COLLABORATION OR POLARISATION:
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL POWER SHARING ON DEMOCRATISATION

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"An imperfect democracy is a misfortune for its people, but an imperfect authoritarian regime is an abomination"

Abstract

Does political power sharing foster or inhibit democratisation in post-civil war states? Previous research dedicated to the study of power sharing and democratisation has been limited to the early post-conflict period and used minimalistic definitions of democracy. This thesis uses a wider definition of democracy and hypothesise that the empowerment of elite actors from relevant communities would strengthen democratisation in the short-term, as these groups would gain a patron that could protect their democratic liberties. Meanwhile, a digression was expected in the longer term as power sharing would equip these elite patrons to avoid accountability and suppress opposition. Democracy score changes were analysed using an OLS regression on 127 cases of civil war settlement between 1945-2006. Findings suggest that political power sharing promotes democratisation in the short term. Moreover, no negative long-term effects were found. Practitioners should therefore host no hesitations against introducing political power sharing when resolving conflicts. The absence of negative long-term effects could be attributed to criticisms not recognising the different setups that power-sharing institutions can take which promote accountability. Possibly, there are also other mechanisms which facilitates interaction between elite actors and their communities at play, counterbalancing the negative effects that power sharing would otherwise entail.

**Key words:** Power sharing, Consociationalism, Democratisation, Civil war.
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1. Introduction

Civil wars have proven notoriously difficult to resolve. Countries who have once experienced internal conflicts often relapse back into conflict within a couple of years. Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Afghanistan are only a few well-recognised examples of where peace continuously eludes a society, independent of whether the conflict ended by a military victory or with a negotiated settlement. Efforts by practitioners and researchers to improve our capability to resolve these conflicts successfully have led to the establishment of several sub-fields within peace and conflict research. The literature on power sharing is one such sub-field.

The power-sharing research field, originally stemming from Lijphart’s (1968) studies of a few heterogeneous European democracies, has been adopted by researchers and practitioners concerned with resolving internal conflicts. Initially, these peace and conflict researchers focused mainly on stability and prevention of civil war recurrence (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Walter, 2002). In recent years, however, attention has also been paid to how power sharing affects democracy (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015; Norris, 2008; Cammett & Malesky, 2012). Concerns regarding the compatibility of power sharing and democracy in post-conflict societies have long been raised. The critique has often branded the division of power along ethnic, religious, or political lines as in essence undemocratic and contradictory to fundamental democratic values (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Horowitz, 2000). Although propagators for power sharing have conducted research in response to these criticisms, additional research is warranted. Beyond the early post-conflict period, the effects of power sharing on democratisation remain unexplored. Similarly, little is known of how democratic liberties beyond voting are affected by power-sharing provisions. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by conducting the first large-N study of the long-term effects of political power sharing on democratisation in post-conflict contexts.

By expanding our knowledge on the long-term effects of power-sharing arrangements, drawbacks and challenges are identified, and progression towards democracy can be supported more effectively. This thesis seeks to contribute to the incipient vein of research of power sharing and democracy in three ways. First, changes to conceptual operationalisations are introduced, aiming to increase the validity of the measured indicators and the overall methodological accuracy. Second, an empirical contribution is also made by looking at both the short- and long-term effects of political power sharing on democratisation. Third, new causal
mechanisms are presented, adding to the theoretical basis of the field. The guiding research question of this thesis is:

*How does political power sharing affect democratisation in states which have settled a civil war?*

This thesis theorises that political power sharing can have a positive effect in the early post-conflict period. By empowering elite patrons from key communities, the democratic rights of these groups enjoy better protection from rival factions seeking to exclude them from political influence. In the longer term, however, these same aspects of power sharing are thought to be detrimental to the development of democracy. The empowerment of these elite actors leads to a limitation of accountability, and their political influence can just as well be used to quell competition from within their community.

To test these hypotheses an OLS regression analysis is conducted. Between 1945-2006, 127 civil war settlements are registered. By measuring the levels of democracy before, five, and ten years after a civil war settlement, the correlation between political power sharing and changes in democracy score in the respective state is tested. General support for Hypothesis 1 is found, with power-sharing countries enjoying more extensive improvement of their democratic score in the early post-conflict period than countries lacking such provisions. For Hypothesis 2, no correlation can be established in either a negative or positive direction between political power sharing and long-term democratisation. It is therefore concluded that practitioners should not hesitate to include political power-sharing provisions in peace processes due to a fear of hindering post-conflict democratisation. On the contrary, political power sharing can be used to ensure more extensive democratisation in the short-term, without entailing detrimental effects in the long-term.

The thesis is set up as follows: first, a review of previous research in the fields of democratisation and power sharing respectively is presented. A research gap is identified followed by a theoretical framework and the formulation of testable hypotheses. The data and the quantitative method are then introduced. After the empirical findings are presented, a discussion on the confirmation or rejection of the hypotheses and the research question ensue. Lastly, key findings of this thesis are summarised and directions for future research is proposed.
2. Previous Research

In this section, relevant previous research within democracy and power sharing will first be presented separately. The intersection between these two fields, with the most central works dedicated to the study of post-conflict democratisation and power sharing, will then be depicted. A presentation of the identified research gap will then follow before the theoretical arguments of this thesis are introduced.

2.1 Democracy

Democratisation literature can scarcely be understood without understanding the research and discussions within the broader field of democracy. Formulating a definition of democracy that accurately describes the concept has received great scholarly attention. A central point of contention is what components constitute democracy; is democracy merely the process of the population electing their government, or should conditions that ensure fair and broad participation of the masses also be included? The former, minimalist approach to democracy is often traced back to Schumpeter (1943). While providing distinct methodological benefits, a minimalist definition of democracy necessarily suffers from an inability to capture the complexity of democracy (Bernhagen, 2009). An election, no matter how well-executed, matters little if conditions that allow genuine public participation are absent. A definition of democracy should thus also capture components such as freedom of speech and freedom of association.

Robert Dahl (1989) provides the most well-established theory of what constitutes a democracy. Democratic regimes’ superior capability to provide human goods, Dahl argues, stems from its basis on equality and freedom. The act of electing a ruler, which in practice could be the verification of an authoritarian rule without valid alternatives or sufficient knowledge on political issues, is not what empowers democracy. It is instead the freedoms that allow it to function, providing fair elections, that ensures superior outcomes (Dahl, 1989). The regimes that have progressed the furthest towards the democratic ideal, titled polyarchies by Dahl, share seven distinct institutions that set them aside from their more autocratic counterparts: Elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, access to alternative information, and associational autonomy (Dahl, 1989). Dahl’s definition lends itself to arranging regimes along a spectrum, rather than in two categories, in which states can climb and fall in response to what degree they uphold their polyarchic institutions. In this thesis, democratisation is thus defined as the process where society moves from autocracy to a regime that better adheres to democratic ideals (Welzel, 2009).
Democracy initially developed in relatively affluent and homogenous countries but have since spread to other contexts (Dahl, 1989). The competition for political influence that democracy provides serves well in states without vertical cleavages, where all parties trust the other actors to respect the rights and freedoms that democracy entails. But in a state emerging from civil war, intergroup relations are often acutely strained, and trust is low due to the trauma inflicted during the conflict. There are ways however to set up the institutions of a democratic regime in ways that mitigate the negative impact that ethnic or religious fractionalisation can have on the advancement of democratisation. The power-sharing literature draws heavily on the ideas of Arend Lijphart and the concept of Consociational democracy, which favours cooperation over competition (Lijphart, 1968).

2.1.1 Consociational democracy

Consociational democracy builds on the idea of elite pacts securing the survival of democratic rule. Lijphart writes that “the essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as overarching cooperation at the elite level, with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system” (Lijphart, 1968, p. 21). A religiously or ethnically diverse and divided country often leads to a fragmented political landscape, with political parties representing ethnically or religiously defined constituencies. These parties make up the most influential elites of their respective group. Had the political institutions fostered fierce competition between these elites, as in many traditional democracies, a higher risk of intergroup violence and reversal of democracy is theorised (Lijphart, 1968). Lijphart’s (1968) theory was developed studying countries such as Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. To counter the centrifugal force that competition exercises in diverse societies, these countries have fostered a political culture of collaboration. By building grand coalitions, additional or all groups are represented on the executive level of the regime (Lijphart, 1968). Through these coalitions, a form of buy-in is created, where all parties are interested in upholding the current regime to perpetuate their political influence.

In addition to grand coalitions, consociational democracies are characterised by a mutual veto, proportional representation, and cultural autonomy. The mutual veto allows each group to commit to a grand coalition as they can veto legislation that goes against their core interests. Proportional representation ensures that a group is represented in the legislative organ of the state but can also be extended to include other civil functions such as the military or state departments (Lijphart, 1968; Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Autonomy is also guaranteed each group on issues related to their collective identity, often organised in a system that allows
partitioned decision-making; leaving sensitive issues under the mandate of local politicians to adopt local legislature (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Consociational democracy should thus be understood as an institutional setup designed to allow the establishment and survival of democracy in states where overt horizontal cleavages otherwise risk delegitimising the regime.

In his later works, Lijphart (1996) identified nine conditions that are unfavourable to the establishment of consociationalism. The presence of a natural majority that, for obvious reasons, would prefer a simple majority rule is perhaps the most detrimental to the prospects of consociationalism. Other factors concern the complexity of intergroup relations. A high number of groups to accommodate, a large total population, or the presence of one dominant minority is theorised to be disadvantageous. Furthermore, if groups are not geographically concentrated, the creation of ethno-federalist states or regions is troublesome, in turn making cultural autonomy harder to achieve. Vast socio-economic inequalities between groups can exacerbate friction and frustrations, whereas an outside threat, such as a rival or hostile state, can promote internal unity. Unity can be further promoted by having a common denominator among the population; the existence of an overarching and unifying identity function as a counterbalance to particularistic ambitions by subgroups. Finally, a tradition of accommodation and compromise rather than dominance and rule of the strong is unsurprisingly beneficial for intergroup relations and consociationalism (Lijphart, 1996).

2.2 Power Sharing

While consociational democracy was developed by studying European countries who were not recovering from civil war, its theoretical contributions have greatly influenced both practitioners and academics within the field of peace and conflict. As conflicts have increasingly been fought within states, power-sharing arrangements that strive to create similar political systems to those studied by Lijphart have received extensive scholarly attention. Early works on power sharing stressed the importance of resolving the commitment problems experienced by the warring parties in an intrastate conflict. In a post-conflict setting, a government will seek to reinstall its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence by disarming the rebels. In a similar vein, inflated military budgets lingering from the previous conflict must be decreased in order to allow reconstruction and service provision (Walter, 2002). Giving up coercive power on either side poses a threat to the party. There is a risk of being dominated or exploited should the opposing side choose to renege on the promises made during the negotiations, retain their military means and relaunch the conflict (Walter, 2002; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Transitioning to democracy can also be daunting to the parties, as there is no
guarantee they will be successful in eventual elections. Should one side enjoy a majority rule after elections, they could use the powers of the state to exclude or oppress the opposing faction (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). Neither side can thus credibly commit to a peace accord that does not in some way guarantee the security and influence of their respective sides. Including provisions and guarantees for future influence in a peace agreement can serve to mitigate these commitment problems (Walter, 2002; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003).

The credible commitment argument advocated by Walter (2002) and Hartzell & Hoddie (2003), is further developed by Jarstad & Nilsson (2008). Focusing less on the security-guarantee aspects of power sharing, Jarstad & Nilsson (2008) propose that the effects of power sharing are best understood from a bargaining theory perspective. More specifically, by accepting the costs that a power-sharing arrangement entails, an actor signals its sincere commitment to resolving a conflict. The other parties to a conflict are thus assured of the former opponent’s good intentions and are more likely to return the favour. Following this logic, a group of actors that agree on extensive and expensive power-sharing institutions should be less likely to return to war (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008).

Moving from theory to empirics and practice, power-sharing arrangements can be set up to divide influence within four dimensions of society: political, military, economic, and territorial (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Findings by Hartzell & Hoddie (2003), Jarstad & Nilsson (2008), and Ottman & Vüllers (2015) suggest that power sharing has a positive effect on the durability of peace, albeit with some disagreements on which dimension having the most substantial impact. Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) find that the more dimensions of power sharing included in a peace agreement, the lower the risk of conflict recurrence. The relationship between power sharing and peace is not uncontested however, with authors such as Horowitz (2000) providing several case studies that challenge the correlation.

Shifting focus to the implementation of power-sharing pacts, the results from the models constructed by Jarstad & Nilsson (2008) suggest that only military and territorial power sharing influence peace. The authors attribute the difference between the dimensions to the cost attributed to both signing and reneging on them. Ottman & Vüllers (2015) manage to reconcile these results by looking at both the negotiation and implementation stages. Promises of military and territorial power sharing during negotiation are found to increase the chances for peace. When looking at implementation however, political and economic pacts are the only dimensions found to have a positive effect on the durability of peace (Ottman & Vüllers, 2015). Overall, while disagreements exist over which dimension of power sharing has the most
considerable effect on the durability of peace, there seems to be a general recognition of power sharing’s positive effects on stability.

2.3 Power Sharing and Democratisation

Having established a relationship between power sharing and durable peace, scholarly attention is shifted to democratisation. A noteworthy qualitative work is the study of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth BiH) by Jung (2012). BiH is identified as a most-likely case given the comprehensive and elaborate power-sharing arrangements that were put in place by the Dayton peace agreement, its relative economic affluence, and the extensive involvement of the international community. Despite these favourable conditions, the author showcases the lack of democratisation in BiH and presents a convincing argument for how power sharing has not fostered democracy but hindered it. Power sharing, Jung (2012) argues, facilitated a quick end to the civil war but has perpetuated wartime divisions into the new regime.

Other small-N studies of power sharing’s effect on democratisation following intrastate conflicts have suggested that the elite focus that is inherent in consociationalism is pernicious to public participation and civil society (Mehler, 2009). In his study of former Belgian colonies in Africa, Lemarchand (2007) concludes that power sharing in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo has had very different outcomes. The variance, Lemarchand claims, is due to a combination of contextual socio-political factors and the limited degree to which consociationalism was implemented (Lemarchand, 2007). A substantial portion of case studies have thus found a negative relationship between power sharing and democratisation.¹

Of the few statistical analyses that have been conducted within the field, two are of particular interest. First of these is the book *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* by Pippa Norris (2008). The book provides a wide arrange of both statistical and qualitative studies of power sharing and its effect on stability and democracy. In the qualitative studies, a natural-experiment design is employed, looking at pairs of states who share many cultural and historical similarities but differ in their choice of democratic system and power sharing. These qualitative studies showcase how power sharing countries have often outperformed majoritarian democracies across a wide range of indicators. These indicators include, among others, the overall level of democracy, stability, rule of law, and freedom of the press. Norris

¹ For an extensive overview of articles on power sharing, please consult Binningsbø’s (2013) informative review of the field.
(2008) constitutes an influential work within the field and provides strong arguments for the favourability of power sharing.

The second large-N study of note is Hartzell & Hoddie (2015). Just like in their earlier work, the authors argue that it is the reduction in uncertainties provided by power sharing that constitutes the mechanism at play. Some additional effects of power sharing are theorised to benefit democratisation in a post-conflict setting. First, power sharing is not dependent on the existence of democracy and may very well function under autocratic rule. But empowering elites from opposition groups and assuring a minimum level of influence is likely to affect how the state functions. From their new position within the political centre, opposition groups provide an elementary checks-and-balance system on the legislative and executive powers (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). Power sharing also provides a set of rules of the division of power in a state which all actors signing the peace accord have agreed to. Coupled with the empowerment of oppositional elites, a basic rule of law is established and the chances of a minimalist democracy to appear is improved (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). As the authors themselves put it: “Power-sharing institutions themselves may not be inherently democratic, but they can serve to help construct a political order upon which democracy may be built” (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015, p. 51). The result of their analysis suggests that power sharing does indeed increase the likelihood of a Schumpeterian – or minimalist – democracy being established in the first years following a peace settlement (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015).

In summary, most studies that find a negative relationship between power sharing and democratisation or peace have been of qualitative character. There are prominent exceptions, such as the statistical analysis conducted by Roeder (2005) correlating power sharing with increased risk of ethnic conflict escalation. Numerous small-N studies have also underscored the positive effects of power sharing in specific cases (Mühlbacher, 2009; Spears, 2005; Tremblay, 2005; Lijphart, 1996). Still, one can still discern an interesting discrepancy in results between positive and negative findings, with few large-N studies finding directly adverse effects of power sharing whereas small-N studies more commonly do.

2.4 Research Gap
The correlation between power sharing and democracy has been established, but several issues remain unaddressed. Previous research on the topic employs a minimalistic definition of democracy, where the most central indication of democracy being present is the holding of competitive elections (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). From both a theoretical and methodological standpoint, it is a reasonable initial step to take when opening a new subfield of research.
Hartzell & Hoddie (2015) argues that the limited administrative and institutional resources that are available to a post-conflict society make an immediate transition to full democracy difficult, if at all possible. Minimalist democracy, although omitting many of the liberties associated with democracy, captures the core aspect of voting. More importantly perhaps, the limiting of associational freedoms and freedom of speech could provide a sense of security to these societies, where non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms could be lacking (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015).

Despite these considerations, minimalist democracy is still arguably an unsatisfying definition and operationalisation of democracy. First, by relying on minimalistic definitions of democracy research risk falling victim to a fallacy of electoralism. Such an approach limits the proponents of democracy to only being the holding of free elections with universal suffrage (Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Bernhagen, 2009). There are benefits to limiting a definition of democracy to the bare fundamentals, as authors can avoid an ideological discussion on the more ambiguous aspects of democracy. More inclusive definitions also run the risk of measuring outcomes of democracy, rather than the components of it (Bernhagen, 2009). Still, reducing democracy to only holding fair elections in order to simplify operationalisations is an unsatisfactory trade-off. As mentioned in the previous literature section, democracy requires a set of rights and institutions to function equally for all citizens. The presence of structural inequality in the access to the democratic process, human rights abuses, or curbing of freedoms among other phenomena cannot be excluded from a measurement of democracy.

An additional weakness in previous research is how democracy has been operationalised into a dichotomous variable. A dichotomous variable is unable to capture the diversity within the democracy and autocracy categories. Iceland, Costa Rica, and Tunisia would all be coded as democracies, yet these regimes differ significantly in their fulfilment of democratic criteria presented by Dahl (1989). Similarly, Eritrea, China, and Venezuela could all be considered autocracies despite there being great variance in legitimacy and governmental efficiency between these states. Acknowledging the unsatisfactory conceptual specificity inherent in reducing regime types to the categories ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’, Dahl writes that “The enormous variety of regimes in nondemocratic countries require discriminating empirical and moral appraisals and a firm rejection of Manichean dualism” (Dahl, 1989, p. 317).

A second gap within the field is the limited time frame during which the effects of power sharing on democratisation has been studied. Democratisation does not happen overnight, but gradually over more extended periods (Lindberg, et al., 2018). Quantitative studies that in a broader sense
study power sharing and regime types, such as Hartzell & Hoddie (2015) and Jarstad & Nilsson (2018), have focused on the first five years after an agreement has been signed or implemented. The empirics provided by Lindberg et al. (2018) indicate that five years is a too restrictive time frame to study democratisation processes, with both successful and unsuccessful processes on average lasting more than five years. Studies of long-term democratisation in power-sharing countries have primarily been of qualitative nature and contributed to theory-building (see for example Jarstad (2008), Jung (2012), and Mühlbacher (2009)). Without complementing these with quantitative analyses however, isolating the effects of power sharing from other contextual factors is difficult, and a more exact measure of the relationship’s strength remains unknown. By expanding our knowledge base on the long-term effects, practitioners will be better equipped to support democratisation processes.
3. Theory

Countries experiencing civil war are likely to have a low democracy rating. Civil wars are most frequent in anocratic states (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001). Thus, these countries could have some ostensibly democratic institutions in place. Case studies however suggest that even if there is a de jure democratic framework, high level of violence is likely to have weakened the functioning of these institutions (Lührmann, Tannenberg, & Lindberg, 2018). Drawing upon the theoretical framework and findings presented by Hartzell & Hoddie (2015), some predictions can be made. By providing security guarantees to the warring parties, power-sharing agreements allow the warring parties to overcome their commitment problems and allow for a transition to peace and democracy (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015).

Furthermore, the power-sharing arrangements offer a standard set of rules that the involved parties agreed on. With recognised legislation in place, a rudimental rule of law is established (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). As Hartzell & Hoddie (2015) have found effects on the electoral and legislative aspects of democracy, it is reasonable to expect improvements in these areas when employing a more extensive democracy measurement.

I argue that there is a reason to suspect that political power sharing specifically provides additional benefits to democratisation. A country experiencing civil war is likely to have had a severely infected political debate. Both sides could have emanated propaganda (see for example UNITA’s Voice of the Black Cockerel in Angola, the Sudanese government’s radio channel SUNA, or the rebel radio Venceremos in El Salvador). Under the most repressive regimes and in the most volatile conflict, the low levels of personal security can reasonably be suspected to have limited individuals’ access to political debates from fear of reprisals, impediments to travelling, and a lack of associational freedom. Although these conditions can be expected to apply for all countries trapped in civil conflict, political power-sharing arrangements are expected to more efficiently improve the situation through the power bestowed in elite members of relevant identity groups.

By empowering elites and guaranteeing their influence in state apparatuses, previously suppressed groups gain a patron in the political centre. Through the power bestowed in them, these elite patrons can function as checks on political opponents (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). I argue that should political opponents seek to limit the civil liberties of a specific group, such as hindering the formation of interest groups or silencing political debate, an elite patron is expected to use their influence to thwart such attempts. As the patrons are represented in the
legislative or executive branches of the state, the institutional tools to hinder a proposal are available to them, as argued by Rothstein & Roeder (2005). In contrast Rothstein & Roeder however, I suggest that these tools can further democratisation at this stage. A proposal to the legislative chamber can be voted against, a veto can be used, the concerns of the affected group can be voiced, or implementation refused. Any attempt to limit civil liberties would thus entail a high political cost, deterring attempts to do so in the first place. The causal mechanism can be described graphically in the following way:

![Figure 1: Causal mechanism showing the proposed positive effect political power sharing may have on short-term democratisation.](image)

The patron can be spurred by either group loyalty or self-interest, as his or her political relevance depends on the continued loyalty of the constituents. Should elite patrons prove unable to protect the civil rights of their respective group, the loyalty of the supporters and the legitimacy of the power-sharing institutions can be eroded (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Similarly, if the patrons cannot ensure the adherence of their group to the peace accord, there is little reason for the other parties to uphold the power-sharing pact (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). As a result, one should expect states with political power-sharing provisions to have a stronger democratisation than states that solved their conflict without these provisions, following the strengthening of civil rights, including associational freedom and freedom of speech. With strengthened protection of associational freedoms and freedom of speech, public access to the political debate and alternative information should in turn improve. Coupled with the previously forecasted advances in the electoral and legislative aspects of democracy, all aspects of polyarchy are expected to be improved. A first hypothesis is thus:
H1: The presence of political power-sharing arrangements strengthens democratisation in the short-term (5 years)

Whereas H1 predicts democratisation to take place in the early years following a conflict, there is no guarantee that these changes constitute the beginning of a gradual development to full democracy. The democratisation literature that, unlike this thesis, also includes states without a recent history of civil war present valuable insights on the outcomes of democratisation processes. Although long-term development to and consolidation of a fully democratic rule can be achieved, periods of rapid democratisation are not seldom followed by a quick reversal back to autocratic rule (Lindberg, et al., 2018). A common outcome among democratising countries is the establishment of hybrid regimes, caught somewhere in between full autocracy and full democracy (Lindberg, et al., 2018). Most regimes, including many autocratic ones, pay at least lip service to the virtues of democracy (Dahl, 1989). It should come as no surprise then that hybrid regimes often establish ostensibly democratic institutions to provide a cover for continued autocracy (Lindberg, et al., 2018). While a democratic legal framework makes for a de jure democracy, elections are severely flawed, competition restricted, and civil rights markedly absent (Lührmann, Tannenberg, & Lindberg, 2018). There are reasons to believe political power sharing creates conditions that foster the rise of hybrid regimes. The argument will be explored in the following paragraphs.

Criticisms have been formulated against the theory of consociationalism, which forms the theoretical base of power sharing. Objections have also been voiced against how these ideas have been too casually transmitted from their western European origins to post-conflict contexts (Jarstad, 2008). Starting with the former critique, power sharing’s claim on being democratic is a contested issue. Despite the democratic intentions of political power sharing, installing these institutions risks coming with several unintended side effects (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005).

Political power sharing challenges the electoral ideals of democracy in two ways: first, the political power-balance is at least partially taken out of the hand of elections by having quotas or a predetermined allocation of positions. Regular elections are essential in ensuring accountability of the ruling elites to their constituents and that the public opinion is heard (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Should political influence prove independent of public support, the population risks becoming disillusioned with the power-sharing system and dissent rise, affecting democracy negatively (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Therefore, I argue that confining the electoral process, the resources it allocates and the leverage it holds on elites, is equal to confining democracy itself.
Second, influential strands within democracy theory identify elite competition for political influence as essential in the transition to and upholding of democracy (Welzel, 2009). Consociationalism, which power sharing builds upon, aims to create conditions for elite cooperation rather than competition (Lijphart, 1968; Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). By setting aside a percentage of the seats in the parliament or guaranteeing specific individuals influential positions based on their ethnic or religious identification, competition between elites is made redundant. Despite good intentions, the consequences are detrimental to democracy; without competition, the meritocratic ideal of democracy is set aside, allowing politicians to avoid accountability to the public via the ballot box (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005).

Shifting focus instead to the practical difficulties of political power sharing, additional problems can be identified. Included in Dahl’s (1989) definition of democracy is how the agenda ought to be exclusively under the control of the voters. Political power sharing does not revoke agenda control from the population but promotes a specific cleavage over others. Political mobilisation will continue to happen along the lines that caused the conflict to begin with. Consequently, identity is cemented at the core of the political discourse in a post-conflict society, effectively preventing a normalisation of intergroup relations (Jarstad, 2008; Jung, 2012; Horowitz, 2000). The elite patrons are unlikely to try and mitigate these ethnic tensions as their political relevance is dependent on ethnicity being a delicate issue. These patrons can then present themselves as a champion for their group’s cause, increasing the personification of politics which in turn has adverse effects on the development of democratic institutions (Cammett & Malesky, 2012). Although voters are still free to cast their vote for any of the candidates, protracted ethnic tensions would likely reduce the viability of candidates from another ethnic group in the eyes of the voters. The elite patron can therefore trust their core voters to remain loyal indifferent of their performance as politicians, further reducing accountability via the ballot box.

Furthermore, the mutual veto could also effectively remove topics from the agenda. The division of power stipulated by an agreement would have corresponded to the size or importance of the groups at the time of writing. However, power relations change over time and would eventually leave the quotas outdated (Jarstad, 2008). If intergroup tensions remain high following the continuous reification of ethnicity as the core political issue, neither side is likely to agree to any reforms that would make the regime more democratic but weaken the own group’s influence. The stalemate created by such a face-off between political actors could further exacerbate ethnic tensions or provide fertile soil for anti-democratic movements to draw upon (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Should a new political movement arise that challenges the
distribution of power in the agreement, or an existent party demand redistribution of political resources, the elite cartel can be tempted to respond with the state’s coercive powers (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). An example of this is Lebanon, where similar developments led to the civil war in 1975 and the mounting tensions in the early 2000s (International Crisis Group, 2006). Such actions restrict not only democracy but also entail a distinct move towards authoritarianism. The empowerment of patrons is therefore expected to inhibit further democratisation. The power to hinder democratic initiatives is installed among the empowered elites, who will seek to retain influence, while the public’s tools for accountability are weakened. Expressed graphically, the causal mechanism is thus:

![Causal mechanism showing the proposed negative effect political power sharing may have on long-term democratisation](image)

Hence, it is the same aspects of power sharing that hypothesis 1 predicts strengthens early democratisation that in the long run inhibits it. These negative effects are not necessarily limited to the later years but are likely also present in the short-term. The positive effects in the short-term period however will likely outweigh the long-term drawbacks early on, given the improvements that any transition from war to peace is assumed to have. Overall, the democracy score of a state would initially improve, with side effects of power sharing becoming visible only once early progression peters out. Following this logic, a second hypothesis is established:

H2: The presence of political power-sharing arrangements limits democratisation in the long term (10 years).
4. Research Design

In the following section, the setup of the analysis will be described, including presentations of the data sources, operationalisations, control variables, and model specifications.

4.1 Statistical Method

The analysis will be conducted by running an OLS regression model using political power sharing as the independent variable while controlling for several other variables. The dependent variable will vary slightly across two analyses, depending on which of the two hypotheses it strives to test. Analysis 1 will test the correlation between political power sharing and short-term democratisation. Analysis 2 in turn will test the correlation between political power sharing and long-term democratisation. These analyses are presented and discussed separately.

4.2 Data and Operationalisations

4.2.1 The dataset

The dataset builds on power-sharing data provided by Hartzell & Hoddie (2015). It covers all civil wars which reached a settlement between 1945-2006. Hartzell & Hoddie’s data is recast from panel data to a wide format, allowing each settlement of civil war to constitute one case. The unit of analysis is thus civil war settlements. Employing the UCDP standard threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths per year, 127 conflicts in 62 countries fulfil the criteria and are included in the dataset. The data details whether these settlements were the result of a military victory, and whether the electoral setup of the state in which the civil war was settled had political power-sharing institutions.

4.2.2 Independent variable

The independent variable is the presence of political power sharing at the time of settlement. When collecting the data, Hartzell & Hoddie (2015) defined power-sharing institutions as “rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power.” (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015, p. 40). Political power sharing was coded as present in a given country-year if there were mechanisms in place that provided proportional representation in either elections, government’s administration, or the government’s executive branch.

In this thesis, political power sharing is operationalised into a dichotomous variable. Political power sharing was coded as 1 if Hartzell & Hoddie’s data indicated the presence of political power sharing institutions, and 0 if not. Unlike the dependent variable, political power sharing
is only measured at the time of settlement. It is therefore possible that states had power-sharing institutions in the early post-conflict period, only to remove them either via a sunset clause or the initiation of electoral reforms. Although this issue presents a slight challenge to the validity of the measurement, it does not undermine the causal mechanisms presented. Elites are still initially empowered, and their privileged positions can likely be upheld even with formal arrangements that guarantee them influence has been removed.

4.2.3 Dependent variables

To determine the democratisation progress of a state, the analysis will rely on V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). This index builds directly on Dahl’s criteria for polyarchies, providing an inclusive democracy measurement whose theoretical basis enjoys widespread recognition among academics (Lindberg, Coppedge, Gerring, & Teorell, 2014). The index ranges from 0-1, where higher values indicate a more democratic regime. EDI captures those aspects of democracy that the hypotheses predict will be affected by power sharing. First, the fundamental component of elections must be fulfilled in order to be considered a democracy on the EDI scale. In addition to the holding of elections, EDI also includes measurements of associational freedom, freedom of speech, and access to alternative information, allowing us to move beyond democratic minimalism.

Although democratisation could theoretically take place within any unit, the most frequently studied political unit and the most relevant actor for this thesis is the state. Three observations are made for each unit: the level of democracy one year prior to signing a peace agreement (T-1), five, and ten years after (T+5 and T+10, respectively). The multiple regression analysis will then compare the changes in democracy levels between states with political power sharing, and states lacking these institutions. The first analysis, concerning short-term democratisation, will compare the EDI score of a state one year prior to settlement, and five years after settlement (T-1 compared to T+5). The second analysis will conduct a similar operation but instead focusing on long-term democratisation by comparing EDI scores five and ten years after a civil war settlement (T+5 compared to T+10). Should the first analysis return a positive correlation between power sharing and democratisation, support for Hypothesis 1 would be strengthened. For the second analysis, if the correlational coefficient is negative and statistically significant, Hypothesis 2 is supported. If no statistical results are found or if these results are positive, Hypothesis 2 can be discarded. The conventional p<0.05 threshold will be applied to evaluate the statistical significance of the results.
4.2.4 Timing of observations

The timing of observation is not arbitrary. Starting with T-1, measurements from the same year the agreement was signed cannot be used since the data could have been collected after the peace deal came into effect. By measuring one year before the resolution of the conflict, one can be sure the data captures the wartime regime. Regrettably, this technique is suboptimal for cases when the civil war lasted for less than a year. If the conflict started the same year it was settled, the T-1 measurement will not capture a wartime regime. Nonetheless, the inconsequentialities this entails is deemed to be of minor importance since it is sensible to assume that a state which was heading for civil war had issues with governance in the time leading up to rebellion too.

Measuring outcomes five years after conflict settlement is an unofficial standard employed by several influential works within the field such as Hartzell & Hoddie (2007), Jarstad & Nilsson (2008), and Ottman & Vüllers (2015). Adhering to the same standards facilitates comparisons between results. Whereas the five-year measurement has been used by scholars studying power sharing, researchers focused on democratisation such as Mansfield & Snyder (1995) and Lindberg et al. (2018) have often employed a ten-year time frame. For measuring democracy, the longer time frame provides vital information about the resilience of democratisation as it typically captures two election cycles. It would arguably be beneficial to include an even longer time frame, say 25 years, for a few reasons. Generational shifts constitute a challenge to agreements as they can fall out of sync with the values and priorities of the new generation (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). There is also reason to believe a democracy that survived for more than two decades has consolidated and is capable of resisting backsliding into an autocratic or hybrid rule (Dahl, 1989). Unfortunately, the data sets the limitations in this case; a large number of the settlements in the data set are too recent, and 25 years have not yet passed since the event. Moreover, the shorter time frame makes the causal connection stronger, as fewer events have intervened between the cause and effect.

The unit of analysis being civil war settlements and the outcome being measured over time, there is a risk of a single country having multiple, overlapping observation periods. A telling case is that of Burundi, where civil war settlements between the government and rebel groups were reached in 2000, 2003, and 2006. With H1 predicting positive effects of power sharing in the first five years, should the effects be observed in 2005, 2008 or 2011? The effects of the 2000 peace agreement would, should the hypotheses hold, already have started to affect the democracy score of Burundi when the T-1 observation is to be made for the 2003 agreement.
Although the possibly skewering effects these overlaps could have on the data is partially mitigated by controlling for a return to conflict, the T-1 measurement would still suffer from low validity in these cases. The overlapping cases should not be considered untreated at the time of measurement. Therefore, while the initial analysis will not exclude any cases, a later analysis will censor cases taking place within a five- or ten-year period after an earlier agreement.

4.2.5 Control variables

The main benefit of multiple regression is the ability to control for other factors mathematically. With democracy being a contested subject and research having identified plenty of conditions correlated with democratisation, isolating the effect of power sharing constitutes the primary hurdle to establishing causality. Quantitative studies have found economic prosperity, gender equality, and ethnic diversity to affect the likelihood of democratisation to take place (Fish & Wittemberg, 2009; Welzel, 2009; Bingham, 1982). Logged and PPP adjusted GDP per capita during the year the civil war was settled, building on Gleditsch’s Expanded GDP Data v.6.0, will be used to measure economic prosperity (Gleditsch, 2002). Controlling for gender inequality is no straightforward process as inequality between the sexes is apparent in most dimensions of society. Although the last decades have seen an increase in data and measurements of gender inequality, few go as far back in time as necessitated by the setup of this thesis. With the dependent variable being of political nature, V-Dem’s Power distribution by gender measures an aspect of inequality most relevant to this thesis which is also coded for the full period (Coppedge, et al., 2018).

Moving on to ethnic fractionalisation, data will come from Alesina et al. (2003). Previous levels of democracy will also be controlled for, using the EDI score of a state one year prior to conflict settlement. Additional control variables relating to the nature of the conflict is included, using the data supplied by Hartzell & Hoddie (2015). These are whether the settlement was the result of a military victory, and if the country experienced a return to war with any actor in the following ten years.

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2 Gleditsch’s data covers the years 1950 to 2011. For the cases where civil war was settled before these dates, their GDP data for 1950 is used. The cases affected are China 1947, Paraguay 1947, Costa Rica 1948, India 1948, North Yemen 1948, China 1949, and Greece 1949.

3 With data on ethnic fractionalisation missing for Yemen, the measure provided by the same data set for linguistic fractionalisation was used instead for the following cases: North Yemen 1948, North Yemen 1970, South Yemen 1986, and Yemen 1994.

4 For five cases, the original dataset lacked entries on whether the settlement was the result of a military victory. In these cases, UCDP yearly data has been used to fill these blanks. The affected cases are Afghanistan 1992, Afghanistan 1996, Afghanistan 2001, Algeria 1962, and Algeria 2005
5. Empirics

Before moving on to testing the hypotheses, the essential qualities of the data will be introduced. Of the 127 cases in the data set, 53 are in Africa, 28 in Asia, nine in Europe, 13 in Latin America, 17 in the Middle East, and seven in Oceania. In total, 52 have political power-sharing arrangements. There are regional differences in the likelihood of a state having a political power-sharing arrangement, with Latin American countries more seldom implementing such provisions whereas African states do so to a higher degree. It should also be noted that Indonesia constitutes six of the seven registered cases in Oceania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Case count</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Summary of cases in the dataset. Percentage of cases indicates how many of the cases in a region have power-sharing arrangements.

Prior to introducing control variables, the data suggests there could be support for Hypothesis 1 at first glance. The mean increase in democracy score in the early post-conflict period for countries without political power-sharing arrangements is 0.017. States with such an agreement on the other hand, enjoy a 0.119 increase to their democracy score. Corresponding values for the long-term democratisation is 0.024 and 0.023, indicating a slightly worse democratisation outcome for power-sharing countries in the long-term. This result could thus indicate support for Hypothesis 2, although the effect would be minute:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Power Sharing</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short-term democratisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((T-1 - T+5))</td>
<td>+0.017</td>
<td>+0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term democratisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((T+5 - T+10))</td>
<td>+0.024</td>
<td>+0.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Mean change in democracy score experienced by cases with and without political power sharing, separately and compared to one another.
Next, I will move on to introducing control variables and shortly describe the findings. The first and second analysis will be presented and described separately before moving on to the analysis.

5.1 Analysis 1: Political Power Sharing and Short-term Democratisation

Table 1: Political power sharing and short-term democratisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Short-term democratisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political power sharing</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (log)</td>
<td>0.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distribution by gender</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous democracy level</td>
<td>-0.457***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict recurrence</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.150 (df = 125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>14.099*** (df = 1; 125)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

The regression analysis shows, in line with the descriptive statistics presented earlier, that a positive value in political power sharing is correlated with a higher short-term democratisation value. In the first, bivariate model, the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. When
introducing the first set of control variables, *power distribution by gender* and *previous democracy level* are also found significant at this level. *Political power sharing* also retains its significance, and there is a substantial increase in the R2-score. In the third model, the inclusion of conflict-related control variables leads to *political power sharing* losing some of its significance but remaining over the conventional threshold of p<0.05. The two new variables provide only incremental increases to the R2-score.

### 5.2 Analysis 2: Political Power Sharing and Long-term Democratisation

*Table 2: Political power sharing and long-term democratisation.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Long-term democratisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political power sharing</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (log)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distribution by gender</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous democracy level</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict recurrence</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.094 (df = 125)</td>
<td>0.092 (df = 121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.093 (df = 119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>0.001 (df = 1; 125)</td>
<td>1.715 (df = 5; 121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.318 (df = 7; 119)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p<0.01, **p< 0.05, ***p<0.01
Turning to long-term democratisation, we should already have been expecting weaker results judging from the insights presented by the descriptive statistics. The expectations are confirmed, with only a very weak correlation between political power sharing and long-term democratisation and the results being far from statistically significant. There thus seems to be no difference between countries with and countries without political power sharing in terms of their long-term democratisation. Surprisingly, none of the control variables reaches significance either, although GDP per capita and ethnic fractionalisation come close. The positive correlational coefficient of ethnic fractionalisation is also noteworthy. As covered in the section on control variables, previous research within the field would suggest that ethnic fractionalisation would be negatively correlated with democracy (Bingham, 1982). In this analysis however, if any correlation between the variables exists, it is in a positive direction. Finally, the R2-score is consistently low across all three models.
6 Analysis

6.1 Short-term Democratisation

The findings of the analysis provide a relatively straightforward response to Hypothesis 1. Starting with the first analysis, the initial two models do find a statistically significant effect on the p<0.01 level. These results indicate that political power sharing does help countries that recently settled a civil war to democratise, in line with the predictions of Hypothesis 1. Judging by the first two models, the worries and criticisms posed by Rothschild & Roeder (2005) and Jarstad (2008), would seem unwarranted – at least in the short-term. The final model of Analysis 1 pushes the significance of political power sharing down to only meet the p<0.05 threshold. Despite the correlation no longer reaching the highest levels of significance, Hypothesis 1 can still be considered supported.

I draw two main conclusions from these findings. First, contrary to the criticisms of Horowitz (2000), Rothschild & Roeder, (2005) and Jung (2012), it seems power sharing can be installed without negative consequences on the general level of democracy in a state. Negative implications can perhaps still be found in one or more of the indicators that are used to construct the EDI score. Though if there are negative effects on some indicators, they are counterbalanced by other aspects of democracy being strengthened under power sharing. Otherwise, a decrease in the EDI score would have been witnessed, which has not been registered. Hence should practitioners, unless more concerned with certain aspects of democracy than others, host no hesitation in including power-sharing provisions when resolving conflicts regarding democratisation.5 This inference echoes the conclusion made by Lijphart (2008), encapsulated in the book’s final sentence: “Hence we do not need to be doubtful either about recommending consociational democracy as a practical solution for deeply divided societies” (Lijphart, 2008, p. 279). Second, I infer that the findings go further than merely dismissing the critique. There is also a significant and substantial positive effect of power sharing on short-term democratisation. Unless the cases with positive experiences of power sharing are systematically different, policymakers should consider installing power-sharing institutions following civil war settlements. Whether required to reach an agreement between warring parties or following the military victory of one side, power sharing seems to have a high potential for fostering short-term democratisation that should not be overlooked.

5 It should be noted that criticisms against power sharing go beyond its impact on democracy. This study offers no insight on, for example, whether identity is cemented as the core political issue or if governments become less efficient (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005).
Moving on to the control variables, neither the significance of power distribution by gender nor that of previous level of democracy in Analysis 1 come as a surprise. Power distribution by gender returns high, stable and significant results. Nevertheless, the results can still be methodologically troublesome, as it is difficult to ascertain the temporal order of gender equality and democratisation. Philosophically, democracy rests on the notion of equality among citizens and trust in every individual to know what is best for them (Dahl, 1989). The presence of democratic values has also been found fundamental to democratisation (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). Should a country go through a process of democratisation and the values that underpin democracy gain traction, it would be hypocritical to advocate a subordinate role for women simultaneously. With that said, gender inequality remains an issue in all countries of the world, although many of them can be considered to have advanced far towards a practicable form of democracy (Lührmann, Tannenberg, & Lindberg, 2018). People are not necessarily consistent in their values, and exclusion from full citizenship could coexist with an improvement in democracy for other segments of society. Furthermore, after removing the explicit obstacles to female political participation, implicit dittos remain that halt progression towards an equal society. With the states in the dataset often starting from low democracy scores however, it is not unlikely that democratisation in many cases entailed an improvement of associational and other freedoms in general, resulting in improvements in both EDI and power distribution by gender.

Looking at previous levels of democracy, Analysis 1 shows a positive and statistically significant effect in both Model 2 and Model 3. The negative value of the coefficient signals that democratisation is, in general, more substantial in previously autocratic countries. It lies in the nature of the measurement. Should a civil war settlement happen in an already democratic country, room for improvement would be smaller. Possibly, improvements in democracy also suffer from a diminishing return on investments, where the early steps from autocracy such as universal suffrage and removal of censorship lead to considerable improvements in EDI. Once fundamental reforms have been implemented, fine-tuning remains, such as ensuring an unbiased media and facilitating voter registration. These reforms would move a country in a more democratic direction, but improvements would be relatively small.

The results should thus not be interpreted as countries with political power-sharing arrangements are, on average, more democratic than other countries. Furthermore, larger improvements in democracy score should not be mistaken for a higher absolute score. Two illustrative examples are El Salvador 1992 and Mali 1995. In both cases, political power sharing
was present. In the years following the settlement of the civil war, El Salvador increased its democracy score from 0.239 to 0.506. Mali’s democracy score on the other hand, fell from 0.615 by 0.093 down to 0.522 in the short-term, only to recoil back to previous levels at the ten-year observation. Despite the considerable improvements that took place in El Salvador, Mali remained more democratic at every point of observation.

In summary, Analysis 1 establishes a statistically significant positive effect of power sharing on short-term democratisation, indicating support for Hypothesis 1. Short-term democratisation is also markedly affected by gender equality and the starting level of democracy. With support for Hypothesis 1 having been established, backing for the criticisms against power sharing is absent – at least with regards to its effects on democratisation in the short term.

6.2 Long-term Democratisation

In Analysis 2, significant results are scarcer. It would seem long-term democratisation is entirely unrelated to power sharing. Even if the analysis had resulted in a statistically significant correlation, the correlational coefficients are so small that the practical implications would be minute. As Hypothesis 2 predicted a reversal in democracy, it can decidedly be dismissed. The theorised adverse effects on accountability and electoral competitions have thus seemingly failed to materialise.

Moreover, the lack of significant control variables – despite all of them having been found relevant for democratisation in previous research – underscores the intricacy of democratisation. As already mentioned in connection to when the results were presented, an intriguing result of the analysis is the almost significant correlation between ethnic fractionalisation and democratisation is in positive rather than negative direction. The negative correlation between ethnic fractionalisation and democracy found by Bingham (1982) is not uncontested (see for example Fish & Wittemberg (2009)). But these results do not only contradict Bingham’s by not finding a significantly negative correlation between ethnic fractionalisation and democracy. It also comes close to finding a statistically significant positive relationship between the two phenomena. It is worth noting however, that the study at hand only concerns post-civil war countries and not democratisation in general. The discrepancy observed regarding ethnic fractionalisation between this and Bingham’s study could be explained by the different universes of cases.

Part of the reason why the analysis tells us so little about the correlation between power sharing and democratisation compared to Analysis 1 could be the smaller variance on the outcome
variable. The smaller variance should not come as a surprise. Previous research has found that democratisation may just as well be swift or occur slowly over extended periods of time (Lindberg, et al., 2018). The slower-paced democratisation processes are likely to result in a smaller variance in the dependent variable since the developments towards the higher end of the democracy index is spread out over a longer time frame. Periods of swift democratisation do not require a settlement of a civil war to ensure. It would appear logical though, that vast changes to the regime structure can be expected following the settlement of a civil war since issues of government is a common incompatibility between the warring parties. Long-term democratisation on the other hand, does not follow directly on an important historical event and can thus expect more gradual changes. The small variance makes the size of the coefficients smaller. Coupled with the low number of observations, which is detrimental to the size of the standard deviations, these characteristics of the data make statistical significance challenging to attain.

Aside from empirical explanations, there is the obvious suspicion that the theory is faulty. Two possible reasons for the failure of the theory can be entertained. First of these is the possibility that power sharing in practise does not have the suggested negative effects. Accountability is perhaps not reduced as predicted due to there being other systems for exerting control over elite patrons. In the cases where an elite actor represents an identity group, support from internal cultural institutions could be vital for their continued influence. It is not uncommon for rebel groups to transform into a political actor and given influence through a power-sharing arrangement. Pacts like these were made in Burundi, Chad, and South Africa to mention but a few examples (UCDP, 2019a; UCDP, 2019b; UCDP, 2019c). Should then these groups be denounced by the very religious or traditional actors it claims to represent, their legitimacy as representatives is highly questionable.

While these religious or traditional actors are not themselves democratically elected, they are possibly in closer contact with the population than the elite patrons. These cultural institutions could thus serve as a channel between the elite patrons and their constituency. Under the threat of losing public support, elite patrons would then be careful not to alienate these actors. The prerequisite of elite dominance for the functioning of power sharing suggested by Rothchild & Roeder (2005) is perhaps then not incorrect, but it misses out on the importance of these middle actors that combines public support with the ability to influence the topmost elite.

Another possible reason for why no adverse effects on democracy are registered is that the power-sharing institutions are set up to mitigate the problems identified by Jarstad (2008) and
The proposed limiting of political competition is most apparent in the cases where power-sharing agreements allot positions in the state apparatus to certain individuals. If a former rebel leader is guaranteed the vice presidency, competition is limited. In cases where seats in parliament are predetermined, competition between groups is likewise severely limited.

Although these arrangements might be the first to come to mind when contemplating political power sharing, there are other setups available to practitioners. Hartzell & Hoddie (2015) describe proportionality in the distribution of central state power as the main emphasis of political power sharing. Indeed, proportionality in representation rather than majoritarian winner-takes-it-all systems has been a key feature of consociational theory and power sharing from the very onset (Lijphart, 1968). Research has also backed up the theoretical arguments by finding a statistically significant correlation between proportional representation and democracy (Norris, 2008), post-conflict stability and quality of governance (Cammett & Malesky, 2012), and a lower degree of personalistic voting (Carey & Shugart, 1995). There are also qualitative descriptions of how proportionality affects democracy. The introduction of proportionality spurred a wave of democratisation in Mexico in the 1990s (Lindberg, et al., 2018), and New Zealand saw a more democratic development than the UK when Norris (2008) compared them using a natural-experiment design. Therefore, it is possible that the positive democratic potential of political power sharing can be tapped in to – if organised appropriately.

The critique of political power sharing might then not be incorrect but instead directed at a particular institutional setup. Disagreements between propagators and critiques would then partially be explained by a lack of conceptual clarity. Many of the prominent studies do not disaggregate or differentiate between different kinds of power sharing beyond the division into political, economic, territorial, and military. With researchers employing different datasets each building on a slightly different operationalisation of power sharing, it should not be surprising that different conclusions are drawn. This is not a novel analysis; Both Binningsbø (2013) and Ottman & Vüllers (2015) recognise that the power-sharing research field lacks consensus on definitions and operationalisations, and suggest that power sharing should be more explicitly defined and further disaggregated in future research. A similar request for increased specificity should also go out to critics, which would allow more accurate testing of the specific iterations of power sharing they oppose.

To summarise, Analysis 2 offered no support for Hypothesis 2. Because of the rather low number of observations, single cases can have a large influence on the coefficients and their
significance. In the next section, a closer inspection of the data will be undertaken to ensure that a few cases do not solely drive the results.

6.3 Robustness Checks

6.3.1 Evaluating residuals

Due to the lack of significant results from the second analysis, the discussion on robustness will focus mainly on Analysis 1. Two kinds of test are run on Analysis 1. The first of these concerns the linearity of the data. An OLS regression assumes that there is a linear correlation between the variables, which is not necessarily the case. The OLS regression estimates a line that fits the data – the dependent, independent, and control variables – best. The distance between the actual observations and the line estimated by the OLS regression constitutes the residuals. Put differently; the residuals are the difference between each case’s observed dependent variable outcome and the value that the model predicted the case to have (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013).

Expressed graphically, if a correlation is linear, the residual and fitted values of each observation should form a straight, horizontal line when plotted (STHDA, 2018). Should observations be concentrated in any of the four corners of the graph and result in the line bending, the correlation is not linear. This issue could then be ameliorated by logging the independent or control variables. When the residual versus the fitted values of the third model in Analysis 1 is plotted, these are the results:
Figure 5: Residual versus fitted values of Model 3, Analysis 1. A horizontal line is preferable and indicates a linear relationship.

The graph shows that there is a rather even spread of observations on both negative and positive end of the spectrum. At a glance, higher positive standardised residuals are reported for predicted values below zero and above 0.15. Between these two thresholds, negative residuals are more frequent. Even though the relationship is not perfectly linear, the line is not decidedly askew. Hence, this first robustness check is interpreted to mean that an assumption of linearity is justifiable.

Even with the linearity of the data having been checked, additional challenges to the robustness of the results remain. Still focusing on the residual values, attention shifts to how these residuals are distributed across the cases. By dividing a residual with the standard deviation, a standardised residual is calculated. The standardisation process provides a unitary measurement that allows for comparison across cases and helps in the identification of outliers (STHDA, 2018). These can take on both positive and negative values. In this thesis, it means that a case with either much higher or lower democracy score than what the model predicts would also have large standardised residuals. This measurement can then be used to compare if the residuals are equally large across all values of the independent and control variable, i.e. if
residuals are normally distributed. For example, if cases with power sharing consistently report higher standardised residuals than cases without power sharing, there is a risk that the line estimated by the OLS model is not the best fit to the data. The model would then be suffering from a heteroscedasticity problem. Should this be the case, the dependent variable could be logged to increase the fitness of the model. Again, when expressed graphically, a horizontal line is preferable. For the model at hand, plotting the standardised residuals and fitted values produce the following graph:

![Scale-Location]

*Figure 6: Standardised residuals versus fitted values. The slight u-shape is indicative of a heteroscedasticity problem.*

Judging by the result of this test, Model 3 could suffer from heteroscedasticity. Both cases that the model predicts to experience negative and rather high (>0.1) developments in democracy score have larger than average standardised residuals. The model is thus less accurate when trying to explain the observed negative and rather high changes to democracy that some cases experience. The correlational coefficient and their significance that Analysis 1 return is therefore called into question. An attempt to resolve the issue of heteroscedasticity is conducted by logging the dependent, *short-term democratisation* variable. When the OLS regression is rerun with *short-term democratisation* logged, *political power sharing* climbs over
the customary significance threshold with its correlational coefficient essentially unchanged. With the main results of the analysis unchanged despite adjustments to the data, confidence in the correctness of the original findings increases. However, no positive effect on the standardised residuals can be observed, which remain largely the same.\(^6\)

Despite applying the prescribed fix, there is still the possibility that the data is suffering from a heteroscedasticity problem. In the original analysis, eight out of the total 127 cases have standardised residuals larger than 2, which could qualify them as outliers. Six of these eight cases exhibit notably more positive changes in democratisation than predicted by the model: Peru 1997, Costa Rica 1948, Indonesia 1999, Nicaragua 1989, India 1948, and Afghanistan 2001. Two cases, Rwanda 1993 and Rwanda 1994, democratised considerably less than expected. With these outlying cases identified, it would be easy to simply rerun the analysis without them. Yet the number of cases, already low, would suffer additionally. In lack of a commonly agreed residual threshold for outliers to be excluded, the outlying cases will instead be shortly examined in order to determine their relevance for supporting or dismissing the hypotheses, and whether they should be excluded or not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Standardised Residual</th>
<th>Power Sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru 1997</td>
<td>+2.819</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica 1948</td>
<td>+2.372</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia 1999</td>
<td>+2.283</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua 1989</td>
<td>+2.256</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India 1948</td>
<td>+2.247</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan 2001</td>
<td>+2.045</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda 1994</td>
<td>-2.196</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda 1993</td>
<td>-2.529</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 7: Outliers in analysis 1 and their standardised residuals in model 3.*

6.3.2 Outliers

A case that stands out among the outliers is India 1948. In the years following decolonisation, India experienced a remarkable improvement in democracy score, moving from a colonial state to a democracy that only performed slightly worse than some of the consolidated democracies in north-western Europe in 1953 (Coppedge, et al., 2018). A swift move towards democracy was not the general experience for former colonies. In the 1950s, Indonesia saw experiments

\(^6\) For the sake of readability, these tables are not presented in the text but can be found in Appendix 3.
with democratisation, only to relapse back into autocratic rule. Algeria’s independence brought no change in EDI, and the Democratic Republic of Congo fell into deeper autocracy after the settlement in 1965 (Coppedge, et al., 2018).

India 1948 thus stands out in the data. It had power sharing, but its relevance in supporting or rejecting the hypotheses can be challenged. The case refers to the conflict in Hyderabad, which at the time had not joined the newly formed Dominion of India. Violence had erupted between several actors. Both political reformists and communists had clashed with the Hyderabad government. Violence had also taken on a sectarian character as attacks and revenge killings between Muslims and Hindus rose (Benichou, 2000; Sherman, 2007).

Being keen on integrating Hyderabad into India, the Indian state intervened in the conflict, ousted the Hyderabad regime and annexed the region (Sherman, 2007). Whereas partition is not a rare outcome of civil war, incorporation into another state certainly is. By becoming a part of India, the monarchical system in Hyderabad where a Nizam held power gave way for a democratic structure in line with their new federal union (Benichou, 2000). Realising the importance of providing development to counter support for communist insurgents, the federal government also made resources available to the federal states (Sherman, 2007). It is possible these investments had a greater effect on stability and democratisation in Hyderabad than power sharing did. Furthermore, India inherited a state apparatus from colonial times. Although its capacity may have been overestimated at times, it was still able to assert its authority over the affected regions (Sherman, 2007).

The particular circumstances in the India case are thus partially different from the conditions under which more recent civil wars are fought and resolved. Still, I argue that the case should not be excluded on the based on its rare conditions or successful outcome. As argued by Lijphart (1996), India is, in fact, an example of one of the more comprehensive – and successful – implementations of power sharing. Should it be excluded, the correlational effects between power sharing and democratisation would be underestimated. Neither the method nor theory requires power sharing to be stipulated by a conflict settlement, but merely present in the given post-conflict state. The Indian federal state provides precisely the aspects of power sharing that the causal mechanism of the hypotheses builds upon: the empowerment of ethnic representatives via the Congress party, cultural autonomy, and, in practice, a mutual veto

7 These experiments are not visible in the data used for this thesis due to the timing of observations; the strongest moves towards democracy happened 6-9 years post-conflict settlement. They were almost completely reversed in the tenth year.
India has also long been at the centre of the debate between critics and propagators of power sharing (Lijphart, 1996). Therefore, I argue that India approaches the status of a crucial case (Eckstein, 2000). Excluding India would then not only risk underestimating the effects of power sharing, but also excludes the very context in which power-sharing theory has continued to develop.

Another problem is presented by the case of Peru 1997, where the settlement of conflict and democratisation were arguably merely coincidental. President Fujimori had steered the country in a more autocratic direction and largely managed to quell the left-wing insurgents active in the country. But democratisation did not take place in tandem with the settlement of the conflict, but after public opinion had forced Fujimori to call for new elections and himself to go into exile (Bentin, 2018). There was thus a disconnectedness between the conflict settlement and the subsequent democratisation.

The Indonesian case of 1999 presents similar issues. The downfall of Sidharto’s regime coincided with an independence referendum and eventual partition with East Timor. Yet the ousting of the dictatorship came by economic collapse and public discontent rather than as a consequence of the resolution of the conflict (Bünne & Ufen, 2009). Still, Peru 1997 and Indonesia 1999 both fulfil the posed criteria and are not any more unique or misrepresentative than the previously covered Indian case. With both of these cases lacking power sharing, it is preferable to include them rather than to overestimate the positive effects of power sharing.

Moving on to Costa Rica 1948, the civil conflict led to the fall of the previous regime and the establishment of a more inclusive democracy. Following their ascension to power, the social democratic party was able to integrate the demands of the opposition and secure support for democracy (Booth, 1998). For Nicaragua, democratisation took place after the government and Contras reached a peace accord containing power-sharing provisions in 1989 (UCDP, 2019e). The US invasion of Afghanistan 2001 also led to a replacement of the Taleban regime and an end to the civil struggle that had been waged against them by UIFSA. An interim government was appointed which set the country en route to democracy, although progress has been uneven and volatile at best (Coppedge, et al., 2018; UCDP, 2019d). These cases are considered to be examples of successful power-sharing arrangements, although the Afghani case does differ quite substantially from the others presented due to the extensive international involvement. Still, none of the cases are deemed to have an unjustifiable influence on the analysis.
Up to this point, there have not been sufficiently deviant conditions present for any of the outlying cases to motivate an exclusion of cases. The Rwandan cases however highlight a potential source of bias in the data, namely overlap. As explained in the methods section, several cases have a second settlement, and thus another observational period, within five or ten years of the first settlement. Their second entry into the data is problematic, as they are not an untreated case. Although this argument could potentially be posed against every state that constitutes multiple cases, the issue is more severe when a pre-settlement measurement of democracy captures a period during which the case is already treated with power sharing. A rerun of the analysis was therefore conducted where cases of overlap were censored. A total of 22 cases were removed when censoring the data used for the short-term analysis. The corresponding number for long-term democratisation is 35. The number of cases censored is higher for long-term democratisation since the length of the observation is ten rather than five years, hence overlapping with more numerous cases.

6.4 Alternative Analyses

Table 3: Alternative analysis, political power sharing and short-term democratisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Short-term democratisation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political power sharing</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.086***</td>
<td>0.084***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (log)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distribution by gender</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.058***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous democracy level</td>
<td>-0.445***</td>
<td>-0.444***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict recurrence</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Appendix 5 for a description of how the censoring was conducted.
These alternative findings reiterate the findings of Analysis 1. *Political power sharing* retains its significance at the p<0.05 level in Model 3, and the correlation coefficient sees a sizeable increase. No other noteworthy changes take place except for a decrease in the R²-value. When a similar treatment is applied to the long-term democratisation data and the analysis is rerun, political power is still statistically insignificant, whereas GDP per capita increases in importance.⁹

Two central inferences can be drawn from this alternative analysis. First, the results of Analysis 1 are further strengthened. With results remaining stable despite censoring problematic cases speaks in favour of the findings, as the inferences that were drawn survived alterations to the data. Thus, the conclusion that practitioners should not only shed hesitation but adopt a positive attitude towards power-sharing arrangements and the contributions these bring towards democratising post-conflict societies is still valid. Although the predicted effect at face value can seem rather small, it should be understood in the context. The mean short-term increase in democratisation score for cases without power sharing is merely 0.019. A predicted additional increase of 0.084 is thus quite substantial. It poses the question to mediators, policymakers, and other practitioners – why not include power sharing?

Second, these results are by no means uncontested within the field, and the conclusions drawn must be balanced against contradicting findings. As presented earlier in the thesis, several small-N studies find a negative relationship between power sharing and democracy. This thesis, on the other hand, aligns more with the findings of Norris (2008) and Hartzell & Hoddie (2015), whom both find statistical evidence for the positive effects of power sharing on democracy. The discrepancy between more positive large-N findings and often more negative small-N studies thus continues.

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⁹ For readability’s sake and due to the lack of significant findings, this output table can be found in Appendix 2.
A possible explanation for the difference in results between methodologies is an insufficient understanding of what conditions favour power sharing, which partially aligns with the lack of conceptual clarity described earlier. A prominent example is the article by Jung (2012). Jung identifies Bosnia and Herzegovina as a most-likely case due to its relative economic affluence, the international enforcement of the peace agreement, and the rigidity of the power-sharing provisions installed. The most-likely design offers a tough challenge to consociational theory to counter as it poses the question “if not here, then where can power sharing succeed?”. However, if the case was incorrectly identified as a most-likely case, much of its leverage is lost.

Small-N studies are thus highly reliant on an accurate case selection. In the case of BiH for example, the formality and extensiveness of the power-sharing institutions was key to its selection (Jung, 2012). But there are no indications that power sharing must be formalised to function. India provides an ample example of a consociational democracy without formalised power-sharing provisions (Lijphart, 1996). In the analysis presented here, control variables that previous studies have found relevant to include when studying democracy have failed to reach significance. GDP per capita is the measure referred to by Jung (2012) when discussing the relative economic affluence of BiH. In the alternative analyses presented just presented, it reaches significance in the long term, but it does not seem to have any effect on democratisation in the first five years. Although no variable corresponding to international intervention was included in the analysis, military victory relates to how the conflict was resolved. Military victory has even lower support than GDP per capita as it does not reach significance in any of the analyses.

Following this argument, the identification of BiH as a most-likely case would be incorrect. Furthermore, an overlooked condition could even render it a least-likely, rather than a most-likely case of successful power sharing, namely the regional effects. The troubled history of partition and subsequent rivalry between the former Yugoslavian republics could have rendered them especially unsuitable for power sharing. The largest ethnic group in BiH, the Bosniaks, often regard the Bosnian Serbs and Croats with suspicion, as they are perceived to host sympathies for rival neighbouring states (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Wucherpfennig, 2018). It is therefore questionable whether there is an overarching identity that these groups relate to, which Lijphart has theorised increases the likelihood of functioning consociationalism (Lijphart, 1996). I would therefore argue that Jung (2012) incorrectly identified BiH as a most-likely case. The mistake is however partly due to the lack of specifications by power sharing propagators.
To my knowledge, there is no research on how the formality of an agreement affects its outcome, and researchers only recently started looking into regional effects (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Wucherpfennig, 2018).

The censoring of overlapping cases led to a strengthening of the effect power sharing has on democratisation. These changes could be due to the theory lacking a scope condition under which power sharing works better. It is possible that the censoring unknowingly added a selection criterion to the data by targeting states with overlapping settlements. The censoring affected countries which had settled numerous conflicts in a short amount of time. By doing so, severely conflict-struck countries end up constituting a smaller proportion of the sample than in the original data. The lack of stability and successful settlements in the censored cases would likely hinder development towards democracy.

One would expect then that the average democracy score increase would be higher in the censored dataset than in the original data, as less successful cases were removed. But that would be a hasty assumption to make. Because of the way the censoring was conducted, it more often removes latter settlements, which might just have resolved the conflict for good. Additionally, the analysis focuses on the prevalence of power sharing. Even if the censoring could potentially remove negative democratisation results, there are no indications that it would bias the data in favour of power sharing or non-power sharing cases. In fact, the difference in mean short-term democratisation score between power sharing and non-power sharing countries among the cases removed is 0.102, which is identical to the differences in means of the full dataset.

The following section will look further into the issue of countries with recurring conflicts and theorise whether these cases differ systematically. A theoretical explanation of the witnessed changes will be outlined, describing a condition that potentially undermines the viability and potential of power sharing.

6.5 Scope Conditions

In states such as Angola, their several entries into the data are in large due to the recurring conflict between the government and UNITA. The actors are thus the same, and the censoring removed two settlements; one in 1989 and a second in 1994. Yet in many recurring civil conflicts, the actor scene is not as stable as in Angola. Although UNITA did see splits in the later years of the conflict, the armed forces largely remained loyal to the original group (UCDP, 2019e). In many civil wars however, the actor scene is more complicated. The number of actors

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10 For a full explanation for how the censoring was carried out, please consult Appendix 5.
is higher, and splits occur regularly. By censoring overlapping cases, it is possible that a relatively larger number of conflicts with volatile actor scenes were removed in comparison to conflicts with more unitary actors.

Two telling examples of such conflicts are Chad and Burundi. Chad constitutes four cases in the original data. Only since 1989, the UCDP has registered more than 20 rebel groups active in the country, and an ongoing civil war has been coded almost every year since 1966 (UCDP, 2019b). The Chadian intrastate conflicts have proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with old and new actors consistently relaunching the conflict. In Burundi, while the conflict line followed the Hutu – Tutsi divide, the country has seen a large number of actors on both sides. Although these groups have at times been able to form coalition-like collaborations such as during the Arusha process, there were often additional rebel groups that refused to partake in attempts to resolve the conflict (UCDP, 2019a).

I argue that the consecutive Burundian and Chadian civil wars are examples of fractionalised conflicts. The first key feature that sets these cases apart from other cases is the number of actors. With many actors comes a sharp increase in the number of interests and relations to take into account, adding complexity to the negotiations (Zartman, 1994). Hence, reaching an agreement that satisfies all actors is a tougher and possibly more drawn-out process. This is perhaps even more difficult when setting up power-sharing institutions, which can be complex under the best circumstances. Outside pressures could eventually build, leading to the actors eventually accepting an agreement, with or without power sharing, that does not sufficiently address the incompatibility.

A second key feature of fractionalised conflicts is the instability of the involved actors. Again, using Chad and Burundi as examples, both countries have not only seen a great number of actors, but these actors have also been prone to splintering. In Burundi, the rebel group Palipehutu was initially the main antagonist to the Tutsi-dominated government and army. During the 1990s, Palipehutu split twice, resulting in the formation of Frolina and Palipehutu-FNL. Palipehutu-FNL has since splintered further. A third major actor in the Burundian civil war was CNDD, which also splintered due to disagreements on whether or not to join the Arusha peace process (UCDP, 2019a). Chadian rebel groups in the civil war that has been almost constantly active since independence showcase even more complex linkages. Groups splinter or disappear, only to relaunch their struggle in other constellations. Parts of groups eventually enter peace talks while other elements continue the war (UCDP, 2019b). Under such circumstances, leadership structures and hierarchies are expected to be unclear and ambiguous.
Negotiating an end to the Burundian or Chadian intrastate conflicts can be expected to entail management of complexities beyond that of conflict with fewer consolidated actors.

Although the data used in this thesis is not organised in a preferable way to accurately determine the level of fractionalisation in a conflict, a rough estimation can still be offered. Out of the 22 cases censored in the short-term democratisation data, ten can be deemed fractionalised at face value.\(^\text{11}\)

It is not hard to imagine the difficulties posed to negotiators trying to settle these conflicts. The challenges are also not limited to the increasing complexities presented by Zartman (1994). If one would seek to resolve these conflicts with power-sharing provisions, lack of group cohesion undermines a precondition for power sharing to function, namely elite dominance. Should a negotiating party be unable to assure the adherence of their constituents to a peace agreement, power sharing can scarcely function (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Both a large number of rebel groups, all claiming to be the legitimate representative of a specific group, or a constant splintering of groups, can be expected to make both negotiation and implementation of power-sharing agreements more difficult.

Creating an inclusive agreement that satisfies all parties – and all subsections of these parties – is thus extraordinarily complicated. If power-sharing provisions were to be implemented but excluding some actors, other actors could be motivated to take up arms and challenge the new regime. Establishing a democratic rule under these conditions would be near impossible, but not only due to the recurrence of conflict. Of more importance to this thesis, it is possible that the predicted benefits from power sharing would not be enjoyed. A requisite of the theory is for all relevant groups in the population to have an empowered elite patron. Should a group lack representation and influence, they cannot obstruct attempts to limit their democratic rights. Democratisation could thus always be challenged by opportunistic former enemies who have been granted control over state capacity and resources, an argument that has voiced by critics of power sharing (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005).

6.6 The Propriety of Using Power Sharing in Fractionalised Conflicts

The most fundamental aspect of consociational democracy theory is the capability of power sharing to allow democracy to function in diverse societies (Lijphart, 1968). Should power sharing prove to be unsuited to promote democratisation in societies with experiences of fractionalised conflict, critics might argue that consociationalism fails at its very raison d’être.

\(^{11}\) See Appendix 5 for a list of cases that are considered fractionalised and under what criteria.
But such a conclusion would be false to draw, as it confuses conflict fractionalisation with ethnic fractionalisation. As the analysis has shown, there is little, if any, correlation between ethnic fractionalisation and democratisation.

Conflict fractionalisation does not require ethnic fractionalisation. Instead, conflict fractionalisation should be understood as the presence of a large number of unstable actors capable of challenging the regime using violence. Placating these actors to ensure their satisfaction with democracy becomes central. Setting up a system that guarantees political influence might then be more complex than more direct buyouts of these actors.

A caveat must be added to the idea of fractionalised conflicts. Power sharing has after all managed to ensure stability and democratisation in some cases with precisely these unfavourable conditions. Although the removal of some of these cases has increased the explanatory strength of power sharing, it does not mean power sharing is incapable of promoting democratisation under these conditions. A telling example is the civil war in fought in Sierra Leone during the latter half of the 1990s. At least five parties partook in the civil war, some of which were formed through splintering (UCDP, 2019f). Despite clearly showcasing these defining characteristics of fractionalised conflicts, it does not share the fate of similar processes in Chad and Burundi. As the conflict was settled, power-sharing arrangements were installed at all levels of government and a period of quick democratisation ensued (UCDP, 2019f; Coppedge, et al., 2018).

A fractionalised conflict is thus not per definition an impossible target for power sharing. There could be valuable lessons to be learned from studying the cases in which power sharing was successful despite conflict fractionalisation, such as Sierra Leone. Qualitative studies could try identifying a systematic difference between the successful and unsuccessful attempt at power sharing after fractionalised conflict. Should there be a difference in, for example, the setup of the power-sharing institutions, the theorised negative effect of fractionalised conflicts could be mitigated. Some quantitative research that disaggregates power sharing into various components already exists (Cammett & Malesky, 2012; Norris, 2008). It is possible that rerunning these analyses while controlling for the number of actors or their propensity to splinter would increase the explanatory power of the model.
7. Conclusion

The costs or benefits to democracy associated with power sharing has been a long-standing debate within academia. Whereas critics have argued power sharing undermines accountability and fosters hostile intergroup relations (Horowitz, 2000; Rothchild & Roeder, 2005), propagators have underscored its capability to promote democracy. When studied however, democracy has either been observed at a specific point in time (Norris, 2008), or over a short period of time employing a dichotomous operationalisation (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). I have argued that these two approaches do not fully capture the complexity of democratisation. Developments in democracy should preferably be traced over more extended periods to capture long-term effects of policy choices. Furthermore, democracy can scarcely be reduced to being present or absent. A dichotomous variable fails to reflect the diversity that exists between states that are categorised as either democratic or autocratic.

This thesis has sought to fill these gaps by measuring changes in democracy both in the short and long term. A continuous variable that lends itself well to trace changes in democracy and which was constructed to reflect the most commonly agreed-upon definition of democracy (Lindberg, et al., 2018), was selected to meet these needs. Through a multiple regression analysis, the correlation between political power sharing and democratisation in both the short and long-term was put to the test.

Drawing on theories developed on both side of the debate, this thesis hypothesised that power sharing would have a positive effect on democratisation in the short term following civil war settlements. Through the empowerment of elite actors, power sharing ensures each community a patron at the political centre that can thwart attempts by political opponents to restrict the democratic liberties of their constituents. The empowerment was thus theorised to foster a democratic development in the short term. Adopting a longer perspective however, the elite patrons possibly stand in the way of democratisation. Power sharing would have empowered these actors with the tools to avoid accountability and ensure their continued personal political dominance.

When these two hypotheses were put to the test, support was only found for the first one. In the short-term, political power sharing can further democratisation in post-civil war societies quite substantially. These findings retain significance and increase in strength following a series of robustness checks and censoring of the data. In the long-term however, power sharing and democratisation appear unrelated. In no iteration did the analysis return statistically significant
differences in the long-term democratisation between power sharing and non-power sharing cases. The negative consequences predicted by critics thus failed to materialise. Therefore, I conclude that policymakers should shed any hesitancy against adopting power sharing institutions in post-conflict environments, unless more concerned with certain indicators of democracy than others. The overall increase in democracy score could obscure negative effects on specific indicators. By using disaggregated measurements of democracy, future research could identify if specific aspects of democracy do suffer under power sharing. Once identified, tools can be developed to help practitioners to balance out these consequences.

The lack of support for Hypothesis 2 could be attributed either to criticisms against power sharing being underspecified, or the existence of other channels for exerting accountability. It is possible that the criticisms against power sharing have not sufficiently recognised the diverse forms that power-sharing institutions can take. Different setups are likely to have varying effects on accountability, and simply correlating power sharing in general with lack of accountability is perhaps insufficient. Alternatively, other channels exist through which constituents can exercise influence over their elite patrons. This thesis theorised that leaders of influential cultural institutions, such as religious actors or elders, could serve as a bridge between the community and their elite patron.

During the process of ensuring the accuracy and robustness of the results, attention was drawn to how the strength of the results improve when removing cases with overlapping observation periods. As such a censoring reduces the proportion of cases which experience recurring conflicts, a fractionalised actor scene is theorised to constitute a scope condition under which power sharing is less successful. Drawing on the cases of Burundi and Chad, two forms of fractionalisation are suggested to have a negative impact on power sharing and democratisation. First, the presence of a large number of warring actors is expected to entail increased complexity in negotiations (Zartman, 1994). Political power-sharing arrangements can be complex entities under best circumstances, and the difficulty of ensuring each community’s satisfaction with their allotted influence is theorised to undermine power sharing and democratisation. Second, if rebel groups are prone to splintering, the number of actors will not only increase over time but ascertaining the legitimacy of one group as a representative of a community is troublesome.

Three directions for future research can be distilled from this thesis. First, given the contradictive findings of previous research within the field of power sharing, attempts should be made to replicate the results made here using other power sharing data. We do not know at present if the intensity of the conflict affects democratisation. Neither do we know whether the
results found here hold when studying specific periods or using alternative operationalisations of political power sharing. Replicating this study but with slight alterations could either strengthen the findings or identify shortcomings. Second, the newly introduced scope condition of fractionalised conflicts is based off unsystematic observations during the process of writing this thesis. To determine whether fractionalisation at all affects the viability of political power sharing, future research would benefit from both qualitative studies to specify the causal mechanisms at play, and quantitative analyses to put these mechanisms to the test. Finally, this thesis constituted the first large-N study of the effects of political power sharing on long-term democratisation. The results show that political power sharing does not fan polarisation in the long term. New enquiries arise in response to these results, most prominently what the effects of power sharing on democratisation are over a full generation. If future research can explore these three areas, successful transitions to democracy can be promoted, introducing democratic rights and liberties to a greater part of the world.
References


Appendices

Appendix 1: Data and variables

At an earlier stage, the analysis built on the Power-Sharing Events Dataset (PSED) by Ottman & Vüllers (2015). PSED has narrower selection criteria, only capturing civil conflicts that ended with a peace agreement between 1989-2006. The method did not suit itself well to panel data, meaning that each peace agreement would have to constitute one observation. As such, the number of observations turned out to be too low and resulted in very high standard deviations. The shift over to the dataset by Hartzell & Hoddie (2015) provided almost three times as many observations. Additionally, as the thesis frequently refers to their 2015 article, using the same data would make for an interesting discussion should disparate results be found.

Several control variables were tested but did not make it into the final model. The choice to go for a smaller number of control variables was the low observation count, which motivated a stricter sifting out of variables. A variable controlling for whether the settlement happened during the Cold War was originally included but discarded as it failed to reach significance. Conflict recurrence did face the same issues but was kept as removing it meant Ethnic fractionalisation gained additional significance in the long-term analysis.

There were some difficulties in finding an appropriate measurement for gender equality that covered all states throughout the time period. Fertility rate was originally used, but it provided no significant result. Women’s political empowerment was then used, but later scrapped as the validity of the measurement was questionable. In essence, Women’s political empowerment was dropped since it measured absolute levels of empowerment, rather than the inequality in power between the sexes. Logically, distribution between men and women can be equal also at low levels of political freedom. Women’s empowerment on the other hand would likely report low scores in an autocracy, even though both men and women could have their political agency equally restricted. Power distribution by gender was preferred for this precise reason and therefore made it into the final iteration of the models.
Appendix 2: Results from censored long-term democratisation analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Dependent variable:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long-term democratisation</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political power sharing</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<td>0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
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<td>Ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>0.051</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (log)</td>
<td>0.023**</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power distribution by gender</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Previous democracy level</td>
<td>-0.149**</td>
<td>-0.135*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
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<td>Military victory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict recurrence</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.117*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.083</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.090 (df = 90)</td>
<td>0.086 (df = 86)</td>
<td>0.086 (df = 84)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>0.631 (df = 1; 90)</td>
<td>2.286* (df = 5; 86)</td>
<td>2.177** (df = 7; 84)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *p*<*0.01, **p*<*0.05, ***p*<*0.01. Overlapping cases censored.*
Appendix 3: Robustness graphs for short-term democratisation analyses

**Short-term democratisation, full dataset**

**Short-term democratisation, censored**

**Short-term democratisation (DV logged)**
Appendix 4: Robustness graphs for long-term democratisation analyses

Long-term democratisation, full dataset

Long-term democratisation, censored
Appendix 5: Censoring

Censoring of cases happened using the following set of priorities: Should two agreements have the same observational period and have the same value on the independent variable, the earlier of the two will be included in the data. Should they have differing values on the independent variable, precedence will be given to the case with political power sharing. This is to ensure that a case without power sharing but that in the later years of its observational period gains a power-sharing pact is not incorrectly perceived as an untreated case. This process was conducted using both the 5- and 10-year observational periods. Consequently, the censored short-term democratisation analysis included 105 cases (22 cases censored), whereas the 10-year ditto included 92 (35 cases censored).


Cases marked with an asterisk are considered fractionalised conflicts, having either more than three actors involved in a given conflict, more than two splits in one or more actors, or both.