The United Nations Does (Not) Wage War
THE ROLE OF HOSTILITY & COMMITMENT IN UN PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS

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“We the people of the United Nations are determined…

… to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…”

The Charter of the United Nations
ABSTRACT

While there exists a considerable body of literature on the development of UN peace operations: from traditional peacekeeping operations to today’s robust enforcement missions; scrutinizing their efficiency and the challenges they face – little attention has been paid to why various levels of military action are used by a mission. This study addresses this research gap by comparing three UN enforcement operations: MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNMISS in South Sudan, and MINUSMA in Mali. This study specifically investigates how the level of hostility in the conflict and commitment from the troop contributing countries affect the level of enforcement actions taken in each conflict. The arguments are tested using a Structured Focused Comparison. The study finds that increased levels of hostility generated an increase in the level of enforcement in all three cases studied, while the level of commitment did not have the same distinct effect.

Keywords: peace enforcement, hostility, commitment, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA, United Nations
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>l’Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre</td>
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<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>AGF</td>
<td>Anti-Government Forces</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</td>
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<td>FLNC</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Corsica</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>M23</td>
<td>Mouvement du 23 Mars</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Mouvement pour L’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation In Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>The Sudan People's Liberation Army</td>
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<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission In South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group, Namibia</td>
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1. **INTRODUCTION**

*Violence as a way of achieving justice is both impractical and immoral. However, I am not unmindful of the fact that violence often brings about momentary results. Nations have frequently won their independence in battle. But in spite of temporary victories, violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones. Violence is impractical because it is a descending spiral ending in destruction for all. It is immoral because it seeks to humiliate the opponent rather than win his understanding: it seeks to annihilate rather than convert. Violence is immoral because it thrives on hatred rather than love. It destroys community and makes brotherhood impossible. It leaves society in monologue rather than dialogue. Violence ends up defeating itself. It creates bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the destroyer.*

*(Martin Luther King Jr., 1964)*

Can violence be justified as a means of achieving peace? As so elegantly phrased by Dr. King, that question is not always easy to answer. One of the main objectives of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace. Consequently, armed interventions sometimes are unavoidable.

However, the United Nations does not wage war. In the preamble of the UN Charter, it clearly dictates that in its endeavor to create a more peaceful world it is “… to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used.”. Yet, 70th years after the Charter was signed, we are seeing numerous military UN peace operations and stabilization missions being deployed with so-called robust mandates, tasked to establish an environment suitable for peace to develop in. Many studies have focused mainly on the doctrinal development to peace enforcement, the efficiency of peacekeeping, the logic behind troop deployment as well as peace enforcements dissonance with the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. In contrast, little attention has been paid to factors that result in the application of military actions by the UN.

The puzzle this thesis address is what determines the level of enforcement in a mission. In general, the mandates given to the different enforcement missions are governed by the same principles and are acting within the same framework. Nevertheless, the practical
implementation of the UN peacekeeping missions varies, as this thesis will highlight, from almost no enforcement measures to active military intervention in intra-state clashes; all in hope of establishing peace and security. Why, then, is a certain level of enforcement applied in a peace enforcement mission?

In an attempt to elucidate some of the causal processes behind these differences, this thesis focuses on hostility and commitment levels; bringing together insights from the literature on indicators such as troop deployment, peacekeeper security, resources, mission composition as well as mission size. The empirics focuses on three cases of UN operations that all show a variance in the level of enforcement applied, namely the missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Mali.

In hope to bring some clarity to the causal process, this study turns to UN mission reports and deploys the method of Structured Focused Comparison with the aim to establish what variables has a determining effect on a mission on the tactical level. The analysis finds support for that the level of hostility can be expected to influence the level of enforcement when the pattern of violence changes, when the opponents easily can be pointed out, and when there is continuous targeting of peacekeepers. This study however fails to establish that a high involvement of regional actors in a mission would lead to higher levels of enforcement, instead pointing to it being its interaction with hostility that can lead to changes in enforcement levels. This thesis contributes to the literature by the complexity its broad definition of hostility brings on, as well as highlighting how the level of commitment, while not being significant in itself, should be viewed in interaction with hostility.

Following this introduction, Chapter Two presents the previous research and background and Chapter Three introduces the theoretical arguments linking the variables. Chapter Four details the research design and case selection. Chapter Five presents the empirical evidence and Chapter Six consists of the analysis, a discussion of the limitations and alternative explanations, and lastly; presents the conclusions of this thesis as well as possible areas for further research.
2. **Previous Research**

Peacekeeping has over the years emerged as one of the UNs main tools to initiate or facilitate a political peace process between two belligerents. Terry M. Mays (2010) writes that peacekeeping missions are clear examples of vital international cooperation and such missions have been credited with saving lives, delivering humanitarian aid, supporting refugees, and establishing conditions for conflict management and peace. However, the missions have also been criticized for being costly, politically divisive, dangerous, and too often unsuccessful. (Capstone, 2008; Mays, 2010A; Sloan, 2014) This Chapter describes the historical development of UN peacekeeping. It introduces the challenges with peace enforcement and addresses what research has said about the logic of deployment of peacekeeping troops.

2.1 **Three Generations of Peacekeeping**

There is no mention of the concept of peacekeeping in the UN Charter, instead it is interpreted as a function or tool originating from Chapter VI\(^1\). Its current definition can be found in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines of 2008* (Capstone Doctrine) and it reads: “Action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.” (Capstone, 2008, pp.97). In the literature, the development of peacekeeping is divided into ‘generations’. First generation peacekeeping, also called traditional peacekeeping, were operations deployed as an interim measure to an armed conflict to help manage and create conditions in the conflict from which negotiations regarding settlement and peace would be able to proceed and prosper. The concept was first developed by the League of Nations after World War I, and the first peacekeeping operation deployed by the UN were the *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan* (UNMOGIP), in 1948. Common to all conflicts in which first generation peacekeeping was employed was the presence of an already

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\(^1\) Chapter VI deals with peaceful settlement of disputes. It states that all disputes that possibly could lead to war should first try to seek solutions through peaceful means. (United Nations, 1945)
established, but endangered, peace to safeguard. Furthermore, all these early peacekeeping missions were strictly governed by the “Holy Trinity” principles of peacekeeping: (1) consent of the parties, (2) impartiality and (3) non-use of force except in self-defense or in defense of the mandate. (Capstone, 2008; Karlsrud, 2015; Sloan, 2014) Kenkel (2013) and Bellamy et al. (2010) writes that the hallmark activity for this first generation of peacekeeping was border monitoring as well as the deployment of troops to create a buffer zone between the frontlines and in doing so reducing the contact between the fighting parties. (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010, pp. 175–176; Kenkel, 2013)

Gradually thereafter, the nature of international conflicts changed, and the second generation of UN peacekeeping missions differed mainly by mainly being intended to handle conflicts within a state rather than a conflict between two sovereign actors. These operations where multidimensional aiming to implement or support complex peace agreements and to help build the foundations of a self-sustaining peace. Hallmark activities for this second generation included various police and civilian tasks to foster economic and social cooperation and develop social, political, and economic infrastructures to prevent future conflicts. Examples of this generation of peacekeeping can be found in Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Cambodia (UNTAC), and Mozambique (ONUMOZ). (Doyle & Sambanis, 2007)

Lastly, the third and current generation of peacekeeping is, according to Doyle and Sambanis (2007), characterized by the application of military force. However, these third generation peacekeeping operations vary from low-level military interventions where the purpose is to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance, to more substantial full-scale military operations that enforce ceasefires and take authoritative steps to help rebuild failed states. (Doyle & Sambanis, 2007) Maybe not surprisingly, these operations have been criticized for its abandonment of the original peacekeeping principles. However, it must be noted that these doctrinal changes where allowed as a consequence of the humanitarian disasters that occurred during the 1990s conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the failure of the UN to protect civilians forced the international community to evaluate their operations effectiveness and their supposed role in conflicts. (Capstone, 2008; Karlsrud, 2015; Sloan, 2014

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2 This is also a part of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) debate. The principle concerns the international community’s opportunity to coalesce when a population faces the threat of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity - especially when the perpetrator is the sovereign power, or they do not do anything to stop it. However, it is also the Sovereignty principle (non-intervention in intrastate concerns) that is the main obstacle for R2P to work. (Bellamy, 2009; Evans, 2009)
2.2 CHALLENGES OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT

After the failure to prevent violence and protect civilians in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested an assessment of the shortcomings of the then existing peacekeeping operations system and recommendations for necessary improvements. The result was the “Brahimi Report” (Brahimi Report, 2000) and it noted that in order to be effective, peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced, equipped, and operate under a clear, credible and achievable mandate. By fulfilling these pre-requisites, military peacekeeping operations can achieve its aim of extending a strong helping hand to a conflict-ridden community, country or region.

The Brahimi Report clearly states that “the United Nations does not wage war,” (Brahimi Report, 2000, p. 10) and highlights impartiality, which has been viewed as crucial to maintain trust and credibility as well as to ensure cooperation from the different stakeholders in regions where the UN has intervened. (Brahimi Report, 2000; United Nations General Assembly, 1996) However, one of the main critiques in recent research is that peace enforcement of today often challenges the basic principles of UN peacekeeping, i.e., consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force. Consent from the main parties in the conflict is sought for normative and practical reasons, it is usually provided through a peace agreement which makes the UN mission more feasible. Consent is challenged by the fact that UN operations frequently is about protecting individual states during an ongoing conflict, as a rule after the request of governments. And seeing the missions are often deployed to active conflict there is no longer any guarantee that all parties involved in the conflict have agreed or had the possibility to agree to third-party intervention by conventional standards. (Tsagourias, 2006) In her book “Taking Sides in Peacekeeping: Impartiality and the Future of the United Nations”, Emily Paddon Rhoads (2016) highlights these recent changes in the impartiality concept and states that there has been a shift from basing impartiality on consent from all involved parties to the notion that there is an international consensus regarding a set of norms (for example human rights) that needs to be upheld. (Paddon Rhoads, 2016) Peter (2015) agrees in that maintaining impartiality has become more difficult and argue that, in peace negotiations today, outside mediators often are looked upon with some suspicion. (Peter, 2015)

With a change towards more offensive military UN missions, the risk for collateral damage to parts of society not directly involved in the conflict, and to other simultaneously ongoing UN operations such as humanitarian aid and support, will increase. Furthermore, different political
agendas may complicate the peacekeeping operations, raise concerns regarding their impartiality and blur the line between humanitarian, political and military actions. In fact, the previously undisputable protection and peacekeeping effect provided by operations carried out under the UN flag might be compromised. Moreover, by intervening actively in an ongoing conflict the security requirements of non-military UN personnel will increase thereby distancing them from their intended aid recipients. This by itself can lead to humanitarian issues and missions becoming subordinated other agendas. (Berdal & Ucko, 2014; Paddon Rhoads, 2016; Tsagourias, 2006)

Several researchers have identified and in different ways tried to make sense and problematize this change of mission mandates and its implication for different parties. I would, however, say that the majority of the studies still have a very state-centric perspective and miss out on reflections in regard to local legitimacy and influence. Furthermore, this literature does also not highlight why enforcement becomes a valid tactic and the effect of different level of enforcement, again making this thesis research gap clear.

2.3 THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS

What factors that influence whether the UN decides to allocate troops to a conflict is a matter of debate and many different views and opinions have been presented throughout peacekeeping literature. One common opinion is that the decision, at least partially, often is in line with the national interest of one or several of the UNSC permanent member states (see for example Phylis Bennis, 1996; David Gibbs, 1997; Chantal De Jonge Oudraat, 1996). Hultman (2012) shows that when deployed, the UN tend to deploy to where there is no greater or clear policy interest of one of the permanent members. This usually makes it easier to bypass the risk for veto votes. (Hultman, 2012) Beardsley and Schmidt’s (2012) study agrees on the P-5 interest being subordinated to other factors, mainly the level of violence, and goes on to attribute this to the UNs’ need to uphold legitimacy amongst its members. (Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012) When Gilligan and Stedman (2003) look into troop deployment, they find evidence for a regional bias in the UN’s selection of missions. However, in contrast to previous arguments, their evidence points to the bias being against Asia rather than Africa. (Gilligan & Stedman, 2003) In contrast, with reference to the concept of democratic peace, Andersson (2000) argues that promotion of democracy has decided where the UN missions have been deployed and not region or state. (Andersson, 2000) Nonetheless, traditional peacekeeping operations were designed to support and ensure stability in post-conflict environments. Third generation
operations are, more often than not, tasked to reduce hostilities in active civil wars. The literature consistently agrees that UN peacekeeping operations tend to focus on “the hard cases” (see for example Fortna, 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hultman 2010).

In her book “Does Peacekeeping Work”, Virginia Page Fortna (2008) states that the relative strength of conflicting governments and the rebel groups provides one explanation to where missions are deployed and especially points to the effect of strong rebel groups. Furthermore, as peacekeeping missions often causes concern for infringement on national sovereignty it is more likely to see peacekeeping where the government is weak. In addition, Fortna claims that a clear threat to regional peace and stability greatly increases the chance of mission deployment. Such threats can be composed of secondary effects of war in neighboring countries or migration of refugees. (Fortna, 2008, pp. 44–46, 70–75)

Lacking throughout the previous research is the aspect of what happens after the mandate is given and the troops deployed. Certainly, the peacekeeping efficiency literature\(^3\) can to some extent be seen as addressing this issue. It has, however, largely been discussing whether peacekeeping \textit{itself} is the most efficient way in establishing peace and security. For example, Hegre et al. (2017) establish that peacekeeping reduces violence in a conflict, that it shortens the duration of the conflict whilst prolonging the peace (Hegre, Hultman, & Mokleiv Nygård, 2017). Furthermore, Hultman et al. (2014) find in their article on peacekeeping, that the effect of approximately a 10,000 troops deployment can reduce the hostilities significantly and in doing so they estimate this to a 73 percent reduction of the level of violence. (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014) Even so, these studies do not discuss the difference in mandate application or how it is determined. Once again, it is here where this thesis aims to makes a scholarly contribution.

In conclusion, much of the literature focuses on the doctrinal and theoretical implications the changing ways of peacekeeping might bring on. There is, however, a continuous lack of focus on the conduct and tactical application of the mandates. With a greater understanding of what decides the level of enforcement, the effect on the peacekeeping doctrine and practice can easier be assessed and related to other challenges facing peacekeeping and the UN. With this in mind, the following chapter introduces the theoretical arguments binding this thesis to the broader field.

3. **THEORY**

The generations introduced in the last Chapter is a clear way to explain the evolution of peacekeeping. When it comes to peace enforcement, John Karlsrud (2018) writes that one of the earliest examples of such a mission is the one deployed to Kosovo (UNMIK) in June 1999. UNMIK’s task was to prevent the recurrence of war and violence, the Mission together with some other international actors were authorized to use all necessary means in its establishment of a security presence in the country. (Karlsrud, 2018) Another example is the UNAMSIL mission deployed to Sierra Leone the same year as UNMIK. While it received a “standard” robust Chapter VII mandate, it was rarely applied by the Mission troops. For years UNAMSIL struggled and suffered several attacks and it was not until the confidence of the Mission was at its lowest (from both the Sierra Leone population and troop-contributing countries) that reinforcement was sent and the UNAMSIL counter-attacks were started. (Findlay, 2002, pp.296-314)

About fifteen years later, the Intervention Brigade belonging to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is authorized to ‘neutralize’ identified rebel groups using all means necessary (Karlsrud, 2018). For example, on the mission webpage, ‘Operation Kuta Futa’ is explained as “… aimed at protecting the civilians, preventing frequent militia movement, disorganizing and annihilating militias, and showing up MONUSCO presence in the militia affected areas.” (MONUSCO Website, 2011) [Emphasis added by Author]. The mandate allowed the Mission, together with the FARDC (the Congolese armed forces), militia hideouts were raided to create a deterring effect. (MONUSCO Website, 2011) In contrast to UNAMSIL, both UNMIK and the DRC mission deploys their mandate with a more distinct goal of creating an environment of deterrence. Moreover, the UNAMSIL case shows that even within a mission, the application of enforcement can vary with time. Noteworthy, the mandates given to these missions are the same; they are based on the same resolutions but the implementation on the ground differs significantly. There must therefore be other factors

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4 In short: ensuring the security and freedom of movement for its personnel, protection of civilians, and to assist the government in DDR activities, and establishing a presence at key locations in the country. The thesis will expend further on this in Chapter Four.
deciding what type of enforcement that is applied on the ground. It is here that this thesis seeks to make a theoretical and intra-scientific contribution.

In line with the stated purpose of this thesis, this chapter sets out to address the theoretical arguments to the differences in implementation observed; how and why it occurs. On an abstract level, the factors influencing mission implementation can be divided into two main groups, conflict environment and mission commitment. Conflict environment describe the level of hostility, i.e., the daily threat experienced by UN troops. Mission commitment summarizes the level of support given to the mission as well as experiences and tools available to the mission to handle daily threats.

3.1 LEVEL OF HOSTILITY

The first mechanism from the causal argument to be introduced is the level of hostility in a conflict. While this mechanism initially might seem like a no-brainer, looking back at peacekeeping history the trend was to deploy troops to where there was a peace to keep, not to active conflict. As examples, the UN peacekeeping mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was deployed only after a ceasefire agreement was reached and was aimed mainly to support the implementation of this agreement (UNMEE Website, 2008). In contrast, the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia was deployed during an ongoing crisis situation characterized by widespread famine, inter-clan fighting, and absence of government authority (UNOSOM II Website, 1997).

According to Gowan and Johnstone (2007) there is a trend towards UN providing Chapter VII mandates preemptively. This is done with the understanding that even in the most unexpected environments, situations can turn sour very quickly. (Gowan & Johnstone, 2007) In recent years, situations with dramatically increased levels of hostility and attacks on UN peacekeepers such as those experienced in Mogadishu in Somalia, has in some cases necessitated emergency withdrawal of UN troops. Taking conflict environment into consideration is, therefore, important in order to understand the variation in the dependent variable.

A conflict is strongly characterized by the level of violence it is experiencing. I argue that high level of violence is a decisive factor in the deployment of UN missions, both where to go, but also size wise, since the level of violence and especially high level of violence tend to create a situation that is hard for the international community to ignore. Doyle and Sambanis (2006, p.62), as well as Virginia Page Fortna (2008, p.178), explains how the UN can be expected to
be present in “hard cases”. These cases are characterized by a high level of violence, relatively strong rebel groups, lack of economic development, number of battlefield deaths, as well as regional support for rebels. The argument is also made by several researchers that the severity (level of violence) of the conflicts also has a decisive part in how and what size of mission that is deployed. (Virginia Page Fortna, 2008, Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, Green, Kahl, & Diehl, 1998) With this in mind, Hultman et al. (2014) article from 2014 investigates if UN peace operations can lower the number of battlefield deaths when deployed to active conflict zones. They find that, while not possible to fully eliminate conflict, deployment of 10,000 peacekeeping troops can lower the level of violence with over 70 per cent. Such a deployment would also dramatically change the dynamics of the conflict by reducing tension. However, they also raise the discrepancy between the long-term and short-term perspective arguing while reducing hostilities between the belligerents UN may inhibit the prospects for a stable and durable peace due to not solving all the information problems between the conflict parties. (Hultman et al., 2014) The environments to which peace enforcement missions are deployed can then be expected to show a high level of violence or other measurements would have been preferable. With this high baseline of violence in mind, I find it important to highlight that I do not argue that a high level of violence by itself decide what level of enforcement is applied by the mission, but rather that in combinations with other mechanisms (discussed below) the violence characterizing the conflict can act as a justifier for a certain type and level of enforcement. For example, one could discuss if an equally high level of violence over a long time period less likely to result in a mission with a high level of enforcement than that of a case with ad hoc surges of violence. However, while research shows that the level of violence has a decisive effect on deployment, there is yet to show what effect on the mandate it has. Thus, by observing the pattern of violence’s in the selected cases on a time spectrum I hypothesize that one could be able to conclude if there is a special type of violence patterns that have a higher chance to lead to a certain level of enforcement.

Looking at the dynamics of the conflict, the number of opposition actors involved is of interest. According to Green et al. (1998,) the number of primary opposition actors affects the mission size. They find that each additional primary actor leads to approximately 1,700 more troops deployed. Green, Kahl, and Diehl attribute this to the logic of more conflict actors require more troops to monitor the additional belligerents. (Green et al., 1998) Whilst agreeing with Green et al. argument that more opponents result in more troops, the keyword in their argument is “monitor”. There is nothing that shows the effect the number of opponent actors has on the
level of enforcement applied on the tactical level. Instead, I suggest that a higher number of opponents increases the complexity of the interactions between rebels and the deployed troops. This would per se require more attention being directed to establishing who did what to whom. I, therefore, argue that it would be logical to assume that a lower number, and preferably clearly defined opponent, results in a higher level of enforcement due to the lower risk for political backlash.

With new mandates and tactics come new threats. Alex J. Bellamy (2014), Seet and Brunham (2000), Bellamy and Williams (2010, p.228), and Peter (2015) all agree that the changing nature of peacekeeping has given rise to concerns about confrontations including peacekeepers. They point to the politicization of peacekeeping and that it making peacekeepers more legitimate targets, resulting in a higher number of fatalities on the UNs’ side. (Bellamy, 2014; Peter, 2015; Seet & Burnham, 2000). Fortna & Martin (2009) do however argue that the authority of peacekeepers does not come from their military capacities, but rather the type of signal the need of peacekeepers (by mainly the government) sends – more specifically, a governments’ intentions to seek a resolution to the conflict. (Fortna & Martin, 2009, p. 88) Fjelde et al. (2016) article main argument is that conflicts can be seen as a bargaining process and Nynke Salverda (2013) writes that due to the less impartial role of peacekeepers they become an active actor in the conflict, often protecting the weaker side from total defeat. (Salverda, 2013, p. 710) This means that weaker rebel groups will seek protection from the peacekeepers while stronger groups are more likely to challenge them. Losses and setbacks can then be understood as creating incentives to attack peacekeepers. (Fjelde, Hultman, & Lindberg Bromley, 2016; Salverda, 2013)

The rising number of attacks on peacekeepers points to their important role in conflict settings. If the presence of peacekeepers is able to bring down the level of violence with around 70 per cent, as established by Hultman et al. (2014), one can expect the peacekeepers to become a very important player or a pawn in the bargaining process. By sifting the power balance between conflict parties, peacekeepers become legitimate targets for rebel groups and spoilers that are striving towards a goal either before or under negotiations. As a consequence of an increased level of threat to UN peacekeepers, it seems likely that the level of enforcement applied will increase as well. Moreover, this will influence planning and implementation of the missions. If UN personnel become strategic military targets, the missions will be probably also be motivated to apply their mandate more forcefully. As always, there have been exceptions to the rule and in some conflicts, attacks on peacekeepers have resulted in the withdrawal of troops. For
example, on June 5th, 1993, twenty-six Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in Somalia while serving under the UN flag and a few months later 18 Americans deployed to support the UN mission suffered the same fate. While Pakistan kept providing troops to UNOSOM II, the U.S chose to withdraw all its troops from Somalia. (Department of Public Information, 1997; Thakur, 1994) (Thakur, 1994) It should be remembered that the Mogadishu events were extreme and especially cruel and strongly affected the American public through unprecedented video recordings of ferocious and savage acts. At the same time, however, Pakistan kept providing troops to UNOSOM II.

In early twentieth century, conflict financing and how this shaped the conflict environment gained increased attention in the international community. This came from armed groups in Africa (for example in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and DRC) where some armed groups and local warlords financed their activities by gaining control over valuable natural resources such as diamonds and oil. New terms like “conflict diamonds” and “blood diamonds” entered the public domain and became closely related to crimes of war. In fact, researchers found that the conflict environment differed based on the presence of different types of resources, that it provided incentives for different types of violence and that these were connected to the national and international context the conflict was related to. Wennmann (2011) exemplifies with Nigeria where the presence of oil resulted in oil theft, the kidnapping of power plant workers, and that the support for the rebel groups came from malcontent communities affected by the oil production. War financing is nothing new, but the study of its interconnectedness to the local communities when it comes to rebel groups is. Strategies such as robbery, foreign government support, revenue from natural resources, kidnapping, diaspora remittances, and taxes used by the rebel groups increase the risk for the local communities to be targeted in regard to both the need for more money by the rebel group or counter-insurgency campaigns. Furthermore, it is important to consider that the possession of resources also can be translated to possessing the financial means to actually keep fighting. There are two costs to keep in mind when it comes to conflict financing: (1) the cost to start a conflict and (2) the costs to maintain the conflict. One could relatively easy predict what one needs to start a rebellion, it is, however, harder to predict the costs for keeping it going. This is due to the cost being affected by conflict dynamics, duration, and intensity. These three factors namely play a big part in deciding on what rate one will need to replace soldiers and materials such as weapons and ammunition. (Wennmann, 2011)
From another point of view, Jeremy Weinstein (2007) writes that the debate regarding ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’ leading to conflict can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Weinstein means that resource-rich groups recruit opportunists using coercive strategies whilst resource-poor groups rely on activist-minded recruits. (Weinstein, 2006, pp. 21, 173, 328–329) With this targeting of locals, the increased possibility for a longer and more intense conflict I argue that groups are perceived by the international community as a bigger threat to international peace and security and therefore must be dealt with, and therefore have a heightening effect on the level of enforcement applied in a mission. This can also be seen in changes in the handling of armed group financing, that since the nineties fundamentally has changed. Going from coercive, legal approaches such as sanctions on trade, travel, bank accounts and commodities, another layer of regulatory and financial institutions has been added to monitor financial flows. However, this resulted in rebel and terrorist groups to a larger extent rely on local resources and methods of financing. (Biersteker, 2007, pp. 2–6) I argue that due to the efforts, and effects of these efforts, it can be expected to be of interest to limit these sources and methods of financing by the deployed mission.

To summarize, with the theoretical arguments made above in mind, I suggest that the level of hostility influence the level of enforcement applied by a mission by establishing the foundation of what the mission can be expected to deal with. I anticipate that an increase in the level of violence increases the level of enforcement in the sense that it raises the need to end the violence and humanitarian suffering. Furthermore, I suggest that a lower number of opponents allows for clarity, decreasing the chance of the mission getting caught in situations that can lead to political setbacks and in that clarity, allowing missions the confidence to use more robust tactics. Additionally, I anticipate that a high number of attacks on peacekeepers will lead to an increased level of enforcement by raising the commitment to and need to end violence. Lastly, I argue that the possession of natural resources increases the level of enforcement by adding a prominent economic layer to the conflict as well as allowing the opposition to self-finance their fighting. Consequently, I present the first hypothesis of this study:

\[ H1: \text{Higher levels of hostility leads to higher levels of enforcement}. \]

3.2 LEVEL OF COMMITMENT

The second mechanism to be addressed in this study is the level of commitment. Fundamentally, this is about the level of interest and resolve invested in the conflict from the international
community. Due to this, a higher level of commitment would suggest a higher level of enforcement and can, therefore, be expected to have an influence on the variation in the dependent variable.

To start, a large mission (i.e. many troops) signals commitment and determination and will presumably increase enforcement. In addition, a large mission increases operational capability, security and self-confidence and, thereby, enforcement. Michelle Benson and Jacob D. Kathman (2014) conclude in their study that the UN tends to provide larger forces and have a bigger commitment in those conflicts where its preferred party is suffering. (Benson & Kathman, 2014) In a similar matter, Diehl and Balas (2014), as well as Green et al. (1998), argue that while size matter, it is the involvement of a UNSC member that indicates commitment and stronger support for an operation or conflict solution. (Benson & Kathman, 2014; Diehl & Balas, 2014; Green et al., 1998) It would therefore also be of interest to study if the missions including a UNSC member tend to be larger, or if there is another determining factor in regard to size, but this will not be covered in this thesis.

Secondly, one needs to consider the actual composition of missions. While UN operations are single-state mandates, the conflicts that the address are often regional meaning the surrounding states in some ways are a part of the conflict dynamics. (Karlsrud, 2015; Peter, 2015) In his dissertation, Michael A. Morgan (2015) theorizes that internal structures, with a focus on organizational structure, plays a part in deciding the functionality and the risk for malicious actions against peacekeepers. After the end of the cold war, the number of UN missions has increased. In parallel, the number of donors to UN missions has increased as well. (Bove & Ruggeri, 2016) This increased diversity in donor states has sometimes been referred to as a “double-edged sword” (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007, p.988) because each contributing state prepares personnel for peacekeeping tasks according to its own standards and practices, those taking part in peacekeeping operations often adhere to diverse standard operating procedures and demonstrate dissimilar battlefield aptitude. As a result, there is a high degree of intra-coalition variation that might affect the operational capability, coordination and effectiveness of the peacekeeping UN forces. (Morgan, 2015) However, the new type of multinational and enforcement missions has put a higher demand on regional actors to participate in operations (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Regional actors have usually only been deployed when there is a consent from all main parties, this is to avoid them becoming or acting as instruments for their own governments in neighboring countries. This was, for example, the case with Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone and the UNAMSIL mission. This is also done to safeguard the credibility of the
mission and its operations as well as to protect peacekeepers from attacks. (Karlsrud, 2015; Peter, 2015) I argue that proximity to a conflict can be expected to come with more media coverage, higher relatability, and a higher risk of spill-overs resulting in the neighboring countries having a higher interest in keeping or, in this case, enforcing peace. Glenn (2011) conducts a study on stabilization missions and coalition formation in connection to them. His main argument is that due to the lack of direct consequences, the bonds between coalition members and personnel are weaker as well as the commitment to the cause. (Glenn, 2011) Peter (2015) and Yamashita (2008) both write that UN operations are starting to rely more on regional efforts and contributions, the increased risks makes it more likely that states with higher regional interest (security and political interests) are willing to contribute with troops. (Peter, 2015; Yamashita, 2008) I therefore also argue that a mission with mainly military personal from the same region as the receiving country tends to have a higher level of enforcement.

Based on the theoretical arguments made above, I suggest that the composition of the mission has a determining effect on its commitment to the resolve of the conflict. A higher level of commitment from the troops and donor countries could suggest a higher willingness to apply a wider and more robust set of means to reach the desired goal or outcome, this would then include measures to enforce peace and stability. Consequently, I present the second hypothesis for this study:

\[ H2: \text{Higher levels of troop commitment, especially regional, leads to higher levels of enforcement.} \]

3.3 SUMMARY CHAPTER THREE

The decision to measure the variables as concepts consisting of indicators (level of violence, troop deployment, peacekeeper security, resources, mission composition as well as mission size) instead of studying the indicators as stand-alone aspects, was to allow for a higher level of complexity in the causal relations and interplay. By allowing for the indicators to guide the study rather than view them as separate, it is possible to examine and determine if one certain type of hostility is especially influential. For example, while I agree that this the higher commitment to peace that the previous research highlight is a determining factor in conflict and peace development, I argue that the literature fails to address if this brings on a higher level of violence overall in the conflict by allowing a third party to deploy military means; and if so, what the influencing factors resulting in this higher level of violence are.
To conclude the theoretical discussion, I do not argue that one mechanism or the other is solely responsible for what type of enforcement that is applied. Instead, the goal of this thesis is to study which factors influence and why. Therefore, I rather argue that the combinations of the two mechanisms constitute fundamental aspects that the missions need to adapt to, and account for while choosing their preferred methods and strategies.

Figure 1: Visualization of the causal pathway.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

In the following Chapter, I will elaborate on the method chosen to test the causal mechanisms argued for in the previous sections. The Chapter is divided into three sections: First, the chosen method is introduced. The second section outlines the operationalization of the independent and dependent variable. To conclude, the last section deals with the selection of cases and talks about the enforcement mandate as it is given.

4.1 METHODOLOGY: STRUCTURED FOCUSED COMPARISON

In their work *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005, p.151-159) outlines the development of case study methods. After being criticized for being too descriptive and lacking in its basis for systematic comparison, the case study method developed into what today is called qualitative Structured Focused Comparison. By applying a so-called structured and focused aspects to case studies, George and Bennett (2005) argue that intense small-N studies are one of the most useful for policy-related work and questions. The method is ‘structured’ in the way that it is asking general and standardized question to each of the cases. These questions need to be cautiously developed with the theoretical focus and research objective of the study in mind. The advantages of using such questions are that it ensures that the data collected becomes comparative. If comparable the result will be able to contribute to the cumulative development of theory and knowledge about the specific phenomenon.

The method is ‘focused’ in the way that it is undertaken with a research objective in mind and an appropriate theoretical framework. A focused comparison does however often result in some challenges, the main one being that having more variables to consider then cases to include – making it hard for the researcher to control for all influencing variables. But to account for all these diverse variables, a different focus would have to be adopted and used with a different theoretical framework. (George & Bennett, 2005)

A Structured Focused Comparison divides the study into three phases. The first phase concerns the design of the study and the following tasks are to be performed:
1. Specifying objectives, research puzzle, previous research, and the research gap. (See Chapter One and Two in this thesis)
2. Identify the variables and presenting the causal argument. (See Chapter Three in this thesis)
3. The selection of Cases. (See Section 4.3 in this Chapter)
4. Operationalization and indicators of the variables. (See Section 4.2 in this Chapter)
5. Formulation of the general questions. (See Section 4.2 in this Chapter)

The second phase is the execution of the case studies. Each case selected is structured and presented in the same way and the focus of the analysis is to address the questions formulated under phase one. With comparative analysis, the third and last phase seeks to identify the theoretical implications of the result as well as develop the theory and propose future research. It is in the last phase that the main scholarly contributions are made. (George & Bennett, 2005)

I settled on using a qualitative method for several reasons. First of all, the strength of qualitative studies is its exploratory characteristics and the ability to study complex causal stories rather than the causal effect. The advantages of using a qualitative method during this study are that it allows for the study of non-quantifiable relations between the variables. This makes it possible to further study the different indicators and their effect on the causal relation and dependent variable, pinpointing if they are of the same importance, if there are indicators missing or they are affecting each other. The structured questions this method calls for will, in this thesis, focus on quite general areas that in a good way captures the indicators for the variables. This is mainly to be able to make the data collected comparable since the time period and prerequisites for the cases might vary to a great extent. The downside for qualitative methods, according to Gerring (2017) and Powner (2014), tend to be its external validity due to a smaller number of cases and non-randomized case selection (Gerring, 2017; Powner, 2014). This is also the case for this study. I fend for this by trying to choose as diverse but representative cases as possible, contrasting them to each other and trying to establish if the result is context or non-context based.

4.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES

To be able to conduct a proper analysis of the hypothesized causal relations between the dependent variable and the two independent variables, the key theoretical concepts need to be translated into terms that can be observed. To do so I will be posing questions in each chosen
case to establish the presence of the variables as well what form they take. In this section, the operationalizations and questions for the variables will be presented.

4.2.1. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE – LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT

There is no easy way to establish the level of enforcement, mainly because it is a quite fuzzy concept with no clear quantifiable or categorical points. Instead one must look to what the missions were doing and how they were responding in different situations. To do this, the UN Secretary-General Reports will be studied, creating an understanding of how the mission is behaving on a tactical level. Mainly, I will be looking for clashes between rebels and the mission troops to be able to establish what means were used and how the troops acted during the hostile situation. The advantage of using the reports is that the same sources will be used for all the cases as well as its proximity to the actual event and mission which allows for a good account of what happened. However, this proximity is also a disadvantage due to an interest in the perception of operations, either to the better or to the worse depending on the mission needs. To fend for this, the ‘Observations’ sections where the Secretary-General shares his observations of the mission needs and addresses the member states will be disregarded, more focus will instead be paid to the informative segments.

To study the dependent variable the following questions will be posed to the literature:

1. Are the missions acting in a proactive or reactive way?
2. Is force used as a response to hostile situations by the mission?

Proactive missions could be where the troops seek out instability and hostile areas, probably with the goal of establishing a more peaceful environment. Reactive missions only engage in hostile situations when faced with or forced into one. The second question regards how the missions behave when in a situation; do they make full use of their mandate or do they tend to withdraw. Possible theoretical answers can, for example, be that a mission applies forceful tactic to reduce the risk for an increase in violence or attacks on civilians. The second question then addresses using what means they do this, for example with low use of force by a high presence in unstable areas rather than robust military action.

For the sake of clarity and intersubjectivity, the dependent variable will fall either under the category of low, medium, or high level of enforcement decided by an aggregated result of the two questions. For example, a proactive tactic with the use of force in hostile situations would result in a high level of enforcement whilst a reactive tactic with low use of force would result in a low level of enforcement, and a mixture between the two will give a medium result.
RESEARCH DESIGN
THE UNITED NATIONS DOES (NOT) WAGE WAR
SOFIA WENNBERG

Of importance is also to note that the variable is one of path dependency, this dependency can affect the cases in two ways. Firstly, what they have experienced before, meaning the ‘historic’ context of the mission’s matter in the way a mission act. Secondly, decisions made at the beginning of the missions are likely to affect the formation of the mandate. For example, if a decision is made to use a higher level of enforcement at the beginning of the mission it may result in the level in the overall mission being higher because one ‘set the bar high’ to begin with. To avoid this, the indicators for the independent variables are mostly pre-deployment or limited to three years after the initial deployment of the robust mission.

4.2.2. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES – LEVEL OF HOSTILITY AND MISSION COMMITMENT

The independent variables are concepts and hence quite hard to by themselves observe in the cases. Therefore, the measurement of the variables will be dependent on a number of indicators. To begin with, conflict environment will be operationalized by studying indicators such as level of violence, the number of attacks on peacekeepers, the number of opponent actors, and resources possessed by the opposition. Level of violence will be observed as a function of the number of deaths over a time period of 12 months leading up to the point when the enforcement mandate was given. In a similar matter, the number of attacks on peacekeepers will be observed as a function of attacks against peacekeepers over a period of 12 months after the adoption of the establishment of the enforcement mandate. The number of opponent actors will be studied in relation to the conflict primary parties as well as in relation to the given mandate and if one or several specific opponents are named. Resources possessed by the opposition will be studied

Figure 2: Possible categorizations of the dependent variable.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of force</th>
<th>Low use of force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proactive</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹This category would imply successful deterrence where the proactive use of force has been so high that there is no longer a need for it. Even though it would be very interesting to study this type, I do not expect to see this category of enforcement in this study seeing the short time period of the dependent variable studied.
by looking at the financing and possession of a resource by the primary conflict opposition party. The questions posed to identify these indicators will be the following:

1. From 12 months prior the establishment of the enforcement mandate, what was the number of deaths in the conflict?
2. During the first 12 months after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, how many attacks\(^6\) were there against UN peacekeepers?
3. In the resolution that stipulates the enforcement mandate, are one or several opponents named?
4. Do the primary opposition parties (as defined by Question 3) possess natural resources?

The first and second question can be answered by looking at the number of deaths or attacks. Seeing there is no standardized ranking system for either of the questions, the answers will therefore have to be relative to the other cases which results in a high significance on a good diversity in the case selection. With the third question, consideration will be shown to how many opponents are listed as well as their implied significance by the resolution. Regarding resources, the theoretical answers circle around not only the presence but also the role of natural resources in the armed groups financing.

For the second independent variable, mission commitment, the indicators will focus on the nature of the mission such as size and nationality of the troops deployed, and task division. The size will be based on the official numbers given by the UN, considered will be the increase or decrease of troops as well as national belonging. Nationality will be mainly be studied with reference to regional versus international troops but also the division within the two groups. Lastly, the task division will be highlighted. Partly the number of contributed troops and if possible, the role distribution between different nationalities. To identify these indicators will be the following questions will be asked:

5. During a period of three years after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, was there a positive change in the number of troops deployed?
6. During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, what nationalities did the mission consist off?
7. During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, was there a difference in the number of contributed troops and the task division between the nationalities?

To study the fifth question, I will look to official documents concerns troop deployment, looking for either a decrease, increase or no change. At the same time, who the troop contributor

\(^6\) This thesis considers targeted attacks on peacekeepers or the Missions. Hence, it does not look to incidents where the Mission became collateral damage by being in the vicinity or intervening in an already hostile situation.
is will be noted to study the division between regional and international personnel. Lastly, notice will also be given in regard to the number of contributed troops and what the division of roles is in connection to nationality.

At the starting point of the study, the questions are not subject to any internal ranking. Instead, I wish to allow flexibility to be able to see if any pattern or level expresses deterministic properties. I hope this would allow for the possibility to study a more complex causal story, where the causal pathway does not behave as I have anticipated. When it comes to the concluding assessment, the aggregation of the result will either a high or low level of the variable. This is due to the complexity in classifying concepts that cannot be measured and trying to avoid falling into all medium cases. The aggregation will have to be clear cut, if two or more indicators are classified as high (in relation to the other cases) the variable will be classified as such as well.

4.3 CASE SELECTION

The goal of this paper is to establish what it is that makes the difference in the level of enforcement. Therefore, when selecting cases, I am looking for a variance in the dependent variable. The downside is, as discussed in the previous section, that the operationalization of a concept such as level of enforcement can be tricky. It is therefore important that a discussion problematizing the operationalizations and its limitations are held, this will be done in section 6.4 of this thesis.

The population of relevance available for this study is UN missions with enforcement mandates. When determining what cases fall under that scope the UNSCs’ Field Mission Mandate Table 2018 (Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch, Security Council Affairs Division, & Department of Political Affairs United Nations, 2018), Field Mission Mandate Table 2017 (Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch, Security Council Affairs Division, & Department of Political Affairs United Nations, 2017), and Patrik Johansson’s inventory of Chapter VII missions (Johansson, 2003) were consulted. The Field Mission Tables allows one to select what type of mandate one is looking for and then it lists the missions that can be categorized as such. However, due to only listing active missions, Johansson’s inventory was brought in to identify older missions. The main objective of the thesis is to establish why and what aspects it is that results in a difference in the level of enforcement applied by the missions. To be able to do that and to increase the generalizability of the study, there is an
interest in choosing a diverse set of cases. To start off, I am looking for post-Brahimi deployments, this is due to the report’s importance in the development of peacekeeping. Secondly, the missions are to be classified as a robust mission by the Mission Tables and/or Johnson (2003). Then, to identify a variation in the cases I look to the number of troops currently deployed or deployed at the time of withdrawal. I argue that the number of troops deployed can be used as an initial indicator for troop commitment and hostility, and the total number of peacekeeper fatalities as initial indicators for the level of hostility. These are used as initial indicators for a variance due to contributing with troops being voluntary, and the number would then signal commitment and importance. Peacekeeper fatalities are used to indicate the threat (level of hostility) the mission is facing.

The following table shows available cases within the scope of this thesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Active?</th>
<th>Previous deployment</th>
<th>Enforcement Mandate</th>
<th>Total number of Peacekeeper Fatalities by Malicious Act</th>
<th>Military Troops Deployed¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>UNIFIL (March 1978)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Res. 1701 (2006)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>11,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>UNMIK (June 1999)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Res. 1244 (1999)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuye</td>
<td>UNISFA (June 2011)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Res. 1990 (2011)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNMIL (September 2003)</td>
<td>No (March 2018)</td>
<td>Yes (UNOMIL, UNOL)</td>
<td>Res. 1509 (2003)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,663*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>MINUJUSTH (June 2004)</td>
<td>No (October 2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Res. 2350 (2017)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,366*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS (July 2011)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Res. 1996 (2011), Res. 2304 (2016)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13,776</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Cases available for selection*

As shown in the table, there is quite some variation in the two last columns. Based on these, the following three cases will be in focus during this study: (1) Democratic Republic of the Congo,
MONUSCO, which shows the highest number of deployed troops and quite a low number of peacekeeper fatalities; (2) Mali, MINUSMA, which also shows a quite high number of deployed troops in relation to the other missions and quite distinctively differ in the high number of peacekeeping fatalities; and lastly (3) South Sudan, UNMISS, which deployment number is between the two other cases but only shows 14 fatalities.

4.3.1. THE ESSENCE OF THE ENFORCEMENT MANDATE

The robust mandates that are given are the same, consist of the same formulation, the same references, and then is supplemented by case specific details. To begin with, the mandates are referred to as an action based off Chapter VII of the UN Charter from which the UNSC then authorize the missions to “use all necessary means” in its strive to deter attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, protect humanitarian personnel and the delivery of aid, as well as to assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019; United Nations, 1945) It is this language and essence this thesis refers to when speaking about a ‘standard peace enforcement’ or ‘robust’ mandate tasks.
5. **CASE PRESENTATION**

The following section introduces the three cases selected for this study. Each case is presented in the same way: First, an introduction to the conflict is given. Second, the dependent and independent variables will be addressed in relation to case empirics. To conclude, a summary of the case will be given in the form of a table. To be noted; the in-case results are presented in the case tables. This is done to allow for a cross-case comparison in the next section, which will explore patterns and implications of the in-case result in a more complex way.

5.1 **THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN (UNMISS)**

After a referendum on the 9th of July 2011, South Sudan declared independence and in doing so became the youngest country in the world. The history of South Sudan and Sudan has been conflict-ridden, and the southern parts of the country has remained military and economically weaker than its northern Sudanese counterpart, partly due to the dominant nomad culture. This also meant that the region has remained out of reach from invading cultures and forces, for example from Egypt in the late 1800s or the British in mid-1900. Due to this the cultural difference between the two areas grew. When Sudan became independent and was merged with the south in 1956, conflict was soon a fact with Sudan turning towards an Islamic rule. Two violent civil wars followed: the first one was characterized by guerrilla warfare and ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement which bestowed some regional autonomy on the south. But tensions remained and when the Sudanese president declared in 1983 Sudan, including the South, to be an Islamic state ruled under shari’a, a second civil war broke out. (de Waal, 2014; Johnson, 2016; Swedish UN Association, 2016)

The Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) was formed by mutineers from the Sudanese army. Originally their goal was a united and secular Sudanese state, but in the 1990s there was a split into two fractions and the first call for an independent southern Sudan state was made. When the second civil war ended in 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) an estimate of one up to two and a half million lives had been lost. While the CPA did not guarantee independence, it guaranteed self-determination for the south and for a six-year period a united Sudan was to be given a chance, after that the South was given a right to hold a
referendum on its belonging. When it was held in 2011, the choice of independence received a total of 98.83 percent of the votes. (de Waal, 2014; Johnson, 2016; UNMISS Website, 2015)

Following the independence of South Sudan, the UNSC adopted resolution 1996 (2011) establishing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with the purpose to support the newly formed state to “… consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development (…) to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically …” (UNSC S/RES/1996, 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, the resolution goes on to mandate the Mission to use all necessary means to perform standard tasks such as protect civilians and humanitarian personnel, but also in assisting the South Sudanese Government to fulfill their security responsibilities, including "… military and police at national and local levels…” (UNSC S/RES/1996, 2011, p. 3). In the year leading up to the establishment of UNMISS, UCDP noted an increase in the total number of battle-related deaths from 1,790 in mid-2010 to 2,567 in mid-2011. Of these 1,404 were from state-based violence, 983 were from non-state violence and 180 from one-sided violence. Most clashes were inter-ethnic, the most prominent one being between Lou Nuers and Murle in the eastern. Other than that, the clashes centered around the border areas between the north and south. The one named organization is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and the resolution demands that the group “… immediately cease all forms of violence and human rights abuses…” (UNSC S/RES/1996, 2011, p. 5). The LRA was founded in Uganda by a spiritual medium and consists of mainly heterodox Christians. Their ideology is disputed but in Uganda, they are fighting for a multi-party democracy and that the state should be ruled by religious measures. In practice, the International Crisis Group (2004) argues that the group does not have an identifiable political agenda – which becomes clear when their tactics and strategies are studied. (International Crisis Group, 2004) According to the Enough Project (2017), the Sudanese Government started funding the LRA in 1994 and it is believed that the LRA has been used by the Sudanese Government to create and maintain unrest in the South. Except for the Governmental funding, the group is involved in illegal trade with elephant ivory, gold, and diamonds. (The Enough Project, 2017) The group was declared a terrorist group by the US in 2001 but became famous amongst a wider population in 2012 and the so-called "Stop Kony" movement. (International Crisis Group, 2004)

Originally the Mission was only to be deployed for one year but were prolonged in 2012 and again in 2013 due to a continued loss of civilian lives, unstable security situation and the lack
of capacity of the government of South Sudan to better these situations. (United Nations Security Council, 2012; UNSC S/RES/2109, 2013) This prolongation meant that when the violence, marking the beginning of the South Sudan civil war, broke out between the SPLM and Anti-Government Forces (AGF) in December 2013, the UN was already on the ground. The relationship between UNMISS and the government did however rapidly deteriorate with misperceptions about the UN’s role during the crisis and allegations about the mission supporting the AGF. (UNMISS Website, 2015) With the increased tension the movement of the UNMISS became increasingly obstructed at the same time as the humanitarian situation worsen. From the end of 2013 until the end of February 2014 some 900,000 persons where estimated displaced and the number suffering from food insecurity had increased from 1.1 million to 3.2 million. When the fighting reached the capital 85,000 civilians sought refuge within UNMISS eight compounds across the country. (UNMISS Website, 2015) With minimum facilities to accommodate them, the UNSC adopted resolution 2132 (2013) on Christmas eve 2013. The resolution endorsed the recommendations made by the Secretary General to increase the overall force levels allowed by UNMISS as well as transfer troops from other missions to the area. (United Nations Security Council, 2013) In line with a report made by the Secretary General in March 2014 (see UN Secretary General Report S/2014/158, 2014) resolution 2155 (2014) was later adopted in May 2014, stating that UNMISS will cease all State-building activities to further establish its role as impartial and to better be able to coordinate with all parties the protection of civilians. (United Nations Security Council, 2014)

Looking at the Secretary-Generals reports for UNMISS from the adoption of the mandate late March 2011 all the way to March 2014, it is clear that during the first reporting leading up to the first report in November 2011, the Mission was still very much in a start-up mode, even though the military component had already at this point reached over 70 per cent of its authorized troops. (UN Secretary General S/2011/678, November 2011) While the Mission was trying to expand to all ten South Sudanese states, the focus was on pre-empting or mitigating the impact of conflict-related violence on the civilian population. The Mission performed "…concerted responses…" in so-called hotspots, using preventive advocacy and multiple forms of local support. Despite limitations, the Mission had also mobilized a multifaceted response including early-warning, patrols, and prevention activities. The need for and the deployment of troops quickly became primarily in response to the status of crisis in the Jonglei State. While not much was being reported on specific Mission activities, one incident that stands out during this period is from October when a UNMISS helicopter comes under fire from the South Sudan
Police Service. With two clear hits towards the helicopter cockpit, but without injuries, the helicopter withdrew and returned to its point of departure. (UN Secretary General S/2011/678, November 2011)

In December 2011 and January 2012, the inter-communal violence in Jonglei increased further. After clashes between people from the villages of Lou Nuer and Murle at the beginning of December, UN aerial patrols spotted a group of 2,000 armed youth; looting and burning villages, heading in the direction of Murle. Due to the previous clashes, pre-emptive positions had already been taken by the Mission at key populated centers, something that allowed for early-warnings and the time for civilians to leave the area. By Boxing Day, the movement had grown to 5,000 and UNMISS positions got reinforced by troops from other parts of the country. It was estimated that half of the Mission's military forces were deployed to the area. The Lou Nuers kept clear of UNMISS forces but kept up its destructive activities leading to the South Sudanese Army (SPLA) starting an offense towards the advancing group on January 2nd, firing at the masses. UMISS military personal moved forward to support the SPLA, and the attackers withdrew from the town. With its high presence, the Mission was able to generate early warnings through ground and air surveillance, and in doing so were able to inform the Government and the SPLA of other impending attacks. However, the continued large-scale deployment in Jonglei State did increase the strain on the Mission’s troop levels, logistics, and resources. By March 2012, the Mission received support from its surrounding UN missions, e.g. two military helicopters from the MONUSCO mission was sent over to help sustain the ongoing operations related to the UNMISS protection mandate. The South Sudanese Government also provided the mission with helicopters to support further efforts. (UN Secretary General S/2012/140, March 2012)

In March border hostilities between Sudan and South Sudan broke out and the SPLA captured and occupied the oil-rich city of Heglig in Sudan. Widespread public demonstrations were held by the public in support of the occupation and demanding the end of the Sudanese Armed Forces bombings that were claiming civilian lives. With these demonstrations', criticism was also directed at UNMISS for demanding the withdrawal of the SPLA from Heglig. Moreover, the people were also demanding that the Mission take greater responsibility in the protection of civilians in the affected area and to invoke its Chapter VII enforcement mandate to help defend South Sudan. The Secretary-General report then highlights that this revealed a "… widespread misunderstanding of the UNMISS mandate…” (UN Secretary General S/2012/486, June 2012,
p.5) and became the beginning of an information campaign throughout the country explaining how the mandate only exists within the borders of South Sudan and does not include protection of territory, neither does it include protection against aerial bombardment. (UN Secretary General S/2012/486, June 2012)

The following reporting period focused on the ever-present violence in the Jonglei. Due to the frequency of civilians being caught in the crossfire between the SPLA and the rebels, UNMISS developed contingency plans for the protection of civilians and deployed a range of mitigating actions. (UN Secretary General S/2012/820, November 2012) The reporting period was also filled with incidents putting pressure on the Mission, e.g. in November UNMISS received a letter demanding them to vacate the Likuangole area and had to take precautionary measures such as reinforce the local troops. Just a few weeks later a UNMISS helicopter was shot down by the SPLA while out on reconnaissance and the four-man crew all died in the incident. The SPLA claimed that the helicopter had been mistaken for one Sudanese Armed Forces helicopter that was supplying rebel groups. This was the second targeted attack that UNMISS fell victim too within the first twelve months of its deployment, both focused on the vital aerial component of the Mission. In late January, clashes between the SPLA and rebel groups forced some 2,500 civilians to seek protection in UNMISS camps. (UN Secretary General S/2013/140, March 2013) Furthermore, the onset of the dry season resulted in an increase of cattle raids. Thanks to local networks and early warning systems, planned raids were foiled by the UNMISS and local actors. (UN Secretary General S/2013/140, March 2013)

In the spring of 2013, there was a clear rise in the attacks on UN peacekeepers. Convoys and patrols in the Jonglei State region were repeatedly attacked by unidentified armed elements, resulting in both injuries and fatalities. At the same time, the SPLA started to engage in more frequent military operations against rebel groups across the country, rendering UNMISS work more difficult due to limited freedom of movement. With this and the downing of a helicopter in 2012 that lead to flight restrictions, the Mission's capability to perform deterrence activities became severely hampered. For the protection of civilians from physical violence, UNMISS continued to provide refuge within its camps for thousands of people across the country. (UN Secretary General S/2013/366, 2013) In the area of Unity, Warrap and the Lakes States, UNMISS continued to support the efforts of local authorities and the Government to deter and mitigate cross-State inter-communal conflicts. This was mainly done through an incentive called ‘Operation Longhorn’. Longhorn highlighted information sharing and coordination, and
UNMISS continued with its high military presence in risk areas, creating a sense of security “...through its deterrent presence.” (UN Secretary General S/2013/366, 2013, p.9). (UN Secretary General S/2013/366, 2013) In November 2013, the Mission had conducted a comprehensive threat analysis that showed that 94 per cent of the conflict-related deaths were occurring in the Jonglei State and the tri-State area. Because of this, the Mission decided to concentrate their efforts on those geographical high-risk areas whilst retaining strategic flexibility to respond to threats elsewhere. The report also noted that “Since 11 September, UNMISS civilian staff have participated in some of the military patrols.” (UN Secretary General S/2013/651, November 2013, p.8). (UN Secretary General S/2013/651, November 2013)

In December 2013 there was a rise in the tension between Government elements. On the evening of December 15th, events took a violent turn with internal fights, something the President called an attempted coup d'état. The violence quickly spread and a few days into the crisis, the relationship between the Government and UNMISS also took a turn for the worse, once again attributed to the misperceptions about the Mission’s role. However, anti-UN sentiments rose quickly and allegations that UNMISS were aiding AGFs led to sharp and public criticism regarding the Missions no longer being impartial. This affected UNMISS freedom of movement and several violations of the status-of-forces agreement was made; such as Government forces forcefully trying to make their way into UN compounds, harassment, physical assault, arrest and detention of United Nations staff. Due to the deteriorating security situation, the Mission started to relocate non-critical personnel from the crisis areas and the Security Council approved the request for temporarily increased to 12,500 military troops. (UN Secretary General Report S/2014/158, 2014; United Nations Security Council, May 2014)

Fighting continued during the first six months of 2014 and the Mission repeatedly ended up in hostile situations. Unidentified perpetrators were responsible for 19 incidents and Government agents for 75 incidents against UNMISS. For example, a convoy struck by grenades resulted in the UNMISS troops having to fight the attackers off. On April 17th, an armed mob said to be peaceful protesters seeking to present a petition, entered and attacked a UNMISS site for protection against civilians. With machetes and guns, the intruders attacked everyone present at the site and UNMISS troops used lethal force trying to repel the attackers. 48 civilians under the Missions protection and three attackers were killed in the incident, but many more injured. (UN Secretary General S/2014/537, July 2014)
Three years into the Mission, there was an estimated 97,000 internally displaced persons. Whilst under severe limitations, the Mission enhanced its patrolling of urban centers, extracted civilians from vulnerable locations, and did their best trying to establishing safe corridors for the movement. (UN Secretary General S/2014/537, July 2014) By this point, the troop number had grown from the initial 5,329 in 2011 to 10,398. This was not only an increase in the actual number but also the authorized number of military troops deployed. In the first resolution the number was set at 7000, and in Resolution 2155 (2014) increased the ceiling of military troops to 12,500. (United Nations Security Council, 2014) In March 2011, the Mission consisted of 26 troop contributing countries. The regional representation was in the beginning quite small, this was mainly due to the AFISMA absorption not being finished. Other than that, the Mission had representation from all parts of the world, including the Oceania. The largest contributor was India with over 2,400 troops on the ground. By 2014 the representation had grown to 37, some countries were new and some previous had left the Mission. India remained the largest donor, even to their number had lowered to 2000, and Nepal had increased their troops to 1,100. Specialist were brought in from the Western countries, the bulk troop countries was Asian, and added to this was the engineering companies sent from India, Japan, and the South Korea. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2011, 2014)

### 5.1.1. UNMISS CASE TABLE

**LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT**

| Q1: Are the missions acting in a proactive or reactive way? | Whilst the mission is highly proactive in protecting civilians, the stabilization part of the Mission is mainly reactive. |
| Q2: Is force used as a response to hostile situations by the mission? | Yes, in extreme cases. Otherwise pre-emptive measures and deterrence are the main tools applied. |
| **Aggregated assessment:** | Medium. |

**LEVEL OF HOSTILITY**

| Q3: From 12 months prior the establishment of the enforcement mandate, what was the number of deaths in the conflict? | The total number of deaths were 2,567 in mid-2011. Of these 1,404 were from state-based violence, 983 were from non-state violence and 180 from one-sided violence. |

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7 Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, India, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, and Rwanda. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2011)

8 Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Moldovia, Mongolia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, South Korea, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, the UK, the US, Yemen, and Zambia. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2014)
Q4: During the first 12 months after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, how many attacks where there against UN peacekeepers?

UNMISS was targeted on two incidents, both times the Missions aerial components were in focus.

Q5: In the resolution that stipulates the enforcement mandate, are one or several opponents named?

Yes, the Lord’s Resistance Army is named in the resolution and it demands the cessation of all forms of violence from the group.

Q6: Do the primary opposition parties (as defined by Question 3) possess natural resources?

No.

Aggregated assessment: Low

**LEVEL OF COMMITMENT:**

Q7: During a period of three years after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, was there a positive change in the number of troops deployed?

Yes. There was an increase in the actual number present (5,329 to 10,398) as well as the authorized number of military troops that could be deployed (7,000 to 12,500).

Q8: During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, what nationalities did the mission consist of?

The Mission did at most consist of 37 nationalities (North and South America, Oceania, Europe, Asia). India was the largest troop contributor during all three years.

Q9: During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, was there a difference in the number of contributed troops and the task division between the nationalities?

India provided the most troops together with regional partners - The West contributed with specialist troops and Asia (India, Japan, and Korea) provided the majority of the military engineers.

Aggregated assessment: High

Table 2: Presentation of the in-case study of UNMISS and the aggregated assessment of the levels for the dependent and independent variables.

5.2 UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUSCO)

War of different kinds has raged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since the mid-1900s. After more than sixty years under Belgian colonial rule, the country became independent in June 1960 and the decades that followed were characterized by regional struggles and break-aways, coups, and power shifts. Already a month after the country's independence, the UN dispatched its first mission to the country, ONUC, who remained in the country until 1964 and was the UNs' first mission with a significant number of military personnel (4,000). However, at this point, the UN was still very strictly guided by the "nonintervention in internal matters" principle and mainly tasked to keep peace where it could be found and protect civilians. After almost two years of political struggles and multiple powershifts reforms to provide the regions with greater autonomy were made, these did however not have the wished-for effect and at the end of 1961 the First Congolese Civil War broke out. When the war ended in 1963 with the restoration of central authority somewhere between 6,000-12,000 people were internally displaced and over 4,500 people had been killed. (Gondola, 2002; MONUSCO Website, 2016; Spijkers, 2015)
The calm did not last long, new types of rebellions emerged and by the end of 1964, the Government was ejected from the eastern parts of northern parts of the country. To quell the rebellions, changes were made in political representations. When the national elections were held in 1965, the result was not respected leading to high tensions and political uncertainty. Taking advantage of the political uncertainty was a military Colonel called Mobutu who took power and remained in the Presidential seat for thirty-two years, staying in power by nationalistic strategies, monopolization of all revenue sources, and strong response to opposition attempts. (Dagne, 2012; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Turner, 2007) By the mid-1970s the economy was weakened, and the state did no longer have the capability to reach all parts of the country. In 1977 they lost control over the Katanga region when the Angolan-based FLNC group invaded, initiating the Shaba Wars and once again displacing hundreds of thousands of people and taking civilian lives. When the Cold War ended in the 1980s the pressure on Mobutu to liberalize the political system increased and by the end of 1993 there were over 300 political parties in Congo. A national conference was held to elect a new Prime Minister, but Mobutu continued to stall the democratization process. In 1994 eastern Congo was flooded by Rwandan refugees fleeing the Tutsi militia. Amongst the refugees were also thousands of Hutu militias who tried to establish a so-called Hutuland in Congo to serve as a sanctuary and military base. In hope of stopping this establishment, the Government striped Rwandan Congolese of their citizenship and in doing so starting a series of ethnic clashes.

Mobutu lost his presidency in May 1997 when the l'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) entered the capital. A regional uprising started in the Kivu region, backed by Rwanda and Uganda the rebel movement quickly seized large areas of the country and even with the support of Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Namibia the AFDL Government could not retain the control of the areas until the Lusaka Peace Accords were signed in 1999. At the same time, the UN deployed the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUC, purposed to observe the ceasefire and disengagement as well as keep the cooperation amongst all the agreement parties. Kabila's presidency did however not last that long, after years of revolts and regional interventions Kabila was assassinated in 2001. In 2006 the first free elections were held by the help of one of the most complex voting processes ever organized by the UN. The already sitting President Joseph Kabila emerged as the winner and the MONUC remained in the country, continuing to implement its mandate that included multiple political, military, rule of law and capacity-building tasks as well as peacebuilding between the provinces.
In July 2010 the UN passed resolution 1925 and established the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo, MONUSCO. The Mission mandated was robust and included to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate. Except for the standard task such as protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel the resolution also mandates MONUSCO to support the stabilization and peace consolidation efforts made by the DRC government. In the year leading up to the establishment of MONUSCO, UCDP noted a total number of 5,160 deaths. Off these 1,978 were from state-based violence, 10 from non-state violence, and 3,172 from one-sided violence. This was a steep increase from the approximate 1,700 deaths in 2008. (UCDP: Congo, 2019; UNSC S/RES/1925, 2010) The resolution mentions two groups; the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Raymond Debelle and Nicolas Florquin (2015) writes that the FDLR is the largest foreign armed group operating in the DRC, it mainly consists of Rwandan Hutu insurgents who retreated to the DRC after the genocide in 1994. The group generates its income from war lot and seizing territory for exploiting natural resources (minerals), refugees, and the local population. Officially it strives for peace and reconciliation in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. However, interviews made with combatants and refugees points to the actual goal being to overthrow the Rwandan government and to create a Hutu-majority government. (Debelle & Florquin, 2015)

Going through the Secretary-General reports, there is a clear line of development – both for the Mission itself, but also in regard to grass level events. To begin with, already from the start there was around 50 troop-contributing countries and the geographical spread included European; Asian and North American participants. Whilst the regional actors were in majority of the contributing country, international (mainly Asian) actors provided the most troops per country e.g. the beginning of the Mission largest was India providing over 4,200 troops and Pakistan 3,500. At the same time, countries like Belgium provided 19 people possessing mainly high-ranking positions. By July 2013 another 20 countries had joined the donor pool, but India and Pakistan remained the top contributors. Due to a previous mission deployed to the DRC (MONUC), the Mission had already in July 2011 passed 19,000 deployed troops. The exact number throughout the years varied but the Mission did not go beneath 19,000 in total. When

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9 Bangladesh, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mongolia, Nambia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Togo, Tunisia, and the US (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010)

10 Benin, Canada, China, France, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, Ukraine, the UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013)
the Intervention Brigade (see below) was established, the troops for this were still to be within the authorized ceiling for MONUSCO, hence 19,815 troops. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010, 2013; MONUSCO Website, 2016)

The first six months of the Mission were relatively stable. In most parts of the country, fighting remained quite low-key and the Mission withdrew some of its troops from areas that were deemed stable enough, centering its efforts in the eastern parts of the country. The period was characterized by criminal activity; however, the reporting period also notes down the systematic rape of at least 303 people in a total of 13 villages, the looting of 923 houses and 42 shops as well as the abduction of 116 civilians and subjected to forced labor. The Secretary-General goes on to explain how reports of these events did not reach the Mission until several days after they happened when they did MONUSCO patrols and protection mechanisms were deployed. These events did, however, result in widespread criticism directed to the Mission. (UN Secretary General S/2010/512, October 2010) The eastern part of the country was the most troublesome and violence there persisted. The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) kept up a high level of operations against armed groups, mainly the FDLR and LRA. MONUSCO participated in FARDC's "Operation Iron Stone", targeting local armed groups. At the beginning of September, MONUSCO launched "Operation Shop Window" and approximately 750 MONUSCO troops were deployed to North Kivu with the aim on putting pressure on and hindering activities by armed groups as well as protecting locals. The operation lasted for 18 days and resulted in the surrender of several rebel elements. (UN Secretary General S/2010/512, October 2010)

The cooperation between the Mission and FARDC were not always easy. At several occasions, FARDC elements carried out multiple transgressions; including lootings, rape, torture, arrests, and extortion. As a response, MONUSCO was forced to deployed patrols to handle situations, and later on, in June 2011 MONUSCO suspended its cooperation with one of the FARDC battalions after serious and persistent human rights violations were committed by some of its soldiers. These soldiers were later arrested. It is however made clear in the reports that even after condemnations of these acts, in its efforts to protect civilians, the cooperation and coordination with the FARDC needed to remain. (UN Secretary General S/2010/512, 2010; UN Secretary General S/2011/20, 2011)

In May 2011, the country started to prepare for elections. With this, the overall number of operations, both by the FARDC and by MONUSCO, decreased and most of the operations that
were conducted were in response to an attack. For example, ‘Operation Eastern Shield' conducted by MONUSCO between 23rd and 27th of April, after two LRA attacks. One operation that stood out was the FARDC-MONUSCO “Operation Leopard Chase” that aimed to in a preemptive way neutralize the last militia active in the southern Irumu territory. Noted by the Mission, at this time, was a shift from organized and coordinated attacks towards common criminality. (UN Secretary General S/2011/298, May 2011)

By the second half of 2011, a reconfiguration of the FARDC had started. This meant decreased pressure on armed groups and the resumption of activity amongst them and the reclamation of areas the FARDC had to vacate due to these changes. Between the end of May and mid-June 2011, MONUSCO conducted several separate military operations to fill the security vacuum created by the reconfiguration, however, many of these operations only yielded limited results. Coordinated military operations against the LRA did, however, continue, in a limited form, and now also with support from the Ugandan military. MONUSCO also participated in the AU development of a regional strategy to deal with the LRA. (UN Secretary General S/2011/656, October 2011) Twelve months after its deployment, the Mission had been subjected to two targeted attacks. Both were against Mission operation bases, the first one resulting in three peacekeepers deaths and the robust response to the second one spared MONUSCO from casualties. (UN Secretary General S/2010/512, October 2010; UN Secretary General S/2011/20, January 2011)

In November the country entered the final part of the election period. The provisional result showed that the sitting President Kabila would remain for another presidential term. The result was quickly disputed by his opponents, and whilst the AU and several other organizations welcomed the largely successful conduction of the election, the EU Observer Mission highlighted irregularities arguing that up to 1.6 million votes had not been counted. The FARDC regimentation had by this point been completed and troops were in the process of being redeployed to fill security gaps and resume military operations. The cooperation between the Mission and the armed forces started once again to deter armed group activities and enhance the protection of civilians. At this time about 94 per cent of MONUSCO's troops were deployed in the eastern provinces of the country. When the Human Development Report 2011 was released in November, DRC was ranked 187th of the 187 countries listed in its development index and together with other international and national observers, the trust in the countries
institutions were reported to be on an all low. (UN Secretary General S/2012/656, October 2012; UN Secretary General S/2012/355, May 2012)

This lack of trust in the institutions continued to affect and hamper political dialogue and processes throughout 2012. Monumental for this period was the creation of the so-called Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23). The group consisted of mutineers from FARDC, mainly consisting of former participants in the rebel group Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), and was according to themselves the result of the Government's failure to implement the peace agreement that had been on the table on 23rd of March, 2009. Clashes between the M23 and FARDC escalated quickly, and seeing the security voids caused by the mutiny and the FARDC not yet able to reinforce their troops the M23 soon had the de facto control of parts of North Kivu. Tensions also rose due to continuing reports that neighboring countries were providing support to the M23. The creation of this new group diverted the FARDC’s attention and reduced the pressure that previously been put on the FDLR, allowing them to gain ground again. On 11 and 12 July, in response to reports of human rights violations and advances made by the M23 towards Goma, MONUSCO attack helicopters started to fire at M23 positions. At the same time, the M23 started to set up parallel administrations in the territories they occupied as well as established its own revenue collection system. By August 17th they had set up their own political cabinet and appointed a "government". Simultaneously, the security situation deteriorated in other parts of the country. Armed groups began recruiting new members and expanded into new areas. Continuing pressure from MONUSCO and the FARDC were put on the LAR and they managed to cease the local commander which lead to the LRA operating mainly in survival mode. MONUSCO focused its efforts on supporting the FARDC in combating the M23. The Mission assisted with planning, evacuations, and supplied, for example, fuel and food to the armed forces. Troops were redeployed from other parts of the country to reinforce the capacity of the FARDC and joint operations were conducted, deterring armed group activity along the borders to Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania. More than 260,00 people were assessed to be internally displaced as a result of the M23 mutiny and creation, this brought the number up from 1.7 million to a total of 2.24 million internally displaced people. (UN Secretary General S/2012/838, November 2012)

In mid-November, the M23 started to advance towards Goma. The FARDC, with "…significant and robust support by MONUSCO…" (UN Secretary General S/2013/96, 2013, p.3), initially had some success in hampering the M23s progress and was estimated to have resulted in high
casualties on the side of M23. The MONUSCO support included launching 18 attack helicopter missions, the firing of 620 rockets, four missiles and 492 rounds of large caliber ammunition. On the ground, forces supplied support vehicles of the Mission fired some 800 large arms ammunition rounds approximately 4,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. However, the FADRC forces later succumbed to a larger, well-organized and well-supplied force. MONUSCO attributed this to “…a sudden increase in the group’s combatants, coordinated multi-pronged attacks and attacks with coordination between infantry and fire support…” (UN Secretary General S/2013/96, February 2013, p. 3) – something the FADRC were not used to face when battling rebel groups. After four days, on November 19th, FARDC withdrew from Goma. The day after, M23 bypassed MONUSCO positions and moved into Goma. MONUSCO focused their efforts on the protection of civilians still remaining in the city and when the M23 tried to take over Goma Airport, MONUSCO robustly prevented it. When M23 finally seized control of Goma, the Mission noted that the group was in possession of equipment not originating from the Congolese armed forces as expected, further substantiate reports of external support. (UN Secretary General S/2013/96, February 2013)

In February 2013, the Secretary-General reports state even though significant progress has been achieved in the DRC over the past 10 years, leaving the western and central parts of the country is generally stabilized, the Northern Kivu crisis remained the main identified obstacle for peace. This crisis resulted in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region being signed by the 11 countries in the region and organizations in 2013. Acting in support of the Framework the UNSC adopted resolution 2098 (2013) in March, and in doing so created an "intervention brigade". With the purpose of strengthening the Mission, the Brigade were to be created within the organization of MONUSCO and within the authorized levels of troops. The resolution authorizes the Intervention Brigade to take all necessary measures in the strife of its goal. Except for enforcement tasks listed in the original MONUSCO resolution, 2098 (2013) also clearly stipulates the task of "Neutralizing armed groups through the Intervention Brigade" in support of the DRC authorities via "...targeted offensive operations (...) either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner..." (UNSC S/RES/2098, 2013, p. 7). (UN Secretary General S/2013/119, February 2013; UNSC S/RES/2098, 2013) The resolution also list “...M23, the FDLR, the ADF, the APCLS, the LRA, the National Force of Liberation (FNL), the various Mayi Mayi groups ...” (UNSC S/RES/2098, 2013, p. 5), demanding them to put an end to their violence. In regard to M23, the resolution also states:
7. *Strongly condemns* the continued presence of the M23 in the immediate vicinity of Goma and its attempts to establish an illegitimate parallel administration in North-Kivu, *demands* that the M23 cease immediately all forms of violence and destabilizing activities and that its members immediately and permanently disband and lay down their arms (…);

(UNSC S/RES/2098, 2013, p. 5)

After the decision to establish the Intervention Brigade, the M23 became increasingly aggressive. Attacks against convoys lead to a MONUSCO show of force. On top of this, the M23 released several statements threatening the Brigade and troop-contributing countries. In its controlled territories they also held demonstrations, inciting the population against the UN and the Brigade. When new clashes occurred between the FARDC and M23 in Goma, the pre-made MONUSCO defense plan for the city was activated and quick reaction forces deployed. The Intervention Brigade's headquarters were established in Goma on April 23rd. By June 17th, 1,232 Tanzanian troops and 808 South African troops had been deployed as part of the Brigade. It was at this point estimated that 95 per cent of the MONUSCO military component was deployed in the eastern areas of DRC. (UN Secretary General S/2013/388, June 2013)
5.2.1. MONUSCO CASE TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1: Are the missions acting in a proactive or reactive way?</td>
<td>The mission was highly proactive, both in cooperation with the national defense forces but also on their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: Is force used as a response to hostile situations by the mission?</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aggregated assessment</strong>: High</td>
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<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF HOSTILITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q3: From 12 months prior the establishment of the enforcement mandate, what was the number of deaths in the conflict?</td>
<td>During the year of 2009, the total number of deaths were according to UCDP 5,160. Off these 1,978 were from state-based violence, 10 from non-state violence, and 3,172 from one-sided violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: During the first 12 months after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, how many attacks where there against UN peacekeepers?</td>
<td>MONUSCO operation bases was targeted on two occasions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5: In the resolution that stipulates the enforcement mandate, are one or several opponents named?</td>
<td>Yes, the FDLR and the LRA are named in the original resolution. The Intervention Brigade resolution also names M23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6: Do the primary opposition parties (as defined by Question 3) possess natural resources?</td>
<td>Yes, the FDLR makes some of its revenue from exploiting natural resources, mainly minerals, in occupied land. M23 sets up a tax collection system in the territory they occupy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aggregated assessment</strong>: High</td>
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<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF COMMITMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q7: During a period of three years after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, was there a positive change in the number of troops deployed?</td>
<td>The exact number of troops varied but never went bellow 19,000 troops. The authorized ceiling remained the same even after the Intervention Brigade was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8: During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, what nationalities did the mission consist of?</td>
<td>The military component of the Mission consisted of over 40 nationalities (African, Asian, European, and North American). India were initially the largest contributor but withdrew their troops leaving Bangladesh and Pakistan to resume the spot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9: During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, was there a difference in the number of contributed troops and the task division between the nationalities?</td>
<td>There was a big difference in the number of troops contributed from a geographical point of view. The low contributing countries also provided specialists or high-ranking officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aggregated assessment</strong>: High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Presentation of the in-case study of MONUSCO and the aggregated assessment of the levels for the dependent and independent variables.

5.3 THE UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION MISSION IN MALI (MINUSMA)

After 60 years of French colonial rule, Mali declared independence in 1960. Over the three following decades, Mali was ruled by a dictator. In the late 1980s, the public demand for democracy increased and by 1991, a military coup put an end to the autocracy; the first election was held the year after. (Stewart, 2013; Swedish UN Association, 2018) In the north of the country, the Tuareg nomads live. Whilst the group belongs to a bigger federation of people that
can be found from Libya to Burkina Faso, in Mali the group makes up less than one percent of the population. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019)

The relationship between the Tuareg and the Government were during the 1990s dominated by conflict with the nomads arguing they were being marginalized and were fighting for the independence of Azawad (the region where they lived). Even though several peace agreements were negotiated between the two parties, the Tuareg dissatisfaction continued to grow when there was no evidence of change. (Stewart, 2013; Swedish UN Association, 2018) In 2011 this dissatisfaction resulted in the establishment of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The MNLA allied themselves with Islamist groups who also sought political changes, foremost groups such as Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour L’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). The troops of these groups consisted mainly of returning combatants from Libya, fighters that after the fall of the Libyan government in 2011 were very well equipped in regards to weaponry. (Stewart, 2013)

On March 27th, 2012, the MNLA and the Islamist groups initiated an uprising. Distracted by a coup d’état back in the capital where a military junta took power and dissolved the governmental institutions, the Malian Government quickly lost control of the northern areas, allowing the MNLA to declare the creation of the state of Azawad on April 6th. The same day as the coup and uprising began the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) started mediations between the parties, ECOWAS managed to get the military junta to sign a framework that led to the resignation of the then President and the establishment of a transitional government. The interim government reached out to the UN asking for help to govern the disputed areas and to provide humanitarian assistance (Human Rights Watch, 2013) so on December 20th, 2012, the UNSC passed resolution 2085, establishing the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM). UNOM was purposed to provide support to the political and security processes, as well as the planning; deployment; and operations by the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). AFISMA was, in the same resolution, authorized by the UNSC to support the Malian government with all means necessary. (MINUSMA Website, 2019)

Whilst sharing an enemy and being able to work towards a shared goal, the Islamist groups and MNLA had problems agreeing how their new state should be governed. For example, Ansar Dine did not necessarily fight for an independent state but instead sought to introduce shari'a throughout Mali. The tension between the MNLA and Islamist groups rose and soon the alliance
began to fight internally; a fight that the Islamists won when they drove the MNLA out of the main cities of northern Mali (Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu). (Cline, 2013; Stewart, 2013)

At the beginning of 2013, the Islamist groups started to advance south towards the capital Bamako and in doing so became a direct threat to the Government. After some territorial advances by the Islamist groups, a call for international assistance went out and in mid-January 2013 French troops entered Mali, initiating "Operation Serval". With Malian, French, and African military operations working alongside each other the security situation was already by the end of January significantly improved and the Government had regained control of most of the major towns up north. With the remaining rebels and terrorists being able to withdraw to the mountains or just blended into the local communities, the security challenges and the threat of terrorist attacks and other criminal activities continued to undermine government institutions. (Cline, 2013; MINUSMA Website, 2019; Stewart, 2013; Swedish UN Association, 2018)

In April 2013 the UNSC adopted resolution 2100 (2013), establishing the Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA). The Mission was robust and included the authorization to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate. MINUSMA was, except for standard tasks such as protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel, asked to stabilize key population areas in support for the reestablishment of State authority and to take active steps to deter threats and to prevent the return of armed elements. The Mission was also asked to assist in cultural preservation and national and international justice. (UNSC S/RES/2100, 2013) In the year leading up to the establishment of MINUSMA, UCDP noted a total number of 359. Of these, 218 were from state-based violence, 118 were from non-state violence and 23 from one-sided violence. While this might not seem like a lot, it was quite an increase from the previous year when the total number of conflict-related deaths was 19. Most clashes were between armed groups in the central parts of the country, however, the clash taking most lives took place in the north-east between the Government and the MNLA. (UCDP: Mali, 2019) The resolution mentions three groups; Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM. All three are militant Islamic groups, but with different aims; Ansar Dine seeks to impose shari’a in Mali; MUJAOs’ goal is to spread jihad across a larger section of West Africa; AQIM aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. The main source of income for all the group’s circles around activities such as smuggling (weapons, drugs, and cash), kidnapping and ransom taking as well as forcefully collection of funds (e.g. taxes, bribes).
CASE PRESENTATION

THE UNITED NATIONS DOES

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Going through the Secretary-General reports for MINUSMA from its deployment in April 2013 up until April 2016, it is very clear that there has been a development in the application of its tactics. During the first six months, the mission was slowly taking over the responsibility from AFISMA and mostly provided planning support and establishing its operational guidelines. (UN Secretary General S/2013/338, June 2013) After the absorption was completed the troop number was 6,085, quite quickly this number dropped to 5,208 due to the withdrawal of one infantry battalion by a troop-contributing country. (UN Secretary General S/2014/1, January 2014) Geographically wise, the distribution of troop-contributing countries\textsuperscript{11} in 2013 were quite Africa centered, with Togo as the largest donor supplying 900 troops. By April 2016 the Mission had grown to 11,750 troops and thirty countries\textsuperscript{12} had joined the donor pool. Burkina Faso and Chad were now the largest contributors with over 1,700 and 1,400 troops respectively.

Looking at the numbers one can also see that the European countries that joined MINUSMA from the beginning had increased their troop numbers, for example, Sweden had gone from four to 234. In the first years only high-ranking personnel was sent, but in late 2014 more personnel started arriving but even then, this was engineering teams and in 2015 an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance task force were deployed. However, it is still evident that the bulk of the troops came from the region. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013, 2016; Swedish Armed Forces, 2019)

During the first six months, the mission was slowly taking over the responsibility from AFISMA and mostly provided planning support and establishing its operational guidelines. (UN Secretary General S/2013/338, June 2013) By October this transfer of responsibility was done and MINUSMA had absorbed most the previous missions’ troops. The Mission also started to experience its first clashes with armed elements, deployed its first quick reaction forces, and operations to subdue violence. For example, on August 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2013, the MNLA and

\textsuperscript{11} Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, France, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Togo, the UK, and the US. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013)

\textsuperscript{12} Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Madagascar, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Yemen. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2016)
Malina armed forces clashed so to contain the violence MINUSMA intervened to stop the violence and protect civilians. (UN Secretary General S/2013/582, October 2013)

Repentantly throughout the reports, it is shown that robust deployments and operations are performed in regard to the protection of civilians, and in January 2014 the Mission conducted a protection assessment in troublesome regions to be able to actively engaged in early responses. (UN Secretary General S/2014/1, January 2014). At this point in time, the Mission was said to have reached 57 per cent of its authorized strength and even so “The Mission’s ability to proactively protect civilians and deter attacks remains limited,” (UN Secretary General S/2014/229, March 2014, p. 12) [Emphasis added by Author]. In March 2014 there was a deterioration in the security situation in the north. The Islamic groups, mainly the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, started using rockets and improvised explosive devices; targeting MINUSMA, French Troops, and the Malina Armed Forces. This resulted in the Mission launching “…compound protection works and adapted its plans for the future United Nations premises in the north.” (UN Secretary General S/2014/229, March 2014, p. 4).

A strategic review of the Mission was conducted about a year after deployment. This review concludes that the majority of the MINUSMA mandate is still to be accomplished, particularly in relation to its stabilization mandate. At the same time, there was a decrease in other organizations and countries missions to Mali, and MINUSMA started to feel the weights of their increased role in the security in the area. (UN Secretary General S/2014/403, June 2014) Twelve months into their deployment, the Mission had been targeted at several occasions. There had been a total of 18 rocket attacks on Mission bases and compounds, 25 convoys had been attacked or disrupted by improvised explosive devices, one attack on a Mission helicopter, and one ground attack on a compound. (UN Secretary General S/2013/582, October 2013; UN Secretary General S/2014/1, January 2014; UN Secretary General S/2014/229, March 2014; UN Secretary General S/2014/403, June 2014)

In September 2014, the Malian Defense and Security Forces withdrew from northern Mali. This resulted in the targeting of the remaining international missions to be increased. Between 27th of May 2014, and 15th of September, 2014, MINUSMA was the subject of 25 attacks, 15 improvised explosive device incidents and 12 rocket or mortar fire incidents. Several of these attacks targeted convoys, but on June 11th and August 16th suicide vehicles detonated at UN compounds. Furthermore, in July UN compounds were subjected to rocket and mortar attacks five times in two weeks. Due to these attacks, the Mission had to develop a counter plan. This
plan is said to have included "… strengthened physical measures, specialized equipment, and additional pre- and post-deployment training for MINUSMA staff and contingents." (UN Secretary General S/2014/692, September 2014, p. 19). During 2014, MINUSMA also started using unarmed aerial systems to surveil northern areas, mainly focusing on the protection of civilian populations. This resulted in the Mission setting up temporary presences in areas of risk. Furthermore, in order to impede the access of terrorist groups, MINUSMA conducted operations using its armed helicopters at the beginning of September. (UN Secretary General S/2014/692, September 2014)

High terrorist activity was maintained throughout 2014, and from mid-September to the end of December 2014 16 peacekeepers were killed and the frequent anti-vehicle mines placed along MINUSMA routes severely hindered operations (both humanitarian and military). (UN Secretary General S/2014/943, December 2014) A MINUSMA logistics convoy was ambushed on October 3rd, an ambush that media reports being well prepared and resulted in the death of nine peacekeepers. However, MINUSMA was not the only organization targeted, two vehicles from an international NGO were carjacked on 8 and 9 November, leading to MINUSMA force assisting in the recovery of the passengers. (UN Secretary General S/2014/943, December 2014) Reporting on the state of the mission, the Secretary-General writes that the Mission military components continue to serve in extremely challenging conditions with limited capabilities. Even so, when discussing a review of the rules of engagement made in relation to MINUSMA it is stated that the mandate is sufficiently robust. (UN Secretary General S/2014/943, December 2014)

By January 2015, the situation in the Gao region had sharply deteriorated, and MINUSMA was deployed to the areas with the task to protect civilians. (UN Secretary General S/2015/219, March 2015) On January 1st, 2015, clashes between two armed groups by a crossing over the Niger River culminated in the Mission vocally reminding parties that “…the Mission would use force, in accordance with its mandate and rules of engagement,” (UN Secretary General S/2015/219, March 2015, p. 5) if the parties kept placing peacekeepers and civilians in imminent danger. Just a few days later, the parties withdrew from the area. (UN Secretary General S/2015/219, March 2015)

At other places, armed clashes however continued, and when heavy machine fire and rockets started to land close to a MINUSMA position as well as civilian locations, MINUSMA deployed attack helicopters to deter further firing and monitor the situation. When fire
continued the Mission fired warning shots. When this failed to halt the shootings MINUSMA helicopters instead targeted rocket launcher possessed by the group, destroying it and in doing so put an end to the fighting. A statement was released by the armed group accusing MINUSMA of having killed and injured its men. (UN Secretary General S/2015/219, March 2015) At another occasion, a rally organized by a youth group turned violent. Stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown at the MINUSMA camp and MINUSMA units. The Mission responded by firing tear gas and warning shots, some of it directed at the protestors. Of the 18 wounded protestors, only four were reported to be by gunshots. (UN Secretary General S/2015/219, March 2015)

While the security situation continued to be problematic, there was a turn for the better in May 2015. The Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation was signed by the Government and the coalition of armed groups, together with several other parties. MINUSMA spent considerable energy on defusing tensions and stopping clashes around the country, especially in the period leading up to and immediately after the signing of the agreement. For example, clashes between several parties on April 28th led to MINUSMA organizing, what was called an extraordinary meeting, with the participation of Government and armed groups representatives to straighten out what actually happened. (UN Secretary General S/2015/426, June 2015) Unsurprisingly, tension continued to characterize the relationship between all parties. MINUSMA kept a high presence on a local level and in areas where civilians tended to get caught in the crossfire. In the region of Kidal, they established a ‘security zone’ of 20km for the same purpose. With this, the threat of attacks against MINUSMA and other international actors kept increasing, from June to September six peacekeepers were killed and 11 injured. (UN Secretary General S/2015/732, September 2015)

The last quarter of 2015 was characterized by a new momentum in the peace process and improved relations between conflict parties. Progress was specially made in the eastern parts of the country but in the north, the number of terrorism and extremist activities continued to rise. Towards the Mission, improvised explosive devices and attacks against convoys remained two of the main threats. Measures to counter these attacks were taken, focus on in-depth training of troops regarding mines as well as force protection measures. This protection measures did, however, consume approximately two-thirds of the Mission’s infantry capacity, putting severe strains on to what extent the Mission could perform the rest of its military-related tasks. (UN Secretary General S/2015/1030, December 2015)
On a regional level, armed banditry constituted more than 75 per cent of incidents occurring. Especially in the Gao and Timbuktu regions. Motivated by economic needs, the Malian Defense and Security Forces took measures to reduce the high levels of criminality. In response, MINUSMA adopted a robust posture by increasing the frequency of long-range patrols as well as the use of its aviation assets to monitor and deter violence. Together with the MDF, MINUSMA also conducted coordinated operations focusing on counter-terrorism operations. (UN Secretary General S/2015/1030, December 2015; UN Secretary General S/2016/281, March 2016)

5.3.1. MINUSMA CASE TABLE

| LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT | | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| Q1: Are the missions acting in a proactive or reactive way? | The mission was mainly reactive in its tactics, especially during the first two years of deployment. |
| Q2: Is force used as a response to hostile situations by the mission? | At extreme cases. Other strategies like surveillance, security zones, and warnings were otherwise preferred. |
| Aggregated assessment: Low | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF HOSTILITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q3: From 12 months prior the establishment of the enforcement mandate, what was the number of deaths in the conflict?</td>
<td>359 number of battlefield related deaths took place in the year leading up to the mandate. Of these, 218 were from state-based violence, 118 were from non-state violence and 23 from one-sided violence. This was an increase from the year before when the number was 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: During the first 12 months after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, how many attacks where there against UN peacekeepers?</td>
<td>MINUSMA experienced a total of 18 rocket attacks on Mission bases and compounds, 25 convoys had been attacked or disrupted by improvised explosive devices, one attack on a Mission helicopter, and one ground attack on a compound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5: In the resolution that stipulates the enforcement mandate, are one or several opponents named?</td>
<td>Yes, the Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are named in the Resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6: Do the primary opposition parties (as defined by Question 3) possess natural resources?</td>
<td>No, the main source of income is from criminal activities such as drugs and weapon smuggling, kidnapping, and forcible fund collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated assessment: High</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF COMMITMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q7: During a period of three years after the establishment of the enforcement mandate, was there a positive change in the number of troops deployed?</td>
<td>Yes, there was an increase in the actual number present (5,208 to 11,750) but no increase in the authorized number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8: During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, what nationalities did the mission consist of?</td>
<td>The military component consisted of 30 nationalities (North American, African, Asian, Nordic and European). Togo was initially the largest contributor but was passed by Burkina Faso and Chad by 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9: During the first three years of the enforcement mandate, was there a difference in the number of contributed troops and the task division between the nationalities?</td>
<td>There was a geographical difference in the number of troops contributed. Interesting is that the low contributing countries had increased their deployed numbers by 2016, and also diversified their tasks. However, bulk troops were still regional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated assessment: High</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Presentation of the in-case study of MINUSMA and the aggregated assessment of the levels for the dependent and independent variables.
6. CROSS-CASE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Having presented the empirical findings and the in-case result in the previous chapter, the analysis chapter now turns to addressing the cross-case analysis, the hypotheses, research question, limitations, and alternative explanations.

6.1 LEVEL OF HOSTILITY

In the theoretical chapter I stated that I anticipated the level of hostility would influence the level of enforcement applied in a mission by establishing the foundation of what the mission can be expected to deal with. I suggested that an increase in the level of violence would lead to a higher level of enforcement. In relation to the empirics I want to highlight two aspects: first, all cases saw an increase in the total number of deaths the year before the adoption of the enforcement mandate – some more significant than others. Of these, state-based deaths were continuously high; only in DRC was the number trumped by one-sided violence. When deployed the Missions also focused on the one-sided violence and deterring actions against it. This must be understood in relation to the peacekeeping principle of consent. As mentioned in previous research, for normative and practical reasons the Missions needs to be deployed with the consent of the sovereign power. The monopoly of violence does belong to the state, and therefore not much can be done in regard to their application of the monopoly. However, interesting to see though is that MONUSCO distanced themselves from part of the FADRC as a response to continuous human rights violations, sending a strong signal of what their expectations are on the national armed forces. Also, both MINUSMA and UNMISS received reinforcements when the violence patterns changed in their countries of deployment which then shows that changed hostility level brought on by the level of violence can result in changed levels of enforcement. This can be understood in relation to Hultman et al. (2014) who found that the deployment of more troops (in their study 10,000 more troops) can bring down the level of violence significantly.

I also suggested that a lower number of opponents allows for clarity and in doing so increases the confidence of mission to use more robust tactics. Looking at the cases, especially
MONUSCO and UNMISS, there is a difference. MONUSCO have three named opponents (LRA, FDLA, and later M23) whilst UNMISS are facing a ‘coalition’ of armed groups (MNLA and the Islamist groups all in one), increasing the complexity of the context the Mission have to orientate in. MONUSCOS enforcement tactics are much more proactive then UNMISS when it comes to targeting the armed groups of relevance. It could also be argued that the goals of the different groups in the two missions had an effect as an alternative explanation\textsuperscript{13}. Shared between all the cases is that they target groups that have a regional presence (LRA in South Sudan and DRC, as well as Al-Qaida affiliated groups in Mali). That they have a wider presence can be an influencing factor since it can be in support of not only the own mission, but other missions in the region and therefore the stance against these groups become more robust in the strive of a goal on more than a national level.

Regarding attacks on peacekeepers I anticipated that a high number of attacks on peacekeepers would lead to an increased level of enforcement. UNMISS and MINUSMA both experienced a large number of targeted attacks on their missions and compounds, and both Missions received reinforcements and an increased authorized troop number. However, for UNMISS it also meant a changed and more limited focus area for its mandate, dropping its state-building activities to focus on the protection of civilians. This could be telling that an overall decrease in the security situation in combination with attacks on the Mission will make the UN reconsider and reevaluate its tactics. To see if this holds empirically, one could study the Mogadishu-incident which actually resulted in the withdraw of international forces and see if there are any common traits to highlight.

Lastly, I suggested that the possession of natural resources by the opposition would increases the level of enforcement. In the DRC, the eastern areas the FDLR ceased territories for natural resources but not in the other cases. What they all did have in common, on the other hand, is that all groups in some way financed themselves from criminal activities (looting, trafficking, tax collection from smaller communities and so on). Majority of the activities targeted civilians and caused civilian suffering, something that can instead be argued to be the common denominator in the case of conflict financing. Of interest could also be if the effect is the same for all types of natural resources, or if a resource such as oil would trigger a different response

\textsuperscript{13} This will be developed on under section 6.4
from a deployed mission. The resource aspect could also be understood in relation to the cessation of territory and if this increases the assessed threat against the state actor.

The first hypothesis argued that high level of violence brings on a higher level of enforcement, and in the cases and the result presented above this hypothesis finds tentative support. In relation to the operationalization’s made and the indicators included, it is visible that a combination do trigger higher levels of enforcement. In Mali and South Sudan, the violence and increased attacks brought on a more robust mission. In DRC, a new and violent actor changed increased the mandate. However, I would suggest that resources should be studied dependent of the increased level of threat rather than as a mechanism, that resource actions that are connected to increased levels of violence against civilians or threat against the state actor.

6.2 LEVEL OF COMMITMENT

In the theoretical chapter I suggested that the level of commitment from troops and donor countries to the resolve of the conflict has a determining effect on the level of enforcement. Troop size, support, and construction lay the foundation for the adaptability that the mission management possesses, and in that way the strategies and tactics used unfolds. I argued that that the level of confidence increases with large troop numbers, making the mission more comfortable with engaging in high-risk situations. Based on the cases in this study, I would conclude the confidence created by the presence of a high number of troops leads to more enforcement. This can work in two ways: first, as UNMISS in the beginning aimed to establish a presence in all ten South Sudanese states for pre-empting or mitigating the impact of conflict-related violence on the civilian population. However, wide presence in this case do not lead to more robust tactics it creates a confidence based on that the sheer number of troops are to have a deterring effect on conflict parties. Secondly, in DRC in 2012 approximately 94 per cent of the deployed troops were stationed in the eastern parts of the country. MONUSCO had established that this, mainly the Jonglei State, were the troublesome areas and with the creation of the M23 this was where their efforts were needed. The same is true for UNMISS in later parts of its deployment, who also chose to concentrate their troops around geographical high-risk areas when a certain level of stability had been reached but retained the strategic flexibility to respond to threats. In a more limited area progress it would be easier to measure and the task would feel more manageable, allowing for increased commitment by donor countries.
A short note regarding the suggestion in the previous literature that stated the UN tend to deploy troops where their preferred party is suffering. When UNMISS mandate were extended and the troop ceiling raised, they also lost the task of assisting in state-building activities to focus on protecting civilians. This would suggest that human suffering rather than the upkeep of states result in a higher level of enforcement. Furthermore, it could then be argued that Emily Paddon Rhoads (2016) note about normative deployments would possess better explanatory powers when it comes to peace enforcement and deployments to active conflicts, then Andersson’s (2000) regarding promoting democracy. This can be seen in that all missions more proactively focuses their efforts against mitigating human suffering and stopping violations against human rights.

I addressed the composition of the missions and argued that proximity to a conflict can be expected to result in the neighboring countries having a higher interest in keeping or, in this case, enforcing peace. All the missions experienced a high level of diversity in their troop contributing counties, and the number also grew over the years. The involvement of regional parties did however differ. In MONUSCO the countries that contributed with the most troops were Bangladesh and Pakistan. In MINUSMA the regional partners were initially in majority, both in their presence and in the number of troops contributed. For UNMISS India and Nepal were the largest contributors. However, regarding this I would like to highlight the cases actually selected in relations to what Karlsrud (2015) and Peter (2015) wrote about credibility and lowering risk for peacekeepers. To avoid becoming instruments for their governments, regional troops have usually only been deployed when there is consent from all parties. This might not be all true in the present cases, seeing the participation and contributions of so many countries in the same region. However, in DRC regional actors already played quite a large role in the conflict dynamics and it was early on suspected that external parties supplied the M23 with weapons14.

In regard to task division, there is a visible difference between the countries sending bulk troops and the majority only sending a few specialists. This is for example true with Sweden’s contribution to MINUSMA, where Sweden initially only deployed high-ranking officers, and then added on specialist teams of engineering and an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance task force. This pattern was also visible in MONUSCO and UNMISS, but not as clear seeing their troop ceiling were reached much faster and did not leave room for the same

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14 This will be expanded on in section 6.4
development. In line with Horwitz & Horwitz (2007) note that diversity can be a ‘double edged sword’, this can be good because specialist knowledge are added to the missions, but also bad due to the internal hierarchies created by national belonging as well as different standards and practices, operating procedures, and battlefield aptitudes. However, as exemplified with Sweden, it is interesting to see that the internal commitment can change. The non-bulk troops are arguably able to choose their commitments more specifically based on being able to provide specialized knowledge. But in agreement with Diehl & Balas (2014), the opportunity to choose your specialized commitment are putting a higher demand on regional actors to provide the bulk of regular ground troops; which often take on a more active, and more dangerous, direct role in conflict situations.

In conclusion, the second hypothesis presented in the study suggested that higher regional commitment will lead to greater levels of enforcement. However, this thesis has not been able to find empirical support for that there is a difference between high regional or high international commitment in terms of enforcement level. In some aspects this contradicts previous research which stated that regional actors have a higher interest due to the risk for spill-over effects, but one could also argue that that interest just takes different forms (involved in the context) or that UN policies has considered this before deployment. This would be in line with what Bove & Ruggeri (2016) writes about the expanding donor pool, allowing both the UN and member states to be pickier in their selection processes.

6.3 ANALYSIS

This thesis set out to answer the question why a certain level of enforcement is applied in a peace enforcement mission. Some patterns can be found by looking at the two variables that are the subject of this study. For level of hostility, all cases experienced advances and changed violence patterns, bringing on change in the enforcement level. For example, for MONUSCO the increased hostility created by the establishment of M23 together with their territorial advances and destabilizing effect on the rest of the country brought on the creation of the Intervention Brigade. For MINUSMA and UNMISS, the change in hostility were more directed against the Mission (increased attacks) and civilians (increased suffering and number of casualties) rather than a substantial change in national stability. A difference that UNMISS highlights, though, is that if attacks against peacekeepers are to have an increased effect on the peace enforcement levels, the attack needs to happen over a longer time-period. In UNMISS
case it took three years to bring on change. If the attacks are already happening at a frequent rate, as in MINUSMA’s case, it is more likely to affect the commitment and recruitment than the mandate application (it took MINUSMA 3+ years to reach its authorized troop number). This is a key theoretical finding. Where previous research arguably has had a more limited definition of hostility, the comparably wide definition used in this study enabled it to capture the many elements that could lead to increased feelings of hostility from the missions, which in extension lead to an increased enforcement level.

Further, the level of commitment did not have the same distinct effect as the level of hostility. While the study did not find support for this variable to have a distinct effect on its own, it could still be argue to have an impact in interaction with hostility: higher levels of hostility makes the commitment to hinder violence higher, and in doing so results in changed tactics and strategies. This was for example seen in the MONUSCO mission and for the Intervention Brigade, but also on a smaller scale in some of the task divisions. Going back to the example of Western states increasing their deployed numbers in missions where their role initially was quite small, one can conclude that the commitment to that mission increases over time and with a better understanding for the needs of the mission. Interaction between the two variables can here be expected, the question would however be if there is a special pattern of violence that increases or decreases the level of commitment. For example, MINUSMA witnessed numerous attacks on peacekeepers, and also an increased commitment from several actors. But at the same time the recruitment of troops was slower, which would argue that level of hostility has an effect on the initiation of commitment.

For the broader field of peace enforcement, the interaction between the level of hostility and the level of commitment studied in this essay is one example of this: where the overall conditions they are acting under influences their potential effects on the level of enforcement. For example, if there is a low commitment, or perhaps just slow commitment, the enforcement tactics and levels will be harder to adapt to a rapidly changing contexts: as was the case in both MINUSMA and UNMISS.

6.4 LIMITATIONS, ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This study is, as most if not all studies, subject to limitations. To begin with, methodological limitations that might have affected the study circles around operationalization’s, case selection,
and sources. First, the operationalization of the variables has sometimes been limited by having to be comparable in a clear way: where, for example, number of attacks effects on the hostility level had to be limited to direct targeted attacks to not get tangled up with the overall level of violence. This methodological choice was done to increase the reliability of the method. Second, case selection might have had an effect on the result due to not considering how involved the regional actors already were in the conflict dynamics. This can for example be seen through external support of armed groups, as in the case of the M23 or the Sudanese Government funding the LRA. If this level of external involvement is already a fact in the conflict context, then it is possible to believe that the UN accounts for this when assigning and deploying troops. This aspect would therefore need to be studied further to reach a more conclusive answer. Third, while the reports serve as a great source of information for the conflict context, operations conducted, and other actions taken by the mission, it sometimes lacked some level of detail. One way to fend for this would have been to use triangulation through media sources in hope of portraying a perhaps more nuanced picture. However, when this was attempted it was quickly established that the international media largely based their reporting of UN reports, and access to local media was hindered both by accessibility and language barriers.

Overall a limitation that can have influenced the study is that the scope of possible cases does not include that many finished missions, and the few that had ended would not have been subjected to the Brahimi Report. This means that the level of enforcement we see today might not be the overall trend in the entire mission, or even representative for a finished one. However, I argue that the importance of the Brahimi Report and the later doctrinal developments needs to be accounted for if not to be able to dismiss the result due to the time difference (e.g. comparing one mission from 1999 to one in 2016) and therefore this limitation had to be made.

Going through the Secretary-General Reports for the three missions, some alternative patterns and explanations have also arisen. First, the conduct of the national armed forces. MONUSCO clearly shows that this is an influencing factor when they decide to end their cooperation with some battalions that are committing human rights violations. This could suggest that if the conduct is bad, the commitment to safeguard and establish better norms give rise to higher commitment but also enforcement by a mission. This would be in line with Fortna’s argument about norms being decisive, but aside from that this would be one venue for future research to establish. This also highlights a factor that is present South Sudan that should be considered in
relation to the thesis, namely trust between the mission and the host state. For UNMISS this becomes highly relevant when they drop their state-building efforts after anti-UN sentiments had risen within the government. This to remain and protect civilians. In other words, the peacekeeping principles still need to be considered. Lastly, in light of political (elections) or peace processes, large parts of the mission’s activities stopped. This could either point to the UN not wanting to create situations that can fall back into conflict or that all the groups where occupied with the process. However, it could be of interest for future research to study the pattern of robust mission in connection to political or peace processes.

6.5 CONCLUSION

In its introduction, this thesis asked the question if violence can be justified as a means of achieving peace. That one of the main objectives of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, and that today one crucial way they do this is through military action. I then went on to argue that the peace enforcement literature currently lacks a thorough explanation for why a certain level of enforcement is applied in some missions, while other experience much less – even though the mandates are the same. Turning to theoretical insights on indicators such as troop deployment, peacekeeper security, resources, mission composition, level of violence, as well as mission size, I aimed to study the interplay between level of hostility and commitment, establishing how these effected the enforcement tactics. This study found that when the violence pattern changed in the Missions, the mandate adapted. It also found that if a mission has clearly defined opponents it allows for more robust strategies, especially if the opponents have a regional presence and are present in other UN missions. Even though the targeting of peacekeepers is becoming increasingly frequent, this study did not find that it has a short time effect on the mandate application. Neither was the study able to establish that the possession of natural resources had any direct impact on what enforcement tactics was used. It did however point to that financing activities that target or cause civilians harm can have an explanatory power. The level of hostility can, based on this, be expected to influence the level of enforcement when the pattern of violence changes, the opponents easily can be pointed out, and there is continuous targeting of peacekeepers.

Furthermore, this thesis also found that the level of commitment can have some influence on the level of enforcement; this is, however, mainly when interacting with the level of hostility. For example, when the pattern of violence or number of attacks on peacekeepers changes, the
mandate application is affected by the current level of commitment. This thesis also put forward a hypothesis arguing that a high involvement of regional actors in a mission would lead to higher levels of enforcement, this could not be supported. This could, however, to some extent be affected by the case selection.

For future research, the thesis identified the effect of an ongoing political or peace process as lowering the level of enforcement. Furthermore, it also noticed that a change in the mandate affected the trust between the host state and the Mission. Better understanding of these two areas could help to further clarify why a certain level of enforcement is applied by a mission, specifically by establishing how the Mission relates to its political surrounding.

The Missions in this study still have active years to go, and the use of peace enforcement mandates will likely continue to increase in the future. This essay both contributes to, and calls for, continued research on how peace enforcement affects the likelihood of conflict resolution – essentially, if violence ever can lead to durable peace.
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