SOCIAL INCLUSION CAUSING CONFLICT

A Comparative Case Study on the role of

Military Integration and Nationalism

Olle Linder
Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3
2. Theory ............................................................................................................................ 5
   2.1 Military Integration ................................................................................................. 6
   2.2 Nationalist Public Opinions ................................................................................. 7
   2.3 International Conflict Initiation ............................................................................ 11
   2.4 Theoretical Claim .................................................................................................. 12
3. Research Design ........................................................................................................... 13
   3.1 Operationalization .................................................................................................. 13
      3.1.1 Independent Variable ...................................................................................... 14
      3.1.2 Mediating Variable ........................................................................................ 15
      3.1.3 Dependent Variable ......................................................................................... 16
   3.2 Case Selection .......................................................................................................... 17
4. Comparative Case Study .............................................................................................. 22
   4.1 Brazil ......................................................................................................................... 22
   4.2 Switzerland .............................................................................................................. 24
   4.3 Analysis and Interpretations .................................................................................... 26
      4.3.1 Additional Observations and Alternative Explanations .................................. 30
      4.3.2 Research Design Limitations .......................................................................... 31
5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 33
6. Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 34
Appendix I ........................................................................................................................ 39
Appendix II ......................................................................................................................... 40

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed causal story (12)
Table 1: Summary of general questions (14)
Table 2: Summary of main results (29)
1. Introduction

There’s an extensive scholarly debate about what factors are having a more significant impact on the initiation of conflicts and its dynamics than others. More specifically, regarding international conflicts, there’s a broad scholarly consensus that both democratic and autocratic leaders are responsive to their domestic public opinions about matters of foreign policy (Weeks, 2008; Weeks, 2012; Tomz & Weeks, 2013). The overall reasons for why this is the case is because governments are always concerned about their reputations among the domestic public (Dafoe & Caughey, 2016; Oktay, 2018). Even though most scholars within the field would agree to this fact that mass public opinions are having a significant impact on international state behaviour in all regime types, there’s still a lack of knowledge about what factors are shaping the public opinions about foreign policies and international conflicts.

Even though some researchers have suggested that factors such as external elite messages have a significant impact on domestic public opinions (Guardino & Hayes, 2018) whereas others have argued that partisanship and the level of political trust are shaping public opinions about military interventions (Clements, 2013). Still, these sorts of factors are heavily determined by what type of regime the country of interest is having. For instance, the degree to which the state public is open for external elite messages is more constrained in autocracies than in democracies. Thus, since there have been arguments claiming that the content of public opinions by itself cannot explain differences in state behaviour between democracies and autocracies (Bell & Quek, 2018), this suggest that some domestic factor(s) being inherently institutionalized in all types of regimes is having a significant impact on public opinions about international conflicts. Since the military is arguably one of these types of common denominators, this could potentially be one factor having a significant impact on public opinions.

Even though there is an extensive amount of studies that have studied what factors are affecting public opinions about the military, not that many studies have considered a reversed causal relationship (i.e. what military factors are affecting public opinions). Nevertheless, some previous studies have suggested a few potential explanations for how the military is affecting public opinions. For instance, some have suggested that a military mission’s perceived legitimacy and its perceived likelihood of success are primarily influencing mass public opinions (Golby et al., 2018), others have argued that those states with a long history of military deployments may provide the public with an “intuitive understanding” of the military works.
Thus, what these previous works have been focusing on is primarily how the state public is perceiving military missions and deployments; however, they have not considered how the military personnel is having an impact on public opinions in a domestic setting. Thus, the aspect of military personnel socially affecting public opinions in a domestic setting has not been further examined in previous studies.

When considering this previous research, the critical relationship this paper is interested in looking at is about how the military can influence international conflicts by affecting public opinions about the use of military forces against other states. In order to gain further knowledge within this topic of interest and research field of military integration, this paper will be asking the following question throughout the study: What domestic factors are shaping public opinions about international conflicts? Thus, by answering this question, one would hopefully be able to not only internally examine this paper’s critical relationship but also externally identify other potential factors influencing public opinions about foreign policies. Also, this research question will hopefully be able to identify further what primary factors are causing the outbreaks and dynamics of international conflicts. As is mentioned earlier, since mass public opinions are having a significant impact on foreign policy decisions, it is essential to recognise what domestic factors are shaping ordinary people’s view about those events occurring on the international stage as well as its actors.

The purpose of this study is mainly to gain further knowledge about this paper’s topic of interest, i.e. how the military is socially affecting public opinions, by conducting a theoretically driven empirical study. In order to do so, this paper will first be arguing for why more research is needed within the topic by presenting previous research dealing with what domestic factors are having a significant impact on foreign policy decisions and why shifting more focus to the aspect of domestic public opinions is needed. Furthermore, by presenting various theories of what factors are considered to influence public opinions, this paper argues for why military integration is theoretically considered to affect international conflict initiations through nationalist public opinions. Thus, the following discussion about this paper’s research design then discusses what methods, measurements, and selection of cases will be needed in order to be able to empirically examine whether the theoretical claim being made in this paper is significant. The next section then explores if/how the military is socially affecting public opinions by examining two empirical cases and whether additional observations can be made from its findings. The last section then briefly summarises the main contributions of this study and what possible policy implications can be drawn.
2. Theory

Regarding theories in previous works relating to the topic of interest in this paper, there is an extensive amount of research dealing with what domestic factors are having a significant impact on foreign policy decisions. For instance, some studies have been suggesting that the domestic political culture of liberal democracies is shaping their policies during international crises (Onderco & Wagner, 2017), others have claimed that humiliating events in which states fail to match international expectations are likely to generate status-seeking acts, such as territorial aggression (Barnhart, 2017). Related to this, scholars have also argued that psychological factors are having an impact on war duration (Dolan, 2018). There have also been suggestions that domestic political revolutions tend to bring particularly aggressive leaders to power; thus there’s a higher probability of getting involved in international military conflicts (Colgan & Weeks, 2015). Even though these previous studies would suggest that there’s extensive knowledge about this paper’s topic of interests, most of this research is heavily focusing on the government and the political leaders of a state. Thus, there’s a scholarly need to shift focus from these actors and put more emphasis on how the domestic public opinions about foreign policies are being shaped.

Even though this perspective remains to be further examined, some studies have already suggested various factors heavily influencing public opinions about foreign policies and international conflicts. For instance, some have argued that elite cues are shaping mass public opinions on international issues (Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). Other researchers have suggested that moral psychology is an essential factor in order to be able to understand the ethical drivers of foreign policies (Rathbun et al., 2018; Kreps & Maxey, 2018). Furthermore, a third theoretical perspective emphasises that geopolitical factors play an important role when determining whether or not the public is likely to support economic sanctions against another country (Onderco, 2017).

Nevertheless, one of the most prominent factors influencing public opinions has been the notion about revenge in the sense that vengeful public opinions are having significant effects on international conflicts (Sagan & Valentino, 2017; Chu, 2018), still different authors are providing different explanations for why this is the case. For instance, one argument is that democracies having retained death penalty for a more extended period are more likely to generate vengeful emotions (Stein, 2015), another one suggests that national injuries being caused by elusive perpetrators may trigger non-instrumental revenge motives (Liberman &
Social Inclusion Causing Conflict

However, when taking all these arguments about revenge into consideration, all of them are heavily making claims within democratic settings; thus very few studies have been elaborating on what domestic factors are shaping public opinions about foreign policies in autocracies. As is mentioned earlier, since the content of public opinions by itself cannot explain differences in state behaviour between different regime types, there must be a common denominator being present in both democracies as well as autocracies explaining public opinions about international conflicts. Thus, since this common denominator seems to have not been further elaborated upon in previous research, this is why military integration is theoretically suggested to have a significant impact on these types of public opinions which will be further elaborated upon in the remainder of this section.

2.1 Military Integration

As being implied earlier, the main argument in this paper is that the idea of military integration should ultimately lead to an increased probability of states to initiate international conflicts and the reason for why this is the case will be further elaborated upon in the subsequent discussion. However, as a starter, the concept of military integration needs to be further elaborated upon so that it becomes entirely clear what this conception refers to. Regarding previous research addressing military integration, much of the literature has primarily considered it as a rebel-military type of integration, thus serving as an additional reason for why further research is needed within this paper’s topic of interest since this paper is interested in regarding the concept as a type of civil-military integration.

Nevertheless, in their article, Krebs & Licklider (2016) provide a maximal definition of the concept by arguing that the processes of military integration can be conceptualised along three dimensions. The first one concerns the magnitude of integration which is the degree to which the military includes individuals roughly proportional to the size of the communal groups they are claiming to represent. The second one is about the horizontal integration of units, i.e. the degree to which individuals are assigned to military units in which only substantive qualifications and merits are taken into consideration. Lastly, the third dimension considers the vertical integration of the officer corps, thus the degree to which communal groups are proportionally represented at all military levels. By definition, a communal group is usually a community of people with the same religious and/or ethnic origins (Oxford University Press, n.d.; Cutler, 2010). Nevertheless, this useful and coherent definition of the concept is simply...
claiming that when there are high levels of integration across all these three dimensions within a state, there’s a high level of military integration in which the military should arguably have a higher level of trust and social acceptance within the civil society.

As being previously touched upon, even though Krebs & Licklider’s (2016) conceptualisation of military integration will be used in this paper, it is essential to acknowledge that their definition contextually concerns rebel-military integration in a post-civil war situation. However, in this case, military integration is considered to be a civil-military integration in which the military personnel are socially affecting the public on the intrastate level when there’s a high degree of military integration, whether it is in a post-civil war context or not. Nevertheless, due to the lack of research within the subject, the conceptualisation being provided by Krebs & Licklider’s (Ibid.) is arguably differentiating from other definitions by providing one of the most valid measurements of the concept. Nevertheless, even though it should be the case that military integration is having an impact on public opinions, the question still remains on how military integration is having a significant impact on public opinions in order to affect international conflict initiations, i.e. what type of public opinions being influenced by the military is prone to supporting international conflict initiations?

2.2 Nationalist Public Opinions

In order to be able to identify how public opinions are being affected by military integration, it is essential to recognise further the ethics characterising the military profession. Like in many other public careers, the military is expected by the society to have a role morality which in this case inherently stems from the oath soldiers are taking when joining the military; i.e. the soldier promises to serve the state and is therefore yielded to the will of the state. In this sense, a soldier does not kill in its name but rather does so in the name of the state. According to some scholars, the reason for why military personnel must obey all legal orders is because they have distinguished themselves from the rest of the society by consenting to serve their country; thus, by enlisting, they have agreed to what is implicitly recognized as the “unlimited liability contract” (Coleman, 2015, pp. 66-68). When considering this, the effect of military integration would imply that values such as loyalty and trust towards the state are socially transmitted from the military to the public.

Concerning state loyalty and trust, Robinson (2016) argues in her text that trust in the state is likely to generate a stable and salient national identity, thus suggesting an increased level of
nationalism within the state in which values such as national pride are further strengthened. Simply speaking, nationalism is the very idea that nations should compose the essential units for social and political life (Dickovick & Eastwood, 2016, p. 307), i.e. it is the degree to which an individual perceives its adherence and ties to a nation (Pang & Thomas, 2017). Hence, one possible way in which military integration is affecting public opinions is that those values characterising nationalism are increasing within the civil society.

Even though nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon in the world, it is still a well-established research field with additional sub-categories included. There are two primary forms of national identity in which one is ethnic nationalism (or Eastern nationalism), and the other one is civic nationalism (or Western/Territorial nationalism). Essentially, ethnic nationalism is treating citizenship as a closed conception in which a formal recognition is not a valid marker for national belonging (Dickovick & Eastwood, 2016, p. 311). However, even though ethnicity is an essential factor when studying nationalism, it is the very dimensions of civic nationalism that will be conceptualised in this paper when referring to the concept. This is due to the fact that while ethnic nationalism claims that “you are a member of the nation because of your ancestry”, civic nationalism is conversely arguing that “you are a member of the nation if you are a citizen of its state” (Ibid., p. 311). As is mentioned earlier, since this paper is emphasising the ethics of the military by referring to state loyalty rather than national loyalty, this suggests that the definition of civic nationalism serves as a more appropriate conceptualisation of nationalism in this paper rather than ethnic nationalism.

However, a critical implication of this conceptualisation is that even though previous studies have considered dimensions of both citizeships and ethnicity contributing to nationalism, very few of them have considered whether and if the military has an impact on nationalism within a country. In one case, Yongming (2005) claims that so-called “military websites” in Chinese cyberspace have a significant impact on Chinese nationalism; in another case, Jensen (2000) shows that military culture can have an essential role in the rise of modern nationalism as the developments in the late 19th and early 20th century Spain have shown. However, since these previous studies have only been looking at individual cases, it is difficult to make any general claims about a potential correlation between the military and nationalism. Therefore, one purpose in this paper is to further contribute to this limited scholarly field by examining whether military integration is having a significant impact on public opinions.

In summary, the underlying logic behind this correlation between the military and nationalism has to do with the fact that since the military soldiers are mainly citizens of the state, they are
therefore socially engaged in the civil society. Thus, if military personnel of a state are successfully integrated into the civil society rather than despised and separated from it, then the values of the military should arguably be affecting the values of the civil society as a whole. As is mentioned earlier, since the military is generally having a high degree of state loyalty and trust, this should generate *nationalist public opinions* in which the degree of an individual’s national pride is increased by collectively strengthening its adherence and ties to the state. Nevertheless, even though nationalism serves as an explanatory framework for how citizens are viewing the world in some states, it still doesn’t provide any moral compass on how the state is expected to act in some international situations. Thus, as the critical relationship in this paper is how the military is socially influencing international conflicts by affecting public opinion about the use of military force against other states, the question remains on what mechanism is determining *why* nationalist public opinions lead to an increased probability of being involved in international conflicts?

Thus, even though many researchers have pointed out the fact that nationalism is strongly associated with interstate conflicts (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; Gruffydd-Jones, 2017; Kadercan, 2017; Bertoli, 2017), not so much research have been able to explain the causal mechanism linking those two phenomena together, i.e. how and why is nationalism considered to cause interstate conflicts? Thus, using this widely acknowledged correlation between nationalism and interstate conflicts as a point of departure, this paper’s theory is interested in further elaborating on this correlation. When doing so, the concept of nationalist public opinions becomes more nuanced and further elaborated upon. Hopefully, one would be able to clarify what specific worldviews and moral values nationalism inherently bring about when considering whether or not to engage in international conflicts.

Regarding moral compasses, three ethical approaches have been widely acknowledged within the scholarly field of international relations: those of the *sceptics*, the *cosmopolitans*, and the *state moralists*. All three of them have distinct views of the role of morality in international relations (Nye & Welch, 2011, p. 24), thus providing three distinct views of how to judge state interventions in international relations. By definition, state intervention implies “external actions that influence the domestic affairs of another sovereign state”, i.e. the most obsessive form of intervention is when a state chooses to conduct military actions against another state (Ibid., p. 197). Thus, getting involved as a primary party in a foreign conflict is classified as the most obsessive form of state intervention. Therefore, being able to theoretically classify which one of these three ethical approaches is mostly associated with nationalist public opinions
should provide a framework for further knowledge about the correlation between nationalism and international conflict initiations.

As the previous discussion about nationalism has already implied, nationalist public opinions are simply being characterised as overall high degrees of both state loyalty and trust as well as national pride. Thus, as the ethical approach of state moralism is essentially emphasising autonomy for the state and its citizens within the discourse of international politics (Nye & Welch, 2011, pp. 199-200), this would arguably suggest that nationalist public opinions are highly associated with state moralism. Furthermore, according to state moralists, the most important institution is a community of states with specific rules and international laws in which non-intervention on another state’s sovereign territory is the most important one. Therefore, state moralists consider that intervention can only be justified if the purpose of the action is to defend one state’s territorial integrity or sovereignty against foreign aggression (Ibid., pp. 199-200).

However, the reality of international relations is often much more complicated than what it seems to be, and foreign aggression is frequently not clear-cut cases (Nye & Welch, 2011, pp. 199-200). Therefore, nationalist public opinions (being characterised as having the ethical approach of state moralism) should perceive foreign aggression against the state more frequently than those states with lower degrees of nationalist public opinions. The reason for why this is the case is because if the public is cherishing their state by having high degrees of national pride and state loyalty, then this should arguably imply that these societies are also having a higher risk of being psychologically paranoid about foreign aggression against the state. Ultimately, according to the state moralist school of thought, this becomes a legitimate reason for the state to initiate armed conflicts against other states in a preventive way. In other words, when there’s a clear and serious threat against one state’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty, then the threatened state must act since there’s otherwise a risk that postponed counteractions might be ineffectual (Walzer, 2006, pp. 96-101).

Altogether, the reason for why nationalist public opinions are leading to a higher risk of international conflict initiations is because when state loyalty and trust increase within the state, then the more fearsome it becomes for the public to lose the state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty which inherently brings about an increased paranoia about foreign threats. Therefore, as the state moralist approach makes it clear that military intervention can be justified in these circumstances, the likelihood of the state initiating international conflicts becomes more plausible.
However, the question remains why the public would prefer military actions rather than peaceful solutions in these circumstances? Nevertheless, it could be theoretically answered by referring back to the fact that since these public opinions are essentially being originated from military integration, then military solutions should become less intimidating when the military is highly integrated into the civil society. Furthermore, when taking this ethical approach of state moralism into consideration, it is essential to acknowledge that this also makes the definition of nationalist public opinions more maximal and therefore more difficult to both measure as well as collect empirical data about; some might even regard this definition of the concept as incoherent. Nevertheless, by including state moralism, this paper’s definition of nationalist public opinions is differentiating itself from other conceptual definitions since it provides a more nuanced and useful theoretical explanation for why nationalist public opinions are correlated with an increased probability of initiating international conflicts.

2.3 International Conflict Initiation

Since this paper is theoretically claiming that military integration should ultimately lead to an increased probability of initiating international conflicts by influencing public opinions, the last theoretical concept to be further elaborated upon is then international conflict initiation. In a sense, this concept is somewhat straightforward since a minimal definition would suggest that it simply concerns initiation of conflicts by states on the international level, i.e. intrastate conflicts will not be taken into consideration in this paper. Furthermore, as this definition requires states to initiate conflicts, the concept only concerns those instances in which the state of interest is engaged as a primary conflicting actor. By definition, a primary party is one of the originators of a military dispute since this actor has together with another primary actor formed the incompatibility of a conflict. Furthermore, it remains to be conceptually clarified that in this paper, an armed conflict is being defined as a contested incompatibility between two parties which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (DPCR, n.d.). All in all, this useful and coherent definition of international conflict initiations will be embraced in this paper just because it captures the essential aspects of the concept.
### 2.4 Theoretical Claim

In summary, when considering this whole theoretical discussion, this paper’s theoretical claim is being formulated as follows: *As the military integration within a state is increasing, the higher probability that the state will initiate international conflicts*. This is because greater military integration into the civil society generates a higher sense of nationalist public opinions which subsequently affects the likelihood of the state being involved in international conflicts (as illustrated in figure 1). Based on this causal story, several testable implications can be drawn for further examination. Still, since a hypothesis is a theory-based statement about the relationship between the phenomenon of interest and its expected outcome, the hypothesis for this paper is being formulated as follows: *The higher levels of military integration within a state, the higher probability that the state will initiate international conflicts*. Thus, this hypothesis will be of central focus when examining whether the proposed theoretical claim being made is empirically significant or not.

Figure 1 Illustration of the proposed causal story
3. Research Design

In order to be able to answer this paper’s research question, there are different ways of doing so. In social science research, there are mainly two different approaches for conducting further knowledge about the phenomenon of interest: qualitative studies (or case studies) and quantitative studies. Since the aim of this paper is primarily to test the proposed theory’s internal validity by examining its causal mechanism, this suggests that conducting a comparative case study will provide the most fruitful knowledge in order to be able to answer this paper’s research question. Furthermore, since the relevant research field has been showing that a significant majority of previous studies have conducted quantitative studies, this also suggests that the comparative case study method would provide the most extensive amount of relevant knowledge in this paper.

Moreover, when conducting comparative case studies, there are several different methods for conducting this sort of design in which one of the most prominent ones is the method of Structured Focused Comparison (SFC) because it formulates a set of pre-established questions in order to sufficiently examine each case of interest. Since SFC would allow this paper to only focus on those aspects being directly relevant for the theoretical claim being made, this is why this method will be conducted in this paper. Furthermore, in order to sufficiently conduct the SFC method, George & Bennett (2005) describe five distinct tasks one must assess in the phase of research design during the research process: (1) specification of the problem and research objective; (2) developing a research strategy and specifying the variables; (3) case selection; (4) describing variance in variables; and (5) formulation of data requirements and general questions. Therefore, these five tasks will lay the foundation for the remaining discussion in this section, yet it is essential to recognise that since all five tasks are both interrelated as well as interdependent (Ibid., p. 88), they will subsequently be processed as an integrated whole in this section.

3.1 Operationalization

Since the purpose of this study is to gain further knowledge about how the military is socially affecting public opinions, one can develop a research strategy for sufficiently accomplishing these aims. In order to do this, the way in which variance of the theoretical variables is being described is crucial to understand since the discovery of potential causal relationships might be dependent upon how these variables are being operationalised (George & Bennett, 2005, pp.
79-86). When operationalising variables in the context of SFC, it should take the form of general questions to be asked of each case so that the subsequent results can be compared, cumulated, and systematically analysed across the cases (Ibid., pp. 86-88). Therefore, this section will further specify and operationalise all three variables being theoretically suggested in this paper which will ultimately result in a set of general questions (being summarised in table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Summary of general questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV₁</td>
<td>Is there a rough numerical balance in the armed forces across communal groups?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₂</td>
<td>Are all communities represented across the units of the armed forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₃</td>
<td>Are all communities represented up the military ranks?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MV₁</td>
<td>How much confidence is the public having in the armed forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MV₂</td>
<td>If a war was imminent, would the public be willing to fight for their country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MV₃</td>
<td>How proud are the public to be a member of their nationality?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV₁</td>
<td>How many international conflicts are the state involved in as a primary actor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV₂</td>
<td>How many Militarized Interstate Disputes are the state involved in as an originator?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.1.1 Independent Variable

Starting with the independent variable (IV) which stresses the implication about military integration. Concerning conceptual clarity, the suggestion being made in this paper is that military integration is the degree to which military personnel are socially integrated into the civil society. Moreover, as being mentioned in earlier, several factors are determining the degree to which the military is integrated into the civil society: the magnitude of the integration, the horizontal integration, and the vertical integration. In other words, these three dimensions are the primary factors determining whether the military is socially accepted or not within a state because if all significant communal groups are proportionally represented in both the military all together as well as its units and ranks, then the military personnel is socially
represented throughout the civil society. Thus, if the overall level of military integration is low within a country, then this suggests that the military should not have any significant social influence on the civil society’s beliefs and viewpoints since they are being regarded as generally alienated from the civil community.

Thus, in order to operationalize this variable validly, Krebs & Licklider (2016) suggest in their article that multiple indicators would have to be used in order to be able to examine military integration as a thick concept thoroughly; namely the magnitude of integration (IV₁), the horizontal integration (IV₂), and the vertical integration (IV₃). Nevertheless, since Krebs & Licklider (Ibid.) are dichotomously measuring these three indicators altogether, it is essential to acknowledge that this might provide unreliable results as interpretations of qualitative data sources will be necessary to a large extent. Nevertheless, due to the general lack of hard data concerning military integration, this measurement being provided by Krebs & Licklider (Ibid.) will be used in this paper despite their contextual application of the concept in a rebel-military setting rather than this paper’s civil-military setting.

### 3.1.2 Mediating Variable

Recalling that one of the research objectives in this study was to examine the degree to which the military is socially affecting public opinions, one would therefore also want to incorporate nationalist public opinions into the research strategy, i.e. the mediating variable (MV). As has been suggested in previous research, there are numerous ways one can operationalise nationalism as a concept. However, regarding conceptual clarity, this paper is primarily regarding nationalism as the degree of state loyalty and national pride. Thus, if the public is having a high degree of nationalist opinions, then the state should arguably be regarded as an identity for the citizen in which national security becomes a higher priority on the political agenda. In this instance, even though scholarly definitions of nationalism commonly regard it from an intrastate perspective, this paper is primarily interested in regarding it from an interstate perspective in which the ethical approach of state moralism is the factor determining the public’s perceptions of foreign threats. Therefore, when considering this, the mediating variable (MV) is simply being predicted to explain the degree to which the public as a whole is having state loyalty and national pride which should ultimately be associated with the degree to which the public is perceiving foreign threats.
As in the case of military integration, since this mediating variable is a multidimensional concept, this would also suggest that measures of multiple indicators are needed in order to make a valid measurement of nationalist public opinions. Firstly, as is mentioned earlier, since the military soldier has agreed to the “unlimited unliability contract” with the state while nationalist public opinions are simultaneously being characterised as high levels of state loyalty and national pride, then this would arguably imply that nationalism is associated with higher confidence ratings in the state’s military. Since the World Values Survey (WVS) has examined this indicator (Inglehart et al., 2014), this measurement will be used in this paper (MV1). Furthermore, relating to this measurement, the concept of nationalism should also suggest that the public is generally more willing to “fight for your country” than other countries with lower levels of nationalism. Since the WVS has also considered this factor (Ibid.), this measurement will too be used in this paper (MV2). Moreover, if there’s a generally high level of nationalist public opinions within a country, then this simply imply that these people are also proud to be a member of their shared nationality, i.e. national pride. In this instance, the WVS has once again emphasised this aspect (Ibid.), thus providing reasons for why this question too will be used in this paper (MV3). As a final note, some might notice that all three questions being asked about the mediating variable are based on the WVS dataset, yet since this variable is about nationalist public opinions, it is essential to gather reliable survey data in which the WVS is one of the most prominent sources of information in this instance.

3.1.3 Dependent Variable

Concerning conceptually clarifying the dependent variable (DV), since the country of interest is expected to initiate new international conflicts, what the dependent variable is predicted to explain is simply about the number of involvements in state-based armed conflicts wherein the state government is one of the primary parties. By definition, a state-based armed conflict is a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (DPCR, n.d.). Furthermore, as being implied earlier, since this variable does not consider the occurrence of intrastate armed conflicts, a reliable measurement of the concept would imply that the international aspect of the variable makes the measurement only concern those state-based armed conflicts in which violence is being conducted beyond the state’s borders.
Nevertheless, in order to make a valid measurement of the concept, it is essential to acknowledge that not all disputes between states and foreign threats are resulting in battle-related deaths. Thus, this paper would also have to consider those instances in which Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) have occurred beyond the state’s borders so that all relevant aspects of the dependent variable are being taken into consideration. Directly speaking, MIDs are essentially minor state-based clashes that could have potentially escalated into full-scale armed conflicts; thus it is important also to acknowledge those instances in which the state has not been afraid of using its military resources but still does so in a non-violent fashion. Also, as in the case of armed conflicts, this paper is only interested in those MIDs where the country of interest has been constituting one of the originators of the dispute. In summary, the dependent variable is therefore predicted to explain the number of occurrences in which the state government of interest has initiated MIDs and/or conflicts beyond the state’s borders.

Regarding operationalisation, this variable is simply being predicted to explain the number of occurrences in which the state government of interest has initiated conflicts beyond the state’s borders (DV$_1$). Thus, the same principle also goes for the number of MIDs since they should be contextually regarded as actions being taken when the government is perceiving a foreign threat against the state (DV$_2$).

### 3.2 Case Selection

The selection of cases is an essential part of a good research strategy in order to assess clearly defined objectives of the study. Therefore, the primary criterion for case selection is that it should be relevant to the research objective of the study. Furthermore, cases are also expected to be sufficiently selected upon the premise of showing both the control as well as the variation that is required for the research problem, and this requires the universe or subclass of events to be clearly defined (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 83-84). In order to do this, there are several different methods for conducting strategic case selection, and the one that will be used in this case is the widely acknowledged method of most-similar cases. Since the research objective of this study is essentially theory testing, the ambition is to select at least two cases which are having varying scores on the dependent variable but similar scores on all other possible confounding variables. When doing so, one would hopefully be able to understand the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable (Gerring, 2007, pp. 131-134).
However, before determining what sample of cases to be selected for further examination, it is essential to acknowledge the broader population of relevant cases, and since this paper’s theoretical claim is primarily about state intervention in international conflicts, this would imply that the **unit of analysis** is nation-states. Furthermore, it is essential to specify what **time period** to focus on when selecting cases. Since there have been declining levels of organised violence during the latest years, primarily because the number of state-based armed conflicts also have steadily decreased ever since 2014 (Pettersson & Eck, 2018), this would imply that not so many states are initiating new international conflicts nowadays. Due to this reason, this paper would have to shift its focus to an earlier and more extended time period. Thus, since the high level of state-based armed conflicts witnessed over the past few years has only been seen once before in the early 1990s, i.e. the post-Cold War period (Ibid.), this would suggest that this paper will focus on the time period of 1990-2017 when selecting cases.

Furthermore, in order to maintain the **time order** in the causal mechanism, one of the most efficient ways in doing so is to create “lagged” variables which imply that the selected cases must be able to provide information following this paper’s causal chain. Thus, information about the independent variable is gathered first in the case studies, and information about the mediating variable would then have to be gathered after the independent variable but before the dependent variable to occur. As is mentioned earlier, since the variance in the mediating variable is primarily based on the data being presented in the WVS’s six survey waves, those cases being selected must have been documented from the same survey wave in the database. Lastly, information about the mediating variable would have to be gathered at least one year before potential military actions were being conducted by the state (i.e. the dependent variable).

Since these aspects concerning unit of analysis, time period, and time order have clearly defined the universe of cases to be selected from, one can now start to acknowledge possible confounding variables affecting both military integrations as well as international conflict initiations. In summary, when all these aspects and confounding variables are being formulated, the population of relevant cases are being confined by substantially isolating the proposed causal relationship from other possible causes which are considered to make the covariation between military integration and international conflict initiations spurious. Furthermore, when narrowing the population of cases in this way, one is also able to identify further this paper’s scope conditions, i.e. what broader population of cases this study applies to. When considering these aspects, there are mainly four distinct confounding variables posing the criteria for which cases should be selected upon in this paper.
Firstly, as being examined by Krebs & Licklider (2016), the occurrence of civil war is arguably having a significant impact on the military integration process. Also, since the probability of conflict recurrence is at its highest directly after the formal end of armed conflict and steadily diminishes by time (Hegre & Nygård, 2014), this would suggest that the occurrence of civil war should also have an impact on the probability of international conflict initiations. By definition, a civil war is a violent conflict between the state and one or more organised non-state actors within the state’s territory (Gleditsch, 2017). Thus, by applying this confounding variable onto the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database (Pettersson & Eck, 2018), the selected countries should not have experienced any state-based armed conflicts (i.e. at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year) within their territories during the whole period of 1990-2017. By ruling out cases in this way, the possibility of a civil war affecting this paper’s causal story becomes significantly reduced.

Secondly, Krebs & Licklider (2016) also emphasise in their article about the importance of military effectiveness, namely that military integration might be affected by the degree to which the armed forces can effectively outperform their designated tasks. By definition, a fully effective military is one with the capability of maximising its combat power from the available resources, both physically as well as politically. Since combat power is the ability to maximise damage upon the enemy while simultaneously minimise the damage being inflicted upon oneself (Millett et al., 1986), this would suggest that military effectiveness should also have an impact on the dependent variable, i.e. probability of initiating international conflicts.

Concerning measuring military effectiveness as a concept, Cochran & Long (2017) suggest in their article an interstate-level Loss Exchange Ratio (LER). In simple terms, the LER is being calculated as the combatant’s casualties divided by the enemy’s casualties so that countries limiting their casualties while simultaneously inflicting high losses on the enemy will have low LERs. Thus, the lower LER of a state, the higher degree of military effectiveness (Cochran & Long, 2017). When applying this measurement of military effectiveness onto the Correlates of War (COW) data collection of MID-level data and documents reaching from 1993 to 2010 (Palmer et al., 2015), one can select those cases which have similar levels of LER. Even though this way of measuring military effectiveness as a thick concept is somewhat simplified and invalid (e.g. it only takes into consideration the number of casualties but not the more significant number of injured people), it still serves as a valid and reliable operationalisation when selecting cases for the purpose of this paper.
Thirdly, Krebs & Licklider (2016) also mention in their article the importance of civilian control in the sense that the degree to which the military is obeying the commands of civilian officials or ignores civilian desires in favour of its aims should have a noteworthy impact on military integration. By definition, full civilian control exists when civilian leaders are having uncontested decision-making power in those matters concerning civil-military relations while in the converse ideal-type of a military regime, soldiers possess the same type of uncontested decision-making power (Kuehn et al., 2017). Since much previous research have shown that military regimes are more likely to initiate militarised conflicts than non-military regimes (Bak et al., 2016), this would suggest that the level of civilian control is likely to have a significant impact on both the independent variable as well as the dependent variable in this case.

When measuring civilian control of the military, Kuehn et al. (2017) suggest that it should be considered as a gradual phenomenon in which civilian control is on the one side of the spectrum while the military regime is at the other side. Thus, when applying this measurement onto the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database (Coppedge et al., 2018), one can identify the degree to which civilian leaders have decision-making power over the military. More specifically, since civilians are being defined by Kuehn et al. (2017) as “the non-military members of the government and legislature with the authority to formulate, implement, and oversee political decisions”, this would suggest that the civilian leaders of the executive and legislature in a country should be in focus when examining civilian control.

In their V-Dem database, Coppedge et al. (2018) distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) when examining the executive. However, in order to avoid possible misconceptions and errors when measuring civilian control, this paper will only consider those cases in which the same executive office is comprising both the HOS and HOG. Furthermore, regarding the legislature, the V-Dem dataset defines it as “an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws” (Ibid.). However, since Kuehn et al.’s (2017) measurement of civilian control is primarily emphasising civilian leaders, this aspect of civilian decision-making will not be acknowledged in this paper’s operationalisation of civilian control.

When evaluating cases’ degree of civilian control by examining their HOS/HOG in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2018), there’s primarily one question being asked in the dataset that is highly relevant: “In practice, from which of the following bodies [i.e. the military] must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?” (see Appendix I). Thus, when collecting the values of these questions from the
population of cases, based on the same year, it is those cases that are having as similar values as possible that will be of relevance when selecting cases. Furthermore, even though this question alone isn’t an entirely valid measurement of civilian control due to its thickness as a concept, it still gives some reliable indication on which cases are generally similar degrees of civilian control.

Fourthly, there have been suggestions that a state’s type of military service could have an impact on the degree to which the military is socially integrated into society due to the fact that the way in which citizens are included into the armed forces is assumed to have an impact on their social status within the country (Geller, 2014). In basic terms, there are two different types of military service policies: conscription and voluntarism (Choi & James, 2003; Pickering, 2011). Conscription, also called draft, is simply being defined as “compulsory enrolment for service in a country’s armed forces” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018); thus, voluntarism could then arguably be defined conversely as “voluntary enrolment for service in a country’s armed forces”. Furthermore, since previous studies have argued that a state’s type of military service is highly correlated with the probability of using military force against other states (Choi & James, 2003; Pickering, 2011), this would suggest that a state’s type of military service should have an impact on both the independent as well as the dependent variable in this paper.

When examining whether the cases of interest have conscription or voluntarism as their military service policies, the World Factbook being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US provides an extensive amount of information about this topic of interest (CIA, 2018). Furthermore, in order to avoid recent institutional changes in the states’ military service policies, the policies must have remained constant ever since the year 2012 in the Factbook. Thus, when holding military service policies constant for a more extended period, one can rule out its potential influence on the independent as well as the dependent variable in a long-term perspective and the selection of cases also becomes structured in the sense that all military service policies would be stemming from the same year. In short, the selection of cases will all have the same type of military service policies (i.e. conscription or voluntarism) in which the latest policy changes were made in 2012.

In summary, when acknowledging these four criteria altogether, two cases have been selected due to their similarities in all four relevant confounding variables (see Appendix II). Thus, in order to examine a possible correlation between military integration and the probability of initiating international conflicts through nationalist public opinions, the two states Brazil and Switzerland will be compared in an SFC approach. At first glance, these two cases might be
perceived as very different from each other, such as their varying levels of democracy and GDP per capita. However, as being emphasised earlier in this paper, it is the very aspects of the armed forces that are of utmost relevance in this paper since these conditions should have the most significant impact on this paper’s hypothesis.

4. **Comparative Case Study**

4.1 **Brazil**

During Vargas’s dictatorial regime (1930-1934, 1937-1945) in Brazil, the Legislative was being kept closed. Still, the most important social policies were implemented in Brazil during this period since they were improving the country’s labour rights as well as social security rights. Nevertheless, in the period following the removal of Vargas (1946-1964), a new legislature with extended authority was consequentially being elected. However, since the Legislative remained dominated by conservative forces, the policies of wealth redistribution and social inclusion were strongly challenged. Therefore, with the intention to complete the social security work being initialised by the Vargas dictatorship, a coup d’état being widely supported by the military was removing the government in 1964 (Pinto, 2016).

Even though the 1964 coup resulted in an implementation of a military regime, still the primary purpose of the regime was to unify the social security system and to keep the mechanisms and procedures of representative democracy at work. Therefore, in the years following the 1964 coup, the country was experiencing a slow and gradual democratisation process whereas civilians were slowly resuming their power, subsequently resulting in the so-called “New Republic” from 1985 to 1989 in which the last government of the military regime was establishing promulgating a new democratic constitution in 1988 (the 1988 Constitution). In summary, this brief narrative of Brazilian political history up until the 1998 Constitution had shown that the most critical social rights were acknowledged and guaranteed during periods of dictatorships, i.e. those instances when the Legislative had limited political influence (Pinto, 2016).

The implementation of the 1988 Constitution in Brazil implied various improvements of the state system, among other things discrimination against minorities was forbidden (Pinto, 2016). Regarding the military, this has entailed that the representation of Evangelicals and Catholics in the Brazilian military have practically mirrored these groups national average even though
there has been a long tradition of overrepresentation by Spiritism. Concerning the representation of ethnic minority groups in the military, it’s difficult to distinguish between those groups due to two reasons analytically: (1) there’s an absence of official statistics; and (2) there’s instead a general perception of a common Brazilian identity as a result of the fusion of ethnicities in Brazil’s deeply mixed society (Simon & Abdel-Moneim, 2011).

The Brazilian military has principally been composed of three units: the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Navy, and the Brazilian Air Force (Simon & Abdel-Moneim, 2011). Regarding the Army, it has played a significant role in maintaining the unity of Brazil and continues to do so due to its intertwined history with the country which is why the Army has been present all over the Brazilian territory and identified itself with the people. Also, within the Army, both men and women have been represented without consideration of their ethnic, religious, or social background (Ministry of Defence, 2012). As for the Navy and Air Force’s cultural diversities, it is essential to acknowledge that not much public information is available on these matters. Thus, indicators such as geographical background, religion, and social background would have to be taken into consideration instead. Regarding geographic diversity, the Navy Academy registered about 90 per cent of its cadets from the country’s Southeast region (mostly from Rio de Janeiro State, where the Navy Academy is located) in the 1990s and the Air Force registered about 58 per cent correspondingly. However, concerning the religious factors, despite the overrepresentation of Spiritism, the cadets of the Navy School have practically mirrored the national average of various religious backgrounds. As for the social background, in both the Navy as well as the Air Force, exogenous recruitment has been the dominating principle (Castro, 2007).

The 1988 Constitution also entailed an increased socialization of the military ranks (e.g. lieutenants and captains) (Schneider, 1996, pp. 133-134), however this did not improve the career situation for many minority groups in the sense that there has been an underrepresentation of many minority groups up the career ladders in many occasions. For instance, up until the early 2000s, there hadn’t been almost any blacks in the country’s diplomatic corps. Furthermore, a survey from the 1990s was also showing that blacks had been concentrated in the lowest ranks of society in which 70 per cent of them were representing the most deprived decile of Brazilians while only 15 per cent of them were representing the richest decile (Htun, 2004). Nevertheless, surveys in 1997 were showing that a significant majority of the overall Brazilian national population were either having quite a lot of confidence (about 40 per cent) or a great deal of confidence (about 30 per cent) in the armed forces. Also, a significant
majority was both willing to fight for their country if a war was imminent (about 70 per cent) and also very proud of belonging to the Brazilian nationality (about 65 per cent) (Inglehart et al., 2014).

Later in the 2000s, about 100 Brazilian troops (backed by military helicopters) were attacking a Peruvian village near the border between Brazil and Peru in 2003. Even though the act did not result in any fatalities on both sides, the Brazilian state was still threatening the Peruvian state by using force on their territory. The reason for why the attack occurred has remained unclear; however local Peruvian sources have claimed that the cause of the event was an ongoing timber dispute between locals on either side of the border (Palmer et al., 2015). Even though this minor dispute between the two countries broke out in 2003, still the Brazilian state was not experiencing any state-based violence during the whole period of 1990-2017, both internally as well as externally (Pettersson & Eck, 2018).

4.2 Switzerland

As a small neutral state in the heart of Europe, Switzerland has historically been facing a tremendous security-political challenge ever since the Middle Ages. Due to the country’s geographic location which has lied between the great continental powers of Germany, France, Italy, and Habsburg-Austria, it has always been exposed to a constant external threat. Due to this reason, Switzerland decided that in the event of a possible confrontation with a major power, a large part of its male population would have to be integrated into the military. Accordingly, the country adopted a military militia system, i.e. an organisation of citizens whose task is to protect civil society, the political system, the territory, and property. Subsequently, this became the school of the nation and a symbol of national unity simply because “the degree of military participation has always been an indication of the degree of civil integration and proximity to the social and political centre of Swiss society” (Tresch, 2011).

In 1874, Switzerland revised its Federal Constitution which subsequently became the real starting point for universal conscription in its militia system. As a consequence, this increased the notion that the Swiss militia was a force by the people for the people, thus serving as an agent for social cohesion in multicultural Switzerland with its four national languages, differing confessions, and the contrast between rural areas and cities. Therefore, compared to other European states, relations between society and the military have always been especially active.
in Switzerland. In the 1960s, Switzerland was being described as follows: “As the whole community is engaged in the task of self-defence, no gulf can open between the armed forces and the nation: The two are virtually one. […] The army is as much an accepted part of everyday life as the weather” (Tresch, 2011). One example of this intertwining of the military and society can be seen in the 1970s when 45 per cent of the politicians in the Swiss parliament and two-thirds of the higher officials in the federal administration were also militia officers; in 1987, about 53 per cent of all top managers in the private sector were also militia officers. Furthermore, up until 1992, there were practically no private alternatives to the military service for young men. Therefore, as a final note, the Swiss militia could be summarised as being grounded on two critical elements throughout its history: the external threat from the surrounding major forces and its internal integrative societal function (Tresch, 2011).

Traditionally, the Swiss national ideology has emphasised equal rights and opportunities for members of all indigenous communities within Switzerland. As an example, this is why the Swiss Army has traditionally been reflecting the territorial organisation of the country which is mainly divided along the country’s four main languages: (Swiss-)German, French, Italian, and Romansh (Berthele & Wittlin, 2013; MRG, n.d.). In practice, this implied that the soldiers were attributed to military units tied to both their home language community as well as territory, and even if military training took place in the same casern, every military unit had its own linguistic identity and was thus a linguistically homogenous entity in a sense (Berthele & Wittlin, 2013).

One reason for why the relations between society and the military became particularly active in Switzerland was because it was easy for military soldiers to climb the military career ladder up to the rank of general; thus the military system was increasing its acceptance (Tresch, 2011). However, a military reform (Armed Forces 95) was launched in 1995 with the purpose of economising Switzerland’s available resources which among other things implied that Switzerland shortened the length of military service. Therefore, the Swiss army was experiencing a dramatic reduction in overall troop size (Berthele & Wittlin, 2013; Tresch, 2011). This troop size reduction subsequently affected the army’s linguistic situation in the sense that if one were to become a high-ranked officer whose purpose was to deal with supra-regional or national issues directly, understanding German, French, and to some extent, also Italian was a criterium in Switzerland. However, since most of the members of the Swiss armed forces spoke German and some other minorities have tended to despise this language and refused to speak this and other foreign languages altogether, this became a matter of power and career opportunities (Berthele & Wittlin, 2013).
In the year following the *Armed Forces 95* reform, surveys were showing that a significant majority of the overall Swiss national population were either having quite a lot of confidence (about 40 per cent) or not very much confidence (about 30 per cent) in the armed forces. Nevertheless, a majority were still willing to fight for their country if a war was imminent (about 60 per cent) and also quite proud of belonging to the Swiss nationality (about 45 per cent) (Inglehart et al., 2014). Furthermore, regarding armed conflicts, the Swiss state has not initiated any conflicts during the whole period of 1990-2017 (Pettersson & Eck, 2018). Also, the state has not even experienced any minor militarised disputes where Switzerland have been the initiator (Palmer, et al., 2015).

### 4.3 Analysis and Interpretations

Starting with Brazil, due to the country’s long history of military rule and the fact that the 1988 Constitution forbade discrimination against minorities, these could be potential reasons for why communal groups’ overall representation within the military was in correlation with their national averages. However, as is mentioned earlier, it is important to acknowledge that it is analytically difficult to distinguish between different ethnicities in Brazil due to their common Brazilian identity. Still, one could assume that it is exactly because of this reason that Brazil should be regarded as having an overall magnitude of integration in the armed forces ever since the 1988 Constitution. Furthermore, the country’s history of military rule could potentially also explain why the Brazilian Army is being regarded as having a significant role in maintaining the unity of the country by being present all over the country’s territory and identifying itself with the people. However, regarding the Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force, even though a significant majority of their cadets were being registered from the country’s Southeast region, the cadets of the Naval School was still mirroring the national average of various religious backgrounds. Furthermore, both within the Navy and the Air Force, exogenous recruitment was the dominating factor during the 1990s. Thus, despite some of their deficiencies, all three units of the Brazilian military seems to have been more or less communally heterogenous (i.e. horizontal integration) in the 1990s since many of the communal groups was being integrated into all essential units of the military.

However, concerning vertical integration, even though the 1988 Constitution was condemning discrimination against minorities, still there was some significant cleavages along ethnic lines in the Brazilian society during the 1990s since ethnic diversity was deficient along the country’s
societal classes. Thus, since the military was successfully mirroring the diversity and heterogeneity of the Brazilian society both in magnitude as well as horizontally, this would also suggest that the country’s military hierarchy should also mirror the societal hierarchy in which ethnic diversity was deficient in the upper classes. However, despite the insufficiency in vertical integration, surveys in the late-1990s were still showing that many Brazilians were having some degree of confidence in the armed forces and that they were willing to fight for their country. The reason for why this was the case could be that since the military was integrated into the civil society, both in magnitude as well as horizontally, their trust towards the military capabilities was increasing as the diversity of the military personnel was reflecting the society at large in a somewhat successful way. Furthermore, this could be the reason for why so many people answering the survey were being proud of belonging to the Brazilian nationality.

Even though nationalist public opinions were reasonably widespread throughout the Brazilian society in the late 1990s, it still didn’t cause any initiations of international armed conflict during the whole post-2000 period. However, Brazil did initiate one minor MID during this period; still it did not escalate into a war or even armed conflict. Thus, one potential interpretation of this could be that if the degree of nationalist public opinions had been lower, it would not have caused this MID at all; while if nationalist public opinions would have been more significant, it may have caused a potential escalation of the MID leading to an armed conflict.

In the case of Switzerland, due to its long tradition in emphasising equal rights and opportunities for all indigenous communities, the country has been able to successfully include all representatives of all indigenous territories into the Swiss Army, mirroring their national average. Furthermore, soldiers were divided into military units tied to their home language community so that linguistic barriers would not become a problem when joining the Swiss Army. In this point of view, both the magnitude of integration as well as the horizontal integration of the military would seem to have been prevalent in Switzerland during the 1990s since the territorial organisation of the country was reflected both within the Swiss Armed Forces all together as well as its military units. Nevertheless, if one were to become a high-ranked officer, multilingualism was a criterion so that one could sufficiently communicate with all military units in Switzerland. Thus, when the Armed Forces 95 reform was implemented, this became a problem since the army experienced a dramatic reduction in troop size which caused a deprivation of career opportunities for people in many communal groups. Therefore, regarding vertical integration, the Swiss state was deficient in this matter during the 1990s since
the communal groups were no longer proportionally represented up the military ranks in the state to the same extent as they had been before.

This dramatic reduction in troop size could also be one potential explanation for why surveys in 1996 were showing that the Swiss population were having various perceptions about the military, i.e. some having quite a lot of confidence in the armed forces and others having not very much confidence. Nevertheless, a majority of the population were still willing to fight for their country, and they were also quite proud of belonging to the Swiss nationality. In this instance, the lack of vertical integration could be one potential explanation for why the Swiss population were differing in their opinions about military confidence in the sense that those communal groups who were perceiving that they were sufficiently being represented along the military hierarchy might have had more confidence rather than those communal groups feeling underrepresented. Thus, the degree to which Switzerland had nationalist public opinions in the late-1990s might have been dependent upon which territorial community one was belonging to. Nevertheless, Switzerland did not experience any armed conflicts nor MIDs being initiated by the state itself during the whole post-2000 period. The reason for why this has been the case might be partly explained by the Armed Forces 95 reform since it reduced the state’s military size, but also it might be explained by the fact that the degree to which the citizens had nationalist public opinions was being held in a moderate and verifiable level.

In summary, when comparing these main results (being summarised in table 2) and interpretations of Brazil and Switzerland to each other, some theoretical generalisations can be drawn. Firstly, even though for different reasons, both countries were having the same degree of military integration in the early 1990s because both of them were sufficient in both its magnitude of integration as well as horizontal integration, however lacking in their vertical integration. Also, Brazil was generally having higher degrees of nationalist public opinions rather than Switzerland in the late-1990s; however both of them were quite similar in their confidence-ratings of the armed forces. Thirdly, even though neither countries did experience any armed conflicts in the post-2000 period, Brazil was still experiencing one MID in 2003. Thus, since Brazil were both having higher degrees nationalist public opinions as well as initiating more international conflicts compared to Switzerland, this would suggest that there seems to be a possible correlation between those two phenomena.
## Table 2: Summary of main results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military integration</th>
<th>Nationalist public opinions</th>
<th>International conflict initiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Magnitude of</td>
<td>Confidence in</td>
<td>State-based armed conflicts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>integration?</td>
<td>military?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horizontal</td>
<td>Willingness to fight?</td>
<td>Militarized Interstate Disputes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>integration?</td>
<td>Pride in nationality?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Quite a lot (40%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (70%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Very proud (64%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Quite a lot (40%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (57%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Quite proud (47%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**  
- Military integration (IV₁): Dichotomous measurement with the possible values “Yes” or “No” wherein the presented value is being based on evaluations of empirical data. Confidence in military (MV₁): Ordinal measurement ranging from “A great deal” to “None at all” in which the presented value was the answer being selected the most by the respondents, illustrating the percental response rate as an indicator. Willingness to fight (MV₂): Dichotomous measurement with the possible values “Yes” or “No” in which the presented value was the answer being selected the most by the respondents, illustrating the percental response rate as an indicator. Pride in nationality (MV₃): Ordinal measurement ranging in practice from “Very proud” to “Not at all proud” in which the presented value was the answer being selected the most by the respondents, illustrating the percental response rate as an indicator. International conflict initiation (DV₃): Ratio measurement ranging from 0 and higher in which the presented value is being based on datasets.

**DATA SOURCES**  
4.3.1 Additional Observations and Alternative Explanations

Regarding additional observations related to this paper’s causal story, there are some that can be drawn from these results. Firstly, as being touched upon earlier, the degree to which a state has nationalist public opinions might be one determinant factor for how severe a potential military dispute might turn out. In other words, if a country is having rather moderate levels of nationalist public opinions, then the state might remain peaceful or in worst cases initiate a MID with no causalities included. Conversely, if a country is having extreme levels of nationalist public opinions, then there’s a much higher risk that a minor dispute might escalate into a full-scale war. Also, if a country is having somewhat moderate levels of nationalist public opinions, it may be the case that the country is choosing to engage as a secondary actor rather than as a primary actor in a conflict. The reason for why this might be the case remains to be further examined in future studies.

Secondly, as being theoretically implied, there seems to be a general correlation between the level of military integration and the degree to which citizens are having confidence in the armed forces. Thus, if both Brazil and Switzerland would have been successful in also having vertical integration of the military, this would suggest that the confidence-ratings in the military would also have been higher. Still, since Brazil was showing somewhat higher levels of military confidence than Switzerland, there must be some additional factor determining the level of military confidence. When taking the Armed Forces 95 reform into consideration, one potential explanation for this could be the fact that when the number of military personnel is decreasing, then the level of military confidence is also decreasing.

Concerning alternative explanations and interpretations of this paper’s results, there are many different ways of doing so. Nevertheless, when considering the background information on both cases, one can claim that even though the histories of Brazil and Switzerland are different from each other in many aspects, still it seems to be the case that the military has played a significant role for the civil society in both cases. As is mentioned earlier, the Brazilian military regime was playing an essential role in promoting the increase in social rights whereas the Swiss army has been serving as an agent for social cohesion. Therefore, these aspects could serve as potential explanations for why both countries are having very similar degrees of military integration as well as levels of confidence in the armed forces. When considering this aspect this could serve as a potential alternative explanation for why both countries have not experienced any armed conflicts. Thus, if a military force has been playing a historically significant role in improving the country’s domestic situation, whether it is socially and/or
politically, then there’s a less expectation from the civil society that the military should also play a significant role in foreign policies. In simple terms, when the military’s domestic role is increasing, then the military’s external role is decreasing. Nevertheless, this possible relationship remains to be further examined in future studies.

Furthermore, regarding national pride, one alternative explanation for why Brazil is having a significantly higher degree of Brazilian pride than Switzerland having Swiss pride may be explained by its strong general perception of a collective national identity rather than the degree to which the military is socially integrated into the society. As is mentioned earlier, this common Brazilian identity is a result of the fusion of several ethnicities in Brazil’s deeply mixed society, and even though Switzerland is also a multicultural country with several official languages, they have not been able to develop a common Swiss identity to the same extent as its Brazilian counterpart. One possible explanation for this could be because Brazil has experienced more of a turbulent history than Switzerland and is also a much bigger country; thus the perception of a shared national identity becomes much more crucial for the survival of the state. Therefore, regarding empirical generalisation, a country’s history may be having a much more significant impact on people’s national pride rather than the level of military integration, still what specific historical aspects/events are possibly having a more significant role on national pride than others remain to be further studied.

### 4.3.2 Research Design Limitations

Even though these main results are confirming this paper’s theoretical claim to some extent, there are still some limitations in this paper’s research design and analysis that deserves to be further elaborated upon. Firstly, as were previously discussed, since the size of the military might be one factor potentially affecting the level of confidence people are having in the armed forces, then this paper’s operationalisation of military integration might be seen as invalid since the proposed operationalization haven’t paid attention to the aspect of military size. Thus, as being earlier discussed, since Krebs & Licklider (2016) are describing military integration in the context of rebel-military integration while this paper has essentially considered military integration to be a civil-military integration, this would suggest that further research is needed on how military integration is socially affecting civilians.

Furthermore, even though this paper’s theoretical claim is stressing that nationalism is being characterised as having the ethical approach of state moralism, still the research design of this
paper have not been able to examine further whether this is the case or not. Thus, due to the lack of empirical findings, it may be the case that nationalism is not having any particular associations with the ethical approach of state moralism. Still, this theoretical puzzle remains to be further examined in future research so that questions such as “How much is the public worried about the probability of a war involving their own country to occur?” can be answered in order to determine a possible relationship between nationalism, state moralism, and the probability of initiating international conflicts.

Relatedly, it’s also important to critically assess the surveys being conducted by the WVS in the sense that since the surveys were covering about 1200 people in both countries (Inglehart et al., 2014), it might be the case that these results are unreliable since only a minor faction out of the whole population has been asked to answer the survey. However, as a response, WVS makes it clear that this sample size has been estimated to be able to represent its whole universe, i.e. the national population, both sexes, and 18 or more years (Inglehart et al., 2014). Also, since the WVS has been widely acknowledged as a trustworthy source concerning public opinions as well as values, this should be regarded as a reliable source of information.

Lastly, as is mentioned earlier, there might be reasons to question whether Brazil and Switzerland is a legitimate selection of cases for the purpose of this study. As being implied earlier, what significantly limited the scope of available cases to select was partly that all selected cases would have to be based on the same survey wave being conducted by the WVS. Thus, since the WVS is not examining all countries throughout the world but is selecting about 50 countries to be examined in each wave instead (Inglehart et al., 2014), this deficiency of available survey data was having a significant impact on this paper’s case selection. Hence, what one could have done instead of basing the operationalisation of nationalist public opinions on the WVS database is to look at other sources of information. Still, since public opinions is a complex concept to both measure as well as gather reliable information about and due to the time limitations on this paper, the WVS database was the most effective and reliable source to gather information from in this instance.
5. Conclusion

Recall that the purpose of this study was to further contribute to the limited scholarly field of military personnel socially affecting public opinions by asking the following research question: “What domestic factors are shaping public opinions about international conflicts?” Since the theoretical claim being made in this paper was that public opinions are a determinant factor when initiating international conflicts and that the military should have a significant social impact on public opinions, the proposed hypothesis was that higher levels of military integration within a state should increase the probability international conflict initiations. After examining this paper’s hypothesis, one would claim that the levels of military integration do not necessarily have to affect the probability of initiating international conflicts significantly. Nevertheless, as being mentioned earlier, since the two cases were posing variations on both the degree of nationalist public opinions as well as the number of international conflict initiations, it seems to be the case that this paper has further demonstrated the widely acknowledged fact that nationalism is associated with higher probabilities of being involved in conflicts. Furthermore, as is mentioned earlier, this paper has been able to further contribute to the scholarly field of military personnel affecting public opinions by pointing to alternative explanations, e.g. that the degree of national pride may be determined by a country’s territorial size or total number of the military personnel.

When situating this study into its broader research field, can claim that even though there are significant levels of military integration, it still doesn’t necessarily have to imply that citizens are also generally having more state loyalty and national pride than countries with a military more socially separated from the civil society. Nevertheless, regarding policy implications, countries should still strive towards increasing their level of military integration since it may prevent them from being involved in conflicts, recalling that there may be a possible correlation between high levels of military integration and low probabilities of initiating international conflicts. Therefore, as being mentioned earlier, since there’s both a lack of qualitative research as well as valid measurements of key concepts within this paper’s topic of interest, further knowledge about this causal relationship is needed. One of these potential sources for further research is to consider a reversed causal relationship of this paper’s theoretical claim, i.e. the degree to which the public may socially affect the military’s opinions about nationalism and foreign policies. Nevertheless, this aspect of military factors potentially causing armed conflicts deserves to be further studied in future research.
6. Bibliography


Available at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-8/

[Accessed 2 January 2019].


Available at:

https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Secondary_supporting_parties

[Accessed 3 December 2018].


Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/conscription

[Accessed 3 January 2019].


Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war

[Accessed 21 December 2018].


[Accessed 5 January 2019].

MRG, n.d. Switzerland. [Online]
Available at: https://minorityrights.org/country/switzerland/
[Accessed 5 January 2019].


Oxford University Press, n.d. communal. [Online]
Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/communal
[Accessed 5 January 2019].

Available at: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs
[Accessed 28 December 2018].


Social Inclusion Causing Conflict

Olle Linder


Appendix I

3.4.7 HOS control over (C) (v2exctlhs)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

*Responses:*

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_0]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_4]
5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_5]
6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_6]
7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_7]

*Ordering:* If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exclhos]. If you select 0-6, skip to question ‘HOS dissolution in practice’ [v2exdfdshs].

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 1-8.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

NOTES: When measuring civilian control by examining the V-Dem database, it’s important to acknowledge three factors: (1) if the *effective* HOS/HOG is someone other than the *official* HOS/HOG, then the dataset only examines those who are effectively using their power; (2) if the HOS and HOG are comprised by the same office, then these are being treated exclusively as the HOS in the dataset; (3) the dataset has only included those executives who held office for at least 100 days (Coppedge et al., 2018).
Appendix II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civil war</th>
<th>Military effectiveness</th>
<th>Civilian control</th>
<th>Military service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>(-0,9)</td>
<td>Conscription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>(-0,9)</td>
<td>Conscription</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES  
Military effectiveness: When measuring LER by examining the MID database, it’s important to acknowledge four factors: (1) it will only be possible to postulate a LER on those cases which have experienced at least one bilateral MID between the years of 1993 and 2010, i.e. those countries who haven’t been involved in any MIDs at all during the MID-dataset’s time period will be excluded from the broader population of relevant cases; (2) multilateral MIDs will not be taken into consideration due to the difficulties in analytically distinguish between “combatant” and “enemy”; (3) the LER will be based upon the most recent year between 1993 and 2010 the country of interest experienced the ending of a MID; (4) in order to make a structured case selection, the LER of the selected cases would have to emanate from the same year in which the measurement is based upon.

DATA SOURCES  