liberals is fiercely disputed and disliked. This becomes discussable when Islamophobic Liberals agrees and even cooperates with far-right individuals/politicians. As a result, they share the same material and prejudices. They even go so far as to exclude Muslims due to not being secular enough (Lean 2017, p. 164-178). Furthermore, the fear of Islamic terrorism is ripe among these Liberals and used to legitimize and spread their Islamophobia among Liberal circles. Hence, they share a perceived common enemy with the far-right, namely Muslims and Islam (ibid.).

The fear of Islam and Muslims is seemingly spreading across the political spectrum. The Danish Social Democrats used to fiercely oppose the far-right nationalistic party, the Danish People's Party (DPP). However, over the last few years the previously opposite parties have been cooperating and conducting politics together (Mattson 2019). This despite that DPP is known for their strict migration politics with Islamophobic sentiments. These

sentiments have in turn not only entered Danish moderate parties, but also functions as inspiration to parties in other countries, such as Sweden (TT 2019). In other words, it is not only Liberal parties and individuals who share Islamophobic sentiments from the far-right.

The reality of that the far-right political parties, organizations and movements are Islamophobic and utilizes people's fear to ensure their political goals is and have been clear for a long time. But the development among Liberal and moderate politics is alarming as it indicates the severity of Islamophobia in today's global society. In Europe for example, the phenomena of right-winged voters, voting for left-winged parties and vice versa showcase the polarized nature of politics and give some explanation to the increased populism seen in Europe. This together with a strong influx of young resourceful people entering the far-right, indicate that the far-right has the means to utilize the current political climate through xenophobia, Islamophobia and public fear (Lean 2017, p. 230-235). Furthermore, in Sweden there has been cases of Muslim politicians from Liberal parties who have been forced to leave their responsibilities within their party, and even leave minister positions due to scandals linked to their faith, customs and bi-national identity (Sundberg 2016; Eklundh 2016). The criticism to the politicians might have been well-founded from a secular perspective, but the implication that Islamophobia within Europe and Sweden might be a hindrance for Muslims to participate in politics, and the potential existence of Islamophobic sentiments among Liberal and moderate parties/movements in Europe and Sweden is clear.

4.7 Islamophobia on the rise

Islamophobia is increasing and have been ever since 9/11, a lot because of the fear of Islamic terrorism. The claims seemingly have merit as hate crimes, threats and a perceived discrimination against Muslims have increased. As is documented in surveys, where Muslims have expressed their concerns and feelings regarding increased discrimination and how [Western] society treats them (Ennaji 2010, p. 18; Hutchinson et al 2015, p. 330; EUMC 2006b). There have been threats and vandalization on mosques, and the most current and abhorrent sign of the increase of Islamophobia must be the terrorist attack in Christchurch 2019 (EUMC 2006a). These signs alone showcase that Islamophobia truly is on the rise, but there is more that indicate the increase of negative sentiments and emotions against Muslims.

Previous research and surveys have shown that Muslims view the media as a strong source of Islamophobia, which then is adopted into the general public and manifests as e.g. hate crimes and discrimination (Kunst et al 2013, p. 235). For example, a study found that Muslims were depicted worse in the media in 2014 than they were immediately after 9/11 (Lean 2017, p. 99). Plenty of surveys have found that non-Muslims in the West hold negative sentiments and emotions towards Muslims and Islam, which indicate that Islamophobia is increasing. For example, in America a 2012 survey showed that about 41 percent of Americans had a negative view of Muslims, and by 2016 the numbers had increased to almost 60 percent (Lean 2017, p. 3-7). Furthermore, there had been an increase of hate crimes against Muslims in America during 2015, which an FBI report in 2016 confirmed with a 67 percent increase of Islamophobic attacks (pp. 7-207). The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) claimed that hate crimes against Muslims rose with 600 percent between 2014 and 2016. They also released a report in 2017 stating biases against Muslims had steadily increased with 70 percent in the course of three years (ibid.). In other words, Islamophobia is increasing in America and with

the Islamophobic sentiments and conspiracy theories shared in American media, it highlights its severity (pp. 49).

As for Europe, the matter of Islamophobia is seemingly increasing as well. With the current political climate where far-right populist parties gain support and where Islamophobic sentiments flourish in the political sphere. Europeans desire quick fixes over the presentation of complicated global problems that need a susceptible approach. Which is a major reason for the Islamophobic and xenophobic far-right parties' success, who instead give often baseless solutions founded on emotions and fear rather than actual solutions (Lean 2017, p. 227). The amount of perceived Islamophobia in Europe during the 21st century is abundant, despite secularism in many European countries and concept of religious freedom. One example is the 2009 ban of minarets (towers which calls Muslim to prayer) in Switzerland, enabled after a successful Islamophobic fear campaign with focus on Islam's incompatibility with Swiss values. This was almost followed by the replication of other European countries' ban of the burqa in 2016. A campaign that was spearheaded by far-right politicians (Lean 2017, p. 228-229; Saunders 2012, p. 93).

An alarming sign of increasing Islamophobia is the result of surveys indicating Europeans' sentiments and feelings towards Muslims and Islam. A French survey from 2011 showed that 68 percent of non-Muslim French considered French Muslims not to be well-integrated into society. It also showed that 55 percent thought that Islam was too visible in France and almost 60 percent blamed the problem of failed integration on Muslims' lack of effort and desire to integrate (Lean 2017, p. 229). Further indication of France continued Islamophobia was found in a survey from 2016, where 50 percent of the French public believed Muslims were a danger to their French nationality (ibid.). Germany and three other European countries showed similar results to surveys, highlighting that Islamophobia is not exclusive to France (pp. 229-239).

Another development in Europe regarding Muslims and Islam, which showcase an increase of Islamophobia, is the formation and increased popularity of hate groups and movements. Which follows the success of far-right parties and their propaganda, who share their belief of a Muslim invasion. These groups venture out on streets to allegedly combat Islamization and protect the nation and its culture using violence and threats. They are driven by far-right ideas of nationalism and xenophobia which often takes the form of Islamophobia due to the perceived large Muslim immigration to Europe (Lean 2017, p. 239-242).

It is easy to assume that increased Islamophobic hate crimes and discrimination are perpetrated mainly by these anti-Muslim groups. Researchers state however that smaller forms of hate crimes, such as vandalism of mosques, are perpetrated also by regular individuals of no specific background. These individuals justify their Islamophobia and abuse against Muslims with mainstream media and politics (Lean 2017, p. 244-245). These crimes are not decreasing, as can be seen from the Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism in Belgium stating in 2011 that from all discrimination cases, 84 percent were targeting Muslims and in 2016 the French National Human Rights Commission (CNCDH) reported an increase of Islamophobic threats and attacks by 223 percent in just that year (pp. 242-245). These increasing figures were supported by the Anne Frank Foundation that describe how Islamophobic occurrences had tripled between 2014 and 2015. The Tell MAMA group measured that Islamophobic physical/verbal assaults had increased with 326 percent in 2015, indicating a systematic increase due to massive increase of Islamophobia prior to CNCDH's report in 2016 (ibid.). Furthermore, an economic index showed that restrictive laws in many European countries seemingly prevent Muslims from fully integrate into the economy. This was further backed by a study showing European Muslims face "an ethnic and religious penalty" in the labour market. Unfortunately this

penalty was proven to follow second to third generations of Muslim immigrants, due to poor education and integration, resulting in a feeling of disengagement from society, a loss of self-identity and a perceived injustice of purposely being excluded. Hence, this penalty and the resulting emotions forces/encourages them to seek out other forms of identification, belonging and empowerment (Saunders 2012, p. 75-149; Ennaji 2010, p. 16-17; Hutchinson et al 2015, p. 331-332).

These figures and surveys show an astounding level and increase of Islamophobia in Europe that is integrated in society, European laws and institutions, prompting that it is a structural form of discrimination.

4.7.1 The Swedish narrative

As have been discussed above Islamophobia is steadily increasing in Europe and the far-right, and its advocates are inflaming the situation by spreading conspiracy theories and disinformation. In all this Sweden is no exception considering the increased popularity of the far-right party the Swedish Democrats, known for their Islamophobia and xenophobia. Furthermore, there is seemingly a normalization of far-right populism and extremism, witnessed in how other major parties speak of Swedish nationalism and the preservation of Christian-Judeo values (Saunders 2012, p. 26; Lean 2017, p. 227-228; Busch Thor 2019).

Sweden has seen attacks and vandalizations against Mosques and other forms of discrimination against Muslims and Islam since the early 21st century and they have increased in recent years (EUMC 2006a, p. 83). The vandalization against Mosques were reported already in 2005, and in 2004 a survey of 10 600 students conducted by the Living History Forum and the National Council for Crime Prevention, showed that 14 percent of these high school students held severe intolerance against Muslims (EUMC 2006a, p. 17-38). Albeit it has

been 15 years since the survey it highlights Islamophobia in Sweden and furthermore these youths are by now adults in its society, thus potentially influential Islamophobes. Sweden has been used by far-right politicians and activists as an example of a crumbling state. Where Swedish segregated, dangerous neighbourhoods blamed on Muslim immigration and a naïve approach to Islamic extremism and Islamization, has been used to spread fear against Muslims. In turn this propaganda has been replicated by the Swedish far-right. Together with a UN report in 2015 which criticized Sweden for increased problems with racism and discrimination, indicates that these youths might not have abandoned their Islamophobia (Lean 2017, p. 95-97; Human Rights Council 2015).

These Swedish, often predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods are not a fictive of the imagination. They suffer from poor socio-economic and socio-political problems of poor education and work opportunities, which has enabled crime, violence and extremism to manifest (Polisen 2017, p. 4-33). But the depiction of Sweden as a crumbling state or these neighbourhoods as completely out of police and governmental control, is not an accurate display of reality. Furthermore, the Sweden Democrats have repeatedly and more openly stated that there is a war of cultures and often referring on Islam and Muslims. Statements that can be found in far-right violent extremism and lack any substance from proper research and accurate historical and/or societal knowledge. Yet they continue to gain support from the Swedish public, which showcase the increase of Islamophobia in Sweden (Lean 2017, p. 145-216; Segerbäck 2019, 01:09:48-1:30:00).

The increase of Islamophobia among Swedish far-right extremist environments and the increased visibility and seemingly confidence from far-right extremist organizations and movements, together with issues discussed above, indicate the increase of Islamophobia in Sweden (Kriminalvården 2017, p. 9; Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 59-65). The current situation in Sweden

is thus that of polarization and increased support for far-right parties which in turn has led to a normalization of far-right extremist views where Muslims are increasingly perceived as a threat and Islamophobia is ripe.

4.8 Increased Islamic radicalization

It is hard to decipher whether radicalization is increasing since radicalization and its processes are highly individual as regards to why it occurs and how it develops, as well as whether an individual is fully radicalized to the point of violent extremism or terrorism. This makes any statistics and proper estimation of whether radicalization increases or not hard to develop. However, one way to estimate the current situation of radicalization, in this case Islamic radicalization, is to find out whether Islamic violent extremism and terrorism have increased and thus forming an opinion on the likelihood of a potential increase of Islamic radicalization. This can be done through viewing the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated, foiled and planned as well as the amount of people arrested/convicted for terror-related crimes. Furthermore, viewing the potential increase of propaganda for Islamic extremism is also a way to decipher the current situation and climate regarding radicalization in society.

The threat of Islamic terrorism has steadily increased since 2006 which has manifested in an increase of terrorist attacks, progressively perpetrated by so-called home-grown cells. While the attacks have increased, they have in turn lacked sophistication from previous attacks done by Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. In other words, the logistics, planning and use of weapons have become less deadly and more easily available, such as knives and cars (Europol 2018, p. 4-5). Noteworthy is that the amount of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe increased with 20 attacks between 2016 (13) and 2017 (33) and most fatalities and injuries were due to Islamic terrorism, precisely 62 fatalities and

819 injured (pp. 9). While this showcase that the threat of Islamic terrorism is present and indicates a potential increase of radicalization, it is worth mentioning that during 2018 there was a decrease of terrorist attacks in Western countries perpetrated by Islamic terrorists (NCT 2019, p. 2). In other words, Islamic terrorism is a reality despite the current increase of far-right extremism found around Europe due to fear of Islamization and immigration (Europol 2018, p. 7-9). Since 2006 there has been fluctuations in terrorist attacks i.e. a decrease was soon followed by an increase, and since Islamic terrorist attacks peaked with 20 attacks in one year (2016-2017), it indicates a potential covert radicalization rather than a decrease (pp. 9). A further implication is the increase of home-grown cells. Probably caused by encouragement from IS to function as sleeping agents in Western countries and commit lone wolf attacks, which increased considerably in 2017 and became further sophisticated in 2018 (pp. 7-9; NCT 2019, p. 1-2).

The number of so-called foreign terrorist fighter (FTFs) from Europe has decreased since 2015. Approximately 1500 (out of the estimated 5000) FTFs is believed to have returned home to their European countries as of 2017, at which point the returnees decreased presumably due to the current situation in Syria. Another 1000 of them are presumed dead, leaving roughly 2500 unaccounted for (Europol 2018, p. 26-28; Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 56). With the returned FTFs there is an increased probability of a security threat in how returned, presumably violence oriented IS recruits, with war-experience/terror tactics, will draw individuals to them and recruit and/or radicalize them, creating more home-grown cells, that in turn might commit terrorist attacks. While this is a probability the likelihood of returned FTFs to commit lone wolf attacks is considered low. Instead the fear of home-grown cells with or without the support from returned FTFs is considered a higher threat, indicating that IS's existence does not determine whether radicalization occurs or not (Europol 2018, p. 26-29; Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 63).

As for individuals arrested/convicted in 2017 it can be established that there has been a steady, albeit at times fluctuating increase of arrests and convictions related to Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. This showcase an increase of interest and activity among Western individuals in Islamic extremism. An increase of arrested/convicted women indicates a potential doubling of radicalization, since women previously have been less drawn to Islamic extremism, thus less radicalized (Europol 2018, p. 10-22). This is a sign of increased radicalization as both attacks and arrests/convictions for Islamic terrorism have increased over the last few years.

Recruitment and propaganda for Islamic terrorism has decreased on mainstream social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube, due to the work of law enforcement and alterations within the industry (Europol 2018, p. 15). However, the more small-scale and new-founded social media platforms are behind in these precautions and thus propaganda and recruitment still occur on these platforms, resulting in that recruitment and propaganda activities were reported on more than 150 social media platforms in 2017 (ibid.). These findings showcase the global reach of propaganda and recruitment as well as the easy access to material which can cause radicalization. Furthermore, the move of e.g. IS supporters from mainstream social media into covert, encrypted and untraceable apps such as Telegram in 2016, improves their anonymity and capability to recruit and plan terror attacks (Europol 2018, p. 31). In 2017 the use of private and closed group chats on Telegram became increasingly used and as a result law enforcement has been faced with a bigger challenge than the public Telegram chats and Facebook messages (ibid.; Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 57).

Apart from the use of Telegram and smaller social media platforms propaganda for Islamic terrorism, often IS-related, still circulates on mainstream social media such as Facebook, despite the decline of propaganda in 2017 (Europol 2018, p. 31-32). The use of Arabic is one of the biggest

reasons for why propaganda can be found on mainstream social media, due to the language barrier in Western law enforcements and simply because of a larger production of Arabic material (ibid.). A lot of the propaganda still circulating is non-violent in nature, making it harder to identify as propaganda and recruitment material. Furthermore, this type of propaganda has been used by Islamic terrorist organizations and sympathizers for a long time and is spreading a non-violent and utopian image of the radical ideology which has been proven to appeal to many individuals. In other words, this form of propaganda is heavily relied upon and proven to be more effective than violent propaganda (ibid.). From 2017 this non-violent propaganda has increasingly been spreading the image of a worldview where Muslims are threatened and victimized by a Christian-Jewish alliance (ibid.). Since this type of propaganda exists and is easily accessible on social media in this polarizing and populist world it can easily cause radicalization. Also, this form of propaganda can be harder to criticize with the amount of disinformation spreading globally. Moreover, for individuals suffering from poor mental health or disappointment and/or feelings of disenfranchisement from society, this type of propaganda can seem legitimate and thus lead to radicalization (NCT 2019, p. 2).

In conclusion despite the existence and easy access to propaganda, the increase of arrests/convictions for Islamic terrorism/violent extremism and the up until 2018 increase of Islamic terrorist attacks spanning over 10 years, it is still unclear whether Islamic radicalization is increasing or not. However, the fact that the threat of Islamic terrorism is still present and considered as significant and the circulating propaganda, indicate the continued existence of Islamic radicalization and thus should be treated as a significant societal problem.

4.8.1 The Swedish narrative

In Sweden the threat of Islamic violent extremism and terrorism is considered the highest out of all types of extremism, due to the nature of Islamic terrorism to commit terrorist attacks aimed at civilians and the estimated continued risk of an attack against Sweden (NCT 2019 p. 1; Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 59). Despite the perceived threat from Islamic terrorism the appraisal made from the information given by Swedish municipalities in 2016, which reported the existence of violent extremism in their municipality, only 36% were Islamic violent extremism which should be compared with far-right violent extremism which was almost 50% (Kriminalvården 2017, p. 6). This would be shocking if the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) had not announced in their annual report of 2018, that the threat of far-right violent extremism is a recognized threat towards Sweden's democracy and thus a more long-term threat. However, it is considered as a less significant threat towards the general public compared to Islamic violent extremism/terrorism, since far-right violent extremism usually targets individuals rather than large groups of civilians (Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 62). This indicate that Sweden has a larger problem with far-right extremism than Islamic extremism and thus with their respective radicalization, but as explained the immediate threat of Islamic violent extremism is greater.

The increased confidence and influence on Swedish politics by the far-right extremist environment in Sweden indicate the severity and normalization of far-right extremist sentiments (pp. 59-65). For example, the Nordic Resistance Front (Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen) has marched with shields and gear reminiscent to riot police, held manifestations and even gained legal access to Almedalsveckan (Sweden's annual, official political gathering) where they have openly showcased values contradicting human rights e.g. homophobia and anti-Semitism (Sundell, Blåder and Sundeby 2017; Håkansson 2017; Youcefi 2018).

That Sweden has a problem with Islamic radicalization is clear. But if the fairly recent implementation of countermeasures to combat and prevent radicalization in Sweden and throughout Swedish municipalities, has proved successful remains unknown. In 2010 it was estimated that there were approximately 200 individuals active in Islamic violent extremism in Sweden and since 2012 it has been confirmed that roughly 300 Swedes (out of approximately 5000 Europeans) have travelled abroad as recruits to organizations, where the majority have joined IS and other groups with ties to Islamic terrorist organizations in Syria and/or Iraq (Säkerhetspolisen 2018, p. 63; Kriminalvården 2017, p. 10). This indicates that interest and desire to engage in Islamic violent extremism exists in Sweden and seemingly these emotions linger resulting in continued radicalization. As of 2018, old IS propaganda spread by supporters, functions as a primary source of inspiration for these individuals and although Sweden is a less likely target for Islamic terrorism compared to other European countries, there is a persistent risk (NCT 2019, p. 1-2). Furthermore, Sweden only had arrests and cases of Islamic terrorism during 2017 and have seen other arrests and convictions into 2019. It highlights the problem of seemingly continued Islamic radicalization in Sweden. The fact that Sweden suffered a deadly terrorist attack in 2017 also show that radicalization exists in Sweden (Europol 2018, p. 23-25).

A recent alarming indication of Islamic radicalization in Sweden is how five high-profiling individuals in Sweden's Muslim environments, have been deprived of their liberty by the Swedish Security Police, and are expected to be deported, due to a perceived threat to national security linked to Islamic extremism (Rapport 2019, 00:50-04:00). In other words, they are accused of intentionally spreading sentiments of Islamic extremism, and/or aimed to radicalize Muslims in Sweden. Furthermore, these highly respected men have gained support from their respective (albeit seemingly small) communities who demonstrate against their deportation and argue that [the state of] Sweden

is purposely excluding Muslims in Sweden. Communities which have been accused of being radical Muslims and support Islamic [violent] extremism and/or terrorism (ibid.; Grabovac and Poohl 2019). Seen together with the Islamic terrorist attack in 2017 and the conviction for the planned terrorist attack in 2019, both which were perpetrated by Muslims in Sweden, indicates the existence and potential increase of Islamic radicalization in Sweden.

In conclusion it is unclear whether Islamic radicalization is increasing in Sweden but the interest and activity in Islamic terrorism and violent extremism, showcase that the phenomenon exists and is estimated to continue.

5. Analysis

The analysis will apply the perspective of exclusion and inclusion, accompanied by biopolitics and the Security-Development Nexus to the findings. This in order to determine whether Muslims in Sweden are more prone to radicalization due to Islamophobia, and whether the state of Sweden, affected by its society utilizes it to enhance national security. Perspectives of radicalization processes and radicalized individuals will also be applied. For clarification the analysis will be divided between the three research questions.

5.1 Is there a link between increased Islamophobia and increased Islamic radicalization?

The fact that social alienation and discrimination is strongly connected to radicalization has been established. This means Islamophobia should theoretically cause radicalization among Muslims since it is a form of discrimination. Applying Bleich's definition of Islamophobia to perspectives of radicalization processes. With the established findings of how Islamophobia can cause a negative national identity and Sageman's argument of how patriotism functions as a barrier towards radicalization into terrorism. The correlation between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization can be found, since Sageman argued discrimination and social alienation jeopardizes the barrier of national identity. Furthermore, the global increase of Islamophobia and far-right populism that normalizes far-right extremist views, has spurred more violence and harassment against Muslims. Since social alienation and discrimination can cause radicalization and with further knowledge of how radicalized individuals adopt a radical ideology with a twisted reality, where a perceived injustice is perpetrated against them and their in-group. The far-right populism and increased violence against Muslims can be used to legitimize said perceived injustice. Thus affect, cause and perhaps even increase Islamic

radicalization. Since Islamophobia started to increase in the early 2000's and the estimated threat of Islamic terrorism has increased since 2006, it strongly implies the correlation between increased Islamophobia and increased Islamic terrorism. By default, these findings also imply a linkage between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization and a potential increase of said phenomenon. It should be underlined that there is no clear statistical evidence to support this implication and further research is warranted.

With Muslims being excluded through segregation due to poor education and work opportunities and segregated neighbourhoods ripe with crimes and a bad reputation, furthering their lack of opportunities, the frustrations garnered from their circumstances can in itself be a cause for social alienation and perceived discrimination, thus enabling the risk of radicalization. Understandably Muslims situation on the labour market and the education system is not helped by increased Islamophobia, as it risks to further decrease their chances of equal access to work and education. Meaning it can further frustrations, humiliation, social alienation and a sense of not belonging among Muslims, all which are known causes for radicalization. Thus, Islamophobia can result in Muslims becoming radicalized. Hence the importance to not only implement countermeasures to enhance work and education opportunities to battle exclusion, but also to decrease Islamophobia is arguably a key factor in battling Islamic radicalization. However, it is important to remember that not all individuals, including Muslims, who suffer from poor socio-economic and socio-political circumstances are radicalized. While the circumstances in these neighbourhoods can affect the risk of radicalization it is not a necessity.

Nevertheless, with Islamophobia increasing in societies, Muslims who overcome exclusionary obstacles might experience continued discrimination and exclusion in lack of work opportunities, despite e.g. appropriate education. In other words, Islamophobia can increase already existing exclusion against Muslims, leading to further social alienation and discrimination which in turn

can cause Islamic radicalization. This furthered by that anti-discriminatory laws have been found unsatisfactory to shelter Muslims from discrimination and the role of the media in spreading and enforcing Islamophobia, it strongly indicates the linkages between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization, as well as the importance to decrease and combat Islamophobia. With the added knowledge of how European societies are seemingly structurally excluding Muslims from the labour market and education system, it further showcases the link between Islamophobia and societal factors which can lead to radicalization.

In conclusion based on the findings, Islamophobia is linked to Islamic radicalization because of the impact of social alienation and discrimination on radicalization processes. Since Islamophobia is a form of discrimination and since efforts to quell it through anti-discriminatory laws has proven unsuccessful and instead a structural discrimination against Muslims has been established, it is clear that the linkage between the two phenomena exists. However, it is also clear that there is no causal link between the two phenomena but rather a correlation, since the findings cannot support a conclusive link. Thus, whether Islamic radicalization increases due to Islamophobia is hard to determine as radicalization is impossible to measure with such accuracy to make any determined claims. As well as that other factors can affect both phenomena, thus affect this analysis. There are however indications of that if Islamophobia increases there is a risk of an increase of Islamic radicalization. This leads to the conclusion that a correlation can be found, but that further research is warranted to establish or refute a causal link between Islamophobia and radicalization.

5.2 Are Muslims in Sweden more prone to being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and terrorism due to perceived Islamophobia?

That there is a correlation between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization is clear but whether it in fact increases the possibility of Muslims being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and terrorism, is debatable. In Sweden Islamophobia is increasing and there might be an increase of Islamic radicalization, but due to the covert nature of radicalization it is impossible to determine if Islamic radicalization is increasing with enough accuracy, and it can only be analyzed into levels of calculated risk. Because of this, answering whether Muslims in Sweden are more prone to being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and terrorism is not possible, with this desk study's findings.

However, the Islamic terrorist attack of 2017 and the arrests in 2019 related to a planned terrorist attack, were both perpetrated/planned by Muslims in Sweden, who had been radicalized in the country. With the increase of Islamophobia and the popularity of far-right parties and sentiments as well as their increased xenophobia, together with calls for stricter migration policies, implies that Islamophobia can in fact have had an influence on these individuals' radicalization. Since the terrorist attack in 2017 happened after the migration crisis in 2015 and the terrorist attack in Paris the same year, which both spurred fear and hostility against Muslim immigrants. It indicates the possibility that after the events of 2015 Sweden faced an increase of Islamophobic sentiments through xenophobia, leading to a potential influence on the Muslim individual guilty of the 2017 terrorist attack and the arrests linked to the planned terrorist attack in 2019. Furthermore, with the deprivation of liberty against high-profiling Muslims among Muslim environments, which was reported in 2019 long after the first reports of increased Islamophobia in Sweden, and the fierce support given to these

individuals allegedly involved in Islamic terrorism, indicates the potential influence of Islamophobia within Sweden on Muslims living in Sweden. Regarding the high profiling Muslims awaiting deportation, their supporters and community which they belong to have been accused of being involved with Islamic extremism, violent extremism and terrorism. The supporters from these communities have in turn expressed concern and feelings of intentional exclusion and discrimination from the state of Sweden. With this in mind and the knowledge of how Sweden has seen an increase of Islamophobia since 2005, it further implies the possibility that if these individuals, supporters and communities are in fact involved with Islamic extremism, that Islamophobia can make Muslims in Sweden more prone to being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. Or at least that Islamophobia can alter society in such a way that exclusion can affect Muslims in Sweden through social alienation, perceived discrimination and a sense of not belonging, to seek out remedies within radicalization.

It has been concluded above that exclusion through bad quality of education, as well as poor work and education opportunities for Muslim immigrants and their offspring, as well as lack of political participation is seemingly a structural problem in Europe. It can be argued that Islamophobia either has caused this system through the remnants of century old Islamophobia found in Orientalism or has been furthered by the increasing Islamophobia seen in Europe today. In other words, Sweden being a part of Europe and with the segregated neighbourhoods of predominantly Muslim residents, where poor education and work opportunities is common, it highlights the potential risk of that the exclusion forced upon Muslims in Sweden can birth social alienation and a quest for significance and identity, which are known factors in radicalization. Hence Islamophobia can potentially influence whether Muslims in Sweden are more prone to radicalization, but it is hardly sufficient evidence to draw any significant conclusions.

In summary, due to that Islamic radicalization cannot be accurately measured it is impossible to determine with certainty if Islamophobia makes Muslims in Sweden more prone to being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. There are however implications of a potential effect. But further research into how Muslims in Sweden perceive both Islamophobia and their exclusion e.g. poor work and education opportunities as well as their opportunities at political participation, is necessary.

5.3 Are Muslims in Sweden excluded in the society to enhance Sweden's security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism, with the use of Islamophobia? If so, does it enhance Sweden's security or jeopardize it against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism?

That Islamophobia is increasing in Sweden is clear with the winds of far-right, nationalistic and xenophobic populism gaining popularity and influence on Swedish politics, and the continued threats and attacks against Muslims as well as vandalization against mosques. But if Sweden as a state, affected by its collective society actively and intentionally excludes Muslims in Sweden to enhance security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism is less clear.

Albeit Islamic radicalization can be argued to have increased it can only be analyzed into a calculated risk, meaning Islamic radicalization cannot be measured with such accuracy needed to make such conclusions. Therefore, the Swedish government and its institutions cannot give Swedes a distinctive answer on how big the threat of Islamic violent extremism and terrorism is. As such Swedes, like the rest of Europe and the Western world are left vulnerable to the concept of fear utilized by far-right organizations and movements, that push their Islamophobic narrative online and as a consequence has found its way into the political sphere. As a result, Sweden has gained Islamophobic

sentiments, and like anti-Semitism prior to WW2 instilled fear and prejudices to such a degree that violence and fierce exclusion were deemed legitimate countermeasures against the perceived threat of Jews and Judaism. It seems probable that Islamophobia is being utilized to repeat history. In other words, the cogs are set in motion to enable societies to view Muslims as a threat so great that fierce exclusion through segregation, exclusion from work and education and from political participation is warranted.

Based on the normalization of far-right populism and far-right extremist sentiments, predominantly of Islamophobic nature, indicate that Sweden is heading towards a sharper political and societal climate, where Muslims are increasingly viewed as a threat or at least as a less desirable fellow citizen. Which in turn is likely to create further exclusion and thus potentially lead to Islamic radicalization through social alienation and discrimination. Furthermore, history has shown through both persecution/hate against Jews and Catholics, that groups with deviant faith, culture and norms have been fiercely ostracized. Meaning history has already repeated itself prior to modern repetition through hate and exclusion, and with radicalization as a potential consequence.

Thus, based on the findings of this thesis, the state of Sweden is neither currently nor actively trying to exclude Muslims in Sweden to enhance national security. There are however indications of a more hostile environment for Muslims in Sweden, coming up in the not so distant future. Furthermore, the deprivation of liberty against individuals within Sweden's Muslim environments, can either be an indication of that the state of Sweden is taking appropriate measures to ensure national security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. Or that the state of Sweden is affected by its society that is increasingly paranoid against Muslims and therefore excludes individuals from society, in accordance with the concept of biopolitics where perceived threats and undesirable citizens are excluded to enhance security, in

an effort to quell said fear of Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. Again, according to the concept of biopolitics and exclusion, this would in theory gain Sweden enhanced national security, which would be the intended goal. But due to the lack of indication or conclusive findings that the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) and/or other Swedish governmental institutions, views the majority of Muslims in Sweden as a threat or involved with Islamic violent extremism and/or terrorism, implies that it is an appropriate security measure, thus not caused by paranoia bred from Islamophobia.

The increase of far-right extremist movements' open display of their anti-democratic sentiments and the normalization of such sentiments in Sweden, indicate that Sweden is heading towards a more totalitarian and less inclusive society. In which Muslims in Sweden due to the increase of Islamophobia, like Jews in the 19th-20th century, are risking exclusion, increased hostility and violence. The already witnessed exclusion against Muslims from political participation, due to Muslim customs and traditions found among Liberal parties in Sweden, further indicates that Sweden already is starting to exclude Muslims in Sweden. A matter which is further implied by the feelings of exclusion expressed by Muslim supporters and communities to the Muslim leaders facing deportation because of alleged involvement with Islamic extremism. Moreover, with the known segregated and excluded neighbourhoods in Sweden, where many Muslims live, and crime, violence and extremism is common, additionally implies the exclusion against Muslims. Applying the concept of biopolitics shows however that this exclusion cannot be called an intentional exclusion to enhance Sweden's national security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism, since even though these neighbourhoods could arguable be considered as 'securitized' according to the Security-Development Nexus, there is little indication or findings beyond the Swedish far-right, that the state of Sweden purposely

enable the poor circumstances in these neighbourhoods, thus intentionally exclude Muslims.

In conclusion the state of Sweden is as far as can be seen from available documentation today, not intentionally excluding Muslims in Sweden to enhance national security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. But indication of that Sweden is heading in such a direction exists through the current political and societal climate, where Islamophobia has a consistent presence. As for whether this development in Sweden would lead to enhanced security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism is hard to determine. But considering that exclusion can cause segregation, lack of political participation and work and education opportunities. Which by default based on the perspectives of exclusion and inclusion, is likely to cause perceived discrimination, a sense of not belonging, humiliation, a sense of insignificance and further social alienation, all which are known causes for radicalization. Imply that the development in Sweden of increased Islamophobia and indication for increased exclusion of Muslims in Sweden, could lead to further Islamic radicalization and thus increase the threat of Islamic violent extremism and terrorism in Sweden. Since Islamophobia systematically increases until Muslims are viewed as a threat and there is an increase of Islamophobia in Sweden, it implies that Muslims in Sweden will be increasingly perceived as a threat. This in turn will only further the notion of exclusion to enhance national security, which as mentioned will probably result in less security. Instead Sweden should focus on including Muslims in Sweden to enhance development and as a default lower the risk of Islamic radicalization and thus the threat of Islamic violent extremism and terrorism.

In other words, based on the findings of this thesis, Sweden is showing signs of a development where Muslims in Sweden are increasingly perceived as a threat and excluded due to increased Islamophobia. Further research is needed to properly investigate how widespread Islamophobia and far-right extremist

sentiments are among Sweden's population, particularly among Sweden's politicians and governmental institutions. But the indications of the negative development are there, prompting the importance of further research

6. Conclusions and recommendations

This thesis has established that a correlation between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization exists due to discrimination and social alienation, which are known factors for radicalization. Ergo Islamophobia is a form of discrimination against Muslims which can easily cause social alienation, meaning it can lead to radicalization. Furthermore, Islamophobia has been found to cause decreased national identification among Muslims which has been linked to help prevent radicalization. Meaning the negative consequence on Muslims' national identity might encourage/force them into Islamic radicalization in a quest for significance and belonging. However, the findings of this thesis do not conclusively support a causal link between the phenomena and that Muslims in Sweden are more prone to being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and/or terrorism. Even though indications of how Islamophobia can cause social alienation and discrimination, as well as exclusionary circumstances, such as poor work and education opportunities as well as political participation, which Muslims in Sweden experience. There is not enough material to support the conclusion that Islamophobia makes Muslims in Sweden more prone to being radicalized into Islamic violent extremism and/or terrorism.

Lastly based on the findings, this thesis concludes that there is no intentional exclusion of Muslims in Sweden, by the state of Sweden to enhance Sweden's national security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism, with the use of Islamophobia. There are, however, indications of a development leading up to such a reality with the increase of Islamophobia and increased popularity and influence by far-right politicians, parties and movements/organizations in Sweden, as well as the normalization of far-right extremist and Islamophobic sentiments. In other words, this thesis concludes that despite the indication within Sweden's society of Muslims being more increasingly perceived as a

threat and/or as less desired fellow citizens, they are not intentionally excluded by the state of Sweden.

The material and findings of this thesis supports that the state of Sweden is not actively and intentionally excluding Muslims in Sweden to enhance national security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. However, this thesis also concludes, that if the increase of Islamophobia and increased far-right populism and its influence on Swedish politics and society is not altered and decreased, it is probable that Sweden will utilize Islamophobia to exclude Muslims in Sweden to enhance security against Islamic violent extremism and terrorism. This will be done due to Muslims being increasingly perceived as a threat. Moreover, it is established through the analysis of the findings, that such an exclusion against Muslims in Sweden is more likely to decrease Sweden's national security, as the exclusion risk furthering Islamic radicalization through social alienation, perceived injustice, quest for significance and discrimination, thus decreasing Sweden's national security.

In conclusion, this thesis has found a correlation between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization, as well as indication of that [the state of] Sweden is currently showing signs of a negative development, where Islamophobia and far-right populism and extremism are increasingly influencing Sweden's public and politics. This desk study has granted a beginning of research regarding correlation/linkage between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization. Further research regarding the magnitude of Islamophobia within Sweden's politics and society should be conducted to inquire on the potential risk of Islamophobic and far-right extremist sentiments further altering Sweden's current societal and political environment, and whether Sweden truly is at risk of perceiving Muslims as such a threat, that exclusion for enhanced security is deemed warranted against all Muslims in Sweden. It is recommended to conduct a larger mixed method study with qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys to determine the level of perceived

Islamophobia and affiliation/sympathy to Islamic extremism among Muslims in Sweden. Another recommendation would be to further this thesis' research with added historical and societal factors to determine whether other factors affect Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization. In other words, research to establish or refute a causal link between Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization.

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Appendix 1 – mind-map

