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Possibly Performative Populism
Within the Sweden Democrats

A Content Analysis of the Speeches of Jimmie Åkesson

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to examine if performative populism exists within the Sweden Democrats and if the level of populism has changed over time. By using a gradational approach when conceptualising populism, it seeks to address a case of 'mixed bags'. Furthermore, this paper address questions regarding how to measure populism and how to operationalise populism into context. Populism is conceptualised as a political style, according to Benjamin Moffitt's work on populism. Thus, the performative side of the leader is central. This includes content, rhetoric, gestures and the theatrical side of the leader's performance. By using a twofold methodological approach, a quantitative content analysis, followed by a qualitative one, both frequency of populist indications and how they relate to each other can be accounted for. Results indicate that populism exists within the Sweden Democrats, and that the level of populism seems to be increasing over time. Moreover, while the methodological approach is sufficient for measuring the level in terms of less and more, it cannot account for degree in terms of index.

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1. Introduction

Populism is undoubtedly one of the hottest concepts within the political discussion in our time. Great media attention is given to the phenomenon known as populism. One of the latest in the form of a quiz called "How populist are you?" (The Guardian, 2018). Populism is also a popular topic among scholars, although a very fragmented discussion regarding the concept's nature is ongoing (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Moffitt, 2016; Hawkins, 2009; Pappas, 2016). There is, however, some consensus on who is populist and what it is. Likewise, a majority seems to agree that populism is on the rise across the world. The Guardian reports that one in four Europeans votes populist and that the populist parties in Europe has tripled their support during the last two decades (Henley, 2018). Among these parties, the Sweden Democrats (SD) is found. The SD is part of the party family of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). In the discussion of European populism, these parties have played a central role. The academic literature is focused on how to conceptualise populism, why there is rather little empirical research focusing on populism. Moreover, populism is often seen as a binary phenomenon. Since populism is on the rise and the academic fragmentation around the concept remains high, this field needs more attention. Therefore, this thesis aims to focus on how to conduct an empirical study in how to measure performative populism, grounded in the latest conceptualisations. By doing this, theoretical and methodological challenges will be addressed, as well as empirical findings on how populism is expressed. Little attention has been given to empirical studies of populism within what has been called the 'mixed bags' (Pappas, 2016:19). These cases of populism are placed in between the binary populist/non-populist categories. It is also important to understand how populism is expressed in different context, and over time. Therefore, attention is aimed towards a case of 'mixed bag', the Sweden Democrats. More specifically, if the level of populism within the 'mixed bags' is changing or not. In the case of the SD, we could expect two scenarios inspiring this thesis. One is that in pace with their formalisation of being a part of the parliamentary politics, they would become less populist over time. The second scenario would be that in line with the mediatisation of politics and increased populism around the world, they would become more populist.

This thesis understands populism as a political style, according to Benjamin Moffitt's definition (2016). Therefore, the political leader and their performance is central. Given the mediatisation of politics as well as that populism is widespread, I argue this is a relevant approach in studying populism.

1.1 Aim and Research Question

The purpose of this thesis is to examine if populism exists within the Sweden Democrats, and if it does, if the level of populism differs over time. The SD could be considered a case of 'mixed bags' and are therefore an interesting case to study. In conceptualising populism as a political style, a deeper understanding of populism within 'mixed bags' can hopefully be achieved. The overall question this thesis seeks to answer is thus:

- *Is there populism within the Sweden Democrats and does the level of populism differ over time?*

This question is dissected into two more narrowed research questions in order to delimit the study and enable an empirical approach that can be answered within the scope of this thesis:

- *Is there populism in the speeches given by the Sweden Democrats between 2011-2018?*
- *Is there more or less populism in the speeches given by the Sweden Democrats in 2018 compared to 2011?*

The overreaching aim of this thesis is to give an initial attempt to measure populism as a political style, to give a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the 'mixed bags' of populism. Therefore, according to the research questions, methodological and theoretical challenges needs to be addressed. This includes addressing the questions of how to measure populism and how to operationalise a context-sensitive concept.

1.2 Delimitations

The research questions will be answered by analysing speeches given by Jimmie Åkesson during Almedalsveckan for the years mentioned above. When understanding populism as a political style, focusing on the performative side, the leader is central. By focusing on the leader, something can be said about populism *within* the SD, however, this paper does not seek to generalise the results to the party as a whole, nor to other PRRP. It merely seeks to give an initial understanding in how populism among 'mixed bags' can be included in the analysis, addressing methodological problems when measuring populism as a context-sensitive phenomenon.

2. Approaches to Understanding Populism

Populism can be understood in a number of ways. Therefore, it is anything but easy to define populism, or as Mudde puts it "define the undefinable" (2004). Scholars has suggested populism to be a political logic (Laclau, 2005), a strategy (Weyland, 2001) or a dynamic process (Müller, 2014). However, in this section two main categories of approaches will be summarised. The categories are the binary and gradational approaches, this helps pointing out central points of this thesis: 'mixed bags', measuring populism and context.

2.1 Binary Approaches

First, perhaps the most prominent approach to populism is the ideological approach. It understands populism as a thin-centered ideology whereas it can be combined with a host-ideology such as socialism or nationalism. Mudde and Kaltwasser defines populism as: "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite" and which argues that politics should be an expression of the Volonté Générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017:6). 'The people' can be tinged as common, sovereign or native people, while 'the elite' could relate to an economic, cultural, political or medial one. A core understanding of populism is that 'the elite' oppose the 'general will' of 'the people' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Another binary approach is provided by Pappas, that suggests that modern populism can be equated with 'democratic illiberalism' (Pappas, 2014:2). The illiberalism of the term contains of: "the acknowledgment of one single cleavage in society, the pursuit of adversarial politics, and majoritarianism" (Pappas, 2016:20) and stands in contrast to liberalism. This minimal definition helps overcome and avoid methodological difficulties and aims to assemble the understanding of populism (Ibid,18-20). Pappas further argues for this definition to be usable because it is not context-sensitive.

2.1.1 Problems with The Binary Approach

What we can bring from the binary approaches of populism is that a minimal, binary approach of populism can be fruitful in categorising and when mapping populist actors on a larger scale and perhaps over region and culture. The minimal approach gives us clear distinctions of what is populism, and what is not. Moreover, there is more or less a consensus among scholars that some kind of anti-establishment and people-centrism are central element of populism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Hawkins, 2009; Moffitt, 2016; de Vreese et al, 2018; Jungar & Jupskås; 2014). This element is present in most understandings of contemporary populism.

However, these binary approaches do not recognise that an actor could be more or less populist. Moreover, they do not take context into account. As populism is a global phenomenon, it is probably also sensitive to context. Moreover, binary approaches cannot account for the 'mixed bags' (Pappas, 2016). The mixed bags are cases that neither can be categorised as populist or non-populist. "Some cases, to be sure, will be mixed bags, and therefore their inclusion in analysis, or exclusion from it, will be assumed by how one defines "democracy" or "illiberalism."" (Pappas, 2016:19). Moffitt points out that this definition cannon account for the cases that "falls in between the cracks" or 'mixed bags' (Moffitt, 2017:114). Moffitt's study also shows that PRRP in Europe, to some extent, shows liberal values (Moffit, 2017). Furthermore, literature on PRRP tends to treat populism as a binary concept (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Mudde, 2013) increasing the gap of understanding the populist 'mixed bags'. By using a gradational approach instead, some clarification about the populist component of 'mixed bags' could be done.

2.2 Gradational Approaches

Moving away from the binary approach, this section looks into populism conceptualised as a gradational concept, such as discourse and political style. As binary approaches fail to make sense of 'mixed bags' and provide a more nuanced approach to populism, gradational approaches enable this.

2.2.1 Discursive Populism

Some scholars have suggested that populism should be understood as a discourse. The discourse contains an appeal to 'the people' versus 'the elite'. Hawkins describes populism as a discourse where 'the people' is put against 'the elite' (Hawkins, 2009:1042). This means that focus lies with the spoken and written words of the political actor – their political discourse rather than their ideology or policies. As the political actor in question can use this discourse or not, in combination with whatever ideology they please, the level of populist discourse can vary over time. This gives a more nuanced approach to the concept, as a political actor can use a more or less populist discourse. Moreover, empirical studies measuring populist discourse in contrast to a pluralist discourse have been made (Hawkins, 2009). This could, as it seems, be an appropriate approach to answer this research question. However, it does not account for the political actor's performance, beyond rhetoric and content. For this, the performative side needs to be included.

Like de Vreese et al. suggests, populism should be understood as a political communication. They separate 'content' and 'style' in a way of referring to content as "the public communication" of the ideology, whereas style contains of "a characteristic set of presentational style elements." (de Vreese et al., 2018:425). Like Moffitt (2016), the authors stress the importance of medias role should not be overlooked, as communication is a core element of populism.

2.2.2 Populism as a Political Style

Previous understanding of populism mostly focuses on the discourse or content of populism. Benjamin Moffitt gives his contribution to the academic field of populism by re-defining populism as a *political style*.

Moffitt understands a political style as "… the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences…" (Moffit, 2016:38). The focus lies with the *performative* side of populism as a mediated phenomenon through media. The performance or performative side relates to how political actors delivers their message, through a certain style including gesture, symbols, rhetoric etc. Moreover, what has been unclear in other approaches, the leader is central, as they are the one's performing populism (Moffitt, 2016:51). The advantages of this approach are in focus in following section, as the details of this approach is examined in later sections.

2.3 Why Performative Populism?

Regarding the research question and focus on the gradational approach in this thesis, it is crucial to capture the performative, self-presenting style of populism. Advantages of this approach, according to Moffitt (2016:45-50), allows us to understand populism over the political spectrum. Additionally, this approach can help to make sense of the thinness of populism as it focuses on "stylish characteristics" (Moffitt, 2016:49), while recognising that content and style are deeply related. This approach also contributes with a more nuanced perspective of populism. In contrast to the binary approach, this approach allows us to understand populism as a concept that differs in intensity over time and space (Moffitt, 2016:46-47). Moreover, it can help to avoid normative views of populism and the use of populist as synonym for "political actors I dislike" (Moffitt, 2016:47).

This approach can help us to understand populism as a phenomenon in itself– without consideration of the ideology it is combined with in any particular case. This conceptualisation goes beyond the analysis of text and speech, as it includes the performative side of politics. In contrast to the discursive populism, performative populism can make sense of how political actor uses populism in a medial political climate, by focusing on style. While still capturing the content of populism, through performance in communication, rhetoric and self-presentation.

The gradational perspective also gives us the theoretical tools to understand the cases where it is unclear if they are populist or not – the ones in-between the populist category (Moffitt, 2017:13f). Inasmuch the binary approach fails to include these in-between cases, the gradational approach can help to make sense the 'mixed bags'. Other definitions have been tried, such as labelling these cases as 'liberal populism' (Fella & Ruzza, 2013:42) or similar. Some 'mixed bags' can be found among the PRRP in Europe, one of these are the SD (Moffitt, 2017).

Thus, this is an adequate approach to populism with regard to the research question. When focus changes to what can be understood as the core of populism - the performance of political actors - it becomes possible to understand if and how the level of populism change over time. This thesis seeks to measure populism in terms of more or less, this approach enables this. Moreover, this approach illuminates the mediatisation of politics as important factors in the study of populism. I share this standpoint, as politics are more medial than ever. Therefore, it is important to study political communication through political actor's performance.

2.4 Measuring Populism

Before that it can be fruitful to have a quick overview of earlier works on measuring populism. So far, I would argue there has not been any detection of how the best way to measure populism should be done. Hawkins (2009) uses a holistic grading as method, grading different speeches of political leaders from a scale of 0-2 (pluralism to populism). Aslanidis (2017) uses a sematic text analysis. Others use a simpler content analysis to detect populist indications in party manifestos, speeches, campaigns etc (Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). In later research, the ideological approach is used as a gradational approach and in attempts to measure populism (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017), mostly focusing on frequency. Little empirical research, using Moffitt's conceptualisation has been done. Oliver and Rahn includes some stylish characteristics in their analysis, although with focus on formal language. Ekström et al. (2018) examines populist style among right-wing populists based on Moffitt's conceptualisation, but do not measure it. Bossetta's (2017) study examines how political actor adapt a more populist style in debates with populist actors. This study uses Moffitt's populist style as definition, however, only focusing on rhetoric. Empirical studies focusing on populist style are increasing. To my knowledge, none has been conducted with aim of measuring populistic style while including the embodied performative side in the study. The first task is therefore to create a theoretical framework, to enable an operationalisation of the concept.

3. Theoretical Framework

This section will present the theoretical framework necessary to be able to answer the research question. First, I will look closer on what Moffitt's definition of populism as a *political style* means. Focus lies with the performative side of the political leader and how they perform populism in three different features. Second, I will present my understanding of Moffitt's definition and try to structure this conceptualisation, to make it more practical for empirical studies. I will offer my interpretation of how the *features* of populism *relates* to each other in a simpler model and separate *content* and *style*. This separation becomes important in the analysis, in understanding how to measure different features by themselves, when they strongly relate to each other. Lastly, the importance and complexity of *contextualisation* will be examined. Here, the general problem with contextual populism will be examined in relation to this theory. I shall also suggest an appropriate way to theoretically approach this challenge.

3.1 Populism as a Political Style

Moffitt distinguishes three core features of populism: 'The people' versus 'the elite', 'bad manners' and 'crisis, breakdown and threat' (Moffitt, 2016:45). Whilst other approaches view pluralism, elitism and liberal democracy as the opposite of populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Pappas, 2014; Hawkins, 2009), this approach argues that the opposite of populist style on a gradational scale, is a technocratic style:

| **Technocratic Political Style**		**Populist Political Style**
Appeal to expertise		Appeal to 'the people' vs. 'the elite'
'Good manners'		'Bad manners'
Stability and progress		Crisis, breakdown, threat

Figure 1: Technocratic Political Style and Populist Political Style (Moffitt, 2016:46)

The technocratic style appeals to expertise knowledge, incrementalism and stability, and 'good manners', acting properly in political life. Populists does the opposite when appealing to a conflict between the elite and the people while appealing to common sense and ignoring expertise knowledge, creating a sense of crisis and behave inappropriate and deviant by using 'bad manners' (Moffit, 2016:46f). In this light, populist style can be regarded as the opposite of a technocratic style, providing a much-needed point of reference when measuring populism.

3.1.1 Appeal to 'the People' Versus 'the Elite'

The first feature contains the construction of two antagonistic groups and a divide between them. 'The people' is constructed as the group which the populists represent and is put against 'the elite' (Moffit, 2016:43f). Moreover, populist sometimes construct and target another group that by populists can be referred to as "others" (Moffitt, 2016:43). These are often groups of minorities, that is put in conflict with the sovereign people. Conflicts with the 'others' are linked to the elite, that has allowed this conflict to take place (Moffitt 2016:44).

Two important points are made by Moffitt regarding the appeal to 'the people'. First, speaking for 'the people' is always mediated in contemporary populism. The connection is always mediated, and therefore not direct as former scholars have suggested (Moffitt 2016:95ff). Second, 'the people' is a vague and absent group. Based on Arbiti's (2007:64) work on populism, the people can be considered to be "render-presented", meaning an absence of an actual people to represent, populists claim to have a close connection to 'the people', whom they speak for. Moreover, 'the people' differs from other politized subgroups such as 'workers' or 'middle class', as they have "no particular social base automatically ascribed to it" (Moffitt, 2016:99). Thus, it is important to focusing on the mediated performances towards 'the people' as an audience.

Parts of appealing to 'the people' can include distancing themselves from the political correctness, in order to show that they "'really knows' what people are thinking" and appealing to common sense in denial expertise knowledge by "saying it like it is" (Moffitt 2016:44).

3.1.2 Performing a Crisis, Breakdown or Threat

This feature relates to a sense of 'crisis, breakdown or threat'. It relates to how populists perform a crisis with aim of gaining immediate support of solving the crisis. A crisis is understood as a 'tipping point' and is not a neutral phenomenon. A crisis needs to be performed and mediated to be considered a crisis in political life, therefore Moffitt suggest that populism also should be considered to attempt to act as a trigger for crisis as well as vice versa (Moffitt, 2016:114).

What defines a crisis is of importance when studying how a populist perform them. Moffitt understands a crisis as 'spectacularisation of failure'. The assumptions behind this is that a crisis only becomes a crisis if there is a norm to compare it to – "crisis compared to what?" (Moffitt, 2016:120). To understand what is perceived as a crisis, we need to look at the failures preceding it. The question whether there is an actual crisis going on is thus less important while studying performative populism. What is important is how the populist construct the situation as a crisis, while blaming this crisis on the elite. Moffitt presents a model of how the populists *perform* a crisis. This includes to connect a political failure to wider framework, such as immigration, framing this as a crisis. 'The people' are constructed as the victims while the crisis is blamed on 'the elites'. This is done through mediated performances, while presenting strong leadership and simple solutions to the crisis, breakdown or threat, often relating to common sense (Moffitt, 2016:120ff).

3.1.3 Performing 'Bad Manners': Self-presentation

As the first two features of populism relates to performed content of the populistic style, the third feature relates to the performative self-presentation. 'Bad manners' is suggested to be a function of the first feature. It can be understood as how actors embodies the commonness of the people by presenting themselves with deviant and unusual manners in political life (Moffitt, 2016:44)

This is a crucial component in studying populism and relates to 'self-presentation' of the political actor. What Moffitt stresses is that this includes and goes beyond the rhetoric of the populist. This can be expressed in clothing, gestures, attitude, body language etc, basically anything to stand out from the technocratic style of self-presentation in the performance. This is why it is important to understand the mediated communication of populism and include the performative side of the political stage (Moffitt, 2016:22,59) In short, 'bad manners' relates to populist's ways of presenting themselves as an outsider, a spokesperson for 'the common people', or as an outsider as in being more spectacular, more colourful than the other politicians. The political actor is balancing performing the ordinary and extraordinary (Moffitt, 2016:55).

'Bad manners' is suggested to display in many different ways and is based on Ostiguy's high-low spectrum (Ostiguy, 2009:7). The 'high' represents what we usually expect from politicians while the 'low' represents the common people, the ordinariness: 'bad manners' (Moffit, 2016:59). This suggests that populist style could be demonstrative, appealing to raw/popular tastes, close to the people, personal, a strong leader, using slang or swearing etc. The feature is also context-specific, meaning that the feature could manifest in different ways depending on cultural and context (Moffitt, 2016:58, 45). It is further argued that the populist's self-presentation aspires to describe themselves as 'outsiders', as well as being politically incorrect or questioning the political correctness (Moffitt, 2016:58-61).

In this feature, some central questions arise. What can be considered to be "well behaved"? How can 'bad manners' be operationalised into a Swedish context? Can this be empirically measured? This thesis seeks to provide suggestions on how a populist style can be empirically measured in a gradational understanding while considering context, furthered explained later on. Before this is discussed further, the interrelations between the features should be addressed closer.

3.2 Interrelations Between the Features

Moffitt identifies three core features of populism presented above. He stresses that the feature cannot be regarded as isolated from each other, they strongly relate to each other and "each figure is not 'in itself' populist" (Moffitt, 2016:43). Therefore, the features as well as the relations between them needs to be taken into account when studying populism. Before continuing, the relations between the features needs to be identified. In this section, a simplified model based on Moffitt's work is presented. In short, Figure 2 is my interpretation of Moffitt's conceptualisation of populism and it illustrates the features and the relations between them. This constitutes the analytical framework for this thesis. Furthermore, the features are separated into performative content and self-presentation, addressing methodological challenges presented later on.

'The people' versus 'the elite'
Performative content

Victim and acountability

Ordinariness

Crisis
Performative content

Emotional appeal towards change

Bad manners
Self-presentation

Figure 2: Interrelations Between Populist Features

First, as many scholars before has argued, the feature of 'the people' versus 'the elite' is the core concept. This remains when understanding of populism as a political style. This is the feature that the other two features relate to the strongest. This is done by appealing to 'the people' through self-presentation of 'bad manners'. As the leader not only communicates the content of representing 'the people', they need become trustworthy through 'acting' as 'the people' as well. The leader becomes one of 'the people' by presenting themselves as one of them. Even though this concept remains vague, the manners that are presented could be ordinariness, the deviant behaviour as how the common person would act (Moffitt, 2016:107).

In short, bad manners relates to the appeal to 'the people' versus 'the elite' through performing *ordinariness* (or extraordinariness) via self-presentation (Moffit, 2016:57ff). In this light, separate a swearword from a politician can be just that, or it could be an expression of populism, if it relates to one or both of the other features. However, as 'bad manners' are regarded as a function of the appeal to 'the people' versus 'the elite' (Moffitt, 2016:44), these to features are strongly related - through the performance of ordinariness.

Second, 'Crisis, breakdown and threat' relates to 'bad manners' through that actors presents an *emotive appeal towards change* and a crisis, breakdown and threat. This is drawn upon Moffitt's idea of that populist perform a crisis by 'spectacularisation of failure' (Moffitt, 2016:120). This, I argue, would therefore manifest in that the populist leader use demonstrative means appealing to emotions in their self-performance as solver of the crisis, or being affected by the crisis. By doing this, the leader would increase the 'feeling' of a crisis, giving them reason to act straight away.

Third, the feature of preforming a crisis and appealing to 'the people' versus 'the elite' are related in that the actor are constructing victims and those accountable in terms of the core concept. The victims of the crisis are 'the people' while 'the elite' are responsible for this (Moffitt, 2016:113-132). Therefore, this relation can be put in terms of *victims and accountability.*

Inspired by de Vreese et al's (2018) separation of content and style, the features will be separated in a similar way. In Moffitt's approach, focus lie with the style rather than content, however they are considered to be closely related (Moffitt, 2016:49). I suggest, based on de Vreese et al's work, that content should understood as the communicated message – the spoken word, while style is referred to as performative self-presentation that is done to create the image of embodying or acting this content.

The *performative content*, the communicated message, contains of the appeal to 'the people' versus 'the elite' as well as the performance of a 'crisis'. Here, the spoken word, the political message that the actor communicates are examined. *Self-presentation* is referred to as the theatrical and rhetoric side of the performance and relates to the feature 'bad manners'. Gestures, clothing, body-language as well as humour, the use of ad-hominem and swearing are here part of how the politician present themselves.

The separation of performative content and self-presentation becomes important in understanding how the features relate to each other. In methodological terms it is important in how this can be empirically measured simultaneously. The implications of the separation are that operational indications can be detected, while still overlapping.

3.3 Contextual populism

In order to operationalise 'bad manners', context needs to be addressed. Populist style can differ from one context to another (Moffitt, 2016:58). From a theoretical perspective it is crucial to understand the specific context where populism is studied. This is a question of validity and reliability. A measurement of populism depends on a close reflection of what is the opposite of it. In the light of that populism also is a global phenomenon, this could be a challenge. Pappas aims his critique towards the feature of 'bad manners' to be an "impressionistic notion and rather impossible to measure." (Pappas, 2017:269f). This critique should be taken seriously, and it is also to a big extent this thesis' larger focus: to operationalise and measure this feature while remaining high validity.

I argue that this could be done, by carefully understanding what is on 'the other side' of the gradational spectrum in a specific context. My understanding of 'bad manners' is that it essentially boils down to deviant behaviour. This is also suggested by Moffitt: "The further that they can dissociate themselves from the technocratic style of 'politics as usual', the better" (2016:58). Accordingly, if we accept that technocratic style is the mainstream style of doing politics, we can start examining if the current cultural context seems to agree with this. The specific cultural context needs to be examined before an operationalisation is conducted.

3.4 Summary

In conclusion, the features of populism are the two relating to performative content: an appeal to 'the people' versus 'the elite', including an appeal to common sense and denial of expertise, and 'Crisis, breakdown or threat' where the actor describes the current situation as a crisis, or like. The self-presentation, focusing on the performance of symbolic gestures, 'bad manners' relates to that the actor is presenting themselves by ordinariness. The three features can be expected to relate to each other according by i) victims and accountability, ii) ordinariness and iii) emotive appeal towards change. The relations are important because populist style should be regarded as the "sum of its parts" (Moffitt, 2016:43). Moreover, the features are separated into performative content and self-presentation, in order to enable an operationalisation. This context-sensitive approach requires an understanding of the specific context, this relates to the point of reference on the gradational scale. This will be done by mapping the Swedish political culture and putting this in relation to technocratic style.

4. Research Design and Methodological Approach

In this section, the research design, data material and methodological approach and challenges will be presented and discussed.

4.1 Research Design

This thesis is of descriptive nature. The research question will be answered by doing a within-case study, comparative over time. The methodological approach is twofold, as both a quantitative and qualitative analysis are conducted. I believe this is an appropriate design to detect changes of the level of populism within a specific party. It is important to stick to examine the populism within a party if we are interested in the change of level over time. Otherwise risking results referring to the level of populism compared to another actors' development. Therefore, thesis does not take interest in the level of populism in comparison to other political actors, but focus lies on populism as a style *within* the party. This relates to the aim of conceptualising populism as a nuanced, independent style of a political actor. It is therefore important to clarify that the results will not give any evidence of the level of populism compared to others.

The research question aims to study a potential change in the level of populism. To describe an actual degree in terms of index is in a methodological perspective challenging. Instead of doing this, risking low validity this thesis focuses on however there has been a change or not (Esiasson et al., 2012:147). The implications of focusing on the *change* over time, is that we can say less of the actual degree of populism, but possibly have more extern validity in the results (Ibid:146).

The case of the Sweden Democrats is chosen based on three arguments. First, the SD has been labelled a populist radical right party by both scholars and media (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Mudde, 2013; Henley, 2018). Also, Moffitt suggest that Åkesson might use a populist style (Moffitt, 2016:42). Second, this a 'mixed bag' in the sense of that the SD shows liberal views, as well as a quite technocratic and substantial policies, deviant from what has been expected from PRRP (Moffitt, 2017). Moreover, the SD does not stand out as a case by any means. This would make it more of a typical case, giving the possibilities to generalise the findings to other similar, 'mixed bags'. However, this thesis does not focus on generalising the empirical results to a population of PRRP or populist actors. It rather seeks to contribute by addressing methodological challenges, as well as giving an initial empirical study of measuring populism as a political style, and describe populism within the SD. Third, by choosing this case in a familiar context for me and with available material an initial attempt to measure and use this theoretical approach can be done. The Swedish context, further examined in the operationalisation, provides mixed signals in what to expect of populism. Lastly, by focusing on the SD, Åkesson automatically becomes the main actor to study in the light of this conceptualisation of populism.

4.2 Data Material

As mentioned, the data material that will be analysed in this thesis are the speeches made during Almedalsveckan between 2011-2018. The material was accessed by The Swedish Media Database. The speeches are in Swedish and all quotes are translated by me and original quotes can be found in the Appendix. The speeches are made by the party leader Jimmie Åkesson. Moreover, the speeches are televised, broadcasted and often live-streamed by the party itself. In other words: the performance of the party leader is mediated and targets a wide audience. By analysing the televised speech, it is possible to capture the performance, both content and self-presentation. By using material such as party manifestos or party programs, the performative side cannot be captured and does not suit this thesis.

Almedalsveckan is a big political happening, creating a big audience. This fits Moffitt's (2016) description of when and how populism is done: populism is the mediated performance to 'the people' as the audience, done by the leader. The speeches are given during similar circumstances and recurring every year. This creates a group of units of analysis that can be used to create a timeline where differences in populist indicators can be detected over time.

In the qualitative analysis the speeches in 2011 and 2018 will be examined further. This is done to make a richer comparison over time, by focusing on the first and latest speech. Due to the scope of this paper, only two speeches are included in the qualitative analysis.

4.3 Methodological approach

The methodological approach is twofold. First, a quantitative content analysis that aims to capture the frequency of populist style in the speeches performed by the leader of the SD. Using this method, frequency of populist indications can be detected and compared over time. The frequency will also be put in relation of the duration of the speech to give an indication of populist scope. Second, in light of the theoretical framework, populism is to be regarded as a whole, not as isolated features. I will conduct a qualitative content analysis aiming to capture the relations of the features. This triangulation of methods is done to capture the relations between the features and control that it actually is populism that is found, according to the theoretical framework and general questions of validity (Bryman, 2012). Therefore, frequency, scope and distinctness of populism can be captured by using these methods. The coding accounts for indications of populism and a possible change. The qualitative analysis accounts for controlling that the features actually relate to each other and how distinct these relations are. Here, if we accept the theoretical framework, a high frequency and distinct relations between the features indicates more populism as well as inversely.

In the quantitative content analysis, operational indications of the features of populism presented in the theoretical framework will be constructed using a code scheme with accompanying principles of coding (Neundorf, 2017:40f). The coding of the speeches is done by counting populist indications in each speech to enable a comparison over time, in this way capturing frequency of when the political actor is using the populist style (Esiasson et al. 2012:197). To get an indication of the scope of populism, meaning how much of the speech is populist, will be done by putting frequency in relation to the length of the speech. This creates an indication of scope of populism. The qualitative analysis aims to capture the relations between them, to understand if it actually is populism that has been found. Moreover, it aims to say something about the distinctness of how the feature relate to each other. In order to compare a potential change over time.

I will use a simple qualitative analysis in order to capture the relations and context in which populism are used. Moreover, an in-depth method as a complement, can provide a greater understanding of the units of analysis (Esiasson et al, 2012:223). Due to this thesis' aim and the theoretical framework, the qualitative analysis aims to capture the relations of features. The research question seeks to answer to the level of populism, and the theoretical framework implies that the relations between the feature are crucial for understanding and measure populism. Thus, it is of importance to closer study the relations in a qualitative matter. The questions of analysis aim to i) categorise how the populist indications interrelate through a thematic categorisation (Esiasson et al., 2012), and ii) examine how the different features of populism are used in relations to each other, focusing on both the meaning, linguistic and performance, accounting for how distinct these are (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2014).

The qualitative analysis has its starting point in the findings done in the coding. It aims to examine the relations between the populist indications. This means that it is sufficient to use a simple qualitative content analysis, with the aim to systematically arrange the speaker's use of populist feature (Esaiasson et al, 2012:211). The qualitative analysis can provide a deep to the findings that the quantitative approach simply cannot. This is important, since populism should be regarded as a whole, not as isolated features.

By using a quite extensive theoretical framework and analysis, I believe that a content analysis is an adequate method to answer the research question. This is to some extent a search for symbolic characteristics and rhetoric, and in some cases hidden meanings by certain words, meaning that a discourse-analysis could have been a more suitable choice (Boréus, 2015:164). Even if the theory is of social constructivist nature to a large extent, it may not be necessary to use a discourse-analysis to examine its features. We are looking for defined manifestations of a certain behaviour, not relationships of power. Therefore, a simpler content analysis, measuring frequencies and examining the relations of the features is an adequate choice of method for this thesis.

4.3.1 Measuring populism

When measuring populism there are some methodological challenges, which I will address here. First, this is measured in ordinal scale, therefore no statistical claims will or should be done (Neuendorf, 2017:133; Teorell & Svensson, 2007). Since the purpose of this thesis is to measure populism in terms of more or less, ordinal scale works. However, it means that the actual degree of populism cannot be determined, as is a recurring theme in the literature. The lack of acceptable index and empirical studies on the matter makes measuring more difficult.

However, in measuring populism, frequency can give indications but not more than this. An impact of using a simple content analysis means that the scope of populist indications is harder to detect. In order to get further indications of how much every indication of populism is 'worth', it is important to have an idea of how much of the total speech that could be considered populist (Esaiasson et al, 2012:202f; Neuendorf, 2017:133).

The speeches are of different lengths, this should be considered. As I neither counts words, nor examine the whole part of the speech a natural index cannot be created as Hawkins' (2009) or Oliver and Rahn's (2016) studies. To solve the issue with unequal length of the speeches the frequency is put into relation to this. Therefore, frequency per minute is calculated to give an indication of how much of the speech is populism, rather than frequency per speech. This could give a complementary indication of the scope of populism detected. This also makes sense considering the speeches different lengths. Moreover, triangulate the material with a qualitative method can give more complete analysis of the speeches can be presented in the results. This, I argue can give a sufficient answer to the research question, without creating an index of measurement, that goes beyond this thesis' scope and could mean validity and reliability problems.

4.4 Operationalisation

This operationalisation is done to get operational indications of populism in the examined speeches by creating a code scheme. First, an operationalisation of the features will be presented for the quantitative coding, followed by a presentation of the questions of analysis of the relation of the features. In constructing operational indicators of the theoretical definition of populism, Moffit has done extensive work by defining the features by using an inductive approach (2016:5f). Thereby, a wide framework of operational indicators has been presented. Drawn from this theoretical approach, as well as other scholars work, the three features will be translated into operational indications. The code scheme and coding principles are fully declared in the Appendix.

Before the operationalisation the separation of performative content and self-presentation should be addressed. This is needed to create mutual exclusive categories (Esiasson et al, 2012:206) for the operationalisation, i.e., a joke can be coded as both an indication of 'bad manners' as well as an indication of critique against 'the elite', one as performative content and one as self-presentation.

The technocratic style is used for a point of reference when creating the operational indicators for the coding, this is further explained in Appendix, where also examples of a full description can be found of the code scheme and coding principles.

4.4.1 An Appeal to 'the People' Versus 'the Elite'

This feature relates to the performative content, the content and rhetoric of the spoken word. Therefor the operational indicators must capture the central elements of this feature: 'the people', 'the elite' and 'the others'. Moreover, it must capture the appeal to common sense and denial of expertise, given that these are ways of how the performative content is used for coming closer to 'the people' and undermining 'the elite'. Therefore, three categories have been constructed. They are fully explained in the Appendix.

1A   'The people' are constructed in a positive setting
1B   'The elite' or 'the others' are constructed in a negative setting
1C   Appeal to common sense and denial of expertise, fake news, true reality

In constructing these three operational indicators for this feature, the most central elements of it can be captured in the content analysis. The coding principals are found in the Appendix, giving further instructions of how the indicators should be translated and understood. As Rooduijn and Pauwels (2010) concludes in their work on measuring populism, critique aimed towards 'the elite' should not be confused with critique towards a specific party or person. Therefore, coding principles also includes that the context also is interpreted in the coding.

4.4.2 Crisis, Breakdown or Threat

The notion of a crisis breakdown or threat is rather straight forward. Here, performative content is in focus, focusing to capture however the political actor is describing the current situation as a crisis or not. In this light, this feature only contains of one operational indicator. That is if the current situation is described as a crisis, breakdown or threat:

    2A   Performing a crisis, breakdown or threat

A crisis is understood as "a crucial point that would tip the scales" (Koselleck, see Moffitt, 2016:119). In more specific terms this could include the speaker presenting how society is at a 'crossroad', or 'tipping point' (Moffit, 2016:123). An important separation, that could be difficult to separate in the coding process is the one between describing a problem in society, as politician does, in contrast to describing the situation as a crisis. This is further explained in the Appendix.

4.4.3 'Bad Manners'

To enable an operationalisation of the feature of 'bad manners' it is as shown crucial to have a point of reference in the particular context. Drawing on the notion that the feature of 'bad manners' is context-sensitive, we need to shortly examine the Swedish political culture before an operationalisation can be done.

In Barrling's work on party culture in the Swedish parliament she distinguishes some similarities in prominent values between the different party working groups. First, is the value of *objectiveness*. Even though there are some differences between the different parties, as some prioritises theoretical knowledge, while some highlights practical knowledge, objectiveness is a prominent value in the Swedish political life (Barrling, 2004:299). Moreover, a number of party groups the communication of their politics faces problems by being to *technical, grey, boring and objectively nuanced* (Barrling, 2004:299). It should be mentioned here that Barrling's study is focused on the working party groups of the Swedish parliament, not the mediated performance of the spokesperson of the politics. However, Möller claims, the leader's capacity to act is limited by the particular political culture in the country *and* the culture within parties (Möller, 2016:120ff). Based on the logic of appropriateness (Möller, 2016:120ff), the political leader capacity to rule and act is constrained by norms and culture within the particular society and context. According to Möller, deliberation or consensus-seeking is a highly regarded value in both social and political life. The spirit of *consensus* is also a distinguished feature of Swedish culture in other academic work on the matter (Zetterberg, 1984., Barrling, 2004). Another similarity between the party groups and in parliament is the sense and expectation of *modesty*, this is highly connected to the normative law of '*jante'*, as is expressed in Barrling's work (2004:300). Lastly, the political culture in Sweden is tinged by *rationality and technocracy* as Zetterberg suggests in his work on Swedish culture (1984).

Thus, indicators of the political culture in Sweden contains of the *spirit of consensus*, *rationality*, *objectiveness*, *modesty* and *technical, grey and 'boring' communication*. This tells us that the technocratic style Moffit (2016:59), to a high extent agrees with the Swedish political culture. This would also most likely mean that politicians in general would probably be more 'modest' in a Sweden compared to another country where modesty is not as a big value, e.g. USA or France (Möller 2016:121). Therefore, we should also expect a more 'modest' populism a Swedish context.

The following operational indications have been constructed:

3A	Demonstrative ways of making a point
3B	Deviant behaviour in disregarding the political norms while performing a stage
3C	Bragging or presenting themselves as an underdog.

These indications focus on the self-presentation of the political actor and coding principles are furthered explained in the Appendix.

4.4.4 The Qualitative Analysis

As the content analysis aims to examine the features (boxes) presented in Figure 2, the qualitative analysis aims to examine the relations (arrows) between them. Thus, focus lies in how the populist indications are used in relation to the others. In the theoretical framework these arrows are named: 'Ordinariness', 'Victim and accountability' and 'Emotive appeal towards change'. These are the analysis questions used in the qualitative analysis:

1. Are the features used in relation to each other in the speeches?
2. How do they relate to each other and how distinct are they?

A closer description of the questions is presented in Appendix. As a starting point of the analysis, the whole speech will be described shortly. This will be followed by examining the populist indications found in the coding. As it is important to get a thicker description of the findings, this will be done by watching the whole speech from start to end, but knowingly focusing on parts where populist indications were detected.

4.5 Validity and Reliability

The question of validity is a question of how well the theoretical term, populism, is translated into operational indicators that are clearly defined (Esiasson et al., 2012:57f). The problems operationalisation populism lies with the difficulties of objectively separate the radical right-wing opinions that is presented in the speeches with populism. As the SD are a nationalistic social-conservative party (Jungar & Jupskås, 2004; Sverigedemokraterna, 2011), their ideology per se includes a native people. Not only does this create a good ground for using a populist style – the ideology and populist rhetoric goes well together. It also means that even if the actor does express an appeal to natives, it does not necessarily mean that it is populism. Moreover, the solution to this problem is including the relations between the features in the analysis. If high frequency of appealing to 'the people' occurs, but no other indicators does, it would not indicate a populistic style according to this theoretical framework.

The question of validity regarding the measurement of populism is perhaps the most crucial one in this thesis. Especially the feature of ''bad manners' has been under the critique of being 'impressionistic' (Pappas, 2017:269). This means that the operationalisation and construction of a code scheme needs to be done extra carefully. It is also important to stress that indicators of 'bad manners' does not have to be populism per se. The usage of humour could very well be used without being populism. That is why including the relations are of importance.

Moreover, to convey full transparency, one indicator was removed after the final coding was completed, suggested by Neuendorf (2017:188). This was done due to later findings of that there were severe validity problems to this variable. The variable was measuring performative content as well as it was difficult to separate to political disagreements, something that are naturally a part of the political speeches. While a very limited results showed, it did not impact the final results in notable ways.

The potential problems in providing a valid operationalisation are dealt with by partly using a cumulative operationalisation (Esiasson et al. 2012:60f). The works of earlier academic measurements have been used in constructing operational indicators, such as Moffitt (2016) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). I have also taken the critique by Pappas in consideration in the operationalisation. Moreover, I aim to convey as much transparency as possible in declaring the procedure and potential problem along the analysis. Furthermore, I use a triangulation of methods by complementing the quantitative coding with a thicker description in the qualitative analysis. This is done in order to achieve greater confidence in potential findings (Bryman, 2012:384ff).

Hopefully, this has given the impression of a sufficient validity of this study. However, the reliability must also be taken into consideration. High reliability relates to the absence of random and unsystematic errors while conducting the study and is therefore a matter of intersubjectivity (Esiasson et al, 2012). When speaking of human coding Neuendorf translates this to 'intercoder reliability' (2017:165). A thorough code scheme and coding principles is constructed in addressing this, furthermore a test of reliability was also conducted. The pilot coding on a subsample of the material showed 17 indications of populism, while my colleague scored 14. This gives a percentage of around 82%. The problems are mostly found in 1C. The code scheme was later clarified and reworked to the one presented in the Appendix.

5. Populist Indications in the Performances of the Sweden Democrats

In the following section the results from the content analysis is presented and discussed in regard of the questions of if there is populism within the SD and however the level of it has increased or decreased over time. This is followed by a qualitative analysis where the relations between the features are examined and put into relation to the research question.

5.1 Quantitative Results

In this table, the observation of populist indications from the quantitative content analysis are shown. Full results of the features and coding is presented in the Appendix. In the quantitative results focus are on the frequencies of populist indications as well as frequency in relation to length.

Table 1: Coding Results of Populist Indications

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
'The people' versus 'the elite'	16	18	23	25	17	31	27	22
'Crisis, breakdown or threat'	2	6	2	1	-	4	7	7
'Bad manners'	5	6	7	19	12	7	8	15
Total frequency	**23**	**30**	**32**	**45**	**29**	**42**	**42**	**44**
Duration (minutes)	51:30	38	42	52	47	34	34	34
Frequency Per Minute	0,45	0,79	0,76	0,87	0,61	1,38	1,23	1,29

At first sight, the coding results shows that there are indications of populism in all the speeches. In all units except in 2015, all features are present. The feature of 'Crisis' is here absent. This gives an initial indication of that populism exists within the SD. The results manifest a slight increased number of populist indications over time. The durations of the speeches decrease over time, creating a higher frequency per minute over time. As shown clearer in later figures, the populist indications increase over time, while the peak is found in 2014. Moreover, if focusing on the features there we can detect that the feature of 'the people' versus 'the elite' is more prominent in all the speeches, as well as more present over time. The second feature, 'crisis', is not always present, as well as varying from year to year. The feature of 'bad manners' also gives the impression of being ambiguous between units. However, it seems to be an increasing number of this feature over time.

Below, the trends manifests clearer:

Figure 3: Coding Results Presented Over Time

Here, the peaks and dips become clearer. The most populist indications are found in 2014, slightly higher than in 2016, 2017 and 2018. In 2015, fewer indications are found. The feature of 'the people' versus 'the elite' seems to decrease in the latest speeches, while still remaining the most prominent feature. The notion of a 'Crisis' is most present in later years, while continuing to be the least prominent feature in the speeches. 'Bad manners' are present in all units examined. In 2014, most indications of this feature are found, while least are found in 2011. Moreover, it seems to be increasing over time.

Moving away from the different features and focusing on the total amount of populist indications, in relation to the duration of the speech. Figure 4 shows the frequencies per minute, giving an indication of the scope of populist indications in the speech. This shows how the populist indications per minute of the speech has doubled between 2011 and 2018.

Figure 4: Frequency Per Minute: coding results presented in relation to the duration of the speech

In terms of scope, it seems to be an increase of populist indications. It also shows how the populist indications seems to be present in all speeches. Moreover, this also shows a low frequency of indications in the speeches the years after election-year: 2011 and 2015, as well as a slight increase during election years. The most populist indications are found in the speech of 2016, where almost 1,4 indications of populism are found per minute. Least indications are found in 2015.

From these findings we can conclude a few things. First, populist indications seem to be present in all of the studied speeches. This gives an indication of that there is populism within the SD during these speeches, performed by the party leader. Second, the results show an increase over time, where there are more populist indications per minute in the later speeches than the earlier. Third, the scope of populist indications seems to be lower in post-election years and relatively high during election years.

5.2 Qualitative Results

The qualitative analysis was made on the speeches of 2011 and 2018. In this section, I will first conclude the results in each speech. Then the results will be summarised in a simple table and later analytically compared according to the differences/similarities. This section focuses on the relation between the features. The 'arrows' from Figure 2, presented in the theoretical framework are thus in focus: 'Ordinariness', 'Victims and accountability' and 'Emotive appeal towards change'.

The speech of 2011 was the SD's first official given speech during Almedalsveckan and given the year after election year. The duration of the speech is 51,5 minutes. In the speech examples of 'Ordinariness' and 'Victims and accountability' are found. The relation 'Emotive appeal towards change' is not found, nor are a relation between all features found.

The speech of 2018 was given during election year, duration was 34 minutes. Findings include evidence of all relations and all the features used together. The relations are rather distinct in all except 'Emotive appeal towards change'

The results are summarised in the following table showing which relation are present in Figure 3 was present during the examined speeches:

Table 2: Presence of the relations in the speeches of 2011 and 2018

	2011	2018
Ordinariness	Yes	Yes
Victims and accountability	Yes	Yes
Emotive appeal towards change	No	Yes
All together	No	Yes

There are some similarities, the first example shows these similarities in how the relation of 'Ordinariness' is used. Here is an example from 2011 when Åkesson makes a joke about how chaos would break out if the SD made it into the parliament.

E1: "… There were even those who claimed that Santa Claus would not make it for Christmas. Even if this probably was said with a big dose of humour. No, indeed, those who likes Sweden does not vote for the Sweden Democrats, raged Fredrik Reinfeldt. And then he sent Mr. Borg and Bildt to Landskrona to lecture narrow-minded Skåningar, who usually votes wrong" (SVT, 2011)

Moreover, a mocking, sarcastic tone is used while making the point of that a few famous politicians will lecture Skåningar (people from a southern county in Sweden where the SD has great electoral support (Valmyndigheten, 2010)) on what is right and wrong. In this example the relation between 'the people' versus 'the elite' and 'bad manners' becomes rather clear, where sarcasm and humour are used to aim critique at 'the elite', in this case the top individuals of the sitting government. This example is rather similar to one in 2018, where Åkesson makes a similar point about the voters of the SD and a political elite:

E2: "Another thing I reacted on this week is when our beloved Foreign Minister said that those who vote for the Sweden Democrats has not understood what we stand for. Implicit, she says that you are a bit dumb if you vote for us instead of the Social Democrats. Unfortunately, I have this impression that just this argumentation is a bit significant for a hegemonic social democracy that in its high-handedness has lost contact with reality. (…) Those choosing to vote for the SD do so because that the old parties have not delivered what they promised (…) the old parties have abused their power and (…) honestly, destroyed our country. That is why wise, well informed Swedes from all parts of society today chooses to vote for the Sweden Democrats" (SVT, 2018)

This is interpreted as of how 'ordinariness' is presented by mockingly providing a rather brisk interpretation of the Foreign Minister's claim and using this to appeal to an 'the people' by putting them against 'the elite'. The ordinary people are here put against the elite who tell them how to think and vote. This is finished by claiming that the country is "destroyed" and that the "old parties" are accountable.

Similarities shows in these examples. First, in how Åkesson pits 'the people' versus 'the elite' by claiming that 'the elite' believes the voters of the party are less intelligent. Here, Åkesson presents himself as a spokesperson for 'the people' that are claimed to be "wise Swedes from all parts of society". This is done by distancing himself from the establishment by sending critique their way by using sarcasm, a mocking tone and using humour. This shows in both speeches. One difference is how the relation of 'victims and accountability' is also present in 2018. In the end of this section, a breakdown of society is suggested, while blamed on 'the elite'. Thus, in 2018 two relations in relation to each other while only one is present in 2011.

Another example of how a difference between the years manifest in following example from 2011, where the relation 'Victims and accountability' shows:

> E3: "We see, my friends, how the foundation for 'Folkhemmet' erodes, how Sweden
> is torn apart by injustices, segregation and disagreements as a result of a distinct
> politics of fragmentation. And the blame for this does not only lies with this
> government. All governments, from left to right during the last decades, have driven
> Sweden in the same destructive direction, towards fragmentation and disruption"
> (SVT, 2011)

Here, the threat to society is blamed on the elite. This is a rather distinct example of how this relation would show according to the theoretical framework. However, in comparison 2018, where the relation of 'victims and accountability' shows in a similar way, there are some interesting differences:

> E4: "Do you know I am terrified of? What makes me sleepless. It is that there are
> more shootings than ever on our streets. (…) It is that only one out of five foreign
> rapists who lives is Sweden gets deported. This is of course horrible, when we get to
> decide, everyone will of course be deported. (…) Above all I am scared of Swedish
> politicians who cares more about the EU-elite's grand visions of another thousand-
> year European empire… than about Sweden, about the Swedish welfare and about
> the safety of Swedish citizens. And, friends of Sweden, I am terrified of that
> politicians, divorced from reality, (…) will get continued confidence to govern our
> country towards disaster." (SVT, 2018)

In this example, all features and relations are present. The speech starts by presenting a threat to society. This is also done by 'emotive appealing towards change' by using certain words such as "foreign rapists" while presenting this as a personal problem. The emotive appeal, according to the theoretical framework, is in this example how Åkesson presents the threats as something that he, personally, is scared and worried about. Creating a sense of crisis and need for immediate acts. The 'ordinariness' is presented in a similar manner when Åkesson presents himself as afraid of the Swedish politicians who cares more about the EU. Whereas the "EU-elite's grand visions of another thousand-year European empire" is said with a rather sarcastic and mocking tone. The relation 'victim and accountability' shows when 'the elite', consisting of "politicians divorced from reality" are blamed for governing the country "towards disaster". This is one of very few examples of how all features relate completely and how performative content and self-presentation relating to each other through all the features. Whereas the same point is made during 2011, we can interpret a difference in how the populist style shows clearer and more complete in 2018.

The coming example from 2018 shows another example where all features are present and, two of them, relating to each other according to the theoretical framework.

> E5: "But the fact is that the criminals are about to win. This is a fact. They are about to win because Stefan Löfven and his government, and governments before this has not taken this seriously. They have failed colossally. And it is common, honest and obedient people all over the country who has to pay for this failure." (SVT, 2018)

Here, a clear case of preforming a threat or breakdown with 'the people' as a victim and 'the elite' as responsible is shown. The common, honest people have to pay for the elite's failure of fighting crime – leading to a threat to society. Additionally, Åkesson demonstratively banter over the fact that no one would install an alarm in their house because it is "flashy or luxurious". Here the deviant self-presentation shows in the mocking tone, uses slang, with accompanying gesture. This is interpreted as self-presenting ordinariness, by using slang in a way of presenting himself as a 'straight shooter', appealing to common sense.

Shortly after, this is followed by a way of constructing the people, while also including himself among them: "One worries because crime is winning ground and creeping closer us common citizens." While this could be interpreted as an 'emotive appeal towards change', where a point is made by using feelings and himself as an example in demonstrating a certain point. It does not manifest very clearly and according to the framework it is a rather tight squeeze to claim manifest this relation. Therefore, this example can only manifests by showing two of the relations, even if all features are present. However, this illustrates the differences between the two speeches. The analysis shows that the relations are more present in the speech of 2018 than 2011, as well as the examples manifests a more distinct manifestation of them.

While this section mostly has been focusing on the presence of the feature relations, it is also important to take direct or distinct the relations into account, in regard to the research question. How distinct the relations are, indicates how much bearing the results should have when drawing conclusions regarding the research question and according to the theoretical framework. In the results from the qualitative analysis, there are some similarities and differences. The similarities are mostly found in the relations between the features of performative content, 'victims and accountability'. In E3, from 2011, the relation is very direct, whereas a direct connection between the crisis and those accountable for it are pointed out: "All governments, from left to right during the last decades, have driven Sweden in the same destructive direction, towards fragmentation and disruption.". In E5, a very similar relation of 'victims and accountability' is found when the threat of that "criminals are about to win" are presented. The victims become the "common, honest and obedient people" and the accountable are 'the elite': previous and current governments. This shows how the relations between the features of performative content are quite similar, not only in presence, but also in how distinct they are presented.

The differences are found in the relations between the features of performative content and self-presentation. First, results indicate rather little presence and even less direct findings of the relation of 'emotive appeal towards change'. This can be interpreted as that none of the speeches are populist to the extent of that this relation would show. It could also be an indication of that this analytic tool does not capture this relation the study is interested in capturing. However, little empirical findings show.

The performative content and self-presentation are in relationship with each other in the feature relations of 'Ordinariness'. Here, there are some differences in how distinct the relation manifests and are present, between the speeches. This shows rather clearly in comparison between the examples of E1 and E5. In E1(2011) the mocking tone is not very distinct. Even if a joke is made in critiquing the establishment, the presence of 'bad manners' is less direct, while still present. In E5 (2018) however, the ordinariness of using slang and bantering with a mocking tone is rather distinct, as well as gestures are used in combination. Furthermore, in another example from 2011 an interpretation could be that a critique against some kind of cultural or medial elite is done while using irony and a mocking tone, while presenting himself as ordinary and distancing himself from the establishment. However, the mocking tone and sarcasm is not very distinct, making this an example that could be questioned.

> E6: "(…) Because every sensible person, who lives on Södermalm and works with
> media, knows that values, one can only have if they are left or right" (SVT, 2011)

This example can be put in comparison with E4, where the personal emotive appeal is very distinct, making the interpretation less questionable. Moreover, the self-presentation, becomes less distinct in this example. We can therefore detect some differences in the directness in the relations and how distinct they show.

To summarise, the qualitative analysis shows some differences and similarities between the two speeches in how the relations are present, in what context and how direct and distinct they are. The key differences are that the features found in 2018 relate to each other more often as well as more distinct than in 2011. Similarities are shown how the relations in performative content occurs and how distinct they are. Relations regarding self-presentation seems to be rather absent or vague in the relation of 'emotive appeal towards change'. The relation of 'Ordinariness', however, seems to be more present and distinct in 2018.

6. Discussion

This paper aims to examine if populism exists within the SD and if the level of populism differs over time. An overreaching scholarly goal contains of the issues of measuring populism, addressing context, aiming to reach the 'mixed bags'. In this section, the findings relating to the research question will be discussed and compared, followed by a theoretical and methodological discussion.

6.1 Empirical Findings

First, indications of populism are found in all speeches. In the qualitative analysis findings indicates that the features of populism relate to each other in both speeches examined. Therefore, there are indications of that populism seems to exist within the SD. Additionally, more indicators as well as more distinct relations shows in the speech in 2018, giving indications of a higher level of populism.

If comparing the results over time, the trend shows an increase of populist indications over time. Although some exceptions, there seems to be more indications of populism in later years compared to earlier. The feature of 'the people' versus 'the elite' is the most prominent feature, while still differing and slightly increasing over time. This relates to what previous research as well as the analytic model claims. In the case of the SD, this feature seems to be a core concept, probably much due to nationalism. The qualitative analysis shows similarities in how the performative content relates through pointing out the people as victims and 'the elite' as accountable, in relation to a crisis. It does show some similarities in how 'ordinariness' is performed in self-presentation, although this is more distinct in 2018.

The second feature of 'crisis' is the least present one and is rather ambiguous regarding presence. An observation shows that years when crisis drew much attention in media, such as the "Migrant crisis" in 2015, or in the riots in Husby in 2013. In these years the feature of 'Crisis' is less prominent. This is interesting, regarding how crisis can be performed and triggered by populist and inversely. The qualitative results show some differences as well as general ambiguities in the relation of 'emotive appeal towards change' whereas this relation does not show rather well in the analysis. This could be due to the analytic tool, or due to the fact that this possible relation does not show - an indication of how distinct the populism within the SD is rather low.

'Bad manners' is found in most speeches and seems to increase over time. Moreover, this feature seems to be rather prominent during election years. In general, there are more populist indications per minute in the later years than earlier, that indicates an increase in populism during this period of time. In the qualitative analysis, it becomes clearer that the relations of ordinariness become more distinct and more present. The results also show this used in combination with the other features and relations to a larger extent. Indicating an increased level and a more distinct populism.

Some external factors should be considered. In 2011, almost 7 years ago, the mediatisation around Almedalsveckan could surely differ from 2018. The rise of social media can probably affect the circumstances for political events. The trend of slightly shorter speeches during the last three years indicates a mediatisation of political performances. This could mean that a similar trend could exist in other parties' performances. Whereas they could react on populist style as Bossetta (2017) shows. Returning to the two possible outcomes presented in the introduction, this could point towards that populism increase over time, as populism diffuse over regions, political spectrum and contexts. The increase of populist indicators during election-years calls for further studies, if keeping in mind that populist feed from media attention (Moffitt, 2016). Moreover, it would be interesting to further study *when* populist perform crisis and what crisis, since some ambiguity is found in this study.

Since no statistical claims can be done, the indication of change of level of populism cannot be determined. However, coding and in-depth analysis shows indication of an increased number of populist indications and a more distinct presence of the relations of the concept.

6.2 Theoretical and Methodological Discussion

In this section I shall return to the overreaching scholarly aim in this thesis. This thesis has made an attempt to measure populism in terms of more or less. By using a twofold methodological approach, both the indications and relations could be examined. However, remembering the critique of Pappas (2016), the operationalisation of populism as a style comes with some challenges. This thesis humble contribution to further studies that seeks to measured populism can be discussed in following notes.

First, the operationalisation of 'bad manners' is possible. Even in a simpler quantitative content analysis of speeches, these indications can be captured. However, as this method could capture populist indications quite well, it could not account for the technocratic style nor the relations between the features. In this light, it could have been better to use another type of method. Perhaps, a holistic grading (Hawkins, 2009; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017), where the whole speech is graded according to a scheme, would have been a better method when measure performative populism. However, with the qualitative analysis focusing on the relations, the distinctiveness could be captured, enabling a further comparison to be made according to the research question. Thus, a very humble contribution to further studies can be that while content analysis might be able to capture possible change of populism in terms of less and more, it is challenging measuring degree in terms of index using this methodological approach, while remaining high validity and reliability.

Second, regarding this context-sensitive conceptualisation of populism, it needs to be addressed that this operationalisation does not work in a different context. Returning to Pappas critique of this approach (2017:269f), there are some valid points, especially in how the feature of 'bad manners' are context-sensitive and challenging to operationalise. Populism should perhaps be regarded as a context-sensitive concept, when understood as a style. While Moffitt's inductive approach shows how this style is used, the question remains how populism can be measured between contexts. This is of course a weakness, when speaking in terms of conceptualising populism to enable comparative research. However, it could also point in the direction that populism will differ between contexts, why studies of populism should be done with awareness of how populism can differ over context and time.

Third, conceptualising populism as a political style enables to include these in-between cases by focusing on the leader. Moreover, this thesis and its results could very well relate to the ambiguity of the SD as a 'mixed bag'. The feature of 'the people' versus 'the elite' is prominent, while 'crisis' and 'bad manners' seems to be increasing slightly. Thus, this theoretical framework can account for populism as an independent concept. This could possibly help to avoid populism to be confused with an ideology and facilitate studies focusing on populism influence on politics and democracy. In general, the results are interesting in the light of a more nuanced approach to populism, where it should not be equated with disliked politicians or some certain ideologies. This thesis shows some indications of how populism within these 'mixed bags' should not be overlooked. Rather, they should be focused on, perhaps similar to Bossetta's (2017) work on how mainstream politicians adapts populistic style.

7. Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to examine if populism exists within the SD and if the level of populism differs over time. The overreaching scholarly goal was to provide an initial attempt to measure populism as a political style, while considering context, degree and aiming attention towards a case of 'mixed bags'.

Some tentative conclusions can be drawn in the light of this thesis. There are indications of populism in all examined speeches and they are increasing over time. The populist indications relate to each other more and are more distinct in 2018 compared to 2011. The methodological and analytical framework does capture sufficient evidence to answer this particular research question. However, in order to determine degree in terms of index, another methodological approach should be considered, one that can account for scope in a more precise way. In studying 'mixed bags' of populism, the conceptualisation of a political style seems to be appropriate. Regarding the context, this thesis has adapted an operationalisation into one specific context. This can be done by accounting for the particular context. However, this paper recognises that populism should be considered to be a context-sensitive concept.

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Data Material

SVT-Forum: Partiledartal i Almedalen. 2011. Jimmie Åkesson (SD). [TV-program]. Sveriges Television, Kunskapskanalen, 10th July

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Appendix

A: Code Scheme with Coding Principles and Examples from Coding

Populist style:	Technocratic style:
An appeal to 'the people' versus 'the elite' and 'the others', an appeal to common sense and denial of expertise knowledge	An appeal to the expertise, technocracy, bureaucracy, not concerning 'the people'.
Describes current situation as a crisis, breakdown or threat.	Describes the current situation as stability with focus on incremental change, addressing problems rather than crisis and threats.
Deviant self-presentation and appealing to ordinariness and/or extraordinariness. The performance of 'bad manners'	Presenting themselves as well behaved including: technical use of language, "good manners", impersonal, consensus-seeking, gray/boring self-presentation, and a modest presentation of themselves in the political life.

General coding principles:
In this content analysis we are searching for frequencies, therefore every indication will be counted. The speeches will not be separated into different parts according to theme or duration. Instead, the coding units are words, phrases and gestures. Several indications of the same feature will not be counted in the same sentence, or if it is clear they relate to the past point or sentence. Thereby, synonyms used in the same sentence or to make the same specific point are only counted as one indication. In category 1 and 2 the performed content is examined. Thereby focus lies on the message communicated by the speaker. In 3 the self-presentation is examined. Thereby focus lies on the embodied performative characteristics of how the speaker is presenting themselves on stage, in other words. These indications can therefore take many forms, gestures, tone, demonstrations, interactions with the audience etc.

Category/Variable	Description and coding instructions	Examples (translated by the author, original quotes in footnotes)
	Operational indicators of: Performative content: 'The people' versus 'the elite'	
1A: 'The people' are constructed in a positive setting	The indicators can include constructing the people such as: the native, the Swedish people, ethnical, pure, sovereign, common, friends of the nation, the general will or similar. This can also include an appeal to the people as 'us' or 'you', if this it is clearly that it implies 'the people' or 'the elite'. Moreover, the whole context should be taken into consideration when coding, for example "Friends of Sweden" should normally not be coded as an indication of this, however it could be an indication of the appeal if said in context. If a synonym phrase for 'the people', is used several times in a sentence this counts as one.	"Violators who scares common, honest, working people of our country are allowed to continue without any consequences." (SVT, 2017) [1]

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[1] "Våldsverkare som sätter skräck I vanliga, hederliga, arbetande människor I vårt land tillåts fortsätta utan att det får några konsekvenser."

1B:'The elite' or 'the others' are constructed in a negative setting	Critique is aimed towards 'the elite' or 'the others' that are mentioned as: the establishment, hypocrites, the elite, or like. The others are mentioned as a subgroup that are in conflict with the people: immigrants, criminals etc. The critique of 'the elite' must be in general terms, it cannot be aimed at a specific party or the government. If critique is aimed in general towards "the other parties" this counts as a critique of 'the elite'. If a synonym phrase for 'the elite', is used several times in a sentence this counts as one.	"But, as usual this does not matter for the establishment." (SVT, 2014) [2] "The British referendum, barely a month ago, sent shock waves through all of Europe, and shook the political elite in depth" (SVT, 2016) [3]
1C: Appeal to common sense and the denial of expertise, fake news, true reality	The appeal to common sense takes form by the speaker claiming to be a 'straight shooter', the denial of expertise, distancing from the political correctness and disregard of complexity of political problems. The disregard of expertise and the appeal to common sense can be expressed in ways of that the speaker appeals to that some opinions are a misconstrue of reality, and they speak of the 'true' reality. The disregard of expertise or political correctness is an appeal against the establishment such as where feelings are more important than expertise knowledge or disregard of using "the correct terms". Indications of this include words like: propaganda, divorced from reality, shame, etc.	"Honestly, if we reflect a bit about this. Why on earth should we have to go begging in Brussels to get permission to sell snuff in our own country?" (SVT, 2013) [4] "It is only through a vote for the Sweden Democrats that one can be sure to not vote for fragmenting ideas, divorced from reality" (SVT, 2018) [5]

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[2] "Men, Som vanligt spelar det här ingen roll för etablisemanget."

[3] "Den här brittiska folkomröstningen,för knappt en månad sen har ju sänt chockvågor genom hela Europa, skakat om den politiska eliten på djupet."

[4] "Ärligt talat, om vi reflekterar ett varv till kring det här. Varför I hela friden ska vi behöva gå med mössan I hand till bryssel för att få lov att sälja vårt eget snus I vårt eget land?"

[5] " Det är bara genome en röst på sverigedemokraterna som man kan vara helt säker på att man inte röstar på verklighetsfrånvända, samhällssplittrande idéer"

Operational indicators of: Performative content: 'Crisis, breakdown or threat'		
2A: Performing a crisis, breakdown or threat	The situation is described as a crisis, breakdown of society or that there is a threat to society in general. This includes a suggestion of a temporal limit from the speaker and that there is a need to act immediate. Isolated problems are not taken into this indication. Several different problems connected to one solution or failure will be if they are presented as a breakdown, threat to society. A crisis can be translated to a 'tipping point' for society or like.	"Most of us understands that Sweden is at a crossroad. We are in a historical stage where the destructive takes more and more place in society, a time where fragmentation, segregation, polarisation spirits our everyday. And also, a time where important, crucial functions of society, essential parts of the welfare, is seriously threatened." (SVT, 2016) [6] "Our country, our common home, is torn apart, by polarisation, fragmentation and segregation" (SVT, 2017) [7]
Operational indicators of: Self-presentation: 'Bad manners'		
3A: Demonstrative ways of making a point	Appealing to feelings by being demonstrative in their way of presenting a point. The appeal to feelings is an appeal to the common person's worries and that the speaker shares this. Moreover, the demonstrative side relates to the use of demonstrative measures to make a point that appeals to feelings. This could include using gestures, emotive words, or other demonstrative measures.	One example of this is how the Nazis in Almedalen are called "a gang of coward wimps" (SVT, 2018) [8] "In our modern home of the people, criminals, murderers, rapists, paedophiles, are locked up." (SVT, 2017) [9] Another example is when Åkesson says "There is only one kind of bracelets that is efficient against sexual offenders, it is this kind." (SVT, 2016) [10] Whereas he holds up handcuffs to show for the audience.
3B: Deviant behaviour in disregarding the political norms in performing a stage	The use of humour, slang, being colourful (dancing, singing, gestures, interacting with the audience) bantering, mocking or sarcastic tone (towards other political actors, parties or policies), swearing, use of ad hominem and name calling. Ad hominem is the attack on a person's or authority's characteristics without substance of the argument.	"I heard that chief of police, Dan Eliasson, is going to resign by choice if I become prime minister… I was going to say, then he has to be quick." (SVT, 2016) [11] When Åkesson enters the stage, clapping and dancing and encouraging the audience to dance. (SVT, 2018)

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[6] "De flesta av oss vi förstår att Sverige befinner sig vid ett vägskäl. Vi befinner oss vid ett historiskt skede där det destruktiva tar mer och mer plats i samhället, en tid där splittring, segregation, polarisering präglar allt mer av vår vardag. Och dessutom en tid där viktiga, vitala samhällsfunktioner, grundläggande delar av välfärden, är allvarligt hotade."

[7] "Vårt land, vårt gemensamma hem, slits isär, klyvs genom polarisering, splittring, segregation."

[8] "Jag har noterat att ett gäng nazister, ett gäng fega töntar"

[9] "I vårt moderna folkhem där sitter grovt kriminella, mördare, våldtäcksmän, pedofiler, de sitter inlåsta."

[10] "Det finns bara en sorts armband som är effektiva mot sexualförbrytare, det är den här sorten"

[11] "Jag hörde att rikspolischefen Dan Eliasson, tanker avgå självmant om det är så att jag blir statsminister. Jag tänkte säga det, då får han vara snabb."

| 3C: Bragging or presenting themselves as an underdog. | The speaker is bragging in their achievements and/or in how they are as a leader. The speaker is presenting themselves as an underdog in the political life.

Bragging about success of the party will be analysed as a self-presentation as a spokesperson for the people. Presenting themselves as underdogs is a way of distancing themselves from the mainstream politics. | "Now, friends of Sweden and visitors of Almedalen, it is precisely two days left to election day. Everybody speaks about us, everyone relates to us, we are the centrifugal force in Swedish politics right now. The only thing the voters can be sure to know that the other parties think, is that they dislike us." (SVT, 2018) [12] |
| *3D: Conflict-seeking** | *The speaker is presenting themselves in a conflict-seeking manner on stage: towards other parties or politicians or towards groups of people.* | - |

3D was removed because of validity and reliability problems.

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[12] "Nu är det Sverigevänner och Almedalsbesökare, ganska precis två månader kvar till valdagen. Alla pratar om oss, alla förhåller sig till oss. Vi är centrifugalkraften I svensk politik just nu. Det enda väljarna kan vara säkra på att de andra partierna faktiskt på riktigt tycker, det är att de inte tycker om oss."

B: Questions of Analysis: Qualitative

The questions of analysis seek to capture how the features relate to each other.

1. Appealing to 'the people' versus 'the elite' while performing 'bad manners' by performing ordinariness/extraordinariness in their self-presentation.
2. Describes the current situation as a crisis, breakdown or threat while blaming this on 'the elite', presenting 'the people' as a victim and presents simple solutions disregarding the complexity of political issues.
3. Using an emotive appeal to change and solutions, relating to 'bad manners', when performing a crisis, breakdown or threat.
4. All features done in relation to each other.
5. How do the features relate to each other and how distinct are they?

These questions are presented in combination as follows:

1. Are the features used in relation to each other in the speeches?
2. How do the features relate to each other and how distinct are they?

C: Full Results from Coding

Category	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1A	6	6	11	9	4	12	13	7
1B	6	8	9	6	6	10	9	10
1C	4	4	3	10	7	9	5	5
SUM	**16**	**18**	**23**	**25**	**17**	**31**	**27**	**22**
2A	2	6	2	1	0	4	7	7
SUM	**2**	**6**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**4**	**7**	**7**
3A	2	2	1	2	3	4	4	4
3B	3	4	4	14	7	7	3	9
3C			2	3	2		1	2
SUM	**5**	**6**	**7**	**19**	**12**	**7**	**8**	**15**
Total	**23**	**30**	**32**	**45**	**29**	**42**	**42**	**44**
LENGTH	51,50	38,00	42,00	52,00	47,00	34,00	34,00	34,00
FPM	0,4466	0,7894	0,7619	0,8653	0,6105	1,3823	1,2352	1,29411

D: Quotes from Qualitative Analysis

Quotes in original language from the qualitative analysis: 2011	
Category:	Example:
Ordinariness	" Det fanns till och med dem som hävdade att tomten inte skulle komma till jul. Även om nog var med ett stort mått av humor trots allt. Nej, minsann, den som tycker om Sverige röstar inte på Sverigedemokraterna, rasade Fredrik Reinfeldt. Och sen skickade han herrarna Borg och Bildt till Landskrona för att läxa upp trångsynta skåningar, som brukar rösta fel." "Proffstyckarnas analys av detta faktum har antingen varit att vi Sverigedemokrater nog är lite dumma i huvudet eftersom vi fortfarande inte har lyckats lära oss att man alltid måste vara antingen höger eller vänster. En annan förklaring är att vårt obegripliga beteende måste bero på att vi är oseriösa populister som helt saknar värderingar. För varenda vettig människa, som bor på Södermalm och jobbar med media, vet ju att värderingar, det kan man bara ha om de är antingen höger eller vänster."
Victim and accountability	"Vi ser, mina vänner, hur grunden för Folkhemmet eroderar, hur Sverige slits sönder av orättvisor, segregation och motsättningar till följd av en utpräglad splittringspolitik. Och skulden till det bär inte bara den här regeringen. Samtliga regeringar, från vänster till höger under de senaste decennierna, har drivit Sverige i samma destruktiva riktning, mot splittring och söndring."
Emotive appeal towards change	-
All features	-

Quotes in original language from the qualitative analysis: 2018	
Category:	Example:
Ordinariness	"Otryggheten i Sverige är utpräglad och vi pratar ofta om den. Vi pratar om det så fort vi får chansen. Det gör ju vi för att otryggheten är på riktigt, för riktiga människor av kött och blod. Det är på riktigt. Människor är oroliga, människor är bekymrade, folk I vårt land är rädda och så ska det inte vara. Då hävdar visa att vi svartmålar, att vi försöker spelar på den här oron, rädslan...men att prata om problem är inte att svartmåla, att prata om problem är inte att spela på människors oro eller rädsla. Det är att ta ansvar. Det är den som skönmålar och förnekar verkliga problem som agerar ansvarslöst."
Victim and accountability	"Vi är garanten för att de andra partierna aldrig någonsin igen kan ta Sverige tillbaka till den totala kravlöshet som rådde i decennier. "
Emotive appeal towards change	See next

| All features | "Vet ni vad jag är livrädd för? Vad som håller mig vaken och sömnlös om nätterna? Jo, det är att det skjuts som aldrig förr på våra gator. Det är att en helt vanlig medborgare kan sprängas till döds av en handgranat som han har hittat på gatan. Det är att sexualbrotten – våldtäkterna – har ökat i en skrämmande takt, att kvinnor inte vågar gå ut när det är mörkt. Det är att bara en av fem utländska våldtäktsmän som bor i Sverige utvisas. Det är naturligtvis helt horribelt. När vi får bestämma ska alla utvisas. Det skrämmer mig är att det i praktiken råder slöjtvång på många förskolor i landet. Att tusentals – tiotusentals – flickor redan från tidig ålder låses fast i hedersstrukturer och islamism. Det som skrämmer mig är att bli allvarligt sjuk och inte få den vård jag behöver i tid. Att människor faktisk – i Sverige 2018 – dör i väntan på den vård de behöver. Det skrämmer mig. Det är att mina föräldrar, som har arbetat och slitit i hela sina liv, ska bli gamla och i behov av omsorg. Jag är allvarligt rädd för hur det kommer att se ut. Det skrämmer mig. Jag tänker på det jätteofta. Det är att min son ska tvingas växa upp i ett splittrat, segregerat samhälle...utan att kunna känna den trygghet och den gemenskap som jag upplevde när jag växte upp. Jag ska snart skicka honom till skolan. Hur kommer det att bli? Kommer han att hitta sin plats? Kommer han att bli sedd? Kommer han att få rätt förutsättningar för att ta sig vidare i livet? Svaret på de frågorna är: Jag vet inte. Det skrämmer mig. Det håller mig sömnlös. Framför allt är jag rädd för svenska politiker som bryr sig mer om EU-elitens storslagna visioner om ännu ett tusenårigt europeiskt imperium...istället för att bry sig om Sverige, om den svenska välfärden och om tryggheten för svenska medborgare. Och, Sverigevänner, jag är livrädd för att verklighetsfrånvända politiker som Stefan Löfven, Gustav Fridolin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Annie Lööf och Jan Björklund ska få fortsatt förtroende att styra vårt land mot en katastrof... Låt oss stoppa dem den 9 september!"

"Men faktum är att brottslingarna håller på att vinna. Detta är ett faktum. De håller på att vinna därför att Stefan Löfven och hans regering, och även tidigare regeringar inte har tagit det här på allvar. De har misslyckats kapitalt. Och, det är vanliga, hederliga, laglydiga människor över hela landet som får betala priset för det misslyckandet.(…) Det kostar att installera ett larm I hemmet. Och det är ingenting man gör för att det är roligt, eller att man vill flasha med nån lyxig teknisk apparat. Man gör det för att öka sin egen trygghet. Man oroar sig för att någon ska bryta sig in. Man oroar sig eftersom brottsligheten vinner mark och kryper allt närmare oss vanliga medborgare". |